PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION,
OR
THE REPRESENTATION OF SUCCESSIVE MAJORITIES IN
FEDERAL, STATE, MUNICIPAL, CORPORATE AND
PRIMARY ELECTIONS.
BY                        0~
CHARLES R.. B'UCKALEW,
LATE U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA.
Biitt an appenbix.
EDITED BY
JOHN G. FREEZE,
COUNSELLOR AT LAW.
"In all Free States, the evil to be avoided is tyranny; that is to say, the' summna im.
peri,' or unlimniited power, solely in the hands of one, the few, or the mnany."-SWIFT.
"Constant experience shows us, that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it.
lie pushes on till he comes to somniething that limits him. To prevent the abuse of power,
it is necessary that by the very disposition of things, power should be a check to power."
-MONTESQUIEU.
PHILADELPHIA:
JOHN CAMPBELL & SON,
LAW BOOKSELLERS, PUBLISHERS AND IMPORTERS,
740 SANSOM STREET.
1872.
BY 
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1872, ly
JOHN CAMPBELL & SON,
In the Office of the Librarian of CoDgress, at Washington.
WESTCOTT & THOMsoN,
Stereotypers and Electrotfpers, I'7ila.
IIENRY B. A~MmEAD,
Printer, PLila. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAIGE
EDITOR'S PREFACE............................................................... vii.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS........................................................ Xi.
SENATE SPEECH, JULY 11, 18;7............................................   1
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH, NOVEMBER 1 9, 1867........................... 31
SENATE REPORT, MARCH 2, 1869........................................... 65
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS, OCTOBER 25, 1870............................. 138
BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT SPEECH, MARCH 27, 1871..................... 157
THE JORDAN LETTER, NOVEMBER 30, 1871............................ 182
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS....................................... 187
ILLINOIS AMENDMENTS.......................................................... 219
WEST VIRGINIA AMENDMENTS............................................... 226
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES FOR REFORMED VOTING................... 228 
LOCAL ELECTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA...................................... 245
NOMINATIONS TO OFFICE....................................................... 256
COLUMBIA COUNTY RULES OF NOMINATION.............................. 258
APPENDIX............................................................................ 273
PROCEEDINGS AND) DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT ON LIMITED  L/
VOTING; AN ESSAY ON MINORITY REPRESENTATION.
INDEX................................................................................. 297
iii. 
I 
ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS.
CHOICE OF REPRESENTATIVES  IN CONGRESS AND PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORS:
Senate Speech, 1.
Philadelphia Speech, 31.
Senate Report, 65.
GENERAL APPLICATION OF FREE VOTE:
Social Science Address, 138.
In what Elections can be Used, 143.
Concerning Fractional Votes, 145.
Filling of Vacancies, 148.
REFORMIED VOTING  IN MUNICIPALITIES: OBJECTIONS TO PLAN
ANSWERED:
Borough Supplement Speech, 157.
REPRESENTATION OF SUCCESSIVE MAJORITIES:
The Jordan Letter, 182.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT:
Proposed for Presidential Electors, 187.
Illinois Amendments, 219.
West Virginia Amendments, 226.
REFORM IN PENNSYLVANIA:
Statutes for, 228.
Local Elections in, 245.
NOMIINATIONS TO OFFICE:
Columbia County Plan of Nomination, 258.
___________                                                       4
APPENDIX.
Parliamentary Debate on Limited Voting.
Minority Representation; an Essay.
V 
I 
EDITOR'S PREFACE.
WITHIN the last few years the public mind  has been
awakened to many questions relating to government, but
to no one more important than that discussed in the volume now presented to the reader. The editor believes it
to be a necessity of the times, in view of current discussions of electoral reform, that the papers now collated and
arranged should be put into' a permanent and accessible
form. For not only in Pennsylvania, but in many other
states of the Union, the great evils of the present system
of voting and of deficient representation, are being earnestly discussed. Therefore, whatever can assist in bringing
about just conclusions either as to the necessity of some
fundamental changes in electoral action, or, that being conceded, as to the best method of adapting the changes agreed
upon to the needs of the people, may be accepted as fit,
timely and useful.
Although a number of works, more or less elaborate,
have been recently published upon electoral and representative reform, no one of them covers precisely the ground
covered by the present one.  They have dealt mostly with
the theoretical and philosophical aspects of the questions
treated, whereas the volume in hand is largely devoted to
the practical application of the plan proposed in it for
popular acceptance. Herein will be found not only the
theory of a reform to extend representation, but sundry
vii 
EDITOR'S PREFACE.
acts of legislation for its enforcement, and the returns of
elections which illustrate the practical workings of reform
and the results to be obtained from it. This information
is believed to be more useful and convincing than abstract
arguments with the great mass of persons with whom po litical power is justly lodged by our American Constitution.   And  as to theory: If the people shall once be
satisfied that a system can be applied whereby in popular
elections, nearly the whole mass of those who vote shall
be represented in government, they will accept it promptly
upon the sound theory of equal and exact justice to all.
The matter contained in this volume, it will be observed,
is arranged, as nearly as may be, in chronological order,
thus exhibiting the growth and modifications of opinion
in the author's mind, contemporaneous with movements
in other states and publications abroad. And although it
consists mainly of legislative arguments, popular addresses
and casual papers thrown off or produced as occasion invited during several years, yet the collected volume has
nearly the completeness and symmetry of a regular work,
with little of surplusage or repetition. There is a regular
development of argument, illustration and thought, and
each separate, successive part presents the question in hand
from a new or enlarged point of view.
The haste with which this volume is put to press precludes careful revision, a correction of former errors of
publication and slips unavoidable in oral discourse, but for
these the intelligent reader will make due allowance without prolonged apology.
As a citizen of the State, and a resident of the town in
which the free vote was first applied at a popular election,
the editor has felt the promptings of a laudable, or at least
viii 
EDITOR'S PREFACE.
a natural, ambition in presenting this work to the public,
convinced as he is that the reform which it presents and
vindicates, when accepted generally, will purify elections,
establish justice in representation, elevate the tone of public life and give additional credit and lustre to that system
of government by the people which is our proudest boast,
and our best legacy for those who come after us.
J. G. F.
BLOOMSBURG, NOV. 12, 1872.
ix 
I 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
AIR.  DUTCHER,  in his recent work  on  Proportional
Representation,* has shown, by elaborate statistics, that of
the votes cast at important contested popular elections in
the United States, over forty per centum are lost or overruled in the computation  of results.   Of  the electors
throughout the country who voted for representatives to
the Fortieth Congress, no less than forty-two per cent.
failed to obtain representation by their votes; and precisely
the same percentage of voters failed in elections for representatives to the Forty-first Congress, and again in the
elections to the Forty-second.  For six continuous years
the rate of actual representation in the popular branch of
Congress was but sixty per cent. of the votes polled. At
the session of the New  York  Legislature, in 1869, the
voters unrepresented in the Senate were forty-one per cent.
of the whole, and in the House forty-two; and at the
session of 1871, in each House, forty-two.
Mr. Hare is authority for the statement that the perceutage of disfranchisement upon votes cast in Parliamentary elections is very nearly as great as in the above
examples.  He says:  "Those who, disagreeing with the
majority in their electoral districts, are now in Parliamentary elections outvoted and left without representation,
* ".Minority or Proportional Representation, by Salem Dutcher, -V. York,
1872."
xi 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
cannot ordinarily be taken at less than two-fifths of the
whole electoral body."*  It may be assumed that, in con tested State and municipal eleetions in this country, the
average proportion of nnrepresented voters is as great as
in elections for members of Congress and members of
Parliament-in other words, that the average rate of vir tual disfranchisement of voters in our contested popular
elections is fully two-fifths of the total vote. This start ling fact is the first one to be considered, and considered
attentively, in any intelligent examination of the great
subject of electoral reform in the Unitedl States; for all
schemes for the amendment of popular representation in
government must be insufficient and illusory which ignore
it or underrate its enormous significance. For it means
that our popular elections are unjust; it exposes the princi pal cause of their corruption, and it may instruet us, if
we duly consider it, concerning those measures of change
which  will  most  certainly impart  health,  vigor  and
endurance to our political institutions.
The plan for securing Proportional Representation presented in this volume, and other plans similar to it in
character or object which have been proposed in recent
years, strike at this great evil of disfranchisement in
popular elections, and are intended to reduce it to its
smallest possible dimensions. But the advantages of the
plan set forth in the following pages will best appear by
comparing it with the old one, which it is intended to
,supersede.
Under the old plan of majority voting, whenever two
* "lfemnoranditm on the History, TfVorking and  Results of Cumulative
Voting," (prepared by Thomnas Hare at the request of thle English Government,) p. 14.
xii 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
or more persons are to be elected at one time to the same
office and for the same term of service, the law assigns to
the voter as many votes as the number of persons to be
chosen, and then commands him to distribute them singly
among candidates.  It restrains and prevents him from
exercising his own judgment as to the manner of polling
his votes, and, in, fact, undertakes to judge for him and
to determine in advance what will be, under all circumstances, a judicious exercise of his right of suffrage. But
in this it must blunder extremely and constantly. For as
the law maker cannot know the future, cannot from sheer
ignorance take into exact account its ever-changing conditions, his injunction or command to the voter must be
purely arbitrary, and must be often or commonly unsuited
to the circumstances to which it shall come to apply.
Hence the virtual disfranchisement and actual non-representation of a large part of the voters is a common fact in
all constituencies, large and small, throughout the country,
the inevitable consequences of which are deeply injurious
and truly deplorable.  Misgovernment, injustice, violence,
corruption and discontent are created and increased by an
unnecessary and absurd restriction upon electoral freedom;
by a wholly gratuitous and impertinent interference of law
with the free action of the citizen; by an open and
palpable violation of the principles of self-government
upon which all our political institutions are founded. Only
when a constituency shall be unanimous, or nearly so, in
opinion and action can the enforced distribution of votesq
singly among the whole number of candidates operate
justly; in all other cases it must result in the non-representation of a part of the electors, and in consequent
injustice and evil.
xiii 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
But we turn from this view to the free vote, now pro  posed to us as an instrument for the improvement of elec  tions and amendment of representation. Its advantages
over the majority vote may be roughly stated as follows:
1. It reduces greatly the number of candidates at popu lar elections, because under it parties will usually nominate
only the number they are entitled to and have power to
elect. Surplus candidates will not commonly be run, and
but few persons will be beaten in struggles for place.
2. It secures nearly complete representation of the whole
body of voters in pluliral elections, by permitting each con siderable interest of political society to take to itself its just
share of representation by its own votes.
3. It reduces enormously the expense of election con tests,-not the legal charges borne by the public, but vol untary outlays by parties and candidates. These will no
longer be required to subsidize the floating vote-the
balance-of-power vote-the mercenary or impressionable
vote-of a district or constituency, as the indispensable
condition of success. Whether applied to legal elections
or to primary ones; to elections to office or to nominations
for 6ffice, in this regard its effect will be the same-to
produce, comparatively, cheap elections.
4. It is a powerful check upon all forms of corruption
and undue influence at elections, because it takes away the
motive, or most of the motive, to corrupt or pervert them
in rendering all ordinary efforts to that end unavailing
,and useless.
5. It produces satisfaction to voters in gratifying their
desire for representation, and thus increases their attaclhment to the government under which they live.
6. It permits the representation of a greater variety of
xiv 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
opinions and interests in legislative bodies, without impairing the right and power of the majority to rule.
7. It will often continue fit and able men much longer
in public service than is now possible, because they will
not hold their places subject so much to fluctuation of
power between parties as to changed preferences in their
own party.
8. It will greatly reduce party violence, and give a
kindlier tone to social relations among the people, without
producing stagnation or indifference to public affairs. In
this, as in other cases, justice means peace, but it does not
mean stagnation; for it is beyond question that reformed
voting "wakes to newness of life," to activity and ihterest
in public affairs, large numbers of persons who, under
majority-voting, are inert because disgusted or discouraged
by their exclusion from representation. Upon this point
Mr. Buxton spoke wisely and soundly in Parliament in
the Reform debates of 1867.*
9. It discourages election cheats, whether in the giving,
receiving, counting, or returning of votes, because by it the
effect of cheating is greatly reduced. And, for a like reason,
it also discourages the trading of votes, or bartering of the
electoral privilege.
10. It is adapted to the bolting of nominations by an
aggrieved interest, for such interest, if of respectable size,
can represent, by its own votes, without disturbing or
changing the whole result of an election.t
11. It renders elections more independent of each other.
No one will much influence another; each one will be
determined upon its own merits, or upon the issues directly
* Appendix, p. 279.
t See case of Northumberland borough election, post, 251.
XV 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
involved in it, and not with reference to its effect upon
other elections.
12. Lastly, it is a certain remedy for the evil of gerrymandering in the formation of Congressional districts, and
may be made to remedy, partially or completely, the same
evil, in apportionments for members of State Legislatures.
Rightly understood, the free vote is not a plan of
minority representation. It is, on the contrary, a plan for
the representation of successive majorities in plural elections, by which will be realized, more fully than ever
before, our fundamental principle of government by the
people.*
It only remains to add, in this place, that in order that
this or any other plan of reformed voting shall be thoroughly effectual, it must not stop with the legal elections,
but must extend to the primary ones also. In fact, upon
plans for the nomination of candidates to office must be
fought out the ultimate battle of electoral reform.
* Letter to Secretary Jordan, post, p. 182.
xvi
IN 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
A SPEECH,
DELIVERED IN THE SENATE. OF THE UNITED STATES,
JULY 11, 1867.*
THE Senate having under consideration Senate
bill No. 131, to give effect to an act entitled "An
act to provide for the more efficient government of
the rebel States," passed March 2, 1867, Mr. BUCKALEW proposed the following amendment as a new
section:
SEC. -. And be it further enacted, That in the election of
Representatives in Congress from the said States mentioned in
the act of March 2, 1867, each elector shall be entitled to give
as many votes as there are Representatives assigned to his State
by apportionment of law, and he may give one vote to each of
the requisite number of persons to be chosen, or may cumulate
his votes and bestow them at his discretion upon one or more
candidates less in number than the whole number of Representatives to be chosen from such State.
After prolonged debate and a vote of the Senate
on a question of order, Mr. BUCKALEW delivered the
following speech for cumulative voting and in vindication of the amendment which he had proposed:
* Congressional Globe, 1st Sess. 40th Cong. 575.
1 
2       PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
Mir. BUCKALEW. The Senate has furnished me a
very good argument against the passage of this bill.
I think no bill of this kind should be passed and
placed upon our statute-book which does not contain
the proposition covered by my amendment; and I
propose to enter upon an exposition of that amendment and a statement of the arguments by which it
is supported.
The plan of cumulative voting has been thloroughly discussed in Great Britain, and is perhaps
better understood in that country than in our own.
What is it? Where more persons than one are to
be elected or chosen by a body of electors, the first
idea is that each elector may have votes equal in
number to the number of persons to be chosen.
Formerly in this country we elected members of
Congress in the several States by what was called a
general ticket, under which plan each voter in the
State voted for as many candidates as there were
Representatives in Congress to be chosen from his
State, giving to each candidate one vote. That was
the system which obtained throughout the United
States. In process of time it came to be discovered
that this plan of choosing Representatives in Congress by general ticket was a complete and perfect
mode of stifling the voice of the minority within a
State. A political majority of only five hundred
votes in such a, State as Nlew York might send
twenty-five or thirty members to the lower House
of Congress, while the large mass of the minority
voters were entirely disfranchised, although nearly
Ias numerous as those who were thus represented in
the other House. 
SENATE SPEECH.
This plan of electing by general ticket was therefore abandoned in a number of the States because
of its rank and notorious injustice and because of the
dissatisfaction which it produced. The habit, however, of so electing Representatives remained in
many of the States until Congress interposed by
virtue of its power under the Constitution of the
United States to regulate this subject, and there is
now a law upon our statute-book which provides
that Representatives in Congress shall be selected
from each State by districts; each State where more
than one are to be chosen is to be broken into single
districts and a member elected from each.   That
action by the States and this ultimate legislation by
Congress were for the purpose of doing away with
the injustice of the former system. It was to enable
the minority, or, to speak in other words, to enable
the various political interests of society, to have a
voice in the councils of the nation, to be heard in
these Halls, where laws were to be enacted which
would be binding universally upon the citizens.
The establishing of the system of single districts for
the election of members of Congress was a great reform and a great improvement in American politics;
it broke the power of the party majority to this extent, that they could not absorb the whole representation of the State in the popular House of Congress. But when you established the system of
single districts you retained still the majority rule
for elections in the districts. The majority rule
which obtained previously for the States was sent
down into these divisions into which the States were
broken, and now obtains in the election of Repre
3 
4       PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
sentatives from those several districts. But as society with us has increased in magnitude and in the
variety of its interests, inconveniences and evils
which formerly were unnoticed or unimportant have
grown in magnitude also, and have become exceedingly important, and the majority rule which prevails in the selection of Representatives by districts
operates hardly and badly and requires amendment.
At least that is my opinion; and ill vindication of
that opinion, before I conclude I will submit such
reasons as have occurred to me in its support.
A majority in a congressional district, although
it be a majority of one vote, though it have but a
preponderance of one vote over the opposing interest, is entitled to select a Representative, and its
voice is heard in the Hall of the people's House.
In theory the men who do not vote for the Representative are represented by him; but that theory is
simply a falsehood; it is opposed to the fact; it is
not true. Instead of representing the men who do
not vote for him in his district, the ordinary fact is
that the Representative opposes their opinions and
contributes all the power which he possesses to render those opinions unpopular and fruitless in the
administration of government.
INJUSTICE TO THE MlNORITY.
Now, sir, it is a hardship that large masses of the
American people should have no voice in the people's House, that they should be shut out from
representation in the Hall where popular representation is supposed to prevail with completeness and
perfection. Everybody admits that the fact is so, 
SENATE SPEECH.
that there is such disfranchisement; and at some
times when the cases are very glaring, that disfranchisement arrests public attention and elicits indignant debate.
But we are told that although a minority may be
under our present system disfranchised in one district, the opposite party may be disfranchised in
another; and so taking the whole State and the
whole country together a sort of equilibrium is produced; the party which fails in one district is successful in another, and vice versda; so that when you
carry this thing  throughout the whole country
there is some approach toward justice and a correct
result. My answer to that, which is really the
main plea for the existing system, is this: in the
first place I do not see that the perpetration of injustice in one locality is any compensation for the
perpetration of injustice in another; that because a
certain minority of voters in Pennsylvania are
without a voice in this Government, therefore the
non-representation of a different class of voters in
Kentucky is justified and made equitable and
honorable and of good repute under a republican
system. In short, sir, my idea is that when you
show me a multiplication of cases of injustice, you
have simply swollen your evil in statement and
made it more odious, more deserving of blows instead of favor, of opposition instead of support:
that the variety of the interests which may be disfranchised under your majority rule as applied to
congressional districts is the very fact which pronounces the most weighty condemnation of that
rule instead of furnishing it a justification or an
5 
6      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
apology. Then I have another reply to this sug gestion; and that is that it is not true in point of
fact that the disfranchisements throughout the coun try taken together, or the disfranchisements in dis tricts in a particular State taken together, do result
in an equilibrium. The fact has never been so; it
is not likely to occur; the chances are a thousand
to one against it. Therefore, even if there were
some soundness in this doctrine of set-off, of setting
off one wrong against another, the result would not
be the production of an equilibrium of political
forces or their just distribution. How was it in the
last Congress?  Sixteen hundred thousand voters in
a particular section of country represented in Congress-the North and West-had but thirty votes;
while two million voters in the same section were
represented in that same House by one hundred and
twenty-eight!  Therefore, sir, it is manifestly absurd to talk about the equalization of disfranchisement. There is no such result; there is no equalization.
Mr. President, we have all heard a great deal said
in our time about the "sacred principle" that the
majority shall bear absolute rule. Well, sir, I deny
that there is any such principle in our system of
government; and if it could be established, I should
deny that it possessed any sacred character. What
is our principle, the principle upon which our republican system is founded? It is that the people shall
rule; that they shall rule themselves; that we shall
have a system of self-government. Does that mean
that a part of the people shall rule over another
part? Does that mean that they shall be divided 
SENATE SPEECH.
numerically, and that twenty shall absolutely control nineteen; or does it mean volition and action of
the whole mass in the business of self-government?
We have, however, from what we have supposed to
be the necessity of the case, a majority rule at elections. It is a simple rule, nothing sacred in it or
about it; an arrangement, a thing of detail, by
which we have attempted in a rude manner to apply
practically our principle of government by the
people; and this majority rule formerly obtaining
in the States and applied to a system of voting by
general ticket, yet applies in the districts into which
tile States are divided. It is the same in its nature
and to a great extent it is the same in its effects as
before, and the very mischief and evil which led to
the abolition of the general ticket plan yet obtains.
and prevails in elections in single districts.  Though
mitigated somewhat, it requires, as I think, the
vigorous hand of reform.
I have made these introductory remarks in order
to approach the subject in an intelligible manner.
What is meant by cumulative voting is this: that
an elector in any State, whether he belongs to the
majority or to the minority, can give his votes for
some candidate or candidates who will be elected
and who will actually represent him in the Congress
of the United States. That is all there is of it.
That is the Alpha and the Omega of this whole
plan. It is a device by which there shall be actual
instead of sham representation in Congress; by which
men who come here into the people's Hall shall represent the men who vote for them and nobody else,
and by which it shall not happen that nearly half
7 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
the people of the United States shall have no efficient or fair representation where the laws are made.
HOW TO CORRECT IT.
How is this object accomplished-? The manner
of accomplishing it is as simple as the thing is itself.
Take the State of Kentucky, about which there is
some discussion now, I believe, in the House of
Representatives as to membership. She is entitled
to nine members in that House. What is proposed
is, that an elector in Kentucky may go to the election and vote for nine members, if he choose, to repsent his State in that House, giving each canldidate one vote; or bestow his nine votes upon foul,
if he choose, or upon one, or upon any other number less than the whole. All the provision of law
that is necessary is that the elector may vote for a
less number of candidates than the whole number
to be chosen, and that hlie may distribute his votes
among that less number according to his judgment
and discretion, enlightened or directed by his convictions of public duty. That is simpler It does
not require a long explanation here; nor to the
commonest-minded man in the country is it necessary to go into a protracted argument in order that
he may comprehend it. The Senator from Kentucky
remarked a short time ago that he was in favor of
this reform if it were practicable; he was in favor
of some improvement of this kind.
Mr. DAVIS. I did not mean to say that it was
impracticable. I am very ready to receive information as to the practicability of it from the honorable
Senator.
8
10 
SENATE SPEECH.
Mr. BUCKALEW. The Constitution of the United
States says you may regulate the manner of electing
members of Congress; you have interposed already
by law to abolish the evils of the general ticket plan
by which a majority could elect all the members from
a State. Now what I ask you to do is in.the same
line of reform with that former legislation; that
you shall go on, and instead of allowing any portion
of the people of a State to be disfranchised, you
shall permit them so to vote that they shall get
actual representation.
Mr. DAVIS. If the honorable Senator will permit me, I will mention as an evidence of my friendliness to his principle, that I was a member of the
House at the time that bill was passed, and voted
for it; and I was then upon the Committee of Elections, and I made a report in favor of the bill.
Some of the States then voted by general ticket,
and some did not.  Some  voted by the district
system, with districts entitled to send two or three
or four Representatives, as was the case in the honorable Senator's State. That measure was deemed
entirely a Whig measure; it was opposed by the
Democracy; and there were four States, according
to my best recollection, two of which I remember,
Mississippi and New Hampshire, who refused obe dience to the law, and continued to elect their Rep resentatives upon the exploded general ticket system,
defying the law of Congress. But their represen tation, elected on the general ticket system, was
accepted in the next House by a majority. I merely
make this statement of my being a friend to that
measure to give some assurance to the honorable
9 
10      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
Senator that I am not hostile to the principle of his
proposition.
Mr. BUCKALEW. Well, sir, whatever may be said
of this measure, it is certainly practicable. It requires nothing but an act of Congress of half a
dozen lines permitting an elector in any State choosing members of Congress to bestow his votes on any
number of candidates less than the whole. Nothing
further is necessary than that the votes so taken
shall be reported, counted by the Secretary of the
Commonwealth in a State, and the returns signed
by the Governor in the usual way, and sent to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.   The
scheme requires no machinery; it requires no involved legislation; it involves no difficulty in putting it into execution.
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE NEW PLAN.
Now, let me show how this scheme would work
by a particular example. Take the case of Vernmont, a State with sixty thousand voters, forty thousand of whom are members of the majority party,
and twenty thousand of the minority. By act of
Congress-the existing  apportionment  law-that
State is entitled to three members. The numbers I
have stated are very nearly the exact numbers of
voters in that State. Every one at a glance can see
what ought to take place. The majority having forty
thousand votes should choose two members of Congress fromn that State, and the minority having
twenty thousand votes should choose one member.
Then there would be just representation. Then
there could be no complaint in any quarter. Then 
SENATE SPEECH.
our principle of the representation of the people
would be applied in the particular case, and no
human being can conceive of any argument or
objection against the result.
This plan of cumulative voting renders just that
result certain-renders it morally impossible that
any other should take place; and why? Because
the minority cumulating their votes upon a single
candidate can give him sixty thousand votes; each
elector giving his candidate three votes, it would
count him  sixty thousand.   The forty thousand
constituting the political majority in the State, if
they attempt to vote for three candidates, can give
them only forty thousand each. If they cumulate
their votes upon two candidates, (which is what they
are entitled to,) they can give them sixty thousand
votes each; so that two men will be elected to Congress representing the majority and one man representing the minority, and it is impossible for either
one of those political interests to prevent the other
from obtaining its due share of representation.
Take the case of Pennsylvania, with twenty-four
members. In that State at the last congressional
election there were polled five hundred and ninetysix thousand one hundred and forty-one votes. The
majority party polled three hundred and three thousand seven hundred and ninety and the minority
two hundred and ninety-two thousand three hundred and fifty-one. It thus appears that there was
a majority in favor of one political interest in that
State at that congressional election, amounting to
eleven thousand four hundred and thirty-nine votes.
Multiplying that by five-one-fifth of the popula
11 
12      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
tion ordinarily being the voters of the State-and
you see that that surplus which one party possessed
of votes over the other represents a population a little exceeding fifty-five thousand-less than one-half
the number of inhabitants in the State entitled to a
representative in Congress-so that this surplus of
votes of one party over the other represents a minority fraction upon a ratio of apportionment of
members of Congress to the State. The returns of
that election (held in October last) were as follows:
PENNSYLVANIA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS.
Republican. Democratic.
I............................................................ 7,728  12,192
II..................................... 12,612  9,475
III...................................t 12,520     11,516
IV..................................... 14,551    12,126
V...................................... 12,259   11,800
~VI........................11,447       14,009
VII...................................... 12,011   8,531
VIII.......................................6,999   13,188
IX.................................14,298         8,675
X..................................... 13,186    12,971
XI..................................... 9,121     15,907
XII............................................................ 13,274  15,280
XIII..................................... 11,940  10,653
~XIV........................  14,190      12,675
XV..................................... 12,489     15,830
XVI..................................... 13,589     12,964
XVII..................................... 11,298      9,979
XVIII...................................... 14,734   12,688
XIX........................................................... 15,107  12,481
XX...................................... 17,106    15,222
XXI....................................... 13,023  12,669
XXII.......................................................... 12,720  9,655
XXIII........................................................... 14,197  10,012
XXIV........................................................... 13,391  11,853
303,790    292,351
292,351
Majority.................................................. 11,439
Ratio of votes for a Representative, according to votes polled...24,839
II............................................................
II...........................................................
IV...........................................................
VI...........................................................
VI...........................................................
VIIr...........................................................
VIll...........................................................
IX...........................................................
X............................................................
xI............................................................
XII............................................................
XIII............................................................
XV............................................................
XVI............................................................
XVII............................................................
XVII...........................................................
XIX...........................................................
XX...........................................................
XXI...........................................................
XXII........................................................... 
SENATE SPEECH.
Now, sir, what is the result? Judging by the
actual votes polled at that congressional election,
there should have been an equal division of Representatives in the House, standing 12 to 12; or, if a
Representative should be assigned to the majority
interest on account of the excess of its vote, the
numbers would stand 13 to 11. But in point of
fact, under your single district system, the result in
that State is that the delegation stands 18 to 6, instead of being equally divided between parties
according to the actual votes which were polled at
the election. But under this plan of cumulative
voting, what would take place? As each political
interest in the State knows that its vote is about
the same as that of the opposing one, and that
if it attempt to obtain more than its fair share
of representation, it may actually lose instead of
gaining, it will be forced to concentrate its votes
upon twelve candidates, or upon thirteen at the
most, and it is impossible that by any ingenuity or
device whatever it can increase its representation in
Congress above about what its actual numbers entitle it to.  If it should make the attempt, the
opposite party would gain an advantage as the result
of the sharp practice attempted upon them.
I have taken Vermont and Pennsylvania.  Now
take the case of Kentucky. There are nine members of the House elected from Kentucky, all of one
political complexion.  They are now demanding
membership in the House, and they are met by a
refusal for reasons which I need not discuss, and
which it would be, perhaps, improper to discuss
here. Suppose a just system of election had pre
13 
14      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
vailed in Kentucky, would the whole nine have
been Democratic-a clean delegation of one political
opinion?  No such thing would have been possible.
At that election the majority was about forty thou  sand for the party that prevailed.
Mr. DAVIS. Larger than that.
Mr. BUCKALEW. I thought it was about forty
thousand. As I make the number of voters re  quired for the election of a member of Congress,
that would represent nearly two members. There  fore the preponderance of one political interest in
Kentucky over the other would represent two mem bers. That would leave seven members of Congress
to be equally divided between the two political in terests; one party having four and the other three,
and the result would be that the representation ill
the House would have been divided, more une qually, to be sure, than in most cases, but still not
with gross inequality between the two parties that
contend for mastery in this country.
Take the case of Maryland at the last election.
You find that representation in the House of Representatives is not just, considering the men who
gave the votes by which those Representatives were
elected; that instead of there being but one Republican Representative from Maryland there should
be two on account of the actual votes polled in that
State.  Then, sir, take the case of Connecticut, an
election recently held, and a most notable trial of
political strength in the North. There, where the
vote was a tie substantially, where the preponderance
of one side over the other was very slight, not more
than about, a thousand or twelve hundred, perhaps, 
SENATE SPEECH.
the delegation stands three to one, whereas it should
be equally divided according to the actual votes
polled and returned according to law.
I cite these cases of recent State elections, and
elections which on the whole have been favorable to
that interest in the country which when the votes
are taken in the aggregate is in the minority, and I
cite the other two cases of Vermont and Pennsylvania as other illustrations. But nearly every State
might be mentioned in illustration of the argumient.
Thus, sir, whether you go to the North or to the
West, or confine your researches to the central portions of the country, you find gross misrepresentation of the people of the United States in that
House which was peculiarly intended to represent
them, and to represent them completely, year by
year. The Senate was intended to be a more permanent body, and to possess somewhat of a different
character. What I propose, then, is the correction
of this injustice, whether it exist in the States I
have mentioned or in any other States represented
in Congress, and to guard against its extension to
the States which you are about to restore under your
legislation to their former places in the Union, and
with regard to which a reform of this kind is more
important than it is to the States of the North, the
centre, or the West.
ITS ADVANTAGES.
SIr. President, I will now proceed briefly to state
in succession, not to elaborate, several distinct arguments by which cumulative voting can be sustained,
vindicated, and made good as I think against all
15 
16      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
objection. In the first place, this plan is one of
justice; it is recognrized as just by every one Who
hears me upon its mere statement; it will be recog nized as just by any man in the country to whom
you carry the proposition and submit it for his judg ment.  It  will  deal  equal, even-handed justice
among political interests in the country, whether
they exist now or are created by the exigencies of
our affairs hereafter.
In the next place, this plan would bring into
public life and keep in public life many able men
who are now excluded under your single district
system. A man of ability in a State can never
reach the Hall of the House of Representatives as
a Representative of the people unless there be a
majority in his district to send him; and if he cominence a career in public life, with high ambition
before him, and devote himself zealously to the
service of the people, and so qualify himself for
high statesmanship, and to take rank in Congress as
men take rank in the Parliament of Great Britain,
he knows that a little shifting of the political scale
in his district will leave him out. Those who agree
with him in opinion cannot continue him in the
public service. The result is that you have no
twenty, thirty, or forty-year men in Congress.
They are mostly men of the moment; they are two
and four-year men in the House, and the example
extends even here. If a member of this body gets
reselected his friends think it is a subject for warm
congratulation, regard it as a wonderful result to be
wrung from a caucus and from managers at home.
But, sir, I insist that in this country, as abroad, the 
SENATE SPEECH.
House of Representatives ought to be the great
House of our Legislature; its Hall should be resorted to for words of eloquence, for profound logic,
and for the exhibition of the highest traits of American statesmanship. How is it and how must it be
as long as you keep members there two, four, and six
years only?  They have no opportunity to grow up
into distinction; they have no opportunity to mature their abilities and become able statesmen.
The result is that the weight of that House in the
Government is far below what it should be. This
may increase the relative importance of the Senate;
but upon the whole it is not a desirable condition
of things, and the continuance of this system of
rapid rotation in the membership of the House of
Representatives bids fair to be one of those injurious
influences which will bring republican institutions
into contempt.
I say then, sir, that this-plan of election by
cumulative voting will allow electors of a particular
party in a State to continue their favorites in Coingress, and will result in improved statesmanship in
the House of Representatives, elevating that branch
of the national Legislature, and, of consequence,
promoting the public interests.
Again, sir, one great advantage of this plan is
that it abolishes gerrymandering in the States, cuts
it up by the roots, ends it forever.  That is one of
the most crying evils of the time. Now, sir, I venture to say that from Maine westward to the Pacific
Ocean, in the last ten years, in no State whatever,
has there been an honest and fair district apportionment bill passed for the selection of members of
2
17 
18      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
Congress. Nowhere, in no State, has there been a
fair apportionment, unless, indeed, it was in a particular and exceptional case where the two branches
of a Legislature were divided in political opinion
and one checked the other; but ordinarily, as we
know, in the course of northern politics, legislative
bodies have been of the same political complexion
in the upper and lower houses; and I venture to
say that whenever this was the fact, unfair and dishonest apportionment bills have been passed.
Under the present system the temptation to party
is too great to be resisted; party interest appeals to
members of a Legislature, and they yield to its denlands and enact injustice into law. The party that
does this knows perfectly well that when a future
apportionment shall be made, the opposite party, if
it be in power, will retort this injustice, perhaps
with increased force. Thus you have a competition
between political interests with reference to the apportionment of the States continually increasing in
injustice, leading to degradation of the Legislatures
and the corruption of the people. The plan of
cumulative voting, however, dispensing with single
districts in a State, avoids altogether this capital
evil and mischief of gerrymandering and brings it
to an end so far as the selection of members of Congress is concerned.
Well, Mr. President, in the southern country, as
already hinted by me, I consider this plan of cumulative voting to be indispensable to the harmony, to
the welfare of that section of the Union. You
have vast masses of voters belonging to two different
races there who are to be brought into antagonism 
SENATE SPEECH.
to each other at the polls, and that in and through
every State of the whole ten now unrepresented.
How will you have them vote? Against each other,
voting each other down under the majority rule,
producing bad blood and riot and turbulence upon
thousands of occasions, with wide-spread discontent
and dissatisfaction through the whole social body?
Will you permit the majority rule of elections to
have uninterrupted effect there, causing results like
these? Will you mnake no provision for amendment, for counteracting  and countervailing these
manifest evils and dangers?
Take the case of Georgia, with seven members.
You can see what the result would be under cumulative voting following a regular registration of
voters. It could be known beforehand about what
number of representatives the colored voters and their
white allies were entitled to, and how many represenltatives under that registration the other elements
of population would be entitled to. The election would
take place quietly, without collision; neither side
could deprive the other of its fair share in the result.
I should like to enlarge on that point, but I shall
not do so; for the reason that the decision of the
Senate ruling the amendment proposed by me out
of order upon this bill does not render a discussion
of the effects of this plan in those States, in connection with the coming elections, as important as it
would otherwise be.
I go over, as briefly as I can, the different heads
of the argument, in order that they may  be considered here and elsewhere, because this is not the
end of this subject. A proposition which is just in
19 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
itself, which is capable of being vindicated by debate, which is important and vital to the working of
our representative system, cannot be kept down or
suppressed.  If it be pushed aside at one time it
will recur upon us, it will return again and again,
until it be determined upon. its merits and according
to an enlightened public sentiment developed or
produced by discussion.
In the last place, Mr. President, this plan of cumulative voting will be a most valuable check upon
fraud at elections. No measure ever proposed in
this Union would have so extensive and salutary an
effect in checking election frauds and corruption as
this plan of fair and honest voting which I defend.
Do you not discover at a glance in looking over the
States of the Union the main source from which
electoral corruption  issues, the main  cause that
brings it into existence? What is that? Why, sir,
the motive put before every candidate in every district of the country that is anything like close, the
strong incentive and the strong temptation is to corrupt a few votes in order to turn them into his scale
and carry his election over an opposing candidate.
And when one candidate resorts to this mode of promoting his interests, the opposing candidate feels
justified in acting in the same way; and thus it is
that an iniquity perpetrated on one side begets similar iniquity upon the other. There is a pitting of
corruption against corruption, in the closely contested districts at all events, or most noticeably at
commercial points, and our system of government is
thereby poisoned at its very fountain. The evil is
growing yearly.
2o
I 
SENATE SPEECH.I-I
As the country becomes denser in population, as
wealth accumulates, as the various interests of society
become more diverse, its affairs more complicated
and dependent upon legislation, this evil of electoral
corruption must increase and swell in volume. You
must correct your arrangements for elections in
order to check it. Cumulative voting will check it.
There will be no longer a struggle for district majorities, a struggle for a few votes for one man over
another, because one party in a State casting its
votes for the number of men or about the number
of men it can elect according to its numbers in that
State will elect them against the whole world, and
there will be no motive to corrupt anybody, no
turning of the scale by any species of illegitimate
influence which may be brought to bear. Then, no
little local interest can come to a political party and
connmmand terms from it, command its action. Then
no man with his pocket full of accumulated gain can
go to election agents and through them corrupt a
part of the electoral body to turn the scale in his
own favor, provoking thereby similar corruption on
the other side. Then illegitimate, pernicious, and
selfish interests in a State will not use the machinery
of your electoral system for the purpose of poisoning
the sources of political power, because there will not
be a sufficient motive. It is these contests for majorities between candidates that cause the major
part of the evil of which we complain.
CORRUPTION OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM.
Sir, we have not in this regard attained to the
full height and depth and breadth of possible evil.
21 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
But we have declined far below the purity of former
times.  The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WIL soN] thinks our elections in this country are models
of purity, that nobody is corrupted, that there is lit tle departure from honest principles in their managed
mnent. Notwithstanding his opinion, I think that
this evil is already extensive enough with us to
alarm every patriot and every honest man. I could
if it were necessary and time permitted put my
finger upon cases in my own State which would
establish a very different opinion (at least as to that
section of the Union) from that which the Senator
firom Massachusetts announces.
Let me illustrate the extent to which, under a
system of elections by the majority rule, corruption
may be carried for the purpose of obtaining these
local majorities.  I take cases from England-some
parliamentary boroughs.   In the debate in the
House of Commons on the 30th of May last a provision of the reform bill was pending which had
been proposed by the ministry for the disfranchisement of certain boroughs, on the ground of the corruption of the electors therein. Four boroughs
were to be struck from the list of those to be represented hereafter in Parliament, (whether the inhabitants were to be counted as electors of the counties
in which they were located or not was not determrined at the last accounts.)  There had been an
examination by a board of commission of the subject
of corruption in those boroughs at the previous parliamentary  election.   Witnesses  were  examined
under oath; the case of each borough was thoroughly investigated, and the facts were laid before
22 
SENATE SPEECH.
Parliament. What did the report of the commission show? The statement is a startling one, and
here it is:
CORRUPTION IN ENGLISH BOROUGHIS.
Registered Yoters. Impure Voters
Totness............................................... 421  158
Reigate.............................................. 912  346
Great Yarmouth................................... 1647  528
Lancaster........................................... 1498  916
In Totness and Reigate the corrupt voters were thirty-eight per cent.
of the whole; in Yarmouth thirty-two per cent., and in Lancaster sixtyfour!
The reason why Yarmouth shows the lowest in
this scale of infamy, is that by act of Parliament
some years since the freemen were disfranchised,
and suffrage was confined to householders; so that
the percentage of corrupt voters is only thirty-two
per cent., whereas in Lancaster, a borough of somewhat similar character, the percentage amounts to
sixty-four per cent. This is shown by a detail of
the voters in Lancaster. There, of freemen, there
were 980 registered, of whom 708 were proved to
be impure; whereas of the householders, 439 registered, the number of corrupt was only 208. Here
three-fourths of the freemen were bribers or bribed,
whereas less than one-half of the  householders
were corrupt.
These are the facts as proved, and they of course
do not include the corruption in those boroughs
which was not detected by the commission, of which
there may have been a considerable amount.   You
see here to what length electoral corruption may be
carried under the district system-because in England their boroughs are districts-where the ma
23 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
jority or the plurality rule obtains, and where there
is a motive for a corrupt man to struggle for the
balance of power in order to turn the scale. One
great objection I have always had to colored suffrage, and which I have stated upon this floor, has
been this: that thereby you cast into the hands of
corrupt and ambitious and evil men in this country,
a vast opportunity for mischief, for using this mass
of votes for their own improper purposes. Looking
from the practical point of view upon this question,
I supposed that it connected itself with the subject
of corruption; but if you had a system of cumulative voting in the South, each political party there
would have the power to secure to itself due representation in Congress in spite of another; the
causes of corruption would be cut off or limited,
and you could have a system comparatively pure.
Sir, I show you these English examples as a warning, as pointing out to you the great danger to
which our representative system is liable, particularly in that section with which your measures of
reconstruction are concerned.
Mr. President, I had prepared some time since a
complete analysis of the recent elections in the
States represented in Congress, from the best means
of information within my power, for the purpose of
showing the operation of our existing system under
the majority rule; but, sir, it is not necessary for
me to go over that.  All I shall say upon that
point is that you cannot examine the facts as to any
State, taking your figures from any authentic publication, without perceiving that your representative
system requires reform; that you must advance
24 
SENATE SPEECH.
from the position you have heretofore maintained
as to the manner in which the right of suffrage
shall be exercised by our people; and the farther
this investigation shall be carried the more thorough
will this conviction be.
Mr. President, I have done what I supposed to
be a duty in calling attention to this question, presenting it to the consideration of the Senate, knowinlg perfectly well that it will be again before us,
and feeling assured that the proposition will eventually triumph here on this floor and throughout the
country, that you will make your plan of taking
the sense of the people in the election of members
of Congress just, equitable, reasonable; fair; that
you will make and shape it according to the information which you now possess, instead of continuing
your present imperfect arrangement; that as you
extend the basis of suffrage, as you make changes
in the foundations of political power, you will
improve the plans upon which your system shall be
worked and made to accomplish its proper objects.
MILL AND GREY ON REFORMED VOTING.
I have in conclusion only to cite authority, which
will be brief upon this question. In the first place
I will read from an author of the first rank-from
John Stuart Mill's work on parliamentary reform,
page 28. He is speaking of districts which shall
elect each three members of the Parliament, and is
proposing the application of improved modes of
voting to them:
"Assuming, then, that each constituency elects three representatives, two modes have been proposed, in either of which a
25 
26      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
minority, amounting to a third of the constituency, may, by
acting in concert; and determining to aim at no more, return
one of the members. One plan is, that each elector should
only be allowed to vote for two, or even for one, although three
are to be elected. The other leaves to the elector his three
votes, but allows him to give all of them to one candidate.
The first of these plans was adopted in the reform bill of Lord
Aberdeen's government; but I do not hesitate most decidedly
to prefer the second, which has been advocated in an able and
conclusive pamphlet by Mr. James Garth Marshall.
"The former plan must be always and inevitably unpopular,
because it cuts down the privileges of the voter, while the
latter on the contrary, extends them. And I am prepared to
maintain that the permission of cumulative votes, that is, of
giving either one, two, or three votes to a single candidate, is
in itself, even independently of its effect in giving a representation to minorities, the mode of voting which gives the
most faithful expression of the wishes of the elector. On the
existing plan, an elector who votes for three can give his vote
for the three candidates whom he prefers to their competitors;
but among those three he may desire the success of one
immeasurably more than that of the other two, and may be
willing to relinquish them entirely for an increased chance of
attaining the greater object.
"This portion of his wishes he has now no means of expressing
by his vote.  He may sacrifice two of his votes altogether, but
in no case can he give more than a single vote to the object of
his preference. Why should the mere fact of preference be
alone considered, and no account whatever be taken of the
degree of it? The power to give several votes to a single
candidate would be eminently favorable to those whose claims
to be chosen are derived from personal qualities, and not from
their' being the mere symbols of an opinion. For if the voter
gives his suffrage to a candidate in consideration of pledges or
because the candidate is of the same party with himself, he
will not desire the success of that individual more than that
of any other who will take the same pledges or belongs to the
same party.
"When he is especially concerned for the election of some
one candidate, it is on account of something which personally 
SENATE SPEECH.
distinguishes that candidate from others on the same side.
Where there is no overruling local influence in favor of an
individual, those who would be benefited as candidates by the
cumulative vote would generally be the persons of greatest real
or reputed virtue or talents."
In his subsequent work on representative government he has gone elaborately into an investigation
of the existing evils of the representative system as
shown in Great Britain, and has laid elaborately the
foundations of an argument upon grounds distinct
from those which I have stated, although in some
cases approaching them, for the adoption of this or
some other adequate plan of reform; and in that
subsequent work he repeats his recommendation of
cumulative voting as one of sensible and material
reform.  He proceeds, however, to state that his own
opinion inclines to a still further reform, the introduction of a system of personal representation,
which I shall not discuss here because the occasion
does not invite it, because I do not suppose it is a
system which  can  be within a, twelvemonth or
within several years debated and understood and
adopted by the American people. It is one much
more complicated, requiring perhaps a higher state
of political experience, or a more advanced stage of
discussion for its comprehension and adoption by
our people. 
I have quoted the authority of Mr. Mill in favor
of cumulative voting as a convenient, practicable,
just, and useful measure of reformn, confident that
his authority will be accepted both by the Senate
and by the people of this country as the highest
perhaps which can be produced upon a question of
27 
28      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
this character. Next I quote from Earl Grey's
work on Parliamentary Government and Reform,
seventh chapter. This is a new edition, published
in 1864. He says:
"The first of the reforms of a conservative tendency which I
should suggest, and one which I should consider a great improvement under any circumstances, but quite indispensable if
any changes favorable to democratic power are to be admitted,
would be the adoption of what Mr. James Marshall has called
the'cumulative vote;' that is to say, the principle of giving
to every elector as many votes as there are members to be elected
by the constituency to which he belongs, with the right of either
giving all these votes to a single candidate or of dividing them,
as he may prefer.
"The object of adopting this rule would be to secure to minorities a fair opportunity of making their opinions and wishes
heard in the House of Commons. In order that it might fully
answer this purpose, the right of returning members to Parliament ought to be so distributed that each constituency should
not have less than three representatives to choose. Supposing
that three members were to be elected together, and that each
elector were entitled to three votes, which he might unite in
favor of a single candidate, it is obvious that a minority exceeding a fourth of'the whole constituency would have the
power of securing the election of one member. It is probable
that in general three members would be thus returned, each
representing a different shade of opinion among the voters.
"The advantages this mode of voting would be calculated to
produce, and the justice of making some such provision for
the representation of minorities, or rather, the flagrant injustice of omitting to do so, have been so well shown by Mr. Marshall in the pamphlet I have already referred to, and by Mr.
Mill in his highly philosophical treatise on Representative
Government, that it is quite needless for me to argue the question as one of principle. But I may observe that, in addition
to its being right in principle, this measure would be in strict
accordance with the lessons of experience if read in their true
spirit. One of the most remarkable peculiarities of the British 
SENATE SPEECH.
House of Commons, as compared to other representative bodies,
is that it has always had within its walls members representing
most of the different classes of society, and of the various and
conflicting opinions and interests to be found in the nation.
Much of the acknowledged success with which the House of
Commons has played its part in the government of the country
has been attributed (I believe most justly) to this peculiarity.
"The changes made by the reform act, and especially the
abolition of the various rights of voting formerly to be found
in different towns, and the establishment of one uniform franchise in all the English boroughs, (with only a small exception
in favor of certain classes of freemen,) tended somewhat to
impair the character of the House in this respect. The greatly
increased intercourse between different parts of the country,
and the rapidity with which opinions are propagated fiom one
extremity of the kingdom to another, have had a similar tendency; and there is no longer the same probability as formerly
that different opinions will be found to prevail in different
places, so as to enable all parties to find somewhere the means
of gaining an entrance to Parliament for at least enough of
their adherents to give expression to their feelings."
And then he goes on with an elaborate investigation and application of this scheme to thei House of
Commons. There has been, therefore, not only an
inquiry abroad, but an assent from minds very differently or variantly constituted, in favor of cumulative voting; from Mr. Mill; a representative of
radical opinion, than whom there is no one more
eminent in political literature; and then, again,
from Earl Grey, representing a more conservative
shade of political sentiment in that country. Why
has not this plan been adopted in Great Britain and
applied in practice, and why has it not been incorporated in the existing reform bill? Because in
that country they have not the same advantages
that we have for its introduction. Here our exist
29 
30      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
ing States offer the facilities for introducing this
plan without inconvenience, whereas in Great
Britain, where they have their districts formed,
districts which have existed for centuries, where the
habits and relations of the people have been formed
for long periods of time, until they have become
inveterate, it is almost imnpossible to make up politi cal constituencies upon whom to apply this plan of
voting. In our States, however, in nearly all of
which more members than one are to be elected by
the,amne body of electors, the introduction of this
plan is both possible and convenient.
I conclude, Mr. President, by saying that I shall
attach, probably, to my remarks a tabular statement,
summing up the results of representation as they
are exhibited by the existing system in the compositionI of the Fortieth Congress, excluding, possibly,
some of the returns which I do not possess. Now,
I submit to the Senate, and to whoever in the country may pay attention to our proceedings and see
my remarks on this occasion, that upon grounds
of both reason and authority this proposition. has
been sustained; and that if it be introduced into
this country, whether in one State or in many States,
or universally throughout the country, in any event
it will bear the character of a ma'eria], useful, and
necessary reform of our political system. 
SPEECH
AT THE
ASSEMBLY BUILDINGS, PHILADELPHIA,
TUESDAY EVENING, NOV. 19, 1867.
Fello?v-Citizens of the City of Philadelphia:
You have had stated to you the circumstances
under which I appear in your presence to speak
upon the subject of representative reform. WVithout any introductory remarks, without pausing over
preliminary topics, I shall proceed to the subjectmatter of my discourse.
Ours is said to be a Government of the people,
meaning by that term the whole electoral body with
whom the right of suffrage is lodged by our constitution. The people, considered in this sense, are
said to rule themselves, and our system is therefore
described as one of self-government. Those who
are bound by the laws are to enact them. Power is
in the first instance exerted by them and obedience
yielded afterward. All rests upon their voluntary
assent and upon their free action. But, as it is impossible that the whole mass of the political community should assemble together for the purpose of
enacting or agreeing upon those rules of conduct
31 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
which are to bind the citizens, and as it would be
impossible for such an enormous body, even if it
were convened, to act with convenience or to act at
all, we, like the people of other countries'in former
times have resorted to what is known as the representative system.
From the impossibility of convening ourselves
together to determine those great questions which
pertain to the political and social bodies, and about
which government is employed, we have determined
to select from among ourselves a certain number of
persons with whom shall be lodged all our powers
connected with legislation and with government,
and whatsoever they shall determine shall be to us
and to all men within our borders thle law of individual conduct.
Well, now, gentlemen, in carrying on this system
of representative government the manner in which
the agents of the people shall be selected becomes
in the highest degree important. Although by our
theory, although by our fundamental principle of
self-government by the people, all the people are to
be represented in the making of laws and in the
administration of government, in point of fact we
have not attained to this result. We have fallen
short of it in our arrangements, and hence it is that
men of intelligence and of sagacity, driven to their
conclusions by thorough examination and by full
inquiry, have been compelled to declare that our
system is imperfect, and imperfect to such an extent
that the quality of our government is deeply affected,
and many pernicious things have place in its administration.
32 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
Instead of there being under the representative
system, as it is known among us, a representation of
the entire electoral body, of all the individuals who
compose it, there is in fact a representation of only
a part. In other words, representation instead of
being complete and coextensive with all those who
are to be represented and who are to be bound by
the action of government, is partial and restricted
to a part only of the political body.
Well, gentlemen, in the infancy or in the early
stages of a Government an imperfection of this
kind may be permitted or overlooked. The affairs
of society when they are not complicated, before the
community has become rich, before its affairs, social
and political, become involved and intricate, may
admit of very rude and imperfect arrangements,
and yet the people may be well governed, the laws
may be just and wholesome and administered in a
proper spirit and with complete success. But, as
wealth accumulates, as population becomes  dense
and great cities grow up, as vices are spread through
the social body, and as widely extended and complicated political action becomes necessary, those earlier
and simpler arrangements-imperfect always-become positively pernicious and hurtful; and the
necessity arises for their correction, and that the
system of government shall be purified and invigorated by amendment.
In your popular elections which are held or taken
under the majority or rather under the plurality
rule, (which ordinarily amounts to the same thing,)
at your popular elections the smaller number of
voices which are spoken in the election of represent     3
33 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
atives who are to enact your laws are stricken from
the count. When the officers charged with the
duty of collecting the voices of the people come to
make up the count and declare the result, they
strike from the poll or the return all those who
when numbered are the smaller quantity or the
smaller political force. Then after your representatives selected in this nManner by a majority merely,
by a part of the community, are convened together,
when they come to act in the business of government, to enact laws, they again act by a similar rule.
The majority in the representative body pronounce
the opinion and decree of that body, and what they
pronounce becomes law, binding upon all the people. Now, what is observable in this statement of
facts? Why, that in the first place, in selecting
representatives you strike off a part of the political
body; then, again, in representative action you
strike off the minority of the representative body,
who represent another portion or mass of the popular electors. The result is that your laws may be
made by men who represent a minority of the people who are to be bound by the laws so made. A
representative majority may not be, in point of fact
-and often is not-a representative of the majority
of the people.
When we come to consider in addition to this that
the representative majority, whether ill a State
Legislature or in Congress, in modern times or comparatively corrupt times, when pernicious and selfish
interests invade the halls of legislation, ordinarily
acts under what is known as the caucus system; you
perceive how far we have departed from those popu
34 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
lar principles upon which we professed to found our
system originally, and which we supposed would
give vitality and energy to its action. A caucus, a
private consultation of majority members, rules the
action of the representative majority. That majority rules the entire representative body, and that
representative body is composed of representatives
of only a part of the political community. Is it
not then established by this inquiry that instead of
our representative system being what we originally
intended it to be, and what we had supposed it
would be, it is in its practical action characterized
by imperfections which must arrest universal attention when the facts are examined and provoke a cry
for some measure of amendment and reform? And
if a project of reform and amendment can  be
brought forward which is practicable, reasonable
and wise, it will be our business to embrace it with
promptness and with gladness of heart.
PLANS OF REFORM.
Now, what do we desire?  We  may desire that
the whole people, instead of a part of them, shall
be represented in the Government, and that is precisely what I propose. In accomplishing this object, differences of opinion, as in all cases of new
investigations, may be expected. One may have
one project and another another. In a time of inquiry, of movement in the public mind, it is not
well and it is not to be expected that all minds
should run in the same channel, and that out of
the inquiries which inidividuals enter upon the
same ultimate proposition should be evolved by
Al
35 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
each. How will we then obtain representation in
government of the entire mass of the people?  Let
us come to that question, and in coming to it inquire
into the several plans or projects which have been
suggested to secure this object. They may be
classed under three heads. In the first place, it has
been proposed in various forms that by law there
should be a restricted or limited mode of voting.
Again, it has been proposed. that the elector in all
elections of representatives and of other officers
where more than one are to be chosen, may bestow
his votes upon a smaller number than the whole;
in other words, may exercise what is known as the
cumulative vote. Again, there has been proposed
in Great Britain and elaborately defended in that
country what is called the system of personal representation, by which an elector shall be emancipated
from the ordinary bonds and trammels of party organization, and shall be as an individual and not as
a member of a party represented in Parliament or
other body of a similar constitution.
THE LIMITED VOTE.
Now, as to the first of these, that is, the limited
or restricted vote-I use these words because I have
none more expressive or convenient at hand-as to
this limited vote: When you pass to your places
of election and proceed to choose for yourselves the
election officers who shall hold elections during
the year in your several election districts, what do
you do?
Each elector votes for one inspector, and yet two
are chosen.  Here is a limitation upon  the voter.
36 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
Instead of voting for both, the law says that he
shall vote for but one. What is the practical result throughout the State under this law? Why,
that one inspector belongs to the majority party in
each election district, and the other belongs to an
opposing one. In other words, both the parties into
which our political society is ordinarily divided are
represented in the election boards. Thus you secure
representation of the entire mass of the electors, and
yet you secure it by.a limitation upon the votes of
individual electors.
What has been the practical result of this arrangement, which is found in your State election law of
1839?  Has the result been good or bad?   Why,
there is not a man who hears me, or an intelligent,
honorable citizen in this Commonwealth, who would
not cry "shame" if that law were repealed.  It is
a law by which elections are kept comparatively
pure, by which fraud is prevented and fairness is
secured to the citizen in polling his vote.
I believe in this city, when you come to choose
assessors in your several wards, those interesting
persons who have control over your pockets [laughter], who take valuations of your property, whose
action as public officers is most interesting to you,
each elector votes for one, and yet two are selected.
In this case you are secured, I presume, against par tiality and injustice in the administration of the tax
laws by dividing those officers between political
parties.
I am told, also, that in selecting your school direc tors each school division or ward has twelve directors
who have charge of your school system-one-third,
37 
38      PRPOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
that is four, elected in each year. In voting, each
elector votes for but three, so that it ordinarily hap pens that the fourth man chosen each year will be
of a different opinion politically from the majority
of his fellow-directors; will represent in the govern mnent of the school district one kind of opinion,
while the greater number of his colleagues will
represent another.
At the last session of your State Legislature a law
was passed which took from the commissioners of
counties and sheriffs the selection of jurors for the
several courts throughout the Commonwealth.
Great complaints were made in this matter, espe cially in the interior of the State. You had a par ticular arrangement in the city which has not been
disturbed, to wit: the selection of jurors by the
judges of the several courts, in order to insure impartiality and fairness and prevent the intrusion of
political interests or passions in the selection of
your jurors. But in the interior the duty of selecting jurors, which was formerly charged upon the
commissioners and the sheriffs of the several counties,
was taken away at the last session of the Legislature
and confided to two officers in each county, who are
to be called jury commissioners.   The presidentjudge in each county has some function or duty in
connection with these officers-it is somewhat doubtful what it is; the law was badly drawn-but substantially the power of selection heretofore exercised
by the ordinary officers of counties to whom I have
referred is now to be confided to these jury commissioners.
How are they to be chosen? As in the case of 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
inspectors of election, where one candidate alone is
voted for, but two are to be chosen. By this means
it is to be supposed that there will be fairness in the
selection of jurors throughout the State, and the
abuse which has heretofore prevailed will be removed from our system —the abuse that in Republican counties Democratic citizens were excluded to
an unreasonable extent from the jury-box, and that
on the other hand in Democratic counties Republican jurymen were unreasonably excluded. Here
again is a limitation upon the elector.  He shall
vote for but one of these officers, who are to select
the men who may sit upon questions which relate to
his life, to his property, or to his reputation, and yet
by this limitation fuller representation of the people
and fairness in trials are secured. I think that a
much wiser arrangement might have been made
than that. If I had possessed power to mold the
law upon this subject I would have simply changed
the mode in which county commissioners are chosen.
I would have had them selected upon the plan of
the cumulative vote (which I will presently explain)
or upon the plan of the limited vote. We would
have obtained substantially in that way the same
result without two additional officers and without
certain inconveniences which attend upon the existing law.  But the object was laudable and the effect
which will be produced by that law will be salutary.
Public opinion will take hold of it and uphold it
hereafter as a just and wise arrangement, compared
with the one it superseded.
Let me illustrate this idea of limited voting which
has obtained in our State by a case taken from the
39 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
State of New York. Under the constitution of that
State every twenty years the question of reforming
the State constitution is to be submitted to a vote of
the people, and in case they vote in favor of a convention to amend the constitution one is to be called.
It happened last year that a convention was to be
called, and Governor Fenton proposed to the Legislature that in addition to the selection of delegates
from the representative districts of the State (one
from each) there should be thirty-two delegates
selected at large, and in selecting these thirty-two
delegates each elector in the State to vote for but
sixteen. His recommendation was adopted by the
Legislature, so that the existing constitutional convention of New York (it has not concluded the
performance of its duties) is constituted of representatives elected from the representative districts,
and of thirty-two delegates from the State at large.
Of the latter, sixteen belong to each political party,
for such was the inevitable effect of the plan adopted.
Many men went into the convention and are now
sitting in it who could not have been elected in their
several local districts, because the party with which
they were associated was in the minority therein.
In selecting delegates from the State at large this
was possible, and able men were selected on both
sides-men of great weight and great wisdom.
These cases of limited voting in our own State which
I have mentioned and this case in New York will
suffice so far as our own country is concerned.
Now, let me carry you to England for a short
time to see what has been done there in this same
direction.   In 1854, under the administration of
40 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
Lord Aberdeen, Lord John Russell introduced a reform bill which underwent protracted discussion in
the House of Commons. One feature of that bill
was that iii all constituencies electing three members
of Parliament no elector should vote for more than
two, the result of which would have been to give to
the minority class of electors ordinarily the third
member. That bill, however, did not become a law;
it fell, and other reform bills introduced since into
Parliament have failed.   But during the present
year a bill was passed through Parliament to amend
and reform the representation of the people of England in the House of Commons. That bill having
passed the House of Commons and being under consideration in the House of Lords on the 30th of
July last, Lord Cairnes moved to amend clause 8 of
the bill by adding, "at a contested election for any
county or borough represented by three members,
no person shall vote for more than two candidates."
This was substantially, if not in exact terms, the
same as the clause in the Russell reform bill of 1854.
After undergoing debate this amendment was adopted in the House of Lords by the following vote:
contents, 142; non-contents, 51, or by the large
majority of 91 in its favor. The bill being returned
with this and other amendments to the House of
Commons  was again considered  in that House.
Finally, upon the 8th of August, after prolonged
and exhaustive debate, in which men whose names
are known throughout the earth participated, upon
motion to strike out this amendment made by the
House of Lords the vote stood-ayes 204, noes 253,
being a majority of 49 in favor of retaining the pro
41 
42      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
vision, and it was retained by that vote; and the
bill subsequently passing and receiving the approval
of the Crown it became and is now the law of Great
Britain, (from which country we derive our political
descent and many of our principles of free government, including  that of representation.)   Henceforth, in the election of members of the lower house
of Parliament, where a constituency select three
members, two shall be given to the majority and one
to the minority of the electors, assuming that the
latter constitute so large a mass as one third of the
whole number. This is the most notable instance
of the application of the limited vote to secure the
representation of the whole political mass of the
community or of a particular constituency charged
with the duty and power of selecting representatives
for the enactment of laws.
By these instances, selected in our own country
and abroad, it is manifest that attention has been
largely drawn to this question of amendment in
representation-of mitigating the evils and inconveniences which must always arise under an unchecked, unmitigated, unamended majority rule.
THE CUMULATIVE VOTE.
But, gentlemen, I pass from the consideration of
this mode of amending representation to the second
form which propositions for that purpose have
assumed; in other words, I pass to the discussion
of the topic which is most interesting at this time
for our consideration. I mean the plan of cumulatiie voting, as it has been named.  This was in
the first instance proposed, explained, and advocated 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
by James Garth Marshall, a subject of the Crown
of Great Britain; and, by his proposition and his
advocacy of it, he has given his name to the political history of his country and to the political history of representative institutions everywhere in
future times: for no one previously had mastered
this subject with such grasp; no one had looked
into it with such intuitive perception of all its
characteristics and was able to strike precisely the
point where reform could be most safely and effectually introduced. It is preferable, infinitely preferable, to all propositions for securing the representation of all interests in society by any limitation
upon thie elector's vote in the manner of the various
propositions which I have already described.
This system or plan of cumulative voting has
been indorsed by John Stuart Mill in his work on
Parliamentary Reform and in his work on Representative Government, and since supported by him
ably in the House of Commons.   It has been
recommended, also, by Earl Grey in his work on
Parliamentary Reform, edition of 1864. It was
proposed during the consideration of the recent
Reform bill in the House of Commons by Mr.
Lowe, on the fifth of July last, and after debate
received the very respectable support of 173 votes.
It is beginning to attract in this country that degree
of attention which it merits, and which is naturally
provoked by the inquiry which has taken place
abroad. I shall describe it in a moment. For the
present I will simply say that the third proposition
of reform, known as personal representation, which
looks to other objects and to other consequences, I
43 
44     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
shall not attempt to discuss to-night. It invites us
over too wide a field of investigation for the time at
our disposal; and I may add that it involves so
many considerations and so much of prolonged
debate that, within the ordinary duration of a meeting, it would be impossible to exhaust the subject
or to come to any intelligent conclusion upon it. I
presume, also, speaking generally concerning it, that
it will be a considerable time before we shall be in
possession of that amount of experience and of discussion which are requisite to its adoption in this
country.
Now, what is cumulative voting?  I propose that
what is known by this term shall be applied to the
election of representatives in Congress and to the
choice of electors of President and Vice President
of the United States. It admits, also, of application
to the selection of senators and representatives in the
several State Legislatures, and to the selection of
county commissioners, and many other officers.
In what I shall say at this time, however, I shall
confine myself, in the discussion of this plan, mainly
to the election of Representatives in Congress. This
reform can be introduced by act of Congress without
any constitutional change; and the plan can be applied to the election of presidential electors by the
Legislatures of the several States, who, under the
Constitution, have committed to them the power of
providing the manner in which those electors shall
be chosen. What, then, is cumulative voting? It
is that where more than one officer is to be chosen
the elector in the first place shall possess as many
votes as there are persons to be chosen, and next, he 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
may bestow those votes at his discretion upon the
whole number of persons to be chosen, giving one
vote to each, or upon any less number, cumulating
his votes upon one, two, three, or any other number
less than the whole. That is simple in its statement,
although its effect, the practical character of the
proposition, requires some reflection and prolonged
experience to its entire comprehension. What is its
effect?  It is that any political interest in a community, whether in a State or in a division of a State,
if it can ascertain about the relative proportion which
its strength bears to the whole mass of the vote, or
to the vote of an opposing interest, may cast the
suffrages of its members in such manner that they
will tell upon the result; and it will happen that
every man, or about every man who votes, will vte
for a candidate who will be chosen, and there iI
be no such thing as unrepresented minorities left.
They will be wiped out of the systemin; they will no
longer exist.  To speak of this as a plan for the
representation of minorities is an abuse of terms,
because it conveys no idea which attaches to the
plan. Far be it from us to arm a minority with
power which we know even majorities abuse! The
proposition now submitted to us is not that there
shall be majorities and minorities known in elec tion returns, but that the men who vote shall vote for
those who will be chosen, and who will in point of
fact represent them.
I cannot better illustrate the scheme than by the
case of Vermont, which I have used on another oc casion.  There are 60,000 voters in Vermont, of
whom 40,000 are memlbers of the Republican party
45 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
and 20,000 of the Democratic party. I speak in
round numbers. By law that State is entitled to
three Representatives in Congress, because her
population, under the Constitution of the United
States, authorizes the allotment of that number to
her.  Now, what ought to take place there?  The
majority should elect two Representatives, having
40,900 voters, and the minority should elect one,
having 20,000 voters; but can that be so in point of
fact at present?  If the electors of that State vote
for three Representatives by general ticket the ma jority would elect the whole three. If the State be divided up into single districts, it is a matter of chance
how the result will be, whether all three districts
will have majorities of the same political complexion
or not. I say it is a matter of chance; nay, more
thl-h that, it is a matter of honesty in the Legislature of the State, and any political majority that
has control of the Legislature will very likely form
the districts to suit its own interests.  We know
that these things occur everywhere. By cumulative voting, by authorizing the 20,000 minority
electors of that State to give each three votes to one
candidate, that candidate would receive 60,000 votes,
and the majority cannot defeat him. The majority
voting for two Representatives can elect them, but
they cannot elect the third. Suppose they attempt
to vote for three candidates, they can only give each
of them 40,000 votes, and the minority candidate
has 60,000. If they attempt to vote for two, as they
ought to do, that being the number they are entitled
to, they can give them 60,000 votes each, the same
numiber that the minority candidate has.  If they
46 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
attempted to vote for one they would give that one
candidate 120,000; but of course they would not
throw away their votes in that foolish manner. The
practical result would be that the 40,000 majority
electors in that State would vote for two candidates
and elect them, and the 20,000 minority electors
would vote for one and elect him, and results analogous to this would occur all over the United States
if this system were applied. In every State the
freemen, each possessing an equal right with his
neighbor, would each vote for a Representative or
Representatives in Congress who would speak his
voice and obey his will, and thus you would obtain
throughout the country, in each State, an actual
representation of the whole mass of people on both
sides; honest representation instead of a sham; a
government by the majority in point of fact in Congress instead of an accidental result, which may be
one way or the other, and is just as likely to be minority rule as anything else, and always and under
all circumstances unjust rule.
Oh! gentlemen, what would happen then? Some
little men in the State Legislature, destitute of honor
but greedy of gain and of personal objects, would
no longer gerrymander your States [applause],
would no longer sit in quiet chambers concocting
injustice by law, studying how they can prevent
their neighbors from being represented in the government and get an undue share of public power for
themselves and for their friends. That iniquity
would be ended, and would be no more heard of
among us.  Why, gentlemen, at this moment, from
the British possessions upon the northeast to the
47 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
Golden Gate of the Pacific, there is probably not
one honest apportionment law for members of Congress, and you will scarcely ever have one, unless in
an exceptional case where one political interest shall
have control of the upper branch of a Legislature
and another of the lower, holding each other in
check, and compelling some degree of fairness in
the formation of the law.
I do not desire to speak on any topic which may
bear a partisan complexion. I am almost afraid to
cite cases lest I shall be thought to have an object
or purpose not openly avowed. Let me tell you the
difficulty in this case is in human nature, and you
must frame your system so that mischief will not
result. "It is necessary," said a great and wise
man, "that by the very constitution of things power
should be a check to power." What said Dr.
Priestly? "There is no earthly power that has
not grown exorbitant when it has met with no control."  Take  these words of men  who  thought
wisely and profoundly, and then look at your existing political action and see whether it is not a
struggle for power instead of a struggle for justice;
whether it is not a struggle by each interest to obtain all it can and to retain all it can, and to keep
away from an opposing interest anything like a fair
distribution of power or fair treatment.
It is necessary, then, gentlemen, that by your
fixed arrangements in your constitutions and laws
you shall curb the injustice of human nature; that
you shall so arrange your system that evil and selfish
men cannot pervert it to their own purposes and
to the injury of others.  A  system of cumulative
48 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
voting secures the government of the real majority
of the people. Instead of striking off a part of
them in the popular elections, they are all represented in the representative body, whether Congress
or the State Legislature, and there by a single
operation the vote is taken, the majority pronounced,
and a proposed law is enacted or defeated. Instead
of unjust representation and an eventual decision by
a representative majority moved and governed by a
caucus, you will have fair, equal, extended, complete
representation of the whole mass of the people and
the proper voice of the majority pronounced in the
representative body.
I repeat, this is no plan for minority representation
merely; it is a plan for the representation of the
whole people, a device by which the majority shall
rule and shall pronounce its voice in a fair and
honest manner. Again, a system of cumulative
voting would secure to you in your legislative bodies
men  of high ability, and secure them for long
periods of time, because elections would not be subject to the uncertainties which attend ordinary elections under the majority rule. A political party in
Pennsylvania, constituting about or near one-half
its electors, assuming that the State would be permanently entitled say to twenty-four members (the
present number), can keep about a dozen men continuously in Congress for a long period of time
Just as long as they retain the confidence of their
constituents they will be elected, because the merit
of this plan is that one part of the community cannot vote down another. Each will get its due share
of Representatives, and can keep it always simply
4
49' 
50      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
by giving votes only to the number which they are
entitled to have and which they can elect. This
system would secure contentment to men constituting minorities, as they are now known, because such
minorities would be abolished at popular elections,
and, although their representatives should be voted
down in representative bodies, they would be heard
there, and it is a great satisfaction for a man to be
heard even when judgment is pronounced against
him.  That is what we- suppose to be one great advantage of courts of justice; a man has his day in
court and he is heard; judgment is not pronounced
in his absence or without a hearing. Just so minorities in our country, as they are now constituted,
are dissatisfied and they always will be dissatisfied
under the present system. Let them be heard, and
if the decision is against them in the legislative
body they will acquiesce, because they have had
fair treatment. This is human nature. Every one
can see that that would be so. Would we not,
therefore, be less liable to revolt, to convulsion, to
war? Content your people, improve your system
so that it will work happily and properly, and you
crush out the seeds of political convulsion. [Applause.]
A CHECK ON CORRUPTION.
I shall not go over the other heads of the argu nient at length, because time will not permit me.
I insist as a principal argument, however, for this
mode of taking the sense of the electoral body, that
it would be a great check upon corruption. Now,
what causes corruption at our elections?  What
brings it into being? I submit that question to 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
you, gentlemen, as men of ordinary experience.
What is it? One candidate wants to get a majority
over another candidate. The district may be close,
or at least each side may have hopes of carrying
it; passion is aroused; to use a common expression
the blood is up; ambition calls, private interest
prompts. Here and there we know, for so the fact
stands revealed to us, a candidate, or the friends of
a candidate, will resort to corrupt means. For what
purpose? To get the balance of power, to turn the
scale; not to corrupt the great body of the electors,
but to gain the tenth, the twentieth, or the fiftieth
man who holds in his hands the balance of power
between political interests. In this manner these
contests for local majorities and for State majorities
between parties call into existence all the evil and
corrupt influences which attend our elections. A
man at Harrisburg or at Washington is expected to
distribute patronage around his district, so that he
can get votes to beat somebody else when he comes
before the people again.  A  man with his pocket
full of accumulated gain, the result of his own thrift
and cunning or the accumulation of his ancestors,
wants a few votes to make a majority against an
opposing candidate, and he gives money to electioneering agents and does not inquire how it is applied.
After a while great complaints are made in your
community of a corrupt election. You hear such
expressions as "shocking,"  "horrible," "what  is
the country coming to; what is the social body and
what is the political body coming to?" Corruption
raises its head in America; it is the danger in our
path; it is the giant we have to fear, whose blows
51 
52  PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
will lay low our republican system if it shall ever
be prostrated. Does not your majority rule invite
all these evil  influences?   Go  out  and  make
inquiry about your last congressional election in
certain districts, and you will hear, "Oh, money
carried it; here was a boss who was bought up;
he had control of fifty or one hundred men;" in
another district another had control of fifty.or one
hundred electors, and the election was turned. It
required only a few votes to win, and away goes the
victor to his post of duty, to make laws for the
American people.   I am  not talking of things
abroad. This cry comes to you in this city. Yes,
corruption is increasing in America. And what
invites it? I will answer in a word-it is the
majority rule at popular elections which invites it;
it is because you have an unjust or imperfect system
by which nearly one-half of the community have
their voices stifled; the corrupt man buys a few
votes, and thousands of his fellow-citizens have no
voice in the Government; they are outvoted; five
votes will do it, if they create a majority, as well as
five thousand. Adopt a plan by which every political party and every political interest, if it choose,
can elect its men and can elect as many men as its
numbers entitle it to, and you are done with this
abuse of corrupting votes to turn the scale, you are
done with this purchase of majorities, you are done
with this scandal of your system, and you have
taken the most effectual guarantee which, with our
present information, it is possible for us to secure
for its integrity and perpetuity hereafter. [Great
applause.] Under a system of cumulative voting, 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
in the present Congress the delegation from this
State would stand twelve Republicans and twelve
Democrats.  Why?  Because each party has three
hundred thousand votes in this State, and each one
knowing that its strength was about equal to the
other, would have cumulated its votes upon twelve.
men and elected them, and there would have been
a fair representation of the State. Vermont would
have had two majority and one minority members
as I have shown. Kentucky, which sends nine
Democratic members, would have sent at least three
Republicans in her delegation, under a sound mode
of voting; and Maryland, instead of one Republican member out of five, would have sent two; in
Connecticut, instead of three Democratic Representatives out of four, there would have been two,
because the vote of the State was about a tie; and
so throughout the Union. You cannot take a State
and examine the facts relating to it in any authentic
publication without seeing this element of injustice
entering into your system and poisoning it at its
very fountain.
I need hardly say-and this is, perhaps, a delicate
branch of my speech-that if in any part of this
Union we are to have two classes of voters, distinguishable by race or color, a very considerable part
of the mischief and evil which the opponents of the
extension of suffrage apprehend would be prevented
or removed by the adoption of the cumulative vote.
Instead of the cry being raised, "one race votes
down another and has its heel upon it "-we have
heard that all over the North, and we know how
powerfully it has influenced the elections-instead
53 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
of that cry it would be announced that each race
obtained representation in proportion to its numbers,
without direct antagonism or collision. This, however, is an argument for gentlemen in a different
position from myself. As to them it ought to be
decisive in favor of their rendering support to the
plan of cumulative voting which I advocate.
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.
Now, gentlemen, a few words as to the application
of this system to the selection of presidential electors. General Jackson proposed that the people of
the United States should vote directly for President
and Vice President, instead of voting for electors in
their several States, and this proposition, at several
times, has been brought forward in Congress. At
the last session it was again introduced by Mr.
WVADE, now President of the Senate, and was defended by him in an argument. Great complaint is
made that the people are not heard directly in the
choice of President; that the electoral colleges are
useless or inexpedient; that they should be removed
from our system, and each voter be permitted to
vote directly for the President of his choice.
Gentlemen, a system of cumulative voting by the
citizens of Pennsylvania, which can be provided by
an act of their Legislature as I understand the constitution, would secure to our citizens, if not the pre-.
cise objects sought by the friends of that reform, at
least greater advantages than it would confer. The
result would be that each of the political interests
existing in this State would select as many electors
as they were entitled to by their numbers, and each
54 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
would be felt proportionably in the presidential
election. How is it now? Do you not know what
is coming on next year in our State? Six hundred
thousand votes are to be polled for presidential electors. Each party has about three hundred thousand. What is going to take place? From Lake
Erie to the Delaware this State is to be convulsed;
a thousand disagreeable circumstances are to attend
the election; men's minds are to be taxed and worried for months; men of property are to have their
attention turned to the security of their investments.
All the unpleasant and illegitimate influences which
attend elections, and to which I have referred, will
be called into existence in that great approaching
struggle. And why? Because whichever interest
obtains a majority in this State, though it be a majority of but one vote, secures twenty-six electoral
votes for President of the United States, and the
struggle will be for the little majority which turns
the scale. Now, do we not all see at a glance what
the fact is? Each party is entitled to thirteen of
these electors, or about that number, because they
are composed of American freemen who are entitled
to an equal voice in our common government. But
both cannot secure electors; the whole twenty-six
must be given to one side, and perhaps that result
will determine the government of this country not
only for four years to come but for four centuries.
We enter upon the canvass as a game of chances,
fearful that the most adroit and unscrupulous interest of the two in the State can command the result;
that there will not be a fair struggle between the
men who are honest and those who are not. Let
55 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
us have honest voting;  let each party have the
presidential electors that its numbers entitle it to,
and let them be felt upon the general result; let
the people in each of the other States vote as we
vote, and let the majority of Americans decide the
contest.
CONVENIENCE AND JUSTICE OF NEW PLAN.
Finally, this plan of representative reform is
convenient in a high degree; it is both practicable
and convenient. It requires in this State nothing
of legislation except simply to permit a citizen who
has, say, twenty-four votes for members of Congress
and twenty-six for presidential electors, to cast those
votes as a freeman, according to his own choice and
pleasure; let him bestow them upon any smaller
number, for instance, giving two to each of twelve
candidates, or four to each of six. Trust the people,
and their common sense will regulate their action.
You do not need-intricate laws, constitutions tinkered, or a great scheme of reconstruction. [Laughter.]
You are simply asked to trust the people, and pernmit them; when  they possess votes, to cast them
as they think best; as their judgment may  be
directed by views of public interest or public duty.
If we should have that system for electing members
of Congress and presidential electors next fall, we
could each go to the polls and vote for twelve Representatives in Congress to sit for Pennsylvania, and
for thirteen electors of President and Vice-President; or, if any one should think that the political
interest with which he is associated is flourishing
56 
5,7
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
and growing in strength, so that it is entitled to
one additional member, he could vote for thirteen
Representatives. If he should be mistaken in his
calculation, he would fail as to one of his votes;
numbers would be counted exactly, and there would
be no injustice.
Now, I must point out one additional special
injustice of the ordinary majority rule at elections,
unmitigated by any such plan as that proposed.
Observe that the party which prevails at the election does not merely carry the day, does not merely
get its votes counted and get the result appropriate
to the counting of them; but it gets all the power
which belongs to the other side in addition to its
own. Suppose that the two parties in Pennsylvania
are so divided that one has 300,000 votes and the
other 301,000.  In choosing electors of President
and Vice-President the 301,000 who prevail, who
have 1000 majority, do not merely get their votes
counted in the presidential election, do not merely
influence the result in selecting our Chief Magistrate by their own votes, but they have in effect
counted into their vote the votes of their opponents,
the other 300,000. Your 301,000, constituting the
majority in the State, wield the political power of
the whole 601,000-wield not only their own appropriate power but a power which does not belong to
them but belongs to the political interest opposed to
them.
That is what sharpens this injustice of disfranchisement, and that is the reason why, in legislative
bodies, a little turning of the popular scale gives
one party or another, when in point of fact parties 
58      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
are nearly equal, such a mass of preponderating
power.
Take the elections which occurred in 1866 in the
States north and west, the States formerly called the
free States. In those elections 2,000,000 voters (in
round numbers) voted Republican tickets for mem bers of Congress in the respective States. The
other party, the Democracy, polled in those States
at those elections a little over  1,600,000 votes.
What  was  the result?   To  Congress  1,600,000
voters chose twenty-eight Representatives only, and
the 2,000,000 voters one hundred and forty-three!
The proportion between the two great masses of our
electoral population, known by the respective party
names, was twenty to sixteen in votes actually
polled in the States to which I have referred. The
Representatives to Congress selected at those elections from those States, instead of standing as
twenty to sixteen, stood one hundred and fortythree to twenty-eight.  And why?  Because under
the majority rule at elections in those States the
majority not only obtained representation in Congress for its own votes, but obtained the greater part
of the representation that belonged to the other
side. Under a system of cumulative voting representation in Congress would have stood about in the
proportion of twenty to sixteen, just as the actual
*votes ran in those States.  Do you not see how the
whole policy of your Government can be changed;
how the voice of the people may be stifled; how
republican institutions may be made a farce and a
sham, and that under a system which you are falsely 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
told secures the fair rule of a majority as a principle
that is sacred?
AN OBJECTION ANSWERED.
Gentlemen, I have already occupied so much time
that I must omit any detailed examination of the
arguments against cumulative voting. I can notice
only one or two of them briefly. It is said that a
system of elections such as I have described would
deprive particular localities of representation; that
there would be a combination of great and powerful
communities within a State against some particular
districts, and those districts which now have Representatives would be disfranchised. This argument
has been made in Great Britain; it is likely to be
repeated here, and it is perhaps the only one deserving any considerable attention.   Of  course my
political reading and political thought have been
against the undue concentration of power at any
particular point, whether Washington, Harrisburg,
Philadelphia, or elsewhere, and I have been in favor
of its distribution, as far as possible, into all the
local communities into which the State or the country is divided. And this objection, from my point
of view, deserves respectful treatment and respectful
answer. I have to observe, then, that, in my opinion, particular localities within a State would have
a due voice and due influence in the selection of
candidates; that if they were selected by a common
body, by a State convention, any attempt to disfranchise any particular section of the State would be
met by a counter combination in the interest of fair
play, and that the practical result would be that
59 
60      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
there would be on the whole a fair distribution of
political power in the different parts of the State by
the selection of candidates. If, however, any difficulty were apprehended on this ground, there might
be a rule adopted by which nominations should be
made by districts, a thing very often done in counties and also in States. It would be a rule to a
party in making its selections that there should be
a distribution of its candidates according to district
divisions, either those established for other purposes
by some general State law or established by the particular party organization for its own purposes of
selection or distribution.
But the conclusive answer to the objection is this,
that any important locality would have the power
to defend itself against such injustice; and that is
one of the merits of this system of cumulative voting.
If there was an attempt to disfranchise the city of
Philadelphia, to prevent her returning her four
members to Congress, and the thing was gross and
glaring, what could she do under a system of cumulative voting? Just combine her vote on her four
men and elect them in spite of all the other electors
in the State, and thus any attempt at injustice in
any section of the Commonwealth might be resented
by the people aggrieved by cumulating their votes
upon one or more local candidates of their own.
They could defeat any such attempt at injustice and
defend themselves against it, and the fact that they
had such power of defense would always secure a
just distribution of nominations.
Again, candidates being thus voted for by the whole
State, there would be opportunities for making bet 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
ter selections than are made by the district system.
Let me take an illustration on this point. What a
misfortune it would have been if the narrow intellectualities of our modern political reasoners had
controlled in England when Edmund Burke was a
candidate before the electors of Bristol in 1780; a
distinguished member of Parliament, whose name
is given to the literature of the world for all future
ages.   He  stood up  in the British Parliament
defending the just rights of the American colonies.
Words in our behalf which yet echo through the
world were heard with admiration and pride even
by those opposed to him in the House of Commons.
But they were heard with other feelings in Bristol,
which he represented in Parliament; and when he
went down to his constituents, instead of re-electing
they rejected him; he was voted down; his own district had a local majority against him of men who
hated America, who were with the king in the war
he waged against our fathers.  Their passions and
prejudices were roused against their eloquent representative who had defended America in the Parliament of the empire; he was defeated under the
majority rule and a single district system. Fortunately, he was returned to Parliament by another
constituency, who thought it an honor to be represented by him, and he continued in the House of
Commons as long as he lived, adorning it by his
eloquence and his genius, and giving his name to
his country and to the world as a cherished recollection for all time. In our country, under similar
circumstances, such a man would remain out of
Congress or out of other legislative body upon a
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62      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
defeat in his district. He would be ostracised from
the councils of his country, his voice silenced, his
career would be closed. What does cumulative
voting do? It enables the freemen of a State to
select their Burkes and their.Websters, their Clays
and Calhouns, wherever they may be in a State, and
to use their abilities so long as they please in shaping the legislation and administration of the governmeilt of the country. [Applause.] No ability, no
merit, no eminence, no greatness, could be stifled in
any of our States under this system.  The majority
rule, which would seem to have been invented to
submerge merit and to lift mediocrity, would  no
longer operate its course unchecked in American
politics; the freemen of our country would have a
breadth of choice which  they would  exercise, I
doubt not wisely, to the advantage of themselves
and of future generations.
Our experience in this State and in other States
is not in favor of carrying the idea of single districts very far. I drew the amendment to the Constitution of our State by which your city is broken
into single districts. [Applause.] What was the
idea of that amendment? It was that one political
interest should not absorb the whole sixteen or
eighteen representatives you send to the Legislature;
that a little shifting majority one way or the other
should not cast that large number of votes on one
side or the other at Harrisburg. The idea was to
break up the political community,  and allow the
different political interests which compose it, by
choosing in single districts, to be represented in the
Legislature of the State. Unfortunately, when that 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH.
arrangement was made for your city (and for Pittsburg also, to which it will soon apply), this just,
equal, almnost perfect system of voting, which I have
spoken of to-night, was unknown; it had not then
been announced abroad or considered here, and we
did what best we could. Now, however, if a change
were to be made, I suppose the same current of
opinion and of sentiment would have course in this
State which has prevailed in New York, where the
system of single districts throughout the State for
the election of members of the Assembly or lower
legislative branch of that State has lost credit. The
idea is very generally abandoned by thinking and
reflecting men in that State.  It is a failure; it has
not produced the results which it was supposed
would flow from it. Cumulative voting, however,
comes in, and it is a principle which is capable of
extended application to popular elections, where
more than a single officer is to be chosen.  It can
be applied to the election of Senators and Representatives in the Legislature from your city and
from each of the counties of the State, or from districts into which the State might be divided, and
you may thus get in the government of your State
that fair and equal representation which you ought
to claim and which is your due as citizens of a free
State.
After some further remarks, Mr. BUCKALEW concluded as follows:
Gentlemen, I have said most of what 1 proposed
to say this evening, so far as points of argument are
concerned. I omit some minor points, and I omit
filling up the outline of the argument. I have said
63 
64      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
what I supposed was most essential. And now, in
conclusion, let me say that I appear here to discuss
this subject before you for no purpose of idle display
or of amusement, but with a proper object; with an
idea to its examination and discussion by others;
and what I shall desire, and what will repay me a
thousandfold for any inconvenience in attending
here and any effort in speaking, will be the support
of the press and people of Philadelphia to a new,
improved; and honorable system of electoral action
by which our representative system in this country
will be vastly improved, and by which the future of
our country will receive an additional guarantee and
security which will not fail it hereafter in peace or
in war. [Great applause.]
[The foregoing address was delivered before a large and intelligent audience at the request of some gentlemen of Philadelphia, who desired the subject of reformed voting to be presented to the people of that city. Hon. Alexander Cummings
presided over the meeting and introduced the speaker with
appropriate remarks. The address was reported by D. F.
Murphy, the accomplished United States Senate Reporter, and
was published in the daily newspapers the following morning.] 
SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.
MARCH 2, 1869.
Mir. BUCKALEW, from the Select Committee on Representative
Reform, submitted the following
[To accompany bill S. No. 772.]
THE bill referred to the committee, and now reported by them, presents a question which deserves
deliberate examination both because it is important
and because it is new. It proposes to secure fair
and complete representation to every important political interest in the country; to strike an effectual
blow at corruption in popular elections; to secure
more of harmony and contentment than now exist
among the people, and to improve the composition
of the popular branch of Congress by facilitating
the introduction and continuance of men of ability
and merit in that body. That these results may to
a great extent be secured by it is, by the friends of
the measure, most positively affirmed. If the claim
made by them on its behalf be substantially true,
* Congresional Globe, 3d Sess. 40th Cong., Appendix, p. 268. Sen.
Corn. Report, same sess., No. 271.
5                                      65
v 
4
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
or true to any considerable extent, and the plan be
capable of convenient application, it will merit
strong commendation and prompt adoption.
THE PLAN.
Representatives being assigned to a State under
the constitutional rule of distribution, each elector
in the State shall possess as many votes as there are
representatives to be chosen. He shall possess his
due and equal share of electoral power as a member
of the political body or State. Thus far we deal
with familiar ideas which have heretofore obtained.
It is next proposed that the elector shall exercise
his right of suffrage according to his own judgment
and discretion, and without compulsion of law. He
shall bestow or distribute his votes upon or among
candidates with entire freedom, and shall be relieved
from that legal constraint to which he has been
heretofore subjected. He may select his candidate
or candidates anywhere within the limit of his State
from among all its qualified citizens, and he may
exert his political power upon the general representation of his State instead of the representation of a
particular district within it. Here is unquestionably a large and valuable extension of privilege to
the citizen, a withdrawal from him of inconvenient
and odious restraint, and a more complete application of that principle of self-government upon
which our political institutions are founded. And
what is material for consideration is, that while all
the advantages of a plan of election by general
ticket are secured, all its inconveniences and evils
are avoided.
,I,.,
W
66 
SENATE REPORT.
FORMIER PLANS-THEIR IMPERFECTIONS.
Formerly when elections of representatives in
Congress were had by general ticket, a great inconvenience resulted which became at last offensive and
intolerable. For a political majority in a State, organized as a party, and casting its votes under a majority or plurality rule, secured in ordinary cases
the entire representation from the State and the minority were wholly excluded from representation.
To avoid this inconvenience and evil which had become general throughout the country, Congress interposed, and by statute required the States to select
their representatives by single districts, that is to
divide their territory into districts, each of which
should elect one member. This contrivance, dictated by Congressional power, ameliorated our electoral system, mitigated the evil of which general
complaint had been made, and was an unquestionable advance in the art of government amongst us.
But retaining the majority or plurality rule for elections and restricting the power and free action of
the elector, it was imperfect in its design and has
been unsatisfactory in practice. It has not secured
fair representation of political interests, and it has
continued in existence in a somewhat mitigated form
the evils of the plan of election by general ticket
which it superseded. Still, one body of organized
electors in a district vote down another; electoral
corruption is not effectually checked, and the general result is unfair representation of political interests in the popular house of Congress.   Besides, the
single district plan has called into existence incon
67 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
veniences peculiar to itself and which did not attach
to the former plan.
It excludes from Congress men of ability and
merit whose election was possible before, and thus
exerts a baneful influence upon the constitution of
the House. Two causes operate to this end. In
the first place no man who adheres to a minority
party in any particular district can be returned, and
next, great rapidity of change is produced by fluctuation of party power in the districts.
Again, the single district system gives rise to
gerrymandering in the States in the formation of
districts. Single districts will almost always be unfairly made. They will be formed in the interest of
party and to secure an unjust measure of power to
their authors, and it may be expected that each successive district apportionment will be more unjust
than its predecessor.  Parties will retaliate upon each
other whenever possible. The disfranchisement suffered through one decade by a political party may be
repeated upon it in the next with increased severity,
but if it shall happen to have power in the legislature
when the new apportionment for the State is to be
made, it will take signal vengeance for its wrongs and
in its turn indulge in the luxury of persecution.
MODES OF VOTING DESCRIBED.
The manner in which the right of suffrage shall
be exercised, always a question of high importance,
is one of difficulty also. It has been regulated in
various ways in our States and in foreign countries,
but must be considered in many respects as still
open to debate. We have pretty generally adopted
68 
SENATE REPORT.
the vote by secret ballot for popular elections, but
whether votes be given by secret or open ballot, or
by voice, a question will remain as to the manner in
which they shall be bestowed upon or distributed
among candidates. Where but one representative
or other official is to be chosen by a constituency, it
is readily understood that a single vote is to be given
by each elector to the candidate of his choice, and
such is the uniform regulation. But where more
than one person is to be chosen by a constituency,
the manner of bestowing votes upon candidates is a
question of more difficulty, and various regulations
have been made or proposed concerning it. Several
of these it is necessary to mention and describe before proceeding to the main matters to be examined
in this report.
The vote by general ticket.-By the general ticket
plan of distributive voting the elector has assigned
to him a number of votes equal to the whole number of persons to be chosen, and is authorized to
bestow them singly upon a like number of candidates.   Upon  this plan presidential electors are
chosen in all the States except Florida.
The vote by single districts.-By the single district plan the general constituency is divided into
parts by territorial lines and each part constituted a
sub-constituency to vote separately and choose one
person. The voter casts a single vote for his candidate and has no participation in the action of the
general constituency beyond the giving of his district vote. Upon this plan, prescribed by statute,
representatives in Congress are now chosen.
The limited vote.- The limited vote obtains
69 
70      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
where the voter is forbidden to vote for the whole
number of persons to be chosen by the constituency,
but is authorized to give single votes to each of a
less number or a single vote to one.
The cumulative vote.-The cumulative vote is the
concentration of two or more votes upon one candi date or upon each of a greater number. It may obtain whenever the voter has assigned to him more
votes than one and is permitted to cast them otherwise than singly among candidates.
The unrestricted or free vote. —The unrestricted
or free vote obtains where the voter has assigned to
him a number of votes equal to the whole number
of persons to be chosen by the constituency, and is
permitted to cast them according to his own discretion and choice without legal restraint. In such
case he may bestow them all upon one candidate,
or distribute them singly among candidates, or
cumulate them upon more candidates than one, or
cast a part of them singly and a part of them
upon the principle of cumulation, precisely as his
judgment may direct him and the possibilities of
the case may permit.
SUPERIORITY OF THE FREE VOTE.
The unrestricted or free vote is more comprehensive and flexible than the others, and it includes many of their features and may be used to
accomplish their objects. It involves or includes
the vote by general ticket without the restriction
that but one vote shall in any case be given to a
candidate. It may be used to accomplish the purposes of the limited vote and of single district
voting in a just, effectual, and popular manner, and 
SENATE REPORT.
it includes completely the cumulative vote, with
which it is in character closely allied. In brief, it
combines the advantages of other plans without
their imperfections, while it is not open to any
strong objection peculiar to itself. The ingredient,
however, of greatest value and importance contained
in it, and the one particularly fitted to regenerate
and give credit to elections is the principle of the
concentration of votes. In fact for practical purposes in dissertation or argument upon the question
of electoral reform, the terms "cumulative vote"
and  "free vote" may  be interchangeably used,
though the latter is most appropriate and accurate
to indicate a plan which commonly involves distribution as well as concentration of votes, and sometimes even the giving of single votes to particular
candidates.
HOW FAR IT CAN BE APPLIED.
The bill now reported by the committee applies
the unrestricted or free vote to the selection of representatives in Congress from the several States, and
the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the
United States reported by the committee onil the 29th
of January will, if adopted, empower Congress to
apply that vote (or some other proper reform) to the
selection of electors of President and Vice-President
of the United States.
By the fourth section of the first article of the
Constitution power is clearly conferred upon Congress to pass a bill regulating the manner of holdimg elections for the choice of representatives.  The
times, places, and manner of holding such elections
are to be prescribed in each State by the legislature
71 
72     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
thereof, but the Congress may at any time make or
alter such regulations. This power was exercised
by the passage of the act of Congress which provides that representatives shall be chosen in the
several States by single districts instead of by
general ticket, which had been the general practice
before, and it is equally competent for Congress to
prescribe a still different manner for choosing them,
subject only to such other provisions of the Constitution as may relate to the same subject. The free
or cumulative vote or other like reform may, therefore, be introduced simply by the enactment of a
statute. No constitutional amendment will be necessary for the purpose.   But as to the choice of
presidential electors the case is different, as before
stated. The first section of the second article of the
Constitution provides that each State shall' appoint
electors "in such manner as the legislature thereof
may direct." Congress may determine the time of
choosing the electors and fix a uniform day on which
they shall give their votes, but cannot prescribe the
manner in which they shall be chosen. To accomplish any reform in the manner of choosing them
through the instrumentality of an act of Congress,
an amendment to the Constitution will be necessary.
That such amendment is desirable, and that it is necessary also to the introduction of any reform whatever in the manner of choosing electors, will be
hereafter shown.
ARGUMENTS FOR ITS ADOPTION.
Recurring now to the question of representative
reform raised by the bill reported by the committee, 
SENATE REPORT.
we will proceed to state those grounds of argument
which recommend the adoption of the unrestricted
or free vote.
ITS SIMPLICITY AND CONVENIENCE OF APPLICATION.
The first consideration to be taken into account is
the simplicity and convenience of this plan of reform.
It is easily understood, convenient of application,
and will readily adapt itself to all new or changed
conditions of political society. It is self-adjusting,
and requires no law whatever to enforce it or afford
it a sanction beyond the act which shall simply call
it into existence. The number of representatives to
which a State shall be entitled being first ascertained
under the rule of distribution contained in the Constitution, the law will simply declare that each voter
of the State shall have as many votes as there are
representatives to be chosen from his State, and at
that point will stop, leaving the voter perfectly free
to cast his votes according to his own judgment and
discretion.
The voter may then exercise his right according
to any of the plans relating to the distribution or
concentration of votes which have heretofore been
the subject of discussion, including those which
have and those which have not been prescribed by
legal enactment. But inasmuch as our political
communities will always be divided into political
parties, (or so long as our free institutions remain
to us,) it must happen that the voter will exercise
his right with direct reference to his party associations-to- the interests of the party to which he shall
belong. He will vote (as he votes now) as a party
73 
74     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
man, and for candidates who have been selected
by some form of nomination-by some agreement
or concert of action among men of common views
and common interests. The inevitable result will
be that political parties and the voters who compose
them will obtain fair and complete representation
by distributing or concentrating their votes in such
manner as to secure it, and nothing can be more
certain than that they will be better judges of
their own interests than the lawmaker possibly
can be. For they will act with a full knowledge
of all the facts which pertain to an election-of the
relative strength of parties at the time-the probable amount of the aggregate vote to be polled, and
generally of the effect of their voting in any particular manner. Of all these matters the lawmaker
must be profoundly ignorant, or must conjecture or
assume them at random. Hle cannot foreknow the
future, nor adapt his arrangements to the everchanging conditions of political society.
It is for this reason that imperfection will always
attach to the limited vote as a general plan to be
applied to popular elections. The lawmaker cannot
know that his arbitrary limitation will operate justly
and secure his object at some future time. If he
could know the exact relative strength of parties
in future years, he might apply his limitation to a
constituency with confidence. Adjusting it to the
facts, he could obtain a proper result. As this
cannot be, the limited vote can be but partially
applied to elections and must in most cases be unsatisfactory. It has rarely been applied to constituencies selecting more than three representatives, 
SENATE REPORT.
and can never be accepted as a plan for extensive
use and application.
The unrestricted or free vote, however, is not
open to these observations. It will adjust itself to
all cases, and it will have the most important and
effectual sanction; for it will be put under the guardianship of party interest, always active and energetic, which will give it direction and complete effect
to the full and just representation of the people.
ITS CONFORMITY TO REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES.
The unrestricted or free vote is in strict conformity with democratic principles, and realizes more
perfectly our ideas of popular government. For
by it the whole mass of electors are brought into
direct relations with government, and particularly
with that department or branch of government (the
principal one in power, if not in dignity) which
makes the laws.   All will participate really in
choosing representatives, and all will be represented
in fact. Now, the beaten body of electors choose
nothing, unless it be mortification, and are not represented at all. For the theory that they are represented by the successful candidates against whom
they have voted-that those candidates when installed in office represent them-is plainly false.
An elected official represents the opinions and the
will of those who choose him, and not of those who
oppose his selection. As to the latter he is an antagonist and not a representative; for his opinions
are opposed to theirs, and their will he will not
execute. And this must always be the case where
political parties act upon elections and a majority or
75 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
plurality rule assigns to one party the whole representation of the constituency. Our present system
of representation is therefore essentially partial and
imperfect, and our great object in reforming it must
be to make it full and complete. If we cannot
secure this object perfectly, it will be our duty, as it
should be our pleasure, to approach it as nearly as
possible.
Now, inasmuch as by extending to the elector
that freedom of choice and of selection which the
law has heretofore forbidden, we can strike from our
system of representative elections almost entirely the
element of disfranchisement and bring the whole
electoral body into direct and useful relations with
the representative body, we may congratulate ourselves that our reform, while it will be rich and
fruitful of results in the purification of elections, in
imparting energy and wisdom to government and
contentment to the people, will also be strictly republican in character and democratic in principle,
and will apply more perfectly than ever before those
ideas of self-government which inspired our ancestors when they established our political institutions.
THE FOUR GREAT REASONS FOR IT.
But we proceed to state the main reasons for the
unrestricted vote, without dwelling upon introductory points or upon those secondary reasons which,
while they may commend this plan of reform to us,
will not alone command its adoption. Those great
reasons (which speak with imperative voice to statesmen and to free constituencies everywhere) are four
76 
SENATE REPORT.
in number, and they will be mentioned in their
proper order.
1. It is just.
The unrestricted or free vote should be permitted
because it is just.  That this quality pertains to it
ill a high degree and constitutes one of its main
characteristics is beyond all question. It gives anil
equal voice to every elector of a State, secures the
elector from the peril of utter disfranchisement, and
affords to him also that freedom of choice which is
indispensable to his complete and useful exercise of
his right. A vote at any point or place in the State
is precisely as valuable and as important as at any
other point or place; location of the voter is immaterial as affecting his right or his consequence in the
electoral body, and no preference in privilege or
power is given or advantage allowed to one elector
over another.  Besides, (and this is the great consideration,) any material disfranchisement of electors is rendered almost impossible; for every political interest, of any considerable magnitude, in a
State, will have the complete opportunity afforded it
of concentrating its vote upon a proper number of
candidates and those candidates will be chosen, not
merely because they have more votes than other
candidates, (as under our present system,) but because they are the recipients of an adequate support.
One mass of voters will not vote down, defeat, or
disfranchise another. One candidate will not beat
another in the ordinary sense of that expression.
The full comprehension of this point may require
reflection by those to whom it is new, but no reflec tion is necessary to perceive the justice of a plan
77 
78      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
which will substantially strike disfranchisement fromnt
our electoral system. Lastly, it is but just that the
elector should have a greater freedom of choice than
is now allowed him, that his judgment should have
freer action, that he should enjoy all possible facili ties for performing his duty to his country in exer cising his right of suffrage. At present he is hedged
about and constrained by legal regulations which,
while wholly unnecessary to the public order and
peace, cripple and impede him in the performance
of his duty.  He is held responsible for the charac ter and action of the government, for in theory he
controls it by his vote, and yet he does not possess
all those facilities and rights the possession of which
will justify that responsibility and enable him to
discharge all its obligations.
In the matter of selecting representatives from
his State to Congress-perhaps the most important
of all electoral operations known in our countryhe is allowed to participate in the selection of but
one out of the whole number. The State may be
entitled by 6 to 12 or to 20 representatives, but the
judgment of the elector can be exercised upon the
choice of one only. As to all the rest, he is excluded from taking part in their selection.  Besides,
his choice of a single representative must be exercised within and for a particular district, arbitrarily
established by law, with such boundaries, population, interests, and political complexion as may happen to be convenient or agreeable to a majority in
the legislature of the State. And practically he
must select his candidate from among the men of the
district and is excluded from all choice beyond it. 
SENATE REPORT.
And when to all this we add that the elections
held in single districts are necessarily subjected to a
majority or plurality rule, which very commonly
renders a large part of the votes cast unavailing for
the purpose for which they are given, we have the
case fully presented as one of inconvenience and
hardship upon the electors The law has been busy
where it should have been inactive, and the voter is
bound by inconvenient and injurious restrictions,
which he can neither evade nor defy. It is time
that the hand of power be lifted from the citizen
and he -be permitted to perform his electoral duties
with all possible freedom.
The justice of the proposed reform is therefore
evident. It extends popular power upon a principle
of equality, limits disfranchisenment, and provides
the voter with necessary facilities for the exercise of
his right.
With good reason therefore did the London Times
in speaking of clause 9 of the reform bill of 1867,
(triumphantly carried in both houses of Parliament
upon full debate, and similar in principle to the
proposition before us,) declare-" that the idea of
modifying our electoral machinery so as to secure in
three-membered constituencies the proportionate
representation of both the great divisions of party,
has made its way by its inherent justice."
2. It will check corruption.
The unrestricted or free vote will greatly check
corruption at elections. It will take away the motive to corrupt, and thus strike anl effectual blow at
the source of a great evil.
79 
80      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
Now, money and patronage are usually expended
upon elections to secure a majority or plurality vote
to one or more candidates over one or more other
candidates, and are directed or applied to the com paratively small  number of electors in the constitu ency who hold the balance of power between parties.
Those persons being bought or seduced, victory is
secured. The importation of voters into a State or
district, or their fraudulent creation within it, is
with a like object.  And such corrupt influence or
practice when resorted to by one party, provokes
like conduct in an opposing one, until both become
tainted with guilt and unfitted for vindicating the
purity of elections. This evil grows in magnitude
yearly, and it will continue to increase until those
motives of interest which produce it shall be weakened or destroyed.
A new right to the elector, whether in the form
of the free or cumulative vote, or of personal representation, or a new protection to him in the form
of the limited vote, will check corruption; but of
these remedies the first is most practicable and effectual.  The limited vote (as will be hereafter shown)
cannot have extensive application, and it is but a
rude  contrivance.   Personal representation  is a
scheme of great theoretical merit; it has been tried
partially in Denmark, and it has received elaborate
vindication from authors of distinction in England,
in Switzerland, and in France.  But it may be put
aside from the present discussion, because it is comparatively intricate in plan and cumbrous in detail,
because it assails party organization, and because
some of its most important effects cannot be dis 
SENATE REPORT.
tinctly foreseen.   It is so radical in character, so
revolutionary in its probable effects, that prudence
will dictate that it should be very deliberately considered, and be subjected to local experiment and
trial before it shall be proposed for adoption upon a
grand scale by the government of the United States.
But why will the cumulative or unrestricted vote
check corruption? It will have this certain effect,
it will operate efficiently to this end, because it will
render any ordinary effort of corruption useless and
unavailing.    Thte corruption of  voters will not
change the result of an election: It will elect no
candidate and defeat no candidate in contested
States or districts, unless indeed it be carried on and
carried out upon a gigantic scale, beyond any ordinary example of the past or probable occurrence of
the future.
An average or common ratio of votes for a representation in Congress, taking the whole country
together, is now 25,000, and it will be much greater
in future times. Assume then that 600,000 votes
are to be cast in Pennsylvania at an election, of
which each political party has one-half, and that 24
representatives are to be chosen.  This is a supposition very nearly conformed to actual numbers in
that State. Now it is evident that either political
party, by resorting to the cumulative vote, can elect
12 representatives, and thus secure to itself exact
and just representation, and no art or effort of the
opposite party can prevent it. But suppose, further,
that corruption shall assail the election, and that
some thousands of votes shall be changed thereby,
or that in the interest of one of the parties so many
6
81 
82.PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
as 10,000 or 20,000 voters shall be imported into
the State, or be fraudulently created or personated
within it, in either case there will be no effect produced; the result will be unchanged; in short, in
the case supposed, a fraudulent increase of its vote
(and of the total vote) by a party, to the extent of
20,000, will not give to it any advantage, nor will
its corrupt acquisition of 5000 or 10,000 votes from
the opposite party. It follows that corruption will
in no ordinary case be resorted to; it will be effectually discouraged and prevented. And even in the
extreme case of the corruption of a large number
of voters in a State, the resulting evil will be reduced to its minimum.
Whit has been said concerning the choice of representatives will apply with equal, if not+ greater,
force to the choice of presidential electors. If the
repres-ntative presidential electors were chosen in
the several States (save those which have but one)
upon the plan of the cumulative vote, there would
be qs to them due representation of the people in the
electoral colleges, and the elections for choosing them
w,)uld receive a much needed purification. Millions
n,)w expended upon those elections would be kept
omlt of the hands of political agents and be applied
I) better and nobler uses.
That fireedom of the vote will have the effect
(laimed for it will more clearly appear from considering the manner in which the present plan of
elections operates to invite and produce corruption.
By considering the evil which exists we will be
better able to judge the merits of the remedy proposed. Popular elections in the States for federal 
SENATE REPORT.
or national purposes are either by a general ticket
for the whole State, or by a single ticket in district
divisions. As before stated, the former obtains in
the choice of presidential electors; the latter, in
the choice of representatives to Congress. But to
both is applied the plurality rule and a struggle
invited between candidates and parties for preponderance of vote.
Whichever can be made to outnumber an opposition upon the return will win the whole result and
will wield the entire power of the constituency in
an electoral college or in Congress. Antagonism is
thus made an essential element of the proceeding,
and the result presents to us the spectacle of victor
and vanquished, the former crowned with honor
and exultant in his strength, the latter humniliated
and powerless. And it is important to observe that
the successful party does not obtain merely a power
proportioned to its vote, does not merely obtain full
representation for itself, but obtains the whole power
of the constituency. The whole vote cast against it
or withheld from it is virtually counted to it and
added to its true vote.
An issue thus made up for popular elections must
be one portentous of evil; and, so far as it is
unnecessary to secure popular representation, must
be denounced as plainly unjust as well as injurious.
3. It will be a guarantee of peace.
The free vote will be a guarantee of peace to our
country, because it will exclude many causes of discord and complaint, and will always secure to the
friends of peace and union a just measure of politi
83 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
cal power. The absence of this vote in the States
of the south when rebellion was plotted, and when
open steps were taken to break the Union, was
unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men
of those States together and have given them voice
in the electoral colleges and in Congress. But they
were fearfully overborne by the plurality rule of
elections and were swept forward by the course of
events into impotency or open hostility to our cause.
By that rule they were largely deprived of representation in Congress. By that rule they were shut
out of the electoral colleges. Dispersed, unorganized, unrepresented, without due voice and power,
they could interpose no effectual resistance to secession and to civil war. Their leaders were struck
down at unjust elections and could not speak for
them or act for them in their own States or at the
capital of the nation. By facts well known to us we
are assured that the leaders of revolt, with much
difficulty, carried their States with them. Even in
Georgia, the empire State of the south, the scale
was almost balanced for a time between patriotism
and dishonor; and in most of those States it
required all the machinery and influence of a
vicious electoral system to organize the war against
us and hold those communities compactly as our
foes.
In those same States the free vote will now allay
antagonism of race, and will substitute therefor the
rivalry of parties formed with reference to the policy
of the general government. The tendency of party
is to form upon national issues, and not upon State
ones, and this tendency will operate more strongly
84 
SENATE REPORT.
if causes of offence between races shall be removed
or lessened. And what can accomplish this more
perfectly than the free vote? For under it one race
cannot vote down and disfranchise the other; each
can obtain its due share of power without injustice
to the other, and there will be no strong and constant motive (as now) to struggle for the mastery.
This fact (the importance of which cannot be overestimated) will allay animosity and prevent conflict.
And because the free vote will have this certain
effect it will nationalize parties in the south and will
be to the whole country an invaluable guarantee of
order and peace.
In extending suffrage largely, in extending it to
include many hundreds of thousands of voters of
another race than our own, it will become us to look
to our electoral machinery and to amend it in those
parts which have been found defective, or which do
not seem well adapted to the new strain to be put
upon it. Unquestionably there is a large mass of
honest opinion in the country opposed to colored
suffrage, and many of those who support it in Congress and out of Congress, put their support of it
upon the ground of necessity-upon the ground
that in order to secure the fruits of emancipation it
is necessary that the emancipated be armed with the
power of self-defence. A majority of this committee hold that colored suffrage is allowable and expedient, that the objections to it are to a great extent
misconceived, and that the fears felt and expressed
by many as to its results will not be realized. But
all must agree that this great experiment of extended suffrage, being once determined upon, should
85 
86      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
have a fair trial; that all the conditions proper to
its success should, as far as possible, be established
by the government. And those who sincerely believe that the experiment will have bad results must
approve a plan of voting which will certainly mitigate its possible evils. But the salutary effects of
the free vote as a guarantee of peace, though well
illustrated by the southern States, will not be confined to them. Everywhere it will decrease the
violence of party contests and create more amicable
relations than now exist among our people.
4. It will im7prove the character and ability of the
House.
The unrestricted or free vote will secure men of
ability and experience in the House of Piepresentatives. It is believed that changes are now too frequent in that House, and that the public interests
suffer detriment from this cause. The committee
give their unqualified approval to that provision of
the Constitution which assigns short termns of service to members of the House. But frequency of
election does not involve rapidity of change. Popular power may be retained over the House, and yet
the great part of its members be continued by reelection for a considerable period of time; in other
words, frequent elections and permanent membership are not incompatible.
But, in point of fact, the members of the House
are frequently changed so that members of less than
four years' service always constitute a large majority,
and it is a rare case that a member continues beyond
a third term. Under such a system or practice of 
SENATE REPORT.
rapid change, the average character of the House
for ability cannot be high. Two and four year men
can know but little of the business of government,
can be but imperfectly qualified to curb abuses in
the executive department, and to expose or comprehend the true character of most questions of domestic and foreign policy.
There are several reasons which account for frequent change in the membership of the House, of
which the single-district system is chief. The fluctuations of party power is next in importance, but
is intimately connected with the former. The single-district system has carried the idea of local
representation to excess, and has produced a class of
inconveniences peculiar to itself. The idea of assigning a representative by law to a special district
within a State is naturally supplemented by the idea
of rotation in the representative privilege among the
localities within the district. Hence, very commonly party nominations are made in turn to the
several counties, parishes, or other municipal divisions of the district, which necessitates the frequent
selection of new men for representative nomination.
The claim of locality becomes more importunate,
and it is often more regarded than the claims or fitness of candidates in making party nominations,
and this although there is no diversity of interest
among the people in the different parts of the district. The other cause which we have mentioned
co-operates with this, though subordinate to it in
effect. Changes of party power in districts, where
one party does not largely predominate over another, are at all times likely to occur, and to defeat
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88      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
the member of the House from the district, although
his own party may desire to continue him in the
public service. These causes of change would have
but slight operation if delegations from States were
elected by general ticket, and would have still less
if they were selected upon the plan of the cumula tive or free vote; and the general ticket system
being quite inadmissible, upon the reasons which
apply to it, we are driven to the cumulative or free
vote as the practical and effectual measure of reform.
It will continue members of merit for long periods
of time in the House, because it will relieve them
and those who support them from the causes of
change above mentioned. They can be re-elected
with certainty so long as the party whose representatives they are desire their continuance in service,
and it may be reasonably expected that somie men
of distinction and intellectual power will always be
found in the House whose period of service counts
by 20 or 30 years.  They will be the great representatives of party, and will give lustre and power
and usefuliness to the House, while they will be the
objects of profound attachment and of honest pride
in the States they represent. Congress will become,
much more than at present, a theatre of statesmanship and a fit representative of a great people, whose
extended territory, diverse populations, and varied
interests demand great ability and wisdom in the
enactment of the laws. Our present system, admirably calculated to repress merit and lift mediocrity,
will be supplanted by one which will produce precisely the opposite result.
At present a member of the House holding his 
SENATE REPORT.
seat insecurely cannot devote himself to public business with that zeal and confidence which his position demands.   He  is involved all the time in a
contest for official existence, and  his energies are
thereby absorbed and wasted. If he has a just ambition to serve the people he must repress rivals at
home, must overcome a rule of rotation in his district, and fortify himself against fluctuations of
party power. It will be expected of him that he
shall distribute the patronage of the government to
men who will be efficient in his support for re-election; and thus appointments to office and government contracts are to be his peculiar study, and
their distribution a leading object of his labor.
And he must be liberal in his expenditure of money
upon elections to retain his popularity and place;
and the more of political contribution from abroad
he can obtain to influence elections in his district
the more admired and the more secure he will be.
In brief, his time and his efforts, instead of being
expended for the public, must be expended on personal objects if he desires to remain for any considerable time a representative of the people.   Un doubtedly many of the best men of the country
must be deterred from entering upon a congressional
career, continuance in which requires such sacrifices
to an evil system, so much of unpleasant effort, at tended with uncertainty and probable mortification.
But freedom to the elector has one special advan tage, hitherto unnoticed, over single-district voting.
Under the district system a large part of the men of
a State are absolutely barred from election to Con gress. They cannot be chosen in districts where
89 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
their party has not a preponderance of vote. The
difference in strength between parties may be slight,
but it will virtually constitute a rule of exclusion,
which will always be rigidly enforced. But the
cumulative or free vote opens the doors of the people's house to any citizen of a State whenever those
who agree with him in opinion in his State will give
him a competent support. They can elect him to
Congress regardless of State or district majorities.
This is an advantage of immense value if republican
principles be true, and republican institutions be
worthy of being carried to their utmost limit of perfection as fit and proper for the use and enjoyment
of mankind.
EXAMPLES OF REFORM.
But let us turn from general argument upon elec toral reform to particular cases which will illustrate
its application. And first of cases in our own
country:
In Pennsylvania and in other States inspectors of
elections are chosen upon the plan of the limited
vote. Each voter is authorized to vote for but one
inspector, and yet two are to be chosen.   Thus,
whenever the minority party in an election district
can poll one-third of the whole vote they can secure
one of the inspectors, and obtain representation in
the election board of the district. This arrangement protects elections from fraud and injustice, and
is everywhere within the States which have adopted
it strongly sustained by public opinion. In fact,
even in districts where the majority has more than
a two-thirds vote the attempt is rarely made by them
to choose the second inspector.
90 
SENATE REPORT.
In Pennsylvania also jury commissioners in the
several counties are chosen upon the same plan.
But one is voted for by each elector, and yet two
are chosen.
For selecting delegates at large to the New York
constitutional convention in 1867 a similar plan was
adopted. Upon the recommendation of Governor
Fenton the legislature provided that thirty-two delegates at large should be chosen by the people-in
addition to the delegates from the representative
districts-and that in choosing them each voter
should vote for but sixteen. The consequence was
that each political party obtained sixteen of the delegates at large, many of whom could not have been
chosen upon a district plan, or upon a general ticket
devised in the ordinary way.
These instances in our own country illustrate the
principle of reform now in question, and many
others might be cited.  They show distinctly that
successful attempts have been made by our people
to break away from an unijust system of voting, and
to secure to themselves those advantages which full
representation is so well calculated to produce.
ENGLISIH REFORM.
But English authority and example may be called
in to aid the argument in a still more effectual manlner. The papers appended to this report from
authors and statesmen of high standing who have
in recent years examined this subject of popular represenitation with great fullness and power, may be
consulted with profit by any one desirous of understanding the general grounds of argument in favor
91 
92      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
of reform. And the debates and proceedings of
Parliament in 1867 upon the reform bill may also
be examined in connection with the returns of parliamentary elections in 1868 for further and most
valuable information.
On the 4th of July, 1867, Mr. Lowe (the present
chancellor of the exchequer in the Gladstone administration) moved the following amendment to
the reform bill in the House of Commons:
POWER TO DISTRIBUTE VOTES.
At any contested election for a county or borough represented by more than two members, and having more than one
seat vacant, every voter shall be entitled to a number of votes
equal to the number of vacant seats, and may give all such
votes to one candidate, or may distribute them among the candidates as he thinks fit.
This amendment (which was for the free vote including the principle of cumulation and applicable
generally to elections where more than one member
was to be chosen) was debated on the day when
offered and on the day following, and received the
very handsome support of 173 votes-a large vote
for a new proposition upon its first trial of strength.
Mr. Lowe's amendment was identical in principle
and almost identical in terms with the bill now
reported by this committee. The English proposition applied to the election of members of Parliament, the American applies to the election of members of Congress, but in both a free vote, including
the right of cumulation, is the essential idea, and the
object in view more complete and just representation
of the people.
On the 30th July, 1867, the reform bill being 
SENATE REPORT.
under consideration in the House of Lords, Lord
Cairns moved to insert the following new clause, to
come in after clause 8 of the bill:
At a contested election for a county or borough represented
by three members no person shall vote for more than two candidates.
This amendment, after an elaborate debate, was
adopted by a strong vote: contents, 142, not contents, 51; and an additional amendment was then
also adopted without a division that "at a contested
election for the city of London" (which is entitled
to four members) "no person shall vote for more
than three candidates."
The success of those amendments (which were
concurred in by the House of Commons on the 8th
of August) constituted an important event in the
history of representative institutions, for they recognized and gave application to a principle of justice
which will endure the test of trial and of time, a
principle which will hereafter receive indefinite extension, and wherever extended will purify elections,
insure contentment to constituencies, and elevate the
character and improve the action of free government.
Mr. Gladstone, speaking in the House of Commons, and confining his attention to his own country,
declared that the proposition or principle contained
in those amendments, if adopted at all, must be
adopted with the certainty that "it must unfold and
expand itself over the whole country and completely
reconstruct the system of distribution of seats."
And generally those who supported it in both
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94      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
houses of Parliament foretold and rejoiced in the
prospect of its future expansion.
Those amendmnents constitute the ninth and tenth
clauses of the reform act of 15th of August, 1867,
and their effect is illustrated by the parliamentary
elections of 1868. We give the returns for certain
districts:
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 1868.
Herefordsthire, three members. Average tory
vote, 3360; average liberal vote, 2074. Two tories
and one liberal elected.
Canmbridgesh,ire, three members.  Average  tory
vote, 3924; average liberal vote, 3310. Two tories
and one liberal elected.
The liberals also obtained the third member ill
each of the tory counties of Oxford, Bucks and
Dorset.
Liverpool borouyh, three members.   Average tory
vote, 16,404, average liberal vote, 15,198. Tory
majority, 1206.
In Liverpool the second seat, previously held by
the tories, was attacked by the liberals; the result
was a failure, as shown by the above vote. But the
third member was most justly secured to the liberals
under the certain operation of the limited vote, provided by clause 9 of the reform act.
Under the operation of the same clause the tories
obtained the third member for Leeds, and they carried mnembers also in Manchester and London.
Blackwood's Magazine, a tory organ, (it has called
itself "the oldest of the tories,") although it admits 
SENATE REPORT.
that its party has suffered loss to the extent of at
least four seats by the minority clause, says:
That to the principle of that clause, fairly and consistently
worked out, it has no objection whatever.-Blackwood'7 3lagazine, January, 1869.
This expression of opinion by a leading organ of
the party which suffered somewhat under the minority clause, is a valuable testimony in favor of
the principle of electoral reform which that clause
was intended to promote.
DIFFICULTIES OF ENGLISH REFORM.
-Mr. Disraeli ill debate on the 5th of July, 1867,
pointed out one great practical obstacle to the adoption of the cumulative vote in England which does
not exist in this country. It happens that the
Scotch and Welsh districts are nearly all one-member districts with liberal majorities. The proposed
reform is, therefore, inapplicable to those parts of
the kingdom as at present organized for election
purposes, and if it were applied to England alone,
upon an extensive scale, it might give undue influence and power in the House of Commons to Scotch
and WVelsh  members.  They  would  control the
house upon all party questions. Full representation
in England would tend to equalize the strength of
parties in the house, and then the Scotch vote cast
wholly on one side would always turn the scale.
But putting this consideration aside, and taking
the English districts as they stand, we find that
most of them are not adapted or well adapted to
the cumulative vote. A great part of them are
boroughs, electing one member each. In Schedule
95 
96      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
A of the reform act are no less than 38 such boroughs, added to those which existed before, and in
Schedule  B,  nine  additional.   Other  boroughs
choose two members each, as do divisions of counties, 35 of which are fixed in the reform act,
Schedule I). The triangular districts, those which
elect three members each, are not numerous, and we
are not aware that any district elects a greater number, save London, which elects four. The limited
vote is now, however, applied to London and to all
the triangular districts, whether boroughs or counties, and it is to be expected that by the reorganization and consolidation of districts hereafter, reform
will be greatly extended.
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES.
But the difficulties and obstacles which exist in
Great Britain do not exist with us. Our States are
well suited to the application of the free vote. There
are now only six of the whole number to which it
will not apply as a plan for representative elections,
to wit, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oregon. They constitute the one-member States, and would be unaffected by the new plan.
But from this class Kansas will pass at the next apportionment, leaving but five States out of 37 to
compose this class; and as they would select but
five representatives out of about 250 who will constitute the House, their influence upon general
results would be unimportant if not inappreciable.
It is to be remarked, also, that these States, in common with the other States, might come under the
operation of the free vote if that vote should be 
SENATE REPORT.
applied to presidential elections, because each  of
them will be entitled to choose three electors.
THE TWO-MEMBER STATES.
The two-member States are Rhode Island and
Minnesota, and both will probably change their
position at the next apportionment of representatives.   Rhode Island will fall off to one member
and Minnesota rise to three.   Other States, however, two or three in number, may take their place,
and hence it will be worth while to consider the
position of two-member States with reference to the
plan of the free vote. It has been sometimes said,
without due reflection, that the cumulative vote is
not suited to elections where two persons are to be
chosen by a constituency, because if it have practical effect it will give equal representation to the
majority and minority. But the frequent application of the limited vote to dual elections-as in the
cases of inspectors of elections and jury commissionlers in Pennsylvania-may cause us to pause and
examine this objection with some care before we
accept it as a sound one. Carefully examined, it
may turn out to be more specious than solid, and
we may further discover that in the case of the representation of our States in the Federal Government
there is an important fact which bears upon this
objection and deprives it of ally appearance even of
strength or force.  In the first place let us test the
objection and illustrate its futility by a supposed
case.   Take  a constituency  of  32,000  electors,
20,000 of whom are tories and 12,000 liberals, entitled to elect two members to Parliament. As there
7
97 
98      PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
are 32,000 voters and two members to be chosen,
the full ratio or number of voters for a member is
16,000. Assign now one member to the tories and
the just demand of 16,000 tory voters is complied
with and exhausted. They can have no further
claim to representation.  What have we left? Why,
on the one hand 4000 tory voters, and on the other
12,000 liberals, and the simple question for us to
determine is whether the 4000 or the 12,000 shall
have the second member. The cumulative or the
free vote will give that second member to the 12,000
liberals; unjust voting will give him to the 4000
tortes.
But let us cite cases of actual parliamentary elections in 1868, for two-member districts, in further
illustration: Northeast Lancashire, two members,
average tory vote, 3615; average liberal vote, 3458.
Two tories elected upon a majority of 157.  The
ratio for a member was 3536, so that 79 tory voters.
obtained the second member, while 3458 liberals
were disfranchised.
Take next two districts in Kent. Middle Kent,
two members; average tory vote, 3245; average
liberal vote, 2873.   West  Kent, two members;
average tory vote, 3389; average liberal vote, 3279.
Two tories were chosen from each district.  In
Middle Kent 186 tory votes carried the second
member, and in West Kent 55; while in the two
districts 6152 liberals were entirely disfranchised.
East Derbyshire, two members; average liberal
vote, 2069; average tory vote, 1974.   Yorkshire,
West Riding, (South,) two members; average liberal vote, 8032; average tory vote, 7935. 
SENATE REPORT.
In these districts four liberals were elected; in
one the second member was carried by 48, and in
the other by 49 votes; while 9909  tories were
wholly disfranchised.
Where, then, a minority in a two-member constituency exceeds one-third the whole number of
voters therein, it does not seem unreasonable to
assign to them the second member, and thus, in
fact, an equality of representation with the majority. It is a case where complete or exact justice is
impossible; there must be disfranchisement to sonme
extent; but that disfranchisement should be reduced
to its minimum, and made to press as lightly as
may be upon the constituency. What, then, can
be said as to.two-member constituencies is thisthat any rule of voting for them must (in the very
nature of the case) be imperfect in result, but that
the cumulative vote, or an equivalent plan applied
even to them, will be one of reform and improvement.
But an important consideration remains to be
mentioned.   Our  States are represented in both
houses of Congress, and not merely in one; a fact
which changes entirely the character of this question in the two-member States. In Great Britain
there is no representation of the people, or even of
districts, in the upper house of Parliament.   Compensation to a constituency for loss of political power
in the House of Commons cannot be obtained by
them in the House of Lords. W5ith us the case is
widely different.  The political majority in a State
will ordinarily have both the senators from the State;
in other words, the whole representation of the State
99 
100    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
in the Senate. If, then, in two-member States they
have but one-half the representation of the State in
the House, (as against a minority of one-third or
upwards,) the aggregate of their representation in
Congress will still be many times over what it should
be upon any principle of justice or of numbers.
THE THREE-MEMBER STATES.
It is agreed pretty generally that the cumulative
or free vote is admirably suited to three-member
constituencies. The States which now elect three
members each are Arkansas, California, New Hampshire, Vermont, and West Virginia. In such States
the majority will always have two members, and the
minority, if it exceed one-fourth the whole constituency and one-third of the majority vote, can obtain the third. Upon constituencies or districts of
this class-called indiscriminately "three-handed,"
"three-cornered," or triangular-much of the debate in Great Britain as to reform in popular voting
has been expended.  The question as to them  in
particular is fully expounded in the papers (drawn
from British sources) which are appended to this
report.
THE GREAT STATES.
Having exhausted the list of States which elect
less than four members, we find that 24 remain.
Of these, Connecticut, South Carolina, and Texas
each elect four members, and the remainder various
numbers, up to New York, which chooses 31. They
may be taken together in this examination as anl
additional, though by far the most important class of
States. They choose 218 out of the 243 members
I..::,.I~.:: 
~e::.. 
SENATE REPORT.
of the House. In this class all the great States are
before us, and all of secondary rank, challenging
the wisdom of Congress to reform and amend our
political system in some effectual manner. For our
country has in some respects outgrown the system
provided for us by the care of our ancestors; new
necessities press upon us; great evils afflict us, and
it has become the duty of statesmen not merely to
administer or to carry on our plan of government,
but to amend it also; and to this end we are to invite and welcome the best thoughts of men abroad
and at home upon political reform, and give them,
as far as possible, application and practical effect.
Now there can be no question that if parties in
the great States obtain representation according to
the number of their votes, one of the greatest possible reforms in a republican government will be
secured. All the arguments heretofore mentioned
apply to those States with special force, because they
contribute the main body of members to the House
and a defective plan of election operates within them
with extensive effect. As to them, reform will be
most important and useful, and no reasonable effort
should be spared in attempting to apply it.
We have in fact as to the great States no point
left for examination except the single one of practicability. Will the free vote work and work well in
the great States? Those who distrust popular intelligence and judgment may deny, while those who
confide in the people will affirm, the practicability
of the plan. But there is one leading consideration,
which in the judgment of the committee is decisive
upon this question. It is that where free action
101
0 
102    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
shall be permitted each political party will pursue its
own interests with activity, intelligence, and zeal, and
will inevitably obtain for itself its due share of representative power. Thus where a party shall have
one-third of the popular vote of a State it will
cumulate its vote upon one-third the number of
representatives to be chosen. Where parties are
nearly equal in strength in a State the weaker one
will cumulate its vote upon one-half the number of
persons to be chosen, or within one of that number.
Where a party has a small majority in a State, and
particularly where it is increasing in numbers, it will
cumulate its vote upon one or two more than onehalf the number of candidates. And finally, in
States with large delegations, a party with so small
a vote as one-fourth or one-fifth the whole number
will cumulate its vote upon the small number of one,
two, three, or more representatives, according to the
proportion which its vote shall bear to the total vote
of the State. The due working of the plan is
secured by the selfish interests with which it deals,
and we may congratulate ourselves that under the
plan the very efforts of parties to secure power for
themselves will result in justice-that is, in the
division of power between them according to their
respective numbers.
Now, it is idle to say that voting in the great
States will be confused and uncertain. On the contrary, it will run according to party organization at
all times, and will adjust itself naturally and inevitably to all changes of opinion and organization
in the political body. And as political parties constantly divide society into parts, the relative strength 
SENATE REPORT.
of which can at any time be approximately stated,
there need not be uncertainty or confusion in the
polling of votes. And even in times of transition
and change, when popular power is departing from
one party and attaching itself to another, or when
some third party takes ground upon a particular
issue, or faction diverts a fragmentary vote from a
great party, the amount of disturbance and consequent uncertainty produced will not be considerable,
and can be readily estimated for all practical purposes, in fixing the number of candidates which
any party shall support. The merit or practicability
of a rule of elections is not to be judged upon a
supposition which is unlikely or exceptional; but
even in the cases supposed, the elements of error
and mistake will be reduced to their smallest possible quantity. Where the relative strength of
party is uncertain-that is, cannot be exactly known
or estimated, or where the boundary of power between them is near the dividing line between ratios
of representation, it will rarely happen that a mistake will be made beyond the extent of one member, and the general result for the State will be but
slightly disturbed.
THE CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS..
The proposed amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, regarding the choice of electors
of President and Vice-President of the United
States, reported by this committee on the 29th of
January, (adopted by the Senate subsequently, but
lost upon disagreement between the two houses,) deserves distinct examination, particularly as full de
103 
104    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
bate upon it in the two houses of Congress could
not be had when it came up for consideration, for
want of time. That amendment is as follows:
The second clause, first section, article two of the Constitu tion of the United States shall be amended to read as follows:
Each State shall appoint, by a vote of the people thereof qualified(
to vote for representative  it Co2gress, a number of electors
equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no sena tor or representative, or person holding an office of trust and
profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector;
and the Congress shall have power to prescribe the manner it
which such electors shall be chosen by the people.
The amendment has two objects: first, to secure
to the people at all times the right of choosing electors themselves: and second, to authorize Congress
to prescribe the manner in which this popular right
shall be exercised. In other respects the amendment follows the language of the existing Constitution and introduces no change. At present electors
are to be appointed as the Legislatures of the several
States may direct, and there is no uniform rule for
the whole country. Although in most of the States
the practice has been to choose them by a popular
vote, this has not been a matter ofconstitutional
right in the people, but of legislative permission,
and liable at anfiy time to be taken away. That the
authority to appoint electors should be fixed in the
Constitution by a uniform rule, and not be left to
legislative discretion is, we believe, a general opinion, and it rests upon good grounds of reason and
experience. South Carolina formerly chose her
electors by a vote of her legislature, and the people
had no voice in the proceeding; but by her present 
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constitution, formed under the reconstruction laws,
their appointment must be directly by the people.
It may bie questioned whether a State constitution
can take away the discretionary power vested in the
legislature by the Constitution of the United States,
which is "the supreme law of the land," but this
action by South Carolina shows that popular right
requires a constitutional guaranty against the caprice, ambition, or corruption of legislative bodies.
Florida has by law placed the appointment of her
electors in her legislature, and a recent attempt in
Alabama to fix a similar arrangement in that State
was only frustrated by all executive veto. It may
be apprehended that in some future election of
President and Vice-President closely contested, the
legislature of a State or the legislatures of several
States may take to themselves the appointment of
electors, prevent their choice by the people, and
change the result of the election. This is a danger
to be carefully guarded against, to be wholly removed from our electoral system, not only because
it contains an element of injustice, but because it
may provoke convulsion and civil war.
The next provision of the amendment that Congress may prescribe the manner in which electors
shall be chosen by the people is most important and
valuable. It is true that this clause only permits
and does not require congressional action, but its
necessity for the introduction of any reform in the
manner of choosing presidential electors is perfectly
certain, as will be presently shown. The objection
that because this clause will take power from the
legislatures of the States and vest it in Congress, or
105 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
rather will authorize Congress to interpose and con  trol the action of State legislatures, it will increase
federal power and tend to consolidation, ought not
to prevail against the amendment, and that for
several reasons. In the first place, the choice of
presidential electors is a federal question as much
as the choice of members of Congress, and may
properly be subjected to similar regulation as to the
manner in which it shall be performed. In the
next place, the original design of the electoral col leges has wholly failed. They were intended to be
bodies for deliberation and free choice; in other
words, to exercise judgment and discretion in giving
their votes to candidates for President and Vice President. It was expected that they would not in
form and theory merely, but in fact and truth choose
the two principal executive officials in the government of the United States, and it is to be noticed
that the "manner " in which they shall choose is
carefully "prescribed" by the Constitution.  They
are to meet on a fixed day in their respective States
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
(one of whom at least shall not be an inhabitant of
the same State with themselves,) and shall make
distinct lists of their votes, signed and certified, and
transmit them under seal to the President of the
Senate.   But the manner in which the electors
themselves should be chosen was not prescribed (or
authority conferred upon Congress to prescribe it)
for two reasons: first, because the convention did
not determine what authority should appoint them;
and second, because the actual choice of President
and Vice-President was intended to be in the col
106 
SENATE REPORT.
leges themselves, whose "manner" of choosing was
distinctly fixed.
These considerations are now of no force. On
the contrary, when it is expressly provided that the
people shall choose the electors, and it is understood
that the colleges shall simply represent them and
execute their will, the regulation of the manner in
which the electors shall be chosen falls, as before
stated, within the same reason which applies to the
regulation of the manner of choosing representatives
in Congress; and it falls, also, within the reasons
which originally induced the regulation of the manner in which the electoral colleges were to exercise
their powers. The amendment therefore, is in conformity with principles already contained in the
Constitution, and does not introduce any "portentous novelty" into our system.
But the most important reason in favor of this
branch of the amendment remains to be mentioned.
It is absolutely necessary to secure reform in the
manner of choosing electors. They are now chosen
by general ticket in nearly all the States, and the
only practical alternative to this plan is legislative
choice, which is still worse, and struck at by the
prior clause of the amendment. Now, the general
ticket plan is very objectionable, as is well known,
and yet the States cannot change it. Theoretically,
by virtue of an express clause of the Constitution,
the State legislatures may direct the manner in
which electors shall be appointed at their pleasure,
but practically they cannot or will not exercise that
power in the direction of reform. Always, whenever they have not taken to themselves the power
107 
108     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
of appointing electors, they have provided that they
should be elected by the people upon the general
ticket plan, and that plan, so long as they allow a
popular vote at all at Presidential elections, they
will not abolish or amend. The explanation of this
is not difficult, and it will be easily understood by
any one familiar with our political history, and with
the character of our political parties.
By the general ticket a political majority in a
State can wield the whole power of the State in an
electoral college-not merely a power proportioned
to their own numbers, but a power proportioned to
the joint vote of their own and of an opposing party.
They obtain not only the power appropriate to themselves, but also the power appropriate to their opponents or rivals. Now it is not to be expected that
a party in a State will voluntarily surrender such
an advantage, though tainted with odium and injustice, or that their representatives in the State legislature will surrender it; for it is a law of party to
obtain all the power possible, and to yield no advantage except upon compulsion or for adequate compensation.
But if considerations of justice and the general
good could have weight with the State legislatures,
and overrule with them the suggestions of selfish
interest, still reform could not be secured. A
change, in order to operate fairly, should be uniform
throughout the whole country, and be applied in all
the States at the same time. But State action in
the way of change must be successive, extending
over a period of years, and would not probably be
uniform or universal. And so no State could well 
SENATE REPORT.
venture to take the initiative, as its political majority
would make a certain sacrifice for an uncertain or
imperfect reform. If a political majority in the
legislature of Indiana should desire to have electors
chosen by single districts, they could not afford to
adopt the plan alone. For they would discover at
a glance that if other States did not adopt it they
would weaken their party without any possible coinpensation. While they would divide power in their
electoral college with an opposing party, that opposing party, by holding on to the general ticket plan in
another State, (Kentucky, for instance,) would obtain an advantage which might determine the general result of the Presidential election. Upon the
whole, then, we must conclude that without an
amendment of the Constitution, any reform whatever in the manner of choosing Presidential electors
is impossible.
But it is said by many that the electoral colleges
should be abolished and the people be permitted
to vote directly for President and Vice-President.
An amendment of the Constitution to effect this
purpose has been often proposed, but has never been
submitted to the States for adoption, and for a very
good reason, which is, that they would have rejected
it.  Nor is it now possible to obtain the ratification
of such an amendment by three-fourths of the
States. The reason is a plain one. All the small
States, and all the States of secondary rank, are
interested largely in retaining their representation
as States in the electoral colleges. They have now
each two electors without regard to population,
whereas under the plan proposed they would be
109 
110    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
confined to the principle of numbers and would in fluence the result of an election only in proportion
to their actual votes polled. No less than 24 States
out of 37 would lose from about one-fourth to two thirds of their present political weight in presiden tial elections by the change. This fact is decisive.
Instead of ratifications by three-fourths of the
States there would be prompt rejections by a ma jority of them if this proposition should be sub mitted.
But although the electoral colleges cannot be
abolished by constitutional amendment, they may
be greatly reformed. They may be made to repre sent more truly the will of the people and the States,
or the people alone, by an amendment of the Constitution which shall prescribe, or shall authorize
Congress to prescribe, the manner in which their
members shall be chosen. It may be provided that
the two electors of each State, commonly called
senatorial electors, who represent the principle of
State equality, shall be chosen in one manner, and
the remaining electors of the State, who represent
the principle of numbers in another, or that all the
electors shall be chosen in the same way. If the
former plan should be preferred, the senatorial
electors might be chosen by general ticket, and
then, as to them, there would be no change from
the present practice. But it could be provided that
the representative electors in the one case, or all the
electors in the other, should be chosen by single
districts, or upon the principle of the free vote. The
single district plan would be a very great improvemnent, and it would be free from somne of the objec 
SENATE REPORT.
tions which lie against it when applied to the choice
of representatives in Congress; but the free vote
would be infinitely preferable to it, because it would
be more convenient, because it would prevent corruption, and because it would secure a more full and just
representation of the people in the electoral colleges.
It is the opinion of the committee that under
their amendment, as reported, Congress would be
authorized only to prescribe uniform rules for choosing electors; rules applicable to the whole country,
and operating equally in every State. But if this
opinion should be questioned, a slight change of
phraseology in the amendment would remove all
doubt.
To the suggestion that Congress might attempt
itself to district the States in order to perpetrate
party injustice, there are several answers. In the
first place, it is not at all certain that Congress would
form districts more unfairly than they would be
formed by State Legislatures. In the next place, it
is not at all likely, and hardly possible, that Congress would undertake this work, which would be to
it both inconvenient and odious. It possesses now
the same power of controlling the manner of choosing representatives which it is proposed to confer
upon it in regard to choosing electors, and yet it
has never undertaken to district the States for representative elections, in which it is more directly interested than in those for electors. But again, if
thought expedient, the amendment might be modified so as to exclude the direct action of Congress
in the formation of districts. It is hardly necessary
to add that the adoption of the free vote for the
ill 
112     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
choice of electors would avoid this and all similar
questions of debate.
CONCLUSION.
The committee must now conclude their examination of a most important subject. They have not
been able, on account of the pressure of other duties,
to fill up completely the argument in favor of the
free vote, or to answer in form the possible objections which may be made to its adoption. But they
have endeavored to present fairly the main arguments which should weigh with Congress and with
the people in its favor, and by due explanation of
its purpose and character to vindicate it against
misconception and cavil. As to the objections which
may be made that it would delocalize representation,
that it would introduce some degree of confusion,
that it would decrease political activity, and that it
is opposed to the doctrine that the majority shall
rule, they must content themselves with declaring
that in their opinion none of those objections are
well taken or well suited to undergo debate, and
that they were thoroughly answered in the two
Houses of Parliament.in 1867.  The last one, in
particular, is preposterous, for it is one of the main
merits of reformed voting, that it will secure the
true rule of the majority, and give to it a sanction
it does not now possess. The whole mass of the
electoral population being represented by reformed
voting in the representative body, the vote will be
there taken upon any question in controversy, and
the voice of the majority duly pronounced. But at
present minority rule may obtain. For in the first 
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place, all minorities at popular elections are struck
out of the returns, and next the minority vote in
the representative body is overruled when a decision
is there made, so that we have, in fact, the rule of a
majority of a majority, which very likely represents
only a minority among the people, particularly when
a plurality rule is applied to the popular elections.
The argument for reform may be summed up in
a few words. By it we will obtain cheap elections,
just representation, and contentment among the
people; by it we will also secure able men in the
people's House; by it our political system will be
invigorated and purified; by it our country will
"take a bond of the future" that our government
shall be a blessing and not a curse; that our prosperity shall be enduring; that our free institutions
"shall not perish from the face of the earth."
SENATE BILL, No. 772.-(4()TH CONGRESS; 3D SESSION.)
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
JANUARY 13, 1869.
Mr. BUCKALEW asked, and by unanimous consent
obtained, leave to bring in a bill entitled "A bill to
amend the representationi of the people in Congress;" which was read twice and referred to a
select committee consisting of Messrs. Buckalew,
Anthony, Ferry, Morton, Warner, Rice, and Wade.
MARCH 2, 1869.
Mr. WADE, from the Select Committee on Representative Reform, reported the bill without amendment, as follows:
8
113 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
A BILL to amend the representation of the people in Congress.
Be it enacted by the Senate and HIouse of Rel)resentatives  of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in
elections for the choice of representatives to the Congress of
the United States, whenever more than one representative is to
be chosen from a State, each elector of such State, duly qualified, shall be entitled to a number of votes equal to the lnumnber
of representatives to be chosen from the State, and may give
all such votes to one candidate, or may distribute them, equally
or unequally, among a greater number of candidates; and the
candidates highest in vote upon the return shall be declared
elected.
APPENDIX.
It has been thought proper and is found convenient to place in an appendix various citations of
authority in favor of representative reform fronm
parliamentary debates and from the writings of
English authors. These evidences of the progress
of thought abroad upon one of the most important
and interesting questions which relate to representative government, it is believed are worthy the attention of both statesman and citizen in this countryof all who desire the progress and improvement of
free institutions and a satisfactory issue to our great
experiment of democratic government.
A few general observations may fitly precede
what follows. In the first place, it is to be remarked that reform in Parliament as secured in
1867, in regard to the mode of popular voting,
broke through the lines of party and was obtained
independent of party support.
In both houses of Parliament whligs and tories,
liberals and conservatives, independent and radical
114 
SENATE REPORT.
members, were found together in support of an
amendment which was intended to do justice to the
people and improve the representative body. In
the upper house of Parliament in fact the opposition
became at last narrowed almost to the ministry and
their immediate dependents-a fact which induced
the chief minister of the Crown in the lower house,
to abandon the opposition which he had at first proclaimed. In this country also the question of reform in the manner of popular votingt, is not one
of a party character, and cannot be made such.  It
appeals to all good citizens and to all thoughtful
men, in whatever political organization they may
be found, and demands of them an independent and
patriotic support. Already men of different opinions upon ordinary questions of party, and others
of independent views, have stood forward among us
as urgent advocates of reform. Of these, outside
of Congress, honorable mention is to be made of
Mr. J. Francis Fisher, Mr. Greeley, Mr. D. G.
Croly, and Mr. Simonr Stern. Mr. Greeley's proposition in the New York constitutional convention
of 1867, for the division of his State into 15 senatorial districts, each of which should elect three
senators upon the principle of the cumulative vote,
was one of much merit, and will deserve, upon sonme
future occasion, to be revived, and will also deserve
to be imitated in oither States.
ARGUMIENTS IN PARLIAMENT.
In the House of Commons, July 4, 1867, Rt.
Hon. Robert Lowe, on moving his amendment for
115 
116     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
the cumulative vote to the reform bill, addressed the
house at length. He said:
That he must not be understood as coming forward to argue
for any protection to the minority... but between the
members of the constituency there should be absolute equality;
the majority should have nothing given to it because it was a
majority; the minority should have nothing taken away from
it.... Let each voter have an equal number of votes not
dependent upon the use he makes of them; let him be at liberty to dispose of them as he likes.... The tendency of
the present system was to make that stronger which was already strong, and that weaker which was already weak.  By
an arbitrary and unreasonable rule it strengthened the majority; by the same arbitrary and unreasonable rule it weakened
the minority. On abstract justice, therefore, the present rule
could not be maintained. The proper way to alter it was to
give each elector as many votes as there were vacancies, and
leave him absolutely free to dispose of them as he pleased-to
give all to one person, one to each of three, or two to one, and
one to another. By that means they would be doing nothing
unjust or unfair to the majority or to the minority. They
would be merely putting them on a level, and leaving them
on perfectly fair ground. That was the abstract argument.
There were different ways by which the end might be accomplished. Some proposed to give only a single vote to each
elector; others recommended that when there were three candidates each elector should have two votes. He preferred to
give each elector three votes, and allow him to dispose of them
as he pleased. The objection to the two first proposals was
that they would operate in the way of disfranchisement, and
would take away something people already possessed; because
on the supposition that there were three candidates they had
already three votes. The system he proposed had greater flexibility and better adapts itself to the general purposes of elections.... They would find that in this way opinion in constituencies would ripen. Opinion in that house would ripen to
changes, and the house would become a more delicate reflex
of the opinions of the constituencies. The existence of such a 
SENATE REPORT.
system of gradual growth, not only of opinion but in the representation of opinion, would, to a great extent, prevent the
necessity of external agitation, and be a great discouragement
to it. There was nothing more worthy of the attention of
statesmen in the new state of affairs than anything which
would have the tendency to prevent that violent oscillation
which they now witnessed. What happened in the United
States? The minority of thousands might as well not exist at
all. It is absolutely ignored. Was their country (England)
in like manner to be formed into two hostile camps, debarred
from each other in two solid and compact bodies?  Or were
they to have that shading off of opinion, that modulation of
extremes, and mellowing and ripening of right principles,
which are among the surest characteristics of a free country,
the true secrets of political dynamics, and the true preservatives of a great nation?  He said then that what he proposed
to the house was in itself just, equal, and fair, founded on no
undue or unfair attempt to give a minority an advantage they
were not entitled to exercise, and that it was peculiarly applicable to the state of things on which they were entering.
... He might justly add that the principle of the amendment was large enough to include boroughs returning two
members, as well as those which had three, and if it were
worth while he was prepared to contend that upon abstract
principle it ought to be applied to both classes of boroughs.Hansard, Parl. Deb., 3d series, clxxxviii. pp. 1037-'41.
In the House of Lords, July 30, 1867, Lord
Cairns spoke at length in support of his amendment
for representation of minorities in three-membered
constituencies.  He said he would state the advantages of the system he had proposed:
These must obviously be looked at from three points of view
-the advantages to the general legislation of the country, the
advantages to the members who would be selected under an
arrangement of this kind, and the advantages to the constituencies themselves. Now, with regard to the legislature, the
advantages which I think would be gained by this system
117 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
would be these: you would obtain in the persons of those who
would be the representatives of the minority in these large constituencies a body of men of great intelligence, and of great
independence; you would have those elements of advantage
which exist in the representation of small boroughs, and, at the
same time, you would be perfectly free from the disadvantages
and defects of the small borough system....  Questions are
constantly arising which in one aspect are questions of general
political interest, but which are more or less connected with
local interests, and bear upon local claims; and thus a question
wvhich, in a general point of view, is of political interest to the
whole country is sometimes colored and affected in many ways
by the way in which it is viewed in different localities.  No
doubt, in discussing general questions of political interest, it
would be of the greatest possible advantage to hear how those
questions were viewed not merely by different localities but
by different bodies of men in the same locality. That result
you would obtain by the plan which I propose.... I will
pass to the consideration of the advantages which would be
gained by the representatives of those large constituencies
themselves.... You would  have from  the same constituency two members representing the majority and one representing the minority, communicating freely with each other,
and without the slightest tinge of jealousy or apprehension that
the interests of one would jar or conflict with the interests of
the other in the constituency.... Again, with  regard to
the constituency itself-and this is one of the most important
views of the case-observe the advantages which would be
gained: First, I believe you would gain the greatest possible
local satisfaction; there is nothing so irksome to those who
form the minority of one of those large constituencies as finding
that from the mere force of numbers they are virtually exclu(led from the exercise of any political power; that it is vain
for them to attempt to take any part in public affairs; that the
elections must go in one direction, and that they have no political power whatever. On the one hand the result is great dissatisfaction, and on the other it is disinclination on the part of
those who form the minority to take any part in affairs in
which it is important they should take a prominent and coinspicuous part.... In addition to that, it would do much to
118 
SENATE REPORT.
soften the asperities of political feeling which sometimes,
though  not often, prevail  in  large constituencies.... Of
this I am sure, (and although some treat it as an objection I
think it a great advantage of the scheme,) that contests would
be very much diminished in large constituencies where contests
are most expensive, so expensive that the mind almost recoils
at hearing the sums which they cost. Contests practically
would come to an end; and as they did, so would danger of
bribery and corruption. You would have great constituencies
divided into great component parts; you would have each
portion well represented; you would have freedom from expense, freedom from the irritation of political feeling, and from
the curse of all elections, bribery.-IHansard, 3d series, clxxxix.
pp. 433-'41.
The views of Earl Russell in favor of dividing
the representation of large constituencies between
parties, have been often expressed. In debate in
the House of Commons upon the reform bill of
1854, hlie spoke as follows:
Now it appears to us that many advantages would attend the
enabling the minority to have a part in these returns. In the
first place there is apt to be a feeling of great soreness when a
very considerable number of electors, such as I have mentioned,
are completely shut out from a share in the representation of
one place.... But in the next place I think that the more
you have your representation confined to large populations, the
more ought you to take care that there should be some kind
of balance, and that the large places sending members to this
house should send those who represent the community at large.
But when there is a very large body excluded it cannot be said
that the community at large is fairly represented. —3d Hansard, clvi. 2062.
In his Essay on the English Constitution, (edition of 1865,) he wrote as follows:
If there were to be any deviation from our customary habits
and rooted ideas on the subject of representation, I should like to
119 
120     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
see such a change as I once proposed in order to obtain representatives of the minority in large and populous counties and
towns. If, when three members are to be elected, each elector
were allowed to give two votes, we might have a liberal country gentleman sitting for Buckinghamshire, and a conservative
manufacturer for Manchester. The local majority would have
two to one in the House of Commons, and the minority would
not feel itself disfranchised and degraded.
In the House of Lords, in 1867, he gave a vigorous and able support to the Cairns amendment,
which now constitutes clause nine of the reform
act of that year. He said:
I believe by means of such a plan you would introduce into
the House of Commons men of moderate views, whose influence would tend to reconcile parties on those occasions which
now and then arise when neither extreme is completely right,
and when the influence of moderate men is of much use in
allaying the heat of party passion.... Suppose a town has
20,000 voters, and that 12,000 are of one side in politics and
8000 of the other, would not that town be better represented if
both the 12,000 and the 8000 were represented than if only
the 12,000 were represented? The gentleman who first impressed me with those opinions as to three-cornered constituencies, mentioned to me that in a great manufacturing town
where there was a very considerable conservative minority,
men of the greatest respectability, men of wealth, and men of
education were in such a state of political irritation, from the
fact of feeling themselves reduced to the position of mere
ciphers at elections, that they were sometimes ready to support
candidates of even extreme democratic opinions.... I can
well understand men who are extremely intolerant and exclusive in politics objecting to give any voice to those whose political views are distasteful to them; but I cannot understand such
an objection being urged by those who are in favor of having
public opinion fairly represented.-Hansard, 3d series, clxxxix.
pp. 446-'47.
Upon the consideration of the reform bill of 
SENATE REPORT.
1831 in the House of Commons, Mr. Praed, dis
tinguished as speaker and poet, expressed himself
as follows:
If we desire that the representatives of a numerous constituency should come hither merely as witnesses of the fact that
certain opinions are entertained by the majority of that constituency, our present system of election is certainly rational,
and members are right in their reprobation of a compromise,
because it would diminish the strength of the evidence to a
fact we wish to ascertain.  But if we intend, as surely we do
intend, that not the majority only, but the aggregate masses of
every numerous constituency, should, so far as is possible, be
seen in the persons and heard in the voices of their representatives-should be, in short, in the obvious literal sense of the
word "represented," in this house-then, sir, our present rule
of election is in the theory wrong and absurd, and in practice
is but partially corrected by the admission of that compromise
on which so much virtuous indignation has been wasted.-3d
Hansard, v. 1362.
THE CUMULATIVE VOTE.
BY EARL GREY.
"The first of the reforms of a conservative tendency which I should suggest, and one which I
should consider a great improvement under any circumstances, but quite indispensable if any changes
favorable to democratic power are to be admitted,
would be the adoption of what Mr. James Marshall
has called the'cumulative vote'-that is to say, the
principle of giving to every elector as many votes
as there are members to be elected by the constituency to which he belongs, with the right of either
giving all these votes to a single candidate, or of
dividing them, as he may prefer. The object of
adopting this rule would be to secure to minorities
1.21 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
a fair opportunity of making their opinions and
wishes heard in the House of Commons. In order
that it might fully answer this purpose, the right of
returning members to Parliament ought to be so
distributed that each constituency should not have
less than three representatives to choose. Suppo sing that three members were to be elected together,
and that each elector were entitled to three votes,
which he might unite in favor of a single candidate,
it is obvious that a minority exceeding a fourth of
the whole constituency would have the power of
securing the election of one member. It is probable that in general three members would be thus
returned, each representing a different shade of
opinion among the voters.
"The advantages this mode of voting would be
calculated to produce, and the justice of making
some such provision for the representation of minorities, or, rather, the flagrant injustice of omitting to
do so, have been so well shown by Mr. Marshall in
the pamphlet I have already referred to, and by
Mr. Mill, in his highly philosophical treatise on
representative government, that it is quite needless
for me to argue the question as one of principle.
But I may observe that, in addition to its being
right in principle, this measure would be in strict
accordance with the lessons of experience, if read
in their true spirit. One of the most remarkable
peculiarities of the British House of Commons, as
compared with other representative bodies, is, that it
has always had within its walls members representing most of the different classes of society, and of
the various and conflicting opinions and interests to
122 
SENATE REPORT.
be found in the nation.  Much of the acknowledged
success with which the House of Commons  has
played its part in the government of the country has
been attributed (I believe most justly) to this peculiarity. The changes made by the reform act, and
especially the abolition of the various rights of voting formerly to be found in different towns, and the
establishment of one uniform franclhise in all the
English boroughs, (with only a small exception in
favor of certain classes of freemen,) tended somewhat to impair the character of the house in this
respect. The greatly increased intercourse between
different parts of the country, and the rapidity with
which opinions are propagated from one extremity
of the kingdom to another, have had a similar tendency; and there is no longer the same probability
as formerly that different opinions will be found to
prevail in different places, so as to enable all parties
to find somewhere the means of gaining an entrance
to Parliament for at least enough of their adherents
to give expression to their feelings.
"Hence there is a danger that the House of Commons may cease to enjoy to the same extent as
formerly the great advantage of representing the
various classes and opinions to be found in the
nation. That danger would be greatly aggravated
by rendering the constituencies more nearly equal
than they are; but the simple change involved in
adopting the cumulative vote would do much towards guarding against it, since with this mode of
voting it would be impossible that any considerable
party in the country should be left unrepresented
in Parliament. The tendency of the alteration
123 
124     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
would be conservative in the best sense of the word,
while at the same time, in many cases, it would have
the effect of relieving liberal politicians from a disadvantage to which they are unfairly subjected. On
the one side it would prevent the representation of
the large town constituencies from being monopolized, as at present, by candidates ready to pledge
themselves to the support of democratic measures.
Even in the metropolitan boroughs we might reasonably expect that some members would be returned
really representing the higher and most educated
classes of their inhabitants, who are now practically
without any representation at all except that which
they obtain indirectly by means of members chosen
by other constituencies. Thus in the large towns it
would put an end to the unjust monopoly on the
part of radical politicians; and on the other hand,
in those counties where a conservative majority now
excludes a strong liberal minority from any share
in the representation, it would correct a similar tendency in the opposite direction. In both cases this
system of voting would be calculated to give more
weight to the independent electors, who are not
thorough-going partisans on either side, and to favor
the return of candidates deserving their confidence."
-Parliamentary Government Considered with reference to Reform, edition of 1864, p. 203.
LIMITED AND CUMULATIVE VOTING.
BY JOIIN STUART MILL.
"Assuming that each constituency elects three
representatives, two modes have been proposed, in
either of which a minority, amounting to a third of 
SENATE REPORT.
the constituency, may, by acting in concert, and determining to aim at no more, return one of the
members. One plan is, that each elector should
only be allowed to vote for two, or even for one,
although three are to be elected. The other leaves
to the elector his three votes, but allows him to give
all of them to one candidate. The first of these
plans was adopted in the reform bill of Lord Aberdeen's government; but I do not hesitate most decidedly to prefer the second, which has been advocated in an able and conclusive pamphlet by Mr.
James Garth Marshall. The former plan must be
always and inevitably unpopular, because it cuts
down the privileges of the voter, while the latter,
on the contrary, extends them; and I am prepared
to maintain that the permission of cumulative votes,
that is, of giving either one, two, or three votes to a
single candidate, is in itself, even independently of
its effect in giving a representation to minorities, the
mode of voting which gives the most faithful expression of the, wishes of the elector. On the existing plan, an elector who votes for three can give his
vote for the three candidates whom he prefers to
their competitors; but among those three he may
desire the success of one immeasurably more than
that of the other two, and may be willing to relin quish them entirely for an increased chance of
attaining the greater object. This portion of his
wishes he has now no means of expressing by his
vote. He may sacrifice two of his votes altogether,
but in no case can he give more than a single vote
to the object of his preference. Why should the
mere fact of preference be alone considered, and no
125 
126    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
account whatever be taken of the degree of it?
The power to give several votes to a single candi date would be eminently favorable to those whase
claims to be chosen are derived from personal quali ties, and not from their being the mere symbols of
an opinion; for if the voter gives his suffrage to a
candidate in consideration of pledges, or because the
candidate is of the same party with himself, he will
niiot desire the success of that individual more than
that of any other who will take the same pledges, or
belongs to the same party.  When lie is especially
concerned for the election of some one candidate, it
is on account of something which personally distinguishes that candidate from others on the same side.
Where there is no overruling local influence in
favor of an individual, those who would be benefited
as candidates by the cumulative vote would generally
be the persons of greatest real or reputed virtue or
talents."-Tltouygts on Parliamentary Reform,, 2d
ed., 1859.
OF TRUE AND FALSE DEMOCRACY-REPRESENTATION
OF ALL, AND REPRESENTATION OF THE MAJORITY
ONLY.
BY JOIIN STUART MILL.
It has been seen that the dangers incident to a
representative democracy are of two kinds: danger
of a low grade of intelligence in the representative
body, and in the popular opinion which controls it;
and danger of class legislation on the part of the
numerical majority, these being all composed of the
samne class. We have next to consider how far it is
possible so to organize the democracy as, without
interfering materially with the characteristic benefits 
SENATE REPORT.
of democratic government, to do away with these
two great evils, or at least to abate them ill the
utmost degree attainable by human contrivance.
The common mode of attempting this is by limiting the democratic character of the representation
through a more or less restricted suffrage. But
there is a previous consideration which, duly kept
in view, considerably modifies the circumstances
which are supposed to render such a restriction
necessary. A completely equal democracy, in a
nation in which a single class composes the numerical majority, cannot be divested of certain evils;
but those evils are greatly aggravated by the fact
that the democracies which at present exist are not
equal, but systematically unequal in favor of the
predominant class.   Two very different ideas are
usually confounded under the name democracy.
The pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the whole people by the
whole people, equally represented. Democracy, as
commonly conceived and hitherto practiced, is the
government of the whole people by a mere majority
of the people, exclusively represented. The former
is synonymous with the equality of all citizens; the
latter, strangely confounded with it, is a government
of privilege in favor of the numerical majority, who
alone possess practically any voice in the State.
This is the inevitable consequence of the manner
in which the votes are now taken, to the complete
disfranchisement of minorities.
The confusion of ideas here is great, but it is so
easily cleared up that one would suppose the slightest
indication would be sufficient to place the matter in
127 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
its true light before any mind of average intelligence. It would be so but for the power of habit,
owing to which, the simplest idea, if unfamiliar, has
as great difficulty in making its way to the mind as
a far more complicated one.   That the minority
must yield to the majority, the smaller number to
the greater, is a familiar idea; and, accordingly, men
think there is no necessity for using their minds any
further, and it does not occur to them that there is
any medium between allowing the smaller number
to be equally powerful with the greater, and blotting
out the smaller number altogether. In a representative body actually deliberating, the minority must
of course be overruled; and in an equal democracy
(since the opinions of the constituents, when they
insist on them, determine those of the representative body), the majority of the people, through their
representatives, will outvote and prevail over the
minority and their representatives.   But does it
follow that the minority should have no representatives at all? Because the majority ought to prevail
over the minority, must the majority have all the
votes, the minority none? Is it necessary that the
minority should not even be heard? Nothing but
habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice.   In a really
equal democracy every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately.
A majority of the electors would always have a
majority of the representatives, but a minority of
the electors would always have a minority of the
representatives.  Man for man they would be as
fully represented as the majority. Unless they are,
128 
SENATE REPORT.
there is not equal government, but a government of
inequality and privilege. One part of the people
rule over the rest. There is a part whose fair and
equal share of influence in the representation is
withheld from them, contrary to all just government,
but, above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root and
foundation.
The injustice and violation of principle are not
less flagrant because those who suffer by them are a
minority; for there is not equal suffrage where
every single individual does not count for as much
as any other single individual in the community.
But it is not only the minority who suffer. Democracv thus constituted does not even attain its
ostensible object-that of giving the powers of
government, in all cases, to the numerical majority.
It does something very different; it gives them to a
majority of the majority, who may be, and often
are, but a minority of the whole. All principles
are most effectually tested by extreme cases. Suppose then that, in a country governed by equal and
universal suffrage, there is a contested election in
every constituency, and every election is carried by
a small majority;  the parliament thus brought
together represents little more than a bare majority
of the people. This parliament proceeds to legislate,
and adopts important measures by a bare majority
of itself; what guarantee is there that these measures accord with the wishes of a majority of the
people?  Nearly half the electors, having been outvoted at the hustings, have had no influence at all
in the decision; and the whole of these may be, a
9
129
I 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
majority of them probably are, hostile to the measures, having voted against those by whom they
have been carried. Of the remaining electors,
nearly half have chosen representatives who, by
supposition, have voted against the measures.  It is
possible, therefore, and even probable, that the
opinion which has prevailed was agreeable only to
a minority of the nation, though a majority of that
portion of it whom the institutions of the country
have erected into a ruling class. If democracy
means the certain ascendency of the majority, there
are no means of insuring that but by allowing every
individual figure to tell equally in the summing up.
Any minority left out, either purposely or by the
play of the machinery, gives the power not to a
majority but to a minority in some other part of
the scale.
The only answer which can possibly be made to
this reasoning is, that as different opinions predominate in different localities, the opinion which is in a
minority in some places has a majority in others;
and, on the whole, every opinion which exists in the
constituencies obtains its fair share of voices in the
representation. And this is roughly true in the
present state of the constituency. If it were not,
the discordance of the house with the general sentiment of the country would soon become evident.
But it would be no longer true if the present colnstituency were much enlarged; still less if made coextensive with the whole population; for in that
case the majority in every locality would consist of
manual laborers; and when there was any question
pending on which these classes were at issue with
130 
SENATE REPORT.
the rest of the community, no other classes could
succeed in getting represented anywhere. Even
now, is it not a great grievance that in every parliament a very numerous portion of the electors, willing and anxious to be represented, have no member
in the house for whom they have voted? Is it just
that every elector of Marylebone is obliged to be
represented by two nominees of the vestries, every
elector of Finsbury or Lambeth by those (as is generally believed) of the publicans? The constituencies to which most of the highly educated and
public-spirited persons in the country belong, those
of the large towns, are now, in great part, either uinrepresented or misrepresented. The electors who
are on a different side in party politics from the
local majority are unrepresented. Of those who
are on the same side, a large proportion are misrepresented, having been obliged to accept the man
who had the greatest number of supporters in their
political party, though his opinions may differ from
theirs on every other point. The state of things is,
in some respects, even worse than if the minority
were not allowed to vote at all; for then, at least,
the majority might have a member who would represent their own best mind, while now the necessity
of not dividing the party for fear of letting in its
opponents, induces all to vote either for the person
who first presents himself wearing their colors, or
for the one brought forward by their local leaders,
and these, if we pay them the compliment which
they very seldom deserve, of supposing their choice
to be unbiased by their personal interests, are compelled, that they may be sure of mustering their
131 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
whole strength, to bring forward a candidate whom
none of the party will strongly object to-that is, a
man without any distinctive peculiarity, any known
opinions except the shibboleth of the party. This
is strikingly exemplified in the United States,
where, at the election of President, the strongest
party never dares put forward any of its strongest
men, because every one of these, from the mere fact
that he has been long in the public eye, has made
himself objectionable to some portion or other of the
party, and is therefore not so sure a card for rallying all their votes as a person who has never been
heard of by the public at all until he is produced as
the candidate. Thus the man who is chosen, even
by the strongest party, represents perhaps the real
wishes only of the narrow margin by which that
party outnumbers the other. Any section whose
support is necessary to success possesses a veto on
the candidate. Any section which holds out more
obstinately than the rest can compel all the others
to adopt its nominee; and this superior pertinacity
is, unhappily, more likely to be found among those
who are holding out for their own interest than for
that of the public. Speaking generally, the choice
of the majority is determined by that portion of the
body who are the most timid, the most narrowminded, and prejudiced, or who cling most tenaciously to the exclusive class interest, and the electoral rights of the minority, while useless for the
purposes for which votes are given, serve only for
compelling the majority to accept the candidate of
the weakest or worst portion of themselves.
That while recognizing these evils many should
132 
SENATE REPORT.
consider them as the necessary price paid for a free
government is in no way surprising. It was the
opinion of all the friends of freedom up to a recent
period; but the habit of passing them over as irremediable has become so inveterate that many persons seem to have lost the capacity of looking at
them as things which they would be glad to remedy
if they could. From despairing of a cure there is
too often but one step to denying the disease, and
from this follows dislike to having a remedy proposed, as if the proposer were creating a mischief
instead of offering relief from one. People are so
inured to the evils that they feel as if it were unreasonable, if not wrong, to complain of them. Yet,
avoidable or not, he must be a purblind lover of
liberty, on whose mind they do  not weigh, who
would not rejoice at the discovery that they could
be dispensed with. Now nothing is more certain
than that the virtual blotting out of the minority is
no necessary or natural consequence of freedom;
that, far from having any connection with democracy, it is diametrically opposed to the first principle
of democracy-representation in proportion to numbers. It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. No real
democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy,
is possible without it.
Those who have seen and felt, in some degree,
the force of these considerations have proposed various expedients by which the evil may be, in a
greater or less degree, mitigated. Lord John Russell, in one of his reform bills, introduced a provision that certain constituencies should return three
133 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
members, and that in these each elector should be
allowed to vote only for two; and Mr. Disraeli, in
the recent debates, revived the memory of the fact
by reproaching him for it-being of opinion, apparently, that it befits a conservative statesman to
regard only means, and to disown scornfully all fellow-feeling with any one who is betrayed, even once,
illto thinking of ends. Others have proposed that
each elector should be allowed to vote only for one.
By either of these plans a minority equalling or exceeding a third of the local constituency would be
able, if it attempted no more, to return one out of
three members. The same result might be attained
in a still better way if, as proposed in an able pamphlet by Mr. James Garth Marshall, the elector retained his three votes, but was at liberty to bestow
them all upon the same candidate.
[The author proceeds to state his preference for the plan of
personal representation propounded by MIr. Hare, over other
plans of reform, as more effectual and complete, as securing
more fully the objects and avoiding the mischiefs mentioned in
his preceding remarks.   He  expresses regret, however, that
none of those other plans had "been carried into effect, as any
of them would have recognized the right principle and prepared
the way for its more complete application."
His preference for personal representation arises from the
fact that it would provide for all local minorities of less than a
third in a constituency, and for all minorities made up from
several constituencies. His views appear to be, to some extent,
affected by the peculiar character of Britishl districts, and the
absence of great State organizations in the kingdom affording
free play for the cumulative vote. As personal representation
is a question not proposed  for examination in the present
report, or for exposition in the papers which accompany it, his
remarks upon it are here omitted; But two additional ex
134 
SENATE REPORT.
tracts, relating to general considerations connected with reform
in representation, are added below.]
The natural tendency of representative government, as of modern civilization, is toward collective
mediocrity; and this tendency is increased by all
reductions and extensions of the franchise, their
effect being to place the principal power in the
hands of classes more and more below the highest
level of instruction in the community. But, though
the superior intellects and characters will necessarily
be outnumbered, it makes a great difference whether
or not they are heard.   In the false democracy
which, instead of giving representation to all, gives
it only to the local majorities, the voice of the instructed minority may have no organs at all in the
representative body.... In the American democracy, which is constructed on this faulty model,' the
highly-cultivated members of the community, except such of them as are willing to sacrifice their
own opinions and modes of judgment and become
the servile mouthpieces of their inferiors in knowledge, do not even offer themselves for Congress or
the State legislatures, so certain is it that they would
have no chance of being returned.... In every
government there is some power stronger than all
the rest, and the power which is strongest tends
perpetually to become the sole power. Partly by
intention and partly unconsciously it is ever striving to make all other things bend to itself, and is
not content while there is anything which makes
permanent head against it-any influence not in
agreement with its spirit. Yet, if it succeeds in
suppressing all rival influences, and moulding every
.......
135 
136     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
thing after its own model, improvement in that
country is at an end, and decline commences.  Human improvement is a product of many factors, and
no power ever yet constituted among mankind includes them all. Even the most beneficent power
only contains in itself some of the requisites of
good, and the remainder, if progress is to continue,
must be derived from some other source. No community has ever long continued progressive but
while a conflict was going on between the strongest
power in the community and some rival powerbetween the spiritual and temporal authorities, the
military or territorial and the industrious classes,
the king and the people, the orthodox and religious
reformers. When the victory on either side was so
complete as to put an end to the strife, and no other
conflict took its place, first stagnation followed, and
then decay. The ascendency of the numerical
majority is less unjust and, on the whole, less mischievous than many others, but it is attended with
the very same kind of dangers, and even more certainly, for when the government is in the hands of
one or a few, the many are always existent as a rival
power which may not be strong enough ever to control the other, but whose opinion and sentiment are
a moral and even a social support to all who, either
from conviction or contrariety of interests, are opposed to any of the tendencies of the ruling authority. But when the democracy is supreme there is
no one or few strong enough for dissentient opinions
and injured or menaced interests to lean upon. The
great difficulty of democratic government has hitherto seemed to be how to provide, in a democratic
"-.:... ~. 
SENATE REPORT.
society, what circumstances have provided hitherto
in all the societies which have maintained themselves ahead of others-a social support, a point
d'appui for individual resistance to the tendencies
of the ruling power, a protection, a rallying point
for opinions and interests which the ascendant public opinion views with disfavor. For want of such
a point d'appui the older societies, and all but a
few modern ones, either fell into dissolution or became stationary (which means slow deterioration)
through the exclusive predominance of a part only
of the conditions of social and mental well-being.
... The only quarter in which to look for a supplement, or completing corrective to the instincts
of a democratic majority, is the instructed minority,
but in the ordinary mode  of constituting  democracy this minority has no organ.-Considerations on
Representative  Government, chapter vii., Harper's
Edition, 1862.
[March 2, 1869, the foregoing Report (with Appendix) upon
being presented to the Senate was ordered to be printed. The
following day it was further ordered that 2000 additional copies
should be printed for the use of the Senate. Two editions of
it were subsequently published by the Personal Representation
Society of Chicago, for distribution at home and abroad.]
137 
AN ADDRESS
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BY THE FREE VOTE.
DELIVERED BEFORE THE SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIA             TION, PHILADELPHIA,
TUESDAY EVENING, OCT. 2, 1870.
(Gentlemen of the Association:-I desire my re marks tonight to be understood as made in continuation of what was said and written by me on
former occasions on the subject of Electoral Reform.
In a speech in this city on the 19th of November,
1867, in a speech in the Senate on the 11th of July
of the same year, and in a report from the Senate
Committee on representative reform, 2d of March,
1869, I discussed the Free Vote in its proposed application to Federal Elections and stated the general
arguments in favor of its adoption. I do not propose to go over again the ground covered by those
speeches and by that report, but to present additional views, the product of further reflection upon
this question of reform, and to mention the steps
which have been taken in this State and in other
States, looking toward the submitting of the plan
of reformed voting to practice.
138
ON 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS.
THE FREE VOTE.
The Free Vote may be applied to elections whenever two or more persons are to be chosen together
to the same office for the same term of service, and
it consists in allowing the voter to distribute his
votes among candidates as he shall think fit, or to
concentrate them upon one. It is here assumed
that the voter shall have the same number of votes
as the number of persons to be chosen, and that the
candidates highest in vote shall be declared elected.
ITS EFFECT ON SINGLE ELECTIONS.
It will be observed that the free vote is inapplicable to the election of a single person; it can be
applied only where two or more are to be chosen.
But it will be a great mistake to assume that it will
have no effect upon single elections because it cannot be applied to them in form and directly. Due
reflection and a careful examination of the subject
will convince any intelligent man-any man well
acquainted with the practical workings of our political system-that while its direct operation must be
confined to plural elections its indirect effects upon
single ones will be very great, and very salutary
also, whenever it shall come to be established. For
the advocates of the new plan assert with confidence
and upon fair grounds of reason, that it will secure
absolutely to political parties their just representation in all ordinary cases of Presidential, Congressional, Legislative and other elections to which it
shall be applied, and will therefore greatly weaken
the tendency toward violent and corrupt party action in the elections to which it shall not apply.
139 
140    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
The election of Governor in a State is mainly interestinig because of the influence which the result
will exert upon the next elections in the State for
Presidential electors, members of Congress and
members of the Legislature; such an election is
hotly contested, money is expended upon it and all
possible means to control it brought into active play,
because elections which are to follow will be powerfully influenced if not determined by the issue of
the contest. In like manner and for the same reason other elections of single officers are assailed by
evil influences and become degraded and of evil report. In my opinion, our remedy, and a Very effectual one, will be to make all our Congressional and
Legislative elections plural and then apply to them
and to Presidential elections the free vote or some
other device by which just representation of the
people shall be secured. Then Gubernatorial and
other single elections will be purified and improved;
they will no longer exert any considerable, much
less controlling, influence upon Federal or Legislative elections and will not therefore invite or provoke those corrupt and evil influences by which
they are now assailed.
ITS OBJECTS-JUST REPRESENTATION AND PURE ELEC                      TIONS.
Two capital objects are sought to be accomplished
by the free vote considered as an instrument of reform: First, the just representation of the people
in government, and Second, the purification of popular elections.
How to secure the proportional representation of 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS.
political parties or interests in government is certainly a question of high importance, and we have
reason to rejoice that it is now receiving earnest attention in our own country and ill Europe. We
must all agree that the majority vote-as I shall call
the old plan to which we have been accustomed-is
both insufficient and unjust in the case of many
elections to which it is applied, and that in unchecked operation it is positively pernicious and
hurtful. Observe, I am not speaking of the majority or plurality rule of elections which in its
proper application to returns is a necessity, but of
the majority vote, of that instrument of oppression
by which government is made unsatisfactory because
it is made unjust. The law has said to the citizen,
"You shall distribute your votes singly among candidates although by doing so you will lose them all
and stand deprived of all voice in the government.
You and your neighbor shall be made to struggle
constantly, each to deprive the other of his equitable right in the very attempt to maintain his own.
And if you shall not choose to vote in this exact
manner and to grasp at more than belongs to you,
you shall not vote at all; you shall stand aside disfranchised and ignored." No wonder that our people, instructed by experience and scourged by many
evils, are beginning to complain of the law and to
inquire whether there is not some possible remedy
for electoral injustice-some plan of amendment by
which all the people can have their votes counted
and obtain by them appropriate power and influence
in the government.
Yes, there are remedies for this injustice, and one
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142     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
of them I advocate to-night; a remedy convenient
of application and effectual for all our purposes of
reform. But it is not proposed in antagonism to
other plans of reform, nor as a finality in the art of
government. It may stand simply for what it isa good, useful, workable plan for the improvement
of elections and for securing justice to the whole
body of our electoral population.
The second great object of reformed voting-the
purification of elections-invites to a more elaborate
exposition of an existing evil and of the remedial
character of the new plan, than my space and time
will permit; but I cannot pass it wholly. unnoticed.
Certainly when you shall cheapen elections by
taking away the motive or the main motive for
spending motley upon them, you will purify them
also. They will be cleansed and elevated in character by being made cheap and inexpensive to parties
and candidates who are now compelled to expend
money upon them profusely as the indispensable
condition of success. Now beyond all question the
free vote will cheapen elections. It will take away
from parties almost entirely two powerful motives
which now operate upon them-a greed for unjust
representation and a fear of unjust disfranchisement
-by the conjoint operation of which desperate and
expensive struggles are produced. -Vhen a party
shall be made secure in its just representation by its
owde votes it need not buy a majority in the corruption market as a measure of necessary defence.
When it cannot by the aid of corrupt votes rob the
opposite party and take to itself more than its just 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS.
share of representative power, it will become frugal
in its expenditures and honorable in its conduct.
Thus the free vote destroys or checks corruption by
taking away the motives which produce it, and in
this respect vindicates itself as a most powerful instrument of moral improvement and progress.
THE APPLICATION OF THE FREE VOTE.
The free vote is proposed for application to the
following elections:
1. To the choice of Electors of President and
Vice-President of the United States.
2. To the choice of members of Congress.
3. To the choice of Senators and Representatives
to the Legislatures of the several States.
In Pennsylvania it should be further applied to
the election of the following officers:
1. Judges of the Supreme Court.
2. Law Judges of all Common Pleas and District
Courts composed of more than one Law Judge.
3. Associate Judges of Counties.
4. Aldermen and Justices of the Peace in wards,
boroughs, and townships.
5. County Commissioners and County Auditors.
6. Directors for the Poor for counties or for Poor
districts whenever their election shall be authorized.
7. Councilmen of cities and boroughs.
8. Assessors of taxes whenever two are to be
chosen, and Assistant Assessors triennially.
9. Constables whenever two are to be chosen.
10. Supervisors of Roads and Overseers of the
Poor in townships.
11. Borough and Township Auditors.
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144     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
121 Directors and Controllers of Common Schools
in all the School Districts of the Commonwealth.
The new plan should also be applied throughout
the country to stockholder elections for the choice
of officers of incorporated companies. One of the
amendments to the Illinois constitution, adopted in
July last, provides, that in all elections in that State
for directors or managers of incorporated companies the free vote shall be allowed, so that stockholder minorities in such companies may always be
represented in their management, and abuse and
wrong be detected or prevented. And all corporations require and should have this fundamental and
most salutary check in their constitution.
But there is still another application of the free
vote, heretofore unnoticed, which I believe to be in
the highest degree important; I mean its application
to primary elections or to the nomination of candidates. In fact when reform shall have accomplished
its work in the legal elections and shall have invigorated and purified them, it will be required more
than ever in the primary ones. For as all nominated candidates will commonly be elected under
the new plan, their nomination must be made upon
sound principles and with all possible guards against
corruption and abuse.  But here it is evident that
the same remedy which will improve the one class
of elections can be used to improve the other also;
in other words, that the free vote can often be
applied directly to the nomination of candidates
and always to the choice of delegates to nominating
bodies. Give it such application freely, to the fullest possible extent, and you will find that you have 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS.
reached and mastered the ultimate difficulty in the
way of electoral reform.
CONCERNING THE USE OF FRACTIONAL VOTES-THEIR
UTILITY AND CONVENIENCE.
In the Bloomsburg act fractional votes are allowed
when three, four, or six persons are to be chosen,
and they may be allowed with advantage in other
cases. Most commonly they will be convenient and
desirable to majorities rather than minorities, and
there can be no question that their allowance will
popularize the free vote, render its reformatory action more effectual and facilitate its extension generally to popular and corporate elections. Fractional
votes have been used with approval many times in
recent local elections in Pennsylvania, they have
also been used in national political conventions for
the nomination of candidates for President and
Vice-President of the United States, and their use
will be found essential to the smooth working of
representative elections under the amended constitution of Illinois. It is evident that when a voter has
three votes and shall desire to bestow them equally
upon two candidates, he must divide one of his
votes; in other words, in order to give one vote and
a half to each of two candidates he must break one
of his votes into two equal fractions.  When four
persons are to be chosen and the majority of the
voters shall desire to vote for three candidates, (giving an equal support to each,) fractions of one-third
should be created; that is, each majority voter
should divide one of his votes into three equal
parts, so that he can give one vote and one-third to
10
145
1. 
146    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
each of the three candidates.  And when six persons are to be chosen and the voter shall desire to
vote for four, he must (in order to render them an
equal support) divide two of his votes into four
halves and give one vote and a half to each of the
four candidates he votes for.
Some other numbers involved in elections are
less adapted than the numbers three, four, and six
for the application of fractional voting; but many
others are as much so, and nearly all admit of such
application to a useful extent. For instance, the
number five admits of the giving of two and a half
votes to each of two candidates, or one and onefourth to each of four; and the number nine admits
of one and a half votes to each of six candidates, or
two and one-fourth to each of four. But as it seems
necessary or highly desirable on grounds of convenience to avoid fractions of which the numerator
exceeds unity or one, we cannot very well divide
five votes equally among three candidates, nor seven
among five, etc. There is, however, more than one
resource in such cases of difficulty. Terms of official service may be arranged with reference to the
new plan of voting, or the body of electors in a
State or district, united by party association, may
divide themselves for the purpose of casting votes.
Take the case of a court of five judges, chosen for
ten-year terms: Instead of electing them all together
it would be well to elect a part of them every fifth
year, say two at one time and three at another, and
so on at successive quinquennial elections. And soto a court of seven judges, four might be chosen at
one time and three at another. Again, take the 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS.
case of a State entitled to eight members of Congress in which the political majority is entitled, by
its numbers, to elect five. In a party convention or
by a State committee it might be easily arranged
that while the great mass or principal part of the
majority voters of the State should vote -for four
candidates, (giving two votes to each,) a-district containing one-fifth of their strength should be set off
or set apart in which the voters of the party should
give all their votes to one candidate.  And so il
Pennsylvania, entitled to twenty-four members of
Congress, and where political parties are nearly
equal in strength, either party that supposed itself
in the majority could vote for a thirteenth member
by a district vote, while the general mass of its
voters in the State would vote for twelve. No law
would be necessary to authorize these and other like
arrangements; they would be made by the voluntary action of parties whenever their expediency
became evident.
In fact, by the means mentioned, and by others,
the use of fractional votes can be dispensed with
altogether in our plan of electoral reform, and whole
votes alone retained.   But I would not dispense
with them in all cases, but would authorize them
whenever their utility should be evident and their
inconvenience slight. At present I am prepared to
say that I would allow fractional votes of one-half,
one-third, or one-fourth, whenever their use shall
be necessary to enable voters to give an equal support to the candidates they vote for under the new
plan.
The counting of fractions in making up election
147 
148     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
returns is a very simple performance as shown at
recent elections in this State. Fractions being always attached to whole votes on the tickets may
even be disregarded in scoring down votes upon the
tally-paper and be added at the end of the score.
For instance, when two candidates have been voted
for as follows:
John Jones, 1, votes,
William Brown, 1' votes,
the first ticket drawn from the box may be copied
upon the tally-paper, (omitting the word " votes,")
and then that and succeeding tickets marked down
in scores of five toward the right according to the
common practice.  To the sum of the scores for a
candidate fifty per centum will be added at the end
of the line. Thus if 80 such tickets have been
voted, the count for each candidate will be carried
out-80 +  40 - 120  votes.   In  this  case the
figures "1~" attached to a candidate's name become
a sign of value for the strokes which follow, and
may be conveniently enclosed in a circle with a pen.
If whole votes alone shall be voted on other tickets
for the same candidate, they should be scored on a
separate line above or below the other and be carried out and added at the proper place on the right.
THIE FILLING OF VACANCIES.
Upon a careful reading of speeches made by John
Bright in 1867, at Manchester, at Birmingham, and
in the House of Commons, in hostility to cumulative voting and to the limited vote as embodied in
the Cairns amendment to the Reform Bill, I became
thoroughly convinced of the utter weakness of all 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS.
possible objections to minority representation, (as it
was then called.) A first-class man, laboring with
great earnestness on repeated occasions, was unable
to make good a single objection to reform, and was
compelled in the final debate on the 8th of August,
to plant himself upon purely conservative ground
and insist upon the novelty of the proposition before
the House.  So far as I can remember, there was
but one point made by him which reached the dignity of appearing plausible, or which seemed to call
for explanation or reply. That was that the new
plans were defective in regard to the filling of vacancies that might happen pending terms of official
service. Supposing, for instance, that the seat of a
member of Parliament from a triangular districta district of three members-should become vacant
from any cause pending his term, neither the cumulative or limited vote could be applied at a special
election to the choice of his successor. I admit the
fact in the case supposed, but I deny the objection
based upon it. That objection is wholly mnisconceived and will disappear upon being submitted to
examination. Mr. Bright did not desire the third
member for Birmingham to be taken by the Tories,
and therefore opposed reform; but his best point,
like all his others, was unworthy of his genius and
his fame. Party interest misled him as it has often
misled other men of equal distinction and mental
power.
Now as the question of filling casual vacancies,
under reformed voting, has never been discussed in
this country, nor, so far as I know, been examined
abroad, (unless in connection with schemes of repre
149 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
sentation which do not come within the scope of my
present discourse,) I shall proceed to speak upon it
briefly, and shall incidentally dispose of the Bright
objection just mentioned.
In the first place I have to remark that if hereafter casual vacancies shall be filled by popular election and by the majority vote, we shall be in no
worse condition than we are now; we shall simply
continue, as to such occasional election, the existing
rule.  In the next place it is to be considered tl at
whenever two or more vacancies shall exist at the
same time, the free or limited vote can be applied to
an election held for the purpose of filling them.
Again, it is evident that most vacancies that will
happen, will be of majority members or officers, and
that the application of the majority vote to the
choice of successors will be perfectly proper and in
complete harmony with our plan of reform.  But I
will take the comparatively rare or unusual case of
a minority vacancy standing alone, or the still rarer
case of two or more such vacancies (without majority ones) existing at the same time. How shall
such minority vacancies be filled?  I answer, they
can be filled and filled properly either by election
or appointment.   In many if not most cases appointments may be made for unexpired terms, but
whenever possible in any case an appointment
should be made from among the voters who shall
have voted for the officer or person whose place is
to be filled. As an illustration I will read the provision concerning the filling of vacancies contained
in the County Commissioner bill introduced into the
Senate of Pennsylvania at its last session. After
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SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS.
providing for the election of three County Commissioners and three County Auditors, respectively, for
three year terms, the fourth section provides as
follows:
"SEC. 4. Vacancies in the office of County ComImissioner or County Auditor occurring otherwise
than by the expiration of a regular term of service,
or occasioned or continued by a failure to elect under
this act, shall be filled by appointments to be made
by the Courts of Quarter Sessions of the Peace of
the several counties in which such vacancies shall
occur, which appointments shall be for the remaining part or time of any unexpired term to be filled.
In the filling of any such vacancy the following
rules of selection shall be observed, to wit: First,
The appointment shall be made from among the
qualified electors of the county who shall have voted
for the Commissioner or Auditor whose place is to
be filled, and Second, The Judges of the Court by
whom the appointment is to.be made shall receive
and consider any respectful petition from qualified
electors of the county who shall have voted for the
Commissioner or Auditor whose place is to be filled,
and shall appoint such fit persons so recommended
as shall, in their opinion, be most acceptable to the
greater part of the electors by whom the Commissioner or Auditor whose place is to be filled was
chosen."
Tile power of appointment for the filling of vacancies may be variously lodged according to the
nature of the case or the character of the office to
be filled, but no matter where lodged it should always be exercised under a rule of selection similar
151 
152     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
to that contained in the bill just cited, so that the
just division of offices between parties shall be at
all times maintained.
But when an appointment cannot well be made
to fill a vacancy on account of the magnitude of
the office, the long duration of the unexpired term,
or because it is difficult in the given case to select a
proper appointing power, a popular election to fill
the vacancy may be provided for. In such case I
would call only upon the voters who had previously
voted for the officer or person whose place is to be
filled and would confine the right of choice to them.
The other voters of the constituency or district
ought not to participate in such election for evident
reasons and should be excluded. But at this point
an objector may say that it will be difficult to distinguish the proper voters from others and to confine the electoral privilege to them. I do not
think so. The party position of most men is fully
known in their own election districts, and in doubtful cases the right of challenge will guard against
improper votes. The official lists of voters taken
down at a former election can be referred to for the
prevention of fraud, and any one offering to vote
may be called upon to prove by his own oath or by
other testimony that he voted at such former election for the officer or person whose place is to be
filled. Besides, as there will be no struggle between political parties for a majority at such elections, the most fertile of all causes of fraud will be
wholly excluded from them. In fact where there
shall be but one candidate at such an election,
(which will be the ordinary case,) there will be no 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS.
motive at all for fraud and its existence will be rendered impossible.
But I am quite certain that when the free vote or
some similar plan of reform shall come into general
use, secret voting will be entirely dispensed with
because it will no longer be necessary to the protection of the voter against intimidation and other
forms of improper influence. The ballot may remain to us, but it will be an open one-probably in
the slip-ticket form-and a large amount of mystery, intrigue, deception and meanness will be expelled from elections. And, by numbering the
ballots when voted, or by other means easily applied, it will be possible to prove afterwards beyond
dispute for whom any voter cast his votes. Possibly we may come at last to a plan of registering votes which will still more completely or conveniently enable us to classify voters and determine
for whom they voted. At all events, by dispensing
with the secret vote we shall possess greater facilities
than now for the proper polling of votes at special
elections.
LOCAL USE OF REFORMED VOTING.
The free vote was first used in an election at
Bloomsburg, in this State, on the 12th of April last,
when six persons were to be chosen members of the
town Council for the ensuing year. The result was
that three Democrats and three Republicans were
elected. It was again used in the same town on the
second Tuesday of the present month in the choice
of Constables, Assessors, Assistant Assessors, School
Directors, and Town Auditors. Altogether, at the
153 
154     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
two town elections, seventeen officers have been
chosen under the new plan, and they are all good
men and are fairly divided between parties. Not
one person among the whole six hundred voters of
the town is known to have expressed himself against
the change, or is believed to be desirous of return ing to the old and unfair majority vote. In short,
the change has been completely satisfactory and is
strongly endorsed by public opinion.
Directors of the Poor for the Bloom Poor District in Columbia county (the district containing
one thousand two hundred voters) were also chosen
at the October election under the new plan and in a
satisfactory manner. The. majority elected two and
the minority one.
In the county of Northumberland, in Sunbury,
Northumberland and other boroughs, the new plan
was also tried at the recent election (principally in
the choice of Councilmen) and with good and satisfactory results.
Certain advantages of the new plan not foreseen
or not foreseen distinctly, appeared in these local
elections. In the first place, they showed that the
number of candidates at an election will be greatly
reduced by the new plan; that in most cases no
more persons will run than can be elected, because
each party will nominate only the number it has
votes to elect.  Next, it was shown that blunders in
nomination, either as to the number of candidates
to be supported or as to individual nominations,
could be readily and certainly corrected by the
voters at the legal election. Also, that bolting (as
it is called) is deprived to a great extent of its mis 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS.
chievous character, bolters being only able to represent themselves by their own votes when their
number is adequate, without being able to turn an
election upside down or prevent a just division of the
offices between parties. It was also clearly shown
at those elections that the preparation, polling,
counting, and return of fractional votes, in cases
where their use was found desirable, was quite simple and convenient, occasioning no difficulty, unlcertainty or confusion.
PROGRESS OF REFORM.
The State of New York a few years since used
the limited vote in choosing thirty-two delegates at
large to her Constitutional Convention. No voter
was allowed to vote for nmore than sixteen. More
recently she chose the six Associate Judges of her
highest court on the same principle; no voter was
allowed to vote for more than four. But though
these were steps in the right direction and resulted
ini fuller representation of the people, it must be acknowledged that the limited vote is an imperfect
contrivance and not fitted for extensive use. More
wisely instructed, the State of Illinois the present
year has adopted the free vote, not only for the
election of directors or managers of incorporated
companies, as before mentioned, but also for the election of Representatives in her Legislature. They
will be chosen biennially, commencing with the
year 1872, three being elected together from each
senatorial district. In this State, in August last, a
respectable convention in favor of minority representation was held at Reading. It adopted proper
155 
156     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
resolutions and organized committees for future work.
The men concerned in that convention and the
friends of reform generally in this State, look forward to a Constitutional Convention as the means
for securing the main objects they have in view.
And they particularly desire that the members of
such convention, if one should be called, shall be
elected upon a plan of reformed voting, so that the
whole people shall be represented in the convention.
Without a convention, however, much can be
done. The Legislature has complete power over
municipal elections and can reform them at pleasure,
and it can also largely improve the representation
of the people in the Legislature itself.
In conclusion I will say to all friends of reform,
be confident and hopeful of the future. It is well
for us "to labor and to wait." Great changes are
best made when made deliberately and with due
caution; not in passionate heat, but upon cool conviction. Electoral reforms may come slowly, but
they are sure to come, for their necessity grows
every year more evident. 
A SPEECH
DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, ON
MONDAY EVENING, MARCH 27, 1871, UPON
THE BiLL ENTITLED
"AN ACT FOR THE FURTItlR REGULATION OF BOROUGHS."*
MR. SPEAKER:-I came to this Senate to serve
during my present term with the intention of devoting myself particularly to the subject of Electoral
Reform. I thought that the attention of the Represenitatives of the people assembled in the Legislature should be directed to some fundamental and
searching changes in our electoral system, by which
existing abuses shall be checked or prevented in
future.
Now, sir, in the first place, I propose to call attention to what has been done heretofore in this
State upon this subject of reform, in the direction
indicated by the present bill.
INSPECTORS OF ELECTION.
In the Constitutional Convention of 1837-8, Mr.
Thomas Earle, of the county of Philadelphia, sub *The bill upon which the above speech was delivered passed and became a law. Those sections of it which relate to the election of Councilmen, in boroughs to the support of which the argument of the speech
was directed, will be found at page 229 of this volume.
157 
158     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
mitted propositions on two occasions, with reference
to the choice of election officers by the people, upon
the plan of what is now known as the limited vote.
On the 27th of June, 1837,* he addressed that Con vention at s,)me length in support of his second
proposition. It was then submitted to a vote and
rejected very strongly; by a vote of, I think, over
three to one, and the majority comprised most of the
strong men of the Convention-such men as Woodward, Sergeant, Forward and others. The Convention passed off and nothing was done. At the session of the Legislature in 1839, the Governor of the
Commonwealth called attention in his message to
the subject of electoral reform. He pointed out to
the two Houses that extensive changes had become
necessary in our election laws by reason of the
amendments to the Constitution. He pointed out
the fact that great frauds had taken place at elections in various parts of the Commonwealth, and, in
short, that our electoral system had fallen under reproach and needed amendment. During the course
of the session, Mr. Senator Brown, of Philadelphia
county, turned his attention to this subject, and, in
a Committee of Conference upon the General Election bill of that year, obtained the insertion substantially of the proposition which had been advocated by Mr. Earle, in the Constitutional Convention
the year before, and for which Mr. Brown himself
had voted, he being a member of that Convention.
Well, sir, that proposition will be found among our
statutes as one of the most important'and useful provisions of the election act of 1839. It provides that
*3 Convention Debates, 173. 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT.
each voter, at the time when election officers are to
be chosen, shall vote for but one person for Inspector of elections during the coming year, and that the
two candidates highest in vote shall be declared
elected. Then follows a provision that each Inspector, so chosen, shall appoint a clerk. The Judge of
the election, the only additional officer, is chosen
under the old plan of the majority vote.  That was
in 1839, and it is to be noted that upon debate, this
reform was carried in the Senate by a vote of only
fifteen to eleven.
But this law as to the manner of choosing election
officers has continued to the present time, a period
of over thirty years, and it is well known that it is
most salutary in operation and most satisfactory to
the people. I do not know what the whole number
of election districts in the State is at the present
time; in 1838 the number a little exceeded one
thousand.  I suppose the number now exceeds two
thousand, and it happens under this law that in
nineteen-twentieths of the election districts of the
Commonwealth, each of the two political parties into
which our people are ordinarily divided, has an Inspector in the Election Board, and also a Clerk, and
that the majority has the Judge. Sir, it is this provision of the law that has preserved our elections
from degeneracy and disgrace. If it were recalled
from our statute book, and we should apply to tlhe
choice of election officers our ordinary plan of voting,
we might expect an enormous increase of fraudulent
voting throughout the State, with consequent degeneracy of our political system, and to a great ex
159 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
tent discredit would be cast upon the political
institutions under which we live.
JURY COMMISSIONERS.
Some years since, complaint began to be made in
various parts of the State that jurymen were not
fairly selected by County Commissioners and Sheriffs to whom the law committed their selection. In
some counties they were taken, it was alleged, exclusively from the majority party in the countythe County Commissioners and Sheriffs representing
the majority and selecting their political friends almost exclusively, from year to year.  Appeals were
made to the Legislature, and several local acts were
passed for particular counties, providing a new arrangement, an election by the people of two Jury
Commissioners in the same manner in which Inspectors of Election are chosen under the election
act of 1839. Finally the Governor recommended
the extension of this plan to the whole Commonwealth. This recommendation was made, I believe,
by Governor Curtin. A general statute was passed
and approved by Governor Geary in April, 1867,
applying this plan of Jury Commissioners to the
whole State, and every Senator present is familiar
with it. Since that time throughout the State we
have had elections for those officers upon the plan
of the limited vote. The statute assigns to President Judges some duties in connection with the
Jury Commissioners. In many of the judicial districts, the President Judges declined to act, or did
not act for some time after the law was passed.
They thought, and I suppose thought properly,
160 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT.
that they ought to have no part in the selection of
men who were to serve in their courts as jurymren; that it was a duty which ought not to be
charged upon them, because it was to some extent
inconsistent with their judicial duties and with that
entire independence which ought to exist between
the Judges and jury who are to try the disputes and
differences of the citizen.  But presently it came to
be understood that in all cases under that law jurymen would be divided equally between political
parties; that in a county where there was nearly a
two-thirds majority the minority would have an
equal number, which seemed unfair; and so, from
time to time appeals have been made to President
Judges to take part and assist their political friends
to get their full share, or perhaps more than their
share of jurymen.
One of the President Judges described to me the
performance on one occasion when he first attended
to select jurors. It was in a county with the inhabitants of which he was not very familiar, he having
previously resided in an adjoining county; but he
was told that he must assist in filling the wheel and
he did so. He found a Democratic and a Republican Jury Commissioner sitting on each side of a
table, and each of them with a hat full of names.
The proceeding was after this fashion: The Democratic Commissioner reached into his hat and took
out a name, and put it into the box or wheel; the
Republican Commissioner did the same from his hat,
and then the Judge, who happened to be a Republican, reached into the Republican's hat and took
out a name and put it into the wheel; and at the end
11
161 
162     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
of the proceeding the Judge did not know a single
name that he had put into the wheel, but the duty
charged upon him under the law had been, after a
fashion, discharged.
What ought to have been done in 1867? Why,
I insist that the bill which.is lying upon your table,
introduced early in the session, ought to have passed
instead of the Jury Commissioner act. That provides that in the election of County Commissioners
all the voters of a county shall be enabled to represent themselves by their own votes; that in all ordinary cases the majority shall be enabled to elect
two Commissioners and the minority one, and then
that the board, so made up, shall be charged with
this duty of selecting jurymen, as formerly. We
would, by that arrangement, be enabled to dispense
with two unnecessary officers-the Jury Commissioners-and we would also be enabled to dispense
with this clumsy provision in relation to the participation of President Judges in the selection of jurymen. We would have the people fairly represented
in courts of justice whenever issues of fact were to
be tried, and every object designed to be obtained
by the act of 1867 would be fully accomplished.
That, by the way, is only one of the advantages, as
I think, of this County Commissioner bill which is
upon your files.  But I proceed:
LOCAL ACTS.
At the last session the two houses of the Legislature passed ten or twelve local bills, at my instance,
applying reformed voting to certain municipal alections in the counties of Columbia and Northumber 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT.
land. A proposition and arrangement which you
have in the third section of the pending bill in relation to boroughs, was applied to the eight boroughs
in Northumnberland county, to the town of Bloomsburg and the borough of Berwick in Columbia
county, and to two poor districts in those counties.
Substantially the free vote was applied to them, and
it has had successful operation.
BILLS PROPOSED.
This constitutes the legislation which has heretofore been had in this particular line of reformn.  At
this session the Senate has passed a bill applying
the free vote to the choice of Directors of Common
Schools, and now it is asked to pass this bill in relation to the election of Councilmen of boroughs
throughout the Commonwealth. The provision is
that in all boroughs incorporated under or pursuant
to general laws, and in all boroughs heretofore established by special acts which may come under the
general laws, there shall be six Councilmen, and in
selecting them each voter may distribute or concentrate his six votes according to his own judgment,
without legal restraint. Now, comparatively described, this provision amounts to this: That, whlereas, the existing law, after assigning to the voter
his six votes, compels him to distribute them singly
among six candidates, this bill will withdraw that
limitation, and allow him to distribute them according to his own judgment, without legal compulsion.
Now, sir, the fundamental principle of our government is that men, or at least American men, are
competent to self-government. Our system is said
16.3 
164    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
to be a system of self-government-that the citizen
is able to choose and determine for himself in all
matters of discretion where strong reasons of public
interest do not interpose to demand legal regulation.
What the supporters of this bill ask is, not that the
law shall be extended, not that legal regulation
shall be increased, not that the law-making power
shall interfere, and do more than it has heretofore
done, but that it shall withdraw itself from the citizen, and allow him a larger measure of freedom and
of choice, in strict accordance with the fundamental
principles of our government.
OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED-CHOICE OF MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS.
Now, sir, what objections are there to this plan
of voting? Why the Senator from Greene [Mr.
Purman] the other day went over some of those that
may naturally occur to a candid and reasonable
mind upon  first approaching  this  subject.   He
stated them, and he stated them in a fair and proper manner, suggesting the line of argument which
it is necessary for me to pursue in vindication of this
bill. He suggests that if this plan of voting were
applied to the choice of members of Congress there
would be no districting of this or any other State;
that the members would be elected by general ticket
throughout the whole Commonwealth; and he
seemed to apprehend that there would be some difficulty in executing such a plan. To this I make
two replies: I say, in the first place, that the districting of States is not at all incompatible with this
plan of voting; it comports with it perfectly. You 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT.
might have a plan of plural though not of single
districts. But there would be no difficulty if members were elected by general ticket in the whole
State. Representation of different localities in the
State even could be easily secured. The reasons for
this opinion I have stated upon another occasion.
CHOICE OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE.
Again, the Senator seems to suppose that it would
be necessary, if this plan of voting were applied to
the choice of members of the Legislature, that the
State should be divided into four Senatorial districts
for the choice of Senators, and into four Representative districts for the choice of Representatives.
Well, sir, I never heard that suggested before. It
never occurred to me that such arrangement would
be selected if this plan were applied. The Senator
will find, by referring to the present constitution of
the State of Illinois, that it provides that each Senatorial District in that State shall select three Representatives upon the plan of the free vote. The result is that in that State the Legislature will form
fifty-one Senatorial districts, and then their duty of
apportioning members of the Legislature will be
concluded. By the Constitution, while each Senatorial District chooses one member of the Senate, it
also chooses three members of the House, and each
voter may give his three votes to one, two or three
candidates for representative, so that the majority
will have two and the minority one. Probably, as
the result, the Democratic representation in Northern
Illinois will be largely increased, while in Southern
Illinois the Republican voters will be emancipated;
165 
166     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
they will send their share of members to the Legislature. That case illustrates the manner in which
a State may be districted, or in which representatives
to the Legislature may be chosen by districts under
this plan of voting.
If the Senator had referred to Mr. Medill's
amendment, introduced into the convention of Illinois, with reference to the election of Senators, he
would have ascertained that a very convenient
method could have been applied to their election by
the free vote. The Senator's suggestion of this difficulty about districts reminds me of what occurred
in 1869. About the month of October, of that year,
I had occasion to address a gentleman in the State
of Illinois, and mentioned to him this subject of reformed voting as one that would possess interest for
their convention which was soon to meet. He answered by saying that he did not see how they could
possibly apply such a plan to the election of members of the Legislature. [Their Legislature was to
be composed of a large number of members; as it
meets only every second year, they can very well
afford to have large numbers in each House; there
are advantages, or supposed advantages, in large
numbers of members in legislative bodies.] He
did not see, he could not understand how a plan of
reformed voting could be applied to. the choice of
fifty-one Senators, and to the choice of one hundred
and fifty-three Representatives.   He  was at that
time laboring under the same doubts which occurred
to the Senator from Greene [Mr. Purman]. Now,
sir, that same gentleman went down to the convention in Springfield shortly afterwards, and made a 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT.
motion to appoint a Committee on Electoral and
Representative Reform, of which he was made
Chairman; and he was the leading man concerned
in putting into the constitution of the State the very
provision in reference to the choice of Representatives to which I have referred, and also other important provisions applying the same plan to the
election of directors of incorporated companies, and
to the election of judges in the city of Chicago.
This supposed difficulty of districting a State for the
purpose of applying a reformed plan of voting in
Legislative elections is quite illusory. Districts to
which this plan shall be applicable are more easily
made than districts in ordinary apportionment laws,
and if we were compelled, under the constitution, to
so district our State that all the people should have
representation by this plan of voting, we would not
have as much difficulty as we have now under our
present system of gerrymandering and disfranchisement. Let me say to the Senator that we get rid of
the great difficulty and evil of gerrymandering by the
free vote; we cut it up by the roots, or, at least, we
reduce it to its smallest dimensions.
THE MAJORITY SHOULD RULE.
The Senator says the majority should rule. Well,
that is true. Mr. Jefferson said so-that absolute
acquiescence in the will of the majority, fairly pronounced, was a vital principle of our system, or one,
at least, which must be applied and carried out constantly, or our experiment-of free government would
end in failure. To that I assent most fully. But
Mr. Mill long ago pointed out the fact that the
167 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
majority vote, as heretofore existing in Great Brit ain and in the United States, does not secure the
will of the majority-that, in point of fact, the rule
which we get from it, as we apply it, is a rule of the
majority of the majority, or often of a small portion
only of the people. In the first place, at the popu lar elections you count out all the minority voters;
you count or allow only majority votes and put
aside the rest. A large part of the people, then, are
virtually disfranchised; they have no further voice
in the government beyond the giving of fruitless
votes, which, after being scored down, are in effect
scored  out again.  Then  the representatives so
chosen, meet in a legislative body, and when any
measure of policy is to be voted upon, the majority
rule is applied again, and the minority of the legislative body ignored; so that the majority of the legislative body pronounces the rule of law for the citizen.
Besides, in practice in this country, legislative
majorities, upon all measures of a political character at least, and many others, act under a system
of consultation-that is, under what we call the
caucus rule.   The representatives of the majority
in the representative body meet together, and subject
their wills to the decision of a majority of themselves; and that caucus decision, concocted and settled in secret, becomes the law of the State. The
caucus is in the third degree removed from the people, and there are three eliminations of popular
power  before the law is enacted.   Therefore  I
say you do not necessarily secure the rule of the
majority under your majority vote, because the
majority of the legislative body, made up as I have
168 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT.
described it, and acting as it does, may very likely
represent only a minority of the people out of
doors, and such, in point of fact, is frequently
the case.
Under reformed voting what do you do? You
do not destroy votes given at the popular elections;
you count them all; you take them and respect
them; you consider them as sacred and inviolate
and give to them full and complete effect. And
what is the result? Substantially that all the electors are represented and obtain due voice and influence in the enactment of the laws. Then, in the
legislative body you have all the people represented.
Each voter, except in rare cases, has his representative in place on whose attention he has a claim and
to whom he can speak as to a friend. There is
thorough representation; all your people are heard.
How widely different is the case now! and because
it is different tlhis evil of local or private legislation
is beginning to be exclaimed against all over the
State; and if you do not take steps to correct it,
there will be a movement of popular power that
will reach over you and beyond you, and through a
change of the fundamental law will effectually cor rect the evil.
The rule of the majority! I agree to the prin ciple; we propose to apply it in this bill.  We take
the vote in the legislative body, and there, the will
of the majority is appropriately pronounced, and it
can be properly pronounced nowhere else. It will
take effect with a sanction that it does not now pos sess, because when all the people have been heard
in the enactment of a law or regulation, they will
169 
170     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
very likely be satisfied with it; and besides, there
will be greater security for the fairness and wisdom
of such law or regulation in the fuller consideration
to which it will be subjected.
BALANCE-OF-POWER PARTIES.
The Senator says that under this plan of voting
all the little side parties of the country would be
represented and heard. As it is now under the old
majority vote they are kept out of Congress, out of
Legislatures, and out of other positions in the Gov ernmenlt. Because they are a small number in any
given constituency, you apply to them the majority
vote, and you extinguish them or push them away
from the high places of power, and do not allow
their voices to be heard there. The Senator seemns
to think that this is an advantage;  he seems to
think it was proper in the case of the Abolitionists,
who were continually repressed by the control and
discipline of the old political parties, and were kept
down in that way. He might have extended his
remark to the South and have said thiat Union men
there were kept out of the local Legislatures and
kept out of Congress, by the discreet handling of
the majority vote in the hands of the extreme leaders of the South. The minority elements in the
North and South were kept down by the majority
vote; but, sir, you did not destroy the fire of sectionalism by your repression; it burned and glowed
underneath the hlollow system of your majority,
until it burst out into an uncontrollable flame in
which we were all involved. How would it have
been, if, instead of repressing them, you had allowed 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT.
them to be represented in proportion to their nunmbers, and allowed everybody in the country to see
the growth of opinion, and your statesmen to prepare securities against it? But you pushed that
danger out of sight as much as possible, and shut
your eyes to it as long as you could. Nevertheless
it was irrepressible; in spite of your majority vote,
the war came and ran its terrific course for four years.
How is it? Here you have a small body of men
in a State, whose single issue, whose single object is
very important to them, so that they will vote with
reference to it as the Abolitionists did. They make
their single issue superior to all others that engage
the public mind. After a time they get strength
enough to hold the balance of power between parties, as the Abolitionists did in many States. When
they get to that stage of growth what do they do.?
They say to a political party, "do our work and we
will give you power; affiliate yourselves with us
and you shall triumph; repel us, reject us, and you
go into a minority or remain in a minority in the
State; your leading men will be struck down at all
elections." Why, in Massachusetts, the Democrats
allied themselves with the free soil element and
elected Charles Sumner to the Senate of the United
States; that element held the balance of power, and
the Democracy were seduced into that act of folly.
The Whig party in State after State was seduced
into a similar kind of alliance subsequently, until it
became utterly debauched and eventually gave up
its own organization and took a creed in which this
balance-of-power party had its choice principles in serted, and thus the movement went forward until
171 
172    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
war came. I insist then, that the best thing you
can do in order to secure the peace of the country,
is to give all your citizens just representation in the
government. If I had time I would go on and
prove, as I think I could, that our late war would
never have occurred if there had been an honest,
fair, and wise system of electoral action in this
country-if all the people had been enabled to represent themselves thoroughly in government by
their own votes, after the fashion or upon the principle of a free-handed and just exercise of their
electoral power.
CORRUPTION OF ELECTIONS.
There was one other point of objection mentioned
by the Senator from Greene [Mr. Purman] to which
I must refer. It was that in cases that might arise
under this bill, there would be greater opportunities
or facilities for corruption than under the old plan
of voting; that a corrupt man or one desirous of
corrupting electors, when he purchased a voter,
would get his whole six votes instead of getting but
one vote, and that the tendency of this new plan
would be to increase corruption instead of diminishing it. Let me answer this point by a few figures.
The town of Bloomsburg polled in 1868 six hundred and forty-six votes for President, of which
Seymour had three hundred and twenty-nine, and
Grant three hundred and seventeen, being a Democratic majority of twelve votes. That town elects
six members of a town Council under the plan of
reformed voting. Upon the vote of 1868 three
Democratic town Councilmen would be elected. 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLElMENT.
each receiving six hundred and fifty-eight votes,
and three Republican Councilmen would be elected,
each receiving six hundred and thirty-four votes
that is, each party can obtain three of the six as a
matter of course under this plan of voting, and
voting as the people do in that town, the political
candidates would  have  the  respective  numbers
which I have mentioned. Suppose a volunteer candidate desires to interrupt the regular course of an
election in that town, and proceeds to debauch voters
in order to appropriate their votes to himself. If
he takes his votes fromn the majority or the Democracy of the town, he is required, in order to
succeed, to purchase eighty-three voters; if from
the minority, he must obtain eighty; if he obtain
his votes equally from both parties, it would be
necessary for him to get ninety-two voters; if he is
to obtain his votes in that corrupt manner as against
the regular parties running a joint ticket, he must
obtain  ninety-three  voters.   Now,  observe  two
things. lii the first place, the supposed corruption
of the voters can only extend to the election of one
Councilman out of six.  The man who buys these
voters can only affect the election to the extent of
one-sixth of the general result. Again, in no ordinary
case, and hlardly in any case, can he be expected to
obtain so many voters by corrupt or improper means.
The number is too great to be seduced, particularly as
they are to be taken away from their party allegiance
and party associations. They must break over party
lines and desert party nominations in order to prosti tute themselves to the purpose of the volunteer.
When you come to look into this point you must per
173 
17 4    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
ceive that the danger of seduction is infinitely small
and worthy of but little consideration. What I have
always said and now say is, that reformed voting
reduces the evil of corruption at elections to its
Ininimum. Of course it will not take hold of
human nature and change it; it will not reorganize
the hearts or intellects of the people. I assign to it
no such complete renovating power; but what I do
insist upon is that it will reduce this evil of corrupt ing voters to its lowest possible quantity, or to use
the scientific term, to its minimum.
Now take the old plan of voting in the same town
and with the same vote given to each party respectively. Suppose this volunteer desires to defeat some
man nominated by the majority; he has some private job of his own; he wants a street laid out
through his property or wants a street closed, or
water-works established; he desires something done
that will promote his interests, and aims to defeat a
certain candidate to that end. What has he to do?
Buy thirteen majority voters and it is done! There
is a majority of twelve in this case-in the case
taken. He has only to corrupt thirteen men and
his object will be accomplished.  Under the majority vote thirteen taken from the majority will
change the result of the election, and he may easily
draw off that small number as a volunteer. Suppose
again, that this man is a member of the minority in
the town, and he desires to be elected to the Council
for some selfish purpose; he says to his party
friends, "nominate me and I will spend money
enough on this election to secure my success, and
not only my ownI but also the success of five other 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT.
candidates to be placed on our ticket, and we will
take away from the opposite party their whole representation in the local legislature of the town."
His party friends assent; the ticket of six is made
up as proposed, the proposer himself being one.
What has he to do under the majority vote in order
to elect himself and his colleagues? Buy seven
votes only!  The democratic majority in the town
is but twelve. Cannot seven or more loose voters
be found in any party out of a total of two or three
hundred? He seduces seven voters, and he puts
himself into the council, with colleagues to assist him
in his ulterior designs. If they put the town in
debt, you cannot help it; if they persecute their political enemies in the town, the injustice must be
borne; a little money in the hands of a base man
has secured immunity to the evil. Such elections
as this are occurring continually throughout the
State in boroughs and other municipalities, under
the majority vote. Under the free vote in Bloomsburg you must seduce eighty to a hundred men, in
order to affect the choice of councilmen to the extent
of one member in six! Under the old plan seven
corrupted voters may change the whole election.
But there is an additional consideration. The
party assailed by the corrupt scheme just mentioned
come together and say, "Are we to be cheated?
No!  We have money also.  We  must'fight fire
with fire.' "  And so both parties spend money on
the election.  Year by year this evil goes on and
increases. Your political system is becoming cankered at the very core, and gentlemen stand here
hesitating and doubting whether electoral reform is
175 
176     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
necessary, and whether a man who talks for it and
works for it is not a little visionary or at least some what ahead of the times.
There is another thing that is sometimes done.
Coalitions are common; we have what are called
"Citizens'," "People's" or "Union" tickets set up.
They are very well in some cases, but are often set
up in the interest of some man, or of a few. A man
of the majority is offended at what his party has
done; perhaps they have done him nothing but
sheer justice; they have declined to put him into
office, and he has a dozen men subject to his influence, or he has money, and he goes to the opposite party-the minority-and he says to them,
"Put me on your ticket, and I will elect it." Or
if he does not ask to be put upon the ticket himself,
he asks that some personal friend of his shall be put
on, and that pledges shall be given in favor of something he wants done. Then by turning over a small
number of voters from his own party to the other,
the coalition is made to succeed.
I insist, therefore, that these points of objection,
or of doubt rather, in reference to this new plan, do
not condemn it or render its adoption unwise or
improper.
REFORM IN NOMINATIONS.
[Mr. B. proceeded to speak upon the application of reformed
voting in the choice of delegates to nominating bodies, and
particularly to County Conventions, describing the various
plans upon which such bodies were chosen, and insisted that
the same remedy which would purify and improve the legal
elections should be extended to the voluntary or primary ones
also.  He strongly condemned the Crawford County plan of
nomination, and expressed his preference for that recently 
TIIE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT.
adopted in the County of Columbia, under which there was
representation of election districts in proportion to their party
vote, and complete freedom to the electors in casting their
votes for delegates. He concluded by stating that he regarded
the bill under consideration as a step in the course of reformas one well calculated to have a considerable effect in the im
provement of municipal government and to familiarize the
people with a new but effectual and necessary plan for the
renovation of popular elections.]
CONCLUDING DEBATE.
In SENATE, March 29, 1871.-Agreeably to order
the Senate resumed the third reading and consideration of Senate bill entitled "An act for the further
regulations of boroughs."
Mr. BUCKALEW.  Mr. Speaker, if any gentleman
desires to make remarks upon this bill I will give
place to himn; if not, I desire to say a fewi words and
then have the vote taken. I desire to explain that
this bill does not apply to any borough in the State
established by special law. It only applies to those
that have been or may be incorporated under the
act of 1851, or the prior act of 1834. Nor does it
apply in many cases where, by special legislation,
particular arrangements have been made in boroughs
for the selection of Councilmen. There are a large
number of laws which provide, for instance, that
where there are one, two, three or more wards, each
ward shall be entitled to elect a member of Council,
or more members than one, for one, two or three
year terms; so that it often happens that only one
Councilman is voted for by the same body of electors.   This bill does not disturb suchi arrangemients
or affect the manner of voting in such cases.  It
12
177 
178     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
applies only to those boroughs which exist under
general laws, and to those hereafter established or
brought under those laws.
I desire to add another explanation, and that is,
that this plan of voting is very different from that
proposed by Mr. Hare, in a work of some celebrity.
He proposes a plan of personal representation by
means of preferential voting, as it is called, and he
announces his leading object to be to emancipate
voters from the domination or control of party
organization; to enable them to vote without reference to those associations heretofore known in Great
Britain and in this country as political parties. I
am not for his plan; and I desire it to be distinctly
understood that the free vote points to an object
quite different from his. This plan now before us,
assumes the existence in political society of political
parties, and it assumes that they will exist hereafter.
It is simply a proposition by which political parties
can represent themselves conveniently and justly by
their own votes. It does not strike at party organization. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I agree entirely with
the main portion of the argument submitted by
yourself [Mr. Wallace] to the Senate the other
evening, in which it was insisted that political parties were a necessity in free governments-at least
that they were inevitable wherever free play was
permitted to the political activity of the citizen.
This doctrine was laid down by Mr. Madison perhaps as briefly and clearly as it ever was, in the
forty-ninth number of the Federalist, in which he
said that "an extinction of parties necessarily implies either a universal alarm for the public safety, 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT.
or an absolute extinction of liberty." Now, sir, I
think that reformers who, in the present stage of
civilization, look to political arrangements independent of party organization, must necessarily be visionary and their schemes impracticable; and I am
one of the last men who would assent to the adoption of any new system based upon their ideas.   I
take political parties as I find them; I take political
society, divided fundamentally upon great government issues, and I assume that so long as free play
is permitted to the human mind ill political affairs
there will be parties, and government must be organized and administered with reference to them,
and that all attempts based upon an assumption that
it is possible to conduct public affairs without parties, are idle and vain; in fine, that all attempts based
on that idea must result in complete and disastrous
failure. No such object has been proposed by persons in this country, or beyond the ocean, who have
supported this plan of the free vote or cumulative
voting. All they propose is to put into the hands
of political parties an instrument by which they
can act justly at elections, by which they can obtain for themselves a fair share of power by their
own votes and by which it will be impossible for
them to take from their fellow-citizens any portion
of political power which belongs to ther,; by which
the principle of gambling (as I call it) shall be extracted from elections, and by which the motive for
spending money in order to obtain the majority at
elections shall be taken away.
I think this explanation was due to the Senate,
and to those who pay attention to our debates, be
179 
180i   PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
cause some distrust or question has been created in
the minds of gentlemen who imagine that the new
plan proposed here is identical with or similar in
principle to the reform proposed by Mr. Hare, which
is so complicated, and so far beyond the convenience
of political society that there is good reason for opposition to it; or at least for distrusting it as an expedient in the management of elections.
Mr. Speaker, I shall not pursue the discussion of
this subject any further, as it seems to be admitted
that this particular bill is but a reasonable experiment-a reasonable experiment by which the merits
and true character of this plan of voting can be ascertained and settled before the people.
[NOTE:  Upon the conclusion of Mr. Buckalew's remarks,
Mr. White and Mr. Osterhout addressed the Senate in support
of the bill, which then passed the Senate without a call of the
yeas and nays.
Subsequently, upon its consideration in the House of Representatives, the following letter in strong indorsement of the
change proposed to be made by it in the manner of electing
Councilmen in borouglhs, was presented by Mr. Strang, a leading member of the Hduse, and read by the Clerk:
BLOOMSBURG, May 8, 1871.
HoN. B. B. STRANG:-DEAR Sin: Observing that on your
motion the session of the House on Wednesday evening of this
week is to be devoted to the consideration of the Borough Supplement bill, which among other useful changes provides for
the introduction to a certain extent of the free vote into borough elections, we are induced to address to you a few earnest
words recommendatory of the bill. In our judgment the passage of that bill will secure more of reformjn and improvement
in boroughs than any other measure which the Legislature can
enact, while it will familiarize the people with the new plan of
voting, which has been so successful and satisfactory in our re 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT.
cent Bloomsburg elections. After having carefully observed
the working of the new plan when put into practical operation,
as it has been here at three elections, we are ready to approve
it and to declare our opinion that it possesses great merit.
It is readily comprehended by voters when they come to deposit ballots. It is of complete convenience in all cases, and it
is just in its operation, giving to every considerable interest
representation according to its relative strength. In addition
to these valuable qualities possessed by no other system ever
adopted in this State, the tendency of the new plan is to check,
if not wholly prevent, improper combinations and corrupt
practices at elections, and its certain effect must be to produce
reformed administration in municipal affairs. These, with
many other considerations which have, no doubt, suggested
themselves to your mind, induce us to hope that your efforts to
procure the passage of the bill through the House will be
crowned with success.
With great respect yours, &c.,
WILLIAM ELWELL,
President Judge.
D. A. BECKLEY,
Editor Republican.
H. L. DIEFFENBACH,
Editor Columbian.]
181 
LETTER TO SECRETARY JORDAN.
THE REPRESENTATION OF SUCCESSIVE MAJORITIES.
To FRANCIS JORDAN, Secretary of tlhe Comnionwealth of
Pelznsylvania.
SIR: -In a letter of yours recently published you
enumerate the several subjects which will be proper
for consideration in the approaching Constitutional
Convention of this State, and among others "Minority Representation" as one.  This term "Minority
Representation" is inaccurate and misleading as
applied to the several plans of electoral reform
which have been proposed in this country and
partially applied by statutory enactments in this and
in other States and notably by Constitutional amendment in the State of Illinois. No one proposes the
representation of minorities by the limited,cumulative, or free vote, or by list or preferential voting,
as those several plans have been explained, advocated, and partially applied in Europe and in the
United States. They are all plans for the representation of successive majorities in plural elections,
and all of them are intended to apply the majority
principle of government more completely and justly
than ever before.  Let us not be misled by words
ill     understood, or perverted fiom their true signifi      1S2
I@ 
THE JORDAN LETTER.
cation, nor by reasoning which while pertinent to
the election of a single person may be quite inapplicable to the election of several or many.
It is said, and the remark is quite true in a general sense, that ours is a system of self-government,
but no plan of representation ever devised can make
it such completely and beyond the possibility of a
disfranchisement of some members of the electoral
population. We must content ourselves with an approach to a standard of absolute perfection, without
indulging hopes of ever reaching it by the utmost
exertion of our powers.  But we must approach it
as nearly as we can, or we will be false to the principles we profess and subject ourselves to just reproach from the friends of free government in all
lands. Our country is new and our experiment and
trial of free institutions is being made not only upon
a grand scale, but under conditions more favorable
for success than ever before existed in the whole
history of the human race.
The more complete representation of the people
in government is, simply stated, the object of those
who advocate electoral reform upon either of the
plans before mentioned; but it is an entire mistake
to assume that they intend to subordinate the greater
to the less in any of the arrangements they propose,
or to subvert or impair any principle heretofore
accepted as sound and just in republican government. On the contrary, they adhere to the principle of majority government with admirable fidelity
and give to it new, useful, and extended operation
and effect.  They represent more persons-disfranchise fewer ones-and cut off the main source of
183 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
electoral corruption, by carrying the majority prin ciple further than it has ever been carried and
placing a power for its effectual enforcement in the
hands of the people themselves.
The force of these general remarks will be best
exhibited by an illustration of the principle of ex tended representation to which they refer, and for
such illustration I will take the case of Bloomsburg-my  own  town-where  four elections have
been held under the plan of the free vote. The
town contains, say, 612 voters, 312 of whom are
Democrats and 300 Republicans. (These are not
far from the exact numbers as shown at recent
elections.)
A President of the town Council is to be elected
annually who is the principal executive officer of
the town as well as President of the Council. If
the 312 Democratic voters unite in support of a
candidate he will be elected, and properly elected,
upon the sound principle that a greater number
shall be preferred to a less in the assignment of
representation. A very few voters in this case turn
the scale, but the result is perfectly just. There is
but one majority to be considered and that in favor
of the successful candidate.
Next, two Assessors-of taxes are to be elected annually, and here the free vote comes into play and
secures their division between parties.  Each voter
is permitted to give one vote to each of two candidates, or two votes to one. Each party, of course,
will run but one candidate, because they can elect
no more, and the second majority in the town is represented as well as the first. The figures are as fol
184 
THE JORDAN LETTER.
lows: Divide 612 (the whole vote) by 2, (the number of assessors,) and we obtain a ratio, or number
of voters for an assessor, of 306. Give the first
assessor to the first majority of 312 Democrats and
deduct the ratio; we have then left, unrepresented,
but 6 Democrats to 300 Republicans, and the free
vote carries the second assessor to this second, or
Republican majority. How much better this is than
giving both the assessors to the first majority!
Here but 6 voters are unrepresented instead of 300.
And in practical. government a clear advantage is
gained; for the possible spite, partiality or incompetency of one assessor is checked or corrected by
the other, and the chances of fair play in the valuations of property in the town are increased.
A similar and salutary division of officers takes
place annually in the choice of two school directors
and two constables, and triennially in the choice of
two assistant assessors.
But in the election of three persons the improvement introduced by the new plan is still more evidenlt than in the case of two.  The numbers will
run: Ratio, 204; first Dem. majority 312; second
Rep. maj. 300; third Dem. maj. 108, and the general result will stand 2 to 1 in favor of the party
having the preponderance upon the total vote. The
disfranchisement of Republican voters will be reduced from 300 to 96, and this by simply permitting each voter to cast his three votes for one, two
or three candidates as he shall think fit. In Bloomsburg three town Auditors are elected together every
third year.
Take next the case of the annual election of six
185 
186     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
Councilmen. The ratio for a Councilman will be
102 and the five successive majorities after the first
will all be represented by the free vote. Although
no calculation of them will be made at the election
such will be the inevitable result; for as each voter
may bestow his six votes upon any number of can didates less than six, each party will run but three,
all of whom will be elected and but six voters in
the whole population will be unrepresented instead
of 300. Here we have a very nearly complete representation of all the voters of the town by following the majority principle at each successive stage
of the distribution.
The exclusive representation of first majorities at
plural elections is a stupid misapplication of a just
principle-a crude, unjust and pernicious rule, the
inevitable effect of which, if continued, will be
the destruction of republican government. For it
produces violent struggles between parties and candidates for a preponderance of vote, with constantly
increasing corruption at elections and demoralization
of the people. These evils cannot be cured or corrected by mere preachment while their cause is left
in full operation. We must take away or greatly
reduce the motive for corrupting voters in order to
introduce reform which shall be effectual and lasting, and this will be accomplished when we provide
that all interests in political society, of any considerable magnitude,'nmay represent themselves in
government by their own votes and in proportion to
their numbers, without resort to corruption or other
means of undue influence.
Nov. 30, 1871. 
THIE CHOICE
OF
PRESIDENTIAL
A SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED
STATES, FEBRUARY 17, 1869.*
[In Senate, January 28, 1869, Mr. Buckalew, by unanimous
consent, introduced a Joint Resolution (Sen. Res. No. 209)
proposing an amendment to the Constitution'of the United
States in relation to the manner of choosing electors of President and Vice-President of the United States, which on his
motion was referred to the select Committee on Representative
Reform.  On the following day Mr. Morton reported the Joint
Resolution without amendment, stating that the report of the
Committee in its favor was unanimous. (Globe, 674-704.)
That Resolution will be found at length in this volume, a?gte,
page 104, in the general report of the Committee on Representative Reform as made to the Senate on the second of March
following.   February 9, House Joint Resolution No. 402,
proposing the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States in relation to colored suffrage being under consideration in the Senate in Committee of the Whole, Mr.
Morton moved to amend by adding the above amendment, reported by him as an additional amendment to the Constitution
to be numbered xvi. His motion was lost, yeas 27, nays 29.
Afterward, however, the same day, the House Resolution
having been reported to the Senate and being under further
consideration, he renewed his amendment and it was carried
after debate by a vote of 37 to 19. A motion to reconsider it
Con gressional Globe, 3d Sess. 40th Cong., 1287.
187
ELECTORS. 
188     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
was lost, and the Joint Resolution was returned to the House
with that and other amendments. (Globe, pp. 1041 to 1044.)
Subsequently, on the 17th February, the House having nonconcurred in the Senate Amendments, those amendments
underwent further consideration and debate, when the following speech was delivered by Mr. Buckalew against receding
from the Morton amendment.]
Mr. BUCKALEW. The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Sumner] on a formner occasion pronounced a strong denunciation of electoral colleges
for the choice of President and Vice President of
the United States. In that he uttered the voice of
public opinion  everywhere,  long  formed, about
which there is no dispute. These colleges are badly
constituted; they do not operate well nor to accomplish the purpose of their original institution.
With reference to all that I think there is a general
agreement.  But the Senator went on to make another remark, and that was that he preferred a direct vote by the people of the United States for
candidates for these great offices of President and
Vice President.
Sir, he followed the lead of great men in expressing that opinion or desire. President Jackson made
a recommendation of a change of the Constitution
to secure such a popular vote, I think, in six annual
messages. It was a favorite question of reform with
the late Senator Benton. I believe you, sir, [Mr.
Wade,] also a few years ago introduced the question
in the Senate, and had a formal proposition for
amending the Constitution of the United States considered here.
Now, Mr. President, theoretically it is understood 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.
through the country that the people do choose their
President themselves, that they vote for him, and
the machinery of the Electoral College is looked
upon as surplusage, unnecessary-as the Senator
from Massachusetts expresses it, "a sham." It is
thought to be a thing superfluous, a piece of machinery established by the Constitution which the people
have outgrown; that it is in point of fact obsolete,
and that the people themselves do, after a fashion,
vote for the candidates for President and Vice
President of the United States.
Sir, this is a very incorrect opinion. The people
do not vote for President and Vice President of the
United States, and the votes they cast for electors to
perform that function to cast actual votes for the
election of President and Vice President do not accomplish necessarily the object for which they are
given.  I showed some days since, when this subject was before the Senate, some startling statistics
to prove this. Among other facts then shown were
the facts that in 1860 it required 114,596 popular
votes to obtain an elector for Mr. Douglas, who was
one of the candidates for President, while it required
only 15,144 to obtain an elector for Mr. Bell, one
of the other candidates. The figures also show that
Mr. Douglas, who was the second candidate before
the people, who received 1,375,157 votes, was the
lowest of all the four candidates in the electoral
colleges, so that if there had been a slight disturbance of the actual vote as it was given in a; few
States, by which the election would have been sent
to the House of Representatives-it came nearly
going there anyhow-Mr. Douglas, the second can
189 
190    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTAT]ON.
didate before the people in the number of votes
polled, would have been ruled out of the House altogether, and the choice of that House would have
been between Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Breckinridge, and
Mr. Bell; Breckinridge receiving 847,953 popular
votes, (independent of South Carolina,) Bell
590,631, and Douglas  1,375,157.  What  would
have been the result?  Why, sir, that House would
have chosen  Mr. WILSON. Will the Senator explain how it
would be that Mr. Douglas would have been ruled
out? The Constitution, if I understand it, requires
the House to choose from the four highest candidates.
Mr. BUCKALEW. The three highest candidates.
Mr. WILSON. Four.
Mr. BUCKALEW.  Three.  So, in 1824, Mr. Clay
was ruled out of the House because Jackson, Adams,
and Crawford were above him; he was the fourth
man. Infallibly that House in 1860, if by a mere
accident there had been a few votes changed in a
few States, would have made John Bell or John C.
Breckinridge President of the United States. They
could not have elected Mr. Douglas if they had
desired.
Mr. EDMUNDS. WVill the Senator permit me to
ask hinm, for information, a question?
Mr. BUCKALEW.  If it relates to this precise
point.
Mr. EDMUNDS.  I should like to have him explain how that happened-whether it was in connection with the fact that in the slave States a much
fewer number of votes, on account of the slaves being 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.   191
represented inii the result, accomplished the election
of an elector, and whether, therefore, Bell and
Breckinridge, carrying more of the slave States than
Douglas got votes in the Northern States, did not
come in on that theory?
Mr. BUCKALEW. Undoubtedly that affected the
question to a certain extent, but it does not account
for the great part of the discrepancy.
Mr. EDIUNDs.  It accounts for just what would
make the difference.
Mr. BUCEIKALEW. Just for the difference it caused;
and I will say to the Senator that it is not a very
considerable element in the calculation, although it
is a just one to be considered. And it did not affect
the vote between Lincoln and Douglas.
How did the electoral vote run in 1864? The
result was right that year; the voice of the people
was executed, but not by any necessary operation
of our system. Mr. Lincoln's electors were chosen
of a ratio of 10,292; those of McClellan by a ratio
of 86,274. I repeat, the result was right, but that
was not the merit of the system, it was a mere accident. So in 1824, when Jackson had one-half more
votes than Mr. Adams from the people. The return does not show his full popular vote, because
South Carolina chose by her Legislature. He had
one-half more than Mr. Adams; lie had more than
Mr. Adams and Mr. Crawford combined before the
people; and what was the result? Why, sir, he was
left in a large minority in the electoral colleges.
Adams and Crawford together obtained 26 more
electors than belonged to them, changing the result
by 52 electoral votes. The election was thrown into 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
the House of Representatives, and there a great
mistake was made, an affront was given to the
American people-or at least they accepted it as
such-and it had an effect to a large extent upon
subsequent elections.
I will not dwell upon this point further than
simply to refer to the numbers at two other elections.
Take the election of 1832. The Jackson electors
had a ratio of 3139; the Clay electors 11,228.  In
1852 the Pierce electors had a ratio of 6242; the
Scott electors of 32,846. In 1824 the plurality
candidate for President was beaten because of the
machinery of the electoral colleges. In 1860, that
great election which touched the depths of the
popular heart throughout the country, the candidate second in the choice and hearts of the American people by the machinery of the electoral colleges had no possibility of ever entering the House
of Representatives as a competitor for the result. It
required one hundred and fourteen thousand American freemen to give him one vote in the electoral
colleges, when twelve thousand could give Breckinridge one vote; and if you made all allowance for
the counting of the three-fifths of slaves in the South,
it would not have disturbed the ratio more than a
few thousands.
You see, sir, that this old machinery, then, is not
a mere sham; it is an instrument of injustice, and,
I will add, of peril also to the future of this country. Any time at the next presidential election, in
1872, or at any other future election, a large majority of the American people may vote without
avail and without result for their choice for the
192 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.
office of President; and a minority man, a man
largely in the minority before the people, may obtain a majority of presidential electors. It depends
upon the accident of how majorities happen to run
in particular States.
Mr. President, during three years that I resided
in one of the Spanish American republics there
were revolutions in thirteen out of fourteen of
those republics. Those republics are scourged and
desolated by revolutions, beginning with Mexico
and going south to the Argentine Confederation
and to Chiili.  What produces these revolutions ordinarily? A disputed presidential election. That
is the cause three times out of four, and has been
ever since 1825, when those republics began to take
their present organizations. Three times out of
four, and perhaps oftener, a dispute about a presidential election causes revolt and civil war, and
desolates all those portions of the New World.
Mr. President, the very point upon which I am
now speaking is a tender and delicate point of our
Constitution, and it has contained in it perhaps
more danger to our country than all other political
causes combined. You have no mode of deciding a
contested election of President and Vice-President,
no machinery provided, no clear grant of power in
your Constitution.  It is not even positively certain
how you shall count electoral votes in case of dispute. A surging and rampant House of Representatives turns itself into a mob even now when your
Constitution is about being executed by the presiding officer of the Senate, and it requires days of
heat-I had almost said of indecorous debate-in
13
193 
194    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
that House to compose the waves of passion which
are roused upon a mere technicality, with no actual
change of the result of the election depending upon
the decision.
It is the point of danger in our political institutions, this point of presidential elections.  Will you
wait until the danger is upon you; will you wait
until civil war is again let loose; will you continue
the old and defective machinery, always unjust,
always full of peril and danger, until the crisis
shall come?  Slavery is gone-the great question
which divided our communities of the North and
South. It is buried in the tomb of the past; no
voice will be sufficiently loud or powerful in all the
centuries of the future to wake it or to speak it
again into life. It will no more return to vex the
councils of this Government or to inflame the hearts
of our people; no blood will be shed to settle the
great issues which it raises and which it inflames.
But here in the very heart of your Constitution is a
defective and weak point. I call your attention to
it. I ask you to consider it, and now, in the days of
quiet and of peace, before trouble has come, fortify
yourselves against future danger; take hold upon
these electoral colleges, which are not merely shams,
as the Senator from Massachusetts says, but boxes
of Pandora from which may issue demons of discord and violence to trouble and scourge your
country and your people in filture years. Give the
opportunity to men of statesmanship and of wisdom
to reform these colleges by regulating the manner in
which the electors shall be chosen. That is one
proposition contained in the Senate amendment 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.   195
which went to the House, which that House will
adopt if you insist upon it.
Mr. President, why is it that the recommendations of President Jackson were unheeded, and that
other men having the ear of Congress and having
the ear of the country since have been unable to
secure the adoption of a proposition for the amendment of our Constitution to dispense with our electoral colleges?  Why is it?  Why cannot you submit at once a proposition that the people shall vote
directly for President and Vice-President and expect its adoption? It is my business to answer that,
and I have a complete and satisfactory answer.
Under the scheme of electoral colleges each State
has two senatorial electors, as they are called-that
is, has two electors as a State; and then it has an additional number equal to the number of Representatives from the State. When you provide that the
people shall vote directly for President and Vice
President you virtually strike off from each of the
States the equal power which they now have in
choosing senatorial electors. You give to each State,
then, in point of fact, in substance, a power proportioned to the number of Representatives which they
select to the lower House of Congress. What is the
effect?  Why, that Rhode Island and other of the
small States lose a large portion of their political
power in the presidential election. Draw an amendment and send it down to the States to-morrow proposing this change, and how would it present itself
to their reflections?  Here are Delaware, Florida,
Kansas, Nevada, Nebraska, and Oregon, six States
with three electors each, two senatorial and one rep 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
resentative.   Your amendment  would mean that
each of these States should give up two-thirds of its
political power in the election of President and Vice
President. Instead of having three electors as at
present to count in an electoral college, they would
have a popular vote, equivalent to only one to count
upon the general result. Then take the States
which elect two members, Rhode Island and Minnesota.  Each of these has four electors, and under
the amendment suggested they would have what
would be equal to two; they would lose one-half of
their power.  The State selecting three Representatives and having five electors are New Hampshire,
Vermont, California, and West Virginia. They
would lose two-fifths of their political power in a
presidential election. Connecticut, South Carolina,
and Texas each elect four Representatives and have
six electors.   They would lose one-third of their
power. Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi,
and New Jersey would lose two-sevenths. Alabama,
Iowa,  Michigan, and  Wisconsin would lose onefourth, as they are now entitled to eight electors
each.
Heire are twenty-four States which would each
lose one-fourth of their political power or more up
to two-thirds by adopting such an amendment to the
Constitution. Twenty-four States out of thirty-seven
interested by that large percentage of power against
the adoption of such a change to the Constitution!
Ten States can defeat an amendment when all the
States are counted. These figures are exactly accurate, except we are to take into account that the
large States would lose their senatorial electors, al
196 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.
though the percentage of loss to them would be very
small; it would affect the result only to a very small
extent. That is, the loss of power to the States I
have enumerated would not be quite as large as
these figures make it, although it would be nearly
that.   If, then, you have twenty-four out of the
thirty-seven States largely interested in rejecting
such an amendment to the Constitution, nobody can
doubt that, instead of such an amendment receiving
the three-fourths vote of the States necessary to its
ratification, it would be rejected by a majority of the
whole number, and that whenever submitted. In
other words, it is impossible to procure an amendment to the Constitution of the United States by
which the people of our country shall vote directly
for President and Vice President. It is against the
interests of too many States, it is against the interest of too many State interests, to permit it to take
place at all, and therefore it will never be accomplished.
This reform, then, of a direct choice by the people
being out of the question, what can be done? Why,
sir, you can do what this amendment proposes: you
can give to Congress the power to prescribe the manner in which electors shall be chosen, and thus you
can introduce reform, and in no other way whatever.
At present the power to prescribe the manner in
which electors shall be chosen rests with the Legislatures of the several States. In former times in
South Carolina the Legislature prescribed that they
themselves should choose electors, and that arrangement continued until recently. The new Constitution of South Carolina, formed under the recon
197 
198    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
struction laws, provides that the people shall select
them by popular vote. That provision in that Constitution is a nullity undoubtedly. It is impossible
for South Carolina by an amendment of her Constitution to take away from her Legislature a power
imposed upon it by the Constitution of the United
States. The provision therefore is a mere nullity.
The Legislature of South Carolina will be at any
time competent to resume her former practice of
choosing electors of President and Vice President.
The Legislature of Alabama recently proposed to
take this power into its own hands, and it was only
checked by an executive veto. Hereafter this mode
of choosing electors may be resorted to by Legislatures of other States, and thus great trouble and
difficulty may be introduced. It is a thing which
ought not to be permitted. Now, Mr. President, in
point of fact, if the Legislatures of the States do not
assume to themselves the power to,choose electors,
they cannot reform the present system of choosing
by general ticket, and that will be seen in a moment
by any one who will bestow due reflection upon this
subject. In all the States, Florida alone excepted,
and perhaps Louisiana also, electors are chosen by
general ticket-that is, each voter of the State votes
for as many electors as the State is entitled to in her
electoral college, and the majority obtain the whole
number for that State.
It is impossible to change this system. as the
power is now located; and why? Take the case of
the State of New York; you propose in the State
of New York that electors shall be chosen by single
districts or according to some other plan of reform, 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.
andwhatwill be the answer? "Why,wecannot afford
to do that in this State; we shall only break up our
own political power; our party will lose nearly onehalf its strength in this State; therefore we cannot
*afford to do it, and will not do it. Besides that, if
we were inclined to do it, we could not, because
other States not doing the same thing we should
lose a portion of our political strength in this State,
while the opposite party to us in another State
electing by general ticket would hold the whole of
its power, and thus we should inflict injury on ourselves as a political organization without any compensation whatever."
The political majority in any Legislature anywhere in the United States would say this to itself
and to you if you proposed to it any reform whatever in the mode of choosing presidential electors.
They would give the conclusive answer, "We cannot afford to do it and weaken our own power; we
cannot control other States; and as long as they do
not adopt the same mode of choosing electors you
simply ask us to make a sacrifice; we cannot do it,
and we will not do it."  The result is that although
the old general ticket system for choosing representatives was changed twenty or thirty years ago
because it was intolerable, the choice of presidential
electors is still according to the old plan, because
there is no power here in Congress to amend it.
The power which does exist in the State Legislatures
cannot be exercised, and I venture to say it never
will be. Therefore you have fixed in the Constitution the electoral colleges, an institution which
three-fourths of the States will not change, which
199 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
is imbedded in the Constitution firmly, and then
you have a system of election by general ticket of
the members of those colleges in the respective
States which cannot be changed and will not
be changed by the Legislatures, who have theoretically the power to do it. There will be no
change, and what is the result? Here I come to
the point which touches us to the quick; which
should make our blood bound through our veins
when we think of it. By general ticket your presidential election is poised upon the vote of two or
three of the larger States, Pennsylvania particularly: and the year of a presidential election into
those States are poured all the corrupt influences
which elections can invite. We are deluged with
evils because our large States have an unjust or
badly-arranged power in the electoral colleges.
Money is poured into our States in a profuse stream
to corrupt and to degrade the elections held among
our people. It was because the voice of Pennsylvania, under an electoral college system, was likely
to rule or influence the result throughout the
country that half a million of dollars perhaps were
poured out in that State in 1868.
On behalf of my people; on behalf of our
republican institutions put in peril; on behalf of
justice and honesty in elections; on behalf of the
American people, whose voices ought to be heard
and counted fairly, I appeal to you to support this
amendment, which will permit reform and will
secure it. The road of reform is now closed up.
The patriot and the honest man must now work and
labor in vain. They can do nothing. Here is the
290 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.   201
golden opportunity. An amendment relating to
suffrage is sent here from the House respecting the
persons who shall vote in the United States, and
here is an amendment proposing that the people
shall have secured to themselves the right of choosing presidential electors; that it shall not be taken
or snatched from them by intrigue or corruption
in the Legislatures; that their honest voices shall
always be heard in the choice of electors; and next,
that reform in the manner ill which elections shall
be held may be introduced by the Congress of the
United States upon due cause shown. Congress
can introduce reform, and will do it. It did introduce reform in electing Representatives to the lower
House. It ordered the States to break themselves
up into single districts; and when New Hampshire
and one or two other States resisted enforced its
will, because it spoke by virtue of the power of this
Federal Constitution of ours.   Give to Congress
identically the same power over the choice of presidential electors; say, as this amendment says, that
Congress may prescribe the manner in which they
shall be chosen. Congress is not obliged to do it; it
only permits it; and by a simple statute here you can
divide the States, or order the Legislatures to divide
the States, into single districts for choosing presidential electors, or you can provide what far-sighted and
just men now contemplate, and which eventually
all will seize upon as a measure of more complete
and perfect justice, that the people in each State,
according to their party divisions, may so vote that
each shall get a due share of power in the electo ral college, by simply voting for the number of 
202     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
men for which they have an adequate number of
votes; that in my State, with six hundred thousand
voters, each party holding three hundred thousand
of them, each or either may vote for twelve instead
of twenty-four electors, and by uniting their vote
upon that smaller number elect them. This is what
I hope may eventually be reached. But nothing is
commanded; the future is left open; and the men
who represent the people of the United States, and
who represent the States of this Union here assem bled in council in these two Houses, may reach out
their hands to this system of election and reform it
so as to secure popular rights, so as to secure honest
elections and a just voice and expression by the
American people in these great elections of President; and thus you will have a guarantee of inestimable value against future disturbance, difficulty,
and possibly revolution and war in this country
from a disputed presidential election. Justice and
public safety appeal to you,
Is there any objection to this? None at all, except a mere prejudice. Some men say, "Why, you
are giving more power to Congress; you are taking
power away from the States; you are increasing
Federal power, and the tendency of this measure is
toward consolidation." Now, sir, of all the people
in the world with whom I have least patience, give
me the man of stupidity; the man who is fighting
against his own purpose and object without knowing
it; the man who with good and sincere motives is
doing bad and evil work and does not know it.
Those people who are shouting State rights and
State privilege and State immunity and authority, 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.
and doing the work of mischief at the same time, are
persons with whom we should have least patience;
perhaps no patience at all.
The choice of presidential electors is properly a
Federal question, rather than a State question. It
relates to this Government, and not to the government of the States. It will therefore be properly
lodged in this Government, because it belongs and
pertains to it legitimately. In the next place, as I
have already shown to you, the location of this
power in Congress is a necessity. Located as it is
now it will never be exercised; you can introduce
no reform. Being, therefore, Federal in its nature,
being necessary to the introducing of any reform
in the regulation of the choice of presidential electors, it should be located in the two Houses of Congress, where, if it should at any time be exercised
improperly, you can introduce change and amendments afterward.
SIr. President, I will read one single passage from
one of the best printed and best edited newspapers
in the United States, although my opinions are as
wide from it as the poles are asunder.  In speaking
of this proposed amendment it says:
"It will prevent the entire vote of such a State asNew York,
for instance, being cast for a particular candidate through the
rascality of its chief city."
I am not indorsing that statement. I am reading
what this paper says:
"It will give more nearly than now the sense of the people
for President in the electoral colleges, because each district will
have its own representative. If anything was to be done at all
with the electoral vote, we should prefer to have had the col
203 
204    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
leges abolished, that the untrammeled will of the people should
be expressed directly upon the question of the fitness of the
candidate for President."
I have already spoken to that point and shown
that it is impracticable. This article concludes by
saying:
"However, this question will not embarrass the suffrage
proposition, as the two articles are to be voted on separately."
MAr. EDMUNDS.  What paper is that?
Mr. BUCKALEW. The Boston Commonwealth.
From what I have said, Mr. President, it will be
discovered that I have very strong opinions, possibly
strong feelings also, in favor of this proposition for
amending the Constitution of the United States in
regard to the choice of presidential electors. I have
imperfectly, and without much preparation, stated
to the Senate a few of the leading considerations
which, in my judgment, demaid this reform.  It is
now within our reach. We can seize upon it; we
can secure it; we can appropriate it, not to ourselves
only, but to the whole American people, and all
this can be done without embarrassment in regard
to the other proposition of amendment of suffrage.
It is distinct in its nature and it is to be submitted
distinctly for the action of the several States. One
proposition can be acted upon without embarrassing
the other in any way whatever. We have now a
go]den opportunity for presenting this proposition,
and presenting it in connection with an amendment
which invites it, because it is an amendment for the
extension of suffrage, while this is for the regulation
of suffrage. 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.
One point more, sir, and I will leave the subject.
Can anything be more evident than that now, when
we are extending suffrage in the United States, and
exteiading it largely, extending it as it was not contemplated it ever could be extended until within a
few years  past, it becomes us to improve  our
machinery, to improve our constitutional arrangenients by which suffrage is to be worked in future?
In calling upon the people of the United States to
adopt an amendment which shall make this extension, which shall allow the casting into the ballotboxes, North, South, and West, of hundreds of
thousands of votes from a new and hitherto disfranchised class, will you not present to them some
proposition of reform with regard to the manner in
which this suffrage shall be exercised, so that it shall
have just operation and fair effect, so that the corruption of a few votes in a State shall not turn the
whole scale and change elections?  In my judgment,
therefore, in addition to all the other considerations,
this proposition is most timely. It never could have
been presented at a juncture when in point of time
it was more appropriate and more deserving of
adoption by Congress and by the American people.
[Eventually the Senate, with some reluctance, receded from
its amendments by a vote of 33 to 24, Mr. Morton accompanying his concession to the House with the declaration that
his amendment could not at that time receive due consideration in the House, but that it was not of a party character, and
he believed it would be submitted and adopted at a future
time.  It commended itself to the good judgment of the
American people, and he believed that hereafter men of all
parties would support it.  (Globe, 1295.)
On a prior occasion, on the 9th of February, when the Mor
205 
206    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
ton Amendment was under consideration in the Senate, Mr,
Buckalew submitted some statistics of Presidential elections,
the republication of which, in connection with the foregoing
speech, appears necessary or proper to a full view of the important question discussed. We quote below a liberal extract
from his remarks as contained in the Globe, p. 1043.]
UNEQUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE IN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.
In the Presidential election of 1824, between
Jackson and Adams, Jackson, with a popular vote
one-half greater than Adams, received fourteen
electoral votes less than his due share, making a
difference or change of twenty-eight ill the electoral
colleges between them.   He received more votes
from the people than Adams and Crawford combined, and yet they outnumbered him twenty-six
in electoral votes.
In the Presidential election of 1828 the Jackson
electors were chosen by an average of 3652 votes
each, and the Adams electors by 6170 votes.
In 1832 the result was:
Popular vote.  Electors.    Ratio.
Jackson..................................... 687;502   219   3,139
Clav.......................................... 550,189   49  11,228
Wirt......................................... 7
Floyd........................................ 11
The total popular vote of Jackson and Clay was
1,237,691, and their electoral votes combined 268.
A common ratio for them therefore was 4618, from
which it results that Clay should have had 119 and
Jackson 149 electoral votes. Clay lost 70 electors,
making a change of 140 in the result as between
them. Jackson should have had 30 electoral majority, but he had 170, or more than five times his
true majority. 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.
I will now cite more recent cases.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1852.
Popular vote. Electors.
Pierce................................ 1,585,545    254
Scott....................................... 1,383,537  42
H a l e....................................... 157,296
3,126,378   296
Six thousand Pierce voters obtained an elector,
while 32,000 were required for a Scott elector!
Now, dividing the whole popular vote by the whole
number of electors we obtain the average or common ratio of votes to each elector of 10,562. If
electors then had been obtained by the several candidates in proportion to the reported popular vote
for each, the result would have been: Pierce 150;
Scott 131; and Hale 15. By the defective plan
upon which electors were chosen, it appears then
that Pierce had 104 more electoral votes than his
due share, that Scott had 89 less than his share,
and that Hale was deprived entirely of electors.
And it is to be remembered that the 104 electoral
votes to Pierce in excess of his due share really
count 208 upon the result in the electoral colleges,
because they are deducted from the other candidates.
Take next the Presidential election of 1860.
Popular vote.
Lincoln............................ 1,866,452
Doiigl1as................................... 1,375,157
Breckinridge............................ 847,953
Bell...................................... 590,631
Total.................................. 4,680,193
Common ratio, 15,446. Lincoln should have had
121 electors, Douglas 89, Breckinridge 55, and Bell
38. Douglas obtained less than one-seventh of the
207
Ratios.
6,242
32.846
Electors.
180
12
72
39
303
Ratios.
10,369
114,596
11,777
15,144 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
electoral vote which belonged to him upon the popular vote. Though second in choice with the people, he was the lowest in the electoral vote of the
four candidates. If, by a slight change of votes in
a few States, the election had gone to the House of
Representatives, he would have been ruled out, as
the House must choose from the three candidates
highest in electoral vote, and Breckinridge or Bell
would probably have been elected by the House.
I might refer to several other Presidential elections. For instance, in 1864, the ratio of the Lincoln
electors was 10,292, and for the McClellan electors
86,274.  In 1868 the difference between the ratios
of Grant and Seymour electors was somewhat less,
but still very remarkable. In both these elections
the popular majority secured the result they desired.
But this was fortunate or accidental rather than a
certain result under our electoral system as now
constituted. The election of 1824 proves that a
plurality as well as a minority candidate may sutffer
heavy loss of electoral votes, and in fact be defeated.
And the subsequent cases must convince us that
there is danger of defeat in future elections even to
majority candidates.
The conclusion to be drawn from the facts in our
political history is that at any time a candidate
with a minority of votes given to him by the people
of the United States may have a majority in the
electoral colleges." *
In tihe figures given above of popular votes at Presidential elections, no vote for South Carolina is included, as her electors were chosen
by the Legislature. But the unavoidable omission of any popular vote
from that State does not materially affect the exhibit or argument. A
single remark may be added in this place. Can any one doubt, in view
208 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.   209
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGES, THEIR DEFECTS AND
FAILURE, AND REMEDIES PROPOSED.*
BY COL. JOHN II. WHEELER, STATISTICAL BUREAU, TREASURY DEPARTMENT.
This nation has recently passed through an exciting election
for President, and the electors have met at the capitals of each
State and cast their votes.
We propose to show that the present mode of election of
President and Vice President does not guarantee "a republican form of government," or carry out the intentions of the
framers of the Constitution, or the will of the people, which is
the foundation of our form of government.
We are aware of the reluctance which exists to disturb the
provisions of the Constitution or the customs of the nation.
But this very Constitution has been amended again and again,
and once in regard to this very question.
Under the second' article of the Constitution, the electors,
appointed in such manner as the Legislatures of the States may
direct, meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for
two persons; the person having the majority of the whole
number of electors appointed shall be President, and the person having the next greatest number of votes shall be Vice
President.
By this mode the first President (Washington) was elected
twice, (1788 and 1792,) and John Adams (in 1796) once.
In consequence of the violence to the popular will attempted
to be done through this mode, this article was amended in 1804,
(Sept. 25,) and the electors required to name in their ballots
the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the
of the facts shown, that reformed voting is imperatively demanded in
Presidential elections to secure the just representation of the people, to
check political corruption, and to avoid the fearful danger of a disputed
Presidential succession?  Doubtless the electoral colleges are admirably
adapted to the workings of a plan of electoral reform. Useless or worse
than useless at present, they may be made available and efficient in improving our political system and securing to us the just ends of popular
government, whenever the free vote or some other appropriate instrument of reform shall be applied to utilize and invigorate them.
* This Essay by Col. Wheeler was contained in the Appendix to
Senate Report on Representative Reform, of 2d March, 1869, (ante,) but
is now inserted here as its proper position in this work.
14 
210    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
person voted for as Vice President.  They are to make a list
of all the persons voted for, and the number of votes for each,
which they are to transmit to the President of the Senate, who,
in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
shall count the votes and declare who is chosen. Thus the
matter now stands. We propose to show, as previously stated,
that this mode as now used does not carry out the intention of
the framers of the Constitution; that it is not a faithful indication of popular will, and, therefore, is subversive of the
principle that lies at the foundation of our government-that
the will of the people lawfully expressed should be inviolate.
If this is so, this mode should be abolished.
As to the intent of the framers of the Constitution we are
not left in doubt. Alexander Hamilton, of New York, a
member of the convention which formed the Constitution, in
No. 68 of the Federalist, acknowledged that the mode as prescribed for the election of the President by electors chosen by
the people was objectionable. He says:
The convention which formed the Constitution did not desire the
appointment of President to depend on pre-existing bodies of men, who
might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes.
The mode was suggested by the practice of the Germanic
Confederation; and this was that the electors or people should
choose as their representatives or electors men of high character, capable and honest, above influences of place or power,
(for no person holding an office of trust or profit under the
United States can be an elector,) and these electors, unbiased
by party partialities and prejudices, unawed by power, impervious to the seductions of place, but guided only by patriotism and virtue, should select some citizen of the nation, eminent for his services, virtues, and talents, as Chief Magistrate.
If this be the true intent of the framers of the Constitution,
how widely does the practice differ from the intent! Any one
who has ever witnessed the assembling of the electors of any
State can but have felt the ridiculous mockery with which, as
mere automatons, they carry out the edict which a caucus or
convention has already dictated; and for any elector to vary
therefrom, or dare to follow the convictions of his judgment,
would be political suicide, although it is his constitutional 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.
right so to do. One case only occurs to our memory in the
history of our government where an elector has ventured to
exercise this unquestioned right. In 1820 Mr. William Plummer, elected in New Hampshire as an elector to choose a President, voted for John Quincy Adams (who was not then a candidate or the nominee of any party) against James Monroe.
He was doomed to political death.  This incident was the
more singular as it was the only vote cast in any electoral college against Mr. Monroe. This gave occasion to the caustic
remark of John Randolph, of Virginia, in Congress, that "Mr.
Monroe came in by unanimous consent and went out of office
by unanimnous consent."
That the mode now used may be no indication of the wishes
of the people, may fail in many instances to carry out their
wil], and, in fact, be at variance with and in opposition thereto,
the examples in our political history, as we will presently show,
abundantly prove.
In 1800 this mode had nearly placed in the Presidential
chair Aaron Burr, for which high position it is well known he
did not receive a single electoral or popular vote.
In 1824, under this mode, John Quincy Adams was placed
in the Presidential chair against the declared wishes of a majority of the people, for he was in a minority in both the electoral and popular vote. We have prepared a table of the
popular and electoral vote. The electoral vote is given from
the organization of the government; the popular vote is only
from 1824. This vote has no constitutional existence, and no
federal record officially presents it.  Prior to the adoption of
the amendment in 1804 the mode of choosing electors was so
heterogeneous, by the legislatures, by districts, and by the people, that no accurate or perfect compilation concerning it is
extant worthy of confidence. Even after the adoption of this
amendment very many States continued to choose electors by
the legislature, (notably New Jersey, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and occasionally Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
York, and Vermont.) In the election of 1824 the electors for
President and Vice President in Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana,
South Carolina, New York, and Vermont were chosen by the
Legislatures of those States. Of the election of 1820, back to
which the table of popular vote extends, Niles's Register, of
211 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
18th November, 1820, has this item: "In Maryland and Vir ginia the election of electors excites so little interest because
there was no thought of opposition that very few votes were
cast, only 17 at Richmond." Hence of the popular vote, as
before stated, no complete record is extant. The table on the
next page is as complete as possible and worthy of careful
study.
(It is to be remembered that the State of South Carolina
continued to choose electors by her Legislature down to the
time of the late rebellion in 1861; so that no popular vote
from her is included in the above returns.  As she is, however,
a State of the third or fourth rank in population, the absence
of her votes does not greatly affect the completeness or accuracy of our exhibit.)
An examination and analysis of this table, and a comparison of the electoral with the popular vote, will prove the positions we have laid down, that the mode of the electoral vote,
as now used, does not carry out the popular vote, and is not a
faithful reflex of public opinion; and that therefore it should
be modified or discontinued.
Take the first case that occurs in this table, where the popular vote appears-the vote in the election of 1824: General
Jackson received 152,899 reported votes, and John Quincy
Adams only 105,321; yet by this mode of machinery the public will was violated and Adams chosen.
The next election (1828) while the popular majority for
Jackson was 137,870, in a total vote of 1,162,180, his electoral
majority was 95, in a total of 261; that is, the popular ratio was
as 1 to 8; the electoral majority was as 1 to 2w, a ratio three
times greater.
In the next election (1832) this disparity appears still more
glaring. While Jackson's popular majority was 137,313, in a
total vote of 1,237,691, or as 1 to 9, his electoral majority was
170, a ratio seven times greater.
In the next election (1836) the popular majority for Van
Buren was but 2608, in a total vote of 1,541,318, while the
electoral majority was 124, in a total vote of 294; that is to
say, the ratio of the majority of the popular votes was but as
1 to 600, while the ratio of the electoral majority was less than
1 to 6, a ratio 100 times as great.
212 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.   213
Popular and electoral vote of the United Statesfrom 1788 to 1869.
Candidates.               Party.                    - 
is~~~~                                                       ~~~~~~~ ~O  0 
1788  1 George Washington.......Unanimous.......  69  69-~~~ ~,.4-.P
9.;A~~~~~~~~
George Washington............
John Adams.....................
Thomas Jefferson...............
...............
John Adams.....................
Thomas Jefferson...............
C. C. Pinckney..................
James Madison..................
C. C. Pinckney..................
George Clinton..................
James Madison..................
De Witt Clinton.................
James Monroe...................
Rufus King.......................
James Monroe...................
John Quincy Adams...........
Andrew Jackson................
John Quincy Adams...........
William  I. Crawford......... 
Henry Clay.......................
Andrew Jackson...............
John Quincy Adams...........
Andrew Jackson...............
henry Clay.......................
William Wirt....................
John Floyd.......................
Martin Van Buren.............
William   Henry Harrison....
Hugh L. White..................
Daniel Webster..................
Willie P. Mangunm.............
William    H. Iarrison..........
Martin Van Buren.............
James G. Birney................
James K. Polk..................
Henry Clay.......................
James G. Birney................
Zachary Taylor..................
Lewis Cass........................
Martin Van Buren.............
Franklin Pierce.................
Winfield Scott...................
John P. Ilale.....................
James Buchanan...............
John C. Fremont............:..
M1illard Fillmore...............
Abraham Lincoln..............
Stephen A. Douglas............
John C. Breckinridge..........
John Bell.........................
Abraham Lincoln..............
George B. McClellan..........
Ulysses S. Grant................
Horatio Seymour...............
Unanimous........... 
~s
Federalist...................
Republ ican 
Federalist...................
Republ ican.................
Federalist...................
Republican.................
Federalist...................
.................................
Republican 
.............o...........o.........
Federalist...................
Republican.................
...g..........................
Democrat...................
Federalist...................
Caucus.. 
Whig.........................
Democrat..........
Federalist..........
Democrat
National Republican
Anti-.Mlason.................
Anti-Jackson..............
Democrat...................
Wthfig.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................
Democrat...................
Abolitionist................
Democrat...................
Whig.........................
Abolitionist................
Whig.........................
Democrat...................
Free-soil.....................
Democrat...................
Whig.........................
Free-soil.....................
Democrat...................
Free-soil.....................
Whig.........................
Republican.................
Democrat...................
........-..-.. ---
Whig.........................
Republican.................
Republican.................
Demsocrat..........
771,968
f  769,350
1.274,203
1,128,303
7,6()9
1,329,023
1:231,C43
66,3(4
1,362,242
1,223,795
' 291,878
1,585,545
1,383,537
157,296
1,838,229
1,342,864
874.625
1,866,452
1,375,057
847,953
590,631
2,223,035
1,811,754
3,016,353
2,706,637
69
132
71
68
73
65
162
14
122
47
6
128
89
183
34
231
1
99
84
41
37
178
83
219
49
7
11
170
73
26
14
11
234
60
17()
105
163
127
254
42
174
114
8
180
12
72
39
212
21
214
~0
George B. McClellan......Democrat.............21        p233    1'811,754
1868  21 Ulysses S. Grant.........Republican..........214                 3'016,353
Horatio Seymour.........Deniocrat.............                 2'706 637
* In this election (9th term) Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and Tennessee did not cast their
full electoral vote.
t In this election (12th term) Maryland did not cast her full vote.
+ In this election (20th ternm) Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, South Carolina, and Virginia cast no electoral votes. 
@ In this election (21st term) Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia did not vote, and in Florida
electors were chosen by the Legislature, and not by popular vote.
i
i
I
I
i
1788
1792
1796
1800
1804
1808
1
2
3
4
5
6
69
132
139
138
176
175
217
217
*235
1812
1816
1820
1824
7
8
9
10
152i899
105,321
47,265
47,087
650,028
512,158
687,502
550,189
261
1828 11
1832 12
261
t288
1836 13
294
1840 11
294
1844 15
275
1848 16
290
1852 17
296
1856 18
296
1860 19
303
ISC4
1868
20
21
1233
317 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
In the election of 1840 Harrison's popular majority was
145,900, in a total poll of 2,402,506, a ratio of 1 to 16, while
his electoral majority was 174, in a vote of 294, or nearly ten
times greater than the popular majority.
In the next election (1844) Polk received but 31,000 majority in a total of 2,626,950, or 1 in 900, while his electoral vote
was 170 out of 275, or 1 to 4; 200 times the popular vote.
In 1848 General Taylor was in a minority of the popular
vote; his vote being 1,362,242, and Cass and Van Buren had
1,515,173; and yet he received a majority of the electoral
votes.
In 1852 Pierce's popular majority was 202,008, in a total vote
of over 3,000,000, a ratio of 1 to 15, while his electoral majority was 192, out of 296 votes, a ratio ten times as great.
In 1856 Mr. Buchanan was in a minority of the popular
vote; he received 1,838,229, while the vote of Fremont and
Fillmore was 2,216,789; and yet he received a majority of
the electoral votes.
In 1860 Mr. Lincoln was in a minority of nearly a million of popular votes. He received a total vote of 1,866,452,
while the vote of Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell combined
was 2,813,741; and yet Mr. Lincoln received a majority of
123 in an electoral vote of 303. This election demonstrates in
a most conclusive manner the fallacy of the electoral mode,
and the possible misrepresentation under it of the popular will.
Lincoln received 180 votes, and Douglas only 12, out of 303
electoral votes. In the popular vote Lincoln received 1,866,452,
while Douglas received 1,375,157 votes.
In 1864 Lincoln received 2,223,035 and McClellan received
1,811,754 of the popular vote, while in the electoral college
Lincoln received 212 votes, and McClellan received 21. A
ratio of 22 to 18 in one case to 10 to 1 in the other.
In the last Presidential election (1868) Grant received a
popular majority of 309,716 in a total of 5,722,990, a ratio of
about 10 to 9, while his majority of electoral vote was 134 in
in a total of 294, a ratio of 13 to 5.
This analysis, carefully made, proves beyond all cavil and
error that there is no analogy or community between the vote
as expressed by the electoral college and the will of the people
as expressed at the polls. In every case they differ. Hence,
214 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.   215
the mode by electors is unfair, since it misrepresents the popular will.  Justice and truth demand its modification or abo]ition. By this cumbersome and circumlocutory process the
electors may be compelled to elect a candidate rejected by the
people, or reject a candidate accepted by the people. The defeat of General McClellan was complete, for he carried only
three States-Delaware,  Kentucky,  and  New Jersey.  The
whole electoral vote was 233, of which a majority necessary for
a choice was 117. Now a change in the popular vote of
35,000 from Lincoln's would have changed the vote of every
State mentioned below, and carried their full electoral vote.
These added to the vote he had received would have elected
General McClellan.
STr~~~ATES..     ~   ~Lincolt's    Electoral
STATF.S.                 popular   vote.
majority.
New Hampshire............................................. 3,530  5
Rhode Island................................................. 5,632  4
Connecticut................................................... 3,407  6
New York..................................................... 6,750  33
Pennsylvania................................................. 20,076  26
Maryland..................................................... 7,415  7
Illdiana......................................................... 20,190  13
Oregon......................................................... 1,432  3
Nevada......................................................... 3,236  3
Kentucky...................................................
New Jersey.........................................   21
Delaware...................................
Total................................................... 70,665  121
The change of 50,000 popular votes in New York in 1848
from Taylor to Cass, or giving one-half of the votes thrown
away upon Van Buren to Cass, would have thrown the 36
electoral votes of New York to Cass, and elected him.
We have shown that, by the present electoral system, a person may be made President by receiving a majority of the
electoral votes, who is in a minority before the people. We
have shown that Lincoln, in 1860, in a popular minority of
more than a million of votes, swept the electoral college by an
overwhelming majority; that Douglas, who received a popular
vote equal to two-thirds of Lincoln's, received only one-fifteenth
of his electoral vote; that Breckinridge, who was 500,000
votes behind Douglas, received six times as many votes in the 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
electoral college, and Bell, who was 800,000 votes of the people behind Douglas, received thrice his number of electoral
votes.
Can any demonstration be more complete and satisfactory as
to the uitter uselessness and impolicy, if not injustice and iniquity, of the present mode of election by electoral colleges?
This defect in the machinery of our government has been
long seen by the statesmen of the nation. General Hamilton,
one of the framers of the Constitution, acknowledges of this
mode that it was objectionable, and when the amendment of
1804 was adopted, he proposed another, as follows:
To divide each State into districts equal to the whole number of senators and representatives from each State in the Congress of the United
States, and said districts to be as equal in population as possible, and, if
necessary of parts of counties contiguous to each other, except where
there may be some detached portion of territory not sufficient of itself
to form a district, which then shall be annexed to some other district.
Thomas H. Benton, during his 30 years in the Senate, again
and again brought this subject before Congress.
General Jackson, in his first annual message, urged an
amendment to the Constitution, to secure the election of the
President by a direct and immediate vote of the people. This
he repeated in five subsequent messages. In his message of
1829, he says: "To the people belongs the right of electing their
Chief Jfagistrate. It never was designed that their choice in
any case should be defeated, either by the intervention of electorial colleges, or by the agency confided in certain contingencies to the House of Representatives. I, therefore, would recommend such an amendment to the Constitution as may remove
all intermediate agency in the election of President and Vice
President."
President Johnson, in 1845, when a member of the House,
and in 1860, when a Senator in Congress, urged similar views.
As President, in a message to Congress, dated July 18, 1868,
he fully sets forth the injustice and inequality of the present
mode, "as virtually denying the right of every citizen of the
United States possessing the constitutional qualification to become a candidate for high office, and also denying the right of
each qualified voter in the nation to vote for the person he
deems most worthy and well qualified."
216 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.   217
Senator Wade, of Ohio, now President of the Senate, at a
recent session brought this question as to a direct vote of the
people for President before the Senate, and defended the position by an able argument. In a recent debate on Senator
Buckalew's amendment, the present mode of electors was denounced by Senator Sumner and others "as cumbersome, effete,
and inconvenient." The scene which occurred recently in the
counting of the electoral votes in the joint convention of both
houses of Congress shows that the system must be altered.
Mr. Miller, of Pennsylvania, introduced recently (February 8,
1869) an amendment to the Constitution to allow the qualified
voters of the respective States to vote directly for President.
The amendment to the Constitution (Article XVI.) of Senator
Morton, adopted by the Senate February 9, 1869, is a proposition in the right direction-that the people shall select electors,
(and not the Legislatures,) and that Congress shall have the
power to prescribe the manner in which such electors shall be
chosen by the people.
Connected intimately with this subject, as a useful remedy
for the evils of the present system, is the reform proposed by
Senator Buckalew, of cumulative voting; which is, that where
there are more persons than one to be chosen, the voter shall
possess as many votes as there are persons to be chosen, and
the voter may bestow his votes at his discretion upon the whole
number of persons to be chosen, or upon a less number, cuminulating his votes upon one, two, three, or any number less than
the whole. The plan introduced into Parliament as early as
1854, by Lord John Russell, is nearly similar; that in certain
constituencies which return three members to Parliament, each
voter should be allowed only to vote for two. This plan was
adopted in 1867, and is now the law of England. Still another
plan is urged by John Stuart Mill in his work on "Represent ative Government," (proposed originally by James Garth Mar shall,) that the elector, having his three votes, should be at
liberty to give all to one candidate, or two to one and one to
another. This is similar to the plan introduced in the Senate
(January 13, 1869) by Senator Buckalew, and commended by
Earl Grey in his work on "Parliamentary Reform." The
more these works are studied, the more clearly will appear the
perfect feasibility of the plan and its transcendent advantages. 
218     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
The allied plan of personal representation has also been highly
commended. As presented by Mr. Hare in an elaborate work,
it contains another great idea; that those who did not like the
local candidates may fill up their ticket by voting for persons
of national reputation. This is sometimes done in our country
on important occasions of deep interest. In 1835, a conven tion was called in North Carolina to reform her constitution.
It was the first convention for this purpose since 1776, and
deeply excited the public mind. The ablest men of the State'
were chosen without regard to their location or politics.
The natural tendency of representative governments, in the
opinion of Mr. Mill, is to collective mediocrity. This will be
increased the more the elective franchise is extended. Edmund Burke was repudiated by the electors of Bristol, in 1780,
for Parliament, for his advocacy of the cause of the American
colonies. He was, however, returned by another constituency,
and continued during life in Parliament, contributing to its
debates and to the glory of the nation. In contrast to this,
William R. Davie, who had been a gallant and successful
officer in the war, governor of the State, (1798,) envoy extraordinary to France, (1799,) was defeated in popular elections
in North Carolina, when a candidate for Congress and for the
Legislature, by individuals without extraordinary merit or
talent.
There is hardly a State of our Union in which the congressional districts are not gerrymandered in the interest of party.
This adds to the deterioration of our public service, so that
Mr. Mill declares "it is an admitted fact that in the American
democracy, which is constructed on this faulty model, the
highly cultivated members of the community, except such as
are willing to sacrifice their own judgment and conscience to
the behests of party and become the servile echo of those who
are inferiors in knowledge, do not allow their names as candidates for Congress or the Legislature, so certain it is they would
be defeated."
February, 1869. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN ILLINOIS.
A CONVENTION authorized to frame and submit to
the people, amendments to the Constitution of Illinois, met at Springfield in December, 1869, and concl      u d e d    the performance of its duties and adjourned
finally on the 13th of May, 1870. The amended
constitution for the State, as formed by the convention, was submitted to a popular vote for adoption
or rejection on the first Saturday in July following,
at which time also eight additional propositions of
amendment were submitted severally to a like vote.
An ingenious and convenient plan was provided by
the Convention for taking the sense of the people
upon all the questions submitted, by means of a
single ticket. The tickets or ballots properly prepared were to be distributed by the Secretary of
State through the County Clerks, and upon their
face were to indicate clearly and separately an affirmative vote for each of the propositions to be passed
upon-first, the new or amended Constitution, and
next, in their order, the several separate amendments proposed. Whenever the voter should strike
off or erase from his ballot either one of the propositilonsS, his vote was to be counted as given against
it, otherwise in its favor. Thus nine distinct questions were passed upon by the people, though pre                                          219 
220     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
cisely the same form of ticket was furnished to each
voter.
The work of the Convention is of peculiar interest
outside of Illinois, because it included several provisions well calculated to secure electoral reform in
that State, which were by strong majorities adopted
by the people.  These will now  be given in the
order in which they appear in the amended Constitution, accompanied by some observations which
they respectively invite.
ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THIE LEGISLATURE.-The Seventh Section of the Fourth Article
of the amended Constitution is as follows:
"The House of Representatives shall consist of three times
the number of the members of the Senate, and the term of office
shall be two years. Three Representatives shall be elected in
each senatorial district at the general election in the year
A. D. 1872, and every two years thereafter. In all elections of
Representatives aforesaid, each qualified voter may cast as
many votes for one candidate as there are Representatives to
be elected, or may distribute the same or equal parts thereof
among the candidates as he shall see fit, and the candidates
highest in votes shall be declared elected."
Under this amendment a minority of voters in a
district exceeding in number onle-fourth of the
whole vote, can elect one of the three Representatives from a district. The principle applied is
simply this: that each voter shall be allowed to distribute or concentrate his three votes as he shall
think proper, and that candidates highest in vote
shall be declared elected.   Practically, whenever
one party is clearly in a majority in a district, but
not able to poll a three-fourths vote, its members 
ILLINOIS AMENDMENTS.
will nominate and vote for two candidates only, and
the minority will nominate and vote for one, and all
the candidates voted for will be elected. No candidate will be beaten and both classes of voters will
be fairly represented.   This will be the ordinary
case, but exceptional cases are fully provided for.
When the majority shall be strong enough to poll a
three-fourths vote they will vote for and elect three
candidates, or the whole number to be chosen.
When parties are about equal in strength, or each
may indulge the expectation of obtaining a majority
vote, each will nominate and support two candidates
and whichever one shall poll a majority of votes will
elect both its candidates, while the minority will
elect but one. In this case it will be certain from
the outset that each party will carry one of its candidates, and there will be a fair test of strength between them upon the election of a second one.
Only one candidate will be beaten and both parties
will be represented as nearly as may be in proportion to their respective numbers.   Again, when
there shall be three parties or interests in a district
struggling for representation, it will probably happen that each will obtain one Representative, or that
one of them will obtain two and another one Representative, whereas under the old plan of voting one
party or interest would be likely to obtain the whole
three upon a mere plurality vote; in other words, a
minority of voters might, in many cases, elect their
whole ticket and the majority of voters be left with out any Representative whatever. Finally, the new
plan allows the voter to discriminate between candi dates in giving them his support. He can in voting
221 
222    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
for two candidates express the relative strength of
his desire for the election of each, by giving one of
them two votes and the other one. In some cases
this will be a valuable and convenient privilege, and
its exercise will tend to the certain success of the
best men among candidates where all cannot be
elected.
The allowance of half-votes in the new plan is
one of its best features, and will secure its conve nient working and promote its ultimate popularity.
This feature, however, is rather for the convenience
of the majority than of the minority, and is not in dispensable to the new plan. The majority can
vote in either one of three ways:
1st. Give single votes to each of three candidates,
which is the old plan;
2d. Give one and a half votes to each of two; or,
3d. Have one-half their voters give two votes to
A and one to B, and the other half two votes to B
and one to A.
Whenever their vote shall not exceed threefourths of the whole vote of the district, they cannot reasonably or safely support three candidates.
If with a weaker vote than three-fourths they shall
attempt to elect the whole three Representatives, the
minority may take advantage of the dispersion of
their vote and carry a second Representative. In all
ordinary cases, therefore, the majority will support
but two candidates. They will not run a third candidate simply that he may be beaten, and incur at
the same time the danger of losing one of the two
Representatives to which they are entitled and have
power to elect. 
ILLINOIS AMENDMENTS.
Assuming, then, that in all ordinary cases, guided
by reason and self-interest, the majority will support but two candidates, the question remains, In
which one of the two ways above mentioned shall
they vote for them? It will be quite possible for
the majority to divide their votes territorially or
otherwise into two equal or nearly equal divisions
and use two forms of ticket at the election. Half
their voters giving A two votes and B one, and the
other half giving B two and A one, the whole
strength of the party will be economized and distributed equally to the two candidates. No strength
will be wasted or misapplied. But this plan will be
inconvenient to the majority even when the proper
result shall be secured, which will not always be
entirely certain.  We think, therefore, that this
particular mode of majority voting will be found
much less satisfactory in practice than the other,
above referred to, which involves the use of halfvotes. When every majority voter shall divide his
three votes equally between two candidates, giving
a vote and a half to each, there can be no doubt that
the object aimed at-the full and economical use of
party power in the election-will be reached, and
reached too without trouble or inconvenience.  The
preparation of a ticket reading as follows:
John Jones, 1~ votes,
William Brown, 1  votes,
will be within the competency of any person who
can read and write, and its intelligent use by voters
a matter of course. As to counting such votes, (as
elsewhere explained in the present volume,) the
question of convenience is equally clear. The elec
223 
224     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
tion officers can copy upon their tally-papers from
the first ticket drawn from the box, the names of
the candidates with the figures attached (it will be
convenient to enclose the latter in small circles with
a pen) and will then take down that and successive
tickets in scores of five towards the right according
to the common practice. The figures 11 will thus
constitute a sign of value for the strokes which follow, and after summing up the latter, fifty per cent.
will be added to make up the true total of votes.
Thus, if eighty such tickets are counted to a candidate, the score will be carried out-80 + 40 = 120
votes, which will be placed to the credit of such can
didate upon the return.
CHOICE OF DIRECTORS AND MANAGERS OF INCORPORATED COMPANIES.- The Third Section of
the EleVenth Article is one of the most important
ever introduced into a constitution, and is as follows:
"The General Assembly shall provide by law, that in all
elections for directors or managers of incorporated companies,
every stockholder shall have the right to vote, in person or by
proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by him, for as
many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected,
or to cumulate said shares and give one candidate as many
votes as the number of directors multiplied by his number of
shares shall equal, or to distribute them on the same principle
among as many candidates as he shall think fit; and such
directors or managers shall not be elected in any other manner."
There are, probably, several thousand corporate
companies in Illinois to the elections of which this
important amendment will apply; for it searches
out all such bodies in the State, without exception, 
ILLINOIS AMENDMENTS.
and applies to them the hand of reform. Hereafter,
a mere majority, a clique or a combination of stockholders in an Illinois corporation, will not be allowed
to exclude their co-stockholders from all voice in the
management of the corporation, nor will a minority
of stockholders holding a majority of stock be allowed to do so. The mismanagement of corporate
bodies, and secresy, intrigue or corruption in the
proceedings of their officers, will receive an important and necessary check.  All the stockholders will
be able to represent themselves in the board of
managers, thus securing to themselves at all times
full knowledge of the corporate proceedings and of
the administration of the funds which they have
invested. They will be enabled more perfectly to
protect their own interests in the corporations and
to prevent the growth of abuses.
ELECTION  OF  JUDGES  IN COOK  COUNTY.-By
the twenty-third section of the sixth article of the
Constitution, as amended, the Circuit Court of Cook
County (in which Chicago is situate) was made to
consist of five Judges, who are to hold their offices
for six-year terms. This provision required the
election of three new Judges, and their first election
was provided for in the seventh section of the schedule to the amendments, upon the plan of the limited
vote. That section contained the injunction "That
at said election in the County of Cook no elector
shall vote for more than two candidates for Circuit
Judge." The election held under this provision on
the first Saturday in July, 1870, resulted in the
choice of two Judges by the political majority and
one by the political minority of Cook County. The
15
225 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
provision was found to be satisfactory on trial, and
the Judges elected under it were all competent and
fit men.
The men of the Illinois Convention and the people of Illinois deserve the thanks of the whole
country for their action in behalf of electoral reform.  Tut special credit is due to Mr. Medill,
(formerly of the Chicago Tribuine and now Mayor
of Chicago,) who, as Chairman of the Committee
on Electoral and Representative Reform in the
Convention, took the lead in argument and labor to
secure the passage of those propositions of amnendment to which we have referred. He had the cordial assistance of Mr. Browning, former Secretary
of the Interior in the Government of the United
States, and of other able and worthy colleagues in
the Convention; but to him above others the principal honor is due of the good and timely work accomplished in his State.
WEST VIRGINIA AMENDMENTS.
The Constitutional Convention of West Virginia,
which met January 16, 1872, agreed upon two
amendments for the introduction of electoral reform
into that State, which were subsequently adopted by
the people, along with other amendments of the
Convention.   One  of these was borrowed  from
Illinois, and constitutes section four of article eleven
of the new Constitution of the State. It is exactly
like the Illinois provision, already given, for the
226 
WEST VIRGINIA AMENDMENTS.
free vote in all elections of directors or managers
of incorporated companies.
The other amendment referred to is section fifty
of article six of the new Constitution, and is as
follows:
"The Legislature may provide for submitting to a vote of the
people at the general election to be held in 1876, or at any
general election thereafter, a plan or scheme of proportional
representation in the Senate of this State, and if a majority of
the votes cast at such election be in favor of the plan submitted to them, the Legislature shall at its session succeeding such
election rearrange the Senatorial Districts in accordance with
the plan so approved by the people."
Utah Amendment.-In the new Constitution of
Utah, adopted March 18, 1872, (preparatory to her
application for admission into the Union as a State,)
appears the following provision:
ART. iv., SEC. 25: "At all elections for Representatives each
qualified elector may cast as many votes for one candidate as
there are Representatives to be elected in the county or district,
or may distribute the same among any or all the candidates,
and the candidates receiving the highest number of votes shall
be declared elected."
227
I 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES
REFORMIED VOTING.
I. GENERAL LAWS.
CHOICE OF INSPECTORS OF ELECTION: Act of 2d
July, 1839, entitled "An Act relating to the Elec  tions  of this Conmonwealth."-Pamphlet Laws,
519, sections 3 and 4.
"SEC. 3. The qualified citizens of the several
wards, districts, and townships, shall meet in every
year, at the time and place of holding the election
for Constable of such ward, district, or township,
and then and there elect, as hereinafter provided,
two Inspectors and one Judge of Elections.
"SEc. 4. Each of such qualified citizens shall vote
for one person as Judge, and also for one person as
Inspector of Elections, and the person having the
greatest number of votes for Judge shall be publicly
declared to be elected Judge; and the two persons
having the greatest number of votes for Inspectors,
shall, in like manner, be declared to be elected Inspectors of Elections."
22S
FOR 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES.
ELECTION OF JURY COMMISSIONERS: "An act for the
better and more impartial selection of persons to
serve as Jurors in each of the Counties of this
Commonwealth," section 1; passed o10th April,
1867.-P. Laws, 62.
"SEC. 1. That at the general election to be held
on the second Tuesday of October, A. D. 1867, and
triennially thereafter, at such election, the qualified
electors of the several counties of this Commonwealth shall elect, in the manner now provided by
law for the election of other county officers, two
sober, intelligent, and judicious persons to serve as
Jury Commissioners in each of said counties, for the
period of three years ensuing their election; but the
same person or persons shall not be eligible for reelection more than once in any period of six years:
Provided, That each of said qualified electors shall
vote for one person only as Jury Commissioner, and
the two persons having the greatest number of votes
for Jury Commissioner shall be duly elected Jury
Commissioners for such county."
BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT: By an Act, entitled "An
Act for the further regulation of Boroughs," ap  proved 2d June, 1871, (P. Laws, 283,) it was pro  vided as follows:
*'" SEc. 2. The number of members of any town
council of a borough where the number is now fixed
at five shall be hereafter six, and in boroughs hereafter incorporated under general laws the number
of such councilmen shall be six; but the several
courts of the Commonwealth having jurisdiction to
229 
230     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
incorporate boroughs may, on granting an incorl)o ration or upon application made to them for the purpose, fix or change the charter of any borough so as
to authorize the burgess or chief executive officer
thereof to serve as a member of the town council,
with full power as such, and to preside at the meetings thereof.
"SEC. 3. In elections for members of town councils
each voter may at his option bestow his votes singly
upon six candidates, or cumulate them upon any less
number, in the manner authorized by the fourth
section of the act to define the limits and to organize the town of Bloomsburg, approved AMarch fourth,
one thousand eight hundred and seventy; and vacancies in any council shall be filled in the manner
provided in the fifth section of the same act; but
nothlling herein contained shall be held to regulate
or affect the manner of choosing the burgess or
other principal executive officer of a borough even
where he shall be authorized to serve as a member
of town council."
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1872: "An
act to p)rovide for) calliny a convention to amend
the Constitution,;" approved 11th April, 1872.-P.
Laws, 53.
"SEC. 1. That at the general election, to be held
on the second Tuesday of October next, there shall
be elected by the qualified electors of this Comnmoniiwealth delegates to a convention  to revise and
amend the Constitution of this State; the said convention shall consist of one hundred and  thirty 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES.
three members, to be elected in the manner following: Twenty-eight members thereof shall be elected
in the State at large, as follows: Each voter of the
State shall vote for not more than fourteen candidates, and the twenty-eight highest in vote shall be
declared  elected;  ninety-nine  delegates shall  be
apportioned to and elected from the different senatorial districts of the State, three delegates to be
elected for each Senator therefrom; and in choosing
all district delegates, each voter shall be entitled to
vote for not more than two of the members to be
chosen from his district, and the three candidates
highest in vote shall be declared elected, except in
the county of Alleghany, forming the twenty-third
senatorial district, where no voter shall vote for
more than six candidates, and the nine highest in
vote shall be elected, and in the counties of Luzerne,
Monroe, and Pike, forming the thirteenth senatorial
district, where no voter shall vote for more than four
canmdidates, and the six highest in vote shall be
elected; and six additional delegates shall be chosen
from the city of Philadelphia, by a vote at large in
said city, and in their election no voter shall vote
for more than three candidates, and the six highest
in vote shall be declared elected.
"SEc. 2. The following regulations shall apply to
the aforesaid election to be held on the second Tuesday of October next....
" First. The said election shall be held and coinducted by the proper election officers of the several
election districts of the Commonwealth, and shall
be governed and regulated in all respects by the
general election laws of the Commonwealth, so far
231 
232     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
as the same shall be applicable thereto, and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
" Second. The tickets to be voted for members at
large of the convention shall have on the outside
the words,'delegates at large,' and on the inside
the names of the candidates to be voted for, not
exceeding fourteen in number.
Third. The tickets to be voted for district mem bers of the convention shall have on the outside the
words,'district delegates,' and on the inside the
name or names of the candidates voted for, not
exceeding the proper number, limited as aforesaid;
but any ticket which shall contain a greater number
of names than the number for which the voter shall
be entitled to vote, shall be rejected; and in the
case of the delegates to be chosen at large in Philadelphia, the words,'city delegates,' shall be on the
outside of the ticket....
"SEC. 8. That in case of vacancies in the membership of said convention, the same shall be filled
as follows: If such vacancy shall be of a member
at large of the convention, those members at large
who shall have been voted for by the same voters,
or by a majority of the same voters who shall have
voted for and elected the member whose place is to
be filled, shall fill such vacancy; if such vacancy
shall be of a district or city member of the convention, those members at large of the convention
who shall have been voted for by the same or by a
majority of the same voters whoQ shall have voted
for such district or city member, shall fill such
vacancy; in either case, the appointment to fill a
vacancy shall be made by the members at large 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES.
aforesaid, or by a majority of them, in writing;
and all such written appointments shall be filed
among the convention records."
Among the other additional provisions of the Convention
Act appears the following proviso in the fourth section:
"Provided, That one-third of all the members
of the convention shall have the right to require
the separate and distinct submission to a popular
vote of any change or amendment proposed by the
convention."
II. LOCAL LAWS.
THE  BLOOMSBURG ACT:  "An  act to define the
limits and to organize the town of Bloomsbur#;"
passed 4th March, 1870.-P. Laws, 343.
"SEc. 4. To the end that the electors of Bloomsburg may exercise their right of suffrage freely and
without undue constraint, and may obtain for themselves complete representation in their local government, the plan of the free vote shall be lawful, and
is hereby authorized in the elections for officers of
said town and'for all officers to be chosen by them
exclusively: In any case where more persons than
one are to be chosen in said town to the same office,
for the same time or term of service, each voter
duly qualified shall be entitled to as many votes as
the number of persons to be so chosen, and may poll
his votes as follows, to wit:
"First. When two persons are to be chosen, lihe
may give one vote to each of two candidates or two
votes to one.
"Second. When three persons are to be chosen, he
may give one vote to each of three candidates, two
233 
PROPOP'TIONAL REPRESENTATION.
votes to one candidate and one to another, one vote
and a half to each of two candidates or three votes
to one.
"Third. When four persons are to be chosen, he
may give one vote to each of four candidates, one
vote and one-third to each of three, two votes to
each of two or four votes to one.
"Foutrthl. When six persons are to be chosen, he
may give one vote to each of six candidates, one
vote and a half to each of four, two votes to each
of three, three votes to each of two or six votes to
one.
" In every case the candidates highest in vote shall
be declared elected. Whenever a voter shall intend
to give more votes than one or to give a fraction of
a vote to any candidate, he shall express his intention distinctly and clearly upon the face of his
ballot, otherwise but one vote shall be counted and
allowed to such candidate. This section shall apply to the choice of School Directors and of all
officers to be chosen exclusively by the electors
of said town, whenever its application shall be possible.
"SEC. 5. Vacancies ill any of the offices of said
town may be filled by appointments to be made by
the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace of Columbia County, except as herein otherwise provided;
but any appointment so made shall be of an elector
of the said town who shall have voted for the officer
or person whose place is to be filled..... This
section shall apply to vacancies in all the offices
before mentioned except those of Justice of the
Peace and Director of Common Schools."
234 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES.
By thle second section of the same act a Town
Council is to be elected annually, consisting of six
members chosen by the free vote, and a President
chosen by a majority vote; and by the third section
two Constables and two Assessors of Taxes annually, and three town Auditors every third year.
By general laws two Assistant Assessors of taxes
are to be chosen triennially, and two Directors of
Common Schools each year for three year terms.
To the choice of all the foregoing officers, except
the President of the Town Council, the new plan of
voting applies, and it will also apply to the election
of Justices of the Peace of the town whenever the
two authorized by law shall happen to be electable
at the same time for the constitutional term of five
years.
BoRotUGH   CoUNCILMNEN  IN  NoRITHUMBERLA:D
COUNTY: "An Act relatiny to the extension of
borouyh limits in Northumberland  County;"
passed 6th April, 1870.-P. Laws, 1000.
"SEC. 1. That the number of town councilmen
in each of thie several boroughs of Northumberland
County, to be hereafter chosen, except in the borough of Sunbury, shall be six; and they shall be
chosen according to the provisions of the fourth
section of the act to define the limits and to organize the town of Bloomsburg, approved March 4th,
1870; and vacancies in their number shall be filled
by the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland
County in accordance with the provisions of the
fifth section of the same act."
235 
236    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
COUNCILMEN IN BOROUGH  OF MILTON: "An Act
relative to elections in the borough of Milton;" ap  proved 14th April, 1870.-P. Laws, 1177.
"SEC. 2. That the members of the town council of
said borough shall be chosen annually, commencing
with the next election, and three thereof shall be
chosen from each ward upon the principle of the
free vote as defined and fixed in the fourth section of
the act to define the limits and to organize the town
of Bloomsburg, approved March 4th, A. D. 1870,
and all acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith
are hereby repealed."
OFFICERs IN BOROUGH SUNBURY: "An Act relating
to elections in the borough of Sunbury;" approved
14th April, 1870.-P. Laws, 1178.
"SEC. 1. That in elections hereafter held in the
borough of Sunbury for borough or ward officers,
whenever two or more persons are to be chosen to
the same office for the same term of service, each
voter may at his discretion bestow his votes upon
one or more candidates less in number than the
whole number of persons to be chosen in the manner provided in the fourth section of the act to define the limits and to organize the town of Bloomsburg, passed at the present session, and the candidates highest in vote shall be declared elected:
Provided, That inspectors of election shall be chosen
as heretofore, and that directors of common schools
shall be considered and held to be borough officers
within the meaning of this act." 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES.
BOROUGH OFFICEIRS IN BERWICK: "An Act sup plementary to the several acts relating to the bor  ough of Berwick in the County of Columbia;"
approved 13th May, 1870.
"SEC. 1. That the number of town councilmen to
be hereafter chosen at elections in the borough of
Berwick, Columbia County, shall be six; and that
all elections in said borough for the choice of borough officers and for the choice of directors of common schools, and all appointments and elections to
fill vacancies in the offices of said borough, shall be
according to the fourth and fifth sections of the act
to define the limits and to organize the town of
Bloomsburg, approved 4th March, 1870: Provided,
however, That this section shall not apply to the
choice of inspectors of election for said borough."
DIRECTORS FOR THE BLOOM POOR DISTRICT: "An
Act to regulate the election of directors of the
poor for the Bloom district in Columbia County;"
approved 28th -Ilarch, 1870.-P. Laws, 611.
"SEC. 1.' That on the second Tuesday of October
next, and every third year thereafter at the time of
township elections under general laws, the qualified
electors of Bloomsburg and of the several townships
which shall have become a part of the Bloom district
for the support and maintenance of the poor, shall
elect three persons to be directors of the poor for said
district, whose terms of service shall commence upon
the first day of April next following their election,
and continue for three years.
"SEC. 2. In all elections of said directors, whether
237 
238     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
for regular terms or to fill vacancies, each voter may
distribute his votes to and among candidates as he
shall think fit, or may bestow them all upon one
candidate; and where three directors are to be
chosen he may give one vote and a half to each of
two candidates; in all cases the candidates highest
in vote shall be chosen....
"SEC. 3. Whenever a single vacancy shall occur
or exist in said board of directors, the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace of Columbia County shall
fill the same for the whole remaining part of the unexpired term in question, by appointing some fit and
competent person from among the electors of said
poor district who shall have voted for the director
whose place is to be filled."
SCHOOL DIRECTORS IN CERTAIN DISTRICTS.-By
ah act approved 10th February, 1871, (P. Laws, 41,)
it was provided, "That hereafter in the election of
School Directors in the Twenty-second, Twentyfourth, and Twenty-seventh Wards of the City of
Philadelphia, each elector shall vote for four persons, and the six having the highest number of votes
shall be declared duly elected to serve for three
years from the first day of January next succeeding
their election."
By another act, approved 2d June, 1871, (P.
Laws, 1351,) entitled, "An Act to change the mode
of electing school directors in certain townships in
the counties of Bradford and Susquehanna," it was
provided  "That from and after the passage of this act,
school directors in Smithfield township, in the 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES.
county of Bradford, and Apolorous and Franklin
townships, Susquehanna County, shall be chosen by
the electors of said districts in the manner following: Whenever an even number is to be chosen,
each elector shall have the right to vote for one-half
the number to be elected, and whenever an odd
number is to be chosen, each elector may vote for a
majority of the number to be elected, and the persons who shall receive the highest number of votes
to the number to be chosen, shall be declared elected,
and of those persons elected, the ones receiving the
highest number of votes shall hold their office for
the longest term of years."
RIVERSIDE BOROUGH: "An Act to incorporate the
village of Riverside, in the County of 2;orthum  berland, into a borough;" approved 4th May,
1871.-P. Laws, 1120.
"SEc. 10. The election of councilmen and other
officers of said borough, including school directors
and justices of the peace, shall be upon the plan of
the free vote, and according to the provisions of the
fourth section of the Bloomsburg act of 4th of
March, 1870, so far as the same can be applied; and
the filling of vacancies in the offices of said borough
shall be, according to the fifth section of the same
act, by the court of common pleas of Northumberland county."
UNIONTOWN BOROUGH: "A supplement to the several
acts relating to the borough of Uniontown, Fayette
County;" approved 11th J~ay, 1871.-P. Laws, 748.
"SEc. 2. That at the next election in said borough,
239 
240    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
and annually thereafter, there shall be chosen by
vote at large in said borough, six members of council, two assessors of taxes and two constables; and
the said councilmen, assessors, and constables shall
be elected under the provisions and in the manner
prescribed by the fourth section of the act of March
fourth, one thousand eight hundred and seventy,
entitled "An Act to define the limits and to organize
the town of Bloomsburg;" and vacancies in said
offices shall be filled, pursuant to the provisions of
the fifth section of the same act, by the court of
quarter sessions of Fayette County.
"SEC. 3. At the next election, and annually thereafter, the voters of said borough shall also elect at
large two school directors, who shall hold their offices for three-year terms; and at said next election,
and every third year thereafter, there shall be elected three auditors who shall'annually settle and adjust all accounts of said borough; and the said
school directors and auditors shall be voted for and
chosen in the same manner as the officers mentioned
in the second section of this act."
SNYDERTOWN BOROUGH: "An Act to erect Snyder  town, in the county of Northumberland, into a
borough;" approved 26th Jfay, 1871.-P. Laws,
1225.
"SEC. 5. That whenever two or more persons are
to be chosen to the same office in said borough, for
the same term of service, they shall be voted for
and chosen according to the provisions of the fourth
section of the Bloomsburg act of 4th of March, 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES.
1870: Provided, however, That this section shall not
apply to the choice of inspectors of election."
SHAMOKIN BOROUGH: "An Act for the division of
the borough of Shamokin into two wards, and for
the better government of the same;" approved 19th
of May, 1871.-P. Laws, 958.
"SEc. 7. In the election of all borough and ward
officers in said borough, (except inspectors of election,) whenever two or more persons are to be elected
to the same office, for the same term of service, they
shall be voted for and chosen under the provision
of the 4th section of the Bloomsburg act of fourth
of March, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and seventy; and vacancies in said offices, when
the manner of filling them shall not be otherwise
provided for by law, shall be according to the fifth
section of the same act by the court of quarter sessions of Northumberland County; the manner of voting herein provided for shall apply to thle election
of justices of the peace and directors of common
schools."
HULMEVILLE BOROUGH: "An Act to incorporate the
borough of Hulmeville, in Bucks County;" ap  proved 8th March, 1872.
"SEc. 6. That all elections in said borough for
the choice of councilmen, town auditors, assistant
assessors and justices of the peace whenever two or
more are to be chosen at the same time and for the
same term of service, shall be according to the provisions of the 4th section of the Bloomsburg act of
4th March, 1870, and vacancies in the said offices,
16
241 
242     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
except that of justice of the peace, shall be according to the 5th section of the same act; and all
elections held in said school district of Middletown
township and said borough of Hulmeville for the
choice of school directors shall also be subject to
and according to the provisions of the aforesaid
fourth section of the Bloomburg act."
SCHOOL DIRECTORs IN CONYNGHAM TOWNsIHIP, Co  LUMIBIA COUNTY: "An Act relating to the election
of school directors i,t Conynyham township, Co  lumbia County;" approved 8th J.arch, 1872.
"SEC. 1. That the provisions of the fourth section
of an act, entitled " An Act to define the limits and
to organize the town of Bloomnsburg,' approved 4th
March, 1870, be and the same are hereby extended
to the township of Conyngham in the county of
Columbia, so far as the same relates to the election
of school directors, from and after the passage of
this act."
BOPOUGH  OF CHA3IBERSBURG:  By  an act approved 9th April, 1872, (P. Laws, 1011,) Chambersburg'was divided into, four wards, and the second
section of the act makes provision for the election
of councilmen therefrom as follows:
"SEc. 2. The town council shall consist of two
members from each ward, who shall hold their offices for the term of two years; and in their election each voter may give his two votes to one candidate, and candidates highest in vote shall be declared elected...." 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES.
III. A SPECIAL STATUTE.
A CONTESTED ELECTION COMMIITTEE.
A remarkable case occurred of the application of
the limited vote to the choice of an election committee, at the legislative session of 1872. By an act
approved 21st February, of that year, supplementary to the general election act of 2d July, 1839,
provision was made for selecting in a new manner a
committee of seven members of the Senate to try
the important contested election case of McClure vs.
Gray. The act was as follows, omitting matter
irrelevant to the present purpose:
"SEc. 1...   That in any case of contested election now pending in the Senate the committee for
the trial of the contest shall be selected and formed
by the Senate... by choosing six members thereof
viva voce, each Senator voting for no more than
three members, and the six highest in vote shall be
declared selected; the remaining member of the
committee shall be chosen by lot in manner following, to wit: The names of all the remaining Senators present except those of the Speaker and sitting
member shall be written on distinct pieces of paper
as nearly alike as may be, each of which shall be
rolled up and put into a box or urn by the Clerk of
the Senate or some person appointed by the Senate
to act in his stead, and the box or urn shall be
placed onl the Speaker's desk; the Clerk of the Senate, or person appointed to act in his stead, having
thoroughly shaken and intermixed said papers, shall
draw them out one by one, and the names of the
Senators so drawn shall be written down on a separate list by one of the clerks until thirteen names
243 
244    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
shall have been drawn; a separate list of the thirteen Senators so drawn shall be given to each of
the parties to the contest, who shall, accompanied
by the Clerk or other person appointed to act in his
stead, immediately withdraw to some adjoining
room, where they shall proceed to strike off alternately the names upon said list until but one
name shall be left thereon; and the Senator whose
name shall remain shall be the seventh member of
the committee.
"SEC. 3. Any vacancy occurring in said committee shall be filled as follows: If such vacancy
shall be of a member chosen by the votes of Senators, it shall be filled by a new appointment made
in open Senate, by the same or by a majority of the
same Senators who shall have voted for the member
whose place is to be filled; if such vacancy shall be
of the seventh member of the committee chosen as
aforesaid by lot and challenge, his place shall be
filled in the same manner as that in which the said
seventh member shall have been chosen, all the
names of the qualified members present being first
placed in the box or urn for the purpose of selection; and any member chosen to fill a vacancy shall
be duly sworn, and shall perform all the duties and
possess all the powers of an original member of the
committee from the time of his selection: In no
case of the selection of a committee or of the filling
of a vacancy shall the sitting member be permitted
to vote, and in case of the absence or refusal to act
of the contestant or of the sitting member, the
Senate shall appoint some proper person to act in
his stead." 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES.
The foregoing plan for selecting an election committee is
believed to be much superior to the Grenville plan, borrowed
from parliamentary practice, which has heretofore obtained in
Pennsylvania, and is prescribed by the general election law of
1839. By the latter, all the members of a committee are
drawn by lot and challenge, and it may happen that all of
them will be members of one political party, thus excluding all certainty of thorough investigation in the trial, as
well as an impartial, decision. So, too, the very extended
allowance of challenge by the old plan makes it probable in
any given case that the ablest members of the body upon both
sides will be excluded from service on the committee, leaving
the committee to be composed of weaker and less independent
members.
LOCAL ELECTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA
UNDER REFORMED VOTING.
UNDER. the Pennsylvania statutes for reformed
voting, just given, there have been numerous elections held within the last two or three years. From
among these a few are selected to illustrate the
practical working of the new plan. They are cases
in which there were disturbing influences, interfering with regular party action, but yet all of which
resulted in fair representation of the people. They
furnish evidence of the practicability of the new
plan under any combination of circumstances likely
to occur, and they further prove that not only does
the new plan give to every respectable interest its
due representation, but it also eliminates from election contests most of the soreness and bad blood
which commonly attend them. It has this latter
effect, because under it there are but few beaten
candidates, no party or interest usually putting up
245 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
more persons to be voted for than it has votes to
elect.
If the subjoined cases prove that the new plan
works justly and well in the turmoil and excitement
of irregular or exceptional election contests, it is
manifest that its operation in all ordinary cases must
be still more satisfactory and complete.
BLOOMISBURG TOWN ELECTION FOR COUNCILMIEN:
The first election held in Bloomsburg under the
new plan of voting was on April 12, 1870, and the
following was the result:
For President of the Council:
Votes.
Elias $Iendenhall........................................ 213
Robert F. Clark......................................... 202
Majority....................................... 11
For Councilnen:
William B. Koons...................................... 393~
Frederick C. Eyer....................................... 362
Stephen Knorr............................................ 297
Joseph Sharpless......................................... 392
Caleb Barton............................................. 364
Charles G. Barkley..................................... 429
Simon C. Shive........................................... 260~
Scattering................................... 351
Republicans in italic. The regular Democratic
ticket had upon it the names of Koons, Eyer and
Knorr, with two votes to each, and was successful,
although votes were diverted from the two latter to
Shive and Barkley, Democrats, originally named
upon the Opposition People's ticket. For originally
the People's ticket was formed with the four names
246 
PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL ELECTIONS.
upon it of Sharpless, Barton, Barkley and Shive, or
two from each party.
But as in the course of the voting it appeared
probable that a fourth man could not be carried
upon the People's ticket, there was a partial dropping of Shive and concentration upon Barkley,
which accounts mostly for the ultimate disparity of
votes between those two candidates. The formation
of a people's ticket in the manner above mentioned,
with 3Iendenlall for President of the Council, no
doubt resulted in the election of the latter, although
it was unsuccessful in defeating any of the regular
candidates for Councilmen nominated by the Democratic majority in the town; but as the President is
a member of the Council, the general result was exactly right as between parties, the political majority
in the town having four and the minority three in
the Council, representing fairly the political opinions
as well as the personal preferences of the citizens.
In the case of this election the new plan was subjected to a severe test by reason of irregular party
action in the formation of a combined or people's
ticket, but it vindicated itself in a just and proper
result. The weakest candidate only upon the combined ticket was beaten, and each party obtained
ultimately its appropriate measure of representation
in the government of the town.
A SECOND ELECTION IN BLOOMSBURG: A second
election in the town for the choice of other town officers beside Councilmen, was held on the second Tuesday of October, 1870, in connection with the general
election. There were to be chosen two Constables;
247 
248     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
two Assessors of taxes; two assistant Assessors;
two School Directors and three Town Auditors, beside the usual officers of election for the two districts of East and West Bloomsburg, and a Justice
of the Peace to fill a vacancy. Omitting the latter
officers from further notice, as they were electable
under former laws, we proceed to explain how those
chosen under the Bloomsburg Act were voted for
and elected.
Each party nominated a ticket in the same form.
The Democratic ticket was as follows:
Constable-Martin C. Woodward, 2 votes.
Assessor- John K. Grotz, 2 votes.
Assistant Assessor-Frederick C. Eyer, 2 votes.
School Director-Charles W. Miller, 2 votes.
Town Auditors-John B. Casey, 1 i votes, B.
Frank Zarr, 11 votes.
The Republican ticket being arranged in the
same manner, with other names, it was certain from
the outset that all the candidates of both parties
would be elected except one of those for Auditor.
The majority would carry two Auditors and the
minority but one. There was, therefore, very
smooth work in the election of local officers; an absence of animosity and sharp management; no
trading of votes and no necessity to struggle for a
majority in order to avoid defeat and virtual disfranchisement.  Each party obtained its share of
the town offices by its own votes.
We append the vote for the several candidates.
Constables.
Martin C. Woodward................................... 753'
Baltzer T. Laycock....................................... 368 
PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL ELECTIONS.
Assesors.
John K. Grotz.................................... 498
Joseph Sharpless................................ 654
Assistant Assessor8.
Frederick C. Eyer.............................. 494
Samtuel Shaffer, Sr..................................... 640
School Directors.
Charles W. Miller..............................502
Jacob K. Edgar........................................ 628
Town Auditors.
John B. Casey.................................... 367
B. Frank Zarr.................................... 366
F. P. Drinker................................... 4900
Ephraim P. Lutz........................................ 4811
All the above were elected except the one lowest
in vote for Auditor; the Republicans in italic.
The very large vote given to Mr. Woodward for
re-election as Constable was intended as a compliment to an officer of unusual merit, whose vigilance
in the preservation of order in the town, and fidelity
in the performance of his other duties, had attracted
to him a large measure of public confidence and approval. It will be observed that at the foregoing
election the ordinary political minority of the town
had in fact the majority of the votes polled, as the
general election which accompanied the town election at that time was not an exciting one, and there
was a sluggish vote of the majority party. It is
evident therefore that under the old plan of voting
the party ordinarily in the minority in the town
would have swept all the offices voted for except one
249 
250    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
constable, and would have deprived their opponents
almost entirely of representation, so far as representation was dependent upon that election. But at
the very next election, on the old plan of voting, a
similar injustice would have been inflicted, though
in exactly the opposite direction; the Republican
minority would have lost every office voted for, and
the majority have seized them all, whereas under
the new plan, at both elections, each party obtained
its just share.
SUNBURY ELECTION OF OCTOBER, 1870: At that
election most of the borough and ward officers being electable under the new plan of voting, there
was a partial division of them between parties. The
Chief Burgess and the Second Burgess were respectively voted for at large, under the majority rule,
and were of course carried by the Republican majority of the town. But to most of the other officers the new rule applied. Each of the two wards
elect annually two assistant Burgesses and four
members of the Town Council, beside their proper
Ward officers. We give some results in the West
Ward from the election returns, which show, however, only the votes given to candidates who were
elected; (Republicans in italic:)
WEST WARD.
Republican, 247; Deminocratic, 110.
AssISTANT BURGESSES, (2).-John Bourne, 277;
George Hill, 217.
COUNcILMEN, (4).-N. F. Lightner, 306; J. W. 
PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL ELECTIONS.
Friling, 293; Jacob Renn, 273; Thomas M. Pursell, 219.
OVERSEERS OF THE POOR,  (2).-Fred. J,Ierrill,
237; P. F. Zimmerman, 210.
STREET COMMISSIONERS, (2).-Ches. Gossler, 252
Charles F. Martin, 236.
In the East Ward, (Republican, 210, Democratic,
107,) the minority carried one of the four Councilmen and one or two of the other officers.
In the voting given above, the Democrats in each
case generally gave two votes to one candidate, but
in the case of four Councilmen, the Republicans
gave one vote and one-third to each of three, and
the Democrats four votes to one.
ELECTION OF COUNCILMEN IN NORTHUIMBERLAND
BOROUGH. —In Northumberland Borough, at the
October election, 1870, there was a Republican majority of 10 for Burgess. Very properly each party
nominated only three Councilmen, although six
were to be chosen, because the free vote applied to
the election of those officers. The result was that
the Democrats, giving each two votes to each of
their three candidates, elected them, but one of the
Republican candidates was beaten by a Republican
Volunteer. As this case illustrates the working of
the free vote, the facts will be stated as they are
understood to have occurred. At the Republican
meeting to nominate Councilmen, a gentleman who
expected to be nominated was defeated by the arts
or influence of a personal enemy, who immediately
afterwards boasted of the achievement. The friends
of the beaten man became indignant and concluded
251 
252     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
to rectify the injustice done, by electing him as an
independent candidate. The free vote afforded
them the ready means of accomplishing their pur pose, and they proceeded at the election to vote
plumpers of six votes for their friend and carried
him through the contest triumphantly. Without
disturbing the results of the election generally,
they carried their man and secured representation
for themselves in the council according to their
desire.
Bolting a nomination under the new plan means,
then, that commonly the bolters can obtain their due
share of power and no more, and that the whole
election cannot be turned upside down or changed
throughout by them. One-sixth of the voters of
Northumberland can elect one Councilman, but they
cannot disturb the other voters of the town in
choosing the remaining five. Under the old majority rule the bolters would have been compelled
to form a combination with the opposite party, or to
trade or buy votes, inll order to succeed; the whole
election would probably have been muddled or
disgraced, and one party or the other would have
carried more than its share of the officers to be
elected. The new plan insures justice to all, prevents intrigue and corruption preserves the orderly
action of parties, cuts off the main mischiefs of
bolting, and encourages the selection of good men
as candidates.
We append the vote for Councilmen in full:
Wm. T. Forsyth.................................... 328
James Tool.......................... 301
A. H. Stone......................................... 291 
PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL ELECTIONS.
Wm. H. Leighow........................................ 319
Benj. Heckert............................................ 224
James McClure......................................... 207
Hiram Young, Ind...................................... 561
Republicans in italic. McClure being the lowest,
was the defeated candidate.
ELECTION OF DIRECTORS OF THE POOR FOR THE
BLOOM POOR DISTRICT.-At the election held in
October, 1870, for three Directors of the Poor, under
the special act of March 28th of that year, the voting
was as follows:
Kramer.
222
123
235~
180
145~
906
Miller.
Bloomsburg, East...2321
Bloomsburg, West...       13       2
Greenwood............227
Sug,arloaf............ 180
Scott..................115 1
923
Stephen H. Miller and William Kramer,.Democrats, and Johnson H. Ikeler, Republican, were
therefore elected for three-year terms commencing
on the first day of April following. These officers
being chosen on the plan of the free vote, it was
inevitable that they would be divided between the
two political parties according to a just principle of
representation; the majority in the district would
be able to elect two and the minority one. The
Democrats therefore voted tickets in the following
form:
"Stephen H. Miller, 11 votes;
William Kramer, 1i votes."
253
.k~eter.
226~
223~
346}1
12
364~
1173
Schuyler.
163~
180
127~
10~
12
493~ 
254     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
The Republicans nominated two candidates also,
and tickets for them were prepared in the same
form; but as they had not votes enough to elect
both they finally concentrated their vote mainly
upon Ikeler, as shown in the above return.  The
election at last becalileto them a question of choice
or preference between their own candidates, and the
result proved that they preferred Ikeler. It is here
showni that the free vote not only divides offices
fairly between parties, but enables voters of either
party, in certain cases, to choose between their own
nominees and to correct any blunder made in their
nomination. The truth is, that the new plan of
voting is so flexible as well as just that it readily
adapts itself to any state of facts at an election, and
gives to the voter that complete freedom of action
which is necessary to his judicious exercise of the
right of suffrage. In this case, where three Directors of the Poor were to be chosen, allowing each
voter to give his three votes to one, two, or three
candidates, as he might think fit, enabled each
party to take what belonged to it and to handle its
votes in the most convenient and effectual manner
to that end; and it also afforded the ready means
of correcting a blunder made in the selection of
candidates. This election also furnishes evidence
of the convenience and accuracy with which fractional votes may be polled, counted, and returned in
all cases where their use shall be found desirable.
ScORLING OF FRACTIONAL VOTEs.-An ordinary
and convenient mode of tallying or counting tickets
containing fractional votes which has obtained in 
PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL ELECTIONS.
the local elections above referred to, and in others,
may here be properly presented.
When tickets containing one and a half votes to
each of two candidates are to be counted by election
officers, the fraction may be disregarded in the first
instance, and the tickets only scored upon the tally
lists, the sum of the fractions being added at the
end of the score, as already explained in another
place. In a given case of forty such tickets polled,
the score will stand as follows:
John Jones,    (a) T I~ N'l   -40+20-60 votes.
wmm  rown, (93 Am, ~ l4            6ve
William Brow,, a    1 ~  ~   ~    =40+20=60 votes.
If in addition to tickets containing fractional
votes, a candidate shall have polled for him tickets
containing whole votes alone, the latter may  be
scored separately above the line containing the
fractional votes, and be carried out and added at
the right. Thus if he shall receive, in addition to
votes scored as above, twenty whole votes unlconnected with fractions, the score or tally may be
made as follows:
m   1                     20
~ ~l i.......................
John Jones, (l)'   I I IN'=40+20=60-80 votes.
Yr  N'F  1,%L —----
Other modes of keeping the tally lists may be
resorted to at the discretion of election officers, but
those above are given because they have some sanction from practice, and because by their use economy
of space is consulted in the making up of returns.
255 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
NOMINATIONS TO OFFICE.
Good plans for nominating candidates to office are
almost as important, and deserve consideration almost
as much, as good plans for electing them. In this
place it is therefore proposed to notice two recent
plans of nomination which have been applied in
Pennsylvania to the selection of nominees for
county offices. They are both popular-vote plans,
and the purpose of both is to avoid the evils which
ordinarily attend upon representative conventions.
The  one  is known  as the  "Crawford  County
System," and the other as the "Columbia County
Plan;" so named from the counties in which they
respectively originated and were first put in force.
By the Crawford County plan, the voters at
primary elections vote directly for candidates for
nomination; from each election district a return
judge conveys the return of his district to a joint
meeting of return judges for the county; in the
joint meeting of those judges the returns are cast
up and candidates highest in vote for each office are
declared the nominees. Of all bad plans, accepted
in recent practice, this is unquestionably the worst,
and yet to men of little reflection and narrow experience, it seems fair, reasonable, judicious and just.
Hence it has been adopted in many counties in
place of the old convention plan. The main objections to it are these: That it produces, inevitably,
expensive contests for nomination; that it tends
strongly to fraudulent voting and fraudulent returns;
that it makes success very often dependent upon
256 
NOMINATIONS TO OFFICE.
intrigue between candidates whereby voters are
deceived; that it shamefully disregards and puts
open contempt upon the doctrine that the majority
shall rule; that it leads to embarrassment of voters
and to blunders in voting by reason of ignorance
among voters of the relative strength of candidates,
and lastly, that it substitutes a feeble body of
return judges (who hardly bear a representative
character) for a regular, strong convention, for the
transaction of other  party business  beside  the
making of nominations. Of course it multiplies
candidates, exasperates popular passions, and degrades the whole tone of party action.*
But the Columbia County plan of nomination is
a popular-vote plan of a different character, and
challenges attention and respect, because it retains
*The working of the "Crawford County system" as a nominating
plan was well shown in the Democratic nominations for Nortlhumberland
County, in 1871. It was in force there, at that time, and exhibited some
of its worst features.  Hundreds of false or unpolled votes were reported
to control results, and were, almost of necessity, received and counted at
the meeting of the return judges; for one imperfection of the plan is
that it provides no means for the investigation and correction of the
frauds which it invites. Upon the face of the returns of votes for the
respective candidates for the several offices, at the primary elections, it
further appeared that each of the nominees (save one) had less than onehalf the total vote and one of them less than one-third.
Analyzing the vote we get the following exhibit:
President Judge.-For nominee, 1408, for other candidates, 2399.
Representative.-For nominee, 1585, for other candidates, 2275.
Associate Judge.-For nominee, 1349, for other candidates, 2219.
Treasurer.-For nominee, 983, for other candidates, 2461.
Connmissioner.-For nominee, 1273, for other candidates, 2074.
This is indeed minority representation with a vengeance! But it was
unavoidable under the plurality rule.
It only remains to state, that the whole ticket set up in this very
objectionable way was beaten, and that the plan of nomination which
produced the disaster was forthwith abolished, and the convention plan
restored with proportional representation of districts.
17
257 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
the feature of a convention well constituted for
work, and because it applies the principle of
reformed voting very thoroughly to the nomination
of candidates. The rules which embody and give
form to this plan are not supposed to be perfect-in
fact, it is evident that they might be improved in
construction, and made much more comprehensive
and complete-but as the first formal attempt to
secure  proportional representation in a nominating
body chosen by popular votes, they may claim a
place in this volume, and justify the comments and
exposition which will follow them.
RULES  OF  NOMINATION IN COLUMBIA COUNTY:  ADOPTED DEC. 26, 1870.
"I. The annual county convention shall be held
at the Court House in Bloomsburg on the second
Tuesday of August, at one o'clock, P. M., and the
delegate elections shall be held on the Saturday
before at the places of holding the general elections
in the several election districts, between the hours
of three and seven o'clock in the afternoon.
"II. The representation of districts in county
convention shall be in proportion to the party vote
of each, as cast at the most recent election for
Governor, but the whole number of delegates shall
not exceed seventy nor be less than fifty-four, and
no district shall be allowed less than two or more
than four delegates.
"III. Until the next election for Governor, delegates shall be allowed to districts upon a ratio of
sixty voters for a delegate, allowance being made
for the largest fractions of a ratio.
258 
COLUMBIA CO. RULES OF NOMINATION.   259
"IV. The Standing Committee shall, whenever
necessary, make an apportionment of delegates to
the several districts under these rules, and publish
it, together with the rules, in the party newspapers
of the County, at least two weeks before each
annual convention.
"V. Voters at delegate elections may give their
votes to a smaller number of candidates than the
whole number to be elected in the manner provided in the fourth section of the Bloomsburg act
of 4th of March, 1870.
"VI. The delegate elections shall be by ballot,
and shall be held and conducted by a judge and
clerk,... and the said officers shall keep a list
of voters, and tally of votes counted, to be sent by
them to the Convention with their certificate of the
result of the election.
"VII. All cases of disputed seats in Convention
shall be disposed of openly -by vote after hearing
the respective claimants and their evidence.
"VIII. All delegates must reside in the districts
they represent. In case of an absent delegate he
may depute another to serve in his stead....
"IX. The voting in Convention shall be open,
and any two members may require the yeas and
nays on any question pending."
Rule 10 authorizes special Conventions to be called by the
Standing Committee. Rule 11 provides that all County nominations and appointments of district conferees and delegates to
State conventions shall be made in County Convention.
"XII. The Standing Committee shall consist of
one member from each election district, who shall
be elected by the people at the delegate elections, 
260    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
who shall choose their own Chairman, and any five
of them shall be a quorum when called together by
the Chairman.
"XIII. No member of the Legislature shall be
chosen by this county as a delegate to a State Convention during his term of office.
"XIV. In Convention a majority of all the votes
given shall be necessary to a nomination, and no
person named shall be peremptorily struck from the
list of candidates until after the fourth vote, when
the lowest name shall be struck off, and so on at each
successive vote until a nomination shall be effected.
"XV. Delegates instructed by the voters who select
them shall obey their instructions in Convention,
and votes given by them in violation of their instruction)s shall be disallowed by the Convention.
All instructions shall be reported by the election
officers.
"XVI. Conventions shall be called to order by
the Chairman of the Standing Committee, or in his
absence by some other member thereof, who shall
entertain and put to vote motions for the election
of a President and two Secretaries for purposes of
temporary organization."
Rule 17. No person shall be eligible to a nomination who
has opposed the ticket of his party at the next preceding election. Rule 18. Any voter may be challenged who has voted
against his party at a Federal or State election within two years,
or opposed his party ticket at the last preceding election, or
has taken or agreed to take money or any valuable tonsideration for his vote at the delegate election, or has corrupted or
attempted to corrupt any voter of the district at such election.
Rule 19. If it shall be made to appear that any candidate for
nomination has paid or promised any consideration to any 
COLUMBIA CO. RULES OF NOMINATION.   261
delegate to influence his vote, or that the same has been done
by another with his approbation, the name of such candidate
shall be struck from the list of candidates, or if already nominated his name shall be struck from the ticket and another
nomination be made, and he shall be ineligible as a candidate
or delegate for two years.  Rule 20. Any delegate who shall
receive, or accept the promise of, any consideration for himself or for another for his vote or influence in Convention,
shall on proof of the fact be forthwith expelled from the Convention (by a majority vote), and shall be ineligible for any
nomination or to serve as a delegate for two years. Rule 21.
A two-thirds vote in a regular annual Convention is required
to alter or amend any of the Rules.
In Convention, August 8, 1871, the following
additional Rule was unanimously adopted:
"XXII. Candidates for nomination may be voted
for directly at the Delegate Elections, and shall receive delegate or district votes in Convention in proportion to their popular vote in the several districts,
upon the same principle on which delegates are
electable under the 5th rule."
OBSERVATIONS ON THE COLUMBIA
COUNTY RULES OF NOMINATION.
REPRESENTATION OF DISTRICTS.-The maximum
of four and minimnum of two delegates to each district, are judiciously fixed for several reasons. First,
The number of districts to be represented being
twenty-seven, the result is a representative body of
convenient size: Second, The numbers two, three
and four are convenient ones for the application of 
262     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
the new plan of voting in the selection of delegates:
Third, Liberal representation of the smallest dis tricts, and a limitation upon the representation of
the largest ones, gives play to the principle of terri torial representation, (as distinguished from that of
mere numbers,) without carrying it to excess, and
in the particular case in hand avoided the dissatis faction which would have been produced in the
smaller districts by a reduction of their representation in Convention.  (Before the new rules were
adopted in 1870, each district, without regard to the
magnitude of its vote, was entitled to two delegates.)
But in the case of a county much larger or much
smaller than Columbia, goQd reasons may exist for
adopting a different scale of representative numbers.
VWhere the districts to be represented are but few in
number, as many as six or eight delegates might be
allowed to some of the largest ones; while in the
case of a great county, with numerous electoral divisions, the smallest districts might be limited to one
delegate each. It is true that in such case proportional representation could not be secured for such
small districts along with separate representation,
but the evil of over-representation in conventionof an unwieldy representative body-imay be
greater than that of partial disfranchisement of district electors by the majority vote. Besides, it is
evident that in the case of single districts, (i. e. districts with but one delegate,) the evils of the majority vote are at their minimum; the disfranchisement is always likely to be much less in such than
in plural districts where the total number of voters
must be greater. And, practically, in any ordinary 
COLUM-BIA CO. RULE&S OF NOMIINATION.   263
case, it will be found that delegates in convention
from single districts will constitute but a small percentage of the whole Convention membership, and
will not constitute a great disturbing force opposed
to the reformatory action of the new plan.
That proportional representation of districts in
nominating conventions is a great improvement
over equal district representation therein, will not
be questioned by any one when the objection of
minority disfranchisement in large districts has been
removed.   For if the representation of large districts is broken up, or divided between parties or
candidates by the free vote, the vote of those districts will not ordinarily overwhelm or swamp the
smaller ones in Convention and give to the former
absolute control of the nominations to be made.
THE FREE VOTE FOR DELEGATES.-The 5th Rule
given above is the first application ever made of the
free vote to primary elections connected with nominations for public office, and it has been found to be
most satisfactory upon trial. The scale of represeintation under it is not difficult of ascertainment or
remembrance. In a district entitled to two delegates, any number of voters exceeding one-third of
the whole can elect one delegate, and, exceeding twothirds, both. In a district of three delegates, any
number of voters exceeding one-fourth can elect one
delegate, exceeding two-fourths (or one-half) two
and exceeding three-fourths, all three. In a district of four delegates, any number of voters exceeding one-fifth can elect one, exceeding two-fifths,
two, exceeding three-fifths, three, and exceeding
four-fifths, all four. In each case the denominator 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
of the fraction is one number above the total dele gate number. For the plan upon which votes may
be actually cast to realize these results, reference
may be had to the 4th section of the Bloomsburg
act to be found at a prior page of this volume.
It is to be remembered constantly that the new
plan of voting is not compulsory.  It is permissive
merely, and need not be resorted to in all cases.
Whenever there is an understanding between candidates, or among the voters of a district, as to the
persons who shall be elected delegates, a common
ticket may be used by all the voters, and cumulation of votes be dispensed with. The right to
cumulate must however exist with the voter in
order to his certain obtainment in any case.of just
representation by the concession or agreement of
his co-electors of the district.
INSTRUCTION OF DELEGATES.-The  15th rule is
superseded in part by the new or 22d rule, but yet
invites examination because it presents a clear case
of unwisdom in stopping short of the ultimate point
to which a sound principle of reform would lead us.
The 5th rule having provided a just plan for the
selection of delegates, it was seen that the old practice of voting district instructions by a majority
would no longer work. It would not do, for instance, to allow a minority in a district to elect a
delegate and then permit the majority to instruct
him. Thereupon, the attempt was made to harmonize the old practice of instruction with the new
voting rule by a modification of the former, expressed by the words italicized by us in the 15th
Rule. "Delegates instructed by the voters who select
264 
COLUMBIA CO. RULES OF NO3INATION.   265
them shall obey their instructions in Convention,"
&c.  By this clause it was intended that election
officers should report separately instructions voted
by majority and minority voters to the delegates
elected by them respectively and not combine them
in the return. But by this device simplicity was
sacrificed to some extent, while questions of difficulty
connected With the old plan of voting instructions
remained uncorrected.
THE POPULAR VOTE FOR CANDIDATES.-By the
new or 22d rule, authorizing a direct vote by the
people for candidates, all the advantages of the old
plan of voting instructions are retained, while its
inconveniences are wholly avoided. It is perhaps
the most perfect rule ever devised for taking the
sense of the people upon nominations for office; for
it is convenient, effectual, popular and just,..and
stands free from all the objections which condemn
other plans of popular-vote nomination, and especially the plan known as the "Crawford County
System."
But here a brief explanation of its practical
working-or of the manner in which it is applied is necessary to its full comprehension; and  such
explanation can be best made by tracing the pro ceeding of nomination under the rules in its suc cessive stages from its commencement at the elec tion of delegates to its consummation in county
Convention.
1. The officers who hold a delegate election in
any district are provided witlh election blanks or
papers on which they keep a list of the persons who
vote, and score tallies or counts at the close of the 
266     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
election of all votes polled, whether for delegates or
candidates for nomination, and these papers, with
returns certified, are transmitted by the election of ficers to the county Convention.
2. The voters at such election vote sheet or slip
tickets (ordinarily printed or partly printed) for
delegates, and for candidates for nomination to the
several offices to be filled; but as the free vote ap plies to the choice of delegates by virtue of Rule 5,
any voter may cumulate his delegate votes on one
or more delegate candidates in the manner provided
in the 4th section of the Bloomsburg act.
3. Returns of the votes cast in each district for
candidates for nomination being produced before the
county Convention when it meets, it can be readily
ascertained how many district or delegate votes in
Convention each candidate is entitled to, and in fact
the record can be made up from the returns by a
Secretary or Clerk and announced by the presiding
officer. But if the districts be called over the vote
of each must be reported correctly by the Delegates
and recorded by the Convention officers, for the former are bound by the 15th rule to obey the virtual
instructions of the home-voting, and the 22nd rule
is imperative as to the principle on which district or
delegate votes shall be assigned to candidates by the
convention.
What is material to observe here, is, that the
popular vote polled in any district is not reported in
order to be itself counted upon the result in Coinvention; it is simply reported to direct and control
the casting of the Convention votes to which the
district is entitled. There is, therefore, no motive 
COLUMBIA CO. RULES OF NOMINATION.   267
to swell the popular vote in a district in order to increase its power or influence in nominations, and
hence a fertile cause of fraud inherent in other
plans of popular-vote nomination is entirely excluded.
4. If upon a report of the district voting throughout the county it shall appear that any candidate
is entitled to a majority of Convention votes, his
nomination will of course be forthwith recorded and
announced.
5. If no candidate shall be entitled to a Convention majority by virtue of the district voting reported, the Convention will proceed to make or perfect a nomination. This is most conveniently done
by calling over the districts in alphabetical order
and receiving the vote of each from its delegates;
in other words, the vote is taken by districts, as it
is taken in national conventions by States.  But
still the delegates from any-district must report or
give their votes according to the home-vote in their
district; they must still obey their home instructions
and execute the twenty-second rule. But from this
obligation as to some of the candidates, they will be
at once or presently discharged by the declination
or withdrawal of candidates, or by the striking off
of names lowest on the list of candidates, under the
fourteenth rule. By one or the other, or both of
these means, delegates from districts will have some
of their votes freed, and can bestow them according
to their best judgment, thus securing a nomination
within a reasonable time. The idea is, that a can didate shall be entitled to all the Convention votes
which the people have ordered to be given to him, 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
so long as he remains before the Convention; but
when he is no longer before it, the vote pledged to
him may be cast freely for others.
6. Necessarily the delegates from a district must
cast the freed vote or votes of their district accord ing to the decision of a majority of their number,
except in one case, to wit: when all the votes of the
district become free, when each delegate may cast a
single or separate vote.  The only alternative to this
would be the allowance of fractional votes to be cast
by delegates or reported, which would require a
special or additional rule.  But mostly nominations
will be made before this question can arise.
Having now traced out the successive stages in
the proceeding of nomination, it only remains to
remark, under this head, that upon the popular-vote
plan, contained in the rules, the principle of the free
vote is substantially applied in the nomination for
each office to be filed; for the same popular vote
which would carry a delegate for a candidate, if used
for that purpose, will carry for him a Convention
vote when given to him directly. In a district of
two delegates a popular vote exceeding one-third of
the vote polled will entitle him to one Convention
vote; in a district of three delegates a popular vote
exceeding one-fourth of the vote polled will entitle
him to one Convention vote, and a like result will
follow in a district of four delegates when he obtains
over one-fifth of the total vote. In other words,
the same number of popular votes is required to
secure a Convention vote that is required for the
election of a delegate, under the fifth rule.
THE CONVENTION.-This body, when assembled,
268 
COLUMBIA CO. RULES OF NOMINATION.   269
represents truly the whole mass of voters in the county who have taken part in the primary elections,
and is well constituted for the transaction of business,
for the selection of district conferees and delegates
to State Conventions, etc., as well as for perfecting
nominations which have not been determined by
the people; and in practice it has been found that
conventional action under the new rules (and particularly since the adoption of the twenty-second
one) has been fair and satisfactory.
THE PLAN IN AMENDED FORM.
For general adoption and use the Columbia County plan
might be expressed in a series of Rules somewhat as follows:
RULES.
A.-Voters at the primary elections may cast their delegate
votes for any less number of candidates than the whole number of delegates to be chosen from their respective districts, in
the manner authorized by the fourth section of the Bloomsburg act of 4th of March, 1870, and delegate candidates highest in vote shall be declared elected.
B.-Each voter at a primary election may vote directly for
one candidate for each of the offices for which nominations are
to be declared or made in Convention, and all votes so given
shall be duly counted and returned by the election officers, to
the Cofivention.
C.-Any candidate for nomination who shall receive popular votes cast as aforesaid at a primary election in any district
shall be entitled to at least one Convention vote of such district, for his nomination, whenever his popular vote therein
shall equal or exceed the number of voters required to elect
one delegate therefrom under Rule A; and the number of
such Convention votes to ivhich he shall be entitled, when
more than one, shall be a number equal to the number of delegates who could be elected under said rule by the voters who
voted for him at said primary election. 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
D.-The Convention votes to which a candidate shall become entitled under Rule C shall remain to him so long as he
continues a candidate before the Convention, but in case no
candidate shall have a majority of Convention votes reported
from the districts, the Convention shall proceed to perfect a
nomination under the following regulations:
1. The districts shall be called over, and the delegates from
each shall report to the Convention the Convention votes of
their district; first the vote or votes pledged by the popular
home-voting to candidates who remain before the Convention,
and next any vote or votes unpledged to candidates or freed
by the withdrawal of candidates.
2. Convention votes- shall become freed by the voluntary
declination of candidates and by striking off the name of the
candidate lowest on the list at each vote after the first.
3. Unpledged and freed Convention votes from a district,
when less in number than the whole Convention vote of the
district, shall be cast by the delegation therefrom or by a
majority of them acting jointly; but when all the Convention
votes from a district shall be unpledged, or shall become freed,
each delegate therefrom may cast one vote separately, or have
his vote separately reported.
270 
APPENDIX.
2;1  
APPENDIX.
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATE IN PARLIAMIENT UPON LIMITED
VOTING IN THREE-MEMIBERED DISTRICTS.
In the House of Lords, July 30, 1867.
The reform bill being under consideration  Lord CAIRXS moved an amendment, to come in after clause
eight of the bill, as follows:.
"At any contested election for any county or borough represented
by three members no person shall vote for more than two candidates."
In supporting this amendment he explained that there would
be at least eleven constituencies to which the plan proposed by
it would be at once applicable, and he foresaw that if there
should be a further alteration in the distribution of electoral
power the great probability was that such alteration would go
in the direction of increasing those three-cornered constituencies. This consideration made him more anxious that some
proposition of this kind should be adopted. He then proceeded at length to present the reasons which had occurred to
him in favor of his amendment, and to answer and repel certain objections which might be urged against it.
A debate followed, in which the amendment was supported
by Earl Russell, Earl Spencer, Earl Stanhope, Earl Cowper,
the Earl of Carnarvon, Lord Houghton, the Earl of Shrewsbury, and Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe; and was opposed
on behalf of the administration by the Earl of Malmesbury
and the Duke of Marlborough.  Lord Denman suggested that
the proposition should be made the subject of a separate bill.
Upon a division the vote stood:
For the amendment....................................................142
Against it.................................................................. 51.
Majority............................................................ 91
18                                   273 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
Lord CAIRNS then proposed the following additional clause:
"At a contested election for the city of London no person shall vote
for more than three candidates."
The clause was agreed to.
The London Times the day following contained an elaborate
and powerful editorial in support of the proposition and in
commendation of the action taken by the House of Lords. It
declared that that House had "by a single vote covered many
errors and justified the opinions of its warmest admirers. Such
a triumph of reason and truth," it continued, "may well startle us, accustomed as we have been during this session to
the rapid growth of convictions." "The idea of modifying
our electoral machinery so as to secure in three-membered
constituencies the proportionate representation of both the
great divisions of party has made its way by its inherent justice.  The verdict of the lords has been decisive, but we do
not believe that it ia any degree outstrips the independent
opinion of the House of Commons, still less that it is at variance with the deliberate judgment of the country.  It has been
everywhere confessed that the adoption in one form or another
of the principle of cumulative voting was essential to maintain the character of our institutions, and that through it, and
through it alone, could the redistribution of electoral power
(which all prescient statesmen regard as inevitable) be reconciled with the preservation of our representative governmenllt."
"The arguments on behalf of the proposal advanced by
Lord Cairns were overwhelming. He himself treated the
question in the succinct dialectic style, of which he is a master,
and the chain of his reasoning was perfect. But he did not
stand alone. In fact every one who took part in the discussion, with the exception of the ministers who represented the
Government, was on his side. It mattered not whether, like
Lord Russell, they spoke from the front bench of the Opposition, or like Lord Stanhope and Lord Shrewsbury, they
avowed themselves faithful supporters of the administration
and resolute to do nothing which should interfere with the
success of the bill; whether, like Lord Spencer and Lord
Cowper, they expressed the views of independent Liberals;
like Lord Carnarvon, they argued from the position of a
274 
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE.
thoughtful Conservative; like Lord Stratford, they uttered the
sentiments of a man above party; or, like Lord Houghton,
confessed their sympathy with pure democracy, the result was
the same. One and all saw in the proposed representation of
minorities a suggestion consonant with the strictest principles
of justice and equity, and therefore to be depended upon as
stable when artificial securities must prove worthless."
"It is only necessary to remember that the House of Commons consults and deliberates as well as votes to see how necessary it is to the due performance of its functions that it should
contain members representing all sections of the community.
The power of decision can never be endangered by the proportionate representation of minorities, but the deliberate formation of opinion is exposed to great hazard if the moderating
influences of dissenting minorities be excluded. Parliament
itself must be improved by the addition of such men as will
be chosen by the wealthy and intelligent merchants and manufacturers who are now unrepresented in the largest towns, and
of the members who will be returned by the Liberal minorities
of counties. The effect of Lord Cairns's amendment on the
members for three-membered constituencies must be equally
beneficial, and its consequences on the constituencies themselves
will prove of transcendent importance.  The voters who are
now hopelessly outvoted and whose political energies become
feeble by disuse will start into fresh vitality. Enfranchised in
deed, and not merely in name, they will be animated by the
consciousness of power.   They  will be brought into direct
relation with the Legislature." "The Lords have shown their
independence and their foresight. At a point of the highest
importance in the history of the representative institutions of
the country they have been faithful to themselves and to their
duties. On minor questions they have shown themselves too
ready to defer to the decision of the ministers of the Crown,
but when the character of the future government of the nation
was at stake they asserted their own judgment against all
attempts to betray them to a false position."
In the House of Comimons, Augutst 8, 1867.
On the order of the day for the consideration of the amendments made by the House of Lords to the reform bill, the
275 
276    PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. DISRAELI, said that the
Cairns amendment "had been opposed on the part of her Ma jesty's Government in the House of Lords with all the authority that a Government can fairly exercise over a deliberative
assembly; but he was bound to say that it was carried by an
overwhelming majority; indeed, he must confess that it was
almost unanimously carried by the House of Lords, because,
when the minority was told, he observed that it consisted
almost entirely of the members of the administration." He
therefore, in deference to this strong expression of opinion
by the House of Lords, advised a concurrence in the amendment.
Subsequently, the same evening, when the amendment came
up for distinct consideration, Mr. BRIGHT moved to disagree
with the amendment of the Lords.  He expressed surprise at
the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in view of his
former speech when the same matter had been previously
before the House. He wished he could find a suitable word
to express his contempt for the proposition without expressing
in the slightest degree anything that might be offensive to
honorable members on his side of the House. But the member from Westminster (Mr. Mill) and his friends thought that
the plan was in some degree an approach to the principle of
the plan under which everybody should be represented and
under which such things as majorities and minorities in election contests should hereafter be unknown. [Hear, hear, from
Mr. Mill.]
Now, he thought those gentlemen who were in favor of Mr.
Hare's plan were not in the slightest degree bound to support
this plan. There was no intention in the country at present to
establish Mr. Hare's plan, and the carrying of this proposition would be an unmixed injustice to the boroughs affected by
it. The proposition was not likely to lead to the plan of Mr.
Hare, but probably to have a contrary effect by reason of the
ill will it would create in these large boroughs and in the
country. The change proposed to be made was a fundamental
change. There was no precedent for it in parliamentary history. It affected fundamentally the power of not only the
constituency but of every individual in it. The alteration
proposed had not been asked for. During six hundred years 
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE.
the principle of election by the majority had prevailed in the
selection of members of the House. He suggested that the
House at least suspend its decision in favor of the proposition
until it had been a longer time before the country and a fuller
opportunity afforded the constituencies of making up their
minds upon it. He cited the cases of Liverpool, Manchester,
Birmingham, and Leeds. They had been entitled to two
members each, making eight altogether. By the bill they
were each to have one additional member, and under the plan
proposed there would be eight on one side and four on the other
upon important public questions, and of course the four on one
side would neutralize four of those on the other. Assuming that
party ties were adhered to these four great constituencies would
be so emasculated and crippled that they would have but four
votes to bestow which would affect any of those great questions to which he had referred. The assigning of additional
members to those boroughs upon this plan would not increase
but would actually diminish their power in the House. He
could speak, he was sure, for Manchester and for Birmingham,
that the great majority of the constituency and population of
those towns would be opposed to the proposition that additional
members should be given them, if given under this crippling
and injudicious clause.
Mr. BERESFORPD HOPE declared himself unable to rise to
the heights of democratic Toryism which had characterized
the speech of the honorable member for Birmingham, [Mr.
Bright.]  Was the case of Birmingham miserable above that
of all other boroughs? Birmingham was the seat of one of
our great staples; Stoke was another. He himself was the
majority member for Stoke, and his honorable colleague was the
minority member for that borough. The Conservatives were
entitled to one member, but he was of opinion that from their
wealth, position, intellect, and numbers the Liberals of Stoke
were likewise entitled to send a member to Parliament.  Well,
one Conservative and one Liberal were returned by the
borough. Would the honorable member from Birmingham
say it was humbled in consequence of that circumstance? So
far was he from taking such a view that he had refused to be
concerned in bringing down a second Conservative member
because he believed it would be tyranny to do so. There were,
277 
278     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
say fifty-five thousand Conservatives and forty-five thousand
Liberals in Stoke.
Now, would it be fair that either of those parties should be
unrepresented? By the existing arrangement the whole popu lation of Stoke was better served in that House. So much for
the case of the two-handed boroughs; and if they took the
case of the three-handed boroughs it was a juggling with
words and a misrepresentation of fact to say that a representa tion of minorities would deprive the majorities in those bor oughs of a fair share of representation in that House. If the
minority in Birmingham should secure a member who could
equal the honorable member (Mr. Bright) in eloquence it
would give them a very great advantage indeed; but he denied
that giving the third member for that borough to the minority
would be a political injustice to the borough. If honorable
members came to the House of Commons merely to count
noses at the table there would be something in the honorable
member's argument; but in no other sense would the influence
of the two Liberal members for Birmingham be counterbalanced. The honorable member, whom he was happy to see on
the first Opposition bench-(Mr. Bright was in conversation
with Mr. Gladstone)-for no man had a better right to that
position, and he would be there hereafter, [a laugh,] had
drawn a touching picture of four towns who had at present
eight members and would have twelve, but who, if this amendment of the Lords were adopted, would only have four; but if
hlie might ask the honorable gentleman to descend from the regions of eloquence to those of plain fact, he would invite him
to examine how matters really stood on these four boroughs.
Manchester had two Liberal members; Liverpool had two
Conservative members; so that these two boroughs wrote each
other off. Leeds had one Liberal member, and one Conservative; thus its two members wrote each other off. Birmingham,
however, had the good fortune to be represented by two Liberals; so that according to the doctrine of the honorable member the whole four boroughs were represented by his colleague
and himself. [A laugh, and "hear, hear."]
Sir J. JERVOISE advocated the proposition for giving representation to the minority. He observed that if any argument
were needed in support of such a proposal it would be found 
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE.
in the fact that the Government, though in the minority, had
brought in this reform bill. [A laugh, and "hear, hear."]
Mr. SCOURFIELD had voted for the proposal before and
would support it again. He cordially agreed with what had
been said by the honorable member for Westminster a few
evenings since-that he would not desire to see oppression practiced, even by the side to which he was most attached. When
the honorable member for Birmingham said that the liberties
of England would suffer detriment if there were no election
contests, he could not help thinking that the honorable member spoke as if the life-blood of all the election agents and
lawyers in the kingdom were flowing in his veins. [Laughter.]
The fact was, that election contests were frequently unmitigated
curses, and many places had been seriously injured by their
means. ["Hear, hear."] He was not aware, for instance,
that Lancaster, Totness, Reigate, and Great Yarmouth were
any better off because they had been the scenes of contested
elections. [" Hear, hear."]
Mr. BUXTON wished to touch upon a single argument which
had not, he thought, received the attention it deserved. It
seemed to him that valuable as the other results would be of
the adoption of the proposed arrangement, no one of them
would be of greater importance than this: that it would call
forth so much political vigor and life in the constituencies to
which it was applied. It was curious that those who had not
given this subject much consideration often objected to this
proposal, because they said that by extinguishing contests this
arrangement would destroy political vitality. He was confi dent that its effect would be exactly the reverse; that it would
be of singular use in preventing political stagnation. That
would be clear if, instead of dealing with the question in the
abstract, they took a concrete example. Take, for example,
the town of Birmingham, in which it was proposed to adopt
this plan.  Could there be a doubt that if no such arrange ment were made Birmingham would henceforth return three
gentlemen of the same political hue?
The Liberal committee would select three candidates, and
the majority of householders in the borough would be certain
to support them. If there were ever a contest it would be a
contest between the Liberals bidding against each other; but
279 
280     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
in all human probability there would be no contest at all; and
those electors, perhaps a very large and important body of
men, but who might not go so far in their political views as the
mass of small householders, would be politically extinct.
They would feel it totally hopeless to attempt to carry a candi date, and they would resign themselves with more or less bitter ness to political death. They would feel that they were alto gether excluded from any influence whatever over the destinies
of their country; not merely that they could not hope to rule,
but that they could not even be represented in the council of
the nation. They would accordingly sink into hopeless apathy,
while the majority having everything their own way, not en joying the advantage of being opposed and forced to struggle
and strive, would themselves also be likely to grow at once
apathetic and arrogant. He was not devising this state of
things out of his own imagination; they knew that exactly
this had happened in many instances both across the water and
in certain constituencies at home, where one party, be it Conservative or be it Liberal, had held irresistible sway. It would
be invidious to do so; otherwise he could easily remind the
House of many boroughs and many counties in which utter
apathy and stagnation had actually resulted from the feeling
of the minority that any-exertion of theirs must be vain.
But now suppose, on the other hand, that instead of all the
three seats being at the disposal of one committee the arrangement now proposed were adopted; immediately every elector
in the constituency would be stirred into life. Those who belonged to the minority instead of giving up the whole affair as
a bad job, shrugging their shoulders, and feeling that although
they were Englishmen they were as destitute of political influence as if they were so many Indians, would immediately begin
to organize themselves as a party to form a committee to look
out for a candidate and combine to carry him. He admitted
that very possibly no contest would ensue; but there would be
as much demand for strenuous exertions and for individual
self-sacrifice on the part of the minority as if a contest were
certain. Political deadness would be exchanged for political
animation. But to the majority this change would bring no
less cause of excitement and vigor. Instead of gleefully accepting their three candidates and carrying them without an 
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE.
effort the party would be driven to keep its machinery in high
order, to choose the best candidates that could be found, and,
in short, to strain every nerve to hold their own.  And yet,
though each party would thus be compelled to be on the alert
and to maintain its vigor, actual contests would probably be
rare. The beauty of this arrangement would be that it would
give all the political activity that contests are supposed to engender, but without that grievous moral injury that contests
almost inevitably inflict. Now, it has been shown that these
eleven constituencies affected by this proposition would contain
2,300,000 persons. If, then, the minority should not be able
to carry its candidate no harm could ensue; but if they carried
them all they must represent a body of some 600,000 or 700,000
persons. It could only be for the advantage not only of the
minority itself but of the majority as well, and of Parliament,
and of the nation, that such a body of men, comprising a large
proportion of the wealth and intelligence of our largest cities,
should enjoy some share of influence over the destinies of their
country.
Sir C. RUSSELL, as a representative of one of the three-cornered constituencies, opposed the Lords' amendment, but his
remarks were not important nor prolonged.
Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN, in-supporting the amendment,
differed from many to whose judgment he was accustomed to
defer.  But he was about to give his vote with the sanction of
high authority, for the proposition had previously received the
support of a large minority of that House taken in about equal
proportions from both political parties, and had now received
the support of a large majority of the other House, embracing
names identified with the growth of liberal principles in the
country. The honorable member from Birmingham (Mr.
Bright) had said that Birmingham ought to have a larger representation than Arundel; but if a third member were given to
Birmingham on the plan proposed he would pair against one
of the majority members, and the representation would be reduced virtually to a level with that of Arundel, which had one
member. The fallacy of that argument was this: what the
honorable gentleman and his colleague represented was not
really the whole community of Birmingham, but some 6000 or
8000 electors as opposed to some 4000 or 5000 who differed
281 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
from him and were totally unrepresented. But to go one step
further. It was true that upon questions in which party inter  ests alone were involved, under the proposed system the three
members froi Birmingham would go into the lobby, two on
one side and ohe? on- the other.  Yet with regard to all ques tions affecting loctalsts as well as those great commercial
and manufacturing questions on which Birmingham was pecu liarly entitled to be heard, the three members would be found
voting together and throwing their whole weight into the scale
in the interest of that great constituency.
The honorable member said Birmingham would not have its
full weight in the representative body. Did he mean to say
that the wealth, the importance of a constituency was derived
only from the majority? Had the conservative minority in
London nothing to do with the weight and importance of the
constituency? It was plain that they ought to give representa tion to all the elements that constituted the importance of a
constituency.
He insisted that two great advantages would be secured by
adopting the proposed system of representation. In the first
place, in times of popular excitement it would insure the return
to Parliament of eminent men who would otherwise be excluded.
Did the honorable member from Birmingham recollect the result of the China vote and his exclusion from Parliament?
[Hear.] Similar cases might occur in time to come, and honest
and able men might be excluded from Parliament when their
services would be most necessary for the welfare of the country,
and when thousands of their fellow-countrymen would be willing to combine to secure their return.
The second great advantage from the adoption of this system
was the inducement it would offer to large numbers of persons
to take part in the political affairs of the country, who might
otherwise be indisposed to give their votes.  This was neither a
party nor a class question, because there were large Liberal
minorities in counties, as there were farge Conservative minorities in towns, which were now unrepresented, and had no inducement to vote. He desired to see the greatest amount of
intelligence and the largest number of persons possible engaged
in taking part in our political affairs. Such participation was
one of the most essential elements of democracy-that every
282
-      1. 
PARLIAMIENTARY DEBATE.
man in the community should feel himself to be a component
part of the State-should assist in framing the laws which he
had to obey, and should throw his whole individual strength
and vigor into the constitution. Now, if this principle of representation was a right one, why should they shrink from adopting it because it was said that, for the last six hundred years,
the precedents had been the other way?  [Hear, hear.]  England was the foremost in the van of civilization, and why should
she not, in reforming her whole representative institutions, introduce a plan of this sort, if it were shown to be-a good
one, and thus render her constitution a model for the world?
[Hear.]  But the honorable member from Birmingham had
asked why the proposal, if adopted, was to be limited to a
few large boroughs, and not be applied to every constituency
throughout the country? He would reply, that if it were
shown to be good, why should they reject it because its application was limited? If it turned out that it worked well,
nothing could be easier than to extend its operation hereafter.
The vote which he was about to give he believed to be a wise
and patriotic one, and he knew it to be an honest one, as it was
founded upon sincere convictions.
Mr. NEWDEGATE supported the amendment. He believed
that if it were adopted it would be possible hereafter further to
redistribute the representation of the country so as to secure
justice both in boroughs and counties. He should vote for it
because he hoped the result of it would be to give the people,
as they advanced in intelligence, fuller opportunities than had
been hitherto accorded them of making their opinions known
in that House.
Mr. GOSCIIEN spoke against the amendment, insisting that
it had not been duly considered; that it was an innovation
and not conservative in character.   The remainder of his
remarks was composed principally of criticisms upon the
various positions occupied by members who supported the
proposition.
Mr. HUBBARD said the bill was full of innovations, that the
objection that this proposition was an innovation applied to
the whole bill. Was not household suffrage itself an innovation?
Mr. GLADSTONE spoke at length and against the amendment.
283
. I 
284     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
A prominent point in his speech was that if the proposition
were agreed to it would have to be extended hereafter to the
constituencics generally; and he distinctly indicated that such
extension would be made. Hie insisted upon further time for
considering so important a proposition, and repeated the argu ment that the addition of one member to Birmingham and
each of the other boroughs mentioned in the bill would not be
advantageous to them upon the new plan of voting; for the
power of majorities therein, instead of being in point of fact
increased, would be diminished. His most important observa tion, however, should be given in his exact language. It was
as follows:
"If adopted at all, this proposition must be adopted with
perhaps the knowledge, and at least with the certainty, that
whether we admit it ourselves or not it must unfold and expand
itself over the whole country and completely reconstruct the
system of distribution of seats." [Hear, hear.]
Mr. LowE concluded the debate with an animated and able
speech in favor of the amendment. He remarked that his
right honorable friend (Mr. Gladstone) had said that he considered the constituency and the majority of the constituency
the same thing; in those few words summing up the whole
fallacy which had pervaded the debate. The honorable member from Birmingham's speech rested on the groundless assumption that when anything was true of the majority of Birn'ingham it was true of the whole of Birmingham.  Taking
their own arguments, he wondered that gentlemen who refused
to give representation to minorities were willing to even admit
their existence.  He should like to know on what principle
they acted in forcing on the Government a third member in
the boroughs except as an homage to numbers. [Cheers.] It
was said that in introducing personal representation you were
doing away with local representation. This is again the same
fallacy. Gentlemen have accustomed themselves so much to
overlook the existence of minorities that they will not allow
them to live even in the places where they actually reside.
[Laughter.] He could not in the least understand what there
was in a minority that should make it less local because it was
less numerous.
Mr. LOWE concluded as follows: There is a sort of worship 
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE.
of the majority which, after all, is a mere political superstition.
True representation, the idea of true representation, is to leave
no portion of the constituencies unrepresented. [Hear.] We
have a specimen of the old and rugged way of doing things in
the case of juries. We require them to be unanimous, and as
that is not in the nature of human things, we shut them up in
"durance vile" until they come to an agreement.  That system
not having been found practicable under all circumstances,
mankind hit upon the plan of representation by majorities as a
better mode of settling their differences.   Well, there is no
absolute reason for stopping there. The art of representation,
like other arts, is progressive; and if means can be found for
increasing the number of members, and then adapting your
system to that increase by the cumulative vote, so as not to
disfranchise minorities and to give some representation to the
whole of the constituency, so far fromnt regarding that as an innovation upon the constitution, I think we ought to hail it as
an advance in the science of government.   [Cheers.]
The great difference between ancient and modern societies
lies in the invention of the principle of representation. It was
from the want of that power of representation that the Roman
empire was reduced to place itself under the tyranny of a
Cesar.  It is only by the existence of that power that large
free governments have become possible. This is just an in stance of the changes which may be produced by the use of the
most simple expedients. Instead of regarding this principle
with hatred and jealousy, I think we shall act more wisely if
we investigate and accept it as a just and necessary improve ment of that system of representative government which has
obtained among us, upon which, il a great measure, the per petuity and glory of our country depend.
The House then divided, when there appeared:
Ayes........................................................................ 204
Noes........................................................................ 253
Majority................................................................ 49
So the motion to disagree to the Lords' amendment was lost,
and the clause stood a part of the bill. The announcement
of the numbers was received with cheers.
The next amendment, that at a contested election for the city
285 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
of London no person should vote for more than three candidates, was then, after a brief debate, agreed to by a majority
of sixty-four.
When the reform bill was first considered by the House of
Commons the cumulative vote was proposed by way of amendment, but rejected. The motion for it was made by Mr. LOWE
on the 4th of July, in the following words:
"That at any contested election for a county or borough represented
by more than two members, and having more than one seat vacant, every
voter shall be entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of
vacant seats, and may give all such votes to one candidate or may distribute them among the candidates as hle thinks fit."
This amendment was debated on the day of its introduction
and again on the next day, and received the support of the
mover and of Mr. Liddell, Mr. Thomas Hughes, Mr. Gorst,
Mr. Morrison, Mr. Beach, Mr. Fawcett, Mr. Newdegate, Vis count Cranborne, Mr. J. Stuart Mill, and Mr. Buxton, while
it was opposed by Mr. Shaw Lefevre, Sir Robert Collier, Mr.
Adderley, Mr. Bright, Mr. Henley, and the Chancellor of the
Exchequer.
It was lost by a vote of, yeas 173, nays 314. The large
number of votes it received upon its first consideration was
evidence of its strength whenever it should be subjected to
examination and debate, and inspirited its friends to further
exertion. In fact, it appeared evident that the opposition of
the administration, through the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
alone prevented its adoption at that time, and such explanation
of the result was distinctly stated by the Times of August 9
in editorial comments upon the adoption of the Cairns' amendment.  It is to be remembered constantly in following the
debates in the House of Commons that the prominent men
who spoke against the cumulative vote and the Cairns' amendment represented districts which were to elect three members
under the provisions of the bill.  Consequently they were
deeply interested as political men in securing in their home
districts the election of the third member by the majority.
Buckinghamshire, represented by Mr. Disraeli, Birmingham,
represented by Mr. Bright, and other districts that contributed
speakers to the debate in opposition to the proposed reform,
286 
A MINORITY VETO PROPOSED.
are all three-member districts, in which the local political
majority could not, under the new plan, elect the third member.
It remains to be observed in this review of the proceedings
in Parliament that the Cairns' amendment secures substantially
the same result as the cumulative vote would in the districts,
the counties, and boroughs, to which it is applied. In the
triangular districts it will ordinarily secure the third member
to the minority, and in London (which elects four members)
the fourth member. But it is very evident that it is a proposition which is incapable of extended application, and therefore
inferior to the plan of the cumulative vote. The latter will
adapt itself conveniently and effectually to all districts electing more than one member, while the Cairns' amendment can
hardly be extended beyond the triangular districts to which it
has a convenient application.
MINORITY REPRESENTATION.*
It must be admitted that Government is, with us, in an unsatisfactory condition. Many evils exist, notwithstanding popilar control and the efforts of just men in public life to prevent
or repress abuses. It is, therefore, timely and proper to inquire wherein our plan of Government is defective, and to
adopt some amendment of it, which will improve its practical
action.
WAVith us, the people are to govern, instead of one man or a
few. They are to govern themselves, constituting ours, a system of self-government. But this is not to be taken absolutely
and without qualification. Sovereignty resides with the State
electors, who constitute but one-fifth of the population. But
the powers of sovereignty, as exhibited in the laws, extend over
the whole.
The fact is thus, because it has been so agreed upon and
settled. For political powers are conventional, being founded
in compact or assent. Ours is a Government of the most
* Printed for private circulation, February, 1862. "Republican" print,
Bloomsburg, Pa.
287 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
worthy-of those best qualified, most fit, most capable.  Those
members of the social body who are incapable, or least capa  ble, are excluded from political power,-as, minors, females,
paupers, and unnaturalized foreigners.
In the electors, then-a select body or part of the popula  tion-resides the power to rule or govern, and this power is ex  ercised through agents, who  represent them.  Government,
then, in its restricted sense of an organism for legislation and
administration, is an Agency, and possesses only such powers
as are imparted to it by the electors. And those powers are
held inI trust, and subject at all times to change or revocation.
In what manner the electors shall be represented-the rules
by which such representation shall be secured and regulated and what shall be the laws of representative action, are ques tions for agreement among those who constitute the sovereignty,
and their solution is shown by the Constitution, the funda meniital law established by the electors. A practical difficulty
arises in representing a numerous body of electors, from the
diversity of interests and opinions which will always prevail
amongst them. Identity of interest and unanimity of opinion
will scarcely ever be found to exist. To secure action, therefore, in an electoral body so constituted, or in a numerous body
representing them in the Government, it is necessary to adopt
the doctrine that a part only may act for the whole. And
hlence.arise practical rules by which the power of the whole
electoral or representative body is wielded by three-fourths,
two-thirds, a majority, or even a smaller number. A plurality
rule is ordinarily provided for popular elections, and a majority
rule for legislative action, except in reviewing a measure vetoed
by the Executive, when a two-thirds rule is substituted.  And
the judicial department decide by the majority rule the cases
that fall within its jurisdiction.
But these several arrangements, or rules, are founded upon
considerations of convenience and expediency, and involve no
fundamental principle of right. It is perfectly competent for
the sovereign power to substitute one rule for another, in any
of the cases just mentioned, or to introduce one altogether
new. The great principle to be regarded is that of the government of the people by themselves, and the practical rules by
which it is attempted to apply this principle, should be adapted
288 
A MINORITY VETO PROPOSED.
to their object, and should be changed whenever shown to be
insufficient or injurious, or should be limited or supplemented
by other constitutional provisions.
That arrangement would be most perfect in theory, which
would secure to every member of the political body a voice in
the government. But this result, or any near approach to it,
cannot be attained by a majority'or plurality rule for popular
elections. And a rule requiring unanimity, or a three-fourths
or two-thirds vote, at such elections, would be intolerably
inconvenient if not wholly impracticable.
If, then, no practicable rule among all those named, will secure complete popular representation, or any near approach to
it; and if, on the other hand, the virtual disfranchisement of a
large part of the electors be objectionable and injurious, (as it
certainly is,) it is plain that something further must be proposed.
And such further proposition for the more perfect representation of the people, must be based upon some division of the
electoral body into parts, and must deal with those parts separately and distinctly. Now, the most marked, extensive and
permanent division of men in a Republic, is into political
parties, usually two in number, and whenever greater in number tending to consolidate into two.- For all practical purposes
we may assume that there will be, always, a division of electors
into a major and a minor party-a greater and a less-each
representing opinions and interests different and distinct fromi
those represented by the other, and sometimes, though not
always, in conflict with them. But, it is certain (as already
shown,) that a majority or plurality rule for popular elections,
especially under a system of nominations by party conventions,
will cause the disfranchisement of the minority party, and subject it to the will and pleasure of the greater. Any rule, or
device, therefore, which will secure to the minority the power
of defending itself against the aggression of the majority, will
secure one of the main objects of the constitution, to wit: the
protection of individual rights, and of all the leading interests
of society, against government abuses. Without such power
of self-defence, lodged somewhere in the system, a majority
rule will change the Government into a despotism of numbers,
and prepare the way for anarchy or revolution. For the
19
289 
290     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
despotism of many is just as intolerable to the individuals and
interests oppressed, as that of one or a few, and just as certainly
tends to produce resistance and convulsion.
To secure the community against the despotism of a ma jority, and against government abuses mainly consequent
thereon, our Constitution provides many peculiar arrangements
of power, usually described as "checks and balances," as well
as prohibitions against the exercise of particular powers. Of
all the checks so provided, that of the Veto is most important
and useful, and it deserves a particular examination.
It is secured in the Legislative branch of the Government
by dividing that branch into two Houses, and requiring the
assent of both to the enactment of laws. Thus each possesses
the power to veto any measure originating with the other.
An Executive Veto is also provided, extending to all acts
of the Legislative branch in the nature of laws. But this veto
is not absolute, as it may be overruled by a two-thirds vote of
both Legislative Houses.
There is also a Judicial Veto, less extensive but more absolute than that of the Executive. It is confined to unconstitutional acts of the Legislature, but as to such it has complete
effect in any given case, and cannot be overruled.
But these checks, although useful and proper, are manifestly
insufficient to secure wise and just government. In point of
fact, they do not secure it, and in consequence wide-spread dissatisfaction exists in the community. The Legislative Houses
will not check each other upon partisan measures when they
agree politically, nor upon many others when strong corrupting
influences assail both. Nor will the Executive Veto be applied when the Legislative majority and the Governor are of
the same party-the very case where a check is most needed.
And we have seen that the Judicial Veto is of limited application. The judges cannot annul an act although shown to be
unijust, inexpedient, and profligate, unless it be also unconstitutional.
An additional check is therefore necessary and ought to be
provided at once, by an amendment of the Constitution. Let
the minority be represented directly, in the Government, and
be armed with a power of self-defence against majority aggression. Let ampler representation of the people correct the evils 
A MINORITY VETO PROPOSED.
in government, exhibited by experience-by time and trialand furnish additional evidence of the wisdom of our fundamental principle of government by the people.
A proposition with these objects, may be stated in the following form:
The candidate second highest in vote at uttbernatorial elections,
to become President of the Senate, and possess the power of vetoing
bills.
By this provision the minority, for the time being, would be
represented by its chosen chief for purposes of defence against
a hostile interest, and the existing vetoes of the Constitution
would be supplemented by one which will apply, in proper
cases, where they will not. And thus the assent of both political parties will be given to new laws, and neither one can impose upon the other a measure grossly obnoxious or injurious.
From which will result greater contentment among the people,
an abatement of party violence, and a great decrease of injustice and corruption in the Government itself.
Substantially, the proposition is, that the minority shall have
power to protect itself. Through its representative, the President of the Senate, it may require a two-thirds legislative vote
for the enactment of laws. It is not a power to initiate lawsto establish an affirmative policy-to wield patronage-to interfere with executive or judicial duties; but to object to new
projects-to defeat, or delay legislation, except against a decided public opinion represented by a two-thirds vote. And, as
a Constitutional check, it operates where the judicial veto cannot reach, and when the executive veto will not be used.
As a curb upon legislation, this Protective, or Minority
Veto, (as it may be called,) would be efficient, appropriate, and
salutary, in a high degree; as will appear from considering the
following results to be attained by it:
1. (As already stated,) an increased amount of popular assent to the enactment of laws, thus carrying more fully into
effect our fundamental principle of government by the people.
Laws will not go upon the statute book branded by party hostility; they will be more heartily accepted by the community,
and be better obeyed and enforced.
2. Conciliation of the minority, inducing an increase of attaclment to the Government and a decrease of hostility to its
291 
292     PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
administration. Participating in the powers of the Govern ment, and thereby secured against aggression, the minority
would be less passionate and violent, and the peril of insurrec tion or revolution would be removed.
3. Increased stability of the laws, and preservation of a consistent policy in their enactment.
4. But the principal utility of the Protective Veto, would be
found in its prevention of bad laws. Most of these may be
classed as corrupt, partisan, or unconstitutional; as, the recharter of the United States Bank, in 1838; the Main Line
Sale Bill, of 1857; the bill transferring the State Canals to the
Sunbury and Erie Railroad Company, in 1858, and its supplements; and the Tonnage Tax repeal, of 1861. To which may
be added an extensive list of corporation acts, and local laws.
Nor are we to omit from mention those offensive and flagrant
examples of injustice, called Apportionment laws, which would,
standing alone, demand the establishment of a Minority veto.
The septennial Apportionments, in 1850 and 1857, of Senators
and Representatives throughout the State, were in many of
their provisions unjust, and in some unconstitutional. And
the most recent Apportionment-that of 1861, for Members of
Congress-was an extreme outrage. By a just bill, proportioned to the relative strength of parties as shown by the Gubernatorial election of 1860, twelve members of Congress would
have been assigned to one party, and eleven to the other. By
the bill actually passed, the numbers stand nineteen to four,
the minority being disfranchised to the extent of seven members for ten years, and the representation of the people of
Pennsylvania, in Congress, being to that extent perverted.
Were the Protective Veto a provision of the Constitution, it
would prevent the passage of laws like those just mentioned,
and thus, to a great extent, preserve the purity of the Government and the integrity of the Constitution, as well as the rights
and interests of the minority. Its benefits would not be confined to the minority. The whole body of the people would
enjoy the advantages of improved action in the Government,
which it would produce.
By our State Constitution of 1776, a Council of Censors was
established, whose duty it was to review the action of the
several departments of Government, and to declare to the peo 
A MINORITY VETO PROPOSED.
pie all departures from the Constitution by either. It was
intended that this body should hold the Government, in all its
branches, responsible to public opinion; that thereby the
system of republican rule then established should be preserved
from abuse, and, especially, that all minority and individual
rights under the Constitution, should be preserved from invasion. But that body had no power to enforce its decisions,
and from this cause, and from its breaking into factions on account of the number of its members, it fell into disrepute, and
was not continued in existence by the Constitution of 1790.
But, the objects in view in constituting the Council of Censors, were laudable and proper, and can be attained, to a great
extent, by the Protective Veto now proposed. Thereby an
officer, of the first rank of ability, would be placed in a suitable
position to check and limit the action of the Legislature; to
defend the principles of the fundamental law against invasion;
to baffle the agents of corruption in their attempts to prostitute
the Government to their purposes; and to protect those interests of society which would, otherwise, be sacrificed or injured
by partisan injustice. Whenever objectionable measures were
proposed by the dominant party, it would be the interest and
desire of the minority represented by the President of the
Senate, to have them sent to the people for examination and
discussion, which could be effected by this veto, operating as it
would in the nature of an appeal to them from the legislative
majority; while, at the same time, there would be no motive
for interposing this power of appeal upon measures of real
merit, the discussion of which, before the people, would
strengthen, instead of weakening the party proposing them.
And if a proper measure were vetoed, its discussion would secure a two-thirds vote for it in the Legislature, or an abandonment of objection to it by the President of the Senate. It
would only be delayed, and it would, eventually, go into effect
with an increased weight of public sentiment in its favor.
That "the world is governed too much," and that "that
government is best which governs least," are maxims of common acceptation. And with us, in view of our experience,
there is good cause for holding, that laws are supplied to the
community beyond its wants and to its injury; that the influences in favor of legislation are unduly strong in the absence
293 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
of effective checks; and that constitutional limitations and
declarations of rights, will not be duly observed in the absence
of power distinctly and suitably provided for their enforcement.
A majority will be apt to construe the principles and provis ions of a constitution according to their interests and passions,
and there must be, therefore, powerful checks upon them, to
prevent over-.action, or wrong action of the government they
control.
Our Election Boards in Pennsylvania represent both politi cal parties, and exemplify some of the advantages of minority
representation. A single Inspector is voted for by each elector,
but the two candidates highest in vote are chosen; thus securing in all ordinary cases the representation of both parties
in the board. This arrangement has proved most useful in
practice, and is justly esteemed to be a valuable guard against
partisan injustice, as well as fraud. It has, no doubt, contributed greatly to preserve our popular elections from degeneracy.
By the division of the State into districts for the election of
Senators and Representatives, minority representation is obtained, to some extent, in the Legislature.  F'or the majority
party in the State will not have a majority in all the districts
into which it is divided; and a plurality rule for elections somewhat disturbs the regularity of results. Upon the whole, however, it is nearly certain that the party in a majority in the State
will control the Legislature and act its pleasure in the enactment of laws. And it will so district the State by Apportionment
laws that the opposing party will be deprived of its due share
of representation. And it is certain that in most cases of conflict between parties in the Legislature, the representation of
the minority, resulting from district apportionment, is quite
illusory; except where the two Houses happen to differ politically, the power of the majority will be as complete as its
exercise will be unscrupulous.
Representation of the minority by a negative power or veto,
then, stands vindicated by all the considerations detailed in
the present paper. And it does not depart from principles
already in the Constitution, but only gives to them a new and
necessary application. The principle of the veto, and the
principle  of minority  representation, we  already possess.
294 
A MINORITY VETO PROPOSED.
What is proposed is that these be combined in a new provision, simple in character, but effective in action, which shall
stand as a bulwark of defence against great and notorious
evils. Political parties, considered as embodiments of all the
main interests and opinions of society, are to be regarded in
the distribution of power, and one of them be made to check
another. And as such parties are inevitable, and as they
thoroughly and permanently divide the mass of the people,
what objection can there be to a recognition of their existence
in the Constitution? In fact, is it not necessary that these,
the most powerful forces which act upon the government, shall
be dealt with and regulated, or at least put under a measure
of control, by the fundamental law? If this be not done, we
hazard nothing in saying that they will pervert the action of
the government, and eventually destroy it. There being no
actual balance of political powers, but on the contrary unchecked party domination, violence, injustice, and corruption
will come in as a flood, until discord and passion reign supreme, and a divided and exasperated people be prepared to
abandon free government and accept the rule of a master.
NOTE.-The election of a Lieutenant Governor would complete the
proposition discussed in this paper.  But being a subordinate question
it is omitted.
[EDITOR'S NOTE.-Thie date of the foregoing Essay shows the early
inclination of the author's mind in matters of electoral reforin.  The
proposition of a minority veto, contained in it, is quite novel, but mav
deserve consideration and development hereafter. It is believed that the
writer intended it to be accompanied by provisions looking to the
choice of alternates for both the Governor and President of the Senate,
so that their offices would always be fitly filled and controlled by the
proper political interest.]
0
295 
0 
INDEX.
BERWICK BOROUGH, act for free vote in, 237.
Bloomsburg, town of, act to organize, 233; its practical operation, 153,
163, 180, 246, 247.
Bloom Poor District, election of Directors for, 154, 237, 253.
Borough Supplement, act, 229; speech on, in Senate of Pennsylvania, 157.
Boroughs in Pennsylvania, act for free vote in elections of Councilmen
for, 229; acts for same in boroughs of Northumberland Counity, 235;
in Berwick, 237; Chambersburg, 242; Hulmeville, 241; Milton, 236;
Northumberland, (election in,) 251; Shamokin, 241; Snydertown,
240; Sunbury, 238; Uniontown, 239.
CAIRNS, LORD, amendment to reform bill, 41, 273; his remarks thereon,
117, 274.
Chambersburg borough, act for election of Councilmen in, by free vote, 242.
Columbia County rules of nomination, 258.
Committee of Senate, Report on representative reform, 65.
Convention, act of Pennsylvania, 1872, manner of electing members, 230;
of New York in 1867, ibid., 40, 91, 155.
Councilmen in Pennsylvania boroughs, manner of electing, general act,
229. For special acts see Boroughs.
County Commissioners and Auditors, bill for election of, 151, 162.
Corruption in English boroughs, 22, 23.
Crawford County plan of nomination for office condemned, 256,257.
Cummings, Alexander, presides at Philadelphia meeting, 64, n.
Cumulative Vote. See Free Vote.
DIRECTORS or Managers of incorporated companies, choice of, by free
vote, 224, 226.
Dutcher, Salem, citation from, xi.
ELECTORAL COLLEGES, their defects and remedies for, 209. See Presi    dential Electors.
FRACTIONAL VOTES, their utility and convenience, 145; manner of count   ing, 148, 223. 224, 255.
297 
INDEX.
Free Vote, the, described, 8, 44, 70, 139, 163; -illustrations of its opera    tion, 10, 45, 54, 58, 97, 172, 184, 245; its indirect effect on single elec    tions, 139; its superiority over other plans, 70, 74, 155; its conlveni    ence, 73; conformity to republican principles, 75; its justice, 77;
will check corruption, 20, 50, 79; will guarantee peace, 18, 19, 83;
and improve representative bodies, 16, 86.
Its use in stockholders' elections for choice of directors or managers of
corporations, 144, 224, 226; and in nominations for office, 144, 256.
Its application to the election of representatives in Illinois, 155, 165,
220; to Senators in West Virginia, 227; and to municipal elections
in Pennsylvania, to wit: to Councilmen in boroughs, 229; to same
in Northumberland County, 235; to town of Bloomsburg, 153, 163,
180, 233, 246, 247; to borough of Berwick, 237; Chlambersburg, 242;
Hulmeville, 241; Milton, 236; Northumberland, 251; Riverside,
239; Shamokin, 241; Snydertown, 240; Sunbury, 236; and Union   town, 239; to Bloom Poor district, 154, 237, 253; bills for applica   tion of, to election of representatives in Congress, 1, 65, 113.
GERPRYMANDERING, fi-ee vote remedy for, 17, 47.
Gray, Earl, on cumulative vote, 28, 121.
HIARE, THOMAS, citation from, xi.
HIulmineville borough, act for free vote in, 241.
ILLINOIS, constitutional amendments, 155, 219.
Incorporated Companies, choice of directors or managers for, in Illinois,
224; in West Virginia, 226.
Inspectors of election, manner of choosing in Pennsylvania, 36, 90, 157;
act regulating choice of, 228.
JORDAN, FRANCIS, Secretary of Commonwealth, letter to, 182.
Judges, choice of, by limited vote in Chicago, 225.
Jury commissioners, manner of electing, in Pennsylvania, 38, 91, 160;
act regulating election of, 229.
LIMITED VOTE, the, named, 36; defined, 69; for choice of election in    spectors, 36, 90, 157, 228; jury commissioners, 38, 91, 160, 229; dele    gates-at-large to New York Convention, 40, 91, 155; to Pennsylvania
Convention, 230; judges of appeals in New York, 155; judges in
Chicago, 225; election committee of Pennsylvania Senate, 243;
school directors in Philadelphia, 37, 238; and assessors, 37; school
directors in certain townships of Bradford and Susquehanna Coun    ties, Pennsylvania, 238; Cairns' amendment for, 41, 93; remarks
on, 117, 120; debated in House of Commons, 275; Mill's opinion of,
125; Mr. Buckalew's, 74, 80, 155.
0
298 
INDEX.
Lowe, Hon. Robert, amendment to reform bill, 92, 115; remarks on
Cairns' amendment, 284.
MEDILL, JOSEPIH, complimentary references to, 226.
Mill, John Stuart, on limited and cumulative voting, 25, 124; on propor    tional representation, 126.
Milton borough act for election of councilmen by free vote, 236.
Minority Representation, an essay, app., 287.
Morton, O. P., Senator, member committee on representative reform, 113;
reports joint resolution proposing an amendment to Constitution,
187; motion to amend House joint resolution, 187, 205,?.
NEW YORK, choice of members-at-large to constitutional convention, 40,
91, 155; constitutional amendment for election of judges of court of
appeals, 155.
Nominations to Office, 256; Columbia county rules for, 258.
Northumberland borough, election in, for councilmen, 251.
Northumberland County, act for free vote in elections of Councilmen of
boroughs in, 235.
OBJECTIONS to free vote noticed: 1. That it would delocalize representa    tion, 59, 112; 2. That it would increase effect of corrupt influence,
172; 3. That it fails in the filling of vacancies, 149; 4. That it is op    posed to the principle that the majority shall rule, 6, 45, 49, 127,
167, 182.
PARLIAMENTARY  BOROUGHS, corruption in, 22, 23.
Parliamentary debate on limited voting, app., 273, 275.
Parliamentary elections, certain returns of, examined, 94, 98.
Pennsylvania statutes for reformed voting, 228; local elections in, 245;
representation of Congressional districts, 11.
Philadelphia speech, 31; choice of school directors in Philadelphia, 37,
238; and assessors, 37.
Poor directors, act for choice of, in Bloom poor district, 237; election of,
253.
Popular vote for President at former elections, 213; for nominations to
office, 256.
President, table of popular and electoral votes for, at former elections, 213.
Presidential electors, choice of, 103, 186, 206, 209; statistics of elections
of, 189, 206, 213, 215; Senate report on, 103; speech on, 206; Col.
Wheeler's essay on, 209; proposed constitutional amendment as to
manner of choosing, 104, 187, 205.
REPRESENTATIVES in Congress, speech on manner of electing, 1; bills
for election of, by free vote, 1, 114; manner of electing representa    tives in Illinois, 220; Utah amendment, 227.
299 
INDEX.
Riverside borough, act for free vote in, 239.
Russell, Earl, proposition for limited vote, 119; remarks on, 120.
SCHOOL DIRECTORS, bill for choice of, 163; acts for, 238, 242.  See
Boroughs.
Senate speech, 1; Senate report on representative reform, 65.
Shamokin borough, act for free vote in, 241.
Snydertown borough, act for free vote in, 240.
Social science address, 138.
Successive majorities, representation of, 182.
Sunbury borough, act for free vote in, 236; election in, 250.
UNIONTOWN BOROUGH, act for free vote in, 239.
Utah, constitutional amendment for choice of representatives, 227.
WADE, BENJ. F., Senator, reports bill for free vote in elections of Rep.
resentatives in Congress, 113.
West Virginia, constitutional amendments, 226.
Wheeler, Col. John H., essay on choice of Presidential Electors, 209.
300
.