I 7l a I!ifj i mLT,.Rr.........I.. __________ 7 2.S 7-L^' THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA VOLUME I Other Volumes by Colonel Sargent NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S 'FIRST CAMPAIGN. WITH COMMENTS. Fourth edition. Crown 8vo, with Maps. $I.5o. THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO. WITH COMMENTS. -Third edition. Crown 8vo, with Maps. $i.5o. A. C. McCLURG & CO., PUBLISHERS CHICAGO THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA BY Jo HERBERT H. SARGENT CAPTAIN SECOND CAVALRY, UNITED STATES ARMY; COLONEL FIFTH UNITED STATES VOLUNTEER INFANTRY DURING SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR; LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TWENTY-NINTH UNITED STATES VOLUNTEER INFANTRY DURING OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES; MEMBER OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS AUTHOR OF " NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN AND " THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO" WITH MAPS IN THREE VOLUME VOL. I CHICAGO A. C. McCLURG & CO. 1907 COPYRIGHT BY HERBERT H. SARGENT 190o7 Published September 7, 1907. Entered at Stationers' Hall, London, England THU UNIVERSITY PFRSS, CAMBRIDGE U. S. A. TO ELIHU ROOT THIS WORK IS DEDICATED IN ADMIRATION OF WHAT HE DID FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR LITTLE ARMY WHEN HE WAS SECRETARY OF WAR L -,O3 I THE recent Spanish-American War, while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of its own, nevertheless, in its broad analogies, falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing thatunity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginning unto this day. It has, moreover, the special value of illustrating the reciprocal needs and offices of the army and navy, than which no lesson is more valuable to a nation situated as ours is. - MAHAN. AFTER a war one ought to write not only the history of what has taken place, but also the history of what was intended.VON DER GOLTZ. FooLS say that you can only gain experience at your own expense, but I have always contrived to gain my experience at the expense of others. -BISMARCK. WAR is a business of positions. - NAPOLEON. DI - PREFACE THOUGH the War and State departments have kindly aided me in obtaining from the Spanish government valuable data (See Appendix A.) as to the number of the Spanish troops in Cuba and at Santiago during the campaign, this history is in no sense an official utterance of the United States government. It is simply an honest expression of my personal views. The seventh clause of the "Terms of the Military Convention of the Capitulation at Santiago de Cuba" allowed the commander of the Spanish forces, upon his departure for Spain, to take with him all military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish forces of eastern Cuba. This has made it very difficult for American writers to obtain accurate information as to the number of men in the Spanish army at Santiago, and especially as to the number in the companies of each organization. Without these records it has been possible to obtain only a few of the orders issued by the Spanish commanders. From the Spanish government's statement (See Appendix A.) I have been able to obtain accurate information as to the number and distribution of the Spanish soldiers in the theatre X PREFACE of operations; but not having had access to the military archives and records of the Spanish army of eastern Cuba, I have found it impossible to ascertain, except in few cases, the exact number of men in the companies of the various organizations at Santiago. But, after all, history at its best can never be more than an approximation to the truth. No history is accurate in all details; no historian can describe events precisely as they occurred. "It is," says Blume, "only possible partly to lift the veil which covers the records of war." My thanks are due to Lieutenant Colonel E. J. McClernand, First Cavalry, U. S. Army, and to Lieutenant Commander John M. Ellicott, U. S. Navy, for criticisms of the text of this history before publication; and they are especially due to Charles P. Fountain, Professor of English at the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, who has read critically the entire manuscript of this work. His constant encouragement during the three years I have been engaged in writing this history; his advice, suggestions, and criticisms; and his discussion of points in English construction have been exceedingly helpful and valuable. H. H. S. COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS January I, 1907 CONTENTS VOLUME ONE CHAPTER I PAGE THE CUBAN INSURRECTION........ 15 COMMENTS............ 25 CHAPTER II THE DECLARATION OF WAR....... 32 COMMENTS............. 34 CHAPTER III THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS....... 35 COMMENTS............... 40 CHAPTER IV THE Two NAVIES...... 44 COMMENTS............. 49 CHAPTER V THE SITUATION OF THE NAVAL FORCES AND THE OUTLOOK FROM A STRATEGICAL POINT OF VIEW 60 COMMENTS............... 65 CHAPTER VI THE RESOURCES, THE ARMIES, AND THE COAST DEFENCES........... 79 COMMENTS............. 94 xii CONTENTS CHAPTER VII PAGE THE SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES, THE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN, AND THE OUTLOOK FROM A STRATEGICAL POINT OF VIEW.... IIO COMMENTS............... 123 CHAPTER VIII THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA AND THE EARLY NAVAL OPERATIONS........... 150 COMMENTS............. 173 CHAPTER IX THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR.... 209 COMMENTS............. 237 MAPS MAP PAGE i. CUBA.24, I56 2. ATLANTIC OCEAN ~.62 3. WEST INDIES.38 4. FORTIFICATIONS AND INTRENCHMIENTS OF HAVANA 82 5. HARBOUR OF SANTIAGO. 224 6. PORT OF GuANTrANANo. 230 7. THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.96 ~~I THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA VOLUME ONE CHAPTER I THE CUBAN INSURRECTION1 DURING the latter part of the nineteenth century there were two insurrections in Cuba against the Spanish government. The first began on October IO, I868. On that date Carlos Cespedes, at the head of one hundred and forty Cubans, raised the standard of revolt in the province of Santiago and proclaimed a republic. Though this insurrection, through good leadership and the sympathy of the Cuban people, was prolonged for nearly ten years, its military history is insignificant. The insurgents never had more than a few thousand men in the field at any one time, and their operations consisted merely of a series of guerilla combats, none of which produced any decisive effect. This insurrection, known as the Ten Years' War, was brought to an end by the conciliatory efforts of the commander-in-chief of the 1 See Map 1. i6 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA Spanish forces in Cuba, General Martinez Campos, who succeeded in effecting, on February xo, I878, a compromise with the insurgents. This compromise is known as the treaty of Zanjon. The second insurrection, which resulted in the freedom of Cuba, began on February 24, I895. On that date, in the provinces of Matanzas and Santiago, several Cuban leaders with small bands of followers rose in revolt against Spanish authority. In the province of Matanzas the insurgents were speedily crushed or forced to surrender, but in the province of Santiago they were successful. They were soon joined by several thousand recruits; and, having obtained arms, they were able to begin a guerilla warfare against the Spanish troops. When it became known that the struggle for independence was being resumed in Cuba, several of the Cuban leaders, who had been prominent in the Ten Years' War and had sought safety in exile, at once returned to the island to aid the insurgents. Josd Marti, Maximo Gomez, and Antonio Maceo were among the number. They became the new leaders. Jos6 Marti assumed the administration of governmental affairs, Maximo Gomez was made commander-in-chief, and Antonio Maceo received a high command in the army. A little later Calixto Garcia, another prominent Cuban patriot, who was also an exile of the Ten Years' War, returned and was appointed to command the forces in Santiago Province. In a short THE CUBAN INSURRECTION I7 time the seriousness of the situation became apparent even to the home government, and CaptainGeneral Martinez Campos, who had been successful in pacifying the Cubans in the Ten Years' War, was sent to Cuba to put down the insurrection. General Campos tried to confine the insurrection to the eastern end of the island by a cordon of soldiers stationed along the western border of the Santiago Province. He was, however, unsuccessful. Though he received within a few months reinforcements to the number of eighty thousand, which increased the total strength of his army to more than one hundred and forty thousand, and though the insurgents sustained a great loss in the death of Jos6 Marti, who was killed in one of the first fights, nevertheless, Generals Gomez and Maceo were able to break through the cordon and push westward with their forces. General Campos then fell back and attempted to stop the enemy by fortifying a line across the island from Jucaro on the south side to Moron on the north, a distance of about fifty miles. Although he stationed thousands of troops along the line, it was impossible to hold it against the enemy. With little difficulty Gomez and Maceo were able to cross it, and, as the Spanish troops were acting almost entirely on the defensive and making scarcely any effort to attack and follow the insurgents, the operations of the Cuban generals met with considerable success. By dividing their forces, which consisted of VOL. I..-2 I8 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA about twenty-five thousand men, into small parties, they were able to intercept convoys, to ambush detachments, and to carry on a very destructive guerilla warfare. In short, the campaign conducted by General Campos was a failure. Accordingly, at the beginning of the following year he was superseded by Captain-General Valeriano Weyler, who arrived in Havana on February Io, I896. Before describing the operations of General Weyler, it will not be out of place to note briefly the methods and policy pursued by the insurgents during the insurrection. Theirs was an essentially guerilla warfare. They did little real fighting and had little respect for the rules of war. Their operations consisted mostly in burning sugar-cane, sugarmills, and other property, in annoying and harassing the Spanish soldiers, and in making levies upon Spanish sympathizers and men of wealth. Their policy was to burn and destroy. Gomez himself issued the orders; and in the name of liberty and independence the torch was applied, and the destruction of property carried on with relentless bitterness.' Upon General Weyler's arrival at Havana, it became evident that he intended to prosecute the war with vigour. He adopted strict disciplinary measures. By proclamations and in other ways he soon made it plain to the Cuban people that 1 See Appendix E. THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 19 the death penalty would be the punishment for such treasonable acts as furnishing aid, arms, or provisions to the enemy. Having received a large number of reinforcements, he immediately began operations against the insurgents. His plans, with few exceptions, were similar to those of his predecessor. He adopted the cordon system. By stringing out his troops, he attempted to occupy and hold lines entirely across the island. These lines were strengthened by field works,-trenches were dug, wire entanglements were placed in front of them, and blockhouses built at intervals. These fortified lines were known as trochas. By means of them General Weyler hoped to confine the insurgents to the eastern part of the island. He attempted to move from west to east, building trochas as he advanced, in order to prevent the insurgents from invading the pacified provinces in his rear. Though on several occasions he took the offensive for a short time with a few thousand soldiers, his tactics were essentially defensive,his main efforts being confined almost exclusively to the defence of the cities, towns, and trochas. The struggle at this time continued to be simply a series of confused guerilla combats. The operations were destructive but not decisive. The insurgents continued to roam about in detachments; but they gained no decisive victory. General Weyler's forces numbered approximately one hundred and 20 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA ninety-six thousand men,1 of whom about eight thousand were cavalry and about five thousand artillery, while the number of insurgents probably never at any one time exceeded twenty-five thousand.2 All these troops were greatly scattered. The Spanish cavalry especially was divided into many detachments and widely dispersed 3 throughout the several provinces of the island. This overwhelming superiority in numbers gave General Weyler a great advantage and brought him some success. During the Summer of 1896 the forces of General Maceo were hemmed in in 1 At the beginning of the Spanish-American War there were in Cuba I96,820 officers and men. See statement of Spanish government, Appendix A. Between the end of General Weyler's operations and the outbreak of the Spanish-American War there was but little if any change in the number of Spanish troops in the island. For further statements and discussion as to the number, see Appendix B. 2 The total number of officers and men in the Cuban army at one time and another during the insurrection was 53,774. (See Appendix D.) Not all of these soldiers, however, possessed fire arms, and only a small portion of them had continuous service. The Spanish War Department estimated the total number of armed insurgents at the beginning of the Spanish-American War at fifteen thousand, of whom five thousand were in the province of Santiago. (See Appendix A.):Though it is almost certain that at several times during the insurrection the number of insurgents exceeded these figures, yet I doubt very much whether there were at any one time more than twenty-five thousand actually on duty under arms. " There is no reason to believe," says " Harper's Weekly" in its issue of March 14, 1903, "that from February, I895, up to the evacuation of Cuba by the Spanish troops, there were twenty-six thousand Cubans under arms, or anything like that number." 8 See Appendix C. THE CUBAN INSURRECTZON 21 the western part of the island, and in December of that year Maceo himself was killed in a chance encounter while attempting to cross a trocha with a few followers. In the following March his successor in command of the insurgents in the western part of the island, General Rius Rivera, was captured and deported. General Gomez, too, who had been successful in the first year of the war, was compelled to fall back and confine his operations to a smaller area. And even in Santiago Province, where the outlook appeared most favourable to the insurgents, General Garcia was unable to capture any of the fortified towns, or to defeat in battle any part of the Spanish forces. In fact, the hopelessness of the insurgent cause was daily becoming more evident. Meanwhile the situation in Cuba was growing desperate. The guerilla warfare, the burning of crops and buildings, the confiscation of stock, money, and provisions, had brought many people on the island to the verge of starvation. There was no security for property, and little opportunity for the Cuban labourer to earn his daily bread. Discontent, suffering, disease, famine, and death were everywhere. Yet, notwithstanding the destructive policy inaugurated and relentlessly carried forward by the insurgents, the Cuban people were in full sympathy with them. The desire for independence and the hatredf of the Spanish government were so firmly fixed in the hearts of these people that they 22 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA were ready to endure almost any hardship rather than yield. The vigorous, severe, and retaliatory measures of General Weyler greatly intensified the desperateness of the situation. When he found that all the rural population were in sympathy with the insurgents and were giving them aid and comfort at every opportunity, he closed the country stores, and in this way prevented, throughout the rural districts, any accumulations of supplies for the insurgents. And finally, when he found the country people acting as spies upon the Spaniards, aiding the insurgents in every way possible, and carrying them information of every Spanish movement, he issued his celebrated reconcentration order. By this order the country people throughout certain districts were required to leave their homes and concentrate in the fortified towns. As the majority of these people were poor and as no means of feeding them had been provided, this severe military measure caused much hardship and suffering, and greatly increased the deaths from starvation. Throughout this insurrection the friction between the United States and Spain continually increased. The American people, who had not forgotten that the independence of their own country had been gained through revolution, sympathized strongly with the Cuban people and felt that a helpful hand should be extended to them. Though the THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 23 - government of the United States endeavoured to maintain, even at great expense to itself, a strict neutrality in regard to Cuban affairs, yet so great was the activity of Cuban agents and sympathizers in the United States that the Spanish people found it impossible to resist the belief that the American government was secretly giving aid and comfort to the insurgents. On the other hand, the United States was greatly irritated at the treatment received by a number of American citizens in the island. Notwithstanding the well-known fact that American citizenship had been acquired by many Cubans with the deliberate purpose of invoking its protection in case of a conflict with Spain, the United States felt bound to intercede in behalf of her citizens and to defend them in their rights. These acts and many others, which were often misunderstood through exaggeration and misrepresentation, continued to be a fruitful source of trouble between the two powers. Meanwhile, the cost of the war to Spain, in men and money, already enormous, was rapidly growing larger. Though reenforcements numbering 217,282 menl had been sent into the island during this insurrection, the Cuban leaders were so hopeful that the United States would help them, and the Cuban people themselves so determined not to yield even in the face of starvation and death, that there seemed to be little prospect of peace. 1 See Appendix G. 24 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA Thus matters went from bad to worse until, finally, in the latter part of General Weyler's administration, the conditions in the island became so dreadful that the United States government itself determined to intervene. Accordingly, it demanded of Spain the revocation of the reconcentration edict and the recall of General Weyler: The result was that early in October, 1897, the Spanish Cabinet decided upon a change of policy in Cuban affairs. They offered Cuba a new constitution, which gave the inhabitants a local parliament and a fairly liberal measure of autonomy. They also recalled Captain-General Weyler, and appointed Captain-General Ramdn Blanco his successor. The new captain-general, upon his arrival at Havana, began to carry out the Spanish Cabinet's new policy. He at once revoked General Weyler's reconcentration order and offered amnesty to all political offenders. But these conciliatory measures came too late. The Cubans no longer had faith in the promises of Spain. The offer of autonomy was spurned. There was now no possibility of a compromise. The time for conciliation and compromise had passed. Independence alone would now satisfy the Cuban people. Such, in brief, was the situation when, on the night of February 15, I898, the blowing up of the United States battleship Maine in Havana Harbour suddenly brought matters to a crisis. This act MAP 1. a 0l /AEy wEsTO q N I 0 11? q A N NE L 'I It'S Iq, 0o Fo so eo 0o;75 do Scal/ of sabtas Mf/le. r r I 1 i I I i r I. i r i r THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 25 meant war between the United States and Spain. It meant the destruction of Spanish power in the West India Islands. It meant, for the Cuban people, the dawn of a new era and the realization of hopes long deferred. COMMENTS BEFORE describing more fully the general situation, it is the purpose here to note briefly the distinguishing peculiarities of the struggle between Spain and the insurgents prior to the SpanishAmerican War, and to point out the principal reasons why the results were not more decisive. It seems remarkable that war should have continued on the island for three years with such unsatisfactory results. It would seem that on an island shaped like Cuba, whose average width is only eighty miles, and whose total area is considerably less than that of the State of Illinois, a Spanish army, numbering from one hundred and forty to one hundred and ninety-six thousand men, should have made short work of an army of twentyfive thousand insurgents. It would seem that this Spanish army, within a year at most, should have destroyed the armed insurgents or have driven them into the sea. Why was this not done? A brief discussion of the methods of warfare employed by the Spaniards will, it is believed, give us a clear and satisfactory answer to this question. 26 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA First: The cordon system of making war which was adopted by the Spaniards was faulty. The Spanish army was greatly weakened in strength and fighting power by being scattered, and by attempting to occupy and hold a line entirely across the island. With a little skill it was easy for the enemy to mass his forces at some point of the line and break through it before reenforcements could arrive. The fact that the line was nearly always fortified did not in any way remedy the faults of the system. Indeed, the stronger the line the less likely were the troops to leave it in order to unite for offensive warfare against the enemy. This system not only resulted in scattering the Spanish troops, but it kept them scattered. After a trocha was built at great expense, it was deemed necessary, of course, to occutpy it and be ready to defend its entire length, even though it might never be attacked. This system is directly opposed to the true system - that of concentration. To concentrate your forces and be stronger than your enemy at the vital point; to act offensively and in force against him; to outnumber him upon the battlefield; to manceuvre so as to make him fight at a disadvantage, these principles constitute the true systemthe system that brings results whatever may be the character of your adversary. Secondly: The Spaniards followed the defensive method of warfare. Having built their trochas, THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 27 they occupied them and awaited developments. Instead of hunting up the enemy and pursuing him vigorously as they should have done, they waited for him to attack them. They were too indolent to take the offensive, and too well satisfied with their own methods to appreciate the fact that only by aggressive and energetic warfare can insurrections be crushed. They should have taken the field against the insurgents; sought for them everywhere; followed them when found; attacked, routed, annihilated, or driven them into the sea. This plan could easily have been followed during the dry season from October to June; and it is safe to say that with their superiority in numbers and their well-known courage, the Spaniards should have crushed out the insurrection in less than a year. The cordon system of the Spaniards, combined with their defensive tactics, gave to the insurgents many advantages. Though the latter were never able, because of military inefficiency and lack of organization, to take full advantage of their adversary's faulty method, yet it continually offered them opportunities for accomplishing great results. Had they been able to profit by it, they might have massed overwhelming numbers at a weak point of the Spanish line, and by attacking and crushing the enemy there, they might have divided his forces and defeated, subsequently, the fractional parts in detail. In short, this method of 28 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA warfare permitted the insurgents to choose their own battlefield, and to bring thereon superior numb ers whenever they so desired. " Bonaparte's art of war - namely, of concentrating forces on the point of attack," says Emerson, " must always be theirs who have the choice of the battlefield." Thirdly: The cavalry force of the Spaniards was too small. The oppressive heat and unhealthful climate of the island made active campaigning there very debilitating for dismounted troops. Mounted troops would have been much more suitable for aggressive warfare. Cavalry was needed to scout the country thoroughly, to hunt out the insurgents from their hiding-places, and to attack and crush them when found. There never was a time during the insurrection when the insurgents, with their lack of organization, poor discipline, and disinclination to concentrate and fight, could have prevented a single brigade x of United States cavalry from marching victoriously anywhere on the island. Such being the case, it is plain that if Spain had possessed twenty or twenty-five good cavalry regiments in Cuba, and had energetically taken the offensive and overrun the rebellious parts of the island, she could hardly have failed to conquer. Undoubtedly such tactics would not only have resulted in the speedy destruction of the armed insurgents, but would have produced upon the Cuban people the greatest moral effect. 1 A brigade consists of three regiments numbering approxi. mately three thousand men. THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 29 It will perhaps not be amiss to point out the fact that in thus dividing forces in order to wage war against the divided and scattered parts of the enemy's army there is no violation of the principle of concentration so long as each fraction of the attacking army is sufficiently strong to meet and overcome any opposition of the enemy. Or, to state the matter more in detail: if the enemy abandons the regular methods of making war and divides his army into detachments for the purpose of waging guerilla warfare, it is allowable, indeed, it may often become necessary for a commander who has superior forces and is waging offensive warfare to divide and scatter his own forces in order to attack and crush separately the enemy's scattered detachments; but in so doing he should ever bear in mind that good strategy requires that each fraction of the attacking force should be stronger than that of the enemy at the point of attack; and, furthermore, that the enemy should not be permitted to concentrate his forces in succession against the fractional parts of the attacking army. From the foregoing comments there may be obtained a fairly clear idea of what the military policy of Spain should have been in Cuba. It is not the purpose in this discussion to point out the general policy which Spain should have followed in her treatment of the Cuban people. That, indeed, is largely a moral question, involving the / 30 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA government of colonies and the rights of man, with which, however interesting, we are not now concerned. But the purely military question, how in the shortest time and with the least expense Spain could have crushed out the armed resistance in the island, does concern us. The Spanish army of one hundred and ninetysix thousand men in Cuba was too large. An army of sixty thousand, organized with the proper proportion of mounted troops, would have been much more effective. The Spanish government seemed to think that in order to gain victories in Cuba it was necessary to overrun the island with foot soldiers. So many troops were sent there that they were actually in one another's way; and the difficulty of supplying them with arms, food, clothing, and medicine increased, of course, in proportion to their numbers. Suppose Spain had taken the money spent upon the subsistence, equipment, and transportation of the 217,282 men sent to Cuba during the insurrection, and had spent it economically and judiciously, or as much of it as was needed, upon an army of sixty thousand soldiers, composed of thirty thousand infantry, twenty-five thousand cavalry, and five thousand artillery; suppose that Spain had given this army better food, better hospital service, more transportation, better forage for the animals, all the ammunition needed for target practice, thorough drill in target shooting; suppose, in short, that she had THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 3I spared no pains and no expense to make this army as nearly perfect as possible, and had then inaugurated a vigorous and aggressive campaign against the insurgents,-who can doubt what the result would have been? Such an army would have been much better able to stand the hardships of a tropical climate. Such an army would have outnumbered the insurgents nearly three to one, and would have possessed sufficient cavalry to overrun the island and crush out the enemy while the infantry and artillery held the towns and cities and gave protection to the loyal people. Spain wasted her means in transporting more men to and from Cuba than were necessary. She wasted her means in arming and equipping more dismounted troops than she had any need of. She wasted her means in building trochas and in defending them when their defence did little or nothing towards defeating the insurgents. She failed, because she did not grasp the situation; because she adopted a faulty system of making war; because she did not appreciate the fact that insurrections can be crushed only by aggressive and energetic warfare; and because she did not have, among the captaingenerals who commanded her troops in Cuba, a single one who showed any generalship worthy of the name. CHAPTER II THE DECLARATION OF WAR T HE blowing up of the battleship Maine was not immediately followed by a declaration of war. Time was taken for an investigation of the disaster, and for preparation for the impending struggle; but the delay only added to the feeling of bitterness between the two peoples. It was the lull before the storm -the pause of silent wrath preceding the clash of arms. The American people and their representatives in Congress believed that Spanish officials were responsible for the destruction of the Maine, and they were determined that Spain should atone for the act, and that her rule in Cuba should end. Accordingly, on April 19, I898, the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States passed the following resolutions: "( Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating as they have in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a THE DECLARATION OF WAR 33 friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which action of Congress was invited: Therefore, " Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, "First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent. " Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. "Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect. "Fourth. That the United' States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the Government and control of the island to its people." These resolutions, approved by the President on April 20, were equivalent to a declaration of war. Almost immediately Spain severed diplomatic relations with the United States, and on April 24 VOL. I. 3 34 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA made a formal declaration of war. On April 25 the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States passed an act declaring that war existed, and had existed between the United States and the kingdom of Spain since April 21, I898. COMMENTS To begin hostilities prior to a formal declaration of war has not been an unusual occurrence since the middle of the eighteenth century. The reason for this departure from the custom of making declarations of war has grown out of the greater facilities with which in modern times information can be disseminated. Nations now have ambassadors at the capitals of civilized countries who are generally accurately informed as to the probabilities of war and can forewarn their countrymen. For the most part, too, war now comes at the end of a long series of negotiations. Hence formal declarations prior to the beginning of hostilities are at the present time seldom necessary. Moreover, under a government like that of the United States, in which an Act of Congress is necessary to create a state of war, a formal declaration is needless; for discussions leading to the passage of legislative acts creating war enable all powers concerned to keep themselves accurately informed as to the probable outcome. CHAPTER III THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS1 T HE islands of Cuba and Porto Rico and their adjacent waters were the principal theatres of operations during the Spanish-American War; but the operations of the Santiago campaign, which will be described in this history, were in large measure confined exclusively to Cuba and its waters. Cuba is the largest of the West India Islands. It lies southeast of the United States, at the outlet of the Gulf of Mexico. It is long and narrow, having the shape of an immense lizard, with the convex side of its curved tail towards the north. Its greatest length is seven hundred and sixty miles, its greatest breadth one hundred and thirty-five miles, and its average breadth eighty miles. It has a number of good harbours, the chief of which are Bahia-Honda, Mariel, Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, Nuevitas, Nipe, and Baracoa on the north coast; and Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos on the south coast. The principal cities lie on or near these harbours. They are Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, Puerto Principe, Holguin, 1 See Maps I and 3. 36 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA Baracoa, Guantanamo, Santiago, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. The railroad mileage of the island is not extensive. At the outbreak of the war the principal railroads were two short lines extending out of Santiago, and the lines connecting Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, and Sagua la Grande on the north coast with Cienfuegos on the south coast. Through nearly the entire length of the island there extends an irregular ridge of mountains and hills. This ridge in some parts of the island is hardly noticeable; in others its highest points rise several thousand feet above sea level. In the southeastern part, near Santiago, is the Cobre range of mountains, the highest in the island, one peak of which reaches an elevation of seventy-six hundred and seventy feet. The climate of Cuba, except in the higher altitudes, is tropical. The average annual rainfall is 51.7 inches, of which nearly two-thirds is precipitated during- the rainy season, which begins with June and ends with October. Porto Rico, the fourth in size of the West India Islands, lies five hundred miles east and a hundred miles south of Cuba, and on the east side of Hayti, which occupies the greater part of the intervening space between Cuba and Porto Rico. Its shape is that of an irregular parallelogram one hundred and eight miles long and thirty-seven miles wide. Its principal harbour, San Juan, one of the best in the West Indies, is a large bay on the north coast shut in from the Atlantic by a long narrow island, which THE THEATRES OF OPERATIOVS 37 at its eastern end is separated from the mainland by only a little surf-covered inlet. The city of San Juan, containing about thirty thousand inhabitants, is situated at the western end of. this island. This city faces inward towards the bay, and is sheltered from the ocean by a ridge about sixty feet high, which rises abruptly along the shore behind the city. The defences of the ridge were two batteries and an old fortification extending along the crest. On the westernmost point of the ridge overlooking and commanding the entrance of the harbour is an antiquated stone fortress known as Morro Castle. Across the mouth of the harbour, on a sand bar near the point of land opposite the castle, is Fort Canuelo, and directly in front of the mouth is Cabras Island. San Juan, Porto Rico, was the nearest Spanish port to Spain in western waters. It is 23541 miles from the Cape Verde Islands, 984 miles from Havana, 960 from Key West, 1187 from Tampa, Florida, and 1245 from Hampton Roads, Virginia. The prevalence of yellow fever and pernicious malarial fever has made campaigning very dangerous in the West Indies. In I74I an English expedition was formed in Jamaica to attempt the capture of Santiago de Cuba. It consisted of a fleet of eight ships-of-the-line, twelve frigates, and about forty transports. The fleet was commanded 1 In this work all distances across water are expressed in nautical miles, and all distances across land in statute miles. 38 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA by Vice-Admiral Vernon,1 and the army aboard the transports, numbering thirty-four hundred men, was under the command of General Thomas Wentworth. As the entrance to Santiago Bay was closed by a boom, a direct attack upon the city of Santiago was deemed impracticable. Accordingly, Guantanamo Bay,2 forty miles east of Santiago, was selected as a base of operations for prosecuting the campaign. The plan was for a part of the fleet, stationed at the entrance of Guantanamo Bay, to cover and protect the transports anchored within; a second part to take position off Santiago Harbour and blockade that port; and a third, consisting of the fastest vessels, to go to Havana to watch the Spanish fleet there, while the land forces marched overland and attacked the city of Santiago. As Santiago was but four days' march from Guantanamo Bay and known to be almost defenceless on the land side, this plan seemed to offer good chances of success. About the middle of July General Wentworth disembarked his forces and began active operations. But as he advanced towards Santiago, he committed the mistake of exhausting the energies 1 With this land force were some American troops. One of the Washingtons accompanied the expedition, and Mount Vernon owes its name to the naval commander-in-chief, Vice-Admiral Vernon. 2 At that time Guantanamo Bay was known as " Walthenam Harbour" and was renamed by Vernon " Cumberland Harbour. " I I MAP 3. GULF O F M EXICO OAR TORU9GASO Ip. P * 7 IYs xv NORTH 50 o00 200 300 SCALE OF STATUTE MILES -ti ATLANTIC 0U) w wZ U2 ( -j-,.-,., I -- OCEAN WST. DOMINGO -'9 T 5o0 CARI B B E A N SEA. Sa < 5 zff.-; i- ~ /< 6 j >. CnBARBAmOS wvc L mO 3 T O L. I THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS 39 of his soldiers in making and repairing roads. The delay was fatal to the success of the undertaking. In about three weeks such a large number of the English troops became suddenly ill that the forward movement had to be stopped within sixteen miles of Santiago, though practically no opposition was offered by the Spaniards. For several months this illness prevented any further effort to capture the city; and in the latter part of November the English army, after losing about fifty per cent of its original strength, returned to the landing and was reembarked on the transports. In 1762 an English expedition, consisting of a fleet of forty war vessels and one hundred and fiftysix storeships and transports, commanded by Sir George Pollock, and an army of I4,041 soldiers, commanded by Lord Albemarle, was sent to take Havana. The expedition arrived off Havana June 6, and on the following day the army was landed. Operations were at once begun against the city. The Spanish fleet, which was in the harbour, consisted of about forty war vessels, and the Spanish military forces numbered 27,610 men. The defence was exceedingly obstinate; butowing to perfect harmony of action between the British fleet and army, good progress was made. On July 30 Morro Castle was taken; and on August 13 the capitulation of the city and the surrender of the Spanish fleet were agreed upon and duly signed. Though the conquest was a valuable one, it was attended by great 40 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA loss of life. On July 3 no less than five thousand soldiers, or more than one-third the entire army, were sick with fever; and at the end of the campaign 2754 soldiers had died, of which number less than four hundred had been killed or had died of wounds. Out of an army of thirty-two thousand soldiers sent to San Domingo by Napoleon at different times during the year I802, "fifteen thousand men at least," says Thiers, "perished in two months." Yellow fever was the main, but not the sole, cause of this frightful mortality. Though great care was given to the sanitary condition of the camps, death swept away the soldiers with awful rapidity; even those who survived the diseases were for months afterwards so reduced in strength that they were utterly unfit for military duty. COMMENTS IN a war between the United States and Spain it was evident that the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico and their adjacent waters, on account of their proximity to the United States and their occupation by the military and naval forces of Spain, would become the principal theatres of operations. Inasmuch, however, as the overthrow of Spanish rule in Cuba was the main issue, and as it was the larger and wealthier of the two islands, and nearer THE THEATRES OF OPERA TIONS 41 the United States, it followed that this island and its contiguous waters would most probably be the scene of the chief military and naval operations of the war. The fact, too, that the Cuban people were engaged in insurrection against the Spanish government, made it easier for the United States to make a landing and gain a foothold in Cuba. But no considerable part of the United States army could be transported to the island with safety until the United States navy should obtain, at least for a time, command of the sea in Cuban waters. As both belligerents had respectable navies, not very unequal in fighting power, as will appear later, it seemed most probable that each navy would strive early in the struggle to cripple, defeat, or destroy the other. It was evident, then, that the part which the land forces of the United States would take in the fight for the island would depend in great measure upon the outcome of the naval struggle. If Spain should be victorious, she would undoubtedly assert herself in Cuban waters and prevent American troops from landing on the island. If, on the other hand, the United States should be victorious, she could despatch her troops to the island for the purpose of entering upon a campaign against the Spanish troops there. The most important strategical point of the island was Havana, the capital city. This city, 42 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA situated on a fortified harbour, connected by rail with Matanzas, Cardenas, and Sagua la Grande on the north coast, and with Cienfuegos on the south coast, was the chief seat of Spanish power in the West Indies. The presence of large numbersof Spanish troops at or near the capital indicated its importance, and its railroad connections added greatly to its strength. In order to cut off the commerce of the city it would be necessary to blockade not only Havana Harbour, but likewise the other points connected with it by rail. This would necessitate the division of the blockading forces into two fleets, -one to close the ports of Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, and Sagua la Grande on the north coast, and the other to close the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast. The knowledge derived from the histories of wars in the West Indies could not fail to be of inestimable value to any one responsible for the conduct of a campaign in Cuba. No matter what precautions were taken, it was plain that invading armies could not long keep their health in the island. As a rule, when an army landed, not much sickness developed before the end of the third or fourth week; then suddenly probably a quarter of the command would become ill and continue ill for several weeks, with new cases arising daily, until practically every soldier of the command had passed through a serious spell of sickness. Malarial fever, dysentery, and yellow fever were the THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS 43 prevailing diseases; and at times, especially when the sanitary condition of the troops was bad, the mortality was appalling. When not fatal, so enervating were these tropical diseases that their victims would lose all ambition and energy; and upon convalescence many would be left in such a weak and emaciated condition that they were no longer fit to bear the hardships of an active campaign. In truth, it may be said without any disparagement of the well-known fighting qualities of the Spanish soldiers, that these diseases were more to be feared than the enemy's bullets. Past experiences all indicated that the most favourable time for making war in Cuba was from October to June. A campaign begun in October, if prosecuted with vigour, might be decided before the arrival of the summer months, or might continue for nineteen months without passing through more than one rainy season. It was plain, too, that if it became necessary to begin military operations in Cuba during the rainy season, the decisive effort should be made before the fevers had weakened the fighting forces and destroyed the chances of victory. CHAPTER IV THE TWO NAVIES T the outset of the war it was evident that a large part of the fighting would take place on the sea, and that the result would depend in a great measure upon the relative naval strength of the two contending powers. A comparison of the two navies will therefore be instructive. A fairly correct estimate of their relative strength may be obtained by considering separately the different kinds of war vessels: first, the battleships and armoured cruisers; secondly, the monitors; thirdly, the protected cruisers; fourthly, the torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers. Modern armoured men-of-war comprise battleships and armoured cruisers. They are the fighters -the ships that bear the brunt of battle. Of these each power had seven. Those of the United States were the battleships Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Oregon; the armoured cruisers, New York and Brooklyn; and the second-class battleship Texas. Those of Spain were the battleship Pelayo, and the armoured cruisers, Emperador Carlos V, Almirante Oquendo, Infanta Maria Teresa, Princesa de Asturias, Vizcaya, and Cristobal Colon. THE TWO NA VIES 45 The following tables give the displacement, the speed per hour, and the principal armament' of each vessel. UNITED STATES BATTLESHIPS. Name of vessel. Displace- Speed2 Armament me nt (tons). (knots). (guns). Iowa...... 11,340 16.5 18 Indiana..... 10,288 15.5 16 Massachusetts... 10,288 16.0 16 Oregon.. 10,288 16.5 16 ARMOURED CRUISERS. Brooklyn.... 9,215 21 20 New York.... 8,200 21 18 BATTLESHIP, SECOND CLASS. Texas...... 6,315 17 8 1 In the tables the guns of the main batteries only are given; the smaller guns, under three inches in calibre, are omitted. 2 The speeds of the vessels are taken from Clowe's Naval Pocket Book of I898. It says: "The speeds given are in most cases trial speeds, or, in the case of vessels not yet tried, estimated speeds. They are not, with very few exceptions, speeds which can be obtained under service conditions; and, as a rule, they may be thus discounted: Extreme service speed about seven-eighths of the speed indicated (and even this cannot generally be maintained for many hours); extreme speed for a continuance, without risk 46 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA [ SPAIN BATTLESHIP. 1 ARMOURED CRUISERS. Emperador Carlos V. 9,090 20 14 Almirante Oquendo. 7,000 20 12 Infanta Maria Teresa. 7,000 20 12 Princesa de Asturias. 7,000 20 12 Vizcaya.... 7,000 20 12 Cristobal Colon.. 6,840 20 14 ill.... It should be noted that the armoured cruiser Princesa de Asturias took no part in the war; in April she had not received even her boilers and engines, nor had the battleship Pelayo and the armoured cruisers, Emperador Carlos V and Cristo boilers or engines, about four-fifths of the speed indicated. Thus, the average so-called 2i-knot ship may be regarded as good, provided that she be moderately clean, for a spurt, without serious risk of breaking down, at about 18.4 knots; and for a continuous chase, lasting several days, at about i6.8 knots. There are, of course, exceptions, particularly among new vessels, and vessels not fitted for forced draught; but the actually attainable speeds are more often than not rather under than over the proportions designated." THE TWO NA VIES 47 tobal Colon, received their entire armament at the outbreak of hostilities. The monitors are light-draft turret vessels of low speed and scarcely any freeboard, with thick armour and large guns, and are designed for harbour and coast defence. Of this class the United States had six; Spain had none. UNITED STATES MONITORS. Name of vessel. Displace- Speed Armament ment (tons). (knots). (guns). Puritan..... 6,060 10 10 Monterey.... 4,084 12.5 4 Miantonomoh... 3,990 10 4 Amphitrite.... 3,990 10 6 Monadnock.... 3,990 12.5 6 Terror..... 3,990 10 4 The Monterey and Monadnock took no part in the Santiago campaign. At the beginning of hostilities they were stationed on the Pacific coast, and shortly afterwards were sent to the Philippines. The protected cruisers are the scouts, the eyes and ears of the navy. Of this class the United States had fourteen; Spain had only five that could be classed with them. 48 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA UNITED STATES PROTECTED CRUISERS. Name of vessel. Displace- Speed Armament ment (tons) (knots). (guns). Columbia.... 7,375 23 11 Minneapolis... 7,375 23 11 Olympia.... 5,870 21 14 Chicago.... 4,500 18 18 Baltimore.. 4,413 20 10 Philadelphia... 4,324 19 12 San Francisco.. 4,098 19 12 Newark.... 4,098 19 12 Charleston...3,730 18 8 New Orleans.. 3,600 20 10 Cincinnati... 3,213 19 11 Raleigh.... 3,213 19 11 Atlanta.... 3,000 15 8 Boston...3,000 15 8 SPAIN PROTECTED CRUISERS. Name of vessel. Displace- Speed Armament ment (tons). (knots). (guns). Alfonso XIII.. 5,000 20 11 Lepanto.....5,000 20 11 Reina Cristina. 3,090 17 6 Reina Mercedes.. 3,090 17 6 Alfonso XII.. 3,090 17 6 THE TWO NA VIES 49 In the United States navy there were fifteen torpedo boats; in the Spanish navy there were nineteen torpedo boats, ten torpedo gunboats, and six torpedo-boat destroyers. Besides the warships and torpedo craft already enumerated, there were in the United States navy fifteen small cruisers, one.large wooden cruiser, one despatch boat, thirteen single turreted monitors, sixteen gunboats, one harbour defence ram, and one dynamite gun vessel; and in the Spanish navy, two old armoured iron cruisers, two large wooden cruisers, eleven small cruisers, two despatch boats, six gun vessels, and twenty-three gunboats. Each belligerent also owned, chartered, or controlled a number of auxiliary cruisers, and numerous yachts, tugs, colliers, transports, and supply ships. At the beginning of the war the personnel of the United States navy, including nearly four thousand naval militia that had been organized in the seaboard and lake States, numbered about nineteen thousand five hundred officers and men; and that of the Spanish navy about twenty-five thousand. But the American sailors, though outnumbered by those of Spain, were more thoroughly drilled in target practice and squadron manceuvres. COMMENTS BEFORE commenting upon the relative strength of the American and Spanish navies, it will not be VOL. I.-4 50 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA out of place to point out a few principles applicable to naval warfare. All results in war are produced by the application of force; and the indispensable requisite for success is to be superior to the enemy at the point of contact in numbers, weapons, or position. The purpose of the science of war is to effect this superiority, which can be obtained only by concentration of forces. To concentrate one's forces and thus be superior to the enemy on the battlefield is the correct system on land or sea for'winning victories. This principle, confined to no element, limited to no time, applicable everywhere and forever, is the foundation of all successful military operations. If the war vessels of a navy were each to act independently, the enemy's fleet would be able to defeat and destroy separately each vessel encountered. Inasmuch, therefore, as good strategy always requires that the attacking force shall be stronger than the enemy on the battlefield, it has come to be the rule for the more powerful warships to manceuvre and fight in fleets. The less powerful generally act as scouts, singly or in pairs, or as commerce destroyers, or as auxiliaries to the main fleets. But though they are sometimes combined into a fleet to meet an opposing fleet composed practically of the same kind of vessels, yet they seldom play a determining part in a maritime war; the real power is centred in the fleets of THE TWO NA VIES 5 I armoured warships that are built for defensive as well as offensive action. The object is so to combine and manceuvre these as to be stronger than the enemy when the battle hour arrives. This superior strength may consist in better armaments, as, for instance, in larger or better guns, or in heavier vessels and thicker armour, or in greater numbers. The strength of a modern warship is in her guns, armour protection, and motive power. By means of her motive power she carries her guns to any part of the world. The motive power of a warship in the present age is self-contained; it resides in the fuel on board, which acts through the boilers and engines. This self-sustaining capacity of a warship to produce motion may be termed her endurance. It means the capacity of the ship for maintaining her motion by means of the fuel supplies carried or furnished. The coal endurance of a ship, as ordinarily understood, means her steaming radius, - the number of miles she would steam without recoaling. For different warships the coal endurance varies with the type, size, and individual peculiarities of each vessel; for monitors it is much smaller than for battleships; for battleships, generally smaller than for cruisers. Inasmuch as the coal supply on'board a ship is necessarily limited, her self-sustaining power to produce motion is also limited. In order, therefore, that ships or fleets may for an unlimited time 52 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA maintain their fighting power, fresh fuel supplies must be obtained from colliers or coaling stations. Hence is seen the importance of having coaling stations in different seas where fleets are intended to operate; or, in case no coaling stations exist, the importance of supplying the fleets by means of colliers sent out for that purpose. In estimating the strength of a fleet the speed of the vessels composing it is a factor of prime importance; for the speed of a fleet as a whole is necessarily regulated by the speed of its slowest vessel. Thus, a fleet pursuing an enemy or fleeing from him faster than its slowest vessel destroys its unity for concentrated action and weakens considerably its fighting power. Hence it follows that if fleets are formed of vessels of varying speed, the speed of each in excess of the slowest is useless for unity of action; and consequently such a fleet has no greater military value than if each vessel composing it had no higher speed than the slowest. When practicable, therefore, fleets should as a rule be composed of vessels of nearly uniform speed. Slow-going monitors should not be combined with battleships or armoured cruisers, unless other conditions than those of utilizing the speed make such combinations temporarily necessary. In the organization of battle fleets the principle of concentration might be carried too far, were it not for certain influences which constantly tend to limit the size of such fleets. As battle fleets THE TWO NA VIES 53 increase in size beyond a certain point, they become unwieldy and difficult to handle. Indeed, they may even become so large as to extend beyond the limits of command of one man. And, moreover, their increase in size nearly always results in a decrease in speed; for the more numerous the additions to a fleet, the greater the probability of slower vessels being among them. As on the land a fighting force of half a million or more men is divided into several armies that each may be better supplied and more easily manceuvred, and the whole be more effective, so on the sea, for like reasons, large navies are divided into several battle fleets. Another consideration, too, which necessitates a division of naval forces into fleets is the nature and extent of the country to be protected, and the number, situation, and importance of its colonial possessions. In a war, for instance, between the United States and a European power, it would be necessary for the United States to divide her naval forces; part would be needed to protect and defend the Philippines, while a much larger part would be needed for offensive and defensive purposes on the Atlantic coast. Again, the conditions of the coast defences of the United States and the distribution of the enemy's naval forces might be such that it would be necessary to divide the naval forces of the United States on the Atlantic coast into two or more fleets. A comparison of navies is not generally an easy 54 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA matter, for the reason that each country classifies its warships according to its own methods, which are far from uniform and often very perplexing. And besides, another difficulty arises from there being so many different kinds of war vessels:vessels of steel and iron and wood; vessels with heavy armour and vessels without armour; vessels with large guns and vessels with small guns; vessels, too, of many sizes, from the gunboat of only one hundred tons' displacement, armed with a single machine gun, to the heavily armoured battleship of sixteen or eighteen thousand tons' displacement, armed with a dozen or more large guns of eight to thirteen-inch calibres. But notwithstanding the difficulties of accurate classification and comparison, an examination of the data already set forth should give us a fairly correct idea of the powers and distinguishing peculiarities of the American and Spanish navies. By referring to the preceding tables it will be seen that the five American battleships and two armoured cruisers were apparently not unevenly matched by Spain's one battleship and six armoured cruisers. In tonnage and armaments the United States ships were somewhat superior; but six out of seven vessels in the Spanish battle fleet were much swifter than all but two of those of the United States. The latter, therefore, had the greater fighting power; the former the greater mobility. As to the monitors, and the dynamite THE TWO NAVIES 55 gunboat Vesuvius, Spain had no ships to compare with them. But her torpedo flotilla was greatly superior; she had nineteen torpedo boats, ten torpedo gunboats, and six torpedo-boat destroyers; and the United States had only fifteen torpedo boats. By again referring to the tables it will be seen that the average trial speed of the American and Spanish armoured cruisers was 20.2 knots per hour, of the battleships I6. knots, and of the four monitors on the Atlantic coast 10 knots. But the speeds that must be taken into account in making or planning naval campaigns are not the trial speeds, but the uniform, sustained speeds that can be obtained under service conditions. Applying to the foregoing figures the rule given in the footnote on page 45 for determining the service speed, we obtain for the armoured cruisers an average service speed of 16.2 knots per hour, for the battleships I2.9 knots, and for the monitors 8 knots. In general these are the speeds that must be reckoned with; but at times even they are subject to a slight discount, for when the vessels of a fleet are not of uniform speed, the average service speed of the fleet would more properly be obtained by discounting the trial speed of the slowest vessel than by discounting the average trial speed of the fleet. Again, it may happen - in fact, often does happen- that some vessel of the fleet that cannot be left behind has so foul a bottom, or is injured in such a way, as to render its speed considerably 56 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA below the service speed of the slowest vessels. But for all practical purposes, bearing in mind that an exceptional circumstance may warrant a separate discussion and conclusion, these speeds may be taken as a correct basis for a comparison of the strategical and tactical manceuvres of these battle fleets. In comparing the armoured fleets of the two belligerents, it will be observed that Spain had six fast armoured cruisers quite similar in armament and in nautical qualities and of uniform speed, and that the United States had but two of this class. This homogeneous group of six fast cruisers gave Spain a great advantage; or rather, would have given her a great advantage if they had all been in perfect condition, as they should have been, at the outbreak of hostilities. In order to bring a superior force against this fleet, the United States would have been obliged to unite all her armoured cruisers and battleships into a single fleet. As the Oregon, however, was not available for this purpose at the beginning of the war, the necessary superiority in fighting power could only have been supplied by adding monitors to the American fleet. But such a fleet of heterogeneous vessels would have been greatly handicapped. The swifter fleet would have had the choice of battle, and in a measure also the choice of the battlefield. Under these circumstances the Spanish commander would have been THE TWO NA VIES 57 able to fight or flee as the conditions seemed more or less propitious. Should he have chosen or been compelled to flee, only the armoured cruisers of the American fleet could have overtaken him, and he could then have turned upon them in the proportion of six to two. If, on the other hand, he should have been able to chase the American fleet, it could not have fled faster than the speed of its monitors without breaking up its unity as a fleet and subjecting its slower vessels to the danger of defeat in detail. As to monitors, they are of little use in offensive war. Being of slow speed and having little coal endurance, and with their turrets awash even in a moderate ocean sea, their usefulness is confined almost exclusively to the defensive. They are intended for coast and harbour defence; diverting them from that object and making them a part of a battle fleet is merely a makeshift to supply the need of battleships or armoured cruisers. It is an attempt to bring a stronger force upon the battlefield at a great cost - an attempt to increase the fighting power of a fleet at the expense of its speed and mobility. "If you wish offensive war carried on vigorously upon the seas," says Captain Mahan, "rely exclusively upon ships that have the qualities of ships and not of floating batteries. We had in the recent hostilities twenty-six thousand tons of shipping sealed up in monitors, of comparatively recent construction, in the Atlantic 58 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA and Pacific. There was not an hour from first to last, I will venture to say, that we would not gladly have exchanged the whole six for two battleships of less aggregate displacement; and that although, from the weakness of the Spanish defences, we were able to hug pretty closely most parts of the Cuban coast. Had the Spanish guns at Santiago kept our fleet at a greater distance, we should have lamented still more bitterly the policy which gave us sluggish monitors for mobile battleships." On the whole, then, taking into account displacement, speed, and armament, and the conditions of the two navies at the outbreak of the war, it would seem that the American navy was considerably better than the Spanish. But it is manifest that if Spain, before the outbreak of hostilities, had exercised a little more foresight and energy in the matter of armaments and drill and target practice, she could easily have had her armoured vessels and crews sufficiently well prepared to have had at least a good fighting chance against the navy of the United States. "The force of the Spanish Navy -on paper, as the expression goes- was so nearly equal to our own," says Captain Mahan, "that it was well within the limits of possibility that an unlucky incident- the loss, for example, of a battleship - might make the Spaniard decisively superior in nominal, or even in actual, available force. An excellent authority told the writer THE TWO NAVIES 59 that he considered that the loss of the Maine had changed the balance - that is, that whereas with the Maine our fleet had been slightly superior, so after her destruction the advantage, still nominal, was rather the other way. We had of course a well-founded confidence in the superior efficiency of our officers and men, and in the probable better condition of our ships and guns; but where so much is at stake as the result of a war, or even as the necessary prolongation of war, with its sufferings and anxieties, the only safe rule is to regard the apparent as the actual, until its reality has been tested." CHAPTER V THE SITUATION OF THE NAVAL FORCES AND THE OUTLOOK FROM A STRATEGICAL POINT OF VIEW1 S soon as war seemed probable the United States government selected the island of Key West, off the southern point of Florida, as a base of naval operations. Lying in the Gulf of Mexico opposite Havana and only ninety miles distant therefrom, it was admirably situated as a base of operations for a blockade of Cuba or an attack on the Cuban capital. Moreover, a fleet rendezvousing there was sufficiently near the gulf ports of the United States to shield them from attack. At the outbreak of the war Acting Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson had under his command at Key West one of the most powerful fleets of warships that had ever floated in American waters. This fleet consisted of the armoured cruiser New York, the two battleships, Iowa and Indiana; the three monitors, Amphitrite, Puritan, and Terror; the four cruisers, Cincinnati, Marblehead, Detroit, and Montgomery; the six gunboats, Wilmington, 1 See Map 2. SITUATION OF NAVAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 6I Nashville, Castine, Machias, Newport, and Helena; the despatch boat Dolphin; the converted yachts, Eagle and Mayflower; and the four torpedo boats, Dupont, Foote, Porter, and Winslow. A second fleet, under the command of Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, was held in reserve at Hampton Roads, Virginia, for the purpose of giving a feeling of security to the people of the coast cities, of strengthening the incomplete coast defences of the Atlantic, and especially of meeting any move that might be made by the Spanish squadron lying at St. Vincent in the Cape Verde Islands. This fleet, known as the Flying Squadron, consisted of the armoured cruiser Brooklyn; the two battleships, Massachusetts and Texas; the two cruisers, Columbia and Minneapolis; and the collier Merrimac. In addition to these two fleets a patrol squadron, commanded by Commodore John A. Howell, was hastily organized for the protection of the Atlantic coast cities northward from Hampton Roads. It consisted of the protected cruiser San Francisco and the four auxiliary cruisers, Yankee, Dixie, Prairie, and Yosemite. The battleship Oregon, which was destined to play an important part in the war, must not be overlooked. She left San Francisco on March i9, I898, en route for the West Indies by way of Cape Horn. After a remarkable voyage of fourteen thousand seven hundred miles, the greater part of 62 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA which was at high speed, she arrived off Jupiter Inlet, Florida, on May 24, in perfect condition. The war vessels of Spain, not including those in the Philippines, were divided into two squadrons. The first, which remained in Spanish waters during the early part of the war, was commanded by Admiral Camara, and consisted of the battleship Pelayo; the armoured cruisers, Emperador Carlos V and Princesa de Asturias; the armed auxiliary cruisers, Rapido and Patriota; and a number of torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers. The second, at the outbreak of the war, was at St. Vincent in the Cape Verde Islands, under the command of Admiral Pascual Cervera. The assembling of the second squadron had begun early in March, when the torpedo-boat destroyers, Pztton, Furor, and Terror, and a small flotilla of torpedo boats sailed from Cadiz to the Canary Islands, and thence on March 24 to St. Vincent in the Cape Verde Islands. At St. Vincent they were joined on April 14 by Admiral Cervera with the Maria Teresa and Cristobal Colon from Cadiz; and on April 19 by the Vizcaya and Almirante Oquendo from Havana. The war vessels of Cervera's squadron were not in first-class condition. Three of the cruisers had defective breech mechanism and poor ammunition for their five and a half inch guns; the Colon had never received her heavy guns; and the Vizcaya, not having been recently docked and cleaned, was Z.1 0 SITUATION OF NAVAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 63 far below her rated speed. Admiral Cervera had repeatedly reported the condition of his ships to the Spanish authorities; but nothing had been done to remedy the deficiencies. So convinced was he of what the result would be in an encounter with one or both of the powerful American fleets that he opposed the sending of his squadron to Cuba. He frankly declared that such an undertaking would be hazardous,- that it would probably result in his defeat, and perhaps in the bombardment of the home cities. As early as April 8 he wrote to his government as follows: " From the bulk of the telegrams received I think I see that the government persists in the idea of sending the flotilla to Cuba. That seems to me to be a very risky adventure which may cost us very dear; for the loss of our flotilla and the defeat of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea may entail a great danger for the Canaries, and result, perhaps, in the bombardment of our coast cities. I do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long ago. I believe a naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while if left to defend itself with its present means, perhaps it would give the Americans some annoyance." And on April 20 he suggested the plan of going to the Canaries, where he could protect these islands, and at the same time be in a position to hasten to the defence of the mother country, if the necessity should arise. The despatch setting forth this plan of operations was signed by Admiral 64 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA Cervera and all his captains. Nevertheless, the orders to sail for the West Indies were issued; and on April 22 Cervera, in acknowledging their receipt, wrote again as follows: "' It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return; while if it should remain in Spain it might be the safeguard of the nation..... The Colon does not yet have her big guns, and I asked for the poor ones if there were no others. The 5.5-inch ammunition, with the exception of about three hundred rounds, is bad. The defective guns of the Vizcaya and Oquendo have not been changed. The cartridge cases of the Colon cannot be re-charged. We have not a single Bustamente torpedo.... But I will trouble you no more. " And on April 24 the Admiral wrote: "I will try to sail to-morrow. As the act has been consummated I will not insist upon my opinion concerning it. May God grant that I be mistaken!... With a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice." And Captain Villaamil, the second in command, who met shortly afterwards such an heroic death in the sea fight off Santiago, sent a private telegram to the Spanish premier, Sagasta, saying: "In view of the importance to the country of the destination of this fleet, I deem it expedient that you SITUATION OF NA VAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 65 should know, through a friend that does not fear censure, that while as seamen we are all ready to meet an honourable death in the fulfilment of our duty, I think it undoubted that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as certain as it will be fruitless and useless in terminating the war if the representations 1 repeatedly made by the Admiral to the Minister of Marine are not taken into consideration. " COMMENTS SINCE the navies of the United States and Spain were not so very unequal in fighting power, and each was divided into two fleets, it is evident that neither nation could have sent one of its fleets across the ocean without subjecting it to the danger of being attacked by the combined fleets of the adversary. As to the United States, she had no good reason at the beginning of hostilities for sending either of her fleets across the ocean, for an attack on Cuba offered a much better opportunity of injuring Spain. The proximity of the island to the naval base of operations at Key West, its wealth and importance, and its occupancy by a large Spanish army, made it, in fact, the natural objective of the naval as well as the military forces of the United States. It was good strategy for the United States to attack Spain in Cuba, not only because the island 1 For a further expression of the views of Admiral Cervera prior to the war, see Appendix 0. VOL. I. - 5 66 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA was the most vulnerable of the Spanish possessions, but because there was a strong probability that nearly all the armoured vessels of the American navy could be brought against any force sent thither by Spain. Thus, in following this plan, the strategical advantage of combination was with the United States. This was a great advantage, as it gave her the opportunity of crushing with superior forces any part of the Spanish navy sent into Cuban waters. Even had all the armoured vessels of Spain been sent to those waters, the opportunity of meeting them before they could have replenished their coal would still have been open to the United States. On the other hand, had Spain elected to keep her fleet at home, and had the United States sent thither one of her fleets, the strategical advantage of combination would have been with Spain. But under these or like conditions, the strategical advantage of combination is of little or no value to its possessor unless he has the ability to act with vigour and promptness in making use of the opportunities offered. By skilful combinations, by unforeseen circumstances, through the errors and perhaps the necessities of the enemy, through even the fortune of war, which sometimes favours the strong and sometimes the weak, the desired results may be reached. But so vast isthe ocean, so numerous are the gulfs and bays and inlets of the sea, so strong are the fortified SITUA TION OF NA VAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 67 harbours where fleets can obtain the protection of shore batteries, and so indeterminable are many of the factors of naval warfare, that the commander of the weaker naval force often has favourable chances for exercising his own skill and genius in thwarting the combinations of his more powerful adversary. At the beginning of the war, pending the issue of the struggle for maritime supremacy, a blockade of the ports of Cuba offered the United States the best chance of injuring Spain. An effective blockade of the island would have destroyed its commerce, cut off the supplies and reEnforcements of the Spanish army, and perhaps forced the Spanish navy to come to the relief of the blockaded ports. But as the United States navy was not sufficiently large to blockade effectively all the principal ports of the island, the best results could have been obtained by blockading Havana Harbour and the ports connected with it by rail. Even if the navy had been divided into two fleets for this purpose - one to blockade the ports of Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, and Sagua la Grande, and the other the port of Cienfuegos - they would still have been sufficiently near each other to concentrate quickly for battle, should Cervera's squadron have appeared in Cuban waters. With the armoured ships of the United States navy divided into two fleets as here suggested, and with a number of protected cruisers watching the 68 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA more distant ports of the island, and other swift cruisers acting as scouts on the lookout for the Spanish squadron, the situation would have been most favourable for decisive results. Thus situated, the United States navy could have cut off a large part of the commerce of the island and at the same time completely covered its base of operations at Key West. Thus situated, it could have inflicted great injury upon Spain without weakening its own power for future action, and yet have been ever ready to mass its warships for battle in an emergency. If the Spanish squadron had attempted to raise the blockade by advancing upon Cienfuegos, the fleet at Havana within thirty-six hours after receiving the news of such an attempt could have joined the fleet at Cienfuegos. If, on the other hand, the Spanish squadron had advanced upon Havana, the fleet at Cienfuegos could just as quickly have joined the one at Havana. Or, if either American fleet had been surprised and brought face to face with the enemy before the other could have united with it, it could either have fallen back upon the second fleet, or have fought with the assurance that the second fleet would join it in a few hours. In either case the chances were that if one of the American fleets had been defeated before the arrival of the other, the Spanish squadron would not have been in a condition, a few hours after the fight, even though victorious, to meet the second fleet successfully. SITUATION OF NA VAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 69 For the purpose of discussion the assumption has just been made that the Spanish squadron might have succeeded in surprising and attacking one of the American fleets before the other could unite with it. But this assumption is highly improbable, for the reason that the Spanish squadron, after crossing the Atlantic, would not have been in a condition to fight a battle successfully without first seeking some harbour near at hand where it could replenish its coal. And evidently the seeking for such a harbour would have soon become known to the American naval scouts, and been promptly communicated to the American fleets. When maritime war between two belligerents cannot be brought to immediate issue, blockade is nearly always the first step taken for the mastery of the sea; and though it is often but a temporary expedient for bringing matters to an issue, it nearly always has a far-reaching effect upon the result of the campaign. And, moreover, there is much to be said in favour of this method of bringing pressure upon an adversary. "The stoppage of commerce, in whole or in part," says Captain Mahan, " exhausts without fighting. It compels peace without sacrificing life. It is the most scientific warfare, because the least sanguinary, and because, like the highest strategy, it is directed against the communications -the resources - not the persons of the enemy." 70 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA Thus far the discussion has been made from the point of view of doing the greatest injury to Spain. But there were other things that had to be considered, the chief of which were the safety of the coast cities of the Atlantic and the demand of the people of those cities for protection against a Spanish naval attack. Had the coast defences of the United States been completed and been occupied by sufficient coast artillery, all the armoured vessels of the United States could have been concentrated upon the western end of Cuba without endangering the safety of the chief seaboard cities of the Atlantic. The deficiencies in the coast armaments of the United States and the unreasonable clamour of the Atlantic seaport population for protection caused the armoured vessels of the United States to be divided into two fleets widely separated from each other. Thus the deficiencies in coast armaments neutralized for a time a large part of the United States naval forces. They were the means of keeping the Flying Squadron on the Atlantic coast, when, otherwise, its true position would have been to aid Admiral Sampson's fleet in the blockade of western Cuba. But it should be borne in mind that the protection of the Atlantic coast cities by the Flying Squadron was merely a temporary expedient. The important point to be determined was the destination of the Spanish naval forces; and this point was ever present in the minds of those who directed the SITUATION OF NAVAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 71 movements of the American fleets.' As long then as there seemed to be a probability that Cervera's fleet might strike at the Atlantic coast cities, there were some reasons -though in the opinion of the writer insufficient ones -for keeping the Flying Squadron in this position; but as soon as it was definitely determined that the destination of Cervera's squadron was the West Indies and not the coast cities, the strategical situation immediately demanded that the Flying Squadron should join Admiral Sampson's fleet, or, which practically amounted to the same thing, take position before Cienfuegos, where it could aid Admiral Sampson in blockading the western end of the island, and at the same time be ready to unite with him for the destruction of Admiral Cervera upon his arrival at any Spanish port in West Indian waters. In view of these facts, what plan of operations was best for Spain to pursue? Had the Spanish navy been fully prepared for war; had it sailed boldly and rapidly for Porto Rico, made San Juan Harbour its base of operations, and used to advantage its superiorityin torpedo boats and torpedoboat destroyers, Spain certainly would have had 1 In planning the naval strategy of the war, the President and Secretary of Navy were assisted by a naval war board. This board at first consisted of Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of Navy; Montgomery Sicard, Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy; Albert S. Barker, Captain U. S. Navy; and A. S. Crowninshield, Captain U. S. Navy. In May Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and Captain Barker left the board, and Captain Alfred T. Mahan, U. S. Navy (retired), joined it. 72 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA a fair chance of victory. Had San Juan Harbour been properly supplied in advance with coal and provisions, it would have made a fairly good base of operations; and with the armoured vessels and torpedo craft of Spain concentrated there, the two fleets of the American navy would have been obliged to unite in order to meet them on anything like equal or superior terms. But inasmuch as the plan was to keep the Flying Squadron in the vicinity of Hampton Roads until the destination of the Spanish naval forces crossing the ocean was definitely ascertained not to be the Atlantic coast cities of the United States, there might have been offered the Spanish navy the opportunity of meeting the American fleets singly before they could have united. Again, inasmuch as the battleships, cruisers, and monitors of the United States navy were of such variable speed, the swift Spanish cruisers might possibly have sailed out of the harbour and met under most favourable conditions one or the other of the American fleets, while they were attempting to unite. In this connection it will be remembered that even the four armoured vessels of Cervera's squadron were, in the aggregate, superior in both speed and armament to the three armoured vessels of the Flying Squadron. Furthermore, Spain had a powerful weapon of destruction in her torpedo boats, and had she been able to use them to advantage, the results would most probably have been startling and tremendous. SITUATION OF NAVAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 73 It might seem that if this plan had been adopted, the coast of Spain would have been left unprotected; but such would not have been the case, for neither of the American fleets would have dared to cross the ocean so long as the Spanish navy remained undefeated in the vicinity of Porto Rico. When two armies are manceuvring against each other's communications, it is a principle of strategy that the army whose communications are most easily threatened will abandon the initiative and conform to the movements of its adversary. This principle with slight modifications applies to naval warfare. On the sea the coast cities -the resources - take the place of the " communications " on the land. If, therefore, two navies are manoeuvring against each other's coast cities, that navy whose coast cities are most immediately threatened will abandon the initiative and conform to the movement of its adversary. As a matter of fact, then, the mere presence of the Spanish naval forces in San Juan Harbour, menacing the coast cities of the United States, would have protected the coast cities of Spain from attack. But however meritorious this plan seems to be, there would have been little or no use in attempting to follow it so long as several important vessels of the Spanish navy were lacking in munitions of war and deficient in armaments. War can never be carried on without taking great risks, even where the prospects for victory seem most encouraging; 74 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA but it would be the height of folly to adopt a plan of campaign and expect a favourable issue, when at the very outset the chances of success are clearly seen to be on the side of the adversary. The conditions being as they were, it is believed that the best plan of operations for Spain was the one pointed out by Admiral Cervera. It will be remembered that he advised sending his squadron to the Canary Islands. As these islands belonged to Spain and could have been easily supplied with coal and provisions, they would have afforded a secure and permanent base of operations. Such a base could not have been maintained in the Cape Verde Islands, where Cervera then was, because they belonged to Portugal. Stationed in the Canary Islands, his squadron would not only have been a constant menace to the Atlantic coast cities of the United States, and thus probably have prevented the Flying Squadron from leaving the vicinity of Hampton Roads to take part in the blockade of Cuba, but would also have been a protection to the coast cities of Spain, for no American naval commander would have been so unwise as to attempt an attack upon them without first defeating Admiral Cervera. In deciding upon a plan of operations, the facts known to the Spanish authorities at the time should have received careful consideration. They knew that the Spanish navy was not properly prepared for war; that the armoured cruiser Princesa de