DIPLOMATIC YE AR
AB EEW    I MR. G WAR'S
A REVIEW OF MR. SEWARD'S
I#frefgn tfl orDesOonente
OF
186g.
BY
A NORTHERN MAN
PHILADALP HIA








THE DIPLOMATIC YEAR.
Mr. Seward has thrown down another challenge to the
world. Ile has issued a volume-rather more than twice
as thick as the one he printed a year ago-containing his
*annual correspondence with all the nations of the earth.
He invites criticism-or he sets it at defiance; and in neither case, can he or his admirers, (of whom he no doubt has
some,) complain, if it be fair and manly. Such is the aim
of the following pages-the writer at the outset pledging himself to demonstrate, that Mr. Seward's pretensions
to scholarship, to statesmanship, or to enlightened patriotism in dealing with the foreign, or, so far as he has had
to do with them, the domestic relations of our afflicted
country, are utterly without foundation.
One disclaimer the author of these pages thinks it due
to himself to make. In this, or any other adverse criticism
he is conscious of no motive of private resentment-no
sense of personal wrong. At the same time, he cannot
disguise from those who take the trouble to read what he
writes, that, viewing Mr. Lincoln's Secretary of State as
the author and willing abettor of the systematic outrages
on the liberty of the citizens-on the freedom of thought,
of speech, and of the. press, which have deformed the government and disgraced the people (inasmuch as they submitted to them)-so regarding him, the author would be recreant to the principles of freedom in which he has been nurtured
-faithless to the profession to which he is proud to belong,




— 4
but which Mr. Seward, (himself a lawyer,) has insulted, if
he sought to repress the sentiment of indignation at the
manifold wrongs that have been done-or the less elevated
feeling, which literary and political imposture ~always
ought to inspire.
It was Mr. Seward who initiated the system of arbitrary
arrests, and who has made, so far as in him lay, the names of
Lafayette, and Warren, and McBIenry, infamous. It was he
who caused at least one person to be 9rrested, and when he
bought his way out of gaol by a discreet application of
money-the possession of which in Bank of England
notes was his imputed crime-treated the arrest and the
prisoner's suffering with a coarse jocularity at which Mr.
Lincoln's kind feeling revolted, though jocularity rarely
comes amiss to him. It was Mr. Seward who, without authority, even from his chief, and as is generally understood
from private pique, dating a, far back as the formation of the
cabinet, imprisoned the Mayor of Washington, and was
forced to release him by Mr. Lincoln's peremptory order.
It was he who immured in a series of Bastiles the Maryland
gentlemen —men' of refinement, cultivation and unblemished
character-relying, in the case of one of them, on a document, which proved to be a forgery, as evidence of guilt.
He continued to hold his post in the cabinet after the bloodiest of outrages-for such it literally was-had been conmmitted under its authority, in the arrest of Judge Carmichael,
who was beaten and dragged by soldiers from the bench
to prison. It was Mr. Seward who, while he kept his innocent countrymen, his own immediate fellow citizens, in
prison, discharged Gilchrist, the Englishman, who had
been held by judicial warrant and remanded after a
full hearing before a judge. It was Mr. Seward who
applauded the Provost-Marshal at Washington for resisting
a habeas corpus for a minor, and threatening to imprison, or,
indeed, imprisoning the officer who brought it. It was




- 5 5Mr. Seward who placed a sentinel at Judge Merrick's door,
for the double and kindred purposes of insult to him  and
intimidation to the electors of Maryland, and so avowed
it.* It was he who issued the orders of November, 1861,
forbidding the State prisoners to employ counsel, saying
that he would find in such intervention " additional reasons for declining to release them." It was Mr. Seward
who, at the very time when he was ostentatiously availing
himself of the services of Prelates abroad, denied to a prisoner in Fort Warren  the  privilege of seeing  a  parish
priest, in a letter recently published, which, though ex-'pressed with such clumsiness that no one can tell whether
vigilance was directed at the penitent or the priest, is, in
any interpretation, most discreditable.t These are some
of the home doings of the Secretary of State which, entirely aside from the shortcomings and follies, and worse
than follies of his foreign' policy, excuse the strong and
earnest and resentful feeling with which every American,
be he writer or reader, critic or student, must regard him.
It may be found convenient at this late day, and in the face
of public opinion in the North, for Mr. Seward's friends to
paint him as a conservative and moderate man; but the
memory of these wrongs, and the official records which we
* Lord Lyons, in writing to Earl Russell, Nov. 4, 1861, says: " Mr. Seward said that he had already sent me a written answer respecting the seven
seamen, and that as to the recent arrests, they had almost all been made in
view of the Maryland elections; that those elections would be over in about
a week's time, and that he hoped then to be able to set at liberty all the British subjects now under military arrest."  Parliamentary Papers, No. 1, p.
102.
" DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, Nov. 20, 1861.
t "SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 16th inst.,
with a copy of that which you addressed to Colonel Dimick, on the 15th November. This Department, having adopted a rtlle'which. precludes all visits
to political prisoners, even from Ministers of the Gospel of any denomination,
has hitherto strictly observed it. If, however, the persons themselves shall,
in the event of sickness, or any other reasonable cause, require the services
of their spiritual advisers, the rule will be relaxed in favor of any one of
undoubted loyalty.
To the Rev. A. L. HITSELBERER, Boston College."




- 6 -
propose to examine, are too fresh and will be too permanent ever to admit of this. The reader will make what
allowance he pleases for the influence on the writer's judgment of the feeling he thus proudly avows.
Now let us look at this new volume of imposture and
note its history, the circumstances of its publication, and,
within certain limits, its contents. All are characteristic.
Daunted no doubt by the strictures made on every side, a
year ago, on the self-abnegation into which Mr. Seward
seduced the President in relation to foreign affairs, he
issues this volume under different auspices. Mr. Lincoln,
in his odd way, has said something about foreign relations:
Out of the twenty-one printed pages of the Message, three
were devoted to this topic of admitted interest, and in
these, are at least two statements of fact, on important
points, for which Mr. Lincoln of course is only indirectly
responsible, which the evidence shows to be utterly groundless. One is this-and we dismiss it incidentally, if for no
other reason, because the Chief Magistrate has as little to
do with the main drama of diplomacy as the chorus in one
of Shakspeare's histories. He speaks a few words at the
beginning, and then is heard no more. It is a pity those
few words were not more truthful.
" In the month of June last," says the Message, "there were
some grounds to expect that the maritime powers which at
the beginning of our domestic difficulties, so unwisely
and unnecessarily as we think, recognized the insurgents
as a belligerent, would soon recede from that position
which has proved only less injurious to themselves than to
our own country."
Here is a positive averment made to Congress that, in
June, 1862, before the reverses on the Chickahominy, there
were grounds to expect the European powers would withdraw their belligerent recognition. There can be no mistake about it. The fact is clearly stated. The time is




distinctly marked. Now, a reference to Mr. Seward's despatches shows this was not so, and that at no time, least of
all in June, was there any ground even for the hope. "This is
susceptible of clear proof.
On the 15th May, 1862, Mr. Adams wrote a despatch describing his pathetic appeal to Earl Russell, when he
"supplicated his Lordship" to withdraw from the position
Great Britain had thus far chosen to assume. "I sup.
plicated his Lordship, then, not to compel me to go without
the possession of the smallest evidence that could refute
the inevitable arguments that would be drawn from the
position that Great Britain had thus far chosen to assume
during this struggle."  The  Earl's  answer to  this
rather undignified appeal is not given, but could not
have been favourable, or it would have been printed.
On the 22d of May, Mr. Adams writes that he had
renewed his application with "little expectation of success," and this time was not disappointed; for he says:
"His Lordship replied that he did not see his way to any
change of policy at present," and added (we fear with that
grim sarcasm which statesmen occasionally indulge in)
that "we seemed tb be going on so fast ourselves that
the question might settle itself before a great while."
These letters were received in Washington from the 1st to
the 10th of June, and not another word from Mr. Adams
on this subject is to be found during the month; or at any
time. So far, then, as England was concerned, Mr. Lincoln was utterly mistaken. How was it with France?
As early as May 5th, Mr. Seward wrote to our Minister
there on this subject, remarking with his characteristic
felicity of diction that "It will be a study for the historian
why the European powers on the first sound of the bugle of
faction, so absolutely abandoned all their former faith in the
Government and people of the United States." On the
16th, Mr. Dayton, in a postscript, says Mr. Adams had told




him of his failure in London, and he thinks he had better
not be importunate in Paris; and on the 22d he wrote that
"without further aid he could do nothing."  On the 26th,
the same thing was repeated, with the addition of the expression of a hope that the Rebels might not know of the
failure, for, says he, in italics, "A  knowledge of the denial of the application would very much encourage the rebels
in their hopes." On the 2d of June, Mr. Dayton says,,' I
have already informed you to what extent this point has
been pressed upon the attention of the French Government, and scarcely suppose, you desire me, under existing
circumstances, to go further. Indeed, after what has been
said here, I don't see how it is possible to do so at present."
This despatch was received on the fth June, and was communicated to the President, so Mr. Seward distinctly says,
and on the 20th, he wrote to Mr. Dayton a long harangue
(for it can be called by no other name,) about "the popular mass surged by the voice of demagogues," and " a Confederacy of discordant States bound by a flaxen cord," and
on the same day, it being Mr. Seward's fashion to write at
least two despatches, (on one day he wrote three,) per diem,
he sends one which we print in full, in'order to clinch the
demonstration that, when Mr. Lincoln in his message said
that, in June, there was ground to expect the European
powers would withdraw their recognition of the South as a
belligerent,'he ought to have known, and his Secretary of
State did know, that he was saying what was not true.*
" While the President regrets that, in your' opinion,
"there is no immediate prospect of success in inducing
"the Government of France to rescind the declaration
"of neutrality which it adopted last year, he does not." at all doubt the fidelity and earnestness with which you
"have presented the subject; and"he has intended to leave,
*The only possible authority for the statement in the Message is a rumor
that reached Mr. Adams in August, and which he says he did not credit.




" as he still leaves, the prosecution of that object to your
"own discretion, in which he reposes the utmost confidence.
"A change of position by the maritime powers is, in his
"judgment, essential to an early and complete restoration'of commerce between this country and Europe. But
"the interest of those powers in that restoration is now
"fully as great as our own. Having submitted our con"victions with frankness, and enforced them with argu"ments derived from a full knowledge of the condition of
"things in this country, we can now cheerfully leave the
" subject to the consideration of parties so deeply interested.
" It is proper that you should understand that the British
"and French Governments do not at all hesitate to suggest
"to us continual modifications of a- blockade, unquestion"ably lawful in all respects, with a view to facilitate their
"acquisition of cotton, while the concessions already made,
"seem to the President to entitle us to the exercise of some
"reciprocal liberality on their part."
But why this falsification? The secret is revealed in the
sentence of the Message which follows the one we have
quoted, and which was written when Mr. Lincoln's military
antipathies were at white heat, and when everything, defeat at home, disappointment abroad, was to be attributed to
mrilitaryt failures. He says immediately after speaking of
this alleged frustration of his hopes abroad, "But the temporary reverses which afterwards hefel the national arms,
and which were exaggerated by our own disloyal citizens
abroad, have hitherto delayed that act of simple justice."
Here then is another positive assertion which we regret
to say is equally groundless.  That there were military
reverses, especially on the Peninsula, during the closing
week of June, from  the battle on the 26th to the arrival
at Harrison's Landing on the 2d July, is certainly true.
It was one of the weeks of Mr. Lincoln's panic  at
Washington, when he and his counsellors had so directed
2




-10the Federal army as to scatter it fruitlessly everywhere, and
to prepare it for the crushing defeat of a month later. But
Mfr. Seward  could, or would  not see  reverses, and  was
busy issuing prophetic bulletins to his agents abroad, which
quite justify the bad name the word has earned. ArchBishop  Itughes had been attending to the ultramontanists
on  the  Continent; Bishop  Mellvaine  was in  England,
taking care of Lord Shaftesbury and the evangelicals; and
Mr. Weed was directing the Prelatical team.  "The army
of General McClellan," wrote Mr. Seward, on the 2d June,
"'will  be  rapidly  strengthened, although  it  is  already
deemed  adequate  to  the  capture  of Richmond."   "No
American now indulges any doubt that the integrity of the
Union  will be triumphantly maintained!"  On the 24th,
he adopted a pensive and interjectional style to Mr.
Adams, " You tell me that in England they point to the
delays at Richmond and Corinth, and they enlarge upon
the absence of displays of Union feelings in New Orleans
and Norfolk.  Ah! well, skepticismt  must be expected in
this world in regard to new political systems, insomuch as
even the Divine revelation needs the aid of miracles to
make converts to a new religious faith."*  On the 30th, the
day of the bloody battle of Malvern Hill-on this day of
sorrow and blood-the sound and  scent of which reached
*Mr. Seward is fond of what we may call the interjectional'style  In a
letter to the Minister in Belgium who, in a fit of despondency. had written recommending some tampering with the press-the nature of which does not
appear, the despatch being suppressed, the Secretary says: " How could we
attempt to regulate the press of Europe.when we cannot regulate our own?
Where are the funds which would be necessary? Who the agent that could
be trusted with them? What an endless chapter of political intrigues should
we not be opening! Who in our country has the skill to conduct them? No,
no." (p. 660.) Apropos of the press abroad, there is a despatch from Mr.
Motley (p. 571) which warrants a suspicion that the foreign press is sometimes enlisted in the Federal cause. He sends to the Department and it is
reprinted here, a long extract from a Viennese paper, which concludes with a
passage which Mr. Motley may understand, but we do not, " Nothing is easier
than to show up apparent inconsistencies and aesthetical shortcomings in many
of Mr. Lincoln's actions of state as is done by the English Pindare of
slavery, tle Times, and Saturday Review."




for many a long mile, the Secretary was in the City of New
York on one of those strange ubiquities which seem, now-adays, to afflict Secretaries and Presidents, taking counsel
with Governor Morgan and Mr. Weed, and talking jocularly for the newspapers. In his absence, Mr. F. W. Seward wrote abroad that " everything was right, and that Gen.
McClellan was nearer Richmond than before, and held his
ground," and a week later, Mr. Seward himself wrote
what now we read with wonder, that " every one of
the battles was a repulse of the insurgents, and the two
last which closed the series were decided victories," that
General McClellan's modest conduct," (such was then the
cue) "will be read with interest and admiration," winding
up with one of the strange flourishes with which. he coneludes not a few of these odd documents.
"If, as fatalists argue, a certain quantity of human blood
must flow to appease the dreadful spirit of faction, and
enable a discontented people to recover its calmness and its
reason, it may be hoped that the needful sacrifice has now
been made. If the representative parties (?) had now to
choose whether they would have the army where it is and
as it is, or back again where it was and as it was, it is not
to be doubted that the insurgents would prefer to it the position and condition on the Pamunkey, and the friends
the one now attained on the bank of the James. The ins-urgents and the world abroad will see that the virtue of
the people is adequate to the responsibility which Providence has cast upon them."
Now, while we do not, in the least, doubt that the virtue
of the people is adequate to any responsibility, we may be
excused, after such a rigmarole of misrepresentation as this,
for a little distrust of the virtue of some of those who have
been elevated a little above the popular level.
The truth is, that if there were reverses which disloyal
men exaggerated, Mr. Seward throughout, even to his con



-12
fidential agents, persisted in denying them-that these reverses, whether precisely stated or exaggerated, had no
such influence abroad as Mr. Lincoln now attributes to them;
and that the whole fabrication of effect and cause is an unworthy afterthought designed to carry out the system of
malignant spite at the Peninsular Generals, which began
with McClellan's removal in November and ended (if it has
ended) in the dismissal of General Fitz John Porter in
January.
Thus did Mr. Lincoln, at Mr. Seward's bidding, usher in
his reference to foreign relations, with what we may mildly
term  a misrepresentation.  It would have been better for
his fame, (if such a word can be so applied,) if, as last
year, he had said nothing about them.
But we do not stop here. The message thus opens,
"The correspondence touching foreign -affairs, which has
taken place during the-last year, is herewith submitted, in
virtual compliance with a request to that effect made by
the House of Representatives near the close of last session
of Congress." One would suppose from this, that Congress
had expressly or, by implication, solicited the publication
of this huge volume. No such thing was dreamed of.
On reference to thb record we find that, on the 9th of
June, 1862, Mr. Cox, a Democratic member from Ohio and
one of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, offered what
we suppose to be the resolution referred to.  It is not very
precise in its terms. It has no reference to future correspondence. Mr. Cox accompanied it with a bri3f speech, in
the course of which he said that, as Parliament had published part of the correspondence, he wished to have any
omission supplied.* He then added he was happy to say
* The Ministry did lay before Parliament Mr. Seward's correspondence of
1861, printing it from the copy he furnished, omitting nothing, adding nothing.
What the motive was, we do not pretend to divine. Mr. Cobden, in his speech
last summer at Rochdale, intimated that the intention was not at all complimentary. Lord Lyons' despatch to Earl Russell, sending a copy of it is very
significant. -Parliamentary Papers, No. I., p. 115.




-18that he could confidently assure the House that the best
understanding existed between us and the European
powers. Every one familiar with the action of Congress
knows that between the State Department and this Committee there is and ought to be a close sympathy- a semi.
confidential relation which overrides political opposition.
In fact, under existing circumstances, Mr. Cox, Democrat,
from Ohio, is closer in affinities to the Secretary than some
of his party friends, or certainly than the Chairman of the
Senate Committee. Such a resolution would not have been
offered, or such an authoritative speech made, but at the
prompting, or with the concurrence of the Department.
Yet, on the day that Mr. Cox was, with the assent of Mr.
Seward, felicitating himself on the cheerful prospect of
perfect tranquillity of our foreign relations, and fancied he
saw
" The birds of calm brooding on the charmed wave,"
on that very day, the Secretary, at the other end of the
avenue, was writing a pettish, irritable despatch to Mr.
Adams, indicating his regret and the President's at the
very unsatisfactory condition of things. " It is impossible,'"
said he, "here to understand the policy by which the
British Government is persuaded that the sensibilities of
this country upon 7the subject of its sovereignty and trnue
independence, in such a crisis as this, can be wisely disregarded."   Mr. Cox was deceived.  There really, in,
all this, seems to have been a tendency to indirectness, a.
facility of disingenuousness which threatens to revive for
Mr. Seward the'nick-name long ago affixed to a British
Statesman-the Malagrida of our diplomacy.
One other remarkable instance of the same sort of thing
may be cited, and with it, we dismiss this very disparaging
and unpleasant view of Mr. Seward's public action.
On the l1th July, 1862, he wrote to Mr. Adams that
"This transaction will furnish you a suitable occasion;for



-14informing Earl Russell that since the Oreto and other gun.
boats are being received by the insurgents from Europe
to renew demonstrations on our national commerce, Congress is about to authorize the issue of letters of marque
and reprisal, and that if we find it necessary to suppress
that piracy, we shall bring Privateers into service for that
purpose and, of course, for that purpose only."
Here again is a distinct and positive averment, "Congress is about to issue letters of marque and reprisal."
Now, Congress was about doing no such thing, and Mr.
Seward knew it. Never was there a more deplorablefiasco
than the feeble attempt made by the Executive to induce
Congress to authorise letters of marque. A bill to that
effect was introduced by Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, on the 12th
July, the date of Mr. Seward's letter, and was met with
such a storm of opposition from the Republican Senators,
that it was scarcely allowed to be read. It was called up
two days later, the mover naively saying, that, in introducing it, he was not representing himself or his own
opinions, but the wishes of the Administration, and on the
15th, three days after the Secretary'had said that " Congress is about to authorize letters of marque," it was, by
common consent, dropped-not a single Senator saying a
word in its favour-and has never been heard of since. It
was not even alluded to in the House of Representatives,
and we search in vain in this volume of despatches for any
correction of this grievous error or mis-statement. It looks
very much as if the action of Congress, such as it was, was
invoked in order to verify Mr. Seward's threat, and not
that Mr. Seward told the truth as to the action of Congress.
And this is thought to be fair play-this is skillful diplomacy in the nineteenth century! In former days we read
of ambassadors of foreign States being watched and their
despatches stolen and read. Lord Chatham, who was anything but a trickster, employed spies and detectives to dog




15 
the steps of the French minister in London in 1761.  Sir
Joseph Yorke was suspected of taking liberties with rebel
correspondence,  Mr. Fox  and  Lord  Shelburne, though
in the same cabinet, had each an agent in Paris in
1782. Lord Malmnesbury was not over-scrupulous. All
sorts of devices were once resorted to, and may be so still,
for aught we know.  But, in  a small way, Mr. Seward's
tortuousness has no parallel, for he seems to think that it is
rather a clever thing to mislead one of his own ministers
abroad, as well as the Governmen't to which he is accredited, by the positive assertion of a fact which was no
fact, and then, not only never to correct the mis-statement,
but to publish it to the world as one of the trophies of his
statesmanship. He has vastly improved on old Sir Henry
Wottons' apothegm.  It is no wonder that Mr. Adams was
all the time begging to be told the truth as to what was
going on at home.*'
Such are some of the flagrant instances of want of can.
dour, not only in the papers themselves, but in the manner
in which they have been introduced to the public-and we
willingly, after this ex:posure, which, for the sake of what
is left of our country's character, we regret the necessity of
making, pass this part of the subject by.
Before considering the substance of this volume, let us —
for our pledge of demolition extends to Mr. Seward's pretensions as a scholar and a writer-say a few words on its
literary merits. It is, if possible, worse than Volume first.
One would think that at this time of day, in the effulgence
* There is something touching in Mr. Adams' prayer for precise information, uttered in answer to a tremendous essay on international ethics from
the Secretary. "I do not like," says he, (p. 23) "to be obliged to confess,
when asked questions by persons who ought to know, touching the movements
and policy of the Government, that I am not able to answer them." " I am
sometimes questioned here," wrote poor Mr. Dayton, " by parties in the Government, as to the future course of events in the United States, and fear I indicate an unwarrantable ignorance, for I am constrained to say that I know
nothing beyond what is common to all the world, while the Government and
diplomats here take it for granted I ought to know a great deal more." —Vol.
I., p. 240.




of education, no one would question that the style, the
mode of expression of a Secretary of State, or even a President, was a fair subject of comment. Yet there are those
who think, or pretend to think, either, that anything like
literary criticism is a small business, or that, as in this case,
the grave, didactic essays, or the scribblings, the light contributions from high executive officers, are too sacred to be
approached or commented upon, except reverently. Be.
lieving, as we do, that no right thinking man can write, we
will not say badly, or clumsily, or ungrammatically, but as
Mr. Seward writes-in other words, that no man, who
writes as Mr. Seward does —can be a perfectly right-minded
or clear-sighted man; believing this, we hold the writings
of such men perfectly fit subject of criticism. And so it is
all the world over. A recent writer has well said that
"There is always a dignified, straightforward way of sap
ing things, and the sooner it is cultivated by those who
frame public documents which all men are expected to
read, the better." It is this very simple dignity of style,
this straightforwardness, in which Mr. Seward's compositions are so deficient. To describe his rhetoric as sophomoric, is to use a mild term. It is radically defective in all
the elements of good style, and the more-'he writes, the
worse it becomes. It is pretentious to an extreme point.
It is stilted. It is flippant. It is feeble. It is distressingly obscure. He is grossly inaccurate in his general
knowledge, and yet excessively fond of parading it on all
occasions, fit and unfit. He indulges in technicalities, and
writes one day like a professor of mechanics (p. 179), and
the next like a horse-jockey (p. 105). Let us relieve the
gravity of criticism by taking a few instances of this, almost
at random,-throwing perhaps into a note, for the amusement, or it may be the astonishment, of our readers, a number of specimens of literary bungling with which we do not
desire to burden our text. Two specimens will suffice here.




-17 -
There is on the eastern side of Iludson's Bay, at least
fifteen degrees of longitude, and, as the bird flies, a thousand miles of measurement from the sources of the Mississippi, a region called "Prince Rupert's Land," perfectly
well known to every student of Arctic adventure, and, one
would suppose, to the copying clerks in the State Department. Mr. Seward, writing on the 7th July to Mr. Adams,
of Commodore iarragut passing the batteries at Vicksburg,
says: "Thus the last obstacle of the navigation of the
Mississippi has been overcome, and it is open to trade once
more from the head waters of its tributaries, near the Lakes
and Prince Rupert's Land, to the Gulf of Mexico!"
So much for geography; but history fares worse at the
Secretary's hands. He calls the motto of the Order of the
Garter "the motto of the national arms "! He affirms
with great stateliness, in one of his most elaborate essays
on matters and things in general, that " Richelieu occupied
and fortified a large portion of this continent, extending:
from the Gulf of Mexico to the Straits of Belle Isle."
There is not a college boy who does not know that the
Cardinal was in his quiet grave in the Sorbonne, and had
been there thirty years, before the Mississippi was discovered, either at its source or its mouth. But lt the passage speak for itself.
"Rather than do this, I willingly turn away from the
" spectacle of servile war and war abroad-of military de"vastation on land, and of a carnival of publicand private
"cupidity on the seas, which has been presented to me" to set down with calmness some reflections calculated to
"avert an issue so unnecessary and so fatal, which you may'possibly find suitable occasion for suggesting to the rulers
"of Great Britain. For what was this great continent,
"brought up, as it were, from the depths of what before
"had been known as' the dark and stormy ocean?' Did
"the European States which found and occupied it, almost




-18" without effort, then understand its real destiny and pur" poses? Have they ever yet fully understood and accepted
"them?  Has anything but disappointment upon disap" pointment, and disaster upon disaster, resulted from their
" misapprehensions?  After near four hundred years of
" such disappointments and disasters, is the way of Provi"' dence in regard to America still so mysterious that it
" cannot be understood and confessed?  Columbus, it was
" said, had given a new world to the,kingdoms of Castile
"and Leon.  What has become of the sovereignty of
"I Spain in America? Richelieu occupied and fortified a"large portion of the continent, extending from the Gulf
" of Mexico to the Straits of Belleisle. Does France yet
"retain that important appendage to the crown of her sove"reign? Great Britain acquired a dominion here, surpass"ing, by an hundred fold in length and breadth, the na1" tive realm.  Has not a large portion of it been already
" formally resigned? To whom have these vast dominions,
" with those founded by the Portuguese, tle Dutch, and
" the Swedes, been resigned, but to American nations, the
" growth of European colonists and exiles, who have come
" hither, bringing with them  the arts, the civilization, and:" the virtues of Europe?"
It is not to be wondered at, that poor Mr. Adams groaned
in spirit under such a style of despatch-writing as this, in
which interrogation and declamation are so strangely commingled, and all the scraps of imperfect knowledge, historical and ethnological, which Mr. Seward ever had, are
collated in order to fill the diplomatic mail bag. It is,
however, when poetry and history combine that the peculiarities of the Secretary's rhetoric, to use his favorite
phrase, "c lminate."* Witness:the despatch to Mr. ilar* In a short despatch to Mr. Motley (p. 550) he says: "Passion is as
natural a condition for nations as for individuals. Secession is a popular excitement, disturbance, passion. It was needful that the new popular passion
should culminate before it could be expected to subside, and to do this, it must
have time. The culmination at home and abroad could be hastened or delayed
by accident."




-19
vey, on the 4th of August, in reply to the infoTmation naturally enough given by that gentleman, though in rather
grandiloquent phrase, that he had attended the ceremony
of laying the corner-stone of a monument to Camoens.
Lest we may do injustice to this gem of the collectionfor so Mr. Seward evidently regards it-the despatch being
exclusively devoted to the one topic of the adventurous
poet of'the East, we quote it in extenso, begging our readers to observe the graceful allusion, at the end, to the Portuguese slave trade, with which poor Camoens had no more
to do than he had with the discovery of the continent-he
dying at Lisbon in 1579, and the Portuguese traffic in
slaves in this hemisphere beginning in 1630.
"DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
"WASHINGTON, August 4, 1862.
"SIR: —Your despatch of June 29, has been received.
" The erection of a monument in Lisbon to the memory of
" the immortal poet of Portugal was not merely an act of
"national justice and a proper manifestation of national
" pride. It illustrated the eclectic, conservative faculty of
"nations, by which they rescue and save whatever is great,
".good, useful and humane from the wrecks of time, leaving
"what is worthless vicious, or pernicious to pass into ob" livion.
"The incident seems doubtless the more pleasing to us
"because it occurs at this conjuncture, when we are en" gaged in combatting, in its full development, a gigantic
"error which Portugal, in the age of Camoens, brought
" into-this continent. I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
"W. H. SEWARD.
The whole correspondence with Mr. Harve, we may
incidentally remark, is redolent of that rhetorical perfume
to which Mr. Seward is so much addicted. We add a
specimen-being the first of the series-noting in passing




our entire unconsciousness of the meaning or appropriateness of the opening sentence, as to what the educational
question is, and what Mr. Harvey at Lisbon has to do with
the French Emperor.
" WASHINGTON, July 9, 1862.
"Sn:-Y- our despatch  of June 5th  was received.  I
"think the Portuguese government and nation are to be
"6 congratulated upon the solution of the educational ques6 tion, which the French  Emperor has so quietl3)  and
"' promptly effected.
"' How much the old European nations suffer from  the
" immobility of classes and masses which this new nation' needs!,   re could  receive and  employ  all the  con"6 scientious teachers of Europe without fear of danger;" from  their imputed heresies in politics or in religion.
"' France, Belgium  and England are agitated and excited to
"6 make war against and destroy us by classes of persons
"4 thrown out of employment, who, if they should make
6" their way here, would find abundant and harmless occu" pation, with large rewards.  Indeed, some of them  might
" hecome founders of States which would, at no distant'4 day, become as great as those which are disordered by
"6 reason of their wants. Let us hope that the European
"( mind may be sagacious enough to discern that the cure
" for all the social evils in both hemispheres is migration'" of surplus population  to  regions where population  is
is deficient.  If it does not like us of the United States,
"why should Spanish America be longer left to languish
"for want of the invigoration which European emigration
"would afford." *
* The practical good sense of the Portuguese Minister of State is shown in
his answer, sdtkrtlessly reported by Mr. Harvey, to the request to exclude the
Confederate steamers from the Western Isles. "The Viscount Bandeira was
frank enough to say to me that the islands in question had been used and
abused by corsairs and pirates during centuries-that they were exposed and
unprotected, and therefore might be so employed again, and that our best
plan would be to send a sufficient'force there to protect American ships
against threatened depredations, and to punish the criminal offenders."Page 888.




We have room but for two other ludicrous instances ot
Mr. Seward's mode of composition.
In a despatch to the Dutch Minister, Mr. Van Limburg;
for the Netherlands seem to have had trouble on both sides
of the Atlantic, with Mr. Pike of the Tribune at the Hague,
and General Butler at New Orleans, Mr. Seward thus oddly
describes the functions of his own department:
"It appears beyond dispute that the person cf the Consul
"was unnecessarily and rudely searched; that certain
"papers which incontestably were archives of the consu"late were seized and removed, and that they are still
"withheld from  him, and that he was not only de"nied the privilege of conferring with a friendly col"league but was addressed in very discourteous and disre"spectful language.. In these proceedings the military
" agents assumed functions which belong exclusively to the
"Department ofState, acting under the directions of the
" President."
For referring to the other, we crave some indulgence,
being quite sure that, were it found anywhere but in a.
volume of grave diplomatic papers, its grossness would be
inexcusable. Even as it is, we refer to it cautiously. There
is —every adult reader is aware-a euphemism by which
when a household- is gladdened by the birth of a babe —the
convalescence of the mother is described in technical and
courtly phrase-" that the mother is going on as well
as could be expected." It has been reserved for Mr.
Seward to embody this phrase in a diplomatic despatch
with a degree of obstetrical circumstantiality which is very
remarkable. Writing to Mr. Adams, on the 18th of July,
1862, (and we beg the incredulous reader to  erify our
literal quotation,) he says:
"All the rivers, canals, lakes, and railroads before mentioned- are free from obstructions; Vicksburg is besieged
and must soon fall, Mobile and Charleston will fall soon




thereafter. The work of pacification in the region' concerned is going on as successfully as could be expected. You
hear of occasional guerilla raids, but these are only the
after pangs of revolution in that quarter which has proved
an abortion."
It is the insensibility to decorum manifested in so nasty
an illustration that accounts for what otherwise would be
an inscrutable puzzle with all men of the least taste, or
experience in public affairs, how a Secretary of State, who
must necessarily suffer from the recoil of his own follies,
could authorize, still less instigate the publication of many
of the confidential papers in this volume. The simple
truth is, that did not foreign statesmen regard, (as we hope
they do,) the Lincoln Administrationjand especially Mr.
Seward, as in every sense exceptional and irresponsible,
there is enough in this volumne, its authorized publication
being the offence, to embroil us with every nation beyond
the jagged edges of what is left of the United States. Especially is this the case with the power with whom just now
friendship seems most precarious, the Emperor of the
French. It is full of revelations not only of Mr. Adams'
private movements and conversations in relation to the
French operations in Mexico, and his exultation at the disappointments which seemed to attend them, but of an elaborate and systematic, tho' apparently ineffectual, intrigue
at Madrid to detach Spain from its French connexions, all
of which may have been right enough in themselves, but
ought not, unless offence was intended or foreign war
desired-to have been authoritatively published. There is
enough in the foolish book to exclude Mr. Adams from
anything like unreserved social or official intercourse in
London, aAn  we can imagine Mr. Dayton's dismay and perplexity if Mr. Druyn de l'EIuys, or the Emperor himself
were to ask an explanation of the following passage from




-23
a despatch of Mr. Pike at the Hague, now given to the
world under the imprimatur of our Government.
" The movement in Mexico," he writes on the 28th May,
"as viewed here, in well informed circles, is regarded as developing a purpose on the part of the Emperor to strengthen
his prestige and his dynasty by coming forward as the supporter of the church party in that country. Though not in
favor with the Catholics, he makes himself necessary to
them in Rome, and he seems to aim to occupy a similar position in Mexico. It is undoubtedly in harmony with his
plans to put money in the pockets of influential supporters
of the empire, by giving value under a new regime to existing Mexican securities in their possession which are at
present worthless."
A darker or more disparaging insinuation could not be
made. The same remark applies with equal force to the
exposure of the kindred follies of Mr. Clay and Mr. Motley,
which, were there there any sense of propriety left at Washington, ought, instead of being ostentatiously published, to
be buried in the deepest pigeon-hole of the department. The indiscretion extends everywhere-even where
words of civility are used. Mr. De Stoeckel, than whom
the diplomatic body can boast of no more shrewd and farseeing member, made so by his long residence here and his
thorough acquaintance with all our public men, Mr.
Seward included, is described as a well-meaning individual, "the excellent Russian Minister," but too tenderhearted for the crisis, and too apt-poor deluded man-to
look at the ghastly aspect of a war which Mr. Seward elsewhere describes as not "a mild  one."  Mr. Bertinatti and Baron Ricasoli learn from this book tiat while,
at one time, Mr. Seward is exuberant in his love for
their sovereign, and Mr. Marsh boasts that "in no part of
the continent was the sympathy with the Government of
the Union so strong and universal as in Italy," meaning




-24
liberalized Italy, at another Mr. Seward thanks COardina'
Antonelli for his especial sympathy.  "The good wishes,'
says he, "expressed by that statesman are such as
the Government expected from  him, and his convictions
that, in rejecting all ideas of concession or compromise
with our domestic enemies, this Government is pursuing
its proper and necessary policy, are  as  creditable  to his
enemies as they are gratifying to the United States"*
Nor is this all. In July, 1861, in the midst of the first
Bull Run panic, as this volume admits, the Executive invited  Garibaldi to take a high command, we believe
a Major-Gleneralship, in the Federal army.  The.effer was
declined for the reason that the policy of the administration
was not  then  sufficiently  advanced   in  the  direction  of
Abolition. Mr. Seward now says that it was made with
the consent of the King of Sardinia, which, if it be the fact,
gives colour to the belief that as far back  as the time we
have intimated, that government was quite willing to be
* Mr. Motley sees close parallels between  Mr. Lincoln's Government
and that of Austria.  "The Grand Vizier," writes Mr. Morris, " exhibits a
warm sympathy with the Union cause"-and the Viceroy of Egypt thinks that
the war should be prosecuted fiercely, and' His Highness,' says our Consul,
Mr. Thayer,' is the son of Mahomet-Ali, and may speak with hereditary
authority on questions of this kind.'" For fear our readers may not
estimate the weight of this authority, we quote from a cotemporary, a brief
statement of Mahomet-Ali's mode of conducting war vigorously:
" A horrible fate awaited those who had shut themselves up in the Palace:
they begged for quarter and surrendered, were immediately stripped
nearly naked, and about fifty were slaughtered bn the spot, and about the
same number were dragged away, with every brutal aggravation of their
pitiful condition to Mohammed Ali. Among them  were four Beys, one of
whom, driven to madness by Mohammed Ali's mockery, asked for a drink of
water; his hands were untied, that he might take the bottle, but he snatched
a dagger from one of the soldiers, and rushed at the Pasha, and fell, covered
with wounds. The wretched captives were then chained, ana left in the court
of the Pasha's house; and on the following morning the heads of their comrades who Ald perished the day before were skinned and stuffed with straw,
before their eyes. One Bey and two others paid their ransom and were
released; the rest, without exception, were tortured and put to death in the
course of the ensuing night. Eighty-three. heads (many of them those of
Frenchmen and Albanians) were stuffed und sent tb Constantinople, with a
boast that the Mameluke chiefs were utterly destroyed.  Thus ended
Mohammed Ali's massacre of his too confiding enemies."




-25rid of the adventurous and troublesome chieftain, and
transfer him to the Federal service here. It was fortunate
the invitation was declined, for soon after, having taken
the Archbishop of New York into his confidence, and sent
him as one of his Nuncios to Europe, Mr. Seward had to
extricate himself from his liberal entanglement. The prelate could scarcely reconcile it with his paramount duty at
Rome, to be a fellow-labourer with one who, like Garibaldi,
had denounced the Papacy as " the most wicked and loathsome government in the world," and on another occasion
had spoken of it as "a hideous immoral monstrosity."
Indeed there is, in this volume, abundant evidence that the
Papal influence, love for Cardinal Antonelli and the Emperor of Austria, very early triumphed in Mr. Seward's heart
over all liberal sympathy. The Lincoln administration
could indeed ill afford to quarrel with the absolutists of
Europe. But its agents abroad, the subordinate ones at
least, did not know of this, and accordingly, we find that in
September, 1862, Mr. Theodore' Canisius, our consul at
Vienna, following the example set a year before at Antwerp, of his 6wn accord, renewed the invitation to Garibaldi. "'The delight," said the simple-minded consul,
" with which you would be received in our country, would
be immense, and your mission, which would be to lead our
brave soldiers to fight for the same principles to which you
have devoted your life, would be fully conformable to your
intentions."  This time, unluckily, Garibaldi agreed to
come, saying, that " so soon as his wounds were healed he
should be glad to satisfy his desire to serve the Great
American Republic, which is now fighting for universal
liberty." They, the consul and the hero, little dreamed of
the change which had in the interval come over Mr. Seward's spirit. He was fighting no longer for liberty, but fot
absolute supremacy and imperial authority. The absolutists
were smiling on him. The smile must be reflected. Early
4




-  v -
in  October he had  received  Antonelli's  honied  words.
About the same time Mr. Motley wrote to him  that the
" entire sympathy" of Austria was with the administration
in its efforts to suppress, what the historian of the Dutch
Republic calls, " the mutiny" of the South. The Turks and
Egyptians were sympathetic.  Mr. Burlingame thought the
Taepings were on the wane, and Mr. Seward at once and
roughly recalled poor Mr. Canisius, telling him that
"at the present conjuncture, every care is necessarily to be
taken to avoid injurious complications in foreign affairs;"
that what had been done was "entirely divergent from
judicious policy," and that Garibaldi was neither more nor
less than a "rebel."   This recall, thus derogatory alike to
the unlucky consul, to Garibaldi, and., in view of what had
occurred, to the writer, Mr. Motley was directed to show
to the Austrian Prime Minister.
And this revelation of inconsistency, this insult to the
liberal spirit of the day, this confession of a grievous
mistake, is put in print as one of the bright trophies of a
statesman.*
The stupendous folly, and worse than folly, of the publication of this volume cannot, therefore, be too strongly
stated.  Should the normal condition  of things at Washington ever be resumed, it will, we trust, be a warning to
all future Departments of State, and an admonition to re* Mr. Seward's despatches to China are "unique."  For example, let the
reader observe the oddity of the following, dated 22d April, 1862: "The
solicitude you have suffered, and which was so honorable to your loyalty and
patriotism, will have been relieved before this time by information that we
have greatly reduced, if not altogether averted, the danger of foreign war, and
have, at the same time, obtained a very fair prospect of early domestic peace.
In view of civil war raging in Greece and in China, and of rising commotion's
in Italy, Hungary and Germany, we may reasonably hope that Europe will
become less severe and censorious in regard to the unhappy demonstrations
of faction in our heretofore tranquil and united country."  "It is your
duty," said he another place, " especially to lend no aid, encouragement or
countenance to sedition or rebellion against imperial authority."




serve that will never be forgotten. The mischief, we fear,
is irreparable.
But what, let us ask, are the actual fruits of this paraded
diplomacy? Absolutely nothing-for we undertake, without effort, to show,
1st. That there is no ground for the claim put forward
by Mr. Seward's friends, that he deserves credit for preventing European mediation or intervention, for the simple
reason that no foreign power has ever till lately dreamed
of mediating or intervening, and then, when the attempt
-was indirectly made by France, Mr. Seward knew nothing
about it.
2d. That in the only matter in which he took the initiative and pursued it-the effort to have the belligerent recognition withdrawn-he absolutely failed, and why he
failed.
3d. That it is a budget of blunders from first to last,
and that the blunders have been committed at the expense
of his country's traditionary principles.
Let us examine this subject briefly and fairly, following,
as far as possible, the easy order of time.
The diplomatic, like the fiscal year, under our system,
is not coincident with the old fashioned one of the calendar. Mr. Seward's year begins and ends in December.
The close of 1861 was very dreary, and no American, be
his political affinities what they may, can think of it without a shudder and a blush. It was the era of the " Trent."
Scarcely had the Secretary of State bundled up and put in
the printer's hand, his volume of first fruits of diplomacy,
scarcely had he, with thie air of one contented with laborious success, written to his favorite minister (p. 274) that
he now looked to see less disposition abroad to treat our
flag with disrespect, when the news broke on the American
public that Captain Wilkes had forcibly taken from a British steamer the Confederate comnmissioners, and brought




-28them to this country. So much has since occurred, so
much blood has been shed and agony endured, so sharp
have been the spasms of exultation and despair that have
convulsed us in the progress of this most wretched war,
that it is not easy to recall distinctly the panic-for such in
truth it was-of the closing month of 1861, from the day
the news of the capture came (Nov. 16) to the day when it
was known the surrender was decided on.  It is not
worth while to reopen this question; but looking back on
it, as one can do with relative composure, there are one or
two points now apparent which were not so then, and there
is, it will be conceded, a settled judgment on the whole
evidence, that but for the attitude taken by Great Britain,
sustained as it was by the unanimity of the world, the Federal administration would have evaded what they now pretend was a voluntary act. In other words, that it was fear
— reasonable enough-and not the conviction of having
done a wrong, or the recognition of a principle, which induced the action of the Government. This it is, and the
recollection of a narrow escap.e from a foreign war, which
causes the slander and the blush. The world will never
know the miserable secrets of office in that interval. The
Secretary of State literally hid himself. On the 13th November, Mr. Russell, of the Times, then a prime favourite;
was dining with Mr. Seward, who pleasantly told him that
" the English were the great smugglers who sustained the
rebellion."  On the 14th, there was another dinner with
Mr. Seward, a cheerful game of whist, and " Mr. Lincoln
dropped in with a new supply of west country jokes."* On
the 16th came the news, and the administration went into
"Retreat."  As late as the 25th, they were invisible; indeed, it would seem they were so till the end of the month.,' I have neither sought nor avoided an interview with Mr.
* Russell's "My Diary."




-29Seward," wrote Lord Lyons, "but it has so happened, I
have not seen.him, nor, indeed, any member of the Government, since the intelligence of the capture arrived." Then
comes the message, without a word on the engrossing topic,
and the Navy Department endorsement, and the vote of the
House of Representatives to throw the prisoners into close
confinement, and anxiety deepenried; and so it continued,
till the 18th of December, when came "the messenger
Seymour," with the seven days' ultimatum, and the ominous freight of diplomatic urgency from every cabinet in
Europe. General Scott hurried home, confident of a war;
for he did not dream the prisoners would be given up without more of a struggle. Private letters flowed in, filled
with alarms and counsel, and, among them, one to the Secretary himself, to which, in the unraveling of this perplexity,
sufficient attention has not been paid, for it was the only
one we know of that suggested the exact course which was
adopted. Those familiar with Mr. Seward's antecedents
know his close affiliation with Irish politicians, their sympathies and antipathies. It is the basis of his intimacy
with the Arch-Episcopal incumbent of Nlew York.  On
the 2d December, 1861, Mr. Smith O'Brien wrote a long
letter to his friend the Secretary of State, which must have
been received at Washington coincidently with Earl Russell's despatch, and which gave the clue for the dark labyrinth of difficulty-of impending danger, and threatened
dishonor-in which he was wandering.' "Answer the British demands," wrote Mr. O'Brien, "in the language of diplomacy. Quote authorities and precedents to show that
you are justified. by the Law of Nations, and especially by
the example of England, in the seizure of these commissioners. Such discussions will give you time for deliberation and for preparation; but lose not an hour in liberating
the commissioners." This is exactly what Mr. Seward did,
and thus, on the face of the evidence, it would seem that




to this Irish hint is due the result at which the world rejoiced and felt relieved, and the nation blushed. It is a
sad chapter, view it as we may, and we gladly turn from it.
One effect, or rather consequence, of the Trent affair, was
a fit of comparative silence on the part of the Secretary of State. While, during the rest of the year, the
average of his despatches is nearly thirty a month, in
January, 1862, he wrote but ten, and those were brief and
meagre. The elasticity of his spirit seemed broken. Mr.
Adams wrote to him  on the 10th, and the despatch,
though acknowledged, is suppressed. Mr. Marsh spoke
of the "wisdom  and skill" of the cabinet, but extorted
no answer, and again wrote Mr. Adams on the 17th:
"I need not add my testimony to the general tribute of
admiration of the skillful manner in which the various difficulties and complications attending this unfortunate business have been met and avoided"-and Mr. Seward turned
with ghastly nausea away from such praises. It was, however, while thus abstinent from foreign correspondence,
that he was engaged actively at home, for, about this
time, occurred the correspondence with Ex-President
Pierce, as to which, no words of reprobation can be found
too strong. One reads it now, with absolute amazement
that such a violation of decency could have occurred, even
here.
But, with the lengthening days of February, Mr. Seward
began to rally, and in that month, he wrote no less than
twenty-one despatches, the majority being to Mr. Adams,
constituting the opening chapter of his new and fruitless
experiments to persuade the European powers to withdraw
or modify their recognition of the Confederates as belligerents. It was chiefly directed to Great Britain. It began
and continued in humiliation, and ended, as we have said,
in disappointment.                             "
Before proceeding briefly to consider this sad story of




- 31 --
diplomatic bungling, it is due to historical truth to say,
that while Mr. Seward directed his energies-if such they
can be termed-mainly to influence the British cabinet, he
never seems to have done justice, or to have fairly estimated,
what these and later revelations show was the fair and
friendly action of the French Emperor. To England, as we
will show, he was prepared to make any concession-to
France, he was, if not churlish and discourteous, silent and
suspicious. Lord Russell (in the true spirit of the Whigs)
never was at heart very friendly to us. The government connived at the fitting out of Confederate vessels, which France
did not. The spirit of Abolitionism-at this moment as
acrid as ever in a certain, but, we hope, limited class of Englishmen-alone kept in check the adverse policy of a portion
of the ministry. It was " the willing to wound and yet afraid
to strike" policy throughout. It tried to please all sides in a
surly fashion. Mr. Gladstone said one thing here, and Sir
George Lewis another thing there. They refused to recall
Mr. Bunch from  Charleston, and yet they never actually
demanded the release of a prisoner from the bastiles. The
Russell policy to America was a companion to what had
been doing in Prussia and Denmark, in Greece and Rome.
And yet, to this government, Mr. Seward was never
wearied of making surrenders. Let us see what and how
fruitless they were. The memory of some of them is fading
away, and ought to be revived.
On the 4th January, 1862, Mr. Seward wrote to Mr.
Adams, transmitting the copy of an unofficial letter he had
sent to Lord Lyons, together with one which, "amid the
intensest heat of the late excitement," he had addressed to
the Governor of Maine. This is the only reference we find
to what is, in our estimation, one of the most remarkable
of Mr. Seward's many freaks-his offer of a transit to the
British reinforcements for Canada over the territory of the
State of Maine. The Trent affair was, as we have seen,




-82only partially settled on the 26th December. That is, the
surrender of the prisoners was agreed to, but no one can
read Lord Lyons' despatch of that day without seeing that
he had grave doubts whether the apology would be deemed
sufficient. It proved to be so, but Mr. Seward did not know
it till nearly a month later. Ile was right, therefore, in
speaking of the excitement as still continuing. On the 4th
January, Diews reached Washington that a.large detachment
of British troops, intended to garrison our frontier, was
about to arrive in the steamer " Bohemian." These troops
were intended, in case of probable difficulty,.to fight us.
They were to be scattered, with others, throughout the long
line of forts from Quebec to Malden; and the artillery
which accompanied them was to be pointed at Ogdensburg,
or Lewistown, or Buffalo, or Detroit. They were, in no
sense, soldiers crossing a neutral territory, for which consent, when asked, is sometimes given. It was not like the
transit from Alexandria to Suez, during the India mutiny.
They were sent to Canada in possi;le hostility to us. And
yet the Secretary of State thought it right, unsolicited,
and without consulting the local authorities, to send orders
to the marshal and other Federal officers at Portland to
give "the agents of the British Government all proper
facilities for landing or carrying to Canada, or elsewhere,
all troops or munitions of war, of every kind, without exception." One reads such an order now with wonder and
incredulity. Need any one be surprised that the authorities of the State of Maine were startled, and remonstrated,
and that, too, when the invading troops did not come, or
that they claimed some right over their own soil and their
own highways?  What would have been thought twenty,
or ten, or five years ago, in our normal condition, had a
Secretary of State, or President sent an order for foreign
soldiers, with all the accomplishments of war-" munitions
without exception"-artillery and baggage wagons-cais



-33sons and ambulances-to pass through the borders of a
State? Let it be supposed that the point to be reinforced
were Windsor or Sandwich, opposite Detroit, to which the
shortest line of approach is from New York or Philadelphia; does any sane man imagine that at either of those
cities, British troops could be safely landed, to be carried
over our railways, "with munitions of war of every kind,
without exception," especially when it was known and ad-.
mitted that the object of these very reinforcements was war
on our borders and against us? Neither Secretary of State,
nor President of the United States has any right, or pretence of right, to put a foreign soldier on the soil of
any State, and no one knows this better than  Mr.
Seward. But, in his haste to propitiate Great Britain, he
forgot it all, and, like every other humiliation to which
he subjected himself and his country, it was fruitless; for
we search in vain through his own despatches, the parliamentary Blue Books, and the newspapers, for any kind
word which this act of gratuitous submission extorted.
This was humiliation in the germ. Let us go on to its
blushing flowers and bitter fruits.
The Slave Trade Treaty was the next voluntary sacrifice,
and as to this, scarcely one word is to be found in the
volume of which Mr. Seward is so proud. It deserves a
distinct consideration.
There were once-when we had a country and a nametwo traditionary principles closely cherished in the hearts
of the American people: the absolute sanctity of the flag
with a denial of the right of police search on the ocean,
and the Monroe Doctrine. We now think of them as of
the dead. When in life and vigour-and especially is' this
true of the second-they were troublesome and sometimes
inconvenient, but they had their root in a high national
spirit, and, they expressed a sense of national power. The
fatuity of Mr. Lincoln's Government has sacrificed them
5




both; the Monroe Doctrine perhaps from necessity, but the
sanctity of the flag, as we can demonstrate, voluntarily,
fruitlessly, and, as we think, shamefully. Mr. Seward may
think nothing of it, but this reversal of history, this renunr
ciation of ancient policy, gives a sharp pang. When, fortyfive years ago, MIr. Wilberforce hinted such a surrender in a
qualified form to Mr. J. Q. Adams, the reply was,," My
countrymen will never assent to such an arrangement."
When, six years later, Mr. Rush signed a convention to
this effect with Sir Stratford Cafning and Mr. Huskisson,
the Senate amended it so as to prevent its application to
the American coasts, and then it was rejected by England.
General Jackson, in 1834, directed his Secretary of State to
say to Sir Charles Vaughan that " the United States were
resolved never to become a party to any convention on this
subject;"' and this, said Mr. Benton, speaking of it, years
afterwards, was "the true American answer."  It was Mr.
Cass' s diplomatic triumph in France to prevent this iaterpolation into the law of nations in 1841. Mr. Webster
refused to recognize it in his' negotiations with Lord Ashburton, as did Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Everett with Lord
Aberdeen, even in its new disguise of "'visitation."'"Without intending," said Mr. Webster in one of his
gravest despatches to General Cass, "or desiring to influence the policy of other governments on this important
subject, this Government has reflected on what was due to
its own character and position, as the leading maritime
power on the American continent, left free to make choice
of such means for the fulfillment of its duties as it should
deem best suited to its dignity. The result of its reflections
has been that it does not concur in measures which, for
whatever benevolent purpose they may be adopted, or with
whatever care or moderation they may be exercised, have
a tendency to place the police of the seas in the hands of a
single Power." As recently as 1858, for the continuity of




-35 -
precedents is perfect, President Buchanan said with emphasis, " The occasional abuse of the flag is an evil far less
to be deprecated than would be the establishment of any
regulations incompatible with the freedom of the seas."
"I don't want any negotiations," said Mr. Crittenden in
the Senate, "with Great Britain, or any discussion with
Great Britain, about the right of search or right of visitation. That is a subject which is exhausted, for our minds
are made up about it. I should think it unworthy of this
Government to enter into any negotiation on the subject."
-' Without referring," said Mr. Dallas in London, " to this
question more closely, it is a point'which is essentiallyconnected with one of the fundamental principles of the
American Revolution, that principle being the necessity of
maintaining on behalf of the great American people, as
a great community, the independence of their flag. I.am
not now going to argue this question as to visit and search,
but I should like, on the Fourth of July, to announce to my
fellow-countrymen, that visit and search, in regard to
American vessels in time of peace, is finally ended."  "Wa.e
have never," said Senator Seward on the 29th of May,
1858, four short years ago, "We have never recognized,this pretension of Great Britain, and we never will. Therefore it is that, for twenty years past, I have never looked
into a law  book to ascertain the law in regard to this
subject. It is enough that the claim cannot be permitted
It is enough that it would destroy the equality of nations.
It is enough that it is a claim on the part of another power
to exercise vigilance and supervision over the conduct of
this nation."*
Great must have been Lord Lyons's delight and surprise
when, if this record tells the whole story, on the 22d of
March, Mr. Seward, in, hot haste, wrote to him, offering to
* Lawrence on the Right of Visit and Search, pages 94 —117.




-36 —
surrender everything-traditions, prejudice, associations,
history, everything-in order to put down a trade which,
according to his own showing, neither Americans, nor
English had any part in, and telling him that, if the suggestion were agreeable, he had the project of a Convention
ready for signature. His Lordship did not, and could not,
hesitate. The diplomatic fruit at which every British statesman-every Minister in this country, from Sir Augustus
Foster downwards —had been stretching out his hand, and
watching anxiously, fell at his feet, Mr. Seward shaking
the tree. On the same day, (22d,) Lord Lyons agreed
to it. Before the 28th, the Convention was revised and
rieady for signature, for on that day a further experiment
was made on Mr. Seward's facility in a suggestion to make
the treaty perpetual; and, on the 7th April, the whole gestation being a fortnight, a compact was made for ten years,
by which an unlimited right of police search within liberal
geographical limits was granted to English cruisers, and
mixed judicial commissions were instituted on the coast of
Africa, and in the city of New York. It was ratified, of
course, by the Abolitionized Senate, and is now the law of
this part of the land. For his share in it, Lord Lyons received wlhat, no doubt, he is on every account well entitled
to, the honour of the Grand Cross of the Bath. If the venerable statesman who, in 1824, signed a treaty of this kind
with Mr. Rush, and who still survives, ever turns his mind
from the Orient to the Occidental world, (occidental, we
fear, in every sense,) he may be excused for wonder at the
miraculous decay in American statesmen, of that fierce,
obstructive, chivalrous spirit which once snuffed danger to
national honour in any breeze that affected our flag on the
ocean.
Since 1842, says Mr. Seward, but one American vessel
(the Wanderer) has ever landed an African on our soil. In
March, 1862 (p. 45) he boasted that the blockade of the




-37 —
Southern coasts was as effective as the world had ever known.
Slaves certainly could not be landed then. The emancipation policy was germinating, which, if successful, according
to the theory of its authors and advocates, would put an
end to slavery, and of course the slave trade. The Gonstitution of the Confederate States, (a surer guaranty than any
treaty that could be patched up at Washington,) prohibited
the trade. There was no conceivable inducement at that
time to make an anti-slave trade compact, unless one is to be
found, (and this is our theory,) in the willingness to propitiate the anti-slavery party of Great Britain, and seduce
Lord Palmerston's Government into a retraction of the
belligerent recognition of the South. We challenge the
detection of any other. We shall presently see how fruitless, how pernicious and, in the estimate of other nations,
how discreditable it was.
Fruitless it certainly was, if the end proposed was a
change in the policy of Great Britain. This volume, in
which, by-the-bye there is a significant silence as to the
Seward surrenders, shows that not a feature of the Russell
countenance towards North and South relaxed, even at this
sacrifice. The Earl was, if possible, sterner and more captious than before. With others in Great Britain, those we
mean of a different party, the Opposition, whose possible
accession to power a cautious diplomatist should always
consider, the effect of this humiliation was positively evil.
" The quarrel between North and South," says a leading
organ of the Tory party, "has given us an opportunity which
has been used of putting an end to what was left of the
Slave trade. The dominant party of the North has not
been sorry to gain credit cheaply for a certain degree of
sincerity in their abuse of slavery. The Stars and Stripes
cannot again, if we show ourselves disposed to enforce the
treaty obligations into which Mr. Lincoln has entered, even
at the cost of war, be used to cover this traffic. It is not to




-'s
-be supposed, we should, recognise the Confederate States
without exacting that they should hold themselves bound
by the spirit of the old compact between England and the
Union of which they formed a part; and it will certainly
be the duty of the Government to obtain such guarantees
as, without infringing the independence or affronting the
jealous susceptibilities of the Southern people, will make it
impossible that the Confederate flag, the flag which Lee,
and Beauregard, and Stonewall Jackson have taught us to
honour-shall never be disgraced, as the Federal colours so
often were, by floating from the mast of a slaver. There
will be no difficulty in obtaining such a treaty. The Confederates have not the slightest desire to revive the slave
trade; their Constitution, their State laws, and the interests.of their ruling class, as well as the strong opinion of the
country, are against it. And they cannot conceive that
their dignity would be compromised by doing what France
-and Spain, the United States and Brazil, have voluntarily
-done. There will be no difficulty, then, in making this war
the means of ensuring the final extinction of the slave trade.
Indeed, when the North was forced to abandon it, it was
virtually destroyed."*
This is poor consolation for Mr. Seward's renunciation of
ancient principles.
Dangerous, practically, this treaty has been, or may prove
to be. By one of its provisions the police supervision of
Great Britain is extended to a distance of thirty leagues,
not from certain portions, but from the whole coast of Cuba.
now, waiving the apparent indecorum of defining the extent
of such a concession by measurement from the limits of a
friendly, tho' jealous power, it is apparent that a line of thirty
leagues from Point Yeacos or Matanzas would touch the
Florida Keys, so that our coast, supposing it still to be ours,
* The Standard, January 6, 1863.




and narrow seas, are placed under this annoying surveillance'
No other independent power on earth, not even Hayti ever
made such a concession,* and this too, at a moment, when,
in view of possible contingencies, it is the obvious policy of
the Northern Government to remove as far away as possible
the naval forces of European powers, who, tho' to-day neutrals, mav to-morrow become belligerents.  In a letter from
the  British  Charge d'Affaires  of September 13, 1862,
is a formidable list of t" Her Majesty's ships employed in the
suppression of the slave trade at North America and the
West Indies," comprising two line of battle ships, (an odd
eraft for such  a service,) four frigates, four corvettes and
eleven gun-boats, with an aggregate armament of 485 guns,
twice as many as are appropriated  to the whole continent
of Africa from Sierra Leone to the mouth of the Red Sea.
Of course the presence of such squadrons, however discreetly managed, leads to trouble.  This volume contains
more than  one complaint of " unreasonable searches and
seizures" (p. 284) under this very treaty, and the old story
of harsh conduct to our "' innocent rnerchlantmen" begins
to fill our newspapers.t
If thus fruitless, and with this germ of possible mischief,
can such a comlpact be otherwise than discreditable in the
estimation, of foreign nations, and especially of that one
great Power who, on this question of the freedom of the
seas, has stood firmly by us?  On this topic, the volume is
painfully silent, and if the French Government uttered or
intimated sorrow, or dissent, or reproach, it has been sup.
* Article IV., Treaty of Hayti with Gre'at Britain, 1839.
-~ The case of the " Morning Star," reported in the Evening Post of January
16th, 1863. In August last, Mr. Sfuart, the British Charge, informed Mr.
Seward that Her Majesty's ship Griffen had captured and burned off Loando
an American barque, fitted for the slave trade, and belonging to New York.
The letter was acknowledged by Mr. Seward, who oddly enough said,'"I
thank you for the information thus communicated, which is in every respect
*.ntirely acceptable and gratifying."




---    () -   -
pressed.  The Spanish authorities wei'e:not so reticent, ~ibr
we find in a despatch fiorom iMr. Perry at M adrid, (p. 509) the
following curious  statement of what that Government
thought, which we quote at lengrth:
At aJ recent interview with Mr. Calderon Collantes, that' minister enquired if I had. received a copy of the treaty' recently concluded between the United States and Eng"land, concerning the muutual right of search, for the sup"pression of the A-frican slave trade,, He was much sur"prised tlhat after combatting that principle so long, the
6" United States should have yielded now a right so exceed"' ingly liable to be abused in practice, and he was veil
6" curious to know what provisions had been stipulated to
6' guard the exercise of the right from such abnse. I replied' regretting I could give no information other than what' Mr. Calderon had himself seen in the newspapers.  I
"understood, however, that the stoppage of the use of the
"American flag in the slave trade was an object which
"would naturally commend itself to the favor of the present' Government of the United States, and I enquired if Spain
6' had not herself conceded the same right.  M'r. Calderon
"said that she had, at a period in her history which could
"n ot be recalled with pleasure, but that ever since he him"self had held the portfolio of foreign afiairs, he had been
"desirous of an opportunity to revise that whole treaty, in
"which the right of search was thus granted to Great
" Britain.  The exercise of this right was vexatious, and
"besides, the English were always talking, in Parliament
-' and out, of their having purchased this right of Spain for
~40,000, sterling money,, always putting their money for"ward, atnd he (Mr. Calderon) would be exceedingly glad
6  f an opportunity to give them  their ~40,000, and have' the treaty back again.  Mr. Calderon asked me if I sup"posed the recent treaty would be ratified by the American
"Senate. I replied to him that I had no reasonable doubt




-41
"that it would be, and remarked that I supposed that
"England was now taking steps to obtain the same concession from the Government of France. Mr. Calderon said
" he had little doubt of it, but he wished to see the Ameri"' can treaty, as it might afford a basis for demanding a
"revision of the Spanish treaty, as to the manner in which
"'this right was to be exercised. Though perhaps this
"conversation was not intended by Mr. Calderon to be
" reported to you, I have thought it interesting.
ThIis seems, naturally enough, to have irritated Mr. Seward, for, on the 2d August, he thus pettishly retorts, giving
a fling at the Spanish authorities, which was neither discreet nor dignified.
" Your despatch of July 11 (No. 69), has been received.
" The African slave trade, which has been so long clandes" tinely carried on from American ports, was a mercenary
"traffic, without even the poor pretext that it brought
"' labourers into our country, or that other or worse pretext,
"that it was necessary to the safety or prosperity of any
"' State or- section. It was carried on in defiance of our
"laws, by corrupting the administration of justice. The
"treaty to which you refer contains no provisions that can
" embarrass an honest and lawful trade, and none that can
"inflict a wound upon the national pride. It was freely
" offered by this Government to Great Britain, not bought,
" or solicited by that Government. It is in harmony with
"the sentiments of the American people. It was ratified
"by the Senate unanimously, and afterwards distinctly ap"proved, with not less unanimity, by both Houses of Con"gress. Not a voice has been raised against it in the'country. I send you a copy of it for Mr. Calderon, as
"you have requested."
Thus, then, has Mr. Seward, without apparent compensation, bound all that is left of this (N7orthern nation in chains,
6




42 -
from which there is no peaceful'escape. That there is not
a secret history in. this inexplicable transaction, an understanding of future sympathy and co-operation between the
contracting parties, the Lincoln and Russell Governments,
in case their tenure of power is prolonged, we are far froln
affirming. The suspicion, the fear, the hope-describe it
as we may-that this sacrifice is not made in vain, and
that the English administration may find it to be its interest
to make this a substantial contract, by giving strength to
the party who voluntarily tendered it, has more than once
come like a dark shadow over us. An anti-slave-trade
treaty with the North alone, would be the idlest of forms,
except on the theory that, as heretofore, all the slave
trading is to be carried on with NTorthern capital and in
Northern bottoms. Then, it may be of value, even if the
Southern Confederacy be established. Otherwise, it is, as
we have said, utterly fruitless. Fruitless, we have it shown
to be as to immediate results.
It was in this same month of March, that the administration assembled and brought into action all its diplomatic
array abroad, regular and irregular. Not only were Mr.
Weed and the Bishops on the spot, but, as this volume
shows, other combinations were initiated.
The. convocation of this new diplomatic Congress, was
formally announced to our ministers abroad, who appear
to have been confounded by the news. "When, in November last,". said Mr. Seward, "we thought we had reason to apprehend new and very serious dangers in Europe,
the subject was taken into consideration by the President
at a full meeting of the cabinet. It was understood that
the insurgents were represented abroad by a number of
active, unscrupulous, and plausible men, who manifestly
weresgcqu:,rin1g;i.fluenc:e in socieily, and in the press, and
empioyinc it with dangerous effect? and it was thought that
such efforts could be profitably counteracted by the pre



sence in London and Paris of some loyal, high-spirited, and
intellectual men, of social position and character.  WVe considered that the presence of such persons there, unless they should
act wilth more discretion than we could confidently expect, would
annoy, and possibly embarrass, our ministers abroad. It was
decided that hazard must be incurred in view of dangers
which seemed imminent."
A better reason for not sending these semi-official agents
abroad could hardly be given than in the lines we have
ventured to italicise. So thought Mr. Adams, for we
search this book in vain for any expression, on his part, of
gratitude for the suggestion. Who the new agents were,
does not appear in these despatches, though aliunde, we
know all about thenm. The Bishops and Mr. Weed hurried
to the rescue. The latter, the accredited friend, the almost
partner of the Secretary of State, was received in England
with great friendliness and apparent unlreserve. He was
the guest of Lady Russell, at Richmond Park, and duly
wrote home letters to be printed in the Albany Evening
Journal, narrating the local gossip which her ladyship bestowed on him, and criticising the details of her household.
Occasionally, his services were needed on a more public
stage. Bishop Mclvaine, who seemns to have been in the
service of the administration from the timne of his visit to
England, until the adjournment of the triennial convention, in October, 1862, always active, meddlesome, intrusive, sometimes needed the assistance of his lay colleague,
and we find that Mr. Weed, the conservative of 1863, was
not far behind the mosftextreme anti-slavery propagandists,
in the spring of 1862.
On the 3d _February, 1862, Mr. Weed attended and addressed a meeting at No. 2 Pall Mall, and, among other
things, said: "As to the prospects of the future, the administration not only desired, but expected emancipation as
the fruit and result of the war. Slavery was and would be




44 --
burned out of every acre and rood of territory conquered
fror the rebels; so that, by process of war and by legal
enactment, if the United States Government were successful, slavery would cease to exist."*
Not content with Mr. Weed and the Prelates, Mr. Seward summoned Mr. Motley from Vienna to London to confer and co-operate with Mr. Adams.
And here, let us pause over another wreck of reputa-,
tion which is seen through the haze of this official correspondence.  SMr. John Lothrop Motley-not, as he tells us,
the Emperor of Austria imagined (p. 557), "a German
exile," but "6 a descendant of the early Pilgims of New
England," had, before he was temlpted into  diplomatic
paths, a high position in American authorship.  Justly or
unjustly, he had gained a large share of approval on both
sides the Atlantic, and when his appointment to Austria
was announced, those who were willing to judge Mr. Seward kindly were content to see a parallel to the case of
Washingto-n Irving, whom  MAr. Webster sent as Minister
to Spain years ago, and whose official action, while it involved no neglect of public interests or duties  was improved by labour in the cause of letters, far dearer to hinm
than polities.  But 1" the descendant of the early Pilgrims"
could not, and, we are bound to say, does not seem to have
tried to, repress the inherited and inherent fanaticism which
seems to be interwoven with the heart-strings of New England.  Before he was appointed, he wrote an  essay for
the London Times on the Constitution, of which it was
justly said by an able critic:  "That its Mrelodramatic style
* London Record, February 8: In curious contrast with this harangue
is Mr. Weed's palinodes of 1863.  "If," said he, "the North rejected
abolition as a merely political test, will it be accepted now, when the lives of
our sons and brothers, and the preservation of the country are involved   V We
ask this question now in view of the concerted effort to narrow this mighty
strLiggle for national existence do-wn to an abolition crusade."




-45 -
prevails widely in the American press, and is well adapted
to the condition to which it has reduced the American
mind; showing, as it does, how words may be made effective
in clouding the mind, and how sentiments may be boldly set
side by side with facts which utterly belie them."* Though
startled by this, we were not prepared for such revelations
of'puerility and what we are tempted to call'snobbishness'
disclosed in the half-dozen despatches from Vienna which
Mr. Seward has cruelly given to the world. We have neither room nor patience to consider them in detail, but beg
the reader, who may, naturally enough, in view of Mr.
Motley's reputation, doubt the severe justice of our judgment, to examine for himself the despatch of November,
1861, narrating his reception by the Emperor, and the concluding one of October, 1862, in which, with a poor garniture of familiar quotations, and a dismal continuity o
platitudes, he discusses the position and character of the
British Chancellor of the Exchequer, with whom, one
would think, the Minister to Austria has no more concern
than with the Rajah of Sarawak, and to whose speech at
Manchester he applies the gentle and gentlemanly criticism: " Blistered be the tongue that speaks of shame is the
only and fit response to such rhetoric and such prophecy
as Mr. Gladstone's." (p. 572.)
Why, with such antecedents, and circumstances, Mr. Motley was selected to go to London to help Mr. Adams
would be a puzzle but for his assertion of his own fitness
for the work. He is the "Mr. Lofty" of this diplomatic
comedy. "I told Count Rechberg that I had recently had
a very long and full conversation with Lord John Russell.
&c."  "I told hin I had received similar assurances from
other members of the English cabinet, &c."  "H e asked
* The Constitution and Mr. Motley. Philadelphia, 1861.




lme what I thought of the attitude of France, and I tol'd
him that M. Thouvenel had assmuied me, &c."; and at last he
winds up with a passage which we reproduce, as being as
concentrated a specimen of egotism and official indiscre.tion as this volume contains.
"One thing is very certain. The government here will
"be very much influenced by the course of policy pursued
"towards the United States by the British and French gov": ernments; and I am therefore glad that, in pursuance of
"your instructions, I passed some time before coming to"my post informing myself at the fountain heads, in Eng"' land and France, of the probable nature of that policy.
I' T am constantly questioned on the subject by all with
" whom I come in contact. Should a tory government
"' succeed the present cabinet in England, I anticipate much
"' trouble. Nothing can exceed the virulence with which
" the extreme conservative party regard us, nor the delight:
"' with which they look forward to 6ur extinction as a na"' tion. They consider such a consummation of our civil
"w' ar as the most triumphant answer which could be made
"' to their own reform party. The hatred to the English
" radicals is the secret of the ferocity and brutality with' which the Times, the Saturday IReview, and other tory
"organs of the press have poured out their insults upon
"America ever since the war began. In the present ads" ministration and its supporters, I know we have many
" warm friends, warmer in their sentiments towards us
c than it would be safe for them, in the present state of
parties, to avow."
YWhat, we may diffidently ask, will be thought of the
propriety and expediency of publishing such. a despatch as
this, if by any political accident Lord Derby and " the extremQ conservative party" should come into power?
MWlether Mr. Motley dlicd bring to MiIr. Adams' aid his
famili.iar acqnaintance with the leaders of Briitish politics,




does Atot appear very clearly, but whether he did or not, no
result was attained.  The aggregated  influence of prelates
and  politicians in  London  availed  naught.  The ministry
refused to recede a hair's breadth from  their recognition of
the  belligerent rights  of the  South.   The  Alabama  and
Oreto, and that unacjud'icated  craft, the Bermuda, sailed
from  Liverpool, freighted with ammunition, or destined for
destructive war on Northern commerce.  Strict port discipline watched the Tuscarora at Southampton, and a British
frigate literally convoyed the Nashville to sea.  The poor
little Saginaw  was ordered away from  Ht]ong Kong.*   The
Emily St. Pierre sWas not given up.  The Bull Dog (p. 228),carried  "' one Pegram   and seven other persons"  to officer
-' 290."   In short, at tihe end of Mr. Seward's year? the curtain dropped on  a scene  of impotent diplomacy, which  all
his  rhetoric  cannot disguise.  Mediation  or intervention
never was drneaned of in England; and the belligerent re* In April last, Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Adams as to the " Chinese'?
Rebellion, a special despatch, which it would be unfair to suppress or mutilate.  Its oddity, -in view of everything at home and abroad, is superlative.
" The reports we receive from China show that the insurrection there is becoming very formidable, and they leave it doubtful whether the British and
French forces now in China are adequate to secure the inviolability of the
persons and property of the subjects and citizens of the western powers
dwelling in the comimercial cities of that Empire.  It is a matter of deep
regret to us that our troubles at home render it hazardous to withdraw a part
of our great land and naval forces from operating here, and send them to China
to co-operate with the forces of the allies there. As you are well aware, the:continuance of the insurrection in the United States is due to the attitudes of
Great Britain and France towards our country. It would seem to be desirable
for those two states to have our co-operation in China in preserving a comomerce of vast importance to them as well as to ourselves. That co-operation
we could give if we were relieved from the necessity for maintaining a blockade and seige of the Southern ports. Mmoeover, the question may be well
aLsked, Where is this tendency to insurrection, which Great Britain and France
seem to us to be practically, although unintentionally, fostering, to end? It
breaks out in the Levant; it grows flagrant on the China coasts; it even lifts
dup its head in France. Is it not the interest of all great maritime states to
erss o e,; lem,.st to discourage it?  The President does not expect ycu to
7:i-!:e aSy:~,3eciaJ. or formal suggestion of these views to the British Q:vernvrie, ntc >u  ii seems to him  you may properly use them, incidentally, with
advantage to your intercourse with the British Gevernment and British
society."




cognifion, for the withdrawal of which there was so -muc h
fruitless urgency, remains in as full force as on the day it
was announced.  "4How  far," said Mr. Adams, in one of
his latest letters,'the question of a recognition of the
insurgents will enter into the deliberation (of Parliament),
I will not venture to predict.  My opinion is that that
event now  depends almost entirely on the fortune of the
war.  If we prove ourselves, by _February next, no more able
to control its results than wre are at this moment, it will be
difficult for ministers longer to resist the current of sentiment leading in that direction in both Houses of Parliament.  Even the unpleasant alternative of appearing to
uphold slavery against the action of the Government will
be acquiesced in as an overruling necessity, dictated by the
popular opinion.  I feel it my duty to say this much, in
order to prevent the smallest misconception of the existing
state of things, on this side, in the minds of the Governmrnent at home."
If to be forewarned is to be forearmned, then, in the begins
ning of November, when this ominous despatch reached
America, was the administration at Washington clad in
proof; yet on  tIhe 10th  of the  same month, General
McClellan was removed from his command and banished
to the mild sympathies of Tew York and Boston, and the
chapter of disaster opened, which seems to have closed, in
bloody disappointment, on the heights of Fredericksburg,
at Vicksburg, aid in the doubtful struggle at Murfreesborough.*
Turning to lM/ir. Seward's diplomacy in Paris, let us
briefly and candidly state its course and its fruits.  As
tending to somethinig like a result at the moment these
* Ashto Frede-ricksburg, there is in General Hooker's testimony before the
Senate',ICommittee the following inexplicable passage:,It was just dark.
Finding I had lost as many nen as my orders required me to lose, I suspended
the attack."-Senate Document No. I73, page 25.




- 49 -
hlines Lre written,  they are very im.portant.  In it, one thing
is very manifest, tlhat Mr. Dayton  never enijoyed the  same
confidential  and  cordial  relations  to  the  Government at
home as did Mr. Adams, or Mr. Motley, or even Mr. Pike,
of the Tribune; and this, for no other apparent reason than,
that a year ago, in the matter of the surreander of privateering, Mr. Dayton had  proved, not only that he had a will of
his own, but that, when he yielded it to positive orders, he
was right and tLhe Government wrong.*   There can hardly
be conceived  a position  of greater embarrassment for an
intelligent, patriotic  and  high  spirited  man, than  that of
Mr. Dayton during the  anxious  and busy year just ended.
Accredited  to a court whose master prid.es hinmself on  hi7s
demeanour  of  reserve,  if  0not  his  policy  of  subtlletfy;
* The threat which, in July 1862, wats made towarcs England, in February'
1863 is about to be aimed somewhere else.  On the 17thl imnstiant, as these
sheets are passing through the press, the Senate Bill authorizing privateers
was dug from its forgotten grave and animated.  It was passed in spite of the
opposition of the Chairman of the Committee of' lIorlign Affairs.  No core.
ment is needed on the following proceedings:
"Ma. MOicDOUtoALL said he especially wanted this bill passed, for he believed
that before Congress met again, we should be at war with a foreign isPow-er, and
should need all our force on sea and land.
6 MR. SUMNER offered an amendment conuiingi the operation of the bill to the
suppression of the rebellion.  He argued that we shoulcd not put anything in
-the bill like a menace.  Wben we were engaged in a foreig'n war, then would
be time enough to meet that question.
" Ma. McDouGALL asked the Senastor, as Chairmean of the Co mittee on
Foreign Relations, if we were not now threatened with foreigna complications.
" Ma. SUIrNERt said he had no information that was not open to the Senate.
"M iR. McDovrGAL believed that before the meeting of another' Conllgress we
should be involved in a foreiggn war, and he wanTvted to hlave the country
prepared.' The amendment of Mr. Suumner was rejected-yeas 1, navys 22.
" MiR, SUMNER offered an amendment as a substfitute revriving the acts of
1812 and 1813, concerning the letters, f tmuarque, ancd applying them to that
portion of the United States in insurrection~  Retj etecl.'      Ma..SUAiNER offered another amendmlient, as a substitute, authorizing the
Secretary of the Navy to hire any vessels needed for the national service,
putting them  in charge of officers commissioned by the United States, and
giving them the character of national ships. Rejected-yeas 8, nrye28.' Ma. Davrs, of Kentucky, offered a substitute, authorizing the Preiident to
pay any vessel regularly put into commission thllee times the value of any
ship or ships captured belonging to the States now in insurrection~ Rejected."
The bill was then passed-yeas 27, nays 9-no Democraitic SenaCor voting.
7




opposed by what, abroad, is a wvast power, social-sytnpathy and antipathy; confronted by an able, astute, and,
in his line of diplomacy, accomplished adversary; unfamiliar with the language of the refined and artificial
society in which he was plunged; Mr. Dayton had, at least,
a right to a thorough and cordial support at home, and to
something more than a chilling and formal endorsement of
his conduct. Mr. Seward was never wearied of sending
honied compliments to Mr. Adams as to his ability, his
sagacity, his discretion, his "far-reaching grasp" (p. 201).
To his colleague in France, he was far more sparing.
But Mr. Dayton laboured under another disadvantage
which was radical. Representing as he has and does,
a jealous, suspicious, irritable Government impregnated
thoroughly with the one idea of unity at any cost, and
coercion to an illimitable extent-a Government which,
whether right or wrong at the beginning, has learned
nothing and forgotten nothing, and resents any different
view of the circumstances which surround it, it was difficult, if not impossible, especially with the meagre information furnished him, to rise to the appreciation of fair play
and really friendly feeling on the part of the Government
to which he was accredited. Yet such has been the conduct
and temper-as the impartial world admits-of the French
government -from first to last —from the time when, long
ago, M. Thouvenel, whom Mr. Dayton says was a friend,
and whose displacement he regretted —gently hinted the
possibility of the war becoming  protracted and bloody,
down to the last offer of friendly intervention, pendente lite,
within the present month.  This steady and considerate
friendliness was disturbed by no hostile act-no departure
from practical neutrality. No armed vessels left the ports of
Frane —no contraband commodities were shipped thence.
The indiscretions here, such as the ostentatious enlistment
of the Orleans princes in the Federal army, or the welcome




to the Conde de Reus after he had broken away from the
French co-operation in Mexico, seemed to make no impression on the really friendly sentiment in France.*   History
has well settled the question, once agitated, of the good
faith of the Bourbon dynasty to us in our time of early
trouble.   It must, we think, pronounce the same judgment
on the doings of the dynasty of their imperial successor.
But Mr. Seward's Minister in Paris was not allowed to
see this, or to act as if he even dreamed of it.  The only
really cordial and friendly despatch ever sent is one, suppressed in this collection, written in February, 1862, on the
subject of Court presentations at the Tulleries, in which,
after saying that " it is pecurliarly uncomfortable at the present moment to find American citizens leaving their counr
try —a prey to factions and civil war-disturbing the Court
of a friendly power, and embarrassing our representative
there with questions of personal interest and pretension;"
Mr. Seward adds quite sensibly, though with a stateliness
of which he rarely divests himself, and  at which, in connexion with the trivial topic of discussion, it is hardly possible not to smile:"Let the Emperor and Empress of F'ance receive when
"' they will, and as many or few as they will, and let all
* The treatment of the Orleans young gentlemen seems to have attracted adverse criticism in France. Some time between the 13th and 23d of June, Mr.
Dayton wrote a confidential despatch, (No. 164,) which is suppressed in this
volume, but the answer shows to what it related. " The President appreciates
the vigilance and the prudence which suggested your confidential despatch.
It may be enough to say, in reply, that the Comte de Paris and the Duc de
Chartres, after a year's service in the army of the United States, in which
they have conducted themselves with the utmost propriety and the highest
gallantry, have returned to Europe. It is not to be doubted that they carry
with them the affectionate gratitude of the American people. This, however,
is a sentiment won by them, not for themselves alone, or even peculiarly, but,
as in the case of Lafayette and Rochambeau, it is a sentiment won by thetan
for France." The analogy to Lafayette is not happy. The first/attle in
which he served on this soil was a defeat, not comparable in its bloodiness to
some we have encountered, but still an appalling defeat. He did not return
to France in the hour of disaster.




"others, as well as those who are admitted, turn their at"tention to the question how they can serve their country
"abroad; and, if they find no better way to do it than by
m naking their attendance in the saloons of the Tulleries,
"let them return home to a country that now, for the first
"time, and not for a long time, needs the active efforts of
"every one of its loyal children to save itself from destruc"tion. Finally, above all things, have no question with the
"Government of France on this subject. Rather introduce
" nobody, however justly distinguished, than let a question
"of fashion or ceremony appear in the records of the im"portant period in which we are acting for the highest in"' terests of our country and of humanity."
No word of cordiality comparable to this, is to be found
anywhere else. Mr. Dayton's situation was a difficult one,
and Mr. Seward did nothing to render it' less so. Sometimes he is-at least, so it seems to us, looking at these despatches in print-almost insulting, as, for instance, when,
in March of last year, in answer to one in which Mr. Dayton felicitated himself on accidentally hearing the views of
the administration "from  the newspapers," the Secretary
sends some meagre military news as to the operations
against New Orleans, prefacing it with the conjecture: "1
suppose I hazard nothing of publicity here by informing you that
General Butler, with an adequate land force, and Captain
Porter, with a fleet, are already in motion to secure and
hold New Orleans."  It was about the same time that Mr.
Dayton wrote about the cotton supply, and said: "' Do not
delay action, I beg of you, a day beyond the time when
you can act on this subject with propriety," and the answer
was a cold, unsatisfactory one of eight lines, in. sharp contrast with the pages the Secretary was writing to Mr.
Adams and Pike, and Cameron. Well might Mr. Dayton
say, in reply, " I was a little surprised by the vague and general terms in which you expressed your intentions, and felt




that the'Government here would not consider them as explicit and satisfactory as those.heretofore used." To this,
or other despatches like this, the answer is stern and repulsive. "To bring the Emperor to this conviction is your
present urgent duty. If successful in performing it, you
will render a benefit to France worth more than any conquest, while you will direct a stream of healing oil upon
the wounds of our afflicted land." To be thus reminded
of one's duty, when conscious of performing it, is anything
but agreeable.
In August, Mr. Dayton's sufferings became intolerable,
and compelled him to send a despatch to Washington
which tells its tale of suffering and injustice with an emphasis that- if anything could, must have made an impression::It would seem to me that you must have some infor" mation, beyond what I receive here, as to the views of
"France, from her minister at Washington. If so, may I
" beg that you will cbmmunicate it? I am sure that I
"need not say that I ask this information from no idle
" curiosity, but as something essential to a useful discharge
"of my duties here. Nothing can be more embarrassing
" than being in the dark upon matters which may have
" transpired between yourself and the French minister at
" Washington. As an illustration of this, the only know" ledge I had of the actual purpose of Mr. Mercier's re" cent visit to Richmond was obtained first from  Lord
"Cowley, the British ambassador, and next, at second
"hand, from the Emperor. You will, under these circum"stances, appreciate at once my embarrassments in falling
"into conversation with Lord Cowley on this subject. I
"make this reference, not at all as matter of complaint, but
"only as an illustration of my meaning, when I allude to
"embarrassments arising from a want of knowledge of
"what may have transpired, if anything, between yourself




5 -    
"and Mr. Mercier.  I know and fully appreciate the vast
"extent of your labours, and it may well be that nothing
"has recently been communicated by the French govern"ment.  If so, I beg that you will excuse me for directing
your attention to the subject."
This was in August, and Mr. Mercier's visit to Richmond
was in April; and though Mr. Dayton had been duly informed of his having gone, no word was ever sent to him
as to why he had gone, or what was the result of his visit.
Mr. Mercier, as we now know, wrote all about it to his government instantl) on bhis return.  Mr. Seward never told
his representative abroad anything, till he supplicated for
some information, and if he did afterwards, it is suppressed
in this publication (p. 378).
And why, let us here pause and ask, why this mystification
on our side as to Mr. Mercier's visit to Richmond when there
was none on the other —why wag Mr. Dayton thus kept in
the dark while the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was
thoroughly well informed, and whed the only thing the outside world knew was, that the instant the Gassendi brought
the mysterious wayfarer back, the President and Mr. Seward
rushed to the Navy Yard to greet him  and find out all
he chose  to tell them?*  These  questions  are  more
easily answered now, than they could have been. a fortnight ago before copies of the "Livre Jaune " reached this
country.
The truth we take to be, that among Mr. Seward's virtues is not that of silence. He talks, we imagine, as fliuently
as he writes, and probably with no greater precision. If Mr.
Wendell Phillips is to be credited, and on matters of fact,
* In curious and impressive contrast with this almost boisterous welcome,
was the austere reserve of the Confederate Executive to Mr. Mercier.
"N'ayant pas cru devoir demander E, voir le President Davis, il ne m'a wtd
fait, a ce sujet, aucune insinuation, non plus que le moindre effort pour donner
a ma presence une autre signification qclue celle que l'avoit reellement."




- 55
we know  no reason that he should not be, Mr. Seward,
before his accession to office, talked Mr. Buchanan's Secretary of State into a sort of confidence, that he was, and
meant to be, a conservative and Constitution-respecting
man, and yet it is to be doubted if he remembers anything
about it now. So, we imagine, with Mr. Mercier, for on no
other principle can we account for the palpable difference
of recollection between the two witnesses who have recently
been upon the stand, and whose testimony, in no uncharitable spirit, we parallelize:
Mr. Mercier to Mr. Thouvenel, April Mr. Seward to the President, February
13th, 1862.                         9th, 1863.
"i Mr. Seward told me that 1 might   "No suggestions were made to M.
add, if I found an opportune occasion, Mercier, by the Secretary of State,
that according to his convictions, the  that induced or were designed or calNorth was animated by no spirit of culated to induce him to undertake a
revenge, and that, for himself, he  mission to Richmond in April last, or
would be most happy to find himself at any other time. He was not then,
again in the Senate with all those the  nor has he or any other person ever
South might choose to send there.    been authorized by this Government
" Iundertook this journey (to Rich- or by the Secretary of State to make
mond) with the explicit acquiescence  any representations of any kind or on
of the Secretary of State, and, as it any subject, to the insurrectionary
seemed to me, according to his de- agents  or so-called authorities at
sire."                              Richmond, or to hold any communication with them  on behalf of this
Government."
*    X,  *    *    *    *
"Since the 4th of March, 1861, no
communication, direct or indirect,
formal or informal, has been had by
this Government or by the Secretary
of State with the insurgents, their
aiders or abettors."
"Passports were granted at the
request of those distinguished persons respectively, and not on any suggestion of the Government or Secrdetary of State. They severally travelled
in a private and unofficial capacity.
They bore no communication, whether
formal or informal, verbal or written,
from this Government or from the
Secretary of State to any of the insurgents, and they brought none from
any such persons to this Government
or to the Secretary of State."




We cannot but think that the suppressed passages of Mr.
Seward's despatch, of the 23d of August, in answer to Mr.
Dayton's supplication for light as to Mr. Mercier's visit, to
Richmond might illustrate this problem, and give us Mr.
Seward's version of his interviews, written at a time when
the radical opposition of his own party was not threatening him; and Lord Lyons must know what Mr. Mercier
told him at the time of the conferences.
But let us hasten on to the closing scene of this busy
year as it is revealed, not only in these papers, but in those
which have been more recently given to the world on both
sides of the Atlantic. It is full of interest.
The clouds began to gather in France as early as October, when M. Thouvenel was superseded, and M. Drouyn
de L'Huys came into office. Mr. Dayton saw the significance of it. "We lose a friend," said he, "at an important point," and one cannot but smile at the meagre consolation that he finds, in the fact artlessly and honestly stated,
that (speaking of M. Drouyn de L'Huys) " his perfect knowledge of our language will, to a certain extent, facilitate our
official intercourse." The President's proclamation reached
Paris soon after, accompanied by a most remarkable minatory despatch from Mr. Seward, and was communicated
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who simply said,
that "ours was a great question, and that he should
endeavour to study it as soon as possible." This was
on the 21st of October; and, in nine days from that
date, having, it is to be supposed, mastered "the great
question," M. Drouyn de L'tHuys wrote his despatch to the
English and Russian cabinets, asking them to unite in an
offer of friendly intoduction with a view to an armistice.
This important step does not appear to have been known
to Mr. Dayton till after the 6th, for, on that day, he sends
an account of a conference he had had with the French
Minister, who told him "that everything remained as it




-57
had done for some time past. That France, in common
with the other powers of Europe, very much regretted the
war and its continuance, but that they had no purpose to
intervene or interfere in any way.'+ How far this is consistent with perfect candour, or how far a public man is
bound to reveal to a party in interest, the fact of the mere
initiation of a correspondence is a question we do not
feel competent to decide. Mr. Seward, anxious enough to
find ground of censure, does not seem to have found fault
with it, but puts his complaint on what seems to us,
and will seem to Europe, the sharp ground, that the
action of the Great Powers "was a conference"-" an Ihconclusive conference" he calls it-to which the United
States should have been invited.
But Mr. Seward and the Cabinet at Washington found it
easier and safer to.condemn their own Minister than to resent anything that France might do; and, accordingly, the
papers recently volunteered to the public and which, bythe-by, were not given, until the contents of the "Livre
Jaune" reached this country and rendered our' Premier's'
tenure of office'and influence precarious-these papers reveal an act of injustice to a distant and patriotic public
servant, which it is due to common fair play to expose and
condemn. If Mr. Dayton were within reach, it looks as if
Mr. Holt or the Government detectives might be directed
against him, and as if the Administration were glad of a
chance to rebuke him for his refractoriness a year ago on
the private war question; or to verify the threat which has
been attributed to Mr. Lincoln, that, as New Jersey had
never done anything for him, be would take the first chance
to punish New Jersey.
What is Mr. Dayton's offence, that called for Secretary
Seward's rebuke? On the 6th of November, as we have
seen, he knew nothing of the Armistice proposition. He did
know of it, however, before the 16th, for, on that day, he
8




-58wrote a remonstrance-earnest, respectful, confident, though
ineffectual remonstrance, directed mainly to convince the
French minister that he was mistaken in supposing that
there was, or ever had been, an equality of strength between
the contending forces here, or that, " after so much bloodshed, they are now in the same position as at first." There
was but one phrase in this letter, which, by possibility,
could give offence at Washington. It was that in which he
did some sort of justice to the valour of the confederates.
"In Virginia," said Mr. Dayton, "the insurgents have advanced and retreated. They have gained battles and have
lost them. I do not mean to deprecate their gallantry;
they are yet my countrymen, and here, at least, they.have
shown equality of strength."'
When this despatch reached the State Department, we
were on the eve of the hideous sacrifice at Fredericksburg, when the Administration knew they were pursuing
a course which involved terrible hazard, and when it
was "treasonable" to admit even to themselves, that, in
Virginia, there had been, and might be, again " equality of
strength." The War Department, or Presidential orCers,
had been issued to make the bloody experiment against
the frowning batteries which overlooked the Rappahannock.
The Cabinet was anxious and irritable. Mr. Dayton had
written a despatch on the 10th of November, which has not
been printed, and which contained evidently some exasperating hint, or some annoying inquiry as to what had
been said to Mr. Mercier, or what Mr. Mercier had been
authorized to say. It was a subject on which Mr. Seward
was nervous, and he says:"In reply to a suggestion in your despatch, it is proper
"for me to say that neither M. Mercier nor any other per-' son has had the least warrant from any authority of the
"United States for representing to hIis Government that
"the President would be disposed to entertain any propo



-59
"sition in regard to the action of this Government in the
"conduct of our domestic affairs from aay foreign quarter
"whatsoever. The exact contrary is, in effect, all that has
"ever passed between all the ministers residing here and
"this department.  You will judge whether it is import"ant to clear up this point at Paris."
On, or immedately before, the 5th of December, Mr. Dayton's remonstrance and argument against the French project arrived, and Mr. Seward, as if angry that anybody but
himself should argue, or prophecy, or " discourse," * sends
a despatch to Mr. Dayton, the import of which cannot be
mistaken:DEPARTMENT OF STATE, }
WASHINGTON?, Dec. 5th, 1862.
SIR: Your despatch of Nov'. 18,. No. 227, has been received. Having already indicated the course which the
President has decided to adopt concerning the late proceedings of the French government, it is not necessary now
for me to review the note which, in the absence of instructions,
you have written to M. Drouyn de L'Huys.
I am sir, your obedient servant,
WM. IH. SEWARD.
And, on the 11th, he repeats this reprimand, showing
that, had the French answer been other than it was, the
language of rebuke would have been still stronger:"From  my previous despatches you will probably have
"inferred that the President did not expect you to open a
"correspondence with M. Drouyn de L'Huys upon the sub"ject of the proposition concerning American affairs, which
"the Emperor has recently submitted to the Emperor of
"Russia and the Queen of Great Britain. Insomuch as you
"have done so without consulting this government, and have thus
* ~' I do not discourse to-day upon the military position."-Mr. Seward to
Mr. Adams, page 379.




60 -
drawn forth from the imperial government a frank and
" friendly answer, it is only proper that you should now in-' form M. Drouyn de L'Huys that his note has been sub"mitted to the President, and that he is gratified with the
" explanations it gives of the present policy of the Empe"ror in regard to the United States."
With Mr. Dayton's manly and earnest reply, which shows
how deeply he felt the wrong that had been done, this chapter of mismanaged statesmanship may be said to close:"PARIS, December 23, 1862.
"SIR: Your despatch of December 5, No. 265, is re" ceived. You simply acknowledge the receipt of my de" spatch of November 18, No. 227, and say that,'having' already indicated the course which the President has de" cided to adopt concerning the late proceedings of the
"French government, it is unnecessary for me to review' tife note, which, in the absence of instructions, you (I)
" have written to M. Drouyn de L'Huys.' I had supposed
" that that note, as it did not assume to indicate any po"licy, but merely to sum up briefly the successes of our
" army and the governmental resources, in hopes of its,
"having wrought in any future deliberation of this go" vernment, could not fail at least to meet the approbation
"of the department. My general instructions in reference' to the subject-matter were most ample, and I had held
" verbal conference with M. Drouyn de L'Huys on the sub"ject before. He told me what he had done; and I could
"answer when, perhaps, the government could not. The
"emergency, I thought, not only justified, but required,
"that, in view of the possible future, I should put my ver"bal suggestions in writing. As one useful result, at all
"events, I have received the important communications of
"M. Drouyn de L'Huys, of November 23d.last, a copy of
"which accompanied my despatch, No. 231. I may add,




— 61 -
" also, that I. felt that it was but just to myself that my
"countrymen, as well as the government, should see and
"know that I had not failed, in the crisis which had oc"curred, fairly to represent its condition.
"I am, sir, your obedient servant,
" WM L. DAYTON."
Nothing now remains but a sort of postscript of negotiations or correspondence, the interest and import of which
cannot be measured till we have the news of the manner
in which it is received on the other side of the Atlantic;
Mr. Seward's last published despatch to Mr. Dayton, of the
6th February, being now on the ocean, having been printed
before it was sent to its destination. Its issue is quite as
momentous as was the undecided question of the Trent.
The reader of these pages must have seen the clear conviction under which they are written, thlat the action of the
French Government from first to last, with perhaps one exception, has been candid, entirely ingenuous and friendly.
No credit perhaps is due for this, for the interest France
has in the integrity and welfare of the United States, as
they once were, ispalpable. We believe Mr. Drouyn de
L'Huys said the actual truth when he wrote: "I assure
you that our friendly dispositions have not changed. If,
some day, the Americans, tired of turning their valour
against themselves, should wish to have recourse to us, in
order to seek, in concert, the means of terminating this
conflict, they would find us always ready, associated with
other powers or separately, to aid them with our co-operation, and to testify by our good offices, the feelings which
have not ceased to animate France in regard to. them."
But it is also apparent, that Mr. Lincoln's Gtovernment, as
represented and controlled by Mr. Seward, never thought
so, or if they did, have never been able so far to reconcile
it with their,poor notions of policy and their craven fears
of the radical element, to be willing to say so.




It is impossible to regard the decision on the last
French proposition of a negotiation, pending hostilities, in
any other light, or to think of it, without ajust solicitude as
to the possible consequences of a refusal to listen to the
voice of friendly counsel, its object being peace-peace
among brethren, "for such," says Mr. Dayton, "we yet
are"-peace in an agonized and bloodstained land-peace
with the chances of seeing a restoration on this continent, of great commonwealths, which may raise the American name and prowess from the abyss in which they have
now sunk. One of two consequences, it requires no skill
of prophesy to know, must follow-that France (and with
it the other great powers), wearied of the material sacrifices
they have been making, and angered at the obduracy with
which all intercession is rejected, may recognize the Southern Confederacy, and give it the moral support which mere
recognition will confer-or that, weariness and disgust
taking another course, they may leave us to the arbitrament which we have chosen, and which no human power,
no course of events, no success, no disappointment, induces
us to relinquish.
Why, but for motives purely personal and having reference to the microcosm of small politics, in which he has
always moved, Mr. Seward  should  rudely have refused to listen  to the  counsel, for it was nothing
more, and not intervention nor mediation, of the French
Government, it is difficult to understand,  One may
imagine, indeed, how it might have been turned to the
prejudice of the Confederates, if they had refused to accede
toit. It is difficult to see any reason for ourrefusingit. Still
it has been refused, and we must abide the issue, as we did
that of the Trent retraction, with deep solicitude, and, as
Mr. Seward hopes, no doubt, with a readiness, should no
evil result follow, to claim it as a new diplomatic triumph.
Were it not a subject so full of gravity in every respect,




-63it would not be unprofitable, before the judgment of what
Mr. Seward somewhere, in truly Chinese style, calls " the
outside world," is known, to look at it critically, for the
conduct of the whole affair is very characteristic. Mr.
Dayton communicated the fact that the Emperor meant to
offer his friendly counsel, in a note, made very laconic by
his sense of recent injury. The counsel was offered on the
3d of the present month, in language, the friendly, deferential tone of which could not be surpassed. Commissioners
were to be named, privately and informally, if need be.
They were to meet-that is, if both belligerents agreed,
and, if they did not, the advantage enured to the one who
did, and, in the language of the French despatch, which, to
our ears, sounds like the accents of a kind and anxious
friend:
"In place of the accusations which North and South
"mutually cast upon each other at this time, would be
" substituted an argumentative discussion of the interests
"which divide them. They would seek out, by means of
"well-ordered and profound deliberations, whether these
" interests are definitively irreconcileable, whether separa"tion is an extreme which can no longer be avoided, or
" whether the memories of common existence, whether the
" ties of any kind which have made of the North and of
"the South one sole and whole federative state, and have
"borne them on to so high a degree of prosperity, are not
" more powerful than the causes which have placed arms
"in the hands of the two populations."
To this counsel, in three days, Mr. Seward sent his answer of denial. It is but fair to say that his attitude, relatively to his own party just now, is not favourable to repose,
or deliberation, or conciliatory action. The temptation to
be exacting and' repellant, and denunciatory is very great
at this moment. It has not been resisted. The answer
is dated on the 6th, and was, as we have said, instantly




-64published.  It has all the marked peculiarities of Mr.,iSeward's rhetoric. No one else, on the roll of statesmen or
such as claim to be statesmen, would venture at this moment of anxious suspense to say, as he does, that the Federal Government now holds half of North Carolina and Mississippi, and one-third of South Carolina!*  No  one but
Mr. Seward would insinuate to a courteous correspondent
that he had, to use his peculiar words, "taken other light "
to guide his footsteps than such as was radiated from his
Department, or would, all things considered, be surprised
if he had. No one else would have described the people
of this country "'as a Peace Demociacy.*"  No one but
a sanguine mlan, like NMr Seward, would ve nture to say, and
hope to be believed, "'that our credit is adequate to the
existing emergency," or would at this tirae of day, revive
the cant of loyal men in the South rel)resented in  Congress, the representatives being refugees elected by military
authority, —and, least of all, no one, we are very sure, but
Mr. Seward, would meet the practical and, if not practical,
perfectly intelligible, suggestion of a commission on neutral
ground, with what we can construe in no other way than the
poor sarcasm  of saying that the Congress of the United
States is the proper "iforual  for debates between  alienated
parties," whose "vacant seats are inviting back the Senators and Representatives of the discontented."  Whether
the force and point of this sarcasm will be appreciated by
the Imperial councils, we do not pretend to conjecture.
Mr. Dayton, in one of his moments of despondency last summer, well said: "At a court where there is a power-a
* The official paper at Washington, which prints "from the original in the
State Department," makes,on this extraordinary statement,the following just
comment: "'Accustomed as we have been to the complaints of factious
politicians, this brief retrospect of our Army and Navy, will only surprise the
American people less than the great Power for whose benefit it is made."Chronicle, February 14th, 1862.




-65thinking, acting power-behind the ministry, we can never
feel quite sure of our position;" and it is on the decision
of that Power, when he shall have received Mr. Seward's
rebuke, that more depends than can be easily measured.
As we have said, action and inaction are alike portentous.
The deep interest of these later revelations have led us
away from the immediate subject of review, and having
exhausted our space, we shall not recur to it. Attention
has been naturally directed to Mr. Seward's " diplomacy"
with the two leading foreign powers, but there is a vast
fund beside, on which we have not drawn. The correspondence with Russia, whence Mr. Clay wrote (and Mr. Seward
prints) that " money and men should be sent into Ireland,
India, and all the British -dominions, all over the world, to
stir up revolt; for our cause is just, and vengeance will
socner or later overtake that perfidious aristocracy;" and
Mr. Cameron informed the government that "'the fountains of Peterhoff were set in operation and a sumptuous
dinner provided" for his benefit; and Prince Gortachow
told Mr. Taylor, as late as October: "Your situation is
getting worse and worse. The chances of preserving the
Union are growing more and more desperate. Can nothing
be done to stop this dreadful war?"-is very suggestive.
So is that with Spain, and Mexico, where Mr. Corwin
amused himself with making treaties which were rejected,
and the Mexicans, on the faith of them, drawing bills
which were protested; and Prussia, and Holland, and
Japan, and China-and the Central American States,
who rose as one man against Mr. Lincoln's negro deportation scheme, and, as our ministers said, "regarded it as the
greatest degradation for the country to be overrun with
blacks" (p. 891), or "to be visited by a plague of which
the United States desired to rid themselves."  (p. 900.)
Morocco, where a consul with a guard of Moors captured
two of the officers of the Sumter, and sent them home in
9




-66
irons, to be discharged or exchanged as prisoners of war, is
a curious chapter; and most curious and discreditable of
all is that of Brazil, where Mr. Webb insisted on making,
at his reception, " a longer speech" than his predecessor, and
whose style of writing to his Government and mode of
diplomatic action, may be judged of by the following passage from one of his despatches to Mr. Seward:
"Robert G. Smith, otr late consul, was an open-mouthed
"traitor and a loud: talker. Ile said, on different occasions,
"'Meade is the greatest traitor of the two, and if he ever
"gets back to Virginia, it will be in consequence of his
"disguising himself.' He said he dared not show himself
"in New York or any Northern State; and finally left here
"with his wife, who is from Maine, in an English ship for
"Liverpool. My impression is, that he has sailed for Que"bec under a feigned name, and if at the North, he is
"doubtless somewhere in the vicinity of his wife's rela"tions. It is fortunate for him that he is not here, as he'" would unquestionably find himself a passenger on board' a coffee ship bound for New York; and under command
"of a loyal shipmaster, as there would be no difficulty in
"sending the traitors home without coming in collision
"with the Brazilian authorities. Our consul reports that
"a very decidedly better feeling exists among all Ameri-' cans here, and that the oath of allegiance is cheerfully
"taken by nine-tenths of the shipmasters, while even' those of rebel proclivities admit its justice, and, after
"making wry faces, take the oath sooner than be refused
"their papers. Some of them had sworn roundly that
"they never would take the oath prescribed; and it is a
"matter of great exultation and pride with the loyal mas"ters to perceive how thoroughly the blusterers, who
"boasted of their secession propensities and their seces"sion flags, have been humbled before the authority of the




v6 --' United States Government exercised in the most quiet
"way possible."
This review is closed in a spirit not more cheerful than that
in whiclh it was begun. If the civil war, in which Providence, for our national wrong-doings, has plunged us, had,
in its fearful processes, evolved one master spirit-one
great man, Soldier or Statesman, on whom, as the darkness
and the danger grew, the hope of the nation might rest,
and who should seem to be able to lead. us out of the labyrinth in which we are condemned to wander, there would
be a sort of consolation. But mediocrity, or less than mediocrity, reigns everywhere. It is the time and the scene
of shallow-half-educated, light-minded men in executive
council. Day after day rolls on, and the hideous monotony of blood is only varied by revelations of corruption
and peculation in places high and low-from the gigantic
contractors of unseaworthy fleets down to the colonel who
cheats the Government by forging dead soldiers' names.
Fierce fanaticism has full sway in the cabinet and out of
it. It seems to be the only positive principle; and before
it, the Constitution and its guarantees have been broken
down. For this'conquest —for this triumph of lawless
less power over constitutional right-for this connivance
against knowledge it the imagined exigencies of the times
to overthrow the law-for the unlawful arrests and cruel
imprisonments that have been perpetrated and are yet justified-for the foreign policy of the Government, which, as
we have tried to show, has gained nothing and sacrificed
everything, and. has now brought us back to where we
were little more than a year ago —a position of anxious dependence on the will of strangers-for all this, no one, in
our poor judgment, is more responsible than the public
man whose writings we have endeavoured fairly to review;
and who now, unless rumour be utterly false, distrusted and
proscribed by the radicals of his own party, is seekingto be




the leader, in conjunction with the kindred spirits who have
always clustered round him, in a new Pseudo-Conservative
party, who imagine they can restore to life the Union
which they they have stabbed, and the Constitution they
have violated. The quotation is trite, but it has an actual
truth, even in its misapplication:"Non tali auxilio. Nec defensoribus istis
Tempus eget."
The Ship of State is among the reefs and breakers, with
gloom  and danger threatening  outside.  The pilot to
weather the storm is not among those on deck. The hands
which steered it into peril cannot be trusted for rescuethe chief mate least of all.