37TH CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. f Ex. Doc. 3d Session.' No. 81. Utr ~,~'~i~~;i~~, /;-a ~.... REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN POPE. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, IN ANSWER TO Resolution of the House of 18th ultimo, transmitting copy of report oJf lajor General John Pope. MARCH 3, 1863.-Laid on the table, and ordered to be printed. M'ARCHi 3, 1863.-Resolved, That five thousand extra copies of the official report of Major General John Pope's campaign in Virginia be printed for the use of the members of the present House. WVAR DEPARTMENT, TIVashington City, March 2, 1863. SIRP: In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th ultimo, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the report of Major General John Pope, and the accompanying documents, concerning the operations of the army of Virginia, while under his command. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. lIon. GALUSHA A. GROW, Speaker of the House of Representatives. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOIHN POPE, UNITED STATES ARM3IY OF IIS CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. LIST OF DOCUMENTS. No. 1. Report of Major General John Pope, of his operations in Virginia. 2. Report of Major General I. McDowell. 3. Report of Major General S. P. Heintzelman. 4. Report of Brigadier General Birney. (D. B.) 5. Report of Brigadier General J. F. Reynolds. 6. Report of Brigadier General J. C. Robinson. 7. Report of Col. O. M. Pol, 2d Michigan volunteers. 8. Report of Brigadier General C. Grover. 9. Report of TMajor General P. Kearney, (by General Birney.) 10. Report of Major General Franz Sigel. 11. Report of Brigadier General R. TH. Milroy. 12. Report of Brigadier General Julius Stahel., 13. Report of Colonel N. C. McLean, commanding brigade. 14. Report of Colonel J. C. Lee, 55th Ohio volunteers. 15. Report of Colonel Orland Smith, 73d Ohio volunteers. 16. Report'of Lieutenant G. B. Haskins, 1st Ohio artillery. 17. Report of Brigadier General Carl Schurz. 18. Report of Colonel J. B. Carr, commanding brigade. 19. Report of Colonel G. A. luhbleck, 73d Pennsylvania volunteers. 20. Report of Lieutenant Colonel S. J. MicGroarty, 61st Ohio volunteers. 21. Report of Major F. Blessing, 74th Pennsylvania volunteers. 22. Report of Major Stephen Kovacs, 54th New York volunteers. 23. Report of Captain F. Brann, 58th New York volunteers. 24. Report of Captain M. Wiedrich, l st New York volunteers. 25. Report of Captain Dilger, company I, 1st Ohio volunteer artillery. 26. Report of Captain J. W. Patterson, 2d New Hampshire volunteers 27. Report of Major R. L. Bodine, 26th Pennsylvania volunteers. 28. Report of Colonel Beardsley, commanding cavalry brigade. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 3 29. Report of commanding officer 4th New York cavalry. 30. Report of commanding officer 9th New York cavalry. 31. Report of commanding officer 6th Ohio cavalry. 32. Report of commanding officer 1st {Maryland cavalry. 33. Report of Brigadier General R. C. Schenck, (by Colonel Cheesebrough, aide-de-camp.) 34. Report of Colonel Krzyzanowski, commanding brigade. 35. Report of Brigadier General George Sykes. 36. Report of G. K. Warren, 5th New York volunteers. 37. Report of Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Buchanan, 4th infantry. 38. Report of Captain S. H. Weed, 5th artillery. 39. Report of First Lieutenant A. M. Randoll, 1st artillery. 40. Report of Second Lieutenant W. E. Van Reed, 5th artillery. 41. Nominal report of casualties of Brigadier General G. Sykes's division. 42. Tabular report of casualties of Brigadier General George Sykes's division. 43. Nominal report of casualties of Brigadier General G. W. Morell's division. 44. Tabular report of casualties of Brigadier General G. WV. Morell's division. 45. Report of Brigadier General J. B. Ricketts. 46. Report of Lieutenant Colonel William Chapman, 3d infantry. 47. Report of Colonel William Blaisdell, 11th Massachusetts volunteers. 48. Report of Captain W. M. Graham, 1st artillery. 49. Report of Captain G. E. Randolph, 1st artillery. 50. Report of Brigadier General Milroy. Copies of letters from Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Buchanan. 51. Report of Brigadier General J. P. Hatch. 52. Report of Colonel J. W. Revere, 7th New York volunteers. 53. Report of Lieutenant Colonel R. Thompson, 115th Pennsylvania volunteers. 54. Report of Lieutenant Colonel G. C. Burling, 6th New York volunteers. 55. Report of Captain George Hoffman, 8th New York volunteers. 56. Report of Major G. Banks, 16th Massachusetts volunteers. 57. Report of casualties of the 8th New Jersey volunteers. 58. Report of casualties of the 2d New York volunteers. 59. Report of casualties of the 115th Pennsylvania volunteers. 60. Report of casualties of the 5th New Jersey volunteers. 61. Report of casualties of the 7th New Jersey volunteers. 62. Copies of correspondence between Generals McDowell and Schurz. 63. Appendix "A" to General McDowell's report. 64. Appendix "A" to General Pope's report.;35. Appendix "B" to General Pope's report. 4 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. No. 1. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN POPE OF HIS OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA. NEW YORK, January 27, 1863. GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the army under my command during the late campaign in Virginia. Several of the reports of the corps commanders have not yet reached me, but so much time has elapsed since the termination of the campaign that I do not feel at liberty to withhold this report longer. The strange misapprehension of facts concerning this campaign which, though proceeding from irresponsible sources, has much possessed the public mind, makes it necessary for me to enter more into detail than I should otherwise have done, and to embody in the report such of the despatches and orders sent and received as will make clear every statement which is contained in it. On the 26th day of June, 1862, by special order of the President of the United States, I was assigned to the command of the army of Virginia. That army was constituted as follows: first corps, under Major General Fremont; second corps, under Major General Banks; third corps, under Major General McDowell. In addition to these three corps; a small and unorganized force, under Brigadier General Sturgis, was posted in the neighborhood of Alexandria, and was then in process of being organized for field service. The forces ii the iirtrenchments around Washington were also placed under my command. All the disposable movable forces consisted of the three corps first named. Their effective strength of infantry and artillery, as reported to me, was as follows: Fremont's corps, eleven thousand five hundred strong; Banks's corps, reported at fourteen thousand five hundred, but in reality only about eight thousand; Mi[cDowell's corps eighteen thousand five hundred-making a total of thirtyeight thousand men. The cavalry numbered about five thousand men for duty, but most of it was badly mounted and armed, and in poor condition for service. These forces were scattered over a wide district of country, not within supporting distance of each other, and many of the brigades and divisions were badly organized and in a demoralized condition. This was particularly the case with the army corps of Major General Fr6mont, a sad report of which was made to me by General Sigel when he relieved General Fremont in command of the corps. My first labors were directed to the reorganization of some of the divisions and brigades of that corps, and to supplying the whole force with much of the material absolutely necessary for troops in the field. The corps of Banks and Frdmont were in the valley of the Shenandoah, between Winchester and Middletown, the bulk of the forces being in the vicinity of the latter place. One division of MlcDowell's corps was at Manassas Junction, with its advance thrown forward to Catlett's Station. The other division was posted in the vicinity of Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg. When I first assumed command of these forces the troops under Jackson had retired from the valley of the Shenandoah and were in rapid march toward Richmond; so that at that time there was no force of the enemy of any consequence within a week's march of any of the troops assigned to my command. It was the wish of the government that I should cover the city of Washington from any attacks from the direction of Richmond, make such dispositions as were necessary to assure the safety of the valley of the Shenandoah, and at the same time so operate upon the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville as to draw off, if possible, a considerable REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 5 force of the enemy from Richmond, and thus relieve the operations against that city of the army of the Potomac. The first object I had in view was to concentrate, as far as possible, all the movable forces under my command, and to establish them in such positions as best to effect the objects set forth. It seemed to me that the security of the Shenandoah valley was not best attained by posting troops within the valley itself, but that the necessary results could be better accomplished, and the other objects with which I was charged best promoted, by concentrating these forces at some point or points from which, if any attempts were made to enter the valley of the Shenandoah from Richmond, I should be able, by rapid marching, to interpose between such force and the main body of the enemy, and cut off its retreat. I felt confident, and this confidence was justified by subsequent results, that no considerable force of the enemy would attempt to enter the valley of the Shenandoah while the forces under my command were so posted as to be able, without difficulty, to intercept its retreat and fall upon its rear. I accordingly sent orders to Major General Sigel, commanding the first corps, to move forward from Middletown, cross the Shenandoah at Front Royal, and, pursuing the west side of the Blue Ridge, to take post at Sperryville by passing through Luray Gap. At the same time I directed Major General Banks, crossing the Shenandoah at the same point, to move forward and take post between six and ten miles east of Sperryville. General McDowell was ordered to move Ricketts's division of his corps from Manassas Junction to Waterloo Bridge, the point where the turnpike from Warrenton to Sperryville crosses the Upper Rappahannock; King's division, of the same corps, it was thought best to leave at Fredericksburg to cover the crossing of the Rappahannock at that point, and to protect the railroad thence to Acquia creek, and the public buildings which had been erected at the latter place. While I yielded to this wish of the War Dapartment, the wide separation of this division from the main body of the army, and the ease with which the enemy would be able to interpose between them, engaged my earnest attention and gave me very serious uneasiness. Whilst these movements were in progress commenced the series of battles which preceded and attended the retreat of General McClellan from the Chickahominy toward Harrison's Landing. When first General MIcClellan began to intimate by his despatches that he designed making this movement toward James river, I suggested to the President of the United States the impolicy of such a movement, and the serious consequences which would be likely to result from it, and urged upon him that he should send orders to General McClellan that if he were unable to maintain his position on the Chickahominy, and were pressed by superior forces of the enemy, to mass his whole force on the north side of that stream, even at the risk of losing much materiel of war, and endeavor to make his way in the direction of Hanover Court-House; but in no event to retreat with his army further to the south than the White House or York river. I stated to the President that the retreat to James river was carrying General McClellan away from any re-enforcements that could possibly be sent him within a reasonable time, and was absolutely depriving him of any substantial aid fiom the forces under my command; that by this movement the whole army of the enemy would be interposed between his army and mine, and that they would then be at liberty to strike in either direction as they might consider it most advantageous; that this movement to James river would leave entirely unprotected, except in so far as the small force under my command was able to protect it, the whole region in front of Washington, and that it would therefore be impossible to send any of the forces under my command to re-enforce General McClellan. without rendering it certain that the enemy, even in the worst case for themselves, would have the privilege and power of exchanging Richmond for Washington city; that to them the loss of Richmond would be 6 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. trifling, whilst the loss of Washington to us would be conclusive, or nearly so, in its results upon this war. I was so deeply impressed with these views that I repeatedly and earnestly urged them upon the President and Secretary of PWar. After General McClellan had taken up his position at Harrison's Landing, I addressed him a letter stating to him my position and the distribution of the troops under my command, and requesting him in all earnestness and good faith to write me fully and freely his views, and to suggest to me any measures which he thought desirable to enable me to co-operate with him, or to render any assistance in my power in the operations of the army under his command. I stated to him that I had no object except to assist his operations, and that I would undertake any labor and run any risk for that purpose. I therefore desired him to feel no hesitation in communicating fieely' with me, as he might rest assured that every suggestion that he would make would meet all respect and consideration at my hands, and that, so far as it was in my power to do so, I would carry out his wishes with all energy and with all the means at my command. In reply to this communication I received a letter from General McClellan, very general in its terms, and proposing nothing towards the accomplishment of the purpose I had suggested to him. It became apparent that, considering the situation in which the army of the Potomac and the army of Virginia were placed in relation to each other, and the absolute necessity of harmonious and prompt co-operation between them, some military superior both of General McClellan and myself should be called to Washington and placed in command of all the operations in Virginia. In accordance with these views Major General Halleck was called to Washington and placed in general command. Many circumstances which it is not necessary here to set forth, induced me to expressI to the President, to the Secretary of War, and to General Halleck, my desire to be relieved from the command of the army of Virginia, and to be returned to the western country. AMy services, however, were considered necessary in the projected campaign, and my wishes were not complied with. I accordingly took the field in Virginia with grave forebodings of the result, but with a determination to carry out the plans of the government with all the energy and with all the ability of which I was master. Previous to taking the field, I issued the following orders, which set out very fully the policy which I considered advisable, and which at that time received the sanction of the government, and, so far as I know, the approval of the country. The order requiring the troops to subsist upon the country in which their operations were conducted has, with a wilful disregard of its terms, been construed, greatly to my discredit, as authorizing indiscriminate robbery and plunder; yet the terms of this order are so specific as to the manner and by whom all property or subsistence needed for the use of the army should be seized, and the order is so common in the history of warfare that I have been amazed that it could have been so misinterpreted and misunderstood. It is therefore submitted here for the calm examination of the government and of the public. I believed then and believe now that the policy there laid down was wise and just, and was well calculated to secure efficient and rapid operations of the army, and, in case of reverse, to leave the enemy without the means of subsisting in the country over which our army had passed, and over which any pursuit must be conducted. The long delay and embarrassment of the army under General Lee, in its subsequent movements towards Washington, occasioned largely by the want of supplies taken from the country under this order, fully justified its wisdom. It was determined, before I left Washington to take the field in Virginia, that the union of the armies of Virginia and of the Potomac was absolutely essential both to the safety of the national capital and to the further successful prosecution of the operations against Richmond. The mission of the army under my REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 7 command, therefore, was to cover as far as possible the front of Washington and make secure the valley of the Shenandoah, and so operate upon the enemy's lines of communication to the west and northwest as to force himn to make such heavy detachments from his main force at Richmond as would enable the army of the Potomac to withdraw from its position at Har;ison's Landing and to take shipping for Acquia creek or for Alexandria. If, as was feared, the enemy should throw his whole force in the direction of Washington, it became my duty to resist his advance at all hazards, and so to delay and embarrass his movements as to gain all the time possible for the arrival of the army of the Potomac behind the Rappahannock. Meantime, before the arrival of General Halleck, I instructed General King, at Fredericksburg, to send forward detachments of his cavalry to operate upon the line of the Virginia Central railroad, and as far as possible to embarrass and destroy communication between Richmond and the valley of the Shenandoah. Several cavalry expeditions which that officer despatched for the purpose were completely successful, and succeeded in breaking up the railroad at several points upon several occasions. At the same time I directed Major General Banks to send forward an infantry brigade With all his cavalry to march rapidly upon Culpeper Court-House, and, after taking possession of that place, to push forward cavalry towards the Rapidan, in the direction of Gordonsville. On the fourteenth of July, after this movement was successfully accomplished, I directed General Banks to push forward during the night of that day the whole of his cavalry force, under Brigadier General Hatch, from Culpeper, with orders to take possession of Gordonsville, and to destroy the railroad for ten or fifteen miles east of that place, with a portion of his forces, whilst all remaining pushed forward in the direction of Charlottesville, destroying the railroad bridges and interrupting that line of communication as far as practicable. At that time there was no force of the enemy at Gordonsville or in the vicinity, and the whole operation as ordered was not only easily practicable, but would have been attended with serious consequences to the enemy; but, to my surprise and dissatisfaction, I received, on the seventeenth of July, from General Banks, a report that General I-latch had taken with him infantry, artillery, and trains of wagons, and that, in consequence of bad roads, he had, at that date, only succeeded in going as far as Madison Court-House. Meantime, on the sixteenth of July, the advance of Jackson's forces under E well had reached Gordonsville, and the proposed movements, as ordered, became impracticable. No satisfactory explanation has ever been made to me of this departure from my orders on the'part of General Hatch. Finding it no longer practicable to occupy Gordonsville, as I had designed, I sent orders to General Banks to direct General Hatch to select from his own cavalry and that of General McDowell, which I had sent forward, fifteen hundred to two thousand of the best mounted men, and to proceed fiom Madison Court-House, around the west side of the Blue Ridge, to a point whence he could make an easy descent upon the railroad west of Gordonsville, and if successful, to push forward to Charlottsville, and, if possible, destroy the railroad between that place and Lynclhburg. In compliance with this order, General Hatch commenced to make the movement. as directed, but abandoned it very soon after he started, and returned by the way of Sperryville to his post. As soon as I had received the report of this second failure, I relieved General Hatch from the command of the cavalry of General Banks's corps, and sent Brigadier General Buffod to report to General Banks as the chief of cavalry of his corps. On the twenty-ninth of July I left Washington, and after reviewing Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps at Waterloo Bridge, repaired to the headquarters of General Banks, a few miles southeast of Little Washington. All preparations having been completed, I instructed General Banks to move forward on the seventh of August and take post at the point where the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpeper crosses Hazel river. General McDowell was 8 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. ordered on the day previous, to move forward with Ricketts's division from Waterloo Bridge to Culpeper Court-House, so that on the seventh of August all the infantry and artillery forces of the army of Virginia were assembled along the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpeper, and numbered about 28,500 men. King's division, as I have before stated, was left on the Lower Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, and was not then available for active operations in the direction of Gordonsville. The cavalry forces covering the front of the army on that day were distributed as follows: General Buford, with five regiments, was posted at Madison CourtHouse, with his pickets along the line of the Rapidan from Burnett's Ford as far west as the Blue Ridge. General Sigel had been directed to post a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery at the point where the road from Madison Court-House to Sperryville crosses Robertson's river, as a support to the cavalry of General Buford, in front of him. General Bayard, with four regiments of cavalry, was posted near Rapidan Station, the point where the Orange and Alexandria road crosses Rapidan river, with his pickets extended as far to the east as Raccoon Ford, and connecting with General Buford on his right at Burnett's Ford. From Raccon Ford to the forks of the Rappahannock, above Falmouth, the Rapidan was lined with cavalry pickets. On the top of Thoroughfare mountain, about half-way between Generals Bayard and Buford, was established a signal station, which overlooked the whole country as far south as Orange Court-House. On the seventh I proceeded to Sperryville and inspected the corps of Major General Sigel. I remained at Sperryville until four o'clock on the afternoon of that day, during which time I received several reports from the front that the enemy was crossing the Rapidan at several points between the railroad crossing of that river and Liberty Mills. I reached Culpeper Court-House on the morning of the 8th of August. The town had been occupied for several days by Crawford's brigade of General Banks's corps, and on the 7th Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps had also reached there from Waterloo Bridge. During the whole of the morning of the 8th I continued to receive reports from General Bayard, who was slowly falling back in the direction of Culpeper Court-House from the advance of the enemy, and from General Buford, who also reported the enemy advancing in heavy force upon Madison Court-House. My instructions required me to be careful and keep my communications good with Fredericksburg, and by no means to permit the enemy to interpose between me and that place. Although during the whole of the 8th of August it was very doubtful, from the reports of Generals Bayard and Buford, whether the enemy's movement was in the direction of Madison Court-House or of Culpeper, I considered it advisable, in view of my relations with Fredericksburg, to concentrate my whole force in the direction of Culpeper, so as to keep myself constantly interposed between the main body of the enemy and the lower fords of the Rappahannock. Early in the day I pushed forward Crawford's brigade of Banks's corps, in the direction of Cedar or Slaughter Mountain, to support General Bayard, who was falling slowly back in that direction, and to assist him as far as practicable in determining the movements and the forces of the enemy. I sent orders, also, to General Banks to move forward promptly,from Hazel river to Culpeper Court-House, and also to General Sigel to march at once from Sperryville to the same place. To my surprise, I received, after night on the 8th, a note from General Sigel, dated at Sperryville, at half-past six that afternoon, asking me by what road he should march to Culpeper Court-House. As there was but one road between those two points, and that a broad stone turnpike, I was at a loss to understand how General Sigel could entertain any doubt as to the road by which he should march. This doubt, however, delayed the arrival of his corps at Culpeper Court-House several hours, REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE, 9 and rendered it impracticable for that corps to be pushed to the point, as I had designed, on the afternoon of the next day. Early on the morning of the 9th of August I directed General Banks to move forward towards Cedar Mountain with his whole corps, and to join the brigade of that corps, under General Crawford, which had been pushed forward on the day previous. I directed General Banks to take up a strong position at or near the point occupied by that brigade, to check the advance of the enemy, and to determine his forces and the character of his movement as far as practicable. The consolidated report of General Banks's corps, received some days previously, exhibited an effective force of something over fourteen thousand men. Appended to this report will be found the return in question. It appeared subsequently, however, that General Banks's forces at that time did not exceed eight thousand men. But although I several times called General Banks's attention to the discrepancy between this return and the force he afterwards stated to me he had led to the front, that discrepancy has never been explained, and I do not yet understand how General Banks could have been so greatly mistaken as to the forces under his immediate command. I directed him, when he went forward from Culpeper Court-House, that if the enemy advanced to attack him in the strong position which I had instructed him to take up, he should push his skirmishers well to the front and notify me immediately. Three miles in his rear, and within easy supporting distance, Ricketts's division of General McDowell's corps had been posted at the point where the road from Madison Court-House to Culpeper intersects the road from Culpeper to Cedar Mountain. This division was so posted because it was not certain whether a considerable force of the enemy was not advancing on Culpeper from the direction of Madison Court-House. General Buford having reported to me very early on the morning of the 9th, from Madison Court-House, that the enemy was in heavy force on his right, his left, and partly on his rear, and that he was retreating in the direction of Sperryville. Desultory artillery firing had been kept up all day on the ninth in the direction of General Banks's corps; but I continued to receive during the whole of that day reports from General Banks that no considerable force of the enemy, except cavalry, had, come forward, and that though the cavalry had been ostentatiously displayed, he did not believe that the enemy was in sufficient force to make any attack upon him. As late as 5 o'clock in the afternoon General Banks wrote me substantially to the same effect; but before I had received this last note the artillery firing had become so rapid and continuous that I feared a general engagement was going on, or might be brought on at any moment. I therefore instructed General McDowell to move forward Ricketts's division rapidly to the field and accompanied that division myself. At no time during the day did General Banks express any apprehensions of attack in force by the enemy, nor did he ask nor intimate that he needed re-enforcements. General Sigel's corps began to march into Culpeper Court-House late in the afternoon, and just as I was leaving that place, having been delayed several hours by General Sigel's singular uncertainty as to what road he ought to pursue; I had given orders a number of days previously that all the troops belonging to the army of Virginia should be ready to march at the shortest notice, and should habitually keep two days' cooked rations in their haversacks. Notwithstanding this order, General Sigel's corps arrived in Culpeper without any rations, and was unable to move forward until provisions could be procured from McDowell's train and cooked at Culpeper Court-House. I have received no report from General Banks of his operations at Cedar Mountain, but I had sent forward Brigadier General Roberts, chief of cavalry of my staff, and had directed him to report to General Banks in the early part of the day of the 9th, and to advise freely with him as to the operations of his corps. General Roberts, as well as General Banks, was fully advised of my 10 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. wishes, and that I desired General Banks merely to keep the enemy in check by occupying a strong position in his front, until the whole of the disposable forces under my command should be concentrated in the neighborhood. General Roberts reported to me that he had conferred fieely with General Banks, and urgently represented to him my purposes; but that General Banks, contrary to his suggestions and to my wishes, had left the strong position which he had taken up and had advanced at least a mile to assault the enemy, believing that they were not in considerable force, and that he would be able to crush their advance before their main body could come up from the direction of the Rapidan. He accordingly threw forward his whole corps into action against superior forces of the enemy strongly posted and sheltered by woods and ridges. His advance led him over the open ground, which was everywhere swept by the fire of the enemy concealed in the woods and ravines beyond. Notwithstanding these disadvantages his corps gallantly responded to his orders and assaulted the enemy with great fury and determination. The action lasted about an hour and a half, and during that time our forces suffered heavy loss, and were gradually driven back to their former position; at which point, just at dusk, Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps, came up and joined in the engagement. As soon as I arrived on the field, at the head of Ricketts's division, I directed General Banks to draw in his right, which was much extended, and to mass the whole of his right wing at the centre of his line, pushing forward at the same time Ricketts's division to occupy the ground thus vacated. The enemy followed Banks, as he retired, with great caution, and emerging from the wood, which had sheltered him all day, attempted to push forward to the open ground in fiont of our new line. A sharp artillery engagement immediately commenced, when the enemy was driven back to the woods principally by the batteries of Ricketts's division. The artillery firing was kept up until near midnight of the 9th. Finding that Banks's cqrps had been severely cut up and was much fatigued, I drew it back to the rear and pushed forward the corps of Sigel, which had begun to arrive, to occupy the woods on the left of the road, with a wide space of open ground in his front Ricketts's, division was also drawn back to the cover of the woods and behind the ridges in the open ground on the right of Sigel. These dispositions were completed about daybreak on the morning of the 10th. Banks's corps, reduced to about five thousand men, was so cut up and worn down with fatigue that I did not consider it capable of rendering any efficient service for several days. I therefore directed General Banks, or,'in his absence, General Williams, who succeeded to the command, to assemble his corps on the road to Culpeper Court-House and about two miles in rear of our front; to collect his stragglers, send back his wounded to Culpeper Court-House, and proceed as rapidly as possible to put the corps in condition for service. In consequence of the vigorous resistance of the night previous, and the severe loss of the enemy in attempting to advance, before daylight of the 10th Jackson drew back his forces towards Cedar Mountain, about two miles from our front. Our pickets were immediately pushed forward, supported by 3ilroy's brigade, and occupied the ground. The day of the 10th was intensely hot, and the troops on both sides were too much fatigued to renew the action. My whole effective force on that day, exclusive of Banks's corps, which was in no condition for service, was about 20,000 artillery and infantry, and about 2,000 cavalry. General Buford, with the cavalry force under his command, not yet having been able to join the main body, I had'telegraphed General King, at Fredericksburg, to move forward on the 8th by the lower fords of the Rappahannock and Stevensburg to join me. A large part of his command had just returned from a very fatiguing expedition against the Central railroad, but he marched forward promptly and joined the main body' REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 11 late in the evening of the 11th. The whole day was spent by both armies in burying the dead and in bringing off the wounded. Although, even after King joined me, my whole effective force was barely equal to that of the enemy, I determined, after giving King's division one night's rest, to fall upon him at daylight on the 12th, on his line of communication, and compel him to fight a battle which must have been entirely decisive for one army or the other. But during the night of the 11th Jackson evacuated his position in front of us and retreated rapidly across the Rapidan, in the direction of Gordonsville, leaving many of his dead and wounded on the field and along the road from Cedar Mountain to Orange Court-House. No materiel of war nor baggage trains were lost on either side, but the loss of life on both sides was severe. Brigadier Generals Geary, Auger, and Carroll were badly wounded, and Brigadier General Prince was captured by accident. Very many of our best field and company officers were killed or wounded. From the verbal reports aiad statements of General Banks and others, the Massachusetts regiments behaved with especial gallantry and sustained the heaviest losses; but the conduct of the whole corps of General Banks was beyond all praise. Although I regret that General Banks thought it'expedient to depart from my instructions; it gives me pleasure to bear testimony to his gallant and intrepid conduct throughout that action. He exposed himself as freely as any one under his command, and his example went far to secure that gallant and noble conduct which has made his corps famous. Generals Geary, Auger, Carroll, Gordon, and Green behaved with distinguished gallantry. General Prince, who had led his brigade throughout the action with coolness and courage, was captured after dark whilst passing fiom one flank of his command to the other. As I have not received any report from General Banks, it is not in my power to mention the field and company officers who distinguished themselves under his immediate eye in this action; but as soon as his report is received I will transmit it to the government, and endeavor to do justice to every officer and soldier who belonged to his corps. Brigadier General Roberts, chief of cavalry of my staff, accompanied General Banks throughout the day, and rendered most important and gallant service. No report of killed and wounded has been made to me by General Banks; I can, therefore, only form an approximation of our losses in that battle. Our killed, wounded, and prisoners amounted to about 1,800 men, besides which fully 1,000 men straggled back to Culpeper Court-House and beyond, and never entirely returned to their commands. A strong cavalry force under Generals Buford and Bayard pursued the enemy to the Rapidan and captured many stragglers. The cavalry forces immediately resumed their original positions, and again occupied the Rapidan from Raccoon Ford to the base of the Blue Ridge. On the 14th of August General.Reno, with 8,000 men of the forces which had arrived at Falmouth, under General Burnside, joined me. I immediately pushed forward my whole force in the direction of the Rapidan, and occupied a strong position, with my right, under Major Gen. Sigel, resting on Robertson's river, where the road from Cedar Mountain to Orange Court-House crosses that stream; my centre, under General McDowell, occupying both flanks of Cedar Mountain; and my left, under General Reno, a position near Raccoon Ford, and covering the road from that ford to Stevensburg and Culpeper. I began immediately again to operate with my cavalry upon the enemy's communications with Richmond. From the 12th to the 18th of August reports were constantly reaching me of large forces of the enemy re-enforcing Jackson from the direction of Richmond, and by the morning of the 18th I became satisfied that nearly the whole force of the enemy from Richmond was assembling in my front, along the south side of the Rapidan, and extending from Raccoon Ford to Liberty Mills. The cavalry expeditions sent out on the sixteenth, in the direction of Louisa Court-House, captured the adjutant general of General Stuart, and was very 12 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. near capturing that officer himself. Among the papers taken was an autograph letter of General Robert Lee to General Stuart, dated Gordonsville, August 15th, which made manifest to me the position and force of the enemy, and their determination to overwhelm the army under my command before it could be re-enforced by any portion of the army of the Potomac. I held- on to my position, thus far to the front, for the purpose of affording all time possible for the arrival of the army of the Potomac at Acquia and Alexandria, and to embarrass and delay the movements of the enemy as far as practicable. On the 18th of August it became apparent to me that this advanced position, with the small force under my command, was no longer tenable in the face of the overwhelming forces of the enemy. I determined, accordingly, to withdraw behind the Rappahannock with all speed, and, as I had been instructed, to defend, as far as practicable, the line of that river. I directed Major General Reno to send back his trains, on the morning of the 18th, by the way of Stevensburg, to Kelly's or Burnett's Ford, and, as soon as the trains had gotten several hours in advance, to follow them with his whole coips, and take post behind the Rappahannock, leaving all his cavalry in the neighborhood of Raccoon Ford to cover this movement. General Banks's corps, which had been ordered, on the 12th, to take position at Culpeper Court-House, I directed, with its trains preceding it, to cross the Rappahannock at the point where the Orange and Alexandria railroad crosses that river. General McDowell's train was ordered to pursue the same route, while the train of General Sigel was directed through Jefferson, to cross the Rappahannock at Warrenton Sulphur Springs. So soon as these trains had been sufficiently advanced, McDowell's corps was directed to take the route from Culpeper to Rappahannock Ford, whilst General Sigel, who was on the right and front, was instructed to follow the movements of his train to Sulphur Springs. These movements were executed during the day and night of the 18th, and the day of the 19th, by which time the whole army, with its trains, had safely recrossed the Rappahannock and was posted behind that stream, with its left at Kelly's Ford and its right about three miles above Rappahannock Station, General Sigel having been directed, immediately upon crossing at Sulphur Springs, to march down the left bank of the Rappahannock until he connected closely with General MecDowell's right. Early on the morning of the 20th the enemy drove in our pickets in front of Kelly's Ford and at Rappahannock Station, but finding we had covered those fords, and that it would be impracticable to force the passage of the river without heavy loss, his advance halted and the main body of his army was brought forward from the Rapidan. By the night of the 20th the bulk of his forces confronted us from Kelly's Ford to a point above our extreme right. During the whole of the days of the 21st and 22d efforts were made by the enemy, at various points, to cross the river, but they were repulsed in all cases. The artillery fire was rapid and continuous during the whole of those days, and extended along the line of the river for seven or eight miles. Finding that it was not practicable to force the passage of the river in my front, the enemy began slowly to move up the river for the purpose of turning our right. My orders required me to keep myself closely in communication with Fredericksburg, to which point the army of the Potomac was being brought from the peninsula, with the purpose of re-enforcing me from that place by the line of the Rappahannoek. My force was too small to enable me to extend my right further without so weakening my line as to render it easy for the enemy to break through at any point. I telegraphed again and again to Washington, representing this movement-of the enemy toward my right and the impossibility of my being able to extend my lines so as to resist it without abandoning my connexions with Fredericksburg. I was assured, on the 21st, that if I would hold the line of the river two days longer I should be so strongly re-enforced as not only to be secure, but to be REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 13 able to resume offensive operations; but on the 25th of August the only forces that had joined me, or were in the neighborhood, were two thousand five hundred men of the Pennsylvania reserves, under Brigadier General Reynolds, who had arrived at Kelly's Ford, and the division of General Kearney, four thousand five hundred strong, which had reached Warrenton Junction. The line of the Rappahannock is very weak, and scarce opposes any considerable obstacle to the advance of an army. It is but a small stream above the forks, and can be crossed by good fords every mile or two of its whole length. The movement of the enemy towards my right occasioned me much uneasiness, in consequence of the instructions, which bound me to keep in close communication with Fredericksburg; but I instructed General Sigel, who occupied the right of my line, and who expressed great apprehensions that his flank would be turned, and proposed to withdraw from his position towards the railroad, to stand firm and hold his ground, and to allow the enemy to cross at Sulphur Springs and develop himself on the road toward Warrenton; that, as soon as any considerable force had crossed at that place, I would rapidly mass my army during the night and throw it upon any force of the enemy which attempted to march in the direction of Warrenton. The whole of the cavalry under Brigadier Generals Buford and Bayard was pushed considerably to the right of General Sigel, in the direction of Fayetteville and Sulphur Springs, to watch the movements of the enemy in that direction, and to picket the river as far up as possible. General Sigel was ordered, if any force of the enemy attempted to cross below Sulphur Springs, to march at once against it and to notify me, as I was determined to resist the passage of the river at any point below the springs. Copies of my despatches to the general-in-chief, and of his replies, the despatches from General Sigel, and my orders to him, given during the 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d of August, are appended, which show completely the condition of things, my understanding of the movements of the enemy, and the dispositions which I made and proposed to make in relation to them. Finding that the continued movement of the enemy to my right, whilst heavy masses of his force still confronted me at Rappahannock Station, would, within a day, if allowed to continue, either render my position on the Rappahannock wholly untenable, or force me to give battle to the enemy in my front and on my right, I determined, on the afternoon of the 22d, to mass my whole forceoto recross the Rappahannock by the bridges and fords near Rappahannock Station, and by Kelly's Ford below, and to fall on the flank and rear of the long column of the enemy which was passing up the river towards our right. I accordingly made the necessary orders on the night of the 22d of August. The attempt would have been dangerous, but no recourse was left me, except to make this attack, to retire to Warrenton Junction and abandon the line of the Rappahannock, or to retire in the direction of Fredericksburg and abandon the Orange and Alexandria railroad and the direct approaches to Washington city. I determined, therefore, to hazard the result, and to fall furiously, with my whole army, upon the flank and rear of the enemy. During the night of the 22d a heavy rain set in, which, before day dawned on the 23d, had caused the river to rise six or eight feet, carried away all our bridges, and destroyed all the fords on the river. To recross the Rappahannock and to make the attack, as proposed, was no longer practicable; but the rise in the river which had prevented the movement I believed also would prevent the retreat of that portion of the enemy which had crossed at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge, according to the reports which had been sent me by General Sigel. Early onthe morning of the 23d, therefore, I massed my whole force in the neighborhood of Rappahannock Station with the purpose of falling upon that portion of the enemy which had crossed above me, and was then supposed to be between Sulphur Springs, Waterloo Bridge, and the town of Warrenton. As the river was too high to be crossed, and was likely to remain so for at least 14 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. thirty-six hours, I had no fear that the enemy would be able to interpose between me and Fredericksburg, or to make any attempt upon the Orange and Alexandria railroad north of the Rappahannock. I directed General Sigel to march, with his whole corps, upon Sulphur Springs, supported by Reno's corps and Banks's corps, to fall upon any body of the enemy that he might encounter, and to push forward along the river to Waterloo Bridge. I directed General McDowell to move, at the same time, directly upon the town of Warrenton, so that from that point he would be able, if necessary, to unite with General Sigel on the road from that place to Sulphur Springs or to Waterloo Bridge. To the corps of General McDowell I had attached the Pennsylvania reserves, under Brigadier General Reynolds, the first of the army of the Potomac which had joined my command. On the night of the 224 of August a small cavalry force of the enemy, crossing at Waterloo Bridge and passing through Warrenton, had made a raid upon our trains at Catlett's Station, and had destroyed four or five wagons in all, belonging to the train of my own headquarters; at the time this cavalry force attacked at Catlett's, and it certainly was not more than three hundred strong, our whole army trains were parked at that place, and were guarded by not less than fifteen hundred infantry and five companies of cavalry. The success of this small cavalry party of the enemy, although very trifling and attended with but little damage, was most disgraceful to the force which had been left in charge of the trains. General Sigel moved, as ordered, slowly up the Rappahannock, in the direction of Sulphur Springs, on the 23d, and first encountered a force of the enemy near the point where a small creek, called Great Run, puts into the Rappahannock, about two miles below the Sulphur Springs; the enemy was driven across the stream, but destroyed the bridges; the heavy rains had caused this small creek to rise so much that it was not then fordable, so that the night of the 23d and part of the morning of the 24th were spent by General Sigel in rebuilding the bridges. On the night of the 23d also the advance of McDowell's corps occupied Warrenton, a cavalry force of the enemy having retreated from there a few hours before. On the morning of the 24th General Sigel, supported by Generals Reno and Banks, crossed Great Run and occupied the Sulphur Springs, under a heavy fire of artillery from batteries which the enemy had established all along the south side of the Rappahannock. The bridge which had been built at Sulphur Springs, and upon which the forces of the enemy which had crossed a day or two previous escaped from the advance of General Sigel, was destroyed, and General Sigel pushed forward, with the force supporting him, in the direction of Waterloo Bridge. Meantime I had despatched Brigadier General Buford with a heavy cavalry force from Warrenton, on the morning of the 24th, to reconnoitre the country in the vicinity of Waterloo Bridge, and to interrupt the passage of the river at that point as far as practicable. It was then believed by General Sigel, who so reported to me, that a considerable force of the enemy was on the north side of the Rappahlannock, and was retiring from his advance in the direction of Waterloo Bridge. By noon of the 24th General Buford reported to me that he hads occupied Waterloo Bridge without finding any force of the enemy, and he did not believe that there was any force between that place and Sulphur Springs. I directed him to destroy the bridge at Waterloo and to maintain his position there until the arrival of the advance of General Sigel. I at once informed General Sigel of these facts, and directed him to push forward his advance to Waterloo; Milroy's brigade, constituting the advance of his corps, reached Waterloo late in the afternoon of the 24th. On that afternoon the whole force of the enemy was stretched along the line of the river from Rappahannock station to Waterloo Bridge, with his centre, and I think his main body, in the vicinity of Sulphur Springs. During the day of the 24th a large detachment of the enemy, numbering REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 15 thirty-six regiments of infantry with the usual number of batteries of artillery and a considerable' cavalry force, marched rapidly towards the north in the direction of Rectortown. They could be plainly seen from our signal stations established on high points along the Rappahannock, and their movements and force were reported to me from time to time by Colonel J. S. Clark, of General Bank's staff, who, both on that day and for many preceding and succeedings day, had given me most valuable and reliable information. I am glad to express here my appreciation of the valuable services of this officer. On the night of the 24th my forces were distributed as follows: Rickett's division, of McDowell's corps, on the road from Warrenton to Waterloo Bridge, and about four miles east of Waterloo; King's division, of the same corps, between Warrenton and the Sulphur Springs; Sigel's corps, near the Rappahannock, with his advance at Waterloo Bridge, and his rear in the direction of the Sulphur Springs; in his rear, and immediately in contact with him, was Banks's corps; while Reno's corps was east, and very near the Sulphur Springs. I was satisfied that no force of the enemy was on the north side of the Rappahannock, but I feared that during the next day-by which time the river would have fallen sufficiently to be passed at any of the fords-that the enemy would make an attempt to cross at Rappahannock Station, or at the fords between that point'and Sulphur Springs; yet, as we were confronted at Waterloo Bridge and Sulphur Springs by the main body of the enemy, still moving towards our right, and as the heavy column mentioned previously was marching with all speed in the direction of White Plains and Salem, and fiom these points would be able to turn our right by the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, or even north of that place, it was with the greatest reluctance, and only because I felt bound to do so under my instructions, that I took measures again to assure my communications with Fredericksburg. I append herewith orders and despatches sent and received during the. 23d and 24th of August, which will of themselves furnish a succinct account of the movements here set forth, and all the information and assurances upon which those movements were made. On the 23d I received a despatch from the general-in-chief, informing me that heavy re-enforcements would begin to arrive at Warrenton Junction the succeeding day, and on the 24th I received despatches from Colonel Haupt, the railroad superintendent at Alexandria, informing me that thirty thousand men, ordered forward to join me, had demanded transportation from him, and that they would all be shipped that afternoon or early the next morning. The force which I thus expected, as reported to me, consisted of the division of General Sturgis, ten thousand strong; the division of General Cox, seven thousand strong; the corps of General Heintzelman, ten thousand strong, and the corps of General Franklin, ten thousand strong. By the night of the 25th it became apparent to me that I could no longer keep open my communications with Fredericksburg and oppose the crossing of the Rappahannock at Rappahannock Station without abandoning the road from Warrenton to Washington, and leaving open to the enemy the route through Thoroughfare Gap, and all other roads north of the Orange and Alexandria railroad; and as the main body of his forces was constantly tending in that direction, I determined no longer to attempt to mask the lower fords of the Rappahannock, but to assembld such forces as I had along the Warrenton turnpike, between Warrenton and Gainesville, and give battle to the enemy on my right or left, as he might choose. I therefore directed General McDowell to occupy Warrenton with his own and Sigel's corps, supporting him by Banks's corps, from the direction of Fayetteville. I pushed Reno forward to occupy a point near the Warrenton turnpike, and about three miles to the east of that town. I sent orders to General Porter, who had reported to me by note from the neighborhood of Bealeton Station, to push forward and join Reno. Heintzelman's corps, which had reached Warrenton Junction, was ordered to remain for the present at that point, it being my purpose to push forward that 16 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. corps, as soon as practicable, to Greenwich, about half-way between Warrenton and Gainesville. I sent orders to Colonel Haupt to direct one of the strongest divisions being sent forward to take post in the works at Manassas Junction, and requested General Halleck to push Franklin with all speed to Gainesville; that he could march quite as rapidly as he could be transported by rail with the limited means of railroad transportation in our possession, and that his baggage and supplies could be sent forward to Gainesville by rail. I also sent orders to the colonel commanding at Manassas Junction for the first division that reached there from Alexandria to halt and take post in the works at that place, and directed him also to push forward all of his cavalry in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap; to watch any movements the enemy might make from that direction. I had instructed General Sturgis, commanding at Alexandria, on the 23d of August, to post strong guards along the railroad from Manassas Junction to Catlett's Station, and requested him to superintend this in person. I also directed General Kearney, who reached Warrenton Junction on the 23d, to see that sufficient guards were placed all along the railroad in his rear. After these precautions and assurances, I thought, and confidently expected, that by the afternoon of the *26th Franklin would have been at or near Gainesville; one division would have been occupying the works at Manassas Junction, and that the forces under Sturgis and Cox would have been at Warrenton Junction, whence they could have at once been pushed north, in the direction of Warrenton turnpike. The orders for the disposition of the forces then under my command were sent, and the movements made, so far as practicable, during the day of the 26th. About eight o'clock at night, on the 26th, the advance of Jackson's force, having passed through Thoroughfare Gap, cut the railroad in the neighborhood of Kettle Run, about six miles east of Warrenton Junction. The cavalry force which I had sent forward towards Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 26th made no report to me. The moment our communications were interrupted at Kettle Run I was satisfled that the troops which had been promised me from the direction of Washington had made no considerable progress. Had Franklin been even at Centreville on the 26th, or had Cox and Sturgis been as far west as Bull Run on that day, the movement of Jackson through Thoroughfare Gap upon the railroad at Manassas would have been utterly impracticable. So confidently did I expect, from the assurances which I had time and again received, that these troops would be in position, or, at all events, far advanced towards me, that Jackson's movement towards White Plains, and in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, had caused but little uneasiness; but on the night of the 26th it was very apparent to me that all these expected re-enforcements had utterly failed me, and that upon the small force under my own immediate command I must depend alone for any present operations against the enemy. It was easy for me to retire in the direction of the lower fords of the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg, so as to bring me in immediate contact with the forces there, or arriving there, but by so doing I should have left open the whole front of Washington; and after my own disappointment of the re-enforcements which I had expected I was not sure that there was any sufficient force, in the absence of the army under my command, to cover the capital. I determined, therefore, at once to abandon the line of the Rappahannock, and throw my whole force in the direction of Gainesville and Manassas Junction, to crush the enemy, who had passed through Thoroughfare Gap, and to interpose between the army of General Lee and Bull Run. During the night of the 26th the main body of the enemy still occupied their positions from Sulphur Springs to Waterloo Bridge and above, but towards morning, on the 27th, I think their advance moved off in the direction of White Plains, pursuing the route previously taken by Jackson, and no doubt with a view of uniting with him eastward of the Bull Run range. From the 18th of August until the morning of the 27th the troops under my REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 17 command had been contilnuously marching and fighting night and day, and during the whole of that time there was scarcely anr interval of an hour without the roar of artillery. The men had had little sleep, we reatly worn down with fatigue, had had little time to get properfood or to eat it, had been engaged in constant battles and skirmishes, and had performed services laborious, dangerous, and excessive beyond any previous experience in this country. As was to be expected under such circumstances, the numbers of the army under my Command had been greatly reduced by deaths, by wounds, by sickness, and by fatigue, so that on the morning of the 27th of August I estimated my whole Wffective force (and I think the estimate was large) as follows: Sigel's corps, nine thousand men; Banks's corps, five thousand men; McDowell's corps, including Reynolds's division, fifteen thousand five hundred men; Reno's corps, seven thousand men; the corps of Heintzelman and Porter, (the freshest by far in that army,) about eighteen thousand men-making in all fifty-four thousand five hundred men. Our cavalry numbered on paper about four thousand men, but their horses were completely broken down, and there were not five hundred men, all told, capable of doing much service, as should be expeeted from cavalry. The corps of Heintzelman had reached Warrenton Junction, but it was without wagons, without artillery, with only forty rounds of ammunition to the man, and without even horses for the general and field officers. The corps of Porter had also reached Warrenton Junction with a very small supply of provisions, and but forty rounds of ammunition for each man. On the morning of the 27th, in accordance with the purpose previously set forth, I directed McDowell to move forward rapidly on Gainesville, by the Warrenton turnpike, with his own corps and Sigel's and the division of Reynolds, so as to reach that point during the night. I directed General Reno, with his corps, followed by Kearney's division of Heintzelmall's corps, to move rapidly on Greenwich, so as to reach there that night, to communicate at once with General McDowell,'and to support him in any operations against the enemy in the vicinity of Gainesville. I moved forward along the railroad towards Manassas Junction with Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps, leaving orders for General Porter to remain with his corps at Warrenton Junction until relieved by General Banks, who was marching to that place from Fayetteville; and, as soon as he was relieved, to push forward also in the direction of Gainesville, where, at that time, I expected the main collision with the enemy would occur. The army trains of all the corps I instructed to take the road to Warrenton Junction, and follow in the rear of Hooker's division towards Manassas Junction, so that the road pursued by the trains was entirely covered from any possible interruption by the enemy. On the afternoon of the 27th a severe engagement occurred between Hooker's division and Ewell's division of Jackson's forces. The action commenced about foulr miles west of Bristow Station. Ewell was driven back along the railroad, but still confronted Hooker at dark along the banks of Broad Run, immediately in front of Bristow Station, at which point I arrived at sunset. The loss in this engagement was about three hundred killed and wounded on each side. The enemy left his dead, many of his wounded, and much of his baggage on the field of battle. The railroad had been torn up and the bridges burned in several places between Bristow Station and Warrenton Junction. I accordingly directed Major General Banks to cover the railroad trains at Warrenton Junction until General Porter's corps had marched from that place,'and then to run back the trains as far as practicable, and, covering them with his troops, to repair the bridges as fast as possible. I also directed Captain Merrill, of the engineers, with a considerable force, to repair the railroad track and bridges as far, as possible in the direction of Bristow Station. The road was accordingly put in order from H. Ex. Doc. 81-2 18 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE Warrenton Junction to Kettle Run during the 27th, and the trains run back to that point early next day. At dark on the 27th General Hooker reported to me that his ammunition was nearly exhausted, and that he had but about five rounds to the man left. I had by that time become conscious that the whole force under Jackson, consisting of his own, A. P. Hill's, and Ewell's divisions, was south of the Warrenton turnpike and in the immediate neighborhood of Manassas Junction. McDowell reached his position during the night of the 27th, as did also Kearney and Reno, and it was clear, on that night, that we had interposed completely between Jackson and the main body of the enemy, which was still west of the Bull Run range and in the neighborhood of White Plains. Thinking it altogether likely that Jackson would mass his whole force and attempt to turn our right at Bristow Station, and knowing that Hooker, for want of ammunition, was in little condition to make long resistance, I sent back orders to General Porter, about dark of the 27th, to move forward at one o'clock in the night, and report to me at Bristow by daylight in the morning, leaving instructions in some detail for Banks, who was expected at Warrenton Junction during that night or early in the morning. The orders for all these movements are herewith appended. General Porter failed utterly to obey the orders that were sent him, giving as an excuse that his men were tired, that they would straggle in the night, and that the wagon trains proceeding eastward, in the rear of Hooker's division, would offei obstructions to hism arch. He, however, made no attempt whatever to comply with this order, although it was stated to him in the order itself that his presence was necessary on all accounts at daylight, and that the officer delivering the despatch was instructed to conduct him to the field. There were but two courses left open to Jackson in consequence of this sudden and unexpected movement of the army: He could not retrace his steps through Gainesville, as it was occupied by McDowell, having at command a force equal, if not superior, to his own, and was either obliged, therefore, to retreat through Centreville, which would carry him still further fiom the main body of Lee's army, or toi mass his force, assault us at Bristow Station, and turn our right. He pursued the former course, and retired through Centreville. This mistake of Jackson's alone saved us from the consequences which would have followed this flagrant and inexcusable disobedience of orders on the part of General Porter. At nine o'clock on the night of the 27th, satisfied of Jackson's position, I sent orders to General McDowell to push forward at the very earliest dawn of day towards Manassas Junction from Gainesville, resting his right on the Manassas Gap railroad, and throwing his left well to the east. I directed General Reno to march at the same hour from Greenwich direct upon Manassas Junction, and Kearney to march at the same hour upon Bristow. This latter order was sent to Kearney to render my right at Bristow perfectly secure against the probable movement of Jackson in that direction. Iearney arrived at Bristow about eight o'clock in the morning, Reno being on his left and marching direct upon Manassas Junction. I immediately pushed Kearney forward in pursuit of Ewell towards Manassas, followed by Hooker. General Porter's corps did not arrive at Bristow until half-past ten o'clock in the morning, and the moment he found that Jackson had evacuated Mlanassas Junction he requested permission to halt at Bristow and rest his men. Sykes's division of Porter's corps had spent the whole day of the 27th, from ten o'clock in the morning until daylight of the 28th, in camp at Warrenton Junction. Morell's division of the same corps had arrived at Warrenton Junction during the day of the 27th, and also remained there during the whole of that night. Porter's corps was by far the freshest in the whole army, and should have been, and I believe was, in better condition for service than any troops we had. General McDowell reported to me afterwards that he had given orders for the movement of his command' upon Manassas REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 19 Junction at two o'clock at night, in accordance with the directions I had sent him, but General Sigel, who commanded his advance, and was at Gainesville, instead of moving forward from Gainesville at daylight, as he was ordered, was absolutely with his advance in that town as late as half-past seven in the morning. Meantime, beginning about three o'clock in the morning of the 2Sth, Jackson commenced evacuating Manassas Junction, and his troops were marching fiom that point in the direction of Centreville until ten or eleven o'clock in the day. If the whole force under McDo-well had *moved forward as directed and at the time specified, they would have intercepted Jackson's retreat toward Centreville by eight o'clock in the morning, and I do not believe it would have been possible for Jackson to have crossed Bull Run, so closely engaged with our force's, without heavy loss. I reached IMacassas Junction with Kearney's division and Reno's corps about twelve o'clock in the day of the 28th, less than an hour after Jackson in persons had retired. I immediately pushed forward Hooker, Kearney, and Reno upon Centreville, and sent orders to Fitz John Porter to come forward to Manriassas Junction. I also wrote to'McDowell and stated the facts, so far as we were then able to ascertain them, and directed him to call back the whole of his force that had come in the direction of Manassas Junction, and to move forward upon Centreville. He had, however, without my knowledge, detached Ricketts's division in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, and that division was no longer available in his movement towards Centreville. Late on the afternoon of the 28th RIearney drove the enemy's rear guard out of Centreville, and occupied that town, with his advance beyond it, about dark. The enemy retreated through Centreville, one portion of his force taking the road by Sudley Springs, and the other pursuing the Warrenton turnpike towards Gainesville, destroying the bridges on that road over Bull Run and Cub Run. McDowell, with his whole force, consisting of his own corps, except Ricketts's division, Sigel's corps, and the division of Reynolds, m-Larching in the direction of Centreville, encountered the advance of Jackson's force retreating towards Thoroughfare Gap about six o'clock on the evening of the 28th. A severe action took place between King's division of McDowell's corps, and the advance of Jackson, which was termiiated by darkness. Each party maintained its ground. Gibbon's brigade of King's division, which was in the advance of that division, sustained the brunt of the action, but was supported handsomely by Doubleday's brigade, which came into action shortly after. This engagement and its result,were reported to. me near Centreville about ten o'clock that night. I felt sure then, and so stated, that there was no escape for Jackson. I accordingly sent orders to General McDowell, as also to General King, several times during the night of 28th, and once by his own staff officer, to hold his ground at all hazards, to prevent the retreat of Jackson to the west, and that at daylight in the morning our whole force from Centreville and Manassas Junction would be up with the enemy, who must be crushed between us. I also sent orders to General Kearney to push forward at one o'clock that night cautiously fronm Centreville along the Warrenton turnpike; to drive in the pickets of the enemy, and to keep closely in contact with him during the night; to rest his left on the'Warrenton turnpike, and throw his right well.to the north, if possible, across Little River turnpike; at daylight in the morning to assault vigorously with his right advanced, and that Hooker and Reno would be up with him very shortly after daylight. I sent orders to General Porter, whom I supposed to be at Manassas Junction, where he should have been in compliance with my orders of the day previous, to move upon Centreville at the ea'liest dawn, and stated to him the position of the forces, and that a severe battle would undoubtedly be fought during the morning of the 29th. The only apprehension I had at that time was that Jackson might attempt to retreat to the north, in the direction of Leesburg, and, for the purpose of preventing this, I directed Kearney to keep 20 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. closely in contact with him during the whole of the night of the 28th. My forces were so disposed that McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds, whose joint forces amounted to about twenty-five thousand men, were immediately west of Jackson, and between him and Thoroughfare Gap, whilst Kearney, Hooker, Reno, and Porter, about twenty-five thousand strong, were to fall on him from the east at daylight in the morning, or very shortly after. With this disposition of troops, we were so far in advance of Longstreet that, by using our whole force vigorously, we should be able'to crush Jackson before Longstreet could, by any possibility, reach the scene of action. To my great disappointment, however, I learned, towards daylight on the morning of the 29th, that King's division had fallen back in tire -direction of Manassas Junction, thus leaving open the road to Thoroughfare Gap and making new movements and dispositions of troops immediately necessary. I submit herewith the reportsiof Generals King, Gibbon, and Doubleday, of the action of the evening of the 28th, as also a detailed report of General McDowell. The orders directing all these movements are also appended, and'they bring the operations of the army up to the 29th of August. The losses in King's division in the action of the evening. of the 28th were principally in Gibbon's brigade of that division, and numbered. Gibbon's brigade consisted of some of the best troops in the service, and the conduct of both men and officers was gallant and distinguished. The report of General King, herewith appended, exhibits his high'opinion of the conduct of this brigade, and of the officers who distinguished themselves in that action. The disposition of troops on the west of Jackson having failed through Ricketts's movement towards Thoroughfare Gap, and the consequent withdrawal of King, an' immediate change in the disposition and proposed movements of the troops for the succeeding day became necessary, and about daylight on the morning of the 29th, shortly after I received information of the withdrawal of King's division, I sent orders to General Sigel, who was in the neighborhood of Groveton, supported by Reynolds's division, to attack the enemy vigorously as soon as it was light enough to see, and bring him to a stand, if it were possible to do so. I instructed General Heintzelman to push forward from Centreville towards Gainesville at the earliest dawn, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, and directed General Reno to follow closely in his rear; to use all speed, and as soon as he came up with the enemy to establish communication with Sigel, and attack with the utmost promptness and vigor. I also sent orders to Major General Fitz John Porter, at Manassas Junction, to move forward with the utmost rapidity with his own corps and King's division of McDowell's corps, which was supposed to be at that point, upon Gainesville, by the direct road from Manassas Junction to that place. I urged him to make all speed, that he might come up with the enemy and be able to turn his flank near where the Warrenton turnpike is intersected by the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville. Shortly after sending this order I received a note from General McDowell, whom I had not been able to find during the night of the 28th, dated at Manassas Junction, requesting that King's division might not be taken from his command. I immediately sent a joint order to Generals McDowell and Porter, directing them, with their two corps, to march with all speed towards Gainesville, on the direct road from Manassas Junction. This order, which is appended, set forth in detail the movements they were directed to make. Sigel attacked the enemy about daylight on the morning of the 29th, a mile or two east of Groveton, where he was soon joined by the divisions of Hooker and Kearney. Jackson fell back several miles, but was so closely pressed by these forces that he was compelled to make a stand and to make the best defence possible. He accordingly took up a position with his left in the neighborhood of Sudley Springs, his right a little to the south of Warrenton turnpike, and his line covered by an old railroad grade which leads from Gainesville in the direc REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE 21 tion of Leesburg. His batteries, which were numerous, and some of them of heavy calibre, were posted behind the ridges, in the open ground on both sides of Warrenton turnpike, whilst the mass of his troops. was sheltered in dense woods behind the railroad embankment. I arrived on the field from Centreville about noon and found the two armies confronting each other, both considerably cut up by the sharp action in which they had been engaged since daylight in the morning. Heintzelman's corps occupied the right of our line, in front or west of the Sudley Springs road. General Sigel was on his left, with his line extended a short distance south of the Warrenton turnpike, the division of General Schenck occupying the high ground to the left of that road. The extreme left was occupied by the division of General Reynolds. General Reno's corps had reached the field, and the most of it had been pushed forward into action, leaving four regiments in reserve and in rear of the centre of our line. Immediately after I reached the ground, General Sigel reported to me that his line was weak; that the divisions of Schurz and Steinwehr were much cut up, and ought to be drawn back from the front. I informed General Sigel that this was utterly impossible, as there were no troops to replace them, and that he must hold his ground; that I would not again push his troops into action, as the corps of Porter and McDowell were moving forward from Manassas Junction on the road to Gainesville, and must very soon be in position to fall upon the enemy's right flank and probably upon his rear. I rode to the front of our line and inspected it from right to left, giving the same information to Generals Heintzelman and Reno. The troops were accordingly suffered to rest in their positions and to resupply themselves with ammunition. From twelve o'clock until four very severe skirmishes occurred constantly atvarious points on our line, and were brought on at every indication that the enemy made of a disposition to retreat. About two o'clock in the afternoon several pieces of artillery were discharged on the extreme right of the enemy's line, and I fully believed that Generals Porter and McDowell had reached their positions, and had become engaged with the enemy. I did not hear more than three shots fired, and was at a loss to know what had become of these two corps, or what was delaying them; but I received information shortly afterwards that General McDowell was advancing to join the main body by the Sudley Springs road, and would probably be up with us in two hours. At half-past four o'clock I sent a peremptory order to General Porter to push forward at once into action on the enemy's right, and, if possible, to turn his rear, stating to him generally the condition of things on the field in front of me. About:half-past five o'clock, when General Porter should have been coming into action in compliance with this order, I directed Generals Heintzelman and Reno to assault the left of the enemy. The attack was made with great gallantry, and the whole of the left of the enemy was doubled back towards his centre, and our forces, after a sharp conflict of an hour and a half, occupied the field of battle; with the dead and wounded of the enemy in our hands. In this attack Grover's brigade of Hooker's division was particularly distinguished by a determined bayonet charge, breaking two of the enemy's lines and penetrating to the third before it could be checked. By this time General McDowell had arrived on the field, and I pushed his corps immediately to the front. along the Warrenton turnpike with orders to fall upon the enemy, who was retreating towards the pike from the direction of Sudley Springs. The attack along the turnpike was made by King's division at about sunset in the evening, but by that time the advance of the main body of the enemy, under Longstreet, had begun to reach the field, and King's division encountered a stubborn and determined resistance at a point about three fourths of a mile in front of our line of battle. Whilst this attack was going on, the forces under Heintzelman and Reno continued to push back the left of the enemy in the direction of the Warrenton turnpike, so that about eight o'clock in the evening, the greater portion of the field 22 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. of battle was occupied by our army. Nothing was heard of General Porter up to that time, and his forces took no part whatever in the action, but were suffered by him to lie idle on their arms, within sight and sound of the battle during the whole day. So far as I know, he made no effort whatever to comply with my orders nor to take any part in the action. I do not hesitate to say that if he had discharged his duty as became a soldier under the circumstances, and had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to eight o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the larger portion of Jackson's force before he could have been by any possibility sufficiently re-enforced to have made any effective resistance. I did not myself feel for a moment that it was necessary for me, having given General Porter an order to march towards the enemy in a particular direction, to send him in addition specific orders to attack, it being his clear duty, and in accordance with every military precept, to have brought his forces into action wherever he encountered the enemy, when a furious battle with that enemy was raging during the whole day in his immediate presence. I believe —in fact, I am positive-that at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th, General Porter had in his front no considerable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right (flank of Jackson, and to have fallen upon his rear; that if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet; and that th'e army of General Lee would have been so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character. I speak thus freely of the strange failure of General Porter, not because I am more convinced of its unfortunate results now than I was at the time, but because a full investigation of the whole subject made by a court-martial has fully justified and confirmed that opinion. Our losses during the 29th were very heavy, but no separate returns of killed and wounded for that day have been made to me. I believed, from all I could learn from corps commanders, and so reported, that our loss during that day was not less than six or eight thousand killed and wounded, and I think this estimate will be confirmed by the general reports which cover the losses during the battles of the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th August, and the 1st of September. My estimate of the loss of the enemy, reported to the departmelit on the morning of the 30th, was based upon the statements made to me by Generals Hooker and Kearney, who had. been over the whole field on the left. General Hooker estimated the loss of the enemy as at least two to one, and General IKearney as at least three to one of our own. Every indication during the night of the 29th, and up to ten o'clock on the morning of the 30th, pointed to the retreat of the enemy from our front. Paroled prisoners of our own, taken on the evening of the 29th, and who came into our lines on the morning of the 30th, reported the enemy retreating during the whole night in the direction of and along the Warrenton turnpike. Generals McDowell and Heintzelman, who reconnoitred thepositions held by the enemy's left on the evening of the 29th, confirmed this statement. They reported to me that the positions occupied by the enemy's left had been evacuated, and that there was every indication that he was retreating in the direction of Gainesville. On the morning of the 30th, as may be, supposed, our troops, who had been so continually marching and fighting for so many days, were in a state of great exhaustion. They had had little to eat for two days previous, and the artillery and cavalry horses had been in harness and saddled continually for ten days, and had had no forage for two days previous. It may easily be imagined how little these troops, after such severe labor, and after undergoing such hardship REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 23 and privation, were in condition for active and efficient service. I had telegraphed to the general-in-chief on the 28th our condition, and had begged of him to have rations and forage sent forward to us from Alexandria with all despatch. I also called his attention to the imminent need of cavalry horses to enable the cavalry belonging to the army to perform any service whatever. About daylight of the 30th I received a note from General Franklin, herewith appended, written by direction of General McClellan and dated at eight o'clock the evening before, informing me that rations and forage would be loaded into the available wagons and cars at Alexandria as soon as I would send back a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. Such a letter, when we were fighting the enemy, and Alexandria was swarming with troops, needs no comment. Bad as was the condition of our cavalry, I was in no situation to spare troops from the front, nor could they have gone to Alexandria and returned within the time by which we must have had provisions or have fallen back in the direction of Washington; nor do I yet see what service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad trains. It was not until I received this letter that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the operations' with which I was charged; but I felt it to be my duty, notwithstanding the desperate condition of my command, from great fatigue, from want of provisions and forage, and from the small hope that I had of any effective assistance from Alexandria, to hold my position at all hazards and under all privations, unless overwhelmed by the superior forces of the enemy. I had received no sort of information of any troops coming forward to my assistance since the 24th, and did not expect, on the morning of the 30th, that any assistance would reach me fiom the direction of Washington; but I determined again to give battle to the enemy on the 30th, and at least to lay on such blows as would cripple him as much as possible, and delay as long as practicable any further advance towards the capital. I accordingly prepared to renew the engagement. At that time my effective forces-greatly reduced by losses in killed, wounded, missing, and broken-down men during the severe operations of two or three days and nights previous; the sharp- actions of Hooker, King, and Ricketts on the 27th and 28th, and the fnrious battle on the 29th-were estimated by me and others, as followsMlcDowell's corps, including Reynolds's division, twelve thousand men; Sigel's corps, seven thousand men; Reno's corps, seven thousand; Heintzelman's corps, seven thousand men; Porter's corps, which had been in no engagement, and was, or ought to have been, perfectly fresh, I estimated at about twelve thousand men, including the brigade of Piatt, which formed a part of Sturgis's division, and the only portion that ever joined me. But of this force the brigades of Piatt and of Griffin, nuimbering, as I understood, about five thousand men, had been suffered to march off at daylight on the 30th to Centreville, and were not available for operations omi that day. This reduced Porter's effective force on the field to about seven thousand men, which gave mue a total force of forty thousand men. Banks's corps, about five thousand strong, was at Bristow Station, in charge of the railroad trains and of a portion of the wagon trains of the army still at that place. Between twelve and two o'clock in the day I advanced the corps of Porter, supported by King's division of McDowell's corps, to attack the enemy along the Warrenton turnpike. At the same time I directed Heintzellhnan and Reno, on our right, to push forward to the left and front towards Warrenton turnpike, and attack the enemy's left in flank, if possible. For a short time Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps was placed in support of this movement on our right. It was necessary for me to act thus promptly and make an attack, as I had not the time, for want of provisions and forage, to await an attack from the enemy; -nor did I think it good policy to do so under the circumustances. During the whole night of the 29th and the morning of the 30th, the advance of the maini 24:REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. body under Lee was arriving on the field to re-enforce Jackson, so that by twelve or one o'clock in the day we were confronted by forces greatly superior to our own, and these forces were being every moment largely increased by fresh arrivals of the enemy from the direction of Thoroughfare Gap. Every moment of delay increased the odds against us, and I therefore advanced to the attack as rapidly as I was able to bring my forces into action. Shortly after General Porter moved forward to the attack along the Warrenton turnpike, sand the assault on the enemy was made by Heintzelman and Reno on the right, it became apparent that the enemy was massing his troops, as fast as they arrived on the field, on his right, and was moving forward from that direction to turn our left, at which point it was plain he intended to make his main attack. I accordingly directed General McDowell to recall Ricketts's division immediately from our right, and post it on the left of our line with its left refused. The attack of Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent, and his troops soon retired in considerable confusion. As soon as they commenced to fall back, the enemy advanced to the assault, and our whole line, from right to left, was soon furiously engaged. The main attack of the enemy was made upon our left, but was met with stubborn resistance by the divisions of General Schenck, General Milroy, and General Reynolds, who, shortly after the action began, were re-enforced on their left and rear by the division of Ricketts. The action raged furiously for several hours, the enemy bringing up his heavy reserves, and pouring mass after mass of his troops upon our left. So greatly superior in number were his forces that, whilst overpowering us on our left, he was able to assault us also with very superior forces on our right. Porter's forces were rallied and brought to a halt as they were retiring to the rear. As soon as they could be used, I pushed them forward to support our left, and they there rendered most distinguished service, especially the brigade of regulars under Colonel Buchanan. Tower's brigade of Ricketts's division was pushed forward into action in support of Reynolds's division, -and was led forward in person by General Tower with conspicuous skill and gallantry. The conduct of that brigade, in plain view of all the forces on our left, was especially distinguished, and drew forth hearty and enthusiastic cheers. The example of this brigade was of great service, and infused new spirit into all the troops who witnessed their intrepid conduct. Reno's corps was also withdrawn from its position on our right centre late in the afternoon, and thrown into the action on our left, where it behaved with conspicuous gallantry. Notwithstanding these great disadvantages, our troops held their ground with the utmost firmness and obstinacy, and the losses on both sides were very heavy. By dark our left had been forced back about a half or three-quarters of a mile; but still remained firm and unbroken, and still covered'the turnpike in our rear. *About six o'clock in the afternoon I heard, accidentally, that Franklin's corps had arrived at a point about four miles east of Centreville, and twelve miles in our rear, and that it was only about eight thousand strong. The result of the battle of the 30th, the very heavy losses we had suffered, and the complete prostration of our troops from hunger and fatigue, made it plain to me that we were no longer able, in the face of such overwhelming odds, to maintain our position so far to the front; nor would we have been able to do so under ally circumstances, suffering as were the men and horses from fatigue and hunger, and weakened by the heavy losses incident. to the uncommon hardships which they had suffered. About eight o'clock at night, therefore, I sent written instructions to the commanders of corps to withdraw leisurely towards Centreville, and stated to them what route each should pursue, and where they should take post. General Reno was instructed with his whole corps to cover the movements of the army towards Centreville. The withdrawal was made slowly, quietly, and in good REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 25 order, no pursuit whatever having been attempted by the enemy. A division of infantry with its batteries was posted to cover the crossing of Cub Run. The exact losses in this battle I am unable to give, as the reports received from the corps commanders only exhibit the aggregate losses during the whole of the operations from the 22d of August to the 2d of September. Before leaving the field that night, I sent orders to General Banks, at Bristow Station, to destroy the railroad trains and such of the stores in them as he was unable to carry off, and rejoin me at Centreville. I had previously. sent him orders to throw into each wagon of the army trains as much as possible of the stores from the railroad cars, and to be sure and bring off with him from Warrenton Junction and Bristow all the ammunition and all the sick and wounded that could be transported, and for this purpose, if it were necessary, to throw out the personal baggage, tents, &c., from the regimental trains. These several orders are appended. At no time during the 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st of August was the road between Bristow Station and Centreville interrupted by the enemy. The whole of the trains of the army were on that road in charge of General Banks, and covered and protected by his whole corps. If any of these wagons were lost, as I believe none were, it was wholly without necessity. I enter thus specifically into this matter, and submit the orders sent to General Banks and his subsequent report to me, because no part of the misrepresentation of this campaign has been grosser than the statement of our heavy loss of wagons and supplies. The orders submitted will show conclusively that every arrangement was made, in the utmost detail, for the security of our trains and supplies, and I am quite convinced that General Banks is not the man to neglect the duty with which he was charged. I arrived at Centreville between 9 and 10 o'clock on the night of the 30tl. The same night I sent orders to the corps commanders to report to me in person as early after daylight as possible on the morning of the 31st, and on that morning the troops were directed to be posted as follows: Porter to occupy the intrenchments on the north or right of Centreville; Franklin on his left, in the intrenchments. In rear of Centreville, between Franklin and Porter as a support, was posted the corps of Heintzelman. Sigel occupied the intrenchments on the left and south side of the town, with Reno on his left and rear. Banks was ordered to take post, as soon as he arrived, on the north side of Bull Run, and to cover the bridge on the road from Centreville to Manassas Junction. Sumner, as soon as he arrived, was ordered to take post between Centreville and Chantilly, and to occupy Chantilly in force. McDowell was posted about two miles in the rear of Centreville on the road to Fairfax Court-House. Ammunition trains and some provisions were gotten up on the 31st, and all corps commanders were notified, by special order to each, that the ammunition trains were parked immediately in r'ear of Centreville, and were directed to send officers to procure such ammunition as was needed in their respective corps. I directed the whole of the trains of the army to be unloaded at Centreville and sent to Fairfax Station to bring up forage and rations. We remained during the whole day of the 31st resting the men, getting up supplies of provisions, and resupplying the command with ainmunition. The enemy's cavalry appeared in force in front of our advance at Cub Run, during the morning of the 31st, but made no attempt to cross and no attack upon our troops posted there. A few pieces of artillery were fired, but with no result on either side. The whole force that I had at Centreville; as reported to me by the corps commanders on the morning of the 1st of September, after receiving the corps of Sumner and Franklin, was as follows: MIcDowell's corps, ten thousand men; Sigel's corps, about seven thousand men; Heintzelman's corps, about six thousand; Reno's, six thousand; Banks's, five thousand; Porter's, about nine thousand; Franklin's, eight thousand; Sumner's, eleven thousand-in all, sixty-two thousand men. From these forces two brigades, as I 26 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. before stated, had been sent to Fairfax Station to guard the trains and the depot at that place, which makes it necessary to deduct four thousand men. It is proper for me to state here, and I do it with regret and reluctance, that at least one-half of this great diminution of our forces was occasioned by skulking and straggling from the army. The troops which were brought into action fought with all gallantry and determination, but thousands of men straggled away from their commands and were not in any action. I had posted several regiments in rear of the field of battle on the 29th of August, and although many thousand stragglers and skulkers were arrested by them, many others passed around through the woods, and did not rejoin their commands during the remainder of the camnpaign. I had telegraphed to the general-in-chief, from Rappahannock Station, on the 22d, that this practice of straggling was very common, and was reducing our force considerably, even at that time. I also sent orders, on the same day, to General Sturgis to arrest all stragglers arriving at Alexandria, to confine them in military prisons, and to bring them to speedy trial. The active and incessant movements of the army prevented me, during the whole of this campaign, friom giving that attention to the subject which ought to be and must be given to it, to preserve efficiency and discipline among any troops.'Our cavalry at Centreville was completely broken down, no horses whatever having reached us to remount it. Generals Buford and Bayard, commanding the whole of the cavalry force of the army, reported to me that there were not five horses to the company that could be forced into a trot. It was impossible, therefore, to cover our front with cavalry or to make cavalry reconnoissances, as is usual and necessary in front of an army. I directed General Sumner, on the morning of the 1st of September, to push forward a reconnoissance of two brigades towards the Little River turnpike, to ascertain if the enemy were making any movements in the direction of Germantown or Fairfax Court-House. The enemy was found moving again slowly towards our right, heavy columns of his force being in march towards Fairfax, along Little River turnpike. The main body of our forces was so much broken, down and so completely exhausted that they were in no condition, even on the Ist-of September, for any active operations against the enemy, but I determined to attack at daylight on the 2d of September, in front of Chantilly. The movement of the enemy had become so developed by the afternoon of the 1st, and was so evidently directed to Fairfax Court-House, with a view of turning my right, that I made the necessary disposition of my troops to fight a battle between the Little River pike and the road from Centreville to Fairfax Court-House. I sent General Hooker early in the afternoon to Fairfax Court-House, and directed him to assemble all the troops that were in the vicinity, and to push forward to Germantown with his advance. I directed McDowell to move back along the road to Fairfax Court-House as far as Difficult creek, and to connect, by his right, with Hooker. Reno was to push forward to the north of the road from Centreville to Fairfax, in the direction of Chantilly. Heintzelman's corps was directed to take post on the road between Centreville and Fairfax, immediately in the rear of Reno. Franklin took post on McDowell's left and rear. Sumner was posted on the left of Heintzelman, whilst the corps of Sigel and Porter were directed to unite with the right of Sumner. Banks was instructed, with the wagon trains of the army, to pursue the old Braddock road and come into the Alexandria turnpike in rear of Fairfax Court-House. Just before sunset on the 1st, the enemy attacked us on our right, but was met by Hooker, McDowell, Reno, and Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps. A very severe action occurred in the midst of a terrific thunder-storm, and was terminated shortly after dark. The enemy was driven back entirely from our front, but during that engagement we lost two of the.best and one of the most distinguished of our general officers —Major General Kearney and Brigadier General Stevens-who were both killed while gallantly REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 27 leading their commands and in front of their line of battle. It is unnecessary for me to say one word of commendation of two officers who were so well and widely known to the country. Words cannot express my sense of the zeal, the gallantry, and the sympathy of that most earnest and accomplished soldier, Major General Kearney. In him the country has suffered a loss which it will be difficult, if not impossible, to repair. He died as he would wish to die, and as became his heroic character. On the morning of the 2d of September, the enemy still continuing his movement towards our right, my whole force was posted behind Difficult creek, from Flint Hill to the Alexandria turnpike. Although we were quite able to maintain our position at that place until the stragglers could be collected and the army, after its labors and perils, put into condition for effective service, I considered it advisable, for reasons which developed themselves at Centreville, and which I explained to the general-in-chief and set forth herewith in the appendix, that the troops should be drawn back to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and that some reorganization should be made of them, in order that earlier effective service should be secured than was possible in their condition at that time. I received orders about twelve o'clock on the 2d of September, to draw back the forces within the intrenchments, which was done in good order and without any interruption by the enemy. The reasons which induced me, before I took the field in Virginia, to express to the government my desire to be relieved from the command of the army of Virginia and to return to the west, existed in equal, if not greater, force at this time than when I first stated them. I accordingly renewed urgently my application to be relieved. The government assented to it with some reluctance, and I. was transferred to the command of the department of the northwest, for which department I left Washington on the 7th of September. It seems proper for me, since so much misrepresentation has been put into circulation as to the support I received from the army of the Potomac, to state here precisely what forces of that army came under my command and were at any time engaged in the active operations of the campaign. Reynolds's division of Pennsylvania reserves, about two thousand five hundred strong, joined me on the 23d of August, at Rappahannock Station. The corps of Heintzelman and Porter, about eighteen thousand strong, joined me on the 26th and 27th of August, at Warrenton Junction. The Pennsylvania reserves, under Reynolds, and Heintzelman's corps, consisting of the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, rendered most gallant and efficient service in all the operations which occurred after they had reported to me. Porter's corps, from unnecessary and unusual delays and frequent and flagrant disregard of my orders, took no part whatever except in' the action of the 30th of August. This small fiaction of twenty thousand five hundred men was all of the ninety-one thousand veteran troops fr'om Harrisoln's Landing which ever drew trigger under my command, or in ainy way took part in that campaign. By the time that the corps of Franklin and Sumner, nineteen thousand strong, joined me at Centreville, the original army of Virginia, as well as the corps of Heintzelman and the division of Reynolds, had been so much cut up in the severe actions in which they had been engaged, and were so much broken down and diminished in numbers by the constant and excessive duties they had performed, that they were in little condition for any effective service whatever, and required and should have had some days of rest to put them in anything like condition to perform their duties in the field. Such is the history of a campaign substantiated by documents written during the operations and herewith appended, which has been misunderstood to an extent perhaps unparalleled in the history of warfare. I submit it here to the public judgment, with all confidence that it will be fairly and deliberately considered and a just verdict pronounced upon it and upon the army engaged in it; 28 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. Upon such unbiased judgment I am very willing, setting aside any previous record I have made during this war, to rest my reputation as a soldier. I shall submit cheerfully to the verdict of my countrymen, but I desire that that verdict shall be rendered upon a full knowledge of the facts. I well understood, as does every military man, how difficult and how thankless was the duty devolved upon me, and I am not ashamed to say that I would gladly have aivoided it, if I could have done so consistently with my sense of duty to the government. To confront with a small army vastly superior forces, to fight battles without hope of victory, but only to gain time and to embarrass and delay the forward movements of the enemy, is, of all duties, the most hazardous and the most difficult which can be imposed upon any general or any army. While such operations require. the highest courage and endurance on the part of the troops, they are perhaps unlikely to be understood or appreciated, and' the results, however successful, have little in them to attract popular attention and applause. At no time could I have hoped to fight a successful battle with the immensely superior force of the enemy which confronted me, and which was able at any time to outflank me and bear my small aimy to the dust. It was only by constant movement, by incessant watchfulness, and by hazardous skirmishes and battles that the forces under my command were not overwhelmed, whilst at the same time the enemy was embarrassed and delayed in his advance upon Wasihington, until the forces from the Peninsula were at length assembled for the defence of that city. I did hope that in the course of these operations the en'emy might commit some imprudence or leave some opening of which I could take such advantage as to gain at least a partial victory over his forces. This opportunity was presented by the advance of Jackson upon Manassas Junction; but, although the best dispositions possible under the circumstances were ordered, the object was frustrated in a manner and by causes which are now well understood. I am gratified to know that the conduct of that campaign, every detail of which was communicated day by day to the general-in-chief, was fully approved by him and by the government, and I now gladly submit the subject to the judgment of the country. General Banks rendered most efficient and faithful service throughout the campaign, and his conduct at the battle of Cedar Mountain and during the operations on the Upper Rappahannock, was marked by great coolness, intrepidity, and zeal. General McDowell led his corps during the whole of the campaign with eminent ability and vigor, and I am greatly indebted to him for zealous and distinguished service both in the battles of the 29th and 30th of August, and in the operations which preceded and succeeded those battles. General Sigel rendere'd useful service in reorganizing and putting in condition the first army corps of the army of Virginia, and made many valuable and highly important reconnoissances during the operations of the campaign. I cannot express myself too highly of the zealous, gallant, and cheerful manner in which General Reno deported himself from the beginning to the end of the operations. Ever prompt, earnest, and soldierly, he was the model of an accomplished soldier and a gallant gentleman, and his loss has been a heavy blow to the army and to the country. General Heintzelman performed his duty faithfully and honestly, whilst the commanders of the divisions of his corps (Generals Kearney and Hooker) have that place in the public estimation which they have earned by many.gallant and heroic actions, and which renders it unnecessary for me to do aught except pay this tribute to the memory of one and to the rising fame of the other. Generals Williams, Auger, Crawford, Green, Geary, Carroll, and Prince, of Banks's corps, have been already noticed for their gallant and distinguished conduct at Cedar Mountain. Generals Iing and Ricketts, of McDowell's corps, led their divisions throughout the operations with skill and efficiency, and General King, before he marched from Fredericksburg, rendered REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 29 important service in organizing and despatching the expeditions, which, on several occasions, broke up the line of the Virginia Central railroad. Generals Patrick, Doubleday, Gibbon, Hartsuff, Duryea, and Tower commanded their brigades in the various operations of this campaign with ability and zeal;* the latter named officer, especially, was particularly distinguished by the long marches which he made, by his incessant activity, and by the distinguished gallantry he displayed in the action of the 30th of August, in which action he was severely wounded at the head of his brigade. General Hatch, after being relieved from the command of the cavalry of Banks's corps, was assigned to the command of one infantry brigade in. King's division of McDowell's corps, and during part of the operations was in command of that division and rendered good service. Generals Schenck and Milroy, of Sigel's corps, exhibited great gallantry and zeal throughout the operations. They were engaged actively in the battles of the 29th and 30th of August, and their commands were among the last to leave the field of battle on the night of the 30th, General Schenck being severely wounded on that day. I must also mention in high terms the conduct of Generals Schurz, Stahel, and Steinwehr during the actions of the 29th and 30th. Generals Birney, Robinson, and Grover, of Heiltzelman's corps, commanded their brigades during the action 6f the 29th and 30th, and Birney during the action of the 1st September, with zeal and gallantry;, and General Stevens, of Reno's corps, was zealous and active throughout the operations, and distinguished himself in the most auspicious manner during the battles,of the 29th and 30th of August. He was killed at the head of his command,.in the battle near Chantilly, on the Ist of September, and his death will be deeply felt by the army and the country. Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Buchanan, commanding a brigade of regulars of Porter's corps, was noticeable for distinguished service on the afternoon of the 30th of August. Of the conduct of the officers commanding divisions and brigades of Porter's corps I know nothing, having received no report from that Iofficer of. the operations of his corps. Brigadier General John F. Reynolds, commanding the Pennsylvania reserves, merits the highest commendation at my hands. Prompt, active, and energetic, he commanded his division with distinguished ability throughout the operations, and performed his duties in all situations with zeal and fidelity. Generals Seymour and Meade, of that division, in like manner, performed their duties with ability and gallantry and in all fidelity to the government and to the army. General Sturgis arrived at Warrenton Junction on the 26th of August with Piatt's brigade of his division, the only portion of that division which joined him. This brigade was temporarily attached to the army corps of Fitz John Porter, and although misled in consequence of orders to follow Griffin's brigade of Porter's corps, which, for some unexplained reason, strayed from its corps to Centreville on the 30th of August, was led forward fiom that place by Generals Sturgis and Piatt as soon as it was discovered that Griffin did not intend to go forward to the field of battle, and reported to me late in the afternoon of that day. Shortly afterwards the brigade was thrown forward into action on our left, where they acquitted themselves with great courage. Brigadier General Sturgis, as well as General Piatt, deserve especial mention for the soldierly feeling which induced them, after being thus misled and with the bad example of Griffin before their eyes, to push forward with such zeal and alacrity to the field of battle, and for the valuable service which they rendered in the action of the 30th of August. Generals Bayard and Buford commanded the cavalry belonging to the army of Virginia. Their duties were peculiarly ardlous and hazardous, and it is not too much to say that, throughout the operations from the first to the last day of the campaign, scarcely a day passed that these officers did not render service which entitles them to the gratitude of the government. The detachments of the signal corps with the various army corps rendered most important service, and I cannot speak too highly of the value of that corps and of the important 30 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. information which, from time to time, they communicated to me. They were many times in positions of extreme peril, but were always prompt and ready to encounter any danger in the discharge of their duties. Brigadier General Julius White, with one brigade; was, in the beginning of the campaign, placed in commandat Winchester. He was selected for that position because I felt entire confidence in his courage and ability, and during the whole of his service there he performed his duty with the utmost efficiency, and relieved me entirely from any apprehension concerning that region of country. He was withdrawn from his position by orders direct from Washington, and passed from under my command. I transmit herewith reports of corps, division, and brigade commanders, which will be found to embrace all the details of their respective operations, and which do justice to the officers and soldiers under their command. To my personal staff I owe much gratitude and many thanks. Their duties were particularly arduous, and at times led them into the midst of the various actions in which we were engaged. It is saying little when I state that they were zealous, untiring, and efficient throughout the campaign. To Brigadier General Roberts, in particular, I am indebted for services marked throughout by skill, courage, and unerring judgment, and worthy of the solid reputation as a soldier he has acquired by many years of previous faithful and distinguished military service. I desire, also, specially to mention Brigadier General Elliotts Surgeon Mic$Farlin, Colonel Beckwith, Lieutenant Colonel T. C. H. Smith, Captain Piper, chief of artillery, Captain Merrill, of the engineers, and Lieutenant Skenck, chief of ordnance. I must also honorably mention the following members of my staff, the conduct of all of whom met my hearty approval and merits high commendation: Colonels Macomb, Clary, Marshal, Butler, Morgan, and Welch, Majors Selfiidge and Meline, Captains Asch, Dpuglas, Pope, Haight, Atcheson, De Kay, Piatt, Paine, and Strother. AIr. icCain, confidential telegraph operator at my headquarters, accompanied me throughout the campaign, and was at all'times eminently useful and efficient. 3Miy personal escort, consisting of two small companies of the first Ohio cavalry, numbering about one hundred men, performed the most arduous service, probably, of any troops in the campaign. As orderlies, messengers, and guards, they passed many sleepless nights and weary days. Their conduct in all the operations, as in every battle, was marked by uncommon activity and gallantry. The reports of corps, division, and brigade commanders, herewith submitted, exhibit the loss in killed, wounded, and missing in their respective commands. No report of any description has been received from the army corps of Banks and Reno. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JNO. POPE, Major General United States TVolunteers. Brigadier General G. W. CULLUM, Chief of Staff and of Engineers, Headquarters qf the Army, Vass.hington, D. C. No. 2. REPORT OF MAJOf GENERAL I. McDOWELL. WASHINGTON, D. C., November 6, 1862. GENERAL: The rapid succession of events, forced marches, separation from books and papers, and other circumstances attending the late campaign of the army of Virginia, were such as made it impracticable for REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 31 me -to make, from time to time, detailed reports of the part taken in it by the third army corps; and as, immediately after the end of the campaign, the corps was sent under another commander on active service into Maryland, and several of the officers commanding divisions and brigades became disabled there, I am still without many of the principal reports and returns which are necessary to make my report as full as it should be. It may, therefore, be found incomplete in some parts, and to comprise much which should have been made the subject of separate reports. In the movements of the army of Virginia made, I presume, for the purpose of drawing on it the enemy's army from Richmond, and then of holding that army in check till a junction could be effected by our forces with the troops from the Peninsula, the third army corps consisted, in the first place, of King's and Ricketts's divisions and Bayard's cavalry brigade. On the 7th of August, when we first felt the advance of the enemy, King's division was on the north bank -of the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, Ricketts's division, with the headquarters of the corps, was between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, about three miles east of the little town of Gulpeper Court-House. Bayard's cavalry brigade was well to the front, in the forks of the Rapidan and its principal northern tributary, (Robertson's river,) with his outposts thrown forward, watching the enemy's line, (which was on the south or right bank of the Rapidan,) from a point some three miles to the east of the crossing of the Orange and Alexandria railroad, to the left of Buford's cavalry, which watched the front from the Rapidan to the Blue Ridge. The Rapidan, from the left of Bayard's line to the Rappahannock and thence to Fredericksburg, was watched by the 1st Rhode Island, 1st Maine, 5th New York, and Harris's Light Cavalry, making a line of cavalry posts from the Blue Ridge to the Potomac. The distance between King's division, at Fredericksburg, and Ricketts's, at Culpeper, was too great for either to join the other in case of its being attacked and so far apart as to leave a wide opening for the enemy to get between them by moving down the Rapidan and crossing near its confluence with the Rappahannock. The weakness of this disposition of the corps early engaged your attention, as it had my own; and you would have remedied it in the beginning by bring-, ing away King's division, but that to do this before the arrival of troops from the Peninsula would cause us to abandon Fredericksburg, and the line from that place to Acquia, which, at the cost of months of labor, had been placed in condition for service, and heavily supplied with railroad rolling stock and other materials for large operations that it was thought might soon have to be undertaken from that point. General King was, however, held in readiness to leave at the shortest notice, and our cavalry was kept far to the front, so as to give timely warning of the movements of the enemy. It was at midnight of the 7th of August that the line was broken by the enemy's crossing the Rapidan above the mouth of Robertson's river, driving in Bayard's outposts, and following them, early on the morning of the 8th, on the road leading across Robertson's river, and thence along the northwest base of Cedar Run (or Slaughter's) mountain, towards Culpeper. Early on the morning of the 8th General Bayard sent Lieutenant Colonel Karge, with a battalion of the 1st New Jersey, to get around the enemy's left flank, whilst the general himself held them in check in front with part of the 1st Pennsylvania, under its colonel, Owen Jones, and part of the 1st New York under Major Beaumont. Slowly falling back towards Robertson's river, he was rejoined by Lieutenant Colonel Karge, (who had been successful in his flank movement-capturing one captain, one lieutenant, and twenty-four privates,) 32 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. and, after passing his command over the river under a fire of the enemy's artillery, the general destroyed the bridge; thus delaying the enemy's advance, and gaining time to call in all his pickets, and give the notice needed to concentrate the army on the point threatened by the enemy. This was on the day of your arrival at Culpeper. The order given by you to King, as soon as news of the enemy's advance became known, found him just returned with a large part of his division (including all of his cavalry) from a demonstration, made in compliance with your ordeis, on the line of the enemy's railroad communications between Richmond and Gordonsville; and though his men were weary, and would have much liked rest before beginning this, march, they set forth at once, and made a forced march of forty miles in thirty-six hours, during oppressively hot weather. The 1st and 2d corps were between the Blue Ridge and. Culpeper, upon which they were directed by your orders. Crawford's brigade, of Banks's corps, had been occupying the town of Culpepper, and being nearest the enemy was sent by you on the Sth to support Bayard, and joined him that evening at Cedar IRun, a small stream running past the eastern base of Cedar Run (or Slaughter's) mountain. Colonel Duffie's. 1st Rhode Island cavalry, and Colonel Allen's 1st Maine cavalry, which had been guarding the fords on the Rapidan below Bayard, also joined him, to aid in holding the enemy in check till the army should be sufficiently massed to offer battle. Thus far this had been done by Bayard's brigade; and now the duty devolved on Crawford, who joined with him infantry and artillery. General Banks arriving at Culpeper in the evening of the Sth, with the remainder of his corps, was sent by you on the 9th to join his advanced brigade, then operating with tile cavalry of my corps holding the enemy in check. The orders were that General Sigel's corps (the first) should follow and support General Banks; Ricketts's division, of my corps, which had been moved to the southwest of the, town, to be in reserve, King's division being more than two days' march distant. The cannonading of the Sth had been resumed on the 9th, and was kept up more or less throughout the day. The reports from the front sent in to me, and from General Banks to your headquarters, (where, by your direction, I had been throughout the day,) were to the effect that the enemy did not yet seem to be in great force, showing his' cavalry somewhat " ostentatiously," and using his artillery only; and these, reports continued to be of this character throughout the day, and gave the assurance the enemy would not be able to bring up his main force till our army should have been sufficiently concentrated and got in good condition for battle. General Sigel's corps having arrived at Culpeper after a forced march, much of it during the night previous, and being reported without provisions and not in a condition to immediately follow General Banks, by your order I directed subsistence to be given General Sigel's men from my supply'train, and instantly took Ricketts's division, accompanied by you, to the front to join General Banks without waiting to follow General Sigel, as had been before ordered. When the order was given me to take Ricketts's division to the front it was not known General Banks had attacked the; enemy, or that he purposed doing so, or that the enemy was in sufficient force to attack him; but the cannonading having become more continuous, I was sent forward as a precautionary measure, and to allow General Sigel's men some rest. When between two and three miles from Cedar mountain, we began to meet the evidences of the battle which General Banks had fought at its base —stragglers, singly and in groups, and soon companies, battalions, and batteries, moving to the rear. General Banks had left the position where he had drawn up his troops, and moved them forward to attack the enemy, not believing him to be in any great force, and found him REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 33 stronger than he had supposed, outnumbering greatly his own corps, and had been driven back after a gallant, severe, and bloody contest. It was now dlark, and under the assurance of General Banks that the remainder of his corps were in the front of a narrow strip of woods which extended across the road, that a brigade was still on a hill to the right of this wood, and that this brigade and the right of his line, which was said to be intact, would be drawn towards and strengthen the centre, which had suffered most, I was ordered to place Ricketts's division to the right and front; this was done by posting Tower's brigade, with two batteries, Shippen's and Thompson's, on the knoll to the right of the wood, Carroll's brigade connecting the left of Tower's line with the woods. Hartsuff's and Druyea's brigades in second line, with Hall's and Thompson's batteries in reserve. But while making these dispositions and moving forward in column to do so, the enemy, following up the, retreat of Geneeral Banks, established a battery beyond the woods before mentioned and opened on the head of my column, and soon after coming through the woods with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, established another battery on the knoll where you had just before made your headquarters, after your conference with General Banks and others. This battery fired on the second line of Ricketts's division, and until the battalions in mass were placed under the shelter of the rolling ground took effect on Hartsuff's brigade. Quickly the batteries in reserve, under the direction of that most valuable officer Major Tellson, chief of artillery, Hall's 1st AMaine and Thompson's 2d Maryland opened on the enemy. It was dark, and only by the flash of the enemy's pieces could they see where to direct their aim, but soon, by a rapid and well-directed fire, they silenced the enemy's batteries and forced them to withdraw, leaving some of their officers and most of their horses dead on the ground. The fire of the enemy's infantry from the woods was mostly'at Carroll's brigade, which suffered from it before his men could be got into position in the front line. The hot reception given the enemy by Ricketts's division caused the ehemy to fall back during the night to their former position on and near Cedar Run mountain, some three miles. Finding Rickett's division too far to the front and right it was drawn over during the night, by your direction, to the right of the position you had directed General Sigel to occupy. On the morning of the 10th (Sunday) nothing was done by either army beyond a few dropping shots, and we remained in position, under arms, awaiting a renDewal of the attack, which was not made, there being only one false alarm of a movement on our right flank. The 1st Pennsylvania cavalry, under Colonel Owen Jones;. the 1st New Jersey cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel Karge, (Colonel Wyndham being a prisoner of war on parole;) the 1st Rhode Island cavalry, under Colonel Duffie, and the 1st Maine, under Colonel Allen, all under Brigadier General Bayard, had been engaged in the battle before we came up, and I am assured by your chief of cavalry, Brigadier General Roberts, who was present, they performed good service, not only before, but during the action. General Bayard, who had himself rendered most valuable service, speaks warmly of a charge made about 5 o'clock p. m. by that gallant old soldier Major Falls, 1st Pennsylvania cavalry, who led his battalion against the enemy's lines and charged completely through them. All the regiments above named, and especially the Pennsylvania and New Jersey, had severe duty to perform in holding the enemy in check. There are two officers of my staff-aides-de-camp-who are deserving of especial mention in connexion, Captain Leslie and Captain Howard Stockton. Having had no officers of topographical engineers, they were placed on this duty, and were constantly in front exerting themselves with a zeal and intelligence that accomplished much for the army, and especially for the advance. H. Ex. Doe. 81 3 34 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. On the 11th nothing in the way of hostilities occurred between the two armies. The burial of the dead and care of the wounded were effected under an informal flag of truce. On the 12th King's division joined from Fredericksburg, and on the same day the enemy retired from our front across Robertson's river, going, according to the reports of our scouts and the lookouts, from the mountains back to Gordonsville, or, at all events, his main body disappearing from the banks of the Rapidan. As it was not intended we should go beyond the Rapidan, but to continue to threaten its passage, the strongest defensible position north of that river and east of its northern tributary, Robertson's river, was occupied by the army; Major General Sigel's corps on the right, his right touching Robertson's river; the 3d corps in the centre; {Major General Reno, who, at the head of the reinforcements coming up the Potomac to Acquia creek, had followed KLng's division from Fredericksburg, on the left, his left near the Rapidan; and General Banks in reserve at the little town of Culpeper Court-House. The Orange and Alexandria railroad, which had been repaired, going through the centre of the position The arimy was in the forks of the Rappahannock and its tributary, the Rapidan. These two streams rise in the Blue Ridge and run through the Bull Run or Piedmont Ridge. Beyond the Rapidan and close to the river the Piedmont Ridge, which disappears at Warrenton, begins again nearly opposite the left of our line, held by Reno, and stretches off to the southwest to Lynchburg. On the morning of the 1Sth one of our spies, who had been with the enemy's army, came and reported to you that the enemy had accumulated all his forces, including several divisions just up from Richmond, behind the ridge immediately beyond the river and opposite our extreme left; his artillery horses were all harnessed, and they were expecting orders to march every moment down the river, to cross at Raccoon Ford to get in our rear. This movement, which had been completely hidden from our sight by the ridge, and even from that of our lookouts on the top of Thoroughfare mountain, was one made in the direction which had been expected from the first, and had for its object the interposing of the whole of the enemy's forces between our army and its re-enforcements then coming up from Acquia creek and Fredericksburg, and from Alexandria by way of Manassas Junction. The information was important, and received in time, provided the enemy gave us that day and night the start. Your orders for the army to retire forthwith behind the Rappahannock required that the reserve corps (Banks's) should immediately send its baggage to the rear, by way of Brandy Station, to. the Orange and Alexandria railroad crossing of the.Rappahannock; that the trains of the third army corps should follow those of Banks; that those of Sigel should follow the third corps to Culpeper, and then go by the Warrenton road to the Sulphur Springs crossing of the Rappahannock, some six miles above the railroad crossing; that Reno should take the road by which he came, and which led him back to Kelly's Ford, some six miles below the railroad crossing. The movement of the trains —unfortunately very large-was followed by the march of the troops in the same order, the troops commencing to move after night, so as to allow the trains to get some distance ahead, if possible. The size of the trains, the night march, the corps having, for a large part of the way, to use the same road, made a retreat a very tedious and wearisome one to the troops, although it was entirely successful, and effected without loss or accident, but the troops did not reach the Rappahannock until the evening of the 19th. Bayard's cavalry, being charged with covering the rear of the column, got no further than Culpeper that night. The next morning, the 20th, agreeably to the instructions given him, he took post at Brandy Station, half way between Culpeper Court-House and the Rappahannock, and sent out strong parties in all the roads coming from the enemy's position. The party sent out on the REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 35 Raccoon Ford road soon came upon the head of the enemy's column, which had made the expected movement, but too late to intercept us. The enemy followed up the cavalry to Brandy Station, and thence to the Rappahannock, some skirmishing taking place on the way, and the cavalry retiring across the river. The entire corps, with the exception of a small party thrown in advance at the head of the bridge, now occupied the left or north bank of the Rappahannock, with General Sigel's corps on the right, General Banks's corps partly in reserve and partly on the left, and Reno's corps below us, at Kelly's Ford, and Reynolds's division, formerly under my command, and which it was soon to rejoin, coming up the river from Fredericksburg. I understood it was desired the line of the Rappahannock should be held as long as possible, to gain time for the troops coming up the Potomac to join, and particularly those coming by way of Acquia and Fredericksburg, who would be liable to be cut off if we should give up the river before they arrived. The Rappahannock, above the mouth of the Rapidan, is an inconsiderable stream, and fordable, at most seasons, every few miles. The third corps was posted at and above the railroad bridge, which had been so arranged as to serve for artillery and cavalry. The advance, a regiment of Hartsuff's brigade, was posted on two small hills on the southern side of the river. The first one was about one hundred and fifty yards from the road and as many from the river; the second some four hundred yards from the road and six hundred from the river. On the first was a small entrenchment thrown up by the enemy at the time of their retreat from Manassas, last spring. That evening a battery of artillery and a regiment of infantry from Banks's corps, I think, were sent by you to guard a ford to the right of my line. Early on the morning of the 21st the enemy attempted the ford held by the battery and regiment on my right, and drove them away, dispersing the regiment and disabling the battery. King's division was immediately sent up to retake the position, which it soon did, driving the enemy back with loss, and taking some of the cavalry prisoners. The rifle batteries of both divisions now lined the river bank in such position as commanded the opposite shore, and gave shelter to our troops. The enemy's fire disabled three guns in Naylor's battery, but they themselves were equally damaged, in return, by the accurate fire of Hall's battery, which finally compelled them to retire. On the 22d, fearing the enemy might gain possession of the most advanced hill, near the bridge, which it was desirable to hold, in the night a trestle-bridge was built by the engineer corps, under Major Huston, of the engineers, about eight hundred yards above the railroad bridge, in a bend of the river, which swept near the further hill, the banks here being covered with woods. This gave us another, and a shorter and hidden, line of communication, and enabled Hartsuff's whole brigade, and Thompson's and Matthews's batteries, to be thrown over to occupy these heights. The firing to-day was very animated between the enemy's batteries and our own. Since the morning of the 21st the enemy's heavy columns of infantry, artillery, and trains could sometimes be plainly seen passing up to our right, and their course; when behind the woods, was indicated by the lines of dust ascending above the trees. The attack on my front had, been followed up by similar ones on the positions held by the other corps above and below me. All the movements of the enemy gave assurances he was moving to turn our right, having failed on the front and left. This was confirmed by the intelligence that he had crossed at Sulphum Springs and was moving on Warrenton. On the night of the 22d, just as I received your orders for the third corps to cross at the bridge, and, in connexion with the commands of Reno and Reynolds below me, to fall on the rear of that long column which had been passing before 36 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. us for two days up the south side of the river, an officer came to report to me, in your presence, that the rain which had been falling during the night had so swollen the river that the trestle-bridge had been swept away, and had lodged against the railroad bridge, the centre of which was yielding to the pressure of the flood, and was in imminent danger of being carried off. The river had risen some six feet and all the fords were gone. Fearing for the safety of Hartsuff's brigade, who were on the opposite bank, I ordered them to be withdrawn. It was now impracticable to cross the river and make the attack you had planned. Your orders then were to move the army against the enemy, who had crossed at Sulphur Springs and gone to Warrenton, whence be had made the attack with his cavalry at Catlett's, and who, it was thought, would be unable, on account of the state of the river, either to recross or be reinforced. The withdrawal of Hartsuff's brigade from the south side encouraged the enemy to move forward to seize the hills he had abandoned before we could complete the entire destruction of the railroad bridge, which we did not wish to leave for the enemy to repair and use to annoy us on our march to Warrenton. They opened a furious fire upon us, and, moving their infantry down in masses, rushed upon the hill Hartsuff had just left. Matthews's, Thompson's, and Leppier's batteries, and our sharpshooters, returned their fire so vigorously that they were soon driven off. Leppier's especially did them much damage. Further to the right Hall's battery engaged two of the enemy's batteries and drove both of them off, and dispersed a regiment of infantry. The firing of this excellent battery was, as usual, rapid and accurate. Further up the river the batteries of Reynolds and Naylor were also successfully engaged. In the meantime the corps, agreeably to your orders, was on the march to Warrenton, to be on the right of General Sigel, who was to attack the enemy, and who was to have Generals Reno and Banks on his left and rear, General Reno having moved up the river for this purpose. Reynolds's division, following him, rejoined thethird corps, andmarched after the division of Generals King and Ricketts to Warrenton. The rear guard of the corps was commanded by Brigadier General Tower, who had his brigade and the batteries of artillery holding the river at the bridge, which he was directed to see destroyed before leaving. In the afternoon, under cover of a thunder storm, which for a while hid all Nbjects at a little distance from view, the enemy again occupied the hill from which they had been driven in the morning, but kept out of sight till after the bridge had been destroyed and the rear guard had taken up its line of march, when, just as the batteries were limbering up to leave, they commenced a rapid fire upon the retiring column. That night the advance of the first division of the corps entered Warrenton, the other divisions being on the, road leading there-but from three to five miles from it. The enemy had retreated in the afternoon toward the river. General Sigel, who had been on the right when we were on the river, facing the south, was now, by our change of front, in advance. He was to have intercepted the enemy, but, for some reason, was not able to come up with them before they crossed the river at Sulphur Springs, on a bridge they had built at that place. General Sigel followed up the north bank of the river to Waterloo bridge, on the crossing of Luray turnpike. On the 24th the whole corps was at Warrenton, and ol4 the road thence to Sulphur Springs. On the 25th I received your order of that date REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 37 "GENERAL ORDER NO. -. "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, " Warrenton, Aurugst 25, 1862. " I. The corps of Major General AMcDowell, to which the division of Brigadier General Reynolds is attached, will occupy Warrenton, with an advance of at least a brigade thrown out toward Waterloo and Sulphur Springs. The cavalry of the corps will be kept along the line of the river. " II. T'he first army corps, under Major General Sigel, -will occupy Fayetteville, and will there be joined by Brigadier General Cox, whose advance will occupy a strong position in the vicinity of Fayetteville, throwing out an advance of at least a brigade towards the fords in front of the position, and keeping his cavalry along the line of the river. " III. The corps of Major General Banks, to which will be added ten thousand men under Brigadier General Sturgis, will take post with its right resting on Bealton Station, and its left extended along the north side of Marsh creek. From this corps at least one division will be pushed forward as near as practicable to the railroad crossing of the Rappahannock. If there be any difficulty about water for this corps, wells will be dug immediately. " IV. The detachment of the ninth army corps, under Major General Reno, will resume its station at Kelly's Ford, putting itself in communication immediately with the forces below it on the river. "' V. The troops of Heintzelman's corps will take post with the centre at Germantown and extended along the Licking river. "VI. Brigadier General Cox, with the troops under his command, will move forward as soon as possible to Fayetteville and report to Major General Sigel. Those under Brigadier General Sturgis will report to Major General Banks at Bealton Station. " VII. The headquarters of the army of Virginia will be established at a point near Warrenton Junction, to be hereafter designated. "By command of Major General Pope. "Per C. SELFRIDGE, "Assistant Adjutant General." directing the 3d corps to occupy Warrenton, &c. This same general order required Major General Sigel's corps to occupy Fayetteville to the left of the 3d corps, General Banks to occupy Bealton's Station to the left of General Sigel, and General Reno to return to Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock. The line thus intended to be established would touch the river only on the extreme left at Kelly's Ford, the centre and right being thrown back or refused, and the right held by the 3d corps, resting on the extremity of the Bull Run or Piedmont Ridge at Warrenton. This order, so far as concerned the 3d corps, was immediately carried out by placing Reno's division on the road to Sulphur Springs, with Meade's brigade thrown forward to within four miles of the springs, which are at the river. Ricketts on the Waterloo road, with Tower's brigade in advance within four miles of the bridge, and King's division near the town, in the forks of the roads abovementioned, which issue from Warrenton at nearly right angles to each other, and are good broad turnpikes; the Waterloo road leading nearly west through the Blue Ridge to Luray, and the Sulphur Springs road nearly south west towards Culpeper. Buford's cavalry brigade was posted between Tower's advanced brigade and Waterloo bridge, (over the Rappahannock,) and Bayard's brigade was to take post on the Sulphur Springs road between MIeade's brigade and the river. On the night of the 25th I received from you, by telegraph from your head 38 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. quarters near Warrenton Junction, an order that, leaving Reynolds in reserve, I should make a reconnoissance with my corps across the river at Sulphur Springs, and sending me an open order for General Sigel, which I was to read and send to him, directing him to force the passage of the river at Waterloo. This order was immediately forwarded to General Sigel by the hands of one of my aidesde-camp, Captain F. Haven, and was received at 2 o'clock a. m., whilst the General was on the retreat in the night from Waterloo to Warrenton, through which his troops were moving all night long. "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, " Acugust 25, 1862-9.30 p. m. "MAJOR GENERAL [MCDOWELL: I believe that the whole force of the enemy have marched for the Shenandoah valley by the way of Front Royal and Luray. The column which has marched to-day to Gaines's Crossroads has turned north, and when last seen was passing under the east base of Buck mountain towards Salem and Rectorstown. I desire you as early as possible in the morning, holding Reynolds in the reserve at Warrenton or vicinity, to make a reconnoissauce with your whole corps and ascertain what is beyond the river at Culpeper Sulphur Springs. There is no force of the enemy between this or Culpeper or at Culpeper. "I send you a despatch for General Sigel, which please read and send to him immediately. "Communicate with me fully by telegraph from Warrenton. "JOHN POPE, " Major General Commanding. "Received 12 m. August 25, 1862." Early the next morning, (the 26th,) Ricketts's division, which was on the Waterloo road, was moved across to the Sulphur Springs road to make the attack you had ordered. In the course of the morning I received your telegram of 5 o'clock a. m.,* and as I was on my way to Sulphur Springs to direct the attack, your telegram of 8.10 o'clock a. m.t These informed me of your order to Reno to make the [Extract.] -* WARRENTON JUNCTION, 5 a. m. August 26, 1862. GENERAL McDOWELL: Please ascertain, in some way, whether the enemy be really in force at Waterloo bridge. Sigel insists that he is, while Banks, who was there late yesterday afternoon, asserts positively that there was no enemy during the day there. You will easily see how important it is for us to know positively what has become of the enemy's force, which was in front, and where the column has gone which took yesterday the road towards Salem. Please use every means possible to ascertain this at once. Reno will cross at Rappahannock Sta. tion, and push forward a reconnoissance to Culpeper. I wish you would send me a regiment of cavalry. 1 have not a mounted man here. Send me one of Buford's or Bayard's. JOHN POPE, -Mlajor General Commanding. [Extract.] t WARRENTON JUNCTION, 8.10 a. m. August 26, 1862. MAJOR GENERAL McDOwVELL: I sent instructions last night to make a strong reconnoissance across to Sulphur Springs, intending that Sigel should do the same thing at Waterloo bridge, and Reno at Rappahannock. Sigel reports himself unable to do anything of the kind, until his men are rested. I directed him to halt them somewhere near Warrenton, and put them in camp for a day. Reno, instead of going to Bealton and then to Kelly's Ford, has come to this place, and is now near here. You must therefore, under these circumstances, exercise your discretion about the reconnoissance to Sulphur Springs; but it will certainly be well for you to ascertain what there is in the direction of Waterloo bridge, REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 39 reconnoissance across the river, below Rappahannock Station to Culpeper, and of his failure to do so; and in view of the failure of General Sigel to force the passage of the river above at Waterloo, authorized me to use my discretion as to crossing at Sulphur Springs, and desired me to ascertain, if possible, if the enemy were really in force at Waterloo, and what had become of the head of his column, which yesterday was in front,"and had taken the road towards Salem. General Sigel, you informed me, reported his men unable to do anything until they should have some rest. Generals Bayard and Buford reported to me that, owing to the hard, unremitting services performed, their cavalry was broken down-the former, that his would neither charge nor stand a charge; the latter, that his was at that time disorganized. As the falling back of General Sigel from Waterloo to Warrenton, and the transfer of my troops frlom the Waterloo road to the Sulphur Springs road, had left the right weakly guarded, and as it was around the right the enemy were then moving, I decided to replace my corps in the position it had occupied the day before. In order to comply with your wishes to ascertain the force of the enemy at Waterloo and further to the right, agreeably to your instructions of 8.10 a. m., I took command of General Sigel's corps and everything in front, (a copy of my note to General Sigel is below, marked E.)* Brigadier General Buford, with the available cavalry at hand, and some artillery from General Sigel's corps, was sent to turn the head of the enemy's column, which was moving through Salem. This was reported to you and met your approval. I am obliged here to ask your attention to General Sigel's report, which has been made public. It will be noticed the general gives at some length his reasons for abandoning the position at Waterloo bridge, and falling back under cover of the 25th; a movement with which he seems to wish it to appear I was in some way connected, if, indeed, I was not responsible. He says, first, he had been under my command since his arrival at Waterloo, had sent to me for instructions, &c. It will be seen from your telegram, my letter, and his own report, that he did not come under my orders until the 26th, after he had left his position and fallen behind my command at Warrenton. Second, he says I was to have relieved Milroy's brigade on the bridge. In that he mistakes the general order (which I have quoted) forming the line from Kelly's Ford on the left to Warrenton on the right. The river was to be held, except at Kelly's Ford, by cavalry only, and Buford's brigade was close behind Milroy for this and still further to your right. Send for Milroy; he is a courageous man. -: *' If you deem it necessary, assume command also of Sigel's corps. It is essential that we should watch the movements of the enemy towards our right in some manner. Out of Buford's, Bayard's, and Sigel's cavalry enough can certainly be found to perform this service. Troops are accumulating here, but not very fast. Take charge of the front, and use everybody you find there. JOHN POPE, fMajor General Commanding. P. S.-I will push Reno to Fayetteville. It will be well to have the men cook three days' rations. Please notify Banks and Sigel. J. P. O:: [E.1 HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMy CORPs, Army of Virginia, August 2 6, 1862. GENERAL: I am instructed by Major General Pope to take command of the troops on the right and front, for the purpose of strengthening some movements I am ordered to make. Please let me know the position and strength of your command, and especially the cavalry. My headquarters are on the hill southwest of Warrenton or Sulphur Springs road. JAMES McDOWELL, Major General Commanding. SIGEL, Major General Commanding Division. 40 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. purpose. Third, he says, when he fell back he had no support within eight or ten miles of him. It is eight miles, so called, from Waterloo bridge to Warrenton. He had behind and to his right Buford's brigade; behind Buford, Ricketts's divisionof four brigades and four batteries of artillery, all of which were between four and five miles of the bridge. Fourth, he says matters wvere confused at receiving a mutilated order or letter from General McD)owell, part directed to him, informing him he would meet his bridge train at Fayetteville, and part addressed to General Banks. I did myself know where his bridge train was, and had no right to call on General Banks for any return, for he was my senior. The letter to him, I have been informed by that officer, was from your late chief of staff, and was, I suppose, sent to Warrenton by telegraph from your headquarters, and forwarded thence to its destination by the operator, by means of one of the cavalry of my corps. However this may be, I know nothing of it. The "attack on the enemy beyond Sulphur Springs by my corps was not undertaken, for the reasons I have stated; but before the countermand was given King's division became engaged with the enemy, mostly with artillery, and the firing was kept up during the day. The troops opposed to him, as we learned from a flag of truce sent. by the enemy, was a division of Anderson's, formerly Huger's, and, as far as I know, the last of those of which we had any knowledge that had left Richmond. I inferred from this the enemy's rear rested then at Sulphur Springs. On the supposition the enemy might offer us battle at or near Warrenton, upon which he could now concentrate a large force, you informed me in your telegram of the 26th that the corps on my left and rear would all be pushed forward, so as to be within supporting distance of the 3d corps. The information, however, received in the evening and night from General Bufbrd, from General Sigel's scouts, and from some negroes, was to the effect that the enemy's column, whose rear division we had been fighting at Sulphur Springs, was directed upon Thoroughfare Gap, through which his advance had passed, to attack our communications at Manassas. Copies of the telegrams to and from your headquarters, concerning the supposed designs of the enemy, are herewith marked.* You then decided to throw the army back on the forces of the enemy which had passed through the Piedmont ridge at Thoroughfare Gap, and agreeably to your order of 8.30 a. m. of the 27th, (and not as stated in General Sigel's proposal,) I gave the latter, who, as we were to march to the rear, was now in front, the following order: "Push, immediately, a strong advance along the turnpike from Warrenton to Gainesville, for the purpose of taking possession of Buckland Mills, on Broad Run, and get your corps in hand as soon as possible, to follow the advance. No wagons, but for ammunition, will accompany your corps on this road. Your baggage trains will immediately proceed to Catlett's. Detach three batteries from your corps to report to Major General Kearney, commanding division, who will be moving by way of Greenwich to your support. Further instructions will be given as to the route by which the batteries are to join General Kearney, and until they do they will remain with you." I gave General Sigel the cavalry of my corps in place of his own, which had been detached by your order, and informed him that Reynolds, King, and Rick-'etts's divisions would immediately follow him,t and that as soon as they closed -: See Appendix t- EADQUAmRTRUS, Tirman AnRuY CoriPs, A 7rmy of Virginia,..dzAu!zs 2 7, 1862. GENERaL: I havejust received your note of 12 p.m.. In default of your cavalry, which is,not yet returned, 1 sendl you this morling General Bayard, with three regiments; when REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE, 4. upon him, he should push his advance to Gainesville, the point where the Warrenton turnpike to Centreville and Alexandria was crossed by the road from Thoroughfare Gap to Manassas Junction. The divisions of Reynolds, King, and Ricketts, in the order named, followed as soon as they could be brought on. As there was but one road for all these troops to march over, stringent orders were given that all wagons not required for ammunition should be sent to the lower road, so as to Rlave this one as unencumbered as possible for the passage of the troops. So far as the 3d corps was concerned, this order, with inconsiderable exceptions, mostly in Reynolds's division, was obeyed. General Sigel succeeded in reaching Buckland Mills in time to save the bridge which I had had made over Broad Run at that place, and had pushed on his advance to Gainesville, as ordered, and that night the three divisions of the corps closed up with him. Buford, who had been indefatigable on this, as on every other occasion during the campaign, sent in word from our extreme left (our former right) that he had cut the enemy's column and forced Longstreet to deploy between Salem and White Plains. Duffie's Rhode Island cavalry was sent up to watch the road between White Plains and Thoroughfare, to see that the enemy should not fall on the rear of our column unawares. The night of the 27th I saw General Sigel at Buckland Mills, and informed him that Longstreet would be coming through the Gap next morning, and that, as the head of his corps (Sigel's) was now on the road leading from the Gap to Manassas Junction, I would give him one of my divisions (a third of my force) and charge him with the duty of marching to Haymarket, watching the Gap and engaging the forces when they came through, whilst I would take the remainder of my force and go against those who had already passed. I sent word to you of this, at Bristow. But whilst the preparations were being made to carry it out, I received your order, dated Bristow, August 27, 9 o'clock p. m., as follows: "At daylight, to-morrow morning, march rapidly on Manassas Junction with your whole force, resting your right on the Manassas Gap railroad, throwing your left well to the east. Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill are between Gainesville and Manassas Junction. We had a severe fight with them to-day, driving them back several miles, along the railroad. If you will march promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn of day, upon Manassas Junction, we shall bag the whole crowd. I have directed Reno to-march from Greenwich at the same time, upon Manassas Junction, and Kearney, who is in his rear, to march on Bristow, at daybreak. Be expeditious, and the day is our own." I showed this order to General Sigel and sent him a copy of my general order,? yours return, please send him back to me. I will send word to Catlet.t's about your regimental provision wagons. Brigadier General Reynolds's division is immediately behind you. King and Ricketts follow. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, JAMES Mcl)OWELL, Major General. SIGEL, Majuor General comnaldingy Idt Corps. " HEADQUARITERS THIRD C~ORPS, RBEYNOLDS'S CABIP, AugZust 28, 1862. GENERAL ORDER, \N O. 10.] 1. Major General Sigel will in-mmediately march with his whole corps on Manassas Junction; his right resting on the Manassas railroad. 2. Brigadier Geneial Reynolds will march on the turnpike, immediately in the rear of General Sigel, and form his division on the left of General Sigel, and march upon Manassas Junction. 3. Brigadier General King will fallow immediately after General Reynolds and form his division on General Reynolds's left, and direct his march on Pdlanassas Junction. 42 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. the receipt of which he acknowledged at 23 a. m. on the 28th. My order required all the forces to march immediately. His advanced division was already at Gainesville, and he had to close his command upon it and march as ordered. I endeavored, by every exertion of myself and staff, to get the force forward as early as you had indicated; and, so far as the 3d corps was concerned, worn as the divisions were by the marching and countermarching of the day previous, up to a late hour in the night, which had prevented many of the regiments from obtaining their supplies, there was no difficulty. They were ready, and marched forward with alacrity, though many of the regiments had barely finished the march of the day before. But General Sigel's rear division was so long getting out of its bivouac that Reynolds's division, after waiting some time, had to pass the larger part of it, and General Sigel's corps, instead of complying fully with my orders, at Warrenton, that all wagons not carrying ammunition should go by the way of Catlett's, had brought with them nearly two hundred, which encumbered the road and embarrassed our movements seriously; and when all the divisions were closed up, instead of a rapid march, everything came to a stand. At 7~ o'clock I received a message from General Reynolds, who was at the head of the 3d corps, that General Sigel was halting on the road, at the junction of the railroad, (Gainesville,) and was making no preparations to advance or to organize, or form his line, and that his men had built fires to cook their breakfast, and had blocked up the road so that he could not get forward. I sent my assistant adjutant general to the head of the column to urge General Sigel to march immediately on Manassas Junction, as ordered, but it was too late in the forenoon before the head of the corps passed him. All the forces of the army were now, by your orders, converging on Mfanassas, and had been moving, till we crossed the railroad at Gainesville, in the angle comprised between the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and the Manassas railroad, which unite at Manassas Junction. The troops under my command, the first and third corps, were to cross the Mlanassas road at Gainesville, and move with the right on that road, the left well to the east. General Sigle says, in his report, that he understood he was to have his right on the railroad leading from Warrenton Junction to Manassas Junction, the Orange and Alexandria railroad, some six miles to the south of us. He saw your order to move with his right on the Manassas railroad, and had my general order, in writing, to the same effect. When I arrived at Gainesville, I found he had moved to the right, or south side, instead of to the left, or north side, of the Manassas road. I varied from your orders to march with "my whole force" only so far as concerned Gefieral Ricketts's division, and the cavalry of Buford and Bayard. Knowing that Longstreet would be coming through Thoroughfare, I sent, early in the morning, Colonel Wyndham's First New Jersey regiment of cavalry to the Gap, and sent up other cavalry as fast as I could get hold of it; and on receiving word the enemy was coming through, I detached Ricketts's division to hold him in check. This departure from your orders, to move with "my whole force " on Manassas, I felt called upon to make, to carry out the spirit of your plan of crushing 4. Brigadier General Ricketts will follow Brigadier General King and march to Gainesville; and if, on arriving there, no indication shall appear of the approach of the enemy from Thoroughfare Gap, he will continue his march along the turnpike, form on the left of General King, and ularch on Manassas Junction. He will be constantly on the lookout for an attack from the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, and in case one is threatened, he will form his division to the left and march to resist it. The headquarters of the corps will be at King's division. By command of MaJoR GENERAL McDOWELL, REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 43 the enemy at that place before his re-enforcements, of whose position I had just received positive intelligence, could join, as those re-enforcements, I thought, could be better held in check at the Gap than this side of it. As soon as the Warrenton road was free, Reynolds's division pushed forward across the railroad, and after a short march the head of his column found itself opposed by the enemy, with a battery of artillery posted on a hill. The attack, commenced by the enemy as soon as we came in view, caused Reynolds to deploy his column; to bring up his artillery, and sent out his skirmishers. After a short engagement the enemy retired, so that when our skirmishers occupied the hill he left; he was nowhere to be seen. Supposing, from the movements of this force, that it was some rear guard or cavalry party, with artillery, sent out to reconnoitre, the march of the division, after caring for the killed and wounded, was resumed, and it turned off to the south of the road to go to Manassas. General Sigel's, getting so far to the south of Manassas railroad, left so wide a distance between him and the leading division of the corpsReynolds's-that King's division, which was to have gone to the left of Reynolds's, was now brought between it and General Sigel's corps, and the march on Manassas resumed. The country between the Warrenton turnpike and the Manassas railroad, on which we were now marching, was unknown to us. It was partly in fields, but mostly in woods, across and through which we were going in the general direction ordered. It was now late in the afternoon, and I ascertained that the enemy were no longer at Manassas Junction; and soon after I received your despatch* of 1.20, from that place, which must have been delayed on the way-for after giving the necessary orders to carry out your instructions, but before the troops had received them, your second despatch,t from Manassas, was received, informing me that the enemy were on the other side of Bull Run on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, as also near Centreville, and directing me to march with my command upon the latter place. King's division, which was nearest the Warrenton and Centreville turnpike, was ordered to march by that road, and Reynolds's division, which was near the Sudley Springs and Manassas road, was ordered to move by that r6ad and thence by the Warrenton turnpike. After putting these divisions in motion and going with Reynolds's division to near Manassas, I proceeded to that place to confer personally with you. King's division moved along the Warrenton road and became engaged with the enemy, and at the same time Ricketts's, some six or eight miles further to the west, became:" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, iManassas Junction, August 28, 1862, 1.20 p. m. MAJOR GENERAL MCDOW;LL: I sent you a despatch a few minutes ago directing you to move on Gum Spring to intercept Jackson. Since then I have received your note of this morning. I will, this evening, push forward Reno to Gainesville, and follow with Heintzelman, unless there is a large force of the enemy at Centreville, which I do not believe. Ascertain, if you can, about this. I do not wish you to carry out the order to proceed to Gum Spring if you consider it too hazardous, but I will support you in any way you suggest, by pushing forward from Manassas Junction across the turnpike. Jackson has a large train, which should certainly be captured. Give me your views fully; you know the country much better than I do. Come no further in this direction with your command, but call back what has advanced thus far. JOHN POPE, Major General Commanding. T HEADQUARTERS, Xanassas Junction, Augunt 28, 4.15 p. m. MAJOR GENERAL McDOWELL: The enemy is reported in force on the other side of Bull Run on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, as also near Ceirtreville. I have ordered Sigel to march on Centreville immediately, as also Kearney and Reno. I will advance Hooker as reserve. Please march immediately with your command upon Centreville from where you are. JOHN POPE, fMajor General Commancding. 44 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. engaged with Longstreet's corps as it attempted the passage of the defile at Thoroughfare Gap. I have, as yet, received no reports from King's division, or from any of the brigade commanders. I cannot say, therefore, as to the engagement of Thursday, the 29th; but from verbal reports, I understand it to have been mostly an affair of General Gibbon's brigade-one of the finest in the army, and part of Doubleday's brigade, with some two brigades of the enemy, and that the troops behaved most creditably. The loss in Gibbons's brigade was severe-in both men and officers. The gallant Colonel O'Conn6r, 2d Wisconsin, and Major May, 19th Indiana, killed; Colonel Cutler, 6th Wisconsin-one of the best officers we have —badly wounded, and at the time reported -dead; the gallant Colonel Robertson, 7th Wisconsin, Major Allen, 2d Wisconsin, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hamilton, 7th Wisconsin, and Major Bells, 7th Wisconsin, wounded. General Ricketts engaged the enemy until dark, holding him in check and -forcing him back; but finding him crossing at Hopewell Gap, above and on his right, and threatened with being turned on his left, he withdrew at nightfall to Gainesville; and here learning from General King that he intended to fall back to Manassas at one o'clock a. m. from the Warrenton road, General Ricketts did the same by the way of Bristow, which gave him a long and fatiguing march. Finding on my arrival there that you had left Manassas, I turned towards Reynolds's division, but did not succeed in finding it-it being now darkuntil daybreak next morning, on the hill by the Warrenton road, near Groveton. It was here I learned of the movements of King's and Ricketts's divisions of the night before. Early in the morning of the 29th General Sigel, who had come up the night before from near Manassas, and who was on Reynolds's right, made demonstrations against the enemy, who seemed to be on the north of us. I directed Reynolds to support General Sigel on the left in the movements he might make, and then proceed to join General King's and Ricketts's divisions. At Manassas I found Major General Fitz John Porter's corps coming up, and soon after, in answer partly to a message of mine, I received your order* of the 29th, from Centerville, addressed, jointly, to General Porter and myself. In compliance with it, King's and Ricketts's divisions were directed, as soon as they could be placed on the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville, which runs nearly west, to follow in the rear and close to General Porter's corps. " HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, Centreville, Auyust 29, 1862. GENERALS M cDowELL AND PORTER: You will please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago Heintzelnman, Sigel, and Reno are now moving at Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not fear ftom Gainesville. I desire that as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and. none to interfere in any way with the movement of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last, which were to hold his position on the NWarrenton'pike until the troops from here should fall on the enemly's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts's position, and I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late' hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with Geoneral Iicketts, and instruct him to rejoin the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If any considerabile advantage is to te gained by departing from' this order, it will not be strictly carried out; one thing must be held in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run by to night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction, at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day. My own headquarters will be, for the present, with H-Teintzeluman's corps, at this place. JOHN POPE, M31jo Gener'eal Cozmeanediemg. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 45 Both these divisions had been on foot night and day for several days past, had marched the most of the night before, and were separated from their baggage and subsistence. They moved forward, however, cheerfully. The column coming to a halt, I rode forward and found General Porter at the head of his corps, on a slight eminence; in front was an open piece of ground, and beyond it the woods skirting the Warrenton road, down which, as we could see from the dust above the trees, the enemy was moving from Gainesville upon Groveton, where the battle was now going on. Just before reaching General Porter I received a note from General Buford, commanding cavalry brigade, who was on our then left and front, acquainting me with the strength of the enemy, which he had seen as they passed through Gainesville, then moving down the road. It consisted of seventeen regiments, one battery, and five hundred cavalry. As this was an inferior force to General Porter's, I decided for him to throw himself at once on the enemy's flank, and as the head of my column was sure three miles back, near the Sudley Springs road, I would move it directly north on that road, upon the field, where the battle was then at its height. Under the authority they gave me I deviated from the letter of your instructions, for I thought in this way the forces could be soonest and best applied, and that by coming up on the left of the line, then actually engaged with the enemy, the best disposition would be effected, and the fixed point in your instructions, which was "that the troops should occupy a position from which they could reach Bull Run that night, or the next morning," would be still fulfilled. Leaving General Porter, I returned to the head of my two divisions, and turned them immediately north, on the Sudley Springs road, to the battle-ground, and, after seeing most of them off, I rode forward to the head of King's division, now commanded by Brigadier General Hatch, General King, who had the misfortune to be struck down by a severe illness on the Rappahannock, but who had since tried to return to duty, being at last forced to relinquish the command. I found General Hatch absent. He had gone, as I was told, to see General Sigel. Gneral Reynolds reports that in the meantime, after I had left him in the morning, he had, agreebly to my orders to support General Sigel in any movement the latter might make, formed his division on the left of General Schenk's, but the right of the enemy's position being discovered upon the heights above Groveton, on the right of the Warrenton turnpike, the division advanced in that direction, Cooper's battery, supported by Meade's brigade, coming gallantly into action on the same ridge on which the enemy's right was posted. By some movement in General Sigel's corps, Reynolds's right becoming unsupported, and the enemy's whole fire being concentrated upon it, he was obliged to fall back. Later in the day General Pope, arriving on the right of the line from Centreville, renewed the attack on the enemy, and drove him back some distance. General Reynolds was then directed to threaten the enemy's right and rear, which he proceeded to do, under a heavy fire of artillery from the ridge to the left of the pike. Generals Seymour and Jackson led their brigades in advance, but, notwithstanding all the steadiness and courage of the men, they were compelled, by the fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry on their front and left, to resume their former position. Immediately on my arrival with King's division, I directed it to move forward, and take place oit the left of Reynolds, then still engaged on the left of Sigel's corps, and some of the brigades went forward to do so, when I received your instructions to order the division over to the north of the turnpike, to support the line held by Reno, which had been hotly engaged all day, and the division was recalled, and bro-ught back to the Sudley Springs road, for this purpose. 46 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. One of the brigades-Patrick's-having received an order, as he informed me, direct from your headquarters, to move across the field, became separated from the division, and, though he moved at the quickest pace, was not able to rejoin till late that evening. About the time the division arrived at the crossing of the Sudley Springs and Warrenton turnpike I received word from you that the enemy were falling back, and to send the division right up the turnpike after them. It was now near dusk, and though the men had been on foot since one o'clock in the morning, they -moved forward with the greatest enthusiasm. They were led gallantly up the road by Brigadier General Hatch, who, trusting to find the enemy in retreat, as he was told, and hoping to turn their retreat into a flight, took the men forward, his own and Doubleday's brigades, and Gerrish's battery of howitzers, with Patrick's brigade in reserve, with an impetuosity akin to rashness. The attack was severe, both on the enemy and our men. About the same time an attack was made by Bayard's cavalry, on the left of Hatch, on the enemy south of the road, in which Seymour's squadron suffered severely. These were the finishing strokes of the day, which we could now safely claim as ours. The batteries of King's division, except Gerrish's, supported by Gibbon's brigade, had been sent to reinforce and relieve those on the ridge near Groveton. Ricketts's division, coming on in the rear of King's, was taken up the Sudley Springs road, north of the Warrenton pike, and held as a reserve, for the time, in front. On the morning of Saturday, the 30th, Major General Fitz John Porter's corps came on the ground, by the same road that had been taken by the divisions of King and Ricketts-the Sudley Springs road-and turned up the Warrenton turnpike, following the course of King's division. The order you just gave was, that we should hold the centre and. left, and mass our troops on the right to attack the enemy's left; and as you ordered me to make this attack with the 3d corps, added to the corps of Porter and Heintzel-.man, I asked to make a reconnoissance in person before sending the troops in, and requested General Hintzelman to accompany me. The Sudley Springs road is nearly north and south, and the Warrenton turnpike is nearly east and west, crossing each othler near where you established your headquarters. I found the enemy had, the day before, occupied nearly the half of a circle, commencing at a point beyond Bull Run on the northeast angle made by those roads, and sweeping around irregularly through Sudley Springs to the west, and then south to a point in the southwest angle. Our line, opposing them, had on the right Hintzelman's corps; in the centre, first, Reno's and then Sigel's corps, and on the left, King's division and Bayard's cavalry; Ricketts, in an interior position, in reserve. Porter's corps, which on the day before had been detached and been on the extreme left, hanging on the enemy's right and rear, was now on the left, up the Warrenton road. On going with General Heintzelman over the position held by his troops, we found all the points held by the enemy the day before, beyond Bull Run, abandoned; and in going over to the Sudley Springs road and west of it, we saw no evidences of the enemy in force, some skirmishers and advanced posts or rear guards, as the case might be, being all that we found. On returning to headquarters and reporting these facts, we found that word had been sent in from the front that the enemy was moving back on the road to Gaines's Mill; similar word was given by General Patrick. On the suppo REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 47 sition that the enemy was falling back, I received your orders* to take command of the corps above named and pursue the enemy; I accordingly gave orders that Ricketts's division should report to General Heintzelman, who was to have charge of the right of the advance, and was to move on the enemy by the road from Sudley Springs to Hay-market, a road running west nearly parallel with the Warrenton turnpike and the north side of it, and placed the other divisions. Reynolds's and King's, which were to the front, on the Warrenton turnpike and near General Porter's corps, under that general, to support him in his advance on that road; but just as theset orders were issued General Reynolds rode up to my headquarters and reported, of his own personal knowledge, that the enemy were not falling back; on the contrary, that he was passing his troops to the south of Warrenton turnpike, and massing them behind the woods, to turn our left and make an attack on the southwest angle of the two roads, and thence across the Sudley Springs road to the southeast angles. It may be well to state here, what, however, is well known to you, that the country around the field of battle is, much of it, thickly wooded, and that the march of large bodies on the side of the enemy could only be seen at intervals, and can be easily hidden from view. *HEADQUARTERS NEAR GROVETON, Auyust 30th, 1862, 12 o'clock m. Special order No..] The following forces will be immediately thrown forward and in pursuit of the enemiy, and press him vigorously during the whole day. Major General McDowell is assigned to the command of the pursuit. Major General Porter's corps will push forward on the Warrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of Brigadier Generals King and Reynolds. The division of Brigadier General Ricketts will pursue the Hay-market road, followed by the corps of Major General Heintzelman; the necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by Major General McDowell, to whom regular and frequent reports will be made. The genercll headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton turnpike. By'command of Major General Pope. GEO. D. RUIGGLES, Colonel and Ohief of Staf. tHEADQUARTERS 3D CORPs ARMY OF VIRGINIA, AaguSt 30th, 1862. Major General McDowell being charged with the advanced forces ordered to pursue the enemy, directs me to inform you that your corps will be followed immediately by King's division, supported by Reynolds; Heintzleman, with his corps, preceded by Reynolds's division, will move on your right, on the road from Sudly Springs to Haymarket. He is instructed to throw out skirmishers to the left, which it is desirable you should join with your right. General McDowell's headquarters will be at the. he#d of Reynolds' s division on the Warrenton road. Organize a strong advance to precede your commaend and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enemy until you come in contact with him. Report frequently. Bayard's brigade will be ordered to report to you; push it well to the left as you advance. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, ED. SCHRIVER, Colonel and Chief of Staf. Major General PORTEa, Comm7anding, 4'c., 4-c. HEADQUARTERS 3D ARMY CoPrs, ARRY OF VIRGINIA, August 30th, 1862. GENERAL: Major General McDowell directs that you push on the -movement, suggested in your note to him, to the left, and General Heointzelman, now here, will attend to the front and right. You have at you disposal, to reinforce you,, King's division and Reynolds's. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, ED. SCHRIVER, Colonel and Chief of Staff. Major General FITz JoHN PORTER, Comal nding, Sc., ic. 48 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. On General Reynolds's information, seeing no time was to be lost, and that instant measures were to be taken to meet this unexpected movement, I gave him orders to take his division immediately over to provide for this threatened attack, and occupy the hill south of the turnpike, he knowing the ground well, having been over it in the course of the battle the day before. You, at the same time, gave orders that some of General Sigel's corps should also move to the south of the turnpike, on the Bald Hill, so called, near Groveton. I immediately wrote to General Porter that he must exercise his discretion as to the use of King's division in the movement. He suggested, in his front, that I had. been obliged to take Reynolds's division from him to guard the left, and had to go there in person to see to it; that you said if he should need more force, you would send him General Sigel. I sent word, also, to General Heintzelman of the change, and that I was obliged to take, from him two brigades and two batteries. of artillery, of Ricketts's. division, to aid in improving the defence of the left, south of the turnpike, where I immediately repaired and remained throughout the battle, having no further communication either with General Ricketts's division, under General Heintzelman, or General King's division, under General Porter. The Warrenton turnpike goes west, up the valley of the little rivulet of Young's Branch, and thrdugh the battle-field-is mostly close to the stream. The ground rises from the stream on both sides; in some places quite into hills. The Sudley Springs road, in crossing the stream at right angles, passes directly over one of these hills, just south of the Warrenton turnpike, and this hill has on it a detached road, with fields stretching back, away from it, some hundreds of yards to the forest. This is the hill on which the Henry House stood. To the west of it is another hill-the Bald Hill, so called-which is, in fact, a rise lying between the roads, and making about the same angle with each, and running back to the forest. Between the two hills is a small stream, a tributary, I think, of Young's Branch. The two brigades under Brigadier General Tower, and the two batteries from Ricketts's division, were taken from north of the Warrenton turnpike, on the Sudley Springs road, to the hill just above mentioned, to the further side of the first woods. Whilst reconnoitering in advapce of these woods-the positions which the enemy would be likely to occupy in the direction indicated by General Reynolds-I was joined by that officer, and, seeing evidence at that time of the enemy to the left, I accompanied him across to the Bald Hill ridge, on,Which, next to the main woods, his division was taking up its position, and on which, next to General Reynolds, General Schenck was coming up from the Warrenton road. Whilst these troops were forming on this ridge, which commanded a view of the enemy in the northwest angle of the two roads before mentioned, and which overlooked the Warrenton road, we saw the effects of the attack which had been made by Major General Porter in front, with his own troops and King's division of my corps. Seeing that it was resulting disasNoTE. —he enemy having shown indications of advancing by the right, Reynolds has been withdrawn from your column and put over on our left; it is still thought you will be strong efough to effect your purpose with King; if not, General Pope will send you Sigel. HEADQUARTERS 3D APRMY CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA, August 30th, 1862. Major General McDowell is now busy attending to our left; he directs me to inform you that you must use your discretion in reference to the employment of King's division in connexion with the service you are to perform. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, ED. SCHRIVER, Colonel and Chief of Staff. Major General PORTER, Commacnding, kc., 8rc. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 49 trously for us, and that our troops were falling back, I returned immediately to the Henry House Hill, to see to the placing of Tower's two brigades and the two batteries. On my way I met one of your staff with your message, asking if, on ordering over this force, I had not taken too much from the right. But soon after meeting you, as you came up the Henry House Hill from the right, and representing the state of affairs in front, with your sanction I sent Tower's command over to the Bald Hill, to the right of General Schenck. The line thus formed, in connexion with that on the north of the turnpike, held by Reno, Sigel, and others, commanded the Warrenton road and protected the retreat of Porter's command, then moving down from the front. The line had not been formed any too soon, for the enemy, after our troops in front had retreated, made the expected attack, and assailed the troops on the ridge both in front and on their left flank. Those of the enemy who had passed to the south of the MTarrenton turnpike, as represented by General Reynolds, soon after opened a severe fire from the southwest of the Henry House Hill, on the Bald Ridge, and at the same time prepared to move down to take the woods on the Henry House Hill itself. The next step was to provide, in some way, for the defence of this hill, and as at this time some battalions of regulars, of Sykes's division, came up the hill, they were sent to the left to occupy the woods which covered it. The Rhode Island battery, under Captain Munroe, and some time after two brigades of Reynolds's division, under Generals Meade and Seymour, which had been withdrawn from the extreme left of the front to form a line across the road, behind which General Porter's troops might rally, were brought over from the right and relieved the regular battalions. The latter rejoined their division, which formed another line on the hill to the east, in rear of the Henry House Hill, and at a few hundred yards distant from it. Reno's corps was also withdrawn, by your order, fiom the north of the turnpike to the Henry House Hill. The attack on the Bald Ridge line had been too severe for the troops to hold it long under the hot fire the enemy maintained upon it. Jackson's brigade, of Reynolds's division; McLean's, of Schenck's, and Tower's two brigades, of Ricketts's division, were, after heavy losses, little by little compelled to yield it, General Schenck and General Tower receiving severe wounds, the former in the arm, the latter in the left knee, as they were encouraging and leading on their men. Colonel Fletcher Webster, 12th Massachusetts, and Captain Fessenden, aide to General Tower, were mortally wounded. Though we lost this position, it had been held long enough to aid in protecting the retreat of our men from the front, who, as they came in, either formed behind it, or in rear of the line on the north of the turnpike. It was the only position on the left, from which we were forced, and its loss reflects no discredit on those who held it, for they yielded to the overwhelming force of the whole right of the enemy's army, which was concentrated on them, after our advance had been driven back. The troops immediately north of the Warrenton turnpike then commenced falling back. On going to the turnpike, where it ascended from the bridge over Young's branch to the top of the hill, to the right and rear of the Henry House Hill, to see to the placing of some troops, which I thought might be of King's division of my corps, coming there from the front, I found Brigadier General Carl Schurz, with some of General Sigel's corps drawn up by the road. The geneeral spoke to me concerning the posting of a battery, then out of position, which I caused to be placed so as to be of use, in case we should be forced from the Henry House Hill, as we had been from the Bald Hill; but with warning they were not to fire till after our men should have left the position in front. Seeing them commence loading, I sent a captain on my staff to warn the battery not to fire, except on the contingency mentioned. I refer to this incident,as it may H. Ex. Doe. 81 4 50 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. have served as foundation for one of the strange stories that soon after became prevalent as to this battle. I annex hereto an extract from General Schurz's report, and a correspondence which grew out of it, from which it will be seen that the general says i he did not mean what he seems to have said."* Leaving General Schurz drawn up on the hill, I went to the left where the corps of General Porter or the larger part of it, that came out of the fight in front, had been formed in double line, and when near Sykes's divivision of regulars, Brigadier General Milroy, a gallant officer of General Sigel's corps, came riding up in a state of absolute frenzy, with his sword drawn, and gesticulating at some distance off, shouting to send forward re-enforcements, to save the day, to save the country, &c. His manner, his dealing in generalities, which gave no information whatever, and which, in the way he uttered them, only showed him as being in a state of mind as unfit to judge of events as to command men, and as being away from his command, caused me to receive him coldly. It was a question with me whether we could hold the Henry House Hill, whether to break. the line of reserve at this time, or hold the position that they occupied. It was a question of importance, on which I should have liked to consult you, the general-in-chief, before deciding-the more so, as I had reason to think, this line had been established under your own orders given direct. But you were further over to the left, and the case had to be determined at once. But whilst General Milroy gave me nothing whatever on which I could be justified in acting, and whilst in doubt, for the moment, in view of the circumstances as to the course to be taken, I received a clear message from that intelligent as well as gallant officer, Brigadier General Meade, through one of his aides-de-camp, to the effect that if he could have some re-enforcements sent to him, in the woods on the Henry House Hill, he could not only hold them, but drive out the enemy, who were not there in great force. Relieved from all doubt by this message, I exclaimed, " Meade shall have re-enforcements," and immediately gave General Porter orders to send them forward. I send herewith an extractS from General Milroy's'report, to which I regret I, have to refer to say that his statement, that I refused to send re-enforcements to General Sigel is without foundation in anything that I said or thought. I had just come from a large part of General Sigel's corps. I had received no intelligence from General Sigel that he needed re-enforcements.'" I found Major General McDowell with his staff, and around him troops of different corps, and of all arms, in full retreat." t " At one time, not receiving assistance from the rear, as I had a right to expect after having sent for it, and our struggling batteries being nearly overcome by the weight and persistence of the enemy's attack, I flew back about half a mile to where I understood General McDowell was with a large part of his corps. I found him and appealed to him in the most earnest manner to send a brigade forward at once to save the day, or all would be lost. He answered coldly, in substance, that it was not his business to help everybody, andl.he was not going to help General Sigel. I told him that I was not fighting with General Sigel's corps; that my brigade had got out of ammunition some time before, and had gone to the rear, and that I had been fighting with half a dozen different brigades, and that I had not itquired where or to what particular corps they belonged. He inquired of one of his aides if General -- was fighting over there on the left. His aide said he thought he was. McDowell replied, that he would soon help him, for he was a good fellow. He then gave the order for a brigade to start; this was all I desired. I dashed in front of them, waved my sword, and cheered them forward. They raised the cheer, and came on at a double quick. I soon led them to where they were most needed, and the gallant manner in which they entered the fight, and the rapidity of their fire soon turned back the tide of battle.. But this gallant brigade, like many others that had preceded it, found the enemy too strong for them, as they advanced into the forest, and were forced back by the tremendous fire that met them." REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE 51 He was in reserve and mostly in a different part of the field than that in which I had been operating. On Friday, I had re-enforced him with Reynolds's whole division, and on Saturday the only part of his corps with which I had had anything to do, up to the time of my seeing General Schurz, was General Schenck's division, which I had re-enforced, without being asked, with every man I had at the time under my control. I send herewith a copy of my correspondence with Colonel Buchanan, coInmanding the brigade of regulars I sent forward at the time in question, and with other officers present on the occasion, from which you see the condition of mind General Milroy was in, and how little his impressions at the time are to be relied on either as to what he did or what I said. To General Sigel, personally, I bore no ill-will, but had he been my enemy, and had I desired to see him harmed —" General Sigel" here represented several thousand men, many of them from my own State, and, aside from the great question of the loss of the battle, the fate of the campaign, and the ruin of the country, which might all have been involved-I could not be so stupidly bad, so utterly false to the simplest form of duty, as to refuse aid to my brother soldiers, when I had the power to give it, only because they were under an officer I did not like. As it seems to have been the impression not only that I was unfriendly to General Sigel, but that we had bitter altercations and even personal conflicts, on the field itself, I take the occasion to state that during the whole course of the operations from Thursday morning, at Buckland Mills, to the next Monday evening, at Fairfax Court-House, not only I did not exchange a word with General Sigel, but I did not see him, and I do not think he saw me. The re-enforcements taken forward by Colonel Buchanan and the troops brought by your orders from the north of the turnpike held the position on the Henry House Hill until they were withdrawn long after dark. It was about seven o'clock when I received your order to take such portions of my corps as I might find in tact, and proceed with them to take a position covering the bridge over Bull Run and Cub Run. Proceeding to the place where I had left General Schurz, I found he had withdrawn, but General Gibbon's brigade, of King's division, was just coming up the hill, and seeing it would not be well to leave the position as unsupported as it then was, I told General Gibbon to take post there and hold it till everything should have passed him. tI'e remained there, I am told by one of the colonels of his brigade, till some two hours after dark, when he withdrew. Learning at this place that Patrick's brigade, of King's division, had just passed towards the bridge, I followed it there. Seeing the road much blocked up with wagons, I endeavored to find the ford, a couple of hundred yards below the bridge, but it was so dark I could not see the way, and returned to the road and crossed over. I left here two officers of my staff and a guard of Pennsylvania Bucktail battalion, belonging to the 3d corps, under the gallant Colonel Kane, and directed some pieces of artillery that were passing by to be placed in position on the left bank. All contest, however, save a shot now and then from one of our pieces on the Henry House Hill; had ceased for some time. This brave little battalion remained here until everybody had passed, when they destroyed the bridge and brought up the rear. The troops, in passing over the bridges and in moving to the rear, did so in good order. Stragglers there were, of course-a march, either in advance or retreat, is seldom without them-but the mass of the men preserved their organization and moved by battalions and batteries. At Cub Run bridge I left, with Major Houston, United States engineers, who had constructed the bridge over Bull Run, and rendered valuable service throughout the campaign, a regiment to keep the troops in the proper order in passing to the rear. I have no reports from King's division, and, as its operations were under direc 52 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. tion of another commander, I am unable to speak as I would like to do concerning it. It was, I know, driven back in the engagement in fiont, but I know it to be one of the finest, best-drilled, best-disciplined bodies of troops in the service, and in the main ably commanded; and if it could not accomplish its task, it must have been an excessively hard one it was called on to perform. The two brigades of Ricketts's division, engaged over in the extreme right, under General Heintzelman, were under General Ricketts, whose report is herewith. On the morning of the 31st the corps was united, and, by your order, placed in reserve behind Centreville, the cavalry, under Bayard, being detached and operating to the right of that place. On the 1st of September I received your order, herewith,* to move immediately to Germantown to intercept the march of the enemy then moving down the Little River (or Aldie) turnpike to Fairfax Court-House. This was complied with within a few ninutes after its receipt, and the corps was in position at Germantown in time to receive the enemy at the crossing of the Difficult. Here Ricketts's division was drawn up, under the direction of Major General Hooker, with a battalion thrown across the valley of the stream, and, opening on the enemy's advance, held it in. check at the time Reno's corps attacked him in flank and repulsed him. September 2, in compliance with general orders, the corps fell back to Hall's and Upton's Hills, in front of Washington. Here the campaign ended. If it had been short, it had been severe. Beginning with the retreat from Cedar Mountain, seldom has one army been asked to undergo more than our men performed. With scarcely a half-day's intermission, the 3d corps was either making forced marches, many times through the night, and many times without food, &c., or were engaged in battle. These fatigues were most severe towards the last, when, on account of the movements of the enemy, we had to separate from our supplies, and many generals, as well as privates, had no food, or only such as could be picked up in the orchards or cornfields along the road. In all this the patience and endurance and general good conduct of the men were admirable. To fight and retreat, and retreat and fight, in the face of a superior force, is a severe test of soldiership. This they did for fifteen days; and, though many broke down under the fatigue and exposures, and many straggled from the ranks, the troops, as a general thing, behaved most creditably, and, even to their return to the lines in front of this place, though they were sad at seeing their numbers so much diminished by hardships and battles, which had availed them nothing, and were tired and reduced from marching and fasting, they preserved their discipline, and it is an abuse of words to say they were either demoralized or disorganized. This report has been delayed so long, for the reasons mentioned at the commencement, that I now forward it without returns of the killed, wounded, and missing. I will supply this deficiency when all the returns are received. General Ricketts, who, at Cedar Mountain and at Rappahannock, was under my immediate command, and rendered valuable service with his division, speaks in high terms of the gallantry of Brigadier Generals Duryea and Tower, both at Thoroughfare Gap and in the battle of the thirtieth (30,) in which the former was slightly and the latter severely wounded. ~~ CENTREVILLE, 1st brigade -. 2 24 1'1 155 — 25 217 2d brigade........... 18 12 151 3 65 249 3d brigade -- 2 22 8 106........ 36 174 4 64 31 412 3 126 640 Respectfully transmitted, D. B. B1RNEY, Brigadier General, Commanding Division. No. 5. REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL J. F. REYNOLDS. HEADQUARTERS REYNOLDS'S DIVISION, Camp near Munson's Hill, Va., September 5, 1862. COLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of this division since leaving Fredericksburg, on the 21st of August last, under orders from Major General Burnside, to proceed to Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahannock river. The division having been united at Fredericksburg, with the exception of the 2d regiment, Colonel McCandless, not yet debarked at Acquia Creek, accompanied by an ammunition train supplied by General Burnside, proceeded to Kelly's Ford, where it arrived, after a severe and arduous march, on the evening of the 22d ultimo, and relieved a brigade of Reno's division under Colonel Farnsworth, of the 79th New York. On the morning bf the 23d the division joined the army of Virginia under General Pope, then on its march to Warrenton from Rappahannock Station, and on arriving at Warrenton was attached, temporarily, to McDowell's army corps. On the 24th the division encamped on the.Sulphur Springs road, one mile south of Warrenton, with'Meade's brigade advanced two miles on that road. On the 26th we moved t6 the Waterloo road. On the 27th it marched with the army, on the Alexandria and Warrenton turnpike, and encamped at Broad Run. On the 27th marched to Manassas, by way of Gainesville; on the supposition that the enemy was at the former place, I was directed to follow General Sigel's corps until our arrival at Gainesville, where I was to form in columns of echelons on his left —-King's division to form in like manner on my left —in which order we were to move on Manassas. On arriving at Gainesville the head of my column was fired upon by two pieces of the enemy, in position on the heights above Groveton and to the left of the turnpike, which were immediately replied to by Ransom's battery, and Meade's brigade rapidly thrown into line of battle by that general. The range being too great for Ransdm's guns, his battery was replaced by the rifled guns of Captain Cooper, when the enemy withdrew, not, 68 - REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. however, before some loss had been sustained by Meade. Some force was displayed and skirmishers sent forward along the pike and through the woods on the right of the road. On the opening of fire upon the enemy from our rifled guns he retired from our front. This was supposed to be merely a demonstration by the enemy to save a wagon train, which was seen moving off on the Sudley Springs road, and the column continued its march towards Manassas. About five o'clock I received orders to march upon Centreville, and the column turned off at Bethlehem church and took the Sudley Springs road towards the Warrenton pike. About this time heavy cannonading was heard both to our front and left, the former supposed to be from Sigel's corps, and the latter from King's division, which had taken the Warrenton pike from Gainesville. I sent word to the column to hasten its march, and proceeded to the left at once, myself, in the direction of the firing, arriving on the field just before dark, and found that Gibbon's brigade of King's division was engaged with the enemy, with Doubleday's and Patrick's brigades in the vicinity. After the firing ceased I saw General King, who, determining to maintain his position, I left about 9 o'clock p. m. to return to my division, promising to bring it up early in the morning to his support. Before leaving, however, I heard the division moving off, and I learned from General Hatch that it was moving by Gainesville towards Manassas. I then returned to my own division, which I reached at daylight on the morning of the 28th; closed up with General Sigel's command on the old battle-field of Bull Run. General Sigel reported the enemy in his immediate front, and requested my co-operation with him in an attack upon his position. I accordingly formed my division on the left of General Sigel's corps, next to the division of General Schenck. General McDowell joined the command at daylight, and directed my co-operation with General Siegel. The right of the enemy's position could be discerned upon the heights above Groveton, on the right of the pike. The division advanced over the ground to the heights above Groveton, crossed the pike, and Cooper's battery came gallantly into action on the same ridge on which the enemy's right was, supported by Meade's brigade; while pressing forward our extreme left across the pike, re-enforcements were sent for by General Sigel for the right of his line under General Milroy, now hardly pressed by the enemy, and a brigade was taken from Schenck's command on my right. The whole fire of the enemy was now concentrated on the extreme right of my division, and unsupported there the battery was obliged to retire with considerable loss in both men and horses; and the division fell back to connect with Schenck. Later in the day, General Pope, arriving on. the right from Centreville, renewed the attack on the enemy and drove him some distance. My division was directed to threaten the enemy's right and rear, which it proceeded to do under a heavy fire of artillery from the ridge to the left of the pike. Generals Seymour and Jackson led their brigades in advance, but notwithstanding all the steadiness and courage shown by the men they were compelled to fall back before the heavy fire of artillery and musketry which met them both on the front and left flank; and the division resumed its original position. King's division engaged the enemy along the pike on our right, and the action was continued with it until dark by Meade's brigade. On the morning of the 30th I was directed to take post with my division on the left of the pike near the Henry House, and ordered by Major' General Pope to form my division in column by company at full distance, with the whole of my artillery on the left; that I would be the pivot in the attack which Porter's corps was to make on the enemy's right, then supposed to be on the pike and in retreat. Having formed my division in the position indicated, and opened with my rifled batteries to drive the enemy from the first ridge, the skirmishers advanced and the attack by Porter's corps commenced. When the skirmishers REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 69 arrived in the thick woods opposite Groveton, I found the resistance so great that another regiment was deployed to support them, and finally a second; in all, three regiments. The advanced skirmishers were the 1st rifles, Colonel McNeil, and the 1st infantry, Colonel Roberts, supported by the 7th infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Henderson. The 6th regiment, Colonel Sinclair, was thrown through the woods on our left flank. Becoming convinced that the enemy were not in retreat, but were posted in force on our left flank, I pushed through the skirmishers to the edge of the woods on the left, gaining sight of the open ground beyond; and advancing myself into the open ground, I found a line of skirmishers of the enemy nearly'parallel to the line of skirmishers covering my left flank, with cavalry formed behind them, perfectly stationary, evidently masking a column of the enemy, formed for attack on my left flank when our line should be sufficiently advanced. The skirmishers opened fire upon me, and I was obliged to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire to gain the rear of my division, losing one of my orderlies who had followed me through the woods. I immediately communicated this to the commanding general of the corps, who came upon the ground, and directed me to form my division to resist this attack, the dispositions for which were rapidly completed. Other troops were to be sent to my support,,when the commanding general, observing the attack of Porter to have been repulsed, ordered me with my division across the field to the rear of Porter, to form a line behind which the troops might be rallied. I immediately started my division in the direction indicated; but before the rear of my column had left the position the threatened attack by the enemy's right began to be felt, and the rear brigade, under Colonel Anderson, with three batteries of artillery, were obliged to form on the ground on which they found themselves to oppose it! Passing across the field to the right, with Meade's and Seymour's brigades and Ransom's battery, my course was diverted by the difficult nature of the ground, and the retreating masses of the broken columns, among troops of Heintzelman's corps, already formed, by which much time was lost and confusion created, which allowed the enemy to sweep up with his right, so far as almost to cut us off from the pike, leaving nothing but the rear brigade ahd the three batteries of artillery of my division and scattered troops of other commands to resist the advance of the enemy upon our left. It was here that the most severe loss of the division was sustained, both in men and material, Kerns losing his four guns, but not until wounded and left on the field; Cooper, his caisson. Colonel Harden, commanding 12th regiment, was here severely wounded. The brigade under command of Colonel Anderson sustained itself most gallantly, and though severely pushed on both front and flank maintained its position until overwhelmed by numbers, when it fell back, taking up new positions wherever the advantages of ground permitted. The two brigades and battery of artillery under my immediate command, finding ourselves perfectly out of place, moved, by the direction of an officer of General Pope's staff, to a position to the right of the Henry House, which position was most gallantly maintained by the commands of Meade and Seymour and Ransom's battery for nearly two hours, when they were relieved by the division of regular troops under Colonel Buchanan. My division was then united and marched during the early part of the night towards Centreville, and bivouacked with Syke's division upon the east bank of Cub Run. On the following morning it proceeded to Centreville. On the afternoon of the 31st my division was directed to relieve the command of General Reno, (Stevens's brigade,) occupying the position of Cub Run, where it remained during the night. On the 1st instant the division marched with the army from Centreville, and encamped near Fairfax Court-House. On the 2d it proceeded by the Alexandria and Columbia turnpike to the vicinity of 70 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. Hunter's chapel and Arlington. On the afternoon of the 4th the division arrived at this place, and encamped in position to the rear of Munson's hill. The conduct of the officers and men during the several actions, and the arduous marches they were subjected to since leaving Fredericksburg, was generally good and commendable. MIany straggled from the ranks, unable to keep up, and some few left the ranks on the field, but rejoining their commands at Centreville it is impossible to ascertain who were censurable. General Meade mentions the 1st rifles, under Colonel McNeil, to whose lot the advance skirmishing principally fell, as deserving particular notice. The 1st infantry, under Colonel Roberts, the 2d, Colonel McCandless, the 6th, Colonel Sinclair, the 7th, Lieutenant Colonel Henderson, and the 12th, Colonel Hardin, are also particularly mentioned. Generals Meade and Seymour, as heretofore, led and conducted their brigades in the most skillful manner throughout the entire marches:and actions; also General Jackson, commanding 3d brigade, up to the time that he was taken sick on the field and obliged to retire on the 30th. His command devol-ed upon Colonel Anderson, who conducted the brigade through that day. To the officers of my small staff, consisting of Captain Kingsbury, assistant adjutant general, Lieutenant Lamborn, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant Snyder, of the 7th regiment, acting aide-de-camp, I am greatly indebted for their indefatigable, efforts to execute my orders, rendered more arduous by the incompleteness of the division as well as brigade staffs, having neither quartermaster nor commissary with the division. Division Surgeon King remained upon the field with Surgeon Read, of the Ist infantry, to attend to our wounded. Not having a single ambulance with the division, it was impossible to bear our wounded any distance from the field. I enclose a return of the killed, wounded, and missing in the several actions; also a list by name. I neglected to mention that the 2d regiment, under Colonel McCandless, joined the division at Warrenton, and that Colonel McCandless was severely wounded in the action of the 30th. Respectfully submitted, JOHN F. REYNOLDS, Brigadier General of Volunteers, Commanding Division. Col. SCHRIVER, Chief of Stay, 3d Army coryps. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 71 Return of killed, woundced and missing, in Reynolds' Division during the actions of the 28th, 29t]h, and 30th of August, 1863. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. 1st brigade, (Meade.) 1st rifles, Colonel McNeil 5 19 3 27 3d infantry, Colonel Sickles - 2 21 27 50 4th infantry, Colonel Magillon — 12 2 14 7th infantry, Lieut. Col. Henderson - - -23 13 36 8th infantry, Captain Lemon 5 21 32 58 Total- -12 96 77 185 2d brigade, (Seymour.) 1st infantry, Colonel Roberts - 6 23. 29 2d infantry, Colonel McCandless 1 15 16 5th infantry, Major Fentmyer -1 9 10 6th infantry, Colonel Sinclair -5 36 20 61 Total-..............,....... 13 83 20 116 3d brigade, (Jackson.) 9th infantry, Colonel Anderson 10th infantry, Colonel Kirk 12 52 35 99 11th infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Jackson 12 34 19 65 12th infantry, Colonel Hardin -5 47 5 57 5 38 23 66 Total -- 34. 171 82 287 Artillery. Battery C, 5th artillery, Capt. D. R. Ransom - - I 1 2 Battery A, 1st Pennsylvania artillery -.- 1 5 1 7 Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania artillery,- 4 19 _ 23 Battery G, 1st Pennsylvania artillery.. 3 22 8 33 Total - 8 47 10 65 Total of the division - 67 397 189 653 Respectfully submitted. JOHN F. REYNOLDS, Brigadier General Volunteers, Commanding. CAMP NEAR UPTON HILL, September 5, 1862. 72 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS, October 9, 1862. GENERAL: I observe in the report by General Schenck's acting assistant adjutant general, published in the Philadelphia Inquirer of to-day, of the operations of that general's division when General Sigel advanced to attack the enemy on the morning of the 29th of August last, (you will yourself observe the error in the dates,) several misstatements, unintentional, no doubt, when referring to the movements of my division. My division manoeuvred on his left from early in the morning until he gained the position alluded to on the pike near Gibbon's battle-ground of the evening previous. It was here that General Schenck asked me for a battery. Cdoper's battery, with Meade's brigade as a support, was immediately placed in position on the ridge to the right.of the pike and on the left of the woods where Gibbon's brigade had been in action, by General Meade and myself. In returning from this position, to bring up the other battery and Seymour's brigade, I passed through Schenck's troops, drawn up on the right of the woods before alluded to, in which Gibbon had been eengaged. But, in bringing up Ransom's battery and Seymour's brigade along the pike, I noticed that Schenck's troops had disappeared from this position and were nowhere in sight. I understood that Schenck had detached a brigade to the right to the support of Milroy, and that I was therefore left alone, as far as I knew. I immediately arrested Seymour's movement, and directed the division to occupy the position across the pike from which it had moved, in doing which MicLean's brigade was discovered occupying a piece of woods just on the left of the pike, and, as soon as could be, this movement was arrested and made to correspond with his position. It was subsequently ascertained that he was disconnected from the rest of Sigel's troops, and the position was again changed to make them correct. i[ sent no word to General Schenck of the kind indicated in this paper of the movement' of the enemy, at the time this change of position was made, nor at any time. There was a report came later in the evening that the enemy were moving over the pike, but I am not aware that I communicated it to General Schenck, as at that time I had no connexion with him. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient 9ervant, JOHN F. REYNOhDS, Brigadier General Volunteers, Commanding. Major General MCDOWELL, Washington, D. C. I make this correction to you and without any desire to enter into a controversy in the paper on official matters. J. F. R. No. 6. REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL J. C. ROBINSON. HEADQUARTERS ROBINSON'S BRIGADE, Centreville, Virginia, August 31, 1862. CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade yesterday and day before: On Friday morning I was ordered to "support Colonel Poe's brigade and to develop his line of battle to the right." After crossing Bull Run, I moved forward in two lines, the first composed of the 20th Indiana and 105th Pennsylvania, and the second of the 63d Pennsylvania and five companies of the 30th Ohio, which were temporarily attached to my command. Arriving on the ground assigned me, I remained for a considerable REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 73 time exposed to a heavy artillery fire, after which I took up my position on high ground further to the right. I was soon after directed by Major General Kearney, commanding division, to move to the support of Poe's left, when I formed the 63d and 105th Pennsylvania in line of battle on the Leesburg road, holding the 20th Indiana and Ohio battalion in reserve. At this time there was a heavy musketry fire to our left and front, and I was directed to move forward through the woods to turn the enemy and cut off his retreat through the railroad cut. On arriving on the ground with the 63d and 105th Pennsylvania, 20th Indiana, and 3d Michigan, I found the railroad already occupied by our own troops, and the cornfield in front filled with the enemy. I then deployed the 63d and 105th Pennsylvania along the railroad to the right of the troops in position, directing the 3d Michigan to protect my right flank, placing the 20th Indiana in reserve, and throwing skirmishers to the front. Soon after taking this position the regiments on my left gave way and passed rapidly to the rear, out of the woods, leaving my left flank entirely exposed. As rapidly as possible I moved my command to the left to occupy the deserted ground, but before my troops could get fairly into position I was fiercely attacked by a superior force that had succeeded in crossing the road. I then threw forward my right wing, forming my line of battle at right angles to the original position, and checked the progress of the enemy. At this time General Birney brought up and turned over to me his 4th Maine. He afterwards sent me his 1st, 40th, and 101st New York regiments. These troops were deployed to the right and left of the railroad, and pushed forward to the support of my regiments in front, which were suffering severely from a terrific fire of musketry and the enemy's artillery posted on a hill to our right and rear. Our men now gained steadily on the enemy, and were driving him before them until he brought up fresh masses of troops, (supposed to be two brigades,) when, with ammunition nearly expended, we withdrew to our second position. Our loss in this action was severe, embracing some of our best officers. rt was here that my 20th Indiana lost their brave colonel, William L. Brown, who fell while gallantly leading his regiment. The loss of this gallant officer and true patriot is irreparable. With him fell other brave officers and men, who will ever be remembered as among our country's heroes and martyrs. The enemy's loss must have been very great. On Saturday morning I was ordered with my brigade to support the right of our line, and took my position in front of one of the fords of Bull Run, placing two regiments in line and one in reserve. The left wing of the 30th Ohio regiment, which afterwards reported to me for duty, was placed on the left of my line. I remained in this position, exposed part of the time to the fire of artillery, until, it becoming evident that the enemy was turning the left flank of the army, I was directed by the major general commanding division to take position on the hill by the Brown House. I moved to this point in column, and so remained, ready to take any position necessary; when, on appearance of the enemy, I deployed into line of battle, facing towards our original front. Soon after, by order of General Heintzelman, I moved in column of regiments to the hollow in front, ready to push forward to the support of Birney's brigade, which was now threatened by masses of the enemy, and my first position on the hill was occupied by troops of Ricketts's division. Soon a straggling musketry fire was heard from there, and I supposed the enemy was repulsed. It was now dark, and I was surprised to learn soon after that our troops had left the hill in possession of the enemy. I used every precaution to conceal from him the knowledge of my position, and, although within speaking distance, I remained there until about ten o'clock, when I withdrew my brigade silently and in perfect order. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of officers and men during the whole of the two days' conflict; all seemed to be animated by the same spirit, and the evolutions in face of the enemy were performed with the same coolness and precision as on drill. I leave it for the regimental commanders to 74 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. mention those of their commands most deserving of notice. I received much assistance fiom the lamented Colonel Brown, of the 20th Indiana, and fiom Colonel Hays, of the 63d Pennsylvania, who led his regiment in his usual gallant manner on the 29th until wounded and taken from the field. Captain Craig, 105th Pennsylvania, gallantly led his regiment and was also wounded. My thanks are due to Colonel Champlin, 3d Michigan; Colonel Egan, 40th. New York; Colonel Gesner and Lieutenant Colonel Brown, 101st New York; and Colonel Walker, 4th Maine, fibr valuable services. The officers of my staff, Captain Kidder, assistant adjutant general; Lieutenant Robinson, aide-de-camp; and Colonel Chester and Lieutenant Sweet, acting aids, were zealous and active, performing their duties gallantly under severe musketry and artillery fire. The regiments engaged suffered the loss of 3 officers killed, 25 officers wounded; 69 enlisted men killed, 375 wounded; 106 missing. Aggregate loss, 578. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOHN C. ROBINSON, Brigadier General. Captain G. H. MENDILL, Acting Assistant AdjUtant General, First Division, Third Corps, Army of Potomac. HEADQUARTERS ROBINSON'S BRIGADE, Camp near Fort Lyon, Virginia, September 8, 1862. MAJOR: I have the honor to report that in the affair of Chantilly, on the 1st instant, this brigade, with Graham's battery, was placed in line of battle on rolling ground to the left of the Centreville road. The 20th regiment of Indiana volunteers was directed to hold the woods on our right. The brigade was, by order of the division commander, held in this position until near night, when I advanced about half a mile. Soon after I received orders from Brigadier General Birney, who had succeeded to the command of the division, to move to the right and front, when I formed the brigade in columns of regiments on his right, and there remained until the division was withdrawn at an early hour the next morning, In this engagement the brigade suffered no loss. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, JNO. C. ROBINSON, Brigadier General. Major BREVOORT, Assistant Adjutant General, First Division, Third Corps, Army of the Potomac. HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, Centreville, Virginia, August 31, 1862. Respectfully forwarded. D. B. BIRNEY, Brigadier General, Commanding Division. No. 7. REPORT OF COLONEL ORLANDO M. POE, SECOND MICHIGAN VOLUNTEERS. CAMP WILTON, VIRGINIA, September 9, 1862. SIR: I have the honor of reporting, for the information of the brigadier general commanding division, that on Monday afternoon, September 1st, the third REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 75 brigade of this division, of which I was then in command, moved from its camp at Centreville, taking the road to Fairfax Court-House. Some three or four miles out on this road, I received orders from General Kearney to form the brigade in line of battle on the road, and move forward in the direction of the firing, then going on between Reno's division and the enemy, until our left connected with General Robinson's right. We did so, and halted for a few minutes, when Lieutenant Colonel Brown, aide-de-camp, brought me an order to motve forward by a road which he would point out, and support Reno's left flank. We did so, until arriving a short distance in the rear of where Randolph's battery had been at work, where we halted;' and in the absence of other officers, who could not at the moment be found, (General Kearney was not then known to have been killed,) I reported to General Reno, who directed me to remain where I was until further orders, at the same time telling me to detach one regiment in support of a battery upon our left. The 5th Michigan was sent to perform this duty. It was now dark, when an order came from General Birney, who had assumed command of the division in the prolonged absence of General Kearney, to move to the front and relieve the first brigade, which had expended its ammunition in the fight. We did so at once; relieving the 38th New York with the 2d Michigan, the 40th New York with the 99th Pennsylvania, and with the 3d Michigan and 37th New York in support. These arrangements had scarcely been made when I was ordered to leave one regiment on picket in the advanced'position, and form the other three in column of regiments at a point indicated. While executing this movement some firing took place between the pickets, and whatever loss (see list appended) we suffered occurred at this time. The firing soon stopped. At 2.30 a. m. I was directed to withdraw in the direction of Fairfax Court-House, following the second brigade. We moved in the indicated direction, leaving the 2d Michigan on picket until the brigade was fairly in motion, when it was withdrawn, acting'as the rear guard until we struck the main road, where we met and passed General Hooker's division, reaching Fairfax Conrt-House at an early hour in the morning. CASUALTIES. Second Michigan Volunteers. Killed, Private John B. Miller, company F. Wounded, Corporal A. B. Simpson, company C. NTinety-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers. Killed, Private William H. Anderson, company C. Missing, Private George A. Logan, company F. RECAPITULATION. Second Michigan volunteers: Killed, 1; wounded, 1. Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania volunteers: Killed, 1; missing, 1. Total: Killed, 2; wounded, 1; missing, 1. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, ORLANDO Mi. POE, Colonel 2d Michigan volunteers, (late) Commanding Brigade. Major HENRY W. BREVOORT, Assistant Adjutant General, 4c. 76 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. No. 8. REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL C. GROVER. HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, THiRD CORPS, September 26, 1862. SIR: I have the honor herewith to enclose the official reports of the first and third brigades of this division, and to state that the report of the second brigade and of the batteries were forwarded to General Hooker soon after our arrival here, at his request. I have also, at General Hooker's request, forwarded to him copies of the within reports. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, C. GROVER, Brioadier General, Commanding Division The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL, third corps. HIEAD QUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE HOOKER'S DIVISION. SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 25th day of August the 1st brigade of Hooker's division left its camp in the vicinity of Alexandria, Virginia, and by rail proceeded to Warrenton Junction, to the left and front of which on the following day it took position. Early on the following day it moved to Bristow Station, preceded by the 2d and 3d brigades, which soon became hotly engaged with the enemy on the line of the railroad. Under the orders of Major General Hooker, I formed line of battle, throwing out skirmishers to the front and on the right, and advanced; but the enemy, having once broken before the preceding brigades, fell back without making a stand until reaching a high bluff north of Cedar Run, where, in strong position, supported by artillery, he awaited an advance. At this time, about sundown, I received an order to move to the left of the road and take position on the high ground, and to hold with three regiments of my command a position on our front and flank, where a road from Richmond intersected the main road, while the remaining two guarded the approaches to our position on the right. Here we rested on our arms for the night. My command had not been under musketry fire during the day, and had been but little annoyed by the enemy's shells, one man of the 11th Massachusetts volunteers only having been wounded. * On the following day we recontinued our march for the plains of Manassas by the way of Centreville, and arrived upon the battle-field about 9 a. m. The battle had already commenced, and as my column moved to the fiont the shells fell witl remarkable precision along the line of the road, but fortunately did no damage. My brigade was temporarily placed under the orders df MIajor General Sigel, whose troops were then engaging the enemy in the centre. Under instructions received from him, I threw forward the lst Massachusetts volunteers to support his line, while my remaining four regiments were drawn up in two lines, sheltered from the enemy's fire by a roll of the field in front. This position was occupied until about 2.30 p. m. In the meantime I rode over the field in front as far as the position of the enemy would admit. After rising the hill under which my command lay, an open field was entered, and from one edge of it gradually fell off in a slope to a valley, through which ran a railroad. embankment. Beyond this embankment the forest continued, and the corresponding heights beyond were held by the enemy in force, supported by artillery. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 77 At 3 p. m. I received an order to advance in line of battle over this ground, pass the embankment, enter the edge. of the woods beyond and hold it. Dispositions for carrying out such orders were immediately made; pieces were loaded, bayonets fixed, and instructions given for the line to move slowly upon the enemy until it felt his fire, then close upon him rapidly, fire one well directed volley, and rely upon the bayonet to secure the position on the other side. We rapidly and firmly pressed upon the embankment, and here occurred a short, sharp, and obstinate hand to hand conflict with bayonets and clubbed muskets. Many of the enemy were bayonetted in their tracks, others struck down with the butts of pieces, and onward pressed our line. In a few yards more it met a terrible fire from a second line, which, in its Turn, broke. The enemy's third line now bore down upon our thinned ranks in close order, and swept back the right centre and a portion of our left. With the gallant 16th Massachusetts on our left, I tried to turn his flank, but the breaking of our right and centre and the weight of the enemy's lines caused the necessity of falling back, first to the embankment, and then to our first position, behind which we rallied to our colors. In this fierce encounter, of not more than twenty minutes' duration, our loss was as follows: Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total First Massachusetts volunteers............ 5 66 7 78 Second New Hampshire volunteers........ 16 87 30 133 Eleventh Massachusetts volunteers......... 10 77 25 112 Sixteenth Massachusetts volunteers........ 4 64 42 110 Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania volunteers...... 6 33 14 53 41 326 116 484 Though forced to retire from the field by the immensely superior numbers of the enemy, supported by artillery, and by the natural strength of his position, men never fought more gallantly or efficiently. I must make special mention of my personal observation of the 2d New Hampshire, and 11th and 16th Massachusetts regiments, that, under every trial, have won new distinctions. The well-known first Massachusetts, though not under my personal observation, was, as usual, in the van. The 26th Pennsylvania, which supported the left, did not have that opportunity of showing its metal that I could have desired, owing to the nature of the ground. Striking exaimples of personal gallantry were unusually numerous. The gallant Lieutenant Colonel Tileston, of the 11th Massachusetts; Captains Littlefield, of the 2d New Hampshire, and Stone, of the 11th; Lieutenant Roberts, of the 1st Massachusetts; Lieutenants Rogers and Moore, of the 2d New Hampshire; Lieutenant Porter, of the 11th, and Lieutenant Banks, of the 16th, were either killed upon the field or died from the effects of wounds soon after the battle. Among those that in the short duration of the engagement I especially noticed were Captains McDonald, of the 11th; O'Hara, of the 16th, (wounded;) Lieutenant Merriam and Lieutenant Banks, (killed.) I had not the opportunity to observe but few cases of signal daring; but, with few exceptions, all officers and men there engaged can look back with just pride to their conduct on that day. After the battle we bivouacked on the field about a mild to the rear. At about 6 p. m. on the 30th, under orders from the major general commanding the division, my command retired from the field and marched to Centreville, where it encamped at about 11 p. m. Since the latter date it has been engaged in no operations worthy of note. 78 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. In closing, I must acknowledge my great indebtedness to my staff officers, Captain IHibbert, A. A. G.; Captaina'Perkins, A. Q. MI.; Captain Corvie, C. S.; Lieutenants Hubbard and Brown, aides-de-camp, for meritorious and efficient services in their especial lines of duty during the period embraced in this report. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, C. GROVER, Brigadier General, Commanding First brigade. Captain JOSEPH DICKINSON, Assistant Adjutant General Hooker's Division. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL P. KEARNEY (BY GENERAL BIRNEY.) HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, THIRD CORPS, A. P., Fort Lyon, September 4, 1862. Respectfully forwarded as the official report drawn up by the late Major General Philip Kearney and intended to have been signed by him the day of his death. D. B. BIRNEY, Brigadier General, Commanding Division. No. 9. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL P. KEARNEY, (BY GENERAL BIRNEY.) HEADQUARTERS 1ST DIVISION, 3D CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Centreville, Va., August 31, 1862. COLONEL: I report the part taken by my division in the battles of' the two previous days. On the 29th, on my arrival, I was assigned to the holding of the right wing, my left on Leesburg road. I posted Colonel Poe, with Berry's brigade, in first line; General Robinson, 1st brigade, on his right, partly in line and partly in support, and kept Birney's most disciplined regiments reserved and ready for emergencies. Towards noon I was obliged to occupy a quarter of a mile additional on left of said road, from Schurz's troops being taken elsewhere. During the first hours of combat General Birney, on tired regiments in the centre falling back, of his own accord rapidly pushed across to give them a hand to raise themselves to a renewed fight. In early afternoon General Pope's order to General Roberts was, to send a pretty strong force diagonally to the front to relieve the centre in woods from pressure. Accordingly, I detached on that purpose General Robinson, with his brigade, the 63d Pennsylvania volunteers, Colonel Hays, the 105th Pennsylvania volunteers, Captain Craig, the 20th Indiana, Colonel Brown, and additionally, the 3d Michigan marksmen, under Colonel Champlin. General Robinson drove forward for several hundred yards, but the centre of the main battle being shortly after driven back and out of the woods, my detachment, thus exposed so considerably in front of all others, both flanks in air, was obliged to cease to advance, and confine themselves to holding their own. At 5 o'clock, thinking-though at the risk of exposing my fighting line to being enfiladed-that I might drive the enemry by an unexpected attack, through the woods, I brought up additionally the most of Birney's regiments, the 4th Maine, Colonel Walker and Lieutenant Colonel Carver, the 40th New York, Colonel Egan, 1st New York, REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 79 Major Burt, and 101st New York, Lieutepant Colonel Gesner, and changed front to the left, to sweep, with a rush, the first line of the enemy. This was most successful. The enemy rolled up on his own right. It presaged a victory for us all. Still, our force was too light. The enemy brought up rapidly heavy reserves, so that our further progress was impeded. General Stevens came up gallantly in action to support us, but did not have the numbers. On the morning of the 30th, General Ricketts, with two brigades, relieved me of my extra charge of the left of the road, and I again concentrated my command. We took no part in the fighting of the morning, although we lost men by an enfilading fire of the enemy's batteries. A sudden and unaccountable evacuation of the field, by the left and centre, occurring about 5 p. m., on orders from General Pope, I massed my troops at the inrdicated point, but soon reoccupied with Birney's brigade, supported by Robinson's, a very advanll block of ~woods. The key point of this new line rested on the Brown Hou~ towards creek. This was held by regiments of other brigades. Soon, however, themselves attacked, they ceded ground and retired without warning us. I maintained my position until 10 p. m., when, in connexion with General Reno and General Gibbon-assigned to the rear guard-I retired my brigades. Miy command arrived at Centreville, in good order, at 2 a. m. this morning, and encamped in front of the Centreville forts. My loss in killed and wounded is over 750, about one in three; in some regiments engaged a great deal severer; in the 3d Michigan, 140 out of 260; none taken prisoners, except my engineer officer, who returned to the house supposed to be held by the troops alluded to. It makes me proud to dwell on the renewed efforts of my generals of brigade, Birney and Robinson. 3My regiments all did well, and the remiss in camp seemed as brightest in the field. Besides my old tried regiments, who have been previously noted in former actions, and maintained their prestige, I have to mark the 101 st New York volunteers and 57th Pennsylvania volunteers, as equalling all that their comrades have done before. Their commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Gesner, of the 101st New York volunteers, and Major Birney, with the 57th Pennsylvania volunteers, have imparted to them the stamp of their own high character. The 63d Pennsylvania, and 40th New York volunteers, under the brave Colonel Egan, suffered the most. The gallant Hays is badly wounded. The loss of officers has been great; that of Colonel Brown can hardly be replaced. Brave, skillful, a disciplinarian, full of energy, and a charming gentleman, his 20th Indiana must miss him. The, country loses, in him, one who promised to fill worthily high trust. The 3d Michigan, ever faithful to their name, under Colonel Champlin and Major Pierce, lose 140 out of 260 combatants. Colonel Champlin is again disabled. The staunch 4th Maine, under Walker, true men of a rare type, drove on through the'stream of battle irresistibly. The 105th Pennsylvania volunteers was not wanting. They are Pennsylvania's mountain men. Again have they been fearfully decimated. The desperate charge of these regiments sustain the past history of this division. The lists of killed and wounded, and reports of brigades and regiments, will be shortly furnished. Randolph's battery of light twelves was worked with boldness and address. Though narrowly watched by three long-reaching enfilading batteries of the enemy, it constantly silenced one of theirs in its front, and shelled and richochetted its shot into the re-enforcements moving fiom the enemy's heights down into the woods. On the 27th, with two sections and Robinson's 1st brigade, Captain Randolph had powerfully contributed to General Hooker's success at Bristow Station. Captain Graham, 1st United States artillery, put at General Sigel's disposition, as repeatedly drove the enemy back into the woods as the giving way of that infantry left the front unobstructed. His practice was beautifully correct, 80 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. and proved irresistible. On the 31st, Captain Graham, not being required on the right, was sent to the extreme"left, and rendered important service with General Reno, firing until late in the night. Lieutenant * * * *, a German officer of distinction, put at my disposal by General Sigel, with two long range Parrotts, covered our right flank and drove off an enemy's battery and regiments. I name these gentlemen as ornaments to their branch of the service. I must refer to General Hooker to render justice to the part taken by my 1st brigade under General Robinson, and Randolph's battery, in the affair of the 27th, at Bristow Station. Again am I called on to name the efficiency of my staff. Captain Mindil, often cited, brave and intelligent, was the only military aide present to assist me; but Doctor Pancoast, division surgeon general, not only insured the promptjs of his department, but with heroism and aptitude carried for me my orders. Very respectfully, your obedient servant. Commanding 1st Division. Col. GEO. D. RUGGLES, Chief of Staff to Major General John Pope. No. 10. REPORT OF GENERAL FRANZ SIGEL. HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA, Near Fort De Kalb, Virginia, September 16, 1862. COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following reports: I. Operations previous to the battles of the 29th and 30th August. After the battle of Cedar Mountain, the retreat of the first corps from the Rapidan behind the Rappahannock, and the several engagements of that corps near Rappahannock Station, Freeman's Ford, and Sulphur Springs, we advanced to Waterloo bridge on the same day. We had taken possession of Sulphur Springs on the 24th August. The brigade of General Milroy occupied a position on the north side of the bridge, extending his line of sharpshooters along the shore of the river. The main body of the corps was encamped between the bridge and Sulphur Springs, and behind it the corps of Major General Banks and General Reno's division. The enemy had advanced from Rappahannock Station along the south side of the river, in a line parallel with the route taken by our troops, and was trying to cross at the abos e-named ford, (Freeman's,) and the bridges at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo. On the night of the 24th of August his camp fires extended from Waterloo bridge to Jefferson village, a distance of four or five miles —his main force of about 30,000 men occupying the latter point. Early on the morning of the 25th a sharp skirmish commenced at the (Waterloo) bridge, which was reported to me by General Pope to have been destroyed by General Buford, but which we found on our arrival in good order and strongly defended by the enemy. While we were taking position on the north side the enemy began to break up his camp at Jefferson and to mass his troops on the south side of the bridge. By noon 28 regiments of infantry, 6 batteries, and several regiments of cavalry of the enemy had arrived and taken their position. I had, the night before, given notice of the enemy's strength and movements to lMajor General Pope, and now again informed him of the position of affairs; as the disposition he had made of our forces was evidently based on the supposition REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 81 that the enemy would force the passage of the river between Bealeton and Waterloo Bridge. In the mean time I had been directed to march to Fayetteville, and form part of the centre -of the army to be arrayed in a line extending from Waterloo Bridge to Bealeton Station. In accordance with this order, General Milroy should have been relieved in the morning by a brigade of General McDowell; another brigade of the 3d corps (McDowell's) had to march to Sulphur Springs. In the forenoon of the same day General Roberts, of Major General Pope's staff, delivered to me a verbal order to hold my position at Waterloo Bridge under all circumstances, and to meet the enemy if'he should try to force the passage of the river, and that General McDowell would be on my right, with the cavalry brigade of General Buford, and General Banks on my left.* Soon afterwards I received intelligence that a large force of the enemy's cavalry had crossed on my right and was moving towards Orleans, and that another force had crossed on my left, at Sulphur Springs, and taken possession of that place. I immediately ordered General Beardsley, with the 9th NewYork cavalry and four mountain howitzers, to Sulphur Springs, to shell the enemy out of the place, which he did. The rest of my cavalry, consisting of three companies of the ist.Virginia and two of the 1st Maryland, I ordered towards Orleans, for the purpose of protecting my right flank. Meanwhile, cannonading was kept up near the bridge, and from all indications I supposed that the enemy would avail himself'of the opportunity to make a combined attack against my position. I therefore sent to the left to find Generals Banks and Reno, and to the right to look after General McDowell's troops, especially the cavalry brigade, and was not a little astonished to learn that Generals Banks and Reno were, by orders of General Pope, on their march to Bealeton, and that no troops could be found on my right except the cavalry brigade of General Buford, which was encamped four miles behind us on the Warrenton road. To confuset matters still more, I received a despatch from General McDowell, one section of it directed to Major General Banks, asking for news from his corps, and the other directed to myself, informing me that I would join my pontoon train at Fayetteville. I sent this despatch to General Banks, and requested him to furnish me with what information he could, so that, in the absence of instructions, I might be enabled to direct my movements properly. I also sent to Generals Pope and McDowell, at Warrenton, for an explanation and for orders; but General Pope had left for Warrenton Junction, and General McDowell did not furnish me with any instructions.4 It was now nearly sunset, and my situation exceedingly critical. Threatened on my right and left flank, an army of 30,000 menacing my front, and separated from me only by a shallow river, fordable at many points for infantry as well as cavalry and artillery, no supporting force within eight or ten miles, I supposed that it was not really the intention of the commanding general to leave me in this position. I was corroborated in my opinion by the answer of General Banks, who advised me to march to Fayetteville, and by the fragmentary paper saying that I would find my pontoon train at that point. ~ Considering all this, I resolved to march to Fayetteville at night, and made my preparations accordingly, although I did not believe in the correctness of the whole plan. Just at the moment when my troops were about to move, one of my officers returned with an order of General Pope, directing me to march to Warrenton: General Buford's whole cavalry force was on Sigel's right, picketing the river for several miles above. t The confusion was entirely in General Sigel's own mini.: Sigel at this time was not under Mc uowell's olvdes at all. ~ Entirely unfounded. General Sigel's opinion, forme! in ignorance of' our condition, is, perhaps, not valuable, and certainly out of place in this report. A. Ex. Doe. 81 —6 82 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. and to encamp there. I put my troops in motion in compliance with this order, and cautiously withdrew from Waterloo Bridge, as I had not a single company of cavalry to cover my retreat.* Before withdraw'iag, however, I ordered the destruction of the bridge, which was accomplished under the direction of General Milroy, after much, exertion and some loss of life. At two o'clock next morning, (August 26,) as I was entering Warrenton with my rear guard, I received another order from General Pope, through General McDowell, directing. me to "force the passage of the Waterloo Bridge at daylight." As this was a matter of impossibility, the troops having marched the whole night on a very inconvenient road, I reported Major General Pope this fact, and received orders to stay at Warrenton. ~ During the day I ascertained that the enemy was marching by Thoroughfare Gap to Manassas, and on the following night that his main army was encamped at White Plains, the advance guard east of Thoroughfare Gap, and the rear at Orleans.t This news was brought in by all the scouts sent out by me, with some cavalry, to Spernyville, Salem, and Gainesville, and was immediately communicated by telegraph to Major General Pope. It was also reported to me that the enemy. was moving during the night, (Tuesday;) that Jackson would be in Manassas next day, (Wednesday;) and that Longstreet had not yet joined him; but was two miles from Salem at noon on Wednesday, the 27th. In view of these facts, I proposed to General McDowell, to whose command the first corps had been attached since its arrival at Waterloo Bridge, to concentrate our forces at Gainesville, and thereby separate Longstreet's troops from those of Jackson, taking the enemy at Manassas in the rear, and by forcing him to evacuate Manassas effect ajunction with the army of General McClellan.: This movement was executed. On the morning of the 27th the first Corps left Warrenton for Buckland Bridge on the road to Gainesville, with directions to take possession of the bridge, and thereby open the road to Gainesville. The brigade of Brigadier General Milroy advanced rapidly towards the bridge, and drove the enemy, who was stationed there with some cavalry and artillery, back towards Gainesville, while the pioneers repaired the bridge, which had been set on fire and partially destroyed by the enemy. In a short time the whole of General Milroy's brigade had passed the river and pressed forward against Gainesville, making on their way about one hundred and fifty prisoners. I now, ordered General Schurz to pass the river and follow General Milroy, and to take position behind him. The division of General Schenck also crossed the river, and the infantry brigade of General Steinwehr remained in reserve at the bridge. Such was the position of the first corps on the evening of the 27th. During the night General McDowell's corps arrived at Buckland Mills, and I received orders, at three o'clock in the morning, to march to Manassas and to take a position, with my right resting on the railroad leading from Warrenton Junction to Manassas Junction; so, at least, I understood the order.~ On this march our cavalry, sent out to the left in the direction of Groveton, was shelled by the enemy, about one and a half mile distant from the road on which we marched; and, besides this, an artillery engagement began between the corps of General McDowell and the enemy. I immediately halted, ordered the whole corps to countermarch, and formed in order bf battle on the heights W':-Where were Sigel's and. Buford's cavalry? tGeneral Sigel has just before stated the extreme peril of his command! at midtnight on the 25th from the main force of the enemy at Waterloo Bridge. Hoaw could they have been at White Plains so soon? $General Pope never heard of such a proposition, and General McDowell says in his report General Sigel never made it. ~No such order given. See the orders in McDowell's report, and General Pope's. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 83 parallel with the Centreville-Gainesville road. The enemy's infantry and cavalry pickets were about three hundred yards from our line, and our skirmishers had already advanced against them, when, on a report made to General McDowell, I received orders to march forthwith to Manassas Junction. I reluctantly obeyed this order, marched off fiom the right, and was within two and a half miles from Manassas when our cavalry reported that IManassas was evacuated by the enemy, and that General Kearney was in possession of that point. As I was sure that the enemy must be somewhere between Centerville and Gainesville, I asked permission to march to New Market, whereupon I was directed to march to Centerville.* This order was in execution, and the troops prepared to cross the fords of Bull Run, when our advance met the enemy on the road leading from New Market to Groveton and Sudley's Ford, this side of Bull Run; about the same time I received a report from General Pope that the enemy was concentrating at Centreville. Supposing that this was correct, I directed the brigades of General Milroy and Colonel McLean to advance against the enemy this side of Bull Run, on the road to Sudley Springs, and left General Stahel's brigade and General Schurz's division near the fords, the latter division facing towards Centreville. As soon, however, as I had ascertained that Centreville was evacuated by the enemy, I followed with these troops to assist Brigadier General Milroy and Colonel McLean, who, under the direction of Brigadier General Schenck, were briskly engaged with the left of the enemy's forces, whose right had engaged a brigade of the third corps. Our artillery advanced steadily until the darkness of night interrupted their movements; they encamped for the night near Mirs. Henry's farm, one regiment having taken position on the Centreville-Gainesyville turnpike, the main force fronting towards Sudley Springs and Groveton. II.-Battle of Groveton, near Bull Run, on Friday, August 29 1862. On Thursday night, August 28, when the first corps was encamped on the heights south of Young's branch, near Bull Run, I received orders from General Pope to " attack the enemy vigorously " the next morning. I accordingly made the necessary preparations at night and formed in order of battle at daybreak, having ascertained that the enemy was in considerable force beyond Young's branch, in sight of the hills we occupied. His left wing rested on Catharpin creek, front towards Centreville; with his centre he occupied a long stretch of woods parallel with the Sudley Springs (New Market) road; and his right was posted on the hills on both sides of the Centreville-Gainesville road. I therefore directed General Schurz to deploy his division on the right of the Gainesville road, and by a change of direction to the left to come into position parallel with the Sudley Springs road. General Milroy, with his brigade and one battery, was directed to form the centre, and to take possession of an elevation in front of the so-called "stone house," at the junction of the Gainesville and Sudley Spring roads. General Schenck, with his division forming our left, was ordered to advance quickly to an adjoining range of hills, and to plant his batteries on these hills-at an excellent range from the enemy's position. In this order our whole line advanced from point to point, taking advantage of the ground before us, until our whole line was involved in a most vehement artillery and infantry contest.'In the course of about four hours, from half-past six mo half-past ten o'clock in the morning, our whole infantry force and nearly all our batteries were engaged with the enemy, Generals Milroy and Schurz advancing one mile, and General Schenck two miles, from.their original positions. At this time (10.30 o'clock) the enemy threw forward large masses of infantry 0Altogether incorrect. See reports of Generals Pope, McDowell, Reynolds, and Sigel's own despatches to General Pope. 84 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. against our right, but was resisted firmly and driven back three times by the troops of Generals Milroy and Schurz. To assist these troops, so hard pressed by overpowering numbers, exhausted by fatigue, and weakened by losses, I ordered one battery of reserve to take position on their left, and posted two pieces of artillery, under Lieutenant Blum, of Schirmer's battery, supported by the 41st New York volunteer infantry, beyond their line, and opposite the right flank of the enemy, who was advancing in the woods. These pieces opened fire with canister most effectively, and checked the enemy's advance on that point. I now directed General Schenck to draw his lines nearer to us, and to attack the enemy's right flank and rear by a change of front to the right, thereby assisting our troops in the centre. This movement could not be executed by General Schenck with his- whole division, as he became briskly engaged with the enemy, who tried to turn our extreme left. At this critical moment, when the enemy had almost outflanked us on both wings, and was preparing a new attack against our centre, Major General Kearney arrived on the field of battle, and deployed by the Sudley Springs road on our right, while General Reno's troops came to our support by the Gainesville turnpike. With the consent of General Reno, I directed two regiments and one battery, under Brigadier General Stevens, to take position on the right of General Schenck-the battery on an eminence in front and centre of our line, where it did excellent work during the.rest of the day, and where it relieved Captain Dilger's battery, which had held this position the whole morning. Three regiments were posted between General Milroy and General Schenck, and two others, with two mountain howitzers, were sent to the assistance of General Schurz. Scarcely were these troops in position when the contest began with renewed vigor and vehemence, the enemy attacking furiously along our whole line, from the extreme right to the extreme left. The infantry brigade of General Steinwehr, commanded by Colonel Koltes, was then sent forward to the assistance of Generals Schenck and Schurz, and one regiment was detailed for the protection of a battery posted in reserve near our centre. The troops of Brigadier General Reynolds had meanwhile (12 o'clock) taken position on our left. In order to defend our right, I sent a letter to General Kearney, saying that Longstreet was not able to bring his troops in line of battle that day, and requesting him (Kearney) to change his front to the left, and to advance, if possible, against the enemy's left flank. To assist him in this movement, I ordered two long-range rifled guns to report to him, as his own battery had remained in reserve behind his lines. At two o'clock in the afternoon General Hooker's troops arrived on the field of battle, and were immediately ordered forward by their noble commander to participate in the battle.* One brigade, under Colonel Carr, received orders, by my request, to relieve the regiments of General Schurz's division, which had maintained their ground against repeated attacks, but were now worn out, and nearly without ammunition. Other regiments were sent forward to relieve Brigadier General Milroy, whose brigade had valiantly disputed the ground against greatly superior numbers for eight hours. To check the enemy if he should attempt to advance, or for the purpose of preparing and supporting an attack from our side, I placed four batteries, of different comnmands, on a range of hills on our centre, and behind the woods, which had been the most hotly contested part of the battle-field during the day. I had previously received a letter from Major General Pope, saying that Fitz John Porter's corps and Brigadier General King's division, numbering 20,000 men, would come in on our left. I did, therefore, not think it prudent -to give the enemy time to make new arrangements, and ordered all the batteries to con-,"Hooker arrived at same time with Kearney, early in the dajy. —(See Heintzelman's report. ) REPORT OF MAJOR GENELRAL POPE. 85 tinue their fire, and to direct it principally against the enemy's position in the woods before our front. Some of our troops placed in front were retiring from the woods, but as the enemy, held in check by the artillery in the centre, did not venture to follow, and as at this moment new regiments of General Hooker's command arrived and were ordered forward, we maintained our position, which Generals Milroy and Schurz had occupied in the morning. During two hours, from four to six o'clock p. m,, strong cannonading and musketry continued on our centre and right, where General Kearney made a successful effort against the extreme left of the enemy's lines. At a quarter past six o'clock Brigadier General King's division, of Major General McDowell's corps, arrived behind our front, and advanced on the Gainesville turnpike. I do not know the real result of this movement, but from the weakness of the enemy's cannonade, and the gradually decreasing musketry in the direction of General Kearney's attack, I received the impression that the enemy's resistance was broken, and that victory was on our side; and so it was. We had won the field of battle, and our army rested near the dead and wounded who llad so gloriously defended the good cause of this country. III.-Battle of / t/e 30th1 qf Atgiust. On Saturday, the 30th of August, I was informed by Major General Pope t;hat it was his intention to " break the enemy's left," and that I, with the first corps, should hold tIle centre, MIajor General Reno should take position on my right, and General Reynolds on my left. The first corps took position behind Groveton, on the right of the Gainesville turnpike. Mhy request to have two batteries in reserve behind the centre for certain emergencies-one of General Reno's and one of General Reynolds's division-was not complied with, although all my batteries were more or less worked down, several pieces unserviceable and short of ammunition, and many horses killed or disabled.* After having taken position as ordered, the corps of lMajor General Porter passed between the enemy and our lines, and was forming in line of battle on the open field before the first corps and that of General Reno, miasking thereby our whole firont. Not understanding the object of this moverient, and being requested by one of thle staff officers of General Porter to give my opinion in regard to the ground before us, I immediately rode over to the general (Porter) atld suggested that, in accordance with the general plan, his troops should pass more to the right, join those of' General Kearney on our extlreme right, and direct his attack against the eleney's left flank and rear. I also informed him that tllhere were too many troops massed in the centre, and that General Reno and myself would take care of the woods in his front. Whilst this was going on I received repeated reports that the enemy was shifting his troops from the Gainesville turnpike to his right. I therefore ordered the 4th New York cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel Nazer, to advance in that direction between New MA-arket and Groveton, passing behind our left, and to scout the country as far as they could go. I also sent one regiment of General Schenck's division to the left of our position, as an outpost to observe the enemy's movements. After the lapse of about an hour I received notice that the cavalry pickets had found the enemy, and that the latter was moving against our left. I sent the messenger that brought this intelligence to General Pope's headquarters. Shortly afterwards I receivod an order by Colonel Ruggles, chief of staff of General Pope, to occupy the "'Bald-header hill" on my left with one briga.de, which I did immediately. Meanwhile General Porter's "-General Sigel hadi several more batteries than any other corps, and some of them, reported to b)e without amnmunition, I knew had T)eenl well supplied. The batteries of other'corps Awere al/solultely needed by them. 86 PREEPORT OP MAJOR GENETRAL POPE. troops, who had not changed their position, advanced into the woods where we had lost a thousand men the day before. About this time on our left, where General Reynolds was posted, the musketry and cannonading began to increase. The troops of General Porter had wholly disappeared in the woods, which led me to believe that the enemy had left his position in front, and that it was the intention of General Pope to advance the first corps on the Gainesville turnpike. Suddenly heavy discharges began in front, the corps of General Porter having met the enemy who was advantageously posted behind a well-adapted breastwork-the old Manassas Gap railroad track. At the same time the enemy opened with shell and solid shot against our centre and left wing. Our batteries replied promptly and spiritedly; and from the general appearance of the battle it was evident that we had the whole army of the enemy, before us. It was now about 5 p. m., when, awaiting the further development of the battle, I received a despatch, through General McDowell, and written by General Porter, expressing his doubt as to the final result of his attack, and requesting General McDowell to "push Sigel forward." Although I had not received positive orders fiom General Pope, I immediotely made the necessary preparations, either to assist General Porter or to resist an attack of the enemy, should he repel General Porter and advance against my own position in the centre, by directing General Stahel to deploy his brigade in front and General Schurz to form his regiments in a line of reserve. During the execution of these movements, General Porter's troops came out of the woods in pretty good order, bringing a great number of wounded with them. In answer to my question why they were retiring after so short a time, they said that "they were out of 4ammunition." Expecting that the enemy would follow up this retrograde movement of a whole corps with a strong force, I kept my troops well together to neet such an event. Thus we stood, when, suddenly, incessant volleys of musketry betrayed the enemy in great force on our left, and showed clearly his real plan of attack.'T'o assist Colonel McLean's brigade on our left, I directed General Milroy to join his brigade with that of Colonel McLean. In executing this order, however, General Milroy directed his brigade more to the rear and left than was intended by me, so that by this disposition an interval of several hundred paces i;was left between these two brigades by which the enemy penetrated, attacking Colonel MecLean's troops in the rear, and compelling them to change their front to the left. They thereby partially evacuated the position they had occupied on the hill. It was at this moment that General Schenck was severely wounded at the head of his troops, whom he had repeatedly led forward against the overw-helming masses of the enemy. When this was the condition of affairs on our left, General Reynolds, who, at the beginning of the battle, had deployed his troops in front and to the left of Colonel McLean's brigade, changed his position, and withdrew his battery fioom a hill to the left of the Gainesville turnpike near Groveton. The enemy immediately took possession of the hill, posted a battery there, and spread his infantry out over the high and wooded ground before Colonel McLean's brigade, and on the flank and almost in rear of our centre. To dislodge the enemy from his lnew-gaiined position, I ordered forward three regiments of infantry under Colonel Koltes, who, under a terrible artillery and infantry fire, boldly advanced against the hills, but could not regain the lost ground. In this attack I have to regret the loss of the intrepid Colonel Koltes, who was killed while executing the movement ordered. I-lis brigade, though nearly decimated, succeeded in protecting our centre and preventing the turning of our flank. It was nowY evident thllat, to avoid the destruction of our troops fiom the sweep of the enemy's batteries, and as tile main attack was now on our left, I ordered (:-enelnl,1churz to.withldrawr his ditvision fro the low ground, under cover of' REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 87 our artillery, and take position on the hills near the stone house, one brigade to face towards the left. The brigade of General Stahel followed this movement, and formed in line of battle on our right. Immediately inl fiont of this position, on a hill to the right (north) of the stone house, I placed a battery of the 4th regulars, which I had met on the turnpike. This battery behaved nobly, and maintained its position until the last hour. Captain Dilger's battery occupied a more advanced position near Groveton, Captain Dickman's was on our left, and Captain Schirmer's on our right, with General Stahel's brigade. General Milroy, with his brigade, and the assistance of several additional regiments which he had brought forward, succeeded in repulsing the enemy on the left. In this gallant exploit his horse was shot under him. We.maintained our second position until night had closed in upon us, when General Pope ordered a general retreat. Following the troops of Generals Porter and McDowell, my corps crossed Young's Branch, where it remained for two hours, until the commands of Generals McDowell, Reno, and Kearney had crossed Bull Run by the ford near the stone bridge, and the whole train had passed over the bridge. It was now between 9 and 10 p. m. I then marched to the turnpike, crossed the bridge over jBull Run, and took position on the left and right of the bridge, throwing my pickets out on the other (south) side of the creek towards the battle-field. Soon' afterwards an officer of General McDowell's staff directed me to fall back, as the enemy was threatening the line of retreat. It was now after midnight, when I ordered my command to continue its march towards Centreville, first destroying the bridge across Bull Run. Our rear guard was coinposed of part of General Schurz's division, two pieces of Captain Dilger's battery, and a detachment of Colonel Kane's Bucktail rifles, which had come up with several guns collected on their march of retreat. I reached Centreville at daybreak on the 31st of August, my command encamping in front of, and occupying the intrenchments of, that place. Otlr losses during the two days' battle, in killed, wounded, and missing, according to the official lists sent in,- are 92 officers and 1,891 non-commissioned officers and privates. To be just to the officers and soldiers under my command, I must say that they performed their. duties, during the different movements and engagements of the whole campaign, with the greatest promptness, energy, and fortitude. Commanders of divisions and brigades, of regiments and batteries, and the commanders of our small cavalry force, have assisted me, under all circumstances, cheerfully and to the utmost of their ability; and so have the commanders of the two batteries of XMajor General Banks's corps, (Captain Romer's and Captain Hampton's,) under Major Keefer, attached to me since our arrival at Freeman's Ford. It also affords me pleasure to mention the faithful services of the members of my staff, and of such officers as were detailed to me for special duty. To them, as well as to the officers and members of my escort, the pioneer companies, and to my scouts, I hereby express my high i'egard and warmest gratitude. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, F. SIGEL, Major General Commanding Corps. Lieutenant Colonel CHAUNCEY McKEEVER, Assistant Adjutant General Defences South of the Potomac. 88 REPORT OF MAJkOR GENERAL POPE. HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Near Fort De Kalb, September 23, 1862. COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the names of officers of this command killed, wounded, and missing in the late actions on the Rappahannock, and the battles of August 29 and 30. Narmes. Rank. Remarks. FIRST DIVISION. Eirst Brigade. 8th N. York vol. inf- - Wilhelm Welker.-..... 1st lieutenant_ Wounded. William Wolf.. do ---—. Do. 45th N. York vol. inf-. Jos. Spangeburg...... Captain.. Do. 41st N. York vol. inf - Richard Kurz......... 2d lieutenant.. Killed. Otto Sibeth, Captain -. —-- Wounded. Charles Voelcker.. do-..... Do. Charles Bang........ 2d lieutenant.. Do. Second Brigade. 75th Ohio vol. inf. -.. TW. J. Ranuels. —--.. 2d lieutenant.. Captured at Bull Run. 73d Ohio vol. inf-.... Charles W. Trimble........- do. Killed. J. C. McKell.......... do -. —---- Wounded. D. L. Greimer......... do. Do. Samuel Fellers........ Ist dlieutenant. Wounded and captured; since paroled. John T. Martin. do. —----- Wounded and captured; since paroled. E. H. Miller... 2d lieutenant. Wounded. L. H. Burkett... Captain ------ Mort'ly wounded; since died, Joshua Davis -. 2d lieutenant.. Missing. 55th Ohio vol. inf.. Daniel S. Brown.. Captain ----- Wounded. Robert Bromly - --- 1st lieutenant_ Wounded, &a prisoner. 25th Ohio vol. inf. John D. Merriman -........do - -..... Wounded. Bat. K, 1st Ohio vol.art. H. S. Camp _... __do. ----- Mort'ly wounded; since died. ThIRD DIVISION. tirst Brigade. - Henry Bohlen. —------ Brig. general. KEilled in action at Freeman's Ford, Aug. 22, Glst Ohio vol. inf Henry Riff........... Lieutenant.,.. Wounded. James Armstrong. ------.-do -—. - Do. 73d Pa. vol. inf...... John A. Koltes..... Colonel. —--- Killed. Aug. Brenkner......... Acting major,. Do. Cllharles A -Kraftt - -.. Captain..... - Wounded. Louis Walter —....... --— do-. —- Do. 74th Pa. vol. inf..., - Charles Bollstetter..do... Do. Gollich Hoberg,..... stlieutenant o, Ferd. Reck. —-------- 2d lieutenant.. Do. Louis Fisher...do —. - Missing, 29th N. Y. vol. inf., Clements Loest. Colonel,.... Woundedl. Charles Newhaus....... Surgeon...... Do. Fried. Zedlitz........ 1st lieutenant_ Died at Washington. Fried. V. Sehleumbach -—..d(o -- M... Missing Dietrich Wulfert. ---- 2d lieutenant.. Wounded. Albert V. Rosenburg.......do.o. O. V. Salin. do-...... Missing. Second Brigade. 75th Pa. vol. inf ------ Win. Frolich.......... 1st lieutenant. Killed. R. Theune --...o.. - Wounded. Fr. Fromhagen...do... Do. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 89 Names of oficers killed, wounded, and missing, 4c.-Continued. Names. Rank. Remarks. 75th Pa. vol. inf -- Schwartz..... Captain - Wounded, Win. Bowen -.. 2d lieutenant - Killed. Richard Ledig-... do ------- Wound ed. 54th N. Y. vol. inf... E. Haberkorn. —----- --—.do ------- Killed. A. Beer_.............__.___ do. Do. - Werntuck -...._.- Captain....... Wounded. - Kernpe - ----------—....do ------- Do. - Steinhardt ------- --—.do ------- Do. Henry Brandt....... Adjutant -.-. Do. Blau... | 1st lieutenant. Do. S — Schirah d. o.l. — do -- Do. G. Hinch.-........-. C-A. -. —--- Do. - Ernemrien-... Captain Do. 58th N. Y. vol. inf.. Win. Henkel. —--- Major ------- Do. Max Schmidt..-..... 1st lieutenant? Do. 68th N. Y. vol. inf -.- J. H. Kleefish...'... Lieut. colonel. Do. Ernst DLonner -.. -.. Captain -. Do. John A. Koberlein.. -. —.- - do, -. —--- Do. Franz Buhlerl. do- ---—. - Do. George G. Dalwigk-..... do -..... Do. Carl V. Tredell -.........do ------- Do. Max Ameliu-nken --.... Ist lieutenant- Do. Arnold Kummer,.-... do. Do. A. Schamberg -... -... 2d lieutenantL. Do. Aug. Von Lindstron --—.....do --—.- Killed. Infantry Brigade. Staff. Zebulon Baird -i-. Captain- -- Taken prisoner. 2d Virginia vol. inf.... H. B. Jaties -. —------ 1st lieutenant. Killed. D. A. Jennings_..-..... 2d lieutenant.. Wounded. Thomas E. Day -...do - Do. James Black. —------—.....do --— _ —. Taken prisoner. 3d Virginia vol. inf.. David Gibson-.... Captain ---- Killed. John E. Day.. -Ist lieutenant t Wounded; since died. Asa Coplin.... co Do. R. E. Fleming -. 2d lieutenant Do. B. F. Lydickl -. - r —_ do..-.- Do. F. W. Thompson.... - ieut. colonel. Do. 5th Virginia vol. inf. - - William Schilling... 1st lieutenanta Do. 8th Virginia vol. inf. - - J. E. Curtiss..-..... Captain... Killed. 82d Ohio vol. inf-. James Cantwell Colonel...... Do. C'avalry Brigade. 4th N. York cavalry.. James Moore........ Lientenant... Do. Thos. H. Phillipson. - — do-...... Wounded, 9th N. York cavalry.. George C. Wooley_. --- do ---- -Taken prisoner. Artillery Reserve. Buell's battalion..... Frank Buell... Captain -..... Killed. —-----------------.... ----—......... - Wounded. Detach. 1st Ind. cavalry Harmon Miller-. -—. " Ist lieutenant Do. I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant, F. SIGEL, Major General Commanding. Lieutenant Colonel C. MCKEEVER, Assistant Adjutant General. 90 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. No. 10. LETTER OF GENERAL F. SIGEL, TRANSMITTING SUB-REPORT OF OFFICERS OF HIS COMMAN D. HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Near Fort DeKalb, Virginia, September 20, 1862. Encldsed please find the following reports: Independent Brigade.-Brigadier General Milroy. First Division.-First brigade, Brigadier General Stahel.; second brigade, Colonel McLean; 55th Ohio volunteer infantry, Colonel Lee; 73d Ohio volunteer infantry, Colonel Smith; Captain DeBeck's battery, Lieutenant Haskin. Second Division- -Attached to third division. Third Division.-Second brigade, Colonel Krzyzanowski; commanding officer 54th regiment New York volunteer infantry; commanding officer 58th regiment New York volunteer infantry; commanding officer.29th regiment New York volunteer infantry; commanding officer 61st regiment Ohio volunteer infantry; commanding officer 73d regiment Pennfsylvania volunteer infantry; Captain Wiedrich's battery; Captain Dilger's battery, company I, 1st Ohio volunteer artillery. Cavalry Brigade. —Colonel Beardsley. Commanding officer 4th New York cavalry, commanding officer 9th New York cavalry, commanding officer 6th Ohio cavalry, commanding officer Ist Maryland cavalry. The reports of Brigadier General Schurz, commanding third division, and Colonel Schimmelpfennig, commanding first brigade, third division, and several reports of regiments and batteries not received yet, will be forwarded at once. General Schenck being wounded, no report has yet been received from him. I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant, F. SIGEL, ~Major Gene~ral Commanding Corps. Lieutenant Colonel C. McKEEVER, Assistant Adjutant General Defences South of the Potomac. No. 11. REPORT OF R. H. MILROY. HEADQUARTERS INDEPENDENT BRIGADE, Near Fort Ethan Allen, Virginia, September 12, 1862. I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of my command since the departure from Woodville, Virginia, on August 8, 1862: At 9 o'clock p. m., my brigade taking the advance of the corps, started in the direction of Culpeper, arriving at the place about 5 next morning. At 5 p. m. of same day received orders to march immediately in direction of Cedar Mountain, from which direction heavy firing had been heard all the afternoon. I again took the advance. Having marched some three miles, and finding the road blocked up by ambulances and stragglers from the battle-field, I started ahead with my cavalry detachment, (three companies of the 1st Virginia,) leaving REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 91 my infantry and artillery to make the best of their way toward the front. Arriving about 8 p. m. at the front, and finding everything in confusion, I ordered my cavalry into line, under the protection of the woods nearest the enemy, and advanced alone to reconnoitre. Fifteen minutes had scarcely elapsed, when a battery of the enemy suddenly opened with great precision upon the remnant of General Banks's corps posted on my right. The enemy's fire had been directed by several large fires burning brilliantly among Banks's batteries. The result was a general stampede, artillery, cavalry, and infantry retreating in the greatest disorder. I endeavored to rally them at first without success, but finally succeeded in'arresting a battery or two and some cavalry, which I brought back to their old position on the road, at the same time throwing my cavalry across on the same side. Shortly after one of Banks's batteries, having retreated to a safe position, commenced, to the left of the road and behind us, responding to the enemy's guns, the firing ceasing in about fifteen minutes. Meanwhile, fearing that my brigade, two regiments of which had been thrown across the road to stop the terrified mass in their headlong retreat, might be delayed too long, I despatched one of my aids to hurry it forward-to.push. before them all of the retreating column possible. They immediately proceeded forward, and after much labor I succeeded in encamping them, near 2 a. m., in the position first selected in the evening. Having posted pickets at a suitable distance on our front, I allowed the men to rest on their arms. Sunday, 10th. —Still holding position in advance of the corps, I threw forward a line of skirmishers, with a sufficient support, along my whole front. They found the enemy's skirmishers, supported by theii whole force, strongly posted in the woods about 2,000 yards in front of us. Here they skirmished until about noon, the enemy occasionally firing upon them by companies. Whenever this occurred I would send a few shells among them, causing their sudden withdrawal. During the afternoon my skirmishers drove the enemy from the woods, following them some three-fourths of a'mile. About 4 p. m. sent out my cavalry to reconnoitre; and, if possible, to allow the ambulances to bring off some of our wounded. In this they were quite successful, bringing off about one hundred. The cavalry had in the meanwhile approached within 300 yards of the enemy's lines without drawing their fire, and having ascertained their position withdrew to our lines. On the morning of the 11th, it being determined to take the dead and wounded from off the field, I was ordered to advance my brigade and cover the ambulances and working parties. I accordingly sent forward my three companies of cavalry, followed by my infantry. The cavalry, upon arriving at the outskirts of the wood, halted, finding ahead of them a strong cavalry force under the direction of General Bayard. I then rode forward, followed by several ambulances, -which I sent back loaded with wounded. About an hour had thus elapsed, when I was informed a flag of truce had been sent in by the enemy, and at the same time received a request from General Bayard to attend a conference.with the rebel General Stuart relative to a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of attending to the dead and wounded of both parties. An armistice. until 2 o'clock p. m. was finally agreed upon, but was afterwards, by mutual consent, extended to the evening. A reconnoissance on the morning of the 12th found the enemy had withdrawn during the night in the direction of the Rapidan river. I followed as rapidly as possible as soon as this was ascertained, but only succeeded in discovering the rear guard of their cavalry in full flight. Having advanced some six miles as far as Crooked creek, and finding it impassable on account of previous heavy rains, encamped my brigade upon its banks and awaited orders. On the morning of the 13th, finding Crooked creek and Robinson's river fordable for my cavalry and artillery, I crossed my infantry on slight bridges hastily constructed. When about 800 yards south of Robinson's river, I was 92 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. obliged to halt my brigade, with the exception of cavalry, on the banks of a narrow and deep creek emptying into Robinson's river. The bottom of this creek, where it crossed the road, was composed of mud worn into deep holes, thus rendering it impassable for my artillery In the course of two hours I had thrown across it a bridge strong enough to sustain my heaviest guns. A party of my cavalry had in the meantime reconnoitred as far as Rapidan river, some five miles beyond us, reported a small party of the enemy on the opposite shore. Having crossed the bridge, I proceeded about a quarter of a mile to where I was ordered to halt for the day. About 4 p. m., when I was about to post my pickets for the night, I received orders to fall back on my original position left in the morning. I accordingly withdrew my brigade, with the exception of my cavalry and a section of my battery, which I left in a favorable position. From the evening of the 13th to the 18th remained in camp on the banks of Crooked creek. Nothing of importance occurred during the interval excepting the capture, on the 16th, of a lieutenant and three privates of the 2d Virginia while on picket by a party of rebel cavalry. At 4 p. m. of the 18th received orders to prepare to fall back as far as Sulphur Springs, the enemy being reported as advancing in great force from Richmond. I soon had my brigade in readiness, and remained under arms until 4 a. m., when orders were received to move with my brigade in the rear, General Pope's command having required all night to withdraw. Qna the 19th we marched all day, passing through Culpeper, and encamping at midnight about four miles north of that place on the Sulphur Springs road. On the 20th at daylight resumed march toward Sulphur Springs, reaching there at 5 p. m. without any signs of the ehemy in our rear. Started on the morning of the 21st, with brigade in advance of corps, in the direction of Rappahannock station to re-enforce Banks and McDowell, who had thus far prevented the enemy from crossing the river at that point, and found a heavy artillery engagement going on. We arrived about nooh, and were ordered to rest near General Pope's headquarters until a position in the field could be assigned me. About 2 p. m. I was ordered to advance toward the river and take position on the right of King's division. After advancing about a half mile, my brigade was divided, yourself, general, taking two regiments along the, road, myself moving with the other two through the fields; a small squad of rebel cavalry, who had been watching our movements from the edge of the woods in front of us, fleeing at our approach. Upon arriving at the edge of the woods I halted my column and allowed the sharpshooters and skirmishers some five minutes in advance. I then started my two regiments, crossed the woods about a quarter of a mile in width, and halted, finding ourselves on the right of the line of skirmishers then engaged, established by General Patrick, of King's division. Remaining here some two hours, the enemy making no demonstration, I fell back to the fields in the rear of the woods to rest for the night. In the meanwhile you, general, had placed my infantry and battery in position near the road on'my right. Thus disposed of, we rested until the following morning. On the morning of the 22d I was early ordered to take the advance in the direction of Freeman's Ford, about one and a half mile in front and to the right of us, where the enemy had massed the night previous and were then holding the ford. When within a quarter of a mile of the ford, in order to reconnoitre and select position, I hurried forward, accompanied by my cavalry, being screened in my approach by a long belt of pines bordering on the river. Arriving at the edge of the pines I halted my cavalry, and, accompanied by my staff, crossed the road and ascended an eminence commanding the ford. Scarcely three minutes had elapsed when the enemy opened upon me from two batteries with grape and shell. I immediately hurried my cavalry across the road to a safe REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 93 position, and ordered my battery, under Captain Johnson, forward on the double quick. Too much praise cannot be awarded the captain for the promptness and skill exhibited in bringing his battery into position. In less than five minutes after receipt of the order he had his pieces in action amid a perfect shower of shot, shell, and canister from three of the rebel batteries, and in ten minutes after had silenced their heaviest battery. He continued engaging the enemy for about two hours, compelling them to constantly change the position of their guns, when his ammunition having given out, I asked for another battery. Captain I)e Beck's battery, of McLean's brigade,.was sent me, he in turn being relieved by Captain Buell, of the reserve artillery, in about two hours. The enemy ceased firing about three o'clock p. m. My infantry, which at the commencement of the action I had placed under cover of the woods on either flank of the battery, had suffered but little, some two killed and twelve or thirteen wounded by canister and shell.. About three p. m., wishing to ascertain the cause of the enemy's silence, I determined to cross the river, and accordingly sent for my cavalry, numbering about one hundred and fifty effective men. I then crossed the ford, sending a company of sharpshooters across and deploying them, ordering their advance up the hill occupied in the morning by the enemy's batteries; myself, with my cavalry, in the meanwhile going around by the road. Arriving at the summit of the hill, I discovered the greater part of the enemy's wagon train, accompanied by their rear guard, moving up the river in the direction of Sulphur Springs. Their cavalry, upon discovering us, gave the alarm, hurrying off their teams and stragglers in the greatest ionfusion. I posted a platoon of cavalry as videttes, at the same time throwing forward twenty of my sharpshooters, who commenced skirmishing with their rear guard. Being merely reconnoitring, and not having sufficient force to pursue their trains, I ordered my two remaining companies of cavalry into line under protection of the hill. The remainder of the company of sharpshooters I deployed as skirmishers, ordering them to feel their way into the woods on my left. They had scarcely entered the woods when they met the enemy's skirmishers, and, from their number and the length of their line, I inferred that they had a large force to back them. Shortly after they opened a heavy fire to my left and rear beyond. the woods I had thrown my skirmishers in, which I afterward learned was the attack of the enemy upon Bohlen's brigade, which had crossed the river below me. It now being sundown, and not being allowed to bring any force across, I returned, my brigade resting for the night without changing position. At 7 a. m., 23d, received orders to move in the direction of Sulphur Springs, my brigade bringing up the rear of the corps. When a short distance en ronte I was directed to take a road on my left, a rougher but shorter route to the springs, the main body of the corps having continued on the main road. Upon coming into the main road again I found myself in advance of the corps. When within a mile of the bridge across Great Run I found our cavalry in line of battle behind the woods. Upon inquiring the cause I was informed that the enemy were in force at and across the run, and had fired on them. Upon this information I passed them with my brigade, and finding the rebel guns in position across the creek, I placed my battery in a commanding position on this side and commenced shelling them, at the same time throwing my infantry into the woods, who soon found and opened a brisk fire into the rebel infantry in front of them on our side of the creek, my men being exposed from the commencement to a cross-fire of grape and canister from a masked battery across the creek. But notwithstanding all these odds, we soon forced them across the creek, and to retire for protection behind their guns. The enemy having torn up the bridge, and it now being dark, I encamped my brigade for the night a short distance back from the banks of the creek. Next morning, 24th, a strong pioneer party having been put to work on the 94 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. bridge to repair for our artillery to cross, I crossed my infantry upon the sleepers, not waiting for my cavalry or artillery. I deployed a strong skirmishing party and was soon on the track of the enemy, who had fallen back during the night to their main body which had crossed the river by the bridge at Sul-' phur Springs, my skirmishers advancing as far as the springs. As soon as my -infantry appeared on the heights qommanding the bridge across Hedgeman river, the enemy, who were in position, opened fir.e from the opposite shore. I sent back for my battery and returned their fire; the other batteries of the corps soon coming up, a general, artillery engagement ensued, which resulted in our driving their gunners away, leaving their pieces very temptingly displayed. Wishing to take advantage of this unexpected opportunity in securing their guns, I had just crossed the bridge with one of my regiments (the 5th Virginia,) following close behind, and when nearly in reach of the prize, found myself in a hornets' nest. As if by magic, the woods and hills became alive with the enemy; the deserted batteries were suddenly manned, and a semicircle of guns nearly'a mile around us commenced pouring a steady stream of shell and canister upon the bridge. I called to niy regiment, which was then crossing, to retire, which it did in very good order and rapid style. Our batteries immediately responded to their fire, thus drawing their attentioin aL.way. froi' us. In a moment the air was perfectly alive with shot and shell, and I took advantage of their elevation to join my command. At this juncture I received orders to take the advance of the corps in the direction of Waterloo bridge, six miles above Warrenton Springs. I got my brigade in motion and arrived at the bridge about 5 p. m. I placed Dickmaa's battery in position on a commanding eminence on the left of the road and near the bridge, immediately opening fire upon a rebel battery across the river; at the same time throwing my skirmishers down near the bridge, and along the bank, where they were soon engaging the rebel skirmishers. Thus matters stood when darkness partially put an end to the firing, but the enemy opened on us furiously several times during the night with small arms, which was promptly replied to. On the morning of the 25th the batteries on both sides opened again and continued through the day without serious loss to us. About 3 p. m. I received orders to burn the bridge at once at all hazards, and to this end brought forward my four regiments of infantry to engage the enemy's infantry concealed in the woods near the bridge on the opposite bank. By keeping up a steady artillery and infantry fire I succeeded in covering a party firing the bridge, which being of heavy oak, burned but slowly,.and it was not till dark that the bridge was entirely consumed. We then received orders to march to Warrenton, my brigade to bring up the rear of the corps. We left about 9 p. in. and arrived at Warrenton next morning at daylight. Here we remained in camp until the morning of the 27th, when we received orders to take the advance in the direction of Gainesville. My cavalry, upon arriving at Broad Run, within four miles of Gainesville, found the bridge on fire, and the rebel cavalry with one piece of artillery drawn up on the opposite side. Major Krepps, commanding my cavalry detachment, immediately ordered a charge, and after two successive charges succeeded in putting them to flight. By this time my infantry had arrived, and I set the pioneer corps to work repairing the bridge, which was executed with such promptness that in fifteen minutes after we were enabled to cross our artillery. Meanwhile I had,pushed ahead with my cavalry and infantry in the direction of Gainesville. When within two miles of Gainesville I sent a platoon of cavalry with a regiment of infantry and a section of my battery to hold the road leading to Haymarket Station. With the rest of the brigade I continued on the main road, and upon approaching Gainesville found we had intercepted REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 95 Longstreet from joining Jackson, Ewell, and Hill, who had just passed up the railroad toward Manassas Junction. At Gainesville we took some 200 prisoners, stragglers from Jackson's army. I here received orders to halt my brigade for the night. Next morning, 28th, took the advance toward Manassas Junction, arriving within a mile of the junction at noon. I halted to await further orders. I accordingly turned my infanitry aside into the shade of the woods, and sent my artillery ahead as far as the junction, there being no water for them nearer. Upon visiting the railroad station at the junction I found an immense amount of government stores in cars, which were yet burning, having been set on fire by the rebels the night previous; after having helped themselves to all they could carry off. At 3 p. m. I received orders to join the balance of the corps then marching in the direction of New Market. I accordingly moved across the country, and soon overtook them. After marching about an hour, skirmishing commenced in front. I was ordered to go forward and take position on Schenck's left, and pressed forward through the woods and underbrush in the direction of the rebel firing, which seemed to recede as I advanced. It finally grew dark, but I pushed forward in the direction of the firing, which had gradually grown into the thunder of a desperate battle. It becoming so dark, and the nature of the ground not admitting of my battery being pushed forward, I left it in charge of two companies of infantry, and started forward with my four regiments in the direction -of the heavy firing, which suddenly ceased with great shouting, indicating, as we judged, a victory by the rebels. It being now 9 o'clock, and the darkness rendering the recognition of friend or foe impossible, I withdrew to my battery, which was on a line with the front of the corps, then fully a mile in my rear, resting my brigade here for the night. On the following morning (the 29th) at daylight, I was ordered to proceed in search of the rebels, and had not proceeded more than 500 yards when we were greeted by a few straggling shots from the woods in front. We were now at the creek, and I had just sent forward my skirmishers when I received orders to halt, and let the men have breakfast. While they were cooking, myself; accompalied by General Schenck, rode up to the top of an eminence, some 500 yards to the front to reconnoitre. We had no sooner reached the top than we were greeted by a shower of musket-balls from the woods on our right. I immediately ordered up my battery and gave the bushwhackers a few shot and shell, which soon cleared the woods. Soon after, I discovered the enemy in great force about three-quarters of a mile in front of us, upon our right of the pike leading from Gainesville to Alexandria; I brought up my two batteries and opened upon them, causing them to fall back, I then moved forward my brigadet with skirmishers deployed, and continued to advance mly regiments, the enemy falling back. General Schenck's division was off to my left, and that of General Schurz to my right. After passing a piece of woods I turned to the right, where the rebels had a battery that gave us a great deal of trouble. I brought forward one of my batteries to reply to it, and soon after heard a tremendous fire of small arms, and knew that General Schurz was hotly engaged to my right in an extensive forest. I sent two of my regiments, the 82d Ohio, Colonel Cantwell, and the 5th Virginia, Colonel Zeigler, to General Schurz's assistance. They were to attack the enemy's right flank, and I held my other two regiments in reserve for a time. The two regiments sent to Schurz were soon hotly engaged, the enemy being behind a railroad embankment, which afforded them an excellent breastwork. The railroad had to be approached from the cleared ground on our side, through a strip of thick timber from 100 to 500 yards in width. I had intended, with the two regiments held in reserve, the 2d and 3d Virginia regiments, to charge the rebel battery, which was but a short distance from us over the top 96 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. of a hill to our left; but while making my arrangements to do this, I observed that my two regiments engaged were being driven back out of the woods by the terrible fire of the rebels. I then saw the brave Colonels Cantwell and Zeigler struggling to rally their broken regiments, on the rear of the forest out of which they had been driven, and sent two of my aids to assist them, and assure them of immediate support. They soon rallied their men and charged again and again, but were driven back each time with great loss. I then sent the 2d Virginia to their support, directing it to approach the railroad at the point on the left of my other regiments, where the woods ended, but they were met by such a destructive fire from a large rebel force, that they were soon thrown into confusion and fell back in disorder. The enemy now came on in overwhelming numbers. General Carl Schurz had been obliged to retire with his two brigades an hour before. And thlen the whole rebel force was turned against my brigade, and my brave lads were dashed back before the storm of bullets like chaff before the tempest. I then ordered my reserve battery into position a short distance in the rear, and when five guns had got into position one of the wheel horses was shot dead; but I ordered it to unlimber where they were, and the six guns mowed the rebels with grape and canister with fine effect. My reserve regiment, the 3d Virginia, now opened with telling effect. Colonel Cantwell, of the 82d Ohio, was shot through the brain andinstantly killed while trying to rally his regiment during -the thickest of the fight. While the storm was raging the fiercest, General Stahel came to me and reported that he had been sent by General Schenck to support me, and inquired where he should place his brigade. I told him on my left and help support my battery. He then returned to his brigade, and, soon after being attacked from another quarter, I did not again see him during the day. I was then left wholly unsupported, except by a portion of a Pennsylvania regiment, which I found on the field and stood by me bravely during the next hour or two. I then rallied my reserved regiment and broken fragments in the woods near my battery, and sent out a strong party of skirmishers to keep the enemy at bay, while another party went forward without arms to get off as many of our dead and wounded as possible. I maintained my ground, skirmishing and occasionally firing by battalion during the greater part of the afternoon. Toward evening General Grover came up with his New England brigade. I saw him forming a line to attack the rebel stronghold in the same place I had been all day and advised him to form line more to the left and charge bayonets on arriving at the railroad track, which his brigade executed with such telling effect as to drive the rebels in clouds before their bayonets. Meanwhile I had gathered the remnant of my brigade, ready to take advantage of any opplrtunity to assist him. I soon discovered a large number of rebels fleeing before the left flank of Grover's brigade. They passed over an open space some five hundred yards in width in front of my reserved regiment, which I ordered to fire on them, which they did, accelerating their speed and discomfiture so much that I ordered a charge. My regiment immediately dashed out of the woods we were in, down across the meadows in front of us after the retreating foe, but before their arriving at the other side of the meadow the retreating column received a heavy support from the railroad below them, and soon, rallying, came surging back driving before their immense columns Grover's brigade and my handful f men. An hour before the charge I had sent one of my aids back after a fresh battery-the ammunition of both my batteries'having given out-which, arriving as our boys were being driven back, I immediately ordered them into position, and commenced pouring a steady fire of grape and canister into the advancing columns of the enemy. The first discharge discomposed them a little, but the mmense surging mass behind pressed them on. I held on until they were REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 97 within a hundredyards of us, and having but a handful of men to support tlhe battery, ordered it to retire, which was executed with the loss of one gun. I then rallied the shattered remnant of my brigade, which had been rallied by my aides and its officers, and encamped some three-quarters of a mile to the rear. The next morning, 30th, I brought my brigade into the position assigned them, and remained in reserve until about 4 p. Im., when I threw it across thle road to stop the retreating masses, which had been driven back from the front. I soon received an order to move my brigade off to the left on double quick, the enemy having massed their troops during the day in order to turn our left flank. I formled line of battle along the road, my left resting near the edge of the woods in whiclh the battle was raging. Soon our troops came rushing, panicsti'icken, out of the Woods, leaving my brigade to face the enemy, who followed tile retreating masses to the edge of the woods. The road in which my brigade was formed was worn and wacshed from three to five feet deep, affbrding a splendid cover for my men BMy boys opened, fire on them at short range, driving the rebels back to a respectful distance. But the enemy, being constantly re-enforced from the masses in their rear, came on again and again, pouring in advance a perfect hurricane of balls, which had but little effect on my men, who were so well protected in their road intrenchment. But the steady fire of my brigade, together with that of a splendid brass battery on higher ground in my re'ar, which I ordered to fire rapidly with canister over the heads of my men, had a most withering effect upon the rebels, whose columns mnelted away and fast recoiled firom repeated efforts to advance upon my road breastwork from the woods. But the fire of the enemy, which had affected my men so little, told with destructive results on the exposed battery in their rear, and it required a watchful effort to hold them to their effective work. My horse -was shot in the head by a musket ball while in the midst of the battery cheering on the men. I got another; and soon after observing the troops on my left giving way in confusion before the rebel fire, I hastened to assist in rallying them, and while engaged in this, the battery took advantage of my absence and withdrew. I had sent one of my aides shortly before to the rear for fresh troops to support this part of our line, where the persistent efforts of the rebels showed they had determined to break through. A fine regiment of regulars was sent, which was formed in the rear of my brigade, near the position the batteiy had occupied. The rebels came around the forest in columns to our right and front, but tlhe splendid firing of the regulars, with that of my brigade, thinned their ranks so rapidly that they were thrown back in confusion upon every attempt made. About this time, when the battle raged thickest, Lieutenant Estie and Lieutenant Niles, of General Schenck's staff, reported to me for duty, informing me that General Schenck had been seriously wounded, and his command thrown back from the field. Aost thankfully was their valuable assistance accepted, and most gallantly and efficiently did they assist me on that most sanguine field until 8 o'clock at night, in bringing up regiments, brigades and batteries, cheering them on to action, and in rallying them when driven back before the furious fire of the enemy. Shortly after sunset my own brigade had entirely exhausted their ammunition, anud it being considerd unsafe to bring forward the ammunition wagon-s, where, the enemy's shells were constantly flying and exploding, and the enemy having entirely ceased their efforts to break through this part of the line, and had thrown the weight of their attack still further to my left, I orderd my brigade back some one-half of a mile to replenish their ammunition boxes, and there await further orders. I remained on the field with Lieutenants Estie and Niles, my own having been sent to see to my regiments. The enemy continued their attacks upon our left until long after dark, which it required the most de H. Ex. Doe. S1 -7 98 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. termined and energetic efforts to repel. At one time, not receiving assistance from the rear, as I had a right to expect, after having sent for it, and our struggling battalions being nearly overcome by the weight and persistence of the enemy's attack, I flew back about one-half mile, to where I understood General McDowell was with a large portion of his corps. I found him and appealed to him in the most urgent manner to send a brigade forward at once to save the day, or all would be lost. He answered coldly, in substance, that it was not his business to help everybody, and he was not going to help General Sigel. I told him I was not fighting with General Sigel's corps; that my brigade had got out of ammunition some time before, and gone to the rear, and that I had been fighting with a half dozen different brigades, and that I had not iaquired where or to what particular corps they belonged He inquired of one of his aides if General L was fighting over there on the left; he answered he thought he was. MI[cDowell replied that he would send him help, for he was a good fellow. He then gave the order for a brigade to start, which was all I desired. I dashed in front of them, waved my sword, and cheered them forward. They raised the cheer, and came on at double quick. I soon led them to where they were most needed, and the gallant manner in which they entered the fight, and the rapidity of their fire, soon turned the tide of battle. But this gallant brigade, like many others which had preceded it, found the enemy too strong as they advanced into the forest, and was forced back by the tremendous fire that met them. But one of General Burnside's veteran brigades coming up soon after dark with a battery, again dashed back the tide of armed treason, and sent such a tempest of shot, shell, and leaden death into the dark forrest after the rebels that they did not again renew the attack. Perhaps some mighty cheering which I got our boys to send up about that time induced the rebels to believe that we had received such re-enforcements as to make any further meddling with our lines a rather unhealthy business; feeling certain that the rebels had been completely checked and defeated in their attempts to flank us and drive us from the field, and that we could now securely hold it until morning, by which time we could rally our scattered forces, and bring up sufficient fresh troops to enable us to gain a complete victory on the morrow. I felt certain that the rebels had put forth their mightiest efforts, and were greatly cut up and crippled; I therefore determined to look up my little brigade and bring it forward into position, when we would be ready in the morning to ienew the contest, and renew the great, glorious drama of the war. I left the field about 8 o'clock p. m. in possession of our gallant boys, and with Lieutenants Estie and Niles started back in the darkness, and was greatly surprised, upon coming to where I expected to find my brigade, with thousands of other troops, to find none. I kept on half a mile further, in painful, bewildering doubt and uncertainty, when I found you, general, and first learned from you, with agonizing surprise, that our whole army had been ordered to retreat back across Bull Run to Centreville. Comment is unnecessary. I felt that all the blood, treasure, and labor of our government and people for the last year had been thrown away by that unoirtunate order, and that most probably the death-knell of our glorious government had been sounded by it. The highest praise I can award to the officers and soldiers of my brigade, in all the hard service and fighting through which we have papsed, is, that they have bravely, cheerfully, patiently, and nobly performed their duty. Colonels Cantwell, of the S2d Ohio, and Zeigler, of the 5th Virginia, deserve particular mention for their coolness and bravery in the long and desperate fight of the 29th with the rebels at the railroad. In the' death of Colonel Cantwell the country, as well as his family, have sustained an irreparable loss. No braver man or truer patriot ever lived. He constantly studied the best interests of his soldiers and of the country, and his men loved, REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 9 9 obeyed, and respected him as a father. Truly the loss of such an officer in these trying times is a great calamity. I avail myself of this opportunity to return my thanks to the members of my staff-Captains Baird, Flesher, and McDonald, and Lieutenants Cravens andHopper-for their promptness, bravery, and efficiency in the transmission and execution of orders. Captain Baird, unfortunately, in attempting to return to me on the field on the evening of the 30th, after dark, in company with one of my orderlies-Corporal Wilson, company C, 1st Virginia cavalry-took a wrong path, which led into the enemy's lines, and they were both captured, and are still prisoners. My brigade surgeon, too-Major Daniel Meeker —is always at his post, whether in field of danger, camp, or hospital. His superior science, skill, and patient industry have proved the greatest blessing to our sick and wounded soldiers. Lists of my killed, wounded, and missing have been sent you. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, R. H. MILROY, Brigadier General, Commanding Indcependent Brigade, 1st Corps Army of Virginia. Major T. A. MEYSENBURG, Assistant Adjutant General. No. 12. REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL J. STAHEL. HEADQUARTERS OF FIRST DIVISION OF FIRST ARMY CORPS OF VIRGINIA, Near Centreville, September 1, 1862. SIR: I herewith have the honor to submit to you the report concerning the active participation of the 1st brigade, 1st division, at the battle on the 29th and 30th of August. On the 28th of August, at about dark, I arrived near Robinson's farm and planted Schirmer's battery on the right near the farm, directing its fire into a wood on the right beside the road, as, at the time, heavy infantry fight took place in front of me on the Warrenton turnpike. With the increasing darkness the fire of the battery ceased, and I marched my brigade, which had been in position behind the farm, towards a hill on the left of the farm, where the brigade remained over night, extending its pickets to Young's branch. With break of day, on the 29th, I followed the 2d brigade, 1st division, marching to Dogan's farm, and took position behind the farm. I remained here but a short time, when I received the order to advance on the Warrenton turnpike beyond Groveton. Having advanced about one mile, I received the order to take position on the left of the road, resting with my right wing of the brigade on the road, and wit~h my left wing on the 2d brigade. Here I found a number of dead and wounded soldiers fiom McDowell's corps from the preceding evening, and I had all the possible medical assistance bestowed upon them. Having remained here half an hour, a heavy skirmish took place to our right, and General Milroy sent to Brigadier General Schenck, commanding 1st division, for support. In order to support General Milroy, I left said position and followed the course shown to ie by General'Milroy's orderly. Arriving at Young's branch with my brigade, I reported myself to General Milroy and took my brigade to the left of Milroy's, along Young's branch, where I could prevent the enemy from breaking our lines, and be ready at any time to render assistance to General Milroy. Here I had but little cover for my troops and was very much exposed to the cross fire of the enemy's artillery, in consequence whereof I sustained a loss of several 100 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. dead and wounded. During these prdceedings one of General Stevens's batteries and two regiments were placed behind Groveton's farm to operate against the enemny's batteries. As soon as the battery commenced firing; thereby fully governing all the open ground on the right of the turnpike, and, with the assistance of the two regiments, making it impossible for the enemy to break through at this point, I received orders from General Schenek to take my brigade through a small defile to. the left of the turnpike, on the left of Groveton's farm, taking position on the borders of the woods, resting my right wing on the turnpike, and the 2d brigade joining on the left. Placing the Sth and 27th regiments in fiont, the 45th and 41st regiments in reserve, and two pieces of the mountain howitzer battery on the left wing of my brigade, the skirmishers in front of the brigade oni a small'ill and in Groveton's farm. The enemy kept up a lively artillery fire upon General Stevens's battery planted on our right wing, about 200 paces to the rear, and also upon the woods occupied by us, while the enemy's skirmishers, trying to advance on the road, were warmly received by ours; and as they threw themselves in stronger force against the skirmishers of the 8th regiment, they were received on the top of the hill by a volley of the Sth regiment, whereupon they fell back and ceased firing. As the right wing seemed to have retreated, the brigade redeived the order at about 4 o'clock to move back slowly on the left of the road, and to take position on the chain of hills to the left of Dogan's farm. Having been here but a short time, I received further orders to encamp behind Dogan's farm; in consequence thereof, I marched there, crossing Young's branch and the turnpike, took camp behind the 2d brigade, where we remained over night. On the 30th of August the 1st brigade remained inl position in its camp, about 400 paces behind Dogan's farm, up to 1 o'clock p. m., till I received orders from Majoo r General Sigel to take position on the crescent of the hill by the side of Dogan's fairm. 01n the crescent itself Iplaced, besides two batteries already planted there, Schirmer's battery, and behind the batteries the 45th, 27th, and 8th regiments of my brigade, in the following order: adjoining the farm, the 45th; on the right of it, the 27th; and on the right of this, the 8th regiment, while the 41st regiment was posted on the left of the road. The fight began in the vicinity of Groveton's farm and to the left of it very lively; also, I saw the troops that occupied the heights to my left fall back. The 41st regiment was now ordered in support on the left wing, and later the whole of Colonel Colt's brigade. The 41st regiment.was here attacked by a strong force of the enemy, defending itself with the greatest bravery, and yielded at last only to greatly superior numbers, after having already been flanked on its left, and having sustained a considerable loss of wounded and killed. Still the enemy pressei forward on our left, taking hill after hill, until he had arrived on the road leading from New Market to the Stone House. While the enemy had taken possession of the heights opposite Dogan's farm, I received orders, through Major Meysenburg, assistant adjutant general, to take position further. In consequence thereof; I marched: the 8th and 27th regiments further to their rear, and left the 45th regiment as protection to the batteries of Major General Hooker. Schirmer's battery now took position'on the east side of Dogan's farm, directing its fire upon the opposite deploying column of the enemy's advance from the front. The 45th regiment then took position between the turnpike and Dogan's farm, and has driven the enemy, who attacked from the left flank, back across Young's branch. Towards 6 o'clock the batteries left their position, while the enemy was fired upon by a battery from on the heights behind the Stone House. Now I ordered the 45th regiment back, taking the road across the heights behind the Stone House, where the 45th regiment, as also the 41st regiment have joined the brigade, where the brigade made another stand, and was shortly afterwards joined by Colonel McLean's brigade. Here I learned that General Schenck REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. L01 was wounded, in consequence whereof I took command of the division, transferring the command of the Ist brigade to Colonel Buschbeck. Having taken with the division a position, I ordered that all troops which came back, belonging to different commands, to rally behind the division, and reported myself to iMajor General Sigel, remaining with him till we arrived next morning at Centreville. It affords me the greatest pleasure to be able to report that tile regiments of the 1st brigade, as well as Schirmer's battery, under the command of First Lieutenant Bloom, on both days, fought with the greatest bravery and gallantry. To enumerate all those who distinguished themselves in the battle of the last two days is impossible, but I cannot omit to mention, with great approbation, the gallantry displayed by the following field-officers: Colonel Buschbeck, of the 27th Pennsylvania volunteers; Lieutenant Colonel Cantador, of the- 27th Pennsylvanin, volunteers; Lieutenant Colonel Tkatislaw, commanding 45th New York State volunteers; Lieutenant Colonel Holmstedt, commanding 41st New York State volunteers; Major Von Einsiede, 41st New York State volunteers; Lieutenant Colonel Hedterich, commanding 8th New York State volunteers; Major Pokorny, 8th New York State volunteers. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, JUL. STAHEL, Brig'adier General. Major T.A. MIEY~SENBURG, Assistant Adjutant General. No. 13. llEPORT OF COLONEL N. C. I&cLcEAN, COMt.fANUI)NG BPRIGADIE. HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION. Camp at Centreville, September 1, 1862. GENg[tAL: I have the honor to report, so far as concerning the active participation of the second brigade in the battle of ALugiust 30, as follows: The brigade had been placed in position on the evening of August 29, with the left resting on the Warrenton road, anid remained there until the afternoon of Augnst 30, when, by order, I detailed the 55th Ohio regiment to occupy a position on the left of the Warrenton road, which was pointed out to Colonel Lee by an aid, of General Sigel, the object of which was to keep up a connexion with General Reynolds on my left. A short time after this General Sigel received an order, in my presence, from General Pope, delivered by Colonel Ruggles, to place a battery with a brigade on a bald hill to my left, so as to sustain General Reynolds, and I was immediately ordered by General Sigel to that position with a battery of.four pieces of artillery and the 2d brigade. The order was executed by-placing the battery with the three remaining regiments of the brigade, the 73d Ohio, the 25th Ohio, and the 75th Ohio, in the position indicated, so as to sustain General Reynolds, who then with his right wing joined my left.' Soon after I had taken this position, much to my surprise General Reynolds put his troops in motion and marched entirely past and across my front to the right, to what point I hm not informed. Finding that this movement had entirely exposed my left flank, I immediately changed the position of my troops, -and deployed in line of battle the 73d and 25th Ohio regiments, fionting the west end to the left of the battery, and the 75th and 55th Ohio, then returned 102 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. fiom its former position, on the right of the battery; thus making my line of battle fionting the west, with the battery in the centre and two regiments on each side. I could by this time see the enemy advancing on my front and a little to the right, driving before them a regiment of zouaves. They came on rapidly, when some troops advanced to meet them from behind a hill on my right; these troops were also driven back in confusion, and as soon as they got out of the way I opened upon the enemy with the four pieces of artillery, throwing first shell, and, as they approached nearer, canister; I also commenced a heavy fire with infantry, and in a short time the enemy retreated in great confusion. During this time my attention had been called to a body of troops advancing towards my position in the rear of my left flank, and supposing them to be enemies I gave the order to turn two pieces of artillery upon them, but countermanded it upon the assurance of some one who professed to know the fact that they were our own troops, and I readily believed this as their clothing was dark, and then rested easy, thinking re-enforcements were coming to take position on my left and occupythe place vacated by General Reynolds. I then turned my exclusive attention to the enemy on my front. Soon after this a heavy force of the enemy, much superior to my own, marched out of the woods across the posititon formerly occupied by General Reynolds in front of my left flank, and swept around so as to come in heavy force both on the front and flank of my left wing. This force opened a heavy fire upon the 73d Ohio, and the next moment the troops in my rear, supposed to be friends, also opened fire with musketry and artillery. Overpowered by such superiority in.numbers, after a short time the 73d and 25th fell back over the crest of the hill, but were still exposed to the fire fiom both columns of the enemy. I immediately, when this attack was made, gave the order to change front so as to repel it if possible, but the retreat of the battery at this moment interfered somewhat with the movement, as it passed through the 75th in its retreat. The 55th on my right flank, at the command, wheeled by battalion to the left and came up into line fronting the enemy in fine order, and the other regiments speedily formed on his left, and delivered such a heavy and continuous fire that in a short time the enemy ceased to advance and commenced to fall back; my men followed with cheers, driving the. enemy back rapidly, and would have cleared them from the field but for the fact that the forces permitted to approach our rear had got into such a position as to rake us with grape, canister, and musketry, whilst we were attacked severely in fiont. Under all this, however, my brigade retained the hill until I, myself, gave the order to fall back slowly; this order was given with great reluctance, and only when my attention was called to a heavy force of the enemy approaching to attack us on our then right flank, but former front. I saw that it would but destroy my whole comfmiand to await that attack, and therefore gave the order under which we left the hill. During the course of the action General Schenck, with several regiments, came to my aid, but not until I had changed front. He greatly aided me by his gallant conduct in rallying and cheering on the men until he received the wound which drove him from the field. The loss is smaller than I supposed, under tlhe circumstances, it could possibly be, and I will make a full return upon this point when the particulars are fully ascertained. Both officers and men, with few exceptions, behaved with great gallantry, and had such support been given me as to protect my rear from the terrible attack made upon me fiom that quarter, I could have continued to drive the enemy and successfully resisted his attack. It is impossible in this report to mention the names of all those who distinguished themselves for gallantry, but I cannot refrain from noticing, with great approbation, the great coolness and gallantry displayed by the commanders of the four regiments of the brigade, Colonel Smith, 73d Ohio; Colonel Lee, 55th REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 103 Ohio; Colonel Richardson, 25th Ohio; and Major Reily, 75th Ohio, during the whole engagement. TMy own horse was killed under me during the hottest of the fire. N. C. McLEAN, Colonel Commanding 2d Brigade, 1st Division, 1st Army Corps, Army of Virginia. Brigadier General STAHEL, Commanding 1st Division, 1tit Corps, Army qf Virginia. HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, Camp at Upton Hill, September 17, 1862; GENERAL: I have the honor to report that fate on the afternoon of the 28th of August I came up with the rear of the enemy near Bull Run. After we had reached the hill, which commanded a view of the country around, the enemy placed a battery on another hill at some distance, and appeared to be firing at some troops not in our corps. I immediately placed De Beck's battery in position on a hill to the left, and further in advance, from which we shelled the battery of the enemy until it retired. This closed the firing on our part for the night. On the next day, 29th August, we were, at an early hour, marched forward in line of battle, on the extreme left,. towards the enemy, with whom we were only engaged by our skirmishers. During the whole day we were in line of battle, and often exposed to fire from the artillery of the enemy, but otherwise we were not actively engaged; our position was fiequently changed; sometimes advancing, and sometimes retiring, and expecting momentarily an attack. At one time the division of General Reynolds took position on my left, and advanced a little beyond my front line; but in a short time General Meade informed me that he had placed a battery which he bad been compelled to withdraw on account of the superior force in artillery which had been brought against it, and that the enemy were marching around on our left in such heavy force that he had decided to fall back immediately, and he then marched the troops which had been a little in advance on my left to some point in my rear. I reported the facts to General Schenck, and he then ordered me to fall back a short distance to another position, which was accordingly done. We remained here until near night, when we were placed in the position we occupied until the afternoon of the 30th. The particulars of the battle on that day I have already reported to you. On the night of the 29th we had an alarm which caused me to turn out the brigade and advance them in line of battle a little in advance of our camping ground, and over the crest of the hill upon which our batteries in reserve had been placed in the afternoon. After remaining under arms some two hours, we again returned to camp. Respectfully, N. C. McLEAN, Colonel Commanding 2d Brigade, 1st Division. Major General SIGEL, Commanding 1st Army Corps. No. 14. REPORT OF COLONEL J. C LEE, FIFTY-FIFTH OHIO VOLUNTEERS. HEADQUARTERS FIFTY-FIFTH REGICMENT OHIO VOL. INFANTRY, Camp L'Anglaise, September 3, 1862. I have, sir, in obedience to orders, to report of the 55th regiment Ohio volunteer infantry since its arrival at Rappahannock Station, 21st ultimo, as follows: 104 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERA L POPE. From the 21st to the 29th, inclusive, the regiment was constantly on duty with the brigade, but not actively engaged with the enemy at any time. On the 29th it was much of the day under fire of the enemy's artillery, with serious injury to no one, but with some bruises to several. On Saturday, the 30th, about 12 m., my regiment was separated from the brigade by order of Colonel McLean, and posted as a vidette between (as I supposed) the left of General Schenck's division and the right of General Reynolds, who formed the right of General McDowell's line. My position was assigned me by a member of General Sigel's staff, with instructions as above stated. This position was to the left of Centreville pike, about one hundred rods, the brigade being close to and on the right-hand side. I found a battery on the first ridge on the left and in front of me, and a regiment of infantry to the left and rear of the battery, from me distant 50 rods, with the battalion massed in column, by division, on the eastern slope of the ridge, to protect it from the frequent solid shot of the enemy's artillery. I remained until nearly 3 o'clock p. m. The battalion of infantry then moved to the left and rear, behind the woods on the left, but without communicating with me. Almost simultaneously I saw several battalions of infantry pass by the flank eastwardly, and to the reair of rny position, along the north side of this piece of woods. Musketry was also heard on the south and west side of the woods. I at once despatched Captain Gamtber, with this information, to Colonel McLean, who had moved the balance of the brigade to the ridge in my rear. I also rode rapidly to the retreating forces above mentioned, but could learn nothing more than that the enemy was in the road and advancing. The balls firom the enemy's musketry, yet unseen, began to fall upon us. By order, column was rapidly deployed to the left, and the battalion advanced rapidly forward toward the crest of the hill; but, at the same time, there came over the hill, and passing numerously in our front federal soldiers, driven by the advancing enemy. With this mass pressing against us it was impossible to fire, and, being wholly unsupported, the battalion was faced by the rear rank, and moved rapidly over to the ridge behind us, whein we reformed on the right of the 75th, under Colonel McLean's orders. In this position we fired upon the enemy, who had fully gained the top of the ridge we had left, and from it he fell back. The enemy appearing upon our left flank, the battalion was wheeled to the left, at the same time delivering a destructive fire. An advance was made, and the enemy held at bay for some time, when he fell back, slowly at first, but soon rapidly, into the woods. ThZeirflagfell three times. At thllis the battalion advanced with enthusiastic cheers. The colors were often pierced, but kept up and unfurled. Although the enemy had disappeared from our new front, he appeared in overwhelming numbers upon our new left and new right flanks, and with re-enforcements upon our front. Thus engaged, the fighting continued until Colonel AicLean ordered a withdrawal from the field. With the colors we came off, leaving upon the field dead and wounded, and losing, as prisoners, in numbers as shown in tabular statement herewith submitted. Of the first deployment into line, the falling back to the brigade, the reforming and the change of front, all under a murderous fire of an overwhelming force, I must say that it reflects much credit upon both men and company officers. In justice, I cannot distinguish between officers or soldiers for good behavior; all brave and true. Owing to meagre transportation for the sick, some were picked up by the enemy in the wacke of our several marches, as appears by statement herewith submitted. I have the honor to be your most obedient servant, J. C. LEE, Colomel 55th Reg't Ohio Volunteer iSfantry, Cora'S. Captain E. H LL. AL;N, Actintg Asssitant Adjutant Genzeral. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE 105 Report of casualties in 55th regiment Ohio volunteer infantry in t/~e bat/e at Bull Run, August 30, 1.862. Killed.-Private Silas P. Riley, company A; Private William F. Edwards, company F; Corporal Jacob Fetterman, company D; Corporal William Bellamy and Private Samuel McGuckin, company C; Corporal John B. Conger, Privates William H. Tallman and J. E. Case, company H; Orderly Sergeaint Benjamin F. Welsh, Corporal David Gilliland, and Privates James Henry and John Sohn, company K; Private Henry Troxwell, company G; Corpolnal John Ostien, and Privates John Martin and David Shesely, company B. Wounded. —Sergeant Nelson Crocket and Private William E. Sheffield, company A; Captain Daniel S. Brown, and Privates Levi Smoolk,,Joln Mi!Ierrar and WAesley Lane, company F; Corporal Edward 1E. Shayes, and Priartes William Cromwell, Carl Zenders,; Jacob C. Utz, and Ed. F. Zolek, (liortally,) company D; Corporal Elisha Cole, and.Privates Oscar aminson, (since died,) Bard Randolph, Lucius Babcock, Sebastian Dohra, Oliver B. Johnlson, WT. W. Potter, Jesse Woodruff, and David P. Benson, company 1; Sergeant J ohnl RL Lowe, Corporal David WVrarren, and Privates John W~hite, Lewis Ray, rhonmas J. Harris, William Coultrip, Wilbert Greene, A. Adams, and W. Conell, cornmpany C; Sergeant A. M. Ross, Corporals Dennis Spurnier and -William Negele, and Privates Barney Weigle, Enoch B. Watson, and-cl James P. Boston, company H; Privates Samuel C. Briggs, John Coupe, John W. Saltmuan, Amberxs Pice, and Thomas E. Buckley, compa-ny E; Corporal Samuel Cooper and ri.vates Curtis Hoff, Henry Yager, Henry Vaughn, Levi Kattermanl, Clirles McClary, and Thomas Casick, company K4; First Lieutenant Robert Bromley, (taken prisoner,) Corporals Hermlan F. Neiman (left on:field) and William tH Rogers, and Privates Thomas A. Longstreet, George Downs, and Valentine Denis, compaony G; Sergeant Evan A. Kirkwood, and Privates John lSibsell Horner A. Durfee, Andrew Niglhswander, Albert J. Maurer, John Ienman, James Headley, F. N. Fell, John Wolfiret, Joseph Harris, tJames T. Whidden, and Leonard Doke, company B. Missing.-Privates James Carper, David Warner, land Francis Decker, com — pany F; Corporal Cyrenus D)e Jean, company H; Private John Ferguson, company E; Private Harman Boucher, company K; Corporal Willi"am R. ce.-r and Private Benjamin Harris, company B. Very respectfully, J. C. LEE, Colonel Commanding 55th Reg't Ohio Volunteer Infnantry. Statement of owcers and soldiers who ha.,e fallen into the hands of' the e nemy from the 55th regiment Ohio volunteer infantry. Captured and Paroled.-Corporal Lyman T. Lord and Private Dexter R. Jones, company A, August 28, 1862; Corporal William RP. Gear and Private Benjamin Harris, company B, August 30, 1862; Corporal Theodore HuntL company B, September 1, 1862. tVounded and captured.-Privates William Cromwell and Edward F. Volk, company D, August 30, 1862; Privates Thomas Buckley, Samuel C. Briggs, and John Ferguson, company E, August 30, 1862; Privates David Warner and Francis Decker, company F, August 28, 1862; First Lieutenant Robeer Bromley, and Privates Thomas Longstreet and Frederick Neiman, company (1-, August 30, 1862. 106 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. Wounded, captured, and paroled. —Privates Samuel Camron and James Kinne, company F, captured September 1, 1862, paroled September 2, 1862; Private W. W. Potter, company I, Aug-ust 30, 1862. The above statement contains both those who were captured on the field of battle and on the march. Very respectfully, J. C. LEE, Colonel 55th Reg't O/hio Volunteers, Com'g. No. 15. REPORT'' OF COLONEL ORLAND S3MITH, SEVEN'FY-THIRD OHIO VOLUNTEERS. HEADQUARTERS 73D OHIO VOLUNTEER INFANTRY, Langley, lVirginia, September 5, 1862. COLONEL: I have the honor to report the part taken by the 73d Ohio volunteer infantry in the engagements of Friday and Saturday, August 29 and 30, in the neighborhood of Bull Run. On the 29th, although not actively engaged with the enemy, the regiment was constantly on the field, and in several instances under severe artillery fire, resulting in the wounding of seven persons of my command. The actual fighting service of the regiment during that day was confined to some slight skirmishing between companies A and B and the enemy's sharpshooters. Nevertheless, the frequent changes of position and preparations for action, continuing till a late hour at night, were fatiguing and harassing, taxing not only the patience and endurance of the men, but very frequently their courage. I am happy to report a commendable obedience and promptness on the part of my men of all grades during the entire day, under all circumstances, whether of exposure without opportunity of replying, or of labor under privations of food and drink, without apparent results. On the 30th our position was as a reserve, in close column of companies, on the left of the brigade.'We remained in this position till the middle of the afternoon, when, in obedience to your orders, the brigade was moved to the left, the 73d being in front. I advanced to a considerable distance in the expectation of forming a junction with the forces of General Reynolds, whom I was told we were to support. Not finding any co-operating forces at the point where I had been told they were in position, I formed forward into line as rapidly as possible, and advanced one company (A) to the front, deployed as skirmishers, to observe the movements of the enemy and report. The regiment was scarcely in line before reports came from MIajor Hurst, on the left, that a large force' of the enemy could be distinctly seen advancing on our left flank and rear. Being under the impression that we must be sustained by other forces in that direction, I could not believe it possible that a hostile force could be approaching us from that quarter with impunity, and was not convinced that they were foes till I made a personal observation, resulting in the conviction that they were not only foes, but that they were in numbers sufficient to crush us at the first onset. I immediately despatched Adjutant B. F. Stone to advise you of the danger, and the necessity for prompt preparation to meet the emergency. On his return lie reported that he had been unable to find you, but had communicated the facts to your aide, Lieutenant Morse. In the mean time Captain Buchwalter, of company A, had reported several regiments of the enemy to be filing up a ravine, and approaching us through the woods, directly in front. REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. 107 I immediately ordered the skirmishers to be recalled, and prepared to receive the approaching masses with a well-directed fire, which was done to-my satisfaction. The first volley drove the enemy back, and was very destructive, as I have since learned from some of my men who visited the field on Sunday, 31st. A devastating fire now opened from the lines of the enemy, who had already turned our flank. Our ranks were soon thinned by the overwhelming force to which we were opposed, and being too weak for further effectual resistance, no alternative was left but a retirement. This was accomplished with considerable loss, under a severe cross-fire from front, flank, and rear. In thus falling back the regiment became somewhat scattered, but the men rallied behind a fence in the edge of the wood to which we retired, and poured a well-directed fire upon the advancing foe, retiring again, when too much exposed, to another point in rear, where they were covered by re-enforcements, which had come forward too late, however, to recover the field. Finding further effort, with my thinned ranks, useless, after having made several rallies, combining with my own forces many from other commands, whom I found isolated, I drew off to join you, which I succeeded in doing just before dark, on the ground occupied by the 1st brigade of our division. All officers and men under my command on that day deserved and-won my highest commendation for cheerful obedience and determined resistance, under the most trying circumstances. Where all did well, it would be useless to attempt personal distinctions. I cannot forbear mentioning, however, the able manner in which I was sustained by M1ajor Hurst and Adjutant Stone. The former had his horse shot under him in the early part of the action, after which he rendered efficient service on foot in rallying and steadying the men. Company A, under command of Captain Buchwalter, and company B, under Lieutenant Kinson, are entitled to favorable mention for the skill and promptness with which they responded to the calls for skirmishers on both days. It may not be improper to mention the name of Captain Madeira, of company H, who, at great personal risk, brought off the national color, when both color bearers and the entire color-guard had fallen. I enclose herewith a list of killed, wounded, and missing. The number, compared with the whole strength of the regiment engaged, will show a very large proportion: The whole number taken into action was-......................... 12 Number ascertained to be killed................................ 25 Wounded and recovered...................................... 56 Wounded prisoners paroled, 31 -8....7................... 87 Prisoners not known to be wounded.............................-..- 10 Total killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing................ 148 Very respectfully,' your obedient servant, ORLAND SMITH, Colonel Seventy-third Ohio Volunteer Infantry. Colonel N. C. McLi.ANr, Commanding 2d Brigade, 1st Division, 1st Army Corps. List of killed, wounded, and missing, of the seventy-thircd l'egiment Ohio volunteer infantry, at the battle near Bull Run, August 29, and 30, 1862. Killed.-Joseph Mass and Burton Crider, company A; Sergeants Charles Shepherd and B. F. Morrison, and Corporal J. H. Smith, company B; Isaac Ater, Jesse Lewis, John Godden, George Selby, Asa Harper, and Wm. Clifton, company C; Henry Lockard and John -McKee, company D; Lieutenant Charles W. Trimble, Privates Thomas Biggerstaff, Henry Henson, and Marcus 108 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. Walston; Charles E. Dustin, company F;'Mason Brown, company G; Wmin. Robinson, comnpany H; Sergeant A. R. iHull, John Halterman, and George A. Wilson, company I; Wim. McKinley and James Watts, company K. Total killed, so far as heard fiom, 25. ffounded aind Yrecocn eyred. —Comman-d ing Sergeant Erskine C.arson, staff; Thos. Reedy, Robert M{cKittrick, Thomas Clark, William Clark, Edward Sweet, and A. D. Zehrung, company A; James Lawson and Levi Russell, company B; Second Lieutenant J. C. McKell, Sergeant J. N. Hawkins, Abram Anderson, Peter Brown, Louis Nail, A. S. Watkins, and S. M. Wiley, company'C; Washington Swift, Nathan MlcCarty, and James Chesser, company D; John Dinley, Wesley Hays, John Shoeffers, and Benjamin Sharpe, company E; Edward Welsh, Anthony Aoran, James Crown, John Newman, Patrick De Lany, John Kennedy, and Patrick Hyland, company 1F; Second Lieutenant D. L. G(reiner, Sergeant E. r y. Fnrry, E. Welsheirner, Lewis Painter, J. B. Greiner, W. A. Detty, John Barnett, and John Weekline, company G; Second Lieutenant E. H. ~1iller, Win. M. Page, B. F. Crothers, Henry Leister, J. K. Bennett,; Morris Wilson, Danl. Buckley, Adam Slaughter, John Caveny, Hiram Clay, and William Kelly, company H; Captain L. H. Burkett, (mortally,) J. C. McLean, Amos Ross, and Henry 1M1ader, company I; John Curtis and Henry Wilshire, comnpany 1K. Total wounded and recovered, 56. Trounded and _paroled as prisoners.- Washington Pence, company A; Levi Mliller, Jesse Rickey, and Sergeant J. H. Martin, company B; Ransom Clemcn<, David F. Nixon, W. W. Crow, W-re. R. Farlow, and Ira W. Booten, company C; L Hernry Argobright and John Durham, company D; James'Whalen and David Thompson, company E; Mortimer Kirkpatrick, Sergeant Win. Barnes, Peter Donahoe, 3iichael Norton, and John O'Donnell, company F; Cyrus Ellis, Eli C-raves, Abner De France, John P'. Whellman, Isaiah Smith, and Lieut. Sam. Fellers, company G; First Lieutenant John F. TiMartin, and Frank Thoman, company H; Theo. Jackman and David W. Bonner, company I; Thos. RceKinley, David Armstrong, and Washington Moore, company K. Total wounded prisoners paroled, 31. Prisoners not known to be wzounded.-Franklin Redd, Win.. Adams, andl Paul Sowers, (all paroled,) company C; Frank Knighton, (paroled,) James Ray, and Wilson. Smallwood, company G; Sergeant C. B. Thomson, (paroled,) company H; Anthony Pialmer, Sergeant A. H. Sanders, (paroled,) William Burley, (paroled,) company K. Total known to be prisoners not wounded, 10. Missing. —T-homas Dawson, Jos. De Haven, and Nelson Lowe, company A; Second Lieutenant Joshua Davis, John Warren, Samuel Turner, J. A. AWilson, Win. Cline, A. S. Underwood, I. C. Fisher, and Samuel Allison, company B; Patrick Henry, company C; Amos Holdren, com pany D; Patrick Rogan, John liVcFadden, Martin Boyle, and Michael Harkins, company E; Henry Thacher, Sergeants William M. Burns and W. J. Shepherd, company G; A. MU. Simmons and Win. Dixon, (wounded,) company H; John Dye, Fordyce Wilfred, Benjamin Cooley, and Gaines Wilshire, company K. Total missing, 26. ORLAND SMITH, Colonel Commandiing Seventy-third Ohio Volunteer infant'ry, Colonel N. C. MCLEAN,'Comn.mc;:ndi,; 29d EBri(ade, l.ts Di-vision, Ist Arnzy C(o7ps. RE PORT OF MAJOR GENEIAL POPE. 109 No. 15.4 )REPOt-['P OF L1IU Ii'EN AN Gi.E-GF' JL rA;K NISs, FiP:T OHO Ai l 3'iLEtY. HEADQUARTERS BATTER' ";K," Buffalo Fort,'[i'inia, September 17, 1862. SinR: The following is a correct statement of the doings of this battery fi'ro the Rappahannock to Bull Run: Was in action near Lenry's Ford, August 22, friom 9 a. m. till 1. p. in., when we were relieved by Captain Weidericl's bat;tery, and went to the rear. Staid at Leary's Ford all night, and marched fi'rom there, August 23, towards Sulphur Springs, and camped about one mile from the springs, where we remained. all. night. Was in action near t.he springs, August 24, in the morning. Marched inl the evening towards XWaterloo Bridge, where we remained all night. WXas out of ammunllition thle 25th until 4 p. m., when we opened upon the enemy with two guns as they were leaving their position. Marched at 7 p. m. same day towards Warrenton, where we arrived, after marching all night, the morning of the 26th of August, and remained there all day and the night following. Marlched, August 27, at 6 a. m. eight miles, towards MIanassas, where we stopped all night. lMarched, August 28, towards Bull Run, where we engaged the enemy from about 4 p. nm. till dark, and remained in our position all night. Fighting resumed next morning, August 29, and engaged the enemy until about 11 a. in., when Awe ran out of ammunition, and, not being able to get more, were ordered to the rear, where we remained that and the following day, August 30, until about 5 p. inm.; then were ordered to Centreville by Captain Schirmer, and started for that place at once. Lieutenant H. S. Camp was mortally wounded near Leary's Ford, August 22, and died September 15, in Washington. - GEORGE B13. HASKINS, Lieutenant Commanding Battery "fK," 1st Ohfio Volunteer Artillery. Colonel McLEAn. No. 17. REPORt' OI BR-tGADVAIE[' GENERAL C. SCHURZ. IEADQUARTERS 3D DIVSION,, Camp near Minor's Hill, KSeptember 15, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report concerning the part taken by the division under my command in the battles of the 29th and 30th of August: On the evening of the 28th of August my division was encamped south of the turnpike leading friom Centreville to G(ainesville, near Mrs. Henry's farm. On the 29th, a little after 5 o'clock a. m., you ordered me to cross the turnpike, to aeploy my division north of it, anld to attack the forces of the enemy supposedL to be concealed in the woods immediately in mny fiont, my division forming the right wing of your army corps. In obedience to your order, I formecd my division left in front, and after having forded Young's branch, deployed the 1st brigade, under Colonel Schimmelfening, o1L the right, and the 2d brigade, under Colonel Krzyzanowski, on the left. There was a little farm-house in friont of Colonel Schimmelfening's brigade, which he was ordered to take as a point of direction, and, after having passed it, to bring his right wing a little forward, so as to execute a. converging movement.towards the 2d brigade, and upon the enemy's left flank. The bhattery of the 2d brigade, Captain Itohmes, I ordered to followr the left wing of the brigade and to take position on a rise of 1 10 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPEc ground immediately on the left of a little grove, through which Colonel Krzyzanowski was to pass. The battery attached to Colonel Schimmelfening's brigade was held in reserve. As soon as the two (2) brigades, consisting of three (3) regiments each, had formed four (4) regiments in column by company in the first line, and two (2) in column doubled on the centre, in reserve behind the intervals, the skirmishers advanced rapidly a considerable distance without finding the enemy. Arrived upon open ground, behind the little patches of timber the division had passed through, I received from you the order to connect my line of skirmishers with General Milroy's, on my left. I pushed my left wing rapidly forward into the long stretch of woods before me and found myself obliged to::extend my line considerably in order to establish the connexion with General Milroy, which, however, was soon effected. Hardly had this been done when the fire commenced near the point where General MIilroy's right touched my left. I placed the battery of the 2d brigade upon an elevation of ground about six hundred (600) or seven hundred (700) yards behind the point where that brigade had entered the woods a little to the left, so as to protect the retreat of the regiments composing the left wing, in case they should be forced to fall back. The battery of the 1st brigade remained for the same purpose on high ground behind the woods in which Colonel Schimmelfening was engaged, covering my right. When the fire of the skirmishers had been going on a little while two (2) prisoners were brought to me, sent by Colonel Schimmelfening, who stated that there was a very large force of the enemy, Ewell's and Jackson's divisions, immediately in my front, and about the same time one of Colonel Schimmelfening's aides informed me that heavy columns of troops were seen moving on my right flank, and that it could not be distinguished whether they were Union troops or rebels. I then withdrew the reserve regiment of the 2d brigade, the 54th New York, from the woods, so as to have it at my disposal in an emergency, and ordered Colonel Schimmelfening to form one of his regiments front towards the right, and to send out skirmishers in that direction, so as to ascertain the true condition of things there. Meanwhile the fire in front had extended along the whole line and become very lively, my regiments pushing the enemy vigorously before them about one half mile. The discharges of musketry increased in rapidity and volume as we advanced, andi it soon became evident that the enemy was throwing heavy masses against us. About that time General Steinwehr brought the 29th New York, under Colonel Soest, to my support, and formed it in line of battle on the edge of the roads behind a fence. I then received information that the columns which bhad appeared on my right;, and which really seemed to have belonged to the enemy, had disappeared again in the woods without meking any demonstration, and also that General Kearney's troops were coming up in my rear. Thus reassured about the safety of my right, and expecting more serious business in the centre, I sent the 54th New York forward again with the order to fill up the gap between my two brigades, occasioned by the extension of my line towards General Milroy's right. The 29th New York remained in reserve. Immediately afterwards the enemy began to press my centre so severely that it gave way, but we soon rallied it again, and after a sharp contest reoccupied the ground previously taken from the enemy. It was about 10 o'clock a. m. when an officer announced to me that General Kearney had arrived on the battle-field and desired to see me. General Kearney requested me to shorten my fiont and condense my line by drawing my right nearer to the left, so as to make room for him on the right. I gave my orders to Colonel Schimmelfening accordingly. A short time afterwards I discovered that two small regiments, sent to my support, had slipped in between my two brigades and were occupying part of my line in the woods. General IKearney was just moving up his, troops on nmy right when the enemy made another furious charge upon my centre. The two regiments above mentioned, as well as the 54th New York, broke, and were thrown out of the -woods REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE, 111 in disorder, the enemy advancing rapidly and in great force to the edge of the forest. The 29th New York poured several volleys into them, checking the pursuit of the enemy only for a moment, and then fell back in good order. The moment was critical. While endeavoring to rally my men again I sent orders to tihe battery of the 2d brigade, which I had placed in position in the rear of my left wing, to open fire upon the enemy who threatened to come out of the woods. This was done with very good effect, and the enemy was brought to a stand almost instantaneously. Meanwhile I succeeded in forming the 54th New York again, whose commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ashby, displayed much courage and determination, and placed it en echelon behind the 29th New York, which advanced in splendid style upon the enemy in our centre. My extreme right, under Colonel Schimmelfening, had stood firm, with the exception of the 8th Virginia, awhile the extreme left, under Colonel Krzyzanowski, had contended every inch of ground against the heavy pressure of. a greatly superior force. The conduct of the 75th Pennsylvania, which displayed the greatest firmness and preserved perfect order on that occasion, deploying and firing' with the utmost regularity, deserves special praise. The 29th New York and the 54th New York had just re-entered the woods when one of your aides presented to me, for perusal, a letter which you had addressed to General Kearney, requesting him to attack at once with his whole force, as the rebel general, Longstreet, who was expected to re-enforce the enemy during the day, had not yet arrived upon the battle-field, and we might hope to gain decisive advantages before his arrival. I then ordered a general advance of my whole line, which was executed with great gallantry, the enemy yielding: everywhere before us. In this charge the 29th New York distinguished itself by its firmness and intrepidity. Its commander, Colonel Soest, while setting a noble example to his men, was wounded and compelled to leave the field. On my right, however, where General Kearney had taken position, all remained quiet; and it became clear to me that he had not followed your request to attack simultaneously with me. I am persuaded, if General Kearney had done at that moment what he did so gallantly late in the afternoon-that is to say, if he had thrown his column upon the enemy's left flank, enveloping the latter by a change of direction to the left-we might have succeeded in destroying the enemy's left wing, and thus gained decisive results before General Longstreet's. arrival. As it was, I advanced and attacked alone. The fight came to a stand on my left, at an old railroad embankment running through the woods in a direction almost parallel to our fiont. From behind this cover the enemy poured a rapid and destructive fire into our infantry, who returned volley for volley. Colonel Schimmelfening's brigade, on my right, gained possession of this embankment, and advanced even beyond it, but found itself obliged, by a very severe artillery and infantry fire, to fall back. But the embankment remained in its possession. While this was going on the battery of the 1st brigade, under Captain Hampton, was ordered to march along the outer edge of the woods in which Colonel Schimmelfening was engaged, and to take position there, in order to protect and faciltate the advance of my right; but the cross-fire of two of the enemy's batteries was so severe that Captain Hampton's battery failed, in two successive attempts, to establish itself until I sent Captain Rohmer's battery to its support, the place of the latter being filled by a battery brought from the reserve by General Steinwehr. At this juncture you put two pieces of the mountain howitzer battery at my disposal. I ordered Major Koenig, of the 68th New York, (temporarily attached to my staff,) to bring them forward, and.he succeeded in placing them into the line of skirmishers, of Colonel Krzyzanowski's brigade, in so advantageous a position that a few discharges sufficed to cause a backward movement of the enemy in front of my left. Now the whole line advanced with great alacrity, ;1 2 REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE. and we succeeded in driving the, enemy away from his strong position, behind the embankment, when they fell into our hands on my left also. While this was going on I heard, from time to time, very heavy firing on my left, where General Milroy stood. The sound of the musketry was swaying forward and backward, indicating' that the fight was carried on with alternate success. Thle connexion of may., left with General Milroy's right was lost, an1d I foundl my left uncovered. However, we succeeded in holding the position of the railroad embankment along my whole front, against the repeated attacks of the einemy, until about two (2) o'clock p. mn., when my troops, who had started at five (5) o'clock in the morning, mostly without breakfast, had been under fire for eight (8) hours, had been decimated by enormous losses, and had exhausted nearly all their ammunition, were relieved by a number of regiments kindly sent by G-eneral for that purpose. These re-enforcements arrived in my front between one and two o'clock. According to your order, I withdrew my regiments, one after another-, as their places were filled by those of General Hooker. rrThus the possession of that portion of the woods, which my division had' ttken and held, was in good order delivered to the troops that relieved me. I rallied my two brigades behind the hill on which the battery of the 2d brigade had been iii position. Here the men took a new supply of ammunition, and for the firsft time on that day they received something to eat. From there you ordered ine to take position in the woods on the right of the open ground, where we encamped for the night. The two mountain howitzers, which had done such excellent service in the contest in the woods, I had left in position to co-operate with the troops who relieved me, and I am sorry to report that one of them was lost when these troops vere temporarily driven back from the ground, the possessiou of which we had delivered to them. Exhausted and -worn down as my men were, my division w