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THE INTIMATE
COLONEL


PAPERS OF
HOUSE


BEHIND THE POLITICAL CURTAIN
1912-1915
'House longed to get good accomplished and
was content that others should have the credit.'
VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON












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THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF


COLONEL HOUSE
Arranged as a Narrative
BY
CHARLES SEYMOUR
Sterling Professor of History, Yale University
T
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BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
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1926




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COPYRIGHT, 1926, BY HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED


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CAMBRIDGE. MASSACHUSETTS
PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.




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TO
SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES








PREFATORY NOTE
BY COLONEL HOUSE
THIS book written around my papers is in no sense a conventional apologia such as, despite my best intentions, I should
probably have written had I attempted to describe the stirring and controversial events in which it was my fortune to
play a part. The reader must bear in mind that it treats
only of such matters as came within the orbit of my own
activities. The President and his Cabinet dealt with many
questions which could not enter into this narrative. My
chief desire has been to let the papers tell their own story,
and for this reason I have preferred to leave their arrangement in the hands of an historian.
Dr. Seymour in arranging these papers has felt it his duty
to assume a highly critical attitude toward some of the chief
actors. Especially he has attempted to present the great
central figure of the period, Woodrow Wilson, in a purely
objective light. As for myself, I frankly admit that I was
and am a partisan of Woodrow Wilson, and of the measures
he so ably and eloquently advocated. That we differed now
and then as to the methods by which these measures might
be realized, this book reveals as one follows the thread of the
story, and never more sharply than in the question of military and naval preparedness.
The President, I believed, represented the opinion prevailing in the country at large, apart from the Atlantic seaboard;
and I was not certain, had he advocated the training of a large
army, Congress would have sustained him. But I was sure,
given a large and efficient army and navy, the United States
would have become the arbiter of peace and probably without the loss of a single life. When the President became
convinced that it was necessary to have a large navy, Congress readily yielded to his wishes. But, even so, it is not




viii


PREFATORY NOTE


certain that had he asked for such an army as I advocated
he would have been successful. The two arms do not hang
together on even terms, for the building of a great army
touches every nerve centre of the nation, social and economic,
and raises questions and antagonisms which could never
come to the fore over a large navy programme.
In my opinion, it ill serves so great a man as Woodrow
Wilson for his friends, in mistaken zeal, to claim for him
impeccability. He had his shortcomings, even as other men,
and having them but gives him the more character and
virility. As I saw him at the time and as I see him in
retrospect, his chief defect was temperamental. His prejudices were strong and oftentimes clouded his judgments.
But, by and large, he was what the head of a state should
be - intelligent, honest, and courageous. Happy the nation
fortunate enough to have a Woodrow Wilson to lead it
through dark and tempestuous days!
Much as he accomplished, much as he commended himself to the gratitude and admiration of mankind, by some
strange turn of fate his bitterest enemies have done more
than his best friends to assure his undying fame. Had the
Versailles Treaty gone through the United States Senate as
written and without question, Woodrow Wilson would have
been but one of many to share in the imperishable glory of
the League of Nations. But the fight which he was forced to
make for it, and the world-wide proportions which this
warfare assumed, gradually forced Woodrow Wilson to the
forefront of the battle, and it was around his heroic figure
that it raged. While he went down in defeat in his own
country, an unprejudiced world begins to see and appreciate
the magnitude of the conception and its service to mankind. The League of Nations and the name of Woodrow
Wilson have become inseparable, and his enemies have helped
to build to his memory the noblest monument ever erected
to a son of man.




NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT


SOME three and a half years ago Colonel House gave to Yale
University, for deposit in the University Library, his entire
collection of political papers. For permission to select and
publish the most significant of these, I myself and all students of recent history are deeply in his debt. The responsibility for the choice and arrangement of these papers, as well
as their interpretation, must rest upon me. Colonel House,
whose sense of the scientific historical spirit is very lively,
agreed that no essential document which might affect the
historicity of the narrative should be omitted. Whatever
deletions appear in the published papers have been dictated
by the exigencies of space or by a regard for the feelings of
persons still alive, and in no case do they alter the historical
meaning of the papers.
The comment and advice of Colonel House have been invaluable. He has carefully avoided, however, any insistence
upon his personal point of view, at the same time that he has
offered priceless aid in throwing light upon innumerable
aspects of the political story which would otherwise have
remained obscure. For the time and interest and freedom
which he has given me I am profoundly grateful. It is a rare
privilege for the historian that his documentary material
should be explained by the chief actor in the drama. I am
indebted also, and beyond measure, to Colonel House's
brother-in-law, President Sidney E. Mezes, and to his secretary, Miss Frances B. Denton, for constant assistance and
criticism. They have read the manuscript and proof, and by
reason of their intimate first-hand knowledge of the events
concerned, they have corrected many misinterpretations.
My gratitude must also be expressed for the help given by
many of those who themselves played an important political




X


NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT


role during the past thirteen years; they have been willing to
discuss freely the history of that period and to permit me to
publish their letters. I would mention Ambassador James
W. Gerard, Ambassador Brand Whitlock, Ambassador H. C.
Wallace, Attorney-General T. W. Gregory, PostmasterGeneral A. S. Burleson, Mr. Frank L. Polk, Mr. Vance
McCormick, Mr. John Hays Hammond, Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, Viscount Grey of Fallodon, the Earl of Balfour, Mr.
Lloyd George, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Sir Horace Plunkett,
Sir William Tyrrell, Mr. H. Wickham Steed, Mr. J. A.
Spender, Sir William Wiseman, M. Georges Clemenceau,
M. Ignace Paderewski. All of these came into close touch
with Colonel House, and the personal and political sidelights
which they have thrown upon him have been of inestimable
value.
The volumes owe much to those who have cordially permitted the publication of letters now in the House Collection
of the Yale University Library. I take pleasure in thanking
Mrs. Walter Hines Page, Mrs. Thomas Lindsay, Mrs.
Franklin K. Lane, Lady Spring-Rice, Mrs. William Jennings
Bryan, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Secretary of the
Treasury William G. McAdoo, Secretary of Agriculture
David F. Houston, Justice James C. McReynolds, President Charles W. Eliot, Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey, Mr. A. H.
Frazier, Mr. E. S. Martin, Mr. George Foster Peabody, Mr.
James Speyer.
In the arrangement of the papers and their interpretation
I have made constant use of the numerous letters from President Wilson to Colonel House now deposited in the House
Collection. It seemed wise to the literary legatee of the
President not to grant permission to publish these letters
textually; something of the personal attractiveness of Mr.
Wilson has thus been lost. But the sense of the letters, setting forth his intimate feelings and policies, has been freely
translated into the pages which follow. A list of the letters




NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT


xi


which I have thus utilized is appended(/ None of them have
beef published; many of them were typed by the President
himself without a copy being made, often in the private code
used only by Colonel House and himself.
To the authorities of Yale University who have provided
facilities for the care of the House Collection and to the staff
of the University Library, especially the Librarian, Mr.
Andrew Keogh, I would express warmest gratitude, as well
as to those alumni of Yale who by financial assistance have
made possible the filing and organization of documents given
by Colonel House and others. I am indebted in particular to
my assistant in the curatorship of the House Collection, Miss
Helen M. Reynolds; every page of these volumes bears witness to the devoted effort she has expended upon the construction of the manuscript, the verification of references,
and the correction of proof. Finally I must acknowledge the
constant encouragement and practical assistance of my wife
in the large task of selecting the most significant documents
and arranging them so as to make a coherent narrative.
C.S.
YALE UNIVERSITY
January -1, 1926
1 See page xv.








LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE
Utilized for the period, October 1911-March 1917


DATE


SUBJECT


1911
October  18 Wilson's party regularity.
24 Desirability of abolishing two-thirds rule in National
Democratic Convention.
December 4 Engagement to dine with House and Dr. Houston.
22 Pre-Convention campaign organization.
26 Pre-Convention campaign organization.


1912
January
February
March


May
June
July
August
September
November
December
1913
January
February
May


4 Personal. Bryan's attitude.
27 Personal.
6 Personal.
14 Personal.
15 Pre-Convention outlook. Political strength of Champ
Clark, Underwood, Harmon.
6 House's political organization in Texas.
29 Personal. [Telegram.]
9 Plans for Baltimore Convention.
24 Convention organization.
17 Plan of electoral campaign.
22 Plan of electoral campaign.
31 Plan of electoral campaign.
11 McCombs' possible resignation as National Democratic
Chairman.
7 Comment on result of election. Gratitude for House's
services.
30 Personal. House's Washington visit for study of Cabinet material.
3 Personal. House's Washington visit.
6 Discussion of Cabinet material.
23 Discussion of Cabinet material.
5 Cabinet appointments.
7 Cabinet appointments.
9 New York appointments.
17 Federal Reserve Bill.
20 Personal. [Telegram.]
17 Personal. [Telegram.]


July




xiv LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE


DATE


SUBJECT


1913
September 4 Personal.
18 Massachusetts appointments.
26 Request for House's help in personal matter.
29 Personal.
October   17 One Hundredth Anniversary of peace among Englishspeaking peoples.
November 5 Mexico.
December 9 Message to Congress.
27 Personal.


1914
January    3
6
9
28
30
February 16
18
25
March      7
30
April      2
May       2
15
June      16
22
26
July       9
August     3
4
5
6
6
17
18
25
27
September 8
16
17
19


Trusts.
Trust Message. [Telegram.]
Federal Reserve Board appointments.
Panama Canal Zone.
Personal. [Telegram.]
Federal Reserve Board appointments.
Federal Reserve Board appointments.
Federal Reserve Board appointments. Mexican situation.
Federal Reserve Board appointments.
Federal Reserve Board appointments.
Federal Reserve Board appointments.
Federal Reserve Board appointments.
Departure of House for Europe.
House's mission in Europe.
French proposal for revision of commercial treaty between France and the United States. Mediation between the United States and Mexico.
House's mission in Europe.
Endorsement of House's mission.
Situation in Europe.
Mediation in European War. [Telegram.]
Mediation in European War.
Mediation in European War. Shipping Bill.
Mrs. Wilson's death. [Telegram.]
Personal.
Personal.
Attitude toward European War.
Personal. [Telegram.]
Approval of House's letters to Zimmermann and Ambassador W. H. Page.
Approval of House's suggestion on taxes.
Appointments.
Approval of House's negotiations with Bernstorff.
[Telegram.]




LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE


XV


DATE
1914
October   10
16
19
22
23
29
November 2
December   1
2
9
14
16
22
25
26
26
28
28
31




SUBJECT


Negotiations for purchase of cotton.
Negotiations for purchase of cotton.
Appointments.
Personal.
Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page.
Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page.
Personal. [Telegram.]
Presidential Message. Belgian relief.
Foreign relations.
Presidential Message.
Personal.
Personal. [Telegram.]
Personal. [Telegram.]
Personal.
Industrial relations. [Telegram.]
Trade Commission.
Personal.
Personal. [Telegram.]
Personal. [Telegram.]


1915
January   5 Approval of House's letter to Zimmermann.
6 Appointments.
7 Federal employment bureau.
11 Personal.
16 Mediation in European War.
17 Personal. [Telegram.]
28 Situation in Germany.
29 Personal. [Telegram.]
29 Purpose of House's European mission.
February 13 House's negotiations in England. Note to the Allies.
[Cablegram.]
15 Gerard's information on situation in Germany. [Cablegram.]
20 Relations with Great Britain. [Cablegram.]
25 House's negotiations. [Cablegram.]
March      1 Conditions in Germany. [Cablegram.]
8 House's negotiations. [Cablegram.]
23 British Order in Council. [Cablegram.]
April     2 Approval of House's negotiations. [Cablegram.]
15 Messages to President and Foreign Minister of France.
[Cablegram.]
22 Pan-American Pact. [Cablegram.]
May      - British blockade. [Cablegram.]
4 Sinking of Gulflight. [Cablegram.]
5 British blockade. [Cablegram.]




xvi LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE
DATE                  SUBJECT
1915
May       16 Possible compromise between British blockade and
German submarine warfare. [Cablegram.]
18 British blockade. [Cablegram.]
20 Possible compromise between British blockade and German submarine warfare. [Cablegram.]
23 British blockade. [Cablegram.]
26 British blockade. [Cablegram.]
June       1 House's return. [Cablegram.]
20 Personal. Wilson planning visit to House. [Telegram.]
22 Wilson's visit to House. [Telegram.]
July       3 Mexico. [Telegram.]
3 Mexico.
7 Mexico.
12 Counsellorship of State Department. Note to Germany.
14 Strained relations with Germany.
19 Contraband and cotton.
20 British blockade.
22 Contraband and cotton.
27 Counsellorship of State Department. British blockade.
29 British blockade. Bernstorff.
August     4 Appointments.
4 Mexico.
4 German plots.
5 Contraband and cotton.
7 Contraband and cotton.
21 Asking for advice on Arabic case. Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page.
25 Bernstorff. German plots.
31 Personal.
31 Arabic crisis. Federal Reserve Board.
September 7 Austrian plots. Sinking of Hesperian.
20 Bernstorff. Arabic crisis.
27 Bernstorff. Arabic crisis.
29 Personal.
October    4 Personal.
4 Armed merchantmen controversy.
18 Possible offer of help to Allies.
18 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page.
29 Personal.
November 10 Possibilities of peace. Domestic politics.
11 House's messages to Grey. [Telegram.]
12 Conditions in Germany. Sinking of Ancona.
17 House's mission to Europe.
24 British and German Ambassadors in Washington.
House's mission to Europe.




LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE                       xvii
DATE                  SUBJECT
1916
January    9 Assurance of American cooperation in policy seeking to
bring about and maintain permanent peace. [Cablegram.]
12 The Senate and British blockade. [Cablegram.]
13 Approval of House's negotiations. [Cablegram.]
February  16 Armed merchantmen. [Cablegram.]
March      3 Personal. [Telegram.]
20 Gerard's report from Germany.
April     15 Appointments. [Telegram.]
21 Sussex crisis.
22 Sussex crisis. Domestic politics.
29 Sussex crisis. [Telegram.]
May        5 Sussex crisis. [Telegram.]
8 Relations with Great Britain.
9 Possibility of peace.
16 Offer of help to Allies. British blockade.
17 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page.
17 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee.
18 Offer of help to Allies. Relations with Great Britain.
18 Request for advice on speech before League to Enforce
Peace.
22 Relations with Allies. Request for material for speech.
Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee.
29 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee.
June       6 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee.
10 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee.
11 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee.
[Telegram.]
22 European situation. Mexico. Plan for electoral campaign.
July       2 Relations with England. Appointments. Electoral
campaign.
23 British Blacklist.
27 Relations with Great Britain.
September 20 Personal.
29 Electoral campaign.
October   10 Relations with Great Britain.
24 Electoral campaign.
30 Madison Square rally.
November 6 Personal.
21 Drafting of note calling on belligerents to state terms of
peace.
24 Relations with Germany. Attitude of Ambassador
W. H. Page.
25 Peace note.
December 3 Peace note.




xviii LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE


DATE
1916
December
1917


SUBJECT


4
8
19
27


Personal.
House's information from England.
Peace note.
Attempt to secure confidential peace terms from Germany.




January   16 Drafting of speech on peace terms before the Senate.
17 House's negotiations with Bernstorff.
19 House's negotiations with Bernstorff. Speech before
the Senate.
24 House's negotiations with Bernstorff.
February 12 Refusal to consider coalition government.




CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. BACKGROUNDS (1858-1911)                              8
War and Reconstruction in the South —House in
School and College - Frontier Life and Friends in Texas
- Political Beginnings - State Electoral Campaigns -
The Governors' Adviser - National Campaigns - Enter Wilson.
III. BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP                          44
First Impressions of Woodrow Wilson - The Pre-Nomination Campaign - Persuading Mr. Bryan - Organizing Texas - The Threat of Champ Clark - The Baltimore Convention - Wilson Nominated - Discords
among the Democrats- McCombs and McAdoo -
Soothing the Tammany Tiger - Captain Bill McDonald
- Democratic Victory.
IV. BUILDING A CABINET                                  83
'Every one wants something' - Sifting the Possibilities
-House Refuses a Cabinet Post —The Aloofness of
Wilson - A Visit with Mr. Bryan - Offers and Refusals
- The Final Slate.
V. THE SILENT PARTNER                                 114
Relations of House and Wilson —'Mr. House is my
second self' — Wilsonian Tabletalk -The Visits of a
President - Defects of Wilson as seen by House - The
Colonel as a Political Buffer - A Recipient of Criticism
- Relations with the Cabinet - Problems of Appointments and Local Politics.
VI. THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK                     151
The Radicalism of Colonel House —'Philip Dru': its
Composition and Significance - Legislative Problems of
the Wilson Administration - Colonel House and Currency Reform - Drafting the Federal Reserve ActMaking up the Federal Reserve Board - Results of the
First Legislative Session: 'A great exhibition of leadership.'




xx                      CONTENTS
VII. ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY                            176
Problems of Diplomatic Appointments -The Ambassadorship to St. James's - Colonel House as Confidant
of Ambassadors - His Conception of a Positive Foreign
Policy - Relations with Great Britain - Panama Tolls
Exemption - Mexico - Clearing the Ground with Sir
Edward Grey - The Visit of Sir William Tyrrell - An
Informal Understanding - Repeal of the Tolls Exemption.
VIII. A PAN-AMERICAN PACT                                  207
House Urges Need of Close Understanding with South
American States - First Draft of Proposed Pact - Conversations with Naon, da Gama, Suarez - Approval, in
Principle, of A.B.C. Powers-Joint Action Regarding
Mexico —Development of the Pact- Difficulties and
Delays - Lapse of Negotiations - Historical Significance of the Attempt.
IX. THE GREAT ADVENTURE                                  235
Heavy Clouds in Europe - House's Sense of American
Interest and Responsibility - A Scheme to Meet the
Danger - An Extraordinary Mission - Atmosphere in
Germany - The Talk with the Kaiser - Planning
Peace with the British - The Murder of the Archduke
- Colonel House's Letter to the Kaiser - Failure.
X. WILSON AND THE WAR                                   276
Outbreak of the Conflagration - The Question of American Mediation - President Eliot's Suggestion of Intervention- The Sympathies of Wilson- House Urges
Military Preparation - Allied Interference with American Trade - Difficulties with the British - Page and
Spring-Rice.
XI. PLANS OF MEDIATION                                   318
The Military Situation in Europe - German Defeat on
the Marne - Overtures of Bernstorff - Discussions
with Spring-Rice - Letters from Page and Gerard -
Growth of Feeling against United States in Belligerent
Countries - Sir Edward Grey on the Attitude of American Government-Wilson Decides to Send House to
Europe.
XII. A QUEST FOR PEACE                                    359
House Sails on the Lusitania - First Conferences with
Grey and Asquith - The German Submarine Threat -
Suggestion of 'The Freedom of the Seas' - Discourag



CONTENTS                           xxi
ing News from Germany - A Talk with the King -
The Personal Contacts of House-War-Time London
- Decision to go on to Germany.
XIII. THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS                               395
Paris - Interview with Delcasse - Aspirations of
France - Berlin -'Everybody seems to want peace,
but nobody is willing to concede enough to get it' —
Feeling against America - House Suggests Freedom of
the Seas - Its Significance - Bethmann and Zimmermann - Return to Paris - Poincare - London again -
Conferences with Grey - Sinking of the Lusitania.
XIV. SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE                              433
House's Advice to Wilson - Lord Kitchener on American Participation - Wilson's Note to Germany - A
Suggestion of Compromise between German Submarine
and Allied Blockade - Grey Approves Compromise -
Germany Refuses —Effect of Allied Restrictions on
American Commerce -House Explains the DangerConferences with Lloyd George, Bryce, Balfour, Crewe
- House Returns to America - Results of Mission.




I




ILLUSTRATIONS


THE PRESIDENT AND COLONEL HOUSE, NEW YORK, 1915
From a snapshot                Photogravure frontispiece
'COME ON, NOW! GIMME THE OPENER!'                 2
Cartoon in the Montgomery (Ala.) Advertiser, April 14, 1916
'SH!'                                             7
Cartoon in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
E. M. H. AND MAMMY ELIZA                         12
Taken in Bath, England
T. W. HOUSE, FATHER OF EDWARD M. HOUSE           18
THREE TEXAS GOVERNORS: CHARLES A. CULBERSON,
JOSEPH D. SAYERS, JAMES S. HOGG                36
THREE TEXAS CABINET-MEMBERS: ALBERT S. BURLESON,
DAVID F. HOUSTON, THOMAS W. GREGORY            142
SIR EDWARD GREY                                 260
With autograph
SIR WILLIAM TYRRELL                             368
THE PRESIDENT AND COLONEL HOUSE OFF DUTY        468




II




THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF
COLONEL HOUSE








THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF


COLONEL HOUSE
*  *
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I look forward now to your book. It is, I hope, books like yours and
mine that will bring people to reflect soberly upon the war. If so we
shall be helping to form a public opinion that will make for peace.
Viscount Grey of Fallodon to House, October 16, 1925
THE practice of interring historical documents in securely
locked archives, where they may lie forgotten until popular
interest in the period evaporates, has much to be said for it.
It prevents their use for partisan political purposes; it
protects the sensibilities of those political leaders whose role,
viewed at close range, may have been less heroic than the
public imagined; it guarantees, through the lapse of time,
the growth of that magical touchstone, 'historical perspective,' which supposedly eliminates bias and ensures the truth.
Unfortunately, if the materials of real history are absent
those of legend replace them. 'History,' said Voltaire, 'is a
fable which men have agreed upon.' And one may ask
whether it is not the duty of the historian to establish the
facts before the fable has crystallized, and the duty of whoever possesses the documents to make them available to the
historian at the earliest possible moment. The argument is
the stronger if we accept the view that mankind learns from
its past. Granting that a lesson of value is to be secured
from history, surely our own generation has a right to insist
that its benefits ought not be reserved for the unborn of the
future. If the inner history of the decade which saw Europe
caught in the horror of war and its aftermath can help us to
avoid another such disaster, the disadvantages of keeping




2 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


that history in cold storage until the twenty-first century
are apparent.
Such thoughts may have crossed the mind of Colonel
House when he determined to have published sufficient of
his papers to elucidate what he regarded as the true story of
the decisive years in which he played a r6le of major political
importance. A newspaper cartoon of 1916 represents the
Muse of History (rather a frowsy Clio, to be sure, bespectacled and distraught) presenting a tightly corked bottle
labelled Foreign Policy to a silent and impassive Colonel
House, and in desperation demanding the opener. After the
lapse of a decade, the Colonel has produced it.
The anxiety of the Historical Muse is comprehensible as
the student pores over the pile of papers which indicate the
extent and variety of the personal and political contacts that
House established. Here are great sheaves of letters from
the European statesmen of the war period - Grey, Balfour,
Bryce, Lloyd George, Plunkett, Reading, Briand, Clemenceau, Zimmermann, Bernstorff, Spring-Rice - with the
Colonel's replies; yet more extensive files of his correspondence with the American Ambassadors in the capitals of
Europe - the Pages, Gerard, Sharp, Penfield, Whitlock,
Willard; letters to and from the members of Mr. Wilson's
Cabinet, covering the details of appointments and departmental policy; and finally the eight years' series of correspondence with the President himself, intimate and affectionate, which explains the origin and development of
Wilsonian policies, domestic and foreign, from the beginning of Wilson's race for the Presidency in 1911 until the
Peace Conference of Paris in 1919.
As he sorts the dusty files, the curious investigator finds
himself introduced into the very penetralia of politics -
the making of a Cabinet, the origins of currency reform, the
American attempt to prevent the World War, American
offers to help the Allies made and refused, the intimate




i...........................::.! i*Xi iiiii:i-::i:i i  i:'::  --.   i  b i -. *  i..-.i*-                w -  ii.  *  i.  -.. i
~..t  t..
g:.1-!:                         i
From  the Montgomery (Ala.) Advertiser, April 14, 1 9 I 6
(F.
i.-: ~: ~:.V.:.








INTRODUCTION


3


details of American cooperation in the war, in the Armistice
and in the Peace Conference; he sees at close range, the
President himself, Bernstorff and the Kaiser, the European
Premiers and Foreign Ministers, American Ambassadors
and Cabinet members.
If it had not been for an aid of exceptional character, the
preservation of these papers would have been difficult or
impossible. Fortunately House possessed in Miss Frances B.
Denton, the daughter of an old friend, an assistant who was
more collaborator than confidential secretary, and one whose
role proved to be of increasing importance. In the midst
of the negotiations which Colonel House carried on with
Cabinets and potentates, she found time to gather and file
the material without which the story could never have been
told. She combined the discretion and tact demanded by
House's diplomatic activities with an instinct for the
preservation of documents that will always endear her to
historians. 'She has not only kept the record,' wrote House
in 1916, 'but has kept the faith and with an enduring loyalty
and self-abnegation.'
Through Miss Denton was made possible the diary which
forms the heart of the entire collection of papers. Every
evening, with rare exceptions and during eight years,
Colonel House dictated to her his resume of the events of
the day. Definitely and objectively he related his conversations with, often the very words of, his political associates,
and he was associated with the men who made the history
of the decade. The result is a journal of more than two
thousand pages, a record drafted at the moment and with a
frankness which suggests that it was not designed for publication. It has the Colonel's comments on men and events,
opinions which he sometimes changed, prophecies which
upon occasion were fulfilled and again remained unfulfilled,
a personal document such as the biographer dreams of
and seldom discovers.




4 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Upon the basis of such papers and his recollections,
Colonel House might have written the conventional 'Memoirs,' which too often confuse the after-impression with the
event itself, but which, through the possession of hindsight,
preserve the author from ever having committed an error.
Instead, he chose to let the papers tell their own story and
permit the reader to decide whether or not the Colonel was
right in this incident and in that. If there is prejudice in the
pages that follow - and what historical narrative is innocent of prejudice? - it is that of the man who, after many
months of arranging the papers so as to let them make a
story, came to see events through the eyes of Colonel House
himself. But at no time was a chapter begun under the
influence of a preconceived thesis, and nothing could have
been more exciting than to watch the behavior of the chief
figures as each chapter took form; in this they did well, in
that they were disappointing.
An objective narrative, such as the documents themselves
recount, was the more necessary in view of the paucity of
published information touching the career and accomplishments of Colonel House. There are few, if any, instances of
men exercising so much political influence about whom so
little was known. The personal story of a man holding
public office must needs become public property. A searchlight is immediately turned upon his past career. The press
will have it so and, if skilfully utilized, political propaganda
of value may conceivably be developed from it. Since we
demand of our public personages a certain blameless rectitude of conduct, without which one is ill-advised to seek
office, the subject of inquiry, even though he may never have
accomplished anything of note, is generally well pleased
with the conventions of political advertising designed to
engage the interest of the voters.
With Colonel House it was bound to be otherwise. He
sought no office for himself - in itself a peculiarity and one




INTRODUCTION5


5


that would naturally puzzle opinion - nor did he seek
office for his friends. His methods and purposes were quite
different from those of the party boss, for he never worked
through a 'machine'; he disliked the details of party politics,
and in later years he generally managed to evade them. He
aimed certainly at influencing political events, as the sequel
will show, but he accomplished his aim through personal
influence very different from that of the orthodox politician.
The story of how he acquired such influence is the explanation of his success, and to understand it we must read his
political papers. But it is easy to comprehend at first
glance that to him conventional political advertisement
could bring no profit and might bring much harm. He
strove constantly to stifle the public adulation that zealous
press agents sought to inspire, and he was careful to bring
it about that credit for this or that measure in which he
was interested should go to the political office-holders.
House's papers are filled with references to the efforts he
made to obliterate the intimate personal sketch, so familiar
in American politics; and when finally a brief biography
appeared which gave him full credit for his influence in the
Wilson administration, at his special request the edition was
withdrawn by the publisher.
The desire to escape publicity was largely a matter of
common sense, for in this way only could he hope to avoid
political enmities and jealousies: President, Cabinet members, Ambassadors, all knew that he stood ready to help
them and yet would seek no public recognition. It was also
instinctive, springing not from undue modesty, for Colonel
House was as coldly objective in judging himself as another,
but rather from a philosophic pleasure in accomplishment
rather than reward, and perhaps in part from a sardonic
sense of humor which was tickled by the thought that he,
unseen and often unsuspected, without great wealth or
office, merely through the power of personality and good




6  INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


sense, was actually deflecting the currents of history.
Whether this supposition is borne out by the intimate papers
of the Colonel, the reader must judge.
The path which House laid out for himself was entirely
untrodden, and it is fruitless to seek an historical parallel.
Monarchs had shared their secrets with father confessors
and extracted wisdom from their advice; Presidents had
created their kitchen-cabinets. But neither the one nor the
other suggests the unofficial functions which House exercised.
He was a combination of Richelieu's Father Joseph and
Thurlow Weed, but he was very much more. At the same
time that he played the part of adviser to the President, of
buffer between office-seekers and Cabinet, of emissary to
foreign courts, he indulged in a complex of activities which
kept him in close touch with business men, local politicians,
artists, and journalists, lawyers and college professors. His
intimacy with European statesmen was as close and his
friendship as warm as the personal associations he created
at home. Long after the war, when their political relations
had become ancient history, he visited Grey and Plunkett,
Clemenceau and Paderewski. Long after the Democrats
lost power in the United States, the officials of Great
Britain, France, and Germany sought his advice. His
range of contacts was so great that he became a sort of
clearing-house for all who desired to accomplish something.
He avoided high office, which comes to many men, but he
reserved for himself a niche which is unique in history.
Inevitably, the public was mystified, especially during the
early years of the Wilson administration. The circle widened
that recognized in him a powerful factor in national and
international politics, and yet few could answer the simplest
questions about him. Who and what was he? Many replies
were given, but, as Colonel House refused to say which were
true and which false, no one was the wiser. He became the
Man of Mystery and, since facts were lacking, fiction sup



INTRODUCTION


7


plied their place. Myths of the most varied sort developed
about this 'Texas Talleyrand,' this 'backwoods politician.'
He was represented as a lover of devious methods, reticent
as the Sphinx, emotionless as a red-skin. Such tales must be
strung with the other mock-pearls of history. And the
interesting point to note is that the public, deprived of facts,
none the less refused to accept the legends fed to them which,
had they been true, would have disqualified House utterly
for the work that he undertook. Puzzled but untroubled,
they accepted him finally as 'the President's adviser.' Here
and there were to be heard grumbles at this strange departure
in American politics; but in general, knowing little of his
activities and nothing of his advice, the people came to look
upon him as a wise institution.
Thus Colonel House disdained fame and achieved it. His
fame, however, rested primarily upon the fact of his relations
with Wilson and not upon what he was or what he did. Of
that the Colonel and those close to him alone could tell, and
they told nothing. It is, therefore, with the greater interest
that the historian turns over the mass of papers from which
the story of his dramatic career may be disengaged.
A d,,o


SH!
From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch




CHAPTER II
BACKGROUNDS
Your success has been without a parallel in Texas politics.
Governor-elect Sayers to House, May 17, 1898
I
'WE originally came from Holland and the name was Huis,
which finally fell into House. Father ran away from home
and went to sea when a child, and did not return to his home
until he had become a man of property and distinction. He
came to Texas when it belonged to Mexico. He joined the
revolution, fought under General Burleson, and helped make
Texas a republic. For his services in this war he received a
grant of land in Coryell County. He lived to see Texas come
into the Union, secede, and return to the Union. He lived in
Texas under four flags.'
Thus wrote Colonel House in the summer of 1916, when a
brief lull in his political activities gave opportunity for him
to reconstruct on paper something of the background that
lay behind his rapid rise to national and international eminence. Although the family was in its origin Dutch, his forbears were for some three hundred years English, and it was
from England that his father ran away. House himself, a
seventh son, was born in 1858, at Houston, Texas, and this
State he has always regarded as his home. Even more than
those of Wilson or Walter Page, with whom he later was so
closely associated, his first years were touched by the excitement and turmoil of the events of the time.
'Some of my earliest recollections are of the Civil War. I
began to remember, I think, in '62 and '63, when our soldiers
were coming and going to and from the front. I remember




THE CIVIL WAR9


9


quite distinctly when Lincoln was assassinated. Father came
home to luncheon, and I recall where Mother was standing
when he told her that the President had been shot. I remember, too, that he said that it was the worst thing that had so
far happened to the South. He saw farther than most men,
and he knew from the beginning of the war that it must end
disastrously for the South. He knew the Northern States
possessed the resources which are potential in war, and that
the Southern States, lacking them, would lose. The blockade
which the Federal Government was able to throw around the
Southern coast, while not absolute, was rigid enough to
make it difficult to break through and obtain from the outside what was needed within.
'During the war he sent many ships out from Galveston
with cotton, to run the blockade to the near-by ports, such
as Havana and Belize Honduras. At that time we had a
house in Galveston as well as in Houston. The Galveston
home covered an entire block. The house was a large red
brick Colonial one, with white pillars, and an orange grove
took up most of the grounds, and oleanders encircled them.
'In determining when to send his ships out, Father was
governed largely by the weather. Dark, st-ormy nights were
the ones chosen. In the afternoon he would go up to the
cupola of our house, and with his glasses he would scan the
horizon to see how many Federal gunboats were patrolling
the coast. Then his ship would go out in the early part of the
night. In the morning, at daylight, he would be again on the
lookout to count the Federal gunboats, to see if any were
missing. If they were all there, he felt reasonably sure his
ship with her cargo had gotten through the blockade.
'It would be months before he knew definitely whether his
ships had come safely to port or whether they had been captured. When he lost one, the loss was complete; but when
one got through, the gain was large. He had a working arrangement with the Confederate Government by which the


f




10 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


return voyage brought them clothing, arms, and munitions
of war of all kinds.
'The terrible days between Lee's surrender and the bringing of some sort of order out of the chaos in the South made a
lasting impression on my mind. I cannot recall just now how
long the interim was, but it must have been a full year or
more.
'There was one regiment of Texas soldiers that came to
Houston and disbanded there. They looted the town. They
attempted to break into Father's storehouse, but he stood at
the doors with a shotgun.... Murder was rife everywhere;
there was no law, there was no order. It was unsafe to go at
night to your next-door neighbor's. When Father had this to
do, he always reached for his shotgun or six-shooter and held
it ready to shoot while both going and coming.'
Those who later were to accuse Colonel House of illconsidered pacifism, would doubtless have been surprised to
learn of the atmosphere in which he was reared. In later
life he was often asked whether he considered himself a
pacifist. 'Yes,' he replied, 'so far as international affairs
are concerned. War is too costly and ineffective a method
of settling disputes between nations. But as an individual
I have not been able to escape the conviction that there
are occasions in life when a man must be prepared to
fight.'
As a boy and later in early manhood, he learned from
personal experience the meaning of lawlessness and bloodshed. Because of this, perhaps, he was brought to perceive
not merely the horror but the stupidity of war; and it was
easier for him, when he attained an influential position, to
utilize it to bring peace, in that his personal courage was
beyond question. It may have been from these early experiences also that he learned the value of audacity. In
the days of his great political influence, Colonel House was




RECKLESSNESS AND DISORDER


11


frequently pictured as a man dominated by the spirit of
caution. Nothing could be further from the truth. He believed always in careful preparation and foresight whenever
possible; as an English statesman once said, 'House always
sees three months ahead.' But he believed more fervently
yet that nothing worth while could be accomplished without a daring that might wisely be allowed to approach recklessness. Like Cavour, whom he admired, he knew how to
wait for the supreme moment and then risk everything.
'Even the children of the town [he wrote] caught the spirit
of recklessness and disorder, and there were constant feuds
and broils amongst us. My brother James, six years older
than I, was the leader of our "gang." We all had guns and
pistols. We had "nigger shooters" (small catapults), and
there were no childish games excepting those connected with
war. We lived and breathed in the atmosphere of strife and
destruction.
'In the evening, around the fireside, there were told tales
of daring deeds, and it was the leader of such deeds that we
strove to emulate. Often the firebells would ring as a signal
that a riot was imminent, and the citizens would flock together at some given point, all armed to the teeth. These
disturbances were, as a rule, between the old-time citizens
and the negroes and carpetbaggers.
'I cannot remember the time when I began to ride and to
shoot. Why I did not kill myself, one can never know, for
accidents were common. My eldest brother had the side of
his face shot off and has been disfigured by it all his life. He
hung between life and death for weeks, but finally came
through with one side of his face gone.
'I had many narrow escapes. Twice I came near killing
one of my playmates in the reckless use of firearms. They
were our toys and, as a matter of fact, death was our playmate.'




12 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


The young House was taken to England as a boy and went
to school at Bath. His experiences with his schoolmates by
no means presaged the cordial relations which he was later to
establish with British diplomats:
'James attempted the same sort of rough play we had been
accustomed to in Texas, and we were constantly in broils
with the young English lads, who were not familiar with such
lawlessness. My old darkey nurse used to tell me that if I
had not been the seventh son of a seventh son, I would never
have survived.'
At the age of fourteen, after the death of his mother, he
was sent to school first in Virginia and then in Connecticut.
House's recollections of the former are not pleasant: 'I shall
never forget my depression when we arrived.... The nearest
town to us was thirty miles away, and a more desolate,
lonely spot no homesick boy ever saw.' Scholastic pursuits
evidently made less impression on his mind than the cruelty
of the older boys, which soon furnished an opportunity for
House to display his mettle. He says little of the particular
incident which evidently gave him a preferred place among
the boys, but that little indicates something of the determined temper which was to appear on various occasions
during his political career.
'I made up my mind at the second attempt to haze me
that I would not permit it. I not only had a pistol but a large
knife, and with these I held the larger, rougher boys at bay.
There was no limit to the lengths they would go in hazing
those who would allow it. One form I recall was that of going
through the pretense of hanging. They would tie a boy's
hands behind him and string him up by the neck over a limb
until he grew purple in the face.... None of it, however, fell
to me. What was done to those who permitted it, is almost




E. M. H. AND MAMMY ELIZA
Taken in Bath, England


I'to\
41 —f




I




AT SCHOOL IN NEW HAVEN


13


beyond belief.... The only thing that reconciled me to my
lot was the near-by mountains, where I could shoot and
enjoy out-of-door life.'
Clearly a change, even to a Yankee atmosphere, was an
improvement; and House hailed with relief, if not enthusiasm, the plan which at the age of seventeen sent him to New
Haven, Connecticut.
'I had expected to be able to enter Yale, but I found myself wholly unprepared and reluctantly entered the Hopkins
Grammar School of the Class of '77.... What I had been
taught was of but little use, and I would have been better off
as far as Latin and Greek were concerned if I had known
nothing and had started from the beginning. I studied but
little, and I soon found I would have difficulty in joining the
Class of '81 in Yale. Meanwhile, Oliver T. Morton, a son of
Senator Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, and I had become fast
friends and we agreed to tutor together and go to Cornell
instead of Yale. Both Morton and I were more bent on mischief than upon books and, while the mischief was innocent,
it made us poor students.'
It was less mischief, however, than budding enthusiasm
for his lifelong interest that kept House and Morton from
their books. Already the young Southerner was intoxicated
by a passion for politics and public affairs; he read politics,
talked politics, and in his first year at the Grammar School, a
boy of seventeen, he brought himself into close contact with
the mechanism of politics. It was the year of the famous
Hayes-Tilden campaign.
'Every near-by political meeting I attended, and there was
no one more interested in the nomination and election of the
presidential candidates of 1876 than I. At every opportunity




14 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


I would go to New York and hang about Democratic Headquarters which, I remember, were at the Everett House in
Union Square. I used to see Mr. Tilden go in and out, and
wondered then how so frail a looking man could make a
campaign for President.
'Bayard, Blaine, and others I heard speak whenever the
opportunity occurred, and I believe that I was as nearly
engrossed in politics as I have ever been since.
'Before the nominations were made, I was, of course, hoping to see young Morton's father nominated for President,
and it was a bitter disappointment to us both when the telegraph operator handed us out the first slip giving news that
the Republicans had compromised upon Rutherford B.
Hayes. The operator knew us, for we were continually hanging about the office instead of attending to our studies.
Morton's father was such a power at that time that there
was no difficulty in his having access to any information that
was to be had.
'Ardent Democrat that I was, and ardent Republican that
he was, young Morton and I had no unpleasant discussions.
After the election and during the contest that followed, it
was utterly impossible for me to bring myself to think of desk
or books. I was constantly going to Washington with
Morton, in order to be near the centre of things. I was usually the guest of the Mortons, who lived at that time at the
Ebbitt House. I knew much of everything that was going
on. Republican leaders would come in day and night to consult the distinguished invalid who was directing the fight for
Hayes. In this way, directly and indirectly, I saw and met
many well-known Republicans in public life at that time.'
No clearer proof is necessary that the child is father to the
man, for, as his papers will show, the mature Colonel House
displayed an invincible obstinacy in making personal friends
of his political opponents. The characteristic proceeded, per



STUDYING POLITICAL OPERATIONS


15


haps, from a natural inability to remain on anything but
good terms with those whom he met, whether in conflict or
cooperation; it resulted in giving him an insight into the
motives that actuated his opponents which was of no small
political value.
The election of 1876, we may remind ourselves, was disputed and was ultimately settled by an Electoral Commission which, despite the protests of Democrats at the moment
and heedless of the criticism of later historians, awarded the
Presidency to Hayes. Such a conflict formed an incomparable opportunity for the young House to study political
operations, and one which he did not fail to utilize, regardless of the fact that school was in session.
'When the Electoral Commission was organized and began
to hold its sittings in the Supreme Court Room at the
Capitol, young Morton and I were permitted to slip in and
out at will, although the demand for admission could only be
met in a very small way. I heard Evarts speak, but the
speech that impressed me most was that of Senator Carpenter who, although a Republican, pleaded for Tilden.
'In those days, too, I had the entree to the White House.
I remember General Grant and Mrs. Grant and several
members of his Cabinet. All this was educational in its way,
but not the education I was placed in the Hopkins Grammar
School to get, and it is no wonder that I lagged at the end of
my class. I had no interest in my desk tasks, but I read much
and was learning in a larger and more interesting school.
'When I entered Cornell, it was the same story.... I was
constantly reading, constantly absorbing, constantly in
touch with, public affairs. I knew the name of every United
States Senator, of practically every Representative, the
Governors of all the important States, and had some knowledge of the chief measures before the people.
'I had found that I could neglect my studies up to the last




16 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


minute and then, by a few days of vigorous effort, pass my
examinations by a scratch, nothing more. I cannot remember getting a condition, nor can I remember getting much
more than a passing mark.
'My Washington experience perhaps changed my entire
career. Fortunately or unfortunately for me, I saw that two
or three men in the Senate and two or three in the House and
the President himself, ran the Government. The others were
merely figureheads. I saw Senators and Representatives
speak to empty benches and for the purpose of getting their
remarks in the Congressional Record sent to their admiring
constituents. I saw, too, how few public men could really
speak well. I can count on the fingers of one hand all the
speakers that I thought worth while. In some the manner
was good, in others the substance was good, but in nearly all
there was lacking one or the other. Therefore I had no ambition to hold office, nor had I any ambition to speak, because
I felt in both instances that I would fall short of the first
place, and nothing less than that would satisfy me.
'Yet I have been thought without ambition. That, I
think, is not quite true. My ambition has been so great that
it has never seemed to me worth while to strive to satisfy it.'
Matters might have been different had it not been for the
delicacy of House's health. 'Up to the time I was eleven or
twelve years old,' he wrote, 'I was a robust youngster. One
day while I was swinging high, a rope broke and I was
thrown on my head. Brain fever ensued, and for a long time
I hovered between life and death. Upon my recovery, malaria fastened upon me, and I have never been strong since.'
The confining routine of office was impossible for him. Especially did he suffer from the heat, which put residence in
Washington during the summer months out of the question.
Thus early and for various reasons he set aside the thought
of a conventional political career; but his ambition, although




UNORTHODOX POLITICAL AMBITIONS


17


unorthodox, was, as he admits, very real, and, even though
he does not admit it, we shall see that he did much to satisfy
it. He longed to play an influential if not a decisive role in
politics, and from the beginning seems to have been inspired
by the desire to improve political conditions. Through all his
correspondence and papers runs this idealistic strain: to make
of government a more efficient instrument for effecting the
desires of the people; to inspire in the people a more sensible
view of their welfare; to take a few feathers out of the wings
of enthusiasm and insert them in the tail of judgment; above
all, to hasten the advent of a system which would protect the
weak, whether in the political or economic sphere, from exploitation by the strong. Even as a boy there was in him
something of Louis Blanc and Mazzini, strictly controlled,
however, by an acute sense of the practical that recalls Benjamin Franklin.
His ambition, furthermore, was determined by an everlively sense of proportion, which means sense of humor, that
continually manifests itself in his papers. It led him to seek
accomplishment rather than notoriety.
Careless of title or office, even had his health permitted
him to seek them, yet determined to make of politics his real
career, House faced the problem that confronts so many
young idealists leaving college and anxious to serve their
country and mankind. How to begin?
II
Mischance cut short the college career of House, for after
two years at Cornell he was called back to Texas by the illness of his father, who died in 1880. The two had been close
companions, and the younger man's sense of loss was acute
and the deprivation of his father's aid and experienced counsel was a serious blow. 'My affection may blind me,' he
wrote, 'and my judgment may have been immature, but he
seemed to me then, as he seems to me now, among the ablest




18 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


men I have ever known.... I owe more to my father than to
any person, living or dead. He not only made it possible for
me to pursue the bent of my inclinations by leaving me a
fortune sufficient for all moderate wants, but he gave me an
insight into the philosophy of life that has been of incalculable value.... While he devoted his life largely to commerce
in various forms and while he acquired what seemed to Texas
a large fortune, he taught me not to place a fictitious value on
wealth. It was with him merely a means to an end.'
The year after leaving college, House married Miss Loulie
Hunter, of Hunter, Texas, and after travelling in Europe for
a twelvemonth, returned to make his home first in Houston
and then in Austin, Texas. Cotton-farming and commercial
enterprises kept him busy, but more and more he began to
steal time from business to indulge his vital interest in public
affairs. During what he calls 'the twilight years,' after he
had achieved political success in Texas and before the opportunity for national service had opened, he indulged his taste
for adventure by embarking upon various industrial schemes,
some of which were obviously calculated to produce pleasure
rather than profit for himself., o
'In this connection I undertook the building of the Trinity
and Brazos Valley Railway. The capital was raised by my
friend, Thomas Jefferson Coolidge, Jr., of the Old Colony
Trust Company of Boston, who occasionally visited me in
Texas. I outlined the route and he accepted my judgment as
to its feasibility.
'For two or three years, this gave me much pleasure and
absorbed my entire interest. There was not a man connected
with the building of this road, except the engineer, that had
ever had the slightest experience with railroad building. I
wonder now at the temerity of those Boston capitalists. My
one thought was to have around me men capable and honest,
and to this I attribute our success. My secretary, Edward




4., "..,,. r
o,,,,


T. W. HOUSE
Father of Edward M. House


OF
/~ 'I








BUILDING A RAILROAD HONESTLY


19


Sammons, than whom there is no better accountant, looked
after the accounts; and William Malone, the manager of my
farms, saw to it that we got such material as was paid for. I
put but little money in the project, for I had but little; therefore I made but a small sum from it, successful as it was -
some thirty thousand dollars. A larger share of the profits
had been allotted me by the syndicate managers who had put
up the money necessary to build the road, but I divided it
with those friends in Texas, poorer than I, who aided in the
actual work of building the road.
'It was a pleasure, though, to undertake to build a railroad
honestly, without a dollar's profit to any one excepting to
those who placed their money in the venture. The money
was raised in advance and everything was paid for in cash,
and no bonds were sold until after the road was a going concern and sold to another system.
'We undertook to lay down one cardinal principle which
no road in Texas, up to that time, had deigned to do; and
that was, to treat the public in such a way that they became
friends of the road instead of enemies. If a farmer or any
citizen along the route had a claim against the company, it
was promptly and fairly adjusted. Notices were put up and
circulars sent out that there would be no need to hire damage
claim lawyers, when there was a claim against the T. and
B. V. Railroad; that all honest claims would be adjusted
immediately.
'The result was magical, and it was not long before the
patrons of the road understood that we were acting in their
interest as well as our own, and any attempt - and there
were many - to blackmail us in the usual way that railroad
corporations have been blackmailed, found no sympathy
with any jury along the line of the road.'
During the eighties, Texas was just passing from the condition of a frontier where law was frequently enforced by the




20 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


individual, according as his hand was quick and his eye true,
and where order was a variable quantity. House speaks admiringly of 'those citizens of Texas who died with their boots
on - a death which every citizen of Texas of those days
coveted.'
We must picture him, accordingly, as a man who spent his
early years not merely in Eastern colleges and schools, in
cotton-farming, and politics, but as the companion and
friend of the older generation - 'that intrepid band,' he calls
them, 'that made Texas what she is to-day. I make obeisance to them! Nothing daunted them. They tore a principality from a sovereign state and moulded a trackless
wilderness into a great commonwealth. These men were the
heroes of my childhood; and now when I am growing old and
have seen many men and many lands, I go back to them and
salute them, for I find they are my heroes still.'
With the younger generation of frontiersmen, House was
on close personal terms and for a while, after returning from
college and beginning his business as planter, he lived their
life. One of the oldest and perhaps the best of these friends
was the noted and picturesque Ranger, Captain Bill McDonald, whose career House felt to be so typical of the Texas
of those days that he could not rest until it was put into a
book.
'I wanted to have Sidney Porter (0. Henry) do it. I had it
in mind that he should write twelve stories, each representing
some incident in Bill's life. I wrote to Porter, whom I had
known while he lived in Texas; but the letter was held back
by his mother-in-law until a few weeks afterwards, when she
visited him at his summer home at New Ground, Long Island. In the meantime, not having heard from Porter, I got
in touch with Albert Bigelow Paine through James Creelman, whom I knew, and he undertook the work.... I received a letter from Porter after Paine had undertaken the




CAPTAIN BILL McDONALD


21


task, in which he said he would have liked to have done it,
for it would have been a "labor of love."
'I was amused at Paine when Captain Bill arrived in New
York. Paine and I were waiting for him at the New Amsterdam Hotel, at Fourth Avenue and Twenty-First Street, which
was convenient to the Players' Club where Paine intended to
stay while writing the memoirs. It was a cold, wet night, and
Bill came in with his "slicker" and big Stetson hat. We
went upstairs with him. He took off his coat, pulled from
one side his.45 and from the other his automatic. He did
this just as an ordinary man takes out his keys and knife. I
explained to Paine that Bill had to carry his artillery in this
way in order to be thoroughly ballasted - that he would
have difficulty in walking without it.
'At this time, Paine was writing the life of Mark Twain
and was living most of the time at Mark Twain's home,
which was then in lower Fifth Avenue. Mr. Clemens invited
us to dinner one evening. I could not go because of a previous engagement, but dropped in later. When I arrived,
Mark and Bill were playing billiards and it was amusing to
see Bill sight his cue just as if it were a rifle and, three times
out of four, send his ball off the table. It entertained Mr.
Clemens immensely. When we went upstairs Clemens ran
and Bill ran after, as if to catch him, but did not do so. Bill
winked at me and said, " I believe the old man really thinks
I could not catch him." Bill is as lean and as agile as a
panther.
'Another time Paine invited Bill and me to take dinner
with him at the Players'. I found Bill in the lobby of the
hotel without a collar. I said, "Bill, you have no collar on."
He reached up his hand and replied, "That's so; I forgot it."
However, he made no move to get one. Paine came in a few
minutes later and asked if he were ready to go to dinner.
Bill replied that he was. Paine then said, "Captain, you
have no collar on." Bill remarked, "My God Almighty,




22 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


can't a man go to dinner in New York without a collar?"
Paine did not press the matter further and Captain Bill went
to the Club just as he was, much to the amusement of everybody there.
'In my early boyhood I knew many of the Bill McDonald
type, although he was perhaps the flower of them all. I knew
personally many of the famous desperadoes, men who had
killed so many that they had almost ceased to count their
victims....
'There were two types of so-called "killers" - one that
murdered simply for the pure love of it, and others that
killed because it was in their way of duty. Bill McDonald
belonged to this latter class. So also did Blue-eyed Captain
McKinney of the Rangers, whom I knew in my ranching
days in southwest Texas.
'McKinney was finally ambushed and killed, as almost
every sheriff of La Salle County was killed during that particular period. Whenever I went to our ranch, I was never
certain that I would return home alive. Feuds were always
going on, and in some of these our ranch was more or less
involved.'
Fort Bend and Brazoria Counties, where the elder House's
plantation lay, seemed to be the breeding-place for bad men.
'They were different from the ordinary desperado, and
only killed upon insult or fancied insult. Duels were frequently fought on the plantation and were always deadly. I
recall two in particular. George Tarver's brother and his
room-mate had some slight quarrel concerning the bed they
occupied in common. I think the room-mate put his muddy
boots on the bedspread. " Here, you can't put those boots on
the bed," said George's brother. " I can if I choose," was the
reply. There was only one possible outcome to the debate.
They went out, stood back to back, counted aloud, walking




TEXAS DUELS


23


ten paces, wheeled, fired, and advanced upon one another.
They fell dead almost in each other's arms, both having
several mortal wounds. They were good friends a quarter of
an hour before the duel.
'Another incident I remember. Jim Thompson fancied
that some man, whose name I have forgotten, was making
fun of him. He demanded that the man get his shotgun.
The man hesitated and made a faint apology, which Thompson would not accept. The man then got his shotgun,
stepped out of the house, both fired, and Thompson killed
him instantly. Thompson was missed by a few inches. They
were so close together when they fired that the buckshot
went almost like a rifle ball, having no time to scatter.
'I asked Thompson why he was so insistent upon fighting.
He said he knew that if he had not called the man to account,
he would not have been able to live at Arcola and would have
been branded as a coward. It was necessary, he thought,
either to kill or be killed, and without further argument...
'I can hardly realize that so short a while ago we lived in
an atmosphere where such things seemed proper and even a
matter of course. I was often with men whom I knew would
surely be killed soon, and perhaps at a time I was with them.
'Governor Hogg,)did more than any executive in Texas to
break up this habit of public killing.... He also broke up
strikes during his administration. Captain Bill McDonald,
of the Ranger Service, was the instrument he used. Hogg
sent word to the leaders that if they continued to uncouple
cars, or to do anything that might interfere with the movement of trains, he would shoot holes through them big
enough to see through. When Bill conveyed this to the ringleaders and presented himself as the instrument through
which it was to be done, lawlessness ceased.
'The nearest I ever came to killing a man was in Breckenridge, Colorado. It was in 1879, when the town was merely a
1 Governor of Texas from 1890 to 1894.




24 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


mining camp. I had gone to Colorado at the request of
Whitney Newton, a college friend who was in Breckenridge
at that time buying gold dust and sending it to the Denver
Mint by special messengers, the express companies refusing
to carry it because of the danger of robbery.
'In going to Breckenridge in those days, one left the main
line of the railway at the little station of Como, which at that
time had but one house. A so-called stage carried one from
there to the mining camp. There is no need to describe it,
for it was like all other camps of that sort - rough men, and
rougher women, gambling, drinking, and killing. I was in a
saloon, talking to a man whom I had known in Texas, when
the incident I speak of occurred. A big, brawny individual
came into the room and began to abuse me in violent terms.
I had never seen the man before and could not imagine why
he was doing this. I retreated, and he followed. I had my
overcoat on at the time and had my hand on my six-shooter
in my pocket and cocked it. The owner of the saloon jumped
over the bar between us. In five seconds more, I would have
killed him. An explanation followed which cleared up the
mystery. He had taken me for some one else against whom
he had a grudge, and whom he had seen but once. I learned
later that he was a popular ex-sheriff of Summit County and
that if I had killed him I should have been lynched within
the hour.
'It always amuses me when I see the bad men in plays
depicted as big, rough fellows with their trousers in their
boots and six-shooters buckled around their waists. As a
matter of fact, the bad men I have been used to in southern
Texas were as unlike this as daylight from dark. They were
usually gentle, mild-mannered, mild-spoken, and often
delicate-looking men. They were invariably polite, and one
not knowing the species would be apt to misjudge them to
such an extent that a rough word or an insult would sometimes be offered. This mistake of judgment was one that




SOCIAL CONTACTS


25


could never be remedied, for a second opportunity was never
given.'
In later years House expressed intense amusement at the
oaths and objurgations of Parisian taxi-drivers, which however violent never seemed to result in physical encounter.
'In Texas,' he said, 'it was the reverse. No words were
wasted. Frequently the first symptom of mild disapproval
would be a blow or revolver-shot. People praise us Southerners for our courteous demeanor; we learned it in a school
of necessity.'
III
It would be a mistake to picture House's early life as
merely that of the frontiersman. Quiet and unobtrusive as
one of the mild-mannered desperadoes he describes, and as
courageous, he loved to meet every variety of individual and
he had a gift for bringing himself into touch with the Rangers
and men of the back districts., He loved the open country,
the smell of the camp-fire, and the meal cooked over its
embers. But his time was spent mostly in the towns and
especially in the capital. He knew the business men of
Texas, the editors, lawyers, and educators; later they tried to
make him a trustee of the University of Texas. The Mayor
of Houston writes to him as 'My dear Ed,' and the Governor
signs himself 'Your friend.'
His father had bequeathed to him a social position in the
State which he enjoyed maintaining and developing, so that,
apart from the frequent journeys that he made to Europe, he
came constantly in contact with persons of interest. The
home in Houston was the place where nearly every distinguished visitor that came to Texas was entertained, Jeffer1 S. V. Edwards, Captain of Rangers, wrote House, May 24, 1902: 'If
you want anything in this new district all you have to do is indicate it.... I am with you to a finish in any old thing.'




26 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


son Davis among the rest. 'Father counted among his
friends,' wrote House, 'the rich and the poor, the humble
and the great.'
The younger House followed in his footsteps. After moving to Austin, he built a large house which became the focus
of the social and political life of the region.
'The large veranda to the south [wrote House] was the
scene, perhaps, of more political conferences than any similar
place in Texas. It was there that the clans congregated. I
had long made it a rule not to visit, and it was understood
that if any one desired to see me, it must be at my home. I
did this not only to conserve my strength, but because it
enabled me to work under more favorable conditions. I had
an office which I was seldom in, and latterly I refused to
make any appointments there whatsoever. This necessarily
led to much entertaining, and our house was constantly
filled with guests. Those days and guests are among the
pleasantest recollections of my life.
'Many distinguished people, passing through Austin, from
time to time were our guests. Among those that I admired
most was Dr. Charles W. Eliot of Harvard. His life and
devotion to public service were a revelation to me. He
seemed to regulate his life in a way to get the maximum of
service for the public good.
'Baron d'Estournelles de Constant of France was another
guest whose society I enjoyed while he was in Texas. I remember when leaving me at the station he remarked: "My
friends in Paris would be amazed if they could hear me say I
was leaving Austin, Texas, with keen regret."'
Apart from the interest which he took in men and in their
activities, a further characteristic should be noted: constant
and omnivorous reading. This fact is to be deduced less from
his correspondence and papers than from the existence of a




OMNIVOROUS READING


27


private library which he developed and enlarged without
cessation. It is an illuminating instance of the man's real
tastes that when, after the Paris Peace Conference, he had
a book-plate made, he omitted in its composition all references to his diplomatic or political career; he chose as salient
features above the horse, dog, and camp-fire, the gun and
powder-flask, reminders of his early life - an open hearth and
books. The books which he read were of all sorts, poetry and
essays, but chiefly biography, history, and political science.
The main strength of Colonel House in his later political
career was, of course, his understanding of human nature, his
ability to enter into friendly relations with all types; but it
would be a mistake to overlook the strength he derived from
books.
In such an atmosphere House began the career in politics
which soon became his real vocation, and it was during those
years that he underwent the political schooling that prepared
him to assume a guiding r1le in national and international
affairs. With all the cosmopolitan tastes which he developed
by constant travel, and with every intention of entering the
arena of national politics, he regarded his life in Texas as a
necessary and delightful prologue. Before he could acquire
national influence, he must win prestige in his own State. An
ardent Democrat, he saw in Texas, with its tremendous influence in the party, an ideal spring-board. A liberal and
progressive, he could throw himself into the fight for liberal
and progressive legislation which Governor Hogg - 'the inimitable Hogg,' House calls him - was directing. He was
ready for the opportunity, which was not slow to knock upon
the door.
IV
The year 1892 was one of politico-social ferment in Europe
and the United States; the forces of liberal progressivism
were everywhere arrayed against reaction. In Texas the




28 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


struggle was sharp. Governor Hogg, whose courage and
force had made him a dominating influence in the State, was
the centre of the storm; and because of his advanced ideas,
many of which found incorporation in sweeping legislative
reforms, he had aroused against himself a powerful group
which protested against his nomination for a second term.
The fight offered to the young House the opportunity for
which he had been waiting. 'House was not nominally manager of the Hogg campaign,' writes T. W. Gregory, later
Attorney-General, who was then active in Texas politics,
'but was chiefly responsible for the organization, and to him
Hogg owed a large share of his victory.' 1 For ten years
House had watched the mechanics of State politics, pondered
the mistakes of politicians, developed personal contacts. Already he possessed the technique necessary for the conduct
of a campaign, and it was infused with an enthusiasm for
reform.
'When I found that the railroads and the entire corporate
interests of Texas were combining to defeat Hogg [wrote
House], I enlisted actively in his behalf. Although he had
known me but a short time, we had many times discussed
political ways and means, and he asked me and the then
State Health Officer to take charge of his campaign. Later
the burden of it fell on me. We selected a committee and got
my good friend, General W. R. Hamby, to act as chairman.
That campaign was a battle royal. We had no money, and
every daily paper in Texas was against us. Hogg's opponent
was Judge George Clark, of Waco. When the Clarkites found
we had sufficient votes to nominate Hogg, they bolted the
convention and nominated Clark. The Republicans endorsed him and we had another hard fight at the election, but
Hogg won by a decisive majority. It was a bitter fight and
1 Manuscript memorandum communicated to the author, August,
1924.




AS A CAMPAIGN-MANAGER


29


the wounds lasted many years. It was the first firm stand the
people of any American State had taken against the privileged classes, and it attracted attention throughout the
Union.
'I felt that Governor Hogg's confidence in me was a great
compliment, because of my youth and, as far as any one
knew, because of my lack of political experience.
'So in politics I began at the top rather than at the bottom, and I have been doing since that day pretty much
what I am doing now; that is, advising and helping wherever I might.'
With the success of the Hogg campaign, the political position of House in Texas evidently became assured.
'From 1892 to 1902 [Mr. Gregory writes] House took continual interest in the elections and the administration of
Texas.... From the first he displayed that quality which
made him of such value to the successive Governors and to
President Wilson, an almost uncanny ability to foretell the
effects which any measure would have upon public opinion.
He was offered by them and declined many positions of
honor and power, and he might have been Governor himself....
'In 1894 he managed Culberson's successful campaign.
He was again in charge when Culberson was reelected in
1896. In 1898 and 1900 he directed the successful campaigns
of Major Joseph D. Sayers. He was active in the Lanham
campaigns of 1902 and 1904.'
Apart from the fact that House himself consistently refused office, one notes especially, in the first place, that he
was invariably successful in his political ventures, and in the
second place, that he did not rely upon a 'machine,' for
House's candidate for Governor was almost invariably op



30 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


posed by his predecessor. It was a curious manifestation of
electoral skill, political judgment, or good luck, according as
the reader may choose. Thus in 1894 Governor Hogg and
House disagreed upon his successor. The Governor supported the veteran Senator Reagan, who had served in Jefferson Davis's Cabinet; House was behind the State's AttorneyGeneral, Charles A. Culberson. Both were liberals. As always in Texas, the real struggle was at the Democratic Convention, where in addition to Reagan and Culberson two
other candidates appeared - one of them as leader of the
reactionary forces in the party which had been suppressed by
Hogg. House pointed out the danger of division in the liberal
camp. All the reform legislation of the past four years was
threatened, and it could be saved only if one of the two
liberals withdrew.
The final interview between the Governor and his recalcitrant adviser must have been picturesque. Hogg was immense, loud, commanding, with his 'Young man, you'll do as
I tell you, if you know what's good for you.' House, of slight
build and quiet manner, speaking almost in a monotone, was
inflexible in his argument that liberalism in Texas depended
upon the union of the progressive forces and that to secure it
Reagan must withdraw. It ended with Hogg going to
Reagan, who magnanimously agreed to retire in order to
avoid the split in the liberal group. 'Texas never produced a
nobler citizen than Judge John H. Reagan,' wrote House.
'He was honest, he was able, and he was fearless.'
Doubtless it was easier for House to pass this high estimate
upon his erstwhile opponent, in that his retirement paved the
way for the nomination of Culberson. Great was the astonishment of the convention when the man chosen to nominate
Reagan, after beginning with the conventional eulogy of his
subject, proceeded in the peroration to announce his withdrawal and to second Culberson himself. House stayed in
the convention until his man had received a majority, then




THE CULBERSON CAMPAIGN


31


walked over to the club to congratulate him. It was characteristic of his foresight that he had by him the expert
accountant, Major Edward Sammons, who could add fractions in his head, so that in the convention (where fractional
votes of delegations are common) he knew the result some
minutes before the clerks themselves. 'The truth is, as I
told you,' wrote Culberson to House, August 17, 1894, 'I
could not have won except through your splendid management.'
'This is the only time in my political career [wrote House]
that I openly assumed the chairmanship of a campaign. It
has been my habit to put some one else nominally at the
head, so that I could do the real work undisturbed by the
demands which are made upon a chairman.
'The public is almost childish in its acceptance of the
shadow for the substance. Each chairman of the campaigns
which I directed received the publicity and the applause of
both the press and the people during and after the campaign
had been brought to a successful conclusion. They passed
out of public notice within a few months, or at most within a
year; and yet when the next campaign came around, the
public and the press as eagerly accepted another figurehead....
'In every campaign I have insisted that the candidate
whose fortunes I directed should in no instance make any
preelection promises, either directly, indirectly, or otherwise.
I pointed out that it was bad morals and worse politics. The
opposition usually promised everything, and it was not infrequent that two men would meet that had been promised
the same office.'
Four years later, a similar situation developed when Governor Culberson, after a second term, supported his AttorneyGeneral, M. M. Crane, while House opposed him - largely




32 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


on the ground that the Attorney-Generalship was becoming
a stepping-stone to the Governorship. 'I did not believe it
was a good precedent to follow,' he wrote, 'because it would
cause an Attorney-General to become something of a demagogue, perhaps unconsciously but nevertheless surely.' He
agreed, therefore, to direct the political fortunes of a Texas
Congressman who during the entire campaign remained in
Washington, Major Joseph Sayers.
'Culberson urged me not to do this [wrote House], declaring that defeat was certain.... I did not heed his advice. It
looked as if it would be necessary to do what was done in the
Culberson-Reagan fight four years before, and that was, to
break down the organization which had been built up during
the previous administration. This was not disagreeable to
me, for I was never a believer in political machines.
'In the Culberson race I had to overcome the Hogg organization which I had helped to build up. In the Sayers-Crane
campaign it was necessary to defeat the Culberson organization.... In justice to that organization, it pleases me to say
that most of them came to offer their services in behalf of
Sayers if I demanded it. This I did in no instance, advising
them to go where their sympathies and interests lay.
'The two other candidates in this campaign were Lieutenant-Governor Jester and Colonel Wynne of Fort Worth.
At the start I assumed that Crane had eighty per cent of
the chances for success. However, there were no single
counties in Texas he could call clearly his own, while
there were many counties that could not be taken from
Sayers.
'We had our friends in these Sayers counties call their
primaries early. The Crane forces saw what we were doing,
but were unable to respond in kind because they had no
counties which they were absolutely certain of carrying. The
result was that when county after county declared for Sayers




THE SAYERS CAMPAIGN


33


and we had practically reached the end of our strength,
Crane in a fit of depression withdrew from the race.
'The Dallas News called me over the telephone at twelve
o'clock at night and said that Crane had sent in his written
withdrawal. They asked me if I had any statement to make.
I replied I would make one in the morning. I lay awake for
nearly an hour, enjoying the victory, and then went back to
sleep. In the morning before I arose I reached for one of my
pockets, secured an old envelope, and wrote in pencil our
opinion of Crane's withdrawal. I took occasion to compliment Crane upon his great patriotism in bowing to the will
of the people, and I declared that it was certain that Mr.
Jester and Colonel Wynne would not be lacking in as high
patriotic motives and that the electorate of Texas could look
forward with certainty to their early withdrawal. The result
was that both Jester and Wynne began to deny they had any
intention of withdrawing. But the deed was done, and Jester
actually withdrew within a few weeks and Wynne did not
stand the pressure much longer.'
Major Sayers displayed at the moment a gratitude and
modesty which the elect of the people are not always prone
to manifest.
'Your success in the management of my canvass [he wrote
House, May 17, 1898] has been unprecedented in the history
of political campaigns. You have taken a disorganized and
probably a minority force at the outset and driven from the
field the candidate of an organized majority. You have not
only done this, but you have also held in line the lukewarm
and trivial of our own party and have made them brave,
vigorous, confident, and aggressive. Your generalship has
indeed been superb, and considering that your own candidate
was absent from the State and has not made a political speech
outside of his own district in more than twenty years...




34 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


your success has been without a parallel in Texas politics.... I have felt that it would be wise in me to leave the entire
matter to yourself.'
The situation was not less piquant in that Culberson, who
opposed House's candidate for Governor, was himself running for the United States Senate and asked House to direct
his campaign. The latter acceded, and the election of Culberson proved to be the beginning of a senatorial career that
lasted a quarter of a century.
V
House's political activities in Texas were by no means confined to elections. Under both Hogg and Culberson he took a
constant interest in legislation and gradually came to occupy
the same position in the State as he was later to assume in
national affairs. He believed first in the necessity of reform,
and next in an intelligent and reasoned foundation for reform
measures, and he spared no study or effort in the preparation
of bills. His pride in the accomplishment of the Texas
Governors was great, and perhaps not unjustified.
'House was always a progressive [writes Gregory], and in
many respects a pronounced radical, almost invariably being
more advanced in his ideas than the persons he was working
with. This genuine interest in progressive legislation accounts to a large degree for his interest in politics. He
wanted to see advanced ideas placed upon the statute books.
It is interesting to note that, although rated as one of the
wealthy men of Texas, he was invariably aligned politically
on the side of the plain people and against most of those
with whom he was socially intimate.'
'In Texas I worked, I think [wrote House], not only for
Texas itself, but also in the hope that the things we worked




GOVERNOR HOGG


35


for there would be taken up by the country at large; and in
this I was gratified. The great measures which Governor
Hogg advocated, like the Railroad Commission, the Stock
and Bond law, were largely written into national law later.
Texas was the pioneer of successful progressive legislation,
and it was all started during Hogg's administrations.... I
see it stated from time to time that California, Wisconsin,
and other States were the first to impress the progressive
movement upon the nation. This is not true; Texas was the
first in the field, and the others followed.
'Even in municipal reform, Texas led the way. Galveston
initiated the commission form of government, and nearly
all the other Texas cities of importance followed. It was
then taken up in Iowa and I often hear of the "Dubuque
idea." As a matter of fact, they took over the idea from
Texas.
'Governor Hogg, I think, we will have to place as the foremost Texan, giving Sam Houston the second place. He did
not have the fine, analytical mind that Culberson has, but he
possessed a force, vision, and courage to carry out, that few
men I have known possess. With Hogg it was always a
pleasure to enter a fight, for it was certain that there would
be no compromise until victory crowned the effort. He was
afraid of nothing and gloried in a conflict.
'It is a great pity that he did not go into national life when
he left the gubernatorial chair. His proper place would have
been in the House of Representatives, although he might
have gone to the Senate had he so desired.'
House's relations with Governor Culberson were even
closer than with Hogg. Many people have wondered how it
was possible for the Colonel later to find a way to make himself indispensable to President Wilson and by what magic he
maintained himself as the President's unofficial adviser.
There was less of magic than of experience, for during his




36 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Texas days he had been doing exactly the same sort of thing
for the Governors.
'During Culberson's terms as Governor [he recorded] I
devoted myself as constantly to his administration of public
affairs as I have since to Woodrow Wilson's as President. I
went to his office at the Capitol nearly every day, and sometimes continued my work there until nightfall.'
House's files are filled with letters like the following:
'Knowing that you have a great deal more influence with the
Governor-elect than any one else, and as I ask nothing for
myself, I venture to write you in behalf of a friend of mine.
Etc.' And from the holder of an appointive office: 'I presume
the crisis will approach very soon in matters political. When
it comes, please remember me in your prayers.'
The Governor evidently relied upon House both as political confidant and personal friend. So much is made clear by
the numerous letters that passed between them.
'You must take charge of things here [wrote Culberson]
and organize the work. My room will be open to you at all
hours.'
And at the opening of a legislative session:
'It is impossible for me to be in Austin prior to the organization of the legislature, and in fact I do not know when I
can get there. This busy time I wish you would seek the
Speaker, whoever he may be, and talk with him about the
committees on taxation and revenue, finance and contingent
expenses.'
'In my day [ran a letter from Culberson, dated February
1, 1895] I have had many friends, but you have been more




Charles A. Culberson
Joseph D  Sayers                               James S. Hogg
THREE TEXAS GOVERNORS








A COLONEL ON GOVERNOR HOGG'S STAFF 37


than any to me.... There is nothing in the way of happiness
and prosperity and honor good enough for you in my view,
yet I hope for you all that is attainable.'
After Culberson entered the Senate, the friendship evidently persisted, for he writes to House: 'I wish I could see
you to-day and have a long talk. I feel that way often these
days.... Take a pencil and write me confidentially how I
stand with the Democrats in the State now. Give me the
thing straight, no matter how the chips may fall.' And when
a certain bill came up in the Senate: 'What do you think of
it? Write me fully and at your earliest convenience, because
I want to study it.'
It was Governor Hogg who provided House with the title
of 'Colonel,' by appointing him, entirely without the recipient's suspicion, to his staff. The staff officer's uniform
could be, and was, bestowed upon an ancient and grateful
darkey, but the title proved to be adhesive. There is a
certain poetic justice, almost classical in character, to be seen
in the punishment thus laid upon House, who spent his life in
avoiding office and titles, and during the World War exercised as much ingenuity in escaping European Orders as in
his diplomatic negotiations: henceforth, despite his protests,
he became and remained 'Colonel House,' or even 'The
Colonel.'
With the succeeding Governors, House's relations were not
so close, but it is obvious that in 1902 his influence in Texas
affairs still dominated. He was the directing spirit in the
election of Lanham in that year, who wrote to him in gratitude for 'your discreet advice and promptness to suggest to
me. Always say just what you think, for it will be received in
the spirit tendered.' And again: 'The fact that your influence was for me has been of incalculable benefit to me....
The knowledge of your friendship for me will also deter other




38 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


entries into the field.... I need and appreciate your counsel.' At the same period a letter from Congressman, later
Postmaster-General, Burleson indicates that it had become a
state tradition for House to draw up the party platform.
'I tender my congratulations upon the skill you have displayed in drafting the platform.... It is such a great improvement, from the standpoint of brevity, over those you
have given us in the past, that I think the State is to be felicitated upon the prospects of its adoption.'
But the end of this phase of House's career was approaching. 'When another election drew near,' he wrote, 'I refused
to interest myself in any way.' We find him asked by both
candidates for his advice, which 'I gave to each of them
advice which in no way conflicted.' Apparently the one
heeded the advice, while the other 'was so certain of success
that he left his campaign to be run in the old slip-shod way,
to find himself defeated.'  3   /  'Y
VI
'I had grown thoroughly tired of the position I occupied in
Texas,' wrote House. He had, it is true, the satisfaction of
participating in the administration of a great commonwealth; ten years of Texas success had been admirable preparation. They gave him the political experience and prestige
he needed. But now he felt equipped for a broader field. 'Go
to the front where you belong,' wrote Governor Hogg in 1900.
'During all these years [recorded House] I had never for
a moment overlooked the national situation, and it was there
that my real interest lay. In 1896 I was ready to take part in
national affairs. My power in Texas was sufficient to have
given me the place I desired in the national councils of the
party.




FRIENDSHIP WITH MR. BRYAN


39


'The nomination of Bryan in 1896 and the free silver issue
made me feel the unwisdom of entering national party politics under such conditions. I therefore bided my time.'
He proved that he knew how to wait. Three national campaigns followed in which the Democratic Party was dominated by Mr. Bryan or by Eastern conservatives, and House
stood aloof. In each campaign overtures were made with the
purpose of giving him a responsible share in its management,
but on each occasion he evaded them. The Democrats must
embrace the liberal creed, he insisted, but it must be cleansed
of the Bryan financial heresies. None the less, House came
more and more into touch with the national Democratic
leaders and with Bryan himself, and established a close
personal friendship.
'Mr. Bryan's daughter, Grace, had not been well and he
wished to spend a winter south. Governor Hogg and I
undertook to arrange a home for the Bryans practically
within the same grounds as ours.... So he, Mrs. Bryan, and
the children lived there next to us during the winter, and I
had many opportunities to discuss with him national affairs
and the coming campaign. It was the winter, I think, of
1898 and 1899.
'I found Mrs. Bryan very amenable to advice and suggestion, but Mr. Bryan was as wildly impracticable as ever. I
do not believe that any one ever succeeded in changing his
mind upon any subject that he had determined upon.... I
believe he feels that his ideas are God-given and are not
susceptible to the mutability of those of the ordinary human being.
'He often told me that a man that did not believe in "the
free and unlimited coinage of silver at 16-1 was either a fool
or a knave." He was so convinced of this that he was not
susceptible to argument.'




40 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


In 1900 Bryan went down to defeat for the second time.
In 1904 the quarrels of the Eastern and Western Democrats
would have ensured disaster even in the face of a weaker
candidate than Roosevelt. 'I returned to Texas,' wrote
House, 'discouraged over the prospects of the Democratic
Party ever being able to rehabilitate itself.' In 1908 came the
third Bryan candidacy and defeat.
But already the Democratic sun was about to rise. The
difficulties in the Republican Party, which threatened under
Roosevelt, became more obvious in the succeeding administration. They were intensified after Roosevelt's return from
travel abroad by his own outburst of discontent at the policies adopted by Mr. Taft, whose selection as President he
had himself demanded. The apparent control of the Republican Party by the Old Guard, alleged to be tied up to the
'interests,' the unsatisfied demand for measures of social reform, the threat of the new Progressive movement in the
heart of the party itself, pointing to a possible split - all
gave hope to the Democrats. That this hope was not entirely illusory seemed indicated by the state and congressional elections of 1910, when the political pendulum swung
far in their direction.
Colonel House was watching the opportunity. The great
problem was to find a leader. In 1910 he came East from
Texas and, like Diogenes, sought a man.
'I began now to look about [he wrote] for a proper candidate for the Democratic nomination for President. In talking with Mr. Bryan, he had mentioned Mayor Gaynor of
New York as the only man in the East whom he thought
measured up to the requirements.
'I felt sure the nomination should go to the East, and I
also felt it was practically impossible to nominate or elect a
man that Mr. Bryan opposed. I therefore determined to look
Mr. Gaynor over with the thought of him as a possibility.




GAYNOR A PRESIDENTIAL POSSIBILITY 41


'I used my good friend, James Creelman, to bring us
together. Creelman was nearer to Gaynor than any other
man. He arranged a dinner at the Lotus Club, at which only
the three of us were present, and it was a delightful affair.
The food and the wine were of the best, for Creelman was a
connoisseur in this line. The dinner lasted until after twelve
o'clock. I had been told that Gaynor was brusque even to
rudeness, but I did not find him so in the slightest. He knew
perfectly well what the dinner was for, and he seemed to try
to put his best side to the front.... He showed a knowledge
of public affairs altogether beyond my expectations and
greater, indeed, than that of any public man that I at that
time knew personally who was a possibility.
'I proceeded to follow up this dinner by bringing such
friends as I thought advisable in touch with him.
'One day Creelman and I went to the Mayor's office by
appointment, to introduce Senator Culberson and Senator
R. M. Johnson, editor of the Houston Post and Democratic
National Committeeman from Texas.... I got Culberson
and Johnson to second my invitation to Gaynor to go to
Texas during the winter and address the Texas legislature.
Gaynor consented. When I went to Texas I asked some
members of the legislature to introduce a resolution inviting
him to address them. This was done and the invitation telegraphed to him. A newspaper reporter of one of the small
Texas dailies sent Gaynor a telegram asking him about it.
Gaynor telegraphed back something to the effect that he had
no notion of coming to Texas to address the legislature and
had never heard of any such proposal.'
Reasonable explanation of this surprising volte-face on the
part of Mayor Gaynor has never been advanced. It may
have been that he failed to appreciate the value of the support of Texas - a vital misjudgment, as the Baltimore Convention of 1912 proved. Or it may have been merely another




42 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


example of the erratic and whimsical nature of the Mayor
which did so much to vitiate his undeniably statesmanlike
qualities. Colonel House felt certain, in any case, that
Gaynor's blindness to the opportunity he had created, indicated a lack of political sagacity.
'I wiped Gaynor from my political slate [he wrote], for I
saw he was impossible. I was confirmed in this resolution
when Dix was nominated for Governor of New York, which I
wanted Gaynor to accept. Some of the Mayor's other
friends thought that it would be a mistake to accept the
nomination, that to be Mayor of New York meant greater
honor and more power than to be Governor of the State. I
contended that the people would hesitate to nominate or
elect a mayor of a city to the Presidency, but if he were
elected Governor he would become the logical candidate.'
House continued his search. He had carefully considered
Senator Culberson, and frequently discussed with him the
possibility of the presidential nomination. But Culberson's
health was poor. Furthermore, House believed that he was
too purely a Southerner to make a successful race. The candidate must come, if possible, from the East; he must attract
the West by his liberalism.
'I now turned to Woodrow Wilson [House wrote], then
Governor of New Jersey, as being the only man in the East
who in every way measured up to the office for which he was
a candidate.'
House had never met Wilson, but his attention had been
called to him by Wilson's ambitious reform programme in
New Jersey and the success with which he was driving it
through the legislature. He studied his background, which
was admirable in that he had no political record and thus




TURNING TO WOODROW WILSON


43


started with no political enemies, while his troubled career at
Princeton seemed to label him as an opponent of aristocratic
privilege. He studied his speeches, which he believed should
be classed with the finest political rhetoric extant. There
was obviously in him the capacity for moral leadership.
Late in the year, House returned to Texas convinced that he
had found his man, although as yet he had never met him.
'I decided to do what I could,' he writes, 'to further Governor Wilson's fortunes. I spoke to all my political friends
and following, and lined them up one after another. This
was in the winter of 1910-1911.'
Thereafter we find House making arrangements to bring
the Governor to Texas, in clearing up doubts of his party
regularity, in securing the aid of Culberson and striving for
that of Bryan. A letter to E. S. Martin, editor of Life, makes
it plain that House's support of Wilson as yet rested less
upon his personal admiration for him than upon the conviction of Wilson's availability.
'The trouble with getting a candidate for President [he
wrote, August 30, 1911] is that the man that is best fitted for
the place cannot be nominated and, if nominated, could
probably not be elected. The people seldom take the man
best fitted for the job; therefore it is necessary to work for
the best man who can be nominated and elected, and just
now Wilson seems to be that man.'
Thus in his work for Wilson, House was serving the Democratic cause rather than the man, whom he had never seen.
One afternoon late in November, Governor Wilson called
alone on Colonel House at the Hotel Gotham, where the
latter was staying. From that moment began the personal
friendship which was so powerfully to affect the events of the
following years.




CHAPTER III
BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP
It looks to me as if they depended too much upon speech-making and
noisy demonstrations, and not enough upon organization.
House to Wilson, August 28, 1912
WOODROW WILSON and Colonel House first met on November 24, 1911, a year before the presidential election. Already House had decided definitely that circumstances
made of Wilson the most available candidate, one who could
arouse the enthusiasm of the voters in the electoral campaign, and one who, if elected, possessed the courage and the
imagination to lead a vigorous reform administration. For
these were the two qualities which the Colonel believed essential to a successful President.
Governor Wilson, in his turn, must have found his curiosity piqued by the friendly efforts of the unseen House,
word of which had been brought to him during the summer.
Without experience in national politics, he knew little or
nothing of the career of House in Texas, nor of his relations
there with the successive Governors and with Bryan. But he
appreciated the skill with which House, working through
Senator Culberson, had disposed of the attacks on Wilson's
party regularity that threatened to destroy his candidacy
even while in the embryonic stage; and he was impressed by
the success of his address in Texas which House and
Gregory had arranged.
This beginning of what Sir Horace Plunkett later called
'the strangest and most fruitful personal alliance in human
history,' should properly have taken place under more dramatic auspices. The small hotel room where they met did
not add glamour to the occasion and neither could guess what
the political future held in store for them. But each evi



FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF WILSON


45


dently experienced an instinctive personal liking for the
other which ripened immediately into genuine friendship.
The first impressions of Wilson can only be deduced from the
almost affectionate tone of the letters that he wrote to House
after the interview. Those of the Colonel have been preserved in more definite form.
'He came alone to the Gotham quite promptly at four
[recorded House], and we talked for an hour. He had an engagement to meet Phelan, afterward Senator from California, at five o'clock, and expressed much regret that he could
not continue our conversation. We arranged, however, to
meet again within a few days, when at my invitation he came
to dine with me.
'Each time after that we met at the Gotham, as long as I
remained in New York that autumn and winter and whenever he came to the city.
'From that first meeting and up to to-day [1916], I have
been in as close touch with Woodrow Wilson as with any
man I have ever known. The first hour we spent together
proved to each of us that there was a sound basis for a fast
friendship. We found ourselves in such complete sympathy,
in so many ways, that we soon learned to know what each
was thinking without either having expressed himself.
'A few weeks after we met and after we had exchanged
confidences which men usually do not exchange except after
years of friendship, I asked him if he realized that we had
only known one another for so short a time. He replied,
"My dear friend, we have known one another always."
And I think this is true.'
It is curious to note that it was the personal amiability of
Mr. Wilson, rather than his intellectual qualities or political
ideas, which impressed House at the outset. He thus reported this first interview to his brother-in-law:




46 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes('l
NEW YORK, November 25, 1911
DEAR SIDNEY:
I had a delightful visit from Woodrow Wilson yesterday
afternoon, and he is to dine with me alone next Wednesday....
I am glad that he has arrived, and we had a perfectly
bully time. He came alone, so that we had an opportunity
to try one another out.
He is not the biggest man I have ever met, but he is one
of the pleasantest and I would rather play with him than any
prospective candidate I have seen.
From what I had heard, I was afraid that he had to have
his hats made to order; but I saw not the slightest evidence
of it....
Never before have I found both the man and the opportunity.
Fraternally yours
E. M. H.
Writing in November to Senator Culberson, House expressed his thorough satisfaction with Wilson as a candidate
and solidified the support which the influential Texan Senator was already prepared to offer. 'The more I see of Governor Wilson the better I like him,' said House, 'and I think
he is going to be a man one can advise with some degree of
satisfaction. This, you know, you could never do with
Mr. Bryan.'
Wilson's amenability to advice at this period permitted an
important development which House suggested and carried
through. The Governor had taken as his chief text for campaign speeches the political control of privileged interests
under Republican Administrations. He had not, however,
1 Then President of the University of Texas, later President of the
College of the City of New York.




WILSON'S TARIFF SPEECHES


47


emphasized the importance of the real stronghold of privilege and the means by which it might be attacked. If Wilson
were to pose as the champion of the 'common man,' he must
not overlook the tariff.
'In reading the speeches he was making in 1911 [recorded
Colonel House], I noticed he was not stressing the tariff. I
called his attention to this and thought it was a mistake.
Underwood and Champ Clark were making this a feature.
I was sure Wilson could do it better than they, and, since it
was becoming a prominent issue of the campaign, I advised
striking a strong note on the subject in order at once to call
attention to himself as a fit champion of the Democratic
cause. I suggested that he let me invite D. F. Houston,' who
had made a lifelong study of the question, to come to New
York for consultation.
'The Governor agreed to the advisability of this move,
and Houston came. I gave a dinner at the Gotham [December 7]. The others present besides Governor Wilson
were Houston, Walter Page, McCombs, and Edward S.
Martin. I seated Houston by Wilson and arranged it so they
could talk afterwards. Before dinner I went over the data
which Houston had prepared, and added to it and eliminated from it whatever seemed necessary. This data was
afterwards given to Governor Wilson, who based his tariff
speeches largely on it.'
The effect of Wilson's tariff speeches was destined to put
him in the popular mind as the chief antagonist of Republican policies and therefore the natural representative of the
Democratic point of view. The dinner at the Gotham also
assured the enthusiastic support of Mr. Houston.
1 Formerly President of the University of Texas; at this time Chancellor of Washington University, and later a member of Wilson's Cabinet.




48 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Dr. D. F. Houston to Dr. S. E. Mezes
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
ST. Louis, December 11, 1911
MY DEAR MEZES:... I have just returned from New York, where I saw a
great deal of Mr. House and something of some other people.
I will tell you all about it, including the Wilson part of it.
Wilson is the straightest thinking man in public life, and can
say what he thinks better than any other man. He may not
be a great executive officer, but neither was Lincoln, and I
am for him. Wilson is clean, courageous, and disinterested.
It will be a liberal education to the community to have Wilson do the talking, such of it as he ought to do and will have
to do.
I can't tell you how much I enjoyed my visit with Mr.
House, especially on the train. He has a vision. I should
like to make him Dictator for a while....
Cordially yours
D. F. HOUSTON
The various booms for candidates were now beginning to
assume definite form. The Wilson movement was regarded
more seriously by the practical machine politicians than
hitherto, but wiseacres believed that the final struggle would
be between Underwood of Alabama and Harmon of Ohio.
Both were regarded as representing conservative interests.
Champ Clark of Missouri, esteemed a radical, was mentioned by those who realized the difficulty of success with
a conservative standard-bearer and who feared that Wilson,
after his fight with the New Jersey bosses, would not be inclined to accept the orders of any machine.
Both House and Governor Wilson understood that the approval of Bryan would be a factor essential to the success of
Wilson's candidacy, and from the autumn until the time




NURSING BRYAN


49


of the nominating convention, House worked ceaselessly to
secure it. The intimacy with Mr. Bryan which he had
developed in Texas now proved of inestimable value, for he
knew exactly which of Wilson's qualities would attract
Bryan and therefore deserved emphasis; he laid especial
weight upon the'fact that the reactionary forces in the
Democratic Party were fighting both Bryan and Wilson.
'Before I left for Texas, in December, 1911 [wrote House],
it was understood that I should nurse Bryan and bring him
around to our way of thinking, if possible. Before Mr. Bryan
left New York for Jamaica, he asked me to keep him informed concerning political conditions and to send him such
clippings as I thought would be of interest. He said he was
taking but few papers: the World, the Washington Post, I
think he mentioned, because I wondered why he took either
of them, since they were both so antagonistic to him.
'However, his request gave me an opportunity to send
him such clippings as I thought would influence him most in
our direction.'
As early as November, we find House writing to Senator
Culberson: 'I saw Mr. Bryan just before he sailed for
Jamaica and I think I removed several obstacles that were
in his mind, and I got him in almost as good an attitude as
one could desire.' Thereafter House called Bryan's attention to all the Wilson characteristics likely to attract his
approval.
Colonel House to Mr. W. J. Bryan
NEW YORK, November 25, 1911
DEAR MR. BRYAN:... Governor Wilson called yesterday afternoon and was
with me for an hour and a half.
I am pleased to tell you that when I asked him what he




50 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


thought of the Supreme Court ruling about which we talked
when you were here, he replied in almost the exact terms
you used to me. As far as I can see, your positions are
identical.
He is also opposed to the Aldrich plank, but I think you
are both wrong there. You will have to convert me the next
time I see you.
I am inclined to think that Aldrich is trying to give the
country a more reasonable and stable system. It seems to
me a long way in advance of the money trust which now
dominates the credit of the nation.
There is some evidence that Mr. Underwood and his
friends intend to make a direct issue with you for control of
the next convention, and it looks a little as if they were receiving some aid from Champ Clark and his friends.
My feeling is that we can lay them low, but we must not
lag in the doing of it....
Faithfully yours
E. M. HoUSE
NEW YORK, December 6, 1911
DEAR MR. BRYAN:
"..I was called over the telephone last week by a friend of
Mr. Hearst, who made an appointment to see me. He said
that Mr. Hearst had been out to his country place on Sunday
and they had talked about enlisting me in his behalf for the
presidential nomination.
I told him that I was thoroughly committed to Governor
Wilson and that, even if I were not, I would advise Mr.
Hearst to submerge himself for a while and work within the
party for a season. After further conversation it developed
that he was grooming himself for a dark horse.
1 For a central bank. Wilson ultimately accepted House's arguments
for centralized control of banking which materialized in the Federal Reserve Act. See Chapter VI.




COLONEL HARVEY ON WILSON


51


I do not know what effect my talk had, but as yet he
has made no formal announcement.
I learned, too, that he was favorable to Underwood or
Champ Clark and was against Governor Wilson.
I took lunch with Colonel Harvey yesterday. It is the
first time I have met him. I wanted to determine what his
real attitude was towards Governor Wilson, but I think I
left as much in the dark as ever.
He told me that everybody south of Canal Street was in a
frenzy against Governor Wilson and said they were bringing
all sorts of pressure upon him to oppose him. He said he told
them he had an open mind, and that if they could convince
him he was a dangerous man he would do so.
He said that Morgan was particularly virulent in his opposition to Governor Wilson. I asked him what this was
based upon, and he said upon some remark Governor Wilson
had made in Morgan's presence concerning the methods of
bankers and which Morgan took as a personal reference.
He told me that he believed that any amount of money
that was needed to defeat Governor Wilson could be readily
obtained. He said he would be surprised if they did not put
$250,000 in New Jersey alone in order to defeat delegates
favorable to his nomination.
We are going to try to devise some plan by which we can
use this Wall Street opposition to Governor Wilson to his
advantage. If the country knows of their determination to
defeat him by the free use of money, I am sure it will do the
rest....
If you can make any suggestions regarding the best way
to meet the Wall Street attack, I would greatly appreciate it.
From now, letters will reach me at Austin, Texas.
With kind regards and best wishes for all of you, I am
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSEE; a, a




52 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


There was in the foregoing letter a cleverness which might
escape the too casual reader. In the form of simple narrative Colonel House underlined the activities of Hearst, who
was anathema to Bryan, and emphasized Hearst's preference for Clark over Wilson; he then indicated the interest
Wall Street exhibited in the defeat of Wilson; and he concluded by an assumption that Bryan would naturally align
himself with the forces that stimulated the enmity of Hearst
and Wall Street. Mr. Bryan evidently wavered. He had
opposed Harmon from the first, as a rank reactionary, and he
refused to consider Underwood. If Clark were to have the
support of the New York group, Bryan might be drawn to
Wilson.
Mr. W. J. Bryan to Colonel House
KINGSTON, JAMAICA
December 28, 1911
MY DEAR MR. HOUSE:... Am anxious to get back and find out more of the
political situation. I shall attend the Washington banquet
on the 8th of January and will have a chance to learn how
things are shaping up.
I am glad Governor Wilson recognizes that he has the opposition of Morgan and the rest of Wall Street. If he is nominated it must be by the Progressive Democrats, and the
more progressive he is the better.
The Washington banquet will give him a good chance to
speak out against the trusts and the Aldrich currency scheme.
Yours very truly
W. J. BRYAN
The Washington banquet, to which he referred, gave a
good chance to Bryan himself to exhibit his personal generosity, for just before it Wilson's opponents published a
letter which, while President of Princeton, he had written to




BRYAN AND WILSON


53


Mr. Adrian Joline, some five years previous. In the letter
appeared this unfortunate sentence: 'Would that we could
do something at once dignified and effective to knock
Mr. Bryan once for all into a cocked hat.' It would have
been only human nature if the Commoner had then and
there forsworn Mr. Wilson and all his works. Instead, he
did not permit himself to show any pique and at the dinner
manifested the utmost cordiality to the Governor, who himself in a speech of rare discretion emphasized the admiration
that all good Democrats felt towards Mr. Bryan.
It is possible that his friendliness towards Wilson was
enhanced by the controversy between the Governor and
Colonel George Harvey, which received much publicity as
the result of a spirited exchange of letters between Mr.
McCombs and Colonel Watterson. For Bryan distrusted
Harvey as a representative of New York interests.
House appreciated keenly the part which Colonel Harvey
had played in setting Governor Wilson on the road to political fortune. Harvey had encouraged him to give up his
academic career and try the luck of politics; he had influenced the New Jersey machine to give him the nomination
for Governor. From the first he had worked with the possibility of the presidential nomination in mind. But the fervor
with which he supported Wilson in Harper's Weekly raised
suspicions in the Middle West that the Governor, through
Harvey, was putting himself under obligations to New York
financial interests. This was so obvious that House had discussed with his friend E. S. Martin, editor of Life and also an
associate editor of Harper's Weekly, the desirability of a less
enthusiastic support of Wilson by the Weekly. After House
left New York, Colonel Harvey put the question direct to
Wilson, as to whether the Governor felt this support to be
injurious; the reply of the latter was perhaps too brusque
an affirmative. The affair might have passed as a minor incident, had it not been for the emotion displayed in the press




54 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


by McCombs on the one side and Watterson on the other.
It was a moment when the conciliatory influence of House,
then absent in Texas, would have proved valuable.
Colonel House to Mr. E. S. Martin
AUSTIN, TEXAS, January 18, 1912
DEAR MARTIN:
What a mess we have made with the Harper's WeeklyHarvey-Wilson matter. I feel it is largely my fault, and yet
I had no thought of it taking any such direction. I would
rather be defeated for the Presidency than even be under
the suspicion of ingratitude, and, according to Colonel
Watterson, Governor Wilson was almost brutal. I hope this
is exaggerated.
All I had in mind was for Harper's not to be so strenuous,
but I never remotely considered wounding Colonel Harvey's feelings nor the breaking of the friendship between
Governor Wilson and himself....
Faithfully yours
E. M. HouSE
Both the Harvey episode and the publication of the Joline
letter ultimately worked in favor of Mr. Wilson. In the Middle West and the South the impression became current that
the Governor had braved the New York interests in refusing
Harvey's support and had displayed honesty in telling Harvey that he did not want it. In Texas Mr. Gregory skilfully
utilized a remark of Colonel Watterson, who had taken up
the cudgels in favor of Harvey. Watterson spoke rather
sneeringly of the 'austere truthfulness of the schoolmaster.'
There was in Texas, a rural community, a great free school
system and some forty thousand school teachers. Mr. Gregory at once gave full publicity to the phrase, asking whether
Wilson should have lied in answer to Harvey's question and




BRYAN AND WILSON


55


whether this was not a time when austere truthfulness was
desirable even from a schoolmaster. The next day forty
thousand Texan school teachers were behind Wilson.
Bryan, reassured by Wilson's quarrel with Harvey, obviously felt kindly toward him after his own magnanimous
treatment of the 'cocked hat' incident. While still warm
with the sense of having acted in a rather large way, he continued to receive the commendatory letters of Colonel
House that always emphasized, directly or indirectly, the
progressiveness of Wilson and the opposition of Wall
Street to him.
Colonel House to Mr. W. J. Bryan
AUSTIN, TEXAS, January 27, 1912
DEAR MR. BRYAN:... Another thing that has pleased me beyond measure is
your treatment of the Joline-Wilson incident. Your friends
all knew your bigness of mind and heart, but it was an object
lesson to those who thought of you differently.
I am glad that you have taken the position that you have
regarding the Wilson-Harvey controversy. I know a great
deal about it, perhaps as much as any one, and I hope that
I may have the pleasure of discussing it with you when you
come to Texas....
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
AUSTIN, TEXAS, February 2, 1912
MY DEAR GOVERNOR WILSON:... Mr. Bryan is now on his Rio Grande farm, and I have
asked him here before he leaves. In the meantime I will continue to keep in touch with him by correspondence.
Please let me know if there is anything you would like to




56 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


have suggested to him, for there can be no better place to do
this than by the quiet fireside.
I am, my dear Governor,
Your very sincere
E. M. HOUSE
Colonel House to Mr. W. F. McCombs
AUSTIN, TEXAS, February 10, 1912
DEAR MR. MCCOMBS:... Mr. Bryan has gone to Tucson to see his son, but he
promises to stop over and see me at the first opportunity.
He says he did not stop in going through, on account of
reaching Austin at four o'clock in the morning, which he
thought a little early for me.
I sent him some clippings favorable to Governor Wilson,
which he promises to use and asks for more. If you could
think to have sent me things that you would like to have
used in the Commoner, I am sure that I could arrange it.
I agree with you that Mr. Bryan's support is absolutely
essential, not only for nomination but for election afterward;
and I shall make it my particular province to keep in touch
with him and endeavor to influence him along the lines desired.
He has evolved considerably in our direction, for when I
first talked to him in October he did not have Governor Wilson much in mind.
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
Apart from his interest in winning Bryan to the Wilson
cause, House directed his energies to the organization of
Texas, the forty votes of which were bound to exercise a
powerful influence at the Democratic Nominating Convention. As one looks back, it is easy to see that without Bryan
and without the steadfast loyalty and enthusiasm of the




ORGANIZING TEXAS FOR WILSON


57


Texas delegates, Wilson could not have been nominated.
That Colonel House realized this so long before the convention is an indication of the degree to which foresight affected
his plans.
When he arrived in Texas, in December, 1911, he found
that, despite the success of Wilson's Dallas speech, sentiment
had not crystallized in his favor. An energetic campaign
would have to be developed if Wilson delegates were to be
chosen. 'That campaign,' writes Mr. Gregory, who played
an important role in it, 'was the greatest work of organization that I remember. Colonel House had various pieces of
his old political machinery lying around, which he soon
brought together; but we had against us the political forces
of the state. The Chairman and thirty of the thirty-one
members of the State Executive Committee were opposed to
Wilson, the Governor did not favor him, and Senator Joseph
W. Bailey stumped the state against him. Only four of the
Texas Congressmen favored him.'
House mobilized his friends, who for three months stimulated Wilson sentiment in critical districts, without a blare of
trumpets but none the less effectively, it would appear, for
by the beginning of March the Colonel was willing to express
the expectation of a solid Wilson delegation from Texas. He
was the more optimistic in that the Harmon supporters devoted themselves to speeches rather than personal canvassing, a sure method, according to House, of making a noise
and losing the fight.
Colonel House to Mr. W. F. McCombs
AUSTIN, TEXAS, March 4, 1912
DEAR MR. MCCOMBS:.. Confidentially, I have not been at all satisfied with
1 Memorandum of T. W. Gregory. Subsequently Governor Campbell,
a friend of Colonel House and later a member of the Texas delegation at
Baltimore, supported Wilson vigorously in the National Convention.




58 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


our organization in this State; but I am glad to tell you that
it is now getting in such shape that I feel I can say that you
need have no further concern about Texas.
I will not go into details now, further than to let you know
that it is in process of complete organization and that we
find the sentiment largely for Governor Wilson.
Strangely enough, the opposition are doing practically
nothing in an effective way, except to blow in the newspapers....
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
AUSTIN, TEXAS, March 6, 1912
MY DEAR GOVERNOR WILSON:
I am pleased to tell you that we now have everything in
good shape in Texas and that you may confidently rely upon
the delegates from this State.
We may or may not have a presidential primary, but the
result will not be changed.
In two or three weeks our organization will be perfected,
and then I shall leave for the East where I shall have the
pleasure of seeing you.
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
Mr. Wilson replied that House's news brought great cheer
when he most needed it. The Governor had been discouraged
by the news from Kansas and Michigan, where he felt the
Wilsonian forces ought to have won, and he declared that the
Colonel's success in Texas and the knowledge that he would
soon be East to offer his counsel put him in heart again.
Wilson was troubled by the suspicion of a combination
against himself of Clark, Underwood, and Harmon, with a
division of territory, and by what he regarded as evidence




THE THREAT OF CHAMP CLARK


59


of its being financed from Wall Street. And he expressed
the fear that the 'dear old party' might become the tool of
reactionaries.
III
In April Colonel House returned to New York, satisfied
that Texas was safe for Wilson, but disturbed by the failure
of the Wilson forces to make the progress elsewhere that had
been expected. For the political situation had changed since
autumn. The conservative leaders, who favored Harmon or
Underwood, appreciated the strength of liberal feeling in the
party and realized that Wilson by assuming the leadership
of the liberals might run away with the nomination. To defeat him the Harmon, Underwood, and Clark supporters combined to concentrate in each State upon the strongest candidate opposed to Wilson. The result was that the threat of
Champ Clark, in particular, began to appear dangerous.
Bryan had endorsed him as a liberal and the conservatives
preferred him to Wilson, for he was a 'practical politician'
with whom they could negotiate. At least he would serve to
deadlock the convention against Wilson. 'Nobody regards
Clark seriously,' wrote House to Gregory, 'except as a means
to defeat Wilson.'
After a few days in the East, House recognized the
strength of the combination that was putting Clark forward.
Pennsylvania went for Wilson, but the South and the Middle West were cold. 'Illinois hit us a pretty bad jolt,' wrote
House to Burleson on April 11. 'It was not that we expected
to carry it, but we did not expect to lose by so heavy a vote.'
A few days later, Nebraska declared for Champ Clark. The
Colonel recorded that at the end of May it looked as if the
anti-Wilson forces would triumph. Bryan remained neutral
as between Clark and Wilson.


'I had seen Mr. Bryan in New York [wrote Colonel House]




60 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


almost immediately upon arrival in April, and had persuaded him to declare his belief that either Clark or Wilson
would be an acceptable candidate. I could not get him to go
further than this, although I pointed out that all his enemies
were in the combination to defeat Wilson.
'Mrs. Bryan helped me in getting a favorable decision for
Woodrow Wilson. I remember I breakfasted with the Bryans at the Holland House, and every argument I made in
behalf of Wilson was supplemented by Mrs. Bryan.'
The Commoner refused as yet, however, definitely to commit himself, and Colonel House could not avoid the suspicion
that Mr. Bryan regarded it as a good Democratic year and
would not scorn the nomination.
Colonel House to Senator C. A. Culberson
NEW YORK, May 1, 1912
DEAR SENATOR:... It looks to me as if the opposing candidates might
again be Bryan and Roosevelt. In that event, I think Roosevelt would beat him. He would get his share of the progressive vote and most of the conservative vote. Bryan
thinks he could beat Roosevelt, but in my opinion, he could
beat Taft more easily.
Wilson's best chance now, I think, is the fear of many
people that Bryan will be nominated and the further fear
that Hearst may succeed in landing Champ Clark and then
dominate the Administration.
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
As May passed, prospects appeared brighter; and the result of the Texas convention, which, as House had predicted,
was wholly in Wilson's favor, gave impetus to the cause.
The Colonel relied upon the forty delegates from Texas to




WILSON ADVISED TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY 61


stand firm, and his confidence was justified. He told them to
consider no second choice. Mr. Gregory records that shortly
before the convention, 'Tammany made an offer to the
Texas delegation that, if they would drop Wilson, Tammany
would support Culberson; but the delegation, which included
Culberson himself, simply laughed at them.'
House also relied upon the fact that many delegates instructed for Clark or Underwood approved Wilson in their
hearts and would vote for him as soon as it became obvious
that their candidates could not be chosen and they were released from their pledges. He now advised Wilson to proceed carefully, for he felt that Bryan, influenced by his wife,
was more favorable, and he feared the tactical mistake
which at the last moment so frequently spoils a candidate's
chances.
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
BEVERLY, MASSACHUSETTS
June 7, 1912
DEAR GOVERNOR WILSON:
I have a letter from Mr.   this morning, telling me
that he has suggested some things to you, which I hope you
will not consider....
In my opinion, everything is being done that should be
towards influencing the delegates in your behalf. Plans for
organizing them into an efficient and effective force at Baltimore are already under way, and will bemuch more potent
than anything Mr.    has suggested.
If I see the situation rightly, there has never been a time
when your nomination seemed so probable as now, and if I
were you I would move cautiously and do nothing further for
the present.
I do not doubt but that a large part of your time has been
taken up, as indeed has Mr. McCombs' and mine, by people
giving advice which, if acted upon, would defeat our ends.




62 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Do you recall what I told you concerning the conversation
I had with Mrs. B.? I have a letter this morning from her
containing this most significant sentence: 'I found Mr. B.
well and quite in accord with the talk we had.' 1
It encourages me to believe that Mr. Clark will never receive that influence and that you will. It also means that he
[Bryan] will not want the nomination unless two Republican
tickets are in the field.
If your engagements will permit, I hope that we may have
the pleasure of seeing you here before the 25th.
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
Governor Wilson replied in a manner that would have surprised some of his later critics. He not merely thanked
House for his advice, but confessed that he stood in need of
it, for at first he had been inclined to follow Mr. — 's suggestion. Not only did he admit he was wrong, but he promised not to act independently in the future.
IV
Colonel House was not at the Baltimore Convention
which nominated Wilson. Because of his health he was accustomed to flee American summer heat, and even the importance of this particular crisis did not prevent him from
following his regular habit, which was to spend the summer
in Europe. When the convention met, he was on the ocean.
This absence did not eliminate his influence. In Texas he
had been present at only three of the nominating conventions that chose the candidates he had supported; he was
accustomed to lay his plans so carefully that they could be
clearly understood and definitely executed by his lieutenants. Thus we find him, during the weeks that immediately
preceded the convention, in close consultation with Mr.
1 Evidently suggesting that Bryan was veering away from Clark.




BEFORE THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION 63


McCombs and spending long hours with the leaders of the
Texas delegation, which was promised the r61e of Old Guard
in the approaching battle.
'On June 1 [the Colonel recorded] McCombs and I went to
Beverly, Massachusetts, where we had taken a house for the
summer. McCombs was so run down in health that I did not
think he would be able to go to the Baltimore Convention on
June 25. Governor Wilson thought I was mistaken about
this and that he was tougher than his appearance indicated.
I was sure, however, he needed the rest; and I was also sure
he needed what suggestions and coaching I might be able to
give him in regard to handling conventions, because he had
never had any experience in such matters.'
In these consultations Mr. T. W. Gregory and Mr. T. A.
Thomson of the Texas delegation played a prominent part.
They were to hold the fort against Clark, who had already
secured a majority of the delegates and who, if his strength did
not weaken on the early ballots, threatened to gather enough
more to obtain the necessary two thirds. Underwood was
strong in the South, but among the Southern delegations
there was bitter opposition to Clark which the Texans were
able to capitalize.
'It looked to me [recorded House] as if Wilson had a good
chance, but nothing more. I urged both Gregory and Thomson to use their influence with the Texas delegation to hold
it as a unit and to stay in the fight in the same way we had
been accustomed to do in Texas. The history of the Convention records the work of those forty delegates from
Texas, without whose loyalty and intelligent support the
President could never have been nominated.'


What House advised was to assign to each influential




64 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


member of the Texas delegation the task of working upon
some other delegation with whom he had personal relations,
and to secure mutual understanding that in no contingency
would either yield to pressure from the Clark forces. This
plan had evidently long been in Colonel House's mind, for
as far back as December, 1911, he had written to a Southern
friend, William Garrott Brown: 'It goes without saying that
we will make no move adverse to Mr. Underwood in his own
State, but we will expect our friends to see that delegates
are selected there not unfriendly to Governor Wilson for
second choice.' Mr. Gregory thus describes his own activities:
'Champ Clark had by far the largest convention vote of
any of the candidates, and it was evident that he must first
be disposed of before any of the other candidates would have
a chance. In these circumstances the Wilson people made
airtight agreements with a sufficient number of delegates
instructed for candidates other than Clark, to the effect that
under no conditions would any parties to the agreement vote
for Clark; there was no agreement as to what would be done
after Clark had been eliminated. The delegates involved in
this agreement constituted more than one third of the convention vote, and against this stone wall the forces of Champ
Clark battered in vain.'
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
BEVERLY, MASSACHUSETTS
June 20, 1912
DEAR GOVERNOR WILSON:
I am sorry beyond measure that it is my fate not to be
able to be at the Baltimore Convention. Both my inclination and my deep interest in your success call me there, but
I am physically unequal to the effort.
However, I have done everything that I could do up to




SAILING FOR ENGLAND


65


now to advise and to anticipate every contingency. I have
had interviews with many delegates, and some of my warm
personal friends on the Texas delegation will be here to-morrow in order to have a final word.
Colonel Ball, who is perhaps the most forceful man on the
Texas delegation and the one best equipped for floor tactics,
has wired me that he will be in Baltimore to-day.
I have told Mr. McCombs of those upon whose advice and
loyalty he can lean most heavily, and now I feel that I can do
nothing further excepting to send my good wishes.
If Mr. Clark's strength crumbles on the second and third
ballot —which I hope may be the case —then I believe
that you will be nominated forthwith; but if, on the other
hand, his vote clings to him and he begins to get the uninstructed vote, he may be nominated.
We are sailing for England on the Cunard S.S. Laconia on
the 25th at six o'clock, but Mr. McCombs has promised to
tell me of the result by wireless; and if you are nominated I
shall return almost immediately.
I shall at least have the benefit of the trip over and back,
and that is one of the reasons I am going on the 25th rather
than waiting until after I know the result....
If you will permit me to act as your friend in an advisory
capacity, it will give me pleasure to use my every effort in
your behalf.
With kind regards and best wishes, I am
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
BEVERLY, MASSACHUSETTS
June 23, 1912
DEAR GOVERNOR WILSON:
T. W. Gregory and T. A. Thomson, two of the delegates
from Texas, have just left me.
I have never known two better organizers than they are,




66 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


and I have outlined to them in detail what to do at Baltimore with Mr. McCombs' approval.
I am afraid that if thorough organization is not had, we
will find fifty of our friends working upon one delegation and
perhaps no one attending to another delegation of equal
importance.
I have suggested that the forty men from Texas be divided into four units of ten, and each given one of the doubtful Southern States. The same methods should be pursued
with New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and other loyal
delegations. In this way the work becomes effective and
good results follow.
I have urged them to make friends with the delegations to
which they are assigned, to influence and entertain them in
one way and another until the convention is ended....
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
On June 25 Colonel House sailed, and on the same day
the Democratic Convention met at Baltimore. Its history
has been told many times and we may merely remind ourselves of the bitter struggle between the liberal and conservative forces, and of how Clark, originally put forward to
break the Wilson movement, soon threatened to run away
with the convention. His strength did not crumble, as
House had hoped, after the first few ballots and, if we
may believe Wilson's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, even
McCombs despaired. At this juncture appeared the value of
the plans made by House during the winter and spring. The
Wilson delegates, at first in a small minority, stood firm, led
by the band of forty from Texas. Gradually, as the cause of
Underwood appeared hopeless, Wilson began to pick up
votes from the delegations of which he was second choice;
the Clark forces weakened. And at the critical moment the
arguments that House had so constantly pressed upon




WILSON'S NOMINATION


67


Bryan, during the winter and spring, bore fruit. The New
York delegation, dominated by Tammany, attacked Wilson
and supported Clark with such vigor that Bryan was finally
convinced that Wilson must be the right man. His intervention proved decisive, and on the forty-sixth ballot Wilson
received the nomination.
Colonel House had not yet reached England when the
issue was determined.
'I received the notification of the nomination of Wilson
by wireless, one day out from Liverpool. It was from H. H.
Childers and read, "Wilson wins." It came at ten o'clock at
night. Dr. Arthur Hadley of Yale and some others were
playing cards at the time. I told Hadley that perhaps he
would be glad to know that Woodrow Wilson had been nominated at Baltimore. I was sadly mistaken in my supposition that the knowledge of this would give him pleasure, for
I never saw a man who evinced less enthusiasm.'
v
The real struggle of 1912 was for the nomination. It
would have been far otherwise had the Republican Party remained united and presented its normal strength at the polls;
in such a case the election of Wilson would have been difficult, if not impossible. But the dissensions which during
the spring had already threatened Republican solidarity culminated in Republican disaster at the Chicago Convention,
where Taft was nominated; for the adherents of Roosevelt
bolted, organized the Progressive Party, and in August nominated their hero.
Most well-informed observers, while they conceded the
personal popularity of Roosevelt, believed that the lack of
an established organization would certainly prevent his
election; nor did they believe that Taft, now deprived of the
support of the most vigorous elements in the party, would




68 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


prove a dangerous candidate. Wilson might count upon the
approval of many regular Republicans who detested Roosevelt and who realized that the surest means of defeating him
would be to elect Wilson. The issue proved the accuracy of
such prognostications. Generalizations are usually misleading, but in this case the historian may venture the assertion that in 1912 Roosevelt put Wilson in the White House.
Colonel House was among those who believed that the
result of the split in the Republican Party would be certain
Democratic victory. Hence he did not cut short the travels
that he had planned for the summer of 1912, which included
Sweden, Finland, Russia as far east as Moscow, Germany,
France, and England. In August, however, he returned
ready to throw himself into the campaign, which soon captured all his time and energy. He was delighted with the
liberalism and eloquence displayed in Wilson's speeches,
which gained in effectiveness as the campaign progressed;
and he found a double assurance of success in the vehemence
with which Roosevelt emphasized the differences between
Republicans and Progressives, in his virulent attacks upon
Taft.
'In my opinion [he wrote Wilson, soon after his return]
the greatest asset that we have is the scare that Roosevelt is
giving the conservative Republicans, and I have found that
my efforts in proselyting prominent Taft adherents have
been successful whenever I have been able to show that a
vote for Taft is a half-vote for Roosevelt.'
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
BEVERLY, MASSACHUSETTS
August 28, 1912
DEAR GOVERNOR WILSON:... I am trying to get our friends to organize properly in
Vermont and Maine. It looks to me as if they depended too




THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRATIC HARMONY 69
much upon speech-making and noisy demonstrations, and
not enough upon organization.
I have suggested that they get a committee in every precinct, whose business it shall be to get out the Democratic
vote and influence as many of the Republican votes as possible.
Upon these committees I have suggested placing a Taft
Republican who is supporting you for one reason or another, a progressive Republican who does not want to vote
for Roosevelt and cannot vote for Taft, and the best Democratic organizer that can be obtained.
If this method is followed, not only in Vermont and
Maine, but in every State in the Union, there will be nothing
left of your opponents that will be worth while.
Your very sincere
E. M. HOUSE
What interested House chiefly was not so much the election of Wilson, which he regarded as certain, as the question
of harmony between the Democratic leaders. Fortunately,
the influence of Mr. Bryan was not among the disturbing
elements. He was naturally satisfied with the part he played
at Baltimore, where he had abdicated his own pretensions,
and his attitude toward the candidate whose success he had
done so much to assure was one of benevolence. Obviously
he was not inclined to interfere with the management of the
campaign.
Mrs. W. J. Bryan to Colonel House
FAIRVIEW, July 27, 1912
MY DEAR MR. HOUSE:
Have been in a mad struggle with mail lately - my desk
is cleared and I celebrate by writing a line to you. Your letter was faithfully delivered by Mr. Thomson, and the correctness of your diagnosis was even then proven. I thought




70 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


of you and Mrs. House several times while the fight was on.
I knew how anxiously you were awaiting bulletins on shipboard.
Just between us three, it was a remarkable fight. I was
never so proud of Mr. Bryan - he managed so well. He
threw the opponents into confusion; they could not keep
from blundering and he outgeneralled them at every point.
After all their careful planning, he wrested the power from
their hands. Under the circumstances I am sure the nomination went to the best place and am entirely satisfied with
the result. Will said all the time he did not think it was his
time, and when we found the way things were set up we were
sure of it.
The people through the country regard him as a hero - he
is filling Chautauqua dates in larger crowds than he has ever
had, and is perfectly well. The mail! The secretary told me
yesterday there are several thousand Baltimore letters still
unopened, and it is almost impossible to handle the daily
increase. I am not telling you these things to boast, but because I know you are interested to know how he is getting
on since he has been 'buried' again.
As to the possibilities in case of Democratic success: I am
not sure what he would do. I know he dislikes routine work
exceedingly, but believe he would do anything to help the
cause....
Did you read the platform? Will got in a provision on
national committeemen that will eliminate the whole ring
four years from now. - This letter seems full of politics, but
we are all interested. My best wishes for a safe return and
kindest regards to Janet, Mrs. H. and yourself.
Sincerely yours
MARY B. BRYAN
Reassured by the friendly attitude of Mr. Bryan, Colonel
House was none the less disturbed by the lack of organiza



TROUBLE BETWEEN McCOMBS AND McADOO 71


tion in the Democratic campaign and the contentions that
had arisen among the campaign leaders. 'They are making
the usual campaign of speeches, publicity, and noisy demonstrations,' he wrote Mr. Houston, 'and if it were not for
the split in the Republican Party the result would be fatal.'
It was true that the Republicans and Progressives firmly refused to permit the Democrats to defeat themselves. But if
the latter were so torn by discord at the moment of victory
as to find it impossible to organize a harmonious administration, there would be small profit in victory.
Much of the difficulty resulted from the illness of Mr.
McCombs, who had been chosen Chairman of the National
Committee and who during the summer found himself unable to stay at Headquarters. Mr. McAdoo, Vice-Chairman,
took active control of affairs. Feeling between the two men
and their adherents became scarcely short of envenomed.
It was the first news that reached House upon his arrival
from Europe.
'We landed at Boston [he recorded] and motored to Beverly, where messengers began to come telling of discord and
demoralization at Democratic Headquarters. Those that
brought their tales first were adherents of McCombs, and
my sympathy was largely with him.
'McCombs himself came from the Adirondacks to Boston
for a conference with me. He told a story of perfidy that was
hardly believable. McAdoo was the ringleader and he,
McCombs, was the victim.'
For Colonel House the important matter was party
harmony. Unable to decide exactly where the trouble lay,
although to begin with he sympathized with McCombs, he
was determined that the first Democratic Administration in
twenty years should not be ruined at the outset by the
scandal of a public quarrel. The initial step was to prevent




72 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


the resignation of McCombs, which he threatened at regular
intervals. The next was to come into touch with McAdoo.
Colonel House to Governor Wilson
BEVERLY, MASSACHUSETTS
September 2, 1912
DEAR GOVERNOR:
McCombs is seriously thinking of resigning, and may do
so to-morrow.
There are reasons why his resignation at this time would
be a serious blow to the cause. I cannot go into an explanation here, but you would readily understand the reason if
all the facts were before you....
Mr. McAdoo has asked me to go to Maine, which I shall
do to-morrow night or Wednesday morning; and when I
return I should be glad to come to New York if you will let
me know when you will be there.
Your very sincere
E. M. HOUSE
'I returned to New York [wrote Colonel House] as soon as
the weather would permit, and had a conference with Woodrow Wilson. I asked if he knew of the feud that was going
on between McAdoo and McCombs, and I indicated my
sympathy for McCombs. At that time I knew McAdoo but
slightly, having met him but twice. Wilson asked me not to
make up my mind about the matter until I had learned the
ins and outs of it by personal contact at Headquarters.
'I afterwards learned the wisdom of this advice, for I had
not been in New York more than two weeks before I knew
that there was another side. Later I found that it was almost
wholly McCombs' fault and that McAdoo was scarcely to
blame at all. McCombs was jealous, was dictatorial....
He was not well enough to attend to the campaign himself,
and he could not sit by and allow McAdoo to carry on the




TAMMANY MAKES TROUBLE


73


work and get a certain amount of newspaper publicity. This
latter was particularly galling to McCombs.'
At this moment (September 25, 1912), Colonel House began to make those detailed daily memoranda which, taken
together, form a diary the historical importance of which
can hardly be overstated. Every night, with rare exceptions,
during the following seven years, he dictated his record of
the events of the day, while his recollection was fresh and
definite and with an astounding frankness of expression.
From the first of these memoranda it appears clear that
during these weeks his main task was always the composing
of quarrels. It was a function to which he had become accustomed from his days at school, where, according to a
youthful friend, he loved to incite disputes between his
schoolmates in order to have an opportunity to settle them.
In September and October there were not merely the
difficulties between the leaders at National Headquarters
which must be alleviated, but also the customary disagreement between the National Committee and Tammany Hall.
The New York organization had fought the nomination of
Wilson at Baltimore and would evidently not 'tote fair' in
the election unless Wilson agreed actively to support the
New York State ticket; and this Wilson would not do if it
meant endorsing the Tammany boss, Charles F. Murphy.
As always, there was the danger that Tammany would
trade its support of the presidential candidate against Republican willingness to permit the election of the Democratic candidate for Mayor of New York City the year
following. And this danger was increased by Wilson's attack upon the bosses and his refusal to approve the renomination of Governor Dix, which Murphy demanded.
At National Headquarters there were divided counsels.
McAdoo, who may have himself hoped to be nominated for
Governor, was willing to fight the bosses; McCombs, both




74 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


because of his feud with McAdoo and his political affiliations, was willing to endorse them heartily. House disliked
the bosses and wrote on September 28, 'I believe McAdoo
would be good material for the Governorship.' But he held
that an open breach with Tammany must be avoided at all
costs.
'The New York situation is acute [wrote House, on September 25], and it is necessary for some definite policy to be
decided upon. The break between Murphy and National
Headquarters is becoming wider each day, and the newspapers are printing numerous false interviews which make it
yet wider. I am anxious to hold the party together, so that
every available means may be used for the common good.
My dislike of Tammany and its leaders is perhaps stronger
than that of Governor Wilson; yet, having had more political experience, I am always ready to work with the best material at hand. My idea is to have them decide upon some
unobjectionable Tammany man for Governor of New York
who would not bring discredit upon the party....
'There is much jealousy and back-biting at Headquarters,
and tales are fetched and carried without number until all
harmony is lost. McAdoo and others are anxious to give me
a room for my personal use. I do not desire a room. They
want to give me half of O'Gorman's.1 Every one offers me
some one else's room. McAdoo continues most cordial and
belies the charges of his accusers.. '
Wilson, fulminating against the bosses, was on the point
of attacking Murphy and Dix by name and insisting that
the New York nominating convention formally repudiate
the control of Tammany Hall. It would have meant an open
conflict between the National and the City and State organizations.
1 United States Senator from New York.




SOLUTION OF THE NEW YORK MUDDLE 75


'Governor Wilson [House wrote, September 28] came in
last night from New England, leaving at twelve. He asked
me to take him out in our motor for a conference. He was
particularly anxious to discuss the State situation before
making his speech at McCombs' dinner. McAdoo is urging
him to come out actively against Dix and Murphy. I urged
him not to do this. McCombs is the only link between the
bosses and Wilson. The Governor's inclination is to go after
them. He finally agreed to give out a letter Monday without mentioning either by name....
'October 2: The New York situation is still in a muddle....'
The solution finally discovered by Colonel House was not
without its elements of humor. At least it prevented an open
rupture between the National Democratic organization and
the New York organization. Mr. Murphy, leader of Tammany, agreed to the demand of Wilson, edited by House,
that no man should dictate to the nominating convention
what it must do. Quietly he permitted the impression to
percolate that Governor Dix need not be renominated. At
the convention, he (according to a New York correspondent)
'once Boss Murphy, now metamorphosized by the talisman
of college men's ideals into Leader Murphy, said nothing,
gave no orders-when nominations for Governor were
called reported himself "present, not voting!"' The convention, thus freed from the despotism of the bosses, repudiating Dix, proceeded to nominate the Honorable William
Sulzer, the purest product of the New York City organization. 'The advocates of the bossless convention had won
and nominated a Tammany brave.'
Thus House saved Wilson from the tactical mistake of a
quarrel with Tammany, which would at this moment certainly have failed to dislodge the bosses and must have produced merely disorganization; at the same time he persuaded Murphy ostensibly to yield to Wilson's leadership.




76 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Press reports gave him full credit: 'Just what the wise Texan
whispered into the Princeton ears no man may know. But
the club did not fall on the Tammany head.... The good
ship is sailing strong and no breakers ahead. Without Tammany New York was gone. With Tammany New York City
will give Wilson the largest vote ever recorded for a Democratic candidate.... The story of Democratic success is
almost ready to be told. Only one thing can preventWilson himself. If he makes no blunder! He almost did in
the matter of New York - but Ed House is still here.' 1
Later, when the leadership of Wilson in the party had been
assured, House urged a vigorous assault upon Tammany;
but a less propitious moment than the autumn of 1912 could
not have been selected.
More difficult, however, was the situation caused by the
physical and nervous condition of the Democratic Chairman.
Much of House's time and energy was consumed in quieting
the suspicions of Mr. McCombs, in persuading him to avoid
indiscretions, and to forget enmities. It was not the first or
the last occasion upon which Colonel House served the cause
of harmony by assuming the ungrateful role of buffer.
'October 3: McCombs and McAdoo had an interview, and
I hope that a more amicable relation will follow. The Governor was particularly anxious to have this brought about,
and said he knew that I could do it if it could be done at all.
'October 8: I went to see McCombs. I do not like his
affiliations or methods. He is very secretive and will only
interview one personat a time, although he seems to have
no secrets from me. He suggested getting rid of McAdoo by
giving him the presidency of some railroad out West, which
he said he could secure for him....
'October 13: McCombs is very emphatic that no campaign promises, either direct or indirect, have been made.
1 Press despatch by Pat Lay, New York, October 4, 1912.




McCOMBS IN A PANIC


77


I talked to Governor Wilson, urging him also not to make
any promises. He says he has not, but he does not altogether trust McCombs in this direction....
'October 24: McCombs is in a panic, and believes there is a
chance of losing New York, Illinois, and Wisconsin...
'October 25: I went to Headquarters at eleven and met
McCombs as I was leaving.... He was countermanding
everybody's orders, without regard to authority.... McAdoo
tells me that the Governor thinks it best not to address
him [McAdoo] in future, and McAdoo asked him not to
consider him in any way. He said he would do the best he
could until the campaign was over, and then he wished to be
forgotten. I did not tell McAdoo that the Governor was
doing this at my suggestion and because I am afraid of an
open scandal between McCombs and himself....
'October 26: Very little is being done at Headquarters excepting routine work. I went over each department, after
seeing McAdoo at nine at his hotel. McCombs is in conference most of the time with old-style politicians. The whole
character of the callers has changed since he took charge, and
for the worse. I fear Governor Wilson will have trouble on
account of connections made at this time....
'October 31: McAdoo is not in evidence at all, and has
almost effaced himself to secure harmony.. '
VI
At the height of the campaign the country was shocked by
the news that a fanatic had shot Mr. Roosevelt, who was on
a speaking tour, and that, while he would recover from the
wound, his personal campaign was at an end.11 Colonel
House, in opposition to the members of the Democratic
1 Mr. Roosevelt, whose life was saved by the manuscript of his speech
and his glasses' case in his breast pocket, recovered so rapidly that he was
able to address an enthusiastic rally in Madison Square Garden just
before the election.




78 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Campaign Committee, insisted that Mr. Wilson should cancel his speaking engagements, for it did not seem quite
sporting for him to continue his vigorous campaign so long
as his most redoubtable adversary was laid low.
'October 18: Everything is upset to-day over the attempted
assassination of Theodore Roosevelt....
'I telephoned Governor Wilson at Princeton while Burleson was here, urging him to cancel all engagements until
Roosevelt was able to get out again. Wilson was at first
doubtful, but wrote out a statement, which he read to me
over the telephone, following my suggestions as to what to
say. All of the Campaign Committee were against me in
this. They wanted the Governor to continue speech-making,
and so advised him. My thought was that if he continued to
speak after T. R. had been shot, it would create sympathy
for T. R. and would do Wilson infinite harm. The situation
is a dangerous one and needs to be handled with care. The
generous, the chivalrous, and the wise thing to do, so it
seems to me, is to discontinue speaking until his antagonist
is also able to speak. I am glad Wilson sees it as I do. He
suggested that we might delay a decision until to-morrow
and get the opinion of the full Committee, but I disagreed
with this and said that the delay would be disadvantageous.
Then, too, it would make it embarrassing if the Committee
differed from him, as they certainly would, for their individual opinions have already been expressed. Burleson
thinks I took too much responsibility in advising contrary to
the rest of the Committee... '
The Colonel's opinion carried the day, and Wilson's
speaking tour was abandoned. The effect of this gesture,
combined with the exchange of cordial telegrams of sympathy and appreciation between Wilson and Roosevelt,
was certainly not disadvantageous to Wilson's campaign.




BILL McDONALD TO PROTECT WILSON 79


' The best politics,' House used to say, 'is to do the right
thing.'
The attack upon Roosevelt immediately drew House's
attention to the danger of a similar attempt upon Wilson's
life, and he bethought himself of his old Texas friend the
Ranger, McDonald. Captain Bill would furnish complete
protection and ideal company for the Governor. There was
also the advantage that McDonald, as House well knew,
would waste no time in discussion as to whether the trip
from Texas were worth while or what preparations he ought
to make.
Colonel House to Captain McDonald
[Telegram]
NEW YORK, October 15, 1912
Come immediately. Important. Bring your artillery.
E. M. HOUSE
Captain McDonald to Colonel House
[Telegram]
QUANAH, TEXAS, October 16, 1912
Coming.
MCDONALD
Colonel House to Dr. D. F. Houston
NEW YORK, October 22, 1912
DEAR DOCTOR HOUSTON:.. I got the Governor to let me send for Bill McDonald
after the T. R. assault. I merely wired Bill to come at once... He thought I was in trouble, so he borrowed a shirt from
one of his friends, boarded the train without money (which
he borrowed on the way), and landed here in a little over two
days after leaving Quanah.
I took him from the station to Headquarters, and it hap



80 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


pened that Judge Parker and Norman Mack were in McCombs' rooms when I brought Bill in. He had on his big
white Stetson and a four days' growth of beard, and I need
not tell you he created a sensation....
Mrs. Wilson told me on Sunday that she had slept better
Saturday night than at any time since T. R. was shot. They
all seem pleased with Bill.
I arranged to keep him out of the papers, and he has
refused to open his mouth to any one about anything. I
told him when he came not to say a word to anybody, and he
is carrying it out literally. I heard a reporter ask him who
I was, and that is the only time I have heard him speak. He
told the fellow that he was a stranger in New York and did
not know.
The mayor and police of one town that I know tried to disarm Bill after he was out of the Ranger Service and had no
right to carry arms, but they were unable to accomplish their
purpose. I would like to see the New York police try it.
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
Wilson and his protector became fast friends. A fortnight
after McDonald's arrival, House noted:
'I arose at seven and went over to see Governor Wilson
and Captain Bill at the Hotel Collingwood. They were just
leaving for the train, but we had a few minutes' conversation. Bill said the Governor was the finest fellow in the
world, and the Governor seemed equally pleased with Bill
and said he was taking good care of him.'
After the election McDonald returned to Texas, with
keen appreciation of his Eastern experiences, but without
reluctance to leave the hard city pavements. He once complained to Colonel House: 'Ed, I get awful tired of walking




THE ELECTION RETURNS


81


on these rocks.' He was not entirely uncritical of the protection provided eminent public servants by the Government.
'November 8: Old Bill arrived [recorded House], and after
talking with him I think it is best for him to return home for
the present. The Wilsons were sorry to see him leave. He
looked over the secret service men to see if he thought them
fit. He told me that they did well enough, but he did not
like their carrying.38's. When he said this to the secret
service men, they did not like it and replied: "A.38 will kill
a man all right." "Yes," said Bill, "if you give him a week
to die in." I find that he has talked much of me and my
political work in Texas to Wilson. The Governor wanted to
know whether I had been successful in all my political campaigns and what kind of men I had chosen.'
VII
The last days of the campaign were not marked by the
customary excitement, for the result of the election had become a foregone conclusion. The contest between Roosevelt
and Taft had split the anti-Wilson vote so effectively that a
Democratic landslide in the electoral college appeared certain.
As election returns came in on November 5, it soon became
clear that Democratic confidence in overwhelming victory
was fully justified. Mr. Taft carried only two states, Roosevelt only 88 electoral votes. It is true that Wilson's popular
vote was less than a majority, but his plurality in the electoral college was the greatest ever received by a presidential
candidate, and he carried with him handsome Democratic
majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives.
'I went to Headquarters [wrote House on the evening of
election day], and saw a few people, but nothing of importance was going on. By half-past six o'clock it was evident




82 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


that Wilson had won, so I sent him a telegram of congratulation. By seven o'clock returns were in enough to enable
one to see that it was a Wilson landslide.
'I went down to the Waldorf Hotel, where McCombs had
invited guests to hear the returns. He had taken nearly one
side of the hotel, and there were about twenty-five people
there....'
It was a season of triumph for McCombs, who as Chairman
of the Committee received fervid praise. It was one of equal
although less obvious triumph for Colonel House, whose
share in the campaign only a few of the more keen-sighted
realized. He held no office in the party organization, his
goings and comings at Headquarters were unostentatious.
But there was no thread in the campaign pattern which he
had not touched, no symptom of party discord which had not
evoked his genius for pacification.(! The new Wilson Administration might have been wrecked at the moment of victory.
This the President-elect understood and his gratitude to
House was unfeigned.
Two days after the election, replying to House's note of
congratulation, he declared that no small part of Democratic success must be ascribed to the counsels of the Colonel.
Whether or not the victory at the polls could be capitalized to ensure a positive programme of reform legislation,
was the question of the future and to it Colonel House had
already turned his attention.
1 "'He would come into an office," explained a Democratic Committeeman, "and say a few words quietly, and after he had gone you would
suddenly become seized with a good idea. You would put that idea forth
and receive congratulations for it; it would work out first rate. Long
after, if you thought the thing over, you would suddenly realize that the
idea had been oozed into your brain by Col. House during a few minutes'
quiet conversation. You did not know it and the Colonel did not want
you to know it. As a matter of fact, before the campaign was over in his
quiet way Col. House came near being the biggest man about the works,
although he did not hold any position and would not take one."'Current Opinion, vol. Iv, no. 6, June, 1913.




CHAPTER IV
BUILDING A CABINET
You can never build a Cabinet to please everybody.... When you
have about concluded that you have the proper man, some one will come
along and condemn him so vigorously that it will make you doubt.
Therefore, in the end, you will have largely to determine their fitness
yourself.
House to Wilson, November 22, 1912
I
THE victory of 1912 was the first won by the Democrats in
a presidential election since 1892, an even twenty years.
This long exclusion from power laid a tremendous handicap
upon the party and its leaders when they came to organize
an administration; for in the United States the minority
suffers as much materially from being the under-dog as the
majority suffers morally from an over-long lease of control.
The older men of the party which has been in opposition
have developed critical rather than constructive faculties,
and it is long since they have exercised executive functions;
comparatively few younger men of capacity have been attracted to the party, and those few have had no administrative experience. What is worse, long political exile will
have sharpened every one's appetite for office, and the first
indication of success at the polls will sound like a dinner
gong, gathering the ravenous horde of anxious placehunters, whose ability is apt to be in inverse ratio to their
eagerness.
Mr. Wilson did not conceal from himself the particular
difficulties which he, as leader of the party and Presidentelect, must face. He was without political experience except
for his brief tenure of the New Jersey governorship. Although he always maintained that a college president found
ample opportunity to develop political genius, he did not,




84 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


at this time certainly, overestimate his own ability. He
was threatened, furthermore, by a flood of enthusiastic and
contradictory advice. His two chief campaign leaders,
McCombs and McAdoo, were at daggers drawn. The man
who exercised strongest influence in the party, Mr. Bryan,
Wilson regarded as impractical and notoriously mistaken
in his personal judgments. Other leaders, such as Underwood and Champ Clark, he had fought vigorously in the
pre-nomination campaign. Still others, in Congress, upon
whom he must depend for the success of his legislative programme, were ex-Populists, such as Gore of Oklahoma, or
machine politicians, such as Stone of Missouri; both types
Wilson had attacked frequently and fearlessly, and their
assistance in this juncture was at least questionable.
Each and all of them, furthermore, if not applicants for
office themselves, marshalled a solid phalanx of deserving
Democrats who had long and faithfully served the cause
when there had been no hope of immediate reward and for
whom places must be found. As early in the campaign as
September 7, House wrote to Walter Hines Page: 'The wise
man will not envy Governor Wilson even in success, for, as
you say, the office-seekers will sorely beset him. They are
cheerfully dividing up the honors now, and the numbers
engaged in this pleasant pastime will increase as the campaign grows older.'
It was inevitable that Wilson should turn to Colonel
House for assistance. Apart from the warm affection he had
conceived for House, he knew the reputation for political
sagacity which the Colonel had earned in Texas and he
recognized the value of his services in the pre-nomination
and electoral campaigns. House and Wilson, furthermore,
were in close accord upon all important political issues.
Both were ardent liberals, and Wilson's sympathy was not
lessened by his realization that the Colonel's idealism was
touched by a very real sense of the practicable.




THE OFFICE-SEEKERS


85


The factor which counted most heavily in stimulating the
confidence of Wilson was the obviously disinterested attitude of Colonel House. At the beginning he made it plain
that he would ask nothing for his friends and wanted no
office for himself. He was too much the philosopher to be
attracted by the badge of public position, and he was convinced that he could serve the Administration more effectively out of office. 'I would not exchange the confidence
and friendship that Governor Wilson seems to have for me,'
he wrote in November, 'for any office in the land.' Nor
would he give advice on appointments until the President
demanded it.


Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes
NEW YORK, November 4, 1912
DEAR SIDNEY:... My mail is getting heavy with applications, but I
think I know how to handle it. As a matter of fact, I do not
care two whoops in Hades who gets the offices, and Governor
Wilson knows it....
He has the opportunity to become the greatest President
we have ever had, and I want him to make good. He can do
it if the office-seekers will give him leisure to think, and I am
going to try and help him get it....
The Governor spent practically all day with me Saturday,
most of the time at the apartment. It would have done your
heart good to have seen him walk in after we had finished
lunch, and Loulie's expression when I asked him to join us.
It is true that I took the food from under the servants'
noses as they were about to eat it, but the Governor enjoyed what he had nevertheless....
Fraternally yours
E. M. HousE 7,
Ho-/~'




86 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to Senator Culberson
NEW YORK, November 5, 1912
DEAR SENATOR:... It is Governor Wilson's intention to leave in ten days
for a four weeks' absolute rest, and during that time I suppose the boys will decide definitely upon what offices they
will take.
As far as I am concerned, I am not interested in the office
end of it.... I have urged Governor Wilson to leave these
matters largely to his Cabinet, to the Senators and to the
Congressmen, and let them be the buffer between himself
and the hungry host. I rather think he will do this in his own
defence, in order that he may have some leisure to consider
the complex problems that will confront him....
It is that end of his Administration in which I am most
interested. In other words, I am interested in measures and
not in men, and what time I have I shall devote to helping
him in that direction...
Your very faithful
E. M. HOUSE
With every one else trying to tell the President-elect what
he ought to do and every one advising differently, and with
Colonel House refusing to press any claims, Wilson characteristically put full trust in him. House was ready. Long
before the election, regarding Wilson's victory as assured,
he had prepared to help him in every way that he could; and
he knew that the first call for advice would be upon the subject of appointments. However honest he might be in his
interest in measures rather than men, the personnel of the
new Administration was the first great problem to be
faced.
'I am on constant watch for good material [he wrote on
October 21] from which to select a Cabinet and other im



KEEPING OUT OF THE LIME-LIGHT


87


portant places. I wish to be well informed if Governor
Wilson should consult me.'
There was no danger that House would not be well informed of those who desired office.  The applicants themselves saw to that. Party leaders already recognized the influence he had acquired and guessed that his approval might
be the determining factor in an appointment. 'A tremendous
mail arrived from all directions,' he wrote immediately after
the election. 'Every one wants something.' All attempts to
disguise the importance of the position given him by the
President-elect proved fruitless, for Mr. Wilson's frequent
visits to the small apartment on Thirty-Fifth Street were too
well known. From October until the following spring, when
in desperation he left for Europe, the assault upon the
Colonel continued.
Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes
NEW YORK, October 11, 1912
DEAR SIDNEY:... It is not a pose with me, this keeping out of the limelight; but it is my judgment that I can do far more effective
work and accomplish the things I have in mind better by
the methods I have heretofore followed.
I agree with you that it is going to be difficult to keep out
of the papers....
The trouble is, the fact that I am close to Wilson is becoming known; and, since everybody wants something, they
are doing their best to please me and this is the way they
think to do it.
A magazine is trying now to write me up and wants my
photograph, but if they get it it will be when I have lost my
head more completely than I think I have as yet.
Fraternally and hastily yours
E. M. H.




88 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Pressure upon House was increased because Wilson had
determined to go to Bermuda for a rest and before sailing
was slow to confer with the politicians, who one and all
feared that they were not going to find a place in the
picture. The Colonel reassured them and urged patience, at
the same time that he pointed out to Wilson the need of
showing consideration for their sensibilities.
'I telephoned to the Governor [he wrote on November 14]
and advised him to write a note to Mr. Bryan telling him
that he would confer with him after his return from Bermuda. He said he would do so at once. I am to see the
Governor Saturday morning and will advise him concerning
other matters pending. In my opinion he is making a mistake in not calling for advice from political leaders, as they
will become disgruntled.'
Two days later, before Wilson left, he and House drew up
a tentative list for Cabinet positions and discussed the best
means to satisfy those who, by their work in the campaign,
felt that they had earned proper rewards. It was already
agreed that Mr. Bryan must be given his choice of positions.
As far back as September, House recorded that Wilson had
accepted his argument that 'it would be best to make him
Secretary of State, in order to have him at Washington and
in harmony with the Administration, rather than outside and
possibly in a critical attitude. Mrs. Bryan's influence, too,
would be valuable.'
Whatever his capacity, Bryan had come to Wilson's
rescue at Baltimore and might ask for political recognition.
Furthermore, his influence in the party was such that, if
hostile, he could effectively block the legislative programme
and perhaps wreck the Administration. Nothing illustrates
more clearly the exigencies of government under the party
system. Mr. Wilson did not want Bryan in his Cabinet and




DISCUSSING CABINET MATERIAL


89


did not believe him fitted for the Secretaryship of State; but
it was undeniable that the new Administration could carry
through its reform programme more effectively with Bryan
in it. At least there would not be the danger to the public
service that threatened in 1897, when McKinley, in order
to provide a vacancy in the Senate which Mark Hanna
might fill, appointed Senator Sherman Secretary of State.'
The claims of McCombs and McAdoo were placed in the
forefront because of their campaign leadership. Wilson regarded the abilities of the latter highly, but he distrusted the
former's capacity, although he had long had for him a personal fondness. McCombs was in ill-health, lacked evenness
of temper, and was ready to make alliance with the type of
old-fashioned politicians whom Wilson hated. He had done
much to stimulate enthusiasm in the pre-nomination campaign, but the experience of the electoral campaign itself
seemed to indicate that his appointment to a Cabinet position
would not make for harmony, even if he possessed the
requisite administrative capacity.
'November 16: Governor Wilson telephoned me early [recorded Colonel House] and asked if it would be convenient
for him to come over [to House's apartment] at ten o'clock.
He remained for an hour or more and we went over all
matters in the most confidential way. Cabinet material was
discussed.... We discussed what to do with McCombs and
McAdoo. He said he would give the former a first-class
foreign appointment in order to get rid of him. He said he
would be willing to give him the Collectorship of the Port
of New York if it were not that he could build up a formidable political machine. I told him McCombs would not
1 William Roscoe Thayer wrote of this manceuvre: 'To force the venerable Sherman, whose powers were already failing, into the most important office after that of President himself, showed a disregard of
common decency not less than of the safety of the nation.' (The Life of
John Hay, II, 156.)




90 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


think of accepting the Collectorship. I suggested McAdoo
as Secretary of the Treasury, Burleson as Postmaster General. He thought Daniels would be better for Postmaster
General, but I thought he was not aggressive enough and
that the position needed a man who was in touch with Congress. He agreed that this was true.
'We talked again of James C. McReynolds as AttorneyGeneral. We practically eliminated Brandeis for this position...... He asked again about offering Mr. Bryan the
Secretaryship of State or Ambassadorship to England, and
I advised him to do so. He said that he would.'
II
With Wilson's departure for Bermuda, House set seriously
to work investigating the claims and the capacities of the
applicants for office, from lowest to highest. Much of the
work was intensely uncomfortable.
'Visited Headquarters [he noted on November 18] and
spent a disagreeable time with X and Y. Suggested to X
the secretaryship of the Senate, which pays $6000 per year,
but he scorns a position of this kind and wants something
much better. Y is in the same frame of mind. Y abused
McAdoo viciously. When I pressed him, he could not verify
any of his statements. He says he will depend upon McCombs to look out for his interests....
'I am overwhelmed with office-seekers who have probably
seen notices of Governor Wilson having called on me on the
16th. I am busy getting up a list of Cabinet possibilities with
data attached, to send the President-elect for his information....'




DISCUSSING CABINET MATERIAL


91


Colonel House to the President-elect
NEW YORK, November 22, 1912
DEAR GOVERNOR:... James C. McReynolds, of Tennessee, but more recently of New York, is worthy of consideration. Although a
Democrat, Mr. Roosevelt made him special counsel for the
Government in the suit against the Tobacco Trust and the
Anthracite Coal Trust.
He won the Tobacco suit and he has won the suit against
the Coal Trust as far as it has gone. It is now in the Supreme
Court.
McReynolds severed his connection with the Government
because of his disagreement with Mr. Wickersham regarding
the dissolution of the Tobacco Trust. He contended that
Wickersham's plan nullified the effects of the victory.
He is about fifty years old. He is considered radical in
his views by a large part of the New York Bar.l His character and legal attainments are of the highest.
I lunched with Mr. Brandeis yesterday. His mind and mine
are in accord concerning most of the questions that are now
to the fore. He is more than a lawyer; he is a publicist and he
has an unusual facility for lucid expression....
A large number of reputable people distrust him, but I
doubt whether the distrust is well founded, and it would
perhaps attach itself to any man who held his advanced
views.
Norman Hapgood2 lunched with us and I found in him
an enthusiastic admirer of Brandeis. They are both going to
Hot Springs for a few days as guests of Mr. Charles R. Crane.
1 This reputation doubtless resulted from the vigor with which he had
prosecuted the suits against the trusts. As a member of the Cabinet Mr.
McReynolds displayed no radical proclivities, and after he assumed his
seat on the Supreme Court he was generally regarded as one of the most
conservative of the Justices.
2 Editor of Collier's Weekly, 1903-12; of Harper's Weekly, 1913-16;
later appointed Minister to Denmark.




92 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Franklin K. Lane, Democratic Interstate Commerce Commissioner from California, was with me a large part of
yesterday. Lane is fine material, but he is contented with
his present position and would not change it.
You will have some difficulty in selecting your Secretary
of the Interior. The West wants him, but it would perhaps
be a mistake to select him from there. In the first place, he
could not maintain himself with his own people and satisfy
the East. If he satisfied the East, the West would rend
him.' It would also be well not to put an ultra-Eastern man
in that position, for the West would resent such action.
As you know, the East is all for conservation and the Far
West is for it in a limited way - that is, where it does not
conflict with their material interests. The West is anxious
to have the forests and mines opened up and used to an
extent that would aid them commercially.
They are also largely wedded to the idea of state versus
national control, which I think is wrong, but which we need
not go into here.
There is one thing I want to say, and that is this: You
can never build a Cabinet that will please everybody. When
you seek advice you will find but few agreements, even
amongst your friends. When you have about concluded that
you have the proper man, some one will come along and condemn him so vigorously that it will make you doubt. Therefore, in the end, you will have largely to determine their
fitness yourself.
Please do not bother to answer my letters unless there is
something you want me to do.
Your very faithful
E. M. HOUSE
Mr. Lane, who was ultimately appointed, belied this prophecy. Although a Westerner and retaining the confidence of the West, he was
generally spoken of by the Eastern press as one of the most capable
members of Wilson's Cabinet.




POLITICAL DIFFERENCES IN THE PARTY 93


Mr. Wilson wrote from Bermuda, thanking House for his
suggestions. He addressed him, as he had done since the
summer of 1912 and continued to do for five years, as 'My
dear Friend,' and signed himself 'Affectionately yours.' He
expressed himself as able to rest with an equable mind if the
kind American people would not unload their correspondence
upon him, and encouraged House in a prospective trip to
Washington.
Colonel House's visit to Washington was partly, as he
expressed it, 'to find the lay of the land' so that he might
wisely advise Governor Wilson upon his return from Bermuda, and partly to discover means to harmonize the discordant factions in the party. The differences that had
arisen during the campaign were largely personal; those that
now threatened were political and seemed likely to cause
more serious difficulties. There was disagreement over the
legislative programme, especially in the matter of currency
reform; and a storm of greater or less severity seemed likely
to arise over the question of the single term for President,
which was warmly advocated by Bryan and to which Wilson
was strongly opposed. House set himself to persuade the
party leaders to take no step which might later bring them
into conflict with the President. He worked unobtrusively.
Mr. Burleson, a Democratic leader in the House, asked
Senator Gore what he thought of the Colonel. 'Take my
word for it,' replied Gore, 'he can walk on dead leaves and
make no more noise than a tiger.'
His work was none the less effective in that it was quiet,
and it does not spoil the story to say that in the end the
currency and single-term problems were both settled in
accordance with Wilson's wishes.




94 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to the President-elect
NEW YORK, November 28, 1912
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I spent two strenuous but interesting days in Washington.
While there I had an hour with Chief Justice White, by
appointment, and was with him at dinner later.
Among those that called upon me were Speaker Clark,
Hoke Smith, Gore, Culberson, Bob Henry, Burleson, Carter
Glass, and many others. I mention these by name, for each
of them had something interesting to say.
Mr. Clark has not gotten over his defeat. He is inclined
to be friendly with you, but his hatred of Mr. Bryan amounts
to an obsession and it is not unlikely that there will be a
personal difficulty between them when they meet.
Almost at the beginning, Clark asked me what you intended to do. I replied, 'About what?' He said, 'About
anything or everything.' I told him that was a pretty leading question and asked him to be more specific. I finally told
him that you intended to carry out the Democratic policies
as far as you were able with the aid of such leaders as himself
and others. Before he left, he was telling me the story of his
life and we were on very cordial terms. I think he would like
to be invited to see you when you return, and I believe it
would be a wise thing to do....
I had a most interesting hour with Mr. Glass. He candidly
confessed that he knew nothing about banking or the framing of a monetary measure. I congratulated him upon this,
for I told him that it was much better to know nothing than
to know something wrong. He, too, indicated a willingness
to do everything in his power to give as speedily as possible a
sound economic bill, and upon lines advised by you....
He expressed a desire to see you soon after your return,
and I think the quicker you see him the better it will be.
You will find him ready to cooperate with you to the fullest
extent.




THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM


95


Harvey was there for the purpose of furthering his plan
for a single term.
Mr. Taft favors this, and so does Mr. Bryan. Mr. Taft
favors a six-year term, and Mr. Bryan leans to four years.
Harvey told me that Bob Henry was working with Bryan
along this line and that was going to be our first difficulty.
He was very pessimistic. He said that no one knew your
viewpoint concerning the matter and that your friends were
apathetic, and that before they realized it a measure would
be passed through both branches of Congress and be ready
for submission to the people.
It does not require the signature of the President, but, if
it did, Mr. Taft would sign it.
Harvey is mistaken about your friends not being alert in
regard to it, because I talked to Burleson and others and told
them to watch every move.
Harvey thought it would be a wise thing to compromise
on a six-year term which would include you.
In talking with Gore about it afterwards, he said the
difficulty there was that the Republican States would
hesitate to lengthen the term of a Democratic President two
years longer than was necessary. If the Republicans refused to lengthen the term of a Democratic President, then
the Democratic States would in turn refuse to lengthen the
term of a Republican President....
The general consensus of opinion amongst those with
whom I talked and who had met Bryan, was that he would
work in harmony with your Administration if he went into
the Cabinet, but they all thought that there were two difficulties which should be met at the outset: the question of a
second term and the further question of currency reform....
I obtained a great deal of valuable information from the
Chief Justice. He talked to me frankly, with the understanding that what he said was to be repeated to no one
excepting you.




96 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


He cheerfully slaughtered nearly all the gentlemen about
whom I wrote to you in my last letter....
Your very faithful
E. M. HOUSE
With the return of Mr. Wilson, conferences multiplied,
and the following six weeks House devoted to sifting the
claims of importunate applicants and to a search for available
but less vociferous candidates. A series of excerpts from his
daily memoranda will illustrate the process. No letters were
exchanged with Mr. Wilson during this period, since the two
were in constant touch through the telephone.
'December 6, 1912: I had a long conversation with McCombs and Vicky I believe if I had been authorized to offer
McCombs a foreign embassy to-day, he would have accepted
it. Office-seekers are driving him crazy. I suggested a foreign
position and he said that he did not have sufficient money;
but I told him that it would not take much. He asked where
I would suggest his going - Vienna, Italy, or where?...
'December 11, 1912: Mr. David F. Houston came to dinner
and spent the evening. We discussed the different Cabinet
possibilities and other matters. He knows that I have suggested him to the President-elect for Secretary of Agriculture. He thought it would be better to defer legislation on
currency and tariff until later, but I convinced him of the
importance of passing such measures before all the patronage
had been distributed...
'December 18, 1912: Governor Wilson came at half-past
one. I talked to him about Morgenthau'and suggested him
for Turkey. He replied, "There ain't going to be no Turkey," and I said, "Then let him go look for it."...
Walter F. Vick, one of Mr. McCombs' chief lieutenants in the electoral campaign.
2 Chairman of the Democratic Finance Committee and later appointed
Ambassador to Turkey.
3 Turkey in Europe seemed about to disappear as the result of the
defeats administered by the Balkan League.




VARIOUS APPOINTMENTS CONSIDERED 97


'I thought if I were in Wilson's place I would take only
men I knew, that in making a selection it was like walking in
the country- one could always imagine that something
better was beyond, but upon reaching the given point the
view was still in the distance like the rainbow.
'Bryan was also discussed freely. I advised him to offer
Bryan the Secretaryship of State, but afterwards to suggest
that it would be of great service if he would go to Russia at
this critical time. He thought Bryan would want to discuss
with him the personnel of his Cabinet and that they could
never agree. I argued that there were many people and
things that they could agree upon, as their object was really
the same only their ways of getting at it were different. He
might, I thought, mention the names of Burleson, Daniels,
and others he was considering for the Cabinet who were also
friends of Mr. Bryan.
'We discussed again the Attorney-Generalship.... We
went back to McReynolds and I thought he seemed to
understand the different phases of the situation better than
any one I had talked to. He asked if I considered McAdoo
suited for the Treasury, and I thought he was; under ordinary conditions I should say an Eastern man would be a bad
choice, but that in this instance I heartily approved McAdoo.
'December 19, 1912: Governor Wilson called me over the
telephone and said that McCombs was distinctly disappointed at the ambassadorial offer made him yesterday, and
no decision was arrived at. He wanted to know again about
Bryan and my advice about it. I advised being cordial in
making the offer,1 and to make it plain afterwards that he
would appreciate his taking the foreign post [the Ambassadorship to Russia].
'B. M. Baruch, McCombs' friend, told Wallace that he
had advised McCombs not to accept office, but to resign from
the National Committee and to go into the practice of law
1 Of the Secretaryship of State.




98 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


as soon as his health permits. McCombs seems terribly
" cut up " over the fact that Governor Wilson has not offered
him all that he desired and that he tendered him an Ambassadorship instead of a Cabinet place.
'I called up Governor Wilson to talk things over, and he
asked if I still held to my advice about Mr. Bryan, and I
answered "yes." This is the third or fourth time he has
asked me this. It shows how distrustful he is of having Mr.
Bryan in his Cabinet....
'December 21, 1912: Tumulty telephoned about the Governor's and Bryan's interview. Bryan was in fine humor and
everything was lovely.+ He asked me to send a further list of
men whom I thought it best for the Governor to see. I had
already sent in a list several days ago to Trenton.
'McAdoo... is now anxious to go to Staunton, where the
Governor is to attend some celebration given in his honor on
the 28th, and some of McAdoo's friends are urging him to go,
telling him he is effacing himself too much and will be forgotten. I advised to the contrary, but wished him to use his
own judgment.
'December 23, 1912 [House and Colonel George Harvey
taking lunch together]: Martin was also at lunch. Harvey
told him that I was the best adviser the President-elect had,
and that he thought I should be given the Secretaryship of
the Treasury. Martin wanted to know, if my health permitted, would I take it? I replied, "Not if I were as strong
as a bull!"; that, as it was, the Governor discussed everything frankly and without fear of misunderstanding, but
that if I were an applicant for any position both he and I
would feel the restraint...
'The more I see of McAdoo, the better I like him. He is
a splendid fellow, whole-souled, and generous, without a
tinge of envy, and with it all he is honest and progressive.
1 At this interview Mr. Bryan was offered the Secretaryship of State
and tentatively accepted it.




POOR MATERIAL FOR THE CABINET


99


'December 29, 1912: Tumulty was with me from five until
half-past nine in the evening. We went over the situation in
detail. He is very desirous of being Secretary to the President.
'I asked Tumulty how many letters of protest the Governor was receiving against himself for that position. He admitted that there had been five or six hundred. I inquired
if he showed them to the Governor. He had not shown them
all, but had always told him of the number received. He did
not show him the letters which came that were favorable to
him either....
'January 5, 1913: The Governor has invited Burleson,
Palmer, Culberson, Gore, Hoke Smith, and Bob Henry, as I
had suggested, to come to Trenton this week. Tumulty said
the Governor did not want to invite them much, as he
thought there was nothing that he wished to discuss with
them. Tumulty explained to him that I thought he should
see them in order to compliment them rather than to expect
much help from their advice. He then consented to see them.
'January 7, 1913: McAdoo came at five and remained
until seven o'clock. We discussed Cabinet possibilities. He
wanted to know what my general idea was, and I told him
that I thought the Governor had poor material to select
from. McAdoo replied, "I believe you are right, and you
may include me too." I disclaimed any thought or reference
to him, but he cheerfully included himself. I explained that
my reason for saying this was that the Democratic Party had
been out of power so long that no one had been in training or
in process of development for public office.
'X tells me that he understands from Thomas Nelson Page
and others that Y is anxious for a reconciliation. Martin
says Y has a plan for disposing of Bryan. I answered that a
lot of people were busy with such plans, but I thought
Governor Wilson and Mr. Bryan would be able to manage
the matter themselves....




100 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'January 8, 1913: I told him [Wilson] he was now leaving
Texas out of the Cabinet. His reply was, "I want you to go
in the Cabinet."... He urged me not to give a definite
answer for the present and said he very much wished me to
be a member of his official family, that it seemed to coincide
with the fitness of things.
'He generously asked me what place I would like, evidently leaving me to choose. I regard this as a very high
compliment, for the reason that he has offered no one a place
in the Cabinet up to now excepting Mr. Bryan, whom we
agreed upon just after the election... as a political necessity. Of course, I shall not take any office, although I would
do much to oblige him and to be of service. My reasons are
that I am not strong enough to tie myself down to a Cabinet
department and, in addition, my general disinclination to
hold office. I very much prefer being a free lance, and to
advise with him regarding matters in general, and to have a
roving commission to serve wherever and whenever possible.'
To such reasons for remaining out of office should be added
one which Colonel House may not have definitely formulated, but which must have affected him at least subconsciously. His experience with the Texas Governors had
taught him that, however much in sympathy he might be
with their general policy, questions of detail must arise on
which his opinions would be at variance from theirs. He
believed that in essential matters he and Wilson would agree
in principle, but they might conceivably disagree as to
method. If he were in an official position such disagreement
would compel his resignation, unless he were to be placed in
the unpleasant position of carrying out a line of action which
he disapproved. So long as he remained in a private capacity,
he could give what advice he chose; and if the President did
not follow it, House could shrug his shoulders and turn his
attention to other matters in which Wilson might accept his




UNCONVENTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 101


guidance. 'Had I gone into the Cabinet,' House once said,
'I could not have lasted eight weeks.' Outside of the
Cabinet he lasted for eight years.;./,.
III
The serious, although rather unconventional, responsibilities laid upon the shoulders of Colonel House during the
process of drafting Cabinet possibilities, were not lightened
by the political inexperience of the President-elect and his
temperamental inability to develop confidential relations
with the party leaders.
'Such men as Speaker Clark [so ran a despatch from Trenton to the New York Herald], Representative Oscar W.
Underwood, Senator Hoke Smith, Senator Culberson, and
many others of importance in the Democracy have journeyed
to Princeton and gone away saying they had no more information than when they came. One of them said to me:
"I know that Governor Wilson was elected President on
November 5. I know that he will be inaugurated on March
4. Further than that I know nothing about what has happened or is going to happen." Several of the leaders frankly
say, when asked what will happen after March 4: "You will
have to ask either the President-elect or Colonel House."' 1
As the days passed the politicians took their hopes and
their ideas to House, who, somewhat embarrassed by his
position, nevertheless worked steadfastly to make them feel
less out in the cold. 'Making the suggestion through you,'
wrote McCombs to House on January 2, of a proposition for
Wilson's decision, 'is the only way I know of handling the
matter.'
'February 17, 1913: X called at five o'clock [recorded
The Herald, February 19, 1913.




102 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


House]. He wished to tell me many things, but particularly
how very competent he was to be Secretary of the Treasury.
He seemed hurt that Wilson had not called him into consultation, or sent for him, or noticed him in any way since the
election. His position, he seemed to think, entitled him to
great consideration. I explained that the President-elect had
not called his friends into consultation, and those who had
been with him had made the appointments themselves and
had not come at his invitation. This was invariably the case,
as far as I knew, with the exception of Mr. Bryan, Speaker
Clark, Mr. Underwood, and some members of the Senate and
House. He left in a fine humor, and promised to write me his
views if I would convey them to the Governor....
'February 19, 1913: Y came at half-past five. He complained bitterly of the way the Governor was treating him;
that he did not consult with him or tell him about any of his
plans. I asked if he knew of any one else that he consulted
or to whom he told his plans. He confessed he did not, and I
told him he had no right to complain.... He said there was
a bitter feeling among the party leaders that they were not
being consulted, and not taken into confidence. Of course he
exaggerates this.'
It was all the more important that when it came to the
composition of the Cabinet the wishes of the party leaders
should be carefully considered; for if, after keeping his own
counsel (or that of Colonel House), Mr. Wilson chose a
Cabinet of independents, he would soon find a rebellious
party in Congress. House was frankly troubled.
'Walter Page lunched with me to-day [the Colonel wrote
on January 14]. I found that he had been advising Governor
Wilson very much along the lines I have....
'I tried him out as to the department in which he was most
interested. If the Governor appoints him, I shall advise that




A TALK WITH MRS. WILSON


103


he be given the Interior. I told Page that I was fearful that
the Governor was thinking of appointing too many independents and that he was not looking for rock-ribbed Democrats.'
The Colonel struck the same note on the following day in
a talk with Mrs. Wilson, whose influence with her husband
he evidently counted upon.
'I told her that the men the Governor had in mind for his
Cabinet were nearly all irregular party men and that most of
them had voted for Taft four years ago. I cited -   as an
instance. She spoke up immediately and said, "But you
would not keep him out of the Cabinet on that account?"
I replied no, not in his case, but I would not put in too many
with the same sort of record, for the reason that the moment
the Cabinet was announced their political records would be
exposed.
'I thought that in twenty years from now no one would
know how the different departments of the Government had
been run and that the President's fame would rest entirely
upon the big constructive measures he was able to get
through Congress; and in order to get them through he had
to be on more or less good terms with that body. This, I
thought, was one of the most important things he had to
consider, for his future reputation would rest almost wholly
upon it.'
Of all the politicians, the one whose influence during the
first legislative session would be most valuable was, of course,
Mr. Bryan; and it was natural that House should suggest
that he be given a voice in the composition of the Cabinet,
or at least an opportunity to comment upon the tentative
slate which Wilson had drafted by early January. The
Governor agreed, House recorded on January 10, that it




104 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


would be well for the Colonel to go to Miami, where Bryan
was building a Southern home, and explain Wilson's plans.
'He said I could talk to him freely, but that it was to give
him, Bryan, information and not to ask his advice.'
The newspapers of the East had taken unholy pleasure in
picturing Mr. Bryan in a truculent frame of mind and inclined to dictate Mr. Wilson's policy and appointments.
House discovered the reverse to be true. 'He is in a delightful humor,' the Colonel wrote Wilson on January 29. 'He
likes the names suggested for the family gathering.' And as
House developed his views he found Bryan careful not to
press any specific appointments with undue ardor and surprisingly mild in his criticisms.
Colonel House to the President-elect
MIAMI, FLORIDA, January 30, 1913
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I had a long conference with our friend last night and again
to-day....
He is very earnest in his advice that a Catholic, and perhaps a Jew, be taken into the family. I told him T[umulty]'s
appointment as Secretary would cover the one, but he
thought not. He suggests Governor Higgins of Rhode Island
as a possible choice. He shows a very fine spirit and is exceedingly anxious for your success. He also shows no disposition whatever to interfere, even in his own department.
He says he would like to name his first assistant unless you
have some one you want to place there.
He knows all the disadvantages to him of accepting place
and mentions them in detail, but he says that those things
must not be taken into account.
He thinks the Pacific slope should be recognized, but he
does not seem to get beyond Phelan and Lane, although I
do not think he would seriously object to any one excepting
Teal.




MR. BRYAN ON PRESIDENT ELIOT


105


For the first time, I think, he is finding out how difficult
it is to form this body.
He likes the suggestion you made to me for Germany
[Professor Fine of Princeton], but has no one in mind for
England....
He has accepted all your conclusions so cordially that it
has been a pleasure to me to discuss matters with him.
Your very faithful
E. M. HOUSE
'January 30, 1913: Mr. Bryan was as pleased with his new
place [recorded Colonel House] as a child with a new toy. He
is really a fine man, full of democratic simplicity, earnest,
patriotic, and of a fervently religious nature. Mrs. Bryan is
the "salt of the earth." She has all the poise and good common sense which is lacking in her distinguished husband....
'January 31, 1913: It was so warm that we did not go
through the Everglades. Mr. Bryan came over in the evening
and we had another political talk. He was much distressed
when I told him that Governor Wilson had offered the Chinese mission to Dr. Charles W. Eliot. He thought it the poorest selection that could be made, for the reason that Eliot
was a Unitarian and did not believe in the divinity of Christ
and the new Chinese civilization was founded upon the
Christian movement there. I asked him to state his objections in writing, not only as to Dr. Eliot, but as to any
member of the proposed Cabinet. I said as far as Eliot was
concerned, it was too late; but I did not believe Dr. Eliot
would accept, for he had told the Governor that he would
take it only if his wife approved and he was afraid she would
not. Mr. Bryan was hopeful she would not.'
'He is only trying to help,' wrote House again to Wilson,
'and does not mean to urge.' 'Everything he said,' the
Colonel noted later, 'showed a fine spirit in Mr. Bryan and




106 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


seemed to me to be a hopeful sign for future harmony.'
It appears from the terms of the following letter that Wilson
left these negotiations entirely to House.
Colonel House to the President-elect
ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA
February 6, 1913
DEAR GOVERNOR:
Our friend has asked me many times whether I had heard
from you in response to his suggestions. He wired me just
before he left for Havana, asking the same question.
If I were you, I would send him a line indicating that you
appreciated his interest and had found his suggestions helpful. He will be back in Miami next Thursday, and if he
found a note from you awaiting him it would please him
greatly....
Your very faithful
E. M. HOUSE
IV
Upon Colonel House's return, early in February, Wilson
felt himself prepared to make the definite appointments.
It was already settled that Bryan should be Secretary of
State. McAdoo had accepted the Treasury portfolio, and
Burleson was to be offered that of Postmaster-General, two
selections urged by House from the beginning. For Agriculture, Wilson had determined upon the distinguished
economist, D. F. Houston, Chancellor of Washington University, another close friend of House. Josephus Daniels, a
North Carolina editor, and W. B. Wilson, once a miner and
an active albeit conservative labor leader, were to be given
the portfolios of the Navy and of Labor respectively. There
remained those of War, the Interior, Justice, and Commerce.


'February 8, 1913: The President-elect writes that he




FRANKLIN K. LANE AND THE CABINET 107


needs to see me for a final conference about the official
family. He asks me to sound Houston on the Secretaryship
of Agriculture. On that case he is clear and his mind made
up, but he thinks it best for me to open the matter with him.
The Treasury has been offered and accepted as we planned.'
In the conferences between Wilson and House which
followed, the latter urged the appointment of J. C. McReynolds and F. K. Lane, the first because of his record as special
prosecuting attorney in anti-trust suits, the second because
of his record on the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Wilson did not know McReynolds, and on February 15 the
Colonel recorded that the latter was invited to House's
apartment while the President-elect was there, 'ostensibly
to discuss the appointment of a District Attorney here. The
Governor liked McReynolds.'
On the following day, Mr. Lane came over from Washington, for Wilson had asked House to sound him as he had
already sounded the other appointees. The conference
crystallized the Colonel's conviction that Wilson would
make a mistake if he left Lane out of the Cabinet.
'I informed him of what we had in mind for him. The
Interior, in his opinion, was the most difficult post in the
Cabinet, but he would take it if we wanted him to do so.
He said he would take anything we thought him best
suited for, but that he was content to remain where he was
as Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
'Feeling responsible for Lane, I drew him out upon all the
leading questions, and I found that he has a remarkably
strong, virile mind. My opinion of him increased materially,
much as I had thought of him before. There will certainly
not be a stronger or more dominant force in the Cabinet.
'Norman Hapgood came and I brought them together,
and we had a fine hour. After Lane left, Hapgood expressed




108 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


his enthusiastic admiration for him and said he thought he
would suit the position for which we had him in mind
wonderfully well. I asked that he write a letter to this effect,
telling him I wanted him to share the responsibility with me
because the President-elect had never met Lane and knew
him only through me.'
The difficulties and complexities of political Cabinet-making are illustrated by the story of the succeeding days. One
after the other, objections cropped up which seemed to destroy the availability of men Wilson wanted. His choice for
Attorney-General was A. Mitchell Palmer, whose activity on
the floor of the Baltimore Convention had gone far to decide
Wilson's nomination. Opposition in certain quarters proved
to be so strong that he was instead offered the Secretaryship
of War. This, however, he felt he must decline, in deference
to his Quaker principles. Inauguration day was approaching,
was barely a fortnight away, and Wilson realized that no
time could be lost if his Cabinet were to be completed by
March 4.
'I asked him not to worry [wrote House], that the getting
of Lane in the Cabinet was of much more importance than
the losing of Palmer for Attorney-General; that Lane could
take that place, if necessary, and fill it with distinction, and
that we could keep Baker 1 for the Interior....
'February 18, 1913: Newton Baker [recorded House] rang
me up to say that he had arrived. When I was in Princeton,
the Governor wrote him a note asking him to come to New
York on Tuesday or Wednesday, as was most convenient,
and to telephone me and that I would make an appointment
for him to meet the Governor at my apartment. I asked
Baker to dine with us at seven o'clock and I requested him
not to let his presence in New York be known and, above all
1 Newton D. Baker, reform Mayor of Cleveland.




NEWTON D. BAKER OFFERED A PORTFOLIO 109


things, not to let any one know he was coming to my apartment or was having an appointment with the Presidentelect....
'I met Governor Wilson and brought him to the apartment. We had about forty minutes before Baker came, and
we discussed the Cabinet and other appointments....
'Baker came and we had a very delightful dinner; politics
were not discussed at all, stories were told, Mark Twain and
various other persons and matters were talked of. After
dinner I left the Governor and Baker....
'In about a half-hour, I returned. The Governor said he
had offered Baker the Secretaryship of the Interior and that
he was considering the matter. Baker finally decided he
could not take it. He said there was no one to carry on the
work in Cleveland which he had begun, and he thought the
government of our American cities was the greatest disgrace
to our citizenship; that Cleveland was emerging from that
state and would soon be an example to her sister cities
throughout the land.
'Both the Governor and I urged him to take a broader
view of the situation and do the bigger work. He finally
decided to take the matter under consideration for the
night, and said if he changed his mind he would wire me
to-morrow, quoting a line from Shakespeare which I would
understand.'
The cryptic line from Shakespeare was never sent, and it
was found necessary to look further for a Secretary of the
Interior. Baker's refusal led Wilson definitely to decide that
he would return to House's original suggestion of McReynolds as Attorney-General. The Colonel pointed out that
Walter H. Page might be offered the Interior and Lane be
shifted to the War Department. Wilson acceded and
authorized House to see whether Page would accept. He at
once called him upon the telephone, but learned that he had




110 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


left town; he thereupon sent him a telegram asking him to
call as soon as he returned.
Chance plays its part in history. Had Mr. Page been in
town, he would have been offered and would have accepted
the Secretaryship of the Interior, and he would not have
gone to London as Ambassador. But before his return, the
party leaders in Congress learned of the suggestion and objected strongly. Page, they pointed out, was a Southerner,
and no Southerner should be Secretary of the Interior because of his control of pensions. In view of these objections,
Wilson decided to keep Lane in the Interior and look for
another man for War. House was left to explain his telegram
to Page to the best of his ability when the latter returned.
He proved equal to the interview, which might conceivably
test his tact and powers of invention.
'February 24, 1913: Walter Page arrived in response to my
telegram. When I wired him we expected to place him in the
Interior and move Lane up to War, but in talking with the
Governor last night it was decided best not to put a Southerner in that place.
'I told Page the reason we had summoned him was because there was likely to be a slip-up in some of the Cabinet
places, and we wanted to know definitely whether he could
be used in case it was necessary. I also told him the Governor
wished me to discuss with him the material already gotten
together. He suggested, and I advised, his going at once to
Trenton to take the matter up with the Governor.'
A few weeks later, House told Page how near he had been
to becoming Secretary of the Interior, a story which excited
in Mr. Page more amusement than regret.
The final choice for the portfolio of War was delayed until the last moment. Colonel House had strongly recommended Mr. H. C. Wallace, who later became Ambassador




A CASUALLY CHOSEN CABINET


111


to France. Mr. Wilson approved the selection and offered
the post to Wallace. But the latter found it impossible to
accept. The ultimate decision was made on the spur of the
moment. During the morning of February 24, House recorded: 'Tumulty suggests, and we are going to look up, a
New Jersey man, Vice-Chancellor Garrison, and see whether
he will fill the bill.' Wilson evidently lost no time, for in the
evening:
'Tumulty telephoned while Page was here, saying that the
Governor had sent for Vice-Chancellor Garrison and was
very much pleased with him, and had offered him the post of
Secretary of War.'
The reader can hardly escape a shock of surprise at the
apparently nonchalant manner in which the President-elect
chose his Cabinet. In reality he had received an immense
quantity of carefully sifted information, and the eligibility
list of possibilities was drafted with care. But he made his
final selection with a suddenness of decision that startled
House himself.
'The thing that impresses me most [he recorded] is the
casual way in which the President-elect is making up his
Cabinet. I can see no end of trouble for him in the future
unless he proceeds with more care.'
The Cabinet, as finally selected, was a melange of administrators selected because of personal ability and of political
leaders whose influence demanded recognition. The number
of purely political appointments was less than is customary,
a tribute to Wilson's original determination to consider
ability alone in his appointments. Because of this fact and
also because of his consistent refusal to discuss the Cabinet
intimately with any one but House, the wiseacres were largely




112 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


at fault in their prognostications. Ten days before the Inauguration, the New York Herald announced 'Rifts in
Cabinet Secrecy.' But the list which it published of the
probable Cabinet proved to be far from accuratel Of the
ten final appointees, only four were recognized beforehand
by the Herald as possibilities.
The publication of the official family aroused more surprise than enthusiasm. In Republican circles the new
Cabinet was naturally regarded as inferior, and by the country as a whole it was looked upon as mediocre. This was
inevitable, since Wilson's choice was limited not merely to
Democrats but to radicals who would approve of the drastic
reforms he contemplated. For half a century the Democratic party had been out of power, except for the two terms
of Cleveland's Presidency; and during that period there had
been a steady gravitation of men of practical ability into the
opposite political camp, which was more and more affiliated
with the great money and business interests.
'It has thus come about [a New York paper pointed out]
that most of the men eminent in the administration of national affairs have become defenders of existing conditions,
in spite of the growing importance of a newly awakened
national consciousness of intolerable wrongs in the political
and economic life of the country.... Such men as seem to
give promise of solid ability and administrative success lack
importance in the public mind.... [Mr. Wilson] expects the
country to be surprised by the absence of commanding or
distinguished figures in his selection, but feels that the men
he is to call into power will in time develop reputations that
will justify him.' 2
Colonel House himself was satisfied rather than enthusi1 See Appendix to chapter.
Evening Mail, New York, January 17, 1913.




PAGE'S OPINION OF THE CABINET


113


astic, and in meeting the criticism of his friends emphasized
the difficulties of the problem more than the Minate strength
of the Cabinet.
'Walter Page [he noted on February 241 came after dinner
and told of his trip to Trenton. He regretted that it was too
late to keep Daniels out of the Cabinet. The President-elect
had already written him. I knew this, because he told me he
intended writing McReynolds, Daniels, and Burleson notes
on Sunday.... He said to Page, "You do not seem to think
that Daniels is Cabinet timber." Page replied, "He is
hardly a splinter."
'In discussing the Cabinet, Page thought it distinctly
mediocre and thought the country would so regard it. I
asked him how he could better it; and when he attempted to
do so, like all the rest he failed signally.... I think, in all the
circumstances, we have done well.'
APPENDIX


Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of War
Attorney-General
Postmaster-General
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Interior
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of Commerce and
Labor


The Herald list
of February 22
W. J. Bryan
W. G. McAdoo
Charles R. Crane
A. Mitchell Palmer
Josephus Daniels
Albert S. Burleson
Lewis Nixon
Alva Adams
Edward L. Norris
Obadiah Gardiner


The Cabinet as
appointed
W. J. Bryan
W. G. McAdoo
Lindley M. Garrison
J. C. McReynolds
Albert S. Burleson
Josephus Daniels
F. K. Lane


D. F. Houston


(W. C. Redfield
Louis D. Brandeis    W. B. Wilson
(Labor)




CHAPTER V
i )/2; * to 8i       THE SILENT PARTNER
The source of his power was.. the cnfideence that men had in his sagacity and unselfishness.  '1 $, ft
E. S. Martin, in 'Harper's Magazine,' February, 1912
I
'MR. HOUSE is my second personality. He is my independent self. His thoughts and mine are one. If I were in his
place I would do just as he suggested.... If any one thinks
he is reflecting my opinion by whatever action he takes, they
are welcome to the conclusion.'
Such was the reply given by President Wilson to a politician who asked whether House represented him accurately
in a certain situation. It indicates the degree of confidence
which he placed in the Colonel. The President made it clear
that, although House had refused official position of any
kind, he was determined that the Administration should not
lose the political services which House was qualified to perform. On the very day of his inauguration he asked and
summarily accepted his recommendations for important
appointive posts.
'The President-elect telephoned [Colonel House wrote on
March 4] and asked Loulie and me to meet his family party
at the Shoreham Hotel at 9.45, in order to accompany them
to the Capitol for the inauguration ceremonies. I took
Loulie to the Shoreham and left her with the Wilsons, but I
did not go to the Capitol myself. I went instead to the
Metropolitan Club and loafed around with Wallace. Functions of this sort do not appeal to me and I never go.
'Mrs. Wilson invited us to the White House to see the




THE SILENT PARTNER


115


fireworks. When we arrived we found the President was over
in his office. I went there and was with him for a few minutes
in order to tell him that I had investigated John H. Marble
for Interstate Commerce Commissioner, in place of F. K.
Lane, and had found him satisfactory. The President had
never met Marble and had made no inquiries concerning
him further than mine. He said he would send his name in
to-morrow, along with the names of his Cabinet. He made
the appointment in this way in order to avoid the great
pressure which would be made upon him by candidates for
this important office....'
'March 8, 1913: The President asked me to be at the
White House this morning at nine.
'The offices were nearly deserted at so early an hour. The
President was dressed in a very becoming sack suit of grey,
with a light grey silk tie. It was rather an informal-looking
costume, but very attractive. I sat with him for nearly an
hour and we had a delightful talk. We discussed the Cabinet
mainly, and he laughingly told me his estimate of each one
and how they acted at the first meeting.... The President
spoke finely of Bryan and said their relations were exceedingly cordial....
'The President suggested that we could have a cypher
between us, so when we talked over the telephone or wrote
we could discuss men without fear of revealing their identity.
He took a pencil and started out with Bryan, saying, "Let us
call him 'Primus."' McAdoo is already known as " Pythias,"
McCombs being "Damon." Garrison he suggested as
"Mars," McReynolds "Coke," Burleson "Demosthenes."'
Thus began House's career as Silent Partner." It was a
relationship which rested chiefly upon the political co6peration of the Colonel in meeting the problems of government.
1 The appellation was first used by Peter Clark Macfarlane in an
article in Collier's, and soon became general.




116 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


His labors were of the most varied kind, and he sought every
opportunity to ease the load that bore upon the President, to
bring him information, to work out details of policy. There
was, however, an essential personal basis to the relationship,
since it would have been impossible for a man of Wilson's
temperament to put full political confidence in a man who did
not evoke his affection as an individual.
'I have an intimate personal matter to discuss with you
[he said to House in the summer of 1915]. You are the only
person in the world with whom I can discuss everythingi
There are some I can tell one thing and others another, but
you are the only one to whom I can make an entire clearance
of mind.'
The letters of Wilson to House invariably displayed an
intensity of personal feeling that would have astounded those
who attributed to him about the same degree of warmth as
that of a Euclidean proposition and failed to realize the
human qualities that lay concealed under his armor of exterior austerity. He wrote him frequently of his desire to talk
with him and the need and desire for his advice on many a
complicated matter. At the end of the first legislative session, he put his feeling into emphatic language.
'Your letter on the passage of the Tariff Bill [the President
said] gave me the kind of pleasure that seldom comes to a
man, and it goes so deep that no words are adequate to express it. I think you must know without my putting it into
words (for I cannot) how deep such friendship and support
goes with me and how large a part it constitutes of such
strength as I have in public affairs. I thank you with all my
heart and with deep affection.'
1 This was after Mrs. Wilson's death and before the President's remarriage.




A PROGRESSIVE FRIENDSHIP


117


The friendship between the two, however rapidly it
bloomed, was progressive. It is not uninteresting and is perhaps significant to trace its development through the forms
of salutation used by the President in his letters. They met in
November, 1911, and until the following spring Wilson addresses him as 'Dear Mr. House.' But after his nomination,
in August, 1912, he begins to address him as 'Dear Friend,'
signing himself 'Faithfully yours,' or 'Sincerely yours.'
After his election in November, 1912, he signs himself 'Affectionately yours,' and this is constant with the salutation of
'Dear Friend,' for two and a half years. In moments of great
emotion, as at the time of Mrs. Wilson's death, he addresses
him as 'My dear, dear Friend.' In the summer of 1915, at
the period of the Arabic crisis when he was torn by doubt and
worry, the President begins to address him as 'Dearest
Friend,' a salutation which remains invariable until after his
reflection in November, 1916. In January of 1917 the President reverts to the form of address, 'My dear House,' although he continues the conclusion, 'Affectionately yours.'
Otherwise it is impossible to detect in Wilson's letters any
change of tone. It is certain that the political relationship
between the two men remained as close during the two years
that followed; but it is possible that their personal friendship
was most intense between the years 1912 and 1917.
Close spiritual communion was not dependent upon physical propinquity, for the heat drove Colonel House far from
Washington in the spring and frequently several months
would pass without their meeting. Separation seems to have
made no difference in their understanding. 'I never worry
when I do not hear from you,' wrote House. 'No human
agency could make me doubt your friendship and affection.... I always understand your motives.' At the end of each
summer, enterprising and ill-informed newspapermen would
regularly feature a 'break.' 'You are a little behind your
schedule this year, my friend,' said House to a reporter




118 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


one September day, after the publication of the annual
story.
During the cool months, however, Wilson and House saw
much of each other, for the latter made frequent trips to
Washington, and on each of these trips Wilson devoted long
hours to intimate discussions with his adviser. The President
lacked the capacity and inclination for meeting and entertaining varied types of people which, under the Roosevelt
regime, made the White House a magnet for explorers, litteratteurs, pugilists, and hunters - every one who had an
interesting story to tell. Wilson had the college professor's
love of a quiet evening by the fireside with the family, and an
early bed, varied by a visit to the theatre, preferably a
simple vaudeville.
House was one of the few admitted to the small family
circle. 'At night,' said Herbert Corey in the Commercial Advertiser, 'after Mr. Wilson had wound the clock, and put out
the cats and politicians, House stayed for a little further
talk.' To the President's study House brought the impressions he had formed of public opinion, gathered from his
numerous contacts with office-holders, business men, and
editors, and there Wilson gave free vent to his political
theories, his aspirations, and his fears. There, too, the President found relaxation in reading poetry and essays to his
friend.    F   (
'May 11, 1913: I spoke to the President about conserving
his strength, and suggested various means by which it could
be done. I thought it was essential. He said it looked as if
the people were trying to kill him, and he spoke of the loneliness of his position, in a way that was saddening....
'I spoke of his probable renomination and reelection. He
replied, "Do not let us talk about that now. My dear friend,
if I can finish up my legislative programme, I do not desire
reelection." I urged him to keep up his courage, for if he




THE EXECUTIVE AS A LEADER


119


ever faltered in the slightest he would lose his leadership and
influence. He realized this and declared he would maintain
his courage to the end.
'October 16, 1913: One thing the President said, which interested me, was that he always lacked any feeling of elation
when a particular object was accomplished. When he signed
the Tariff Bill he could not feel the joy that was properly his,
for it seemed to him that the thing was over and that another
great work was calling for his attention, and he thought of
this rather than the present victory.
'November 12, 1913: He [Wilsoni said he believed in the
Executive becoming the leader in putting into law the desires of the people. He thought there was no danger in this
course for the reason that unless a President had the force of
public sentiment back of him, he could never get a law
through. That the reason he himself had been successful
with the tariff and the currency bills was because the people
demanded them, and Congress knew it. It was not the
pressure from him, but the pressure of the nation back
of him.
'He read some extracts from his works on government, in
order to define better his views. He expressed himself as
being in sympathy with the movement for amending the
Constitution with less difficulty than at 'present....
'He said he had not slept well the night before; that he had
nightmares, and that he thought he was seeing some of his
Princeton enemies. These terrible days have sunk deep into
his soul and he will carry their marks to his grave.
'December 22, 1913: At dinner there was no one present but
the family, and the conversation ran along general lines.
I asked the President how high he ranked Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. He said, very, very high. He had also noticed
that great orations and great poems, when spoken or written
under deep emotion, were simple in language. He mentioned
Burke as an example. Some member of the family took ex



120 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


ception to this opinion and cited Browning and also suggested that Shakespeare made his heroes say grandiloquent
things under stress of great emotion....
'I spoke of his success, and he said his Princeton experience hung over him sometimes like a nightmare; that he had
wonderful success there, and all at once conditions changed
and the troubles, of which every one knew, were brought
about. He seemed to fear that such a denouement might
occur again....
'It was twenty minutes to twelve when we left his study
for bed. He was solicitous of my welfare and came into my
room to see that everything was properly arranged.
'April 27, 1914: The President spoke of not feeling at
home anywhere now; that is, he had a feeling that he had no
home. He said he felt the same way when he was at Princeton and occupied the house of the President; that while he
was perfectly comfortable and happy in his surroundings, yet
he always had that unsettled feeling as if he had no permanent abiding-place.
'April 28, 1914: At breakfast I spoke of Edward S.
Martin's delicious humor, and I thought he was not only
humorous but had as much good sense as any one I knew.
The President replied that "humor and good sense go
together."..
'I asked if he would like to be editor of a daily paper. He
replied that nothing would appeal to him less, for the reason
that no one could write every day an opinion of value. It
was difficult enough to do this once a week, but impossible to
do it each day. He said he enjoyed Punch very much. That
"while there were no laughs in it, it was full of smiles."
'May 11, 1914: No one dined with us excepting Grayson,'
and after dinner he left us. The President read poems to me
for nearly an hour. It was Wordsworth, Matthew Arnold,
Edward Sill, and Keats. What he particularly liked was "A
Dr. Cary T. Grayson, physician to the President.




WILSON'S CONSIDERATION FOR OTHERS 121


Fool's Prayer" by Sill, and "A Conservative" by Gilman.
When he finished reading, I took out my budget.'
'August 30, 1914: The last morning I was with the President [in the country] he planned to play golf early enough to
get back for lunch and leave on the 2.40 train for Washington. It was my intention to leave... when he started for the
golf field. This necessitated our getting up early and about
the same time. He arose a half-hour earlier than was necessary, merely to give me, the uninterrupted use of our common
bathroom. This illustrates, I think, as well as anything I
could mention, his consideration for others and the simplicity of the man. I notice, too, in his relations with his
family that he is always tender, affectionate, and considerate.
'September 28, 1914: We talked much of leadership and its
importance in government. He has demonstrated this to an
unusual degree. He thinks our form of government can be
changed by personal leadership; but I thought the Constitution should be altered, for no matter how great a leader a
man was, I could see situations that would block him unless
the Constitution was modified. He does not feel as strongly
about this as I do.
'November 7, 1914: There were no outside visitors for
dinner, but the President artfully evaded getting alone with
me in his study. He was afraid I would renew the McAdooTumulty controversy. However, he need not have worried.
We had a delightful evening. He began by talking about
German political philosophy and how wrong their conclusions usually were. He spoke of himself as a disciple of
Burke and Bagehot. This is literally true, for he is always
quoting from one or the other, mostly from Bagehot.
'He began to speak of a flexible or fluid constitution in
contradistinction to a rigid one. He thought that constitu1 Meaning the items of political business that demanded the President's attention.




122 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


tions changed without the text being altered, and cited our
own as an example. At the beginning, he thought, there was
no doubt that there was no difference of opinion as to the
right of the States to secede. This practically unanimous
opinion probably prevailed down to Jackson's time. Then
there began a large sentiment for union which finally culminated in our Civil War, and a complete change of the
Constitution without its text being altered.
'Just then the ladies came in the sitting-room where we
were, and I got him to read some poems, something he very
much likes to do. He read William Watson's "Wordsworth's
Grave," and afterward, at my request, Gray's "Elegy." He
also amused himself with any number of limericks. We did
not go to bed until around 10.30.
'December 19, 1914: As usual, no one excepting the family
was present at dinner. After we had finished the President
read aloud for nearly two hours, "The Adventures in Arcadia
of the Idle Rich."'
When President Wilson came to New York, he almost invariably stayed with Colonel House. The two would motor
in the country, often to Piping Rock, followed by the secret
service automobile and three cars of newspapermen who
hovered around the President 'like birds of prey,' the
Colonel wrote, to be ready in case of an accident. More
pleasant were the evenings spent in the small apartment on
Thirty-Fifth Street and later on Fifty-Third Street. House
disconnected the telephone, barred the door, and left to the
President the blessed choice between going to bed or a talk
upon some subject unconnected with politics- literature,
ethics, the immortality of the soul.
Like Napoleon, Wilson enjoyed suddenly descending upon
his friends.


'November 14, 1914: Last night Loulie and I went to dinner




A VISIT FROM THE PRESIDENT


123


and theatre with the Bertrons. He had the Belgian Minister
and Madame Havenith. The play was "The Only Girl,"
which I found amusing. Upon my return to the apartment I
found a call from the White House. In answering it, they
told me the President would arrive at six o'clock this morning and would expect me to breakfast at six-thirty. This
changed my plans and I had to notify the Police Commissioner and several others, so it was well after midnight before
I went to bed, and I arose at half-past five.
'The matter of entertaining a President within such confined quarters as our little apartment is not an easy undertaking, especially since I have no clerical force excepting my
one secretary.
'October 8, 1915: To-day started off with the usual bustle
incident to a visit from the President. Telegrams, telephone
calls, secret service men, newspaper reporters, notes, etc.,
etc. However, the confusion will cease the moment the President arrives, for I do not permit the telephone to ring and we
are undisturbed by letters, notes, telegrams, or visitors. When
he is once here, everything appears as peaceful as if there
were no such things as noise and confusion in the world.'
II
House's admiration for the President's qualities was as
keen as his personal affection was deep. He regarded Wilson's power of leadership as supreme, and in certain respects
he placed a high estimate upon his intellectual qualities.
'I have seen a great deal of the President on this visit [he
wrote April 17, 1914], and we have opened our minds to one
another without reserve. I am impressed by the analytic
qualities of his mind and the clearness with which he expresses his thoughts. I have come in contact with minds of
greater initiative and imagination, but never one that had
more analytical power and comprehension.




124 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'November 14, 1914: The President... is efficient in his
manner of working. For instance, when we were discussing
his message to the people concerning the Belgian Relief
funds he said: "Now let us decide what points are best to
cover." He took a telegraph blank having lines on it, and
began to take down in shorthand the different points, he
making some suggestions and I making others. There were
about five points to be covered, and he asked me to think if
that were all. When we concluded, there was nothing more;
he called his stenographer and dictated the message in full.
'He has one of the best ordered minds I have ever come in
contact with, although he is always complaining of forgetfulness.'
On the other hand, Colonel House was too objective not
to observe certain qualities in the President which weakened
him as an executive and the effects of which might ultimately seriously endanger his influence.
'One peculiar phase of the President's character develops
itself more fully from time to time [he wrote, November 22,
1915]; that is, he "dodges trouble." Let me put something
up to him that is disagreeable and I have great difficulty in
getting him to meet it. I have no doubt that some of the
trouble he had at Princeton was caused by this delay in
meeting vexatious problems.
'Another phase of his character is the intensity of his prejudices against people. He likes a few and is very loyal to
them, but his prejudices are many and often unjust. He
finds great difficulty in conferring with men against whom,
for some reason, he has a prejudice and in whom he can find
nothing good.
'July 10, 1915: I am afraid that the President's characterization of himself as " a man with a one-track mind" is all too
true, for he does not seem able to carry along more than one




WILSON'S CASUALNESS


125


idea at a time. I say this regretfully, because I have the
profoundest admiration for his judgment, his ability, and his
patriotism.
'December 8, 1915: The President, as I have often said
before, is too casual and does the most important things
sometimes without much reflection.'
An example of such casualness is to be found in Mr. Wilson's speeches, which at times he delivered almost impromptu. He had the power of arranging in his head, at
short notice, the order of the topics he would treat and even
of constituting the phrases he would use. On May 11, 1914,
he came from Washington to deliver a memorial speech at
the Brooklyn Navy Yard as tribute to the sailors who had
died in the capture of Vera Cruz. House met him at the
station and asked him about the speech. 'He had not prepared anything,' wrote the Colonel, 'but he would think it
out en route from the Battery to the Navy Yard. It is his
way of doing. Sometime he will make a serious blunder. It
is an occasion for something great, and he may or may not
rise to the occasion.'
Unfortunately, President Wilson lacked the power to conceal his prejudices and he was not equipped by temperament
or experience to appear a good 'mixer.' A Senator passed the
word to House that 'the Senators are in an ugly mood and
critical of the President. One grievance is that when they go
to the White House for conferences, they are offered nothing
to drink excepting water and nothing to smoke.' 'The President,' House commented, 'does not drink excepting occasionally at meals and he never smokes; consequently he does
not offer such things to his guests.'
More serious was the fact that the President did not convey the impression of great respect for the Senators, either
individually or as a body. 'Senator - ' he hazarded, 'is
the most comprehensively ignorant man I have ever met.'




126 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


And later, referring to the same statesman, Wilson said to
House, 'Some one wanted to know the other day if I didn't
think So-and-So the most selfish man in America. I replied,
"I am sorry, but I am already committed to Senator —."'
Such remarks, frequently as apt as they were indiscreet,
did not tend to promote cordial relations between the two
branches of government.
Mr. Wilson, however, evidently felt that the criticism
passed upon him for aloofness and cold self-confidence was
quite unjustified.
'December 22, 1913 [conversation between House and Wilson]: I said my long experience with public officials had made
me fearful of any one after they were elected to office; that
the adulation of friends and partisans and the position itself,
seemed to go to their heads and they did not do rational
things.... He thought there was no fear of this with him;
that his long university training had shown him how necessary it was to confer about important matters; that he
seldom went into a conference and came out with the same
ideas as when he went in.
'April 15, 1914: I asked [Wilson] whom he considered the
greatest man in the early days of the Republic. He thought
Alexander Hamilton was easily the ablest. We spoke of
Washington and how much he depended upon Hamilton's
advice. I thought this in itself indicated Washington's greatness. The fact that he was able to pick out Hamilton from
among his associates, as his guiding mind, and that he used
him in this way, showed a breadth of view that was remarkable. I told him that all the really big men I had known had
taken advice from others, while the little men refused to
take it....
'At another time in our conversation, he remarked that he
always sought advice. I almost laughed at this statement,
for McAdoo had just been telling me to-day that he was at




WILSON'S ALOOFNESS


127


White Sulphur with the President and his family when the
despatch came from Admiral Mayo concerning his demand
of Huerta to salute our flag, and he said the President never
even mentioned the matter to him. The President does get a
lot of information and suggestions from others, but it mostly
comes gratuitously and not by his asking. McReynolds,
Houston, Lane, and all the others have the same story to
tell....
'April 18, 1914: Houston and I lunched with Martin [recorded House]. Henry Watterson was also there. He spoke
kindly of the President and said they did not differ regarding
his policies, but he was a man that he, Watterson, could not
successfully cooperate with, indicating that the President
was cold and indifferent. I told him that as far as my own
experience had been, he was just the opposite, for I had never
had a sweeter, kinder, or more affectionate friend than
Woodrow Wilson....
'June 27, 1914 [in London]: I lunched with Page.1 Afterwards we went into the private park in front of his house and
talked for an hour or more. He asked me to bring to the
attention of the President the fact that he, the President,
was not seeing enough business men and was not talking to
them, as he expressed it, "in their language." He thought
the President had a broad and philanthropic view of the
situation, and that everything he was doing for the country
was absolutely right, but he failed to give proper assurances
to the business world that he had their welfare at heart and
was not unfriendly as they thought. He suggested that the
President should invite some of them to lunch and show
them some marked social attention. I did not think he
would do this - he was not constituted that way; that I had
been at the White House a great deal, but, with the exception
of seeing Cleveland Dodge there once, I had not met any one
other than the immediate family.
1 Walter Hines Page, Ambassador to the Court of St. James's.




128 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'I told him, too, how very tired the President was and how
he had to conserve his strength, and that we must take him
as he was and not as some people would like to have him. He
said a prominent American told him the other day that the
President did not confer with any one excepting me;... he
thought a President should not confine himself to a single
individual. Page asked how he knew this was true. He replied that it was a matter of common knowledge in America.
'I told Page the President consulted with the individual
members of his Cabinet about their departments, but he did
not consult with them on matters affecting their colleagues,
and I thought he was right. If he did this, he would soon
have every Cabinet officer meddling with the affairs of the
others, and there would be general dissatisfaction.'
Keenly aware of the wave of criticism that threatened the
President because of his retired habits, and realizing that
Wilson's strength lay in the formulation and exposition of
policy rather than in the despatch of business through personal conference, House set himself to the labor of innumerable interviews and multifarious correspondence, which
might offset the criticism and lighten the burden of detail
that weighs upon every President. He intercepted importunates on their way to the White House and promised to
arrange their business with the President more rapidly than
they could themselves. He sifted applications for appointments. He discussed industrial relations with capitalists and
labor leaders. He advised the chiefs of industrial corporations how to settle their difficulties with the Government.
And afterwards, reporting the gist of these interviews to the
President, he brought him into touch with the currents of
opinion and affairs.
'March 22, 1913: Mr. Frick came at eleven. He wished to
know whether I thought it was possible to settle the United




LIGHTENING THE PRESIDENT'S BURDENS 129


States Steel Corporation suit outside of the courts. He declared that he came of his own initiative and no one knew he
was doing so. He wanted the matter kept confidential, excepting the President and Attorney-General. We discussed
the matter at some length. I pointed out the difficulties,
with which he concurred. He seemed fair. I promised to
mention the matter and to see what could be done....
'March 24, 1913: I told him [Wilson] about Mr. Frick's
call and his suggestion in regard to the United States Steel
Corporation suit. Before the President replied, I said, "You
had better let me tell Frick that you referred me to the
Attorney-General and suggested that whatever proposal
came to you should come through the Attorney-General's
Office." The President smiled and said, "You may consider
it has been said."
'We discussed it at some length. The President thought
that the Steel Corporation should have the same consideration as any other, neither more nor less, and that they should
be allowed to make a proposition for an agreement as to a
decree of court in the suit....
'April 18, 1913: I went to the White House early and met
the President on his way to the memorial service held for the
late President of the Honduras. I found a large number of
people waiting, Mitchell Palmer being one of them. I asked
if I could not attend to his matters for him, explaining how
busy the President was and how uneasy we were for his
health if the pressure continued. He said he wanted to know
about Guthrie's chances for an ambassadorship. I was able
to tell him that the President had him down for Japan. I
asked, "What next?" He wished to know about Berry for
Collector of the Port of Philadelphia. I was able to tell him
that McAdoo and I had threshed that out the day before and
we would both recommend his appointment.
'After that he wanted to know about Graham, who wishes
to go in the Attorney-General's Office. I told him that Mc



130 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Reynolds and I had discussed that the day before and that he
intended to appoint him. This satisfied Palmer and he went
back to the Capitol.
'Jerry Sullivan from Iowa was waiting to see the President, and I treated him as I did Palmer. He had just been
appointed on the Appraisers' Court in New York.... He
was uncertain as to whether he ought to leave Iowa and
wished to know how much time he could have to decide....
I asked him not to bother the President, but to take it up
with me and I would thresh it out with the Attorney-General
and take it to the President in concentrated form. He had
several other desires, which I advised him to put in writing
and to send to me at his convenience.
'I wish I could always be here to do these things for the
President and give him time to devote himself to the larger
problems which confront the country....
'August 2, 1913: John Mitchell, President of the Federation of Miners, and Timothy Healy, President of the International Brotherhood of Stationary Firemen, lunched with
me to-day. I talked to them earnestly concerning the future
of labor. I urged upon them the necessity of taking a broad
view, and not letting the unimportant things of to-day interfere with the larger ones which are to come....
'November 19, 1913: I lunched with Charles Grasty of the
Baltimore Sun. The other guest was Mr. Daniel Willard of
the Baltimore and Ohio. I found Willard had a clear knowledge of railroad rates. Many of the facts given me by Secretary Lane, Conmmissioner Marble, and Frank Trumbull are
misleading. Mr. Willard is very agreeable. He used the
tablecloth instead of paper to make diagrams and to illustrate his points, and he ate no lunch to speak of, but talked
all the time, though not tiresomely....'
Not the least important function taken over by the
Colonel was that of receiving complaints against the Ad



E. S. MARTIN ON WILD PIGS


131


ministration - which his personal friends, who frequently
did not share his admiration for the President, passed on to
him with a rugged disregard for his peace of mind. With
journalists and editors he kept always in close touch, and
they seemed to find in him a man to whom it was worth
while to send criticism.
Mr. E. S. Martin to Colonel House
May 18, 1915
DEAR HOUSE:... Cass Gilbert was at lunch. I said to him: 'The most
that I shall do to-day will be to send clippings to House.
Why do people do such things for House?' And then we
went on to discuss House.
Well! I hope House is pretty well and that the swivel in
his honorable neck is working easily, so that when his head is
turned with consortations with the mighty he can twist it
back without too much effort.
Good luck!
E. S. MARTIN
1914
DEAR HOUSE:
I commend to your thoughtful consideration the story I
read in the paper, that in some districts in India where they
held a bee and cleaned out the tigers, the wild pigs so multiplied that they ruined the crops.
Are the wild pigs going to... devour us when we pass the
anti-trust bills with the labor union exemptions and muzzle
the railroads and skin the millionaires?
I think that is quite a parable about the tigers and the
wild pigs.
The I.W.W.'s, the laborites, the socialists, all the cranks
and all the hoboes, they are the wild pigs.
Yours
E. S. M.




132 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


May 11, 1915
DEAR HOUSE:... Woodrow, after a three-day conference exclusively
with himself, made a short speech yesterday which I didn't
like; but no matter. I wished he had talked to himself and
conferred with some one else. They say he has not conferred
one single lick with Bill Bryan... and that is good. So we
profit by the virtues of Woodrow's defects....
I think Wilson will do right, but if he gets sloppy I'm going
to get right in with the Powers of Darkness [Roosevelt and
his followers] and help drive the Bryan and Daniels crowd
out into the wilderness. This I say, not that it is true, but to
enable you to feel the temper of the public....
Good luck.
E. S. M.
Mr. George W. Wickersham to Mr. E. S. Martin (forwarded to
Colonel House)
NEW YORK, February 3, 1914
MY DEAR MARTIN:
Your editorial for February 11 is very sane. The trouble
with Mr. Wilson is that he lives in an imaginary world. He
fancies that a thing should be so, and it is so. Which is all
very well until a large enough number of people begin to
inquire, 'Is it so?' Then, like 'the unsubstantial fabric of a
vision,' it vanishes. Unlike it, it does leave a mark behind.
Yours faithfully
GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM
Mr. James Speyer to Colonel House
NEW YORK, March 12, 1914
MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:
I am glad you are coming back soon  I am satisfied that
the gentlemen in Washington do not realize the seriousness
of the financial situation through the general impairment




THE RAILROAD SITUATION


133


of railroad credit. The Interstate Commerce Commission
shows no disposition to hurry its decision, as to an advance in
rates; on the contrary, they have again extended the time for
hearings and are asking more questions, etc. Meantime gross
and net earnings are declining and the weaker roads like the
Erie, Southern Railway, Chesapeake and Ohio, etc., cannot
sell their bonds except at bankruptcy figures, if at all. I can
only repeat that in my opinion, which I do not express publicly, we are face to face with the possibility not of one but of
several receiverships of the big railroad systems. And you
know how harmful that would be and how slow the recovery.
Mr. Rea's statement of which I enclose a copy is absolutely
true and so is the enclosed article from the Railway Gazette.
Something must be done and done soon, in a big and
courageous way, to stop these attacks by Government
agencies both Federal and State, if disaster is to be averted.
We need a practical and constructive policy and measures.
I wish I could write more cheerfully, but even I am not
sufficiently optimistic to close my eyes to existing conditions.
With kind regards
Sincerely yours
JAMES SPEYER
Major Henry L. Higginson to Colonel House
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
January 13, 1915
MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:... It does not seem clear to Washington that the action
there and in the States is keeping business men on pins, and
that, having lost considerable money and lost almost entire
confidence, they are not willing to risk their credit. They
have simply withdrawn their money in a large way from
active business, and are waiting to see whether it is safe for
them to pledge their names and their honor in carrying out
either old or new enterprises.... It is not what Mr. Wilson's




134 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Administration has wished; it is not his intention or that of
Congress, no doubt, but they do not see, they do not realize
how people feel.
I was glad to vote for Mr. Wilson, and have liked a great
deal that he and Congress, with his guidance, have done; but
this shipping bill is a terrible mistake. If we can only have
peace and nothing new, trust placed in railroad directorates
and in other great concerns, we shall go on very well....
Perhaps these matters could be laid before influential men
and do some good, and perhaps not.
With kind regards, I am
Very truly yours
H. L. HIGGINSON
Mr. E. S. Martin to Colonel House
NEW YORK, February 10, 1915
DEAR HOUSE:
Your press agent is still working overtime.
Who is he, anyhow?
Here are a few clippings.
Our poor country is working along under shortened sail
since you lefts I don't know any more than I can help about
what is going on, and read the papers through smoked
glasses. I understand that your friend W. W. has clenched
his teeth through the remnants of the shipping bill and
means to hold on. He has a heroic bite. I am afraid it is his
destiny finally to adhere to something that will sink with
him. But who can tell? We are all in the Lord's hands and
should be hopeful however anxious....
Yours
E. S. MARTIN
House received the complaints cordially, explained the
situation, and promised to do what he could to better it. To
1 For six months in Europe.




BISHOP BRENT ON THE PHILIPPINES 135


members of the Cabinet he passed on the criticisms and insisted upon the need of meeting the factors that produced
them.
'November 7, 1913: Bishop Brent came at half-past five to
tell of conditions in the Philippines. He says they have a
very wrong impression of the Administration, believing that
the Democratic Party's advent to power means immediate
self-government for them. He does not believe it possible to
give them self-government until the school children of today become old enough to take an active part in public
affairs.
'I complimented him upon the work he is doing, and suggested that any time he wished to reach the President or
to accomplish something which he could not accomplish
through the ordinary channels, he could communicate with
me.'
Colonel House to Mr. William Garrott Brown
NEW YORK, April 10, 1913
DEAR MR. BROWN:
Martin tells me that you think too many Southerners are
being given office under this Administration.
You are quite right, but it is hard to help it. The best
material that has been suggested for office comes from the
South, and it is almost as hard to get satisfactory Democrats
from the North as it would be for a Republican Administration to get satisfactory Republicans from the South.
In naming Mr. Page for England the President went into
the subject carefully, and by process of elimination Mr. Page
seemed to be the most available. And so it has been in every
instance....
It seems to me that we will have to assume the burden of
responsibility and let it go at that. If the Administration
succeeds, as we now hope, then it will be a great tribute to




136 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


the South; and if it fails, we must necessarily shoulder a
larger part of the blame....
With warm regards and best wishes, I am
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
Mr. E. S. Martin to Colonel House
NEW YORK, October 21, 1915
DEAR HOUSE:
It uplifted me very much to talk to you.
It always does.
You must be a hypnotizer. Anyhow you always make me
feel that we're going to do our duty.
Here's next week's Life with a good cartoon.
More power to your elbow!
E. S. M.
Colonel House to Secretary McAdoo
AUSTIN, TEXAS, March 7, 1914
MY DEAR FRIEND:
I am enclosing you two letters from Colonel Nelson of the
Kansas City Star, which I think it would be well to have the
President glance over.
Every day some complaint of this sort reaches me. I never
tire of reading the generous chorus of praise of the President's
first year in office, and no one knows better than we how
richly he deserves it. However, long experience has taught
me how quickly this may turn in other directions. If this
should happen, I feel sure it will not be from any act of the
President himself, but because those of us whom he has
trusted on the watch tower have failed in their duty toward
him....
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE




INTIMATE RELATIONS WITH THE CABINET 137


III
The extraordinary position of Colonel House, without
office and yet an integral part of the Administration, was
made possible not merely by the personal regard of the
President and the infinite variety of services which House
performed for him, but by the intimacy of relations he maintained with the Cabinet. He carried on constant correspondence with them, sometimes personal, sometimes political,
always cordial in character. Each time that he visited
Washington he evidently took pains to study the problems of
their departments and to acquire for them whatever information he could. Brief selections from his memoranda
indicate the informality of their intercourse.
'March 20, 1913: From Burleson I went to call upon the
Secretary of the Interior, and spent a very pleasant quarter
of an hour. After that I returned to the Cosmos Club, where
I met McAdoo and Houston. They immediately began to
berate me for having put them in the Cabinet. They wanted
to know what they had done to have such jobs imposed upon
them. Houston said he had work enough to do for six healthy
men....
'April 13, 1913: Secretary Lane came an hour before the
time set for the dinner to be given Ambassador James Bryce.
He desired to talk of his department and to outline some
plans for the future....
'November 24, 1913: We arrived at the Bryans' at nine
and went almost immediately to bed. It was understood that
we were to have breakfast at half-past seven, but, much to
our relief, Mrs. Bryan knocked on our doors a few minutes
later and announced that Mr. Bryan would take his horseback exercise before breakfast, so we would not have it until
half-past eight - an unusually late hour for the Bryan
household....




138 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'November 25, 1913: To-day was Cabinet day, and I remained to meet the different members as they came in, for
there was something I had to say to each...
'December 12, 1913: Houston and Burleson came around to
see me. I first took up with them the question of Cabinet
officers not making speeches without the President's permission, and perhaps not making any speeches unless the President had something in particular for them to say to the
country about their departments. I thought the present
habit of members of the Cabinet making indiscriminate
speeches was very bad, and often embarrassing. I suggested
that if the President would designate them to speak upon
certain subjects at certain times, what they said would have
much weight and would be almost equal to a presidential
utterance.
'I found there was some feeling among the members of the
Cabinet because the Friday Cabinet meetings had been discontinued. I agreed to mention it to the President and ask
him to resume them. Later in the day I did this, and the
President consented to do so.
'The President was pleased when I told him I had spoken
to a sufficient number of the Cabinet to ensure the adoption
of my suggestion that no speeches should be made in the
future without his consent, and only when he thought the
occasion demanded it....
'November 15, 1915: Last night the Secretary of War sent
a special messenger from Washington, bearing a letter for me
concerning his report. He desired me to discuss with the
President the advisability of putting his report out in advance of handing it to the President. The President does not
wish him to do so, and I am to convey to Garrison this unpleasant information. Mr. Bryan has wired requesting that
I ask the President to appoint a friend of his as Marshal
here. This he also declined to do, because he said the man
was not fit for that particular place.....




INTIMATE RELATIONS WITH THE CABINET 139


'December 22, 1913: McAdoo's carriage met me [upon
arrival in Washington] and I drove to his home for breakfast.
He came to my room in his pajamas, half asleep. He had
been up practically all night so as to be in touch by telephone
with the House and Senate Conference Committee, which
did not reach a conclusion until five o'clock this morning.
'During the morning I remained in McAdoo's private
office, telephoning some of the Cabinet members and making
some memoranda of things I desired to discuss with the
President....
'December 23, 1913: I walked with McAdoo to the Cabinet
meeting and saw the others as they assembled. Redfield was
particularly anxious to show me some statistics regarding our
exports, which he considered interesting....
'January 16, 1914: I spoke to each member of the Cabinet
as they came in, and talked to Lane about the conservation
of our radium deposits, strongly urging it....
'April 28, 1914: McAdoo and I went back to the White
House, as there was to be a Cabinet meeting. There I met
all the Cabinet, but had no conversation with any of them
excepting Houston. I advised him that the President felt he
could not spare him from the Department of Agriculture for
the present, but later would probably place him on the
Federal Reserve Board....
'May 8, 1914: From the Treasury I went to the White
House Offices in order to see members of the Cabinet before
they convened. McReynolds, Burleson, Lane, Garrison, and
others each held me for a moment. Lane was anxious to
know whether I thought it advisable for him to go to California at this time to take the LL.D. degree which the University of California has offered him. I advised taking it up
with the President and being governed by his wishes... '
No more striking example of the cordial feeling of Cabinet
members towards Colonel House can be found than the offer




140 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


made by the Postmaster-General and the Attorney-General
to resign, if their withdrawal would make it easier for the
President to appoint House Secretary of State. This occurred in the early autumn of 1915, after Bryan's resignation.
'Burleson and Gregory [noted House on June 20, 1915]
thought perhaps I was refusing to become Secretary of State
because it would give Texas three men in the Cabinet and
all from Austin. They therefore offered to send in their
resignations if I would accept.
'When I told the President about Burleson and Gregory
offering to resign so as to leave me free to accept the Secretaryship of State without embarrassment to him, he said, "I
am glad you told me, for it is something I shall always remember with pleasure."'
Colonel House to Postmaster-General Burleson
ROSLYN, LONG ISLAND
June 21, 1915
DEAR ALBERT:
Gregory has given me your message, and nothing has ever
touched me more deeply.
There is no consideration, I think, that would influence me
enough to make me accept an office. My endeavor must
always be in the path I have so long followed. If I could be
brought to think of it at all, it would be to serve my friends
and not to accept sacrifices from them.
You and Gregory have made me feel that life is worth
living and that all I have tried to do has not been in vain.
Your friend always
E. M. HousE
To House, members of the Cabinet brought the most
varied problems. He responded with an unsparing expenditure of time and energy and, like Kipling's hero, frequently




INTIMATE RELATIONS WITH THE CABINET 141


showed them a quiet and safe way round, out, or under.
They evidently relied upon his judgment in matters of appointments. 'Will you kindly have this pair looked up,'
wrote McAdoo, 'and tell me what is thought of them?' And
two days later: 'Please hurry up report on Mr. Vernon
[appointments].' And again, still later: 'Here is a sample of
my troubles. Will you be good enough to look into the character of this man and let me hear from you quickly?'
'May 10, 1914: Attorney-General McReynolds lunched
with me [recorded House]. We went over much the same
ground covered in Washington. We discussed a vacant
Federal judgeship... and I insisted upon his making an
immediate appointment. The docket is becoming clogged
and there is no reason for his delay. I had X to see him this
morning in order that he might look him over. His only objection to him was that he had no chin. The two men I sent
him last week as candidates for United States Marshals
seemed to be all right excepting that they were too fat. I
have another suggestion to make for an appointment, but the
man has a large mole on the back of his ear. I shall ask him
to be careful not to expose that side of his head.
'Later in the day, Gregory and I were laughing at this
eccentricity of McReynolds. Gregory says he is such a big,
fine-looking fellow himself that he cannot get it through his
head that any one has any ability that is not built upon the
same lines.'
Attorney-General McReynolds to Colonel House
NEW YORK, May 11, 1914
DEAR MR. HOUSE:
I've devoted some time to the judgeship, and this is the
way it lies in my mind:
X is well recommended and would not be a bad appointment; neither will he ever make more than an ordinary




142 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


judge. He did not make a good impression on me personally.
Y made a better impression, but I do not regard him as the
very best kind of material. If I should act wholly on my own
impressions, I'd guess in favor of Y.
However, if you gentlemen think it wisest to select X, I
will recommend his appointment and take the chance. He
said that he was not certain about acceptance if tendered.
We ought to know whether he will, before any formal tender
is made to him.
Will you see that the rest is done?
Called you on the 'phone, but you were reported out with
the President.
Sincerely
MCREYNOLDS
House's opinion was finally approved.
With Gregory, who succeeded McReynolds when the latter was appointed to the Supreme Court, Colonel House's
association was even more intimate. The Colonel discussed
frankly with him the relations of a Cabinet member with
the President, and gave him the benefit of his own experience:
'Never to go into long-winded arguments upon any subject, but to state his position in brief terms and never repeat.
That when he and the President agreed upon a matter, never
to give him reasons for so agreeing, as the President was too
busy to listen to unimportant details. I was sure he would
always be able to see the President whenever necessary if he
did not burden him with unimportant and unnecessary
verbiage....
'Gregory is very able and has been exceedingly successful
with New Haven affairs, but it has not spoiled him in the
least. He is one of the few that I have ever met who, I believe, would never get "the big head" no matter how suc



Albert S. Burleson                                  David F. Houston
Thomas W. Gregory
THREE TEXAS CABINET-MEMBERS




I




ATTORNEY-GENERAL GREGORY


143


cessful he became. He is not only able, but is as loyal as the
Legion of Caesar.'
Colonel House to Attorney-General Gregory
PRIDE'S CROSSING, MASSACHUSETTS
August 20, 1914
MY DEAR FRIEND:... I am so eager for your success and so anxious it may be
brought about without any impairment of your strength that
there are many suggestions that have come to me since our
last talk.
Do be careful about making appointments too soon. Take
your time about them and do not let friendship have any
undue influence upon you....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
On his side, Mr. Gregory wrote continually to House, evidencing invariably the strongest affection both for him and
for the President. 'How can I ever repay such confidence or
justify it,' he wrote on August 22, 1914. 'How can I ever
even up matters with you, who have given him so exaggerated an idea of my ability?' And four days later: 'Come to
Washington soon, give us all the suggestions you can spare,
and do not doubt that I know you to be, as you have been for
years, my very best friend.'
Apparently the Cabinet counted on House not merely to
discover available material for appointments, but also to inform unsatisfactory office-holders that they need not expect
reappointment or continuance. The function could not have
been attractive. House writes to McAdoo: 'I am always
ready to meet any suggestion that you make, but if you
know Mr. X at all you would know that it would be utterly
impossible for me or any one else to notify him "in a tactful
way" and " in a way not to hurt his feelings" that his services




144 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


were to be discontinued. I would as soon undertake to
square the circle or to prove the fourth dimension.'
Mr. X, who was evidently a gentleman to be handled
diplomatically, seems to have made difficulties, for some
time later Mr. Gregory wrote as follows to the Colonel:
Attorney-General Gregory to Colonel House
WASHINGTON, November 25, 1914
MY DEAR FRIEND:
I went to the White House last night and had a long talk
with the President about X. I do not think the President
will agree to appoint him to the --  position, although a
final conclusion was not reached. The President made a
memorandum of X's case and is going to make an effort to
provide for him in some way, and I will keep the matter in
mind.
I do not want X, however, to be eternally bombarding my
private secretary and me with telegrams demanding his immediate appointment to the place, and I must say that he is
making a nuisance of himself. I wish you would get this idea
conveyed to him in some diplomatic way....
Sincerely and affectionately yours
T. W. GREGORY
Much more interesting and congenial was the task which
Colonel House set himself whenever in Europe-that of
studying all sorts of reforms so as to be able to pass on new
ideas to the heads of departments in Washington.
'This afternoon [he wrote in London, June 20, 1913] Sir
Horace Plunkett came to call and remained for an hour. We
discussed the betterment of the farming class along the lines
of more effective farming, farming credits, cooperative marketing, and the making of country life more pleasant and




SIR HORACE PLUNKETT


145


desirable. He wished me to come to Ireland and visit him for
three days before we sail, and I have promised to go. I am
much interested in this phase of governmental work. I want
to see what has been done in Ireland under his direction so
that I may take some practical knowledge of it to the President and to Secretary Houston for their information.'
House knew of the lifetime of service which Plunkett had
devoted to the science of agricultural improvement and to its
application to Ireland, of his friendship with Roosevelt, and
his love for America. He looked upon him as among the
most eminent of living British statesmen, and he hoped to
win his interest and help in the solution of American agricultural problems. Plunkett, on his side, had been on the
watch for a chance to come into contact with the new Democratic Administration and was delighted to find in the President's adviser a congenial spirit, between whom and himself
sprang up an enduring companionship. 'Thus began,' said
Plunkett, twelve years later, 'this precious friendship of my
later years.' 1
Sir Horace Plunkett to Colonel House
WASHINGTON, D.C., October 16, 1913
MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:
You leave me wondering how you can show such extraordinary kindness to a stranger in the land, of whom you know so
little, and how I can ever repay such hospitality and help.
Yesterday morning and last night will long remain delightful
memories. You gave me the opportunity I badly needed to
explain things to Mr. Houston, and in this, judging by his
kindness to me to-day, I think I must have had some success.
I had a most useful time with him and others at the Department this morning and shall probably resume my studies
to-morrow. I paid my respects to the President and was
1 Conversation with the author, August 1, 1925.




146 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


shocked to see him looking so worn. The change since January last is terribly marked, and you ought to try and
force him to take a week's complete rest the moment the
strain is relaxed- even at the sacrifice of some public
business.
You will be glad to know that already the atmosphere at
the Department of Agriculture has noticeably changed. I am
going to think quietly over what I have learned and shall
probably write you from Battle Creek a suggestion for a line
which, if taken by the President in his first annual message,
might greatly assist the Agricultural Department. You
would know whether to mention it to the President. Any
suggestions I may have from time to time for the Department I shall send direct to the Secretary....
With renewed thanks and kind remembrances to Mrs.
House, I am
Sincerely yours
HORACE PLUNKETT
Most characteristic is the following letter, which suggests
the remarkable position held by Colonel House. Mr. Lane
had in mind resigning from the Cabinet in case a certain
other high office should be opened to him. Quite obviously
he regarded House's approval as necessary, and yet his fondness for the Colonel was such that he was unwilling to embarrass him by approaching him directly.
Secretary Lane to Dr. S. E. Mezes
WASHINGTON, July 4, 1916
MY DEAR SID:... Now don't think me importunate or cheeky or impatient. I'm here to do my 'bit.' I'll stand guard all night
without a whimper. All I want is for you, in that superlatively tactful way of yours, to find out if my chances are
worth considering at this time - and if they are, will the




A FINE COLLECTION OF CRANKS


147


Colonel make them something better than mere chances. If
they are not, I shall continue sawing wood, and whistling
most of the time.
I am not asking for what Ned calls 'bull-con' or for any
pat on the back. If you can give me a tip, I shall be obliged;
if not, I shall be as always your most devoted and sometimes
humble servant,
F. K. L.
P.S. Treat this rather frivolous epistle upon a most important subject as entirely between us. I wouldn't for a good
right leg want Colonel E. M. to think me to be butting in.
IV
The activities of Colonel House were not confined to assisting the National Administration. We find him in consultation with the Boston city authorities when appointments were
to be made, and the New York City and State Democrats
looked to him for counsel and aid. An infinite number of
lesser problems were cheerfully deposited upon his doorstep
by friends, acquaintances, and strangers. He soothed disgruntled journalists, and discussed the plans of inventors
who would save the Republic from material destruction in
the next war and social enthusiasts who would preserve its
soul during the peace.
'I have had as fine a collection of cranks to-day [he wrote
on October 20, 1913] as it has been my lot to meet for a long
time. Mr. Bryan sent one, Secretary Daniels sent another,
and I inherited yet another from the President. The talk has
ranged all the way from office-seeking to the control of the
planetary system....'
'October 23, 1914: My, my, what a busy day! Commencing
with Governor Glynn, McAdoo, Dudley Malone, Commissioner Adamson, former Corporation Counsel Archibald




148 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Watson, Stuart Gibboney, Clarence Shearn, Montgomery
Hare, Francis Lynde Stetson, McAneny, and so many others
I cannot even think of them. Every phase of the New York
State election has been referred to me to-day. Telegrams,
party notices, arrangements for meetings, have all passed up
for visa. I am literally tired out and shall be glad when the
election has come and gone....
'May 23, 1914 [on an Atlantic liner]: I had several wireless
messages, one from Mrs. -, who desires her husband, who
is now Consul at, appointed to the vacancy in London.
Even at sea there is no rest from the office-seekers...
'November 4, 1914: Loulie and I took the 12.08 for Washington. Major-General -    went with us by invitation. I
shall be more careful next time, for he literally talked me to
death. If he can fight as hard as he can talk, no enemy in the
world could resist him....'
Colonel House regarded his position in public affairs with
philosophical eye and not without a touch of humor. 'The
funny part of it is,' he wrote to his brother-in-law, 'that
people seem to think that I have done something unusual,
when as a matter of fact it is only because the newspapers
have begun to say extravagant things about me. Such, however, is the stuff of which fame is made.'
The interest of the Colonel's life was beyond question, but
none the less it must have proved wearying. The more
people realized the difficulty of reaching President Wilson
personally, the more strenuous were the efforts they made at
least to reach House.
'The Governor comes in again this afternoon [wrote House
to Dr. Mezes] to spend the night with me and go to the
theatre. It is an exceedingly pleasant diversion to have him,
but you have no idea how much work it entails.
'As soon as the papers blaze forth in the morning, my




NEWSPAPER NOTORIETY


149


troubles immediately begin anew and I receive communications from unheard-of quarters as well as from friends who
have been lost for many years....'
And later:
'... I am suffering from the after-effects of the President's
visit. All the latent cranks in the country are at me. Some
to kill,1 some to amuse, but most of them to instruct concerning what is best to be done in every phase of government....'
House also asked himself what would be the effect of his
growing reputation upon the mind of the President and
others in official positions. The role of eminence grise was one
that demanded a never-failing tact. It may have been flattering to be so placed that every one should regard his consent to a proposal as equivalent to success, but it was politically perilous as well as physically tiring.
Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes
NEW YORK, April 24, 1913
DEAR SIDNEY:... I was in Washington ten days, and when I returned I
literally had to wade through mail to get to my desk. Every
office-seeker and every crank in the United States is on my
trail, and I get photographs from all sorts and conditions of
people who think in this way they can impress their identity
more securely upon me. ^. in;    r /
It all comes from the newspaper notoriety, and the end is
not yet. The next edition of Collier's, I believe, is to do the
The following, although belonging to a later period, is typical of the
threatening letters House received: 'Sorry I missed the President when
he left your home. I had a nice bullet for him for a wedding present
I get him yet and you to, because you are a facker. A friend of Justice.'




150 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


thing in grand style. The article is to be entitled 'The
President's Silent Partner.' I urged them to name it anything but that, but nothing but that would satisfy them.
They said that title had much more punch in it than any
other. I agree to that, but I am afraid that I will get some of
the licks.
I do not know how much of this kind of thing W. W. can
stand. The last edition of Harper's Weekly spoke of me as
'Assistant President House.' I think it is time for me to go to
Europe or take to the woods.
Fraternally yours
E. M. HOUSE
House decided to go to Europe, where he spent the summer of 1913. But he returned to find his influence undiminished and his energies engaged in a succession of major problems, at first domestic and then international in character.




CHAPTER VI, THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK
President Wilson has brought his party out of the wilderness ol Bryanism.
It has been a great exhibition of leadership.
New York Tribune, December 24, 1913
I
'THE main thing, I think [wrote House to Wilson, July 31,
1915], is always to do the job better than any one else has
ever done it, and the political end will take care of itself.
This has always been my theory, and I have found it satisfactory and successful.'
This note, which recurs continually in House's letters,
would doubtless have surprised many persons who, without
adequate information, looked upon the Colonel primarily as
a political manager and an expert in party tactics. Another
misconception lay in the belief that House acted as a brake
upon the President, constantly restraining him from overenthusiasm in reform and urging caution in speeches and
legislative measures. His papers by no means bear out this
supposition. One may deduce from them, indeed, the definite conclusion that the Colonel was the more radical of the
two and was ever in fear lest this Administration, like so
many others, once it came into power should be content
merely to govern and forget to pave the path for progress.
House always insisted upon the need of courage and of
radical reform. A clear example of his feeling is found in
two conversations, almost a year apart, between House and
the President. The first occurred at the moment when tariff
lobbyists were threatening the political annihilation of Wilson if he persisted in driving through the Tariff Bill without
regard to the demands of special interests. The second took




152 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


place when reactionary forces were stirring feeling against
him because of his proposed anti-trust legislation.
'May 11, 1913: Captain Bill McDonald once told me that
he attributed his still being alive to the fact that he had
never hesitated the fraction of a second, but had always gone
straight towards the point of danger, and the courage of the
other fellow had always failed. I urged this attitude upon
the President as strongly as I knew how, and told him it was
the most essential thing of all....
'April 27, 1914: We talked of the desirability of pushing
the progressive cause forward. I thought unless we did this,
we could not justify being in the position we were. We spoke
of the political results of such a course, and came to the conclusion that it was best not to consider that aspect at all, but
to go resolutely forward with the reform programme and let
the future take care of itself.'
The extent of Colonel House's influence upon the legislative plans of the Administration may be gathered from a remarkable document which deserves some attention. In the
autumn of 1912, immediately after the presidential election,
there was published a novel, or political romance, entitled
'Philip Dru: Administrator.' It was the story of a young
West Point graduate, incapacitated for military service
by his health, who was caught by the spirit of revolt against
the tyranny of privileged interests. A stupid and reactionary
Government at Washington provokes armed rebellion, in
which Dru joins whole-heartedly and which he ultimately
leads to complete success. He himself becomes dictator and
proceeds by ordinance to remake the mechanism of government, to reform the basic laws that determine the relation of
the classes, to remodel the defensive forces of the republic,
and to bring about an international grouping or league of
powers, founded upon Anglo-Saxon solidarity. His reforms




PHILIP DRU: ADMINISTRATOR


153


accomplished, he gives effect once more to representative
institutions as formulated in a new American Constitution,
better fitted than the old for the spirit and conditions of the
twentieth century.
As a romance, the book was not notable, for the effort of
the anonymous author had evidently been spent upon the
careful working-out of the political and social ideas of the
young Philip Dru rather than upon its literary form. Certain
reviewers, however, were piqued by the daring and the ingenuity of these ideas and, treating the book as a political
manifesto rather than a novel, acclaimed it as a remarkable
publication. Speculation as to the personality of the unknown author, who was described merely as 'a man prominent in political councils,' naturally followed. There seemed
to be general agreement that he could not belong to either of
the two older parties. 'We trust he is to be found among the
Democrats,' wrote one reviewer, 'but we greatly fear he is of
the New Party.' Another reviewer was of similar opinion:
'We trust that the author's counsel and assistance will be
available at Washington, if not during the present Administration, surely when the Progressive Party assumes control.'
There were, indeed, numerous suggestions that Mr. Roosevelt himself was the author.
Five years after its publication an enterprising bookseller, noting the growing influence of House in the Wilson
Administration, wrote with regard to the book: 'As time
goes on the interest in it becomes more intense, due to the
fact that so many of the ideas expressed by "Philip Dru:
Administrator," have become laws of this Republic, and so
many of his ideas have been discussed as becoming laws.'
And he ends with the question, 'Is Colonel E. M. House of
Texas the author? If not, who is?'
Colonel House was, in truth, the author; to his other occupations he had added that of novelist. He tells us himself in
a brief memorandum how, in the autumn of 1911, he con



154 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


ceived the idea of writing a novel as a medium to express his
economic and political theories. That winter in Austin he
was seriously ill.
'When I began to convalesce at home, and before I was
able to get about, I wrote "Philip Dru: Administrator." I
was surprised at the rapidity with which I wrote, for I was
not certain when I began that I could do it at all....
'I was also surprised to find how much I was interested in
doing this kind of work. I had written platforms, speeches,
etc., for different candidates and officials, and newspaper
articles for campaign purposes, but this was an entirely new
departure. I did not spend more than thirty days upon the
first draft of the book. Mezes read and approved it, and I
sent it to Houston to look over, largely with the view of
getting his judgment as to the economic features of it.
'He kept the manuscript until I passed through St. Louis
on my way East. He declared his belief that it was economically sound, but held that the fiction in it was so thin that he
advised rewriting it as a serious work, as he had suggested
originally.'
Colonel House to Dr. D. F. Houston
AUSTIN, TEXAS, March 12, 1912
DEAR DOCTOR HOUSTON:... I expect to elaborate somewhat concerning the functions of the National Government.
I particularly want to make it clear that the Executive
and his Cabinet will be more nearly akin to the English
Premier than to the French, inasmuch as I want him to have
the right to propose measures directly and without referring
them to a committee.
If you have any suggestions along this or any other lines,
please let me have them.
I have done some padding - as, for instance, the story of




PHILIP DRU: ADMINISTRATOR


155


the tenement fire - which I expect to take out later and
put in more serious stuff.
It is not much of a novel, as you will soon discover; at the
same time, unless it were known by that name its audience
would be reduced at least ninety-nine per cent. If it was called
what I really mean it to be, only those who think pretty
much as I do would read it, and those I am trying to reach
would never look at it.
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
But this was the spring of 1912, and all of House's energies
were taken up with the pre-convention campaign that
ended with the nomination of Wilson. The early summer he
spent in Europe. Evidently not wishing to give the time
necessary to putting it into the form that Mr. Houston advised, by elimination of the romance, and fearing that a
scientific essay would not reach a large public, he decided
merely to smooth it out so far as possible while on the Atlantic.
'I worked assiduously on "Philip Dru" all the way over
and all the way back, but had no time for it in Europe....
We returned early in August, and the first thing I did was to
shake myself clear of "Philip Dru."
'E. S. Martin read the manuscript and wanted me to rewrite it, saying that "some of it was so good that it was a
pity that parts of it were so bad." I had no time, however,
for such diversions, for the political campaign was engrossing
my entire time and the publisher was urging me to give him
the manuscript so it might be advertised in the autumn
announcements.
'I was so much more interested in the campaign than I
was in the book that I turned it over to the publisher, having
determined to let it go as it was.'




156 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Whatever the literary merits of 'Philip Dru,' it gives us an
insight into the main political and social principles that
actuated House in his companionship with President Wilson.
Through it runs the note of social democracy reminiscent of
Louis Blanc and the revolutionaries of 1848: 'This book is
dedicated to the unhappy many who have lived and died
lacking opportunity....' 'The time is now measurably
near when it will be just as reprehensible for the mentally
strong to hold in subjection the mentally weak, and to force
them to bear the grievous burdens which a misconceived
civilization has imposed upon them.' Government, accordingly, must be inspired by the spirit of charity rather than
the spirit of ruthless efficiency. Especially must privileged
interests be excluded from governmental influence, for by
the nature of things their point of view is selfish.
Through the book also runs the idea that in the United
States, government is unresponsive to popular desires - a
'negative' government, House calls it - for it is at more pains
to do nothing with safety than to attempt desirable reforms
which might disturb vested interests and alienate the voters.
'We have been living under a Government of negation.'
The theory of checks and balances has developed so as to
reenforce this negative character of government; closer cooperation between the President and Congress, perhaps in
the direction of parliamentary methods, is necessary if the
tendency of American government is to be made active and
positive.
The specific measures enacted by Philip Dru as Administrator of the nation, indicated the reforms desired by House.
The Administrator appointed a 'board composed of
economists and others well versed in matters relating to the
tariff and internal revenue, who... were instructed to work
out a tariff law which would contemplate the abolition of the
theory of protection as a governmental policy.'




PHILIP DRU: ADMINISTRATOR


157


'The Administrator further directed the tax board to
work out a graduated income tax....'
Philip Dru also provided for the 'formulation of a new
banking law, affording a flexible currency bottomed largely
upon commercial assets, the real wealth of the nation, instead of upon debt, as formerly.... Its final construction
would completely destroy the credit trust, the greatest, the
most far-reaching, and under evil direction the most pernicious trust of all.'
'He also proposed making corporations share with the
Government and States a certain part of their net earnings.... '
Such were some of Dru's plans which shortly found actual
life in Wilsonian legislation. No wonder that Cabinet members like Mr. Lane and Mr. Bryan commented upon the
influence of Dru with the President. 'All that book has said
should be,' wrote Lane, 'comes about.... The President
comes to "Philip Dru" in the end.' '
Other excerpts indicate the extent of House's progressiveness.
'Labor is no longer to be classed as an inert commodity to
be bought and sold by the law of supply and demand.'
Dru 'prepared an old-age pension law and also a laborer's
insurance law covering loss in cases of illness, incapacity,
and death.'
'He had incorporated in the Franchise Law the right of
Labor to have one representative upon the boards of corporations and to share a certain percentage of the earnings above
the wages, after a reasonable per cent upon the capital had
been earned. In turn it was to be obligatory upon them
[the laborers] not to strike, but to submit all grievances to
arbitration.'
I Letters of Franklin K. Lane, p. 297.




158 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


To such an extent had Colonel House formulated his
ideas upon national problems before the election of Wilson.
'In regard to "Philip Dru,"' wrote House in 1916, 'I want
to say that there are some things in it I wrote hastily and in
which I do not concur, but most of it I stand upon as being
both my ethical and political faith.'
II
Four great legislative problems confronted Wilson, and
their solution constitutes his chief claim, in matters of domestic politics, to the title of statesman. They concerned the
revision of the tariff, with the introduction of an income tax
law, the creation of the Federal Reserve banking system, the
control of trusts, and the regulation of industrial relations.
In meeting them Wilson displayed the inspiring leadership
essential to success; he showed himself as convincing and
sympathetic when he dealt with Congress as a whole, as he
was reserved in his dealings with individual Congressmen. By
the end of the special session which passed both the Tariff and
Currency Acts, his moral supremacy was firmly established
and his mastery of the party was complete. He was hailed
as the Moses who had led the party out of the legislative
ineffectiveness supposedly characteristic of all Democrats.
In each of the great problems House took deep interest.
He brought to the President the variety of opinions which he
culled from his numerous personal contacts, he utilized his
relations with party leaders to assist the passage of the bills
through Congress. But it was in the currency question that
he took chief interest, for this he had long studied and from
its solution might be expected positive, tangible benefits in a
short time. As cotton planter and one-time banker in Texas
he appreciated the dangers of an inelastic currency, and as
a liberal he distrusted the financial power which certain
metropolitan banking firms were able to wield over national
commerce and industry.




THE MONEY TRUST


159


Organized capital, 'Wall Street' in popular parlance, had
secured a control of banking credits which, if it were extended, might place the industrial life of the country in the
power of private and at least partially irresponsible interests.
Against this so-called 'credit trust' Mr. Bryan had protested
in 1896:' Let the Government go out of the banking business,'
the financial magnates had cried; to which Bryan retorted,
'Let the banks go out of the Government business.' If
private individuals could release or withhold credits at will,
it meant a control of industry and inequality of opportunity
at complete variance with traditional American principles.
Colonel House to Senator Culberson
MAGNOLIA, MASSACHUSETTS
July 26, 1911
DEAR SENATOR:... I think Woodrow Wilson's remark that the money
trust was the most pernicious of all trusts, is eminently
correct.
A few individuals and their satellites control the leading
banks and trust companies in America. They also control
the leading corporations; and if they are to be permitted on
the one hand to use the corporations as a bar against loss to
any speculation which they may make, and to use on the
other hand the banks and trust companies to borrow all the
funds they may need for such speculations, the stockholders
of the corporations which they dominate and the business
world that depends upon funds from the trust companies
and banks which they dominate, are bound to suffer....
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
During the autumn of 1912 and the spring of 1913, even in
the midst of the campaign and the process of forming a
Cabinet, House worked constantly on the currency problem,




160 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


in order to be prepared to assist the President when he should
meet the congressional committees. The task which Colonel
House set himself was primarily to prevent the Presidentelect from committing himself to any one scheme until the
problem had been thoroughly studied; later he guided the
measure so that it was left in the control of experts and preserved from the heresies of political incompetents. The
Colonel was the unseen guardian angel of the bill, constantly
assisting the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairmen of
the Senate and House Committees in their active and successful labor of translating it into law. Wilson, who was accused
of a tendency to avoid advice, proved himself in fact to be
far from the self-confident doctrinaire pictured by his opponents, and in the matter of currency reform he was determined that the bill should be founded upon expert opinion.
'The greatest embarrassment of my political career [he
said to an enthusiast on this subject] has been that active
duties seem to deprive me absolutely of time for careful
investigation. I seem almost obliged to form conclusions
from impressions instead of from study, but I intend to go
much more thoroughly into this matter before saying anything about it; and I heartily agree with you that this, the
most fundamental question of all, must be approached with
caution and fearlessness and receive dispassionate and openminded treatment. I wish that I had more knowledge, more
thorough acquaintance, with the matters involved. All that
I can promise you is sincere study. I wish that I could
promise you a constructive ability.'
Colonel House was indefatigable in providing for the
President the knowledge that he sought. He collected in his
study the banking laws of every nation of Europe. He gathered reports and abstracts from college professors of economics and banking. But he laid chief stress upon his frequent




CURRENCY REFORM


161


conferences with the bankers themselves, especially those
who had had practical experience in drafting previous bills
for Republican Administrations.
'December 19, 1912: I talked with Paul Warburg over the
telephone regarding currency reform. I told of my Washington trip and what I had done there to get it in working
order; that the Senators and Congressmen seemed anxious
to do what Governor Wilson desired and that I knew the
President-elect thought straight concerning the issue.
'February 26, 1913: I went to the Harding dinner and
talked with the guests invited to meet me. It was an interesting occasion. I first talked to Mr. Frick, then with Denman, and afterwards with Otto Kahn.
'March 13, 1913: Vanderlip and I had an interesting discussion regarding currency reform.
'March 27, 1913: Mr. J. P. Morgan, Jr., and Mr. Denny of
his firm, came promptly at five. McAdoo came about ten
minutes afterwards. Morgan had a currency plan already
formulated and printed. We discussed it at some length. I
suggested that he should have it typewritten and sent to us
to-day.' 1
'The Governor [recorded Colonel House on January 8,
1913] agreed to put me in touch with Glass, Chairman of the
Banking and Currency Committee, and I am to work out a
measure which is to be submitted to him.
'He spoke of his fear that Bryan would not approve such a
bill as I have in mind. I said it was better to contend with
Mr. Bryan's disapproval and fail in securing any bill at all,
than it was to get one which was not sound.
'March 24, 1913: I had an engagement with Carter Glass
at five. We drove, in order not to be interrupted....
1 Typewritten, in order to avoid the impression that might be given by
a printed plan that Morgan's were so sure of their financial power that
they could impose a cut-and-dried plan.




162 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'I urged him not to allow... the Senate Committee to
change what we had agreed upon in any of the essential
features. He promised to be firm. I advised using honey so
long as it was effective, but, when it was not, I would bring
the President and Secretary of the Treasury to his rescue.
'I spoke to the President about this after dinner and advised that McAdoo and I whip the Glass measure into final
shape, which he could endorse and take to Owen 1 as his own.
My opinion was that Owen would be more likely to accept it
as a presidential measure than as a measure coming from the
House Committee on Banking and Currency.'
The Currency Bill was brought into the House of Representatives early in the extra session, its main features unchanged from the first drafts decided upon by the President,
McAdoo, and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees. The initial difficulties threatened by certain elements in the party which tended toward economic freethinking, were safely passed. There remained, however, the
opposition of a number of Senators, behind which lay the
dislike of the bill expressed by prominent Eastern bankers,
who evidently feared that it meant a weakening of Wall
Street's power and an amateur or political control of national
financial problems. House spent much of his summer in defending the bill and more of his autumn in securing political
support for it.
'July 23, 1913 [conversation with Josiah Quincy, former
Mayor of Boston]: I tried to show him the folly of the Eastern bankers taking an antagonistic attitude towards the
Currency Bill. The Administration is endeavoring to serve
the country as a whole, and it is the better part of wisdom
for the Eastern bankers to join hands in working out a
measure for the general good.
1 Chairman of the Senate Committee.




DISCUSSIONS WITH BOSTON BANKERS 163


'Quincy wanted to know what I thought the result would
be of their threat to withdraw their national bank charters
and take out state charters. I thought the threat was puerile,
and not to be discussed, and that the bill would be passed no
matter what action they took in that direction.'
On the following day, House dined with the members of
the Boston Clearing House Association to discuss the bill.
He went in no optimistic frame of mind. 'I have a feeling,'
he wrote, 'that they are not coming for the purpose of discussing the measure with open minds, but are antagonistic to
it. I shall be alone to defend the measure.'
His forebodings were apparently realized, for he noted
after the dinner: 'I found the bankers singularly barren of
suggestions. They seem to stand upon the general proposition of being against the Administration bill, but without
any constructive suggestions looking to its betterment.'
House found more consolation and satisfaction in a long
talk with Major Henry L. Higginson, at the end of August.
'I can well understand [wrote House] why he is considered
by many, Boston's first citizen. We talked of the currency
question and I found that he had a breadth of view unusual
amongst those of his calling. He seemed to want what was
best for the entire country, and not something for his particular locality and profession. I explained with what care
the bill had been framed. Just before he arrived, I had
finished a review by Professor Sprague of Harvard of Paul
Warburg's criticism of the Glass-Owen bill, and will transmit
it to Washington to-morrow. Every banker like Warburg,
who knows the subject practically, has been called upon in
the making of the bill. Major Higginson seemed thoroughly
satisfied with the endeavors the Administration have made
to construct a good and beneficent measure.




164 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to Mr. E. S. Martin
BEVERLY. MASSACHUSETTS
September 2, 1913
DEAR MARTIN:... The Currency Bill should go through the House next
week, but it will have a harder road in the Senate. I have
been working upon it assiduously. McAdoo has been here
three or four times, and it seems to me that I have seen every
banker and political economist in the East.
The bankers, sad to relate, know next to nothing about it,
and none of them agrees as to what is best. The only unanimity of opinion amongst them is that the bill should be
made for them and be operated by them, and they cannot
understand that the manufacturers, merchants, railroads,
farmers, and others have any rights in the premises.
I think the bill is getting in good shape. Houston was with
me last week and he says that in his opinion, and in the
opinion of ninety per cent of the political economists throughout the country whose opinions are of value, it is the best
bill that has ever been constructed - infinitely better than
the Aldrich Bill....
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
'October 19, 1913: I saw Senator Reed of Missouri in the
late afternoon and discussed the currency question with him.
He says the President seems to be more concerned in regard
to haste than he does as to the measure itself. In this, of
course, he is mistaken. The President is satisfied with the
measure approximately as it is, and he knows that Reed and
the other Democratic Senators who are delaying it are doing
so from a failure to study the measure as it has progressed
through the House, and he is impatient in consequence.
'October 31, 1913: Paul Warburg was my first caller, and
he came to discuss the currency measure. There are many




CONFERENCES ON THE CURRENCY


165


features of the Owen-Glass Bill that he does not approve.
I promised to put him in touch with McAdoo and Senator
Owen, so that he might discuss it with them.
'Senator Murray Cranei followed Warburg. He has been
in touch with Senators Weeks and Nelson of the Currency
Committee, and urged them to bring about quick action in
order that the business community could have done with
this uncertainty and could go ahead with the renewed hope a
proper currency measure will give them. He telephoned me
later that he had been in communication with Washington,
and he advised that we bring some pressure upon the Democratic insurgents of the Committee. I called up McAdoo
immediately and asked him to convey this information to
the President and to gently start the pressure. I also arranged for him to meet Warburg here on Monday.
'November 17, 1913: Paul Warburg telephoned about his
trip to Washington. He is much disturbed over the currency
situation and requested an interview, along with Jacob
Schiff and Cleveland H. Dodge. Mr. Dodge came in advance of the others. He said he felt obliged to come at their
request, because they had just given him a substantial subscription for the Y.M.C.A. fund. He had a feeling that the
President knew what he was doing and did not need any
more advice than he was getting from the channels he himself selected. I told him I shared this view and that, since all
the experts disagreed, it left one in doubt as to what to do.
'Mr. Schiff and Mr. Warburg came in a few minutes.
Warburg did most of the talking. He had a new suggestion
in regard to grouping the regional reserve banks, so as to
get the units welded together and in easier touch with the
Federal Reserve Board. Mr. Schiff did not agree as to the
advisability of doing this. He thought the regional reserve
banks should be cut down to four and let it go at that.
'They wanted me to go to Washington with Mr. Warburg
1 Republican Senator from Massachusetts.




166 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


and Mr. Dodge, Mr. Schiff saying I was the Moses and they
would be the Aarons. He asked if I knew my Bible well
enough for this to be clear to me. I told him I did. I combated the idea that the President was stubborn in his stand
upon the currency measure. I thought he had to be firm and
had to make up his mind as to what was good and what was
bad in the innumerable suggestions that came to him, and
that was all he was doing. I advised against going to the
President with new suggestions. I thought they should be
taken to Secretary McAdoo, Senator Owen, and Mr. Glass;
if they agreed as to the advisability of accepting them, the
President would probably also accept them.'
Pressure from both sides and from above, as exercised by
the President, finally compelled the acquiescence of the
opposing Senators; and on December 20, 'a gala day' House
called it, the Federal Reserve Bill passed the Senate. It
was hailed generally as a greater triumph for Wilson even
than the Tariff Act, and in the Colonel's matured judgment
was the most important single legislative act of the entire
Wilson Administration. Even the strongly Republican New
York Tribune could not withhold words of commendation:
'President Wilson has brought his party out of the wilderness of Bryanism. It has been a great exhibition of leadership.'
Few persons suspected the share taken by Colonel House
in the formation and passing of the Federal Reserve Act,
and he said nothing that might enlighten the public. Towards the end of December, 1913, after the Senate had approved the bill, House was discussing it with two outstanding
journalists, Lawrence of the Associated Press and Price of
the Washington Star. 'I wish you would let me tell about
your activities in making the bill,' said the latter. But the
Colonel was obdurate in his insistence upon silence. 'Will
you stay over to see it signed?' asked Lawrence. But now




THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT


167


that the main job was accomplished, House admitted he
lacked sufficient interest in any mere ceremony to keep him
in Washington.
As events developed, Colonel House's connection with the
Federal Reserve Act was by no means ended when it became
law, for there remained the problem of the appointment of
the five Governors of the Federal Reserve Board who, with
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the
Currency, act as the coordinating body of the system. The
personnel of the Board was obviously a matter of the first
importance, not merely for the sake of administrative efficiency, but also because the easiest way to win public confidence in a measure which has been questioned is to appoint
men whom the public admires and trusts.
Colonel House acted in much the same capacity when it
came to the appointment of the Board as he did in the selection of the Cabinet; that is, he gathered lists of possibilities,
interviewed them, culled opinions about them, sifted the
names and passed them on to President Wilson and Secretary McAdoo. The following excerpts are typical:
'January 19, 1914: Mr. X came to lunch. I had a very
frank talk with him, saying I had thought of him in connection with the Federal Reserve Board and intended to present his name to the President provided I did not find some
one else whom I thought better fitted for the place. The
more I see of him, the more I like him. He is not the biggest
mentality I have met, but he has good sense and has many
fine qualities.
'Mr. Y came to be looked over for the Federal Reserve
Board. He differs from X inasmuch as he is an applicant,
while I sought X out myself without any suggestion from
any one.... He is older and has had more experience, but he




168 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


is not so fine a type. I played the part of schoolmaster, as
usual, and questioned him closely about himself and his
business career.
'January 21, 1914: After dinner we [Wilson and House]
went to the President's study as usual, and began work on
the Federal Reserve Board appointments. I insisted that it
was the most important constructive legislative measure
that had been passed since the foundation of the Republic
and thought its success or failure would largely depend upon
the personnel of the Board. He replied, "My dear friend, do
not frighten me any more than I am now." I saw no need for
alarm, because for this particular Board there was plenty of
good material to choose from....
'In discussing the Federal Reserve Board, there was one
man whose name I presented by saying that he had been
getting his friends to endorse him and had secured many
eminent people to ask for his appointment. The President
replied to this, "Let us eliminate him without further discussion." '
Secretary McAdoo to Colonel House
WASHINGTON, February 15, 1914 [?]
DEAR COLONEL:... I wish some people would quit trying to put over
political appointments on the Board! That is the most insidious and difficult thing to deal with. I am firmly opposed
to making these banks political instrumentalities, and yet I
am going to offend many of my best friends because they
can't see the importance of eliminating politics absolutely
from the organization of the banks. Of course this doesn't
apply to you! I'm speaking of politicians.
With warm regards, always
Cordially yours
W. G. McADoo




THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD


169


Colonel House to the President
AUSTIN, TEXAS, February 21, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I find that Mr. X of Dallas is too old to be considered, so
he will have to be eliminated.
Burleson, who is here to-day, tells me that Doctor Y, of
whom you speak, is a crank of the first water and would
not do.
I do not know Mr. Z, and the objection to him might be
that he is not sufficiently prominent for his appointment to
carry weight. That is something to be considered in this
Board if it is to be thought of in the same sense as the Supreme Court.
I can think of some men that I am sure would be equal to
the job, but they would not carry confidence and therefore
would be poor appointments.
If the elder Simmons were appointed for the two-year
term, you could replace him by Houston afterwards, if you
desired. Then, with Miller from the Pacific Coast and
Wheeler or some one else from Chicago, you would have the
West taken care of....
If Z does not bear inspection, then your suggestion of
Gregory I would not be bad. Gregory is something of the
same type as Carter Glass, and, while he knows nothing of
the matter now, yet within six months he would be as wellinformed upon the subject as Glass was after that period of
time.
Call me when you need me, for I am always under orders.
Yours with devotion
E. M. HousE
P.S. Any recommendation made by members of Congress
should be prima facie evidence of unfitness, and I would not
take any suggestions from that quarter without the most
1 T. W. Gregory, later Attorney-General.




170 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


careful investigation. What I mean is that their recommendations would be political, and therefore largely worthless.
'March 25, 1914: Houston, McAdoo, Williams, and I
[wrote House] discussed the division of the country into districts and the location of the regional reserve banks.
'In the evening the President and I dined alone and went
immediately to his study to have an old-time business session
in regard to the Federal Reserve Board. I found he had
added no names to those I had given him before I left for
Texas. We concluded, however, that I should get up some
new material and submit it to him next week, when he hopes
to be able to visit me in New York.'
Colonel House to the President
NEW YORK, April 3, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I am terribly disappointed that you could not come this
week, and more particularly since Mrs. Wilson's condition is
the cause.
I have been working assiduously towards getting a list of
suggestions to submit to you for the Federal Reserve Board.
Since you are not coming, I am enclosing them in this.
If Richard Olney would take the two-year term, it would
be fine, for Houston could then be appointed to succeed
him. I have asked a number of people whose opinions are
worth while, in regard to Olney, and they all approve it. I
do not know whether he would accept, but I have been told
that he might do so.
There are a number of names on the list that seem to me
admirable, but they would need a little more looking into.
If you will indicate the ones that appeal to you, I will investigate further....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE




THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD


171


During the following weeks, McAdoo and House had many
conferences, as a result of which the President was ready by
the end of April to make his appointments. House would
have been pleased to have Houston appointed Governor of
the Federal Reserve Board, but Wilson would not consent to
his leaving the Cabinet at this time. 'I wish there were two
1loustons instead of one,' he had told House on February 18.
'I really do not see how I can spare him from the Secretaryship of Agriculture, particularly at this juncture when we are
considering rural credits and when we are just beginning to
be able to guide the farmers in new directions. We have not
yet entirely convinced them of our usefulness.'
Instead, the President accepted House's suggestion of
offering the post of Governor to Richard Olney of Boston,
Secretary of State under President Cleveland and one of the
most distinguished figures of the party. Paul Warburg of
New York, because of his interest and experience in currency
problems under both Republican and Democratic Administrations, and W. P. G. Harding as a leading banker of the
South, had always been sponsored by House and were accepted by the President. To represent the Middle West and
the Pacific Coast, H. A. Wheeler of Chicago and A. C. Miller
of California had finally been selected. Warburg, Harding,
and Wheeler were professional bankers, Olney a lawyer, and
Miller a college professor whose distinction in the field of
economics had brought him into the Department of the
Interior. Political affiliations were not a factor in their
appointment; but of the five two were Republicans, two
Democrats, and the fifth an independent.
Notes made by House of conversations with Wilson in
April throw light on the final process of appointment.
'April 15, 1914: We motored for an hour and a half and
had a delightful talk. We discussed the Federal Reserve
Board at length, and McAdoo's attitude toward the different




172 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


names proposed. I had taken the precaution to thresh these
matters out with McAdoo and could tell the President his
state of mind. I am anxious for this Board to administer the
currency law successfully, for I am certain the President's reputation in history will rest largely upon its success or failure.
'April 28, 1914: After dinner we went to the office for the
President to sign his mail. We read the Mexican despatches
together and afterward got down to the real finish of the
Federal Reserve Board. He took his pen and wrote down
their names: Richard Olney first, then Paul Warburg,
Harding, Wheeler, and Miller. He turned to me and said,
"To whom would you give the ten-year term?" I advised
giving it to Miller, which he did. He gave Olney the twoyear term, Warburg four years, Harding and Wheeler the
six and eight-year terms.
'I told him McAdoo preferred Hamlin.1' He replied,
"But I prefer Olney and I happen to be President." He also
said, "McAdoo thinks we are forming a social club." This,
of course, was because McAdoo had consistently urged a
Board that would work in harmony with him.'
Olney, however, found it impossible to accept. He wrote
the President that he had undertaken trusts which he could
not resign and that the provision requiring each member of
the Board to give his entire time to its work would prove an
insuperable obstacle to his acceptance. 'You can hardly be
sorrier than I am,' he said, 'that I am able to do so little in
aid of an Administration whose first year of achievement
makes it one of the most notable the country has ever
known.' The appointment was therefore given to Mr.
Hamlin, according to McAdoo's wishes.2
1 Mr. Hamlin was an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury whom
McAdoo desired to take out of the Department and put upon the Board.
2 A further change in the original composition of the Board resulted
from Mr. Wheeler's inability to serve. After some delay the place was
given to F. C. Delano of Chicago.




BRYAN AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 173


IV
The close of the first legislative session of the Wilson Administration was a season of triumph for the Democratic
Party. Two of the major problems had been met with vigor
and honesty, and settled, in principle at least, to the satisfaction of the nation. The income tax provisions of the Tariff
Act and the Federal Reserve System of the Currency Act
established a solid basis upon which national finances could
rest securely during the days of stress that followed the outbreak of war in Europe. The triumph of the Administration
was the greater in view of the failure of the preceding Republican Administrations to settle the currency problem. The
main principles of the solution finally carried through by Wilson, the Republicans had advocated, individually or collectively; but they had lacked either the courage or the strength
to write them into law.
Wilson's success justified largely the inclusion of Mr.
Bryan in the Cabinet. The Commoner's sense of loyalty had
kept him from an attack upon the Federal Reserve Act
which, it would appear, he never entirely understood; but
had he been outside the Cabinet, with his influence in the
party, he could have destroyed the measure which failed to
accord with his personal doctrines.
Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House
LONDON, December 20, 1913
MY DEAR HOUSE:... I've just read of the passage by the Senate of the Currency Bill. What a record that is! The Tariff Act and the
Currency Act at one sitting. I don't know the final form of
the currency measure, but no matter. The getting cf it
through is an unmatched achievement.... It's all wonderful;
and I'll be proud to do or to endure anything for the man at




174 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


the helm who steers the old ship in this fashion. If I'd lived a
hundred years ago I'd have said, 'There's the hand of God
in this.'
Yours
W. H. P.
Mr. Jacob W. Schiff to Colonel House
NEW YORK, December 23, 1913
MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:
I want to say a word of appreciation to you for the silent,
but no doubt effective work you have done in the interest of
currency legislation and to congratulate you, that the measure has finally been enacted into law. We all know that an
entirely perfect bill, satisfactory to everybody, would have
been an impossibility and I feel quite certain fair men will
admit that unless the President had stood as firm as he did,
we would likely have had no legislation at all. The bill is a
good one in many respects, anyhow good enough to start
with and to let experience teach us in what directions it needs
perfection, which in due time we shall then get. In any
event you have personally good reasons to feel gratified with
what has been accomplished, and trusting that this feeling
may increase your holiday spirit,
I am with good wishes
Faithfully yours
JACOB W. SCHIFF
Secretary Lane to Colonel House
WASHINGTON, D.C., December 25, 1913
MY DEAR COLONEL:... This should be a glad time for you. I know of no one
who has more fully realized his ambition or who may with
more justification take pride in the good he has done.
I was sorry not to see you when the President signed the




INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 175


Currency Bill. He made a speech in all ways worthy of himself - which is saying much....
Sincerely yours
FRANKLIN K. LANE
The fact that he had had some share in the legislative
accomplishment of these months was the reward that House
sought for the pains and effort he had given to help in making
Wilson's Administration a success. To a friend who wrote
complaining that House's aversion for holding office would
deprive him of the public credit that belonged to him, the
Colonel replied: 'I am satisfied with the consciousness of
having taken part in things that are worth while.'
The sentence was not entirely accurate, for, although
Colonel House was obviously careless of the fact that the
extent of his activities was not widely suspected, he wanted
to exercise his energy in a broader field. He was wearied by
the details of party politics and appointments; even the
share he had taken in constructive domestic legislation did
not satisfy him. From the beginning of 1914 he gave more
and more of his time to what he regarded as the highest form
of politics and that for which he was peculiarly suited -
international affairs. They shortly became his main preoccupation, and it is in this field that he rendered his greatest
services.




CHAPTER VII
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
If some of the veteran diplomats could have heard us, they would have
fallen in a faint.
Sir William Tyrrell to House, November 13, 1913
I
NOTHING is more strange than the chain of circumstances
which finally brought President Wilson to play a ryle of
supreme importance in the affairs of the world, and to centre
his whole being upon a policy of international service. At
the beginning of his political career, and even during his first
two years as President, diplomatic questions were of far less
interest for him than his legislative programme; he was slow
to develop what might be called a definite policy, and he left
his Ambassadors to work out their problems themselves.
Shortly after the appointment of Mr. Page as Ambassador
to St. James's, Colonel House reports that he asked Wilson
'if he had given Ambassador Page special instructions....
He had not, but took it for granted that he would be diplomatic and conciliatory.'
This seems casual, but we may remind ourselves that
neither the traditions of the Democratic Party nor the background of Mr. Wilson could lead to the expectation of keen
interest in other than domestic matters. The Democratic
platform touched on foreign affairs only in a brief reference
to the Philippines, and Wilson himself in his first inaugural
address confined himself entirely to questions of social and
industrial reform.
For Colonel House, on the other hand, foreign problems
were always of the first interest and importance. When he
says that he shaped his early career so as to prepare him and




WILSON AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE             177
permit him to satisfy his penchant for politics, he interpreted
the word 'politics' in its broadest sense, and included international relations. During his career in Texas he had never
ceased to study current diplomacy; and running all through
his varied activities as the President's adviser in 1913 there
is obvious the desire to free himself from details of domestic
politics and to find time to help in the formulation of a positive foreign policy. With the passing of the legislative programme of 1913, he felt convinced that the moment had
come for Wilson to lay its broad foundations. A year and a
half later, on June 24, 1915, he wrote: 'To my mind, the
President has never appreciated the importance of our foreign policy and has laid undue emphasis upon domestic affairs. I thoroughly approved this up to the end of the special
session of Congress, when the tariff, banking, and such other
measures were involved...'
However slow to formulate a positive policy, President
Wilson was acutely aware of the danger that always menaces
American interests abroad when a change of administration
occurs, and to his credit be it said that he fought constantly
against the threatened intrusion of the spoils system. His
first choices for the more important diplomatic posts were
President Eliot, Richard Olney, Professor Fine of Princeton; and before his inauguration he expressed to House
his desire to elevate 'the foreign service by appointments
as nearly akin to that of Dr. Eliot as he could find favorable material.' The problem was not a simple one, in view
of the difficulty of discovering distinguished Americans
with the necessary combination of intellectual background
and material resources, and also in view of the purely
partisan influences which regarded the foreign service as
primarily designed to furnish occupation for political supporters. The invincible good-nature of Mr. Bryan made it
hard for him to refuse an application for a diplomatic or
consular appointment, especially when made by some loyal




178 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


adherent of 16-1 in '96. Surely such a one had earned his
reward! 1
House was entirely of the President's opinion. He urged
that even the highest consular offices should be kept under
Civil Service Regulations, and it was at his insistent recommendation that diplomates de carriere, such as William Phillips and H. P. Fletcher, who had proved their ability under
Republican Administrations, were brought back into the
diplomatic service or promoted. And he warned the President against appointments that might seem connected with
business interests.
'April 18, 1913: I told Mr. Bryan [recorded House] of my
conversation with the President regarding the question of
keeping the Consuls under the Civil Service.... The President stated that he would hold to Roosevelt's executive
order in regard to Consuls. Mr. Bryan is a spoilsman and is
in favor of turning the Republicans out and putting in Democrats. He argued strongly and eloquently for his position.
I remained quiet, for my sympathy is with the President's
policy even though it keeps some of our very good friends
from their desires.
'January 16, 1914: We discussed the President's Civil
Service views [House wrote of a later conversation with the
Secretary of State], which, of course, do not agree with Mr.
Bryan's. I can see some feeling developing between them... on the question of patronage. Mr. Bryan has no pa1 Thus the Secretary of State wrote to the Receiver of Customs in
San Domingo, who had been appointed through the influence of Mr.
McCombs: 'Now that you have arrived and are acquainting yourself
with the situation, can you let me know what positions you have at
your disposal, with which to reward deserving Democrats?... You have
had enough experience in politics to know how valuable workers are
when the campaign is on; and how difficult it is to find rewards for all the
deserving.... Let me know what is requisite, together with the salary,
and when appointments are likely to be made.' (Letter dated August
20, 1913, and published in the New York Sun, January 15, 1915.)




DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS


179


tience with the Civil Service. He said the President told him
I had recommended —, and the President desired to appoint him. Mr. Bryan said, "Of course he can do as he
pleases, but I am certain  is one of those supercilious
persons who will be constantly looking down upon me."'
Colonel House to the President
NEW YORK, October 8, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
One or two people have asked me to suggest X for the
Mexican Embassy.
I hardly think it is necessary to caution you about this,
but I feel that perhaps I had better do so.
X, I have always been told, was a part of the Y, Z Oil
Company and a bosom friend of Z. The fact that you offered him Argentina makes them feel that he would have a
chance for this place, which I have no doubt he would accept
quickly enough.
When this appointment is made, I would be certain that
the appointee was chemically clean from oil or ore.
Affectionately yours
E. M. HouSE
When it came to the more important diplomatic appointments, Wilson appealed constantly to House for information
and advice. At one moment the President commissioned him
to discover an applicant's attitude on religion, as he was being
considered for China and the President wanted to know
whether or not he was an orthodox Christian., House undertook the delicate task, and the following day put the presumptive candidate through an examination on religious
principles. 'He did not seem to have any worth while,' re1 This interest upon the part of Mr. Wilson was dictated by Mr.
Bryan's insistence that none but an orthodox Christian could be appointed as Minister to China.




180 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


corded the Colonel, and the appointment was not made.
With House the President discussed at length the choice of
men for St. James's, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, and Paris.
For the Court of St. James's, Wilson expressed himself as
anxious to find a man who could continue the traditions established by Adams, Bayard, and Hay. But first President
Eliot, and then Richard Olney, declined the post. Colonel
House, who was himself frequently suggested for this position, urged Walter Hines Page. The latter was personally
magnetic, possessed a genial and discriminating wit, and
could boast of a distinguished journalistic career. On March
20, House, recording a conversation with the President in
which Mr. Wilson expressed his discouragement at the lack
of material for the important ambassadorships, wrote: 'I
think he will eventually offer the London mission to Walter
Page.'
'March 24, 1913: We first took up foreign appointments
[House noted of a later conversation with Mr. Wilson]. He
thought that Walter Page was about the best man left for
Ambassador to Great Brftain. I was not only the first to
suggest Page for this place, but, since Eliot and Olney declined it, I have advocated him earnestly. He asked if I
thought Page would take it. I assured him that he would,
and promised to find out definitely to-morrow.
'We discussed a great number of other people for foreign
appointments.... I thought Thomas Nelson Page should
have Italy, and he agreed....
'March 26, 1913: I called up [Walter] Page and said,
"Good morning, Your Excellency." He wanted to know
what it meant. I replied it meant a great deal. He seemed
quite agitated and asked whether I was not joking. I replied
that I was not, for the President had authorized me to ask
him if he would accept the Ambassadorship to the Court of
St. James's. We arranged for him to call at 4.30.




APPOINTMENT OF WALTER H. PAGE


181


'Page arrived promptly. He was excited over the news I
had conveyed. He asked me to tell him exactly how it happened. I told him I had suggested his name to the President
two months ago.... I had talked to the President from time
to time about the matter, and when I dined with him on
Tuesday he had authorized me to find whether he, Page,
would accept.
'He was immensely pleased with the compliment, but expressed doubt as to his ability to fill the place. It was so
entirely different from anything he had previously done....
'March 28, 1913: Walter Page telephoned around nine
o'clock: "I have decided to turn my face towards the East,"
which meant he would accept the post to Great Britain. I
felicitated him and expressed my pleasure. He wished to
know the next move. I told him I would notify the President and that he would write him a formal note offering him
the Ambassadorship.
'I called up the President at Washington a little after
nine, to tell of Page's acceptance. He replied, "That is fine;
I am very glad." He promised to write him at once.
'I telephoned Page to let him know how pleased the President was. He expressed great appreciation for what I had
done....'
Having confided to House the mission of informing Mr.
Page of his choice, the President thought little more about it
and was apparently in no hurry to communicate himself
with the appointee - an attitude which surprised and troubled the new Ambassador and recalls the manner in which
Secretary Houston had been appointed to the Cabinet:
'March 30, 1913: Walter Page and Secretary Houston
came to dinner [wrote House], and we had a delightful time.
Houston and I tried to make Page feel happy in his new
field of endeavor. He seems fearful lest he might not be able




182 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


to maintain himself, and yet he said he had enough sporting
blood to undertake it. He was somewhat disturbed because
he had not heard from the President, and asked me whether
I thought it was actually settled.
'Houston then told of his experience. He said, "I have
never to this good day received any notification of my appointment as Secretary of Agriculture, excepting that which
I received from Mr. House." And further, "I was uncertain
whether I should come to Washington, but I concluded I had
better do so. I came, and I had no notification there. Finally some cards were sent to my wife and to me, inviting us
to lunch at the White House after the Inauguration. We
went, the President shook hands with me and said he was
glad to see me, but nothing else. The President's Secretary
sent me word that the President expected me at the White
House at eleven o'clock the next day for an informal meeting
of the Cabinet. I felt that matters were getting warm and I
was getting nearer my job. I went to the informal meeting
and, since I seemed to be expected, concluded that in due
time I would be notified; but I never was. Then I read in the
newspapers that my name had gone to the Senate, and finally
I received my commission."...
'April 12, 1913: I lunched at the White House [recorded
House]. Loulie, Mr. and Mrs. Page, and Mr. and Mrs. Wallace were the other guests. Soon after lunch I rang up Mr.
Bryan to tell him that Mr. Page desired to pay his respects.
He asked us to come over to the State Department at once.
Bryan was very gracious to Page, which pleased him because he has not said many kindly things of Mr. Bryan.
Page hoped Mr. Bryan would place him in the kindergarten
and teach him as rapidly as possible the essentials of his
work. Bryan laughingly replied, "I will have to learn myself first."..r.',   iR,
These were busy days for Colonel House. It was the period




THOMAS NELSON PAGE


183


when he was trying to concentrate upon the framing of the
Federal Reserve Act; but on the one hand the President, and
on the other every one who desired a diplomatic post, assailed him for advice and assistance.i
'March 10, 1913: Another stream of callers all day, and
long distance telephones from Washington and elsewhere.
This job of being "adviser to the President" may have its
compensations, but it certainly has its drawbacks....
'March 11, 1913: Again another day of office-seekers.
Thomas Nelson Page called. He did not mention his own
aspirations, but I brought up the subject myself. I told him
that it had been the President's intention to appoint him
either to France or Italy, but I was afraid now that he
[Mr. Wilson] had reached Washington he would be stormed
by those desiring the appointments for others.
'Page said he would prefer Italy to France, though France
was a greater honor....
'April 12, 1913: The dinner to the French Ambassador,
Monsieur Jusserand, was interesting. I talked with Senator
Lodge. He wants a man from Nahant retained in the Boston
Custom House, and I promised to try and arrange it if he
was competent.
'Thomas Nelson Page was at the dinner, and I informed
him that if no change was made he would go to Italy. I advised him to keep away from the President....
'April 16, 1913: A Colonel who would be a Brigadier-General, and a Secretary of Legation who would be transferred
from Japan to France, caught me at breakfast. The diplomat
is wealthy, so I requisitioned his motor and had him take
me from place to place until lunch time...
'April 20, 1913: Justice Gerard came to see me about his
chances for ambassadorial honors. I thought they were
1 The character and the amount of the work carried on by Colonel
House suggests the advisability of including in the Cabinet a member
without portfolio.




184 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


slight, but they were better now than they had been. He
laughed and said, "I do not believe that until right recently
I had any chances at all." That, I replied, was true. I told
him, furthermore, if McCombs and Morgenthau were given
foreign appointments that five out of the nineteen major
places would have gone to New York, which was out of all
proportion to her share. He saw the point. He did not believe McCombs would accept. He evidently does not know
McCombs; he is as likely to do one thing as another.....
'September 29, 1913: X is sitting on the doormat again.
Rumors that McCombs is not to take the Ambassadorship to
France have started his hopes afresh....'
II
Because of his interest in foreign affairs and diplomatic appointments, House was brought into close touch with the
Ambassadors, and the cordial relations that resulted went far
to facilitate the special missions which he undertook in
Europe during the war. Thomas Nelson Page wrote after
his appointment:
'Neither letter nor cable can in the least convey the appreciation I have of your kindness to me since our first acquaintance. I am just going to let the debt stand as it is, and
reckon ourselves as old friends whose community of feeling
and sentiment does away with any count of mere time.'
Brand Whitlock wrote from Brussels:
'My dear friend, I hope it's only un petit au revoir....
Your last letter brought me joy.... It increased, if that were
possible, my desire to see you and to have again one of those
long chats.... I have need of such sympathetic intercourse.'


Willard at Madrid, Penfield at Vienna, Morris at Stock



JAMES W. GERARD


185


holm wrote frequently to him, and House evidently spared
neither time nor effort in keeping them informed of political
developments at home.
The Colonel's correspondence with Gerard' at Berlin and
Walter Page at London was voluminous.
'I told Gerard [recorded House] that he would get very
meagre information from the State Department concerning
the happenings in Administration circles, and I promised to
keep him measurably well-posted in order that he might confer without embarrassment with the Kaiser or the Minister
for Foreign Affairs. In turn, he said he would write me
every ten days.'
Colonel House's relations with Mr. Gerard became of
great political importance in the stirring days that were to
come, for the Ambassador kept his promise. His war letters
to House were pungent and prophetic, and through them
President Wilson was to be informed accurately of the complicated forces that governed Germany. Nothing is further
from fact than the legend that the President lacked available
and authentic information of the political underworld on the
continent of Europe. Mr. Gerard was excelled by none in
the dignity and capacity with which he maintained the
interests and furthered the policy of his Government in the
most trying diplomatic situation of the war zone. He knew
how to establish cordial relations with the Berlin Government, and he gave thought to the details that make for
friendliness. But he never forgot Bismarck's aphorism: 'A
good Ambassador ought not to be too popular in the country
to which he is accredited.'




186 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House
BERLIN, November 4, 1913
MY DEAR COLONEL:
Now that I have presented my letters to the Kaiser, I
have something to report.
Pursuant to your suggestion I stopped in London to see Page,
and had to wait nearly a week for him, as he was in Scotland
with Carnegie. I found him a most agreeable and attractive
man, and, from all I heard in London, he is a great success.
I spent the remainder of my time in Paris, principally in
furniture shops, but arrived here the 6th October... v The
Kaiser was away and I was not received until last Wednesday.
The Kaiser has permitted me to wear ordinary clothes,
which disposes of the infernal uniform question, so there I
am now better off than Page who has to wear knickers to
Court functions.
Before seeing the Kaiser I called on the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg - a very tall, pleasant,
Abraham Lincoln sort of man. He is one of the few officials
who does not speak English, but we got on very well in
French and some German. The Minister of Foreign Affairs
is away, but his substitute, Zimmermann, is a very jolly sort
of large German who was once a Judge, which made us
friends at once. The rest of my time I put in at Embassy
work, of which there is plenty, and in calling on the various
Ambassadors and calling on others who call on me. I think
I have the house question settled and will take an old quietlooking house formerly owned by Prince Hatzfeld, then by
the von Schwabachs... and just now bought by an adjoining
bank. It will cost me a good deal to put it in repair, but,
as it is large enough for the Embassy offices, if I get the
same allowance as heretofore made, I shall pay much less
rent than the Paris man or than Page in London, who, by
the way, has secured a most suitable and 'fashionable' house
in Grosvenor Square.




LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR GERARD 187


I have taken up a lot of things which former Ambassadors
did not. I am taking an active part in the American Benevolent Society, the American Church (where Lanier and I sit
every Sunday in the front pew), the American Institute, and
the American Lunch Club, the American Association of
Commerce and Traders, etc., and my wife will become
President of the American Woman Club, a very worthy
charity which takes care of the numerous girl students in
Berlin.
We must have made a wonderful sight when we were presented to the Kaiser; they sent the Royal carriages for us
with footmen standing behind in powdered wigs, outriders,
etc., though we looked rather dismal in our dress suits. In
the glass carriages we must have looked like a funeral. The
Kaiser is a much more majestic-looking man than I expected.... We mostly talked business and sport, and he asked why
we didn't have an Embassy building in Berlin and congratulated me on at last housing the Embassy in a decent house.
When I presented the staff to him, he asked why we did not
all ride in the Thiergarten and I told him we would challenge
any Embassy in Berlin to any known form of sport.
Friday I went to Potsdam by train in a Royal military
carriage and was driven to the new Palace, where I was presented, alone, to the Empress. She is a tall, fine-looking
woman, and we talked of nothing in particular, just 'white
conversation.'
I made a speech at a German art banquet and have been
doing a good deal of work for the Panama Exposition. There
is an agreement between England and Germany that neither
shall exhibit unless both do....
Yours ever
JAMES W. GERARD
With Walter Hines Page, as with Gerard, Colonel House
maintained constant and intimate relations. The new Am



188 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


bassador to St. James's was pleased to have a correspondent
to whom he might write frankly and through whom he might
influence the President. When House came to London in
June, 1913, Page greeted him warmly and shared with him
his hopes and difficulties.
'I dined with Page last night [wrote Colonel House on
June 19] and remained with him until half-past twelve....
He finally walked home with me to our hotel.
'He had many curious and interesting experiences to relate and he was much disturbed at some of his social blunders. The one which distressed him most was at the Duke of
Norfolk's the other evening. He took Princess - in to
dinner and afterward, when they were in the drawing-room,
he left her without being dismissed. The reason he did this
was that he had been reminded that he was the one to leave
first, and for the moment he forgot that with a member of
the Royal Family the reverse course was proper.
'He considered taking a duchess or royalty out to dinner
was hard sledding. They refused to exert themselves in the
slightest to keep up the conversation, and he said it was the
hardest work he had yet encountered in his Ambassadorial
duties. He spoke particularly of the Duchess of -. She
was a woman of good sense, he understood, but she kept it
quietly to herself when he was with her. He had gotten quite
"chummy" with the Duke of Connaught, and was doing all
he could to make himself agreeable to the important people
in England.
'He asks me to aid him in formulating some constructive
policy that will make the President's Administration and his
notable in the annals of this Embassy. He said of all men,
I could help him most in this regard. He is always generous
in his praise of me. I shall try to outline some plan before I
leave, for I have some things in mind which I think may redound to the advantage of both countries.'




WALTER PAGE AS AMBASSADOR


189


Mr. Page had great success in winning the regard and respect of the British people and the Government to which
he was accredited. His bonhommie, his transparent honesty
of purpose and method, his evident anxiety to discover
means of promoting Anglo-American friendship, soon placed
relations between the two Governments upon a cordial personal basis, which Page, like House, believed to be the only
firm foundation for intercourse between nations. The Ambassador and his wife had won the hearts of the British even
before the trying months of the war, in which Page's hatred
of German militarism intensified British affection for him.
On July 12, 1914, Colonel House noted of a conversation
with the English journalist, Sidney Brooks:
'In speaking of the Pages, Brooks said Mrs. Page had
made the greatest success of "any Ambassadress within his
memory." This is delightful to hear.'
Mr. Page, however, as he himself confessed, was subject to
moods, 'I sometimes think,' he wrote to House, 'they are the
dominant moods of my life, when I feel that I don't want any
official position at all... I have so long been entirely free
and so independent that official restraint is yet unnatural.'
He found it hard to sink his individual convictions in carrying out instructions from Washington. He enjoyed his work,
but the difficulties always attaching to the life of an American Ambassador abroad galled him, and his sensitive nature
suffered under vexations which some of the other Ambassadors hardly noticed. To House he poured out his soul.
In a letter of December 12, 1914, he concluded: 'I didn't
mean to write you all these things.... But I must once in a
while blow off to somebody. You have the misfortune to be
the only man to whom I can blow off.' With characteristic
frankness, the Ambassador let the Colonel understand with
some definiteness that he regarded the conduct of the State




190 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Department under Mr. Bryan as worse than unfortunate.
And yet at the conclusion of almost every long letter came
the assurance that in the main he was enjoying his task, and
the intimation that the vexations were minor by-products.
'As for this Embassy,' he wrote April 27, 1914, 'we're getting
on better. We now get answers to questions, and if I had
ever been disposed to complain, there's no excuse for complaining now.'
All the difficulties with which the State Department had
to contend, House explained: the need of a period of experience, the pressure of political factors, the lack of funds.
'Please bear in mind too,' he wrote to Page, 'that just now
the State Department is working day and night and is all too
short of help. They expect a bill of relief from Congress
shortly, and then you will get more secretaries and they will
get more help.' With serpentine wisdom, he replied to Page's
criticism of individuals in Washington by repeating complimentary remarks which those very individuals had recently
passed regarding the Ambassador. Thus, on October 29,
1914, in a letter to Page: 'Your criticism of X came to me
the day that Wallace was telling me of a talk he had with him
the day before, in which he, X, said: "Y and Z together have
not done as much as Walter Page, and yet they advertise
themselves so well that the American people think that comparatively no one else has done anything." This is to be
forgotten.'
The relations of House with the American Ambassadors
abroad were paralleled closely by those which he maintained with foreign diplomatists in Washington. Before the
outbreak of the war he was on intimate, almost confidential, terms with Spring-Rice and Bernstorff, Jusserand and
Dumba. He was thus admirably equipped to study plans
for developing the positive foreign policy upon which he
hoped President Wilson would soon embark.




THE MONROE DOCTRINE


191


III
Colonel House's conception of such a policy was farreaching. He believed that the time had passed when the
United States could pose effectively as the protector of all
the American states, and he wanted to bring about a definite
friendly understanding with the great South American
states upon the basis of an equal partnership. He realized
acutely the feeling in South America, hostile to the United
States and based upon the consciousness that the Monroe
Doctrine (as they interpreted it) was thoroughly one-sided
and accordingly distasteful to Latin-American sensibilities.
If it could be transformed into a common policy and a common responsibility in which all American states participated,
it would, House insisted, benefit the United States no less
materially than morally. Such a partnership, he believed,
might develop into a league for the preservation of peace
and tranquillity in the Americas, and would be of the
utmost service in handling situations such as had arisen in
Mexico.
This ambitious plan, reminiscent of Blaine's Pan-American proposals, carried another, even more ambitious, as its
inevitable consequence. A general Pan-American Pact was
bound to interest the European Powers, some of which, such
as the British Empire, were also American Powers. House
was one of the few persons in the United States who realized
before the war how thoroughly the previous thirty years had
altered our relations with Europe and made of the United
States, intellectually and economically, one of the family of
World Powers. Political companionship, he was convinced,
must follow. Never lacking in boldness, he was willing to
accept the consequences; and just as he felt that the mythical protectorate of the Monroe Doctrine should be transformed into an American partnership, so he believed that the
legend of political isolation from Europe was the outworn




192 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


remnant of an age that was past. What he wanted was some
sort of cooperative understanding with the great European
Powers that might help to preserve the peace of the world, in
which the United States had vital material interest. This
conviction was not lessened by his realization that the
European situation was critical and might at any moment
result in a general European war.
Such a policy implied a frank recognition that the factors
upon which American traditions rested had disappeared. If
it were to be developed successfully, a working understanding with Great Britain would be necessary, both because the
presence of the British in Latin America could not wisely be
ignored and also because the imperial power of Great Britain
was necessary to any feasible plan of international cooperation.
Anglo-American relations were not unfriendly at the beginning of the Wilson Administration, but a cordial and intimate understanding could not be reached until two clouds
were removed, of which the most important, at least in the
public mind, concerned the Panama tolls controversy. During the last year of Mr. Taft's Administration, Congress had
passed an act exempting vessels engaged in coastwise trade
of the United States from Panama Canal tolls, notwithstanding a clause in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901
which provided that the Canal should be open to ships of all
nations on 'terms of entire equality.' Feeling in the United
States, especially in Irish districts, favored such exemption
warmly, on the ground that it was 'reasonable,' and made an
'open canal.' A plank in the Democratic platform approved
it. Feeling in Great Britain supported with equal warmth
the contention that, reasonable or not, such exemption directly contravened engagements taken in 1901; the issue was
not one of logic, but simply whether the United States
would keep its word.
Even before Wilson assumed office, he and House seem to




THE PANAMA TOLLS CONTROVERSY


193


have agreed that, despite the overwhelming majority in
Congress that favored exemption, the American contention
ought not to be upheld.i It was of supreme importance to
emphasize international ethics by an insistence upon the
sanctity of treaties. On January 24, 1913, House discussed
the matter with Wilson:
'I asked him concerning his views in regard to the Panama
Canal tolls controversy with Great Britain. I was glad to
find that he took the same view that I have, and that is that
the clause should be repealed.'
Action could not be taken by the President during the
extra session of Congress. It was first necessary that he establish firmly his leadership, for what he planned was nothing less than a complete conversion of the party upon an
issue intensely troubled by the strong anti-British feeling
characteristic of many Democratic strongholds. The topic
was therefore not raised during the extra session. Ambassador Page did not fail to call constant attention to the
importance of the question, indulging in promises of the
benefits of repeal that might be regarded as exaggerated.
Ambassador W.,H. Page to Colonel House
LONDON, August 28, 1913
MY DEAR HOUSE:... If the United States will... repeal the Canal toll discrimination, we can command the British fleet, British manufacturers - anything we please. Till we do these things,
they'll regard us as mean and stingy and dishonorable on
occasion and, therefore, peculiar and given to queer freaks;
1 'The repeal of the tolls exemption was opposed by nearly all of the
Democratic leaders in Congress. To drive the repeal through the House
and the Senate, Wilson was compelled to have recourse to Cabinet
members, especially Burleson and McAdoo.' (Note by E. M. H.)




194 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


they like us, but don't know what to think of our Government. Our Government, they don't trust or admire....
Heartily yours
WALTER H. PAGE
If the British felt they had cause of complaint with the
American Government over the matter of the Canal tolls,
the American Government, on the other hand, felt that the
British were hampering Wilson's policy in Mexico. The British Ambassador in Mexico, Sir Lionel Carden, was known to
be an advocate of Huerta and was supposed to represent the
British oil interests of Lord Cowdray. Huerta was believed
to have made extravagant promises of concessions to those
interests in the event that his regime became firmly established. The American Government assumed that the British
Foreign Office stood behind the British oil interests and that
the British provisional recognition of Huerta meant that
they would fight Wilson's policy of non-recognition.
Obviously the difficulties with the British resulted largely
from misunderstanding and misinformation on both sides.
What was necessary was a frank interchange of views, and
House welcomed the opportunity given him in the summer of
1913 to approach the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward
Grey.
It was on July 3, 1913, that the two first met, at a small
luncheon given by Sir Edward at his house, 33 Eccleston
Square. The only others present were Ambassador Page and
Lord Crewe, then Secretary for India. Colonel House doubtless looks back upon the luncheon as an event in his career,
since he came to have for Grey an affection and a respect
unsurpassed in his relations with foreign statesmen. This
feeling resulted in large measure from a singular community
of personal tastes and ideals, which from the moment they
met made a deep impression upon Colonel House. He found
in Sir Edward a philosopher, like himself careless of conven



SIR EDWARD GREY


195


tional honors, with no apparent sense of his own importance,
driven, over-hard perhaps, by what he felt to be his duty and
taking no credit therefor. As statesman, moreover, the British Foreign Secretary approached House's ideal, supremely
distinguished as he was by sincerity of purpose and honesty
of method; above all a diplomat who did not regard diplomacy as a mysterious intrigue, but rather as a means by which
the representatives of different states could discuss frankly
the coincidence or the clash of national interests and reach a
peaceable understanding. House was then and always convinced that foreign policy should be conducted like personal
business, from which it differed only in degree of importance;
and he wanted to introduce into diplomacy the characteristics of personal intercourse, with its code of individual honesty and friendliness. In Grey he discovered a man with
whom he could treat upon this basis. We shall find them discussing the most delicate points of national policy with the
frankness that officials of the same department of a government might use.
Their first conversation was of importance, for it led in
the autumn to an understanding on the two vexatious questions at issue. House explained Wilson's Mexican policy and
attitude on the tolls exemptions; Grey intimated that British
support of Huerta was neither definite nor final.
'July 3, 1913: While Lord Crewe and Page were discussing
the eradication of the hookworm in India and other countries [recorded House], Sir Edward and I fell to talking of the
Mexican situation. I told him the President did not want
to intervene and was giving the different factions every possible opportunity to get together. He wished to know
whether the President was opposed to any particular faction.
I thought it was immaterial, as far as our Government was
concerned, which faction was in power, if order was maintained. I thought our Government would have recognized




196 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Huerta's provisional Government if they had carried out
their written promise to call an election at an early date and
abide by its decisions.
'Sir Edward said his Government had not recognized the
Huerta Government excepting as a provisional one, and that
if Huerta undertook to run for President in spite of his promise not to do so, their recognition of him would come up
again as an entirely new proposition. He intimated that in
those circumstances they would not recognize him.
'He wished to know what would happen if we intervened,
and suggested that perhaps the same condition would prevail as in Cuba. I replied that this was a question for the
future, but personally I did not believe intervention would
be as serious as most people thought.
'We then drifted to the Panama Canal tolls question. He
said his Government intended to put two propositions
squarely up to our Government; i.e., whether we desired to
take up the discussion of the treaty as it stood, or whether
we would prefer arbitration. His Government have no objection to our Government giving free passage to coastwise
vessels, so long as it did not interfere with British shipping or
was not unfavorable to it; but just what plan could be devised to bring this about, he did not know. However, he was
willing to take up the discussion with our Government in the
event the free tolls were not abolished by the bill now before
our Senate.
'I suggested that the matter should not be pressed for the
moment, but be left open for the long session of Congress
beginning in December. I explained that the President was
exceedingly anxious to get through his legislative programme
at the extra session; that a reduction of the tariff and the reform of our currency system were almost vital to the success
of his Administration, and that in the Senate he had only a
narrow margin on the tariff and he did not wish to press anything else until these measures were through.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


197


'Sir Edward said he quite understood the President's
position and sympathized with it, and his Goverm-nent were
perfectly willing to allow the matter to rest as suggested.'
Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House
LONDON, July 8, 1913
DEAR MR. HouSE:
I had an interview to-day with Sir Edward Grey about a
matter of state business; and, when I rose to go, he followed
me to the door and stopped me and said that he owed me
much for the pleasure I had given him in making him acquainted with you; and he wished me to tell you that he
should expect to see you whenever you should come to London: 'I was much interested in what he told me - a man
that I'm glad to know,' said he.
I send you this while it is still hot in my mind....
It was a duchess last night - an easy and friendly one;
to-night it's a bishop, quality yet unknown; to-morrow night,
the Russian Ambassador, a fine old Slav whom I know.
Yours heartily
W. H. P.
Thus, at the moment when Anglo-American relations
threatened to become clouded by popular feeling over Panama tolls, the personal intervention of Page and House went
far to secure complete official cordiality. Grey was evidently assured of the friendliness of the President, as manifested through his personal adviser. On the other hand, the
forbearance of the British in not pressing the tolls question
convinced Wilson of what House and Page insisted upon;
namely, that Grey was anxious to work with the United
States and that a cordial understanding was possible if only
outstanding issues could be frankly discussed.
That Sir Edward was impressed by the value of his talk
with House is indicated by his decision to send his secretary,




198 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Sir William Tyrrell, to the United States to canvass the
whole matter of Anglo-American relations with the President and his adviser. This was the more important in that
the new British Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, was ill
and unable to take up his duties actively. Tyrrell proved to
be an ideal selection. He shared the complete confidence of
Grey and his views on international relations, so that not
merely could he give to Wilson Grey's exact ideas, but he
might claim from the President an equal frankness. No one
understood better the ins and outs of Continental politics,
or realized more acutely how great an asset to the British
American sympathy might become in case of trouble in
Europe. He possessed, moreover, an almost boyish enthusiasm for the task in hand, which completely won the affection of the Colonel and the confidence of the President. He
came in doubt as to the willingness of the Americans to cooperate with Grey. He returned convinced that they would
play the game. 'Tyrrell's back,' wrote Ambassador Page to
House, in December, 'a changed man. He says that you and
the President and Houston did it. That's all to the good.'
House took pains to come into touch with Sir William
immediately after his arrival, and explained to Wilson the
importance of his mission.
'November 11, 1913: The President saw me at once, although I had no appointment. I expressed concern in regard
to Mexico and explained more in detail about Sir William
Tyrrell. In talking to Sir William we were practically talking to Sir Edward Grey, and I thought it would be foolish
not to utilize the opportunity in order to bring about a better
understanding with England regarding Mexico. I told him
of my luncheon engagement at the British Embassy on
Wednesday, and thought if he would give me a free hand I
might do something worth while. He authorized me to talk
to Sir William as freely as I considered advisable....




ENGLAND AND MEXICO


199


'November 12, 1913: I suggested again that in my talk
with Sir William Tyrrell it would be well to urge him to get
England to bring the other Powers to exert pressure upon
Huerta in order that he might eliminate himself.
'The President asked me to come to the White House and
remain with him overnight. I told him I had counted upon
returning home, but my going depended upon the success of
my interview with Sir William. I promised to get in touch
with him, the President, as soon afterward as it was convenient to him, provided anything worth while developed.
He said he had wished to get with me yesterday. He also
told of how very tired he was....'
Colonel House had met Sir William in New York, but the
decisive interviews took place in Washington, at the British
Embassy and the White House.
'November 12, 1913: At one o'clock [recorded House], I
lunched with Lady Spring-Rice at the British Embassy....
'Sir Cecil Spring-Rice was not well enough to appear, and
sent me words of regret. After lunch, Sir William Tyrrell and
I went into another room and discussed the questions uppermost in the minds of both. He began by showing me
despatches from his Government and his own replies. He declared Lord Cowdray had no concessions from Huerta, and
if he could get them in the future, his Government would not
recognize their validity. He thought a deliberate attempt
was being made to connect Cowdray with these matters in
order to create a sentiment for intervention. He said Sir
Lionel Carden was not antagonistic to America; he was fair
and would do in spirit, as well as in act, just what he was
told to do by his Government. He admitted he was very
pro-British, but, other than that, no criticism could be made
of him.
'I replied that both the President and Mr. Bryan held very




200 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


different views of Lord Cowdray and Sir Lionel Garden, and
I was glad to hear the other side. He spoke of Sir Edward
Grey's desire to bring about a cessation of armaments, for
he thought our present civilization would eventually be destroyed upon that rock. He thought, too, that an armament
trust was forcing all Governments not only to pay excessive
prices, but was creating war scares - they being the only
people having any interest in having the different Governments keep up large expenditures for war purposes.
'We talked of the Panama tolls question. Sir William said
Sir Edward Grey's idea was that no possible good came to
nations if either the letter or the spirit of a treaty were
broken. He said the English people felt keenly upon this
subject, and no one more so than Sir Edward himself; and
the only reason he held office was his desire to promote the
peace of nations.
'I replied that the President felt as keenly as Sir Edward
did about the inviolability of treaties, and I thought when he
talked with him, the President would make his position
clear. I expressed the desire immediately to bring the President and Sir William together, and he was delighted to have
the opportunity....'
President Wilson was not generally expansive in conferences with persons whom he met for the first time, and House
was somewhat surprised and even more pleased that the interview developed the degree of frankness that characterized
it.
'November 13, 1913: The President received Tyrrell in the
Blue Room. He had on a grey sack suit, while Sir William
wore a cutaway. They both appeared a little embarrassed.
The President opened the conversation by saying I had told
him of my conversation with him yesterday; and then outlined the purpose of our Government regarding Mexico, very




WILSON AND SIR WILLIAM TYRRELL 201


much as I had done the day before. Sir William replied much
as he had to me. The President spoke frankly and well; so
did Sir William. It was an extremely interesting discussion.
'The President, of his own volition, brought up the arbitration treaty and the Panama tolls question and, much to my
surprise, told Sir William what he had in mind, not only as to
his views, but also how he expected to put them into force.
He asked him to convey to Sir Edward Grey his sympathy
with the view that our treaty with England should remain inviolable, but to ask him to have patience until he had time to
develop the matter properly. He thought an overwhelming
majority of our people held his views, but there was an opposition composed largely of Hibernian patriots, both in the
Senate and out, that always desired a fling at England.
'We talked of the necessity of curbing armaments and of
the power of the financial world in our politics to-day. Sir
William was just as earnest in his opinion regarding this as
either the President or I.... The President said, "It is the
greatest fight we all have on to-day, and every good citizen
should enlist."
'The hour was up, and the President had to leave for
other engagements.... I talked with Sir William for a moment after the President left. He was pleased with the interview and thanked me cordially. He said he had never before
had such a frank talk about matters of so much importance.
We all spoke with the utmost candor and without diplomatic
gloss. He said, " If some of the veteran diplomats could have
heard us, they would have fallen in a faint." Before leaving,
we agreed to keep in touch with one another. He is to telephone me whenever he receives despatches which he thinks
I should see, and I am to go to Washington when necessary.'
IV
The basis of House's diplomacy was always complete
frankness whenever he negotiated with men who were will



202 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


ing to place their cards on the table; and the relations he developed with the British through Sir William Tyrrell were
intimate. Tyrrell responded readily. 'You will forgive, I
know,' he wrote to House on January 20, 1914, 'the frankness of my utterance, but that is the basis of our relationship, isn't it?' As a result of this intimacy, a quite informal,
but none the less significant, understanding was reached.
The British Foreign Office made plain to Sir Lionel Garden
that he must not take steps to interfere in any way with Wilson's anti-Huerta policy in Mexico. Tyrrell on November
26 showed to House despatches from Grey, plainly indicating
this; and henceforth the Administration profited by the
British influence. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that
the abdication and flight of Huerta, in July, 1914, was directly related to the withdrawal of British support. Huerta's
elimination was the first and perhaps the only diplomatic triumph won by Wilson in his Mexican policy, and it is right
that future historians should understand that something of
it was due to British cooperation.
On the other hand, President Wilson promised to push the
repeal of the clause exempting American coastwise shipping
from the Canal tolls, provided the British would not hurry
him. To this they gladly agreed, and on December 13,
House wrote to Page: 'Sir Cecil Spring-Rice will leave the
Panama tolls question entirely in our hands.' The conversation with the British Ambassador to which House refers is
interesting in view of the events of 1914, for it indicated how
thoroughly Sir Edward Grey was determined to base his foreign policy upon the principle of the sanctity of treaties.
'December 11, 1913: I lunched at the British Embassy. I
was the only guest. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and I talked of
the Panama tolls question, and he agreed to leave the matter
alone and let us take it up at our leisure and handle it in the
way we thought best. He said that as far as the monetary




SPRING-RICE AND THE TOLLS PROBLEM 203


end of it was concerned, the British Government would perhaps lose something more by their interpretation of the
treaty than by ours; but the thing they had most in mind
was maintaining inviolable treaty obligations. He said in
southern Europe that question was constantly to the fore;
and the next time it arose after the United States had violated the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, the fact would be thoroughly threshed out, and it would be said that Britain made
no objection to the violation of a treaty where the United
States was concerned, but when one of the smaller nations
of eastern Europe did so a great hue and cry was raised.'
House had taken up the tolls problem with Wilson in October, at a time when the President's legislative programme
seemed to be nearing completion, and he found Wilson determined to force repeal of the exemption upon Congress,
although he recognized that it would test his party leadership more than any question that had thus far arisen. The
President thought 'that trouble would be encountered in the
Senate, particularly in the opposition of Senator O'Gorman,
who constantly regards himself as an Irishman contending
against England rather than as a United States Senator upholding the dignity and welfare of this country.'
The Colonel, according to his habit, preferred to persuade
the opposition before open debate began, rather than fighting out the issue in Congress. He brought the situation to
the attention of Senator O'Gorman's son-in-law, Dudley
Malone, a warm supporter of the Administration, who had
just resigned from the State Department to become Collector of the Port of New York.
'November 26, 1913: Malone and I discussed the Panama
tolls question. He indicated that Senator O'Gorman would
make a strenuous fight to uphold his position on this subject. I diplomatically showed him reasons for this country




204 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


to keep on good terms with Great Britain. I explained how
the President's hands would be tied in Mexico if he did not
have the sympathy of Great Britain in his plans. Malone
saw the point and agreed to help in bringing Senator O'Gorman around to a more reasonable view. He promised to start
upon this at once, and I agreed to confer with O'Gorman
later and try to persuade him to accept the President's policy....
'January 21, 1914: We [Wilson and House]... decided it
was best to bring the matter to the attention of Congress
immediately, so that the British Government would have
something to go on when Parliament convened February 10.
We decided it was best not to see Senator O'Gorman alone,
but to call the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in as a
whole, Republicans and Democrats alike, and explain the
situation to them; that it would be well to tell them how important it was at this particular time that our relations with
Great Britain should be undisturbed; that it was better to
make concessions in regard to Panama rather than lose the
support of England in our Mexican, Central and South
American policy.
'The President has called the Committee for Monday. I
shall look forward with some anxiety to the outcome. I suggested that a poll be taken of the Senate in advance, in order
to find what support he would have. Senator James was
decided upon for this work. Senator Stone would have been
selected, but he has not been well and is in the South for the
moment.
'The President said one of the strangest things that had
come about was that he and Stone had become good friends
and that the Senator seemed to have a positive affection for
him....'
It proved impossible to push the matter forward as rapidly
as House had hoped, for the opposition was still strong in




PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON THE TOLLS 205


both Committee and Senate. It yielded, however, before
Wilson's insistence. On March 5, the support of the Senate
Committee apparently assured to him, the President in a
message to Congress formally asked the repeal of the clause
exempting from tolls vessels engaged in coastwise trade.
He based his demand chiefly upon the fact that everywhere,
except in certain quarters of the United States, opinion held
that the clause violated the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.
'Whatever may be our own differences of opinion [said
Wilson to Congress] concerning this much-debated measure,
its meaning is not debated outside the United States. Everywhere else the language of the treaty is given but one interpretation, and that interpretation precludes the exemption
I am asking you to repeal. We consented to the treaty; its
language we accepted, if we did not originate; and we are too
big, too powerful, too self-respecting a nation to interpret
with too strained or refined a reading the words of our own
promises just because we have power enough to give us leave
to read them as we please. The large thing to do is the only
thing that we can afford to do....'
The President also had in mind, of course, the value of
British influence in meeting the Mexican problem, and to this
he made veiled reference which excited endless speculation
and of which he himself never gave public explanation. 'I
ask this of you,' he said, 'in support of the foreign policy of
the Administration. I shall not know how to deal with other
matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if
you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure.' The other
matter of great delicacy was the elimination of Huerta and
the understanding with Great Britain.
The obvious determination of the President, the sense of
loyalty to his leadership in the Democratic Party, and the
active labors of Burleson and McAdoo, who had charge of




206 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


getting the measure through House and Senate respectively,
finally bore fruit. In June the repeal of the special exemption became law. From this time forward, the United
States Government could count upon the sympathy of Sir
Edward Grey.
'June 27, 1914 [London]: I lunched with Sir Edward Grey,
Sir William Tyrrell, and Walter Page [wrote Colonel House].
We talked from 1.30 until 3.30.... Sir Edward and I did
practically all the talking, Page and Sir William only occasionally joining in.
'We spoke first of the Panama tolls repeal bill. Sir Edward expressed pleasure at the fine way in which the President did it and without any negotiations between the two
Governments in regard to it. He spoke of his having done it
of his own volition because of his high sense of justice. He
purposes paying this tribute to the President in Parliament
when a fit opportunity occurs.'
The fit opportunity did not occur, for only a month later
the European war broke out and the mind of Sir Edward
was caught by problems that were nearer home. But the
sentiment of American friendliness lingered in the Foreign
Office even during the vexatious discussions regarding
blockade and neutral rights. Through his insistence upon
the sanctity of international engagements, furthermore,
Wilson was able to assume a tone in his controversy with
Germany which would have been impossible if he had
yielded to the dictates of expediency in the question of
Panama tolls.




CHAPTER VIII
A PAN-AMERICAN PACT
It will be such a great accomplishment that there will be nothing he
[Wilson] can ever do afterward that can approach it in importance.
Ambassador Naon to Colonel House, December 29, 1914
I
THE success with which President Wilson forced the repeal of the Panama tolls exemption upon an unwilling Congress, thus securing the good will of the British as well as
vindicating the good faith of the United States, was followed
almost immediately by the flight of Huerta from Mexico.
This diplomatic victory was of even less significance than
the fact that, by refusing to intervene actively in Mexico
and by calling for the mediation of the A.B.C. Powers, he
had given a powerful stimulus to the cordiality of South
American feeling. Mr. Fletcher, Minister to Chile, wrote
enthusiastically to House of 'the President's success in the
Mexican difficulties - turning, as he did, a situation fraught
with difficulties and danger to our American relations into
a triumph of Pan-Americanism.'
Colonel House was anxious to capitalize the advantage of
the moment, in order to develop a positive and permanent
Pan-American policy, based upon the principle of conference
and cooperation. The world had witnessed the bankruptcy
of European diplomacy, which the outbreak of the Great
War made manifest in August, 1914, and which, in House's
opinion, resulted primarily from the lack of an organized
system of international cooperation. Such a system he was
anxious that Wilson should develop for the Americas; and
when the President visited him in November he laid his
plans before him.




208 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'November 25, 1914: I advised him [recorded the Colonel]
to pay less attention to his domestic policy and greater
attention to the welding together of the two western continents. I thought the Federal Reserve Act was his greatest
constructive work and was the thing that would stand out
and make his Administration notable. Now I would like him
to place beside that great measure a constructive international policy, which he had already started by getting the
A.B.C. nations to act as arbitrators at Niagara. I thought
the time had arrived to show the world that friendship,
justice, and kindliness were more potent than the mailed fist.
'He listened attentively to what I had to say, and asserted that he would do it and would use his speech at San
Francisco, when he opened the Exposition, to outline this
policy.'
A few days later, so eager was he to see such a policy
developed while circumstances were propitious, Colonel
House permitted himself a rare luxury - that of enforcing
his verbal advice by a letter.
Colonel House to the President
NEW YORK, November 30, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:... As I said to you when you were here, I feel that the
wise thing for you to do is to make your foreign policy the
feature of your Administration during the next two years.
The opportunity to weld North and South America together in closer union is at your hand; do you not think you
should take some initiative in this direction before your
speech at the Panama Exposition? You might take that
occasion to amplify it, but in the meantime there are many
things that might be done to give it further acceleration...
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE




LEAGUE OF AMERICAN STATES PROPOSED 209


Some weeks later, the plan had taken more definite form
in the Colonel's thoughts and he decided that he would go
to Washington to impress it upon the President - a still
more unusual step on his part and one that indicated how
much importance he attached to the scheme. What Colonel
House had in mind was nothing less than a rather loose
league of American states which should guarantee security
from aggression and furnish a mechanism for the pacific
settlement of disputes.
The reader will doubtless observe that what House
planned bears a close relationship to the League of Nations
which Wilson ultimately advocated for the world at large.
Especially significant is the account which the Colonel gives
of the following conversation with the President, for it
indicates that at this moment was born almost the exact
wording of Article X of the League of Nations Covenant.
'December 16, 1914: I then explained the purpose of my
visit to Washington. I thought he [Wilson] might or might
not have an opportunity to play a great and beneficent part
in the European tragedy; but there was one thing he could
do at once, and that was to inaugurate a policy that would
weld the Western Hemisphere together. It was my idea
to formulate a plan, to be agreed upon by the republics of
the two continents, which in itself would serve as a model
for the European nations when peace is at last brought
about.
'I could see that this excited his enthusiasm. My idea
was that the republics of the two continents should agree to
guarantee each other's territorial integrity and that they
should also agree to government ownership of munitions of
war. I suggested that he take a pencil and write the points to
be covered.
'He took a pencil, and this is what he wrote:
"' 1st. Mutual guaranties of political independence under




210 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


republican form of government and mutual guaranties of
territorial integrity.l
'"2nd. Mutual agreement that the Government of each
of the contracting parties acquire complete control within
its jurisdiction of the manufacture and sale of munitions of
war."
'He wished to know if there was anything else. I thought
this was sufficient, taken in conjunction with the Bryan
Peace Treaties which had already been concluded between
the republics of the two continents.
'He then went to his little typewriter and made a copy of
what he had written, and handed it to me to use with the
three South American Ambassadors with whom        it was
thought best to initiate negotiations. We discussed the
method of procedure, and it was agreed that it should be
done quite informally and without either himself or the
Secretary of State appearing in it until after I had sounded
the different Governments at interest. We did this for
another reason, and that was not to hurt Mr. Bryan's
sensibilities. It was agreed that I should explain the matter
to Mr. Bryan and should tell him why it was thought best
for me to do it rather than the President or himself.
'The President was evidently somewhat nervous about
Mr. Bryan's attitude. It was easy to see that he did not
want him to interfere in any way with my procedure, and
yet he was afraid he might be sensitive regarding it. I
thought I could work it out satisfactorily, for Mr. Bryan is
generous and big-minded in matters of this sort....
'December 17, 1914: I arranged for an interview with Mr.
Bryan at 9.30 this morning. I outlined the plan the Presi1 Cf. Article X of the League of Nations Covenant: 'The members of
the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all
Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any
threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the
means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.'




BRYAN AND PAN-AMERICAN POLICY 211


dent and I were preparing for the linking of the Western
Hemisphere and showed him what the President had
written, explaining why it was thought best that I should do
it. He acquiesced in a most generous way, which proved
my forecast to the President was correct.... After but a
few minutes' conversation upon the subject of this proposed
league, he began to discuss the Venezuela Minister's proposal concerning the calling of a convention of belligerent
and neutral nations, for the purpose of securing the rights of
neutrals. He also discussed the Russian treaty, which had
been tentatively suggested as being possible at this time.
After that he got off on prohibition, and I was glad to take
him to his office and proceed to other business....'
Mr. Bryan, in truth, appeared to take but little interest
in this Pan-American policy, for he had complete confidence in the 'cooling-off' treaties he had arranged, which
provided for a period of investigation, in case of dispute,
before hostilities could be started. Some days later, after
House had reported progress to the Secretary of State, the
Colonel recorded:
'December 20, 1914: Mr. Bryan seemed pleased with what
had been done, but drifted off into the question of patronage
and the best way to "do up Senator X."... He followed
me all the way to the automobile, bareheaded in the cold
bleak wind, to get in as much as he could upon that subject.'
II
Given a free hand, Colonel House proceeded with surprising rapidity. On December 19, he saw the three
Ambassadors of the A.B.C. Powers and was much encouraged by their attitude. What he planned was obviously
to the advantage of the South American States, in that it
would bring them into equal partnership with the United




212 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


States and would transform the Monroe Doctrine from a
protective assurance on the part of one state into a mutual
covenant. Whether or not a Pan-American Pact of the kind
he suggested would prove an effective guaranty of peace
might be doubtful; but it would certainly eliminate the
implication of inferiority which South America deduced
from the traditional form of the Monroe Doctrine. To
secure such moral advantages, however, the South American
States must renounce all aggressive designs. Would they
prove equal to the opportunity offered them? The plan
assumed also that the smaller Latin-American States had
attained a degree of political stability which would permit
them to maintain the promises which they made. The
assumption was at least questionable.
'December 19, 1914: Justice Lamar telephoned that the
Argentine Ambassador was back. I made an engagement
with him at half-past eleven. I hurriedly gathered together
what data I could get concerning Argentina and upon Naon
himself. When the Justice introduced me, he excused himself for a moment and took Naon aside to inform him how
thoroughly I represented the President. He then took his
leave.
'I began the conversation by complimenting Naon upon
the advanced thought in his country, particularly in regard
to penal reform. I considered the Argentine fifty or one
hundred years ahead of Europe and the United States in
that direction. I marvelled at the statesmanship that saw
as long ago as 1864, when they had their war with Uruguay,
that a victorious nation had no moral right to despoil the
territory of the vanquished. After I had made these few
remarks, I had fertile soil upon which to sow the seeds of my
argument.
'Naon took the typewritten memorandum which the
President had given me and warmly approved both sen



TALK WITH THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR 213


tences one and two. He was tremendously impressed with
the significance of the first article, and said it struck a new
note and would create an epoch in governmental affairs.
When I told him the President had written the memorandum
on the typewriter himself, he asked permission to keep it,
saying it would become an historical document of much
value.
'I urged him to communicate with his Government by
cable and to give me an answer by Monday or Tuesday. He
felt confident the reply would be favorable. He took my
address in New York and said he would communicate with
me without delay. I let him understand that when the
South American Governments had acted upon the matter
and it had been pretty well buttoned-up, I would step aside
and have the President and Mr. Bryan act officially. When
I left, he followed me to the door and said he considered it a
joy to work toward the consummation of such a policy as
"your great and good President has promoted."...
'At lunch I reported to the President the substance of my
conversation with the Ambassador from the Argentine, and
he was delighted. Naon thought I would have more difficulty with the Brazilian and Chilean Ambassadors.
'The President said in talking with them I could go very
far, and he was emphatic in the statement that the United
States would not tolerate... aggression upon other republics.
'In the afternoon I saw them both. Da Gama 1 was easy
of conquest and with practically the same argument I used
with Naon. Suarez 2 was more difficult because he is not so
clever, in the first instance, and, in the second, Chile has a
boundary dispute with Peru. He asked if I knew of this, and
I told him I did, but we would arrange in the final drawing
of the agreement to cover such cases, since there were other
boundary disputes which would have to be adjusted, like
1 The Brazilian Ambassador.  2 The Chilean Ambassador.




214 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


that between Costa Rica and Panama. They both agreed
to cable their Governments and strongly recommend the
ratification of the proposal.'
This was rapid work for the first day of negotiations and
Colonel House, who knew something of diplomatic delays,
did not conceal his satisfaction. He was pleased still more
by the speed with which the Ambassadors of Brazil and
Argentina extracted replies to his suggestion from their
Governments. Brazil was the first to respond, less than a
week after the original suggestion of the Colonel had been
offered.


Ambassador da Gama to Colonel House
WASHINGTON, December 24, 1914
MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:
I have just received the answer from my Minister of
Foreign Affairs to the telegram I sent him on Saturday,
19th, transmitting the two propositions of the President's
project of convention.
The answer was delayed pending further information that
I sent on Monday and then consultation with our President,
who gladly authorizes me to declare that both points of the
President's proposal are agreeable, it being understood that
only American territories are contemplated in the first of
those paragraphs.
I suppose that the sounding having proved favorable, the
formal overture of the negotiations will soon follow. This
will be an epoch-making negotiation.
Yours sincerely
DA GAMA
% D




ANOTHER TALK WITH AMBASSADOR NAON 215


Colonel House to the President
NEW YORK, December 26, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I am enclosing you a copy of a letter from da Gama which
I have just received and which I know will please you as
much as it has me.
As you know, I had a telephone talk with Naon; but he
spoke such broken English and the connection was so bad,
that I could not gather the sense of his message. He promised to write, but I have nothing from him yet. I gleaned
enough to know that he wanted to have another conference;
therefore I told him I would be in Washington early next
week.
This is a matter of such far-reaching consequence that I
feel we should pay more attention to it just now than even
the European affair, for the reason that, if brought to a
successful conclusion, the one must have a decided influence
upon the other....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
Three days later House went again to Washington, where
he had a gratifying conference with the Argentine Ambassador. Naon handed to him the following despatch, which
had just come in from Buenos Ayres: 'The Government
receives with sympathy the proposition with the understanding that such a proposition tends to transform the onesided character of the Monroe Doctrine into a common
policy of all the American countries.'
'December 29, 1914: Naon was very enthusiastic [House
recorded] over the entire proposal and said, "... It will be
such a great accomplishment that there will be nothing he
[Wilson] can ever do afterward that can approach it in
importance."




216 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'He thought Chile would hesitate to come m.... He had
talked with the Chilean Ambassador since I was in Washington and had not received much encouragement. I told him
that the United States would not favor the acquisition of
territory by the other republics, either by war or otherwise,
and that Chile might as well accept that condition in a
formal convention. He replied that Argentina held the
same view, and would not willingly permit territorial aggrandizement in South America.'
The Colonel returned to the White House to report to
Wilson.
'We discussed the best means of buttoning-up the South
American proposition, and it was agreed that he should see
Senator Stone immediately upon his return; and we again
discussed whether it would be advisable to bring the matter
before the entire Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
or before the Democratic members of it. He would not
discuss anything of importance with Senator  - for the
reason that he immediately gave it to the press; in this
instance it was necessary to have the matter presented to
the country properly when they first heard it, and not get
a garbled or distorted account from a political opponent.
'I told him Naon desired to know whether it was our
purpose to make twenty-one different treaties or a single
convention. I had replied that it was the intention to make
a single convention, which the President thought was right.
Naon suggested, I told him, that the A.B.C. Powers and
ourselves should first thresh out the terms to a satisfactory
conclusion before bringing in the smaller republics. This,
too, the President agreed to.
'December 30, 1914: We had breakfast, as usual, at eight.
The President and I talked a few minutes afterward and
laid out the business that I should attend to. I made




WAITING TO HEAR FROM CHILE


217


an engagement with the Chilean Ambassador for eleven
o'clock.
'I found he had not heard from his Government. He
gave a change of ministry as the reason, and was sure he
would receive a favorable reply. I could not see how he
could fail to do so. This was not really in accordance with
Naon's statement to me, but I found Naon wrong in the
first estimate of the manner in which Brazil and Chile would
receive the proposals.
'January 13, 1915: I found the Chilean Ambassador very
cordial, but he had not heard from his Government regarding the President's proposal. I told him the Senate would
adjourn in about sixty days and would not meet again for
nearly a year, and that it was important for him to get into
communication with his Government again and ask them to
send a response. I informed him of the favorable responses
from both Brazil and Argentina; but before proceeding to a
further discussion of the convention we wished to hear from
Chile. The President requested me to say to him that he had
approached Senator Stone of the Foreign Relations Committee and had found him sympathetic, and he felt sure
there would be no difficulty from that source....
'I went... to see the Brazilian Ambassador to inform
him also that the President had taken the matter up with
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and he would soon
call them together for a more intimate discussion of the
details of the convention. Da Gama was pleased with this
procedure and thought it was wise for the President to get
the Senate in line before any public announcement was
made.
'I returned to the White House for lunch, and while the
President was dressing for his golf I told of my morning's
work.'


Chile was slow in responding, but on January 21, 1915,




218 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House received the following letter from Ambassador Suarez:
Ambassador Suarez to Colonel House
WASHINGTON, January 19, 1915
MY DEAR SIR:... I wished to inform you that I have since two days the
expected reply from Chile. It is favorable in principle and
praises the idea as a generous and pan-american one.
Although it is sometimes not a little difficult to find the
proper expressions to render an idea agreeable to several
parties, I hope we shall succeed when the moment of discussing the development of our first accord comes.
Mr. Bryan has told me lately to be in full acquaintance
with the matter; and under this understanding I assume I
can communicate with him in your absence.
I am, my dear Mr. House,
Very sincerely yours
EDO. SUAREZ
This was ambiguous, but House, who was on the point of
leaving for Europe, to be engaged upon quite different but
equally important affairs, urged the President to accept the
letter at its face value and push the agreement through.
Colonel House to the President
NEW YORK, January 21, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I am enclosing you a copy of a letter which has come from
the Chilean Ambassador this morning.
Everything now seems to be in shape for you to go ahead.
I believe the country will receive this policy with enthusiasm and it will make your Administration notable, even
had you done but little else....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HouSE




PAN-AMERICA AND MEXICO


219


III
Colonel House left for Europe on January 31, 1915.
Henceforth his time and his energies were chiefly occupied
with the problems that arose from the European war, but
his interest never flagged in the Pan-American policy which
he had done so much to inaugurate. He insisted upon its
general value as an example, which might later be followed
in Europe, of international organization in place of international anarchy; he emphasized its special value in view of
the persistent uneasiness resulting from the always unsettled
Mexican problem. For the elimination of Huerta had not
led to any diminution of disorder; attacks upon American
lives and property continued, and American public opinion,
at least in certain circles, called for a positive policy that
might end the crisis.
House himself was constitutionally unable to approve a
purely negative line of action, and, while he realized the
dangers of forcible intervention in Mexico by the United
States alone, he believed that with the cooperation of the
South American Powers, the mediation of which had already
been utilized in 1914, the Mexican problem could be settled.
Such a step would fit in perfectly with the plan for a PanAmerican Pact. Just before leaving for Europe he urged it
upon the President and the Secretary of State.
'January 24, 1915: I suggested [to Wilson] that the
Mexican problem could best be solved now by calling in the
A.B.C. Powers and ourselves. The President thought this
an excellent idea and that it was merely a question of when
to put it in operation. I offered to see the Ambassadors
to-morrow if he thought well of it. He believed this would
be too soon, for conditions were not quite ready in Mexico for
such a move, and he was afraid the A.B.C. Ambassadors
would not want to move so quickly....




220 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'January 25, 1915: I talked to Mr. Bryan of my suggesting
a commission form of government for Mexico, with the
A.B.C. Powers and ourselves acting jointly. He thought
fairly well of it, but was not as enthusiastic as the President.
I talked of the South American concord and many other
matters.'
Colonel House to the President
PARIS, FRANCE, March 15, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
Since I have been over here, every now and then Mexico
raises its head.
It would be of enormous advantage to your prestige if you
could place that problem well on the road to settlement
before this war ends. I have heard it time and again - not
directly, but through others - that the belligerent Governments will become insistent that order be restored there.
Winslow i tells me that he hears it constantly in Berlin.
I have wondered whether you have taken the matter up
with the A.B.C. Powers, as you contemplated when I left.
This seems to me to be the wisest solution. I think you have
now given them [the Mexicans] every chance to work it out
themselves, and help should be offered them and insisted
upon...
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
President Wilson, however, was unwilling to take so
decided a step at this time. Three months later he himself
drew a graphic picture of conditions in Mexico: 'Her crops
are destroyed, her fields lie unseeded, her work cattle are
confiscated for the use of the armed factions, her people flee
to the mountains to escape being drawn into unending
bloodshed, and no man seems to see or lead the way to peace
1 Lanier Winslow, attache in Berlin.




NO PROGRESS ON PAN-AMERICA


221


and settled order.... Mexico is starving and without a
Government.' Even so, he hesitated to take any positive
action.
Colonel House was in Europe from January to June. On
his return he found that, despite the cordial approval given
by Argentina and Brazil, no progress had been made by
Wilson or Bryan in pushing the Pan-American Pact to a
definite conclusion. Clearly, much of the delay might be
attributed to the hesitations of the Chilean Ambassador,
but it seemed plain also that the Secretary of State had not
taken up the matter with energy. He lacked the sort of
ability necessary to translate ideas into facts. Mr. Bryan
had imagination and foresight; many of his ideas which
began as subjects of ridicule ended by becoming laws, but,
except in rare instances, not through his own efforts.
'The most important event of the day [recorded House
on June 18, 1915] was a visit from Henry P. Fletcher, our
Ambassador to Chile. We discussed the South American
situation as it related to the proposal I made the President
before I left, concerning the welding of the two continents.
I find nothing has been done in this matter during my
absence. The Chilean Ambassador and Government have
been the cause of the delay. They evidently do not want to
tie themselves to a non-aggressive policy.... I do not feel,
however, that the situation has been handled to the best
advantage; and I shall take it up with the President again
and suggest some means by which it may be expedited.
'Fletcher thought if we got the A.B.C. Powers to declare
for the Monroe Doctrine it would be sufficient. I told him
that this would in no way be sufficient and that he did not
grasp the idea or scope of it. We desired to see the Americas
knitted together so as to give the world a policy to be
followed in the future. Haste was necessary for the reason
that the European war made the time opportune, and, if it




222 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


did not go through before the end of the war, it might never
do so.
'I suggested to Fletcher the advisability of his visiting the
different South American countries to further the proposal.
I thought if Chile continued to obstruct, we should go ahead
without her. The smaller republics would agree and, with
Argentina and Brazil, it made but little difference whether
Chile came in or remained out.'
With the appointment of Mr. Lansing as Secretary of
State, in July, 1915, following Bryan's resignation, new
impetus was given to the proposals which House had
initiated. 'I am again urging action in that direction,' the
Colonel wrote on July 18 to Thomas Nelson Page. A week
later, Mr. Lansing came up to the North Shore to spend the
day with him.
'July 24, 1915: Secretary and Mrs. Lansing arrived on
the 10.30 train. Lansing and I at once went into executive
session and talked continuously until lunch. There was
much to go over. I wished to tell him of European conditions, as I found them, and to give him an insight into what
had been done in the Department concerning some important matters.... The South American proposal was one.
I was surprised to find that Lansing was ignorant of what
had been done. He said, as far as he knew there was nothing
on file in the Department. I was surprised, too, that the
President had not talked with him more freely and given
him fuller information concerning pending matters....
'We took up the Mexican situation and he is getting under
way the arrangement to have the A.B.C. Powers join us in
composing the difficulties there. He did not know the suggestion was mine and was made as far back as January and
lying dormant until now. I do not think the President can
altogether relieve himself of blame in this delay, for, while




CONFERENCE WITH SECRETARY LANSING 223


he would probably have gone ahead with it if... he had
had as Secretary of State a better executive, yet it might
have been done even under the unfavorable circumstances
with which he had to contend...
'I find him [Lansing] thoroughly familiar with the machinery for such designs, and he seems to be energetic and
ambitious to make a record.'
Practical effects of this conference were not slow to
appear. In the first place, Mr. Lansing took up at least part
of the suggestion that Colonel House had made the preceding
January and which the President and Secretary Bryan had
not pushed forward; namely, that the South American
Powers should be called in to assist in the settlement of the
Mexican problem. In August, upon the invitation of Mr.
Lansing, the diplomatic representatives of Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay met at
Washington to discuss the Mexican settlement. From this
conference there resulted an invitation to the different
Mexican leaders to meet in pacific conference to arrange for
general agreement and orderly elections. All the leaders,
with the exception of the chief of the Constitutionalists,
Carranza, agreed to the invitation, and yet it was Carranza
who seemed to exercise the widest powers in Mexico and
whose cooperation was essential. Wilson did not deceive
himself into the belief that Carranza was friendly to the
United States, but both the President and House recognized
in Carranza's lieutenant, Obregon, certain qualities which
might prove equal to the problem of Mexican pacification.
'September 23, 1915: We breakfasted at eight [wrote
House]. After breakfast Tumulty talked to me for nearly an
hour. The President rescued me and took me up to his study.
We discussed Mexico. He laughingly said that Carranza
had once or twice put it over us and in a very skilful way.




224 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


He thought when the A.B.C. Conference resumed on the
8th of October, we would perhaps have to recognize Carranza. We were both of the opinion that General Obregon
was responsible for the accelerated fortunes of Carranza
and that he would perhaps finally turn out to be the "man
of the hour" in Mexico. We agreed that if Carranza was to
be recognized he must first guarantee religious freedom, give
amnesty for all political offences, institute the land reforms
which had been promised, give protection to foreigners, and
recognize their just claims.'
Despite the steady negative returned by Carranza to the
invitation to meet with the other Mexican leaders, the
conference of American states at Washington refused to be
snubbed; in October it decided that the Carranza r6gime
constituted a de facto government in Mexico and recommended its recognition. This recognition was granted by
the United States Government on October 19.
The Mexican problem was not thereby settled, but general
opinion would probably have agreed with that of Ambassador Gerard, who wrote Colonel House in October: 'Carranza has his faults, like most of us, but it seems to me that
it is the proper thing to recognize him and a good solution of
a bad situation.'
Once again the method of solution was of more importance
than the result. Students of the Latin-American situation
insisted that it was of the first significance that the United
States should have taken this step in conjunction with and
upon the recommendation of the chief South American
states. President Wilson did not fail to capitalize the
friendly sentiments aroused in South America when he
delivered his annual message:
'The moral is that the states of America are not hostile
rivals, but cooperating friends, and that their growing sense




NEW DRAFT OF THE PAN-AMERICAN PACT 225


of community of interest, alike in matters political and alike
in matters economic, is likely to give them a new significance
as factors in international affairs and in the political history
of the world.'
Under the influence of this display of the United States'
desire to cooperate rather than to control, Mr. Lansing
found it possible to continue discussions on the definite PanAmerican Pact. On October 19, House wrote to Walter
Hines Page: 'Lansing is pushing the South American
proposal. The President, Lansing, and I went into this
thoroughly some two weeks ago and decided upon a course
of action which we believe will accelerate matters and perhaps bring it to a conclusion before Congress meets.'
As a result of long discussion, the original proposition
made by House had been revised so as to eliminate one
obvious source of practical difficulty; namely, the veto upon
the private manufacture of arms. For reasons which the
League of Nations Commission later were to find cogent,
the abolition of private manufacture was deemed not
feasible. Indeed, the new draft of the Pact carried merely a
provision for an automatic embargo on munitions in case of
revolutionary attack upon an existing government. Articles
providing for investigation and arbitration in the settlement
of disputes were added. The first and most important article,
guaranteeing 'territorial integrity' and 'political independence under republican forms of government,' was retained.
Secretary Lansing to Colonel House
WASHINGTON, November 18, 1915
MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:
I enclose a revision of the four propositions for the
proposed Pan-American Convention.l Possibly the President
has already sent you a copy, but I am doing so on the supposition that he has not.
1 See Appendix to chapter.




226 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Before Ambassador Naon sailed, I submitted to him the
propositions and he was entirely satisfied with them.
This morning I saw the Brazilian Ambassador and he also
approved. This afternoon I asked the Chilean Ambassador
to come and see me, and after a long discussion of the whole
question he changed his views in regard to the convention
and said that he could see no reason why Chile could not
accept the propositions as redrafted. I urged on him the
advisability of speedy action and he agreed that he would at
once communicate them to his Government and ask that
the new Cabinet, which comes into office on December 20th,
would act immediately and cable him instructions accordingly.
I feel convinced that the Ambassador will do all he can to
secure favorable action by his Government.
I thought you would be interested to know the present
status of the negotiations and when I see you will explain
more fully the substance of my conversation with Mr.
Suarez.
I hope to be in New York at the Army-Navy football
game on the 27th and shall stay over until Sunday night.
Possibly I may have an opportunity to see you then if you
are not in Washington before that time.
With warm regards, I am
Cordially yours
ROBERT LANSING
IV
As in the case of the League of Nations Covenant three
years later, Colonel House was less interested in the wording
of the draft than in the spirit behind the agreement and in
securing definite and unanimous acceptance. 'I think you
have now gotten the four propositions down to the best
possible form,' he wrote Mr. Lansing on November 20.
And he urged the President to get the business 'buttoned



GREAT BRITAIN AND PAN-AMERICA 227


up.' Indeed, the matter seemed so close to completion that
on January 6, 1916, Mr. Wilson, in his address to the PanAmerican Scientific Congress, stated publicly the gist of the
proposals.
But more delays intervened. House again left for Europe in
December, remaining abroad until March; and, apparently,
during his absence little progress was made in overcoming
the final difficulties. While in Europe, although engaged on
complex and even more far-reaching business, the Colonel did
not forget the Pan-American Pact and took what occasion
he might to assist it. It was the subject of discussion between him and the Chilean Minister to Great Britain, Senior
Eduardes, and also members of the British Cabinet. He
was hopeful of British support, and even considered the
possibility of the participation of Canada in the Covenant.
'February 20, 1916: I had a conference with the Chilean
Minister before lunch [he wrote]. He said his Government
was pleased with the proposed pact between the American
republics. He mentioned the fear Chile had of Japan. He
spoke of the advantage Chile could be to the United States
because of her coastline as a base, and because of her nitrate
and copper deposits. He believed that Chile during the
coming year would take second place among copper-producing countries. While talking with him, it occurred to me
it would be a good time for Great Britain to indicate that
she was in sympathy with the Pan-American Pact; and I
told Eduardes I would suggest to Sir Edward Grey to-morrow
that he have some member of the House of Commons put a
question to him asking if the Government was cognizant of this
Pact, how they regarded it, and what effect it would have
upon Great Britain. I shall suggest that Grey reply that Great
Britain views it sympathetically; that, being one of the largest
American Powers, she looks with favor upon any arrangement which will make for a closer union of American states.




228 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'Eduardes was delighted with this suggestion. Later in
the day I proposed it to LansdowneJ) He was startled, and
said it was a matter needing careful consideration because
Japan might consider it was directed at her. I thought
Japan should be taken at her word. She has repeatedly said
she had no designs in the Western Hemisphere, and Great
Britain need only accept her assurances at their face value.
Lansdowne favored the proposal, but declared it of such
importance that careful thought should be given it.
'February 21, 1916: The first question I took up with
Grey was the suggestion which came to me yesterday
regarding the Pan-American Pact. I told Grey I had mentioned it to Lansdowne and he thought it a great move,
provided it was so guarded as not to offend the Japanese.
Grey took the same attitude I did, that the Japanese could
not possibly consider it directed at them. He enthused over
the idea and asked me to dictate the question I thought
should be put to him in Parliament. I did so, while he wrote
it down. It was, whether the Government was taking
cognizance of the Pan-American Pact recently announced,
guaranteeing the political and territorial integrity of the
American republics, and what effect it would have upon the
British Dominions in America.
'The thought then occurred to me, and I expressed it to
Grey, that after this was done and after I had consulted
with the President, the British Government might join the
American guaranty as far as their American colonies were
concerned. This, I told him, was one way [for Great Britain]
to bring about a sympathetic alliance not only with the
United States, but with the entire Western Hemisphere.
In my opinion, it was an opportunity not to be disregarded
and its tendency would be to bring together an influence
which could control the peace of the world.
'Grey... thought it should be done. I afterward cabled
1 Minister without Portfolio.




GREAT BRITAIN AND PAN-AMERICA 229


the President, telling him what I had proposed to Grey, but
without giving details....
'I gave Loreburn ' a summary of what I had told Grey
concerning the Pan-American Pact and what Grey had
promised to do in the House of Commons provided the
Canadian Prime Minister approved. Grey felt that a matter
appertaining solely to American affairs should first be submitted to the Canadian Government, and this was being
done by cable.
'I suggested to Loreburn that he prepare a speech in advance, without saying anything to Grey, so when the announcement was made in the Commons he could give it his
warm approval in the House of Lords. Hewas eager to do this,
for he said it presented to his mind a magnificent prospect.
'February 22, 1916: He [Grey] told me that Bonar Law
was of the opinion it would be somewhat hasty to have the
question asked in the House of Commons, and an answer
given just now, about the Pan-American Pact. He has
cabled the Canadian Prime Minister and the matter will be
brought out at the time considered most opportune.'
Returning to the United States on March 5, House heard
from Grey soon afterwards that the British thoroughly
approved of the Pan-American Pact and were interested in
the plan of affiliation with it, but evidently feared to make
any public statement before its consummation seemed
better assured.
Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House
FOREIGN OFFICE, March 23, 1916
DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:
Soon after you left, the Chilean Minister volunteered a
statement to Sir M. de Bunsen 2 of his conversation with you
about the Pan-American proposal.
1 Lord Loreburn, an advanced Liberal and former Lord Chancellor.
2 British Ambassador to Austria until 1914; appointed Special Ambassador to States of South America in 1918.




230 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


In consequence of what Sir M. de Bunsen told me I
thought it desirable to see the Chilean Minister before saying
anything in public. I found him pleased with what you had
said to him, but insisting very carefully that the idea of partnership must be emphasized and that of tutelage suppressed.
He admitted that you had done this, but he made it clear
that if I made any public statement it must be evident that
I was founding myself not only on what President Wilson
had said, but on the feelings of the A.B.C. countries in
South America as well.
I asked him to send me a statement which he said the
President of Chile had made favourable to the idea, so that
if I had to say anything in public I might refer to it as well
as to what President Wilson had said.
The Canadian Government were quite willing that I
should say what I thought of saying in favour of it, but
finding I should be on rather delicate ground as regards the
A.B.C. countries, I think I will wait till the matter comes up
in the Press again before making any public utterance.
I made it clear to the Chilean Minister that we were favourable to the plan as put before him by you, and that you
had spoken to me in exactly the same way as to him, but I
said nothing of having discussed with you the question of a
public statement here.
Yours sincerely
E. GREY
Notwithstanding the cordial protestations of the Chilean
Minister in London, House soon discovered that the attitude
of Suarez in Washington was not encouraging and that, as
a result of the hesitations of Chile, the early enthusiasm of
Brazil was beginning to evaporate. The situation was
complicated by a new Mexican crisis. On March 8, Villa,
in revolt against Carranza and pursuing the temporarily
profitable career of bandit under the diaphanous guise of




MEXICO AND THE PAN-AMERICAN PACT 231


liberal patriot, crossed the frontier and murdered seventeen
American citizens at Columbus, New Mexico. The punitive
expedition under Pershing which was sent after him across
the border, led to verbal and military retaliation on the part
of Carranza which threatened to produce formal warfare
between Mexico and the United States. The atmosphere
during the spring and summer months was by no means
favorable to the completion of the Pan-American Pact.
Furthermore, Mr. Fletcher, who had been given charge of
the negotiations, discovered an unwillingness to settle upon
details that nullified the agreement upon the principle
which the South American states had professed.
The differences were slight on the surface, but they proved
sufficient to delay and finally to prevent signature of the
Pan-American Pact. It was impossible for the United States
to urge action, without arousing the suspicions of Chile that
the Pact in reality was to serve our special interests rather
than those of the Americas in general. On August 8, Frank
Polk, then Under-Secretary of State, wrote to Colonel House
that the Pact 'seems dead for the moment.'
On the following day, Mr. Fletcher reported that progress
had stopped. Se-nor Naon desired delay in order that the
tense feeling aroused by the crisis in Mexico and the dispute
with Carranza might subside. The attitude of Chile became
increasingly aloof.
'In view of the check put on the negotiations by Mr.
Naon's unwillingness to sign [wrote Fletcher to House],
I could not open out the treaty to the other republics. So the
matter rests in statu quo. Chile is definitely and decidedly
opposed to the treaty.... I feel sure that if we go on without
Chile, that is, isolating her from the American concert, she
will turn naturally elsewhere in finance and trade and that
gradually a spirit of hostility against the United States will
be engendered.'




232 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Thus the summer dragged along. In September, following
the subsidence of the Mexican crisis, the Argentine Ambassador declared himself ready to sign; but Chile still held off
and Brazil tended to follow her example. The last reference
in Colonel House's papers for 1916 to the plan which he had
started nearly two years before, is dated October 1:
'Fletcher called to report on the Pan-American Peace Pact.
He did not go further with Ambassador Naon, who is willing
to sign for Argentina, because Lansing had promised Dr.
Miiller, Brazilian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
that he would not move actively in the matter until the 15th
of November, which would give Miiller time to return to
Brazil and ascertain the will of his Government. Miiller
has been in the United States for the past six weeks at a
health resort.'
The weeks that followed were filled first with election
activities and then with the negotiations that succeeded
Germany's first peace note. The Pan-American Pact was
pushed to one side and, with the entrance of the United
States into the European war in the spring of 1917, it
slipped into a forgotten grave.
The failure to carry through the plan to its completion
must have brought harsh disappointment to Colonel House,
who followed the progress of negotiations with invariable
interest, although he ceased to retain active direction of
their course. But even unfulfilled, the plan occupies a
position of historical significance. It was designed not
merely to bring the American states more closely together,
but also to serve as a model to the European nations when
they had ended the war. Both in its specific language and
in its general intent, the Pan-American Pact is the immediate
prototype of the Covenant of the League of Nations. By
the summer of 1916 Colonel House could see its failure with




FAILURE OF THE PAN-AMERICAN PLAN 233


greater equanimity because his eyes already caught the vision
of the United States entering and vivifying a larger concert
than that of purely American states. The development of
our relations with Europe, forced by the war, brought upon
the horizon the need of a world organization into which the
Americas might conceivably be drawn.
Even before the war House realized that the traditional
separation of the United States from Europe in matters
political could not be maintained indefinitely and that the
time had come when political events of moment in Europe
must inevitably prove of direct importance to the United
States. It was this realization that led him to give over the
active direction of the Pan-American scheme while his chief
interest was caught in the European situation. It led him to
visit the Kaiser in June, 1914, and thus to enter upon an
adventure that determined the course of his main activities
during the following six years. Nothing with which he had
hitherto been connected, whether of a diplomatic character
or in the field of domestic politics, compares in importance
with the European mission he undertook in the early summer of 1914, to which we must now turn our attention.
APPENDIX
PAN-AMERICAN PACT - REVISED DRAFT
ARTICLE I
That the high contracting parties to this solemn covenant and agreement hereby join one another in a common and mutual guaranty of
territorial integrity and of political independence under republican forms
of government.
ARTICLE I!
To give definitive application to the guaranty set forth in Article I,
the high contracting parties severally covenant to endeavor forthwith to
reach a settlement of all disputes as to boundaries or territory now pending between them by amicable agreement or by means of international
arbitration.




234 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE
ARTICLE III
That the high contracting parties further agree, First, that all questions, of whatever character, arising between any two or more of them
which cannot be settled by the ordinary means of diplomatic correspondence shall, before any declaration of war or beginning of hostilities,
be first submitted to a permanent international commission for investigation, one year being allowed for such investigation; and, Second, that
if the dispute is not settled by investigation, to submit the same to arbitration, provided the question in dispute does not affect the honor, independence, or vital interests of the nations concerned or the interests
of third parties.
ARTICLE IV
To the end that domestic tranquillity may prevail within their territories, the high contracting parties further severally covenant and agree
that they will not permit the departure from their respective jurisdictions of any military or naval expedition hostile to the established government of any of the high contracting parties, and that they will prevent
the exportation from their respective jurisdictions of arms, ammunition,
or other munitions of war destined to or for the use of any person or
persons notified to be in insurrection or revolt against the established
government of any of the high contracting parties.
November, 1915




CHAPTER IX
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
The situation is extraordinary. It is militarism run stark mad.... There
is some day to be an awful cataclysm....  '
House to Wilson, May 29, 1914, from Berlin
I
AT the beginning of Wilson's Administration there were few
citizens of the United States who professed a knowledge of,
or an interest in, European politics. The traditions of the
nineteenth century still held the public mind - traditions
which laid down, as the primary principle of American
policy, a complete abstention from the political affairs of
Europe. They had their origin in sound judgment. During
the early days of the Republic, as both Washington and Jefferson realized, entanglement in foreign alliances would
have meant that the United States, lacking material
strength, must have become the catspaw of an alien power.
On the other hand, Nature had provided a wonderful opportunity if the independent colonists would turn their backs
upon the Atlantic and devote themselves to developing the
resources of their own land.
Thus during the early nineteenth century the young
country spent its energy upon domestic problems: an aggressive extension of the frontier, a fierce wrestle with the backwoods, a struggle for political unity, the building of transportation lines, the creation of an industrial system. The
people knew and cared little of what went on across the
Atlantic.
But by the beginning of the twentieth century, conditions
had changed. Not merely had the Pacific coast been reached
and the intervening territory conquered, but through the
merchant and the missionary American interests had been




236 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


established in the Orient, and the fortunes of war had
brought the Philippines under the United States flag. Our
Government claimed a position of equality with the European Powers in the Far East and, under the direction of
Hay, had entered into close cooperation with them there.
The acquisition of Porto Rico, the control of Cuba, the cutting of the Panama Canal, assured predominance in the
Caribbean. Almost unconsciously, the country had become
a world power, and it was certain that political contacts with
Europe must become more frequent and close, for the great
European states were also world powers and their interests
touched ours at many points. Economic and intellectual
intercourse with Europe was intimate and constant; political
intercourse was henceforth inevitable.
This fact had been realized by President Roosevelt, who
insisted that responsibility must accompany power. So keen
was his sense of responsibility that in 1905 and 1906 he took
an active, albeit unguessed, part in the negotiations that led
to the Algeciras Conference, which averted the threat of a
European war. This was a crisis in which the United States
had no direct interest, and one which concerned purely
European states. Roosevelt participated in the negotiations
merely because of his conviction that the United States must
fulfil its duties to the rest of the world in the cause of peace.
In such a cause he was willing to scrap the tradition of isolation.
The war clouds of 1906, however, continued to hang low
over Europe. The reconciliation of France and Great Britain,
consummated in the Entente of 1904, had disturbed the
Germans, who saw in it an encouragement to the French
political renaissance and to the active foreign policy of the
French Foreign Minister, Delcasse. They had hoped to
break the Entente by raising the Moroccan issue, but failed.
In 1907 they were still more disturbed by the Anglo-Russian
reconciliation. It seemed to them that an iron ring was being




THE EUROPEAN SITUATION IN 1913


237


drawn about Germany. They feared especially the development of an aggressive Russian policy in the Balkans that
would destroy Germany's ally, Austria, and cut off the road
to the southeast. Once more, in 1911, they tried to break
the Entente, now the Triple Entente, and again they failed.
Counsels in Germany were evidently divided. There were
those, such as the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, an
amiable but anaemic personality, who hoped to find a solution in a peaceable understanding- especially with the
British, without whose help Russian plans in the Near East
could not succeed. But there were others who insisted that
Germany must precipitate a war at the first favorable moment, before Russia was ready. The aggressive spirit had
been taught for a generation by the professors, it was rampant in military circles, and it had caught the naval officers.
The temper of these groups, who doubtless did not represent exactly the ruling opinion of the nation, would have
been a less serious factor, if it had not been supported by the
widespread conviction that the Entente was planning to
close in on Germany. In this case, as so often, fear proved to
be the mother of recklessness. Should the control of German
policy be captured even temporarily by the firebrands,
backed by a panicky public sentiment, the danger of a decision to risk everything on a sudden attack was very real.
And because of the complexity of the diplomatic groupings,
such an attack would mean a general European war.
In England the peril was realized acutely, but the Government faced an unpleasant dilemma. The rapid development
of German sea-power could not but be regarded as a threat
to British security, which naturally led to the keenest sort of
naval competition. Any slackening in British naval preparation would be flying in the face of Providence. In view of the
engagements which the British had made with France,which
however informal were none the less morally binding, military
preparation was also necessary. Such preparation, on the




238 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


other hand, could only intensify the diplomatic crisis, by
increasing the fears of Germany and giving a lever to the
German militarists who desired war.
In Russia and in France military development was the
order of the day. There were many who looked upon the
general war as inevitable; the Dual Alliance must get ready
and must omit no step which might increase its diplomatic
and military weight. Any other policy would lay those in
control open to the charge of criminal negligence. But each
step taken seemed to transform the Dual Alliance from a
defensive to an offensive combination and inevitably stimulated the fears and the belligerence of Germany.
Europe thus prepared for war and, as William Graham
Sumner used to say, 'What you prepare for you get.' It is
true that in 1913 the immediate danger seemed to pass when
the efforts of Sir Edward Grey brought a pacific solution to
the Balkan crisis. For a few months a detente in AngloGerman relations, assisted by the offer of British cooperation
in German plans for the Bagdad Railway, appeared to provide
a means for ending the conflict of alliances. But as the
British Premier later wrote, the diplomats were conscious
that they 'were skating on the thinnest of ice and that the
peace of Europe was at the mercy of a chapter of unforeseen
and unforeseeable accidents.1'
II
Like Roosevelt, House was convinced that a European
war must necessarily attain such proportions that every part
of the world would be touched, and that it was both the duty
and the interest of the United States to do all in its power to
avert it. The days had passed when America was isolated
from the Eastern Hemisphere; she had much to fear from
European trouble and she could do much to appease it.
Even before the inauguration of President Wilson, House
I Asquith, Genesis of the War, 166.




PLAN TO AVERT A WAR


239


planned a policy of cooperation which should include the
United States, Great Britain, and Germany. He saw that the
crux of the danger lay in the animosity of Germans and
British, and he hoped that it might be allayed by getting
the two countries to work towards a common end. Germany's expansive energy, he thought, might be turned
into more useful channels than Krupp factories and dreadnoughts.
'January 22, 1913: Martin lunched with us [Colonel House
recorded].... I told him that I wanted to get Governor
Wilson to let me bring about an understanding between
Great Britain, this country, and Germany, in regard to the
Monroe Doctrine....
'I also told him that it would be my endeavor to bring
about a better understanding between England and Germany; that if England were less intolerant of Germany's
aspirations for expansion, good feeling could be brought about
between them. I thought we could encourage Germany to
exploit South America in a legitimate way; that is, by development of its resources and by sending her surplus population there; that such a move would be good for South America and would have a beneficial result generally.'
During the first year of the Wilson Administration, the
pressure of domestic problems left the plan only half formed
in House's mind. But he kept turning it over and, as occasion
offered, he raised the subject with persons whose influence
and information might prove useful.
'April 23, 1913: I have a letter from James Speyer [he
wrote] asking me to meet at lunch downtown Count von
Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, who has expressed a
desire to know me. I never go downtown, and declined....
'April 25, 1913: James Speyer telephoned and again asked




240 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


if I would lunch with the German Ambassador uptown instead of downtown, and I promised to do so....
'May 9, 1913: I lunched at Delmonico's with the German
Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, and Mr. Speyer.
'The Count talked rather more freely than I anticipated
a diplomat of his training would. He spoke of Mr. Bryan
and of the different assistants in the State Department with a
good deal of freedom. He also criticized ex-Secretary Knox
and Huntington Wilson, his First Assistant.
'The most interesting part of his conversation was after
lunch, when Mr. Speyer left us and Bernstorff and I walked
down the Avenue alone. I suggested, that it would be a
great thing if there was a sympathetic understanding between
England, Germany, Japan, and the United States. Together
I thought they would be able to wield an influence for good
throughout the world. They could ensure peace and the
proper development of the waste places, besides maintaining
an open door and equal opportunity to every one everywhere.
'Much to my surprise, he agreed with me. He said the
understanding between Germany and England was much
better of late, and if they had some mutual field of endeavor
he thought a good understanding could finally be brought
about between them. He suggested that perhaps China was
the most promising field at present for concerted action, for
the United States could work there with Germany and
England....'
Two months later, in London, House discussed the broad
lines of this plan with the American Ambassador. Page
sympathized thoroughly with House's scheme of utilizing
the force of nations for purposes other than military or naval.
'It is a time,' he wrote to House, 'for some great constructive, forward idea - an idea for action. If the great world
forces could, by fortunate events and fortunate combina



PLANTING THE SEEDS OF PEACE


241


tions, be united and led to clean up the tropics, the great
armies might gradually become sanitary police, as in Panama,
and finally gradually forget the fighting idea and at last
dissolve...
But Page felt that the Europeans were too traditionally
minded to embark upon such a plan, which had in it something suggestive of the Secretariat of the League of Nations.
'On the Continent of Europe,' he wrote, 'the Kaiser is
probably the foremost man. Yet he cannot think far beyond
the provincial views of the Germans. In England, Sir
Edward Grey is the largest-visioned statesman. Yet even
he does not seem to have a definitely constructive mind.'
House did not force his ideas upon the British at this time,
but he discovered that in Sir Edward Grey he would deal
with a man who may have lacked imagination, but who was
sincerely desirous of attempting any scheme that might lead
towards the maintenance of peace. On July 3, 1913, Colonel
House had lunch with Grey, Lord Crewe, and Page.
'We discussed the feeling between Germany and England.
Sir Edward remarked that the great cause of antagonism
between nations was the distrust each felt for the other's
motives. Before leaving this subject I told him of my
luncheon with Count von Bernstorff, German Ambassador
at Washington, and that I had been surprised to hear him
say he believed that good feeling would soon come between
England and Germany. My purpose in repeating this was to
plant the seeds of peace.'
On his return to the United States, House was caught in
the swirl of appointments and the passage of the Federal
Reserve Act. But whenever he had the opportunity, he returned to his study of the European problem.


'September 1, 1913: I have had some interesting conversa



242 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE
tions with Dumbal particularly in regard to some phases of
the political situation in southeastern Europe. He was at
one time Minister at Bucharest and, of course, knows the
Balkan situation thoroughly.'
In November arrived Sir William Tyrrell, Grey's secretary, with whom Iouse found it possible to discuss in all
candor every sort of international question. After arranging
with Tyrrell the understanding as to Wilson's Mexican policy
and Panama tolls, the Colonel proceeded to impart his new
plan, which he had formulated with some definiteness. The
existing crisis he hoped to tide over by an understanding
that would lead to a limitation of armaments. If this succeeded, he would follow it up with the plan he had already
suggested to Bernstorff - a cooperative policy of developing
the waste places of the world.
'December 2, 1913: I told him [Tyrrell] the next thing I
wished to do was to bring about an understanding between
France, Germany, England, and the United States, regarding a reduction of armaments, both military and naval. I
said it was an ambitious undertaking, but was so well worth
while that I intended to try it. He thought it one of the most
far-reaching and beneficent things that could be done. He
thought if we continued as at present, ruin would eventually
follow, and in the meanwhile it would prevent us from solving the vexatious industrial problems we are all facing. He
considered I had "a good sporting chance of success."
'I asked him to suggest my procedure, and we discussed
that at length. He thought I should go to Germany and see
the Kaiser first, and afterward the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs and Finance. He said I would find them responsive
to the idea, but that the Minister of Marine, von Tirpitz,
was a reactionary and largely responsible for the present
German policy.
1 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.




PLAN TO SEE THE KAISER


243


'He did not think it necessary for me to take any credentials. He advised having our Ambassador in Germany
whisper to the Kaiser that I was "the power behind the
throne" in the United States. That if this were done, I
would have to warn our Ambassador to tell official Berlin I
did not care for "fuss and feathers"; otherwise I would have
red carpets laid for me all over Berlin.
'He thought I should proceed quietly and secretly, but
should secure an audience with the Kaiser and say to him,
among other things, that England and America "had buried
the hatchet" and there was a strong feeling that Germany
should come into this good feeling and evidence their good
intention by agreeing to stop building an extravagant navy,
and to curtail militarism generally.
'Sir William assured me that England would cooperate
with Germany cordially, and had been ready to do so for a
long while. He saw no cause for difference between them.
With England, United States, France, and Germany [agreed],
we both thought the balance of the world would follow in line
and a great change would come about. He said the Kaiser
was a spectacular individual and partook more of French
qualities than he did of German. He likened him to Roosevelt.
'Sir William promised to give me all the memoranda
passed between Great Britain and Germany upon this question of disarmament, in order that I might see how entirely
right Great Britain had been in her position.'
Ten days later, House discussed the plan with President
Wilson and received his approval. 'I might almost say he
was enthusiastic,' wrote House to Page. It was decided that
in the early summer the Colonel should go directly to Berlin
and take the plan to the Kaiser. If he proved complaisant,
House would go to England.
During the winter and spring he made his preparations.




244 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


In January he wrote to Gerard to make sure of the Kaiser's
plans; he learned that Wilhelm II would be in Corfu in the
late spring, that he would return to Potsdam, go on to Kiel
for the races, then on a cruise in Norwegian waters, and later
to his estates on the Rhine& House chose the earliest moment available and cabled Gerard to arrange the interviewfor June, after the Kaiser's return from Corfu.
The Colonel felt himself already in such close touch with
the situation in Great Britain that he believed the chief task
he must undertake would be a study of current German
psychology and especially the character of William II. In
January we find him taking lunch with Benjamin Ide
Wheeler and quietly extracting information.
'January 1, 1914: We had a delightful time together. He
is just back from Germany and has seen much of the Kaiser,
not only this time but upon former visits. He visits him in
the most informal manner and spends many hours with him
and his family. He gave me nearly all the information I
need regarding the Kaiser and his entourage. Wheeler is
also a close friend of Roosevelt's, and I was interested in his
comparison of the two men. He considers them very alike,
particularly in regard to memory and impulsiveness, but
they are dissimilar inasmuch as the Kaiser has a religious
turn of mind and is more cultured in his manners.
'In order to obtain the information I desired, I had to
disclose my object in questioning him; and he encouraged
me to believe that I might have some chance of success in
bringing the Kaiser around to an agreement for disarmament. He thought the Minister of Marine would be the
obstacle, just as Sir William Tyrrell had pointed out. He
1 House to Gerard, January 1, 1914; Gerard to House, February 11,
March 15, 1914. The matter is of historical interest, since it has been asserted that the Kaiser sailed to Norway as a blind to cover German war
plans. It is clear that his itinerary was arranged long before the murder
of the Archduke.




BENJAMIN IDE WHEELER ON THE KAISER 245


said the Kaiser had told him that his object in building a
navy was not to threaten England, but to add prestige to
Germany's commerce upon the seven seas. He had spoken
of how impossible war should be between England and
Germany, or, in fact, how utterly foolish any general European war would be. He thinks the coming antagonism is between the Asiatics and the Western peoples and that within
twenty years the Western peoples will recognize this and
stand together more or less as a unit.
'Wheeler told of how narrowly a general European war
was averted last March over the Balkan embroglio, and how
the Emperor thinks he saved the day by his suggestion of
creating the State of Albania.i The Kaiser told Wheeler
that he had warned Russia if they attacked Austria, he
would strike them immediately. The Kaiser also told him
he felt kindly toward England and that he was Queen Victoria's favorite grandchild.
'In his talks with the Kaiser, he said the Kaiserin seldom
joined in the conversation, but would sit quietly knitting
and only entered the discussion when it fell upon domestic
problems.,
'Another difference between the Kaiser and T. R. was that
the Kaiser was a good listener when necessary, and is courteous in doing so.'
Colonel House spent most of the winter in Texas. But as
soon as he returned to the East in March and notwithstanding the time and effort he was giving to the Federal
Reserve appointments, he continued preparations for his
European venture. In April he had long conferences with
1 After the defeats of the Turkish army by the Balkan League in the
autumn of 1912, Austria protested against the acquisition of any part of
the Adriatic littoral by Serbia. A conference of the Great Powers was
held at London, where Great Britain and Germany worked for a compromise and where the independent State of Albania was created. Serbia
acquired Macedonia, thus precipitating a quarrel with Bulgaria.




246 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Irwin Laughlin, Counsellor of the American Embassy at
St. James's.
'April 9, 1914: We fell to talking about my plan for decreasing armaments. Laughlin was three years First Secretary of the American Embassy at Berlin. During that time
he talked with the German Chancellor regarding disarmament, and he did not believe there was one chance in a million of my getting Germany to consent to a naval holiday.
'I surprised him by telling him of the direct information I
had of the Kaiser himself —none of which, though, was
favorable to my plan, but rather coinciding with Laughlin's
views. But what impressed him was the method I had in
mind of accomplishing results. I explained my purpose not
to take it up from a sentimental or purely ethical viewpoint,
but to try and prove that it would be of material advantage
to Germany.
'I went into some detail as to giving Germany a zone of
influence in Asia Minor and Persia, and also lending a hope
that they might be given a freer hand commercially in the
Central and South American republics. I changed his views
as to the desirability of making the effort, but he wanted time
to think it over and promised to let me know his conclusions
later. Laughlin knows the Germans well, and he told me of
the difficulties of reaching the Emperor under right conditions....
'April 10, 1914: Mr. and Mrs. Irwin Laughlin lunched
with us. Laughlin and I went into my disarmament plan at
some length. I used him as a dummy, as it were, knowing he
would catch me if I tripped at any point. I discussed my
intentions thoroughly, and talked to him as I would talk to
the Kaiser were we to meet.
'After thinking of the matter overnight and hearing my
plans more in detail, Laughlin believes I should make the
effort....




THE GREAT ADVENTURE


247


'April 16, 1914: At half-past nine I left to go to the Borden
Harrimans' in order to meet the guests, since Mrs. Harriman
had told them I would do so. Prince Muinster, Prince Paul
Troubetskoy and his wife, Ambassador Dumba, General
Wood, and several others were there. I talked with Prince
Miinster for a while about the German Emperor, in order to
get more information about him....
'April 28, 1914: I spoke to the President about what I was
doing in regard to Germany and the Kaiser, and he remarked, "You are preparing to make the ground fallow."
I asked again whether he was certain that he wished me to
go at this particular time. He replied, "The object you have
in mind is too important to neglect."..
'May 7, 1914: Hugh Wallace saw Count von Bernstorff and
told him I was going to Germany on the sixteenth day of
May. Von Bernstorff said the German Foreign Office had
already informed him I was coming and had asked him to
give them a report upon me, which he had sent. He said he
intended sending another, which I thought was perhaps inspired by Wallace....'
Thus Colonel House set forth on his extraordinary mission, a private American citizen whose only relevant title
was 'personal friend of the President,' a single individual
hoping to pull the lever of common sense that might divert
the nations of the Old World from the track of war to that of
peace. To inject himself successfully into the core of the
European maelstrom demanded as much courage as diplomatic deftness. These qualities he possessed, as well as a
sense of proportion which caused him often to laugh at the
stark humor of the odds against him. But the stake for
which he played was tremendous. It was the peace of the
world. If he failed no harm was done. And if he succeeded-!
He called his mission the Great Adventure.




248 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


III
Colonel House to the President
AMERICAN EMBASSY
BERLIN, May 29, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I was fairly well informed as to the situation here when I
reached Germany. Prince Miinster and the Count von
Moltke were fellow passengers, and I came to know von
Moltke welli
Miinster is what we would call a reactionary, and I let
him do all the talking. Von Moltke, on the contrary, is
perhaps the only noble in Germany who has a detached point
of view and sees the situation as we do. He gave me valuable
information, which merely tended to confirm my opinion as
to the nearly impossible chance of bettering conditions.
I have not seen the Kaiser, but have been invited to lunch
at Potsdam on Monday. Just what opportunity there may
be to talk with him is an uncertainty....
I have had long talks with von Jagow, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Admiral von Tirpitz. Jagow is a clever
diplomat without much personality. Von Tirpitz is the
father of the greater navy and is forceful and aggressive.
Neither has ability of the highest order.
I was told not to talk to von Tirpitz, because of his wellknown opposition to such views as we hold; but, finding that
he is the most forceful man in Germany excepting the
Kaiser, I concluded to go at him. We had an extremely
interesting hour together, and I believe I made a dent. Not
a big one, but sufficient at least to start a discussion in London.
I am careful always not to involve you. Opinions and
1 This Count von Moltke was a nephew of the great Field Marshal and
a cousin of the German Chief of Staff during the invasion of Belgium and
France who was superseded by Falkenhayn after the failure of the German offensive.




TO THE PRESIDENT FROM BERLIN


249


purposes I give as my own, and you come in no further than
what may be assumed because of our relations.
The situation is extraordinary. It is militarism run stark
mad. Unless some one acting for you can bring about a
different understanding, there is some day to be an awful
cataclysm. No one in Europe can do it. There is too much
hatred, too many jealousies. Whenever England consents,
France and Russia will close in on Germany and Austria.
England does not want Germany wholly crushed, for she
would then have to reckon alone with her ancient enemy,
Russia; but if Germany insists upon an ever-increasing
navy, then England will have no choice.
The best chance for peace is an understanding between
England and Germany in regard to naval armaments, and yet
there is some disadvantage to us by these two getting too close.
It is an absorbing problem, and one of tremendous consequence. I wish it might be solved, and to the everlasting
glory of your Administration and our American civilization.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
What Colonel House soon realized was that in Germany
there was a sense of fear as well as aggressiveness, the fear of
the man tortured by uncertainty and ready to jump at the
throat of the first who seemed to move. Conscious of the
enmity which it had aroused, Germany kept its revolver
cocked and would let it off at the least whisper.
'May 27, 1914: I had insisted before coming [recorded
House] that we should not be entertained. There are only a
few people I desire to meet. However, the Gerards did not
literally follow our desires and we had several people every
day. On Tuesday they gave a dinner of twenty-four covers,
at which were Admiral von Tirpitz, Minister of Marine, von
Jagow, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Goschen, the




250 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


British Ambassador, and Count and Countess von Moltke,
who were invited at our request.
'Von Tirpitz and I left the dining-room together and we
stood in one of the drawing-rooms and talked for an hour.
He evidenced a decided dislike for the British, a dislike that
almost amounted to hatred. One of the things that amused
me most was his suggestion that the English "looked down
upon Germans and considered them their inferiors."
'Von Tirpitz spoke of the anti-German feeling in the
United States and cited our newspapers in evidence of it.
He also spoke of Admiral Mahan's articles which have a proBritish leaning. I assured him our newspapers did not indicate our real feeling, and asked him whether the press of
Germany represented the feeling of the Germans toward us.
He replied, "Not at all." He said the Government had
absolutely no control over the German newspapers, but in
England, he noticed, the English brought their papers around
to the Government point of view whenever the situation required it.
'I spoke of the courage and character of the President.
This I illustrated by different incidents —one being his
insistence in taking part in the funeral parade of the Vera
Cruz sailors, and another his refusal to be intimidated or
coerced into recognizing Huerta. I drew clearly the distinction between the President and Mr. Bryan. I wanted official
Germany to know that if any international complications
arose between our two countries, they would have to deal
with a man of iron courage and inflexible will.
'Von Tirpitz and I talked largely of armaments, I pleading
for a limitation in the interest of international peace and
he stating vigorously the necessity of Germany's maintaining
the highest possible order of military and naval organization.
He disclaimed any desire for conquest and insisted it was
peace that Germany wanted, but the way to maintain it was
to put fear into the hearts of her enemies.




TALK WITH VON TIRPITZ


251


'I pointed out the danger in this programme, for, while
Great Britain did not desire to see Germany crushed because
it would leave her to reckon alone with her ancient enemy,
Russia, at the same time she could not view with equanimity
the ever-increasing naval strength of Germany combined
with her large and efficient standing army. If it came to a
decision as to whether Germany should be crushed or be permitted to have a navy sufficient to overcome British supremacy at sea, their policy would clearly be to let Germany
go under.
'I thought an understanding could be brought about between Germany and England. He hoped so, but he did not
trust England, because the English were not "reliable."
Von Tirpitz was the most anti-English of any of the German
officials with whom I talked. I am giving my conversation
with him very fully, for it indicates the general trend of my
conversations with others.
'Among other things we did was to go to the Aviation
Field and see what they were doing in that direction. I
found it difficult to get any estimate of the ae-rial strength of
Germany. One of the airmen was brought up to the club by
the German Major in charge and introduced to us. He then
went up and did some spectacular flights for our benefit.
He came directly over our heads and looped the loop several
times. He performed all sorts of dangerous and curious
manoeuvres. I was glad when he came down, for I was afraid
his enthusiasm to please might result in his death. The
Major told me that thirty-six had already been killed on that
field.
'The airman was named Fokker, and he told me he was
a Dutchman and had recently come from Holland at the
request of the German Government.'
Thus was Colonel House, before the war, given a glimpse
of the aviator whose name was to become terribly familiar.




252 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


IV
Not without difficulty and the exercise of diplomatic
adroitness, Ambassador Gerard had arranged that House
should have a private talk with the Kaiser. Official Berlin
protested. The Foreign Office was perfectly willing that the
Colonel should receive the satisfaction of an interview, but
they insisted that some member of the civil Government
must be present. House was equally definite in his insistence
that it must be a tete-a-tete or nothing. 'If that is not possible,' he had written Gerard, 'then please do not bother
about it at all.' He wanted to be sure that the frankness of
the conversation should not be impeded by official red tape.
Later he wrote: 'It was a bluff on my part, but I declined to
see him unless it could be arranged that I could see him
alone.'
Whatever the magic influence may have been, and House
ascribes it to the diplomacy of Ambassador Gerardi the
bluff accomplished its purpose, and Gerard finally received
word that if he and House would come to Potsdam on June 1,
an occasion would be made for the latter to talk alone with
the Kaiser. On that day took place the ceremonies of the
Schrippenfest,(i)a gorgeous presentation of devotional militarism in the Prussian style, such as the Kaiser loved dearly.
1 House wrote later, 'I cannot state too strongly my appreciation of
the part the Ambassador played in finessing with Wilhelmstrasse in
order to bring about the desired result.'
2 The Schrippenfest, literally the 'White Roll Feast' (a Schrippe being a
roll of white bread), was held annually on Whit-Monday for the model
Battalion, in Potsdam. Traditionally it was the one occasion of the year
when the common soldier received white instead of black bread, and
when he was also treated to such luxuries as meat courses, stewed prunes,
and wine. The feast was given by the Kaiser, who invited foreign military and naval attaches, ambassadors, and distinguished strangers. It
was attended by the Kaiserin and the younger members of the imperial
family. The outstanding feature of the ceremony was the Kaiser's
presence at the table, sitting in the midst of his troops, eating their white
rolls, and drinking from a glass already used by one of the common soldiers.




ENTERTAINED BY THE KAISER


253


House and Gerard, in their black evening dress suits, provided a grotesque sombreness quite out of keeping with their
surroundings - 'like two black crows,' as the Kaiser himself
described them with more pungency than politeness.
'June 1, 1914: Gerard and I [recorded House] set forth for
Potsdam at half-past nine. We arrived too early and wandered about until nearly eleven, and then entered the Palace.
We found ourselves to be the only guests invited to the
Schrippenfest.
'We were taken through a beautiful sweep of rooms,
running across the park front, until we came to a side entrance. Here we waited a few minutes until the Kaiser was
announced. He came up and shook hands and passed out
with his suite into the park. We followed after the royal
party, which consisted of the Emperor, the Empress, and
the Princes and their wives. We were given a position near
the royal family.
'After religious exercises came the parade, then the decorations were given, and afterward we went across to the other
Palace, where the soldiers were having their lunch. During
this time I was largely with Herr Zimmermann, UnderSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Acting Secretary
while von Jagow is absent [on his honeymoon]. I found
him quite responsive to my ideas concerning a sympathetic
understanding between Great Britain, Germany, and the
United States. We discussed every phase of the present
European situation.
'We lunched in the famous Shell Hall ['probably the
ugliest room in the world,' remarked Gerard].1 The table
was crescent-shaped and was beautifully decorated. Gerard
and I were seated directly opposite the imperial party. On
my right was the Minister for War, General von Falken1 The walls of the room were composed of sea-shells which encrusted
the plaster.




254 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


hayn;1 the man to my left was some general from Saxony,
but I did not catch his name. The Emperor talked across
the table with our party, mostly with General von Falkenhayn.... The food was delicious and the meal not long,
perhaps fifty minutes....
'I had cautioned Gerard before coming to Berlin not to use
the title of "Colonel" when referring to me or when introducing me after I arrived. This did not serve my purpose,
for Bernstorff had cabled of my coming, so I became
"Colonel" immediately. Most of my time at luncheon was
used in explaining to my neighbors the kind of Colonel I
was- not a real one in the European sense, but, as we
would say in America, a geographical one. My explanation
finally reached Falkenhayn's consciousness, but my neighbor
from Saxony was hopelessly befuddled and continued until
the last to discuss army technique...
'Afterwards we adjourned to one of the larger drawingrooms, where I was presented to the Empress. We talked of
Corfu, the beauty of Germany in the spring, and other generalities. When this formality was over, the Kaiser's Aidede-Camp came to say that His Majesty was ready to receive
me on the terrace....
'I found that he had all the versatility of Roosevelt with
something more of charm, something less of force. He has
what to me is a disagreeable habit of bringing his face very
close to one when he talks most earnestly. His English is
clear and well chosen and, though he talks vehemently, yet
he is too much the gentleman to monopolize conversation. It
was give-and-take all the way through. He knew what he
wanted to say, so did I; and since we both talk rapidly, the
half-hour was quite sufficient.
'Gerard and Zimmermann stood in conversation some ten
Falkenhayn became later Chief of Staff and directed the German
offensive of 1916 against Verdun. Following the failure to take Verdun,
he was succeeded by Hindenburg.




CONVERSATION WITH THE KAISER


255


or fifteen feet away, quite out of hearing. At first I thought
I would never get His Majesty past his hobbies, but finally
I drew him to the subject I had come to discuss.... I found
him much less prejudiced and much less belligerent than von
Tirpitz. He declared he wanted peace because it seemed to
Germany's interest. Germany had been poor, she was now
growing rich, and a few more years of peace would make her
so. "She was menaced on every side. The bayonets of
Europe were directed at her," and much more of this he
gave me. Of England, he spoke kindly and admiringly.
England, America, and Germany were kindred peoples and
should draw closer together. Of other nations he had but
little opinion....
'He spoke of the folly of England forming an alliance with
the Latins and Slays, who had no sympathy with our ideals
and purposes and who were vacillating and unreliable as
allies. He spoke of them as being semi-barbarous, and of
England, Germany, and the United States as being the only
hope of advancing Christian civilization....
'I thought Russia was the greatest menace to England and
it was to England's advantage that Germany was in a position to hold Russia in check, and that Germany was the
barrier between Europe and the Slavs. I found no difficulty
in getting him to admit this.
'He spoke of the impossibility of Great Britain being able
to make a permanent and satisfactory alliance with either
Russia or France. I told him that the English were very
much concerned over his ever-growing navy, which taken
together with his enormous army constituted a menace; and
there might come a time when they would have to decide
whether they ran more danger from him and his people
making a successful invasion than they did from Russia, and
the possibility of losing their Asiatic colonies. I thought
when that point was reached, the decision would be against
Germany.




256 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'I spoke of the community of interests between England,
Germany, and the United States, and thought if they stood
together the peace of the world could be maintained. He
assented to this quite readily. However, in my opinion,
there could be no understanding between England and Germany so long as he continued to increase his navy. He replied that he must have a large navy in order to protect
Germany's commerce in an adequate way, and one commensurate with her growing power and importance. He also said
it was necessary to have a navy large enough to be able to
defend themselves against the combined efforts of Russia
and France'1
'I asked when he would reach the end of his naval programme. He said this was well known, since they had formulated a policy for building and, when that was completed,
there would be an end; that Great Britain had nothing to
fear from Germany, and that he personally was a friend of
England and was doing her incalculable service in holding
the balance of power against Russia.
'I told him that the President and I thought perhaps an
American might be able to better compose the difficulties
here and bring about an understanding with a view to peace
than any European, because of their distrust and dislike for
one another. He agreed to this suggestion. I had undertaken
the work and that was my reason for coming to Germany, as
I wanted to see him first. After leaving Germany it was my
1 In a memorandum made later, House recorded: 'I forgot to say that I
asked the Kaiser why Germany refused to sign the "Bryan treaty" providing for arbitration and a "cooling-off period" of a year before hostilities could be inaugurated. He replied: "Germany will never sign such a
treaty. Our strength lies in being always prepared for war at a second's
notice. We will not resign that advantage and give our enemies time to
prepare."'
Had Germany signed this treaty, it would not have been possible for
the United States to enter the war on the submarine issue until after the
lapse of a twelvemonth, except on the ground that German use of submarines constituted acts of war against the United States.




CONVERSATION WITH THE KAISER


257


purpose to go directly to England, where I should take the
matter up with that Government as I had done with him.
'I explained that I expected to feel my way cautiously
and see what could be accomplished, and, if he wished it, I
would keep him informed. He asked me to do this and said
letters would reach him "through our friend Zimmermann
here in the Foreign Office."...
'I talked to the Kaiser on the terrace for thirty minutes
and quite alone. Gerard and Zimmermann stood some ten
feet away. There was a special train scheduled to leave
Potsdam at three o'clock, and the time was growing perilously near and every one was becoming uneasy. The Empress herself came upon the terrace at one time for the purpose of breaking up our conversation, and, prior to that, she
had sent one of her sons for the same purpose. Neither, however, approached us, for they saw the earnest and animated
manner in which we were talking. She finally sent the Grand
Chamberlain, who approached in a halting and embarrassed
way, and told the Emperor of the difficulty. He scarcely
noticed him and dismissed him curtly and continued our
conversation for at least ten minutes more.
'By this time I had said all I cared to and was ready to
leave myself; therefore I stopped talking and was very quiet
in order to indicate that I, at least, was through. This had
the desired effect and we bade each other good-bye. Gerard
told me afterward that there was the greatest amount of
interest displayed concerning what the Kaiser and I were
discussing, and that all Berlin was talking of the episode and
wondering what the devil we had to say to each other for so
long and in such an animated way.'
v
Colonel House left for Paris in the evening that followed
his memorable interview with the Kaiser. He was evidently
well pleased with the reception that his plan had met, for




258 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


although the Emperor made no promises, he left House with
sufficient encouragement to proceed in taking up matters
with the British. "I am glad to tell you,' he wrote Wilson
from Paris, 'that I have been as successful as I anticipated.. I am very happy over what has been accomplished and
I am eager to get to London to see what can be done there.
I have a feeling that the soil will be much more fallow.'
What impressed House chiefly in Germany was not so much
a will to war based upon any definite plan, but an unreasoning nervousness which might at any moment result in a-reckless attack, and a complete inability to approach the problem
with intelligent poise and capacity for compromise.
'I find that both England and Germany [he wrote the
President] have one feeling in common, and that is fear of
one another. Neither wants to be the first to propose negotiations, but both are agreed that they should be brought
about, though neither desires to make the necessary concessions.'
In the meantime President Wilson, whose attitude toward
the European situation had originally been not far from indifferent, began to appreciate the possibilities of the Great
Adventure. He wrote House of the thrill of pleasure he experienced on receiving the Colonel's report and of his confidence that House had begun a great thing and was carrying
it through in just the right way with characteristic tact and
quietness.
In Paris discussions proved to be impossible. France was
caught by a Cabinet crisis and the capital would think of
nothing but the shooting of Calmette by Madame Caillaux
and all the political consequences thereof. Following his
custom when conditions seemed unpropitious, House retired
into his shell, whence for a few days he continued merely to
observe.




TALK WITH HERRICK IN PARIS


259


'June 8, 1914: I have spent a quiet week in Paris, my most
arduous duty being to dodge Americans and others wanting
to see me. We have had many invitations to dinner and
luncheon, all of which have been declined, although one
came from our Ambassador.
'I called on Herrick,l it having been understood that I
would do so when I was ready to talk with him. Mr. Roosevelt had been with him the day before, and he told me something of T. R.'s mental and physical activities. Herrick
made the prediction that T. R. was getting ready to go back
home and to give the Democrats a thoroughly unhappy
time. I replied that I was sure he could do nothing that would
distress us so much as it would his fellow Republicans.
'Herrick read passages from his forthcoming book upon
rural credits and told me that within a short time he would
have it finished and ready for publication. He would then
like to return to America...
'June 12, 1914 [London]: I came from Paris on the 9th.
I lunched with Page on the 10th and he lunched with me
yesterday, so we have had an exchange of ideas. He was kind
enough to say that he considered my work in Germany the
most important done in this generation. I thought before
making an estimate we would have to see how far I could get
with it here. He replied I would find this Government very
sympathetic and he felt a beginning was as good as accomplished. We decided to approach Sir Edward Grey first and
leave it to his judgment whether to bring in Asquith and the
King.... '
House arrived in London at the height of the season, and
there was no possibility of securing political results with
speed. Social affairs held sway, and it was not until a full
week after the Colonel's arrival that Ambassador Page could
find a free day for the lunch with Sir Edward. In the meanThe American Ambassador.




260 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


time House followed his habit of seeing people of interest
and information - chatting with Sir Horace Plunkett and
Lord Bryce, lunching at the Embassy with Roosevelt and
other notables, and meeting such varied types as Lord
Curzon and Henry James, the Bishop of London and John
Sargent, dining at Burdett-Coutts' palatial home in Piccadilly and discussing its art treasures and manuscripts, and
reckoning the wealth of nations with Sir George Paish, of
the Statist.
On June 17, House, Sir Edward Grey, Sir William Tyrrell,
and Page had lunch together. The Colonel told of his visit
to Germany and his proposition to the Kaiser.
'Sir Edward was visibly impressed [recorded Colonel
House], and we discussed every phase of the European situation, particularly as it applied to Germany and England.
He agreed with me that the French statesmen had given up
all idea of revenge and of the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, and that they would be content with the position of
France as it now is....
'We spoke of the difficulties of bringing about negotiations. I suggested that the Kaiser, he, and I meet at Kiel in
some way; but this was not gone into further.
'The relations between Russia and the British Empire
were talked of freely and with the utmost candor. Sir
Edward explained that Great Britain and Russia touched at
so many points in the world that it was essential for them to
have some sort of good understanding.
'I thought they should permit Germany to aid in the development of Persia. He said it might be a good move to
play the one against the other, and yet the Germans were so
aggressive it might be dangerous. Sir Edward was very fair
concerning the necessity for Germany to maintain a navy
commensurate with her commerce, and sufficient to protect
herself from Russia and France. I told of the militant war




I
I I V
------ -- -, — ---
-111-11-11-,.....
"m.







TALK WITH SIR E. GREY ON GERMANY 261


spirit in Germany and of the high tension of the people, and I
feared some spark might be fanned into a blaze. I thought
Germany would strike quickly when she moved; that there
would be no parley or discussion; that when she felt that a
difficulty could not be overcome by peaceful negotiation, she
would take no chances but would strike. I thought the Kaiser
himself and most of his immediate advisers did not want war,
because they wished Germany to expand commercially and
grow in wealth, but the army was militaristic and aggressive
and ready for war at any time.
'I told him there was a feeling in Germany, which I shared,
that the time had come when England could protect herself
no longer merely because of her isolated position; that modern inventions had so changed conditions that the Germans
believed she would be within striking distance before long,
just as were her Continental neighbors. Sir Edward replied,
"The idea, then, is that England will be in the same position
as the Continental Powers." I said, "Quite so."
'I gave my opinion of the German aerial strength and
what they might accomplish even now. I explained the part
we desired to play as pacificators and why I felt we could do
this better than they could do it themselves. I warned him
that the present Chancellor of Germany might go at any
time and be replaced by von Tirpitz, and a solution would
then be a much more difficult undertaking.
'I feel that my visit has been justified, even if nothing
more is done than that already accomplished. It is difficult
for me to realize that the dream I had last year is beginning
to come true. I have seen the Kaiser, and now the British
Government seem eager to carry on the discussion. It is
hard to realize, too, that every government in the world may
be more or less affected by the moves we are making and
every human being may be concerned in the decisions reached
from day to day.
'I told Sir Edward the Kaiser had said when his name was




262 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


mentioned that he, Sir Edward, had never been on the Continent and therefore could not understand Germany. Sir
Edward replied that while this was not literally true, it was
nearly so; a great many years ago he went to India and
crossed the Continent of Europe, though practically without
stopping, and the other day he was in Paris with the King
for several days.'
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, June 17, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:... I found Sir Edward a willing listener and very frank
and sympathetic. I am to stay the week-end with Tyrrell,
and lunch with Sir Edward next Wednesday. In the meantime he will doubtless discuss the matter with his colleagues....
I find here everything cluttered up with social affairs, and
it is impossible to work quickly. Here they have their
thoughts on Ascot, garden parties, etc., etc. In Germany
their one thought is to advance industrially and to glorify
war. In France I did not find the war spirit dominant. Their
statesmen dream no longer of revenge and the recovery of
Alsace and Lorraine. The people do, but those that govern
and know, hope only that France may continue as now.
Germany already exceeds her in population by nearly fifty
per cent, and the disparity increases year by year. It is this
new spirit in France which fills me with hope, and which I
used to-day to some advantage. France, I am sure, will
welcome our efforts for peace.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. HOUSE




LUNCHEON WITH SIR EDWARD GREY 263


LONDON, June 26, 1914
MY DEAR FRIEND:
I had a very interesting luncheon with Sir Edward Grey
Wednesday. The other guests were the Lord Chancellori
the Earl of Crewe, and Sir William Tyrrell. Page had to go
to Oxford to take his degree and could not be with us.
I did not go into the details of my trip to Germany again,
for I took it for granted that Sir Edward had given them to
both Haldane and Crewe.
I gave it as my opinion that international matters could
be worked out to advantage in much the same way as individuals would work out private affairs, and I thought that
most of the misunderstandings were brought about by false
reports and mischief-makers, and if the principals knew of
the facts, what appeared to be a difficult situation became
easy of solution.
I illustrated this by mentioning the service Sir William
Tyrrell performed in America last autumn and the consequent cordial relations between our two countries.
The conversation lasted two hours, and it was agreed that
it should be renewed at a later date. In the meantime, the
general idea was accepted; that is, that a frank and open
policy should be pursued between all the parties at interest.
They told me that there was no written agreement between England, France, and Russia, and their understanding
was one merely of sympathy and the determination to conserve the interests of one another....
Sir Edward was in a most delightful mood and paid you a
splendid tribute. At our last meeting, he said it was his
purpose, at the proper time, in the House of Commons to say
publicly what he thought you had done for international
morals.2
I breakfasted with Lloyd George yesterday and had a
1 Lord Haldane.
2 A reference to the repeal of the Panama tolls exemption.




264 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


most interesting conversation with him. I found him peculiarly ill-informed regarding America and its institutions. I
will tell you more of this when we meet.
I am lunching with the Prime Minister on Thursday of
next week, and I will write you again when anything further
of importance follows....
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
House not merely emphasized the negative aspect of the
problem, the necessity of removing the factors that threatened war in Europe, but also urged the importance of a positive policy of international cooperation with a constructive
purpose. It was the same plan he had discussed with Page
and Bernstorff, a plan designed to bring the Great Powers of
the world into a general undertaking for the development and
protection of the backward regions of the world, and it contained the germ of the mandatary scheme later worked out
in the League of Nations. He suggested the plan one cool
evening as he sat with Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and Sir William
Tyrrell before the open fire in Tyrrell's country home.
Spring-Rice and Tyrrell approved, and House carried his
plan to Grey.
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, June 26, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
There is another matter I have taken up, which I hope may
have your approval. I have suggested that America, England, France, Germany, and the other money-lending and
developing nations, have some sort of tentative understanding among themselves for the purpose of establishing a plan
by which investors on the one hand may be encouraged to
lend money at reasonable rates and to develop, under favorable terms, the waste places of the earth, and on the other




A CAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL FRICTION 265


hand to bring about conditions by which such loans may be
reasonably safe.
I suggested that each of these countries should tell its
people that in the future usurious interest and concessions
which involve the undoing of weak and debt-involved
countries would no longer be countenanced; that the
same rule must hereafter prevail in such investments as is
now maintained in all civilized lands in regard to private
loans.
I brought this matter up at luncheon on Wednesday, and
Grey, Haldane, and Crewe were equally cordial in their discussion of it. I told them I wanted to get their views so that
they might be laid before you when I returned.
If this can be brought about, it will not only do away with
much of the international friction which such things cause,
but it will be a step forward towards bringing about a stable
and healthful condition in those unhappy countries which are
now misgoverned and exploited both at home and abroad.
Your faithful and devoted
E. M. HOUSE
When Colonel House put a project before President Wilson,
he did not expect affirmative commendation. He evidently
took the President's silence for consent, for, as he once said,
'If the President did not object, I knew that it was safe to go
ahead, for he rarely agreed in words; while if he disagreed,
he always expressed himself.' With House the opposite was
true; we find many phrases, in his memoranda, such as 'I
showed by my silence that I did not agree.'
In the present case, receiving no dissenting cable from
Wilson, the Colonel proceeded to elaborate his plan. On
July 3 he gathered the American Ambassadors to St. James's
and Italy, the British Ambassador to the United States, and
Sir William Tyrrell. Spring-Rice had prepared a memorandum for Sir Edward Grey, giving the main points of House's




266 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


proposal, so that the Foreign Office might be fully informed
of its bearing.
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, July 4, 1914
MY DEAR FRIEND:... Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, Sir William Tyrrell, Walter
Page, and Thomas Nelson Page, who is now here, took lunch
with me yesterday to go into a more detailed discussion....
Tyrrell told me that Sir Edward Grey was deeply interested [in the suggestion] and approved entirely its general
purpose, and that you could count upon this Government's
cooperation.
It was the general consensus of opinion that a great deal
of friction in the future would be obviated if some such
understanding could be brought about in this direction, and
that it would do as much as any other one thing to ensure
international amity.
The idea, of course, is based entirely upon your Mobile
speech, and it is merely that we are trying to mould something concrete from what you have already announced in
general as your policy. I suggested that it would be well to
keep the matter absolutely confidential until after I had
talked it out with you and you had decided how best to
bring all the other Governments into agreement, if at all. I
do not think it wise to have it known that England was the
first to accept the proposal.
Tyrrell thought that after we had worked out a plan here
which was acceptable to this Government, I could take it to
you for your approval and further suggestion. You could
then, if your judgment approved, take it to the other Governments through Jusserand - ostensibly because he is the
dean of the Diplomatic Corps at Washington, but really because the Central and South American republics would feel
more kindly towards a proposal coming from a Latin nation.




PLAN FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 267


Tyrrell, Spring-Rice, and I meet again on Wednesday to
bring the matter into final form. Page may or may not be
present. I think perhaps he had better not be, for the reason
that it would lend something of an official character to it,
which we wish to avoid.
I touched lightly upon this subject to the Kaiser and I
feel sure he, too, will approve. This was fortunate, for the
reason that it can be said it was brought to his attention
first.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. HouSE
P.S. As Page puts it, this is a concrete example of what
may be accomplished if a better international understanding
can be brought about.
Sir Edward Grey's personal response to the suggestions of
House was enthusiastic, for he was as sincerely anxious to do
all that lay in his power to convince Germany of the peaceful
intentions of the British, as he was to lay the foundations for
a permanent system of international cooperation. He may
or may not have realized that quick action was desirable.
Unfortunately quick action did not seem possible. He had to
consider the sensibilities of the French and Russians, and
Tyrrell reported to House that Grey was meditating methods
of coming into touch with the Germans without offending
the other members of the Entente. Such were the vices of
the pre-war system of alliances which made impossible
straightforward conversations. Grey was evidently not willing to go to Kiel as House had suggested. Furthermore, the
major interest of the Cabinet lay in the Irish crisis, and it
was difficult to persuade them that the international situation demanded immediate attention if the explosion were to
be prevented.
House chafed at the delay, but philosophically continued




268 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


his round of social engagements which might later be turned
to diplomatic advantage. Sidney Brooks, of the Times,
asked him whether he wished to meet 'politicians or gentlemen,' and it was with him that House breakfasted with
Lloyd George.
'June 25, 1914: Sidney Brooks called at nine o'clock this
morning [recorded House], and we went to the Chancellor of
the Exchequer's for breakfast. We were a trifle late and
Lloyd George was waiting for me. There were also at breakfast Governor Clifford of the Gold Coast country, and Lloyd
George's daughter. It was a most informal affair, each of us
going to a side table and helping himself to whatever desired,
as is the usual English custom. The choice of food consisted
of fried sole, sausage, ham, eggs, fruit, coffee and tea.
George ate a very hearty breakfast....'
A week later he lunched with the Prime Minister and Mrs.
Asquith.
'July 2, 1914: After the ladies left the table, Asquith
asked me to come and sit by him so that we might talk,
which we did earnestly for fifteen or twenty minutes. I did
nearly all the talking. We first discussed the merits of
Cabinet officers sitting in Parliament or Congress, as the
case may be.... I expressed the feeling that it was better
they should have seats, and he also was inclined to this
view.... I felt very much at home in London now, for the
reason that his Government was being abused in exactly the
same terms and by the same sort of people as were abusing
the Wilson Administration in the United States. This
amused him. I thought the purposes of the Liberal Government and of the Democratic Party were quite similar; that
we were striving for the same end, but if the Conservatives
of the two countries had their way, the end would probably




THE SERAJEVO ASSASSINATION


269


be that many of them would be stripped of their wealth and
hanged to lamp-posts. He agreed to this.
'Mr. Asquith cast the usual slur upon Mr. Bryan. I explained why the President had taken him into his Cabinet.
He understood that the President had acted wisely and yet
he considered it extremely unfortunate that the necessity
existed. This is the usual comment I hear everywhere, in
Germany, in France, and here. They do not do Mr. Bryan
justice, but it is absolutely useless to fight his battles, because in doing so you discredit the purpose you are striving
for.'
VI
While House waited for Grey to give some definite word
which he might pass on to the Kaiser, the spark was struck
that ignited the pile of combustible material which the diplomatic conflict of a decade had heaped up. On June 28, the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the AustroHungarian throne, was murdered by a Serb nationalist in
Serajevo, chief city of Bosnia. Presumably few Englishmen
had ever heard of the Archduke and fewer still could locate
the provincial capital on a map, yet such was the diplomatic
net in which Europe was caught that within six weeks
British soldiers were meeting death on the Belgian border.
The news of the Archduke's assassination reached London
at the height of the Irish crisis and the feminist agitation,
and it created no more audible effect than a tenor solo in a
boiler-shop. Some days later the Foreign Secretary expressed
a sense of anxiety as to the situation in Southeastern Europe,
but domestic politics continued to hold the attention of the
Cabinet. In Berlin the danger of a political crisis was openly
discussed in the papers, and privately the sanction of the
German Government was given to Austria for any retaliatory and repressive measures that Vienna might choose to
put into effect against Serbia. But apparently there was




270 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


little suspicion that the carte blanche so carelessly vouchsafed
would end in world war and the destruction of the Empire.
The higher officials of the army and navy were not recalled to
Berlin; the Foreign Secretary remained on his honeymoon;
plans for the Kaiser's cruise were not interrupted. Ambassador Gerard wrote cheerfully to House of his return to the
United States in August.
Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House
BERLIN, July 7, 1914
MY DEAR COLONEL:... Have been on A.'s yacht at Kiel, and Mrs. Gerard is
still there. I came up for our Colony celebration of the 4th
of July.
/  Dined with the Kaiser and lunched with von Tirpitz before
the news of the murder of Franz Ferdinand came. They
were both most enthusiastic about you. Von Tirpitz
thanked me for giving him the opportunity to meet you.
We have about decided to go to U.S.A., sailing August 12th
on Vaterland - and I shall certainly report to you, wherever
you are, before my return.
Kaiser had asked me to sail a race on his racing yacht with
him at Kiel, but the murder in Bosnia prevented my thus
spending a day with him.
Tennis is responsible for this almost illegible handwriting.
When do you sail?...
Berlin is as quiet as the grave....
Yours ever
JAMES W. GERARD
What more sinister, in the light of after events, than the
last sentence: 'Berlin is as quiet as the grave.' It was the
eve of Armageddon.
Ironically enough, precisely at this moment when Austria




BRITISH MESSAGES TO THE KAISER 271


planned her attack upon Serbia, and Germany blindly approved, while the wheels of war were already being geared,
the British Foreign Office made definite albeit rather belated
response to the suggestions of House. On July 3 the Colonel
heard from Tyrrell that Grey wanted him to let the Kaiser
know of the peaceable sentiments of the British in order that
further negotiations might follow. House at once wrote a
long letter to His Imperial Majesty.
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, July 3, 1914
MY DEAR FRIEND:... Tyrrell brought word to me to-day that Sir Edward
Grey would like me to convey to the Kaiser the impressions
I have obtained from my several discussions with this Government, in regard to a better understanding between the
nations of Europe, and to try and get a reply before I leave.
Sir Edward said he did not wish to send anything official or
in writing, for fear of offending French and Russian sensibilities in the event it should become known. He thought it
was one of those things that had best be done informally
and unofficially.
He also told Page that he had a long talk with the German
Ambassador here in regard to the matter and that he had
sent messages by him directly to the Kaiser.
So you see things are moving in the right direction as
rapidly as we could hope.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. HOUSE




272 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to the Kaiser
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON, July 7, 1914
His Imperial Majesty,
Emperor of Germany? King of Prussia,
Berlin, Germany.
SIR:
Your Imperial Majesty will doubtless recall our conversation at Potsdam and that with the President's consent and
approval I came to Europe for the purpose of ascertaining
whether or not it was possible to bring about a better understanding between the Great Powers, to the end that there
might be a continuation of peace, and later a beneficent
economic readjustment, which a lessening of armaments
would ensure.
Because of the commanding position Your Majesty occupies, and because of your well-known desire to maintain
peace, I came, as Your Majesty knows, directly to Berlin.
I can never forget the gracious acceptance of the general
purpose of my mission, the masterly exposition of the worldwide political conditions as they exist to-day, and the prophetic forecast as to the future which Your Majesty then
made.
I received every reasonable assurance of Your Majesty's
cordial approval of the President's purpose, and I left Germany happy in the belief that Your Majesty's great influence
would be thrown in behalf of peace and the broadening of
the world's commerce.
In France I tried to reach the thoughts of her people in
regard to Germany and to find what hopes she nursed. My
1 The Kaiser was 'German Emperor' and not 'Emperor of Germany.'
He always aspired to the latter title, which the jealousy of the German
Princes forbade. Is this unconscious or intentional flattery on the part of
Colonel House? On the copy of the letter is an endorsement in House's
handwriting: 'I wrote this letter and submitted it to Irwin Laughlin,
Counsellor of the Embassy, and he advised its stilted style, which I very
much dislike. E. M. H.'




LETTER TO THE KAISER


273


conclusion upon leaving was that her statesmen have given
over all thought of revenge, or of recovery of the two lost
provinces. Her people in general still have hopes in both
directions, but her better-informed rulers would be quite
content if France could be sure of her autonomy as it now
exists.
It was then, Sir, that I came to England and with high
hopes, in which I have not been disappointed.
I first approached Sir Edward Grey, and I found him sympathetic to the last degree. After a two hours' conference,
we parted with the understanding that we should meet
again within a few days. This I inferred to mean that he
wished to consult with the Prime Minister and his colleagues.
At our next conference, which again lasted for two hours,
he had, to meet me, the Lord Chancellor, Earl Crewe, and
Sir William Tyrrell. Since then I have met the Prime
Minister and practically every important member of the
British Government, and I am convinced that they desire
such an understanding as will lay the foundation for permanent peace and security.
England must necessarily move cautiously, lest she offend
the sensibilities of France and Russia; but, with the changing
sentiment in France, there should be a gradual improvement
of relations between Germany and that country which England will now be glad to foster.
While much has been accomplished, yet there is something still to be desired in order that there may be a better
medium created for an easy and frank exchange of thought
and purposes. No one knows better than Your Majesty of
the unusual ferment that is now going on throughout the
world, and no one is in so fortunate a position to bring about
a sane and reasonable understanding among the statesmen
of the Western peoples, to the end that our civilization may
continue uninterrupted.
While this communication is, as Your Majesty knows,




274 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


quite unofficial, yet it is written in sympathy with the wellknown views of the President, and, I am given to understand, with the hope from His Britannic Majesty's Government that it may bring a response from Your Majesty which
may permit another step forward.
Permit me, Sir, to conclude by quoting a sentence from a
letter which has come to me from the President:
'Your letter from Paris, written just after coming from
Berlin, gives me a thrill of deep pleasure. You have, I hope
and believe, begun a great thing and I rejoice with all my
heart.'
I have the honor to be, Sir, with the greatest respect,
Your Majesty's
Very obedient servant,
EDWARD M. HOUSE
Thus was a last opportunity given to the Kaiser, who had
the assurance of a disinterested outsider that if Germany
sincerely desired peace she would have the active assistance
of the United States and the cooperation of Great Britain.
It was a definite answer to the allegation that Grey's policy
aimed at the encirclement and isolation of the Germans.
Alas! By the time Colonel House's letter reached Germany,
Wilhelm II was already on his cruise in Norwegian waters
whence he was recalled by the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia
and the war-clouds that immediately gathered.
The Great Adventure had ended in failure. But House's
attempt to prevent the war was perhaps less barren of
consequences than superficial consideration would suggest.
His experience during these months in Europe that ended
with the sudden descent of the horror he feared, taught him
the need of international organization and confirmed his
belief in the necessity of some positive purpose to be followed
by this organization. He was already, in essence, an advocate
of a league of nations, and his influence with Wilson in this




A CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT 275


respect was to be an historical factor of vital importance.
Among House's papers there is a significant memorandum
which he made of a conversation with the President soon
after the beginning of the war.
'August 30, 1914: I explained my plan about the backward nations and how enthusiastically it was received by the
British Government, and how much they thought it would
do toward bringing about a better understanding between
the Great Powers. I believed if we had had an opportunity
to put this into effect, in all human probability such a war
as this would not have occurred - because with the Powers
meeting at regular intervals, and with such a concrete example of the good that might be accomplished by concerted
action, a conflagration such as was now going on would have
been impossible.'
NOTE. - '" The visit of Colonel House to Berlin and London in the
spring of 1914," Emperor William remarked to me at Doom, "almost
prevented the World War."' - GEORGE SYLVESTER VIERECK.




CHAPTER X
WILSON AND THE WAR
He [Wilson] goes even further than I in his condemnation of Germany's
part in this war....
Extract from Diary of Colonel House, August 30, 1914
I
COLONEL HOUSE sailed on July 21 and arrived in Boston
eight days later. Immediately before he left, word was carried to him that the British Foreign Office had awakened to
the serious character of the international situation.
'July 20, 1914: Tyrrell brought me another message from
Sir Edward Grey, which was to the effect that he wished me
to know before I sailed that the Austro-Serbian situation was
giving him grave concern.'
The forebodings which the Colonel had experienced in
Berlin were indeed in process of realization. On July 23,
Austria sent to Serbia an ultimatum designed to provoke
war, and five days later, brushing aside the Serbian reply as
unsatisfactory, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The
civil rulers of Germany appreciated suddenly the peril of the
path down which they were being dragged by their Austrian
ally and their own military clique; stupidly, they refused to
accept the conference suggested by Grey, which would have
permitted a cooling-off period; and as the crisis intensified
with the mobilization of Russia in support of Serbia, the army
leaders seized control at Berlin. As House had prophesied,
they wasted no time but struck immediately. Diplomatic
and military complexities produced this paradox: that a
Russo-German war set in motion by an Austro-Serbian




BRITISH DELIBERATION


277


quarrel must begin with a German attack upon France,
prefaced by the cynical and brutal onslaught upon Belgium.
Great Britain, committed to the defence of Belgium by legal,
and to that of France by moral, engagements, impelled by
her own national interest, could not stand aside. It was the
general war.
House reached Boston and went up to the North Shore
while the issue of the crisis was yet undetermined. He still
hoped that the assurances he had sent William II of British
good feeling might strengthen the Kaiser's peaceful inclination, and that England and Germany might work together
for a pacific solution, as they had in 1913. If only the British
had been less deliberate in their consideration of House's
proposals, an understanding might have been reached before
the murder of the Archduke.
Colonel House to the President
PRIDE'S CROSSING, MASSACHUSETTS
July 31, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
When I was in Germany, it seemed clear to me that the
situation, as far as a continuation of peace was concerned,
was in a very precarious condition; and you will recall my
first letter to you telling of the high tension that Germany
and southern Europe were under.
I tried to convey this feeling to Sir Edward Grey and other
members of the British Government. They seemed astonished at my pessimistic view and thought that conditions
were better than they had been for a long time. While I
shook their confidence, at the same time I did not do it
sufficiently to make them feel that quick action was necessary; consequently they let matters drag until after the
Kaiser had gone into Norwegian waters for his vacation,
before giving me any definite word to send to him.
It was my purpose to go back to Germany and see the




278 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Emperor, but the conservative delay of Sir Edward and his
confreres made that impossible.
The night before I sailed, Sir Edward sent me word that he
was worried over conditions, but he did not anticipate what
has followed. I have a feeling that if a general war is finally
averted, it will be because of the better feeling that has been
brought about between England and Germany. England is
exerting a restraining hand upon France and, as far as
possible, upon Russia; but her influence with the latter is
slight.
If the matter could have been pushed a little further, Germany would have laid a heavy hand upon Austria and
possibly peace could have been continued until a better
understanding could have been brought about.
Russia has a feeling, so I was told in England, that Germany was trying to project Austrian and German influence
deep into the Balkan States in order to check her. She has
evidently been preparing for some decisive action since the
Kaiser threw several hundred thousand German troops
on his eastern frontier two years ago, thereby compelling
Russia to relinquish the demands that she had made in regard to a settlement of Balkan matters....
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
PRIDE'S CROSSING, MASSACHUSETTS
August 1, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
There are one or two things that would perhaps be of
interest to you at this time and which I shall tell you now and
not wait until I see you.
Sir Edward Grey told me that England had no written
agreement with either Russia or France, or any formal
alliance; that the situation was brought about by a mutual
desire for protection and that they discussed international




THE WAR BEGINS


279


matters with as much freedom with one another as if they
had an actual written alliance...
The great danger is that some overt act may occur which
will get the situation out of control. Germany is exceedingly
nervous and at high tension, and she knows that her best
chance of success is to strike quickly and hard; therefore
her very alarm might cause her to precipitate action as a
means of safety.
Please let me suggest that you do not let Mr. Bryan make
any overtures to any of the Powers involved. They look upon
him as absolutely visionary, and it would lessen the weight
of your influence if you desire to use it yourself later....
If I thought I could live through the heat, I would go to
Washington to see you; but I am afraid if I reached there, I
would be utterly helpless. I wish you could get time to take
the Mayflower and cruise for a few days in these waters so
that I might join you.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
Even as House was writing these letters, the act which he
feared took place. Assailed by technical arguments which he
could not controvert, the Chancellor was carried away by
the military influence and threw up his hands. Germany despatched to Russia the ultimatum that made war inevitable
and flung into Belgium the vanguard of the army designed
to conquer France.
Herr Zimmermann to Colonel House
BERLIN, August 1, 1914
MY DEAR COLONEL:
I beg to inform you that I laid the letter which you addressed to His Majesty the Emperor from London before
His Majesty. I am directed to convey to you His Majesty's
sincere thanks.




280 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


The Emperor took note of its content with the greatest
interest. Alas, all His strong and sincere efforts to conserve
peace have entirely failed. I am afraid that Russia's procedure will force the old world and especially my country in
the most terrible war! There is no chance now to discuss the
possibility of an understanding, so much desired, which would
lay the foundation for permanent peace and security.
With assurances of my high regard, I remain, my dear
Colonel,
Sincerely yours
ZIMMERMANN
From Ambassador Page in London there came a veiled but
emphatic reference to the efforts which House had made to
prevent the war. Mr. Page issued the following announcement to the press:
'One thing I want to make clear that a great many people
have talked to me about. Many seem to have the impression
that the United States missed a great opportunity. The
United States did everything possible to avert war. If ever
a job was done right up to the hilt, it was that.'
On the other hand, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British
Ambassador in Washington, went so far as to intimate that,
while it was the information that House brought from Berlin
which had opened Grey's eyes to the seriousness of the situation, the Colonel's endeavors might have been one of the
causes which precipitated that crisis. 'You came so near
making a general war impossible,' he told House, 'that the
war party in Berlin and Vienna became alarmed. They
probably knew why you were in Berlin and what you said
to the Kaiser. They also probably knew why you went to
England, and they undoubtedly knew the contents of your
letter to the Kaiser. That, together with Sir Edward Grey's




MEMORANDUM ON THE CAUSE OF THE WAR 281


conversations with the German Ambassador in London,
alarmed the war party and they took advantage of the
Archduke's murder and the Kaiser's absence to precipitate
matters, believing they were coming to the end of the passage
and that it was now or never.'
The hypothesis is interesting, not entirely conclusive.
Eight months afterwards House made a private memorandum, the gist of which accords in general with the opinions
of later historians who were able to study the German official
documents.
'April 15, 1915: I am often asked my views as to the cause
of the war [he wrote], and, while I never give them, I might
as well record them here.
'It is clear to me that the Kaiser did not want war and did
not actually expect it. He foolishly permitted Austria to
bring about an acute controversy with Serbia, and he concluded that by standing firm with his ally, Russia would do
nothing more than make a vigorous protest, much as she did
when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rattling of the scabbard and the shining armor were sufficient in
that case and he thought they would be in this, for the reason
that he did not believe Great Britain would go to war concerning such a happening in the Southeast. He had tried
England twice in the West and had found that he himself
must give way, and there was not much danger of his trying
it again where England was involved. But in this instance he
thought Germany's relations with England had improved to
such an extent that she would not back Russia and France
to the extent of making war on Germany.
'And he went so far in what might be termed "bluff"
that it was impossible at the last-moment to recede because
the situation had gotten beyond him. He did not have the
foresight to see the consequences, neither did he have the
foresight to see that the building up of a great war machine




282 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


must inevitably lead to war. Germany has been in the hands
of a group of militarists and financiers, and it has been to
conserve their selfish interests that this terrible situation has
been made possible.'
II
Wilson had to meet the political crisis at a moment when
he was overwhelmed with domestic trouble, for his wife was
at the point of death. 'His burdens are heavier than any
President's since Lincoln,' wrote House to Page on August 6.
'He has grown enormously in popularity within the last ten
days and there is scarcely a dissenting note throughout the
country. I believe he will live in history as one of the greatest Presidents, if not the greatest, that this country has
brought forth.'
Such eulogistic phrases must have been inspired by
House's general feeling of admiration for the President
rather than by what he did in the crisis, for there was little
he could do. Urged by the Senate resolution and against
House's judgment, Wilson issued a formal appeal to the
belligerents, offering his services in the cause of mediation.
But it was, as might have been expected, without effect.
Colonel House to the President
PRIDE'S CROSSING, MASSACHUSETTS
August 5, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:... If a statement is made, let me suggest that you make
it clear that what you have done was at your own instance.
If the public either here or in Europe thought that Mr. Bryan
instigated it, they would conclude it was done in an impracticable way and was doomed to failure from the start.
I hate to harp upon Mr. Bryan, but you cannot know as I
do how he is thought of in this connection. You and I understand better and know that the grossest sort of injustice is




THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER OF MEDIATION 283


done him. Nevertheless, just now it is impossible to make
people think differently.
It may interest you to hear that Olney expressed regret
that he did not accept your tender of the Ambassadorship to
London. He said he had no idea it would mean anything
more than social activity.
My heart is full of deep appreciation for your letter of
August 3. I never worry when I do not hear from you. No
human agency could make me doubt your friendship and
affection. That my life is devoted entirely to your interests,
I believe you know, and I never cease from trying to serve
you.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
The President's offer of mediation was merely an expression of willingness to act. As sent to the monarchs of the
belligerent Powers, it read:
SIR:
As official head of one of the Powers signatory to the
Hague Convention, I feel it to be my privilege and my duty
under Article 3 of the Convention to say to Your Majesty
in a spirit of most earnest friendship, that I should welcome
an opportunity to act in the interest of European peace
either now or at any time that might be thought more suitable as an occasion, to serve Your Majesty and all concerned
in a way that would afford me lasting cause for gratitude and
happiness.
WOODROW WILSON
A fortnight after this offer, President Wilson issued an
appeal to the citizens of the Republic, requesting their assistance in maintaining a state of neutrality. It was later
to draw upon the President the virulent attacks of pro



284 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Entente elements, especially on the Atlantic seaboard, but
at the moment, as Colonel House indicates, general articulate
opinion seemed to approve it heartily. Wilson based the
appeal, not upon indifference to the war, but upon the danger
that might arise for the United States if factions should take
form supporting the one or the other of the belligerent
groups.
'It will be easy to excite passion [said the President], and
difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will
assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for no less a
thing than that the people of the United States, whose love
of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should
unite them as Americans all, bound in honor to think first of
her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile
opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in
impulse and opinion if not in action.... Every man who
really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of
neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness
and friendliness to all concerned.'
Colonel House to the President
PRIDE'S CROSSING, MASSACHUSETTS
August 22, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
Thinking that I might see you soon has caused me to hope
that I might tell you in person of how splendidly I think you
are meeting the difficult situations that come to you day by
day.
Your Address on Neutrality is one of the finest things you
have ever done, and it has met with universal approbation.
Every day editorials of the Republican press speak of you as
if you were of their party instead of being the idol of ours.
The food investigation, the shipping bill, the war risk
insurance bill, and everything else that you are doing give




NEUTRALITY OF THE UNITED STATES 285
the entire nation cause for constant congratulation that you
are at the helm and serving it as no other man could.
Of course the war continues to be a most disturbing and
uncertain element. I am sorry that Japan injected herself
into the general melee, for it will place an additional strain
upon us not to become involved.
The saddest feature of the situation to me is that there is
no good outcome to look forward to. If the Allies win, it
means largely the domination of Russia on the Continent of
Europe; and if Germany wins, it means the unspeakable
tyranny of militarism for generations to come.
Fundamentally the Germans are playing a role that is
against their natural instincts and inclinations, and it shows
how perverted men may become by habit and environment.
Germany's success will ultimately mean trouble for us.
We will have to abandon the path which you are blazing as
a standard for future generations, with permanent peace as
its goal and a new international ethical code as its guiding
star, and build up a military machine of vast proportions.
Your faithful and affectionate


t  ' )


E. M. HOUSE  7. rf`


President Wilson was harshly criticized in the following
year for not having adopted a more positive policy at this
time. As signatory to the Hague Convention, his critics
averred, the United States should have protested against the
German invasion of Belgium and the President should have
made plain that in sympathy, at least, the country stood on
the side of the Entente Allies. Such criticism disregards the
fact that the opinion of the whole country was by no means
crystallized at this time, and that the issuance of protests or
expressions of sympathy would be worse than futile, unless
the Government intended to abandon its attitude of neutrality.
Few persons dared to suggest at that time that the United






286 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


States should enter the war. Theodore Roosevelt, who was
to become one of the most outspoken of those who later
demanded participation, writing in the Outlook, congratulated the country on the separation from Europe which permitted its neutrality~I Ambassador Page, who himself a few
months later insisted that the United States must break
relations with Germany, wrote to House on August 28,
1914: '... What a magnificent spectacle our country presents! We escape murder, we escape brutalization; we will
have to settle it; we gain in every way.' And the British
Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, wrote to the Colonel on
September 12, 'I hope and believe that at any rate one part
of the world will keep out of it.'
One of the rare Americans who at the moment had the
courage to suggest that the United States should adopt a
positive policy in order to ensure the defeat of Germany, was
President Charles W. Eliot. His suggestion is the more
interesting in that Dr. Eliot displayed then, as always, a
mental poise which prevented him from criticizing Wilson
when the latter refused to take action. Eliot admitted that
neither he nor any American could know enough of the
facts to insist upon the course he first advised, and he also
admitted that Wilson could not be sure that public opinion
in the United States would support positive action. It even
appears that Eliot himself, after second thought, reached the
same conclusion as.the President.
The historian may well ask, however, whether the policy
first advised by Dr. Eliot would not have shortened the war
1 'Our country stands well-nigh alone among the great civilized Powers
in being unshaken by the present world-wide war. For this we should be
humbly and profoundly grateful. All of us on this continent ought to
appreciate how fortunate we are that we of the Western world have been
free from the working of the causes which have produced the bitter and
vindictive hatred among the great military Powers of the Old World.....
It is certainly eminently desirable that we should remain entirely neutral
and nothing but urgent need would warrant breaking our neutrality and
taking sides one way or the other.' - Outlook, September 23, 1914.




DR. ELIOT TO THE PRESIDENT


287


by many months and perhaps have saved the need of an
American expeditionary force. Would it not also have been
a direct step toward a league of nations? President Wilson
was so far impressed by his arguments that he read the
earlier letter to his Cabinet and discussed the suggestion
carefully with House. He wrote to Eliot, however, that he
did not regard it as practicable.
Dr. Eliot to the President
AsTIcoU, MAINE, August 8, 1914
DEAR PRESIDENT WILSON:
I have hesitated three days to mail the enclosed letter to
you, and should still hesitate to forward it while you are
overwhelmed with sorrow, did I not recall that under such
circumstances there is comfort and relief for the sufferer in
resolving that he will thereafter do everything in his power
to help other people who are suffering or bereaved.
At this moment millions of men are apprehending death
or agonies for themselves or poverty and desolation for their
families, and millions of women are dreading the loss of
lovers, supporters, and friends; and perhaps you have the
power to do something to stop these miseries and prevent
their recurrence.
In such an effort you would find real consolation.
With deepest sympathy in your affliction, I am
Sincerely yours
CHARLES W. ELIOT
ASTICOU, MAINE, August 6, 1914
DEAR PRESIDENT WILSON:
Has not the United State, an opportunity at this moment
to propose a combination of the British Empire, the United
States, France, Japan, Italy, and Russia in offensive and
defensive alliance to rebuke and punish Austria-Hungary
and Germany for the outrages they are now committing, by




288 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


enforcing against those two countries non-intercourse with
the rest of the world by land and sea? These two Powers
have now shown that they are utterly untrustworthy
neighbors, and military bullies of the worst sort - Germany
being far the worse of the two, because she has already violated neutral territory.
If they are allowed to succeed in their present enterprises,
the fear of sudden invasion will constantly hang over all the
other European peoples; and the increasing burdens of competitive armaments will have to be borne for another forty
years. We shall inevitably share in these losses and miseries.
The cost of maintaining immense armaments prevents all the
great Powers from spending the money they ought to spend
on improving the condition of the people, and promoting the
progress of the world in health, human freedom, and industrial productiveness.
In this cause, and under the changed conditions, would
not the people of the United States approve of the abandonment of Washington's advice that this country keep out of
European complications?
A blockade of Germany and Austria-Hungary could not
be enforced with completeness; but it could be enforced both
by sea and by land to such a degree that the industries of
both peoples would be seriously crippled in a short time by
the stoppage of both their exports and their imports. Certain
temporary commercial advantages would be gained by the
blockading nations - a part of which might perhaps prove
to be permanent.
This proposal would involve the taking part by our navy
in the blockading process, and, therefore, might entail losses
of both life and treasure; but the cause is worthy of heavy
sacrifices; and I am inclined to believe that our people would
support the Government in taking active part in such an
effort to punish international crimes, and to promote future
international peace.




DR. ELIOT'S PROPOSAL


289


Is it feasible to open pourparlers by cable on this subject?
The United States is clearly the best country to initiate such
a proposal. In so doing this country would be serving the
general cause of peace, liberty, and good will among men.
This idea is not a wholly new one to me. The recent
abominable acts of Austria-Hungary and Germany have
brought to my mind again the passages on the 'Fear of
Invasion,' and the 'Exemption of Private Property from
Capture at Sea,' which I wrote a year ago in my report to
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, entitled
Some Roads Toward Peace, pp. 16-17. The outrageous actions of the last fortnight have reenforced the statements
I then made, and have suggested a new and graver application of the doctrines therein set forth.
I offer this suggestion in entire submission to your judgment as to its present feasibility and expediency. It seems to
me an effective international police method, suited to the
present crimes, and the probable issues of the future, and
the more attractive because the European concert and the
triple alliances have conspicuously failed. It, of course,
involves the abandonment by all the European participants
of every effort to extend national territory in Europe by
force. The United States has recently abandoned that
policy in America. It involves also the use of international
force to overpower Austria-Hungary and Germany with all
possible promptness and thoroughness; but this use of force
is indispensable for the present protection of civilization
against a savagery, and for the future establishment and
maintenance of federal relations and peace among the
nations of Europe.
I am, with highest regard,
Sincerely yours
CHARLES W. ELIOT




290 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


ASTICOU, MAINE, August 20, 1914
DEAR PRESIDENT WILSON:
In revising a letter I had written you on August 17th,
amplifying the proposal contained in my letter of August
6th, I have come to the conclusion that it would not be
desirable 'to open pourparlers by cable on this subject' at
the present moment, even if it were feasible. Two considerations have led me to this conclusion: (1) We apparently do
not possess full information on the real purposes and objects
of either Russia or Germany; at least the thinking American
public does not possess this information, and therefore cannot justly fix on Germany the chief responsibility for the
present cataclysm. The extreme rashness of Germany's
action cannot but suggest that elements of the situation,
still unknown to the rest of the world, were known to her.
I do not feel the confidence I then felt in the information
accessible when I wrote my letter to you of August 6th. (2)
Communications between our Government and the Governments of France and Great Britain, which would necessarily
be secret, are undesirable at the present stage of the conflict.
Indeed secret diplomacy is always to be disliked, whether
used by free governments or despotic. These are sufficient
objections to the pourparlers I suggested.
I am inclined to give new weight to certain reasons for
holding to our traditional policy of neutrality in conflicts
between other nations: (1) It seems probable that Russia,
Great Britain, and France together can inflict ultimate
defeat on Germany and Austria-Hungary - the only tolers.
able result of this outrageous war. (2) It seems possible that
the seven nations now at war can give the much-needed
demonstration that the military machinery which the last
half of the nineteenth century created all over Europe cannot be set in motion on a large scale without arresting production to a very dangerous degree and causing an intolerable amount of suffering and misery. The interruption of




DR. ELIOT'S SECOND THOUGHTS


291


production and commerce which has already taken place
since July 31st is unexampled in the history of the world; and
yet the destruction of life and property has hardly begun.
If seven nations can give this demonstration, the other
nations had better keep out of the conflict.
On reflection, I have also come to think that much public
discussion of the interest of free governments in the reformation of the military monarchies of Europe will be necessary
before American public opinion will sanction forcible opposition to outrages committed by those monarchies on weaker
and freer neighbors.
I remain of the opinion that, in the interests of civilization
and peace, neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary should be
allowed to succeed in its present undertakings.
Your address to your countrymen on the conditions of real
neutrality is altogether admirable in both form and substance.
Sincerely yours
CHARLES W. ELIOT
ASTICOU, MAINE, August 22, 1914
DEAR PRESIDENT WILSON:
My letter to you of August 20th crossed in the mails yours
of August 19th to me. Yours came to hand yesterday, the
21st. I had already come to your conclusion....
I am, with highest regard and confidence,
Sincerely yours
CHARLES W. ELIOT
III
That President Wilson adopted a policy of neutrality
from a feeling of tenderness for Germany and from a failure
to appreciate the moral issues involved in the war and in the
German attack upon Belgium, is an assertion which has




292 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


been frequently put forward. It rests upon supposition or
prejudice, and not upon evidence. So much is plain from
House's account of his visit to the President's summer home
at Cornish at the end of August, 1914.. 'August 30, 1914: I was glad to find the President situated
so delightfully [recorded the Colonel]. The house reminds
one of an English place. The view is superb, and the arrangement and furnishings are comfortable and artistic. The
President showed me my room himself. It was the one Mrs.
Wilson used to occupy and was next to his, with a common
bathroom between. We are in one wing of the house and
quite to ourselves. A small stairway leads down to his study,
and it was there that we sat and discussed matters until after
one o'clock when lunch was announced.
'I told of my experiences in Europe and gave him more of
the details of my mission. He was interested in the personalities of the people who are the Governments' heads, and later
said my knowledge of these men and of the situation in
Europe would be of great value to him.
'The President spoke with deep feeling of the war. He
said it made him heartsick to think of how near we had come
to averting this great disaster, and he thought if it had been
delayed a little longer, it could never have happened, because
the nations would have gotten together in the way I had
outlined.
'I told in detail of my suggestion to Sir Edward Grey and
other members of the Cabinet, that the surest guaranty of
peace was for the principals to get together frequently and
discuss matters with frankness and freedom, as Great
Britain and the United States were doing. He agreed that
this was the most effective method and he again expressed
deep regret that the war had come too soon to permit the
inauguration of such procedure. He wondered whether
things might have been different if I had gone sooner. I




THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON THE WAR 293


thought it would have made no difference, for the reason
that the Kaiser was at Corfu and it was impossible for me to
approach him sooner than I did....
'I was interested to hear him express as his opinion what I
had written him some time ago in one of my letters, to the
effect that if Germany won it would change the course of our
civilization and make the United States a military nation.
He also spoke of his deep regret, as indeed I did to him in
that same letter, that it would check his policy for a better
international ethical code.
'He felt deeply the destruction of Louvain, and I found
him as unsympathetic with the German attitude as is the
balance of America. He goes even further than I in his condemnation of Germany's part in this war, and almost allows
his feeling to include the German people as a whole rather
than the leaders alone. He said German philosophy was
essentially selfish and lacking in spirituality. When I spoke
of the Kaiser building up the German machine as a means of
maintaining peace, he said, "What a foolish thing it was to
create a powder magazine and risk some one's dropping a
spark into it!"
'He thought the war would throw the world back three or
four centuries. I did not agree with him. He was particularly
scornful of Germany's disregard of treaty obligations, and
was indignant at the German Chancellor's designation of
the Belgian Treaty as being "only a scrap of paper."
' I took occasion here to explain to him Sir Edward Grey's
strong feeling upon the question of treaty obligation, and
his belief that he, the President, had lifted international
ethics to a high plane by his action in the Panama tolls
question.'
But although the personal feeling of the President was
with the Allies, he insisted then and for many months after,
that this ought not to affect his political attitude, which he




294 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


intended should be one of strict neutrality. He felt that he
owed it to the world to prevent the spreading of the conflagration, that he owed it to the country to save it from the
horrors of war. There was also some truth in the popular
impression that he looked upon the war as a distant event,
terrible and tragic, but one which did not concern us closely
in the political sense. He had not yet come to realize that
his great opportunity was to lie in foreign affairs.
Colonel House saw in the war a great chance to bring
about a revolution in international organization by impressing upon the public mind the need of a new standard of
international morals. The code of conduct for nations should
be as high as that for individuals and, if public opinion could
be brought to realize this necessity, House believed that
a new spirit would inform international affairs. He tried to
show the President how much he might do by preaching
this doctrine, which later became the soul of Wilson's international policies. 'He did not have a hopeful outlook,'
recorded House, August 30. 'I tried to make him see that
reforms were going forward with much more celerity than
heretofore, for man desired the commendation of his fellow
man more than anything else, and with public opinion set
toward higher purposes, individuals would naturally strive
to obtain the good opinion of society.'
Some weeks later House expounded his creed to his friend
Edward S. Martin, in whom he found a sympathetic auditor.
It was henceforth the leit-motiv running through all his
diplomatic experiences.
'I lunched with Martin to-day at the Century Club [wrote
House]. He had just written one of his illuminating editorials
for Life, and we fell to philosophizing upon international
morals and governmental affairs. I did most of the talking,
trying to point out the fundamental error in international
morals, inasmuch as they are upon a different level from




INTERNATIONAL MORALS


295


individual morals. No high-minded man would think of
doing as an individual what he seems perfectly ready to do as
a representative of a State. It has been thought entirely
legitimate to lie, deceive, and be cruel in the name of
patriotism. I endeavored to point out that we could not get
very far toward a proper international understanding until
one nation treated another as individuals treat one another.
We see the wreck individuals make of themselves by devoting all their time to selfish interests, and, while they may
acquire things that seem to them worth while, in the end
they lose the regard of their fellow men and find themselves
unhappy because of them.'
House believed that the United States should lead in a
crusade for such a revolution in international morals. He
found the President difficult to stir. Wilson was profoundly
interested in domestic problems and was still slow to formulate a positive foreign policy. He seemed to feel that he had
already accomplished his great work.
'September 28, 1914: The President [House noted] declared
if he knew he would not have to stand for reelection two
years from now, he would feel a great load lifted from him.
I thought he need not accept the Presidency unless he wished
to, even if the Democratic Party demanded it, though I could
understand why he would feel it a duty to do so provided
his health permitted. I could not see what else he could do
in life that would be so interesting. He replied that the
thing that frightened him was that it was impossible to make
such an effort in the future as he had made in the past, or to
accomplish anything like what he had accomplished in a
legislative way. He feared the country would expect him to
continue as he had up to now, which would be impossible.
I thought the country would neither expect it nor want it.
There were other things he could do which would be far




296 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


more delightful in accomplishment, and would add even
more to his fame. I referred particularly to his foreign policy
which, if properly followed, would bring him world-wide
recognition.
'I find the President singularly lacking in appreciation of
the importance of this European crisis. He seems more
interested in domestic affairs, and I find it difficult to get his
attention centred upon the one big question.
'Congress will adjourn now within a few days, and when
it is out of the way it is my purpose to make a drive at the
President and try to get him absorbed in the greatest problem of world-wide interest that has ever come, or may ever
come, before a President of the United States.'
A month later House noted again:
'October 22, 1914: I am sorry to say, as I have said before,
that the President does not seem to have a proper sense of
proportion as between domestic and foreign affairs. I suppose it is the Washington atmosphere that has gripped him
as it does every one else who lives there, and the work of the
day largely obscures the tremendous world issues that are
now before us.'
Wilson's lack of appreciation of the opportunity for a
positive policy in foreign affairs accounts in some measure,
perhaps, for his failure to perceive the immediate necessity
of developing the military and naval strength of the nation.
Colonel House, on the other hand, had taken great interest
in what came to be called 'preparedness,' even before the
outbreak of the European war, and he seems to have been
on terms of intimacy with the outstanding -apostle of the
movement, Leonard Wood.


'April 16, 1914: I had a long talk with General Wood




TALK WITH WOOD ON PREPAREDNESS 297


about the army's preparedness. We discussed the international situation, particularly regarding Japan and the
possibility of trouble there, and what would be necessary to
be done. He said Manila was now so fortified that we could
hold it for a year at the minimum, and that within a short
while Hawaii would be in a similarly impregnable position.
He thought the Panama Canal was so near completion that
it could be used in twenty days in the event of an emergency.
We promised to keep in close touch with one another from
now on.'
If, as House hoped, the United States were to take the
lead in an international movement to prevent future war or
to render it less likely, it was of vital importance that the
moral influence of America should be based upon an adequate material force, especially a strong army and navy.
There was even the possibility that if the nation were
placed on a war footing as rapidly as possible, the United
States would be in a position to insist that the belligerents
stop fighting, by a threat of entering the war against the side
that refused reasonable terms. And with Europe on the road
to exhaustion, the combined economic and military strength
of America would permit her to decide what were reasonable
terms.
There was also the danger of a German victory, in which
case the United States, if unarmed, would find herself facing
an aggressive power capable of carrying through by force an
expansive policy in South and Central America that might
touch closely and adversely our most important interests.
In any event, it seemed the part of wisdom to prepare a
force sufficient to support the diplomatic demands we might
be compelled to make upon the belligerents, should either
side disregard our rights as a neutral.
Because of such factors Colonel House found himself in
complete agreement with the preparedness crusade, and he




298 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


urged that immediate steps be taken to strengthen both
army and navy. He found the President cold. Wilson did
not visualize the r61e America might play in the same fashion
as House; he believed that the United States should give an
example of pacific idealism which was at the other pole from
military preparation, and he felt himself supported by the
mass of public opinion which, until aroused by the peril and
the opportunity of the situation, opposed the sacrifices
necessary to preparedness.
'November 3, 1914: Loulie and I [recorded House] lunched
with General and Mrs. Leonard Wood at Governor's Island.
I wished to see the General before I went to Washington.
I am strongly of the opinion that it is time for this Government to adopt some system, perhaps the Swiss, looking
toward a reserve force in the event of war. I found General
Wood receptive. He is to send me, at the White House,
memoranda and data to hand the President for his information.
'Wood is desirous of going to the war zone, and I told him
I would try to arrange it for the reason that we have no
military man who has had any experience in the handling of
large bodies of troops....
'November 4, 1914 [conference between Wilson and
House]: We passed to the question of a reserve army. He
baulked somewhat at first and said he thought the labor
people would object because they felt that a large army was
against their interests. He did not believe there was any
necessity for immediate action; he was afraid it would shock
the country. He made the statement that no matter how
the great war ended, there would be complete exhaustion;
and, even if Germany won, she would not be in a condition
seriously to menace our country for many years to come. I
combated this idea, stating that Germany would have a
large military force ready to act in furthering the designs




TALK WITH WILSON ON PREPAREDNESS 299


which the military party evidently have in mind. He said
she would not have the men. I replied that she could not
win unless she had at least two or three million men under
arms at the end. He evidently thought the available men
would be completely wiped out.
'I insisted it was time to do a great constructive work for
the army and one which would make the country too powerful for any nation to think of attacking us. He told me there
was reason to suspect that the Germans had laid throughout
the country concrete foundations for great guns, similar to
those they laid in Belgium and France. He almost feared to
express this knowledge aloud, for, if the rumor got abroad,
it would inflame our people to such an extent that he would
be afraid of the consequences. General Wood has the matter
under investigation, and he asked me to caution Wood to be
very discreet.1
'I spoke of General Wood's desire to be sent abroad and
asked him to let him go in order that we might have at least
one man in our army with some experience. He said they
would not accept him. I replied that Wood thought otherwise and it was something for him to work out in his own
way.
'In speaking of the building-up of our army, I thought if
the Allies were successful there would be no need for haste;
but if the Germans were successful and we then began our
preparations, it would be almost equivalent to a declaration
of war, for they would know we were directing our preparations against them. I therefore urged that we start without
delay, so that we might be ready and avoid being placed in
such a position....
'November 8, 1914: The President desired me to go to
church with him, but I compromised by having Loulie go.
Mr. Bryan had just arrived from the West and I felt it
1 Probably neither Wilson nor House took such suspicions very seriously; the investigation proved them to be without basis.




300 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE
necessary to see him. I wanted to find out what his views
were regarding the army. I found him in violent opposition
to any kind of increase by the reserve plan. He did not believe there was the slightest danger to this country from
foreign invasion, even if the Germans were successful. He
thought after war was declared there would be plenty of time
to make any preparations necessary. He talked as innocently as my little grandchild, Jane Tucker. He spoke with
great feeling, and I fear he may give trouble....
'November 25, 1914 [conversation with Wilson]: We spoke
of the ever-present topic of the war. I have gotten from' good
authority that Italy would now be with the Allies if she had
been prepared. She found her equipment was not sufficient
to be effective, but she is putting herself in shape to get into
the war just as soon as she is ready and can make her forces
worth while. I thought Roumania would also join the
Allies. He expressed pleasure at this, and hoped these two
countries would not delay too long.
'I again insisted that Germany would never forgive us for
the attitude we have taken in the war and, if she is successful, she will hold us to account....
'I spoke again of our unpreparedness and how impractical
Mr. Bryan was. I urged the need of our having a large
reserve force, and he replied, "Yes, but not a large army,"
an amendment which I accepted. I particularly emphasized
the necessity for greater artillery plants and more artillery.'
The arguments of House produced no immediate effect
upon the President, who in his annual message to Congress
refused to approve plans for a large reserve force and the
principle of compulsory training; Wilson insisted that any
revolution in our established military policy (if policy it
might be called) would indicate that we had been 'thrown
off our balance by a war with which we have nothing to do,
whose causes cannot touch us.' Left thus without guidance,




WILSON'S ATTITUDE ON PREPAREDNESS 301


except of a negative sort, public opinion was slow to perceive
the need of military efficiency, and in some quarters, as the
following letter indicates, Wilson's attitude received the
most enthusiastic approval.
Mr. George Foster Peabody to Colonel House
NEW YORK, December 16, 1914
DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:
As I am writing to you at the White House, I shall venture
to say to you that I think General Leonard Wood's address
to the Merchants' Association and others respecting unpreparedness of our army most unsuitable and also reflecting
upon the President's magnificent presentation of the whole
situation in his address to Congress.
I hope that he may be promptly called down.
I cannot tell you how profoundly I was stirred by the
President's address and by the deep and widespread impression it made. I should have liked to write to him to
gratify my enthusiasm, but I have the impression that in the
press of such vitally important state problems he has not
had the time to see the later letters I wrote. I should not
want to burden him, much less intrude....
Very truly yours
GEORGE FOSTER PEABODY
Colonel House himself was not blind to the high cost of
military preparation, in the moral as well as in the material
sense, nor was he unaware of the evils which its extravagance
had brought upon Europe. Lord Grey, in his memoirs, says:
'Every country [in Europe] had been piling up armaments
and perfecting preparations for war. The object in each case
had been security. The effect had been precisely the contrary
of what was intended and desired. Instead of a sense of
security there had been produced a sense of fear, which was
yearly increasing.... Such was the general condition of




302 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Europe; preparations for war had produced fear, and fear
predisposes to violence and catastrophe.', All this House
appreciated, and he sympathized with Wilson's dread that
military preparation in the United States might destroy the
calm spirit necessary to the rescue of the world from a spell
of madness.
But although to this degree, and because of his horror at the
idea of mass slaughter, House regarded himself as a pacifist,
he could not avoid the fact that international pacifism becomes mere anaemia unless organized to include in its influence all the great Powers. In the greatest crisis of history
the United States was helpless to play any role except that
of passivity. To protect our rights effectively, to aid the
world to escape from the nightmare in which it was caught,
there was need of a positive organization of our potential
strength. This House, as we shall see, did not fail to urge
upon the President.
Twelve months afterwards, in the autumn of 1915, Wilson
yielded to the logic of events and did not lack the courage to
confess that he had changed his mind; in a series of magnificent speeches he demanded vigorous military preparation
anl he led through Congress the largest naval bill of our
history. But a precious year had been lost and the President
encountered a pacifistic opposition which he himself had
originally done something to foster. He paid a heavy price,
for without the material force necessary to the support
of his diplomacy, Wilson was destined later to miss the
opportunity, if not of ending, at least of shortening, the
war.
IV
Wilson's sense of aloofness from Europe and the war was
quickly shattered by the march of circumstances, and he
was soon to learn that the war could touch us very closely.
1 Grey, Twenty-Five Years (Frederick A. Stokes Company), ii, 279.




THE QUESTION OF CONTRABAND


303


Ironically enough, in view of later developments, it was a
dispute with the British over their control of trade which
first awakened a general sense of our national proximity to
the fighting front. British supervision of war-time neutral
trade has always been strict, and its interpretation of the
meaning of 'contraband' broad. From the British point
of view it would have been flying in the face of Providence
to surrender the opportunities offered by the mastery of the
sea. The Entente Allies were naturally interested in preventing the arrival in Germany, directly or indirectly, of any
articles that might help the enemy to prolong the war, for
in a modern war almost any article of common necessity,
such as cotton, oil, copper, or foodstuffs, may be of as much
military value as what was formerly declared contraband of
war. It was inevitable that the Allies, under British leadership because of the strength of the British navy, should seize
and search neutral vessels which might carry contraband; it
was equally certain that they w'ould extend the definition of
contraband.
On the other hand, as the largest of the neutral Powers the
United States was vitally concerned in preserving open
routes to the neutral countries of Europe and an open market
in Europe for non-contraband goods.
The situation contained dynamite, and it is not pleasant
to reflect that under existing international usages it is one
which the United States must confront whenever Great
Britain is at war with a Continental Power.
'September 30, 1914 [conference between Wilson and
House]: When we were discussing the seizure of vessels by
Great Britain, he read a page from his " History of the American People," telling how during Madison's Administration
the War of 1812 was started in exactly the same way as this
controversy is opening up. The passage said that Madison
was compelled to go to war despite the fact that he was a




304 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


peace-loving man and desired to do everything in his power
to prevent it, but popular feeling made it impossible.
'The President said: "Madison and I are the only two
Princeton men that have become President. The circumstances of the War of 1812 and now run parallel. I sincerely
hope they will not go further."
'I told the British Ambassador about this conversation.
He was greatly impressed, and said that in his cablegram to
Sir Edward Grey he would call attention not only to the
passage in the President's book, but to his comment to me
upon it.'
In view of the strong sympathy for the Entente cause in
the United States, the danger of an actual break was remote.
Both Wilson and Grey were convinced that the future welfare of the world depended upon Anglo-American friendship, and each was anxious to yield as much to the other
as might be necessary to assure it. But unless care were
taken, a point might be reached beyond which neither could
yield.
Ambassador Page in London had fortunately won the
respect and affection of the British, and negotiations were
always facilitated by the cordiality of the relations he maintained with the Foreign Office. On the other hand, he
suffered from the defects of his virtues, placing such value
upon Anglo-American friendship that he was not inclined to
present American protests with the emphasis desired at
Washington. Both Wilson and the State Department were
convinced that the avoidance of future trouble could best be
secured by letting the British understand clearly at the very
beginning that we regarded British Admiralty policy as
infringing our neutral rights and material interests.
Mr. Page looked at the problem in a different light. He
was willing to make allowance for the British restrictions on
trade, and he evidently felt that in comparison with the




ATTITUDE OF AMBASSADOR PAGE


305


defeat of Germany and the maintenance of good feeling
between Great Britain and America, the losses and inconveniences of neutrals did not count. 'Everything is going
well here, I think,' he wrote to House, September 15, 1914.
'The British Government is most considerate of us in all
large ways. The smaller questions of ships and prizes, etc.,
are really in the hands of the Admiralty - really, tho' not
nominally - and they are conducted on a war basis.'
It was with some irritation that the Ambassador discovered that in the United States British seizure of ships and
prizes was not regarded as a 'smaller question,' and he did
not conceal his lack of sympathy with the arguments drafted
by the legal advisers to the State Department in protection
of American rights on the seas.
Colonel House to the President
NEW YORK, October 21, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I have received the following cablegram from Page,
through his son Arthur.
'God deliver us, or can you deliver us, from library lawyers. They often lose chestnuts while they argue about burns.
See our friend [President Wilson] and come here immediately
if the case be not already settled.l Of utmost importance.'...
I hardly know to what he refers, but perhaps you do. It
may be the Declaration of London matter.
I notice that Northcliffe, in his papers, and the London
Post are demanding that the Government seize neutral
vessels carrying reservists or contraband cargoes.
If you think I can be of any service, please wire me and I
The British had refused the American demand that the Declaration
of London be generally accepted. The Declaration of London (1909),
which Great Britain had never ratified, left among other articles copper
and rubber on the non-contraband list and would have permitted the
importation of foodstuffs by Germany.




306 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


will come to Washington immediately. Page is evidently
disturbed.
Affectionately yours
E. M/. HOUSE
The President replied that if Page was disturbed by the
attitude of the State Department, he, Wilson, was a little
disturbed by that of the Ambassador. If Page were to represent the American Government, he must see the matters
under discussion in the light in which they were seen in the
United States. Wilson insisted that Page's advice was of
great value, but he expressed the fear that Page's intense
feeling for the British case might prove a danger. Wilson
himself was sometimes disparaging in his remarks about
professional diplomats, but he did not enjoy having the
work of the State Department, which emphasized the American point of view, referred to as that of 'library lawyers.'
Colonel House shared Mr. Page's conviction that too much
depended upon the friendship of Great Britain and the
United States to permit a quarrel over anything that was
not vital; but he appreciated, as the Ambassador did not,
the irritation caused in the United States by the British
methods of holding up American cargoes, and he also realized
that unless the United States maintained her rights as a
neutral with vigor in the case of the seizure of cargoes, she
would not be able to protest effectively should more serious
attacks follow.
On the other hand, he believed that through the exercise
of care in the drafting of protests and by maintaining close
personal relations with the British Ambassador in Washington, much friction could be avoided.
'September 27, 1914: I took the 12.08 train to Washington
and was met at the station by McAdoo and Eleanor. They
went to the White House with me and took dinner with us.




CONFERENCE WITH SPRING-RICE


307


After dinner we talked for a while, until a large package of
papers came from the State Department marked "urgent."
This was the signal for... the family to leave, and the President and I immediately got down to work.
'X had written a long letter to Page, concerning the
Declaration of London and its effect upon neutral shipping.
X's letter of instruction to Page was exceedingly undiplomatic, and I urged the President not to permit it to be
sent....
'I then suggested that he permit me to have a conference
with Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and get at the bottom of the
controversy. He expressed warm approval of this plan. After
this we went to bed, pretty tired and somewhat worried.
'September 28, 1914: I had Hoover'j arrange with Billy
Phillips 2 for the use of his home, and I asked Sir Cecil
Spring-Rice over the telephone to meet me there at ten
o'clock. The conference was a most interesting one.
'I showed the Ambassador the letter X had prepared to
send Page. He was thoroughly alarmed over some of the
diplomatic expressions. One paragraph in particular he
thought amounted almost to a declaration of war. He said
if that paper should get into the hands of the press, the headlines would indicate that war with Great Britain was inevitable, and he believed one of the greatest panics the
country ever saw would ensue, for it was as bad or worse
than the Venezuela incident. He said he did not know what
I had accomplished in a busy life, but he felt sure I had never
done as important a piece of work as in this instance....
'We discussed the best ways and means of getting out of
1 Chief usher at the White House.
2 Mr. William Phillips was at this time Third Assistant Secretary of
State; his ability and diplomatic qualifications enabled him to perform
services as important as they were unheralded. He was on terms of close
friendship with Sir Cecil and it was at his house that House usually met
the British Ambassador. Phillips became First Assistant Secretary in
1915, and later Minister to Holland and Ambassador to Belgium.




308 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


the difficulty, which he said would never have arisen if the
State Department had talked the matter over with him
frankly in the beginning. His Government's attitude had
been known at the State Department for a month, and yet
not a word of objection had been raised. If he had known
what the feeling of this country was, he would have taken
it up with his Government and their attitude would have
been modified. As it was, they had already published their
intention of doing the things to which our Government
objected, and it would be difficult to handle it now in a way
to save the amour-propre of his Government.
'We outlined a despatch for this Government to send to
Page, and then we outlined the despatch which we thought
he should send Sir Edward Grey. We agreed to be absolutely
frank with one another, letting each know just what was being
done, so there could be no subterfuge or misunderstanding.'
It would be difficult to find in all history another instance
of diplomacy so unconventional and so effective. Colonel
House, a private citizen, spreads all the cards on the table
and concerts with the Ambassador of a foreign Power the
despatches to be sent the American Ambassador and the
Foreign Minister of that Power. If there is criticism of
the method, it is stifled by its success.
As a result of this intervention, the threatened crisis was
tided over; and during the next five weeks it proved possible
to approach the problem of neutral shipping with equanimity, although no fundamental solution was discovered.
House himself said nothing of what he had done.
Colonel House to Ambassador W. H. Page
NEW YORK, October 29, 1914
DEAR PAGE:
When your cablegram came, I communicated with the
President, but found that everything was in process of ad



PAGE ON ENGLAND AND AMERICA


309


justment. I cannot see how there can be any serious trouble
between England and America, with all of us feeling as we
do; but of course we must needs be careful in the manner of
doing things - for the American people, as you know, are
exceedingly sensitive regarding certain questions, and it
would not be advisable for the President, with all his power
and popularity, to go counter to this sentiment....
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House
LONDON, November 9, 1914
MY DEAR HOUSE:... I want to thank you for what I suppose you did when
I telegraphed you thro' Arthur. I sent the telegram thro'
Arthur so that your name and mine shd. not be on the same
telegram and thereby possibly excite suspicion. The situation is safe, but it can at any time be made critical by a
captious manner. I did not and do not mean to criticize
Lansing or anybody else - only to make sure that things
are seen in their proper perspective.
Sir Edward values American friendship more than anything else of that kind. He is not going to endanger it. To
this day, he hasn't confiscated a single American cargo, tho'
there are many that he might have confiscated within his
rights. Our continued good relations[hip] is the only thing
that now holds the world together. That's the big fact. A
cargo of copper, I grant you, may be important; but it can't
be as important as our friendship. It's the big and lasting
things that count now. I think of the unborn generations of
men to whom the close friendship of the Kingdom and of our
Republic will be the most important political fact in the
world. - Have stiff controversies? Yes; I'm for them
whole-heartedly, when we have a good reason. But there's
no reason now; and, if there were, this is the time to be




310 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


patient. There'll be plenty of time left to quarrel when this
dire period is past....
It's no time, then, to quarrel or to be bumptious about a
cargo of oil or of copper, or to deal with these Gov'ts as if
things were normal. Thank God, you are 3000 miles from
it. I wish I were 30,000....
Yours heartily
W. H. P.
Unfortunately, the oil and the copper exporters in the
United States felt differently and protests poured in upon
the State Department in Washington. For Mr. Page, who
was in vital sympathy with the Allied cause, the situation
was worse than trying. His nerves became taut. As usual,
the minor questions were the more vexatious. What was
dangerous was that, in his misunderstanding and irritation
with the State Department, he should lose sight of the
Washington point of view, which he was sent to London to
represent. It was the more difficult to warn Mr. Page to be
careful not to display pro-Ally feeling in that he looked
upon himself as falling over backward in his neutrality, and
was not in a frame of mind to receive criticism philosophically.
Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House
LONDON, December 12, 1914
MY DEAR HOUSE:... I am trying my best, God knows, to keep the way as
smooth as possible; but neither Government helps me. Our
Government merely sends the shippers' ex-parte statement.
This Government uses the Navy's excuse.
Oh, well, praise God it goes as well as it does. I get my
facts as best I can —from other neutrals, from shipcaptains, etc. - and I do the best I can, getting thanks for
nothing, getting lectures for - nothing. I happened a little




PAGE'S VEXATIONS


311


while ago to telegraph that I 'conferred' with the neutral
Ministers, meaning, of course, that I talked with them and
found out what facts I could. It was their ships that were
stopped, with American cargoes. I got back a despatch from
Washington saying I had no authority to be making shipping
and trade agreements with neutral Powers - they did that
themselves at Washington! Now what damfool in the State
Department supposed that I was making agreements with
any Govt. or that I was doing anything but trying day and
night to get an American cargo released and to prevent
more from being stopped - I don't know, nor care to know;
and I haven't a trace of a shade of a dream of feeling about
it. Anybody's at liberty to think anything about me he
pleases; I've long since ceased to care a fig. A man in a difficult public place must turn heaven and earth to do his very
uttermost duty - must try doubly and trebly hard at any
cost and must absolutely exhaust every possible effort and
resource and satisfy his most exacting conscience. He will
be blamed then. He will be misunderstood. He will be misjudged. He must accept that and go on without paying
the least heed to it. I can do that easily. I don't care a
fig. I'm incapable of resenting any misunderstanding.
But- BUT, you can't help doubting the intelligence of a
man (whoever he is) that breaks loose with a sermon about
my making 'agreements with other governments'; and you
don't know just how much dependence to put in the next
telegram about something else, that comes from the same
source....
Everybody here, so far as I have heard (and I shd hear,
you may be sure), regards us all as neutral of course, and
so treats us -English, Germans, Austrians, French, and neutrals. Of the neutral members of the diplomatic corps I
see much (in spite of my inability to make 'agreements with
other countries'); and I can't tell you to save my life what
the leanings are of any of them! I have felt no suspicion from




312 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


any quarter but Washington. Suspicion, I have noticed,
generally sleeps in the bed with Ignorance....
Heartily yours
WALTER H. PAGE
Colonel House to Ambassador W. H. Page
NEW YORK, December 4, 1914
DEAR PAGE:
I have just returned from Washington....
The President wishes me to ask you please to be careful
not to express any unneutral feeling, either by word of
mouth, or by letter, and not even to the State Department.
He said that both Mr. Bryan and Mr. Lansing had remarked
upon your leaning in that direction, and he thought it would
materially lessen your influence.
He feels very strongly about this, and I am sending the
same message to Gerard.
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House
LONDON, December 15, 1914
DEAR HOUSE:
I'll tell you a story: Within a week two Americans who
have lately come here have criticized me and the Embassy
for being pro-German, and I often hear such remarks that
come from the English.
And I'll ask you a question:
Is an Ambassador a man sent to keep another Government friendly and in good humor with your Government so
that you can get and give all sorts of friendly services and
make the world better?
Or is his business to snap and snarl and play 'smart' and
keep 'em irritated - damn 'em! - and get and give nothing?
These I send you by Mrs. Page as my Xmas greeting.
W. H. P.




RELATIONS WITH SPRING-RICE


313


If the State Department had difficulties in impressing its
point of view upon the American Ambassador in London,
there was also cause for some anxiety because of petty misunderstandings with the British Ambassador in Washington.
Sir Cecil Spring-Rice was a diplomatist of distinction and a
scholar of charm. During the early weeks of the war, his
relations with our Government were of the most cordial sort.
House kept in close touch with him, and the following letter
indicates the tone of their intercourse:
Ambassador Spring-Rice to Colonel House
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, November 5, 1914
MY DEAR COLONEL:
I hear you have come. How are you?...
We hope that the exports will continue as at present. But
the evident intentions of the Germans are to get some fast
cruisers out of the North Sea and effect a junction with those
in the Atlantic, and so control for a short time the trade
routes. We suspect the ships in United States ports of an
intention to run out and get converted into commerce
destroyers, which would be awkward. For this reason I am
asking that ships in New York harbour should be periodically inspected and not allowed to leave unless their cargoes
are innocent.
Do you gather that an attack will be made on the Administration in Congress for remissness about contraband
matters? As a matter of fact, no American exporter has
suffered any loss and all the protests of the Administration
have been successful. But owing to changed conditions of
modern war it is evident that the definition of contraband
must be changed - i.e., for instance, it must include petroleum and copper (which in Germany is entirely used for
cartridges, bombs, etc.); and the American doctrine of
'continuous voyage,' or that the character of the goods is




314 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


determined by its ultimate destination, and not the port
where it is landed, is evidently applicable to certain ports
like Genoa, Rotterdam, and Copenhagen which are the
back doors of Germany. A just cause of complaint would be
the seizure of goods really destined for neutrals and we are
making arrangements by which such goods will be hallmarked by the sender here if he wishes it. I hope by December these arrangements will be in working order and no
further inconvenience suffered. I am telegraphing about this
now and a man is arranging with the copper men here for
an amicable understanding. A protest, reserving all rights,
could be made at once in cases of unreasonable or prolonged
detention.
Yours sincerely
CECIL SPRING-RICE
Unfortunately, Sir Cecil was in wretched health, and his
nerves, even more than those of Page, were prone to become
frazzled as unpleasant incidents arose. The following excerpts from House's memoranda indicate the delicacy of the
situation as well as the extraordinary activity of the Colonel,
for those were the days in which he was negotiating with the
South America21 Ambassadors the first draft of the PanAmerican Pact.
'December 29, 1914: went from Naon to the home of Billy
Phillips to meet the British Ambassador. I found him nervous and excited because of the premature publication and a
garbled account of the protest made by the President to the
British Government concerning the holding-up of neutral
vessels. He did not mind the note, for he and I had already
threshed that out and settled it long before it was sent. He
had even received a reply from Sir Edward Grey indicating
that the President's request would be granted. The note was
merely a formal matter of routine after the real issue had




THE AMBASSADOR'S RUFFLED FEELINGS 315


been met, but what he objected to was the way in which it
had been given publicity and the manner in which our press
had treated it....
I tried to explain to Spring-Rice how badly the President
felt. He accepted that part, but blamed the State Department most unreservedly and said it was impossible to conduct diplomatic negotiations of a delicate nature through the
newspapers. He claimed that it was not the first time and
that he hesitated to take up further matters with them; in
fact, he intended to absent himself from the Department
in future. He had no doubt we would all be pro-Germans
within six months, that the Germans were strong and had a
thorough organization, and they would finally break down
any anti-German sentiment which now existed....
'He talked so many different ways, in almost the same
sentence, that I concluded he was too upset for me to have
any profitable discussion with him, and I therefore took my
leave.'
As it turned out, the State Department was quite guiltless
of any indiscretion, but then, as generally, it was made the
scapegoat for the sins of others.
'December 30, 1914: I called up Phillips at the State Department [recorded House] and told him I was sorry Mr.
Bryan was out of town, because I desired to suggest to him
that he soothe the ruffled feelings of the British Ambassador.
I asked Phillips to take part in this laudable endeavor. I said
my trip to Washington had been largely nullified by the premature publication of the President's protest to the British
Government and I hoped they would get the Ambassador in
a normal frame of mind before I returned, for he blamed the
State Department for the leak. Phillips said they had found
exactly where the leak was, that it was not in the State Department, and indicated as nearly as he could over the tele



316 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


phone that it was, a fact which I already knew as well
as I could know anything that had not happened under my
own eyes....
'December 31, 1914: I received the accompanying letter
from Spring-Rice a few minutes ago. He is evidently in good
humor again. I am exceedingly glad....'
Ambassador Spring-Rice to Colonel House
I have just received copy of the note that is the telegram
to Page and it seems to me a very fair just courteous and
firm presentment of the case to which no objection whatever
could be raised on the ground of its form. I am sure it will
create a very lasting impression and will remain on the
records as an honourable effort to solve in an amicable manner the question at issue.
Such crises, flaring up and flickering down, wearied the
President beyond anything else, and were not conducive to
prompt settlement of the points at issue. When House
brought to Mr. Wilson the gist of his various interviews, the
President's face, he recorded, 'became grey.' The Ambassadors might have been recalled, but there were strong arguments against such a step. However unfortunate Mr. Page's
relations with the State Department, it would have been impossible to find any one more capable of holding close personal relations with Sir Edward Grey. Nor would it have
been easy to suggest to the British that they recall SpringRice. Wilson's solution was to send House to England to
explain personally the American case on the holding-up of
cargoes. He sympathized with the British, and at the same
time realized the force of the view taken by the State Depart1 Sir Cecil's letters to Colonel House were frequently unsigned and, as
in this case, without any superscription. When they carried a superscription he generally addressed Colonel House as 'Mr. Beverly.' His
manner, both personal and epistolary, was sometimes apt to suggest the
mysterious.




A EUROPEAN MISSION                317
ment. He was on terms of intimacy with Sir Edward Grey
and Sir William Tyrrell.
Wilson's decision was hastened by another factor which
assumed the first importance at the close of the year. All
through the autumn Colonel House had engaged in frequent
conferences with the German and British Ambassadors concerning the possibility of American mediation. The question
asked by the President was whether this possibility might be
changed to a probability, and he saw no means of answering
it except through the European mission which House agreed
to undertake.




CHAPTER XI
PLANS OF MEDIATION
The most serious difficulty.. is the deep-rooted distrust England has
for German diplomacy and promises. Something of this is also felt by the
Germans for England.
House to Wilson, September 22, 1914
COLONEL HOUSE was not one of the multitude which, so long
as the war lasted, believed the crippling of Germany as a
great economic and political Power to be an essential element
of future peace. On the contrary, he was convinced that a
strong, albeit demilitarized, Germany was necessary to the
economic stability of Europe and the welfare of the world.
He consistently opposed the political disintegration of Germany which was openly or secretly advocated by her Continental enemies. In the opening week of the war House foresaw Germany's defeat, and he feared the consequences if this
defeat should prove overwhelming. To his mind the greatest
menace to civilization lay in the possibility of the domination
of Europe by Tsarist Russia.      P I
'August 6, 1914: It looks to me as if Germany was riding
for a fall [he wrote], and it also seems to me that, if this
should happen, France and Russia will want to rend her in
twain. It is clearly to the interest of England, America, and
civilization to have her integrity preserved, shorn, however,
of her military and naval power.
'I expect to see the British Ambassador and outline this to
him.'
Ten days later, in a message to Ambassador Gerard, House
suggested the possibility of stopping the war before passions
became so inflamed that neither side would consider laying




EARLY OVERTURES OF MEDIATION


319


down arms. It was no more than a suggestion, and House
himself did not believe that it would lead to practical results.
But the message is significant, for it sketched what was, four
years later, to be the American plan for lasting peace and
in it, as in the Pan-American Pact, is the principle of the
League of Nations Covenant - an organization to guarantee territorial integrity and to provide for disarmament.
Colonel House to Ambassador Gerard
PRIDE'S CROSSING, MASSACHUSETTS
August 17, 1914
DEAR JUDGE:... The Kaiser has stood for peace all these years, and it
would not be inconsistent with his past life and services to be
willing now to consider such overtures. If peace could come
at this hour, it should be upon the general proposition that
every nation at war should be guaranteed its territorial integrity of to-day. Then a general plan of disarmament should
be brought about, for there would be no need under such an
arrangement for larger armies than were necessary for police
purposes.
Of course, this matter would have to be handled very delicately; otherwise sensibilities might be offended.
As far as I am concerned, I would view with alarm and
genuine regret any vital disaster to the German people. The
only feeling in America that has been manifested against
Germany has not been directed against her as a nation, but
merely against her as the embodiment of militarism. Our
people have never admitted that excessive armaments were
guaranties of peace, but they have felt, on the contrary, that
in the end they meant just such conditions as exist to-day.
When neighboring nations with racial differences and prejudices vie with one another in excessive armaments, it
brings about a feeling of distrust which engenders a purpose
to strike first and to strike hard.




320 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


With Europe disarmed and with treaties guaranteeing one
another's territorial integrity, she might go forward with
every assurance of industrial expansion and permanent
peace.
Faithfully yours
E. M. HousE
The difficulty was that the victorious advance of the
German armies through Belgium and northern France, during the month of August, prevented any consideration of
peace in Berlin; on the other hand, the treatment they meted
out to the invaded regions inflamed the French, Belgians,
and British and crystallized their determination never to
cease fighting until the damage had been repaired and Teutonic war methods punished. On the eastern front there
was the same situation with reversed r61es. The Russians
advanced triumphantly, while their devastation of East
Prussia convinced the Germans that the menace of the
barbarous Slav must be ended once for all.
But in September the Russians, while they were able to
continue the invasion of Galicia, were driven out of East
Prussia by Hindenburg, who immediately proceeded to
threaten an attack upon Russian Poland. In the west the
Germans were defeated on the Marne, and although they
maintained themselves on the line of the Aisne it became
obvious that the immediate and overwhelming defeat of
France, which their military leaders had promised, was likely
to remain an unfulfilled dream. As the autumn drew on, a
condition of deadlock seemed to have been reached.
German war plans had been based upon the assumption of
a short campaign, and the prospect of facing a vast coalition
through a long-drawn-out struggle was one that appalled the
army leaders; some of them have since confessed that with
the battle of the Marne, and the beginning of the deadlock
on the western front, they regarded the war as lost. Colonel




LETTER TO HERR ZIMMERMANN


321


House was of the same opinion, and argued that if the
Germans were wise they would accept what terms they
might, before the ultimate consequences of defeat became
apparent. At the very moment of the decision on the Marne,
he had written to Zimmermann, suggesting that the time was
approaching when President Wilson's offer of mediation
might be taken in other than an academic sense.
Colonel House to the President
PRIDE'S CROSSING, MASSACHUSETTS
September 5, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I am enclosing you a letter to Herr Zimmermann. If you
approve, will you not have it properly sealed and sent to the
German Embassy for transmission?
Please criticize it frankly and return it to me for correction
if you think best.
I have a feeling that Germany will soon be glad to entertain suggestions of mediation and that the outlook is more
hopeful in that direction than elsewhere.
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
Colonel House to Herr Zimmermann 1
WASHINGTON, D.C., September 5, 1914
DEAR HERR ZIMMERMANN:
Thank you for your letter of August 1. I gave it to the
President to read and he again expressed his deep regret that
the efforts to bring about a better understanding between the
Great Powers of Europe had so signally miscarried.
He looks upon the present war with ever-increasing sorrow, and his offer of mediation was not an empty one, for he
would count it a great honor to be able to initiate a movement for peace.
The letter was approved by Wilson and sent to Zimmermann.




322 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Now that His Majesty has so brilliantly shown the power
of his army, would it not be consistent with his lifelong
endeavor to maintain peace, to consent to overtures being
made in that direction?( @
If I could serve in any way as a medium, it would be a
great source of happiness to me; and I stand ready to act
immediately upon any suggestion that Your Excellency may
convey or have conveyed confidentially to me.
With assurances of my high esteem, I am, my dear Herr
Zimmermann,
Sincerely yours
EDWARD M. HOUSE
At the same time, House renewed his personal contacts
with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, of whom he had
seen much the previous summer on the North Shore.
'September 5, 1914: I am dining out to-night [he wrote] to
meet Ambassador Dumba. I am laying plans to make myself persona grata to all the nations involved in this European
war, so that my services may be utilized to advantage and
without objection in the event a proper opportunity arrives.
I have been assiduously working to this end ever since the
war broke loose. I do not believe in leaving things to chance,
and then attribute failure to lack of luck or opportunity. I
am trying to think out in advance the problems that the war
will entail and the obligations which will fall upon this
country, which I hope the President will properly meet.'
1 House's rather florid tribute to the pacific tendencies of the Kaiser
must be read in connection with Zimmermann's letter of August 1 (above,
p. 279). The implication of House's phrase is, 'If the Kaiser really loves
peace as much as you say, now is the time to show it.'




THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR TALKS 323


Colonel House to the President
PRIDE'S CROSSING, MASSACHUSETTS
September 6, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
Last night I had a conference with the Austrian Ambassador. He talked very indiscreetly and, if one will sit still, he
will tell all he knows. I sat very still.
I learned that the Germans were making a mighty effort to
gain a decisive victory in France and that, when that was
accomplished, they would be ready to consider overtures for
peace.
I also learned that their great fear was starvation. Austria
is fairly self-sustaining and, because of her close proximity to
Roumania, she would not unduly suffer; but Germany faces
famine if the war continues.
England, it seems, lets no ship pass into neutral ports
without first ascertaining whether or not it contains foodstuffs; and when it does, she exercises her right to purchase
it.
What Dumba particularly wants, is for the American ships
to defy England and feed Germany....
He spoke of England's enormous power and said Germany's military power was not to be compared with that
which England exercised over the entire world because of her
navy. He forgot to add that England is not exercising her
power in an objectionable way, for it is controlled by a
democracy.
He strongly deprecated the war and said if he had been
Foreign Minister in Austria it would never have occurred.
He intimated that Germany and Austria felt that Russia
would have been prepared in 1915, and therefore it was
necessary to anticipate her...
He deprecated the use of bombs.
Your very affectionate
E. M. HOUSE




324 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


II
Colonel House was under no illusion as to the difficulty of
beginning parleys. He had observed the pathetic failure of
the attempt of Mr. Oscar Straus, who had engaged in peace
discussions with Count Bernstorff and hoped to pass a
German offer to the Allies through Mr. Wilson; some one
talked, and all hope of success immediately evaporated. The
fiasco did not enhance House's respect for the discretion of
the German Ambassador, nor would it tend to facilitate
other attempts. Furthermore, although House argued that
were he in the shoes of the German leaders he would make
every concession for peace, he did not place great confidence
in their political good sense. On September 10 he wrote:
'England will not stand for peace unless it also means permanent peace, and that, I think, Germany is not yet ready
to concede.'
Nevertheless, when Bernstorff asked for an interview, the
Colonel agreed to discuss the matter, for he did not want to
leave any possible opening untried. If the German Government would actually authorize Bernstorff to make a reasonable offer, it would be good sense for the Allies to consider it
carefully. In House's mind at this time a 'reasonable offer'
seems to have meant evacuation of invaded territory and full
compensation to Belgium.
Colonel House to the President
NEW YORK, September 18, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
Bernstorff came to see me this afternoon. I suggested that
he meet Sir Cecil Spring-Rice at dinner. He is willing.
I am writing Sir Cecil, asking if it would be convenient for
him to come to New York within the next day or two, but
making no mention of my conferences with Bernstorff. If we
can get these two together, we can at least make a start.




BERNSTORFF AND SPRING-RICE


325


For the moment, England dominates her allies. Later, she
may not. She would probably be content now with an agreement for general disarmament and an indemnity for Belgium. Germany, I think, would be glad to get such terms.
Shall I go on, or shall I give Sir Cecil some satisfactory reason
for wanting to see him?
Now that I am in touch with Bernstorff, I hope to persuade him to close his mouth for a while. He promises that
no human being shall know of these negotiations.
The world expects you to play the big part in this tragedy
- and so indeed you will, for God has given you the power to
see things as they are.
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. HouSE
'I found Bernstorff [Colonel House recorded in a separate
memorandum] in a different attitude from when I last saw
him, which was in the spring. He was then debonnaire and
cock-sure of himself and of his country. After telling him
something of my visit to Germany and of my purpose in
making it, and after speaking of the charming manner in
which the Kaiser received me at Potsdam, I began to talk of
the peace negotiations. I asked if he had met Sir Cecil
Spring-Rice since hostilities began. He said he had not, that
it was against diplomatic usage to do so. I thought the best
thing that could be done now was for the two of them to
meet, and I asked if he was willing to do so provided I could
bring it about. He hesitated for a moment and then said he
would be willing to do so provided it was known only to the
three of us. I agreed that the President would be the only
one informed. If anything developed from the conference, I
promised permission from our Government for him to use
code messages direct to his Government, which of course up
to now he has not been able to do. He said if nothing came
from the conference, he would not mention it to his Government or to any one else.'




326 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Fortunately House was, even as early as this, on the most
intimate terms with the British Ambassador. The two
had already gone over important despatches to Page and
Grey, together working for the elimination of undiplomatic
phrases. Spring-Rice wrote to House in a private code, and
the latter felt free to call on him at any time when the importance of the business in hand warranted. From him the
Colonel had already gathered that the Allies would not consider a makeshift peace. 'You will understand that no peace
is any good which simply means an armed truce with another
war at the end of it.' Thus wrote the Ambassador to House
on September 12. 'We want not only the end of a war but
the end of all wars: and unfortunately no treaty has now the
slightest importance. We have suffered too severely by
trusting in treaties, and if we were to allow Belgium to suffer
what she has suffered without compensation, we should be
pretty mean quitters. It is an awful prospect for the world
and I see no immediate remedy.'
None the less, House felt it worth while to attempt to
arrange a meeting between Bernstorff and Spring-Rice - a
highly unconventional proceeding, but House recked little of
conventions; and when Spring-Rice telephoned that he could
not leave Washington at the moment, House insisted that he
must come at once. 'I will take the midnight train,' answered the Ambassador. It is hard to repress a smile at the
thought of the diplomatists taking orders from the quietly
persuasive Colonel.
'September 20, 1914: I met Sir Cecil [recorded House] at
seven-thirty at the Pennsylvania. I did not get out of the car
for fear of being seen.' We immediately took up the subject
1 Spring-Rice had a horror of spies. Evidently he preferred that his
interview with House should not be generally known, for House noted:
'Around eleven o'clock Sir Cecil went to the Majestic Hotel to see Sir
Courtenay Bennett, the British Consul-General. He merely did this to
give an excuse for his trip to New York in the event it became known.'




TALK WITH SPRING-RICE


327


in hand. I found him unwilling to confer with Bernstorff,
whom he considers thoroughly unreliable. He says he has a
bad reputation not only in England but in Germany, and
that he was sent to America because it was thought he could
do no harm here....
'I explained to Sir Cecil the situation as I saw it. First,
that at this time Great Britain dominated the Allies, which
perhaps she would not do later. Second, that Great Britain
could probably obtain from Germany, for the Allies, a disarmament agreement with compensation for Belgium. This
was what Great Britain wanted and not the dismemberment
of Germany, which would surely follow even over her protests, provided the Allies were signally victorious.
'He agreed to all this, but said the Germans were so unreliable, that their political philosophy was so selfish and so
unmoral that he hesitated to open up negotiations with them.
He was also afraid the time was not ripe for peace proposals.
'He said it would be necessary for all the Allies to be
approached simultaneously, for it would not do for Great
Britain to begin secret negotiations, even if they were willing,
because Germany would not play fair and would later
denounce Great Britain as being treacherous to her allies.
Then there was difficulty with France's and Russia's representatives here. Jusserand, he said, had an extremely bad
case of nerves at present, and the Russian Ambassador was a
reactionary of the worst type and was little less than mad.
'He told me of despatches that had passed between Sir
Edward and himself, and we discussed at great length what
was best to do in the circumstances and what was best to tell
Bernstorff.... He is frank and honest, and is a high-minded
scholarly gentleman.
'He thinks the best thing for the present is for the President to keep constantly in touch with the situation and to
give repeated assurances to the different Governments that
he stands ready to act whenever they feel the moment has




328 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


arrived. He believes it would not do for the President to
make any proposals as to terms, but merely to hold himself
in an absolutely neutral position....
'I was successful in making Sir Cecil see that it was not
wise for Great Britain to take any big gamble in this conflict.
If she could get disarmament and compensation for Belgium,
she had better accept it and not risk the stupendous consequences of defeat. I also made him see that if the Allies won
and Germany was thoroughly crushed, there would be no
holding Russia back and the future situation would hardly be
less promising than the past.'
The cable which Spring-Rice sent to Sir Edward Grey as
the result of this conversation, embodying the American
point of view, was as follows:
Ambassador Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey
B[ernstorff] was willing that he should enter into communication with S.-R. direct. S.-R. answered that as three Powers
were bound to make peace simultaneously, he could not
receive a communication.
I think B. was not acting without instructions or knowledge of his Government. Conversations here are likely to be
difficult.
But following considerations seem to force themselves on
the attention of the world:
If war continues, either G[ermany] becomes supreme or
R[ussia]. Both alternatives would be fatal to the equilibrium
of Europe. Consequently the present moment is more propitious to an agreement favorable to the principles of equilibrium.
President may therefore (from this point of view) be
anxious to facilitate negotiations now. The basis for these
might well be Sir E. G.'s two principles: (1) End of militarism and permanent peace. (2) Compensation to Belgium.




SPRING-RICE TO SIR EDWARD GREY 329


If other Powers are willing to make suggestions in order to
effect an agreement on the basis of these two principles, then
negotiations could begin. If they have other proposals to
make, it would be as well that they should be made known as
soon as possible for reasons given above, and the P[resident]
would be perfectly willing to facilitate exchange of ideas as
friendly intermediary, without expression of opinion.
G[ermany] is doing her best to put E[ngland] in the wrong
by causing a belief that E[ngland] is rejecting G[ermany]'s
friendly overtures.
It would be dangerous for E[ngland] to persist in non
possumus attitude. Although it is fully understood that she
cannot negotiate without knowledge of other two, it would
be to advantage of all three that G[ermany] should be forced
to show her hand.
E. G.'s two principles would have sympathy of world.
Colonel House to the President
NEW YORK, September 22, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
Bernstorff came to see me again yesterday in order to hear
the outcome of Spring-Rice's visit.
I told him that Sir Cecil hesitated to go into a conference
without the consent of his Government and without the
knowledge of their allies. Bernstorff thought this reasonable.
He justified his own action by saying that he thought the
instructions from his Government warranted him in taking
up negotiations of this sort....
Bernstorff thought it was not too early to begin conversations, for the reason that they could hardly bring results in
any event for some months.
Sir Cecil and I agreed that the Kaiser would probably be
willing to accept such terms as England would be glad to
concede, provided the German war party would permit him.
The most serious difficulty that will be encountered during




330 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


negotiations is the deep-rooted distrust England has for
German diplomacy and promises. Something of this is also
felt by the Germans towards England.
Another difficulty was expressed by Bernstorff, to the
effect that neither side wished to be placed in the position of
initiating peace proposals. This can be avoided, however, in
some such way as is being done now, for they will soon find
themselves talking about it and will not be so sensitive....
Your faithful and affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
NEW YORK, October 6, 1914
DEAR GOVERNOR:
Dumba came to see me and handed me the enclosed
article, which he has written for publication in the World's
Work for November. He wanted you to see it in advance.
He hardly tried to disguise his eagerness for peace measures
to begin. I told him I did not think the Allies would want to
commence conversations of this sort as long as the German
forces occupied their territory. He replied, 'Perhaps, then,
a German defeat at this time might not be an unmixed evil.'
I told him how anxious you were to be of service, but that
you felt you had gone as far as it was wise to go without
some encouragement.
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
Whatever the private protestations of Bernstorff and
Dumba, the public announcements of the German and
Austrian Governments were in a directly opposed sense and
did not facilitate the beginning of peace negotiations. Public
opinion in the Central Empires had been encouraged to expect a smashing victory and their official spokesmen continued to promise it. The Allied leaders echoed such sentiments on their side with a shade of increased intensity. The




LETTER FROM SPRING-RICE


331


British felt, and not without some j ustification, that it was hard
to reconcile Bernstorff's suggestions of peace with the campaign of hate against England which Berlin was whipping up.
Ambassador Spring-Rice to Colonel House
WASHINGTON, D.C., September 24, 1914
MY DEAR COLONEL:.. The message went to its destination and is being considered by the big bugs there. In the meanwhile I note that
the assurance made to you and others by your friend [Bernstorff] has been publicly and officially repudiated by his employers, so that he cannot be regarded as either authorized or
responsible. Any suggestions from this quarter that one
member of the firm [the Triple Entente] alone should discuss
conditions with him, can obviously only be made with a
view to sowing distrust among them. Any one who wants the
terms of an arrangement to be discussed, must approach all
the members of the firm simultaneously....
I notice that our own selves are at the present moment the
object of the most virulent attacks from the person who
talked to you [Bernstorff] and from his friends and associates.
There is no sign whatever of any peaceful intention and
everything is done to envenom the situation, especially and
very particularly as far as we are concerned.
I enjoyed our talk most of any I have had for a long time
and I hope we shall have another one....
Yours ever
CSR
Mr. H. C. Wallace's memorandum of a conversation with
Ambassador von Bernstorff
September 25, 1914
I was lunching alone at the Ritz Carlton to-day and he
came up and asked to sit with me.
He was anxious to know whether there were any subse



332 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


quent developments, and I said I thought the difficulty was
the necessity of talking with the partners [France and
Russia].
During the conversation I asked whether he believed the
time was propitious for negotiations to begin; and he answered there was not the slightest doubt, provided an opening wedge could be started on the Island [England]. In his
opinion, a full cooperation could be counted on in his country,
but he told me this was in strictest confidence. He said if
negotiations could start on the Island and could be kept
absolutely secret, that he could arrange for a favorable reception and visit to his country. His principal apprehension
was public opinion'on Island and partners - hence necessity
of secrecy.
He also believed that unless something was done soon, the
affair would be long-drawn-out, as nothing really decisive
could occur for at least six months and probably a year; and,
further, that if something occurs which makes either side
particularly happy, public opinion would harass, if not defeat, plans short of subjugation. He also told me in confidence that his people had refrained from doing a number of
very disagreeable things to avoid inflaming that nation.
If Winston [Churchill] voices the feeling of Government, it
is useless to make effort; but I told him G[rey] had different
views, and he replied that if that were true, great accomplishment might be made by sending some one from the
P[resident] to the Island first and then across the Channel.
'September 29, 1914 [Spring-Rice and House in conference]:
He said the cablegram to Sir Edward Grey, which we composed together, September 20, was being considered by his
Government and they were discussing it with the Allies.
When I pushed him, he admitted that perhaps it would be
some time before we heard from it. I gathered that they
intend doing nothing until what they consider a propitious




LETTER FROM W. H. PAGE


333


time, and then they will use it as a means of beginning peace
conversations. I could see that Sir Cecil was thoroughly of
the opinion that Germany should be badly punished before
peace was made. There was something of resentment and
almost vindictiveness in his attitude. He said to forgive
Germany now and to make peace, was similar to forgiving a
bully and making peace with him after he had knocked you
down and trampled upon you pretty much to his satisfaction.'
'III
From the American Ambassadors in London and Berlin,
House received confirmation of the fact that both sides were
determined to carry the conflict to a finish. Mr. Page sympathized entirely with the popular point of view in England,
which at that time saw no way of ending German militarism
without annihilating Germany in the political sense. House
did not agree, but maintained then and always that German
militarism had failed at the battle of the Marne and that the
only sure way to resuscitate it was to threaten the German
people with political destruction and force them to accept a
military dictatorship.
Mr. Page's letters displayed at times a prescience and,*
again, a surprising misreading of the future.
Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House
LONDON, September 15, 1914
DEAR HOUSE:... You needn't fool yourself; they are going to knock
Germany out, and nothing will be allowed to stand in their
way. And unless the German navy comes out and gets
smashed pretty soon, it will be a longer war than most
persons have thought. It'll be fought to a finish, too. Pray
God, don't let... the Peace Old-Women get the notion afloat
that we can or ought to stop it before the Kaiser is put out




334 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


of business. That would be playing directly into Bernstorff's
hands. Civilization must be rescued. Well, there's no chance
for it till German militarism is dead....
Yours heartily
W. H. P.
LONDON, September 22, 1914
MY DEAR HOUSE:... 'The war will begin next spring' - so said Kitchener
yesterday. And probably that's true. The French will do all
they can till cold weather comes, and the Russians will
smash Austria. Then in the spring the English will go in
with a million and a half fresh men and get the fox's tail.
That's what Wellington did at Waterloo. That's the English
way. - Look at their diplomatic management. Of course
the war is really between Germany and England; but England made sure that Russia and France were both in before
she went in. Germany has only Austria to help her. Italy
failed, and Austria is already whipped. - Grey and Kitchener are too much for them~
In fact the blindest great force in this world to-day is the
Prussian war party —blind and stupid. Well, the most
weary man in London just this hour is
Your humble servant
W. H. P.
but he'll be all right in the morning.
LONDON, November 9, 1914
MY DEAR HOUSE:.. Peace? I fear not for a very long time. The Germans
feel as the woman feels whose letter I enclose. Their Gov't
can't stop so long as the people feel so and so long as it has
1 These statements do not do justice to the Ambassador's historical
knowledge or his prophetic instincts.




A WAR OF SELF-DEFENCE


335


food and powder and men. The English can't stop till the
Germans are willing to reinstate Belgium and to pay for its
awful rape. - Yet, I pray Heaven, I am mistaken; for the
sheer awfulness of this thing passes belief. We say to one
another, Rockefeller is worth 400 or 500 or 1000 millions of
dollars. That means nothing: it is too big. If a man be
worth $100,000, or half-a-million, or a million, or even ten
millions, we can comprehend it. So, when I say that perhaps
3,000,000 men have been killed - that means nothing. We
have no experience to measure it by. Hence this unbelievable courage goes on.... We have lost our common human
bearings, and all the old measurements of things are thrown
away, and we have no new measurements; we are simply
dazed....
Yours heartily
W. H. P.
The Ambassador's estimate of the killed was exaggerated,
but his conclusion is of poignant interest, for it suggests the
soul of the tragedy, Europe helpless to prevent the war in
the first place, equally helpless to stop it: 'simply dazed.'
In Germany as in England, the only feeling was that of the
necessity of endurance. The German people, like all the
belligerents, regarded the war as one of self-defence. 'Their
principal concern,' so ran a letter written from Leipzig by an
American correspondent in August, 'is that America shall
understand that they resisted war as long as they could do so
with honor. My association with all kinds of Germans bears
out their assertion that war was undesired. The general belief among them that they were forced into it by Russia, is
perfectly sincere.'
With this consciousness, it was hopeless to expect from
them a willingness to make sacrifices in order to secure peace.
Even in the midst of their suffering, the Germans were
buoyed up by the feeling that they fought for a sacred cause.




336 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Countess von Moltke to Colonel House
CREISAU (SCHLESIEN), October 7, 1914
DEAR MR. HOUSE,
I have so often thought of your remark to me in Berlin in
May: 'Europe is in a dangerous state.' How dangerous I
never realized; I wonder if you did? The present state of
affairs seems like a bad dream; one can hardly realize that
this embittered struggle is a fact....
Only one great value has this war brought with it to us in
Germany at least - all that was best and noblest in the
nation has risen to the surface; materialism, luxury and selfishness have slipped from us, and each one of us feels that we
are better men and women than before. But it is a hard price
to pay.
My husband is away fighting like every one else. The
spirit among the troops is very sober but most confident.
Every one, even the Social Democrats, feels that Germany
did not want war, that therefore they are absolutely right in
defending their country, and they all have unbounded confidence in those in command, in their ability and trustworthiness...
Our only consolation is that we in Germany are making
the best possible use of its lessons and growing morally in
an astonishing way. Germany is being new-born, but the
travail is heart-breaking....
Yours very sincerely
DOROTHY MOLTKE
Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House
BERLIN, November, 1914
MY DEAR COLONEL:... I had a long talk with the Chancellor to-day, who sent
for me as he was here a few days from the Front. He says he
sees no chance of peace now. Germany is much worked up
over Americans selling munitions of war to France and Eng



LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR GERARD 337


land. Also over the condition of German prisoners in other
countries, particularly Russia. The hate here against England is phenomenal - actual odes of hate are recited in the
music halls. The people are still determined, and seem to be
beating the Russians in spite of reports from the Allied press.
On the French Front there is nothing to report. The Reichstag voted another large credit and then adjourned. Only
Liebknecht objected, and since then his own party has reproved him. Life seems perfectly normal here and provisions
are only slightly higher. Women send their only sons of
fifteen to fight, and no mourning is worn and it is etiquette to
congratulate a family who has lost a son on the battle-field.
The losses to date here alone are 4500 officers and 83,000
men killed - about 280,000 wounded and about 100,000
prisoners. Not great, by any means, out of a possible twelve
millions. The finances are in perfect order and the country
can continue the war indefinitely - a war which is taken
quite coolly by the people at large.
We still have lots of work. I have been especially engaged
in getting cotton in and chemicals and dyestuffs out. We
have to have cyanide to keep our mines going and dyestuffs
to keep endless industries, and the Germans know this and
want to use this as a club to force us to send cotton and wool
in. So they only let us have about a month's supply at a
time. Also they fear lest we should re-sell to the English. -..
My job is made harder by these sales of munitions by
U.S.A. to France and England and by the articles and caricatures in American papers; but I still seem O.K. with the
Government, and the Kaiser has intimated he wants me to
visit him at the Front....
Yours ever
J. W. GERARD
House realized acutely that it would not do to press the
Allies unduly for a categoric response to the suggestion of




338 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


parleys which he had sent to Grey through Spring-Rice.
Such pressure might easily be construed as a move to save
Germany from the defeat which many optimists believed
would be inflicted upon her in the spring. The Colonel himself wanted to see Germany sufficiently beaten so that the
issue of militarism would be settled for all time to come.
But he felt strongly that unless some beginning were made
toward peace in the early winter, the most favorable opportunity would be lost. For the moment, military movements
had reached a deadlock. In the spring each side would see
the chance of victory and would refuse conversations until
they had tried out their new armies. The end of the autumn
was necessarily the psychological moment for negotiations.
There was at least one German who, in his belief that his
country was headed toward destruction and could be saved
only by an early peace, labored incessantly to begin negotiations. This was Count von Bernstorff. The distrust which
his early career had awakened in the British was perhaps not
entirely unmerited; yet the record of the following months
was to prove the complete sincerity of his efforts for peace
and for the preservation of friendly relations between Germany and the United States. House had been prejudiced
against him and was never able to negotiate with him on the
basis of complete frankness he used with the British. But he
ended by admitting both the ability and the essential honesty of the German Ambassador.
iv
It may have been diplomatic wiles, it may have been selfdeception; at all events, Bernstorff reiterated the willingness
of Berlin to make terms that would satisfy the British.
Perhaps his Government was willing to let Bernstorff make
promises, and repudiate him at their convenience. Certainly
a letter which House received from Zimmermann in December did not indicate clearly any change of the official German




LETTER FROM HERR ZIMMERMANN  339


heart, although there was a hint that, if the other side made
advances, Germany might not be unreasonable.
Herr Zimmermann to Colonel House
BERLIN, December 3, 1914
MY DEAR COLONEL:
Please pardon me for allowing so much time to elapse before answering your letter of September 5th which was besides long delayed in reaching me. I read what you wrote
with great interest, but it seems to me that considering the
turn events have taken so far and the apparently unabated
zeal of our opponents, the question of mediation has not yet
reached the stage for action.
When I say 'unabated zeal of our opponents' I have in
mind such utterances as appeared for instance in the London
correspondences of the New York Sun of October 9th and the
New York Tribune of October 16, announcing that 'to no
voice of the kind (i.e., mediation) will England, France or
Russia now listen.'
On the other hand, you are fully aware of the fact that we
have greatly appreciated the President's and your own good
offices. You may be perfectly sure that the President's offer
of mediation was received exactly in the spirit in which it was
meant and that it was not for a moment considered an empty
one.
Germany has always desired to maintain peace, as she
proves by a record of more than forty years. The war has
been forced upon us by our enemies and they are carrying it
on by summoning all the forces at their disposal, including
Japanese and other colored races. This makes it impossible
for us to take the first step towards making peace. The situation might be different if such overtures came from the other
side.
I do not know whether your efforts have been extended in
that direction and whether they have found a willing ear.




340 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


But as long as you kindly offer your services in a most un-o
selfish way, agreeing to act upon any suggestion that I convey to you, so it seems to me worth while trying to see where
the land lies in the other camp.
Needless to say, your communications will always be welcome and considered confidential....
Sincerely yours
ZIMMERMANN
Bernstorff insisted that if House would come to Germany,
he would find the Berlin Government entirely reasonable.
The two had lunch together in Washington in mid-December.
'December 17, 1914: We took up the question of European
peace proposals [recorded House]. I informed him of the
President's decision to leave the matter to me; that is, as to
the proper time and as to the question of procedure. He said
there would be no objections from his Government; that it
would not be necessary to go to Germany first; that if I could
get the Allies to consent to parleys, I would find the Germans
willing. I replied that there was no use taking it up with the
Allies excepting upon a basis of evacuation and indemnity of
Belgium and drastic disarmament which might ensure permanent peace. He thought there would be no obstacle in
that direction.
'I congratulated him upon this position, and thought it
would have a fine effect and would show it was not Germany's fault if peace parleys were not started. I asked him
to confirm this by cabling to his Government. He has maintained that he has no means of communication with his
Government excepting through our State Department; but I
said, " Of course I know that you can communicate with your
Government when you desire, for any intelligent man can see
that it would be impossible, under modern conditions, to
prevent this." He then admitted that he could reach them.




FAVORABLE REPLY FROM GREAT BRITAIN 341


'I regard my conversation with Bernstorff as satisfactory,
although should actual parleys commence I may have difficulty in holding him to any verbal agreements they may
make. However, I kept this misgiving well under cover.'
Three days later, House received the message from the
British for which he had waited so long. It was not entirely
unequivocal, but it indicated at least that there might be
some chance of British consideration of a German offer.
'December 20, 1914: At 9.45, Phillips of the State Department telephoned to say the British Ambassador desired to
see me in the morning about a matter of importance. I told
Phillips I was leaving for New York to-night and to ask the
Ambassador to come immediately to his house, and I would
be over within five minutes. I excused myself to the President and went to Phillips' and met Spring-Rice. He had
word from Sir Edward Grey concerning our peace proposals,
and thought it would not be a good thing for the Allies to
stand out against a proposal which embraced indemnity to
Belgium and a satisfactory plan for disarmament. Sir Edward wished me to know that this was his personal attitude.
'I returned to the White House. The President... was
much elated and wanted to know whether I could go to
Europe as early as the coming Saturday. I stated that I
could go at any time. He... thought before I left we could
button-up our South American matters so as to leave me
free....
'December 23, 1914: When I met Spring-Rice, he said he
had received another cablegram from Sir Edward Grey and,
while he was personally agreeable to the suggestion made, he
had not yet taken it up with his own Cabinet, much less with
the Allies. He felt there would be difficulties with France and
Russia, and great difficulty in effecting a plan by which a
permanent settlement might be brought about. Sir Cecil




342 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


wanted to go into a discussion of what such a settlement
would entail. It seemed to me footless to undertake such a
discussion at this time, for it would probably cover a period
of weeks, if not months, even after the Powers had begun
parleys. I told him it was not my idea that they should stop
fighting, even after conversations began, and that an armistice need not be brought about until at least a tentative
understanding as to what would constitute a permanent
settlement was well within sight.
'He thought France would probably desire the French
part of Lorraine, and he thought Russia would like Constantinople. He wondered if Germany would accede to the
former request. I thought that was something to be threshed
out later, and that the conversations should begin upon the
broad lines of an evacuation and indemnity for Belgium and
an arrangement for a permanent settlement of European
difficulties, including a reduction of armaments.
'I was surprised to hear him say that the indemnity to
Belgium could be arranged, for all the Powers might be
willing to share the damages done that brave little nation. I
was also surprised to hear him say that he saw signs of what
he called "a general funk among the European nations," and
he thought perhaps "most of them feared revolutions."...
'He could not understand why Germany would consent to
peace parleys now when they seemingly were so successful,
and he did not believe the German military party or the
German people as a whole would permit such conversations
being brought to satisfactory conclusions. That was also my
opinion, as far as those two elements were concerned; but I
thought the Kaiser, the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary,
and their entourage knew that the war was already a failure
and did not dare take the risk involved, provided they could
get out of it whole now....
'Sir Cecil said he would cable Sir Edward Grey to-night
and tell him of our conversation, and ask him to feel out the




THE OUTLOOK FOR MEDIATION


343


Allies and let us know as soon as possible whether it was advisable for me to come to London.
'I asked him to explain that we had no disposition to force
the issue, but it would be inadvisable to let the Germans have
the advantage of having expressed a willingness to begin
parleys upon such terms, and then have the Allies refuse....
'Returning to the White House, I found the President
anxiously awaiting me. After telling what had passed, we
discussed what was best to do regarding Bernstorff, and we
came to the conclusion that it would be well to leave him
alone until I had heard something direct from the Allies; and
then we could put the question squarely up to Bernstorff by
telling him I was ready to go to London, but he must not let
me go only to find Germany repudiating what he had said.'
v
Until December, Wilson had displayed more enthusiasm
than House for the proposed mission to be attempted by the
Colonel. House understood the British distrust of German
sincerity and partly shared it. He realized more keenly than
the President the difficulties involved in persuading warblinded belligerents that compromise was better than the
risk of annihilation. And he sympathized too thoroughly
with the Allied point of view to desire a compromise peace, if
it meant the continued life of German militarism.
But the crisis in our relations with the British that threatened to result from the dispute over restrictions on neutral
trade, added a new factor. If the friendly understanding
with the British were broken, there would be no possibility of
American mediation. Furthermore, German opinion, which
during the early weeks of the war had been friendly, was becoming hostile because of the export of American munitions
to the Allied countries. Obviously no further progress
toward mediation could be made through the Ambassadors
in Washington. If he went abroad, more positive results




344 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


might be secured from the chiefs of government; and House
could at least help to appease the anti-American sentiment
that was becoming apparent in all the belligerent nations.
He was confirmed in this feeling by messages from Gerard
and Sir Edward Grey.
Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House
BERLIN, December 29, 1914
MY DEAR COLONEL:
Thanks for the 'tip' about the German ladies (American-born) who write home about this Embassyl    One is
doubtless a Frau von, who threatened me (and in
writing) that she would complain to the President because we
would not accept her invitation to dinner or invite her here.
As a matter of fact, we declined her invitations because we
were tired, and would have invited her here in time were it
not for her extraordinary outburst; and now, of course, we
cannot be sand-bagged or black-jacked or blackmailed into
inviting any one - and, anyway, the 'hand of Douglas is
his own....
Prospects of peace seem very dim. But in about three
months more, the plain people in every land are going to be
very sick of the business and then, unless one side has some
startling success (which all hope for in the spring), Peace will
come, grudgingly, slowly; and we hope to see you here in the
role of the Angel thereof.
The Germans are a little irritated just now at our sale of
munitions to the Allies. Also because of an extraordinary
order that 'American Ambassador shall not inspect or visit
prisons, camps, etc.,' issued by State Department; and they
naturally feel that we cannot protect their interests i
1 House had warned Gerard, as he had Page, to be careful not to express unneutral feeling. Complaints had come to Washington that the
American Embassy in Berlin was anti-German. It is interesting to compare Gerard's placid reception of the warning with Mr. Page's reaction as
related in the preceding chapter.




LETTERS FROM AMBASSADOR GERARD 345


France, England, and Russia without such inspection. Also,
they are quite 'sore' because Chandler Anderson from our
Embassy in London was allowed to come here and inspect
places where English were confined, but when we (and this
was an express condition of allowing Anderson here) sought
to send some one from here to look at English camps, we
were met by this order (see my long cable to Department).
Have been working hard getting cotton in and dyestuffs
out.
The Emperor has been sick for a few days, but neither I
nor any one else saw him. They say he is quite angry at
Americans over the sale of arms, but I don't think he would
shut up Krupps' factory if we were at war with Japan, and
during the Spanish War many munitions from Germany
found their way to Spain. There is no doubt, however, that a
real neutrality would stop the sale, but would our people
'stand' for such a curtailment of American industry?...
Sincerely yours
J. W. G.
BERLIN, January 20, 1915
MY DEAR COLONEL:
Hope you can read my writing; but, as most of my stenographers are doubtless in the pay of the Foreign Office, it is
safer than typewriting....
Great talk in the newspapers and many anonymous letters, etc., coming here about sale of arms by U.S.A. to Allies.
But you never could satisfy the Germans unless we joined
them in war, gave them all our money and our clothes and
the U.S.A. into the bargain. Besides, it would be unneutral
to change the rules after the game had commenced, and,
anyway, the German Government has not protested. Germany sold arms to Spain in 1898 and to Russia in the RussoJapanese War, and to Huerta when we were having trouble
with him; and, in any event, as I have said, we cannot satisfy




346 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


the Germans. They write many articles accusing the President of being against Germany and say that Secretary
Bryan is unneutral because his son-in-law is a British
officer....
In the meantime, however, I seem to be getting through
most of the matters I have in hand, in spite of the unpopularity of Americans. Why was an order sent me from the
State Department telling me not to visit or inspect the camps
of British prisoners here?  That is the only way I can get
good treatment for the prisoners. Is it because Page in
London doesn't want to visit the camps in England? The
Spanish Ambassador visits the camps of the French and
Russian prisoners, and it is considered an essential part of
the duty of an Ambassador who takes over the interests of
another country to inspect personally or by members of the
Embassy. Hundreds of poor devils have died already from
neglect, which I might have prevented. Germany makes no
pretense of keeping the Hague Convention about the treatment of prisoners. I buy clothes (with funds from English
Government) for these prisoners - many of whom, captured
in August, have only summer clothes, no change of underwear, and are alive with vermin. The food given is not sufficient and the officers are subjected to petty annoyances to
make them revolt and get in fights with officers of their
allies. In some camps the commanders are gentlemen as well
as officers, and these annoyances do not occur.
If business lets up a little, I shall try to see the Emperor
soon at the front and report how he feels. Every one here
still confident, and the organization is so wonderful I don't
see how they can lose. They will soon undoubtedly try to
blockade England with submarines and attack the ports
with Zeppelins as soon as the weather is more favorable.
Zimmermann is still in charge of Foreign Office, as von
1 The order was rescinded and Ambassador Gerard was permitted to
inspect the prison camps.




GREY ON THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE 347


Jagow is at the front. I get on very well with Zimmermann....
Best wishes to Mrs. House from us both.
Ever yours
JAMES W. GERARD
German antagonism toward the United States, combined
with confidence in military victory, would not facilitate a
plan for American mediation. Still more disheartening was
a message from Sir Edward Grey passed on to House by
the British Ambassador in Washington. Grey stated frankly
that the British were disappointed by the attitude of the
United States Government and were inclined to be suspicious of the motives that actuated President Wilson.
Sir Edward Grey to Ambassador Spring-Rice
January 22, 1915
Your message received.
It will give me great pleasure to see him [House] and talk
to him freely. Of course, he understands that all that can be
promised here is that if Germany seriously and sincerely desires peace, I will consult our friends as to what terms of
peace are acceptable.
Before, however, setting out on his journey, it is as well
that he should be informed as to the state of public opinion
here. I fear it is becoming unfavorably and deeply impressed
by the trend of action taken by the United States Government and by its attitude towards Great Britain. What is felt
here is that while Germany deliberately planned a war of
pure aggression, has occupied and devastated large districtsin Russia, Belgium, and France, inflicting great misery and
wrong on innocent populations, the only act on record on the
part of the United States is a protest singling out Great
Britain as the only Power whose conduct is worthy of reproach....




348 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


At the beginning of the war there was, no doubt, a distinct
and purely American sentiment which was stirred by the
wrong done to Belgium and which approved of our action in
going into war. This feeling was no doubt genuine and widespread and founded rather on ideals of conduct than on race,
history, or language. But we feel that the Germans regard
themselves as partisans, that they work actively in America as
everywhere else by all means in their power, for the success in
Europe of the German arms, and that they aim one way or
another at making their influence felt in the press, in business,
and in every branch of the Government. Upon their action
and upon the success which has attended it so far, Germany
founds hopes that the attitude of the United States Government will be increasingly disadvantageous to the Allies and,
it may be added, more especially to Great Britain....
I can hardly believe that such a policy is deliberately
desired by any but the German-Americans in the United
States. There is, however, an impression in Europe that
there is a danger of the United States Government insensibly drifting into such a policy. If this apprehension is
realized, then there can be no hope of a speedy conclusion
of the war. Germany will not relax her hold on Belgium;
and as for Great Britain, not to speak of the Allies, she
cannot give up the restoration of Belgium unless and until
she has exhausted all her resources and has herself shared
Belgium's fate.
This is what people here are beginning to feel, and I should
like him [House] to know it. The feeling has not yet found
widespread public expression, but it is there and it is growing.
In the struggle for existence in which this country is at stake,
much store is set in England on the good will of the United
States; and people cannot believe that the United States desires to paralyze the advantage which we derive from our sea
power, while leaving intact to Germany those military and
scientific advantages which'are special to her.




BRITISH OPINION UNJUSTIFIED


349


I think it is only fair that he should be warned that should
people in England come to believe that the dominant influence in United States politics is German, it would tend to
create an untoward state of public opinion which we should
greatly regret.
The above is purely personal and must be so regarded; but
I think it is my duty under the circumstances to give this
personal and friendly warning as to the probable trend of
public sentiment.
E. GREY
British opinion, as expressed by Grey, of the official attitude assumed by the United States, was to a large degree unjustified and rested more upon emotion than upon fact. If
the only protests raised by America had been directed against
the British, this was because the only flagrant interference
with American neutral rights, thus far, proceeded from the
application of the British Orders in Council. British fear
of German intrigues that might influence the policy of the
United States was without foundation. If it was true that
the German-Americans were agitating for an embargo upon
munitions of war, it was equally true that the Government
steadfastly refused to permit the embargo; thus the United
States had not merely asserted their neutral rights of export
as against the demands of Germany and German-Americans,
and incidentally incurred German ill will, but at the same
time supplied what Grey himself termed the 'need of the
Allies.'
These facts were evidently not clearly appreciated by
the British Government or people. There was all the
more reason for sending to England some one capable of
emphasizing them and explaining the American point of
view.
Early in January, House decided to make the venture.




350 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


VI
'January 12, 1915: I took the 12.08 for Washington. I
found Samuel Huston Thompson of the Department of
Justice, and H. C. Wallace on the train. At Baltimore,
Davies and Harris, Director of the Census, met me; so,
altogether, I had no rest.
'McAdoo and Grayson were at the station to meet me.
After I had dressed for dinner, I went into the President's
study; and in a few minutes he came in. We had exactly
twelve minutes' conversation before dinner, and during those
twelve minutes it was decided that I should go to Europe on
January 30. I had practically decided before I came to
Washington that this was necessary, and I was certain, when
I gave my thoughts to the President, he would agree with
me it was the best thing to do.
'I thought we had done all we could do with the Ambassadors at Washington, and that we were now travelling in a
circle. It was time to deal directly with the principals. I
had a feeling we were losing ground and were not in as close
touch with the Allies as we had been, and that it was essential to take the matter up directly with London and afterward with Berlin.
'There were no visitors for dinner. After dinner the President read from A. G. Gardiner's sketches of prominent men
until half-past eight, when Senator La Follette came. When
he left, the President resumed his reading. I was surprised
that he preferred to do this rather than discuss the matters of
importance we had between us. He evidently had confidence
in my doing the work I came to Washington for, without his
help...4 r    ~3
'Ja  ary 13, 1915: After breakfast this morning the President and I strolled from the elevator to his study, in which
1 The primary reason for this trip to Washington was to confer with
Naon, da Gama, and Suarez upon the Pan-American Pact, for House was
at this time carrying on a three-ring circus of negotiations.




CONFERENCE WITH THREE AMBASSADORS 351


time I told him of my plans for the day; that is, I should see
the South American Ambassadors, the British Ambassador,
and Mr. Bryan. I considered it important for us to decide
what reason to give Spring-Rice for my going over. I
thought it was best to tell him I wanted to try out the
Germans, and the President said, "Of course, if you stop
over in London and see the British Government in the meantime, that would be expected and could not offend the sensibilities of the British Ambassador."
'I met Spring-Rice at Phillips' at 10.45. I found him in
rather a sulky mood. He began to talk about this country's
attitude toward the Allies, and indicated that the Allies
would not receive the good offices of the President cordially.
I soon got him in a good humor by telling him what a wonderful thing it would be to have the United States throw its
great moral strength in behalf of a permanent settlement,
and it was my purpose not to discuss terms with Germany
so much as to discuss a plan which would ensure permanent
peace.
'He thought this fine, and said I had hit the nail on the
head. I told him how strongly the President felt upon obtaining a permanent settlement, and that it was not his intention to suggest any cessation of fighting until this condition had been agreed to by all the belligerents. He approved
this programme, and thought if I explained it to Sir Edward
Grey when I went to London, he would cordially approve.
He wanted me to talk to the Russian and French Ambassadors and tell them of my purpose, as they might take
offence at not being called into conference. My judgment
was, not to see them; but I yielded to his advice. We agreed
that we should all meet at Phillips' at four o'clock....
'I was the first to arrive, then came Spring-Rice and, later,
Jusserand and Bakhmetieff [the French and Russian Ambassadors]. I had asked Sir Cecil to inform the other two
Ambassadors of our conversation in the morning and to get




352 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


them into a receptive frame of mind. He evidently had not
done so, and he was not particularly nice in helping me out.
It was rather awkward at first. Both Jusserand and Bakhmetieff were violent in their denunciation of the Germans
and evinced a total lack of belief in their sincerity. They
thought my mission would be entirely fruitless.
'Later, I brought them around to the view that at least it
would be well worth while to find how utterly unreliable and
treacherous the Germans were, by exposing their false pretenses of peace to the world. That suited them better, and it
was not a great while before we were all making merry and
they were offering me every facility to meet the heads of
their Governments. I found them somewhat sensitive about
my going to London and Berlin; each thought Petrograd and
Paris should also be visited. I agreed to this, but made a
mental reservation that it would be late in the spring before
I could get as far as Russia....
'I gave Mr. Bryan a summary of my day's work with the
European Ambassadors and of what the President desired me
to do. He was distinctly disappointed when he heard I was
to go to Europe as the peace emissary. He said he had
planned to do this himself....
'I replied that the President thought it would be unwise
for any one to do this officially, and that his going would
attract a great deal of attention and people would wonder
why he was there....
'He was generous enough to say that, if he did not go in an
official way, I was the one best fitted to go in an unofficial
way....
'The President and I got down to work. We agreed upon
a code to be used between us in sending cable messages while
I am abroad. I thought he should write me a letter of instructions - something that I need not let go out of my
hands, but which I might show in the event it was necessary
for me to go to countries where I was not well known.




TALK WITH BERNSTORFF


353


'Together we outlined what this letter should contain, and
he is to send me a draft of it in a day or two for me to look
over and make suggestions which seem pertinent. He said he
would write it himself on his little typewriter, so that not
even his confidential stenographer would know of it....
'January 14, 1915: Count von Bernstorff called at 2.30.
We had an interesting and satisfactory talk, and he expressed
pleasure that I was going to Europe so soon and said he
would notify his Government at once. I told him frankly of
my meeting with the Allied Ambassadors yesterday, and
that none of them thought the Germans were sincere in their
desire for peace....
'I suggested he advise his Government not to make useless
and sensational raids upon England by Zeppelins or otherwise, for they could do nothing effective from a military
standpoint and would merely destroy non-combatants, and
that such raids would have a very bad effect upon my
endeavors....
'January 20, 1915: I asked the German Ambassador to
come to see me this morning at twelve....
'I asked him again, for the love of Heaven, to stop his
people from killing non-combatants in England by dropping
bombs. The attempt yesterday upon Sandringham, had it
been successful, would have made impossible any discussion
of peace. He promised to send this view to his Government,
although he could not promise definite results, for the reason
that the military and not the civil authorities dominated.
He is to inform his Government of my expectation to be in
Berlin soon after the middle of next month.'
VII
House returned to New York for his final preparations.
He had many affairs to wind up, for besides the negotiations
he had been conducting with the European diplomats regarding the possibility of mediation, and with the South




354 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Americans regarding the Pan-American Pact, he had also
on his hands many details of local politics which, with his
continued residence in New York, were gently steered in
his direction. He did not expect to remain long in Europe.
As matters turned out, he stayed there for nearly six
months.
Nothing illustrates so exactly the President's purpose in
sending him abroad as the letter of credentials which House
was to carry. In this letter Wilson emphasizes the fact that
House was representing not an official attempt at mediation,
but merely the desire of the President to serve as a channel
for confidential communication through which the belligerent nations might exchange views with regard to terms
upon which the present conflict might be ended and future
conflicts rendered less likely. He disclaimed himself any desire to indicate terms or to play the part of judge, but merely
that of the disinterested friend who had nothing at stake
except interest in the peace of the world.
European despatches which at the last moment the President forwarded to House, gave cause for both hope and
anxiety. The temper of the Germans was not reassuring.
The British were likely to be reasonable, but they must
always reckon with the territorial ambitions of France and
Russia, which would prove a stumbling-block to a peace
based on the status quo ante.
Ambassador W. H. Page to Secretary Bryan
LONDON, January 15, 1915
I lunched to-day with General French C!who came here
secretly for a council of war. He talked, of course, in profound confidence.
He says the military situation is a stalemate. The Germans cannot get to Paris or to Calais. On the other hand, it
will take the Allies a year, perhaps two years, and an incal1 Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F.




WAR-MAD GERMANY


355


culable loss of men, to drive the Germans through Belgium.
It would take perhaps four years and an unlimited number of
men to invade Germany. He has little confidence in the
ability of Russian aid in conquest of Germany. Russia has
whipped Austria and will whip Turkey, but he hopes for
little more from her.
Speaking only for himself and in the profoundest confidence, he told me of a peace proposal which he said the
President, at Germany's request, has submitted to England.
He tells me that this proposal is to end the war on condition
that Germany gives up Belgium and pays for its restoration.
French's personal opinion is that England would have to
accept such an offer if it should be accompanied with additional offers to satisfy the other allies, such, for example, as
the restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine and the agreement that Russia shall have Constantinople....
American Ambassador, London
Ambassador Gerard to the President
BERLIN, January 24, 1915
I do not think that the people in America realize how
excited the Germans have become on the question of selling
munitions of war by Americans to the Allies. A veritable
campaign of hate has been commenced against America and
Americans....
Zimmermann showed me a long list, evidently obtained by
an effective spy system, of orders placed with American concerns by the Allies. He said that perhaps it was as well to
have the whole world against Germany, and that in case of
trouble there were five hundred thousand trained Germans in
America who would join the Irish and start a revolution. I
thought at first he was joking, but he was actually serious.
The fact that our six army observers are still here in Germany and not sent to the front is a noteworthy indication.
Zimmermann's talk was largely ridiculous, and, impossible as




356 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


it seems to us, it would not surprise me to see this maddened
nation-in-arms go to lengths however extreme.
GERARD
VIII
Before sailing, House spent another twenty-four hours in
Washington, partly to make final arrangements, chiefly to
have the pleasure of personal farewell with the President,
who at no time in his career showed himself more appreciative of the Colonel's efforts.
'January 24, 1915: I left to-day on the 12.08 for Washington. There was no one I knew on the train and I had a quiet
and restful trip. Dr. Grayson met me in a White House car.
The President was waiting for me and we immediately began
to work and remained at it continuously for more than an
hour, delaying dinner ten or fifteen minutes, which is a most
unusual thing for the President to do....
'He insisted upon arranging for my expenses abroad and
for those of my secretary, Miss Denton. I let him know how
trustworthy she was, so he would not think me indiscreet in
writing through her about matters of an important and confidential nature. He asked me to tell Sir Edward Grey his
entire mind, so he would know what his intentions were
about everything.... He said, "Let him know that while
you are abroad, I expect to act directly through you and to
eliminate all intermediaries."
'He approved all I had in mind to say to Sir Edward and
to the Germans. He said, "There is not much for us to talk
over, for the reason we are both of the same mind and it is
not necessary to go into details with you."
'I asked if it would be possible for him to come over to
Europe in the event a peace conference could be arranged
and in the event he was invited to preside over the confer



FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR MISSION 357


ence. He thought it would be well to do this and that the
American people would desire it....
'January 25, 1915: I went to Phillips' at ten o'clock to
meet the British Ambassador. He seemed pleased that I was
holding to my intention to leave on Saturday. I again requested that he arrange with Sir Edward Grey, by cable,
an engagement immediately upon my arrival. He said Sir
Edward left Saturday afternoons and did not return until
Monday morning, but, if I thought best, he knew Sir Edward
would remain in town. I did not consider this necessary, for
my boat would probably get in Saturday and I would not be
in London until Sunday; therefore Monday would be time
enough. He is cabling Sir Edward to ask me for lunch on
Monday.
'Spring-Rice talked optimistically one minute, and pessimistically the next, absolutely contradicting himself.... He
warned me that I should probably encounter sentiment in
England hostile to my mission, based upon the belief that it
was possibly actuated by a desire to help Germany. He said
there was a party there which would seize upon any excuse
for an early peace, and that they resembled the "Copperheads" of the North during our Civil War. I replied that he
need not worry about my giving them comfort....
'Phillips explained the arrangements he had made concerning money for my expenses. I dislike taking money even
for them. I have never been paid by either a state or national
Government for my services, and, while I am not being paid
for them now, I have heretofore paid my expenses. I do not
feel able to meet the expenses of such a trip as this, and it
lifts a load from me to have the Government pay them. It
was agreed that $4000 should be placed to my credit at once.
I have a feeling this will last for six months....
'It then came time to say good-bye. The President's eyes
1 As events developed, when it came to the actual decision in the
autumn of 1918 Colonel House did not favor Wilson's going to Europe.




358 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


were moist when he said his last words of farewell. He said:
"Your unselfish and intelligent friendship has meant much
to me," and he expressed his gratitude again and again, calling me his "most trusted friend." He declared I was the
only one in all the world to whom he could open his entire
mind.
'I asked if he remembered the first day we met, some three
and a half years ago. He replied, "Yes, but we had known
one another always, and merely came in touch then, for our
purposes and thoughts were as one." I told him how much
he had been to me; how I had tried all my life to find some
one with whom I could work out the things I had so deeply at
heart, and I had begun to despair, believing my life would be
more or less a failure, when he came into it, giving me the
opportunity for which I had been longing.
'He insisted upon going to the station with me. He got
out of the car and walked through the station and to the
ticket office, and then to the train itself, refusing to leave
until I entered the car. It is a joy to work for such an appreciative friend.'




CHAPTER XII
A QUEST FOR PEACE
If every belligerent nation had a Sir Edward Grey at the head of its
affairs, there would be no war...
Extract from Diary of Colonel house, February 7, 1915
I
ON January 30, 1915, Colonel House 'sailed from New York
upon the Lusitania. It was one of the last of her voyages.
For House it was one of the first of the adventurous missions
in which he attempted to translate into fact his doctrine that
a new code of international ethics must be impressed upon
the nations by demanding from Governments the same
standard of morals as that which applies to individuals.
This doctrine had proved the soul of his first mission of the
year before, the Great Adventure, when he tried to bring
about an understanding between the European states which
would prevent the war he foresaw. He kept it constantly in
mind as he approached the war zone in this attempt to discover some means by which a path to peace could be blazed
and bases of permanent peace be laid.
House left with no trace of overconfidence. The emotions
aroused in Europe were of such intensity that no wellinformed person could be hopeful of finding a pacific opening; and the Colonel was extremely well-informed. The
complexities were such that the least gaucherie would produce an 'incident' that might not merely ruin the influence
of the United States, but even endanger her friendly relations
with a belligerent Power. For this reason, if for no other, the
mission must be unofficial. Mr. Bryan had told the Colonel
that he was the one best fitted for the task. 'I hope he may
be right,' wrote House, 'for I am leaving with much trepidation. The undertaking is so great, and the difficulties are so
many, that to do it alone and practically without consulta



360 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


tion or help from any one, is as much of a task as even I, with
all my willingness to assume responsibility, desire.'
However difficult and delicate, Colonel House regarded
the attempt as necessary. No matter how slight the chance
of peace, that chance should be pursued upon every occasion.
Europe was caught in a horror from which she could not
rescue herself; if an outsider could help, the duty was imperative. Furthermore, as the war proceeded, feeling in
the belligerent countries turned against the neutrals and especially the greatest neutral, the United States. 'He that is
not with me is against me.' No one was better fitted than
House to explain the motives of the United States Government, for he was the closest friend of the President.
Whatever the Colonel's trepidation, and a brave man
always confesses nervousness, he must have been heartened
by the confidence of a man who had watched him in the
political crises of Texas for thirty years, the captain of
Rangers, Bill McDonald.
Captain W. J. McDonald to Colonel House
DALLAS, TEXAS, February 6, 1915
MY DEAR ED:... If I could have seen you before you left for Europe, I
would have tried my utmost to persuade you not to take this
trip on account of the waters being mined as well as other
dangerous conditions in that Country. Don't suppose it
would have done any good, though, after you decided to go,
as you and I are very much alike when we make up our
minds to go against anything. I am not certain of your mission there, but am sure you will make a success as you generally do when you take hold.
Wishing you a pleasant time and a safe return to Texas,
I am
As ever yours
W. J. MCDONALD




AMERICAN FLAG ON THE LUSITANIA 361


In view of the tragic fate of the Lusitania three months
later, the voyage of House in February holds some sentimental interest.
'February 5, 1915: Our voyage has about come to a close.
The first two days we had summer seas, but just after passing
the Banks a gale came shrieking down from Labrador and it
looked as if we might perish. I have never witnessed so
great a storm at sea. It lasted for twenty-four hours, and
the Lusitania, big as she is, tossed about like a cork in the
rapids.
'This afternoon, as we approached the Irish coast, the
American flag was raised. It created much excitement, and
comment and speculation ranged in every direction....
'February 6, 1915: I found from Mr. Beresford, Lord
Decies' brother, who crossed with us, that Captain Dow had
been greatly alarmed the night before and had asked him,
Beresford, to remain with him on the bridge all night. He
expected to be torpedoed, and that was the reason for raising
the American flag. I can see many possible complications
arising from this incident. Every newspaper in London has
asked me about it, but, fortunately, I was not an eye-witness
to it and have been able to say that I only knew it from
hearsay.
'The alarm of the Captain for the safety of his boat caused
him to map out a complete programme for the saving of passengers, the launching of lifeboats, etc., etc. He told Beresford if the boilers were not struck by the torpedoes, the boat
could remain afloat for at least an hour, and in that time he
would endeavor to save the passengers.
'Ambassador Page met us upon our arrival. So also did
the representatives of nearly every New York paper. They
wished to know when they might have a talk with me. I
told them they could do so then, for I would tell them as
much as I would later - which would be nothing at all.'




362 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House had all the advantage of being already upon
intimate terms with the British statesmen, so that he need
not waste time in preliminaries. Characteristically, however, he waited until he learned the essentials of the European
situation as the British saw them, before he suggested the
possibility of peace negotiations. And always he gave the
impression of one who came to discover methods rather than
as a meddler with an idee fixe.
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, February 9, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
We arrived here Saturday afternoon, and I immediately
arranged a private conference with Grey for eleven o'clock
Sunday morning. We talked steadily for two hours and then
he insisted upon my remaining for lunch, so I did not leave
until two-thirty.
We discussed the situation as frankly as you and I would
have done in Washington, and, as far as I could judge, there
was no reservation. He said several times, 'I am thinking
aloud, so do not take what I say as final, but merely as a
means of reasoning the whole subject out with you.'
I gave him your book, which pleased him, and he regretted
that the only thing he could give you in return was a book he
had written on angling.
We went into every phase of the situation, he telling me
frankly the position the Allies were in, their difficulties, their
resources, and their expectations. That part of it is not as
encouraging as I had hoped, particularly in regard to Italy
and Rumania. There is no danger of their going with Germany, but there is considerable doubt whether they will go
with the Allies. Germany's success has made them timid and
there is also difficulty in regard to Bulgaria. Up to now it
has been impossible to harmonize the differences between
Bulgaria and Serbia. Germany is making tremendous efforts




CONFERENCE WITH SIR EDWARD GREY 363


at present to impress Italy and Rumania to keep them from
participating. If the differences between Bulgaria and Serbia
could be adjusted, Rumania would come in at once and so
probably would Greece; but they are afraid to do so as long
as Bulgaria is not satisfied.
The difficulty with Russia is not one of men, but of transportation. They have not adequately provided for this,
while Germany has to the smallest detail. It prevents them
from putting at the front and maintaining more than one and
one half million to two million men.
The most interesting part of the discussion was what the
final terms of settlement might be and how the difficult
question of armaments could be adjusted....
He went into the discussion of what Russia and France
would demand. I told him if France insisted upon AlsaceLorraine, I would suggest that a counter-proposition should
be made to neutralize them in some such way as Luxembourg now is. This would prevent the two [France and Germany] from touching anywhere and they could only get at
one another by sea.' He thought that Russia might be satisfied with Constantinople, and we discussed that in some
detail.
I let him know that your only interest was in bringing
them together and that you had no desire to suggest terms,
and that what I was saying was merely my personal view,
expressed to him in confidence and as between friends.
There was one thing Grey was fairly insistent upon, and
that was that we should come into some general guaranty for
world-wide peace. I evaded this by suggesting that a separate convention should be participated in by all neutrals as
well as the present belligerents, which should lay down the
principles upon which civilized warfare should in the future
be conducted. In other words, it would merely be the assembling at The Hague and the adopting of rules governing
I Compare the demilitarized zone finally arranged in 1925.




364 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


the game. He did not accept this as our full duty, but we
passed on to other things....
I am making a point to influence opinion over here favorably to you and to America. There has been considerable
criticism of us, and I was told that at a public meeting the
other day, when the name of the United States was mentioned, there was some hissing. I find, though, that intelligent people over here are wholly satisfied with your course.
I took tea yesterday with one of the editorial writers of the
Times and dined with the Managing Editor last night. Tonight I dine with our friend, A. G. Gardiner. I shall write you
about that later.
Affectionately yours
E. M. Hous
In a separate memorandum, Colonel House noted:
'When we had finished talking, Sir Edward smiled and
said, "Here I am helping to direct the affairs of a nation at
war, and yet I have been talking for three and a half hours
like a neutral."...
'I put questions to him with great rapidity, so as to find
what difficulties were necessary to overcome. He answered
with the utmost candor, telling me the whole story as he
would to a member of his own Government. It was an extraordinary conversation, and I feel complimented beyond
measure that he has such confidence in my discretion and
integrity.
'I have many times expressed my high regard for the character of Sir Edward Grey, but I wish to reiterate it here. If
every belligerent nation had a Sir Edward Grey at the head
of its affairs, there would be no war; and if there were war, it
would soon be ended upon lines broad enough to satisfy any
excepting the prejudiced and selfish.'


The conversation is significant, not merely because it in



A SIGNIFICANT CONVERSATION


365


dicates the embarrassment which the territorial aspirations
of France and Russia then and always caused the British,
but also because of Grey's suggestion that the United States
should cooperate at the end of the war in a general organization designed to guarantee peace. Even more significant was
the reiteration by House of his earlier plan, providing for a
scheme of limiting armaments and a guaranty of territorial
integrity.
The two men who sat discussing these questions before
and after lunch, were destined to play a large part in the creation of the League of Nations. Grey from the very beginning of the war insisted that it might have been prevented if
the conference he had proposed had been accepted by Germany; he never wavered in his conviction that until some
international mechanism were established capable of providing a permanent international conference, the world
would not be safe from the menace of war. Through Colonel
House the conviction was ultimately impressed upon President Wilson and was finally translated into the Covenant of
the League. And in the drafting of that Covenant the ideas
and the diplomacy of Colonel House became of the utmost
importance.
II
Colonel House arrived in England at the moment that
Germany embarked upon a momentous course, which still
more envenomed the feeling between the belligerents and intensified the difficulties of his mission. The military events
of the autumn had disarranged German plans, for the surprising speed of the Russian mobilization, the success of the
Russian invasion of Austrian Galicia, and the incursion into
East Prussia compelled Germany to make a counter-attack
in the East at the moment when the Germans had hoped to
concentrate their main force upon the defeat of France.
Hindenburg triumphantly drove the Russians out of East




366 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Prussia, but his attack on Russian Poland failed. In order to
rob the Russians of further offensive power, it seemed necessary to carry through the conquest of Poland and to liberate
Galicia. This attack upon the Russian armies was the more
important in that negotiations for an Austro-Italian settlement were not proceeding smoothly and there appeared imminent danger that Italy might join the Allies. To meet this
new enemy, Austria must be freed from the threat of Russian
attacks.
If Germany mobilized her main strength in the East, she
would be unable to push a vigorous offensive against the
French and British in the West. But here she possessed one
great advantage, a superiority of munitions, and upon this
she counted. It was vital that Great Britain, slow in the
production of her own munitions, should not be permitted to
import them from America, which always refused to lay an
embargo. Hence Germany's determination to utilize the
submarine.
Taking as a pretext the British restrictions upon the entrance of foodstuffs into Germany, a new departure which the
Germans regarded as worthy of retaliation, they proclaimed
a 'war zone' around the British Isles to take effect upon
February 18, 1915. After that date, they threatened, German submarines would destroy any enemy merchant ship in
this zone, without regard for the safety of the passengers or
crews of the vessels attacked. They warned neutral shipping
of the peril that would attend entrance into the war zone,
since mistakes might occur, especially if belligerent ships
continued the practice of raising neutral flags.
The response of the American Government was prompt
and definite. It warned Great Britain of the peril inherent
in the unauthorized use of the American flag. In more solemn phrases it warned Germany that if submarines should
'destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of
American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government




NOTE ON THE SUBMARINES


367


of the United States to view the act in any other light than
as an indefensible violation of neutral rights.... The Government of the United States would be constrained to hold
the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability
for such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps
it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives
and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.'
These new developments complicated House's mission,
but did not alter his underlying purpose, which was to proceed to Berlin after his conversations with the British, provided he received a direct intimation that the Germans
would receive him. The Colonel refused to go to Germany
unless invited. At Washington, Bernstorff kept insisting
that his Government wanted House and through him would
express their desire for a 'reasonable' peace. On February
13, Wilson cabled House that he was stimulating German
interest in peace through Bernstorff, who was confident that
a letter of invitation was on the way.
House spent long hours almost daily with the officials of
the Foreign Office, for he realized that a complete understanding was necessary both as regards trade disputes and
the possibility of peace discussions. His proposed trip to
Germany would be fruitless unless the British approved. He
was anxious also to discuss the bases upon which a permanent world peace could be founded, something beyond the
ending of the war and a settlement of the territorial aspirations of the warring states.
'February 10, 1915: I lunched with our Ambassador [the
Colonel recorded] to meet Sir Edward Grey and Sir William
Tyrrell. I wish I could give in detail every word of the conversation, for it was freighted with importance. We discussed at length the question of whether Germany was in
earnest about beginning peace parleys. I maintained that




368 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


she was, and that she was sparring for advantage; that she
desired me to come on Bernstorff's invitation, unsolicited by
the Government, in order that they might say, in the event
negotiations failed, that they had never been a party to them.
'Sir Edward thought the Germans were not ready for parleys, but were fencing for the purpose of getting the Allies at
a disadvantage so that they might say to Ferdinand of Bulgaria and others that the Allies were making overtures for
peace. I took the view that, while it was doubtful whether
the military party was yet ready for peace, I felt certain the
Kaiser and his entourage were.
'Sir Edward said he had told Delcasse, French Minister
for Foreign Affairs, of my visit and of our conversations of
Sunday. Delcasse thought that the Allies had not yet
achieved sufficient military success to begin negotiations, and
he believes with Sir Edward that the Germans are insincere.
'Among other things, Grey told me that the British Ambassador [Sir Francis Bertie] at Paris had sent him a despatch
advising him of my presence in London and suggesting that
he get in touch with me. This amused us all very much.
'Grey and I did practically all the talking, Page and
Tyrrell joining in every now and then. We went over some of
the ground we had covered Sunday, regarding a permanent
settlement, and Sir Edward reverted to his view that our
Government should be a party to the making of peace.
Much to my surprise, Page thought this would be possible
and advisable. I told Sir Edward more directly than I did
on Sunday that we could not do so; that it was not only the
unwritten law of our country but also our fixed policy, not
to become involved in European affairs.')
1 House was evidently uncertain of Wilson's willingness to become
entangled in European politics and realized the national prejudice
against such entanglements. The covenant he proposed would not involve the United States in any purely European problems. Our participation in the war, naturally, altered his opinion as to the necessity of
participating in a peace conference.




SIRl WILLIAM TYRRELL


(o1








A PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL COVENANT 369


'Tyrrell said we had not always followed this policy,
reciting the Algeciras incident. Page also cited the Perry
and Morocco Pirates incident. I held, nevertheless, that it
would be impossible and that all we could do would be to
join the neutrals and belligerents in a separate convention
after the peace covenant was drawn up and signed by the
belligerents. I told Grey that it would be impossible for our
Government to take part in such questions as what should
become of Alsace-Lorraine and Constantinople, and that we
could not be a party to the making of the actual terms of
peace, which this first convention must necessarily cover.
I felt sure, though, that our Government would be willing to
join all nations in setting forth clearly the rights of belligerents in the future and agreeing upon rules of warfare that
would take away much of the horror of war.
'I suggested that this covenant should forbid the killing of
non-combatants by aircraft, the violation of neutral territory, and the setting forth of certain lanes of safety at sea in
order that shipping of all countries, both belligerent and
neutral, would not be subject to attack when they were in
those lanes.
'Sir Edward amended this latter suggestion by saying he
thought Great Britain would be willing to agree that all merchant shipping of whatever nature, belligerent or neutral,
would be immune. I accepted the amendment and was
pleased to know that Great Britain stood ready to go so far.
'February 11, 1915: I lunched with Sir William Tyrrell today and we had a most interesting conversation. He spoke
with entire frankness....
'Tyrrell believed that in the convention I suggested yesterday, if an agreement should be made between all the
Powers, neutral and belligerent, to establish rules governing
future warfare, Great Britain would consent to the absolute
freedom of merchantmen of all nations to sail the seas in
time of war unmolested. This was brought out in our con



370 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


ference yesterday, but Tyrrell developed in his conversation
to-day that Great Britain recognized that the submarine had
changed the status of maritime warfare and in the future
Great Britain would be better protected by such a policy
than she has been in the past by maintaining an overwhelming navy.' 4
The conversations were significant, for this is the germ of
the idea soon to be developed by House, which he later termed
the 'Freedom of the Seas.' As Grey and Tyrrell realized, the
practical application of the idea would be of immense value
to Great Britain, an island depending for its life upon the
continuity of its merchant trade. But House saw that the
Germans, blockaded as they were and also largely dependent
upon overseas trade, would be attracted by it. It might
serve as the beginning of negotiations.
The fact which must touch the sense of humor of the
historian is that the 'Freedom of the Seas,' later so bitterly
opposed by the British and regarded generally as a German
trick, was first suggested by the British Foreign Office as a
means of furthering British interests.
III
On February 12, House received the invitation from the
Germans for which he had been waiting. It was not entirely
satisfactory, for Zimmermann demurred at the suggestion
of an indemnity for Belgium, but it gave the opening if the
Colonel thought best to use it.
Herr Zimmermann to Colonel House
BERLIN, February 4, 1915
MY DEAR COLONEL:... I read with interest what you were good enough to
write with reference to the desired interchange of opinion.
1 Grey had already advocated this policy in his instructions to the
British Delegation to the Second Hague Conference, 1907.




ZIMMERMANN ON A BELGIAN INDEMNITY 371


While we are quite ready, as I wrote you before, to do our
share to bring about the desired termination of the war, at
the same time there are certain limits which we are unable to
overstep.
What you suggest concerning the paying of an indemnity
to Belgium seems hardly feasible to me. Our campaign in
that country has cost the German nation such infinite sacrifices of human lives that anything in the form of such a decided yielding to the wishes of our opponents would cause
the most bitter feeling among our people.
I heard that you are on your way to England at this moment and that a trip to Germany is in view. I shall be most
happy to see you, should you carry out your intention, and
shall hope for a personal interview more satisfactory than is
possible through correspondence by letter.
With kindest regards, I am
My dear Colonel
Sincerely yours
ZIMMERMANN
'February 13, 1915: I lunched alone with Sir Edward Grey
[recorded House] at 33 Eccleston Square, which, by the way,
he leases from Winston Churchill. We had a very simple
lunch and I made it a point not to talk business while we were
at the table. We talked of nature, solitude, Wordsworth....
He told of Roosevelt's visit with him in the New Forest and
how it occurred. Roosevelt' sent him word he would like very
much to hear the song-birds of England, and Sir Edward
undertook to gratify this wish. He said they heard forty-one
distinct voices, no one of which Roosevelt recognized excepting the golden-crested wren, which I believe we also have in
America.
'In speaking of Wordsworth, I asked if he went often to
the English lake district. He replied that he had never been,
that his country home was so much more attractive to him




372 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


than any other place on earth that when he had time he always went there. He is the least travelled man of prominence
I have ever known.
'When we went to the library, I showed him Zimmermann's letter and we discussed it long and carefully. I
thought it was up to him and to me to decide when to begin
negotiations for peace. As far as I was concerned, I did not
want them to begin one moment before the time was ripe for
a peace that would justify the sacrifices of the brave who had
already given their lives, for it was even better for others to
die if the right settlement could be brought about in no other
way. On the other hand, neither of us would want to sacrifice one single life uselessly; and if we could accomplish now
the desired result, we should do it.
'We went over the entire ground and discussed it in this
spirit. I had a feeling that the sooner I went, the better -
for our relations with Germany were growing worse, and
soon I might not be welcome. I was afraid some foolish or
wanton outrage, either by air or sea, might be committed
which would so set opinion against Germany as to make it
impossible for his Government to begin any discussion.
'We sat by the fire in his library, facing one another, discussing every phase of the situation with a single mind and
purpose. He had information that Germany was starting an
enveloping movement upon the Russian front with a view of
impressing the Balkan States and, if she was successful in
this, it might be that Bulgaria would come into the warnot, perhaps, against Great Britain or Russia, but against
Serbia, which would be much the same thing.
'He told me of the plan to convey English troops to Salonika and to take them that way into Serbia. He thought
if as many as 200,000 British troops could be safely taken
there, Greece would gladly join the Allies. He did not think
it fair to Greece to let her come into the war without some
protection. The difficulty, he explained, was the mainte



CONVERSATION WITH GREY


373


nance of the troops after they were there, since only a singletrack railway ran into Serbia.
'He said they had never tried to influence Holland to come
into the war, for they had not been able to send sufficient
troops there to protect her from an invasion in the event she
declared war on Germany. He thought if Germany succeeded in the present enveloping movement [in the East], she
would then turn to the West and again try to break through
the lines and reach Paris.
'In conclusion, he did not think it wise for me to undertake
a peace mission to Germany until after this enveloping movement had either succeeded or failed, for he did not believe
the civil Government would be able to do anything in the
direction of peace until von Hindenburg and the other military men had tried out their different campaigns.
'It was finally agreed that we should defer a decision until
after I had lunched with the Prime Minister on Wednesday.
He had told none of the Cabinet about our conversations,
but he had made notes and it was his purpose to discuss
them with the Prime Minister and no one else at present....
'February 14, 1915: Sir Edward Grey told me yesterday
that when this war was over, he intended to retire for a year
and rest. I advised retiring permanently, for he would probably have taken so great a part in this European conflict,
that to do anything else afterward would be like a great
artist going out in his back yard and painting the fence. He.. looked at me wide-eyed and serious.'
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, February 15, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:... I am still undecided as to what to do about Berlin.
The difficulties are these: This Government [the British] has
to be extremely careful about giving us any encouragement
whatever. They do not dare say what they actually feel, not




374 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


only because it might make England's position misunderstood in Germany, but also because it would meet with a
storm of disapproval here, for the reason that no one believes that anything like the kind of terms that England will
demand will be met now.
As a matter of fact, there is no feeling whatever, excepting
among a very small circle, for anything out of the war excepting a permanent settlement, evacuation, and indemnity
to Belgium; but no one believes that Germany is ready for
such terms.
Germany, on the other hand, is now controlled almost
wholly by the militarists. There is a peace party there as
there is here, and both, strangely enough, are conducting the
civil Governments. Those here are much more powerful to
act than those in Germany, where I believe they have but
little power. As long as the military forces of Germany are
successful as now, the militarists will not permit any suggestion of peace....
I am formulating in my own mind, and am unravelling it
from time to time to Grey and others in authority, to see
how far it is feasible, a plan for a general convention of all
neutral and belligerent nations of the world, at which you
will be called upon to preside and which should be called
upon your invitation.
It could meet concurrently with the peace conference, or,
if peace is not in sight by August, it could then be called and
it might be used as-a medium of bringing about peace between the belligerents. This second convention, of course,
would not deal with any of the controversies between the
belligerents, but it would go into the rules of future warfare
and the rights of neutrals.
It would be of far-reaching consequence —more farreaching, in fact, than the peace conference itself....
Affectionately yours
E M. MHOUSE




TRIP TO GERMANY POSTPONED


375


As a result of his conference with Grey and Asquith,
House decided that the trip to Germany should be postponed, at least for a few weeks. The Colonel would reply to
Zimmermann in such a way that, if Berlin were really serious,
the door could be kept open. A message from Gerard, urging
immediate action, did not change this decision, since it was
plain that the Germans thought they were winning the war
and Gerard himself found it difficult not to agree with them.
So long as they were in this frame of mind, negotiations
would be fruitless, for the Germans would merely utilize conversations for diplomatic purposes, without any real intention of making peace.
Colonel House to Herr Zimmermann
LONDON, February 17, 1915
MY DEAR HERR ZIMMERMANN:
Thank you for your kind letter of February fourth.
I thought I should be able to go to Berlin early next week,
but it now seems best to remain here until I can have another word from you.
All of our conversations with the Ambassadors in Washington representing the belligerent nations were based upon
the supposition that Germany would consent to evacuate
and indemnify Belgium and would be willing to make a
settlement looking towards permanent peace.
I can readily understand the difficulty which your Government would encounter in regard to an indemnity; therefore, if that question might for the moment be waived, may
we assume that your Government would let the other two
points mark the beginning of conversations?
If we could be placed in so fortunate a position, I feel confident that parleys could at least be commenced.
I need not tell you, Sir, what great moral advantage this
position would give Germany, and how expectantly the neutral nations would look towards the Allies that they would
meet so fair an attitude,




376 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Your favorable reply to this will, I believe, mark the beginning of the end of this unhappy conflict.
I am, my dear Herr Zimmermann
Sincerely yours
E. M. HOUSE
Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House
BERLIN, February 15, 1915
MY DEAR COLONEL:
I received your letter from London. I saw Zimmermann
also. He told me he had written you saying they would be
glad to see you, etc., which is, of course, all they can do.
It is felt here that we are partial to England.
They are serious here about this submarine blockade, but
are willing to withdraw it if food and raw materials are
allowed to enter - in other words, if England will adopt
either the Declaration of London or of Paris - but they say
they will not stand having their civil population starved.
Make no mistake, they will win on land and probably get a
separate peace from Russia, then get the same from France
or overwhelm it, and put a large force in Egypt, and perhaps
completely blockade England.
Germany will make no peace proposals, but I am sure if a
reasonable peace is proposed now (a matter of days, even
hours), it would be accepted. (This on my authority.)
The Allies should send a peace proposal or an offer to talk
peace, to me verbally and secretly here. If it is accepted, all
right; if not, no harm done, or publicity for the proposal -
for I would only make it in case I learned it would be accepted.
But Germany will pay no indemnity to Belgium or any one
else. But, as I told you, this peace matter is a question
almost of hours. The submarine blockade once begun, a
feeling will come about which may make it impossible until
after another phase of the war. If you can get such an intimation from the Allies and then come here, it will go, to the




CORRESPONDENCE WITH GERARD


377


best of my belief. I do not think the Kaiser ever actually
wanted the war.
The feeling, as I said, just now is very tense against America. The sale of arms is at the bottom, and the fact that we
stand things from England that we would not from Germany
(according to the Germans) is the cause. But it is very real
and makes us all very uncomfortable.
Hope to see you soon.
Yours ever
JAMES W. GERARD
P.S. I am sure of acceptance of proposal.
Colonel House to Ambassador Gerard
LONDON, March 1, 1915
MY DEAR JUDGE:... These are slow-moving people [the British], and when
I undertook to tell them of your opinion that quick action
was necessary and it was a question of hours rather than
days, I saw that it was hopeless. Of course, though, this is
inevitable no matter how fast they wished to move, for the
reason that they cannot act alone; and it takes an incredible
time to get any satisfactory communication with the Allies,
especially with Russia.
I see no insuperable obstacle in the way of peace and I feel
if the belligerents would begin to talk, they might soon come
to an agreement.
The army and navy machine here is now under a tremendous momentum and your prediction as to the final outcome
is not shared by any one here, from the highest to the lowest.
If this war lasts six months longer, England will have a navy
that will be more than equal to the combined navies of the
world. That is something for us Americans to think of; in
fact, it is something for everybody to think of....
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE




378 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to the President
LONDON, February 18, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:... I had a conference with Sir Edward Grey last Tuesday
evening, and again yesterday at which the Prime Minister
and Page were present.
Both Asquith and Grey thought it would be footless for me
to go to Berlin until the present German enveloping movement in the east is determined. It looks, for the moment, bad
for the Russians; and they do not want me to be in Berlin at
such a time. If this movement fails and things get again
deadlocked, they think I should take that opportunity to go
there....
I put the matter plainly to both Asquith and Sir Edward,
asking their advice as to what to do, telling them we were all
interested alike in bringing about the desired result, and it
was a question of how best to do it. They accepted this
position and Sir Edward thought, at the moment, I should
write to Zimmermann along the lines that I did.
The idea was that unless they at least conceded these two
points;,) the matter had as well be dropped until they were
willing to do so.
Sir Edward said that England would continue the war
indefinitely unless these cardinal points were agreed to....
I told them at yesterday's conference that it would not do
to close the door too tightly, for we must leave it ajar so it
could be widely opened if Germany really desired peace.
Asquith smiled and said, 'You will be a very clever man if
you can do that successfully.'
The situation grows hourly worse because of the German
manifesto in regard to merchantmen   and the sowing of
1 Evacuation of invaded territory and guaranties for permanent peace.
2 On the day on which this letter was written, the German threat of
February 4 was to come into effect: that every enemy merchant ship
found in the war zone would be destroyed 'without its being always
possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews and passengers.'




GREY DISCUSSES GERARD'S LETTER 379


mines. I tried hard to get Sir Edward, and afterwards Asquith, to meet this situation before to-day; but with the
usual British slowness, they put it off until Thursday or perhaps next Tuesday.
The psychological time to have ended this war was around
the end of November or the first of December, when everything looked as if it had gotten into a permanent deadlock.
You will remember we tried to impress this upon Sir Cecil
and tried to get quicker action, but without success....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
'February 18, 1915: I went to 33 Eccleston Square at 7.30
to see Sir Edward Grey and was with him a half-hour. I
handed him Gerard's letter and also one from Penfield....
'Sir Edward talked as frankly as usual and said the terms
Gerard proposed would only be entertained by Great Britain in the event all the things he predicted would happen,
had already happened; that is, that Russia and France were
completely beaten and Egypt and other British territory occupied by the enemy.
'I again urged upon him better coordination between the
eastern and western fronts. He did not think this possible,
because of the Russian governmental system. It seems to me
perfect folly not to work more in harmony; that is, when
the Germans are attacking in the east, they should be severely
pressed in the west, and vice versa....
'February 20, 1915: I called on Sir Edward Grey at 33 Eccleston Square at 7.15. Lord Kitchener was with him when
I arrived, but he left within a few minutes.
'Sir Edward said that the Allies intended forcing the Dardanelles and that perhaps it would take them three or four
weeks.i This is not only a spectacular movement, but, if suc1 'It is interesting to note how far afield this prophecy was.' [Note by
E. M. H.]




380 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


cessful, will have far-reaching effect upon the Eastern situation, besides giving Russia an outlet and inlet. He also told
me that Kitchener said his reports from Russia were that the
Germans had not captured more than one division, and the
situation in the East was nothing like as bad as represented.
Sir Edward qualified this, however, by saying that Russian
news was never quite reliable. He thought after matters had
quieted down upon the Eastern front and a deadlock had once
more been arrived at, and the Dardanelles had been forced,
it would be well for me to go to Germany.'
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, February 23, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
In reply to your cablegram of the 20th, indicating that you
thought there was danger of mry yielding too far to the wishes
of this Government in deferring my visit to Berlin, I tried to
give you some explanation in my reply which I sent yesterday.
Up to now, all we know is that Germany refuses to indemnify Belgium and refuses to make any proposition herself. She may or may not be willing to evacuate Belgium and
consider proposals looking to permanent peace. But even if
she concedes these two cardinal points, it is well to remember that neither Russia nor France is willing now to make
peace on any such terms.
When the Russian Minister of Finance and the French
Minister for Foreign Affairs were here, Sir Edward told them
of your letter and of my presence. He also told them what I
thought might be accomplished now and he asked them
whether or not they would like to have a conference with me.
They both preferred not doing so, stating that the time was
not opportune for peace proposals, for the reason that it was
certain that Germany, being so far successful, would not
acquiesce in such terms as their Governments would demand.




LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT


381


The British public and a majority of the Cabinet would
not look with any greater favor upon the only terms that
Germany would now concede, than would France and
Russia.
Since the war has begun and since they consider that Germany was the aggressor and is the exponent of militarism,
they are determined not to cease fighting until there is no
hope of victory, or until Germany is ready to concede what
they consider a fair and permanent settlement.
It is almost as important to us to have the settlement laid
upon the right foundations as it is to the nations of Europe.
If this war does not end militarism, then the future is full of
trouble for us.
If there was any reason to believe that Germany was ready
to make such terms as the Allies are ready to accept, then it
would be well to go immediately; but all our information is
to the contrary and the result of my visit there now would
be to lose the sympathetic interest which England, and
through her the Allies, now feel in your endeavors and without accomplishing any good in Germany.
You may put it down as a certainty that Germany will
only use you in the event it suits her purposes to do so; and
she will not be deterred from this if at any time she sees that
it is to her advantage to accept your good offices.
Asquith told Page yesterday that he sincerely hoped that
I would not make the mistake of going just now. That
simply means, if I do go they will probably cease to consider
you as a medium.
If Zimmermann replies to my letter, then I shall go to
Berlin and have a conference with him; but it will accomplish nothing for the moment, for he will not now go further;
and the Allies will not be willing to begin parleys upon such
a basis.
Sir Edward is extremely anxious for England to take the
highest possible grounds and not ask for anything excepting




382 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


the evacuation and indemnifying of Belgium and a settlement that will ensure permanent peace. But, there again, he
comes in conflict with colonial opinion. The South African
colonies have no notion of giving up German Africa which
they have taken, as they say it will be a constant menace to
them to have so powerful and warlike a neighbor.
The same applies to... the Caroline Islands, Samoa, etc.,
which the Australians have taken.
Sir Edward is trying assiduously to work up an opinion
upon broader lines, and he may or may not be successful;
but he is not now in a position to say that his wishes will
prevail....
Germany may be successful. If France or Russia gives
way, she will soon dominate the Continent; and it is not altogether written that one or the other will not give way.
Even if the Allies hold together, there is a possibility that the
war may continue another year....
I try very hard not to think of it any more than I did at
home, and I try to talk of it as little as possible, so that my
mind may be clear to look'at the situation dispassionately.
The one sane, big figure here is Sir Edward Grey; and the
chances are all in favor of his being the dominant personality
when the final settlement comes, and I believe it is the part
of wisdom to continue to keep in as close and sympathetic
touch with him as now....
I note now with interest that occasionally Sir Edward
speaks of 'that second convention which the President may
call.' He has come to look upon it as one of the hopes for the
future and, if we accomplish nothing else, you will be able to
do the most important world's work within sight.
I have reason to believe that this Government will be
ready to make great concessions in that convention in regard
to the future of shipping, commerce, etc., during periods of
war.l It is my purpose to keep this'up my sleeve' and, when
1 Another reference to the plan of the 'Freedom of the Seas.'




HOOVER AT THE EMBASSY


383


I go to Germany, use it to bring favorable opinion to you by
intimating that I believe when the end comes you will insist
upon this being done; in other words, that with your initiative and with Germany's cooperation, Great Britain can be
induced to make these terms. This, I think, will please the
Germans and may go a long way towards placating their
feelings toward us....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
IV
As one might expect, Colonel House took care to come into
contact with every one who might give information or assistance in his mission of good will: politicians of all parties and
shades of opinion, men of business, journalists.
'February 14, 1915: I lunched with Lady Paget, and in the
afternoon Sidney Brooks took tea with me. He said there
was much curiosity in London as to the purpose of my visit,
and he had explained that my trousers had worn out earlier
this year than usual and I had come to have Poole renew
them. He asked me seriously if I desired anything said of my
visit or whether I wished the Times to comment at all upon
Anglo-American relations. I asked him to please say nothing for the moment. He said the Times was at my disposal whenever I wished to use it for the purpose of my
mission, whatever that mission was....
'February 20, 1915: I went to the Embassy and found
Hoover discussing with Page the difficulties he is encountering from day to day in his Belgian relief work. He is a resourceful fellow and needs to be, for he has a most complex
situation to contend with, having the German, the Belgian,
and British Governments at cross-purposes....
'February 25, 1915: I lunched with Lord Bryce to-day at




384 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


his apartment at No. 3 Buckingham Gate. We had a most
delightful time. He arranged for us to be entirely alone,
not even Lady Bryce being there.
'He inquired after the President, and I told of the President's having read me Gardiner's sketch of him in "Pillars of
Society," the opening sentence of which I remember was:
"If one were asked to name the greatest living Englishman
I think it would be necessary to admit, regretfully, that he
is a Scotsman born in Ireland."
'Bryce smiled and said he had not read it, and was afraid
to do so for fear his head might be turned; at the same time,
I noticed he asked me again the title of the book.
'We gradually drifted into a discussion of the war and of
the problems for its solution. It seemed to me a good opportunity to test the wisdom of my views upon so clear and
subtle a political mind; and I told him forthwith, though in
strict confidence, pretty much what I had planned. This embraced, of course, the proposition regarding the cessation of
the manufacture of armaments for a period of years, the
calling of the second convention by the President, and its
scope and character.
'Bryce was visibly interested. I told him, too, what I had
tried to do toward preventing the war, at least between the
Western Powers. He was as interested in this as in the other,
and agreed that it might have been possible if war had been
deferred a short while longer. He had also heard that Great
Britain and Germany were on the eve of a settlement concerning the Bagdad Railroad and a division of the sphere of
influence in Africa. This convention was yet to be signed
when the war burst forth....




PRIVATE AUDIENCE WITH THE KING 385


Colonel House to the President
LONDON, March 1, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
The King's Private Secretary, the Lord Stamfordham,
called yesterday to bring an invitation to me from the King
to call at eleven o'clock for a private audience. I was curious
to know what he wanted.
I was with him for nearly an hour. He is the most bellicose
Englishman that I have so far met. I had hopes that he might
want to talk concerning peace plans, but he evidently wanted
to impress me with the fact that this was no time to talk
peace. His idea seemed to be that the best way to obtain
permanent peace was to knock all the fight out of the Germans, and stamp on them for a while until they wanted peace
and more of it than any other nation.
He spoke kindly of the Germans as a whole, but for his
dear cousin and his military entourage, he denounced them in
good sailor-like terms. He is the most pugnacious monarch
that is loose in these parts.
He told me a good deal about the navy and its operations
and also of what they hoped to do on land. He seemed more
certain than any one I have met that France and Russia
would stick to the last man. He said what would happen to
Germany when the French got in there, if they ever did,
would be a plenty; and he said his cousin, the Czar, had
written him that Russia was aflame from one end to the
other and was determined to win if they had to put in the
field twenty million men.
As for England, he said she was sending the flower of the
nation to the front and that the world would be forced to
acknowledge, before the spring and summer were over, that
her army was equal to her best tradition.
He spoke of our relations and expressed the greatest gratification that we were on such good terms. He said the hope
of the world lay in their continuance.




386 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


He asked me to convey to you his most respectful compliments and assurances of distinguished consideration.
Some one had evidently given him a glimpse of your character, for he voiced almost all I said of you before I could say
it myself....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
Colonel House asked the King why he did not take occasion to speak to the British public in the forceful manner in
which he had talked to him regarding the war and war
measures. He replied, House recorded, 'that he did not do
so for the reason that his distinguished cousin, the Kaiser,
had talked so much and had made such a fool of himself that
he had a distaste for that kind of publicity. Then, too, he
added, this was a different sort of monarchy and he did not
desire to intrude himself in such matters.'  6q 1 5 t r
Colonel House to Mr. Gordon Auchincloss
LONDON, March 2, 1915
DEAR GORDON:... I am lunching and dining with some one of importance
every day. On Tuesday I go into the Conservative camp
further than I have yet done, by dining to meet Balfour,
Lord Curzon, and several others....
4 U's(/ and I keep in constant communication by cable;
but so far as I can see, my main object now must be to mark
time and not offend by overdoing....
Unless one has undertaken such a job himself - and there
has been none like it up to now - he cannot possibly imagine the pitfalls that lurk on every hand. It keeps one sidestepping every moment; and if I succeed in doing nothing
more than keeping out of trouble, I shall consider I have been
fortunate.
1 An obvious representation of W. W.




CONFERENCE WITH MR. BALFOUR


387


I have succeeded in keeping my name absolutely out of the
European press, which is a good beginning, and I remain in
as much obscurity as is possible for one having such work in
hand. No one, of course, not even Page, knows when I see
the different Ministers or personages of importance; and my
comings and goings are as unchronicled as if I were a crossing-sweeper.
Paternally yours
E. M. HOUSE
'March 4, 1915 [conference between House and A. J. Balfour]: We got along famously together, I doing most of the
talking, although at times he would become enthusiastic and
would get up and stand by the fire and declaim to me just as
earnestly as I had to him. I took a liking to him at once, and
have a sincere desire that it should be reciprocated. I like
the quality of his mind. It is not possible to allow one's wits
to lag when one is in active discussion with him. In that
respect, he reminds me somewhat of the President. I am
inclined to rank him along with the President and Mr.
Asquith in intellectuality, and this, to my mind, places him
at the summit.'
Colonel House to Mr. Gordon Auchincloss
LONDON, March 5, 1915
DEAR GORDON:... I have seen almost every Liberal of importance in the
Kingdom, and for the past week I have devoted myself to
the Conservatives, as it will be very helpful, not only to the
Government, but to me individually in the final negotiations.
Balfour was very complimentary in regard to the suggestions I have made, and said they were unique and practicable
as far as he could see at the moment.
I have seen for a long while that the limiting of armaments
was the insuperable obstacle in the way of a permanent set



388 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


tlement, and I have not been able to think of a way that was
satisfactory to me until I was on the Lusitania with my mind
free to devote to the subject. It then occurred to me that if
all the important nations, belligerents and neutrals, should
agree to cease the manufacture of munitions of war for a
period of ten years or more, the question then of how large
an army Germany should have, or France should retain, or
the size of Germany's or Great Britain's navy, need not be
discussed.'
The armies and the navies would remain as they are at the
end of the war; but without the manufacture of any further
battleships or munitions of war, everything would automatically become obsolete in a few years. What we need to
do is to play for time. Time will make Germany democratic
and there will be no more danger in that direction than from
the United States, England, or France. Russia is another
problem, which may or may not have to be dealt with in the
future.
This plan would involve the shutting-down of Krupps' and
of Armstrong's and other manufacturers, and it would leave
the world at the end of ten years on a peace footing. The
money that it would save to each nation every year would
be sufficient to pay the interest on the great war debts that
they are piling up.
All this, of course, is not to be mentioned except to Sidney
and Martin,A from whom I keep nothing....
Paternally yours
E. M. HOUSE
'March 5, 1915: Sidney Brooks called in the afternoon.
He was on his way to the Foreign Office to offer his services in
an effort to present the British side of questions arising be1 The proposal is obviously based upon the assumption of a military
stalemate, which at that time seemed probable to House.
2 Dr. Sidney Mezes, and Mr. E. S. Martin, editor of Life.




LORD CURZON A JINGO


389


tween the United States and Great Britain. He hopes to be
able to do better work than has been done. He said up to
now the Foreign Office had done it as badly as human ingenuity could suggest. He asked if I thought they could have
done it worse. I thought not, and Brooks seemed pleased at
this tribute to their efforts....
'Chalmers Roberts and I took supper at Scot's. Afterward I went to the Ambassador's, as he wished to show me
Colonel George O. Squier's diary, which he said I must keep
in the deepest confidence. It embarrassed me to have to tell
him that I had had a copy of the diary for more than two
weeks.
'We talked of home, of the President, McAdoo, and conditions, and we had a genuinely good time. I like Page.
He is direct and without guile....
'March 8, 1915:1 dined with Lord Loreburn. John Burns
was the only other guest. They are both sane, reasonable,
able men, and we talked of the war and of the jingoes and
of the difficulties of peace. I told them of the demands of
France and of those of South Africa concerning the German
African colonies. Burns thought the latter could be met, but
considered those of France more serious....
'March 9, 1915: We dined with Lady Paget. She had a
notable gathering. The other guests were Lord Curzon, Mr.
A. J. Balfour, Sir John Cowan, Mr. Cust (who will be Lord
Brownley), Lord and Lady Desborough (Lady-in-waiting
to the Queen), Duchess of Marlborough, Mrs. John Astor,
and Mrs. George Keppel.
'Curzon and I had considerable talk together when coffee
was served, and I found him the worst jingo I have met. He
wants to make peace in Berlin no matter how long it takes to
get there. He is an able man, expressing himself forcefully
and well. We got along agreeably, for he seemed to want to
be as pleasant as possible. With that type I seldom or never
argue, because our views are too far apart to ever harmonize.




390 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'Balfour has a much more charming personality. I talked
to Cust and succeeded in changing his point of view as to the
United States....'
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, March 8, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:... Since I last wrote, I have seen something of the peace
party, headed by such men as the recent Lord Chancellor,
Lord Loreburn, Mr. Hirst of the Economist, and others.
Northcliffe is of the ultra set on the other side. He remarked to one or two friends of mine that if you had sent me
over here to discuss peace, I should be run out of England.... I mention this to show the extreme difficulties of the situation. Sidney Brooks told me, however, that he had found
no one with whom I had talked now antagonistic to our purposes.
I shall find this anti-peace feeling much stronger in Germany among the military party; but if I can get directly at
the Kaiser, I hope to be able to make some impression. The
great question is, who really controls in Germany? This is
something I am afraid I shall have to find out for myself....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HouSE
V
In the meantime, Grey and House had decided that the
moment had arrived for the Colonel to go to Berlin. Messages had come from von Jagow through Washington that
the Germans awaited him; and although letters from Zimmermann and Gerard contained no intimation of Germany's
willingness to make concessions, it seemed worth while to
discover the real situation in Berlin.




LETTER FROM ZIMMERMANN


391


Herr Zimmermann to Colonel House
BERLIN, March 2, 1915
MY DEAR COLONEL:
Many thanks for your letter of February 17th. I regret to
see that you consider giving up your trip to Berlin which I
had counted on as offering a much more satisfactory opportunity for an interchange of ideas than has been possible up
to now.
I read with interest what you believe to be a possible beginning to the desired end. It seems to me, however, that you
are taking as a basis a more or less defeated Germany or one
nearly at the end of her resources. It is hardly necessary
for me to show in how far this is not the case. Although I
can assure you that Germany has the welfare of Belgium
very much at heart, still she is not able to forget what a
terrific cost was paid for the resistance our men encountered
there.
You may be sure, as I said before, that Germany's wish
for a permanent peace is as sincere as your own. If England
would consent to give up her claim to a monopoly on the seas
together with her two-to-one power standard, I think it might
be a good beginning.
I remain, my dear Colonel
Sincerely yours
ZIMMERMANN
Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House
BERLIN, March 6, 1915
MY DEAR COLONEL:
I hope you are coming here soon. Von Jagow said he
hoped you were coming, and while I see no prospect of peace
now, you could acquaint yourself with the general situation
and be in a better position to talk in the other capitals....
The feeling against America is in abeyance, waiting to see
what happens with relation to the latest English declaration




392 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


about the blockade of Germany. I have as yet no official
information.
The Chancellor is not boss now. Von Tirpitz and Falkenhayn (Chief of Staff) have more influence, especially as the
Chancellor bores the Emperor, and there are great intrigues
going on among all these conflicting authorities. The people
who were in favor of accepting a reasonable peace proposal
were, strange to say, the military general staff end, and it
was von Tirpitz who did not want our last proposals accepted.ll...
I hate to write in these spy times and do most earnestly
hope you are coming soon, or, if you are going to Italy, I will
run down and report to you there if you want....
Ever yours
JAMES W. GERARD
'March 7, 1915 [conference with Grey]: We both think the
time has come for me to go to Germany. I have decided to
go via France, and I asked his opinion as to whether I should
see Delcasse. At first he thought not. He said Delcasse was
decidedly of the opinion, when he was here, that it was no
time for peace parleys, and he did not believe he had changed
this point of view. I was afraid he would consider it a discourtesy if I did not see him. Looking at it from that viewpoint, Grey thought I was right and it would be best to see
him, though he cautioned me to be guarded in what I said.
I assured him he need have no fear of my being indiscreet.
'Grey thought France would insist upon Alsace-Lorraine. The French believe the Allies will win and that they
can impose terms of peace upon Germany; later, perhaps,
they would find that to impose peace conditions upon Germany would necessitate continuing the war for a number of
1 The United States proposed that Germany should give up the submarine war zone around Great Britain, provided the British relinquished
the food blockade.




GREY'S MEMOIRS QUOTED


393


years and, when that was realized, they might be willing to
make concessions.
'He did not know the mind of Russia, but he believed by
giving them Constantinople and the Straits, they would be
willing to acquiesce in almost any other terms that might
be agreed upon....
'The difficulty I expect to find here in the final negotiations is, there is no man who dominates the situation....
In Germany I shall find the situation even more uncertain.
If there were a Palmerston or a Chatham here, and a Bismarck in Germany, it would be easier.'
The Quest for Peace had thus far revealed nothing but the
unwillingness of any of the belligerents to yield an iota of
their aspirations. Yet the mission had not been wasted.
House had established relations with the British which not
merely helped to tide over the difficulties of the present, but
which must prove invaluable in preventing misunderstanding for the future. The memoirs of the British Foreign Secretary indicate how thoroughly the Colonel had succeeded
in establishing a sympathetic understanding. 'It was not
necessary,' writes Grey, 'to spend much time in putting our
case to him. He had a way of saying, "I know it" in a tone
and manner that carried conviction both of his sympathy
with, and understanding of, what was said to him.' And
again: 'Our conversations became almost at once not only
friendly but intimate. I found combined in him in a rare
degree the qualities of wisdom and sympathy. In the stress
of war it was at once a relief, a delight, and an advantage to
be able to talk with him freely. His criticism or comment was
valuable, his suggestions were fertile, and these were all conveyed with a sympathy that made it pleasant to listen to
them. After a day that began about seven in the morning I
broke off work by seven in the evening and took things easily
at my house for an hour before dinner. It was arranged that




394  INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE
in this hour House should come whenever he wanted to have
a talk.' 1
The Colonel's mission would have been worth while if only
because of this close personal understanding with the Foreign
Secretary, and it was one of the imponderables that weighed
heavily in the diplomatic history of the following years.
Appreciative of Grey's honesty and moderation, fearful of
the demands of France, suspicious of German sincerity, yet
determined if possible to find a thread to throw across the
chasm: such were the feelings of House when on March 11 he
left England for Paris and Berlin.
1 Grey, Twenty-Five Years (Frederick A. Stokes Company), II, 124.




CHAPTER XIII
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
If peace parleys were begun now upon any terms that would have any
chance of acceptance, it would mean the overthrow of this Government
and the Kaiser.
Zimmermann to House, March 21, 1915
I
Colonel House to the President
PARIS, March 14, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
We arrived here Thursday night. A destroyer accompanied our boat a good part of the way, and we passed one
floating mine about one hundred yards away. Otherwise
the trip was without incident....
I have just returned from my interview with DelcassVx'
The interpreter was the Assistant Secretary for Foreign
Affairs.2 I let him read your letter and told him I came to
present your compliments, but that you did not desire to
intrude yourself upon them or to hurt their sensibilities in
any way by making an immature suggestion of peace.
I said this before he had a chance to say anything, for I
knew quite well what was in his mind. He was visibly
pleased when this suggestion was made, and it placed us on
a good footing.
I then told him that you had foreseen for a year or more
that, unless something was done to prevent it, some spark
1 Minister for Foreign Affairs. Theophile Delcasse had been a prime
mover in the Entente with Great Britain, and largely responsible for the
energetic foreign policy of France from 1904 on. He was the bete noire of
the Germans, who regarded him as the collaborator of Edward VII and
Grey in the attempt to 'encircle' Germany.
2 Jaquin de Margerie, at that time Director of Political Affairs of the
Foreign Office; in the post-war period appointed French Ambassador to
Germany.




396 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


might cause the present conflagration, and you had sent me
to Europe last May for the purpose of seeing what could be
done to bring about a better understanding; that I had gone
to Germany and had come to France, but they were changing
Government at the time and it was impossible to talk to them.
I wanted to let him know that you had had the threads in
your hands from the beginning and that you understood the
situation thoroughly....
In reply he said that France greatly appreciated your
keen interest and noble desire to bring about peace, and he
was glad I had come to Paris and would look forward with
interest to seeing me when I returned from Germany. He
said he would then tell me in the frankest way what France
had in mind and was willing to do. I did not press him to
tell me this then, because I happened to know what they
have in mind and I did not want to go into a footless and
discouraging discussion.
I had accomplished more than I anticipated, for it was not
certain that I would be received cordially. Even Sir Edward
was a little worried. The main thing accomplished was that
France has at least tentatively accepted you as mediator;
and that, I think, is much....
Gerard tells me, through Winslow, that he does not
believe the Germans would hesitate a moment to go to war
with us. On the other hand, Winslow says that when you
sent them the note to Germany which was almost an ultimatum," he saw a distinct change for the better at the
German Foreign Office the very next day. They had been
insolent before, but were all right afterwards.
They all seem to think that the Germans have literally
gone crazy. I am not so sure of it myself. I can see gleams
of sanity in much they are doing.
1 A reference to Wilson's note of February 10, warning the German
Government that in case of the destruction of an American vessel or
American lives it would be held to a 'strict accountability.'




IN PARIS ON THE WAY TO BERLIN


397


I shall be exceedingly careful about cabling you or even
writing from Berlin, for it is dangerous to the last degree.
Winslow tells me that their system of espionage is something
beyond belief and that one can never be sure that papers
have not been tampered with.
I find that the ruling class in France do not desire peace,
but that a large part of the people and the men in the
trenches would welcome it. This, I think, is also true of
Germany....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
P.S. Gerard also sent word that he thought the Kaiser
would be deposed in the event Germany was not successful
in this contest.
'March 14, 1915: Willard Straight called this morning.
He is a great friend of Casenave 1 and also of Margerie, and
Margerie is a friend of Casenave and Delcasse, so the circle
is fairly complete. I told Straight some things I wished told
to Delcasse through Casenave and Margerie. This Straight
promised to undertake. I wish Delcasse to know that in my
opinion France is taking a big gamble in demanding peace
terms that Germany will never accept unless the Allies reach
Berlin. I am sorry I am not on such terms with Delcasse
to tell him these things myself, for I do not like using third
parties.
'Straight is to convey the thought that it will be of
advantage to the Allies to have the good will of the President,
and that the best way to get it is through me. Another idea
I wished conveyed was that the really essential thing and
the big thing was to strive for a permanent settlement and
not for any small territorial advantage, which in itself would
leave wounds which in time would lead to further trouble.'
1 In charge of the Press Bureau at the Foreign Office.




398 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to the President
PARIS, March 15, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
De Casenave came to see me to-day. He is at the head of
the Press Bureau and his principal duties are to see that the
French papers contain the proper kind of reading matter in
regard to England, America, and other nations....
I asked him to be very frank and to tell me of French
opinion. He said the French people at large thought that
America had nothing in mind further than a dollar. He said
a few Frenchmen had gone to America, had stayed there
some weeks, not knowing the language, had visited such
places as the pork packeries of Chicago, and had come away
to write books concerning the avarice of our people. He
said this had been done to such an extent that the opinion
was fixed in France that we were guided entirely by mercenary motives.
He said when he gave to the French papers directions
as to what to say in regard to America, they smiled and
shrugged their shoulders....
I am trying to make a friend of de Margerie of the Foreign Office. He has lived in America, speaks English well,
and is said to be almost as much of a force in the Foreign
Office as Delcasse, besides being in Delcasse's confidence.
I have some mutual friends on this job and I will remain
here long enough upon my return to try and clinch it.
I shall attempt the same thing in Germany, probably
using Zimmermann as a medium. If I can establish such
relations, the situation can scarcely get away from us....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
II
All his conversations in Paris merely confirmed the forebodings which House had experienced in England. The




FRANCE AND GERMANY FOR ANNEXATIONS 399


aspirations of the French for territorial annexations put out
of court immediately the bases for peace which he had
discussed with Grey. A message from Gerard indicated that
the Germans were equally determined upon wide annexations. 'He was sure,' House noted after receiving the
message, 'that they were not in a frame of mind to consider
such peace terms as the Allies would think of offering....
The French not only want Alsace and Lorraine, but so much
more that the two countries are not within sight of peace.
If it is brought about, it will be through the sanity and
justice of Sir Edward Grey and British opinion.'
House might have given up his proposed trip to Germany
then and there. But he saw the chance of placing GermanAmerican relations on a better footing, through personal
conversations, and did not wish to lose the opportunity of
indicating to the Germans some basis of future compromise
with the British. He determined, however, that it would be
worse than useless to raise the question of immediate peace
parleys in Berlin.
Colonel House to Mr. Gordon Auchincloss
BERLIN, March 21, 1915
DEAR GORDON:
We left Paris at eight o'clock Wednesday morning. We
went close to the firing line, somewhere between ten and
twelve miles. Soldiers boarded the train as we passed
through this territory and pulled down all shades and
stationed themselves in the corridors so we could not look
out. We were within hearing of the guns.
The different Governments are always notified of our
coming, before we reach the borders, and every facility
has been extended to us. If this were not done, travelling
would be practically impossible - that is, where we have
gone.
At Basle I had a conference with Minister Stovall from




400 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Berne and Consul-General Wilbur from Zurich, and at
Frankfort with Consul-General Harrison.
We arrived in Berlin yesterday morning in a snowstorm.
Gerard met us and brought us to his house. I have had a
conference with Zimmermann and he was exceedingly
cordial and delightful. I have always liked him and I am
glad we have resumed our friendly relations.
I cannot write you very fully, excepting to say that there
is nothing that even looks like peace within sight. However,
I am accomplishing many things that I have in mind and I
hope I am doing some good. It looks as if there would have
to be a decisive victory on one side or the other before
parleys can begin.
If I succeed in establishing cordial relations at the different belligerent capitals, I will have done all that I expected at this time....
Paternally yours
E. M. HOUSE
Colonel House to the President
BERLIN, March 20, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:... We arrived in Berlin this morning and Gerard immediately arranged a private conference for me with Zimmermann. I let him read your letter, which impressed him
favorably as it does every one. I told him frankly what I
had done in England, whom I had met there, in what way,
and my conclusions.
He was surprised to hear of the lack of bitterness in
England towards Germany and was equally surprised when
I told him that the difficulty was with France. They have
evidently tried to cultivate good relations with both France
and Russia, for the purpose of making separate terms with
them. I think I convinced him that England did not desire
Germany crushed and that, in the final analysis, terms would




CONFERENCE WITH ZIMMERMANN


401


have to be agreed upon between these two countries. This
is so patent that I wonder they do not recognize it. It is
fortunate it is true, for the difference between the two is not
great and they could get together now if it were not for the
fact that the people in both Germany and England have
been led to expect much more than is possible of realization.
Neither Government can fulfil these expectations. If they
attempted to make peace upon a different basis from that
which the people have been led to believe will ultimately
come about, there is a possibility that the Governments
would be overthrown. That is the real trouble now. Just
how it can be overcome, is the question.
I am trying to get every one to soften down through the
press and create a better feeling. Zimmermann tells me
that the main thing Germany wants is a settlement which
will guarantee permanent peace. It is the same cry in each
of the belligerent states.
I showed Zimmermann the different points where our
interests and theirs touched, and expressed a desire that we
work together to accomplish our purposes. I brought up
the second convention [for organizing permanent peace] in
this connection, and he received it most cordially. I told
him in particular that we as well as Germany desired that
some guaranty should be had in the future as to the protection and uninterruption of our commerce, either as neutral
or as belligerent. I told him that we recognized England
had a perfect right to have a navy sufficient to prevent
invasion, but further than that she should not go.
He was exceedingly sympathetic with this thought, and I
think it will have a tendency to put us on a good footing
here.
The Chancellor is out of town for a few days, but Zimmermann is to arrange a meeting as soon as he returns. He
also suggested that the Emperor might want to see me.
Gerard says this is impossible, that he has not seen him for




402 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


months because of his intense feeling against us on account
of our shipment of munitions of war to the Allies. It is not
important now whether I see him or not, and I shall leave it
to Zimmermann's judgment....
I am somewhat at a loss as to what to do next, for it is
plain at the moment that some serious reverse will have to
be encountered by one or other of the belligerents before any
Government will dare propose parleys. I can foresee troublous times ahead, and it will be the wonder of the ages if
all the Governments come out of it intact.
The world has been strained as never before in its history,
and something is sure to crack somewhere before a great
while.
It looks as if our best move just now is to wait until the
fissure appears.
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
BERLIN, March 21, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I am gradually getting at the bottom of things here and,
while I cannot write with perfect freedom, I can tell enough
to give you a fair idea of it.
I am seeing a great many people, just as I did in England,
and I hope to have soon a composite picture that may be of
value.
I met last night an able and sane man by the name of
Dr. Rathenau.1 I am told he is a great power in commercial
Germany. He has such a clear vision of the situation and
such a prophetic forecast as to the future that I wonder how
many there are in Germany that think like him. It saddened
1 The dominating figure of the early post-bellum German Republic.
Foreign Secretary from January 31, 1922, to June 24, 1922; Germany's
representative at the Genoa Conference, 1922; assassinated by reactionaries, June 24, 1922.




CONVERSATION WITH DR. RATHENAU 403


me to hear him say that as far as he knew, he stood alone.
He said he had begun to wonder whether all the rest were
really mad, or whether the madness lay within himself....
It was almost pathetic to hear him urge us not to cease in
our efforts to bring about peace. He said it was the noblest
mission that was ever given to man and that he would pray
that we would not become discouraged. I hear this note
struck in all the countries. Mothers and wives, fathers and
brothers, have spoken in the same strain and have seemed to
feel that the only hope lies in our endeavors.
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
'It is a sad commentary,' added House, 'that the Governments of each of the belligerents would probably welcome
peace negotiations, and yet none of them are able safely to
make a beginning.' For each Government, in order to evoke
the belligerent enthusiasm necessary to a prosecution of the
war, had created a Frankenstein monster which emphatically
vetoed any whisper of peace. Zimmermann stated, wrote
House on March 24, 'that if peace parleys were begun now
upon any terms that would have any chance of acceptance,
it would mean the overthrow of this Government and the
Kaiser.'
Colonel House to the President
BERLIN, March 26, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
While I feel I have accomplished much of value here, I
leave sadly disappointed that we were misled into believing
that peace parleys might be begun upon a basis of evacuation of France and Belgium.
I have been cordially received and have added many new
friendships to the old. I find the civil Government here as
sensible and fair-minded as their counterparts in England,
but they are for the moment impotent.




404 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


It is a dangerous thing to inflame a people and give them
an exaggerated idea of success. This is what has happened
and is happening in almost every country that is at war....
If those that are in charge of the civil Government now
hold their power when peace comes, there will be no doubt
of their cooperation - provided, of course, our relations grow
no worse, and without actual war they could not be worse.
This is almost wholly due to our selling munitions of war
to the Allies. The bitterness of their resentment towards us
for this is almost beyond belief. It seems that every German
that is being killed or wounded is being killed or wounded by
an American rifle, bullet, or shell. I never dreamed before
of the extraordinary excellence of our guns and ammunition.
They are the only ones that explode or are so manufactured
that their results are deadly.
I have pointed out the danger of such agitation against us
and have tried to show how much it would lessen our influence
in helping Germany when our help is needed. I have indicated where our interests touched at various points anid
how valuable it would be to both nations to work in harmony
rather than at cross-purposes...
There is a general insistence here, as elsewhere, that when
a settlement is made it must be an enduring one; but ideas
as to how this may be brought about are as divergent as
the poles....
Gerard has been exceedingly helpful here. He has not
interfered in the slightest and has insisted upon my seeing
the different Cabinet Ministers and influential Germans
alone. He is very courageous, and is different from some of
our representatives, inasmuch as his point of view is wholly
American.
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE


As in London, House made a point of meeting varied




GREAT BRITAIN AND CONTRABAND 405


types, although he sought out especially those who represented the moderate point of view. He had long talks with
Rathenau and von Gwinner,l with Solf, the Minister for the
Colonies who later played a major r61e in the final armistice negotiations, with Helfferich - 'a young man,' House
noted, 'who is considered one of the rising powers in Germany,'- with the Foreign Minister, von Jagow, and with
the Chancellor.
Apart from his desire to obtain information and create an
atmosphere friendly to the United States, House wished to
try out on the Germans the plan which he believed might
serve as the basis for a future compromise between Germany
and Great Britain. It was the plan which came to be called
the 'Freedom of the Seas.'
The problem presented itself in the following aspects to
Colonel House. Existing maritime regulations permitted
the capture of private property of neutrals on the high seas,
if it came within the category of contraband, and it was
inevitable under conditions of modern warfare that the
definition of contraband should be progressively extended
to include practically all materials and articles of industrial
life. In any war between Great Britain and a Continental
Power, the first thought of the British was naturally to use
their control of the sea so as to interrupt the direct and
indirect imports of the Continental enemy. A quarrel
between Great Britain and the United States, the largest
exporting neutral, must necessarily follow, for British
restrictions meant the destruction of American trade. The
events of 1914 and 1915, as well as those that led to the War
of 1812, offered a practical example of this ever-recurring
factor of discord, the sole factor that seriously threatened the
cordial relations of the two countries.
1 Banker, and promoter of the Bagdad Railway.




406 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Apart from the peril of complications with America, there
were other elements in the situation which did not seem to
favor Great Britain. The British, living on an island, dependent for their lives upon trade with the outside world and
especially with their colonies, were in a position of real
danger that was not clearly recognized. They had believed
that so long as their fleet remained supreme, they were
perfectly safe. But the introduction of the submarine
raised the question whether Great Britain's ocean-going
trade, carried as it was by British ships, could not be destroyed and the nation be deprived of the foodstuffs and
raw materials which entered her ports, even though her
surface fleet remained intact. Such a threat to the security
of national life became very lively in 1917.
Germany was dependent, although not to the same degree,
upon overseas trade. In their struggle with England, the
Germans counted upon the neutral ports of Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. But the British, in control of
the sea, could confiscate or seriously harass trade bound for
these ports, and thus threaten the starvation of Germany.
So much the Germans themselves, in their protests against
the British food blockade, admitted.
What House proposed was that the contraband list
should be restricted so as to include only actual implements
of warfare; everything else should be placed upon the free
list. The trade of merchant vessels, whether belligerent or
neutral, should be allowed to proceed freely outside territorial waters so long as they carried no contraband. They
might even enter any belligerent port without hindrance,
unless that port were actually and effectively blockaded by
the enemy's fleet. Such a blockade in the case of England
would be practically impossible, because of the multitude of
available harbors and the strength of the British fleet. An
effective blockade was equally impossible in the case of
Germany, as the events of the war demonstrated.




PROPOSAL TO RESTRICT CONTRABAND 407


For what, then, could a fleet be used, one will ask. Simply
for purposes of defence, Colonel House replied; to prevent
the landing of a hostile military force and to keep essential
ports open.
The proposal was less revolutionary than many thought,
and it had behind it the force of both British and American
traditions. Sir Edward Grey had instructed the British
delegation to the Second Hague Conference in 1907 to work
for a restriction of the contraband list, and it was at his
inspiration that the delegation carried the idea to its logical
limit and expressed a willingness to abandon the principle of
contraband of war entirely." In their talks with House in
February, Grey and Tyrrell had approved also the principle
of the immunity of belligerent merchant shipping in time of
war; in fact, it was that approval which lay at the bottom
of House's present suggestion.
What is equally striking is that in 1907 Elihu Root, then
Secretary of State, in his instructions to the United States
delegates to the Hague Conference, advocated almost
precisely what House now suggested, the exemption from
capture of belligerent private property, although he said
nothing about the restriction of contraband.
'The private property of all private citizens or subjects of
signatory Powers [so ran his instructions], with the exception
of contraband of war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure on the high seas or elsewhere by the armed vessels or
by the military forces of any of the said signatory Powers,
but nothing herein contained shall extend exemption from
seizure of vessels or their cargoes which may attempt to
IThe following declaration was made on the part of Great Britain:
'In order to diminish the difficulties encountered by neutral commerce in
time of war the Government of H.B.M. is prepared to abandon the
principle of contraband in case of war between the Powers which may
sign a convention to that effect. The right of visit would be exercised
only in order to ascertain the neutral character of the merchantmen.'




408 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of any of the said
Powers.'
This was in entire consonance with the Final Act of the
First Hague Conference, which gave preference to 'inviolability of private property in naval warfare.'
It was only the use of the term 'Freedom of the Seas' as
applied to this suggestion which was new; and this, it appears,
was originated by Colonel House. Grotius in 1609 used
the term mare liberum, and the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries became accustomed to such slogans as 'a free sea
or war,' ' free ships, free goods,' 'free flag, free goods.'
The phrase 'freedom of the seas' was itself used in 1798
by the French Revolutionary leader, Barere, in his famous
summary of French foreign policy: 'Freedom of the seas,
peace to the world, equal rights to all nations.' But it
remained for Colonel House to utilize the phrase as applicable to what Choate had called, in 1907, 'immunity of
private property at sea,' and to include the proposal of a
rigid restriction of contraband of war.
House's plan for the Freedom of the Seas was thus based
upon the approval of both British and American authorities.
It carried with it immediate and ultimate advantages which
in the case of the United States would eliminate practically
all factors of complication with European belligerents. If
contraband were restricted, the trade of the United States
might proceed with almost as much freedom in time of war
as in that of peace. The advantages to the world at large
were still more obvious, since the r61e of a navy would become chiefly defensive and naval disarmament might proceed apace.
Germany would undoubtedly gain much by the Freedom
of the Seas. An enemy possessing a strong fleet, like Great
Britain, would still be free to blockade German ports if it
1 In England, on the eve of the War of Jenkins' Ear.




THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS


409


could reach them, but could not cut off the foodstuffs and
raw materials which the Germans received through neutral
ports and contiguous countries. Great Britain would thus
lose an offensive weapon of doubtful legality. But as
compensation, how greatly British defensive strength would
be enhanced! The disadvantages of her island position would
largely disappear, her food supply would be secure, and her
commerce with the far-flung portions of the Empire would
be assured without the protection of a costly fleet. Submarines would not be able to prey upon merchant shipping.
Under the principle of the Freedom of the Seas, the Power
with the most colonies and the widest overseas trade stood
to gain most.
So much was plain to Colonel House, although he was
careful not to whisper in Berlin that he believed the British
would win the lion's share of advantage. To him the great
irony of the war was that his proposal was so eagerly swallowed by the Germans, so scornfully refused by British
opinion.
The weak point in House's plan lay in the danger that an
unscrupulous nation, after accepting its principle, would
proceed to disregard its engagements. The British could
not escape the fear that Germany, which had broken its
promises in the Belgian treaty, was quite capable of agreeing
to the Freedom of the Seas and, after securing the partial
disarmament of Great Britain thereby, might embark upon
a wholesale destruction of British merchant shipping. To
meet this danger, House was insistent upon an association
of nations bound to unite forcibly against any nation that
violated its international promises.
The Colonel believed that the acceptance of the Freedom
of the Seas, as a principle of international law, was essential
to stability of relations between the United States and
European Powers. He also believed that the idea could be
used as a means to start peace negotiations between the




410 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


belligerents. If the British would agree to his proposal,
with all its ultimate advantages for them, he planned to
present this fact to the Germans as a diplomatic victory
for Germany that would justify peace parleys and satisfy
German public opinion.
Colonel House to the President
BERLIN, March 27, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
Some way has to be thought out to let the Governments
down easy with their people. That is almost, if not quite,
our hardest problem.
It occurred to me to-day to suggest to the Chancellor
that, through the good offices of the United States, England
might be brought to concede at the final settlement the
Freedom of the Seas, and to the extent I have indicated to
you. I told him that the United States would be justified in
bringing pressure upon England in this direction, for our
people had a common interest with Germany in that question.
He, like the others I have talked to, was surprised when I
told him the idea was to go far beyond the Declaration of
Paris or the proposed Declaration of London. I said that
some one would have to throw across the chasm the first
thread, so that the bridge might have its beginning, and
that I knew of no suggestion that was better fitted for that
purpose than this; that if England would consent, this
Government [the German] could say to the people that
Belgium was no longer needed as a base for German naval
activity, since England was being brought to terms.
I have sown this thought of the Freedom of the Seas very
widely since I have been here, and already I can see the
results.... I think I can show England that, in the long run
and looking at the matter broadly, it is as much to her
interest as it is to the other nations of the earth.




EFFECT OF GERMAN INDISCRETION 411


The Chancellor seems to think, and so does Zimmermann,
that I have offered in this suggestion the best idea as a
peace beginning....
I have told them frankly and with emphasis that they
could not expect us to lay an embargo on the exportation
of munitions of war, and that they must soften their press
and people on this point. They have promised to do this. I
have told them I would help them in the big thing later and
that they must be content with our efforts in that direction.
I leave here fairly satisfied with the situation, as we now
have something definite to work on and as the warring
nations have tentatively accepted you as their mediator....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HouSE
Unfortunately, the Germans did not possess either the
discretion or the tact necessary to the development of
House's plan for the Freedom of the Seas. He hoped to win
British approval, for he knew of Grey's sympathy. All he
wished from Germany, for the moment, was an acquiescent
silence. But the Germans lost no time in advertising the
idea as their own and thereby immediately ruined all chance
of success. In the United States, Herr Dernburg, in charge
of German propaganda, announced that if England granted
the Freedom of the Seas, Germany would retire from
Belgium; if England refused, Germany would establish a
permanent fortified base on the English Channel. Englishmen were entirely ignorant as to what the Freedom of the
Seas meant, or whether it would be advantageous or not to
refuse it; but coming in this fashion as a threat, public
opinion immediately decided that it was something made in
Germany and that every true Britisher would spill the last
drop of his blood before considering it. From that moment
began the unreasoning prejudice against the idea, which
ultimately became invincible.




412 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


IV
In the meantime House had left Germany, passing back
to Paris through Nice and Biarritz, where he engaged in
conferences with the American Ambassadors to Italy and to
Spain.
'April 2, 1915 [Nice]: Page  and I have continued our
talks. He has given the Italian situation in detail, going into
the intricacies of Italian politics, especially as to the rivalry
between the present Premier, Salandra, and the late Premier, Giolitti.
'Page thinks Italy is acting in a wholly selfish way and
that it matters little with her whether she supports the
Allies or the Dual Alliance, provided she is on the winning
side. The aristocracy are favorable to Germany and the
people to the Entente. Nowhere throughout Italy is the
feeling against Germany anything like as bitter as it is
against their old-time enemy, Austria.
'Page does not believe Italy would last long in the conflict,
and that if she had entered at the beginning of the war she
would probably have been easily defeated and disarmed.
He believes she will finally enter the war on the side of the
Allies when she can see the end of the struggle within a few
months.
'He thinks England has made something of a mistake in
not giving her some assurance as to her aspirations for new
territory, or, we might say, old territory which she seeks to
recover. This would include a portion of Austria, around
what the Italians term the Gulf of Venice, the twelve islands
which she has long coveted, and a sphere of influence in
Asia Minor....2
1 Thomas Nelson Page.
2 At that moment, negotiations were being carried on which ended
with the Treaty of London, a guaranty by the Entente that Italy should
receive the territories she claimed




ATTITUDE OF THE KING OF SPAIN


413


'April 8, 1915 [Biarritz]: Ambassador Willard came from
Madrid to-day, arriving at 2.30.... He says the King
dominates Spain and at heart he is an advanced Liberal.
He is well informed and is altogether an intelligent and upto-date ruler. His Ministers are not nearly so progressive,
and hold him back to a considerable degree.
'The King desires to figure in peace overtures, but is willing to allow the President to take the lead and will cooperate
with him in a secondary capacity. I told Willard I did not
see how he could figure in it jointly, since it would have to
be done by one or the other and, unless the situation changed
it would doubtless be the President. However, the situation
could change to the disadvantage of the President, for, if
all the belligerents become dissatisfied and embittered with
our neutral policy, they might conceive the idea that any one
would be preferable to the President as a mediator. I explained to Willard that I was appealing to the self-interests
of both sides, and that in itself would probably induce them
to accept Wilson.
'Willard said the King was pro-French, but not especially
pro-British; that he was anti-German, but pro-Austrian.
His reason for not being strongly pro-British, even though
his wife is English, is because he feels that he has not been
very courteously treated by the British upon his several
visits to England. Then, too, there is always Gibraltar to
sting Spanish pride....'
Colonel House to the President
PARIS, April 11, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
This is the first time I have had an opportunity to write
you freely since I left here. My visit in Berlin was exceedingly trying and disagreeable in many ways. I met there
no one of either high or low degree who did not immediately corner me, and begin to discuss our shipment of muni



414 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


tions to the Allies, and sometimes their manner was almost
offensive.
Upon the streets one hesitated to speak in English, for
fear of being insulted....
I feel, however, that with the Government and with the
influential people with whom I talked, a better understanding of our purposes was brought about; and I hope this feeling will sooner or later reach the people at large....
The trouble with Germany is that it is antiquated in
some of its ideas. They started upon the rule of force at a
time when the most advanced nations were going in the
opposite direction.
I endeavored to make it clear to the German Government
that their best interests could be served by working along
harmoniously with us. If we can keep this view before them,
they will probably want you as mediator, for they are
narrowly selfish in their purposes and have no broad outlook as to the general good of mankind.
I found a lack of harmony in governmental circles which
augurs ill for the future. The civil Government are divided
amongst themselves.... The military and civil forces are
not working in harmony.
The Emperor is still in absolute authority, although he is
criticized pretty generally by both the civil and military
branches of the Government. Falkenhayn and von Tirpitz
seem to have more influence with him than any one, but
Falkenhayn is not popular with the army in general.
The Crown Prince seems to be left out of all important
councils and is generally ignored by both the civil and
military Governments, though he seems to be more popular
with the people than his father because he is said to be without egotism and more democratic in his manner.
Hindenburg is the popular hero and is the only one that
dares to assert himself against the Emperor. I believe
there are troublous times ahead for the Kaiser and that




TALKS WITH DELCASSE AND POINCARE 415


one denouement of the war may be a more democratic
Germany....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HouSE
At Paris Colonel House did not raise the question of
peace, for there was less chance of it than ever. In the East,
the Germans were driving the Russians out of Poland. In
the West, the French were planning a great drive in the
Champagne regions. The British were developing the
attack upon the Dardanelles. Italy was on the point of
joining the Allies. Both sides were trying to win over
Bulgaria. Every one hoped for victory. House confined
himself to securing information and solidifying his personal
relationships, especially with Delcasse and Poincare. House
met Poincare for the first time on this occasion. An American diplomat warned him not to be disappointed by the
coldness of manner characteristic of the French President.
'I replied,' wrote House, 'that his coldness and silence
would not embarrass me if it did not embarrass him, and I
could be as quiet, and for as long, as anybody.'
Colonel House to the President
[Telegram]
PARIS, April 13, 1915
In a private conference with Delcasse, he was good enough
to express his satisfaction at the way negotiations have been
carried on up to now. He said that I had given Berlin a
correct idea of France's attitude and he approved what I had
said and done there....
He wished me to convey to you the appreciation of
France for the fairness with which you have maintained our
relations with the belligerents. I shall see Poincare before
I leave.
E. M. HOUSE




416 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to the President
PARIS, April 17, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I have just cabled you of my interview with Poincare. I
had been told that he was austere in his manner and I was
quite unprepared for the warmth with which he welcomed
me.
He seemed to understand my relation to you and he expressed his appreciation of your having sent me to France.
When I wrote the cable to you on Thursday, I made a
request that you send some message that could be repeated
to him and to Delcasse. I afterwards struck this out, for
fear lest it might give you too much trouble. When I
received your cablegram yesterday, sending messages to
them both, it seemed like a case of telepathy.
Poincare was visibly pleased. I have not seen Delcass6
since, but will do so in a day or two in order to discuss with
him the second convention. There is nothing you could do
that would promote better feeling than occasionally to send
some word that I may repeat to those in authority in the
country in which I happen to be. We are all susceptible to
these little attentions.
I find your purposes badly misunderstood in France. They
believe the American public largely sympathetic to the
Allies; but there is a feeling, which I am sorry to say is almost universal throughout France, that you personally are
pro-German. It is the most illogical conclusion that one
could imagine, and I can scarcely keep within the bounds of
politeness when I discuss it....
Affectionately yours
E. M. HouSE




FRENCH IDEA OF THE PRESIDENT


417


Colonel House to Secretary Bryan
PARIS, April 15, 1915
DEAR MR. BRYAN:... Everybody seems to want peace, but nobody is willing
to concede enough to get it. They all also say that they
desire a permanent settlement so that no such disaster may
occur hereafter, but, again, there is such a divergence of
ideas as to how this should be brought about that for the
moment it is impossible to harmonize the differences.
Germany is not willing to evacuate Belgium at all, nor
even France, without an indemnity, and Count von Bernstorff's suggestion that this could be arranged was wide
afield. The Allies, of course, will not consent to anything
less; and there the situation rests.
With warm regards and good wishes for Mrs. Bryan and
you, I am
Faithfully yours
E. M. HOUSE
'April 16, 1915: I can see from my interviews [wrote
House], not only with Delcasse and Poincar6 but with others,
that I would have made a mistake if I had attempted to talk
peace at this time. France as a whole has an idea that the
President is not altogether in sympathy with the Allies and
that he is inclined to be pro-German, and that it is for that
reason he has tried to push peace measures and in order to
save Germany's face. It is very discouraging to have to talk
to intelligent people and argue with them about such a
matter, but that is what I have to do.
'Another impression they have here is that the President
is catering to the pro-German vote. I explain to them that
a man of the President's intelligence would hardly cater to
fifteen per cent of the American vote in order to lose eightyfive per cent of it. This they had never thought of. In fact,
it seems to me they do not think much at all.




418 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


'The ignorance of Europe concerning itself, to say nothing
of America, is appalling.
'France, to-day, does not understand England, her purposes, or her forces in the war. They have an idea that they,
themselves, are doing it all and that England is idling. Only
a few Frenchmen who have been in England understand the
momentum gathering force there, and the indomitable
energy and tenacity which in the end will probably turn
the scales in favor of the Allies '   c i /
Colonel House to President S. E. Mezes
PARIS, April 18, 1915
DEAR SIDNEY:.. We lead a busy and interesting life and do not get
time to thoroughly enjoy the bombs that drop before and
after us. We just missed them in Paris and also missed
them as they were dropped on the stations and railway sheds
along our journey. Now that the weather is milder, we have
a better sporting chance, as all the belligerents promise
that an acceleration of their activities in this direction will
soon commence.
Martin is evidently looking forward with interest to a
bomb catching me somewhere on the Allies' territoryas he believes that would bring about war with Germany,
which he considers would be worth dying for. On the other
hand, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat writing editorially hopes
I may be spared, for the reason that, desirable as my taking
off would be, the price of a war with Germany would be too
great to pay....
Fraternally yours
E. M. HOUSE
'April 19, 1915: Last night Ambassador and Mrs. Sharp
gave a dinner. The guests besides ourselves were, the
Infanta Eulalia of Spain, the Spanish Ambassador and his




TALK WITH THE INFANTA EULALIA


419


wife, Ambassador Willard, Robert Bliss, Mrs. Crosby, and
Mr. and Mrs. Tuck. I sat by the Infanta and immediately
caught her attention by complimenting her recent article
in an American magazine, on the Kaiser. I thought she had
written charmingly of him, and any one who knew him would
recognize how truthful it was. She said she was fond of the
Kaiser, and had tried to make the French people understand
that he was not the ogre they imagined. We had a spirited
talk about the war and its outcome. She knew the situation
in Italy thoroughly and of the dangerous position in which
the King was. She also knew that the King and aristocracy
were for Germany, but the people were in favor of the
Allies....
'She spoke of the petty jealousies and differences among
Royalty, and laughingly said that when the family silver
spoons were to be divided, it was always a question as to who
should have this spoon and who should have the other. In
talking of the Kaiser, I thought he had not surrounded
himself with an efficient Cabinet. She said that was one of
his faults, for he wanted to do everything himself and did not
desire any dominant figure on the boards excepting himself;
consequently he had been badly served.'
Colonel House to the President
PARIS, April 20, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:. *The Spanish Ambassador told me that the King of
Spain wished him to meet me and ask me to come to Madrid.
He confirmed what Willard had said, and that is, the King
would like to take some part in peace negotiations and is willing to follow your lead.
I told the Ambassador that you did not desire me, at the
moment, to visit the neutral countries and that I was confining myself to the belligerents, and that we were not making
any peace overtures, but were simply studying conditions.




420 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


I told him, however, that after visiting Russia I might go
to San Sebastian and meet the King. This makes it indefinite and many things may happen to prevent my going....
Evidence still comes to me each day of the misunderstanding which the French people at large have of our position. They are very much afraid that peace will be made
overnight and that the Germans will not receive the punishment for their misdeeds which they feel they so richly
deserve.
In the course of the next two or three months, the conviction will break in upon them that the wonderful things they
expect the army to do, have not happened; and they will then
become more reasonable in their attitude.
I notice that Dernburg has taken the cue from Berlin and
is saying that Belgium must be retained unless the 'Freedom
of the Seas' is established. Yesterday I noticed that a prominent Hamburger said the same thing, and it looks as if the
German Government had accepted my suggestion that this
was the best way to save their faces before the people.
I took lunch to-day with Joseph Reinach. He is a GermanFrench Jew whose people have lived in France some sixty
years. He is said to be thoroughly patriotic and is a man of
influence.
He writes for the Figaro, and I outlined some things I
thought it would be well for him to incorporate in his next
article. I drew his attention to the fact that it was more to
France's interest to have the United States come in at the
final settlement and exercise its moral influence than it was
to ours.
I also made him the same talk I have made to others concerning you and your purposes....
Reinach gets German papers from friends in Switzerland,
and he said he saw a great change within the last two weeks in
their attitude towards England. I am wondering whether
what I said to them in Berlin has begun to bear fruit and




TALK WITH NORTHCLIFFE IN LONDON 421


they see the wisdom of modifying their hate campaign in
that direction.
Your affectionate
E. M. HouSE
House left Paris for London on April 28. His visit to
France had been without result so far as hastening the chance
of peace was concerned, but he had solidified the personal
relations which were later to be of immense diplomatic
value. In England he at once renewed his intimacy with
British friends and created new contacts of interest and importance.
'May 5, 1915: I lunched with Lord Northcliffe. The only
other guest was L. J. Maxse, of the National Review.
'Northcliffe spoke freely about the war and criticized the
Government without stint. He thought Kitchener too old
for the job and that he did not understand the sort of warfare
he was now engaged in. He did not think the British appreciated the magnitude of the task before them, or that they
were meeting the situation with anything like the determination and ability the occasion required. Neither Northcliffe
nor Maxse thought there was a big man connected with
either the Government or army. He told of the number of
men they had in France at this time and the number in every
place. It was most indiscreet to tell these facts, if, indeed,
they are facts. I do not wonder the Germans get so much
information, for I hear the most profound secrets of the army
and navy repeated in a way that makes me shiver....
'May 6, 1915: I dined with General Sir Arthur and Lady
Paget. The others present were Mrs. McGuire, daughter of
the late Lord Peel, Lady Fingall, Arthur Balfour, and Sir
Horace Plunkett.
'During dinner the conversation drifted upon the subject
of whether Great Britain was doing her full duty, and was




422 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


performing as important a part in the war as her resources
and position demanded. I allowed the talk to run along for a
few minutes, and then I broke in by saying that of all the
belligerents Great Britain had performed her part best.
Germany was considered the dominant military nation of
the world and Great Britain the dominant naval power.
Germany had failed to maintain her dominance on land,
while Great Britain had asserted her supremacy at sea and
was the undisputed master of it within a week after hostilities began. In addition to this, she had raised an enormous
army, something it was thought would not be required of
her, and she was the only belligerent with a world-wide
vision of the war and its consequences - differing from
France, Germany, and even Russia, who looked upon it from
local points of view and as to its effects upon them.
'When Great Britain entered the war, every neutral country felt that Germany was doomed to defeat, and I was sure
Germany herself had the fear of God in her heart. I was interrupted from time to time by the English "hear, hear," and
when I had finished Balfour said, "That is the most eloquent
speech I have ever heard." This, of course, was polite... -
'When the ladies left the table, Sir Arthur told us of his
recent visit to Russia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, and
Greece, from which countries he has just returned. He was
with the Grand Duke for ten days, and he gave a better idea
of his ability and character than I have yet had. He spoke
glowingly of the Russian army, and regretfully of Russian
corruption which prevented the Grand Duke from equipping
his army properly. He said the Grand Duke was displeased
at the manner of Joffre's insistence that he change his plan of
campaign and attack Prussia, at a time when the Grand
Duke thought he should merely fortify himself against the
Prussians and direct his entire energies against Austria.
This change of policy he claims has caused Russia to lose
innumerable men and treasure.




GREY AND THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 423


'May 7, 1915: I went to Sir Edward Grey's at ten o'clock.
I handed him the King's invitation to call at 11.30.... I
decided, however, to go with Grey to Kew and get a glimpse
of it. Before we started, I showed him some telegrams and
letters - one from Ambassador Willard bearing on the Spanish situation, one from Thomas Nelson Page on the Italian
situation, and, most important of all, the President's cable
concerning the retention of American cargoes....
'The gates of Kew Gardens were not open when we arrived, but we got through by the porter's lodge. I have never
seen the gardens so beautiful; it is to me one of the superlatively beautiful spots in England. Grey showed me the different trees and told something of them. The blackbirds
were singing, and we talked of how different they were to
those in far-away Texas.
'Grey's eyesight is failing, the doctors having warned him
that unless he stops reading he will lose his sight to the extent of not being able to read again. He said he supposed
this was the sacrifice he had to make for his country and he
was going on in that spirit, knowing well what lay before
him.'
v
In the meantime House had taken up again with Sir Edward the question of the Freedom of the Seas, concerning
which the two had corresponded while House was still in
Paris, and which, as House wrote Wilson, he hoped to use as
a means of starting negotiations between the belligerents.
Grey was suspicious of the Germans, perhaps not without
justification, and he wished to make sure that if England accepted the Freedom of the Seas, Germany would agree to
general military disarmament.




424 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey
PARIS, April 12, 1915
DEAR SIR EDWARD:... I did not find conditions in Berlin favorable for any discussion looking towards peace; consequently I did not remain
long or say much. The visit, however, had great value and I
feel that I now know the true conditions there, making a
more intelligent line of action possible.
I found but few points where our interest and theirs
touched strongly enough for me to create a sympathetic
feeling, but one of these was what we might term the Freedom of the Seas. It was upon that subject alone that I
awoke sufficient enthusiasm to warrant the hope that in it
lies the way to peace.
Looking at the matter from a narrowly selfish standpoint,
they could not believe that England would concede enough
in this direction for Germany to consent to those things
without which no peace can ever be possible. But from my
conversations with you, I knew that you saw a future more
secure and splendid for England in this new direction than in
the old. I gave no sign of this, but left them thinking what
concessions they might make in order to reach so promising
an end.
While I am eager to discuss this and other matters with
you, still I feel that it is well to move leisurely and to assume
a certain indifference as to time...
Your very sincere
E. M. HOUSE
Colonel House to the President
PARIS, April 12, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:.. What I want to do, is to get Sir Edward's consent to
what might be termed a paper campaign. If he agrees to
this I will write to him, even though in London, and have




GREY AND THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 425


him reply. Copies of this correspondence will be sent either
to the German Chancellor direct, or to him and Zirnmermann
through Gerard.
This will necessitate replies, and we may have them talking to one another before they realize it....
Your affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House
33 ECCLESTON SQUARE, LONDON
April 24, 1915
DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:. Your news from Berlin is not encouraging; it reduces
Bernstorff's peace talk at Washington to 'Fudge.'
What you hear from Berlin and found there is confirmed
to me from another source - neutral but not American.
As to 'freedom of the seas,' if Germany means that her
commerce is to go free upon the sea in time of war, while she
remains free to make war upon other nations at will, it is not
a fair proposition.
If, on the other hand, Germany would enter after this war
some League of Nations where she would give and accept the
same security that other nations gave and accepted against
war breaking out between them, their expenditures on armament might be reduced and new rules to secure 'freedom of
the seas' made. The sea is free in times of peace anyhow.'
Yours sincerely
E. GREY
1 A curious irrelevancy, in view of the fact that war-time trade was the
subject under discussion. Perhaps Grey had in mind an argument, which
Wilson later accepted, that with a league of nations to prevent war the
question of war-time trade became academic.




426 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to the President
LONDON, April 30, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I arrived here Wednesday night. I have already had two
conferences with Sir Edward Grey, and I am to have the
first formal one with him, by appointment through Page, this
afternoon at five o'clock.
Of course no one but you is to know of the other two conferences.
I have outlined to him the full plan of the Freedom of the
Seas and how best it can be brought to Berlin's attention and
what concessions they must give in return. I shall not let
them know how receptive he is to the idea, but shall try to
impress upon them how hard we are working to accomplish the desired end and give them little driblets of hope
from time to time. The thing thus is held within our
hands.
Sir Edward tells me that public opinion here will have to
be educated in this direction, particularly the Conservatives,
and I shall endeavor to do this....
We will have to keep this programme absolutely confidential between yourself, Sir Edward, and myself; and even
the men I shall discuss these things with, will not know our
full purposes....
I told Sir Edward I felt sure that the Berlin Government
wanted peace and that they were deterred mainly by German
public opinion, which will have to be educated to the making
of concessions....
Your affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
Even as early as this, the historian will observe, House had
begun to make plans for the Peace Conference, for he believed in being prepared. A note which he made after this
conversation with Grey throws light on what the Colonel




PLANS FOR A PEACE CONFERENCE


427


wanted to have accomplished by the Paris Conference in
1918 and 1919.
'April 30, 1915: I told Grey... how I planned to organize
this convention by getting the material that was to come before it thoroughly prepared and digested, in order that nothing should be left to chance. I would try to get the commissioners from each of the neutral States, and from as many
of the belligerent States as possible, in accord with us before
they came to the convention.
'I explained my methods of organization in political conventions in the past; that while they were seemingly spontaneous, as a matter of fact nothing was left to chance.
While measures were apparently drawn by different delegations, in the end it was found they fitted into the platform
like a mosaic., I could see Grey was intensely interested in
this programme. I showed why no opposition could withstand such thorough organization.... We would be actuated by unselfish motives and would not propose anything
that was merely to the advantage of Great Britain or the
United States, but would advocate only such things as would
redound to the good of the entire world. If we held to this
principle, with thorough preparation and organization we
would be able to do great and lasting good - good which
would be limited only by the extent of our ability to conceive and execute it.
'In order to get the proper material and to prepare for an
1 The illness which laid Colonel House low just before the meeting of
the Paris Peace Conference prevented him from carrying through the
organization he planned. Henry Wickham Steed, foreign editor of the
Times, says in this connection: 'One serious misfortune - which proved
to be a disaster - befell the Conference through the illness of Colonel
House. A severe attack of influenza incapacitated him for any work
during this critical formative period. Consequently his guiding influence
was absent when it was most sorely needed; and, before he could resume
his activities, things had gone too far for him to mend.' - Through Thirty
Years, II, 266.




428 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


intelligent discussion of the questions which might come before the peace conference, I desired to see some of the best
minds in England as to particular subjects. I mentioned
Lord Loreburn as being one with whom to advise on Admiralty questions. Grey approved Loreburn, but suggested,
in addition, Lord Mersey, and said Balfour could also be of
service.
'Grey makes the point clear that whatever guaranty of
good faith the Allies would wish from Germany, Germany
would receive a like guaranty from the Allies. His mind and
mine run nearly parallel, and we seldom disagree. I know in
advance, just as I know with the President, what his views
will be on almost any subject. I often come in contact with
very able men whose minds run in an opposite direction from
mine, and I find it difficult to agree with them upon any
question. It is therefore my good fortune that Fate has given
me two such friends as Woodrow Wilson and Edward Grey.
'Grey came to Page's at five. I took the precaution to remain downstairs in order to meet him when he first came in
and to walk up to the drawing-room with him. In this way
there was no embarrassment nor any pretense of not having
met before.
'He stayed for a half-hour and the conversation was unimportant, as we had covered most of it before. I merely
filled in the gaps by telling something further of my recent
travels. I told Page that one of the General Staff in Berlin
had said that Sir Edward's ambition was to be a George
Washington, a Lincoln, a Bismarck, and a Napoleon. Page
thought this very amusing, but Sir Edward... took it seriously and argued upon the peculiar bent of the German
mind that could compare Washington and Lincoln with
Bismarck and Napoleon.'




CONVERSATION WITH LORD LOREBURN 429


Colonel House to the President
LONDON, May 3, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:... I saw Lord Loreburn this morning. He is not only a
man that can be thoroughly trusted, but I believe he is my
friend. He told me that he thought if we could bring about
the Freedom of the Seas, it would be the greatest act of statesmanship that had been accomplished in centuries. He
thought it would be of 100 per cent value to other nations
and 120 per cent to England, though we would have great
difficulty in getting the English mind to see this.
He spoke of Balfour as having great ability, but thought
his mind was too feminine to grasp the significance of such a
measure. He advised, just as Sir Edward did, that I see
Bonar Law, who he said had an inferior mind, but who was
practical and could probably be convinced sooner on that
account.
He said if we could incorporate this idea into the peace
convention, it would not only be a great act of statesmanship, but it would be perhaps the greatest jest that was
ever perpetrated upon an unsuspecting nation - having, of
course, Germany in mind.
I told him I shivered in Berlin when I proposed it to the
Chancellor and the Foreign Office, for fear they would see that
it was more to England's advantage than their own and
would therefore not be willing to make concessions because
of it....
Lord Loreburn is one of the warmest admirers you have in
Great Britain, which is naturally a great bond of sympathy
between us.
Your affectionate
E. M. HOUSE




430 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to Herr Zimmermann
LONDON, May 1, 1915
MY DEAR HERR ZIMMERMANN:
Since I saw you in Berlin, I have been to Switzerland and
France and came here a day or two ago. I have carried out
my plans as expressed to the Chancellor and you and have
seen many of our representatives at the different European
capitals, who came by appointment to meet me, and I have
discussed with them the questions I had in mind.
I have seen Sir Edward Grey and have mentioned to him
the interest which the United States and Germany had in
the Freedom of the Seas, and I am pleased to tell you that
he was at least willing to listen to the suggestion.
He explained to me, however, that if he himself could be
brought to the idea, it would only be upon an agreement that
would guarantee the making of aggressive warfare on land as
impossible as it was intended to make it upon the sea. In
other words, if the commerce of the world, even in time of
war and even between belligerents, was to go free and to have
access to its own ports and to neutral ports without molestation, the land should be as free of menace as the sea.
He did not undertake to commit himself to the suggestion,
and he particularly wanted me to know that he was speaking
for himself and not for the Government or for the people.
He has promised to discuss the matter with his colleagues,
and I shall undertake to get some estimate of the general
sentiment in regard to such a proposal.
Of course, you understand that the conversation was predicated upon the evacuation of Belgium and France and upon
the consent of all the Allies.
If the belligerents really desire to make an honorable peace
that will be of far-reaching good, not only to themselves but
to the entire world, I think the opportunity will soon be here.
If you will give me some assurance that you consider these
questions at least debatable, it will go a long way to aid us in




LETTER TO ZIMMERMANN


431


our endeavors. I shall understand that no commitments are
made, either directly or indirectly, and that everything is
unofficial; but this seems to me to be the most promising
starting-point.
It will take a long while to make a successful campaign in
England in regard to the Freedom of the Seas; but we will
undertake it with both pleasure and enthusiasm, provided
our efforts are cordially seconded by the other nations at
interest.
Please present my very warm regards to their Excellencies,
the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
and believe me, my dear Herr Zimmermann,
Very sincerely yours
E. M. HOUSE
VI
The chief difficulty that obstructed the development of
House's plan was obviously the inability of the British to
comprehend the advantages they would derive from the
Freedom of the Seas. This lack of comprehension rested in
part upon a false sense of security and a failure to realize the
extent of the danger threatened by the German submarine.
It was also based upon a natural emotion, aroused by the
war, which compelled the average citizen to believe that anything acceptable to Germany must ipso facto be inacceptable
to Great Britain. Any intensification of the bitter feeling
between the two countries would inevitably spell failure for
House's hopes.
Precisely at this moment, the German navy committed
the outrage upon humanity which a modern Talleyrand
must certainly have pronounced 'worse than a crime, a
blunder,' and which immediately rendered hopeless any
attempt to reconcile the belligerents.
It was not entirely unforeseen by House, who on May 5
received a cable from Wilson asking him for advice in view of




432 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


the attack upon an American oil boat., House warned him
that the German threat of using submarines recklessly might
have to be taken at its face value.
Colonel House to the President
[Telegram]
LONDON, May 5, 1915
I believe that a sharp note indicating your determination
to demand full reparation, would be sufficient in this instance.
I am afraid a more serious breach may at any time occur,
for they seem to have no regard for consequences.
EDWARD HouSE
On the morning of May 7, House and Grey drove out to
Kew. 'We spoke of the probability of an ocean liner being
sunk,' recorded House, 'and I told him if this were done, a
flame of indignation would sweep across America, which
would in itself probably carry us into the war.' An hour later,
House was with King George in Buckingham Palace. 'We
fell to talking, strangely enough,' the Colonel wrote that
night, 'of the probability of Germany sinking a transAtlantic liner.... He said, "Suppose they should sink the
Lusitania with American passengers on board...."'
That evening House dined at the American Embassy. A
despatch came in, stating that at two in the afternoon a German submarine had torpedoed and sunk the Lusitania off the
southern coast of Ireland. Many lives had been lost.
Thus did Germany interpret the Freedom of the Seas.
1 The Gulflight, torpedoed by a German submarine on May 1, but not
sunk. The master died of heart failure the next morning, and two sailors
were drowned.




CHAPTER XIV
SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE
I think we shall find ourselves drifting into war with Germany....
House to Wilson, June 16, 1915
THE sinking of the Lusitania destroyed all hope of beginning
negotiations between Germany and Great Britain. It was
now, rather, a question as to whether the United States itself
could remain out of the war. Ambassador Page regarded
immediate intervention as inevitable, and cabled Wilson to
that effect. 'Page strongly urges the President,' House recorded, 'to bring us into the struggle upon the side of the
Allies, stating that he does not believe we can retain the good
opinion of any one if we fail to do so.'
Colonel House himself believed that the United States could
not long stand aside, in view of Germany's reckless course.
'It seems clear to me,' he wrote on May 9, 'that the Lusitania
is merely the first incident of the kind and that more will
follow, and that Germany will not give any assurance she
will discontinue her policy of sinking passenger-ships filled
with Americans and non-combatants.' That the United
States must receive such an assurance or enter the war to
enforce it, he believed then and always. On May 9 he sent
the President a carefully pondered cable. It is historic, for
Mr. Wilson read it to his Cabinet at the same time that he
read them his note of protest to Germany.
Colonel House to the President
[Telegram]
LONDON, May 9, 1915
It is now certain that a large number of American lives
were lost when the Lusitania was sunk.




434 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


I believe an immediate demand should be made upon
Germany for assurance that this shall not occur again. If
she fails to give such assurance, I should inform her that our
Government expected to take such measures as were necessary to ensure the safety of American citizens.
If war follows, it will not be a new war, but an endeavor to
end more speedily an old one. Our intervention will save,
rather than increase, the loss of life.
America has come to the parting of the ways, when she
must determine whether she stands for civilized or uncivilized warfare. We can no longer remain neutral spectators.
Our action in this crisis will determine the part we will play
when peace is made, and how far we may influence a settlement for the lasting good of humanity. We are being
weighed in the balance, and our position amongst nations is
being assessed by mankind.
EDWARD HOUSE
LONDON, May 11, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:... I cannot see any way out unless Germany promises to
cease her policy of making war upon non-combatants. If you
do not call her to account over the loss of American lives
caused by the sinking of the Lusitania, her next act will
probably be the sinking of an American liner, giving as an
excuse that she carried munitions of war and that we had
been warned not to send ships into the danger zone.
The question must be determined either now or later, and
it seems to me that you would lose prestige by deferring it.
Germany has one of two things in mind. She may believe
that we will not go to war under any provocation; or that
we will be impotent if we do and she desires us to enter. The
first is more understandable than the second, although she
probably thinks if we became involved we would stop the
shipment of munitions in order to equip ourselves.




CRISIS AFTER SINKING OF LUSITANIA 435


She may also think that mi the peace conference we would
be likely to use our influence to settle upon broader and
easier terms for Germany.
Or she may think that being able to torpedo our ships
would contribute to the isolation of England.
If, unhappily, it is necessary to go to war, I hope you will
give the world an exhibition of American efficiency that will
be a lesson for a century or more. It is generally believed
throughout Europe that we are so unprepared and that it
would take so long to put our resources into action, that
our entering would make but little difference.
In the event of war, we should accelerate the manufacture
of munitions to such an extent that we could supply not
only ourselves but the Allies, and so quickly that the world
would be astounded.
You can never know how deeply I regret the turn affairs
have taken, but it may be for the ultimate good. My heart
goes out to you at this time as never before, and I think of
you every hour of the day and wish that I was by your side.
My consolation is that I may be of greater service here.
Your affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
Colonel House's conversations in London make it clear
that both he and his British friends believed that Germany
had embarked upon a course which would inevitably bring
the United States into the war. The Colonel discussed with
Kitchener the value of American intervention to the Allies.
'May 12, 1915: Lord Kitchener has asked to meet me and
invited me to come to the War Office or to York House as I
preferred. I seldom go to any of the offices, so I met him at
York House at six o'clock....
'He was very cordial. When I put the question as to
whether it would be of benefit to the Allies for the United




436 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


States to come in on their side, he said, "Nobody but a damn
fool could think it would not be of benefit to us, and I am
surprised that any Englishman could question it." This
was apropos of the editorial I showed him from the St.
James Gazette, and of conversations I had had with some of
his countrymen.
'He said, "God forbid that any nation should come into
such a war," and he asked me to say to the President that he
did not want him to think that Great Britain either made
the request or had a desire for us to enter, but if we considered it necessary to do so, in his opinion it would greatly
shorten the war and would save innumerable lives, not only
of the Allies, but of the Germans as well.
'He said the war was one of attrition and the moment we
entered, the Germans, unless they were totally mad, would
know that the end was a certainty and would endeavor to
make the best terms they could. It was a case of a mad dog
turned loose, and every one trying to do his share toward
stopping him. If we entered, and I would let him know, he
would at once put his mind upon the problem and would aid
us not only as to organization but in any other way we desired. He paid a magnificent tribute to American valor and
said: "With American troops joined with the British, we
will not need French troops on the West Front, but can
keep them as a reserve."
'He has 2,200,000 men under arms, and of these 500,000
are now in France and 650,000 are ready to go the moment
they are needed. In addition, there are 120,000 in the Dardanelles. He spoke of the army and the war as if it were his
army and his war, and very much as a monarch would speak.
'We talked for the best part of an hour, although I tried to
leave repeatedly because I knew how busy he must be and
how valuable his time was to his country. When I got up to
leave, he arose, but continued to walk up and down the room
and talk. He repeated time and again that the war would




CONVERSATION WITH LORD KITCHENER 437


be shortened enormously if the United States entered, and
that it would be helpful to an extent which no one but a man
of his experience could estimate. He said the coming in of
Italy was as nothing compared to that of the United States,
even though she had a large trained army....
'He was greatly interested when I gave it as my opinion
that the Germans did not have a man of the "first class" in
official life. He was also interested in von Tirpitz and Falkenhayn. The latter, I thought, was a much abler man than
von Tirpitz and an abler man than von Moltke, whom he
superseded. Kitchener spoke several times of their method
of warfare, and said he did not dream that a nation claiming
to be civilized would stoop to the things they had done. He
was especially bitter concerning asphyxiating gases and
said the only thing he could do was to reply in kind.
'This is the first time I have met Kitchener, and he seemed
to me to be forceful and able, though, perhaps, without the
spark of genius - unless, indeed, his great power of organization might be termed that.1 I was impressed by his fairness
and the impartial way he discussed our possible entry into
the war. While it was the clever way to talk to me, he did not
do it for that reason, for how could he know what would or
would not influence me? He doubtless realizes, as the King
does, that my advice to the President will be a potent influence in this crisis, but there was nothing of eagerness or
urging in his remarks. He took no pains to hide his opinion
that our entry would be decisive, and yet he said no word to
Kitchener's organizing ability, however, was better fitted to the
crises of his earlier career than to that which he faced as Secretary of War
in 1915. The value of Kitchener's name was inestimable and he built up
a great army, but he was used to a situation that could be handled by
himself as dictator and he never understood the need of an able General
Staff at the War Office. 'His conception of work,' wrote Grey, 'was that
it must be a one-man job. He shouldered the responsibility and did the
work of a Titan; but he did not realize that general responsibility must be
shared with the Cabinet, and strategic responsibility with the most independent and expert military brains, organized in a General Staff and
working with him.' - Twenty-Five Years, II, 246.




438 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


hasten that decision. Kitchener is not the greatest intellect
with which I have come in touch, but he has a manner indicating great reserve force, and if I were going tiger hunting
I would gladly have him for a companion.
'May 13, 1915: I lunched with Arthur Balfour. We had a
most interesting talk. I told of my interview with Kitchener
and of my advice to the President regarding the Lusitania
incident and read him my cablegram, which he complimented
warmly. I talk to Balfour with more freedom than any man
in Great Britain with the exception of Grey, for I trust him
implicitly. Grey and Balfour are two great gentlemen, and I
feel sure of their discretion.
'Balfour criticized the Government for depending so much
upon America for munitions of war. He thought at the very
outset they should have accelerated the manufacture of
munitions to such an extent that by now they would have
needed no outside aid...'
During the six days that followed the sinking of the Lusitania, Colonel House received no intimation of the action
that President Wilson planned. He did not seriously suspect
him of an inclination to avoid the issue which Germany had
raised, but he did confess some anxiety as a result of a speech
which was generally interpreted as proof of Wilson's invincible pacifism. On May 11 he recorded:
'Page and all of us are distressed by the President's speech
at Philadelphia, in which he is reported to have said, "There
is such a thing as being too proud to fight." Page sent him a
long cablegram, which he submitted to me for criticism.'
Mr. Wilson faced a choice of two alternatives: to break
diplomatic relations forthwith, on the ground that the sinking of the Lusitania and her thousand passengers was a
crime against civilization, or to demand an official disavowal




THE PRESIDENT'S LUSITANIA NOTE


439


and the assurance that inhuman acts of such a kind would not
be repeated. To break relations without giving Germany
any chance to alter her submarine methods was contrary to
the President's instincts, and it is unlikely that the nation
would have supported him with the degree of unity which
such a decided step demanded.
He chose the second alternative, and on May 13 he sent to
Germany a note conceived and expressed with vigor, but
avoiding both the form and tone of an ultimatum. Rehearsing the earlier attacks made by submarines that had resulted
in the loss of American lives, 'a series of events which the
Government of the United States has observed with growing
concern,' he demanded that the Germans should
'disavow the acts of which the Government of the United
States complains, that they will make reparation so far as
reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure,
and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles
of warfare.... Expressions of regret and offers of reparation
in case of the destruction of neutral ships sunk by mistake,
while they may satisfy international obligations, if no loss of
life results, cannot justify or excuse a practice, the natural
and necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations
and neutral persons to new and unmeasurable risks.'
The note did not satisfy the bellicose insistence of Mr.
Roosevelt for an immediate break with Germany. Another
ex-President, however, William Howard Taft, described it
as 'admirable in tone... dignified in the level the writer
takes with respect to international obligations... it may
well call for our earnest concurrence and confirmation.' Mr.
Page himself expressed satisfaction and telegraphed to the
President, 'May I be allowed to express my personal congratulations on the note.' And he added that most of the




440 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


members of the British Government, as well as Lansdowne,
Balfour, and Bonar Law of the Opposition, gave 'private
expressions of praise.'"
Articulate opinion, indeed, with rare exceptions both at
home and abroad, commended the note; it was only later,
after many months of German diplomatic evasions, that
critics with the advantage of hindsight complained that Wilson should have issued an ultimatum and set down for Germany a time-limit - a course which might or might not have
led her to give up the submarine campaign immediately.
Sidney Brooks, writing in The English Review, insisted that
'this note ranks with the greatest diplomatic literature. It
seems as if one could see the President wrestling with the
Wilhelmstrasse for the soul of Germany.' The Times declared that 'nothing less than the conscience of humanity
makes itself audible in his [Wilson's] measured and incisive
sentences.' From France, it is true, Whitney Warren wrote
to House that there was a growing inclination to believe that
'the President has been influenced in the past and is still
influenced by German tradition and inspiration.' And the
depatriatized Americans of Paris, always hostile to Wilson,
attacked him bitterly for truckling to Germany. But official
opinion both there and in England agreed that the President
had acted not merely wisely but adequately.
Ambassador Sharp to Colonel House
PARIS, June 2, 1915
MY DEAR MR. HOUSE:... While practically everybody over here has endorsed
the President's note to Germany, following the sinking of
the Lusitania, yet it makes a loyal American rather 'hot
under the collar,' as we say, to read little squibs like those I
have marked.... However, those in authority in the French
Government fully understand and appreciate the attitude of
1 Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, iii, 245.




FRENCH AND ENGLISH REACTIONS


441


President Wilson and have great confidence in the integrity
of his purpose.
Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador, told me the
other day that he was very much in hopes that we would not
go to war with Germany, as we could be of very much more
assistance to the Allies out of the war than actively in it....
Very truly yours
WILLIAM G. SHARP
Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey2 to Colonel House
LONDON, June 1, 1915
MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE,... As I was walking home here just now I was thinking
to myself —'We don't want America to come in.' The
thought of dragging our own kith and kin into this hideous
struggle is odious, but I do wish that the Americans could tell
the Germans, 'if you dare to destroy Westminster Abbey,
America will never forgive you. It is ours as well as theirs.'
And yet with these lunatics that might after all be the
worst way of protecting it. I suppose it is childish, but I
would rather see half London smashed than the Abbey and
Westminster Hall destroyed. Except for that, Zeppelins
will never give me a bad night.
Yours very sincerely
J. ST. LOE STRACHEY
II
Colonel House evidently did not believe that Germany
would alter her methods of naval warfare unless some more
potent factor than the protests of the United States could be
brought to bear. On May 18 he wrote to Secretary McAdoo:
'The German mind seems not to understand anything ex1 In his private papers the British Ambassador expressed quite the
contrary opinion.
2 Editor of The Spectator.




442 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


cepting hard knocks and they have a curious idea that we
will not fight under any circumstances. As a matter of fact,
this idea is prevalent throughout Europe and will sooner or
later involve us in war.' A fortnight later, after another
submarine attack, he recorded: 'I have concluded that war
is inevitable.'
Both House and Page agreed that unless Germany yielded
to the demands set forth in Wilson's note and ceased the
torpedoing of ships without warning, the United States
could not avoid intervention.
Unlike Page, however, House shared the sentiment of
President Wilson that war with Germany could not be justified unless every possible means to secure a peaceful settlement were first attempted; and he worked assiduously to
discover a plan by which Germany might be induced to give
up the cruel and illegal submarine warfare. He had the
cooperation of Sir Edward Grey, who, with a singular largeness of view rare amid the passions of war, was ready to consider any reasonable compromise.
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, May 14, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I took lunch with Sir Edward Grey to-day. The principal
topic of our conversation was the Lusitania disaster and the
action you might take.
Grey told me he did not see how you could do differently
from what you have done, and he intimated that if we had
done less we would have placed ourselves in much the same
position in which England would have been placed if she had
not defended Belgian neutrality. In other words, he thought
that we would have been totally without friends or influence
in the concert of nations, either now or hereafter. I am sure
that this is true.
If we had failed to take action in a determined way it




THE ENTRY OF ITALY


443


would have meant that we would have lost the friendship of
the Allies on the one hand, and would not have mitigated any
of the hate which Germany feels for us. Sooner or later we
would have had to reckon with Germany unless she is completely crushed, and we would not have had a sympathetic
friend among the great nations.
Grey asked me what I thought Germany's reply would be.
I told him that if I were writing Germany's reply I would say
that if England would lift the embargo on foodstuffs, Germany would consent to discontinue her submarine policy of
sinking merchantmen. Grey replied that if Germany would
consent not only to discontinue that mode of warfare, but
would also agree to discontinue the use of asphyxiating gases
and the ruthless killing of non-combatants, England would
be willing to lift the embargo on foodstuffs.
I am rushing a cablegram to you, outlining this. It distresses me that I cannot have you, Grey, and Berlin within
talking distance. If that could happen, so much could be
accomplished that is impossible under present conditions.
I am writing this hastily, in order to catch to-night's mail.
It may interest you to know that Italy has signed an agreement with the Allies to come into the war before the 26th.1
This agreement will be carried out unless the Italian Parliament refuses to sanction it. I have had this information for
ten days or more, but have not written it because there
seemed so many slips between the agreement and its completion...
Your affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
1 The Treaty of London, signed April 26, 1915, one of the 'secret
treaties.' It did not set a date for Italy's entrance into the war, providing
merely that she should use all her resources in making war with the
Allies upon all their enemies. On May 23, Italy declared war against
Austria, but did not declare war on Germany until August 27, 1916. On
April 30, 1917, Mr. Balfour explained the details of the treaty to President Wilson.




444 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


The conversation with Grey suggested the possibility of an
arrangement which might go far towards settling the dispute
with England over the holding-up of cargoes and also might
avert the livelier danger of an open break with Germany,
over the submarine. The European War, as it touched the
United States, had now become a struggle between German
submarine and British blockade. Both weapons infringed
American neutral rights. If the belligerents could be induced
to give up their use, much of our difficulties would disappear.
And to many the compromise seemed fair, for if the British
food blockade threatened to starve Germany out, the German submarine threatened to destroy British commerce.
The suggestion was not new. In February, President Wilson, following a hint of Ambassador Bernstorff, had made a
similar proposal to the British. Since the Germans averred
that the submarine war zone was merely retaliation for the
British attempt to starve non-combatants, Wilson argued
that, if the British would permit foodstuffs to pass, Germany
ought to give up her illegal submarine warfare. Grey had
approved the proposal. Talking to House on February 27, he
pointed out that with an agreement of this kind the British
could carry on the war indefinitely. British public opinion,
however, did not appreciate how dangerous a weapon the
submarine might become, and felt that Great Britain would
be sacrificing too much by lifting the embargo upon food.
Ambassador Page himself held this opinion and, regarding
the President's suggestion as something made in Germany,
did not push it vigorously.
'I went to the Embassy to see the Ambassador [wrote
House]. He did not return from his week-end with the Prime
Minister until 12.15.... Page told of the two unhappy days
he had spent in the country. One of the perquisites of the
Prime Minister is the use of an old castle near Dover, and in
it Page was lodged for two cold, wet, miserable nights. There




GREAT BRITAIN REFUSES A COMPROMISE 445


were no fires excepting one here and there, and, though Page
is a vegetarian, there seemed nothing to eat excepting meats
of many varieties....
'Page was inclined not to make a personal appeal to Grey
in behalf of the acceptance of the President's proposal concerning a compromise with Germany on the question of the
embargo. I called his attention to the President's cable to
me requesting me to say to Page that he desired the matter
presented with all the emphasis in his power. He then said
he would make an appointment with Grey and do so, though
one could see he had no stomach for it. He did not consider
the suggestion a wise one, nor did he consider its acceptance
favorable to the British Government. I argued to the contrary, and tried to convince him that the good opinion gained
from the neutrals would be compensation enough for any
concessions this Government might make, and that the concessions were not really more than those made by Germany.'
Evidently the British Cabinet, with the exception of Grey,
shared Page's belief that it was preferable to retain the
offensive weapon of the food blockade against Germany,
even if it meant braving the threat of the submarine, the
danger of which then and even later they did not fully
realize. On March 15, they refused the compromise.
The crisis of May was so much more acute than that of
February, that House seized eagerly upon the chance of renewing the proposal that Germany give up the submarine
warfare provided that Great Britain would relax the food
blockade. He was sincere in his belief that the British would
gain both a moral and a material advantage thereby, and he
was convinced that it offered the sole means of preventing
American intervention, which otherwise would be inevitable
as the result of German submarine attacks.


'Grey was very fine about it [recorded Colonel House].




446 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


He said of course it would be to the advantage of Great
Britain for the United States to enter the war, and if he
agreed to do what we requested it would mean that the
United States would remain neutral. Nevertheless, he
wanted to do what we considered to be for our best interests
and what, indeed, he thought was in the long run for Great
Britain's best interests.
'We discussed this feature at length, I maintaining that
Great Britain was taking long chances upon being isolated by
German submarine warfare, and if her commerce could be
free from this menace, she could carry on the war indefinitely
without fear of ultimate defeat.'
President Wilson immediately cabled to House expressing
deep interest in the suggestion. He looked upon it, not
merely as a means of ending the crisis in German-American
relations, but also as affording a possible solution of the
quarrel with England over the blockade. For the sake of
diplomatic consistency, he asserted, he would soon have to
address a note to Great Britain regarding the interruption of
American trade with neutral ports. It would be a great
stroke on England's part, said the President, if she would of
her own accord relieve the situation and put Germany wholly
in the wrong, a small price to pay for the ending of submarine
outrages.
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, May 20, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
When your cable of the 16th came, I asked Page to make
an engagement with Grey in order that we might protest
against the holding-up of cargoes and find definitely whether
England would agree to lift the embargo on foodstuffs, providing Germany would discontinue her submarine policy. Page
promised to make the appointment. He did not do so, and




THE BRITISH CABINET IN DISSOLUTION 447


finally told me that he had concluded it was useless because,
in his opinion, the British Government would not consider
for a moment the proposal to lift the embargo.
It was then I sent you the discouraging cable. However,
when your second cable of Tuesday came, I went to see Sir
Edward without further consultation with Page.
I found Grey was even more receptive of the suggestion
than when I saw him last, and he promised to use all his influence in favor of such a proposal, provided one was made
by Germany. He added, however, that the discontinuance of
asphyxiating or poisonous gases must also be included in any
agreement made.
He explained that the Cabinet was in dissolution and that
he could only speak for himself and that he did not want me
to consider that he spoke for the Government. I expressed a
willingness to accept his personal assurance in regard to his
own endeavors, with the understanding that it committed no
one but himself. He said that in ordinary times if the
Cabinet refused to acquiesce in his view, he would resign; but
that he did not feel justified in doing this in time of war. I
took occasion to express your high regard for him and to
assure him that we would consider his resignation a calamity.
He dictated, while I wrote, the understanding between us,
which was literally this:
1st. Permitting staple foodstuffs to go to neutral ports
without question.
2d. All foodstuffs now detained to be brought before the
prize court as quickly as possible.
3d. Claims for cotton cargoes now detained to be made as
soon as shippers certify as to each cargo, that they are the
real owners to whom payment should be made.
Should England agree to the first proposition, Germany
was to cease submarine warfare on merchant vessels and
discontinue the use of asphyxiating or poisonous gases.
Propositions two and three are matters between this Gov



448 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


ernment and ours and have no reference to Germany and
will be carried out at once.
I told Grey that I would immediately cable Gerard, asking
Germany to withhold her answer to your note until I could
communicate with him further. I also told him I would suggest to the German authorities, through Gerard, that they
answer the note by making the proposal in question....
I assumed the entire responsibility, so if things go wrong
you and Sir Edward can disclaim any connection with it.
If Germany refuses to consider this proposal, it will place
you in the position of having done everything possible to
avert war between the United States and Germany.
Sir Edward took a copy of the memorandum I made, so
that there might be no misunderstanding between us. Of
course there would be none, anyway, for he remembers well
what he says and never recedes from his word....
It is unfortunate that the Cabinet is to be re-formed, for
I am confident with the present members the plan would go
through, provided Germany makes the proposal. The new
element to go in is less apt to favor the proposal than those
already there.     Affectionately yours
E. M. HouSE
Colonel House to Ambassador Gerard
[Telegram via Copenhagen]
LONDON, May 19, 1915... Can you not induce the German Government to answer our note by proposing that if England will permit foodstuffs in the future to go to neutral ports without question,
Germany will discontinue her submarine warfare on merchant vessels and will also discontinue the use of poisonous
gas? Such a proposal from Germany at this time will give
her great advantage, and in my opinion she will make a grave
mistake if she does not seize it.
EDWARD HOUSE




DINNER WITH LORD HALDANE


449q


'May 19, 1915: Page thought I was making a mistake in
doing anything [wrote House], and that it would result in
bad feeling between England and the United States provided
Germany assented and Sir Edward Grey could not get his
Government to agree. I answered that this was a matter I
could not control; that my purpose was to place the United
States and the President clearly in the right, so if trouble
came between Germany and ourselves the President would
have done everything within his power to prevent war, and
could maintain his position taken in the note with a clear
conscience and with the certain approval of the American
people.
'I took dinner with Lord Haldane. By common consent
we dined alone, so as to discuss matters freely.... He showed
me the diary he kept during his memorable visit to Berlin on
February 9 and 10, 1912. He was sent over, as the world
knows, as the representative of the King and British Government, to try to bring about a better understanding with
Germany and to draw up a tentative treaty to that effect....
'I took it as an indication of his confidence that he let me
read this. He explained, however, that he felt I should know
everything that had passed between the German and British
Governments, in regard to Asia Minor, the African Colonies,
and the larger relations concerning the Triple Entente, and
what Great Britain might do in the event either Germany or
England should become involved with nations other than
themselves.
'Grey had spoken to Haldane about my proposal concerning the lifting of the embargo on foodstuffs and the discontinuance of the submarine campaign. He said his own influence would be in favor of the proposal, but he did not know
what action the new Ministry would take.
'He spoke of himself and of his years of service to his
country, and his voice saddened when he told of how he had
been maligned and misunderstood since the war with Ger



450 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE
many began.' He gave me two of his books, and we talked at
length of Germany, her future, and the German people. I
mentioned my proposal as to the Freedom of the Seas. He
thought it splendid, and I understood that I could count
upon his influence in behalf of that measure when the proper
time came....
'May 21, 1915: I lunched with Grey and read him the
President's despatch.... He has seen nearly all the present
Ministry and enough of the Opposition who would probably
be in the Cabinet, to be able to say that in his opinion, if
Germany made the proposal I had suggested it would be
considered by his Government.
'He is always cautious in his statements, and I conclude
that what he says means that the British Government will
accept the proposal. It will be a great diplomatic triumph
for the President if brought about, and it will settle our contentions with both Governments....'
Whatever the ultimate decision of the British Cabinet
might have been, the German Government put an end to any
chance of a compromise settlement by a brusque refusal to
consider House's suggestion. In public the plaintiveness of
German protests against the cruel starvation of women and
children by the British was not diminished, but in private the
German leaders were evidently unwilling to pay the price
necessary to raise the blockade. They were determined to
make full use of the submarine, and they were the less inclined to heed American warnings in that they were not conHaldane, as Minister of War in the Asquith Cabinet, had created the
territorial organization and made possible the immediate despatch of an
efficient Expeditionary Force. 'But for his work,' wrote Grey to Asquith, 'this Force would not have been available at a moment's notice.... That Haldane of all people should have been... accused of lack of
patriotism or public spirit is an intolerable instance of gross ignorance, or
malice, or of madness.' (Grey, Twenty-Five Years, II, 244.) But the
Conservatives made Haldane's exclusion from the new coalition Cabinet
a condition of their own participation.




DUMBA'S CABLE AND ITS EFFECTS


451


vinced the United States would support such warnings by
other than verbal factors. Two messages from Ambassador
Gerard to Colonel House carried the news of the failure of
the proposed compromise and indicated the cause.  xC
Colonel House to the President
[Telegram]
LONDON, May 24, 1915
Gerard cables me as follows: 'Zimmermann told me yesterday that Dumba, Austrian Ambassador, had cabled him that
Bryan told him that America was not in earnest about Lusitania matter.' Of course Mr. Bryan did not say that, but I
think you should know what Zimmermann told Gerard....
EDWARD HOUSE
Ambassador Gerard learned of the cable from Dumba in a
curious fashion. Zimmermann had come to lunch with him
and after his customary two quarts of Moselle was talking
freely to an American lady, wife of a German. He assured
her that there would be no break with the United States over
the Lusitania, since Wilson was not serious in his protest.
The Ambassador, as soon as he learned the gist of the conversation, called upon Zimmermann and demanded the
source of his information. Zimmermann at once pulled out
the cable from Dumba and laid it before him. Mr. Gerard
faced a problem. It was essential that he inform Wilson, and
he could hardly do so through the State Department, since
his cable would go straight to Mr. Bryan. Thus he turned it
over to House, knowing that he would at once inform the
President. Dumba's message carried disastrous effects, since
it convinced the Germans that they could carry on their submarine campaign with impunity. Hence their refusal of the
compromise that House suggested.




452 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Colonel House to the President
[Telegram]
LONDON, May 25, 1915
I have following cable from Gerard:
'I gave your suggestion to von Jagow this morning. This
proposition of permitting the passage of food in return for the
cessation of submarine methods has already been made and
declined.
'If raw materials are added, the matter can perhaps be
arranged. Germany is in no need of food.'
Of course the conditions they make are impossible. This
does away with their contention that the starving of
Germany justifies their submarine policy. I think this
strengthens your already unassailable position.
EDWARD HOUSE
Colonel House to Ambassador Gerard
[Telegram]
LONDON, May 25, 1915
The Allies would never agree to allow raw materials to go
through; therefore I can do nothing further and there is no
need for Germany further to delay acting on our note.
I am terribly sorry, because the consequences may be very
grave.
EDWARD HOUSE
'May 26, 1915: I lunched with Sir Edward Grey again
to-day. I read him all the telegrams that had passed between the President, Gerard, and myself since we last met.
We first discussed Gerard's cable saying Berlin had refused
to accept my suggestion. Grey thought it had at least placed
Great Britain in a more advantageous position, and he expressed himself as being glad it had been sent, for it settled
the German contention that they were compelled to wage their




GERMANY REJECTS THE COMPROMISE 453


submarine policy against Great Britain because she was endeavoring to starve sixty-five million German non-combatants.
'In talking to other members of the Government, he said
some of them had thought in the event Germany accepted
the proposal it would mean that she was actually running
short of food and it would not be well for England to relax.
Grey, however, argued that there were too many advantages
on the other side to let that one prevail. He said, too, he was
anxious for us to know that England was doing what she
could to keep us from war with Germany, and not trying to
push us in. My admiration and affection for him grows.'
Thus ended the most favorable opportunity for settling the
controversy that later was to exercise momentous effect upon
the course of the war and the fate of Germany. Had Berlin
accepted the compromise, not merely would Germany have
obtained the food of which, as she complained, her starving
civilian population was deprived by an illegal blockade, but
she might have avoided the quarrel with the United States
that brought America into the war. 'Whom the Gods would
destroy-'
III
Germany's refusal to seize the opportunity that had thus
been offered her convinced Colonel House that further stay
in Europe was useless. The chance of beginning peace negotiations between the belligerents, if it had ever existed, had
completely disappeared. On both sides emotion was so thoroughly envenomed that any suggestion of a pacific arrangement was regarded as criminal. House was also convinced
that German policy meant American intervention and he
wished to be near the President so as to urge him to wage
war with vigor.


'I have concluded that war with Germany is inevitable [he




454 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


wrote on May 30] and this afternoon at six o'clock I decided
to go home on the S.S. St. Paul on Saturday. I sent a cable
to the President to this effect.
'I discussed the matter with Wallace, who will go with us,
and I also discussed it with Page, who advised our going if we
cared to get home within the year. Page is always a candid
adviser....
'June 1, 1915: I told Plunkett I was leaving for America
and my reasons for doing so. I said it was my purpose to persuade the President not to conduct a milk-and-water war,
but to put all the strength, all the virility, and all the energy
of our nation into it, so that Europe might remember for a
century what it meant to provoke a peaceful nation into war.
'I intended to suggest a commission, with perhaps a member of the Cabinet as chairman, to facilitate the manufacture
of munitions of war and war materials. Plunkett wanted me
to see some of the British Cabinet and talk with them before
I left. He arranged for me to meet Lloyd George at six
o'clock... '
A letter from the American Ambassador in Berlin indicated that Germany had embarked upon the new course
with confidence, and strengthened House's conviction that
war could not be avoided.
Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House
BERLIN, June 1, 1915
MY DEAR COLONEL:
I am afraid that we are in for grave consequences. This
country, I fear, will not give up the torpedoing without
notice of merchant and passenger steamers; and their recent
victories over the Russians have given them great confidence
here. They seem also to be holding their lines in the Dardanelles and their lines in France and Belgium with ease, and
probably Italy will be defeated.




GERMAN CONFIDENCE


455


The only thing that can gain the war for the Allies is universal service in England and the throwing into the balance of
at least two million new English troops. If the English knew
what the Germans have in store for England in case of success, the very dead in the graveyards would volunteer for the
war.
It is the German hope to keep the Lusitania matter 'jollied
along' until the American people get excited about baseball
or a new scandal and forget. Meantime the hate of America
grows daily.
As to food and even raw materials, the Germans have
enough for war purposes. They need raw materials for the
trades, but have everything needed for the manufacture of
munitions; and as they are spending all the money for war
supplies in their own country their financial situation is good
for the present. They expect some other country to pay the
cost of the war.
In governmental circles there is no talk of giving up Belgium. They want to keep it and exact great indemnities
from other countries.
They are building new and great submarines (2800 tons),
and are putting so many in the water that I think they will
soon become a serious menace to England. That is why a
great land army is necessary....
Will cable if anything comes up. Best wishes to Mrs. House.
Yours as ever
JAMES W. GERARD
If, contrary to expectations, Germany agreed to abandon
or modify the submarine warfare or if the crisis should be
tided over, House was equally desirous of being in the
United States and near the President, for in that case the dispute with Great Britain over the holding-up of American
cargoes would certainly become acute. The difference was
serious enough at best, and mutual misunderstanding threat



456 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


ened to make it worse. Colonel House was anxious that
President Wilson should comprehend the difficulties which
Sir Edward Grey faced, how hard he was pressed by British
opinion and the Admiralty, and how important it was that
the United States remain on friendly terms with the Allies.
Whatever the irritation caused by the restriction of American
trade, House never wavered in his conviction that our welfare was bound up in German defeat. All this Ambassador
Page had urged in many long letters. But the very number
and length of the letters, touched as they were by pro-Ally
emotion, lessened the influence of the Ambassador, who, in
Washington, seemed more like the spokesman of Allied interests than the representative of the American Government.
As House realized acutely, a purely objective summary of the
situation with emphasis upon American interests would carry
more weight.
'March 4, 1915: Yesterday [wrote House], when Page was
drawing up his despatch to the President asking that he do
nothing for the moment concerning the proposed blockade of
Germany, he had a lot of things in it which I advised eliminating. It was the strongest sort of pro-British argument,
and I knew it would weaken his influence both with the State
Department and with the President. He reluctantly cut it
down to a short statement....'
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, May 25, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:... There is nothing new to report here, and it looks as if
things might be settling down for a long war.... I want very
much to see you and to go over the situation in person. There
are so many things that cannot be written, and I think it
would be well worth while for me to make the trip even if
it is necessary to return within a short time.




POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES


457


There is no doubt that the position you have taken with
both Germany and Great Britain is correct; but I feel that
our position with the Allies is somewhat different, for we are
bound up more or less in their success, and I do not think we
should do anything that can possibly be avoided to alienate
the good feeling that they now have for us. If we lose their
good will, we will not be able to figure at all in peace negotiations, and we will be sacrificing too much in order to maintain all our commercial rights.
The situation, I know, is most trying and difficult, and you
have acted with extraordinary patience and good judgment.
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
Colonel House had constantly impressed upon his British
friends the importance of recognizing the irritation and loss
caused in the United States by the holding-up of American
cargoes and mails. From the moment of his arrival in
February, 1915, he emphasized the fact that, even though
this was the only serious cause of friction between the two
countries, it was nevertheless one that would lead to grave
results unless eclipsed by the dispute with Germany. The
latter infringed the rights of humanity, whereas the controversy with Great Britain was of a far less vital sort. But it
touched the pockets and the sensibilities of many Americans.
Furthermore, it was impossible for the President to protest with vigor against German infractions of the law of
nations, so long as the Germans had some ground for complaint that he permitted the British to alter maritime regulations at will. Letters from the President and Cabinet members gave House a clear picture of the difficulties which they
faced in Washington. The friendly tone of the President's
message goes far to answer the criticism that the gaucherie
of American protests tended unnecessarily to embitter AngloAmerican relations.




458 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


He reiterated his emphasis upon the change that was
coming over American opinion because of British interference with neutral trade and expressed the fear that it might
be impossible to prevent the passage by Congress of an embargo upon shipments of arms. Wilson intimated that he
would try to prevent it, but he wished Grey to realize the
danger. He conveyed the warning through House rather
than Page because he wished it to be absolutely unofficial and
spoken merely in personal friendship. Secretary Lane expressed similar sentiments.
Secretary Lane to Colonel House
WASHINGTON, May 5, 1915
MY DEAR COLONEL:
I am glad to receive your note. There is little that I can
say as to conditions here. The President is bearing the burden well. Notwithstanding all the insults of Germany, he is
determined to endure to the limit, to turn the left cheek and
then the back, if necessary; but of course, he cannot suffer
insult after insult to the point of humiliation, for the country
would rise in rebellion. We are a sensitive people, as our
English friends discovered a hundred years ago.
And the English are not behaving very well. They are
holding up our ships; they have made new international
law. We have been very meek and mild under their use of
the ocean as a toll road. Of course, the sympathy of the
greater part of the country is with the English, but it would
not have been as strongly with them, not nearly so strongly,
if it had not been for the persistent short-sightedness of our
German friends. I cannot see what England means by her
policy of delay and embarrassment and hampering. Her
success manifestly depends upon the continuance of the
strictest neutrality on our part, and yet she is not willing to
let us have the rights of a neutral.
You would be interested, I think, in hearing some of the




LETTER FROM SECRETARY LANE


459


discussion around the Cabinet table. There isn't a man in
the Cabinet who has a drop of German blood in his veins, I
guess. Two of us were born under the British flag. I have
two cousins in the British army, and Mrs. Lane has three.
The most of us are Scotch in our ancestry, and yet each day
that we meet we boil over somewhat, at the foolish manner
in which England acts. Can it be that she is trying to take
advantage of the war to hamper our trade?...
If Congress were in session, we would be actively debating
an embargo resolution to-day....
After all, our one great asset is the confidence of the
people in the President. They do not love him, because he
appears to them as a man of the cloister. But they respect
him as a wise, sane leader who will keep them out of trouble,
and whatever fool things are done they are willing to blame
on Bryan, which is gravely unjust. I am growing more and
more in my admiration for Bryan each day. He is too good a
Christian to run a naughty world and he doesn't hate hard
enough, but he certainly is a noble and high-minded man,
and loyal to the President to the last hair....
As always yours
F. K. L.
Even in England there were a number of thoughtful persons who felt that interference with neutral cargoes bound
for neutral ports, even though the goods were ultimately
destined for Germany, was not worth the difficulties it
would provoke. Such opinion, although held by a minority,
was not entirely confined to pacifist circles.
'March 3, 1915: Both Brooks and Pollen i} [wrote Colonel
House] agreed with me that Great Britain was entering into
a dangerous phase of warfare in undertaking to establish a
paper blockade against Germany, an actual blockade being
1 A. H. Pollen, journalist and naval authority.




460 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


seemingly impossible. I argued the point very earnestly, for
I wanted their influence and that of their papers in the
trouble I can see looming up between our two countries.
'March 4, 1915: Francis W. Hirst, editor of The Economist,
called this morning for the second time. I missed him
yesterday when he was here. I found in him an entirely
new type of Englishman.... He is antagonistic to the
Government, though a Liberal. He criticized Grey and
Asquith severely, though Asquith is a near relative....
He is against the war, and claims he is far from being
alone, for he believes the war unpopular in England, and if
public opinion could find expression it would be shown to be.
He desires me to meet Lord Morley and the former Lord
Chancellor, Lord Loreburn. He says both of them are against
the war and they believe peace should be brought about
now.
'Hirst thinks the President should take an active stand
against the proposed blockade, believing if he would prohibit all exports to all the belligerents, he could force this
Government to do practically what he desired. He wished
the President to lay down a new international code of laws
and insist upon every nation living up to it. I tried to point
out some of the difficulties of such a procedure.
'He said that his predecessor on The Economist, Richard
Bagehot, whom the President admires so much, declared
that England should have done this in 1870....
'March 9, 1915: Mr. Robert Donald, editor of The Daily
Chronicle, took tea with me. He is an able and reasonable
Scotchman. We talked of the embargo, and of war and
everything relating thereto. He is a great friend of Lloyd
George and thinks he is the greatest man in the Kingdom.
He thought it a mistake for Great Britain to declare a blockade against Germany, and believed if it is enforced our
Government would be justified in placing an embargo on
munitions of war. He is to touch upon this matter cautiously




DIFFICULTIES OF SIR EDWARD GREY 461


in his paper, and will try to influence the Government in the
direction we desire... '
IV
Colonel House to the President
LONDON, May 7, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
Your cablegram concerning the delaying of cargoes came
to me yesterday. I already had an engagement with Sir
Edward Grey this morning, so I did not make an earlier
appointment.
I read him your message and told him that in my opinion
the situation was critical and that it would not do to temporize with the matter; that the Germans were doing everything possible to embarrass you and to force you to place an
embargo upon arms.
He said he understood the situation perfectly. He took a
memorandum, which he read to me afterwards and which
was to be sent to each member of the Cabinet in the form of
a communication. He put it strongly and urgently, and he
told me he would do all that was possible.
He said he had to contend with public sentiment here
that demanded a complete blockade of Germany. I think,
too, he has opposition in the Cabinet with Kitchener and
Winston Churchill....
Sir Edward wants to do everything that is possible, and
he desired me to let you know that he had great difficulties
here to contend with....
I have seen a great many people since I last wrote you,
among them the Russian Ambassador. I found him a very
able man, but as ignorant of your purposes as the people of
France....
When I came over here it was practically the universal
opinion in France and England and, I find now, in Russia
also, that you were inclined to be pro-German even though




462 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


the American people as a whole were otherwise. I have a
feeling that Sir Cecil has fostered this sentiment, because
what I have heard here sounds very much like what he said
to me on several occasions. He told Norman Hapgood that
the Administration was pro-German, and he has told others
the same thing.
I took occasion to tell Sir Edward that Sir Cecil was very
nervous and was constantly seeing spooks and that he had
told me that we would all be pro-German before the end of
the war. I did this because I was sure he had written the
same thing to Sir Edward....
Your affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
LONDON, May 27, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I saw Sir Edward Grey yesterday and discussed the holding-up of cargoes.
As to cotton, he said this Government, following precedent, had a right to make it contraband of war just as our
Government did during our Civil War. But out of consideration for our wishes they had not done so, and therefore he
hoped we would be lenient.
He also said they were doing everything that was possible
now to avoid friction with us and that orders had gone out to
pass upon all questions speedily, so they could no longer be
charged with delay.
He told me some things of interest concerning the Balkan
States. One was that Rumania had agreed to come in, provided the Allies would give her certain Hungarian territory.2 Sir Edward refused to consider such terms, for the
1 Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, British Ambassador in Washington.
2 The Banat of Temesvar and the Transylvanian forelands. Serbia's
claim to the southwestern portion of the Banat was insistent. The Peace
Conference in 1919 recognized much of Serbia's claim, dividing the Banat
between that Power and Rumania.




SITUATION OF THE BALKAN STATES 463


reason that what she wanted would be unfair to Serbia.
His reply was that since Great Britain went into this war to
defend the rights of one small nation, it would not transgress
upon the rights of another, even though great advantage to
the Allied cause might accrue.
If it were not for Ferdinand, Bulgaria would probably
come in with the Allies, and, if she did, then Greece would
also. They all fear lest some one of the Balkan States will
remain out and be in a condition to take advantage of the
exhaustion that may occur....
I am glad Balfour is in the new Cabinet. He is a man of
the Grey type, and I feel sure that there will be less trouble
with the holding-up of cargoes now than when the Admiralty was administered by Churchill."
Sir Edward leaves Monday to be gone a month, and Lord
Crewe will probably act for him during his absence. He is
to arrange with Crewe for me to see him at any time I desire, and at his home. He lives close by. I never go to the
Foreign Office or any of the other Government Offices on
account of the publicity. They all understand my reasons
for this....
Your affectionate
E. M. HOUSE
Before leaving for the United States, Colonel House
entered many long conferences with members of the new
Cabinet and with others of influence, in order that no misunderstanding should mar Anglo-American relations. In
most of these conversations he laid strong emphasis upon
the blockade problem, for he regarded it as vital that the
British should appreciate the American point of view.
'May 22, 1915: Lord Bryce called at ten o'clock. I told
I An unfulfilled prophecy, despite the calm good sense of Mr. Balfour
and his friendly feeling toward the United States.




464 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


of some of the troubles between Great Britain and the United
States, regarding the holding-up of cargoes. He expressed a
willingness to use his influence with the Foreign Office, but I
asked him to do nothing for the moment, for I am sure he
cannot do more than I have already done with Grey.
'We agreed that it was not the Foreign Office at fault,
but the War and Admiralty Departments. I talked to him
about the Freedom of the Seas, and he asked if it had to do
with "capture and search at sea." He did not seem in favor
of it, saying he had heard that Dernburg very much desired
it. I replied that I was the instigator of it in Germany,
and the Germans were merely echoing the thought I had
given them. He laughed and said he felt better, for, if we
were doing it, he was quite sure it was not a bad thing, and
that in the future he would look at it with more friendly eyes.
'June 2, 1915: I met Lloyd George at ten, as previously
arranged. I was surprised at the freedom with which he criticized the War Department. He said Great Britain should
now have all the shells they could use, since they were the
largest engineering country excepting the United States,
and had all sorts of factories that could be made to turn out
explosives. He showed me a list of shrapnel and explosive
shells that were used by the British in recent battles. In one
battle, 50,000 shrapnel were fired and only 1600 high explosives, while it should be the reverse.
'He said he had found soldiers to be self-opinionated and
unsatisfactory, but he indicated his intention of putting an
impetus on munition production that would revolutionize
the situation. He had a list of firms and corporations from
whom they were getting munitions in the United States.
While important, it was not as large as I had thought....
'He stated that it would be a serious menace to the Allied
cause if we should stop the shipment of munitions of war at
this time....
'This was, I believe, George's first day as Minister of




CONVERSATION WITH LLOYD GEORGE 465


Munitions in his new Whitehall quarters. There was no
furniture in the room except a table and one chair. He insisted upon my taking the chair, which I declined to do,
declaring that a seat on the table was more suitable for me
than for a Cabinet official.
'He spoke again and again of "military red-tape," which
he declared he would cut out as speedily as possible. He was
full of energy and enthusiasm, and I feel certain something
will soon happen in his department. He reminds me more of
the virile, aggressive type of American politician than any
member of the Cabinet.... He has something dynamic
within him which his colleagues have not and which is badly
needed in this great hour....
'After lunch I went to keep an appointment with the new
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna.... I took
occasion to tell him that Germany had saved England from
a good raking over the coals because of her embargo policy,
which was entirely illegal and to which we submitted merely
because Germany was so prodigal in greater infractions. I
urged him to use his influence at Cabinet meetings to modify
their actions in this direction. If they did not, and we composed our differences with Germany, I assured him we would
hold his Government to a stricter accountability. It was
not a question of what the President thought of the controversy between the belligerents, but what he had to do in
justice to a large portion of the American people, who were
insisting that their rights were being infringed.
'He entirely agreed with this and hoped the differences
could be ironed out satisfactorily. It was also agreed that in
the event we came into the war on the side of the Allies, he
would communicate with me unofficially, in order that I
might help in facilitating the solution of financial questions
arising between the two Governments....
'At half-past five, I went to Lansdowne House to call on
the Marquis of Lansdowne.... I spoke strongly of his




466 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


Government's policy in holding-up neutral cargoes, and let
him know that, if Germany was not acting so much worse,
they would be called to an accounting. I did not believe
Great Britain, under similar circumstances, would permit it for
a moment, and the President had bent almost to the breaking
point in order to avoid a disagreeable controversy with them.
'I gave a sketch of the President in which I depicted him
as a Scotchman with all the tenacity of purpose of that race,
and bade him remember that while the President at heart
sympathized with the Allies and their purposes, yet he was
President of the United States, and our people did not differentiate between those violating international law, and he
had of necessity to maintain an equitable attitude.
'June 3, 1915: Lord Crewe and I lunched alone, in order
to have a farewell talk about matters which could not be
discussed before a third party....
'I read him the President's despatches to me regarding the
shipping controversy, and urged him to impress upon his
colleagues the necessity of straightening this out, provided
we did not immediately drift into war with Germany. I told
him the President was being criticized for writing one kind of
note to Germany and demanding an immediate answer, and
writing another kind to Great Britian and having no reply
for months. I considered it necessary for them to prepare an
answer at once to the note sent in February concerning the
stoppage of cargoes, and to hold it in readiness for delivery
in the event it was asked for. On the other hand, I would
advise the President not to ask for it until the German submarine controversy was settled one way or the other; and if
it was settled by war, there would be no need for an answer.
But if our differences with Germany were settled, then an
immediate answer should be forthcoming. I spoke of how
pressed the President was in this matter, and that it would
not do to act in the future as they had acted in the past.
'June 4, 1915: I read the King one or two cables I had




TALKS WITH KING GEORGE AND BALFOUR 467


sent the President, principally about the interference with
our shipping. I wish all official England to understand our
Government's attitude upon this question, in order that
there may be no misunderstanding should it be necessary to
act with vigor later.
'His Maj esty talked of the recent Zeppelin raid and thought
a very much more serious one Vould occur soon, believing
they would attempt to burn London. I showed him the last
cartoon in Life which Martin sent in advance of publication,
which depicts his distinguished cousin Wilhelm hanged at
the end of a yardarm. I was not sure of the wisdom of showing this, but he seemed to enjoy it thoroughly. The more I
see of the King, the better I like him; he is a good fellow and
deserves a better fate than being a king....
'I lunched with Mr. Balfour. The only other guest was
Sir Horace Plunkett, who has our confidence. Balfour said
he intended to have the St. Paul convoyed as effectively as
the British navy could do it....
'There is a distinct feeling of depression in England at
present, largely due to the lack of high explosives, and also to
the fact of Russia's continued defeat because she, too, lacks
munitions of war.
'He said that what the navy needed most now was torpedo-boat destroyers, and he was contracting for a large
number of other small fast boats of this type. They have
plenty of battleships. He spoke of how fortunate they had
been with their transports, saying they had not lost one. He
reached over, like any good American, and knocked on wood.
'I went into our shipping troubles as I havewith othermembers of the Government, and I think I made him understand
just what difficulties our Government was laboring under.'
v
House sailed on the St. Paul, June 5. Arriving in the
United States a week later, he summarized for the President




468 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


his impressions of European affairs and emphasized the
gravity of the crisis which the American Government must
face.
Colonel House to the President
ROSLYN, LONG ISLAND
June 16, 1915
DEAR GOVERNOR:
The situation, as far as the Allies go, is not encouraging.
Much to their disappointment and to the surprise of the
Germans, they have not been able to make the progress
which they thought the spring and summer weather would
bring about. They have made two cardinal errors. One was
the attempt to force the Dardanelles by sea only. They
found this was impossible and, before they could send a land
force to cooperate with the fleet, the Turks under the direction of German officers had time to make the Straits almost
impregnable. They will finally get through, but at a terrible cost.i'
The second mistake was in not accelerating during the
winter months the manufacture of high explosives. When
the spring campaign opened and they attempted to storm
the German trenches, they found that they not only had insufficient ammunition, but what they had was of the wrong
kind. This mistake was more largely made by the English
than by the French.
The Germans, through their espionage system, evidently
knew the weakness of the Allies; consequently their great
concern regarding the munitions of war coming from America.
When I was in Berlin in March, it seemed to me that they
were talking nonsense when they said that if we would stop
the shipment of munitions the war would end within a short
time.
1 The prophecy was not fulfilled, for, although the cost was paid, the
Allied expedition withdrew from Gallipoli in the following winter.




THE PRESIDENT AND COLONEL HOUSE OFF DUTY








MILITARY SITUATION IN JUNE, 1915     469


The English have been unable to do more than hold their
ground, and the Russians have been utterly unable to withstand the German onslaught, for the reason that they have
neither sufficient arms nor ammunition. It has resolved itself into a war of munitions rather than one of men.
Germany was much more willing for peace in the autumn
than she has been since. I am enclosing you a letter from
Gerard bearing upon this phase.
There was the greatest possible concern in England when
I left, although they are confident of ultimate victory if the
Allies hold together; but it will be delayed longer than anticipated, and perhaps it would not come at all if their American supplies were for any reason shut off.
I need not tell you that if the Allies fail to win, it must
necessarily mean a reversal of our entire policy.
The sinking of the Lusitania, the use of poisonous gases,
and other breaches of international laws, made it impossible
for me to continue the discussion in England of the Freedom
of the Seas or the tentative formation of a peace covenant.
If these things had not happened, I could have gone along
and by midsummer we would have had the belligerents discussing, through you, the peace terms.
The difficulty is not with the German civil authorities,
but with the military and naval as represented by the Kaiser,
von Tirpitz, and Falkenhayn. The feeling is not good between the Foreign Office and von Tirpitz, for their differences are irreconcilable. In my opinion, von Tirpitz will
continue his submarine policy, leaving the Foreign Office to
make explanations for any 'unfortunate incidents' as best
they may.
I think we shall find ourselves drifting into war with Germany, for there is a large element in the German naval and
military factions that consider it would be a good, rather
than a bad, thing for Germany.
Regrettable as this would be, there would be compensa



470 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE


tions. The war would be more speedily ended, and we would
be in a strong position to aid the other great democracies in
turning the world into the right paths. It is something that
we have to face with fortitude, being consoled by the thought
that no matter what sacrifices we make, the end will justify
them.
Affectionately yours
E. M. HOUSE
The mission of Colonel House had not accomplished the
miracle of peace, which in 1915 was a practical impossibility.
But he had accomplished what few persons guessed- a
thorough understanding with those who guided the fortunes
of the Allies. Henceforth, whatever the disputes of State
Department and Foreign Office, the personal relations he
had created would preserve an underlying cordiality. He
had been given a private code that would permit him to communicate speedily and informally with Sir Edward Grey,
and the British Foreign Secretary promised to write him
frankly and frequently. House had obviously won the confidence of the British Government at a moment when public
opinion in England was turning against America. He had
made a host of friends abroad who would send him constant
and reliable information. And President Wilson, supposed
to be ill-informed and isolated, was through Colonel House
kept in close touch with the inner currents of European politics.
Sir Horace Plunkett to the President
THE PLUNKETT HOUSE, DUBLIN
June 4, 1915
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:... Colonel House, in his own quiet, tactful, and marvellously persuasive way, has, to my certain knowledge, rendered an inestimable service to the Goyernment of this




RETURN TO AMERICA


471


country by his counsel and advice in regard to its attitude to
the United States in this crisis. What similar service he may
have rendered to you, and to his people, in other European
countries you will know. He sails to-morrow, and I can well
believe that, as he cannot be in Europe and America at the
same time, it may be better that he should now be at your
side. As I have had the privilege of introducing him to some
people he wished to meet over here, and of explaining to
them some aspects of American public life which it was
necessary for them to know in order to appreciate the value
of Colonel House's help, I have offered to be of any assistance in my power, should misunderstandings arise in his
absence which informed unofficial intervention may be best
qualified to remove. I have also offered to keep him advised
of any events or movements of opinion, which, from the
possession of his confidence, I feel he ought to know. I
merely wish to assure you, Mr. President, that something
will be done to minimize the loss to us over here which must
be set against the gain to you and to the United States in
having Colonel House at Washington.
I am, with deep respect
Yours sincerely
HORACE PLUNKETT
It was, therefore, with his eyes fully opened to all aspects
of the European situation, that President Wilson faced the
long-drawn-out crisis in our relations with Germany which
followed the sinking of the Lusitania.
<n WWL      1,24., tfw '1-! t M;Af^tflI,,'f/' I    '


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