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After this work was announced the publisher received a copy
of the Second Edition, with additional and important matter.  Tllis
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II- \z I\
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9~~~~~~~~~~~~~




SOUTHERN HISTORY OF THE WAR.
THE
FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
REPRINTED FROM THE RICHMOND CORRECTED EDITION.
NEW YORK:
CHARLES B. RICHARDSON,
594 & 596 BROADWAY.
1863.




Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1863,
BY CHARLES B. RICHARDSON,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New York.
RENNIE, SHEA & IINDSAY,
S3TREOTYPERS AND ELECTROTYRS,                           83 RAIGH  e-Stret, PRINTER,
81, 83, and 85 Centre-street,                            8 Centre-Street, 
Nzw YORK.




THE
FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
BY
EDWARD A. POLLARD,
AUTHOR OF " BLACK DIAMONDS,"  ETC.
CORRECTED AND IMPROVED EDITION.
RICHMOND:
WEST & JOHNSTON, 145 MAIN STREET.
1862.




Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1862,
Br WEST & JOHNSTON,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Confederate States for the Eastern
District of Virginia.
CHAS. H. WYNNE, PRINTER.




PREFACE.
IT is scarcely necessary to state that the following pages
have been written without any thing lille literary ambition.
They have been composed by the author, with but little aid,
within the short period of three months, arid in the midst of
exacting occupations in the editorial department of a daily
newspaper.
These explanations are not made to disarm criticism. Their
purpose is only to define the claim which the author's work
makes at the bar of public criticism. He does not pretend to
have written a brilliant or elaborate book; but he does claim
to have composed, without seeking after literary ornaments, or
taxing his style with intellectual refinements, a compact, faithful, and independent popular narrative of the events of the
first year of the existing war.
The author acknowledges some assistance from Mr. B. M.
DEWIvr, in the collection of materials.'He has but little other
of obligation to express, except to his publishers, Messrs. WESTr
& JOHNSTON, of Richmond, to whom he would make a public
acknowledgment for their generous encouragement, liberality,
and enterprising endeavors, which have enabled him, under
many inauspicious circumstances, to complete his work.
Richmond, Virginia, July, 1862.








PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.
THE author, in presenting to the public a second edition of his work,
has taken occasion to correct some errors, to make material annotations,
and to add a supplementary chapter, tracing the progress and developments of the war from the concluding point of the first year of its history to the period of publication.
He desires to make his grateful acknowledgments for the favor with
which his work has already been received by the public; for numerous
kind notices of the newspaper press, and for words of encouragement
spoken by many whom he is proud to call his friends. The success with
which his work has so far met, being unprecedented, he believes, in the
literary enterprises of the South, has surprised and gratified the author.
He protests, however, that, under any circumstances, he has but little
literary vanity to be inflated; that he composed his work in haste, with
neither time nor purpose to polish his style, or to captivate the taste of
readers, and that he is content to ascribe the success of his book to the
fact that, though rudely written and imperfect in many particulars, it is,
as he believes, honest, fair, independent, and outspoken.
While such has been the general character of the reception given his
book by the public, the author is sensible that some attacks have been
made upon it from malicious and disappointed sources, and that the
honest record which he has attempted of the truth of history, has been
encountered by many unjust, ignorant, and contemptible criticisms,
emanating mainly from favorites of the government and literary slatterns
in the Departments. The author has made no attempt to conciliate
either these creatures or their masters; he is not in the habit of toadying to great men, and courting such public whores as " official" newspapers; he is under no obligations to any man living to flatter him, to
tell lies, or to abate any thing from the honest convictions of his mind.
He proposed to write an independent history of some of the events of
the existing war. He is willing for his work to be judged by the strictest rule of truth; he asks no favors for it, in point of accuracy; he only
protests against a rule of criticism, which exalts paid panegyric above
honest truth, and reduces the level of the historian to that of the scrubs
and scribblers who write poetry and puffs in newspaper corners.




2                            PREFACE.
The flatterer's idea of the history of the present war would no doubt
be to plaster the government with praises; to hide all the faults of the
people of the South while gilding their virtues; to make, for a consideration, " especial mention" of all the small trash in the army; to coat
his puffs thickly with fine writing and tremendous adjectives; and to
place over the whole painted and gilded mass of falsehood, the figure of
Mr. Jefferson Davis, as the second Daniel come to judgment. The author has no ambition to gratify in these literary elegances.
In the eyes of the historian the person of Mr. Jefferson Davis is no
more sacred than that of the meanest agent in human affairs. The author has not been disposed to insult the dignity of office by coarse
speeches; he recognizes a certain propriety of style even in attacking
the grossest public abuses; but, while he has avoided indecency and
heat of language, and has, on the other hand, not attempted the elegance
and elevation of the literary artist, he trusts that he has given his opinions of the government and public persons with the decent but fearless
and uncompromising freedom of the conscientious historian. He is certain that he has given these opinions without prejudice against the Administration in this war. The danger is, in such a contest as we are
waging, that we will be too favorably and generously disposed towards
the government, rather than prejudiced against it-that we will be blind
to its faults, rather than eager and exacting in their exposure.
The author is aware that the views expressed in this work of the autocracy of President Davis, and the extraordinary absorption in himself of
all the offices of the government, have been resented with much temper
by critics in some of the newspapers. He would ask these persons who
are so anxious to vindicate the character of Mr. Davis in this respect, for
a single instance in the history of the war, where the Cabinet has interposed any views of its own, addressed any counsel to the government, or
been any thing more than a collection of dummies. In all our experience
hitherto of republican government, we hear of views of the Cabinet and
the counsel of this or that member.  In this war these common observations are lacking; the Cabinet is dumb or absolutely servile; we have
never heard a syllable from it on a single question of national importance,
and the voice of the President alone decides the conduct of the war,
distributes the patronage of the government, and forces into practice the
constitutional fiction of himself being the commander-in-chief of our
armies. These facts are notorious in the streets of Richmond.
The Cabinet of President Davis has really no constitutional existence.
The Cabinet has many objects to serve in our system of government. It
was designed as a check to Executive power; it was intended to cull
and collect the wisdom of the country in the management of public af



PREFACE.                           3
fairs; it shares the qualities of a popular system of representation with
the conservatism and virtues of aristocracy; it constitutes the highest
and gravest council in our form of government.  Certainly not one of
these constitutional offices has been fulfilled by the Cabinet of President
Davis, and history is forced to confess that the harmony of our government has been deranged by striking from it an important, valuable, and
essential part.
The author is sensible that another ignorant rule of criticism besides
that of the professional political flatterer, has been unjustly applied to his
work. He is informed that there are persons so childish and contemptibly ignorant as to have decried his work on the ground that it has exposed abuses in our administration, and faults in our people, which will
be a gratification and comfort to the enemy. The objection is simply
absurd and contemptible. Throwing out of consideration the interest of
truth, it is surely much better, even on the narrow ground of expediency,
to expose abuses, and to let the enemy have what pleasure and comnfcrt
he can from them, than to permit them, unnoticed and uncorrected, to
sap the strength of our country, and publish their conclusion to the
world in the ultimate ruin of our cause. There are ignoramuses in the
Southern Confederacy who think it necessary in this war that all the
books and newspapers in the country should publish every thing in the
South in couleur de rose; drunken patriots, cowards in epaulets, crippled
toadies, and men living on the charity of Jefferson Davis, trained to damn
all newspapers and publications in the South for pointing out abuses in
places of authority, for the sage reason that knowledge of these abuses
will comfort the enemy and tickle the ears of the Yankees. These
creatures would have a history written which would conceal all the
shortcomings of our administration, and represent that our army. was
perfect in discipline, and immaculate in morals; that our people were
feeding on milk and honey; that our generalship was without fault, and
that Jefferson Davis was the most perfect and admirable man since the
days of Moses-all for the purpose of wearing a false mask to the enemy.
They would betray our cause while hoodwinking the enemy; they would
make a virtue of falsehood; they would destroy the independence of all
published thought in the country. The author spits upon the criticisms
of such creatures.
So much the author has thought it necessary to say with reference to
two classes of critics, who have attacked not only his book, but every
form of free and independent thought in the country. With reference
to the public, confident as the author is of the rectitude of their decision,
he is content to submit his work to their judgment, without importuning
their favor.




4                          PREFACE.
Finally, the author begs to make, without temper and in the fewest
words, a plain and summary vindication of the character and objects of
his work.
Every candid mind must be sensible of the futility of attempting a
high order of historical composition in the treatment of recent and incomplete events; but it does not follow that the contemporary annal, the
popular narrative, and other inferior degrees of history, can have no
value and interest, because they cannot compete in accuracy with the
future retrospect of events. The vulgar notion of history is, that it is a
record intended for posterity. The author contends that history has an
office to perform in the present, and that one of the greatest values of
contemporary annals is to vindicate in good time to the world the fame
and reputation of nations.
With this object constantly in view, the author has composed this
work. He will accomplish his object and be rewarded with a complete
satisfaction, if his unpretending book shall have the effect of promoting
more extensive inquiries; enlightening the present; vindicating the
principles of a great contest to the contemporary world; and putting before the living generation, in a convenient form of literature, and at an
early and opportune time, the name and deeds of our people.
Richmond, September,: 1862.




CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
Delusive Ideas of the Union..-Administration of John Adams.-The " Strict Constructionists."-The " State Rights" Men in the North,-The Missouri Restriction.General Jackson and the Nullification Question.-The Compromise Measures of 1850.
-History of the Anti-Slavery Party.-The " Pinckney Resolutions."-The Twentyfirst Rule.-The Abolitionists in the Presidential Canvass of 1852. —The KansasNebraska Bill.-The Rise and Growth of the Republican Party.-The Election of
President Buchauanam-The Kansas Controversy.-" Lecompton" and "Anti-Lecompton."-Results of the Kansas Controversy.-The John Brown Raid,-" Helper's
Book."-Demoralization of the Northern Democratic Party.-The Faction of Stephen
A. Douglas. —The Alabama Resolutions.-The Political Platforms of 1860.-Election
of Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States.-Analysis of the Vote.-Political
Condition of the North.-Secession of South Carolina,-Events in Charleston Harbor.
-Disagreements in Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet.-The Secession Movement in Progress.
-Peace Measures in Congress.-The Crittenden Resolutions,-The Peace Congress.Policy of the Border Slave States,-Organization of the Confederate States Government.-President Buchanan.-Incoming of the Administration of Abraham Lincoln.
-Strength of the Revolution......................... PAGE 11
CHAPTER II.
Mr. Lincoln's Journey to Washington.-Ceremonies of the Inauguration.-The Inaugural Speech of President Lincoln.-The Spirit of the New Administration.-Its Financial Condition.-Embassy from the Southern Confederacy.-Perfidious Treatment
of the Southern Commissioners-Preparations for War.-The Military Bills of the
Confederate Congress.-General Beauregard.-Fortifications of Charleston Harbor.Naval Preparations of the Federal Government. —Attempted Reinforcement of Fort
Sumter.-Perfidy of the Federal Government. —Excitement in Charleston.-Reduction
of Fort Sumter by the Confederate Forces.-How the News was received in Washington,-Lincoln's Calculation.-His Proclamation of WAR.-The " Reaction" in the
North.-Displays of Rancor towards the South.-Northern Democrats.-Replies of
Southern Governors to Lincoln's Requisition for Troops,-Spirit of the South.-Secession of Virginia:-Maryland.-The Baltimore Riot. —Patriotic Example of Missouri. —
Lincoln's Proclamation blockading the Southern Ports.-General Lee.-The Federals
evacuate Harper's Ferry.-Burning of the Navy Yard at Norfolk.-The Second
Secessionary Movement.-Spirit of Patriotic Devotion in the South. —Supply of
Arms in the South.-The Federal Government and the State of Maryland.-The Prospect.................................................................... PAGE 41




6                              CONTENTS.
CHAPTER III.
Confidence of the North.-Characteristic Boasts.-" Crushing out the Rebellion."Volunteering in the Northern Cities.-The New York "Invincibles."-Misrepresentations of the Government at Washington.-Mr. Seward's Letter to the French Government.-Another Call for Federal Volunteers.-Opening Movements of the Campaign.
-The Federal Occupation of Alexandria.-Death of Col. Ellsworth.-Fortress Monroe.-The BATTLE OF BETHEL.-Results of this Battle.-Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.The Upper Potomac.-Evacuation and Destruction of Harper's Ferry.-The Movements in the Upper Portion of the Valley of Virginia.-Northwestern Virginia.-The
BATTLE OF RICHI  MoUNTAIN.-Carrock's Ford.-The Retreat of the Confederates.General McClellan.-Meeting of the Federal Congress.-Mr. Lincoln's Message.Kentucky.-Western Virginia. —Large Requisitions for Men and Money by the Federal Government.-Its Financial Condition.-Financial Measures of the Southern
Confederacy.-Contrast between the Ideas of the Rival Governments.-Conservatism of the Southern Revolution.-Despotic Excesses of the Government at Washington..........................................................  PAGE 70
CHAPTER IV.
The " Grand Army" of the North.-General McDowell.-The Affair of Bull Run.An Artillery Duel.-THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS.-" On to Richmond."-Scenery of the
Battle-field.-Crises in the Battle.-Devoted Courage of the Confederates.-THE ROUT.
-How the News was received in Washington.-How it was received in the South.General Bee.-Colonel Bartow.-The Great Error.-General Johnston's Excuses for
not advancing on Washington.-INcIDENTS OF THE MANAssAS BATTLE........ PAGE 95
CIAPTER V.
Results of the Manassas Battle in the North.-General Scott.-McClellan, " the
Young Napoleon."-Energy of the Federal Government.-The Bank Loan.-Events
in the West.-The MIssoURI CAMPAIGN.-Governor Jackson's Proclamation.-Sterling
Price.-The Affair of Booneville. —Organization of the Missouri forces.-The BATTLE
OF CARTHAGE.-General McCulloch. —The BATTLE OF OAK HILL.-Death of General
Lyon.-The Confederate Troops leave Missouri.-Operations in Northern Missouri.General Harris.-General Price's march towards the Missouri.-The Affair at Drywood Creek.-The BATTLE OF LEXINGTON.-The Jayhawkers.-The Victory of " the
Five Hundred." —General Price's Achievements.-His Retreat, and the necessity for
it.-Operations of General Jeff. Thompson in Southeastern Missouri.-The Affair of
Fredericktown.-General Price's passage of the Osage River.-Secession of Missouri
from the Federal Union.-Fremont superseded.-The Federal forces in Missouri demoralized.-General Price at Springfield.-Review  of his Campaign.-SxETCH oF
GENERAL PRICE.-Coldness of the Government towards him................ PAGE 124
CHAPTER VI.
The Campaign in Western Virginia.-General Wise's Command.-Political Influences in Western Virginia.-The Affair of Scary Creek.-General Wise's Retreat to
Lewisburg.-General Floyd's Brigade.-The Affair at Cross Lanes.-Movements on
the Gauley. —The Affair of Carnifax Ferry.-Disagreement between Generals Floyd




CONTENTS.                                7
and Wise.-The Tyrees.-A Patriotic Woman.-Movements in Northwestern Virginia.-General Lee.-The Enemy intrenched on Cheat Mountain.-General Rosecrans.-Failure of General Lee's Plan of Attack. —He removes to the Kanawha Region.-The Opportunity of a Decisive Battle lost.-Retreat of Rosecrans.-General
H. R. Jackson's Affair on the Greenbrier.-The Apprloach of Winter.-The Campaign
in Western Virginia abandoned.-The Affair on the Alleghany.-General Floyd at
Cotton Hill.-His masterly Retreat.-Review of the Campaign in Western Virginia.Some of its Incidents.-Its Failure and unfortunate Results.-Other Movements ill
Virginia.-The Potomac Line.-The BATTrLE OF LEESBURG.-Overweening Confidence
of the South.......................................................... PAGE 159
CHAPTER VII.
The Position and Policy of Kentucky in the War.-Kentucky Chivalry.-Remniniscences of the " Dark and Bloody Ground."-Protection of the Northwest by Kentncky.-How the Debt of Gratitude has been repaid.-A Glance at the Hartford
Convention.-The Gubernatorial Canvass of 1859 in Kentucky.-Division of Parties.Other Causes for the Disloyalty of Kentucky.-The " Pro-Slavery and Union" Resolutions.-The " State Guard."-General Buckner.-The Pretext of " Neutrality," and
what it meant.-The Kentucky Refugees.-A Reign of Terror.-Judge Monroe in
Nashville.-General Breckinridge.-Occupation of Columbus by General Polk.-The
Neutrality of Kentucky first broken by the North.-General Buckner at Bowling
Green.-Camp " Dick Robinson."-The " Home Guard."-The Occupation of Columbus by the Confederates explained.-Cumberland Gap.-General Zollicoffer's Proclamation.-The Affair of Barboursville.-" The Wild-Cat Stampede."-The Virginia
and Kentucky Border.-The Affair of Piketon.-Suffering of our Troops at Pound
Gap.-The " Union Party" in East Tennessee.-Keelan, the Hero of Strawberry
Plains.-The Situation on the Waters of the Ohio and Tennessee. —THE BATTLE OF
BELMONT.-Weakness of our Forces in Kentucky. —General Albert Sidney Johnston.Inadequacy of his Forces at Bowling Green. —Neglect and Indifference of the Confederate Authorities.-A Crisis imminent. —Admission of Kentucky into the Southern
Confederacy..........................PA..GE 183
CHAPTER VIII.
Prospects of European Interference.-The selfish Calculations of England.-Effects
of the Blockade on the South.-Arrest by Capt. Wilkes of the Southern Commissioners.-The Indignation of England.-Surrender of the Commissioners by the Lincoln
Government.-Mr. Seward's Letter.-REVIEw OF AFFAIRS AT THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR
1861.-Apathy and Improvidence of the Southern Government. —Superiority of the
North on the Water.-The Hatteras Expedition.-The Port Royal Expedition.-The
Southern Privateers.-Their Failure.-Errors of Southern Statesmanship.-" King
Cotton."-Episodes of the War.-The Affair of Santa Rosa Island.-The Affair of
Dranesville.-Political Measures of the South.-A weak and halting Policy.-The
Spirit of the War in the North.-Administration of the Civil Polity of the Southern
Army.-The Quarter-master's Department.-Hygiene of the Camps.-Ravages of the
Southern Army by Disease.-The Devotion of the Women of the South.... PAGE 206
CHAPTER IX.
Prospects of the Year 1862.-The Lines of the Potomac.-General Jackson's Expedition to Winchester.-The BATTLE OF MILL SPRINGS IN KENTCKYr.-General Crit



8                               CONTENTS.
tenden.-Death of General Zollicoffer.-Sufferings of Crittenden's Army on the
Retreat.-Comparative Unimportance of the Disaster.-The BATTLE OF ROANOKE
ISLAND.-Importance of the Island to the South.-Death of Captain Wise.-Causes of
the Disaster to the South.-Investigation in Congress.-Censure of the Government.Interviews of General Wise with Mr. Benjamin, the Secretary of War.-Mr. Benjamin
censured by Congress, but retained in the Cabinet.-His Promotion by President
Davis.-Condition of the Popular Sentiment...................... PAGE 220
CHAPTER X.
The Situation in Tennessee and Kentucky.-The affair at Woodsonville.-Death of
Colonel Terry.-The Strength and Material of the Federal Force in Kentucky.-Condition of the Defences on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.-The Confederate
Congress and the Secretary of the Navy.-The Fall of Fort Henry.-Fort Donelson
threatened.-The Army of General A. S. Johnston.-His Interview with General
Beauregard.-Insensibility of the Confederate Government to the Exigency.-General
Johnston's Plan of Action.-BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON.-Carnage and Scenery of the
Battle-field.-The Council of the Southern Commanders.-Agreement to surrender.
-Escape of Generals Floyd and Pillow.-The Fall of Fort Donelson develops the
Crisis in the West.-The Evacuation of Nashville.-The Panic.-Extraordinary
Scenes.-Experience of the Enemy in Nashville.-The Adventures of Captain John
Morgan.-General Johnston at Murfreesboro.-Organization of a New Line of Defence
South of Nashville.-The Defence of Memphis and the Mississippi.-Island No. 10.Serious Character of the Disaster at Donelson.-Generals Floyd and Pillow "relieved from Command." —General Johnston's Testimony in favor of these Officers. —
President Davis's Punctilio.-A sharp Contrast.-Negotiation for the Exchange of
Prisoners.-A  Lesson of Yankee Perfidy.-Mr. Benjamin's Release of Yankee
Hostages............................................................... PAGE 235
CHAPTER X1.
Organization of the permanent Government of the South.-The Policy of England.
— Declaration of Earl Russell. —Onset of the Northern Forces.-President Davis's
Message to Congress.-The Addition of New States and Territories to the Southern
Confederacy.-Our Indian Allies.-The Financial Condition, North and South.-Deceitful Prospects of Peace.-Effect of the Disasters to the South.-Action of Congress.
-The Conscript Bill.-Provisions vs. Cotton. —Barbarous Warfare of the North.-The
Anti-slavery Sentiment.-How it was unmasked in the War.-Emancipation Measures
in the Federal Conlgress.-Spirit of the Southern People.-The Administration of Jefferson Davis.-His Cabinet.-The Defensive Policy.-The NAVAL ENGAGEMENT IN
HAMPTON RoADs. —Iron-clad Vessels.-What the Southern Government might have
done.-The Narrative of General Price's Campaign resumed.-His Retreat into Arkansas.-The BATTLE OF ELK HoRN.-Criticism of the Result.-Death of General McCulloch.-The BATTLE OF VALVERDE.-The Foothold of the Confederates in New
Mexico.-Change of the Plan of Campaign in Virginia. -Abandonment of the Potomac
Line by the Confederates.-The BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN.-Colonel Turner Ashby.Appearance of McClellan's Army on the Peninsula.-Firmness of General Magruder.
-The New Situation of the War in Virginia.-Recurrence of Disasters to the South
on the Water.-The Capture of Newbern.-Fall of Fort Pulaski and Fort Macon.Common Sense~vs. " West Point."....................................... PAoE 259




CONTENTS.                                  9
CHAPTER XII.
The Campaign in the Mississippi Valley.-Bombardment of Island No. 10.-The
Scenes, Incidents, and Results.-Fruits of the Northern Victory.-Movements of the
Federals on the Tennessee River.-The BATTLE OF SHILOH.-A " Lost Opportunity."
-Death of General Albert Sidney Johnston.-Comparison between the Battles of
Shiloh and Manassas.-The Federal Expeditions into North Alabama.-Withdrawal
of the Confederate Forces from the Trans-Mississippi District.-General Price and
his Command.-The FALL OF NEW ORLEANS.-The Flag Imbroglio.-Major-general
Butler.-Causes of the Disaster.-Its Results and Consequences.-The Fate of the
Valley of the Mississippi................................................PAGE 291
CHAPTER XIII.
CONCLUSION.
Prospects of the War.-The Extremity of the South.-Lights and Shadows of the
Campaign in Virginia.-Jackson's Campaign in the Valley.-The Policy of Concentration.-Sketch of the Battles around Richmond.-Effect of McClellan's Defeat upon
the North.-President Davis's congratulatory Order.-The War as a great Money
Job.-N-ote: Gen. Washington's Opinion of the Northern People.-Statement of the
Northern Finances.-Yankee Venom.-Gen. Pope's Military Orders. —Summary of
the War Legislation of the Northern Congress. —Retaliation on the part of the Confederacy.-The Cartel.-Prospects of European Interference.-English Statesmanship.
-Progress of the War in the West.-The Defence of Vicksburg.-Morgan's great
Raid.-The Tennessee-Virginia Frontier.-A Glance at the Confederate Congress.Mr. Foote and the Cabinet.-The Campaign in Virginia again.-Rapid Movements
and famous March of the Southern Troops.-The signal Victory of the Thirtieth of
August on the Plains of Manassa.&-Reflections on the War.-Some of its Characteristics.-A Review of its Military Results.-Three Moral Benefits of the War.-Prospects and Promises of the Future..................................... PAGE 322








THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
CHIAPTER I.
Delusive Ileas of the Union.-Administration of John Adams.-The "Strict Constructionists."-The " State Rights" Men in the North.-The Missouri Restriction.General Jackson and the Nullification Question.-The Compromise Measures of 1850.
-History of the Anti-Slavery Party.-The "Pinckney Resolutions." —The Twentyfirst Rule.-The Abolitionists in the Presidential Canvass of 1852.-The KansasNebraska Bill.-The Rise and Growth of the Republican Party.-The Election of
President Buchanan.-The Kansas Controversy.-" Lecompton" and " Anti-Lecompton."-Results of the Kansas Controversy.-The John Brown Raid.-"' Helper's
Book."-Demoralization of the Northern Democratic Party.-The Faction of Stephen
A. Douglas.-The Alabama Resolutions.-The Political Platforms of 1860.-Election
of Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States.-Analysis of the Vote.-Political
Condition of the North.-Secession of South Carolina.-Events in Charleston Harbor.
-Disagreements in Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet.-The Secession Movement in Progress.
-Peace Measures in Congress.-The Crittenden Resolutions.-The Peace Congress.Policy of the Border Slave States.-Organization of the Confederate States Government.-President Buchanan.-Incoming of the Administration of Abraham Lincoln.
-Strength of the Revolution.
THE American people of the present generation were born
in the belief that the Union of the States was destined to be
perpetual.  A  few minds rose superior to this natal delusion;
the early history of the Union itself was not without premonitions of decay and weakness; and yet it may be said that the
belief in its permanency was, in the early part of the present
generation, a popular and obstinate delusion, that embraced
the masses of the country.
The foundations of this delusion had been deeply laid in the
early history of the country, and had been sustained by a false,
but ingenious prejudice. It was busily represented, especially
by demagogues in the North, that the Union was the fruit of
the Revolution of 1776, and had been purchased by the blood
of our forefathers. No fallacy could have been more erroneous
in fact, more insidious in its display, or more effective in ad



12            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
dressing the passions of the multitude. The Revolution achieved our national independence, and the Union had no connection
with it other than consequence in point of time. It was founded,
as any other civil institution, in the exigencies and necessities
of a certain condition of society, and had no other claim to
popular reverence and attachment than what might be found
in its own virtues.
But it was not only the captivating fallacy that the Union
was hallowed by the blood of a revolution, and this false inspiration of reverence for it, that gave the popular idea of its
power and permanency. Its political character was misunderstood by a large portion of the American people. The idea
predominated in the North, and found toleration in the South,
that the Revolution of'76, instead of securing the independence of thirteen States, had resulted in the establishment of a
grand eonsolidated government to be under the absolute control of a numerical majority. The doctrine was successfully
inculcated; it had some plausibility, and brought to its support an array of revolutionary names; but it was, nevertheless,
in direct opposition to the terms of the Constitution —the bond
of the Union-which defined the rights of the States and the
limited powers of the General Government.'
The first President from the North, John Adams, asserted
and essayed to put in practice the supremacy of the "National" power over the States and the citizens thereof. lie
was sustained in his attempted usurpations by all the New
England States and by a powerful public sentiment in each of
the Middle States. The "strict constructionists" of the Constitution were not slow in raising the standard of opposition
against a pernicious error. With numbers and the most conspicuous talents in the country they soon effected the organization of a party; and, under the leadership of Jefferson and
Madison, they rallied their forces and succeeded in overthrowing the Yankee Administration, but only after a tremendous
struggle.
From the inauguration of Mr. Jefferson, in 1801, the Federal
Government continued uninterruptedly in Southern hands for
the space of twenty-four years. A large proportion of the active
politicians of the North pretended to give in their adhesion to
the State Rights school of politics; but, like all the alliances




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            13
of Northern politicians with the South-selfish, cunning, extravagant of professions, carefully avoiding trials of its fidelity,
unhealthy, founded on a sentiment of treachery to its own
section, and educated in perfidy —it was a deceitful union, and
could not withstand the test of a practical question.
While acting with the South on empty or accidental issues,
the "State Rights" men of the North were, for all practical
purposes, the faithful allies of the open and avowed consolidationists on the question that most seriously divided the country
-that of negro slavery.  Their course on the admission of
Missouri afforded early and conclusive evidence of the secret
disposition of all parties in the North. With very few exceptions, in and out of Congress, the North united in the original
demand of the prohibition of slavery in the new State as the
indispensable condition of the admission of Missouri into the
Union; although the people of Missouri, previous to their
application to Congress, had decided to admit within its jurisdiction the domestic institution of the South. The result of the
contest was equally unfavorable to the rights of the South
and to the doctrine of the constitutional equality of the States
in the Union. The only approach that the North was willing
to make to this fundamental doctrine was to support a " compromise," by which slavery was to be tolerated in one part of
the Missouri Territory and to be forever excluded from the
remaining portion. The issue of the controversy was not only
important to the slave interest, but afforded a new development of the Northern political ideas of consolidation and the
absolutism of numerical majorities. The North had acted on
the Missouri matter as though the South had no rights guaranteed in the bond of the Union, and as though the question at
issue was one merely of numerical strength, where the defeated
party had no alternative but submission. "The majority must
govern" was the decantatum on the lips of every demagogue,
and passed into a favorite phrase of Northern politics.
The results of the acquiescence of the South in the wrong of
the Missouri Restriction could not fail to strengthen the idea
in the North of the security of the Union, and to embolden its
people to the essay of new aggressions. Many of their politicians did not hesitate to believe that the South was prepared
to pledge herself to the perpetuity of the Union upon Northern




14            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
terms. The fact was, that she had made a clear concession of
principle for the sake of the Union; and the inference was
plain and logical, that her devotion to it exceeded almost
every other political trust, and that she would be likely to
prefer any sacrifice rather than the irreverent one of the Union
of the States.
The events of succeeding years confirmed the Northern
opinion that the Union was to be perpetuated as a consolidated
government. It is not to be denied that the consolidationists
derived much comfort from the course of President Jackson,
in the controversy between the General Government and the
State of South Carolina, that ensued during the second term
of his administration. But they were hasty and unfair in the
interpretation of the speeches of a choleric and immoderate
politician. They seized upon a sentiment offered by the President at the Jefferson anniversary dinner, in the second year of
his first term —" The Federal Union-it must be preserved"to represent him as a " coercionist" in principle; and, indeed,
they found reason to contend that their construction of these
words was fully sustained in General Jackson's famous proclamation and official course against Nullification.
General Jackson subsequently explained away, in a great
measure, the objectionable doctrines of his proclamation; and
his emphatic declaration that the Union could not be preserved
by force was one of the practical testimonies of his wisdom
that he left to posterity. But the immediate moral and political
effects of his policy in relation to South Carolina were, upon
the whole, decidedly unfavorable to the State Rights cause.
His approval of the Force Bill gave to the consolidationists
the benefit of. his great name and influence at a most important juncture. The names of "Jackson and the Union" became inseparable in the public estimation; and the idea was
strongly and vividly impressed upon the public mind, that the
great Democrat was " a Union man" at all hazards and to the
last extremity.
The result of the contest between South Carolina and the
General Government is well known.  The Palmetto State
came out of it with an enviable reputation for spirit and
chivalry; but the settlement of the question contributed to
the previous popular impressions of the power and perma



THlE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            15
nency of the Union. The idea of the Union became what it
continued to be for a quarter of a century thereafter-extravagant and sentimental. The people were unwilling to stop to
analyze an idea after it had once become the subject of enthu-.
siasm; and the mere name of the " Union," illustrating, as it
did, the power of words over the passions of the multitude,
remained for years a signal of the country's glory and of
course the motto of ambitious politicians and the favorite
theme of demagogues. This unnatural tumor was not peculiar to any party or any portion of the country. It was deeply
planted in the Northern mind, but prevailed also, to a considerable extent, in the South. Many of the Southern politicians
came to the conclusion that they could best succeed in their
designs as advocates and eulogists of what was paraphrased as
" the glorious Union;" and for a long time the popular voice
of the South seemed to justify their conclusion.
The settlement of the sectional difficulties of 1850, which
grew out of the admission of the territory acquired by the
Mexican War, was but a repetition of the " Compromise" of
1820, so far as it implied a surrender of the rights of the
South and of the principle of constitutional equality. The
appeals urged in behalf of the Union had the usual effect of'
reconciling the South to the sacrifice required of her, and
embarrassed any thing like resistance on the part of her representatives in Congress to the " compromise measures" of
1850. South Carolina was the only one of the Southern
States ready at this time to take the bold and adventurous
initiative of Southern independence. In justice, however, to
the other States of the South, it must be stated, that in agreeing to what was called, in severe irony or in wretched ignorance, the " Compromise" of 1850, they declared that it was
the last concession they would make to the North; that they
took it as a " finality," and that they would resist any further
aggression on their rights, even to the extremity of the rupture
of the Union.
This declaration of spirit was derided by the North. The
anti-slavery sentiment became bolder with success.  Stimulated by secret jealousies and qualified for success by the low
and narrow cunning of fanaticism, it had grown up by indirection, and aspired to the complete overthrow of the peculiar




16              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
institution that had distinguished the people of the South from
those of the North, by a larger happiness, greater ease of life,
and a superior tone of character. Hypocrisy, secretiveness,
a rapid and unhealthy growth, and at last the unmasked spirit
of defiance, were the incidents of the history of the antislavery sentiment in the North, from the beginning of its
organization to the last and fatal strain of its insolence and
power.
Until a comparatively recent period, the Northern majority
disavowed all purpose of abolishing or interfering in any
way with the institution of slavery in any State, Territory,
or District where it existed. On the contrary, they declared
their readiness to give their "'Southern brethren" the most
satisfactory guaranties for the security of their slave property.
They cloaked their designs under the disguise of the Right of
Petition and'other concealments equally demagogical. From
the organization of the government, petitions for the abolition
of slavery, signed in every instance by but a few persons, and
most of them women, had, at intervals, been sent into Congress; but they were of such apparent insignificance that they
failed to excite any serious apprehensions on the part of the
South. In the year 1836, these petitions were multiplied, and
many were sent into both Houses of Congress from all parts
of the North. An excitement began. On motion of hMr.
H. L. Pinckney, of South Carolina, a resolution was adopted
by the House of Representatives, to refer to a select committee all anti-slavery memorials then before that body, or that
might thereafter be sent in, with instructions to report against
the prayers of the petitioners and the reasons for such1 conclusion.
On the 18th of May, 1836, the committee madaea unanimous
report, through Mr. Pinckney, its chairman, concluding with a
series of resolutions, the last of which was as follows:
"Resolved, That all petitions, memorials, resolutions, propositions, or papers
relating, in any way, or to any extent whatever, to the subject of slavery, or
the abolition of slavery, shall, wit iout being either printed or referred, be laid
upon the table, and that no further action whatever shall be had thereon."
The resolutions were carried by a vote of 117 yeas to 68
nays. A majority of the Northern members voted against the




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                17
resolution, although there was then scarcely an avowed Abolitionist among them. They professed to be in favor of protecting the slaveholder in his right of property, and yet declared by their votes, as well as by their speeches, that the
right of petition to rob him of his property was too sacred to
be called in question.
The passage of the "Pinckney resolutions," as they were
called, did not silence the anti-slavery agitation in the House.
In the month of December, 1837, a remarkable scene was
enacted in that body, during the proceedings on a motion of
Mr. Slade, of Vermont, to refer two memorials praying the
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia to a select
committee.  Mr. Slade, in urging his motion, was violent in
his denunciations of slavery, and he spoke for a considerable
time amid constant interruptions and calls to order. At length,
Mr. Rhett, of South Carolina, called upon the entire delegation from all the slaveholding States to retire from the hall,
and to meet in the room of the Committee on the District of
Columbia. A large number of them did meet for consultation
in the room  designated. The meeting, however, resulted in
nothing but an agreement upon the following resolution to be
presented to the House:
" Resolved, That all petitions, memorials, and papers touching the abolition
of slavery, or the buying, selling, or transferring of slaves in any State, Dis.trict, or Territory of the United States, be laid on the table without being
debated, printed, read, or referred, and that no further action whatever shall
be had thereon."'
This resolution was presented to the House by Mr. Patton,
of Virginia, and was adopted by a vote of 122 to 74.
In the month of January, 1840, the House of Representatives, on motion of Mr. W. Cost Johnson, of Maryland,
adopted what was known as the " Twenty-first Rule," which
prohibited the reception of all Abolition petitions, memorials,
and resolutions.                               0
The Twenty-first Rule was rescinded in December, 1844, on
motion of John Quincy Adams, by a vote of 108 to 80. Several efforts were afterwards made to restore it, but without
success. The Northern people would not relinquish what they
termed a " sacred right"-that of petitioning the government,
2.




18            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
through their representatives in Congress, to deprive the
Southern people of their property.
During the agitation in Congress upon the right of petition,
there was, as before stated, but very few open and avowed
Abolitionists in either House, and the declaration was repeatedly made by members that the party was contemptibly small
in every free State in the Union. Mr. Pierce, of New Hampshire (afterwards President of the United States), declared, in
1837, in his place in Congress, that there were not two hundred Abolitionists in his State; and Mr. Webster, about the
same time, represented their numnbers in lMassachusetts as quite
insignificant. Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, with characteristic sagacity, replied to these representations, and predicted
that " Mr. Webster and all Northern statesmen would, in a few
years, yield to the storm of Abolition fanaticism and be overwhelmed by it." The prophecy was not more remarkable than
the searching analysis of Northern " conservatism" with which
the great South Carolinian accompanied his prediction. He
argued that such a consequence was inevitable from the way
in which the professed " conservatives" of the North had invited the aggressions of the Abolitionists, by courteously
granting them the right of petition, which was indeed all they
asked; that the fanaticism of the North was a disease which
required a remedy, and that palliatives would not answer, as
Mr. Webster and men like him would find to their cost.
In the Thirtieth Congress, that assembled in December,
1849, the professed Abolitionists numbered about a dozen
members. They held the balance of power between the Democratic and Whig parties in the House, and delayed its organization for about a month. Both the Whig and Democratic
parties then claimed to be conservative, and, of course, the
opponents of the anti-slavery agitation.
In the Presidential canvass of 1852, both Pierce and Scott
were brought out by professed national parties, and were supported in each section of the Union. John P. Hale, who ran
upon what was called the " straight-out" Abolition ticket, did
not receive the vote of a single State, and but 175,296 ot
the popular vote of the Union. The triumphant election of
Pierce, who was a favorite of the State Rights Democracy of
the South, was hailed by the sanguine friends of the Union as




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.              19
a fair indication of the purpose of the North to abide, in good
faith,I by the Compromise of 1850. But in this they were deceived, as the sequel demonstrated.
During the first session of the first Congress under Mr.
Pierce's administration, the bill introduced to establish a territorial government for Nebraska, led to an agitation in Congress and the country, the consequences of which extended to
the last period of the existence of the Union. The Committee
on Territories in the Senate, of which Mr. Douglas, of Illinois,
was chairman, reported the bill, which made two territoriesNebraska and Kansas-instead of one, and which declared
that the Missouri Compromise act was superseded by the Compromise measures of 1850, and had thus become inoperative.
The phraseology of the clause repealing the Missouri Compromise was drawn up by Mr. Douglas, and was not supposed at
the time to be liable to misconstruction. It held, that the
Missouri Compromise act, " being inconsistent with the principles of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the
States and Territories, as recognized by the legislation of 1850,
commonly called the Compromise Measures, is hereby declared
inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of
this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor
to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in
their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United
States." The clause here quoted, as drawn up by Mr. Douglas, was incorporated into the Kansas-Nebraska bill in the
Senate on the 15th of February, 1854. The bill passed the
House at the same session.
The repeal of the Missouri Compromise caused the deepest
excitement throughout the North. The Abolitionists were
wild with fury. Douglas was hung in effigy at different places,
and was threatened with personal violence in case of his persistence in his non-intervention policy. The rapid development of a fanatical feeling in every free State startled many
who had but recently indulged dreams of the perpetuity of the
Constitutional Union. Abolitionism, in the guise of " Republicanisrm," swept almost every thing before it in the North and
Northwest in the elections of 1854 and 1855, But few professed conservatives were returned to the Thirty-first Congress;




20             THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
not enough to prevent the election of Nathaniel Banks, an objectionable Abolitionist of the Massachusetts school, to the
Speakership of the House.
The South had supported the repeal of the Missouri Compromise because it restored her to her rightful position of
equality in the Union. It is true, that her representatives in
Congress were well aware that, under the operations of the
new act, their constituents could expect to obtain but little if
any new accessions of slave territory, while the North would
necessarily, from the force of circumstances, secure a number
of new States in the Northwest, then the present direction of
our new settlements. But viewed as an act of proscription
against her, the Missouri Compromise was justly offensive to
the South; and its abrogation, in this respect, strongly recommended itself to her support.
The ruling party of the Nlorth, calling themselves " Republicans," had violently opposed the repeal of the act of 1820,
in the same sentiment with which it was fiercely encountered
by the Abolitionists. The two parties were practically identical; both shared the same sentiment of hostility to slavery;
and they differed only as to the degree of indirection by which
their purposes might best be accomplished.
The election of Mr. Buchanan to the Presidency, in 1856,
raised, for a time, the spirits of malny of the true friends of
the Constitutional Union. But there was very little in an
analysis of the vote to give hope or encouragement to the patriot. Fremont, who ran as the anti-slavery candidate, received 1,341,812 votes of the people, and it is believed would
have been elected by the electoral college, if the anti-Buchanan
party in Pennsylvania had united upon him.
The connection of events which we have sought to trace,
brings us to the celebrated Kansas controversy, and at once to
the threshold of the dissensions which demoralized the only
conservative party in the country, and in less than four years
culminated in the rupture of the Federal Union. A severe
summary of the facts of this controversy introduces us to the
contest of 1860, in which the Republican party, swollen with
its triumphs in Kansas, and infecting the Democratic leaders
in the North with the disposition to pander to the lusts of a




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           21
growing power, obtained the control of the government, and
seized the sceptre of absolute authority.
When Mr. Buchanan came into office, in March, 1857, he
flattered himself with the hope that his administration would
settle the disputes that had so long agitated and distracted the
country; trusting that such a result might be accomplished by
the speedy admission of Kansas into the Union, upon the
principles which had governed in his election. Such, at least,
were his declarations to his friends. But before the meeting
of Congress, in December, he had abundant evidence that his
favorite measure would be opposed by a number of Senators
and Representatives who had actively supported him in his
canvass; among them the distinguished author of the KansasNebraska bill, Mr. Douglas.
In the month of July, 1855, the Legislature of the Territory
of Kansas had passed an act to take the sense of the people
on the subject of forming a State government, preparatory to
admission into the Union. The election took place, and a
large majority of the people voted in favor of holding a convention for the purpose of adopting a Constitution. In pursuance of this vote, the Territorial Legislature, on the 19th of
February, 1857, passed a law to take a census of the people,
for the purpose of making a registry of the voters, and to elect
delegates to the Convention. Mr. Geary, then Governor of
Kansas, vetoed the bill for calling the Convention, for the
reason that it did not require the Constitution, when framed,
to be submitted to a vote of the people for adoption or rejection. The bill, however, was reconsidered in each House, and
passed by a two-thirds' vote, and thus became a binding law
in the Territory, despite the veto of the Governor.
On the 20th of May, 1857, Mr. F. P. Stanton, Secretary
and acting Governor of Kansas Territory, published his proclamation, commanding the proper officers to hold an election
on the third Monday of June, 1857, as directed by the act referred to.
The election was held on the day appointed, and the Convention assembled, according to law, on the first Monday of
September, 1857. They proceeded to form a Constitution, and,
having finishe'd their work, adjourned on the 7th November.




22             THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
The entire Constitution was not submitted to the popular vote;
but the Convention took care to submit to the vote of the
people, for ratification or rejection, the clause respecting slavery. The official vote resulted: For the Constitution, with
Slavery, 6,226; for the Constitution, without Slavery, 509.
The Abolitionists, or "Free State" men, as they called themselves, did not generally vote in this or any other election held
under the regular government of the Territory. They defied the
authority of this government and that of the United States,
and acted under the direction of Emigrant Aid Societies, organized by the fanatical Abolitionists of the North, to colonize
the new territory with voters. The proceedings of this evil
and bastard population occasioned the greatest excitement, and
speedily inaugurated an era of disorder and rebellion in this
distant portion of the Federal territory.
The Free State party assembled at Topeka, in September,
1855, and adopted what they called a " Constitution" for Kiansas. This so-called Constitution was submitted to the people,
and was ratified, of course, by a large majority of those who
voted; scarcely any but Abolitionists going to the polls. Under their Topeka Constitution, the Free State party elected a
Governor and Legislature, and organized for the purpose of
petitioning Congress for the admission of Kansas into the
Union. The memorial of the Topeka insurgents was presented
to the Thirty-fourth Congress. It met with a favorable response in the House of Representatives, a majority of that
body being anti-slavery men of the New England school; but
found but a poor reception in the Senate, where there was still
a majority of conservative and law-abiding men.
On the 2d of February, 1858, Mr. Buchanan, at the request
of the President of the Lecompton Convention, transmitted to
Congress an authentic copy of the Constitution framed by that
body, with a view to the admission of Kansas into the Union.
The message of the President took strong and urgent position
for the admission of Kansas under this Constitution; he defended the action of the Convention in not submitting the
entire result of their labors to a vote of the people; he explained that, when he instructed Governor Walker, in general
terms, in favor of submitting the Constitution to the people,
he had no other object in view beyond the all absorbing topic




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             23
of slavery; he considered that, under the organic act, the
Convention was bound to submit the all-important question of
slavery to the people; he added, that it was never his opinion,
however, that, independently of this act, the Convention would
be bound to submit any portion of the Constitution to a popular vote, in order to give it validity; and he argued the fallacy
and unreasonableness of such an opinion, by insisting that it
was in opposition to the principle which pervaded our institutions, and which was every day carried into practice, to the
effect that the people had the right to delegate to representatives, chosen by themselves, sovereign power to frame Constitutions, enact laws, and perform many other important acts,
without the necessity of testing the validity of their work by
popular approbation. The Topeka Constitution Mr. Buchanan
denounced as the work of treason and insurrection.
It is certain that Mr. Buchanan would have succeeded in
effecting the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution, if he could have secured to the measure the support
of all the Northern Democrats who had contributed to his
election. These, however, had become disaffected; they opposed and assailed the measure of the Administration, acting
under the lead of Mr. Douglas; and the long-continued and
bitter discussion which ensued, perfectly accomplished the division of the Democratic party into two great factions, mustered
under the names of " Lecompton" and " Anti-Lecompton."
The latter faction founded their opposition to the Administration on the grounds, that the Lecompton Constitution was
not the act of the people of Kansas, and did not express their
will; that only half of the counties of the Territory were represented in the Convention that framed it, the other half being
disfranchised, for no fault of their own, but from failure of the
officers to register the voters, and entitle them to vote for
delegates; and that the mode of submitting the Constitution
to the people for " ratification or rejection" was unfair, embarrassing, and proscriptive.
In reply, the friends of the Administration urged that twenty-one out of the thirty-four organized counties of Kansas were
embraced in the apportionment of representation; that, of the
thirteen counties not embraced, nine had but a small population,
as shown by the fact that, in a succeeding election, to which




24            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
the Anti-Lecomptonites had referred as an indication of public
sentiment in Kansas, they polled but ninety votes in the aggregate; that, in the remaining four counties, the failure to register
the voters, and the consequent loss of their representation, were
due to the Abolitionists themselves, who refused to recognize
all legal authority in the Territory; and that the submission
of the Constitution, as provided by the Lecompton Convention,
afforded a complete expression of the popular will, as the
slavery question was the only one about which there was any
controversy in Kansas.
The bill for the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton
Constitution, was passed by the Senate. In the House, an
amendment, offered by Mr. Montgomery, of Pennsylvania, was
adopted, to the effect that, as it was a disputed point whether
the Constitution framed at Lecompton was fairly made, or expressed the will of the people of Kansas, her admission into
the Union as a State was declared to-be upon the fundamental
condition precedent, that the said constitutional instrument
should first be submitted to a vote of the people of Kansas,
and assented to by them, or by a majority of the voters, at an
election to be held for the purpose of determining the question
of the ratification or rejection of the instrument.
The Senate insisted upon its bill; the House adhered to its
amendment; and a committee of conference was appointed.
The result of the conference was the report of a bill for the
admission of Kansas, which became a law in June, 1858, and
substantially secured nearly all that the North had claimed in
the controversy.
The bill, as passed, rejected the Land Ordinance contained
in the Lecompton Constitution, and proposed a substitute.
Kansas was to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing,
in all respects, with the original States, but upon the fundamental condition precedent, that the question of admission,
along with that of the Land substitute, be submitted to a vote
of the people; that, if a majority of the vote should be
against the proposition tendered by Congress, it should be
concluded that Kansas did not desire admission under the Lecompton Constitution, with the condition attached to it; and
that, in such event, the people were authorized to form for
themselves a Constitution and State government, and might




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            25
elect delegates for that purpose, after a census taken to demonstrate the fact, that the population of the Territory equalled or exceeded the ratio of representation for a member of the
House of Representatives.
Thus ended the six months' discussion of the Kansas question
in Congress in 1858. The substitute to the Land Ordinance
was rejected by the voters of the Territory; and Kansas did
not come into the Union until nearly three years afterwardsjust as the Southern States were going out of it. She came in
under an anti-slavery constitution, and Mr. Buchanan signed
the bill of admission.
The discussions of the Kansas question, as summed in the
preceding pages, had materially weakened the Union. The
spirit of those discussions, and the result itself of the controversy, fairly indicated that the South could hardly expect,
under any circumstances, the addition of another Slave State
to the Union. The Southern mind was awakened; the sentimental reverences of more, than half a century were decried;
and men began to calculate the precise value of a Union
which, by its mere name and the paraphrases of demagogues,
had long governed their affections.
Some of these calculations, as they appeared in the newspaper presses of the times, were curious, and soon commenced to
interest the Southern people. It was demonstrated to them
that their section had been used to contribute the bulk of the
revenues of the Government; that the North derived forty to
fifty millions of annual revenue from the South, through the
operations of the tariff; and that the aggregate of the trade
of the South in Northern markets was four hundred millions
of dollars a year. It was calculated by a Northern writer,
that the harvest.of gain reaped by the North from the Union,
from unequal taxations and the courses of trade as between
the two sections, exceeded two hundred millions of dollars per
year.
These calculations of the commercial cost of the "glorious
Union" to the South, only presented the question in a single
aspect, however striking that was. There were other aspects
no less important and no less painful, in which it was to be
regarded. The swollen and insolent power of Abolitionism
threatened to carry every thing before it; it had already bro



26            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
ken the vital principle of the Constitution-that of the equality of its parts; and to injuries already accomplished, it added
the bitterest threats and the most insufferable insolence.
While the anti-slavery power threatened never to relax its
efforts until, in the language of Mr. Seward, a senator from
New York, the " irrepressible conflict" between slavery and
freedom was accomplished, and the soil of the Carolinas dedicated to the institutions of New England, it affected the insolent impertinence of regarding the Union as a concession on
the part of the North, and of taunting the South with the
disgrace which her association in the Union inflicted upon the
superior and more virtuous people of the Northern States.
The excesses of this conceit are ridiculous, seen in the light of
subsequent events. It was said that the South was an inferior
part of the country; that she was a spotted and degraded section; that the national fame abroad was compromised by the
association of the South in the Union; and that a New England traveller in Europe blushed to confess himself an American, because half of the nation of that name were slaveholders. Many of the Abolitionists made a pretence of praying
that the Union might be dissolved, that they might be cleared,
by the separation of North and South, of any implication in
the crime of slavery. Even that portion of the party calling
themselves "Republicans" affected that the Union stood in
the way of the North. Mr. Banks, of Massachusetts, who
had been elected Speaker of the House in the Thirty-first Congress, had declared that the designs of his party were not to be
baffled, and was the author of the coarse jeer —'Let the Union
slide."  The New York Tribune had complained that the
South "could not be kicked out of the Union."  Mr. Seward,
the great Republican leader, had spread the evangely of a natural, essential, and irrepressible hostility between the two sections; and the North prepared to act on a suggestion, the only
practical result of which could be to cleave the Union apart,
and to inaugurate the horrors of civil war.
The raid into Virginia of John Brown, a notorious Abolitionist, whose occupations in Kansas had been those of a horsethief and assassin, and his murder of peaceful and unsuspecting citizens at Harper's Ferry in the month of October, 1859,
was a practical illustration of the lessons of the Northern Re



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                   27
publicans, and of their inevitable and, in fact, logical conclusion in civil war. Professed conservatives in the North predicted that this outrage would be productive of real good in
their section, in opening the eyes of the people to what were
well characterized as " Black Republican" doctrines. This
prediction was not verified by succeeding events. The Northern elections of the next month showed no diminution in the
Black Republican vote. The manifestations of sympathy for
John Brown, who had expiated his crime on a gallows in Virginia, were unequivocal in all parts of the North, though comparatively few openly justified the outrage. Bells were tolled
in various towns of New England on the day of his execution,
with the knowledge of the local authorities, and in some instances, through their co-operation; and not a few preachers
from the pulpit alloted him an apotheosis, and consigned his
example to emulation, as one not only of public virtue, but of
particular service to God.
The attachment of the South to the Union was steadily
weakening in the historical succession of events. The nomination in December, 1859, to the Speakership of the House of
Representatives of Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, who had made himself especially odious to the South by publicly recommending,
in connection with sixty-eight other Republican members, a
fanatical document popularly known as " Helper's Book,"*
* The tone of this book was violent in the extreme. We add a few extracts, which will enable the reader to form a correct opinion of the character
and object of the work" Slavery is a great moral, social, civil, and political evil, to be got rid of at
the earliest practical period."-(Page 168.)
"Three-quarters of a century hence, if the South retains slavery, which
God forbid! she will be to the North what Poland is to Russia, Cuba to Spain,
and Ireland to England." —(P. 163.)
"Our own banner is inscribed-No co-operation with slaveholders in
politics; no fellowship with them in religion; no affiliation with them in
society; no recognition of pro-slavery men, except as ruffians, outlaws, and
criminals." —P 156.)
" We believe it is as it ought to be, the desire, the determination, and the
destiny of the Republican party to give the death-blow to slavery."-(P. 234.)
"In any event, come what will, transpire what may, the institution of
slavery must be abolished."-(P. 180.)
"We are determined to abolish slavery at all hazards-in defiance of all
the opposition, of whatever nature, it is possible for the slaveocrats to bring




28              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
from the name of the author, and which openly defended and
sought itself to excite servile insurrections in the South, produced a marked effect in Congress, and was encountered by
the Southern members with a determined spirit of opposition.
The entire Southern delegation gave warning that they would
regard the election of Mr. Sherman, or of any man with his
record, as an open declaration of war upon the institutions of
the South; as much so, some of the members declared, as if
the Brown raid were openly approved by a majority of the
House of Representatives. The Black Republican party defiantly nominated Sherman, and continued to vote for him for
near two months, giving him within four votes of a majority
upon every trial of his strength. Although he was finally
withdrawn, and one of his party, not a subscriber to the
Helper Book, was elected, yet the fact that more than threefourths of the entire Northern delegation had adhered to MIr.
Sherman for nearly two months in a factious and fanatical
spirit, produced a deep impression on the minds of Southern
members and of their constituents. The early dissolution of
the Union had come to be a subject freely canvassed among
members of Congress.
With the unveiling of the depth of the designs of the Black
Republican party, another danger was becoming manifest to
the South. It was the demoralization of the Northern Democratic party on the slavery question. This whole party had
been an unhealthy product; its very foundation was a principle of untruth, and false to its own section, it could not be expected to adhere to friends whom it had made from interest
and who had fallen into adverse circumstances. It had united
with the South for political power. In the depression of that
power, and the rapid growth of the anti-slavery party in the
against us. Of this they may take due notice, and govern themselves accordingly."-(P. 149.)
"It is our honest conviction that all the pro-slavery slaveholders deserve
at once to be reduced to a parallel with the basest criminals that lie fettered
within the cells of our public prisons."-(P. 158.)
"Shall we pat the bloodhounds of slavery? Shall we fee the curs of
slavery? Shall we pay the whelps of slavery? No, never."-(P. 329.)
"Our purpose is as firmly fixed as the eternal pillars of heaven; we have
determined to abolish slavery, and, so help us God! abolish it we will."P. 187.)




THE FIRS'r YEAR OF THE WAR.           29
North, it had no hesitation in courting and conciliating the
ruling element. This disposition was happily accommodated
by the controversy which had taken place between Mr. Douglas and the administration of Mir. Buchanan. The anti-slavery
sentiment in the North was conciliated by the partisans of the
Illinois demagogue, in adopting a new principle for the government of the Territories, which was to allow the people to
determine the question of slavery in their territorial capacity,
without awaiting their organization as a State, and thus to
risk the decision of the rights of the South on the verdict of a
few settlers on the public domain. This pander to the antislavery sentiment of the North was concealed under the demagogical name of "popular sovereignty," and was imposed
upon the minds of not a few of the Southern people by the
artfulness of its appeals to the name of a principle, which had
none of the substance of justice or equality. The concealment, however, was but imperfectly availing. The doctrine
of MIr. Douglas was early denounced by one of the most vigilant statesmen of the South as "a short cut to all the ends of
Black Republicanism;" and later in time, while the " Helper
Book" controversy was agitating the country, and other questions developing the union of all the anti-slavery elements for
war upon the South, a senator from Georgia was found bold
enough to denounce, in his place in Congress, the entire Democratic party of the North as unreliable and "rotten."
The State Rights party of the South had co-operated with
the Democracy of the North in the Presidential canvass of
1856, upon the principles of the platform adopted by the National Democratic Convention, assembled in Cincinnati, in
June of that year. They expressed a willingness to continue
this co-operation in the election of 1860, upon the principles
of the Cincinnati platform; but demanded, as a condition precedent to this, that the question of the construction of this
platform should be satisfactorily settled. To this end, the
State Rights Democratic party in several of the Southern
States defined the conditions upon which their delegates should
hold seats in the National Convention, appointed to meet at
Charleston on the 23d of April, 1860. The Democracy in Alabama moved first. On the 11th of January, 1860, they met
in convention at Montgomery, and adopted a series of resolu



30                THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
tions, from which the following are extracted, as presenting a
summary declaration of the rights of the South, a recapitulation of the territorial question, and a definition of those issues
on which the contest of 1860 was to be conducted:
Resolved, by the Democracy of the State of Alabama in Convention assembled, That holding all issues and principles upon which they have heretofore
affiliated and acted with the National Democratic party to be inferior in dignity and importance to the great question of slavery, they content themselves
with a general reaffirmnance of the Cincinnati platform as to such issues,
and also indorse said platform as to slavery, together with the following
resolutions:
Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States, is a compact between
sovereign and co-equal States, united upon the basis of perfect equality of
rights and privileges.
Resolved, further, That the Territories of the United States are common
property, in which the States have equal rights, and to which the citizens of
any State may rightfully emigrate, with their slaves or other property
recognized as such in any of the States of the Union, or by the Constitution
of the United States.
Resolved, further, That the Congress of the United States has no power to
abolish slavery in the Territories, or to prohibit its introduction into any of
them.
Resolved, further, That the Territorial Legislatures, created by the legislation of Congress, have no power to abolish slavery, or to prohibit the introduction of the same, or to impair by unfriendly legislation the security and
full enjoyment of the same within the Territories; and such constitutional
power certainly does not belong to the people of the Territories in any capacity, before, in the exercise of a lawful authority, they form a Constitution,
preparatory to admission as a State into the Union; and their action in the
exercise of such lawful authority certainly cannot operate or take effect before
their actual admission as a State into the Union.
Resolved, further,, That the principles enunciated by Chief Justice Taney,
in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, deny to the Territorial Legislature the
power to destroy or impair, by any legislation whatever, the right of property
in slaves, and maintain it to be the duty of the Federal Government, in all of
its departments, to protect the rights of the owner of such property in the
Territories; and the principles so declared are hereby asserted to be the rights
of the South, and the South should maintain them.
Resolved, further, That we hold all of the foregoing propositions to contain
"cardinal principles"-true in themselves-and just and proper and necessary for the safety of all that is dear to us; and we do hereby instruct our
delegates to the Charleston Convention to present them for the calm consideration and approval of that body-from whose justice and patriotism we
anticipate their adoption.
Resolved, further, That our delegates to the Charleston Convention are
hereby expressly instructed to insist that said Convention shall adopt a plat



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                     31
form of principles, recognizing distinctly the rights of the South as asserted
in the foregoing resolutions; and if the said National Convention shall refuse
to adopt, in substance, the propositions embraced in the prece4ing resolutions,
prior to nominating candidates, our delegates to said Convention are hereby
positively instructed to withdraw therefrom.
Under these resolutions the delegates from Alabama received their appointment to the Charleston Convention. The
delegates from some of the other Cotton States were appointed
under instructions equally binding. Anxious as were the
Southern delegates to continue their connection with the Convention, and thus to maintain the nationality of the Democratic party, they agreed to accept, as the substance of the
Alabama platform, either of the two following reports which
had been submitted to the Charleston Convention by the majority of the Committee on Resolutions-this majority not
only representing that of the States of the Union, but the only
States at all likely to be carried by the Democratic party in
the Presidential election:
Resolved, That the platform at Cincinnati be reaffirmed with the following
resolutions:
Resolved, That the Democracy of the United States hold these cardinal
principles on the subject of slavery in the Territories: First, that Congress
has no power to abolish slavery in the Territories. Second, that the Territorial Legislature has no power to abolish slavery in any Territory, nor to
prohibit the introduction of slaves therein, nor any power to exclude slavery
therefrom, nor any power to destroy and impair the right of property in
slaves by any legislation whatever.
IL
Resolved, That the platform adopted by the Democratic party at Cincinnati
be affirmed, with the following explanatory resolutions:
First. That the government of a Territory, organized by an act of Congress,
is provisional and temporary; and, during its existence, all citizens of the
United States have an equal right to settle with their property in the Territory, without their rights, either of person or property, being destroyed or impaired by congressional or territorial legislation.
Second. That it is the duty of the Federal Government, in all its departments, to protect, when necessary, the rights of persons and property in the
Territories and wherever else its constitutional authority extends.
Third. That when the settlers in a Territory having an adequate population form a State Constitution, the right of sovereignty commences, and,




82               THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
being consummated by admission into the Union, they stand on an equal
footing with the people of other States; and the State thus organized, ought
to be admitted into the Federal Union, whether its Constitution prohibits or
recognizes the institution of slavery.
The Convention refused to accept either of the foregoing
resolutions, and adopted, by a vote of 165 to 138, the following as its platform on the slavery question:
1. Resolved, That we, the Democracy of the Union, in Convention assem
bled, hereby declare our affirmance of the resolutions unanimously adopted
and declared as a platform of principles by the Democratic Convention at
Cincinnati, in the year 1856, believing that Democratic principles are unchangeable in their nature, when applied to the same subject-matters; and
we recommend as the only further resolutions the following:
Inasmuch as differences of opinion exist in the Democratic party as to the
nature and extent of the powers of a Territorial Legislature, and as to the
powers and duties of Congress under the Constitution of the United States,
over the institution of slavery within the Territories:
2. Resolved, That the Democratic party will abide by the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States on the questions of constitutional law.
The substitution of these resolutions for those which were
satisfactory to the South, occasioned the disruption of the
Convention, after a session of more than three weeks, and its
adjournment to Baltimore, on the 18th of June. The Cotton
States, all, withdrew from the Convention; but the Border
Slave States remained in it, with the hope of effecting some
ultimate settlement of the difficulty. The breach, however,
widened. The reassembling of the Convention at Baltimore
resulted in a final and embittered separation of the opposing
delegations. The majority exhibited a more uncompromising
spirit than ever; and Virginia and all the Border Slave States,
with the exception of Missouri, withdrew from the Convention,
and united with the representatives of the Cotton States, then
assembled in Baltimore, in the nomination of candidates representing the views of the South. Their nominees were John C.
Breckinridge of Kentucky for President, and Joseph Lane of
Oregon for Vice-President.
The old Convention, or what remained of it, nominated Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois for President, and Benjamin
Fitzpatrick of Alabama for Vice-President. The latter declin



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            33
ing, Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia was substituted on the
ticket.
The Southern Democracy and the Southern people cf all
parties, with but few exceptions, sustained the platform demanded by the Southern delegates in the Convention, and justified the course they had pursued. They recognized in the
platform  a legimate and fair assertion of Southern rights.
In view, however, of the conservative professions and glozed
speeches of a portion of the Northern Democracy, a respectable number of Southern Democrats were induced to support
their ticket. Mr. Douglas proclaimed his views to be in favor
of non-intervention; he avowed his continued and unalterable
opposition to Black Republicanism; his principles were p10ofessed to be "held subject to the decisions of the Supreme
Court"-the distinction between judicial questions and political questions being purposely clouded; and his friends, with
an ingenious sophistry that had imposed upon the South for
thirty years with success, insisted that the support of Stephen
A. Douglas was a support of the party in the North which had
stood by the South amid persecution and defamation. In consequence of these and other protestations, tickets were got up
for Mr. Douglas in most of the Southern States. The great
majority, however, of the Democracy of the slave-holding
States, except Missouri, supported Breckinridge.
A Convention of what is called the " Constitutional Union"
party met in Baltimore on the 9th of May, 1860, and nominated for President and Vice-President, John Bell of Tennessee and Edward Everett of Massachusetts. Their platform
consisted of a vague and undefined enumeration of their political principles; as, "The Constitution of the Country, the
Union of the States, and Enforcement of the Laws."
The National Convention of the Black Republican party
was held at Chicago, in the month of June. It adopted a platform declaring freedom to be the " normal condition" of the
Territories; but ingeniously complicating its position on the
slavery question by a number of vague but plausible articles,
such as the maintenance of the principles of the Constitution,
and especial attachment to the Union of the States.
The Presidential ticket nominated by the Convention was
Abraham  Lincoln of Illinois for President, and Hannibal
3




34            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
Hamlin of Maine for Vice-President. Governed by the narrow considerations of party expediency, the Convention had
adopted as their candidate for President a man of scanty political record-a Western lawyer, with the characteristics of
that profession-acuteness, slang, and a large stock of jokesand who had peculiar claims to vulgar and demagogical popularity, in the circumstances that he was once a captain of
volunteers in one of the Indian wars, and, at some anterior period of his life, had been employed, as report differently said,
in splitting rails, or in rowing a flat-boat.
The great majority of the Southern Democracy supported
the Breckinridge ticket; it was the leading ticket in all the
Slave States, except Missouri; but in the North but a small
and feeble minority of the Democratic party gave it their support. In several States, the friends of Douglas, of Breckinridge, and of Bell coalesced, to a certain extent, with a view to
the defeat of Lincoln, but without success, except in New Jersey, where they partially succeeded.
The result of the contest was, that Abraham Lincoln received the entire electoral vote of every free State, except New
Jersey, and was, of course, elected President of the United
States, according to the forms of the Constitution.
The entire popular vote for Lincoln was 1,858,200; that
tor Douglas, giving him his share of the fusion vote, 1,276,780;
that for Breckinridge, giving him his share of the fusion vote,
812,500; and that for Bell, including his proportion of the fusion vote, 735,504. The whole vote against Lincoln was thus
2,824,874, showing a clear aggregate majority against him of
nearly a million of votes.
During the canvass, the North had been distinctly warned
by the conservative parties of the country, that the election of
Lincoln by a strictly sectional vote would be taken as a declaration of war against the South. This position was assumed
on the part of the South, not so much on account of the
declaration of the anti-slavery principles in the Chicago platform, as from the notorious animus of the party supporting
Lincoln. The Chicago Convention had attempted to conceal
the worst designs of Abolitionism under professions of advancing the cause of freedom in strict accordance with the Constitution and the laws. The South, however, could not be igno



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            35
rant of the fact, or wanting in appreciation of it, that Lincoln
had been supported by the sympathizers of John Brown, the
indorsers of the " Helper Book," the founders of the Kansas
Emigrant Aid Societies, and their desperate abetters and
agents, " Jim" Lane and others, and by the opponents of the
Fugitive Slave law. It was known, in a word, that Lincoln
owed his election to the worst enemies of the South, and that
he would naturally and necessarily select his counsellors from
among them, and consult their views in his administration of
the government.
Threats of resistance were proclaimed in the South. It is
true that a few sanguine persons in that section, indulging narrow and temporizing views of the crisis, derived no little
comfort and confidence from the large preponderance of the
popular vote in the Presidential contest in favor of the conservative candidates; and viewed it as an augury of the speedy
overthrow of the first sectional administration.  But those
whose observations were larger and comprehended the progress
of events, took quite a different View of the matter. They
could find no consolation or encouragement from the face of
the record. The anti-slavery party had organized in 1840,
with about seven thousand voters; and in 1860 had succeeded
in electing the President of the United States. The conservative party in the North had been thoroughly corrupted. They
were beaten in every Northern State in 1860, with a single
exception, by the avowed enemies of the South, who, but a few
years ago had been powerless in their midst. The leaders of
the Northern Democratic party had in 1856 and in 1860,
openly taken the position that freedom would be more certainly
secured in the Territories by the rule of non-intervention than
by any other policy or expedient. This interpretation of their
policy alone saved the Democratic party from entire annihilation. The overwhelming pressure of the anti-slavery sentiment had prevented their acceding to the Southern platform in
the Presidential canvass. Nothing in the present or in the future could be looked for from the so-called conservatives of the
North; and the South prepared to go out of a Union, which
no longer afforded any guaranty for her rights or any permanent sense of security, and which had brought her under the
domination of a growing fanaticism in the North, the senti



36            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WARA.
ments of which, if carried into legislation, would destroy her
institutions, confiscate the property of her people, and even
involve their lives.
The State of South Carolina acted promptly and vigorously, with no delay for argument, and but little for preparation. Considering the argument as fully exhausted, she determined, by the exercise of her rights as a sovereign State, to
separate herself from the Union. Her Legislature called a
Convention immediately after the result of the Presidential
election had been ascertained. The Convention met a few
weeks thereafter, and on the 20th day of December, 1860, formally dissolved the connection of South Carolina with the
Union, by an ordinance of Secession, which was passed by a
unanimous vote.
On the same day Major Anderson, who was in command of
the Federal forces in Charleston harbor, evacuated Fort
Moultrie, spiking the guns and burning the gun-carriages, and
occupied Fort Sumter, with a view of strengthening his position. On the 30th of December, John B. Floyd, Secretary of
War, resigned his office, because President Buchanan refused
to oQrder Major Anderson back to Fort Moultrie-Mr. Floyd
alleging that he and the President had pledged the authorities
of South Carolina that the existing military status of the United
States in that State should not be changed during the expiring
term of the Democratic administration.
The withdrawal of South Carolina from the Union produced
some sensation in the North, but the dominant party treated it
lightly. Many of these jeered at it; theirJeaders derided the
"right of secession;" and their newspapers prophesied that
the "rebellion" in South Carolina would be reduced to the
most ignominious extremity the moment the " paternal government" of the United States should resolve to have recourse
from peaceful persuasions to the chastisement of "a spoilt
child." The events, however, which rapidly succeeded the
withdrawal of South Carolina, produced a deep impression
upon all reflecting minds, and startled, to some extent, the
masses of the North, who would have been much more alarmed
but for their vain and long-continued assurance that the South
had no means or resources for making a serious resistance to
the Federal authority; and that a rebellion which could at any




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            37
time be crushed on short notice, might be pleasantly humored
or wisely tolerated to any extent short of the actual commencement of hostilities.
On the 9th day of January, 1861, the State of Mississippi
seceded from the Union. Alabama and Florida followed on
the 11th day of the same month; Georgia on the 20th;
Louisiana on the 26th; and Texas on the 1st of February. Thus,
in less than three months after the announcement of Lincoln's
election, all the Cotton States, with the exception of Alabama,
had seceded from the Union, and had, besides, secured every
Federal fort within their limits, except the forts in Charleston harbor, and Fort Pickens, below Pensacola, which were
retained by United States troops.
The United States Congress had, at the beginning of its session in December, 1860, appointed committees in both houses
to consider the state of the Union. Neither committee was
able to agree upon any mode of settlement of the pending issue
between the North and the South. The Republican members
in both committees rejected propositions acknowledging the
right of property in slaves, or recommending the division of
the territories between the slaveholding and non-slaveholding
States by a geographical line. In the Senate, the propositions,
commonly known as Mr. Crittenden's, were voted against by
every Re]publican senator; and the House, on a vote of yeas
and nays, refused to consider certain propositions, moved by
Mr. Etheridge, which were even less favorable to the South
than Mr. Crittenden's.
A resolution, giving a pledge to sustain the President in the
use of force against seceding States, was adopted in the House
of Representatives by a large majority; and, in the Senate,
every Republican voted to substitute for Mr. Crittenden's
propositions, resolutions offered by Mr. Clarke, of New Hampshire, declaring that no new concessions, guaranties, or amendments to the Constitution were necessary; that the demands of
the South were unreasonable, and that the remedy for the
present dangers was simply to enforce the laws-in other
words-coercion and war.
On the 19th day of January, the Legislature of the State
of Virginia had passed resolutions having in view a peaceful
settlement of the questions which threatened the Union, and




38            THE FIRST rEAR OF THE WAR.
suggesting that a National Peace Conference should be held in
Washington on the 4th of February. This suggestion met with
a favorable response from the Border Slave States and from
professed conservatives in the North. The Conference met on
the day designated, and Ex-President Tyler, of Virginia, was
called to preside over its deliberations. It remained in session.
several days, and adjourned without agreeing upon any satisfactory plan of adjustment.
Most of the delegates from the Border Slave States indicated
a willingness to accept the few and feeble guaranties contained
in the resolutions offered, a short time before, in the Senate by
MBr. Crittenden. These guaranties, paltry and ineffectual as
they were, would not be conceded by the representatives of
the Northern States. The Peace Conference finally adopted
what was called the Franklin Substitute in lieu of the propositions offered by Mlr. Guthrie, of Kentucky-a settlement less
favorable to the South than that proposed by Mr. Crittenden.
It is useless to recount the details of these measures. Neither
the Crittenden propositions, the Franklin Substitute, nor any
plan that pretended to look for the guaranty of Southern
rights, received a respectful notice from the Republican majority in Congress.
Shortly after its assemblage in January, the Virginia Legislature had called a Convention of the people to decide upon
the course proper to be pursued by the State, with reference
to her present relations to the Union and the future exigencies
of her situation. The election was held on the 4th of February,
and resulted in the choice of a majority of members opposed
to unconditional secession. Subsequently, Tennessee and North
Carolina decided against calling a Convention-the former by
a large, the latter by a very small majority. These events
greatly encouraged the enemies of the South, but without
cause, as they really indicated nothing more than the purpose
of the Border Slave States to await the results of the peace
propositions, to which they had committed themselves.
In the mean time, the seceding States were erecting the
structure of a government on the foundation of a new Confederation of States. A convention of delegates from the six
seceding States assembled in Congress at Montgomery, Alabama, on the 4th of February, 1861, for the purpose of organ



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             39
izing a provisional government. This body adopted a Constitution for the Confederate States on the 8th of February. On
the 9th of February, Congress proceeded to the election of a
President and Vice-President, and unanimously agreed upon
Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, for President, and Alexander
II. Stephens, of Georgia, for Vice-President. Mr. Davis was
inaugurated Provisional President on the 18th of February,
and delivered an address, explaining the revolution as a change
of the constituent parts, but not the system, of the government,
and referring to the not unreasonable expectation that, with a
Constitution differing only from that of their fathers, in so far
as it was explanatory of their well-known intent, freed from
sectional conflicts, the States from which they had recently
parted might seek to unite their fortunes to those of the new
Confederacy.
President Buchanan had, in his message to Congress, denounced Secession as revolutionary, but had hesitated at the
logical conclusion of the right of "coercion," on the part of
the Federal Government, as not warranted by the text of the
Constitution. Timid, secretive, cold, and with no other policy
than that of selfish expediency, the remnant of his administration was marked by embarrassment, double-dealing, and weak
and contemptible querulousness. He had not hesitated, under
the pressure of Northern clamor, to refuse to order Major
Anderson back to Fort Moultrie, thus violating the pledge
that he had given to the South Carolina authorities, that the
military status of the United States in Charleston harbor
should not be disturbed during his administration. He added
to the infamy of this perfidy by a covert attempt to reinforce
Fort Sumter, under the specious plea of provisioning a " starving garrison;" and when the Federal steamship, the Star of
the'West, which was sent on this mission, was, on the 9th of
January, driven off Charleston harbor by the South Carolina
batteries on Morris Island, he had the hardihood to affect
surprise and indignation at the reception given the Federal
reinforcements, and to insist that the expedition had been
ordered with the concurrence of his Cabinet, including Mr.
Thompson, of Mississippi, then Secretary of the Interior, who
repelled the slander, denounced the movement as underhanded,
and as a breach not only of good faith towards South Carolina,




40            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
but of personal confidence between the President and his advisers, and left the Cabinet in disgust.
On the incoming of the administration of Abraham Lincoln,
on the 4th of March, the rival government of the South had
perfected its organization; the separation had been widened
and envenomed by the ambidexterity and perfidy of President.
Buchanan; the Southern people, however, still hoped for a
peaceful accomplishment of their independence, and deplored
war between the two sections, as " a policy detrimental to the
civilized world." The revolution in the mean time had rapidly
gathered, not only in moral power, but in the means of war
and the muniments of defence. Fort Moultrie and Castle
Pinckney had been captured by the South Carolina troops;
Fort Pulaski, the defence of the Savannah, had been taken;
the arsenal at Mount Vernon, Alabama, with 20,000 stand of
arms, had been seized by the Alabama troops; Fort Morgan,
in Mobile Bay, had been taken; Forts Jackson, St. Philip,
and Pike, near New Orleans, had been captured by the Louisiana troops; the Pensacola Navy-Yard and Forts Barrancas
and  McRae had been taken, and the siege of Fort Pickens
commenced; the Baton Rouge Arsenal had been surrendered
to the Louisiana troops; the New Orleans Mint and CustomHouse had been taken; the Little Rock Arsenal had been
seized by the Arkansas troops; and, on the 16th of February,
General Twiggs had transferred the public property in Texas
to the State authorities. All of these events had been accomplished without bloodshed. Abolitionism and Fanaticism had
not yet lapped blood. But reflecting men saw that the peace
was deceitful and temporizing; that the temper of the North
was impatient and dark; and that, if all history was not a lie,
the first incident of bloodshed would be the prelude to a war
of monstrous proportions.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                       41
CHAPTER II.
Mr. Lincoln's Journey to Washington.-Ceremonies of the Inauguration.-The Inaugural Speech of President Lincoln.-The Spirit of the New Administration.-Its Financial Condition.-Embassy from the Southern Confederacy.-Perfidious Treatment
of the Southern Commissioners.-Preparations for War.-The Military Bills of the
Confederate Congress.-General Beauregard.-Fortifications of Charleston Harbor.Naval Preparations of the Federal Government.-Attbempted Reinforcement of Fort
Sumter.-Perfidy of the Federal Government.-Excitement in Charleston.-Reduction
of Fort Sumter by the Confederate Forces.-How the News was received in Washington.-Lincoln's Calculation.-His Proclamation of WAR.-The " Reaction" in the
North.-Displays of Rancor towards the South.-Northern Democrats.-Replies of
Southern Governors to Lincoln's Requisition for Troops.-Spirit of the South. —Secession of Virginia.-Maryland. —The Baltimore Riot.-Patriotic Example of Missouri.Lincoln's Proclamation blockading the Southern Ports.-General Lee.-The Federals
evacuate Harper's Ferry. —Burning of the Navy Yard at Norfolk.-The Second Secessionary Movement.-Spirit of Patriotic Devotion in the South. —Supply of Arms in
the South.-The Federal Government and the State of Maryland.-The Prospect.
THE circumstances of the advent of Mr. Lincoln to Washington were not calculated to inspire confidence in his courage
or wisdom, or in the results of his administration. His party
had busily prophesied, and sought to innoculate the North with
the conviction, that his assumption of the Presidential office
would be the signal of the restoration of peace; that by some
mysterious ingenuity he would resolve the existing political
complication, restore the Union, and inaugurate a season of
unexampled peace, harmony, and prosperity. These weak and
fulsome prophecies had a certain effect.  In the midst of anxiety and embarrassment, in which no relief had yet been
suggested, the inauguration of a new administration of the
government was looked to by many persons in the North, outside the Republican party, with a vague sense of hope, which
was animated by reports, quite as uncertain, of the vigor,
decision, and individuality of the new President. For months
since the announcement of his election, Mr. Lincoln's lips had
been closed. He had been studiously silent; expectations were
raised by what was thought to be an indication of a mysterious wisdom; and the North impatiently waited for the hour
when the oracle's lips were to be opened.
These vague expectations were almost ludicrously disappointed. On leaving his home, in Springfield, Illinois, for




42            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
Washington, Mr. Lincoln had at last opened his lips. In the
speeches with which he entertained the crowd that at different
points of the railroad watched his progress to the capital, he
amused the whole country, even in the midst of a great public
anxiety, with his ignorance, his vulgarity, his flippant conceit,
and his Western phraseology. The North discovered that the
new President, instead of having nursed a masterly wisdom in
the retirement of his home at Springfield, and approaching
the capital with dignity, had nothing better to offer to an
agonized country than the ignorant conceits of a low Western
politician, and the flimsy jests of a harlequin. His railroad
speeches were characterized by a Southern paper as illustrating
"the delightful combination of a Western county lawyer with
a Yankee bar-keeper." In his harangues to the crowds which
intercepted him in his journey, at a time when the country was
in revolutionary chaos, when commerce and trade were prostrated, and when starving women and idle men were among the
very audiences that listened to him, he declared to them in his
peculiar phraseology that " nobody was hurt," that " all would
come out right," and that there was "nothing going wrong."
Nor was the rhetoric of the new President his only entertainment of the crowds that assembled to honor the progress of his
journey to Washington. He amused them by the spectacle
of kissing, on a public platform, a lady-admirer, who had suggested to him the cultivation of his whiskers; he measured
heights with every tall man he encountered in one of his public
receptions, and declared that he was not to be " overtopped;"
and he made public exhibitions of his wife-" the little woman,"
he called her-whose chubby figure, motherly face, and fondness for finery and colors recommended her to a very limited
and very vulgar portion of the society of her sex.
These jests and indecencies of the demagogue who was to
take control of what remained of the Government of the United
States, belong to history. Whatever their disgrace, it was
surpassed, however, by another display of character on the part
of the coming statesman. While at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
and intending to proceed from there to Baltimore, Mr. Lincoln
was alarmed by a report, which was either silly or jocose, that
a band of assassins were awaiting him in the latter city.
Frightened beyond all considerations of dignity and decency,




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             43
the new President of the United States left Harrisburg at
night, on a different route than that through Baltimore; and in
a motley disguise, composed of a Scotch cap and military cloak,
stole to the capital of his government. The distinguished
fugitive had left his wife and family to pursue the route on
which it was threatened that the cars were to be thrown down
a precipice by Secessionists, or, if that expedient failed, the
work of assassination was to be accomplished in the streets of
Baltimore. The city of Washington was taken by surprise by
the irregular flight of the President to its shelter and protection. The representatives of his own party there received him
with evident signs of disgust at the cowardice which had hurried his arrival in Washington; but as an example of the early
prostitution of the press of that parasitical city to the incoming administration that was to feed its venal lusts, the escapade
of Mr. Lincoln was, with a shamelessness almost incredible,
exploited as an ingenious and brilliant feat, and entitled, in
the newspaper extras that announced his arrival, as " another
Fort Moultrie coup de rmain"-referring to the fraud by which
the government had stolen a march by midnight to the supposed
impregnable defences of Fort Sumter.
But Mr. Lincoln's fears for his personal safety evidently did
not subside with his attainment of the refuges of Washington.
A story was published seriously in a New York paper, that at
the moment of his inauguration he was to be shot on the Capitol steps, by an air-gun, in the hands of a Secessionist selected
for this desperate and romantic task of assassination. The
President, with nerves already shattered by his flight from
Harrisburg, was easily put in a new condition of alarm. An
armed guard was posted around Willard's hotel, where he had
taken temporary quarters. Preparations were busily made to
organize a military protection for the ceremony of the inauguration. The city of Washington had already been invested
with large military forces, under the immediate command of
General Scott, whose vanity and weak love of public sensations
had easily induced him to pretend alarm, and to make a military display, more on his own account than for the ridiculous
and absurd object of Mr. Lincoln's personal security. For
weeks the usually quiet city had been filled with Federal
bayonets; the bugle's reveille, the roll of drums, and the tramp




44.         THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
of armed guards startled, in every direction, the civilian of
Washington, who had been accustomed to nothing more warlike than parades at the Navy Yard and rows in Congress;
companies of flying artillery daily paraded the streets and
thundered over its pavements; and no form of ostentation was
omitted by the senile and conceited general in command, to
give the Federal metropolis the appearance of a conquered
city.
The hour of the inauguration —the morning of the fourth of
March-at length arrived. Mr. Lincoln was dressed in a suit,
of black for the occasion, and, at the instance of his friends,
had submitted to the offices of a hair-dresser. He entered the
barouche that was to convey him to the Capitol, with a nervous
agitation and an awkwardness, that were plainly evident to the
crowd.  His person attracted the curiosity of the mob. Of
unusual height, the effect of his figure was almost ludicrous,
from a swinging gait and the stoop of his shoulders; a cadaverous face, whose expression was that of a sort of funereal humor; long, swinging arms, with the general hirsute appearance
of the Western countryman, made up the principal features of
the new President.
The inauguration ceremony was attended by a most extraordinary military display, under the immediate direction of General Scott; who, to give it an appearance of propriety, and to
increase its importance, affected the most uneasy alarms. Previous to inauguration day, the vaults of the Capitol were explored for evidences of a gunpowder plot to hurry Mr. Lincoln
and his satellites into eternity. In the procession along Pennsylvania Avenue, the President was hid from public view in a
hollow square of cavalry, three or four deep. The tops of the
houses along the route were occupied by soldiery watching for
signs of tumult or assassination. Artillery and infantry companies were posted in different parts of the city; officers were
continually passing to and fro; and as the procession approached the Capitol, Gen. Scott, who was in constant communication with all quarters of the city, was heard to exclaim, in
a tone of relief, " every thing is going on peaceably; thank
God Almighty for it." The expression of relief was simply
ridiculous. The ceremony was disturbed by but a single incident: as the procession neared the portico of the Capitol, a




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.        4.
drunken man, who had climbed up one of the trees on the
avenue, amused himself by striking with a staff the boughs of
the tree and shouting to the crowd. The thought flashed upon
the minds of the special police, that he might be the identical
assassin with the air-gun; he was instantly seized by a dozen
of them, and hurried from the scene of the ceremony with a
rapidity and decision that for a moment alarmed, and then
amused, the crowd. Mr. Lincoln delivered his inaugural from
the East portico of the Capitol, to an audience huddled within
the lines of the District militia, and with a row of bayonets
glittering at his feet.
The inaugural was intended to be ambiguous; it proposed to
cozen the South by a cheap sentimentalism, and, at the same
time, to gratify the party that had elevated Mr. Lincoln, by a
sufficient expression of the designs of the new administration.
These designs were sufficiently apparent. Mr. Lincoln protested that he should take care that the laws of the United
States were faithfully executed in all the States; he declared
that in doing this, there was no necessity for bloodshed or violence, " unless it was forced upon the national authority."  He
promised that the power confided to him would be used to
hold, occupy, and possess the forts and places belonging to the
government, "but," continued the ambidexterous speaker,'beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will
be no invasion, no using of force against or among any people
anywhere."
In the South, the inaugural was generally taken as a premonition of war. There were other manifestations of the spirit
of the new administration. Violent Abolitionists and men
whose hatred of the South was notorious and unrelenting, were
placed in every department of the public service. William H.
Seward was made Secretary of State; Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; and M/Iontgomery Blair, Postmastergeneral.  Anson Burlingame was sent as representative to
Austria; Cassius M. Clay, to Russia; Carl Shurz, to Spain;
James E. Harvey, to Portugal; Charles F. Adams, to England; and Joshua R. Giddings, to Canada. In the Senate,
which was convened in an extra session to confirm executive
appointments and to transact other public business, Charles
Sumner was appointed Chairman of Foreign Relations; Wil



46             THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
liam P. Fessenden, of Finance; and Henry Wilson, of Military Affairs. A portion of the time of this extra session was
consumed in discussing the policy of the administration. Mr.
Douglas, who had represented the Northern Democracy in the
Presidential contest, and still claimed to represent it, and who
had already courted the new administration of his rival-had
held Mr. Lincoln's hat at the inauguration ceremony, and enacted the part of Mrs. Lincoln's cavalier at the inauguration
ball-essayed to give to the President's inaugural a peace interpretation, and to soften what had been foreshadowed of his
policy. The efforts of the demagogue were ill-timed and
paltry. Senators from Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Arkansas, Missouri, and North Carolina, who still continued in the councils of the government, remained long enough
to witness the subversion of all the principles that had before
contributed to the prosperity and stability of the American
Government; to learn, as far as possible, the course the government would pursue towards the Confederate States; and to
return home to prepare their people for the policy of discord,
conflict, and civil war which had been inaugurated.
The financial condition of the government at the time of Mr.
Lincoln's accession was by no means desperate. There was a
balance in the Treasury of six millions, applicable to current
expenses; the receipts from customs were estimated at eighty
thousand dollars per day; and it was thought that a loan
would not be called for for some time, should there be a happy
continuation of peace.
The Confederate States government at Montgomery had
shown nothing of a desperate or tumultuous spirit; it had not
watched events with recklessness as to their conclusion; it was
anxious for peace; and it gave a rare evidence of the virtue
and conservatism of a new government, which was historically
the fruit of a revolution, by the most sedulous efforts to avoid
all temptations to violence, and to resist the consequence of
war. Soon after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, it had deputed an embassy of commissioners to Washington, authorized
to negotiate for the removal of the Federal garrisons from
Forts Pickens and Sumter, and to provide for the settlement
of all claims of public property arising out of the separation of
the States from the Union. Two of the commissioners, Martin




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            47
Crawford, of Georgia, and John Forsythe, of Alabama, attended in Washington, and addressed a communication to Mr.
Seward, which explained the functions of the embassy and its
purposes.
Mr. Seward declined for the present to return an official
answer to the commissioners, or' to recognize in an official light
their humane and amicable mission. His government had resolved on a policy of perfidy. The commissioners were amused
from week to week with verbal assurances that the government
was disposed to recognize them; that to treat with them at the
particular juncture might seriously embarrass the administration of Mr. Lincoln; that they should be patient and confident;
and that in the mean time the military status of the United
States in the South would not be disturbed. Judge Campbell,
of the Supreme Court, had consented to be the intermediary
of these verbal conferences. When the sequel of the perfidy
of the administration was demonstrated, he wrote two notes to
Mr. Seward, distinctly charging him with overreaching and
equivocation, to which Mr. Seward never attempted a defence
or a reply.
The dalliance with the commissioners was not the only deceitful indication of peace. It was given out and confidently
reported in the newspapers, that Fort Sumter was to be evacuated by the Federal forces. The delusion was continued for
weeks. The Black Republican party, of course, resented this
reported policy of the government; but a number of their
newspapers endeavored to compose the resentment by the
arguments that the evacuation would be ordered solely on the
ground of military necessity, as it would be impossible to reinforce the garrison without a very extensive demonstration of
force, which the government was not then prepared to make;
that the purposes of the administration had not relaxed, and
that the evacuation of Sumter was, as one of the organs of the
administration expressed it, but "the crouch of the tiger before he leaped."
It was true that the condition of the garrison of Fort Sumter
had been a subject of Cabinet consultation; but it was afterwards discovered that all that had been decided by the advisers
of the President, among whom General Scott had been admitted, was that military reinforcement of the fort was, under the




48            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
circumstances, impracticable. There never was an intention to
evacuate it. The embarrassment of the government was, to
avoid the difficulty of military reinforcements by some artifice
that would equally well answer its purposes. That artifice
continued for a considerable time to be the subject of secret
and sedulous consultation.    *
While a portion of the public were entertained in watching
the surface of events, and were imposed upon by deceitful
signs of peace, discerning men saw the inevitable consequence
in the significant preparations made on both sides for war.
These preparations had gone on unremittingly since the inauguration of the Lincoln government. The troops of the United
States were called from the frontiers to the military centres;
the Mediterranean squadron and other naval forces were ordered home; and the city of Washington itself was converted
into a school where there were daily and ostentatious instructions of the soldier. On the other hand, the government at
Montgomery was not idle. Three military bills had been passed
by the Confederate Congress. The first authorized the raising
of one hundred thousand volunteers when deemed necessary by
the President; the second provided for the Provisional Army
of the Confederate States, which was to be formed from the
regular and volunteer forces of the different States; and the
third provided for the organization of a Regular Army, which
was to be a permanent establishment. But among the strongest indications of the probability of war, in the estimation of
men calculated to judge of the matter, and among the most
striking proofs, too, bf devotion to the cause of the South, was
the number of resignations from the Federal army and navy
on the part of officers of Southern birth or association, and
their prompt identification with the Confederate service. These
resignations had commenced during the close of Mr. Buchan
an's administration. On the accession of Mr. Lincoln, Adjutantgeneral Cooper had immediately resigned; and the distinguished example was followed by an array of names, which had
been not a little illustrious in the annals of the Federal service.
While the South was entreating peace, and pursuing its
accomplishment by an amicable mission to Washington, a
strong outside pressure was being exerted upon the administration of Mr. Lincoln to hurry it to the conclusion of war.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           49
He had been visited by a number of governors of the Northern States. They offered him money and men; but it was
understood that nothing would be done in the way of calling
out the State militia and opening special credits, until the
Southern revolutionists should be actually in aggression to the
authority of the Federal government. Another appeal was
still more effectively urged. It was the argument of the partisan. The report of the intended evacuation of Fort Sumter,
and the apparent vacillation of the administration, were producing disaffection in the Black Republican party. This party
had shown a considerable loss of strength in the municipal
elections in St. Louis, Cincinnati, and other parts of the West;
they had lost two congressmen in Connecticut and two in
Rhode Island. The low tariff, too, of the Southern Confederacy,
brought into competition with the high protective tariff which
the Black Republican majority in Congress had adopted, and
which was popularly known as "th& Morrill Tariff," was
threatening serious disaster to the interests of New England
and Pennsylvania, and was indicating the necessity of the
repeal of a law which was considered as an indispensable party
measure by the most of Mr. Lincoln's constituents.
For weeks the Cabinet of Mr. Lincoln had been taxed to
devise some artifice for the relief of Fort Sumter, short of
open military reinforcements (decided to be impracticable),
and which would have the effect of inaugurating the war by a
safe indirection and under a plausible and convenient pretence.
The device was at length hit upon. It was accomplished by
the most flagrant perfidy.  Mr. Seward had already given
assurances to the Southern commissioners, through the intermediation of Judge Campbell, that the Federal troops would
be removed from Fort Sumter. Referring to the draft of a
letter which Judge Campbell had in his hand, and proposed to
address to President Davis, at Montgomery, he said, -" before
that letter reaches its destination, Fort Sumter will have been
evacuated." Some time elapsed, and there was reason to distrust the promise. Colonel Lamon, an agent of the Washington
government, was sent to Charleston, and was reported to be
authorized to make arrangements with Governor Pickens, of
South Carolina, for the withdrawal of the Federal troops from
Fort Sumter. He returned without any accomplishment of
4




50              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
his reported mission. Another confidential agent of Mr. Lincoln, a Mr. Fox, was permitted to visit Fort Sumter, and was
discovered to have acted the part of a spy in carrying concealed
dispatches to Major Anderson, and collecting information with
reference to a plan for the forcible reinforcement of the fort.
On the Tth of April, Judge Campbell, uneasy as to the good
faith of Mr. Seward's promise of the evacuation of Sumter,
addressed him another note on the subject. To this the
emphatic and laconic reply was: " Faith as to Sumter fully
kept-wait and see."  Six days thereafter a hostile fleet was
menacing Charleston, the Lincoln government threw down
the gauntlet of war, and the battle of Sumter was fought.
On the day succeeding the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln, General P. G. Toutant Beauregard* was put in command
of the Confederate troops besieging Fort Sumter. His military record was slight, but gave evidence of genius. He was
the son of a wealthy and influential Louisiana planter.  He
had graduated at the military academy at West Point, taking
the second honors in his class, and had served in the Mexican
war with distinction, being twice brevetted for gallant and
meritorious conduct in.the field-the first time as captain for
the battles of Contreras and Cherubusco, and again as major
for the battle of Chapultepec.  He was'subsequently placed
by the Federal government in charge of the construction of
the mint and custom-house at New Orleans. He had been ordered by Mr. Buchanan to West Point as superintendent of
the military academy. The appointment was revoked within
forty-eight hours for a spiteful reason-the family connection
of the nominee with Mr. Slidell, of Louisiana; and Major
Beauregard, resigning his commission at once, received higher
rank in the army of the Southern Confederacy.
* Beauregard is forty years of age. He is small, brown, thin, extremely
vigorous, although his features wear a dead expression, and his hair has
whitened prematurely. Face, physiognomy, tongue, accent-every thing about
him is French. He is quick, a little abrupt, but well educated and distinguished in his manners. He does not care to express the manifestation of an
ardent personality which knows its worth. He is extremely impassioned in
the defence of the cause which he serves. At least he takes less pains to conceal his passion under a calm and cold exterior than do most of his comrades
in the army. The South found in him a man of an uncommon ardor, a ceaseless activity, and an indomitable power of will.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             51
On taking command of the Confederate forces at Charleston,
General Beauregard at once gave the benefit of his eminent
skill as a military engineer, which merit had been recognized
in him before, and had procured his elevation to the important
and critical command in front of Fort Sumter, to the construction of works for the reduction of the fort, and the defence of the entrances to the harbor. At the time of Major
Anderson's removal to Sumter, the approaches to the harbor
were only defended by the uninjured guns at Fort Moultrie,
and three 24-pounder guns mounted en barbette on a hastily
constructed and imperfect earthwork on Morris' Island. The
injured guns were replaced, and all, amounting to thirty-eight
in number, of various calibres, were protected by well-constructed merlons; lines of batteries were constructed on the
east and west on Sullivan's Island; at Cummings' Point on
Morris' Island, the nearest land to Fort Sumter, batteries of
mortars and columbiads were erected, protected by an iron
fortification of novel and formidable construction; and another
novelty in iron fortifications was perfected by the skilful and
practical genius of the commander in a floating battery, constructed of the peculiarly fibrous palmetto timber, sheathed
with plate iron, and embrasured for and mounting four guns
of heavy calibre.
Notwithstanding the extent and skill of the besiegers' works,
Fort Sumter was declared, by a number of military critics, to
be impregnable. It certainly had that appearance to the unscientific eye. The fortification, a modern truncated pentagonal fort, rose abruptly out of the water at the mouth of
Charleston harbor, three and a half miles from the city. It
was built on an artificial island, having for its base a sand and
mud bank, which had been made secure by long and weary
labors in firmly imbedding in it refuse blocks and chips from
the granite quarries of the Northern States. The foundation
alone had cost the government half a million of dollars, and
had occupied ten years in its construction. At the time of
Major Anderson's occupation of the fortification, it was so
nearly completed as to admit the introduction of its armament.
The walls were of solid brick and concrete masonry, sixty feet
high and from eight to twelve feet in thickness, and pierced
for three tiers of guns on the northern, eastern, and western




52            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
exterior sides, They were built close to the edge of the water
and without a berme.
The advantages of delay which the Lincoln government had
obtained by the pretence of the evacuation of Sumter, and the
adroitness of Mr. Seward with the commissioners, had been
profitably employed by it in naval and other preparations for
its meditated blow on the Southern coasts. Unusual activity
was perceptible in all the dock-yards, armories, and military
depots throughout the North. The arsenals of Troy and Watertown were constantly occupied, and the creaking of blocks,
the clang of hammers, and the hum of midnight labor resounded through every manufactory of arms. Numerous
large transports were employed by the government for the conveyance of soldiers and war material, and the signs of the
times betokened that the administration was preparing for a
long and bloody struggle. Within ten days from the first of
April, over eleven thousand men were sent from Fort Hamilton and Governor's Island. The recruiting offices in New York
were daily engaged in enrolling men for the Federal service.
On the 6th of April, the frigate Powhatan was ready for sea,
and, with her armament of ten heavy guns and four hundred
men, prepared as convoy to the transports Atlantic, Baltic, and
Illinois. On the 8th, the Atlantic sailed with Barry's battery
(four guns and ninety-one men), four hundred soldiers and a
large store of supplies. The same morning the steam-cutter
Harriet Lane, Captain J. Faunce, eight guns and one hundred
men, sailed for Charleston harbor. Late at night, the transport Baltic, with twenty surf-boats, stores, and two hundred
recruits from Governor's Island, and the transport Illinois,
with five hundred cases of muskets, stores, three hundred soldiers, and the steam-tug Freeborn, sailed from New York harbor.; On the whole, besides the Powhatan, eleven vessels
were ordered to be got in readiness, with an aggregate force
of 285 guns and 2400 men. There was now not the slightest
doubt that the first blow of the rival forces would be struck
at Sumter. The fleet dispatched to Charleston harbor consisted of the sloop-of-war Pawnee, the sloop-of-war Powhatan,
and the cutter Harriet Lane, with three steam transports.
No sooner was the hostile fleet of the Federal government
safely on its way to the Southern coasts, than the perfidy of




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            53
Abraham Lincoln and his advisers was openly and shamelessly
consummated. The mask was dropped. The Southern commissioners who had been so long cozened, were distinctly rebuffed; and simultaneously with the appearance of the Federal fleet in the offing of the Charleston harbor, an official
message, on the 8th day of April, was conveyed to Governor
Pickens, of South Carolina, by Lieutenant Talbot, an authorized agent of the Lincoln government, announcing the determination of that government to send provisions to Fort Sumter, "peaceably if they can, forcibly if they must." The message was telegraphed by General Beauregard to Montgomery,
and the instructions of his government asked. He was answered by a telegram from Mr. Walker, the Secretary of War,
instructing him to demand the evacuation of the fort, and, if
that was refused, to proceed to reduce it. The demand was
made; it was refused. Major Anderson replied that he regretted that his sense of honor and of his obligations to his
government prevented his compliance with the demand.
Nothing was left but to accept the distinct challenge of the
Lincoln government to arms.
The most intense excitement prevailed in Charleston. No
sooner had the official message of Mr. Lincoln been received,
than orders were issued to the entire military force of the city
to proceed to their stations. Four regiments of one thousand
men each, were telegraphed for from the country. Ambulances for the wounded were prepared; surgeons were ordered
to their posts, and every preparation made for a regular battle.
Among the portentous signs, the community was thrown into
a fever of excitement by the discharge of seven guns from the
Capitol Square, the signal for the assembling of all the reserves ten minutes afterwards. Hundreds of men left their
beds, hurrying to and fro towards their respective locations.
In the absence of sufficient armories, the corners of the streets,
the public squares, and other convenient points formed places
of meeting. All night long the roll of the drum and the
steady tramp of the military and the gallop of the cavalry, resounding through the city, betokened the progress of preparation for the long-expected hostilities. The Home Guard corps
of old gentlemen, who occupied the position of military exempts, rode through the city, arousing the soldiers and doing




54            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
other duty required at the moment. Hundreds of the citizens
were up all night. A terrible thunder-storm prevailed until
a late hour, but in nowise interfered with the ardor of the
soldiers.
On the 12th day of April, at half-past four o'clock in the
morning, fire was opened upon Fort Sumter. The firing was
deliberate, and was continued, without interruption, for twelve
hours. The iron battery at Cumming's Point did the most
effective service, perceptibly injuring' the walls of the fortification, while the floating battery dismounted two of the parapet
guns. The shell batteries were served with skill and effect,
shells being thrown into the fort every twenty minutes. The
fort had replied steadily during the day. About dark, its fire
fell off, while ours was continued at intervals during the night.
The contest had been watched during the day by excited and
anxious citizens from every available point of observation in
Charleston-the battery, the shipping in the harbor, and the
steeples of churches-and, as night closed, the illuminations
of the shells, as they coursed the air, added a strange sublimity
to the scene to men who had never before witnessed the fiery
splendors of a bombardment. The next morning, at seven
o'clock, the fort resumed its fire, doing no damage of consequence. A short while thereafter, the fort was discovered to
be on fire, and through the smoke and glare, its flag was discovered at half mast, as a signal of distress. The Federal
fleet, which was off the bar, contrary to all expectations, remained quietly where it was; they did not remove from their
anchorage or fire a gun. In the mean time, the conflagration,
which had seized upon the officers' quarters and barracks at the
fort, continued; it no longer responded to our fire, which was
kept up with an anxious look-out for tokens of surrender; its
garrison, black and begrimed with smoke, were employed in
efforts to extinguish the conflagration, and in some instances
had to keep themselves lying upon their faces to avoid death
from suffocation. During the height of the conflagration, a
boat was dispatched by General Beauregard to Major Anderson, with offers of assistance in extinguishing the fire. Before
it could reach the fort, the long-expected flag of truce had
been hoisted; and the welcome event was instantly announced
in every part of the city by the ringing of bells, the pealing




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            55
of cannon, the shouts of couriers dashing through the streets,
and by every indication of general rejoicing. Major Anderson agreed to an unconditional surrender, as demanded of him;
he received of his enemy in return, the most distinguished
marks of lenity and consideration: his sword was returned to
him by General Beauregard; himself and garrison allowed to
take passage, at their convenience, for New York; and, on
leaving the fort, he was permitted to salute his flag with fifty
guns, the performance of which was attended with the melancholy occurrence of mortal injuries to four of his men by the
bursting of two cannon. There was no other life lost in the
whole affair.
Thus ended the bombardment of Sumter. It had continued
during two days; it was estimated that two thousand shots
had been fired in all; a frowning fortification had been reduced
to a blackened mass of ruins; and yet not a life had been lost,
or a limb injured in the engagement.
The news of the fall of Fort Sumter, when it was received in
Washington, did not disturb President Lincoln. He received
it with remarkable calmness. The usual drawing-room entertainment at the White House was not intermitted on the evening of the day of the commencement of civil war. The same
evening the President turned to a Western Senator and asked,
" Will your State sustain me with military power 2" He made
no other comment on the news, which was agitating every part
of the country to its foundation.
The fact was that the President had long ago calculated the
result and the effect, on the country, of the hostile movements
which he had directed against the sovereignty of South Carolina.'He had procured the battle of Sumter; he had no desire or hope to retain the fort: the circumstances of the battle
and the non-participation of his fleet in it, were sufficient evidences, to every honest and reflecting mind, that it was not a
contest for victory, and that " the sending provisions to a
starving garrison" was an ingenious artifice to commence the
war that the Federal Government had fully resolved upon,
under the specious but shallow appearance of that government
being involved by the force of circumstances, rather than by
its own volition, in the terrible consequence of civil war.
On the 14th day of April, Mr. Lincoln published his proc



56               THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
lamation of war.  He acted to the last in a sinister spirit.
He had just assured the commissioners from Virginia, who had
been deputed to ascertain the purposes of his government, that
he would modify his inaugural only so far as to " perhaps cause
the United States mails to be withdrawn" from  the seceded
States.  The following proclamation was the "modification"
of the inaugural:
" Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past, and
now are, opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed in the States of South
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by
combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceeding, or by the powers vested in the Marshals by law" Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in
virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution and the laws, have
thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth the militia of the several
States of the Union, to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, in
order to suppress said combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed.
The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the State authorities through the War Department.
" I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our National Union, and
the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs already long
enough endured.
"I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby
called forth, will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which
have been seized from the Union; and in every event the utmost care will be
observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation and
destruction of, or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful
citizens in any part of the country. And I hereby command the persons composing the combinations aforesaid, to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days from this date.
"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."
The trick of the government, to which we have referred, in
its procurement of the battle of Sumter, is too dishonest and
shallow  to account for the immense reaction of sentiment in
the North that ensued. That reaction is certainly to be attributed to causes more intelligent and permanent than the weak
fallacy that the Lincoln government was not responsible for
the hostilities in Charleston harbor, and that the South itself
had dragged the government and people of Abraham Lincoln
unwillingly into the inauguration of war. The problem of
this reaction -may be more justly solved. In fact, it involved




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            57
no new fact or principle. The Northern people, including all
parties, secretly appreciated the value of the Union to themselves; they knew that they would be ruined by a permanent
secession of the Southern States; many of them had sought
to bring the dissatisfied States back into the Union by the old
resource of artful speeches and fine promises; and finding, at
last, that the South was in earnest, and was no longer to be
seduced by cheap professions, they quickly and sharply determined to coerce what they could not cozen. This is the whole
explanation of the wonderful reaction. The North discovered,
by the fiery denouernent in Charleston harbor, that the South
was in earnest, and itself became as instantly in earnest. The
sudden display of Northern rancor was no reaction; it was
no new fact; it revealed what was already historical, and had
been concealed only for purposes of policy-the distinct and
sharp antipathy between the two sections, of which war or
separation, at some time, was bound to be the logical conclusion.
The crusade against the South involved all parties,.and
united every interest in the North by the common bond of attachment to the Union. That attachment had its own reasons.
The idea of the restoration of the Union was conceived in no
historical enthusiasm for restoring past glories; it was animated by no patriotic desires contemplating the good of the
whole country; the South was to be "whipped back into the
Union," to gratify either the selfishness of the North, or its
worse lusts of revenge and fanaticism. The holiness of the
crusade against the South was preached alike from the hustings
and the pulpit. The Northern Democratic party, which had
so long professed regard for the rights of the Southern States,
and even sympathy with the first movements of their secession,
rivalled the Abolitionists in their expressions of fury and revenge; their leaders followed the tide of public opinion: Mr.
Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, who some months before
had declared in a public speech that if the seceded States were
"determined to separate, we had better part in peace," became
a rhetorical advocate of the war; Daniel S. Dickinson, of
New York, rivalled the Abolition leaders in his State in inflaming the public mind; and in the city of New York, where
but a few months before it had been. said that the Southern




58               THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
Confederacy would be able to recruit several regiments for its
military service, demagogues in the ranks of the "National
Democracy," such as John Cochrane, harangued the multitude, advising them to " crush the rebellion," and, if need be,
to drown the whole South in one indiscriminate sea of blood.
Old contentions and present animosities were forgotten; Democrats associated with recreants and fanatics in one grand
league for one grand purpose; foreigners from Europe were
induced into the belief that they were called upon to fight for
the " liberty" for which they had crossed the ocean, or for the
"free homesteads" which were to be the rewards of the war;
and all conceivable and reckless artifices were resorted to to
swell the tide of numbers against the South.  New England,
which had been too conscientious to defend the national honor
in the war with Great Britain, poured out almost her whole
population to aid in the extermination of a people who had
given to the nation all the military glory it had achieved.*
* In the war of 1812, the North furnished 58,552 soldiers; the South,
96,812-making a majority of 37,030 in favor of the South. Of the number
furnished by the NorthMassachusetts furnished........................... 3,110
New Hampshire  "............................ 897
Connecticut     "............................ 387
Rhode Island    "............................ 637
Vermont         "............................ 181
5,162
While the little State of South Carolina furnished 5,696.
In the Mexican war,
Massachusetts furnished............................1,047
New Hampshire  ".......................... 
The other New England States...................0,000
1,048
The whole number of troops contributed by the North to the Mexican war
was 23,054; while the South contributed 43,630, very nearly double, and, in
proportion to her population, four times as many soldiers as the North.
When a resolution was introduced into the Legislature of Massachusetts
tendering a vote of thinks to the heroic Lawrence for his capture of the Pea
cock, that pious State refused to adopt it, and declared —
" That in a war like the present, waged without justifiable cause, and prosecuted in a manner indicating that conquest and ambition are its real motives,
it is not becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of
military and naval exploits not directly connected with the defence of our seacoast and our soil."




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                   59
The effect of Mr. Lincoln's proclamation at the South was
no less decisive than at the North. It remains a problem,
which facts were never permitted to decide, but the solution of
which may at least be approached by the logical considerations
of history, to what extent the Border Slave States might have
been secured to the Union by the policy of peace, and the simple energy of patience on the part of the government at
Washington. As it was, the proclamation presented a new issue; it superseded that of the simple policy of secession; and
it inaugurated the second secessionary movement of the Southern States on a basis infinitely higher and firmer, in all its
moral and constitutional aspects, than that of the first movement of the Cotton States.
The proclamation was received at Montgomery with derisive
laughter; the newspapers were refreshed with the Lincolniana
of styling sovereign  States "unlawful combinations," and
warning a people standing on their own soil to return within
twenty days to their " homes;" and, in Virginia, the Secessionists were hugely delighted  at the strength Mr. Lincoln
had unwittingly or perversely contributed to their cause. One
after the other of the Border States refused the demands for
their quotas in terms of scorn and defiance. Governor Rector,
of Arkansas, repudiated the proclamation with an expression
of concentrated defiance; Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky,
replied, that that State would  "furnish  no troops for the
wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States;"
Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, telegraphed to Washington, " I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws'of
Subsequently the famous Hartford Convention was called. It assembled
in the city of Hartford, on the 15th of December, 1814, and remained in session twenty days. It made a report accompanied by a series of resolutions.
The following is a part of the report, as adopted:
"In cases of deliberate, dangerous, and palpable infractions of the Constitution, affecting the sovereignty of a State and the liberties of the people, it
is not only the right, but the duty, of each State to interpose its authority for their
protection in the manner best calculated to secure that end. When emergencies
occur which are either beyond the reach of judicial tribunals, or too pressing
to admit of the delay incident to their forms, States, which have no common
umpire, must be their oon judges and execute their own decisions."
This is the doctrine which the South had always held from the beginning,
and for which the South is now pouring out her blood and treasure




60            THE FIRST YEAR OF. THE WAR.
this country, and especially to this war which is being waged
upon a free and independent people;" Governor Jackson, of
Missouri, replied directly to Mr. Lincoln, "Your requisition,
in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary,
and, in its objects, inhuman and diabolical;" and even the
unspirited governor of Virginia, John Letcher, constrained by
the policy of the time-server to reflect the changes which had
become apparent to him in the uprising indignation of the
people, ventured upon a remonstrance to President Lincoln,
reminding him that his proclamation was "not within the
purview of the Constitution or the act of 1795." The only
Southern governor that signified any degree of submission to
the proclamation was the notorious Thomas Holladay Hicks,
of Maryland; he gave verbal assurances to Mr. Lincoln that.that State would supply her quota and give him military support; but, at the same time, with an art and effrontery that
only a demagogue could attain, he published a proclamation to
the people of Maryland, assuring them of his neutrality, and
promising that an opportunity would be given them, in the
election of congressmen, to determine, of their own free will,
whether they would sustain the old Union, or assist the Southern Confederacy.
On the 17th day of April, the Virginia Convention passed
an ordinance of secession. It was an important era in the
history of the times. It gave the eighth State to the Southern
Confederacy. The position of Virginia was a commanding
one with the other Border States; she started, by her act of
secession, the second important movement of the revolution;
and she added to the moral influence of the event by the fact,
that she had not seceded on an issue of policy, but on one of
distinct and practical constitutional right, and that too in the
face of a war, which had become absolutely inevitable and was
frowning upon her own borders.
Virginia had been chided for her delay in following the
Cotton States out of the Union, and, on the other hand, when
she did secede, she was charged by the Northern politicians
with being inconsistent and having kept bad faith in her relations with the Federal government. Both complaints were
equally without foundation. The record of the State was
singularly explicit and clear.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             61
The Virginia Resolutions of'98 and'99 had for sixty years
constituted the text-book of the State Rights politicians of the
South. The doctrine of State sovereignty was therein vindicated and maintained, and the right and duty of States, suffering grievances from unjust and unconstitutional Federal
legislation, to judge of the wrongs, as well as of c" the mode
and measure of redress," were made clear. The Virginia platform, as thus laid down in the elder Adams' time, was adopted
by the "Strict Constructionist" party of that day, and has
been reasserted ever since. Mr. Jefferson, the founder of the
Democratic party in this country, was elected upon this platform, and his State Rights successors all acknowledged its
orthodoxy. Whenever there arose a conflict between Federal
and State authority, the voice of Virginia was the first to be
heard in behalf of State Rights. In 1832-33, when the Tariff
and Nullification controversy arose, Virginia, though not
agreeing with South Carolina as to the particular remedy to
which she resorted, yet assured that gallant State of her sympathy, and, at the same time, reasserted her old doctrines of
State Rights. Her gallant and patriotic governor, John Floyd,
the elder, declared that Federal troops should not pass the
banks of the Potomac to coerce South Carolina into obedience
to the tariff laws, unless over his dead body. Her Legislature
was almost unanimously opposed to the coercion policy, and a
majority of that body indicated their recognition of the right
of a State to secede from the Union. The voice of Virginia
was potential in settling this controversy upon conditions to
which the Palmetto State could agree with both honor and
consistency. At every stage of the agitation of the slavery
question in Congress and in the Northern States, Virginia
declared her sentiments and her purposes in a manner not to
be misunderstood by friend or foe. Again and again did she
enter upon her legislative records, in ineffable characters, the
declaration that she would resist the aggressive spirit of the
Northern majority, even to the disruption of the ties that
bound her to the Union.
With almost entire unanimity, Virginia had resolved in
legislative council, in 1848, that she would not submit to the
passage of the Wilmot proviso, or any kindred measure. From
the date of the organization of the Anti-Slavery party, her




62              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
people, of all parties, had declared that the election of an
Abolitionist to the Presidency would be a virtual declaration
of war against the South on the part of the North, and that
Virginia and every other Slave State ought to resist it as such.
The Legislature that assembled a few weeks after Lincoln's
election declared in effect, with only four dissenting voices,
that the interests of Virginia were thoroughly identified with
those of the other Southern States, and that any intimation,
from any source, that her people were looking to any combination in the last resort other than union with them, was unpatriotic and treasonable.
The sovereign Convention of Virginia, elected on the 4th of
February, 1861, for a long time lingered in the hope that the
breach that had taken place in the Union might be repaired
by new constitutional guaranties. Nevertheless, that body,
before it had yet determined to pass an ordinance of secession
-while it was, in fact, hopeful that the Union would be saved
through the returning sanity of the Northern people-adopted
unanimously the following resolution:
" The people of Virginia recognize the American principle, that government
is founded in the consent of the governed, and the right of the people of the
several States of this Union, for just cause, to withdraw from their association under the Federal government, with the people of the other States,
and to erect new governments for their better security; and they never
will consent that the Federal power, which is, in part, their power, shall be
exerted for the purpose of subjugating the people of such States to the Federal
authority."
The entire antecedents of Virginia were known to Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet. They knew that she was solemnly
pledged, at whatever cost, to separate from the Union in the
very contingency they had brought about-namely, the attempt to subjugate her sister States of the South. They knew
that the original " Union men," as well as the original Secessionists, were committed beyond the possibility of recantation
to resistance to the death of any and every coercive measure of
the Federal government. Nevertheless, Mr. Lincoln and his
advisers had the temerity to make a call upon the State of
Virginia to furnish her quota of seventy-five thousand men to
subjugate the seceded States. They had but little right to be
surprised at the course taken by the State, and still less to
charge it with inconsistency or perfidy.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            63
It was expected that Maryland might follow the heroic
course of Virginia, and but two days after the secession of the
latter State, there were indications in Maryland of a spirit of
emulation of the daring and adventurous deeds that had been
enacted South of the Potomac. On the 19th of April the
passage of Northern volunteers, on their way to Washington,
was intercepted and assailed by the citizens of Baltimore, and
for more than two weeks the route through that city was effectually closed to Mr. Lincoln's mercenaries. The Baltimore
" riot," as it was called, was one of the most remarkable collisions of the times. A number of Massachusetts volunteers,
passing through Baltimore in horse cars, found the track barricaded near one of the docks by stones, sand, and old anchors
thrown upon it, and were compelled to attempt the passage to
the depot, at the other end of the city, on foot. They had not
advanced fifteen paces after leaving the cars when they found
their passage blocked by a crowd of excited citizens, who
taunted them as mercenaries, and flouted a Southern flag at
the head of their column. Stones were thrown by a portion of
the crowd, when the troops presented arms and fired. The
crowd was converted into an infuriated mob; the fire was returned from a number of revolvers; the soldiers were attacked
with sticks, stones, and every conceivable weapon, and in more
than one instance their muskets were actually wrung from
their hands by desperate and unarmed men. Unable to withstand the gathering crowd, and bewildered by their mode of
attack, the troops pressed along the street confused and staggering, breaking into a run whenever there was an opportunity
to do so, and turning at intervals to fire upon the citizens who
pursued them. As they reached the depot they found a crowd
already collected there and gathering from every point in the
city. The other troops of the Massachusetts regiment who had
preceded them in the horse cars had been pursued by the
people along the route, and the soldiers did not hesitate to
stretch themselves at full length on the floors of the cars, to
avoid the missiles thrown through the windows. The scene
that ensued at the depot was terrific. Taunts, clothed in the
most fearful language, were hurled at the troops by the panting
crowd who, almost breathless with running, pressed up to the
windows, presenting knives and revolvers, and cursing up in




64            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
the faces of the soldiers. A wild cry was raised on the platform, and a dense crowd rushed out, spreading itself along the
railroad track, until for a mile it was black with the excited,
rushing mass. The crowd, as they went, filled the track with
obstructions; the police who, throughout the whole affair, had
contended for order with the most devoted courage, followed
in full run removing the obstructions; as far as the eye could
reach the track was crowded with the pursuers and pursued, a
struggling and shouting mass of human beings. In the midst
of the excitement the train moved off; and as it passed from
the depot a dozen muskets were fired by the soldiers into the
people that lined the track, the volley killing an estimable
citizen who had been drawn to the spot only as a spectator.
The results of the riot were serious enough: two of the soldiers
were shot; several of the citizens had been killed, and more
than twenty variously wounded.
The excitement in Baltimore continued for weeks; the
bridges on the railroad to the Susquehanna were destroyed;
the regular route of travel broken up, and some twenty or
twenty-five thousand Northern volunteers, on their way to
Washington, detained at Havre de Grace, a portion of them
only managing to reach their destination by the way of Annapolis. On the night of the day of the riot, a mass-meeting was
held in Monument Square, and was addressed by urgent appeals for the secession of Maryland, and speeches of defiance
to the Lincoln government. Governor Hicks, alarmed by the
display of public sentiment, affected to yield to it. He addressed the crowd in person, condemning the coercive policy
of the government; and ending with the fervid declaration, " I
will suffer my right arm to be-torn from my body before I will
raise it to strike a sister State." The same man, in less than a
month thereafter, when Maryland had fallen within the grasp
of the Federal government, did not hesitate to make a call
upon the people for four regiments of volunteers to assist that
government in its then fully declared policy of a war of invasion and fell destruction upon the South.
In the city of St. Louis there were collisions between the
citizens and soldiery as well as in Baltimore; but in Missouri
the indications of sympathy with the South did not subside, or
allow themselves to be cooked by spectral fears of the " crucial




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            65
experiment of secession" —they grew and strengthened in the
face of all the Federal power could do.
The riots in Maryland and Missouri were, however, only incidents in the history of the period in which they occurred.
That history is occupied with far more important and general
events, indicating the increased and rapid preparations, North
and South, for war; the collection of resources, and the policy
and spirit in which the gathering contest was to be conducted.
Mr. Lincoln had, on the 19th of April, published his proclamation, declaring the ports of the Southern Confederacy in
a state of blockade, and denouncing any molestation of Federal
vessels on the high seas as piracy. The Provisional Congress
at Montgomery had formerly recognized the existence of war
with the North, and letters of marque had been issued by the
Confederate authority. The theatre of the war on land was
indicated in Virginia. General Lee, who had resigned a commission as colonel of cavalry in the old United States army,
was put in command of all the Confederate States forces in
Virginia.
That State was the particular object of the rancor of the
government at Washington, which proceeded to inaugurate
hostilities on her territory by two acts of ruthless vandalism.
On the 19th day of April the Federals evacuated Harper's
Ferry, after an attempt to destroy the buildings and machineshops there, which only partially succeeded-the armory buildings being destroyed, but a train to blow up the machineshop failed, and a large quantity of valuable machinery was
uninjured. On the succeeding day, preparations were made
for the destruction of the Navy Yard at Norfolk, while.Federal
reinforcements were thrown into Fortress Monroe. The work
of vandalism was not as fully completed as the enemy had designed, the dry-dock, which alone cost several millions of dollars, being but little damaged; but the destruction of property
was immense, and attended by a terrible conflagration, which
at one time threatened the city of Norfolk.
All the ships in the harbor, excepting the old frigate the
United States, were set fire to and scuttled. They were the
Pennsylvania, the Columbus and Delaware, the steam-frigate
Merrimac (she was onlTy partially destroyed), the sloops Germantown and Plymouth, the frigates Raritan and Columbia,
5




66            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
and the brig Dolphin. The Germantown was lying at the
wharf under a large pair of shears, which were thrown across
her decks by cutting loose the guys. The ship was nearly cut
in two and sunk at the wharf. About midnight an alarmn was
given that the Navy Yard was on fire. A sickly blaze, that
seemed neither to diminish nor increase, continued for several
hours. Men were kept busy all night transferring every thing
of value from the Pennsylvania and Navy Yard to the Pawnee
and Cumberland, and both vessels were loaded to their lower
ports. At length four o'clock came, and with it flood-tide.
A rocket shot up from the Pawnee, and then, almost in an instant, the whole front of the Navy Yard seemed one vast
sheet of flame. The next minute streaks of flame flashed
along the rigging of the Pennsylvania and the other doomed
ships, and soon they were completely wrapped in the devouring
element. The harbor was now one blaze of light. The iemotest objects were distinctly visible.  The surging flames
leaped and roared with mad violence, making their hoarse
wrath heard at the distance of several miles. The people of
HIampton, even those who lived beyond, saw the red light,
and thought all Norfolk was on fire. It was certainly a grand
though terrible spectacle to witness. In the midst of the
brilliance of the scene, the Pawnee with the Cumberland in
tow, stole like a guilty thing through the harbor, fleeing from
the destruction they had been sent to accomplish.
The Lincoln government had reason to be exasperated towards Virginia. The second secessionary movement, commenced by that State, added three other States to the Southern
Confederacy. Tennessee seceded from the Union, the 6th of
May; on the 18th day of May, the State of Arkansas was
formally admitted into the Southern Confederacy; and on the
21st of the same month, the sovereign Convention of North
Carolina, without delay, and by a unanimous vote, passed an
ordinance of secession.
The spirit of the rival governments gave indications to discerning minds of a civil war of gigantic proportions, infinite
consequences, and indefinite duration. In every portion of the
South, the most patriotic devotion was exhibited. Transportation companies freely tendered the use of their lines for transportation and supplies. The presidents of the Southern rail



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            67
roads consented not only to reduce their rates for mail service and conveyance for troops and munitions of war, but voluntarily proffered to take their compensation in bonds of the
Confederacy, for the purpose of leaving all the resources of
the government at its disposal for the common defense. Under the act of the Provisional Congress authorizing a loan, proposals issued for the subscription of five millions of dollars
were answered by the prompt subscription of more than eight
millions by its own citizens; and not a bid was made under
par. Requisitions for troops were met with such alacrity that
the number in every instance, tendering their services, exceeded the demand. Under the bill for public defence, one
hundred thousand volunteers were authorized to be accepted
by the Confederate States government for a twelve months'
term of service. The gravity of age and the zeal of youth rivalled each other to be foremost in the public service; every
village bristled with bayonets; large forces were put in the
field at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St.
Philip, and Pulaski; while formidable numbers from all parts
of the Confederacy were gathered in Virginia, on what was
now becoming the immediate theatre of the war. On the 20th
day of May, the seat of government was removed from Montgomery, Alabama, to Richmond, Virginia, and President
Davis was welcomed in the latter city with a burst of genuine
joy and enthusiasm, to which none of the military pageants of
the North could furnish a parallel.
It had been supposed that the Southern people, poor in manufactures as they were, and in the haste of preparation for the
mighty contest that was to ensue, would find themselves but
illy provided with arms to contend with an enemy rich in the
means and munitions of war. This disadvantage had been
provided against by the timely act of one man. Mr. Floyd,
of Virginia, when Secretary of War under Mr. Buchanan's
administration, had by a single order effected the transfer of
115,000 improved muskets and rifles from the Springfield armory and Watervliet arsenal to different arsenals at the South.
Adding to these the number of arms distributed by the Federal government to the States in preceding years of our history,
and those purchased by the States and citizens, it was safely
estimated that the South entered upon the war with one hun



68            TIlE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
dred and fifty thousand small-arms of the most approved
modern pattern and the best in the world.
The government at Washington rapidly collected in that city
a vast and motley army. Baltimore had been subdued; the
route through it was restored; and such were the facilities of
Northern transportation, that it was estimated that not less
than four or five thousand volunteers were transported through
the former Thermopylae of Baltimore in a single day. The
first evidences of the despotic purposes of the Lincoln government were exhibited in Maryland, and the characteristics of
the war that it had commenced on the South were first displayed in the crushing weight of tyranny and oppression it
laid upon a State which submitted before it was conquered.
The Legislature of Maryland did nothing practical. It was
unable to arm the State, and it made no attempt to improve
the spirit of the people, or to make preparations for any future
opportunity of action. It assented to the attitude of submission indefinitely. It passed resolutions protesting against the
military occupation of the State by the Federal government,
and indicating sympathy with the South, but concluding with
the declaration: "' under existing circumstances; it is inexpedient to call a sovereign Convention of the State at this time,
or take any measures for the immediate organization or arming
of the militia." The government of Abraham Lincoln was not
a government to spare submission or to be moved to magnanimity. by the helplessness of a supposed enemy. The submission of Maryland was the signal for its persecution. By the
middle of May, her territory was occupied by thirty thousand
Federal troops; her quota of troops to the war was demanded
at Washington, and was urged by a requisition of her obsequious governor; the city of Baltimore was invested by General
Butler of Massachusetts, houses and stores searched for concealed arms, and the liberties of the people violated, with every
possible addition of mortification and insult.
In a few weeks the rapid and aggravated progression of acts
of despotism on the part of the Lincoln government reached
its height in Maryland. The authority of the mayor and police board of the city of Baltimore was superseded, and their
persons seized and imprisoned in a military fortress; the writ
of ]habeas co7tus was suspended by the single and unconstitu



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.              69
tional authority of the President; the houses of suspected
citizens were searched, and they themselves arrested by military force, in jurisdictions where the Federal courts were in
uninterrupted operation; blank warrants were issued for domiciliary visits; and the sanctity of private correspondence was
violated by seizing the dispatches preserved for years in the
telegraph offices of the North, and making them the subject of
inquisition for the purpose of discovering and punishing as
traitors men who had dared to reproach the Northern government for an unnatural war, or had not sympathized with its
rancor and excesses.
Such was the inauguration of "the strong government" of
Abraham Lincoln in Maryland, and the repetition of its acts
was threatened upon the "' rebel" States of the South, with the
addition that their cities were to be laid in ashes, their soil
sown with blood, the slaves freed and carried in battalions
against their masters, and "'the rebels" doomed, after their
subjection, to return home to find their wives and children in
rags, and gaunt Famine sitting at their firesides.




70                THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
CHAPTER III.
Confidence of the North.-Characteristic Boasts.-" Crushing out the Rebellion."Volunteering in the Northern Cities.-The New York " Invincibles."-Misrepresentations of the Government at Washington.-Mr. Seward's Letter to the French Government.-Another Call for Federal Volunteers.-Opening Movements of the Campaign.-'The Federal Occupation of Alexandria.-Death of Col. Ellsworth.-Fortress Monroe.The BATTLE OF BETHEL.-Results of this Battle.-Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.-The Upper
Potomac. —Evacuation and Destruction of Harper's Ferry.-The Movements in the
Upper Portion of the Valley of Virginia.-Northwestern Virginia.-The BATTLB OF
RICH MOUNTAIN.-Carrock's Ford.-The Retreat of the Confederates.-General McClellan.-Meeting of the Federal Congress.-Mr. Lincoln's Message.-Kentucky.Western Virginia.-Large Requisitions for Men and Money by the Federal Government.-Its Financial Condition.-Financial Measures of the Southern Confederacy.Contrast between the Ideas of the Rival Governments.-Conservatism of the Southern
Revolution.-Despotic Excesses of the Government at Washington.
NOTHING could exceed the boastful and unlimited expressions
of confidence on the part of the Northern people, in the speedy
" crushing out of the rebellion," and of contempt for the means
and resources of the South to carry on any thing like a formidable war. In the light of subsequent events, these expressions
and vaunts give a grotesque illustration of the ideas with which
the Northern people entered upon the war.
The New York people derided the rebellion.  The T'ribune
declared that it was nothing " more or less than the natural
recourse of all mean-spirited and defeated tyrannies to rule or
ruin, making, of course, a wide distinction between the will
and power, for the hanging of traitors is sure to begin before
one month is over." " The nations of Europe," it continued,
"' may rest assured that Jeff. Davis &  Co. will be swinging
from the battlements at Washington, at least, by the 4th of
July. We spit upon a later and longer deferred justice."
The New  York Ti'mes gave its opinion  in the following
vigorous and  confident spirit: "Let us make quick work.
The'rebellion,' as some people designate it, is an unborn tadpole. Let us not fall into the delusion, noted by Hallam, of
mistaking a'local commotion' for a revolution.  A strong
active'pull together' will do our work effectually in thirty
days.  We have only to send a column of 25,000 men across




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            71
the Potomac to Richmond, and burn out the rats there; another
column of 25,000 to Cairo, seizing the cotton ports of the Mississippi; and retaining the remaining 25,000, included in Mr.
Lincoln's call for 75,000 men, at Washington, not because there
is need for them there, but because we do not require their
services elsewhere."
The Philadelphia Press declared that "no man of sense
could, for a moment, doubt that this much-ado-about-nothing
would end in a month." The Northern people were "simply
invincible." "The rebels," it prophesied, "a mere band of
ragamuffins, will fly, like chaff before the wind, on our approach."
The West was as violent as the North or the East. In the
States of Iowa and Wisconsin, among the infidel Dutch, no
rein was drawn upon the wild fanaticism. In Illinois, too,
there was a fever of morbid violence. The Chicago Tribune
insisted on its demand that the West be allowed to fight the
battle through, since she was probably the most interested in
the suppression of the rebellion and the free navigation of the
Mississippi. "Let the East," demanded this valorous sheet,
"get out of the way; this is a war of the West. We can fight
the battle, and successfully, within two or three months at the
furthest. Illinois can whip the South by herself. We insist
on the matter being turned over to us."
The Cincinnati Commercial, in commenting upon the claims
of the West, remarked that " the West ought to be made the
vanguard of the war" —and proceeded: "We are akin, by
trade and geography, with Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri,
and in sentiment to the noble Union patriots who have a majority of three to one in all these States. An Ohio army would
be received with joy in Nashville, and welcomed in a speech
of congratulation by Andrew Johnson. Crittenden and Frank
Blair are keeping Kentucky and Missouri all right. The rebellion will be crushed out before the assemblage of Congress
-no doubt of it."
Not a paper of influence in the North, at that time,
had the remotest idea of the conflict; not a journalist who
rose to the emergencies of the occasion-all was passion, rant,
and bombast.
In the Northern cities, going to the war for " three months,"




72            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
the term of the enlistment of volunteers, was looked upon
almost as a holiday recreation. In New York and Philadelphia, the recruiting offices were besieged by firemen, rowdies,
and men fished from the purlieus of vice, and every sink of
degradation. There appeared to be no serious realization of
the war. If a man ventured the opinion that a hundred
thousand Southern troops might be gathered in Virginia, he
was laughed at, or answered with stories about the Adirondack
sharpshooters and the New York " roughs."  The newspapers
declared that the most terrible and invincible army that ever
enacted deeds of war might be gathered from the " roughs"
of the Northern cities. Nothing could compete with their
desperate courage, and nothing could withstand their furious
onslaught. A regiment of firemen and congenial spirits was
raised in New York, and put under command of Colonel Ellsworth, of Chicago, a youth, who had some time ago exhibited
through the country a company of young men drilled in the
manual and exercises of the French Zouaves, who had made
himself a favorite with the ladies at the Astor House and
Willard's Hotel, by his long hair, gymnastic grace, and red
uniform, and who boasted of a great deal of political influence
as the pet and protege of President Lincoln. To the standard
of this young man, and also to that of a notorious bully and
marauder, by the name of Billy Wilson, flocked all the vagrant
and unruly classes of the great and vicious metropolis of New
York. The latter boasted, that when his regiment was moved
off, it would be found that not a thief, highwayman, or pickpocket would be left in the city. The people of New York
and Washington were strangely enraptured with the spectacle
of these terrible and ruthless crusaders, who were to strike
terror to the hearts of the Southern people. Anecdotes of
their rude and desperate disposition, their brutal speeches and
their exploits of rowdyism, were told with glee and devoured
with unnatural satisfaction. In Washington, people were delighted by anecdotes that Ellsworth's Zouaves made a practice
of knocking their officers down; that their usual address to the
sentinels was, "Say, fellow, I am agoin' to leave this ranch;"
that on rainy days they seized umbrellas from citizens on the
streets, and knocked themn in the gutter if they remonstrated;
that, "in the most entire good humor," they levied contribu



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            73
tions of boots, shoes, liquors, and cigars on tradesmen; and
that the " gallant little colonel," who controlled these unruly
spirits, habitually wore a bowie knife two feet long. These
freaks and eccentricities were not only excusable, they were
admirable: the untamed courage of the New York firemen
and rowdies, said the people, were to be so useful and conspicuous in the war; and the prophecy was, that these men,
so troublesome and belligerent towards quiet citizens who came
in contact with them, would be the first to win honorable
laurels on the field of combat.
"Billy Wilson's" regiment was held up for a long time in
New York as an inimitable scarecrow to the South. The
regiment was displayed on every occasion; it was frequently
marched up Broadway to pay visits to the principal hotels.
On one of these occasions, it was related that Billy Wilson
marched the companies into the hall and spacious bar-room of
the hotel, and issued the order " Attention." Attention was
paid, and the bystanders preserved silence. "Kneel down,"
shouted the colonel.  The men dropped upon their knees.
" You do solemnly swear to cut off the head of every d    d
Secessionist you meet during the war." " We swear," was the
universal response. "The gallant souls," said a New York
paper, " then returned in good order to their quarters."
The newspaper extracts and incidents given above afford
no little illustration of the spirit in which the North entered
upon the war, and, in this connection, belong to the faithful
history of the times. That spirit was not only trivial and
utterly beneath the dignity of the contest upon which the
North was to enter; it betrayed a fierceness and venom, the
monstrous developments of which were reserved for a period
later in the progress of events.
What was partly ignorance and partly affectation on the
part of the Northern press and people, in their light estimation of the war, was wholly affectation on the part of the intelligent and better informed authorities at Washington. The
government had a particular object in essaying to represent
the Southern revolution as nothing more than a local mutiny.
The necessity was plain for balking any thing like a European
recognition of the Southern Confederacy, and Mr. Seward was
prompt to rank the rebellion as a local and disorganized insur



)74           THE FIRST YEAR OF TIHE WAR.
rection, amounting to nothing more than a passing and incidental "change" in the history of the Union. At the time
that all the resources of the government were put out to encounter the gathering armies of the South, already within a
few miles of the capital, Mr. Seward, in a letter of instructions
to Mr. Dayton, the recently appointed minister to France,
dated the 4th of May, urged him to assure that government
of the fact that an idea of a permanent disruption of the
Union was absurd; that the continuance of the Union was
certain, and that too as an object of "Ifqection!" He wrote:
"The thought of a dissolution of this Union, peaceably or by
force, has never entered into the mind of any candid statesman here, and it is high time that it be dismissed by the
statesmen in Europe."
The government at Washington evidently showed, by its
preparations, that it was secretly conscious of the resources
and determined purposes of the revolution. Another proclamation for still further increasing his military forces had been
made by Mr. Lincoln on the third of May. He called for fortyodd thousand additional volunteers to enlist for the war, and
eighteen thousand seamen, besides increasing the regular army
by the addition of ten regiments. It is curious that these immense preparations should have attracted such little notice
from the Northern public. The people and soldiers appeared
to be alike hilarious and confident in the prospect of a " short,
sharp, and decisive" war, that was to restore the Union, open
the doors of the treasury, give promotion and fame to those
desirous of gain in those particulars, and afford new opportunities to adventurers of all classes.
The first and opening movements of the Northern campaign
were decided to be a forward movement from the Potomac
along the Orange and Alexandria and Central roads towards
Richmond, while another invading army might be thrown into
the Valley of Virginia from Pennsylvania and Maryland.
The first step of the invasion of Virginia was the occupation of Alexandria, which was accomplished on the 24th of
May, by throwing some eight thousand Federal troops across
the Potomac, the Virginia forces evacuating the town and falling back to the Manassas Junction, where General Bonham, of
South Carolina, was in command of the Confederate forces.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            75
The invasion was accomplished under cover of the night, and
with such secrecy and dispatch, that a number of Virginia
cavalry troops were found, unconscious of danger, at their
quarters, and were taken prisoners.
The Federal occupation of the town was attended by a dra
matic incident, the heroism and chivalry of which gave a
remarkable lesson to the invader of the spirit that was to
oppose his progress on the soil of Virginia. In the gray of
the morning, Col. Ellsworth, who, with his Fire Zonaves, had
entered the town, observed a Confederate flag floating from
the top of an hotel called the Marshall House, and attended by
a squad of his men, determined to secure it as his prize. He
found his way into the hotel, ascended the stairs, and climbed,
by a ladder, to the top of the house, where he secured the
obnoxious ensign. As he was descending from the trap-door,
with the flag on his arm, he was confronted by Mr. Jackson,
the proprietor of the hotel, who, aroused from his bed by the
unusual noise, half dressed and in his shirt-sleeves, with a
double-barrel gun in his hands, faced Ellsworth and his four
companions with a quiet and settled determination. "This is
my trophy," said the Federal commander, pointing to the flag.
" And you are mine," responded the Virginian, as, with a quick
aim he discharged his gun full into the breast of Colonel
Ellsworth, and the next instant sank by his side a breathless
corpse, from a bullet, sped through the brain, and a bayonetthrust at the hands of one of the soldiers.
The slayer of Colonel Ellsworth was branded, in the North,
as an "assassin." The justice of history does not permit such
a term to be applied to a man who defended his country's flag
and the integrity of his home with his life, distinctly and fear.
lessly offered up to such objects of honor: it gives him the
name which the Southern people hastened to bestow upon the
memory of the heroic Jackson-that of " martyr."  The character of this man is said to have been full of traits of rude,
native chivalry. He was captain of an artillery company in
his town. He was known to his neighbors as a person who
united a dauntless and unyielding courage with the most generous impulses. A week before his death a " Union" man
from Washingtofn had been seized in the streets of Alexandria,
and a crowd threatened to shoot or hang him, when Jackson




76            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
went to his rescue, threatened to kill any man who would
molest him, and saved him from the vengeance of the mob.
A day before the Federal occupation of the town, in a conversation in which some such movement was conjectured, his
neighbors remonstrated with him about the danger of making
his house a sign for the enemy's attack, by the flag which
floated over it. He replied that he would sacrifice his life in
keeping the flag flying-and by daybreak the next day the
oath was fulfilled. He laid down his life, not in the excitement of passion, but coolly and deliberately, upon a principle,
and as an example in defending the sacred rights of his home
and the flag of his country. This noble act of heroism did not
fail to move the hearts of the generous people of the South; a
monument was proposed to the memory of the only hero of
Alexandria; the dramatic story, and the patriotic example of
"the martyr Jackson," were not lost sight of in the stormy
excitements of the war that swept out of the mind so many
incidents of its early history; and in most of the cities of the
South practical evidences of regard were given in large, voluntary subscriptions to his bereaved family.
The Federal forces were not met in Alexandria with any of
those demonstrations of "Union" sentiment which they had
been induced, by the misrepresentations of the Northern press,
to expect would hail the vanguard of their invasion of the
South. The shouts and yells of the invaders fell upon the ears
of a sullen people, who shut themselves up in their houses, as
much to avoid the grating exultations of their enemies as contact with the rowdyism and riot that had taken possession of
the streets. On coming into the town, the New York troops,
particularly the Fire Zouaves, ran all over the city with their
usual cry of "Hi," "Hi."  Citizens closed their doors, and
as the news of the tragedy at the Marshall House spread over
the town, it assumed an aspect like that of the Sabbath.
About the wharves and warehouses, where hitherto the life and
excitement of the town had been concentrated, the silence was
absolutely oppressive; and the only people to be seen were
numbers of negroes, who stood about the wharves and on the
street corners with frightened faces, talking in low tones to
each other.
With Alexandria and Fortress Monroe in its possession, the




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           77
Federal Government held the most important passages into
Virginia. General McDowell was charged with the command
of the division of the forces thrown across the Potomac. General Butler was placed in command at Fortress Monroe. The
town of Hampton was occupied by the Federal troops, and
Newport News, at the mouth of the James River, invested by
them. At Sewell's Point, some eight or ten miles distant on
the other side, the Confederates had erected a powerful battery,
which had proved its efficiency and strength by resisting an
attack made upon it on the 19th of May, and continued for
two days, by the Federal steamer Monticello, aided by the
Minnesota.
The first serious contest of the war was to occur in the low
country of Virginia. On the 10th of June the battle of
Bethel was fought.
THE BATTLE OF BETHEL.
The Confederates, to the number of about eighteen hundred,
under Colonel J. Bankhead Magruder, were intrenched at
Great Bethel church, which was about nine miles on the road
leading south from Hampton. A Federal force exceeding four
thousand men, under General Pierce-a Massachusetts officer
who was never afterwards heard of in the war-was moved
towards Bethel in two separate bodies, a portion landing on the
extreme side of the creek, some distance below, while the rest
proceeded across the creek. The landing of the latter was
effected without opposition, and presently the Federal troops,
who had marched up from below, closed in on the Confederates
almost simultaneously with those attacking their front.
The attack was received by a battery of the Richmond
Howitzers, under command of Major Randolph; the action
being commenced by a shot from the Parrott gun in our main
battery aimed by himself. One of the guns of the battery
being spiked by the breaking of a priming wire in the vent,
the infantry supports were withdrawn, and the work was occupied for a moment by the enemy. Captain Bridges, of the
1st North Carolina regiment, was ordered to retake it. The
charge of the North Carolina infantry, on this occasion, was
the most brilliant incident of the day. They advanced calmly




t'8            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
and coolly in the face of a sheet of artillery fire, and when
within sixty yards of the enemy dashed on at the double quick.
The Federals fell back in dismay.
The enemy continued to fire briskly, but wildly, with his artillery. At no time, during the artillery engagement, could
the Confederates see the bodies of the men in the column of
attack, and their fire was directed by the bayonets of the enemy. The position of the enemy was obscured by the shade
of the woods on their right and two small houses on their left.
The fire of the Confederates was returned by a battery near
the head of the enemy's column, but concealed by the woods
and the houses so effectually that the Confederates only ascertained its position by the flash of the pieces.
The earthworks were struck several times by the shots of the
Federals. They fired upon us with shot, shell, spherical case,
canister, and grape, from six and twelve pounders, at a distance
of six hundred yards. The only injury received from their
artillery was the loss of a mule. The fire on our part was
deliberate, and was suspended whenever masses of the enemy
were not within range. From 9 o'clock A. M. until 1:30 P. M.
but ninety-eight shot were fired by us, every one of them with
deliberation.
After some intermission of the assault in front, a heavy column, apparently a reinforcement or a reserve, made its appearance on the Hampton road and pressed forward towards the
bridge, carrying the United States flag at its head. This column was under command of Major Winthrop, aid to General
Butler. Those in advance had put on the distinctive badge of
the Confederates-a white band around the cap. They cried
out repeatedly, " don't fire." Having crossed the creek, they
began to cheer most lustily, thinking that our work was open
at the gorge, and that they might get in by a sudden rush.
The North Carolina infantry, however, dispelled this illusion.
Their firing was as cool as that of veterans; the only difficulty
being the anxiety of the riflemen to pick off the foe, the men
repeatedly calling to their officers, " May I fire? I think I can
bring him."
As the enemy fell back in disorder and his final rout commenced, the bullet of a North Carolina rifleman pierced the
breast of the brave Federal officer Major Winthrop, who had




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            79
made himself a conspicuous mark by his gallantry on the field.
"He was," says Colonel Hill, of the North Carolina regiment,
in his official report of the action, "the only one of the enemy
who exhibited even an approximation to courage during the
whole day." The fact was, that he had fallen in circumstances
of great gallantry. He was shot while standing on a log,
waving his sword and vainly attempting to rally his men to
the charge. His enemy did honor to his memory; and the
Southern people, who had been unable to appreciate the courage of Ellsworth, and turned with disgust from his apotheosis
in the North, did not fail to pay the tribute due a truly brave
man to the gallant Winthrop, who, having simply died on the
battle-field, without the sensational circumstances of a private
brawl or a bully's adventure, was soon forgotten in the North.
During the fight at the angle of our works, a small wooden
house in front was thought to give protection to the enemy.
Four privates in the North Carolina regiment volunteered to
advance beyond our lines and set it on fire. One of them, a
youth named Henry L. Wyatt, advanced ahead of his companions, and, as he passed between the two fires, he fell pierced
by a musket-ball in the forehead, within thirty yards of the
house..This was our only loss in killed during the entire engagement.
The results of the battle of Bethel were generally magnified
in the South. It is true that a Confederate force of some
eighteen hundred men, in a contest of several hours with an
enemy more than twice their numbers, had repulsed them;
that the entire loss of the former was only one man killed and
seven wounded, while that of the enemy, by their own acknowledgment, was thirty killed and more than one hundred
wounded. The fact, however, was, that our troops had fought
under the impenetrable cover of their batteries, the only instance of exposure being that of the North Carolina infantry,
who, by their charge on the redoubt taken by the enemy early
in the action, contributed, most of all, to the success and glory
of the day. The battle had been the result of scarcely any
thing more than a reconnoissance; it was by no means to be
ranked as a decisive engagement, and yet it was certainly a
serious and well-timed check to the foe.
In one respect, however, the result was not magnified, and




80               THE FIRST YEAR OF TEE WAR.
that was in its contribution of confidence and ardor to the
South. Thus regarded, it' was an important event, and its
effects of the happiest kind. The victory was achieved at a
time when the public mind was distressed and anxious on account of the constant backward movements of our forces in
Virginia, and the oft-recurring story of "surprise" and consequent disaster to our troops in the neighborhood of the enemy's lines.  The surrender of Alexandria, the surprise and
dispersion of a camp at Philippi by a body of Federal troops,*
* The disaster at Philippi was inconsiderable; but it was the subject of
some recrimination at the time, and Colonel Porterfield, the Confederate commander, was subjected to a court-martial, which, in the main, exonerated him,
and complimented him for his courage. Colonel Porterfield had been ordered
to Grafton about the middle of May, 1861, with written instructions from
General Lee to call for volunteers from that part of the State, and receive
them into the service, to the number of five thousand; and to co-operate with
the agents of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad; and with verbal orders to try
to conciliate the people of that section, and to do nothing to offend them.
Finding, soon after his arrival, that the country was in a state of revolution,
and that there was a large and increasing Federal force at Camp Denison, in
Ohio, opposite Parkersburg, and another in the vicinity of Wheeling, Colonel
Porterfield wrote to the commanding general, that unless a strong force was
sent very soon, Northwestern Virginia would be overrun.
Upon directing the captains of organized volunteer companies to proceed
with their companies to Grafton, they replied that not more than twenty in
companies numbering sixty were willing to take up arms on the side of the
State; that the others diclared, if they were compelled to fight, it would be
in defence of the Union. Colonel Porterfield succeeded in a week in getting
together three newly-organized companies. This force was increased by the
arrival of several other companies, two of which were unarmed cavalry companies-amounting in all to about 500 infantry and 150 cavalry. These
troops had been at Grafton but a few days, when, or about the 25th of May,
Colonel Porterfield was reliably informed of the force of the enemy and withdrew his command to Philippi. Orders were given for the destruction of the
Cheat bridge, but were not executed. The enemy's force at Grafton was
about eight thousand men. On the 3d of June, through the failure of the
guard or infantry pickets to give the alarm, the command at Philippi was
surprised by about five thousand infantry and a battery of artillery, and dispersed in great confusion, but with inconsiderable loss of life, through the
woods. The command had no equipments and very little ammunition. Such
was the inauguration of the improvident and unfortunate campaign in Western Virginia.
General Garnett succeeded Colonel Porterfield in the command in Northwestern Virginia, with a much larger force (about six thousand men), but
one obviously inadequate, considering the extent of the district it was expected to defend, the hostile character of the country, and the invading forces
of the enemy.




TIHE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           81
and the apparently uncertain movements of our forces on the
Upper Potomac, had unpleasantly exercised the popular mind,
and had given rise to many rash and ignorant doubts with respect to the opening events of the war. The battle of Bethel
was the first to turn the hateful current of retreat, and sent
the first gleam of sunlight through the sombre shadows that
had hung over public opinion in the South.
It is certain that the movements on the Upper Potomac were
greatly misunderstood at the time, especially with regard to
the evacuation of Harper's Ferry. General Joseph E. Johnston, who had been a quartermaster-general in the old United
States service, and had resigned to take part in the defence of
his native State, Virginia, had assumed command at Harper's
Ferry, on the 23d of May. On the 27th of the same month,
General Beauregard had relinquished his command at Charleston, being assigned to duty at Corinth, Mississippi; but, the
order being recalled, he was put in command at Manassas, our
forces being divided into what was known as the armies of the
Potomac and of the Shenandoah. At the time General Johnston took command at Harper's Ferry, the forces at that point
consisted of nine regiments and two battalions of infantry,
with four companies of artillery-a force which was certainly
not sufficient, when we consider that it was expected to hold
both sides of the Potomac, and take the field against an invading army. After a complete reconnoissance of the place and
environs, General Johnston decided that it was untenable, but
determined to hold it until the great objects of the government required its abandonment.
The demonstrations of the Federal forces in the direction of
the Valley of Virginia were certainly thwarted by the timely
falling back of our army from Harper's Ferry to Winchester.
General Patterson's approach was expected by the great route
into the Valley from Pennsylvania and Maryland, leading
through Winchester, and it was an object of the utmost importance to prevent any junction between his forces and those
of General McClellan, who was already making his way into
the upper portions of the Valley. On the morning of the 13th
of June, information was received from Winchester that Romney was occupied by two thousand Federal troops, supposed
to be the vanguard of McClellan's army. A detachment was
6




82            THE FIRST YEAR OF TIIE WAR.
dispatched by railway to check the advance of the enemy;
and on the morning of the 15th, the Confederate army left
Harper's Ferry for Winchester.
The next morning, after the orders were issued for the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, brought one of those wild, fearful
scenes which make the desolation that grows out of war. The
splendid railroad bridge across the Potomac —one of the most
superb structures of its kind on the continent-was set on fire
at its northern end, while about four hundred feet at its southern extremity was blown up, to prevent the flames from reaching other works which it was necessary to save. Many of the
vast buildings were consigned to the flames. Some of them
were not only large, but very lofty, and crowned with tall towers and spires, and we may be able to fancy the sublimity of
the scene, when more than a dozen of these huge fabrics,
crowded into a small space, were blazing at once. So great
was the heat and smoke, that many of the troops were forced
out of the town, and the necessary labors of the removal were
performed with the greatest difficulty.
On the morning of the day after the evacuation of Harper's
Ferry, intelligence was received that General Patterson's army
had crossed the Potomac at Williamsport; also that the Federal force at Romney had fallen back. The Confederate army
was ordered to gain the Martinsburg turnpike by a flank
movement to Bunker's Hill, in order to place itself between
Winchester and the expected advance of Patterson. On
hearing of this, the enemy crossed the river precipitately.
Resuming his first direction and plan, General Johnston proceeded to Winchester. There his army was in position to oppose either McClellan from the West, or Patterson from the
North-east, and to form a junction with General Beauregard
when necessary.
Intelligence from Maryland indicating another movement
by Patterson, Colonel Jackson with his brigade was sent to
the neighborhood of Martinsburg to support Colonel Stuart,
who had been placed in observation on the line of the Potomac
with his cavalry. On the 2d of July, General Patterson again
crossed the Potomac. Colonel Jackson, pursuant to instructions, again fell back before him; but, in retiring, gave him a
severe lesson. With a battalion of the Fifth Virginia Regi



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           83
ment and Pendleton's Battery of Field Artillery, he engaged
the enemy's advance. Skilfully taking a position where the
smallness of his force was concealed, he engaged them for a
considerable time, inflicted a heavy loss, and retired when
about to be outflanked, scarcely losing a man, but bringing off
forty-five prisoners.
Upon this intelligence, the force at Winchester, strengthened
by the arrival of G3neral Bee and Colonel Elzey and the Ninth
Georgia regiment, were ordered forward to the support of
Jackson, who, it was supposed, was closely followed by General Patterson. Taking up a position within six miles from
Martinsburg, which town the enemy had invested, General
Johnston waited for him four days, hoping to be attacked by
an adversary double his number. Convinced at length that
the enemy would not approach him, General Johnston returned
to Winchester, much to the disappointment of his troops, who,
sullen and discontented, withdrew in the face of the enemy.
On the 15th of July, Colonel Stuart, who, with his cavalry,
remained near the enemy, reported the advance of General Patterson from Martinsburg. He halted, however, at Bunker's
Hill, nine miles from Winchester, where he remained on the
16th. On the 17th, he moved his left to Smithfield. This
movement created the impression that aA attack was intended
on the south of the Confederate lines; but, with a clear and
quick intelligence, General Johnston had penetrated the designs of the enemy, which were to hold him in check, while
" the Grand Army" under McDowell was to bear down upon
General Beauregard at Manassas.
In the mean time, General McClellan's army had moved
southwestward from Grafton. In the progress of the history
of the war, we shall meet with frequent repetitions of the lesson
of how the improvident spirit of the South, in placing small
forces in isolated localities, was taken advantage of by the quick
strategic movements and the overwhelming numbers of the
North. The first of the series of these characteristic disasters
was now to befall the South.




84            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
THIE BAT'TLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN.
The main column of Federal troops under General McClellan
was estimated to be twenty thousand strong; his movements
were now directed towards Beverley, with the object of getting
to the rear of General Garnett, who had been appointed to the
command of the Confederate forces in Northwestern Virginia,
and was occupying a strong position at Rich Mountain, in
Randolph county.
The strength of General Garnett's command was less than
five thousand infantry, with ten pieces of artillery, and four
companies of cavalry. The disposition of these forces was in
the immediate vicinity of Rich Mountain. Col. Pegram occupied the mountain with a force of about sixteen hundred men
and some pieces of artillery. On the slopes of Laurel Hill,
General Garnett was intrenched with a force of three thousand
infantry, six pieces of artillery and three companies of cavalry.
On the 5th of July, the enemy took a position at Bealington,
in front of Laurel Hill, and a day or two afterwards a large
force appeared in front of Rich Mountain.
On the morning of the 11th instant, General Garnett received a note from Colonel Pegram at Rich Mountain, stating
that his pickets had that morning taken a prisoner, who stated
that there were in front of Rich Mountain nine regiments of
seven thousand men and a number of pieces of artillery; that
General McClellan had arrived in camp the evening before,
and had given orders for an attack the next day; that General
Rosecrans had started a night before with a division of the
army three thousand strong, by a convenient route, to take
him in the rear, while McClellan was to attack in front; that
he had moved a piece of artillery and three hundred men to the
point by which General Rosecrans was expected, and that he
had requested Colonel Scott, with his regiment, to occupy a
position on the path by which the enemy must come. As soon
as General Garnett received this note, he sent a written order
to Colonel Scott to move to the point indicated by Colonel
Pegram, and to defend it at all hazards.
The attack on Colonel Pegram was met with the most gallant resistance. Tpie fight lasted nearly three hours. The enemy




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.              85
advanced by a pathless route through the woods, the whole
division moving in perfect silence through the brush, laurel,
and rocks, while the rain poured down upon them in torrents.
The expectation however of surprising the little force on the
mountain was disappointed. As the enemy advanced, our artillery, posted on the top of the mountain, opened upon them,
but with little effect, as their lines were concealed by the trees
and brushwood. The earth of the mountain seemed to tremble
under the thunders of the cannon. The tops of immense trees
were cut off by our fire, which was aimed too high; the crash
of the falling timber mingled with the roar of the cannon, and
as our artillery again and again belched forth its missives of
destruction, it seemed as if the forest was riven by living
streams of lightning. While the cannonading progressed, an
incessant fire of musketry was kept up in the woods, where the
sharpshooters, wet to the skin in the rain, kept the advancing
lines of the enemy at bay. For more than two hours the little
army of Colonel Pegram maintained its ground. Its situation,
however, was hopeless. Finding himself with three thousand
of the enemy in his rear and five thousand in front, Colonel
Pegram endeavored to escape with his command, after a small
loss in the action. One part of the command, under Major
Tyler, succeeded in escaping; the other, about five hundred in
number, were compelled to surrender, when it was found that
General Garnett had evacuated Laurel Hill. Among the prisoners. taken by the enemy was Colonel Pegram himself. Thrown
from his horse, which was wounded and had become unmanageable, he refused to surrender his sword to his captors, and
a messenger had to ride six miles to find an officer to receive it
from the hands of the ill-starred commander.
When Gen. Garnett heard of the result of the engagement
at Rich Mountain, he determined to evacuate Laurel Hill as
soon as night set in and retire to Huttonsville by the way of
Beverley. This design was baffled, as Col. Scott with his regiment had retreated beyond Beverley towards Huttonsville,
without having blocked the road between Rich Mountain and
Beverley.*  General Garnett was compelled by this untoward
* It is proper to state, that there was some controversy as to the precise
orders given to Colonel Scott. That officer published a card in the newspapers




86             THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
circumstance, and by the mistaken execution of another order
by which the road was blocked from Beverley towards Laurel
Hill, instead of that between the former place and Rich Mountain, to retreat by a mountain road into Hardy county.
The retreat was conducted in good order, amid distresses and
trials of the most extraordinary description. The road was
barely wide enough for a single wagon. In the morning, the
army arrived at a camp on the Little Cheat, and after resting
on the grass in the rain a few hours, took up their dreary line
of march through the forest. On the morning of the second
day of the retreat, soon after leaving the camp on the branch
of the Cheat River, the pursuing enemy fell upon the rear of
the distressed little army, and skirmishing continued during
the day. Four companies of the Georgia regiment were cut off.
At one of the fords, a sharp conflict ensued, in which the
enemy were held at bay for a considerable time.
This action, known as that of Carrock's Ford, more than
retrieved the disasters of the defeat. It was a deep ford,
rendered deeper than usual by the rains, and here some of the
wagons became stalled in the river and had to be abandoned.
The enemy were now close upon the rear, which consisted of
the 23d Virginia regiment, and the artillery; and as soon as
the command had crossed, Colonel Taliaferro commanding the
23d was ordered to occupy the high bank on the right of the
ford with his regiment and artillery. On the right, this position was protected by a fence; on the left, only by low bushes;
but the hill commanded the ford and the approach to it by the
road, and was admirably selected for a defence. In a few
minutes, the skirmishers of the enemy were seen running along
the opposite bank, which was low and skirted by a few trees,
and were at first taken for the Georgians, who were known to
have been cut off, but our men were soon undeceived, and with
a simultaneous cheer for " Jeff. Davis" by the whole command,
they opened upon the enemy.
The enemy replied with a.heavy fire from their infantry and
artillery. A large force was brought to the attack, but the
at the time, relieving himself from censure and showing that he occupied on
Lhe day of the battle the position to which he was peremptorily ordered by
General Garnett at the instance of Colonel Pegram.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           87
continued and well-directed fire of the Confederates kept them
from crossing the river, and twice the enemy was driven back
some distance from the ford. They again, however, came up
with a heavy force and renewed the fight. The fire of their
artillery was entirely ineffective, although their shot and shell
were thrown very rapidly, but they all flew over the heads of
the Confederate troops, without any damage except bringing
the limbs of the trees down upon them.
After continuing the fight until nearly every cartridge had
been expended, and until the artillery had been withdrawn by
General Garnett's orders, and as no part of his command was
within sight or supporting distance, as far as could be discovered, or, as was afterwards ascertained, within four miles of
the ford, Col. Taliaferro, after having sustained a loss of
about thirty killed and wounded, ordered the regiment to retire
-the officers and men manifesting decided reluctance at being
withdrawn.
The loss to the enemy in this gallant little affair must have
been quite considerable, as they had, from their own account,
three regiments engaged. The people in the neighborhood reported a heavy loss, which they stated the enemy endeavored
to conceal by transporting the dead and wounded to Bealington
in covered wagons, permitting no one to approach them.
At the second ford, about half-past one o'clock in the day,
Gen. Garnett was killed by almost the last fire of the enemy.
On reaching at this ford the opposite bank of the stream, Gen.
Garnett desired one company from the 23d Virginia regiment
to be formed behind some high drift wood. He stated that he
would in person take charge of them, and did so-the company
being the Richmond Sharpshooters, Capt. Tompkins. In a few
minutes, Capt. Tompkins and all his men, but ten, came up to
the regiment, stating that Gen. Garnett only wanted ten men.
The inference was palpable-he had taken an extreme near
position to the enemy. Very soon the firing commenced in the
rear where Gen. Garnett was, and immediately the horse of the
general came galloping past without a rider. He fell just as
he gave the order to the skirmishers to retire, and one of them
was killed by his side.
At the second ford, where Gen. Garnett was killed, the
enemy abandoned the pursuit, and the command under Col.




88            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
Ramsey reached Monterey and formed a junction with Gen.
Jackson.
The actual reverses of the retreat consisted of some thirtyodd killed and wounded, a number missing, many of whom
afterwards reached the command, and the loss of its baggage,
a portion of which was used in blocking the road against the
enemy's artillery. The conflict and the retreat, the hunger
and fatigue of the men, many of whom dropped from the ranks
from sheer exhaustion, were unequalled by any thing that had
yet occurred in the war. Its success appeared as extraordinary
as its hardships and privations. Surrounded by an army of
twenty thousand men, without supplies, in a strange country,
and in the midst of continuous and drenching rains, it was a
wonder that the little army of three thousand men should have
escaped annihilation. The command had marched sixty hours,
resting only five hours, and had endured a march through the
forest without food for men or horses.
Gen. McClellan announced to the government at Washington a signal victory. He summed up the results of the battle
on the mountain and his pursuit of the retreating army as two
hundred killed and wounded, a thousand taken prisoners, the
baggage of the entire command captured, and seven guns
taken. "Our success," he wrote to Washington, " is complete,
and Secession is killed in this country."
The affair of Rich Mountain was certainly a serious disaster;
it involved the surrender of an important portion of Northwestern Virginia; but with respect to thp courage and discipline of our troops, it had exhibited all that could be desired,
and the successful retreat was one of the most remarkable in
history. It is certain that the unskilful disposition of our
troops, as well as their inadequate numbers, had contributed
to the success of the enemy, and doubts are admissible whether
more advantage might not have been taken of the position at
Carrock's Ford, with proper supports, considering its extraordinary advantages of defence, and how long it had been
held against the forces of the pursuing enemy by a single
regiment.
A feeling of deep sympathy, however, was felt for the unfortunate commander, whose courage, patriotic ardor, and generous, because unnecessary, exposure of his person to the bullets




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            89
of the enemy, commended his memory to the hearts of his
countrymen.
Whatever might have been the depression of the public
mind of the South by the Rich Mountain disaster, it was more
than recovered by news from other quarters. The same day
that the unfavorable intelligence from Rich Mountain reached
the government at Richmond, the telegraph brought, by a
devious route, the news of the battle of Carthage in Missouri.
The blow given to the enemy at this distant point, was the first
of the brilliant exploits which afterwards made the Missouri
campaign one of the most brilliant episodes of the war. It had
gone far to retrieve the fortunes of an empire that was hereafter to be added to the Southern Confederacy, and assure the
promise that had been made in the proclamation of the gallant
Gen. Price of that State-"a million of such people as the
citizens of Missouri were never yet subjugated, and, if attempted, let no apprehension be felt for the result." But of
this hereafter.
On the anniversary of the Fourth of July, the Federal Congress met at Washington. Galusha A. Grow, a Pennsylvania
Abolitionist, and an uncompromising advocate of the war, was
elected Speaker of the House. The meeting of this Congress
affords a suitable period for a statement of the posture of political affairs, and of the spirit which animated the North, with
respect to existing hostilities.
In his message, Mr. Lincoln denounced the idea of any of
the States preserving an armed neutrality in the war, having
particular reference to the continued efforts of Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, to maintain a condition of neutrality on
the part of that State. Mr. Lincoln declared that if armed
neutrality were permitted on the part of any of the States, it
would soon ripen into disunion; that it would build impassab.le walls along the line of separation; and it would tie the
hands of the Unionists, while it would free those of the Insurrectionists, by taking all the trouble from Secession, except
that which might be expected from the external blockade.
Neutrality, he said, gave to malcontents disunion without its
risks, and was not to be tolerated, since it recognized no fidelity
to the Constitution or obligation to the Union.
Kentucky was not unreasonably accounted a part of the




90             THIE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
Northern government. But with an outrage of the plainest
doctrines of the government, and a practical denial not only of
every thing like the rights of States, but even of their territorial integrity, the Northwestern portion of Virginia, which
had rebelled against its State government, was taken into the
membership of the Federal Union as itself a State, with the
absurd and childish addition of giving to the rebellious counties
the name of "Virginia."  A Convention of the disaffected
Northwestern counties of Virginia had been held at Wheeling,
on the 13th day of May, and after a session of three days, decided to call another Convention, to meet on the 11th of June,
subsequent to the vote of the State on the Ordinance of Secession. The Convention reorganized the counties as a member
of the Federal Union: F. W. Pierpont was elected governor;
and W. T. Willie and the notorious John S. Carlile, both of
whom had already signalized their treason to their State by
their course in the Convention at Richmond, were sent as
representatives of "Virginia" to the United States Senate, in
which absurd capacity they were readily received.
The message of the President gave indications of a determined and increased prosecution of hostilities. It called for
an army of four hundred thousand men, and a loan of four
hundred millions of dollars. This call was a curious commentary upon the spirit and resources of the people, who it had
been thought in the North would be crushed out by the three
months' levies before the Federal Congress met in July to decide upon what disposition should be made of the conquered
States.
The statements of Mr. Lincoln's fiscal secretary were alarming enough; they showed a state of the treasury unable even
to meet the ordinary expenditures of the government, and its
resources were now to be taxed to the last point of ingenuity
to make for the next fiscal year the necessary provision of four
hundred and eighty.millions of dollars, out of an actual revenue
the first quarter of which had not exceeded five millions. The
ordinary expenditures of the Federal government for the fiscal
year ending June 30th, 1862, were estimated at eighty millions
of dollars; the extraordinary expenditures, on the basis of increased military operations, at four hundred millions. To meet
these large demands of the civil and war service, Secretary




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                   91
Chase confessed to a receipt of but five millions per quarter
from  the "Morrill" tariff, showing that at this rate of the
receipt of customs, the income of the government would be
twenty millions per year against nearly five hundred millions
of prospective outlay.
It was proposed in this financial exigency to levy specific
duties of about thirty-three per cent. on coffee, tea, sugar, molasses, and syrup, which might yield twenty millions a year; it
was hoped by some modification of the Morrill tariff, with respect to other articles, to increase its productiveness from
twenty to thirty-seven millions; the revenue from the sale of
public lands was estimated at three millions; and it was timidly
proposed that a tax should be levied upon real property of
one-third or one-fifth of one per cent., to produce twenty
millions additional. Thus by means ofThe Tariff,...................................$37,000,000
Tea, Sugar, and Coffee,........................... 20,000,000
Public Lands,................................... 3,000,000
Direct Taxes...................................... 20,000,000
Producing a total of....................... $80;000,000
The Northern government proposed to eke out the means of
meeting its ordinary expenses, leaving the monstrous balance
of four hundred millions of dollars to be raised by a sale of
bonds.
The financial complications of the government of Mr. Lincoln
were in striking contrast with the abundant and easy means
which the Southern Confederacy had, at least so far, been able
to carry on the war.  The latter had been reduced to a paper
currency, but it had for the basis of its currency the great
staple of cotton,* which in the shape of a produce loan was
practically pledged to the redemption of the public debt.
* The whole cotton crop of America, in 1860, was 4,675,770 bales; and of
this, 3,697,727 bales were exported, and 978,043 bales used at home. England
alone took 2,582,000 bales, which amounted to about four-fifths of her entire
consumption. The cotton-fields of the Southern States embrace an area of
500,000 square miles, and the capital invested in the cultivation of the plant
amounts to $900,000,000. Seventy years ago, the exports of our cotton were
only 420 bales-not one-tenth of the amount furnished by several countries
to England. Now, the South furnishes five-sevenths of the surplus cotton
product of the entire world




92               THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
Prospects were entertained of a speedy raising of the blockade,
the disappointment of which, at a later day, drove the Confederacy to other expedients of revenue, in a war tax, &c.; but,
at the time of the comparison of the financial condition of the
two governments, the Confederate currency was accounted
quite as good as gold, as the cotton and tobacco once in the
market would afford the Southern government the instant
means to discharge every cent of its indebtedness.
The Federal Congress commenced its work in a spirit that
essentially tended to revolutionize the political system and ideas
of the North itself. It not only voted to Mr. Lincoln the men
and supplies he asked for, but the first days of its session were
signalized by a resolution to gag all propositions looking towards peace, or any thing else than a prosecution of the war;
by another, to approve the acts done by the President without
constitutional authority, including his suspension of the habeas
corpus; and by the introduction of a bill to confiscate the property of " rebels."
The pages of history do not afford a commensurate instance
of the wide opposition in the social and political directions of
two nations who had so long lived in political union and intercourse as th- North and the South. While the latter was daily
becoming more conservative and more attached to existing institutions,* the North was as rapidly growing discontented,
* A type of the conservatism of the Southern revolution-its attachment to
the past-was vividly displayed in the adoption of its national ensign, a blue
union with a circle of stars, and longitudinal bars, red, white, and red, in place
of " the stripes" of the flag of the old government. The present Confederate
flag was balloted for in the Provisional Congress, and was selected by a majority of votes out of four different models. At the time of the early session of
Congress at Montgomery, the popular sentiment was almost unanimous, and
very urgent, that the main features of the old Federal Constitution should be
copied into the new government, and that to follow out and give expression to
this idea, the flag should be as close a copy as possible of the Federal ensign.
A resolution was introduced in the Provisional Congress to the effect that the
flag should be as little different as possible from that of the Federal government; which resolution was vigorously opposed by Mr. Miles, of South Carolina, Who was then chairman of the Flag Committee. The design recommended
by Mr. Miles, but voted down, has since been adopted as the battle flag of
Generals Johnston and Beauregard. It is a blue saltier (or Maltese cross),
with inner rows of stars, on a red field-the emblem of the saltier (saltere, to
leap) being appropriately that of progress and power. The two other competing designs, from which our present flag was selected, were, one, an almost




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                93
restless, radical, and revolutionary.  The people of the North
had passed the stage of pure Democracy, and inaugurated military despotism. They, in effect, had changed their form of
government, while vainly attempting to preserve their territorial ascendency. They charged the South' with attempting
revolution, when it was only fighting for independence; while
they, themselves, actually perpetrated revolution rather than
forego the advantages of a partial and iniquitous Union. The
South, in the midst of a war of independence-a war waged not
to destroy, but to preserve existing institutions-was recurring
to the past, and proposing to revive conservative ideas rather
than to run into new and rash experiments.
The war had already developed one great moral fact in the
North of paramount interest. It was the entire willingness of
the people to surrender their constitutional liberties to any
government that would gratify their political passions.
This peculiarity of the condition of Northern society, was
more significant of its disintegration and revolutionary destiny
than all the other circumstances and consequences of the war
combined, in loss of trade, prostration of commerce, and poverty
and hunger of the people. It was the corruption of the public
virtue. The love of constitutional liberty was degraded to political hatreds. While these were gratified, the Northern people
were willing to surrender their liberties to their panderers at
Washington. Without protest, without opposition, in silent
submission, or even in expressions stimulating and encouraging
the despot who stript them of their rights, to still further excesses, they had seen every vestige of constitutional liberty
swept away, while they imagined that their greed of resentment
towards the South was to be satisfied to its fill. They had seen
the liberties of the people strangled, even in States remaining
in the Union. They had seen the writ of kabeas corpus denied,
not only by the minions of Abraham Lincoln in Maryland, but
by the commanding officers of Forts Hamilton and Lafayette.
They had seen, not only the rights of free speech, but the
sanctity even of private correspondence, violated by the seizure
exact reproduction of the Federal stars and stripes, the only variation being
that of a blue stripe, and the other a simple blue circle or rim, on a red field.
The consideration that determined the selection of the present flag was its
similarity to that of the old government.




94            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
of dispatches in their own telegraph offices. They had seen the
law of the drum-head not only established in Baltimore, but
measures to subvert their own municipal liberties inaugurated
by a system of military police for the whole Federal Union.
They had suffered without protestation these monstrous violations of the Constitution under which they professed to live.
They had not only suffered, but had indorsed them. They had
not only done this, but they had applauded in this government
of Abraham Lincoln violations of honor, morality, and truth,
more infamous than excesses of authority.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                  95
CHAPTER IV.
The " Grand Army" of the North.-General McDowell.-The Affair of Bull Run.An Artillery Duel.-THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS.-" On to Richmond."-Scenery of the
Battle-field.-Crises in the Battle.-Devoted Courage of the Confederates.-THE ROUT.
-How the News was received in Washington.-How it was received in the South. —
General Bee.-Colonel Bartow.-The Great Error.-General Johnston's Excuses for
not advancing on Washington.-INcIDENTS OF THE MANASSAS BATTLE.
THE month of July found confronting the lines of the Potomac two of the largest armies that this continent had ever
seen. The confidence of the North in the numbers, spirit, and
appointments of its " Grand Army" was insolent in the extreme. It was thought to be but an easy undertaking for it to
march to Richmond, and plant the Stars and Stripes in Capitol
Square. An advance was urged not only by the popular
clamor of " On to IRichmond," but by the pressure of extreme
parties in Congress; and when it was fully resolved upon, the
exhilaration was extreme, and the prospect of the occupation
of Richmond in ten days was entertained with every variety
of public joy.
Nothing had been left undone to complete the preparations
of the Northern army. In numbers it was immense; it was
provided with the best artillery in the world; it comprised,
besides its immense force of volunteers, all the regulars east
of the Rocky Mountains, to the number of about ten thousand,
collected since February, in the city of Washington, from Jefferson Barracks, from  St. Louis, and from  Fortress Monroe.
Making all allowances for mistakes, we are warranted in saying that the Northern army consisted of at least fifty-five
regiments of volunteers, eight companies of regular infantry,
four of marines, nine of regular cavalry, and twelve batteries,
forty-nine guns. This army was placed at the command of one
who was acknowledged to be the greatest and most scientific
general in the North —General McDowell. This officer had a
reputation in the army of being a stoic philosopher —a reputation sought after by a certain number of West Point pupils.
General Beauregard was fully informed of the movements of




96             THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
McDowell. The vaunting and audacious declaration of the
enemy's purpose ta force his position, and press on to Richmond, was met by firm and busy preparations for the crisis.
It was no mean crisis. It was to involve the first important
shock of arms between two peoples who, from long seasons of
peace and prosperity, had brought to the struggle more than
ordinary resources and splendors of war.
The decisive battle was preceded by the important affair of
Bull Run, a brief sketch of which, as a precursor to the events
of the 21st of July, furnishes an intelligent introduction to the
designs of the enemy, and alike to the complicated plan and
glorious issue of the great battle that, through the sultry heats
of a whole day, wrestled over the plains of Manassas.
Bull Run constitutes the northern boundary of that county
which it divides from Fairfax; and on its memorable banks,
about three miles to the northwest of the junction of the
Manassas Gap with the Orange and Alexandria railroad, was
fought the gallant action of the 18th of July. It is a small
stream, running in this locality, nearly from west to east, to
its confluence with the Occoquan River, about twelve miles
from the Potomac, and draining a considerable scope of country, from its source in Bull Run Mountain to within a short
distance of the Potomac at Occoquan. Roads traverse and
intersect the surrounding country in almost every direction.
The banks of the stream are rocky and steep, but abound in
long-used fords. At Mitchell's Ford, the stream is about
equidistant between Centreville and Manassas, some six miles
apart.
Anticipating the determination of the enemy to advance on
Manassas, General Beauregard had withdrawn his advanced
brigades within the lines of Bull Run. On the morning of
the 17th of July our troops rested on Bull Run, from Union
lMill's Ford to the Stone Bridge, a distance of about eight
miles. The next morning the enemy assumed a threatening
attitude. Appearing in heavy force in front of the position
of General Bonham's brigade, which held the approaches to
Mitchell's Ford, the enemy, about the meridian, opened fire
with several 20-pounder rifle guns from a hill over one and a
half miles from 13u11 Run. At first, the firing of the enemy
was at random; but, by half-past 12 P. M., he had obtained




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             97
the range of our position, and poured into the brigade a shower
of shot, but without injury to us in men, horses, or guns. Our
fire was reserved, and our troops impatiently awaited the op
portune moment.
In a few moments, a light battery was pushed forward by
the enemy, whereupon Kemper's battery, whi6h was attached
to Bonham's brigade, and occupied a ridge on the left of the
Centreville road, threw only six solid shot, with the remarkable effect of driving back both the battery and its supporting
force. The unexpected display of skill and accuracy in our
artillery held the advancing column of the enemy in check,
while Kemper's pieces and support were withdrawn across
Mitchell's Ford, to a point previously designated, and which
commanded the direct approaches to the ford.
In the mean time, the enemy was advancing in strong columns of infantry, with artillery and cavalry, on Blackburn's
Ford, which was covered by General Longstreet's brigade.
The Confederate pickets fell back, silently, across the ford
before the advancing foe. The entire southern bank of the
stream, for the whole front of Longstreet's brigade, was covered at the water's edge by an extended line of skirmishers.
Taking advantage of the steep slopes on the northern bank of
the stream, the enemy approached under shelter, in heavy
force, within less than one hundred yards of our skirmishers.
Before advancing his infantry, the enemy maintained a fire of
rifle artillery for half an hour; then he pushed forward a
column of over three thousand infantry to the assault, with
such a weight of numbers as to be repelled with difficulty by
the comparatively small force of not more than twelve hundred bayonets, with which Brigadier-general Longstreet met
him with characteristic vigor and intrepidity. The repulse of
this charge of the enemy was, as an exhibition of the devoted
courage of our troops, the most brilliant incident of the day.
Not one yard of intrenchment or one rifle-pit protected the
men at Blackburn's Ford, who, with rare exceptions, were, on
that day, the first time under fire, and who, taking and maintaining every position ordered, exceeded in cool, self-possessed,
and determined courage the best-trained veterans. Twice the
enemy was foiled and driven back by our skirmishers and
Longstreet's reserve companies. As he returned to the contest
7




98            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
with increased numbers, General Longstreet had been reinforced from Early's brigade with two regiments of infantry
and two pieces of artillery. Unable to effect a passage of the
stream, the enemy kept up a scattering fire for some time.
The fire of musketry was soon silenced, and the affair became
one of artillery. The enemy was superior in the character as
well as in the number of his weapons, provided with improved
munitions and every artillery appliance, and, at the same
time, occupying the commanding position. The results of the
remarkable artillery duel that ensued were fitting precursors
to the achievements of the twenty-first of July in this unexpectedly brilliant arm of our service. In the onset, our fire
was directed against the enemy's infantry, whose bayonets,
gleaming above the tree-tops, alone indicated their presence
and force. This drew the attention of a battery placed on a
high, commanding ridge, and the duel commenced in earnest.
For a time, the aim of the adversary was inaccurate, but this
was quickly corrected, and shot fell and shells burst thick and
fast in the very midst of our battery. From the position of
our pieces and the nature of the ground, their aim could only
be directed by the smoke of the enemy's artillery; how skilfully and with what execution this was done can only be realized by an eye-witness. For a few moments, the guns of the
enemy were silenced, but were soon reopened. By direction
of General Longstreet, his battery was then advanced, by hand,
out of the range now ascertained by the enemy, and a shower
of spherical case, shell, and round-shot flew over the heads of
our gunners. From this new position our guns fired as before,
with no other aim than the smoke and flash of their adversaries' pieces, and renewed and urged the conflict with such signal vigor and effect, that gradually the fire of the enemy slackened, the intervals between their discharges grew longer and
longer, finally to cease; and we fired a last gun at a baffled
flying foe, whose heavy masses in the distance were plainly
seen to break- and scatter in wild confusion and utter rout,
strewing the ground with cast-away guns, hats, blankets, and
knapsacks, as our parting shell was thrown among them.
Thus ended the brilliant action of Bull Run. The guns engaged in the singular artillery conflict on our side were three
six-pounder rifle pieces and four ordinary six-pounders, all of




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            99
Walton's battery-the Washington Artillery of New Orleans.
Our casualties were unimportant-fifteen killed and fifty-three
wounded. The loss of the enemy can only be conjectured; it
was unquestionably heavy. In the cursory examination, which
was made by details from Longstreet's and Early's brigades,
on the 18th of July, of that portion of the field immediately
contested and near Blackburn's Ford, some sixty-four corpses
were found and buried, and at least twenty prisoners were also
picked up, besides one hundred and seventy-five stands of
arms and a large quantity of accoutrements and blankets.
The effect of the day's conflict was to satisfy the enemy that
he could not force a passage across Bull Run in the face of our
troops, and led him into the flank movement of the 21st of
July and the battle of Mlanassas.
THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS.
General Scott having matured his plan of battle, ordered
General McDowell to advance on Manassas on Sunday, the
21st of July-three days after the repulse at Bull Run. The
movement was generally known in Washington; Congress had
adjourned for the purpose of affording its members an opportunity to attend the battle-field, and as the crowds of camp
followers and spectators, consisting of politicians, fashionable
women, idlers, sensation-hunters, editors, &c., hurried in carriages, omnibuses, gigs, and every conceivable style of vehicle
across the Potonlac in the direction of the army, the constant
and unfailing jest was, that they were going on a visit to Richmond. The idea of the defeat of the Grand Army, which, in
show, splendid boast, and dramatic accessaries, exceeded any
thing that had ever been seen in America, seems never to have
crossed the minds of the politicians who went prepared with
carriage-loads of champagne for festal celebration of the victory that was to be won, or of the fair dames who were equipped with opera-glasses to entertain themselves with the novel
scenes of a battle and the inevitable rout of "rebels."  The
indecencies of this exhibition of morbid curiosity and exultant
hate are simply unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. Mr. Russell, correspondent of the London Times, an
eye-witness of the scene, describes the concourse of carriages




100           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
and gayly-dressed spectators in the rear of the army on the
morning of the battle of IManassas as like a holiday exhibition
on a race-course.
The scene was an extraordinary one. It had a beauty and
grandeur, apart from the revolting spectacle of the indecent
and bedizened rabble that watched from a hill in the rear of
the army the dim outlines of the battle and enjoyed the nervous emotions of the thunders of its artillery. The gay uniforms
of the Northern soldiers, their streaming flags and glistening
bayonets, added strange charms to the primeval forests of
Virginia. No theatre of battle could have been more magnificent in its addresses to the eye. The plains, broken by a
wooded and intricate country, were bounded as far as the eye
could reach to the west by the azure combs of the Blue Ridge.
The quiet Sabbath morning opened upon the scene enlivened
by moving masses of men; the red lights of the morning, however, had scarcely broken upon that scene, with its landscapes,
its forests, and its garniture, before it was obscured in the
clouds of battle. For long intervals nothing of the conflict
was presented, to those viewing it at a distance, but wide and
torn curtains of smoke and dust and the endless beat of the
artillery.
Orders had been issued by McDowell for the Grand Army
to be in motion by two o'clock on the morning of the twentyfirst, and en route for their different positions in time to reach
them and be in position by the break of day. It was also ordered that they should have four days' rations cooked and
stored away in their haversacks-evidently for the purpose of
gaining Manassas and holding it, until their supplies should
reach them by th.e railroad from Alexandria. Thus stood the
arrangements of the Northern forces on the evening preceding
the battle of the twenty-first.
It is a remarkable circumstance of the battle of Manassas,
that it was fought on our side without any other plan than to
suit the contingencies arising out of the development of the
enemy's designs, as it occurred in the progress of the action.
Several plans of battle had been proposed by General Beauregard, but had been defeated by the force of circumstances.
He had been unwilling to receive the enemy on the defensive
line of Bull Run, and had determined on attacking him at




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          101
Centreville. In the mean time, General Johnston had been
ordered to form a junction of his army corps with that of General Beauregard, should the movement, in his judgment, be
advisable. The best service which the army of the Shenandoah could render was to prevent the defeat of that of the
Potomac. To be able to do this, it was necessary for General
Johnston to defeat General Patterson or to elude him. The
latter course was the most speedy and certain, and was, therefore, adopted. Evading the enemy by the disposition of the
advance guard under Colonel Stuart, our army moved through
Ashby's Gap to Piedmont, a station of the Manassas Gap railroad. Hence, the infantry were to be transported by the railway, while the cavalry and artillery were ordered to continue
their march. General Johnston reached Manassas about noon
on the twentieth, preceded by the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments and by Jackson's brigade, consisting of the 2d, 4th, 5th,
27th and 33d Virginia regiments. He was accompanied by
General Bee, with the 4th Alabama, the 2d and two companies of the 11th Mississippi. The president of the railroad had
assured him that the remaining troops should arrive during
the day.
General Johnston, being the senior in rank, necessarily
assumed command of all the forces of the Confederate States
then concentrating at nManassas. He, however, approved the
plans of General Beauregard, and generously directed their
execution under his command. It was determined that the
two forces should be united within the lines of Bull Run, and
thence advance to the attack of the enemy, before Patterson's
junction with McDowell, which was daily expected. The plan
of battle was again disconcerted. In consequence of the
untoward detention on the railroad of some five thousand of
General Johnston's forces that had been expected to reach
Manassas prior to the battle, it became necessary, on the
morning of the twenty-first, before daylight, to modify the
plan accepted, to suit the contingency of an immediate attack
on our lines by the main force of the enemy, then plainly at
hand. It thus happened that a battle ensued, different in
place and circumstance from any previous plan on our side.
Our effective force of all arms, ready for action on the field
on the eventful morning, was less than thirty thousand men.




102           THE FIRST YEAR OF TtIE WAR.
Our troops were divided into eight brigades, occupying the
defensive line of Bull Run. Brigadier-general Ewell's was
posted at the Union Mill's Ford; Brigadier-general D. R.
Jones' at McLean's Ford; Brigadier-general Longstreet's at
Blackburn's Ford; Brigadier-general Bonham's at -Mitchell's
Ford; Colonel Cocke's at Ball's Ford, some three miles above,
and Colonel Evans, with a regiment and battalion, formed the
extreme left at the Stone Bridge. The brigades of Brigadiergeneral Holmes and Colonel Early were in reserve in rear of
the right.
In his entire ignorance of the enemy's plan of attack, General Beauregard was compelled to keep his army posted along
the stream for some eight or ten miles, while his wily adversary developed his purpose to him. The subsequent official
reports of MciDowell and his officers show that that commander had abandoned his former purpose of marching on
iManassas by the lower routes from Washington and Alexandria, and had resolved upon turning the left flank of the
Confederates.
The fifth division of his Grand Army, composed of at least
four brigades, under command of General Miles, was to remain at Centreville, in reserve, and to make a false attack on
Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords, and thereby deceive General Beauregard as to its intention. The first division, composed of at least three brigades, commanded by General Tyler,
was to take position at the Stone Bridge, and feign an attack
upon that point. The third division, composed of at least
three brigades, commanded by Heintzelmnan, was to proceed as
quietly as possible to the Red House Ford, and there remain,
until the troops guarding that ford should be cleared away.
The second division, composed of three or four brigades, commanded by Hunter, was to march, unobserved by the Confederate troops, to Sudley, and there cross over the run and
move down the stream to the Red House Ford, and clear
away any troops that might be guarding that point, where he
was to be joined by the third or Heintzelman's division.
Together, these two divisions were to charge upon, and drive
away any troops that might be stationed at the Stone Bridge,
when Tyler's division was to cross over and join them, and
thus produce a junction of three formidable divisions of the




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           103
Grand Army across the run, for offensive operations against
the forces of General Beauregard, which the enemy expected
to find scattered along the run for seven or eight miles-the
bulk of them being at and below Mitchell's Ford, and so situated as to render a concerted movement by them utterly impracticable.
Soon after sunrise, the enemy appeared in force in front of
Colonel Evans' position at the Stone Bridge, and opened a
light cannonade. The monstrous inequality of the two forces
at this point was not developed. Colonel Evans only observed in his immediate front the advance portion of General
Schenck's brigade of General Tyler's division and two other
heavy brigades. This division of the enemy's forces numbered
nine thousand men and thirteen pieces of artillery-Carlisle's
and Ayres' batteries-that is, nine hundred men and two sixpounders confronted by nine thousand men and thirteen pieces
of artillery, mostly rifled.
A movement was instantly determined upon by General
Beauregard to relieve his left flank, by a rapid, determined
attack with his right wing and centre on the enemy's flank
and rear at Centreville, with precautions against the advance
of his reserves from the direction of Washington.
In the quarter of the Stone Bridge, the two armies stood
for more than an hour engaged in slight skirmishing, while
the main body of the enemy was marching his devious way
through the " Big Forest," to cross Bull Run some two miles
above our left, to take our forces in flank and rear. This
movement was fortunately discovered in time for us to check
its progress, and ultimately to form a new line of battle nearly
at right angles with the defensive line of Bull Run.
On discovering that the enemy had crossed the stream
above him, Colonel Evans moved to his left with eleven companies and two field-pieces to oppose his advance, and disposed his little force under cover of the wood, near the intersection of the Warrenton turnpike and the Sudley road.
Here he was attacked by the enemy in immensely superior
numbers.
The enemy beginning his detour from the turnpike, at a
point nearly half-way between Stone Bridge and Centreville,
had pursued a tortuous, narrow track of a rarely used road,




104           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
through a dense wood, the greater part of his way until near
the Sudley road. A division under Colonel Hunter, of the
Federal regular army, of two strong brigades, was in the advance, followed immediately by another division, under Colonel Heintzelman of three brigades, and seven companies of
regular cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of artillery —eighteen
of which were rifled guns. This column, as it crossed Bull
Run, numbered over sixteen thousand men, of all arms, by
their own accounts.
Burnside's brigade-which here, as at Fairfax Court-house,
led the advance-at about 9.45 A. M., debouched from a wood
in sight of Evans' position, some five hundred yards distant
from Wheat's Louisiana battalion. He immediately threw
forward his skirmishers in force, and they became engaged
with Wheat's command. The Federalists at once advanced,
as they report officially, the 2d Rhode Island regiment volunteers, with its vaunted battery of six thirteen-pounder rifle
guns. Sloan's companies of the 4th South Carolina were then
brought into action, having been pushed forward through the
woods. The enemy, soon galled and staggered by the fire,
and pressed by the determined valor with which Wheat handled his battalion, until he was desperately wounded, hastened up three other regiments of the brigade and two Dahlgren howitzers, making in all quite three thousand five hundred bayonets and eight pieces of artillery, opposed to less
than eight hundred men and two six-pounder guns.
Despite the odds, this intrepid command, of but eleven
weak companies, maintained its front to the enemy for quite
an hour, and until General Bee came to their aid with his
command.
General Bee moving towards the enemy, guided by the
firing, had selected the position near the now famous " Henry
House," and formed his troops upon it. They were the 7th
and 8th Georgia under Colonel Bartow, the 4th Alabama, 2d
Mississippi, and two companies of the 11th Mississippi regiments, with Imboden's battery. Being compelled, however,
to sustain Colonel Evans, he crossed the valley, and formed
on the right and somewhat in advance of his position. Here
the joint force, little exceeding five regiments, with six fieldpieces, held the ground against about fifteen thousand Federal




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           105
troops. A fierce and destructive conflict now ensued-the fire
was withering on both sides, while the enemy swept our short,.
thin lines with their numerous artillery, which, according to
their official reports, at this time consisted of at least ten rifle
guns and four howitzers. For an hour did these stout-hearted
men, of the blended commands of Bee, Evans, and Bartow,
breast an unintermitting battle-storm, animated surely by
something more than the ordinary courage of even the bravest
men under fire.
Two Federal brigades of HIeintzelman's division were now
brought into action, led by Rickett's superb light battery of
six ten-pounder rifle guns, which, posted on an eminence to the
right of the Sudley road, opened fire on Imboden's battery.
At this time, confronting the enemy, we had still but Evans'
eleven companies and two guns-Bee's and Bartow's four
regiments, the two companies 11th Mississippi under Lieutenant-colonel Liddell, and the six pieces under Imboden and
Richardson. The enemy had two divisions of four strong
brigades, including seventeen companies of regular infantry,
cavalry, and artillery, four companies of marines, and twenty
pieces of artillery. Against this odds, scarcely credible, our
advance position was still for a while maintained, and the
enemy's ranks constantly broken and shattered under the
scorching fire of our men; but fresh regiments of the Federals came upon the field, Sherman's and Keyes' brigades of
Tyler's division, as is stated in their reports, numbering over
six thousand bayonets, which had found a passage across the
Run, about eight hundred yards above the Stone Bridge,
threatened our right.
Heavy losses had now been sustained on our side, both in
numbers and in the personal worth of the slain. The 8th
Georgia regiment had suffered heavily, being exposed, as it
took and maintained its position, to a fire from the enemy,
already posted within a hundred yards of their front and
right, sheltered by fences and other cover. The 4th Alabama
also suffered severely from the deadly fire of the thousands of
muskets which they so dauntlessly confronted under the immediate leadership of the chivalrous Bee himself.
Now, however, with the surging mass of over fourteen
thousand Federal infantry pressing on their front and under




106           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
the incessant fire of at least twenty pieces of artillery, with
the fresh brigades of Sherman and Keyes approaching-the
latter already in musket range-our lines gave back, but under
orders from General Bee.
As our shattered battalions retired, the slaughter was deplorable. They fell back in the direction of the Robinson
IHouse, under the fires of HIeintzelman's division on one side,
Keyes' and Sherman's brigades of Tyler's division on the
other, and Hunter's division in their rear, and were compelled
to engage the enemy at several points on their retreat, losing
both officers and men, in order to keep them from closing in
around them. Under the inexorable stress of the enemy's
fire the retreat continued. The enemy seemed to be inspired
with the idea that he had won the field; the news of a victory
was carried to the rear, and, in less than an hour thereafter,
the telegraph had flashed the intelligence through all the cities
in the North, that the Federal troops were completing their
victory, and premature exultations ran from mouth to mouth
in Washington.
If the enemy had observed the circumstances and character
of this falling back of a portion of our lines, it would have
been enough to have driven him in consternation from the
field. With the terrible desperation that had sustained them
so long in the face of fivefold odds and the most frightful
losses, our troops fell back sullenly; at every step of their retreat staying, by their hard skirmishing, the flanking columns
of the enemy.
The retreat was finally arrested just in rear of the Robinson
House by the energy and resolution of General Bee, assisted by
the support of the Hampton Legion, and the timely arrival of
Jackson's brigade of five regiments. A moment before, General
Bee had been well-nigh overwhelmed by superior numbers.
He approached General Jackson with the pathetic exclamation, "General, they are beating us back;" to which the
latter promptly replied, " Sir, we'll give them the bayonet."
General Bee immediately rallied his over-tasked troops with
the words, " There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let
us determine to die here, and we will conquer."
In the mean time, the crisis of the battle and the full development of the enemy's designs had been perceived by our




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           107
generals. They were yet four miles away from the immediate
field of action, having placed themselves on a commanding
hill in rear of General Bonham's left, to observe the movements of the enemy. There could be no mistake now of the
enemy's intentions, from the violent firing on the left and the
immense clouds of dust raised by the march of a large body
of troops from his centre. With the keenest impatience,
General Beauregard awaited the execution of his orders of
the morning, which were intended to relieve his left flank by
an attack on the enemy's flank and rear at Centreville. As
the continuous roll of musketry and the sustained din of the
artillery announced the serious outburst of the battle on our
left flank, he anxiously, but confidently, awaited similar sounds
of conflict from our front at Centreville. When it was too late
for the effective execution of the contemplated movement, he
was informed, to his profound disappointment, that his orders
for an advance had miscarried.
No time was to be lost. It became immediately necessary
to depend on new combinations, and to meet the enemy on the
field upon which he had chosen to give us battle. It was plain
that nothing but the most rapid combinations and the most
heroic and devoted courage on the part of our troops could
retrieve the field, which, according to all military conditions,
appeared to be positively lost.
About noon, the scene of the battle was unutterably sublime. Not until then could one of the present generation, who
had never witnessed a grand battle, have imagined such a
spectacle. The hill occupied in the morning by Generals
Beauregard, Johnston, and Bonham, and their staffs, placed
the whole scene before one-a grand, moving diorama. When
the firing was at its height, the roar of artillery reached the
hill like that of protracted thunder. For one long mile the
whole valley was a boiling crater of dust and smoke. Occasionally the yells of our men, in the few instances in which the
enemy fell back, rose above the roar of artillery. In the distance rose the Blue Ridge, to form the dark background of a
most magnificent picture.
The condition of the battle-field was now, at the least, desperate. Our left flank was overpowered, and it became necessary to bring immediately up to their support the reserves not




108           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
already in motion. Holmes' two regiments and battery of
artillery, under Captain Lindsey Walker, of six guns, and
Early's brigade, were immediately ordered up to support our
left flank. Two regiments from Bonham's brigade, with Kemper's four six-pounders, were also called for, and Generals
Ewell, Jones (D. R.), Longstreet, and Bonham were directed
to make a demonstration to their several fronts to retain and
engross the enemy's reserves, and any forces on their flank, and
at and around Centreville.
Dashing on at headlong gallop, General Johnston and General Beauregard reached the field of action not a moment too
soon. They were instantly occupied with the reorganization
of the heroic troops, whose previous stand in stubborn and
patriotic valor has nothing to exceed it in the records of history. It was now that General Johnston impressively and
gallantly charged to the front, with the colors of the 4th
Alabama regiment by his side. The presence of the two
generals with the troops under fire, and their example, had the
happiest effect. Order was soon restored. In a brief and
rapid conference, General Beauregard was assigned to the
command of the left, which, as the younger officer, he claimed,
while General Johnston returned to that of the whole field.
The battle was now re-established. The aspect of affairs
was critical and desperate in the extreme.
Confronting the enemy at this time, General Beauregard's
forces numbered, at most, not more than six thousand five
hundred infantry and artillerists, with but thirteen pieces of
artillery, and two companies of Stuart's cavalry.
The enemy's force now bearing hotly and confidently down
on our position —regiment after regiment of the best-equipped
men that ever took the field-according to their own official
history of the day, was formed of Colonels Hunter's and
Heintzelman's divisions, Colonels Sherman's and Keyes' brigades of Tyler's division, and of the formidable batteries of
Ricketts, Griffin, and Arnold regulars, and 2d Rhode Island,
and two Dahlgren howitzers-a force of over twenty thousand infantry, seven companies of regular cavalry, and twentyfour pieces of improved artillery. At the same time, perilous, heavy reserves of infantry and artillery hung in the
distance, around the Stone Bridge, Mitchell's, Blackburn's, and




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             109
Union Mill's Fords, visibly ready to fall upon us at any moment.
Fully conscious of the portentous disparity of force, General
Beauregard, as he posted the lines for the encounter, spoke
words of encouragement to the men to inspire their confidence
and determined spirit of resistance. HIe urged them to the
resolution of victory or death on the field. The men responded
with loud and eager cheers, and the commander felt reassured
of the unconquerable spirit of his army.
In the mean time, the enemy had seized upon the plateau on
which Robinson's and the Henry houses * are situated —the
position first occupied in the morning by General Bee, before
advancing to the support of Evans —Ricketts' battery of six
rifle guns, the pride of the Federalists, the object of their un-.stinted expenditure in outfit, and the equally powerful regular
light battery of Griffin, were brought forward and placed in
immediate action, after having, conjointly with the batteries
already mentioned, played from former positions with destructive effect upon our forward battalions.
About two o'clock in the afternoon, General Beauregard
gave the order for the right of his line, except his resersves, to
advance to recover the plateau. It was done with uncommon
resolution and vigor, and at the same time Jackson's brigade
pierced the enemy's centre with the determination of veterans
and the spirit of men who fight for a sacred cause; but it suffered seriously. With equal spirit the other parts of the line
made the onset, and the Federal lines were broken and swept
back at all points from the open ground of the plateau. Rallying, soon, however, as they were strongly reinforced by fresh
regiments, the Federals returned, and, by the weight of numbers, pressed our lines back, recovered their ground and guns,
and renewed the offensive.
By this time, between half-past 2 and 3 o'clock, P. M., our
reinforcements pushed forward, and directed by General Johnston to the required quarter, were at hand just as General
Beauregard had ordered forward to a second effort, for the
recovery of the disputed plateau, the whole line, including his
* These houses were small wooden buildings, occupied at the time, the one
by the Widow Henry and the other by the free negro Robinson.




110           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
reserve, which, at this crisis of the battle, the commander felt
called upon to lead in person. This attack was general, and
was shared in by every regiment then in the field, including
the 6th (Fisher's) North Carolina regiment, which had just
come up. The whole open ground was again swept clear of
the enemy, and the plateau around the Henry and Robinson
houses remained finally in our possession, with the greater
part of the Ricketts and Griffin batteries. This part of the
day was rich with deeds of individual coolness and dauntless
conduct, as well as well-directed, embodied resolution and
bravery, but fraught with the loss to the service of the country of lives of inestimable preciousness at this juncture. The
brave Bee was mortally wounded at the head of the 4th Alabama and some Mississippians, in the open field near the
H-Ienry house; and, a few yards distant, Colonel Bartow had
fallen, shot through the heart. He was grasping the standard
of his regiment as he was shot, and calling the remnants of
his command to rally and follow him. He spoke after receiving his mortal wound, and his words were memorable. To the
few of his brave men who gathered around him he said, " They
have killed me, but never give up the field." The last command was gallantly obeyed, and his men silenced the battery
of which he died in the charge. Colonel Fisher had also been
killed. He had fallen at the head of the torn and thinned
ranks of his regiment.
The conflict had been awfully terrific. The enemy had been
driven back on our right entirely across the turnpike, and
beyond Young's Branch on our left. At this moment, the
desired reinforcements arrived.  Withers' 18th regiment of
Cocke's brigade had come up in time to follow the charge.
Kershaw's 2d and Cash's 8th South Carolina regiments arrived soon after Withers', and were assigned an advantageous
position. A more important accession, however, to our forces
was at hand. A courier had galloped from Manassas to report
that a Federal army had reached the line of the Manassas
Gap railroad, was marching towards us, and was then about
three or four miles from our left flank. Instead, however, of
the enemy, it was the long-expected reinforcements. General
Kirby Smith, with some seventeen hundred infantry of Elzey's brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah and Beckham's




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            111
battery, had reached Manassas, by railroad, at noon.  His
forces were instantly marched across the fields to the scene of,
action.
The flying enemy had been rallied under cover of a strong
Federal brigade, posted on a plateau near the intersection of
the turnpike and the Sudley-Brentsville road, and was now
making demonstrations to outflank and drive back our left,
and thus separate us from Manassas. General Smith was instructed by General Johnston to attack the right flank of the
enemy, now exposed to us. Before the movement was completed, he fell severely wounded. Colonel Elzey, at once taking command, proceeded to execute it with promptness and
vigor, while General Beauregard rapidly seized the opportunity, and threw forward his whole line.
About 3.30 P. M., the enemy, driven back on their left and
centre, and brushed from the woods bordering the Sudley
road, south and west from the Henry house, had formed a line
of battle of truly formidable proportions, of crescent outline,
reaching, on their left, from the vicinity of Pittsylvania (the
old Carter mansion), by Matthew's and in rear of Dogan's,
across the turnpike near to Chinn's house. The woods and
fields were filled with their masses of infantry and their carefully preserved cavalry. It was a truly magnificent, though
redoubtable spectacle, as they threw forward in fine style, on
the broad gentle slopes of the ridge occupied by their main
lines, a cloud of skirmishers, preparatory for another attack.
Colonel Early, who, by some mischance, did not receive
orders until 2 o'clock, which had been sent him at noon, came
on the ground immediately after Elzey, with Kemper's 7th
Virginia, Hay's 7th Louisiana, and Barksdale's 13th Mississippi regiments. This brigade, by the personal direction of
General Johnston, was marched by the Holkham house, across
the fields to the left, entirely around the woods through which
Elzey had passed, and under a severe fire, into a position in
line of battle near Chinn's house, outflanking the enemy's
right.
The enemy was making his last attempt to retrieve the day.
lHe had re-formed to renew the battle, again extending his
right with a, still wider sweep to turn our left. Colonel Early
was ordered to throw himself directly upon the right flank ot




112           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
the enemy, supported by Colonel Stuart's cavalry and Beckham's battery. As Early formed his line, and Beckham's
pieces played upon the right of the enemy, Elzey's brigade,
Gibbons' 10th Virginia, Lieut.-colonel Stuart's 1st Maryland,
and Vaughan's 3d Tennessee regiments, and Cash's 8th and
KIershaw's 2d South Carolina, Withers' 18th and Preston's 28th
Virginia, advanced in an irregular line, almost simultaneously.
The charge made by General Beauregard in front, was sustained by the resolute attack of Early on the right flank and
rear. The combined attack was too much for the enemy. He
was forced over the narrow plateau made by the intersection
of the two roads already mentioned. IHe was driven into the
fields, where his masses commenced to scatter in all available
directions towards Bull Run. He had lost all the artillery
which he had advanced to the last scene of the conflict; he
had no more fresh troops to rally on, and there were no combinations to avail him to make another stand. The day was
ours. From the long-contested hill from which the enemy had
been driven back, his retreating masses might be seen to break
over the fields stretching beyond, as the panic gathered in their
rear. The rout had become general and confused; the fields
were covered with black swarms of flying soldiers, while cheers
and yells taken up along our lines, for the distance of miles,
rung in the ears of the panic-stricken fugitives.
THE ROUT.
Early's brigade, meanwhile, joined by the 19th Virginia
regiment, of Cocke's brigade, pursued the now panic-stricken
fugitive enemy. Stuart, with his cavalry, and Beckham had
also taken up the pursuit along the road by which the enemy
had come upon the field that morning; but, soon cumbered by
prisoners who thronged the way, the former was unable to attack the mass of the fast-fleeing, frantic Federals. The want
of a cavalry force of sufficient numbers made an efficient pursuit a military impossibility.
But the pressure of close and general pursuit was not necessary to disorganize the flight of the enemy. Capt. Kemper
pursued the retreating masses to within range of Cub Run
Bridge. Upon the bridge, a shot took effect upon the horses




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           113
of a team that was crossing. The wagon was overturned directly in the centre of the bridge, and the passage was completely obstructed. The Confederates continued to play their
artillery upon the train carriages and artillery wagons, and
these were reduced to ruins. Cannons and caissons, ambulances and train-wagons, and hundreds of soldiers rushed down
the hill into a common heap, struggling and scrambling to
cross the stream and get away from their pursuers.
The retreat, the panic, the heedless, headlong confusion was
soon beyond a hope. Officers with leaves and eagles on their
shoulder-straps, majors and colonels who had deserted their
comrades, passed, galloping as if for dear life. Not a field-officer seemed to have remembered his duty. The flying teams
and wagons confused and dismembered every corps. For
three miles, hosts of the Federal troops-all detached from
their regiments, all mingled in one disorderly rout-were fleeing along the road. Army wagons, sutler's teams, and private
carriages choked the passage, tumbling against each other amid
clouds of dust, and sickening sights and sounds. Hacks containing unlucky spectators of the late affray were smashed like
glass, and the occupants were lost sight of in the debris.
Horses, flying wildly from the battle-field, many of them in
death agony, galloped at random forward, joining in the stampede. Those on foot who could catch them rode them bareback,
as much to save themselves from being run over as to make
quick time.
Wounded men lying along the banks —the few either left on
the field or not taken to the captured hospitals-appealed, with
raised hands, to those who rode horses, begging to be lifted
behind; but few regarded such petitions. Then, the artillery,
such as was saved, came thundering along, smashing and overpowering every thing. The regular cavalry joined in the
mVlee, adding to its terrors, for they rode down footmen without mercy. One of the great guns was overturned and lay
amid the ruins of a caisson. Sights of wild and terrible agony
met the eye everywhere. An eye-witness of the scene describes the despairing efforts of an artilleryman, who was running between the ponderous fore and after wheels of his guncarriage, hanging on with both hands and vainly striving to
jump upon the ordnance. The drivers were spurring the
8




114            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAER.
horses; he could not cling much longer, and a more agonized
expression never fixed the features of a drowning man. The
carriage bounded from the roughness of a steep hill leading to
a creek; he lost his hold, fell, and in an instant the great
wheels had crushed the life out of him.
The retreat did not slacken in the least until Centreville was
reached. There, the sight of the reserve —lMIiles's brigadeformed in order on the hill, seemed somewhat to reassure the
van. The rally was soon overcome by a few sharp discharges
of artillery, the Confederates having a gun taken from the enemy in position. The teams and foot-soldiers pushed on, passing
their own camp and heading swiftly for the distant Potomac.
The men literally screamed with rage and fright when their
way was blocked up. At every shot, a convulsion, as it were,
seized upon the morbid mass of bones, sinews, wood, and iron,
and thrilled through it, giving new energy and action to its
desperate efforts to get free from itself. The cry of " cavalry"
arose. Mounted men still rode faster, shouting out, " cavalry
is coming." For miles the roar of the flight might be beard.
Negro servants on led-horses dashed frantically past, men in
uniform swarmed by on mules, chargers, and even draught
horses, which had been cut out of carts and wagons, and went
on with harness clinging to their heels as frightened as their
riders. " We're whipped," " we're whipped," was the universal cry. The buggies and light wagons tried to pierce the rear
of the mass of carts, which were now solidified and moving on
like a glacier; while further ahead the number of mounted
men increased, and the volume of fugitives became denser.
For ten miles, the road over which the Grand Army had so
lately passed southward, gay with unstained banners, and
flushed with surety of strength, was covered with the fragments of its retreating forces, shattered and panic-stricken in a
single day.
It is impossible to conceive of a more deplorable spectacle
than was presented in Washington as the remnants of the army
came straggling in. During Sunday evening, it had been supposed in the streets of the Federal city that its army had won
a decisive and brilliant victory. The elation was extreme.
At each echo of the peals of the cannon, men were seen on the
street leaping up and exclaiming —" -here goes another hun



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           115
dred of the d -d rebels." The next morning the news of
defeat was brought by the tide of the panic-stricken fugitives.
One of the boats from Alexandria came near being sunk by the
rush of the panic-stricken soldiers upon its decks. Their panic
did not stop with their arrival in Washington. They rushed to
the depot to continue their flight from Washington. The government was compelled to put it under a strong guard to keep off
the fugitives who struggled to get on the Northern trains.
Others fled wildly into the country. Not a few escaped across
the Susquehanna in this manner, compelling the negroes they
met to exchange their clothes with them for their uniforms.
For four or five days, the wild and terror-stricken excitement
prevailed. Many of the fugitives, with garments nearly torn
from them, and covered with the blood of their wounds,
thronged the streets with mutinous demonstrations. Others,
exhausted with fatigue and hunger, fear and dismay upon their
countenances, with torn clothing, covered with dust and blood,
were to be seen in all quarters of the city, lying upon the pavements, cellar-doors, or any other spot that offered them a place
for the repose which nature demanded. Many of them had
nothing of the appearance of soldiers left except their besmeared and tattered uniforms. They did not pretend to observe any order, nor did their officers seem to exercise the least
authority over them. Some recounted to horror-stricken audiences the bloody prowess of the Confederate troops. The city
of Washington was for days in trembling expectation of the advance of the Confederate army, flushed with victory and intent
upon planting its flag upon the summits of the Northern capital.
We had, indeed, won a splendid victory, to judge from its
fruits within the limits of the battle-field. The events of the
battle of Manassas were glorious for our people, and were
thought to be of crushing effect upon the morale of our hitherto
confident and overweening adversary. Our loss was considerable. The killed outright numbered 369; the wounded, 1,483;
making an aggregate of 1,852. The actual loss of the enemy
will never be known; it may now only be conjectured. Their
abandoned dead, as they were buried by our people where they
fell, unfortunately were not enumerated, but many parts of the
field were thick with their corpses, as but few battle-fields have
ever been. The official reports of the enemy are expressly si



116           THEI FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
lent on this point, but still afford us data for an approximate
estimate. Left almost in the dark, in respect to the losses of
Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions-first, longest, and most
hotly engaged-we' are informed that Sherman's brigadeTyler's division-suffered in killed, wounded, and missing, 609;
that is about 18 per cent. of the brigade. A regiment of
Franklin's brigade-Gorman's-lost 21 per cent.  Griffin's
(battery) loss was 30 per cent.; and that of Keyes' brigade,
which was so handled by its commander, as to be exposed to
only occasional volleys from our troops, was at least 10 per
cent. To these facts add the repeated references in the reports
of the more reticent commanders, to the " murderous" fire to
which they were habitually exposed-the "pistol range" volleys, and galling musketry, of which they speak, as scourging
their ranks, and we are warranted in placing the entire loss of
the Federalists at over 4,500 in killed, wounded, and prisoners,
28 pieces of artillery, about 5,000 muskets, and nearly 500,000
cartridges; a garrison flag and 10 colors were captured on the
field or in the pursuit. Besides these, we captured 64 artillery
horses, with their harness, 26 wagons, and much camp equipage,
clothing, and other property, abandoned in their flight.
The news of our great victory was received by the people of
the South without indecent exultations. The feeling was one
of deep and quiet congratulation, singularly characteristic of
the Southern people. A superficial observer would have
judged Richmond, the Confederate capital, spiritless under the
news. There were no bells rung, no bonfires kindled, no exultations of a mob, and none of that parade with which the North
had exploited their pettiest successes in the opening of the war.
But there was what superficial observation might not have
apprehended and could not have appreciated-a deep, serious,
thrilling enthusiasm, which swept thousands of hearts, which
was too solemn for wild huzzas, and too thoughtful to be uttered
in the eloquence of ordinary words. The tremulous tones of
deep emotion, the silent grasp of the hand, the faces of men
catching the deep and burning enthusiasm of unuttered feelings
from each other, composed an eloquence to which words would
have been a mockery. Shouts would have marred the solemnnity of the general joy. The manner of the reception of the
news in Richmond was characteristic of the conservative and




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                117
poised spirit of our government and people. The only national
recognition of the victory was the passage of resolutions in the
Provisional Congress, acknowledging the interposition and
mercies of Providence in the affairs of the Confederacy, and
recommending thanksgiving services in all the churches of the
South on the ensuing Sabbath.
The victory had been won by the blood of many of our best
and bravest, and the public sorrow over the dead was called
upon to pay particular tributes to many of our officers who
had fallen in circumstances of particular gallantry. Among
others, Gen. Bee, to whose soldierly distinction and heroic services on the field justice was never fully done, until they were
especially pointed out in the official reports, both of General
Johnston and General Beauregard, had fallen upon the field.
The deceased general was a graduate of West Point. During
the Mexican war, he had served with marked, distinction, winning two brevets before the close of the war; the last that of
captain, for gallant and meritorious conduct in the storming of
Chapultepec. His achievements since that time in wars
among the Indians were such as to attract towards him  the
attention of his State; and in his dying hand, on the field in
which he fell, he grasped the sword which South Carolina had
taken pride in presenting him.
Colonel Francis S. Bartow, of Georgia, who had fallen in
the same charge in which the gallant South Carolinian had
received his death-wound, was chairman of the Military Committee of the Provisional Congress, and that body paid a public tribute of more than usual solemnity and eloquence to his
memory.*
* An eloquent tribute was paid to the memory of Colonel Bartow in Congress by Mr. Mason, of Virginia, in which some interesting recitals were
given of Colonel..Bartow's short, but brilliant experiences of the camp. The
following extract is indicative of a spirit of confidence, which was peculiarly
characteristic of the officers and men alike of our army:
" While in camp, and before the advance of Patterson's column into Virginia, but while it yet hovered on the border in Maryland, watched closely
by Johnston's army, I said, casually, to Colonel Bartow,'The time is approaching when your duties will call you to meet Congress at Richmond, and
I look to the pleasure of travelling there with you.' He replied,'I don't
think I can go; my duties will detain me here.' I told him that if a battle
was fought between the two armies, it certainly was not then imminent, and
I thought his service in Congress, and especially as chairman of the Military




118              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
The results of the victory of Manassas were, on the first
days of its full announcement, received in the South as indicative of a speedy termination of the war. The advance of our
army on Washington was impatiently expected.  A few days
passed, and it became known to the almost indignant disappointment of the people, that our army had no thoughts of an
advance upon the Northern capital, and was content to remain
where it was, occupying the defensive line of Bull Run.
Much has been said and written in excuse of the palpable
and great error, the perniciousness of which no one doubted
after its effects were realized, of the failure of the Confederate
army to take advantage of its victory, and press on to Washington, where for days there was nothing to oppose them but
Committee, would be even more valuable to the country in Congress, than in
the field. After a pause, and with a beaming eye, he said:'No, sir; I shall
never leave this army, until the battle is fought and won.' And, afterwards,
while the two armies lay in front of each other, the enemy at Martinsburg,
and Johnston with his command at Bunker Hill, only seven miles apart-the
enemy we knew numbered some twenty-two thousand men, while on our side
we could not present against them half that number, and the battle hourly
expected. His head-quarters under a tree in an orchard, and his shelter and
shade from a burning sun the branches of that tree, and his table a camp
chest-I joined him at dinner. Little is, of course, known of the views and
purposes of a general in command, but it was generally understood that
Johnston was then to give the enemy battle, should he invite it. In conversation on the chances of the fight, I said to Bartow,'of the spirit and courage
of the troops I have no doubt, but the odds against you are immense.' His
prompt reply was,'they can never whip us. We shall not count the odds.
We may be exterminated, but never conquered. I shall go into that fight
with a determination never to leave the field alive, but in victory, and I know
that the same spirit animates my whole command. How, then, can they whip
us?'
" Am I here to tell you how gallantly and truthfully he made that vow good
on the bloody plain at Manassas, and how nobly the troops under his command there redeemed the pledge made for them? The'battle was fought
and won,' as he vowed at Bunker Hill, and he sealed in death his first promise
in the field of war. Will you call this courage-bravery? No, no. Bartow
never thought of the perils of the fight. Bravery, as it is termed, may be
nothing more than nervous insensibility. With him the incentives to the
battle-field were of a far different type. The stern and lofty purpose to free
his country from the invader; the calm judgment of reason, paramount on its
throne, overruling all other sensations; resolution and will combined to the
deed, the consequence to take care of itself. There is the column of true
majesty in man. Such was Bartow, and such will impartial history record
him. He won immortality in Fame, even at the threshold of her temple."




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            119
an utterly demoralized army, intent upon a continuance of
their flight at the approach of our forces. In his official report, General Johnston insists that " no serious thoughts " were
ever entertained of advancing against the capital, as it was
considered certain that the fresh troops within the works were,
in number, quite sufficient for their defence; and that if not,
General Patterson's army would certainly reinforce them soon
enough. This excuse takes no account of the utterly demoralized condition of the Northern forces at Washington; and
the further explanations of the inadequate means of our army
in ammunition, provisions, and transportation are only satisfactory excuses, why the toil of pursuit was not undertaken
immediately after the battle, and do not answer with complete
satisfaction the inquiry why an advance movement was not
made within the time when means for it might have been furnished, and the enemy was still cowed, dispirited, and trembling
for his safety in the refuges of Washington.
The fact is, that our army had shown no capacity to understand the extent of their fortunes, or to use the unparalleled
opportunities they had so bravely won. They had achieved a
victory not less brilliant than that of Jena, and not more profitable than that of Alma. Instead of entering the gates of
Sebastopol from the last-named field, the victors preferred to
wait and reorganize, and found, instead of a glorious and unresisting prey, a ten months' siege.
The lesson of a lost opportunity in the victory of Manassas
had to be repeated to the South With additions of misfortune.
For months the world was to witness our largest army in the
field confronting in idleness and the demoralizations of a stationary camp an enemy already routed within twenty miles of
his capital; giving him the opportunity not only to repair the
shattered columns of his Grand Army, but to call nearly half a
million of new men into the field; to fit out four extensive
armadas; to fall upon a defenceless line of sea-coast; to open a
new theatre of war in the West and on the Mississippi, and to
cover the frontiers of half a continent with his armies and
navies.




120               THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
INCIDENTS OF THE BATTLE.
A friend, Captain McFarland, who did service in the battle
of Manassas as a private in Captain Powell's Virginia cavalry,
has furnished us with a diary of some thrilling incidents of
the action.  We use a few  of them  in Captain McFarland's
words:
"At 8 A. M. we proceeded to take position as picket guard and videttes in
a little clump of timber, about three quarters of a mile, directly in front of the
Confederate earth-works at Mitchell's Ford. The picket consisted of twelve
infantry and three cavalry. Having secured our horses, we lay down in the
edge of the timber, and with our long-range rifles commenced to pick off such
of the enemy as were sufficiently presumptuous to show themselves clear of
the heavy timber which crowned the distant hill. In a short time, the enemy,
being very much annoyed by our sharp shooting, ran out from the woods,
both in our front and on the left, two rifle pieces, and threw their conical
shells full into our covert. The pickets, however, were not dislodged. But two
of our horses became frantic from the whistling and explosion of the shells,
and we found it necessary to remove them. Just at this moment, a detachment
of the enemy's cavalry came dashing down the road, but halted before they
came within range of the muskets of the infantry. The enemy then commenced a heavy firing with artillery on our earth-works at the ford, and we
retired beyond Bull Run.
In the mean time, the thunder of battle was heard on our left, and from the
heights above the stream could be seen the smoke from the scene of the conflict, which, as it shifted position, showed the varying tide of conflict. Occasionally, a small white cloud of smoke made its appearance above the horizon,
indicating the premature explosion of a bomb-shell; while, at painfully regular intervals, the dull, heavy report of the enemy's thirty-two pounder told us
that its position remained unassailed. In the mean time, the infantry in the
trenches at Mitchell's Ford were impatiently awaiting the vainly looked-for
advance upon our breastworks. The enemy threw their shells continuously
into this locality, but during the whole day killed only three men, and these
were standing up contrary to orders. This position was commanded by the
brave Brigadier-general M. L. Bonham, of South Carolina.
About 11 o'clock, the cavalry were ordered to ride to the main field of
action, in the vicinity of the Stone Bridge. We set off at a dashing gallop,
throwing down fences and leaping ditches, in our eagerness to participate in
the then raging conflict. In crossing an open field, I was, with Lieutenant
Timberlake, riding at the head of a detachment, consisting of Captain Wickham's light-horse troop, and Captain E. B. Powell's company of Fairfax cavalry, when a,shell was thrown at the head of the column from a rifle piece
stationed at the distance of not less than two miles, and as, hurrying onward,
we leaned down upon our horses, the hurtling missile passed a few inches
above us, burying itself harmlessly in the soft earth on our left.
On arriving near the scene of action, we took position below the Lewis
house, under cover of an abruptly rising hill. Here we remained stationary




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                    121
for about an hour. The enemy in the mean time, knowing our position, endeavored to dislodge us with their shells, which for some time came hissing
over our heads, and exploded harmlessly in our rear. Finally, however, they
lowered their guns sufficiently to cause their shot to touch the crest of the
hill, and ricochet into our very midst, killing one man, besides wounding sev-,
eral, and maiming a number of horses. But we still retained our position
amid the noise of battle, which now became terrific.
From the distance came the roar of the enemy's artillery, while near by our
field-pieces were incessantly vomiting their showers of grape and hurling
their small shell into the very teeth of the foe. At intervals, as regiments
came face to face, the unmistakable rattle of the musketry told that the smallarms of our brave boys were doing deadly work. At times, we could hear wild
yells and cheers which rose above the din, as our infantry rushed on to the
charge. Then followed an ominous silence, and I could imagine the fierce but
quiet work of steel to steel, until another cheer brought me knowledge of the
baffled enemy.
Meanwhile, our reinforcements were pouring by, and pressing with enthusiastic cheers to the battle-field. On the other hand, many of our wounded were
borne past us to the rear. One poor fellow was shot through the left cheek;
as he came past me, he smiled, and muttered with difficulty, " Boys, they've
spoilt my beauty." He could say no more, but an expression of acute pain
flitted across his face, and shaking his clenched fist in the direction of the foe,
he passed on. Another came by, shot in the breast. His clothing had been
stripped from over his ghastly wound, and at every breath, the warm lifeblood gushed from his bosom. I rode up to him, as, leaning on two companions, he stopped for a moment to rest. " My poor fellow," said I, " I am sorry
to see you thus." " Yes I yes," was his reply, "they've done for me now, but
my father's there yet! our army's there yet! our cause is there yet!" and
raising himself from the arms of his companions, his pale face lighting up like
a sunbeam, he cried with an enthusiasm I shall never forget, "and Liberty's
there yet!" But this spasmodic exertion was too much for him, a purple flood
poured from his wound, and he swooned away. I was enthusiastic before, but
I felt then as if I could have ridden singly and alone upon a regiment, regardless of all but my country's cause.
Just then, the noble Beauregard came dashing by with his staff, and the cry
was raised, that part of Sherman's battery had been taken. Cheer after cheer
went up from our squadrons. It was taken up and borne along the whole
battle-field, until the triumphant shout seemed one grand cry of victory. At
this auspicious moment, our infantry who had been supporting the batteries
were ordered to rise and charge the enemy with the bayonet. With terrific
yells, they rushed upon the Federal legions with an impetuosity which could
not be withstood, and terror-stricken, they broke and fled like deer from the
cry of wolves. Our men followed hard upon them, shouting, and driving their
bayonets up to the hilt in the backs of such of the enemy as by ill luck
chanced to be hindmost in the flight.
At this moment, one of Gen. Beauregard's aids rode rapidly up and spoke
to Col. Radford, commander of our regiment of Virginia cavalry, who immediately turned to us and shouted, " Men, now is our time I" It was the happiest moment of my life. Taking a rapid gallop, we crossed Bull Run about
three-quarters of a mile below the Stone Bridge, and made for the rear of the




122              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
now flying enemy. On we dashed, with the speed of the wind, our horses
wild with excitement, leaping fences, ditches, and fallen trees, until we came
opposite to the house of Mrs. Spindle, which was used by the enemy as a hospital, and in front of which was a small cleared space, the fence which inclosed
it running next the timber. Leaping this fence, we debouched from the woods
with a demoniacal yell, and found ourselves on the flank of the enemy.
The remnant of Sherman's battery was passing at the time, and thus
we threw ourselves between the main body of the enemy and Sherman's
battery, which, supported by four regiments of infantry, covered the retreat of the Federal army. Our regiment had divided in the charge, and our
detachment now consisted of Capt. Wickham's cavalry, Capt. E. B. Powell's
troop of Fairfax cavalry, the Radford Rangers, Capt. Radford, the whole led
by Col. Radford.
Our onslaught was terrific. With our rifles and shot-guns, we killed fortynine of the enemy the first discharge, then drawing our sabres, we dashed
upon them, cutting them down indiscriminately.
With several others, I rode up to the door of the hospital in which a number of terrified Yankees had crowded for safety, and as they came out, we shot
them down with our pistols. Happening at this moment to turn round, I saw
a Yankee soldier in the act of discharging his musket at the group stationed
around the door. Just as he fired, I wheeled my horse, and endeavored to
ride him down, but he rolled over a fence which crossed the yard. This, I
forced my horse to leap, and drawing my revolver, I shouted to him to stop;
as he turned, I aimed to fire into his face, but my horse being restive, the ball
intended for his brain, only passed through his arm, which he held over his
head, and thence through his cap. I was about to finish him with another
shot (for I had vowed to spare no prisoners that day), when I chanced to look
into his face. He was a beardless boy, evidently not more than seventeen
years old. I could not find it in my heart. to kill him, for he plead piteously;
so seizing him by the collar, and putting my horse at the speed, leaping the
fence, I dragged him to our rear-guard.
Just at this moment, I saw that the enemy had unlimbered two field-pieces,
and were preparing to open upon us. Capt. Radford was near me, and I
pointed to the cannon. He dashed the spurs into his horse, and shouted,
" Charge the battery." But only twenty of our men were near, the rest having
charged the rear of the main body of the flying Federals.. Besides this, the
cannon were supported by several regiments of infantry. We saw our situation at a glance, and determined to retreat to the enemy's flank. We were
very close to the battery, and as I wheeled my horse, I fired a shot from my
revolver at the man who was aiming the piece. He reeled, grasped at the.wheel, and fell. I had thrown myself entirely on the left side of my horse,
my foot hanging upon the croup of the saddle, and the grape consequently
passed over me. Capt. Radford was in advance of me, his horse very unruly,
plunging furiously. As I rode up, he uttered a cry, and put his hand to his
side. At this instant, we came to a fence, and my horse cleared it with
a bound. I turned to look for Capt. Radford, but he was not visible. A
grape-shot had entered just above the hip, and tearing through his bowels,
passed out of his left side. He fell from his steed, which leaped the fence
and ran off. The captain was found afterwards by some of Col. Munford's
cavalry. He lived till sunset, and died in great agony. By this discharge




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                   123
were killed, besides Capt. R., a lieutenant, two non-commissioned officers, and
five privates.
Having gained the flank of the enemy, I dismounted and fired for some
time with my rifle into the passing columns. Suddenly I found myself entirely
alone, and remounting, I rode back until I found Col. Munford's column
drawn up in the woods. Not being able to find my own company, I returned
to the pursuit.
Kemper's battery had dashed upon the horror-stricken foe, and opened on
their rear, which was covered by the remainder of Sherman's battery, including the thirty-two pound rifle-gun, known as " Long Tom." The havoc produced was terrible. Drivers were shot from their horses, torn to pieces by
the shells and shot. Cannon were dismounted, wheels smashed, horses
maimed, and the road strewn with the dead. This completed the rout, and
the passage of Cub Run was blocked by wagons and caissons being driven
into the fords above and below the bridge, and upon the bridge itself.
The route taken by the flying enemy was blocked with dead. I saw Yankees stone-dead, without a wound. They had evidently died from exhaustion
or sheer fright. Along the route we found the carriage of Governor Sprague
of Rhode Island, and in it his overcoat, with several baskets of champagne.
The necks of the bottles were snapped in a trice, and we drank to our victory.
But our delight and pride can scarcely be imagined, when we found "Long
Tom," whose whistling shells had been falling continually among us from
early dawn. It was hauled back to Bull Run amid the shouts of our men, and
particularly Kemper's artillery boys, who acted so well their part in causing
the Federals to abandon it.
* *  * * * * * * The following morning, in the dark drizzling
rain, I rode over the field of battle. It was a sorrowful and terrible spectacle
to behold, without the stirring excitements of battle to relieve the horrors of
the ghastly heaps of dead that strewed the field. At a distance, some portions of the field presented the appearance of flower-gardens, from the gay
colors of the uniforms, turbans, &c., of the dead Zouaves. The faces of many
of the dead men were already hideously swollen, blotched, and blackened,
from the effects of the warm, wet atmosphere of the night.
In a little clump of second-growth pines, a number of wounded had crawled
for shelter. Many of our men were busy doing them offices of kindness and
humanity. There was one New York Zouave who appeared to be dying; his
jaws were working, and he seemed to be in great agony. I poured some water down his throat, which revived him. Fixing his eyes upon me, with a
look of fierce hatred, he muttered, " You d-d rebel, if I had a musket I
would blow out your infernal soul." Another pale youth was lying in the
wet undergrowth, shivering in the rain, and in the cold of approaching death.
He was looking wistfully towards a large, warm blanket spread across my
saddle, and said in his halting, shivering breath, "I'm so cold." I spread the
blanket over him, and left him to that end of his wretchedness which could
not be far distant.




124               THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
CHAPTER V.
Results of the Manassas Battle in the North.-General Scott.-McClellan, " the
Young Napoleon."-Energy of the Federal Government.-The Bank Loan.-Events
in the West.-The MIssoURI CAMPAIGN. —Governor Jackson's Proclamation.-Sterling
Price.-The Affair of Booneville.-Organization of the Missouri forces.-The BATTLE
OF CARTHAGE.-General McCulloch.-The BATTLE OF OAF E HILL.-Death of General
Lyon.-The Confederate Troops leave Missouri.-Operations in Northern Missouri.General Harris.-General Price's march towards the Missouri.-The Affair at Drywood Creek.-The BATTLE or LEXINGTON.-The Jayhawkers.-The Victory of " the
Five Hundred." —General Price's Achievements.-His Retreat and the necessity for
it.-Operations of General Jeff. Thompson in Southeastern Missouri.-The Affair of
Fredericktown.-General Price's passage of the Osage River. —Secession of Missouri
from the Federal Union.-Fremont superseded.-The Federal forces in Missouri demoralized.-General Price at Springfield.-Review of his Campaign.-SKETcC o0r
GENERAL PRICE.-Coldness of the Government towards him.
THE Northern mind demanded a distinguished victim for its
humiliating defeat at Manassas. The people and government
of the North had alike flattered themselves with the expectation of possessing Richmond by midsummer; their forces were
said to be invincible, and their ears were not open to any report or suggestion of a possible disaster. On the night of the
21st of July, the inhabitants of the Northern cities had slept
upon the assurances of victory. It would be idle to attempt a
description of their disappointment and consternation on the
succeeding day.
The Northern newspapers were forced to the acknowledgment of a disaster at once humiliating and terrible. They assigned various causes for it. Among these were the non-arrival of General Patterson and the incompetence of their general
officers. The favorite explanation of the disaster was, however, the premature advance of the army under General Scott's
direction; although the fact was, that the advance movement
had been undertaken from the pressure of popular clamor in the
North.
The clamor was now for new commanders. It came from
the army and the people indiscriminately.  The commanderin-chief, General Scott, was said to be impaired in his faculties
by age, and it was urged that he should be made to yield the




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           125
command to a younger and more efficient spirit. The railing
accusations against General Scott were made by Northern
journals that had, before the issue of Manassas, declared him
to be the " Greatest Captain of the Age," and without a rival
among modern military chieftains. It was thought no alleviation of the matter that he was not advised, as his friends represented, of the strength of " the rebels." It was his business to
have known it, and to have calculated the result.
General Scott cringed at the lash of popular indignation
with a humiliation painful to behold. He was not great in
misfortune. In a scene with President Lincoln, the incidents
of which were related in the Federal House of Representatives
by General Richardson, of Illinois, he declared that he had
acted " the coward," in yielding to popular clamor for an advance movement, and sought in this wretched and infamous
confession the mercy of demagogues who insulted his fallen
fortunes.
The call for a "younger general" to take command of the
Federal forces was promptly responded to by the appointment
of General G. B. McClellan to the command of the Army of
the Potomac. The understanding on both sides of the line
was, that General Scott was virtually superseded by the Federal government, so far as the responsibility of active service
was concerned, though he retained his nominal position and
pay as lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief of the Army
of the United States. The unfortunate commander experienced
the deep humiliation and disgrace of being adjudged incompetent by the North, whose cause he had unnaturally espoused,
and whose armies he had sent into the field as invaders of the
land of his birth. The retribution was righteous. No penalties of fortune were too severe for a general who had led or
directed an army to trample upon the graves of his sires and
to despoil the homes of his kindred and country.
General McClellan had been lifted into an immense pojpularity by his successes in Northwestern Virginia, in the affair
of Rich Mountain and the pursuit of General Garnett, which
Northern exaggeration had transformed into great victories.
For weeks he had been the object of a " sensation."  Htis name
was displayed in New York, on placards, on banners, and in
newspaper headings, with the phrase, "McClellan-two victo



126           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
ries in one day." The newspapers gave him the title of "the
Young Napoleon," and in the South the title was derisively
perpetuated. He was only thirty-five years of age-small in
stature, with black hair and moustaches, and a remarkable
military precision of manner. He was a pupil of West Point,
and had been one of the American Military Commission to the
Crimea. When appointed major-general of volunteers by
Governor Dennison, of Ohio, he had resigned from the army,
and was superintendent of the Ohio and Mississippi railroad, a
dilapidated concern. There is no reason to suppose that the
man who was appointed to the responsible and onerous commnand of the Army of the Potomac was any thing more than
the creature of a feeble popular applause.
A leading Southern newspaper had declared, on the announcement of the complete and brilliant victory at Manassas,
"the independence of the Confederacy is secured." There
could not have been a greater mistake. The active and elastic
spirit of the North was soon at work to repair its fortunes; and
time and opportunity were given it by the South, not only to
recover lost resources, but to invent new. The government at
Washington displayed an energy which, perhaps, is the most
remarkable phenomenon in the whole history of the war: it
multiplied its armies; it reassured the confidence of the people; it recovered itself from financial straits which were almost thought to be hopeless, and while the politicians of the
South were declaring that the Federal treasury was bankrupt,
it negotiated a loan of one hundred and fifty millions of dollars
from the banks of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, at a
rate but a fraction above that of legal interest in the State of
New York.
While the North was thus recovering its resources on the
frontiers of Virginia and preparing for an extension of the
campaign, events were transpiring in the West which were
giving extraordinary lessons of example and encouragement
to the Southern States bordering on the Atlantic and Gulf.
These events were taking place in Missouri. The campaign
in that State was one of the most brilliant episodes of the war,
one of the most remarkable in history, and one of the most
fruitful in the lessons of the almost miraculous achievements
of a people stirred by the enthusiasm of revolution.. To




TEIE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           127
the direction of these events we must now divert our narrative.
THE MISSOURI CAMPAIGN.
The riots in St. Louis, to which reference has already been
made, were the inaugurating scenes of the revolution in Missouri. The Federal government had commenced its programme of subjugation with a high-hand. On the 10th of
May, a brigade of Missouri militia, encamped under the law
of the State for organizing and drilling the militia, at Camp
Jackson, on the western outskirts of St. Louis, had been forced
to surrender unconditionally on the demand of Captain (after.
wards General) Lyon of the Federal Army.  In the riots
excited by the Dutch soldiery in St. Louis, numbers of citizens
had been murdered in cold blood; a reign of terror was
established; and the most severe measures were taken by the
Federal authority to keep in subjection the excitement and
rage of the people. St. Louis was environed by a line of
military posts; all the arms and ammunition in the city were
seized, and the houses of citizens searched for concealed munitions of war. The idea of any successful resistance of Missouri to the Federal power was derided. "Let her stir," said
the Lincolnites, " and the lion's paw will crush out her paltry
existence."
The several weeks that elapsed between the fall of Fort
Sumter and the early part of June were occupied by the Secessionists in Missouri with efforts to gain time by negotiation
and with preparations for the contest. At length, finding
further delay impossible, Governor Jackson issued his proclamation, calling for fifty thousand volunteers. At the time of
issuing this proclamation, on the 13th of June, 1861, the governor was advised of the purpose of the Federal authorities to
send an effective force from St. Louis to Jefferson City, the
capital of the State. He determined, therefore, to move at
once with the State records to Booneville, situated on the south
bank of the Missouri, eighty miles above Jefferson City. Before his departure from the latter place, he had conferred upon
Sterling Price the position of major-general of the army of Missouri, and had also appointed nine brigadier-generals. These




128           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
were Generals Parsons, M. L. Clark, John B. Clark, Slack,
Harris, Stein, Rains, McBride, and Jeff. Thompson.
There was at the time of the issuance of this proclamation
no military organization of any description in the State. Per
haps, there had not been a militia muster in Missouri for twelve
or fifteen years, there being no law to require it. The State
was without arms or ammunition. Such was her condition,
when, with a noble and desperate gallantry that might have
put to blush forever the stale and common excuse of "helplessness" for a cringing submission to tyranny, the State of
Missouri determined alone and unaided to confront and resist
the whole power of the North, and to fight it to the issue of
liberty or death.
Orders were issued by General Price, at Jefferson City, to
the several brigadiers just appointed, to organize their forces
as rapidly as possible, and send them forward to Booneville and
Lexington.
On the 20th June, General Lyon and Colonel F. P. Blair,
with seven thousand Federal troops, well drilled and well
armed, came up the river by vessels, and debarked about five
miles below Booneville. To oppose theml there the Missourians
had but about eight hundred men, armed with ordinary rifles
and shot-guns, without a piece of artillery, and with but little
ammunition. Lyon's command had eight pieces of cannon and
the best improved small-arms. The Missourians were commanded by Colonel Marmaduke, a graduate of West Point.
Under the impression that the forces against him were inconsiderable, he determined to give them battle; but, upon ascertaining their actual strength, after he had formed his line, he
told his men they could not reasonably hope to defend the
position, and ordered them to retreat. This order they refused
to obey. They declared that they would not leave the ground
without exchanging shots with the enemy. The men remained
on the field, commanded by their captains and by Lieutenantcolonel Horace Brand. A fight ensued of an hour and a half
or more; the result of which was the killing and wounding of
upwards of one hundred of the enemy, and a loss of three
Missourians killed and twenty-five or thirty wounded, several
of whom afterwards died. "The barefoot rebel militia," as
they were sneeringly denominated, exhibited a stubbornness on




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           129
the field of their first fight which greatly surprised their enemy,
and, overpowered by his numbers, they retreated in safety, if
not in order.
Governor Jackson and General Price arrived at Booneville,
from Jefferson City, on the 18th June. Immediately after his
arrival, General Price was taken down with a violent sickness,
which threatened a serious termination. On the 19th, he was
placed on board a boat for Lexington, one of the points at
which he had ordered troops to be congregated. This accounts
for his absence from the battle of Booneville.
A portion of the Missouri militia engaged in the action,
from two hundred and fifty to three hundred in number, took
up their line of march for the southwestern portion of the
State, under the direction of Governor Jackson, accompanied
by the heads of the State Department and by General J. B.*
Clark and General Parsons. They marched some twenty-five
miles after the fight of the morning, in the direction of a place
called Cole Camp, to which point it happened that General
Lyon and Colonel Blair had sent from seven hundred to one
thousand of their "Home Guard," with a view of intercepting the retreat of Jackson. Ascertaining this fact, Governor
Jackson halted his forces for the night within twelve or fifteen
miles of Camp Cole. Luckily, an expedition for their relief
had been speedily organized south of Cole Camp, and was at
that very moment ready to remove all obstructions in the way
of their journey. This expedition, consisting of about three
hundred and fifty men, was commanded by Colonel O'Kane,
and was gotten up, in a few hours, in the neighborhood south
of the enemy's camp. The so-called "Home Guards," consisting almost exclusively of Germans, were under the command
of Colonel Cook, a brother of the notorious B. F. Cook, who
was executed at Charlestown, Virginia, in 1859, as an accomplice of John Brown, in the Harper's Ferry raid. Colonel
O'Kane approached the camp of the Federals after the hour of
midnight. They had no pickets out, except in the direction of
Jackson's forces, and he consequently succeeded in completely
surprising them. They were encamped in two large barns,
and were asleep when the attack was made upon them at daybreak. In an instant, they were aroused, routed, and nearly
annihilated; two hundred and six of them being killed, a still
9




130           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
larger number wounded, and upwards of one hundred taken
prisoners. Colonel Cook and the smaller portion of his command made their escape. The Missourians lost four men killed
and fifteen or twenty wounded. They captured three hundred
and sixty-two muskets; thus partially supplying themselves
with bayonets, the weapons for which they said they had a
particular use in the war against their invaders. Of this succes  of the Missouri "rebels" there was never any account
published, even in the newspapers of St. Louis.
Having been reinforced by Col. O'Kane, Governor Jackson
proceeded with his reinforcements to Warsaw, on the Osage
river in Benton county, pursued by Col. Totten of the Federal
army, with fourteen hundred men, well armed and having several pieces of artillery. Upon the receipt of erroneous infor-',mation as to the strength of Jackson's forces, derived from a
German who escaped the destruction of Camp Cole, and perhaps, also, from the indications of public sentiment in the
country through which he marched, Col. Totten abandoned
the pursuit and returned to the army under Gen. Lyon, at
Booneville. Jackson's forces rested at Warsaw for two days,
after which they proceeded to Montevallo, in Vernon county,
where they halted and remained for six days, expecting to form
a junction at that point with another column of their forces
that had been congregated at Lexington, and ordered by Gen.
Price to the southwestern portion of the State.
That column was under the command of Brigadier-generals
Rains and Slack, and consisted of some twenty-five hundred
men. Col. Prince, of the Federal army, having collected a
force of four or five thousand men from Kansas, with a view of
cutting them of, Gen. Price ordered a retreat to some point in
the neighborhood of Montevallo. Gen. Price, still very feeble
from his recent severe attack of sickness, started with one hundred men to join his forces. His object was to draw his army
away from the base-line of the enemy, the MIissouri river, and
to gain time for the organization of his army. The column
from Lexington marched forward, without blankets or clothing
of any kind, without wagons, without tents, and,.indeed, without any thing usually reckoned among the comforts of an army.
They had to rely for subsistence on the country through which
they passed-a friendly country it is true, but they had but




TRE FIRST YEAR OF TRE WAR.           131
little time to partake of hospitalities on their march, being
closely pursued by the enemy. On the night of the 3d of July,
the column from Lexington formed a junction with Jackson's
forces in Cedar county.
That night, under orders from Governor Jackson, all the men
belonging to the districts of brigadier-generals then present,
reported respectively to their appropriate brigadier-generals
for the purpose of being organized into companies, battalions,
regiments, brigades, and divisions. The result was, that about
two thousand reported to Brig.-gen. Rains, six hundred to
Brig.-gen. Slack, and about five hundred each to Brigadiergenerals J. B. Clark and Parsons; making an entire force of
about three thousand six hundred men. Some five or six hundred of the number were, however, entirely unarmed; and the
common rifle and the shot-gun constituted the weapons of the
armed men, with the exception of the comparatively few who
carried the muskets taken in the fight at Cole Camp. The
army was organized by 12 o'clock, the 4th of July, and in one
hour thereafter, it took up the line of march for the southwest.
Before leaving, Governor Jackson received intelligence that
he was pursued by Gen. Lyon, coming'down from a northeasterly direction, and by Lane and Sturgis from the northwest,
their supposed object being to form a junction in his rear, with
a force sufficiently large to crush him. He marched his command a distance of twenty-three miles by nine o'clock on the
evening of the 4th, at which hour he stopped for the night. Before the next morning, he received authentic intelligence that
a column of men, three thousand in number, had been sent out
from St. Louis on the southwestern branch of the Pacific railroad for Rolla, under the command of Gen. Sigel, and that they
had arrived at the town of Carthage, immediately in his front,
thus threatening him with battle in the course of a few hours.
Such was the situation of the undisciplined, badly-armed MAissouri State troops, on the morning of the 5th of July; a large
Federal force in their rear, pressing upon them, while Sigel in
front intercepted their passage. But they were cheerful and
buoyant in spirit, notwithstanding the perilous position in which
they were placed. They resumed their march at two o'clock on
the morning of the 5th, and proceeded, without halting, a distance of ten miles. At 10 o'clock A. M., they approached a




132           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
creek within a mile and a half of the enemy, whose forces were
in line of battle under Sigel, in the open prairie, upon the brow
of a hill, and in three detachments, numbering nearly three
thousand men.
THE BATTLE OF CARTHAGE.
The Missourians arrived on their first important battle-field
with a spirit undiminished by the toil of their march and their
sufferings. The men were suffering terribly for water, but
could find none, the enemy being between them and the creek.
The line of battle was formed with about twelve hundred men as
infantry, commanded by Brigadier-generals J. B. Clark, Parsons, and Slack, and the remainder acting as cavalry under Brigadier-general Rains, the whole under the command of Governor Jackson. The infantry were formed, and placed in line of
battle six hundred yards from the enemy, on the brow of the
hill fronting his line. The cavalry deployed to the right and
left, with a view of charging and attacking the enemy on his
right and left wing, while the infantry were to advance from
the front. Sigel had eight pieces of cannon. The Missourians
had a few old pieces, but nothing to charge them with. While
their cavalry were deploying to the right and left, Sigel's batteries opened upon their line with grape, canister, shell, and
round-shot. The cannon of the Missourians replied as best
they could. They were loaded with trace-chains, bits of iron,
rocks, &c. It was difficult to get their cavalry up to the position agreed upon as the one from which a general charge should
be commenced upon the foe. Sigel would turn his batteries
upon them whenever they came in striking distance, causing
a stampede among the horses, and subjecting the troops to a
galling fire. This continued to be the case for an hour and
thirty-five minutes. Owing to the difficulty of bringing the
horses into position, the brigadier-generals ordered the infantry
to charge the enemy, the cavalry to come up at the same time
in supporting distance. They advanced in double-quick, with
a shout, when the enemy retreated across Bear Creek, a wide
and deep stream, and then destroyed the bridge over which
they crossed. Sigel's forces retreated along the bank of the
creek a distance of a mile or a mile and a half, and formed




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           133
behind a skirt of timber. The Missourians had to cross an
open field, exposed to a raking fire, before they could reach the
corner of the woods, beyond which the enemy had formed. A
number of the cavalry dismounted and acted with the infantry,
thus bringing into active use nearly all the small-arms brought
upon the field. They rushed to the skirt of timber, and opened
vigorously upon the enemy across the stream, who returned
the fire with great spirit. For the space of an hour, the fire
on each side was incessant and fierce. The Missourians threw
a quantity of dead timber into the stream,'and commenced
crossing over in large numbers, when the enemy again abandoned his position and started in the direction of Carthage,
eight miles distant. A running fight was kept up all the way
to Carthage, Sigel and his forces being closely pursued by the
men whom they; had expected to capture without a fight. At
Carthage, the enemy again made a stand, forming an ambuscade behind houses, wood-piles, and fences. After a severe engagement there of some forty minutes, he retreated under cover
of night in the direction of Rolla. He was pursued some
three or four miles, till near nine o'clock, when the Missourians
were called back and ordered to collect their wounded. They
camped at Carthage that night (July 5), on the same ground
that Sigel had occupied two nights before. The little army had
done a brilliant day's work. They had fought an enemy from
10 A. M. to 9 P. M., killing and wounding a considerable number
of his men, and driving him twelve miles on the route of his
retreat. They afterwards ascertained that he continued to
march all night, and did not halt till eleven o'clock the next
day, nearly thirty miles from Carthage. The casualties of the
day cannot be given with accuracy. The Missourians lost between forty and fifty killed, and from one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fifty wounded. The loss of the enemy was estimated at from one hundred and fifty to two hundred killed, and from three hundred to four hundred woundedhis killed and wounded being scattered over a space of upwards
of ten miles. The Missourians captured several hundred muskets, which were given to their unarmed soldiers. The victory
of Carthage had an inspiriting effect upon the Missourians, and
taught the enemy a lesson of humility which he did not soon
forget. It awakened the Federal commanders in Missouri to




134           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
a sense of the magnitude of the work before them. When
Sigel first got sight of the forces drawn up against him, he
assured his men that there would be no serious conflict. Ile
said they were coming into line like a worm-fence, and that a
few grape, canister, and shell thrown into their midst, would
throw them into confusion, and put them to flight. This ac-'
complished, he would charge them with his cavalry and take
them prisoners, one and all. But after carefully observing
their movements for a time, in the heat of the action, he changed
his tone. "Great God," he exclaimed, "was the like ever
seen! Raw recruits, unacquainted with war, standing their
ground like veterans, hurling defiance at every discharge of
the batteries against them, and cheering their own batteries
whenever discharged. Such material, properly worked up,
would constitute the best troops in the world." Such was the
testimony of Gen. Sigel, who bears the reputation of one of
the most skilful and accomplished officers in the Federal service.
The next day, July 6th, General Price arrived at Carthage,
accompanied by Brigadier-general IcCulloch of the Confederate army, and Major-general Pierce bf the Arkansas State
forces, with a force of nearly two thousand men. These important arrivals were hailed with joy by the Missourians in
camp. They were happy to see their beloved general so far
restored to health as to be able to take command; and the
presence of the gallant Generals McCulloch and Pierce with
an effective force gave them an assurance, not to be mistaken,
of the friendly feeling and intention of the Confederate government towards the State of Missouri.
On the 7th, the forces at Carthage, under their respective
commands, took up the line of march for Cowskin Prairie, in
McDonald county, near the Indian nation. It turned out that
Lyon, Sturgis, Sweeny, and Sigel. instead of pursuing their
foe, determined to form a junction at Springfield. The forces
of Price and McCulloch remained at Cowskin Prairie for several days, organizing for the work before them. General Price
received considerable reinforcements; making the whole numerical strength of his command about ten thousand. More
than one half of the number, h,wever, were entirely unarmed.
Price, McCulloch, and Pierce decided to march upon Spring



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           135
field, and attack the enemy where he had taken his position in
force. To that end, their forces were concentrated at Cassville,
in Barry county, according to orders, and from that point they
proceeded in the direction of Springfield, ninety miles distant,
General McCulloch leading the advance.
Upon his arrival at Crane Creek, General McCulloch was
informed by his pickets that the Federals had left Springfield,
and were advancing upon him in large force, their advanced
guard being then encamped within seven miles of him. For
several days there was considerable skirmishing between the
pickets of the two armies in that locality. In consequence of
information of the immense superiority of the enemy's force,
General McCulloch, after consultation with the general officers,
determined to make a retrograde movement. HIe regarded the
unarmed men as incumbrances, and thought the unorganized
and undisciplined condition of both wings of the army suggested the wisdom of avoiding battle with the disciplined
enemy upon his own ground, and in greatly superior numbers.
General Price, however, entertained a different opinion of
the strength of the enemy. He favored an immediate advance. This policy being sustained by his officers, General
Price requested McCulloch to loan a number of arms from his
command for the use of such of the Missouri soldiers as were
unarmed, believing that, with the force at his command, lie
could whip the enemy. General McCulloch declined to comply with the request, being governed, no doubt, by the same
reasons which had induced him to decline the responsibility of
ordering an advance of the whole command.
On the evening of the day upon which this consultation
occurred, General McCulloch received a general order from
General Polk, commander of the Southwestern division cfi the
Confederate army, to advance upon the enemy in Missouri.
He immediately held another consultation with the officers of
the two divisions, exhibited the order he had received, and
offered to march at once upon Springfield, upon condition that
he should have the chief command of the army. General
Price replied, that he was not fighting for distinction, but for
the defence of the liberties of his countrymen, and that it
mattered but little what position he occupied. He said that he




136           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
was ready to surrender not only the command, but his life as
a sacrifice to the cause. He accordingly did not hesitate, with
a magnanimity of which history presents but few examples in
military leaders, to turn over the command to General McCulloch, and to take a subordinate position in a contest in which,
from the first, he was assured of victory.
On taking command, General McCulloch issued a general
order, that all the unarmed men should remain in camp, and
all those furnished with arms should get their guns in condition
for service, provide themselves with fifty rounds of ammunition,
and get in readiness to take up the line of march by twelve
o'clock at night. The army was divided into three columns:
the first commanded by General McCulloch, the second by
General Pierce, and the third by General Price. They took
up the line of march at the hour named, leaving the baggage
train behind, and proceeded in the direction of Springfield.
The troops were in fine condition and in excellent spirits, expecting to find the enemy posted about eight miles from their
camp, on the Springfield road, where the natural defences are
very strong, being a series of eminences on either side of the
road. They arrived at that locality about sunrise, carefully
approached it, and ascertained that the enemy had retired the
previous afternoon. They followed in pursuit that day a distance of twenty-two miles, regardless of dust and heat; twelve
miles of the distance without a drop of water-the troops having no canteens.
The weary army encamped on the night of the 8th at Big
Spring, one mile and a half from Wilson's Creek, and ten
miles and a half south of Springfield. Their baggage trains
having been left behind, and their beef cattle also, the troops
had not eaten any thing for twenty-four hours, and had been
supplied with only half rations for ten days previous. In this
exigency, they satisfied the cravings of hunger by eating green
corn, without a particle of salt or a mouthful of meat. The
wardrobe of the soldiers on that night was thus humorously
described by one of the number: "We had not a blanket, not
a tent, nor any clothes, except the few we had on our backs,
and four-fifths of us were barefooted. Billy Barlow's dress at
a circus would be decent in comparison with that of almost
any one, from the major-general down to the humblest private."




T'E FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          137
On the next day, the army moved to Wilson's Creek, and
there took up camp, that they might be convenient to several
large fields from which they could supply themselves with
green corn, which, for two days, constituted, their only repast.
Orders were issued by General McCulloch to the troops to
get ready to take up the line of march to Springfield by nine
o'clock P. M., with a view of attacking the enemy at four different points at daybreak the next morning. His effective force,
as stated by himself, was five thousand three hundred infantry,
fifteen pieces of artillery, and six thousand horsemen, armed
with flint-lock muskets, rifles, and shot-guns.
After receiving the order to march, the troops satisfied their
hunger, prepared their guns and ammunition, and got up a
dance before every camp-fire. When nine o'clock came, in
consequence of the threatening appearance of the weather, and
the want of cartridge-boxes to protect the ammunition of the
men, the order to march was countermanded, the commanding
general hoping to be able to move early the next morning.
The dance before the camp-fires was resumed and kept up
until a late hour.
THE BATTLE OF OAK HILL.
The next morning, the 10th of A.ugust, before sunrise, the
troops were attacked by the enemy, who had succeeded in
gaining the position he desired. General Lyon attacked them
on their left, and General Sigel on their right and in their
rear. From each of these points batteries opened upon them.
General McCulloch's command was soon ready.  The Missourians, under Brigadier generals Slack, Clark, McBride,
Parsons, and Rains, were nearest the position taken by General Lyon with his main force. General Price ordered them to
move their artillery and infantry rapidly forward. Advancing
a few hundred yards, he came upon the Inain body of the
enemy on the left, commanded by General Lyon in person.
The infantry and artillery, which General Price had ordered
to follow him, came up to the number of upwards of two thousand, and opened upon the enemy a brisk and well-directed
fire. Woodruffs battery opened to that of the enemy under
Captain Totten, and a constant cannonading was kept up be



138           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
tween these batteries during the action. Hebert's regiment of
Louisiana volunteers and McIntosh's regiment of Arkansas
mounted riflemen were ordered to the front, and, after passing
the battery, turners to the left, and soon engaged the enemy
with the regiments deployed. Colonel McIntosh dismounted
liis regiment, and the two marched up abreast to the fence
around a large corn-field, where they met the left of the
enemy already posted. A terrible conflict of small-arms took
place here. Despite the galling fire poured upon these two
regiments, they leaped over the fence, and, gallantly led by
their colonels, drove the enemy before them back upon the
main body. During this time, the Missourians, under General
Price, were nobly sustaining themselves in the centre, and
were hotly engaged on the sides of the height upon which
the enemy was posted. Some distance on the right, General
Sigel' had opened his battery upon Churchill's and Green's
regiments, and had gradually made his way to the Springfield
road, upon each side of which the Confederates were en
camped, and had established their battery in a strong position.
General McCulloch at once took two companies of the Louisiana regiment which were nearest to him at the time, and
marched them rapidly from the front and right to the rear,
with orders to Colonel McIntosh to bring up the remainder.
When they arrived near the enemy's battery, they found
that Reid's battery had opened upon it, and that it was
already in confusion. Advantage was taken of this, and soon
the Louisianians gallantly charged upon the guns and swept
the cannoneers away. Five guns were here taken, and Sigel's
forces completely routed. They commenced a rapid retreat
with a single gun, pursued by some companies of the Texas
regiment and a portion of Colonel Major's Missouri regiment
of cavalry. In the pursuit, many of the enemy were killed
and his last gun captured. Having cleared their right and
rear, it became necessary for the Confederate forces to direct
all their attention to the centre, where General Lyon was
pressing upon the Missourians with all his strength. To this
point, McIntosh's regiment under Lieutenant-colonel Embry,
and Churchill's regiment on foot, Gratiot's regiment, and
McRae's battalion, were sent to their aid. A terrible fire of
musketry was now kept up along the whole line of the hill




TIE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           139
upon which the enemy was posted. Masses of infantry fell
back and again rushed forward. The summit of the hill was
covered with the dead and the wounded. Both sides were fighting with desperation for the field. Carroll's and Green's regiments, led gallantly by Captain Bradfute, charged Totten's
battery; but the whole strength of the enemy were immediately in the rear, and a deadly fire was opened upon them.
At this critical moment, when the fortunes of the day seemed
to be at the turning-point, two regiments of General Pierce's
brigade were ordered to march from their position, as reserves,
to support the centre. Reid's battery was also ordered to
move forward, and the Louisiana regiment was again called
into action on the left of it. The battle then became general,
and probably, says General McCulloch, in his official report,
"no two opposing forces ever fought with greater desperation;
inch by inch the enemy gave way, and were driven from their
position. Totten's battery fell back-Missourians, Arkansans,
Louisianians, and Texans pushed forward-the incessant roll
of musketry was deafening, and the balls fell thick as hailstones; but still our gallant Southerners pushed onward, and,
with one wild yell, broke upon the enemy, pushing them back,
and strewing the ground with their dead. Nothing could withstand the impetuosity of our final charge. The enemy fled, and
could not again be rallied."
Thus ended the battle of Oak Hill, or of Wilson's Creek, as
Gen. Sigel called it in his official report to the Federal authorities. It lasted about six hours. The force of the enemy was
stated at from nine to ten thousand, and consisted for the most
part of well-disciplined, well-armed troops, a large portion of
them belonging to the old United States army. They were not
prepared for the signal defeat which they suffered. Their loss
was supposed to be about two thousand in killed, wounded, and
prisoners. They also lost six pieces of artillery, several hundred stand of small-arms, and several of their standards. Major-general Lyon, their chief-in-command, was killed, and many
of their officers were wounded-some of them high in rank.
Gen. McCulloch, in his official report, stated the entire loss on
the part of his command at two hundred and sixty-five killed,
eight hundred wounded, and thirty missing. Of these, the
Missourians, according to Gen. Price's report, lost one hun



140           TH14] FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
dred and fifty-six killed, and five hundred and seventeen
wounded.
The victory was won by the determined valor of each division of the army. The troops from Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana bore themselves with a gallantry characteristic of their
respective States. The Missouri troops were mostly undisciplined, but they had fought with the most desperate valor,
never failing to advance when ordered. Repeatedly, during
the action, they retired from their position, and then returned
to it with increased energy and enthusiasm-a feat rarely performed by undisciplined troops. The efficiency of the doublebarrel shot-gun and the walnut-stock rifle, was abundantly
demonstrated —these being the only arms used by the Missourians in this fight, with the exception of the four hundred
muskets captured from the enemy on the two occasions already
named.
Gen. Lyon, at the head of his regulars, was killed in an attempt to turn the wing mainly defended by the arms of the
Missourians. He received two small rifle-balls or buckshot in
the heart, the one just above the left nipple, the other immediately below it. He had been previously wounded in the leg.
His surgeon came in for his body, under a flag of truce, after
the close of the battle, and Gen. Price sent it in his own wagon.
But the enemy, in his flight, left the body unshrouded in Springfield. The next morning, August 11th, Lieut.-col. Gustavus
Elgin and Col. R. H. Mercer, two of the members of Brigadiergeneral Clark's staff, caused the body to be properly prepared
for burial. IIe was temporarily interred at Springfield, in a
metallic coffin procured by Mrs. Phelps, wife of John S. Phelps,
a former member of the Federal Congress from that district,
and now an officer in the Lincoln army. A few days afterwards, the body was disinterred and sent to St. Louis, to await
the order of his relatives in Connecticut.
The death of Gen. Lyon was a serious loss to the Federals in
Missouri. He was an able and dangerous man-a man of the
times, who appreciated the force of audacity and quick decision
in a revolutionary war. To military education and talents, he
united a rare energy and promptitude. No doubts or scruples
unsettled his mind. A Connecticut Yankee, without a trace
of chivalric feeling or personal sensibility —one of those who




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            141
submit to insult with indifference, yet are brave on the fieldhe was this exception to the politics of the late regular army
of the United States, that he was an unmitigated, undisguised,
and fanatical Abolitionist.
Shortly after the battle of Oak Hill, the Confederate army
returned to the frontier of Arkansas, Generals McCulloch and
Price having failed to agree upon the plan of campaign in
Missouri.
In northern Missouri, the bold and active demonstrations of
Gen. Harris had made an important diversion of the enemy in
favor of Gen. Price. These demonstrations had been so successfully made, that they diverted eight thousand men from
-the support of Gen. Lyon, and held them north of the river
until after the battle of Oak Hill, thus making an important
contribution to the glorious issue of that contest.
The history of the war presents no instance of a more heroic
determination of a people to accomplish their freedom, than
that exhibted by the people of northern Missouri. Occupying
that portion of the State immediately contiguous to the Federal
States of Kansas, Iowa, and Illinois, penetrated by two lines of
railroads, intersecting at right angles, dividing the country
north and south, east and west-which lines of railroads were
seized and occupied by the enemy, even before the commencement of hostilities; washed on every side by large, navigable
rivers in possession of the enemy; exposed at every point to
the inroads of almost countless Federal hosts, the brave people
of northern Missouri, without preparation or organization, did
not hesitate to meet the alternative of war, in the face of a foe
confident in his numbers and resources.
On the 21st June, 1861, a special messenger from Governor
Jackson overtook, at Paris, Monroe county, Thomas A. Harris,
who was then en route as a private soldier to the rendezvous
at Booneville. The messenger was the bearer of a commission
by which Thomas A. Harris was constituted Brigadier-general
of the Missouri State Guard, and assigned to the duty of organizing the forces for the defence of that portion of the State
north of the Missouri river. The commission was accompanied
by orders from Gen. Sterling Price. At the date of the delivery of the commission and orders, the affair at Booneville had
transpired, and the governor and Gen. Price, with such of the




142            TIIE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
forces as had been hastily collected, were, as already stated, in
full retreat before the enemy in the direction of southwestern
Missouri.
Gen. Harris was without any organized force whatever;
without military supplies of any kind; without money, or any
authorized agent to pledge the credit of the State. He commenced recruiting an army in the face of the enemy. At a
public meeting, called by him, he delivered a stirring and
patriotic address, caused the oath of allegiance to the South to
be administered to himself in the most public and impressive
mianner, and, in turn, administered the same oath to fifty-three
men, and organized them into a company, directing them to
return to their homes, collect their private arms, and join hin'
without delay. When we consider that this bold action was
within three hours' march of an enemy in force, and that it invited his bitter resentment, we can rightly appreciate the heroism and self-sacrificing patriotism of the participators.
A false report of the approach of the enemy caused the
evacuation of the town of Paris, where quite a number of unarmed troops had assembled. General IHarris retired into a
stronghold in the knobs of Salt River. He was a brigadiergeneral, with a command of three men, and a few  officers
whom  he had appointed upon his staff.  Hei'e, without
blankets, tents, or any kind of army equipments, he commenced the organization of a guerrilla force, which was destined to render important service in the progress of the war in
Missouri.
Gen. Harris adopted the policy of secretly organizing his
force, the necessity for such secrecy being constantly induced
by the continued presence and close proximity of the enemy. The fact, however, that Gen. Lyon was moving to the
southwest in pursuit of Gen. Price, caused him to attempt a
diversion, which was successful, as has been stated, in holding
a large Federal force north of the Missouri river. Although
the active duties of a guerrilla campaign necessarily involved
a delay in organization, yet Gen. Harris was successful in raising a force of two thousand seven hundred and thirty men in
the very face of the enemy, and in crossing them over the
river; and after a march of sixty-two miles, in twenty-eight
hours, he united his command with Gen. Price in time to par



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           143
ticipate in the memorable battle of Lexington. To follow Gen.
Price's command, to that battle-field we must now turn.
Late in August, Gen. Price, abandoned by the Confederate
forces, took up his line of march for the Missouri river, with
an armed force of about four thousand five hundred men, and
seven pieces of cannon. Hie continued to receive reinforcements from the north side of the Missouri river.
Hearing that the notorious trio of Abolition bandits, Jim
Lane, Montgomery, and Jenison, were at Fort Scott, with a marauding force of several thousand, and not desiring them to
get into his rear, he detoured to the left from his course to the
Missouri river, marching directly to Fort Scott for the purpose
of driving them up the river. On the 7th of September, he
met with Lane about fifteen miles east of Fort Scott, at a
stream called Drywood, where an engagement ensued which
lasted for an hour and a half, resulting in the complete rout
of the enemy. Gen. Price then sent on a detachment to Fort
Scott, and found that the enemy had evacuated the place. He
continued his march in the direction of Lexington, where there
was a Federal army strongly intrenched, under the command
of Col. Mulligan.
Gen. Fremont, who had been appointed by the Federal government to take command in the Missouri department, had inaugurated the campaign with a brutality towards his enemy,
a selfish splendor in his camp, and a despotism and corruption
more characteristic of an Eastern satrap than an American
commander in the nineteenth century. IHe had published a
proclamation absolutely confiscating the estates and slave
property of " rebels," which measure of brutality was vastly
pleasing to the Abolitionists of the North, who recognized the
extinction of negro slavery in the South as the essential object
of the war, but was not entirely agreeable to the government at
Washington, which was not quite ready to declare the extremity to which it proposed to prosecute the war.
On the 10th of September, just as General Price was about
to encamp with his forces for the day, he learned that a* detachment of Federal troops were marching from Lexington to
Warrensburg to seize the funds of the bank in that* place, and
to arrest and plunder the citizens of Johnson county, in accordance with General Fremonts proclamation and instruc



144            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
tions. Although his men were greatly fatigued by several
days' continuous and rapid marching, General Price determined to press forward, so as to surprise the enemy, if possible, at Warrensburg. After resting a few hours, he resumed
his march at sunset, and continued it without intermission till
two o'clock in the morning, when it became evident that the
infantry, very few of whom had eaten any thing for twentyfour hours, could march no further. He then halted them,
and went.forward with the greater portion of his mounted men,
till he came, about daybreak, within view of Warrensburg,
where he ascertained that the enemy had hastily fled about
midnight, burning the bridges behind him. A heavy rain
commenced about the same time. This circumstance, coupled
with the fact that his men had been fasting for more than
twenty-four hours, constrained General Price to abandon the
pursuit of the enemy that day. His infantry and artillery
having come up, he encamped at Warrensburg, where the
citizens vied with each other in feeding his almost famished
soldiers.
A violent storm delayed the march next morning till the
hour of ten o'clock. General Price then pushed rapidly forward, still hoping to overtake the enemy. Finding it impossible to do this with his infantry, he again ordered a detachment of mounted men to move forward, and placing himself at
their head, continued the pursuit to within two and a half
miles of Lexington, where he halted for the night, having
learned that the enemy's forces had all gone within the city.
THE BATTLE OF LEXINGTON.
About daybreak the next morning, a sharp skirmish took
place between the Missouri pickets and the enemy's outposts.
A general action was threatened, but General Price, being unwilling to risk an engagement when a short delay would make
success, in his estimation, perfectly certain, fell back two or
three miles, and awaited the arrival of his infantry and cavalry.
These having come up, he advanced upon the town, driving in
the Federal pickets, until he came within a short distance of
the city. Here the enemy's forces attempted to make a stand,
but they were speedily driven from every position, and com



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           145
pelled to take shelter within their intrenchments. The enemy
having strongly fortified the college building, the Missourians
took their position within easy range of it, and opened a brisk
fire from  Bledsoe's and Parsons' batteries. Finding, after
sunset, that his ammunition, the most of which had been left
behind in the march from Springfield, was nearly exhausted,
and that his men, most of whom had not eaten any thing in
thirty-six hours, required rest and food, General Price withdrew to the Fair Ground, and encamped there. His ammunition wagons having been at last brought up, and large reinforcements having come in, he again moved into town on the
18th, and commenced the final attack upon the enemy's works.
Brigadier-general Rains' division occupied a strong position
on the east and northeast of the fortifications, from which
position an effective cannonading was kept up on the enemy
by Bledsoe's battery, and another battery commanded by Capt.
Churchill Clark, of St. Louis. General Parsons took his position southwest of the works. Skirmishers and sharp-shooters
were sent forward from both of these divisions to harass and
fatigue the enemy, and cut them off from water on the north,
east, and south of the college, and did great service in the accomplishment of the purposes for which they were detached.
Colonel Congreve Jackson's division, and a part of General
Stein's, were posted near General Rains and General Parsons
as a reserve.
Shortly after entering the city on the 18th, Colonel Rives,
who commanded the fourth division in the absence of General
Slack, led his regiment and Colonel Hughes' along the river
bank to a point immediately beneath and west of the fortifications, General McBride's'command and a portion of General
Harris's having been ordered to reinforce him. Colonel Rives,
in order to cut off the enemy's means of escape, proceeded
down the bank of the river to capture a steamboat which was
lying immediately under their guns. Just at this moment, a
heavy fire was opened upon him from a large dwelling-house,
known as Anderson's house, on the summit of the bluff, which
the enemy was occupying as a hospital, and from which a white
flag was flying. Several companies of General Harris's command and the soldiers of the fourth division, who had won
much distinction in previous battles, Immediately rushed upon
10




146           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
and took the place. The important position thus secured was
within one hundred and twenty-five yards of the enemy's intrenchments. A  company from  Colonel Hughes' regiment
then took possession of the boats, one of which was freighted
with valuable stores. General McBride's and General Harris's
divisions meanwhile stormed and occupied the bluffs immediately north of Anderson's house. The position of these heights
enabled the assailants to harass the enemy so greatly, that,
resolving to regain them, he made upon the house a successful
assault, and one, said General Price, which would have been
honorable to him had it not been accompanied by an act of
savage barbarity, the cold-blooded and cowardly murder of
three defenceless men who had laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves as prisoners. The position thus retaken
by the enemy was soon regained by the brave men who had
been driven from it, and was thenceforward held by them to
the very end of the contest.
The heights on the left of Anderson's house were fortified
by our troops with such means as were at their command. On
the morning of the 20th, General Price caused a number of
hemp bales to be transported to the river heights, where movable breastworks were speedily constructed out of them. The
demonstrations of the artillery, and particularly the continued
advance of the hempen breastworks, attracted the attention
and excited the alarm of the enemy, who made many daring
attempts to drive back the assailants. They were, however,
repulsed in every instance by the unflinching courage and
fixed determination of men fighting for their homes. The
hempen breastworks, said General Price, were as efficient as
the cotton bales at New Orleans. In these severe encounters,
McBride's and Slack's divisions, and Colonel Martin Green
and his command, and Colonel Boyd and Major Winston and
their commands, were warmly commended for their gallant
conduct.
About two o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th, and after
fifty-two hours of continuous fighting, a white flag was displayed by the enemy on that part of his works nearest to Col.
Green's position, and shortly afterwards another was displayed
opposite to Colonel Rives' position. General Price immedi
ately ordered a cessation of all firing, and sent forward his




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            147
staff officers to ascertain the object of the flag and to open
negotiations with the enemy, if such should be his desire. It
was agreed that the Federal forces should lay down their arms
and surrender themselves prisoners of war.
The entire loss of the Missourians in this series of battles
was but twenty-five killed and seventy-two wounded. The
enemy's loss was considerably larger, but cannot be stated
here with accuracy. The visible fruits of the victory to the
Missourians were great: about three thousand five hundred
prisoners-among whom were Cols. Mulligan, Marshall, Peabody, White, Grover, Major Van Horn, and one hundred and
eighteen other- commissioned officers; five pieces of artillery
and two mortars; over three thousand stand of infantry arms,
a large number of sabres, about seven hundred and fifty horses,
many sets of cavalry equipments, wagons, teams, some ammunition, more than $100,000 worth of commissary stores, and a
large amount of other property. In addition to all this, General
Price obtained the restoration of the great seal of the State, of
the public records, and about $900,000 of which the bank at
Lexington had been robbed, in accordance with Fremont's instructions. General Price caused the money to be returned at
once to the bank.
In his official report of the battle of Lexington, General
Price paid a high compliment to the command that had
achieved such rich and substantial fruits of victory. "This
victory," he wrote, " has demonstrated the fitness of our citizen
soldiery for the tedious operations of a siege, as well as for a
dashing charge. They lay for fifty-two hours in the open air,
without tents or covering, regardless of the sun and rain, and
in the very presence of a watchful and desperate foe, manfully
repelling every assault and patiently awaiting my orders to storm
the fortifications. No general ever commanded a braver or
better army. It is composed of the best blood and bravest
men of Missouri."
During the siege, quite a number of citizens came in from
the neighboring country, and fought, as they expressed it, " on
their own hooks." A participator in the battle tells an anecdote
of an old man, about sixty years of age, who came up daily
from his farm, with his walnut-stock rifle and a basket of provisions, and went to work just as if he were engaged in hauling




148           THE FIRST YEAR OF TIIE WAR.
rails or some other necessary labor of his farm. He took his
position behind a large stump upon the descent of the hill on
which the fortification was constructed, where he fired with
deadly aim during each day of the siege.
When the surrender was made, and the forces under Colonel
Mulligan stacked their arms, General Price ordered that they
were not to be insulted by word or act, assigning as the reason
therefor, that they had fought like brave men, and were entitled to be treated as such. When Colonel Mulligan surrendered his sword, General Price asked him for the scabbard.
Mulligan replied that he had thrown it away. The general,
upon receiving his sword, returned it to him, saying, he disliked to see a man of his valor without a sword. Mulligan refused to be paroled, upon the ground that his government did
not acknowledge the Missourians as belligerents. While awaiting his exchange, Colonel Mulligan and his wife became the
guests of General Price, the general surrendering to them his
carriage, and treating them with the most civil and obliging
hospitality. The captive colonel and his lady were treated by
all the officers and soldiers of the Missouri army with a courtesy
and kindness which they seemed to appreciate.
After the first day's conflict at Lexington, while General
Price was encamped.at the Fair Grounds near the city, awaiting reinforcements and preparing the renewal of the attack, an
episode occurred at some distance from the city, in which the
Missourians again had the satisfaction of inflicting a terrible
chastisement upon the bandits of the Lane and Montgomery
organization.
Gen. Price was informed that four thousand men under Lane
and Montgomery were advancing from the direction of St.
Joseph, on the north side of the Missouri river, and Gen. Sturgis, with fifteen hundred cavalry, was also advancing from the
Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, for the purpose of relieving
the forces under Mulligan. About twenty-five hundred Missourians, under the immediate command of Col. Saunders,
were, at the same time, hurrying to the aid of Gen. Price, from
the same direction with the Lane and Montgomery Jayhawkers; and having reached the run at Blue Mills, thirty miles
above Lexington, on the 17th September, crossed over their
force, except some five hundred men, in a ferry-boat. While




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            149
the remainder were waiting to cross over, the Jayhawkers
attacked the five hundred Missourians on the north bank of
the river. The battle raged furiously for one hour on the river
bottom, which was heavily timbered and in many places
covered with water. The Missourians were armed with only
shot-guns and rifles, and taken by surprise: no time was given
them to call back any portion of their force on the south side
of the river; but they were from the counties contiguous to
Kansas, accustomed in the border wars since 1854 to almost
monthly fights with the Kansas "Jayhawkers," under Lane,
and were fired with the most intense hatred of him and of them.
Gen. D. R. Atchison, former President of the United States
Senate, and well known as one of the boldest leaders of the
State Rights party in Missouri, had been sent from Lexington
by Gen. Price to meet our troops under Col. Saunders, and
hasten them on to his army. He was with the five hundred,
on the north side of the river, when they were attacked, and
by his presence and example cheered them in the conflict.
Charging the "Jayhawkers," with shouts of almost savage
ferocity, and fighting with reckless valor, the Missourians
drove the enemy back a distance of ten miles, the conflict becoming a hand-to-hand fight, between detached parties on both
sides. At length, unable to support the fearful fire of the
Missourians at the short distance of forty yards, the enemy
broke into open flight. The loss of the Jayhawkers was very
considerable. Their official report admitted one hundred and
fifty killed and some two hundred wounded. The entire loss of
the Missourians was five killed and twenty wounded. The
intelligence of this brilliant victory of "the five hundred,"
was received with shouts of exultation by Price's army at
Lexington.
On the second day after the battle of Blue Mills, Col. Saunders, with his command, joined the army at Lexington, and
fought gallantly till the surrender of the Federal garrison. In
the mean time, Sturgis with his cavalry appeared on the river
bank opposite Lexington, expecting to cross over in the boats
of Mulligan, and reinforce him to the extent of fourteen hundred men. It happened, however, that on the day before his
arrival, Gen. Price's forces had captured all of the enemy's
boats and Gen. Sturgis ascertaining this fact, retreated precipi



150           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
tately in the direction from which he came. Gen. Price had
sent across the river two thousand men under Gen. Parsons, to
meet the forces under Gen. Sturgis, and they succeeded in capturing all the tents and camp equipage of that distinguished
Yankee commander. The tents were most acceptable to the
Missourians, as they were the first they had obtained in the
war, except one hundred and fifty taken at Springfield. Gen.
Sturgis did not stop in his flight for three days and three
nights.
The capture of Lexington had crowned Gen. Price's command with a brilliant victory, and so far, the Missouri campaign
had proceeded, step by step, from one success to another. It
was at this period, however, that Gen. Price found his position
one of the greatest emergency. After the victory of Lexington, he received intelligence that the Confederate forces, under
Generals Pillow and Hardee, had been withdrawn from the
southeastern portion of the State. Gen. McCulloch had retired to Arkansas. In these circumstances, Gen. Price was
left with the only forces in Missouri, to confront an enemy
seventy thousand strong, and being almost entirely without
ammunition, he was'reduced to the necessity of making a
retrograde movement.
Before leaving Springfield, Gen. Price had made arrangements for an ample supply of ammunition, then at Jacksonsport, Arkansas, to be sent to him in Missouri, Gen. MeCulloch
promising to send a safe escort for it. Gen. McCulloch subsequently declined to furnish the escort and stopped the train,
assigning as the reason therefor that, under the circumstances
then existing, it would be unsafe to send it, and that Gen.
Price would be compefled to fall back from the Missouri river,
before the overwhelming forces of the enemy moving against
him under the direction of Gen. Fremont.
Having no means of transportation, except for a limited
number of men, and surrounded by circumstances of the most
painful and unlooked-for misfortune, Gen. Price was compelled
to disband a considerable portion of his forces. No occasion
could be more fraught with mortifying reflections to the brave,
generous, and hopeful spirit of such a commander as Gen. Price.
IHe had marched from success to success; he had raised a force
from hundreds to tens of thousands; his army had been swelled




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           151
to twenty-three thousand during' his stay at Lexington, not
enumerating ten thousand volunteers who had collected on the
north bank of the Missouri about the period when he commenced a retreat, compelled by emergencies which the most
daring valor could no longer hope to surmount. Gen. Price
advised all who could not accompany him to take care of such
arms as they had, to cherish a determined spirit, and to hold
themselves in readiness for another opportunity to join his
standard.
In southeastern Missouri, the operations of the partisan,
Jeff. Thompson, in connection with Gen. Hardee's command,
had attracted some public notice from its adventure, and some
incidents of interest. But the campaign in the Ozark mountains was not productive of any important or serious results.
Gen. Thompson and his "Swamp Fox Brigade" gave many
rash illustrations of daring in the face of the enemy. At one
time he burnt an important railroad bridge within fifty miles
of the city of St. Louis, which was swarming with Federal
troops. On a march towards Fredericktown, with a force of
twelve hundred men, Gen. Thompson encountered a Federal
force numbering ten thousand men, which he engaged with
such skill and courage as to check the enemy's pursuit and
move his little force out of danger. The feat showed extraordinary military skill, when we consider that the small force was
extricated with only twenty killed, while the loss of the enemy
was counted by hundreds; and that his pursuit was baffled
only from the impression of a large force opposed to him, which
was given by the skilful disposition of amnbuscades.
Gen. Price commenced his retreat about the 27th of September. He sent his cavalry forward, and directed them to make
a demonstration in the neighborhood of Georgetown, fifty miles
from Lexington, where Fremont was concentrating his. forces
with a view of surrounding him. With Sturgis on the north
side of the river, Lane on the west, and himself on the east,
each advancing upon Lexington, Fremont expected to cut off
and capture the entire force of the Missourians. Gen. Price
supplied his mounted men with provisions for several days, and
directed them to make demonstrations on each of the divisions
of the Federals, so as to gain time for the safe retreat of his
infantry and artillery. By this means, he succeeded in deceiv



152           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
ing the enemy as to his real purpose; inducing Fremont, Lane,
and Sturgis to believe that he was about to attack each of
them. Each of them fell back, and Fremont commenced
ditching.
In the mean time, Price's infantry and artillery were.making
the best time they could towards the south. They had to encounter a very serious obstacle in crossing streams swollen by
the recent rains. The whole command, fifteen thousand strong,
crossed the Osage river in two common flat-boats, constructed
for the occasion by men who could boast of no previous experience either as graduates of military schools, or even as bridge
builders.
Subsequently, General Fremont was fifteen days engaged in
crossing at the same place, upon his pontoon bridges. The
superiority of the practical man of business, over the scientific
engineer and "pathfinder," was demonstrated to the great
satisfaction of the Missourians.
Gen. Price continued his retreat to Neosho, at which place
the Legislature had assembled, under a proclamation from
Governor Jackson.
At Neosho, Gen. Price again formed a junction with Gen.
McCulloch, at the head of five thousand men. The Legislature had passed the Ordinance of Secession, and elected delegates to the Provisional Congress of the Southern Confederacy;
and here Gen. Price had the satisfaction of firing one hundred
guns in honor of the formal secession of Missouri from the
United States; to which his services in the field had more than
any thing else contributed.
Gen. McCulloch remained a day or two in Neosho, and then
fell back with his forces to Cassville. Price remained ten days
in Neosho, and then retreated also to Cassville, and from Cassville to Pineville, in McDonald county.
Meanwhile, General Fremont, with his grand army of sixty
thousand men, equipped in the most splendid and costly manner, had concentrated his forces at Springfield, throwing forward an advance of ten thousand men under Gen. Sigel to
Wilson's Creek. The Missouri forces at Springfield, under the
command of Col. Taylor, were ordered by General Price to
fall back upon the approach of the enemy; but in leaving the
town they encountered Fremont's body-guard, three times




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           153
their own number, armed with Colt's rifles and commanded by
Col. Zagonyi. A conflict ensued, in which fifty of the enemy
were killed, and twenty-five captured, including a major. The
loss of the Missourians was one killed and three wounded.
At Pineville, General Price made preparations to receive
Fremont, determined not to abandon Missouri without a battle.
His troops were enthusiastic and confident of success, notwithstanding the fearful superiority of numbers against them.
They were in daily expectation of being led by their commander into the greatest battle of the war, when they received
the unexpected intelligence that Fremont had been superseded
as commander of the Federal forces. This event had the effect
of demoralizing the Federal forces to such an extent, that their
numbers would have availed them nothing in a fight with
their determined foe. The Dutch, who were greatly attached
to Fremont, broke out into open mutiny, and the acting officers in command saw that a retreat from Springfield was not
only a wise precaution, but an actual necessity. They accordingly left that town in the direction of Rolla, and were pursued by Gen. Price to Oceola. From Oceola, Gen. Price fell
back to Springfield, to forage his army and obtain supplies;
and here, for the present, we must leave the history of his campaign. We have now traced that history to a period about
the first of December.
From the 20th of June to the 1st of December, General
Price's army marched over 800 miles, averaging ten thousand
men during the time. What they accomplished, the reader
will decide for himself, upon the imperfect sketch here given.
They fought five battles, and at least thirty skirmishes, in some
of which from fifty to hundreds were killed on one side or the
other. Not a week elapsed between engagements of some sort.
They started without a dollar, without a wagon or team, without a cartridge, without a bayonet-gun. On the first of September, they had about eight thousand bayonet-guns, fifty
pieces of cannon, four hundred tents, and many other articles
needful in an army; for nearly all of which they were indebted
to their own strong arms in battle and to the prodigality of the
enemy in providing more than he could take care of in his
campaign.
Notwithstanding the great exposure to which the Missouri




154           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
troops were subjected, not fifty died of disease during their six
months' campaign, and but few were on the sick list at the close
of it. The explanation is, that the troops were all the time in
motion, and thus escaped the camp fever and other diseases
that prove so fatal to armies standing all the time in a defensive position.
SKETCH OF GENERAL PRICE.
The man who had conducted one of the most wonderful
campaigns of the war-Sterling Price-was a native of Virginia. He was born about the year 1810 in Prince Edward
county, a county which had given birth to two other military
notabilities-General John Coffee, the "right-hand man" of
General Jackson in his British and Indian campaigns, and
General Joseph E. Johnston, already distinguished as one of
the heroes of the present war.
Sterling Price emigrated to Missouri,.and settled in Charlton
county, in the interior of that State, in the year 1830, pursuing the quiet avocations of a farmer.
In the year 1844, Mr. Price was nominated by his party as
a candidate for Congress, and was elected by a decided
majority. He took his seat in December, 1845; but having
failed to receive the party nomination in the following spring,
he resigned his seat and returned home. His course in this
respect was dictated by that conscientious integrity and high
sense of honor which have ever distinguished him in all the
relations of life. He argued that his defeat was caused either
by dissatisfaction with his course on the part of his constituents, or else by undue influences which had been brought to
bear upon the people by ambitious aspirants for the seat, who
could labor to a great advantage in their work in supplanting
an opponent who was attending to his duties at a distance from
them. If the former was the case, he was unwilling to misrepresent his constituents, who, he believed, had the right to
instruct him as to the course he should pursue; if the latter,
his self-respect would not allow him to serve a people who had
rejected him without cause, while he was doing all in his power
to advance their interests.
At the time of Mr. Price's retirement from Congress, hostili



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           155
ties had broken out between the United States and Mexico,
and volunteers from all parts of the South were flocking to the
defence of their country's flag. Mr. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, bred a soldier, who, like Mr. Price, was serving his
first term in Congress, resigned his seat about the same time,
and was soon marching at the head of a Mississippi regiment
to the field, from which he was destined to return loaded with
many honors. So, too, did a brave Missouri regiment call to
its head her own son, who had just doffed his civil robes to
enter a new and untried field of duty and honor. The regiment to which Col. Price was attached was detailed for duty
in what is now the Territory of New Mexico. It was by his
own arms that that province was subdued, though not without several brilliant engagements, in which he displayed the
same gallantry that has so distinguished him in the present
contest.
Soon after the close of the Mexican war, a violent political
excitement broke out in Missouri. The slavery agitation had
received a powerful impetus by the introduction into Congress of the Wilmot Proviso and other sectional measures,
whose avowed object was to exclude the South from any portion
of the territory which had been acquired principally by the
blood of Southern soldiers. The people of the South became
justly alarmed at the spread of Abolitionism at the North, and
no people were more jealous of any encroachment upon the
rights of the South than the citizens of Missouri, a majority of
whose leading statesmen were as sound on the slavery question
as those of Virginia or South Carolina. In order to cause Col.
Benton, who had become obnoxious to a large portion of the
Democratic party by his course on the Texas question, the
Wilmot Proviso, and other measures of public policy, to resign
his seat, and for the purpose of casting the weight of the State
against the surging waves of Abolitionism, a series of resolutions, commonly known as the " Jackson resolutions," was
introduced into the Senate at the session of 1848-9, by Claiborne F. Jackson, the present governor of Missouri, which
passed both houses of the General Assembly. These resolutions were substantially the same as those introduced the year
before, by Mr. Calhoun, into the Senate of the United States.
From the Legislature Col. Benton appealed to the people, and




156            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
made a vigorous canvass against the Jackson resolutions throughout the whole State, marked by extraordinary ability and bitterness towards their author and principal supporters. The
sixth resolution, which pledged Missouri to " co-operate with
her sister States in any measures they might adopt," to defend
their rights against the encroachments of the North, was the
object of his special denunciation and his most. determined
opposition. He denounced it as the essence of nullification,
and ransacked the vocabulary of billingsgate for coarse and
vulgar epithets to apply to its author and advocates. But his
herculean efforts to procure the repeal of the resolutions proved
abortive. Colonel Benton was defeated for the Senate the
next year by a combination of Democrats and State-Rights
Whigs; and the Jackson resolutions remain on the statute
book unrepealed to this day. Their author is governor of the
State; their principal supporters are fighting to drive myrmidons of Abolitionism from the soil of Missouri; and how nobly
the State has redeemed her pledge to " co-operate with her
sister States," the glorious deeds of her hardy sons, who have
fought her battles almost single-handed, who have struggled
on through neglect and hardship and suffering without ever
dreaming of defeat, afford the most incontestible evidence.
In the canvass of 1852, the Anti-Benton Democrats put forward Gen. Sterling Price as their choice for the office of governor, and the Bentonites supported Gen. Thomas L. Price, at
that time lieutenant-governor, and now a member of Lincoln's
Congress and a brigadier-general in Lincoln's army. The
Anti-Bentonites triumphed, and the nomination fell on Gen.
Sterling Price, who, receiving the vote of the whole Democratic party, was elected by a large majority over an eloquent
and popular whig, Colonel Winston, a grandson of Patrick
Henry.
The administration of Gov. Price was distinguished for an
earnest devotion to the material interests of Missouri. At the
expiration of his term of office, he received a large vote in the.
Democratic caucus for the nomination for United States senator, but the choice fell on Mr. James Green.
In the Presidential election of 1860, in common with Major
Jackson, who was the Democratic candidate for governor, and
a number of other leading men of his party, Ex-Governor




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           157
Price supported Mr. Douglas for the Presidency, on the
ground that he was the regular nominee of the Democratic
party.' Ie moreover considered Mr. Douglas true to the institutions of the South, and believed him to be the only one of
the candidates who could prevent the election of the Black
Republican candidate. The influence of these men carried
Missouri for Douglas.
Upon the election of Abraham Lincoln, the Border States
were unwilling to rush into dissolution until every hope of a
peaceful settlement of the question had vanished. This was
the position of Missouri, to whose Convention not a single Secessionist was elected. Governor Price was elected from his
district as a Union man, without opposition, and, on the assembling of the Convention, was chosen its President. The Convention had not been in session many weeks before the radicalism of the Black Republican administration, and its hostility
to the institutions of the South, became manifest to every unprejudiced mind. The perfidy and brutality of its officers in
Missouri were particularly observable, and soon opened the
eyes of the people to the true objects of the Black Republican
party. The State authorities decided upon resistance to the
Federal government; the Governor issued his proclamation for
volunteers; and of the forces raised under this call, who were
denominated the Missouri State Guard, Governor Price was
appointed major-general, and took the field.
The period of history has scarcely yet arrived for a full appreciation of the heroic virtues of the campaign in Missouri,
especially as illustrated in the character of the chieftain whom
no personal jealousies could distract or unmerited slights turn
from the single course of duty and devotion to his country.
He had given the government at Richmond a valuable, but
distasteful lesson in the conduct of the war. He did not settle
down complacently into one kind of policy, refusing to advance
because he was on the defensive, but he sought the enemy
wherever he could find him, fought him when ready, and retreated out of his way when not prepared. His policy was
both offensive and defensive, and he used the one which might
be demanded by the exigencies of his situation. He was something better than a pupil of West Point-he was a general by
nature, a beloved commander, a man who illustrated the Ro



158           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
man simplicity of character in the nineteenth century. His
troops not only loved him, they were wildly and enthusiastically devoted to him. His figure in the battle-field, clothed in
a common brown linen coat, with his white hair streaming in
the wind, was the signal for wild and passionate cheers, and
there was not one of his soldiers, it was said, but who was willing to die, if he could only fall within sight of his commander.
It is not improbable that had General Price been supported
after the battle of Lexington, he would have wrung the State
of Missouri from the possession of the enemy. He was forced
by untoward circumstances, already referred to, to turn back
in a career just as it approached the zenith of success, and he
could have given no higher proof of his magnanimity than
that he did so without an expression of bitterness or a word of
recrimination. He bore the cold neglect of the government at
Richmond and the insulting proposition which President Davis
was compelled by popular indignation to abandon, to place
over him, as major-general in his department, a pupil of West
Point his inferior in rank, with philosophic patience and without any subtraction from his zeal for his country. When his
officers expressed resentment for the injustice done him by the
government, he invariably checked them: stating that there
should be no controversies of this kind while the war lasted,
and that he was confident that posterity would do him justice.
He was more than right; for the great majority of his living
countrymen did him justice, despite the detractions of jealousy
in Richmond.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                     159
CHAPTER VI.
The Campaign in Western Virginia.-General Wise's Command.-Political Influences in Western Virginia.-The Affair of Scary Creek.-General Wise's Retreat to
Lewisburg.-General Floyd's Brigade.-The Affair at Cross Lanes.-Movements on
the Gauley.-The Affair of Carnifax Ferry.-Disagreement between Generals Floyd
and Wise.-The Tyrees.-A Patriotic Woman.-Movements in Northwestern Virginia.-General Lee.-The Enemy intrenched on Cheat Mountain.-General Rosecrans.-Failure of General Lee's Plan of Attack. —He removes to the Kanawha Region.-The Opportunity of a Decisive Battle lost.-Retreat of Rosecrans. —General
H. R. Jackson's Affair on the Greenbrier.-The Approach of Winter.-The Campaign
in Western Virginia abandoned.-The Affair on the Alleghany.-General Floyd at
Cotton Hill.-His masterly Retreat.-Review of the Campaign in Western Virginia.Some of its Incidents.-Its Failure and unfortunate Results.-Other Movements in
Virginia.-The Potomac Line.-The BATTLE OF LEEsBURG.-Overweening Confidence
of the South.
WE must return here to the narrative of the campaign in
Virginia. The campaign in the western portion of the State.
was scarcely more than a series of local adventures, compared
with other events of the war. It was a failure from the beginning-owing to the improvidence of the government, the
want of troops, the hostile character of the country itself, and
a singular military policy, to which we shall have occasion
hereafter to refer.
General Wise, of Virginia, was appointed a brigadier-general without an army.  He rallied around him  at Richmond a
number of devoted friends, and explained to them his views
and purposes. Cordially favoring his plans, they went into
the country, and called upon the people to rally to the standard of General Wise, and enable him to prevent the approach
of the enemy into the Kanawha Valley.
About the first of June, General Wise left Richmond for the
western portion of the State, accompanied by a portion of his
staff. At Lewisburg, he was joined by several companies
raised and organized in that region. From this point, he proceeded to Charleston, in the Kanawha Valley, where he undertook, with his rare and characteristic enthusiasm, to rally the
people to the support of the State. A number of them joined
his command; but the masses continued apathetic, owing to a




160           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
number of adverse influences, prominent among which was the
political position of George W. Summers, the most influential
politician of Western Virginia, the leader of the " Union" men
in the State Convention, and a prominent delegate to the Peace
Conference at Washington.
This person threw the weight of his great influence in opposition to the uprising of the people. He. advised them to a
strict neutrality between the public enemy and the supporters
of the Confederate government. Notwithstanding all the appeals made to his patriotism, he maintained an attitude of indifference, and, by reason of the high estimation in which he
was generally held by the community' which he lived, as
a wise and sagacious man, he succeeded in neutralizing the
greater portion of Kanawha and the adjoining counties.
Despite, however, the obstacles in his way, General Wise
succeeded in raising a brigade of two. thousand five hundred
infantry, seven hundred cavalry, and three battalions of artillery. Of this force, western Virginia furnished about threefifths and the east about two-fifths. On his arrival at Charleston, General Wise found C. G. Tompkins in command of a
number of companies, chiefly from Kanawha and the adjacent
counties. These forces, combined with those of the Wise
Legion, amounted to about four thousand men.
General Wise, anxious to give an assurance of support to
the strong Southern sentiment reported to exist in Gilmer and
Calhoun, sent an expedition into those counties to repress the
excesses of the Union men. In the mean time, the enemy had
landed considerable forces at Parkersburg and Point Pleasant
on the Ohio river, and had military possession of the neighboring country. Iis superior facilities for raising troops in
the populous States of Ohio and Indiana, and his ample means
of transportation by railroad through those States, and by the
navigation of the Ohio and Kanawha rivers, enabled him, in
a short space of time, to concentrate a large force, with adequate supplies and munitions of war, in the lower part of the
Kanawha Valley.
About the middle of July, the enemy advanced up the river
into the county.of Putnam, and, on the 17th, Captain Patton
(afterwards Colonel Patton), with a small force, met and repulsed three regiments of the enemy at Scary Creek, in Put



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           161
nam county, taking prisoners Cols. Norton and Villiers of the
Ohio troops, and Cols. Woodroof and Neff of the Kentucky
troops. The enemy retired, and our forces remained in possession of the field. On the evening of the day of the action,
General Wise sent down two regiments under Colonels Tompkins and McCausland to reinforce the troops at Scary. Upon
arriving at the opposite side of the river, they found that the
enemy had fallen back to his main forces under the command
of General Cox.
Being unprepared to hold the position, not having the adequate supplies of men and munitions of war, the Confederates
tell back in the dirqtion of Charleston. Capt. Patton had
been dangerously wounded in the action, and could not be removed from the place. Col. Norton, one of the Federal officers
captured, was also wounded. He and Capt. Patton were placed
in the same house, Col. Norton entering into an arrangement
by which Capt. Patton was to be released by the enemy in exchange for himself. Gen. Cox, on his arrival, repudiated the
understanding. He, however, released Capt. Patton on parole
as soon as he had partially recovered from his wound.
After the action of Scary, the enemy's forces, which had
been largely increased, steadily advanced up the valley both
by land and water. Gen. Wise, however, was ready to offer
battle to the enemy, and was confident of his ability to repulse
him. But just about this time the news of the disaster to
Gen. Garnett's command at Rich Mountain reached the Kanawha Valley, and put a new aspect upon military operations
in that section. The consequences of this disaster exposed the
little army of Gen. Wise to imminent peril. He was in danger
of being cut off in the rear by several roads from the northwest, striking the Kanawha road at various points between
Lewisburg and Gauley Bridge. Under these circumstances,
Gen. Wise determined to fall back with his entire force to
Lewisburg, a distance of one hundred miles. This he did in
good order, destroying the bridges behind him, and reaching
Lewisburg about the first of August. Remaining in, that
vicinity some ten days, laboriously engaged in organizing his
brigade, and supplying it, as far as possible, with arms and
the essential materials for an active campaign, he announced
himself as again prepared to take up the line of advance.
11




162           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
About this time, General Floyd arrived at the GIeenbrier
White Sulphur Springs with a brigade of three regiments of
infantry and a battalion of cavalry. He had been ordered, in
the first instance, to proceed with his command to Jackson
River, with a view to the relief of the retreating forces of Gen.
Garnett; but, on his arrival at the Sweet Springs from Southampton, Virginia, Gen. Floyd's direction was changed by authority to the Kanawha Valley. After consultation between
Generals Floyd and Wise in Greenbrier county, the formelr,
who was the ranking officer, resumed his march westward, the
latter following in a few days.
Gen. Floyd commenced to skirmish with the enemy's pickets
at Tyree's, on the west side of the Sewell Mountain, driving
them back to their command, five miles distant, with a loss of
four killed and seven wounded. Upon his approach, the army
retreated from Locust Lane to Hamilton's, near Hawk's Nest,
Floyd's command advancing and occupying the camp of the
Federals the next night. The Wise Legion also came up and
occupied the same ground. The two commands then advanced
to Dogwood Gap, where the road froln Summersville intersects
the turnpike from Lewisburg to Charleston. There two pieces
of artillery were posted to keep open the line, and prevent a
flanking movement from Cox's command via Carnifax Ferry,
where there was reported to be a Federal force of several
thousand. The main command then moved down to Pickett's
Mills, near Hamilton's, within a few miles of the enemy's
camp. At this point, information was obtained that the rear
of the Confederates was threatened by Matthews' and Tyler's
commands, which had occupied Carnifax Ferry (on the Gauley
liver), and Cross Lanes, a few miles distant therefrom. Gen.
Floyd at once ordered his brigade to strike tents, and at halfpast one o'clock in the morning he took up the line of march,
with the view of engaging the forces of his assailants, whose
object was to cut off his trains and fall upon his rear.
Gen. Wise's command was left at Pickett's ]Mills to hold the
turnpike, and prevent a flank movement from Hawk's Nest,
where the main body of Cox's forces were stationed on New
River, seven miles east of Gauley Bridge.
Floyd's brigade proceeded by a rapid march, and reached
Carnifax Ferry about noon of the -same day. On his arrival




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           16
there, he learned that the enemy had drawn in his commands
at Cross Lanes and Carnifax Ferry, in anticipation of an attack
at Hawk's Nest. Gen. Floyd proceeded at once to raise the.
boats which the enemy had sunk in the river at the ferry, and
to construct other boats for crossing the river immediately, so
as to occupy the strong positions which the enemy had held on
the opposite side of the Gauley. In the short space of twentyfour hours, he had constructed a small batteau to carry some
ten men, and had raised a ferry-boat capable of carrying fifty
men and transporting his wagons, and had succeeded in ferrying over all of his infantry and two pieces of artillery. He
then undertook to transport his cavalry, when an accident
occurred which caused the loss of the ferry-boat and four men.
The boat capsized and was drawn over the rapids. By this
accident, Gen. Floyd's command was severed, most of his
cavalry and four pieces of artillery being left on the eastern
side of the stream, while his infantry and a small portion of his
cavalry had reached the opposite shore. The stream had been
so swollen by recent rains as to render ferrying extremely
hazardous. Gen. Floyd, from the western side, ordered the
quarter-master across the river to build boats on the other side,
and to convey a message to Gen. Wise informing him of the
condition of the command.
In twenty-four hours, a boat was built and launched from
the west side of the river, and the remainder of the artillery
and cavalry and such wagons as were needful were passed
over. In the mean time, Gen. Floyd was engaged in strengthening his position. His scouts were thrown out in the direction of Gauley Bridge, by way of the Summersville and Gauley
turnpike, and they reported the advance of the enemy in considerable strength from Gauley, in the direction of Cross
Lanes. The next evening, the enemy had advanced to Cross
Lanes, within two miles of Floyd's camp. The Federal officers
had heard of the casualty at the ferry, and their "Union"
friends in the neighboring country had reported to them that
but two hundred of the infantry and cavalry had succeeded in
crossing over.
Col. Tyler, who commanded the Federals, was confident of
the capture of the whole force on the western side of the river.
He was sadly disappointed. Gen. Floyd had drawn up his




164           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
forces in line of battle on the evening of Sunday, August 25th,
and prepared for an attack. His pickets had closely scented
the enemy's position. Keeping his men in line of battle all
night, at four o'clock the next morning he ordered an advance
upon the enemy, whose strength was estimated at from fifteen
hundred to two thousand. The order was promptly obeyed.
The several Virginia regiments marched by the respective
routes assigned them, and succeeded in completely surprising
the Federals. Col. Tyler's line of pickets did not extend more
than two or three hundred yards from his camp in the direction of Carnifax Ferry. His men were found preparing their
breakfasts of green corn and fresh beef-roasting their corn
by the fire and broiling their beef on sharp sticks. They were
encamped in separate divisions, the rear being very near the
church, in the direction of Gauley, in which building Col.
Tyler had taken up his quarters. Their pickets were drawn
in, and the division nearest to Floyd's forces took position
behind a fence, where, for a time, they stubbornly resisted the
attack. They were soon dislodged, and the whole command
pushed over the hills, where they broke into the most disgraceful flight, the advance of which was conspicuously led by their
colonel and field-officers. The flight was one of wild consternation, many of the enemy not only throwing away their arms,
but divesting themselves of hats and coats to accelerate their
flight, which was continued on an uninterrupted stretch for
twelve or fifteen miles.
The commander of the Federals, Col. Tyler, was an Ohio
man, and was familiar with the topography of the country he
had come to invade, having visited it for years in the character
of a fur-dealer. On his advent in the Kanawha Valley as the
commander of an invading regiment, the coarse jest was made
in some of the Northern papers that he would " drive a snug
business" in rebel skins. The joke was turned against him by
the Virginia soldiers at Cross Lanes, when they captured all
the baggage of the Federal command, including the colonel's
shirts, who had thus narrowly escaped with his own skin..As
the flying enemy dashed on, the colonel led the retreat at a
considerable distance ahead of itL One of his staff, a major, in
leaping a fence got his horse astride it, and had to leave him
there, trusting to the fleetness of his own heels for safety.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           165
In the affair at Cross Lanes, the enemy's loss in killed,
wounded, and prisoners was about two hundred. That on our
side in killed and wounded did not exceed a dozen men.
Gen. Floyd proceeded to strengthen his position on the
Gauley. Having succeeded in throwing his forces between
Cox and Rosecrans, he set to work to bring up ten days' supplies in advance, intending to throw a portion of his command
into the Kanawha Valley below Cox, with a view of cutting off
his retreat. Having secured supplies sufficient to justify an
advance movement, Gen. Floyd was about this time apprised
of the approach of Rosecrans, by way of Suttonsville, with
a large force for the relief of Cox. On the evening previous to
the contemplated advance of the Confederates against Cox,
about three o'clock of the 10th of September, Rosecrans, by a
rapid march of sixteen miles, threw his entire force of ten regiments and several heavy batteries of artillery about Floyd's
intrenchments, and commenced a vigorous attack.
The successful resistance of this attack of the enemy, in the
neighborhood of Carnifax Ferry, was one of the most remarkable incidents of the campaign in Western Virginia. The force
of Gen. Floyd's command was 1,740 men, and from three
o'clock in the afternoon until nightfall, it sustained, with unwavering determination and the most brilliant success, an assault from an enemy between eight and nine thousand strong,
made with small-arms, grape, and rounds-hot, from howitzers
and rifled cannon.
Upon the close of the contest for the night, Gen. Floyd determined at once to cross the Gauley river, and take position
upon the left bank-Gen. Wise having failed to reinforce him,
and it being only a question of time when he would be compelled to yield to the superiority of numbers. The retreat
across the river was accomplished by aid of a hastily constructed bridge of logs, about four feet wide, without the loss
of a gun, or any accident whatever. In a continued firing upon
us, by cannon and small-arms, for nearly four hours, only
twenty of our men had been wounded and none killed. We
had repulsed the enemy in five distinct and successive assaults,
and had held him in complete check until the river was placed
between him and the little army he had come in the insolent
confidence of overwhelming numbers to destroy. The loss of




166           THE FI iST YEAR OF THE WAR.
the enemy had been considerable, Col. Lytle, of Cincinnati,
and a number of other Federal officers, having fallen in their
attempts to rally their men to a successful charge. The whole
loss of the enemy cannot be stated here; it was very serious,
by the admission of the Cincinnati Commercial, and other Federal newspapers; it, unquestionably, must have amounted to
several hundred in killed and wounded. Gen. Floyd was
wounded by a musket-shot in the arm. His flag, which was
flying at head-quarters, and his tent were riddled with balls.
At the time that information had reached Gen. Floyd of the
advance of the enemy towards his position, he had dispatched
orders to Gen. Wise for reinforcements, which he failed to procure. In his official report of the action, Gen. Floyd wrote to
the War Department at Richmond: " I am very confident that
I could have beaten the enemy and marched directly to the
Valley of the Kanawha, if the reinforcements fiom Gen. Wise's
column had come up when ordered, and the regiments from
Nolrth Carolina and Georgia could have reached me before the
close of the second day's conflict. I cannot express the regret
which I feel at the necessity, over which I had no control,
which required that I should recross the river, I am confident that if I could have commanded the services of five
thousand men, instead of eighteen hundred, which I had, 1
could have opened the road directly into the Valley of the
Kanawha."  Referring to the correspondence between himself
and Gen. Wise, in which the latter had declined to send forward reinforcements, Gen. Floyd indicated to the government
the urgent necessity of shaping the command in the Valley
of the Kanawha, so as to insure in the future that unity of
action, upon which alone can rest any hope of success in milli
tary matters.
While Gen. Floyd was at Carnifax Ferry, Gen. Wise marched
down to Big Creek, inFayette county, where the enemy were
in considerable force, fortified his position, and offered them
battle. He hoped to bbtain a position upon the flankl of the
enemy, and with that view, sent Col. Anderson and his regiment by an obscure county road, but did not succeed in his object. Meanwhile, with two regiments of infantry and a battery
of artillery, Gen. Wise remained within a quarter of a mile of
the enemy. A sharp skirmish took place, the enemy opening




THE FIRS r YEAR OF THE WAR.          167
upon Wise's forces with artillery, doing no execution, however.
The artillery of the Wise Legion replied, throwing shell, with
some effect, into the enemy's lines. But the attempt to bring
on a general engagement was unsuccessful, the enemy declining the offer of battle.
Gen. Floyd retreated in good order from Carnifax Ferry to
the summit of Big Sewell Mountain, where he remained for
three days, when, in accordance with the decision of a council
of officers called-by him, he ordered a retreat to Meadow Bluff,
a position which, it was said, guarded all the approaches to
Lewisburg and the railroad. Gen. Wise, however, who had
fallen back with Gen. Floyd to Big Sewell, declined to retreat
to Meadow Bluff; and proceeded to strengthen his position,
which he named Camp " Defiance."
The enemy had advanced to Tyree's-a well-known public
house, on the turnpike-road, in Fayette county. This country
tavern had been kept for a number of years by an ancient
couple, whose fidelity and services to the South were remnarkable. Of the courage and adventure of Mrs. Tyree, many wellauthenticated anecdotes are told. Her husband, though a very
old man, had gone into the ranks of the Confederate army
at the commencement of the war. The enemy, who were welladvised of the enthusiastic attachment of Mrs. Tyree to the
cause of the State of Virginia, soon made her an object of their
annoyances. Their first attempt was to take away the only
horse the old woman had. A Federal soldier came to her
house, caught her horse without her knowledge, and was about
to ride him off, when she discovered the thief and demanded
his business. The soldier replied that he was directed to take
the horse for the purpose of " jayhawking." The words were
scarcely out of his mouth, when Mrs. Tyree knocked him down
with a billet of wood, stretching the ambitious "jayhawker"
almost lifeless upon the ground. The horse, for further security, was locked up in the old woman's smoke-house.
On another occasion, a file of Federal soldiers proceeded to
the premises of Mrs. Tyree, with the intention of driving off
her cow.'Discovering them, she asked what they intended to
do witlh her cow. " We intend to drive it to camp for a beef,"
was the reply. Instantly, wrenching a gun from the hands of
one of the soldiers, ]Mrs. Tyree deliberately declared that she




.168           THIE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
would shoot the first man who attempted to drive the cow from
her premises. "The rest of you may then kill me," she said,
"if you think proper."  The soldiers were baffled, and Mrs.
Tyree's cow was saved.
A few nights afterwards, a number of soldiers surrounded
her house, under the shelter of which was herself, her daughter,
and a few faithful servants, without any male protector whatever. They ordered the family to leave, as they intended to
burn the house. Mrs. Tyree positively refused to leave the
house, very coolly locked all the doors, and told them if they
intended to burn the building, to apply the torch without
furrther ceremony, as she and her family were resolved to be
consumed with it. The villains, hesitating at such a work of
fiendish assassination, were forced to leave without putting their
threat into execution. The heroic spirit of such a woman, not
only protected her household, but furnished many interesting
incidents to the campaign in her neighborhood, which it is not
now the time to relate. It is to be regretted that her home
was left within the lines of the enemy.
Having traced to a certain period, the operations in the Valley of the Kanawha, we must turn to note the movements of
the army in northwestern Virginia.
After the retreat of Gen. Garnett from Rich Mountain, and
the death of that officer, Gen. Lee was appointed to succeed
him, and, with as little delay as possible, to repair to the scene
of operations. The most remarkable circumstance of this campaign was, that it was conducted by a general who had never
fought a battle, who had a pious horror of guerrillas, and whose
extreme tenderness of blood induced him to depend exclusively
upon the resources of strategy, to essay the achievement of victories without the cost of life.
Gen. Lee took with him reinforcements, making his whole
force, in conjunction with the remnant of Gen. Garnett's army
that had fallen back from Rich Mountain to Monterey, about
sixteen thousand men. Early in August, Gen. Lee reached
with his command the neighborhood of Cheat Mountain, on
the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, and found it strongly
fortified by the enemy. The position was known to be an exceedingly strong one, and not easily turned. Nevertheless,
Gen. Lee was confident that he would be able by strategic




THE FIrST YEAR OF THE WAR.                  169
movements to dislodge the enemy from his stronghold, capture
his forces, and then march his victorious army into the heart
of northwestern Virginia, releasing the people there from  the
fetters with which, for two months, they had been bound.  The
prospect of such a conquest of the enemy was eminently pleasant. Rosecrans* was the ranking officer in northwestern Virginia, but Gen. Reynolds was in command of the troops on
Cheat Mountain and in its vicinity, his force being estimated
at from ten to twelve thousand men.
Gen. Lee felt his way cautiously along the road leading from
Huntersville to Tluttonsville, in the county of Randolph, and
reaching Valley Mountain, he halted for some time, arranging
his plans for attacking the enemy, who were about eight miles
below him, in Randolph county, at Crouch's, in Tygart's Valley River, five or six thousand strong. His plans were arranged so as to divide his forces for the purpose of surrounding
the enemy. After great labor and the endurance of severe
hardships on the mountain spurs, where the weather was very
cold, he succeeded in getting below the enemy, on Tygart's
Valley River, placing other portions of his forces on the spurs
of the mountain immediately east and west of the enemy, and
marching another portion of his troops down the Valley River
close to the enemy. The forces were thus arranged in position
for making an attack upon the enemy at Crouch's, and remained there for some hours. It was doubtless in the plan of
Gen. Lee for his forces to remain in position until the consumination of another part' of his plan, viz. that some fifteen hundred of Gen. H. R. Jackson's forces stationed at Greenbrier
* Gen. Rosecrans is of German descent, a native of Ohio, and a graduate
of West Point. He had devoted much study to chemistry and geology, and
resided some time in Charleston, Kanawha, prosecuting some researches into
the mineral riches of that region. He was also employed in some capacity
for a time by some of the coal companies or some of the coal-oil manufacturers there. His last enterprise, previous to the war, was the establishment of
an oil manufactory in Cincinnati. In this he failed pecuniarily. The war
was a timely event to him, and his military education gave him a claim to
consideration. In the South, he was esteemed as one of the best generals the
North had in the field; he was declared by military critics, who could not be
suspected of partiality, to have clearly out-generalled Lee in western Virginia, who made it the entire object of his campaign to " surround" the Dutch
general; and his popular manners and amiable deportment towards our prisoners, on more than one occasion, procured him the respect of his enemy.




170           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
River should march around another position of the enemy, at
the celebrated Cheat Mountain Pass, on the Staunton and
Parkersburg road, where he was five or six thousand strong.
Jackson's forces did march around this position, under comrn
mand of Col. Rust, of Arkansas, through extraordinary difficulties and perils and under circumstances of terrible exhaustion. The troops had to ascend the almost perpendicular
mountain sides, but finally succeeded in obtaining a position
in front of and to the west of the enemy. The attack of this
force upon the enemy on Cheat Mountain was understood to
be, in the plan of Gen. Lee, a signal for the attack by his
forces upon the enemy at Crouch's. Col. Rust, however, discovered the enemy on the mountain to be safely protected by
block-houses and other defences, and concluding that the attack could not be made with any hope of success, ordered a
retreat. The signal was not given according to the plan of
Gen. Lee, and no attack was made by his forces, which retreated without firing a gun back to Valley Mountain.
It is understood that Gen. Lee did not expect Col. Rust to
make an attack with any certainty or even probability of success; his purpose being for Col. Rust to hold the enemy in
position at Cheat Mountain Pass, while he was engaging them
at Crouch's. The fact, however, is, that Cheat Mountain Pass
was, by the nearest road to Crouch's, ten miles distant; and
there are strong reasons for believing that, if Gen. Lee had
made the attack upon the enemy at the latter position, they
would have been captured to a man; notwithstanding the
failure to hold the forces in check at Cheat Mlountain. Such
was the impression of the Federals themselves. If the enemy
had been captured at Crouch's, a march of ten miles down the
Valley River by Gen. Lee would have brought his forces in the
rear of the enemy at Huttonsville, cutting off his supplies, and,
with Jackson on the other side, compelling him to the necessity
of surrender.
It is to be regretted that Gen. Lee failed to make the attack
at Crouch's, and to realize the rich results of his well-matured
plan. Had he defeated the enemy at Crouch's, he would have
been within two days' march of the position from which Gen.
Garnett had retreated, and could have held Rosecrans in check,
who was at that time making his way to Carnifax Ferry to




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          171
oppose Floyd. There is reason to believe that if Gen. Lee had
not allowed the immaterial part of his plan to control his
action, a glorious success would have resulted, opening the
whole northwestern country to us, and enabling Floyd and
Wise to drive Cox with ease out of the Kanawha Valley. Regrets, however, were unavailing now. Gen. Lee's plan, finished
drawings of which were sent to the War Department at Richmond, was said to have been one of the best-laid plans that
ever illustrated the consummation of the rules of strategy,
or ever went awry on account of practical failures in its
execution.
Having failed in his plans for dislodging the enemy from
Cheat Mountain, and thus relieving northwestern Virginia of
his presence, Gen. Lee determined to proceed to the Kanawha
region, with a view of relieving Generals Floyd and Wise, and
possibly driving the enemy to the extreme western borders of
Virginia. Accordingly, in the latter part of September, he
ordered the principal portion of his command to take up a line
of march in that direction.
It has already been stated that Gen. Floyd had fallen back
with his forces to Meadow Bluff, while Gen. Wise stopped to
the east of the summit of Big Sewell. In this position Gen.
Lee found them on his arrival. He took up his head-quarters
with Gen. Floyd, and, after examining his position, proceeded
to Sewell, where Gen. Wise still remained in front of the
enemy. He decided to fortify Wise's position. Gen. Floyd's
command, except a garrison at Meadow Bluff, returned to Big
Sewell. IHe had been largely reinforced since he had left the
Gauley river. The position on Big Sewell was made exceedingly strong by a breastwork extending four miles.
The whole Confederate force here under the command ot
Gen. Lee was nearly twenty thousand. This formidable army
remained for twelve or fifteen days within sight of the enemy,
each apparently awaiting an attack from the other. Thus the
time passed, when, one morning, Gen. Lee discovered, much
to his surprise, that the enemy he had been so long hesitating
to attack no longer confronted him. Rosecrans had disappeared in the night, and reached his old position on the Gauley, thirty-two miles distant, without annoyance from the
Confederate army. Thus the second opportunity of a decisive




172            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
battle in western Virginia was blindly lost, Gen. Lee making
no attempt to follow up the enemy who had so skilfully eluded
him; the excuses alleged for his not doing so being mud, swollen streams, and the leanness of his artillery horses.
In withdrawing from the Cheat Mountain region, Gen. Lee
had left a force of some twenty-five hundred men at Greenbrier
River, and, while he was playing at strategy in the Kanawha
valley, this little force had achieved a signal victory over an
apparently overwhelming force of the enemy. The force on
the Greenbrier at the foot of Cheat Mountain was under cominand of Gen. IH. R. Jackson, of Georgia. A snlall force had
also been left on the Alleghany Mountain, at Huntersville, and
perhaps other localities in that region.
On the 3d of October, the enemy, thinking that he might
strike a successful blow, -in the absence of Gen. Lee and the
larger portion of his command, came down from Cheat Mountain, five thousand strong, and attacked Jackson's position on
the Greenbrier. The attack was gallantly repulsed. The most
unusual and brilliant incident of the battle was the conduct of
our pickets, who held the entire column of the enemy in check
for nearly an hour, pouring into the head of it a galling fire,
not withdrawing until six pieces of artillery had opened briskly
upon them, and full battalions of infantry were outflanking
them on the right, and then retiring in such order, and taking
such advantage of the ground, as to reach their camp with but
a trifling loss.
The action was continued by a severe artillery engagement,
when, after four hours' interchange of fire, in which we could
not bring more than five pieces into action to return the fire of
the enemy's eight, he began to threaten seriously our front and
right, by heavy masses of his infantry. He had been repulsed
at one point of the so-called river (in fact, a shallow stream,
about twenty yards'in width), by the 3d Arkansas regiment.
As the designs of his column were fully developed, the 12th
Georgia regiment were ordered to take position near the
stream, while a battery commanded by Capt. Shumaker was
directed to open fire upon the same column. The encounter
was of but short duration. In a short time, the unmistakable
evidences of the enemy's rout became apparent. Distinctly
could their officers be heard, with words of mingled command,




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            173
remonstrance, and entreaty, attempting to rally their battalions
into line, and to bring them to the charge, but they could not
be induced to re-form' their broken ranks, nor to emerge from
the cover of the woods, in the direction of our fire. Rapidly,
and in disorder, they returned into the turnpike, and soon
thereafter the entire force of the enemy, artillery, infantry,
and cavalry, retreated in confusion along the road and adjacent
fields.
The engagement lasted from seven in the morning to halfpast two o'clock ii the afternoon, at which time the enemy,
who had come with artillery to bombard and demoralize the
small force of Confederates; with infantry to storm their camp;
with cavalry to rout and destroy them, and with four days'
booked rations in his haversacks, to prosecute a rapid march
either towards Staunton, or towards Huntersville, was in precipitate retreat back to his Cheat Mountain fastnesses. His loss
in killed and wounded was estimated at from two hundred and
fifty to three hundred. That of the Confederates was very inconsiderable, not exceeding fifty in all.
The approaching rigors of a winter in the mountains, gave
warning of a speedy termination of the campaign in western
Virginia, in which, in fact, we had no reason to linger for any
fruits we had gained. The campaign was virtually abandoned
by the government, in recalling Gen. Lee shortly after he had
allowed the opportunity'of a decisive battle with Rosecrans
to escape him. He was appointed to take charge of the coast
defences of South Carolina and Georgia. Gen. Wise was ordered to report to Richmond; Gen. Loring was sent with his
command to reinforce Gen. T. J. Jackson (" Stonewall"), at
Winchester; and Gen. H. R. Jackson was transferred to duty
in the South. With the exception of Gen. Floyd's command,
which still kept the field in the region of the Gauley, and a
force of twelve hundred men on the Alleghany Mountain, the
Confederate forces were withdrawn from western Virginia,
after the plain failure of the campaign, and in the expectation
that the rigors of the advancing winter season would induce
the enemy to retire from the mountains to the Ohio.
The last incident of battle in the campaign was a brilliant
one. On the 13th of December,'the whole of the enemy's
forces, under Gen. Reynolds, were bronght out to attack the




174            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
position commanded by Col. Edward Johnson, of Georgia, with
his little force on the Alleghany. The enemy had been conducted to our position by a guide, a Union man. The Federals,
on the flank, where the principal attack was made, numbered
fully two thousand. They were gallantly met by our troops,
who did not exceed three hundred at this time, being a portion
of Hansborough's battalion, the 31st Virginia. These were
reinforced by a few companies of Georgia troops, who came up
with a shout, and joining the troops who had been forced back
by overwhelming numbers, pressed upon the enemy with a
desperate valor, and drove him from his almost impenetrable
cover of fallen trees, brush, and timber. Many of the officers
fought by the side of their men, and the enemy was pushed
down the mountain, but with serious loss to the gallant little
command. In describing the conduct of his men, Col. Johnson
wrote to the War Department, "I cannot speak in terms too
exaggerated of the unflinching courage and dashing gallantry
of those five hundred men, who contended from a quarter past
7 A. M., until a quarter to 2 P. M., against an immensely superior force of the enemy, and finally drove them fromn their
position and pursued them a mile or more down the mountain."
The casualties in this small force amounted to tventy killed and
ninety-six wounded.
Gen. Floyd was the last of the Confederate generals to
leave the field of active operations in western Virginia. After
the retreat of Rosecrans from Sewell Mountain, Gen. Floyd,
at his own request, was sent with his brigade, by way of Richard's Ferry and Raleigh and Fayette Court Ihouse, to Cotton
Hill, on the west side of the Kanawha. Here he again confronted Rosecrans and his whole force, encamped at Hamilton's, at Hawk's Nest. at Tompkins' farm, and at Stodin's, near
the falls. Cotton Hill is in Fayette county, on the Kanawha,
opposite the mouth of the Gauley; the Raleigh and Fayette
turnpike passes over the hill, crossing the Kanawha river at
the ferry below the falls, where it intersects the Kanawha turnpike leading from Lewisburg to Charleston. From the position
of Cotton Hill, the several camps of Rosecrans referred to
could be distinctly seen, stretching to the distance of several
miles. Gen. Floyd reached this point after a fatiguing march
of eleven days, and occupied the landings of all the approaches




TILE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           175
to his position, at Bougten's Ferry, Matthews' Ferry, Montgomery's Ferry at the falls, and Loop Creek. For three weeks,
he continued to challenge the enemy to battle, firing at him
across the river, annoying him considerably, cutting off his
communication with the Valley of the Kanawha, and holding
in check his steamboats, which ran up to Loop Creek shoals at
high tides. For several days, the communication of the Federals, between their corps on the opposite sides of the Gauley,
was entirely suspended. Gen. Floyd continued to challenge,
insult, and defy the enemy with his little six-pounders at Cotton Hill, while Rosecrans, before he would accept the challenge made to his already superior numbers, waited for heavy
reinforcements from the Ohio.
At last, being largely reinforced by the way of Charleston,
Rosecrans plauned an attack upon Cotton Hill, and moved by
several distinctly indicated routes, namely, Miller's, MIontgomery's, and Loop Creek Ferries, all concentrating at Fayetteville,
nine miles from Cotton Hill. He expected the most brilliant
results from his overpowering numbers and well-conceived designs, and was confident of cutting off the retreat of Floyd and
capturing his command. His force was fifteen thousand men;
that of Floyd did not exceed four thousand effective men, his
ranks having been reduced by sickness, and the old story of
promised reinforcements never having been realized to him.
In these circumstances, Gen. Floyd made a retreat, the success
of which was one of the most admirable incidents of a campaign, which he, at least, had already distinguished by equal
measures of vigor, generalship, and gallantry. He effected his
retreat in perfect order, fighting the enemy for twenty miles,
and bringing off his force, including sick, with a loss of not
more than five or six men. In this loss, however, was Col.
Croghan, of Kentucky, a gallant young officer, and a son of the
late Col. Croghan, who had obtained historical distinction in
the Northwestern campaign of the War of 1812. The enemy,
after pursuing Gen. Floyd for twenty miles, turned back in
the direction of Fayette Court House, leaving him to retire at
- his leisure to southwestern Virginia. It was from here that
Gen. Floyd was transferred by the government to the now imposing theatre of war in Tennessee and Kentucky.
A minuter history of the campaign in western Virginia than




176           THE FIRST YEAR OF TlE WAR.
the plan of our work admits, would enable us to cite many instances of individual gallantry and self-sacrifice. They would
show the good conduct of small parties of Confederates on
many occasions. In concluding the narrative of the general
events of the war in western Virginia, we may add a very
brief mention of some of these occurrences, which were only
incidents of the campaign, which did not affect its general results, but which showed instances of gallantry that, on a larger
scale of execution, might have accomplished very important
results.
While the enemy had possession of the IKanawha Valley,
Col. J. Lucius Davis' cavalry, of the Wise Legion, was sent to
Big Coal River, thirty-five miles from Fayette Court House.
On reaching Big Coal, they gave rapid chase to a marauding
party of Federals, and overtook them at Tony's Creek, where a
fight took place on the 11th September, which resulted in the
total rout of the enemy, with a loss of about fifty killed and
wounded, about the same number of prisoners, and the capture
of all his provisions, munitions, &c. The Confederates sustained no loss whatever. The action lasted three hours, the
remnant of the enemy having been pursued to a point within
twelve miles of Charleston. The cavalry returned with their
trophies, after having traversed, in twenty-four hours, a distance of seventy-five or eighty miles over steep mountain trails,
bridle-paths, and rocky fords. Col. J. Lucius Davis, in his report of the affair, speaks of Lieut.-col. Clarkson as the hero of
the expedition.
On the 25th September, Col. J. W. Davis, of Greenbrier, at
the head of two hundred and twenty-five militia of Wyoming,
Logan, and Boone counties, were attacked at Chapmansville,
by an Ohio regiment commanded by Col. Pratt. The militia
fought well, and were forcing the enemy from the field, when
their gallant leader, Col. Davis, received a desperate, and as
was thought at the time, a mortal wound. This unfortunate
circumstance reversed the fortune of the field. The militia
retreated and the enemy returned to the field. Col. Davis was
taken by the Ohio troops, and remained in their hands till his
partial recovery from his wounds, when he was paroled. The
troops under Col. Davis lost but two killed and two wounded,
while the loss of the Ohio troops 5n killed and wounded ex



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           17
ceeded fifty, from the best information Col. D. was able to obtain.
Col. Jenkins' cavalry rendered efficient service in the Kanawha Valley, and kept the enemy all the time uneasy. On
the 9th November, they made a gallant dash into the town of
Guyandotte, on the Ohio river, and routed the forces of the
enemy stationed there, killing and wounding a number of them,
and taking nearly one hundred prisoners. Federal reinforcements afterwards came up to the town, and on the pretence
that the Confederates had been invited to attack it by resident
Secessionists, gratified a monstrous and cowardly revenge by
firing the larger portion of the town, although many of the inhabitants had come out to meet them on the banks of the river,
waving white flags and signifying the most unqualified submission. Women and children were turned into the street, many
of them being forced to jump from the windows of their houses
to escape the flames.
We have already adverted to the causes which contributed
to make the campaign in western Virginia a failure. The
cause which furnished the most popular excuse for its ineffectiveness-the disloyalty of the resident population-was, perhaps, the least adequate of them all. That disloyalty has been
hugely magnified by those interested, in finding excuses in it
for their own inefficiency and disappointment of public expectation. While Maryland, Kentucky, and other regions of the
South, which not only submitted to Lincoln, but furnished him
with troops, were not merely excused, but were the recipients
of overflowing sympathy, and accounted by a charitable stretch
of imagination " sister States" of the Southern Confederacy, an
odium, cruelly unjust, was inflicted upon western Virginia,
despite of the fact that this region was enthralled by Federal
troops, and, indeed, had never given such evidences of sympathy with the Lincoln government as had been manifested both
by Maryland and Kentucky in their State elections, their contributions of troops, and other acts of deference to the authorities at
Washington. It is a fact, that even now, " Governor" Pierpont,
the creature of Lincoln, cannot get one-third of the votes in a single county in western Virginia. It is a fact, that the Northern
journals admit that in a large portion of this country, it is unsafe
for Federal troops to show themselves unless in large bodies.
12




178           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
The unfortunate results of the campaign in western Virginia
abandoned to the enemy a country of more capacity and grandeur than, perhaps, any other of equal limits on this continent;
remarkable for the immensity of its forests, the extent of its
mineral resources, and the vastness of its water-power, and
possessing untold wealth yet awaiting the coal-digger, the salt
dealer, and the manufacturer.
While the events referred to in the foregoing pages were
transpiring in western Virginia, an inauspicious quiet, for
months after the battle of Ianassas, was maintained on the
lines of the Potomac. A long, lingering Indian summer, with
roads more hard and skies more beautiful than Virginia had
seen for many a year, invited the enemy to advance. He
steadily refused the invitation to a general action; the advance
of our lines was tolerated to Munson's Hill, within a few miles
of Alexandria, and opportunities were sought in vain by the
Confederates, in heavy skirmishing, to engage the lines of the
two armies. The gorgeous pageant on the Potomac, which, by
the close of the year, had cost the Northern people three hundred millions of dollars, did not move. The "Young Napoleon" was twitted as a dastard in the Southern newspapers.
They professed to discover in his unwillingness to fight the
near achievement of their independence, when, however the
fact was, the inactivity of the Federal forces on the northern
frontier of Virginia only implied that immense preparations
were going on in other directions, while the Southern people
were complacently entertained with the parades, reviews, and
pompous idleness of an army, the common soldiery of which
wore white gloves on particular occasions of holiday display.
THE BATTLE OF LEESBURG.
The quiet, however, on the lines of the Potomac was broken
by an episode in the month of October, which, without being
important in its military results, added lustre to our arms.
The incident referred t'o was the memorable action of Leesburg, in which a small portion of the Potomac army drove an
enemy four times their number from the soil of Virginia, killing and taking prisoners a greater number than the whole
Confederate force engaged.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           179
Gen. Stone having been persuaded that no important force
of the Confederates remained along the Upper Potomac, and
in obedience to orders from head-quarters, commenced his passage of the river on Sunday, the 20th of October, at Harrison's
Island, a point of transit about six miles above Edwards'
Ferry, and nearly an equal distance from Leesburg. A force
of five companies of Massachusetts troops, commanded by Col.
Devins, effected a crossing at the ferry named above, and, a
few hours thereafter, Col. Baker, who took command of all the
Federal forces on the Virginia side, having been ordered by
Stone to push the Confederates from Leesburg and hold the
place, crossed the river at Conrad's Ferry, a little south of
Harrison's Island.
The brigade of Gen Evans (one of the heroic and conspicuous
actors in the bloody drama of Manassas), which had occupied
Leesburg, consisted of four regiments, viz.: the 8th Virginia,
the 13th, the 17th, and the 1Sth Mississippi. Having a position
on Goose Creek, they awaited the approach of the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, the force which he had thrown
across the river being between seven and eight thousand strong.
The enemy had effected a crossing both at Edwards' Ferry, and
Ball's Bluff, and preparations-were made to meet him in both
positions.  Lieut.-col. Jenifer, with four of the Mississippi
companies, confronted the immediate approach of the enemy in
the direction of Leesburg; Col. Hunton, with his regiment, the
8th Virginia, was afterwards ordered to his support, and, about
noon, both commands were united, and became hotly engaged
with the enemy in their strong position in the woods.
Watching carefully the action, Gen. Evans saw the enemy
were constantly being reinforced, and at half-past two o'clock
P. M., ordered Col. Burt to march his regiment, the 18th Mississippi, and attack the left flank of the enemy, while Colonels
Hunton and Jenifer attacked him in fropt. On arriving at his
position, Col. Burt was received with a tremendous fire from
the enemy, concealed in a ravine, and was compelled to divide
his regiment to stop the flank movement of the enemy.
At this time, about three o'clock, finding the enemy were in
large force, Gen. Evans ordered Col. Featherston, with his
regiment, the 17th Mississippi, to repair, at double quick, to
the support of Col. Burt, where he arrived in twenty minutes,




180           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
and the action became general along the whole line of the
Confederates, and was hot and brisk for more than two hours.
The Confederates engaged in the action numbered less than
eighteen hundred men; the 13th Mississippi, with six pieces of
artillery, being held in reserve. The troops engaged on our
side fought with almost savage desperation. The firing was
irregular. Our troops gave a yell and v6lley; then loaded and
fired at will for a few minutes; then gave another yell and
volley. For two hours, the enemy was steadily driven near the
banks of the Potomac. The Federal commander, Col. Baker,
had fallen at the head of his column, and his body was with
difficulty recovered by his command. As the enemy continued
to fall back, Gen. Evans ordered his entire force to charge and
drive him into the river.
The rout of the enemy near the bluffs of the river was appalling. The crossing of the river had gone on until seven
thousand five hundred men, according to the report of Gen.
Stone, were thrown across it. Some of these never saw the
field of battle. They had to climb the mud of the bluff, dragging their dismounted arms after them, before they could reach
the field, expecting to find there a scene of victory. The difficult ascent led them to a horrible Golgotha. The forces that
had been engaged in front were already in retreat; behind
them rolled the river, deep and broad, which many of them
were never to repass; before them glared the foe.
The spectacle was that of a whole army retreating, tumbling, rolling, leaping down the steep heights-the enemy following them, killing and taking prisoners. Col. Devins, of
the 15th Massachusetts regiment, left his command, and swam
the river on horseback. The one boat in the channel between
the Virginia shore and the island was speedily filled with the
fugitives. A thousand men thronged the banks. Muskets,
coats, and every thing were thrown aside, and all were desperately trying to escape. Hundreds plunged into the rapid
current, and the shrieks of the drowning added to the horror
of sounds and sights. The Confederates kept up their fire
from the cliff above. All was terror, confusion, and dismay.
One of the Federal officers, at the head of some companies,
charged up the hill. A moment later, and the same officer,
perceiving the hopelessness of the situation, waved a white




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            181
handkerchief and surrendered the main body of his regiment.
Other portions of the column surrendered, but the Confederates kept up their fire upon those who tried to cross, and
many, not drowned in the river, were shot in the act of
swimming.
The last act of the tragedy was the most sickening and appalling of them all. A fiat-boat, on returning to the island,
was laden with the mangled, the weary, and the dying. The
quick and the dead were huddled together in one struggling,
mangled mass, and all went down together in that doleful river,
never again to rise.
The Northern newspapers, with characteristic and persistent
falsehood, pretended that the Leesburg affair was nothinga mere reconnoissance, in which the Federals accomplished
their object-a skirmish, in which they severely punished the
" rebels"-an affair of outposts, in which they lost a few men,
nothing like so many as the "rebels," &c. But the truth at
last came out, stark and horrible. The defeat of Leesburg
was named in the Federal Congress as " most humiliating,"
" a great national calamity," and as another laurel added to
the chaplet of the " rebellion."
The Federal soldiers who had suffered most severely in this
action were from New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.
They had given an exhibition of cowardice, quite equal, in
degree at least, to its display at Manassas.  There were no
instances among them of desperate stubbornness, of calm
front, of heroic courage. There was but one tint of glory to
gild the bloody picture, and that was in the circumstance of
the fall of their gallant commander, Col. Baker, who had been
shot several times through the body, and, at last, through the
head, in his desperate and conspicuous effort to rally his broken
forces.
Col. Baker was United States senator from Oregon. He
had served with distinction in the Mexican war; was since a
member of Congress from Missouri; emigrated to California,
where he long held a leading position at the bar, and, being
disappointed in an election to Congress from that State, removed to Oregon, where he was returned United States senator to Washington. In the opening of the war, he raised what
was called a "California" regiment, recruited in New York




182           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
and New Jersey, and at the last session of the Federal Congress had distinguished himself by his extreme views of the
subjugation of the South, and its reduction to a " territorial"
condition. He was a man of many accomplishments, of more
than ordinary gifts of eloquence, and, outside of his political
associations, was respected for his bravery, chivalry, and address.
Our loss in the action of Leesburg, out of a force of 1,709
men, was 153 in killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy
was 1,300 killed, wounded, and drowned; 710 prisoners captured, among them twenty-two commissioned officers; besides
1,500 stand of arms and three pieces of cannon taken. This
brilliant victory was achieved on our side by the musket alone,
over an enemy who never ventured to emerge from the cover,
or to expose himself to an artillery fire.
The battle of Leesburg was followed by no important consequences on the Potomac. It was a brilliant and dramatic
incident; it adorned our arms; and it showed a valor, a demonstration-of which, on a grander scale and in larger numbers, might easily have re-enacted on a new field the scenes of
Manassas. But, like the Manassas victory, that of Leesburg
bore no fruits but those of a confidence on the part of the
South, which was pernicious, because it was overweening and
inactive, and a contempt for its enemy, which was injurious,
in proportion as it exceeded the limits of truth and justice,
and reflected the self-conceits of fortune.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                       183
CHAPTER VII.
The Position and Policy of Kentucky in the War.-Kentucky Chivalry. —Reminiscences of the "Dark and Bloody Ground." —Protection of the Northwest by Kentucky.-How the Debt of Gratitude has been repaid.-A Glance at the Hartford
Convention.-The Gubernatorial Canvass of 1859 in Kentucky.-Division of Parties.Other Causes for the Disloyalty of Kentucky.-The " Pro-Slavery and Union" Resolutions.-The "State Guard."-General Buckncer.-The Pretext of " Neutrality," and
what it meant.-The Kentucky Refugees.-A Reign of Terror. —Judge Monroe in
Nashville.-General Breckinridge.-Occupation of Columbus by General Polk.-The
Neutrality of Kentucky first broken by the North.-General Buckner at Bowling
Green.-Camp " Dick Robinson."-The " Hiome Guard."-The Occupation of Columbus by the Confederates explained.-Cumberland Gap.-General Zollicoffer's Proclamation.-The Affair of Barboursville.-" The Wild-Cat Stampede."-The Virginia
and Kentucky Border. —The Affair of Piketon.-Suffering of our Troops at Pound
Gap.-The " Union Party" in East Tennessee.-Keelan, the Hero of Strawberry
Plains.-The Situation on the Waters of the Ohio and Tennessee. —TiE BATTLE OF
BELMONT.-Weakness of our Forces in Kentucky. —General Albert Sidney Johnston.Inadequacy of his Forces at Bowling Green.-Neglect and Indifference of the Confederate Authorities.-A Crisis imminent.-Admission of Kentucky into the Southern
Confederacy.
IF, a few months back, any one had predicted that in an
armed contest between the North and the South, the State ot
Kentucky would be found acting with the former, and abetting
and assisting a war upon States united with her by community
of institutions, of interests, and of blood, he would, most probably, in any Southern company in which such a speech was
adventured, have been hooted at as a fool, or chastised as a
slanderer.  The name of Kentucky had been synonymous with
the highest types of Southern chivalry; her historical record
was adorned by the knightly deeds, the hardy adventures, the
romantic courage of her sons; and Virginia had seen the State
which she had peopled with the flower of her yduth grow up,
not only to the full measure of filial virtue, but with the ornament, it was thought, of even a prouder and bolder spirit than
flowed in the blood of the Old Dominion.
War discovers truths in the condition of society which would
never otherwise have been known..  It often shows a spirit of
devotion where it has been least expected; it decides the claims




184            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
of superior patriotism and superior courage often in favor of
communities which have laid less claim to these qualities than
others; and it not infrequently exposes disloyalty, rottenness, or
apathy on the part of those who had formerly superior reputation for attachment to the cause which they are found to desert or to assail.
It is not to be supposed for a moment, that while the position of Kentucky, like that of Maryland, was one of reproach,
it is to mar the credit due to that portion of the people of each,
who, in the face of instant difficulties, and at the expense of
extraordinary sacrifices, repudiated the decision of their States
to remain under the Federal government, and expatriated
themselves, that they might espouse the cause of liberty in the
South. The honor due such men is in fact increased by the
consideration that their States remained in the Union, and
compelled them to fly their homes, that they might testify their
devotion to the South and her cause of independence. Still,
the justice of history must be maintained. The demonstrations of sympathy with the South on the part of the States referred to-Maryland and Kentucky-considered either in proportion to what was offered the Lincoln government by these
States, or with respect to the numbers of their population, were
sparing and exceptional; and although these demonstrations
on the part of Kentucky, from the great and brilliant names
associated with them, were perhaps even more honorable and
more useful than the examples of Southern spirit offered by
Maryland, it is unquestionably, though painfully true, that the
great body of the people of Kentucky were the active allies of
Lincoln, and the unnatural enemies of those united to them by
lineage, blood, and common institutions.
A brief review of some of the nmost remarkable circumstances in the history of Kentucky is not inappropriate to the
subject of the existing war.
Kentucky has been denominated "the Dark and Bloody
Ground" of the savage aborigines. It never was the habitation of any nation or tribe of Indians; but from the period of
the earliest aboriginal traditions to the appearance of the white
man on its soil, Kentucky was the field of deadly conflict between the Northern and Southern warriors of the forest.
When, shortly after the secession of the American colonies




THIE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          185
from the British empire, this contested land was penetrated by
the bold adventurous white men of Carolina and Virginia, who
constituted the third party for dominion, its title of the " Dark
and Bloody Ground" was appropriately continued. And when,
after the declaration of American independence, Great Britain, with a view to the subjugation of the United States, formed an alliance with the Indian savages, and assigned to them
the conduct of the war upon all our western frontier, the territory of Kentucky became still more emphatically the Dark
and Bloody Ground. Nor did the final treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States bring peace to
Kentucky. The government of Great Britain failed to fulfil
its obligations to surrender the western posts from which their
savage allies had been supplied with the munitions of war, but
still held them, and still supplied the Indians with arms and
ammunition, inciting them to their murderous depredations
upon the western border.
This hostile condition continued in Kentucky until the celebrated treaty of Jay, and the final victory over the savage enemy achieved by General Wayne, and the consequent treaty
of peace which he concluded with them in 1795. By this
treaty of peace, the temple of Janus was closed in Kentucky
for the first time in all her history and tradition.
The battles in these wars with the savage enemy were not
all in Kentucky, nor were they for the defence of the territory
of her people only, but chiefly for the defence of the inhabitants of Ohio, who were unable to protect themselves against
their barbarous foes. How this debt has been paid by the descendants of these Ohio people, the ravages of the existing war
sufficiently demonstrate.
Peace was continued in Kentucky for about twenty years.
There were commotions and grand enterprises which we cannot
even mention here. But they were all terminated by the purchase of Louisiana by Mr. Jefferson in 1803. The ratification
of the treaty by which this vast southern and western dominion was acquired at the price of fifteen millions of dollars,
was opposed by the Northern politicians, whose descendants
now seek to subjugate the people of the South, at the cost of
a thousand millions of dollars, and of a monstrous, unnatural,
and terrible expenditure of blood.




186          THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
In the war of 1812 with Great Britain, the surrender of
Hull having exposed the Michigan Territory and all the northern border of Ohio to the invasion of the British and the
savages, who were now again the allies of that government,
Kentucky sent forth her volunteers for the defence of her assailed Northern neighbors; and when so many of her gallant
sons were sacrificed upon the bloody plains of Raisin, the Legislature of Kentucky requested the governor of the State to
take the field, and at the head of his volunteer army to go
forth and drive back the enemy. The request was promptly
complied with. It was the army of Kentucky that expelled
the savages from all Ohio and Michigan, and pursuing them
into Canada, achieved over them and the British upon the
Thames a victory more important than had been yet won upon
land in that war, thus giving peace and security to Ohio and
all the northwestern territory, whose people were confessedly
powerless for their own defence.
It is these people, protected by the arms and early chivalry
of Kentucky, who have now made her soil the Dark and
Bloody Ground of an iniquitous civil war, waged not only upon
a people bearing the common name of American citizens, but
upon the eternal and sacred principles of liberty itself.  In
these references to the early history of Kentucky we must be
brief. In indicating, however, the lessons of rebuke they give
to the North with respect to the existing war, we must not
omit to mention that in the war of 1812, in which Kentucky
covered herself with such well-deserved and lasting glory, the
New England States stood with the enemy, and the body of
their politicians had resolved upon negotiation with Great
Britain for a separate peace, and had, in fact, appointed a
Convention to be assembled at Hartford, to carry into effect
what would have been virtually a secession from the United
States, and the assumption of neutrality between the belligerents, if not an alliance with the public enemy. These facts
are not fully recorded in history, but they might be well collected from the public documents and journals of the day. Indeed, they are well known to men yet living in our land. The
schemes of the New England traitors were defeated only by the
battle of Orleans, and the consequent treaty of peace. Upon the
happening of these events, the conspirators abandoned their




*THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.         187
Convention projet, and denied that they had ever contemplated
any thing revolutionary or treasonable. The whole matter was
suffered to pass into oblivion. The conspirators were treated
by the government and people of the United States as William
the Third treated those around his throne who, within his
knowledge, had conspired against him, and had actually served
the public enemy of England. It was known in each case that
the conspirators were controlled by their selfish interests, and
that the best mode of managing them, was to cause them to see
that it was to their interest to be faithful to their government.
It needs no comment to indicate with what grace the vehement
denunciation of the secession of the Southern States from a
Union which had been prostituted alike to the selfishness of
politicians and the passion of fanatics, comes from a people
who had been not only domestic rebels, but allies to the foreign
enemy in the war of 1812.
In tracing the political connections of Kentucky in the present war, it will be sufficient for our purposes to start at the
election of its governor in 1859. Down to that period the
body of the partisans now upholding the Lincoln government
had been an emancipation party in the State. This party had
lately suffered much in popularity. In the election of 1859, they
determined to consult popularity, and took open pro-slavery
ground. The State Rights candidate (Magoffin) was elected.
By their adroit movement, however, the Anti-State Rights
party had made some advance in the confidence of the people,
which availed them in the more important contests that followed. In the Presidential election of 1860 they supported
Mr. Bell, and thus succeeded in their object of gaining the ascendency in the councils of the State. Emancipationists were
urged to support Mr. Bell, upon the ground that from his antecedents and present position they had more to expect from him
than from his principal competitor in the race in Kentucky,
while the people at large were persuaded to support Mr. Bell
as the candidate of the friends of " the Union, the constitution,
and the Laws."
The Anti-State Rights party (at least they may be known
for the present by this convenient denomination), succeeded in
carrying the State by a large plurality. They commenced at
an early day to combat the movements of secession in the




188           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
South. Popular assemblies and conventions were called to
pledge themselves to the support of the Union in every contingency. The party, as represented in these assemblies, united
all the friends of Mr. Bell, and the great body of those of Mr.
Douglas and of Mr. Guthrie. By this combination an organization was effected which was able to control and direct public
opinion in the subsequent progress of events.
It is certainly defective logic, or, at best, an inadequate explanation, which attributes the subserviency of a large portion
of the people of Kentucky to the views of the Lincoln government to the perfidy of a party or the adroitness of its management. However powerful may be the machinery of party, it
certainly has not the power of belying public sentiment for
any considerable length of time. The persistent adhesion of a
large portion of the Kentucky people to the Northern cause
must be attributed to permanent causes; and among these
were, first, an essential unsoundness on the slavery question,
under the influences of the peculiar philosophy of Henry Clay,
who, like every great man, left an impress upon his State
which it remained for future even more than contemporary
generations to attest; and, second, the mercenary considerations of a trade with both North and South, to which the
State of Kentucky was thought to be especially convenient.
These suggestions may at least assist to the understanding of
that development of policy in Kentucky which we are about
to relate.
On the meeting of the Legislature of Kentucky, after the
election of Lincoln, the party in the interest of the North succeeded in obtaining the passage by that body of a singular set
of resolutions, which, by a curious compost of ideas, were
called " pro-slavery and Union" resolutions. They denounced
secession, without respect to any cause which might justify the
measure, deprecated any war between the North and the South,
and avowed the determination of Kentucky to occupy in such
an event a position of perfect neutrality.
At its regular session in 1859-'60, the Legislature had organized an active body of volunteer militia, denominated the
State Guard, and General Buckner had been appointed its
highest officer. This army, as it might be called, was found to
consist of the finest officers and best young men in the State.




THIE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          189
It was necessarily, by the provisions of the Constitution, under
the command of the governor; but as Governor IMlagoffin was
supposed to be a Southern Rights man, and the fact appearing
that nearly all of the State Guard were favorable to the same
cause, and that they could not be made the soldiers of the
despotic government of the North, he was in effect deprived
of their command, and measures were taken for forcing out of
their hands the public arms with which they had been furnished, and for the organization of a new corps, to be commanded by the officers and partisans of Abraham Lincoln. In
the mean time, as if to make their professed determination of
neutrality effective, the Legislature proceeded to arm with
muskets their "- Home Guards," as their new army was called.
With this programme before the people, the Legislature took a
recess, probably to await the progress of events, when the
mask of neutrality might be thrown off, and their real purposes
might safely be announced to the people.
Gov. Magoflin's refusal to furnish troops to answer the
requisition of the Federal government (to which reference has
already been made in another part of this work), appeared at
the time to meet with the approval of the entire people of Kentucky. The enemies of the South acquiesced in the decision
of the governor only until the period arrived when the farce
of neutrality might be conveniently broken, and the next step
ventured, which would be union with the North. With the
pretence of neutrality, and the seductive promises of a trade
with both belligerents, which would enrich Kentucky and fill
her cities with gold, a considerable portion of the people were
held blinded or willingly entertained, while the purposes of the
Lincoln government with respect to their State were being
steadily fulfilled.
In the election of members of the Congress called by Lincoln to meet in special session on the 4th of July, 1861, men
of Northern principles were elected from every district in
Kentucky save one; and in the same condition of the public
mind, the members of the Legislature were elected in August,
the result being the return of a large majority of members ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining the ground of neutrality, but with what real designs was soon discovered. The
election of the Lincoln rulers having been thus accomplished,




190           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
the measures all the time contemplated and intended were
easily put in course of execution. In a short time every State
Rights newspaper was suspended; every public man standing
in defence of the South was threatened with arrest and prosecution; and the raising of a volunteer corps for the defence
of the South was totally suppressed.
Immediately after the declaration of war by the Lincoln
government, a number of young men in Kentucky, actuated
by impulses of patriotism, and attesting the spirit of the ancient chivalry of their State, had commenced raising volunteer
companies in the State for the Confederate service. They
passed South in detachments of every number. This emigration was at first tolerated by the Unionists, if not actually desired by them, for the purpose of diminishing the opposition in
the State to their sinister designs. By the removal of its members, and by the acts of the Legislature already mentioned, the
admirable army of the " State Guard of Kentucky" was totally disorganized, and the command of it virtually taken from
Governor Magoffin and General Buckner, and placed in the
hands of the political partisans of the Lincoln government.
General Buckner could not long occupy such a position, and
therefore, as soon as practicable, he resigned his office, renounced the Lincoln government, and placed himself under
the Confederate flag. The value of his accession to the Southern cause was justly appreciated, and he was speedily appointed a brigadier-general in the provisional army of the Confederacy.
The encouragement to emigration was not long continued by
the party in power in Kentucky. It was determined by the
Lincoln government to make examples of the small party re
maining in Kentucky who sympathized with the South, and to
arrest at once every public and influential man in the State
known to be hostile to the North, or to the despotic purposes
of the government at Washington. Ex-Governor Morehead
was at a dead hour of the night arrested in his own house, a
few miles from Louisville, in the presence of his afflicted
family, by the Lincoln police, and hurried through the city and
over the river, and out of his State and district, in violation of
all law; and the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus was practically denied him in a mode which, at any period in the last




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           191
two hundred years, would have aroused all England into commotion. The high-handed act, it might have been supposed,
would have aroused Kentucky also to a flame of indignation at
any other period since it became the habitation of white men.
The people, however, seemed to be insensible, and the outrage
was allowed to pass with no public demonstration of its disapproval. Encouraged by its experience of the popular subserviency in Kentucky to its behests, it was in convenient time
determined by the Lincoln government to arrest or drive off
from the State every prominent opponent of its despotic authority. It was determined at Louisville that John C. Breckenridge, late Vice-President of the United States, Col. G. W.
Johnson, a prominent citizen, T. B. Monroe, Jr., Secretary of
State, William  Preston, late Minister to Spain, Thomas B.
Monroe, Sr., for about thirty years District Judge of the
United States, Col. Humphrey Marshall, ex-member of Congress, and a distinguished officer in the Mexican war, Capt.
John Morgan (since " the Marion" of Kentucky), and a number of other distinguished citizens in different parts of the
State, should be arrested at the same hour, and consigned to
prison, or driven from their homes by the threats of such a
fate. It is supposed that some of the Lincoln men, and perhaps some officers of the government, preferred the latter
alternative, especially in respect to some of the individuals
named. However this may be, it happened that all of them
escaped, some in one direction, and some in another.
The venerable Judge Monroe, on his arrival at Bowling
Green, whence he was on his next day's journey to pass out of
his State and his district, executed in duplicate, and left to be
transmitted by different modes of conveyance, his resignation
of the office of Judge of the United States for Kentucky; and
in conformity to the general expectation at the time, he placed
upon historic record the declaration of his expatriation of himself from the dominion of the despotic government of Lincoln,
and adopted himself a citizen of the Southern Confederacy.
The proceedings occurred in the Confederate Court of Nashville on the 3d of October. The scene of the renunciation of
allegiance to the government that would have enslaved him, by
this venerable jurist, who had been driven from a long-cherished home, and was now on his way to the State of Virginia,




192           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
whose honored soil held the sacred ashes of a dozen generations of his ancestors, was one of peculiar augustness and interest. The picture of the scene alone was sufficient to illustrate and adorn the progress of a great revolution. It was
that of a venerable patriot, a man of one of the greatest historical names on the continent, just escaped from the minions
of the despot, who had driven him from a State in which he
had lived, the light of the law, irreproachable as a man, beloved by his companions, honored by his profession, and venerable in years, voluntarily and proudly abjuring an allegiance
which no longer returned to him the rights of a citizen, but
would have made him an obsequious slave; and with all the
dignity of one thus honored and respected, and conscious of
his rectitude, appearing in the presence of a Confederate court
of justice, and with the pure eloquence of truth, offering the
remaining years of his life to the service of the new government, which had arisen as the successor of the old Union, as it
was in its purer and brighter days.
Mr. Breckenridge reached Nashville by a very circuitous
route, a few days after his departure from Lexington, and after
a brief sojourn in the former place, proceeded to Bowling
Green, and there entered into a compact with a number of his
old constituents who had taken refuge in the camp of General
Buckner, that they would take up their arms in defence of the
rights and liberties of their country, and never lay them down
till the invader was driven from the soil of Kentucky. Shortly
afterwards, he received the appointment of brigadier-general
in the army of the Confederate States, and was assigned to the
command of a brigade of his fellow-citizens of Kentucky. Col.
Humphrey Marshall received, at the same time, the appointment of brigadier-general, and was assigned to the district of
southeastern Kentucky and southwestern Virginia. Colonel
Johnson was subsequently chosen Provisional Governor of
Kentucky by the friends of the Confederate government in
that State.
To reconcile the people of Kentucky to the Lincoln government, its partisans had told them' at the outset that they had
the right to insist upon the strict observance of neutrality. As
events progressed, they ascribed the violation of Kentucky's
neutrality to the acts of the Southern government, in the face




THE FIRST YEAR OF TIME WAR.          193
of facts about which there can be no dispute. The facts are,
that the Federal forces were preparing to take possession of
Columbus and Paducah, regarding them as important positions;
and because Gen. Polk anticipated them and got prior possession of Columbus, they charged the Confederates with the responsibility of the first invasion of Kentucky. The Federals
had commissioned Gen. Rouseau, at Louisville, to raise a brigade for the invasion of the South, but while the recruits were
enlisted in Louisville, the camp was kept at Jeffersonville, on
the Indiana side of the river, until the Lincoln commander became satisfied that the temper of the people of Louisville would
tolerate a parade of Northern soldiers on their streets. Then,
and not till then, were the, Northern soldiers boldly marched
across the State in the direction of Nashville. Gen. Buckner
took possession of the railroad, and stationed himself at Bowling Green, in Southern Kentucky, about thirty miles from the
Tennessee line. The partisans of Lincoln, still determined to
blind the people by all sorts of false representations, established
a camp called "'Dick Robinson," near Lexington, and there
made up an army comprised of recruits from Ohio, vagabonds
from Kentucky, and Andrew-Johnson men from Tennessee.
They insisted that no invasion was contemplated, that their
forces were merely a " Home Guard" organization of a purely
defensive character. They did not hesitate, however, to rob
the arsenals of the United States of their muskets, bayonets,
and cannon, and place them at the disposal of such infamous
leaders as George D. Prentice, Tom Ward, and Garrett Davis.
With these arms, " Dick Robinson's" camp was replenished,
and at this memorable spot of the congregation of the most
villanous characters, an army was raised in Kentucky for the
invasion of the South.
The causes which led to:the occupation of Kentucky by the
Confederate States were plain and abundant. Finding that
their own territory was- about to be invaded through Kentucky,
and that many of the people of that State, after being deceived
into a mistaken security, were unarmed, and in danger of being subjugated by the Federal forces, the Confederate armies
were marched into that State to repel the enemy, and prevent
their occupation of certain strategic points which would have
given them great advantages in the contest-a step which was
13




194           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
justified, not only by the necessities of self-defence on the part
of the Confederate States, but also by a desire to aid the people of Kentucky. It was never intended by the Confederate
government to conquer or coerce the people of that State; but,
on the contrary, it was declared by our generals that they
would withdraw their troops if the Federal government would
do likewise. Proclamation was also made of the desire to respect the neutrality of Kentucky, and the intention to abide by
the wishes of her people, as soon as they were free to express
their opinions.
Upon the occupation of Columbus by the Confederates, in
the early part of September, the Legislature of Kentucky
adopted resolutions calling upon them, through Governor
Magoffin, to retire. General Polk, who was in command of
the Confederates at Columbus, had already published a proclamation, clearly explaining his position. He declared in this
proclamation, that the Federal government having disregarded
the neutrality of Kentucky, by establishing camps and depots
of armies, and by organizing military companies within their
territory, and by constructing a military work on the Missouri
shore, immediately opposite and commanding Columbus, evidently intended to cover the landing of troops for the seizure
of that town, it had become a military necessity, involving the
defence of the territory of the Confederate States, that the Confederate forces should occupy Columbus in advance.
The act of Gen. Polk found the most abundant justification
in the history of the concessions granted to the Federal government by Kentucky ever since the war began. Since the election of Lincoln, she had allowed the seizure in her ports (Paducah) of property of citizens of the Confederate States. She
had, by her members in the Congress of the United States,
voted supplies of men and money to carry on the war against
the Confederate States. She had allowed the Federal government to cut timber from her forests for the purpose of building
armed boats for the invasion of the Southern States. She was
permitting to be enlisted in her territory troops, not only from
her own citizens, but from the citizens of other States, for the
purpose of being armed and used in offensive warfare against
the Confederate States. At camp "Dick Robinson," in the
county of Garrard, it was said that there were already ten




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          195
thousand troops, in which men from Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana,
and Illinois were mustered with Kentuckians into the service
of the United States, and armed by the government for the
avowed purpose of giving aid to the disaffected in one of the
Confederate States, and of carrying out the designs of that government for their subjugation. When Gen. Polk took possession of Columbus, he found that the enemy, in formidable
numbers, were in position on the opposite bank of the river,
with their cannon turned upon Columbus, that many of the
citizens had fled in terror, and that not a word of assurance of
safety or protection had been addressed to them.
In reply to the demand made through Governor Magoffin
for the withdrawal of the Confederate troops from Kentucky,
Gen. Polk offered to comply on condition that the State would
agree that the troops of the Federal government be withdrawn
simultaneously, with a guaranty (which he would give reciprocally for the Confederate government) that the Federal
troops should not be allowed to enter, or occupy any part of
Kentucky in the future. This proposition for a simultaneous
withdrawal of forces, was derided by the partisans of Lincoln
in Kentucky and elsewhere.'
Gen. Polk had taken possession of Columbus on the 4th of
September. The Federals were then occupying Paducah, at
the mouth of the Tennessee river. The town of Cairo, at the
mouth of the Ohio, had been previously occupied by a strong
Federal force. New Madrid, on the Missouri side of the Mississippi, was occupied by Southern troops under the command
of Gen. Jeff. Thompson.
Early in the summer, it was known that the Federals were
threatening the invasion of East Tennessee by way of umberland Gap. To counteract their designs, the Confederate government sent Brigadier-general Zollicoffer, with a force of several
thousand men, by way of Knoxville, East Tennessee, to the
point threatened.  On- the 14th September, Gen. Zollicoffer
telegraphed Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, as follows: " The
safety of Tennessee requiring, I occupy the mountain passes at
Cumberland, and the three long mountains in Kentucky. For
weeks, I have known that the Federal commander at Hoskins'
Cross Roads was threatening the invasion of East Tennessee,
and ruthlessly urging our people to destroy our own road and




19G           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
bridges. I postponed this precautionary movement until the
despotic government at Washington, refusing to recognize the
neutrality of Kentucky, has established formidable camps in
the centre and other parts of the State, with the view, first to
subjugate your gallant State, and then ourselves. Tennessee
feels, and has ever felt, towards Kentucky as a twin-sister;
their people are as one people in kindred, sympathy, valor, and
patriotism. We have felt, and still feel, a religious respect for
Kentucky's neutrality. We will respect it as long as our safety
will permit. If the Federal force will now withdraw from their
menacing position, the force under my command shall immediately be withdrawn."
At the same time Gen. Zollicoffer issued an order setting
forth that he came to defend the soil of a sister Southern State
against an invading foe, and that no citizen of Kentucky was
to be molested in person or property, whatever his political
opinions, unless found in arms against the Confederate government, or giving aid and comfort to the enemy by his counsels.
On the 19th September, a portion of Gen. Zollicoffer's command advanced to Barbour.ville, in Kentucky, and dispersed
a camp of some fifteen hundred Federals, without any serious
struggle. He continued to advance cautiously in the direction
of Somerset, driving the enemy before him. A large Federal
force, chiefly from Ohio and Indiana, was sent forward to meet
him. This expedition was speedily brought to a disgraceful
and ruinous conclusion. Before getting near enough to Zollicoffer to confront him, Gen. Schoepff, the commander of the
Yankee expedition, was induced to believe that Gen. Hardee
was advancing from Bowling Green on his flank. What was
known*as the "Wild Cat Stampede" ensued. The retreat of
the panic-stricken soldiers, which for miles was performed at
the double-quick, rivalled the agile performances at Bull Run.
For many miles the route of the retreat was covered with
broken wagons, knapsacks, dead horses, and men who had sunk
by the wayside from exhaustion. The flight of the Federals
was continued for two days, although there was no enemy
near them. Such was the result of the first expedition sent to
capture Zollicoffer and to invade the South by way of Cumberland Gap.
Another design of the Federals was to invade southwestern




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          197
Virginia from eastern Kentucky, by way of Prestonsburg and
Pound Gap, with the view of seizing upon the salt-works and
lead-mines in this portion of Virginia, and of cutting off railroad communication between Richmond and Memphis. To
thwart this design, there was raised in the neighborhood of
Prestonsburg a force little exceeding a thousand men, who
were placed under the command of Col. Williams. To capture
the "rebels" at Prestonsburg, a considerable force was sent
after them under the command of Gen. Nelson, of Kentucky.
This somewhat notorious officer reported to the Lincoln government that his expedition had been brilliantly successful;
his command, according to his account, having fallen upon the
"rebels" at Piketon, captured upwards of a thousand of them,
killed five hundred, or more, wounded a great number, and
scattered the few remaining ones like chaff before the wind.
This announcement caused intense joy in Cincinnati, and, indeed, throughout the North; but the rejoicings were cut suddenly short by the authentic account of the affair at Piketon,
which occurred on the 8th of November, and in which the
Confederates lost ten killed and fifteen wounded, while they
ambushed a considerable body of Nelson's men on the river
cliff, near that place, and killed and wounded hundreds of
them. Owing to the superior force of the Federals, however,
Col. Williams' little command fell back to Pound Gap.
He had not more than 1,010 men, including sick, teamsters,
and men on extra duty. He described the little army that had
held in check an apparently overwhelming force of the enemy,
as an " unorganized, half-armed, and barefooted squad." He
wrote to Richmond: "We want good rifles, clothes, greatcoats, knapsacks, haversacks, and canteens; indeed, every thing
almost except a willingness to fight. Many of our men are
barefooted, and I have seen the blood in their tracks as they
marched.:'
There had long been unpleasant indications on the Tennessee
border of disloyalty to the South. In what was called East
Tennessee there was reported to be a strong " Union" party.
This section was inhabited by an ignorant and uncouth population squatted among the hills. The Union faction in East
Tennessee was the product of the joint influences of three men,
differing widely in tastes, habits of thought, and political




198           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
opinion, but concurring in a blind and bigoted devotion t6 the
old Federal government. These men were Andrew Johnson,
William G. Brownlow, and T. A. R. Nelson. The first of
these was a man who recommended himself to the ignorant
mountain people of Tennessee by the coarseness and vulgarity
of his manners; but beneath his boorish aspect he had a strong
native intellect, was an untiring political schemer, and for more
than twenty years had exercised a commanding control over
the rude mountaineers of Tennessee, who for an equal length
of time had held the balance of power between the old Whig
and Democratic parties in that State, voting first with one and
then with the other political organization. Brownlow, "the
parson," the haranguer of mobs in churches and at the hustings, and who, by his hatred of Andrew Johnson, had once
made himself an ultra pro-slavery oracle of the Methodist
Church, found Unionism so strong an element of popular partisan strength in East Tennessee, that lie was forced to cooperate with his old enemy. The sincerest and most respectable of the trio was Nelson, an accomplished orator, a poet and
dreamer besides, having no likeness to the people among whom
he resided but in his apparel, and passing most of his time in
the secluded occupations of a scholar, in which vocation he was
both profound and classical. There could be no stranger combination of talent and character than in these three men, who
had been brought together by a single sympathy in opposition
to the cause of the South.
The Union party in Tennessee was for a long time occult;
its very existence was for a considerable period a matter of
dispute among Southern politicians; but it only awaited the
operations of the enemy in Kentucky to assist and further their
designs by a sudden insurrection among themselves. Their
demonstrations were, however, premature. Early in November
there was a conspiracy formed on the part of the Unionists
for burning all the bridges on' the East Tennessee and Virginia
and Georgia and Tennessee railroads. The designs of the
conspirators were consummated in part by the destruction of
two or three bridges in East Tennessee, and of one in Georgia.
The bridge across the Holston, at Strawberry Plains, on the
East Tennessee and Virginia road, was saved by the heroic
and self-sacrificing act of an humble individual, named Edward




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           199
Keelan, at that time the sole guard at the place. He fought
the bridge-burning party-more than a dozen in numberwith such desperation and success, that they were forced to retire without accomplishing their object. One of the party was
killed, and several badly wounded. Keelan was wounded in a
number of places. Upon the arrival of friends, a few minutes
after the occurrence, he exclaimed to them, ".They have killed
me, but I have saved the bridge." Luckily the wounds did not
prove mortal, and the hero of Strawberry Plains still lives.
The Federal expedition to Pound Gap was of the same character with all the other invasions from the northwestern territory in this contest. The troops were from Ohio and other
northwestern States, the occupiers of the lands bountifully
granted by Virginia to the Federal government, and by that
government liberally distributed among the ancestors of the
people attempting the invasion of Virginia and the South.
This territory had been won by a Virginia army, composed ot
volunteers from this State and from the district of Kentucky,
then a part of the Old Dominion. The bold and successful
enterprise of George Rogers Clark in the conquest of all that
western territory, constitutes one of the most romantic and
brilliant chapters of the history of the Revolution.
We turn from the operations on the Kentucky and Virginia
border, which were in effect abandoned by the enemy, to the
more'active theatre of the war in Kentucky, in the neighborhood of the waters of the Ohio and Tennessee. It was to these
waters that the enemy in fact transferred his plans of invasion
of the South through Kentucky and Tennessee, by means of
amphibious expeditions, composed of gunboats and land forces.
Further on in the course of events we shall find the front of the
war on the banks of the Tennessee instead of those of the Potomac, and we shall see that a war which the Southern people
supposed lingered on the Potomac, was suddenly transferred,
and opened with brilliant and imposing scenes on the Western
waters. But it is not proper to anticipate with any comment
the progress of events.
Gen. Polk had been completing his works for the defence of
Columbus. While thus engaged, he was assailed on the 7th
November by the enemy in strong force from Cairo.




200           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.
Before daybreak on the morning of the 7th of November,
Gen. Polk was informed that the enemy, who were under the
command of Gen. Grant, had made their appearance in the
river with gunboats and transports, and were landing a con —
siderable force on the Missouri shore, five or six miles above
Belmont, a small village. Gen. Pillow, whose division was
nearest the point immediately threatened, was ordered to cross
the river and to move immediately with four of his regiments
to the relief of Col. Tappan, who was encamped at Belmont.
Our little army had barely got in position, when the skirmishers were driven in, and the shock took place between the
opposing forces. The enemy were numerous enough to have:
surrounded the little Confederate force with triple lines. Several attempts were made by the enemy's infantry to flank the
right and left wings of the Confederates; but the attempt on
the right was defeated by the deadly fire and firm attitude of
that wing, composed of the regiments of Colonels Russell and
Tappan, the 13th Arkansas and the 9th Tennessee, commanded
by Col. Russell, as brigade commander. The attempt to turn
the left wing was defeated by the destructive fire of Beltzhoover's battery and Col. Wright's regiment, aided by a line
of felled timber extending obliquely from the left into the bottom. The two wings of the line stood firm and unbroken for
several hours, but the centre, being in the open field, and
greatly exposed, once or twice faltered.
About this time, Col. Beltzhoover reported to Gen. Pillow
that his ammunition was exhausted: Col. Bell had previously
reported his regiment out of ammunition, and Col. Wright that
one battalion of his regiment had exhausted its ammunition.
The enemy's force being unchecked, and now emerging into
the edge of the field, Gen. Pillow ordered the line to use the
bayonet. The charge was made by the whole line, and the
enemy driven back into the woods. But his line was not
broken, and he kept up a deadly fire, and being supported by
his large reserve, the Confederate line was forced back to its
original position, while that of the enemy advanced. Tho
charge was repeated the second and, third time, forcing the




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           201
enemy's line heavily against his reserve, but with like result.
Finding it impossible longer to maintain his position without
reinforcements and ammunition, Gen. Pillow ordered the whole
line to fall back to the river-bank. In this movement his line
was more or less broken and his corps mingled together, so
that when they reached the river-bank they had the appearance of a mass of men rather than an organized corps.
The field was to all appearances lost. Reinforcements, however, had been sent for, and at the critical time when our
forces were being driven: to the river, a regiment, the 2d Tennessee, commanded by Col. Walker, which had crossed the.
river, came to their support. The opportunity was seized by
Gen. Pillow to engage afresh, with this timely addition to his.
force, the advance of the enemy, while he made a rapid movement up the river-bank, with the design of crossing through
the fallen timber, turning the enemy's position and attacking
him in the rear.
As Gen. Pillow advanced the main -body of his original
force in broken order up the river, to a point where he could
cross through the fallen timber to make the flank movement,
he was joined by two other regiments ordered by Gen. Polk to
his support. These fresh troops were placed under command
of Col. Marks, of the 11th Louisiana. He was directed to
lead the advance in double-quick time through the woods, and
to the enemy's rear, and to attack him with vigor. Col. Russell, with his brigade, was ordered to support the movement.
It was with great reluctance that Gen. Polk lessened the
force assigned to the immediate defence of Columbus, as an attack in his rear was every moment apprehended. It was obvions, however, from the yielding of our columns to the heavy
pressure of the masses of the enemy's infantry, and the fierce
assaults of their heavy battery, that further reinforcements
were necessary to save the field. Gen. Cheatham was ordered
to move across the river in advance of his brigade, to rally and
take command of the portions of the regiments within sight on
the shore, and to support the flank movement ordered through
Col. Marks.
About this time the enemy'had fired our tents, and advancing his battery near the river-bank, opened a heavy fire on the
steamers which were trapsporting our troops, in some instances




202           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
driving shot through two of them at the same time. Captain
Smith's Mississippi battery was ordered to move to the riverbank, opposite the field of conflict, and to open upon the enemy's position. The joint fire of this battery and the heavy
guns of the fort was for a few moments terrific. The enemy's
battery was silenced, and it could be seen that they were taking
up their line of march for their boats.
The Federals, however, had scarcely put themselves in motion, when they encountered Col. Marks first, and afterwards
Gen. Cheatham, on their flank. The conjuncture was decisive.
The enemy finding himself between two fires, that of Smith's
artillery in front, and of Col. Marks' and Russell's column
in the rear, after a feeble resistance, broke and fled in disorder.
Satisfied that the attack on Columbus for some reason had
failed, Gen. Polk had crossed the river, and ordered the victorious commands to press the enemy to their boats. The order
was obeyed with alacrity. The pursuit was continued until
our troops reached the point where the enemy had made his
surgical head-quarters, and depository of stores, of ammunition,
baggage, &c. Here our troops found a yard full of knapsacks,
arms, ammunition, blankets, overcoats, mess-chests, horses,
wagons, and dead and wounded men, with surgeons engaged
in the duties of their profession. The enemy's route of retreat
was strewn likewise with many of these articles, and abundantly with blood, dead, and wounded men. "The sight along
the line of the retreat," says an observer on the field, " was
awful. The dead and wounded were at every tree. Some
crawled into the creeks to get water, and died there."
On coming in sight of the enemy's gunboats and transports,
our troops, as they arrived, were ordered to move as rapidly as
possible through the cornfields to the bank of the river. The
bank was thus lined for a considerable distance by our troops,
who were ordered, as the boats passed up the river, to give the
enemy their fire.  The fire was hot and destructive. On the
boats all was dismay. Under the fire from the bank, the Federals rushed to the opposite side of the boats, and had to be
forced back by the bayonet to prevent capsizing. Many of
the soldiers were driven overboard by the rush of those behind
them. They did not take time to unloose the cables, but cut




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                   203
all loose, and were compelled to run through the fire of sharpshooters lining the bank for more than a mile.
The day which at one time had been so inauspicious to our
arms, closed upon a signal triumph.  In his official report of
the battle, Gen. Pillow declared, that no further evidences
were needed to assure the fact, that "the small Spartan army"
which withstood the constant fire of three times their number
for nearly four hours (a large portion of them  being without
ammunition), had acted with extraordinary gallantry, than the
length and character of the conflict, the great inequality of
numbers, and the complete results that crowned the day.
That our loss should be severe in such a conflict might be
expected.  The list of our killed, wounded, and missing numbered 632. The loss of the enemy was stated in the official
reports of our generals to have been more than treble ours.
Of this, we had the most abundant evidence in the incidents
of the field, in his flight, and his helpless condition, when assailed in his crowded transports with the fire of thousands of
deadly rifles.
The victory of Belmont was esteemed as one of the most
brilliant triumphs of the war.* In his congratulatory order,
Gen. Albert Sydney Johnston, who had been appointed to
* The government at Washington, with a characteristic falsehood, stubborn
to every other consideration but that of sustaining the spirits of its people,
claimed the affair at Belmont as a victory to Northern arms. It is curious,
and to some degree amusing, to notice the manner of this misrepresentation,
and the gloze and insinuation by which it was effected in the Northern official
reports of the battle. Gen. Grant, in his official report, declared that he had
driven the Confederates to the river, burnt their camps, &c. So far, his report
was ostentatiously fine, but not untrue. It has been shown, however, that
the scale of battle was completely turned by a flank movement of our forces in
heavy numbers, which routed the enemy, and converted his early successes of
the morning into an ignominious defeat. In the Northern official reports of
the battle, this portion of the day was dismissed with refreshing brevity and
nonchalance. After describing in the most glowing terms his victory in
pressing the Confederates to the river, Gen. Grant wrote to his friends, who
communicated the letter to the newspapers, "on our return, stragglers that
had been left in our rear fired into us, and more recrossed the river." In his
official report, the flank movement of the Confederates, that was the event of
the day and had decided it, was alluded to in a single sentence of casual mention, " The rebels recrossed the river, and followed in the rear to our place of
debarkation." Instances of this style and effrontery of falsehood abounded in
all the Northern official reports of the events of the war; the above is furnished only as a characteristic specimen.




204           TEE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
command in the Western Department, and had established his
head-quarters at Bowling Green, declared: "This was no ordinary shock of arms; it was a long and trying contest, in which
our troops fought by detachments, and always against superior
numbers. The 7th of November will fill a bright pagein our
military annals, and be remembered with gratitude by the
sons and daughters of the South."
Despite the victory of Belmont, our situation in Kentucky
was one of extreme weakness and entirely at the mercy of the
enemy, if he had not been imposed upon by false representations of the number of our forces at Bowling Green. When
Gen. Johnston was about to assume command of the Western
Department, the government charged him with the duty of deciding the question of occupying Bowling Green, Kentucky,
which involved not only military, but political considerations.
At the time of his arrival at Nashville, the action of the Legislature of Kentucky had put an end to the latter consideration
by sanctioning the formation of companies menacing Tennessee,
by assuming the cause of the government at Washington, and
by abandoning the neutrality it professed; and, in consequence
of their action, the occupation df Bowling Green became necessary as an act of self-defence, at least in the first step.
About the middle of September, Gen. Buckner advanced
with a small force of about four thousand men, which was increased by the 15th of October to twelve thousand, and though
other accessions of force were received, it continued at about
the same strength until the end of November, measles and
other diseases keeping down the effective force. The enemy's
force then was reported to the War Department at fifty thousand, and an advance was impossible.
Our own people were as much imposed upon as were the
enemy, with respect to the real strength of Gen. Johnston's
forces, and while they were conjecturing the brilliant results ot
an advance movement, the fact was that inevitable disasters
might have been known by the government to have been in
store for the Southern cause in Kentucky and Tennessee, and
to be awaiting only the development of a crisis. The utter
inadequacy of Gen. Johnston's forces was known to the government. The authorities at Richmond appeared to hope for results without the legitimate means for acquiring them; to look




TkE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           205
for relief from vague and undefined sources; and to await, with
dull expectation, what was next to happen. While the government remained in this blank disposition, events marched onward. It is easily seen, as far as our narrative has gone, that
our troops had shown a valor that was invincible against largely
superior numbers of the enemy; that had given striking illustrations of endurance in circumstances of the greatest adversity
and suffering; and that promised with absolute certainty, as far
as its agency could go, the achievement of our independence.
It is hereafter to be seen that this valor and devotion, great as
they were, could yet not withstand an enemy superior in force,
when his numbers were multiplied indefinitely against them;
that they could not resist armaments to which, for want of
defences, they could only offer up useless sacrifices of life; and
that some other agency than the natural spirit and hardihood
of men was necessary in the conduct of a war, in the nineteenth
century, against a nation which had given such unquestionable
proofs, as the North had, of quick and abundant resource,
mental activity, and unflagging hope.
It remains but to add here, mention of the political connection which was scarcely more than nominally effected between
Kentucky and the Confederate States. On the 18th November,
the opponents of the Lincoln rule in Kentucky assembled in
Convention, at Russellville, in the southern part of the State,
for the purpose of organizing a provisional government for
Kentucky, and for taking steps for her admission into the
Southern Confederacy. On the 20th November, the Convention unanimously agreed upon a report, presenting in a strong
light the falseness of the State and Federal Legislature, and
concluded with the declaration that " the people are hereby absolved from all allegiance to said government, -and that they
have the right to establish any government which to them may
seem best adapted to the preservation of their lives and liberty."
George W. Johnson, of Scott county, was chosen governor.
Commissioners were appointed to negotiate with the Confedcrate government for the earliest admission of Kentucky into
the government of the Confederate States. The embassy of the
commissioners to Richmond was successful, and before the
middle of December, Kentucky was duly recognized as one of
the States of the Southern Confederacy.




206               THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
CHAPTER VIII.
Prospects of European Interference.-The selfish Calculations of England.-Effects
of the Blockade on the South.-Arrest by Capt. Wilkes of the Southern Commissioners.-The Indignation of England.-Surrender of the Commissioners by the Lincoln
Government.-Mr. Seward's Letter.-REvIEw OF AFFAIRS AT THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR
1861.-Apathy and Improvidence of the Southern Government.-Superiority of the
North on the Water.-The Hatteras Expedition.-The Port Royal Expedition.-The
Southern Privateers.-Their Failure.-Errors of Southern Statesmanship.-" King
Cotton."-Episodes of the War.-The Affair of Santa Rosa Island.-The Affair of
Dranesville.-Political Measures of the South.-A weak and halting Policy.-The
Spirit of the War in the North.-Administration of the Civil Polity of the Southern
Army.-The Quarter-master's Department.-The Hygiene of the Camps.-Ravages of
the Southern Army by Disease.-The Devotion of the Women of the South.
SINCE the commencement of the war, the South had entertained prospects of foreign interference, at least so far as to
involve the recognition of her government by England and
France, and the raising of the blockade. Such prospects,
continued from month to month, had an unhappy effect in
weakening the popular sentiment of self-reliance, in turning
the attention of the people to the result of external events, and
in amusing their attention with misty illusions.
These prospects were vain. By the close of the year, the
South had learned the lesson, that the most certain means of
obtaining injury, scorn, and calumny from foreign people, was
to attempt their conciliation or to seek their applause, and that
not until she had proved herself independent of the opinions of
Iurope, and reached a condition above and beyond the help
of England and France, was she likely to obtain their amity
and justice.
It had been supposed in the South, that the interest of Europe in the staples of cotton and tobacco would effect a raising
of the blockade, at least by the fall of the year. The statistics
on these subjects were thought to be conclusive. France
derived an annual revenue of $38,000,040 from her monopoly
of the tobacco trade; and Great Britain and her people, a
revenue of $350,000,000 per annum from American cotton.
Five millions of souls, in England, were interested in one way




THE FIRST YEAR OF THIE WAR.           207
or the other in the cotton manufacture; and the South calculated, with reason, that the blockade would be raised by foreign
intervention, rather than that one-sixth of the population of
the British Isles would be permitted to be thrown out of employment by a decree or fulmination of the Yankee government at Washington.
Among the statesmen of Great Britain, however, a different
calculation prevailed, and that was, as long as the possible contingencies of the future held out the least hope of avoiding the
alternative of war with the Washington government, to strain
a point to escape it. It was argued, that it would be cheaper
for England to support, at the public expense, five millions of
operatives, than to incur the cost, besides the unpleasantness
of an embroilment in American affairs; and it was in this
spirit of selfish calculation-the results of which were stated
by Lord Palmerston in the declaration, that the " necessities"
of England had not reached that point to require her to interfere, in any manner, in the American war-that it was ultimately decided by the British government to maintain her
neutrality with reference to the blockade, as well as other incidents of the war.
About the fall of the year, the South had begun to feel severely the effects of the blockade. Supplies of the usual goods,
and even provisions, were becoming scarce. The evils were
augmented every day in the results of a baneful spirit of speculation, which indulged in monstrous extortions and corrupted
the public spirit, making opportunities for mercenary adventure
out of the distresses and necessities of the country.  There
was great suffering among the poor, and especially among refugees, who had fled to the cities from districts occupied by the
enemy.
The resources of the South were such, however, that any
thing like famine or actual starvation, of any portion of the
people, was not to be apprehended. The changes which happened in the circumstances and pursuits of people, were not
always as unfortunate as they appeared, and, in the end, not
unfrequently proved an advantage to them and to the prosperity
of the country.  Many new enterprises were started; many
sources of profitable labor were sought out; and many instances of the diversion of popular industry were occasioned,




208            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
which promised to become of permanent advantage in developing the resources of the country in minerals and manufactures, and introducing provision crops on an enlarged scale in
the Cotton States of the Confederacy.
In the month of December occurred an event which promised
the most fortunate consequences to the South, with respect to
foreign intervention and -her release from the blockade. The
Confederate government had deputed Mr. James M. Mason, of
Virginia, and Mr. John Slidell, of Louisiana, commissioners,
respectively, to England and France. They had escaped the
blockade at Charleston on a Confederate vessel, and arriving
at the neutral port of Havana, had left there on the 7th day of
December in a British mail-steamer, the Trent, commanded by
Capt. Moir. The next day after leaving port, the British vessel, while in the Bahama channel, was intercepted'by the'Federal steam-frigate, San Jacinto, Commander Wilkes, being
brought to by a shotted gun, and boarded by an armed boat's
crew. The persons of the commissioners and their secretaries,
Messrs. Eustis and IMlacfarland, were demanded; they claimed
the protection of the British flag, and refused to leave it except at the instance of actual physical force, which Lieut. Fairfax, who had boarded the vessel, then declared he was ready
to use. The Trent was an unarmed steamer, and as resistance
was hopeless, the commissioners were surrendered, under a
distinct and passionate protest against a piratical seizure of
ambassadors under a neutral flag.
This outrage done by a Federal vessel to the British flag,
when it was learned in the' South, was welcome news, as it was
thought certain that the British government would resent the:insult, and as the boastful -and exultant tone in the North, over
the capture of the commissioners, appeared to make it equally
certain that the government at Washington would not surrender its booty.'War between England and the North was
thought to be imminent. Providence was declared to be in
our favor; the incident of the Trent -was looked upon almost
-as a special dispensation, and it was said, in fond imagination,
that on its deck and in the trough of the weltering Atlantic
the key of the blockade had at last been lost.
These prospects were disappointed by the weakness of the
government at Washington, in surrendering the commissioners




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           209
and returning them to the British flag. The surrender was an
exhibition of meanness and cowardice unparalleled in the political history of the civilized world, but strongly characteristic
of the policy and mind of the North. The people of the North
had, at first, gone into raptures over the arrest of the commissioners; the newspapers designated it as "worth more than a
victory in the field;" the hospitalities of the city of New York
were offered by its common council to Capt. Wilkes, and a dinner was given him by leading citizens of Boston, in honor of
his brave exploit in successfully capturing, from the deck of
an unarmed mail-steamer, four unarmed passengers. The government at Washington had given every indication of its approval of the arrest. The compliments of the Cabinet had been
tendered to Capt. Wilkes, and a proposition introduced into
Congress to distinguish his piratical adventure by a public
vote of thanks. The subjects of the capture were condemned
to close cells in Fort Warren.
Despite all this manifest indorsement by the government of
the legality and value of the arrest of the commissioners, Mr.
Seward did not hesitate to surrender them when the alternative of war with Great Britain was indicated to him, in the
dispatches of that government demanding, in very simple and
stern terms, the reparation of the outrage that had been committed upon its flag.
In a letter to Mr. Adams, the representative of the Washington government at London, Mr. Seward had advised him
to make no explanations, as the Washington Cabinet thought
it better that the ground taken by the British government
should first be made known to them. The ground of its claims
was never furnished by the British government. Its demand
for reparation and apology was entirely naked, and evidently
disdained to make a single argument on the law question.
With unexampled shamelessness, Mr. Seward made the plea
himself for the surrender of the commissioners; he argued that
they could not be the subjects of a judicial proceeding to determine their status, because the vessel, the proper subject of
such a proceeding, had been permitted to escape; and with
a contemptible affectation of alacrity to offer, from a returning
sense of justice, what all the world knew had been extorted
from the alarms of cowardice, he declared that he " cheerfully"
14




210           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
surrendered the commissioners, and did so in accordance with
long-established American doctrine.
In surrendering the commissioners, the Washington govern
ment took the opportunity to declare its reassured hopes of the
Union, and to express its contempt for the Southern revolution. In his letter to Earl Russell, Mr. Seward took particular
pains to declare, that " the safety of the Union did not require
the detention of the captured persons;" that an "'effectual
check" had been put to the " existing insurrection," and that
its " waning proportions" made it no longer a subject of serious consideration.
The declaration was false and affected, but it contained an
element of truth. There is no doubt that, at the time it was
made, the power of the revolution in the South was declining;
and a rapid survey of the political posture, and of events transpiring in the latter half of the year 1861, affords painful evidence of relaxation on the part of the Confederate government,
and of instances of weakness and abuse that the people, who
had pledged every thing and endured every thing in a contest
for freedom, had no right to expect.
REVIEW OF AFFAIRS AT THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1861.
The justice of history compels us to state that two causesthe overweening confidence of the South in the superior valor
of its people, induced by the unfortunate victory of Manassas,
and the vain delusion, continued from month to month, that
European interference was certain, and that peace was near at
hand, conspired, about this time, to reduce the Southern cause
to a critical condition of apathy.
Western Virginia had been abandoned to the enemy almost
with indifference, and with an apathetic confidence in an army
that was in danger of becoming demoralized, and in the prospects of European interference, which were no brighter than
formerly, except in imagination, the South carelessly observed
the immense preparations of the North, by sea and land, to
extend the area of the contest from the coasts of Carolina to
the States on the Mississippi, and to embrace her whole territory with the lengthening arms of the war.
While the enemy was busy making his immense naval prep



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           211
arations against our sea-coast, and building scores of gunboats on the upper Mississippi to drive our armies out of
Kentucky and Tennessee, the Southern government had shown
the most extraordinary apathy; the spirit of our armies was
evidently decaying, and abuses of extraordinary magnitude
had crept into the civil administration of our affairs. No corresponding activity was manifested by us in the line of naval
enterprise adopted by the enemy. Means were not wanting for
at least some emulation in this respect. Large appropriations
had been made by Congress for the construction of gunboats
and objects of river defence; the State of Virginia had turned
over to the Confederate government the best navy-yard on the
continent, and two armories with their machinery; and with
the means and appliances at Gosport and Richmond, it is not
doubted that, with proper activity, the government might have
created a considerable fleet.
The North had improved the advantage of its possession of
a navy by increasing its numbers. Nearly a hundred vessels
of different descriptions were purchased by it, and fleets of
gunboats fitted out for operations on the coast and rivers.
Two naval expeditions had already, before the close of the
year, been sent down the Carolina coast, and without accomplishing much, had given serious indications of what was to be
expected from this arm of the service on the slight fortifications of our ocean frontier.
On the 29th of August, a naval expedition from Fortress
Monroe, under command of Commodore Stringham and Majorgeneral Butler, had reduced the two forts at Hatteras Inlet,
and had signalized their victory by the capture of fifteen guns
and 615 prisoners, among whom was Commodore Barron, the
Confederate officer in command.
The capture of Port Royal, on the South Carolina coast, on
the 7th of November, by the bombardment of Forts Walker
and Beauregard, gave to the enemy a point for his squadrons
to find shelter, and a convenient naval depot. The attack was
made on the 7th of November, by a Federal fleet, numbering
fifteen war-steamers and gunboats, under command of Capt.
Dupont, flag-officer of the south Atlantic blockading squadron.
The attack was easily successful by the bombardment of the
forts at the entrance of the sound. It may be imagined how




212           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
inefficient our defences must have been, when the fact is, that
they yielded after a bombardment which continued precisely
four hours and thirty minutes; the condition of Fort Walker
at this time being, according to the official report of General
Drayton, who was in command, " all but three of the guns in
the water front disabled, and only five hundred pounds of powder in the magazine." But these were only the first lessons of
the enemy's power and our improvidence in defences, that were
to be taught us on the coast.
The privateering service had yielded us but poor fruits. The
Savannah, the first of the privateers, was captured, and her
crew treated as pirates, at least so far as to load them with
irons, and confine them in felons' cells. With the exception of
the Sumter (an awkwardly rigged bark) and one or two others,
the privateers of the South were pretty closely confined within
their own harbors and rivers by the blockading fleets. The
"militia of the seas," that, it was predicted in the early part
of the war, would penetrate into every sea, and find splendid
prizes in the silk ships of China, and the gold-freighted steamers of California, had proved but an inconsiderable annoyance
to the extensive commercial marine of the North; it had
captured during the year but fifty prizes in smacks, schooners,
and small merchantmen, and by this time the South had learned
that its privateering resources were about as delusive as that
other early and crude expectation of adventitious aid in the
war-the power of "King Cotton."
It is curious, indeed, how the early expectations of the manner and conduct of a war are disappointed by the progress of
-its events, and its invariable law of success in the stern competitions of force, without reference to other circumstances. It
was said, at the beginning of the war, that, while cotton would
"bring Europe to its knees," the Southern privateers would
cut up the commerce of the North, and soon bring the mercenary and money-making spirits of that section to repentance.
Neither result was realized. At the close of the year 1861,
the South appeared to be fully convinced that it was waging a
war in which it could no longer look for aid to external and
adventitious circumstances; that it could no longer hope to
obtain its independence from European interference, or from
cotton, or from the annoyances of its privateers, or from the




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           213
rupture of a financial system in the North; and that it had no
other resource of hope but in the stern and bloody trials of the
battle-field.
Beyond the events briefly sketched in this and the foregoing
chapters, there were some incidents which were interesting as
episodes in the progress of the war, up to the close of the year
1861, to which a full reference has been impossible in a work
which professes to treat only the material parts of the important campaigns of the year.
The most interesting of these was probably the attack on
Santa Rosa Island, in the harbor of Pensacola, on the night of
the 8th October, and the storming, by picked companies from
the Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Florida
regiments, of the camp which had been made on the island by
the notorious Billy Wilson Zouaves. Landing from steamers
and flats on the enemy's shore, within sight of his fleet, the
small band of Confederates marched some three or four miles
in the darkness of the night over an unknown and almost
impassable ground, killing the enemy's pickets, storming his
intrenched camp, driving off the notorious regiment of New
York bullies, with their colonel flying at their head, and burning every vestige of-their clothing, equipage, and provisions.
This action was rendered remarkable by an instance of disgusting brutality on the part of the enemy —the murder of our
wounded who had been left on the field on account of the
necessity of rapidly retiring with our small force, before the
enemy could rally from his surprise. Of thirteen dead bodies
recovered, eleven were shot through the head, having, at the
same time, disabling wounds on the body. This fact admits of
but one inference.
The affair of Dranesville, on the line of the Potomac, had
given a sharp and unexpected lesson to our immoderate confidence. This action occurred on the 22d day of December.
Our whole force engaged ivas nearly 2,500 men, composed of
Virginia, South Carolina, Kentucky, and Alabama troops,
under command of Gen. Stuart. The expedition, which was
attended by a train of wagons intended for foraging purposes,
fell in with the enemy near Dranesville. On the appearance
of the enemy, the 11th Virginia regiment charged them with a
yell, and drove them back to their lines within sight of Dranes



214            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
ville. Here the enemy rallied. In the confusion which ensued,
the 1st Kentucky regiment fired upon the South Carolina
troops, mistaking them for the enemy. Discovering his mistake, Colonel Taylor, of the 1st Kentucky, moved cautiously
through the woods. Coming in sight of another regiment,
and prompted to unusual caution by his previous mistake, he
shouted to their commander to know who he was. "The
colonel of the 9th," was the reply. "Of what 9th?" "Don't
shoot," said the Yankees; "we are friends-South Carolinians."  " On which side are you?" asked Col. Taylor. " For
the Union," now shouted the Federals; at the same instant
pouring a murderous volley into the ranks of the Kentuckians.
The engagement now became general. The Federals had the
advantage of position and largely superior numbers. Their
field batteries swept our lines, and several regiments of their
infantry, protected by the ground, had advanced within one
hundred yards of us, keeping the air full of minie-balls.
After sustaining the fire for some time, our troops were compelled to fall back. The retreat was executed in good order,
as the enemy did not attempt any pursuit. Our loss on the
field from which we were repulsed was about two hundred in
killed and wounded. The next day, reinforcements having
reached Gen. Stuart, the enemy had drawn off from the
locality of the battle-field, and declined any further engagement.
The affair at Dranesville was no serious disaster, but it was
a significant warning, and, in this respect, it had an importance beyond the size of the engagement and its immediate results. The Yankees were learning to stand fire, and, out of
the material which was raw at Bull Run, McClellan was
making troops who were no longer contemptible, and who were
perceptibly improving in discipline, stanchness, and soldierly
qualities.
Of the political measures adopted by the South in furtherance of the objects of the wai, but a few words need be said.
They are justly described as weak and halting responses to the
really vigorous acts of the Northern government in its heartless, but strong and effective prosecution of the war. While
the Washington government protected itself against disaffected
persons and spies by a system of military police, extending




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.              215
over the whole North, the Provisional Congress, at Richmond,
was satisfied to pass a law for the deportation of " alien enemies," the execution of which afforded facilities to the egress
of innumerable spies. The Washington government had passed
a law for the confiscation of the property of " rebels."  The
Congress at Richmond replied, after a weak hesitation, by a
law sequestrating the property of alien enemies in the South,
the operations of which could never have been intended to
have effect; for, by future amendments in the same Congress,
the law was soon emasculated into a broad farce. The Washington government was actually collecting an army of half a
million of men. The Richmond Congress replied to the threat
of numbers, by increasing its army, on paper, to four hundred
thousand men; and the Confederate government, in the midst
of a revolution that threatened its existence, continued to rely
on the wretched shift of twelve months' volunteers and raw
militia, with a population that, by the operation of conscription, could have been embodied and drilled into an invincible
army, competent not only to oppose invasion at every point of
our frontier, but to conquer peace in the dominions of the
enemy.
The universal mind and energy of the North had been consolidated in its war upon the South. The patriotism of the
nation was broadly invoked; no clique arrogated and monopolized the control of affairs; no favorites closed up against the
million outside the avenues of patronage, of honor, and of promotion. It was a remarkable circumstance that the North
had, at all stages of the war, adopted the best means for securing specific results. The popularity of Fremont, with the half
million " Wide Awakes" of the North, was used to bring an
army into the field. The great ship-broker of New York,
Morgan, and the great ship-owner, Vanderbilt, were patronized
to create a navy. In the army, the popularity of Banks, Butler, Grant, and Baker were employed equally with the science
of McClellan, Buell, and Ualleck.* It had been thus that the
* The two most conspicuous Federal generals in the operations of the West
were Generals Buell and Halleck. Don Carlos Buell was a native of Ohio.
He had served in the Mexican war with distinction, having been twice brevetted for gallant conduct-the last time as major in the battle of Churubusco,
in which he was severely wounded, At the close of the Mexican war, he was




216              THE FIRST YEAR OF T    WAR.
Federal government had united the whole North, brought an
army of half a million men into the field, and swelled the proportions of the war far beyond any expectations of the world.
The policy of monotonous defence had been perseveringly
pursued by the authorities of the Confederacy. On the side
of the enemy, it had more than repaired the damage inflicted
upon them in many brilliant battles, and had left them at
perfect leisure, in the very presence of our forces, to devise,
mature, and make trial of any plan of campaign or assault
which they thought expedient. A large portion of Virginia
and important regions on the Southern seaboards were now
occupied by the enemy, who would never have ventured forth
to such distances, if they had been menaced nearer home. The
strictly defensive policy was sustained by elaborate arguments.
appointed assistant adjutant-general, with rank of captain, but relinquished
his rank in line in 1851. As a commander, he was courageous, energetic, and
methodical, and he obtained the respect of the South for his chivalric disposition, his courteous behavior to prisoners, and his uniform recognition of
the laws and amenities of civilized warfare.
G6en. Henry Wager Halleck, before the war, had been but little known, and
that only as the author of some military works, and a prominent land lawyer,
deeply versed in Mexican titles, at the bar of San Francisco, California. He
was a pupil of West Point, and had been brevetted captain for meritorious
services in California during the Mexican war. He was appointed Secretary
of State of the province of California in the military government of Generals
Kearney, Mason, and Riley, and was a member of the Convention to form and
one of-the committee to draft the State Constitution of California in 1849.
He subsequently disappeared from public attention, and occupied himself
with his innumerable Mexican clients in California as a lawyer and land
speculator.
A correspondent gives the following account of the personnel of General
Halleck: "In the field he is hardly the same person who might have been
seen quietly gliding from the Planters' House to head-quarters in St. Louis.
He does not look a whit more military in appearance, but looks, in his new
and rich, though plain uniform, as if he were in borrowed clothes. In truth,
he bears a most striking resemblance to some oleaginous Methodist parson
dressed in regimentals, with a wide, stiff-rimmed black felt hat sticking on
the back of his head, at an acute angle with the ground. His demeanor in
front of his tent is very simple and business-like. When on horseback, his
Wesleyan character is more and more prominent. He neither looks like a
soldier, rides like one, nor does he carry the state of a major-general in the
field, but is the impersonation of the man of peace. His face is large, tabular,
and Teutonic; his eyes a kind of indistinct gray, not without expression, but
of that deep welling kind that only reveal the emotion without indicating its
character."




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            217
It is not within the design of our work to canvass the logical
value of these arguments; but it is to recognize as a fact the
natural and almost universal impression made upon the popular
mind of the South, that it could not be good generalship which
left the enemy at perfect leisure to mature all his preparations
for aggression; and that it could not be a glorious system of
warfare, which never ventured an aggressive movement, and
which decimated its armies by inaction.
In the administration of the civil polity of the Southern
army, as distinguished from its command, there were abuses
and defects which were constant subjects of newspaper comment.
In the Quarter-master's department, however, the results accomplished by the energy of its directors were little less than
surprising, and received the marked commendation of a committee of the Provisional Congress, appointed to inquire into
the civil polity of the army. That the immense army now in
the service of the Confederate States, suddenly collected, men
and officers generally inexperienced in camp life and military
duty, should be clothed, armed, and moved with the facility of
a permanent organization, was not to be expected; and yet,
with but few exceptions, this result was accomplished. Major
Alfred M. Barbour, of Virginia, was appointed Chief Quarter-master of the army of the Potomac, our principal corps
d'armne in the field; and his remarkable resources of judgment,
his vast energy, and his untiring devotion to his extensive duties in the field, contributed most important results in the emergencies of the many sudden and rapid movements of our forces
in Virginia, in the remarkable campaign in that State of the
spring of 1862. Such contributions to the public service are
not to be depreciated by the side of more visible, and, in the
popular mind, more brilliant achievements of the war. The
labors of the Quarter-master's department penetrate the entire
military establishment, breathe life into the army, nurture its
growth, and give it strength and efficiency in the field; vigilant, prepared, and present, it moves unnoticed amid the stirring events of the field, and obscured by the dust and smcke
of the combat, it remains unobserved even while collecting the
fruits of victory.
The most distressing abuses were visible in the ill-regulated




218             THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
hygiene of our camps. The ravages of disease among the
army in Virginia were terrible; the accounts of its extent were
suppressed in the newspapers of the day, and there is no doubt
that thousands of our brave troops disappeared from notice
without a record of their end, in the nameless graves that yet
mark the camping grounds on the lines of the Potomac, and
among the wild mountains of Virginia.
Our camps were scourged with fever, pneumonia, and diarrhcea. The armies on the Potomac and in western Virginia
suffered greatly —those troops in Cheat Mountain and in the
vicinity of the Kanawha Valley most intensely. The wet and
changeable climate, the difficulty of transportation, exposure
to cold and rain without tents, the necessary consequence of
the frequent forward and retrograde movements, as well as the
want of suitable food for either sick or well men, produced
most of the sickness, and greatly aggravated it after its accession.
The regulations, requiring reports from the regiments as to
the number of sick, their diseases, and the wants of the medi
cal station, were, but in few instances, complied with. The
result of this neglect was, that upon a change of position in
the army, it was the unhappy consequence that the number of
sick greatly exceeded that indicated by the reports. They
were hurried to the rear, where the accommodations, both as
to food, shelter, and medical attendance, being all insufficient,
there was great suffering and great mortality.
The suffering of our army evoked, on the part of the Southern people, demonstrations of patriotic devotion and generosity,
such, perhaps, as the world had never seen. The patriotism
of our citizens at home was manifested in unremitting efforts
to supply the wants and relieve the sufferings of the soldiers,
sick and well. The supply of money, clothing, and hospital
stores, from this voluntary and generous source, is estimated
in millions of dollars.* It was the most cheering indication
* The following contributions (estimated in money) were listed at the Passport Office, in Richmond, during the last three months of the year 1861. The
list comprises almost exclusively the donations made to the army of the Potomac. Of the voluntary supplies sent to the army in Missouri, Arkansas,
and Kentucky, there is no account whatever; but, as the same patriotic devotion animated our people everywhere, there is no reason to doubt that an equal




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                    219
of the spirit of our people in the cause of independence. The
women of the country, with the tenderness and generosity of
their sex, not only loaded railroad cars with all those appliances for the comfort of the sick which their patriotic ingenuity
could devise, but also came to the rescue in clothing those who
were well and bearing arms in the field. They made large pecuniary contributions, took charge of the hospitals established
by the States, and, as matrons of those institutions, carried
cleanliness and comfort to the gallant soldier, far from home
and kindred. A committee of the Provisional Congress placed
on record the thanks of the country to the women of the South,
for their works of patriotism and public charity, and declared
that the government owed them " a public acknowledgment
of their faithfulness in the glorious work of effecting our independence."
amount of clothing, stores, &c., had been sent to those troops. With this calculation, the whole amount of contributions for the last quarter of the year
1861 could not have fallen short of three millions of dollars:
North Carolina...........      $325,417
Alabama,................................... 317,600
Mississippi.............................. 272,670
Georgia..................................... 244,885
South Carolina,....................... 137,206
Texas.................................    87,800
Louisiana.................................. 61,950
Virginia,...............................  48,070
Tennessee................................. 17,000
Florida,....................................   2,350
Arkansas,...........          950
$1,515,898




220              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
CHAPTER IX.
Prospects of the Year 1862.-The Lines of the Potomac.-General Jackson's Expedition to Winchester.-The BATTLE OF MILL SPRINGS IN KENTUcKY.-General Crittenden.-Death of General Zollicoffer.-Sufferings of Crittenden's Army on the
Retreat.-Comparative Unimportance of the Disaster.-The BATTLE OF ROANOKE
IsLAND.-Importance of the Island to the South.-Death of Captain Wise.-Causes of
the Disaster to the South.-Investigation in Congress.-Censure of the Government. —
Interviews of General Wise with Mr. Benjamin, the Secretary of War.-Mr. Benjamin
censured by Congress, but retained in the Cabinet.-His Promotion by President
Davis.-Condition of the Popular Sentiment.
THE year 1862 was to bring in a train of disasters to the
South. Taking a brief glance at the lines of the Potomac, we
shall thereafter have to find the chief interest of the war in
other directions-in the West and on the seacoast.
In December last, Gen. Thomas F. Jackson was sent from
Gen. Johnston's line to Winchester with a force at his disposal
of some ten thousand men. Had the same force been placed
at the command of Gen. Jackson in early autumn, with the
view to an expedition to Wheeling, by way of the Winchester
and Parkersburg road, the good effects would, in'all probability, have shown themselves in the expulsion of the Federals
from northwestern Virginia.
On the 1st of January, 1862, Gen. Jackson marched with
his command from  Winchester to Bath, in Morgan county,
and from the latter place to Romney, where there had been a
large Federal force for many weeks, and from which point
they had committed extensive depredations on the surrounding
country. Gen. Jackson drove the enemy from Romney and
the neighboring country without much fighting.  His troops,
however, endured the severest hardships in the expedition.
Their sufferings were terrible in what was the severest portion
of the winter. They were compelled at one time to struggle
through an almost blinding storm of snow and sleet, and to
bivouac at night in the forests, without tents or camp equipage.  Many of the troops were frozen on the march, and died
from exposure and exhaustion.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                  221
The heroic commander, whose courage had been so brilliantly illustrated at Manassas, gave new  proofs of his iron
will in this expedition and the subsequent events of his campaign in the upper portion of the valley of Virginia. No one
would have supposed that a man, who, at the opening of the
war, had been a professor in a State military institute-that
at Lexington, Virginia-could have shown such active determination and grim energy in the field. But Gen. Jackson had
been brought up in a severer school of practical experience
than West Point, where he had graduated twenty years before;
he had served in the memorable campaign from Vera Cruz to
Mexico; and an iron will and stern courage, which he had
from  nature, made him  peculiarly fitted to command.*  But
we must wait for a subsequent period to refer again to Gen.
Jackson's operations in the Valley, or to other portions of the
campaign in Virginia.
* At the siege of Vera Cruz, Jackson commanded a battery, and attracted
attention by the coolness and judgment with which he worked his guns, and
was promoted first lieutenant. For his conduct at Cerro Gordo, he was brevetted captain. He was in all Scott's battles to the city of Mexico, and behaved
so well that he was brevetted major for his services. To his merits as a commander he added the virtues of an active, humble, consistent Christian,
restraining profanity in his camp, welcoming army colporteurs, distributing
tracts, and anxious to have every regiment in his army supplied with a chaplain. He was vulgarly sneered at as a fatalist; his habits of soliloquy were
derided as superstitious conversations with a familiar spirit; but the confidence he had in his destiny was the unfailing mark of genius, and adorned the
Christian faith, which made him believe that he had a distinct mission of duty
in which he should be spared for the ends of Providence. Of the habits of his
life the following description is given by one who knew him: " He is as calm
in the midst of a hurricane of bullets as he was in the pew of his church at
Lexington, when he was professor of the Institute. He appears to be a man
of almost superhuman endurance. Neither heat nor cold makes the slightest
impression upon him. He cares nothing for good quarters and dainty fare.
Wrapped in his blanket, he throws himself down on the ground anywhere,
and sleeps as soundly as though he were in a palace. He lives as the soldiers
live, and endures all the fatigue and all the suffering that they endure. His
vigilance is something marvellous. He never seems to sleep, and lets nothing
pass without his personal scrutiny. He can neither be caught napping, nor
whipped when he is wide awake. The rapidity of his marches is something
portentous. He is heard of by the enemy at one point, and, before they can
make up their minds to follow him, he is off at another. His men have little
baggage, and he moves, as nearly as he can, without incumbrance. He keeps
so constantly in motion, that he never has a sick list, and no need of hospitals."




222           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
THE BATTLE OF MILL SPRINGS IN KENTUCKY.
In a previous chapter, we noticed the expedition of Gen.
Zollicoffer in Kentucky, and gave an account of the rout of the
forces sent against him. The next expedition of the enemy
against him was successful beyond their expectations.
Since the affair referred to, Gen. Zollicoffer had moved with
a portion of his command to Mill Springs, on the southern
bank of the Cumberland river, and soon after advanced across
to Camp Beech Grove, on the opposite bank, fortifying this
camp with earthworks. At Beech Grove, he placed five regiments of infantry, twelve pieces of artillery, and several hundred cavalry, and at Mill Springs he had two regiments of
infantry and several hundred cavalry. About the first of
January, Major-general Crittenden arrived and took the command, having been advanced, by President Davis, from a
captaincy in the Federal army to a major-generalship in the
Confederate army.
Our position at Beech Grove had but few advantages. From
the face of the country in front there was a very bad range for
artillery, and it could not be of very material benefit against
an attacking infantry force; and, considering the extent of the
front line and the number of works to be defended, there was
within the camp an insufficient force. At the same time, for
several weeks, bare existence in the camps was very precarious,
from want of provisions and forage. Regiments frequently
subsisted on one-third rations, and this very frequently ot
bread alone. Wayne county, which was alone productive in
this region of Kentucky, had been exhausted, and the neighboring counties of Tennessee could furnish nothing for the
support of the army. Only corn could be obtained for the
horses and mules, and this in such small quantities that often
cavalry companies were sent out on unshod horses which had
eaten nothing for two days. The condition of the roads and the
poverty of the intervening section rendered it impossible to
transport from Knoxville, a distance of one hundred and thirty
miles. The enemy from Columbia commanded the Cumberland
river, and only one boat was enabled to come up with supplies
from Nashville. With the channel of communication closed,
the position became untenable without attack.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           223
In these straits, when the entire army at Mill Springs had
been reduced to a single ration of beef per day, and a half ration of corn, the latter eaten as parched corn, and not issued
as meal, news reached Gen. Crittenden of an advance movement of the enemy, both from Columbia and from Somerset.
On the 17th of January it was ascertained that a large Federal force, under Gen. Thomas, was moving on the road from
Columbia, and, on the evening of that day, was camped about
ten miles from Beech Grove. It was also ascertained that
other reinforcements were moving from the direction of Columbia, under command of Gen. Schoepff, and that the junction of
these two forces was intended for an attack on Camp Beech
Grove.
Under these circumstances, Gen. Crittenden determined to
attack Gen. Thomas's force in his camp. The, decision, which
was sanctioned by a council of war, was a most adventurous
one. It was proposed, with an effective force of four thousand
men, to attack an enemy in his intrenchments, at least ten
thousand strong; it is true, however, that a defence of our intrenchments was impracticable, and that to have awaited the
enemy there, would only have given him time to have effected a
junction of his forces. This consideration, however, gives but
an imperfect vindication of the impetuous adventure determined
upon by Gen. Crittenden. The fact was, that the avenues of
retreat were open to our little army, and could only have been
cut off by the enemy's crossing above and below Mill Springs.
In perfect silence, at midnight, the march began. The brigade of Gen. Zollicoffer moved in front. In the gray dawn,
about six o'clock, two miles from their camp, the pickets of the
enemy fired upon our advanced cavalry. The morning of the
19th was dark and rainy-a fit day for a sabbath battle. The
15th Mississippi regiment, in line of battle, was steadily advanced, under the constant fire of the enemy. The charge of
Gen. Zollicoffer's brigade, in which this gallant regiment earned
the most conspicuous distinction of the day, soon became impetuous. The Mississippi troops fought with a devotion never
excelled by the soldiers of any battle-field; nearly half of the
regiment (it numbered only 440) fell in the action; at times
they fought with the enemy at ten or twelve paces, and, in one
of their sweeping and exultant charges, for fifty yards, dashed




224            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
over the dead bodies of Yankees. The enemy was steadily
driven back before the charge of Gen. Zollicoffer's command.
Already he was ascending the last hill to its crest, where
the heaviest firing told the battle raged. He sent for reinforcements, and the brigade of Gen. Carrol was ordered up.
In another moment, it was announced that Gen. Zollicoffer was
killed. He had fallen on the crest of the hill, the stronghold
of the enemy, which he had almost driven them from, and
which once gained, the day was ours.
Gen. Zollicoffer fell very near the camp of the enemy. He
was with Col. Battle's Tennessee regiment, this and the Mississippi regiment being the chief participants in the action, and
in the ranks of which were his own home friends, born and
brought up around him at Nashville. In front, and concealed
in the woods, was a regiment of Kentucky renegades, commanded by Col. Fry. By some mistake, probably that of the
Kentuckians for a regiment of his own command, Gen. Zollicoffer got very near them. Col. Fry was at the right of his
regiment. Gen. Zollicoffer was within a few feet of the colonel.
A gum coat concealed his uniform. The two parties mistook
each other for friends, and discovered their mutual mistake
almost at the same instant. One of General Zollicoffer's aids
shot at Colonel Fry, but only wounded his horse. The next
moment the Federal colonel fired at Zollicoffer, and the general, raising his hand to his breast, fell, pierced by several balls.
At the announcement of the death of Gen. Zollicoffer, a
sudden gloom pervaded the field and depressed the Tennessee
troops, who had been devotedly attached to him. Gen. Crittenden essayed all that personal example could do to retrieve
the sinking fortunes of the day. He, in person, rode up to the
front of the fight, in the very midst of the fire of the enemy.
To gain the disputed hill, the fight was still continued. Charge
after charge was driven back by the heavy forces of the enemy.
After a conflict of three and a half hours, our troops commenced to give way. The pursuit was checked by several
stands made by the little army, and the intrenchments at Camp
Beech Grove were reached in the afternoon, with a loss on our
side of about three hundred killed and wounded, and probably
fifty prisoners.
The advance of the enemy arrived late in the evening before




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           225
the Confederate intrenchments, and fired upon them with shot
and shell. Night closing in, put a stop to further demonstrations. Our men, tired and worn out as they were, stood behind the breastworks until midnight, when orders came for them
to retreat quietly across the river. A steamer, with three
barges attached, commenced the work of transportation. Cannon, baggage wagons, and horses were abandoned; every thing
was lost save what our men had on their backs, and yet the
whole night was consumed in getting the army over the river,
which was very high at the time. The line of retreat was taken
up towards Monticello, Gen. Crittenden having determined to
strike for the Cumberland at the highest point where boats
could land with safety, in order to be in open communication
with Nashville.
The retreat was one of great distress. Many of the troops
had become demoralized, and, without order, dispersed through
the mountain by-ways in the direction of Monticello. "We
reached Monticello," writes an officer of one of the regiments
in the retreat, "at night, and then we were threatened with
starvation-an enemy far more formidable than the one we left
beyond the river. Since Saturday night, we had but an hour
of sleep, and scarcely a morsel of food. For a whole week, we
have been marching under a bare subsistence, and I have at
length approached that point in a soldier's career when a hand
ful of parched corn may be considered a first-class dinner. We
marched the first few days through a barren region, where supplies could not be obtained. I have more than once seen the
men kill a porker with their -guns, cut and quarter it, and broil
it on the coals, and then eat it without bread or salt. The
suffering of the men from the want of the necessaries of life,
of clothing, and of repose, has been most intense, and a more
melancholy spectacle than this solemn, hungry, and weary
procession, could scarcely be imagined."
The enemy invested the abandoned camp of the Confederates
on the morning following the day of the battle. Gen. Schoepff's
brigade had crossed the river preparatory to the attack which
Gen. Thomas had intended to make on the intrenchments on
Monday. Early in the morning, the steamer used by the Confederates in effecting their retreat was discovered lying in the
river, and was burnt by the shells of the enemy. They con15




026           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
gratulated themselves that they had cut off the last hope of
the escape of " the rebels." Long columns of troops filed away,
and the artillery commenced to play on the intrenchments, iil
doubt for a moment whether their guns were replied to or not,
when word came that the intrenchments were abandoned. As
the enemy marched into the camp there was hardly a cheer.
They had hoped to capture every man of the Confederates, and
were bitterly disappointed. They secured, however, a rich
spoil of victory-every thing in fact that made our poor soldiers
an army. The property captured was of considerable value.
It consisted of eight six-pounders and two Parrott-guns, with
caissons filled with ammunition, about 100 four-horse wagons,
and upwards of 1,200 horses and mules, several boxes of arms
which had never been opened, and from 500 to 1,000 muskets.
The death of Gen. Zollicoffer was deeply lamented by his
countrymen. It is doubtful whether the death of any man of
the present generation ever produced such conspicuous grief
among Tennesseeans. He was a man made of stern stuff, and
possessed in a remarkable degree the confidence of his army
and of the Tennessee people. Ie was devoted to the interests
of the South, and, during a long career in Congress, was one
of the few members of the Whig party who voted uniformly
with Southern men on all questions involving her honor and
welfare. Made a brigadier-general, he was assigned to the department of East Tennessee at an early period of the war, and
had exhibited rare address and genuine courage -and military talents in the administration of his responsible command, It was a
melancholy mode which his army chose of testifying their appreciation of his ability as a commander, in giving up all for
lost when he was shot down; but it certainly afforded a marked
testimony of their confidence in his generalship.
The body of General Zollicoffer fell into the hands of the enemy. His remains were treated by them with unusual respect.
One of their officers, who had known him in Washington,
asked to be permitted to see the corpse. A pistol-shot had
struck him in the breast, a little above the heart. Iis face
bore, no expression such as is usually found upon those who
fall in battle-no malice, no reckless hate, not even a shadow
of physical pain. It was calm, placid, noble. "Poor fellow,'
wrote the officer who visited with respect his remains just after




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           227
the battle, " I have never looked on a countenance so marked
with sadness. A deep dejection had settled on it.'The low
cares of the mouth' were distinct in the droop at its corners,
and the thin cheeks showed the wasting which comes through
disappointment and trouble."
The reverse sustained by our arms in Southern Kentucky
involved no important military consequences; and the government at Richmond found. cause of congratulation in the circumstance that, if a defeat must needs have happened to it at
this time, it could not have come upon it at a point of less comparative consequence than the battle-ground near Somerset,
Kentucky. It was a hundred miles from the line of railroad
connecting us with the great West; it was a still greater distance from Cumberland Gap, the nearest point of the Virginia
line; and there intervened, on the road to Knoxville, rivers and
mountain passes which an invading army could only traverse
slowly and with great caution.
But a disaster to our arms was shortly to ensue, of the importance and gravity of which there could be no doubt, and
with respect to which the government could find neither consolations nor excuses. While we have seen how matters stood
on the Potomac in the opening of the year 1862, and what
ominous indications had taken place in the West, we must now
remove the attention of the reader to the sea-coast, where,
along the low and melancholy scenery of the sea-border of
North Carolina, one of the most extraordinary dramas of the
war was to be enacted.
THE BATTLE OF ROANOKE ISLAND.
On the 21st of December, that part of North Carolina east
of the Chowan river, together with the counties of Washington
and Tyrrell, was, at the request of the proper authorities of
North Carolina, separated from the remainder, and constituted
into a military district, under Brigadier-general H. A. Wise,
and attached to the command of Major-general Huger, commanding the department of Norfolk.
Immediately upon the secession of the State of North Carolina from the government of the United States, and the adoption of the Constitution of the Confederate States of America,




228           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
the authorities of that State commenced the construction of
fortifications at Hatteras and Oregon Inlets, and other points
upon her coast, which were not completed when the State
transferred her forts, arsenals, army, navy, and coast defences
to the Confederate government. Shortly thereafter the attack
was made upon Forts Hatteras and Clark, and they were
taken, and the fortifications at Oregon Inlet were abandoned,
and the armament, stores, and ammunition were removed to
Roanoke Island. The enemy immediately appeared in force
in Pamlico Sound, the waters of which are connected with Albemarle and Currituck sounds by means of the two smaller
sounds of Croatan and Roanoke. The island of Roanoke being situated between these two latter sounds, commanding the
channels of each, became, upon the fall of Hatteras and the
abandonment of Oregon Inlet, only second in importance to
Fortress Monroe. The island then became the key which unlocked all northeastern North Carolina to the enemy, and exposed Portsmouth and Norfolk to a rear approach of the most
imminent danger.
Such was the importance of Roanoke Island. It was threatened by one of the most formidable naval armaments yet fitted
out by the North, put under the command of Gen. Burnside,
of Rhode Island. It might have been placed in a state of defence against any reasonable force, with the expenditure of
money and labor supposed to be within the means of the government. Ample time and the fullest forewarnings were given
to the government for the construction of defences, since, for a
full month, Gen. Wise had represented to the government,
with the most obvious and emphatic demonstrations, that the
defences of the island were wholly inadequate for its protection
from an attack either by land or water.
The military defences of Roanoke Island and its adjacent
waters on the 8th of February, the day of its surrender, consisted of three sand forts, a battery of two 32-pounders, and a
redoubt thrown across the road in the centre of the island, about
seventy or eighty feet long, on the right of which was a swamp,
on the left a marsh. In addition to these defences on the
shore and on the island, there was a barrier of piles, extending
from the east side of Fulker Shoals, towards the island. Its
objaect was to compel vessels passing on the west of the island




TIIE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          229
to approach within reach of the shore batteries; but up to the
8th of February, there was a span of 1,700 yards open opposite
to Fort Bartow, the most-southern of the defences, on the west
side of the island.
The entire military force stationed upon the island prior to,
and at the time of, the late engagement, consisted of the 8th
regiment of North Carolina State troops, under the command
of Col. It. M. Shaw; the 31st regiment of North Carolina
volunteers, under the command of Col. J. V. Jordan; and three
companies of the 17th North Carolina troops, under the command of Major G. H. Hill. After manning the several forts,
on the 7th of February, there were but one thousand and
twenty-four men left, and two hundred of them were upon the
sick list. On the evening of the 7th of February, Brig.-gen.
Wise sent fiom Nagg's Head, under the command of Lieut.col. Anderson, a reinforcement, numbering some four hundred
and fifty men. The whole force was under the command of
Brig.-gen. Wise, who, upon the 7th and 8th of February, was
at Nagg's Head, four miles distant from the island, confined
to a sick-bed, and entirely disabled from participating in the
action in person. The immediate command, therefore, devolved
upon Col. H. M. Shaw, the senior officer present.
On the morning of the 7th of February, the enemy's fleet
proceeded steadily towards Fort Bartow. In the sound between Roanoke Island and the mainland, upon the Tyrrell
side, Commodore Lynch, with his squadron of seven vessels,
had -taken position, and at eleven o'clock the enemy's fleet,
consisting of about thirty gunboats and schooners, advanced
in ten divisions, the rear one having the schooners and transports in tow. The advance and attacking division again subdivided, one assailing the squadron and the other firing upon
the fort with nine-inch, ten-inch, and eleven-inch shell, spherical case, a few round-shot, and every variety of rifled projeectiles. The fort replied with but four guns (which were all
that could be brought to bear), and after striking the foremost
vessels several times, the fleet fell back, so as to mask one of
the guns of the fort, leaving but three to reply to the fire of
the whole fleet. The bombardment was continued throughout
the day, and the enemy retired at dark. The squadron, under
the command of Commodore Lynch, sustained their position




230           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
most gallantly, and only retired after exhausting all their ammunition, and having lost the steamer Curlew and the Forest
disabled.
In the mean time, the enemy had found a point of landing
out of the reach of our field-pieces, and defended by a swamp
from the advance of our infantry. The enemy having effected
a landing here, our whole force took position at the redoubt or
breastwork, and placed in battery their field-pieces with necessary artillerymen, under the respective commands of Captain
Schemerhorn, and Lieutenants Kinney and Seldon. Two companies of the Eighth and two of the Thirty-first were placed at
the redoubt to support the artillery. Three companies of the
Wise Legion, deployed to the right and left as skirmishers.
The remainder of the infantry were in position, three hundred
yards in the rear of the redoubt, as a reserve.
The enemy landed some fifteen thousand men, with artillery,
and, at T o'clock, A. M., of the 8th, opened fire upon the redoubt,
which was replied to immediately with great spirit, and the
action soon became general, and was continued without intermission for more than five hours, when the enemy succeeded
in deploying a large force on either side of our line, flanking
each wing. The order was then given by Col. Shaw to spike
the guns in the battery, and to retreat to the northern end of
the island. The guns were spiked, and the whole force fell
back to the camps.
During the engagement at the redoubt, the enemy's fleet attempted to advance to Croatain Sound, which brought on a
desultory engagement between Fort Bartow and the fleet,
which continued up to half-after 12 o'clock, when the commanding officer was informed that the land defences had been
forced, and the position of the fort turned; he thereupon ordered the guns to be disabled and the ammunition destroyed,
which was done, and the fort abandoned. The same thing was
done at the other forts, and the\ forces from all the forts were
marched in good order to the camp. The enemy took possession of the redoubts and forts immediately, and proceeded in
pursuit, with great caution, towards the northern end of the
island in force, deploying so as to surround our forces at the
camp.
Col. Shaw had arrived with his whole force at his camp in




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             231
time to have saved his whole command, if transports had been
furnished. But there were none.  His situation was one of
extreme exigency. He found himself surrounded by a greatly
superior force upon the open island; he had no field-works to
protect him; he had lost his only three field-pieces at the redoubt; and he had either to make an idle display of courage
in fighting the foe at such immense disadvantage, which would
have involved the sacrifice of his command, or to capitulate
and surrender as prisoners of war. IIe determined upon the
latter alternative.
The loss on our side was, killed, 23; wounded, 58; missing,
62.  Our mortality list, however, was no indication of the
spirit and vigor of our little army, as in its position it had but
little opportunity of contest without a useless sacrifice of human
life on their side. Among the killed was Captain O. Jennings
Wise, of the Richmond Blues, son of General Wise, a young
man of brilliant promise, refined chivalry, and a courage to
which the softness of his manners and modesty of his behavior
added the virtue of knightly heroism. His body, pierced by
wounds, fell into the hands of the enemy, in whose camp, attended by every mark of respect, he expired.  The disaster at
Roanoke Island was a sharp mortification to the public.  But
for the unfortunate general, who was compelled to hear on a
sick-bed-perhaps to witness from the windows of a sick-chamber-the destruction of his army and the death of his son, there
was not a word of blame.
In a message to Congress, President Davis referred to the
result of the battle at Roanoke Island as " deeply humiliating;"
a committee of Congress, appointed to investigate the affair,
resented the attempt to attribute a disaster, for which the government itself was notoriously responsible, to want of spirit in
our troops; declared that, on the contrary, the battle of Roanoke
Island was " one of the most gallant and brilliant actions of the
war;" and concluded that whatever of blame and responsibility
was justly attributable to any one for the defeat, should attach
to Gen. Huger, in whose military department the island was,
and to the Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin, whose positive refusal to put the island in a state of defence secured its
fall. There was, in fact, but little room for the government to
throw reflection upon the conduct of the troops. In the lan



232              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
guage of their commanding general, "both officers and men
fought firmly, coolly, efficiently, and as long as humanity would
allow."
The connection of the War Department with the Roanoke
Island affair, which was with difficulty dragged to light in
Congress, is decidedly one of the most curious portions of the
history of the war. Gen. Wise had pressed upon the government the importance of Roanoke Island* for the defence of
Norfolk. He assumed the command of the post upon the 7th
of January. In making a reconnoissance of the island and its
defences, on the 13th January, he addressed Secretary ]Benjamin, and declared that the island, which was the key of all the
rear defences of Norfolk, and its canals and railroads, was
"utterly defenceless." On the 15th of January, Gen. Wise
addressed the secretary again. He wrote that twenty-four
vessels of the enemy's fleet were already inside of Hatteras
Inlet, and within thirty miles of Roanoke Island; that all there
was to oppose him was five small gunboats, and four small
land batteries, wholly inefficient; that our batteries were not
casemated; and that the force at Hatteras, independent of the
Burnside expedition, was "' amply sufficient to capture or pass
Roanoke Island in any twelve hours."
These written appeals for aid in the defences of the island
were neglected and treated with indifference. Determined to
leave nothing wanting in energy of address, Gen. Wise repaired
in person to Richmond, and called upon the Secretary of War,
and urged, in the most importunate manner, the absolute
* It (Roanoke Island) was the key to all the rear defences of Norfolk. It
unlocked two sounds, Albemarle and Currituck; eight rivers, the North,
West, Pasquotank, the Perquimmons, the Little, the Chowan, the Roanoke,
and the Alligator; four canals, the Albemarle and Chesapeake, the Dismal
Swamp, the Northwest Canal, and the Suffolk; two railroads, the Petersburg
and Norfolk, and the Seaboard and Roanoke. It guarded more than four-fifths
of all Norfolk's supplies of corn, pork, and forage, and it cut the command
of General Huger off from all its most efficient transportation. It endangers
the subsistence of his whole army, threatens the navy-yard at Gosport, and
to cut off Norfolk from Richmond, and both from railroad communication
with the South. It lodges the enemy in a safe harbor from the storms of
Hatteras, gives them a rendezvous, and large rich range of supplies, and the
command of the seaboard from Oregon Inlet to Cape Henry. It should have
been defended at the expense of twenty thousand men, and of many millions
of dollars." —Report of Gen. Wise.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           233
necessity of strengthening the defences upon that island with
additional men, armament, and ammunition. Mr. Benjamin
replied verbally to his appeals for reinforcements, that he had
not the men to spare for his command. Gen. Wise urged upon
the secretary that Gen. Huger had about 15,000 men in front
of Norfolk, lying idle in camp for eight months, and that a
considerable portion of them could be spared for the defence of
the rear of Norfolk, and especially as his (Gen. Wise's) district
supplied Norfolk and his army with nearly or quite all of his
corn, pork, and forage.
The reply to all these striking and urgent appeals was a peremptory military order from Secretary Benjamin, dated the
22d of January, requiring Gen. Wise to proceed immediately
to Roanoke Island. With ready military pride the unfortunate
general received the orders, without a murmur in public; it
being known only to his most intimate friends the circumstances under which he left Richmond on the stern and unpropitious mission which promised nothing to himself but
disaster, the mistaken calumnies of the public, and death in
the midst of defeat.
The facts we have referred to are of record. The committee
of Congress that investigated the affair of Roanoke Island declared that the Secretary of War, Mr. J. P. Benjamin, was
responsible for an important defeat of our arms, which might
have been safely avoided by him; that he had paid no practical
attention to the appeals of Gen. Wise; and that he had, by
plain acts of omission, permitted that general and an inconsiderable force to remain to meet at least fifteen thousand men,
well armed and equipped. The committee referred to was
open to any justification that might have been sought by the
Secretary of War, or his friends: none was offered; and the
unanimous conclusion of the committee, in sharp and distinct
terms, was put upon the public record, charging a Cabinet
officer with a matter of the gravest offence known to the laws
and the interests of the country.
The effect of war is always, in some degree, public demoralization; and the gravest charges are often lost and swallowed
up in the quick and feverish excitements of such times. But
whatever may have been the charities of speedy oblivion with
respect to the charges against Mr. Benjamin, the public were,




234           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
at least, not prepared for such an exhibition of trust and honor
as was given him by the President, in actually promoting him,
after the developments of the Roanoke Island disaster, and
giving him the place in his cabinet of Secretary of State.
Whatever may have been the merits of this act of the President, it was at least one of ungracious and reckless defiance to
the popular sentiment; and from the marked event of the
surrender of Roanoke Island and its consequences, we must
date the period when the people had their confidence weakened
in the government, and found no other repose for their trust
than in the undiminished valor and devoted patriotism of the
troops in the field.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                       235
CHAPTER X.
The Situation in Tennessee and Kentucky.-The affair at Woodsonville.-Death of
Colonel Terry.-The Strength and Material of the Federal Force in Kentucky.-Condition of the Defences on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.-The Confederate
Congress and the Secretary of the Navy.-The Fall of Fort Henry.-Fort Donelson
threatened.-T.he Army of General A. S. Johnston.-His Interview with General
Beanregard.-Insensibility of the Confederate Government to the Exigency.-General
Johnston's Plan of Action.-BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON.-Carnage and Scenery of the
Battle-field.-The Council of the Southern Commanders.-Agreement to surrender.
-Escape of Generals Floyd and Pillow.-The Fall of Fort Donelson develops the
Crisis in the West.-The Evacuation of Nashville.-The Panic.-Extraordinary
Scenes.-Experience of the Enemy in Nashville.-The Adventures of Captain John
Morgan.-General Johnston at Murfreesboro.-Organization of a New Line of Defence
South of Nashville.-The Defence of Memphis and the Mississippi.-Island No. 10.Serious Character of the Disaster at Donelson.-Generals Floyd and Pillow " relieved from Command."-General Johnston's Testimony in favor of these Officers.President Davis's Punctilio.-A sharp Contrast.-Negotiation for the Exchange of
Prisoners.-A Lesson of Yankee Perfidy.-Mr. Benjamin's Release of Yankee
Hostaoges.
THE unequivocal demonstrations of the Federals for an advance upon Tennessee through Kentucky, urged the Confederate government to send all the disposable forces at its command to strengthen the army of the southwestern division.
Near the close of the year 1861, the Floyd Brigade and several
regiments belonging to Tennessee and other Confederate States
were sent from Virginia to Bowling Green, in southern Kentucky, the principal strategic point of the southwestern army.
The command of that army was given, as we have seen, to
General Albert Sidney Johnston.
Early in December, the Federal army occupied Muldraugh's
Hill, Elizabethtown, Nolin, Bacon's Creek, and other points on
the railroad, from forty to sixty miles below Louisville. Later
in that month, a body of them advanced to MunfordvillM, on
Green River, about seventy-five miles below  Louisville, and
about thirty-five miles above Bowling Green. A portion of
this advance crossed the river at Munfordville to Woodsonville
on the opposite shore, where they were attacked by the advance
Confederate forces under Brig.-general Hindman and defeated,
with a loss of about fifty killed. The Confederates lost four




236:          THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
killed and nine wounded. Their conduct was marked by the
most impetuous valor. On charging the enemy, Col. Terry, of
the Texas Rangers, was killed in the moment of victory.
In the death of Col. Terry, said General Hardee, in his official
report, " his regiment had to deplore the loss of a beloved
and brave commander, and the whole army one of its ablest
officers." His name was placed in the front rank of the gallant sons of Texas, whose daring and devoted courage had
added to the lustre of our arms and to the fruits of more than
one victory.
The fight at Woodsonville was on the 17th of December.
When the enemy reached that place in force, the Confederates
fell back some fifteen or twenty miles, in the direction of Bowling Green. For some weeks thereafter, the whole South was
excited with reports to the effect that the Federals were advancing upon Bowling Green in three columns, of 20,000 each.
But the unanticipated success of the Federals in two important
movements at other points within the department of General
Johnston, enabled them to accomplish their object without an
attack upon Bowling Green, and forced upon the Confederates
the necessity of evacuating that post.
The North had collected an immense army in Kentucky,
under command of Major-general Buell, a, general of great skill,
remarkable for the caution of his operations, but having with
this quality the rare combination of energy, courage, and unwearied activity. The whole force of the Federals in Kentucky consisted of about one hundred thousand infantry, eleven
thousand cavalry, and three thousand artillerists, divided into
some twenty odd batteries. It is remarkable that this immense
army was composed almost entirely of Western men, and that
the "Yankee" proper was scarcely represented in its ranks.
-Of the Eastern States, only Pennsylvania had troops in Kentucky, and those comparatively few. Every Western State,
with the exception of Iowa,'Missouri, and Kansas, was represented by more or less regiments.
A large force of the Federals had been collected at Paducah,
at tle mouth of the Tennessee river, with a view to offensive
operations on the water. This river was all important stream.
It penetrated Tennessee and Alabama, and was navigable for
steamers for two or three hundred miles. The Provisional




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAlR.          237
Congress, at Richmond, had appropriated half a million dollars for floating defences on the Tennessee and Cumberland
rivers; but owing to the notorious inefficiency of the Navy
Department, presided over by Mr. Mallory of Florida, who
was remarkable for his obtuseness, slow method, and indifferent intellect, and whose ignorance even of the geography of
Kentucky and Tennessee had been broadly travestied in Congress, both rivers were left open to the incursions of the
enemy. On the Tennessee there was nothing to resist the
enemy's advance up the stream but a weak and imperfectly
constructed fort. The Cumberland was a still more important
river, and the key to Nashville; but nothing stood in the way
of the enemy save Fort Donelson, and from that point the
Federal gunboats could reach Nashville in six or eight hours,
and strike a vital point of our whole system of defences in the
West.
On the 4th of February, the enemy's expedition up the
Tennessee, under Gen. Grant, arrived at Fort Henry, the only
fortification on the Tennessee river of any importance, situated near the lines of Kentucky and Tennessee, on the east
bank of the stream. On the morning of the 6th, the fort was
attacked.
Our works were untenable, but it concerned us to save our
little army. To defend the position at the time, Gen. Tilghman, commanding division, had Col. Heiman's 10th Tennessee,
Irish volunteers, eight hundred strong; Col. Drake's Mississippi volunteers, four hundred strong; Col. Hughes' Alabama
volunteers, five hundred strong; and Lieut.-col. Gantt's Tennessee volunteers, cavalry, three hundred strong; one company
of light artillery, commanded by Lieut. Culbertson, Confederate States artillery, and Captain Jesse Taylor's company of
artillery, sixty strong, forming the garrison of Fort Henry,
and manning its batteries of nine or ten guns.
A sudden rise in the river found Fort Henry, on the morning of the attack, completely surrounded by water, containing
only Capt. Taylor's company of artillery. The two thousand
tnen of all arms, who formed Gen. Tilghman's command, were
half a mile off, beyond a sheet of back-water. Gen. Grant's
army was on the direct road, between them and Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, and within two miles of the fort, and




238           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
already in motion to invest it. It was an embarrassing question to determine what was to be done. Gen. Tilghman's little
army was in the jaws of the lion, and the question was, how
could it be extricated.
Gen. Tilghman at once solved the problem, by ordering it to
retreat by the upper route. He remained with his sixty men
in the fort, where he was surrounded by water, and unable to
get away.
A few minutes before the surrender, the scene in and around
the fort exhibited a spectacle of fierce grandeur. Many of the
cabins and tents in and around the fort were in flames: added
to the scene were the smoke from the burning timber, and the
curling but dense wreaths of smoke from the guns; the constantly recurring spattering and whizzing of fragments of
crashing and bursting shells; the deafening roar of artillery;
the black sides of five or six gunboats, belching fire at every
port-hole; the volumes of smoke settled in dense masses along
the surrounding back-waters; and up and over that fog, on the
heights, the army of Gen. Grant (10,000) deploying around
our small army, attempting to cut off its retreat. In the midst
of the storm of shot and shell, the small force outside of the
fort had succeeded in gaining the upper road, the gunboats
having failed to notice their movements until they were out of
reach.
To give them further time, the gallant Tilghman, exhausted
and begrimed with powder and smoke, stood erect at the
middle battery, and pointed gun after gun. It was clear, however, that the fort could not hold out much longer. A white
flag was raised by the order of Gen. Tilghman, who remarked,
" it is vain to fight longer; our gunners are disabled; our guns
dismounted; we can't hold out five minutes longer." As soon
as the token of submission was hoisted, the gunboats came
alongside the fort and took possession of it, their crews giving
three cheers for the Union. Gen. Tilghman and the small garrison of forty were taken prisoners.
The fall of Fort Henry was the signal for the direction of
the most anxious attention to Fort Donelson, on the Cumbe —
land.
We have noticed before the extreme inadequacy of Gen.
Johnston's forces. It is doubtful whether he ever had over




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           239
23,000 effective troops at Bowling Green. Of these, after reinforcing Fort Donelson, he had scarcely more than eleven
thousand effective men. Shortly after the disaster at Mill
Springs, Gen. Beauregard had been sent from the Potomac to
Gen. Johnston's line in Kentucky. At a conference which
took place between the two generals, Gen. Beauregard expressed his surprise at the smallness of Gen. Johnston's forces,
and was impressed with the danger of his position. There is
nothing more remarkable in the history of the war than the
false impressions of the people of the South as to the extent of
our forces at the principal strategic point in Kentucky, and the
long and apathetic toleration, by the government in Richmond,
of a prospect that promised nothing but eventual disaster.
On establishing himself in Bowling Green early in October,
General Johnston wrote to the War Department: "We have
received but little accession to our ranks since the Confederate
forces crossed the line-in fact, no such enthusiastic demonstration as to justify any movements not warranted by our
ability to maintain our own communications." He repeatedly
called upon the government for reinforcements. IHe made a
call upon several States of the Southwest, including Tennessee,
for large numbers of troops. The call was revoked at the instance of the authorities in Richmond, who declined to furnish
twelve months' volunteers with arms; and Gen. Johnston, thus
discouraged and baffled by a government which was friendly
enough to him personally, but insensible to the public exigency
for which he pleaded, was left in the situation of imminent
peril, in which Gen. Beauregard was so surprised to find
him.
A memorandum was made of the conference between the
two generals. In the plans of Gen. Johnston, Gen. Beauregard entirely concurred. It was determined to fight for Nashville at Donelson, and Geh. Johnston gave the best part of his
army to do it, retaining only, to cover his front, fourteen thousand men, about three thousand of whom were so enfeebled by
recent sickness that they were unable to march.
BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON.
On the 9th February, Gen. Pillow had been ordered to pro



240           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
ceed to Fort Donelson and take command at that place, which
it was supposed would be an immediate object of attack by
Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and his combined land and naval forces.
No time was lost in getting the works in defensible condition.
The armament of the batteries consisted of thirteen guns of
different calibres. The site of the fortification was plainly unfavorable in view of a land attack, being commanded by the
heights above and below the river, and by a continuous range
of hills all around the work to its rear. A line of intrenchments about two miles in extent was occupied by the troops.
On the morning of the 13th of February, Gen. Floyd, who
had been stationed at Russellville, reached the fort by orders
transmitted by telegraph from Gen. A.S. Johnston, at Bowling
Green. Soon after his arrival, the intrenchments were fully
occupied from one end to the other, and just as the sun rose
the cannonade from one of the enemy's gunboats announced
the opening of the conflict, which was destined to continue for
several days and nights. The fire soon became general along
our whole lines.
During the whole day the enemy kept up a general and active fire from all arms upon our trenches. At several points
along the line he charged with uncommon vigor, but was met
with a spirit of courageous resistance, which by nightfall had
driven him, discomfited and cut to pieces, back upon the position he had assumed in the morning. The results of the day
were encouraging. The strength of our defensive line had
been pretty well tested, and the loss sustained by our forces
was not large, our men being mostly under shelter in the riflepits.
The enemy continued his fire upon different parts of the intrenchments throughout the night, which deprived the Confederate troops of any opportunity to sleep. They lay that
night upon their arms in the trenches. A more vigorous attack from the enemy than ever, was confidently expected at the
dawn of day; but in this the Confederates were entirely mistaken. The day advanced, and no preparation seemed to be
making for a general onset. The smoke of a large number of
gunboats and steamboats on the river was observed a short distance below, and information at the same time was received
within our lines of the arrival of a large number of new troops,




THiE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           241
greatly increasing the strength of the enemy's forces, already
said to be from twenty to thirty thousand strong.
About three o'clock in the afternoon the enemy's fleet of
gunboats, in full forcej advanced upon the fort and opened fire.
They advanced in the shape of a crescent, and kept up a constant fire for an hour and a half. Once the boats reached a
point within a few hundred yards of the fort. The effects of
our shot upon the iron-cased boats were now distinctly visible.
Two or three well-directed shots from the heavy guns of the
fort drove back the nearest boat; several shot struck another
boat, tearing her iron case and splintering her timbers, and
making them crack as if by a stroke of lightning, when she,
too, fell back. A third boat received several severe shocks,
mak-ing her metal ring and her timbers crack, when the whole
line gave way and fell rapidly back from the fire of the fort,
until they passed out of range.
The incidents of the two days had all been in our favor.
We had repulsed the enemy in the battle of the trenches,
broken the line of his gunboats, and discomfited him on the
water.
In the mean time, however,, reinforcements were continually
reaching the enemy; and it might have been evident from the
first that the whole available force of the Federals on the western waters could and would be concentrated at Fort Donelson,
if it was deemed necessary to reduce it. A consultation of the
officers of divisions and brigades was called by General Floyd,
to take place after dark. It was represented that it was an absolute impossibility to hold out for any length of time with our
inadequate number and indefensible position; that there was
nb place within our intrenchmnents but could be reached by
the enemy's artillery from their boats or their batteries; that
it was but fair to infer that, while they kept up a sufficient fire
upon our intrenchments to keep; our men from sleep and prevent repose, their object was merely to give time to pass a
column above us on the river, and to cut off our conimunications; and that but one course was left by which a rational
hope could be entertained of saving the garrison, and that was
to dislodge the enemy from his position on our left, and thus
to pass our troops into the open country lying southward
towards Nashville.
16




242           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
It was thus determined to remove from the trenches at an
early hour the next morning, and attack the enemy in his position. There was, in fact, no other alternative. The enemy
had been bhsy in throwing his forces of every arm around the
Confederates, extending his line of investment entirely around
their position, and completely enveloping them. Every road
and possible avenue of departure was intercepted, with the certainty that our sources of supply by the river would soon be
cut off by the enemy's batteries placed upon the river above us.
The sufferings of our army had already been terrible. The
day of the opening of the battle (Thursday) was very cold, the
mercury being only ten degrees above zero, and during the
night, while our troops were watching on their arms in the
trenches, it sleeted and snowed. The-distance between the two
armies was so slight that but few of the dead of either could
be taken off, and many of the wounded who could neither
walk nor crawl remained for more than two days where they
fell. Some of our men lay wounded before our earth-works at
night, calling for help and water, and our troops who went
out to bring them in were discovered in the moonlight and
fired upon by the enemy. Many of our wounded were not recovered until Sunday morning-some of them still alive, but
blue with cold, and covered with frost and snow. It would
have been merciful if each army had been permitted, under a
flag of truce, to bring off its wounded at the close of each day;
but it was not so, and they lay in the frost and sleet between
the two armies-many to hear, but none to help them.
For nearly a week a large portion of our troops had been
guarding their earth-works, and from the day of the battle
they had been out in force night and day.  Many of them in
the rifle-pits froze theirfeet and hands. The severity of the
cold was such that the clothes of many of the troops were so
stiff from frozen water, that could they have been taken off,
they would have stood alone.
At the meeting of general officers called by Gen. Floyd on
Friday night, it was unanimously determined to cut open a
route of exit, and thus to save our army. The plan of attack
agreed upon and directed by Gen. Floyd was, that Gen. Pillow,
assisted by Gen. Bushrod Johnson, having also under his command commanders of brigades, Col. Baldwin, commanding




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           243
Mississippi and Tennessee troops, and Col. Wharton and Col.
iMicCausland, commanding Virginians, should, with the main
body of the forces defending our left wing, attack the right
wing of the enemy occupying the heights reaching to the bank
of the river; that Gen. Buckner, with the forces under his
command, and defending the right of our line, should strike
the enemy's encampment on the Winn's Ferry road; and that
each command should leave in the trenches troops to hold
them.
The attack on the left was delayed, as Gen. Pillow moved
out of his position in the morning. He found the enemy prepared to receive him in advance of his encampment. For two
hours this principal portion of the battle-field was hotly and
stubbornly contested, and strewn with piles of dead. The
Federal troops in this quarter fought with a steadiness and determination rarely witnessed, and the exhibition of their courage on this field afforded a lesson to the South of a spirit that
it had not expected in an enemy whose valor it had been accustomed to deride and sneer at since the battle of Manassas.
The Federals did not retreat, but fell back fighting us and contesting every inch of ground. Being forced to yield, they retired slowly towards the Winn's Ferry road, Buckner's point
of attack.
On this road, where Gen. Buckner's command was expected
to flank the enemy, it had been forced to retire from his battery, and as the enemy continued to fall back, Gen. Buckner's
troops became united with the forces of Gen. Pillow in engaging
the enemy, who had again been reinforced. The entire command of the enemy had been forced to our right wing, and in
front of Gen. Buckner's position in the intrenchment. The
advantage was instantly appreciated. The enemy drove back
the Confederates, advanced on the trenches on the extreme
right of Gen. Buckner's command, getting possession, after a
stubborn conflict of two hours, of the most important and commanding position of the battle-field, being in the rear of our
river batteries, and, advancing with fresh forces towards our
left, drove back our troops from the ground that had been won
in the severe and terrible conflict of the early part of the day.
The field had been won by the enemy after nine hours of
conflict. Night found him in possession of all the ground that




244            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
had been won by our troops in the morning, and occupying the
most commanding portion of our intrenched work, to drive
him from which the most desperate assaults of our troops had
been unsuccessful. The enemy had been landing reinforcements throughout the day. His numbers had been augmented
to eighty-two regiments. We had only about 13,000 troops,
all told. Of these we had lost in three different battles a large
proportion. The command had been in the trenches night and
day, exposed to the snow, sleet, mud, and ice-water, without
shelter, without adequate covering, and without sleep. To renew the combat with any hope of successful result was obviously vain.
A council of general officers was called at night. It was
suggested that a desperate onset upon the right of the enemy's
forces on the ground might result in the extrication of a considerable proportion of the command. A majority of the council rejected this proposition. Gen. Buckner remarked, that it
would cost the command three-fourths its present numbers to
cut its way out, and it was wrong to sacrifice three-fourths to
save one-fourth; that no officer had a right to cause such a
sacrifice. The alternative of the proposition was a surrender
of the position and command. Gen. Floyd and Gen. Pillow,
each, declared that they would not surrender themselves prisoners. The former claimed that he had a right individually
to determine that he would not survive a surrender. He said
that he would turn over the command to Gen. Buckner, if he
(Gen. Floyd) could be allowed to withdraw his own particular
brigade. To this Gen. Buckner consented. Thereupon, the
command was turned over to Gen. Pillow, he passing it instantly to Gen. Buckner, declaring that "he would neither surrender the command nor himself."  Col. Forrest, at the head
of an efficient regiment of cavalry, was directed to accompany
Gens. Floyd and Pillow in what was supposed to be an effort
to pass through the enemy's lines. Under these circumstances,
Gen. Buckner accepted the command. He sent a flag of truce
to the enemy for an armistice of six hours, to negotiate for
terms of capitulation.* Before the flag and communication
* The following is a correct list of the Confederate prisoners taken at Fort
Donelson. The number was reported in the newspapers of the time, South




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.               245
were delivered, Gens. Pillow and Floyd had retired from the
garrison, and by daylight were pursuing them retreat towards
Nashville, the largest portion of the command of the latter
toiling in their flight along the banks of the Tennessee, but
without a pursuing enemy to harass them.
The surrender of Donelson was rendered memorable by the
hardest fighting that had yet occurred in the war, and by one
of the most terrible and sickening battle-fields that had yet
marked its devastations, or had ever appealed to the horrorstricken senses of humanity. The conflict had run through
four days and four nights; in which a Confederate force not
exceeding 13,000, a large portion of whom  were illy armed,
had contended with an army at least three times its number.
The loss of the Federals was immense, and the proofs of an
undeniable courage were left in the numbers of their dead on
the field. In his official report of the battle, Gen. Floyd conjectures that the enemy's loss in killed and wounded reached a
number beyond 5,000. The same authority gives our loss at
1,500. Both statements are only conjectural.
The scene of action had been mostly in the woods, although
there were two open places of an acre or two where the fight
had raged furiously, and the ground was covered with dead.
All the way up to our intrenchments the same scene of death
was presented. There were two miles of dead strewn thickly,
mingled with fire-arms, artillery, dead horses, and the paraphernalia of the battle-field. Federals and Confederates were
promiscuously mingled, sometimes grappling in the fierce death
throe, sometimes facing each other as they gave and received
the fatal shot and thrust, sometimes huddled in grotesque
shapes, and again heaped in piles, which lay six or seven feet
deep. Many of the bodies were fearfully mangled. The artillery horses had not hesitated to tread on the wounded, dying,
as well as North, to have been much larger: Floyd's Virginia Artillery, 34;
Gray's Virginia Artillery, 59; French's Virginia Artillery, 43; Murray's
Battery, 97; Cumberland Battery, 55; Fiftieth Tennessee, 485; Fourteenth
Mississippi, 326; Third Mississippi, 330; Seventh Texas, 354; Twenty-sixth
Mississippi, 427; Twenty-seventh Alabama, 180; Third Tennessee, 627; Tenth
Tennessee, 608; Forty-second Tennessee, 494; Forty-eighth Tennessee, 249;
Forty-ninth Tennessee, 450; Twenty-sixth Tennessee, 65; Second Kentucky,
136; Third Alabama, 34; Fiftieth Virginia, 10; Fifty-first Tennessee, 17.
Total, 5,079.




246           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
and dead, and the ponderous artillery wheels crushed limbs
and skulls. It was an awful sight to behold weak, wounded
men lifting their feeble hands beneath the horses' hoofs. The
village of Dover, which was within our lines, contained in every
room in every house sick, wounded, or dead men. Bloody rags
were everywhere, and a door could not be opened without
hearing groans.
"I could imagine," says an eye-witness of the field of carnage, "nothing more terrible than the silent indications of
agony that marked the features of the pale corpses which lay
at every step. Though dead and rigid in every muscle, they
still writhed and seemed to turn to catch the passing breeze
for a cooling breath. Staring eyes, gaping mouths, clinched
hands, and strangely contracted limbs, seemingly drown into
the smallest compass, as if by a mighty effort to rend asunder
some irresistible bond which held them down to the torture of
which they died. One sat against a tree, and, with mouth and
eyes wide open, looked up into the sky as if to catch a glance
at its fleeting spirit. Another clutched the branch of an overhanging tree, and hung half-suspended, as if in the death-pang
he llad raised himself partly from the ground; the other had
grasped his faithful musket, and the compression of his mouth
told of the determination which would have been fatal to a foe
had life ebbed a minute later. A third clung with both hands
to a bayonet which was buried in the ground. Great numbers lay in heaps, just as the fire of the artillery mowed them
down, mangling their forms into an almost undistinguishable
mass."
The display of courage on the part of the Federal troops
was unquestionable. The battle, however, was fought against
us by Western men, there not being in the ranks of the enemy,
as far as known, any men east of the Ohio. The Southern
people, while contemning the fighting qualities of the New
England "Yankee" and the Pennsylvania Dutchman, were
constrained to give to the Western men credit for their
bravery; and many of our own officers did not hesitate to express the opinion that the Western troops, particularly from
southern Illinois, Minnesota, and Iowa, were as good fighting
material as there was to be found on the continent. A Confederate officer relates a story of an extraordinary display of




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           247
spirit on the field of Donelson by a regiment of Zouaves from
southern Illinois-the " Egypt" regiment, as it was called. It
had been completely shattered by the fire of artillery, and was
scattered over the fields in what the Confederates supposed
to be an irretrievable rout. A few sharp rallying words fiom
their color-bearer, and the men, who a few minutes ago were
fugitives, flocked to their colors, at the double quick, from different parts of the field, and re-formed in the very face of the
advancing foe.
The fall of Fort Donelson developed the crisis in the West,
which had long existed. The evacuation of Bowling Green
had become imperatively necessary, and was ordered before
and executed while the battle was being fought at Donelson.
Gen. Johnston awaited the event opposite Nashvill e. The reeult of the conflict each day was announced as favorable. At
midnight on the 15th February, Gen. Johnston received news
of a glorious victory-at dawn of a defeat.
The blow was most disastrous. It involved the surrender of
Nashville, which was incapable of defence from its position,
and was threatened not only by the enemy's ascent of the
Cumberland, but by the advance of his forces from Bowling
Green. Not more than 11,000% effective men had been left
under Gen. Johnston's command to oppose a column of Gen.
Buell, of not less than 40,000 troops, while the army from
Fort Donelson, with the gunboats and transports, had it in
their power to ascend the Cumberland, so as to intercept all
communication with the South. No alternative was left but
to evacuate Nashville or sacrifice the army.
The evacuation of Nashville was attended by scenes of panic
and distress on the part of the population unparalleled in the
annals of any American city. The excitement was intensified
by the action of the authorities. Governor Harris mounted a
horse and galloped through the streets, proclaiming to everybody the news that Donelson had fallen; that the enemy were
coming and might be expected hourly, and that all who wished
to leave had better do so at once. He next hastily convened
the Legislature, adjourned it to Memphis, and, with the legislators and the State archives, left the town.
An earthquake could not have shocked the city more. The
congregations at the churches were broken np in confusion and




248            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
dismay; women and children rushed into the streets, wailing
with terror; trunks were thrown from three-story windows in
the haste of the fugitives; and thousands hastened to leave
their beautiful city in the midst of the most distressing scenes
of terror and confusion, and of plunder by the mob.
Gen. Johnston had moved the main body of his command
to Murfreesboro'-a rear-guard being left in Nashville under
Gen. Floyd, who had arrived from Donelson, to secure the
stores and provisions.  In the first wild excitement of the
panic, the store-houses had been thrown open to the poor.
They were besieged by a mob ravenous for spoils, and who had
to be dispersed from the commissariat by jets of water from a
steam fire-engine. Women and children, even, were seen
scudding through the streets under loads of greasy pork, which
they had taken as prizes from the store-houses. It is believed
that hundreds of families, among the lower orders of the population, secured and secreted government stores enough to open
respectable groceries. It was with the greatest difficulty that
Gen. Floyd could restore order and get his martial law into
any thing like an effective system. Blacks and whites had to
be chased and captured and forced to help the movement of
government stores. One man, who, after a long chase, was
captured, offered fight, and was in consequence shot and badly
wounded. Not less than one million of dollars in stores was
lost through the acts of the cowardly and ravenous mob of
Nashville. Gen. Floyd and Col. Forrest exhibited extraordinary energy and bificiency in getting off government stores.
Col. Forrest remained in the city about twenty-four hours, with
only forty men, after the arrival of the enemy at Edgefield.
These officers were assisted by the voluntary efforts of several
patriotic citizens of Nashville, who rendered them great assistance.
These shameful scenes, enacted in the evacuation of Nashville, were nothing more than the disgusting exhibitions of any
mob brutalized by its fears or excited by rapine. At any rate,
the city speedily repaired the injury done its reputation by a
temporary panic, in the spirit of defiance that its best citizens,
and especially its ladies, offered to the enemy. We discover,
in fact, the most abundant evidence in the Northern newspapers that the Federals did not find the "Union" sentiment




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           249
that they expected to meet with in the capital of Tennessee,
and that, if there were any indications whatever of such sentiment, they were " found only among the mechanics and laboring classes of the city." The merchants and business men ot
Nashville, as a class, showed a firm., unwavering, and loyal attachment to the cause of the South. The ladies gave instances
of patriotism that were noble testimonies to their sex. They
refused the visits of Federal officers, and disdained their recognition; they collected a fund of money for the especial purpose of contributing to the needs of our prisoners; and, says
a recipient of the bounty of these noble women, as soon as a
Confederate prisoner was paroled, and passed into the next
room, he found pressed in his hands there a sum of money
given him by the ladies of Nashville. Many of the most respectable of the people had been constrained to leave their
homes rather than endure the presence of the enemy. The
streets, which, to confirm the predictions of Northern newspapers of the welcomes that awaited the " Union" army in the
South, should have been gay and decorated, presented to the
enemy nothing but sad and gloomy aspects. Whole rows of
houses, which, but a short while ago, were occupied by families
of wealth and respectability, surrounded by all the circumnstances that make homes happy and prosperous, stood vacant,
and the gaze of the passer-by was met, instead of, as in former
days, with fine tapestry window-curtains and neatly polished
marble steps, with panes of dust-dimmed glass.
On the whole, the experience of the enemy in Nashville was
vastly instructive. The fact that, wherever he had gone, he
had converted lukewarm  Southern districts into Secession
strongholds, or had intensified the sentiment of opposition to
him, was as unexpected to him as it was gratifying to us.
This experience was universal in the war, from the date of the
occupation of Alexandria, which had voted overwhelmingly
for the Union in the preliminary stages of the revolution, and
was subsequently as thoroughly Southern as any town in the
Confederacy, down to the occupation of Nashville, which had
at first given some signs of weak submission to its fate, and
afterwards spurned its invaders with a spirit of defiance, reckless of consequences.
In the neighborhood of Nashville, the enemy was constantly




250           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
harassed by local parties of adventurers, who shot his pickets,
watched his movements, and attacked detached portions of his
forces at various points. The whole country rang with the
exploits of the gallant and intrepid cavalier, Captain John H.L
Morgan and his brave men, in the vicinity of Nashville. His
squadron belonged to Gen. Hardee's command, and he had
been left in command of the forces at Murfreesboro to watch
the movements of the Federals, which he not only did effectually, but enacted a number of daring adventures within the
lines of the enemy.
Scarcely a day passed without some such exploit of Capt.
Morgan and his intrepid partisans. Once he nearly succeeded
in capturing a Federal general. Another day he attacked a
party of scouts, and killed the captain. The next exploit
was to rush into the camp of some regiment, and carry off a
train of wagons. The most daring of his adventures was his
sudden appearance in the rear of the enemy, entering with
forty brave followers the town of Gallatin, twenty-six miles
north of Nashville, on the Louisville and Nashville railroad.
On entering the town, Capt. Morgan immediately seized upon
the telegraph office and the depot. He had presented himself
at the telegraph office, carelessly asking the operator what was
the news, when that individual, never for a moment imagining
who it was that addressed him, replied that there were rumors
that "the rebel scoundrel" Morgan was in the neighborhood,
and proceeded to illustrate his own valor by flourishing a revolver, and declaring how anxious he was to encounter the man
who was creating so much uneasiness and alarm in the country.
"You are now speaking to Captain Morgan" was the quiet
reply of the pai:tisan: " I am he!" At these words, the pistol
dropped from the hands of the operator, who entreated the
mercy of his captor. The poor fellow easily submitted to the
task assigned to himi of sending a dispatch, in the name of
Capt. Morgan, to Prentice, the notorious editor of the Louisville Journal, politely offering to act as his escort on his proposed visit to Nashville. After tihis amusement, Capt. Morgan
and his men awaited the arival of the train from Bowling
Green. In due time the train came thundering in; Capt. Morgan at once seized it, and taking five Federal officers who were
passengers and the engineer of the train prisoners, he burned




THE FIRST tEAR OF THE WAR.           251
to cinders all of the cars, with their contents, and then filling
the locomotive with turpentine, shut down all the valves, and
started it towards Nashville. Before it had run eight hundred
yards, the accumulation of steam caused it to explode, shivering it into a thousand atoms. Capt. Morgan then started
southward with his prisoners, and made his way safely to the
Confederate camp.
On another occasion, while returning alone towards Murfreesboro, Capt. Morgan encountered a picket of six of the
enemy, and captured them and their arms. It was accomplished by a bold adventure. He discovered the pickets in a
house, and having on a Federal overcoat, assumed a bold front,
and riding up to the sergeant rebuked him for not attending
properly to his duty, and ordered that the whole party should
consider themselves under arrest, and surrender their arms.
The soldiers, not doubting for a moment that they were addressed by a Federal officer, delivered up their muskets. As
they were marched into the road, with their faces turned from
their camp, the sergeant said, " We are going the wrong way,
colonel."  "We are not," was the reply. "I am Captain
Morgan."
The name of Captain Morgan was fast becoming famous as
that of a partisan leader. He was induced to abandon his
present field of operations to accept promotion in the army,
being appbinted to a colonelcy in the regular mnilitary service, for which he had been urgently recommended by Gen.
Hardee.
Since falling back to Murfreesboro, Gen. Johnston had
managed, by combining Crittenden's division and the fugitives
from Donelson, to collect an army of 17,000 men. His object
was now to co-operate with Gen. Beauregard for the defence
of the Valley of the Mississippi, on a line of operations south
of Nashville. The line extending from Columbus, by way of
Forts Henry and Donelson, had been lost. The disaster had
involved the surrender of Kentucky, and a large portion of
Tennessee to the enemy; and it had become necessary to reorganize a new line of defence south of Nashville, the object
of which would be to protect the railroad system of the
Southwest, and to insure the defence of Memphis and the Mississippi.




252-          THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
The work of putting the Mississippi river in a state of complete defence had bee-n intrusted to General Beauregard. On
abandoning Columbus, he had taken a strong position about
forty-five miles below it, at Island No. 10. This locality was
looked upon as the chief barrier to the progress of the Federals
down the Mississippi. At the island, a bend occurs in the
river of several miles extent. Around and upon this curve
were located the towns of New Madrid and Point Pleasant.
The distance around the bend was about thirty miles, whereas
the distance across by land from Tiptonville below to the island
above did not exceed five miles. It was calculated that even
should the enemy hold Point Pleasant, and get possession of
New Madrid by our evacuation of that post also, our communications by water to Tiptonville, and thence by land across the
bend to Island No. 10, would still remain intact. The island
was thought to be impregnable. It was flanked on the Missouri side by an extensive swamp, and on the other side by a
lake of several miles extent, which rendered it impossible for
the enemy to approach the position by land.
With this indication of the situation in the West, and the
operations for the defence of Memphis and the Mississippi, to
which the southward movement of Gen. Johnston towards the
left bank of the Tennessee was expected to contribute, we must
leave, for a short period, our narrative of the movements and
events of the war in this direction.
The serious disaster at Donelson appears to have been fully
appreciated by the Confederate government; and its announcement in Richmond was followed, to the surprise of the public,
by a communication from President Davis to Congress, on the
11th of March, declaring the official reports of the affair incomplete and unsatisfactory, and " relieving from command"
Gens. Floyd and Pillow. The main causes of dissatisfaction
indicated by the President were, that reinforcements were not
asked for by the commanding generals at Donelson, and that
the senior generals " abandoned responsibility," by transferring
the command to a junior officer. This act of President Davis
was the subject of warm and protracted argument in Congress
and in the newspapers. It was shown, by evidence produced
before Congress, that no reinforcements had been asked for,
because it was known how much the command of Gen. Johns



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           258
ton had already been weakened by sending Floyd's and Buckner's forces to Donelson; because an overwhelming force of
the enemy was pressing on his rear; and because Gen. Johnston's troops were on the march between Bowling Green and
Nashville, and could not reach Fort Donelson in time to change
the fortunes of the day.
With reference to the second assignment of cause of the
President's displeasure, it was agreed on all sides that the
transfer of the command by the senior generals was irregular.
In a letter, however, written to the President by Gen. Johnston himself, which was understood to be private and confidential, and was, therefore, wholly relieved from any suspicion of
the gloze of an official report, that officer had directed no censure upon Gens. Floyd and Pillow. On the contrary, in the
confidence of this private letter, he wrote to the President,
"the command was irregularly transferred, and devolved on
the junior general, but not apparently to avoid any just responsibility or from any want of personal or moral intrepidity;"
and he expressed continued " confidence in the gallantry, the
energy, and the devotion to the Confederacy," of both Gens.
Floyd and Pillow, which was testified especially in the case
of Gen. Floyd, by assigning him, after the fall of Donelson, to
the important duty of proceeding to Chattanooga to defend
the approaches towards northern Alabama and Georgia, and
the communication between the Mississippi and the Atlantic.
This was the private and unrestrained testimony of Gen. Johnston. With perhaps a superior military sensitiveness of "irregularity," Mr. Davis repudiated the explanations of the commanding general in the field; deprived Generals Floyd and
Pillow of their commands; and offered the spectacle to the
country of a President with one hand sacrificing two brave
officers who had contributed to the country's glory and safety
in more than one victory, for a military punctilio, and with
the other elevating to the highest office in his gift a man who,
as Attorney-general, Secretary of War, and, at last, Secretary
of State, seemed to enjoy the monopoly of the lucre and honors of state, and who had been charged, by the official report
of a general in the field, and by the deliberate and unanimous
verdict of a committee of Congress, with the plain and exclugive responsibility of the disaster of Roanoke Island. The




:2 54          THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
contrast between these two acts needed no addition of argument to convince the public mind that its government was not
above the errors of judgment or the partialities of human affection.
The disposition of the Confederate prisoners taken at Fort
Donelson gave an exhibition of vile perfidy on the part of the,North, to which there is no parallel to be found in the history
of civilized warfare, or in al the crooked paths of modern
diplomacy. Instead of these prisoners being discharged by the
North according' to the understanding existing between the
two governments, they were carried off into the Western
interior, where they were treated with indignities and made a
spectacle for mobs, who jeered at them because they did not
have uniforms and warm coats, because many of the poor
fellows had nothing better than horse blankets, rags, and coffee
sacks around their shoulders, and because the "rebels"whose true glory a just and generous spirit would have found
in their coarse and tattered garbs and marks of patient suffering-lacked the fine and showy equipments' of the Federal
troops. This act of bad faith on the part of the North is remarkable enough for a full and explicit history of the circumstances in which it was committed.
Permission had been asked by the Northern government for
two comnissioners, Messrs. Fish and Ames, to visit their
prisoners of war within the jurisdiction of the South. Our
government, while denying this permission, sought to improve
the opportunity by concerting a settled plan for the exchange
of prisoners; and for the execution of this purpose Messrs.
Conrad and Seddon were deputed as commissioners to meet
those of the Northern government under a flag of truce at
Norfolk.
Subsequently a letter from Gen. Wool was addressed to Gen.
Huger, informing him that he, Gen. Wool, had full authority
to settle any terms for the exchange of prisoners, and asking
an interview on the subject. General Howell Cobb was then
appointed by the government to mediate with Gen. Wool, and
to settle a permanent plan for the exchange of prisoners during
the war.
In the letter to General Huger, dated the 13th of February,
1862, General Wool wrote:




TrIE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR. W255
" Iam atone clothed with full powoer for the purpose of arranging for the
exchange of prisoners. Being thus empowered, I am ready to confer with you
on the subject, or the Honorable Messrs. Seddon and Conrad, or any other
persons appearing for that purpose. I am prepared to arrange for the restoration of all the prisoners to their homes on fair terms of exchange, man for
man, and officer for officer of equal grade, assimilating the grade of officers of
the army and navy, when necessary, and agreeing upon equitable terms for
the number of men or officers, of inferior grade, to be exchanged for any of
higher grade when the occasion shall arrive. That all the surplus prisoners
on either side be exchanged on parole, with the agreement that any prisoners
of war taken by the other party shall be returned in exchange as fast as captured,
and this system to be continued while hostilities continue.
" I would further-inform you, or any other person selected for the purpose
of making arrangements for the exchange of prisoners, that the prisoners
taken on board of vessels, or otherwise in maritime conflict, by the forces of
the United States, have been put, and are now held, only in military custody,
and on the same fJoting as other prisoners taken in arms."
The proposition, it appears, was readily accepted by our
government, and a memorandum made as a basis for a cartel.
It was proposed in this memorandum that the prisoners of war
in the hands of each government should be exchanged, man for
man, the officers being assimilated as to rank, &c.; that our
privateersmen should be exchanged on the footing of prisoners
of war; that any surplus remaining on either side, after these
exchanges, should be released, and that hereafter, during the
whole continuance of the war, prisoners taken on either side
should be paroled within ten days after their capture, and delivered on the frontier of their own country.
General Wool promptly agreed to all the propositions except
two. In lieu of the compensation basis of equivalents contained in one of the items of the memorandum, he proposed the
cartel of equivalents adopted by Great Britain and the United
States, in the war of 1812, and General Cobb accepted it.
He also objected to the provisions in another item, which
required each party to pay the expense of transporting their
prisoners to the frontier of the country of the prisoners. The
provision met his entire approval, but he did not feel authorized,
by his instructions, to incorporate it into the proposed cartel,
and, therefore, desired time to consult his government on the
subject.
The interview closed with the promise from General Wool
that he would notify General Cobb, as soon as he could hear
from his government, on that point.




2        6       THE FIR~ST YEAR OF TIHE WAR.
On the first of March General Cobb held his second interview
with hinm, in which he (General Cobb) proposed to enter into a
cartel, containing the stipulations previously set forth.  Gen.
Wool then replied that his government would not agree to the
proposition that each party should pay the expense of transporting their prisoners to the frontier, when General Cobb
promptly waived it, thus leaving the cartel free from all his
objections, and just what General Wool had himself proposed
in his letter of the 13th February, to General Huger.
Upon this, General Wool informed General Cobb that his
government had changed his instructions, and abruptly broke
off the negotiation.
In the mean time our government, in a very curious or very
foolish anticipation of the good faith of the North, had directed
the discharge of the prisoners held by us as hostages for the
safety and proper treatment of our privateersmen, who were
confined in felons' cells and threatened with the gallows. Cols.
Lee, Cogswell, and Wood, and Major Revere were sent to their
own country; the remaining hostages were brought on parole
from distant points to Richmond, on their way to be delivered
up, at the expense of this government, and their surrender
was only suspended on receipt of intelligence from General
Cobb, that he saw reason to suspect bad faith on the part of
the enemy.
The perfidy of the North was basely accomplished.* The
* This act of deception on the part of the North was but one of a long
series of acts of Yankee perfidy, and of their abnegation of the rights of
civilized war. When McDowell left Washington city to take Richmond, his
army was supplied with handcuffs to iron rebels. After the battle of Bull
Run they sent a white flag to ask permission to bury their dead. It was
humanely granted. They left their dead to bury their dead, and attempted,
iunder the protection of that white flag, to erect batteries for our destruction.
On the battle-field of Manassas they unfurled a Confederate flag, and shouted
to our troops not to fire upon them, that they were our friends, and then they
fired upon our troops and fled. At Manassas and Pensacola they repeatedly
and deliberately fired upon our hospitals, when over them a yellow flag was
waving. In Hampton Roads they hung out a white flag, and then prostituted
the protection it secured to them to the cowardly assassination of our brave
seamen. At Newbern, in violation of the laws of war, they attempted to shell
a city containing several thousand women and children, before either demanding a surrender, or giving the citizens notice of their intentions. A Kentuckian
went into a Federal camp to reclaim a fugitive slave, and they tied him up




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE  VAR.                 257
correspondence of the Federal authorities, to which we have
alluded, on this subject, constitutes a chapter of diplomacy
qualified to attract the scorn of all civilized and honorable
nations. At the time when it was believed our government 
held the larger number, of -prisoners, the Federal government
proposed to exchange all prisoners, and to place on parole, in
their own country, the surplus held by:either party; and our
government agreed to the proposition.  Before the agreement
could be reduced to writing, and signed by the parties, the
casualties of war, in the -fall of Fort Donelson, reversed this
state of things, and gave the Federal government the larger
number of prisoners. With this change of things that government changed its policy, and deliberately, and perfidiously,
and shamelessly receded from the propositions to which it had
been distinctly committed by every obligation of truth, honor,
and good faith.
While Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of War, by a curious act of
supererogation was releasing our most important prisoners of
war in advance of the conclusion of negotiations, sending them
North without waiting to have them regularly and safely exchanged under a flag of truce in Norfolk harbor, the enemy
were conveying the prisoners captured at Fort Donelson to
Chicago and other points more distant from their homes, and
were parading the officers who fell into their power through
the entire breadth of the land, from western Tennessee, to Fort
Warren in Boston harbor, where they were incarcerated. For
the prisoners so curiously, and with such unnecessary haste,
dispatched to the North by Mr. Benjamin, not a single officer
taken at Fort Donelson, nor a single captive privateersman, had
been restored to his home. With an excess of zeal well calcuand gave him twenty-five lashes upon his bare back, in the presence of his
runaway slave. It was repeatedly proposed by the people of the South to
treat such an enemy without ceremony or quarter, by hanging out the black
flag, and making the war a bellurn internecinum; but while the South debated,
talked, and threatened, the North acted, availing itself of the most ferocious
and brutal expedients of the war, arming the slaves, breaking faith on every
occasion of expediency, disregarding flags of truce, stealing private property,
ravishing women, bombarding hospitals, and setting at defiance every law of
civilized warfare. Such was the perfidy and brutality of the North, to which
the South responded with the puerile threat of a black flag, which was never
hoisted, and which did not elven serve the purposes of a scarecrow to its bold
and unscrupulous enemy.
17




258           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.,
lated to draw attention from his own part of the transaction,
Mr. Benjamin proposed, as a retaliation upon the perfidy of the
North, to discharge our own citizens who were subject to
parole; but happily a counsel, which proposed to redress a
wrong by an act disreputable to ourselves and in violation of
what were the obligations of our own honor in the sight of the
civilized world, was rejected alike by the government and the
country, who were content to commit the dishonor of their
enemy, without attempting to copy it under pleas of retaliation,
to the justice of history and the future judgments of the world.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                     259
CHAPTER XI.
Organization of the permanent Government of the South.-The Policy of England.
-Declaration of Earl Russell.-Onset of the Northern Forces.-President Davis's
Message to Congress.-The Addition of New States and Territories to the Southern
Confederacy.-Our Indian Allies.-The Financial Condition, North and South.-Deceitful Prospects of Peace.-Effect of the Disasters to the South.-Action of Congress.
-The Conscript Bill.-Provisions v8. Cotton.-Barbarous Warfare of the North.-The
Anti-slavery Sentiment.-How it was unmasked in the War.-Emancipation Measures
in the Federal Congress.-Spirit of the Southern People. —The Administration of Jefferson Davis.-His Cabinet.-The Defensive Policy.-The NAvAL ENGAGEMENT IN
HAMPTON RoADs.-Iron-clad Vessels.-What the Southern Government might have
done.-The Narrative of General Price's Campaign resumed.-His Retreat into Arkansas.-The BATTLE OF ELK HoRN.-Criticism of the Result.-Death of General McCulloch.-The BATTrimLE OF VALVDE.-The Foothold of the Confederates in New
Mexico.-Change of the Plan of Campaign in Virginia. -Abandonment of the Potomac
Line by the Confederates.-The BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN.-Colonel Turner Ashby.Appearance of McClellan's Army on the Peninsula.-Firmness of General Magruder.
-The New Situation of the War in Virginia.-Recurrence of Disasters to the South
on the Water.-The Capture of Newbern.-Fall of Fort Pulaski and Fort Macon.Common Sense v8. "West Point."
THE permanent government of the Confederate States was
organized on the 22d4 day of February, in a season of reverses
to our arms and at a dark hour in our national fortunes.
All hopes of foreign interference were positively at an end.
On the meeting of the British Parliament in the early part of
February, Earl Russell had declared that the blockade of the
American ports had been effective from the 15th of August,
in the face of the facts that the dispatches of Mr. Bunch, the
English consul at Charleston, said that it' was not so; and that
authentic accounts and letters of merchants showed that any
ships, leaving for the South, could be insured by a premium of
seven and a-half to fifteen per cent. England had accepted
the Treaty of Paris, and yet did not hesitate to violate the
principles that had been definitely consecrated by article four
of that treaty, by declaring the Federal blockade effective, for
no other reason than that " considerable prudence was necessary in the American question."  In the House of Commons,
Mr. Gregory asserted that the non-observation of the Treaty of




260              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
Paris was a deception for the Confederate States, and an ambuscade for the interests of commerce throughout the world.
The Northern army had remained quiet on the Potomac,
amusing the Southern people with its ostentatious parades and
gala-day sham fights, while the government at Washington
was preparing an onset all along our lines from Hatteras to
Kansas.  Burnside had captured Roanoke Island in the east,
while Fort Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the
Cumberland had-sent the echo-back to Albemarle.  Buffeting
sleet and storm, and'by forced marches, the enemy had seized
Bowling Green, while Sigel fell suddenly upon Springfield;
the enemy's gunboats -threatened Savannah, and Gen. Butler
hurried off his regiments and transports to the Gulf, for an attack vica Ship Island upon New Orleans.
In his message to'Congress, President Davis declared that
the magnified proportions of the war had occasioned serious
disasters, and:that the effort was impossible to protect by our
arms the whole of the territory of the:Confederate States, seaboard and inland. To the popular complaint of inefficiency in
the departments of the government, he declared that they had
done all which human power and foresight enabled them to
accomplish.
The increase of our'territory since the opening of the war
was scarcely a cause "for boast.  The addition of new States
and Territories had greatly extended;our lines of defence.
Missouri had been ulnable;to wrest:from  the enemy his occupancy of her soil. Ketituekyhad been admitted into the Confedermcy-only to beeome thb theatre:of active hostilities, and,
at last, to be,abandoned to  the enemy.  The JIndian treaties
effected by the Provisional Congress, through the mediation
of Gen. Albert Pike, had secured us a rich -domain, but a troublesome;and worthless ally.*  It was possible, however, that
* In December last, Col. James McIntosh was sent from Arkansas into the
Cherokee Nation to chastise the rebellious Creek chief Opoth-lay-oho-la, which
he did with good effect. The results of the incursion'were thus enumerated
by C.ol.:Intosh: " We^capturekd one hundred andsixty women and children,
twenty  eygroes, thirty wagons,-seventy -yoke of oxen, about five hundred Indian horses, several hundred head of cattle, one hundred sheep, and a great
quantity of property of much value to the enemy. The stronghold of Opoth.
lay-oho-la was completely broken up andhis:force scattered in every direction,
destitute of the simplest elements of:'stUbslstence."




THE FIRST YEAR- OF THE WAR.                 261
in this domain there might be secured a rich inheritance for
posterity.  It comprised an area of more than eighty thousand
square miles, diversified by-mountains filled with iron, coal,
and other mineral treasures, and broad-reaching: plains, with
the Red River running along its southern-.border, the Arkansas
river almost through its centre, and their tributaries: reticulating its entire surface.
At the time of the inauguration of our- permanent government, there was, however, one aspect of our affairs of striking
encouragement. It- was- the condition of- the finances of the
government.  We had no floating debt.  The credit of the
government was unimpaired  among its, own  people.  The
total expenditures for the year had! been, in round numbers,
$170,000,000; less: than one-third of the sum- expended by the
enemy to conquer us, and less: than the value-of a single article
of export-the cotton crop of the year.
In the Federal Congress it was estimated that, at the end of
the fiscal year (June, 1862), the public debt of the Northern
government would be about $750,000,000, and that the demands on the treasury, to be metby taxation, direct and indirect, would not beiless than $165,000,000 per annum.
The problem of the Northern finances was formidable enough.
It was- calculated that the Federal  tax would, be from  four to
six times greater for eachl State than their usual assessments
heretofore, and doubts were expressed, even by Northern jourThe Indian Territory (not including the Osage country-its extent being
unknown-nor the 800,000 acres belonging to the Cherokees, which lie between
Missouri and Kansas) embraces an-area of 82,073..square mUles-more. than
fifty-two millions of acres, to wit:
The land of the Cherokees, Osages, Quapaws, Senecas, and Senecas and
Shawnees, 38,105 square miles, or 24,888,800 acres.
That of the Creeks and Seminoles, 20,531 square miles, or 18,140,000 acres.
That of the Reserve Indians, and -the Chocta ws as  Chiekasaws,: 23,437
square miles, or 15,Q00,000 acres.
Total 82,073 square miles, or 52,528,800 acres.
Its population consists of Cherokees, 23,000; Osages, 7,500; Quapaws, 320;
Creeks, 13,500; Seminoples, 2,500; Reserve. Indians, 2,000; Choctaws, 17,500;
and Chickasaws, 4,70Q0-making an; aggregate of 7-1,52 souls.
This Indian country is, in many respects, really a magnificent one. It is
one of the brightest and fairest parts of the great West, and only needs the
development of its resources to become the equal of the most favored lands on
this continent.




262           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
nals in the interest of the government, if it could be raised in
any other way than by practical confiscation.
The South, however, had already lingered too long in the
delusive promise of the termination of the war by the breaking
down of the finances of the Northern government, and had
entertained prospects of peace in the crude philosophy and calculations of the newspaper article, without looking to those
great lessons of history which showed to what lengths a war
might be carried despite the difficulties of finance, the confines
of reason, and the restraints of prudence, when actuated by
that venom and desperation which were shown alike by the
people and government of the North. The very extent of the
Northern expenditure should have been an occasion of alarm
instead of self-complacency to the South; it showed the tremendous energy of the North and the overpowering measure
of its preparation; it argued a most terrible degree of desperation; and it indicated that the North had plunged so far into
the war, that there was but little sane choice between striving
to wade through it, and determining to turn back with certain
and inevitable ruin in its face.
Fortunately, the lessons of its late disasters were not entirely
lost upon the government of the Confederate States. They
happily gave fresh impulses to the authorities, and were productive of at least some new and vigorous political measures.
The most important of these was a conscript bill for increasing
our forces in the field. The enlargement of the proportions of
the war demanded such a measure; the conflict, in which we
were now engaged, extended from the shores of the Chesapeake
to the confines of Missouri and Arizona.
The measures and expressions of the government plainly
intimated to the people, who had been so persistently incredulous of a long war, that it had become probable that the war
would be continued through a series of years, and that preparations for the ensuing campaigns should be commensurate with
such a prospect. In Congress, resolutions were passed urging
the planters to suspend the raising of cotton, and to plant provision crops, so.as to provide for the support of the army.
This change in the direction of our industry, besides increasing
the capacity of the South to sustain itself, aimed a blow at the
well-known selfish calculations of England to repay herself for




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           263
past losses from the blockade, in the cheap prices expected
from the excessive supply of two years' crops of cotton in the
South. The South was not to be the only or chief loser in the
diminished production of her great staple and the forced change
in her industrial pursuits. For every laborer who was diverted from the culture of cotton in the South, perhaps, four times
as many elsewhere, who had found subsistence in the various
employments growing out of its use, would be forced also out
of their usual occupations. The prospect of thus bringing ruin
upon the industrial interests of other countries was not pleasing to our people or our government; although it was some
consolation to know that England, especially, might yet feel,
through this change of production in the South, the consequences of her folly and the merited fruits of her injustice to a
people who had been anxious for her amity, and had at one
time been ready to yield to her important commercial privileges.
In the growing successes of the Northern armies, the spirit
of the Southern people came to the aid of their government
with new power, and a generosity that was quite willing to forget all its shortcomings in the past. The public sentiment had
been exasperated and determined in its resolution of resistance
to the last extremity by the evidences of ruin, barbarism, and
shameless atrocities that had marked the paths of the progress
of the enemy. The newspapers were filled with accounts of
outrages of the enemy in the districts occupied by him. By
his barbarous law of confiscation, widows and orphans had been
stripped of death's legacies; he had overthrown municipalities
and State governments; he had imprisoned citizens without
warrant, and regardless of age or sex; he had destroyed commerce, and beggared the mechanic and manufacturer; he had
ripped open the knapsacks of our captured soldiery, robbing
them of clothing, money, necessaries of life, and even of the
instruments of their surgeons. The Southern people considered that they were opposing an enemy who had proved himself
a foe to mankind, religion, and civilization.
The venomous spirit of Abolition had been free to develop
itself in the growing successes of the Northern arms. It is a
curious commentary on the faith of the people of the North, or
rather a striking exposure of the subserviency of all the ex



264            THE FrST YEAR OF THE WAR.
pressions of opinion on the part of that: people to considerations
of expedinoy, that, in the beginning of hostilities, even after
the proclamation of war by President Lincoln, when it was yet
thought important to affect moderation, fugitive slaves from
Virginia were captured in the streets of Washington, and, by
the direct authority of the Northern- government, returned to
their masters-! A, few months lateri, negro slaves were kidnapped from- their masters- by the- Federal: army, under the
puerile and nonsensical pretence of their being " contraband of
war." Tlhe anti-slavery purposes of the war rapidly developed
from that point.- The Northern journals declared that the ex.
cision of slavery was one of the important objects of the war;
that the opportunity was to be taken in-the prosecution of hostilities to crush out what had been the main cause of difference,
and thus to assure-the fruit of a permanent peace. In his message to the Federal Congress in December, Mr. Lincoln had
hinted that "all indivsensable means" must be employed to
preserve the Union, An order was published by the War
Department making it the occasion of a court-martial for any
army officer to return any negro slave within his lines to his
master. It was -followed by the explanation- of Mr. Lincoln's
former hint. In an executive message to the Federal Congress,
the policy of "the gradual abolishment of slavery," with the
pretence of "-pecuniary aid" to States adopting such policy,
was advised;-it was approved in the House of Representatives,
by a vote of 8S. to 31; and about, the same time a bill was
introduced into the Senate for, the forcible emancipation of the
negro slaves in the District of Columbia, which was subsequently passed,
These bitter exhibitions of the, North had envenomed the
war; its sanguinary tides rose higher; its battle-fields emu
lated in carnage the -most desperate in modern history; flags
of truce were but seldom used, and the amenities of intercourse
between belligerents were. often slighted by rude messages of
defiance. Battles had become frequent and really bloody. But
they were no longer decisive of a nation's fate. The campaign
covered the whole of a huge, territory, and could only be decided by complicated movements, involving great expenditure
of troops and time.
The Southern people, however, were again aroused, and




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.               265
nothing was wanting but wisdom, energy, and capacity on the
part of the government to have inaugurated: another series of
brilliant achievements, such as those which rendered illustrious
the first months: of the war. The rush of men to the battlefield, which was now witnessed in every part of the South, was
beyond all former example; and if the government had met
this mighty movement: of the people with a corresponding
amplitude of provision and organization, the cause of the South
might have been reekoned.safe beyond. peradventure.
Unfortunately, however, President Davis was not the man to
consult the sentiment and.wisdom of the people; he desired to
signalize the. infallibility. of his own intellect in every measure
of the revolution, and to:identify, from motives of vanity, his
own personal genius with every event and detail of the remarkable period of history in which he had been called upon
to act. This. imperious, conceit seemed to swallow up every
others idea in his- mind, By what was scarcely more than a
constitutional fiction, the President' of the Confederate States
was the head of the army; but Mr. Davis, while he made
himself the supreme master of the civil administration of the
government, so far-as to take the smallest details. within his
control, and to reduce. his cabinet officers to the condition of
head clerks, insisted also upon being the autocrat of'the army,
controlling the plansof every general in the field, and dictating
to him the precise limits of every movement that was undertaken. Many of our generals fretted under this pragmatism of
an executive, who, instead of attending to the civil affairs of
the government and correcting the monstrous abuses that were
daily pointed out by. the newspapers in the conduct of the
departments, was unfortunately possessed with the vanity that
he was a great military genius, and that it was necessary for
him to dictate,.from his, cushioned seat in Richmond, the details of every campaign, and to conform  every.movement in
the field'to the invariable formula of " the defen8ive policy."*
* The following extract of terse criticism on offensive and defensive warfare
is taken from a small work written by one.of Napoleon's generals in 1815, and
revised in 1855.; The.writer. could not have written with more aptitude to
the existing contest, if the errors and unfortunate demonstrations of President
Davis's defensive policy had been before his eyes:" The offensive is the proper
character which - it is essential to give to: every war; it exalts the courage of




266              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
In a revolutionary leader, something more is wanted than
scholarly and polished intellect. The history of the world
shows that, in such circumstances, the plainest men, in point of
learning and scholarship, have been the most successful, and
that their elements of success have been quick apprehension,
practical judgment, knowledge of human nature, and, above
all, a disposition to consult the aggregate wisdom of the people,
and to increase their stores of judgment, by deigning to learn
from every possible source of practical wisdom within their
reach.
President Davis was not a man to consult, even in the.smallest matter of detail, the wisdom of others, or to relax his purposes or personal preferences, at the instance of any consideration that might compromise him in respect of conceit or
punctilio. About nothing connected with the new government
had the popular will been so clearly and emphatically expressed, as the necessity of a reorganization of the Cabinet. Nobody
expected those offices to be permanently filled by the provisional appointees. They were put there under an emergency;
in some instances simply as compliments to certain States, and
without the slightest expectation that they would be imposed
on the country for seven long years. HEad the Union continued,
and Mr. Davis been elected to the Presidency, the selection of
such a Cabinet of intellectual pigmies from the nation at large
would have astounded the public.  The two great branches of
the administration-the War and the Navy Departmentswere in the hands of men who had neither the respect, nor the
confidence of the public. Mr. Benjamin, the Secretary of War,
had been seriously injured, by a number of doubtful official
acts, in the public estimation, which never held him  higher
the soldier; it disconcerts the adversary, strips from him the initiative, and
diminishes his means. Do not wait for the enemy in your own fireplaces, go
always to seek him in his own home, when you will find opportunity at the
same time to live at his expense, and to strip from him his resources. In
penetrating his territory, commence by acting en masse with all forces, and be
sure that the first advantages are yours. * * * "   Never adopt the
defensive, unless it is impossible for you to do otherwise. If you are reduced
to this sad extremity, let it be in order to gain time, to wait for your reinforcements, drill your soldiers, strengthen your alliances, draw the enemy upon
bad ground, lengthen the base of his operations; and let an ulterior design to
take the offensive be without ceasing the end of all your actions."




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           267
than a smart, expeditious, and affable official. Mr. Mallory,
the Secretary of the Navy, had, in the old government, in
which he was chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval
Affairs, been the butt of every naval officer in the country for
his ignorance, his sang-froid, his slow and blundering manner,
and the engrossment of his mind by provisions to provide
gratifications for his social habits.
President Davis refused to concede any thing to public sentiment with reference to the reorganization of his cabinet;
although it is to be remarked that the demand for change was
made not by a popular clamor, which a wise ruler would have
done right to disregard and to contemn, but by that quiet, conservative, and educated sentiment which no magistrate in a republican government had the right to disregard. Mr. Mallory
was retained at the head of the navy; Mr. Benjamin was promoted to the Secretaryship of the State, and the only material
change in the cabinet was the introduction as Secretary of War
of General Randolph, of Virginia, a gentleman whose sterling
personal worth made him acceptable to all parties, and promised at least some change for the better in the administration
of a government that had been eaten up by servility, and had
illustrated nothing more than the imperious conceit of a single
man.
The Confederate Congress had passed a bill to create the
office of commanding general, who should take charge of the
military movements of the war. The bill was vetoed by President Davis; but, at the same time, the unsubstantial show of
compliance which had been made with reference to the Cabinet
was repeated with reference to the commanding general, and
Mr. Davis appointed Gen. Lee to the nominal office of commanding general, the order, however, which nominated him
providing that he should " act under the direction of the president." Thus it was that Mr. Davis kept in his hands the
practical control of every military movement on the theatre
of the war; and it was very curious, indeed, that the servile
newspapers, which applauded in him this single and imperious
control of the conduct of the war, were unmindful of the plain
and consistent justice of putting on his shoulders that exclusive responsibility for disasters which is inseparable from the
honors of practical autocracy.




268            THE iIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
We have referred to the dark period and uncompromising
auspices in which the permanent government of the Confederate States was inaugurated. Across the dreary tract of. disaster there were, however, sudden and fitful gleams of light,
such as the undaunted courage of our troops and the variable
accidents of war might give in such circumstances of misgovernment as were adverse or embarrassing to a grand: scale of
successes. Of these, and of the disasters mingled with them,
we shall proceed to treat in the progress of the narrative of the
external events of the war.
THE NAVAL ENGAGEMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS.
In the progress: of the war, attention had been directed, on
both sides, to different classes of naval structure, composed of
iron, such as floating batteries, rams, &c. On the 12th of
October, an affair-had occurred near the mouth of the Mississippi river, in which a partially submerged iron ram, the Manassas, attacked the Federal blockading fleet at the head of
the Passes, sinking one of them, the Preble, and driving the
remainder of the fleet out of the river. This, the first of our
naval exploits, was to be followed by adventures on a larger
and more brilliant scale.
As far back as the month of June, 1861, the little energy
displayed by the Navy Department: had been employed in
building a single iron-clad naval structure. In the destruction
of the navy-yard at Norfolk, at the commencement of the war,
the steam-frigate Merrimac had been burned and sunk, and
her engine greatly damaged by the enemy. HIowever, the
bottom of the hull, boilers, and heavy and costly parts of the
engine were but little injured, and it was proposed of these to
construct a casemated vessel with inclined iron-plated sides
and pubmerged ends. The novel plan of submerging the ends
of the ship and the eaves of the casement was the peculiar and
distinctive feature of the Virginia, as the new structure was
called. It was never before adopted. The resistance of iron
plates to heavy ordnance, whether presented in vertical planes
or, at low angles of inclination, had been investigated in England before the Virginia was commenced; but, in the absence
of accurate data, the inclination of the plates of the Virginia




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           269
and their thickness and form had to be determined by actual
experiment.
With the completion of the Virginia, the Confederate squadron in the James river, under command of Flag-officer Franklin Buchatnan, was as follows: steamer Virginia, ten guns;
steamer Patrick HIIery, twelve guns; steamer Jamestown, two
guns; and gunboats Teazer, Beaufort, and Raleigh, each one
gun —total, 27 guns.
On the morning of the 8th of lMarch, about eleven o'clock,
the Virginia left the navy-yard at Norfolk, accompanied by
the Raleigh and Beaufort, and proceeded to Newport News to
engage the enemy's frigates Cumberland and Congress, and
their giunboats: and shore batteries. On passing Sewell's Point,
Capt. Buchanan made a speech to the men. It was laconic.
He said: "My men, you are now about to face the enemy.
You shall have no reason to complain of not fighting at close
quarters. Remember, you fight for your homes and your
country. You-see those ships —you must sink them. I need
not ask you -to do it. I know you will do it."
At this time, the Congress was lying close to the batteries
at Newport News, a little below them. The Cumberland was
lying immediately opposite the batteries. Thle Virginia passed
the Congress, giving her a broadside, which was returned with
very little effect, and made straight for the-Cumberland. In
the midst of a heavy fire from the Cumberland, Congress, gunboatS, and -shore batteries concentrated on the Virginia, she
stood rapidly on towards the Cumberland, which ship Capt.
Buchanan had determined to sink with the prow of the Virginia. On board the Yankee-frigate, the crew were watching
the singular iron roof bearing down upon them, making all
manner of derisive and contemptuous remarks, many of them
aloud, and Within hearing of those on board the Virginia; such
as-: " Well, there she comes."  " What the devil does she look
like?"  " What in h —ll is she after.?"  "-Let's look at that
great Secesh -curiosity," etc. These remarks were:cut short by
a discharge from the Virginia's bow gun, which swept from one
end of the Cumberland's deck to the other, killing and wounding numbers of the poor deluded wretches. In a few minutes
thereafter, the Virginia had struck her on her starboard bow;
the crash below the Water was distinctly heard, and, in fifteen




270           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
minutes thereafter, the Yankee vessel, against whom an old
grudge had long existed for her participation in the burning
of the navy-yard, sank beneath the water, her guns being
fought to the last, and her flag flying at her peak.
Just after the Cumberland sunk, Commander Tucker was
seen standing down James river under full.steam, accompanied
by the Jamestown and Teazer. Their escape was miraculous,
as they were under a galling fire of solid shot, shell, grape, and
canister, a number of which passed through the vessels without
doing any serious injury, except to the Patrick Henry, through
whose boiler a shot passed, scalding to death four persons and
wounding others.
Having sunk the Cumberland, the Virginia turned her attention to the Congress. She was some time in getting her
proper position, in consequence of the shoalness of the water.
To succeed in this object, Captain Buchanan was obliged to
run the ship a short distance above the batteries on James river
in order to wind her. During all the time her keel was in the
mud, and, of course, she moved but slowly. The vessel was
thus subjected twice to all the heavy guns of the batteries in
passing up and down the river.
It appears that while the Virginia was engaged in getting
her position, it was believed on the Congress that she had
hauled off. The Yankees left their guns and gave three cheers.
Their elation was of short duration. A few minutes afterwards
the Virginia opened upon the frigate, she having run into shoal
water. The " Southern bugaboo," into whom the broadside
of the Congress had been poured without effect, not even faizing her armor, opened upon the Yankee frigate, causing such
carnage, havoc, and dismay on her decks, that her colors were
in a few moments hauled down. A white flag was hoisted at
the gaft and half-mast, and another at the main. Numbers of
the crew instantly took to their boats and landed. Our fire
immediately ceased. The Beaufort was run alongside, with
instructions from Captain Buchanan to take possession of the
Congress, secure the officers as prisoners, allow the crew to
land, and burn the ship. Lieutenant Parker, commanding the
Beaufort, received the flag of the Congress and her surrender
from Commander William Smith and Lieutenant Pendergrast,
with the side-arms of these officers. After. having delivered




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          271
themselves as prisoners of war on board the Beaufort, they
were allowed, at their own request, to, return to the Congress
to assist in removing the wounded to the Beaufort. They
never returned, although they had pledged their honor to do
so, and in witness of that pledge had, left their swords with
Lieut. Alexander, on board the Beaufort.
The Beaufort had been compelled to leave the Congress
under a perfidious fire opened from the shore, while, the frigate
had two white flags flying, raised by her own crew.. Determined that the Congress should not again fall into the hands
of the enemy, Captain Buchanan remarked: "That ship must
be burned," when the suggestion was gallantly responded to
by Lieutenant Minor, who volunteered to take a boat and burn
her. He had scarcely reached within fifty yards of the Congress, when a deadly fire was opened upon him, wounding him
severely and several of his men. On witnessing this vile
treachery, Captain Buchanan instantly recalled the boat, and
ordered the Congress to be destroyed by hot shot and incendiary
shell. The illumination of the scene was splendid; the explosion of the frigate's magazine a little past midnight, aroused
persons asleep in Norfolk, and signalled to them the completeness of our victory.
In the perfidious fire from the shore, Captain Buchanan had
been disabled by a severe wound in the thigh from a minieball, and the command of the ship had been transferred to
Lieut. Catesby Jones, with orders to fight her as long as the
men could stand to their guns. At this time the steam-frigate
Minnesota and Roanoke, and the sailing-frigate St. Lawrence,
which had come up from Old Point, opened their fire upon the
Virginia. The Minnesota grounded in the North channel,
where, unfortunately, the shoalness of the channel prevented
the near approach of the Virginia. She continued, however,
to fire upon the Minnesota, until the pilots declared that it was
no longer safe to remain in that position, when she returned
by the South channel (the middle ground being necessarily
between the Virginia and Minnesota, and the St. Lawrence
and Roanoke having retreated under the guns of Old Point),
and again had an opportunity to open upon her enemy. Night
falling about this time, the Virginia was anchored off Sewell's
Point.




272           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE'WAR.
The next morning (Sunday) the contest occurred between
the Monitor (the Ericsson battery) and the Virginia.  The
Yankee frigates, the Roanoke and St. Lawrence, had retreated
to Old Point —"the apothecary shop," as it was facetiously
styled by our men; and the Monitor had gone up on Saturday
night to assist the Minnesota, which was still aground. The
daylight revealed lying near the Minnesota the celebrated iron
battery, a wonderful-looking structure that was justly compared
to a prodigious ":cheese.box on a plank," said "cheese-box"
being of a Plutonian blackness. At 8 o'clock the Virginia ran
down to engage'the Monitor. The contest continued for the
space of ~two hours, the distance between the two vessels varying from half a mile to close quarters, in which the two iron
vessels were almost -side to side; belching out their fire, the
heavy -thugs on the iron sides of each being the only effect of
the terrific cannonade. Again and again the strange-looking
battery, with its black, revolving cupola, fled before the Virginia. -It was, as one -of our officers remarked,'" like fighting
a ghost." Nowshe ran down towards -Old Point, now back
towards Newport News, now approached to fire, and then ran
away to load. The rapidity -of the movements df Ithe Monitor
gave her the only advantage which she had in the'contest.
The great length and draft of the Virginia rendered it exceedingly difficult to'work her. Once she got aground. It was a
moment of:terrible suspense to the noble ship, against which
the combined batteries of the XMinnesota and Monitor'were now
directed. The -shot fll like hail,:the shells flew like rain-drops,
and slowly,'steadily she'returned the fire. There lay the
Minnesota with two -tugs alongside. Here, there, and everywhere, was the black " cheese-box." The Virginia still fired
with the samie deliberate regularity as before. Presently a
great white column of smoke shot up above the Minnesota,
highier and higher, fuller and filler in its volume, and beyond
doubt, carried death all along her decks, for the boiler of one
of the tugs had been exploded iby a -shot, -and that great white
cloud canopy was the'steam thus liberated.
In fifteen minutes the Virginia had got off and was again in
motion. The pilots declared -that it was impossible to get
nearer the Minnesota,:which was lbelieved to be entirely disaabled. The Virginia had twice silenced the fire of the Mloni



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            273
tor, and had once brushed her, narrowly missing the coveted
opportunity of sinking her with her prow, and the continuation
of the contest being declined by the Monitor having run into
shoal water, the Virginia ceased firing at noon and proceeded
to Norfolk.
She steamed back amid the cheers of victory. In the direction of Newport News could be seen the spars of the Cumberland above the river she had so long insolently barred; but of
her consort there was not even a timber-head visible to tell her
story. This was not all the Virginia had done. The Minnesota was disabled and riddled with shot. Within eight and
forty hours the Virginia had successfully encountered the
whole naval force of the enemy ii the neighborhood of Norfolk,
amounting to 2,890 men and 230 guns; had sunk the Cumberland, probably the most formidable vessel of her class in the
Federal navy, consigning to a watery grave the larger portion
of her crew of 360 men; had destroyed the crack sailing-frigate
Congress, with her enormous armament; and had crippled in
the action the Minnesota, one of the best steamers of the enemy's navy. Our casualties were two killed and nineteen
wounded, and the Virginia had come out of the action with the
loss of her prow, starboard anchor, and all her boats, with her
smoke-stack riddled with balls, and the muzzles of two of her
guns shot away, but with no serious damage to her wonderful
armor, that had sustained a cannonade such as never before
was inflicted upon a single vessel.
The exploits of the Virginia created immense excitement in
the North and a marked interest in Europe, as illustrating a
novel and brilliant experiment in naval architecture. As an
example of the sharp and practical energy of the Northern
government, and its readiness to avail itself of all means in the
prosecution of the war, it may be mentioned that in five days
after the occurrence of the Confederate victory in Hampton
Roads, a bill was introduced into the Senate at Washington,
appropriating nearly fifteen millions of dollars for the construction of additional iron-clad vessels.
In Great Britain and France, and on the Continent generally, public attention was strained to a pitch of fearful anxiety
on the subject of changes in naval architecture, and their adaptation to the new exigencies that had arisen in warfare on the
18




274            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
water. All the European governments that had a strip of seacoast busied themselves to turn to profit the lesson the Virginia
had given them. Denmark voted a million of rix dollars for
the construction of iron-plated vessels, while Sweden sent its
Crown Prince to assist at the trial trip of the French frigate
La Couronne, the largest iron war-steamer afloat. Italy had
already some very fine iron vessels-of-war, and her citizens
were hard at work on others. Austria was officially informed
of the revolution in warfare at sea on the very day that an
imperial commission reported her huge land fortresses as defiant of every known means of assault; and the Prussians, people
and government, regarded the engagement in Hampton Roads
as one of " the most important events of the day."
The Confederate States government might have learned some
instructive lessons from the victory achieved by the Virginia.
Instead of one such vessel, we might have had ten, had the
Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mallory, possessed the ability and
zeal essential to his responsible position. The cost was not a
matter of the slightest consideration. A vessel built at an expense of half a million was cheap enough, when in her first
essay she had destroyed thrice her value of the enemy's property. The State of North Carolina and the Confederacy had
spent at least a million of dollars already in futile attempts to
defend the eastern coast of that State. If that sum had been
expended in building iron:clad vessels suitable to the waters
on the Carolina coast, all of our disasters in that direction
might have been prevented, except, perhaps, the one at Hatteras, and our ports on that portion of our coast kept open, at
least partially, if not entirely. In no possibly better manner
could ten or twenty millions of dollars have been expended
than by augmenting the power of our infant navy.
While the Virginia was achieving her memorable victory in
Hampton Roads, a battle had commenced in the extreme
northwest portion of the State of Arkansas, which had but one
parallel as to its duration, and probably few as to its desperate
character, since the opening of the war.
It will be recollected that, in a previous chapter, we left
Gen. Price about the close of the year 1861 occupying Springfield, Missouri, for the purpose of being within reach of supplies, and protecting that portion of the State from domestic




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          275
depredations and Federal invasion. About the latter part of
January, it became evident that the enemy were concentrating
in force at Rolla, and shortly thereafter they occupied Lebanon. Believing that this movement could be for no other purpose than to attack him, and knowing that his command was
inadequate for such successful resistance as the interests of the
army and the cause demanded, General Price appealed to the
commanders of the Confederate troops in Arkansas to come to
his assistance. He held his position to the very last moment.
On the 12th of February, his pickets were driven in, and reported the enemy advancing upon him in force. Gen. Price
commenced retreating at once. He reached Cassville with loss
unworthy of mention in any respect. Here the enemy in his
rear commenced a series of attacks, running through four days.
Retreating and fighting all the way to the Cross Hollows, in
Arkansas, the command of Gen. Price, under the most exhausting fatigue, all that time, with but little rest for either
man or horse, and no sleep, sustained themselves, and came
through, repulsing the enemy upon every occasion, with great
determination and gallantry.
Gen. Van Dorn had recently been appointed to the command
of the Confederate forces in the Trans-Mississippi district. A
happy accord existed between him and Gen. Price, and a private correspondence that had ensued between these two military chieftains, on the occasion of Gen. Van Dorn's appointment by President Davis to take command in Arkansas and
Missouri, not only showed a spirit of mutual appreciation and
compliment highly honorable to both, but developed a s;ngular similarity of views (considering that the letter of each was
written without knowledge of that of the other) with reference
to the conduct of the war.
Learning that Gen. Price had rapidly fallen back from
Springfield before a superior force of the enemy, and was endeavoring to form a junction with the division of Gen. McCulloch at Boston Mountain, Gen. Van Dorn, who was then
at Pocahontas, Arkansas, resolved to go in person to take command of the combined forces of Price and McCulloch. He
reached their head-quarters on the 3d of March.




276           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
THE BATTLE OF ELK HORN.
The enemy, under the command of Gens. Curtis and Sigel,
had halted on Sugar Creek, fifty-five miles distant, where, with
a force variously estimated at from seventeen to twenty-four
thousand, he was awaiting still further reinforcements before
he would advance. Gen. Van Dorn resolved to make the attack at once. He sent for Gen. Albert Pike to join him with
his command of Indian warriors, and, on the morning of the
4th of March, moved with the divisions of Price and McCulloch, by way of Fayetteville and Bentonville, to attack the enemny's camp on Sugar Creek. The whole force under his command was about sixteen thousand men.
At Bentonville, General Sigel's division, seven thousand
strong, narrowly escaped a surprise and fell back, our advance
-skirmishing with the rear-guard to Sugar Creek, about seven
miles beyond.
On the morning of the 7th of March, Gen. Van Dorn made
disposition for attack. Before eleven o'clock, the action had
become general. The attack was made from the north and
west, the enemy being completely surrounded. About two
o'clock, Gen. Van Dorn sent a dispatch to Gen. McCulloch,
who was attacking the enemy's left, proposing to him to hold
his position, while Price's left advance might be thrown forward over the whole line, and easily end the battle. Before
the dispatch was penned, Gen. McCulloch had fallen, and the
victorious advance of his division upon the strong position of'the enemy's front was checked by the fall of himself and Gen.
McIntosh, also, in the heat of the battle and in the full tide of
success. It appears that two musket-balls, by killing the gallant McCulloch and Mcintosh, had prevented us from gaining
a great victory. Notwithstanding the confusion that succeeded
this untimely occurrence, Gen. Van Dorn pressed forward with
the attack, sustained by the resistless charges of the Missouri
division. At nightfall, the enemy had been driven back from
the field of battle, and the Confederates held his intrenchments
and the greater part of his commissary stores, on which our
half-famished men fed. Our troops slept upon their arms
nearly a mile beyond the point where the enemy had made his




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           277
last stand, and Gen. Van Dorn's head-quarters for the night
were at the Elk Horn tavern-from which locality the battlefield derived its name. We had taken during the day seven
cannon and about two hundred prisoners.
On the morning of the 8th, the enemy, having taken a
strong position during the night, reopened the fight.  The
action soon became general, and continued until about halfpast nine o'clock, by which time Gen. Van Dorn had completed his arrangements to withdraw his forces. Finding that
his right wing was much disorganized, and that the batteries
were, one after another, retiring from the field, with every shot
expended, Gen. Van Dorn had determined to withdraw his
forces in the direction of their supplies. This was accomplished with almost perfect success. The ambulances, crowded
with the wounded, were sent in advance; a portion of McCulloch's division was placed in position to follow, while Gen. Van
Dorn disposed of his remaining force as best to deceive the
enemy as to his intention, and to hold him in check while executing it. An attempt was made by the enemy to follow the
retreating column. It was effectually checked, however, and,
about 2 P. M., the Confederates encamped about six miles from
the field of battle, all of the artillery and baggage joining the
army in safety. They brought away from the field of battle
300 prisoners, four cannon, and three baggage wagons.
Our loss in killed and wounded was stated by Gen. Van
Dorn to be about six hundred, as nearly as could be ascertained, while that of the enemy was conjectured to be more than
seven hundred killed and at least an equal number wounded.
Gen. Curtis, in his official report, gives no statement of his loss,
but simply remarks that it was heavy. The entire engagement
had extended over the space of three days, the 6th, 7th, and
8th of March. The gallantry of our soldiers had been unrivalled. More than half of our troops were raw levies, armed with
shot-guns and country rifles. The enemy were armed with
superior guns of the latest patents, such as revolving rifles,
sabre bayonets, rifled cannon, mounted howitzers, &c. Our
army had forced them by inches from one position to another,
and, although compelled to fall back at last, were able to make
their determination good never to permit the enemy to advance
South.




278           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
The Indian regiments, under Gen. Pike, had not come up in
time to take any important part in the battle. Some of the
red-men behaved well, and a portion of them assisted in taking
a battery; but they were difficult to manage in the deafening
roar of artillery, to which they were unaccustomed, and were
naturally amazed at the sight of guns that ran on wheels.
They knew what to do with the rifle; they were accustomed
to sounds of battle as loud as their own war-whoop; and the
amazement of these simple children of the forest may be imagined at the sight of such roaring, deafening, crashing monsters
as twelve-pounders running around on wheels. Gen. Van
Dorn, in his official report of the battle, does not mention that
any assistance was derived from the Indians-an ally that had,
perhaps, cost us much more trouble, expense, and annoyance,
than their services in modern warfare could, under any circumstances, be worth.
In the action, the Missouri troops, from the noble veteran,
who had led them so long, down to the meanest private, behaved with a courage, the fire and devotion of which never,
for a moment, slackened. The personal testimony of Gen. Van
Dorn to their noble conduct, was a just and magnanimous tribute. He wrote to the government at Richmond: " During the
whole of this engagement, I was with the Missourians under
Price, and I have never seen better fighters than these Missouri troops, or more gallant leaders than Gen. Price and his
officers. From the first to the last shot, they continually
rushed on, and never yielded an inch they had won; and when
at last they received orders to fall back, they retired steadily
and with cheers. Gen. Price received a severe wound in the
action, but would neither retire from the field nor cease to expose his life to danger."
Nor is this all the testimony to the heroism of Gen. Price on
the famous battle-fields of Elk Horn. Some incidents are related to us by an officer of his conduct in the retreat, that show
aspects of heroism more engaging than even those of reckless
bravery. In the progress of the retreat, writes an officer,
every few hundred yards we would overtake some wounded
soldier. As soon as he would see the old general, he would
cry out, "General, I am wounded!" Instantly some vehicle
was ordered to stop, and the poor soldier's wants cared for.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           279
Again and again it occurred, until our conveyances were
covered with the wounded. Another one cried out,' General, I
am wounded!' The general's head dropped upon his breast,
and his eyes, bedimmed with tears, were thrown up, and he
looked in front, but could seen no place to put his poor soldier.
He discovered something on wheels in front, and commanded:' Halt! and put this wounded soldier up; by G-d, I will save
my wounded, if I lose the whole army!' This explains why
the old man's poor soldiers love him so well."
Although, in the battle of Elk Horn, our forces had been
compelled to retire, and the affair was proclaimed in all parts
of the North as a splendid victory of their arms, there' is no
doubt, in the light of history, that the substantial fruits of victory were with the Confederates. The enemy had set out on a
march of invasion, with the avowed determination to subjugate Arkansas, and capture Fort Smith. But after the shock
of the encounter at Elk Horn, he was forced to fall back into
Missouri, leaving several hundred prisoners in our hands, and
more than two thousand killed and wounded on the field.. The
total abandonment of their enterprise of subjugation in Arkansas is the most conclusive evidence in the world, that the
Federals were worsted by Gen. Van Dorn, and that this brave
and honorable commander had achieved for his country no inconsiderable success.
The fall of Gen. Ben McCulloch was esteemed as a national
calamity, and, in his official report of the battle, Gen. Van
Dorn declared that no success could repair the loss of the gallant dead, who had fallen on the well-fought field. Gen. McCulloch's name was already historical at the time of the breaking out of the revolution. Twenty-six years ago he served in
the battle of San Jacinto, afterwards passed his time on the
Texan frontier, in a succession of hardships and. dangers such
as few men have seen, and subsequently, in the Mexican, war
on the bloody field of Buena Vista, received the public and official thanks of Gen. Taylor for his heroic conduct and services.
McCulloch, as a soldier, was remarkable for his singular capacities for partisan warfare, and, in connection with Walker,
Hays, and Chevallie, had originated and rendered renowned
the name of "Texas Ranger." These daring adventurers did
much in achieving the independence of the Texan republic,.




280           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
and in defending its borders from the ruthless and enterprising
Camanche. In the war of the United States with Mexico, they
rendered invaluable service as daring scouts, and inaugurated
the best and most effective cavalry service that has ever been
known in the world.
The moment Lincoln's. election became known, McCulloch
identified himself as an unconditional secessionist, and repaired
to Texas to take part in any movement that might grow out of
the presence of over 3000 United States troops in that State.
He was unanimously selected by the Committee of Public
Safety to raise the men necessary to compel the surrender of
San Antonio, with its arsenal and the neighboring forts, four
or five in number. Within four days, he had travelled one
hundred and fifty miles, and stood before San Antonio with
eight hundred armed men, his old comrades and neighbors.
His mission succeeded. Texas looked to him with confidence
as one of her strong pillars in case of war. She sent him abroad
to procure arms; but, before he had fully succeeded, President
Davis appointed him brigadier-general, and assigned him to
the command of the Indian Territory.
He was killed in the brush on a slight elevation by one of
the sharp-shooters of the enemy. He was not in uniform, but
his dress attracted attention. He wore a dress of black velvet,
patent-leather high-top boots, and he had on a light-colored,
broad-brimmed Texan hat. The soldier who killed him, a
private in an Illinois regiment, went up and robbed his body
of a gold watch.
Genm McIntosh, who had been very much distinguished all
through the operations in Arkansas, had fallen on the battlefield, about the same time that McCulloch had been killed.
During the advance from Boston Mountain, he had been placed
in command of the cavalry brigade, and in charge of the
pickets. He was alert, daring, and devoted to his duty. His
kindness of disposition, with his reckless bravery, had attached
the troops strongly to him, so that, after McCulloch fell, had
he remained to lead them, all would have been well with the
right wing; but, after leading a brilliant charge of cavalry,
and carrying the enemy's battery, he rushed into the thickest
of the fight again.at the head of his old regiment, and was shot
through the heart.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           281
A noble boy from Missouri, Churchill Clarke, commanded a
battery of artillery, and, during the fierce artillery action of the
7th and 8th, was conspicuous for the daring and skill which he
exhibited. He fell at the very close of the action.
While there was, in Richmond, great anxiety to construe
aright the imperfect and uncertain intelligence which had arrived there, by devious ways, from Arkansas, news reached
the Southern capital of a brilliant and undoubted victory still
further to the West, in the distant territory of New Mexico.
This victory had been achieved weeks before the slow intelligence of it reached Richmond. Although it had taken place
on a remote theatre, and was but little connected with the
general fortunes of the war, the victory of Valverde had a
good effect upon the spirits of the Southern people, which had
been so long depressed and darkened by a baleful train of
disasters.
THE BATTLE OF VALVERDE.
The Confederates marched from Mesilla, in Arizona, upon
Fort Craig, about 175 miles distant, and there fought the battle
and won the victory of Valverde, on the 21st of March. Gen.
Sibley, with his command, numbering, rank and file, two
thousand three hundred men, left Fort Thorn, eighty miles
below Fort Craig, about the 12th of February. On arriving in
the vicinity of Fort Craig, he learned from some prisoners,
captured near the post, that Gen. Canby was in command of
the Federal forces in the fort; that he had twelve hundred
regular troops, two hundred American volunteers, and five
thousand Mexicans, making his entire force near six thousand
four hundred men. Notwithstanding this superior force, he
boldly advanced, and, on the 19th, crossed the river near Fort
Craig, and, making a detour of some miles, arrived on the
morning of the 21st March at Valverde, on the east bank of
the Rio Grande, three miles above the fort, where a large body
of the enemy were stationed to receive him. It seems that all
the enemy's forces, with the exception of their artillery and reserve, were upon the same side of the river to which our troops
were advancing. A portion of Col. Baylor's regiment, under
command of Major Pyon, numbering 250 men, were the first




282           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
to engage the enemy. Alone and unsupported for one hour,
they held their position amid a hail of grape, canister, and
round-shot. At that time they were reinforced, and the battle
became general. The enemy then made an attack upon our
right wing, and were repulsed. A general movement was then
made upon our line with more success, a portion of our left
wing being compelled to fall back and take a new position.
This was about 2 o'clock. The enemy now supposed they had
gained the day, and ordered their battery across the river,
which was done, and the battery planted upon the bank. As
soon as the battery opened General Sibley knew it had crossed,
and immediately ordered a general charge, which was performed only as Texans can do it. Starting at a distance of
eight hundred yards, with their Camanche war-whoop, they reserved their fire until within thirty yards of the battery, when
they poured a deadly fire, with double-barrelled shot-guns and
pistols, immediately into the horror-stricken ranks of their foes.
They sprung into the river, and in crossing, numbers were
killed. Captain Teel's battery now coming up, closed this
sanguinary contest with shell and grape, as they fled down the
opposite side of the river to the fort. The battle lasted nine
hours. It afforded one of the most remarkable instances of
valor in the war-the taking of a field-battery with shot-guns
and pistols. Our loss was thirty-eight killed, and one hundred
and twenty wounded; that of the. enemy, as given by themselves, was three hundred killed, four or five hundred wounded,
and two thousand missing. The enemy suffered the most while
retreating across the river, where the slaughter was for some
moments terrible.
After the victory of Valverde, the small force of Texans not
being in any condition to assault Fort Craig, pressed on to Albuquerque,.about ninety miles north of the battle-field. This
city, the second in size and importance in the territory, having
a population of seven or eight thousand, the Federals had
evacuated. The victorious Confederates still pressed towards
Santa Fe, the capital city of the great central plateau of interior America, which the Federals had also evacuated, and
fallen back on Fort Union, about sixty miles northeast of Santa
F6, and one of the strongest fortifications in America.
Thus the Texans had marched about three hundred miles




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           2S3
from Mesilla, defeated the Federals and destroyed their army
in a pitched battle, ejected them from their two chief cities,
and driven them out of the territory to their outpost on its
eastern limits.
The result of the battle of Valverde was encouraging, and
the prospect was indulged that New Mexico was already conquered, and that the Confederate States held the Southern
overland route to California.
Referring to the progress of the campaign in Virginia, we
shall find its plans and locality widely changed, the line of the
Potomac abandoned, and the long and persistent struggle of
the Federals for the possession of Richmond transferred to a
new but not unexpected theatre of operations.
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston had determined to change his line
on the Potomac, as the idea of all offensive operations on it
had been abandoned, and it had become necessary, in his opinion, that the main body of the Confederate forces in Virginia
should be in supporting distance and position with the army of
the Peninsula; and in the event of either being driven back,
that they might combine for final resistance before Richmond.
The discretion of falling back from the old line of the Potomac was confided by President Davis entirely to the discretion
of Gen. Johnston, who enjoyed a rare exemption from official
pragmatism at Richmond, and was in many things very much
at liberty to pursue the counsels of his own military wisdom.
For the space of three weeks before the army left its intrenchments at Manassas, preparations were being made for falling
back to the line of the Rappahannock, by the quiet and gradual
removal of the vast accumulations of army stores; and with
such consummate address was this managed, that our own
troops had no idea of what was intended until the march was
taken up. The first intimation the enemy had of the evacuation of Manassas was the smoke of the soldiers' huts that had
been fired by our army.
That the strategic plans of the enemy were completely foiled
by the movement of Gen. Johnston, was quite evident in the
tone of disappointment and vexation in which the Northern
newspapers referred to the evacuation of Manassas, which,
unless there had been some disconcert of their own strategy by
such an event, they would have been likely to regard as a con



284           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
siderable advantage on their side in letting them further into
the territory of Virginia.
THE BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN.
While our forces deserted the old line of the Potomac, it was
determined not to leave the Valley of Virginia undefended, and
the command of Gen. Jackson was left in the neighborhood of
Winchester, to operate to the best advantage.
Near the town of Winchester occurred, on the 23d of March,
what was known as the battle of Kernstown. The Federals
were attacked by our forces under Gen. Jackson, the engagement having been brought on by the gallant Col. Ashby, who
had been fighting the enemy wherever he had shown himself in
the Valley. The Confederate forces amounted to six thousand
men, with Capt. McLaughlin's battery of artillery and Colonel
Ashby's cavalry. All the troops engaged were from Virginia,
except a few companies from Maryland. It was thought that
there would be but a very small force at the point of attack,
but the enemy proved to be nearly eighteen thousand strong,
with a considerable number of field-pieces. They occupied a
rising ground, and a very advantageous position.
Gen. Banks had concluded that there was no enemy in front
except Ashby's force of cavalry; that Gen. Jackson would not
venture to separate himself so far from the main body of the
Confederate army as to offer him battle, and under these impressions he had left for Washington. On Sunday morning,
Gen. Shields, who had been left in command of the Federals,
satisfied that a considerable force was before him, concentrated
his whole force, and prepared to give battle. The action conmmenced about four o'clock in the evening, and terminated when
night closed upon the scene of conflict. Our men fought with
desperation until dark, when the firing on both sides ceased.
During the night, Gen. Jackson decided to fall back to Cedar
creek, and prepare there to make successful opposition with
his small force, should the enemy advance. The enemy was
left in possession of the field of battle, two guns and four
caissons, and about three hundred prisoners. Our loss was
about one hundred killed, and probably twice that number
wounded. The loss of the enemy was certainly more than




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            285
double. At one period of the fight our men had got possession of a stone wall, which formed the boundary of two fields,
and dropping on their knees, had fired deadly volleys into the
advancing lines of the enemy. The Confederates carried off
the greater portion of the wounded up the Valley. Their retreat was conducted in perfect order; and even Gen. Shields,
in his accounts of the affair, which were very much exaggerated, of course, for the purposes of popular sensation in the
North, testified of the Confederates, that "such was their gallantry and high state of discipline, that at no time during the
battle or pursuit did they give way to panic."
The enemy had but little reason to boast of the battle of
Kernstown. In fact, the affair was without general signification. It was an attack by the Confederates, undertaken on
false information, gallantly executed, and, although unsuccessful, was not disastrous. The Northern troops had made no advance in the Valley; from the Manassas line they had actually
retired; nor had they any considerable body of troops this side
of Centreville. Whether they would ever attempt to execute
their original plan, of a march through Piedmont to Richmond,
was now more than problematical.
The greater portion of our dead left on the field of battle
were buried under the direction of the mayor of Winchester.
Some fifty citizens collected the dead, dug a great pit on the
battle-field, and gently laid the poor fellows in their last resting-place. It was a sad sight, and sadder still to see women
looking carefully at every corpse to try to identify the bodies
of their friends. Scarcely a family in the county but had a
relative there. But their suffering did not mollify the noble
Southern women of Winchester. Every feeling, testified a
Federal officer who witnessed the sad and harrowing scenes of
the battle-field, seemed to have been extinguished in their intense hatred of " the Yankees."  " They would say,'You may
bring the whole force of the North here, but you can never
conquer us, —we will shed our last drop of blood,'" &c.
Col. Ashby covered the retreat of the army, and by his tireless energy, made himself, as on many other occasions, the
terror of the Yankees. The daring feats and heroic exploits of
this brave officer were universal themes of admiration in the
South, and were rehearsed by the people of the Valley, who




286           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
idolized him, with infinite gratification and delight. A few
months before, when Winchester had been evacuated, under
orders from the War Department, he had been unwilling to
leave the town, and had lingered behind, watching the approach of the haughty and unprincipled foe into this ancient
town of the Valley. He waited until the Federal columns had
filled the streets, and, within two hundred yards of them,
cheered for the Southern Confederacy, and then dashed off at
full speed for the Valley turnpike. He reached it only to find
his way intercepted by two of the enemy's pickets. Nothing
daunted, he drew his pistol and shot down one of the pickets,
and, seizing the other, dragged him off a prisoner, and brought
him safely to the Confederate lines. It was adventures like
these, as well as extraordinary gallantry in the field, that made
the name of the brave Virginia cavalier conspicuous throughout
the South, and a tower of strength with those for whose homes
and firesides he had been struggling.
The personal appearance of Col. Ashby was not striking.
He was of small stature. He wore a long black beard, and
had dark, glittering eyes. It was not generally known that
the man who performed such deeds of desperate valor and enterprise, and who was generally pictured to the imagination as
a fierce, stalwart, and relentless adventurer, was as remarkable
for his piety and devoutness as for his military achievements.
His manners were a combination, not unusual in the truly refined spirit, of gentleness with the most enthusiastic courage.
It was said of him, that when he gave his most daring commands, he would gently draw his sabre, wave it around his
head, and then his clear, sounding voice would ring out the
simple but thrilling words, " Follow me." In such a spirit we
recognize the fine mixture of elements that the world calls
heroism.
The Northern forces pursued neither the retreat of Johnston
from Manassas, nor that of Jackson from Winchester. On the
contrary, they withdrew the forces first advanced, and blocked
the road between Strasburg and Winchester. It was known,
however, about this time, that the canips at Washington had
been rapidly diminished, and that McClellan had totally disappeared from the scene. At the, same time an unusual confidence was expressed in the Northern journals that Richmond




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          287
would now fall almost immediately into the hands of their
generals. Then followed the daily announcements of fleets of
transports arriving in Hampton Roads, and the vast extension
of the long line of tents at Newport News. These were evident indications of the intention of the enemy to abandon for
the present other projects for the capture of Richmond, so as to
make his great effort on the Peninsula formed by the York and
James rivers.
General Magruder, the hero of Bethel, and a commander
who was capable of much greater achievements, was left to confront the growing forces on the Peninsula, which daily menaced him, with an army of seventy-five hundred men, while the
great bulk of the Confederate forces were still in motion in the
neighborhood of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and he
had no assurance of reinforcements. The force of the enemy
was ten times his own; they had commenced a daily cannonading upon his lines; and a council of general officers was convened, to consult whether the little army of seven thousand
five hundred men should maintain its position in the face of tenfold odds, or retire before the enemy. The opinion of the
council was unanimous for the latter alternative, with the exception of one officer, who declared that every man should die
in the intrenchments before the little army should fall back.
"By G-, it shall be so I" was the sudden exclamation of Gen.
Magruder, in sympathy with the gallant suggestion. The resolution demonstrated a remarkable heroism and spirit. Our
little force was adroitly extended, over a distance of several
miles, reaching from Mulberry Island to Gloucester Point, a
regiment being posted here and there, in every gap plainly
open to observation, and on other portions of the line the men
being posted at long intervals, to give the appearance of numbers to the enemy. Had the weakness of Gen. Magruder at
this time been known to the enemy, he might have suffered the
consequences of his devoted and self-sacrificing courage; but
as it was, he held his lines on the Peninsula until they were
reinforced by the most considerable portion of Gen. Johnston's
forces, and made the situation of a contest upon which the attention of the public was unanimously fixed as the most decisive of the war.
It is not our purpose at this time to follow up the develop



288           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
ments of the situation on the Peninsula. We must, for the
present, leave affairs there in the crisis to which we have
brought them, while we refer to a serious recurrence of disasters about this time on our sea-coast and rivers, where again
the lesson was repeated to us of the superiority of the enemy
on the water, not by any mysterious virtue of gunboats, but
solely on account, as we shall show, of inefficiency and improvidence in our government.
On the 4th of March, the town of Newbern, in North Carolina, was taken by the Federals, under command of General
Burnside, after a feeble resistance. The day before, the Federals had landed about ten thousand troops fifteen miles below
Newbern, and at the same time had ascended the river with a
fleet of gunboats, which, as they advanced, shelled the woods
in every direction. The next morning the fighting was commenced at early dawn, and continued until half-past ten o'clock,
when our forces, being almost completely surrounded, were
compelled to retreat. All the forts on the river were abandoned. Fort Thompson was the most formidable of these. It
was four miles from Newbern, and mounted thirteen heavy
guns, two of them rifled 32-pounders. The guns at Fort Ellis,
three miles from Newbern, were dismounted and thrown down
the embankment. Fort Lane, mounting eight guns, two miles
from Newbern, was blown up. In the first attack upon our
lines, at 7 o'clock, the enemy had been repulsed three times
successively by our infantry, with the assistance of Fort Thompson; but having flanked our forces on the right, which caused
a panic among the militia, he had changed the fortunes of
the day. The railroad bridge across Neuse river was not
burnt until after all our troops had crossed, except those whose
escape had been effectually cut off by the enemy. The Federals achieved a complete victory after a contest of very short
duration, having taken about five hundred prisoners, over fifty
pieces of cannon, and large quantities of arms and ammunition.
The easy defeat of the Confederate forces at Newbern, the
surrender of our fortifications, on which thousands of dollars
had recently been expended, and the abandonment not only of
our heavy guns, but of some of our field-guns also, was a subject of keen mortification to the South. The fact was known
that our force at Newbern was very inadequate-not more than




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          289
five thousand-a part of whom were militia, and had been left.
despite of appeals to the government for reinforcements, to encounter whatever force Gen. Burnside should choose to bring
against them. Gen. Branch, who was in command of the Confederate forces, and who displayed courage and judgment, was
compelled to fight at Newbern. To have given it up without
a struggle, after all that had been done there, would have
brought him into discredit with the government, the people,
and the troops. As it was, the enemy had gained an important
position within easy reach of the Wilmington and Weldon
road. But few persons remained in the town. Seven trains left
for Goldsboro', all crowded to overflowing by fugitive soldiers
and panic-stricken people. A shell from the enemy's gunboats
fell within twenty-five feet of the last train as it moved off
Women and children were overtaken by the trains many miles
from Newbern, some in vehicles of various kinds, and many on
foot. The panic and disorganization extended for miles, and
yet there was a nobility in the determination of the population
of Newbern to fly anywhere rather than court security in their
homes by submission to the enemy. The town of Newbern
originally contained twelve hundred people; when occupied by
the enemy, it contained one hundred people, male and female,
of the old population.
On the 12th day of April one year ago, the guns and mortars of the South Carolina batteries opened upon the then hostile walls of Fort Sumter. Strangely enough, the first anniversary of the event was signalized by the startling and uncomfortable announcement that Fort Pulaski, the principal
defence of the city of Savannah, had surrendered to the Yankees, after a brief bombardment. The news was all the more
unpleasant, from the fact that the day before the public had
been informed by telegraph that the enemy's batteries had
been " silenced." It seems that they were not silent until our
flag was struck. The surrender was unconditional, and the
garrison, consisting of more than three hundred men, four of
whom had been wounded and none killed, were made prisoners
of war.
Another Confederate disaster on the coast shortly ensued, in
the surrender of Fort Macon. This fort, on the North Carolina
coast, was surrendered on the 25th of April, after a bombard19




290           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
ment from the enemy's land batteries of less than twelve hours.
It commanded the entrance to Beaufort harbor, and was said
to be the most formidable fortification on the North Carolina
coast.
For these painful and almost humiliating disasters on our
coast and rivers, a ready but very silly excuse was always at
hand. A most pernicious and false idea appeared to have
taken possession of the public mind with reference to the essential superiority of the enemy on water. A very obvious reflection of common sense dissipates the idea of any essential advantage which the enemy had over us on the water. The failures
in our defences had been most unjustly attributed to the bugbear of gunboats, when they ought to have been ascribed to no
more unavoidable causes than our own improvidence and neglect.
The suggestion of common sense is, that if it was possible
to make a vessel ball-proof, it was certainly much easier to
make a fortification ball-proof. The excuse had been persistently made for our lack of naval defences, that it was difficult
to;supply the necessary machinery, and almost impossible, with
the limited means at our disposal, to construct steam-engines.
But these excuses about lack of machinery and steam-engines
did not apply to our land defences. No machinery was necessary; Xno engine was necessary; and no consultation of curved
lines -of naval architecture was required to make a land fortification.ball-proof. The iron plate that was fitted on the side of
a gunboat had only to be placed on a dead surface, to make
the land fortification a match in invulnerability to the ironplated man-of-war. This was common sense. Unfortunately,
however, it was a common sense which the scientists of West
Point had been unable to appreciate. While the public mind
had been busy in ascribing so many of our late disasters to
some essential and mysterious virtue in iron-plated boats, it
seemed never to have occurred to it that it was much easier to
construct iron-plated batteries on land than the iron-plated
sides of a ship, besides giving the structure the power of locomotion, and that our defeats on the water, instead of being
charged to "gunboats," or to "the dispensations of Providence," had been but the natural results of human neglect and
human stupidity.




TEE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                  291
CHAPTER XII.
The Campaign in the Mississippi Valley.-Bombardment of Island No. 10.-The
Scenes, Incidents, and Results.-Fruits of the Northern Victory.-Movements of the
Federals on the Tennessee River.-The BATTLE OF SHILOH.-A "Lost Opportunity."
-Death of General Albert Sidney Johnston.-Comparison between the Battles of
Shiloh and Manassas.-The Federal Expeditions into North Alabama.-Withdrawal
of the Confederate Forces from the Trans-Mississippi District.-General Price and
his Command.-The FALL OF NEW ORLEANS.-The Flag Imbroglio.-Major-generai
Butler.-Causes of the Disaster.-Its Results and Consequences.-The Fate of the
Valley of the Mississippi.
TRm last period of our narrative of events in Tennessee, left
Gen. Johnston making a southward movement towards the left
bank of the Tennessee river, for the objects of the defence of
Memphis and the Mississippi river, and indicated the important
position of Island No. 10, forty-five miles below Columbus, as
still in possession of the Confederates.
This important position in the Mississippi river was defended
by General Beauregard with extraordinary vigor and success
against the fleet of the enemy's gunboats, under the command
of Flag-officer Foote. The works were erected with the highest
engineering skill, were of great strength, and, with their natural
advantages, were thought to be impregnable.
The bombardment of Madrid Bend and Island No. 10 commenced on the 15th of March, and continued constantly night
and day. On the 17th a general attack, with five gunboats
and four mortar-boats, was made, which lasted nine hours.
The attack was unsuccessful. On the first of April, General
Beauregard telegraphed to the War Department at Richmond
that the bombardment had continued for fifteen days, in which
time the enemy had thrown three thousand shells, expending
about one hundred thousand pounds of powder, with the result
on our side of one man killed and none seriously wounded. The
gratifying statement was also made in General Beauregard's
dispatches that our batteries were entirely intact. We had
disabled one of the enemy's gunboats and another was reported
to be sunk, and the results of the bombardment, so far as it had




292           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
continued, afforded room for congratulation that the fantasy of
the invincible power of Yankee gunboats would at last be dispelled, and that the miserable history of the surrender of all our
forts to this power was destined to wind up in a decisive and
brilliant Confederate triumph on the waters of the Mississippi.
The daily bulletin from Island No. 10, for many days, represented that the enemy, after an incessant bombardment of
many hours, had inflicted no injury. The people of the South
were constantly assured that the place was impregnable, and,that the enemy never could pass it.
The bombardment had been one of unparalleled length in
the war. Every day the mortars continued to boom, and still
the cannon of the island replied with dull, sullen roar, wasting
shot and temper alike. The very birds became accustomed to
the artificial thunder, and alighted upon the branches of trees
overhanging the mortars in the sulphurous smoke. The scenes
of this long bombardment are described as affording some of
the most magnificent spectacles-the tongues of flame leaping
from the mouths of the mortars amid a crash like a thousand
thunders, and then the columns of smoke rolling up in beautiful fleecy spirals, developing into rings of exquisite proportions.
It is only necessary for one to realize the sublime poetry of
war, as illustrated in the remarkable scenes at Island No. 10,
to imagine a dozen of these monsters thundering at once, the
air filled with smoke clouds, the gunboats belching out destruction and completely hidden from sight in whirls of smoke, the
shells screaming through the air with an unearthly sound, and
the distant guns of the enemy sending their solid shot above
and around the island, dashing the water up in glistening columns and jets of spray.
While the people of the South were induced to anticipate a
decisive and final repulse of the enemy on the waters of the
lississippi, the news reached them through Northern channels
that the capture of Island No. 10 had been effected on the 8th
of April, and that not only had the position been weakly surrendered, but that we had saved none of our cannon or munitions, had lost our boats, and had left about six hundred prisoners on the island in the hands of the enemy.
The evacuation of the island, which was effected in the greatest precipitation —our sick being abandoned, there being no




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           293
concert of action whatever between the Confederates upon the
island and those occupying the shore, the latter fleeing, leaving
the former to their fate-had taken place but two days after
Gen. Beauregard had left command of the post for important
operations to check the movements of the enemy on the Tennessee river, which were developing a design to cut off his
communication in west Tennessee with the eastern and southern
States. Gen. Makall had been appointed to take command of
the post. He assumed it on the 5th of April, in a flaming order, in which he announced to the soldiers: " Let me tell you
who I am. I am a general made by Beauregard-a general
selected by Gens. Beauregard and Bragg."  In the mean time,
the enemy was busy, and his operations were suffered to escape the vigilance of the Confederate commander. The Federals had cut a canal across the peninsula at New Madrid,
through which the steamers and several barges were taken.
The undertaking was an herculean one. The canal was twelve
miles long, through heavy timber, which had to be sawed off
by hand four feet under water.
One of the enemy's gunboats had succeeded in passing the
island in a heavy fog. On the night of the 5th of April, the
enemy, with a gunboat engaged Rucker's battery. While attention was engaged with this boat, a second gunboat slipped
down unperceived, except by the men at one of the batteries,
who fired two shots at her without effect. The situation was
now serious; the enemy had possession of the river below the
island. On the night of April 6, Gen. Makall moved the infantry and Stewart's battery to the Tennessee shore, to protect the landing from anticipated attacks. The artillerists
remained on the island. The enemy having effected a landing
above and below the island in large force, its surrender might
be considered as a military necessity. But there could be no
excuse for the wretched management and infamous scenes that
attended the evacuation. All our guns, seventy in number,
varying in calibre from 32 to 100 pounders, rifled, were abandoned, together with our magazines, which were well supplied
with powder, large quantities of shot, shell, and other munitions of war. The transports and boats were scuttled. Nothing seems to have been done properly. The guns were spiked
with rat-tail files, but so'imperfectly that several of them




294            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
were rendered serviceable to the enemy in a very short time.
The floating battery, formerly the Pelican Dock at ZNew Orleans, of sixteen heavy guns, after being scuttled, was cut loose.
At daylight it was found lodged a short distance above Point
Pleasant, and taken possession of by the enemy. Four steamers
afloat fell into the hands of the enemy, with all the stores on
board.
The unhappy men on the island were abandoned to their
fate, the Confederates on the mainland having fled with precipitation. On one of the hospital boats were a hundred poor
wretches, half dead with disease and neglect. On the shore
were crowds of our men wandering around among the profusion of ammunition and stores. A few of them effected their
escape through the most remarkable dangers and adventures.
Some trusted themselves to hastily constructed rafts, with
which to float down the Mississippi, hoping to attract the attention and aid of the people living on the shore. Others
gained the upper banks of the river, where, for several days
and nights, they wandered, lost in the extensive cane-brakes,
without food, and in severe toil. Some two or three hundred
of the stragglers, principally from the forces on the mainland,
succeeded in making their way to Bell's Station, on the Ohio
railroad, and reached Memphis.
-The disaster was considerable enough in the loss of Island
No. 10; but the circumstances attending it, and the consequences in the loss of men, cannon, ammunition, supplies, and
every thing appertaining to an army, all of which might possibly have been avoided, increased the regrets of the South,
and swelled the triumph of her enemies. Our total loss in
prisoners, including those taken on the mainland as well as
those abandoned on the island, was probably not less than two
thousand. The Federal Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Welles,
had reason to declare, that "the triumph was not the less
appreciated, because it was protracted, and finally bloodless."
No singfe battle-field had yet afforded to the North such visible
fruits of victory a's had been gathered at Island No. 10.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            295
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
In the mean time, the movements of the enemy on the Tennessee river were preparing the situation for one of the grandest battles that had yet been fought in any quarter of the war,
or had yet illustrated the exasperation and valor of the contestants. Gen. Beauregard had determined to foil the apparent
designs of the enemy to cut off his communication with the
south and east, by concentrating all his available forces at and.
around Corinth. This town is situated at the junction of the
Memphis and Charleston and the Mobile and Ohio railroads,
about ninety-two miles east of Memphis.
Gen. Johnston had taken up a line of march from Murfreesboro, to form a junction of his forces with those of General
Beauregard. By the 1st of April, these united forces were
concentrated along the Mobile and Ohio railroad from Bethel
to Corinth, and on the Memphis and Charleston railroad from
Corinth to Iuka. The army of the Mississippi had received
other important accessions. It was increased by several regiments from Louisiana, two divisions of Gen. Polk's command
from Columbus, and a fine corps of troops from Mobile and
Pensacola. In numbers, in discipline, in the galaxy of the
distinguished names of its commanders, and in every article
of merit and display, the Confederate army in the vicinity of
Corinth was one of the most magnificent ever assembled by the
South on a single battle-field.
The enemy under Gen. Grant, on the west bank of the Tennessee, had obtained a position at Pittsburg and in the direction of Savannah. An advance was contemplated by him, as
soon as he could be reinforced by the army under Gen. Buell,
then known to be advancing for that purpose by rapid marches
from Nashville by the way of Columbus. To prevent this
demonstration, it was determined by Gen. Beauregard to press
the issue without delay. By a rapid and vigorous attack on
Gen. Grant, it was expected he would be beaten back into his
transports and the river, or captured in time to enable the
Confederates to profit by the victory, and remove to the rear
all the stores and munitions that would fall into their hands,
in such an event, before the arrival of Gen. Buell's army on




296           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
the scene. It was never contemplated, however, to retain the
position thus gained and abandon Corinth, the strategic point
of the campaign.
It appears to have been Gen. Beauregard's'plan to have attacked the enemy in their encampments on Saturday, the 5th.
He, therefore, began the movement on Thursday, but the roads
were heavy, and the men could not be got into position before
Saturday. Had the attack been made on that day, the first
day's fighting must have ended the conflict, for the enemy
could have had no hope of aid from Buell. As it was, one
day was lost, and the enemy were constantly inspirited by the
almost momentary expectation of the arrival of Gen. Buell. In
the mean time, courier after courier was sent by Gen. Grant
for Buell to hasten on.
The Confederate forces did not reach the intersection of the
roads from Pittsburg and Hamburg, in the immediate vicinity
of the enemy, until late on Saturday afternoon. Their march
had been tedious and wearisome. The roads were narrow and
traversed a densely wooded country, and a severe rain-storm
had rendered them almost impassable, and had drenched our
troops in bivouac.
The morning of the 6th of April (Sunday) was to usher in
the bloody scenes of a memorable battle. One camp of the
enemy was near Shiloh church-a rude log chapel; and another stretched away in the direction of the road leading from
Pittsburg Landing on the river to Corinth. The scene of the
encampment was a very beautiful and magnificent one, there
being but little undergrowth, and the thin ranks of the tall
forest-trees affording open views, while the interlacing of their
topmost boughs made a picturesque and agreeable canopy. In
a military point of view, the battle-field might be described as
a broken country, presenting opportunities for a great variety
of manceuvres and independent operations by comparatively
small bodies of men.
On the Saturday evening preceding the Sunday fight at
Shiloh, there had been considerable skirmishing on our lines.
Early Sunday morning, before sunrise, Gen. Hardee, in front
of the enemy's camp, made an advance upon it. The enemy
was taken completely by surprise, not expecting to he attacked,
under any circumstances, by our inferior force. Many of the




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            297
men were undressed and in night attire, and the hot breakfasts
prepared by the messes were left untouched for the entertainment of our men. A line of battle was hastily formed by the
enemy, and, in the mean time, our forces were advancing in
every direction. The plan of the battle on our side was to
form three parallel lines-the front, centre, and rear-each line
having its centre and two flanks. The rear constituted the reserve, and the artillery was distributed between the first and
second lines. The front was commanded by Gen. Hardee, the
centre by Gen. Bragg, and the rear by Gen. Polk-Johnston
and Beauregard being with the latter.
From daylight until a little after six o'clock, the fighting
was principally between the pickets and skirmishers, but, at
the latter hour, a portion of our main body appearing in sight,
fire opened with artillery, and for an hour or more one heard
nothing but the incessant uproar of the heavy guns. Our men,
though many of them were unaccustomed to the iron hail, received the onset coolly, awaiting the orders to rise from their
recumbent position and advance. In due time these came, and
thenceforward through the day, brave and disciplined as were
the Federal troops, nothing seemed capable of resisting the
desperate valor of the Confedrates. The enemy fell like chaff
before the wind. Broken in ranks, they rallied behind trees
and in the underbrush, only to be again repulsed and driven
back.
The scenery of the battle-field was awfully sublime. Far up
in the air shells burst into flame like shattered stars, and passed
away in little clouds of white vapor, while others filled the air
with a shrill scream, and burst far in the rear. All along the
line the faint smoke of the musketry rose lightly, while, from
the mouths of the cannon, sudden gusts of intense white smoke
burst up all around. Every second of time had its especial
tone. Bullets shredded the air, and whistled swiftly by, or
struck into trees, fences, wagons, or with their peculiar " chuck"
into men. Every second of time had its especial tone, and the
forest, among whose branches rose the wreathing smoke, was
packed with dead.
The irresistible attack of our troops was compared by Gen.
Beauregard, in his official report of the battle, to "' an Alpine
avalanche." The enemy were driven back by a series of dar



298            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
ing, desperate, and Auccessful charges, the various Confederate
regiments and brigades rolling rapidly forward to the sound of
enthusiastic cheers. In all of these, both general and field
officers displayed a bravery that amounted to sheer recklessness,
frequently leading the men into the very teeth of the opposing
fire. It was these inspiring examples of personal valor which
made our troops invincible.
At half-past two, Gen. Johnston, the commander-in-chief of
the Confederates, fell. He was leading a charge upon the third
camp of the enemy. The fatal wound was inflicted by a
musket-ball on the calf of his right leg, and was considered by
him as only a flesh wound. Soon after receiving it, he gave
an order to Governor Harris, who was acting as volunteer aid
to him, who, on his return to Gen. Johnston, in a different part
of the field, found him exhausted from loss of blood, and reeling in his saddle. Riding up to him, Governor Harris asked:
"Are you hurt?"  To which the now dying hero answered:
" Yes, and I fear mortally;" and then stretching out both arms
to his companion, fell from his horse, and soon after expired.
No other wounds were discovered upon his person.
Prudently the information of Gen. Johnston's fall was kept
from the army. But the day was already secured. Amid the
roar of artillery and the cheers of the victorious army, the
commander-in-chief quietly breathed his last. Our forces were
successfully pushing the enemy back upon the Tennessee river.
It was after six o'clock in the evening when his last position
was carried. The. remnant of his army had been driven in
utter disorder to the immediate vicinity of Pittsburg, under the
shelter of the heavy guns of his iron-clad gunboats, and the
Confederates remained undisputed masters of his well-selected,
admirably provided cantonments, after over twelve hours of
obstinate conflict with his forces, who had been beaten from
them and the contiguous covert, but only by a sustained onset
of all the men we could bring into action.
The substantial fruits of our victory were immense. We
were in possession of all the enemy's encampments between
Owl and Lick rivers, nearly all of his field artillery, about
thirty flags, colors, and standards, over three thousand prisoners, including a division commander (General Prentiss) and
several brigade commanders, thousands of small-arms, an iln



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           299
mense supply of subsistence, forage, and minitions of war, and
a large amount of means of transportation. Never, perhaps,
was an army so well provided as that of the enemy, and never,
perhaps, was one so completely stripped on a single battle-field.
On taking possession of the enemy's encampments, there were
found therein the complete muster-rolls of the expedition up
the river. It appeared that we had engaged the divisions of
Gens. Prentiss, Sherman, Hurlbut, McClernand, and Smith, of
9,000 men each, or at least 45,000 men. Our entire force in
the engagement could not have exceeded 38,000 men. The
flower of the Federal troops were engaged, being principally
Western men, from the States of Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin,
and Iowa. There were also quite a number of Missourians
opposed to us, who are said to have fought with great spirit,
opposite Gen. Gladden's brigade, on the extreme right. These
men were accustomed to lives of hardihood and adventure.
The captured Federal general, Prentiss, did not hesitate to
testify to General Beauregard, "You have whipped our best
troops to-day."
The enemy's artillery on the field, according to Gen. Prentiss' statement, numbered in all one hundred and eight pieces,
or eighteen batteries of six pieces each. Their small-arms
were of every description: Minie rifles, Enfield rifles, Maynard
rifles, Colt's six-shooters, common muskets, &c., all of the best
quality and workmanship. The Federal equipments left
nothing to be desired. Their clothing was of the best quality
and abundant, and the same may be said of their supplies.
An abundance of excellent coffee was found in their tentsbeef, pork, butter, cheese, navy biscuit, and sugar. The famous
expedition to the plains of Manassas was not better fitted out
or supplied.
On Sunday night, Gen. Beauregard established his headquarters at the little church of Shiloh, and our troops were
directed to sleep on their arms in the enemy's encampment.
The hours, however, that should have been devoted to the
refreshment of nature were spent by many of the troops in a
disgraceful hunt after the spoils. The possession of the rich
camp of the enemy seemed to have demoralized whole regiments. All through the night and early the next morning
the hunt after the spoils was continued. Cowardly citizens




300           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
and rapacious soldiers were engaged alike in the wretched
work. They might be seen everywhere, plundering the tents
out of which the enemy had been driven, and loading themselves down with the spoils. The omission of discipline, which
permitted these scenes, is not pardonable even in the license and
indulgences which generally attend the victory of an army.
The spoils of a victorious army should be carefully gathered
up and preserved for the use of the army itself. They are the
just possession of the conqueror, are frequently of great value,
and should not be lost or carried off, where they can be of use.
But, more than this, nothing could be more likely to demoralize troops than the indiscriminate pillage of an enemy's camp.
It creates disorganization in the army; it so far stands in the
way of a vigorous pursuit of the enemy; it demoralizes the
spoiler himself, and lets him down at one step from an honorable soldier to a plundering brigand. It is no wonder that the
troops which confronted the enemy next morning in the vicinity
of Pittsburg Landing betrayed, however bravely they fought in
comparison with the enemy, a diminution of spirit and visible
signs of demoralization.
Sunday night found both armies in a critical situation. Gen.
Beauregard hoped, from news received by a special dispatch,
that delays had been encountered by Gen. Buell in his march
from Columbia, and that his main force, therefore, could not
reach the field of battle in time to save Gen. Grant's shattered
fugitive forces from capture or destruction on the following
day. The situation of Gen. Grant was that of the most extreme anxiety to himself. The enemy had supposed that the
last act of the tragedy would have been completed on Saturday
evening. The reserve line of the Federals was entirely gone.
Their whole army was crowded into a circuit of half to twothirds of a mile around the landing. They had been falling
back all day. The next repulse would have put them into the
river, and there were not transports enough to cross a single
division before the Confederates would be upon them. As the
lull in the firing of the Confederates took place, and the angry
rattle of musketry died upon the ears of the fugitive Federals,
they supposed that the pursuing army was preparing for the
grand final rush that was to crown the day's success. But
Gen. Beauregard had been satisfied to pursue the enemy to the




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.               301
river, and to leave him under the cover of his gunboats, without an attempt to penetrate it. When it was understood that
pursuit was called off, Gen. Grant could ill conceal his exultation.  His anxiety was suddenly composed, and, in a tone of
confidence, he exclaimed to the group of officers around him,
"to-morrow  they will be exhausted, and then we will go at
them with fresh troops." *
He was right. Looking across the Tennessee, he could see
a body of cavalry awaiting transportation over. They were
said to be Buell's advance; yet they had been there an hour
or two alone. Suddenly there was a rustle among the gazers.
They saw the gleaming of the gun-barrels, and they caught,
amid the leaves and undergrowth down the opposite side of the
river, glimpses of the steady, swinging tramp of trained soldiers. A division of Buell's army was thbre, and was hailed
with tremendous cheers by the men on the opposite bank of
the river.
The enemy was reinforced on Monday morning by more troops
than Gen. Beauregard could have counted upon. The divisions
of Gens. Nelson, MlcCook, Crittenden, and Thomas, of Buell's
army, had crossed the river, some 25,000 strong; also, Gen. L.
Wallace's division of Gen. Grant's army had been moved up
the river-making at least 33,000 fresh troops. Vigorous
preparations were made by Gen. Beauregard to resist the assault, which was deemed almost certain on Monday. A hot
fire of musketry opened about six o'clock in the morning from
the enemy's quarter upon his advanced lines, and assured him
of the junction of his forces. The battle soon raged with fury,
the enemy being flushed by his reinforcements, and confident
in his largely superior numbers.
* The evidence of a "lost opportunity" in the battle of Shiloh abundantly
appeared in the statements of the Northern commanders. Gen. Prentiss is
reported to have made the following statement: " Gen. Beauregard," he said,
" asked me if we had any works at the river, to which I replied,'you must
consider us poor soldiers, general, if you suppose we would have neglected so
plain a duty!' The truth is, however, we had no works at all. Gen. Beauregard stopped the pursuit at a quarter to six; hid he used the hour still left
him, he could have captured the last man on this side of the river, for Buell
did not cross till Sunday night."
According to Buell's report, our shot were falling among the fugitives
crouching under the river-bank when our troops were called off.




302            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
On the right and centre, the enemy were repulsed in every
attempt he made with his heavy columns in that quarter of the
field; on the left, however, and nearest to the point of arrival
of his reinforcements, he drove forward line after line of his
fresh troops, which were met with resolution and courage.
Again and again our troops were brought to the charge, invariably to win the position at issue, invariably to drive back their
foe. But hour by hour, thus opposed to an enemy constantly
reinforced, the ranks of the Confederates were perceptibly
thinned under the unceasing withering fire of the enemy. By
noon, eighteen hours of hard fighting had sensibly exhausted a
large number; Gen. Beauregard's last reserves had necessarily
been disposed of, and the enemy was evidently receiving fresh
reinforcements after each repulse; accordingly, about 1 P. M.,
he determined to withdraw from so unequal a conflict, securing
such of the results of the victory of the day before as was then
practicable.
The retreat was executed with uncommon steadiness, and
the enemy made no attempt to follow. Gen. Breckinridge
had been posted with his command so as to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the army. Gen. Beauregard had approached him and told him, that it might be necessary for him
to sacrifice himself; for said he, " This retreat must not be a
rout! You must hold the enemy back, if it requires the loss
of your last man!" "Your orders shall be executed to the
letter," said the chivalrous Breckinridge; and gathering his
command, fatigued and jaded and decimated by the toils and
terrors of a two days' battle, he and they prepared to devote
themselves, if necessary, for the safety of the army. There,
weary and hungry, they stood guard and vigil. The enemy,
sorely chastised, did not indeed come as expected; but Breckinridge and his heroes deserve none the less praise.
Never did troops leave a battle-field in better order. Even
the stragglers fell into the ranks, and marched off with those
who had stood more steadily by their colors. The fact that the
enemy attempted no pursuit indicates their condition. They
had gained nothing; we had lost nothing. The Confederates
left the field only after eight hours of incessant battle with a
superior army of fresh troops, whom they had repulsed in every
attack on their ]ines, —so repulsed and crippled, indeed, as to




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           303
leave it unable to take the field for the campaign for which it
was collected and equipped at such enormous expense, and with
such profusion of all the appliances of war. The action of
Monday had not eclipsed the glorious victory of the preceding
day. Sunday had left the Confederate army masters of the,battle-field, their adversary beaten, and a signal victory achieved
after an obstinate conflict of twelve hours.
The result of the engagement was most honorable to the
South, and was recognized as one of the most conspicuous
triumphs to its arms. The exultations, however, of victory in
the public mind were perceptibly tempered by the sad intelligence of the death of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston.
The deceased commander had led, perhaps, one of the most
eventful military lives on this continent. He was graduated at
the West Point Academy in 1820, as lieutenant in the Sixth
Infantry, and after serving in the Black Hawk war left the
army, and in 1836 emigrated to Texas, arriving there shortly
after the battle of San Jacinto. He entered the Texan army
as a private soldier, and was soon promoted to succeed Gen.
Felix Houston in the chief command-an event which led to a
duel between them, in which Johnston was wounded. Having
held the office of senior brigadier-general until 1838, he was
appointed Secretary of War, and in 1839 organized an expedition against the Cherokees, who were totally routed in an engagement on the Neches. In 1840, he retired from office, and
settled upon a plantation in Brazoria county. He was an ardent
advocate for the annexation of Texas to the United States. In
1846, at the request of Gen. Taylor, he took the field against
Mexico, as commander of the volunteer Texan rifle regiment,
in which capacity he served six months. Subsequently, he was
acting inspector-general to Gen. Butler, and for his services at
the sieke of Monterey received the thanks of his commander.
In October, 1849, he was appointed paymaster by President
Taylor, with the rank of major, and, upon the passage of the
act of Congress authorizing the raising of additional regiments
in the army, he was appointed colonel of the Second Cavalry.
In the latter part of 1857T he received the command of the
United States forces sent to coerce the Mormons into obedience
to the Federal authority, and conducted the expedition in
safety to Great Salt Lake City in the opening of the succeeding




304           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
year. Since then he commanded the military district of Utah.
He resigned the Federal service as soon as the intelligence of
the opening of the war reached him, and, travelling from
California by the overland route, reached New Orleans in
August last. Proceeding to Richmond, he was appointed, on
his arrival there, general, to take command of the Department
of the Mississippi.
It is known that Gen. Johnston was the subject of most unjust and hasty public censure in connection with his late
retreat from Bowling Green and fall of Fort Donelson. He is
said, but a few days before the battle in which he fell, to
have expressed the determination to discharge his duties and
responsibilities to his country, according to the best convictions
of his mind, and a resolution to redeem his losses at no distant
day. According to the official report, he fell in the thickest of
the fight.
Keen regrets were felt by the friends of Gen. Johnston on
learning the circumstances of the manner of his death, as these
circumstances appeared to leave but little doubt that his life
might have been saved by surgical attention to his wound.
His only wound was from a musket-ball that severed an inconsiderable artery in the thigh. He was probably unconscious of
the wound, and never realized it until, from the loss of blood,
he fell fainting and dying from his horse.
Gen. Johnston was in the natural vigor of manhood, about
sixty years of age. IHe was about six feet in height, strongly
and powerfully formed, with a grave, dignified, and commanding presence. His features were strongly marked, showing the
Scottish lineage, and denoted great resolution and composure
of character. His complexion, naturally fair, was, from exposure, a deep brown. His manner was courteous, but rather
grave and silent. He had many devoted friends, but they had
been won and secured rather by the native dignity and nobility
of his character, than by his power of address.
Besides the conspicuous loss of the commander-in-chief,
others had fallen whose high qualities were likely to be missed
in the momentous campaign impending. Gen. Gladden, of
South Carolina, had fallen, after having been conspicuous to
his whole corps and the army for courage and capacity. Distinguished in Mexico, on the bloody fields of Contreras and




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           305
Churubusco, he received honorable wounds. Having become
a citizen of Louisiana, and selected to command a noble brigade, he again accumulated honor upon his native State, illustrated its martial fame, served her, no less than Louisiana, with
his life, and sealed the great cause with his best blood.
George M. Johnston, Provisional Governor of Kentucky,
had gone into the action with the Kentucky troops. Having
his horse shot under him on Sunday, he entered the ranks of a
Kentucky company, commanded by Capt. Monroe, son of the
venerable Judge Monroe. At night, while occupying the same
tent with the captain, it occurred to him that he had not taken
the oath which entitled him to be enrolled in that company.
He, therefore, desired the oath to be administered, which was
done with due solemnity; "and now," said the new recruit,
"I will take a night's rest and be ready for a good day's
fighting." Faithfally he kept his pledge, and fell mortally
wounded in the thickest of the fight. In making official mention of his death, Gen. Beauregard declared that (" not Kentucky alone, but the whole Confederacy had sustained a great
loss in the death of this brave, upright, and able man." lHe
was one of a family of heroes, the nephew of the dauntless
chief in the battle of the Thames, and the man who, during a
long public and private career, had been ever regarded one of
the noblest of Kentucky chevaliers, true and worthy governor
of all that was left of Kentucky.
The fearless deportment of the Confederate commanders in
the action was remarkable, as they repeatedly led their commands personally to the onset upon their powerful adversary.
Gen. Bragg had two horses shot under him. Gen. Breckinridge was twice struck by spent balls. Major-general Hardee
had his coat rent by balls and his horse disabled, but escaped
with a slight wound. Gen. Cheatham received a ball in the
shoulder, and Gen. Bushrod Johnson one in the side. Gen.
Bowen was wounded in the neck. Col. Adams, of the First
Louisiana regulars, succeeded Gen. Gladden in the command
of the right wing, and was soon after shot, the ball striking him
just above the eye and coming out behind the ear. Col. Kitt
Williams, of Memphis, and Col. Blythe, of Mississippi, formerly
consul to Havana, were killed.
The casualties of the battle of Shiloh were terrible. In car20




306            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
nage, the engagement might have compared with some of the
most celebrated in the world. Our loss, in the two days,
in killed outright, was 1,728; wounded, 8,012; missing, 959making an aggregate of casualties of 10,699. The loss of the
enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners, unquestionably could
not have been less than 15,000.
The suffering among the large numbers of our wounded was
extreme. They continued to come in from the field slowly,
but it was a long -and agonizing ride that the poor fellows
had to endure, over twenty-two or twenty-three miles of the
roughest and ruttiest road in the Southern Confederacy. The
weather was horrible, and a cold northeast storm pelted mnercilessly down upon them. As they were carried, groaning, from
the vehicle to the floor of the hospital, or laid in the depot, it
was sad to see the suffering depicted upon their pinched and
pallid features. Some of them had lain on the ground, in the
mud, for two nights, and were wet to the skin and shivering
with chills.
In view of the immense carnage of the battle of Shiloh, it
was popularly esteemed the great battle of the war, and was
declared by the Southern newspapers to take preference over
the celebrated action of Manassas. Indeed, the rank which
the Manassas battle held in the history of the war, was disputed
by newspaper critics on every occasion when some other action
presented a larger list of casualities or more prolonged scenes
of' conflict. But these circumstances, by themselves, certainly
afford no standard for measuring the importance and grandeur
of battles. It is true that the action of Shiloh was a brilliant
Confederate success. But in dramatic situation, in completeness of victory, in interesting details, and in the grand historical tragedy of the enemy's rout, no battle has yet been fought
in the war equal to that of Manassas, and, so far, it must hold
its place in the history of the first year of the war as its grand
battle, despite the efforts of interested critics to outrank its
grandeur by that of other achievements, and to do violence to
the justice.of history.
There was one very remarkable circumstance in the battle of'
Manassas, which alone must give it an interest distinguished
from  that of any other engagement of the war.  It was
that, in the army which achieved that victory, there was rep



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            307
resented, by troops, every State then in the Southern Confederacy.
At Shiloh, the troops engaged were principally Tennesseeans, Mississippians, Alabamians, Louisianians, Floridians, Texans, Arkansians, and Kentuckians. There was also a battery
of Georgians in the field. The behavior of these troops had
given us additional reason for the pride so justly felt in Southern arms and Southern prowess. Each and all of them fought
so bravely that no distinction can be made between corps from
different States. Battles are won, by each soldier feeling that
the day depends upon his own individual efforts, and, on the
field of Shiloh, this spirit was displayed, unless in rare instances
of cowardice, or the more numerous exceptions of demloralization by the pillage which had unfortunately been permitted of
the enemy's camp.
The misrepresentations of the North, with reference to the
issue of the war, found a crowning example of falsehood and
effrontery in the official declaration made at Washington of
the action of Shiloh as a brilliant and glorious Federal victory. The Lincoln government had not hesitated to keep up
the spirits of the people of the North by the most audacious
and flaming falsehoods, which would have disgraced even the
war bulletins of the Chinese, and which have always been
found to be, in nations using this expedient in war, evidences
not only of imperfect civilization, but of natural cowardice.
The order of the War Department at Washington, signalizing
its impostured victory at Shiloh, was as disgusting in profanity
as it was brazen in falsehood. It declared that at meridian
of Sunday next after the receipt of this order, at the head of
every regiment in the armies of the United States, there should
be offered by its chaplain a prayer, giving " thanks to the Lord
of Hosts for the recent manifestation of His power in the overthrow of the rebels and traitors." One of the Federal generals
who was incidentally complimented in this order-H. W. Halleck-for his " success" in the Missouri campaign, had written
a voluminous letter to the Washington Cabinet recommending
thepolicy of representing every battle in the progress of the
war as a Federal victory. A government, which Mr. Seward
had declared, in his letter to the British premier on the occasion of his cringing surrender to that power of the Southern




308           THE FIRST YEAR OF THIE WAR.
commissioners, represented "a civilized and humane nation, a
Christian people," had been persuaded to stoop to a policy which
even the spirit and honor of brigands might have scorned, and
which is never recognized but as a weapon of the vilest and
most cowardly of humanity.
Gen. Beauregard retired to Corinth, in pursuance of his
original design to make that the strategic point of his campaign. The Federals had sent several expeditions into North
Alabama, and had succeeded in occupying Huntsville and Decatur; but the design of these expeditions did not appear to
extend further than an attempt to cripple our resources by cutting off the Memphis and Charleston railroad, which runs
through these towns.
In the mean time, it was decided by the government at Richmond to remove our forces from the Trans-Mississippi district,
and to unite the armies of Van Dorn and Price with such force
as Gen. Beauregard already had at Corinth. The order for
leaving the limits of their States was responded to by the Missouri and Arkansas troops with ready and patriotic spirit.
These brave men gave an example of gallantry and devotion,
in leaving their homes and soil in the possession of the enemy,
to fight for other parts of the Confederacy, which was made
especially conspicuous from the contrast afforded by the troops
of some other States which had made unusually large pretensions to patriotism and gallantry, regiments of which had
openly mutinied at being ordered beyond the limits of their
State, or had marched off with evident discontent, although
no enemy held their territory, or. was left in possession of their
homes and the treasures they contained.
The noble " State Guard" of Missouri had a better appreciation of the duties of patriotism than many of their fellowcitizens of the Confederacy, whose contracted and boastful
spirit had made them louder in professions of chivalry and de-,otion. They followed their beloved commander without a
murmur across the waters of the Mississippi, turning their
backs upon their homes, for which they had fought with a
gallantry and devotion unequalled by any other struggle of the
war., They felt that while they were fighting for the fortunes
of the Confederacy, they were also contending for the ultimate
restoration of Missouri, and that they would serve their State




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                   309
most effectually by following promptly and cheerfully Gens.
Van Dorn and Price to Tennessee. Their leader had been
made a major-general in the Confederate service; the tardy
act of promotion having been at last done from motives of
policy, after all efforts had been made in vain to wring it from
the obtuse official sense of justice. His influence was used to
lead the troops of Missouri to new and distant fields of service, and his noble, patriotic appeals could not but be effectual
to nen who loved him, who had suffered with him, and were
almost as his children.*
* The annexed address of Gen. Price to the troops, who followed him across
the Mississippi into the Confederate camp, will strike the reader as an admirable appeal. Comprehensive in its terms, Napoleonic in spirit, and glowing with patriotic fire, it challenges comparison with some of the military
orders of the most celebrated commanders in history.
HEADQUARTERS, MISSOURI STATE GUARD,
Des Are, Arkansas, April 3, 1862.
Soldiers of the State Guard:
I command you no longer. I have this day resigned the commission
which your patient endurance, your devoted patriotism, and your dauntless
bravery have made so honorable. I have done this that I may the better
serve you, our State, and our country-that I may the sooner lead you back
to the fertile prairies, the rich woodlands and majestic streams of our beloved
Missouri, that I may the more certainly restore you to your once happy homes,
and to the loved ones there.
Five thousand of those who have fought side by side with us under the
grizzly bears of Missouri, have followed me into the Confederate camp. They
appeal to you, as I do, by all the tender memories of the past, not to leave us
now, but to go with us wherever the path of duty may lead, till we shall have
conquered a peace, and won our independence by brilliant deeds upon new
fields of battle.
Soldiers of the State Guard! veterans of six pitched battles and nearly
twenty skirmishes! conquerors in them all! your country, with its "ruined
hearths and shrines," calls upon you to rally once more in her defence, and
rescue her forever from the terrible thraldom which threatens her. IJknow
that she will not call in vain. The insolent and barbarous hordes which have
dared to invade our soil, and to desecrate our homes, have just met with a
signal overthrow beyond the Mississippi. Now is the time to end this unhappy war. If every man will but do his duty, his own roof will shelter him
in peace from the storms of the coming winter.
Let not history record that the men who bore with patience the privations
of Cowskin Prairie, who endured uncomplainingly the burning heats of a
Missouri summer, and the frosts and snows of a Missouri winter; that the
men who met the enemy at Carthage, at Oak Hills, at Fort Scott, at Lexington, and in numberless lesser battle-fields in Missouri, and met them but to




310            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
It was generally considered in the South that the victory of
its arms at Shiloh fully compensated the loss of Island No. 10,
and that the Mississippi river below Fort Pillow, with its rich
and productive valley, might be accounted safe, with the great
army at Corinth covering Memphis, and holding the enemy in
check on the land. But a great disaster was to occur where it
was least expected, and where it involved the most immense
consequences-a disaster which was to astound the South, which
was to shake the confidence of the world in the fortunes of the
Confederacy, and which was to lead, by unavoidable steps, to
the abandonment to the enemy of the great Valley of the Mississippi.
THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS.
When it was known in Richmond that the Federal fleet,
which had so long threatened New Orleans, had at last commenced an attack on the Mississippi river forts, Jackson and
St. Philip, no uneasiness was felt for the result. The enemy's
fleet, which was to be engaged in this demonstration, was of
formidable size. It consisted of forty-six sail, carrying two
hundred and eighty-six guns and twenty-one mortars; the
whole under the command of Flag-officer Farragut, a renegade
Tennesseean. But it was declared, with the most emphatic
confidence, that New  Orleans was impregnable; the forts,
Jackson and St. Philip, were considered but as the outer line
of defences; vast sums of money had been expended to line the
shores of the river with batteries; the city itself was occupied
by what was popularly supposed to be a large and disciplined
Confederate force under Gen. Lovell, and in its harbor was a
fleet consisting of twelve gunboats, one iron-clad steamer, and'
the famous ram Manassas.
The authorities at Richmond did not hesitate to express the
most unlimited confidence in the safety of New Orleans, and
conquer them; that the men who fought so bravely and so well at Elk Horn;
that the unpaid soldiery of Missouri were, after so many victories, and after
so much suffering, unequal to the great task of achieving the independence
of their magnificent State.
Soldiers i I go but to mark a pathway to our homes. Follow me I
STERLING PRICE,




THE FIRSTr YEAR OF THE WAR.          311
refused even to entertain the probability of the enemy's penetrating the outer line of defence, constituted by the river forts,
which were about sixty miles below the city. General Duncan,
who was said to be the best artillerist in the Confederate service, was in command of the forts. On the 23d of April he
had telegraphed the most encouraging account of their condition. The bombardment had then been continued for a week
with extraordinary vigor. Nearly 25,000 thirteen-inch shell
had been thrown by the enemy's mortar-boats, many thousands
having fallen within the fort. But, in spite of this unremitting
bombardment, the works were not at all damaged; only three
guns had been dismounted, and the garrison had suffered only
to the extent of five killed and ten wounded.
The public were inspired with confidence of a favorable
result. The citizens of New Orleans, never doubting the impregnability of the defences of their city, were occupied as
usual with the avocations of business and trade. The morning
succeeding the date of the encouraging telegram of General
Duncan was to witness scenes of the most extraordinary consternation, and to usher in the appalling intelligence of the
enemy's approach to the city.
At half-past three o'clock, on the morning of the 24th of
April, the Federal fleet steamed up the river and opened on
our gunboats and both the forts, Jackson and St. Philip.. The
fire was vigorously returned by our side, and in a very short
time became perfectly furious, the enemy's fleet and our whole
force being engaged. In about one hour several of the enemy's
vessels passed the forts-the first one in the advance having
our night signal flying, which protected her from the fire of
our boats, until she ran up close and opened the fire herself.
The citizens of New Orleans were awakened from their dream
of security to hear the tolling of the alarm bells announcing
the approach of the foe. It was about 9 o'clock, on the morning of the 24th, that the intelligence was received. The whole
city was at once thrown into intense commotion; every one
rushed into the streets-to the public places —to head-quarters
-to the City Hall-inquiring the meaning of the agitation
which prevailed, the extent of the danger, and its proximity.
It was soon announced, on authority, that the enemy's vessels
had succeeded in passing the forts and were then on their way




312           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
to the city. The number was not known, but was afterwards
ascertained to amount to five heavy sloops-of-war and seven or
eight gunboats.
The attempt of the enemy had been audacious, but was aided
by various contingencies. The defences of the Mississippi
consisted of the two forts already mentioned-Jackson and St.
Philip-the former situated on the left bank, and the latter on
the right bank of the river. About three-quarters of a mile
below, the river had been obstructed by means of a raft consisting of a line of eleven dismasted schooners, extending from
bank to bank, strongly moored, and connected together with
six heavy chains. Unfortunately, a violent storm had rent a
large chasm in the raft, which could not be closed in time.
It appears, too, that on the night of the attack, the river
had not been lighted by fire-rafts, although General Lovell had
several times requested that it should be done. Moreover, the
person in charge of the signals neglected to throw up rockets
on the approach of the fleet, and, by a strange coincidence, the
enemy's signals, on that night, were identically the same as
those used by our gunboats. The consequence was, that the
advance of the enemy's vessels was not discovered until they
were abreast of the forts.
The conflict between the Federal fleet and our fleet and forts,
was of a desperate character. The forts opened fire from all
their guns that could be brought to bear; but it was too late
to produce much impression. The ships passed on, the Hartford, Commodore Farragut's flag-ship in the van, delivering
broadsides of grape, shrapnell, and round-shot at the.forts on
either side. On arriving at this point they encountered the
Confederate fleet, consisting of seventeen vessels in all, only
about eight of which were armed. The Confederate gunboats
carried, some of them, two guns, and others only one. Nevertheless, they fought with desperation against the enemy's overwhelmingforce, ufitil they were all driven an shore and scuttled
or burned by their commanders.  The IManassas was not
injured by the enemy's fire. She was run ashore and then
sunk. The Louisiana, the great iron-clad vessel, built to compete with the success lately won by the famous Virginia, was
not in good working order. She could not manceuvre, and
only her three bow-guns could be used, although her full com



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           313
plement consisted of eighteen. She emerged from the action
totally uninjured. The broadsides of the Pensacola, delivered
three times, within a distance of ten yards, failed to loosen a
single fastening, or to penetrate a single plate.  The forts,
likewise, remained intact; but the garrisons lost 52, in killed
and wounded. Commander McIntosh was desperately wounded.
He and Commander Mitchell both stood on the deck of the
Louisiana during the whole engagement.
Gen. Lovell arrived just in time to see the Federal fleet passing Fort St. Philip, and to witness the desperate but ineffectual
attempt of the Confederate gunboats to check its progress up
the river. Just at this moment, the Iroon, one of the enemy's
vessels started in pursuit of the Doubloon, Gen. Lovell's boat,
and was rapidly overhauling her, when the Governor Moore
darted upon the Iroon, and ran into her three times. The
Federal vessel managed to escape from this assault, and was
again chasing the Doubloon, when the Quitman attacked her,
ran into her amidships, and sank her. Thus General Lovell
narrowly escaped capture. In the mean time, Captain Kennon,
commanding the gunboat Governor Moore, sped down the
river into the midst of the enemy's fleet, darting hither and
thither, attacking first one and then another of his monstrous
antagonists, until he had fired away his last round of ammunition. He then drove his vessel ashore, and applied the torch
to her with his own hand. In this way the forts were eluded,
the Confederate naval forces destroyed, and the great city of
New Orleans placed at the mercy of the Federal squadron.
At 2 o'clock, P. M., on the 24th, General Lovell arrived at
the city, having driven and ridden almost the whole way up
along the levee. He was immediately called on by the mayor
and many other citizens, and in reply to the inquiries of these
gentlemen, stated that the intelligence already received was
correct; that the enemy's fleet had passed the forts in force,
and that the city was indefensible and untenable.
The hasty withdrawal of Gen. Lovell's army from the city
drew upon him severe public censure; but the applications of
this censure were made in ignorance of the facts, and the evidence which afterwards transpired showed that the evacuation
had been made at the urgent instance of the civil authorities
themselves of New Orleans, who had entreated the Confederate




314           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
commander to retire from their midst, in order to save the city
from the risk of bombardment. Gen. Lovell expressed a readiness and willingness to remain with all the troops under his
command. But it was the undivided expression of public
opinion that the army had better retire and save the city from
destruction; and, accordingly, the general ordered his troops
to rendezvous at Camp Moore, about seventy miles above New
Orleans, on the Jackson railroad.
A demand was made by Farragut for the surrender of the
command, which Gen. Lovell positively refused, but told the
officer who bore the message, that if any Federal troops were
landed he would attack them. Two days after he retired, it
was said that the city had changed its purpose,.and preferred
a bombardment to occupation by the enemy. General Lovell
promptly ordered a train and proceeded to New Orleans, and
immediately had an interview with Mayor Monroe, offering, if
such was the desire of the authorities and people, to return
with his command and hold the city as long as a man and shot
were left.
This offer not being accepted, it was decided that the safety
of the large number of unprotected women and children should
be looked to, and that the fleet would be permitted to take
possession. The raw and poorly armed infantry could by this
time have done nothing against the fleet.
The impression which prevailed, that General Lovell had a
large army under his command, was singularly erroneous.
His army had been stripped to reinforce that at Corinth, and,
since the 1st of March, he had sent ten full regiments. to Gen.
Beauregard, besides many companies of cavalry and artillery.
The morning report on the day of the evacuation of New Orleans showed his force to be about twenty-eight hundred men,
two-thirds of whom were the volunteer and military companies
which had recently been put in camp.
Notwithstanding, however, these facts, the circumstances in
which Gen. Lovell agreed to evacuate the city under the
persuasion of the civil authorities, appeared by no means to be
in that desperate extremity that would have justified the step
in military judgment; and it was thought by a considerable
portion of the public, not without apparent reason, that the
evacuation, at the time it was undertaken, was ill-advised,




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.               315
hasty, and the result of panic or selfish clamors in the community.
The evacuation was begun on the 24th of April. At this
time the river forts had not fallen; but two of the enemy's
gunboats actually threatened the city; and the works at Chalmette-five 32-pounders on one side of the river, and nine on
the other-were still intact. But it is known that there were
reasons other than those which were apparent to the public,
which decided Gen. Lovell to evacuate the city, and which
were kept carefully to himself for obvious reasons. Gen. Lovell
was fully aware that a single frigate anchored at Kenner's
plantation, ten miles above the city, where the swamp and the
river approached within less than a mile of each other, and
through which narrow neck the railroad passes, would have
effectually obstructed an exit of troops or stores from the city
by land.
This was doubtless the real or most powerful reason for the
evacuation of the city.*
On the morning of the next day, the Federal ships appeared
off the Chalnette batteries, which exchanged a few shots with
them, but without effect. Passing the lower batteries, the ships
came up the river Under full headway, the Hartford leading,
then the Brooklyn, the Richmond, the Pensacola, and six gunboats. On and on they came, until they had extended their
line a distance of about five miles, taking positions at intervals
of about 900 yards apart. The scene on the water and in the
city was alike extraordinary. The Confederate troops were still
busy in the work of evacuation, and the streets were thronged
with carts, drays, vehicles of all descriptions, laden with the
multifarious articles constituting the paraphernalia and implements of warfare. Officers on horseback were galloping hither
and thither, receiving and executing orders. The streets were
* The water at Kenner's was so high that a ship's guns could have had a
clear sweep from the river to the swamp, and there would have been no necessity of any bombardment; the people and the army of New Orleans would
have been cut off and starved into a surrender in a short time. The failure of
the enemy to occupy Kenner's, for which it is impossible to account, enabled
Gen. Lovell to bring out of the city nearly all the.portable government
property necessary for war purposes, as well as a large part of the State
property.




316            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
crowded with persons rushing about with parcels of sugar,
buckets of molasses, and packages of provisions plundered
from the public stores. Others were busying themselves with
patriotic zeal to destroy property of value to the enemy, and
huge loads of cotton went rumbling along on the way to the
levee.
No sooner had the Federal fleet turned the point and come
within sight of the city, than the work of destruction of property commenced. Vast columns of smoke ascended to the sky,
darkening the face of heaven, and obscuring the noon-day sun;
for five miles along the levee fierce flames darted through the
lurid atmosphere, their baleful glare struggling in rivalry with
the sunlight; great ships and steamers, wrapped in fire, floated
down the river, threatening the Federal vessels with destruction by their fiery contact. In front of the various presses,
and at other points along the levee, the cotton had been piled
up and submitted to the torch. It was burned by order of
the governor of Louisiana and of the military commander of
the Confederate States.  Fifteen thousand bales were consumed, the value of which would have been about a million
and a half of dollars. The tobacco stored in the city, being all
held by foreign residents on foreign account, was not destroyed.
The specie of the banks, to the amount of twelve or fifteen millions, was removed from the city and placed in a secure place;
so were nearly all the stores and movable property of the
Confederate States. But other materials were embraced in the
awful conflagration. About a dozen large river steamboats,
twelve or fifteen ships, some of them laden with cotton, a great
floating battery, several unfinished gunboats, the immense ram,
the Mississippi, and the docks on the other side of the river,
were all embraced in the fiery sacrifice. The Mississippi was
an iron-clad frigate, a superior vessel of her class, and accounted
to be by far the most important naval structure the Confederate
government had yet undertaken.
On evacuating the city, Gen. Lovell had left it under the exclusive jurisdiction of Mayor Monroe. That officer, although
he had appealed to Gen. Lovell to evacuate the city, so as to
avoid such exasperation or conflict as might put the city in
peril of bombardment, was not willing to surrender it to the
enemy; but was content, after due protestations of patriotic




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WARI           317
fervor, that the enemy should perform, without interruption,
the ceremony of surrender for himself in taking down the flags
flying over all the public buildings of the city. A correspondence ensued between the mayor and the flag-officer of the
enemy's fleet. The correspondence was certainly of very unnecessary length on the part of the mayor, and was travestied
in the Northern newspapers as a controversy between " Farrago and Farragut."  But the sentiments of the mayor, although tedious and full of vain repetitions, were just and
honorable. He declared, with explanations that were not
necessary to be given to the enemy, and at a length that
showed rather too much the, vanity of literary style, that the
citizens of New Orleans yielded to physical force alone, and
that they maintained their allegiance to the government of the
Confederate States.
On the morning of the 26th of April, a force landed from the
sloop-of-war Pensacola, lying opposite Esplanade-street and
hoisted a United States flag upon the mint. It had not remained
there long before some young men, belonging to the Pinckney
battalion, mounted to the dome of the mint, tore it down and
dragged it through the streets.
Whether Flag-officer Farragut was exasperated or not by this
circumstance, is not known; but he seemed to have determined
to spare no mortification to the city, which its civil officers had
already assured him was unprepared to resist him, and to hesitate at no misrepresentation in order to vilify its citizens., In
one of his letters to the mayor, he had sought to publish the
fact to the world, that helpless men, women, and children had
been fired upon by the citizens of New Orleans "for giving
expression to their pleasure at witnessing the old flag;" when
the fact was, that the cheering on the levee referred to had
been, in defiance of the enemy, for " the Southern Confederacy,"
and the only firing in the crowd was that of incautious and
exasperated citizens at the Federal fleet.
The State flag of Louisiana still floated from the City Hall.
It was an emblem of nothing more than State sovereignty, and
yet it too was required to be lowered at the unreasonable and
harsh demand of the invader. A memorial, praying the common council to protect at least the emblem of State sovereignty from insult, was signed by a large number of the noble




818           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
women of New Orleans, including many of the wealthiest,
fairest, and highest in social position in the city. The reply
of the council was feeble and embarrassed. They passed a
resolution declaring that " no resistance would be made to the
forces of the United States;" approving, at the same time, the
" sentiments" expressed by the mayor, and requesting him " to
act in the spirit manifested by them."
On the 28th of April, Flag-officer Farragut addressed his
ultimatum to the mayor, complaining of the continued display
of the flag of Louisiana on the City Hall, and concluding with
a threat of bombardment of the city by notifying him to remove the women and children from its limits within forty-eight
hours. The mayor replied with new spirit, that the satisfaction which was asked at the hands of a vanquished people,
that they should lower with their own hands their State flag,
and perform an act against which their natures rebelled, would
not, under any circumstances, be given; that there was no
possible exit from the city for its immense population of the
women and children, and that if the enemy chose to murder
them on a question of etiquette, he might do his pleasure.
In the delay of the enemy's actual occupation of the city,
while the correspondence referred to between the mayor and
the enemy was in progress, the confidence of the people of
New Orleans had, in a measure, been rallied. There were yet
some glimmers of hope. They thought that, with the forts
still holding out, and the enemy's transports unable to get up
the river, the city might be saved. The fleet had no forces
with which to occupy it, and there was no access for an army
except by way of the lakes. They had determined to cut the
levee below should Gen Butler, in command of the land forces,
attempt an approach from Lake Borgne, and above the city,
should he make the effort from Lake Pontchartrain. In the
last resort, they were determined to man the lines around the
city, armed with such weapons as they could procure, and
fight the Federal land forces whenever they might make their
appearance.
These hopes were suddenly dispelled by the unexpected nevs s
of the fall of Forts Jackson and St. Philip. Fort Jackson had
been very little damaged in the bombardment. It yielded
because of a mutiny of three or four hundred of the garrison,




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           319
who refused to obey the commands of its brave officer, Gen.
Duncan. He had no alternative but to give up the place. At
the first signs of the mutinous disposition, he threatened to
turn his guns on his own men, but found a large number of
them spiked. He surrendered, in fact, to his own garrison.
The post could, probably, have been held, if the men had stood
to their guns. He stated this in an address on the levee to the
people, and, while stating it, cried like a child.
The news of the surrender of the riveir forts effected a sudden change in the views of Flag-officer Farragut. He was
evidently anxious lest Gen. Butler, to whose transports a way
had now been opened to the city, should arrive before he could
consummate the objects of his expedition. He had already
involved himself in a maze of incongruities and contradictions.
First, he demanded peremptorily that the flag should be taken
down; then he insisted that it should be removed before 12 M.
on Saturday, the 28th; on Monday, he repeated the demand,
under a threat of bombardment, giving forty-eight hours for
the removal of the women and children. On Tuesday morning, he reiterated his peremptory demand, but, within an hour,
he agreed to waive every thing he had claimed, and reluctantly
consented to send his own forces to take down the flag.
About noon, a Federal force, consisting of about two hundred armed marines and a number of sailors, dragging two
brass howitzers, appeared in front of the City Hall, and the
officer in command, mounting to the dome of the building, removed the flag of the State in sight of an immense crowd of
the citizens of New Orleans. No interruption was offered to
the small party of the Federals, and the idle utterances of
curiosity were quelled by the sadness and solemnity of the
occasion. Profound silence pervaded the immense crowd. Not
even a whisper was heard. The very air was oppressive with
stillness. The marines stood statue-like within the square,
their bayonets glistening in the sunbeams, and their faces stolid
with indifference. Among the vast multitude of citizens, the wet
cheeks of women and the compressed lips and darkened brows
of men betrayed their consciousness of the great humiliation
which had overtaken them. But among them all there was not
one spirit to emulate the devotion of the martyr-hero of Virginia, who, alone and unaided, on the steps of the Marshall




320           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
House, in Alexandria, had -avenged with his life the first insult
ever offered by the enemy to the flag of his country.
Thus was the surrender of the city of New Orleans completed. Gen. Butler took possession on the Lst of May, and inaugurated an administration, the despotism and insolence of
which might have been expected from one of his vile personal
character and infamous antecedents. He was a man who had
all the proverbially mean instincts of the Massachusetts Yankee; he had been a "disreputable jury lawyer at home; as a
member of the old Democratic party, he had been loud in his
professions of devotion to the South; but his glorification in
this particular had been dampened in the Charleston Convention, where he pocketed an insult from a Southern delegate, and
turned pale at the threat of personal chastisement. The war
gave him an opportunity of achieving one of those easy reputations in the North which were made by brazen boastfulness,
coarse abuse of the South, and aptitude in lying. We shall
have future occasion to refer to the 9rutal and indecent despotism of this vulgar tyrant of New Orleans, who, in inviting
his soldiers to treat as prostitutes every lady in the street who
dared to show displeasure at their presence, surpassed the
atrocities of Haynau, and rivalled the most barbarous and
fiendish rule of vengeance ever sought to be wreaked upon a
conquered people. If any thing were wanting to make the
soldiers of the South devote anew whatever they had of life,
and labor, and blood to the cause of the safety and honor of
their country, it was the infamous swagger of Butler in New
Orleans, his autocratic rule, his arrest of the best citizens, his
almost daily robberies, and his " ingenious" war upon the helplessness of men'and the virtue of women.
The narrative of the fall of New Orleans furnishes its own
comment. Never was there a more miserable story, where
accident, improvidence, treachery, vacillation, and embarrassment of purpose, each, perhaps, not of great importance in itself, combined under an evil star to produce the astounding
result of the fall, after an engagement, the casualties of which
might be counted by hundreds, of a city which was the commercial capital of the South, which contained a population of one
hundred and seventy thousand souls, and which was the largest
exporting city in the world.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             321
The extent of the disaster is not to be disguised. It was a
heavy blow to the Confederacy. It annihilated us in Louisiana; separated us from Texas and Arkansas; diminished our
resources and supplies by the loss of one of the greatest grain
and cattle countries within the limits of the Confederacy; gave
to the enemy the Mississippi river, with all its means of navigation, for a base of operations; and finally led, by plain and
irresistible conclusion, to our virtual abandonment of the great
and fruitful Valley of the Mississippi.-It did all this, and yet
it was very far from deciding the fate of the war.
21




322                THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
CHAPTER XIII.
CONCLUSION.
Prospects of the War.-The Extremity of the South.-Lights and Shadows of the
Campaign in Virginia.-Jackson's Campaign in the Valley.-The Policy of Concentration.-Sketch of the Battles around Richmond.-Effect of McClellan's Defeat upon
the North.-President Davis's congratulatory Order.-The War as a great Money
Job.-N-ote: Gen. Washington's Opinion of the Northern People.-Statement of the
Northern Finances.-Yankee Venom.-Gen. Pope's Military Orders. —Summary of
the War Legislation of the Northern Congress.-Retaliation on the part of the Confederacy.-The Cartel.-Prospects of European Interference.-English Statesmanship.
-Progress of the War in the West.-The Defence of Vicksburg.-Morgan's great
Raid.-The Tennessee-Virginia Frontier.-A Glance at the Confederate Congress.Mr. Foote and the Cabinet.-The Campaign in Virginia again.-Rapid Movements
and famous March of the Southern Troops.-The signal Victory of the Thirtieth of
August on the Plains of Manassas.-Refiections on the War.-Some of its Characteristics.-A Review of its Military Results.-Three Moral Benefits of the War.-Prospects and Promises of the Future.
WE have chosen the memorable epoch of the fall of New Orleans, properly dated from the occupation of the enemy on the
1st of May, 1862, as an appropriate period for the conclusion
of our historical narrative of the events of the first year of the
war. Hereafter, in the future continuation of the narrative,
which we promise to ourselves, we shall have to direct the attention of the reader to the important movements, the sorrowful disasters, and the splendid achievements, that more than
compensated the inflictions of misfortune, in the famous summer
campaign in Virginia. In these we shall find full confirmation
of the judgment which we have declared, that the fall of New
Orleans, and the consequent loss of the Mississippi Valley, did
not decide the fate of the war; and, indeed, we shall see that
the abandonment of our plan of frontier defence made the way
for the superior and more fortunate policy of the concentration
of our forces in the interior.
The fall of New Orleans and consequent loss of our command
of the Mississippi river from New Orleans to Memphis, with
all its immense advantages of transportation and supply; the retreat of Gen. Johnston's forces from Yorktown; the evacuation




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                  323
of Norfolk, with its splendid navy-yard-an event accomplished by a mere brutum fulmen, and without a blow; the stupid
and unnecessary destruction of the Virginia, " the iron diadem
of the South;" * the perilous condition of Charleston, Savan* The destruction of the Virginia was a sharp and unexpected blow to the
confidence of the people of the South in their government.
How far the government was implicated in this foolish and desperate act,
was never openly acknowledged or exactly ascertained; but, despite the pains
of official concealment, there are certain well-attested facts which indicate
that in the destruction of this great war-ship, the authorities at Richmond
were not guiltless. These facts properly belong to the history of one of the
most unhappy events that had occurred since the commencement of the war.
The Virginia was destroyed under the immediate orders of her commander,
Commodore Tatnall, a little before five o'clock on the morning of the 11th of
May, in the vicinity of Craney Island. During the morning of the same day a
prominent politician in the streets ofRichmond was observed to be very much
dejected; he remarked that it was an evil day for the Confederacy.
On being questioned by his intimate friends, he declared to them that the
government had determined upon, or assented to, the destruction of the Virginia, and that he had learned this from the highest sources of authority in the
capital. At this time the news of the explosion of the Virginia could not have
possibly reached Richmond; there was no telegraphic communication between
the scene of her destruction and the city, and the evidence appears to be complete, that the government had at least a prevision of the destruction of this
vessel, or had assented to the general policy of the act, trusting, perhaps, to
acquit itself of the responsibility for it on the unworthy plea that it had given
no express orders in the matter.
Again, it is well known that for at least a week prior to the destruction of
the Virginia, the evacuation of Norfolk had been determined upon; that during the time the removal of stores was daily progressing; and that Mr.
Mallory, the Secretary of the Navy, had within this period, himself, visited
Norfolk to look after the public interests. The evacuation of this port clearly
involved the question, what disposition was to be made of the Virginia.
If the government made no decision of a question, which for a week stared
it in the face, it certainly was very strangely neglectful of the public interest.
If Mr. Mallory visited Norfolk when the evacuation was going on, and never
thought of the Virginia, or, thinking of her, kept dumb, never even giving so
much as an official nod as to what disposition should be made of her, he must
have been even more stupid than the people who laughed at him in Richmond, or the members of Congress who nicknamed without mercy, thought
him to be.
It is also not a little singular that when a court of inquiry had found that
the destruction of the Virginia was unnecessary and improper, Mr. Mallory
should have waived the calling of a court-martial, forgotten what was due to
the public interest on such a finding as that made by the preliminary court,
and expressed himself satisfied to let the matter rest. The fact is indisputable,
that the court-martial was called at the demand of Commodore Tatnall himself. It resulted in his acquittal.




324             THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
nah, and Mobile, and the menace of Richmond by one of the
largest armies of the world, awakened the people of the South
to a full appreciation of the crisis of the war, and placed their
cause in an extremity which nothing could have retrieved but
the undiminished and devoted spirit of their brave soldiers in
the field.
We shall have, however, to mingle with this story of disasters, the triumphs, not indeed of the government, but of brave
and adventurous spirits in the field. We shall tell how it was
that the retreat from Yorktown, although undertaken without
any settled plan as to the line of defence upon which it was to
be reorganized, led to the successful battle of Williamsburg;
we shall recount the events of the glorious battle of Seven
Pines, the sound of whose guns was heard by the people of
Richmond, and was followed by the speedy messages of a
splendid victory; and we shall tell how it was that, while the
news of the destruction of the Virginia was still the bitterest
reminiscence of the people of the South, and while Secretary
Mallory was making a drivelling show of alacrity to meet the
enemy by advertising for "timber" to construct new naval
defences, a powerful flotilla of Yankee gunboats was repulsed
by a battery of four guns on the banks of James river, and the
scale of war turned by even such a small incident as the action
of Drury's Bluff. In this connection, too, we shall have to
record the evidences of the heroic spirit that challenged the
approaching enemy; the noble resolution of the citizens of
Richmond to see their beautiful city consigned to the horrors
of a bombardment, rather than to the hands of the enemy;
and the brave resolution of the Virginia Legislature, which
put the Confederate authorities to shame, and infused the
hearts of the people with a new and lively spirit of courage
and devotion.*
* " Resoleed by the GeneraZ Assembly: That the General Assembly hereby
express its desire that the capital of the State be defended to the last extremity, if such defence is in accordance with the views of the President of the
Confederate States; and that the President be assured that whatever destruction or loss of property of the State or individuals shall thereby result, will be i
cheerfully submitted to." —Resolution Va. Legislature, May 14.
" Some one said to me the other day, that the duty of surrendering the city
would devolve either upon the President, the Mayor, or myself. I said to him,




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.               325
But we shall have occasion to tell of even more brilliant
triumphs of Southern spirit, and to explain how, for some time
at least, the safety of Richmond was trusted not so much to
the fortunes of the forces that immediately protected it, as to
the splendid diversion of the heroic Jackson in the Valley of
Virginia.
We shall see how this brave general, whom the government
had determined to recall to Gen. Johnston's lines, rejected the
suggestions of the surrender of the Valley, and his personal
ease, and adventured upon a campaign, the most successful and
brilliant in the war. We shall trace with particular interest
the events of this glorious expedition, and we shall find reason
to ascribe its results to the zeal, heroism, and genius of its commander alone. We shall recount the splendid victory over
Banks, the recovery of Winchester, the capture of four thousand prisoners, the annihilation of the invading army of the
Valley, and the heroic deeds which threw the splendor of sunlight over the long lines of the Confederate host. The reader
will have occasion to compare the campaign of General Jackson in the Valley of Virginia, with some of the most famous
in modern history. We shall show that, in this brief, but brilliant campaign, a gallant Southern army fought four battles
and a number of skirmishes; killed and wounded a considerable number of the enemy, took several thousand prisoners,
secured millions of dollars of stores, destroyed many millions
of dollars' worth for the enemy, and chased the Federal army,
commanded by General Banks, out of Virginia and across the
Potomac; and that all these events were accomplished within
the period of three weeks, and with a loss scarcely exceeding
one hundred in killed and wounded.
In this story of disaster, mingled with triumph, we shall be
if the demand is made upon me, with the alternative to surrender or be
shelled, I shall reply, BOMBARD AND BE DAMNED."-Speech of Gov. Letcher
May 16.
" I say now, and will abide by it, when the citizens of Richmond demand of
me to surrender the capital of Virginia and of the Confederacy to the enemy,
they must find some other man to fill my place. I will resign the mayoralty.
And when that other man elected in my stead shall deliver up the city, I hope
I have physical courage and strength enough left to shoulder a musket and go
into the ranks." —Speech of Mayor Mayo, May 16.




326           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
disappointed if we do not discover the substantial prospect ot
brighter fortunes and final triumph for the South.
Indeed, the fact will be shown to be, that events, although
mixed and uncertain to the views taken of them at the time of
their occurrence, were preparing the way for a great victory
and a sudden illumination of the fortunes of the South.
The disasters on the Mississippi frontier and in other directions had constrained the government to adopt the policy of
concentrating its forces in the interior of Virginia. The object of all war is to reach a decisive point of the campaign,
and this object was realized by a policy which it is true the
government had not adopted at the instance of reason, but
which had been imposed upon it by the force of disaster.
There were childish complaints that certain districts and points
on the frontier had been abandoned by the Confederates for
the purpose of a concentration of troops in Virginia. These
complaints were alike selfish and senseless, and, in some cases,
nothing more than the utterance of a demagogical, shortsighted, and selfish spirit, which would have preferred the
apparent security of its own particular State or section to the
fortunes of the whole Confederacy. The fact was, that there
was cause of intelligent congratulation even in those districts
from which the Confederate troops had been withdrawn to
make a decisive battle, that we had at last reached a crisis,
the decision of which might reverse all our past misfortunes
and achieve results in which every State of the Confederacy
would have a share.
On the Richmond lines, two of the greatest and most splendid armies that had ever been arrayed on a single field confronted each other; every accession that could be procured
from the most distant quarters to their numbers, and every
thing that could be drawn from the resources of the respective
countries of each, had been made to contribute to the strength
and splendor of the opposing hosts.
Since the commencement of the war, the North had taxed
its resources for the capture of Richmond; nothing was omitted for the accomplishment of this event; the way had to be
opened to the capital by tedious and elaborate operations on
the frontier of Virginia: this accomplished, the city of Richmond was surrounded by an army whose numbers was all that




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           327
could be desired; composed of picked forces; having every
advantage that science and art could bestow in fortifications
and every appliance of war; assisted by gunboat flotillas in
two rivers, and endowed with every thing that could assure
success.
The Northern journals were unreserved in the statement
that the commands of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, had
been consolidated into one army, under Major-general Pope,
with a view of bringing all the Federal forces in Virginia, to
co-operate with McClellan on the Richmond lines. A portion
of this army must have reached McClellan, probably at an
early stage of the engagements in the vicinity of Richmond.
There is little doubt but that, in the memorable contest for the
safety of Richmond, we engaged an army whose superiority
in numbers to us was largely increased by timely reinforcements, and with regard to the operations of which the Northern government had omitted no conditions of success.
Of this contest, unparalleled in its duration; rich in dramatic incident and display; remarkable for a series of battles.
any one of which might rank with the most celebrated in history; and distinguished by an obstinacy, on the part of the
sullen and insolent enemy, that was broken only by the most
tremendous exertions ever made by Southern troops, we shall
have to treat in a future continuation of this work, with the
utmost care as to the authenticity of our narrative, and with
matured views as to the merits and importance of what is now
supposed to be a great and decisive event.
For the present, merely for the purpose of extending the
general record of events in this chapter to the present standpoint of intelligent reflection on the future of the war, we must
content the reader with a very brief and summary sketch of
the battles around Richmond. Such a sketch is necessarily
imperfect, written amid the confusion of current events, and is
limited to the design of acquainting the reader with the general situation at this writing, without venturing, to a great degree, upon statements of particular facts.




328           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE.WAR.
SKETCH OF THE BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND.
Upon taking command of the Confederate army in the field,
after Gen. Johnston had been wounded in the battle of Seven
Pines, Gen Lee did not hesitate to adopt the spirit of that
commander, which had already been displayed in attacking
the enemy, and which indicated the determination on his part
that the operations before Richmond should not degenerate
into a siege.
The course of the Chickahominy around Richmond affords
an idea of the enemy's position at the commencement of the
action. This stream meanders through the tide-water district
of Virginia-its course approaching that of the are of a circle
in the neighborhood of Richmond-until it reaches the lower
end of Charles City county, where it abruptly turns to the south
and empties into the James. A portion of the enemy's forces
had crossed to the south side of the Chickahominy, and were
fortified on the Williamsburg road. On the north bank of the
stream the enemy was strongly posted for many miles; the
heights on that side of the stream having been fortified with
great energy and skill from Meadow Bridge, on a line nearly
due north from the city, to a point below Bottom's Bridge,
which is due east. This line of the enemy extended for about
twenty miles.
Reviewing the situation of the two armies at the commencement of the action, the advantage was entirely our own. McClellan had divided his army on the two sides of the Chickahominy, and operating apparently with the design of half circumvallating Richmond, had spread out his forces to an extent
that impaired the faculty of concentration, and had made a
weak and dangerous extension of his lines.
On Thursday, the 26th of June, at three o'clock, Majorgeneral Jackson-fresh from the exploits of his magnificent
campaign in the Valley-took up his line of march from Ashland, and proceeded down the country between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey rivers. The enemy collected on the
north bank of the Chickahominy, at the point where it is crossed by the Brooke turnpike, were driven off, and Brigadiergeneral Branch, crossing the stream, directed his movements




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.         329
for a junction with the column of Gen. A. P. Hill, which had
crossed at Meadow Bridge. General Jackson having borne
away from the Chickahominy, so as to gain ground towards
the Pamunkey, marched to the left of Mechanicsville, while
Gen. Hill, keeping well to the Chickahominy, approached that
village and engaged the enemy there.
With about fourteen thousand men (Gen. Branch did not arrive till nightfall), Gen. Hill engaged the forces of the enemy
until night put an end to the contest. While he did not succeed, in that limited time, in routing the enemy, his forces
stubbornly maintained the possession of Mechanicsville and
the ground taken by them on the other side of the Chickahominy. Driven from the immediate locality of Mechanicsville, the enemy retreated during the night down the river to
Powhite swamp, and night closed the operations of Thursday.
The road having been cleared at Mechanicsville, Gen. Longstreet's corps d'armee, consisting of his veteran division of the
Old Guard of the Army of the Potomac, and Gen. D. H. Hill's
division, debouched from the woods on the south side of the
Chickahominy, and crossed that river. Friday morning the
general advance upon the enemy began; Gen. A. P. Hill in
the centre, and bearing towards Coal Harbor, while Gen.
Longstreet and Gen. D. H. Hill came down the Chickahominy
to New Bridge. Gen. Jackson still maintained his position in
advance, far to the left, and gradually converging to the Chickahominy again.
The position of the enemy was now a singular one. One
portion of his army was on the south side of the Chickahominy,
fronting Richmond, and confronted by Gen. Magruder. The
other portion, on the north side, had fallen back to a new line of
defences, where McClellan proposed to make a decisive battle.
As soon as Jackson's arrival at Coal Harbor was announced,
Gen. Lee and Gen. Longstreet, accompanied by their respective
staffs, rode by Gaines's Mill, and halted at New Coal Harbor,
where they joined General A. P. Hill. Soon the welcome
sound of Jackson's guns announced that he was at work.
The action was now to become general for the first time on
the Richmond lines; and a collision of numbers was about to
take place equal to any that had yet occurred in the history of
the war.




330           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE'WAR.
From four o'clock until eight the battle raged with a display
of the utmost daring and intrepidity on the part of the Confederate army. The enemy's lines were finally broken, and his
strong positions all carried, and night covered the retreat of
McClellan's broken and routed columns to the south side of the
Chickahominy.
The assault on the enemy's works near Gaines's Mills is a
memorable part of the engagement of Friday, and the display
of fortitude, as well as quick and dashing gallantry of our
troops on that occasion, takes its place by the side of the most
glorious exploits of the war. Gen. A. P. Hill had made the
first assault upon the lines of the enemy's intrenchments near
Gaines's Mills. A fierce struggle had ensued between his
division and the garrison of the line of defence. Repeated
charges were made by Hill's troops, but the formidable character of the works, and murderous volleys of grape and canister
from the artillery covering them, kept our troops in check. It
was past four o'clock when Pickett's brigade, from Longstreet's
division, came to Hill's support. Pickett's regiments fought
with the most determined valor. At last Whiting's division,
composed of the " Old Third" and Texan brigades, advanced at
a " double quick," charged the batteries, and drove the enemy
from his strong line of defence. The works carried by these
noble troops would have been invincible to the bayonet had
they been garrisoned by men less dastardly than the Yankees.
To keep the track of the battle, which had swept around
Richmond, we must have reference to some of the principal
points of locality in the enemy's lines. It will be recollected
that it was on Thursday evening when the attack was com-.menced upon the enemy near Meadow Bridge. This locality
is about six miles distant from the city, on a line almost due
north. This position was the enemy's extreme right. His
lines extended from here across the Chickahominy, near the
Powhite Creek, two or three miles above the crossing of the
York River railroad. From Meadow Bridge to this railroad,
the distance along the Chickahominy on the north side is about
ten miles. The different stages between the points indicated,
along which the enemy were driven, are Mechanicsville, about:a mile north of the Chickahominy; further on, Beaver Dam..Creek, emptying into the Chickahominy; then the New Bridge




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.          331
road, on which Coal Harbor is located; and then Powhite
Creek, where the enemy had made his last stand, and been repulsed from the field.
The York River railroad runs in an easterly direction, intersecting the Chickahomipy about ten miles from the city.
South of the railroad is the Williamsburg road, connecting with
the Nine Mile road at Seven Pines. The former road connects
with the New Bridge road, which turns off and crosses the
Chickahominy. From Seven Pines, where the Nine Mile road
joins the upper one, the road is known as the old Williamsburg
road, and crosses the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge.
With the bearing of these localities in his mind, the reader
will readily understand how it was that the enemy was driven
from his original strongholds on the north side of the Chickahominy, and how, at the time of Friday's battle, he had been
compelled to surrender the possession of the Fredericksburg and
Central railroads, and had been pressed to a position where he
was cut off from the principal avenues of supply and escape.
The disposition of our forces was such as to cut off all communication between McClellan's army and the White House, on
the Pamunkey river; he had been driven completely from his
northern line of defences; and it was supposed that he would
be unable to extricate himself from his position without a victory or a capitulation. In front of him being the Chickahominy,
which he had crossed —in his rear, were the divisions of Generals
Longstreet, Magruder, and Huger, and, in the situation as it
existed Saturday night, all hopes of his escape were thought to
be impossible.
On Sunday morning, it appears that our pickets, on the
Nine Mile road, having engaged some small detachments of
the enemy, and driven them beyond their fortifications, found
them deserted. In a short while, it became known to our
generals that McClellan, having massed his entire force on this
side of the Chickahominy, was retreating towards James river.
The intrenichments which the enemy had deserted, were
found to be formidable and elaborate. That immediately across
the railroad, at the six-mile post, which had been supposed to
be light earth-work, designed to sweep the railroad,, turned out
to be an immense embrasured fortification, extending for hundreds of yards on either side of the track. Within this work




332           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
were found great quantities of fixed ammunition, which had
apparently been prepared for removal, and then deserted. All
the cannon, as at other intrenchments, had been carried off. A
dense cloud of smoke was seen issuing from'the woods two
miles in advance of the battery, and lalf a mile to the right of
the railroad. The smoke was found to proceed from a perfect
mountain of the enemy's commissary stores, consisting of sugar,
coffee, and bacon, prepared meats, vegetables, &c., which he
had fired. The fields and woods around this spot were covered
with every description of clothing and camp equipage. No
indication was wanting that the enemy had left this encampment in haste and disorder.
The enemy had been imperfectly watched at a conjuncture
the most critical in the contest, and through some omission of
our guard-the facts of which have as yet been but imperfectly
developed-McClellan had succeeded in massing his entire
force, and taking up a line of retreat, by which he hoped to
reach the cover of his gunboats on the James. But the most
unfortunate circumstance to us was, that since the enemy had
escaped from us in his fortified camp, his retreat was favored
by a country; the characteristics of which are unbroken forests
and wide swamps, where it was impossible to pursue him with
rapidity, and extremely difficult to reconnoitre his position so
as to bring him to decisive battle.
On Sunday morning, the divisions of Generals Hill and
Longstreet crossed the Chickahominy, and were, during the
whole of the day, moving in the hunt for the enemy. The disposition which was made of our forces brought General Longstreet on the enemy's front, immediately supported by General
Hill's division consisting of six brigades. The forces commanded by General Longstreet were his old division, consisting
of six brigades.
The position of the enemy was about five miles northeast
of Darbytown, on the New Market road. The immediate
scene of the battle was a plain of sedge pines, in the cover of
which the enemy's forces were skilfully disposed —the locality
being known as Frazier's farm. In advancing upon the enemy,
batteries of sixteen heavy guns were opened upon the advance
columns of Gen. Hill. Our troops, pressing heroically forward,
had no sooner got within musket range than the enemy, form



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           333
ing several lines of battle, poured upon them from his heavy
masses a devouring fire of musketry. The conflict became
terrible, the air being filled with missiles of death, every moment having its peculiar sound of terror, and every spot its
sight of ghastly'destruction and horror. It is impossible that
in any of the series of engagements which had taken place
within the past few days, and had tracked the lines of Richmond with fire and destruction, there could have been more
desperate fighting on the part of our troops. Never was a more
glorious victory plucked from more desperate and threatening
circumstances. While exposed to the double fire of the enemy's
batteries and his musketry, we were unable to contend with him
with artillery. But although thus unmatched, our brave troops
pressed on with unquailing vigor and a resistless courage, driving
the enemy before them. This was accomplished without artillery,
there being but one battery in Gen. Hill's command on the spot,
and that belonged to Longstreet's division, and could not be got
into position. Thus the fight continued with an ardor and devotion that few battle-fields have ever illustrated. Step by step
the enemy were driven back, his guns~ taken, and the ground
he abandoned strewn with his dead. *By half-past eight o'clock
we had taken all his cannon, and, continuing to advance, had
driven him a mile and a half from his ground of battle.
Our forces were still advancing upon the retreating lines of
the enemy. It was now about half-past nine o'clock, and very
dark. Suddenly, as if it had burst from the heavens, a sheet
of fire enveloped the front of our advance. The enemy had
made another stand to receive us, and, from the black masses
of his forces, it was evident that he had been heavily reinforced,
and that another whole corps d'armere had been brought up to
contest the fortunes of the night. Line after line of battle was
formed. It was evident that his heaviest columns were now
being thrown against our small command, and it might have
been supposed that he would only be satisfied with its annihilation. The loss here on our side was terrible.
The situation being evidently hopeless for any further pursuit of the fugitive enemy, who had now brought up such overwhelmhning forces, our troops retired slowly.
At this moment, seeing their adversary retire, the most vociferous cheers arose along the whole Yankee line. They were




334           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
taken'up in the distance by the masses which for miles and
miles beyond were supporting McClellan's front.  It was a
moment when the heart of the stoutest commander might have
been appalled. The situation of our forces was now as desperate as it well could be, and required a courage and presence of
mind to retrieve it, which the circumstances which surrounded
them were not well calculated to inspire. They had fought for
five or six hours without reinforcements. All our reserves had
been brought up in the action. Wilcox's brigade, which had
been almost annihilated, was re-forming in the rear.
Riding rapidly to the position of this brigade, Gen. Hill
brought them, by great exertions, up to the front, to check the
advance of the now confident, cheering enemy. Catching the
spirit of their commander, the brave, but jaded men, moved up
to the front, replying to the enemy's cheers with shouts and
yells. At this demonstration, which the enemy, no doubt,
supposed signified heavy reinforcements, he stopped his ad
vance. It was now about half-past ten o'clock in the night.
The enemy had been arrested; and the fight-one of the most
remarkable, long-contested, and gallant ones that had yet occurred on our lines-was concluded with the achievement of a
field under the most trying circumstances, which the enemy,
with the most overpowering numbers brought up to reinforce
him, had not succeeded in reclaiming.
Gen. Magruder's division did not come up until 11 o'clock
at night, after the fight had been concluded. By orders from
Gen. Lee, Magruder moved upon and occupied the battleground; Gen. Hill's command being in such a condition of
prostration from their long and toilsome fight, and suffering in
killed and wounded, that it was proper they should be relieved
by the occupation of the battle-ground by a fresh coTps d'armee.
Early on Tuesday morning the enemy, from the position to
which he had been driven the night before, continued his
retreat in a southeasterly direction towards his gunboats on
James river,  At eight o'clock Magruder recommenced the
pursuit, advancing cautiously, but steadily, and shelling the
forests and swamps in front as he progressed. This method of
advance was kept up throughout the morning and until four
o'clock, P. M., without coming up with the enemy. But between four and five o'clock our troops reached a large open




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             335
field, a mile long and three-quarters in width, on the farm of
Dr. Carter. The enemy were discovered strongly intrenched
in a dense forest on the other side of this field. Their artillery,
numbering fifty pieces, could be plainly seen bristling over
their freshly constructed earth-works. At ten minutes before
five o'clock, P. M., Gen. Magruder ordered his men to charge
across the field and drive the enemy from their position. Gallantly they sprang to the encounter, rushing into the field at
a full run. Instantly, from the line of the enemy's breastworks,
a murderous storm of grape and canister was hurled into their
ranks, with the most terrible effect. Officers and men went
down by hundreds; but yet, undaunted and unwavering, our
line dashed on, until two-thirds of the distance across the field
was accomplished. Here the carnage from the withering fire
of the enemy's combined artillery and musketry was dreadful.
Our line wavered a moment, and fell back to the cover of the
woods. Twice again the effort to carry the position was renewed, but each time with the same result. Night, at length,
rendered a further attempt injudicious, and the fight, until ten
o'clock, was kept up by the artillery of both sides. To add
to the horrors, if not to the dangers, of this battle, the enemy's
gunboats, from their position at Curl's Neck, two and a half
miles distant, poured on the field continuous broadsides from
their immense rifle-guns. Though it is questionable whether
any serious loss was inflicted on us by the gunboats, the horrors of the fight were aggravated by the monster shells, which
tore shrieking through the forests, and exploded with a concussion which seemed to shake the solid earth itself.
The battle of Tuesday, properly known as that of Malvern
Hill, was perhaps the most sanguinary of the series of bloody
conflicts which had taken place on the lines about Richmond..
It was made memorable by its melancholy monument of carnage. But it had given the enemy no advantage, except in, theunfruitful sacrifice of the lives of our troops, and the line of his,
retreat was again taken up, his forces toiling towards the, river
through mud, swamp, and forest.
The skill and spirit with which McClellan had managed to,
retreat was, indeed, remarkable, and afforded no mean proofs
of his generalship. At every stage of his retreat he had confronted our forces with a strong rear-guard, and, had encountered




336              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
us with well-organized lines of battle, and regular dispositions of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. His heavy rifled
cannon had been used against us constantly on his retreat. A
portion of his forces had now effected communication with the
river at points below City Point. The plan of cutting off his
communication with the river, which was to have been executed by a movement of Holmes' division between him and
the river, was frustrated by the severe fire of the gunboats,
and since then the situation of the enemy appeared to be that
of a division or dispersion of his forces, one portion resting
on the river, and the other, to some extent, involved by our
lines.
It had been stated to the public of Richmond, with great
precision of detail, that on the evening of Saturday, the 28th
of June, we had brought the enemy to bay on the south side of
the Chickahominy, and that it only remained to finish him in
a single battle. Such, in fact, appeared to have been the
situation then. The next morning, however, it was perceived
that our supposed resources of generalship had given us too
much confidence; that the enemy had managed to extricate
himself from the critical position, and, having massed his forces,
had succeeded, under cover of the night, in opening a way to
the James river.*
*A great deal was claimed for "generalship" in the battles around Richmond; and results achieved by the hardy valor of our troops were busily
ascribed by hollow-hearted flatterers to the genius of the strategist. Without
going into any thing like military criticism, it may be said that it is difficult
to appreciate the ascription of a victory to generalship, in the face of the
exposure and terrible slaughter of our troops in attacking, in front, the
formidable breastworks of the enemy. The benefit of "generalship" in such
circumstances is unappreciable: when troops are thus confronted, the honors
of victory belong rather to the spirit of the victors than the genius of the
commander.
With reference to McClellan's escape from White Oak Swamp to the river,
letters of Yankee officers, published in the Northern journals, stated that
when McClellan on Saturday evening sent his scouts down the road to Turkey
Island Bridge, he was astonished and delighted to find that our forces had not
occupied that road, and immediately started his wagon and artillery trains,
which were quietly passing down that road all night to the James river,
while our forces were quietly sleeping within four miles of the very road they
should have occupied, and should have captured every one of the enemy's one
thousand wagons, and four hundred cannon.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             337
Upon this untoward event, the operations of our army on the
Richmond side of the Chickahominy were to follow the fugitive
enemy through a country where he had admirable opportunities of concealment, and through the swamps and forests of
which he had retreated with the most remarkable judgment,
dexterity, and spirit of fortitude.
The glory and fruits of our victory may have been seriously
diminished by the grave mishap or fault by which the enemy
was permitted to leave his camp on the south side of the
Chickahominy, in an open country, and to plunge into the
dense cover of wood and swamp, where the best portion of a
whole week was consumed in hunting him, and finding out his
new position only in time to attack him under the uncertainty
and disadvantage of the darkness of night.
But the successes achieved in the series of engagements
which had already occurred were not to be lightly esteemed,
or to be depreciated, because of errors which, if they had not
occurred, would have made. our victory more glorious and more
complete. The siege of Richmond had been raised: an army
of one hundred and twenty thousand men had been pushed
from their strongholds and fortifications, and put to flight; we
had enjoyed the eclat of an almost daily succession of victories;
we had gathered an immense spoil in stores, provisions, and
artillery; and we had demoralized and dispersed, if we had not
succeeded in annihilating, an army which had every resource
that could be summoned to its assistance, every possible addition of numbers within the reach of the Yankee government,
and every material condition of success to insure for it the
great prize of the capital of the Confederacy, which is now, as
far as human judgment can determine, irretrievably lost to
them, and secure in the protection of a victorious army.
The Northern papers claimed that the movements of McClellan from the Chickahominy river were purely strategic, and
that he had obtained a position, where he would establish a new
It is further stated in these letters, that if we had blocked up that only
passage of escape, their entire army must have surrendered or been starved
out in twenty-four hours. These are the Yankees' own accounts of how much
they were indebted to blunders on our part for the success of McClellan's
retreat-a kind of admission not popular with a vain and self-adulatory
enemy.
22




338           THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
base of operations against Richmond. Up to the first decisive
stage in the series of engagements-Coal Harbor-there were
certainly plain strategic designs in his backward movement.
His retirement from Mechanicsville was probably voluntary,
and intended to concentrate his troops lower down, where he
might fight with the advantages of numbers and his own
selection of position. Continuing his retreat, he fixed the
decisive field at Coal Harbor. Again having been pushed
from his strongholds north of the Chickahominy, the enemy
made a strong attempt to retrieve his disasters by renewing a
concentration of his troops at Frazier's farm.
From the time of these two principal battles, all pretensions
of the enemy's retreat to strategy must cease. His retreat was
now unmistakable; it was no longer a falling back to concentrate troops for action; it is, in fact, impossible to disguise that
it was the retreat of an enemy who was discomfited and whipped, although not routed. He had abandoned the railroads;
he had given up the strongholds which he had provided to
secure him in case of a check; he had destroyed from eight to
ten millions dollars' worth of stores; he had deserted his
hospitals, his sick and wounded, and he had left in our hands
thousands of prisoners, and innumerable stragglers.
Regarding all that had been accomplished in these battles;
the displays of the valor and devotion of our troops; the expenditure of blood; and the helpless and fugitive condition to
which the enemy had at last been reduced, there was cause for
the keenest regrets that an enemy in this condition was permitted to secure his retreat. It is undoubtedly true, that in
failing to cut off McClellan's retreat to the river, we failed to
accomplish the most important condition for the completion of
our victory. But although the result of the conflict had fallen
below public expectation, it was sufficiently fortunate to excite
popular joy, and grave enough to engage the most serious
speculation as to the future.
The effect of the defeat of McClellan before Richmond was
received at the North with ill-concealed mortification and
anxiety. Beneath the bluster of the newspapers and the affectations of public confidence, disappointment, embarrassment,
and alarm were perceptible. The people of the North had
been so assured of the capture of Richmond, that it was diffi



THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            339
cult to reanimate them on the heels of McClellan's retreat.
The prospects held out to them so long, of ending the war in
" sixty days," " crushing out the rebellion," and eating victorious dinners in Richmond, had been bitterly disappointed and
were not to be easily renewed. The government at Washington showed its appreciation of the disaster its arms had sustained by making a call for three hundred thousand additional
troops; and the people of the North were urged by every variety of appeal, including large bounties of money, to respond
to the stirring call of President Lincoln.
There is no doubt but that the North was seriously discouraged by the events that had taken place before Richmond.
But it was a remarkable circumstance, uniformly illustrated in
the war, that the North, though easily intoxicated by triumph,
was not in the same proportion depressed by defeat. There is
an obvious explanation for this peculiarity of temper. As long
as the North was conducting the war upon the soil of the South,
a defeat there involved more money expenditure and more calls
for troops; it involved scarcely any thing else; it had no other
horrors, it did not imperil their homes; it might easily be repaired by time. Indeed, there was some sense in the exhortations of some of the Northern orators, to the effect that defeat
made their people stronger than ever, because, while it required
them to put forth their energies anew, it enabled them to take
advantage of experience, to multiply their means of success,
and to essay new plans of campaign. No one can doubt but
that the celebrated Manassas defeat really strengthened the
North; and doubtless the South would have realized the same
consequence of the second repulse of the enemy's movements
on Richmond, if it had been attended by the same conditions
on our part of inaction and repose.
In his congratulatory address to the army on their victory
before Richmond, President Davis referred to the prospect of
carrying the war into the North. His friends declared that
the President had at last been converted from his darling military formulas of the defensive policy; that he was sensible that
the only way to bring the war to a decisive point was to invade
the North. But it was urged that our army was too feeble to
undertake at present an aggressive policy; although the facts
were that, counting in our immense forces under Gen. Bragg




340            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
in the West, which for months had been idly lying in MIississippi, we had probably quite as many troops in the field as the
North had; that delay could accomplish but little addition to
our forces, while it would multiply those of the North, its
resources of conscription and draft being intact; that if our
army was small, it was due to the neglect of the executive in
enforcing the Conscription Law, which should have furnished
three quarters of a million of men; and that if reduced and
demoralized by desertion and straggling, it was because of the
weak sentimentalism of our military authorities, which hesitated to enforce the death penalty in our armies, or to maintain
military discipline by a system much harsher than that of
moral suasion. Judgment must be taken subject to these facts
as to how far the government was responsible for lingering in
a policy which, though of its own choosing at first, it at last
confessed to be wronrg, and from which, when discovered to be
an error and a failure, it professed to be unable to extricate
itself on account of a weakness of which itself was sole cause
and author. Happily, however, the valor and devotion of our
troops came to the rescue of the government, and opened a
way in which it had so long hesitated, and found paltry excuses
for its tame and unadventurous temper. But to this we shall
refer hereafter.
It is curious to observe how completely the ordinary aspects
of war were changed and its horrors diminished, with reference to the North, by the false policy of the South, in keeping
the theatre of active hostilities within her own borders. Defeat
did not dispirit the North, because it was not brought to her
doors. Where it did not immediately imperil the safety of
the country and homes of the Yankees, where it gave time for
the recovery and reorganization of the attacking party, and
where it required for the prosecution of the war nothing but
more money jobs in Congress and a new raking up of the scum
of the cities, the effects of defeat upon the North might well
be calculated to be the exasperation of its passions, the inflammation of its cupidity, and the multiplication of its exertions
to break and overcome the misapplied power of our armies.
Indeed, the realization of the war in the North was, in many
respects, nothing more than that of an immense money job.
The large money expenditure at Washington supplied a vast




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                   341
fund of corruption; it enriched the commercial centres of the
North, and by artificial stimulation preserved such cities as
New York from decay; it interested vast numbers of politicians, contractors, and dissolute public men in continuing the
war and enlarging the scale of its operations; and, indeed, the
disposition to make money out of the war accounts for much
of that zeal in the North, which was mistaken for political ardor or the temper of patriotic devotion.*
* The following is an extract from an unpublished letter from Gen. Washington to Richard Henry Lee, and, as an exposition of the character of the
Northern people from a pen sacred to posterity, is deeply interesting. There
can be no doubt of the authenticity of the letter. It has been preserved in
the Lee family, who, though applied to by Bancroft, Irving, and others for a
copy for publication, have hitherto refused it, on the ground that it would be
improper to give to the world a private letter from the Father of his Country
reflecting upon any portion of it while the old Union endured. But now, that
" these people" have trampled the Constitution under foot, destroyed the government of our fathers, and invaded and desolated Washington's own county
in Virginia, there can be no impropriety in showing his private opinion of the
Massachusetts Yankees:
[Copy.]
CAMP AT CAMBRIDGE, Aug. 29, 1775.
Dear Sir: * * *
As we have now nearly completed our lines of defence, we have nothing
more, in my opinion, to fear from the enemy, provided we can keep our men
to their duty, and make them watchful and vigilant; but it is among the most
difficult tasks I ever undertook in my life to induce these people to believe
that there is or can be danger, till the bayonet is pushed at their breasts; not
that it proceeds from any uncommon prowess, but rather from an unaccountable kind of stupidity in the lower class of these people, which, believe me,
prevails but too generally among the officers of the Massachusetts part of the
army, who are nearly of the same kidney with the privates, and adds not a
little to my difficulties, as there is no such thing as getting officers of this
stamp to exert themselves in carrying orders into execution. To curry favor
with the men (by whom they were chosen, and on whose smiles possibly they
may think they may again rely) seems to be one of the principal objects of
their attention. I submit it, therefore, to your consideration, whether there
is, or is not, a propriety in that resolution of the Congress which leaves the
ultimate appointment of all officers below the rank of general to the governments where the regiments originated, now the army is become Continental?
To me, it appears improper in two points of view-first, it is giving that
power and weight to an individual Colony which ought of right to belong to
the whole. Then it damps the spirit and ardor of volunteers from all but
the four New England Governments, as none but their people have the least
chance of getting into office. Would it not be better, therefore, to have the
warrants, which the Commander-in-Chief is authorized to give pro tempore,




342               THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
But while politicians plundered the government at Washington and contractors grew rich in a single day, and a fictitious
prosperity dazzled the eyes of the observer in the cities of the
North, the public finances of the Yankee government had long
ago become desperate. It is interesting at this point to make
a brief summary of the financial condition of the lNorth by a
comparison of its public debt with the assets of the government.
The debt of the present United States, audited and floating, calculated from  data up to June 30, 1862, was at least
$1,300,000,000. The daily expenses, as admitted by the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, was between three
and four millions of dollars; the debt, in one year from this
time, could not be less than two thousand five hundred millions
of dollars.
Under the census of 1860, all the property of every kind in
all the States was estimated at less than $12,500,000,000. Since
approved or disapproved by the Continental Congress, or a committee of their
body, which I should suppose in any long recess must always sit? In this
case, every gentleman will stand an equal chance of being promoted, according to his merit: in the other, all offices will be confined to the inhabitants of
the four New England Governments, which, in my opinion, is impolitic to a
degree. I have made a pretty good slam among such kind of officers as the
Massachusetts Government abounds in since I came to this camp, having
broken one colonel and two captains for cowardly behavior in the action on
Bunker's Hill, two captains for drawing more provisions and pay than they
had men in their company, and one for being absent from his post when the
enemy appeared there and burnt a house just by it. Besides these, I have at
this time one colonel, one major, one captain, and two subalterns under arrest
for trial. In short, I spare none, and yet fear it will not all do, as these people seem to be too inattentive to every thing but their interest.
There have been so many great and capital errors and abuses to rectify-so
many examples to make, and so little inclination in the officers of inferior
rank to contribute their aid to accomplish this work, that my life has been
nothing else (since I came here) but one continual round of vexation and
fatigue. In short, no pecuniary recompense could induce me to undergo what
I have; especially, as I expect, by showing so little countenance to irregularities and public abuses as to render myself very obnoxious to a great part of
these people. But as I have already greatly exceeded the bounds of a letter,
I will not trouble you with matters relative to my feelings.
Your affectionate friend and obedient servant,
(Signed)            GEO. WASHINGTON.
Richard Henry Lee, Esq.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.               343
the war commenced, the depreciation has been at least onefourth, $3,175,000,000. From $9,375,000,000 deduct the property in the seceded States, at least one-third-$3,125,000,000;
leaving in the present United States, $6,250,000,000.. It will thus be seen, that the present debt of the North is
one-fifth of all the property of every kind it possesses; and in
one year more it will be more than one-third.  No people on
earth has ever been plunged in so large a debt in so short a
time. No government in existence has so large a debt in proportion to the amount of property held by its people.
In continuing the narrative of the campaign in Virginia, we
shall have to observe the remarkable exasperation with which
the North re-entered upon this campaign, and to notice many
deeds of blackness which illustrated the temper in which she
determined to prosecute the desperate fortunes of the war.
The military authorities of the North seemed to suppose that
better success would attend a savage war, in which no quarter
was to be given and no age or sex spared, than had hitherto
been secured to such hostilities as are alone recognized to be
lawful by civilized men in modern times.  It is not necessary
to comment at length upon this fallady.  Brutality in war was
mistaken for vigor. War is not emasculated by the observances of civilization; its vigor and success consist in the resources of generalship, the courage of troops, the moral ardors
of its cause. To attempt to make up for deficiency in these
great and noble elements of vigor by mere brutal severitiessuch as pillage, assassination, &c., is absurd; it reduces the idea
of war to the standard of the brigand; it offends the moral
sentiment of the world, and it excites its enemy to the last
stretch of determined and desperate exertion.
The North had placed a second army of occupation of Virginia under command of Gen. Pope, who boasted that he was
fresh from a campaign in the West, where he had "seen only
the backs of rebels.* This brutal braggart threatened that fire,
* This notorious Yankee commander, Major-general John Pope, was a man
nearly forty years of age, a native of Kentucky, but a citizen of Illinois. He
was born of respectable parents. He was graduated at West Point in 1842,
and served in the Mexican war, where he was brevetted a captain.
In 1849, he conducted the Minnesota exploring expedition, and afterwards
acted as topographical engineer of New Mexico, until 1853, when he was as



344              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
famine, and slaughter should be the portions of the conquered.
He declared that he would not place any guard over any private
property, and invited the soldiers to pillage and murder. He
issued a general order, directing the murder of peaceful inhabitants of Virginia, as spies if found quietly tilling their
farms in his rear, even outside of his lines; and one of his
brigadier-generals, Steinwehr, seized upon innocent and peaceful inhabitants to be held as hostages, to the end that they
might be murdered in cold blood, if any of his soldiers were
killed by some unknown persons, whom he designated as " bushwackers."
signed to the command of one of the expeditions to survey the route of the
Pacific railroad. He distinguished himself on the overland route to the Pacific
by " sinking" artesian wells and government money to the amount of a million of dollars. One well was finally abandoned incomplete, and afterwards
a perennial spring was found by other parties in the immediate vicinity. In
a letter to Jefferson Davis, then Secretary of War, urging this route to the
Pacific and the boring these wells, Pope made himself the especial champion
of the South.
On the breaking out of the war, Pope was mnade a brigadier-general of
volunteers. He held -a command in Missouri for some time before he became
particularly noted. When General Halleck took charge of the disorganized
department, Pope was placed in command of the District of Central Missouri.
He was afterwards sent to southeastern Missouri. The cruel disposition of
the man, of which his rude manners and a vulgar bearded face, with coarse
skin, gave indications, found an abundant field for gratification in this unhappy State. His proceedings in Missouri will challenge a comparison with
the most infernal record ever bequeathed by the licensed murderer to the abhorrence of mankind. And yet it was his first step in blood, the first opportunity he had ever had to feast his eyes upon slaughter and regale his ears
with the cries of human agony.
Having been promoted to the rank of major-general, Pope was next appointed to act at the head of a corps to co-operate with Halleck in the reduction of
Corinth. After the evacuation of Corinth by General Beauregard, Pope was
sent by Halleck to annoy the rear of the Confederate army, but Beauregard
turned upon and repulsed his pursuit. The report of Pope to Halleck, that
he had captured 10,000 of Beauregard's army, and 15,000 stand of arms, when
he had not taken a man or a musket, stands alone in the history of lying.
It left him without a rival in that respectable art.
Such was the man who took command of the enemy's forces in northern
Virginia. His bluster was as excessive as his accomplishments in falsehood.
He was described in a Southern newspaper as " a Yankee compound of Bobadil and Munchausen." His proclamation, that he had seen nothing of his
enemies "but their backs,";evived an ugly story in his private life, and gave
occasion to the witty interrogatory, if the gentleman who cowhided him for
offering an indignity to a lady, was standing with his back to him when he in



THIE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.                 345
The people of the North were delighted with the brigandish
pronunciamentos of Pope in Virginia. The government at
Washington was not slow to gratify the popular passion; it
hastened to change the character of the war into a campaign
of indiscriminate robbery and murder. A general order was
issued by the Secretary of War, directing the military commanders of the North to take private property for the convenience and use of their armies, without compensation. The
public and official expressions of the spirit of the North in the
war were even more violent than the clamors of the mob. The
abolitionists had at last succeeded in usurping complete control of the government at Washington, and in imparting to
the war the unholy zeal of their fanaticism. Nine-tenths of
the legislation of the Yankee Congress had been occupied in
some form. or other with the question of slavery. Universal
emancipation in the South, and the utter overthrow of all
property, was now the declared policy of the desperate and
demented leaders of the war. The Confiscation Bill, enacted
at the close of the session of Congress, confiscated all the slaves
belonging to those who were loyal to the South, constituting
nine-tenths at least of the slaves in the Confederate States. In
the Border States occupied by the North, slavery was plainly
doomed under a plan of emancipation proposed by Mr. Lincoln
with the flimsy and ridiculous pretence of compensation to
slaveholders.* Other violent acts of legislation were passed
flicted the chastisement. The fact was, that Pope had won his baton of mar
shal by bragging to the Yankee fill. He was another instance, besides that
of Butler, of the manufacture of military reputation in the North by cowardly
bluster and acts of coarse cruelty to the defenceless.
* According to the census of 1860Kentucky had........................... 225,490 slaves.
Maryland......................... 87,188 "
Virginia............................. 490,887    "
Delaware............................   1,798    "
Missouri................................  114,965    "
Tennessee............................ 275,784    "
Making in the whole................... 1,196,112
At the proposed rate of valuation, these would amount to   $358,833,600
Add for deportation and colonization $100 each,     119,244,533
And we have the enormous sum of                    $478,078,133




346              THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
with the intention to envenom the war, to insult and torture
the South, to suppress the freedom of public opinion in the
North, and to keep the government in the hands of the fanatics
and crusaders of Abolitionism.  Disaffection was threatened
with a long list of Draconian penalties. The political scaffold
was to be erected in the North, while the insatiate and unbridled fury of its army was to sweep over the South. " Rebellion" was to be punished by a warfare of savages, and the
devilish, skulking revenge, that pillages, burns, and assassinates, was to follow in the bloody footsteps of the invading
armies.
To this enormous mass of brutality and lawlessness, the Confederate States government made but a feeble response.  It
proposed a plan of retaliation, the execution of which was
limited to the commissioned offlcers of the army of Gen. Pope;
which, by declaring impunity to private soldiers, encouraged
their excesses; and which, in omitting any application to the
army of Butler in New Orleans, who had laughed at female
virtue in the conquered districts of the South, and murdered a
citizen of the South for disrespect to the Yankee bunting,* was
lamentably weak and imperfect. The fact was, that the govIt is scarcely to be supposed that a proposition could be made in good faith,
or that in any event the proposition could be otherwise than worthless, to add
this vast amount to the public debt of the North at a moment when the
treasury was reeling under the enormous expenditures of the war.
* The act for which William B. Mumford was executed by Butler, was
taking down the Yankee ensign from the Mint in that city on the 24th of
April. This act of Mumford was committed before the city of New Orleans
had surrendered. Indeed, the flag was hoisted in the city while negotiations
were being conducted between the commander of the Yankee fleet and the
authorities; and under these circumstances the raising of the enemy's flag
was a plain violation of the rules and amenities of war, and an outrage on the
authorities and people of the city. Taking the harshest rule of construction,
the act of Mumford, having been committed before the city of New Orleans
had surrendered, was nothing more than an act of wtar, for which he was no
more responsible than as a prisoner of war.
The unhappy man was hung in the open day by order of the Federal tyrant
of New Orleans. The brutal sentence of death on the gallows was carried
into effect in the presence of thousands of spectators. The crowd looked on
scarcely believing their senses, unwilling to think that even such a tyrant as
Butler could really have the heart for such a wanton murder of a citizen of
the Confederate States, and hoping every moment for a reprieve or a pardon;
but none came, and the soul of the martyr was ushered by violent hands into
the presence of its God.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.             347
ernment of President Davis had been weakly swindled in its
military negotiation with the North. It was persuaded to sign
a cartel for the exchange of prisoners, in which it made a present to its enemy of a surplus of about six thousand prisoners;
and its weak generosity was immediately rewarded, not only
by the barbarous orders of Pope, which were issued just at the
time the cartel was signed, but by the practical proclamation
in all the invaded districts of the South of the policy of the
seizure and imprisonment of unarmed inhabitants.  Our government had left out of the recent cartel -any provisions for
private citizens kidnapped by the enemy; it had left the
North in the undisturbed enjoyment, in many places, of the
privilege it claimed of capturing in our country as many polit*ical prisoners as it pleased; and it had, to a considerable extent, practically abandoned the protection of its own citizens.
Before the eyes of Europe the mask of civilization had been
taken from the Yankee war; it degenerated into unbridled
butchery and robbery. But the nations of Europe, which
boasted themselves as humane and civilized, had yet no interference to offer in a war which shocked the senses and appealed
to the common offices of humanity. It is to be observed, that
during the entire continuance of the war up to this time, the
British government had acted with reference to it in a spirit
of selfish and inhuman calculation; and there is, indeed, but
little doubt that an early recognition of the Confederacy by
France was thwarted by the interference of that cold and
sinister government, that ever pursues its ends by indirection,
and perfects its hypocrisy under the specious cloak of extreme
conscientiousness. No greater delusion could have possessed
the people of the South than that the government of England
was friendly to them. That government, which prided itself
on its cold and ingenious selfishness, seemed to have discovered
a much larger source of profit in the continuation of the American war, than it could possibly derive from a pacification of the
contest. It was willing to see its operatives starving, and to
endure the distress of a " cotton famine," * that it might have
* Great pains were taken alike by the Yankee and the English press to
conceal the distress caused in the manufacturing districts of Europe by the
withholding of Southern cotton; and the specious fallacy was being con



348               THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
the ultimate satisfaction, which it anticipated, of seeing both
parties in the American war brought to the point of exhaustion,
and its own greatness enlarged on the ruins of a hated commercial rival.  The calculation was far-reaching; it was characteristic of a government that secretly laughed at all sentiIment, made an exact science of selfishness, and scorned the
weakness that would sacrifice for any present good the larger
fruits of the future.
In the regular continuation of our historical narrative, in
which much that has been said here by way of general reflection will be replaced by the record of particular facts, and
special comments upon them, we shall have occasion before
stantly put forward that the cotton product in the colonial dominions of
Great Britain and elsewhere was being rapidly stimulated and enlarged; that
it would go far towards relieving the necessities of Europe; and that one effect of the American war would be to free England from her long and galling
dependence on the Slave States of the South for the chief article of her manufacturing industry.
The proofs in reply to the latter fallacy and falsehood are striking and unanswerable. The shipments of cotton from the British colonies, Egypt, Brazil,
&c., are actually falling off, and were much less this last summer than for a
corresponding period of the year before. The evidence of this fact is furnished
in the cotton circulars of Manchester.
India seems to have been cleared out by the large shipments of last year,
and the shipments to Europe, from the first of January to the last week in
May, showed a decrease of 100,000 bales; the figures being 251,000 bales
against 351,000 last year. From the large proportional consumption of Surat
cotton, the stock at Liverpool of this description, which, on the 1st of January
last, stood at 295,000 bales against 130,000 last year, was, about the close of
May, reduced to 170,000 against 133,000 last year; while in the quantity
afloat the figures were still more unfavorable, viz.: 184,000 bales against
258,000.
The downward progress of the stock of American cotton is illustrated
roughly by the following quarterly table prepared from the Manchester
circulars:
March, 1861.   June.
In American ports.................... 750,000     100,000
Afloat and at Liverpool................. 918,000   971,000
1,668,000    1,071,000
March, 1862.    May.
In American ports.....................  30,000     20,000
Afloat and at Liverpool................. 160,000   108,000
193,000     128,000




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            349
tracing the active prosecution of the campaign in Virginia, to
direct the attention of the reader to the progress of events in
the West.
We shall find many remarkable events to record in this
direction. We shall see how it was that the evacuation of
Corinth was determined upon; that the retreat was conducted
with great order and precision; and that, despite the boasts of
the North to the contrary, we lost no more prisoners than the
enemy did himself, and abandoned to him in stores not more
than would amount to one day's expense of our army.
We shall find in the defence of Vicksburg a splendid lesson
of magnanimity and disinterested patriotism. We shall see
how for several weeks this city resisted successfully the attack
of the enemy's gunboats, mortar fleets, and heavy siege-guns;
how it was threatened by powerful fleets above and below, and
with what unexampled spirit the Queen City of the Bluffs sustained the iron storm that was rained upon her for weeks with
continued fury.
New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Natchez, and Memphis were in
the hands of the Yankees, and their possession by the enemy
might have furnished to Vicksburg, in its exposed and desperate situation, the usual excuses of timidity and selfishness
for its surrender. But the brave city resisted these vile and
unmanly excuses, and gave to the world one of the proudest
and most brilliant illustrations of the earnestness and devotion
of the people of the South that had yet adorned the war.
The fact that but little hopes could be entertained of the
eventual success of the defence of Vicksburg against the powerful concentration of the enemy's navy, heightened the nobility of the resistance she made. The resistance of an enemy
in circumstances which afford but a feeble and uncertain prospect of victory, requires a great spirit; but it is more invaluable to us than a hundred easy victories; it teaches the enemy
that we are invincible, and overcomes him with despair; it
exhibits to the world the inspiiations and moral grandeur of
our cause; and it educates our people in chivalry and warlike
virtues by the force of illustrious examples of self-devotion.
We shall have, however, the satisfaction of recording an
unexpected issue of victory in the siege of Vicksburg, and
have occasion to point to another lesson that the history of all




350            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
wars indicates, that the practical test of resistance affords the
only sure determination whether a place is defensible or not.
With a feeling of inexpressible pride did Vicksburg behold two
immense fleets, each of which had been heretofore invincible,
brought to bay, and, unable to cope with her, kept at a respectable distance, and compelled to essay the extraordinary
task of digging a new channel for the Mississippi.
In following the track of detachments of our forces in the
West, we shall refer to the brilliant movements across the
Mississippi that drove the enemy from Arkansas, and harassed
him on the Missouri border with ceaseless activity, and to the
dashing expedition of the celebrated John Morgan into Kentucky. We shall see that the expedition of this cavalier was
one of the most brilliant, rapid, and successful raids recorded
in history. He left Tennessee with a thousand men, only a
portion of whom were armed; penetrated two hundred and
fifty miles into a country in full possession of the Yankees;
captured a dozen towns and cities; met, fought, and captured
a Yankee force superior to his own in numbers; captured three
thousand stand of arms at Lebanon; and, from first to last,
destroyed during his raid, military stores, railroad bridges, and
other property to the value of eight or ten millions of dollars.
He accomplished all this, besides putting the people of Cincinnati into a condition, described by one of their newspapers, as
"bordering on frenzy," and returned to Tennessee with a
loss in all his engagements of fifteen men killed, and forty
wounded.
While some activity was shown in extreme portions of the
West, we shall see that our military operations from Greenbrier county, Virginia, all the way down to Chattanooga, Tennessee, were conducted with but little vigor. On the boundaries of East Tennessee, southwestern Virginia, and Kentucky,
we had a force in the aggregate of thirty thousand men, confronted by probably not half their number of Yankee troops;
yet the southwestern counties of Virginia, and the valley of
the Clinch, in Tennessee, were entered and mercilessly plundered by the enemy in the face of our troops.
Turning for a moment from the military events of this
period, we shall notice the reassembling of the Confederate
Congress. on the 18th of August, 1862. We shall then find




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.               35.1
occasion to review the conduct of this branch of the government, and to observe how it fell below the spirit and virtue of
the people; what servility to the Executive it displayed, and
what a singular destitution of talents and ability was remarkable in this body. Not a single speech that has yet been made
in it will live. It is true, that the regular Congress elected by
the people was an improvement upon the ignorant and unsavory body known as the Provisional Congress, which was the
creature of conventions, and which was disgraced in the character of some of its members; among whom were conspicuous,
corrupt and senile politicians from Virginia, who had done all
they could to sacrifice and disgrace their State, who had
toadied in "society," as well as in politics, to notabilities of
New England, and who had taken a prominent part in emasculating, and, in fact, annulling the Sequestration Law, in order
to save the property of relatives who had sided with the North
against the land that had borne them and honored their fathers.
But the regular Congress, although it had no taint of disloyalty or Yankee toadyism in it, was a weak, sycophantic, and
trifling body. It has made no mark in the history of the government; it was utterly destitute of originality. Its measures
were those which were recommended by the Executive or suggested by the newspapers. It produced no great financial
measure; it made not one stroke of statesmanship; it uttered
not a single fiery appeal to the popular heart, such as is customary in revolutions. The most of the little ability it had
was eaten up by servility to the Executive; and the ignorance
of the majority was illustrated by a trifling and undignified
style of legislation, in which whole days were consumed with
paltry questions, and the greatest measures-such as the Conscript Law*-embarrassed by demagogical speeches made for
home effect.
* The execution of the Conscript Law was resisted by Governor Brown, of
Georgia. The correspondence between him and the President on this subject,
which was printed and hawked in pamphlet-form through the country, is a
curiosity. What will posterity think of a correspondence between such dignitaries, taking place at a time when the destinies of the country trembled in
the balance, composed of about equal parts of hair-splitting and demagogueism,'and illustrated copiously by Mr. Brown with citations from the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, and exhumed opinions of members of the




352             THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
It is difficult, indeed, for a legislative body to preserve its
independence, and to resist the tendency of the Executive to
absorb power in a time of war, and this fact was well illustrated by the Confederate Congress.  One of the greatest
political scholars of America, Mr. Madison, noticed this danger in the political constitution of the country. He said: —
" War is in fact the true nurse of Executive aggrandizement.
In war a physical force is to be created, and it is the Executive will which is to direct it. In war the public treasures
are to be unlocked, and it is the Executive hand which is to
dispense them. In war the honors and emoluments of office
are to be multiplied, and it is the Executive patronage under
which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that laurels
are to be gathered, and it is the Executive brow they are to
encircle."
There was but little opposition in Congress to President
Davis; but there was some which took a direction to his Cabinet, and this opposition was represented by Mr. Foote of Tennessee-a man of acknowledged ability and many virtues of
character, who had re-entered upon the political stage after
a public life, which, however it lacked in the cheap merit of
partisan consistency, had been adorned by displays of wonderful intellect and great political genius.  Mr. Foote was not
a man to be deterred from speaking the truth; his quickness
to resentm6nt and his chivalry, which, though somewhat
Quixotic, was founded in the most noble and delicate sense
of honor, made those who would have bullied or silenced a
weaker person, stand in awe of him. A man of such temper was not likely to stint words in assailing an opponent;
and his sharp declamations in Congress, his searching comnments, and his great powers of sarcasm, used upon such men
as Mallory, Benjamin, and Huger, were the only relief of the
dulness of the Congress, and the only historical features of its
debates.
old Federal Convention of 1787? The display was characteristic of Southern
politicians; in the most vital periods of the country's destiny they had an eye
to making political capital for themselves, and in the fierce tumults of a revolution, refreshed the country with exhumations from the politicians of 1787,
and the usual amount of clap-trap about our "forefathers," and the old
political system that had rotted over our heads.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           353
Returning to the history of the campaign in Virginia, we
shall have occasion to enumerate another brilliant victory of
our arms, achieved on that fortunate theatre of the war. We
refer to the battle of Cedar Mountain. We shall find other
topics to record in the events which, at the time of this writing, are developing themselves, and reaching to the most important consequences, both in Virginia and Tennessee. We
shall see how the great army which McClellan had brought
for the reduction of Richmond, and in sight of the church
steeples of that city, was compelled to retire towards the Potomac, with its proud columns shattered, humiliated, and demoralized; how Pope, who had entered Virginia with a splendid
army and the most insolent boasts, was ignominiously whipped
on more than one occasion, and with what agony of cowardice
he sought safety for his retreat; how considerable portions of
Virginia and Tennessee were surrendered to the jurisdiction
of the Confederacy; how the enemy in various quarters was
pushed back to his old lines; and how intelligent men in the
South saw for the first time certain and unmistakable indications of demoralization in the armies of the North, brought on
by the remarkable train of victories in Virginia, extending from
early June to September.
In these events we shall find bright and flattering prospects
renewed to the South. Much of these we shall find already
realized in the events in the midst of which we write this imperfect sketch. We shall trace the painful steps by which our
worn troops advanced to meet another invading army in Virginia, reinforced not only by the defeated army of McClellan,
but by the fresh corps of Generals Burnside and Hunter. We
shall tell what hardships were endured by our troops, and what
exploits of valor were performed by them on this celebrated
expedition; how they were compelled to toil their way with
inadequate transportation; how they crossed streams swollen
to unusual height, and bore all the fatigues and distresses of
forced marches; how their spirit and endurance were tested by
repeated combats with the enemy; how at last they succeeded
in turning his position; and how, having formed a junction of
their columns in the face of greatly superior forces on the
historic and blood-stained plains of Manassas, they achieved
there the ever-memorable victory of the thirteenth of August,
22




354               THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
1862, the crowning triumph of their toil and valor. A nation's
gratitude is evoked to repay all that is due to the valor of our
troops and the providence of Almighty God.*
We do not trust ourselves to predict the consequences of current events; and the brilliant story of MIanassas, grouped with
contemporary victories in the West, must be left to the decisions
of the future —trusting as we do that we may have occasion to
record in another volume the consequences as well as the details of these events, and to find in the future the fulfilment of
the promises of to-day.
* * * * A few general reflections on the material and
moral phenomena of the war will appropriately conclude our
work for the present.
It is a censurable practice to flatter the people. It is equally
* The vulgar and unintelligent mind worships success. The extraordinary
and happy train of victories in Virginia seems to have had no other significance or interest to a number of grovelling minds in the South, than as a
contribution to the personal fame of General Lee, who by no fault of his own
(for no one had more modesty, more Christian dignity of behavior, and a
purer conversation), was followed by toadies, flatterers, and newspaper sneaks
in epaulets, who made him ridiculous by their servile obeisances and excess
of praise. The author does not worship success. He trusts, however, that
he has intelligence enough to perceive merit, without being prompted by the
vulgar cry; he is sure that he has honesty and independence enough to acknowledge it where he believes it to exist. The estimation of General Lee,
made in some preceding pages, was with reference to his unfortunate campaign in Western Virginia; it was founded on the events of that campaign,
in which there is no doubt Gen. Lee blundered and showed an absurd misconception of mountain warfare; and so far as these events furnished evidence for the historian, the author believes that he was right, unprejudiced,
and just in ascribing the failure of that campaign to the misdirection of the
commanding general. If, however, it can be shown, as now seems to be
likely from incomplete events, that on wider, clearer, and more imposing
fields Gen. Lee has shown qualities which the campaign in the mountains
of Virginia had not illustrated, the friends of this commander may be assured
that the author will be honest and cordial in acknowledging the fact, and
that in a future continuation of these annals, justice will be done to the
recent extraordinary events in Virginia, fraught with so many critical issues
of the war, and associated with so many reputations dear to the people of the
South. In writing the facts of this war, the author takes no counsel of popular cries, and notions fashionable in the newspapers; he is neither the
panegyrist nor the antagonist of any clique; he is more pleased to praise
than to censure, but his aim is truth, and he is resolved to pursue it, no
matter what popular prejudice or affection he is compelled to crush in its
attainment.




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            355
censurable to withhold from them the plain recognition of their
accomplishments. The present war will win the respect of the
world for the masses of the people of the Confederate States.
With inferior numbers, with resources hampered on all sides,
we are yet winning the issue of the great struggle in which we
are involved. No one claims that this is owing to the wisdom
of our government. No one ascribes it to the ability of our
military chieftains; for blunders in our military management
have been as common as in our civil administration. But
there is a huge, unlettered power that wages the war on our
side, overcoming everywhere the power of the enemy and the
incumbrances of our own machinery. It is the determined,
settled will of the people to be free, and to fight themselves
firee, that has constituted our strength and our safety.
The existing war has, doubtless, disappointed the world in
its meagre phenomena of personal greatness, and, to some extent, has disappointed its own people in the bigotry of its
policy and the official restraint put upon its spirit. It may be
said with singular truth, that it has produced or exhibited but
few great men-that it has not raised up to public admiration
in the South a statesman, an orator, a poet, or a financier, all
which are generally considered as much the natural products
of war as military genius itself.  For this disappointment,
however, we may find an explanation in some degree satisfactory. It is, that the very circumstance of the almost universal
uprising of the people of the South, and the equal measures of
devotion shown by all classes and intellects, have given but
little room for overshadowing names, and presented but little
opportunity for marked personal distinctions of greatness.
After all, it is the spirit of the people that is most sure to
achieve the victorious results odf revolutions; and on this firm
reliance, and not on the personal fortunes of master-spirits, or
on adventitious aid, or on the calculations of any merely external events, do we rest, under Providence, the hopes of the
Southern Confederacy. The verdict of the history of the world
is, that no powerful nation has ever been lost except by its own
cowardice. All nations that have fought for an independent
existence, have had to sustain terrible defeats, live through
deep, though temporary distress, and endure hours of profound
discouragement. But no nation was ever subdued that really




356            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
determined to fight while there was an inch of ground or a
solitary soldier left to defend it.
As far as the war has been fought, its results, in a military
point of view, are deeply humiliating to the North. The war
was commenced by the North with the most intense expressions of contempt for its adversary; the idea of the contest
being extended beyond a few months, was derided and spit
upon; in that short time it was believed that the flag of the
Union would float over the cities and towns of the South, and
the bodies of " traitors" dangle from the battlements of Washington.
This was not affectation. It was calculated by many people,
in a spirit of candor, that a contest so unequal in the material
elements of strength as that between the North and the South
would be speedily determined.  The North had more than
twenty millions of people to break the power of eight millions;
it had a militia force about three times as strong as that of the
South; it had the regular army; it had an immense advantage
over the South in a navy, the value of which may be appreciated when it is known that its achievements in the war have
been greater than those of the land forces, and that its strength,
with proposed additions to its active war vessels, is estimated
to-day in the North as equivalent to an army of half a million
men.
Nor did the superiority of the North end here. While the
South was cut off from the world by the restrictions of the
blockade, without commerce, with but scanty manufactures
and few supplies on hand, the North had all the ports of the
world open to its ships; it had furnaces, foundries, and workshops; its manufacturing resources compared with those of the
South were as five hundred to one; the great marts of Europe
were open to it for supplies of arms and stores; there was
nothing of material resource, nothing of the apparatus of conquest that was not within its reach.
These immense elements of superiority on the part of the
North have not remained idle in her hands. They have beenl
exercised with tremendous energy. Within the last fifteen
months the government at Washington has put forth all its
power to subjugate the South; it has contracted a debt six
or seven times more than that of the South; it has called out




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.           357
more than half a million soldiers: it has put Europe under
contribution to furnish it not only arms, but soldiers to use
them; it has left no resource untried and omitted no condition
of success.
The result of all this immense and boasted superiority on
the part of the North, coupled with the most immense exertions is; that the South remains unconquered. The result is
humiliating enough to the warlike reputation of the North.
It has not been separated from its feeble adversary by seas or
mountains, but only by a geographical line; nature has not
interfered to protect the weak from the strong; three " Grand
Armies" have advanced in the Confederate territory; and yet
to-day, the Yankees hold in Virginia and Tennessee only the
ground they stand upon, and the South, in spirit, is more invincible than ever.
Nor has the war, so far as it has been waged, been without
great moral benefits to the South. We may indicate at least
three important and inestimable blessings which it has conferred upon our people.
It has made impossible the theory of the " reconstruction"
of the old Union, which was no doubt indulged in the early
formation of the Confederate government. It has carried a
revolution, which, if no war had taken place, would probably
have ended in "reconstruction," on the basis of concessions
from the Northern States, which would in no way have impaired the advantages of the old Union to them, to a point
where the demand for our independence admits of no alternative or compromise. It has revealed to us the true characteristics of the people of the North; it has repulsed us from a
people whose vices and black hearts we formerly knew but imperfectly; and it has produced that antagonism and alienation
which were necessary to exclude the possibility a reunion
with them.
Again: the war has shown the system of negro slavery in
the South to the world in some new and striking aspects, and
has removed much of that cloud of prejudice, defamation,
falsehood, romance, and perverse sentimentalism through which
our peculiar institution was formerly known to Europe. It
has given a better vindication of our system of slavery than all
the books that could be written in a generation. Hereafter




3 a8              TIHE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.'
there can be no dispute between facts plainly exhibited and
the pictures of romance; and intelligent men of all countries
will obtain their ideas of slavery from certain leading and indisputable facts in the history of this war, rather than from
partisan sources of information and the literary inventions of
the North. The war has shown that slavery has been an elenment of strength with us; that it has assisted us in the war;
that no servile insurrections have taken place in the South, in
spite of the allurements of our enemy; that the slave has tilled
the soil while his master has fought; that in large districts unprotected by our troops, and with a white population consisting
almost exclusively of women and children, the slave has continued at his work, quiet, cheerful, and faithful;* and that, as
* The following is taken from the letter of an English nobleman, who
visited the South while the war was in its active stages, and the result of
whose observations there, at the time war was racking the country and many
of our own whites were houseless and starving, was, that the condition of the
negro slaves in the South was " better than that of any laboring population in
the world."
X*      *          *        *      *   *  *       *
"Among the dangers which we had heard at New York threatened the
South, a revolt of the slave population was said to be the most imminent.
Let us take, then, a peep at the cotton-field, and see what likelihood there is
of such a contingency. On the bank of the Alabama river, which winds its
yellow course through woods of oak, ash, maple, and pine, thickened with
tangled copse of varied evergreens, lie some of the most fertile plantations of
the State. One of these we had the advantage of visiting. Its owner received
us with all that hospitality and unaffected bonhomie which invariably distinguish a Southern gentleman.'Having mounted a couple of hacks, we started
off through a large pine wood, and soon arrived at the " clearing" of about
two hundred acres in extent, on most of which was growing an average cotton
crop. This was a fair sample of the rest of the plantation, which consisted
altogether of 7000 acres. Riding into the middle of the field, we found ourselves surrounded by about forty slaves-men, women, and children-engaged
in "picking." They were al} well dressed, and seemed happy and cheerful.
Wishing to know what time of day it was, I asked Mr. -   the hour, whereupon one of the darkies by my side took out a watch and informed me.
"'Do your laborers wear watches, sir?' I inquired.
"' A great many of them have. Why, sir, my negroes all have their cottonplats and gardens, and most of them have little orchards.'
" We found from their own testimony that they are fed well, chiefly'upon
pork, corn, potatoes, and rice, carefully attended to when sick, and on Sundays
dress better than their masters. We next visited the'station,' a street of
cottages in a pine wood, where Mr. -'s slaves reside. These we found
clean and comfortable. Two of the men were sick, and had been visited that




THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.            359
a conservative element in our social system, the institution of
slavery has withstood the shocks of war and been a faithful
ally of our arms, although instigated to revolution by every
art of the enemy, and prompted to the work of assassination
and pillage by the most brutal examples of the Yankee soldiery.
Finally, the war has given to the States composing the Confederacy a new bond of union. This was necessary. Commerce and intercourse had been far more intimate between the
Slave States on the Lower Mississippi and those on the Upper
Mississippi and its tributaries, than between any portions of
the Confederate States. The war has broken this natural affinity; it has supplanted sympathy by alienation, interest by
hlate, between the people of Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio, and
those of Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi; and by the principle of repulsion as well as union, by the tie of a common
bloodshed, and the memory of a common labor and glory, the
stability of our Confederacy has been strengthened and secured.
Such are the inestimable blessings which, although draped
in sorrow and suffering, the war has conferred upon the people
of the South.
The resolution of the South to achieve its independence has
been greatly encouraged as the war has advanced. It is alike
prompted by the spirit of her people, and strengthened by motives which address the judgment. These motives are explained
in the plain consequences of subjugation. The spirit of the
North in the existing war has already been developed far
enough to indicate the certain condition of the South, if her
enemy should succeed in establishing his dominion over her
people.  That condition may be described in confiscation,
brutality, military domination, insult, universal poverty, the
beggary of millions, the triumph of the vilest individuals in
these communities, the abasement of the honest and industrious, the outlawry of the slaves, the destruction of agriculture
and commerce, the emigration of all thriving citizens, farewell
to the hopes of future wealth, and the scorn of the world. The
morning by a doctor; in the mean time they were looked after by the nurses
of the establishment, of whom there were three to take care of the children
and invalids."




360            THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
resistance of such a destiny, properly conceived, will restore
the worst fortunes of war, pluck victory from despair, and
deserve the blessing of Providence, which " can save by many
or by few," and which has never yet failed to reward a just
and earnest endeavor for independence.
RICHMOND, September, 1862.




APPENDIX.
THE attention of the author was directed to some particulars of his work,
which required some correction or explanation, at the time when it was passing through the press. It was then too late to modify the passages referred to,
unless in the form of a postscript or appendix. The author congratulates himself that he has found real occasion for so few corrections or explanations.
Page 36.-The date of Anderson's evacuation of Fort Moultrie should be the
26th of December instead of the 20th; the error occurred through a mistake of
the digit 6 for 0 in the rough notes of the author.
Page 177. —In noticing the expedition of our cavalry to Guyandotte, we
should have associated with this bold enterprise the name of Col. Clarkson,
who originated it and was intrusted with its execution by Gen. Floyd. The
services of Col. Clarkson on this and other enterprises, and his intrepidity on
some of the most critical occasions in the western Virginia campaign, deserve
mention, and we regret that we can give it no further within the limits of this
postscript, than to supply the omission of credit justly due him in connection
with the famous expedition of our cavalry to the Ohio.
Page 247.-The circumstances in which Governor Harris left Nashville
were imperfectly known at the time; and there is no doubt but that some
injustice was done to one of the most ardent and courageous patriots of the
South, in attributing his conduct on this occasion to panic or embarrassment.
The circumstances in which he acted have been ascertained from unquestionable sources of testimony, and may be briefly narrated here: On the morning
of Sunday, the 16th of February, at ten minutes after 4 o'clock, a messenger
arrived at Gen. Johnston's head-quarters at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, with
a dispatch announcing the fall of Donelson. Orders were at once issued to
push the army forward across the river as soon as possible. The city papers
or extras of that morning published dispatches announcing a "glorious victory."  The city was wild with joy. About the time the people were assellbling at the churches, it was announced by later extras that " Donelson had
fallen."  The revulsion was great. Governor Harris, however, had been
informed of the fact early in the morning, and had proceeded to Gen. Johnston's head-quarters to advise with him as to the best course to adopt under
the altered circumstances. The action of the State authorities would, of
course, be greatly influenced by the course Gen. Johnston intended to adopt
with the army. The general told the governor that Nashville was utterly




3 6 8                        APPENDIX.
indefensible; that the army would pass right through the city; that any
attempt to defend it with the means at his command would result in disaster
to the army and the destruction of the city; that the first and highest duty
of the governor was to the public trusts in his hands, and he thought, to discharge them properly, he should at once remove the archives and public records to some safer place, and call the Legislature together elsewhere than at
Nashville. Governor Harris did all this quietly, energetically, and patriotically. Just as soon as he had deposited these papers, he returned to Nashville.
The confusion at Nashville did not reach its height until a humane attempt
was made to distribute among the poor a portion of the public stores which
could not be removed. The lowest passions seemed to have been aroused in a
large mass of men and women, and the city appeared as if it was in the hands
of a mob. The military authority, however (Gen. Floyd having been put in
command by Gen. Johnston), asserted its supremacy, and comparative order
was restored. During these excitements it became publicly known, for the
first time, that Governor Harris was out of the city, but few really knowing
that he had quietly gone away in the discharge of a public duty. His absence
was wholly misunderstood, and, of course, misrepresented. There is no doubt
but that, in the course of these misrepresentations in the newspapers, injustice
was done to a man who illustrated his devotion to the South by distinguished
courage on the battle-field, and who, from the moment that he first rebuffed
the Washington government in his famous defiance to Lincoln's call for
troops, down to recent periods in the history of the revolution, had given the
most constant and honorable proofs of his attachment to the liberties and
fortunes of the South.