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THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR
Ea lbtitorp bp
THE WAR LEADERS
ILL US TRA TED
With numerous original engravings, maps and diagrams
NORWICH, CONN
CHAS. C. HASKELL & SON
22 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND, LONDON, ENGLAND
GAY & BIRD
1899




COPYRIGHT, 1899, BY
CHAS. C. HASKELL & SON.
REGISTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL, LONDON, ENGLAND.
All rights reserved.
Half-tone Plates by
Walker Eng. Co.


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INTRODUCTION.


BY
GaN. STEWART L. WOODFORD, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to
the Court of Spain.
IT is an honor which I deeply appreciate to be asked to
write these introductory words to such a noteworthy collection of papers as this volume contains.
The island of Cuba suffered during many years from unrest,
disorder and civil war. For about half the time between i868
and i898 it was the theatre of struggles which wasted its
resources and destroyed nearly one quarter of its population.
So continuous had been these struggles and so dreadful their
results that in our last Presidential canvass both our great
political parties practically pledged themselves to such action
by our Government as should restore order and compel peace
in Cuba. Spain was three thousand miles distant and Cuba
was less than one hundred miles from our coast. The burden
and the duty of humanity were upon us, and our people of
all sections and all parties recognized this duty and accepted
this burden.
In March, i897, President McKinley was inaugurated. As
soon as the more pressing needs of internal administration
and revenue legislation had been met, he addressed himself to
the settlement of the Cuban question. He recognized that it
was, in the largest and broadest sense, a national question and
was not to be considered and solved upon partisan considerations or through party agencies alone. He retained at Havana
as Consul-General a distinguished Democrat, appointed to




4


INTRODUCTION.


that pivotal post by President Cleveland. This was Fitzhugh
Lee, who had been a gallant soldier of the Confederacy during
our own Civil War and after that war a Governor of Virginia.
He sent as Minister to Madrid a citizen of New York, who
had served in the Union Army and who was in his personal
politics a Republican. The new American Minister started
for his post on the 28th of July, i897. Shortly after his arrival at London, he learned of the assassination of the Spanish
Prime Minister, Sentor Canovas. There were short delays at
London and Paris, and on the ist of September the American
representative reached San Sebastian, where the Queen
Regent of Spain was holding her summer Court. *His formal
presentation to Her Majesty soon followed, and his negotiations with the Spanish Government in relation to Cuba were
promptly begun. Those negotiations, whether oral or written,
were, from the beginning to the end, straightforward, open and
direct and were conducted on the lines of what has come to
b.e known as the " New American Diplomacy." At the outset the American Minister authorized the Spanish Government to publish freely and fully whatever communication he
should make to them.
The instructions of the President were firm, yet friendly,
and were sincerely in behalf of justice and peace. Those
instructions the American Minister sought to carry out to
the best of his ability.  When war at last came, it was
because war was inevitable. The President had done all that
a strong and wise man could do for peace, with justice to
Cuba and with due regard to the great American interests in
that island. At the beginning the President sought the establishment of those conditions in Cuba which should make permanent peace possible and tendered to Spain the good offices
of the United States for securing this result. That offer was
unfortunately never accepted.




INTRODUCTION.                     5
The first formal note from the American Minister was
delivered on the 23rd of September. Within a few days
thereafter the members of the Spanish Conservative Cabinet
resigned. They were succeeded early in October by a Liberal
Ministry under the presidency of Senfor Sagasta. This seemed
a distinct gain for the cause of peace.
General \Veyler had been in absolute command of Cuba
since the spring of 1896. It was generally understood that
he had received assurance from the Spanish Government
that he should be given at least two years, or until the
spring of i898, within which to work out his own policy, of
suppressing the Cuban insurrection.  His administration as
Captain-General in Cuba was not acceptable to the conscience
of the American people and was disapproved by American
public opinion. His well-known bandos or military decrees, in
regard to the reconcentrados and the export of tobacco, were
believed by our people.to be directly responsible for much of
the horrible suffering then known to exist in Cuba. I did not
then believe and I do not now believe that it would have been
possible to keep peace between Spain and the United States
until Christmas, 1897, had General Weyler remained in command of Cuba until that Christmas. The change of Ministry
therefore seemed to me at the time a distinct gain in the
interest of peace.
Senor Sagasta during the preceding month of June, before
the assassination of Senor Canovas and while Sagasta was
only the leader of a party out of power, had issued a proclamation or manifesto in the name of the Liberal Party. In
this document he had discussed very freely and fully the condition of affairs in Cuba and had promised, if the Liberal
Party were again entrusted with the Government of Spain,
that General Weyler should be recalled and that an enlarged
and efficient system of autonomy should be established in




6


INTRODUCTION.


Cuba. The Sagasta Ministry came in. General Weyler was
recalled. Decrees granting enlarged autonomy were prepared
and promulgated.
The President dwelt upon these things in his message to
our Congress when that body met in December, I897, and
expressed his earnest hope that humane methods of warfare
and sincere and effective autonomy might bring rest, order
and enduring peace in Cuba.
The American Government and people waited with patient
benevolence. Meanwhile the war continued. Order was not
restored in the rural districts. The disease was too deeply
rooted. It was the result of methods four centuries old, and
mutual distrust and hatred could not be eradicated or even
assuaged in weeks or months. Possibly they may not be in
years. The camps of the reconcentrados were not broken up.
Disease and starvation kept on in their deadly work of decimating the people. Peace did not come, and the necessity
for action by the United States grew each day more evident
and more imperative.
Then occurred an incident which had immediate, serious
and far-reaching effect. Some time during the winter, a private letter from the then Spanish Minister at Washington to
a prominent Spaniard, who was visiting Cuba, was discovered at Havana. It was published by the American press
and its authenticity was admitted by its writer. It contained expressions of opinion with regard to autonomy and
concerning our President which caused natural, immediate
and widespread doubt among many of our most conservative
people, whether Spain was acting with sincerity and in good
faith in this vital matter of autonomy. These suspicions may
have been unjust, but they were natural and even inevitable.
So far as the Sagasta Ministry and her Majesty the Queen
Regent were concerned I am sure that they were unjust. I




INTRODUCT ION.


7


believe that both the Ministry and the Queen Regent tried
loyally and in good faith to grant and enforce such autonomy
as they thought would secure peace and order. This statement is due to them and to history. In practice the autonomy
which they offered proved insufficient. Revolutions never go
backward, and events in Cuba were not to be an exception to
this historic rule. But if the trusted representative of Spain at
Washington thought what he wrote about autonomy, it was
natural and inevitable for all Americans to fear that the Spanish authorities in Cuba might think the same and that thus in
practice autonomy might prove a delusion and a snare. The
mischief had been done, and a grave element of doubt and
distrust had been added to a situation already very tense and
difficult. One private letter from a public man seems a little
matter but there is large truth and enduring application in
the old adage that "it is the last straw which breaks the
camel's back."
The Spanish Minister at Washington at once telegraphed
his resignation to his Government at Madrid. He did this
before any communication had been received by our Minister
at Madrid from our Government at Washington. Immediately on receiving a communication from our Government,
the American Minister sought an interview with the Spanish
Foreign Office, but before such interview was accorded, the
Spanish Government had accepted the resignation of. the
Spanish Minister at Washington. Serious interviews and correspondence followed, and finally the Spanish Government
made representations and explanations of such a character
that they were accepted as being full and ample reparation,
and this unfortunate and untimely incident wvas diplomatically
declared to be satisfactorily closed.  But the mischief had
been done and its evil effect remained to the end.
Meanwhile there had been a second and far more serious




8


INTRODUCTION.


matter, and one whose seriousness was aggravated by what had
just occurred. The United States Steamer Maine had gone
on a friendly visit to the Harbor of Havana. The Spanish
cruiser Vizcaya had been ordered on a return visit of courtesy to the Port of New York.  On the night of February
i5, while anchored in the Harbor of Havana, at a buoy,
indicated by the Spanish authorities, and while under
the protection which the ships of a friendly Government
are entitled to enjoy from the Government in whose
waters they lie, the steamer Maine was blown up and destroyed
with the loss of 266 of our sailors. In the excited and tense
condition of public opinion there came at once the horrible
suspicion of foul play and of an external cause for the awful
catastrophe. With a wisdom that cannot be too highly commended, Captain Sigsbee at once telegraphed the Navy Department reporting the loss of his vessel and asking suspension of
judgment as to its cause. The American people are just and
waited to know the facts before they should form a final
opinion and fix the responsibility.  A  Naval Court of
Inquiry was ordered, and the report of that body was that
the explosion of the ill-fated Mlaine was due to external
causes. If any doubt still remained, that doubt was finally
and forever removed when the phenomena of the internal
explosions of iron-clad war-vessels were so clearly shown in
the Spanish ships which were run ashore in the sea fight off
Santiago Harbor and which, having been set on fire, were
destroyed by the explosion of their own magazines. The ribs
of these vessels were bent outward, while the ribs of the
Maine were bent inward.
Negotiations continued, but the end was drawing nigh.
Patriotic people and thoughtful people sought peace. The
Queen at Madrid and the President at Washington were alike
earnest in their desire and in their efforts for peace. The




INTRODUCTION.


9


Spanish Government had recalled General Weyler, and had
offered as large autonomy to Cuba as military and political
opinion in Spain would permit. It was the misfortune of
Spain that Spanish statesmen did not believe that they could
do or ought to do the only things that would have assured
peace. Those things were the declaration and enforcement
of an immediate armistice and the prompt taking of steps
looking to the removal of the Spanish flag from Cuba. According to the best judgment I could then form, the leaders
of Spanish opinion believed that the granting of independence
to Cuba meant immediate and possibly successful revolution
in Spain. They chose between war with us and the overthrow of the Alphonso Dynasty. It might be possible to
have war with us and thereby lose Cuba and yet save the
Dynasty. While, should Spain grant freedom to Cuba, she
must lose the Island and possibly her King. It is not for
me, a stranger to Spain and an American, to decide as to the
wisdom or unwisdom of this judgment. Whatever any may
have thought then, it is now evident that no compromise as
*to Cuba was possible. The forces bred and born of four
centuries of Spanish rule and of nearly three centuries of
American neighborhood and example were at work. Cuba
could not remain Spanish. She must become independent or
American, and war was the last and only possible solution.
As I look back I can see that the incident of the Maine,
coming close on the heels of the discovered letter, created
conditions which made peaceful solution practically impossible. I did not then so believe. I did then believe, that
immediate and effective armistice would be followed by such
negotiations as would secure local independence and the finlial
and peaceful removal of the Spanish flag from Cuba.
Whether this belief was right or wrong I did not succeed in
obtaining such armistice in time to be of any effect. The




IO


INTRODUCTION.


wishes of the American Government, as finally presented on
March 29, did not receive satisfactory reply in the final and
formal interview with Ministers Sagasta, Gullon and Moret on
March 31, and, in accordance with the directly expressed
purpose of our President, the entire Cuban question was
shortly laid by him before Congress.
What was done thereafter is matter of public history.. On
the nineteenth of April, 1898, Congress took final action. Its
resolutions were approved by the President on April 20,
and a copy was at once communicated by our Secretary of
State to the Spanish Minister at Washington. This latter
official immediately asked for his passports and left Washington en route for Canada. A copy of these resolutions with
appropriate instruction was telegraphed in open English and
not in cipher to the American Minister at Madrid.  He
received this telegram at half-past two o'clock on the morning of April 2l. At half-past seven o'clock on that morning he received the following note from the Spanish Foreign
Office. As this note has been published by the Spanish
Government in their official Red Book of April, I898, it can
be given here without any violation of diplomatic usage or
courtesy.
Extract from Spanish Red Book, page I98:EL MINISTRO DE ESTADO
AL MINISTRO PLENIPOTENCIARIO
DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS.
PALACIO, 21 de Abril de i898.
EXCMO SENOR:
MuY SEROR MIO:
En cumplimiento de un penoso deber,
tengo la honra de participar a V. E. que, sancionada por el
Presidente de la Republica una Resolucion de ambas Cama



INTRODUCTION.


II


ras de los Estados Unidos que, al negar la legitima soberania
de Espafla y amenazar con una immediata intervenci6n
armada en la Isla de Cuba, equivale A una evidente declaraci6n de guerra, el Gobierno de S. M. ha ordenado & su
Ministro en Washington que se retire, sin p{rdida de tiempo,
del territorio norte-americano, con todo el personal de la Legaci6n.
Por este hecho quedan interrumpidas las relaciones diplomAticas que de antiguo existian entre los dos paises, cesando
toda comunicaci6n oficial entre sus respectivos Representantes, y me apresuro A ponerlo en conocimiento de V. E. A fin de
que adopte por su parte las disposiciones que crea convenientes.
Ruego al propio tiempo A V. E. se sirva acusarme recibo de
esta Nota, y aprovecho, etc.
Firmado: PIo GULLON.
It is translated as follows:THE MINISTER OF STATE:
TO THE MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY
OF THE UNITED STATES.
PALACE, April 21, I898.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR:
MY DEAR SIR:
In fulfilment of a painful duty, I have the honor
to make known to Your Excellency that, a resolution of both
Houses (Chambers) of the United States, having been approved
by the President of the Republic, which, by denying the
legitimate sovereignty of Spain and by threatening with an
immediate armed intervention in the island of Cuba, is equivalent to an open (evident) declaration of war, the Government of
his Majesty has ordered his Minister in Washington to withdraw without loss of time, from the North American territory, with all the members of the Legation.
By this fact the Diplomatic relations, which from of old
have existed between the two countries, are found to be
interrupted, all official communication between their respec



1 2


INTRODUCTION.


tive representatives ceasing, and I press myself to put this
in the knowledge of Your Excellency to the end that you
may adopt on your part the arrangements which you may
believe convenient.
I ask at the same time that Your Excellency may be
pleased to acknowledge to me the receipt of this note, and I
avail, etc.
(Signed)   Pio GULLON.
Spain had thus deliberately decided that the passage of the
resolutions by Congress and their approval by the President
constituted an Act of open war (evidente guerra) and had
broken off diplomatic relations between the two countries.
As it had been the duty and the desire of the American
Minister to do for peace all that was possible, so long as anything was possible, so now it was his duty to act promptly as
the honor of his country required. He accepted at once the
challenge to arms which the Spanish Government had tendered; asked for his passports; received themn at one
o'clock that afternoon, and at four o'clock started by express
train for Paris. The Spanish authorities showed him all possible courtesy on leaving and furnished him with an efficient
military escort to the French frontier. Except for slight
disorders by a mob at Valladolid and an unsuccessful attempt
to arrest his chief clerk before reaching the frontier, his journey
from Madrid to Paris was pleasant and free from annoying
incidents.
The war which followed lasted but little more than a hundred days. It has sometimes been compared to Napoleon's
hundred days in Italy. But the resemblance is only in duration of time. Napoleon did not greatly change the map of
Europe for more than twenty years. The war with Spain has
changed the map and the future of the world forever.
That the final results of this war will be of real blessing to




INTRODUCTION.


13


Spain, I firmly believe. She has marvelous opportunities.
Her area embraces many varieties of soil and climate. Indian
maize and the potato grow in the Basque Provinces and
the orange and the olive on the shores of the Mediterranean while grapes are abundant everywhere. Her hills
are rich with iron, quicksilver, silver and gold. Her wheat
fields were the granary of Rome centuries ago and are,
with like irrigation, as fertile to-day. On the Bay of Biscay,
the Atlantic and the Mediterranean she has a coast line of
nearly three thousand miles with sufficient and good harbors.
The peasant population are singularly patient, industrious,
frugal and even abstemiously temperate. When they shall
secure actual freedom and just opportunities for general education, Spain should again become one of the most productive
countries of Europe. She ought also to be a successful
manufacturing and commercial nation.
I shall never forget the many acts of kindness and courtesy
everywhere and always received, alike from the Court and
from the plain people of Spain, and now that the war is over
and peace has come, I pray most earnestly that happiness
and prosperity may be and abide upon the people and the
land of Columbus.
*;QL~~~~~~o




I
I
I




CONTENTS.
C.APTER.                                             PAGE.
INTRODUCTION,
Gen. Stewart L. Woodford....    3
I. HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN \WARS,
Br i.-Gen. Carlos Garcia....     7
II. CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895 TO 1898,
Bri.-Gen. Carlos Garcia..              45
III. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE,
Lieut.. Geo. I.  i lb/man, U. S. N... 1
IV. THE NAVAL, BATTLE OF MANILA BAY,
Licut. C. G. Calkins, U S....    103
V. STATEMENT OF THE SINKING OF THE MIERRIMAC,
Francis Kelly, U.S. S.. Neo York, Flafgshi.. x29
VI. THE STORY OF THE TEXAS,
Cyrus S. Radford, Lieut. U. S. Marines..
R. K. Crank, Asst. Engineer, U. S. N.. 143
VII. THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO,
Capt. RobleyD. Evans, U. S. N....   55
VIII. THE VOYAGE OF T1HE OREGON,
Lieut. W. I. AlIcn, U. S. f....    65
IX. THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN,
Maj.-Gen. IVm. R. Shafter, U. S. V... 179
X. MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO,
Capt. Henry H. Whitney, A A. G...        99
XI. THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA,
Capt. H. C. Taylor, U. S. N.... 219
XII. THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII,
Hon. Shelby Af. Cullom..... 239
XIII. THE MANILA CAMPAIGN,
Maj.-Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A,,. 263




1 6                   C O CONTENTS.
CHAPTER.                                            PAGE.
XIV. THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT,
Hona. Perry S. Heath....      28 
XV. WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE,
Hon. f. W. Daniel...                 297
XVI. PROVIDING THE " SINEWS OF WAR,"
Hona. Velson DLitngley.                 325
XVII. THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR,
Hon.Jaoh D. LonJ....     339
XVIII. WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Hol. Lyman. Gage.....     367
XIX. U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SANTIAGO,
Maj.-Gen. Leonard Wood, U. S. V.       393
XX. THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION,
Getn. T. Estrada Palma.               403
XXI. THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR,
Hon. Johln E. WIilkie.....423
XXII. WOMAN'S XWORK IN THE WAR,
Mrs. Anos G. Draper...  -...437
XXIII. ARMY AND NAVY CHRISTIAN COMMISSION,
Maya.- Gen. O. O. Howavrd....457
XXIV. THE TREATY OF PEACE,
Hon. Jo/hn Bassett Moore..... 471
XXV. WHAT ENGLAND FEELS,
fHol. Justin McCarthy, M. P.....487
XXVI. THE WVORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE,
Maj.-Gen. Velson A. Miles....     509
ADDENDUM,
Speech of Senator Redfield Proclor...54
APPENDIX,
Messages, State Papers, etc..        555
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE..                       599




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CHAPTER I.


HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.
BY
CARLOS GARCIA VELEZ, Brigadier-General
INCE Columbus discovered Cuba, in October, 1492, that
S    beautiful Island of the world has been unceasingly the
-arena of a wonderful struggle for freedom.
It is strange that Spain should have treated the natives of
all her extensive colonies with equal cruel barbarism, since
the Spanish people are not prejudiced against marrying and
mingling with all sorts of races. All the famous Spanish
captains married native women, regardless of birth or color,
as soon as they arrived at the colonies, and certainly the soldiers followed their example. Thus the colonies, after some
generations, xvere composed of Indians, Creoles and Spaniards.
The first of these people, Aboriginals, were the real owners of
the land; the second, descendants of native women and
Spaniards; the third, new employees and officials, mostly
adventurers of the worst class, who kept coming from Spain.
In Cuba the native Siboney Indian was a good type of a
physically well-developed race, with amiable and innocent
character, hospitable and graceful. In I 5 i I, Columbus's son
sent 300 men, with Velazquez commanding, to take possession
of the Island. The Spaniards never employed kindness or diplomacy to gain control over the natives, but by brutal force
established Spanish sovereignty, trampling on their natural
rights and slaughtering those who resented their domination.
The Indian Siboney Chief Hatuey preferred to die at the
stake rather than submit to Velazquez's tyranny. When
Hatuey was dying, a Catholic priest approached him and
talked about the Almighty in Heaven, and urged him to pre



i8


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


pare his soul for the other world. The noble Chief had listened attentively to the priest's exhortation, but suddenly he
asked him if in Heaven he would find any Spaniards? To
which the priest replied-" Oh, yes! " "Then, father," Hatuey said, " I would rather go to Hell."
The Indian slave trade was, from the outset, established in
the markets of Spain. Thousands were carried away from
their country to distant climes, and thousands were butchered
in the Island, to plunder them of their property. It is estimated that over half a million perished thus in a short term
of years, and Cuba was rapidly depopulated. About this
time, Philip the second, the great monster and tyrant of the
Escorial, issued, through his counsel, fourteen laws for the
government of the Indians. To augment the decreasing population of Cuba, it was determined to take Africans there, and
the barbarous slave trade wvas established and carried on until
the latter part of the fifties of this century. Otherwise there
was no intercourse between Cuba and other parts of the world.
She was kept intellectually and commercially isolated under
the absorptive power of colonizing Spanish officers.
In the last third of the sixteenth century, a Captain-General was ordered to the Island. From that time until recent
years, the most despotic military rule has prevailed. According
to the personal characters of the different Spanish commanders, so xvas it governed well or ill, as it happened.
What marks a great change in Cuba's inhabitants is the
opening of the port of Havana to foreign trade in 1762. The
English attacked and captured the city from the Spanish and
immediately opened its port to commerce. This brought the
Cubans in contact with the world, particularly with the
United States; and although the city was a year later surrendered to the Spaniards, who lost no time in re-establishing the
old system, the seed had been sown, and the well-to-do natives began to send their children to American schools and
colleges, for in Cuba there were no suitable ones. The Government of Madrid, advised of this tendency among the rich
classes to educate their children in foreign countries of different institutions and customs from the effete Castilian type,
published in the Gaceta of Madrid, in I799, a Royal Decree




HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.


Is


ordering that all Cuban parents should be advised and persuaded not to send their children axvay, on the ground that
only evil consequences could be expected from it.
Charles IV, King of Spain, busy with his hunting parties at
El Pardo, did not believe that the people should be taught
anything to their benefit, and his obliging and perfidious Ministers took good care to encourage his hunting mania, so as to
be more at ease in managing government affairs. In i808,
Spain was invaded by the armies of Napoleon and the King
and Royal family were held prisoners in France. The Spanish people named a National Junta that should take the place
of their sporting King, and, in i8io, the Junta issued adecree
convening the Cortes, authorizing and directing the people of
Spanish possessions in America to elect deputies to represent
them.
Cuba sent two representatives, A Constitution was adopted by
the Cortes of Cadiz, in 1812, the first article of which declared
that the Spanish nation was composed of all the Spaniards of
both hemispheres and that all the inhabitants of those countries were entitled to representation in the Cortes. The war
to liberate themselves from the French was waging, and the
Spanish people fought hard and bravely for their Independence. It could hardly be expected that such people should
deny to the Cubans what they so dearly cherished for themselves! The cynical and treacherous Fernando VII was put
on the throne in 1814, and his first act of sovereignty was to
abolish the Constitution. Six years later he was compelled
to re-establish it, and then Cuba elected and sent to the Cortes four deputies.
Again Fernando suppressed the Constitution in 1823. Naturally, all the provinces and colonies became irritated because
of the King's despotism, and conspiracies began to be the
Cubans' only hope for throwing off the yoke of such a ruler.
Local passions were greatly excited also on account of the unconditional partiality and extremely unjust policy observed by
the Government, protecting, as it did, the corrupted Spanish
monopolists against the interests of the people. In that same
year, 1823, a conspiracy was betrayed to the Spanish authorities at Santiago, and the famous Cuban poet Heredia, one of




2C


THE AMNERICAN-SPANISH WAAR,


the conspirators, was exiled for life, sentenced by the Audiencia of that city.
The King trusted only in coercive power to maintain the integrity of the Spanish dominions. On the 28th of March,
1825, the Gaceta de Madrid published the following Royal
Decree:
"His Majesty the King, our Sefior, desiring to obviate the
inconveniences which might result in extraordinary cases
from a division of command and from the interference of powers and prerogatives of the respective officers, for the important end of preserving in that precious Island his legitimate
sovereign authority and public tranquillity through proper
means, has resolved, in accordance with the opinion of his
Council of Ministers, to give to your Excellency the fullest
authority, bestowing upon you all the powers which by the
Royal Ordinances are granted to the Governors of besieged
cities. In consequence of this, his Majesty gives to your Excellency the most complete and unbounded power, not only
to send away from the Island any persons in office, whatever
be their occupation, rank, class or condition, whose conduct,
public or private, may alarm you, replacing them with persons
faithful to his Majesty and deserving of all the confidence of
your Excellency; but also to suspend the execution of any
order whatsoever, or any general provision made concerning
any branch of the Administration, as your Excellency may
think most suitable to the Royal Service."
Thus Fernando VII placed in Cuba a man invested with
power to dispose of life and property,-that is, his representative; for in Spain, although the Royal Decree was not enforced, still the King put to death thousands of people
arbitrarily and without the knowledge of the courts of justice.
And, consider, such an infamous document as that Decree
has been in full force in the Island of Cuba until these very
civilized days, for it had not been revoked when the late war
broke out on the 24th of February, 1895. It seemed as if in
issuing the Decree, the Crown predicted the loss of the everfaithful Island forever to Spain, for in that same year, the
United States of America refused to guarantee Spain the
perpetual possession of Cuba in exchange for commercial
concessions.
In 1826, Francisco Aguero revolted with a small number of




HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WIARS.


2 I


men. All were captured and paid with their lives the penalty of daring to repulse the Captain-General's despotism.
From that date, the Cubans have not rested one moment
from working and fighting for their independence; uprisings,
revolts, conspiracies and revolutions have year after year
burst out, to be quenched in a bloody, barbarous manner
by the Spaniards.
The higher classes were greatly annoyed in 1828 with
another Decree, issued by the King, ordering that all students
then abroad should be at once called back to Cuba, that parents disobeying it should be punished, and that all those
having received education in the North should be held in
surveillance by the police and a careful record be kept of their
opinions and movements. That year there was an uprising:
in 1830 another, and in 1834 the Madrid Government sent,
as Captain-General of Cuba, General Tacon, a man of energetic temper. He proved to be a despotic and brutal ruler,
who did his utmost to establish differences of classes. He
made two divisions of the inhabitants; those that were born
in the Peninsula he called Espa;?oles and those born in the
Island, hle termed Cubafios. He sustained the idea that these
Cubalios were inferior people to the Spanish born, and consequently treated them as such, and behold the real masters
of the country, the heirs and descendants of the conquerors
and founders of Cuba, converted into an inferior race, without civil privileges of anykind and deprived of the personal
consideration due to them! The adventurer from  Spain,
the new-comer fresh from the motherland, the starved officeseeker or the degraded and reckless member of an aristocratic
Spanish family wvas invariably considered and treated as of
a superior race, enjoying always the most prominent positions
and receiving the highest honors, in payment, no doubt, for
complicity in the numberless crimes perpetrated and sanctioned by the Administration.
In 1835, General Narciso Lopez matured a conspiracy to
overthrowv Spanish power in Cuba, attempted a revolt and
was unsuccessful. He was born in Venezuela; had been first
under Bolivar, but afterwards joined the Spanish Army and
fought in the Carlist war; there he was made General of




22


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Division and sent to Cuba, where he resigned his commission and revolted.
In I836, the Constitution of I812 was revived and Cuba
was allowed to elect four deputies to the National Cortes.
In the following year, three of the deputies presented to the
Cortes at Madrid certificates of election, but they were not
recognized. General Tacon had informed the Government
that if the lawvs were to be changed in the Island, it would be
the loss of Cuba to Spain. The Spanish Treasury was very
poor and the Colonies were badly needed to build- it up.
Besides, a Cuban representation in Cortes meant that the
level of the Cuban people must be raised higher and necessarily the deputies, after being admitted to the Cortes, would
open the eyes of their people, candidly informing them what
was expected of Cuba and what would be done with it. The
Minister of Finance, in the Cortes on March 25, i837, protested against any change " that may endanger the considerable contributions with which those countries are helping the
mother-land." The Cuban deputies received the following
reply from the Spanish representative, Sefior Sancho, on
April 3:" It is said that the Government has changed its opinion.
Some of the deputies may believe that such a change has
taken place. I believe that it is not so, and no one is better
informed than I am. The Government never entertained the
opinion that the American deputies should be called. On the
contrary, it has always looked upon this as an evil which should
be remedied as soon as possible."
The Government wvas consulted and decided that the Constitution should not be extended to those countries, and that as
few deputies as possible should come from them. The Cuban
deputies filed a protest against their exclusion, and the
Cortes appointed a Committee to look into the matter; its
report was as follows:" In future, the American and Asiatic provinces should be
governed by special laws, and their deputies should not be
admitted into the Cortes." This resolution was adopted by
the Cortes, and Cuba was deprived of her right of representation in them.




HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WAVARS.


2 


Placido, colored, the most popular Cuban poet, was arrested
ill 1845, tried and accused of conspiracy. He pleaded innocent of the charge-he really was not implicated in the affair
-but the Spanish sentenced him to die by garrote. His
celebrated and well-known " Plegaria," composed just before
his death, proves his innocence. He was executed on the
27th of June, 1845.
Cuban refugees in the United States had greatly increased
in these years, owing to the active persecution of the Spanish
authorities in the Island. All the uprisings were secretly
aided by the refugees, and when General Narciso Lopez, in
1849, went to the States, he was received by many sympathizers and was helped effectively alike by Cubans and
Americans.
This fact gave occasion for the issuing of a Proclamation
by President Taylor, on the Ith of August of that year,
which read as follows:
By the President of the United States:
A PROCLAMATION.
There is reason to believe that an armed expedition is about
to be fitted out in the United States with an intention to
invade the Island of Cuba or some of the provinces of Mexico.
The best information which the Executive has been able to
obtain points to the Island of Cuba as the object of this
expedition. It is the duty of this government to observe the
faith of treaties and to prevent any aggression by our citizens
upon the territories of friendly nations. I have, therefore,
thought it necessary and proper to issue this proclamation, to
warn all citizens of the United States who shall connect
themselves with any enterprise so grossly in violation of our
laws and our treaty obligations, that they will thereby subject
themselves to the heavy penalties denounced against them by
our acts of Congress, and will forfeit their claim to the protection of their country. No such persons must expect the
interference of this government, in any form, on their behalf,
no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their conduct. An enterprise to invade the territories of a friendly country set on foot and prosecuted within
the limits of the United States, is, in the highest degree,
criminal, as tending to endanger the peace and compromise




24


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


the honor of this nation; and, therefore, I exhort all good
citizens, as they regard our national reputation, as they
respect their own laws and the laws of nations, as they value
the blessings of peace and the welfare of their country, to
discountenance and prevent, by all lawful means, any such
enterprise; and I call upon every officer of this government,
civil or military, to use all efforts in his power to arrest, for
trial and punishment, every such offender against the laws
providing for the performance of our sacred obligations to
friendly powers.
Given under my hand the eleventh day of August, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-nine, and
the seventy-fourth of the independence of the United States.
Z. TAYLOR.
By the President:
J. M. CLAYTON, Secretary of State.
General Lopez sailed from New Orleans in 1850, with an
expedition composed of 400 Americans and 200 Cubans, and
landed and captured the city of Cardenas, a port on the northern coast of the Island. The Governor of the city was taken
prisoner and Lopez proceeded on his march inland, where he
was defeated and driven back by the Spanish. The Cubans
had not been fully prepared for the movement, and it was rumored throughout the Island that Lopez was an annexationist to the United States, which kept many revolutionists from
lending him valuable aid in the field. The great enthusiasm,roused by Lopez in the States, the constant applications of
men wanting to enlist with him and the protests of the Spanish Minister, caused President Fillmore to give the following
proclamation
By the President of the United States of America:
-           A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, there is reason to believe that a military expedition
is about to be fitted out in the United States with intention
to invade the Island of Cuba, a colony of Spain, with which
this country is at peace;
And, Whereas, it is believed that this expedition is instigated
and set on foot chiefly by foreigners who dare to make our
shores a scene of their guilty and hostile preparations against
a friendly power, and seek by falsehood and misrepresenta



HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.


25


tion to seduce our own citizens, especially the young and inconsiderate, into their wicked schemes-an ungrateful return
for the benefit conferred upon them by this people, in permitting themn to make our country an asylum from oppression,and in flagrant abuse of the hospitality thus extended to
them;
And, Whereas, such expeditions can only be regarded as adventures for plunder and robbery, and must mneet the condemnation of the civilized world, whilst they are derogatory to
the character of our country, in violation of the laws of nations, and expressly prohibited by our own; our statutes declaring " that if any person shall, within the territory of jurisdiction of the United States, begin or set on foot, or provide
or prepare the means for, any military expedition or enterprise,
to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district,
or people, with whom the United States are at peace, every
person, so offending, shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be fined not exceeding three thousand dollars, and imprisonment not more than three years;
Now, Therefore, I have issued this, my Proclamation, warning all persons who shall connect themselves with any such
enterprise or expedition in violation of our laws and national
obligations that they will thereby subject themselves to the
heavy penalties denounced against such offenses, and will forfeit their claim to the protection of this government, or any
interference 'in their behalf, no matter to what extremities
they may be reduced in consequence of their illegal conduct.
And therefore, I exhort all good citizens, as they regard our
national reputation, as they respect their own laws and the
laws of nations, as they value the blessings of peace and
the welfare of their country, to discountenance, and, by all
lawful means, prevent any such enterprise; and I call upon
every officer of this government, civil or military, to use all efforts in his power, to arrest for trial and punishment every
such offender against the laws of the country.
Given under my hand, the twenty-fifth day of April, in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one,
and the seventy-fifth of the independence of the United
States.
MILLARD FILLMORE.
By the President:
WV. S. DERRICK, Acting Secretary of State.
General Lopez went to Key West after his defeat and set
to work immediately on the organization of another revo!u



26


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


tionary movement. On the 12th of August, 1851, he disembarked at Las Pozas, Pinar del Rio. The Spanish General
engaged him in a fight shortly after and a fierce battle took
place. Lopez fought bravely, but was again defeated and captured. He wvas executed as a common outlaw by the garrote.
On the scaffold, he cried out these words, that are still ringing in every Spaniard's ears: "Tyrants! My death in nothing changes the destinies of Cuba! 
In 1854, an American, General Kitman, attempted to lead
an expedition to Cuba, aided by Betancourt, but was not successful. The conspiracies continued to work their way, and
occasionally some one captured would be plunged into an
African dungeon or banished to the insalubrious island of Fernando Poo, or publicly executed as an outlaw. But heedless
of banishment or death, the desire for independence was
clearly manifested throughout the country and the Cubans
felt it deeply rooted in their hearts. With hopes for the future, they persevered in their great ideal.
Much worriment was -produced in the guilty consciences of
the Spanish Ministers, when it was asserted that the symptoms
of a near-coming revolution in Cuba were plainly seen and
felt by every one. To appease their own discomfort, more
than with intentions of yielding to a suffering people's entreaty,
the Spanish Government ordered that the Cubans should
elect Commissioners to go to Madrid, and recommend there
to the Government such reforms and laws as, in their judgment, would satisfy the people. In i866, the Minister of
Ultramar, Don Antonio Canovas del Castillo, called to Madrid
the Committee of Information, as it was termed, composed of
sixteen prominent Cubans chosen by election. The Committee
reached Madrid and gave the report of their people's wants.
The Cabinet dismissed the Committee, with the promise that
due study would be given to the claims presented. In 1867,
taxes were largely increased, so much so that the farmers and
land-owners, unable to pay the exorbitant dues, presented
themselves in a body to the authorities for the purpose of giving up their property instead. The Government never answered one word to the petitions made by the Committee of
Information, and at last the Cubans realized the fact that, if




HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.


27


they wanted their rights, they must fight for them. Members
of the principal Cuban families began to conspire against the
Government throughout the Island, the following being the
names of the principal conspirators; from the province of
Oriente:
Francisco Vicente Aguilera, of a distinguished family and a
wealthy land and slave owner of Oriente.
Francisco Maceo Osorio, of a distinguished family and a
man of uncommon intellectual ability (not connected with
Generals A. and J. Maceo, afterwards so famous as leaders).
Manuel de Jesus Calvar, planter.
Tomas Estrada Palma, of a distinguished family and a rich
land proprietor.
Bartolome Maso, of a prominent family and a rich land
proprietor.
Luis and Pedro Figueredo, of a rich and distinguished
family.
Calixto Garcia Yniguez, of a prominent family of merchants
and a rich land proprietor.
Vicente Garcia, rich proprietor of Tunas, and
Carlos M. de Cespedes, of a prominent and rich family.
All these were native-born Cubans.
Besides these well-known gentlemen, others no less distinguished took part in the secret meetings held in Bayamo,
namely, Juan Hall, Luis Marcano, Elijio Yzaguirre, Julio
Grave de Peralta and Manuel Codina. At a secret meeting
held at the plantation El Rosario, it was decided that the
revolutionary movement should take place on the I4th of
October, and Cespedes was elected leader. The plot was
betrayed to the Governor of Manzanillo and the conspirators
were compelled to anticipate the day of the uprising. Orders
were hastily issued to that effect everywhere, and although
the opportunity was considered hopelessly lost, Carlos M. de
Cespedes, at Yara, on the ioth of October, I868, with about
I20 men, badly armed and equipped, revolted against the
tyrannical oppressors. He was quickly followed by Cubans
from every part of the country, regardless of class or standing,
and the heroic struggle for independence was commenced
between Cuba, the beautiful little Island, the most noble an]




THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


generous country on earth, driven to frantic desperation, and
the powerful, cruel and surly Spain. History does not register in its pages a more heroic struggle with such great odds.
On one side a handful of patriots, unarmed and unskilled in
warfare, foodless and nude, with all the weight of international laws applied against whatever help they might expect
to receive from foreign countries; and on the other, an army
of veterans, well armed and equipped with all the resources
that money could secure, backed by I7,000,000 of people and
honored by all the nations of the world.
An idea of the noble character of the men of the revolution
can be obtained by considering that Francisco V. Aguilera,
one of the leaders, after refusing a foreigner, shortly before
the uprising, six hundred thousand dollars for his slaves on
the plantation Santa Gertrudis, when the war broke out, summoned all his blacks and spoke to them thus:
" Until this glorious day, you have been my slaves. From
now hence you are to be my friends. I give to each of you
your liberty, so that you may choose the mode of life that
may suit you best, and by so doing I relinquish all dominion
over you; but those that would accompany me to battle are
welcome; you, to struggle for your civil liberty, and we for
our political rights."
Those six hundred slaves followed Aguilera to the revolution and fought and perished for Cuba's freedom.
On the 4th of November, i868, the province of Camaguey
seconded the Yara movement, Ignacio Agramonte, a rich and
distinguished gentleman of Puerto Principe, commanding the
revolted party. The revolution abolished slavery with the decree of the 27th of December, i868. More than half of the
Island joined the revolution. Old and young, women and
children, all swarmed to the country, to fields and woods, and
fled from towns and villages held by the Spaniards. They
carried but scanty garments with them; they left everything behind, abandoning comfort and luxury for the sake of being near
their sons, husbands and brothers. What these families suffered during the ten years war, is difficult to describe, even if it
be done hurriedly and in a condensed manner. Thousands perished from famine, disease and exposure; many were barbar



HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.


29


ously sacrificed by the Spanish guerrillas. At times they
were a great benefit to the patriots, but afterwards wvere a burden to them. At any rate, it was preferable to know that
they died of famine, honorably, in the country of the noble
and brave, rather than to live in the prostituted garrisoned cities where honor had to be traded for bread.
It has been unjustly said by some writers, that the revolittion did not succeed because it was the product of the plans of
a few gentlemen, and that it had not risen from the lower
classes of the inhabitants. The fact is, that the revolution
was felt and yearned for by the majority of Cubans in the Island, long before the uprising. The Guajiro in his character
and habits is a model of the conservative, old-fashioned farmer;
but he loves dearly the independence of his country, never
hesitates to give up his peaceful occupation to lead the roaming and dangerous life of the soldier and to die fighting -for
Cuba Libre. He has been the constant sufferer in Cuba's revolts and he feels very proud to be able to say so.
The ten years war wvas not successful, not only because all
the Cubans did not go to the field, many being bribed by the
Spanish to remain during all the struggle with them, directly
or indirectly harming the success of the revolution-but other
important features besides those mentioned have to be considered, to appreciate fully the situation.
The conspiracy was not sufficiently extended and organized
throughout the Island, with appointed leaders in each locality
or zone, to rise powerful and menacing from the very first
day. Nearly every one was a partisan, individually, of the revolutionary movement, but he had no understanding or connection on the subject kvith his neighbor. The conspiracy was
betrayed before the necessary arrangements had been made.
When Cespedes, fearing that all was lost, anticipated the
plans and revolted in Yara, the news took the majority of the
initiates by surprise.
It must be remembered, too, that Cuba is a narrow strip of
land, without the necessary war resources and conveniences.
It has never had manufactures of any kind. Being an island
with numerous ports and harbors which have to be defended
or protected by ships and sailors, it has not had artillery and




30


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


ammunition, and provisions to feed the army. True, the Cubans could have obtained all these, if they had been recognized as belligerents by one or more of the strong powers; but
they failed to get recognition, and it may be said with astonishment and admiration, that they have fought gallantly and
tenaciously, the largest colonial war on record, to obtain their
independence.
A few battles of that war, which will be mentioned in the
course of this narrative, will show that the Cubans, besides being good, enduring patriots, were plucky, intelligent, self-made
soldiers, with many good commanders to lead them to victory.
A garrison of over 300 Spanish regulars held the City of
Bayamo when the war broke out. Cespedes marched toward
the city with about Soo men, mostly unarmed, their weapons
being shot guns, revolvers, machetes and farming tools. The
revolutionists made their way into the city and drove the
Spaniards to a fort, where the defeated garrison took refuge.
The inexperienced patriots were thronging the streets in wild
joy at their success, when suddenly the Spanish cavalry, protected by infantry, made a sally which caused considerable
confusion; the commanders, however, promptly checked it
and a hand-to-hand fight took place. The Spaniards were defeated with heavy loss; nearly all their casualties were
made with the machete.
The first town liberated from the Spanish was Jiguany, situated inland about seventy-five miles from Santiago; it was
captured by the patriots, under Calixto Garcia and Donato
Marmol.
Another important victory was reported on the 27th of October, i868, for the Cuban forces. Donato Marmol, at Baire,
had had a successful engagement with the enemy. Marmol
from that time became very popular, singularly so with the
colored Cuban troops. He deserved the popularity because
the Baire victory gave much prestige to the Yara Revolution.
Thousands of patriots followed and obeyed him and called
him their general, and the leader became the principal fighting figure of the war. He commanded about 4,000 poorly
armed men, blacks being in the majority. Prominent officers




HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.


31


have subsequently stated that Marmol's command was considered in those days the only hope for the success of the revolution. He was ordered to occupy an advantageous and
strategic position on the Bayamo bank of the Cauto river, at
Cauto Embarcadero, about eighteen miles from that city,
whence any approach of the enemy could be readily seen and
checked, whether it came from Holguin, Tunas or Manzanillo.
Furthermore, it was known that the Spanish General Valmaceda was marching toward Bayamo, 2,000 men strong, for
the purpose of attacking and routing the revolutionary forces
before they had time and opportunity to become organized.
Cauto Embarcadero was the best position imaginable to fight
with advantage a strong, well-armed, disciplined foe. The river
was not passable without the aid of pontoons or canoes. The
position held by Marmol was therefore impregnable, having,
as he had, the enemy on the other side of the river. Valmaceda
had camped between the rivers Salado and Cauto, being harassed by General Modesto Diaz, with another Cuban column,
from the opposite bank of the Salado river-a very tight
place for the Spaniards indeed, considering that they could
not retreat or proceed without suffering positive defeat.
General Marmol had strict orders not to move from Cauto,
but having been informed that General Diaz might at any
moment make a formal attack on the Spanish, and ambitious
not to lose an opportunity to rout the enemy, not stopping to
consider the disadvantages of a reckless attack and its probable
fatal consequences, he abandoned his Cauto camp, advanced
and attacked the Spanish lines at Saladillo with extraordinary
vigor and bravery. The Cubans had their few archaic fire
arms, machetes and spears of Yara; the Spaniards, modern
rifles, plenty of ammunition and artillery. The result was
easy to imagine.  Marmol's first line advanced furiously
against Valmaceda's force, which met the advance steadily,
and after a bitter contest the Spaniards brought their artillery
fire to bear so successfully upon the Cubans that they fell
back in confusion. The second line then entered the fray and
stood its ground more determinedly than the first. Some of
the Cubans were pierced with bayonets just when they had
reached the enemy's artillery pieces.  But the effect of




32


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Spanish musketry fire and the accuracy with which it was
delivered caused the assailants to fall back in utter dismay.
Assault upon assault was repelled and the day ended, giving
the victory to Valmaceda, while Marmol, badly defeated,
made his retreat with heavy losses.
Valmaceda then proceeded unchecked to Bayamo, where
the news of the disaster had spread. The inhabitants determined to burn every house in the city and join the Cubans, so
that the Spaniards should find only ashes as they entered.
When Valmaceda arrived at Bayamo, he marched through the
streets blocked by ruins and ashes, and decided to camp amid
them. At one end of the city an antique structure named
Torre de Zarragoitia lay untouched by fire, having escaped the
conflagration. Valmaceda, in order to take vengeance on the
fleeing inhabitants, erected over it a fort which became famous
during the war for the crimes that were perpetrated from it.
The disaster of Saladillo was the severest blow that the
struggle for freedom could receive. Marmol's defeat was the
defeat of the rising revolution. After that it rallied several
times, but never again recovered the probabilities of success
that it had prior to the battle of Saladillo.
Then Valmaceda issued that inhuman Bando, giving to
his soldiers full power to kill and plunder all those that
should be captured about the country, and ordering the persecution of families in order to compel the inhabitants to return
to the towns under his rule. A period of terror in the Island
was inaugurated by the Spanish. All prisoners were shot and
the property of the revolutionists or suspects was confiscated
without. right of appeal. Caballero de Rodas, Montaner,
Weyler and Gonzalez Boet, all of fiendish character, were
Valmaceda's satraps. The narrative of their crimes and
victims would cover many hundred pages. All these infamies
were committed with the knowledge and approval of the
Spanish Peninsular Revolutionary Government, who professed
to be fighting for freedom and citizenship in Spain.
The representative of the Cubans in the United States,
Senor Jose Morales Lemus, protested against the Bando of
Valmaceda and the arbitrary confiscation of property. Although he was not recognized in his official capacity, the Ad



HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.


33


ministration took notice of the Spanish general's Ukase, and
the Secretary of State, Mr. Hamilton Fish, wrote to the Spanish Minister to the United States, Seflor Lopez Roberts, the
following letter:
" In the interest of Christian civilization and common humanity, I hope that this document is a forgery. If it indeed
be genuine, the President instructs me, in the most forcible
manner, to protest against such mode of warfare."
But the Spaniards continued their villainies, and old and
young were slaughtered every day. The attitude of indifference observed by the nations during this special period of
terror in Cuba, can be qualified only as cowardly, mean and
criminal. The poor families suffered greatly without food or
shelter, pursued across fields and woods, and lacking garments
to cover their naked bodies. The patriots too, were suffering
from lack of food and ammunition to cope with the enemy,
being compelled to eat their horses and mules. When these
gave out, they lived on fruits and herbs. The lack of salt to
season their frugal and unwholesome food caused disease to
spread, with fatal results, all over Bayamo, Holguin and Santiago. More than forty per cent of the population died of
fevers, smallpox and cholera. It seemed as if all the calamities of the world had agreed to strike simultaneously at the
patriots, but they continued to fight hard, notwithstanding
their great suffering.
On the ioth of April, i869, a Constitution was proclaimed
at Guaimaro, and was signed by:
CARLOS M. DE CESPEDES,    ARCADIO GARCIA,
MIGUEL GUTIERREZ,         EDUARDO MACHADO,
SALVADOR CISNEROS,        ANTONIO LORDA,
MANUEL VALDEZ,            ANTONIO ALCALA,
HONORATO CASTILLO,        JESUS RODRIGUEZ,
MIGUEL BETANCOURT,        FRANCISCO S. BETANCOURT,
JOSE M. YZAGUIRRE,        IGNACIO AGRAMONTE,
ANTONIO ZAMBRANA.
The American Confederate General, Thomas Jordan, gives
a very interesting report of an engagement. Nobly and disinterestedly he had come from the States to help the Cubans




34


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


by his experience as a soldier, which he had gained during
the American Civil War, under General G. T. Beauregard,
the brave and skillful defender of Charleston. The report is
transcribed to show what he thought of the patriots as
soldiers:............................ the  number of  our forces did  not
exceed 548 men all told, with one artillery piece. Circumstances beyond my power to control prevented me from
concentrating more men in time for the battle. The enemy
had a trifle less than 2,000 troops of infantry, cavalry and
artillery..,   0.......................................................
there were at least 100o cavalry and three artillery pieces. On
the battlefield were found 200 dead, many officers amongst
them, and 45 horses. The engagement lasted seventy-five
minutes, and in that time, one after the other, three assaults
of the Spanish regulars were repulsed. They advanced in
compact columns of 500 metres. Then a thicker column
charged on us, and it would have been defeated also had the
reserve ammunition been at hand; unfortunately it was not
there, and from lack of cartridges I was compelled to withdrav my force from the position. The retreat was performed
with a coolness and precision that would have done honor to
veterans of a hundred battles.
All the line of trenches that measured 490 paces was under
my view, and I did not see one single case of reproachable
conduct on the part of any officer or private. On the contrary, I remarked that they displayed superb spirit and
gallantry.
By request of the officers and soldiers, I ordered a machete
charge against the sharpshooters of the enemy at our left
flank. It was made in a brilliant manner and with great
effectiveness; yielding some booty to those that took part in it..................................................
With twenty rounds more of cartridges the enemy would
have been stampeded; they rallied only when our ammunition
gave out..........................
I am proud of having had the opportunity to command
gsuch.troops; their noble example has given great enthusiasm.to 4ll those that have joined us, and all are equally anxious,to engage the, enemy. This will be very soon, and I am sure
the most satisfactory results will be obtained. After the
battle the enemy were so dowvn-hearted that, not daring to




HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.


35


advance towards Camaguey, they have countermarched three
miles on the road and have entrenched themselves there,
never moving from camp more than a few hundred yards, and
even then with not less than 300 men.
Certainly this situation cannot last long and the column
will have to move in one direction or another, burdened with
300 wounded, besides their arms and those of the dead.
The enemy has been reduced one-third of its total effective
force, for the dead and wounded cannot be less than 500.
THOMAS JORDAN, Majlor-Genzeral'Co mmanding.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SAN AUGUSTIN, Jan. 12, 1870.
The Revolutionary Congress, in session April II, 1869, at
Guaimaro, passed a resolution presented by a member,
Eduardo Machado, for the adoption of the Cuban flag:
ground, red triangle with a white five-pointed star in the
center; three longitudinal blue stripes and two white ones.
It was the same flag that Gen. Narciso Lopez raised. Considerable discussion went on before its adoption. Antonio
Lorda had proposed that the triangle be blue with red and
white stripes. In the same session Carlos M. de Cespedes
was elected President, Manuel Quesada Commander in Chief,
and Francisco V. Aguilera Secretary of War of the Republic.
Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Peru extended recognition of
belligerency to the Republic of Cuba almost immediately
after. Unfortunately, these republics were weak and poor,
and their sympathy, although greatly esteemed, did not aid
the patriots.
In 1869 the Secretary of State offered the intervention of
the United States to General Prim, representative of the
Spanish Government, on the basis of a purchase by the
Cubans of their independence, under a guarantee by the
United States, to which the General replied:
"We can better proceed in the present situation of things
without even this friendly intervention. A time wvill come
wvhen the good offices of the United States will be, not only
useful, but indispensable in the final arrangements between
Spain and Cuba. \Ve will ascertain the form in which they
can be employed and confidently count upon your assistance."
The United States answered that its good offices for that




36


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


object would be at any time at the service of the parties to
the conflict.
A long and interesting diplomatic correspondence, treating
of Cuban affairs, was kept up between the two Governments,
the Americans tendering their good offices to stop the war,
the Spaniards cunningly deferring a definite answer-the
diplomacy of Rome foiling Anglo-Saxon diplomacy. The
followving document issued in the next year proves it:
By the President of the United States of America:
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, divers evil-disposed persons have, at sundry times,
within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States,
begun, or set on foot, or provided,.or prepared the means for
military expeditions or enterprises to be carried on thence
against the territories or dominions of powers with whom the
United States are at peace, by organizing bodies pretending
to have powers of government over portions of the territories
or dominions of powers with whom the United States are at
peace, or by being or assuming to be members of such bodies,
by levying or collecting money for the purpose, or for the alleged purpose of using the same in carrying on military enterprises against such territories or dominions, by enlisting and
organizing armed forces to be used against such powers, and by
fitting, out, equipping, and arming vessels to transport such organized armed forces to be employed in hostilities against
such powers;
* And, Whereas, it is alleged, and there is reason to apprehend, that such evil-disposed persons have also, at sundry
times, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United
States, violated the laws thereof by accepting and exercising
commissions- to serve by land or by sea against powers with
vhom the United States are at peace, by enlisting themselves
or other persons to carry on war against such powers, by fitting out and arming vessels with intent that the same shall
be employed to cruise or commit hostilities against such powers, or by delivering commissions within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States for such vessels to the intent
that they might be employed as aforesaid;
And, Whereas, such acts are in violation of the laws of the
United States in such case made and provided, and are done
in disregard of the duties and obligations which all persons residing or being within the territory or jurisdiction of the




HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.


37


United States owe thereto, and are condemned by all rightminded and law-abiding citizens:Now, Therefore, I, Ulysses S. Grant, President of the
United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim
that all persons hereafter found within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States committing any of the afore-recited violations of law, or any similar violations of the sovereignty of the United States for which punishment is provided
by law, will be rigorously prosecuted therefor, and, upon conviction and sentence to punishment, wtill not be entitled to
expect or receive the clemency of the executive to save them
from the consequences of their guilt; and I enjoin upon every
officer of this government, civil or military or naval, to use all
efforts in his power to arrest, for trial and punishment, every
such offender against the laws providing for the performance
of our sacred obligations to friendly powers.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this twelfth day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand
(Seal)  eight hundred and seventy, and of the independence of the United States of America the ninetyfifth.
U. S. GRANT.
By the President:
HAMILTON FISH, Secretary of State.
The United States of Colombia, in February, 1870, extended to the Cubans belligerent rights. What a noble example of disinterestedness did those little, poor, South and
Central American Republics give to the other nations of the
world!
The Government employed the most stringent coercive
methods in the course of this ten years struggle, to prevent
demonstrations of sympathy towards the patriots by the inhabitants of the cities. The most ridiculous measures were
taken to that end, and in a good many instances the proceedings were savage and barbarous. A mob of volunteers threw
the city of Havana into consternation by forcing a court-martial, and passing capital sentence on eight innocent youths,
students of the University there, on the suspicion that they
had scratched somebody's tomb in the graveyard.




38


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


Dozens of prisoners from a filibustering expedition, the Virginius, were shot unmercifully at Santiago, notwithstanding
the protestations of the American Consul, and only by the
firm intervention of one of Her Majesty's warships did the
Spanish General Burriel stop the executions.
President Grant, through his miserable money expectations
from the Alabama claims, and also through the sudden and
unaccountable change effected in Mr. Hamilton Fish's attitude towards the patriots, lost the best opportunity of his
civil career to give a noble example to the civilized world of
what a great, free nation would generously do for a suffering
people and for the love of liberty. Had the President granted
to Cuba the rights of belligerency, all the savagery of the
Spanish would have been stopped and Cuban Independence
secured, unstained by the innocent blood of aged men, women
and children.
In April, 1875, Guatemala recognized the Cuban Government.
The revolution weakened considerably, ravaged by disease
and battle; the communications with the outer world were
difficult and even extremely dangerous. With canoes made of
the trunk of the seiba, a gigantic tree of Cuba, trips were constantly made to Jamaica with the most remarkable luck
attending the improvised sailors, who would start out to sea
without a compass or a sail. Still this was carried on during
all the war, and it is not known that a mishap overtook any
of them.
The most important battles of the ten years war were:
Guasimas, Palo Seco, Punta Gorda, Melones, Copo del Chato,
siege and capture of Tunas. The leaders who distinguished
themselves the most were:-Maximo Gomez, Antonio Maceo,
Calixto Garcia, Ignacio Agramonte, Modesto Diaz and Vicente
Garcia, although this leader's attitude was the cause of losing
the revolution its unity, respect and obedience to authority,
absolutely necessary for the regulation of an army. The
Civil Government of the revolution proved to be absolutely
worthless.
Many expeditions with arms and ammunition were sent
to the patriots by refugees in the United States, but they were




HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.


9


not sufficient to meet the necessities, and many were captured by the Spanish, on the sea or ashore.
In I878, General Martinez Campos, who had conquered in
Sagunto, was sent to subdue, at any cost, the revolution, and after offering to the patriots reforms and liberties
of all kinds, the compact of Zanjon was made. General
Maceo, at Mangos de Baragua, protested against it and left
the Island without having anything to do with the treaty.
General-Commander Gomez put himself aside on the pretext
that he was not a Cuban-that the Cubans should decide.
And so ended the ten years struggle.
After four years of imprisonment in dungeons and cells of
different fortresses of Spain, when the Zanjon compact was
made and General Calixto Garcia Yniguez was given his liberty, he proceeded directly to Paris, where, in company with
Dr. Betances and other prominent Cubans, he commenced
the organization of new plans for a conspiracy. The long
captivity he had suffered, instead of exhausting his vigor and
enthusiasm, had only served to increase them. It was astonishing to all, to see the man who had wasted perhaps the
best years of his manhood boxed up between walls waiting
patiently for his liberty, instead of being downhearted and
disappointed, come out strong and enthusiastic, ready for
another struggle, of which no one dreamed, in Cuba or elsewhere. He sought and obtained the co-operation of nearly
all the commanders and officers of the war living at that
time in the Island or abroad. Among others were Antonio
Maceo, Gregorio Benitez, Pio Rosado, Roloff, Fonseca, etc.,
who answered, offering their services. General Maximo
Gomez and General Vicente Garcia never definitely gave
their approval, and consequently General Calixto Garcia
Yniguez did not have their help. Suddenly the leaders of
the conspiracy in the Santiago province were arrested.
Brigadier Flor Crombet and Colonels Pedro Martinez Freire,
Jose Maria Rodriguez (Mayia) and Beola were sent to Spain
as prisoners of war; they had had General Calixto Garcia's
unbounded confidence.  The three prisoners arrived  at
Madrid, where they were put in communication with the
other members of the conspiracy in Oriente, through General




40


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Garcia's special revolutionary envoy, Dr. Ensebio Hernandez,
who undertook to carry letters of the said leaders, which lhe
delivered to General Moncada and to Colonels Jose Maceo,
Silverio del Prado and Santos Perez, the last, commanding
a band of Spanish guerrillas, and approving of the uprising.
In these letters the prisoners warned them not to wait any
longer, lest they too be discovered and arrested.  It was
agreed by the Committee of Santiago, in several meetings
held, not to wait any longer but to revolt, which they did on
the night of the 26th of August, 1879, easily taking possession of the city of Santiago. But General Moncada, senior
officer commanding, incensed because of the intrigues of the
autonomists who characterized the movement as a war of
races (the three principal chiefs, whites, as stated above,
having been made prisoners and deported to Spain), hesitated
at the last moment, when it was most important to exert
promptness and pluck, and instead of surprising and seizing the
barracks, he marched out of the city with the revolutionists
and began to organize his force in the country. The garrison
was so taken by surprise that they did not even fire a shot,
and if they had been attacked, would have surrendered immediately. Dr. Hernandez carried to Havana orders to the leaders of Las Villas and the Western province. The delegate
and sub-delegates of Gen. Garcia, in Havana, were Jose Antonio Aguilera and Jos6 Marti, in conjunction with whom Dr.
Hernandez set to work and sent arms and ammunition to
Francisco Carrillo, Emilio Nufez, Arias and other leaders of
Las Villas. They were soon discovered, and Aguilera and
Marti were arrested. Dr. Hernandez escaped to the States
in a boat. Carrillo and Nufiez revolted and were seconded by
Arias and Cecilio Gonzalez, who landed with a small expedition sent from New York by Gen. Garcia, and the new revolution became formidable in a short time. But this did not
last long. Gen Garcia battled against the lack of sufficient
funds to continue the war.
The people were fatigued from the ten years struggle and
felt skeptical in regard to the results of the present one; their
contributions for the cause were scanty; the policy of suavity
employed by the Government since the Zanjon compact did




HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.


4I


much to prevent the undecided from joining; the revolutionary propaganda had not been accepted by the plantation districts of the West that wvere making good harvests; the rich
Vegas of Vuelta Abajo w\ere producing delicious tobacco, sold
at heavy prices; the laborers received fair wages and work
was plenty everywhere; and then the absence from this
movement of Gen. Gomez and Vicente Garcia, who dodged
all proposals to engage themselves in it, were reasons of sufficient weight to prevent the revolutionists from succeeding.
When Gen. Calixto Garcia, in despair, failing to obtain the
necessary funds to equip anl expedition for the aid of those
that were in the field fighting, flung aside his patience, and
with i5 men risked his life thrice, in the attempt to land in
Cuba, he did it, not because he had faith in the success of
the struggle, but because he was bound to get there even
though he perished in the attempt.
About the same time that he landed in Cuba with his staff,
the two most prominent men of the uprising, Moncada and
Jos6 Maceo (mysterious and complicated event!) surrendered
with all their men to. the Spanish authorities, and Gen. Garcia
and his i5 followers were left to battle in the Oriente alone,
the battle for the independence of i,5oo00,000ooo inhabitants, while
they were all enjoying the blessings of a dishonorable truce,
in shameful association with the Spaniards. All the available
troops were detached in operations against the small party of
revolutionists. Only Carrillo and Nufiez remained in arms,
the rest having surrendered.
Gen. Benitez, who had arrived successfully at the Puerto
Principe province, seeing the failure of the revolution, attempted to escape by boat to Jamaica and was murdered by
some men bought with Spanish gold.
Abroad, only three leaders upheld their convictions in those
cruel days of defeat: -Gen. Roloff, Col. Jose M. Aguirre and
Dr. Hernandez, who prepared an expedition to aid the revolutionists. Gen. Garcia suffered horribly for several months.
Bullets, famine and disease reduced his party to four men,
who, at last, exhausted and without ammunition, were compelled to surrender to Gen. Valera, near Bayamo. This happened in the latter part of the year o1880.




42


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Then came what may be justly called the anesthetic period
of Cuba. Autonomy was the powerful drug employed. Its
effect was produced simply by smelling of the bottle where
it was carefully kept. Generally a lecture on the therapeutics and materia medica of Autonomy was quite sufficient a
dose to produce a profound slumber. Without administering
the drug, anesthesia would be produced, and it was prolonged
with marvelous precision. The Autonomists claimed that
they were versed on the subject, that the Cuban people were
pathological cases and that only Autonomy could keep them
on their feet. This period lasted but a few years, fortunately.
Meantime the leaders of the Cubans were scattered and
discouraged all over the world:-Gen. Calixto Garcia, a prisoner of the enemy; Gen. Gomez, shunned by the Cubans
since the Zanjon compact, more for what he wrote than for
what he did; A. Maceo, unsuccessful, in Turk's Island, where
he was driven, pursued by Spanish gun-boats; Roloff also unsuccessful. There remained only one senior leader with sufficient prestige to take command, but he became so indolent
that he was not fit for the place-Vicente Garcia (no connection with Calixto).
Here Hernandez appeared again, persuading the men of
Yara to reunite. He reconciled Maceo and Roloff, and later
on Roloff and Gomez.
The four mentioned and Generals Crombet, Ruis Rivera,
R. Rodriguez, J. Calvas and Tomas Estrada Palma, sought
hospitality in Honduras, where they were well treated and
held important positions of official capacity.
Gen. A. Maceo well understood that he could not be the
leader of the next revolution, and in accord with others, supported by Dr. Hernandez, suggested Gomez as their future
leader. This xvas difficult to arrange, because the Cubans had
taken a great dislike to him for certain things he had said
about them. So the work of reconciliation lasted from i88i to
1884.
Crombet and Hernandez were detailed to collect funds.
This they did, from President Bogran of Honduras and from
numerous Cubans who had settled at the Panama Canal and
were working there.




HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.


43


In August, 1884, Gomez, Maceo, Crombet, Marti, Zambrana,
Salvador Cisneros and a majority of the officers were in agreement and accepted the leadership of Gomez, excepting Gen.
Bonachea, Panchin Varona and Limbano Sanchez. The first
of these fitted out an expedition. He was made prisonerwith
his men and shot at Santiago. Col. Limbano Sanchez fitted
up another, landed, was captured and killed. Marti disagreed
with Gomez's and Maceo's methods and separated from the
commission.
Dr. Hernandez was sent to collect funds, and, aided by generous patriots, raised $40,o00oo. This sum was received on
deposit by F. Lamadriz to deliver to Gen. Gomez. The
movement was planned but the plot failed. The authorities
of St. Domingo confiscated $io,ooo worth of war material
and distributed it to their soldiers. Gomez became unpopular
again. He had done his best, no doubt, but all his plans
failed.
Maceo too lost the chance of combining in a plot to send
war material from the United States to Colon, made by Drs.
Hernandez and Tomas Padro. Carrillo, Hernandez and
Crombet attempted to get to Cuba in an open boat, but
failed. These manceuvres lasted from 1884 to i886.
In 1887, Juan Fraga, a noble-hearted refugee, aided by
Angel Garcia, a good patriot and man of action, founded the
club, "Los Independientes." Among the founders were Calixto Garcia and Hernandez. This club continued work for
the cause with the purpose of not compromising more lives
or money uselessly, as had been done, and agreed not to set
out on any uprising without half a million dollars.
Marti appeared again: he wanted to go to Cuba.
Then the Sartorius Brothers made an uprising at Purnio
(Holguin), but it all vanished in a few days.
Then came the last of the Fernandina expeditions, which
was Marti's first experience and cost Cuba dear.




I   Al
' ~ ~~~~~~ *~
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 








r.    




CHAPTER II.


CUBA    AGAINST SPAIN.          I895-IL898.*
BY
CARLOS GARCIA VELEZ, Brigadier-General.
I T is a hazardous, asv well as a very difficult task to undertake, as I do in this chapter, to narrate the principal
events of the Santiago Campaign from a point of view
unknown as yet to the xvorld, after so much      has been said
about the subject by different writers with whom I differ
essentially in the course of this narration.
The author of this chapter, a member of Calixto Garcia's
staff, having taken an active part in that campaign, believes
that.he is qualified to give his opinion, together with important data, based on original and authentic documents, facshuiles of which are not displayed here because of the limited
dimensions of this chapter. The facts are so plain and comprehensive that they will be sufficient proof of the author's
assertion when lhe states that all the official reports are decidedly  unjust to   General Calixto    Garcia's army of Cuban
patriots, as to the active and undeniable part taken by them
in that wonderful success, the surrender of Santiago. On the
other hand, it was to be. expected that some one would come
forward to vindicate the Cubans, so praised at first, so slandered
afterward by the war correspondents and some military commanders.
The author will demonstrate the many things accomplished
by the Cubans if it only be with the object of answering the
*Gen. Calixto Garcia responded very enthusiastically to our invitation to write this chapter. He wrote us:
"I will gladly undertake the work you propose to me for the history of the war with
Spain. This work wvill be very dear to mly heart."
His untimely death cut short his preparations for writing. His son has prepared the
chapter from his father's memoranda and papers.
THE PUBLISHERS.




46


THE AMIERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


gratuitous charges heaped on the brave allies of the Americans. The writers who have done this might be pardoned if
they had contented themselves with magnifying their own
feats, having, as I freely admit, accomplished so much in
behalf of Cuban independence. But when they go beyond
this and claim for the Americans exclusively, what pertains
rightfully and equally to both armies, they do a great and
perhaps irreparable injustice to a whole allied army. In so
doing they attempt to belittle and, what is worse, ignore
deeds of men, in no respect-be they nude and starving as
they were-inferior as generals or soldiers. The harmless
vanity of victorious commanders and unscrupulous correspondents becomes the criminal wrong of the false historian.
Some have erred from lack of proper and impartial investigation of the campaign as it was conducted by both armies;
others, because their sole object, for some unaccountable
reason, was to misrepresent and belittle the cooperation of the
Cubans.
Fortunately, history is not made by a dozen writers or from
the reports of only one of the nations engaged in a war,-no
matter if these reports are made by reputable military writers.
The history of the American-Spanish War has not yet been
written because the facts revealed in this chapter have not as
yet been published. As a contribution to do justice and to
honor the grave of the dead, the author of this work relates
the truth, and in it the living and the dead find just defence
and credit.
The misrepresentation of facts in this war, especially by the
American wvriters, is only a repetition of what has happened
under similar circumstances with all other auxiliary armies of
invasion. The victory has been invariably claimed by the
army whose country is larger and more powerful. History
presents numberless instances and although I could furnish
the reader many well-known examples, I shall cite only two
that xvill suffice to showv the accuracy of the statement.
Lafayette, with a well equipped and disciplined army, aided
the Americans in their war for independence. The French
army came from a rich and powerful country, its officers and
soldiers retaining fresh in their remembrance the luxurious




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


47


European life which they had enjoyed at home. They had
formed an ideal, purely imaginative, of the American patriot,
having seen only those who had gone to Paris, commissioned
by the Continental Congress. Their surprise was great when
they beheld masses of poor and ragged men, worn and haggard
from long privations, in a terrible struggle of which the newvcomers had no conception. Then a sensation of disgust
overpowered them, derived from a selfish and unfair comparison of their own polished and glittering appearance with
that of the sombre American patriots, shabbily attired and
care-worn. The victory achieved by both parties was claimed
by the French in those days as due entirely to them, although
the French never thought of taking back with them to
France, as trophies, the guns, which they had helped the
Americans to capture from the English, and which are to-day
admired at West Point with patriotic and legitimate American pride.
The English sent their army in aid of the Spanish whose
independence wvas at stake. The whole peninsula was burning with sacred and noble patriotism and in many a battle
the Spaniards had proved to the world how dearly they cherished liberty. Although not equal either to their opponent
or to their ally as a disciplined army, Spanish valor and
tenacity were never questioned. Nevertheless, the English
have always claimed that the Spaniards were only bands of
unorganized guerrillas and that victory was solely due to
Great Britain's soldiers.
It appears that humanity, in this respect, does not change
as years roll by.
Primero yo, despues yo, y siempre yo.
A fearful war, with destruction of life and property, had
been waging in the Island of Cuba for three years; three hundred thousand victims had already fallen to the ferocious war
yell of the Spaniards: " Exterminio de los Ciubanos! " Many
able Cuban commanders had been killed in battle, of whom
the foremost figures were Antonio Maceo, Flor Crombet,
Ducasse, Jose Maceo, Zayas, Serafin Sanchez, Aranguren and
the great Jose Marti; and of these dying of disease contracted




48


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


in the campaign, Guillermo Moncada, Jos6 M. Aguirre, and
Juan Ruz.
In the Eastern Department (from the Jucaro-Moron trocha
east), in point of organization of troops, and farming zones
and cattle-herding, the military condition of the Cubans can
be classified as excellent. The Spaniards were kept constantly
at bay within the fortified cities and towns, never daring to
venture out of them without forming columns of not less than
four thousand men, and then only to accompany the convoys
of rations to the different garrisons. The city of Tunis had
been stormed with artillery and carried by the Cuban forces,
taking several hundred prisoners who were delivered back to
the Spaniards. The towns of Guaymaro and Guisa had likewise been captured. Other numnerous smaller towns and
villages had also been taken and the enemy was compelled to
evacuate many others on account of the impossibility of
rationing them with regularity. The Spaniards were kept
constantly busy within those fortified precincts which allowed
them to remain entirely on the defensive. It wvas no difficult
thing to do, as may be inferred, to travel about the whole
Department without fear of being surprised by the enemy,
for, as has been already stated, they were shut up in blockhouses, forts and, invariably, within walls.
The Jucaro-Moron trocha was of no military value when the
American-Spanish War broke out because it was not sufficiently garrisoned to prevent the passage of the Cuban forces
from one department to another. The line of block-houses
along the Cauto River (navigable 75 miles) up to Cauto
Embarcadero Village, which General Pando had two months
previously completed, kept twelve thousand Spanish troops
inactive and exposed to malaria and yellow fever, without any
positive effectiveness against the plans of the Cuban General,
Calixto Garcia, Commander of the Department.
The Western Department extended from the Jucaro-Moron
trocha to the west, being cut by another trocha, the MarielMajana, and was in command of General J. M. Rodriguez.
War in this part of the island was conducted on different
principles by the Spaniards. There the towns and cities with
excellent harbors were more numerous, richer, larger and far




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. i895-i898.


49


better. Plantations and railroads traversed the whole Department, and for centuries the site of the supreme authority of
the Island had been situated there. Havana the capital, and,
as such, under the old system of centralization, the head and
the stomach of Cuba, had absorbed all that xvas important for
itself and had a larger proportion of Spanish inhabitants than
any other city. Capital was accumulated consequently in the
Western Department of Cuba and naturally the Spaniards
gave more attention to fighting the rebellion there than in
the east, considering too that the nature of the country was
better adapted to develop their so-called strategic movements.
Moreover that part had never before been in a serious revolt
and it was believed by the Spanish that the Revolution could
be more easily checked there than in the east. Besides, since
the invasion of Maceo and Gomez, the world's attention had
been fixed exclusively on the war events of the wvest, as this
invasion was an extraordinary raid, the results of which the
world was anxious to see. The movements of these commanders in that famous march were so rapid that they had
time only to fly through towns and villages. Notwithstanding great destruction of property, as the invaders had no time
to pause, what was conquered one day had to be abandoned
the next, leaving it again in the possession of the Spaniards.
After the surprise came the reaction and the Spaniards
immediately fortified the towvns and plantations and divided
Gen. A. Maceo's army from that of General Gomez, by building a trocha which was formidable, considering our lack of
wvell-armed troops and of artillery. One hundred and fifty
thousand men were thrown upon the Cubans and active operations were constantly carried on. The result of it was that
General Maceo was daily compelled to fight desperately,
while General Gomez failed to organize his forces properly to
relieve Maceo from such enormous odds. Maceo, fighting the
most brilliant battles in Pinar del Rio, was abandoned by
Gomez to his fate. Seeking to organize the forces east of the
trocha he wvent by sea to Havana province where he was
killed in a skirmish. The Revolution wvas greatly weakened,
but notwithstanding the activity and great number of the
Spanish troops and General Gomnez's incapacity to direct the




50


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR,


campaign, it continued, thanks to the extraordinary ability of
Rius Rivera,* Betancourt, J. M. Gomez, Gonzalez, Arango,
Cardenas, Lacret and other leaders who with notable skill
kept the Spanish columns busy with their small fragments of
veteran regiments, till the American-Spanish contest put an
end to such an unequal struggle.
This, in a few words, was the state of the Cuban Revolution,
when, on April 13, 1898, Gen. Calixto Garcia camped at
Jaguey, near Baire, received news from several Cuban commanders that the enemy had hoisted flags of truce in the
cities, towns and forts throughout the Eastern Department
and that the fire of our troops was unanswered by the Spanish. Orders were issued by the General to investigate the
cause of such a change and it was promptly learned that General Blanco had given orders for a suspension of hostilities.
As General Garcia had not received any such order from his
government, he suspected the measure to be a strategem of
the enemy to gain time for some unknown object and immediately directed that all his troops move towards the fortified
towns to harass them with musketry day and night. It
appeared clear to us that the Spaniards, fearing a declaration
of war from the United States and finding themselves involved
in a rather complicated affair for which they were totally
unprepared, had decided to prevent intervention by seeking,
through conference with the Cubans, a prompt solution of
the war. After some days we received a copy of CaptainGeneral Blanco's Manifesto and a proclamation ordered by
the Queen Regent suspending hostilities in the Island of Cuba,
which read as follows:
"His Majesty's Government, yielding to the reiterated
wish expressed by His Holiness the Pope, has been pleased
to decree a suspension of hostilities with the object of preparing and facilitating the restoration of peace on this Island,
in virtue whereof I believe it convenient to order:
"ARTICLE i.-From the day following the receipt in each
locality of said proclamation, hostilities are ordered to be suspended in all the territory of the Island of Cuba.
"ARTICLE 2.-The details of the execution of the above arti* Taken prisoner by the enemy after an engagement in Finar del Rio subsequent to Maceos
death,




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


S I


cle wvill be the object of special instructions that will be communicated to the several commanders-in-chief of the army corps for
easy and prompt execution according to the situation and circumstances of the case.
Havana, April ii, i898.                  BLANCO.
"The General Government of the Island of Cuba to the
inhabitants of the Island of Cuba:"Without any reason or legality, without the least offense
on our part, and at a time xvhen they received from us only
proofs of friendship, the United States are forcing us into war
just at the moment when quietude began to settle over the
country, when production was flourishing, commerce taking
courage and peace approaching, with the cooperation of all
classes and all parties under the new institutions granted by
the mother country.
" Such a proceeding is without precedent in history. It
evidently manifests the bogus politics of the Republic,
demonstrating the tricky plans and purposes that have always
been nourished against Spain's sovereignty in Cuba, which
the enemy has been conspiring for nearly a century to destroy.
Our foes now carry their hypocrisy and falsehood to the extent
of demanding immediate peace in a war provoked and sustained by themselves; her prudence and moderation have
been of no avail to Spain, though she has carried her concessions to the extreme limit of toleration in order to avoid a
rupture. She still deplores the state of affairs but she accepts
it with all the energy of a glorious national history and the
pride of her people, a pride which will never yield to the
stranger's haughtiness, nor consent to see Spain's right and
reason trampled upon by a nation of nobodies.
" If the United States xvants the Island of Cuba, let them
come and take it. Perhaps the hour is not far distant in
which the Carthaginians of America will find their Zama in
this Island of Cuba, which Spain discovered, peopled and civilized and which will never be anything but Spanish.
" It is our turn to have the honor of defending her and we
shall know how to do it with decision and an effort many a
time put forth. I count upon you for this with absolute certainty. I believe  there is no sacrifice you  are not
prepared to make in defense of the national territory,
whose integrity is sacred to  all Spaniards of whatever
origin. I am sure that every one in whose veins runs
Spanish blood will respond readily to the call, which, in these
solemn moments, I address to all, and that all will group
themselves around me to contribute as much as they can to




52


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


repel a foreign invasion, without allowing dangers, sufferings
or. privations to weaken the heart of courage.
" To arms, then, fellow countrymen, to arms! There will
be a place for all in the fight. Let all cooperate and contribute with the same firmness and enthusiasm to fight the eternal enemy of the Spanish name, emulating the exploits of our
ancestors, who always elevated high their country's fame and
honor. To arms! Cry a thousand times 'Viva Espafa,'
'Viva el Rey Alfonso XIII,' 'Viva la Regente,' 'Viva Cuba,
always Spanish.'
Your Governor-General,
RAMON BLANCO.
Of course the armistice, thus proclaimed by the Spanish,
without consultation or agreement with our Government, was
not even considered by any Cuban commander. On the contrary, all simultaneously attacked or feigned to attack the
towns, especially those of the interior, and it was done to
such an extent that the Spanish soldiery exclaimed, " Would
to God that the suspension of hostilities had not been decreed,
because nozw we have to fight day and nzight and be on the alert
every moment.."
The Autonomists endeavored to send commissioners to the
Revolutionists with propositions of peace, but as they were
not based upon the absolute independence of the Island the
commissioners did not even dare to approach our lines, fearing to meet the death penalty in accordance with the Spotorno
law of the revolution. Blanco soon convinced himself that
the Cubans would not enter with him into any understanding
whatever, that was not based on the absolute independence
of Cuba. Then the Spaniards, losing all hope of securing
peace, made several unsuccessful attempts to concentrate
forces in different cities. WvVhile crossing the country, protected by a flag of truce, several columns were severely
attacked by our forces and compelled to stop and turn back.
This happened to a column that marched out of Jiguani and
was beaten so badly that it fell back to the town.
The ruse that the Spaniards employed was promptly
frustrated by General Garcia's circular which, condensed,
was:ist. That the suspension of hostilities was not to be con



CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


53


sidered unless our Government should order it, at the same
time stating Spain's agreement to proclaim peace on the
basis of absolute independence of Cuba.
2nd. To harass the enemy continually and lay siege to
their fortified towvns.
3rd. To prevent by all means the concentration of the
enemy's troops, which they would surely try to effect should
var be declared between Spain and the United States.
4th. To be in readiness to aid and support the Americans
by land should they attack the Spaniards by sea.
In a letter of General Garcia to the Government dated at
La Ratonera (Baire) April i8, i898, he said:" In view of the last events I first thought of going where
the government was, so as to second its orders with more rapidity, but as I receive news daily from the exterior and as I
desire to be in position to direct personally the operations of
the ist and 2nd Army Corps, I have at last determined to stay
in Oriente.   I shall give you, notwithstanding, my views of
the situation. The armistice proclaimed by the enemy, without stipulating previously its terms or bases with our Government, moreover, without counting with our Government, may
be qualified as a sarcastic mockery, if, besides gaining time
with the Americans, as wve at first believed, it had not the
principal object, as we clearly see now, of providing with rations
all the towns of the interior and reconcentrating with impunity
its forces in points of the coast of their convenience.  I inclose
copies of the orders issued to the commanders of the corps
under my command and the great crisis in which they wete issued will demonstrate that if it had not been for them a large
column would not have been attacked, as it was on its march
from Holguin to Bayamo.* I have the artillery ready to take
advantage of the first chance, which I do not doubt will come
as soon as war between Spain and the United States is declared.
"I propose to aid the Americans in every way I can, even if
this American intervention takes place without a previous recognition of our Republic, and I tell you this, for, in case my
purposes should not merit the approbation of our Government,
* Col. Carlos Garcia, with part of his flying brigade, six hundred infantry, composed of
Baracoa, Guantanamo and Jiguani battalions, at El Tamarindo, near Babiney, fought a large
Spanish column commanded by Gen. Tejeda as it was en route from Holguin to Bayamo,
attempting to cross the country unmolested under a flag of truce. This same column some
days before had sought to cross the province of Holguin also and was heavily chastised by
Gen. Menocal's division and the explosion of dynamite mines at Aguacatones. Several days
later, Col. Garcia fought another column from La Mula to Cautillo en route from Holguin to
Bayamo commanded by the Spanish General, S. R. Marina, on whom he inflicted serious loss.




54


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


it may be able to give me contrary orders which I shall, of
course, obey. I have just received telegrams from Santiago
of which I inclose copies. They confirm more and more my
belief that a war between Spain and the United States is on
the verge of breaking out, and my plans are to aid the Americans unconditionally and to take advantage of the first opportunity the Spaniards may give me to attack them in the towns.
April iS, 1899.        CALIXTO GARCIA,
~^      Maj.-Gen. Commanding Eastern Department."
In the letter transcribed, Gen. Garcia exposed clearly to
the Government of Cuba the sentiment prevalent among the
Cuban troops in favor of cooperating with the Americans
against the eternal enemy of Cuba's independence. It was
logical for them to feel in this way, and I may say without
fear of being contradicted that it would not have been prudent and upright to have our army refused a frank and
decided cooperation in fighting the common foe. I do not
enter into the analysis of the legal point, as to whether our
Government conducted the diplomatic negotiations through
proper channels to draw from the American administration
under President Cleveland, in those critical days, a compact
or promise in which some sort of official recognition be
accorded our Government. Anyway, it would have been
folly, to say nothing of the grave complications which would
have ensued, in addition to the world's bitter criticism, if we
had refused outright to cooperate in a warwhich we had been
waging alone for three years. The nature of this work does
not allow me to dwell on this special subject which is of vital
importance.
All efforts of the Spanish commanders to accumulate provisions in the inland fortified towns met with the energetic
resistance of the Cuban troops, who were largely reenforced
by thousands of new soldiers who joined the patriots, abandoning the towns where they had been during the wvar. This
stubborn resistance of our troops caused Captain-General
Blanco some days later to order the evacuation of all the
inland fortified towns, some excellent ports of Oriente and
towns of minor importance of the west.
The heliographic turrets of the Eastern Department were




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


55


likewise abandoned. One after the other-from April 20 to
the first week of May-La Piedra, Jiguani, Santa Rita,
Bayamo, Cauto Embarcadero, Bueycito, Veguita, Guamo,
San Agustin, San Andres, Brenosa, Maniabon, San Manuel,
Puerto Padre and other villages and fortifications were
abandoned by the Spanish troops after plundering and destroying all the valuable private and official property, as it was
impossible to carry it with them on account of the constant
harassing by our troops. The Spaniards tried to induce the
families to abandon the towns also and accompany them to
the cities,, telling them that if they stayed, the insurgents
would abuse them and plunder their households, but the
majority did not heed the advice and remained in their
homes. In the Eastern Department, as the villages and
towns were evacuated by the Spanish under Cuban musketry
fire, our forces entered them in. perfect order. General Garcia
issued orders for each locality to elect by suffrage its civil
officials, and these first elections can be cited as comparable
with any in the most civilized countries. Utmost order prevailed in all the towns that the enemy had abandoned, and
their inhabitants were satisfied to see their persons and property so well respected by that army of ragged men, who had
been long misrepresented to them by the Spaniards. It must
not be forgotten that those people who remained in the
towns were families of our own soldiers, but many were
loyal Spanish subjects. Still others, although native Cubans,
had fought against us throughout the war in the guerrillas.
On the 28th of April, General Garcia moved his headquarters
to Bayamo, where he received the visit, on May I, of Lieut.
(now Lieut.-Col.) A. S. Rowan, with credentials from Mr. T.
Estrada Palma introducing him as a representative of the
War Department. Lieutenant Rowvan told the General that
the American Government was ready to aid the Cubans and
that his errand to Cuba was to ascertain what quantity of war
material and other supplies were wanted by General Garcia
in order to send it immediately to him. General Garcia dispatched Gen. E. Collazo and Lieut.-Col. Chas. Hernandez to
accompany Lieutenant Rowan to the United States with
instructions as to his opinion on the coming campaign:




56


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


" TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR, U. S. A.
DEAR SIR:-I have had real pleasure in receiving to-day
the visit of Mr. A. S. Rowan, who affirms himself to be the
bearer of verbal instructions of your department.
After answering through him the questions you ask me, I
send Gen. E. Collazo, perfectly authorized to represent me
near you. Mr. A. S. Rowan has accomplished his mission
entirely to my satisfaction and I should be very glad if you
could put him under my command.
I profit by this opportunity to express to you the heartfelt
thanks of the Army of the East under my command.
Yours truly,
Bayamo, May I, 1898.            CALIXTO GARCIA."
The party started that same day and embarked at the
northern coast of Tunis, on May 3, for the United States,
where they arrived, after a perilous voyage in an open rowboat, some days later. Gen. E. Collazo was favorably greeted
in Washington and received marks of great consideration
from Secretary Alger and Gen. Nelson A. Miles.
On May 10, the Cuban Government issued orders to Generals Gomez and Garcia to cooperate with the American army
and for them to obey the orders and second the plans of the
American Generals.
A close lookout xvas recommended to the coast-guards, and
Col. Thomas Collazo, Chief of the Staff of General Garcia,
was directed to embark on the Holguin coast and in a sailboat
proceed outward and lie in wait for some vessel of the American Navy to send letters to the War Department. In the
latter part of May a large expedition of arms, munitions and
rations arrived at the port of Banes; it was the Florida,
escorted by the American dispatch-boat Osceola. In this expedition Gen. Julio Sanguilly and Jos6 Lacret arrived with a
small regiment of Cuban volunteers. The war. material was
safely deposited in charge of Gen. L. Feria, but the provisions
were distributed by General Lacret among the many starving
families that flocked to Banes praying for food. This circumstance caused great suffering, a fortnight later, to three
thousand men who were obliged to march to the vicinity of
Santiago, through a territory absolutely devoid of victuals,




CtU-BA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


57


without rations which otherwise would have served for that
toilsome march in which so many Cuban soldiers died from
fatigue and lack of food.
On the sixth of June, Lieut.-Col. Chas. Hernandez arrived
aboard the U. S. S. Gloucester at the Bay of Banes. He
brought important orders and news from the War Department relative to the role the Cuban army was to play in the
coming campaign against the Spaniards.  General Garcia
promptly answered the communications on the same night,
and the next day the Gloucester steamed out of the bay back
to the United States to convey the final arrangements
decided upon between Generals Miles and Garcia before the
American troops should leave their country for the attack
on Santiago. With what throbbing anxiety were those papers
of General Garcia expected. The military commanders did
not try to conceal their joy when the Gloucester arrived and
the documents were read at headquarters.
Meantime, what had happened on the other side of the
Jucaro-Moron trocha? The War Department had also sent
to General Gomez an envoy, Mr. Somerford, a newspaper
correspondent, asking Gomez for some information about
that part of the island and also offering him necessary assistance. The American Vice-Consul at Cardenas, Sr. Juan
Joba, proposed to furnish Gomez, in the name of the Administration, with all the war supplies for which he should ask.
It appears that General Gomez was too low in his estimate of
the needs of his army for he asked only for three small expe.
ditions to be embarked respectively in the provinces of
Cienfuegos, Remedios and Sancti Spiritus. Afterwards he
changed his order and instructed that one of these expeditions should approach the coast of Camaguey, where it was to
embark a brigade and transport it to Matanzas Province.
The Administration, however, after conferring with Mr. T.
Estrada Palma, sent several well-equipped expeditions of
arms and provisions and several hundred Cuban volunteers
that were put ashore at different points of the Western Department, to the great disgust of General Gomez, who feared
that they would be seized by the enemy as he did not have
at his disposal a sufficiently large force to protect the landing




58


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


of the war material. In one of these expeditions, the " Maine,"
a company of American cavalry commanded by Captain
Johnson, arrived and was attached for several days to General
Gomez's escort, passing them under the orders of Gen. Josd
Miguel Gomez * the hero of Jibaro and Arroyo Blanco,
towns which this General captured with the aid of artillery
admirably directed by Col. J. Estrampes.
I beg the reader to return to the events that occurred in
the Eastern Department after the arrival of the Florida expedition at Banes, where about five thousand men had been concentrated by General Garcia to arm themselves with Springfield rifles and two hundred rounds per soldier. On June 13,
all these forces had arrived at Miejia (Holguin) already armed
and prepared for the operation that was contemplated. Next
day, camp was struck and one of the most wonderful efforts
of the whole war was performed by the bare-footed, ragged,
Cuban infantry; a long and toilsome march under heavy rains,
through knee-deep muddy trails, fording or swimming swollen
rivers, climbing and sl-iding mountains while loaded with
heavy rifles and two hundred cartridges each; without provisions of any kind whatever till Juan Baron was reached,
where for the first time since their departure from Banes the
troops got something for their empty stomachs, quinine for
their malaria, and rest for their bodies; this two days' stop
enabled them to continue their march across the Sierra Maestra to Aserraderos, where they arrived in excellent spirits on
the 22nd and the rear guard on the 23rd.  General Garcia
arrived at Aserraderos, early on the morning of the i9th, where
Generals Rabi, Cebreco and Lora were camped with two
divisions of the 1st and 2nd army corps. A few hours after
his arrival General Garcia paid a visit to Rear-Admiral Sampson on board the New York, with whom some agreements
were made as to the manner in which the campaign was to be
developed.
On June 20, Major-General William R. Shafter went ashore
to meet and confer with General Garcia. At this council the
Cuban Generals Rabi, Lora, Castillo (D. and J.) and the chiefs
of staff of both armies were present. General Garcia's plan of
* Gen. Jose Miguel Gomez is not related to Gen. Maximo Goniez.




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-i898.


59


disembarkation was accepted by General Shafter and it was
resolved that a demonstration of Cuban forces and of the
U. S. Navy be made on the western part of Santiago in order
to facilitate the landing of the American troops on the eastern coast at Daiquiri; this landing to be protected by Gen.
Demetrio Castillo's brigade, which was composed of troops
perfectly familiar with the mining district east of Santiago.
It was agreed also to transport 3,o000 Cubans from Aserraderos
to Siboney to aid the American troops in the attack on the
city. The Cuban troops were rationed by order of General
Shafter at Aserraderos with hardtack, bacon, canned beef,
coffee and sugar. The rations were good and plenty.
Gen. Agustin Cebreco, in compliance with orders from
General Garcia, marched with his division on the 2Ist to
Manacal, whence he was to feign an attack on the enemy, west
of Santiago; on the same day Col. Carlos Gonzalez embarked
with a small brigade of the second division of the second army
corps. He was to receive orders from Brig.-Gen. Demetrio
Castillo, who was in charge of the forces that wvere to aid the
landing of the American troops at Daiquiri. Brig.-Gen. Francisco Estrada was ordered to take charge of Col. Carlos
Garcia's flying brigade that was distributed at Cauto Abajo
and on the Holguin-Santiago highway in expectation of fighting the reinforcements that might endeavor to reach Santiago.
Col. Carlos Garcia was ordered to General Garcia's staff to
assist in the conferences between his father and the American
commanders.
Orders had been given since the first days of June to Gen.
Salvador Rios, Gen. Luis de Feria and Gen. Pedro Perez,
commanders of the Manzanillo, Holguin and Guantanamo
Divisions, respectively, to keep a sharp watch on the enemy in
case they should try to make a sally towards Santiago in aid
of the blockaded city. These orders were repeated several
times. Sufficient forces were left to embarrass, harass and
delay the enemy on the roads to Santiago, in proximity to
Guantanamo, Manzanillo and Holguin.
Gen. Pedro Perez of Guantanamo had, since the arrival of
Admiral Sampson's fleet in Cuban wvaters, rendered most
valuable services. To his measures it was due that General




6o


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Correa's order (Spanish Minister of War) to reinforce Santiago
was not obeyed by the commander of the Guantanamo troops.
who was compelled to remain shut up in the city, blockaded
by the Navy off Caimanera and on land by the Cubans.
Commander McCalla can testify to the valor and discipline of
Lieut.-Col. E. Thomas and his battalion and to the fortunate
assistance which our soldiers rendered to the Marines in the
Caimanera engagements.
The Spanish commander of Holguin was General Luque,
who had 12,oo000 men. Next to General Linares, he was considered. the most daring Spanish commander of the department,
although his campaign in Oriente does not register one single
victory. Nevertheless, everybody expected from him a bold
sally with a strong column, and General Garcia, fearing it,
gave General Feria a large force with instructions to prevent
by all means the advance of Luque toward Santiago and if
possible inflict upon him severe loss. He was to follow on
the heels of the Spanish column, sending couriers ahead at full
speed to headquarters, in case that column should break
through the Cuban lines. General Feria, ably aided by his
officers and brave soldiers at El Pason River, repulsed Brig.Gen. Nario, who was in command of the reinforcements, and
compelled him to fall back within that city's line of fortifications. If General Luque's pluck had been equal to the height
of his fame (for he was called by the Spanish press the Hero of
Paso Real), General Linares might have given a little trouble
to General Shafter. As it was, he preferred to remain quietly
in Holguin while the sovereignty of his country in the new
world was beitg shattered to pieces. Moreover, if he had intended to retreat towards Puerto Principe, as was whispered in
the city during those critical days, he would have met Gen.
Lope Recio, commander of the Camaguey forces, with a cav
alry brigade ready to oppose him. General Garcia had instructed Recio to advance towards Holguin with the cavalry,
leaving the infantry camped near the Tunas boundary line in
readiness to take into their hands the fleeing enemy.
Of the three commanders to whom General Garcia entrusted
the checking of reinforcements, the only one that deserves
any criticism is Gen. Salvador Rios, commander of the Man.




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


6i


zanillo division. It is true that Rios was baffled by Colonel
Escario's sudden sally and due credit is given to this Spanish
commander for his ability to avoid engagements with the
Mllanzanillo infantry. In excuse for General Rios it may be
stated that although his infantry was not able to engage the
enemy on account of the impossibility of covering all the roads
properly, his cavalry, marching out of Manzanillo at dusk,
rather unexpectedly fought the enemy incessantly, as will be
explained later in this chapter.
On June 21, Col. Carlos Gonzalez with his brigade was
taken to Daiquiri on one of the American transports. General Shafter ordered Gen. WV. Ludlow, chief of the Engineer
Corps, to build pontoons at the beach of Aserraderos, for the
embarkation which was accomplished with considerable
trouble.
The landing of Cuban troops at Daiquiri was a wise and
able manceuvre that gave the key to the whole invasion of
the territory and gave perfect security to the disembarkation
of the American troops. The Spanish were menaced by the
navy from Punta Cabrera to Punta Berracos, being fired upon
along nearly the whole line. Colonel Cebreco was feigning
an attack on the west of Santiago. The Spaniards were scattered, holding forts in all the iron-mining region, covering
very feebly an extensive territory which they were unable to
protect against an enemy already in it and perfectly familiar
with every trail, and the powerful fleet that constantly swept
the coast with its guns. The assistance of the Cubans in the
operation, clearing the way and attacking by land, while the
fleet bombarded the fortifications, gave success to the disembarkation of General Shafter's army. This has been passed
over in silence by all writers and is one of the facts that I
distinctly wish to impress upon the reader. To illustrate the
dashing attack of the Cubans by land, it may be well to recollect that at Siboney they entered under the fire of Spanish
musketry and.of the bomb-shells of the American fleet, compelling the enemy to retreat to Firmeza, and from there to
Savilla. In this attack General Castillo suffered a number of
casualties, some of them inflicted by the fleet's artillery, proving that the navy did not expect that the Cubans could carry




62


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


the village so quickly and under such a hail of bullets from
the ships.
At 7 A. M. of the 25th, the Cuban troops began to embark
in boats towed by launches of the U. S. N. to the transports
that lay a mile and a half off. General Sanchez commanded
the forces that were taken on the Leona, General Capote those
on the Seneca, and General Cebreco those on the Orizaba.
Col. Candelario Cebreco was left in command of the forces on
shore at Aserraderos and of those that were detached on duty
west of Santiago.
General Garcia, his staff, and Generals J. Rabi, S. Lora and
R. Portuondo were invited aboard the Alamo by Gen. William
Ludlow, who showed himself a perfect gentleman in the highest acceptance those words have; we all knew he was an able
engineer and a good West Point scholar before we had the
pleasure of meeting him. After that trip, strong ties of warm
friendship united us all to General Ludlow, which tightened
each day during the campaign, for he was our neighbor in the
trenches. During all that period, General Garcia's army
happened to be on the right of General Lawton's division,
of which Ludlow's brigade was the extreme right.
On the afternoon of the 25th, General Sanchez landed at
Siboney and the other Generals with their forces on the morning of the succeeding day. General Garcia established his
headquarters in the village and awaited General Shafter's
orders. When we jumped out of the surf, an officer approached General Ludlow and informed him hurriedly of
what had occurred during his absence. I saw the General look
suddenly grave when he learned that Captain Capron had
been killed the day before, and he quickly inquired how the
fight had begun. The officer could not tell exactly; so many
contradictory versions were given that he hardly understood
how it came. Later on we heard from ourown men and from
some correspondents the details of the Guasimas fight, with
words of praise on every lip as to the bravery of the Rough
Riders and their commanders. But one could hear some
criticisms, for the movement ordered by General Wheeler,
the gallant old soldier hero of a hundred battles, was considered reckless because such a comparatively small force had




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


63


advanced upon a position held by the enemy, whose number
no one could exactly tell. It was logical to think that at that
point a large force must be camped, considering that all the
garrisons of the fortifications of the mining zone had retreated
to that point and to Aguadores. The criticisms grew sharper
when it was ascertained that General Castillo's forces, after
driving the enemy out of Siboney and vicinity, had attacked
the retreating Spaniards on the 23rd and skirmished all that
day at Las Guasimas, meeting with a strong defense. When
this fight of the Rough Riders was referred to General Garcia,
he said:
l"It is always of good moral effect to soldiers that have
never fought a battle to win the first one and it produces,
naturally, an opposite effect on the one that is defeated. The
Americans have done well if they have rushed to the front
and carried the enemy, even if it xvas executed in a reckless
way. By this time the Spanish soldier is perfectly satisfied
that the Yankees are men of pluck. And if, in a couple of
more fights, the Americans advance in the same manner, rest
assured that as soon as the Spaniards see the blue shirts
moving towards them, they wvon't wait a minute and will
take to their heels terror-stricken."
Our General knew the Spaniards well. He had sized them
up accurately in those fexv sentences, as was demonstrated at
the end of the campaign, when the Spanish soldiers were heard
to exclaim;-" Oh, those Americans are devils: when they advance one must get out of their way, and d - quickly too! "
Gen. D. Castillo has been accused of not keeping his appointment on the morning of the 24th to advance on Las
Guasimas, and he in defense says that he made no such
appointment with any American commander. He also states
that he had sent to headquarters ample information of the
enemy's position and had put at the disposal of the Americans all the men that as guides and scouts were to aid in the
operation, and that he had distinctly informed General Young
that he could not go because there would be left in Siboney
no senior Cuban commander to receive orders from General
Shafter and General Garcia. The latter, with three thousand
men, was to disembark that day from Aserraderos. As I
have already stated, the forces wvere not able to embark on the




64


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


24th because the pontoon bridge had not been completed, but
they were expected to arrive at Siboney on that date.
I firmly believe that General Wheeler did right in pushing
forward to Las Guasimas the van of the invading army, but
the movement ought to have been combined with another
column that should have previously advanced, taking the other
trail. If there was a mistake in this fight, it certainly was
due only to the lack of a flanking force that would have facilitated the advance of the main column. Col. Leonard Wood
did what a good level-headed soldier would have done in similar circumstances-push forward.
In Cuba, a flanking force must always have excellent guides,
with a section of chapeadores, armed with machete only, to
open the way through the thick undergrowth, beluco, and
tangled bushes; otherwise the nzanigta-as it is called by the
Cubans-is absolutely impenetrable, and deploying in such a
country without men that know how to handle the machete
is absurd.
The Spanish official report of the engagements sustained on
the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of June against the
Cubans under Col. C. Gonzalez and the Rough Riders
commanded by Col. Leonard Wood, is as follows:" Santiago de Cuba, June 24th, 1898.
"General Rubin's column under orders of the commanderin-chief of the Fourth Army Corps was attacked yesterday at
noon and again in the evening.
" This morning considerable forces with artillery guns
made a resolute attack and were repulsed, losing many men.
"On our side we had, in the two days, seven dead, Jose
Lances, Captain of the provisional battalion of Puerto
Rico, and Zenon Borregon, second Lieutenant of the same
battalion, seriously wounded; Francisco las Tortas, first
Lieutenant of the regiment of Royal Artillery, slightly
wounded; two privates seriously wounded and two slightly
wounded. Various contusions.
" General Rubin had on the heights of Sevilla three companies of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, three of
San Fernando, all the detachments from the forts gathered
the day before, and two Plasencia guns. Rubin had divided
his force in three echelons-as Lieut. Jose MUiller * affirms,* Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, translated and published by the Navy
Department, 1899.




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


65


the foremost one under Commander Alcaniz, formed of three
companies of Puerto Rico troops and one mobilized company.
" On the 23rd, this echelon alone checked the enemy's
advance in the morning and again in the evening, the echelon
having been reinforced by one company from San Fernando,
half engineers, and two guns. When the battle was over the
forces withdrew to their former positions, the echelon remaining on the same site.
"At daybreak on the 24th, the echelon was reinforced by
two companies from Talavera, and not only resisted a strong
attack of the enemy but also forced the latter to retreat.
" In spite of this advantage, they received orders to withdraw because the enemy was approaching the Morro by rail,
and, as there were not forces enough to oppose him, it would
have been surrounded.   In compliance with the order
received, the column withdrew to the city."
If Lieutenant Miuller's statement be correct, the enemy had
about five hundred men at Las Guasimas on the first echelon,
and now it does not appear queer that the Cubans should not
be able to carry the position, as they were a much smaller
force than their opponents.
General Shafter continued on board the Seguranfa till the
road to La Redonda had been opened by the engineers. It
was quite difficult to carry him any dispatches when the sea
was rough, because the boats could hardly approach the
pontoon bridge, and then there was no launch ready to take
you to where the Seguranfa was lying, by no means near
shore. All the launches were busy landing the regiments and
only as a courtesy of the midshipmen in charge could you get
aboard the floating headquarters of the 5th Army Corps.
Our troops were ordered to camp on the outskirts of the
village and General Cebreco's force on the road to La
Redonda. Gen. D. Castillo had organized a good system of
receiving daily information from the city and wve were pretty
wvell posted on what was going on in Santiago. It was
through this channel that General Garcia received and afterward presented to Rear-Admiral Sampson a map of the harbor, wvith important data of the fortifications, showing where
the torpedoes and ships were lying. All this valuable service
was performed by Cubans willingly and without remunera



66


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


tion, risking their lives in the city, where, if detected, a
summary court-martial would have deprived us of their valuable and much needed assistance.
On the twenty-seventh a dispatch was received at the
Cuban Headquarters stating that a large Spanish column had
marched out of Manzanillo late in the afternoon of the
twventy-second, and as General Pando some days before left
Havana via Batabano,-it was supposed for Manzanillo,gathering first some forces at Jucaro, we inferred that the
reinforcements were under his command. How mistaken
were wve! General Pando, far from coming with these, was
travelling through Central America and Mexico incognito
in pursuit of a wild plan of Spanish colonization. To think
that when Spain was about to lose her colonies, literally
kicked out of them by an American nation, the chief of staff
of Captain-General Blanco should be seeking land concessions
for colonies, particularly in America, where Spain's sovereignty
was forever doomed!
General Garcia, fully realizing the importance of such news
and thinking with foundation that the reinforcements were
much larger than they really were, ordered Gen. D. Castillo
and Col. C. Garcia to General Shafter's headquarters to give
him the details of the dispatch and General Garcia's views of
what could be done against the advancing column. We
accordingly started out for a voyage to the Segnranfa, that was
fully three miles off. By a lucky coincidence we found at the
beach a good soul willing to steam us alongside of the flagship. We were politely greeted. by the General and after
saluting him  we informed  him  of our mission.   We
stated that General Garcia suggested to him the advisability
of sending a strong Cuban force to Aguacate that same day,
the twenty-seventh, under Gen. J. Rabi's command. Aguacate was the junction of all the roads from Manzanillo, and he
was confident that the enemy would pass through those positions which were unique for checking the enemy and routing
him. General Garcia was sure to get his forces there in time
to engage the enemy, for the column would certainly be
delayed at the passage of the Contramaestre River by General
Estrada, to whom orders were to be sent immediately to




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


67


make a desperate fight and hold his own till General Rabi
should arrive at Aguacate.
General Shafter consulted the maps before him and ascertained through General Garcia's representatives that from
Aserraderos the Cuban infantry would be at El Aguacate on
the txventy-ninth by making a forced march, if they could be
transported that same afternoon to Aserraderos. Meanwhile,
General Garcia had given orders to General Rabi to be ready
and near; two thousand men xvere rationed for four days and
formed in the streets of Siboney, only waiting for General
Shafter's order to embark.
General Shafter suddenly changed his mind, without
any apparent cause to justify such change, and said to
Castillo and Garcia that he would rather not send any troops
to meet the reinforcements, that he needed all the Cubans
with his troops, as they were a valuable aid to him; that it
was not wise to divide the army now; that if the reinforcements should enter Santiago, he would have thirty-one thousand men to bottle them all up in the city, and that he
certainly would not move a single man from the bulk of the
army. As he was saying this, Colonel McClernand came in
from the salon of the steamer where the typewriters were
working incessantly, carrying a printed list of transports with
all the important data concerning accommodation and other
particulars. When the General saw him, he said, " Never
mind it, sir, I don't need that list now."
WVe dropped the conversation and begged the General's permission to withdrawv, but he detained us asking our opinion as
to a proposed advance to Aguadores and as to the strength of
Santiago's fortifications. Then the General sent word to
General Garcia not to worry about the reinforcements and
that next day he (Shafter) would go ashore.
Had the Cuban forces been allowed to go and meet the
enemy-either by sea to Aserraderos or by land, cutting
through the Spanish line of fortifications-Colonel Escario
would have been routed or captured and then at least a part
of the glory that the Americans monopolized with the surrender of Santiago would have gone to the credit of the
Cubans. As it wvas, we were slandered bitterly by the wvar



68


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


correspondents (with very few exceptions) who, in their wrath
against us for not furnishing them servants and horses as they
expected we would, wrote down statements that only existed
in their excited imaginations.
We had left our packs, saddle-horses and tents at Aserraderos, whence they were to go all around to Juan Baron,
Cauto Abajo, Sabanilla and Ramon de las Yaguas, to Siboney.
Nearly all of our generals and officers were afoot, from the
time of their arrival at Daiquiri and Siboney till the eighth of
July, when they arrived at our camp at Quintero Hill. Col.
F. Dieguez arrived at Siboney on the twenty-seventh with
one hundred cavalry, and as soon as the horses were seen the
petitions from the excursionists increased to such an extent
that there was one who asked me to dismount some of the
cavalry, so as to lend them the horses till the campaign was
over. It was difficult to make them understand that we could
not do such things. Some of them wvould ask an officer to
let him hire one of the soldiers of his company, stating that
the man would receive good pay. There was no end to these
and other requests.
Miss Clara Barton had arrived at Siboney with a large cargo
of provisions which had been intended to be distributed in
the western part of Cuba. She sent word to General Garcia
that the Red Cross would gladly aid his army in every poss!ble way and that she desired to know if there xvere any indigent families near Siboney, so as to distribute food amongst
them. General Garcia ordered an aide-de-camp of his to
express in his name to Miss Clara Barton that he appreciated
dearly and accepted the aid of the Red Cross and that he
would be glad to give Miss Barton any information regarding
indigent Cubans, who were many but lived far away from
Siboney. That same day some nurses landed and took charge
of the Cuban Hospital which was under the direction of the
Cuban surgeon Dr. F. Veranes. These nurses performed wonderfully good service during the days that we were in Siboney,
and all said in their favor is little compared to what they
deserve. Soon, all the inhabitants of the mountains flocked
down to Siboney, as they had been told that the Red Cross
was distributing food and clothes to everybody. Hundreds




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. I895-I898.


69


of poor settled down permanently in the village or its vicinity,
giving to the streets a strong oriental aspect and odor, which
made the most indifferent man shrink from the scene, besides
causing some Americans to think that such an unfortunate
collection were a fair representation of the Cuban people and
members of Garcia's Army.
What seems to have caused considerable comment and
unjust criticism by the many jolly excursionists that accompanied the Shafter expedition to Cuba wvas the personal
appearance of our soldiers. The sad and weary gaze of these
unfortunate men of the tropics, tired and worn out from privations of all sorts during months and years of toil, so different from the bold, defiant look of the free citizen of the north,
a happy possessor of physical and moral energies accumulated
during a lifetime of welfare, their calm and unconcerned attitude-not indolent as has been erroneously supposed-toward
men and things that surrounded them, compared to the business-like, inquisitive brand-new and glory-seeking soldiers of
optimistic inclinations just out from the land of liberty, caused
those incipient war-critics to draw an unfair parallel without
stopping to consider that the skeptical and unconcerned
appearance of the first was a logical result of a rough campaign of numberless hardships, as xvas the optimistic and
brilliant disposition of the others, the product of a charming
civilized life of liberty, love and relative prosperity.
On the twenty-ninth, General Shafter came ashore and
ordered General Garcia to move his troops next morning
towards Santiago. On the thirtieth, at 6 A. Ml., we broke camp
and three hours later we pitched it at El Salado. General
Shafter moved all his army excepting Sheffield's division, and
camped at La Redondita. Col. Carlos Gonzalez continued in
the van where he had been since the first days, and his force
was the foremost and nearest to the enemy. Scouting parties
from this column vent out daily to reconnoiter the enemy
and the nature of the ground. General Chaffee accompanied
them, once obtaining valuable knowledge that served him
later. A council presided over by General Shafter at his
headquarters, was held on the thirtieth at three o'clock P. M.
attended by nearly all the American commanders, in addition




70


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


to Gen. Demetrio Castillo and Colonels Collazo and Garcia,
representatives of Gen. Calixto Garcia. The combined movements of the next day's attack were discussed. General Lawton was to take El Caney, and General Wheeler, San Juan
Hill block house. General Garcia was to move to Marianage
and wait until Lawton should capture the village and then
cross to Ducourau and keeping on Lawton's right flank
advance to Santiago. The most optimistic views were
expressed by those that took part in the discussion of the
proposed attacks, and when we left the council we were quite
satisfied that the next day's fight would not amount to anything worth considering.
Early on the morning of the first of June, complying with
the orders above mentioned, General Garcia occupied Marianage, while General Lawton's division moved towards El Caney
and General Sumner's towards San Juan. General Garcia
distributed his forces, with orders to be ready for any emergency, in the following manner:-Two companies of the
" Santiago" regiment under Col. F. Dieguez were ordered to
the Masonry Bridge on the Caney-Santiago road with pickets
at Santa Cruz and Ducourau. The infantry was stationed at
the bottom of the Marianage plateau on the trail leading to
San Juan, and in these positions the Cuban forces remained
during the attacks of San Juan and Caney. Marianage is the
ruins of a plantation, magnificently situated on a hill that
commands all the territory facing Caney, Ducourau and San
Juan. From the plateau we could clearly see both battles as
they were fought simultaneously, and the incidents of both
were eagerly followed by Generals Garcia and Rabi and their
staffs. Col. Evan Miles, who was also awaiting orders at
Marianage with his colored regulars, soon received instructions
to move down to Caney, which he- promptly did. At our left,
facing San Juan, was E- Pozo, where Grimes's battery was situated, and a detachment of Cubans had been left with it; the
battery was soon quieted by the accurate shots of the Spanish
artillery, which did some damage to our men, amongst whom
may be mentioned Lieutenant-Colonel Paneque, who was
badly wounded by a bomb-shell.
The advance on San Juan was brilliant but of the most reck



CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


7 I


less character. We could see the men climb the hill slowly,
steadily, but without losing an inch of ground so dearly
gained, and we could see bunches of five stand their own
without flinching, and advance half way up the hill without
firing a shot, while the Spaniards behind the trenches were
blazing away at them. Turning our eyes towards El Caney
we could see two horse-shoe formed clouds of smoke, vwhich
denoted that the battle there was raging furiously, both the
defenders and the assailants manifesting, for hours of incessant
fighting, unsurpassed  bravery. Charge after charge was
made, only to be again and again repulsed. Our anxiety had
no limits as we watched those fights go on. We expected to
be utilized in some way, and every Cuban heart was beating
for envy and disappointment, being compelled to wait there
between the two fights, inactive, while the men who came to
aid us in our struggle were being killed in heaps by our enemy,
who opened immense lanes into the serried ranks of our allies.
They fought admirably, regardless of the losses to which they
were thus being subjected, and they well deserved the victory so dearly won.
Those fights reminded us how the Cubans under Antonio
Maceo used to attack. He would throw his infantry against
an intrenched enemy regardless of the consequences. He did
not possess artillery to shake the foundations of a fort or-to
clear a line of trenches, preparing thus for the infantry's
attack. He counted only upon the pluck and stubbornness
of his men, for he could not count on anything else. His
self-reliance was supreme, and we believed 'unique, till we
beheld the battles of San Juan and El Caney.
Meantime our infantry was receiving a hail of bullets from
the enemy of San Juan Hill, and at four o'clock P. M., when
roster was called, before moving to Ducourau it was learned
at headquarters that we had over a hundred casualties without firing in return a single shot at the enemy.
Colonel Gonzalez, who with his men entered the Caney engagement with General Lawton's division,was warmly congratulated
by his commanders for his behavior during the day, and
especial praise was accorded Major Victor Duany, who with a
Cuban Company had flanked the Spanish position and ably




72


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


assisted in the victory of the American troops. Brig.-Gen. Vara
del Rey made a heroic defense of the village, and, had he had
double the number of men at his disposal, the victory of the day
would unquestionably have been his.
The Americans had abandoned, all along the trail, haversacks, blanket-rolls and all sorts of objects. Cubans, as well as
Americans, who needed any of these articles freely helped
themselves. Col. Evan Miles took a little more care with the
property of his soldiers, and as he went down from Marianage
to Caney, when the firing burst out, he ordered his men to lay
their impedimenta alongside the Caney main road, leaving a
man from each company to watch over the heaps of haversacks and blanket-rolls. In either case the surprise of our
soldiers was great to see how unconcernedly the American
soldier would throw aside these things so important in war.
A mambi never parts from his jolongo (haversack); he fights.
eats and sleeps with it. There is nothing more wearisome
and discouraging to a soldier, after a battle in which his nervous system has been greatly strained by the work and emo
tions undergone, than to find himself at the end, when he
most needs to repair his energies, without those articles so indispensable. Whoever has had any sort of practical war training
fully appreciates the value and necessity of clinging to his
jolongo and blanket, through thick and thin.
At nightfall our forces marched to Ducourau, where headquarters were established. Gen. A. Cebreco was ordered to
camp at Sabana Ingenio.
I beg the reader to remember that General Lawton was to
advance to Santiago after taking El Caney. But in General
Shafter's plans it was not calculated what was going to
happen. Lawton had suffered considerably in the assault of
the village and was in no condition to continue that same day
toward the beleaguered city. Next day before daybreak we
marched from Ducourau and advanced towards Santiago, our
van skirmishing with some Spanish detachments of the fortified zone (all the mountains back of Santiago) who were
already in retreat to Santiago. We took possession of La Caridad Hill where General Garcia pitched his tent, while General
Lora captured the San Miguel blockhouse, the village of Cua



CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


73


bitas and the water works; Generals Capote, Cebreco and
Sanchez destroyed the railroad of San Luis, lifting and bending the rails, and burning the bridge named Purgatorio.
As we appeared on the height of La Caridad and Quintero
facing the city, the Spaniards opened a heavy musket fire on us.
During all that day it continued and General Garcia ordered
Cebreco to deploy a line of sharpshooters that should keep
anl intermittent and effective fire on the Spanish trenches,
especially at two batteries that had opened fire onl us and were
causing considerable damage. Col. F. Dieguez was detached
with his cavalry on a reconnoitering tour towards the river
Gascon and the Cobre road. Immediately afterwards the
Spaniards sent from the fleet some Marines and disembarked them near Matadero. A considerable force could be seen
moving to and fro at the Cobre entrance and about the Plaza de
Toros, expecting no doubt an attack at those points. General
Garcia never left the saddle until we were in possession of all
the points mentioned.
At noon, Monsieur E. Cheux came out from the city, stating to General Garcia that the French consul was about to leave
the city with all the foreign subjects. The General informed
M. Cheux that the consul would be cordially welcomed within
our lines. At 3 o'clock P. Mi. the consul, followed by about
four hundred persons of both sexes, left the city by the Cuabitas road and were conducted far beyond the range of the
Spanish fire.
When night came strong pickets were detached on our
flanks to avoid a surprise from our enemy, as we were absolutely isolated from the American Army, which was at least
one mile to our left. Captain A. Escalante carried an order
to General Cebreco that evening to harass the enemy during the
night with guerillas, which was done at about half past nine
with a very unfortunate and unexpected result; the Spaniards,
believing that they were assaulted, broke out with a heavy fire,
and the Americans, in their turn, mistaking it for an advance
of the enemy to recover the positions they had lost the day
before, opened fire also, and in a few minutes there was such a
thundering that the Cubans themselves concluded to blaze
away in the direction of the city. This general alarm caused




74


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


Shafter to issue an order to General Garcia not to repeat the
night harassment thereafter, for while it had the desired effect
on the enemy it disturbed his own troops in their slumber.
Next day was the memorable third of July. General Lawton
with other generalsvisited GeneralGarciaandtheyallrode
around to the positions held by the Cubans. While they
were at La Caridad Hill, whence an excellent view of the city
and harbor could be had, the Spanish fleet stupidly steamed
out of the harbor to their inevitable doom, leaving the city
without the protection of those floating, impregnable fortresses
whose mighty guns were sufficient to clear the hills of an
enemy far inferior in strength.
At It A. M. General Garcia received information that the
enemy were landing forces by rail at Dos Bocas and along the
line. He ordered General Sanchez's column to march immediately and reinforce General Lora, who was occupying the railroad. General Garcia himself started out towards the enemy
with his staff and infantry escort and took command of both
forces, advancing with them to San Vicente. This village was
carried by a detachment of said escort under Lieutenant Arcia,
wvho occupied it until General Lora, after taking the heliograph
turret of Boniato, advanced to the-village. When General Garcia returned he changed the headquarters to Cuabitas leaving in
the trenches of Caridad and Quintero Hills the forces of
Generals Capote and Cebreco.
That afternoon General Garcia was visited by Generals Lawton, Ludlow, Chaffee and Col. E. Miles, and a very important
conference took place, in which very pessimistic views as to
the situation were advanced by the visitors again and again.
General Garcia as often gave assurances to the American generals that his army and he were greatly indebted to the American nation, and that the latter could positively count on the
unconditional support of the Cubans. The American generals
withdrew, feeling that they had done their full duty in behalf
of the army under their command and satisfied that the practical knowledge of Spanish warfare and procedure possessed by
the Cuban general was a satisfactory guarantee to them.
That day Colonel Escario with his column from Manzanillo
arrived at the city. General Garcia has been held responsible




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


75


for the entrance of these reinforcements to the beleaguered
city on the ground that he did not check their advance to
Santiago, as it noWv appears that General Shafter expected he
would do. I respectfully refer the reader to the conference
held on board the Seguranfa the twventy-seventh of June,
when General Garcia showed to General Shafter the necessity
of sending General Rabi and troops to El Aguacate to intercept the above-mentioned reinforcements, a proposition that
General Shafter refused.
Late in the afternoon of the third of July, our troops (General Lora) occupied the village of Dos Bocas on the railroad
to San Luis. As may be observed, Lora's forces were gradually moving towards this town and the railroad was absolutely ours. All communications from the city to the fortified
zone were cut. On the fourth of July-ve received the official
report of the destruction of Cervera's fleet, also the news of
the entrance and occupation of El Cobre, Bartolon, Monte
Real, Coleto, Mazamorra and San Miguel, and the news that
General Shafter had prolonged for twenty-four hours the
truce which had been granted to the city the day before,
allowing the families to evacuate. Before 6 o'clock A. M. of
the fifth they began to leave the city. As they walked out
they formed a column more than three miles long. Men,
women and children flocked fo Cuabitas, terror-stricken, fearing that the cannonade would commence at any moment and
they would not have timne to escape therefrom. The majority of them went out of Santiago without any other garments
besides those they wore, and very few had the foresight to
provide themselves with enough food for a few days. Everybody thought that in a couple of hours the fortifications of
Santiago were to be a mass of ruins, figuring that the Americans wvere to open fire with no less than sixty enormous calibre siege guns, that being the story prevalent among them.
Of course we did not dare to inform them of the true state ot
affairs, as that would tend towards increasing their already
great distraction. General Garcia did his best to alleviate
their many wvants and desires; notwithstanding, many perished
from wvant of food, disease and exposure. Subsequently, General Shafter ordered rations to be sent to them, but there were




76


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


hardly enough pack-trains to attend to the transportation of
the rations for the troops. When the much-needed rations
could finally be delivered them, alas, it was too late, for starvation had played its part.
As pack-trains have been incidentally mentioned, I venture
to say that they were not sufficient in number to provide for
the entire attacking forces, and as may be supposed, the
Cuban troops were the ones to suffer. Lieut.-Col. J. M.
Galdos, Chief Commissary of the Cuban Army, pitched his
tent alongside of Major Gallagher's Chief Commissary of the
5th Army Corps, at La Redondita, close to General Shafter's
headquarters. It was fully nine miles from the Cuban trenches
to the Commissary's camp, and daily the Cuban troops had to
tramp that distance for rations, or go without. This necessary grub-parade caused the ever thoughtful and economical
American correspondents to open their eyes in astonishment
and exclaim that the Cuban allies, instead of fighting, were
plundering Shafter's depots, thereby inconsiderately exhausting the war fund.
On the sixth of July, General Cebreco received an official
report that Lieutenant-Colonel Vaillant, commander of the
Cuban forces at Aserraderos under Colonel Cebreco, had captured Rear-Admiral Cervera and nearly all the survivors of the
destroyed Spanish fleet, others escaping probably to Santiago.
The prisoners were delivered to officers of the American fleet
and receipts given the Cuban officers in exchange for them.
It has possibly not been known into whose hands Cervera and
his men first fell upon reaching the shore, so the above will
explain.
As General Lawton had manifested to General Garcia his
desire to move the artillery batteries to La Caridad, where our
forces had dug out rifle-pits during four days of constant
work, we moved to Loma Quintero the forces that held La
Caridad, and those of Quintero along the crests of the hills as
far as San Pablo. On the seventh of July, General Estrada
arrived with 8oo00 infantry and all the impedimenta of our army
that had been left when we embarked at Aserraderos to go
around the hills. General Estrada, as may be remembered,
was in command of the flying brigade which was to engage




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


77


the enemy, should it come from Manzanillo, as actually happened.
The report that Col. Rafael Montalvo gave [he was in command at the Aguacate engagement] says very little that the
reader does not already know. But it is convenient and just
to affirm that Colonel Montalvo fought tenaciously with his
8oo recruits at El Aguacate, and that he did his best to check
the enemy, who outnumbered him four to one.
Colonel Escario entered Palma Soriano with a large quantity of stretchers, leaving all his dead unburied on the field.
In that town he gathered fresh troops from the garrison, and
leaving all the wounded marched to Santiago after having
given his men ample time to recuperate their energies. Lieut.Col. Alfredo Lora with a cavalry troop, and Lieut.-Col. Carlos
Poey with General Garcia's cavalry escort, skirmished with
Escario's column between Baire and Palma Soriano, both sustaining heavy loss.
A painful errand took the author a few months ago to
Washington, where he accidentally met some good old friends
of the Santiago campaign. Naturally their conversation
turned upon the events of the war in which the deceased Gen.
Calixto Garcia had so actively and ably cooperated with his
army. An old veteran with a big, noble heart, a very dear
friend of the writer, introduced him to General, who
at once wvas recognized as one of his friends of the campaign.
Through the courtesy of this gentleman a copy was received
of Lieut. Jos6 Muller's Bat//es and Capitulation of Santiago
de Cuba, then just off the press, published by the Office of Naval Intelligence. From the introduction to this official edition
the following words are quoted:
" Among the newly translated chapters, the one giving the
diary of General Escario's march, with 3,752 men, from Manzanillo to Santiago, a distance of 52 leagues through the
enemy's country, is one of great interest. Considering the
nature of the country, which forced them generally to march
single file, the heavy rains and the continual harassment of the
Cubans, the effectiveness of which is shown by the large number of killed and wounded on both sides, it may be classed as
one of the most noticeable military feats of the war. It shows
what the Cubans did towards the fall of Santiago, and a study




78


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH IWAR.


of the situation will be interesting, considering what would
have been the temporary effect if Escario's march had been
unopposed and he had arrived at Santiago with his force unimpaired a day or two before that critical period-July 2 -just previous to the departure and destruction of Cervera's
fleet.                        RICHARDSON CLOVER,
December 31, I898.          Chief Intelligence Officer.
We herewith furnish a complete copy of the Spanish Col-.
onel's diary, which, as Mr. Richardson Clover says, will be of
great interest to study. The broad views and good sense of
the -American reader will, naturally, make due allowance for
the bombastic style of the document, appreciating that it
comes from a soldier of Spanish schooling. Ample conclusions can be drawn as to the credit due the Cuban troops, and
the loss inflicted upon Escario's column during the march
towards Santiago.
(Diary of the operations of campaign of the forces of the
Manzanillo division from June 22 to July 3, I898.)
"FROM MANZANILLO TO.BAYAMO.
"In compliance with orders from  the lieutenant-general,
commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, in his cablegram
of the twentieth inst., ordering that the forces of the Manzanillo division should proceed to Santiago de Cuba, Colonel
Frederico Escario, for the time being commander-general of
said division, having made the necessary preparations for such
a long journey, having properly equipped the troops and
rationed them for six days, commenced the march on the 22d
at the head of a column composed of the first and second
battalions of the Isabel la Catolica regiment of infantry, No.
75; the first battalion of the Andalusia regiment, No. 52; the
Alcantara  Peninsular battalion, No. 3; the battalion of
Puerto Rico chasseurs, No. I9; the second section of the first
battery of the fifth mountain regiment; part of the eighth company of the first regiment of sappers; mounted guerillas from
Calicito, Bayamo and Manzanillo; five medical officers and
thirty men of the medical department destined for the Santiago hospitals, and the tenth company of the transportation
column in charge of thirty rations of hard-tack (galleta),
15,ooo extra rations loaded on 148 mules and 50 private beasts
of burden properly loaded.
i" This column, comprising a total of 3,752 men, left Manzanillo at five o'clock P. M. and at nightfall reached Palmas Altas,




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1I898.


79


where its commander gave orders to encamp for the night,
which, however, did not afford the soldiers the rest that was
intended, owing to a steady downpour so that only a few could
lie down.
" The twenty-third dawned more brightly than the preceding day; the camp xvas struck, the column reorganized, and
the difficult march recommenced at 5: 30. High weeds had
to be cut down to open a road on the left bank of the Yara
River, which route the commander chose in order to obviate
passing through towns which might be occupied by the enemy,
thereby complying with the order to avoid encounters, contained in the cablegram of the twentieth above referred to.
" The column passed through the Don Pedro plain and
arrived at dark at the ford of the Yara river, near the town of
the same name. Orders were given to encamp there. The
column had been harassed all day, especially while preparing
to occupy the camp, when the enemy opened a steady, lively
fire, which lasted ten minutes, killing one of our men and
wounding three. The fire was answered by the vanguard of
the column. The usual reconnoissance having been made by
the mounted force, which reported that the enemy had withdrawn, the column encamped and the night was spent without
further events and under more favorable conditions than the
previous night. A clear sky and a dense grove allowed our
soldiers comparative rest until daybreak of the twventy-fourth,
when the column, rising at the sound of reveille, after drinking coffee, was again formed and organized by six o'clock, when
it continued its march through Arroyo Pavon, Ana Lopez
and Sabana la Loma, sustaining slight skirmishes in which
the column had one man killed and one man wounded. The
column encamped on the banks of the Canabacoa River.
" On the twenty-fifth, at the usual hour, the camp of the
preceding day was struck and the column reorganized while
heavy showers were falling. The march was continued
through Las Peladas, Palmarito and across the Buey and Yao
Rivers. The camp was pitched at Babatuaba. The same as
yesterday, the columrn was harassed all day, always repulsing
and dispersing the enemy. One man was killed during the
skirmishes.
" The night passed quietly, and at 6: 30 A. M. of the twentysixth the march was resumed. The day was eventful and of
excellent moral and material results for the Spanish cause, as
will be seen from the fact that our forces entered the city of
Bayamo after a long march and pursued and scattered hostile detachments through the heights of San Francisco,
Peralejo, across the Maybay River, and at Almirante, where
the camp was pitched, not without some resistance from the




go


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


enemy, who was severely punished by the accurate fire of the
column, without causing us the least damage.
"; The diary of those days would not be complete without
an account of the entrance into Bayamo above referred to.
This manceuvre was undertaken, contrary to the orders to
avoid encounters contained in said cablegram of the twentieth
from the commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, for the
reason that the commander of the column thought it would
be discouraging to the soldiers to be. so near said city without
entering it and that their spirits would rise, on the other hand,
if they were allowed to do so and to show the enemy and the
ungrateful people of Bayamo that there were Spaniards left in
Cuba. For this.purpose there was strength and time enough
left that day. The commander therefore decided to explain
these reasons to the commander-in-chief and ordered that
Col. Manuel Ruiz, second commander of the column, should
occupy the city with the cavalry and 6oo infantry, the latter
to be divided into two columns and the cavalry to form the
third. Interpreting faithfully the wishes and orders of
Colonel Escario, Colonel Ruiz left the camp at Almirante at
3 o'clock P. M. after the troops had taken their first mess, and
divided his forces into the three groups mentioned, himself
taking command of one of the groups of infantry, placing
the other in charge of Lieut.-Col. Baldomero Barbon, the first
commander of the Alcantara battalion, and the mounted
force in charge of Luis Torrecilla, commander of the first battalion of the Isabel la Catolica regiment. These three
columns of attack, advancing steadily on three different points,
succeeded in approaching the city without disturbance or
interruption. Evidently the enemy was desirous of saving
his fire, for alarm signals were heard and groups were seen
running from one place to another of the precinct, leaving no
doubt that the enemy was near.
" The columns in the meantime continued to advance rapidly and in silence, deployed in perfect order of battle and
thus arrived at the banks of the Bayamo River, where hostile
forces tried to check them by a steady musketry fire from the
city. But this attempt became futile when the signal of
attack was given. At the sound of it, our soldiers, arms in
hand and without firing a single shot, crossed the river at a
run. With only one casualty and without further resistance,
they triumphantly entered the stronghold of the enemies of
Spain. In disorderly and precipitate flight that savage tribe
retreated. Our forces went to occupy the forts and principal
avenues, and in separate groups they reconnoitered the whole
city, gathering up at the military cornmandancia of the insurgents several packages of their records and correspondence.




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


HIT


The station and part of the telegraph line which the rebels
had established with Jiguani and Santa Rita were wrecked.
" No information concerning the enemy could be obtained
from the people of Bayamo, who, as usual, kept silent; a few
only opened their doors from sheer curiosity, plainly showing
in their faces the disgust they felt at the presence of Spanish
soldiers on that soil where it had been believed that they
would never again set foot.
"Our forces then returned to the camp at Almirante. The
result of that day's work was not known at first, but it was
afterwards learned that the enemy had 19 casualties, io killed
and 9 wounded. The night at Almirante passed without
further incidents, and thus ended the first part of what may
be called the glorious march from Manzanillo to Santiago.
" FROM BAVAMO TO BAIRE.
"At daybreak of the twenty-seventh, the camp at Almirante was struck and the column continued its march across
the plain of Guanabano, through Chapala and across the
Cautillo River, destroying on their way the enemy's telegraph
line from Bayamo to Santa Rita, where the camp was pitched
for the night, which was spent without any further incidents.
" At 6 A. M. of the twenty-eighth, the march was resumed,
the column proceeding to Baire via Cruz Alta, Jiguani River,
Upper Jiguani, Piedra de Oro, Granizo, Cruz del Yarey and
Salada. The enemny, in greater number than on preceding days
and in control of the heights which overlook the ford of the Jiguani River, tried to prevent our forces from crossing, but their
intention was foiled by timely flank attacks ordered by the
commander of the column, protected by accurate artillery
fire. After the river had been forded, the march was continued without interruption to Cruz del Yarey, where the rebels
appeared again, offering less resistance, and we defeated them
once more. They seemed inclined, however, to continue to
impede the march, which was apparent upon the arrival of our
column at the ruins of what was formerly the town of Baire.
They were waiting there, and as soon as they espied the
column they opened a galling musket fire, which was silenced
by the rapid advance of our vanguard, who compelled them to
retreat in shameful and precipitate flight. In this encounter,
Col. Manuel Ruiz, second commander of the column, was
wounded and his horse killed under him; four soldiers were
killed and five wounded. The column encamped and spent
the night at Baire.
" The high weeds wvhich during almost all those days completely covered the soldiers and hampered their progress,




82


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


causing at the same time a suffocating heat, which made it
almost impossible to breathe, and cutting off the road, which
had to be opened by dint of hard work, rendered the march
extremely laborious and often made it necessary to proceed
in single file. The sickness caused by the inclement weather
and the hard work of these operations; the ever increasing
convoy of stretchers; the consideration that one-half of the
journey had been accomplished; and the further very important consideration that the column had arrived at a place
where it would be easy to throw the enemy off the track, as
they would not know what direction our forces might take
(there being three roads leading from here to Santiago); all
these were reasons which the commander of the column took
into consideration when he decided to suspend the march and
rest during the day of the twenty-ninth. It was so ordered
owing to fatigue, but the enemy kept harassing us and we had
three more wounded.
" LA MANTONIA.
"At daybreak of the thirtieth, the camp at Baire was
struck and the column proceeded to Palma Soriana, where the
wounded and dead were left, and continued its march via Ratonera, Doncella Creek and the Contramaestre River to La
Mantonia, where the camp was pitched and the night spent.
" Before the column was deployed on the road to Ratonera,
the enemy from intrenched positions opened fire, which was
answered and silenced by the first forces leaving the camp.
The commander of the column foresawv that such an attack
would be repeated, and in order to obviate the casualties, thus
further complying with the or-der of the aforesaid cablegram
from the commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, he
changed the route, and our forces, thus eluding the ambuscades, arrived at the slopes of the Doncella Creek, the ford of
which was reached by a narrow pass and difficult ravine. The
rebels occupied positions here. Our vanguard brought them
out without answering their fire. When the column had
been reconcentrated after fording the Doncella, they prepared
to ford the Contramaestre River, where the enemy was awaiting us, which fact they had announced themselves by written
clhallenges and threats which they had left along the road.
Lieut.-Col. Baldomero Barbon of the Alcantara battalion, who
since Colonel Ruiz was wounded had been in command of onehalf of the vanguard brigade, deployed his forces in perfect
order of battle and advanced resolutely. Commanding. positions overlooked the clear and unobstructed road which the
columnn had to follow, after coming out of the mountains




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


83


through the narrow valley of the Contramaestre, and moreover they had to scale the steep and tortuous ascent of the
opposite bank. Without other shelter than the high weeds,
which, as usual, impeded the march, without other trenches
than their own hearts, these brave soldiers with their commander at their head, advanced calmly and in perfect order, accepting the challenge which had been addressed to them. The
enemy had told the truth. There they were in large numbers
occupying those favorable positions which would have been
impregnable if they had been held by any one wvho knew how
to defend them. But not expecting that we would accept the
challenge, they allowed themselves to be surprised by a lively
musket fire and effective artillery discharges, which demoralized and dispersed them, and the rapid advance of our forces
rushing upon them arms in hand did not give them a chance
to rally. The enemy, being unable to do much firing, retreated
with little resistance and having suffered a number of casualties
left the field and their positions to those who, understanding
the sacred duty imposed upon honor, had known how to pick
up the glove that had been thrown to them. Regardless of
danger and without measuring their strength they had marched
on unflinchingly in search of the death with which they had
been threatened. Having crossed the Contramaestre and
passed through extensive pastures, the column arrived at a
farm (finca) known as La Mantonia, where a number of huts
of all sizes and many recent tracks indicated the proximity of a large hostile force. And indeed, soon after the first
forces of the vanguard had entered that large encampment,
the enemy tried to check our advance by a galling fire from
the slope of a mountain where they were intrenched, controlling a line of 1,200 meters. Through this it was necessary
for us to pass unprotected, as the high weeds made any deployment of the column and advance of cavalry impossible.
By order of Lieutenant-Colonel Barbon, the two companies
of the vanguard of the Alcantara battalion in command of
Francisco Gonzalez, wvho himself rendered an exact account of
the hostile position, advanced steadily and without answering
the fire, following the only passable trail, and engaged the hostile position on the left flank, compelling the enemy to abandon the trenches, leaving us a great deal of ammunition, mostly
of the Remington type.
" In the fierce battles of that day Captain Jenaro Ramiro, of
the Alcantara battalion, and nine privates were wounded and
five killed.
" AGUACATE.
"At daybreak of July i the column resumed the march and




84


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


reached the ford of the Guarinao river, after passing through
Las Lajas, where the enemy held the advantageous positions
from which our vanguard routed them without much resistance.
After crossing the Guarinao, small detachments sent out surprised two ambuscades; the column sustained insignificant
skirmishes with outposts and small reconnoitering parties,
which indicated that large hostile forces were not far off. Subsequent events showed that this theory was correct. When the
column arrived at a rugged place dominated by steep heights
forming an amphitheatre, they discovered in its center a camp
of recent construction, sufficiently large to accommodate 2,000
men. A rapid glance convinced us that the site was specially
adapted for an ambuscade. Colonel Escario, realizing this and
taking precautions accordingly, gave orders for the column to
proceed in its advance and for the artillery to take positions.
The enemy did not wait to be surprised, but opened fire at
once from Aguacate Hill, the station of our heliograph, and
adjoining hills to the right and left in an extensive intrenched
line. Our soldiers manoeuvred as though on drill, and advancing steadily two-thirds of the column entered the battle,
and that hail of lead which strewed death in its path was not
sufficient to make them retreat or even to check them. Calmly,
with fearless heroism, they advanced, protected by the frequent and sure fire of the artillery and skillfully guided by
their chiefs and by the cry " Long live Spain! " and, charging with bayonets, they simultaneously took these heights
which were so difficult and dangerous to scale, driving the enemy into precipitate retreat, so that they could not gather up
their dead and wounded. Seventeen dead were left on the
field, also ammunition of various modern types. There were
moments during that battle when the tenacity of the enemy
and the order with which they fought gave the impression
that they might belong to our own column. This report spread
rapidly and reached Colonel Escario's ears. Fearing that
this might really be the case, he gave orders to suspend the
fire and tried to make himself known by bugle signals. But
this precaution was useless, and the commander becoming
convinced that he was fighting rebel forces, ordered the attack
to be renewed and the hostile positions to be taken. To do
the enemy justice it must be stated that they defended those
well-chosen positions with persistency and in good order, and
that they rose to unusual heights tiat day, making this the
fiercest battle which we sustained on the march from Manzanillo to Santiago and one of the most remarkable ones of
the present campaign. Our casualties consisted of seven dead,
and one lieutenant and forty-two privates wounded. Large
pI)ols of blood on the battle-field showed the severe chastise



CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-i898.


ment which the enemy had suffered at our hands. When the
column had been reorganized, the march was continued to
Arroyo Blanco, where the night was spent.
"FROM ARROYO BLANCO TO SANTIAGO.
"From Arroyo Blanco, where the column had encamped
during the night, it proceeded to Palma Soriano, fighting the
enemy all along the road, on both sides of which the latter
occupied good positions and endeavored to detain the column
at any price. Engaging the enemy in front and on the flank,
a passage was forced and the column reached Palma Soriano
at 3 o'clock P. M. The battle of that day caused us four dead
and six wounded.
" From Palma Soriano, the commander of the column, by
heliogram sent to San Luis, announced his arrival to the
commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps at Santiago, and
in reply he was notified that large United States forces had
landed and were surrounding a part of the city, and that it
was, therefore, of urgent necessity to reinforce the place, the
defenders of which were few, and to force the march as m uch,
as possible. Desirous of complying with this order, Colonel
Escario, who realized that the soldiers must be prepared to
accomplish the rest of the journey wvith the greatest speed
possible, had the following order of the column, dated at
Palma Soriano, July 2, I898, read to the companies:'Soldiers:-We left Manzanillo because the enemy was
threatening Santiago de Cuba. We must hasten to the assist
ance of our comrades; our honor, which is the honor of our
fathers, calls us there,
'I, who am proud of having been able to be with you in
these days when our country requires of us twofold energy
and courage, address these few words to you in order to tell
ydu that I am highly pleased with your behavior and to point
out to you the necessity of making a supreme effort to save
the honor of our beloved country, as we have done so far.
'Then say with me, Long live Spain! and let us go in
search of these who are desirous of finding out what each one
of you is worth. The victory is ours.
'Your Colonel,
' ESCARIO.'
"After a plentiful and nourishing meal the troops were
ordered to rest. At 2 o'clock in the night the reveille was
sounded, and the column, organizing immediately, resumed
it.. march. which the soldiers tried to hasten as much as possible, with no other stimulus than that imposed by duty, of




86


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


which they were constantly reminded by the cannonades that
could be heard in the distance, in the direction of Santiago.
With slight skirmishes, and without eating or resting, these
brave soldiers reached the pass of Bayamo, where they had
the first view of the city of Santiago. Here it was learned
that on the same day our fleet, forcing the entrance of the
channel which was blockaded by the American ships, had
gone out in search of death, which is the fate reserved for
heroes.
" It was now between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning of the third, and when Colonel Escario noted the intense
cannonade in the direction of the city, he organized a flying
column which was to march as fast as possible, leaving the
rest of the column with the train, in command of Col. Ruiz
Ranoy, to follow at once.
"The flying column was formed of the first battalion of the
Isabel la Catolica Regiment in command of Commander Torrecilla, with thirty of the strongest men of each company, the
whole cavalry and two artillery pieces. The command of this
column was placed in charge of Lieut-Col. Baldomero Barbon
of the Alcantara battalion.
"This column advanced towards Puerto Bayamo, from
which point Colonel Escario proceeded to the city with a section of cavalry, arriving there at 3 o'clock P. M. The rest of
the flying column reached Santiago between 4 and 4:30, and
the nucleus of the column with the train between 9 and io
o'clock P. M.
" Those worthy chiefs, officers and long-suffering soldiers,
that handful of brave men, constantly defeating the enemy
who persistently tried to check them, rising superior to the
inclement weather, to sickness and fatigue, had arrived at the
post of honor after a supreme effort and after victoriously
crossing the Alps of Cuba. It is not to be wondered at that
when they came in sight of the city, they took off their hats
and with tears in their eyes opened their lips in a unanimous
shout of 'Long live Spain!' which rose spontaneously from
those noble hearts.
"The casualties during the whole march were I colonel, 2
officers and 68 privates wounded and 27 killed. 28,670 Mauser
cartridges had been used and 38 rounds of artillery fired.
"At 1o o'clock the last rear guard entered the city of Santiago de Cuba, and the battalions at once repaired to the different trenches assigned to them by the chief of staff, and from
that time on they formed part of the forces defending the
city.
Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898."




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


On the tenth of July we were again asked to leave our positions to allow them to be occupied by part of General
Lawton's division, and we accordingly pushed our forces to
San Pedrito, San Pedro and Gascon.
At Dos Caminos and upon the Jesus Maria Hill, Spanish
cavalry and infantry held intrenched positions. General
Garcia ordered a flank movement down from the left of the
Jesus Maria intrenchments. The movement caused considerable panic among the enemy, who immediately abandoned
both positions and retreated to the city, fearing to be isolated.
Two infantry battalions with two twelve-pound Hotchkiss
guns under Col. Carlos Garcia occupied the Jesus Maria Hill
and a cavalry detachment was sent to Dos Caminos. On
June 12 our forces were again compelled to abandon their
positions at San Pedrito and San Pedro to leave them ready
and very well intrenched, too, for the American forces.
General Garcia transferred his headquarters to. Casa Azul
(Gascon). At every new position that the Cubans would
occupy, new trenches had to be dug, only to give them up to
the Americans a few days later; it so happened that all the
trenches made from La Caridad along the crests of the hills
to the right, as far as Caimanes, wvere made by our men; and
very painfully at that, for the hard earth had to be dug with
sharpened sticks, as they had no shovels. As I was directing
the construction of a line of trenches, an officer of the transit
survey commission came along and was so shocked at seeing
my men working with such tools that he offered to send me
promptly next day picks and shovels. I am yet waiting for
them. On the thirteenth General Garcia received a note
from Major-General Miles, who had arrived and wished to see
and confer with him. A most cordial meeting was that of the
commanders of the American and Cuban armies, and the
most exquisite courtesy and consideration was shown by the
former to the latter, who esteemed those attentions highly.
Purposely I have not said a word in this chapter about the
numberless times the flags of truce appeared on the tops of
trenches and forts.
A dispatch wvas received at headquarters in which General
Garcia wvas informed of the proposed sally of a Spanish




88


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


column from Mayari to Holguin. Col. Luis Marti was ordered
to march immediately with his regiment and some forces of
Colonel Enamorado's Tunas brigade. Colonel Marti, making
forced marches, arrived in time to rout and stampede the
enemy, winning one of the last battles of the war and certainly
the luckiest and most brilliant of all. He captured two field
pieces, a rapid-fire gun and all the convoy of ammunition that
the Spanish commander in his evacuation of Mayari was taking
to Holguin. Great slaughter was inflicted on the enemy in
this engagement. Had it not been for the opportune marching of Colonel Marti's column from the Gascon heights near
Santiago to Mayari, the enemy wvould not perhaps have suffered as severely as it did. The fleeing enemy was again
attacked and defeated by Colonels M. Rodriguez and F. Salazar before entering Holguin.
On the fourteenth, the news of the capitulation of Santiago
spread about the camps and was greeted with shouts of joy.
Two days later, General Garcia visited the American headquarters, where he learned of the terms accepted by General
Toral. We were absolutely excluded from all participation in
the surrender of the city. General Garcia's interview with
General Shafter was short and of imposing character. General Garcia did not go back to his camp of Casa Azul after
the embarrassing and painful conference he had held with the
American  general.  His grief and disappointment were
such that he remained that night at Cuabitas, fearing we all
should detect in him his great chagrin.
The fact, coming suddenly, utterly stunned him fora time,
and the most sinister and cruel apprehensions for the future
overpowered him. How xvas he to reveal to his army the
cruel and awful truth? Howv was he to tell his men that our
allies of yesterday with whom we had so willingly and nobly
cooperated to overthrow the enemy, not needing our services
further, had pushed us aside with contempt and away from
the laurels and glory of a victory that was common to both
armies, the Cuban and the American?
It is impossible to describe the first effect of the intelligence
upon our troops.  The rumors were received with general
incredulity. Official confirmation of Shafter's order followed,




CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.


89


and disbelief gave place to excitement. Speculation as to
what General Garcia would do covered a wide range.
In any case, never has an event come at a more critical
moment. It caused such agitation that only General Garcia's
extraordinary diplomacy and the great influence he exerted
over his troops dominated the dangerous situation.  The
lofty spirit that inspired his famous letter to General Shafter
reveals his genius. The American people acknowvledged General Shafter's mistake some months later, showing marks of
esteem and admiration for the commander of the Cubans, wvho
had been so unjustly wronged.
General Garcia left the vicinity of Santiago for the interior
on the twentieth of July, with all the forces that had assisted
in the surrender of the city, leaving near the city only General
Cebreco with a small force, in order to facilitate public intercourse between the inhabitants of the city and those that resided in the country. General Garcia immediately gave orders
to these forces to continue the attack on the towns and cities
held by the Spaniards. A very interesting and important communication from General S. Rios was received onl the twentysixth of July, in which this general asked the commander of
the department what he was to answer the Spanish forces of
Manzanillo, who asked General Garcia's permission to leave the
city and cross the country to Holgui i, unmolested. General
Garcia denied the petition, point blank. As the attacks on
Holguin were increasing every day, the Spanish General
Luque resolved to abandon the port of Gibara and concentrated all the forces of his division at Holguin. General Garcia
occupied the city immediately and the good behavior of the
Cuban troops there can be testified to by all the Spanish
inhabitants, wvho were in a great majority, and by Commander
WVashburn Maynard, U. S. N., of the gunboat Nashville, one of
the most able and distinguished officers of the American fleet.
On the sixteenth of August, General Luque attempted to
capture Gibara but was compelled to desist from such an
insane scheme, after a serious engagement with Generals
Capote and Feria, at Auras, that lasted five hours. In the
event of an attack on the city, General Garcia placed two
brigades as a reserve, holding the mountain passes of




9o


THE. AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Embarcadero and Cupercillo, under Colonels M. Rodriguez
and C. Garcia and in cooperation with Captain Maynard.
Thus the Nashville could shell the enemy in combination
with our attack on the advancing Spaniards.
On the seventeenth the Spanish gun-boat Infanta Ysabel,
flying a flag of truce, entered the port with orders from
Captain-General Blanco announcing a suspension of hostilities. A commission composed of three officers-American,
Cuban and Spanish-was sent to General Luque with the
orders of General Blanco.
On the eighteenth of August, an American- transport
arrived with the official news that the Protocol of Peace had
been signed by President McKinley on the twelfth of August.
General Garcia gave orders to all our forces to suspend hostilities.
This chapter is an exact narration of the events that
occurred from the time when the rumorsfo an American-Spanish war were received at General Garcia's headquarters, up to
the date when, officially, it was learned that the war between
Spain and the United States had ended.
HABANA, April 29th, 1899.


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CHAPTER III.


THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.
BY
[ABUT. GEO. F. W. HOLMAN, U. S. N.
T HE destruction of the Maine in the harbor of Havana,
Cuba, on February i5, I898, is an event occupying a
middle place between the long series of incidents connected with the struggles of the Cubans for release from the
galling rule of Spain and the beginning of the actual war in
which, as a result of the Cuban struggles, the United States
finally became involved. Spain strenuously disavowed having caused, either officially or ultra-officially, the annihilation
of this powerful battleship, and indeed, claimed, through its
Court of Inquiry investigating the circumstances, that the
Maine was destroyed by causes entirely internal, namely, the
accidental explosion of one or more of her magazines. The
United States, on the other hand, after a most thorough investigation of twenty-three days of patient labor by a Court of
Inquiry composed of some of the most scientific men of the
Navy, presided over by Captain Sampson, who soon after became the Admiral of glorious victories in the East, reached the
conclusion that the loss of the battleship was due, not to internal causes, but to the springing of a mine planted in close
proximity to the moorings which had been assigned her, in
the harbor, by the Spanish officials. This finding of the
Court of Inquiry of the United States was most conclusively
substantiated by the condition of the wreck above and below
water, which gave evidence that, although one or more magazines had exploded, throwing upward and outward heavy
masses of the decks and sides of the ship, the primary source
of damage originated from a mine exploded beneath the vessel's bottom, as manifested by the principal fact that the keel




92


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


had been thrown upward in an inverted V shape and broken,
in two with the break remaining about thirty feet above its
normal position; by the further principal fact that the outside bottom plating was bent inward from outward in a reversed V shape; by the still further principal fact that the
outer shell of the ship, on the port forward side, had been
thrown upward to a point about thirty-four feet above its
normal position; and by many other facts impossible to have
been produced save by a submarine mine. A full report of
the Court of Inquiry was transmitted to our Congress by the
President of the United States in his Message of March 28,
1898.
While the people of the United States were intensely inflamed by the outrage, and desired war at once, believing
with the greater part of the world, that the disaster was attributable to an outside source and not to internal accident,
they nevertheless followed the counsels of their leaders and patiently awaited the result of the cool investigation ordered by
them; and when, after over two months of waiting, war was
finally declared, the nation was content to accept the judgmrent of the President, which based the war on broad humanitarian principles for the liberation of an oppressed people,
and cited the Mainze disaster as merely an incident, one among
many, that finally led to the inevitable struggle between the
United States and Spain.
To go back a little, the sympathies of the people of the
United States, always in favor of the Cubans as against
Spain, had become pronounced to such an extent in the debates in our Congress and in the articles of the press, that
between the public of the United States and that of Spain
a great animosity and a strong desire for immediate hostilities developed, which required tactful exertions on the part
of the diplomatic corps of both countries to keep in repression. Among other acts of conciliation adopted by our
government was the discontinuance, with regard to Cuba,
of the practice in vogue among all civilized nations from
times of long ago-that of sending men-of-war on amicable
visits to the ports of foreign nations. Realizing the possibility that the appearance of one of our war vessels in a Cuban




THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.


93


port during the period of strained relations between the
United States and Spain might be regarded by the ignorant
class of the latter country as a menace, and might consequently occasion a pretext for an outbreak of the unruly mob,
our government refrained from despatching our ships of war to
Cuban waters for any purpose whatever; but a time arrived
when it was believed to be advisable to act otherwise in this
respect.
In January, 1 898, the relations between the Spaniards under
arms and the -Spaniards not enrolled as combatants, many on
both sides being classed, on the one hand, as adherents of the
aggressive&General Weyler, and, on the other, as those of the
more pacific General Blanco, together with the further confusion caused by the acts of the Cubans themselves represented
by diverse parties and interests, led to rioting in the City of
Havana, which, never becoming serious, nevertheless threatened the safety and property of all people within its limits.
For the protection of American citizens and their interests it
became obligatory on our government to display our flag in
the troubled region. Our State Department acted through
correspondence with the State Department of Spain in this
direction with a careful regard for the peculiarities of the situation. The result of the diplomatic correspondence between
the two governments was that the best interests of both
countries would be observed by sending a man-of-war of
the United States to Havana on-a visit of a thoroughly amicable nature. The Spanish, in turn, intimated their intention
of returning the courtesy by sending one of their battleships
on a similiar visit to New York. The ship chosen by the
United States for this interchange of visits was the battleship Maine. The Spaniards, on their part, selected the armored cruiser Vizcaya.
The Maine, built at the New York Navy Yard, was a secondclass battleship, which went into commission September 17,
1895; she was a powerful vessel, as shown by the following details of structure, armament, and personnel:-Extreme length,
324 feet; beam, 57 feet; draught, 22 feet I inch; displacement,
6,65o tons; horse power, 9,290; speed, 17.45 knots; she was
subdivided into 214 water-tight compartments. Her armor




94


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


protection was a heavy armored belt of i80 feet on each side,
joined by heavy steel transverse bulkheads forward and aft, and
roofed by a strong protective deck. Forward and abaft the
armored portion of the ship, cellulose protection was relied
Upon1. Two turrets, in barbette, of heavy steel, one forward
and one ar, arranged in the echelon system, carried, each, two
io-inch breech-loading rifled guns. Six 6-inch breech-loading
rifles, seven 6-pounder and eight i-pounder rapid firing rifles
completed her gun battery. A powerful ram and four torpedo
tubes were an additional instalment to her powers, aggressive
and defensive. She was completely fitted with all the modern
appliances for pumping, lighting, interior and exterior signalling, internal communication, ventilating, and all other requirements necessary to the efficiency of a battleship. Her
crew numbered 354 all told, 26 of whom were officers. The
officers of the Mazine at the time of the disaster were:
Captain Charles D. Sigsbee; Executive Officer, Lieutenint-Commander Richard Wainwright; Navigator, Lieutenant George F. WV. Holman; Lieutenants, John Hood, Carl W.
Jungen, George P. Blow, John J. Blandin, and Friend W. Jenkins; Naval Cadets, Jonas H. Holden, Wat T. Cluverius, Jr.,
Amnon Bronson, Jr., and David F. Boyd, Jr.; Surgeon, Lucien G. Heneberger; Paymaster, Charles M. Ray; Chief
Engineer, Charles P. Howell; Passed Assistant Engineer,
Frederic C. Bowers; Assistant Engineers, John R. Morris
and Darwin R. Merritt; Naval Cadets (engineer division), Pope
Washington and Arthur Crenshaw; Chaplain, John P. Chidwvick; First Lieutenant of Marines, Albertus W. Catlin;
Boatswain, Francis E. Larkin; Gunner, Joseph Hill; Carpenter, George Helms; Pay-Clerk, Brent McCarthy.
The Maine, from the date of her commissioning, proved
herself an exceptionally efficient ship, in calm and in storm,
and met with but few of the mishaps incident to such complicated structures as are battleships. She did active and almost continuous cruising along the eastern coast of the
United States from between the extreme limits of Bar Harbor, Maine, in the north, to Newv Orleans, Louisiana, in the
south; at first, under the command of Captain A. S. Crowninshield, later Chief of the Bureau of Navigation; afterwards




t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...




.i
I.I




THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.


95


under the command of Captain Sigsbee. She participated in
all the drills of the North Atlantic Squadron; acted successfully, under Captain Sigsbee, as the senior officer's ship of the
squadron detailed by the Navy Department for the repression
of filibustering operations in the Cuban War with Spain
and visited 'many of our cities on occasions of public moment.
On Monday night, January 24, i898, the Maine, then with
the North Atlantic Squadron in the roads of Dry Tortugas,
Florida, received orders to proceed to Havana. She immediately got under way and arrived at her destination the following morning, where she was boarded by the Spanish
government pilot and was by him conducted to the mooring
buoy where she subsequently met her fate. Captain Sigsbee's orders from our government were simply to make a
friendly visit, all the details of his action in carrying out these
orders being left to his discretion. This officer acted with
marked tact and judgment under trying circumstances. The
customary gun salutes were exchanged, and the usual interchange of official visits was strictly carried out; but beyond
this, the visit of the Maine as a friendly tentative proved a
failure. Captain Sigsbee emphasized the fact that he apce
peared on a friendly mission and gave all opportunities consistent with dignity for the establishment of social relations.
YWhile the representatives of all factions were punctiliously
polite, the Spaniards of the higher classes in general were
cold and non-responsive. The autonomists were apparently
suspicious. The Spaniards of the lower classes frequently
manifested a disposition to show their dislike openly, and
none but the Cubans gave a hearty welcome.
No open hostility was shown by any one, but it was deemed
prudent to take all measures possible for the guard and safety
of the ship consistent with her presence in the port of a
friendly nation. Extra sentries were kept posted and vigilant lookout was maintained night and day, but nothing of
an unusual or threatening nature was observed at any time.
At 9:40 P. M., on the i'th of February, i898, nearly all
the officers and crew not on duty having retired for the night,
a heavy explosion, unmistakably that of a submarine mine,
togk place under the forward part of the ship in the neigh



96


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


borhood of the forward magazines. This explosion wvas followed by another one, almost simultaneous, evidently that of
one or more of the magazines ignited by the submarine mine.
The forward part of the ship was at once reduced to a mass
of wreckage, the after part remaining comparatively unharmed. The ship sank at once to the bottom in six fathoms of water, the poop deck being nearly awash, until later,
when the vessel sank deep in the mud.
The scene was one impossible to depict; eye witnesses only,
of the terrible calamity, could realize the horror of the situation. The placid waters of the harbor were suddenly lashed
into foam in the neighborhood of the doomed ship; a heavy
column of flame and smoke, dotted with innumerable fragments
of the once mighty vessel, shot upward into the calm obscurity
of the night; the waters around were sprinkled with the forms
of men-some, through almost a miraculous escape, unin-.
jured; others wounded; others dead, but apparently intact in
person; others torn into fragments. In the bosom of the ship,
as afterwards ascertained by the divers, hundreds of men lay
drowned in their hammocks in such a tangle that even attempt at escape had evidently been impossible; others, to
whom a brief interval of time, limited by minutes, had been
given for an effort to reach the upper decks, were caught by
the rushing waters and floating debris sweeping aft, in conmpartments and in places remote from the hatches which they
were striving to reach as the only exit from the death trap below. Among the latter were two officers, Lieutenant Friend
W. Jenkins and Assistant Engineer Darwin R. Merritt.
The loss of mnen all told, counting those who were immediately killed and those who subsequently died of their wounds,
was 266, and the saved were 88.
The survivors exerted their utmost efforts in the rescue of
the wounded, and in the hopeless attempt to save the ship.
Captain Sigsbee directed the operations with a cool bravery
paralleled by few episodes in the world's history, ably seconded
by his executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwrightlater the hero of the Gloucester at the naval battle off Santiago,
and earnestly aided by all the others. Fire was raging in the
upheaved part of the wreck forward; ammunition stored in




THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.


97


emergency magazines in different parts of the superstructure
of the ship was exploding at frequent intervals. Only two
boats were left available for the work of rescue. Under Captain Sigsbee's direction, some officers wvere sent to the neighborhood of the fire to suppress it if possible; other officers
and men were detailed to the boats with orders to rescue the
men in the water. All proceedings were initiated and executed
with the coolness attending an ordinary daily drill, manifesting a state of discipline of which the Navy and the nation may
be forever proud.
It was believed by many on board, if not by all, that the explosion was the beginning of an attack by the Spaniards. In
pursuance of this belief, orders wvere- given to procure arms,
which, however, were not obtainable, the ship having sunk so
quickly that all armories and racks for arms were at once submerged. The survivors found themselves a defenseless group
gathered together on the poop, the only remaining dry and
intact part of the ship at the time-some clad in the uniformn
of the.day; others partly robed; still others only in their night
clothing. To whomever the dastardly deed was attributable,
it soon became evident that a continuance of the attack was
not contemplated, but that all in the vicinity were lending
their aid to the rescue of the few who were left.
The noise of the explosion had aroused not only the harbor,
but the entire city, and even the outlying suburbs. In the immediate neighborhood of the Maine was the Spanish cruiser
Alfonso XII. and the Ward Line steamer City of UVashington. The greatest activity was displayed by these vessels in
sending boats to the scene of the disaster, and notable credit
is due to the officers and crew of the City of WVashington for
bravery evinced on their part. Certain small row-boats plying
a passenger trade in the harbor also contributed to the work
of rescue. In a short time all of the men afloat were picked
up out of the water and taken-some to the Alfonso XII.,
others to the City of Washington, and others to the hospitals
on shore, receiving everywhere proper attention from the surgeons. Captain Sigsbee, remaining on board the wreck, dispatched officers in all possible directions to make a muster of
the saved, and not until this had been done, and it had long




98


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


since become evident that no more could be accomplished for
his ship and that no further advantage was to be gained by
exposing his own life and the lives of those whom he retained
on board as assistants, did he finally give the order to abandon the wreck. He himself was the last to leave, stepping
from the now all but submerged poop deck into his gig with
the deliberate calm dignity befitting a captain who, with his
ship sunk under him, was nevertheless not vanquished in
spirit.
Captain Sigsbee, with his officers, went on board the Ward
Line steamer City of Waskington for the night. The following day, all of the wounded who were able to travel, and all of
the officers and men whom it was not necessary to retain in
Havana in the interests of the Maine, were sent by steamer to
Key West, Florida. Captain Sigsbee, with a small staff of
officers retained to assist him, occupied quarters at hotels in
the city. The badly wounded were transferred from the Alfouzso XII. and the City of Washington to hospitals on shore.
Work was at once begun in various lines: that of recovering
the bodies of the dead; of making preliminary investigations
as to the cause of the disaster; and of recovering from the
wreck such articles of the equipment of the ship as were still
above the water line or accessible to divers. This property
was put on board the U. S. Despatch Steamer Fern and the
U. S. Light House Tender Mangrove, which arrived in port
from Key West the day following the explosion in answer to
a request by cable from Captain Sigsbee. The Spanish officials expressed profound sympathy for the occurrence, and
disclaimed any govermental knowledge of its cause. On the
afternoon of February I7, impressive funeral services at the
municipal palace were held over nineteen bodies, the first recovered, which, after the services in the palace, were taken to
the Colon Cemetery escorted by one of the most imposing
processions, civic, naval, and military, that had been witnessed
in Havana for a long period of years. Every effort was made
by the Spaniards to express sympathy on a magnificent scale.
On the 21st of February, a Court of Inquiry, ordered by
Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard, U. S. Navy, Commanderin-Chief of the United States force on the North Atlantic Sta



0
I




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X 




THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.


99


tion, convened on board the U. S. Light House Tender Mangrove in the harbor of Havana. The Court was composed of
Captain William T. Sampson, President; Captain French E.
Chadwick and Lieutenant-Commander William P. Potter-,
MIlembers; and Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, Judge
Advocate. The Court made a most patient, thorough and
searching investigation into all matters pertaining to the destruction of the Maine, examining the wreck in detail, above
and below the water line, with the assistance of expert Naval
Constructors and divers, and examining all witnesses whose
testimony promised to throw light, in the faintest degree, on
the subject. Eighteen days of this investigation were held
on board the U. S. Light House Tender Mangrove in the
Harbor of Havana, and five days on board the U. S. Battleship Iozwa off Key West, Florida.
The primary object of a naval court of inquiry, in the case
of damage to naval property, is to determine whether or not
blame for this damage should attach to any officer in whose
charge this property may be. The finding of the Court in
the case of the Maine is of historic interest. The official
report reads as follows:
"After full and mature consideration of all the testimony
before it, the Court finds as follows:
" i. That the United States Battleship Maine arrived in the
harbor of Havana, Cuba, on the 25th day of January, 1898,
and was taken to buoy No. 4, in from 51 to 6 fathoms of
water, by the regular Government pilot.
"The United States consul-general at Havana had notified
the authorities at that place, the previous evening, of the
intended arrival of the Maine.
" 2. The state of discipline on board the Maine was excellent, and all orders and regulations in regard to the care and
safety of the ship were strictly carried out.
"All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed
instructions, and proper care was taken whenever ammunition
was handled.
" Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shell
rooms which was not permitted to be stowed there.




Too


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH AWAR.


" The magazines and shell rooms were always locked after
having been opened, and after the destruction of the Maine
the keys were found in their proper place in the captain's
cabin, everything having been reported secure that evening
at 8 p. m.
" The temperatures of the magazines and shell rooms were
taken daily and reported.  The only magazine which had
an undue amount of heat was the after io-inch magazine,
and that did not explode at the time the Maine was destroyed.
" The torpedo war heads were all stowed in the after part of
the ship, under the ward room, and neither caused nor participated in the destruction of the Maine.
"The dry gun-cotton primers and detonators were stowed
in the cabin aft, and remote from the scene of the explosion.
" Waste was carefully looked after on board the Mazine to
obviate danger. Special orders in regard to this had been
given by the commanding officer.
" Varnishes, driers, alcohol and other combustibles of this
nature were stowed on or above the main deck and could not
have had anything to do with the destruction of the Maine.
"The medical stores were stowed aft, under the ward room,
and remote from the scene of the explosion.
" No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in
any of the other storerooms.
" The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers
adjacent to the forward magazines and shell rooms, four were
empty, namely: B3, B4, B5, B6. Ai5 had been in use that
day, and Ai6 was full of New River coal. This coal had
been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The
bunker in which it was stowed was accessible on three sides
at all times, and on the fourth side at this timne, on account of
bunkers B4 and B6 being empty.   This bunker, Ai6, had
been inspected that day by the engineer officer on duty.
" The fire alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and
there had never been a case of spontaneous combustion of
coal on board the Maine.
" The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of
the disaster, but for auxiliary purposes only, with a compara



THE DESTRUCTION OF T'HE MAINE.


101


tively low pressure of steam, and being tended by a reliable
watch.
" These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the
ship. The four forward boilers have since been found by the
divers, and are in a fair condition.
" On the night of the destruction of the Maine, everything
had been reported secure for the night at 8 p. m. by reliable
persons, through the proper authorities, to the commanding
officer. At the time the Maine was destroyed the ship was
quiet, and, therefore, least liable to accident caused by
movements from those on board.
EXPLOSIONS.
"3. The destruction of the Maine occurred at 9:40 p. m.
on the i5th day of February, i898, in the harbor of Havana,
Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to
which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were two
explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very
short but distinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the
time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in
the nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second explosion was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume.
This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused
by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the Maine.
CONDITION OF THE WRECK.
" 4. The evidence bearing upon this, being principally obtained from divers, did not enable the Court to form a
definite conclusion as to the condition of the wvreck, although
it was established that the after part of the ship was practically intact, and sank in that condition a very few minutes
after the destruction of the forward part.
"The following facts in regard to the forward part of the
ship are, however, established by the testimony:
" A portion of the port side of the protective deck, which
extends from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown
up, aft, and over to port. The main deck, from about frame
30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and slightly over to




102


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR,


starboard, folding the forward part of the middle superstructure over and on top of the after part.
"This was, in the opinion of the Court, caused by the
partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines
of the Maine.
" 5. At frame 17, the outer shell of the ship, from a point
2II feet from the middle line of the ship, and 6 feet above the
keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to
be now about 4 feet above the surface of the water, therefore
about 34 feet above where it should be had the ship sunk uninjured.
" The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V shape
(A), the after wing of which, about i5 feet broad and 32 feet
in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon
itself against the continuation of the same plating, extending
forward.
" At frame I8 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat
keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the
outside bottom plating. This break is about 6 feet above the
surface of the water, and about 30 feet above its normal
position.
" In the opinion of the Court this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the
bottom of the ship at about frame I8 and somewhat on the
port side of the ship.
"i 6. The Court finds that the loss of the Maine on the occasion named was not in any respect due to fault or negligence
on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of
said vessel.
" 7. In the opinion of the Court the Maine was destroyed
by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the
partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines.
"8. The Court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing
the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any
person or persons."
*~~~~~~~~                ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~, t %




I




.............i/(  




CHAPTER IV.


THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.
BY
LIEUT. C. G. CALKINS, U. S. N.
Nl    OT long ago the Philippine Archipelago was nothing
but a geographical expression to most of us. Now it
threatens to become an interminable problem in our
political future and appeals to the interest of millions of eager
Americans. It may be worth while to discuss the historic
event which brought about this transformation. Even personal impressions and incidental corrections may, perhaps, be
set forth without suspicion of vanity or pedantry. For instance, it is worth noting that the Philippine Islands were discovered by Commodore Dewey before May I, 1898. The
work done by the Navy in the campaigns of 1898 was based
quite as much on mental preparation as on that splendid,
though incomplete, material equipment which has been one of
the most picturesque features of our national progress since
i885.; Given the constant factors of loyalty and discipline,
the problems of war are solved by taking thought before
putting on the panoply of battle.
When the Philippine Islands had to be studied, it appeared
that sources of information were neither numerous nor interesting. Beside a few rare old books of rambling gossip about
monastic affairs, there are two or three modern works blending
scientific fragments with travelers' tales.  Vague consular
documents relating chiefly to commerce have also been
printed. But the true basis of the campaign was contained in
the portfolio of charts of the China Sea and Eastern Archipelago. The modern arts of navigation and pilotage reduce
themselves to the interpretation of charts, and the tactics of
naval warfare as well as strategy in general are only special




104


1FHE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


applications of the same method. These graphic representations are supplemented by volumes of Sailing Directions,
which attempt verbal expression for hydrographic and topographic detail. Special interest attached to the Estado General de la Armada, or Navy List of Spain, which enumerates
the armament of ships and the accomplishments and decorations of officers with elaborate candor. We knew the force of
the Spanish squadron in every detail, and were informed in regard to the names and ages of all officers on duty in the Philippines; But no minute comparisons were attempted. Our
confidence was founded on national and personal qualities
and convictions.
After buying every chart of the Philippines in Hong Kong
and examining the approaches to Manila, it became plain
that no strong defensive combination was ready to oppose
our advance on that capital. The situation might have justified the removal of the Spanish squadron to some place of
greater tactical advantage, but there were political and other
considerations to oppose such action. It did not appear that
forts commanding the entrance to Manila Bay had been constructed during the three centuries of Spanish domination,
and it was felt that no improvised batteries or torpedo-linles
could serve as barriers for both channels. Once inside the
bay, our fleet would find convenient anchorage anywhere
within a circle twenty miles in diameter. Security would be
attained as soon as the Spanish fleet was disabled and the batteries silenced or isolated from support.
While it was known that Spain had a more numerous squadron in the Archipelago than we had on the Asiatic station,
there was more reason to dread their dispersion than their concentration at Manila. Light draught and local experience
should have given them many advantages in a dodging campaign. If concentrated, their ships would have more men
afloat and nearly as many modern rifled guns as we carried,
but they had no ship equal to the Olympia in all round effectiveness, to the Baltimore in weight of metal, or to the
Raleigh in rapid fire. Moreover, they had " lame ducks " well
known at the Hong Kong dockyards. Therefore we counted
on finding them at anchor and disposed for fighting under the




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.


105


protection of shore-batteries, under conditions implying discouragement and anticipation of defeat.
Our own preparations began with the choice of an objec* tive. Ten days after the destruction of the Maine, while
most of us were still holding that tragedy an accident, the
Commander-in-Chief was informed that his squadron must be
ready to attack the Philippines if war were declared. Concentration was immediately directed. The Olym1pia and Petrel
were already at Hong Kong; the Bostonz and Concord hurried
thither from Korea; the Raleigha, and later the revenue cutter
Hughi McCulloch, came north from the Indian Ocean via Singapore. Last of all, and not a day too soon, came the Baltimore from Honolulu. There was a scanty margin of time for
cleaning her bottom and filling her coal bunkers after the British authorities had issued their proclamation of neutrality.
Two small steamers, the Nan-Shan and the Zafiro, wvere purchased and prepared for service as colliers or tenders. There
was time for the discussion of this gathering and an exchange
of reassuring editorials between colonial and metropolitan journals. Manila was cheered from Madrid by statements denying that our concentration had any serious meaning, and
depreciating our equipment for attack. But this report, reaching the Philippines during the last week of April, came too
late to restore public confidence.
After coaling, the ships were all painted a dull greenish
gray,-" wet moon color," as the Spanish Admiral named it
when prescribing a tardy imitation. The tint selected was
found to blend naturally with the waters of Manila Bay. Another important detail was the distribution of ammunition.
All the stock on hand, including a supply brought out by the
Baltimore, was divided according to the batteries of the different ships. Some attempt was also made to get rid of superfluous wood-work to reduce the danger from sparks and splinters
in action. So much had to be left in place that the precaution appeared suggestive rather than final. Fortunately the
enemy's shells did not complete the demonstration of this
well-founded opinion.
Changes in personnel had also to be considered. The Commanding Officer of the Boston had served his time on the sta



io6


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


tion and his relief was at hand. But Captain Wildes wanted
to stick to his ship to test the discipline which he had spent
thirty months in establishing. Therefore Captain Lamberton
joined the Olyzmpia as Chief-of-Staff. Lieutenant Elliot and
other officers had also voluntarily prolonged their term of service. There were cases where there seemed no room for
choice. Both the Captain and Executive Officer of the Olympia had been stricken by climatic disease before war was declared. Captain Gridley had not been ill until after the ship
reached Hong Kong in February, and he insisted on retaining
his command. He performed all his responsible duties with
unfailing skill and with characteristic coolness and courtesy
until the battle was over. A month later he died on his way
home, a willing sacrifice to his country and his profession.
Lieutenant-Commander Paine had suffered longer in his effort
to complete a three-years' cruise without surrendering to the
climate. The doctors were kind and inflexible, and hle was
sent home in April. He had been an eager and active officer
for thirty-three years, two-thirds of which had been passed in
the grade of lieutenant, and there was much regret that he
should be forced to miss this opportunity of employing his
recognized talents in working a battery in action.
Lieutenant Rees came from   the old Monocacy, which
was laid up at Shanghai, and was assigned to duty as Executive of the Olympia. He was followed by several officers
and most of the crew of that antique side-wheeler, and every
ship had her full complement. Altogether our force was
about 1,750 men. A few Chinamen were missing at the last
moment; a painter with twenty years of naval service, some
stewards, and several mess-attendants deserted in Hong Kong.
The Chinese who remained showed no fear in action and
could bear comparison with any other race for cool industry and cheerful curiosity.
The Baltimore having made good use of the days of
grace following the proclamation of neutrality, the flagship
led the last group of ships out of the hospitable harbor of Hong
Kong on April 25. As we passed the vessels of the British
fleet, their bulwarks were thronged with eager soldiers and
sailors. The men-of-war might not cheer, but the convales



I
I




R SHE'                            MEER  M
Epsom
M K ]PLEET IN THR HARBOR OF HONG MIME
MOM A MOONCR ON M. HK
M.  III p gp -1 N  uA i




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.


I07


cent soldiers of the hospital-hulk were able to express British feeling by a hearty round of applause. We were going to
war, and they felt both sympathy and envy. Our own men
were cheerful and confident; ready to trust their guns, their
ships, their Commander-in-Chief and themselves.
There could be little doubt as to our objective. "Proceed
to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly
against the Spanish fleet. You must capture or destroy vessels. Use utmost endeavor." This was the President's message, a model of wholesome elasticity and inspiring brevity.
Had it been written a month later all exhortation might have
been omitted. It soon came to be an axiom that Admiral
Dewey would be strenuous and thorough in all his undertakings. Some New York papers had ventured to interpret the
gathering of ships at Hong Kong to mean that they were to
come to the Atlantic. The odd notion of a local war between
two nations with world-wide interests still survived. Our
commerce in the Pacific demanded protection. Spain's colonies invited attack. Beside the military weakness which exposed their capital and their naval stations, there were elements of moral weakness and strategic confusion in the condition of the Philippines. Much had to be conceded to the
claims of prestige and sentiment. We had reason to hope
for the concentration of the Spanish Squadron at Manila, to
hold that capital and to suppress a renewal of the Tagalo insurrection of 1896. Dispersion would have baffled our purpose, and dodging might have prolonged the life of Montojo's fleet. Its prompt destruction involved, as we now see,
not only the moral conquest of the Archipelago, but also the
confusion of Spain's counsels and the diversion of her most
powerful squadron from operations in the Atlantic.
Twvo restless days and nights were spent in Mirs Bay, completing material preparations and awaiting the last remnants of official instruction and casual information. Our
visit to this region drew from the Manila press a sarcastic appeal to know how long we would " hide our flag on the inhospitable coasts of China." Did we intend to continue " wasting coal and hoarding ammunition " until the war was over?
This was printed April 27, the very day we sailed- from Mirs




1o8


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


Bay and shaped our course southeast for the shores of Luzon.
The situation might have seemed to justify some address
to our ship's companies, some appeal to their loyalty as Americans, to their energy as fighting seamen. Fortunately the
enemy saved us the trouble. Every public authority in Manila, Governor-General, Alcaldo and Archbishop, had burst into eloquence upon the declaration of war. The staple of
these addresses was ever the same. Americans were abused
for oppressing " Indians," hating religion and lacking courage.
General Augustin's bitter words were published in every ship:
"' A squadron manned by foreigners possessing neither instruction nor discipline is preparing to come to this Archipelago
with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of all that mteans
life, honor and liberty." Whatever the effect may have been
in Manila this address roused an excellent fighting spirit
among our men. On the Olympia at least, nothing more
was needed except a quiet lesson from Captain Gridley to the
thirty men who were to point the guns. At dusk on Saturday evening he reminded themn that we were at war with
Spain and that it was the duty of every man to do his best,
to waste no ammunition, but to take deadly aim and keep it
utip until the enemy was beaten. Nothing more was needed
to prepare them for their Sunday morning's work.
The squadron formed in double column for a passage of
630 miles, maintaining a speed of about eight knots an hour.
This low speed was adopted to give training to watch officers
and engineers and also to show consideration for the smaller
and slower vessels of our fleet. The force was made up of
cruisers only; there were no ironclads and no torpedo boats.
But it could hardly be called a homogeneous squadron. The
Olympiza had tried to combine many forms of power, and
European criticism has said that she is " over-engined and
overgunned"; while every gun was welcome, she had no
chance to use her speed in this campaign. Her armor is
confined to her turrets, where it was obstructive as well as
protective in action. The heavy battery of the Baltimore
gave moral as well as material effect to her bulky outlines,
but she was not well-found in rapid-fire guns. The Boston is
an early example of a good type, but she has her steering



THE NAVAL BATTRLE OF MANILA BAY.


log


engine entirely exposed. The Raleigti has been said by a high
authority to have "nothing good about her but her guns,'"
but nothing else but her guns had anything to do with the
coming battle. No battery could be better served or better
fitted for the destruction of Spanish cruisers than the fiveinch rapid-fire guns of the Raleigkh. The Concord and Petrel
have ever been reckoned as handy vessels for cruising and
for inshore work generally. They showed themselves fit to
form in line of battle, and developed every unit of power in
their batteries. No battleship was needed to make this
squadron effective and, for the work in sight, invincible.
But these qualities could only be demonstrated by fighting.
The sea was smooth, and the passage from China to Luzon
xvas uneventful. On the third night out, in the dark hours of
the morning, we made the land near Cape Bolinao. A dark
mass and a rank tropical odor revealed the great island.
Daylight showed leagues of mangrove swamp backed by
ridges of rock, covered with scrubby timber, with lofty peaks
farther inland. Rather barren for the tropics it seemed, but
the coast is bold with landmarks for safe navigation. The
Boston and Concord were sent ahead to reconnoiter Subic Bay,
and later the Baltimore was detached to support them. The
wake of this advance squadron xvas strewn with cabinet-work
and lumber. Clearing ship for action is a destructive yet inconclusive process which appeals to some boyish or primitive
instinct of sailor-men, and the task was prosecuted with erratic vigor.
In the afternoon the southwestern cape of Luzon was
rounded, and the advance section of our fleet was discovered
lying peacefully off the entrance of Subic Bay. The narrow
channel was unfortified and the navy-yard was open to attack.
But our game was not there, and the scouting cruisers gathered like a pack of hounds at fault. There was time before
dark for a final council, and the captains were called on board
the Olympia. About sunset Captain Gridley was directed to
lead the squadron through the Boca Grande, the wide
southern channel of entrance to Manila Bay. The other
ships were to follow the Olympia, guided by a narrow ray
from her stern lantern, each ship turning in the visible wake




I IO


- THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.,


which trailed after the file-leader. All lights except these
stern lanterns had been masked or extinguished during the
night. A track was laid off on the chart and approved by
the Commander-in-Chief, and this track was closely followed
from dusk to dawn, from Subic entrance to the mouth of the
Pasig River in front of Manila. Four changes of course were
required, and the points where turns must be made were
picked up by cross-bearings of islands and headlands checked
by the courses steered and the readings of the patent log.
No local knowledge was needed to arrange these details, and
no degree of darkness could have disturbed our navigation.
The moon made efforts to break through the clouds, but on
the whole the night was dark, in spite of the dancing pillars
of cloud pulsing with tropical lightning among which we
cruised. There were light showers which dampened hundreds of suits of white duck, but nobody noticed such trifles.
As night fell, we began to realize that we were preparing to
force an entrance into a guarded bay with hostile batteries
and ships lying in wait for us. No welcome flashed from the
dark summits of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo. Spain had
extinguished every light intended to aid mariners in approaching her Archipelago. Having reason to suspect that the
batteries on Corregidor were placed to command both channels, we had chosen the wider one and had shaped courses to
pass that stronghold at a distance of three miles and a half, —
not out of range, but too far off to be checked in a resolute
advance. Before ten o'clock all hands went to quarters, and
the guns were ready for service at any moment during the
next twelve hours. Small islands showed clearly on the
horizon, though black shadows lay under the land.  La
Monja, or the Haystack, was left to port, and El Fraile shoxved
a jagged lump nearly ahead. While we could see these marks
we needed no pilot. Yet the Spaniards abused the whole
British race because of a suspicion that we were helped by
the master of a British steamer trading to Manila. The
legend of a foreign pilot belongs with the story of British
gunners recruited in Hong Kong. We had Americans at the
wheel and Americans behind the guns. Yet questions were
asked in the British Parliament and fictions were invented in




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.


I I I


Spain.  " With every aggravating circumstance, darkness,
treachery and desperation, the crime of Cavit6 was consummated "; thus the story was told in the journals of Madrid.
Yet there was nothing to show that the situation was
strained or desperate. There were no dramatic moments on
tie bridge of the Olymnpia. The Commodore and Captain
Gridley took counsel and kept watch quietly.   Formal
reports were hardly necessary and sonorous orders were never
given. As we entered the channel, a clear light winked and
flashed a long message from the north shore.. Later, a rocket
soared from the summit of Corregidor. There were dull
flashes from other points, but no roar of guns followed them.
Our course led past El Fraile at a distance of i,5oo yards.
There was deep water close to the rock, and it was a good
landmark. Just beyond opened the broad expanse of Manila
Bay, where we might cruise or anchor, blockade or fight, at
will.
Changing course from East to N. E. by N. swung the
stern ray from the Olymnpia's guiding light toward the rock,
and a moment later there was a red flash, a whistling shriek
overhead, and a loud report. Then came other dull flashes
from the South. Before one had time to remember that
Secretary of the Navy who used to be fond of saying, " No
naval officer now living will ever hear the sound of a hostile
gun,' the Raleigh, Boston and Concord made sharp answer,
and shells were seen bursting in fiery spray against the southern cliffs. The McCulloclh also let her six-pounders speak out
in testimony of vigilance. The Olyimpia was too far ahead to
assist, and there was no thought of confusing the line by any
turning movement. The plan was to get through the pass
and to leave the batteries to rave over their lost opportunity.
Our unchecked advance carried us out into open water and signal lanterns were soon flashing assurance that the fleet was untouched by shell or torpedo.
All the defenses of both channels wvere made worthless by
our safe passage. Returning at leisure to dismantle the batteries and dismiss their garrisons, it kvas found that four batteries guarded the northern channel and three were placed to
command the Boca Grande through which we entered.




112


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


There were nineteen guns in all and they were all rifled,
though most of them    were muzzle-loaders.  The best
battery, containing three breech-loading rifles of modern type,
was placed on El Fraile, where it had an excellent chance to
disable one or more ships. Had the existence of this battery
been known we might have circled around it to shatter the
rock and dismount the guns by concentrated fire. Restinga
Point also fired, but it was too far off to count. Pulo Caballo
did not open, " because of the speed at which the enemy fled,"
says a simple apologist in the Diario de Manila, who adds that
one of the Fraile guns was crippled by recoil at the first fire.
There had been much speculation about mine-fields, which
had no effect upon the tactical methods pursued. Mines
were simply ignored; there was no dragging or dodging to
eliminate this danger. The channel is too wide and too deep
for effective defense by torpedoes. Yet we knew that materials were accumulated, that telegrams were sent appealing
for gun-cotton, for pebble-powder, for blasting-powder, for
insulating tapes and guns. Finally the Colonel of Marine
Artillery commanding, telegraphed from Corregidor on April
27 declaring the " batteries ready and lines of torpedoes in
place." He added a request for gunboats to patrol the
channels, closing with a characteristic proverb: " Pedido
queda pedido." "Things urgent remain urgent." This sums
up the whole military system of Spain. Yet we were assured
by the highest authority, by the Governor-General as well as by
the Commandant of the Naval Arsenal, that the Boca Grande
xvas " full of torpedoes." This statement came too late to be
of any service, as it was delivered on May 2.  It was not
thought necessary to have the channel explored, and the
warning remains unverified to this day.
The moon set shortly after the firing ceased, and we crept
onward through the darkness at slow  speed.  Since the
enemy's squadron had not fought in the entrance channel with
the support of the shore batteries, there was no reason to expect them to attack in open water. They must have scattered
to hide in remote harbors, or sought shelter under the guns of
Manila or Cavite. The transports were called up to form an
outer column abreast the column of attack.  The course was




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I




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.


11I3


shaped for Manila, and speed was reduced so that the anchorage would be approached at early daylight. The white glow
in the northeast broke into bright points of electric light, marking the avenues of Manila. Many snatched an hour or so of
sleep during this silent mid-watch. The Commander-in-Chief
watched the slow progress of the ship and tried to induce Captain Gridley to rest and recruit his shattered strength. Coffee
was ordered to be ready at four o'clock and every one welcomed that refreshment. The coffee from the cabin was accompanied by sticky gingerbread; that from the wvard-room
brought a burden of thick bread and butter. Hardtack would
have been more to the purpose, and sandwiches not unacceptable. We heard afterward that some ships' companies had to
fight on empty stomachs. Breakfast at the usual hour was no
wanton luxury after all.
Daylight came out behind Manila and revealed long ranges
of white houses and gray fortifications with domes and towers
breaking the dim outlines. Eager eyes were turned to the anchorage off the breakwater. The binoculars showed a cluster
of black hulls and lofty spars; sixteen sailing-ships were
counted. There wvere no men-of-war, no steamers of any sort,
and another scrap of misinformation was cast away. Our
transports and despatch-boat were warned off and the battle
flags were broken at every masthead. The Olympia's mainmast bore a broad pennant of blue with the single star of a
commodore. It was almost five o'clock and the dawn wvas
spreading. All this we saw from the forward bridge of the
Olymzpia and all that is told hereafter is the report of one
pair of eyes from that post of observation. That it was a good
look-out station has been proved by two excellent narratives,
the official report of Admiral Dewey and the account written
by Mr. J. L. Stickney for the New York Herald. Each ship
had one or two posts of equal advantage, but there were none
such outside the six fighting cruisers. This is proved by numerous extraneous publications, American and Spanish. There
was not a single foreign vessel in port,-not even a German
cruiser.
The Olympia carries her standard compass on a grating
supported by brass rods some twelve feet above the con



THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


iI4


ning-tower overhanging the forward turret. This crow's-nest
seemed to the Commodore a convenient station for handling
his squadron in action, and there he spent several hours on that
eventful Sunday morning. There was barely room for the
compass and the navigator on this perch, but it escaped the
jar and the smoke which annoyed those standing on the bridge.
Captain Gridley wxas directed to stay in the conning-tower,
where he had a clear outlook and a set of voice tubes for passing orders. Ensign Butler stood outside the tower acting as
aid to the Captain. The ship was steered from a wooden pilot-house, on the roof of which Captain Lamberton took his
stand. The Executive Officer, Lieutenant Rees, stood on the
bridge to direct the working of the guns. There were half-adozen petty officers and marine orderlies on the bridge, and a
quartermaster who took a twelve-hour's trick at the wheel.
The signals were worked from the after bridge by Lieutenant
Brumby and Ensign Scott of the staff. Every officer had his
" understudy" indicated by order of rank or special detail.
Ensign Kavanagh assisted the navigator with that change in
view. The marine-guard was stationed on the upper deck to
pass orders or to use their rifles-when required.
It was after five when we sighted the enemy. Then we saw
a line of gray and white vessels stretching to the eastward from
the bay sheltered by Sangley Point. To the right lay a sweep
of green grass and yellow sand; the white buildings of the Arsenal were behind. Topmasts were housed and flame-colored
flags were afloat. As the Olympia turned to face them, a
white cloud with a heart of fire rose from Sangley Point and a
shell soared toward our line. The plunge of the projectile
was followed by the roar of the gun. There has been a two-gun
battery on that point since the year i600o, but this was the crack
of a modern rifle. One shell was seen dropped beyond us describing a trajectory of more than six miles. They were ready
for us then, and meant to fight. But a moment later two
harmless fountains sprang up miles ahead of our column and it
wvas plain that the defense was flurried. Another proof of
wildness came from the batteries along the water-front of Manila. The two small breech-loaders on the south mole and the
four big ones along the promenade rashly opened fire as our




...................




I




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.


I r5


line extended. A few broadsides in return would have laid
waste the helpless mass of buildings in the background. But
the heaviest battery was the only one noticed. The Boston
and Concord sent some warning shells close to the guns,
but their wanton fire was kept up for many hours.
The column swept past the city " in perfect and majestic
order," wrote an unwilling admirer in the city; "rather confused," said the Spanish Admiral, who saw the line slantwise
and made out eight ships instead of six. We did not count
his force until later, but his flagship, the Reina Cristina, was
readily made out, as well as the white Casti/la, which was
moored and protected by lighters filled with sand. While the
head of our column was still three miles away, the two
largest ships went off like bunches of fire-crackers and the
waters ahead of the Olymnpia were troubled by plunging
showers of shells. The other cruisers joined the fray, and for
half an hour their fire was brisk though ineffective. We were
patient for twenty odd minutes, but when the distance was
estimated as 5,400 yards, the historic order, "You may fire
when you are ready, Gridley," was uttered, and the roar and
jar of an eight-inch gun pointed on the starboard bow announced that we had begun to fight. The firing was delibererate at first, but when we turned to the southwest and had
our port broadside opposed to the enemy all the guns opened,
and a mighty shower of projectiles was poured upon the
Spanish line.
Yet the enemy's fire was not smothered, even when all our
line lay parallel to his and every ship was engaged. Shells
soared and whistled overhead. Others fell short and plunged
and sank, or else leaped wildly up to dive again. Ricocket
effects were worthless and incalculable. Perhaps each vessel
could have counted a hundred shells that struck within her
own length, yet did no harm. When a shell burst at the surface, the splash and smoke of the explosion would be followed
by spiteful whistlings and sullen plunges as the lazy fragments
made their scattering flight. Decks were scored, wire rigging
stranded and signal-halyards cut by sharp-edged bits of steel.
But no shell burst among our guns' crews, or scattered splinters among the firemen and others who toiled below. The




Ii6


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Olympia had a dozen boats on cradles or davits, but not one
of them was injured by"the Spanish fire. Other ships had
their boats blown to pieces by the blast of their guns, but
none were touched by the enemy. The Baltimore was penetrated by an armor-piercing shell from Sangley Point, but the
projectile did not explode and it failed to strike anybody inll
its wandering course. A six-pounder shell burst in the wardroom of the Boston, doing uncompensated injury to an
officer's wardrobe.
The course was set co pass the Spanish line at a mean distance of 3.o000o yards, and a steady fire was maintained from
our port broadside. But a new disturbing factor now appeared. A launch about forty feet long steamed out from
behind the batteries and stood across our track. She then
turned her head inshore, and seemed to lie in wait for the
Olympia. She bore the Spanish ensign and her movements
indicated a desperate resolve to use torpedoes. Of course,
rapid fire was opened to sink her. Even the main battery
threatened hyr, while six-pounders dropped shells close to
her side. The marines also used their rifles to put her out of
action. The boat was soon crippled and ran ashore, followed
by a rain of projectiles. No man ever lived through a fiercer
storm of fire, yet we are assured that this crew escaped with
their lives. Must all the truth be told? The English owner
of the boat declares that she was manned by his Filipino servants, bound for Manila on domestic errands. The incident
leaves one puzzled, but inspires respect for the possible end)rance of torpedo boats.
Within a mile of Sangley Point the Olympia made a quick
turn and swept back to the eastward, followed by her flock,
with the starboard batteries playing. We could see that the
Castilla's hull was scarred and blackened by our shells. The
Spanish fire seemed slacker than at first, and some ships were
shifting uneasily in the rear rank. With some exasperation
we noted a large percentage of misses from our well-aimed
guns. It was hard to be sure of the fall of any particular
shot, but many splashed ineffectually. Yet our batteries kept
hammering away, straining and jarring the ship in the shock
of their recoil. Sometimes the shock seemed to come from




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.


117


the outside, but no casualty was reported. Nor did any of
our consorts drop out of line or slacken fire. Yet the Spanish
ensigns still flew and their broadsides still thundered when we
had completed our third run past their line and had been engaged for an hour and a half.
There was some natural impatience for visible results. As
we headed to the eastward for the fourth run, preparations
were made to close, in order to try the effect of stationary 
practice. The Olympia was headed southeast to cross the
five-fathom  curve. At this instant the Reina Cristina was
seen to move to a gap in the line and to turn her bows to
seaward. The two flagships drew together as if for a duel,
but the Olympia was covering more ground than her opponent,
who was exposed to the concentrated fire of several broadsides. The slow advance continued until the Cristina was
within 1,200 yards and we could see our shells strike home.
Dark clouds of smoke poured up from the bow and stern and a
plume of white steam made another signal of distress. A
shell had pierced the superheater, the ship was on fire in two
places, the steering-engine was shot away and most of the
guns were disabled. So the ship turned inshore and sought
refuge in shoal water close to the Arsenal. The object of her
charge need not be considered. As usual, the Spaniards
were reduced to counsels of desperation. Perhaps some
dream of attack by ramming or using torpedoes inspired the
effort. The Don Juan de Austria had made a similar movement earlier in the fight, but her rush was still more brief and
ineffective. This battle had to be fought out with guns,
though the enemy found that a hard saying.
Again we steamed to the westward, while Admiral Montojo
was shifting his flag to the Is/a de Cuba. In passing the
Castil/a, it was noted that she, too, was on fire. Turning
within 1,500 yards of the batteries on the point, the fleet
stood out toward the middle of the bay. The fine rifled guns
on shore were as ineffective at 1,200 yards as they were at
12,000. They followed us with steady fire as we steamed to
the northward, and the heavy guns outside the walls of
Manila resumed their task of bombardment. Their shells of
9.5 inches calibre might have been powerfully destructive




n8


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


had their descending flight landed them on our decks, but
they all missed, even when our two groups made a motionless
cluster of nine vessels within range of their cross-fire. The
Spanish Captain-General telegraphed to Madrid that we
" withdrevw behind thie merchant shipping to transfer wounded."
The rest of the world insists in prose and verse that we
stopped fighting to get breakfast. There may have been
other considerations, but we had done a morning's work,-a
bigger one than we knew-and breakfast was welcome.
There were sardines, corned beef and hard-tack on a corner
of the wardroom table, still encumbered by the surgeons'
ghastly gear, which was all unstained, however. Indeed, the
answer to the signal, " Report casualties," had been comfortable. Half-a-dozen men slightly wounded by the shock of
that erratic shell which traversed the Baltimore's upper deck
covered everything. A capable observer watching the fight
from one of our colliers was able to give the net result of our
work as soon as we stopped firing, but he estimated the
American loss as not less than 400. Let us be thankful that
it was not so, though we may not know why our men's lives
were spared.
The crews had glorious opportunities for cheering each
other. The big Baltimore and the little Petrel drew special
attention as the two extremes of our fleet, but not one ship
was slighted, nor was there a word of captious comparison
mixed with the generous burst of applause. All had fought gallantly and loyally, and all had escaped unharmed. Natural
selection had done its work on the niceties of naval uniform
while we were cleared for action. Golf caps and pith helmets
were seen in high places; officers and men came on the bridge
in obsolescent pajamas or inadequate undershirts; the turret
crews were frankly primeval in their attire. But good spirits
and prompt obedience were the natural order of the day.
There had been no need to promote them by signalling commonplace maxims. There was neither shirking nor flinching
among the 1,700 men under the Commodore's pennant on the
first of May.
The smoking hour and the consultation of captains after
breakfast were enlivened and inspired by frequent explosions




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.


I 1


of ammunition in the burning ships off Cavite. The inevitable decision was that the work should be finished. The
records show that this movement began at 10:45 A. M., but it
might have been six hours or a week later if one had to trust
individual impressions. The Baltimore was designated to
lead the line, and the intervals were closed, as Sangley Point
was approached from the westward. One gun from the point
was still in action when the Baltimore stopped her engines
and turned her heavy broadside on the earthworks. Her sixinch and eight-inch shells were soon bursting and throwing up
showers of sand close to the guns. The other ships ranged
past in succession, and the Olympia poured in a galling fire
from her six-pounders at a distance of i,8oo yards. In passing
the Baltimore each ship had to stop firing and take to cheering, which seemed to have a decisive effect, as the batteries
were silenced and deserted by their demoralized garrisons.
One ship attempted to keep up the battle. The Don Antonio de Ulloa fired two or three shots, but she was soon silenced
and sunk by shells from the Boston and Raleighi, which
were turning the point to approach the Arsenal. She was the
only ship sent to the bottom by our projectiles. Others were
burned, blown up, or driven ashore by our'fire. The Spanish
flag still waved from the lofty shears at the Cavite Arsenal,
but a few well-aimed shells from the Raleigh shattered buildings and scattered troops about the navy-yard. The red and
yellow flag came down; a white sheet was shown from the
Commandant's quarters, and Cavite was surrendered.
The Petrel had stood in ahead of the other ships assisting
in the bombardment, and she was now sent in to finish the
task of destroying the Spanish vessels, which had taken refuge
behind the Arsenal and scattered themselves in shoal water
close to the wharves, which were thronged by troops under
arms and by the beaten crews who had escaped from the
squadron. Lieutenant Hughes lowered the Petrel's soundest
whaleboat and dashed in past these forces, supported by Lieutenant Fiske in another whaleboat. For the first time that
day Americans and Spaniards came face to face. But the Spanish officers seemed to realize the responsibilities of surrender,
and the work of destruction was not opposed. Cruisers sunk




I12 0


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


within pistol range of the quays were boarded and set on
fire by our boats' crews, and a flotilla of tugs and launches
was gathered and brought out by the Petrel. The armed
transport Manila was found to be uninjured and was also
made a prize for the fleet. Meanwhile the Concord, supported
by the Olympia, had stood in toward Las Pinas on a similar
errand. The steamer Is/a de Mindanao, which had held a
place in the Spanish line during the action, had drifted ashore
there, and her crew were driven off and the ship set on fire by
the Concord's shells. This vessel was armed, and there is
evidence that she fired during the action. She had brought
war material on her last voyage from Spain, and she had been
towing disabled cruisers just before the action. Her owners
had intended to dispatch her to Spain on the next Saturday,
May 7. They showed a lamentable lack of faith in American
activity, and insurance companies refuse to pay for losses due
to imprudent delay and belligerent behavior.
This second action lasted about two hours, or nearly as long,
as the first. It was performed before a larger audience, as the
British steamer Esmeralda had just entered the harbor with a
journalist or two on board. In spite of various destructive
and dramatic incidbnts, the vital inspiration of battle was
lacking. The enemy failed to stand to his guns. Only half-adozen shells were fired by the Spaniards, while a thousand or
so were discharged from their ships in the early morning. But
we had to make sure that all resistance xvas over. Our victory
at Cavit6 also silenced the batteries at Manila forever. The
Captain-General was warned that further firing would compel
the fleet to bombard the walled city. In acceding to this
warning he admitted total defeat.
The wanton and ineffectual employment of batteries adjacent to a defenseless city furnishes an instance of the desperate futility of Spanish traditions. The legend runs that the
Governor-General had forbidden the batteries to fire, but that
the Colonel of Artillery felt himself bound by technical rules
affecting his military honor. So he persisted until defeat was
demonstrated. He was told that the next day would see him
under close arrest. He did not linger until the day of grace
was done, but shot himself in the Plaza before the palace of




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THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.


I21


the Archbishop the same evening. That sinister fact is certain, and it is also true that his wife died and his son became
insane. So his daughter is left alone in the world to reflect on
the cruelty of war as aggravated by arbitrary and fatalistic
notions of honor.
" Early in the afternoon our line was anchored in front of
Manila, and our battle flags waved until sunset. The garrison
mighlt have heard the cheers of our seamen and the notes of
the " Star Spangled Banner " when our band saluted the colors. Our Sunday's work included the destruction of eleven
vessels, eight of them classed as cruisers in the Spanish register. Seven of them were anchored in line of battle and
cleared for action when wve approached Cavite. There was no
question of a surprise. Our departure from Hong Kong and
Mirs Bay and our presence off Bolinao, Subic and Corregidor
had been duly reported by telegraph. The guns had been
manned at daylight and the regular rounds of cheers, for the. King, for the Queen, and for Spain, had roused the 2,000 men
of the Spanish fleet.
The victorious squadron had fought in the following order:
Olympia, Baltimore, Ralezigh, Cozncord, Petrel and Boston.
The McCulloch, Nan-S/han and Zafiro made up our convoy
or reserve. The names of the Spanish ships may also be
noted: Reina Cristina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Isia
de Mindanao, Velasco, Argos, Marques Del Duero, General
Lezo, Is/a de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, Don Juan de A ustria. The
three cruisers last named are to be raised and refitted for service, under a contract signed in October.
The total number of effective guns in the batteries, placed
to command the channels of entrance and the approaches to
Cavit6 and Manila, attains the formidable figure of sixty-one.
Smooth-bores and field-pieces are not counted. Of these guns
twenty-five were breech-loading rifles, nine rifled mortars and
the rest muzzle-loading rifles. The average calibre was over
seven inches. When the fleet was destroyed and the Sangley
Point battery silenced, all the rest were put out of action.
The Manila batteries were silenced by intimidation and the
Corregidor defenses condemned to isolation.
The American fleet was free to work its will upon the capi



I22


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


tal of the Philippines, but certain instincts or principles
seemed to forbid bombardment. Spanish sentiment failed to
understand our restraint. The papers still raved of defending the city, and our position was declared to be critical for lack
of a naval base, of coal, and of other supplies. It was said that
our shells did little harm in Cavite, and, therefore, that
Manila could stand a bombardment. But neither the town
nor the Arsenal had been our target during the action off
Cavite. On the other hand, a Madrid journal declared that all
the buildings had been laid in ruins before the place was surrendered.
After the Governor-General's rant about "ruffianly intentions," backed by the Archbishop's invective against the
" base passions engendered by heresy," which inspired our
campaign, it may have been difficult to allow for the moral restraints and humane tendencies which modified the situation.
Certainly Spanish history reveals no such forbearance. The
bombardment of Valparaiso, a commercial city undefended
by a single gun, is counted as one of the glories of the Spanish Navy. In i866 the squadron of Mendez Nufiez fired 2,600
shells into that city, making the bonded warehouses their
principal target, but incidentally hitting several churches and
hospitals.  Property to the value of $i5,ooo,ooo.oo was
destroyed. Half of this belonged to foreigners, yet the Spanish Commodore refused to receive the protest of the Consuls
against the proposed bombardment. He went on to Callao and
attempted a similar attack, the history of which is given in
the medal awarded to the Peruvians who took part in the
defense: "With fifty guns you beat off three hundred."
This motto might have braced the defenders of Manila, but
they preferred to quote some empty phrase of Mendez-Nufiez
about " honor without ships rather than ships without honor."
That sentiment failed to inspire a single torpedo attack during the summer of 1898, though there were scores of idle
naval officers, many of them qualified as torpedistas, in
Manila, with handy steam launches and torpedoes at their
disposition. Their best excuse is the desire not to expose
the city to retaliation. The " new school " of naval strategy,
which takes commerce-destroying and the bombardment of




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.


I23


commercial towns to be principal objects of maritime attack,
has its prophets in Spain as well as in France. Let us hope
that war may teach them humanity.
It was necessary, however, to deprive Manila of some of
the resources of civilization. A strict commercial blockade
was announced and enforced. The cable was also cut as soon
as it was found that wve were not to be allowed to use it. The
English managers had no choice under the terms of their contract and the constraints of Spanish authority. The interruption of this line of communication was far more hurtful to
Spain than to us, since our dispatches could be forwarded via
Hong Kong with only two or three days delay. Steamers were
allowed to give passage to all neutrals wvho desired to withdraw from Manila, and even Spaniards, a Bishop, for instance,
wvere granted the same favor when their stay in Manila would
involve special hardship. Mails were also allowed to go in
and out without interference. Foreign cruisers and trading
steamers rendered this service at frequent intervals.
This sketch of visible results may be supplemented by some
notes on.the methods employed. Personal opinions and impressions only will be- offered, and it is recognized that chronicle and argument are alike defective. The tactical scheme
was simple; a column of vessels was to be led past the enemy
until his defeat was accomplished by broadside fire. It took
five turns to do the work. The length of our line with 400 -yard intervals Was about 2,500 yards, and this wvas also the
mean distance from the Spanish center. The enemy had
formed his ships with the western flank inside Sangley Point
and the eastern flank near shoal water north of Bakor. Advancing in column, wve moved freely in open water, slipping
past our own smoke, and disconcerting the enemy's aim by
varying distances. The Commander-in-Chief led the line and
wvas enabled to guide his supporters by example as well as by
signal. The extended order of our ships allowed effective
concentration from all broadsides on the huddled Spanish
formation. Finally, no turning movements were necessary
within the space covered by the guns of the enemy's ships.
Our track was determined at first by the depth of water as
shown on the chart. It was thought best to keep outside the




124


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


"t five-fathom curve." The Olympia drew twenty-four feet, or
four fathoms, and the rest could follow in her wake without
taking soundings or angles for position. Certain sinister
notes on the navigation of Cavite Bay imposed caution; " from
Spanish surveys," "t point extending to eastward," " filling up
since Horsburgh's time," were warnings that turned out to be
unnecessary. The chart was correct, except that the water
had deepened to the eastward. The Captain-General cabled
to Madrid that our fleet had suffered greatly and had been
" forced to make various changes and evolutions " by the fire
of batteries ashore and afloat. The evolutions had all been
planned, and we cruised and fought between the points B'and
C' of the diagram prepared in Hong Kong.
The enemy chose to open fire at extreme ranges, but we
fired only one shot from a distance greater than 5,000 yards.
Many of us had been taught that 2,000 yards was the maximum range for naval guns in action, and that that could be
attained well enough by cast-iron smooth-bores. Fortunately,
we had emerged from that era of darkness, and we saw a
squadron destroyed at 2,500 yards. Had all the guns of the
water batteries of Manila been mounted on Sangley Point,
and had the Spanish line drawn back into shallow water, we
might have had to diminish our distances to the danger point
and to make turns under concentrated fire. Being left at
liberty, however, a distance was chosen which enabled us to
punish the enemy for his hopeless marksmanship without loss
or injury to our ships.
The enemy failed to inflict damage, not on account of any
deficiency in the range or penetration of the shells fired from
his thirty modern breech-loading rifles of 12 centimeters and
upward, or from his numerous rapid-fire six-pounders. Nor
is there evidence that his ammunition was defective. Not
even the ravagesof our fire can be alleged as a complete excuLse. The guns were pointed wvildly, that is all.
Rapid fire from our guns doubtless had much to do with
the unsteadiness of gunners. The Olympia and Raleigh had
fine batteries of five-inch rapid-fire guns. Each shell from
these guns was fit for any work that was done that day.
Superheaters can be pierced, steering-engines crippled, and




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.


I 2 5


guns crews swept away by five-inch shells as well as by those
of heavier calibre. No armor had to be pierced, and no ship
was structurally disabled by any single shell. Nor were guns
dismounted in shore batteries, nor parapets thrown down by
any projectiles. The work was done by the shattering and
incendiary effects of shells exploded inboard. The preference
for "heavy guns in protected positions " was not justified
here. The four eight-inch guns in the Olymgpia's turrets wvere
able to fire only thirty-five shots in all, which was the average
for each gun in the five-inch battery, which had also a greater
percentage of hits among its 350 fires. Yet each turret was
handled by a vigilant and experienced officer, and was fired
on both broadsides without impediment.
Rapid-fire projectiles of smaller calibres, down to threepounders, are also deadly in effect. They rarely fail to explode, and they are capable of igniting wood. Of course, the
Spanish protest against the use of "incendiary projectiles
forbidden by all laws divine and human" was mere ignorant
raving. Had high explosives been used with delayed-action
fuses,-the ammunition of the future,-the protest might
have been still more shrill. Let us hope that before another
contest comes we may be provided with genuine smokeless
powder. Of old-fashioned ammunition we had a plenty. Our
eight-inch guns might have been fought for a week, but the
five-inch supply was low enough to cause some concern, about
forty per cent. having been used in two hours. The Naval
Bureau of Ordnance promptly replaced all deficiencies, and
other Bureaus did likewise. It is worth noting that neither
gun-mounts nor ammunition delayed the.Olymnpia's fire,
though annoying accidents have frequently interfered with
target practice. The improvement was doubtless due to the
training of the crews and to the adjustments made by division
officers during a three years' cruis6.
Range-finding offered the usual difficulties. The Baltimore
had an electric range-finder which hardly survived the first
broadsides The method of picking up ranges by a rapid-fire
gun was not convenient in the Olympia, where most of the
battery is mounted on covered decks. The approximate position of the Spanish line was marked on the chart and the dis



I 2 6


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


tance measured from successive positions determined by crossbearings. Some annoyance resulted from   the attempt to
communicate with the guns by " passing the word." The eye
is the organ to be trusted during the crash and roar of naval
action, and a series of dials should give direct and visible messages from the bridge or conning-tower to each division of the
battery. Telephones fail and voice-tubes are uncertain.
It remains to consider the concrete effect of our fire. Admiral Montojo reckoned seventy hits in the hull and superstructure of the Cristina, with fifty odd killed and one hundred
wounded. Her Captain, Don Luis Cadarso, was among the
slain. On the last Sunday before the fight he had addressed
his crew after mass, and his fiery harangue made them break
forth (prorrumpicron) into cheers for every Spanish emblem of
authority. The two funnels were also riddled by rapid-fire
projectiles; the steam-steerer was disabled; steam was escaping from the superheater; the ship was on fire forward and
aft; the ammunition had begun to explode when she retired
from action. No other ship drew so much of our fire, and it
is probable that less than ten per cent. of the shots aimed at
her were effective. The estimate for the glorious running
fight off Santiago was as low as three per cent. The Casti/la
also suffered heavily.  The total number of killed and
wounded is given as 38i in Spanish reports. The battery at
Sangley Point lost six men killed and four wounded before the -crews were driven from the guns, which were not
dismounted by our fire, though one had been crippled by its
own discharge. The effect of heavy shells against earth-works
seems to be less, and the value of rapid-fire greater, than had
been allowed. It has been a maxim among engineers that
one gun ashore was worth five or ten afloat under like protection. This experiment does not establish any such co-efficient. Flagships draw fire, and it is probable that half as
many shells were fired at the Olympia as at the Cristina, yet
the score of hits is at least one hundred to nothing.
Apologists find reasons enough for this difference. Our
ships were called iron-clads, invulnerable to Spanish shot.
Cold steel was invoked " to disturb the deadly calm in which
instruments of precision were regulating engines of destruc



THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.


127


tion." Now none of our ships was handled from armored
conning-towers. Wooden bridges and pilot-houses served
our turn. Our broadside batteries were unshielded by armor.
None of the existing protection was tested during the action.
Scarcity of gunners and incapacity of engineers are also
alleged. If it were to be discussed from our point of view,
the scheme of defense would seem lacking in energy, foresight,
and persistence. Individual courage was there, but organized
resolution was not in evidence. The Spanish Admiral explained his decision not to fight in deep water by his unxvillingness to lose men as well as ships. This amazing reason
seems to have been allowed to circulate to the discouragement
of the fleet.
The deep water which had to be abandoned was in the harbor of Subic. Had the artillery scattered about Manila been
mounted at the entrance to Subic, our work would have been
done in a slow and costly fashion. But in spite of a dozen
annual reports from the commission which has been investigating Subic since i885, nothing seems to have been known
of its defensive conditions. It was abandoned two days before our coming, and the fleet was brought back to defend
Cavite. The delay in mounting guns and mooring torpedoes
caused the Admiral " much disgust.
The only advocate of Subic was Captain del Rio, who was
left behind to burn his coal-depot. He had sketched an imaginary naval attack in i89i, and his pamphlet must have
been familiar to every naval officer of high rank at Manila.
Assuming an attack on Manila by a squadron somewhat superior to the defensive force, he points out that the hostile
Admiral xvill reconnoitre Subic. Finding it empty, he will
gladly stand in to seek the Spanish squadron. Encountering
it motionless off Cavit6, he will destroy it and the Arsenal.
Then he will bombard Manila. This prediction erred only in
assuming a ruthless Spanish temper in the victorious Admiral.
The notion of strategic naval defense by a squadron not confined to the harbor of a commercial capital is not universally
accepted. Yet, if the United States ever undertakes the defense of Manila, it will be necessary to make Subic a naval
port de sortie and to equip and fortify it accordingly.




1 28       THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.
When the last gun was silenced on this memorable May
day, a high authority announced the meaning of the day's
work as follows: " Spain has lost her fleet and she has lost
these islands also; without ships she cannot hold them, arid
this fleet cannot be replaced." Desperate efforts have been
made by military and diplomatic methods to reverse this verdict. But history does not allow the hands of the clock to be
put back, and the fact remains that the Philippine Archipelago was virtually and strategically relieved from the domination of Spain by the squadron commanded by Admiral Dewey
on the first of May.
@9 @./rC(A




I




. I,______._._......_________._..____r__1.__1.1__________________.
/" * '        /
('efJ2*      f-e/



CHAPTER V.


STATEMENT OF THE SINKING OF THE
MERRIMAA C.*
BY
FRANCIS KELLY, U. S. S. New York, Flagship.
T had always been my inclination to enlist in the American
I Navy as fireman. I saw my opportunity on the 2Ist of
April, 1898, when the war broke out between the
United States and Spain. On that date, I went on board the
U. S. R. S. Franklin at the Navy Yard, Norfolk, Va., and
through a special request, enlisted for one year. I passed all
the required examinations, having had ten years of experience
in the merchant service, in engine and fire rooms, as well as
on deck. The next day after enlisting, I was detailed to go
on board the Merrimrac, which was then loaded with coal for
the use of Rear-Admiral Sampson's fleet, then blockading the
island of Cuba. Arriving at Key West on the 7th of May,
we anchored outside all the fleet which was there at that time.
I passed the remark to my shipmates that it looked as if they
were going to leave us there for a target, we lying so far out
to sea, and on the 17th, when we received orders to paint her
all black, over her war color, I believed it still more.  But
all such thoughts soon vanished, for on the night of the i9th,
we got orders to get ready for sea and to proceed to
Cienfuegos to meet Schley's fleet, which was there at that
time watching the harbor, in which Cervera and his ships were
thought to be.
On the 24th, we got a signal from the Brooklyn to go along* Mr. Kelly was the only man below the deck of the Merrimac after she came well within
range of the Spanish guns. He gives a most interesting statement of one of the bravest
deeds of history.
THE PUBLISHERS.




130


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


side the U. S. S. Massachusetts and give her all the coal she
wanted. As we had over 5,ooo tons aboard, several small
ships of the fleet came alongside and took on coal.
On May 28, we were compelled to leave early, proceed to
Santiago, and begin coaling the remainder of the ships as
soon as possible, because the Commander-in-Chief wanted to
have the Merrimac dismantled so that she could be sunk in the
harbor of Santiago de Cuba, to bottle up the Spanish fleet,
which, by that time, was known to be there and not at Cienf uegos.
It was the first day of June when we were ordered to dismantle her. At that time she had on board about 2,500 tons
of coal. Then the crew got orders from Lieutenant Gilmore
to take all their clothes and transfer them to the Massachinsefts. After this, the crew of the Massachusetts began to dismount the Merrimac's guns and her other gear. At the
same time, a working party from the flag-ship Nzew  York
was detailed for the cable to be run right aft, so that when
we should enter the harbor of Santiago, we might be held by
an anchor aft as well as fore.
On that same day, the first of June, at four o'clock in the
afternoon, Admiral Sampson on the bridge of the New York
signaled to the fleet, asking for volunteers to go in and designedly sink the Merrimnac in the entrance to Santiago harbor.
At the same hour, Mr. Crank, chief engineer of the MXerriMac, came down into the engine room along with Lieutenant
Hobson, for the purpose of showing him all the connections
of the keelson valves on board, which might be of use in assisting to sink her. He also showed him the bunker doors
which we had opened. When those seven mines, which were
hanging over the port side under water, should be connected
and exploded, that side of the ship would be blown in, the
water would rush through those bunker doors, and fill up fireroom, engine-room, and holds numbers one, two and three.
Hold number three had been filled with coal for our own use.
It was all gone. We had cut two holes in the wooden bulkhead twenty feet in diameter, which would allow the water to
travel from hold number three to holds numbers two and one.
So, you see, we were prepared to make a good job of it,




SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC.


13I1


Now I, Francis Kelly, was present with Mr. Crank and
Lieutenant Hobson when all these things were being discussed.
After the plan of action had been decided upon, Lieutenant
Hobson went up on deck.
As Mr. Crank still stopped in the engine-room, I asked him
if he was going into the harbor with her. He answered that
he was going, as far as he knew. By this time it was six
o'clock at night. Then I asked Mr. Crank if I could get to
go in along with him, as I had heard that our machinist,
George Phillips, was going in with him.
He asked me if I was willing to go. I answered that I
certainly was, and that was the reason I had asked him.
Then he wanted to know if I realized the job I was about to
undertake. I-told him I did. Then he took me up from the
engine-room to the bridge, where were Commander Miller of
the Merrimnac and Lieutenant Hobson. Mr. Crank said to
Commander Miller,-" Here is Kelly, the water tender, who
wants to go in along with us to help sink the Merrimac."
Lieutenant Hobson asked from what ship I came. Mr. Crank
told him that I was one of the Merrimtac's own crew. Then
Lieutenant Hobson said he didn't want any of her own crew;
that the men he wanted were volunteers. Mr. Crank said, " I
am going in with her myself, so I would like to have Kelly
and Phillips along with me, as they thoroughly understand
the work they have got to do. I do not think I could get
better men for the same job, as they understand the run of
the ship." Then Lieutenant Hobson called me by name.
"Kelly, go and get Phillips, as I want to see you together."
You see, the flag-ship lVew York was supposed to chase the
Merrimnac into the harbor, firing blank shots. This was to
blindfold the Spaniards, and make them believe that it was a
Spanish ship that the New York was chasing. Such a ship
was expected about this time by the Spaniards with provisions
for their fleet. In reality, the Nezw York had captured this
merchantman several days before.
When we both came back to Lieutenant Hobson, he gave
us the following instructions. The signal, two bells, was to
mean that I was to knock the bonnets of the keelson valves
and cut the pipes. When this had been done below, I was to




I32


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


come on deck, go to the bridge and report to Lieutenant
Hobson that I had performed my duty. I was then to lie
down on the bridge. Then Lieute"nant Hobson was to signal
one bell to Phillips, the machinist, to stop the engines. As
soon as this was done, I was to leave the bridge, dive overboard
and get into a small boat that had been towed alongside the
Merrimac. In this boat we were supposed to make good
our escape. if possible. After I got into the boat, I was to
cut away the lines fore and aft which held her to the Aerrimac. By that time Phillips would be up on deck from the
engine-room to report to Lieutenant Hobson. I was supposed to have pulled the boat about twenty yards from the
side of the Merrimac and to be ready to pick up the remainder
of the crew. At this time Lieutenant Hobson would give
the word of command to let go the two cables as he was putting her across the entrance of the harbor, and, by that same
command, the rest of the crew were to dive overboard and
swim for the small boat which I was keeping ready for them.
The crew would not mind the swimming part of it as we were
all supposed to be good swimmers. Lieutenant Hobson was
to be the last man to leave the Merrimac. He was to stand
on the bridge and touch the button which connected the
mines hanging on her port side and so explode them. We
were also told that if the small boat in which the crew was to
escape was blown up by the Spanish, we would have to swim
over three miles. Now those three miles of water were alive
with sharks, and before wve could strike the beach it would be
necessary for us to pass among all those man-eaters. The
clothing we had for that trip xvas very light, consisting of a
pair of pants cut off above the knees, a life belt, a revolver
and belt and thirty-six rounds of ammunition well covered
with tallow to prevent the water getting to them, and three
pairs of stockings. We had to have as many as that on our
feet, to keep them from being cut should we have the good
luck to get to the beach. These were Lieutenant Hobson's instructions, knowing that the flag-ship New York would have
a steam launch cruising around the entrance of the harbor
looking for us.
On the first of June, at eight o'clock in the evening, Admi



SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC.


133


ral Sampson came on board the Iferrimac to see how Lieutenant Hobson was getting along with the clearing of the
ship. He saw that the work was going on pretty well. He
also inspected the decks from forward to aft, the mines which
the electrician had about finished, and the cable chains, to be
sure that they were placed in the right position on deck, that
there might be no fouling in their running out. Seeing that
everything was all right, he left the Merrimac at 9:30 P. M.
I expect that he said that he svould be back before we
should start to go in, but something happened to his steam
launch about one o'clock on the morning of the 2d, when he
was returning to the JI~Terrimac for the last time. When he
did come on board, lhe vent to the bridge and asked Lieutenant Hobson if everything svas ready.  The answer wvas,
"Yes." Then the Admiral said, " You are rather late this
morning."
Lieutenant Hobson replied, " We can make it, sir." "What
time is it?"  Lieutenant Hobson took his watch out and
went to the starboard side of the bridge, where there was a
lamp covered over to keep it from showing light about decks.
Then he replied to Admiral Sampson that it was twenty
minutes past three.  Commander Miller of the Merrimac
had been standing on the bridge with them all this time.
Turning to the Commander, the Admiral said, " I think we
will be going."
Commander Miller said, "Am I not going with the ship?
But Admiral Sampson replied, " No, no, we are too old for  '
this cruise. It is one of the most daring that ever was made,
and it requires young heroes like Lieutenant Hobson and his
crew. We will bid them 'good-night' and 'God speed.'"
Uttering these wvords to Commander Miller, he shook hands
with Lieutenant Hobson and his crexv and then went over
the gangway.
Phillips and I were ordered below, and the telegraph was
rung half speed ahead by Lieutenant Hobson on the bridge.
Ten minutes after we started, daylight came on. Then Admiral Sampson sent up signals for us to return. He also sent
the torpedo-boat Porter after us and made us come back.
Dowvn below wve did not know that we were toSturn back.




134


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


I was working hard in the fire-room. Mr. Crank, the engineer, was also helping me by raking the fires so as to get up
as much steam as possible. Mr. Crank made the remark
that we were like three rats in a trap, as everything had been
closed down on us so that no noise could be heard from the
engines. Five minutes later Lieutenant Hobson sent down
the chief gunner's mate to tell Mr. Crank that we were to
turn back by the orders of Admiral Sampson. The time was
four A. M. and the day was just breaking. We steamed to
the starboard side of the flag-ship, which lay one mile from
us. Mr. Crank gave me orders to draw the fires, which had
been made extraordinarily heavy for the purpose of getting
high pressure to drive her hard across the channel. We got
the fires down to prevent her making any noise that- would
arouse the suspicions of the Spaniards. This was the second
of June.
That day we lay on the decks wishing that the flag,-ship
would send us something to eat, as we commenced to feel
hungry. We had been up the day before and all that night,
and you may believe that there was not much cooked aboard
for those two days, because the excitement in regard to the
sinking of the ship was working the boys up to a high pitch.
About ten o'clock in the morning, the Marblehead steamed
alongside of us, and Mr. Crank requested them to send over a
machinist and fireman to relieve Phillips and Kelly, so -that
they might be in working order for the morning of the third.
By this time, the New York had a whale boat alongside and
took us aboard to get something to eat. That afternoon at
four, we lay down and rested till half-past eleven that night.
At about half-past two, the pilot discovered a light and made
the remark, " You are not going to take me any further in, as
the Spanish will see the light of the compass through the window of the pilot house." Turning to Lieutenant Hobson he
asked him to get something to cover the windowv, as that would
protect the man at the wheel. Lieutenant Hobson, seeing
that the pilot was getting scared, said it would be much better
to let the steam launch come alongside and get the pilot off the
Merrimnac, as the Spaniards knew him well, for he was a
Cuban.




SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC.


135


During this time Lieutenant Hobson had run another signal down to the engine-room. It was a rope. One end was
to be made fast to machinist Phillips' arm, so that in case the
telegraph was blown away by the enemy, one pull of the rope
by Lieutenant Hobson would stop the engines and tell me to
cut the pipes and let go the keelson bonnets, for the purpose
of sinking her.
We started away, for the second time, into the harbor,
about three o'clock on the morning of the third. Just as we
were entering, a torpedo boat fired a six-pounder and destroyed all our steering gear. Lieutenant Hobson gave the
signal to stop the engines. At the same moment he also
told the man at the wheel to put his helm hard aport. He
replied, " Hard aport, sir, but helm will not answer."
During this time I was cutting away the pipes. Before this,
I had heard the shooting, and one shot had come through the
plates into the fire-room. I had gone into the engine-room
and asked Phillips if he heard the shooting. He said, yes,
and that it was the New  York, for, you remember, the ATewz
York was to pretend to chase us. Then I said that it was a
very funny blank shot to come through the plates, for the
ball went right past me.
Then Phillips went on deck to set off his mine, leaving nme
below to cut the pipes yet remaining. This was a very hard
thing to do, because all this time there was heavy firing and
the shots were coming into the engine-room and the force of
the water knocked me down below the platform. I had a
hard time to get out again, there being no light in the engineroom. When I did get out, I had a curious feeling on me.
Hearing so much firing, I did not know what minute one of
those shots might penetrate the boilers, and there was twentyfive pounds more of steam on than she was tested for. During all this time I had not~seen any water in the starboard
boilers. As the steam was still rising, I thought of starting
the auxiliary pump, but then it seemed as if I might as well
take my chances and put water into the boilers. I expected
to be killed as soon as I went on deck anyhow, hearing such
terrible shooting, and might as well get blown up by the
boilers down below. So I opened the feed check on the star



136


THE AMERICAAN-SPANISH WAR.


board boiler and started the fire pump and, leaving it working,
proceeded on deck.
I had not seen Phillips since he went up to set off his mine
and thought I might find him lying down somewhere near the
place where we were all to meet. This place wvas on the starboard side of the spar deck. But you could not see or hear
anything for the rapid firing. So I crawled along the deck
on my hands and knees, thinking that every moment would
be my last, until I got alongside the mine which I was to set
off. This was mine number seven. Near it was a life belt
and a revolver which I was to put on. Then I got hold of
the wire which I was to connect and found the insulation on.
As I had lost my knife, I had to tear it off with my teeth, so
that it could be set off. No sooner had I set the mine off
than a shell from the western battery struck the main mast
and exploded. A piece of it struck me over the left eye and
on the mouth. Both my legs also were struck, and I was
knocked flat on the deck. My wounds were slight. As there
was no decrease in the firing, I thought that it was all up with
me now. Finally I got on my feet and made toward the engine-room, looking for Phillips, but I could not see him. I
did see that the pressure of the steam was gaining, and opened
up the connection doors of the boilers to reduce the steam.
I did not know at what moment they would explode, for the
water was rushing all about. Then I went up on deck again
to go to the place where we were to assemble. The boat in
which we were to make our escape had been blown away by
the enemy. This made the men get together in another part
of the ship. I did not know this, as I saw. the block in its
place as if the boat had been unhooked. As it was twenty
minutes since Phillips and I had seen each other, Lieutenant
Hobson thought that I must have been killed down below.
The Spaniards were all the time firing away, as I wandered
about the decks alone. Then the thought struck me to
make for the bridge. As I was on the starboard side close to
the machinist's mess room, I heard a voice, but where, I could
not tell. Then I overheard some one say, "That is Kelly."
I went through a mass of smoke calling out, " Hallo, where
are you?" The answer came, " Come alongside of the bunker
hatch." Just at that moment a shell from Morro battery ex



SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC.


I3 7


ploded all around me, but none of it touched me. I got
alongside the rest of the men and they told me to lie down
with them. Some one asked me if I had been wounded, as
they had seen the shell burst all around me. I said, yes, that
over by the mine I got pelted in the eye and mouth and legs.
One of the men said to me, "You were lucky, as Lieutenant
Hobson and I were on the point of shooting you. We
thought you must be a Spaniard who had gotten on board,
for we were sure you had been killed down below when you
didn't turn up sooner." Lieutenant Hobson asked me if I
had gone down into the engine-room to see if Phillips had
been there, as I could not find him or any one on deck. He
also asked me how things were down below. I answered him
that the water was blowing freely. At this time they were
firing away strong at us from the western battery, and one
shot had struck the smokestack and whistle, tearing them
away. As the steam was escaping, I was satisfied that the
boilers would not explode, knowing that there svas an independent valve from each boiler connected with this pipe.
That was the only thing which was in my mind while lying
on deck.
Then the enemy began to explode the submarine mines, and
one of them struck on her starboard side, giving her a list to
port. Lieut. Hobson said, " They are helping us to sink her,
lads." This was about a hundred yards from the entrance to the
harbor. The next mine that strudk her was the final blow which
lifted her bodily eight feet out of the water. Then the water
rushed with terrific force and washed us along the deck forward
and then aft again, washing some of the men overboard. It
washed me into a bunker. I thought it was all up with me,
but kicked until the ship settled to the bottom and then shot
up like a rocket. I was very nearly used up from the amount
of water I drank, but the life belt assisted me in my struggle.
When I looked about to see where I was, I noticed a lot of
wreckage floating around. Striking out, I got hold of a
scuttle bucket. I heard the Spaniards cheering. They still
kept firing at everything they saw. During the time that I
was hanging on to the bucket, I wvas vondering if all my comrades were drowned. I could see none of themn. But soon I
heard some one calling to me, " Come over this way." The




38


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


voice came fromn outside the catamaran, so I dived off the
scuttle bucket and came up alongside Lieut. Hobson. He
asked me if I was all right. I said, " Yes, but I feel a little
shaky."
By this time they had stopped firing at the Merrimac. I
should think that the time from their starting firing till they
finished was about thirty-five minutes. We still remained
hanging on to the float for an hour and a half. We saw the
Spanish soldiers running about the beach with signal lamps.
As daylight came on, the Spaniards saw us from the lighting
tops of the Reina Mercedes. Then Lieut. Hobson discovered
the steam launch of the Cristobal Colon coming toward us.
He said, " Lads, they see us." They came within fifteen yards
of us and challenged all of us in Spanish. Lieut. Hobson answered them in Spanish. Then the officers of the launch gave
orders to the Spanish marines to get ready. One of our men,
Dan Montague, called out, " They are going to fire on us."
At that moment Lieut. Hobson said, "I give myself up as a
prisoner of war, also the men with me, under the flag of truce."
That was for them to notify the flag-ship that we were safe.
So then the Spanish officers told us to give up our arms, and
Lieut. Hobson told us to swim for the launch. At that moment we cast loose our belts and revolvers and let them overboard, sooner than allow the Spaniards to get them. Then
we went on board the steam launch one by one. They
stripped us of our life belts, dumping them overboard and
leaving us with only the trunk of our overalls. I can assure
you that we were pretty well exhausted by being so long in
the water. The steam launch took us to the Reina Mercedes.
As soon as we went aboard, all the Spanish crew ran from forward to aft to see the American prisoners. Surely we were
pretty wild-looking men, with nothing on but plenty of grease
and a half pair of pants. This was about half-past six o'clock
the morning of the third. Lieut. Hobson was taken to the
cabin and- we got supplied with the articles asked for.
During this time our launch had been cruising around looking for us. When the Spaniards spied her from the fort, they
began firing at her. Then the New York sent three shells at
the Reina Mercedes and these landed very close to where we
were standing washing ourselves. At once the Spaniards




SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC.


139


sounded " Quarters " and flewv to their guns, thinking that
there was going to be a battle. Some of us commenced to
laugh at them, which made them mad, but we did not care,
for we thought that there was something worse. in store for
us.
About nine o'clock that same morning, Admiral Cervera
gave orders that we should be removed from the ship to the
cells in Morro Castle. The launch put us ashore, and.we had
about a mile and a half to walk on a bad road and in our bare
feet. When we reached the Castle the Commander ordered
Lieut. Hobson to be taken to a cell by himself, then turned
and shook hands with us all, at the same time pointing out
our cells to us. These were not inviting. The smell was
like that of a pig-sty, but we were pretty tired, so we lay
down and commenced to think how we all had escaped with
our lives. I passed the remark that our time had not yet
come. Shortly after this, they opened the cell door and
brought some rice and olive oil and horse beans and black
bread and wine. The fare was not very good but there was
no use in kicking.
* At three o'clock that same day, they opened the cell door
and told us all to come out. Some of us thought we were
going to be shot, but they took to Lieut. Hobson's cell, uniform
cloth which had been sent from the flag-ship. There had
also been sent tobacco, and money in case of hunger. Lieut.
Hobson told the English consul to buy us each a hammock
and a blanket. With these, we returned to our cell. Then we
started to smoke, hearty and glad to know that they knew
that we were safe.
On the second day, the bombarding began. Some stray
shots came close to the cell where we were. The sentry, who
was guarding us, ran away. The sergeant of the guard got
hold of him and kicked him back to his post. He went down
on his knees and began to pray while the mortar and bricks
were flying thickly around him and in through the window
and door of the cell.
On the morning of the sixth of June, they came to the cell
and wakened us, telling us to get dressed, as we were to be
removed from Morro Castle to the prison in the town, about
six miles awvay. When we were all ready, they formed a




140


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


guard of thirty soldiers. There was also a sergeant and one
officer. We were made to go in single file with fifteen of the
guard in front and fifteen behind. They marched us over
hills and railroad tracks for the purpose of fooling us in regard
to the roads. When we had marched about three miles they
handed us over to another guard, a body of sixteen men, a
sergeant and an officer, who took us the rest of the way.
Along the road the women were crying, thinking that we were
going to be shot. When we got to the city, Lieut. Hobson
was put by himself and the seven of us into one cell, with cots
in it. We were taken out in the day time. Every morning
they used to let two of us out at a time to wash, with a guard
of sixteen men forming a square around us while we washed.
During all this time they did not believe that we belonged
to the navy, but thought that we had been engaged outside
the navy for the purpose of sinking the Merrimrac. They
thought that navy men would not do such a deed. Every day
for about eight days, some of the Spaniards would come to
our cell, making motions with their hands as if firing a gun, and
saying that in about two hours we should be shot. This continued until the English consul put a stop to it. We also made
a report to the English consul in regard to the complement of
bread with which we were served. Some days we would get
two ounces, other days three, with rice and beans and olive
oil all mixed up together. Besides this, there was a sardine
and a half for each man and two bottles of wine. That was
our living during our stay. But the English consul brought
us eighty-five biscuits, which cost twenty cents apiece, some
sugar and some coffee. He told us he could not do any more,
as there was nothing else in the place.
Then I took the fever and so did Dan Montague. We had
it badly. A Spanish doctor visited us every morning. He
always complained of the very bad smell in the cell. There
was but one opening about eighteen inches square. That
was all the ventilation we had. Exercise we had none. At
last the English consul requested the general to remove us to
a place where we could get more fresh air, saying that we should
all be down with the fever. So they removed us to another
block, which looked like a prison and a hospital and barracks.
There we had plenty of fresh air and a new doctor to attend




SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC.


141


us who could speak good English. We began to recover our
strength under the treatment he gave us. But they never
let us out of this place to wash. They sent water in to us.
They would not allow us to walk about the cell and told us
to sit on our cots.
On the morning of the 25th of July, about seven o'clock,
the doctor came in and told us that he had been ordered to
notify us that we were to be exchanged that day. He said
that we might as well be ready about two o'clock. But no
one came until three o'clock the next day. Then it was the
doctor who made his appearance and wondered why we were
not gone. At eight o'clock that night the aide-de-camp of
the general came and asked if we had any complaints to make
against any of the officers for anything that had happened
while we had been in prison. We said no, but alas, we had plenty
of them to make! At seven the next morning, the doctor
and the aide-de-camp both came and notified us from the general that we were to be exchanged at ten o'clock that day.
Then the doctor shook hands with us all, saying that war was
a bad thing and that they were going to have a battle at five
o'clock that evening, and added, " Perhaps you will be fighting against us." Again he told us to be ready at ten o'clock.
We said that we would not accept the exchange unless Hobson was to be released with us. Then an officer came with
handkerchiefs and blindfolded us, leading us to the place of
exchange. We sat there about half an hour, until our. officer
brought the ten Spanish prisoners to exchange for the eight
Americans. But the Spaniards would accept only man for
man. We were then taken to the American lines and were
received with loud cheering. XVe had another hearty cheering
and reception when we got on board the New York at Siboney.
This is the true statement of the sinking of the Merrirnac
and of our imprisonment in Morro Castle and in Santiago.
&.4 tJ C          - # e*ow/




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CHAPTER VI.


THE STORY OF THE TEXAS.
HER PART IN THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.
BY
CYRUS S. RADFORD, Lieut. U. S. Marines.
R. K. CRANK, Ass't Engineer, U. S. N.
BEFORE proceeding to describe the naval battle of Santiago, the precautions taken by Admiral Sampson to
make the blockade of Santiago effective and to prevent the escape, by day or by night, of any of the enemy's
vessels, should be noted.
On June 2nd, the day after his arrival off Santiago, Admiral
Sampson issued an "Order of Battle." By this order, the
American naval force was divided into the First and Second
Squadrons. The First Squadron, under Admiral Sampson,
comprised the New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower and Porter. The Second Squadron, under Commodore
Schley, comprised the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead and Vixen. These ships were stationed on a semicircle around the Morro, a fort at the entrance.of the harbor
on the east, each ship lying six miles from the entrance, the
ships on the extreme east and west keeping two miles
from shore. At night the vessels were to close in nearer.
The accompanying sketch shows the arrangement of the ships
under this first order. The First Squadron xvas on the east,
the Second Squadron on the west, of the entrance. The Admiral also said: " If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must
close in and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink
his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel."
On June 7th, when the dark nights came on, the Admiral
adopted the following plan for night blockade; three armed
picket-launches were stationed at dark at a distance of one




144


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


mile from the Morro, one launch to the east, one to the west
and one south of the entrance. Outside of the launches, at a
distance of two miles from the Morro and disposed in a similar manner, were stationed naming from west to east, the
Vixen, the Suzwvanee and the Dolephin, the eastern and western
vessels being about three-fourths of a mile from shore. The
larger remaining vessels, in their regular blockading order, lay
four miles from the entrance.
On June 8th, the Iowa, Oregon and Massachusetts took turns
of two hours each, in keeping a search-light on the entrance
1/
II'.-Picket launches.
b.-Guard sllip.
s.-Search-light ship.
Disposition of vessels for night blockade according to Admiral's
last order.
of the harbor. This proving to be a success, these ships were
/     4^    \ 
ordered to go in, each in turn for two hours, to a distance of
two miles and keep the beam of a search-light directly up the
narrow harbor entrance, taking care not to expose the picket
launches. On June 12th, the blockading distance was reduced to three miles in the daytime and to two miles at night.
After the landing of the Army, when the position of the
**
I
/ZZ.-Picket launches.
b.-Guard ship.
s.-Search-light ship.
Disposition of vessels for night blockade according to Admiral's
last order.
of the harbor. This proving to be a success, these ships were
ordered to go in, each in turn for two hours, to a distance of
two miles and keep the beam of a search-light directly up the
narrow harbor entrance, taking care not to expose the picket
launches. On June 12th, the blockading distance was reduced to three miles in the daytime and to two miles at night.
After the landing of the Army, when the position of the




THE STORY OF THE TEXAS.


145


enemy became critical, one battle-ship always lay in the
shadow near the ship that was using the search-light, with the
men at the guns, ready for immediate action.
The morning of Sunday, July 3rd. 1898, was slightly
cloudy and sultry. The ships of the American blockading
squadron lay in their usual positions around the harbor-mouth
of Santiago, anticipating nothing beyond the usual; quiet, uneventful day of routine duties. The ships lay, as they had
done for weeks in compliance with the order of Admiral
Sampson, in a large semi-circle, with the Morro for its center.
The little Vixen lay farthest to the west and closest in shore;
*vo'E                                             %MAV(FIWEf
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Blockading positions of ships according to Admiral's order of
June 2nd. These were relatively the positions in which the ships
lay on July 3rd, except that the distance from the Morro was three
miles instead of six.
then came the Brooklyn,-she was out of position, outside
the semi-circle and about 7,000 yards distance from the
Morro; almost due east of the Brooklyn, and 5,ioo yards
S. S. W. from the Morro, lay the Texas: she was heading
nearly east, with her port broadside to the shore. To the
east of the Texas and in the order named came the lowa, Oregon
and Indiana. These ships lay in their positions on the semi*




146


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


circle; they were abou.t two thousand 'yards apart and each
ship headed towards the Morro, as had been ordered by the
Admiral. Close inshore to the eastward lay the converted
yacht Gloucester; she was about 4,300 yards from the Morro.
The flag-ship New York had left her blockading station 'about
nine o'clock to go to Siboney, where the Admiral was to have
a consultation with General Shafter; the Massachusetts had
gone earlier in the morning to Guantanamo to coal. Pursuant to orders, the remaining ships had closed in to fill up
the gaps in the blockading line. The torpedo-boat Ericsson
and the converted yacht Hornet lay about six miles to the
eastward of the Morro.
The usual Sunday-morning muster and inspection had been
omitted to give the men a chance to rest; and as the chaplain
was ill, there had been no prayers on the quarter deck, as was
customary. Most of the men were lying around the decks.
Shortly before 9:30 A. M., moving columns of smoke were
seen back of the hills to the west of the harbor-mouth. There
was but little breeze and the smoke went straight up. It had
become an instinctive habit and almost second nature to
watch the Morro and the harbor; and nothing that was visible
in the direction of the entrance escaped notice.- It was
thought from the columns of smoke, that some of the ships
inside were changing their position; it was hoped, no doubt,
by many, that the Spanish ships were coming out. Very soon
after the smoke was first observed, the black bow of a big
ship was seen poking out of the channel to the east of Smith
Cay.
Almost simultaneously, signal guns were fired from the
Iowza and Oregon,;.and the signal, 250, "The enemy's vessels
are escaping," was hoisted on all our ships. On the Texas,
some one shouted down through the ward-room hatch, "They're
coming out! " and a moment later the general alarm sounded.
It is hard to describe one's emotions at this time. There was
a feeling of intense but suppressed excitement and of momentary doubt that the Spaniards were really coming out;,and there was a desire on the part of nearly every one to
verify, by the testimony of his own eyes, the stupendous fact
that the long-awaited enemy was at last coming out to meet




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THE STORY OF THE TEXAS.


I47


us; but with all, I think, there was a feeling of elation over the
fact that the enemy was coming. One felt as if the time of
his life-or at least, of his naval life,-had come.
In a moment, all wvas activity aboard. The ships were already cleared for action and ammunition wvas kept in readiness
near the guns. We were practically ready for battle at any
time. The men instinctively wvent to their stations. They
had almost lived at the guns for five weeks. As the engines
were moved frequently to keep the ship in position, the fires
were kept in good condition, heavy and covered over, a third
of them being cleaned every watch, as is usual at sea. The
steam pressure was always kept up to the highest workingpressure. The officer-of-the-deck shouted down the speaking
tube: "For God's sake give us all the steam you can!
They're coming out!" Then came the slamming down of
battle-hatches, shutting out the last ray of natural light from
the compartments below the protective deck; the shutting of
water-tight doors; the calls of the men in the handling-rooms
and at the ammunition hoists; the hurrying of feet as the
men went to their stations; the clanging of the general alarm;
-all apparent confusion, yet all perfect system and order.
The ships were sighted and the general alarm was sounded at
9:35; just three minutes afterwards, we began firing with our
port guns. The Spaniards said that they had expected to
surprise us at prayers; what a cruel disappointment!
The leading ship of the enemy came out rapidly, firing with
her big gun as she cleared Socapa Point, probably at the
Brooklyn or the Texas; the shell fell short. The forts opened
fire simultaneously.
The leading vessel of the enemy was soon followed by
three others; they came out rapidly, running apparently at
about nine knots. We now know that the order in which the
enemy came out was as follows: ist, the Maria Teresa, flying the flag of Admiral Cervera; 2nd, the Vizcaya; 3rd, the
Cristobal Colon; 4th, the Alinirante Oquendo. As soon as
the Maria Teresa cleared the mouth of the harbor, she turned
sharply to the xvest and ran full speed close inshore, the other
vessels following in her wake at intervals of about 500 or 6oo
yards.




. 148


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


The ships of our squadron that were lying to the eastward
of the Texas, as well as the Brooklyn, were headed towards
the Morro, so that they had only to go ahead at full speed,
as they did, to close in on the enemy. The Texas was
headed towards the east, and as soon as the enemy was
sighted, she went ahead full speed with both enginesand with
the helm hard-a-starboard so as to swing around to the west;
as she swung, the port guns were fired as rapidly as possible,
the turret gun being fired.
The other vessels of our force, with the exception of the
Vixen, headed full speed for the enemy, firing with their main
and secondary batteries as they closed in. The Vixen was
lying close inshore, about 5,300 yards west of the Morro,
and right in the path of the enemy's ships. Had she remained there she would have been caught between the shore
and the enemy's ships, or between the enemy's line of
battle and our ships, and exposed to the fire of both; so
she very properly and promptly hustled seawards, going beyond the Brooklyn's first position, and ran parallel to our
ships and outside of them during the engagement. The
Gloucester, lying a little to the eastward of the Morro and
about a mile and a half off shore, headed at full-speed for
the enemy, firing as she approached; she began firing at
about 3,500 yards and soon reduced her distance to less than
3,000 yards, when she slowed down to wait for the two Spanish torpedo destroyers in case they should come out.
As soon as they cleared the entrance, the enemy's ships
opened a very rapid, fierce fire on our ships. At first their
range seemed to be fairly good; but later, as the action
became closer, all their shells seemed to go too high. The
fire from our ships was also very rapid. As we knew very
closely the distance at which our ships had been lying from
the Morro at the beginning of the fight, and hence knew very
closely the range at which to fire, our fire at first must have
been very accurate,-as indeed, was subsequently proved to
be the case. A very light breeze was blowing from the shore,
and the smoke hung in heavy clouds over our ships and was
blown back into the faces of the men at the guns, seriously
interfering with our fire. This same smoke however, forminc




THE STORY OF THE TEXAS.


149


as it did, a grayish-white background for the lead-color of
our ships, must have made it very difficult for the enemy to
see us well. The black hulls of their ships stood out plainly
through the smoke of their guns.
When the four large vessels of the enemy were well clear
of the harbor-mouth and the rear one had gotten about i,5oo
yards to the westward of the Morro, the destroyers Plutoit and
Furor made their appearance and turned to the west to follow
in the wake of the other vessels. This was shortly before ten
o'clock. The Gloucester, in anticipation of the coming out of
the destroyers, had slowed down to wait for them, keeping up
a deliberate fire on the enemy's cruisers in the meanwhile.
As soon as the destroyers appeared the Gloucester opened a
rapid fire on them and closed in on them at full speed.
At ten o'clock, then, all of the enemy's vessels were well
out of and away from the harbor-mouth and steaming at full
speed to the west. The leading vessel was half a mile southeast of the entrance to Cabanas Bay,-a small bay about two
miles to the westward of the Morro. The interval between
the enemy's ships was about 500 or 6oo yards. The Plu/on
and Furor were close inshore and about half a mile west
of the entrance of Santiago. Our ships that were at first
lying to the east of the Morro had closed in rapidly. The
Gloucester had arrived at a point just about south of the
Morro. The Indiana, steaming almost due west, had come
up to a point about 2,500 yards southeast of the Morro. The
Oregon, heading at first northwest, had swung around to the
westward and had come up rapidly until she was nearly
abreast of the Texas. The Iowa, at first headed almost due
north, had also swung around to the westward, and was on
the starboard beam of the Oregon. The Texas had swung
around in a big circle to port, with starboard helm, until she
was now heading vest, with the Iowa and Oregon on her starboard quarter. The Brooklyn, heading northeast and running
directly for the enemy, would have crossed the bows of the
Texas, had she (the Brooklyn) continued on her course; but,
putting her helm hard-a-port, the Brooklyn swung around to
the eastward almost directly in the course that the Texas was
taking. Continuing to swing with a port helm, the Brooklyn




I50


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


made almost a complete circle, finally standing off to the west
on a course parallel to that of the enemy's vessels. As the
Brooklyn swung, she ran directly across the bows of the Texas;
the Texas was forced to slow and stop until the Brooklyn had
passed out of the way. About this time, while the Texas
was slowed or stopped, the Oregon passed her on the starboard side, running between the Iowa and the Texas and
blanketing the fire of the Texas. This was a little after ten
o'clock. This manceuvre on the part of the Oregon was extremely dangerous in the smoke and confusion of the battle.
It is said that one of her 6-inch-gun captains had the lock
string of his gun in his hand, waiting for a favorable opportunity. to. fire into the Texas at point-blank range. With the
Oregon on the starboard bow and the Iowa on the starboard
quarter, the Texas was at the focus of the enemy's fire, in a
very fair position to receive the shells of the enemy directed
at these other two vessels. It was at this time that the shells
from the enemy were flying most thickly and rapidly over
the decks of the Texas. It is probable that the 6-inch shell
that struck and burst just outside the smoke-pipe, in the airtrunk to the forced-draft blowers, came aboard at this time.
The New York had gotten under way from Siboney at the
beginning of the fight. At first she could make only eight
knots, having only a fraction of her boiler power in use, but she
gradually increased her speed and was coming up slowly astern.
The torpedo-boat Ericsson had also gotten under way at the
beginning of the fight and ran up in time to overhaul easily
all the ships; she stopped to assist the Iowa in picking up
the men of the Vizcaya after that ship had been beached. The
action began at a range, for the Texas, of about 4,500 yards. At
9:45, the range given out on the Texas was 3,200 yards. Shortly
afterwards, a range of 2,600 yards was given out. This was
the last range given.
The perpendicular distance between the enemy's column
and our own column was about 2,200 yards; this was because
we were firing at the enemy forward of the beam.
The Oregon passed the Texas, and running ahead, engaged
the two leading vessels of the enemy with the Brooklyn. The
Texas and Iowa devoted themselves to the last two vessels of








..j..........




THE STORY OF THE TEXAS.


I " I


the enemy. The destroyers received the concentrated fire of
the secondary batteries of the Texas, Oregon, Iowa, Indiana
and Gloucester. The fire directed on these two, the Pluton and
Furor, was something terrible; the water around them fairly
foamed from the rain of rapid-fire shells that struck near them.
A big shell-whether from one of the 12-inch guns of the Iowa
that was fired at one of the boats or from the after 6-inch gun
of the Texas, that was also fired at one of the boats, no one
knows-struck one of the destroyers, cutting her nearly in
two. The other boat was cut to pieces by shell. The Gloucester followed the destroyers closely, though she was exposed
to the fire of the larger vessels of the enemy that were in the
rear.
About 10:15, the two leading vessels of the enemy were about
one and a half miles west of the mouth of Cabanas Bay. Until ten o'clock the order of the enemy's vessels was as follows:
1st, Maria Teresa; 2nd, Vizcaya; 3rd, Colon; 4th, Oquendo.
Between o10 and o10:15, this order was changed. The Vizcaya,
keeping her course, had taken the lead. The Colon, passing
inshore of the Teresa, followed on the starboard quarter of the
Vizcaya, and at some time, the Oquendo passed the Teresa.
Our ships were enveloped in smoke and were very hotly engaged with the enemy about this stage of the fight; so it is
very difficult, if not impossible, to say with certainty just
what happened. At o10:15, the position of our ships was this:
The Brooklyn was the farthest offshore, abreast of the leading
vessel of the enemy; the Oregon followed closer inshore and
about on the starboard quarter of the Brooklyn; the Oregon was
500 yards or more closer to the enemy than the Brooklyn, i. e.,
about 3,000 yards from them; the Texas was just astern of
the Oregon and about i,ooo yards behind the Oregon and
about abreast of the third of the enemy's vessels; the Iowa
was on the starboard quarter of the Texas and about 400 yards
astern of her; the Indiana perhaps a mile and a quarter
astern of the Iowa; the Gloucesterabout half a mile southeast
of Cabanas Bay, engaging the destroyers, which were just off
the mouth of the bay. These hours given are approximately
accurate.
The destroyers were the first of the enemy's vessels to be




152


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


knocked out. The explosion-on the Furor occasioned by a
big shell, most probably from the Iowa, which was the first
visible sign of disaster in the enemy's squadron, took place
about 10:17; and the Furor sank in deep water a little to the
west of Cabanas (about one mile). A great cloud of steam
and smoke ascended from the Furor as she exploded. She
stopped and sheered in toward the beach, firing her guns to
the last. When the smoke cleared away, only the P/u/on was
to be seen. The P/uton slowed after the Furor exploded.'
Soon after, there was an explosion on the Pit/on and she
steered wildly, being apparently unmanageable; she did, however, get close inshore and was beached in the surf on the
rocks. The destroyers went down about 10:22.
The action was probably hottest from ten o'clock until the
Teresa and Oquendo were beached.  The enemy's vessels
kept up a continuous and very rapid fire. Numbers of their
shells, both large and small, passed over the Texas. Their
fire was not so rapid as ours, however. Roughly, the Brooklyn'
and the Oregon were engaged with the Vizcaya and the Colon
after io:i5; and the Texas and Iowa with the Oquendo and
Maria Teresa. At ten minutes past ten, the Maria Teresa
the third of the enemy's vessels in column, was seen to be
sheering in towards the beach; she seemed to be on fire forward before she headed in. But this smoke was probably
due to an explosion, as it seemed to clear away soon, after
which she at once headed for the beach. To those on the
American ships astern, it looked as if she were coming back to
aid the Oquendo, which was now the last ship in the column,
and, because of this position, had been receiving the concentrated fire of the Texas and Iowa and probably also of the
Indiana. The Oquendo went on a short distance past the
Teresa and then herself headed in towards the beach. These
two ships beached in a small cove called Nima-Nima, about six
miles west of Morro: they went ashore about 500 to 8oo yards
apart and almost simultaneously. This was at 10:35. The
Teresa hoisted a white flag. The Oquendo simply struck her
colors.
The Cris/oba/ had gained steadily on the Vizcaya, and about
the time that the first two ships were beached, she passed in



THE STORY OF THE TEXAS.


153


shore and ahead of the Vizcaya. They were a mile and a half
beyond Nima-Nima at 10:35. The Brooklyn was well on the
port quarter of the leading ship of the enemy and well offshore (about sixty-five hundred yards). The Oregon followed
on the starboard quarter of the Brooklyn, about half a mile
closer inshore. The Texas followed in the wake of the Oregon and about a mile astern of her; the Iowa was close on the
starboard quarter of the Texas; the Indiana was about a mile
astern of the Texas. The running fight continued. The two
fleeing Spaniards replied rather weakly to the fire of our ships,
which was concentrated on the Vizcaya. The Texas wvas firin g at a range of 6,400 yards. This rather dispirited fight continued for about seven miles. The Vizcaya must have suffered severely from the fire of these four ships, the Brooklyn,
Oregon, Texas and Iowa. At o10:55, the Vizcaya sheered in
towvards the beach, on fire forward and aft, and in a very short
time she hauled down her colors (i i:05). She was enveloped
in clouds of thick smoke that came from her decks and sides;
through the smoke patches of flame could be seen. Her
men were to be seen lowering boats, and many jumped overboard. The Texas was abeam of the Vizcaya about 11:30.
About this time, there was a terrific explosion on the Vizcaya
and our men burst into cheers. The Vizcaya went ashore at
Acerradero, about fifteen miles west of the Morro. The Iowa
dropped out of the chase here, and remained to pick up the
officers and men of the Vizcaya; she was out of the fight
from this time, as was also the Indiana. The New York was
gaining slowly and coming up astern, increasing her speed all
the time.
The Colon had increased her lead and was now doing her
best to escape. She was closely followed by the Brooklyn and
Oregon. The Texas followed about four miles astern of the
Oregon. The speed was about sixteen knots and at times it
must have run nearly two knots higher. The Brooklyn shaped
her course so as gradually to force the Colon to run ashore
The Brooklyn was about a mile farther offshore than the Ortgon, which held a parallel course. The Texas was headed for
the Colon. The Brooklyn was firing from her 8-inch guns.
The greater number of the shells fell short, a few going over




154


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


the Colon. The chase continued from  Ii:30 until 1:20, the
Brooklyn gradually edging the Colon in towards the beach and
the Oregon hauling up astern. As there was a point of land
(Cape Cruz) in plain sight, and as the Brooklyn was heading directly for it, it soon became evident that the Colon must turn
out seaward or run ashore on this point, if the Brooklyn did
not intercept her before the point was reached. After the
Vizcaya was beached and we had ceased firing on her, there
was no further firing until about 12:45. We had been gaining
on her all the time, even the Texas being in the push. About
12:45, the Oregon fired two heavy shells at the Colon, which
fell short. The Oregon's next shot fell very close. The Brooklyn tried a few shots, which fell far short on account of the
great distance from the Colon. It is probable that the cornmmanding officer of the Colon had decided that the game was
up and was simply looking for a good place to beach his ship.
His case was hopeless.  The shells from the Oregon were
splashing close around his ship, the New York was coming up
rapidly astern and the Brooklyn could have headed him off
had he turned to seaward. So the Colon was seen to slacken
her speed about one o'clock, and at 1:20 she ran on the beach
and surrendered. The Texas hoisted the signal:   The
enemy's vessel has surrendered," and Captain Philip called all
hands aft for silent prayer. The Colon surrendered to Commnodore Schley, who signalled to the New York: "We have
gained a great victory; details will be communicated later."
A at
GM.          le
A, 58.,<.d~7               t




I..        I....
I.        4,  -   I,.4
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N.
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I r rriiX  n.1-.1.1 11  i.




CHAPTER VII.


THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.
BY
CAPr. ROBLEY D. EVANS, U. S. N.
O   N May i9, 1898, the Spanish Admiral, Pascual Cervera y
Topete, had entered the harbor of Santiago, on the
south side of the Island of Cuba, with the fast
armored cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa, Vizcaya, Almirante
Oquendo and Cristobal Colon, together with the sea-going
torpedo boats Furor and Pluton.
On Sunday morning, July 3, 1898, the American fleet, commanded by Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson, was blockading the
harbor of Santiago. The entrance to the harbor was defended by numerous batteries, none of sufficient strength to
endanger the blockading fleet, but together strong enough to
protect the lines of electric and observation mines with which
the narrow channel was known to be planted.
The disposition of the blockading fleet was as follows:
beginning at the eastern end of the line was the auxiliary
gunboat Gloucester, off Aguadores, close into the land and
about three miles from the Morro fort; next to the Gloucester
the flag-ship New York; then the battleship Indiana; then
the battleship Oregon; next to her the battleship Iowa; next
to her the second-class battleship Texas; next to her the
armored cruiser Brooklynz, flying the broad pennant of Commodore Schley; and on the western end of the line, the
auxiliary gunboat Vixen, close into the land.
The fleet was arranged in an irregular half circle with the
western part of the curve flattened out, owing to the lay of
the land in that direction, and all distant about three miles
from the Morro-the fort at the eastern entrance to the harbor. This was the usual position of the American fleet from
daylight until dark.




i56


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


The orders from the flag officer commanding, Admiral Sampson, were as follows: " The vessels wvill blockade Santiago de
Cuba closely, keeping about six miles from the Morro in the
daytime and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well
inshore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side
of the port and the second squadron on the wvest side. If
the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close in and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or
force them to run ashore in the channel."
The distance from the Morro was afterwards decreased to
three miles in the daytime and less at night.
Sunday, July 3, was one of those beautiful clear days sometimes seen in the tropics, without a cloud in the sky and
when objects can be distinguished at a long distance. The
flag-ship New York had started to Siboney, at about 9 A. M.,
flying the signal: " Disregard the movements of the Commander-in-Chief"-Admiral Sampson had been invited to a
conference and xvas on his way to meet General Shafter.
At about 9:35 the Spanish fleet was discovered coming out.
The Iowa, from her position, could see farther into the harbor
than any other ship and was therefore the first to discover
them. Before the leading vessel, the Maria Teresa, bearing
the flag of Admiral Cervera, had made the turn into the channel in front of the Punta Gorda battery, the Iowa flew the
signal: " Enemy's ships coming out;" at the same time she
fired a shotted gun to call attention to the signal. This was
the first gun of the engagement.
The above signal was immediately repeated, and almost at
the same moment, by the Oregon, a few seconds later by the
Texas and then by the Brooklyn.
Lieut. Schuetze, navigator of the Iowa, and Lieut. F. K.
Hill were on the bridge when the latter discovered the Maria
Teresa as her bow showed around the end of Cayo Smith.
Lieut. Hill immediately jumped to a six-pounder on the
bridge, gave the gun extreme elevation and as the signal was
run up, fired in the direction of the enemy's ships. The signal had been bent on the night before and was, therefore, all
ready.
At this moment the ships of the American fleet were in the




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.


T.5 7


following positions:-The New York about four miles to the
eastward of her usual position, turning with helm hard aportthe Admiral's flag in plain sight from the Iowa; the Gloucester close inshore off Aguadores; the Indiana in or near the
position usually occupied by the New York, heading for the
Morro and going at full speed; the Oregon heading for the
entrance at full speed; the Iowa heading a little to the westward of the entrance, going at full speed; the Texas heading
about East across the course of the Iowa; the Brooklyn heading about North by West and the Vixen heading South and
coming out fast from under the land.
Almost immediately upon the discovery of the Maria Teresa,
the Oregon and Iowa opened fire on her at a range of 6,ooo
yards. The Texas and Brooklyn also opened with their port
batteries. - As the Maria Teresa, followved by the Vizcaya,
Colon and Oquendo, in the order named, cleared the point and
stood to the westward, the Indiana, which was approaching
the Morro from the eastward, was exposed to their fire and
became hotly engaged.
When the last Spanish vessel, the Oquendo, cleared the
point, the action was general on both sides and the fire
very heavy. The shore batteries had all opened on the American fleet as soon as the first shots were fired at the Maria
Teresa and, as they received no answer from the Americans,
they continued to fire at will, but it could not be observed
that any damage resulted from their efforts.
The Spanish squadron was now standing to the westward
in column, the distance between the ships being about 6oo
yards and-the speed gradually increasing to about thirteen.
knots.
Three American battleships were closing in on them at full
speed, keeping them on their starboard bows and using all guns
that would bear in that direction. The Spanish were using
their broadsides and firing with great rapidity but with little
accuracy.
The armored cruiser Brooklyn, at this stage of the battle,
put her helm to port and turned to the south, away from the
enemy's fleet, and. thereby materially increased her distance
from  them.  In performing the manceuvre she caused the




I58


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Texas to slow down and stop to avoid collision. Before the
latter could recover her speed she had fallen somewhat astern
of the battleships. As the Brooklyn completed her turn and
headed off to the westward she became hotly engaged with
the Vizcaya, as was also the Texas, the latter having regained
her position by an increase of speed.
The pace proved too hot for the Maria Teresa and the
Oquendo, and at about ten o'clock both ships were seen to be
in distress. Soon smoke began to show from their after
hatches and through the -shot holes in their sides and they
turned and stood for the beach, first the Maria Teresa and
then the Oquendo. At IO:25 the former, and a few minutes
later, the latter took the beach. Both were in flames fore
and aft.
The Colon had in the meantime tried to carry out her part
of Admiral Cervera's well-considered plan of escape. When
all the ships were fully engaged and the smoke was the thickest, she ran inside the Spanish ships ahead of her and, at a
speed of seventeen knots, made her dash for liberty. The
Oregon immediately passed under the stern of the Iowa, across
the bows of the Texas and stood after the Colon, in so doing
closely engaging the Vizcaya. At this time the battleships
Iowa and Indiana swung to the westward and the American
fleet was in column at irregular distances. The cruiser Brooklynl, well off to the left, led the column and was broad off the
port quarter of the Colon, about six miles away from her; the
Oregon came next, well inside the Brooklyn but astern of her
and a little on the port quarter of the Colon; next came the
Texas on the port quarter of the Oregon and astern of her;
next after the Texas came the Iowa, inside ship of all, heading for the Vizcaya, and last the Indiana, almost directly in
the wake of the Iowa.
At 9:50, two thousand yards astern' of the Spanish ships
came the torpedo boats Plbton and Furor. The Indiana flew
the signal: " Enemy's torpedo boats escaping," and opened
on them with her secondary and rapid-fire batteries as they
passed the Morro and hauled to the westward. The Iowa
and Texas also opened a furious fire on them and a few moments later the Gloucester attacked them with great spirit.




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.


159


At 10:30, the Furor blew up and sank in deep water, and the
Piniton headed for the beach, where she ran on the rocks and
was submerged except a small portion of her bows. The
American fleet, having destroyed or disabled the two torpedo
boats and two of the Spanish cruisers, stood on in column, as
before described, in chase of the two remaining ships.
At ii o'clock the Vizcaya turned for the beach, in flames,
and was run ashore at Accerraderos, fifteen miles to the westward of the Morro, where she continued to burn until practically destroyed. At this time the battle of Santiago may be
said to have ended.
The Indiana was sent back to guard the Santiago entrance
and prevent the escape of the Spanish vessels known to be
still in the harbor. The Iowa, assisted by the Hist and
Ericsson, rescued the crew of the Vizcaya; the Harvard performed the same service for the Maria Teresa and Oquendo,
assisted by the boats of the Indiana and Gloucester.
Shortly after the surrender of the Vizcaya, the flag-ship Newz
York passed to the westward in chase after the Colon. The
Brooklyn, Oregon, Texas and Vixen continued also in chase
and at about I P. M. the Oregon opened fire with her forward
thirteen-inch guns. The Brooklyn fired with her eight-inch
guns at about the same time. The Oregon's first shot, at
nine thousand yards, fell short, but the second at nine thousand eight hundred went over the Colon, and her captain,
deeming further resistance to be useless, struck his colors at
1:15 P. M. and ran his ship on the beach at Rio Tarquino,
about fifty miles to the westward of the Morro. After she
had been surrendered her sea valves were treacherously
opened and the vessel sank and rolled over on her side.
No shot struck the Colon after she made her run past the
other Spanish ships and her commander stated that she surrendered only because he found the Oregon could reach him
and he feared the effect of her thirteen-inch shells.
When the flag-ship New York passed near the wreck of the
Vizcaya, it was evident at a glance that the Iowa could be of
no service in chasing the Colon. At the same time it was
clear to all that the fast battleship Oregon, and the faster armQred cruisers, New  York and Brooklyn, were surely and




i6o


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


steadily overhauling her and that it would be only a short
time before they would come up with her and compel her
surrender. This was accomplished, as before stated, at
1:15 P. M.
The effect on the American ships of the fire of their Spanish opponents was very much less than might have been expected. The Iowa was more damaged than any other vessel,
having been struck in the starboard bow by two six-and-ahalf-inch shells, one of which exploded on the berth-deck, doing great damage. She was also cut up somewhat about the
upper works by small projectiles and her sides and turrets
marked by a great number of Mauser bullets fired from the
Oquendo. One shell struck at or near the water line on the
starboard bow and penetrated the cellulose belt. The cellulose was washed out of the coffer-dam before it had time to
swell and stop the shot hole and the water astern for several
miles was covered with it.
The Brooklyn lost the only man killed in the action. She
was much cut up or marked by small projectiles, but was not
struck by anything larger than a six-inch shell. The fact
that she was struck much oftener than any other ship was no
doubt owing to the much larger target she presented to the
enemy due to her high foreboard and great length.
The Texas came next in point of damage received. She
was twice struck, once by a six-inch shell which exploded
after passing through the hammock berthing, doing much
harm; the other shell, size not known, exploded near the
bridge and did considerable damage to the pilot-house.
The Oregon was struck by one six-inch shell and two fragments of shell but was not seriously injured.
The Indiana was marked by two small fragments of shell
but no damage was done her.
The other American ships were not struck. In no case was
the machinery injured and not a single gun was put out of
action by the fire of the Spaniards.
The accuracy of fire on the American side was vastly superior to that of the Spaniards and its effects were terrific. The
JlMaria Teresa's water mains were cut before she reached the
Morro and when she was headed to the westward she had




'A




- - - - - - - - - --------- - - ----------------------------- ---- - - -- -........................................
MOMINd U10 hi M 1ARARM




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.


It 6 Ii


forty dead men on her decks. In fact, all the Spanish ships
were simply smothered by the fire of the Americans. The
full effect of this fire could not be observed except in the case
of the Co/on, as all the others were burned and partially submerged, but the parts above water show how effective and
terrific it inust have been. The forward turret of the Oquendo
is a fair sample of it. An eight-inch shell struck the edge of
the hood of this turret, flanged it back and exploded, killing
every man and officer in the turret and disabling every piece
of machinery in it.
Every ship except the Colon showed in all parts, above the
protective decks, the awful havoc caused by the explosion of
modern projectiles. Their exposed sides were simply riddled
and in many cases the shells passed completely through from
side to side. To the accuracy of the American fire may
be fairly attributed the inaccuracy of the Spanish return
fire.
The loss of life in the action was most disproportionate, the
Americans having lost but one man, while the Spanish loss
in killed was given by Admiral Cervera, in his telegram to
General Blanco, as over six hundred. This has since been
reduced to about four hundred. The number of wounded
will never be known, as a great many of them were burned
with their ships.
The American hospital ship, Solace, however, cared for
and took north II7 wounded Spanish officers and men. Of
the several plans of escape open to Admiral Cervera, he undoubtedly adopted the one most likely to succted. He
might have headed to the eastward after passing the Morro
instead of to the westwvard, but if he had done so he would
have had to pass the battleships Oregon and Indiana at close
range, immediately after encounter the Nezw York, one of the
most efficient armored cruisers in the world.  If he had
succeeded in escaping from Admiral Sampson's fleet, he
would still have had to deal with the vessels under Commodore Watson at Guantanamo, among them the battleship
Massachzusetts.
He might have opened out his ships after clearing the entrance and made for the open sea, each vessel steering a




i62


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


different course. Had he done so, each of his ships would
have had to pass between two American ships, and the result
to him would have been the almost instant destruction of his
fleet.
If Admiral Cervera had intended to fight with the object
of doing all the damage possible to the American fleet, he
should have come out with his ships in column, closed to half
distance, Fvith the torpedo boats close under the stern of the
last, or next to the last vessel, and in this formation charged
the American line. In the thick of the smoke there would
have been a chance for ram and torpedo, and it is more than
probable that the Americans would have lost seriously in
ships and lives. The result would, however, have been the
same in the end-the Spanish fleet would have been destroyed and sunk in deep water, and the loss of life appalling.
But Admiral Cervera had no such intentions. He came out
to escape and not to fight more than was necessary in order to
accomplish his object. He was compelled by imperative
orders to leave the harbor and under all the circumstances he
adopted the course most promising of success. His plans
were admirably made, and the attempt to carry them out,
one of the most gallant recorded in history.
It was a fatal mistake to send the fleet out in the face of
such a force, and the result must have been foreseen by Admiral Cervera and the able officers associated with him, but
once outside, by standing to the westward, he confined the
fire of the American fleet to one side of his ships and thus reduced the chance of hits to the minimum.
The handling of the torpedo boats was a mistake. They
should have been kept close to the leading ships and on their
starboad or inshore sides, ready at the proper moment to use
their torpedoes or make a dash for liberty.
The only other course open to the Spanish Admiral was to
attempt to escape by night, and this was rendered absolutely
impossible by the persistent use of search lights by the American fleet, and by the further fact that three battleships were
always close in to the entrance of the harbor. Any attempt to
come out during this time-from dark until daylight-would
have resulted in the sinking of the leading ship and the grounding and destruction of all the others,




THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.


I63


It may be fairly assumed that if Admiral Cervera-one of
the ablest men of his profession-had been left to his own
devices, the Spanish fleet undcr his command would not have
attempted to escape from Santiago harbor on the 3d of July.
Following is a list of the vessels engaged in the battle of Santiago with their batteries.
AMERICAN SHIPS.
NAME.              BROADSIDE.
(5 — 8 inch rifles.
New York       6    46-   4  "'  4
4    6 pounders.
2  - I    It
6       - 5 inch rifles.
6 — 8 "
Brooklyn       5-   6 pounders.
2    XI
2    Colt Automatic.
I — I2 inch rifle.
4 ---6   "    "c
Texas        4
Texas     {6 —6 pounders.
2 ---Hotchkiss revolving guns.
4    I2 inch rifles.
4 —8 "        "
3 4   "  "    *
I     o3wa
Iowa        o       2 — o6 pounders.
2 --  Colt Automatics.
f 4-   13 inch rifles.
4 —8      "    "
2 —6    "    "
IIndiana   O —  6 pounders.
2 -I
I — Colt Automatic.
4 — 13 inch rifles.
4 —8     "    "
2 —  6   " 
Oregon      Io  66 pounders.
2    I     {'
i-   Colt Automatic.
2 ---6 pounders.
Gloucester     3 — 3 "   A
I-   Colt Automatic.




I64


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Vixen


2 —6 pounders.
1 3- I
SPANISH SHIPS.
BROADSIDE.


NAME.


2-I I inch rifles.
5 — 5 5   "  "
Infanta      4-   6 pounders.
Maria Teresa   5 -  I    "
4 —  Nordenfeldt machine guns.
2    Maxim          c     "
2 —    I inch rifles.
5 —55 i"      "
4    6 pounders.
Vizcaya     -     I   ~
4 —  Nordenfeldt machine guns.
2 -Maxim           "       "
2 —     I inch rifles.
5 ---5.5 "    "
Al mirante   4 —6 pounders.
Oquendo     5- 
4 —Nordenfeldt machine guns.
2 ---Maxim           "     "
2 -   9.8 inch rifles.
5 - — 6   "   "
Cristobal    3    4.7  "   "
Colon       5    6 pounders.
5 ---I 
2 -  Maxim machine guns.
2-12 pd'r rapid-fire Maxim Nordenfeldt guns.
Pluton      I ---6   "    "       "        "
I -Maxim Automatic.
2-12 pd'r. rapid-fire Maxim Nordenfeldt guns.
Furor       I -6      "  "      "(  ~            1 
I -Maxim Automatic.
*These guns were not on board-they were replaced by guns supposed to be six-inch
rifles.
/2>V,^^^




I




.........i//il




CHAPTER VIII.


THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON.
BY
LiEUT. W. H. ALLEN, U. S. N.
T     HE U. S. S. Oregon, when designed and built, was
classed as a coast-line battleship. It was not intended
that she should make long trips at sea, but her duty
was to defend the coast against any vessels that might be
sent to devastate it. The ship is nominally of 10,288 tons displacement, but, when equipped for a long cruise, displaces
nearly 12,000 tons. She wvas designed for iS knots, but
on her official trial developed a speed of i6.7 knots, under
forced draft, using both her main and auxiliary boilers. Her
crew consists ordinarily of thirty officers and 438 men, and
her armament is the heaviest carried by any vessel of the
same displacement. Foreign experts doubted the ability of
this class of ships to keep at sea in rough weather.
The only extended trip of the Oregon previous to March,
i898, had been from San Francisco to Acapulco, Mexico, a
distance of about eighteen hundred miles. This voyage was
made at various speeds to determine the coal consumption.
At that time this was considered a long distance for a battleship to make without a stop. Subsequently, on a trip from
San Francisco to Puget Sound, during a violent wind, she
demonstrated her ability to weather any gale if properly
handled.
In order to make the ship more steady at sea, bilge keels
were built on her bottom. This was done in the dry dock at
Bremerton, Washington.
As the Oregon was being hauled out of the dry dock at
Bremerton on the morning of February i6, I898, news of the
blowing up of the Maine in the harbor of Havana was re



i66


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


ceived. On that day commenced the preparations for her
memorable voyage to the eastern coast. Previous to going
into dock, all ammunition and coal had been removed in order
to lighten her, the ammunition having been left at the Mare
Island Navy Yard near San Francisco.
Orders were received to proceed as soon as possible to San
Francisco and prepare for a long cruise. Owing to the Klondike excitement in the northwest section of the country, vexatious delays occurred in procuring the necessary coal for the
trip to San Francisco, nearly all available vessels being diverted to the Klondike trade. It was not until the 6th of
March that the Oregon sailed for San Francisco, where she
arrived on the 9th.
Ammunition, coal and stores were hurried on board, the
bunkers and store rooms of the ship being crowded to their
utmost capacity. The work was carried on night and day, the
crew working with an enthusiasm seldom seen on a man-ofwar. At this time the final destination of the Oregon was not
known to any one on board, but it was surmised that she
would proceed as far as Callao, Peru, and there await further
instructions. Just as the ship was ready for sea, Captain A.
H. McCormick, who was in command, was obliged to leave
on account of ill health, and was relieved by Captain Charles
E. Clark, who assumed command the morning before the ship
sailed, and who remained on the ship until after the battle of
Santiago. During the period of preparation the excitement
on board was intense, and no one doubted what would be the
findings of the Court of Inquiry on the Maine disaster, though
the final result was in doubt. It is certain, however, that the
crew of the Oregon hoped for war, whatever may have been
the wishes of the officers.
Final orders were received from the Navy Department on
March iS, and early on the morning of the i9th, the Oregon
sailed from San Francisco, and after passing through the
Golden Gate and across the bar, was headed by the most direct route for Callao, Peru.
During the trip from San Francisco to Callao fine weather
was experienced. Ten knots an hour was decided upon as
the most economical speed for this distance, and the engines




THE VOYAGE or 1'THE OREGON'.


i67


were run at a constant rate of seventy-five revolutions per
minute. As she was just out of dock and her bottom clean,
this gave her a speed of nearly eleven knots per hour during
the entire trip. Owing to the construction of the ship, when
she had been a few days at sea, all parts below the upper deck
became so heated that it was impossible for the men to sleep
in their quarters, and this continued all the way around, even
in the cool climate of the Straits of Magellan. It may be
mentioned that the temperature in the armored portion of the
ship over the boilers and engines ranged from X i00 to 11 50, while
the temperature in the ammunition passages was at times as
high as I4o', and these parts of the ship rvere not cooled by
the blowers, which supplied hot air. The temperature of the
fire and engine rooms was even greater than this, and it is
worthy of note that during the entire trip around, only one
man of the engineer's force of the ship succumbed to the
heat, while on previous occasions on short trips such occurrences were common. This was probably due to the enthusiasm of the crew. Every man seemed determined to do everything in his power to push the ship along.
From the time of leaving San Francisco, clearing ship for
action and battery drill were the order of the day, and preparations were made for all possible contingencies. These drills
were carried on daily with few exceptions until the arrival of
the Oregon at Key \Vest. The crew and officers thus became
thoroughly familiar with their duties in battle. Little time
could be spared for actual target practice, and ammunition
wvas precious, but frequent sub-calibre practice was had, to
perfect the gun pointers.
The equator was crossed on March 31, and that day was
given up to the reception of King Neptune, who came on
board with his suite and initiated all those who had not before come into his royal domain. All land lubbers were
treated to a shave ard a bath, and were given certificates
showing that they wvere now free to pass Neptune's kingdom,
and bespeak for themn good treatment.
The Oregon's band, composed of sailors, was an unfailing
source of amusement during the voyage, and there was dancing on the superstructure deck nearly every evening. A




I68


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


whist party of officers met nightly in the cabin, pajamas being
the customary uniform.
During this portion of the trip the anxiety for news was
great, and on our arrival at Callao, April 4, there was a feeling of disappointment that the report of the Court of Inquiry
had not been made public. The meagre news that could be
gathered from the papers published at Callao and Lima was
contradictory and unsatisfactory. Two days after our arrival,
however, the findings of the Court were published. It was
here that Captain Clark was notified by the Department of
the presence on the east coast, of the Spanish torpedo boat
Temerario. The picture and description of this vessel, in connection with her slow speed, failed to create any alarm among
the officers and crew, who even hoped that they might meet
and sink her. The captain decided, however, that if she was
met in the Straits of Magellan she would be there for no
other reason than to attack the Oregon, and that he would
sink her, war or no war.
The gunboat Marietta had been at Callao, and sailed for
Valparaiso the day before the arrival of the Oregon. Her
captain, by order of the Department, had purchased coal for
the Oregon, and it was ready for the ship on her arrival.
Coaling was commenced immediately, and carried on night
and day until all bunkers were full and about two hundred
tons of coal in sacks were piled on deck. This large amount
was taken because of the uncertainty of finding any at Punta
Arenas.
The sentiment of the Peruvians seemed to be strongly in
favor of the United States, but it was reported that a plot
existed among the Spanish residents of Callao and Lima to
sink or blow up the Oregon. In consequence of this rumor
the number of sentries was doubled, and they were furnished
with ball cartridges. The steam launch patrolled around the
ship from dusk until daylight, and no boats were allowed to
approach the ship %without proper authority. This patrol was
continued in all South American ports visited by the Oregon.
Coaling being finished, the Oregon left Callao just before
dark April 7, and headed for the western entrance to the
Straits of Magellan. Fair weather wvas encountered until the




THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON.


i69


afternoon of April i6, when the ship was off Cape Pilar, at the
western entrance to the straits. Fortunately it was clear
enough for her to run in before the gale, which proved to be
a very severe one, even for this region, noted for its furious
gales. At dusk we anchored outside Port Tamar in forty
fathoms of water, having two anchors down. The gale blew
furiously during the night, which was an anxious one, but the
good ship rode it out without difficulty, and early next morning was under way for the run through the straits to Punta
Arenas. This proved to be one of the remarkable runs of the
voyage. The distance to Punta Arenas is i65 miles, and the
captain decided to reach that point in the evening, if possible.
The ship was, therefore, run under assisted draft, that is, the
fire-room blowvers were used to increase the natural draft of
the smoke pipes. The distance to Punta Arenas was covered
in eleven hours, or at a rate of fifteen knots an hour. The
strain on the engineers and firemen was great, but all bore it
without a murmur. During this run crews were stationed at
the secondary battery, in case the Temerario should be found
in the straits, where there are many coves in which a vessel
might lie in wait. On approaching Punta Arenas the lights
of several vessels were visible through the dusk, and as a precaution the crew was called to quarters and the guns loaded.
The anchorage was reached at 6:30 P. M., April I7. No
Spanish vessels were found in the port, and there was no later
news than that we had heard at Callao. Arrangements were
immediately made for taking in coal from the coal hulk, arid
the work commenced, early the next morning.
The Marietta arrived about midnight, having been stormbound in Tuesday Bay, a harbor near the western entrance to
the straits. Seeing the Oregon pass, her captain immediately
got up anchor and followed to Punta Arenas.
While the coaling was going on the usual courtesies were
exchanged with the Chilian naval and military authorities.
The sentiment here, as at Callao, seemed to favor the United
States, but, nevertheless the launches patrolled around the
ship at night, as in that port. On the evening of the 20th an
English mail steamer arrived from Valparaiso, but she brought
no later newvs than the 17th. Coaling was distressingly slow,.




170


THE AMIERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


owving to the poor facilities, and working night and day, only
about 5oo tons had been taken on board by the evening of
the 20th. For this coal the government was obliged to pay
the sum of twenty-two dollars per ton.
At 7 A. M., April 21, the day war was declared, the Oregon,
accompanied by the Marietta, took her departure from Punta
Arenas and steamed towards the eastern entrance to the
straits. The Marietta preceded, on account of her lesser
speed, and also to act as a scout. During the day two American steamers bound to the westward to engage in the Klondike trade, were met, and one of them, much against her
captain's will, was compelled to stop while a boat was sent to
obtain the latest news. The other was interrogated by signals, but neither had as late news as we already possessed.
The two ships passed out of the straits after dark and both
were for the first time in the Atlantic, and headed once more
to the northward. During the remainder of the voyage, no
lights were shown except two lights on the Marietta, to serve
as a guide for the Oregon, and these were carefully screened
so as to show only astern. The Marietta wvas pushed to her
utmost capacity, while the Oregon was obliged to go slower
than her usual speed. The Marietta rolled and pitched in a
fearful manner in the Atlantic swell, and life must have been
very uncomfortable for her ship's company. From the Oregon
she appeared at times fairly to stand on end, but she pluckily
kept on. On the Oregon all lookouts wvere doubled, and the
crews slept at their guns or on the tops of the turrets. No
precaution against surprise was neglected, though it was not
thought that any formidable Spanish vessel would be found
in this locality. Drills were carried on with renewed energy,
for the captain realized that when the tropics were reached it
would be necessary partially to suspend drills in order to keep
the crew in good physical condition.
On the morning of April 30 the Oregon left the Marietta
and pushed ahead at fourteen-knot speed, and at 3 P. M.
dropped her anchor in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
the Marietta arriving about 9 P. M. The first boat alongside
the ship was eagerly questioned for news, and it was then
learned that war had been declared on the 21st. This news




THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON.


17 I


was received with wild cheering by the ship's company, and
all on board were anxious to be away to the scene of action.
The Oregon had anchored at the usual man-of-war anchorage, but soon after her arrival, various rumors were heard
as to the movements of the Temerario, one being that she was
at Isla Grande, a port a few miles to the southward of Rio
de Janeiro. In consequence of this, the Oregon moved farther
up the harbor and Captain Clark gave notice to the Brazilian
authorities that if the Temerario entered the harbor and anchored within half a mile of the Oregon or Marietta, she
would be fired upon and sunk. The Marietta was anchored
nearer the entrance with orders to signal the approach of the
Spaniard. The Brazilian Admiral stationed a torpedo destroyer near the entrance to intercept the Temerario should
she attempt to enter the harbor. At this time, however, the
redoubtable Temerario was in the vicinity of Montevideo and
Buenos Ayres, in a state of dilapidation, and finally went up
the La Plata River as far from the scene of action as possible,
there to remain until the war was over.
Although a state of war existed, no objection wvas raised to
the stay of our ships in port, repairs being necessary to the
engines, and no difficulty was experienced in obtaining all the
coal needed; in fact, it was understood that our government,
through its agents, held an option on all the coal in the harbor,
and the Brazilian government had not declared coal contraband of war.
\WVhile here, information was received of the departure of
Cervera's fleet from the Cape de Verdes in the somewhat poetical cablegram, "Four armored cruisers, heavy and fast,
three torpedo boats, sea-going class, left St. Vincent on the
29th; avoid them if possible." The newvs of Admiral Dewey's
victory at Manila and of the bombardment of Matanzas was
received, and created the wildest enthusiasm among the crew,
and was celebrated in proper style, the band playing patriotic
airs and several of the crew making. speeches.
The departure of the two ships was somewvhat delayed by the
non-readiness of the Nlict/ieroy, which had been purchased from
the Brazilian government. This vessel had been bought by
Brazil during the recent revolution and fitted as a dynamite




I 7 2


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


cruiser, but had never seen active service in that capacity.
The guns had been removed, and she was to all intents and
purposes a merchant vessel. Her machinery and boilers being
in bad condition, extensive repairs were necessary before she
could sail, and the Brazilian government stipulated that she
should not leave until twenty-four hours after the departure
of the Oregon and Marietta. The Nicthzeroy is known in our
service as the Buffalo.
None of the officers or crew were allowed to go ashore except on duty, on account of the prevalence of yellow fever in
the city.
The orders received by Captain Clark left everything to his
discretion after leaving Rio de Janeiro, being in general terms
to avoid the Spanish fleet and to proceed to some West Indian or United States port and report to the Department.
On the morning of May 5, the Oregon and Marie/ta steamed
out of the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, and after passing outside
the marine league, the Marietta was ordered to cruise off
Cape Frio, while the Oregon steamed slowly up and down
off the harbor entrance, awaiting the Aictlzeroy, which did
not come out until the evening of the 6th. The three vessels
then started to the northward, but it soon became evident
that the Nict/zeroy could not make more than six or seven
knots. The captain then decided to push ahead, leaving the
Marietta to convoy the Nict/eroy, with orders to proceed to
Bahia and report to the Department. The Oregon soon lost
sight of the two vessels, and headed for Bahia, wvhere the captain
wished to notify the Department of his action. During this
trip the upper works of the ships were painted war color, in
place of the former spotless white. The hull was painted
during the stay at Bahia. This port was reached at 8 P. M.,
May 8, and, after reporting to the Department, the captain received orders to proceed north, and at the same time the
Department expressed its confidence in the ability of the
Oregon to defeat the whole Spanish fleet. The ship left
Bahia at IO P. m4., May 9, and resumed her voyage north.
After leaving Bahia, the plan of action in case the Spanish
fleet was encountered, was developed. In general terms, as
the Spanish fleet was supposed to have a speed of nineteen




THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON.


I73


knots, the Oregon was to run away at full speed. If the
Spaniards pursued, they were likely to become separated at
high speed, and the Oregon could engage them singly, or two
at a time, if necessary, with a good chance of success. Even
if the Oregon was defeated, the Spaniards would pay dearly
for their victory. Subsequent events showed that the Oregon
could probably have gotten the better of the whole squadron.
The orders to the officer of the deck were substantially as
follows: In case a suspicious vessel was sighted, immediately
to sound the general alarm, go to quarters and run away from
the stranger at full speed.
The first test of this plan occurred on the morning of May
ii. The officer of the deck at early daylight sighted the
masts of a vessel and immediately sounded the electric gongs.
The crew rushed to quarters, the men and officers below in
decided undress, all divisions were ready in eight minutes,
and the ship was soon running at full speed, under forced
draft, away from the stranger. Full daylight showed the
suspected vessel to be an inoffensive merchantman, but the
incident proved how quickly the crew of the Oregon could prepare for action in an emergency. Another period of excitement occurred on the night of May 12, shortly before
midnight, when the masthead lights of two steamers were seen
on one side of the ship and, shortly after, the light of another
steamer on the other side.  We were then near Cape St.
Roque, and as this was the locality where it was thought the
Spanish fleet might be encountered, many believed that the
Oregon actually passed through it unobserved, for it will be
remembered that all lights were carefully screened, and she
carried no running lights. At this time, however, the Spanish
fleet wvas near Martinique. After the battle of Santiago, a
wounded Spanish sailor who wvas taken to the Oregon from the
Cristobal Colon, stated that on May I2, the Colon had picked
up off Cape St. Roque, a flour barrel marked " U. S. S.
Oregon." This, of course, was only a sailor's "yarn." No more
exciting incidents occurred during this portion of the trip,
and the Oregon pushed on rapidly to her next stopping place,
Bridgetown, on the island of Barbadoes, where she arrived at
3:30 A. M., May I8.




I174


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAAR,


It had not been the intention of Captain Clark to enter the
harbor during the night, but as a number of suspicious lights
were seen in the vicinity of the island, he decided to go in
and anchor. After daylight the health officer visited the
ship, and she was placed in strict quarantine, having come
from an infected port.
Barbadoes being an English colony the British declaration
of neutrality was strictly enforced. The captain was not allowed to report the arrival of the ship or receive any telegraphic-communication. The arrival, however, was reported
by our consul. The ship was allowed to take coal and stores
enough to reach the nearest -home port, but the Colonial government was liberal in the allowance of coal. Only two hundred tons were needed, however, and this was taken in before
night. Here it was learned that the Spanish fleet was, or had
been at Martinique, though it was actually at this time at
Curacoa. Twvo Spanish torpedo boats and a transport had
been seen to pass the harbor a day or two before, so the Oregon was evidently in the vicinity of some Spanish vessels.
Little news of the progress of the war could be gleaned from
the local papers.  The sympathy of the Barbadians was
clearly with us, and we were constantly advised to go in and
whip the Spaniards. The ship attracted great attention and
during our stay was surrounded by boatloads of spectators.
At 9:30 P. M. the Oregon was again under way, and stood out
of the harbor to the westward, with her steaming lights burning. After proceeding to the westward a few miles, all lights
were extinguished and the ship headed to the eastward to
make a detour around the Windward Islands. The strictest
kind of lookout was kept, and it was not until Martinique
had been passed that a feeling of relief was felt, for then it
was reasonably certain that the Oregon was out of reach of
the Spanish fleet. From this time until arrival at Jupiter Inlet, Florida, nothing of special importance occurred, though
the ceaseless vigilance which had marked the whole trip was
never for a moment relaxed.
The Oregon: arrived at Jupiter Inlet at 8 P. M., May 24.
Captain Clark reported his arrival, and received the congratulations of the Department. He was ordered,?if the Oregon




THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON.


I 75


needed repairs, to proceed to Hampton Roads, otherwise to
Key West. As the ship, owing, to the constant care and
earnest work of all on board, was practically in as good condition as when she left San Francisco, Key West was her
next stopping place, where she arrived on the morning of
May 26.
The total distance traveled by the Oregon during this record-breaking trip was i3,792 miles, at an average speed of
II.2 knots per hour. During the entire journey, the engines
were never once slowed or stopped for repairs. The voyage
occupied sixty-eight days, of which fifty-eight days or parts of
days were spent at sea. Such repairs as were necessary were
made by the ship's force. No body of men could have
worked more earnestly under adverse circumstances than did
the Oregon's crew. Comfort was out of the question during
the trip, but not a murmur was heard.  Such patriotism
speaks for itself. Later on, the crew showed its capacity for
fighting as wvell as for work.
Arriving at Key West, the work of coaling the ship at once
began, and was carried on night and day until I A. M. on the
S3th of May, when the Oregon was once more under way, to
join Commodore Watson's blockading squadron on the north
coast of Cuba. She reached it on a beautiful Sunday morninlg. The ship and crew were dirty, forming a strong contrast
to the other ships, with their crews in Sunday dress of spotless
white.  But her reception was none the less hearty, and
amounted to an ovation. Each ship in turn cheered the Oregon's crew, and their bands played welcoming airs, the most
popular apparently being, " There's a new coon in town," and,
" There'll be a hot time in the old town to-night."
The Oregon's stay with Commodore Watson's fleet was
brief, for the next morning Admiral Sampson arrived from
Key West on the New York, and, in company with her and
the Mayflower, the ship proceeded around the east end of
Cuba, and on June I joined the blockading squadron off
Santiago de Cuba.
Naval officers at Key West had been skeptical as to the
ability of the Oregon to make the speed claimed for her, after
her long trip and no repairs. But during the cruise with the




.76


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


New York she had maintained a speed of thirteen knots without difficulty, and on the day of her arrival off Santiago
occurred an amusing incident, which at the same time settled
the question of the Oregon's speed.
Soon after joining the squadron, the Admiral steamed
away on the New York, without leaving orders for the Oregon.
Captain Clark asked Commodore -Schley by signal what
station would be assigned to the Oregon. The Commodore
replied, " Proceed six miles to the southward and report
names of strange vessels," meaning that this was to be our
station. It happened that just at this time smoke was seen to
the south, and in a moment the Oregon was off in pursuit,
and the boilers put under forced draft. All was excitement
on board, for here was the first prize. Gradually the Oregon
increased her speed to sixteen knots, and was closing up on
the stranger, xvhich, in the distance, appeared to be a large
steamer. The lookout even saw the cargo being thrown
overboard, and the steamer was evidently doing its best to
escape. A nearer view showxed the chase to be a large tug,
and when finally a blank charge brought it around, the
United States flag was shown, and it proved to be a newvspaper boat, with a number of correspondents on board,
bound for Port Antonio, Jamaica, with despatches. The
chase occupied about four hours, as the tug was making fourteen knots an hour. Those correspondents would have fared
sadly that day had they fallen into the hands of the firemen of the Oregon. Seeing the mistake of the Oregon, the
Commodore ordered the Marblehead to overtake and order
her back, but the Marblehead could only meet her on the
return from the fruitless trip, although making fifteen knots.
The Orego-n received a hearty cheer from the Marblehead, for
here was a battleship with cruiser speed. She participated in
all the bombardments of the forts at Santiago, occupied a
regular station on the blockading line, and nightly, in turn
with the Iowa and Massachusetts, moved in close to the entrance of the harbor and turned her searchlights into it to
prevent the escape of the Spanish fleet.
The event for which her crew had impatiently waited took
place on Sunday, July 3. The writer was officer of the deck at




I
I.4; -




..............................




THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON.


I 7 7


the time. The ship had been tidied up for the usual Sunday
inspection by the captain, and officers and crew were in Sunday dress. The first call for quarters had sounded at 9:25,
and all hands were awaiting the 9:30 call. At 9:28 the chief
quartermaster rushed up to the bridge with the cry, " They're
coming out." At that instant nothing was visible in the
harbor entrance, but a moment later a Spanish ship, the Maria Teresa, flying a large new Spanish ensign, showed her
black hull and masts, rounding a point inside the entrance.
Although he had many times rehearsed what he would do in
case the Spaniards came out, the officer of the deck was momentarily dazed, but recovering quickly, he caused the alarm
gongs to be sounded from the pilot house. For a moment or
two every one thought the gongs had sounded accidentally, as
was often the case, but the order, " To your quarters," convinced the crew that this was no false alarm. A rousing cheer
Pvent up from the men as they rushed to their stations, stripping off their clothes as they ran. The Oregon was heading
towards the entrance at the time. She immediately wvent
ahead full speed towards the enemy, and in a few minutes was
under forced draft. The Oregon had at all times kept fires
spread in all her main boilers, and was thus ready for the
emergency, attaining -her maximum speed before the. other
ships of the squadron, and quickly passed all except the
Brooklyn.
It is claimed on the Oregon that the first gun of the action
was fired from one of her six-pounders, and that she first made
the signal, "The enemy is escaping," but these statements
have been disputed, as have the stories of many other incidents of the battle. In such exciting moments, one's attention is naturally concentrated on his owvn ship.
The story of the battle has been often and graphically told,
but in the first newspaper accounts the Oregon was omitted
and the Massachusetts put in her place. It is now a matter of
record how the Oregon, with her marvelous speed, soon passed
the other ships of the squadron and closed up on the Brooklyn,
her guns all the time firing on the enemy; how she overtook
three of the Spanish ships one by one, passing them as they
turned to the beach in flames, anld still rushing ahead, with the




17 8


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Brooklyn outside her, was finally able, with her thirteen-inch
guns, to force the Cristobal Colo/n to run on the beach and
surrender. The chase lasted nearly four hours. During the
engagement the Oregon fired nearly i,8oo shots from her guns,
and by singular good fortune was struck only once, and then
by a small fragment of a shell which merely marred the paint
on one of her turrets.
She well earned her Spanish and American nicknames,
The Yankee Devil and " The Bull Dog of the Navy.'
The Oregon at present, after a few minor repairs, made necessary by the wear incident to war service, is on her way to
her native waters, the Pacific, but without the rush and excitement which marked her voyage to the eastern coast.
&eoct, 7(.4 day>








I




CHAPTER IX.


THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
BY
MAJ.-GEN. WM. R. SHAFTER, U. S. V., Commanding General.
N April, i898, it was decided by the War Department to
assemble troops on the Atlantic seaboard, with a view to
their mobilization for use in Cuba. At that time I was in
command of the Department of California and was stationed
at San Francisco. Orders came to proceed to New Orleans;
upon arrival there I was directed to come to Washington,
at once, for consultation with the President and was informed
that the command of the first expedition that would be sent
to Cuba was to be given to me. It was understood that this
expedition would be what is termed a " reconnoissance in
force," for the purpose of communicating with General Gomez,
supplying him with arms and ammunition and ascertaining the
number of his men and their position. It was to be organized
at Tampa, Florida. I proceeded to Tampa and practically commenced the work of organizing troops for the expedition, and
incidentally the 5th and 7th Army Corps. On May 30 a telegram was received from the Headquarters of the Army in which
it was stated: " Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and
two torpedo boats have been seen in the Harbor of Santiago.
Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist
in capturing harbor and fleet."
Transports had already been assembled in Tampa Bay.
Orders were immediately given for loading aboard these transports the necessary subsistence and quartermaster's supplies,
and for the embarkation of the authorized number of troops and
their material. The facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa, for
embarking the troops and the large amount of supplies
required, were inadequate, and with the utmost effort it was




i80


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


not possible to accomplish nthis work as quickly as I hoped
and desired.
On the evening of June 7, orders were received to sail without
delay, but with not less than i0,000 men. After some of the
transports had started out and had reached the lower bay,
telegraphic instructions were received from the Secretary of
War directing that the sailing of the expedition be delayed
until further orders. This delay was occasioned because the
Navy reported that a Spanish war vessel had been sighted in
the Nicholas Channel. The ships in the lower bay were
immediately recalled. On the next day, in compliance with
instructions from the Adjutant-General of the Army, the
necessary steps were taken to increase the command to the
full capacity of the transports and the expedition sailed on
June 14, with 8I5 officers and i6,072 enlisted men.
The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and uneventful. The health of the command remained remarkably good,
notwithstanding the fact that the conveniences on many~of the
transports, in the nature of sleeping and closet accommodations, space for exercise, etc., were not all that could have been
desired.
While passing along the north coast of Cuba, one of the
two barges we had in tow broke away during the night and
was not recovered. The loss proved to be very serious, for it
delayed and embarrassed the disembarkation of the army.
On the morning of June 20 we arrived off Guantanamo Bay
and about noon reached the vicinity of Santiago, where
Admiral Sampson came on board the headquarters transport.
It was arranged between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban
General Garcia, at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles to the west
of the Morro. During the interview, General Garcia offered
the services of his troops, comprising about 4,000 men in the
vicinity of Aserraderos, and about 5oo under General Castillo
at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles east of Daiquiri.
I accepted his offer, telling him however that although no
military control could be exercised over him except such as
he would concede, yet as long as he served under me I
would furnish his command rations and ammunition.
From the time the orders were received every effort possi



THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.


18i


ble was made to become familiar with the surroundings of
Santiago, both as to the terrain and the climatic conditions
with which we should have to contend. The description
given in the " Journal of the Siege of Havana " of the experience of the English Army during their siege of Havana in
1762 was re-read. Valuable information was also obtained
from two natives of Cuba, who were on the Seguranfa with
me, one of them a civil engineer who had assisted in making
surveys in the vicinity of Santiago. From General Garcia
also additional information was received which was of great
value in planning the attack on Santiago. At this interview
with General Garcia, all the possible points of attack were for
the last time carefully considered and, for the information
and guidance of Admiral Sampson and General Garcia, the
following plan of campaign was then and there outlined.
With the assistance of the small boats of the Navy, the
disembarkation was to commence on the morning of the
twenty-second at Daiquiri. On the twenty-first, 500 insurgent troops were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo, increasing the force already there to i,ooo men. This
force under General Castillo was to attack the Spanish force
at Daiquiri in the rear at the time of disembarkation. (This
movement was successfully made.) To mislead the enemy as
to the real point of our intended landing, I requested General
Garcia to send a small force, about 500 men, under General
Rabi, to attack the little town of Cabafnas, situated on the
coast a few miles to the west of the entrance to Santiago
harbor, and where it was reported that the enemy had several
hundred men intrenched and from which a trail leads around
the west side of the bay to Santiago. Admiral Sampson was
requested to send several of his war ships, with a number of
the transports, opposite this town, Aserraderos, for the purpose of making a show of disembarking there. In addition
the Admiral was asked to cause a bombardment to be made
at Cabafas, upon the forts around the Morro, and also at the
towns of Aguadores, Siboney and Daiquiri. The troops under General Garcia, remaining at Aserraderos, were to be
transferred to Daiquiri or Siboney on the twenty-fourth. This
was successfully accomplished at Siboney.




I82


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


The approach to Santiago and the attack upon it was to be
made from the east over a narrow road, in some places not
better than a trail, running from Daiquiri through Siboney and
Sevilla towards Santiago. This seemed the only feasible plan.
Subsequent information and results confirmed that judgment.
On the morning of the twenty-second the army commenced
to disembark at Daiquiri. The following general order indicates the manner in which the troops left the transports and
the amount of supplies carried immediately with them:HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD S. S. SEGURANCA, AT SEA, June 20, 1898.
General Orders, No. i8.
EXTRACT.
i. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper
commanders, troops will disembark in the following order:
First. -The 2nd division, 5th corps (Lawton's). The Gatling gun detachment will accompany this division.
Second.-General Bates's brigade. This brigade will form as
a reserve to the 2nd division, 5th corps.
Third. -The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler's).
Fourth.-The ist division, 5th corps (Kent's).
Fifth. -The squadron of the 2nd Cavalry (Rafferty's).
Sixth. -If the enemy, in force, vigorously resist the landing, the Light Artillery, or part of it, will be disembarked by
the Battalion Commander and brought to the assistance of
the troops engaged. If no serious opposition be offered, this
artillery will be unloaded after the mounted squadron.
2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket roll
(with shelter tent and poncho), three days' field rations (with
coffee ground), canteens filled and ioo rounds of ammunition
per man. Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops,
tentage, baggage and company cooking utensils will be left
under the charge of the Regimental Quartermaster, with one
non-commissioned officer and two privates from each company.
3. All persons not immediately on duty with, and constituting a part of, the organizations mentioned in the foregoing
paragraphs will remain aboard ship, until the landing be accomplished and until notified that they can land.




THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN..


I83


4. The Chief Quartermaster of the expedition will control
all small boats and will distribute them to the best advantage
to disembark the troops in the order indicated in paragraph I.
5. The Ordnance Officer, Second Lieutenant Brook, 4th
Infantry, will put on shore, at once, ioo rounds of ammunition per man and wvill have it ready for distribution on the
firing line.
6. The Commanding General wishes to impress officers
and men with the crushing effect a well-directed fire wvill have
upon the Spanish troops. All officers concerned will rigidly
enforce fire discipline and will caution their men to fire only
when they can see the enemy.
*    *   *    *    *   *    *    *   *    *
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER.
E. J. MCCLERNAND, Assistant Adjitant-General.
The small boats belonging to the Navy and to the transports, together with a number of steam-launches furnished by
the Navy, were brought alongside and loaded with troops as
prescribed in the order just quoted. When General Lawton's division was fairly aboard the small boats, the latter wvere
towed in long lines by the steam-launches to the shore. The
sea was somewhat rough but, by the exercise of caution and
good judgment the beach was reached and the troops disembarked satisfactorily. As a precaution against a possible
attack upon the part of any Spaniards who might have been
hidden in the adjacent blockhouses and woods, the Navy
opened a furious cannonade upon these places, vwhile the
troops were moving towards the shore. It was learned afterwvards that the Spanish garrison had retired, in the direction
of Siboney, soon after daylight. By night about 6,ooo troops
were on shore. General Lawton was ordered to push forward
a strong force in order to seize and hold Siboney.
On the twenty-third the disembarkation was continued and
about 6,ooo more men landed. Early on this date General
Lawton's advance reached Siboney, the Spanish garrison of
about 6oo00 men retiring as he came up and offering no opposition except a few scattering shots at long range. Some of
the Cuban troops pursued the retreating Spaniards and skir



i84


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


mished with them. During the afternoon of this date the disembarkation of Kent's division was commenced at Siboney,
which enabled us to establish a base eight miles nearer Santiago. The unloading of troops and supplies was continued at
both Daiquiri and Siboney. The disembarkation was continued throughout the night of the twenty-third, and by the
evening of the twenty-fourth it was practically completed.
The orders for June 24 contemplated General Lawton's
division taking a strong defensive position a short distance
from Siboney, on the road to Santiago; Kent's division was
to be held near Siboney, where he disembarked; Bates's brigade was to take position in support of Lawton, while Wheeler's division was to be somewhat to the rear on the road from
Siboney to Daiquiri. It was intended to maintain this situation until the troops and transportation were disembarked,
and a reasonable quantity of necessary supplies landed. General Young's brigade, however, passed beyond Lawton on the
night of the twenty-third, thus taking the advance, and on
the morning of the latter date became engaged with a Spanish force intrenched in a strong position at La Guasima, a
point on the Santiago road, about three miles from Siboney.
General Young's force consisted of one squadron of the ist
Cavalry, one of the ioth Cavalry and two of the ist U. S.
Volunteer Cavalry; in all 964 officers and men. The enemy
made an obstinate resistance, but wvere driven from the field
with considerable loss. Our own loss was one officer and fifteen men killed; six officers and forty-six men wounded. The
engagement had an inspiriting effect upon our men and, doubtless, correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now
plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet
who would advance upon them under their heavy fire delivered
from intrenchments. General Wheeler, Division Commander,
was present during the engagement and reports that our
troops, officers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry.
This engagement gave us a well-watered country farther to
the front, on which to encamp.
The unloading of transportation and subsistence stores, so
that we might have several days' rations on shore, was continued during the remainder of the month. This work was




THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.


I85


ably superintended by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles F. Humphrey, Deputy Quartermaster General U. S. A., and Colonel
John F. Weston, Assistant Commissary General of Subsistence, Chief Commissary.  Nothwithstanding their utmost
efforts, it was with great difficulty that supplies were landed
in excess of those required daily to feed the men and animals,
and the loss of the scow, mentioned as having broken away
during the voyage, as well as the loss at sea of lighters sent
by the Quartermaster Department was greatly felt. The lack
of wvharves, scows, steam-lighters and steam-launches can be
appreciated only by those who were on the ground directing
the disembarkation and landing of supplies. It was not until
nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible
to place on shore three days' supplies in excess of those required for the daily consumption.
On June 30, I personally reconnoitered the country about
Santiago and completed the plan of attack. From a high hill,
from which the city was in plain view, the San Juan Hill
could be seen and the country about El Caney. The roads
were very poor, indeed little better than bridle paths, until
the San Juan River and El Caney were reached. The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of great
importance to the enemy as holding the Guantanamo road, as
wvell as furnishing shelter for a strong outpost that might be
used to assail the right flank and rear of any force operating
against San Juan Hill. In view of this, I decided to begin
the attack next day at El Caney with one division, while
sending two divisions on the direct road to Santiago, passing
by El Pozo House, and, as a diversion, to direct a small force
against Aguadores from Siboney, along the railroad by the
sea, with a view of attracting the attention of the Spaniards
in the latter direction, and of preventing them from attacking our left flank or going to the support of Santiago garrison.
During the afternoon of June 30, the division commanders
were assembled, and the general plan of battle was explained
to them. Lawton's division, assisted by Capron's light battery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon towards
El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next morning.
After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the Caney




iS6


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


road towards Santiago and take position on the right of the
line. Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry, and Kent's
division of infantry, were directed on the Santiago road, the
head of the column resting near El Pozo. Toward these
heights Grimes's battery moved on the afternoon of the 30th,
with orders to take position thereon early the next morning
and, at the proper time, to prepare the way for the advance
of Wheeler and Kent on San Juan Hill. The attack at this
point was to be delayed until Lawton's guns were heard at
El Caney and his infantry fire showed that he had become
well engaged.
The history of the disasters of previous expeditions in that
climate determined me to bring on the battle at the earliest
possible moment. The preparations were far from what I
desired them to be, but if wve were to succeed the blow must
be struck promptly. We were in a sickly climate; our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road
which the rains might at any time render impassable; fears.were entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to sea, thus separating us from our supplies;
and lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with 8,ooo
reinforcements for the enemy, was en route from Manzanillo
and might be expected in a few days.
Early on the morning of July i, Lawton was in position
around El Caney, Chaffee's brigade on the right across the
Guantanamo road, Miles's brigade in the center and Ludlow's
on the left. The duty of cutting off the enemy's retreat,
along the Santiago road, was assigned to the latter brigade.
The artillery opened on the town at 6:15 A. M. The battle
here soon became general and was hotly contested.. The
enemy's position was naturally strong and was rendered more
so by blockhouses, a stone fort, intrenchments cut in solid
rock and the loopholing of a solidly built stone church. The
opposition offered by the enemy was greater than had been
anticipated and prevented Lawton from joining the right
of the main line, during the day, as had been intended.
After the battle had continued for some time, Bates's brigade
of two regiments reached my headquarters from Siboney. I
directed him to move near El Caney, to give assistance if




THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.


necessary. He did so and was put in position between Miles
and Chaffee. The battle continued wvith varying intensity
during most of the day and until the place was carried by
assault about 4:30 P. M. As the Spaniards endeavored to
retreat along the Santiago road, Ludlow's position enabled
him to do very effective work and practically to cut off all
retreat in that direction.
After the battle of El Caney was well opened, and the
sound of the small-arms fire caused me to believe that Lawton
was driving the enemy before him, I directed Grimes's battery
to open fire from the heights of El Pozo on the San JuLan
blockhouse, which wvas visible in the enemy's intrenchments
that extended along the crest of San Juan Hill. This fire
was effective and the enemy could be seen running away from
the vicinity of the blockhouse. The artillery fire from El
Pozo was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They evidently had the range of this hill and their first shells killed
and wounded several of our men. As the Spaniards used
smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the positions
of their pieces awhile, on the contrary, the smoke caused by
our black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery.
At this time the cavalry division under General Sumner,
which was lying concealed in the general vicinity of the El
Pozo House; was ordered forward with direction to cross
the San Juan River and deploy to the right on the Santiago
side, while Kent's division was to followv closely in its rear
and deploy to the left. These troops moved forward in compliance with orders, but the road xvas so narrow as to render
it impracticable to retain the column of fours formation at all
points, while the undergrowth on either side was so dense as
to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It
naturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the
long-range rifles of the enemy's infantry killed and wounded
a number of our men while marching along this road and
before there wvas any opportunity to return the fire.
At this time Generals Kent and Sumner were ordered to
push forwvard with all possible haste and place their troops in
position to engage the enemy. General Kent, with this end
in viewv, forced the head of his column alongside of the cavalnr




i88


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


column as far as the narrow trail permitted and thus hurried his
arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that stream.
A few hundred yards before reaching the San Juan, the road
forks,-a fact that was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel
Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the front in a
war balloon. This information he furnished to the troops,
with the result that Sumner moved on the right hand road,
while Kent was enabled to utilize the road to the left.
General Wheeler, the permanent commander of the cavalry
division, who had been ill, came forward during the morning
and later returned to duty, rendering most gallant and
efficient service during the remainder of the day.
After crossing this stream, the cavalry moved to the right
with a view of connecting with Lawton's left when he should
come up, and with their left resting near the Santiago road.
In the meanwhile Kent's division, with the exception of two
regiments of Hawkins's brigade, being thus uncovered, moved
rapidly to the front from the forks in the road previously
mentioned, utilizing both trails, but more especially the one
to the left, and having crossed the creek formed for attack in
front of San Juan Hill. During the formation, the Third
Brigade suffered severely. While personally superintending
this movement, its gallant commander, Colonel Wikoff, was
killed. The command of the brigade then devolved upon
Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, I3th Infantry, who was soon
severely wounded, and next upon Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum,
24th Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the
terrible fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade
then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, gth Infantry.
While the formation just described was taking place, General Kent took measures to hurry forward his rear brigade.
The ioth and 2nd Infantry were ordered to follow Wikoff's
brigade, while the 21st was sent on the right hand road to
support the ist Brigade under General Hawkins, who had
crossed the stream and formed on the right of the division.
The 2nd and ioth Infantry, Colonel E. P. Pearson commanding, moved forward in good order on the left of the division,
passed over a green knoll and drove the enemy back towards
his trenches.




THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN..189


After completing their formation, and advancing a short
distance, both divisions found in their front a wide bottom,
intersected by several lines of barbed wire fence, beyond
which there was a high hill, along whose crest the enemy was
strongly intrenched. Nothing daunted, these gallant men
pushed on and drove the enemy from his chosen position,
both divisions losing heavily. In the action on this part of
the field, most efficient service was rendered by Lieutenant
John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, and the Gatling gun detachment under his command.
Words fail to do justice to the gallant conduct of regimental commanders and their heroic men in this fierce
encounter, for, while the generals indicated the formations
and the points of attack, it was, after all, the intrepid
bravery of the subordinate officers and men that planted our
colors on the crest of San Juan Hill and drove the enemy
from his trenches and blockhouses, thus gaining a position
which sealed the fate of Santiago.
The fighting continued, at intervals, until nightfall, but our
men held resolutely to the positions gained at the cost of so
much blood and toil. During the night Lieutenant-Colonel
Derby collected and sent forward the necessary tools, and
later in the night trenches of very considerable strength were
constructed. During the afternoon Major Dillenbeck, by my
order, brought forward the two remaining batteries of his
battalion and put them in position at El Pozo, to the left of
Grimes. Later in the afternoon all three batteries were
moved forward to positions near the firing line, but the
nature of the country and the intensity of the enemy's smallarms fire was such that no substantial results were gained by
our artillery in the new positions. The batteries were
intrenched during the night. The diversion at Aguadores
was successful, in that the Spaniards who were there were
held so that they could not withdraw to reinforce those in
Santiago.
After the brilliant and important victory gained at El
Caney, Lawton started his tired troops, who had been fighting all day and marching much of the night before, to connect with the right of the cavalry division. Night came on




Igo


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


before this movement could be accomplished. In the darkness, the enemy's pickets were encountered, and the Division
Commander, being uncertain of the ground and as to what
might be in his front, halted his command and reported the
situation to me. This information was received about I2:30
A. m. General Lawton was directed to march by the road
passing my headquarters and the El Pozo House, as the only
certain way of gaining his new position.
My headquarters were practically on a line from El Caney
to Aguadores, at the junction of the Santiago and El Caney
roads and from a mile to a mile and a half to the rear of the
center of the line. Lawton's division returned along the
Caney road to the Santiago road, thence along the Santiago
road to the San Juan river and took position on the right of
the cavalry division early the next morning, the morning of
the second. Chaffee's brigade arrived first about half past
sevenjand the other brigades before noon.
On the night of July i, the 34th Michigan and 9th Massachusetts, which had just arrived at Siboney from the United
States, were brought forward. The 34th Michigan was
placed in the rear of Kent, and the 9th Massachusetts was
assigned to Bates, who placed it on his left.
Soon after daylight on July 2 the Spaniards opened fire,
but with the intrenchments made during the night by our
troops, the approach of Lawton's division and the presence of
Bates's brigade, which had taken position during the night
on Kent's left, little apprehension was felt as to our ability to
repel the Spaniards and to hold our position.
It is proper to state here that General Bates and his brigade performed most arduous and efficient service, having
marched much of the night of June 30 and a good part of
the next day, during which they also participated in the
battle of El Caney. After this they proceeded, by way of
El Pozo, to the left of the line at San Juan, reaching the new
position about midnight.
All day on the second the battle raged with more or less
fury, but such of our troops as were in position at daylight
held their ground, and Lawton also gained a strong and commanding position on the right. About IO P. M. the enemy




THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.


191


made an assault on one of our pickets and for a short time
firing was general throughout the line, but no advantage was
gained on either side.
On the morning of the third of July the battle was renewed,
but the enemy seemed to have expended his energy in the
assault of the previous night, and the firing along the lines
was desultory until stopped by the sending of the following
letter within the Spanish lines:
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, July 3, 1898, 8:30 A. M.
TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE
SPANISH FORCES, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.
SIR: I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago
de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and
all women and children, that they should leave the city before
10 o'clock to-morrow morning.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
WILLIAM R. SHAFTER,
Major- General,
U.S. V.
To this letter the following reply was received:
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 3, 1898.
HIS EXCELLENCY,
THE GENERAL COMMANDING FORCES
OF THE U. S., NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER.
SIR: I have the honor to reply to your communication of
to-day, written at 8:30 A. M. and received at I P. M., demanding the surrender of this city, or in the contrary case announcing to me that you will bombard this city and that I advise
the foreigners, women and children, that they must leave the
city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.
It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender
and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of
the contents of your message.
Very respectfully,
JOSE TORAL,
Cozmmander in Chief, 4Vt Corps.




192


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


The first message went under a flag of truce at 12:30 P. A4.
I was of the opinion that the Spaniards would surrender if
given a reasonable time and thought this result would be
hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand how they would be treated as prisoners of var. Acting
upon this presumption, it seemed best to offer to return all
the wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to
bear transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles
not to serve against the forces of the United States until
regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted.
These officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish privates, twenty-seven in all, were sent to their lines under the
escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were
received with honors, and there is every reason to believe that
the return of the Spanish prisoners and what they told of the
treatment they had received from us produced a favorable
impression on their comrades. The cessation of firing about
noon on the third practically terminated the battle of Santiago.
After deducting the detachments retained at Siboney and
Daiquiri to render those depots secure from attack; organizations held to protect our flanks; others acting as escorts and
guards to light batteries; the members of the Hospital Corps;
guards left in charge of blanket rolls, which the intense heat
caused the men to cast aside before entering battle; orderlies,
etc., it is doubtful if we had more than I2,000 men on the
firing line on July i, when the battle was fiercest and when
the important and strong positions and San Juan Hill xvere
captured. A few Cubans assisted in the attack on El Caney
and fought valiantly, but their numbers were too small to
change materially the strength as indicated above.
The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our
owin, they fought obstinately in strong and intrenched positions, and the results obtained clearly indicate the intrepid
gallantry of the company officers and men and the benefits
derived from the careful training and instructions given our
troops during recent years, in rifle practice and other battle
exercises.
Our losses in all these battles embracing the actions at San
Juan Hill, El Caney and Aguadores July i and 3 and the




THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.


1193


actions around Santiago July IO and I2 were: killed, 22 officers and 222 enlisted men; wounded, 93 officers and I,288
enlisted men.
On the night of July 2 the Spanish garrison of Santiago was
reinforced by about 3,000 troops under General Escario.
General Garcia, with between four and five thousand Cubans,
had been intrusted with the duty of watching for these
reinforcements and intercepting them, but for some reason he
failed to do so, and General Escario passed into the city along
my extreme right near the bay. Up to this time I had been
unable to complete the investment of the town with my own
men, but to prevent any more reinforcements coming in, or
the enemy escaping, I extended the lines as rapidly as possible
to the extreme right and completed the investment of the
place, leaving General Garcia's forces in the rear of our right
flank, to scout the country for any approaching Spanish reinforcements, a duty which his forces were very competent to
perform.
In the battle of Santiago, the Spanish Navy endeavored to
shell our troops on the extreme right, but the latter were concealed by the inequalities of the ground, and the shells did
little if atiy harm. Their naval forces also assisted in the
trenches, having i, ooo on shore, and I am informed that they
sustained considerable loss,-among others Admiral Cervcra's
chief of staff was killed. Being convinced that the city wvould
fall, Admiral Cervera determined to put to sea, informing the
French Consul that it was better to die fighting than to sink
his ships. The news of the great naval victory which followed
wvas enthusiastically received by the army.
Information of our naval victory was transmitted under a
flag of truce to the Spanish Commander at Santiago on July
4, and the suggestion was again made that he surrender to
save needless effusion of blood. On the same date I informed
Admiral Sampson that, if he would force his way into the
harbor, the city would surrender without any further loss of
time. Coxmimodore Watson replied that Admiral Schley was
temporarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the
Navy should not enter the harbor.
In the meanwhile, letters passing between General Toral




194


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


and myself caused the cessation of hostilities to continue.
Each army, however, continued to strengthen its intrenchments. Being still of the opinion that the Spaniards would
surrender without much more fighting, on July 6, I called General Toral's attention to the changed conditions and at his
request gave him time to consult his home government. This
he did, asking that the British Consul with the employes of
the Cable Company be permitted to return from El Caney to
the city. His request was granted.
The strength of the enemy's position was such that I did
not wish to make an assault if it could be avoided. An
examination of the enemy's works, made after the surrender,
fully justified the wisdom of the course adopted. The
intrenchments could have been carried only with very great
loss of life, probably with not less than three thousand killed
and wounded.
On July 8, General Toral offered to march out of the city
with arms and baggage, provided that he would not be molested before reaching Holguin, and to surrender to the American forces the territory then occupied by him. I replied that,
while his proposition should -be submitted to my home government,.I did not think that it would be accepted.
Meanwhile arrangements were made with Admiral Sampson
that when the Army again engaged the enemy, the Navy
would assist by shelling the city from ships stationed off
Aguadores, dropping a shell every few minutes.
On July IO, the ist Illinois and the ist District of Columbia
regiments arrived and were placed on the line to the right of
the cavalry division. This enabled me to push Lawton's line
farther to the right and practically to command the Cobra
road.
On the afternoon of the date last mentioned, the truce
was broken at 4 P. M.  I determined to open wvith four batteries of artillery and went forward in person to the trenches,
to give the necessary orders, but the enemy anticipated us
by opening fire with his artillery, a few minutes after the hour
stated. His batteries were apparently silenced before night,
while ours continued playing upon his trenches until dark.
During this firing, the Navy fired from Aguadores, most of




THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.


195


the shells falling in the city. There was also some smallarms firing.
On the morning of July II, the bombardment by the
Navy and our field guns was renewed and continued until
nearly noon, and on the same day a report was sent to the
Adjutant-General of the Army that the right of Ludlow's
brigade of Lawton's division rested on the bay. Thus our
hold upon the enemy was complete. At 2 P. M. on this date,
the eleventh, the surrender of the city was again demanded.
The firing ceased and was not again renewed.
By this date, the sickness in my army was increasing very
rapidly, as a result of exposure in the trenches to the intense
heat of the sun, the heavy rains and the dews which, in Cuba,
are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the troops was
becoming so apparent that I was anxious to bring the siege
to an end, but in common with most of the officers of the
army I did not think an assault would be justifiable, especially
as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in his preliminary propositions to surrender.
On July Ii, I wrote General Toral as follows:
"With the largely increased forces which have come to me,
and the fact that I have your line of retreat securely in my
hands, the time seems fitting that I should again demand of
your Excellency the surrender of Santiago and of your
Excellency's army. I am authorized to state that should
your Excellency so desire, the Government of the United
States will transport the entire command of your Excellency
to Spain."'
General Toral replied that he had communicated my proposition to his General-in-Chief, General Blanco.
July 12, I informed the Spanish Commander that MajorGeneral Miles, Commander-in-Chief of the American Army,
had just arrived in camp and requested him to grant us a
personal interview on the following day. He replied that he
would be pleased to meet us. The interview took place on
the thirteenth, and I informed General Toral that only his
surrender could be considered and that as he was without
hope of escape he had no right to continue the fight.
On the fourteenth another interview took place, during




i6


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


which General Toral agreed to surrender, upon- the basis of
his Army, the 4th Army Corps, being returned to Spain, the
capitulation embracing all of eastern Cuba, east of a line passing from Asseraderos on the south to Sagua de Tanamo on
the north, via Palma Soriano. It was agreed that commissioners should meet during the afternoon to arrange definitely
the terms of surrender, and I appointed Major-Generals
Wheeler and Lawton and Lieutenant Miley to represent the
United States.
The Spanish Commissioners raised many points and were
especially desirous of retaining their arms. The discussion
lasted until late at night and was renewed at 9:30 next morning. The terms of surrender finally agreed upon included
about I2,000 Spanish troops in the city and as many more in
the surrendered district. There were included also a small
gun-boat and about 200 seamen, together with five merchantships in the harbor. One of these vessels, the Mexico,
had been used as a war vessel and had four guns mounted
on it.
It was arranged that the formal surrender should take place
between the lines on the morning of July I7, each army being
represented by ioo armed men. At the time appointed, I appeared at the place agreed upon accompanied by my staff,
my general officers and their staff, and ioo troopers of the
2nd Cavalry under Captain Lloyd M. Brett. General Toral
also arrived with a number of his officers and i00 Infantry.
We met midway between the representatives of our two
armies, and the Spanish Commander formally consummated
the surrender of the city of Santiago and the 24,000 troops
in the city and the surrendered district.
After this ceremony, I entered the city with staff and escort, and at twelve o'clock, noon, with appropriate ceremonies, the American flag was hoisted over the governor's
palace by Captain McKittrick and Lieutenant Miley of my
staff and Lieutenant Wheeler of General Wheeler's staff.
On August 4, I received ordets to begin embarkation for
transfer to Montauk Point, Long Island, New York. The
movement continued without interruption until August 25,
when I sailed for Montauk with the last troops of my corn



THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.


197


mand, turning over the district of Santiago to Major-General
Lawton.
Something may be said of the natural obstacles which had
to be encountered and which no foresight could have overcome or obviated. The rocky and precipitous coast afforded
no sheltered landing places, the roads wvere mere bridle paths,
the effect of the tropical sun and rains upon unacclimated
troops was deadly, and a dread of strange and unknown
diseases had its moral effect upon the army.
At Daiquiri, the landing of the troops and stores was made
at a small wooden wharf, which the Spaniards tried unsuccessfully to burn, and the animals were pushed into the water and
guided to a sandy beach about 200 yards in extent. At
Siboney, the landing was made on the beach and at a small
wharf erected by the engineers. I had neither the time nor
the men to spare to construct permanent wharves. At times
the roads were impassable for wagons. The San Juan and
Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so much as to
prevent the passage of xvagons, and then the eight pack trains
with the command had to be depended upon for the victualling of the troops, as well as the 20,000 refugees, who could
not, in the interest of humanity, be left to starve while we
had rations. Often for days nothing could be moved except
on pack trains. After the great physical strain and exposure
of July i and 2, the malarial and other fevers began rapidly to
advance throughout the command, and on July 4 the yellow
fever appeared at Siboney.
The supply of Quartermaster and Commissary stores during the campaign was ample and, notwithstanding the difficulties in landing and transporting the ration, the troops on the
firing line were at all times supplied with its coarser components, namely, bread, meat, sugar and coffee.
The sick and wounded received every attention that it was
possible to give them. The medical officers, without exception, worked night and day to alleviate the suffering, which was
no greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. Of the
wounded, only fourteen died as the result of their wvounds.
Each soldier and officer carried into action what was termed
a " First aid package,"-a small supply of bandages and anti



'98        THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.
septic dressing. In many cases, the wounds were so well
dressed on the battle-field by use of these packages that it
was not found necessary to remove the dressing until after
the wounded men returned to the United States.
In closing, it is proper to say a word in regard to the discipline of the command. It is a remarkable fact that not an
officer or enlisted man was brought to trial by court-martial
during this campaign. The discipline of the entire command
was superb.
in




I...  I..     t.    I  I..- I.  I


144
-     1.   I








CHAPTER X.


MILES'S CAMPAIGN        IN  PUERTO      RICO.
BY
CAPTr. HENRY H. WHITNEY, U. S. A., Assistant Adjutant-General.
" During a campaign, whatever is not profoundly considered in all its
detail is without result. Every enterprise should be conducted according
to a system; chance alone can never bring success."-NAPOLEON.
p   UERTO    RICO was a strong base of supplies for the
Spaniards in Cuba, and as it was known that the rainy
season did not begin until late in August, it seems to
have been the plan of the Major-General Commanding to
strike the first real blow there, making it a secondary base of
operations against Cuba later in the fall. But the presence
of Cervera's fleet changed the plan, when the Navy asked for
the Army's assistance at Santiago. When this bugaboo of the
seas had been so brilliantly disposed of, and General Miles
had taken reinforcements to Shafter's army and with them
the prestige of a " Master of Victory," he hurried to Guantanamo to assemble his Puerto Rican expedition.
Every contingency that might arise had been foreseen, and
on the I th of July, requisition by cable was made for a train
of Soo pack mules complete, 400 freight travois with saddle-,
an abundant supply of medical stores, hospital supplies,
ambulances and tentage, dock construction corps with laborers, steam tugs and lighters, and $ioo100,000ooo for hire of native
transportation and purchase of horses. All infantry was to
be supplied with smokeless powder arms, and there was to be
sent a full allowance of transportation for all commands.
Several days were spent waiting for the necessary naval
convoy; finally, on the 21st of July, the fleet set sail, composed of the following vessels: transports Lampasas, Nueces,




200


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


City of Macon, Comanclze, Unionist, Specialist, Rita and Stiltwater, together with the cruiser Columbia and converted
cruiser Yale, with a grand total of 3,554 fighting men. The convoying squadron was composed of the U. S. Battleship Massaclhusetts, the U. S. converted yacht Gloucester, and the U. S.
converted yacht Dixie. The cruiser Columbia, and auxiliary
cruiser Yale, having troops aboard, are not properly considered part of the convoy.
When the invasion of Puerto Rico was definitely decided
upon, a temporary landing on Vieques, or Crab Island, about
I3 miles east of the main island, xvas considered. This could
be effected without opposition, hospitals established, the
troops from Cuba recuperated and a landingn made, when the
proper time came, at any desired point on the main island.
But after the fever had broken out, it was not deemed safe to
take any of the Cuban troops. Besides, Santiago had fallen
and it was important to seize Puerto Rico and make secure
some of the substantial fruits of victory, before the enemy,
seeing the hopelessness of the struggle, sued for peace. So,
on the representation of naval officers who had cruised along
the eastern coast, Point Fajado, on the northeast coast, was
selected, and on the i6th of July General Miles cabled that reinforcements on transports coming from the United States be
directed to proceed to that point.
When, on leaving the Windward Passage, the bows of the
ships turned eastward on their hazardous mission, the General
Commanding had with him very little more means for disembarking on a strange and hostile shore than did Columbus
when he sailed westward on adjoining seas some four centuries before. The fleet moved slowly, expecting to be overtaken by or fall in with transports bringing reinforcements
and appliances for landing quickly. Finally the northern end
of Mona Passage was reached, but no looked-for ships appeared. The problem now became a serious one for the General Commanding, who had but 3,554 unskilled troops with
which to land in the face of between eight and nine thousand
Spanish regulars and more than that many armed volunteers,
the majority of whom could concentrate at any point on the
coast in from four to five days. The waters about Point




MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO.


201


Fajado, the selected landing place, might be used as a rendezvous for the naval vessels in fair weather, but is nothing of a
harbor at which to land troops and munitions of war without
the means at hand for disembarking, and with no prospect of
securing any on arrival. As the landing place had been well
advertised in our own press, the Spanish commander evidently knew of our intention and xvould bring artillery from
the Capital, some 35 to 40 miles away, over passable roads,
and entrench on the hills commanding the beach. This, it
was learned afterwards, had in a measure, been done, when a
naval vessel touching at this point brought away some Puerto Rican refugees. So common prudence as well as one of the
first principles of strategy demanded that the landing be
made elsewhere in an unexpected quarter.
An officer on the staff of the Major-General Commanding
had made, in May, a hasty reconnaissance of the southern
portion of the island and had gathered important information
about the harbors on that coast and noted the number and location of the native lighters, means for defence, etc. It was
known that on the south coast Guanica was the best harbor
of which there was a chart, and it was reported to be unmined
and undefended. It opened into the most disaffected district
of the island. Four miles from its head, at Yauco, is the terminus of a railroad, fifteen miles long, leading to Ponce. The
town of Ponce could be taken easily, being practically undefended because the troops had been withdrawn to oppose our
projected advance from the east. Ponce once occupied, we
would have the largest town on the island, the end of a cable,
and the terminus of the fine military read leading to the Capital.
The General's mind was soon made up, and he signalled to
the Admiral of the fleet, (Captain Higginson) his desire to
change the objective. As fast as the signal flag could spell
out the words, came back the message of the naval commander,
with hearty co-operation, " All right, Guanica it is," and the
ships were promptly headed south by southwest into the
Mona Passage, a vessel being dispatched to Cape San Juan to
redirect any transports that should arrive there.
\Vith all lights out and absolute quiet aboard, the fleet




202


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH AVAR.


crept through the passage, close to the shore, and arrived off
Guanica harbor on the morning of July 25. The Gloucester
(Commander Wainwright) was sent forward to reconnoiter.
She made her way slowly at first, zigzagging her course back
and forth across the mouth of the harbor, feeling for possible
mines or torpedoes, more mindful, apparently, of the safety
of the transports to follow than of her own. When sure that
the way was unobstructed, she struck straight in,-followed
closely by the transports. Spanish troops, to the number of
about 250 were occupying the village but retreated when a
few shells from the Glouceszer were thrown about them. The
marines, twvo companies of the provisional engineer battalion
and several companies of infantry were put ashore in ship's
boats, a skirmish line was formed and shortly afterwards outposts established. Brigadier-General Gilmore, who was the
first general officer to land, superintended the disembarkation. Upon opening fire the inhabitants, terror stricken, fled
from the town to the hills. During the day word was sent to
them to return to their homes, which, before night, they did
and were very demonstrative in their expressions of joy at the
arrival of the Americans. It was the policy of the General
Commanding to make the best impression upon the natives on
the initial landing, knowing how rapidly the news of arrival
would travel over the island and the effect his every act would
have upon future operations in the interior. The Spaniards
had'caused reports to be circulated freely among the ignorant,
mainly through the priesthood, that the American soldiers were
giant ravishers who, though impotent against Spanish arms,
would despoil their homes and destroy their property. At the
date of invasion, therefore, a large proportion of the illiterate
native element were in doubt whether to support the ills
they already had or to fly to others that might be worse. The
best protection to life and property was what they wanted
and what they would fight for. General Miles showed by his
treatment of the inhabitants that the complete success of the
expedition depended as much on the conciliation of them as
upon the force of his arms.
Our arrival was a complete surprise, as was afterwards
learned, the enemy having no intimation of our proximity.




MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO.


203


On the morning of July 26 General Garretson, with parts of
the 6th Mass. and the 6th Ill. regiments of his brigade, undertook a reconnaissance, in force, to about three miles beyond
Guanica along the road towards Yauco. He found the
Spanish troops in position on a hill along a solid angle
formed by the intersection of the north and east slopes. The
enemy opened fire on the advance guard of his force from a
position on a hill to the west. The suddenness and volume
of the fire caused a momentary confusion among our troops,
but they were quickly steadied, and in a spirited engagement
drove the Spaniards from their position into the valley beyond. The force of the enemy engaged consisted of battalion 25 ("Patria") of the Spanish regulars and some volunteers-in all about 6oo to 700 men. The casualties on the
American side were two officers and two enlisted men slightly
wounded. The casualties of the enemy were reported to be
one lieutenant and one cornet killed, eighteen seriously and
thirty-two slightly wounded. On the following day, July
27, a further reconnaissance established the fact that the
enemy had retreated beyond Yauco, which a part of General. Henry's command promptly occupied.
Several staunch lighters were found in the harbor and
these, towed by two navy steam launches, were of great assistance in disembarking the light batteries, ammunition and
supplies. The Chief Engineer, Lt.-Col. Black, built a pontoon bridge 260 feet long, employing the battalion of provisional engineers under Maj. Sackett. On this bridge most
of the animals and stores were unloaded and it has been continued in use almost daily up to the present time.
As Ponce was our real objective, Guanica being what might
be called an accidental one, on account of its harbor, the Dixie,
followed by Capt. Higginson with the rest of the naval convoy, moved into the port of Ponce on the evening of July
27, and its commander, through one of his officers, Ensign
Curtin, took possession of the Playa without opposition.
Seventy lighters and several schooners that were in the harbor were seized by the navy and declared prizes of war. On
suspension of hostilities the lighters were turned over to the
army for proper disposition, when it was found that they
were the property of private citizens.




204


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


On the morning of July 28, General Miles, accompanied'
by his staff, landed, formally took possession and raised the
National colors and the headquarters flag over the custom
house. Maj.-Gen. Jas.. II. Wilson, who had arrived at Guanica with his command on the twenty-seventh, was sent forward to occupy the city of Ponce two miles inland from the
port. The Spanish troops, numbering about 5oo, retreated
on our approach, leaving arms and ammunition in store-houses
and barracks. Before retiring they endeavored to destroy
the railroad property at the station, planting mines along the
route to Yauco, setting fire to the rolling stock, breaking
down the telegraph lines and destroying the cable instruments. The railroad, under the energetic supervision of Brig.
Gen. Roy Stone, was soon put in running order and the telegraph lines were promptly repaired by the Signal Corps under
the immediate supervision of Lt.-Col. Sam Reber. New cable
instruments were procured by Colonel James Allen at St.
Thomas, Danish West Indies. On the day of landing the
Major-General Commanding published, in Spanish and Englisli, a proclamation to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, for
which they were anxiously looking. This manifesto had a
very salutary effect upon the people. The dignity of its language and the wisdom of its assurances as to the future policy
of the government will give it the highest rank among state
papers.
General Wilson proceeded energetically to get his command into shape for a forward movement and to organize
the civil administration of the city and district. Owing to
the lack of launches, which had been foreseen before leaving
the U. S. but which had not been remedied, the work of landing troops and supplies was seriously hampered and the difficulties would have been almost insurmountable had it not been
for the assistance rendered by the navy in towing lighters back
and forth from the shore to the transports. As it was, the
preparations for an advance into the interior were delayed at
least a week longer than would have been otherwise necessary.
This movement was further delayed by the grounding of two
loaded transports, the Massachusetts and Manitoba.
General Schwan having joined at Ponce with his command,




MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO.


205


July 31, and General Brooke with his on August I, gave a
total strength of about fourteen thousand men. The General
Commanding was now ready to make his contemplated
forward movements. The friendly attitude of most of the inhabitants, the abundant supply of provisions in some sections
of the country, the apparent healthfulness of the climate and
the ability to hire native transportation convinced him that
columns starting from Ponce as a base of operations, moving
first on diverging lines and then converging finally toward a
principal objective, would meet with success. The columns
were to capture or drive the enemy out of the small towns,
receive and disarm such volunteers as desired to surrender,
and so conduct their march that the inhabitants might be
made to understand that our chief object was to overthrow
the armed authority of Spain; that it was not a war of devastation, but one bringing protection and security to all
within the control of our military and naval forces. The
campaign was to be conducted along four lines of operations
separated into two groups, Brooke's and Wilson's commands
forming one, and Henry's and Schwan's the other-the
former converging towards Aibonito and the latter towards
Arecibo.
On the second and third of August the forces under MajorGeneral Brooke landed at Arroyo, about forty miles east of
Ponce. They consisted of General Peter Hains's brigade,
made up of the following elements:
3rd Ill. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Bennitt);
4th Ohio Vol.. Infantry (Colonel Coit);
4th Penn. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Cass);
27th Indiana Light Battery;
Sth Missouri Light Battery " A"';
Penn. Light Battery " B," (with three dynamite guns);
Philadelphia City Troop;
Troop " H," 6th U. S. Cavalry;
Co. < H," 8th U. S. Infantry;
Detachment Hospital Corps;
Detachment Signal Corps.
Total —   4,790.




206


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


The task selected for this force was the movement on
Aibonito with the view of co-operating with General Wilson
in the defeat and capture of the Spanish, particularly those in
the vicinity of Cayey, it being especially important that the
column should reach this point in time to intercept the enemy
should he abandon his position at Aibonito and retreat along
the military road to San Juan.
Onl the morning of August 5, at eight A. M., General
Hains, with the 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry in advance and the
3rd Ill. Vol. Infantry in reserve, moved on the town of Guayama, occupied by about 300 of the enemy, who offered but
slight resistance and were driven out of the town and pursued
beyond it with a loss on our side of four enlisted men
wounded. One of the enemy was killed and two wounded,
so far as known. A few shots fired from the Sims-Dudley
dynamite guns are reported to have had a very demoralizing
effect upon the enemy. By the night of the fifth, the 3rd Ill.
and the 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry occupied a strong position on
the outskirts of the town. No active movement again occurred until the eighth of August, when a reconnaissance along
the Cayey main road, "for the purpose of developing the
enemy's position and to clear the way for the engineers to
map the country correctly," was attempted by two companies of the 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry. They were met with a
sharp fire from the enemy on the hills. Some members of
Co. " C," 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry, fell back to the town,
bringing reports of a repulse. In consequence of this, the remnaining companies of the regiment were sent forward to the
support of the reconnoitering party, when the enemy retired
to stronger positions and the regiment returned to the camp
with five men wounded and two overcome by heat. No
further aggressive movement was made until August 13,
General Brooke being seriously delayed by the grounding of
two transports on which were his artillery, cavalry and most
of his rations. For this day a general attack upon the Spanish position was planned. The enemy, variously estimated at
from six hundred to fifteen hundred infantry, had been
busily engaged, during the eight days he was left unmolested, in entrenching himself along the crests and in the




MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO.          207
passes of the hills north of Guayama, where Nature had provided a stronghold that lent itself most admirably to the
genius of the Spanish engineer. The trenches were cleverly
hidden among banana trees and palms, and disposed along
not less than five miles of the divides of the Sierra de Jajome,
the Corro de las Palmas and the Atlas de Guamani, in the
form of an arc convex towards the front, with advanced
works on the sharp spurs jutting out from the main divide.
The Spanish center occupied the Guamani Pass, 2,o100 feet
above the sea level, through which the military road to Cayey
leads. Their right rested on a spur of the Sierra de Jajome
range, 2,400 feet high. The left, on the Atlas de Guamani,
wvas 400 feet higher. The trenches and barricades covered
about four miles of the main road south of the pass and
every important trail along which the position might be
flanked. Brooke's general plan of action was an artillery assault upon the Spanish center, which was to begin when General Hains, with the 4th Ohio, had excuted a flank movement
against the enemy's right on the crest of the Sierra de
Jajome. At the moment when the order suspending hostilities was received the artillery was unmasked before the Spanish trenches, at a bend in the road about three miles above
Guayama, and was about to open fire. The flanking column
had proceeded about eight and a half miles on the old Cayey
trail, which passes through the village of Carmen, four miles
south of the Jajome range. The greater part of this march,
although over a rough mountain trail, was accomplished in a
remarkably short time, considering the heat, yet without a
single straggler. In the light of what is now known of the
strength of the Spanish position it would seem that our
troops had a very warm day's work before them. General
Brooke was " satisfied, however, that but for the receipt of
telegram from Headquarters of the Army the entire Spanish
force would have been captured."
As rapidly as General Wilson's command was disembarked
at Ponce it was pushed forward along the military road leading to San Juan, the troops finally comprising the force being
as follows;




208


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


General Oswald Ernst, commanding Brigade,
2nd Wis. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Born),
3rd Wis. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Moore),
i6th Penn. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Hulings),
Battalion of Light Artillery (Major Lancaster),
consisting ofLight Battery " F," 3rd Artillery (Potts),
Light Battery " B," 3rd Artillery (Anderson),
4th Artillery, Detachment with two dynamite guns
and one Gatling gun (Buckey), also
Troop " C," N. Y. Vol. Cavalry (Clayton),
5th Co. U. S. Vol. Signal Corps,
Hospital Detachment.
Total     3,417.
On the evening of the seventh of August Wilson's outposts occupied a line across a narrow valley about seven and
a half miles beyond the village of Juana Diaz, controlling
the valley of the Descalabrado River.  Energetic reconnaissance and reports of spies and deserters disclosed the fact
that the enemy had gathered a force of about 2,000 regulars
and volunteers at Aibonito, thirty-five miles from Ponce, a
village situated in a pocket near the summit of the main
divide, in a position of great natural strength overlooking and
commanding at every turn the winding military road leading
to it. Coamo, an advanced position held by not less than
250 of the enemy, was in the way of a movement against
Aibonito and, as it could not be taken by direct attack without great loss, Wilson decided to turn it by the enemy's
right. On the evening of the eighth, he sent the i6th Penn.
Vol. Infantry by exceedingly difficult mountain cross trails
over the divide into the valley of the Coamo River, so as to
reach the main road from a half-mile to a mile in the rear of
the town. Meanwhile, at 6 A. M. on the morning of the
ninth, General Ernst, with the main body of his brigade,
moved forward and began the direct attack against the town,
four guns of Captain Anderson's battery having shelled and
destroyed the block-house commanding the forks of the road
about a mile and a half southwest of Coamo. The entire




MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO.


209


movement was executed substantially as planned. The i6th
Penn., under the guidance of a staff officer who had discovered the mountain route, reached the road beyond the town
and engaged the enemy, who began retreating at the opening
of the direct attack. The affair lasted about an hour and was
terminated by the surrender of the Spanish forces. The
brunt of the action fell upon the i6th Penn., which lost seven
men wounded. The Spanish lost two officers and fourteen
men killed and wounded, while seven officers and I63 men
surrendered. The enemy was taken completely aback by the
brilliant turning movement of the Pennsylvania men, most of
whom, brought up among the mountains of their own state,
took as naturally to hill climbing as did Lord Robert's regiment of Goorkhas in India during his advance upon Cabul.
Those of the enemy who were not cut off were pursued by
the cavalry about five and a half miles beyond Coamo, where
the advance was stopped by fire from the enemy's batteries on the summit of Asomante Hill and El Pefion, situated
two and a half miles northwest of the town of Aibonito. On
the slopes below the batteries were the infantry intrenchments,
which completely swept, with a plunging fire, the main road
for several miles. The position was practically impregnable
against a direct assault and Wilson decided after a careful reconnaissance of all approaches, to turn it by a movement
around the right as at Coamo, moving the main body of the
brigade to Barranquitas, and thence to Aibonito, via Honduras, or to Cayey, via Comerio and Cidra, leaving a battalion
as a containing force in front of the position. To divert the
enemy's attention from the movement, which was ordered for
the thirteenth, and to develope his fire, an artillery reconnaissance was made by Light Battery " F," 3rd Artillery (Potts),
which on the twelfth advanced from camp at Coamo and
opened fire, at one P. M., with five guns, from a position on
the reverse side of a low ridge to the left of the main road,
at a range of 2,250 yards from the batteries on Asomante and
1,200 feet below them. More than a passing word is due this
action of the artillery. Before the guns were in place the
action was begun by the Spanish batteries on El Penlon.
The preliminary shell firing developed the range almost imme.




210


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


diately-as corresponding to the calculated range of 2,250 yards,
and in less than twenty minutes the enemy's battery was silenced and the fire was directed on the rifle pits, whose occupants scampered out at the first direct shot.
Too much credit cannot be given for the skill displayed by
this battery. It was manned mostly by men who had never
before been under fire, yet it came into position exposed to
the projectiles of small arms and field pieces, and in an incredibly short time had ranged the objectives to a nicety.
The position was most difficult, with an enemy elevated I,200
feet in a range of 2,250 yards, and could never even have been
reached had not the sloping hillside afforded the necessary
additional elevation; yet the greater difficulty under which
the Spaniards labored, compelling the use of plunging fire,where the slightest deviation in depression made their shots
go wild of the mark,-is all that rendered our position tenable, for the ranges had been carefully determined beforehand
by the enemy. The ammunition in the meantime had been
exhausted, and, as the primary object of the reconnaissance
had been attained, the guns were withdrawn. It is believed,
however, that if advantage could have been taken of the first
supremacy of fire by throwing forward a regiment of infantry
on the hog-back, which approaches the position from the
south, its capture would have been a certainty, for the accurate fire of the battery would have held the enemy in check
till our forces got within rifle range, when their left flank
would have been at our mercy. The casualties on our side
were two enlisted men killed, and two officers and three men
wounded. The order to suspend hostilities, received on the
thirteenth, stopped the projected movement by the flank.
The distinguishing feature of General Wilson's operations wvas
his thorough reconnaissance of the ground before making any
advance, so that there was no hesitancy or miscalculation
when once a movement was begun.
With Wilson advancing in force on Aibonito, and Brooke
at Guayama moving evidently against the same objective by
way of Cayey, it must have looked to the enemy as if General
ifiles was determined to push his entire command along the
main military highway through the Spanish center to San




MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO.


2 I I


Juan. Indeed, this seemed about the only land operation
against the Capital, with Ponce as a base, that was practicable.
But to do what the enemy least suspects you of doing is a
cardinal principle of warfare, whether it be between prize
fighters in the ring or between armies in the field. So General Miles decided that the opportunity was ripe for the
planned diversion around the western end of the island, in order that the ground might be swept clean as his army moved
towards the ultimate objective, San Juan. General Schwan
was therefore directed, on August 6, to proceed from Ponce
with six companies of the i i th U. S. Infantry to Yauco, moving by rail if desirable. Troop A, 5th U. S. Cavalry, and two
batteries of light artillery were to move by wagon road. At
Yauco the remainder of the i1th Infantry and two companies
of the i9th U. S. Infantry were to be aidded and when the
expedition was organized it was to proceed to Sabana Grande,
San German, Mayaguez, and from thence to Lares and
Arecibo, driving out or capturing all the Spanish troops in
the western portion of the island. It was to be a sort of
" flying column " of picked troops moving with the greatest
freedom and dispatch. The column as finally organized consisted of the following:
iith U. S. Infantry (Colonel DeRussey),
Troop "A," 5th U. S. Cavalry (MacComb),
Battery " C," 3rd U. S. Artillery (Califf),
Battery " D," Sth U. S. Artillery (Thorp),
Detachment Signal Corps,
Detachment Hospital Corps.
Total,     1,464.
A party of well-mounted natives, numbering at various
times from eleven to twenty men, under their chief, Lugo
Vifia, a man of fine character, accompanied the expedition as
scouts and rendered valuable service. But one day was occupied in organization, the command moving out on the morning of the ninth, General Schwan supplementing its regular or
government transportation, which was quite inadequate, with
hired or impressed native transportation.




2 12. THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


This expedition was unique in several respects. The force
comprising it was taken entirely from the regular establishment and was made up of the three fighting arms-cavalry,
infantry and artillery. The cavalry fought mounted, the only
instance during the war where this arm had an opportunity to
actin its natural sphere. The strict tactical order of march, as
laid down in the text books, xvas followed successfully and
satisfactorily,-an answer to the objection  that practice
marches, so faithf ully made by the regulars in peace-time,
were not simulating war conditions.  The disposition on the
march was as follows: the troop of cavalry acted as a screen
and marched about two miles in front of the "point" of the
advance guard. Two companies of infantry, one platoon of
artillery and two Gatling guns constituted the advance guard.
A pioneer detachment, consisting of one non-commissioned
officer and eight men, with the requisite tools carried in a
cart, and under the direction of the engineer officer of the
brigade, were attached to the advance guard. The main body
consisted of nine companies of infantry, one battery and two
platoons of artillery and two Gatlings. The train followed
the main body in the following order: hospital train, ammunition train and supply and baggage wagons. The rear guard
was composed of one company of infantry, a detachment
from it being required to guard the exposed flank of the
train. This order was preserved until the afternoon of the
tenth, when the cavalry ran into the enemy's scouts near Hormigueros. Here the entire garrison of Mayaguez, numbering
some 1,300, of which about goo were regulars, had selected a
position of great strength on the hills commanding our line of
march, in order. to oppose the advance on the. town. In the
engagement that ensued the enemy was completely routed;
the advance guard, admirably led by Captain Hoyt, pushing
forward followed by the main body, on the principal road;
the cavalry, under the skilful guidance of Captain MacComb, diverging to the right to attack the Spanish flank. One enlisted man killed and one officer and fifteen men wounded
comprised the loss on our side, while that of the enemy
amounted to fifteen in killed alone. The command bivouacked
on the spot and at an early hour the next morning resumed




MILES'S CAMIPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO.


213


the march. General Schwan entered Mayaguez at the head
of his troops at 9:30 A. M., with band playing and colors flying,
the populace giving him a most enthusiastic reception. Six
companies of the first Ky. Vol. Infantry on the transports
Morgan and Hudson convoyed by the U. S. S. Montgomery,
had been sent from Ponce as reinforcements to Schwan in
time, it was expected, to reach Mayaguez so as to be of
assistance in taking this important seaport. The Montgomery,
entering the harbor on August Ii all cleared for action, was
surprised to find that Schwan had already arrived and was in
possession, with his flag flying from the hill overlooking the
bay. His column of regulars did not tarry long at Mayaguez.
Leaving the Kentucky infantry to hold the town and to patrol the surrounding country, which was swarming with bushwhackers, he promptly resumed the pursuit of the fleeing Spanish force. On August 13 his advance, under LieutenantColonel Burke, overtook this force while crossing the Rio Prieto, near Las Marias, in their retreat toward Lares, inflicting
upon them a heavy loss in killed, wounded and drowned.
The part of the Spanish force which reached Lares on the
evening of the thirteenth evacuated it the next day in anticipation of pursuit. The task set for this column had been
nearly completed, when early on August 14, notice to suspend hostilities was received. The engagement on the Prieto
has the distinction of being the last affair of the war on land, as
it occurred later than the battle of Manila by several hours.
Eleven towns, including the important seaport town of Mayagutlez, and the country adjacent to them, had been cleared of
the enemy. One hundred and sixty-three regulars, including
a Colonel, a Lieutenant-Colonel and three other officers, had
been made prisoners of war and a large number of captured
or surrendered volunteers had been paroled. Under conditions of intense tropical heat and bad roads, the command
had made a remarkable march. They had covered a distance,
including outposts, etc., of ninety-two miles from August 7 to
August 13. Fully one-fourth of the command were sick,
they had no extra clothing and their shoes were worn out, yet
when the telegram to General Schwan from headquarters,
" Commanding General sends congratulations and thanks.




2 I4


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


He relies implicitly upon your skill, good judgment and generalship," was published to the men, new life was infused into
them and fresh hardships were eagerly sought.
General Henry, with a part of his original command, led
the fourth and last column, made up of the following troops:
General Garretson, commanding Brigade composed
of the
6th Mass. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Rice),
6th Ill. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Foster),
Troop " B," 2nd U. S. Cavalry (Hoppin),
Part of Troop " A," N. Y. Vol. Cavalry (Coudert),
Four Cos. i9th U. S. Infantry,
Detachment Signal Corps,
Detachment Hospital Corps.
Total force about -- 3,060.
He was directed to proceed north through Adjuntas and
Utuado to Arecibo, connect with Schxvan and cut off the retreat of any of the enemy who might attempt to reach San
Juan in that direction. Previous to General Henry's movement General Stone had been sent forward with materialto
repair and build the road between Adjuntas and Utuado.
He employed native labor for the purpose, assisted by a company of the Provisional Engineer Battalion. The rough
mountain trail could be widened only sufficiently to permit
the passage of troops and supplies with great difficulty, yet
Henry had succeeded, without opposition from the enemy, in
getting a force through to within a few miles of Arecibo, when
the order to suspend military operations was received.
When the Commandante of Arecibo learned that troops and
wheeled vehicles had come over the Utuado trail he evinced
the greatest surprise.. The route was deemed impossible except for solitary animals, and was left totally unguarded. A
few determined men posted at the single pass could have held
it against a division.
A glance in review shows that the announcement that a
peace protocol was signed found aggressive activity along
the line of operations, which extended almost straight from




MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO.


2 I -


Aguadilla on the northwest coast, southeast to Arroyo on the
south coast. Schwan was close on the heels of the Spanish regulars he had routed at Hormigueros and again on the Rio
Prieto, and what few might have escaped would surely have
run into the arms of Henry's command approaching Arecibo.
Brooke's guns were primed ready to fire on the heights above
Guayama, and Wilson was about to execute a most difficult
and hazardous turning movement around Asomante. The
military student was on the point of gaining valuable material for his education. There would have been some blood
spilled, the interest of the country in the Puerto Rican campaign would have been aroused in consequence, military reputations would have been made, and some, perhaps, lost. Of
the favorable result to the American arms there can be no
question. Even if Wilson and Brooke had found it expedient
to "mark time," as it were, in front of their allotted tasks,
Henry and Schwan would surely have joined at Arecibo, the
Spaniards stationed here having retreated to San Juan.
With the former seaport on the north coast as a new base,
they were to move along the shore by the railroad and two
parallel wagon roads, which have frequent connecting cross
roads, and, with the left flank always in close supporting dis
tance of the sea, would, in two days at least, have been in
the rear of San Juan, and at the northern terminus of the
main military highway, along which a force would have been
despatched to take the positions at Aibonito and Cayey in
the rear, if they had not already fallen.
Such, briefly outlined, was the campaign suspended August
13 by the peace protocol and auspiciously closed on October
i8, when the U. S. flag was raised in San Juan, farther east
by a thousand miles than ever before. Sovereignty changed
hands on that day and there is no question of divided interest
in the title.
The campaign in Puerto Rico was clean cut and strategically brilliant, and none the less great because on account of
it a thousand homes are not in mourning and twice that number of pensioners are not compelled to stand at the doors
of the Treasury and demand alms of the Government. It
demonstrated too that the Commanding General of the Army




2I6


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


is as great a strategist, at the council board with a map and a
pair of dividers, as he is a great personal leader of men in
battle.
But it is not the business of the historian to draw conclusions or to point morals, particularly when he happens to be
an army officer. Sufficient facts are presented in the preceding pages, it is hoped, to enable the reader to make intelligent deductions.  Suffice it to say, that the prompt success of the army in Puerto Rico was an important factor in
precipitating Spanish overtures for peace, so anxiously desired by both the nations in arms, while the strategic and
purely material advantages accruing from the campaign make
it the most profitable and satisfactory one of the war.
"At the last accounting, the war has only cost us directly
about $I65,ooo,ooo, and as a compensation for the outlay we
have appropriated Puerto Rico, which can hardly be valued
at much less than double that sum."*
NOTE:-TROOPS AND STORES ON TRANSPORTS FOR PUERTO
RICAN EXPEDITION, LEAVING GUANTANAMO
JULY 21, 1898.
Steamer Yale (Captain Wise).
General Miles and Staff, General Garretson and Staff,
12 Cos. 6th Mass. Vol. Infantry, I Co. 6th I111. Vol.
Infantry, with camp and garrison equipage,-a total of
1,4IO men; 52,000 field rations (lacking 8,oo000 pounds
bacon, 200 pounds sugar), 25,000 rations tomatoes, and
4,000 travel rations.
Steamer Columbia (Captain Sands).
3 Cos. 6th Ill. Vol. Infantry,-a total of 300 men,
with camp and garrison equipage, and 1,300 travel rations.
Lamnpasas (Captain Barstow).
Provisional Engineer Battalion, To officers, 139 enlisted
men, with 45 days rations, engineer's supplies, pontoon
train, 22 wagons, 136 horses and mules, forage, ammunition, packs and harness for pack-train and Headquarters
mess supplies; and Red Cross surgeons and nurses.
*Hon. Hannis Taylor in the December number of the North American Review.




MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO.


217


ANueccs (Captain Risk).
12 officers, and 199 enlisted men of Siege Battery " B,"
5th U. S. Artillery, and 24 teamsters, 7 hospital corps
men, 163 horses and mules, 22 wagons, 6-7 in. mortars
and IO-6 in. mortars, IO field cars, with ammunition and
appliances; also 50 kegs of powder, for General Shafter.
City of Macon (Captain Savage).
275 unassigned regular recruits and Ioo,ooo rations.
Comanche (Captain Pennington).
General Henry and staff, LightBatteries " C "and " F,"
3d Artillery, " B," 4th Artillery and " D," 5th Artillery,
-a total of 492 men, with 6-3.2 in. guns to each battery;
also 483,000 rounds 30 calibre ammunition, 50 steel
shields and Ioo,ooo rations.
Unionist (Capt Scanes).
Horses for light batteries, 2-5 in. siege guns, 216
smokeless, and 216 black  powder charges for same,
863,000 rounds 30 calibre, 85,000 rounds revolver ammunition, 7 escort wagons, and 7 sets of harness, I,OOO rations
of forage, much of it in a damaged condition, and 22,000
gallons of water, with capacity to condense I,OOO gallons
daily.
Stillwater (Captain Stevenson).
6 officers and 60 enlisted men of Signal Corps, 53 horses
and mules; 8 wagons; 2 lance trucks; I balloon; telegraph and signal stores, etc.
Rita (Captain Porter).
6 companies 6th Ill. Vol. Infantry,-a total of 672
men, with camp and garrison equipage and 2,700 travel
rations.
Specialist (Captain Evans).
Horses for light batteries, and forage for 200 horses
for five days; 4 caissons and limbers for 3.2 in. guns and
ammunition for same; Battery " G," 5th U. S. Artillery;
2-3.2 in. guns and limbers; 2 caissons and limbers for
same; 5 limbers and 2 caissons belonging to Batteries
"C" and "F," 3d Artillery, guns of Battery "B," 4th
Artillery, and "D," 5th Artillery; 6-5.2 in. guns and
limbers; 2-3.2 in. gun carriages and limbers; 8 caissons




218        THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.
and limbers for 3.2 in. guns, with harness belonging to
Light Batteries " E " and " K," Ist Artillery, and "A"
and " F," 2nd Artillery, and Battery " F," 5th Artillery,
in Santiago, Cuba; 23 boxes of clothing, consigned to
General Shafter's troops, which Quartermaster at Daiquiri, Cuba, could not receive; 3,500 rounds of ammunition, for 3.2 in. field guns, of which about 700 rounds
were intended for Light Batteries in Santiago, Cuba, and
2,800 rounds for Batteries going to Puerto Rico, and I6
wagons to haul extra field-gun ammunition.
NAVAL CONVOY.
U. S. Battleship Massachusetts,
U. S. converted yacht Gloucester,
U. S. converted yacht Dixie.




I
I




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I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
L-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i




CHAPTER XI.


THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.
BY
CAPT. H. C. TAYLOR, U. S. N.
T nHERE are different kinds of blockades, varying with
the objects to be attained. In a general way they
may be said to be naval and commercial. The former
has a military object in view, the holding within a port of anl
enemy's fleet, preventing its exit and thereby destroying for
the time its power for harm, its warlike offensive quality,
compelling it to that inactivity which in itself is a form
of strategic paralysis. Such was the blockade of Cervera's
fleet in Santiago by our squadron. This form of blockade is
of a directly warlike character,-force is matched against
force,-a battle is always probable, usually imminent. If the
enemy within attempts to escape, he knows he must fight, must
lose heavily in ships and men; if the force outside means to
make sure of its object and keep the enemy in, it must for
its part keep close to shore and chance heavy losses from the
enemy's sorties, from land batteries and submarine mines.
The situation assumes an actual fighting character, one
actively hostile.
A commercial blockade, on the other hand, although an act
of war and frequently of great weight in determining the
final issue, is not directly warlike in its nature. It does not
necessarily nor usually involve the sinking of ships or the
killing of men. Attempts to evade it when discovered, are
met by threats, such as firing a shot across the bows or the
milder menace of a blank charge. Should the blockade runner think his chances of escape good, he disregards the gun
which orders him thus to heave to and he may escape; butt
should there appear the slightest sign of fighting or loss of life,




220


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


the delinquent surrenders at once and without bloodshed.
When in the possession of the capturing force, the prize
passes to judicial trial to decide whether it is justly captured.
Whatever that decision may be, the people of the prize are
not regarded as prisolners of war and are released as soon as
convenient, without any pledge or guarantee required from
them that they w\ill not repeat the offence.  In fact there
are several instances in our own WVar of the Rebellion of persons returning more than once, only to be recaptured in new
attempts to run the blockade. Commercial blockade has the
general features of a game to be played, of great hazards and
high stakes, but not the quality of war and killing, nor the
sanguinary tinge which marks the incidents of an active campaign carried on by a military or naval force properly opposed.
The blockade of Cuba as generally understood was the
effort to close its ports, prevent trade and prohibit the entry
of all articles which could assist the enemy in prosecuting the
war. The subject had received attention before the war came.
It had been decided that a blockade of the western half of
Cuba would practically isolate the Spanish force in the island. The axial railway running east and west has branches
to the north and south coast, but the continuity of this road
is broken after it passes to the eastward of a line joining Cienfuegos on the south coast and Sagua la Grande on the north.
A blockade therefore extending from Cienfuegos around the
west end to Sagua la Grande would include all points from
which goods, if landed, could be shipped conveniently or in
any way successfully to Havana and to the army in its vicinity. There was no doubt in naval minds generally that
this blockade could be made effective, as blockades go, as
thorough in fact as any we know of in history; but there had
been at times differences of opinion as to howv effective the most
perfect blockade could be. Some there were who held that
the Spanish army, depending as it did from day to day upon
the arrival of provision ships, would actually begin to starve
within a few days, in a week would be at the last gasp and in
a fortnight would surrender unconditionally and even gladly.
Thus would be avoided the loss, misery and bloodshed of a
protracted campaign by sea and land. The statement that a




THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.


2 2 I


passive blockade, however thorough, could produce such results
was contrary to the nature of things. It was the effort so
often made before to find a short cut to success, a royal road to
learning.
It should be said that the great majority of practical men
among naval officers recognized the impossibility of such results flowing from a simple blockade. Students of the art of
war learn early in their studies that there are no easy roads
by which to travel toward the goal of victory,-it is in war
as in other trades and pursuits, the object to be obtained will
require vigorous work and persistent effort in proportion to
its value. The blockade of Cuba was but one of several
factors which combined could compel the surrender of the
Spanish. Vigorous offensive movements must accompany a
blockade. The closing of our southern ports in the War of
the Rebellion wvas very satisfactory after experience had
taught us the proper methods. Perhaps none in history has
been more successful, and it is well-known that the suffering
of the Southern Confederacy was much increased by its inability to procure the munitions of war as well as the necessities of life in sufficient quantities; yet the starving out of the
South by this means toolk four years to achieve. It was
forced by necessity to pm-iuce many of the articles needed,
but this was not altogether the reason for the tenacity of its
resistance. That was in great part due to the fact that a
large majority of the blockade runners did succeed i-n passing
through the lines, both in and out. Not more than a third of
the attempts were unsuccessful. Not more than that proportion were captured or otherwise prevented from landing their
cargoes in the Confederacy and departing outward bound
with cotton which was largely used to pay the cost of goods
imported. There was no reason to expect a higher percentage of captures by our blockading line at Cuba than in our
Civil War, certainly not in the opening months of such a wvar
before experience in the methods of blockading was gained.
The conditions of our blockade of Cuba were distinctly favorable to those attempting to evade it. South of Cuba lies
Jamaica with good ports and with but a short distance intervening between it and Manzanillo, where a network of reefs,




22 2


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


permeated by deep but dangerous channels badly surveyed or
in some cases quite unknown, offer every opportunity to such
a traffic. Farther to the west but still within easy distance
of Jamaica is another similar labyrinth of islands and reefs in
the neighborhood of the Isle of Pines, whose channels, known
only to the local pilots, afforded access for light-draught
vessels to Batabano and other landing places inside the Isle
of Pines. All blockade runners of whatever country could
take their goods on board at Jamaica and start thence to any
one of the south Cuba ports. Jamaica is an English possession and that government was neutral, even friendly in its
disposition towards us, but there is no international law or
general custom which would regard the use of this island for
that purpose as an act of enmity, a blockade being, as has
been said before, of a commercial rather than a warlike nature.
Similar conditions prevailed to the north of Cuba. The
Bahamas, an English group of islands whose reefs and islets
extend southward over the Great Bahama banks to within
sight of Cuban shores, offered every chance of concealment to
those attempting to violate the blockade. Nassau in the
center of this group was used for years as the starting point
of blockade runners during the War of the Rebellion, and the
Bahama bank, to the south of that port, makes the passage to
Cuba even more feasible than to the United States for those
vessels whose errands require secrecy. The closer the examination of existing conditions was carried the more certain it
became that, whatever an ideal and theoretical blockade might
accomplish, a practical blockade, such as a fleet could maintain ought not to be counted upon for more than a small
part in deciding the campaign against Spain in the West
Indies.
It was felt of course that the blockade must be as stringent
as it was possible to make it and, to insure this, it was decided
to concentrate the force at the government's disposal upon
the western half of the island and to close all ports from Sagua
la Grande on the north around the western end of Cuba to
Cienfuegos on the south and thus to stop or at least check
the influx of goods destined for the Spanish forces.
On the twenty-second day of April, I898, the President of the




THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.


223


United States issued the proclamation of the blockade of
Cuba in the following terms:
PROCLAMATION.
Blockade of Cuban ports by the President of the United
States. A proclamation. Whereas, by a joint resolution
passed by the Congress and approved April 20, 1898,
and communicated to the government of Spain, it was demanded that that said government at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw
its land and naval forces fromn Cuba and Cuban waters, and
the President of the United States was directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United
States and to call into the actual service of the United States
the militia of the several states, to such extent as might be
necessary to carry said resolution into effect, and,
Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the President of the United States deemns it necessary to set on foot
and maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including
ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and
the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba aforesaid,
in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the laws of
nations applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be
posted so as to prevent the entrance and exit of vessels from
the ports aforesaid. Any neutral vessels approaching any of
said ports or attempting to leave the same without notice or
knowvledge of the establishment of such blockade will be
duly warned by the Commander of the blockading forces, who
will endorse on her register the facts and the date of such
warning, where such endorsement was made, and if the same
vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port, she
will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for
such proceedings against her and her cargo, as prizes, as may
be deemed advisable. Neutral vessels lying at any of said
ports at the time of the establishment of said blockade will be
allowed 30 days to issue therefrom.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
(SEAL)
Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-second day of
April, A. D. 1898, and of the Independence of the United
States, the One Hundred and Twventy-second.
WILLIAM MCKINLEY.
By the President,
JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State.




THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


224


It will be observed in this proclamation that, on the north
coast of Cuba, Bahia Honda is the most western point named
and that a gap of several hundred miles intervenes between it
and Cienfuegos, on the south coast of the island. At Bahia
Honda begins aline of reefs skirting the shore and rendering
it unapproachable as far as Cape San Antonio. After passing
San Antonio, for some distance on the southern shore the
coast has no harbors of commercial importance. Add to this
the fact that communication with the capital from these
western points of the island was difficult, that the insurgents
were strong in that section while the military grasp of Spain was
relatively feeble, and it will be understood that ships employed
in blockading that portion of Cuba would be in a measure
wasted. The Isle of Pines was however, a prominent feature
of the south coast between Cape San Antonio and Cienfuegos,
and abreast of it was Batabano on the mainland of Cuba, a
place of some importance, being but thirty miles from Havana and connected with it by a direct railroad. Only vessels
of very light draft could reach it, however, and it was to be
supposed that the government thought the limited number
of ships then available could be better employed elsewhere.
It will be noticed further that the proclamation omits the
port of Sagua la Grande, lying on the north shore to the
eastward of Cardenas. This point was of considerable value
to the Spaniards and its omission was thought at the time to
be due to reasons of state, unknown to the writer.
War having been declared on the twenty-first of April, the
first movement toward Cuba was made by Admiral Sampson's
fleet leaving Key West the morning of the twenty-second
and arriving off Havana at sundown of the same day. Patrolling, during the night, before that port in fleet formation,
the vessels took station the next day at points specified by
the Admiral and began the regular work assigned to them.
Shortly after leaving Key West the Spanish steamer Buena
Ventura was captured, and in the first few days of the blockade several vessels were intercepted and either captured and
sent in as prizes or warned of the blockade and ordered to
keep off. The latter were valuable vessels which, being
within the limit of time set by the President in his proclama







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THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.


2 25


tion and belonging to neutral nations, could not be regarded
as guilty, unless after one warning a second attempt should
be made. The margin of time thus given does not, however,
exempt vessels belonging to the enemy, and of these one
of the most notable captures was the Panama which appeared
from the northward steering for Havana and was pluckily
brought to by the little Mangrove, which was assisted later in
securing the prize by the Indiana.
From Havana as a center Admiral Sampson extended the
blockade to neighboring harbors east and west, as rapidly as
his force was increased by the Navy Department. Matanzas
was almost immediately guarded by monitors and small
vessels and these extended the line, as their numbers made it
practicable, to cover the entrance to the reefs and islands,
inside of which lies Cardenas. Beyond this to the eastward
there was no marked extension for some time, and later, when
the force at hand would have permitted the next port to the
eastward, Sagua la Grande, to be closed, the order so to
blockade it was withheld by the government for reasons
which as before mentioned were not known to the writer or to
the fleet generally.
Extending in the same way to the westward the line of
vessels soon included Mariel, twenty miles west of Havana.
The intention was to make a close blockade of the three
ports: Havana in the center, Matanzas to the east and Mariel
to the west, for the reason that the two latter ports were near
enough to Havana to be constantly in touch with it and
directly in the sphere of military influence which concentrated
at the capital. West of Mariel the next harbor of importance, fifteen miles distant from it, was Cabanas while ten
miles farther vest was the sheltered bay of Bahia Honda.
Cabanas and Bahia Honda were deemed of secondary imnportance because of their distance from Havana and the
lack of railroad connection. They were, however, observed
by our vessels though not closely blockaded in the earlier
days of the war.
These two bays of Cabafnas and Bahia Honda would have
offered some advantages as 'a shelter and refuge for our torpedo boats and other light craft as well as an anchorage for




226


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


colliers if we could have taken possession of them. It has
always been found in blockade service, or in any duty which
demands that a fleet of war vessels maintain itself in a given
locality for long periods of time, that a temporary advanced
base near the scene of operations is very necessary to the
efficiency of the fleet.
Such a base is not likely to be found in -most blockades except upon the enemy's coast or upon islands lying conveniently near it. The reefs and islets of the Bahama bank
are near enough to portions of the northern coast of Cuba,
but being English possessions they were neutral territory
during this war and could not, therefore, be occupied for such
purposes. Opposite Havana and about ninety miles distant
is Key West and Tortugas. Both of these harbors could be
utilized as bases and Key West became a center of bustle and
activity throughout the war. Hither vessels resorted to take
coal, provisions and ammunition, and to receive such minor
repairs as the resources of its naval station could make. It was
felt, however, that a distance of ninety miles across a rough
channel was too great for the convenience of the numerous
small vessels which were in use and there was serious thought
of seizing one of the less frequented harbors of the north
coast of Cuba and holding it as an advanced base. In the
early stages of the war the blockading fleet did not have at its
disposal a land force capable of holding a position on shore.
Later on, a body of marines was sent to Admiral Sampson
but, soon after they became available, the interest of the campaign shifted to Santiago de Cuba, six hundred miles to the
eastward, and the marines were urgently needed to hold a
base at Guantanamo. The blockade about Havana, therefore, was obliged to rely upon Key West and no position
upon the enemy's shore was held by us in that vicinity. The
points that were under consideration for advanced bases in
the early days of the war were, as before said, Cabanas and
Bahia Honda to the westward of Havana and one of the
islands off Cardenas to the eastward. More convenient than
these, being closer to Havana, would have been Mariel to the
west and Matanzas to the east but as before mentioned these
points were in one case strongly fortified and held by the




THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.


22 7


Spanish, and in the other so closely under observation of the
enemy's troops that their occupation would have been difficult if not impossible.
A lesson may be drawn from the above in reference to having at hand, when war threatens, a considerable force of
marines fully equipped for land operations and ready to be
placed aboard transports, these latter being also kept fully
equipped for this duty. The preparation of this body of
marines and the vessels that are to carry them should keep
pace with that of the principal fleet or squadron, when operations against or near to an enemy's coast are anticipated, and
they should sail in company with the fleet for the scene of
operations, unless some important naval battle with a hostile
squadron is impending.
The blockade of the southern coast of Cuba began later, as
was to be expected, and wvas more irregular in its operations.
The President's proclamation mentioned at first only Cienfuegos on the south coast, and operations at that point were
interrupted for a time by the expectation that Cervera might
bring his squadron there. Thus our strength off that port
varied at different times from a heavy squadron of iron clads
to a small gun-boat or auxiliary vessel. West of Cienfuegos
and -occupying a large part of the coast front between that
port and Cape San Antonio, lies the Isle of Pines, with a
great expanse of reefs, shoals and channels between it and the
Cuban shore. Inside of this island the coast of Cuba
makes a great bend inward, forming a large recess in the land.
In the middle of this bend in the Cuban shore lies Batabano,
separated from Havana by the width of the island which
being here at its narrowest is less than thirty miles. A railroad crosses the island between Batabano and Havana. The
position is an ideal one for running the blockade and it was
early seen that our possession of the Isle of Pines was essential to a successful blockade of Batabano and of that part
of the coast extending for fifty miles on each side of it.
It is probable, had a large force of marines been ready early
in the war, that the Isle of Pines would have been at once
occupied, but even without that advantage some blockade
runners were captured by our ships in that vicinity. It wvas,




2 28


2THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


however, only in the latter days of the war and after Cervera's
squadron had been destroyed that our numbers sufficed to detach a portion of our force to occupy the Isle of Pines, and
before this occupation was effected the campaign was brought
to an end by the Peace Protocol. We repeat that we cannot
too strongly emphasize the necessity for marines to be at the
disposal of an Admiral from the day a naval war begins.
Any regularly organized body of troops would be similarly
useful, but the preparation of an army for war does not
usually include the instant mobilization of a small force to be
landed at once upon an enemy's territory. The minds of
army chiefs are naturally and properly directed to the preparation for the line of battle of a due proportion of infantry, artillery and cavalry, and to the provision of the stores and
munitions of war for a large army. This great task is not
compatible with sudden mobilization of a smaller body for a
special purpose. For this sort of work the marines were
doubtless invented in the early days of history.
There camne a time very early in the days of the blockade
of Cuba when the battleships and other heavy vessels were
suddenly called away from blockade duty. The news that
Cervera had sailed from the Cape de Verde Islands for the
West Indies and the uncertainty as to his exact destination
made it necessary for the ships of the line of battle to seek
him out and if possible destroy his squadron. It was among
the probabilities that he would proceed to Puerto Rico where
the Spanish government had, at the port of San Juan de
Puerto Rico, a comfortable harbor and dockyard facilities,
defended by some strength of guns and fortifications on shore.
On May 4, therefore, Admiral Sampson with his flag-ship
the New   York, the Iowa, the Indiana, Terror and Am/itrite, together with the Detroit, Montgomery and smaller vessels, left the blockade and proceeded a thousand miles to the
eastward to search for Cervera's squadron at Puerto Rico.
The absence of these vessels from the blockading line did not
seriously affect its efficiency, as they were for the most part
constructed more with a view to fleet engagements than for
chasing blockade runners, and there were no Spanish armed
ships then in Cuban ports to make the presence of our battle



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.


229


ships and monitors necessary to sustain our line of blockading
ships in case of an attack from the enemy. We may except
from this statement the Detroit and Montgomery, which cruisers accompanied the fleet to Puerto Rico but were regarded
also as very valuable blockaders.
Not finding Cervera's squadron at San Juan and believing
therefore that he contemplated some other destination, Admiral Sampson moved promptly back to the westward, learning on the way that the Spanish fleet had touched at Curaroa,
an island in the southern part of the Caribbean Sea near the
main land of SouthAmerica. Our squadron regained the
vicinity of Havana and Key West on the nineteenth of May,
having been absent fifteen days from the blockade. The Flying Squadron, which had been ordered to the front from
Hampton Roads, arrived off Key West about the same time
and, as Cienfuegos was thought to be a probable destination
for Cervera's force, the Flying Squadron sailed at once from
Key West for that port. This squadron was composed of
the Brooklyn, Admiral Schley's flag-ship, the.Massachusetts,
Texas and smaller vessels, reinforced in a few days by the lozva.
The blockade of Havana was now for the moment strengthened by the vessels that had returned from Puerto Rico, with
the exception of the Iozva, but a few days later the news
reached the fleet there of the arrival of Cervera's force at Santiago. The knowledge that the Flying Squadron was off
Cienfuegos and that therefore the Spanish ships might, after
hastily coaling at Santiago, leave that port and come westward along the northern coast of Cuba caused the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sampson, again to withdraw from
the Havana blockade a number of vessels and move to the
eastward to guard the mouth of the old Bahama channel and
intercept Cervera at that point, thus forcing him to battle before he could decide between passing to the northward, to
raid our coasts, and continuing along the Cuban shore in an
attempt to raise the blockade of Havana and enter that port.
At this stage of the war the blockading force was much
strengthened by vessels of the cruiser and gunboat type which
our government had hurried to the front to assist in the
blockade. Moreover, the position chosen by the Admiral for




2 70


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


patrolling the Bahama Channel with the heavy ships was one
which enabled them to guard at the same time and quite
effectively a considerable stretch of coast east of Havana and
Matanzas; so that, although the blockading line on the north
coast was at times thinly held, it was at no time so sparsely
occupied as to cause a question concerning its effectiveness.
On the southern coast Cienfuegos, after it was known that
Cervera was at Santiago, was blockaded and a gradual extension of the line was made a little to the east, while to the
west our efforts reached as far as the Isle of Pines. It was in
this vicinity that the attempts of the valuable prize Santo
Domingo to run in her valuable cargo were finally frustrated
and the vessel destroyed.
The squadron patrolling the western mouth of the old
Bahama Channel continued that work until the Commanderin-Chief had assured himself that the Spanish ships were
still at Santiago and that the Flying Squadron had arrived
from Cienfuegos in that vicinity. He then, with his flag-ship
and the Oregon, which had lately arrived at Key West and
joined the patrol, proceeded eastward to take command at
Santiago, leaving the patrol to be continued under the command of Commodore Watson. The latter's force was still
further diminished by the Indiana being sent to Key West,
where she organized the force of vessels which was to convoy
General Shafter's army to Santiago.
At this period, that is about the first of June, the blockade
had been extended and strengthened and the general condition was as follows: Havana and Matanzas thoroughly
guarded; Cardenas and Mariel sufficiently so; Cabanlas and
Bahia Honda also blockaded, but it was not expected that
any large or valuable cargoes would enter those harbors owing
to the difficulty of landing their goods and of transporting
them to the Spanish centers of military force; Cienfuegos
blockaded and the great bay of the Isle of Pines beginning to
come under the influence of our watchfulness; Sagua la
Grande on the north side still open. So much for the western
half of the island. To the eastward on the north coast the
harbors of Nuevitas, connected by rail with Puerto Principe,
but not with Havana; Nipe bay, a deep and commodious har



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.


231


bor but not having easy connections with the centers in the
interior; and some other harbors of less importance not
permanently guarded. Passing thence around Cape Maysi,
the extreme eastern point of Cuba, we come, on the southern
side, to the harbor of Guantanamo, a place of some importance commercially and, in a military and naval view> very
necessary as a base to a fleet operating at Santiago and its vicinity. Its value being recognized, it was occupied by a division
of the squadron under Commander McCalla. On June io a
strong post on shore was occupied by our marines and after some
brisk fighting permanently secured. Remarks have already
been made about bases for naval operations on a hostile coast
and their usefulness was fully demonstrated in the case of
Guantanamo. Doubtless even without this base the blockade
of Cervera's fleet at Santiago would have been maintained for
as long a time as the circumstances demanded, but the work
was made much simpler and easier by the possession of this
valuable harbor. Our battleships could and did, to some extent, coal directly off the port of Santiago in the open sea
from the steam colliers that were sent to the squadron, but it
was most difficult and resulted in more or less damage to the
vessels that thus lay close together in the swells which even
in the quietest weather are felt in the open sea. The repairs
of modern ships demand some quiet harbor near by in order
to preserve their efficiency and as soon as Guantanamo was securely in our hands the government hurried to that point
the repair-ship Vulccan, a complete outfit of tools and machines, and a body of skilled mechanics and officers who rendered valuable assistance to the battleships which came for
that purpose to Guantanamo. The value of this port to our
blockade of Cuba can hardly be overestimated and this experience should not be forgotten by us in future operations. It
was recognized fully in the WVar of the Rebellion, though not
until experience had taught us thit the blockade of the North
Carolina coast could not be successfully maintained if based
upon New York or even upon Hampton Roads, and it was
not until Beaufort, North Carolina, was in our hands at a distance of only a few hours steaming from  the Wilmington
blockade that the needs of the blockade were completely filled




232


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


and its efficiency thoroughly established. Off Charleston, the
blockading line had Port Royal conveniently at hand after its
capture by Admiral Dupont and this harbor served also as a base
for the blockade of Savannah river. In the Gulf of Mexico,
Pensacola and Ship's Island served as bases for the blockade of Mobile and the Mississippi River. The general principle that a base is necessary to efficient blockading is not new
but is of special application in our present stage of naval
evolution, which requires coal as a fuel, in large quantities,
and convenient methods for taking it on board. During the
sail period, that is the few centuries intervening between the
warfare of rowing galleys and triremes and our present condition of steam propulsion, vessels being driven by wind alone
were independent so far as their powers of propulsion were
concerned, although in the matter of provisions and repairs
they still felt a base to be a great convenience.. English
fleets blockading off Cadiz had Gibraltar close to them.
Those blockading Brest had their own ports across the
English channel, while those fleets which watched Toulon,
not always successfully, had Sardinia and Corsica conveniently
at hand.
Passing to the westward from Santiago toward Cienfuegos,
wve come to no ports or harbors until we reach Manzanillo
which is in the upper part of a deep gulf in the southern side
of the island. At the period of which we speak, this port and
the other towns in the same gulf were for the first time beginning to be watched by occasional vessels and this soon developed into a regular blockade, culminating in the attack upon
Manzanillo of a division of small ships under Commander
Todd and the complete destruction of all the enemy's armed
vessels in the port. From Manzanillo westward along the
southern shore there extended to Trinidad, which is to -the
eastward of Cienfuegos, a line of reefs and keys separated by
a considerable interval from the coast, the area thus included
being occupied by keys and devious channels making navigation for a stranger impossible. Had the war continued long,
this stretch of coast would probably have been the resort of
blockade runners from Jamaica but it would not in any case
have had great effect upon the final result of the wvar, for the




THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.


233


goods once landed could not have been transported in any
large quantities or in any reasonable time to points of Spanish influence in the island.
No blockade, as has been said, is perfect and there were
one or two occasions in which vessels were successful in breaking through our lines off the Cuban ports. But these exceptions were rare. Vessels above the size of fishing craft, as a
rule, failed completely to get in or out of blockaded ports.
There was very little effort made by vessels in Cuban harbors
to come out, while on the contrary considerable effort was made
by Spanish and other vessels to carry valuable cargoes to the
island. In this respect the reports of our smaller armed vessels on the blockade form a mass of evidence of great interest.
The running ashore of the fine steamer Santo Domingo, with
her rich cargo by the Eagle near the Isle of Pines on the
southern coast of Cuba, and her subsequent burning by Lieutenant Southerland, commanding the Eagle, is an example of
these incidents and there are many similar cases. The rigid
character of the blockade can be best understood by a succession of reports made by certain vessels blockading different
ports of Cuba. These taken together show that the same
blockade runner tried successively several ports and at each
one was chased off until at the last one she was run ashore
and destroyed. The incident is sufficiently typical to justify
brief extracts from the reports of the vessels concerned. WVe
will premise by stating that Cienfuegos, where the blockade
runner first made her attempt, is near the central part of the
southern coast of Cuba. Her second attempt was at or near
the Isle of Pines at a distance of about one hundred and fifty
miles. The third scene of her efforts wvas at Mariel on the
north coast and it was here that she was caught and destroyed.
U. S. S. YANKTON,
OFF CIENFUEGOS, July 3, I898.
SIR:-I have the honor to report that on July 2, about 3:30
P. M., I sighted a smoke bearing south-southwvest and
gave chase. At 4 P. M. the steamer, which up to this
time had been heading for Cienfuegos, turned at first to the




234


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


eastward and then to the southward and westward, and
steamed away from us. I was able plainly to see that she had
four masts and two smokestacks between the second and
third masts. The two forward masts seemed to have heavy
cross-trees. I chased her for two hours, but she evidently was
making about 15 knots, while we were making only 12. As
there was no possibility of- our overhauling her I turned back
and reported the occurrence to the commanding officer of the
Detroit.
The vessel answers to the description, furnished me by
Commander Dayton, of the Spanish auxiliary cruiser Alfonso
XII, but, I am at a loss to understand why, if this were the
case, she did not show fight, unless she mistook us for a heavily armed gunboat.
Very respectfully,
J. D. ADAMS,
Lieut.-Commander, U. S. N., Commanding.
The Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.
U. S. S. EAGLE,
OFF ISLE OF PINES, CUBA, July 3, i898.
SIR:-At 5:05 this morning, when about 10 miles west of
Cape Pepe, Isle of Pines, bound to Rosario Channel, a large
four-masted steamer with two smokepipes was sighted to the
southward, standing to the northward and westward.
The Eagle gave chase immediately, and a few minutes later
the steamer altered her course to the southward almost at
right angles and commenced to run away. She continued on
this southerly course for over ten miles, when, it becoming
apparent that she was slowly dropping the Eagle, she commenced to edge away to the westward, and at the end of the
chase was heading about west by north, a good course for
San Antonio.
The Eagle chased her for a distance of 59 miles. There was
nothing shown to indicate her nationality.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
W. H. H. SOUTHERLAND,
Lieut., U. S. N., Commanding.
The Commander-in-Chief of United States Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.




THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.


235


U. S. S. PRAIRIE,
OFF HAVANA, CUBA, July 5, I898.
SIR:-I have the honor to report that at half-past IO on the
morning of July 5, I898, I being the senior officer present of
the Havana blockading force, the Commanding Officer of the
U. S. S. Hawk came on board and reported to me that on the
preceding night a large four-masted steamer was observed by
him attempting to run the blockade and enter Havana; that
as soon as she caught sight of the Havwk she turned and
steamed down the coast to the westward pursued by the
Hawk. Upon reaching the entrance to the harbor of Mariel
she attempted to enter the harbor and in so doing ran high and
dry on the beach on the west side of the entrance. The commanding officer of the Hawk reported the circumstances to
the commanding officer of the U. S. S. Castine, the nearest
blockading vessel, and was ordered to report to me by him.
The commanding officer of the Castine immediately proceeded
to the spot and shelled the vessel, setting her on fire. Upon
receiving the report from the commanding officer of the
Hawk I proceeded with this vessel to the place and found the
steamer burning fiercely and opened fire upon her with my
port battery to complete her destruction.
Very respectfully,
C. J. TRAIN,
Commander, U. S. N., Commnanding,
and Senior Officer Present.
The Secretary of the Navy.
The efficiency of the blockade is plainly shown by the
above reports. It is quite within bounds to say that nothing
of consequence reached the enemy through ports that were
being guarded. It should be observed, however, that the war
ended so quickly that no systematic running of the blockade
had begun. There had been no time to organize a system.
There is no reason to doubt that the conditions existing in
Cuba were not different, or at least not more favorable to blockaders, than were the conditions of our own coast in the War
of the Rebellion. It is needless to dwell upon what might
have happened in case the blockade had been existing a year
or even six months, and the urgent needs of the inhabitants
of the island had begun to be measured in money value suffi



2"6


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


cient to tempt adventurous men and capitalists to fit out
ships and take the risks of their ventures. Practically we
may say that the enemy got nothing through the blockaded
ports and comparatively little from Sagua la Grande which
was still open. Yet how disappointing were the results of this
three months exclusion from outside assistance to those who
thought ten days' stoppage of provisions for the Spanish army
would cause its surrender!  In truth that large force, which
was said to live from day to day upon provisions brought in
from abroad and which it was thought could not last a fortnight without such supplies, did continue to live and thrive
without them except such small amounts as came in through
Sagua la Grande.
It was a never-ceasing wonder that no attacks of the nature
of sorties were made by the Spanish vessels upon our blockading lines. The description of such a sortie is given in a
German account as having occurred on May I4 at Havana.
It is stated that two Spanish gunboats came out and attacked
the blockade line and that an action ensued, but our own
records do not confirm this. These vessels may have come
out and in the darkness some shots may have been fired at
them, but anything in the nature of a determined attack on
the part of vessels of the Spanish navy is entirely without
foundation. It was customary for some small armed vessel of
the Spanish force to come to the mouth of the harbor whenever our ships appeared and the writer has seen at Sagua la
Grande quite a display of energy in that xvay when his ship
lay for a few hours off that port to reconnoiter, but it
amounted to nothing more than this in almost all instances.
When we consider the numerous small armed craft- in the
possession of the Spaniards in Cuba, the intricate and dangerous reefs and shoals which made entrance into many of
their ports hazardous or impossible to strangers; when we reflect on the experience the Spanish officers and their pilots had
had through several generations, and their intimate acquaintance with these tortuous channels; and when finally we recognize the approved bravery of Spanish gentlemen, wve stand
bewildered before the entire failure of these men to harass usseriously and cause us heavy loss in our attempts to blockade




THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.                237
their coasts. Knowing them as gallant men wve discern in
their conduct a strange and fatal apathy. To inquire whence
this came,-what causes may be found for it in the history of
Spain,-are questions we need not here pursue. It is a difficult problem and he who attempts to solve it by instancing the
corruption of government, the form of religious worship, or
any other special and definite circumstance, must be careful that he does not confuse cause and effect; for he may discover at the end of his reasonings that all the defects he enumerates have themselves a common cause in some inherent
national malady, whose nature and origin are unknown to him.
ARC' h-     o.~^'
god- ~S Jar/L
rw,^fa/js^        Go-^t~-,.




.1
I
i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~








H
E.H. -
I " "....




CHAPTER XII.


THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.
BY
HON. SHELBY M. CULLOM, Chairman of Senate Committee on Hawaiian Annexation.
T NRADITION      indicates that during the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries there was more or less intercourse
between the various groups of the islands of Polynesia.
Voyages were made between the Hawaiian Islands and the
Samoan and Society groups. About that time the Harvey
Islands and New Zealand were colonized. The fact that the
Hawaiians, New Zealanders, the inhabitants of the Easter
Islands and others in the south and east, have a distinct
physical resemblance, as well as similar moral peculiarities,
would tend to bear out the tradition that the Polynesian
races sprang from the East Indian countries, and probably
trace a relationship back to the Hindoostanees of the third
and fourth centuries. It is claimed that many of the modern
Polynesians speak dialects of the same language, have similar
traditions and general rites. In many instances they have
the same color as the residents of Java. They have also the
straight black hair of many of the Malaysian people.
There being no writtenrhistory which extends far into the
early centuries of the Christian era regarding these various
peoples, of course very many of these assumptions are based
only upon collateral facts and, to a certain extent, upon
known conditions. Alexander, who is perhaps the leading
modern historian of the Hawaiian people, says: "The question of the origin of the Hawaiian race cannot yet be said to
have been fully solved." The general fact remains, however,
that the affinities of the people are with the islands to the
south and southwest.
Again, it has been proven that the Polynesian language is




240


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


but one member of a wide-spread family of languages, spoken
over the islands from Micronesia, the Philippines and the
Malayan Archipelago, even to Madagascar.
Marquesan traditions state that the progenitors of the race,
or of the chiefs, were Wakea and Papa, his wnife, but they
give so early a date that nothing whatever authentic can be
ascertained in regard to it. There are no traditions of any
voyages to and from other countries for at least thirty generations (about one thousand years) after Wakea's reputed time,
but there are still to be seen many of the early great works,
such as the lava-stone temples called " Heiaus," and the
great fish-ponds along the coasts of several of the Hawaiian
Islands. These works, which are plainly visible at this date,
show that the labor of possibly thousands of men had been so
employed by the island chiefs, in the building of these royal
premises; and they, possibly better than anything else, mark
approximately the time of certain classes of rulers. It is
quite likely, however, that the two progenitors above mentioned, Wakea and Papa, were simply words expressive of
certain ideas, as the first is the God of Light, in the Marquesan
Islands, while Papa is intended as a personification of the
Great Mother. This idea, is also expressed in the Hawaiian
phrase, "The Mother of Islands."
Everything relating to the Hawaiian Government during
the latter half of the last century and for many years in this
century must refer in some important particulars to the
dynasty of Kamehameha, or his successors whose reigns
covered the period of some of the great changes and reforms
which have taken place. A very brief sketch of the rise of
the Kamehameha administration may be of interest.
In November, I736, Kekaulike, who was the chief of the
Island of Maui, died and was succeeded by his son, Kamehameha Nui, Nui being translated "Great." He died in I765
and was succeeded by his brother Kahekili. During his
reign, on the eighteenth of January, 1778, Captain Cook, the
great English navigator, while sailing due north from the
Society Islands, discovered the Islands of Oahu and Kauai.
The next day he landed at Waimea, Kauai, where he held
friendly intercourse with the natives, and afterwards laid in




THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.


241


supplies at Niihau. He finally sailed for Alaska on the second
of February. The Hawaiians looked upon him as an incarnation of the god Lono and upon his crew as supernatural beings. Returning from the Arctic the following winter, he
anchored in Kealakekua Bay, on the Island of Hawaii, January 17, 1779. Here he received almost divine honors and
was loaded with munificent presents of the best that the
islands could produce. By the rash and arbitrary conduct
either of himself or his men, however, he involved himself in
an affray with the natives, in which he was killed on February
14, 1779. The spot where he fell is now marked by an appropriate monument, erected in 1825 by Lord Byron, an English Captain.
The struggles between Kahekili and other island chiefs
wvere kept up from 1765 to 1794. Sometimes the warriors of
one island defeated the others, and the supremacy over Hawaii,
Oahu, Kauai and Maui passed backwards and forwards repeatedly. Armies wvent from island to island in fleets of
double canoes, and sanguinary conflicts were carried on.
There are instances, well authenticated by tradition and by
the reports of visiting travelers, where the armies of one side
were driven bodily over perpendicular precipices and hundreds
were killed. During the chiefship of Kahekili, war continued
between Maui and Hawaii, with occasional expeditions to
Oahu. Kamehameha I., now became his rival for the control
of Maui. He was defeated once or twice by Kahekili, who
captured Oahu; but, after a time, he succeeded in overcoming
all the various island chiefs, effected a consolidated government over all the islands, except Kauai and Niihau, and became the king. He finally obtained the cession of Kauai,
from the chief of that island, in 18o9, and thereafter was the
ruler and king of the entire group, until his death in 1819.
Kamehameha I., was the original Hawaiian governmental
reformer. The government at the time of his accession was a
sort of semi-barbarous establishment, with chieftains over the
principal islands. He re-organized the general system and
broke up that which existed at the time, appointing governors
in place of the chieftains. These governors, subject to his
personal supervision, appointed tax collectors, heads of dis



242


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


tricts, and other subordinate officers. They also dispensed
justice, after a manner. The four great chiefs who had aided
him in all his wars were the twin-brothers, Kameeiamoku and
Kamanawa, and a half-brother. These, with Keeaumoku
and Keaweheulu, were his recognized advisors and, together
with Kalauimoki, they may be regarded as his cabinet.
Prior to his death in 1819, Kamehameha I., had appointed his
favorite queen, Kaahumanuu, as the premier or regent, called
a " Kuhinanui," to exercise equal authority with his son Kamehameha II., who was known as " Liholiho." She possessed
the power of veto over the young king's acts. Liholiho visited
England in 1823 and died there in 1825, whereupon Kauikeaouli, his brother, known as Kamehameha III., began to reign
in 1833, at nineteen years of age. The premiership of Kaahumanuu was continued on account of the youth of the
* young monarch, and the former council of chiefs or governors
was converted into The House of Nobles.
Up to that time the common people were not considered to
have any political rights whatever, but during the reign of
Kamehameha III. both he and his chiefs became convinced
of the necessity of remodeling their system. They sent to
the United States for a legal advisor and a person to instruct
them in the science of government. In 1 838, they chose Mr.
Richards as advisor and interpreter; and he, having been released from his connection with the American Mission, entered upon his duties in 1839, by delivering a series of lectures
on the science of government to the king and his chiefs, at
Lahaina. A code of laws was drawn up and a declaration of
rights was prepared by a graduate of the Seminary at that
place, directed by the king. The king and the chiefs spent
several days in discussing it. At a second meeting, which included all the important chiefs of the islands, it was read a
third time and unanimously approved. It was then signed
by the king and published June 7, 1839, in a pamphlet of
twenty-four pages. The next year, 1840, a constitution was
drawn up in a similar manner and approved in the general
council of the chiefs.
The islands were visited occasionally by Russian and American ships and some French and English vessels. Probably




THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.


243


the most important visitors, who, at any time before or since,
have visited Hawaii, were those who arrived on March 20,
1820, in the American brig, Thaddeus, from Bostoh. These
were the first missionaries to the islands, the first party consisting of the Rev. Asa Thurston and the Rev. Hiram Bingham,
ordained missionaries, with their wives and five other Americans and four Hawaiians who had received some education at
a school in the States. These missionaries at once commenced their labors, and on August 25, i82I, the first Christian meeting house was erected in Honolulu. Following this,
many native congregations were organized and a number of
churches built. The missionaries were persistent and industrious.
Up to this time, the Hawaiians had had no written language
or printed books. The missionaries prepared an alphabet,
created and introduced a written language and, in i822, six
months after the first church building was erected, the first
printed sheet in the Hawaiian tongue was struck off at the
American Mission in Honolulu. The missionaries and many
of the leading citizens devoted much time to the introduction
of this new language. Teachers were immediately sent out
among the natives, who were eager for knowledge and advanced rapidly in the study of the new tongue. It was
adopted by the Seminary which had been established at Lahaina. Schools for its introduction were opened in many
places throughout the islands. It may not be amiss to say
that the general features of the new tongue are these:-there
are but twelve letters in the alphabet; five of the letters are
vowels which have, generally, the European pronunciation;
all words end with a vowel. During the twelve or fifteen years
following its introduction it became quite well understood
not only by the younger, but even by the older classes of the
people, and it still remains the native language.
From immemorial time, a system of tabus, or forbidden
things, had grown up in Hawaiian life; the penalties for violation of these, in many cases, were extremely severe. A few
years after the introduction of Christianity by the missionaries, 'many of the chiefs and important officials of the islands
became earnest Christians and at quite an early date the sys



244


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


tern of tabus was destroyed. Many of the old superstitions
which had come down from a distant past were shown to be foolish and members of the royal family took part in the efforts to
break up some of the more ridiculous notions. At a later day
the worship of idols was abandoned. In the city of Honolulu
and in Hilo, to-day, some of the largest churches are native
churches of different denominations.
During the closing years of the reign of Kamehameha I.,
the principal business, or method of obtaining money or property, was the sale of sandal-wood; ships loaded with sandalwood were frequently dispatched to China, and cargoes were
bartered for various articles of trade. In 1829, an adventurer,
on the pretense that he had discovered an island of sandalwood in the South Pacific, obtained one or two vessels from
credulous Hawaiians and started away for the south. One of
the vessels had about 300 men and the other 179 men. The
inhabitants wevent wild over this expedition. One of the vessels was never heard of again; the other one, on its return,
nearly a year later, had only twenty remaining of its original crew.
In 1831, under the care of the Rev. Lorrin Andrews, the
Lahaina Luna Seminary was founded. A printing press and
book-bindery were attached to the school and many books
were printed. In the year i832, Kaahumanuu, the premier or
" Kuhinanui," who had become noted for her advanced ideas
of government, religion and humanity, died. After her death,
Kamehameha III. became king.
In 1833, the Rev. John Diell arrived in Honolulu, bringing
with him from New London, Connecticut, the frame-work of a
chapel, which was erected in Honolulu under the name of the
Bethel Church. About this time schools began to be opened
for the native children, and school-houses were erected for
English-speaking children. In i837, a girls' boarding-school
was opened in Wailuku.
The sandal-wood trade, which at one time amounted to
$400,000 a year, fell off in I835 to $30,000. Efforts were
made to start silk plantations and cotton began to be manufactured in 1835 and i837. In 1836, the first English newspaper, the Sandwich Island Gazette, was published in HonoI LiI u.




THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.


245


There were, however, still existing among the inhabitants
of the islands, very crude notions of government. They
could not understand a government distinct from the person
of the king. They had always been led to believe that the
king or monarch was the controller and practically the
owner of all the property, particularly the real estate of the
islands, and that the king could dispossess any person at will.
At a later date the idea of independent ownership of land began to be understood better.
In 1838 and 1839, there was a great religious revival, whiclh
extended to nearly all the islands and affected nearly all the
people. In the two years, over fifteen thousand people were
admitted to the Protestant churches and during the same
time over seven thousand wvere admitted to one of the
churches in Hilo.
In the latter year, I839, a Captain La Place of a French 6ogun brig, arrived at Honolulu. As the French Ministry had
adopted a vigorous colonial policy, the Hawaiian Islands, as
well as the Marquesas and Tahiti, felt its effects. Captain
La Place issued a manifesto, practically compelling the islands
to submit to any indignity which he might see fit to attempt.
He announced that on the twelfth of July he intended to
commence hostilities. On the fourteenth, with one hundred
men with fixed bayonets and a band of music, he proceeded
to a building belonging to the king and presented certain demands, which the king was required to siagn by breakfast
next morning. He refused to grant time for consideration or
consultation and the convention was signed. But Captain
La Place soon sailed away; and after his departure the demands which he had imposed upon them obtained little attention.
In the period of 1839 to 1842, as there had been much confusion growing out of religious persecution, a declaration of
rights, which has been termed the Magna Charta of Hawaiian
freedom, was signed by the king and promulgated.. The following year a constitution was drawn up and proclaimed, creating a legislative body of representatives. Old laws were
revised and new ones added. School laws were enacted in
1841 and, in 1842, all government property was set apart and




246


ITHE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


a Treasury Board created. A regular system of keeping accounts, paying government officers and collecting taxes, was
adopted.
On May 30, i840, a great eruption of the volcano of Kilauea
began and continued for three weeks. A few small hamlets
were overwhelmed by the lava stream on its way to the coast,
but no lives were lost.
A school for the education of young chiefs was founded in
May, 1840, and fifteen men of high rank were educated
through the medium of the English language for about ten
years. The school now known as the Oahu College, one of
the finest institutions to be found anywhere, wvas founded at.Punahou in i842. The buildings and grounds of this college
are now, fifty-eight years after its founding, amnong the finest
and best in the islands.
In 1842, the government of the islands having had frequent
difficulties with the French government, certain attempts were
made by other countries to take advantage of the simplicity
of some of the Hawaiian officers and diplomats but through
intervention and recognition by the United States, these difficulties were readily settled.
In 1843, under the coaching of certain private interests, the
government was induced to yield certain points to Lord Paulet, representative of the British government, but the king
and premier protested bitterly against the proceedings of the
British Ambassador and appealed to the sense of justice and
magnanimity of the Queen of England for redress. The king
was intimidated into signing a guarantee deed for the benefit
of speculators but finally, declined to yield to any further intimidation. The speculators had brought in lists of damages
against the government in a short time aggregating about
$80,000. An attempt was made to collect these claims by
additional force and intimidation. Certain lands were claimted
by a Mr. Charlton. Lord Paulet seized the land which had
been claimed by Charlton, cleared it of its occupants and demolished a number of the houses. The British government
at London, as soon as the true state of affairs was presented
to the Premier, disavowed the acts of Lord Paulet and of
those who had been attempting the intimidation of the




THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.


247


Hawaiians, and declined to accept the provisional cession of
the Hawaiian Islands, which had been forced from King
Kamehameha III. under duress.
On the thirty-first day of July, I843, a ceremony memorable in Hawaiian history was celebrated by a salute of twentyone guns in honor of the restoration of the flag fromn unauthorized British encroachments.  The king addressed the
people, a great crowd of whom had assembled at the native
church in Honolulu, and said to them, " The life of the land
has been restored through righteousness; " using the words
which have since been adopted as a national motto:-" Ua
mau ke ea o ka aina i ka pono." The British Admiral, Thomas,
who was present, gave his assistance in establishing order and
morality. His act of justice was fully approved by the
British government.  The ground whereon this ceremony
took place is named "Thomas Square," in honor of the
Admiral.
In i845, the Legislature created a Board of Commissioners
to settle land titles. Before these commissioners, all persons
Were required to file their claims to land within two years, or
to be forever barred. This board continued in office until
March 31, I855, having performed a great work, the results of
which are comprised in many large books deposited in the
records of the Land Office. After investigation, it was finally
determined that three classes of persons had vested rights in
land, namely,-first, the king; second, the chiefs; third, the
common people. It was decided that the king should allow to
the chiefs one-third, to the common people one-third and
keep one-third for himself. In 1848 a division was effected.
The king voluntarily divided the lands which had been surrendered to him, reserving only one-half of his share for himself as his own private estate and setting apart the other half
for the use of the government. This was deemed an illus:
trious example of public spirit, and within the next two years
nearly all the chiefs gave up one-third of their lands to the
government in order to obtain an absolute title to the remainder. The common people were given fee-simple titles for
their house-lots and the lands which they actually cultivated.
These were finally confirmed, a:nolunting, in all, to 1,309




248


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


claims. Aliens were not allowed to hold lands in fee-simple,
until July, i850. Thus a foundation was laid for individual
property in land. The poor people became for the first time
owners of their homes, the ancient feudal system having now
been swept away..
Alexander says that the preliminary declaration of rights,
published in 1839, was the first step towards establishing the
right of individual property in land. It also guaranteed religious liberty and was followed by the edict of toleration,
issued by the king in 1839.
Under this constitution, land could be conveyed without
the consent of the king. Land forfeited for the non-payment
of taxes, reverted to him. He had the direction of the government property and was given the prerogative to make treaties
and receive ambassadors. He was commander-in-chief of the
army, with power to make war in any time of emergency,
when the chiefs or nobles could not be assembled. He was
also the chief judge of the Supreme Court.
The office of the premier was continued, being the same in
nature as that created by Kamehameha I. for Kaahumanuu,
but all business done by the premier was under the authority
of the king.
The four governorships instituted by Kamehameha I. were
perpetuated with nearly the same powers.
A Legislature was created, composed of a House of Nobles
consisting of fifteen hereditary nobles, together with the king
and premier, and certain representatives to be chosen by the
people. The Legislature wvas to meet annually. The number
of representatives was fixed by lawv at seven. The two
houses could sit separately or together, at their discretion.
A Supreme Court was established, consisting of the king,
premier and four judges to be appointed by the Legislature.
Under the provisions of this constitution, the Legislature
was formally opened in May, 1845, with appropriate ceremonies which have been retained since. An attorney general
appointed at that time, Mr. Ricord, made an able report in
regard to the Constitution and the powers and duties of the
king. By order of the Legislature, he prepared two volumes
of statute laws, organizing five executive departments, and,




THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.


249


until now, there has been little change in this executive machinery set in operation over fifty yearsago.
In i850o, the number of representatives in the legislative
council was increased from seven to twenty-four, and the
cabinet ministers were given seats and votes in the House of
Nobles. An act was passed regulating elections. The office
of the premier, or, in Hawaiian language, the kuhina uni, was
retained as a kind of vice-king, in deference to the wishes of
the chiefs. This officer was to be the king's special counselor
and the king and premier each had a negative upon the other's
acts.
A privy council was created.
The members of the House of Nobles were appointed by
the king for life, but their number could not exceed thirty.
The House of Nobles was empowered to sit as a court to try
impeachments brought by the House of Representatives
against public officers.
Representatives wvere to be elected only by universal
suffrage. There was no property qualification for voters or
representatives.
All revenue bills were to originate in the lower house.
For a number of years, the constitution worked reasonably
well. Occasionally amendments were offered and, in i856,
the sessions of the Legislature wvere made biennial instead of
annual.
Kamehameha III. died December I5, 1854, and was succeeded by Alexander Liholiho, who became King Kamehameha IV. His brother, who afterwards became Kamehameha
V., was known as Prince Lot. He was very strongly opposed
to the American tendency of the constitution of 1852 and, accordingly, on the thirtieth of November, 1863, after the
death of his brother, he was proclaimed king, under the title
of Kamehameha V., without taking the oath to support the
constitution. He did not convene the regular Legislature in
1864, but called a constitutional convention, to be held on the
thirteenth of June.
He, together with several of his special friends, made a tour
through several of the islands to induce the people to support
the changes which he desired to make in the constitution.




25o


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


The convention met on the seventh of July, 1864, and after
considerable debate and controversy, the action of the convention not being satisfactory to him, on the thirteenth of
August, 1864, he prorogued the convention and declared the
existing constitution to be abrogated.
On the twentieth of August, 1864, he promulgated a new
constitution, on his own authority, which was submitted to
without resistance and which continued in force for twentythree years. This constitution made fewer changes than was
expected. The clause guaranteeing elections by ballot was
stricken out, the office of ku/ina nui was abolished, and other
provisions made for a regency in case of minority of the royal
heirs or in the absence of the king.
Some other changes were made in the number of representatives and nobles. Voters were required to own - a certain
amount of real property and, if born since 1840, to know how
to read and write.
During the existence of the constitution of 1864, government offices were freely bestowed upon members of the Legislature.  Consequently, the legislative bodies were soon
under the direct influence of the crown.
There was a great deal of discontent in the public mind
with the arbitrary reign of Kamehameha V. Upon his death
in 1872, W. C. Lunalilo was elected king by the Legislature.
Pie took the oath to support the constitution. He lived only
about a year, his death occurring in February, 1874; whereupon, David Kalakaua was chosen king by the Legislature and
took the oath to support the constitution.
The disposition manifested during the two past reigns,
that of Kamehameha V. and Lunalilo, to override the people
and to take away constitutional prerogatives was intensified
during the reign of Kalakaua. The evil tendency of the
wrongful assumptions of kingly power produced its legitimate
effect and caused a revolution in 1887. By this Kalakaua
was compelled to sign and proclaim a new constitution on the
seventh of July. This new constitution contained a great
many changes, nearly all of them tending strongly in favor of
the rights of the people at large. It wvas, in a limited sense,
comparable to the Magna Charta granted by King John, at
Runnymede, many hundred years ago.




THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.


25 1


After the death of Kalakaua, the sovereign, Queen Liliuokalani, insisted upon or claimed the right to demand the
resignations of the former cabinet and to appoint a new one.
It was said that she was about to present a new constitution
and insist upon its acceptance by the people. The people,
generally, were wide-awake and wvere not wvilling to submit to
any constitution about to be proposed by the queen, without
having something to say about its terms. Another revolution
therefore took place, which resulted in the organization of a
provisional government, the dethronement of the queen and
the final adoption of a republican form of government.
The Legislature of 1892 closed its sessions January 14, 1893,
and passed into history, flagrant with intrigue against the
public interest." The act of the queen and the announcement of her intended revocation of the constitution, to follow the removal of her constitutional advisers and the appointment of a new cabinet, produced the utmost consternation in Honolulu. A revolution immediately followed and a.
Provisional Government was at once established. Special
commissioners were at once sent to Washington, leaving for
San Francisco by steamer on January 19, to arrange terms
of union with the United States. A draft of a treaty was
proposed by President Harrison and sent to the Senate for
action.
On the twenty-fourth of January, 1893, after an investigation had been made, which looked to the punishment for treason of a number of people who had been tried and found
guilty, the following document was forwarded to the new republican government:"I, Liliuokalani Dominis, do solemnly swear in the presence
of Almighty God that I will support the constitution, laws
and government of the Republic of Hawaii,. and wvill not,
either directly or indirectly, encourage or assist in the restoration or establishment of a monarchical form of government in
the Hawaiian Islands.
(Signed)       LILIUOKALANI.
Subscribed and sworn to this twenty-fourth day of January,
1893, before me,
W. L. STANLEY, Notary Public.




25 2


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


On the same day, a lengthy paper, signed by the late queen,
announced her irrevocable abdication, renunciation and release
of all claims or pretensions whatsoever to the late throne of
Hawaii.
Meantime, while awaiting further developments, the situation at Honolulu becoming serious, United States Minister
Stevens, acting at the request of the Provisional Government,
proclaimed a Protectorate over the country February I, i893.
He hoisted the American flag over the government building,
while a battalion of U. S. troops from the U. S. Cruiser
Boston, then in the harbor, took possession of the premises
and remained on guard.
President Cleveland assumed the administration of the
government of the United States on the fourth of March and
immediately withdrew the treaty from the Senate. He followed this by sending Colonel J. H. Blount, as a Special
Commissioner, to visit the islands, examine and report.
Colonel Blount reached Honolulu on March 27, took official control, terminated the Protectorate  on April I,
lowered the American flag, and the troops from the Boston
returned to their ship.
This unexpected action on the part of the American Government caused the greatest consternation all over the
United States and appeared almost like a death-blow to the
Provisional Government. But the men who, like the signers
of the American Declaration of Independence, had put their
hands to the work did not turn back. They maintained the
organization and kept control of affairs.
They were successful in the collisions which occurred between their forces and those of the expiring monarchy.
They conducted their new government with firmness, decency
and constant watchfulness. The situation culminated early
in the following year by the calling of a Constitutional Convention. The adoption of the constitution ordained by that
body resulted in the establishment of the Republic of
Hawaii.
The government of the Republic, which has been in full
-operation since the fourth of July, 1894, and which will Cointinue in operation until final action by the Congress of the




THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.


253


United States, has been a strong, vigorous, effective government. It has maintained good order and demonstrated its
stability. UnderF its administration, the welfare of the common people has been closely looked after and the conditions
of society generally are remarkably good.
Among the incidents or occurrences of more or less importance, which have taken place during the last half. century
upon the islands, that of the development and growth of leprosy is one of very great significance. This unwelcome disease was first observed in 1853, and its spread was quite
rapid, persistent and apparently uncontrollable, for ten or
twelve years. The alarm created by its presence was widespread and serious. Public interest was awakened, not only
among the people of the islands but in the United States
and other countries, and special efforts for taking control of
the persons effected wvere directed by law. It seemed to attack persons of Hawaiian or part Hawaiian parentage in a far
greater proportion than those of other races and nationalities.
After a careful investigation by the best medical authorities
of the world, acting by their advice, the Legislature in i86;
passed a law to isolate all lepers from association with other
persons. In that same year Dr. Hutchinson, acting for the
Government, selected a peninsula on the north side of the isj
land'of Molokai, covering about five thousand or six thousand
acres and shut off from the main portion of the island on the
south by a range of inaccessible mountains over two thousand
feet in perpendicular height. Upon the east, north and west
sides of the peninsula dash the high waves of a raging ocean,
whose rushing waters break upon coral rocks. Upon this
peninsula the first colony of lepers, i40 in number, was established in i866. The government has provided liberally and
kindly for the unfortunates; it furnishes them with clothing,
food and medical attendance, paying all expenses and making
their support a part of the fixed charge upon the general public. The law operates effectively throughout the groups and,
whenever any person is credibly charged with having become
leprous, he or she is held in a detention hospital until the certainty of the infection has been determined. Then he is
conveyed to the settlement to remain there permanently.




25 4;


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


About i,i5o persons so gathered are now at this place. The
disease does not appear to be increasing or diminishing at
present but remains somewhat stationary. The usual period
of life of those confined here is from three to ten years after
admission. They do not seem especially unhappy, considering
their almost certain future. Very fexv wvhites or Chinese or
Japanese contract the disease, probably not one per cent in
all. There was grim philosophy in the remark of one of the
physicians in charge, who told us that the chief amusement
of the people was attendance upoAi funerals. Two brass
bands exist among the lepers and there is a rivalry between
them as to which shall give the most acceptable music at the
burials, which occur every day or two. There are two or
three churches, Catholic and Protestant. The hospital duties
are performed at Kalaupapa, the women's settlement, by five
devoted Sisters of Charity from Syracuse, N. Y., who have
given their lives to the work. At Kalawao, on the eastern
end of the peninsula, the hospitals and cottages of the male
lepers are located and several Catholic brothers look carefully after them, under the direction of Brother Joseph
Dutton, who came from Wisconsin and dedicated himself to
this work for life. Sad as the situation appears to be, the
dread conditions are greatly mitigated by the kindly care
given by the government in their support and comfortable
maintenance.
There is one feature of the Hawaiian policy which deserves
more attention in this country, and that is the educational
system.  Schools are carefully maintained and a sufficient
classification is kept. School attendance is compulsory by
general law. Good educators have been imported from the
States, but the chief value of the school establishment is
found in its English tendency. The native Hawaiian language has been abandoned in schools and the English tongue
is made the arbitrary medium of all their studies. This has
a far-reaching effect which can readily be understood by those
interested in the progress of American institutions in the new
territorial accessions.
The Hawaiian Islands are delightful oases in the broad
Pacific. They lie a little over two thousand miles to the




THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.


255


southwest of California, whiich is, in fact, the nearest of the
enlightened countries bordering upon the Pacific. As facilities
for steam transportation across the Pacific exist at present, it
is about a six-days voyage from San Francisco to Honolulu.
There are eight of the larger islands which compose the
group, of which seven are inhabited. The area of the group
is about 6,740 square miles. The largest of these islands, Hawaii, has 4,210 square miles. The next in size, Maui, has 760
square miles. But the most important of the group is Oahu,
which has a population of 40,000 and an area of 600 square
miles. The most fertile of the islands, Kauai, has a little less
than 6oo square miles of surface and is called the " Garden
Island," because it is abundantly watered and adapted to the
growth of several important agricultural products.
For many years, Honolulu, the chief city, situated upon the
island of Oahu, has been an important port of call for the
great number of ships, including whalers, freighting ships,
fishing vessels, war vessels and others, which have traversed
the Pacific. It bids fair no;V, since it is to come under the
beneficent control of the United States, to become the principal commercial point in that broad ocean 6,0oo miles across.
The group takes its name from the largest of the islands, Hawaii. The soil upon them all is volcanic in character, except
for a very small extent along the coast where it is of a coralline formation. During the past ages, there have doubtless
been innumerable flows of lava from the different volcanoes,
most of which are now extinct. There are remaining at
present on the Island of Hawaii tvo living volcanoes, both of
which are occasionally active. They are both upon one
mountain, Mauna Loa. The greater one in size, Mokuaweoweo, is situated at the top of this great mountain at a height
of nearly 14,000 feet above the level of the sea. The other
one, Kilauea, upon the north side of the same mountain is
about twenty miles from Mokuaweoweo at a point 4,000 feet
above the level of the sea. Kilauea, which has within the
last score of years been frequently in eruption, has often been
described by travelers and others and, because of the existence
of the so-called " Lake of Fire " in its crater, has become somewhat celebrated. Qn the adjacent island of Maui is the




256


2THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


crater of Haleakala, the largest extinct crater in the world,
being nearly twenty miles in extent and half a mile in depth.
The soil of all the islands is composed of lava. Much of
this has become disintegrated or decomposed by lapse of time
and now upon the application of water becomes wonderfully
fertile and productive. Lying only a few degrees from the
equator, in nearly the same latitude as Cuba, the products of
the soil are all tropical in character, except at high altitudes
upon the slopes of the higher mountains where the temperature ranges, according to elevation, from summer heat to
freezing. The rainfall varies greatly according to location,
elevation and prevalent winds. For the larger part of the
year, the northeast trade winds are nearly constant and the
precipitation of moisture from the clouds upon the windward
or northeast side of the islands is many times greater than
upon the leeward side. For instance, upon the windward
side of Hawaii, at Hilo and Olaa, two places fifteen miles
apart, the annual rainfall varies from 150 to 200 inches, while
at Kailua, on the leeward or southwestern side of Hawaii, it is
about sixty inches and at Waimea, on the north and west, only
forty inches. At Paia, on the island of Maui, where there is
a profitable sugar plantation irrigated by artesian water, there
is an annual rainfall of only thirty inches.
At Honolulu the temperature is delightful and constitutes
a chief attraction to the American visitor. It averages for
the year about seventy-two or seventy-three degrees Fahrenheit, while the highest is about eighty-eight and the lowest
about fifty-eight. The cooling influence of the northeast
trade winds has the effect of modifying the temperature of
the entirz group, so that there is no really hot weather and
no cold weather except on the tops of the high mountains.
The teinperature at sea level is such as to be well adapted for
the growth of sugar cane, rice and tropical products generally.
Churches are numerous and church privileges are in most
places easily available.
The government for many years, even under the king has
been an excellent one and the abuses, which crept into the
administration of the Hawaiian monarchs, resulted in most
cases from the improper influences of white courtiers.




THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.


25 7


The revolution which resulted in the establishment of a Republic was the natural outcome of the attempt to break down
the high civilization which existed, by pressing degrading
measures and acts upon weak rulers. The people would not
submit and the result is before us. The Republic, which suc*ceeded the Monarchy in 1893, has since commended itself to
Hawaiians and to the world. It became a strong and excellent government, advanced in its ideas and efficient in execution of wise laws. It was respected and deserved respect.
But any small insular establishment in a remote part of the
Pacific, growing rapidly rich and prosperous, would have been
simply a standing invitation to predatory powers to capture
and possess.
The people of Hawaii with their institutions are decidedly
valuable acquisitions to the United States as a government.
Their annexation is not so directly valuable to the individual
American as to the country. Of course that means much to
individual Americans ultimately, by their participation in the
property of the United States.  But the failure of the
United States to avail itself of the opportunity which offered
itself in July last, would have been clearly censurable if not
criminal. As it now is, the sugar fields and rice fields, the
coffee plantations and the cattle ranches of Hawaii will all
prove of advantage to our interests. These products, which
now have an annual export value of about sixteen millions
and promise much more, will go far to render us independent
of other nations in certain trade matters.
But in addition to all else which may be said about the
value of this most excellent country, one of its chief jewels
is Pearl Harbor. Its name is well chosen, for it will certainly
become in a few years not merely Pearl Harbor, but the
Pearl of the Pacific. It is a wonderful natural addition to
our facilities for the building, repairing, protection and development of the shipping and commercial interests of the
United States in the Pacific. It is the only harbor of magnitude available in a vast water field seven or eight thousand
miles in extent.  Considering the delightful climate, it is
bound to become a veritable sailor's home,-a home for commerce,-and although it be two thousand miles from our




258


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


nearest seaport, it is still hundreds of miles nearer to our
coast than to any other.
ANNEXATION TO THE UNITED STATES.
For many years there has been a strong sentimental relationship in social, religious and commercial interests between the
government and people of the Hawaiian Islands and those of
the United States. The dynasty of the Kamehameha family
in Hawaii began not far from the time that the United States
became an independent republic. The visits of the English
mariner, Captain Cook, to Hawaii and his discoveries and
death took place there during our own Revolutionary period.
From that time down to the last decade, the vicissitudes of
political and governmental affairs have very frequently involved Hawaii in difficulties with other nations. On several
occasions the kindly offices of the ships of the United States
have been tendered by our government in aid of the Hawaiians,
whose rights were invaded by the navies of other nations.
Great Britain and France, each with armed force, invaded the
islands in i839 and i843.
Annexation to the United States was solicited by Hawaii
in i853 and a treaty to that end was signed by the negotiators, but the sudden death of the king prevented its adoption.
Daniel Webster when Secretary of State in March, I853,
writing to Commissioner Brown, instructed him as follows:"It is obvious, from circumstances connected with
their position, that the United States require that no
other power should colonize or possess the Sandwich
Islands, or exercise over their government an influence
which would lead to partial or exclusive favors in matters of navigation or trade."
The people of the United States and of Hawaii have looked
to annexation as manifest destiny, and the failure of the treaty
sent to the Senate by President Harrison on its peremptory
withdrawal by his successor was a staggering blow to the
hopes of both Americans and Hawaiians. The real sense of
our people was voiced by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations in their report of March i6, I898, as follows;



THE ANNEXATION OF HAWVAII.


259


"4The full ownership of the Hawaiian Islands is indispensable to the commerce of the United States, in respect of its development and safety, and equally indispensable as to the defense of our Pacific coasts."
The preceding remarks indicate the conservative sentiment
of the Congress of the United States in relation to the necessity of annexation. This sentiment was greatly emphasized
by the events of the recent war with Spain and heightened by
the naval victories at Manila and elsewhere, so that Congress
on the seventh of July, 1898, adopted a joint resolution to
provide for annexing the -Hawaiian Islands to the United
States.  This resolution declares that the cession of those
islands by the government of the Republic of Hawaii is accepted, ratified and confirmed and that they are thereby declared to be annexed as a part of the territory of the United
States.
In pursuance of the further provisions of this resolution, a
Commission, consisting of the folloxving five persons, was appointed by the President to recommend to Congress such
legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they should
deem necessary and proper:Senator Shelby M. Cullom, of Illinois, Chairman.
Senator John T. Morgan, of Alabama.
Representative Robert R. Hitt, of Illinois.
President Sanford B. Dole, of Hawaii.
Judge Walter F. Frear, of Hawaii.
These Commissioners met at Honolulu on the eighteenth
day of August, I898, and held their sessions in the government building, formerly the palace of King Kalakaua, and of
the late Queen, Liliuokalani. Daily sessions were held for
several weeks and all matters pertaining to the future government of the islands were fully and freely considered. The
principal question which confronted the Commission was the
form of the government to be recommended for adoption.
The Commission discussed the question whether there should
be established a colonial government for the islands, a government by a commission, as in the District of Columbia, or a




260


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAVAR.


territorial form of government much after the fashion of the
territorial governments heretofore established for the Dakotas,
Idaho and other territories which have since become states.
The Commission considered with care all the questions involved and unanimously determined that the colonial system
should not be recommended; neither did they favor the suggestion of government by a commission, but believed that
every consideration of duty demanded a territorial form of
government in harmony with past precedents, taking into
account the history of the islands, the relation they have sustained to the United States, their fitness for self-government
and the perfection of their government already established,
patterned largely after our own.
Besides all these reasons in favor of a territorial form of
government, the Commission regarded the joint resolution of
Congress annexing the islands as in a sense equivalent to a
declaration that the islands should not be regarded as a colony,
the language of the act or joint resolution being:-" that the
Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies be, and they are
hereby, annexed as a part of the territory of the United
States," etc., etc.
These islands are as completely a part of the United States
as it has been possible for the United States Government to
make them by legislative action and while the United States
may have the arbitrary power to govern the people of the
islands in some other manner, yet the Commission deemed it
to be its duty to make the recommendation for a territorial
form of government. The proposed government is intended
to be as nearly like that of the present Republic of
Hawaii as the conditions of the new sovereignty will admit.
The bill provides for appointment by the President of the
United States of a Governor and Secretary of the territory,
leaves the local courts to remain as already established, provides, for the appointment by the President of the United
States of a United States District Judge for life for the District of Hawaii and attaches the district to the Ninth Judicial Circuit of the United States. This, in the judgment of
the Commission, was important, because of the multitude of
weighty questions constantly arising out of our commrnerciu.




THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.


26l


relations wvith the Pacific States and the large amount of foreign shipping already calling at Hawaiian ports. For these
and for many other reasons, it was deemed necessary to separate the jurisdictions, thus leaving all cases arising under
local laws to the territorial courts, and all cases arising under
United States laws to be disposed of by a United States District Court. Of course the creation of a United States District
Court carries with it the necessity of a United States District Attorney and Marshal to prosecute and execute the orders of the
Court. The ordinary territorial judiciary will be appointed
by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate, and their compensation provided by the territory. The territorial machinery provided in the bill reported by the Commission is intended to cause as little change or shock as possible to the
accustomed methods already in vogue and well understood by
the people. Otherwise, the system proposed is nearly identical with that already in operation in other territorial
governments of the United States.
The limitations upon the right of suffrage are rather conservative. Both a property and an educational qualification
are required for the position of senator and also for voters for
senators, and an educational qualification is required for the
position of representative and also for voters for representatives. It is thought, however, as both qualifications were in
force under the monarchy and retained under the republic,
that there will be but little objection to those limitations.
The giving of vitality to the recommendations of the Commission remains for Congress to direct and, as the Fifty-fifth
Congress has adjourned without final action, it is believed
that the early sessions of the Fifty-sixth Congress will speedily dispose of the Hawaiian question by actual annexation
and the establishment of the proposed territorial government.
This desired result will happily bring under the beneficent
control of this government a people who are worthy of the
kindest care and consideration from the United States.




I




I1




.   ^.............................. 




CHAPTER XIII.


THE MANILA CAMPAIGN.
MAJ-GEN. WESLEY MERRITT, U. S. A
OMMODORE         DEWEY'S matchless Naval victory
over the Spanish fleet in the Bay of Manila, May I,
1 898, raised a difficult and unlooked-for problem in the
prosecution of the war with Spain. In order to follow up the
advantage gained, and to secure full control of the capital of
the islands, it was necessary to send heavy reinforcements of
troops at the very earliest possible date. It was estimated
that a force of at least 20,000 men would be required for the
capture of the city itself and its subsequent occupation. The
task of organizing, arming and equipping so large a body of
troops under pressure of such urgent necessity was simply
enormous. San Francisco was selected as the rendezvous for
the troops; and the first regiment of volunteers, the Second
Oregon, arrived at this point May 13, 1898.
On May i6, Major-General Wesley Merritt, United States
Army, was placed in command of the Department of the Pacific, which department included all the military forces w-hich
participated in the Philippine operations.
The first expedition to the Philippines, under command of
Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, United States Volunteers, consisting of the First California Infantry, the Second Oregon Infantry, part of the Fourteenth United States
Infantry, and a detachment of California Artillery-ii5 offi.
cers and 2,386 enlisted men-sailed May 25, arriving off Manila June 30.
The second expedition, underthe command of BrigadierGeneral F. V. Greene, United States Volunteers, sailed June
I 5, and consisted of the First Colorado, First Nebraska,




264


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, four companies each of the
Eighteenth and Twenty-third United States Infantry, two
batteries Utah Artillery and a detachment of United States
Engineers-a total of 158 officers and 3,428 enlisted menreaching their destination July 17.
The third fleet of transports, in command of Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, United States Volunteers, put to sea
June 27, carrying four companies of the Eighteenth and
four companies of the Twenty-third United States Infantry,
one company of United States Engineers, the First Idaho,
First Wyoming, Thirteenth Minnesota, First North Dakota
and detachments of the Hospital and Signal Corps. This
fleet did not drop anchor in Manila Bay until July 31, six
days after the arrival of the transport Newzport, which sailed
from San Francisco June 29, with General Merritt and his staff,
four batteries of the Third United States Artillery and the
Astor Battery (New York Volunteers). There was an aggregate in the three expeditions of 470 officers and 10,464 enlisted
men, including those on the Newport, who participated in the
operations before Manila. The fourth and subsequent expeditions did not arrive until after the fall of the city. The
military situation in Manila Bay when General Merritt assumed command of the troops was as follows:
Rear-Admiral Dewey's fleet of warships was anchored off
Cavit6, outside the line of military transports and supply
vessels. He was in full control of the bay, and his vessels
passed and repassed within range of the water batteries at
Manila, without drawing the fire of the enemy. General
Anderson commanded the military forces prior to General
Merritt's arrival, with headquarters in Cavit6, that town being
occupied by the Second Oregon, detachments of California
heavy artillery and two regiments of regular infantry. General Greene's brigade, comprising the troops of the second expedition, with the addition of the Third United States
Artillery was encamped not far from Manila, along the line of
the bay shore, and near the village of Paranaque, about five
miles by water and twenty-five miles by the road from Cavite.
The left or north flank of Greene's brigade camp extended
to a point on the Calle Real, the only road out of Manila




THE MANILA CAMPAIGN.


265


toward Cavite, one and a quarter miles from the oute tine of
the Spanish trenches of Manila. The Spanish line stretched
eastward from old Fort San Antonio (the powder magazine),
just south of the Malate suburb, in more or less detached
works, through swamps and rice fields, completely encircling
the city and covering all avenues of approach.
Between the American and Spanish lines on the Calle Real,
along the front of General Greene's brigade, the Filipino insprgents under General Aguinaldo had established an earthwvork within 8Soo yards of the-magazine fort. In addition,
the insurgents occupied a position to the right of Greene's
line, on the road leading from the village of Pasay, and they
also commanded the approach by the beach. In fact, they
held positions of investment at various points opposite the
Spanish line throughout their entire extent. They had been
waging a desultory warfare against the Spaniards for several
months, their forces now numbering about 12,000 men. They
were well supplied with small arms and ammunition, besides
several antiquated field pieces. The presence of a quasihostile force of native troops between the American and the
Spanish positions was, of course, very objectionable. The
situation wvas difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar re6
lations which existed between the American and the insurgent leaders as a result of the active operations undertaken
by the latter, more or less encouraged by the naval authorities,
prior to the arrival of the army reinforcements. General
Emilio Aguinaldo, the principal leader of the insurgents,
shortly after the battle of Manila Bay, had come to Cavite
from Hong Kong and begun active work in raising troops,
and had succeeded to some extent in pressing the Spaniards
back toward Manila. At least 4,000 officers and men had
been made prisoners by Aguinaldo's forces; and they held full
possession of the territory adjacent to Manila, including the
Province of Cavitt, which Admiral Dewey had allowed them
to occupy. Aguinaldo then proclaimed himself president of
the Philippine Republic, and, at the time of the arrival of the
third expedition, he had established executive and legislative
departments, and was ostensibly in complete control of an independent government. On July 4, in a letter addressed to




266


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


General Aguinaldo, General Anderson, in behalf of the United
States, expressed entire sympathy for the native people of
the Philippine Islands and the most friendly sentiments
toward them. A desire was also expressed both to have the
most amicable relations with the insurgent commander, and
to have his people co-operate with the Americans in military
operations against the Spaniards. Considerable correspondence, mainly with regard to the difficulty of collecting supplies for the American forces, passed between Generals
Anderson and Aguinaldo. It was found necessary to solicit
the latter's aid in obtaining horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for
purposes of transportation, for which the native population
was disposed to charge exorbitant prices. Further communications passed between them on the subject of securing maps
and other data concerning the topography of the country
about Manila. Aguinaldo, although profuse in promises of
assistance in every possible direction, actually rendered very
little aid. This correspondence was abruptly terminated by a
letter from the Filipino General dated July 24, in which lihe
asserted that he had come from Hong Kong in order to prevent his own countrymen from making common cause with
the Spaniards against the Americans and protested against
the landing of American troops in places conquered and occupied by the insurgents, without previous notice, in writing,
to his "Government."
General Merritt sought no communication with the insurgent leader, not wishing to recognize his authority until
Manila should be under American control, when he would be
in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce his authority
in the event of Aguinaldo's pretentions conflicting with his
designs. Aguinaldo did not offer his services as a subordinate
leader and the preparations for attack were conducted independently, no attempt being made to secure the co-operation of
the insurgents. The wisdom of this course was subsequently
fully established by the fact that when the American troops
carried the Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to
the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, they were
under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack,
to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the




THE MANILA CAMPAIGN.


267


insurgents, but wvere able to move forward at once and occupy
the city and suburbs.
The position of the insurgent troops between General
Greene's brigade and the Spanish line made a forward movement difficult. It was arranged, however, between the brigade commander and the insurgent chief that the latter's forces
should move farther inland, thus giving the Americans unobstructed control of the roads in their immediate front.  General Greene then threw forward a heavy outpost line on the
Calle Real, occupied the insurgent trenches and, about ioo
yards in advance of them, constructed another line of trenches
about 270 yards in length in which a portion of the guns of the
Utah battery was placed. The Spanish line of intrenchments
stretched from the beach at Fort San Antonio, across the
American front, eastward in a curved line, for a distance of
about I,200 yards, enveloping their right flank and terminating in a fortified blockhouse on the Pasay road known as
Blockhouse I4. The entire length of the line was held by a
strong force of infantry, while several light pieces of artillery
were mounted at the stone fort on the beach and near the
blockhouse on the Pasay road. It was supported in its rear by
strong reserves at Malat6 and in the walled city.
The activity of the Americans in pushing forward and constructing trenches aroused the Spaniards, who made a sharp
attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 3I.
The trenches were then occupied by two battalions of the
Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, a foot battery of the Third
Artillery and four guns of batteries A and B, Utah Artillery,
which sustained the attack until reinforcements came up
from the rear. When the firing commenced, battery K of the
Third Artillery proceeded at once to the trenches, followed by
a battalion of the First California Infantry. The second and
third battalions of the latter regiment and the First California
Infantry moved forward and awaited orders just out of range
of the Spanish fire. For about an hour and a half both sides
kept up a heavy artillery and infantry fire. In the Tenth
Pennsylvania Regiment, which was posted to the right of the
intrenchments, six men were killed and twenty-nine wounded.
Of the other regiments engaged, four men were killed, includ



268


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


ing Captain Richter of the First California, and four wounded.
It is estimated that the American forces fired nearly 6o,ooo
rounds of infantry ammunition and i6o rounds of artillery,
while the Spaniards used nearly double that amount. The
intense darkness of the night and the blinding rain may
account for the small number of casualties, as compared with
the amount of ammunition expended.
After this attack the construction of trenches was vigorously pushed, although constantly interrupted by the enemy's
fire. Owing to the almost incessant rains, which kept the
trenches half filled with water, this work was attended by
great suffering among the men, who were obliged to remain
at their work twenty-four hours before being relieved.
During the week following, the Spaniards repeated these
night attacks, inflicting losses aggregating five killed and ten
wounded. The brigade commander expressed the opinion
that these nightly attacks could be stopped if the fleet would
co-operate and reduce the  Spanish fort.  Both Admiral
Dewey and General Merritt, however, believed that a bombardment by the fleet would precipitate a general action, which
they wvere anxious to avoid at that time on account of unpreparedness; but it xvas agreed that the Raleigth and three other
vessels should be held in readiness to render assistance if
necessary. A blue light was to be burned on shore as the
signal for the ships to open fire, but this signal was not to be
given except in the face of imminent danger of being driven
from the trenches. This contingency did not arise and the
signal consequently was not used, although the enemy continued to harass the troops until the notice was given of possible bombardment after forty-eight hours or sooner, if the
Spanish firing continued. From this time, August 7, until
the final assault, not a shot was fired on either side. Great
difficulty was experienced during this period in preventing
the insurgents from provoking further outbursts from the
Spaniards, and it was necessary to use stringent measures,
even force, to keep them from breaking the tacit armistice.
The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for
outpost duty rendered it imperative to reinforce Greene's
troops with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived




THE MANILA CAMPAIGN.


269


on the 3 Ist of July. The landing from the transports was
accomplished under great difficulties. The vessels being at
anchor off Cavite, five miles from the point where it was desired to land the men, it was necessary to employ native
lighters, called "cascos," or small steamboats, to move the
men to the landing place and then disembark them either
through the surf in small boats or by running the lighters
head-on to the beach. Severe squalls and heavy rains continuing day after day, the landing was accomplished only as a
result of hard work and great hardship.
The same difficulties were met in landing supplies and equipage, so that the greater portion of the troops were provided
with shelter tents only and suffered many discomforts on account of inadequate protection from the fierce heat of the sun
and the terrific rain-storms characteristic of the tropics at this
season.
On August i, the forces of Generals MacArthur and
Greene were organized into a division of two brigades, the
first and second, respectively, and designated as the Second
Division, Eighth Army Corps, with General Thomas M. Anderson in command. There were now about 8,500oo men in position for the attack. Admiral Dewey's fleet had been
strengthened by the arrival of the monitor Monterey and the
time had come for final action. Under date of August 7, the
naval and military commanders sent a joint letter to the Governor-General of the Philippines, notifying him that operations of
the land and naval forces of the United States against the defenses of Manila might begin at any time after the expiration of
forty-eight hours from the time of its receipt and suggesting
the removal of all non-combatants from the city. The following is a translation of the reply received from the GovernorGeneral:
MANILA, August 7, 1898.
THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE MAJOR-GENERAL OF THE ARMY
AND THE REAR ADMIRAL OF THE NAVY, COMMANDING,.
RESPECTIVELY, THE MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES OF
THE UNITED STATES.


GENTLEMEN:-I have the honor to inform your excellen



270


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


cies that at half-past twelve to-day I received the notice with
which you favor me, that after forty-eight hours have elapsed
you may begin operations against this fortified city or at an
earlier hour if the forces under your command are attacked by
mnine.
As your notice is sent for the purpose of providing for the
safety of non-combatants, I give thanks to your excellencies
for the humane sentiments you have shown and state that, findingcr myself surrounded by insurrectionary forces, I am without
places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick,
women and children who are now lodged within the walls.
Very respectfully, and kissing the hands of your excellencies,
FORMIRE JAUDENES,
Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philzipines.
On August 9 the American commanders united in a formal demand for the surrender of the city:
HEADQUARTERS U. S. LAND AND NAVAL FORCES,
MANILA BAY, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, August 9, 1898.
THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
SIR:-The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded,
sick, women and children, in the event that it becomes our
duty to reduce the defenses of the walled town in which they
are gathered, will, we feel assured, appeal successfully to the
sympathies of a general capable of making the determined
and prolonged resistance which your excellency has exhibited
after the loss of your naval forces and without hope of succor.
We therefore submit, without prejudice to the high sentiments of honor and duty which your excellency entertains,
that surrounded on every side as you are by a constantly increasing force, with a powerful fleet in your front and deprived
of all prospect of reinforcement and assistance, a most useless
sacrifice of life would result in the event of an attack, and
therefore every consideration of humanity-makes it imperative
that you should not subject your city to the horrors of a bombardment. Accordingly, we demand the surrender of the city
of Manila and the Spanish forces under your command.
Very respectfully,
W. MERRITT,
Major-General, United States Army,
Commanding Land Forces of the United States.
GEORGE DEWEY,
Rear-Admiral, United States Navy, Commanding
United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station.




THE MANILA CAMPAIGN.


2 7 I


The Governor-General's reply of the same date stated that
the council of defense had considered the matter and declared
that the demand for surrender could not be granted, but he
offered to consult his government if sufficient time were allowxed him for the communication by way of Hong Kong.
This request was declined for the reason that further delay,
with little prospect of results favorable to the Americans,
would subject the troops in the trenches, unnecessarily, to
oreat exposure and the unhealthy conditions of a bivouac
during the rainy season.
The main batteries in defense of Manila being so situated
that an attempt to reduce them by bombardment from the
sea would almost certainly have been attended with loss of
life among non-combatants in the city and great damage to
neutral property, Admiral Dewey and General Merritt decided that an effort should be made to carry the extreme right
of the Spanish line of intrenchments, which, with its flank on
the seashore, was open to the fire of the Navy. As the army
was without siege guns, the reduction of Fort San Antonio,
where the Spanish line began, was to be accomplished by
the guns from the ships, to prepare the way for the assault.
All the troops were in position at an early hour on the
morning of the thirteenth, with General Anderson in command, he having moved his headquarters from Cavit6 to the
brigade camps in anticipation of the attack. General Greene's
brigade was stationed to the American left, along the beach,
and inland across the Calle Real, the First Colorado, Eighteenth United States Infantry and Third United States
Artillery being in the trenches, while the remainder of his
force, consisting of the First California, First Nebraska and
Tenth Pennsylvania, constituted the reserve.  The brigade
utinder General MacArthur was located to the right, about half
a mile inland on the Pasay road, opposing Blockhouse 14 and
the left of the Spanish trenches.
The insurgent forces were unable to restrain their impatience and for several hours before the operations commenced
maintained a general fusillade along their lines, provoking a
considerable fire of small arms and cannon from the Spaniards.




272


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


The division and brigade commanders were to be guided
by the following instructions, issued the previous day:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH
ARMY CORPS. MANILA BAY, P. I., AUGUST 12, I898.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL OFFICERS IN CAMP REGARDING
THE POSSIBLE ACTION OF SATURDAY, AUGUST 13.
The navy, under Rear-Admiral Dewey, is to sail at 9 o'clock
in the morning, August 13, moving up to the different
positions assigned to the warships, and open fire about IO
o'clock. The troops are to hold themselves in readiness, as
already agreed upon, to advance on the enemy in front,
occupying the intrenchments after they are so shaken as to
make the advance practicable without a serious disadvantage
to our troops. In case the navy is delayed in dismounting
the enemy's guns and leveling the works, no advance is to
be made by the army unless ordered from these Headquarters. In the event of a white flag being displayed by the
enemy on the angle of the walled city, or prominently anywhere else in sight, coupled with a cessation of firing on our
part, it will mean surrender, as the Admiral proposes, after
having fired a satisfactory number of shots, to move up towards
the walled city and display the international signal, " SURRENDER." If a white flag is displayed, this will be an
answer to his demand; the troops will advance, in good order
and quietly.
The Headquarters will be on board the Zafiro, which has
been placed at the disposal of the Commanding General
by the Admiral. Six companies of the Second Oregon Regiment, now quartered at Cavite, will accompany these Headquarters, to be used in occupying and keeping order in the
walled city in the event of necessity. If the white flag is
displayed, the Admiral will send his Flag Lieutenant ashore,
accompanied by a Staff Officer from these Headquarters, who
will bring word as to the proposition made by the enemy.
The troops in the meantime will advance and, entering the
enemy's works by our left flank, move in such positions as
may be assigned them by orders from these Headquarters.
This is not intended to interdict the entrance, if possible, by
the First Brigade or part of the troops over the enemy's
works on the right. It is intended that these results shall be
accomplished without the loss of life; and while the firing
continues from the enemy with their heavy guns, or if there
is an important fire from their intrenched lines, the troops




THE MANILA CAMPAIGN.


273


wvill not attempt to advance unless ordered from these
H eadquarters.
In the event of unfavorable weather for the service of the
guns on board ship, the action will be delayed until further
orders.
Meemorandumn of the positions to be occupied by the troops
after entering the enemy's defenses will be carried by the
Chief of Staff, General Babcock, and wvill be complied with
as far as is practicable.
WESLEY MERRITT,
Malor-General.
At 9 A. M., the fleet, accompanied by the Zafiro, steamed
toward Manila, from Cavite, taking a position opposite the
magazine fort, with the Zafiro abreast of the camp as near
shore as her draft would permit. The fleet of foreign warships which had hitherto been at anchor off the walled city
steamed out of the line of fire. The Olympia at 9:40 sent two
challenge shots from her 8-inch guns in the direction of the
Malate fort, quickly followed by a 6-inch shell from the Petrel. One of these shots struck the water, ricocheted, and exploded at the base of the fort. As the fire was not returned
and the expected white flag failed to appear, after a brief
pause, the flag-ship, with the Petrel and the Raeight, opened a
hot and accurate fire of heavy and rapid-fire projectiles which
was continued for half an hour against the sea flank of the
Spanish intrenchments and the magazine fort.
When it was believed that Greene's brigade could move,
the fleet was signalled to cease firing and a column from the
First Colorado Regriment left the trenches and deployed rapidly
forward between the Calle Real and the beach; another line
from the same regiment advanced swiftly up the beach in
open order. The skirmishers were compelled to halt and lie
down, however, on account of the continued firing from the
fleet, where evidently the signals to stop firing had not
been observed. When the cannonading from the fleet finally
ceased, the second and third battalions of the First Colorado
moved up from the trenches and all pushed forward rapidly,
the column to the right keeping up a steady fire on the enemy's works to cover the advance of the line on the beach.
The latter line forded the creek, %vaded along the beach and en



274


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


tered the fort, which xvas found deserted, where the American
flag was hoisted; meanwhile the second and third battalions advanced toward the trenches flanking the fort, passed over them,
finding them vacated, and joined the first battalion beyond on
the Calle Real. The fort being taken without resistance, the
Eighteenth Regular Infantry moved forward and was met by
a sharp fire from the woods near Cingalon and Paco, and one
battalion deployed to the right of the road in formation for
attack. The enemy was using smokeless powder and it was
therefore impossible accurately to locate his position, but his
fire was replied to by volleys and the advance was kept up by
a series of determined rushes until the abandoned Spanish
trenches were reached. Simultaneously with the advance of the
Eighteenth Infantry, the Third United States Artillery moved
up from their position on the extreme right and occupied the
trenches in their front. The reserve then came up and was
ordered to follow toward Manila by the beach.
Meantime the First California had joined the First Colorado
beyond the fort on the Calle Real and the two regiments were
advancing through Malate. They were checked by a heavy fire
from a second line of defense along the road fromn Malate to Cingalon, which was replied to and subdued after an engagement
lasting about fifteen minutes. The advance then continued
toward Manila, the First California and the Eighteenth Infantry moving along the Calle Real, while the Colorado Regiment
took the right flank and the First Nebraska took the beach.
In this formation the brigade proceeded through Malate and
Ermita, in the face of a straggling fire from the direction of
Paco, reaching the Luneta just south of the walled city at about
I P. M. A white flag was flying at the southwest corner of
the city wall. Here word was received by the brigade commander that negotiations for surrender were in progress. A
force of nearly 1,000ooo Spanish troops who had retreated from
Santa Ana through Paco, probably driven in by the insurgents, and who doubtless had conducted the fire on the right
flank of the Americans, were met at the Paco road. They
surrendered to Greene and were ordered inside the city. The
walls of the town were lined with armsd Spaniards, who, in returninga the fire from a party of insurgents, killed one man and




THE MANILA CAMPAIGN.


275


wounded two others in the California regiment. A considerable force of the insurgents had penetrated to the walls from
the direction of Paco, expecting to enter the city and raise
their flag. To prevent this a battalion of the Third Artillery
wvas sent down the Paco road to hold them in check.
In accordance with the instructions given the brigade commanders by General Merritt, Greene's troops then moved to
the east around the walled city, crossed the Pasig river and
occupied positions on the north side for the protection of
lives and property there.
During the advance of Greene's troops from the fort, two
little captured gunboats, the Barcelo and Callao, moved along
abreast of them close in shore, and rendered valuable assistance to the advancing column by a vicious fire from their
rapid-fire guns. The commanders of these small craft showed
admirable courage in taking them within easy range -of the
enemy's heavy ordnance.
Meantime some sharp fighting had occurred in General MacArthur's advance on the right along the Pasay road. Soon
after the naval attack commenced, the Astor Battery sucessfully engaged in a spirited duel with an opposing battery,
and Battery B of the Utah Artillery opened fire on Blockhouse 14. There was no response to the fire of the latter
battery but the opposition to the Astor Battery was quite
stubborn and was subdued only after a hot contest. About
eleven o'clock, when it was known that the attack of the
Second Brigade on the Malate fort had been successful, a
general advance was begun. Blockhouse 14 had been abandoned by the Spaniards and the United States flag was hoisted
over it. Here a battalion of the Twenty-third Regular Infantry was left to intercept any possible advance of the insurgents toward Manila. The Minnesota and North Dakota
regiments, with parts of the Fourteenth and the Twentythird Infantry and the Astor Battery, moved along the Pasay
road. At a point just south of Cingalon a blockhouse was
found burning and a scattering fire from the enemy was encountered. As the forward movement was pressed, the intensity of this fire increased until it developed into strong opposition at Blockhouse 20 in the village mentioned, which was




275


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


occupied by a strong detachment of infantry. Here the advance party of the American line, consisting of volunteers
from the Astor Battery and the Minnesota regiment, was
obliged to retire after reaching a point within eighty yards of
the blockhouse. A rough work was hastily improvised and
held with great gallantry by a firing line of about fifteen men
until the main body of the troops came up.. The Americans
directed their fire from behind the village church, stone walls
and intrenchments hastily constructed in the street. The
opposition, though obstinate, succumbed to the steady fire of
the Americans and the advance xvas resumed toward Malate.
The engagement lasted for an hour and a half and resulted in
the loss of four killed and thirty-six wvounded. This action
was probably the most hotly contested of the day, but it xvas
the last stand against MacArthur's advance and the city was
entered through the Paco district without further incident.
The swampy condition of the ground and the heavy undergrowth wvhich concealed the enemy rendered the movements
of MiacArthur's troops extremely difficult and hazardous.
The station of MacArthur's troops after the surrender included the Ermnita and Malate districts and extended north to
the Pasig River.
The losses of the day in the First Brigade amounted to
four killed and thirty-eight wounded; in the Second Brigade,
two killed and five wounded. The previous losses in the
trenches wvere fourteen killed and sixty wounded, making a
total of one hundred and twenty-three casualties in the taking
of Manila.
While the operations on shore were in progress, the Zafiro
had remained with the fleet. At the appearance of the white
flag on the city walls, representatives of General Merritt and
Admiral Dewey were sent-ashore in the launch of the Belgian
Consul, which that official courteously placed at their disposal, to communicate with the Captain-General. Upon the return of these officers the international signal, " The enemy
has surrendered," was displayed from the masthead of the
Olympia. General Merritt with his personal staff then returned with the Belgian Consul to the walled city, entering
through the Pasig River, which was so filled with sunken hulks




THE MANILA CAMPAIGN.


277


as to render the ingress very tortuous and difficult. Landing
at the northwest corner of the city, the party, headed by the
Belgian Consul, moved along the Paseo de Santa Lucia, passed
through the walls and entered the Cathedral, where the acting Governor-General and his adviser were in consultation.
After the general terms of surrender were agreed upon, General Merritt proceeded to the city palace of the GovernorGeneral, vwhich was soon filled with the Spanish officials w'ho
had come to make formal transfer of their offices. The terms
of surrender, which were signed by General Merritt and the
Captain-General, were subsequently incorporated in the formal
terms of capitulation as arranged by the officers representing
the twvo forces. A part of the Second Oregon Regiment, wvhich
had proceeded by sea from Cavit6, disembarked and entered
the walled town as a provost guard; at 5:45 P. M. the Spanish
colors were hauled down, the flag of General Merritt was run
up on the palace and the American flag was displayed and
saluted by the guns of the fleet.
The city was filled with Spanish troops driven in from the
intrenchments and regiment after regiment lined the streets
in readiness to deliver up their arms. The colonel of the
Oregon regiment was designated to receive the arms and deposit them in a place of security. The Governor-General's
palace was temporarily used as a repository for the captured
arms and accoutrements.
The trophies of the battle of Manila amounted to $900,000
in public funds, 13,000 prisoners of wvar and 22,000 stands of
arms. -
After the battle the insurgent forces gathered outside the
American lines endeavoring to gain admission to tUc town,
but strong guards were posted and General Aguinaldo wvas
given to understand that no insurgents would be allowed to
enter with arms. A few of the houses in the suburbs, whose
occupants had taken refuge in the town, were looted by the
insurgents in spite of the vigilance of the Americans. Considerable fear was evinced among the Spanish forces inside
the city that a massacre would be attempted by the insurgents, and they were very anxious to unite with the Americans against them.




278


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


The headquarters of the General Commanding were established in the city office of the Governor-General immediately
after the surrender and steps were at once taken to inaugurate
a government of military occupancy. General MacArthur
was appointed provost marshal-general and civil governor of
the town. General Greene was made director of financial affairs and placed at the head of the customs and internalrevenue department. Lieut.-Col. Whittier was appointed collector of customs and Major Whipple of the Pay Department,
a bonded officer, was made custodian of the public funds to
control and disburse all Spanish moneys from whatever source
derived.
A proclamation was issued to the people of the Philippines,
under date of August 14, 1898, and published in all the newspapers of the city, in English, Spanish and native dialect, concisely reciting the conditions then existing in the island as
the result of the operations of the American Army and Navy;
setting forth the form of government to be adopted, the
methods of its administration, military and civil, the privileges
to be afforded to neutral nations in Philippine ports under
United States authority, the protection to be accorded to
places devoted to religious worship, the arts and sciences, education, etc., and finally assuring the people that they would not
be molested or disturbed in their persons and property so long
as they preserved the peace and performed their duties towards
the representatives of the United States, except so far as
might be found necessary for the good of the service of the
United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines.
It was not until August i6 that a cablegram was received
announcing the signing of the peace protocol and the proclamation of the President directing a cessation of hostilities.
This was at once communicated to the Spanish authorities
and resulted in a formal protest from the Governor-General
regarding the transfer of public funds then taking place, on
the ground that the protocol was dated prior to the surrender. The delivery was insisted upon, however, and was finally made under protest.
The operations around Manila were not marked by any conspicuous feature in the way of hard fighting, with heavy loss,




THE MANILA CAMPAIGN.


279


or any particularly brilliant military manoceuvres; but for a
body of men, a large proportion of whom were newly organized and hastily equipped and very few of whom had ever
participated in an engagement, to enter under fire a town covering a wide area, to deploy rapidly and guard all principal
points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent
forces pressing for admission, to disarm quietly an opposing
army more than equalling their own in numbers and finally, to
prevent all rapine, pillage and disorder, and gain complete
possession of a city of 300,000 inhabitants, who were stirred
up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in
the outside trenches, was an accomplishment of which only
the law-abiding, temperate, resolute American soldier, ably
and skilfully handled by his regimental and brigade commanders, was capable..@ /^^ ^^^.S An                 l


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CHAPTER XIV.


THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT.
BY
HON. PERRY S. HEATH, First Assistant Postmaster General.
R 1 T   E want no wars of conquest. We must avoid the
V V   temptation of territorial aggression.  War
should never be entered upon until every agency
of peace has failed."
These were the ringing words of William McKinley, when
he took the oath of office as President of the United States,
on the 4th of March, 1897, with the shadow of an impending
conflict with Spain resting darkly over him. From the views
thus expressed he never deviated during all the trying period
that afterwards intervened. When every agency of peace
had failed, and war became inevitable, he accepted all of its
grave responsibilities, just as, after the protocol of peace had
been signed, he declared that where the flag, had once been
raised it should not be hauled down with his consent, and
that, as far as in him lay, he would carry out to their logical
and legitimate conclusions the results achieved by. the war.
More fully than any one else Mr. McKinley appreciated.
when he entered upon the duties of Chlief Executive, the
dread responsibilities which a declaration of war would inpose. He knew that though war might be demanded or proclaimed by the people of any nation-Imperial, Monarchical
or Republican-the responsibilities for its conduct and for its
results must fall upon the Executive. He comprehended the
peculiar difficulties which surrounded our relations with Spain,
the greatest of these being that which had the least popular
consideration-the possibility that a declaration of war with
Spain would bring about the hostile intervention of other
European Powers, intimately connected with that country by




282


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


ties of common interest and family relationship. Traditions
and international understandings, the Monroe Doctrine, the
inviolability of which has so recently been asserted by this
country), and questions of politics and religion all aided to
complicate the situation. While it is true that each of the
great political parties in the campaign which preceded the
election of President McKinley had condemned in strong
terms the existing condition of affairs in Cuba, and declared a
readiness to exhaust every effort to secure to the people of
that island the blessings of freedom and good government, no
pledge was given by either party which could, even by inference, be held to bind the Government of the United States to
take up arms to accomplish the end which was rhetorically
advocated.
When Mr. McKinley left his home in Canton, Ohio, to assume the duties of the Presidency, he had in mind a plan,
which he had carefully thought out, for the emancipation of
Cuba and the establishment of an independent form of government in that island. His purpose was to bring about this result by a series of swift and positive diplomatic movements,
which included an appeal to motives of humanity and justice,
and an array of the more powerful, if less disinterested, motives of self interest. There can be little doubt that one of
his leading ideas for the pacification of Cuba was the surrender of Spanish sovereignty to be brought about by diplomatic negotiation or by friendly purchase, the United States
to be either the direct purchaser or the guarantor in behalf of
an independent Cuban Republic. He immediately proceeded
to put in operation all the agencies of diplomacy to secure anl
amelioration of thle condition of the people of Cuba. Contemporaneously with these efforts he called Congress in extra
session, to enact laws which should place the industrial, commercial and agricultural interests of our own country upon a
more satisfactory basis. He asked Congress, before transacting any other business, first to provide sufficient revenue to
administer the Government faithfully, without the contraction
of further debt or the continued disturbance of our finances.
In the light of events that followed, it may well be claimed
that Divine Providence shaped the ends to which the Presi



THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT.


283


dent directed the nation. Without the revival of prosperity,
which almost immediately followed the legislation recommended,-the enactment of which consumed time and tended
to create a feeling of unrest on the part of those who desired
speedy action in Cuba,-there could not have been the national cohesion which enabled us to secure the results afterwvards achieved.
During this extra session, called only to consider economic
questions, events in Cuba so progressed as to excite the public
mind almost beyond the limits of repression. General Weyler's policy of concentration, inaugurated February i6, 1896,
removed from the provinces controlled by the Spanish army
the rural population, including women, children and helpless
old people. The massing of these in the neighborhood of the
cities, and the leaving of them there to die of starvation, had
reached a culmination of horror which shocked the civilized
world. The President issued an appeal to the people of the
United States to relieve the necessities of these innocent
sufferers; Congress made an appropriation for the purpose;
and the noble organization of the Red Cross, and, later on,
many newspaper and private agencies of benevolence were
drawn to their assistance.
Agitation for the recognition of Cuban Independence, or
for-forcible intervention by the United States, was rampant
all over the country, sustained by the pulpit, the press and
the lecture forum. Resolutions by the hundred were adopted
at public gatherings and forwarded to the President, almost
as urgent in tone as those addressed to President Lincoln
prior to the Proclamation of Emancipation. So many Americans, impelled by righteous indignation at the stories of
Cuban wrongs, had entered the service of the Cuban army of
freedom that there was scarcely a Congressional District
which did not number one or more of these recruits, whose
relatives were importunate in beseeching their Representatives in Congress to take speedy measures to put an end to
the struggle.
Expeditions, unauthorized by international law, but quite
generally sanctioned by public sentiment, fitted out in our
ports to carry arms, ammunition and men to aid the cause c f




284


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Cuba Libre, became so alarmingly frequent and formidable
that the President ordered a special patrol by revenue cutters
and naval vessels of our coast adjacent to Cuba, and directed
the appointment of special officers of the Department of Justice to prosecute the offenders against our neutrality laws.
Among those intercepted and prosecuted as the result of
these measures was General Calixto Garcia, the Cuban patriot,
whose death in December, 1898, while on a mission of peace
and conciliation to the City of Washington, was generally deplored.
To the different delegations from. Congress who waited upon
him to urge immediate action, President McKinley, with the
frankness which has always characterized his dealings with
the legislative branch of the Government, explained his plans
and his aspirations for a peaceful settlement, and asked them
to give him further time. Congress trusted the President, and
respected his wishes by adjourning the extra session without
taking decisive action on the Cuban question.
Diplomatic efforts to effect an adjustment were continued
with increased vigor. The'President, it is understood, went
just as far in his demands as he could within the constitutional
limits of his power, stopping short only of such action as
might be construed into a practical declaration of wvar. Spain
replied, in her customary manner, by promises and prevarication. The pressure of public sentiment increased in volume.
Local militia organizations, covertly or openly abetted by
governors of States, and many individual citizens of military
training, undertook the organization of volunteer forces to
proceed to Cuba to aid in the liberation of its people. Political parties and geographical lines were ignored. The men
who carried on the agitation were those who had fought on
each side of the most desperate civil war of modern history.
To withstand this pressure until the time was ripe; to continue to enforce our neutrality laws in the face of a hostile
public sentiment; and scrupulously to observe all our international obligations towards Spain, imposed upon the
President duties which called for the exercise of the highest
executive ability and tact.
WVhen the 356 members of the House of Representatives




THE WVORK OF THE PRESIDENT.


285


and the ninety Senators, fresh from intercourse with their
people, met in regular session of Congress on the 6th of December, 1897, it was as the commingling of many streams
forming one mighty flood of public sentiment in favor of the
immediate evacuation of Cuba by Spain, or an open declaration of war by the United States as the alternative. The
President addressed to Congress a thoughtful, firm, but temperate message. Summarizing the historical facts, he reminded
Congress that our relations towards Spain and Cuba had been
almost a continuous question since the first enfranchisement
of the colonial possessions of Spain in the Western Hemisphere in 1823, and that the possibility that some other European Power might take advantage of the weakness of Spain's
hold upon Cuba to establish a foothold on that island to the
detriment of the United States, had called forth repeated declarations that this country would permit no disturbance of
Cuba's connection with Spain, unless in the direction of independence, or the acquisition of the island by the United States
through purchase.
While maintaining in his communications to Congress the
reticence which must accompany uncompleted negotiations,
and withholding any statement of precise propositions, so as
to avoid embarrassment to the Government of Spain, he
stated that our new Minister to that country (General Stewart
L. Woodford) had been instructed to inquire seriously
whether the time was not ripe for Spain, of her own volition,
moved by her own interests, to make proposals of settlement
honorable to herself and just to her Cuban colony; and also
instructed to intimate, in plainest terms, that the United
States, as a neighboring country, with large interests, both
commercial and humane, in Cuba, could not be required to
wait much longer for the restoration of peace and order in
that island. The President still counselled a last appeal to
peaceful negotiation. Forcible annexation of Cuba by the
United States, he said, would be an act of criminal aggression.
Recognition of the belligerency or of the independence of
the Cuban Republic he also put aside, for the reason that the
essential qualifications of sovereignty required by international law had not, in his judgment, been yet attained. De



286


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAVAR.


nouncing General Weyler's concentration order as an act, not
of civilized warfare, but of extermination, hle gave full faith
to the declarations of the new Spanish Government of Premier
Sagasta, which had succeeded that of Premier Canovas, under
whom this cruel policy originated, that it would be reversed
and that a broad and liberal scheme of Home Rule or
Autonomy wvould be granted to Cuba. These propositions
he thought were in the line of a better understanding between
this Government and that of Spain. He felt that it was
honestly due to Spain that she should be given a reasonable
chance to realize her expectations and to prove the asserted
efficacy of the new order of things to which she stood irrevocably committed.
At the same time he added these pregnant words:
" Sure of the right, keeping free from all offence ourselves,
actuated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved
neither by passion nor selfishness, the 'Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens, and will abate none of its efforts 'to bring about
by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and
enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed
by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity,
to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part
and only because the necessity for such action shall be so
clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized
world."
This declaration was afterward abundantly fulfilled. On
the night of the i5th of February, eleven weeks after the
assembling of Congress, the United States battleship Malic,
while on a friendly visit to the harbor of Havana, and lying
at a mooring especially assigned to her by the Captain of the
port, was destroyed by a submarine mine, and in this catastrophe two of her officers and 264 of her crew perished.
The horror and suspicion which this occurrence created in
the minds of the President and his advisers were increased by
the fact that Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee at Havana had
cabled, suggesting delay in sending the Maine to that city, on
the ground that the Spanish authorities professed to think her
presence had some ulterior purpose, and would obstruct




THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT.


287


autonomy and most probably produce a demonstration. This
telegram was received after the Maine had sailed for Havana.
Those who saw President McKinley the night this fateful
news was received say that the anguish depicted on his face
wvas as great as that which Abraham Lincoln exhibited when
he visited the battlefield of Gettysburg. He knew then that
all his efforts to avert a wvar, of which no one could foretell
the duration or extent, had been unavailing.
This was the crucial moment in the President's life; a
turning point in the life of the Republic. Then the sturdy
characteristics of firmness and readiness of mind derived from
his ancestry were displayed. Mr. McKinley, as is well known,
is of Scotch-Irish descent. The crest of "James McKinlay
the Trooper," head of the Scotch clan of McKinlay, from
whom the McKinleys of Pennsylvania and Ohio descended,
was an olive branch clasped in a mailed hand. The motto
accompanying this emblem implied Moderation and Patience.
Its literal reading was, " Not too much." In transition from
Scotland to the North of Ireland the "a " of the name was
changed to "e," and under the Scotch-Irish name of " McKinley," the ancestors of the present President of the United
States came to America, where, in York County, Pennsylvania, his great grandfather, David McKinley, a gallant private soldier of the \Var of the Revolution, was born.
These old heraldic bearings derived new significance in the
present crisis. The "olive branch" had been extended for
eleven months; the " mailed hand" was now to come into
play. Not for the first time was William McKinley, the
soldier, called upon to take heroic assumption of responsibility, but never before in so vast a theater and with the
world for a spectator. William McKinley was a gallant
soldier in the war of i 861 —. He entered that war as a private
and emerged as a Major. He participated in many battles,
and won promotion for distinguished services. He knew
what war meant, and had shown his capacity in positions of
great difficulty and responsibility.
An incident recorded of himn in that struggle illustrates the
self-reliance of the man, and the qualities which wvere now to
be brought into operation on a far grander scale. The story,
as told by one of his biographers, is this:



288


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


" At the battle of Opequan, McKinley (who, like his ancestor of Revolutionary fame, had entered the war as a private,
but who was now a Captain and Aide on General Crook's
staff) was sent with an order to General Isaac H. Duval to
move his command quickly to a position on the right of the
Sixth Corps; but Duval, not knowing the topography of the
country, asked the young aide, ' By what route shall I move
my command?' Captain McKinley was without definite
orders or knowledge of the country, but having a general idea
of the direction of the water courses and location of the
troops, replied, 'I would move up this creek.' Duval then
said, 'I shall not move without definite orders.' McKinley
knew that any delay was hazardous, and so, acting on his own
view of the position of the armies, at once replied: 'This is
a case of great emergency, General, and so I order you, by
command of General Crook, to move your command on the
road up this ravine to a position on the right of the army! '
The movement proved exactly right, and Duval's command
was soon in position to do effective work. It drove the
enemy in confusion from their works and contributed to the
victory of the day. Still it is not hard to conjecture what
would have been the young aide's fate, if the order had been a
mistake."
The admirable equipoise of Mr. McKinley's character, and
his readiness to meet emergencies whenever they occurred,
and however unexpectedly they confronted him, have been
manifested on many occasions since the termination of this
great epoch in American history. Three years before he was
called to enter upon the duties of Chief Executive of the Nation, when he wvas filling a similar but less exalted position,
that of Chief Executive of the great State of Ohio, disturbances of a most threatening character broke out among the
coal miners. Governor McKinley assumed personal direction
of the State troops sent to suppress rioting, and by his firmness and moderation averted what threatened to be a sanguinary and widespread disturbance.
His twelve years' service in Congress, his experience in
other walks of life, in all of which he acquitted himself in the
most trying circumstances with credit and distinction, marked




,Z.., t




WF 3C  ELm I)A0   r NH  LSESM   E< A  SUEA P l< 9NIEI$I  ' 
THE   WAR    CABINIM




THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT.


289


him as the man destined for the hour when the storm of foreign war broke over the United States.
On the day after the news of the destruction of the battleship Maine, the President was visited bynearly every member
of Corngrecq, rcing immediate warlike artion. He counselled
prudence and delay; he asked them all to suspend judgment
before determining the responsibility for the tragic occurrence.
In point of fact, he sustained the wvise cable message sent by
Captain Sigsbee of the Maine in announcing the disaster.
President McKinley knew-none better-that the country
was not prepared for wvar. We had an army of but 27,500
men, while Spain had sent 135,000 troops to Cuba alone. The
Spanish Navy, on paper at least, was equal, if not superior, to
that of the United States. Very little had been done since
the war of I86i-5 in the way of fortifying our sea coast or
providing siege guns or fixed ammunition. It is related that
at this juncture a distinguished army officer reported to the
President, " If we should go to war with Spain to-morrow, we
have not enough small ammunition for a continuous battle of
two hours."
Nevertheless a caucus of the House of Representatives.
confined to no one political party, decided almost unanimously
on an immediate declaration nf war- and a -iifficnt nmr;-her
of members of Congress were present at this conference to indicate that the strength of the war party in both Houses was
sufficient to override even a Presidential veto.
The President had asked Congress, at the beginning of the
session, to await the result of Spain's new policy of granting
autonomy to Cuba, and of reversing General Weyler's order
of concentration. The hopes of peace which these propositions held out failed him at this critical juncture. Our Consuls in Cuba reported the continuance of such sickening
scenes of starvation, cruelty and death in the camps of the reconcentrados that the correspondence, though called for by
Congress, was for the time prudently withheld by the President from publication, lest in the excited state of the public
mind it might prove a spark in the powder magazine, already
dangerously near explosion. These Consuls also reported
that autonomy was an absolute failure; that coercion and




290


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


bribery had been tried in vain to induce Cubans of character
to give countenance to the movement. Sr. Manuel Rafael
Angulo, sent to Washington as a Delegate from the so-called
Colonial or Autonomist Government of Cuba, about this time
cabled Governor-General Blanco at Havana, through the
Spanish Minister in Washington, that it was necessary, in
order to offset what he termed " the perfidious machinations
of Lee and his copartners," to have a cable message sent him
giving the names of representative native-born Cubans of
standing who adhered to the Autonomist Government.
When the reply was received on April i5th, 1898, he wrote
despairingly to Sr. Jose Maria Galvez, President of the Council of the so-called Colonial Government at Havana, that the
names which had been forwarded to him were all " Peninsulares" (that is, Spaniards), not Cubans; that he had seen the
President of the "Chamber of Congress" by appointment,
and had also had an interview with the Honorable John Addison Porter, Secretary to the President, at the White House,
who had made it apparent that if the Autonomist solution
was to be well received in the United States it must be shown
to be, not a Spanish proposition, but a Cuban; also that it
must be shown that affairs had changed in Cuba, not in appearance only, but substantially.
Autonomy was thus admitted to be a subterfuge, even by
its originators, and the promised reforms a failure.
Amid all these discouragements the President remained undismayed; his courage never failed him; he abated none of
his high purposes; and Congress showed its unlimited confidence in him by an act which excited the wonder and
admiration of Europe. On the mere suggestion of the Executive, by a unanimous vote of both Houses, on the 9th of
March, i898, an appropriation of fifty million dollars was made
"for the national defence and for each and every purpose
connected therewith, to be expended at the direction of the
President." It is a matter of history that Congress subsequently supplemented this grant by authorization to negotiate a three per cent loan to the extent, if necessary, of
$400,000,000, only half of which was called out, and which
was subscribed by the people in sums ranging from twenty




THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT.


29I


dollars upwards, no one subscription accepted exceeding five
thousand dollars.
Immediate steps were taken by the President so to utilize
the fund created by the special appropriation bf $so,ooo,ooo
as to place the country on a war footing. Agents were sent
abroad to purchase all available warships before the outbreak
of hostilities brought the neutrality laws into force. On the
suggestion of the President, the four swift ocean steamers of
the International Navigation Company were chartered and
fitted out as cruisers and scouts, and other vessels were bought
for colliers and transports. At home every arsenal and navy
yard, and all private firms engaged in the manufacture of
munitions of war, were put to work at their full capacity, by
night as well as by day.
On the i ith of April, the President addressed a message to
Congress, setting forth in detail the final efforts he had made,
through diplomatic channels, by means of Minister Woodford
at Madrid, to bring about an amelioration of the condition of
the people of Cuba, and the reply of the Spanish Government,
which remitted the question of the settlement of terms of
peace with the Cuban insurgents to the so-called Insular
Congress of the pretended Autonomist Government of Cuba.
"With this last overture," he said, " in the direction of immediate peace, and its disappointing reception by Spain, the
Executive is brought to the end of his effort."
The President referred to the destruction of the Maine as a
tragic horror, increasing the elements of danger and disorder,
and asked that Congress authorize and empower the President
to take measures to secure a full and final termination of
hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people
of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a
stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing
its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquility
and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use
the military and naval forces of the United States as may be
necessary for these purposes.
On the same day he sent to Congress the delayed Consular
correspondence relating to the atrocities perpetrated on the
reconcentrados of Cuba.




292


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


On the i9th of April, after nine days' debate and conference,
Congress passed a joint resolution calling upon Spain to withraw its an  an na va               a and Cuban waters,
andLdirecting the President to use the entire land and naval
forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service
of the United States the milit  the ce^rrl Stt9 to such
t~~~~~~~~i UL- Ap~e-1stt               to such
extent as might be necessary to carry this resolution into
effect. jih 'u in effct n fnrr I dfolaraon of war.
On the morning of the 21st of April, before he could present
this ultimatum to the Spanish Government, Minister Woodford
received his passports, and immediately afterwards Minister
Polo y Barnabe withdrew from Washington. On the 22nd of
April the blockade of the north coast of Cuba was proclaimed
by President McKinley, and on the 25th of April Congress
passed an act declaring the existence of a state of war
between the United States and Spain.
It is not the purpose of this chapter to follow in detail the
events of that brief and glorious struggle, but only to indicate
some of the prominent incidents of the President's personal
participation therein. Every movement, great or small,
received the benefit of his personal consideration, and of the
experience he had gained in the War of i86i-65, the animosities arising from which his efforts have done so much to
obliterate. It was indeed fortunate for the Government and
the people of the United States that a man occupied the
Executive chair who was by birth and training so well
equipped to perform the duties devolving upon him as was
William McKinley. In the prime of life, 55 years of age, his
mental and physical vigor sustained by a life of conspicuous
rectitude and his administrative powers enforced by years of
trying experience, he entered the arena with every qualification to command the esteem of his countrymen and to insure
also the respect of the governments of other Nations. In the
selection of the general officers to command the volunteer
forces he ignored sectional lines, calling to his aid distinguished
army officers who had worn the gray to co-operate with those
who had worn the blue, thus presenting to the world the
imposing spectacle of a United Nation of seventy millions of
people-a




THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT.


293


"Tower of strength,
" Which stood four-square to all the winds that blew."
When 200,000 volunteers responded promptly to the President's call, he said: "I feel that the American people have
committed these boys to my hands;" and he watched over
the minutest details of their equipment, encampment, sustenance, hospital accommodation and transportation, not contenting himself with the reports of his capable Chiefs of
Department, but going directly to the Bureau officials who
had the actual work in charge. The President spent hours
every day following the movements of the campaign with pin
points on the maps in the war room of the White House,
studying out every possible condition and contingency. He
knew neither rest nor recreation from the hour when hostilities commenced until the protocol of peace was signed. Like
Lincoln, he never slept when there was duty to perform.
The cabinet met frequently, sometimes twice a day. It
was by the President's personal direction that Secretary Long
issued the famous order to Admiral Dewey to proceed to the
Bay of Manila, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet, and take
possession of the harbor and the city. It is said that when
the President announced to the Cabinet his determination to
strike this decisive blow at the power of Spain in the East,
the audacity and gravity of the proposition produced a silence
which could be felt, and which wvas not broken for several
minutes. The President carried his point, and the result is
known of all men.
When the land attack on Santiago was determined upon,
the President asked how many siege guns were ready to be
taken to Santiago, and the reply was that fifteen or twenty
were at command. The President contended that not less
than eighty were necessary, and it was not his fault that
eighty were not sent. Thus he looked after the details of
preparations for battle.
Direct telegraphic communication was established between
Playa del Este, the Cuban cable terminus on the Santiago
coast, and the Executive Offices at the White House in XVashington, and was maintained during and after the battles of




294


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


San Juan and El Caney. General Shafter's camp was near
Sevilla, within easy communicating distance of Playa del Este.
The interchange of cable messages was rapid, and on the part
of our Commanding General indicated a desire to retreat or to
ask for a parley with the Spanish Commander.
On the 3rd of July, General Shafter cabled that he had the
city of Santiago well invested on the north and east, but, as
he added significantly,- "with a very thin line." He said
that as he approached the city he found the defences so strong
that it would be impossible to carry it by storm with his
present forces, adding: " I am now seriously considering withdrawing about five miles and taking up a new position on the
high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with
our left at Santiago, so as to get our supplies to a large extent
by means of the railroad, which we can use, having engines
and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date will aggregate a
thousand." Then he spoke of his own health and that of his
generals, and of his efforts to get Admiral Sampson to force
the entrance of the harbor. Of himself he said: " I have been
unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days, but
am retaining the command. General Wheeler is seriously ill,
and will probably have to go to the rear to-day. General
Young also very ill, confined to his bed; General Hawkins
slightly wounded in foot during sortie enemy made last night."
Other dispatches followed, and one in particular was spoken
of in the press dispatches some days after its receipt, as follows:
" There was some talk in the Cabinet to-day about the telegram General Shafter sent on Sunday morning, to the effect
that he would have to have reinforcements before he could
proceed. Just what was said is not known. It is learned
that the telegram contained suggestions which were stricken
out. It is claimed that if these statements had been made
public the country would have been greatly worried on Sunday."
The public did not then know, nor till some time afterwards,
how firm was the grasp which the President kept on the
progress of events. On the I5th of July, i898, he directed
this dispatch to be sent:




THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT.


295


" WASHINGTON, J uly I 5, I 898, 9:20 P. M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER, Plaaya del Este:
"The President and Secretary of War are becoming
impatient with parley. Any arrangement that allows the
enemy to take their arms had as well be abandoned once for
all, as it will not be approved. The way to surrender is to
surrender, and this should be fully impressed on General
Toral."
Once more the result justified the President's judgment.
Santiago was surrendered, and with it a force nearly double
that of the investing army.
In every movement of the war, as well as in the peace negotiations that followed, the President's firm hand was felt,
and the country has surely just cause to be proud of the humane and Christian policy by which he sought to avoid a war;
the prudent and patriotic foresight with which, when war became inevitable, he postponed its outbreak until the country
was ready for it; and the marvelous skill, courage and judgment with which he so directed affairs, aided by the invincible
valor of our sailors and soldiers, as to bring about an early,
honorable and glorious peace.


I




I








.......................




CHAPTER XV.


WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.
BV
HON. J. W. DANIEL, Member of Committee on Foreign Relations.
T     HE causes of the war between the United States and
Spain are to be found in the geography, in the past
history, in the racial and institutional differences between the two peoples and in the cherished principles of
American polity which are essential to our interest, peace and
safety. Were I to enumerate them, I should say that they
lie in the proximity of Cuba to the United States; in our
Monroe Doctrine_ in the incapacity, corruption and cruelty of
$panish r.u; in the wa      and irritating incidents of our
diplomacy with Spain; in our            erce with Cuba,
and tthe lTarge investments of American capitalthere; and
finally, in the destruction of the battleship Maine in Havana
harbor on the night of February i5, 1898. The war with
Spain has been called a war of humanity; and, to a certain
extent, it was, as is demonstrated by the generous contributions of our Government and people to relieve the suffering
Cubans. But it was no less a war of national interest, dignity
and honor.
The Senate of the United States has played an important
part in shaping the policy of our Government with reference
to the war and the questions which produced it, but this
policy cannot be appreciated without fully understanding the
causes of the war and the incidents that led up to it. In
some respects the Senate has more intimate relations with our
foreign affairs than has the House of Representatives. It
shares with the President the power of appointing officers,
including the ambassadors, ministers and consuls who represent us in foreign lands, It shares, also, with him the power




298


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


of making treaties. By reason of its smaller membership and
its greater freedom of debate, the sense of the body can be
more readily collected, expressed and fashioned into measures.
The Committee on Foreign Relations is the organ of the
Senate in the consideration and presentation of questions
relating to our foreign affairs. When the Cuban revolution
broke out, this Committee was composed as follows:
John Sherman, Chairman; William P. Frye, Cushman K.
Davis, J. Donald Cameron, Shelby M. Cullom, Henry Cabot
Lodge, Republicans; John T. Morgan, George Gray, David
Turpie, John W. Daniel, Roger Q. Mills, Democrats.
The Committee was kept busy from the incipiency of the
revolution to its close in considering the numerous and vexatious questions to which it gave rise. Contemporaneously
other foreign affairs of great magnitude arose, which likewise
required serious consideration, especially the Venezuela Boundary question, the Armenian massacres, Hawaiian annexation
and the General Arbitration Treaty. From time to time the
Committee took the evidence of witnesses as to the conditions
in Cuba, and many communications and resolutions were laid
before it. Numerous reports were made to the Senate, some
of which were able and exhaustive discussions of international
law questions, such as the Monroe Doctrine, arbitration, neutrality, belligerency, the rights of American citizens and the
construction and interpretation of treaties and statutes.
The Senate took the initiative in dealing with the great
issues arising concerning Cuba, and it is believed that the
measures which it favored were in consonance with the spirit
of our institutions, with our necessary political relations to
the island of Cuba and with that sense of justice toward a
people struggling for liberty which best befitted the first republic of the Western world.
It also initiated some less consequential though eminently
worthy measures, such as that proposed by Mr. Gallinger authorizing the expenditure of $5oooo for the relief of suffering
Americans in Cuba, and that proposed by Mr. Proctor authorizing the officers of our army in Cuba exercising separate
commands to furnish subsistence, medical and Quartermasters'
supplies to destitute inhabitants. It concurred without a dis



WVAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


299


senting voice in the action of the House, which was equally
unanimous, in placing fifty millions of dollars in the hands of
the President to be used for war purposes;-an act of questionable policy from the point of view of constitutional criticism,
but bespeaking clearly the confidence of Congress in the President andVthe unbounded patriotism with which all men were
ready to sustain him.
The narrow space of this article forbids that I follow the
course of debate in the Senate or even refer to the many able
and eloquent speeches which were made during the successive
Congresses that dealt with the Cuban struggle. They were as
a rule of a high order and up to the highest standard of deliberative assemblies; but it is of the action of the body that
I am to treat, and this prevents the reference that I should be
often prompted to make to the excellent suggestions and eloquent addresses of particular Senators.
The late Cuban revolution broke out in February, i895, on
the eve of the adjournment of the Fifty-third Congress. Since
that period there have been two sessions of the Fifty-fourth
Congress, under Cleveland's administration, and three of the
Fifty-fifth, under the administration of McKinley.
When the first session of the Fifty-fourth Congress convened, on December 2, 1895, President Cleveland said in his
message:"Cuba is again gravely disturbed, and an insurrection, in
some respects more active than the last preceding revolt which
continued from i868 to 1878, now exists in a large portion of
the eastern interior of the island, menacing some populations
on the coast."
But he exhorted Congress against sentimental sympathy
with the Cubans and declared that" Neither the warmth of our people's sympathy with the
Cuban insurgents, nor our loss and material damage consequent upon the futile endeavors thus far made to restore
peace and order, nor any shock our humane sensibilities may
have received from the cruelties which appeared to specially
characterize this sanguinary and fiercely conducted war have
in the least shaken the determination of the Government to
fulfil every international obligation."




300


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


At this time the revolution, which had been organized under
the leadership of Jose Marti and Maximo Gomez, was ten
months old. Numerous skirmishes had taken place between
the Cubans and Spaniards. Marti had been killed and Gomez
wounded. Martinez Campos, the most distinguished general
of Spain, had succeeded Callejas as Captain-General, only to
get his laurels dishevelled. The Cuban Convention had
adopted a constitution. Betancourt had been chosen President, Maso Vice-President, and Maximo Gomez, a hero of the
Ten Years War and a native of San Domingo, had been made
General-in-Chief, with Antonio Maceo as his Lieutenant. A
provisional government had been organized with its capital at
Cubitas. Laws had been enacted for the collection of taxes
and the establishment of post-offices. Fifty thousand Cuban
volunteers were in arms, and Gomez and Maceo were riding
over the island perplexing and baffling the armies of Spaiit
marshalled for their subjugation. Maceo a little later appeared
in sight of Havana.
This was the seventh insurrection that had agitated Cuba
during the present century and it was soon evident that it
was the most serious. Should the belligerency of the Cubans
be recognized? This was the first question presented. Belligerency is a state of war. To recognize it is to accord to
those on both sides engaged in it the rights of war. Many
resolutions were soon offered in the Senate favoring the recognition of belligerency, Senators Allen and Call being the
first to advocate their passage.
The strongest argument against such action on the part of
the United States is to be found in the message of President
Grant delivered to Congress during the Ten Years War, in
which he opposed any sort of recognition of the Cubans, on
the ground (i) that it would authorize the right of search on
the high seas of vessels of both parties and would subject
those carrying arms and munitions of war, which might now be
transported freely in vessels of the United States, to detention
and possible seizure; (2) would give rise to countless vexatious questions; (3) would release the parent government
from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents; (4) would
invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recog



WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


310 r


nized by our treaty of I795 over our commerce on the high
seas; and the further fact that it would require the enforcement of a large and onerous code of neutrality on our Government. But to this it might be answered, (i) that as belligerency
is a fact, it was but just that the fact should be recognized, with
its attendant consequences; (2) that it is no offence to a foreign nation to recognize a state of war within its borders,
Abraham Lincoln having been himself the first by the implication of his proclamation blockading southern ports, to recognize the Southern Confederacy, which he afterwards overthrew; (3) that it is in the interest of humanity, as said by our
Supreme Court, that the rights of war should be accorded
whenever wvar prevails; (4) that while the right of search of
our vessels on the high seas by Spain might occasionally be
annoying, it was not an incovenience of a very grave nature;
(5) that a different policy pursued in the Ten Years War had
brought no good result; (6) that while recognizing belligerency
would release the parent government from responsibility for
acts done by the insurgents, such responsibility on the part
of a bankrupt nation like Spain was not a matter of momentous consequence, for in releasing her we would transfer the
responsibility to the insurgents who, representing the inhabitants of Cuba, were just as likely to make good their responsibility as the  Spaniards.  Further, that a  mercantile
consideration of that kind should not stand in the way of
national honor and humanity. Eventually, by the treaty
which we have just ratified with Spain, we have taken upon
ourselves the burden of her debts to American citizens for
property injured, and twenty millions of claims, or more, have
already appeared and been filed at our State Department.
So that the upshot of this objection is that we have been victimized by our own refusal to recognize the belligerency of
the insurgents in the pursuit of that straightforward policy
which our code of national ethics dictated. Above all there
lay a still weightier consideration) We were not dealing with
a far distant land like Armenia, where the cruelties of the
Turk provoked resolutions of protest on the part of the Senate.
We were dealing with a practical question involving a neighboring people. The lovely and fruitful island of Cuba, des



302


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


cribed by Columbus as "the most beautiful island that eyes
ever beheld, filled with excellent ports and profound rivers,"
is a part of the American Continent and only one hundred
miles from our shores. It is about the size of the State of
Virginia and is capable of supporting many millions of inhabitants. As it is the nearest of the West Indian group to our
coast, so it is the largest and most populous and the richest in wealth of mine, field, forest and orchard. With spacious harbors, long mountain ranges, well-nigh impenetrable
fastnesses and jungles, it is easily defended, and its topographical, like its geographical, position makes it a strategic
point of primary importance to American contemplation.
It is naturally a military and naval outpost of the United
States.  It is the key of the Gulf of Mexico and the
Caribbean Sea. It stands sentinel to the approaches of the
cities and harbors of our southern coast. It commands the
eastern outlet to the projected canal which must ere long
connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, whether by the
Nicaraguan or Panama route.  Havana, its metropolis, was
the rendezvous of the Spanish armaments launched against
the South American republics in the early part of this
century. It is the most important of all the lands which
come within the purview of our Monroe Doctrine. By that
doctrine we have separated Cuba from the sphere of European influence and intervention. No European nation, in the
face of that doctrine, would now think of recognizing Cuban
revolutionists as belligerents, and still less would any European monarchy incline to recognize the independence of a
Cuban Republic.
On the contrary, we are bound to the island and its people
by the strongest ties. In i809 Jefferson declared the desirability of Cuba in our Union and answered the objection, that
if we received it no limit would be drawn to our future acquisitions, by the reply that "it could be defended without a
navy, and that this develops the principle which ought to
limit our future." In recent times the spread of the British
Empire over the earth, the tendency of smaller states to consolidate in great confederacies and the concurrent tendency
of greater states to appropriate the possessions of weaker ones




WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


3o3


have all conspired to quicken American interests in the island
and to make plain the path of destiny and duty. But for the
Monroe Doctrine, that island, which once fell into the hands
of England in 1762, would long since have fallen into English
hands again or those of some grasping European nation.
The debate on the Cuban question had scarcely begun in
the Senate when, on the seventeenth of December, I895, was
announced a message from President Cleveland on the
Venezuelan Boundary controversy, in which he informed
Congress of the declination of Great Britain to arbitrate that
question with Venezuela and invoked the Monroe Doctrine,
as applicable to constrain "the United States to resist by
every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its
rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any
lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any
territory which after investigation we have determined of
right belongs to Venezuela."
The Monroe Doctrine, as formulated by President Monroe
in 1823, in warning'the allied powers of Europe against joining
'Spain p_...s-uaate the South American republics, is the
simple declaration that we
E should'     nny eir ersy t (of to  mnnion  of
Europe5 toextend their system  t t ny portion of our
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."
President Cleveland declared this doctrine
"essential a.tthe i.ntegrity of our free institutions and
the tranquil rainftennr.a nf nr diLtinctiv form of governmnt —4t was intended to apply to every stage of or
national life. and rcan not becme obsolete while our Re.
public endures."
He combated the British idea that it was not founded on
the general consent of nations, by declaring that it
"finds its recognition in those principles of international
law which are based upon the theory that every nation
shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced."
The vigor of this message, challenging Great Britain to
war over a boundary line in Venezuela, is in striking contrast




304


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


to the President's warning against " sentimental sympathy"
with the Cubans and his deferential regard for Spanish sovereignty. It was against the extension of the monarchical
system on this continent that Monroe had uttered his doctrine,
and the principles which led to the Venezuelan message
would have seemed to call for the President's full sympathy
in the Cuban struggle and for his readiness to recognize those
engaged in it. Beyond this, the Monroe, Doctrine has its
corollary which touches keenly our national honor. It warned
Europe against interference in the affairs of the American
Continent; and in doing so, as the Hon. Thomas F. Bayard,
Secretary of State during Mr. Cleveland's first administration,
said"The United States has proclaimed itself the protector
of this Western world, in which she is by far the superior
power, from interference by European governments."
The same idea, logically extended, was expressed by
Senator Lindsay, of Kentucky, during the debate, when he
said"We have made ourselves the keeper of this brother
and, if we shrink from the duties which we have voluntarily assumed, the blood of that brother will cry out
from the ground against us."
Denying to Cuba the right to be rescued from the Spanish
wolf by any European alliance such as we had with France
during our own Revolution, placarding her coasts with notices
to all the world, "Hands off," wve could not play the dog in
the manger and ourselves withhold at least a moral and sympathetic support to her suffering people. Against such unseakable wrongs as that litt  l    ff
rule our intervention was clearly warranted.
This corollary of the Monroe Doctrine is part of it to all
minds which follow the logic of this manly and just declaration. It is a doctrine necessary to our f d _nr  n d  r
dignity and honor as a na ion.-T nere was nothing original in
Monroe's message, but this does not detract from its author's
glory, which lies in the responsibility he bravely assumed
against embattled Europe and in the good judgment he




WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


305


exercised in the deliverance of the message. President Madison, in i8ii, had uttered like sentiments with respect to
Spain in the Floridas, and their germs will be found in the
nature of our institutions and in our geographical situation.
It xvas simply the embodiment of an idea in every thoughtful mind, just as the Declaration of Independence was the
embodiment, by Jefferson, of the matured conviction of his'
generation and his country. Moreover, the fact that all our
great statesmen, including our Presidents from John Quincy
Adams to Grover Cleveland, have reaffirmed this doctrine,
and that the people have thoroughly responded to every
utterance is an assurance of its rectitude and of its fixity as a
part of the American law, as much as any clause of our written Constitution.
The Senate has the honor of being the first political branch
of the government of the United States to indicate its realizing sense of these American principles during our recent
troubles. They found expression on January 28, 1896, when
Mr. Morgan, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
reported Mr. Call's resolution, with two resolutions as a substitute, the first declaring that the war in Cuba should be conducted on civilized principles, and the second that the President be requested to interpose his friendly offices by the
recognition of belligerent rights to the Cubans. Mr. Cameron,
from the same Committee, reported a minority resolution of
the Committee, to the effect that the President be requested
to interpose his friendly offices with Spain for the recognition
of the independence of Cuba.
On February 5, 1896, Mr. Morgan, under instruction from
the same Committee, reported the following concurrent
resolution as a substitute for those previously presented:"Resolved by the Senate the House of Representatives concurring ttel,   at, in te opinio  -  ongress, a condition of public war exists between the
Government of Spain and the GovernMIent   limc
and For some time maintained by orce o arms   y the
''people o u a; and that the United States of America
SnI-ulramaintain a strict neutrality between the contending powers, according to each all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territory of the United States."




306


TH4E AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


On the twenty-eighth day of February, 1896, it was adopted
by the following vote:(See Record, Part 3, 54th Cong., ist Session, p. 2257.)
YEAS-64.
Allen            Cullom            Jones (Ark.)      Proctor
Allison          Daniel            Kyle             Quay
Bacon            Davis             Lindsay          Roach
Baker            Dubois            Lodge            Sherman
Bate             Elkins            McBride          Shoup
Berry            Faulkner          McMillan         Smith
Brown            Frye              Mantle           Squire
Burrows           Gallinger        Martin            Stewart
Butler            Gear             Mills            Teller
Call             Gibson            Mitchell (Ore.)  Thurston
Cameron           Gorman           Morgan           Turpie
Cannon           Gray              Nelson           Vest
Carter            Hawley           Pasco             Walthall
Chandler         Hill              Peffer           Warren
Clark            Irby              Perkins           White
Cockrell         Jones (Nev.)      Pritchard         Wilson
NAYS-6.
Caffery                George                Morrill
Chilton                Hale                  Wetmore
NOT VOTING-i8.
Aldrich           Gordon           Palmer           Till man
Blackburn         Harris           Pettigrew        Vilas
Blanchard         Hoar             Platt            Voorhees
Brice             Mitchell (Wis.)  Pugh             Wolcott
Murphy           Sewell
This resolution by the Senate was a signal triumph for
those who contended that(i) The war in Cubahad assumed the proportions that
merited recognition;
(2) The policy of recognition of belligerency was humane and just; and that
(3) Congress might fitly express its opinion upon the
subject.
But it was a concurrent resolution       only-that is, a mere
expression of opinion, without efficacy of a legislative character. It was received in the House with applause, but that
body subsequently passed a resolution of its own, by way of
amendment to that of the Senate, though differing little in
import. Subsequently it receded from its amendment, and
on April 6, 1896, concurred in the resolution of the Senate
by a vote of 247 yeas to only 27 nays.




WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


307


President Cleveland ignored these resolutions of Congress.
Affairs in Cuba grew worse and worse. In February, i896,
Captain-General Don Valeriano Weyler took command. A
more brutal monster never encumbered the earth. With fire
and sword he ravaged the land, and a reign of terror ensued
such as even Cuba had never known before, for he "Outheroded Herod" in deeds of violence and blood. The
inhabitants were driven into the towns in indiscriminate bands
of old men, women and children, and herded together in
pestilential camps without food, medicine or shelter. There
they perished by thousands and tens of thousands, amidst
scenes of anguish and horror that no language can adequately
describe.
When Congress met December 7, I896, President Cleveland
informed them that the insurrection in Cuba continued with
all its perplexities; that it was not possible to perceive any
progress toward the pacification of the island, but that the
situation had not in the least improved; that, though Spain
held Havana and the seaports and all the considerable towns,
the insurgents still roamed at will over at least two-thirds of
the island; that the industrial value of the island was fast
diminishing; that both parties were engaged in the wholesale
annihilation of property, and that the rural population had
been required to concentrate in the towns. He declared that
the spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjacent country, by
nature one of the most fertile and charming on the globe and
hardly separated from our own territory, should engage our
serious attention. He pointed out further that our citizens
had from thirty to fifty millions invested in railroad, mining
and other enterprises in the island, and that we were deeply
interested in a commerce which amounted in i893 to one
hundred and three millions, in 1894 to ninety-six millions.
While still enjoining our non-interference, he further declared
that when the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the
insurrection had become manifest, and
"It is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in
Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence; and when
a hopeless struggle for its reinstatement has degenerated
into a strife which means nothing more than the useless




308


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the
very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be
presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of
Spain will be superseded by higher obligations which
we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge."
It was now evident that something more than sentimental
sympathy was involved in our relations to Cuba. It was also
evident that the President recognized the principle which the
Senate asserted, that our obligations to the sovereignty of
Spain might be superseded by higher ones. In no event did
our obligation to Spain require that we should not recognize
the patent fact that there was war in Cuba; and the President's
vague, indefinite postponement of any specific recommendation was taken as an indication that his patience would be long
exercised before he got beyond the expression of generalities.
Both political parties, in their platforms of I896, had
expressed the sympathy so profoundly felt by the American
people in the Cuban struggle, and the people generally concurred in the declaration of the Republican platform that
Spain had lost control of Cuba and was unable either to protect property or lives of resident Americans, or to comply
with its treaty obligations.
Numerous resolutions were offered during this short session
of Congress but nothing of moment was done, and soon the
Cleveland administration passed away, leaving all the questions which had arisen during the war as a heritage to its
successor.
On the fourth of March, i897, President McKinley was
inaugurated, and in anticipation thereof President Cleveland
had convened the Senate in special session. The inaugural
address made no allusion to the war in Cuba.
On the sixth of March, 1897, President McKinley called
Congress in extra session. Accordingly, on the fifteenth of
March the first session of the Fifty-fifth Congress convened.
The message of the President was confined to recommendations touching a tariff revenue bill and was silent on the
question of the war in Cuba. But soon the Calendar
thickened, as in previous sessions, with resolutions on this
subject. Mr. Allen introduced a resolution recognizing the




WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


309


political independence of Cuba, and Mr. Morgan offered a
joint resolution, which read as follows:
" Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That a condition of public war exists between
the Government of Spain and the Government proclaimed and for some time maintained by force of arms
by the people of Cuba; and that the United States of
America shall maintain a strict neutrality between the
contending powers, according to each all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territory of the United States."
This resolution was passed on May 20, 1897, by a vote of
4I yeas to 14 nays, the vote being as follows:YEAS-4i.
Bacon            Cullom           Lindsay          Rawlins
Baker            Davis            McBride          Shoup
Bate             Deboe            Mantle           Stewart
Berry-           Foraker          Mason           Thurston
Butler           Gallinger        Mills            Tillman
Carter           Gorman           Morgan          Turner
Chandler         Hansbrough       Nelson           Turpie
Chilton          Harris (Kan.)    Pasco            Walthall
Clark            Heitfeld         Pettigrew
Clay             Jones (Ark.)     Pettus
Cockrell         Kenney           Pritchard
NAYS-14.
Allison          Gear             Hoar             White
Burrows          Hale             Spooner          Wilson
Caffery          Hanna            Wellington
Fairbanks        Hawley           WVetmore
NOT VOTING-33.
Aldrich          Gray             Morrill          Sewell
Allen            Harris (Tenn.)   Murphy           Smith
Cannon           Jones (Nev.)     Penrose         Teller
Daniel           Kyle             Perkins          Vest
Earle            Lodge            Platt (Conn.)    Warren
Elkins           McEnery.     Platt (N. Y.)    Wolcott
Faulkner         McMillan         Proctor
Frye             Martin           Quay
George-          Mitchell         Roach
Thus a second step was taken by the Senate toward the
recognition of Cuban belligerency.       It affirmed, by implication, the right of Congress to make direct recognition of a
condition of war in a foreign country. It was contended in
debate that this was the exclusive province of the Executive.




310 


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


But war is a fact, and the right of the political powers of the
Government to recognize that fact has been affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the United States in a number of cases,
and was abundantly demonstrated by Henry Clay when chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and
must exist in the nature of things. Whoever is invested with
discretion to deal with facts, either in making or administering laws, must of necessity have the power of discriminating
between them and recognizing them as they are. Those who
so contended were vindicated in their opinions by this decisive vote in the Senate. The joint resolution went to the
House and there disappeared, as no Committee on Foreign
Affairs had been appointed and as the House had declined to
equip itself with the machinery of general legislation.
The President, during the session, transmitted a list of
claims of citizens of the United States against Spain and also
a list of citizens arrested since February 24, i895, with correspondence relative to their imprisonment.
The subject of the war was debated from time to time on one
or another of the resolutions offered, but no important action
was taken.
When the second session of Congress met on December 6,
1897, it was greeted by a message from President McKinley
which fully considered the Cuban situation, and he justly
regarded it as the most important problem pertaining to our
foreign relations. He had entered his firm protest against
thepolicy of extermination which had been inaugurated by
Spain, had at last demanded the instant release, or speedy trial,
of American citizens under arrest and had applied the funds
appropriated by Congress to the relief of Americans suffering
in Cuba.
The assassination of Canovas and the succession of Sagasta
to the leadership in Spain had been contemporaneous with
the departure of our Minister, General Woodford, to the
Court of Spain, and the new Spanish Government had indicated a 'change in policy which had somewhat ameliorated
the conditions. Weyler had been superseded by Blanco as
Captain-General,:and a less vigorous r6gime had been established. But the war still raged with no sign of abatement;




WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


3I I


and our Consul-General Lee, whose firm and intelligent course
had inspired great confidence in his opinion, testified in concurrence with the general view that the Cubans could not
take the towns, nor the Spaniards subjugate the country, and
that both sides were conducting a warfare of waste and ruin,
and of indefinite duration.
Under these circumstances the President declared that of
the untried measures there remained only recognition of thu
insurgents as belligerents; the recognition of the independence
of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war, by proposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and
intervention in favor of one or the other party. He added:
"I speak not of forcible annexation; for that, under our
code of morality, can not be thought of."
He opposed any sort of recognition of the Cubans, on the
grounds stated by General Grant during the Ten Years War,
which we have already quoted, but withheld any specific
recommendation of his own, declaring that:
"the near future would demonstrate whether or not a
righteous peace is likely to be attained."
The message was followed by numerous resolutions touching the subject, such as had been offered in previous sessions;
and while the devastating struggle continued in the island,
the debate rolled on in the Senate from day to day and from
week to week, and a patient people still listened to the cries
of woe and looked upon the scenes of horror which had so
long tortured the very soul of the nation.
Suddenly, on February i6, i898, the news was flashed over
the land that on the night before, the U. S. battleship Maine
had been blown up in Havana harbor and 266 of her crew had
suddenly passed to a fiery, or watery death. The note of the
Alpine hunter's horn, it is said, agitating the air, sometimes
disturbs the balance of the accumulated avalanche and sends
it hurling down the mountain side. This incident settled the
fate of Cuba and culminated in the termination of Spanish
rule in America.
A board of naval officers, of which Admiral Sampson was
chairman, investigated it and reported that the explosion




3 I 2


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


must have occurred from an extraneous cause. Consul-General Lee, who was near by at the time and quickly on the
scene of action, testified to the same effect. Some believed
that it was the direct work of the Spanish authorities; others,
that it was done by some Spanish sympathizer without
governmental agency; still others made the far-fetched suggestion that the insurgents had committed the crime to induce
American intervention. An interesting incident of this session was the visit of Senators Proctor, Money, Gallinger and
Thurston to Cuba. They related their observations to the
Senate, and their harrowing accounts of the acute conditions
there existing stimulated the general feeling that the time for
action on our part was near at hand. A little later the Coinmittee on Foreign Relations, consisting of Senators Davis,
(who had succeeded Mr. Sherman as chairman upon his
becoming Secretary of State), Frye, Cullom, Lodge, Clarke,
Foraker, Morgan, Gray, Turpie, Daniel and Mills, concluded
that"The destruction of the Maine was compassed by the
official act of the Spanish authorities (and the ascertainment of the particular person is not material), or was
\ made possible by a negligence on their part so willing
and gross as to be equivalent in culpability to positive
\ criminal action."
They expressed their belief that recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans, if it had been given seasonably when
it was suggested by concurrent resolutions to that effect passed
by Congress, would have"caused a speedy termination of the war without involving
the United States in the contest,"
but that now it would fall short of meeting the situation.
They might have repeated the remark with reference to the
failure of the House of Representatives to concur in the joint
resolution of the Senate recognizing Cuban belligerency.
At this time Spain was engaged in the last hopeless effort
to bring about an armistice with renewed promises of autonomy, and our Minister at Madrid, General Woodford, was
still parleying with the Spanish Ministry upon some vague prop.




WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


3I13


osition, which it was thought might placate the indignation
of the American people by assurance from Spain of a stable
government based on the participation of the Cubans therein.
But the day of diplomacy had passed, and the press of the
country clamorously called for, while the people impatiently
expected some decisive word from the President. Indisposed
to war and having done all he thought he could to prevent it,
the President spoke that word on April i I, i898, in a message
to Congress, in which he reviewed the Cuban revolution and
recommended the forcible intervention of the United States
as a neutral to stop the war, according to the dictates of
humanity and following many historic precedents where
neighboring states had intervened to check the hopeless sacrifice of life by internecine conflict beyond their borders, justifying themselves on national grounds.
He added these words:" It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both
the parties to the contest, as well to enforce a truce
as to guide the eventual settlement."
Two days afterwards, April I3, i898, the committee on
Foreign Relations through their chairman submitted an able
report infavor of intervention and recommended the adoption o  hTMre             uion
Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independence of the people of
Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and
government in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces
from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the Uniited
States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these
resolutions in effect.
Whereas, the abhorrent conditions which have existed for
more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own
borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the
United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization,
culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States
battleship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly
visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured,
as has been set forth by the President of the United States in
his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was
invited: Therefore,




3 I 4


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of A merica in Congress assembled,
First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of
right ought to be, free and independent.
Second.  That it is the duty of the United States to
demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish
its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
Third. That the President of the United States be, and he
hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual
service of the United States the militia of the several states,
to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions
into effect.
A minority, consisting of Messrs. Turpie, Mills, Daniel and
Foraker, concurred in the report, but favored" The immediate recognition of the Republic of Cuba
as organized in that island as a free, independent and
sovereign power among the nations of the world."
The resolution as originally offered by Mr. Foraker had
contained such a provision, and on the motion of Mr. Turpie
the words were inserted in the first clause "and that the
Government of the United States hereby recognizes the
Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of the
island." The debate on this question was deeply interesting.
The suggestion of the President, of neutral interventionof hostile constraint on both parties without any recognition
of rights to the insurgents-was specially opposed as out of
keeping with the respect which this Republic should show
to a neighboring people following its example.  Abraham Lincoln in the House of Representatives on February 12,
i848, declared that "any people, anywhere, being inclined
and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake off
the existing government and form a new one that suits them
better." This is a most valuable and sacred right and a right
which we hope and believe is to liberate the world. It was
by the exercise of this right that the United States became a
free nation. It was this right that the Cubans were exercising against the most odious and cruel despotism that has




WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


3I5


ever oppressed any land on the American continent. It was
but just that we, who xvere the first to proclaim the right, should
be the first to accord it to our neighbors. Besides, the consideration weighed with some that the recognition of the
Cuban Government would give us a competent authority
and ingratiate our country into its confidence and good will.
It is the destiny of the island ultimately to be annexed to the
United States, and a liberal policy would best pave the way
to that consummation.
Eager and impatient crowds filled the Senate galleries and
awaited the result of the debate, while the press of the country, in morning issues and extra editions, warned the Senate
that the Spanish fleet of Cervera was heading under full steam
to attack American ports, and that while the Senate debated
"Rome might perish."       Every Senator except the lamented
Walthall, who was then sick and soon afterwards departed this
life, was present.
By a decisive vote the Senate supported the view that the
Republican Government of Cuba should be recognized, and
the amendment to that effect was carried, the vote being as
follows:
YEAS-51.
Allen           Gallinger        Mason           Roach
Bacon           Harris           Mills           Smith
Baker           Heitfeld         Mitchell         Stewart
Bate            Jones (Ark.)     Money            Teller
Berry           Jones (Nev.)     Murphy           Thurston
Butler          Kenney            V-1son          Tillinan
Cannon          Kyle              '   4           Turley
Chandler        Lindsay          Peni,e         Turner
Chilton         McEnery          Perkins          Turpie
Clay             McLaurin        Pettigrew        Vest
Cockrell         Mallory         Pettus           White
Daniel           Mantle          Quay             Wilson
Foraker          Martin          Rawlins
NAYS-37.
Aldrich          Fairbanks       Hoar             Sewell
Allison          Faulkner        Lodge            Shoup
Burrows         Frye             McBride          Spooner
Caffery         Gear             McMillan         Warren
Carter          Gorman           Morgan           WVellington
Clark           Gray             Morrill          Wetmore
Cullom          Hale             Platt (Conn.)   Wolcott
Davis            Hanna           Platt (N. Y.)
Deboe            Hansbrough      Pritchard
Elkins           Hawley          Proctor
ABSENT-i.
Walthall




3I6


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


Upon motion of Mr. Davis, an additional amendment was
adopted, without dissent, declaring:
Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any
disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification
thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the
island to its people.
Then by a vote of 67 to 2I the resolutions thus amended
were adopted.
The House of Representatives struck out the clause of the
resolutions recognizing the Republican Government in Cuba.
A conference committee was appointed and, at a late hour of
the night, the Senate concurred in the action of the House,
by a vote of 42 to 35 and the resolutions without recognition
of the Cuban Republic were adopted. This meant war.
Spain speedily declared war against the United States, and
on April 25, I 898, a resolution, which originated in the House
and speedily passed the Senate, was approved by the President, declaring war with Spain to have existed since April 2z,
and authorized the President touse the entire land and naval forces of the United
States and to call into active service the militia of the
several States to such extent as might be necessary."
Six days later Admiral Dewey's fleet, which had sailed directly, under orders, for the Philippine Islands, destroyed the
Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, and the beginning of the end
was at hand.
On July 3, i898, history repeated itself, and the Spanish
fleet of Cervera, endeavoring to escape from Santiago Bay,
was sunk by the American fleet under Commodore Schley,
Admiral Sampson, its nominal commander, being temporarily
absent in consultation with the commander of our land forces.
On July I7, after the brilliant assaults of the American
army had shown the futility of further resistance, the Spanish
army at Santiago surrendered. On the first of January, 1899,




WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


31I7


the American army took formal possession, under Gen. J. R.
Brooke, of the island of Cuba, and the career of Spain on the
American Continent was closed.
On the twelfth of August the protocol of a treaty was
signed at Washington by W. R. Day, our Secretary of State,
and Jules Cambon, the Ambassador of' France, representing
the Spanish Government, by which it was agreed, with a view
to the establishment of peace between the two countries, that
Spain should relinquish all claims to sovereignty over, and
title to, Cuba; should cede the island of Porto Rico to the
United States, and such island in the Ladrones as might be
selected by the United States; that the United States should
occupy the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace that should determine the control,
disposition and government of the Philippines. It was also
agreed that Cuba and Porto Rico should be immediately evacuated by Spain and that Commissioners, appointed by the
two Governments, should make arrangements accordingly;
that each government should appoint not more than five Commissioners to treat of peace, their meeting to take place at
Paris not later than October i.
At the time when this protocol was signed, our naval forces
under Commodore Dewey and our land forces under Gen.
Merritt were besieging Manila, and Gen. Aguinaldo, with the
Philippine forces, was assisting us.
The President appointed Hon. W. R. Day, who resigned
the Secretaryship of State to accept the commission; Hon.
Cushman K. Davis, Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations; Hon. W. P. Frye and Hon. George
Gray, members of that Committee, and Whitelaw Reid, Esq.,
of New York, as Commissioners on behalf of the United
States. On October i they met at Paris the Commissioners
appointed by the Queen of Spain.
The work of the Commission was long and laborious, but it
was concluded by a treaty, signed at Paris, December i, i898,
which was communicated to the Senate on January 4, 1899,
by the President. The treaty fulfilled the provisions of the
protocol with respect to Cuba and Porto Rico and the island
in the Ladrones which was to be ceded to the United States.




318


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


By the third article Spain ceded the whole Philippine archipelago to the United States, and the United States agreed to
pay to Spain $20,000,000 within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty.
It was also provided that the United States should for ten
years admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of
the Philippines on the same terms as ships and merchandise
of the United States; that we would send back to Spain, at
our own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war
on the capture of Manila by the American forces, and that
the arms of the soldiers in question should be restored to
them. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms,
guns of all calibres, ammunition and materials of all kinds belonging to the land and naval forces in the Philippines and
Guam should remain the property of Spain. Mutual release
and return of prisoners of war was provided for, and the
United States undertook to obtain the release of all Spanish
prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the
Philippines.
There was mutual relinquishment of all claims, national
and individual, for indemnity of any kind that arose out of the
war. But this, like the return of prisoners of war, operated as a heavy burden upon the United States and a trivial
burden on Spain, for many thousands of Spanish prisoners
were in our hands, entailing considerable cost for their transportation home, and the claims of our citizens against Spain
and her insurgent subjects during the Four Years' War are
variously estimated at from $5,ooo,ooo to $20,00o,000.
The debate on the treaty occurred in secret session and is
not reported. But in open session resolutions were offered by
Senators Vest, Bacon, Allen and others defining the principles of our government with reference to the annexation
of territory.  It was shown by numerous decisions of the
Supreme Court that annexation carried with it the principles
of our Constitution as to the rights of the inhabitants to the
equal protection of the laws and as to the uniformity of tariff
and revenue laws as applicable to them.
Under the constitution, a vote of two-thirds of the Senators
present is requisite to ratify a treaty, and for some weeks it




WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


3T9


seemed as if such a vote could not be obtained. The main
objection to the treaty was directed against the cession of the
Philippine archipelago to the United States. The islands are
7,000 miles from the United States, and they are tenanted
by a heterogeneous population incapable of assimilation with
our own people. The climate is such that our white race cannot
establish their homes in the country and colonize it. The
islands must, in the nature of things, become a mere dependency, where the many must be ruled by a few of alien blood.
As a real-estate investment, the experience of the modern
colonizing nations indicates that it will not be a success.
But, beyond these and other considerations of public policy,
we had made the Filipinos our allies in dispossessing Spain of
the islands, and it seemed to many inconsistent with the
honor of this nation that, when our mutual efforts had been
successful, we should ourselves take the tainted title of Spain
and step into her shoes to force a government upon the inhabitants against their will.
These considerations alone moved many Senators to oppose
the treaty. There were others scarcely less cogent. Defended by the ocean east and xvest, the United States is
to-day impregnable. With the Philippine Islands to defend,
we have a weak spot which will be immediately assailed in
the event of war between this and any other great nation,
and which will require vast expenditures of men and money
to protect.
Our institutions are free. The Malay race has never
founded a free state, nor do they seem to be capable of doing
so. By the treaty we incorporate the twelve to twenty thousand islands into our territory and make eight millions of
these strange people American citizens. It is true that we
do not invest them with political rights, but they are our
citizens nevertheless, and we become permanently responsible
for them and their government and bring them under a free
constitution which has no place for subject peoples. It was
admitted by the opponents of the treaty that wve could not
leave the islands in the hands of Spain, nor incontinently
withdraw and let them be appropriated by any other nation.
But it was contended that temporary military occupation,




320


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


after the fashion of our occupation of Cuba, with friendly
offices to the inhabitants to enable them to form a stable
government, was the better policy to pursue; and that from
that point of view we could satisfy all equitable demands
upon us and shape our future course consistently with our
interests and without the assumption of the permanent obligations that the acceptance of sovereignty entailed.
- On Saturday night, February 4, i899, the forces of Aguinaldo most improvidently attacked the American Army at
Manila, but were mowed down like grass and repulsed. The
Monday following the Senate voted on the treaty. Up to
that morning the necessary two-thirds vote in favor of it had
not been assured and its defeat seemed probable. When the
roll was called the issue seemed still doubtful, but when the
vote was announced it stood as follows:VOTE ON THE TREATY.
FOR RATIFICATION.
Aldrich          Faulkner        McBride          Ross
Allen            Foraker         McEnery          Sewell
Allison         Frye             McLaurin         Shoup
Baker            Gallinger       McMillan         Simon
Burrows          Gear            Mantle           Spooner
Butler           Gray            Mason           Stewart
Carter           Hanna           Morgan          Sullivan
Chandler         Hansbrough      Nelson           Teller
Clark            Harris          Penrose         Thurston
Clay             Hawley          Perkins         Warren
Cullom           Jones (Nevada)  Pettus           Wellington
Davis            Kenney          Platt (Conn.)    Wolcott
Deboe            Kyle            Platt (New York)
Elkins           Lindsay         Pritchard
Fairbanks        Lodge           Quay             Total 57 -AGAINST RATIFICATION.
Bacon            Gorman          Mills            Roach
Bate             Hale            Mitchell         Smith
Berry            Heitfeld        Money            Tillman
Caffery          Hoar            Murphy          Turley
Chilton         Jones (Arkansas)  Pasco          Turner
Cockrell         Mallory         Pettigrew       Vest
Daniel           Martin          Rawlins
Total 27.
ABSENT AND PAIRED.
Messrs. Cannon and Wilson, for, with Mr. White, against, and Messrs. Proctor
and Wetmore, for, with Mr. Turpie, against.




WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


32 1


Thereupon, and thereby, all the Philippine Islands became
a part of American territory and all their people American
citizens, except indeed that citizens of Spain may within a
year preserve their allegiance to that kingdom by formal declaration before a court of record of that intent.
The Spanish Cortes by a small majority refused its approval of the treaty. But this was not essential. The Queen
Regent's signature was affixed to it March I7, 1899, and as
soon as formal exchanges of the ratification are made the war
with Spain will be a thing of the past.
Pending the consideration of the treaty Mr. McEnery
offered the following resolution:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, etc.
That by the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain it is
not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of said islands
into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to
permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the
territory of the United States. But it is the intention of the
United States to establish on said islands, a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants of said
islands, to prepare them for local self-government, and in due
time to make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and
the inhabitants of said islands.
Upon this he vainly endeavored to get a vote before the
treaty was ratified. Failing in this it was considered afterwards, and Mr. Bacon offered the following amendment
which was lost by a tie vote, the Vice-President voting against
it.
Resolved, further, That the United States hereby disclaim
any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their
determination, when a stable and independent government
shall have been erected therein, entitled in the judgment of
the Government of the United States to recognition as such,
to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be
reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by
Spain, and to thereupon leave the Government and control of
the islands to their people.




322


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR,


The vote stood as follows:

Bacon
Bate
Berry
Caffery
Chilton
Clay
Cockrell
Faulkner
Allison
Burrows
Carter
Chandler
Deboe
Fairbanks
Frye
Gear


YEAS-29.
Gorman            Lindsay
Gray              McLaurin
Hale              Martin
Harris            Money
Heitfeld          Murphy
Hoar              Perkins
Jones (Arkansas)  Pettigrew
Jones (Nevada)    Pettus
NAYS-29.
Hanna             Morgan
Hawley            Nelson
Kyle              Penrose
Lodge            TPlatt (Conn.)
McBride           Platt (New York)
McEnery           Pritchard
McMillan          Ross
Mantle            Shoup
NOT VOTING-32.
Davis             Mills
Elkins            Mitchell
Foraker           Pasco
Gallinger         Proctor
Hansbrough        Roach
Kenney            Sewell
Mallory           Spooner
Mason             Sullivan


Quay
Rawlins
Smith
Tillman
Turner
Simon
Stewart
Teller
Warren
Wolcott


Aldrich
Allen
Baker
Butler
Cannon
Clark
Cullom
Daniel


Thurston
Turley
Turpie
Vest
Wellington
Wetmore
White
Wilson


The McEnery resolution was then adopted by the follow

ing vote:Allison
Burrows
Chandler
Deboe
Fairbanks
Faulkner
Frye
Bacon
Bate
Caffery
Carter
Clay
Cockrell
Aldrich
Allen
Baker
Berry
Butler
Cannon
Chilton
Clark
Cullom
Daniel
Davis




Gear
Gray
Hale.
Hanna
Harris
Kyle
Lodge
Hawley
Hoar
Lindsay
McBride
Martin
Money


YEAS-26.
McEnery
McLaurn
McMillan
Mantle
Mason
Nelson
Perkins
NAYS-22.
Morgan
Murphy
Pettigrew
Platt (Conn.)
Rawlins
Ross
NOT VOTING-42.
Mitchell
Pasco
Penrose
Pritchard
agh       Proctor
Roach.rk.)     Sewell
rev.)     Shoup
Spooner
Thurston
Tillman


Pettus
Platt (N. Y.)
Quay
Sullivan
Teller
Simon
Smith
Stewart
Warren
Turley
Turner
Turpie
Vest
Wellington
Wetmore
White
Wilson
Wolcott


Elkins
Foraker
Gallinger
Gorman
Hansbroi
Heitfeld
Jones (A
Jones (N
Kenney
Mallory
Mills




WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.


323


This expost facto resolution was not considered by the
House of Representatives, and interest in the subject had now
waned as it was not believed that any explanatory resolution
of Congress could affect the significance of a treaty negotiated
by the President and the Senate, and which must remain the
supreme law of the land until changed by competent authority. The terms of fhe resolution were contradictory to the
terms of the treaty, and being ineffective as an amendment or
alteration thereof would merely indicate the vacillations of
opinion, without in any respect changing the situation. Annexation " for better or for worse " had taken place with all
its necessary consequences and no obscuration of the fact
could in any wise affect it. Future Congresses will receive
the subject as an appropriate matter for legislation, and they
alone can deal with it.
In closing hostilities with Spain, we succeed to problems
in our new possessions which only time, patience and wisdom
can rightly solve. The exploits of our soldiers and sailors, the
patriotism with which all classes and sections have sustained
the Government, with our tremendous exhibition of national
power and spirit, have made a deep impression upon the civilized world and exalted the pride of American citizenship.
The relations of friendship between ourselves and the mother
country have been cemented, and the whole English-speaking people has been brought into the communion of a race
patriotism that is full of hope and inspiration. The last vestige of sectional legislation that grew out of our civil dissensions was erased from our statute books and to-day there is
no citizen disfranchised. The President has had the satisfaction of commissioning ex-Confederate and ex-Union soldiers
in our volunteer Army to fight side by side; and, as the whole
people have supported him, so he in turn with an equal grace
and magnanimity has delighted to confer trust and honor
without regard to the past strife of sections or present political
difference. A people so nobly disposed and so thoroughly
united may surely regard their future with confidence and
self-reliance, and go forth to grapple with whatever difficulty
confronts them, " rejoicing as a strong man to run a race."
But we should not leave the war without reflecting upon




324


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


the lesson of local self-government which it teaches. Least
of all the colonizing nations has Spain been able to learn it,
and without it she has wasted her courage and her substance
in vain. The discoverer and mistress of the Western world,
the conqueror and founder of a great European empire and
the possessor of many islands of the sea has no longer an acre
of ground on the continent which she discovered, and is
shrivelling up within her own borders while she feeds upon
bitter memories. Without conception of human rights or
democratic institutions, and with no regard for them when
forced to realize their existence, the Empire of Spain has
perished under the inflexible rule as to the survival of the
fittest-has perished because it showed itself unfit to endure.
Froude in his book on the West Indies relates that after
the Revolutionary War, the King and the cabinet of Great
Britain, fancying that other colonies would follow the example
of secession set by the United States and declare their independence, despairingly granted them local rights and autonomous charters. To their surprise these measures appeased
the spirit of discontent and her colonies were drawn in closer
and more fraternal relations to the mother country.
The British Ambassador at the Court of France recently
proclaimed the beneficial influence of our independence upon
Great Britain as well as upon ourselves. America taught
the mother country a lesson. She had the wisdom and the
magnanimity to learn it and apply it; and the consolidation
and expansion of her empire may be largely attributed to it.
Spain could never learn that lesson. Her mind seemed to be
closed and her heart hardened against it and, as she recalls
the dust of Columbus back to the land to which he gave a
continent and the dream of universal dominion, she receives
the last instruction from this Republic, which all nations
should attend, that a government which does not rest upon
the recognition of the rights of man and the community must
surely fall.




0




...........................................................................




CHAPTER XVI.


PROVIDING THE "SINEWS OF WAR."
BY
HON. NELSON DINGLEY, Chairman Committee on Ways and Means.
I T has been justly remarked by an intelligent financial writer
that " the same energy and adaptation of means to ends
which marked the exploits of the army on the land and
the navy on the sea, also marked the financial administration
of the war with Spain."
Up to the time of the destruction of the U. S. Battleship
Maine in the harbor of Havana, on the i5th of February,
i898, the administration and the country believed that the war
with Spain would be averted through peaceable pressure
brought to bear on the Spanish ministry: and consequently
no preparations for an armed conflict were entered upon.
While the hope of a peaceful solution continued to be entertained, pending the inquiry into the blowing up of the
Maine, yet the administration in the meantime quietly
took measures to contract for needed ammunition and supplies
-of which there were almost none on hand,-relying on the
assurances of leading members of Congress that appropriations would be forthcoming when required.  0
The excitement so increased in this country, in consequence
of rumors that the naval board of inquiry would probably
find that the Maine was destroyed by external agencies,
that, on the 7th of March, the President summoned to the
White House the chairmen of the Finance Committee and
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the chairmen
of the Committee on Ways and Means and Committee on Appropriations of the House, with several other leading
members of both houses, to confer with him on the critical
condition of affairs.




3 26


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


The conference resulted in a decision to appropriate immediately fifty atillions of dollars " for national defence." Chairman Cannon of the Committee on Appropriations, on the
same day, introduced in the House a joint resolution to this
effect, which practically unanimously passed the House on
March 8, and also the Senate on the next day. The object
in making this appropriation, which it was proposed to draw
from the cash balance in the Treasury, was to put the country
measurably in a position to enter into an armed conflict, in
case one could not be avoided. For this preparation, time
was indispensable.
With great difficulty the armed conflict was averted for six
weeks, and during this time every effort was put forth partially
to prepare the country for xvar, so far as coast defences and
military and naval supplies were concerned. Before these
preparations could be adequately made, the report of the
Naval Board of Inquiry on the destruction of the Maine, the
detailed statements of visiting Senators and Representatives
as to the fearful condition of the reconcentrados in Cuba, and
the apparent indifference of Spain to the situation, so stirred
public sentiment in this country that Congress on April i9
passed a joint resolution, approved by the President on the
succeeding day, directing armed intervention, if necessary, to
end the unbearable situation in the Island of Cuba, and secure
the independence of the people of that country.
The President on the same day, April 20, presented this
ultimatum to Spain, and the Spanish Minister accepted it as
a declaration of war, and immediately demanded and was
given his passports, notwithstanding the President had allowed
Spain till April 23 to reply. April 25 the two houses of
Congress passed a joint resolution formally declaring war
against Spain.
For ten days previous to this culmination, the majority
members of the House Ways and Means Committee, after
conference with the President and Secretary of the Treasury,
had been giving their attention to the preparation of a bill
" to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures."
This bill was introduced in the House by Chairman Dingley
on the 23d of April-the day of the expiration of the ultima



PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF WAR.


327


turn to Spain-and referred to the Ways and Means Committee. The Committee on Ways and Means, after considering
the bill April 25 and 26, ordered it reported; and on the
latter day Chairman Dingley reported it to the House.
The bill was based on the estimates of the officials of the
war and navy departments, that the war would cost about
$5o,ooo,ooo per month. It was thought desirable not only
as a measure of precaution, but also as a potent factor in
creating the impression in Spain and Europe that this country
had the ability and disposition to push the war with the
utmost energy, to provide the means for carrying it on for at
least one year, in case it should continue that length of time;
and to impose such additional internal taxes, making use in
part of the stamp taxes levied from i864 to I872, as would
strengthen the credit of the government bV providing means
for paying the interest and gradually extinguishing the principal of necessary loans.
The bill, as reported, provided for additional internal taxes,
estimated to yield about $9o,ooo,ooo per annum, of which
$33,ooo,ooo, it was estimated, would come from doubling the
tax of $i per barrel on fermented liquors, $iooo,ooo from
doubling the 6 cents per pound tax on tobacco and increasing
the tax on cigars and cigarettes, $5,oooooo from the imposition
of a special tax on dealers in tobacco and cigars, $2,000,000
from an increase in the tax on tonnage in the foreign trade,
and $38,o00,ooo from a documentary and proprietary stamp
tax, based substantially on the stamp-tax acts enacted near
the close of the War of the Rebellion.
To provide whatever additional means might be required
to prosecute the war, the Secretary of the Treasury was
authorized to borrow on the credit of the United States, from
time to time, whatever amount should be required, not to
exceed five hundred millions, and to issue therefor ten-twenty,
three per cent bonds, to be offered at par as a popular
loan.
An important section was added, not as a war measure but
as a permanent provision to guard against any temporary
deficiency of revenue in the future, authorizing the Secretary
of the Treasury to issue one-year three per cent certificates of




,328


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


indebtedness, not exceeding one hundred millions to be outstanding at any one time-the object being to provide means
to meet any temporary insufficiency of revenue to pay current
expenditures, and thus avoid either bankruptcy or the necessity of using for this purpose the greenback redemption fund,
or (what is the same thing) the demand notes which have
been presented and redeemed, a necessity which from 1893 to
i896 created the "endless chain" that came so near resulting
in serious disaster.
The bill was taken up for consideration in the House April
27, and, by agreement, xvas debated in the committee of the
whole for three days, and on the last day was opened to
amendment.
The opposition to the bill was directed almost entirely
against the section authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury
to borrow whatever amounts might be required, outside of
the revenue for war taxes, to meet the expenditures of the
var. The opponents contended that instead of borrowing
and issuing interest-bearing obligations therefor, more revenue
should be raised by an income tax, and that the so-called
" seigniorage " of the silver bullion of the Treasury, estimated
to amount to $42,000,000, should be utilized by using that
amount of silver certificates against it; and $I5o,ooo,ooo additional U. S. demand notes or greenbacks should be issued,
through which means, it was contended, the people could be
relieved of the burden of interest-bearing obligations.
To these contentions the friends of the bill replied, that,
inasmuch as the Supreme Court of the United States had
decided that a Federal income tax is unconstitutional, unless
imposed on the basis of population-a condition which made
such a tax impracticable-the income-tax plan was a proposition to remand the government for means to carry on the war
to the proceeds of a law suit already decided against us; that
the silver " seigniorage " idea ignored the fact that there can
be no seigniorage or profit in coinage until coinage actually
takes place; and that the proposition to issue additional
demand notes or greenbacks, without providing the means
for their payment, rests on the " fiat " idea of money, and has
been shown by experience to be not only mischievous and




PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF WAR.


329


dangerous, but in the end the costliest finance to which our
people was ever subjected. 
The income-tax amendment was defeated by a vote of 171
to 134; the silver "seigniorage " amendment was ruled out
on a point of order; and the additional greenback amendment was lost by a vote of 147 to io6.
All amendments offered, except such as were presented by
the Committee on Ways and Means, were rejected, and April
29 the bill passed the House by a vote of 18I to I3I, " present " I, not voting and paired 42; as follows:
YEAS-i8i.


Acheson,
Adams,
Aldrich,
Alexander,
Arnold,
Babcock,
Baker, Md,
-~... Barham,.Barney,
Barrows,
Bartholdt,
Beach,
Belden,
Belford,
Belknap,
Bennett,
Bingham,
Bishop,
Booze,
Boutell, Ill.,
Boutelle, Me.,
Brewster,
Broderick,
Bromwell,
Brown,
Brownlow,
Brumm,
Bull,
Burleigh,
Burton,
Butler,
Cannon,
Capron,
Chickering,
Clark, Iowa.,
Connell,
Cooper, Wis.,
Corliss,
Cousins,
Crump,
Crumpacker,
Cummings,
Curtis, Iowa,
Curtis, Kans.,
Dalzell,
Danford,


Davidson, Wis.,
Davison, Ky.,
Dayton,
Dingley,
Dolliver,
Dorr,
Dovener,
Driggs,
Eddy,
Ellis,
Evans,
Faris,
Fenton,
Fischer,
Fitzgerald,
Fletcher,
Foote,
Foss,
Fowler, N. J.,
Gardner,
Gibson,
Gillet, N. Y.,
Graff,
Griffin,
Grosvenor,
Grout,
Grow,
Hager,
Hamilton,
Harmer,
Hawley,
Heatwole,
Hemenway,
Henderson,
Henry, Conn.,
Henry, Ind.,
Hepburn,
Hicks,
Hilborn,
Hill,
Hitt,
Hooker,
Hopkins,
Howe,
Howell,
Hull,


Jenkins,
Johnson, Ind.,
Johnson, N. Dak.,
Joy,
Kerr,
Ketcham,
Kirkpatrick,
Knox,
Kulp,
Lacey,
Landis,
Lawrence,
Littauer,
Loud,
Loudenslager,
Lovering,
Low,
Lybrand,
MZcA leer,
McCall,
McCleary,
MrcClellan,
McDonald,
McEwan,
Mclntire,
Mahon,
Marsh,
Mercer,
Mesick,
Miller,
Mills,
Minor,
Mitchell,
Moody,
Morris,
Mudd,
Northway,
Olmsted,
Otjen,
Overstreet,
Parker, N. J.,
Payne,
Pearce, Mo.,
Pitney,
Powers,
Pugh,


Ray,
Reeves,
Robbins,
Royse,
Russell,
Sauerhering,
Shannon,
Shattuc,
Sherman,
Showalter,
Smith, Ill.,
Smith, S. W.,
Smith, Wm. Alden,
Southard,
Southwick,
Spalding,
Sperry,
Sprague,
Steele,
Stevens, Minn.,
Stewart, N. J.,
Stewart, Wis,
Stone, C. W.,
Stone, \W. A.,
Strode, Nebr.,
Sturtevant,
Sulloway,
Tawney,
Tayler, Ohio,
Tongue,
Updegraff,
Van Voorhis,
Wadsworth,
Walker, Mass.,
Walker, Va.,
Wanger,
Ward,
Weaver,
Wheeler, Ala.,
White, Ill.,
Williams, Pa.,
Wise,
Young.




330


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


NAYS —I31


Adamson,
Bailey,
BAKER, ILL,
Ball,
Bankhead,
BARLOW,
Bartett,
BELL,
Benner,
Benton,
Berry,
Bland,
Bodine,
BODKIN,
Bradley,
Brantley,
Brenner, Ohio,
Brewer,
Broussard,
Brucker,
Brundidge,
Burke,
Carnmack,
CASTLE,
Clardy,
Clark, Mo.,
Clayton,
Cochran, Mo.,
Cooney,
Cooper, Tex.,
Cowherd,
Cox,
Davey,


Davis,
De Armond,
De Graifenreid,
De Vries,
Dinssmore,
Dockery,
Elliott,
Fitzpatrick,
Fleming,
FOWLER, N. CG,
Fox,
Gaines,
GREENE,
Griffith,
Griggsi
GUNN,
HandZy,
HARTMAN,
Hay,
Henry, Miss.,
Henry, Tex.,
HOWARD, ALA.,
HEzoard, Ga.,
IH nter,
Jones, Va.,
JONES, WASH.,
KELLY,
K7ing,
KAitchin,
Kleber%,
KNOWLES,
Lamb,
Lanham,


Latimer,
Lentz,
Lester,
Lewis, Ga.,
LEWIS, WASH.,
Linney,
Little,
Livingston,
Lloyd,
Love,
MCCORMICK,
McCulloch,
McDowell,
McMillin,
McRae,
Maddox,
Maguire,
MARTIN,
MAXWELL,
Meyer, La.,
Miers, Ind.,
Moon,
Norton, Ohio.,
Norton, S. C.,
Ogden,
Osborne,
Otey,
PETERS,
Pierce, 7Tenn.,
Rhea,
Richardson,
RrDGELY,
Rixey,


Robb,
Robertson, La.,
Robinson, Ind.,
Sayers,
Settle,
SHAFROTH,
SHUFORD,
SIMPSON,
Sims,
SKINNER,
Slayden,
Smith, Ky.,
Sparkman,
Stallings,
STARK,
Stephens, 7ex.,
Stokes,
STROWD, N. C.,
Sullivan,
Sulzer,
SUTHERLAND,
Swanson,
Talbert,
Taylor, Ala.,
Thorp,
Underwood,
Vandiver,
Vehslage,
VINCENT,
Wheeler, Ky.,
Wilson,
Zenor.


ANSWERED "PRESENT"-I
Baird.
NOT VOTING —42.
Allen,            Cranford,         Meekisonz,         ate,
Barber,           Davenport,        NEWLANDS,         Terry,
Barrett,          Ermentroat,       Odell,            TODD,
Brosius,          Gillett, Mass.,   Packer, Pa.,      Warner,
Campbell,         Hinrichsen,       Pearson,         Weymouth,
Catchings,        Hurley,           Perkins,         White, N.C.,
Clarke, N. H.,    Jett,             Prince,          Wilber,
Cochrane, N. Y.,  Lorimer,          Quigg,            Williams, Miss.,
Codding,          Mahany,           Shelden,         Yost.
Colson,           Mann,             Snover,
Connolly,         Marshall,        Strait,
Republicans in Roman; Democrats in Italics; Populists and Silver men in
Small Caps.
The bill went to the Senate April 30, and was referred to
the Senate Committee on        Finance.    A majority of this committee, composed of six Democrats and one Populist, reported   back  the bill, May    12, with the bond and certificate
provisions stricken out, and amendments for the issue of one
hundred and fifty millions of new greenbacks, and the im



PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF WAR.


33I1


mediate coinage of forty-two millions of so-called seigniorage from the silver bullion in the Treasury and the issue of
silver certificates thereon; while the five Republicans of
the committee, composing a minority, reported in favor of the
retention of the House provisions for the issue of certificates
of indebtedness and bonds, reducing the amount of the latter
to three hundred millions.
Both the majority and minority of the Finance Committee
concurred in reporting amendments to the House bill giving a
rebate of 7j per cent, on sales of beer stamps, striking out the
special tax on dealers in tobacco and the tax on tonnage,
slightly reducing the proposed House rate on cigars and cigarettes, levying a special annual tax on bankers, brokers, proprietors of circuses etc., theatres, billiard and pool rooms; and
imposing a tax on inheritances and legacies in estates exceeding, ten thousand dollars, and on refineries of oil and sugar
producing more than two hundred and fifty thousand dollars
annually; and also providing for a stamp tax on bills of lading,
and on sleeping and parlor car tickets; with other amendments of an immaterial character.
The new internal taxes proposed by the amendments reported by the Senate Finance Committee, were estimated by
them to produce fifty millions additional to those provided by
the House bill, nine millions of which it was estimated would
be derived from the legacy and succession tax, five millions
from the special taxes on brokers etc., and thirty millions from
the additional stamp taxes, raising the stamp taxes, as the
Committee estimated, to sixty-eight millions, and as the two
House taxes proposed to be dropped (the tax on dealers in
tobacco and the tax on tonnage) aggregated seven millions, the
net increase over the House bill was estimated at forty-three
millions.
The bill was taken up in the Senate May i6 for discussion
and amendment. The House bond and certificate of indebtedness provisions, offered by the minority of the Senate
Finance Committee, were restored by a vote of 45 to 3I; the
greenback amendment, reported by the majority of the
Finance Committee, was defeated by a vote of 45 to 3i; the
seigniorage amendment, somewhat modified, was adopted by




332           THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.
a vote of 48 to 3I; and all the other amendments reported by
the Committee were adopted by the Senate.
An amendment offered by Mr. Tillman, of South Carolina,
imposing a duty of ten cents per pound on tea-the only
tariff provision in the bill-was adopted by a vote of 48 to 32.
On June 4 the bill, as amended, passed the Senate by a
vote of 48 to 28, and 13 not voting and paired, as follows:
YEAS-48.
Aldrich,        Foraker,         Lodge,           Platt, N. Y.,
Allison,         Frye,           McBride,         Pritchard,
Baker,          Gallinger,       McEnery,         Sewell,
Burrows,        Gear,            McMillan,        Shoup,
Caffery,        Gorman,          Mantle,          Spooner,
Carter,          Hale,           Mason,           Thurston,
Chandler,        Hanna,          Mitchell,        Turpie,
Clark,           Hansbrough,     Morrill,         Warren,
Davis,           Hawley,         Murphy,          Wellington,
Deboe,           Hoar,           Nelson,          Wetmore,
Elkins,          KYLE,           Perkins,         Wilson,
Fairbanks,      Lindsay,         Platt, Conn.,    Wolcott.
NAYS-28.
ALLEN,           Clay,           McLaurin,        Rawlins,
Bacon,           Cockrell,       Mallory,         Roach,
Bate,           Daniel,          Martin,          STEWART,
Berry,           Harris,         Money,           Sullivan,
Butler,         Heitfeld,        Pasco,           Tillman,
CANNON,         Jones, Ark.,     PETTIGREW,       Turley,
Chilton,        JONES, NEV.,     Pettus,          White.
NOT VOTING-I3.
Cullom,         Mills,           Quay,            Vest.
Faulkner,        Morgan,         Smith,
Gray,           Penrose,         TELLER,
Aenney,          Proctor,        Turner,
Republicans in Roman; Democrats in Italics; an'd Populists and Silver men in
Small Caps.
The bill as amended by the Senate was promptly nonconcurred in by the House, and sent to a conference by the
vote of the two Houses on June 6.
The conferees were Senators Allison, Aldrich and Jones of
Arkansas, on the part of the Senate; and Representatives
Dingley, Payne and Bailey, on the part of the House.
The conferees met on the same day in the Senate Finance
Committee room, and daily thereafter till June 9, on which
day the Republican majority of the Senate and House conferees reached a final agreement.
The conference report was presented in the House by




PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF WAR.


333


Chairman Dingley at 5 o'clock P. M. of the same day, and
after a debate of three hours (a recess to 8 o'clock having
been taken after the reading of the report) was agreed to by
the House at I I:3o o'clock P. M., by a vote of 154 to 107-the
division running on the same lines as those shown in the
passage of the original bill.
The Senate took up the conference report the next day
(June io), and agreed to it at 5 P. M. by a vote of 43 to 22,
and 24 not voting and paired, as follows:
YEAS-43.
Aldrich,       'Fairbanks,       Lindsay,        Perkins,
Allison,        Foraker,         McBride,        Platt, Conn.,
Baker,          Frye,            AIcEnery,       Pritchard,
Burrows,        Gallinger,       Mantle,         Quay,
Caffery,        Gear,            Mason,          Shoup,
Carter,         Gorman,          Mitchell,       Turpie,
Chandler,       Hanna,           Morgan,         Warren,
Clark,          Hansbrough,      Morrill,        Wellington,
Cullom,         Hawley,          Murphy,         Wilson,
Deboe,          Hoar,            Nelson,         Wolcott.
Elkins,         KYLE,            Penrose,
NAYS-22.
Bacon,          Cockrell,        Martin,         Rawlins,
Bate,           Daniel,          A/ills,         Reach,
BUTLER,         Heitfeld,        Money,          Sullivan,
CANNON,         Jones, Ark.,     Pasco,          TELLER.
Chilton,        JONES, NEV.,     PETTIGREW,
Clay,           McLaurin,        Petttus,
NOT VOTING-24.
ALLEN,          Harris,          Proctor,         Tillman,
Berry,          Kenney,          Sewell,          Tutrley,
Davis,          Lodge,           Smith,           Turner,
Faulkner,       McMillan,        Spooner,         Vest,
Gray,           Mallory,         STEWART,        Wetmore,
Hale,           Platt, N. Y.,    Thurston,        White.
Republicans in Roman; Democrats in Italics; and Populists and Silver men in
Small Caps.
The act to "provide ways and means to meet war expendi.
tures," as finally agreed to by both houses, and approved by
the President on June 13, provided for the increase of the
internal tax on fermented liquors to two dollars per barrel,
with a discount of 72 per cent on stamps purchased-making
the tax practically $I.85 per barrel; for the increase of the
internal tax on tobacco to 12 cents per lb., with an increase
to $3.60 per thousand on cigars and cigarettes weighing more
than three pounds per thousand, to one dollar per thousand




334


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


on cigars weighing less, and to $i.5o per thousand on cigarettes weighing not more than three pounds per thousand; for
special annual taxes, after July i, on bankers, brokers, pawnbrokers, proprietors of theatres, museums and concert halls in
cities of over twenty-five thousand population, proprietors or
agents of circuses and other public exhibitions for money,
and proprietors of bowling alleys and billiard tables, and on
certain manufacturers of and wholesale dealers in tobaccoretail dealers in tobacco and cigars being exempted; for stamp
taxes after July i on certain specified certificates, documents
and other instruments, including checks, bills of lading issued
by railroads, express companies and other common carriers,
telegraph and long-distance telephone messages, sleeping and
parlor car tickets, insurance policies, medicinal proprietary
articles and preparations, chewing gum and bottled wine; for
excise taxes on refiners of sugar or petroleum on the gross
amount of their business in excess of $25o,o0o; for an excise
tax on legacies and distributive shares of personal property,
where such property shall exceed the value of ten thousand
dollars; and for an excise tax on manufacturers of mixed flour
for the purpose of securing the marking of the same.
The only tariff provision in the bill was one imposing a
duty of ten cents per pound on tea imported after the passage
of the act, which was estimated to yield ten millions annually.
The Senate amendment for the coinage of the so-called
" seigniorage " of silver bullion in the Treasury was dropped,
and a provision simply reciting the coinage clause of the
unrepealed provisions of the silver purchase act of i890, as
it is being executed, substituted for it.
The uncertain elements in the estimates of the revenue that
would be secured by the internal-revenue provisions of the
War-Revenue Act, lay in the receipts from the stamp taxes,
which were variously estimated, and from the tax on inheritances and legacies, which were estimated by the Senate
Finance Committee at nine millions per annum. The lowest
estimate of the aggregate war revenue was nine millions per
month, or $io8,ooo,ooo per annum, and the highest twelve
and one-half millions, or $iso,ooo,ooo per annum, with ten
millions per annum additional from the customs duty on tea.




PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF WAR.


335


The receipts from the internal-revenue provisions of the
War-Revenue Act (additional to the revenue derived from the
internal taxes levied by previous laws), based on the receipts
for the first three months, are estimated by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue for the fiscal year which will end June
30, I899, as follows:
From Tobacco etc.     I    *.. $I6,oooJooo
From Fermented Liquors etc.... 33,000,000
From Stamp Taxes, Schedules A & B.. 40,000,000
From Special Annual Taxes on Bankers etc.    7,000,000
From Legacies and Successions...   3,600,000
From Gross Receipts of Refineries...    400,000
$I 00,o),000
NOTE. The receipts from legacies the first three months were only $375,337, but after
sufficient time has elapsed to close up estates of persons deceased since July ist, iS98, it is
believed the tax on gross receipts will be more than the estimate.
The full text of the two sections of the War-Revenue Act,
authorizing the issue of bonds and of certificates of indebtedness, is as follows:
SEC. 32. That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized
to borrow from time to time, at a rate of interest not exceeding three per centum per annum, such sum or sums as, in his
judgment, may be necessary to meet public expenditures, and
to issue therefor certificates of indebtedness in such form as
he may prescribe and in denominations of fifty dollars or.
some multiple of that sum; and each certificate so issued
shall be payable, with the interest accrued thereon, at such
time, not exceeding one year from the date of its issue, as the
Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe: Provided, That the
amount of such certificates outstanding shall at no time
exceed one hundred millions of dollars; and the provisions of
existing law respecting counterfeiting and other fraudulent
practices are hereby extended to the bonds and certificates of
indebtedness authorized by this act.
SEC. 33. That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby
authorized to borrow, on the credit of the United States, from
time to time, as the proceeds may be required to defray
expenditures authorized on account of the existing war (such
proceeds when received to be used only for the purpose of
meeting such war expenditures), the sum of four hundred




336


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


million dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, and
to prepare and issue therefor, coupon or registered bonds of
the United States in such form as he may prescribe, and in
denominations of twenty dollars or some multiple of that
sum, redeemable in coin at the pleasure of the United States
after ten years from the date of their issue, and payable
twenty years from such date, and bearing interest payable
quarterly in coin at the rate of three per centum per annum;
and the bonds herein authorized shall be exempt from all
taxes or duties of the United States, as well as from taxation
in any form by or under State, municipal or local authority:
Provided, That the bonds authorized by this section shall be
first offered at par as a popular loan under such regulations,
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, as will give
opportunity to the citizens of the United States to participate
in the subscriptions to such loan, and in allotting said bonds
the several subscriptions of individuals shall be first accepted,
and the subscriptions for the lowest amounts shall be first
allotted: Providedfurther, That any portion of any issue of
said bonds not subscribed for as above provided may be disposed of by the Secretary of the Treasury at not less than
par, under such regulations as he may prescribe, but no commissions shall be allowed or paid thereon; and a sum not
exceeding one-tenth of one per centum of the amount of the
bonds and certificates herein authorized is hereby appropriated
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
to pay the expense of preparing, advertising and issuing the
same.
In view of the fact that Congress had either appropriated,
or proposed to appropriate, $36i,ooo,ooo to provide for the
expenditures of the war up to January I, i899, in response to
the estimates of the war and navy officials; and in view of
the further fact that the war revenue up to that time would
not be likely to exceed fifty-five millions, and the available cash
balance in the Treasury (exclusive of the one hundred millions
greenback redemption fund and the fifty million working
balance required for the operations of the Treasury), would
not exceed seventy millions more-leaving a balance of at
least two hundred and thirty millions of the appropriations




PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF AWAR.


337


to be provided for, Secretary of the Treasury Gage thought
it xvise, immediately after the approval of the War-Revenue
Act, to take measures to invite popular subscriptions for
two hundred millions of the three per cent bonds authorized
to be issued and sold.
There were many financiers who pointed to the fact that
the four per cent loan of I925 was then selling in the market
at a premium which netted three and a quarter per cent
interest to the investor, and to the further fact that the
war-revenue law  practically withdrew  the proposed loan
from the competition of large investors, by providing that
"in, allotting said bonds the several subscriptions of individuals shall be first accepted, and the subscriptions for the
lowest amounts shall be first allotted," and doubtfully shook
their heads at the possibility of placing a loan of two
hundred millions bearing only three per cent interest, without the payment of a single dollar in commissions, and with
the expenditure of less than one-tenth of one per cent for
clerical help, stationery, engraving and printing and distributing.
The success of the loan went far beyond the expectations
of the most sanguine believers in the patriotism and ability of
our people, and contributed powerfully to impress on Spain
and on Europe a profound conviction of the unity of our
people in support of the war, and of the unlimited extent of
our resources.
Notwithstanding subscriptions were limited to thirty days,
yet when the loan closed on the afternoon of July I4, tenders
had been made by about 320,000 persons for $I,394,o,000o,
or nearly seven times the amount offered.
The popular character of the tenders is shown by the fact
that there were 230,000 subscriptions for $5oo or less-a large
number for $20, $4o and $50-amounting in the aggregate to
$IOI,ooo,ooo, or more than half the entire loan; awhile the
other $99,00,ooo 0was taken by about 70,000 subscribers, no
one of whom received over $4,500. Not a single syndicate or
corporation or individual subscribing for over $4,500, was able
to obtain a dollar of the loan.
It is probable that the remarkable success of this popular




338


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


loan was as potent a factor in bringing the war to an early
and successful close as a victory on the land or the sea.. The war was much shorter than was anticipated, and for
the first time in our history less costly than was estimated by
the War and Navy Departments and appropriated for by
Congress. The estimates and appropriations up to January
i, 1899, were $361,ooo,oo, to meet which $325,Ooooo were
provided; while the actual expenditures up to that time were
only $200,000,000, or $220,000,000 including the amount
which it is proposed to pay Spain for improvements in the
Philippines, leaving a balance in the Treasury of about $ioo,ooo,ooo000 (in addition to the greenback redemption fund and a
working balance of $50,000,0ooo) to meet the extraordinary
expenditures in excess of the war revenue necessitated for
some time by the new responsibilities imposed upon us by
the successful results of the war.
O,/




I
I




..............




CHAPTER XVII.


THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.
BY
HON. JOHN D. LONG, Secretary of the Navy.
UR new navy, which has come out of the war witn Spain
O )    with so much credit and renown, dates from the administration of President Arthur, when Mr. Chandler
was Secretary of the Navy. The first ships were the Chicago,
Atlanta, Boston, and Dolphin.  John Roach builded, not
better than he knew, but apparently better than anybody else
knew. He and Secretary Chandler not only laid the foundation of our present magnificent navy, but gave an impulse to
iron naval ship building in this country which has resulted in
the creation of American ship yards capable of turning out as
good work as any in the world. An infelicitous attempt was
made to discredit the little Dolphin as " structurally weak," but
she has circumnavigated the globe and has come out of the
recent war equal to every demand and sound as a nut.
Secretary Whitney, with continuing ability and foresight,
enlarged the work which was begun under Mr. Chandler, and
was followed in the same lines by Secretaries Tracy and Herbert, each adding to the number of our war ships and developing in every way our naval power.
When I entered upon my duties in March, I897, the Navy,
though not large compared with the navies of one or two foreign
powers, was well equipped and well prepared. A high professional spirit animated its officers; the Bureaus and leading
naval stations were officered by chiefs alive to their responsibilities, zealous and progressive. It is fair to say that after
the last above named date no new life or force was infused
into the administration of the Navy. These were already
there. The fleets went on, as during the year before, in the




340


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


gunnery and target practice and manceuvres at sea. They
were supplied at home and abroad with ammunition, coal,
medical and other supplies, so that they were ready for any
emergency, and the credit of their substantial preparedness
when war came belongs to no one man nor to any one year.
And yet it was the preparation of a small Navy, almost
pathetically small as compared, for instance, with that of Great
Britain. It had seen no war service; its battleships, gunboats
and torpedo boats were untried. To appreciate the situation
we must forget the glory and confidence felt in it everywhere
to-day and remember that a year ago it had very little popular
hold. At the first muttering of the storm with Spain, it was
an open question whether her naval power was not equal to
our own. She had ships of the finest and most recent naval
construction; she had gallant and educated officers and brave
seamen; she had ready access to every resource which the
skill of Europe could supply in the way of naval construction,
armament and ammunition. It was with a consciousness of
these facts on our part that, when the possibility of war
became apparent, the work of providing for its exigencies,
which had been begun and carried on so well already under
the ordinary conditions of past years, was continued strenuously and earnestly by the same agencies to meet the
extraordinary demands which war would bring.
As early as January, i898, the increasing tension of our
relations with Spain put the Navy Department on its guard.
The fleet in Atlantic waters had been largely engaged during
the previous years in enforcing the neutrality laws, and great
vigilance had been exercised in preventing the fitting out and
departure of filibustering expeditions from our coast. Recognizing the importance of retaining experienced enlisted men
in the service, the Commander-in-Chief of the European
station was directed, on the iith day of January, i898, not to
discharge men whose enlistments were about to expire. This
was probably the first important order given in contemplation
of war. On January 17, the Commander-in-Chief of the South
Atlantic station was informed of the critical condition of our
relations with Spain and directed to proceed xvith the Cincinnati and Castine from Montevideo to Para, Brazil. -On the




T HE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.. 341


same day, the Helena, then on her way to the Asiatic station,
was ordered to await instructions at Lisbon; and the Witmnington, on her way to the South Atlantic station, was
ordered to await instructions in the West Indies. On January
26, the Commander-in-Chief of the European station was
ordered to assemble his squadron at Lisbon, and on the next
day the Comm-ander-in-Chief of the Asiatic station was ordered
to retain the men whose enlistments were about to expire.
For several years prior to the incoming of the present
Administration, it had been the policy of our Government to
refrain from sending naval vessels to Cuban waters. This
policy was now reversed, and in the Fall of 1897, the North
Atlantic squadron, following the formerly established custom,
and so without just cause of offense to Spain, was ordered
south for the purpose of winter evolutions and practice. The
next step was for our naval vessels to resume friendly visits
to Cuban ports; and after conference between our Secretary
of State and the Spanish Minister, in which the subject was
" discussed and accepted," the authorities at Madrid and
Havana were informed that the U. S. S. Maine would be
forthwith instructed to call at the port of Havana.
The order dispatching the Maine was sent January 24, the
ship being at that time off Dry Tortugas, Florida. The
telegram directing this movement was as follows:
WASHINGTON, January 24, i898.
SICARO, Key West:
Order the Maine to Havana, Cuba, and make friendly call,
pay his respects to the authorities, particular attention must
be paid to usual exchange of civilities. Torpedo boat must
not accompany Maine. The squadron must not return to
Key West on this account.
The Maine was received in Havana with every mark of
official courtesy. Reports from her commanding officer,
however, and other sources, indicated from the first that this
visit was received with disfavor.
A little after one o'clock, on the night of February I5, my
daughter came into my apartment at the Hotel Portland,
woke me from a sound sleep, and gave me a dispatch which
she had just received from a Western Union messenger boy




342


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


in the hallway, with the information that it was of great
importance.  It was the famous dispatch from  Captain
Sigsbee announcing the destruction of the Maine, and was as
follows:
HAVANA, February 15, I898.
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Was/ihlugton, D. C.:
Maine blown up in Havana Harbor at 9:40 to-night, and
destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed or
drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war
and Ward Line steamer. Send light-house tenders from Key
West for crew and the few pieces of equipment above. No
one has clothing other than that upon him. Public opinion
should be suspended until further report.  All officials
believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted
for. Many Spanish officers, including representatives of General Blanco, now with me to express sympathy.
SIGSBEE.
It was almost impossible to believe that it could be true, or
that it was not a wild and vivid dream. As my eyes went
over and over the letters, I seemed to see between the lines
the harbor at Havana, lying under the shadow of night,
suddenly rift with a column of fire and startled with the
thunder of the explosion of the noble battleship. Commander
Dickins was at that time, in the absence of Captain Crowninshield, acting Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and I sent
the dispatch to him with a short note written in lead pencil as
follows:
DEAR DICKINS:
I have just received this terrible telegram. Please have
request attended to at once by telegram in ordinary language,
not using cipher.
Commander Dickins reported a little later at my hotel. I
was sitting in a small room adjoining the hotel office with
two or three newspaper correspondents, who had already
heard the news and had come to me for confirmation of it.
Dickins was ordered to send to the naval station at Key West
instructions to dispatch a vessel to Havatna with medical
assistance. He then went to the White House to inform the




t ' - _ >._ P U '  a% r._.      -aMy = - - -.  = —  -  - -- I — Ad -I ~ ~ '


THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.           343
President of the catastrophe. The following telegram was
sent to Captain Sigsbee:
SIGSBEE, Havana:
The President directs me to express for himself and the
people of the United States his profound sympathy with the
officers and crew of the Maine, and desires that no expense
be spared in providing for the survivors and caring for the
dead.                                       LONG.
The telegram of Captain Sigsbee did much to hold public
opinion in check and to assist the Department in securing in
the public mind as dispassionate a view as possible of the disaster, and a suspension of judgment until the facts could be
investigated.
A Board of Inquiry was appointed on February i9 to
investigate and report to the Department the cause of the
explosion. It consisted of Captain W. T. Sampson, Captain
F. E. Chadwick, Lieutenant-Commander Wm. P. Potter as
members, and Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix as
recorder. They proceeded to Havana and began their investigations on the 2Ist day of February. A most thorough
and exhaustive examination of the wreck was made, and the
Board reported on the 2Ist day of March that the Maine had
been destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, but
that the responsibility could not be fixed upon any person-or
persons. The most cursory examination, even by a nontechnical eye, of the drawings which accompany the report is
convincing that the cause of the disaster must have been
from the outside. The impression has prevailed that the
Department was cognizant of the nature of the findings of
the Court long before they were received in Washington.
This, however, was not the case. At one time the advisability
of having the report- telegraphed in cipher was considered,
but the proceedings were so protracted and the preparations
for any emergency had reached such a stage that this step
was not deemed necessary.
On February 25, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic
station, Commodore Dewey, was ordered to assemble the
squadron under his command -at Hong Kong and to retain
the Olympia, which was under orders to proceed to San Fran




344     THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


cisco. Instructions were given, outlining his conduct and
duty in the event of hostilities. The Baltimore, then at
Honolulu, was directed to join the Asiatic squadron and a
large supply of ammunition was sent to Honolulu by the
ilohican and transferred to that vessel.
The Department, as early as March 3, issued instructions
to the Office of Naval Intelligence to make special inquiries
of our naval attach6s in Europe as to what men-of-war and
torpedo boats could be purchased abroad.   They were
directed to submit estimates of cost and to report upon the
condition of purchasable ships. It was considered important
to secure any war vessels which might be in the market, not
only to strengthen our own navy, but to prevent them from
coming into the possession of Spain, and it was necessary
that any purchases made abroad should be concluded before
the outbreak of hostilities, which, under the neutrality laws,
would then make their purchase impracticable.
With a view to these and other proper expenditures, Congress passed, on March 9, the Emergency Bill, appropriating
$5oooo,oo6 for National defence. A Board was at once
appointed for the purpose of examining such vessels of our
own merchant marine as were deemed suitable for naval
purposes. With the ample means thus provided, the purchase of vessels, ammunition, guns and all classes of naval
war material went rapidly on. The inquiries set on foot in
Europe showed the impossibility of obtaining war ships in
any number in foreign markets. On the day of the passage
of the Emergency Appropriation, the Naval Attachd at London was authorized to negotiate for the purchase of two
cruisers then building in England for the Brazilian Government, the Amazonas and the Alnirante Abreu. This purchase
was successfully concluded and the United States. flag was
hoisted March i8 on board the- Amazonas, renamed the New
Orleans, which soon afterwards became an efficient part of
our naval war fleet..  The Almirante Abreu, since then
named the Albany, was far from completion, but one vessel
could not be bought without the purchase of both. An
officer was sent to Europe with instructions to negotiate for
other vessels, but made no purchases. The Naval AttachM at




THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.


345


Berlin purchased at Elbing, Germany, a torpedo boat which
was renamed the Somers. Unfavorable weather and other
causes prevented her prompt departure for the United States,
and when war was declared she was in an English port, where
she remained. The cruiser Diogenes was purchased from the
Thames Iron Works on April 2, i898, and there placed in
commission as the Topeka. The NVictzeroy, afterwards renamed the Buffalo, was purchased at Rio Janeiro and the
Manly, a 'very small torpedo boat, was purchased in Europe.
The statement of the armed vessels actually bought affords
but a meager idea of the number of vessels the purchase of
which was under consideration from time to time, and for
some of which extensive negotiations were carried on. Of
those really desirable, few could be obtained, and great care
was necessary to avoid burdening our navy list with a number
of obsolete craft, for many of which exorbitant prices were
asked. A number of colliers were purchased abroad, as it was
not practicable to obtain enough suitable vessels for this purpose in the United States, and they proved of great value
during the war.
A naval war board was established early in March, and
continued in session at the Department throughout the war.
Its services were of great value, although there was at first an
inclination in the public mind to carp at such a board and to
make it the easy target of criticism; but no institution was
ever more thoroughly vindicated. The time of the Secretary
of the Navy, like that of every other Cabinet officer, is so
much taken up with interviews and routine work, that it was
a great relief to me to refer questions relating to naval movements to this board, which, in the quiet of its room, aided by
maps and charts, and constant telegraphic communication,
was able to give professional and undivided consideration to
every problem that arose.  Its duty was to consider and outline the strategical policy of the Department. Under it were
prepared, for the consideration and signature of the Secretary,
orders bearing upon this policy, and to it were referred all information received of the movements of the Spanish naval
forces and everything bearing upon the operations of the war.
Its permanent members were Rear-Admiral Montgomery




346


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Sicard, U. S. N., Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. N. (retired), and
Captain A. S. Crowninshield, U. S. N.:-Admiral Sicard, a
man of long and copious naval experience, and of the most
painstaking deliberation; Captain Mahan, the famous naval
author, quick, earnest and competent; and Captain Crowninshield, through whom all orders to ships in commission are issued and who is in direct touch with the personnel of the navy
as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
In the meantime, the Columbia and Minneapolis, in reserve,
had been ordered to prepare for service. The Brooklyn had
been ordered to proceed from La Guayra to Hampton Roads,
in contemplation of the Flying Squadron. The Commandersin-Chief of stations had been ordered to husband ammunition
and to keep their vessels filled with the best coal obtainable.
The Helena and Bancroft had been ordered to the United
States, and the Commander-in-Chief of the European station
had been ordered to attach the New Orleans to his command
and proceed home. The Oregon had been ordered from
Bremerton, Washington, to San Francisco, with a view to
bringing her around to augment the Atlantic fleet, and the
Cincinnnati, Castine and Wilmington had been ordered to proceed from Para, Brazil, to Port Antonio, Jamaica.
The report of the Maine Court of Inquiry was received at
the Department on March 24.     Lieutenant-Commander
Marix brought it into my office about ten o'clock in the
morning, and after reading the findings of the Court I went
with him to the White House, where they were read by him
to the President, and I recall that both the President and
myself were much struck with their brevity. This report was
forwarded to Congress on March 28 with a special message.
Congress having passed an act authorizing the appointment
of officers in the navy and marine corps in such numbers as
might be required, to serve for the period of the emergency
created by war with Spain, the Department appointed boards
to conduct the examination of applicants. As a result 856
officers were commissioned for temporary service.
On March 3, the navy yards at Brooklyn, Boston and
League Island were instructed to enlist seamen, firemen and
petty officers for general service, and the enlisted force was




THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.


347


steadily increased as vessels became available for service,
until, on August I, the date on which it reached its maximum,
there were 24,123 enlisted men in the service.
The purchase of auxiliary ships, under the efficient direction
first of Assistant-Secretary Roosevelt and then of his successor,
Mr. Allen,? went on as rapidly as possible. As fast as purchased, they were sent to the navy yards and to certain private
establishments for such changes as were necessary for their use
by the navy. The old monitors, which had been laid up in
reserve, were placed in commission and were provided with
crews from the naval militia of the states and stationed at
important ports along the coast. A system of coast defense
and coast signal service was devised and wvas ready to be put
in operation upon the outbreak of hostilities.
The total ships added to the navy numbered 128. The
maximum fighting force separated into classes was as follows:


Battle ships (first class)
Battle ship (second class)
Armored cruisers
Coast-defense monitors
Armored ram
Protected cruisers
Unprotected cruisers
Gunboats
Dynamite cruiser.
Torpedo boats
Vessels of old Navy, incluc
Auxiliary navy:
Auxiliary cruisers
Converted yachts
Revenue cutters
Light-house tenders
Converted tugs
Converted colliers.
Miscellaneous
On April 20, Congress passed
President to intervene in Cuba.


4
I
2
6
I
12
3
Is
I I
ling monitors. i4
I I... 28
Is5
27
19
the resolution directing the
In order to understand the


situation of the navy on this date, let us recall that the North
Atlantic Squadron, under command of Captain W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., was in the vicinity of Key WVest. The Oregon
had reached Atlantic waters on her way to join the North




348


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Atlantic Squadron; the North Patrol Squadron, for the protection of the Atlantic coast between the capes of the Delaware and Bar Harbor, had been organized under command of
Commodore J. A. Howell, U. S. N.; the Flying Squadron,
under command of Commodore W. S. Schley, U. S. N., had
been assembled at Hampton Roads; the Asiatic Squadron,
under command of Commnodore George Dewey, was at Hong
Kong, China; and the Pacific Squadron, under Admiral Miller,
was at different points on the Pacific coast.
Commodore Dewey, having carried out his orders to retain
the men whose enlistments were about to expire, to proceed
to Hong Kong, China, with the squadron under his command
and keep his fleet full of the best coal obtainable, to retain
the Olympia, to purchase two supply vessels, and to arm and
man them, and having been reinforced by the Baltimore, and
received full instructions outlining his duties, was ready for
the outbreak of hostilities. The following dispatch was sent
to him:
WASHINGTON, April 24, 1898.
DEWEY, Hong Kong:
War has commenced between the United States and
Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence
operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet.
You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.
LONG.
Upon the request of the Governor of Hong Kong, Commodore Dewey left that place on April 25 and proceeded to
Mirs Bay, China, where the arrival of the United States
Consul from Manila was awaited. The squadron sailed on
April 27 and arrived at Manila on the morning of May i.
The brilliant action of the squadron in passing the mines and
forts at the entrance of the harbor, and in engaging and
destroying the Spanish fleet under Admiral Montojo, is without parallel in naval history. It is described in other chapters
of this book.
News of this great victory was first received through the
public press, via Madrid. The official dispatch, sent by the




THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.


349


McCullock to Hong Kong and transmitted from that place,
was not received at the Department until May 7. It was
dated Manila, May I, and being of some length was received
in piece-meal. The fact of its arrival at once became known,
and many correspondents and others had gathered in the
big reception room of the Department eagerly awaiting its
translation.
The news was received with the greatest enthusiasm. It
announced the complete destruction of the Spanish fleet,
without injury to our squadron and without the loss of a single
man. Another dispatch, received from Commodore Dewaney
on the same day, dated Cavit6, May 4, announced that he
had taken possession of the naval station at Cavitt and
destroyed its fortifications, that he controlled the bay completely and that he could take the city at any time. The
gratification of the Department at the receipt of this news it
is difficult to state. Aside from the moral effect of the victory, coming almost immediately upon the outbreak of
hostilities, and the inspiriting influence it had on the personnel
of the entire naval service, it relieved the Pacific coast from
all danger of attack and all shipping in the Pacific ocean from
fear of capture. An immense saving to the country was
effected by the decrease in marine insurance rates which
followed in consequence.
The force under Commodore Dewey consisted of the Oymnpia, flagship, Baltimore, RaleidiAl, Petrel, Concord, Boston, the
revenue cutter McCulloclh and the supply ship Zafiro and
collier Nansizan. The Spanish squadron was composed of the
Reina Cristina, flagship, the Castilla, Don Juan de Austria,
Don Antonio de Ulloa, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, Marques
del Duero, General Lezo, Argos, Velasco and transport Is/a de
_M1indanao. All the ships of the Spanish squadron were sunk
or burned, and the casualties on the Spanish side amounted
to about 400 killed and wounded.
This victory made Commodore Dewey deservedly famous,
and gave him rank with the most distinguished naval heroes
of all time. Nor was his merit most in the brilliant victory
which he achieved in the battle fought with the utmost gallantry and skill, waged without an error, and crowned with




350


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


overwhelming success. It was still more in the nerve with
which he moved from Mirs Bay to Manila harbor; the genius
of his conception of attack; the high commanding confidence
of a leader who has weighed every risk, prepared himself for
every emergency, and has that unfaltering determination to
win and that utter freedom from the thought or possibility of
swerving from his purpose, which are more than half the
battle. It was a man of resolution and power, who, at that
vast distance from home, with his little fleet shut off by the
neutrality laws from every port, bearing the fate of his country in his hand, was equal to the emergency and met it as
serenely and masterfully as if it were an incident of an ordinary voyage.
On May 7 the following message was cabled to him: "The
President, in fhe name of the American people, thanks you
and your officers and men for your splendid achievement and
overwhelming victory"; and on the ioth he was informed
that the thanks of Congress had been tendered him and the
officers and men under his command, and that he had been
promoted to the grade of Rear Admiral. Admiral Dewey
established a blockade of the harbor of Manila, and the
Department at once took steps to reinforce this squadron.
The Charleston, which had been previously sent to Honolulu,
sailed for Manila on June 4 with the chartered steamer City
of Pekin, and the transports Australia and City of Sydney,
carrying the first detachment of troops.
The Charleston had orders to stop at the Island of Guam,
in the Ladrones, and to demand the surrender of that place
with all officials and persons in the military service of Spain.
She arrived at the Port of San Luis d'Apra on June 20, and
on the next day received the surrender of the Island. After
taking on board the Governor and Captain of the Port and all
officers and men in the Spanish service, she sailed for Manila,
where she arrived on June 30. Further to reinforce the
Asiatic squadron, the Monterey sailed for Manila, with the
collier Brutus, on June ii, and the Monadnock on June 25,
accompanied by the collier Nero.
On June i8, information xvas received of the sailing of the
Spanish home fleet, under Admiral Camara, for the Philip



THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.


3.5 1


pines. Admiral Dewey was kept informed from day to day
of the progress of this squadron, and as soon as information
was received that it had passed into the Suez Canal, the
Eastern squadron was formed under command of Commodore
Watson, and a statement given to the press that this fleet
would sail at once for the coast of Spain. This action induced
Admiral Camara's squadron to return to Spain. The reinforcements, however, which the Department had dispatched
to Admiral Dewey, so strengthened the force under his command that no anxiety was felt on his account. During the
continuance of hostilities, the conduct of affairs in the Philippines, under Admiral Dewey, merited the warmest commendation of the Department.
On May 26, he was advised that it was desirable not to
have any political alliances with the insurgents or any faction
in the islands which might incur liability to maintain their
cause, and on June 14 he was directed to report fully any
conferences, relations or co-operations which he had had with
Aguinaldo. Admiral Dewey's reply showed that he had
acted with great discretion, and that while his relations with
the insurgent leader were cordial, and he had exercised a
strong influence towards having the insurgents conduct their
war in a humane and civilized manner, he had refrained from
any recognition of the insurgent cause or any action which
committed this country to support it. Upon the arrival of
General Merritt, the joint operations of the Army and Navy
were begun, which resulted in the surrender of Manila on
August 13.
In the conduct of the war in the Atlantic, three objects
were in view, the most important of which was the blockade
of Cuba. -It was believed that the establishment of a close
and efficient blockade, which would prevent supplies and
munitions of war from entering the island, might induce the
Spanish to capitulate before the conclusion of the rainy
season.
The next important object was the destruction of the
Spanish fleet. In order to introduce supplies and munitions
of war into Cuba, it was necessary for the Spanish to raise




352


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAAR.


the blockade, and this could only be accomplished by defeating our fleet, or by evading it and reaching a port in Cuba.
The third consideration was the protection of the Atlantic
sea coast of the United States.
With these purposes in view, the Department in March
directed the monitors to join the squadron under Admiral
Sicard, and detached the Massachusetts and Texas from his
command and ordered them to proceed to Hampton Roads,
where the Flying Squadron was organized. The Brooklyn,
Minneapolis and Columbia were also attached to this squadron.
It was stationed at this central point in order that it might
go to any port on the Atlantic coast which should be menaced
by a Spanish fleet, or be able promptly to reinforce the fleet
in Cuban waters should the Spanish endeavor to raise the
blockade.
Captain W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., yeas assigned to the
command of the North Atlantic fleet on March 26 to succeed
Rear-Admiral Sicard, U. S. N., whom, on account of his
health, it was found necessary to relieve from this onerous
and exacting duty. Upon the detachment of Admiral Sicard,
Captain Sampson was the senior officer present. He was
thoroughly familiar with the personnel and mat6riel of the
fleet and with all the arrangements which had been made
immediately before the war, and the Department had every
confidence in his judgment and professional ability. Upon
the outbreak of hostilities on April 2I, he was assigned to the
command of the United States -naval force on the North
Atlantic station with the rank of Rear Admiral.
It proved to be a wvise selection in every respect. It is fair
to say greater mere naval responsibilities rested on Admiral
Sampson than on any other officer during the war. They
were discharged with great ability and without error. The
number of ships and men subject to his command was larger
than those of any other officer. His duties were of a complicated and very onerous character; they began with the
beginning of the war and lasted until its close. Aside from
the routine of correspondence and the details of so extensive
and exacting a command, there were three great objects to be
accomplished by him. First, the maintenance of the blockade




THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.


353


of the island of Cuba; second, the pursuit and destruction of
the Spanish Atlantic fleet; third, the work of convoying,
landing, and co-operating with, the Army in the movement
upon Santiago and afterwards upon Porto Rico. How thoroughly all this was done is now matter of history.
The command of the Flying Squadron upon its formation
was given to Commodore W. S. Schley, U. S. N., who was
informed that, in case of the juncture of the Flying Squadron
and the fleet under Admiral Sampson, he would be placed
under command of Admiral Sampson.
At 6:30 A. Mt., on April 22, Admiral Sampson sailed from
Key West with the squadron under his command, and in
execution of the President's orders of April 21, at once established a blockade of the northern coast of Cuba from Bahia
Honda to Cardenas.
The instructions to Admiral Sampson were that he should
make every effort to capture or destroy the Spanish war
vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gun-boats
which were stationed along the coast of Cuba. He was
expressly directed not to expose the squadron under his
command to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago or
other strongly fortified ports of Cuba, or Porto Rico, as it
was deemed of prime importance that our vessels should not
be risked to capture or injury before the Spanish squadron
had been met and defeated.
At the beginning of the war it was the opinion of Admiral
Sampson, urged strenuously by him and concurred in by
Captains Evans, Taylor and Chadwick, that a strong attack
upon the batteries at Havana would compel the capitulation
of that place, but in view of the undesirability of sending
troops to Cuba, especially until the more formidable vessels
of the Spanish navy had been destroyed or captured, this
course was deemed to involve risks which in the exercise of a
wise discretion were judged inadvisable. It was clear to the
Department that our battleships should be exposed to no risk
of destruction until they could meet those of the enemy.
Information having been received that a Spanish gun-boat
had been seen off the New England coast, the Columbia and
Minneapolis were ordered from Hampton Roads to make a




THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


354


cruise in the waters between Newport, R. I., and Eastport,
Me., calling at different ports for the purpose of reassuring
the inhabitants of the cities and towns in that section.
The fleet under command of Admiral Sampson had become
so large with the additions of the auxiliary ships that it was
necessary to provide for a division of the many duties with
which he was charged, and two Commodores were sent to
serve under his orders, the senior, Commodore Remey, to
command the naval base at Key West, and the junior,
Commodore Watson, to be given a command afloat.
Upon the withdrawal of our attach6s from Spain, it became
very difficult to secure information regarding the prospective
movements of the Spanish fleet, and a secret service was
organized in order to keep the Department informed of the
resources, condition and plans of the Spanish naval forces.
An officer was sent to Europe, who followed and reported
the movements of the naval force under Admiral Camara,
and another officer proceeded to Cadiz, reporting the strength
of the Spanish vessels there, and later, to the West Indies for
the same purpose. Information was also received from a
variety of other sources.
It was exceedingly important to secure early advices as to
the departure and destination of the Spanish squadron under
Admiral Cervera. On April 28, the Department was informed
that it was probable that part of the Spanish flotilla would
leave the Cape de Verde Islands that night. The agent of
the Department was authorized to charter a steamer to follow
the Spanish squadron and report the direction taken. On
April 29 this agent reported that four cruisers and three
destroyers had sailed, and on the next day this vessel returned
to port and cabled that the Spanish flotilla when last seen
was continuing west at full speed.
Steps were at once taken to ascertain, at the earliest possible moment, the presence of these vessels on this side of the
Atlantic, and the Harvard and St. Louis were sent to sea
under sealed orders, with instructions to cruise to the eastward
of the Windward Islands on certain lines specifically laid
down.
Explicit instructions were given as to the length of time to




THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.


355


remain on this duty, and the method of communicating with
the Department in the event of sighting the Spanish fleet.
The ships were required to make at least three hundred and
thirty-six miles a day on the trip from Newv York to the
cruising grounds.
Admiral Sampson was promptly informed of the sailing of
Cervera's squadron and of its strength, and given an outline
of action in the event of certain contingencies, such as the
appearance of this fleet on the Atlantic coast of the United
States, or their entry into San Juan or other ports in West
Indian waters.
On April 30, instructions were sent to cut the cable on the
south coast of Cuba. On the next day the Yale was sent to
sea with instructions similar to those given the St. Louis and
Harvard, to proceed to the Island of Porto Rico and cruise
around that island.
On May 4, Admiral Sampson sailed east from off Havana
for the purpose of observation, and, continuing in that direction, arrived at San Juan, Porto Rico, on the 12th. His
purpose in going to San Juan was to make a reconnaissance
to ascertain if the Spanish fleet was in that port. Finding
that the Spanish squadron was not there, he bombarded the
fortifications and turned westward again in order to cover
Havana and prevent any attempt to raise the blockade.
Telegrams were received from the Harvard and St. Louis on
the i ith, stating that they had been unable to get any news
of the whereabouts of the Spanish squadron. On the I2th
the Harvard cabled from St. Pierre, Martinique, that the
Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer, Furor, had arrived that day
at Fort de France, Martinique, and later departed, and that a
fleet of five large vessels had been seen off the coast, probably
the Spanish.
This was the first information the Department had of the
whereabouts of Admiral Cervera's squadron. Early the next
morning, May 13, Commodore Schley, at Fortress Monroe,
Va., was instructed to get ready for sea immediately, and later
in the day directed to proceed at once to Charleston, S. C.
The Minnzeapolis was ordered to proceed with all dispatch to
cruise between Monte Cristi, Haiti, and Caicos Bank, Baha



356


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


mas, and the St. Paul was ordered to cruise between Morant
Point, Jamaica, and the west end of Haiti. Admiral Sampson
and the Naval Station at Key West were informed of the
sighting of the Spanish squadron and of the orders to the St.
Paul and lVinneapolis, and the importance of keeping in touch
with the movements of the Spanish was emphasized.
On May 14, the Spanish squadron was reported at the
Island of Curacoa. The Naval Station at Key West was
promptly given this information and instructed to keep a
close lookout in Yucatan Channel, as the enemy might round
Cape San Antonio or enter the Gulf of Mexico. The orders
to the St. Paul of the 13th were revoked, and that ship was
directed to proceed at utmost speed to Key \Vest. Admiral
Sampson was instructed to return with all possible dispatch
to Key West. The information regarding the enemy's squadron and the orders to Admiral Sampson were received by him
on the i5th, by the torpedo-boat Porter, the squadron being
then off Puerto Plata, Haiti.
Admiral Sampson, upon receipt of these dispatches, sent
the Yale to cruise between Jamaica and Cuba; the Harvard
was instructed to cruise in Mona passage and on the north
side of Porto Rico Island; and the St. Louis was ordered to
cut the cable at Santiago and at Guantanamo, Cuba, then at
Ponce, Porto Rico, and then to proceed to St. Thomas about
May i9 to await orders. He advised the Department of the
disposition made of these vessels and that the squadron was
proceeding at best speed to Key West.
Information was received which induced the Department to
believe that Admiral Cervera's squadron would proceed from
Curacoa to the Gulf of Venezuela to coal. The Harvard wvas
informed of this at St. Pierre, Martinique, on the i th, and
directed to endeavor to get and keep in touch with the Spanish fleet. A telegram was sent to Cape Haitien, to be sent
thence to the Minneanpolis, to the same effect, and the St. Paul
at Key West was instructed to proceed to Cape Haitien and
communicate.  After sending these dispatches, the aforementioned telegram from Admiral Sampson was received regarding the disposition of the auxiliary cruisers, and the Department instructed the Harvard at Martinique to obey the


C




THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.


35 7


orders of Admiral Sampson rather than the Department's
order of the i 5th.
The Naval Station at Key West was instructed to be ready
to coal the North Atlantic Squadron and the Flying Squadron
upon arrival, and Admiral Sampson was directed to reinforce
the Flying Squadron by an armored vessel and such torpedo
boats, if any, as he thought fit, and send this squadron to
Cienfuegos. He was given the choice of remaining on the
blockade of Havana, or of proceeding with the squadron
under orders for Cienfuegos.
The Flying Squadron arrived at Key West on the morning
of May i8, and Admiral Sampson arrived on the New York on
the same afternoon. At this point he received the instructions of the Department above mentioned and gave Commodore Schley the choice of remaining with the blockading
squadron off Havana, or proceeding with the Flying Squadron
to the south coast of Cuba. From a strategical point of view
it seemed probable that the Spanish squadron would endeavor
to make the port of Cienfuegos or Santiago. Commodore
Schley preferred to remain in command of the squadron destined for Cienfuegos, and after coaling sailed at 9 A. M., on
the i9th, for that port, with the Brooklyn, Texas, Massachlusetts and Scorpion. Later on the same day, information was
received to the effect that the Spanish squadron had arrived
at Santiago. The Minneapolis, at St. Thomas, and the St.
Paul, at Cape Haitien, were given this information, and ordered to proceed off Santiago. Information and instructions
to the same effect were sent the next day to the Harvard off
the north coast of Porto Rico, the St. Louis at Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti, and the Yale at Cape Haitien. Admiral Sampson
was informed at Key West of this report and advised to send
word to Commodore Schley to proceed at once off Santiago
de Cuba with his whole command. Admiral Sampson reported that he deemed it best to let the Flying Squadron remain at Cienfuegos until a report could be had from the
auxiliary vessels at Santiago or more definite information received as to the presence of the Spanish squadron there. On
May 20, the Iowa, Castine and Merrimac sailed by his order
to Key West to reinforce the squadron under Schley.




358


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


On May 2i, Admiral Sampson left Key West for the blockade of Havana, having, at 3 A. M. of that day, sent the Marblehead with the order to Commodore Schley to proceed to Santiago. On May 23, a dispatch was received from the St. Louis
from St. Thomas, stating that the Spanish fleet was not at
Santiago de Cuba at 7 P. M., of May i8, and that it was not
off that port at 8 A. M., May i9. The log of the Colon, which
has since come into possession of the Department, shows that
the Spanish fleet anchored in the harbor of Santiago at 8:20
A. M., May ig, from which it is evident that the St. Louis must
have missed the Spanish fleet by a very few minutes.
No information having been received from Commodore
Schley, and it being of Vital importance to verify the report of
the arrival of the Spanish squadron at Santiago, and, if there,
prevent it from again getting out of the reach of the Department on the high seas, the cable office at Mole St. Nicholas
was directed, on the 25th, to deliver to the first American
vessel arriving in port, the following message: " Where is the
Flying Squadron? Await further orders at Mole." Later in
the day, a dispatch was received from Commodore Schley
dated May 22, sent by the Harvard from Mole St. Nicholas,
reporting his arrival off Cienfuegos on May 2i, and stating
that he was not informed as to whether the Spanish fleet was
in that port or not.
The Harvard reported that she had left Santiago on May
24; that on the same day the Minneapolis had left that port
for Cienfuegos to report to Schley; that the Spanish fleet
had not been seen and no information had been obtained respecting its recent movements. The Harvard was promptly
directed to " Proceed at once and inform Schley and also the
senior officer present off Santiago as follows: 'All Department's information indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago. The Department looks to you to ascertain facts and
that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive
action.' " This dispatch was delivered to Commodore Schley
on the morning of May 27, the squadron being at that time
between 20 and 25 miles to the southward of Santiago.
On May 26, a telegram, received from Commodore Schley,
dated May 24, off Cienfuegos, stated that coaling off Cienfuegos




THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.


359


was very uncertain: that he had ascertained the Spanish fleet
was not at that place and that he would move eastward on the
next day, the 25th, and communicate from Nicholas Mole,
Haiti; but that he could not blockade if Spanish squadron
was at Santiago, on account of want of coal.
The orders which had been sent to Commodore Schley by
the Marbtekead on the morning of May 2i, directing him to
proceed to the port of Santiago, were not received until the
morning of the 24th, whereas the duplicate orders sent later
on the same day by the Hazw/k were received by Commodore
Schley early in the morning of May 23, which shows the
wisdom of sending two vessels with- these very important
orders.
The Department having this information, expected the
squadron under Commodore Schley to reach Santiago some
time during the 24th.
In the meantime, the fleet under Admiral Sampson had
been guarding the Nicholas Channel in such a manner as to
prevent the approach of the Spanish squadron from the east
to Havana.
On May 26 he wired the Department that not having heard
from Commodore Schley and " as the Spanish squadron may
have evaded at Santiago and attempted to reach Havana by
Cape San Antonio, I have moved westward to provide against
this contingency. Will attempt to cover Havana from both
directions."
Later on the same day he cabled the Department, which
dispatch was received on the morning of the 27th, that he
had received information from Schley under date of May 23,
as follows: " Am not satisfied the Spanish squadron is not in
Cienfuegos, Cuba," and also added that " He states he will
remain off Cienfuegos keeping squadron ready for emergency.
He reports Adula entered into Cienfuegos May 23; learned
probably from her, as she left, if the Spanish squadron was in
port. I think that he has gone probably to Santiago de
Cuba. To assure this, I send Wasp to Cienfuegos to-night.
If he has not left, this will enable him to reach Santiago de
Cuba before I could do so."




36o


6THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Commodore Schley, upon the receipt, on May 27, of the
Department's telegram by the Harvard from Mole St. Nicholas, sent a reply by the same vessel which was transmitted
from Kingston on May 28, acknowledging receipt of the
Department's telegram, and stating that he could not remain
off Santiago on account of the coal supply; that he much
regretted his inability tQ obey the orders of the Department;
that he was forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way
of the Yucatan channel, and that he had been unable to
ascertain anything positive respecting the enemy.
It is difficult to state the anxiety which this dispatch caused
the Department. It was the most anxious day in the naval
history of the war and was the only instance in which the
Department had to whistle to keep its courage up, It was
received on the afternoon of the day on which the President
and his Cabinet reviewed the Army Corps at Camp Alger.
The feeling that the Spanish fleet might leave the harbor of
Santiago was a heavy weight upon the President's mind. To
deal with it was not difficult when its whereabouts were
known, but to feel that it might leave the Cuban coast, that
its movements might- be lost track of, and that it might
appear at any time on the coast of the United States, was
depressing beyond measure. The despatch was not given out.
The most energetic measures were at once taken to
endeavor to hold our footing at Santiago, and Admiral Sampson, who had received information that Commodore Schley
could not maintain the blockade at that place, sent the New
Orleans and Sterling on the 27th with orders to him " to
remain on the blockade of Santiago at all hazards, assuming
that the Spanish vessels are in that port," and gave instructions for the sinking of the collier Sterling to obstruct the
channel of the harbor in case he should leave Santiago.
Admiral Sampson was promptly advised of the receipt of
Schley's telegram that he had gone to Key West with his
squadron for. coal, and was asked " how soon after the arrival
of Schley at Key West could you reach Santiago de Cuba
with the New York, Oregon, the Indiana and some lighter
vessels and how long could you blockade there?" To this
Admiral Sampson replied that he could reach Santiago in




THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.


36i


three days, could blockade indefinitely, and would like to
start at once with the New York and Oregon, arriving in two
days, and added:
" Do not quite understand as to the necessity of awaiting
arrival of Schley, but I would propose meeting and turning
back the principal part of the force under his command if he
has left."
Admiral Sampson was at once instructed to proceed to
Santiago. Further orders were sent to Commodore Schley,
to Port Antonio and to Kingston:
" It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Spanish
fleet is in Santiago and report. Would be discreditable to
the Navy if that fact were not ascertained immediately. All
military and naval movements depend upon that point."
Later on the same day, the 29th, a more reassuring dispatch
was received from Commodore Schley, sent from Port Antonio, stating that he would endeavor " to coal in open sea and
retain position off Santiago until coal supply of larger vessels
is reduced to the lowest safe limit." The squadron under
his command had proceeded west, on its way to Key West, to
a point about forty miles in a direction to the southward and
westward of Santiago, and, on the afternoon of May 28,
returned in the direction of Santiago and arrived at a point
about ten miles to the southward of that port shortly after
dark. On the morning of the 29th, the Cristobal Co/on was
seen in the entrance of the harbor.
Admiral Sampson was at once instructed to proceed with
all possible dispatch to Santiago, with the New York, Oregon
and such other vessels as he might desire, and instructions
wvere sent to Schley, at Kingston, to " hold on at all hazards.
New York, Oregon and New Orleans are on the way."
Admiral Sampson left Key West at ii P. M. on May 29
with the New York, Oregon, Mayflower and Porter, and arrived at Santiago on the first of June at 6 A. m., and immediately established a most thorough and effective blockade of
that port.
On June 4 the Department was advised of the sinking of
the Merrimnac in the channel of Santiago in the early morning




362


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


of June 3, by Asst. Naval Constructor Hobson and a crew of
seven men. This dispatch further reported that the crew of
the Merrimnac were prisoners of war. The story of this thrilling achievement is elsewhere told.
In order to enable the fleet to remain indefinitely on the
blockade of Santiago, it became of great importance to secure
a harbor of refuge where the ships could take shelter in case
of storm, and where repairs could be made and the coal supply replenished. With this object in view, the Marblehead
and Yankee took possession of the bay of Guantanamo, which
is situated a short distance to the eastward of Santiago, on
June 7. On June IO, the first battalion of marines was landed
here for the purpose of holding this port, and, although for
the next three days they were almost continuously under the
fire of the Spanish, they succeeded in driving off the enemy and
in maintaining their position. This action reflected great
credit on the Marine Corps.
As soon as it was ascertained definitely that the Spanish
fleet was at Santiago, it was determined to send a force of U.
S. troops to that point, and the Department arranged a suitable convoy for the transports which had been assembled by the
War Department at Tampa. The expedition rendezvoused
off Rebecca Shoals, Florida, at 8 P. M. on June i5, and was
successfully convoyed to Santiago, where the troops were
landed by aid of the Navy, and the joint operations of the
Army and Navy then began.
On June 2I, the Department divided the North Atlantic
fleet into squadrons, and assigned Commodore Watson to
command of the first squadron, detached Commodore Schley
from command of the Flying Squadron and assigned him to
command of the second squadron, and directed Commodore
Remey to exercise command over all vessels within signaling
distance of the Naval Station at Key West.
Information having been received that the Spanish home
squadron, under Admiral Camara, had passed Cape Bon Tunis
going to the east on June 22, Commodore Watson was directed to hold himself in readiness to sail, with the Iowa, Oregon, Newark, Yosemite, Yankee and Dixie, for St. Michaels,Azores. The Northern Patrol Squadron, under command of




THE NAVY DEPARTMIENT IN THE WAR.


363


Commodore Howell, was ordered to Key West to strengthen
the blockade, and Admiral Sampson was instructed to give
Commodore Howell command of the first squadron of the
North Atlantic fleet upon the relief of Commodore Watson.
On June 28, a blockade was proclaimed of the entire southern coast of Cuba from Cape Cruz to Cape Francis and of the
port of San Juan, Porto Rico.
It is not a part of this article to treat of the detailed operations of the fleet under Admiral Sampson, and it is sufficient
to say that the blockade was maintained so effectively, both
by day and night, that the exit of the Spanish squadron was
not possible without a decisive engagement.
From the first day of June the most thorough arrangements had been made for bottling up the Spanish fleet in
Santiago. The ships were stationed in a semi-circle about six
miles from the entrance of the harbor during the day, and
much closer in at night, and the ships were instructed to keep
searchlights directed on the entrance of the harbor from dark
to dawn. A standing order was issued that, in case the enemy
endeavored to escape, the ships must close in and engage as
soon as possible.
As is well known, Admiral Cervera's squadron, upon the investment of the City of Santiago by the Army and Navy,
attempted to leave the harbor, on the morning of July 3, and
was completely destroyed in an action which in its brilliancy
and decisiveness stands side by side with the battle of Manila.
Although the Commander-in-Chief was some miles away at
the beginning of the action, his plans were followed by Commodore Schley and the captains of our ships, which closed in
with great gallantry, spirit and effectiveness,.and the result
showed in a striking manner how important an element in
naval warfare are the officers in command and the men behind
the guns. In this battle both won and deserved immortal
fame. It is difficult to account for the inefficiency of the
Spaniards, who are brave men, and for their overwhelming defeat, except upon the ground of the greater accuracy of our
own fire, the splendid spirit and dash of our attack, and the
fact that the enemy, instead of making a stand-up fight, had
only in mind to escape.




,364


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


News of this victory was not had until late on the evening
of the 3d. Early on the morning of that day, information
was received that a retreat of the Army before Santiago was
contemplated, and that the fleet under Admiral Cervera had
succeeded in making an exit from the harbor and escaping.
The official dispatch from Admiral Sampson was not received until about mid-day on the 4th. It announced the entire destruction of the Spanish squadron, consisting of the
Cristobal Colon, Vizcaya, Oquendo, Maria Teresa and two
torpedo-boat destroyers, the Pluton and Furor. In this action, only one man was killed on our side and our ships suffered no injury of any account.
After the surrender of Santiago on July I7, the Army expedition, under General Miles, was convoyed to the southern
coast of Porto Rico by the Massachusetts, Columbia, Yale,
Dixie and Gloucester.
The city of Ponce, Porto Rico,,surrendered, on July 26, to a
small squadron composed of the Dixie, Anna'polis, Gloucester
and Wazsp, and on August i, the Gloucester and Wasp took
possession of Arroyo.
Throughout the entire period of the war the blockade of the
coast of Cuba was prosecuted with great vigor, and much service of an extremely arduous and wearying character was
rendered by the vessels on this duty. The incidents of the
blockade are described elsewhere.
The history of the Navy during the war is one of continued
efficiency and success. It is in many respects unprecedented.
Two of the greatest naval victories of all time were xvon,
practically without loss of life, injury to person, or damage to
naval property. Not a gun was lost or a flag captured by the
enemy. The health of our men and officers during the whole
time was as good as if it had been a period of peace instead of
war. While the Navy was well prepared at the beginning, it
must be remembered that, owing to the large increase in the
-number of enlisted men and volunteer officers, and of
auxiliary ships with their armament and equipment, a vast
amount of work was necessary, but it was done without delay
or friction, and there was no emergency for which the Navy




THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.


365


was not ready. Yachts were converted into gunboats and
fought as efficiently as if they had been encased in armor.
Great transport ships were converted into cruisers. Naval
vessels convoyed the army, and it was our seamen who landed
the troops at Santiago. Supplies of provisions and clothing
were furnished in the most satisfactory manner. Three great
supply ships, capable of carrying meats, vegetables and other
provisions sufficient to maintain fleets for months, were afloat.
The repair-ship Vulcan, equipped in the most thorough manner with every appliance for repairing our ships and engines
at sea, was in constant attendance upon our fleet, and was a
navy yard in itself. Distilling vessels and a hospital ship wvere
marked features. Medical arrangements were perfect; and
the whole condition of the Navy reflects the highest credit,
not only upon officers and men afloat, but upon the successive Assistant-Secretaries and the Commandants of naval stations and especially upon the Chiefs of Bureaus at Washington, who were charged with the duty of equipping, provisioning
and supplying the ships of the fleets.
More gallant officers and men never served on board ship.
The professional spirit which animated them cannot be too
highly praised. It was not confined to any one branch of the
service-it animated the officer on deck, the engineer in the
bowels of the ship, the marine at his post, whether afloat or
ashore-zeal and pride in his corps was the characteristic of
each man. There was not only the joy of the contest, the love
of adventure, the element of pluck and courage, but a fine sense
of loyal service, of patriotic devotion and of the determination
to wvin. In the glare of the glory of Manila, Santiago and the
sinking of the Merrimac, there is danger of overlooking the repeated instances of conspicuous and heroic individual gallantry which were occurring almost every day and of which the
official reports are full. It is only as we read the complete accounts of the war that each individual receives the due recognition of his services, and each act of gallantry its meed of praise.
It is also to be said that on both sides there was a great deal of
chivalrous feeling and that no personal animosity towards the
foe was exhibited. When the battle was over, nothing could
exceed the tenderness and care with which our officers and




366


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


seamen risked their lives to rescue and protect the foemen
whom they had vanquished. War is a horror of hardship and
bloodshed, but if anything can relieve its dark shadows, it is
the spirit with which the war with Spain was undertaken and
with which also it was fought to a swift and victorious end.


Dec. 24, 1898.




I
I




...........................................................




CHAPTER XVIII.


WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.
BY
HON. LYMAN J. GAGE, Secretary of the Treasury.
I T is well said that final judgment cannot be passed upon
events still recent. This applies to the financial history
of a war as well as to the operations of fleets and armies.
Not until years after the civil war closed was there fully comprehended the depth of that struggle as measured by the problems met and solved in raising money.  Now that time has
set its seal on the efforts of those who achieved or failed in
that fearful conflict, the financial trials of a generation ago are
better understood. We know well to-day the effects of measures then adopted and their influence on subsequent affairs,
while we see in a clearer light what was actually accomplished
at the time by the Government for the Union in the resort to
many expedients for procuring funds; and we realize more
fully how the Confederacy suffered, in depreciated paper currency, a repetition of the direful and well-nigh hopeless days
which marked the financial story of the Revolution.
As the events of the Spanish-American War are yet of yesterday, no more will be attempted now than to tell as simple
a story as possible of the war operations of the Treasury Department.
All ages have recognized that money is the essential in conducting wvar. Centuries ago Cicero declared: " Money is the
sinews of war "-a trite phrase, which has not lost force by
repetition in all the years since it was uttered. In fact, as
time has gone on, it has gained in strength until it is regarded
now as an axiom. Money is indispensable, and the power of
the war chest has perhaps never been better demonstrated
than during the late conflict from which we have emerged




368


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


There is a vast difference in time and in methods since
Alexander led his legions over the hills of Greece to conquer
the world. To-day this modern republic of ours stands foremost for a different world conquest, a struggle in which is involved the advancement of humanity and civilization. In
the olden days, wvhen warriors fought with spear and shield
and battle axe, their methods of subsistence wvere as primitive
as were their~weapons of warfare. They lived in large part
upon the country, as xve term it, by foraging and plunder.
To-day no army is well organized without a commissary department, equipped to the point of perfection, for it has come
to be realized that soldiers fight best when they are well fed.
I may be pardoned in this connection for relating a story told
by Rear-Admiral Schley. Recently, when he served as a
member of the Porto Rican Evacuation Commission, a Spanish
member of that body said to him: " How do you account for
the easy manner in which your countrymen have so overwhelmingly defeated mine?" To which the Admiral replied:
" General, you must get down to a fundamental principle;
you cannot expect men to fight who are not fed, nor soldiers
to win victories evho are not paid."
Vast changes have taken place even in recent times in the
methods of conducting maritime warfare. The tendency in
this respect has long been toward an increase of expenditures.
The cost 'of a-single battleship runs into the millions, while
to refill once all the vessels of our navy with ammunition
costs more than six millions of dollars. The necessity for
such an outlay of treasure during the war for independence
would have broken the spirit of even the indomitable Washington, and no nation of this time not rich in material resources could expect to prosecute war successfully.
Naturally enough, the chief function of our Treasury Department during the recent conflict was to keep the war chest
supplied. The main purpose of this chapter will be to tell a
simple story of how this was done. Incidentally, however,
the writer may be permitted to recount with pride some of the
achievements of other branches of the Treasury service in the
war with Spain.
Not many realize how vast an organization is the Treasury




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 369


Department. In the last annual report of the Secretary there
vere no less than twenty-seven chapters, devoted to as many
different branches. These by no means include all the
Treasury services, for there are yet several important subdivisions which are not made the subject of an annual report.
Ever since the very beginning of Cuban troubles the United
States Treasury Department has had more or less of a share
in them as represented by the efforts of this Government to
enforce the neutrality laws as they relate to vessels. The
first expedition in January of i895, intended to carry arms
and ammunition to the little band of insurgents who were
even at that time making ready, for the revolution which was
proclaimed shortly afterwards on Washington's birthday, was
apprehended at Fernandina, Florida, by officers of the Treasury Department. The arms and boxes of ammunition on
board the Lagonda, their first vessel, were cast overboard into
the bay to escape capture by -the Treasury's collector of
customs. From that time until the actual breaking out of
hostilities between the United States and Spain, the Treasury Department was vigilant and active in maintaining
neutrality. Expedition after expedition was circumvented
or captured, and much annoyance and expense resulted from
these efforts. A long coast line furnished ample opportunity
for the successful embarkation of men, guns and ammunition
for Cuba. The Florida Peninsula was also a base which was
frequently used for illicit expeditions, and therefore the
coasts of the Peninsula and Gulf were patrolled by revenue
cutters of the Treasury Department, and collectors of customs
were under strict orders to take the most effective steps at
their command to prevent violation of the law. The revenue
cutters engaged were the Boutwell, Colfax, Forward, Hamilton,
McLane, Morrill, Windom and Winona. As the revolution
in Cuba progressed, the burden of maintaining neutrality as
between nation and nation increased. The continued complaints of the Spanish Government against the landing of
expeditions in Cuba were met by every effort the Department
could bring to its command; yet, notwithstanding a wellordered patrol, both by the cutters and vessels of the navy,
and despite the vigilance of customs officers, arms and ammu



370


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


nition are alleged to have reached the insurgents from the
United States, although in no such quantities as frequently
reported. This part of the Treasury work prior to the war
was committed to the care of the Bureau of Navigation, and
much of its time, ordinarily given to the consideration of
questions relating to American merchant vessels and the protection of American seamen, was devoted to the extraordinary work which grew out of the struggle of the Cuban insurgents to throw off the yoke of Spain.
Later on, when war between the United States and Spain
had been declared, this same Bureau of Navigation performed
an important part in regulating the exports of coal from this
country. One of the earliest precautionary measures of Congress was a joint resolution, approved April 22, which authorized the President to regulate the export of coal or other
material used in war from any seaport of the United States.
The execution of this resolution was delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury, and under his direction the Bureau of
Navigation from time to time framed regulations and instructions. It was recognized by the Treasury Department that
the commanders of Spanish fleets would have a problem of
no mean proportions to solvc In obtaining adequate supplies
of fuel and provisions with 'home ports 3,000 miles away.
Our naval plans were drawn wtl.tWl the intent to increase the
enemy's difficulties in this respect, and it was therefore designed that we should take Porto Rico. It was also realized
that the loss of that island to them as a base of supplies would
intensify their necessities and increase the probability of their
obtaining fuel from accessible neutral points, the latter being
stocked with coal from the United States. So far as known,
however, in view of the efforts of the Department, no coal or
other material used in war reached the Spanish forces from
the United States. The regulations and instructions at the
same time were so framed as to permit coal exporters to take
full advantage of the opportunity afforded by the strike in the
Welsh collieries, and an actual increase of about 7 per cent in
our coal exports for May and June over the exports for the
same months in 1897 was recorded.
In the interests of American commerce-both present and




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 37'1


future-efforts were made by the Treasury Department to
confine the list of contraband articles within the narrowest
practicable limit. The following list actually promulgated
will probably be accepted by maritime nations for some years
to come:
Absolutely contraband.-Ordnance; machine guns and their
appliances, and the parts thereof; armor plate, and wvhatever
pertains to the offensive and defensive armament of naval
vessels; arms and instruments of iron, steel, brass or copper,
or of any other material, such arms and instruments being
specially adapted for use in war by land or sea; torpedoes
and their appurtenances; cases for mines, of whatever material; engineering and transport materials, such as gun carriages, caissons, cartridge boxes, campaigning forges, canteens,
pontoons; ordnance stores; portable range finders; signal
flags destined for naval use; ammunition and explosives of
all kinds; machinery for the manufacture of arms and munitions of war; saltpeter; military accouterments and equipments of all sorts; horses.
Conditionally contraband.-Coal, when destined for a naval
station, a port of call, or a ship or ships of the enemy; Lnaterials for the construction of railways or telegraphs, and
money, when such materials or money are destined for the
enemy's forces; provisions, when destined for an enemyts
ship or ships, or for a place that is beseiged.
The revenue-cutter service took an active and creditable
part in the war with Spain. It is provided by law that the
revenue cutters shall, whenever the President so directs, cooperate with the Navy. It is not in derogation of the rights
of any other department to claim that what they did contributed as well to the glory of the Treasury Department, of
which they form, in times of peace, an integral part. Under
the law referred to, there were with the Navy thirteen revenue cutters, carrying sixty-one guns, ninety-eight officers
and five hundred and sixty-two enlisted men. Of these,
eight cutters (forty-three guns), fifty-eight officers and three
hundred and thirty-nine men, were in Admiral Sampson's
fleet and on the Havana blockade; one cutter (six guns), ten
officers and ninety-five men, were in Admiral Dewey's fleet
at Manila, and four cutters (twelve guns), thirty officers and




372


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


one hundred and twenty-eight men, co-operated with the
Navy on the Pacific coast.
In addition to services rendered by vessels with the naval
forces, there were seven others, carrying ten guns, thirty-three
officers and one hundred and sixty-three men, with the army,
engaged in patrolling and guarding mine fields in various
harbors from Boston to New Orleans.
At the battle of Manila, the McCulloch, Captain D. B.
Hodgsdon, efficiently performed the duties assigned by Admiral Dewey. During that engagement the McCullocl was stationed near the line of moving ships, in order that she might
instantly assist in withdrawing any that might be disabled.
While so stationed, the cutter was frequently subjected to
the fire of the battery on Sangley Point. This happened
whenever the line was out of range of the guns in that battery. -As the guns of the battery could not be depressed
so as to fire upon the fighting ships, they were trained upon
the McCulloch, which, however, fortunately escaped injury.
It was this vessel that carried to Hong Kong the dispatches
announcing to the government and to the world the victory.
Until November, I898, the McCulloch remained with the fleet
in Manila, serving in the capacity of a dispatch vessel, and
frequently on special duty. The cutter was assigned by the
Admiral to light the mouth of the Pasig River the night after
the battle of Manila, and guard the fleet from possible attacks
of torpedo boats. It was frequently employed in patrol duty
in Manila Bay, stopping and searching ships seeking entry.
Early in September the McCulloch was sent by the Admiral
to Batangas, where it captured the insurgent steamer Abbey,
which was reported to have sailed from Macao with 3,000
stands of arms for Aguinaldo's troops. Admiral Dewey having received some additions to his fleet of fighting vessels, she
was returned to the Treasury Department and ordered to San
Francisco, her permanent station. Here the vessel will be engaged, as all revenue cutters are, in preventing violations of
the revenue laws, and in those benevolent efforts which have
characterized the winter cruising of our service, in the saving
of lives and in patrolling the coast in stormy weather, guarding the safety of ships and passengers.




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 373


At the battle of Cardenas, May 12, the revenue-cutter Hudson, Lieutenant Frank H. Newcomb commanding, sustained
the fight against the gun boats and shore batteries of the
enemy, side by side with the navy torpedo-boat Winslow,
and when Ensign Bagley and half the crew of the last-named
vessel had been killed, and her commander wounded, rescued
from certain destruction the vessel and survivors of the
crew. On that same day the Windom, Captain Maguire commanding, engaged a shore battery at Cienfuegos and destroyed the rendezvous of the Spanish troops there. The
Manning, Captain F. M. Munger commanding, was in many
engagements with the shore batteries of the enemy. RearAdmiral Howell and Commodore Remey have officially commended the service for its valuable assistance.
Another important branch of the Treasury service contributed its most efficient vessels to the navy. It will be well
remembered that the light-house tender Mangrove gained distinction by capturing alone the Spanish auxiliary cruiser
Panama. This was the richest prize of the war. The
Panama, with a large cargo of provisions for Havana, had
sailed from New York prior to the declaration of war, and
there was much anxiety in the blockading fleet that she
mightlescape into Havana with provisions enough to supply
that city for some time. The Mayflower, the Mlaple, the
Mangrove and the Armneria were transferred to the navy, and
they all rendered conspicuous service during the war.
At the time that probability of war with Spain became
pronounced, the Light-house Establishment numbered among
its officers several who are distinguished for their achievements during the war. Commodore (now Admiral) Schley
was chairman of the Light-house Board, while Captain
Robley D. Evans, of the battleship Iowa, Commander.Theodore F. Jewell, of the Minneapolis, Commander William M.
Folger, of the New Orleans, and Commander George F. F.
Wilde, of the ram Katahdin, occupied important trusts in the
service.
As soon as it became apparent that open hostilities were
likely between the United States and Spain as the result of the
latter's troubles with her colonies in the WVest Indies, the




374


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Light-house Service began preparations for the new conditions that would be imposed by war with a foreign maritime
power. A comprehensive plan was devised by which the service in'all its parts could be made an efficient aid to the naval
and military branches. Provisions were made for the prompt
removal and replacement of buoys and daymarks, and for
changing their conditions and characteristics. The extinction and re-lighting of light-houses, beacons and lighted
buoys, and making changes in the characteristics-of lights on
short notice, was regarded as specially important, particularly
in the case of lights marking important channels and approaches to harbors. Every effort was made to equip this
branch of the public service so that it might still render its
customary aid to navigation and at the same time furnish no
advantage to the enemy.
A small allotment from the appropriation of $5o,ooo,ooo for
the national defence, amounting to $75,ooo, and subsequently
another of $38,500, was made to enable the Light-house
Board to carry out the plans for rendering aid to the naval
and military establishments, while at the same time maintaining its own regular service. Telephone and telegraph lines
were built between light-houses, submarine cables laid, and
light keepers were provided with signal flags to enable them
to communicate with vessels. Many of the light-houses were
utilized as stations in the line of coast signal stations which
xvas established all along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The
tenders of the service not transferred to the navy rendered
valuable assistance in several important harbors in planting
and protecting the submarine-mine defenses, and, upon receipt of notice from the War Department of the establishnent of mines, the lights marking the approaches to harbors
were extinguished in whole or in part, and changes in the
buoys were made at important seacoast ports. Friendly
mariners were notified of changes; but during all the war no
seacoast light was extinguished, and no light not extinguished
was otherwise modified. The extinction of harbor lights was
not a direct measure of defense, but was necessary to prevent
injury to the mines liable to be caused by merchant vessels
passing during the night.




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 375


At some points on our coast natural conditions are so insurmountable that light-houses cannot be built. At each of
these places light-ships are anchored. These were prepared
at any time to seek safety upon the appearance of the enemy.
The Light-house Board reports that, while a naval attack on
the coast did not occur, and the system of coast communication did not have the actual test which such an attack
would have given it, most valuable experience was gained.
Among the questions to which the war has given rise is
that in regard to neutralizing the light-house service in time
of war. In view of the intimate relations between this service and coast defense, it is said by the Board to be impracticable to neutralize the whole service, but it is highly desirable
that certain light stations and all light vessels and tenders
employed only in their regular duties as such should be neutralized. This suggestion corresponds in some respects to that
which has recently been revived by the New York Chamber of
Commerce in reference to extending the same immunity to
private property on the sea as that which is granted to private property on land. The subject has already been considered by the President, and in his last message to Congress
he recommended that the Executive be authorized to correspond with the Governments of the principal maritime powers
with a view to incorporating into the permanent law of civilized nations the principle of the exemption of all private
property at sea, not contraband of war, from capture or destruction by belligerent powers. Such questions as these are
significant of the tendency of modern civilization to confine
warfare within as narrow limits as possible, and are greatly to
be commended.
The United States Signal Service is of comparatively recent
origin. According to the report of its Superintendent, it was
organized in conformity with the recommendations of a board
convened by the Navy Department, October i8, i897, "for
the purpose of considering the establishment of coast signal
stations for naval defence." The establishment of such a service was a new problem which confronted the Government.
That it was so easily and satisfactorily solved is due in large
part to the fact that the Government already had in existence




376


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


a line of life-saving and light-house stations along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. " The crews of the Life-saving Service,"
says the Superintendent of the United States Signal Service,
"for ten months in the year (August to May) constantly
patrol the beaches from Maine to Texas, and no vessel can
approach within sight of the coast and escape their attention,
while the light-house keepers and observers of the Weather
Bureau have exceptional facilities for noting the approach of
ships." That these stations were availed of to the fullest extent may be realized from the fact that of the 233 stations
which formed those of the Coast Signal Service, 139 were
furnished by the Life-saving Service and 49 by the Lighthouse Establishment.
Under the provisions of a special act of Congress, the i39
stations of the Life-saving Service performing coast signal
duty were kept open and manned during the months of June
and July, the inactive season, when the crews would otherwise
have been laid off. The value of this brahch of the service
in time of war may be better understood by the fact that
keepers and crews are well drilled in the signals of the international code, and their thorough discipline is such that they
may at a moment be relied upon to perform effective service
in aid of either the military or naval branch.
The unexampled rapidity with which our armies and fleets
overwhelmed the enemy happily rendered it impossible for
Spanish ships to threaten the coast. There was, therefore,
no opportunity for measuring the importance of the signal
stations, but the naval officer in charge of the system reports
that the service would have effectively answered every purpose of its establishment had occasion called. As a matter of
fact, it did render valuable service by advising the Navy Department of the movement of Government vessels. The most
notable was the report of the arrival of the battleship Oregon
on the coast of Florida, after its long cruise from the Pacific.
The United States Marine Hospital Service is another
branch of the Treasury Department which had its measure of
added duties to perform in consequence of the war with
Spain. It rendered aid to the army and the navy in the care
of sick or injured soldiers and sailors, many of whom were




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMEMT. 377


treated at the various hospitals of the service. By arrangement with the War Department, officers of the Marine
Hospital Service were detailed for duty on vessels used by
the army as transports. While so stationed, it was their
duty to assist in keeping the ships in good sanitary condition
and free from infection. This was a matter of no easy accomplishment in view of the fact that during the summer season
these transports were in constant movement between infected
ports and ports of this country. It being a great-if not the
greatest-duty of the Marine Hospital Service to prevent the
introduction of epidemic diseases into the United States, that
service was called upon to establish regulations for the landing of troops at Montauk Point. These regulations, carefully complied with by the officers of the army, effectually
prevented the spread of any disease from among our feverstricken soldiers who came direct from the battlefields of
Santiago to their own country.
Yet another Treasury Service performed meritorious work
in connection with the war. Before the outbreak of hostilities, but with this possible contingency in view, the Coast
Survey steamers Baclhe and Blake were engaged on hydrographic work on the southern coast. The former made a resurvey of Tortugas Harbor and approaches, this being a
suitable gathering place for wvar-ships. The work was intended to bring out also the possibilities of that harbor as a
coaling station for deep-draft vessels. After the destruction
of the Maine the Baclhe was employed in the transportation of
divers and wrecking material to Havana and in carrying
back the dead and wounded. She was placed at the disposal
of the Commander of the North Atlantic Squadron the morning following the disaster. The Blake, in April and May,
made a re-survey off Key West to develop a harbor for warships at our southernmost port.
During the war the issue of charts to the general public
vas discontinued, the entire supply being practically confined
to the Army and Navy. Thework of printing charts was carried on night and day. In part, the war-room at the White
House was equipped by the Coast and Geodetic Survey.
Four large wall maps were prepared for the use of the Presi



378


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


dent. These were hung in the war room and were suitably
provided with small pin flags, thus enabling the Executive to
follow the movements of the land and sea forces. Many detailed maps of various localities were also furnished, and
special information was collected as needed by the President.
While the faithful work performed in each of the abovenamed services was of great value, yet the most important
function of the Department was to provide funds for the carrying on of those successful naval and military operations
which added so much to the glory of our arms.
In devising plans for the financial administration of a war,
it is the duty of those who have in charge so important a
trust to have regard to two things: (i) the procuring of
funds promptly, and in amounts sufficient to meet instantly
all demands of the military and naval departments; (2) ill So
procuring funds to have great care that the public credit be
not impaired. As a corollary to the latter consideration
there should be strict attention paid to the industrial condition of the country itself, for it may be readily perceived that
anything which operates injuriously upon the business of the
country must also impair the nation's credit. It was the
hope and aim of those who had to do with the financial administration of the war that these things should be accomplished.
War expenditures began practically with the blowing up of
the Mllaine. It is true, some preparations had been made in
view of the possibility of a conflict with Spain, but so far as
these are concerned they were not reflected in the withdrawal
of moneys from the Treasury. When, however, that sad
event occurred, possibility became probability, and the regular
appropriations, made annually with a view to the maintenance of the military and naval establishments on a peace
basis, were rapidly exhausted. The cash balance stood, at
the close of February, I898, at $227,224,ooo. This by no
means represented the amount which would have been available for war purposes. It is our fixed policy to maintain, at
all events, the integrity of a fund in the Treasury, amounting
to $ioo,ooo,ooo, in gold, known commonly as the '' gold
reserve."  Upon this base. of safety depends the stability of




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 379


more than $900,000,000 in other forms of money, and to undermine this foundation, already too narrow, if measured by
the standard which prudent business men employ, would be
to threaten our whole financial structure. Having regard,
therefore, to the maintenance of the public credit, this fund
should not be impaired unless the nation's necessity should
be greater than the danger which would follow from a resort
to it. Of the remaining $127,000,000, some $33,000ooo,ooo wvere
held in trust for the redemption of notes of national banks,
either in process of liquidation or which were voluntarily engaged in retiring circulation; $14,000,000 must be held for
the redemption of Pacific Railroad bonds, due January i,
1899; $13,000,000 of fractional silver and minorcoins must be
practically deducted, because a large part were worn and uncurrent, and from that fund the country's needs for small
change must be satisfied. These deductions left but $67,00ooo,ooo, and it was not to be forgotten that, while every energy
should be employed for war preparations, civil establishments
must not be the subject of any neglect. Thus some $30,000,ooo or $40,000,000 were required to be kept on hand as cash
to be used for the ordinary functions of the Government.
" That amount," says a writer on war finances, " corresponds
to the cash on hand which a merchant keeps in the till to
make change, or to meet small bills." So this available cash
balance of $227,ooo000,000ooo at the close of February, 1898, shrank,
when measured by the Government's ordinary needs, to
barely $25,000,000 or $30,000,000.
We had so long been a peace-loving nation, and it has been
so contrary to our traditional policy to maintain large armies,
and, until recently, to maintain a fleet worthy of the name,
that our commendable tendencies in the one direction, and
our reprehensible neglect, perhaps, in the other, rather
invited the hasty and ill-considered action of the enemy in
suggesting early in March the recall of Consul-General Lee.
This act, hostile in its nature, and following so soon after our
country had been plunged into the depths of sorrow by what
many believed to be the xvanton destruction of a ship and its
crew, resulted in more pronounced activity looking to the
national defense. The President without delay conferred with




380


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


the leaders in both Houses of Congress. The result of this
conference was that the House, on March 8, and the Senate the
following day, without discussion and by a practically unanimous vote, passed a bill appropriating $50,ooo,000 for the
national defense. There has been a question whether or not
a still larger appropriation would not have had the moral
effect of aiding diplomatic negotiations, but the appropriation
was not made for that purpose, for the -Government energetically began the work of preparation which was contemplated
by the act. The sum made available was to be expended
under the direction of the President. In disposing of it to
the best advantage, the Executive allotted to the several
Departments amounts in accordance with the requirements of
their respective services, as follows: Navy Department,
$29,723,274.22;  War Department, $i8,944,627.68; State
Department, $393,860.89; Treasury Department, $170,000.00;
total, $49,231,762.79.
Activity in preparation for the coming conflict was now the
order of the day. Others will tell how speedily the army and
navy were placed on a war footing by means of the money
thus made available by Congress. The United States SecretService, a bureau of the Treasury Department, devoted its
energies to the breaking up of the spy system which had been
established by Spanish officials at Montreal. How successful
this work proved to be is elsewhere told by the Chief of the
Service.
Until the last moment the President and other conservative
officials earnestly hoped that war might be escaped through
the medium of diplomacy. That was not to be, however, and
Congress, April 23, passed the declaration of war and made
it effective from the 2ISt of that month. For the first time in
a half century the United States were at war with a foreign
nation. The storm had broken and it camrne swiftly.  No
years of apprehension, no careful, patient effort to husband
resources as is done by nations expecting war; but the country was brought suddenly face to face with conditions which
imperatively required the immediate raising of large sums of
money. The enemy, while impoverished, and in a measure
exhausted by long continued troubles with its colonies, had,




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.


38i


nevertheless, almost at our door an army fully equipped,
variously estimated in the strength of men to be six or eight
times that of our own. On the sea Spain was believed to be
nearly, if not quite, equal in the number of ships and gulls,
and in the fighting strength of the men who manned them. The
enemy was instantly ready; so must we be. With the first
call for volunteers-a call which met with noble responsecame the necessity for immediately providing adequate revenues to meet new and extraordinary situations. Allotments
from the appropriation of $50,ooo,ooo for the national defense
could be depended on only in part for equipping, transporting and maintaining the thousands who rushed to the aid of
their country. Congress was therefore soon called upon to
supply deficiencies, both for the naval and military services,
and it was also called upon to provide means for speedily filling the war chest. In view of what has already been said, and
of the following list of appropriations made on account of the
war, this duty was imperative:
For the national defense, Act March 9, 1898, $50,117,000ooo.oo00
Army and navy deficiencies, Act May 4, "  34,625,725.71
Naval Appropriation Act, May 4, 1898, amount
of increase over preceding naval appropriation act,                             23,095,549.49
Fortification Appropriation Act, May 7, 1898,
amount of increase over act as passed by
House,                                 5,232,582.00
Naval Auxiliary Act, May 26, 1898,         3,000,000.00
Additional clerical force, War Department,
Auditors' offices, etc., Act May 31, 1898,  227,976.45
Life-saving Service, Act June 7, 1898,       70,000.00
Army and navy deficiencies, Act June 8, 1898, 18,0iS5,ooo.oo
Appropriations in act to provide ways and means
to meet war expenditures, June 13, 1898,  6oo,000ooo.oo00
Army, navy and other war expenses for six
months, beginning July I, 1898, in general
deficiency act,                      226,604,261.46
Expenses of bringing home remains of soldiers,  200,000.00
Total,               $361,788,095.I I
Committees in Congress conferred with the heads of various Departments as to their necessities, and on May 3 the




382


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WNIAR.


Secretary of the Treasury appeared before the Senate Committee on Finance and was questioned as to the necessity for
increased revenues and appropriations. The result of these
and other conferences was the War Revenue Act of June 13,
1898. Pending the discussion of its provisions in the House
and Senate, the available cash balance in the Treasury, which
on April 23 had been reduced to $220,364,000, or rather, as
previously explained, to $20,000,000 or $25,000,000 could be
relied upon to furnish the ready means for carrying on the
operations of the war.
It ordinarily happens that any scheme by which new taxes
are to be provided must fail of being thoroughly efficient in
time of war by reason of the fact that much time is consumed
in placing it in operation. The main point, aside from avoiding unjust and oppressive taxation, in framing the war revenue legislation of 1898, was to place the Treasury in a position
where it would be at once in receipt of additional funds. It
wvas beyond the power of any one to tell how long the war
would continue. Experience, drawn from other perilous times
counseled in favor of two courses for raising money-one by
borrowing, the other by levying additional taxes. It was obvious that the whole of any great sum could not be raised by
taxation within the time it would be required for use, nor
could any great sum be raised within a short period without
oppressing the people and seriously affecting the financial,
commercial and industrial interests of the country. On the
whole, it seemned best (and it is believed both the present and
future will bear witness to the fact that it was best) to borrow
at once a sum sufficient to maintain active and aggressive operations, and at the same time, by the imposition of additional
taxes, to give assurance to intending subscribers to the contemplated issue of bonds that the war loan would have behind
it a substantial increase in the revenues.
With the beginning of the new calendar year, the tariff act,
which had become operative July 24, 1897, had begun to fulfil the promises of its supporters that it would provide sufficient revenues for the ordinary needs of the government.
Close observers of its subsequent operation were convinced
that when full recovery had come from the abnormally heavy




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.


383


importations of the spring of 1897 the act would produce all
the revenue that was required. It therefore was not deemed
prudent to modify any of its provisions. In explanation of
the bill to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures
Mr. Dingley said:
" They (the Committee on Ways and Means) naturally have
had recourse to the legislation of the period of the Civil XWar,
wvhen so large an amount had to be raised, and they have
found, after a careful consideration of the question of taxation,
that on the wvhole it is better at the present time, and eve
trust that that may be all that may be necessary, that about
$iooooo,ooo additional revenue should be raised, and that
entirely through internal revenue legislation.  Hence, the
war revenue bill which has been reported provides for internal
revenue taxes exclusively. These taxes have been selected,
-first, because we have the machinery for the collection of
them now, and they can be collected with but slight additions
to the force and with but slight increase of expense. We
have selected them also because they wvere a source of revenue
successfully seized upon during the Civil War, and because
they are taxes either upon articles of voluntary consumption
or upon objects where the tax will be met by those who are
ordinarily able to pay them; and we have refrained from putting a tax in a direction where it would be purely upon consumption, unless the consumption were an article of voluntary consumption, so that the consumer might regulate his
own tax, following wlhat is the accepted rule of taxation in all
countries, with a view of imposing the least burden and disturbing the business of the country as little as possible."
The bill was introduced in the House April 25, i898, and it
passed that body April 29 by a vote of isi to i3i. It was
the subject of much consideration by the Senate Finance
Committee, and with amendments wvas reported to the Senate
May 12. It passed that body June 4 by a vote of 48 to 28.
The report of the Conference Committee was agreed to in the
House June 9, and in the Senate June io. Three days later
it received the approval of the President, and by the terms of
the act went into effect the next day, except where in some
cases July i was specified.
Prior to the passage of the act, the more important internal
revenue taxes were grouped under three heads. Those under
the head of spirits yielded, for the fiscal year 1898, $92,500,



384


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


ooo; those under the head of tobacco, $36,oo,ooo, and those
subject to tax under the head of fermented liquors, $39,500,ooo. By the war revenue act, the taxes on fermented liquors
and tobaccos were doubled, while there was no addition made
to those on spirits. Some comment has been made as to why
this third group was not also subjected to additional taxes.
The main reason lies in the fact that, with spirits already
taxed $i.io per proof gallon, it was believed the revenueproducing capacity of that group had been fully utilized, if
not exceeded. There is a maximum revenue point in all taxes
upon articles which are the subject of voluntary use. It is
doubtful if a tax of $2.20 a gallon on spirits would have added
greatly to Treasury receipts. In addition, the legitimate
trade in spirits by reason of over-production was already depressed, and additional taxes in this direction would have
proved neither profitable to the government nor anything but
ruinous to the private interests involved.
A tax of ten cents a pound on tea imported into the
United States was provided, and it was estimated that the
revenue to be derived from this source would amount to not.
less than $io,ooo,ooo a year. It had been seriously contemplated, when the Dingley act was under consideration, to subject tea to the same tax levied by the war revenue act. The
main argument, aside from the revenue-producing qualities of
such a tax, was that its imposition would result in an improvement in the quality of tea imported. Low grade and adulterated teas could not afford to pay the-specific rate of ten
cents a pound, and the result would be that teas of higher
grades would form the bulk of importations. Such had been
the working of a similar tax imposed by Great Britain. By
the act of March 2, i897, however, Congress had taken steps
to prevent the importation of spurious and adulterated teas,
and under its provisions the Treasury Department had
organized a Tea Board for the purpose of selecting standards
with which all subsequent importations were to be compared.
The new tax on tea, therefore, served a double purpose-that
of providing considerable additional revenue, and at the same
time of contributing to the efforts to secure better teas for
consumption in the United States.




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.


385


A tax known to the old internal revenue schedules, in
vogue during the Civil War and for some years thereafter,
was revived-taxes on patent and proprietary medicines and
toilet articles, on chewing gum, and on wine. Certain new
taxes on business were also provided. These were levied on
bankers, brokers, museums, concert halls, circuses and other
public exhibitions, bowling alleys and billiard and pool roomns.
Taxes were also levied on refiners of petroleum and sugar,
and on pipe line companies. Stamp taxes were also revived
and applied to various business transactions, as represented
by bonds, debentures, certificates of stock and of indebtedness, bills of exchange, bank checks and drafts, and, in fact,
a variety of instruments, including telegraph dispatches, express receipts, passenger tickets, etc.
Opportunity was also taken to incorporate in the act provisions subjecting mixed flour to certain taxes and restrictions.
This was not done, of course, in aid of the public revenues,
but to regulate an industry which had become as objectionable as that of the production of oleomargarine, which, under
a previous internal revenue law, had been subjected to similar restraints. The operation of the law for the first six
months of its existence indicated that it would produce
about $ioo,ooo,ooo a year.
That part of the law which relates to loans authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury to issue certificates of indebtedness, payable not exceeding one year from the date of issue,
to the amount of $ioo,ooopooo. This provision was designed
to enable the Secretary to provide the public treasury with
funds in case it should be necessary to do so in a quicker
manner than could be done by availing himself of the provisions relating to the issue of bonds. It did not become necessary to resort to the issue of such certificates.
Section 33 of the act authorized the Secretary of the
Treasury to borrow on the credit of the United States
$400,ooo,ooo, or so much thereof as might be necessary to
defray expenses authorized on account of the xvar, and to
issue bonds therefor in denominations of $20 or some multiple of that sum, redeemable in coin at the pleasure of the
United States after ten years from the date of their issue




386


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


payable twenty years from such date, and bearing interest pay.
able quarterly in coin at the rate of 3 per centum per annum.
The section also contained a provision that "The bonds
authorized by this section shall be first offered at par as a
popular loan, under such regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury as will give opportunity to the citi.
zens of the United States to participate in subscriptions to
such loan, and in allotting said bonds the several subscripf
tions of individuals shall be first accepted, and the subscrip.
tions for the lowest amounts shall be first allotted." The
law also provided that an appropriation not exceeding one.
tenth of one per centum of the amount of the bonds and
certificates authorized be appropriated to pay the expense of
preparing, advertising and issuing the same.
It xvas decided, under this authority, to ask the people of
the United States to subscribe to a loan of $200,000,000.
It was believed that that sum, together with the additional
taxes to be derived from the revenue provisions of the act,
would be sufficient to meet the expenditures which would be
incurred before Congress would again meet in December.
Most of the large war appropriations had been made available
only until the 3Ist of that month.
The war loan of 1898 was one of the great successes of the
war. It exhibited the power of the public credit, and
increased our financial prestige both at home and abroad.
No sooner had it become apparent that Congress would give
the Secretary of the Treasury the authority above described
than the Department began to arrange for the floating of the
loan. After the report of the Conference Committee had
been agreed to in both Houses, the Executive approval being
certain, all the energies of the Department were directed
toward asking the people of the United States, the moment
the President should put his signature to the act, to subscribe
for bonds to the amount of $2oo00,000,000ooo. Late in the afternoon of Saturday, June ii, the Public Printer was placed in
possession of copy for circulars, pamphlets, blanks and
forms relating to the call. When the Department opened
for business on the Monday morning following, the immense
work of printing had been done, and 4,000,000 impressions




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.            387
of the various papers referred to were ready for delivery.
A mailing division had already been organized in the Department, engaged in preparing envelopes, so that on the very
day the act received the Executive approval the Secretary of
the Treasury sent broadcast through the land the call for
subscriptions to the loan. Every effort possible was made
to make the loan what it was intended by Congress it should
be-a popular one. All the banks in the country, both State
and national, were invited to co-operate with the Secretary;
the great express companies tendered their services free of
cost; all the money-order post-offices were charged with the
receipt of subscriptions, and every newspaper in the country
was asked to lend its aid in disseminating information concerning the loan. With few exceptions this svas freely done,
and as a result of all these agencies combined it is probable
that few citizens of the United States were not awvare that
the Government had asked the people to subscribe to its
bonds.
The books of the loan were open for a period of thirty-two
days, closing July 14. The clerical work during this time
and subsequently was something unprecedented in the history
of national loans. It was not possible at the time to utilize
any considerable number of clerks from the regular force,
owving to the fact that the war had greatly increased the ordinary business of the Department in all its branches. It
became necessary, therefore, to organize immediately a temporary force. This work was intrusted to Assistant Secretary
Vanderlip. The number of persons employed on this force
varied, according to requirements, from 350 in the latter half
of June to 6oo at the close of August. Nor was it possible
to do the work in the Treasury building. For the loan of
1898 the " new city post-office building," not- yet completed,
wvas used. The ground floor:-of this structure was hastily
prepared, and all during the summer months the several hundred clerks of the temporary force were there engaged in receiving, recording and scheduling subscriptions to the loan.
Here, also, the first deliveries of bonds were made, a branch
of the office of the Register of the Treasury having been
organized for that purpose. Experienced clerks from the De



388


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


partment were placed in charge of the respective divisions,
and, notwithstanding the unprecedented character of the
undertaking, and its immensity, the work was satisfactorily
performed. Some idea of its extent may be had from the
fact that, during the thirty-two days the books were open,
more than 320,000 subscriptions were received. Of these,
29.1,850 subscribers were successful. Great as was the total
of subscriptions, it was evident that many having large sums
to invest were deterred from subscribing because of the belief
that the loan would be absorbed by those who had invested
small sums. The most sanguine supporters of the popularloan idea had estimated that not more than thirty or forty
million dollars would be covered by subscriptions in amounts
of $5oo and less. As a matter of fact, subscriptions of this
class absorbed more than half the loan, those who had subscribed for $500oo or less being allotted bonds to the amount, in
round numbers, of $ioi,ooo,ooo. The remaining $99,ooo,ooo
was taken by 59,626 people, whose subscriptions ranged from
$520 to $4,500 each. The line between the successful and
the unsuccessful subscriber was drawn at the latter figure,
each of those who subscribed for amounts of $4,500 receiving
only I,300 of the bonds. One thing in particular operated to
encourage people of small means to invest in the loan. It
was confidently believed that such subscriptions would by no
means take the greater part of the bonds, and as an encouragement to the humble investor the Secretary of the Treasury
had announced in his call for subscriptions that all of $500
and less would receive immediate allotments. This feature,
while successful beyond expectation, had also its evil results.
The discrimination in favor of people of small means was the
invitation to many to submit fictitious subscriptions, or subscriptions signed by persons who were to have no interest in
the bonds. Every obstacle the Department could interpose
was placed in the way of such subscriptions. Many millions
of dollars in suspected subscriptions were suspended; where
the cases were plain they were returned outright, or the
persons through whom they were submitted were given7 an
opportunity to explain their interest. Thousands of such
subscriptions, involving millions of dollars, were rejected as




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.  389


the result of the Department's searching investigations, and
the energetic efforts of the Department no doubt deterred
others from submitting so-called " dummy " bids.
The loan was a success from the very moment the
books were opened. It had been doubted by some of the
ablest financiers of the country whether the Government
could float a loan in time of war at so low a rate of interest as
3 per cent. There was apparently just reason for this misgiving. The old 4's and 5's were quoted at such rates in the
market as to bring to the holders approximately 31 per cent,
a slightly larger rate than the Government proposed to attach
to bonds issued while the country was at war. To those who
were fearful of failure the Secretary of the Treasury pointed out
that the bonds of the new loan would find a market among
the national banks, because, under present conditions, they
Nvere more valuable as a basis for circulation than either the
bonids of 1904 or 1925. It was shown that a national bank
doing business on a capital of $ioo,ooo would, with the old
bonds as a basis for circulationmake a profit of only $65.io,
while with the new 3's a bank doing business with the same capital would make a profit of $1,437.50 in a year. It was represented also that the business welfare of the country required
that the loan, above everything else, should be a success. It
was as important in this respect as a victory in the field or on
the sea, in fact more so, for, if the war loan of 1898 had failed,
the disaster would have been greater than would have been the
defeat of General Shafter's army at Santiago or the American fleet blockading that port. The result was shown in the
patriotism manifested by groups of leading financiers in the
country, some of whom submitted offers to the Government,uaranteeing to take the whole or any part of the loan which
the people should leave unsubscribed. In fact, one syndicate
offered to take $ioo,oooooo of the loan at a slight premium.
Not many days had passed after the books were open, therefore, when it became certain that the loan would be subscribed
for many times over. Very nearly fourteen hundred million
dollars wvas the'amount subscribed for in all, or seven times the
total of bonds offered. The results set forth in a strong light




390


THE AMERICAN-SPANIS-1 WEAR.


our vast resources in svealth, just as the patriotic rush to arms
exhibited our strength in men.
On the day the loan closed Santiago fell, thus presaging
the end of the war. Short as was the struggle, it had not
been without much loss of precious lives and great cost in
money. It xvill be for others to recount the deeds of those
who fell; it remains for me to tell the less thrilling story of
the cost to the public treasury. By December 31, when most
of the war appropriations expired by limitation, war expenditures had reached a total of $i95,oooooo. The tendency of
such expenditures, during the last three months of the year,
showed slight decreases; but they were still such as to indicate that the cost, as given above, will be much enlarged.
By the end of the calendar year, also, the Government had
received into the Treasury almost the entire $200,000,ooo on
account of the war loan. In receiving and disbursing large
sums drawn from and returned to the markets, it was the
intention to prevent, if possible, any derangement of commerce or the industries of the country. This, it is believed,
was successfully accomplished. Large expenditures, in part,
offset the equally large receipts; but these could not be made
to coincide to such an extent as to maintain equilibrium.
The Secretary of the Treasury, therefore, provided that in
paying for the bonds of the loan subscribers might do so in
instalments, which would have the effect of obviating the sudden withdrawals of money from centers where it might otherwise be productively employed. Deposits in national banks
were also largely increased by equitable distribution throughout the country. These accounts, on the day the books of
the loan were opened, stood at $27,948,ooo and had been
increased to $95,9oo,ooo at the end of the year.
During all the cOurse of the war it was the constant effort of
the Department to do nothing which would interrupt the
returning tide of prosperity. Never was there, at any time
during the struggle, any appreciable stringency in the money
market; in fact, for the whole of the year I 898, no alarming upward tendency of rates was noticeable, except immediately succeeding the destruction of the Maine and during the period of
uncertainty which preceded the declaration of war. Even the




WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.


— I9I


certainty of wvar itself, with all its disturbing influences, furnished only a basis for improving conditions; thus, while the
nation emerged from the conflict victorious upon sea and
land, its credit also had been preserved, nay strengthened, and
the business of the country had expanded rather than diminished. It wvill not often fall to the lot of any nation to be so
singularly fortunate in any of these respects.
''to it 4.. ~~~ii




3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~.
rr




'j,




-.............




CHAPTER XIX.


U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SANTIAGO.
BY
MAJ.-GEN. LEONARD WOOD, U. S. V.
T nHE American control of affairs in the Province of Santiago began with the surrender of the Spanish Army,
July I7, I898.
The problem which presented itself was a very complex
one and included everything, from the feeding and care of the
Spanish prisoners of war to the thorough and complete reestablishment of the Civil Government.
In the city was that portion of the population which had
not fled to Caney and the Spanish prisoners of war, these latter
amounting to between i i,ooo and I2,ooo men. Round about
it was encamped the American Army -of approximately 20,000
men and the Cuban forces u-nder General Garcia of about
4,ooo. Four miles away was the village of Caney with some
I7,000 or i8,ooo refugees. It was the beginning of the most
unhealthy season of the year. Already the American Army
were feeling seriously the frightfully depressing influence of
the climate, and fevers of all types were prevalent, especially
malarial fever in all its various forms and some few cases of
yellow fever.
Scattered along the road between Santiago and Siboney
were various hospitals and detention hospitals with cases of a
suspicious character. Within the city, affairs were in a very
disorderly and demoralized state and the sanitary condition
was as bad as it could have been.
The American Commander, General Shafter, immediately
devoted himself to getting the American Army into the best
possible camps, as near good water as practicable and in reach
of the supplies of which we had a great abundance, but of




394


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH VAR.


which we had been unable to avail ourselves on account of
the bad roads. The condition of the roads was due principally
to the excessive amount of rain which had converted them
into perfect quagmires, through which wagon-trains struggled
painfully and slowly, carrying only a -small portion of the
average load. At the same time he was also selecting a
suitable camp for the Spanish prisoners of war and making
the necessary arrangements to feed them and take as good
care of them as possible. The General's headquarters at this
time were in Santiago in the old palace of the Civil Governor,
where I had also established my headquarters on being as.
signed to the command of the city.
My duties were to maintain order in the city and do all
that I could toward improving its sanitary condition and to
look after the welfare and well-being of its inhabitants. It is
very difficult for Americans who have clean towns to appreciate the condition in which we found the city of Santiago.
It is an old, tumble-down place, interesting and picturesque
in many ways, but at this time it was frightfully dirty and full
of filth, dead people, dead animals and all kinds of refuse.
The people were generally sick and terror-stricken from the
siege and the frightful effects of starvation and disease. It
was difficult to work with such material, and at first very
arbitrary measures had to be employed to get men to do the
necessary sanitary work. This was accomplished however by
rounding up, under military guard each morning, a certain
number of men and putting them to work for the day. At
night they were lined up and paid a dollar apiece. The same
methods were employed to obtain wagons to haul away the
refuse. None of our Army wagons were available as they
were all required to haul rations out to our camps and to the
Spanish prisoners of war, so we had to depend on such wagons
as we could find in the city. Their owners were either afraid
or unwilling to work, and the only way we could get them
was to order the chief of police to assemble all sorts of
wagon transportation at a certain point each morning. The
collection of wagons was then sent out in detachments under
military guard to do the work of the day whatever it happened
to be. The city was at once divided into districts and a




U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SANTIAGO. 395


thorough house-to-house inspection made as rapidly as possible, the most unsanitary sections and houses being especially
reported upon and made the subject of immediate action.
At the same time, while this was bein, done, it was necessary
to maintain a very rigid system of police to prevent looting
and robbery, as the city wvas practically without any local
government and full of people thoroughly demoralized. The
sick had also to be looked after as wvell as wve could. There
were no less than i5,ooo reported among the population, who
had to be taken care of and fed. Food and medicine had to
be furnished to all charitable institutions, also to the sick of
the Spanish Army of whom we had over 2,000. The people
were returning from Caney where they had been exposed to
great hardships and undergone great suffering. They nearly
all came back either actually sick or just beginning to break
down. The hospitals wvere overcrowded with people and were
found to be almost entirely without food and entirely without
medicines and surgical supplies. The same conditions prevailed in the orphan asylum and the asylum for old people.
There was absolutely no money in the city treasury and, outside of rice, some flour and coffee, there was no food in the
city. In fact there was a condition of the utmost demoralization and destitution. This, combined with the well-known
unhealthiness of the city and its reputation for being one of
the hotbeds of yellow fever in the island, made the situation
extremely grave. All about the city in every direction, extensive earthworks had been thrown up and land torn up
for other purposes, all of which tended to increase tremendously the already prevalent malaria and to produce the worst
types of this disease. From all the surrendered province the
smaller towns were sending in appeals for food and assistance.
The harbor was full of transports loaded with food and supplies which we were getting on shore and distributing as
rapidly as possible. Nearly all the lighters had been destroyed and the docking facilities were very limited, hence
this work was necessarily interfered with a good deal and
rendered slower than would otherwise have been the case, but
those having it in charge did the best they possibly could
under the circumstances and deserve credit for the result




396


THE AMIERICAN-SPANISH WAk.


which they obtained. In criticizing their work it must be
remembered that they struggled with great difficulties, not
the least among,these being the fact that it was impossible to
get suitable workmen. The, population was demoralized and
sickly, and the men employed were able to do only a portion
of -the work which robust men could have done. However,
at the end of a week we had the sanitary renovation of the
worst portions of the city well under way and had removed
all the dead people from the houses and the dead animals from
the streets, burying the one and burning the other. The
death rate, as a direct result of the hardships of El Caney
and the upturning of the earth, was rapidly increasing, and it
now reached the rather alarming proportion of nearly 200 per
day. Many of the cases were suspicious and it was extremely
difficult to get undertakers and others to dispose properly
of the dead. So great was this difficulty that it was finally
resolved to burn them, as a means of getting them out of the
way and as a preventive of further infection. This was accomplished in a rather crude but effective manner with a
grating of railroad iron, piling the bodies upon it, mixed with
grass, sticks, etc., and saturating the whole with kerosene.
This measure seemed to meet with the entire approval of the
people and undoubtedly resulted beneficially.
The municipal police were reorganized and given all possible support, and the condition of the public order in the city
soon became excellent; The Spanish prisoners of war gave us
absolutely no trouble and were as law-abiding a set of men as
I have ever seen. Physicians had been appointed to the
different hospitals and rations regularly issued to the sick.
One Court of the First Instance was in operation and also the
municipal courts of the city. The Spanish prison which was
found full of political prisoners, was thoroughly inspected and
all those held for political reasons were promptly released.
Large working parties were set to work on the water-system,
repairing the injuries done during the siege and making every
effort to get it into efficient working condition. Large temporary crematories were established outside the city where all
infectious materials were taken and destroyed.
A yellow fever hospital was established on an island in the




U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SANTIAGO. 397


harbor and relief stations for the distribution of rations and
medicines put into operation throughout the city. At each
of these relief stations food wvas issued from 7 A. M. till dark.
No effort was made to issue rations in exact amounts, but
every one strove to give the people, who applied, that which
they most needed. This wvork was very successful, thanks to
the liberal issue of supplies sent to the Army and also to the
large amount of Cuban rations on hand and the very liberal
assistance of the Red Cross. The results of this systematic
work were soon apparent, both in the appearance of the city
and in the health and condition of the people. The place had
become comparatively clean and the death rate sensibly
decreased. A spirit of confidence soon began to appear
among the people. Public order became excellent and robberies and disorders of rare occurrence. The Cuban people
deserve great credit for the orderly manner in which they conducted themselves and the self-restraint which they displayed
in these very trying days of reorganization.
In August the Spanish prisoners of war were removed and
the American Army of invasion also, the latter being replaced
by Volunteer troops. These were established as rapidly as
possible in suitable camps about the city and at the various
towns throughout the conquered territory, and every effort
was made to put them in as good sanitary condition as possible.
General Lawton had succeeded General Shafter as Commanding General of the Department. General Garcia had
visited the city and had been received with every consideration and honor which we could show him, and he seemed to
appreciate fully the attentions which he had received.
The Cuban Army in the province wvas rapidly disintegrating
and the people going back to their homes. There were some
disorders in the interior, robberies, etc., but considering the
situation and conditions these were remarkably few.
The school system of Santiago was reestablished, a local
Board of Education having been appointed and some twenty
schools started in the city under native teachers. People
showed a keen appreciation of the advantages offered them
and the number of schools had to be rapidly increased. At




398


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


the present time there are, including the kindergarten, some
sixty schools. The hospitals had in the meantime been thoroughly renovated and supplied, as far as it was possible for us
to do so, with the necessary medicines and apparatus. The
municipal courts were put on a better footing and sanitary
work in Santiago and other cities was being pushed as rapidly
as possible. The health of the Volunteers who replaced the
Regulars was far from good and, although given every attention in their food, shelter, etc., we found that the amount of
sickness among them was very great; in fact it was very evident that the sickness was due, not altogether as we had at first
supposed to the exposure and service incidental to the campaign, but really principally to the effects of the climate. Those
of us living under the best conditions obtainable were almost
as much subject to the fever as others. In short I do not
believe that the large amount of sickness in the Army of invasion wvas due to anything else than the effects of the climate
and exposure during the campaign. Troops can be kept in.
Cuba in fairly healthy condition, provided they are given good
shelter and kept at a fair elevation above the sea. It is very
important that they should be in buildings under heavy roofs,
well protected from the sun. Good health cannot be maintained in tents. I believe that if we use the caution which
the British have observed in Jamaica and elsewhere, we can
obtain the same results and maintain an army in a state of
efficiency and good health.  Mounted troops will however
be able to do much better duty in this island than foot troops,
for the vegetation is so dense that a march is extremely hot
wpork, and in the rainy season the men are always wet from
the brush, mud, etc., under foot.
In October General Lawton went home on sick leave having had a long siege of fever and I was left in command of
the Department. The situation as it then stood wasi:-the
city of Santiago had been pretty well cleaned up and in fairly
good running order; a fair condition of confidence and good
order existed throughout the surrendered territory; the
people wvere beginning to return from Jamaica and other outside places, whither they had gone to escape the war. During
October a general renovation of all public buildings and a




U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SANTIAGO. 399


sytematic repair of the streets of the city and roads about it
was commenced, about one thousand men being employed.
Schools were increased both in Santiago, Guantanamo, Manzanillo and other large towns of the province. The evacuation of the province by Spanish troops was completed and
the towns up to this time held by them were put through the
same process of renovation which had taken place in Santiago.
At this time the most wretched of all portions of the province
was the District of Holguin where the people were found in a
condition of the greatest destitution and suffering, and the
whole district thoroughly infested with smallpox. Active
measures wvere taken to stamp this out, the people of the district being vaccinated and some of the-small infected thatched
villages destroyed. Clothing and medicine in large supplies
were obtained both by purchase and from the various charitable contributions; a large corps of medical men wvere put to
work; military quarantine was established and every energy
devoted to bringing the district into a state of normal health
and establishing wholesome sanitary conditions. This work
was under the immediate charge of Colonel Duncan N. Hood,
2d. Immunes, who had as his chief medical officer, Captain
Robert S. Woodson, U. S. A., with an able corps of Cuban
assistants, chief of whom was CQlonel Felipe Veranes of the
- Cuban Army. All these gentlemen deserve the greatest
credit, as their work was of the highest degree of efficiency
and thoroughness and as the service rendered to the people
of the afflicted district was invaluable. They established
large isolation hospitals and in the comparatively short time
of six weeks had the disease thoroughly under control and at
the present time- it has been practically stamped out.
The light-houses throughout the Department were reestablished in October. Extensive plans for reopening of roads
which had been abandoned for many years were completed;
indigent rations were sent to the interior towns within our
reach and every effort made to get the people away from the
larger towns and scattered upon their plantations throughout
the Department. The end of December found the condition
of the province as regards public health excellent with the
exception of the remains of the epidemic in Holguin. The




400


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAAR.


rural police of 250 men had been established, divided into
four companies and stationed in the large towns in different
parts of the province. These men are thoroughly acquainted
with the country and also with the disorderly element. They
have rendered efficient service up to date and they will, I
believe, be able to maintain order throughout the interior.
Municipal government in all the larger towns has been reestablished and these different towns made self-supporting as
far as possible. The courts, including the Supreme Court,
have been put in thorough working order; freedom given the
press, and the people granted a Bill of Rights which gives
them the privilege of free assemblage, a guarantee of prompt
trial and right to give bail for all offenses not capital. Good
public spirit is rapidly developing and the people are all interested in the welfare of the province and the improvement of
the public service. Especially is this true of the interest in
the schools, which is very keen, and in the establishment of a
thorough judicial system. They are all anxious to have a
modification of the existing methods of procedure and also to
have a public school system on the same basis as the public
school system of the United States. There is a strong spirit
abroad for provincial and municipal autonomy, which spirit,
while it recognizes the necessity of a Central Government,
wishes it to be as limited in its jurisdiction as possible and as
inexpensive as consistent with efficiency.
The revenues of the province are ample for the maintenance
of the present form of government and for the support of the
necessary police, etc., as well as the maintenance of several
thousand men engaged in public works, such as road building
and harbor improvements. Several hundred miles of road
have been built. Plans for water-works and harbor improvements in the larger towns have been completed, and in Santiago the Barber Asphalt Company are laying five miles of
pavement, at the same time putting in modern sewers and a
modern water-system, as the work is completed. Dredging
plans for the harbor have been finished and work is about to
begin. In addition to paying the expenses of the Civil Government, $220,000 was saved from the customs revenue of the
province between July I7 and Dec. 31, i898. This will be




U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMIENT OF SANTIAGO. 401


devoted to payment for the pavement and partial payment
for the dredging. The improvements are much needed and
the people are anxious to assist in every way in these public
works.
The present condition of the province is one which promises
well for the future and if the details of the Civil Government
are not pressed upon them too rapidly and if they are left to
assimilate and absorb what has already been given them,
before attempting more advanced problems, good results may
be expected. The people as a class are kind and impulsive in
disposition and are sincerely anxious to learn and to improve.
One thing must be remembered and that is that a solid foundation must be built before the superstructure is put on.
There is needed:-reform in the courts and methods of procedure; honest municipal administration with thorough rooting up of old and corrupt methods accompanied by much
needed sanitary reforms, etc.; construction of proper hospitals
and schools; also a thorough reformation of the present educational methods with the construction of suitable buildings;
honest work for honest pay, and an entire avoidance of the
former ruinous system of multitudinous office-holders in the
ruined public buildings of towns with empty treasuries,
ghastly hospitals and impossible streets.




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CHAPTER XX.


THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION.
BY
GEN. T. ESTRADA PALMA. Delegate Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Cuba.
A FTER the peace of Zanjon, in i878i the Cuban leaders
for the most part left Cuba and scattered through
Spanish America and the United States. A great
many individuals and families later followed their example
and it may be broadly stated that nearly all the Cubans outside of Cuba, after the termination of the ten years wvar, were
in sympathy with the idea of Cuban independence. Jos6
Marti conceived the idea of organizing the Cuban immigration
into a revolutionary party and succeeded in establishing clubs
throughout Central and South America, Mexico, Santo Domingo, Jamaica, Haiti and in many cities of the United
States, particularly in the cigar-manufacturing centers. These
clubs were united to form what was called the Cuban Revolutionary Party. They elected a president, who was called a
Delegate, and a treasurer, the Delegate naming the secretary
of the party.
The following are the by-laws of the Cuban Revolutionary
Party:
ARTICLE Ist. The Cuban Revolutionary Party is established with the object of accomplishing, by the united efforts
of all men of good will, the absolute independence of the
island of Cuba, and with the object of aiding a similar movement for Porto Rico.
ARTICLE 2nd. The Cuban Revolutionary Party does not
intend to precipitate war in Cuba inconsiderately, nor to begin a movement crudely and inharmoniously, at the expense
of the country, but to bring about an organization approved
by all the various elements and in accord with- them all, which




404


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


will undertake a war, brief in duration, whole-hearted and
single-aimed, for the purpose of establishing peace, opportunities of work and consequent happiness, for all the inhabitants of the island.
ARTICLE 3rd. The Cuban Revolutionary Party will bring
together all the revolutionary elements now existing and,
without degrading compromises with any man or body of men,
will unite in the common movement all the elements, so that
war may be conducted in a thoroughly republican spirit and
method, with the sole aim of establishing a nation able to
guarantee the happiness of its own children and to fulfil in
the history of the Continent the difficult duties that its geographical situation entails.
ARTICLE 4th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party does not
propose to perpetuate in the Cuban Republic, under new
guises and with new words, the spirit of tyrannical authority
and the bureaucratic composition of the colony but to found
and to insure, in the untrammeled and free exercise of the
legitimate rights of man, a new nation, sincere in its democracy and able by honesty, stability and hard work to cope
with the dangers that nearly always attend a novel condition
of society existing among a people suddenly brought out of
bondage into freedom.
ARTICLE 5th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party does not
propose to give over Cuba to the oppression of a dominant
victorious party that will look on the island as its prey by
right of conquest. It seeks only to insure by all legitimate
means, which the freedom and protection of foreign countries
offer it, the war which will be for the dignity and welfare of
all the Cubans; and to deliver to all the inhabitants a liberated
country.
ARTICLE 6th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party is established to found one free and united country in which the elements of organization will from the first, work together to
overcome the dangers threatening them at home and abroad,
to substitute reform and good order for the economic disorder
in which the financial system of the island is now and to prepare it for its immediate development.
ARTICLE 7th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party will endeavor not to utter an indiscreet word, or do any indiscreet
action which might attract the ill-will of other peoples or
countries with whom it is the duty of Cuba, not only from
motives of prudence but of affection, to maintain friendly relations.




THE WVORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 405
ARTICLE 8th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party has for its
purposes:
ist. To unite in a continuous and common effort for Cuba's
liberty all the Cubans residing in foreign lands.
2nd. To encourage sincere and cordial relations among
the political and historical factors and agents in and out of
the island which can contribute to the swift success of the
war, and to aid and strengthen all the institutions that after
the war shall be established and founded in consequence of it.
3rd. To disseminate in Cuba the knowledge of the spirit,
aims and methods of the revolution and to bring all the inhabitants of the island to one mind with a spirit favorable to
victory, in order that war may speedily be conducted without unnecessary risk to Cuban lives.
4th. To collect funds for the realization of that programme and to open every possible source for the war, and
5th. To establish discreetly, with countries friendly to
us, relations which will tend to accelerate with the least possible blood and sacrifice the successful issue of the war and
the foundation of the new republic which is indispensable to
American equilibrium.
The members of the clubs contributed funds which were remitted to the treasurer who expended the moneys on the
order of the Delegate.
Jose Marti was elected the first Delegate and undertook the
work of opening and maintaining correspondence and communications with those in various parts of Cuba who were
likely to respond to a call to arms in favor of the independence of their country. The preliminary work of organization lasted several years. At the end of that time Marti
had conferred with all the principal veteran leaders of the ten
years war, who had agreed that General Maximo Gomez, then
residing in Santo Domingo, should be the Commander-in-chief
of the coming revolution.
As the Spaniards did not allow the inhabitants of Cuba to
own rifles without permits, plans had to be made for the
shipment of arms as well as munitions to the island. Accordingly a large supply of war material was purchased and
when all plans had been perfected and the various agents in
Cuba had notified Marti that the people were ready to rise,
three vessels, the Baracoci, the Amadis and the Lagwonda, were
chartered to take the various generals and their followvers, to



406


THE AMERIMCAN-SPANISH W,17AR


gether with the arms, to Cuba. The landings were to be simultaneous and in several parts of the island. General Gomez
was to take one vessel, General Maceo another, and Generals
Roloff and Sanchez the third. Unfortunately the Lagonda
-was seized in Fernandina, Fla., by the United States authorities, as were also the arms and munitions. As the plan had
failed Marti notified all those concerned that for the time
being the uprising had to be postponed.   This seizure
occurred about the middle of January, -1895. Efforts made
for the restitution of the war material were successful. The
people of Matanzas notified Marti that to delay the uprising
was extremely dangerous as they were likely to be imprisoned
and their secret deposits of arms and munitions discovered
by the Spanish authorities. As a result Marti sailed for Santo Domingo to join Gomez having previously designated
the 24th of February as the day on which the uprising in
Cuba should take place. On his leaving the United States,
the affairs of the Cuban Revolutionary Party were left in
charge of Benjamin J. Guerra, the treasurer, and Gonzalo db
Quesada, the secretary. After the death of Marti in May,
1895, an election was held by the clubs constituting the Cuban
Revolutionary Party and the writer was elected Delegate.
During the ten years war, the interests of the Cuban revolution abroad were attended to by a body of men who were known
as the Cuban junta. This name was revived by the newspapers and by those familiar with certain affairs and was applied to designate the Cuban Delegation, which has been
commonly known as the Cuban Junta.
On the establishment of a civil government by the Cuban
Revolutionists in the fall of 1895, I -was elected by the Constituent Assembly as Delegate Plenipotentiary abroad, being vested with the fullest powers of representation as to all
matters pertaining to Cuban interests, including diplomatic
relations. The Delegate was empowered to appoint all employds or representatives and to remove them at his pleasure,
to receive, collect and invest all funds, to raise money by
issuing securities or otherwise, to purchase and ship war
material, to represent the Cuban Government at Washington
and to appoint representatives with diplomatic functions to
other countries.




THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 407


The funds for the expedition to Cuba were all furnished
by the Delegation; there was no private enterprise. After
Marti and Gomez from Santo Domingo and the Maceos and
their followers from Costa Rica had been landed in Cuba in
April, the first large expedition to land was that led by Roloff
and Sanchez in the summer of I89$.
It will be remembered that after General Martinez Campos's
defeat by Maceo at Peralejo, the former withdrew to Bayamo
and sent to Santa Clara and Puerto Principe for reinforcements. It was then that Roloff and Sanchez were landed on
the south coast of Santa Clara and the organization of that
province was perfected before Martinez Campos could extricate himself from Bayamo. The next expeditions sent by
the Delegation landed in the province of Santiago, the one
under Francisco Sanchez Echevarria, the other under Carlos
Manuel de Cespedes. In January, I896, General Calixto
Garcia sailed from the city of New York with a large
supply of arms and ammunition, on the steamer Hawkins,
which unfortunately foundered at sea, a number of the men
and crew being drowned. The steamer Bermudia was then
procured and Garcia was about to leave the harbor of New
York when, on the 24th of February, he was arrested with over
one hundred companions, the vessel and cargo being both
seized. General Garcia was admitted to bail and, as soon as
the Bermuda was released and the cargo partly restored,
sailed for Cuba, landing in Santiago where he fought until the
end of the war.
Towards the end of December, I895, when the invasion of
the western provinces by Gomez and Maceo was attracting
so much attention, the Delegate prepared and presented a
petition to the Government of the United States, asking that
belligerent rights be granted to the Cubans. The Delegate,
accompanied by Mr. Gonzalo de Quesada and Mr. Horatio S.
Rubens, counsel of the Delegation, went to Washington and
Cuba's case was presented to Secretary Olney and to the
members of Congress. Much opposition was encountered by
reason of the fact that the Cubans had adopted the policy of
destroying the cane-fields in order to cut off the resources of
Spain, some plantations being owned by citizens of the




408


THE AMERICAN —SPAMISH  ALP-.


United States.  This opposition 'was soon overcome, and
towards the end of January, I 896 a resolution was presented to
the Senate by the Committee on Foreign Relations favoring
the recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans. The manifold duties of the Delegate necessitated his frequent visits to
New York, where the office of the Cuban Delegation had
been established, and in consequence he appointed Mr. Gonzalo de Quesada as Charge d'affaires at Washington so that
the interests of Cuba might constantly be represented at the
capital.
From the very first all possible efforts were made to secure
the sympathy and support of the American press, as being the
best medium possible for spreading propaganda in favor of
the insurrection, throughout the United States. At all times
access was given to the representatives of newspapers who
were ever ready to state the Cuban case as it was explained
to them. Notwithstanding all charges to the contrary, not a
dollar was spent by the Cuban Delegation for the support of
the American press, which did so much to rouse that popular
opinion which ultimately compelled the effective intervention
of the United States in Cuba.
The amount of good done to the cause of Cuba by the
newspapers cannot be overrated; although it is true that
many false and exaggerated reports were published, the Delegation at no time stood sponsor for them. From the very
first the rule was adopted to publish nothing but what the
Delegation was convinced was true and which might be proven,
if necessary. The circulation of pamphlets, while effective to
a certain extent, was found to be almost useless with public
men, who receive so many pamphlets in their mail that they
tossed them directly from the desk to the waste basket. Accordingly, every member of the House of Representatives and
of the Senate was visited in person and the cause of Cuba
was pleaded. The result was that, backed by the progress of
the Cuban invasion of the western provinces and later on by
the wonderful campaign of Maceo in Pinar del Rio, the question of the recognition of belligerent rights of the Cuban insurgents became the most prominent one before Congress.
Information of all kinds was asked for by the friends of Cuba




THE WVORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 409


who favored recognition, as material for the preparation of their
speeches, and no adequate-idea can be formed of the amount
of labor necessary to supply this demand alone. The debates
had to be attended daily in order to supply data for the
correction of misstatement of facts and for the contraversion
of the arguments used by the friends of Spain. As a result,
nearly the whole night had to be spent in drawing up memoranda for use on the following day. It will be remembered
that the debate on the first resolution favoring the recognition of belligerency, which was adopted by an overwhelming
majority in both Houses, lasted several months. While this
work wvas being carried forward the newspapers were not neglected and at the same time a heavy correspondence from
all the United States and foreian countries had to be attended to, funds raised, arms and ammunition bought, vessels
procured and expeditions sent to strengthen the equipment
of the Cuban forces, there being throughout the war thousands of men xvho had taken the field, but who were entirely
unarmed. At the same time communications had to be maintained between the Delegation and the Civil Government in
Cuba-as wvell as with the- Commander-in-chief and the Commanders of the various provinces. Questions of policy were
thus determined on and the most urgent needs of the various
Army Corps were ascertained. The means of communication
were extremely precarious and the utmost care had to be
taken in the selection of the persons who were entrusted
with the correspondence..Employes of regular steamship
lines, either native  Cubans or well-known sympathizers,
would carry the correspondence at great personal risk and
deliver it to the secret agents or committees in the Cuban
ports who then undertook to dispatch the letters to their destination, and to return the answers through the same channels.
When communication became more systematic in the island,
the Delegation ordered an issue of postage stamps of various
denominations and sent them to the proper authorities in
Cuba.
During the progress ot the invasion, because of the rapidity of the movements of the Cuban troops and the uncer.
tainty of finding them in a cprescribed district at a certain




4TO


4THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


time, it was impossible to land war supplies for their use.
Even after Maceo had returned to the province of Pinar del
Rio, many months had to pass before an expedition could
safely be sent to him, because of the extreme vigilance and
number of Spanish cruisers guarding the coast of Pinar del
Rio and the large number of Spanish troops who were patrolling the coast.
A deposit of arms and ammunition had been made at Key
West, which were intended to be sent to Cuba when opportunity offered, and some of these were placed on the sailing
vessel Competifor with Colonel Munson and about forty men.
After landing most of the men and a portion of the cargo on
the coast of Pinar del Rio, a Spanish gunboat captured the vessel and its remaining cargo, together with a number of the
crew. There being some American citizens among the prisoners, the United States intervened in their behalf, prevented
their execution after they had been condemned to death and
ultimately succeeded in obtaining their release. The few
thousands of cartridges which were landed by the Competitor
were safely delivered to Maceo, who made good use of them
by administering a signal defeat to the Spaniards in the
battle of Cacarajicara. Subsequently the Delegation succeeded in landing several important expeditions in Pinar del
Rio, one of which carried a dynamite cannon, which had been
previously tested. This was successfully used by Maceo, for
the first time in actual warfare. This expedition was in
charge of General Rius Rivera who afterward succeeded
Maceo in command of the Province of Pinar del Rio and who
was subsequently captured by the Spaniards. The Delegation used its judgment in sending supplies to the island,
selecting such provinces for immediate relief as appeared to
be in most urgent need. Although the forces throughout the
island were all necessitous, nevertheless care had to be taken
to land resources in the places where they were least exposed
to capture by the Spaniards and where, for the time being,
there were important operations.
The problem of sending supplies became more and more
difficult as time went on. It was harder to leave the shores
of the United States with a cargo than it was to land it in




THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 411


Cuba. President Cleveland issued two proclamations several
months apart, calling upon all citizens and residents of the
United States to respect the neutrality laws. The utmost
rigor was exercised by the Federal authorities, who, in their
anxiety to avoid the possibility of all claims by Spain against
the United States for violation of neutrality, proceeded
rather too far in restraining the sailing of expeditions. The
best proof of unjust discrimination against the Cubans, in this
particular, is that the Government failed in every prosecution
to obtain a forfeiture either of the vessel or its cargo. There
were a great many of these prosecutions which put the Delegation to great expense and caused it to lose valuable time in
the landing of much needed supplies in Cuba. An extensive
system of espionage was established along the Atlantic coast
by the Spaniards, who virtually were put in control of all the.
machinery of the Treasury Department and even of the Navy
to prevent the sailing of supplies.
All that was needed was a fair amount of suspicion aroused
in some Spanish agent and complaint founded thereon, to obtain an order for a revenue cutter or naval vessel-to proceed to
the point from which the expedition was supposed to be about
to sail and to have the local United States District Attorney and
Marshal prepared to seize, arrest and prosecute. It was decided over and over again that the shipment of arms and munitions to the Cuban insurgents was not a violation of the
laws of neutrality, but nevertheless the seizures and prosecutions continued.
Aside from the extraordinary official vigilance and stringency, the continued risk of discovery made it necessary to
change the point of shipment in each succeeding expedition,
or at least to vary the plan of sailing. There was, too, constant danger that the crews of the vessels would give information to the authorities. This indeed happened at least on
their return from the landing in Cuba in almost every instance
where a large vessel demanding a numerous crew was used.
No matter how well these men were paid, the Spaniards
almost invariably succeeded in bribing some of them to
testify. At one time there was a prosecution of those 'ho
were on board or managed the expedition, every time a ves



A T I>


Trvr AA rrflAj  TVAR.


sel returned to the United States.. Of the large number of
prosecutions of individuals for the violation of the neutrality
laws, only three were successful. The men convicted were
Captain Wiborg, Captain John D. Hart and Dr. Joseph J. Luis,
in the order named. With the captains there was comparatively little trouble. One indeed turned informer and succeeded in convicting Dr. Luis and another meditated the surrender of an  expedition to the Spaniards.  This was
discovered, however, before he could do any harm. The
Spanish agents offered liberal rewards to the captains who
were known to be in the service of the Delegation to give information concerning plans or to betray the landing point in
Cuba, but without success. There was never a more honest
and loyal set of men than these. The one who took the
largest number of expeditions to Cuba is Captain John
O'Brien, popularly known as " Dynamite" Johnny O'Brien.
Among the others who served faithfully and well are Captains
Morton and Edward Murphy who have since died, Captains
Lewis, Dickman, Wiborg, Riley and Samuel Hughes, the last
of whom was particularly brave and dashing. He even took
his wife with him on two occasions.
It was found to be extremely dangerous to notify the
Cubans in the field that an expedition would be landed at
a given point, at a certain time, because any movement of
the Cuban troops towards the coast would become known to
the Spaniards, who, immediately suspecting the true reason,
would dispatch a large body of troops to the neighborhood
and send several gun-boats to control that part of the coast.
It was for this reason, as well as the practical difficulties of
making the landing in any other manner than by surf-boats,
that it was found necessary to send men with the arms,
whose duty it was to load the small boats, row them ashore,
land the supplies and then either transport them inland or
bury them while they went into the interior to notify the
Cuban troops of the landing place. Considering the great
difficulties attending the proper organization, dispatch and
landing of these expeditions, it is really remarkable that
there were so few losses.
In the course of the revolution, the Delegation lost three




THE WITORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 413.


steamers, which foundered at sea, all under nearly the same
conditions. It is a curious fact that each of these vessels wuras
lost in the month of January, the Hawkins in 1896, the Commodore in 1897 and the Ti/lie in i898. In each case, the
pumps, which had been properly tested before starting, wvere
found to be clogged when the critical moment came and
other circumstances tend to show that there was foul play.
In each instance, the Spanish officials in the United States
were aware that the vessbl was about to sail, but made no attempt to prevent it. The Hawkins and Commodore with the
James H. Woodall were the property of the Delegation, while
the Ti/lie was merely chartered. The Delegation made it a
rule to charter rather than to buy a vessel, because of the
fact that after the first expedition the vessel would be the subject of a continuous and strict surveillance, and the hiring of a
crew for such a vessel would be fraught with grave danger of
having a spy or a traitor appear on board.
The vessels used at various times in this service were the
Bermuda, the Three Friends, the Laurada, the Dauntless, the
Horsa, the James H. Woodall, the Leon, the Monarch, the Som-fiers Smith, the George W. C(hilds and the Commodore, which
made two successful trips before she foundered.
These expeditions were in charge of the chief of expeditions, General Emilio Nunvez, and Dr. Joaquin D. Castillo,
who alternated in taking them to the Cuban shores. Colonel
Federico Perez Carb6 also landed a number of them, once being attacked by two Spanish gun-boats, which he succeeded
in outrunning.
Hardly was one expedition landed before another had to be
undertaken and in all thirty-six expeditions were landed successfully. It was thus that the Cubans were supplied with
arms and ammunition. It meant the running of a blockade
by —the United States vessels to leave the American shores
and the runningof the Spanish blockade in Cuba, followed
by almost certain seizure of the vessel on her return, and the
prosecution of the Captain and the representative of the
Delegation who happened to be on board.
The most strenuous efforts were made by the Spanish
agents and diplomatic representatives to have the Delegation




A T -


'PTLTY   A  L T-  N  i'n A in   - -  I  -  -
I ~JL.ij flV ~ lN-t1 ft VA.K.


prosecuted and convicted, but they failed to obtain the necessary evidence to convict under the law.
Possibly no better recommendation for the value of the
work done by the Delegation can be given than the statements of the Spanish Ministers at Washington, Sefiors Dupuy
de Lome and Polo, who told Secretary of State Day that if
the United States Government had closed up the Delegation
there would have been an end to the war in Cuba. This
statement was also repeatedly made by the Secretaries of
Foreign Relations of the Spanish Cabinet at Madrid, as may
be seen in the Spanish Red Book, transmitting to the Cortes
the diplomatic correspondence between Spain and the United
States.
The work of carrying supplies to the men in the field was
continued even after the declaration of war between Spain
and the United States, and many of the men who had served
the Delegation were used by the American government to
great advantage in their various capacities. The Delegation
had always a number of skilful Cuban pilots, representing
various parts of the island, and these were of great value in
selecting the best localities for disembarkation. Of course, as
time wvent on, the men engaged in these expeditions became
experts, so that landings were ultimately made in about half
the time which was at first consumed. As the difficulties
placed in the way of departing from the United States increased, it was found best to charter both a sailing vessel
which could carry a large cargo and a steamer which, after
making a landing, would return for a second and sometimes
even a third cargo, to the place where the schooner was
lying in wait.
The largest expedition was that landed by the Laurada in
the port of Banes, where she remained twenty-six hours unloading in sight of a Spanish fort. Naturally, these expeditions cost much money and the question was frequently asked,
where did the Cubans get it.
The organization of the Cuban Revolutionary Party was
kept intact until December, 1898 and the various clubs contributed with the utmost regularity. When an extraordinary
effort was to be made, they were advised of the fact and




THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 415


always responded most loyally. Besides this source of income,
there were private contributions from individual sources, one
Cuban lady in particular contributing more than one hundred
and twenty thousand dollars.
On the death of General Antonio Maceo, the Cubans all
over the world contributed to an extraordinary collection, to
prove that, despite the great blow the revolution had received,
it was a fight for principle and not because of the prestige of
any one leader. The Cuban colony of Paris alone contributed
more than one hundred thousand dollars on this occasion.
Besides these sources of income, there were the taxes collected
by the Cubans in the island, which in the year.i895 to i896
aggregated over four hundred thousand dollars. In addition,
some bonds were sold for cash, or given in part payment for
the charter of vessels, postage stamps were sold and later
silver souvenir coins.
There was comparatively very little money contributed to
the cause by the American public, but the sympathy of the
people was perhaps in the end just as practicable and even
more effective in winning independence for Cuba.
While-the collection of funds was a matter necessitating a
great deal of detail work and much care, the disbursements
were equally onerous.
Not one dollar was paid out of the treasury, except on a
written order of the Delegate, to which a receipt was
attached. The order specified the amount and purpose of the
expenditure and the receipt had to be signed before the money
was paid over. A receipt was also given for each item as it
was contributed to the treasury.
Besides the expenditures for the war material and expeditions, there were large amounts spent monthly to maintain
abroad the families of some of the principal officers of the
revolution. While the amounts thus paid were very moderate in each instance, being in fact just sufficient to enable the
recipients to live in the most modest way possible, the sum
total was a considerable sum. Railroad transportation for
the men who accompanied the expeditions and their maintenance while in this country, together with the necessary
office expenses of the Delegation, swelled the amount to very




lP  V  a ANUrCqPTCA NT QPAXTIQT AJUTAP
&-A"    I — - -. %,I ~-   s.s 4 1-   A1 L  L  In. Ad &.. -'.


respectable proportions. The amount expended in telegrams
and cablegrams alone was very considerable.
It may readily be imagined that the problem of keeping a
fair balance in the treasury for an emergency was constantly
occupying the mind of the Delegation. To attend to any one
of the numerous branches of work charged on the Delegation
demanded a great amount of detail work, and to attend to all
the branches simultaneously, for none could be neglected, was
a Herculean task. In forming a proper estimate of the services rendered by the Delegation, this fact should be constantly borne in mind.
While, therefore, funds were being raised to equip the
army, the campaign in Washington was being carried on most
vigorously to obtain the recognition of belligerent rights.
The passage of the concurrent resolution by Congress, in
April, i896, favoring the recognition of the Cubans, was followed by a period of expectancy, which however did not signify that no work was being done. The friends of Cuba in
Congress were kept constantly informed of the progress which
was being made by the revolution, and reassured that under
no circumstances would Cuba accept anything short of her
absolute independence. An effort was made to re-cast the
resolutions, and adopt them in the form of a joint resolution
which would compel some action, either favorable or otherwise, by President Cleveland, but Secretary of State Olney
warned Congiess in advance that the President maintained
the right of recognition to lie solely with the Executive and
that he would accordingly reject the resolution. For this
reason the matter was not pressed any further at the time.
As the time for the election of a President to succeed Mr.
Cleveland approached, efforts were successfully made to have
both the great political parties adopt a plank in their platform
favorable to Cuba.
On December 2I, i896, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations unanimously reported in favor of a resolution which
had been previously offered by Senator Cameron, wherein it
was resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
" That the independence of the Republic of Cuba be, and




THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 417


the same is hereby acknowledged by the United States of
America.
"Be it further resolved, That the United States will use its
friendly offices, with the government of Spain, to bring to a
close the war between Spain and the Republic of Cuba."
Again Secretary Olney announced that Congress had no
power of recognition, this time doing so publicly. No action
was taken on this resolution as President McKinley had been
elected and all eyes were turned on him.
The policy of extermination had been inaugurated by Weyler and the consequent horrible conditions were depicted by
the Delegation from reliable reports. This was found an additional, strong argument for some action by the United States
in respect to Cuban affairs.
The truth of these statements was established when President McKinley, on May 17, 1897, asked Congress for a $5oooo
appropriation for the indigent American citizens of Cuba.
On May 20, the Senate adopted the resolution introduced
by Senator Morgan, recognizing the belligerent rights of the
Cubans.
Despite all efforts, these resolutions could not be brought
before the House of Representatives for a vote, because- of
its peculiar rules, although there was an overwhelming majority of Congressmen ready to vote for its adoption.
The work on propaganda was continued despite all obstacles, and public opinion became stronger and stronger in favor of putting an end to a condition of affairs which was a
disgrace to civilization. The message of President McKinley
in December, i897, though conservative, admitted a state of
horrors and suggested the possibility of action in the near
future.
Even so far back as Mr. Cleveland's administration, efforts
were being made by the American Government to have Spain
grant liberal reforms or autonomy. As soon as this became
known, the Delegation protested most vigorously that no
half measures would be acceptable to the Cubans, and demonstrated to the Cuban sympathizers in Congress the futility
of such a plan.
Nevertheless, negotiations apparently continued and, as




4ii8


TRI-F AME.RITCA NPANJTQU-T WARP


the position of the United States became stronger on behalf
of Cuba, Spain began to make promises of autonomy and
even to frame a scheme of reforms, which wvas formulated
just about as Congress was assembled in December, i897.
The Delegation took up the proposed legislation and discussed it seriatim and proved beyond the shadow of a doubt,
to any fair-minded man, that the whole plan was a trap and
a mockery, framed only for the purpose of preventing action
on the part of the United States, while the policy of extermination could be carried on. Even while showing the utter
inadequacy of the proposed scheme of autonomy, the Delegation never ceased to declare that even an ideal plan, guaranteed by the American government, would not be accepted
by the Cubans, who had declared their unalterable determination to fight on to independence or death. From this
time on, the popular interest was so intense, that the daily
mail of the Delegation increased to an enormous extent and,
as every letter was invariably answered, its force had to be
increased. Although general instructions were given as to
the manner in which communications should be answered,
there were hundreds of special inquiries which demanded
more careful consideration and diplomatic replies.
As a natural result of the popular interest or perhaps as the
original cause of it, the newspapers devoted themselves with
renewed ardor to the cause of Cuba and a constant stream of
reporters seeking news and interviews were received at the
offices of the Delegation, even late into the night.
Hundreds of visitors appeared at the Delegation daily, to
give gratuitous advice or to seek information or to give
personal expression to their sympathy, while the number of
men who applied to be sent to Cuba to fight the Spaniards
was legion. These latter were informed that the Cubans
needed arms, not men, and that the Delegation would not violate the neutrality laws of the United States by enlisting men.
Another great drain on the time of the Delegation was the
horde of adventurers offering their services for some desperate
deed, such as the assassination of Weyler, the blowing up of
the palace in Havana, or of the Arsenal, or of some Spanish
man-of-war.  Untold inventors insisted on explaining their




THE WVORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 419


apparatus or their plans, so that everything from a sub-marine
boat to an airship had to be discussed.
Under the auspices of the Delegation, various meetings
were held by the Cubans at which autonomy was rejected, and
a manifesto was signed by all the prominent leaders to the
same effect. When arguments in favor of the autonomic
plan were published in the papers by Spanish statesmen, the
Delegation forthwith refuted them, but despite all its efforts
the American administration apparently believed that Spain
was acting in good faith and that the Cubans were unreasonable.
The hypocrisy and bad faith of Spain was made manifest by
the letter which Minister lDupuy de Lome wrote to Seinor
Canalejas. This was taken from the desk of Canalejas at
Havana and brought to the United States by the man who
took it, to serve his countrymen, and delivered to the Delegation. It was decided to give the letter the broadest publicity,
inasmuch as it showed just how Spain was deceiving the
United States. The letter was given to the press and the
very morning of its publication it was delivered to the President. The Delegation was prepared to prove its genuineness
in case that should be attacked, but de Lome rendered that
unnecessary by admitting the authorship.
The letter was given to the President, to be disposed of as
he saw fit, and when Canalejas claimed it as his property, it
was given up to him.
It has been repeatedly asserted that the de Lome letter
was stolen by agents of the Delegation in this country or abstracted from the mails but this is absolutely untrue.
Whatever may have been the effect of the assertions contained in this letter in official circles, the effect on the American public was profound. The insults to President McKinley
contained in the letter made the people indignant, while the
chicanery of Spain was made most manifest.
Within a few days after the publication of this letter, the
battleship Maine was blown up in Havana harbor.
There now followed a period inl which delicacy prevented
the Delegation from obtruding Cuba's woes, while the whole
American people were mourning the dead of the Maine.




420


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH IWAK.


The lull was short-lived, however, for enormous pressure
was now brought to bear on the Delegation to persuade the
Cubans to accept an armistice. High officials at Washington,
representatives of European bankers, and even the church of
Rome joined in trying to persuade Spain to grant an armistice and the Cubans to adopt it. The Delegation firmly refused to consider the proposition, stating that the Cubans
would continue to fight while acceptable terms might be discussed, but that under no consideration would an armistice be
accepted, particularly when the wet season was shortly coming
on and thus Spain would be spared the expense and danger
attending a summer campaign. It also pointed out that the
Cuban army could only subsist on the resources of the country,
which would be no longer possible if an armistice were accepted. In such a case, the Cubans would have had to die of
starvation, to disband, or to be driven by their necessities into
breaking the agreement for an armistice and again to live on
the country. Documents expounding the Cuban view were
frequently filed by the Delegation with the Secretary of State.
When fairly satisfied that the Cuban autonomy plan had
failed in practice, a scheme was suggested whereby Spain was
to retain suzerainty, Cuba occupying the same relation to
Spain that Egypt does to England. This too was rejected,
with the explanation that the Cubans would never be satisfied
until the Spanish flag was forever removed from Cuban soil.
Then came the final message of President McKinley and
renewed agitation in Congress.
Up to the very last moment, the Delegation insisted that
some declaration be made recognizing the independence of
Cuba and at last succeeded in having the resolution passed
with the fourth paragraph containing the Teller amendment,
which declared that the United States would exercise no control or sovereignty in Cuba, except forthe purposes of pacification. The declaration that the people of Cuba are and of
right ought to be free and independent was much fought
against, but finally was incorporated in the resolution.
After the declaration of war between Spain and the United
States, the Delegation organized several expeditions of hundreds of Cubans, which conveyed to Cuba arms and munitions




THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 421


sent by the American government, placed its pilots and
managers of expeditions at the disposal of the United States,
and indicated the places where much needed rations could be
landed to save their starving countrymen.
XVhen the peace protocol was signed, the Delegation, at the
request of the American authorities, sent the news to the
Cubans in the field, at the same time advising them as to the
terms of the protocol, which was on the lines of the resolution
of intervention.
After the proclamation of the protocol, the Delegation still
continued to place the questions, which would certainly arise,
before the American authorities and to suggest the measures
which in justice to the Cubans should be taken.
The pending prosecutions were at the request of the Delegation dismissed, and money, which was deposited as bail, was
restored and used by the Delegation in furnishing food to the
needy and aiding the families of Cuban officers and others to
return to Cuba.
Fully confident that the pledges in favor of Cuba would be
religiously carried out by the United States, the Delegation
was arranging to close its offices, when in November the Assembly of Representatives authorized the Delegate and Chargc
d'affaires Quesada to remain at their posts in representation
of the Cubans.
The Cuban Revolutionary Party was, however, dissolved by
proclamation of the Delegate.
At present writing, the work of the Delegation is about
ended and in a few days the offices will be closed.
The Delegation is content to be judged by the results of its
labors.




ii
I 
I~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




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CHAPTER XXI.
THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR.
BY
JOHN E. WILKIE, Chief Secret Service Division, Treasury Department.
TOWHERE was nothing spectacular about the work of the
Secret Service men during the Spanish-American war,
for there were wholly lacking the military features
which the public so generally associated with that branch of
the Government's service. In the War of the Rebellion Col.
Baker's men were operating in the enemy's country surrounded by all the perils that menace a spy in hostile territory. There were hairbreadth escapes and thrilling experiences
of the most sensational character. Penetrating the enemy's
lines, securing information of his strength, position and probable movements-these were the tasks set for the daring fellows who composed the Secret Service force in the War Department in the early sixties. Not so in the last war. The
late secret service campaign, if it may so be termed, was one
wholly of defense and protection. It was believed that every
large center of population was infested by foreigners of anarchistic tendencies who might seize the opportunity for the
execution of plots against the officers of the Government or
against the welfare of the community at large. It was also
believed that Spain would attempt to secure official information of our plans and movements, and it was to checkmate
the moves of these two dangerous classes that the Treasury
Department Secret Service devoted its energies.
XVhen Col. Baker's force was disbanded at the close of the
Rebellion, the counterfeiting of government obligations had
grown to such appalling dimensions that the Service wvas reorganized as a branch of the Treasury Department for the suppression of this and other crimes against the Government, but




424


4TtHL ATItERILAN-SPANISH WVAR.


for the last thirty years the Secret Service Division as we know
it to-day has existed for the purpose of suppressing counterfeiting, and its operations are limited to that field by the
phraseology of the appropriation bill to which it owes its existence. Under the terms of this bill the operatives of the
division could not be reimbursed for any services rendered in
any other direction, and therefore, on the i6th of April I prepared the following letter to the Honorable Lyman J. Gage,
Secretary of the Treasury:
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, SECRET SERVICE DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D. C., April I6, I898.
THE HONORABLE,
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
SIR:
Owing to recent international complications, the Secret
Service Division has been called upon to supply men for special detail outside of the duties prescribed by the appropriation from which they are paid. In order that this additional
expense may be properly and promptly met, and that this
Division may be in a position to respond instantly to any
such demand upon its force, I respectfully request that the
sum of five thousand dollars be allotted to this Division from
the fifty-million-dollar defense fund, said five thousand dollars
to be employed in defraying the expense of such special investigations as we may from time to time be called upon to
make.
Respectfully yours,
JOHN E. WILKIE, Chief.
The application was at once approved by the Secretary,
who instructed Assistant Secretary Vanderlip to go with me
to the \Vhite House and secure the President's approval. A
very brief statement was sufficient to satisfy President McKinley that the apportionment was justified, and the Division
was supplied with the necessary funds for commencing active
operations.
During the last two weeks of April and the early part of
May, I perfected, as far as possible, the organization of an
auxiliary secret service force. It was my aim to leave the
regular force of the Division free to pursue its legitimate la



THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR.


425


bor of looking up counterfeiters. It was a time of great public excitement, wvhen the clever criminals who follow this
particular branch of law-breaking would find it easier to carry
on their operations, and I did not feel that it would be wise
to interfere wvith the routine of the Department. For the
auxiliary force, the requirements were comparatively simple.
Experience as a detective was desirable, but a knowledge of
Spanish was even more important. The secret service office
in the Treasury Department was inundated with applications
for positions. I think I could have put into the field a brigade of detectives, but out of all those who applied, hardly two
per cent were selected. The applications came from all parts
of the United States, from Canada, from Mexico and fromnt
Cuba. The force as finally organized was made up wholly of
Americans, the majority of whom had, at one time or another, resided either in South America, Spain or Cuba.
They were men of unusual intelligence and education, and in
volunteering for secret service work were actuated wholly by
motives of the highest loyalty and patriotism.
April 21, the Spanish Minister, Sefnor Polo y Bernabe, and
his suite left Washington. Their programme, as announced,
included a direct run to neutral territory and a short stay in Toronto, which was their first objective point. It was added
that they would sail within a few days for the other side.
As it was the desire of this Government that no harm
should come to the ex-Minister, while it was extremely unlikely that anything would happen to mar his journey to
Canada, it was deemed wise to provide him unostentatiously
with an escort, and two members of the Secret Service Division therefore accompanied the ministerial party as far as Niagara. While these two agents were introduced to Seinor
Polo, and were known to the other members of his party, I
sent, by another route, two capable men, who arrived in Toronto about the time that the departing Minister reached
there, and through whom I was kept informed of their movements.
That there was, beyond any question, a deliberate determination on the part of Spanish representatives to secure inside
information as to the intentions of those directing the military




n nHE AElLICAlIN-SPANI 1SH WAR.


and naval operations of the United States forces, became a
matter of absolute certainty before the war was two weeks
old. The Downing case, so-called, demonstrated that some
members of the Spanish ex-Minister's party in Canada were
devoting themselves to this particular kind of work; and it may
not be amiss to go somewhat into detail in considering one of
the earlier sensations of the xvar.
Among the members of Senor Polo's suite, who was making
his headquarters at Toronto, was Sefior Ramon Carranza,
who had been naval attache of the legation here. To the
agents in Toronto, it seemed that this officer received the
greater number of suspicious visitors, and his callers therefore
came in for a close surveillance. On the morning of May 6th,
Lieutenant Carranza received in his private apartment a blackeyed, dark-faced young man of sturdy build, and for an hour
and a half they were engaged in earnest conversation. The
greater part of their talk is recorded in the Secret Service Division at Washington. It resulted in the absolute engagement of the stranger as a secret informant. It appeared that
he was an Englishman by birth, that he had been naturalized,
that he had served as a petty officer on the Brooklyn in the
United States Navy; that he had lost his place, and that he
was willing to give the Spanish agent the benefit of the knowledge he had acquired while in the navy, and to obtain for
him at Washington and at the governmental navy yards, certain other information which would be of benefit to the enemy.
He received explicit instructions fronm Lieutenant Carranza as
to the forwarding of any information he might obtain. The
cipher code that he was to use was explained to him, and an
address in Montreal was given to him where all the information was to be forwarded. At the conclusion of his talk with
the Lieutenant, he left the room and proceeded to an obscure
hotel in Toronto, where he had been staying, accompanied by
an agent of the Service. He was to leave Toronto that afternoon. A Secret Service man saw him aboard the train, and
saw his ticket by way of Buffalo and the Lehigh Valley and
Baltimore & Ohio Roads to Washington. All of this information, including a careful description of the suspect, was wired
to me by one of my men, and it was a simple matter, when his




THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR.


427


train arrived the following morning, to identify the first paid
agent of Spain who came to the Capital. All unconscious of
the fact that every movement was being watched, the man
made his way to a lodging-house in E Street, where he left a
black hand-bag that he was carrying, and started out for a
Nvallk which included a visit to the Navy Department. Two
hours after he arrived he returned to his boarding-house, from
which he emerged an hour later and made his way to the
general post office. While he stopped at the window to purchase a stamp, one of the men who had been shadowing him
slipped in through the office of the Postmaster, and was at the
letterdrop when the suspect, after affixing a stamp, dropped
a letter through the slot. It was sealed with red wax, and was
addressed:
FREDERICK W. DICKON, ESQ.,
Dorchester St., I248, Montreal, Canada.
It was brought to my office and opened. It read as
follows
WASHINGTON, Saturday, May 7, '98.
A cipher message has been sent off from Navy Department
to San Francisco, directing the cruiser Charleston to proceed
to Manila with five hundred men and machinery for repairs
for Dewey. A long cipher has been received from Dewey at
the Department at 3:30 P.M. They are translating it now.
Cannot find it out yet. I heard important news respecting
movements of colliers and cruiser Newark at Norfolk Navy
Yards; also about the new Holland boat, as to what they intend to do with her and her destination. I shall go to Norfolk to find important news. My address will be Norfolk
House, Norfolk, Virginia, but shall not go until Tuesday.
Respectfully yours,
G. D., in haste.
A copy of this letter, with the report of the agent who had
overheard the conversation between Lieutenant Carranza
and the spy in Toronto, xvas presented to the Adjutant General of the XVar Department, and he advised an immediate




THE AMEKIt-AN -SPAN ISH WAR.


arrest.  Assistant S.ecretary Meiklejohn directed Captain
Sage of the 8th Artillery, stationed at WVashington Barracks,
to report to me at the Treasury Department, with two men.
At eleven o'clock that night, accompanied by Chief Clerk
Moran of the Secret Service Division, and Eugene Crist, then
an emergency employe of the -Division, and afterward an officer in the District troops in the Cuban campaign, I secured
admission to the house where the suspect was rooming,
arrested him, turned him over to Captain Sage, and searched
his apartment. His name was then learned for the first
time. It was George Downing. The landlady of the establishment stated that he had been there a week before and
that he had left, telling her that he was going to Virginia.
His cipher code, several envelopes directed to the same address in Montreal as that borne by the letter we had seized,
some other papers, and something less than $200 in money,
were taken to headquarters. The fact that he made absolutely no resistance when arrested, as well as his demeanor at
the time, was an absolute indication of guilt; and, two days
later, overwhelmed by the weight of his guilty knowledge and
shame at the betrayal of the Government to which he had
sworn allegiance, he hanged himself to the bars of his cell.
The tremendous activity of all the various branches of the
War and Navy Departments, in preliminary precautionary
measures, attracted a vast amount of attention; and the
knowledge that there were in this country a very large number
of Spanish sympathizers, resulted in a natural uneasiness as to
the possible interference, by the use of high explosives, with
ship-building operations, ammunition manufacturing and so
on. Among the earliest work of the Division there were
many cases of suspected spies at the various navy yards, and
in and about manufacturing establishments having government contracts. A number of powder-mill explosions, occurring in various parts of the country just about the time that
hostilities were begun, were very generally charged up to
emissaries of the enemy, but it was not satisfactorily established in a single instance that the disaster was due to outside causes. Every manufactory in the country, where explosives and ammunition were being made to fill " rush " orders




THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR.


429


from the government, wvas testing its capacity. Most of
them were running night and day, extra hands were at work
and the possibilities of accident were multiplied almost a
hundred fold. I feel perfectly safe in saying that not a
single government factory was attacked or damaged by spies.
A patriotic public, jealous of the interest and safety of its
country, supplied the Secret Service Division wvith a good
deal of material for investigation. After the Downing episode, the letters relating to the presence or acts of suspicious
strangers increased greatly in number. Most of these undoubtedly were founded on trifling suspicion, but considerably more than a thousand cases were considered of sufficient
importance to warrant an investigation by agents of the
Service. In the majority of instances it was discovered that
the suspected persons had been injudicious in their conversation, or had been too outspoken in their friendship for Spain,
and it was found necessary to interfere only where the individuals had expressed a determination to do something if the opportunity presented itself. Such persons wvere watched for a
while, and then, if necessary, warned that the Government was
aware of their sentiments and intentions, and that any attempt
on their part to make a move against the interests of the
United States would be followed by arrest. In the majority
of cases this was sufficient to cause a subsidence of any enthusiasm there might have been, or any determination to act as a
spy. Of the thousand or more suspects who were reported
to the Secret Service Division, more than six hundred men
and women were under close surveillance for longer or shorter
periods.  There were professors, diplomats, doctors, merchants, cigar-makers, marines, electrical experts, government
employes of foreign birth and uncertain antecedents, capitalists, milliners, dress-makers, society women and servants.
On the i6th of May, the President having affixed his signature to an application I made for a further allotment of fifty
thousand dollars for the emergency force of the Division, I was
able to cover more satisfactorily and completely the points
of army mobilization, and all of the cities where it seemed
advisable to locate the agents of the Service. Montreal,
Toronto, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Newport




A3~


A  20   AM iviERCls AN-SPANISfH WAR.


News, Savannah, Jacksonville, Tampa, Key West, Mobile,
New Orleans, Galveston and San Francisco were the principal
points of activity. Through the Gulf States there-was a large
foreign element of Spanish extraction, that was heartily in
sympathy with Spain; and in Mobile and New Orleans, especially, there were combinations of tobacco smugglers and
foreign cut-throats, whose operations it was extremely desirable to watch. In consorting with the members of these
gangs, agents of the Secret Service ran greater risks than fell
to the lot of the average man in the Service. The only plotting, however, that promised to amount to anything, had its
origin in the active brain of Lieutenant Carranza; and every
agent employed by him to operate in the interests of the
enemy, who came into the United States for that purpose,
was detected and arrested.
One of these plans, of an exceedingly interesting character,
developed in the latter part of May. The Spanish agent,
with the co-operation of some Canadian private detectives,
elaborated a scheme to secure information for the benefit of
the Spanish commanding officers in Cuba and Manila. For
their purpose they needed men of military experience, and,
by offers of liberal pay and promises of future reward commensurate with the success of the undertaking, they
secured the services of several ex-members of the Canadian
militia. The Canadian assistants of the Spanish agents
picked up these men, and, after satisfying themselves of their
willingness to embark in the scheme, they showed them to
Lieut. Carranza, who approved the selection. In brief the
plan was this:-The men were to proceed to Tampa and San
Francisco and enlist in the American troops bound for Spanish territory, were to make themselves acquainted with every
possible feature that could be of any benefit to the Spanish
officers; were to proceed with the troops to the objective
points, and, at the first favorable opportunity, were to leave
the American lines and surrender themselves to the Spanish
outposts. Each of the men was to be provided with a ring,
upon the inner circumference of which were engraved the
words, " Confienza Augustina." As soon as the Spanish lines
had been reached, the spy was to send this ring by a courier




THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WIAR.


4131 


to the commanding general, who had been instructed that the
wearer of the ring would be the bearer of some information.
He was then, upon being escorted to the Spanish headquarters, to give the officer the benefit of the knowledge that he
had acquired of the American forces and plans.
Of three men picked out for this service, one wvas to go to
San Francisco, and twvo to Tampa. The one selected for the
San Francisco-Manila expedition, after having been provided
with his railway transportation and advance funds, concluded
that the assignment was one not wholly creditable to an Englishman, and confided to his former colonel the details of the
proposition that had been made to him. His action in giving
up the project was applauded, but it led to an assault upon
him by employ6s of the agents who had secured his services,
and he was compelled to leave the Dominion to escape more
severe punishment. The two men who went to Tampa in the
furtherance of the Spanish scheme were ill-fated. One of
them enlisted and was arrested because of his suspicious actions; the other tried to enlist and, failing, set himself about
securing information to be forwarded to Montreal. This
man-Frank Arthur Mellor-who was masquerading under
the name of Miller, was a guest at the Almeria Hotel at
Tampa. On Tuesday, May 24, the following telegram
addressed to him was received:
Cannot telegraph money to-day. Move from where you are
and telegraph from some other town. Write fully re stocks
at once. Will wire money and instructions on receipt.
SIDDALL.    B
Mellor was taken in charge by an agent of the service, and
questioned as to the identity of his Montreal correspondent.
He claimed that his communications with Montreal were
wholly innocent in their nature, but he failed to explain satisfactorily what he meant by the information " re stocks,"
which seemed to us altogether too suggestive of information
about movements of troops. With such facts as had been obtained at Tampa in my possession, I started an investigation
at Montreal, and soon established that Siddall was a character
who was being used as a " blind" by agents in the pay of Car



A II
IT ) 


A  LTv iA? AERICPTOA T-S PANIITS-T WAR.


ranza; and a further investigation made it quite clear that
Mellor was one of the men engaged in pursuance of the plan
originated by Lieut. Carranza. This was mnore than confirmed
later, when the young Englishman whose conscience had
troubled him as soon as he realized what his engagement with
the Spanish agents meant, was brought back from England
and prevailed upon to tell the entire story of his connection
with the Spanish agents. If anything were needed to conmplete the evidence against Mellor, it was supplied in an unexpected way, by Lieut. Carranza himself. Two days after the
arrest of Mellor at Tampa, Lieut. Carranza, then living at 42
Tupper Street, Montreal, wrote a long letter to a relative
occupying a high position in the Spanish Navy, in which he
made a number of statements concerning his duties at Montreal, and lamented the fact that their best spies had fallen into the hands of the Americans. He referred specifically to
the arrest of Mellor at Tampa, without naming him, but as
Mellor's was the only arrest, on the day mentioned, at Tampa,
the inference was irresistible.
The Carranza letter furnished one of the sensations of the war,
for it supplied to the United States Government the one thing
which was most needed to rid this Continent of the men who
were most actively engaged in maintaining the Spanish spy
system. A very careful and close watch had been kept upon
Carranza and his associates, with the hope that it might be possible to make out a case strong enough to induce the British Government to expel them from British territory. This watch upon
Carranza included occasional visits to his house by Secret Service agents,-of course without his knowledge. One of these
visits was made on the morning of Friday, the 27th of May.
The agent was accompanied by two American friends, a gentleman and a lady, and their call was for the ostensible purpose of examining the house with a view to renting it furnished when the two months' lease held by the Spanish gentleman should have expired. Lieut. Carranza and Captain
du Bosc were at breakfast at the time of the call. The visitors were shown through the establishment, and in the bedroom of Lieut. Carranza the agent saw an official-looking
letter, sealed and stamped, ready for mailing, lying upon the




THE SECRET SERVICE iN THE WAR.


433


dresser. Conjecturing that any document addressed to Madrid, emanating from either of the Spanish officers, would
probably be of value to the United States Government, he
slipped the letter into his pocket, and later in the day started
it for Washington in the hands of an American railroad engineer, who carried it with him to the end of his run into Vermont, and then entrusted it to the United States mail service.
It reached Washington Saturday night, and Sunday I had it
translated. It was as follows:
MONTREAL, 26th of May, I898. TUPPER STREET, 42.
To His EXCELLENCY SR. DON JoSE GOMEZ YMAY.
MY DEAR DON JOSE:
It was my belief that they would have appointed you to
command the Cadiz fleet, and it was my intention to have sent
you a telegram asking that you would take me with you to meet
you in the Antilles, or wherever you might say. The case
has not turned out thus, however, and it seems as though God
were not on our side, because the election of Senor Camara,
I fear, will be fatal, although he may have a good chief of
staff. No one could possibly suit him, because he is very
capricious, and besides is not a hard worker; on the contrary,
he is lazy and would pay no attention to the advice of any
one. You will not take this for flattery, but to-day no one
but you and Don Pasquale Cervera should have command of
our fleet, and that is the belief of the younger element of the
personnel. Now there is no remedy, and may God shed his
light upon him and keepg him in his hands. I wrote to the
Minister, and with the confidence due to my special duties I
said to him, on sending a clipping from a newspaper containing
a telegram from Cadiz, speaking of our fleet and of its Admiral,
that it was not Senor Camara but you who should command it;
and that we, the lower personnel, who have traveled about a
little, know you very well. It may be that this action may
have made a bad impression upon him, but I don't care, because if ILcan do so, I shall leave the service when this war is finished. I have been left here to receive and send telegrams
and to look after the spy service which I have established, or,
I had better say, am establishing here, because, until a very
little while ago, I was not permitted to do as I pleased. Wehave had bad luck because they have captured our two best
spies, one in Washington, who hanged himself-or else they
did it for him-and the other day before yesterday in Tampa.
The Americans are showing the most extraordinary vigilance.




434


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


I do not wish to remain here without taking an active part in
the war, and I desire duty in which I can take the initiative and
do something. I shall be extremely gratified to have a ship in
order to run the blockade, or a torpedo boat. However, if there
is no other remedy, I would go perfectly willingly on board a
large ship. I am very sorry that the war finds me so low. in
rank, for it offers opportunities for any one who wishes to
work and to risk himself. I cannot believe that Don Pasquale could be in Santiago as reported by the American press.
He entered it on the i8th, and if he had gone immediately to
Havana he would have met only two monitors in front of it.
I make it out that he entered that place only to coal, and for the
moral effect it would produce in Spain. Suppose he went out
Friday, the 20th, if he had gone to the North and through the
Providence Channel, he would have passed into Havana right
under the noses of the Americans, who had only small cruisers; for Schley was at sea on the night of Thursday, Sampson on that of Friday, and on that of Sunday, the 22d, he took
the lower channel for the East, and on Wednesday turned
back towards Havana. Schley's squadron has been reinforced
by the Iowa, and Sampson's by the Oregon. I believe that in
war one has to tempt fortune. If it had not been because
Sampson was afraid that Don Pasquale might go to Havana
and that Schley would not be there, or our confidence is well
grounded that he found himself very short of ammunition
after the bombardment through the stealing in the Ordnance
Department, the fact remains that it was logical for him to
remain near Santiago and Cienfuegos, and, if he could not
prevent the entrance of our squadron, to shut it up, and thus
close its campaign, as those people over there already believe
it closed. But I cannot believe such a stupid thing possible.
I suppose that he went to the South or Porto Rico and that
he had ordered a cruiser or two there to cover the Terror
and that he will appear at San Juan the 27th or 28th. He
will coal there and will rest a day or two and will then return
to delay and annoy them and delay the invasion. The Vizcaya and the Oquendo at least need to go into dry-dock. I
telegraphed to Don Pasquale on the morning of the 20th when
I knew he was in Santiago, saying that the squadrons were at
Key West. He did not answer me. That afternoon there
came another telegram from Madrid saying he had left Santiago.
I continued sending messages to General Blanco in respect
to all the movements, and now, so far as I know, Don Pasquale
has arrived at Porto Rico, where I shall try to correspond
with him. If he should have set out for Martinique or
Havana, having twenty-four hours advantage, he would have
arrived before now. I am very much afraid lest they attack
Porto Rico by sea and land and put off the attack on Havana.




THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR.


435


They are not going to do more than try to take the latter,
and they think then, if they destroy our fleet, of taking the
war into Spain with Havana already in their power. They
have no confidence in their army but they have in their
navy, and they are afraid of our army and yellow fever,
because if the men should begin to die in Cuba there would
be a tremendous row, as they are not like our people.
Anyway, we shall see when there is news of the fleet. I
expect it to-morrow. With them cleaning their hulls at the
Keys, we should be able to clean something in three days at
Porto Rico. Each day that passes is worse for us on account
of the almost total lack of preparation. If the Cadiz squadron is to come to bombard Boston, Portland and Long Island,
they can do it now, but after a few months it will be too late.
I think, if we are to have any success in this matter, it will
be through treating for peace by yielding Cuba and having
them recognize the debt. If we do not do this soon, it
will be too late and we shall lose Cuba and Porto Rico and
all that this war has cost us, and in addition we shall be
charged with the Cuban debt for which our Treasury is
responsible. There is no doubt here that we cannot continue
this war, in which we have nothing to gain, and may lose our
three colonies and be ruined for fifty years. In the matter
of money there is no patriotism here. Proof is given by the
bank, which ought to have bought gold, although at a premium of one-hundred per cent, and issued notes against it in
the same or a slightly greater quantity. With one hundred
and fifty millions it has made thirteen hundred millions.
This is the moment of the year at which, instead of returning
twenty-three or twenty-four per cent, it returns only twelve
or fifteen. As regards its buying gold, exchange has gone
down, and if in buying four hundred millions it issues five
hundred millions, paying six hundred or seven hundred, inasmuch as the state subscribes at the rate of five per cent,
this would represent to the bank an interest of about three
per cent, and its dividend would have gone down very little.
The bank is the nation, and with the nation it has grown rich
by offering paper money, which it did not have in its treasury,
and by getting interest on that which it really never had
given out. But, whatever the bank does, nobody dares object
except those who have no money in their pants if they
should call for it.
I have written to the Minister, but I did not give him so
much news of the fleets as to you, because I had other
things to speak of. If you should see him you might give
him some news. We shall see when they relieve me and
send some one here to work and not amuse himself. I can
imagine your anxiety for Francisco and the rest, an anxiety




A '26
TO -


THE AME.R TC. A NSPANTST-   W A I


that we share. Their terrible ships do not go as fast as ours
by perhaps two and a half -miles. As for the monitors, they
do not count for much; they can be used only to bombard
in a smooth sea, and besides cannot go fast, and carry very
little coal. They have delayed Sampson the whole voyage.
My regards to Raphael and his daughters, and you know
how much your kinsman and subordinate loves you.
RAMON CARRANZA.
I should be glad to have you write me your opinions.
You know how much I appreciate them. If the squadron
is in Cuba, they are going to destroy its wretched fortification
and sink a couple of steamers in the mouth. They have already telegraphed to Key West for them to see if they have
got them there, and the inventor, Holland, offers his submarine boat to destroy the mines.
It will be seen at once that the statements in the early part
of the letter, gave to this Government exactly what it had
been waiting for; and the information was so convincing in
its nature, that, upon receiving a photographic copy of the
original, the British Government ordered both Lieutenant
Carranza and Captain Du Bosc, to leave the country. The
fact that the letter was in the hands of the Secret Service Division at Washington, was not made public until about a week
later. In the meantime, the agent who had secured the letter
was ordered away from Montreal, to make it absolutely certain
that his identity should not be discovered, and the Spanish
officers were at their wits' end to account for the disappearance of their compromising letter. An unfortunate private
detective in Montreal was suspected of being responsible for
its disappearance, but it was impossible to sustain the charge
in court, and the case was dismissed. When the letter was
given to the public, a vigorous denial of its accuracy was
made by its author, but his denial could not stand against
the evidence of the document itself. With his removal from
the field of activity, the Spanish spy system received its
death-blow.




II




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r            -e


CHAPTER XXII.
WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR.
BY
MRS. AMOS G. DRAPER, Treasurer D. A. R. Hospital Corps.
F, as a noted orator said, " In raising your monuments to
the heroes of war, one should honor not only the heroism and patriotism of -the dead soldier, but that of the
mother who gave him birth and of the faithful, self-sacrificing
nurse, who in many cases lost her life in the effort to save his,"
surely no history of the American-Spanish war can be complete without some mention of the part in it sustained by
women. In all pieceding wars mothers have given their bestbeloved to their country, and hundreds of women in other
times of need have pressed eagerly forward to do all they
could to relieve the suffering. But in this war women have
not only, as in previous ones, responded to the call of duty,
but also for the first time in the history of our country their
freely-offered services have been formally accepted, and an
organization of women has been recognized, not as an auxiliary, but as temporarily a part of the Medical Departments
of the Army and Navy and subject to their orders. During
this war the trained woman nurse has obtained for herself a
position unique in history, and the relief work undertaken by
women in every section of the United States has been so
helpful as to lead the Surgeon-General of the Navy to say in
his official report: "In this war, woman has done her perfect work."
As it was evident to all thinking persons early in the year
'98 that war would soon be declared, various chapters of
Daughters of the American Revolution and other patriotic
organizations passed resolutions, which were forwarded to the




450
43,0


TTT T-A MrAlAN-SPAi SH. WAR.~ ~~rIn~ij2,N %1 it IN -o r AIN IZ).l WVARt.


President and other officials, offering their services in case war
should be declared. No definite plan of help was proposed
by any of them beyond collecting supplies which might be
used in case of need. Acting therefore upon a suggestion
from the War Department,- the Board of Management of the
National Society D. A. R., (Mrs. Daniel Manning, President
General) after passing several resolutions indicating a desire
to be of use, on April 27, '98, offered its services to the Surgeons General of the Army and Navy, as an examining board
for female nurses.
It was known that the Surgeon-General of the Army had
received a number of applications from women for positions
as nurses but that a lack of sufficient clerical force to examine
properly into the qualifications of the different applicants had
rendered it impossible for him to take any steps toward engaging women as contract nurses up to that time. It was thought
that women nurses might also be needed in the Naval
Hospitals. The Surgeon-General of the Army, as we see from
his annual report,
"foreseeing the necessity for a large force of trained
nurses at the general hospitals, applied to Congress (April 28,
1898), for authority to employ by contract as many nurses
as might be required during the war, at the rate of $30 per
month and a ration, the pay to be furnished from the appropriation of the Medical and Hospital Department. This was
very promptly granted."
On the same day the offer of the Daughters of the American
Revolution was accepted, as is seen by the following letters.
"The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy Department heartily approves of the proposition of your Committee to
form a corps of able, trained nurses from whose number competent nurses may be promptly detailed for such service as
may be required in caring for the sick and wounded during
the present war.
The standard of competency of these nurses will be left
entirely to the discretion of your Committee. The Bureau
places the same reliance on your judgment as it does on your
patriotism, and it rests assured that a manifestation of the same
loyalty and the same zeal in good works will be shown in the
labors of your Committee as was shown by your ancestors,




a


WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR.               439
whose never-failing support and devotion sustained the courage of their husbands and brothers in the struggle of the
Nation for independence.
Very respectfully,
(Signed) W. K. VAN REYPEN,
Surgeon General, U. S. Navy."
"I have received a large number of applications from trained
nurses and other patriotic ladies who are willing to serve as
nurses, but have been obliged to answer all of these offers to
the effect that no trained nurses are needed at present, and I
am uncertain as to what our requirements may be in the
future. It is not my intention to send any female nurses with
troops to Cuba, and in case we have a number of good hospitals established I expect to depend principally upon our trained
men of the Hospital Corps for service as nurses in the wards.
I should, however, be glad to avail myself of the services of a
ceftain number of female nurses for the care of special cases
and for the preparation and distribution of special diet in the
hospitals. I appreciate very highly the offer of the National
Board of Management of the Daughters of thie American
Revolution and am quite willing to turn this whole matter
over to your Committee, giving you the applications now on
file and those which may hereafter be received, and allowing you
to select proper persons for the service required in case I have
occasion to call for the assistance of trained female nurses.
In this case I would expect you to answer all letters of
inquiry and to keep a list of eligibles from which to make
your selections in case of a call from me. This list need not
be a long one, and it is desirable that those selected should be
from different parts of the country. Residents of Washington should not have a preference in this selection over those
of other cities. As a rule, I think it would be better to have
women of not less than thirty and not more than fifty years
-of age. 'They should, of course, be able to present proper
testimonials as to training, capacity and character. No
special legislation will be necessary in order to make appointments if the services of female nurses are required.. The compensation will be $30 a month, with board, and lodging
accommodations in the hospital where this is practicable.
I shall be glad to confer with your Committee at any time,
and remain,
Very respectfully yours,
(Signed) GEO. M. STERNBERG,
Surgeon General, U. S. Army."




44~


T E A AEAi- SPASH n  W. - 
kL AXf ntinXU/1  -tAJN 1SH WAR.


The Board adopted the plan, as endorsed by the SurgeonsGeneral of the Army and Navy, appointing the following officers:-Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee, Director, Miss Mary
Desha, Mrs. Francis S. Nash, Assistant Directors and Mrs.
Amos G. Draper, Treasurer. The Surgeons-General were
then promptly notified that the D. A. R. Hospital Corps was
formed and ready for work.
May 3, the Surgeon-General of the Army referred to the
Corps six hundred applications and letters from women and
organizations of women, offering services; May i6, the Surgeon-General of the Navy referred one hundred and forty-two
of similar character, and thereafter all applications from women
for hospital positions in the Army and Navy, whether sent to
the President, Secretary of War, Members of Congress or the
Surgeon-General, were referred to the Corps for examination,
action and filing.
While all applicants were no doubt actuated by a spirit of
patriotism and desire to serve their country, their qualifications
ranged from having served one season successfully in light
opera to twenty years of successful experience as trained nurse,
superintendent, etc. The standard set by the Surgeon-General of the Army was adhered to; a set of questions prepared
by the Hospital Corps and approved by the Surgeons-General
was sent to each applicant, whose letter indicated any evidence
of hospital training. Those designated for service were required, except in a few emergency cases, to be not only graduates from a regular training school but to be endorsed by
their superintendents.
On May 7, a request was received from the Surgeon-General of the Army for the names of three (afterwards increased
to four) surgical nurses for duty at the Military Hospital at
Key West, Fla., and on May 13, they signed contracts and left
for Key West. On the same day the names of six female
nurses for the Hospital Ship, Relief, were called for by the
Surgeon-General of the Army. From that time on, orders
were being received, and were filled, sometimes at the rate of
I 50 a day, from the list which on April 28 we were told " need
not be a long one." On September 7, the D. A. R. Hospital
Corps was relieved from further duty by the Surgeon-General




WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR.


44I1


of the Army, having selected over nine hundred nurses from
almost every State east of the Rocky Mountains, for service
in twenty-two different Army hospitals, and six for service at
the Naval hospital at Norfolk, Va. Between five and six
hundred of these were selected between August i 5 and September 7.
The Chief Surgeons at Jacksonville and Montauk appointed
directly many persons. These in addition to the nurses who
failed to sign contracts and those who were qualified by the
D. A. R. Hospital Corps but were not ordered to duty until after September 7, increased the number to twelve hundred,
more than a full regiment! These figures do not include the
faithful band of volunteer nurses or those employed in the
service of the Red Cross Auxiliary and other patriotic organizations, of whom mention wvill be made later.
Thirteen of the contract nurses, Isabella R. Bradford, Sister Anastasia Burke, Sister M. Elizabeth Flanagan, Margaret
J. Greenfield, Sister Mary Larkin, Katherine Stansberry, Sister Mary Agnes Sweeney, Irene S. Toland, M. D., Ellen May
Tower, Margaret N. Tricoche, Minerva Turnbull, Clara H.
Ward and Sister Caroline Wolfe, died in service. Many more,
like the soldiers they nursed, were so enfeebled by disease, as
to be practically dependent upon others for support for weeks
and months. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a
man lay down his life for his friends."
While Miss Dix was appointed Superintendent of nurses in
i86i by the Secretary of War, and served in that position
until the close of the Civil War, trained nursing as a profession was then unknown, and this is the first time that trained
nurses have been recognized as a part of the Medical Department of the Government. That the idea of women nurses in
the regular military hospitals was not acceptable to many bf
the Commanding Surgeons at first, was of course to be
expected. But the fact remains that in every instance where
their services were allowed, (often in the face of much opposition) within a short time the Surgeon Commanding asked for
more, considering their presence a necessity. The following
extracts are cited as examples of many that could be given if
space permitted. The first is from Major Dewitt, Surgeon




442 -

442THE AMEERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Commanding the Hospital at Fortress Monroe, where only
thirty-four of the seventeen hundred patients died.
"I am satisfied that whatever success we may have had in
the treatment of our sick and wvounded, has been in a great
measure due to the skill and devotion of the female nurses."
Major Mearns, Surgeon Commanding the John Blair Gibbs
General Hospital, says:
"In patriotism, courage and patient endurance of hardships, the female contract nurses...  have risen above the
standard of enlisted men, and I am compelled to compare
them in these respects with the soldiers of the regular army
of the U. S."
Like all other "persons employed in hospitals," the contract nurse is required to " wear habitually during the war, on
the left sleeve of the coat, midway between the shoulder and
elbow, a brassard or arm badge, consisting of a red cross on a
white ground," in accordance with the treaty of Geneva.
This, and the fact that in many instances her maintenance
was paid entirely or in part by the Red Cross Auxiliary No.
3, has given rise to the erroneous impression among many
persons, that she was a volunteer nurse, working in the service of the " American National Red Cross." The Hospital
Ship, Relief,-owned by the Government, whose women nurses
were designated by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps and
engaged bV the Surgeon-General, was supposed by many persons to belong to the " civil society " above mentioned
because, according to the treaty, it carried the Geneva cross
flag at the fore whenever the National flag was flown.
Various organizations, religious and otherwise, applied for
permission to serve in the military hospitals. These were
declined, but the service of many members of the organizations, applying as individuals were gladly accepted. This is
notably the case of the Sisters of Charity, Sisters of Mercy,
Sisters of the Holy Cross, Sisters of St. Joseph and Sisters of
the American Congregation, all of the latter order being
daughters of Indian Chiefs-Cheyennes and Sioux. Two




WOMAN'S WORK IN THE \VAR.


443


hundred and forty-three of these served, 2i8 of them being
designated by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps.
This is the first time that Roman Catholic Sisters have
signed contracts as individuals. They did it cheerfully in
this instance, realizing the principle at stake and being
desirous of aiding and not hindering the Government in its
efforts to secure the highest grade of nursing for its men. Of
the value of their services Colonel Hoff writes from Chickamauga:"No words can express my sense of obligation to the kind
Sisters for their admirable work with, and tender care of our
sick.... Please return to the Sisters my sense of obligation
to them, and the hope that I may feel at liberty to call upon
them under like circumstances in the future."
Dr. Almy says in a letter from Montauk:
"In fact, it is due to their untiring work that every one says
that the 'Annex' is the model hospital here. I would wish
to state that I consider them a great and indispensable help
in the military hospitals."
Other equally appreciative letters could be given.
Miss Ella Lorraine Dorsey, a " high private in the D. A. R.
Hospital Corps," was given the privilege and duty of examining and filing all papers in relation to the Sisters, and to her
kindness I am indebted for the data concerning them.
The following extracts from the annual report of the Surgeon-General
"A number of patriotic societies offered to provide the hospitals with nurses, but the Committee referred to, answered
its purpose so well that I did not feel the need of additional
assistance and awas relieved from what would otherwise have
been a serious responsibility;"
and from a letter received from Major Carter, Surgeon Commanding Leiter Hospital:
"I cannot refrain from expressing my admiration for the
care and discretion exercised by the D. A. R. Hospital
Corps in the selection of nurses; and I beg leave to express
my highest appreciation of the invaluable aid they afforded
the management of Leiter Hospital;"




444


THE AVlERICAN-SPFANJSH WAR.


and scores of other letters give an idea of the value set upon
the services rendered by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps. The
best proof, however, of the - thoroughness of the work of
selection lies in the fact that not one of the nurses designated
by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps was discharged for "misconduct or neglect of duty."
One shudders to think what might have been the result if
nurses had been chosen by political influence alone, nor can
one refrain from admiring the wisdom and forethought of the
Surgeon-General of the Army for his persistent refusal, in the
face of much adverse criticism, to appoint women nurses in
the beginning, until their credentials could be properly,examined, and for his continued adherence to the high
standard of excellence first maintained.
That it would have been impossible for any woman or corps
'of women, living in one locality to have obtained such results,
is self-evident. The Daughters of the American Revolution
were peculiarly fitted for this work. Not only were its
members alive to all patriotic deeds; they were thoroughly
organized and embraced all classes of society, all political
parties and all shades of religious belief. Two of the officers
of the Hospital Corps were daughters' of Union men, and two
of Southern veterans. April 30, a circular letter had been
sent by the Board to its 582 chapters in every state in the
Union, calling upon them for assistance. This was promptly
responded to. Committees, usually consisting of physicians'
wives, were formed to which were referred the credentials of
applicants from that section. One wealthy woman in Boston
came to town twice a week and opened her house to receiye
the applications of nurses and visited personally the physicians, patients and hospitals to whom references were made,
before giving her endorsement. Women of wealth and
influence in Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit,
Philadelphia, Rochester and St. Louis were equally efficient,
many of them remaining at home through the entire summer
to fulfil the duties of their office. Their work was ably
supplemented by the Associated Alumne of Trained
Nurses and other organizations of similar character, as well as
by the superintendents of training schools who rendered




WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR.


445


invaluable assistance. These and many others worked
zealously for the good of the cause, without hope of reward,
satisfied with the consciousness of duty well performed.
When the hospital at Fortress Monroe was opened a new
difficulty arose. In a tent hospital, there were and necessarily could be no accommodations forwomen nurses. Realizing the necessity, however, Mrs. Walworth, Director-General
of the Woman's National War Relief Association, telegraphed
to the Hospital Corps;-" If the Surgeon-General will send
eight nurses designated by you to Fortress Monroe, we will
pay their board." Within two hours the nurses had been
appointed by the Surgeon-General and were on their way.
This Society deserves more than a passing mention. Not
only did it pay the board of the nurses above mentioned; it
supplied thousands of dollars worth of delicacies to the hospital at Fortress Monroe, engaged cooks in order that the
food might be served in the most palatable manner, and
furnished medicines and supplies to many of the transports
setting out for Porto Rico. Many a poor soldier has reason
to bless the day that his surgeon, young and inexperienced, who let his medicine case be taken on board ship
with other baggage and thus found it inaccessible, met Mrs.
Walworth and was given a fresh supply of needed articles.
When the poor fever-stricken remnant of our gallant army
was landed at Montauk, Miss Helen Gould, whose generous
gift of $iooooo had been gratefully accepted by the Government some time before, was chosen to represent the Association and, from that time until the last tent was pitched, she
and other officers of the Association might be seen, ministering to the sick and affording help in so many ways that the
thanks of Congress were tendered her for her manifold services.
Miss Reubena Walworth volunteered as a nurse at the
beginning of the war and was employed by the Association.
She labored most zealously at Fortress Monroe and at Montauk
and finally lost her life in the Detention Hospital, beloved
by all with whom she came in contact.
Early in July one great deficiency was seen in the method
of supplying women nurses to the military hospitals as they




44i6


THE AMERPCAN-QSPANJT-SH WAR.


were needed. Since Congress had provided no special fund
for their transportation, considerable delay had always occurred
before they could reach their destinations, and as these hospitals were rapidly filling up with patients, in consequence of the
outbreak of typhoid and malarial fevers in the different camps,
the effect of such delay became daily more dangerous. The
Red Cross Society for the Maintenance of Trained Nurses,
Auxiliary to the American National Red Cross Relief Committee, Auxiliary No. 3, through its Acting President, Mrs.
Winthrop Cowdin, who was always keenly alive to the needs
of the soldier and the nurse and on the alert to supply them
if possible, offered to make good this lack. Five hundred dollars was placed in the hands of the Treasurer of the D. A. R.
Hospital Corps as Acting Treasurer, which was afterwards increased to $5,500oo, to meet transportation expenses of nurses,
ordered directly from Washington. The transportation expenses of over 400 others was paid from New York to their posts
of destination. Owing to this generous contribution, nurses
were ordered by telegraph by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps to
proceed at once to their posts of duty, being assured that their
transportation would be refunded them, without waiting for the
official papers necessary under the old system. In this way they
were ready for service several days, sometimes a week earlier,
and there is no doubt that much suffering and some lives were
saved thereby. This Society also provided maintenance for
43 nurses at Fortress Monroe, 150 at the Sternberg Hospital,
Chickamauga, furnished supplies in great abundance to the
nurses and men at many of the hospitals, most especially
those of Sternberg and Montauk, supported over 200 nurses
sent by permission to different hospitals in this country and
in Cuba, and richly earned for itself the encomium of Major
Rafferty of Fort Hamilton:
" Were I to choose the most worthy and successful body of
workers from amnong all the generous people who have been
rendering such beautiful aid to our sick and wounded, I should
unhesitatingly point to your Auxiliary for the Maintenance of
Trained Nurses. "


This Society also lost by d.eath one of its efficient workers,




WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR.


447


Miss Phinney, who after serving faithfully at the Leiter Hospital succumbed to the physical and mental strain.
i Nor did the D. A. R. Hospital Corps content itself with being merely an examining board for nurses. From the first
week in May when we undertook to supply Soo hospital shirts,
till the last of September, when we reported $6o, ooo in money
and supplies received and forwarded, it formed one of the
channels into which poured the great stream of relief work undertaken by women throughout the entire country. From
the 236 chapters and societies contributing, it sent supplies to
every general hospital in the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico
and Manila and to many of the field and division hospitals,
started a diet kitchen at Fort McPherson, Ga., gave employment to many women, whose relatives were in the war, and
furnished patterns of garments needed in hospitals to hundreds
of applicants.
In Connecticut the relief work was thoroughly organized
under its energetic State Regent. One had but to telegraph
to New Haven, and whether the request was for collapsible
rubber bath-tubs, straw matting beds or food delicacies, it
was granted instantly.
In many of the towns in New York and Pennsylvania, notices
were read from the different churches calling upon the people to unite, and War Emergency Relief Boards were formed,
frequently with a Daughter of the American Revolution at
the head. One in Cleveland, Ohio, having '88 auxiliaries in
the city and surrounding towns, contributed over $9,ooo in
money and sent 365 boxes of clothing and supplies. In
Rochester, N. Y., the work begun under the auspices of the Irondequoit Chapter, D. A. R., soon outgrew its quarters, and a
large organization called the Rochester War Relief Committee
was formed which embraced iiS organizations in Rochester
and in the towns of western New York. These contributed
thousands of dollars in money and supplies to different camps
and hospitals wherever the call seemed most urgent. Mite
boxes were placed in different hotels and public places in Detroit, and the result, mostly in pennies, was wisely expended
in fruits and other delicacies for the sick.
The Daughters of the Confederacy in Virginia and in Texas




'[TE A   PVD TOCA NT CD A TTC  WAR n
A.L  I   X, X _, v I  w 11  a -  A X A.   WV CLf..


contributed most generously to the cause. Contributions both
in money and supplies were sent by them through the D. A.
R. Hospital Corps to several hospitals, chieflyto Pablo Beach,
18 miles from Jacksonville, where a large convalescent hospital was established for convalescents and others who had
become debilitated through climatic influences. Mrs. Fitzhugh
Lee worked unceasingly for the good of the soldiers stationed
there and herself supervised many of the details of relief work.
Other societies, notably the King's Daughters, Woman's
Relief Corps, Council of Jewish Women, Rathbone and Pythian Sisters, Ladies of the G. A. R., Temperance Unions and
many Church Societies, both Catholic and Protestant, lent
willing aid to our efforts to serve our country.
Our support came from all classes; from the richest to the
poorest, from those in perfect health to the woman who,
although confined to her bed, cut out io8 flannel bands and
later wrote, " I have so enjoyed the pattern you sent me,"
from the old lady of 83 who faithfully served her country
during the Civil War to the boy of ten, who culled from
newspapers and magazines the choicest and brightest clippings
and sent them in envelopes to the different hospitals.
The office in Washington was open from 8 A. M. to II
and 12 P. M. When, one by one, the many efficient volunteer
helpers were obliged to leave town, and one of the officers
even was unable to render further assistance, the others
uncomplainingly lengthened their own hours and no call,
whether for nurses or supplies, at whatever hour of the day or
night it might be received, was unheeded. In reviewing the
work one can only echo the words of a most faithful worker:
"We are learning a great lesson here and that is in finding
out the best in hundreds of people we never could have met
but for such a crisis. I believe more than ever in humanity."
It is an historical fact that the decision of the Government
to send the Hospital Ships, Scandia and Arizona, to Manila
was hastened, if not actually inspired, by the efforts of a
woman who at her own expense came to Washington from
Portland, Oregon. Almost on her knees she begged the military authorities to send relief to the men, many of whom
had been school boys under her tuition. Like the importunate




WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR.


449


widow in Bible times, she would not be denied. Letters were
sent by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps to the State Regents of
all States west of the Rocky Mountains, informing them of
the good deeds of their Eastern Sisters and inciting them to
effort in the same direction. This met with the same generous response that had been accorded all other appeals to the
patriotism of women, and our boys at Manila had reason to
echo the prayer made by members of a Kentucky Regiment
who stood with uncovered heads, as supplies were being
brought in, and said, " God bless the Daughters of the American Revolution;"
As the D. A. R. Hospital Corps was organized for service
in the Army and Navy, the money and supplies passing
through its hands were spent under the direction of the
Surgeons General. In this way duplication of charitable
gifts was avoided and every garment sent and every dollar
expended was appreciated to the fullest extent. If the supplies reached their destination and were of service in alleviating suffering, what does it matter that in many cases they, as
well as the nurses furnished by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps,
were credited to the American National Red Cross, which in
the minds of many persons stands for all that is good and
true? That they did relieve suffering and were sent where
they were most needed has been abundantly proven. Extracts from a few letters chosen at random, from many in the
possession of the Daughters of the American Revolution are
given.
"It is not possible within reasonable limits, to set forth all
the varieties of help afforded by the D. A. R. But whether
it was nurses, supplies, wines, waters, clothing or cooks that
were needed, the D. A. R. were ever ready to meet the
demands. Thanks and gratitude are particularly due to the
Cincinnati Committee and its able Chairman. No request of
any sort was made to them in vain. And their promptness
and business-like methods were deserving of the highest commendation."
"There was not a single article that was not needful...
The thermometers, medicine glasses, swabs, slippers, handkerchiefs, sponges, soaps, bay rum, fans, etc., etc., in a word each
and every article will meet its proper recognition in discharge




45O


flT   1 A   r  T     A 1T -SPD ANT T TC!T  T A R.
I I Ii fli X VJIli Ix I ~a IN- 1  a. r JA - L..sa~   a. XL%


of our labor and will contribute largely to the comforts and
also pleasure of the sick, all of whom with us, seem to be
very refined and of respectable appearance, some mere boys,
and all looking to the nurses now as their own friends and
relations."
"The grape juice, soups and other delicacies came just as
they were most needed, and the poor convalescents enjoyed
all so much. We divided the good things among the nurses
and rejoiced in them as much as the sick, for there is nothing
harder than to have the care of sick, and not have wherewith
to nourish them as their condition requires."
In the beginning the D. A. R. Hospital Corps had taken
upon themselves the privilege of supplying each nurse with a
dozen aprons, which were furnished by the different Chapters,
according to their ability, at the rate of from one to seventy-five
dozen. As the demand for nurses increased, the stock became
exhausted and with fear and trembling the question was put
to the Chairmen of different Committees by Miss Desha,
Assistant Director, who had been placed in charge of this
matter: "Shall we supply these later nurses with aprons? "
As quick as the wires could carry the message, came the first
response, " Let us keep our word. Rochester ready in one
week with twenty dozen." This was followed with similar
messages from Chicago and Elmira, but the climax was
reached when Louisville responded that 200 dozen were awaiting our orders, thus completing our quota.
The D. A. R. Hospital Corps was only one outlet for the
activity of the " Daughters." A War Comrmittee, with Mrs.
Daniel Manning, Chairman, and Mrs. Russell A. Alger, ViceChairman, was formed. They sent food and clothing to many
different hospitals and purchased a launch for the Hospital
Ship, Missouri, of which Major Arthur writes;
" The launch proved of the very greatest utility in bringing
our sick on board. We put all the recumbent patients in the
launches on litters, and towed those able to sit up in the
ship's gig, behind. In this way we transferred one hundred
and six patients from the shore to the ship in an hour and
three quarters."


Many members gave as individuals, like the woman in Phil



WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR.              451
adelphia who, when the news of the battle of El Caney was
received, telegraphed the President, "How can $6oo best be
expended for soldiers at Santiago?" The reply, "Soups,
Franco-American," was hardly received before they were
bought and ready for shipment on the first transport.
Others took upon themselves the care of the families of the
soldiers and sailors, both regulars and volunteers. Rents
were paid; food and clothing given to the destitute; and as
far as possible, employment obtained for the women who,
especially in the case of the Regulars, were often left stranded
with no means of obtaining a livelihood and no money to
enable them to go where work could be found.
The official report of the work of the D. A. R. places the
amount contributed at $350,ooo, and every Daughter will remember with pride the additional fact that Miss Clara Barton.
the President of the American National Red Cross, is a
charter member and Honorary Vice President General ot
the D. A. R., that Mrs. Walworth, Director-General of the
Woman's National War Relief Association, is one of its founders, and that Miss Helen Gould is also a " Daughter."
The Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association called upon
all the women of that State to help fit out the Hospital Ship.
Bay State, which, although designed primarily for the use of the
Massachusetts soldiers was given to the Government to be used
as the needs demanded. This ship, like the Solace, Relief and
Missouri, is said to have been loaded to the water's edge
with medical supplies, delicacies and clothing suitable for the
comfort of the sick and wounded.
The Legion of Loyal Women, as an auxiliary to the American National Red Cross, contributed large supplies of food
and clothing to the various camps, and individual members
established diet kitchens at several hospitals and rendered
other valuable assistance.
The WV. C. T. U. opened lunch rooms and "Rest rooms
near all the camps, making them as inviting as possible that
the tired soldier might be induced to while away his leisure
hours there, and avoid the pitfall of the neighboring saloons.
No history of the part taken by woman in this war can be
complete without mention of the American National Red




452


4THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Cross, which with the various other societies bearing the name
" Red Cross," some of them auxiliary to, and all animated by
the same noble purpose, contributed more than half the supplies furnished to the various camps during the war. For
while it is true that most of the incorporators and many of
the officers are men, all women are proud of the fact that the
President, Miss Clara Barton, is a woman. To the State of
Texas, with her party of doctors and nurses on board, was given
the honor of being the first ship to sail into Santiago after the
surrender. Her nurses were the first women to minister to the
sick and wounded in Cuba and hundreds of men and women
rise up to call her blessed."
The Red Cross of California, the Red Cross of Oregon and
the Red Cross of Seattle have taken a very prominent part in
the relief work of the war. Men and women nurses have been
sent to Manila by them, a hospital established, and thousands
of dollars worth of supplies of all sorts forwarded to the Phil-. ippines.
While women as well as men realize that "In union there
is strength," and most of the relief work was carried on by
organizations, there are several notable exceptions. Five
women, Clara Barton, Anna Bouligny, Margaret Chanler,
Helen Miller Gould, and Annie Wheeler, received the thanks
of Congress for their deeds of generosity and mercy, and hundreds of others gave in equal measure, according to their
ability.
As the war drew to a close and the men were allowed to
return to their homes, patriotic women all Over the country
united to make their journey as comfortable as possible.
Home-made bread, cakes, lemonade, etc., were taken to the
different stations and served to the wan, gaunt specimens of
humanity, many of whom said- that it was the first nourishing food they had eaten for months. Nurses and doctors
were employed to go into the cars and examine the patients;
permission was obtained to remove those who were unable to
travel further and to place them in hospitals; and assistance
was rendered to the convalescent. At one station in Pennsylvaniaa man was found lying in the broiling sun, with face as
yellow as a lemon. The passers-by were afraid to go near him




WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR,.5


453


as it was reported he had yellow fever. A woman physician,
a Daughter of the American Revolution, went up to him, and
finding after examination that he was suffering simply from a
severe case of malaria, had him conveyed to a hospital, took
care of him herself until other nurses could be obtained and
had the satisfaction of seeing him discharged, quite convalescent, within a few days.
I wish I might truthfully say that the supplies poured out
in such abundant measure, " twice trodden and running over,"
always reached those for whom they were intended, or that
all suffering was, as it ought to have been, relieved by them.
That such was not always the case thousands, alas, can testify.
This is in very few instances the fault of the senders, but like
many other things, can be accounted for by the general unpreparedness of our country for-war. In a few hours, spent at
one of the hospitals, I saw seriously ill patients obliged to lie
on the floor of a tent, although an ample supply of cots were
only two miles away and had been 'for days, but for lack of
transportation facilities they could not be obtained. On my
return to the station I saw gallons of milk standing in the hot
sun where it had been all day, because- no wagon could be
found to take it to the typhoid. patients, who were suffering
for lack of it. All who were interested in the work know that
in every hospital there were times when there would be a lack
of necessities, and times when necessities, comforts and luxuries even were received in such abundance that they could not
be utilized.
Such things will inevitably occur, until the Surgeon-General
of the Army has as full power accorded him as is given to the
Surgeon-General of the Navy, and until all relief work in time
of war or national disaster is organized under one or more
national societies, in harmony with the Government and under
its control, and whose chiefs shall be either elected by the people
or appointed by the Government or both. Then and not till
then will the greatest possible good be given the greatest
number of people at the least expenditure of money and
strength.
Different commanders have vied with each other in disclaiming the honor for their victories, giving it to the " men behind




454


THE A1V1t;K1UA1N-bYAN1bni WA.K.


the guns." Shall no word of praise be given to the woman, who,
by her skill in restoring the sick to health and by her furnishing the needed supplies when the men were exhausted, rendered them capable of winning victories? It was a glorious
thing to stand firm, and make the famous charge at San Juan.
Was it not also glorious for a woman, reared in the Northern
climate, to offer her services as nurse for soldiers stricken with
the dread yellow fever, and then when on her arrival at the
hospital she found that, while there was no lack of trained
nurses like herself, no one could be engaged to properly prepare the food, to go herself into the kitchen, and for five weeks
prepare with her own hands the broths and soups necessary
for several hundred sick and convalescents? It required true
courage and patriotism to lie in the trenches day after day,
uncomplainingly, although wet to the skin, as so many of our
brave men did. Was, no courage or patriotism shown by
the pleasure-loving, young girl, who cheerfully relinquished a
trip to the sea-shore and performed routine clerical work day
after day, in order that the money thus saved might be expended in delicacies for the wounded, -or by the woman, who,
employed in the service of the Government during the day,
worked until midnight all through the hottest summer ever
known in Washington, in order that " haply some life might
thereby be saved," or by the woman in Cleveland, who packed
box after box through the long summer days, until at last she
fainted at her self-imposed task, and was carried away to suffer
for weeks from the effects of her labors,-or by the poor laundry
women who worked over hours, without pay, that the shirts
sent to the soldiers might be soft and clean as only freshlylaundered linen can be,-or by the colored cook, who for two
days, steadily, in a hot kitchen, strained and prepared the
grape-juice, which was so refreshing to the fever-stricken
patients,-or by hundreds of women, whose deeds come to
the mind of every reader of these pages, wherever in this
great country he may be.?
Not long ago the earthly remains of the brave men who
died in Cuba and Porto Rico were brought home, to be
interred in that beautiful and historic spot, Arlington,
where the heroes of many a war are resting. The President




WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR.


45 'a


and other high officials of the Government were present to do
them honor; flags were put at half-mast; Government offices
were closed; the whole nation mourned. In honoring them,
however, we should not fail to respect the memory of the
young physician, Dr. Irene Toland, who, as soon as she was
told that yellow-fever had broken out among the soldiers and
that her services were needed, left an extensive practice in St.
Louis and was sent to Cuba. After restoring many to health
by her efficient nursing, her strength was exhausted and she
died at Santiago, having as truly given her life in the service
of her country as any soldier who fell on the field of battle.
Nor should we forget Sister Mary Larkin and Ellen May
Tower who lost their lives in Porto Rico that their patients
might live.
When the Government erects at Arlington its welldeserved tribute to the men, whose names are on the roll of
honor of their country, close beside it should stand a slender
marble shaft, inscribed " Sacred to the memory of the women
who gave their lives in response to their country's call."


7




-f-.,;. 1...       7 —".




I




I~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~..... 111  111...........11111_............ llllllII
I HERxx x  _  I  IIII




CHAPTER XXIII.


CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN,
ARMY AND NAVY CHRISTIAN COMMISSION.
PERSONAL GLIMPSES OF ITS WORK.
BY
MAJ.-GEN. 0. 0. HOWARD.
O    N the 3rd of September, i86i, I lost my first brigade
command. It was caused by my promotion, passing
as I did from a senior colonelcy to the rank of a
Brigadier General of Volunteers. While waiting under McClellan for an assignment to a new brigade, I was living with
my Adjutant General and some friends in what was called the
chain-building. It was in Washington, near the New York
Avenue Presbyterian church, where General Scott had once
roomed.
Having at the time but little official business on hand, I
spent many hours with the members of the Young Men's
Christian Association, of which institution I was a member.
The Washington branch, which I was helping, had immediately undertaken an active Christian work in the regiments, as
soon as they came to be stationed in and around the District
of Columbia. These efforts were similar to those before the
Spanish War, lately undertaken and carried forward by our
young men, particularly in the local branches near State encampments.
About the same time that we in Washington set up our
Christian standard and were unfurling it in that part of the
United States Army, a central committee in Philadelphia
showed itself with a larger outlook. This committee sprang
from the Young Men's Christian Association of the United
States.




456


4 T HE AIVERKICAN-SPANISHi WAR.


George H. Stuart, an eminent Christian merchant of Philadelphia, became, upon invitation of the committee, the
conspicuous President of the new organization, soon christened: " The Army Christian Commission."
I have regarded the Washington enterprise of i86i as a
stepping-stone to the Commission-to that grand body of
men and women (for women's organizations were soon multitudinous and auxiliary) who raised millions of dollars and
carried by their delegates essential comforts, proper literature
and breezes of home-life to our camps and hospitals duringthe four dreadful years of the Civil War.
The general national association long ago became international, and through institutions of learning, academies,
colleges and universities, has taken its Christian enterprises
in behalf of young men into every part of every country on
the globe where such institutions exist.
When the war with Spain became imminent and State
camps for soldiers were located and occupied by the National
Guard, at once local associations became active. They
planted large-sized tents that are more like old-fashioned
pavilions than army tents. Let us take for an example one
such pavilion. You find it equipped with a platform at one
end, which carries a desk for the secretary and a cabinet organ,
with song books of different kinds and sizes heaped around
it, with tables long and short usually covering the entire
space of the pavilion, excepting the platform and the room
occupied by benches and chairs convenient to the tables, and
a few stands devoted to harmless games. On the tables are
found an abundance of weekly journals, monthlies and dailies,
with here and there piles of small books and booklets. But
the main thing noticeable is the fine arrangement for writing:
ink-wells, headed paper and patriotic envelopes by the million.
As soon as one of the pavilions had been erected, there were
put up outside of it, under canvas or rough boards in shanty
form, a small storehouse and kitchen where the secretarymanager and his three or four assistants ate and slept and
kept on hand reserve supplies. Either here or at the end of
the pavilion could always be found a large tank of ice water
that somehow, like the widow's barrel and cruse, never became




CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN. 459


empty. Such was the early equipment intended for about
four or five regiments for each pavilion.
To go back for a moment to the impelling force, near the
first of May our grand international committee living in New
York and vicinity did several things. They first called a
public Association meeting of members, in the Collegiate
Church (The Dutch Reformed) of the city, which was largely
attended, the members coming together from all quarters and
from different denominations. They established a Branch,
the name of which, as finally settled upon, was " The Army
and Navy Christian Commission." They then fixed headquarters at No. 3 West 29th Street, at the same place where
for a long time have gathered the secretaries and helpers of
the international committee, a place before and after this
event full of benevolent activity and Christian interest. Two
young men were selected and placed in charge as business
managers, Mr. W. E. Lougee and Mr. Wm. B. Millar. The
first controlled the large correspondence and the raising from
the people of the necessary funds; the other appointed and
regulated the field agents for each encampment and the
superintendents of the pavilions. Very soon, of course, a
treasurer was essential. Frederick B. Schenck, Esq., was
wisely chosen, for he had the confidence of the business
community.
Such was the arrangement already existing, but naturally
not yet perfected, when in the same month of May, Major D.
W. Whittle and I met at the Murray Hill Hotel late one
evening. Our visits to the Commission made the next morning, to the Christian Herald, to the Secretaries of the Bible
Society, to the American Tract Society and to Mr. Sankey's
commercial establishment, from which came many thousands
of hymns and song books, proved to be remarkably fruitful.
Bibles, parts of Bibles, Testaments, books and booklets, song
books and religious weeklies were generously given, boxed
and sent forward to our order without charge. General
Samuel Thomas kindly secured us transportation for ourselves
to Chickamauga, Atlanta, Mobile, Tampa and return.
My first sight of a furnished pavilion, such as I have
described, wvas at Camp Coppinger in the thin forest of pines




A dT:T  A ITnfl flC TnSPA 'r  --
AlJ2 -.r- n ihJ1 N-tAiN ISf  WAR.


about four miles northeast of Mobile. Just outside the pavilion was the small platform temporarily removed from its
place inside. The cabinet organ and all the seats had also
been carried out and arranged in front of it. The soldiers
were already gathered. Just after dark the benches were
filled, but more men were standing on the right and left, more
still in the rear-probably 2,000 altogether. Mr. Harte, from
the Mobile Association, with selected singers to help him,
was conducting some preliminary exercises. He was a large,
well-built, healthful-looking young man of most acceptable
presence and speech. It was indeed a weird scene- that
greeted us-all lighted up in smoke and flame by torches of
the pitch-pine held in the hands of many soldiers. These
were mainly regulars with a sprinkling of volunteers from the
Texas regiment and from the Alabama camp just joined.
Officers of every rank were gathered near the platform. As
we approached-Major Whittle, Lieutenant John Howard
and myself-we heard Mr. Harte making promises of our
coming, so that we knew that we were waited for. It was a
rousing welcome that was given us when we stepped upon
the platform, for, be assured, the soldiers do not hesitate in
any voluntary meeting, religious or otherwise, to cheer
heartily when they choose.
It was a great delight to me to hear the hymns, especially
those of a patriotic kind, that -filled with their music the piny
woods that night. Strong, manly voices followed up the
inimitable solos with such choruses as could not be rendered
elsewhere.
Major Whittle, an evangelist of long experience, who in the
Civil War was my beloved staff officer and companion, accustomed to soldier audiences, never appeared to better advantage than when speaking on that occasion. He was, without
doubt, specially inspired. His face shone brightly as the
flambeaux waved near him, and his voice rang out eloquently
as he demonstrated with extraordinary clearness what the
Scriptures meant by repentance and belief in Christ. His
illustrations, usually drawn from his early army associations,
were fresh, pointed and convincing.
My first address at that Camp Coppinger followed that of




CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH. SPAIN. 461


Major Whittle, and the subject was, "He died for me." I
also illustrated my theme by several selections from my own
army experience, taking cases where an officer or soldier had
been killed or desperately wounded when connected with my
staff or myself in campaign and battle; that is to say, where in
some sense the life surrendered appeared to be given for me.
Perhaps the most marked instance among my illustrations
was that of my hostler and orderly, McDonald. At the battle
called Kolb's Farm, in Georgia, with my staff and orderlies I
was watching some important operations not far from our
front line, when McDonald was hit by a rifle ball that passed
through his instep, giving him a very painful wound. He
rode up near me and told me that he was wounded, while
showing me his foot. He said that he should die. I told
him, no; I knew the wound was painful, but did not believe
it fatal. I said that if he would go back to the field hospital
I would join him after the battle was over and do what I
could for his comfort. He then rode away, but before
departing he looked up into my face while a tear was glistening in his eye and said, " How glad I am that I was wounded
and not you." I felt then, and the impression has remained
with me, that McDonald gave his life for my life. When I
went back to the field hospital I found that he had already
been carried away to Lookout Mountain, where he was placed
in hospital. He died there and was buried among the vast
multitude marked " Unknown."
The soldiers at Mobile-the most of them-afterwards went
to Tampa and thence to Cuba and fought in the battles about
Santiago. Many of them were killed or wounded or died in
hospitals. Some of them, convalescing, were sent home. I
met some in the hospitals at Key West and I came up with
others on the Seguranfa to New York. On board were many
that had come from Santiago de Cuba. I saw one man in
the social hall on the long side seat; the nurse and one or
two of his comrades were near him. He lay there stretched
out, pale as death, hardly breathing. The nurse said that he
could not live many minutes longer. A young doctor came
to him and I accompanied the doctor. I put my hand on his
head and spoke to him gently, and he opened his eyes and




A62


TUE Ajas{E RTCANTS PDANT TS TTvTAR


told me his name and his regiment and the letter of his company. His name was Corcoran of the 3d Regular Infantry.
He was from Baltimore, the only son of Michael Corcoran of
that city. When I turned away the doctor said, " General,
you have done him more good than medicine," for the young
man showed evidence of increasing life. As I was on the
point of leaving the social hall, I came toward Corcoran.
Just then the young man opened his eyes and looked at me
for a moment and said: "Aren't you General Howard?"
"Yes," I replied.
" I thought so. You spoke to us at Mobile and told us the
story of Private McDonald." I sat down close to him and
said gently:
" Are you trusting in McDonald's Savior?"
He answered me with decision and with more strength of
voice than I had believed -he could command: " Yes, I am!"
Day by day, as we moved along on the large steamer, I
visited Corcoran in the forward part of the ship and found
him slowly gaining strength. Once he said to me: " General,
I am praying all the time."
Like McDonald, after he became a Christian, he appeared
to become more and more attached to me, and was greatly
delighted at a small present which I gave him, of something
that had been with me for some years. He would not allow
his mess-mate to take it out of his sight. I learned from his
comrades that he had been a splendid soldier, in fact an athlete, and they said that it was surprising how quickly the
fever had brought him to death's door.
This incident gives some idea of how we may, when we
least think of it, make a lodgment in the mind and heart of
an immortal soul, and how by the Divine help such a soul
may enter into salvation.
I omitted to say that the Evangelical Division of the Army
and Navy Commission was intrusted to D. L. Moody, the
evangelist. He early made up his mind that something more
than giving literature, however good, and games, however
innocent, and letter-paper, however abundant, was necessary
to satisfy Christian people and please the Master. He heard
at the outset that there were almost no chaplains at Tampa




CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN. 463


and many vacancies among them elsewhere. He therefore
sent to Tampa many of his best speakers. They went also
to Camp Alger and the camps at Chickamauga, Jacksonville,
Mobile, Miami and elsewhere.
It was a little later that Major Whittle and I met a bevy of
the workers at Chickamauga. Our organization was more
complete at that great camp than anywhere else. We sat
down in a place we called headquarters, not far from General
John R. Brooke, commanding the Corps present. Our group
was at his left rear, near the Signal Corps, and not far from
Leiters' Station. These Christian headquarters had tents,
shanties for storehouses, and a board kitchen extensive enough
to accommodate at least twenty boarders, with a good Christian worker as a sort of commandant of kitchen, " to run that
part of the machine." It was very delightful and very profitable to sit by Whittle's tent at a place where prayer was wont
to be made, and where the Christian helpers came in from all
parts of the encampment for prayer, conference and supplies.
From that center they went out all over the vast forest to
the twenty-eight pavilions, arranged as I have described and
ready for their meetings. The pavilion we usually found
filled with soldiers sitting at the tables, reading the literature,
or playing some harmless games or writing letters to the
home-circle or to other friends.
The singers were a great feature of our efforts; each one of
them, like Maxwell or Burke, was a leader and a teacher.
He could sing a solo and in a few minutes teach a regiment
or brigade to sound the chorus. Maxwell at times seemed to
play upon a body of men 3,000 strong as he would upon an
organ or a piano. The choruses in the open air were always
strong, grand, impressive. It seemed to me wonderful that
there were so many good singers. The singers did more.
They visited the hospitals every day, and, where they could,
they sang hymns to the convalescent, and with others they
went from house to house, or from canvas to canvas, to give
cheer and condolence, or receive for transmission tender messages which the sick men believed they themselves would
never be able again to give.
The Red Cross had a noble work, and in fact it did not dif



Ar64


TI-FE AMP.RTCAN-.SPATNqT-T WAR


fer materially from ours, because of Christian hearts like those
of Dr. Gill and Miss Clara Barton, who distributed the relief. Medicines, soups and delicate fruit are themselves powerful instrumentalities to lift up human souls when they are
carried in the right way to those who are in need; but these
things ought we to have done and not leave the other things
undone.
The Army and Navy Commission and the Red Cross Society combined, gave precious food and helpful, healing medicine to souls as well as to bodies.
The evidences of good feeling between the volunteers from
different sections were not wanting in any of the large camps
that we visited. In the city of Mobile our reception was cordial. The stars and stripes decorated all the streets through
which we passed and floated from vertical and horizontal
staffs over the hotels and other public buildings. This was
far different from the Mobile of a few years ago.
On our second visit to his regiment I had the honor of formally presenting Mr. Harte, who had become my fast friend,
and whom the Second Alabama had just elected as chaplain.
The camp was about as far from town as Camp Coppinger,
but in a different direction. As Mr. Harte and I were leaving
Mobile to visit this encampment, Major Whittle with some
singers and a Christian delegation went again to Camp Coppinger.
The regimental commander, Colonel Clark, in his welcome
made us feel at home. He took us to his large mess-tent,
introduced us to his officers and invited us hospitably to
break bread with him and them at his table. All the commission who were off duty accompanied us to the pavilion. The
contents of this large tent and the surroundings were like
those at other places. The cabinet-organ stood by my side and
helped to relieve my diffidence while speaking for the first
time to a southern regiment, for I could put my arm upon the
top piece and lean hard. The soldiers and the flaming, smoking torches were before me spread out like a fan. The most
of the men sat down or reclined upon the ground; while the
singing and reading proceeded I xvas looking into those young
faces. How like boys the six or seven hundred seemed!




CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN. 465


Could lads from seventeen to twenty-five have been no older
in the sixties? How bright, hopeful and interested they were!
A Yankee General was to address them. That night I told
the story of my conversion forty-one years before this visit,
and of my union for a time with a southern church at Tampa,
-and I tried to show something of the Savior's love, which
was as easily manifest to each of them as to me. The soldier
could not be excluded, for of one commander of a hundred
men our Master had said: "I have not seen so great faith, no,
not in Israel."
Some young man, after I had ended my speech, shouted:
"Three cheers for General Howard!" They were given with
a will. I then asked them by way of response to cheer the old
flag. Instantly it was done with apparent unanimity and
with marked power and effect. After the last song and a
benediction by the chaplain, the soldiers gathered around me,
some to take my hand, while others showed their sympathy
and good will by touching my arm and shoulder. I said to
myself: " The old hostility is all gone!"
In the hospitals everywhere there were remarkable exhibitions of mutual helpfulness and fellowship between the sick
men who had come together from various sections, particularly as soon as the patients were sufficiently convalescent to
pay and return visits, going from bed to bed.
The fraternal feeling between General Fitz-Hugh Lee and
myself, also between General Joseph Wheeler, Major Whittle
and myself, was pronounced. It seemed hardly possible that
in so many bloody battles we had actually fought against
each other. Indeed, the truth is, that xve never did have any
personal animosity, and it rejoiced all the comrades of both
sides in the old strife, who were able to participate in this war
with Spain, to find themselves together, fighting:now for the
same flag.
When I intimated to General Wheeler that I might have to
go upon his staff, he welcomed the thought with lively acclamation.
Though Tampa enjoyed great advantages from our Christian Commission, xve did not plant so many pavilions for the
soldiers' convenience as at Chickamauga. The Moody Taber



4166


T7HE AJPF7D vT CA N  AlXTorT 17I vA R.


nacle left at Tampa after Mr. Moody's evangelical visit the
previous winter, had been removed to " The Tampa Heights,"
the highest ground of the encampment, and there set up. An
immense platform for singers, benches for hundreds of soldiers
and a screen from the hot sun constituted the Tabernaclethlat was the famous structure.  Here spoke Dr. Dixon of
Brooklyn, Major Whittle, Rev. Mr. Anderson of Tampa and
others. Here sang Burke, Sankey and other choice singers in
Israel. These talked as they sang, and sang as they talked. I
How the soldiers enjoyed those gatherings and profited by
them cannot be told. It was these men who were to penetrate the jungles of Cuba, tread upon the stinging cactus,
break down all barriers, natural and artificial, and charge in
front of prepared intrenchments without faltering,-rushing
up to the crests of El Caney and San Juan. Hundreds of them
were not only brave and true soldiers of their country, but
were soldiers of the Cross who purposed in their hearts to do
and suffer the will of God.
The Army and Navy Commission established a central
station and depot in the town of Tampa. Mr. Mahan of
North Carolina was the Agent-or Secretary in charge. The
clergy of Tampa, some Christian citizens and nearly all the
regimental chaplains gathered daily around our commission,
and we worked together. The public places at and near the
city and the Picnic Island, or some shady place near tobacco
factories, were used for meetings day and night. Besides
these, speakers and singers went two by two from regiment to
regiment-in fact, to any place where they were permitted and
welcome. They labored faithfully to hold those who were
already Christians in line and tried to extend their number.
In this there was abundant success.
We, all who were in fellowship at Tampa and thereabouts,
rejoiced that our labor was not in vain. Of its power and
usefulness as a means of prevention to waywardness and dissipation, General Shafter spoke in decided terms, General
Henry publicly praised the services and many other general
officers were glad to recognize and supplement them as opportunity offered. I am sure that thousands of friends at home
were made glad that, by those means, prodigals were re



CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WVAR WITH SPAIN. 467


deemed, and doubtful souls brought into the fruitful valley of
decision, while the sick and the ailing, tenderly cared for, were
not neglected.
Key West is an odd city, built on a coral flat. The attrition
of ages has been so small that the soil is not deep enough anywhere for much plant or vegetable life. Its population is
now about 20,000. The proximity of the place to Cuba has
naturally caused the persecuted of that island to flock thither
and their home work has followed them. The manufacture of
cigars became the principal industry and large tobacco factories have thriven. The gathering of sponges, of shells of all
sorts, the abundant fisheries and the ordinary shops for trade,
together with the necessary restaurants and hotels, suggest
some of the occupations of the inhabitants. But the war with
Spain shut off everything except what war retains and what war
brings. Key West at once became an important war port.
Commodore Remey, always on his flag-ship, the Lancaster,
commanded the entire harbor and what pertained to it in the
city. The old army barracks, brushed up for temporary occupancy, were again after years filled with soldiers. The large
Catholic convent was generously offered by the Sisters of
Charity and accepted as an Army and Navy hospital. Other
buildings in strenuous need for the sick and wounded were
hired and long tents put up in yards in their neighborhood.
All were furnished completely for hospital use. Naval vessels
came and went; army transport ships and Red Cross steamers found here a refuge from wandering Spaniards and fierce
storms at sea. Storehouses were filled with naval and transport replenishments, while docks and slips were occupied by
vessels large and small to be loaded or unloaded. The population at Key West is mixed, consisting of many Cubans,
some stay-at-home Spaniards who pass with Americans for
Cubans, often to disgrace them, hosts of negroes and a small
number of bona-fide Americans, or rather Anglo-Saxons,
thrown into the interstices, naturally including the more recent
importations from the Bahamas.  There are churches wvell
attended, and schools fairly good for all. But the most noticeable places of business which I have notiyet mentioned are
the liquor saloons. On the first available spot when you




4U8


'Tt-Ir ANTRI CT)  A xT CT) A XTTL WT A1D
I iIJ2 J fljVi  4JLX%,fl.L' -CYL  I'% A L  J t? LIS.


land from the main wharf you see the "First Chance," and
not far on cityward is the " Second Chance," and the corners
of the street give plenty of others, more or less respectable.
The more disreputable are of course only dives and brothels
where all sorts of traps are set to catch soldiers when off duty
and sailors " on liberty." What a fine place is Key West for
unscrupulous men, such as gamblers, thieves, rumsellers and
their helpers! Our Secretary and Commission manager, young
Mr. Steele, arrived from New Orleans. He found a few
Christian assistants. A good man and his wife took him to
their home about a stone's throw from the " First Chance "
and told him that he might eat and sleep at their house.
Steele looked over the Key West territory thus occupied and
at first felt discouraged at the miserable condition of things,
though he was a tall, strong, healthful, able man of God. An
idea struck him, perhaps launched by the Spirit.  It was to
rent that vacant tobacco factory whose gable end was toward
the large wharf. It would hold on its second floor four or
five hundred people. He made a good bargain, as the factory
was not in use. He soon fitted it up like our field pavilions
-not forgetting the cold-wvater tank. An aged Christian
negro, James by name, generally stood by the broad doorway or near the stairs to welcome the comers, and his wife,
Martha, kept the tables and their contents clear of dust. The
showy outside sign and the waving flag caught my eye.
"Oh, General Howard!" cried Steele, when I came to the
head of his stair-way and uttered my name, " I have been
asking the Lord to send you here, but I didn't know you were
anywhere near!" In that large room I had my first soldier
and sailor audience sitting together. Mr. W. C. Howland,
my delightful young secretary and assistant, aided in the
music, while Mr. Steele and I conducted the ordinary social
religious meeting. This tobacco warehouse became a stepping stone to like efforts on the Lancaster, invited by Captain
Perry, its commander, and Commodore Remey. There I had
my first experience with seamen by themselves. Probably my
army language and war stories were as quaint to them as were
their special sea talk and odd ocean tales to me. From this
opening, Mr. Howland and I passed on to the large steamer




CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN. 469


Saratoga, a naval-supply ship that carried us in five days on
to Guantanamo. There the Vixen pleasantly bore us up the
coast, past the famous battle grounds of both Army and Navy,
as far as Santiago de Cuba.
Only one larae tent (pavilion) succeeded in getting to the
first front to be there where the need of Christian supply and
aid was greatest, but Miss Clara Barton, whom I next met on
the transport Cormal at Santiago, was early on hand. Admiral
Sampson had seen to it that the relief transport Texas, with
Miss Barton on board, should be put into the ever-to-be-remembered harbor ahead of all the fleet. The battle being
over, kind Christian supply- took the lead. When I held the
lady's hand I said in substance: " Miss Barton, some journals
say that I have turned funds away from you- " "You
could not," she exclaimed, " because our work is one!" Yes,
it was one, and the Lord's method. Good tidings, bread and
medicine for the needy were for our own young men and for
the starving Cubans,-the well-filled pavilion conducted by
the Army and Navy Christian Commission and the large relief
ship at the quay pouring out her treasures for the poor and
suffering under the guidance of the Red Cross Association,
these were the combined manifestations of the Master's great
love for men.




I
I




D~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
0
D0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~  r




A




CHAPTER XXIV.


THE TREATY OF PEACE.
BY
HoN. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, Counsel and Secretary of the Peace Commission.
T HE rapid progress of the American arms, as narrated in
the preceding pages of this volume, induced the government of Spain on the twenty-second of July, i898, to
make formal overtures for peace. This was done by a note,
couched in the form of a message from the government of Her
Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain to the President of the
United States, and signed by the Duke of Almodovar del Rio,
as Minister of State. It intimated that Spain was prepared to
relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba, and expressed a wish to
learn from the President the basis on which a " political status"
might be established there and an end be put to a conflict
"which would continue without reason should both governments agree upon the means of pacifying the island."
The note of the Duke of Almodovar was presented to the
government of the United States by M. Cambon, the French
Ambassador at Washington, who, in the interruption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain, in
consequence of. the state of xwar, acted, with permission
of his government and the approval of that of the United
States, in a friendly capacity, as the representative of Spanish
interests. The reply of the President was made on the thirtieth of July, in a note which was addressed by Judge Day,
then Secretary of State, to the Duke of Alnodovar, and
which was handed to M. Cambon for communication to the
Spanish government.
The suggestion of Spain that the war might be brought to
a close on the basis of an agreement as to the future status of
Cuba was not accepted. On the contrary it was declared




A72


T4m r AMERnICAN-SPANISH WAR.


that the " local question " as to the peace and good government of Cuba, out of which the wvar had grown, had by the
course of events been " transformed and enlarged into a general conflict of arms between two great peoples."  In the
prosecution of this conflict the President had been compelled
to avail himself unsparingly of the lives and fortunes of his
countrymen, and untold burdens and sacrifices, far transcending any material estimation, had been imposed upon them.
Nevertheless, the President was, said the note, inclined to
offer abrave adversary generous terms of peace. The President's terms were then defined as follows:
" The United States will require:
"First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim  of
sovereignty over a title to Cuba and her immediate evacuation of the island.
" Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now put forward any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he cannot be insensible to the losses
and expenses of the United States incident to the war or to
the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and
property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must,
therefore, require the cession to the United States and the
immediate evacuation by Spain of the island of Porto Rico
and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the
West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones
to be selected by the United States.
" Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled
to occupy and will hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila,
pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.
" If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety,
commissioners will be named by the United States to meet
similarly authorized commissioners on the part of Spain for
the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and
signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated."


The reply of the Spanish government bears as date the sev



THE TREATY OF PEACE.


473


enth of August, I898. In regard to Cuba, Porto Rico and
other Spanish islands in the \Vest Indies, and the island in
the Ladrones, it in substance accepted, without qualification or
reserve, the President's terms. In respect of the Philippines,
it was less specific. Though it declared in conclusion that
the government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent " accepts
the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the
Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties," some of
the expressions used in relation to the Philippines were not
free from ambiguity. This circumstance induced the President
to pronounce the note unsatisfactory and to propose, as the
most direct and certain way of avoiding misunderstanding to
embody in a protocol the precise terms on which negotiations
should be undertaken. This course was adopted, and on the
twelfth of August the protocol was signed at Washington by
Judge Day, Secretary of State, duly empowered by the President for the purpose, and by M. Cambon, French ambassador, acting under a special full power from the Queen Regent
of Spain.
This protocol embodied, without qualification or reserve,
the precise terms offered by the President to Spain on the thirtieth of July. It consisted of six articles. By the first, Spain
agreed to " relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title
to Cuba." By the second, she engaged to cede Porto Rico and
other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and an island in the
Ladrones, to be selected by the United States. The third was
in these words: "The United States will occupy and hold
the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of
a treaty of -peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines." The fourth provided for the appointment of two commissioners, to meet
respectively at Havana, in Cuba, and San Juan, in Porto Rico,
for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of
the immediate evacuation by Spain of Cuba, Porto Rico and
other Spanish islands in the West Indies. By the fifth, it
wvas stipulated that the United States and Spain should each
appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace,
and that the commissioners so appointed should meet in
Paris not later than October i, i898, and proceed to the ne



474


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


gotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace. By the sixth
and last article it was agreed that, upon the conclusion of the
protocol, hostilities between the two countries should be suspended, and that notice to that effect should be given as
soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its
military and naval forces.
The way having thus been cleared for the negotiation of
a peace, the twvo governments proceeded, in conformity with
the stipulations of the protocol, to the appointment of their
respective commissioners for that purpose. On the part of the
United States, the President appointed the Hon. William R.
Day, who subsequently acted as president of the American
commission; the Hon. Cushman K. Davis, chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate;
the Hon. William P. Frye and the Hon. George Gray, both
members of the same committee; and the Hon. Whitelaw
Reid, formerly Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to France.
On the part of Spain, the Queen Regent appointed as commissioners Seftor Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of
the Senate of Spain; Sefnor Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, a
senator of the Kingdom and formerly ambassador of the
Spanish Republic to France; Sefor Don Jose de Garnica, an
associate of the Supreme Court of Justice of Spain and a deputy of the Cortes; Senor Don Wenceslao Ramirez de VillaUrrutia, Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain to Belgium; and
General Rafael Cerero, ranking General of Engineers of the
first army corps.
The secretaries of the American and Spanish commissions
were, respectively, the writer of the present chapter, who had
lately held the office of Assistant Secretary of State of the
United States and who acted as secretary and counsel, and
Sefior Don Emilio de Ojeda, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain at Tangiers.
On the arrival of the American commission in Paris towards
the end of September, notice of its presence was given to the
French government by Gen. Horace Porter, United States
ambassador, and arrangements were made for its immediate
presentation to M. Delcass6, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,




1 HE TREATY OF PEACE.


475


and to President Faure. This done, the next question was
how to bring the American and Spanish commissions together.
All difficulty on this score was forestalled by M. Delcasst, who,
with the hospitality and tact characteristic of his government
and people, invited the members of the two commissions to
meet each other at a breakfast at the Foreign Office. At this
breakfast there were also present, besides the American and
Spanish ambassadors, M. Brisson, then Prime Minister of
France, and other officials of the French government. All
the arrangements were faultless, and I believe it was the unanimous opinion of those for whose benefit the function was
given, as it certainly was of the American commission, that
an affair of the kind could not have been conducted with
greater skill and propriety.
For the meetings of the joint commission, the French government set apart two large rooms in the Foreign Office,
which have been the scene of many notable gatherings, among
which may be mentioned the Congress of Paris of i856.
Here, on the first of October, i898, the American and Spanish
commissioners met in their first official conference. There
were present all the commissioners and the American secretary,
and also Mr. Fergusson, who accompanied the American commissioners as interpreter and who, as the proceedings were
conducted in English and in Spanish, acted as the medium of
oral communication to the end of the conferences. The
functions of secretary on the Spanish side were performed by
Senor Villa-Urrutia till the third session, when Sefnor 'Ojeda
appeared and entered upon the discharge of his duties. The
proceedings were conducted with as little formality as possible. No one was chosen to preside over the deliberations of
the joint commission. The representatives of the two governments ranged themselves on either side of a long table, in the
order in which they were named in their full powers, so that no
question could arise as to form and precedence. The oral discussions, however, represented but a small part of the labors
of the commissions. Projects and counter-projects were submitted in writing and under the rule, adopted by the joint
commission, that written arguments might be filed in support
of rejected propositions as well as written answvers to such




476


TH E1' A   rn T A N S       C1 PAN  T S  O   A R.
_-_ AX 4_   _ 0'1-Li 1Jil  VVtX.N.


argumnents, most of the questions that arose in the negotiations were fully argued in writing. These arguments appear
as annexes to the protocols or official minutes of the conferences.
On the proposal of the American commissioners, it was
agreed that the questions before the joint commission should
be taken up in the order in which they appeared in the protocol
of the twelfth of August. The American commissioners therefore submitted, at the second session, a paper containing a
draft of two articles, to be inserted in the treaty of peace, for
the purpose of giving effect to Spain's engagement to relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba, and to
cede Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies,
and an island in the Ladrones, the island of Guam being specified as the one which the United States had selected in that
group. These matters were, in the view taken of them by
the American commissioners, determined by the protocol of
the twelfth of August. Hence, where the protocol said
" Spain will relinquish," or " Spain will cede," the draft
articles said " Spain hereby relinquishes," and " Spain hereby
cedes; "and to these simple stipulations, which were expressed
in the very words of the protocol, were merely added certain
incidental stipulations as to the transfer of public property
and archives.
At the third session, the Spanish commissioners presented
a counter-proposition. The substance of this proposition was
that Spain should not only relinquish her sovereignty over
Cuba but also transfer it to the United States, which should
" at the proper time" transfer it to the Cuban people, and
that the relinquishment and transfer thus made should embrace
not only " all the prerogatives, powers and rights" of the
Spanish crown, but also " all charges and obligations of every
kind" in existence at the time of the ratification of the treaty
of peace, which the crown of Spain, or her authorities in Cuba,
had lawfully contracted, such charges and obligations to be
considered as " an integral part " of the sovereignty relinquished
and transferred. The cession of Porto Rico and other ceded
territory was to be made, subject to similar burdens as to
charges and obligations.




THE TREATY OF PEACE.


47 7


It is obvious that these proposals of the Spanish commissioners presented the serious question of the assumption by
the United States and in turn by Cuba of what is commonly
known as the Cuban debt. This debt, for the payment of
which the revenues of Cuba were pledged, was contracted by
the Spanish government and its authorities for the most part
during the insurrections in Cuba after i868. In that year the
so-called debt of Cuba amounted to only $i8,ooo,ooo. In i88o,
two years after the close of the ten years war, it amounted to
upwards of $i70,ooo,ooo. Between February, I895, when the
last insurrection broke out, and January i, I898, new bonds
were issued to the amount of 858,55o,ooopesetas, or $17I,00 -ooo. There were also other debts, uncertain in amount,
which were understood to be considered in Spain as properly
chargeable to Cuba. To Spain the question of the disposition of these financial burdens was evidently more important,
from the pecuniary point of view, than that of the relinquishment of territory, the attempt to retain which had given rise
to them. The Spanish commissioners therefore bent all
their efforts to the establishment of the position that the
debts in question must follow the sovereignty of the island
and must be assumed by whatever nation possessed that
sovereignty. The American commissioners, on the other
hand, maintained that from no point of view could the debts
in questioni be considered as local debts of Cuba or as obligations chargeable to the island; that they were created by the
government of Spain, for its own purposes and through its own
-agents; and that the precedents which had been cited of the
assumption or apportionment of debts, where a state was absorbed or divided, were inapplicable to the so-called Cuban
debt, the burden of which, imposed upon the people of Cuba
without their consent and by force of arms, was one of the
principal wrongs for the termination of which the struggles
for Cuban independence wvere undertaken. The American
commissioners moreover contended that Spain, by her unconditional agreement to relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba,
had waived the question of the debt. On these grounds the
American commissioners repeatedly declined to assume the
so-called Cuban debt, either for the United States or for




A 7R.ri 


TmnE AErrnCAlN-SPAIS nrAR.
~111-1 nOir'ttANN- iJf IN  Z11l VAAN..


Cuba. The discussion continued, however, in various forms,
upon successive propositions and counter-propositions, till
the-eighth conference, on the twenty-fourth of October, when
the president of the American commission, replying to a
remark of the president of the Spanish commission, brought it
to a head by pointedly inquiring whether the Spanish commissioners " would refuse to consider any articles as to Cuba
and Porto Rico which contained no provision for the assumption of indebtedness by the United States, or Cuba, or both."
The Spanish commissioners asked for time in which to
reply, and an adjournment wvas taken till the twenty-sixth of
October. On that day the Spanish commissioners presented
their answer in writing. In substance, they declared that
they would not refuse to consider any articles which did not
contain a provision for the assumption of indebtedness, since
the " final approval " of such articles must be contingent on
an agreement upon a complete treaty of peace; and they
"invited " the American commissioners " to enter upon the
discussion of the other points to be embodied in the treaty,
at the outset to take up the discussion of the Philippine
Archipelago, and to propose to the Spanish commissioners
what they understand should be agreed upon in said treaty
with respect to this subject."
The joint commission was thus brought face to face with
the question of the Philippines. To this question the American commissioners had given much consideration since their
arrival in Paris. They had heard General Merritt, who, besides presenting his own views orally, brought with him from
Manila, for the information of the American commissioners, communications from General F. V. Greene and other
officers in relation to the condition of things in the Archipelago. They had examined Mr. John Foreman, who, from i 88o
to 1898, a period of eighteen years, had spent altogether
eleven years in the Philippines and whose book on the islands
is a standard authority. They had also taken the testimony
of other persons, competent to speak on the subject, besides
obtaining a mass of information, some in print and some in
manuscript, on the various aspects of the situation. All these
things they communicated either textually or in substance,




THE TREATY OF PEACE.


479


according to the circumstances, to their government, with
which they were, as is always the case in these days of telegraphs and fast steamers, in constant correspondence through
the whole course of the negotiations.
The proposal of the American commissioners on the subject of the Philippines was presented at the eleventh conference, which was held on the thirty-first of October. It provided for the cession of the whole group, but stated that the
American commissioners were prepared to insert in the treaty
a stipulation for the assumption by the United States of any
existing indebtedness of Spain incurred for public works and
improvements of a pacific character in the islands. On receiving this proposal, the Spanish commissioners asked for an
adjournment in order that they might examine it " and either
accept it or present a counter-proposal." The kernel of this
reply, as it turned out, lay in the latter alternative. At the
next conference, which was held on the fourth of November,
the Spanish commissioners submitted a counter-proposal in
the form of an argumentative memorandum, in whichafter contending that the protocol of the twelfth of August
did not justify a demand for the cession of the whole group
and that the capture of Manila by the American forces, after
the signature of that instrument, though in fact before news
of its signature was received in the islands, was, in view of the
agreement for a suspension of hostilities, unlawful,-they
declared that the treaty of peace ought to provide for the
immediate delivery of Manila to the Spanish government, the
immediate release of the Spanish garrison, the return to the
Spanish government of all funds and public property taken
by the American army since the occupation of the place as
well as of all taxes collected prior to its restoration, and for
an indemnity to Spain for the damage occasioned by the detention of her troops as prisoners, to which was to be ascribed
the spread of the Tagals insurrection in Luzon and its extension to the Visayas and the ill-treatment of Spanish prisoners,
civil and military, by the natives. They concluded by inviting the American commissioners to present a proposition
concerning "the control, disposition and government" of the
Philippines which should conform to " the stipulations of
Article III" of the protocol.




48o


THEUP A   T TMERICAN-SPANISTTTT AIr 
-J.1 zL-  A*w ~Lx  kIL.1 A-,-L  I X 1-L  TV V rX


To this argumentative counter-proposal, the American commissioners submitted at the fourteenth conference, on the sixteenth of November, an. extended reply. Obviously, the
principal point at issue between the two commissions was the
proposal for the cession of the group. The American 'commissioners did not controvert the general principle that acts
of war, committed after a general suspension of hostilities, do
not afford a basis for a claim of title by conquest, even
though such acts be committed prior to the receipt of notice
of the suspension; but they pointed out that by the third
article of the protocol the United States was to " occupy and
hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace," and that the occupation thus expressly provided for imported a military occupation, with all
the rights and powers of government legally incident to
such occupation. The great subject of controversy, however,
was the effect to be given to the words " control, disposition
and government."  Did the stipulation that the treaty of
peace should " determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines" warrant a demand for the cession
of territory? Did they authorize a demand for the transfer
of sovereignty over the group or any part of it?
We have seen that the words in question were first used in
the note of the thirtieth of July, in which the terms on which
the United States would enter upon negotiations for peace
were conveyed to the Spanish government, and that the
reply of the Spanish government on this point, as given in its
note of the seventh of August, was unsatisfactory. The exact
words of that note, which was presented in English, were as
follows:
"The terms [of the President of the United States] relating
to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United
States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the
harbor and the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a
treaty of peace, cannot be that of conquest, since, in spite of
the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, in
spite of the siege established on land by a native supported
and provided for by the American Admiral, Manila still




THE TREATY OF PEACE.


481


holds its own and the Spanish standard still waves over the
city.  On the other hand, the whole archipelago of the
Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain.
Therefore the government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should constitute a guarantee.
It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines; but as the
intentions of the Federal government by regression remain
veiled, therefore the Spanish government must declare that,
while accepting the third condition, they do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms as the
condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their
natives may render desirable.
" The government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition with the above-mentioned declarations.
" Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish government has the honor to submit in reply to your
Excellency's communication.  They accept the proffered
terms [i. e., the various terms offered in the note of the thirtieth of July], subject to the approval of the Cortes of the
kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties."
It may fairly be argued that the statement that the Spanish
government did not " a priori " renounce " the sovereignty of
Spain over the archipelago " clearly implied that the renunciation of that sovereignty might become the subject of
negotiation, and that the reply did in reality constitute an acceptance of the offer of the United States in the fullest sense,
the meaning of that offer being that the question of the Philippines should be left in its entirety for future determination
in the treaty of peace. Nevertheless, the President, as has
been seen, declined to treat as an acceptance of his offer a reply which was capable of more than one construction. This
decision was made known to M. Cambon, the French ambassador, in oral conference, and was afterwards formally conveyed to him in a note of the tenth of August, with which
there was enclosed a draft of the protocol'in the exact words
in which it was signed two days later. The attempt to reach
an agreement by correspondence was abandoned and the




482


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


terms on which negotiations were to be undertaken were
embodied in a single document.
But, apart from any reservations in the note of the seventh
of August, the Spanish commissioners contended that the
words " control, disposition and government" did not comprehend the subject of sovereignty. In this contention they
placed much stress upon the French text of the protocol. The
protocol was signed both in English and in French. In fact, the
French text was a translation of the English, but both texts
purported to mean the same thing. In the French text the
words " control, disposition and government" appeared as
Ie conirode, a disposition et la gouvernement." In reality, the
French word controlSe possesses a signification less extensive
than the English "control." It denotes " supervision " or
" inspection" rather than the full power and authority conveyed in the word " control." But the words disposition and
gouvernemnent have the same extensive meaning in French that
"disposition" and " government " have in English. The
American commissioners therefore answered that the Spanish
contention would involve, practically, the elimination of the
three words of the English text altogether and of two of the
three words of the French text. The position of the American commissioners was that it was the object of the clause in
question to leave the whole subject of the Philippines open
for future negotiation and settlement. Nothing was to be
considered as prejudged against either party. The effect of
using the word " sovereignty " would have been to restrict
the negotiations to the question of supreme power and control. The words " control, disposition and government " were
broad enough to cover any form of adjustment on which the
parties might ultimately agree, including that of the transfer
of sovereignty.
At the fifteenth conference, on the twenty-first of November, the American commissioners, in order to bring the discussions to a close, presented a final proposition, on the
acceptance or rejection of which the continuance of the negotiations was to depend. This proposition embraced the cession of the entire archipelago of the Philippines and the
payment by the United States of the sum of $20,000,000, and




THE TREATY OF PEACE.


483


in connection with this offer the American commissioners
stated that, "it being the policy of the United States to
maintain in the Philippines an open door to the vorld's commerce," they were prepared to insert in the treaty a stipulation to the effect that, for a term of years, Spanish ships and
merchandise should be admitted into the ports of the islands
on the same terms as American ships and merchandise. The
proposition also embraced a mutual relinquishment of claims
that had arisen since the beginning of the insurrection in
Cuba in i895. In conclusion, the American commissioners
expressed the hope that they might receive from the Spanish
commissioners, on or before the twenty-eighth of November,
a definite and final acceptance of these proposals and also of
the demands as to Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish
islands in the West Indies, and Guam, in the form in which
those demands had been provisionally agreed to. In this
event, it would, declared the American commissioners, "be
possible for the joint commission to continue its sessions and
to proceed to the consideration and adjustment of other matters, including those which, as subsidiary and incidental to the
principal provisions, should form a part of the treaty of peace."
In particular, the American commissioners expressed a desire
to treat of religious freedom in the Caroline Islands, as agreed
to in i886; of the release of political prisoners in connection
with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines; of the acquisition of the island in the Carolines variously known as
Kusaie, Ualan, or Strong Island; for a naval and telegraph
station; of cable landing rights at other places in Spanish
jurisdiction; and of the revival of certain treaties previously
in force between the United States and Spain.
During the week following the submission of this " final
proposition," the Spanish commissioners made by letter various alternative proposals, as possible substitutes for the
American demands. These proposals wvere, however, declined; and on the twenty-eighth of- November the Spanish
commissioners presented in conference a formal written acceptance of the ultimatum.
The treaty of peace was signed on the tenth of December.
Its text will be found at the end of this volume. It covers




484


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


the subjects embraced in the final proposition of the American commissioners and such as may be considered "subsidiary and incidental " thereto. In regard to none of the
additional points on which the American commissioners expressed a desire to treat, except that of the release of political prisoners, was any stipulation inserted. Proposals on all
the other points wvere presented, but they were rejected by
the Spanish commissioners, in some cases with the statement
that they might form the subject of future negotiation
between the two governments. In truth, after more than two
months of constant negotiation and strenuous discussion, the
joint commission, having reached a conclusion on essential
questions, could go no further. The situation of the Spanish
commissioners was from the beginning a difficult one and the
time had come to bring the conference to a close. Moreover,
the American commissioners had rejected various proposals
of the Spanish commissioners, including one for an investigation and arbitration of the case of the Maine by an international commission.
It is proper as well as gratifying to state that, while the consciousness of a serious conflict of views and of interests was
ever present, the intercourse of the two commissions was characterized by the uniform observance of the dictates of courtesy and propriety. Any reports that may have got abroad
to the contrary were founded on misapprehension. The commissioners on both sides wvere too much impressed with the
importance of the work committed to them to allow its performance to be retarded or puLt in jeopardy by displays of personal feeling, even if they had been disposed to indulge in them.
The American commissioners, in the last paper submitted
by them, availed themselves of the opportunity to express
" their sense of the thoroughness, learning and devoted
ability, no less than the uniform courtesy," with which the
Spanish commissioners had conducted the negotiations then
about to terminate. The president of the Spanish commission,
responding to this expression, declared that " he had much
pleasure in acknowledging the courtesy and consideration
which had been shown by the American commissioners in their
personal intercourse during the continuance of the negotia



THE TREATY OF PEACE.                485
tions, which, however painful to the Spanish commissioners,
would leave with them the personal remembrance of the attentions which had been bestowed upon them by the worthy
members of the American commission."
The conferences closed with words of personal respect and
good-will. In the same spirit we may cherish the hope that,
with the re-establishment of the state of peace and the removal of the causes of discord that produced its interruption,
the relations between the two countries will again assume the
friendly aspect which distinguished them in former times.
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CHAPTER XXV.


WHAT ENGLAND FEELS.
BY
HoN. JUSTIN McCARTHY, M. P.
T HE close of the War between the United States and
Spain took the general public of England even more
by surprise than the opening of the war had done.
The blowing up of the Maine made almost every one here feel
vell assured that an appeal to arms must follow. Even
among those who had little means of forming an opinion as
to whether the explosion was the result of mere accident or
not, it seemed to be accepted as a kind of omen that something serious would come next. For a long time, for a whole
generation, in fact, the English public had a vague general
knowledge that there were constant troubles between the
United States and Spa-in, owing to the fact that Cuba was in
a state of perpetual insurrection, and that Cuba lay almost
within gunshot of the shores of one of the American States.
But most people here had grown accustomed to the vague
general knowledge that such a condition of things could not
last for ever, and were content with the assumption that it
would probably last for their time, and, therefore, turned
their attention away to other subjects. Of course, I am now
speaking of what I may call the outer public, of the man in
the streets, as that public has been described by one English
writer; of the bald man on, the top of an omnibus, as lhe has
been described by another English writer. The bald man on
the top of the omnibus knew that there was trouble in America because of the condition of Cuba; but the trouble had
been going on so long without coming to a crisis that he had
ceased to look out for a crisis as a possibility of immediate
concern. But when the blowing up of the Maizne vas made




488


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


known to the world, the English public suddenly became
prepared for an immediate crisis. Then a quick revulsion of
feeling set in, and the general public began to think that the
preparations were moving slowly, and that the war, somehow,
was hanging fire. At last, the actual business of battle began,
and then the impression of our friend on the top of the
omnibus distinctly was that the war was destined to la~t for
a considerable time; and, at the moment when he had made
up his mind to this opinion, there came the news that the Spanish fleets were destroyed, that Spain had lost Cuba and the
Philippines, and that the war was all over.
How were the sympathies of the people of England in
general affected by the war and by its conclusion? I think
it is not too much to say that the sympathies of the
vast majority of the people in Great Britain and Ireland
were thoroughly with the American cause and with the
American triumph.  Now, I do, not desire to make this
statement without some serious reservations. Among a certain minority of Englishmen, there was still a sort of oldfashioned, traditional attachment to Spain, which misled the
judgment of many. Those who were thus misled regarded
Spain as a grand, old, historic state, the existence of which
was an important element in the dignity of Europe; a state
which had at one time divided the empire of the world with
England herself; a state which had waged big war with
England, and been honorably defeated; a state which, later
still, had been rescued from a foreign conqueror by the arms
of England. Now, we must make allowance for feelings or
prejudices of this kind. They are not ignoble in themselves;
and even when they are unreasonable they have a sort of
claim on our sympathy. Then, again, there comes in the
question of religion. A certain proportion of the English
aristocracy is made up of Catholics, and of Catholics who,
for the most part, are inclined to old-world Tory views where
political questions are concerned. Therefore, to a certain
number of Englishmen, the struggle between America and
Spain became a subject for the sentiment of religion to work
upon, or the traditional feeling of reverence for the old order
of things, and an idea that the new order was asserting itself




WHAT ENGLAND FEELS.


489


as an unwelcome intruder. I am far from saying that the
Catholic population of England were generally in sympathy
with Spain; for I know that any such saying could be
founded only on a strange misapprehension; but what I do
wvish to convey is that a considerable number of the Catholic
aristocracy gave their good wishes to Spain simply on the
ground that Spain was a Catholic country and that America
was not.
In Ireland, also, there was a certain difference of opinionI am now speaking of national Ireland, not the Ireland of
Dublin Castle and the vice-regal lodge. Ireland had been
attached to Spain by old ties of affection; Spain, from whatever motive, had endeavored at more than one period of
her history to give help to the Irish national cause. Thomas
Moore, the Irish national poet, had coupled, in one of his
songs, the shamrock of Erin and olive of Spain. Irish exiles
had risen to great distinction in the military and civil service of Spain.  I can myself remember the days when
Marshal O'Donnell, Duke of Tetuan, an Irishman by descent,
was Prime Minister of Spain; and it used to be commonly
said at the time, that O'Donnell refused to learn English because he could not consent to converse in the tongue of his
country's conquerors. Naturally, therefore, there was a feeling among a small minority of Irishmen that Spain was entitled to their special sympathy; but I can say with confidence
that the minority was very small indeed. The vast majority
of Nationalist Irishmen everywhere gave their cordial good
wishes to America, the country which had been the shelter
and the home of so many millions of their race. I believe
the whole of the Irish Nationalists in the House of Commons,
save for two exceptions, openly and formally proclaimed their
sympathy with the United States; and if I were to mention
the names of the two exceptions, the names would probably
convey no manner of idea to the ordinary American reader. I
am entitled, therefore, to say that the vast majority of people
in these Islands admitted the justice of the American cause,
acknowledged that America had forborne to the utmost limits
of forbearance, and sincerely rejoiced in America's swift
success.




490


4  THE AflftVK1AiN-bIffl1NZ  VVA t.


I have very little doubt that, when the diplomatic history
of the crisis comes to be given to the world, it will be made
plain that the diplomatic influence of England had its important effect in warning certain European states against the dangers of any policy that might seem like intervention. I have
not been a great admirer' of Lord Salisbury's foreign policy in
general, and do not often feel drawn into much sympathy
with the conduct of a Tory Government; but I am well convinced that in this instancc Lord Salisbury and the Tory Government did play a fair, a friendly and a manly part towards
the United States. It might have been thought, and undoubtedly it was thought by some, that by her victory over Spain
and her obtaining possession, under whatever qualifications,
of Cuba and the Philippine Islands, America was taking a new
and perilous departure in her political life, and might become
hereafter a new and portentous element of unsettlement in the
politics of the civilized world. Such a feeling as this did undoubtedly find expression here and there; but it had no real
effect on the general feelings of the public. Those who were
fairly well acquainted with the history of the whole question
had long known that if Spain were to persevere in her methods
of governing Cuba, it-would at last become impossible for the
United States to look with a cold neutrality at the scenes
that were going on within easy reach of her own shores. A
whole generation had passed away since one of our most popular writers, Anthony Trollope, who, besides being one of our
foremost novelists, was a keen and sound observer of political
events, gave warning to all his public that the policy of Spain
in Cuba would one day force the United States to intervene.
Many other English writers, newspaper correspondents among
the rest, who had studied the subject from personal observation, had told the same story to their English readers.
Most of us, therefore, who take any continuous interest in
foreign affairs, had long been filled with the knowledge that
the time must come when the antiquated policy of Spain
would have to give way to the growing influence of enlightenment and civilization. This was, in fact, the feeling of all, or
nearly all, of those who belonged to what I may call the politically-instructed classes in these islands. When I speak of




WHAT ENGLAND FEELS.


491


the politically-instructed classes, I mean to speak of those who
were prepared to form their opinions upon practical information, and were not absolutely governed by some sentiment or
prejudice which took no account of actual conditions and refused to learn anything from the teaching of events. Those
politically-instructed classes had long recognized the fact that
in the Spanish administration of Cuba and in the republican
system of the United States, mediaeval barbarism and modern
civilization were brought into a direct antagonism. Those
who saw this could not but trust and believe that the antagonism must end in the victory of civilization. All reasonable
men had to admit that America could not long endure the
existence of such a system as that which was practised in
Cuba, without feeling its disturbing effects upon her own condition as astate. Let us put aside, if we will, for the moment,
any consideration of the claims which mere humanity must
have had upon a Government based like that of the United
States on the principle of human equality before the law.
Let us take the coldest, the most narrow and practical, the
most prosaic view of America's duty and assume that there
xvas no occasion for her to trouble herself about the sufferings
of Cuba, so long as those sufferings brought to her no manner of
domestic inconvenience. Let us assume that it ought to be
nothing to America,even though Cuba were deluged with blood,
so long as no American blood were spilt to swell the deluge.
The plain fact was that the unceasing struggle in Cuba did
lead to the shedding of much generous American blood. The
sympathies of Americans were naturally drawn to the condition of that suffering Cuban population, whose efforts at independence were encountered day after day, and year after year
by just such repressive measures as the Duke of Alva had
employed centuries before to crush the population of the
Netherlands. Many American sympathizers were constantly
taking part in expeditions and efforts of all kinds to set Cuba
free from the merciless domination of its Spanish rulers.
Newv York itself became the headquarters of many an organization formed by American citizens with the avowed object
of assisting the insurgents of Cuba. It would have been perfectly impossible for any application of what are called the neu



492


42THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WVAR.


trality laws to prevent Americans from taking personal part
in organizations so humane and so noble in their purpose.
I remember well having heard the late Earl Russell, Lord
John Russell as he then was, boast in the House of Commons
of the open manner in which he and his friends had endeavored to assist the Greeks against the Turks, although they
were perfectly well aware that they were violating the neutrality laws and were pledging their own country, so far as they
could do it, to the support of the Greek patriots against the
brutal tyranny of the Ottoman Government. The result, of
course, was that England did interfere in the end, and that
the naval battle of Navarino, the untoward event, as it was
diplomatically called, put an end once and for ever to the
dominion of Turkey over that country which is now the
Kingdom of Greece. Now, let us suppose for a moment that
Greece, instead of lying at the Eastern end of the Mediterranean, had been an island lying almost within sight of one of
the English shores; is it not perfectly certain that Lord John
Russell and his friends would have secured the intervention
of their country at a much earlier date in favor of the rescue
of the Greeks from their Ottoman oppressors? Only the
other day the voice of the best and most enlightened men
and women in Great Britain xvas crying shame upon the slowness and apathy of the Great Powers in allowing the rule of
the Turk to endure so long in the island of Crete. How
would it have been if Crete had been an island lying within
easy reach of the population of Dover or Brighton?  All
American statesmen had for more than a whole generation a
sense of the terrible burthen which was put upon them by the
action of the Spanish Government in Cuba. Remonstrance
after remonstrance was tried in vain. The American Government, at one time, made the proposition that the whole subject should be referred to a conference of the civilized powers,
Spain herself to be included in the consultation, and, of course,
the proposal was angrily and contemptuously rejected by
Spain. The wonder to most of us was, not that America
should have intervened at last, but that she had not intervened long before.
Any one who had studied the question with intelligent obser-,




WHAT ENGLAND FEELS.


493


vation, even though the Atlantic lay between him and the scene
of the struggle, must have known that the hand of the American Government would sooner or later have been forced by the
American people, if by no other impulse, and that Cuba would
have to be cleared of the Spanish domination. This was the
conviction which events were slowly bringing home to the minds
of all classes of Englishmen wvho took any interest in what was
happening beyond the range of their own national concerns.
In England, no doubt, it was the fashion of many people
for a long time to regard America as a land given up altogether
to the culture of cotton, to the building of railways, the working of mines and the worship of the almighty dollar. Only
of later years have we begun to trouble ourselves in any serious way with the purposes of American statesmanship, only
of late years has it become the habit of educated Englishmen
to visit the United States as their fathers and grandfathers
used to visit France and Germany. Even to this day we are
somewhat slowv to understand the workings of American political life. I have met with many an intelligent Englishman who
firmly believed that Tammany Hall was one of the State institutions of the Republic, with which the President and Congress had a direct connection.
All the same, however, there has been in this country of
late a wonderful awakening of public attention to the actual
condition of things in the American Republic; and every year
and every week brings the people of the two countries into
closer and more friendly communication. Thus it came to
pass that when the knowledge was first brought home to the
minds of Englishmen that war must break out betwveen Spain
and America, if Spain would not relinquish her hold on Cuba,
there wvere ready instructors amongst Englishmen to teach
the English public that the quarrel was none of America's
seeking, and that even if America cared nothing as a State
for the pleadings of mere humanity, she would have to consider whether her own interest as a State did not compel her to
the work of intervention. We heard very little talk indeed on
this side of the Atlantic about the greed of the young Republic for the acquisition of new territory. No reasonable person
really supposed that the American people had any desire to




A49


THE AMfERTC.AN-SPANTSTT WAR


become the owners of Cuba, or felt any imperious longing
to put down the pride of. Spain. On the whole, I may
confess that as a looker-on I am rather surprised that so
little was said on this subject. Some of the few-the very
few-champions whom Spain found in the English press did
indeed ring the changes on the supposed inconsistency of the
American Republic when it took upon itself to invade an
island which could not by any possibility be claimed as a part
of the Union. In one or two instances we were gravely assured that to invade Cuba was to fly in the face of the Monroe Doctrine; for there are still, it would appear, some people
left among us who believe that the Monroe Doctrine pledged
American statesmanship never to take account of anything
that might happen outside the territorial limits of the American Union. But on the whole it must be owned that the
voice of the English journals and the English people expressed
a thorough understanding of the difficulties which had long
beset the American Republic in regard to the condition of
Cuba, and a friendly and cordial wish for the success of the
American cause. Even the controversy that arose on the
other side of the Atlantic with regard to the ultimate settlement of the Philippine Islands did not waken much of an echo
on this side. The general feeling among politicians, among
Members of the House of Commons, for example, seemed to
be that America might safely be trusted to act for the best
interest of humanity in her ultimate disposal of the new territory which had come within her influence; and that the business of English statesmanship was to discourage in the best
way it could any attempts at foreign intervention with the
work which America had found it necessary to undertake.
For the first time within my personal recollection there existed to all appearances a thoroughly friendly understanding
between the parent country and the "mighty daughter," as
Swinburne calls the American Republic. That friendly understanding had been growing up for some years on this side
of the Atlantic. For a long time after the American Civil
War there was a feeling of bitterness among certain classes in
this country towards the United States. That feeling came
out of the impression that England had been humiliated in




WHAT ENGLAND FEELS.


495


the controversy about the Alabama claims, and had been
compelled to pay damages and to make a public apology. I
need hardly say that such a feeling as this did not spread
through the English people as a whole; it belonged only to
what is called Society, and to certain orders of men in official
and political life. The men who had confidently predicted the
break-up of the American Republic, the bursting of the Republican bubble, while the war was going on, were naturally the
men to be angry because their predictions had proved utter
failures, and were naturally more angry still when Enigland
had to pay the penalty for their prejudices and their mistakes.
The class of men whose dominant influence had caused England to make mistakes at a time of momentous crisis were the
very men who denounced Mr. Gladstone because of the honor.
able determination of himself and his official colleagues to make
manful reparation for the wrong that had been done. Throughout the whole controversy about the Alabama, as throughout the whole Civil War, the great majority of the English
people entertained none but friendly sentiments towards the
cause of the Union. The English working-classes as a whole
were heart and soul with that cause. The working-men in the
towns of Lancashire and Yorkshire, who suffered most in
their daily lives from the outbreak and the prolongation of
the Civil War in America, were the most cordial and united
in their hopes that the war might go on until its great objects
should have been attained. But then it is hardly necessary to
say that the true opinions of the majority of the people do
not always find a ready way to the intelligence of a distant
State, while that State is convulsed by civil war. The people
of America, north and south, were left for the most part to
form their estimate of English public opinion from the utterances of Society and of certain political organizations, and of
the newspapers which represented Society and these political
organizations. Only two daily journals in London, out of
seven or eight, advocated the cause of the Union. Therefore,
I have no doubt that an impression prevailed widely in
America that the English people generally were hostile to the
unity of the American Republic. Naturally such an impression gave rise to many utterances of remonstrance, anger and




4o6


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


complaint from disappointed Americans who believed that
England ought to have been on the side of the Union, and
were assured by too many English newspapers that England
only desired to see the Republic broken up.
Let me refer to one single and striking illustration of the feeling which then prevailed among some leading public men in
America. Take, for instance; the example of Mr. Charles Sumner. As everybody knows, Sumner had been, during all the
previous part of his public career, a most cordial friend to England. YVhen the Civil XVar broke out, Sumner, no doubt, fully
expected that the whole heart and sympathy of the English
people would go with the cause of the Union. He believed
himself to be mistaken; assuming too hastily that the utterances of certain London newspapers and certain Members of
Parliament xvere the voice of England, he felt bitterly disappointed; and he denounced England with all the force of his powerful eloquence. The effect was positively distressing to many
Englishmen who had long known Mr. Sumner and always respected him, and who found themselves unable, at the moment, to make any satisfactory explanation of the hostile
attitude which he had taken up. Now, it was but natural that
many men on this side of the ocean should regard the language
of Charles Sumner as expressing the general sentiments of the
American people, and should get it into their minds that
America had become the bitter enemy of England. It is easy
to understand how, at such a time and under such conditions,
the most utter misinterpretation of international feeling may
grow up; and it is certain that for some time-indeed for a
long time-after the close of the Civil War there was a want
of cordial understanding between some classes on both sides
of the ocean. Of course, as years went on, the feeling of bitterness on either side began to grow less and less; but between the fading of enmity and the growing up of friendship
there is often a vast blank interval.
At the time of the Venezuela controversy there was a flash
of angry feeling on both sides which ill-natured persons on
both sides -were willing, no doubt, to fan into a flame. It was
soon, however, made apparent that neither on this side of the
ocean nor on the other was there the slightest inclination




WHAT ENGLAND FEELS.


497


among reasonable men, that is, among the great bulk of
either population, to bring about an international quarrel. I
think a good many sober-minded Englishmen were deeply impressed by the fact that notwithstanding all our prophets of
evil had been telling us, there was evidently no intention on
the part of the United States to put on an attitude of hostility
towards England. There were questions of what I may fairly
call minor importance still awaiting settlement between the
two countries, and it was made clear that the American
people in general were just as anxious as the English people
that these questions should be settled in a reasonable and a
friendly spirit, a spirit of " give and take." While this condition of feeling prevailed in England, there came on the quarA
rel between America and Spain. Englishmen of the more intelligent order saw that, so far from America's desiring to
force a quarrel on this country, she had a quarrel forced upon
her in which all the sympathies of civilization and of humanity
ought to be engaged on her side. The moment was thoroughly
propitious for a good understanding between the two peoples.
Englishmen could not but see that America xas taking the
course which the best of Englishmen would have called on
England to take under the like conditions. A wave of public
feeling rose up in this country which was wholly in sympathy
with the action of America in regard to the Cuban troubles.
It was easily seen that America had not been in training for
anything that might be called a great struggle, that she had
not been expecting any crisis of the kind to arise so suddenly,
and most people here were prepared to find the process of
national armament go on but slowly, and, as I have already
said, to see a prolonged struggle with Spain. But there were
two facts which particularly impressed the great bulk of the
English people. One was the fact that the American President and his Government showed no inclination to rush into
a war; but, on the contrary, allowed every opportunity for a
satisfactory settlement on the basis of peace-a settlement
which Spain could have obtained almost up to the last moment, if only her councils had been guided by common prudence, to say nothing of the spirit of Christianity and humanity. The other fact which deeply impressed Englishmen was




498


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


the readiness with which the American people threw themselves into the struggle, and proved themselves equal to any
sacrifice on behalf of the national cause, and of mercy to an
enslaved and a tortured population. As the war went on-short
though its time of duration-it was easy for critics on either side
of the ocean to find fault with the military and naval arrangements made by America. On this side of the water there was
but little inclination to enter into any such criticism. Some
of us could still remember the breakdown, at one time almost
complete, of the English military arrangements in the Crimea;
and very few indeed felt any surprise that America, in her first
foreign war, should give some evidences of imperfect administration. I may, perhaps, also remark that much interest was
created among intelligent readers here by the frankness and
the boldness with which some of the American war correspondents criticized the arrangements made by their own naval and
military authorities, and by those who were in charge of the
commissariat. Of course, the English readers to whom I refer
had no means of knowing whether these strictures-were deserved or undeserved; but they regarded it as a healthy sign
of America's public spirit that men might fearlessly find fault
with the preparations which had been made for carrying on
the war. I have myself heard some Americans say that the,
criticisms were unjust; I have heard from other sources, also
American, that they were well deserved. That, however, was
not the question which directly concerned the English public.
Many Englishmen could well remember the splendid service which was rendered by William Howard Russell, the
war correspondent of The Times during the Crimean campaign, when he denounced and exposed the shortcomings of
our naval and military authorities in their arrangements for
the arming, and even the feeding and the clothing of the
British troops. There were many at the time who complained bitterly of the course taken by Russell, and who
called it unpatriotic to invite the attention of the enemy and
the world to the shortcomings of the War Office administration. The general voice of public opinion, however, commended Russell for his courage, and declared that a war correspondent could not better serve his country than by ex



WHAT ENGLAND FEELS.49


499


posing the defective system which xvas leaving an army to
perish. Now, I have no means of knowing wvhether the
American war correspondents who found fault with the arrangement of the war with Spain were right or wrong in
their censures; but I know that public opinion in England
fully recognized the necessity for free and open criticism, and
felt sure that no sound administration could suffer from it in
the end.  Public opinion in England, too, was much impressed by the fact that so many young Americans possessed
of large private fortune and free to lead lives of mere luxury,
had flung themselves heart and soul into the struggle,
and shared as volunteers the worst dangers and the most
painful privations of the campaign. The end came almost
before we knew that the reality of the struggle had well
begun; and men learned in England that Spain was without
a navy and that the struggle was all over.
The public here read with delight and enthusiasm the
accounts from both sides, of the generosity with which the
vanquished had been dealt with by the victors, of the welcome
which had been given to defeated Spanish admirals on the
decks of American wvar-vessels, of the cheers with which
American soldiers and sailors had greeted their former
enemies when the strife was done. The worst characteristic
of war in its distant days was the hardness of heart, the
ferocity of temper which it engendered among the victors,
and which, even when the battle was over and the cause adjudged, sought new expression in the further punishment
and humiliation of the vanquished. No trace of this antiquated feeling was to be found on the victorious side in this
Cuban campaign; victor s and vanquished recognized the
heroic qualities in each other, and the chief desire of the
conqueror seemed to be to soften as much as possible the
pangs of defeat to the conquered. Americans fully understood that the responsibility of the war did not rest upon the
shoulders of the Spanish officers and men who had to do
their part in the fighting, and who had done it with so gallant
a spirit. Not even the rulers of Spain were alone responsible
for that war. The Queen-Regent of Spain, it was well understood, had done all that lay in her power to maintain




500


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


peace; but all that lay in her power was not much, for the
temper of the Spanish people was not then such as to allow
of the just and wise concessions which alone could have
rendered it possible for America to hold her hand.
Yet the Spanish Government and the Spanish people were
not altogether responsible for the policy which led to the
war. Government and people alike were visited with an inheritance of wrong, with a curse which had come down from
ages of mediaval intolerance and cruelty. The. temper
which animated the long and futile attempt to stamp out the
rebellion of the Netherland provinces had bequeathed its passion to other generations; and it seemed to many a Spaniard
a part of the traditional duty of every Spanish patriot to
maintain, by whatever means, and at whatever cost, the fatal
gifts with which past conquest had endowed the nation.
Spain is above all things an old-fashioned country; she clings
to old ideas and old traditions; and her recent governments
have done all they possibly could to keep her from any
knowledge of the spread of civilization in the world of newer
thoughts and better education outside. Then, again, as all
intelligent Americans knew, Spain was divided by dynastic
factions; and nothing was more certain than the fact that if
the party in power were to make concessions to justice, humanity and prudence, the party out of power would take advantage of the opportunity to advertise itself as the patriot
band which alone could hold for Spain the possessions she
had won in her domineering days. All this was thoroughly
understood by enlightened Americans; and even during the
very war itself there xvas a certain feeling of commiseration
in the American heart for the brave Spaniards who had to fight
in such a cause. Therefore, the whole world could see, and
the people of England readily saw, that there was no bitterness of feeling in the mind of the American conquerors, and
that the close of the strife allowed victors and vanquished to
shake hands and be friends again. Even among those who
in this country had looked on at the struggle with eyes that
wvere friendly to Spain, there xvere many who thought that
Spain after all had come easily out of it and that her defeats
on sea and land, and the losses of territory which those de.




WHAT ENGLAND FEELS.


50I


feats had entailed upon her, might only be the means of giving her a new starting point from which to set out on a
brighter and a happier career.
One of Spain's great troubles during many recent generations has been her ownership of those colonial possessions
which she did not know how to govern, and had too much
inherited pride to give up. No one can doubt the quickness,
the intelligence and the general capacity of the Spanish people, and there is nothing particularly sanguine in the hope
that, relieved from the burden and the curse of those ill-fated
colonial possessions, she may yet come to hold a high place
among the States of Europe. Spain, like Italy, will begin to
do well when she gives up the vain idea of figuring as one of
the great European Powers. Even the biggest and strongest
of those continental Powers which we call great, cannot be
maintained in the place of their ambition without the most
terrible sacrifices of national prosperity and national comfort,
and without the constant danger of some convulsion which
may bring the whole artificial system into chaos. For Spain
to attempt to imitate such a course of policy is an effort as
needless as it is hopeless. It cannot be done, and there is
nothing worth having to be got by it, even if it could be
done. Therefore, even among the friends of Spain in this
country, there were many indeed who drew some comfort and
some hope for Spain out of the very wreck and welter which
came of her attempt to maintain her ill-omened dominion
over Cuba.
When the battle was over, and America was the victor, as
everybody knew from the beginning that she must be, most
of the friends of Spain drew a deep breath and felt a sense of
relief that the question was settled, and that Spain was relieved of a burden far too heavy for her strength to carry.
If there was any feeling of ill-will towards America among
any of the English sympathizers of Spain, it certainly found
no expression in the press or from the platform. I cannot
remember having heard or read an unkindly or uncharitable
word in this country about the policy and the conduct" of the
United States, when once the war was over and the swords
on either side were sheathed.




,z J 4


onTI AMER CAN-SPANISH WAR.


Indeed there seemed to come over the great mass of the
people in England a sudden feeling of positive enthusiasm for
the United States. "Now at last we are brought together,"
appeared to be the general sentiment of England. An idea
was spreading that this country owed something like reparation
to their kinsfolk in America. I do not wonder at the idea.
Something like a reparation was undoubtedly due. Great
Britain, as a State, had often acted an unfriendly part towards
the American Republic. Great Britain, as a State, had proved
herself not a friend to the Republic at more than one crisis,
when even the mere expression of friendship would have been
an encouragement, and something like a positive help. I
should say now that when I speak of Great Britain as a State
I do not by any means intend to put the blame for her action
on the majority of the English people. I have already shown
how, during the whole of the great Civil War, the majority of
the English people were cordial and thorough in their sympathy with the cause of the Union. But it often happens in
human affairs that the state policy of a nation does not represent the feeling of the majority of the people. The course
taken, for instance, by the English Government under Lord
Palmerston at the time of the dispute about the Trent affair
was one of bluster and of positive hostility which certainly
was not a fair representation of the national feeling. We have
learned long since on the clearest evidence that it did not represent the feeling of Queen Victoria or of her husband, the late
Prince Consort. We know that it did not represent the feeling
of the English Liberals who recognized the leadership of Richard Cobden and John Bright. We know that it did not represent the feelings of the educated and enlightened men who followed the intellectual guidance of John Stuart Mill.  We
know that it did not represent the feelings of the English
working-classes. Still, it was a course w-hich presented itself
plainly to the world as the action of the English Government,
and, therefore, as the action of the State. Therefore, I can
quite understand the revulsion of feeling which took place in
the minds of many Englishmen, when they saw the American
Government stand up for the cause of humanity and civilization
and carry on a war against Spain for the sake of rescuing the
victims of tyranny in Cuba.




WHAT ENGLAND FEELS.


503


England did, in fact, owe some reparation to America; and
the opportunity for discharging the debt in some sort of intelligible way was welcomed by the great majority of English.
men. The feeling swelled into positive enthusiasm. Nothing
less would content some of our public men than the expression of a hope that England and America might in the future
be not merely friends but actual pledged allies. One English
public man, as we all know, indulged in the utterance of a
hope that the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes might before long be seen floating side by side somewhere or otherit did not appear to matter where-over a foreign battle-field.
Many of the more composed observers on both sides of the
Atlantic thought that this, perhaps, was going a little too fast
and too far. I remember talking on the subject with a distinguished American, then on a visit to England, who had served
his country well on the battle-field and in the field of literature.
The opinions which he gave me were exactly in accordance
with my own, and are in accordance, I think, with those of most
people in Great Britain and in America. He is and always has
been the friend of England and of Englishmen; but he could not
see his way to any actual alliance between England and the
American Republic. He pointed out that England's vast variety of enterprises outside the limits of the British Empire
could hardly obtain a practical working guarantee from the
people of the American Republic. I know that some distinguished countrymen of my own, both in Ireland and in the
States, spoke loudly against the suggested alliance, on the
ground that by strengthening England it might enable her
for an indefinite time to resist the national claims of the Irish
people.  My own impression was quite the other way. I
should have thought that an alliance, if such were possible, between England and a Republic, the essential condition of
whose existence is the recognition of the principle of home
rule, would make the claim of Ireland, already thoroughly recognized by the whole Liberal Party of Great Britain, absolutely irresistible. But, at the same time, I was entirely in
agreement with the opinion of my American friend, that an
actual alliance between England and America consigned to a
formal treaty is hardly to be accomplished under the existing
conditions.




q_04


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


That, however, is not a question into which there is any occasion for me to enter just now; I am only concerned to
note as an observer the fact that the general feeling of the
English people was one of such enthusiasm towards the
American Republic that a popular orator could hardly go too
far in the expression of his desire for a union of heart and purpose between England and America. It is quite time that
such a feeling as this should prevail.  The English and the
Americans are, after all, for the most part, of the same kith
and kin. "1 Blood is thicker than water" was the exclamation
of the American naval commander when he came to the rescue of the English ships on which fire was.suddenly opened
from the forts in the Chinese river. My mind went back to a
story told of an English naval commander at a more distant
date-during the wvar between England and America which
broke out in 18I2. The English naval commander was talking over the defeats inflicted on English vessels during that
struggle, and he brought his reflections to a conclusion with a
cheery and good-natured remark that after all we don't so
much mind being beaten by American ships and American
sailors, it would be a different thing if the defeat came from
Frenchmen or Russians, but the Americans are only ourselves
over again. Now, the feeling expressed by these two sailors,
the American and the Englishman, was just the kind of feeling
which prevails at the present moment among the vast majority
of the English people. There is a common desire that the
English-speaking races, wherever they may be settled throughout the world, by Atlantic or Pacific shores, should recognize
their common kinship, and accept as far as possible a common
purpose in the work of civilization.
The English people, I hope, have got quite enough of alliances with the great Powers of the European continent.
England was allied forty years ago with the French Second
Empire, for the purpose of maintaining the Ottoman dominion
in the southeast of Europe; and what came of the alliance?
Is there an educated Englishman living to-day who has a word
to say in defence of the policy which led to the Crimean war?
Is there an Englishman who does not know that the result of
the war was not to weaken but to strengthen Russia? What




WHAT ENGLAND FEELS.


S50


did the alliance do for England, even as regarded our relations
with France? Do the French people love England now?
Do we not read every day in the French press the sort of
language which makes one believe that.Fashoda is taking
the place of Waterloo in the embittered memories of the
French people? Do we not hear every day some talk of a
French alliance with Russia or even with Germany, with the
object of enabling France sometime or other to make England
pay for her triumph in the valley ot the Nile? The plain
truth is that in the present temper of Europe, with the new
fashion and the new passion for the acquisition of territory
here and there and anywhere, in Asia and in Africa, it is impossible for England to form cordial friendship with any of
the great continental Powers. Reasonable Englishmen are,
therefore, beginning to feel that the time hascomewhen England ought to look for lasting friendships elsewhere, and, that
the one true and lasting friendship in her power to make,
would be with her kith and kin, whose national banner bears
the Stars and Stripes. No one can feel more convinced than
I am that such a friendship would make for the best interests
of freedom and of civilization all over the world. I believe
that in the minds and the hearts of the best Englishmen of all
parties such is the feeling, the hope, and indeed the conviction.
There seems every reason to believe that an opportunity has
now arisen for a thoroughly good understanding between the
United States and England, such as never arose before since
the severance of the colonies from the parent country. Indeed, at different periods of the interval between that time
and the present, it has seemed as if England and America
were drifting farther and farther away from each other in
sympathy and in understanding.  I am again anxious to
point out, however, that this drifting apart was not so much
the work of the populations as the work of the governing
systems. The opportunity that seems to me now to have
arisen is an opportunity for a greater harmony between the two
States, using the word in its political sense, as well as between
the two peoples. We used to hear a good deal, at one time,
about "the manifest destiny" of the American Republic.
The phrase with the peculiar significance once attached to it




50I,,o


TI-. AVMPPRTCA1NKPAMNTTU WAR


has almost passed out of the memory of the present generation. The manifest destiny of America now is to lead the way
in the culture of all the arts and the teachings which tend to
the development of humanity and the growth of civilization.
That destiny it is in America's own hands to accomplish for
herself. She starts to the work with advantages denied to
any of the older States. She is free from that debilitating
load of pauperism which defective conditions and bad systems
have brought upon the great States of Europe. She is not
vexed with a thirst for territorial aggrandizement, having, to
use the familiar colloquial phrase, " enough and to spare  of
her own.
Some alarm was undoubtedly expressed in this country,
and by Englishmen who are sincere friends of the American
Republic and have proved themselves so at the most trying
time, that the territorial conquests which the Republic has
lately had to make might bring with them a desire to gain
still further possessions, and, as a means to such an end, to
accept the modern policy of certain European States which
stretch out grasping hands in this, that and the other direction. I may say that I have not felt any fear of this kind myself, and that I do not think it is generally felt by the people of
Great Britain and Ireland. Most of us have noted with satisfaction the strong protest which many Americans have made
against any indulgence in such a temptation, and have settled
down to the conviction that such will be the general sentiment of the American people. Only a very small minority,
indeed, in Great Britain and Ireland could have.so misinterpreted the motives and the purposes of the American people
as to believe, even for a moment, that the war with Spain was
undertaken out of any pitiful desire for the annexation of
Cuba and the Philippines. If any such desire had prevailed
in America, nothing could have been more easy than to find
an excuse and an opportunity long ago for putting it into
action. The condition of Cuba has been a trouble to America for far more than a generation; and there was a time, undoubtedly, when a policy of conquest might have found an
enthusiastic support among the populations of some of the
American States. Nothing could have been more easy, at one




WHAT ENGLAND FEELS5


507


time or another, than to pick a quarrel with Spain, and force
her into a war. There were seasons during which Spain, rent
by actual civil strife, would have been in a far worse position
for the maintenance of her colonial possessions than she was
at the time when the war broke out at last. It is now well
understood in England that America held back from a war
policy as long as she fairly could, and gave Spain every opportunity of putting herself right before the world, by adopting a better system of government in Cuba. There is, therefore, no fear whatever that a cordial understanding between
England and the United States could be checked by any serious
misgivings on the part of Englishmen about the policy of
America in the future. My own strong belief is that a cordial understanding between England and America would help
the better intellects aind the healthier purposes of England to
set her free from the old-world traditions which regard
national greatness as a question of territorial mileage. The
English-speaking races, actuated by that cordial sympathy and
common understanding, of which I have spoken, would open
the way for civilization to spread itself everywhere, and would
form a guarantee of peace such as the world has never yet
seen.
We hear constant talk of what terrible evils may yet be
brought upon the world by the ambition of Russia, by the
ambition of Germany or of France-there is even a man of
great military authority in England who has warned the
world more than once against the imminent danger which
may yet be threatened by the overweening ambition of China.
Now, against all these menaces to the world, even including
the possible passion of China to make a descent upon Europe
-a danger which need hardly yet be taken into serious account-I know of no barrier so strong and worthy of reliance
as a general good understanding between the two great English-speaking peoples. Even the Chinese Alexander the
Great or Tamerlane, whenever he rises on the world's horizon,
vhose soul is swelled by the fierce desire to make conquest of
Europe, might perhaps take into his calculations that in such
an attempt he would have to reckon with America as well as
with England. Certainly the ruler of Russia or of Germany,




rnoZ
A-t,


TriA      '-v l-R WANSPANISH WAR.


whose ambition urged him into fields of reckless enterprise,
would be apt to think the matter over very carefully when it
was made clear to him that the English-speaking races all over
the world would be likely to make common cause against any
reckless disturber of the world's peace.
It is impossible to measure the influence which might be
brought to bear, for the cause of humanity and good order,
by such a general understanding among the English-speaking
races. So far. as I can observe or understand, the general
feeling of the best men in England is thoroughly in favor of
such an international union. I should have to come to the
same conclusion, even if, like some of my own countrymen, I
were opposed to such a union on the ground that the grasping
policy of England might only be strengthened and encouraged
by a partnership with the powerful Republic of the west. I
have already explained that I have no such feeling, and that
I believe, on the contrary, the policy of the American Republic would have a most wholesome influence on the policy of
England. But, even if I shared the views of some of my
countrymen, I should none the less be compelled to declare,
as an observer, that there is just now all over England a feeling of the most cordial friendship towards America, a recognition of the purpose which has inspired her recent policy,
and a thorough faith in the position which she is destined to
hold as a leader of modern civilization. Such a feeling on the
one side, understood and appreciated as it is sure to be on
the other, opens the way for a genuine international alliance
which needs no formal treaties, signed and interchanged, to
ensure its value and its lasting power.
LA




11.
11




.-....I




CHAPTER XXVI.


THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.
BY
MAj.-GEN. NELSON A. MILES, Commanding U. S. Army.
O    UR war with Spain had many exceptional features.
Some preceded, some occurred during the progress,
and some appeared after the close of hostilities. In
the first place, there was a formal declaration of war before the
opening of hostilities. This is not only far from being the rule
in the experience of warring nations, but is a rare occurrence.
For many months the nation had been expecting war. Fifty
millions of dollars had been appropriated for the national
defense, and for each and every purpose connected therewith,
to be expended at the discretion of the President. Presumably that immense sum was used in the purchase of ships, arms,
and the munitions of war for the Army and Navy, that new
levies might be promptly armed and equipped.  That the
war was inevitable wvas apparent to every thoughtful reader of
history. The statesmen of the nation had recognized the
question of the duty of the Government of the United States
towards Spain and the Cuban struggle for liberty, as being
by far the most important problem with which we were then
called upon to deal. If that did not mean something more
than a mere probability of war, what did it mean? For several
years previous to the declaration of war, we had energetically
employed our powers, if not in the interest of Spain and
against the interest of the Cuban patriots, at least to maintain
our friendly relationship with the kingdom of Spain. Nearly
a year in advance of the declaration of wvar, the unanimous
voice of the people of the nation, expressed in the nominating conventions of the great political parties, was a direct
command for a cessation of this policy, and its reversal. This




5 r ^
rr - 


rTHr AEA VTTC A XT Cfl AN TH T vA.T '7 
-L JJ1A2A.J f-XLfiL  fLLd - fL N -O-LP n~ Ion.1   V V tj1-ilk


voice was heard, expressly recognized, and with apparent
cordiality accepted by the candidates. The voice of the
people was heard by Congress, and Congress responded. So
clearly was the approach of war discerned that, weeks before
the declaration of war, the continental powers unitedly,
through their ambassadors and envoys, addressed to the
Executive an expression of hope that humanity and moderation might mark the course of this Government and people;
as if this Government and people had not led all the nations
of all the world in humanitarian principles. This notice was
not only an exceptional, but an unprecedented feature. Not
only that, but it now forms a precedent pregnant with possibilities of future perplexities and dangers for this country.
War having been declared, it was an exceptional feature
that our antagonist had already more than she could handle
with patriots of Puerto Rica, Cuba and the Philippine Islands
alone. For three years she had been steadily losing ground.
Cuba was lost to Spain. The circumstances of Cortes were
immeasurably less favorable than ours when he burned his
ships behind him. With a few hundred followers he joined
the weaker side, and with it won an empire, vastly greater in
extent and numbers than our acquisitions from Spain; not
only so, but with a loss of fewer of his men, all-told, than we
had killed at Santiago.
Another exceptional feature was the practical unanimity of
our people as evidenced in the voting of $5o,ooo,ooo, in the
declarations in their political conventions, and the response
to the call for volunteers. Such unanimity had never before
been known in all our history. In i86i the cause of disunion
had many sympathizers in every section of the country; in
1846 more than one half the population was averse to the
war; in 1812 the prospect was that whole states would have
to be coerced; in 1776 the Tories were a large, vigorous and
dangerous minority.
Another exceptional circumstance in our experience of war
was the immense number of trained soldiers for service. It is
true our regular military establishment was small, but nearly
a million of the best-trained soldiers in the world stood ready
as minute men to answer the call of their country in an emer



THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


51I


gency. The few individuals among them, whose services
were for some reason accepted, abundantly proved their experience and aptitude in camp, on the march and in action.
Some further exceptional features will present themselves
in due course, as we now proceed with a sketch of the history
of the war from the commencement of actual hostilities.
In conducting the preparations for war, it was reasonable
that the highest executive should expect and fully consider,
in dealing with military questions, the best thought, based on
long experience and mature study, of the highest military and
naval officials. In case their superiors in authority should
decide against any advice or plan submitted and in favor of
some other, then it became their duty to support the one
adopted with unhesitating zeal. Such being the case, we
believed that the calling for so large a number of volunteers
before they could be properly equipped and especially the
manner in which they were brought into service, was injudicious. We felt as Wellington must have felt in the campaign
in Spain. Plagued as he was by the Spanish habit of getting
together recruits first, and thinking of how to feed and equip
them afterwards, he wrote:
" It will answer no purpose to bring to the theatre of war
on the Douro or the Ebro crowds of starving soldiers. We
shall increase our difficulties without reaping any advantage
from the trouble taken in forming them.  An army wvell
equipped, disciplined, officered and instructed is far more
effective than a larger one without these essential conditions."
The President, on the 25th of April, announced to the
world that Congress had declared wvar, and immediately
directed the Secretary of the Navy to telegraph orders to the
Commander of the Asiatic Squadron, then lying in the Port
of Hong Kong, pointing out in diplomatic terms that, as
there could be no harbor of rest within his reach, there remained for him only to commence operations; and nothing
could be more superb than the promptitude with which the
summons was obeyed, and a new name emblazoned high over
all on the roll of naval heroism. The proclamation of neutrality by different governments having debarred our Asiatic
Squadron from harbor privileges, this was recognized as the




r5"
a

THE A!CNERIAN-SFANISH WAR.
lam' - 'I- 1V1tNIL.


only course open, for inaction would mean the speedy exhaustion of the supplies of the fleet, 12,000 miles from any home
port and from the means of replenishing. As is usual in
momentous affairs of the history of the world, and as the event
proved, the man for the occasion was present. There was
not a moment's hesitation or vacillation as to the course he
would pursue. He at once ordered the ships of his squadron
to Mirs Bay, and gave it a formation that it maintained
throughout the voyage and to the end of the epoch-making
battle. There was no uncertainty or doubt manifested by
him, as there was when Nelson set out from Naples, the latter
having obtained provisions and water through the interposition of his friend, Lady Hamilton, just prior to the battle of
the Nile. On the 26th of April, Dewey set out for Manila,
leading his fleet in the following order: the flagship Olympia,
bearing the broad pennant of the Commanding Commodore;
then the Baltimnore, the Raleigh, the Petrel, the Concord, and
the Boston. The revenue cutter McCulloch, with the transports Nanshan and Zafiro, formed a separate column to the
starboard. The Commander of the squadron had never been
at Manila, nor had a single one of his officers; yet he had
made a study of the charts he had taken care to procure, of
Philippine waters, made his plans thereon, and proceeded to
put them into execution. He well knew that the enemy was
informed by telegraph of his movements, and would have
nearly a week in which to complete their preparations to
receive him. In this he was at one disadvantage that Nelson
never had to take into account. "In early morn, at dawn of
May," as some poetical genius has expressed it, he found
himself with his squadron intact and in order of battle, and
with the order established at Mirs Bay unchanged, calmly reposing on the waters of the harbor of Manila. The change
from darkness to light and from light to darkness, comes with
extreme rapidity in the tropics, and as the great disk of the
equatorial sun swept up from below the horizon, the squadron
of the enemy was presented suddenly but distinctly to the view,
formed in battle array. Its formation was very similar to that
which Nelson encountered in Aboukir Bay, when he exclaimed
that before the morrow his fate would be a peerage or West



THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


5I3


minster Abbey. We hear no such exclamation on the part
of Dewey. It was about 5:30 that the attack began in both
cases; Nelson in the evening, Dewey in the morning. All
night long Nelson's battle raged, replete with dramatic personal incidents, and, as at Trafalgar, ship to ship, and hand to
hand encounters. We hear of nothing personally demnonstrative on the part of Dewey. Nelson himself describes the
French position as " a strong line of battle for preventing the
entrance to the Bay, flanked by enormous gun-boats, four
frigates, and a battery of guns and mortars." The Frcnch
ships were placed "at a distance from each other of about i60
yards, with the van ship close to a shoal in the Northwest,
and the whole of the line just outside a four-fathom sand
bank; so that an enemy, it was considered, could not turn
either flank." The Spaniards had disposed their forces so as
to cover the entrance to Cavite, the western flank of the fleet
resting on Sangley Point, and the eastern flank resting on the
shoal near the land on the other side of the Bay, both flanks
being apparently so close to shoal water as to prevent Dewey
from passing at either place, or " doubling" on them. Here
the parallelism ended. No signal was flying to the breeze
over Dewey like that of Nelson at Trafalgar that America
"expects every man to do his duty." He simply ported his
helm at once and headed for the Spaniards, followved by his
ships. As was afterwards learned, the Spanish line consisted of
the Reina Christina (flagship), Castilla, Isle de Luzon, Isle de
Cuba, Don Juan de Austria, Don Antonio de Ulloa, and the
Marques Del Duero. Five times he slowly passed along the
Spanish line of battle, back and forth, steadily closing in
towards them, and working his 120 guns mounted on I9,5oo00
tons of ship displacement against the enemy's go90 guns and
12,o000oo tons of ship displacement, after which he quietly wvent
to breakfast. It was the next morning after the battle wvhen
Nelson finished his work, and estimated his loss and gains; it
was immediately after breakfast when Dewey deliberately
proceeded to finish the business and take an account of stock.
Never in the history of the world was the superiority of intellect over mere brute force more gloriously illustrated. Every
portion of the contest in Manila Bay seems to have been




5 I 4


5HE i AMWI ERl I CAhNI-SJ PAf IN I S n V (A R.


carefully, though quickly, calculated and provided for in
advance. The enemy had the greater number of shipsand
men, but the mechanical power employed was with the
Americans; and contrary to all previous experience, there
was no attempt at ramming or boarding and no attempt at
the display of independent individual bravery. Such display
was exclusively on the losing side.
It requires no great stretch of poetic license to perceive the
descendants of the Gallic and Iberian Romans reminded by
the sudden appearance of the descendants of the rude rovers
of Angle-land, of the descents that were made by the vikings
upon the maritime towns of the Bay of Biscay fifteen centuries ago. Their consternation was most natural in any event;
but to those whose education and intelligence could carry their
reflections back through the intervening annals, the event
must have been especially portentous. May not the Filipino
wonder if the landing of Dewey and Merritt at Manila shall
prove as disastrous to the natives as was that of Hengist and
Horsa on the Island of Thanet fourteen and one half centuries ago?
At the conclusion of the contest it was found that no one in
our fleet had been killed, and only eight men had been injured,-none of these seriously. Not a single ship had received any injury that reduced her efficiency in the slightest,
with the exception of one gun on the Baltimore struck by the
same shell that caused all the wounds that were experienced
by our men at the battle. We have already noticed the disproportion in favor of the Americans between the tonnage displacement and the number of guns; but this disproportion
and that of the hits between the two fleets was comparatively
small. That the American fleet was the stronger in battery
power is no reproach to us, but the reverse; for it shows that
the American Commander acted in accordance with the first
principles of warfare. It xvas Napoleon who said that God
was on the side of the heaviest battalions. Nelson always recognized that fact. When attacking superior numbers, both
of men and ships, he so attacked, laying ship to ship on the
flank, as to throw out of action a considerable portion of the
enemy's fleet, leaving him actually superior at the point of
battle.




THE WVORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


5 1 


Commodore Dewey, having gotten his superior tonnage and
superior metal into the action, proceeded to use them effectively. But few of the enemny's guns could reach him at all,
and such as could have reached him failed to do so because
of poor gunnery, probably resulting from excitement and consternation. at the terrible destructiveness of the American fire.
This permitted the display of extraordinary individual 'heroism
on the Spanish fleet, and prevented any opportunities for the
same on that of their antagonists. The result wvas that there
were none but heroes on the American fleet, because every
man stood at his post and fought with deliberation, without
excitement; and the Commander himself, while showing the
highest quality of courage and bravery, could make no greater
display personally than his lowest subordinate. Of course
the coolness of the Commander in such an action is imparted
to all his subordinates, and the confidence of the Commander
in his men and of the men in their Commander must have been
owing in no small degree to previous acquaintance and previous drill and preparation. All this preparation and superiority in the adaptation of means to ends, scientific construction
of guns and appurtenances, accurate proportioning of powder
ingredients, elaborate and ingenious mechanisms for handling
guns and ammunition — all such expedients being calculated
and perfectly in control in advance, while it insured victory,
detracts nothing from, but rather enhances the glory of the
men, and especially of the leader, who achieved success.
The success of Dewey was as substantial as it was spectacular, a concurrence of circumstances extremely rare in the
affairs of the world. Never before in the annals of time did a
name spring more suddenly from quiet professional life into
world-wide fame. In the last minute of the month of April
that name was practically unknown beyond the purview of
the departmental roster. Before the end of the first of May,
with the speed of that appliance which girdles the earth in
forty minutes, or less, that name, emblazoned on every sky,
obscured the lustre of many of the maritime achievements of
the past.
When war was declared, we had a regular army of 25,000
men, located in small detachments at the various military sta



5 I6


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


tions scattered all over our vast country. We had made a
very little advance on the conditions that existed at the time
of the Venezuelan embroglio, at which time we had but three
high-power guns mounted and in position for service along
the vast extent of coast line of the United States. Our navy
had recently been increased by the addition of purchased
cruisers and battleships, but they were only about half manned,
and all were more or less deficient in ammunition.
Our fortifications were inadequate for the defence of the
great commercial cities and important harbors, and such defences as we had were only partly equipped in guns, ammunition and men. Foreign nations regarded us as a people devoted to industrial and commercial pursuits and unworthy of
serious consideration as a military or naval power, although
they well understood that our reserve power and wealth were
elements of strength which could be utilized if we were given
time for preparation.
The Navy of* Spain, as well as her Army, having been engaged in active war for years, was naturally supposed to be
prepared for immediate action, and therefore capable of the
greater effectiveness at the commencement of the contest;
and our authorities, as the event proved, were unduly cautious
in ordering aggressive movements. This was very natural
under the circumstances; but had they fully comprehended
the enemy's weakness, notwithstanding the appearances, as
well as the excellent state of discipline of the forces manning
our Navy, the obvious movement, whether for aggressive or
defensive operations, was an immediate seizure of Puerto Rico.
This is no new discovery. That it was a necessity of the situation could not well be overlooked. Indeed, as early as
February 3 preceding the declaration of War, a retired officer, Admiral Ammen, writing from the Naval Hospital in
Washington to Senator Morgan of Alabama in regard to the
ostensible efforts of the Spanish authorities to organize an
autonomous government for Cuba, said:
"I hope this Cuban autonomy will not be permitted to be
smothered, and if attempted and ignored, that Congress will
be disposed to acknowledge the independence of the Island of
Cuba, which will in my belief enable them to attain it. If Spain




THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


5 I 7


chooses to make war, we should at once take Puerto RIco,
which will leave her without a point except the Island of Cuba.
Then I would say we should knock all of their defences down
except those of Havana, for the comfort and in aid of the insurgents, but not land a man on the island, as we should do
on Puerto Rico, which we should occupy with a considerable
force. As for Havana, we might try our hand as between her
guns and our's afloat. As for the Spanish Navy, I have the
idea that it is in a very bad condition, and it would be a question of relative forces whether we should engage it."
The sanitary objections to a campaign in Cuba during the
summer season were well understood. The details of the expedition under the charge of Admiral Bacock of the British
Navy, with Lord Albemarle in command of the military forces,
in the year I762, were accessible, and not only accessible but
thoroughly canvassed. The invading force numbered about
i5,ooo men, almost exactly the number of our first expeditionary force to Santiago. The total loss of the British in I 762
and that of our army in the present year, including sickness,
was represented by very nearly the same figures.
As the portent of war grew darker and rose higher in our
political sky, it became my duty to urge with increasing zeal
and earnestness the importance of early and thorough preparation. It was not in my power to do more than give warning, to
point out the dangers and suggest the remedies. This much
I did, or tried to do, with a persistency and earnestness limited
only by the strict requirements of official courtesy. Tentage,
transportation and camp equipage wvere insufficient for any important military operations. Congress passed a joint resolution
which was approved April 2o, demanding that the Government
of Spain relinquish its authority on the Island of Cuba. Prior to
that action Congress had appropriated $-o,ooo,ooo for the national defence. During the period intervening, in anticipation
of actual hostilities, efforts were made by the military authorities to secure material for military operations on a scale commensurate with the exigencies of the situation and on a scale
far more expansive than had been adopted for a great many
years. The importance of that act of Congress can be readily
appreciated, as the time thus given was most opportune for se



5 18


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


curing such munitions of war as were absolutely necessary to
the proper equipment of an army and for securing the materials which had not previously been in demand in our country,
but which are indispensable to the highest success in modern
warfare. I had earnestly recommended the purchase of smokeless powder, rapid-fire and machine guns, modern rifles and
such like requisites. A number of bills had been introduced
in Congress looking to a re-organization and an increase of the
Regular Army, but the wide divergencies of opinion on the
subject might have prevented any action whatever but for the
growing strain upon the relations between our government and
that of Spain. These strained relations served to emphasize
the need for action on the subject, and resulted in an act,
which was approved by the President on the 26th of April, authorizing an increase in the enlisted strength of the Army to
62,597 men, which number was subsequently increased by a
supplementary act authorizing the enlistment of i1,ooo men
possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates.
Previous to the passage of this act, as early as the 9th of April,
I had recommended the equipment of 5o,ooo volunteers, and
shortly thereafter that an additional auxiliary force of 40,000
men be provided as a reserve and for the protection of the
coasts. -This would have given us an effective force of i62,597
men, which when supplemented by the auxiliary force of
5o,ooo natives of Cuba, I believed would be sufficient. I
deemed it, however, of the first importance that this force
should be well equipped and placed in the highest degree of
efficiency for active service.
As early as the middle of April steps were taken for the
mobilization of the regular troops, various regiments of infantry being ordered to Mobile, New Orleans and Tampa, the
understanding then being that these orders were preparatory
to an inmmediate movemnent to Cuba upon a declaration of
war, which then seemed imminent. On further consideration,
the authorities modified this order, and part of the regular
infantry, with artillery and cavalry, was diverted to Chattanooga and placed in camp at Chickamauga Park. On May
Io, the regular artillery and cavalry were ordered from
Chickamauga to Tampa, preparatory to a movement on Cuba.




THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


519


Subsequently 70,000 men were ordered to move on Cuba, and
commissary stores for go days for the men and 30 days for
the animals were ordered to be concentrated at Tampa, but
the want of proper equipment and ammunition rendered such
movement impracticable, and it never reached the stage of
an actual attempt at departure from our shores.
The President's proclamation declaring a state of war appeared on the 2$th of April, and the next day it became my
duty to advise giving prompt attention to the equipment,
organization and discipline of the troops for field service,
and that, after being assembled, organized and sworn into the
service of the United States, they would require uniforms,
tentage, complete camp equipage, arms and ammunition and
a full supply of stationery, including blank books for reports
of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, Medical and Ordnance
Departments; that they would also require complete equipment of supplies and munitions of war, hospital appliances
and transportation, including ambulances and stretchers; that
the officers and non-commissioned officers would have to
be appointed and properly instructed in their duties and responsibilities, and that they should have some instruction in
tactical exercises and other duties of the highest importance
to the efficiency and health of troops in the field; that the importance of this preliminary work was urgent, as also that it
should be completed in advance of the troops leaving their
States; and it was furthermore strongly represented that
this might be done while the general and staff officers were
being selected, appointed and properly instructed, and the
large camps were being secured, and stores collected therefor.
It was a matter of very great concern to me that unequipped,
ununiformed men by the thousands should not be collected
in great camps away from their States where it would be
difficult for them to be properly supplied with food, camp
equipage, blankets, tentage, medical supplies and transportation facilities; for the absence of these appliances could
not but cause debilitating results upon the health and strength
of the men who were thus gathered together.
While the railways of the United States were engaged in
transporting troops, munitions of war and supplies to Tampa




520


THIE AM EI T A N-S PA NTIS WAR.'


and other points of departure on the Gulf and the South Atlantic, the military authorities at Washington took steps to
obtain accurate and detailed information within the limits of
the prospective seat of war. Two young, energetic and iiitelligent officers of the Bureau of Military Information were
assigned, the one to Cuba, the other to Puerto Rico, to attempt
the daring and difficult duty of ascertaining and reporting
conditions as they might be found to exist in the territories
respectively assigned to them. Both, in the results of their
efforts, gave abundant proof of the wisdom of their selection.
The emissary to Cuba, Lieutenant Rowan, having left the
United States on April 9, landed April 24 at Portillo, about
70 miles west of Santiago de Cuba.  He penetrated the
interior, found and conferred with General Garcia, one of the
most successful and brilliant leaders of the Cuban Army, and
without undue delay hastened to lay before his superiors in
Washington the valuable data that he had acquired. With
General Garcia's concurrence, he brought back with him two
officers of that chieftain's staff, Brigadier-General Enrique
Collazo and Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos Hernandez.  The
course of his return journey lay up to Manati on the North
Coast; thence by an open boat to Nassau, New Providence,
whence they arrived in the United States May 13.
It was nearly a month after Lieutenant Rowan's departure
that Lieutenant Whitney sailed, May 5, from Key West for
Puerto Rico, which, after a ten days' voyage, he entered and
proceeded to explore under disguise, giving his attention
more particularly to the southern sections of the island. He
departed thence on his return June I, and reported the resLIlts of his mission in Washington on the 9th of that month.
Like the report of Lieutenant Rowan, that of Lieutenant
Whitney was eminently satisfactory at Army Headquarters.
He had gone on the most hazardous duty an officer can be
called upon to perform. He was in constant and imminent
danger of discovery, the penalty for which would have been
an ignominious death from which there could have been no
appeal.
Several relief expeditions carrying arms and supplies for
the Cubans were organized and dispatched. The first of these




THE WORK OF THE ARMNf1Y AS A WHOLE.


521I


was equipped at Key West under the direction of Colonel
Hall, since promoted to Brigadier General. This expedition
landed under charge of Captain O'Connell of the United
States Army, his assistant, Lieutenant Crofton, also of the
army, being the first officer to land on Cuban soil during the
Spanish-American War.
One of the most important of these expeditions was under
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dorst of the volunteer
army, which sailed from Key West by way of Nassau and
landed at the harbor of Banes on the north coast of Cuba,
where he delivered to the Cubans, who held and continued
to hold that port, 7,500 rifles, a million cartridges, 5,ooo uniforms and other munitions of war and supplies of which the
ten thousand veteran Cubans under General Garcia stood
sadly in need. Colonel Dorst returned early in June, reported
the entire success of his expedition, and received the hearty
congratulations of his commanding officers, whose trust he
had so thoroughly vindicated.
Meanwhile the forces gathering at Tampa, originally destined for an invasion of Cuba on a much larger scale, were
being organized to a strength of five thousand with a view to
a lodgment at Tunas on the south side of Cuba, where it was
expected to open communication with the General in Chief
of the Cuban forces, General Gomez, and support and co-operate with him in the healthful mountain region where he was
understood to be operating. This expedition was designed to
be under the command of Major-General Shafter, the senior
officer then at Tampa, and was intended to be strong enough
to effect a landing and maintain its position, while furnishing
all the supplies needed by the force of General Gomez. The
movement of Admiral Cervera's fleet from the Cape de Verde
Islands rendered necessary the adoption of new plans, and
this expedition, like the first one designed, was suspended, and
in effect never advanced to the point of setting sail.
The reports of conditions at Tampa became such that at this
time I determined to take the field in person with headquarters
temporarily at Tampa. I issued an order to the Army designed
to increase and promote the esprit de corps on the part of officers and men, to bring the military forces to the highest state




522


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


of efficiency, and to call forth the best energies of all the
elements composing the Army, of whatever character or station, in order that they might the more speedily accomplish the
objects in view through an increased zeal for the cause and an
enlarged earnestness of effort. Attention was called to the
high development which had been reached throughout the
civilized world by the experience of the past century, and the
faithful observance of laws and regulations which govern military bodies in all civilized countries, and I urged that all officers, of whatever grade, should as far as lay in their power
guard and preserve the health and welfare of all under their
charge, that the officers should labor diligently and zealously to
perfect themselves and their subordinates in military drill, instruction and discipline; and above all, that they should constantly endeavor, by precept and example, to maintain the highest soldierly standard, to foster and stimulate that high soldierly
spirit and'-patriotic devotion to duty-which must characterize
an effective army. Reciting the fact that the order was issued
upon the day sacred to the memory of the herioc dead, the
30th of May, I hoped that the injunctions, from all the circumstances, would be strongly impressed, and result beneficially, most especially throughout the volunteer regiments that
were so rapidly forming, and lessen the dangers that are always
present with large bodies of men gathered on short notice for
a great national purpose.
Definite information having been received that Cervera's
fleet had been inclosed in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba by
our Navy, orders were given to General Shafter, May 30, to
embark his troops and proceed to that harbor for the purpose
of assisting our naval forces in capturing that fleet; and on
the same evening I left Washington.
Reaching Tampa on the ist of June, I found that place
crowded with an indiscriminate accumulation of supplies and
war material. The confusion, owing partly to the want of
terminal railway facilities and partly to the want of system
in loading and billing material, appeared for a time to be
utterly inextricable. The sidings from the port of.Tampa
for perhaps fifty miles into the interior were blocked wvith cars,
and the resulting difficulties of the situation prevented proper




THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


523


embarkation of the troops earlier than June 8, on which
date the flotilla was in the act of moving to sea. This movement, however, was suspended by orders from Washington,
and the expedition did not sail until the 14th. My request
for permission to accompany the expedition had not been
granted, and on the day following its departure I received
and immediately complied xvith, the following:
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 15, 1898.
MAJOR-GENERAL MILES,
Tamnrpa, F/a.,
Important business requires your presence here; report at once. Answer.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
In a chapter like this, it is impossible to enter into the details of this expedition; nor is it necessary, since it is all very
fully described by others in the foregoing chapters, and I will
content myself with merely repeating the belief which I entertained from the first and stated officially to the Department,
that we could secure the surrender of the Spanish army in the
Island of Cuba without any great loss of life. I know of no
reason at present to revise that opinion. There is, however, a
duty which I owe to the Cuban patriots before leaving this
part of my subject, and that is to make clear the fact of the
co-operation received from their governmental and military
authorities. While at Tampa, on the 9th, and again on
the 12th of June, I received cheering news by cable from
the Cuban patriots in response to my communications to
General Garcia on the 2d.   These were in the form of
suggestions and requests, but they were heartily accepted
as commands.  Nothing could have been more convincing
of the hearty good will of the Cubans toward the American
people and American government at that time than the
alacrity with which this response was made and the instructions followed out. So anxious was General Garcia to assure
us of the readiness of the patriot armies and people to co-operate that his response was hurried forward through different
channels, in order that in case one should miscarry, another




5 24


THE AMTERICAN-SPA-NISH WAR.


might reach its destination. In that response he was careful
to add that hle would take measures at once to carry out my
recommendations, regarding them as orders, and that he would
immediately proceed to concentrate forces at the points indicated; that he would march without delay; that already he
had put forces in motion to intercept aid going from Holguin
and other points to Santiago; that, repeating every assurance
of good will, he desired to second our plans.
It was on the sixth of June that Colonel Hernandez, on
board the steamer Gloucester, had arrived in the harbor of
Banes. Proceeding ashore at once, he delivered my communication to General Garcia, who had recently come into possession of that port. It conveyed to General Garcia the first
information regarding the proposed expedition to Santiago,
and he immediately gave orders for the concentration suggested in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba. The difficulties in
his way were very great, but were overcome, one after another,
until on the i9th, at 7:30 A. M., he reached Aserradero and
placed himself in communication with Admiral Sampson.
Invited by the latter on board his flagship, the two proceeded
to concert a plan of attack preparatory to the expected arrival
of General Shafter's expedition. It should not be forgotten
that in his attitude toward the military authorities of our
government General Garcia was not acting simply on his own
authority, but in obedience to orders that he had previously
received from the Council of the Cuban Government, to obey
and respect the orders and instructions of the commanders of
the American Army whenever they should commence operations in the territory under his command. General Shafter,
on arrival of his expedition off Santiago Bay, with Admiral
Sampson, visited General Garcia at his headquarters at Aserradero to confer with him in regard to the attack by land.
The result of this conference was that it was determined to
make the landing of the American forces east instead of west
of the Bay of Santiago, and Cuban troops were placed on
board American transports to reinforce the brigade of General
Ramon, already in position to protect the landing of the
American forces. These reinforcements landed at Sigua and
advanced at once on Daiquiri, the united commands being




THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.,


525


under General Castillo. The Spanish troops at Daiquiri hastily abandoned their position at that place, which wvas at once
occupied by the Cubans; and when the American Navy bombarded the hills in the vicinity of that town, preparatory to
the landing of the forces of General Shafter, the result of
such bombardment was the spilling of Cuban blood only.
From that time until the close of the campaign the Cubans
were always in the vanguard, whether at Firmeza and Siboney,
or Las Guasimas and El Caney.
On the 1st of July, under orders from General Shatter,
General Garcia, with his 4,000 Cubans, began at 5:30 in the
morning, his march toward Marianajo, and at 7 o'clock occupied the positions allotted to him at that point. Marianajo
lies between El Caney and San Juan Hill, and it was part of
the duty assigned him to protect both El Caney and San
Juan Hill should the enemy come out from Santiago to reinforce either place during the battle. This duty was effectively
performed. All the Cubans were under the enemy's fire,
and their loss amounted to about one hundred. After the
conclusion of this day's action, under orders from General
Shafter, General Garcia, at the head of his forces, made a
night march to the extreme right flank. At dawn of the 2d
he was north of the city in a strong position, with his vanguard in close proximity to the city, and during the 2d drove
the enemy from the villages of Cuabitas and Boniato and captured several fortified positions, closing in on San Vicente.
During this day the Cubans suffered ten casualties, the skirmishing continuing all day. From this time General Garcia
continued to advance and extend his right until his men
scouted, picketed and occupied the ground between the coast
and the Bay of Santiago, and at the same time strong commands were covering the roads leading from Holguin and
other Spanish garrisons to Santiago.
Upon the surrender of the city of Santiago, General Garcia,
commanding the Cuban forces, was debarred from any cooperation in the enjoyment of the honors or fruits of the
victory.
On the 26th of June I received a formal order to organize
an expedition for operation against the enemy in Cuba and




526


56THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


Puerto Rico, with which I proceeded at once to comply. The
limits of the space of this chapter will not permit me to go
into the details of these preparations; nor of various subsidiary military enterprises which I had advised, such as the capture of the Isle of Pines and the harbor of Nipe; nor of the
provisions I recommended against the spread of the yellow
fever which had broken out in the southern portion of our
own country. A clear understanding of the course of events
cannot be obtained, however, with the omission of either of
the following self-explanatory dispatches:
PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 3, 1898.
THE SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington:
We have the town well invested on the north and east,
but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of
such a character and the defences so strong it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about 5 miles and taking up a
new position on the high ground between the San Juan River
and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, so as to get our supplies
to a large extent by means of the railroad, which we can use,
having engines and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date
will aggregate a thousand, but list has not yet been made;
but little sickness outside of exhaustion from intense heat and
exertion of the battle of the day before yesterday and the almost constant fire which is kept up on the trenches. Wagon
road to the rear is kept up with some difficulty on account of
rains, but I will be able to use it for the present. General
Wheeler is seriously ill, and will probably have to go to the
rear to-day. General Young also very ill, confined to his bed.
General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot. During sortie
enemy made last night, which was handsomely repulsed, the
behavior of the regular troops was magnificent. I am urging
Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the
harbor, and will have a consultation with him this morning.
He is coming to the front to see me. I have been unable to
be out during the heat of the day for four days, but am retaining the command. General Garcia reported he holds the
railroad from Santiago to San Luis, and has burned a bridge
and removed some rails; also that General Pando has arrived
at Palma, and that the French consul with about four hundred French citizens came into his lines yesterday from Santiago. Have directed him to treat them with every courtesy
possible.
II:44 A. M.                SHAFTER, Major-General.




THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


527


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 3, 1898.
GENERAL SHAFTER, Playa delEste, Cuba:
Accept my hearty congratulations on the record made of
magnificent fortitude, gallantry and sacrifice displayed in the
desperate fighting of the troops before Santiago. I realize
the hardships, difficulties and sufferings, and am proud that
amid those terrible scenes the troops illustrated such fearless
and patriotic devotion to the welfare of our common country
and flag. Whatever the results to follow their unsurpassed
deeds of valor, the past is already a gratifying chapter of history. I expect to be with you within one week with strong
reinforcements.
MILES, Major-General Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
* NEAR SANTIAGO, PLAYA, July 4, 1898.
MAJ.-GEN. NELSON A. MILES:
Commanding the A rmny of the United States, Washington:
I thank you in the name of the gallant men I have the
honor to command for splendid tribute of praise which you
have accorded them. They bore themselves as American
soldiers always have. Your telegram will be published at
the head of the regiments in the morning. I feel that I am
master of the situation and can hold the enemy for any length
of time. I am delighted to know that you are coming that
you may see for yourself the obstacles which this army had to
overcome. My only regret is the great number of gallant
souls who have given their lives for our country's cause.
SHAFTER.
I left Washington for Charleston, S. C., on the evening of
July 7, and, on board the steamer Yale, loaded with i,o500
troops, and accompanied by the steamer Columbia, also conveying troops, I arrived off Santiago harbor on the morning
of July ii, and, the bombardment being in progress, notified
Admiral Sampson, commanding the fleet, of my purpose to land
the troops I had brought with me within a little harbor called
Cabanas, two and one-half miles from the entrance of Santiago
harbor, preparatory to a prompt advance against the Spanish
position. The Admiral at once came on board the Yale, and
I explained to him more fully the purpose of my presence and
my plan of operations, and received his very cordial acquies



. 528
520


THE AnivlRtAICAN-SPANISH WAR.


cence in the plan and assurance of his readiness to co-operate.
I then went on shore and opened communication with General Shafter, between whom and Washington the following
dispatches had been exchanged:
SIBONEY, VIA HAITI.
RECEIVED WASHINGTON, July lo, I898-5:55 P. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY, Washington.
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, IO.-I have just received
letter from General Toral declining unconditional surrender.
Bombardment by the Army and Navy will begin at as near
4 P. M. to-day as possible.
SHAFTER, Major General.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July io, I898.
GENERAL SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Santiago, Cuba:
Should the Spaniards surrender unconditionally and wish to
return to Spain, they will be sent back direct at the expense
of the United States Government.
R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
At 12:45 P. M., July I I, General Shafter signaled to Admiral
Sampson:
Please continue firing with heavy guns until I I o'clock, and
then cease firing until further orders.
At 4:45 P. M., the Brooklyn reported to the flagship.:
General Shafter states that fire from ships very accurate,
shells falling in city; lines have been advanced. Flag of truce
went forward to demand unconditional surrender. Will communicate with you fully directly to Aguadores as to time of
firing and result of truce.
On July I2, as stated by the Secretary of the Navy in his
annual report, the Admiral received a dispatch from General
Shafter stating:
My lines are now complete to the bay north of Santiago.
Your shots can be observed from here perfectly, at least those
that fall in the town. Flames followed several shots fired today.
On that morning I rode from Siboney to the headquarters
of General Shafter. After consulting with him, he sent a
communication to General Toral, saying that the Command



THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


529


ing General of the American Army had arrived in his camp
with reinforcements, and that we desired to meet him between
the lines at any time agreeable to him. He replied that he
would see us at I2 o'clock next day. The interview was held,
after which I rode along the trenches from right to left, examining the entire position, during the progress of which I
received the following in reply to a telegram I had sent the
night before:
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 13, i898 (Received 2:45 P. M.).
MAJOR-GENERAL MILES:
You may accept surrender by granting parole to officers
and men, the officers retaining their side arms. The officers
and men after parole to return to Spain, the United States
assisting If not accepted, then assault, unless in your judgment an assault would fail. Consult with Sampson and pursue such course as to the assault as you jointly agree upon.
Matter should be settled promptly.
R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
Just before the time appointed for a second meeting with
the Spanish Commander between the lines, a letter was received of which the following was the translation:
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July I4, 1898.
HONORED SIR:
His excellency the general in chief of the army of the
Island of Cuba telegraphs from Havana yesterday at 7 P. M.
the following: "Believing the business of such importance as
the capitulation of that place should be known and decided
upon by the Government of His Majesty, I give you notice
that I have sent the conditions of your telegram, asking an
immediate answer and enabling you also to show this to the
General of the American army to see if he will agree to await
the answer of the Government, which can not be as soon as
the time which he has decided, as communication by way of
Bermuda is more slow than by Key West. In the meanwhile your honor and the General of the American army may
agree upon capitulation on the basis of repatriation [returning
to Spain]." I have the honor to transmit this to you, in case
you may [consider] the foregoing satisfactory, that we may
designate persons in representation of himself, wvho, with those
in my name, agree to clauses of the capitulation upon the basis




530


THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.


of the return to Spain, accepted already in the beginning by
the general in chief of this army.
Awaiting a reply, I am, very respectfully, your servant,
Josie TORAL, ETC.
GENERAL IN CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN FORCES.
My reply was made verbally at the interview which immediately followed, and which resulted in a definite surrender not
only of the Spanish garrison at Santiago, but of all the troops
in the eastern end of Cuba. This was largly due to the action of General Garcia and his troops. It is set forth in the following self-explanatory telegram:
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIvISON, UNITED STATES ARMY.
BEFORE SANTIAGO, CUBA, July I4, I898-12:55 P. M.
THE SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:
General Toral formally surrendered the troops of his army
corps and division of Santiago on the terms and understanding that his troops would be returned to Spain. General
Shafter will appoint commissioners to draw up the conditions
of arrangement for carrying out the terms of surrender. This
is very gratifying, and General Shafter and the officers and
men of this command are entitled to great credit for their tenacity and fortitude in overcoming almost insuperable obstacles
which they have encountered. A portion of the army has
been infected with yellow fever, and efforts will be made to
separate those who are infected and those free from it,
and to keep those who are still on board ship separated
from those on shore. Arrangements will be immediately
made for carrying out the further instructions of the President
and yourself.
MILES, Major- General, Commanding the Army.
Directing General Shafter to appoint the Commissioners
provided for in the terms of the surrender, in a letter of instructions, and in other written communications instructing him to
take immediate measures for the protection of the health of
the troops, I returned to Siboney to push forward preparations for an immediate descent upon Puerto Rico. While
these preparations were in progress, I visited and inspected
Daiquiri and other stations, and on the I7th of June concentrated transports at Guantanamo Bay, in order to take on water, coal, etc.,' having immediately after the agreement to




THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.           53
surrender asked Admiral Sampson to supply me with naval
convoy.
By 3 o'clock of that day, July 21, the ships of the flotilla
were heaving anchors, and presently thereafter were majestically plowing the waters of the deep in the direction of Puerto
Rico. So important did I consider the necessity of moving
the troops away from the yellow fever and malarial camps,
that I had given orders for them to move to the sea shore or
the mountains, and just before departure, a final telegram was
sent to the Secretary of War:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ON BOARD U. S. S. YALE,
GUANTANAMO BAY, July 21, i898.
SECRETARY OF WAR, Washing/on, D. C.:
*      *     *      *      *     *      *
There is not a single regiment of regulars or volunteers
with General Shafter's command that is not infected with
yellow fever, from one case in the Eighth Ohio to thirty-six
in the Thirty-third Michigan.
After consulting with best medical authorities, it is my
opinion that the best mode of ridding the troops of the fever
will be as I have directed, namely, the troops to go up as high
into the mountains as possible, selecting fresh camps every
day. If this does not check the spread of the disease, the
only way of saving a large portion of the command will be to
put them on transports and ship them to the New England
coast to some point to be designated by the Surgeon-General.
MILES, Major-General Commanding.
We were moving with an effective force of 3,3I4 men
against an enemy over 17,000 strong. The convoy under
Captain Higginson consisted of the battleship Massachusetts
and two smaller vessels. The Yale and Columbia, though
armed ships, were loaded with troops and therefore available
only as transports. The long and anxiously looked for tugs,
launches and lighters, that had been ordered from Santiago,
Washington and Tampa, were expected at any moment to
heave in sight, and the hope of meeting them was not given
up until the entire Windward Passage had been traversed.
Then, beyond the possibility of further cable communication




532


ITrE  A 1ff Tfll   A XE T Cl A S TTCTSY Wr A 
I fllo   fLVI TJ.iL  IN -OF r ftviN I  nl VY t *.


with the government, I signaled to the commander of the convoy to halt long enough to send him by a boat lowered for
the purpose the following:
ON BOARD U. S. S. YALE,
EN ROUTE TO PUERTO RICO, July 22, 1898.
SIR: Our objective point has been Pt. Fajardo or Cape San
Juan, but so much time has occurred since the movement was
decided in that direction and such publicity has been given
the enterprise, that the enemy has undoubtedly become apprised of our purpose. While it is advisable to make a demonstration near the harbor of San Juan near Pt. Fajardo or
Pt. Figueroa, I am not decided as to the advisability of landing at either of these places, as we may find them well occupied
by strong Spanish forces. If we draw them to that vicinity,
we might find it judicious to quickly move to Puerto Guanica,
where there is deep water near the shore-41 fathoms-and
good facilities for landing. We can move from Cape San Juan
to that point in twelve hours (one night), and it would be impossible for the Spanish to concentrate their forces there before
we will be reinforced. I am also informed that there are a
large number of strong lighters in the harbors at Ponce and
Guanica, as well as several sailing vessels, which would be
useful. As it is always advisable not to do what your enemy
expects you to do, I think it advisable, after going around the
northeast corner of Puerto Rico, to go immediately to Guanica
and land this force and move on Ponce, which is the largest
city in Puerto Rico. After or before this is accomplished, we
will receive large reinforcements, which will enable us to move
in any direction or occupy any portion of the island of Puerto
Rico.
Your strong vessels can cover our landing, and capture any
vessels in the harbor of Ponce, Guanica, or the ports on the
southern coast; one light vessel can remain at Cape San
Juan to notify transports that will arrive where we have
landed and another could scout off the northwest corner of
Puerto Rico to intercept others and direct them where to find
us.
Very respectfully,
NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General, Commanding United States A riny.
CAPT. FRANCIS J. HIGGINSON,
Commanding United States Naval Convoy.


Two days later, in pursuance of understanding with Captain




THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


533


Higginson, arrived at by means of signaling, another halt was
made, while Captain Whitney of my staff visited Captain
Higginson, with his maps and reports, under instructions to
give him all the information it was possible to give as to the
result of his late secret explorations on the island of Puerto
Rico.
The design of this chapter will not admit of any detailed
reference to an impressive burial at sea, and other incidents
of the voyage, nor to the subsequent campaign, the history
thereof being already given by another participant and in another chapter. Enough that the voyage ended off Guanica,
at daylight, July 25, the harbor being entered without serious opposition, and the landing speedily effected, the resistance overcome after a short skirmish, and the flag of the
United States at once hoisted over Puerto Rican soil. The
day following, the town of Yauco was occupied after a spirited
engagement by troops under General Garretson, giving us
possession of the railroad and highway to the city of Ponce.
The day following the spirited engagements at Guanica
and Yauco, the villagers who had fled during the affairs came
back. Among the number who crowded about our horses, as
we sat watching the movements of the troops and the return of
the excited villagers, was a tall, slender, black-eyed Ethiopian,
whom I observed coming close up to my horse. Looking me
full in the face with the most intense earnestness, he secured
my attention. I spoke to him kindly and asked him what he
wanted. He said in good English: "Is this General Miles?"
and he repeated the question after being answered in the
affirmative. I reassured him of the fact; when he took a
letter which had been sewed inside of his shirt, written on
fine French notepaper, in the Spanish language, and handed
it to me, the translation of which is as follows:
To the Chief of Operations of the Invading Army of the
American Union.
CITIZEN:
Not knowing exactly how I ought to guide myself in
entering into a direct communication with your camp, I
direct this to the Chief of Operations to express to you my
duty in these historical moments and that trust in the power




534


T'T r  A Arrnrr1% A tY TA A -
fln 'lV~fI VfN -orn AIN 1. f l VY.1 IC.


of a strong conscience and in the valor of arms as they pertain to the great issues of liberty and of patriotism in this
island. An absolute military censorship shuts out from the
city the means of obtaining the news, and I wish that you
and your companions may know the true feeling of our
municipality. Here we wait with impatience American occupation that comes to break the chain that has been forged
constantly during four centuries of infamous spoliation, of
torpid despotism and shameful moral slavery. When the
rudders of the American ships entered the waters of the coast
of Guanica to bear to this country political revolution, great
confidence was born again, again was awakened the ideal of
sleeping patriotism in our consciences and the lullaby of perfidious promises which have never been fulfilled. An entire
city, with the exception of those who live under the shadow
of pretense and official immunity, is prepared to solemnize
the glorious triumph of civilization and offers its blood as a
holocaust to such a grand proposition. Let this message bear
to you notice that our municipal conscience does not sleep and
wait. Here you can count on the great masses who are prepared to second your gigantic strength. All the districts of
this jurisdiction are prepared for combat. The districts of
the city are also prepared. Men of intrepid heart surround
me ready for the struggle. The only thing that prevents the
manifestation of unity is an absolute need of the elements of
war. On the other hand, we have already driven from the
town our eternal enemies to the rights of Puerto Ricans. I
do not wish to impose upon my ideas of patriotism the grave
responsibility of directing my men upon the enemy without
capacity to maintain the struggle. In this moment of activity
may this communication serve to dispose you to embrace an
opportunity to utilize the services that I offer. Before closing, I wish to warn you that at the entrance to this city, on
the roads of Adjuntas and Canas, the Spanish government is
actively engaged in constructing several trenches to foolishly obstruct the march of the army of liberty, and they are
concealing themselves in the small neighboring hills and
difficult passes in the canyons in order to carry out this resistance. With many wishes for your health and much appreciation of the great triumph of America,
I am, your humble servant,
FELIX MATO BERNIER.
July 26, i898. (PONCE, P. R.)
The above illustrates the sentiment of the intelligent portion of the people of Puerto Rico, as well as the courage that




THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


535


would prompt a man to write a letter of that kind and send
it through the Spanish lines, thereby running the risk of death,
if not torture, in case of discovery. In fact, the atrocities
that were perpetrated upon men holding such sentiments
within our own time would better become the people of the
dark ages than of the i9th century under a so-called civilized
government. There are men who exhibit hands the joints of
which have been crushed by the blows of a hammer, or feet
the soles of which have been shaved off and they afterwards
compelled to walk on the gravel road between Ponce and San
Juan. They can show other scars and mutilations by which
they have been tortured, when their only offence was love of
liberty and hope of freedom. People possessing such sentiments as are indicated in the above letter, and the courage to
write them under such circumstances, are richly deserving of
their liberty. To such a people it was my pleasure to issue
the following proclamation:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
PONCE, PUERTO Rico, July 28, i898.
TO THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO Rico:
In the prosecution of thewar against the Kingdom of Spain
by the people of the United States in the cause of Liberty,
Justice and Humanity, its military forces have come to occupy
the Island of Puerto Rico. They come bearing the banner of
Freedom, inspired by a noble purpose to seek the enemies of
our country and yours, and to destroy or capture all who are
in armed resistance. They bring you the fostering arm
of a nation of free people, whose greatest power is in its Justice and Humanity to all those living within its fold. Hence
the first effect of this occupation will be the immediate release
from your former political relations, and it is hoped a cheerful acceptance of the government of the United States.
The chief object of the American military forces will be to
overthrow the armed authority of Spain and to give to the
people of your beautiful island the largest measure of liberty
consistent with this military occupation. We have not come
to make war upon the people of a country that for centuries
has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to bring protection,
not only to yourselves but to your property, to promote your
prosperity and bestow upon you the immunities and blessings
of the liberal institutions of our government. It is not our




536


TtrrE A APD T CAXT Q A            ATTU XTr A.L.L LiLA              r11C~ r oes Q  IJ2 1Q-L1  TV flA1tr.


purpose to interfere with any existing laws and customs that
are wholesome and beneficial to your people so long as they
conform to the rules of military administration of order and
justice.
This is not a war of devastation, but one to give to all
within the control of its military and naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization.
NELSON A. MILES,
Major- General, Commnanding United States Army.
This was seed sown on good ground, and a bountiful and
speedy harvest of patriotic sentiment was the result. The
sentiment spread like magic over the island. It caused a
large number of volunteers immediately to desert the cause
and'colors of Spain. They returned to their homes, surrendered
their arms and equipments, and took the oath of allegiance to
the United States; and this had a discouraging and demoralizing effect upon the regular troops of the Spanish government, which greatly aided us in the conquest of the island.
On the 27th of July reinforcements arrived under MajorGeneral Wilson, and that night the expedition started from the
Bay of Guanica, timed to reach that of Ponce at daylight. The
combined movement resulted as planned, to the letter, and the
American flag waved over the public buildings of the port
and the city founded by Ponce de Leon. Still further reinforcements arrived under Brigadier-General Schwan on the last
day of July. The movements of the different columns and
short engagements have been described by another, and the
results were most gratifying. On the I3th of August I received notification from the War Department that the President had signed preliminaries of peace, and instructed a
cessation of hostilities. With the utmost dispatch of wire
and horsemanship, I called a halt on the four columns pressing the island with the prospect that within a few days the
entire island would have been in our possession, including the
capital city of San Juan. Four of these columns had been
in actual contact with the enemy, and two were in the
very act of opening battle, when the messages of instruction
arrived on foaming horses, putting an end to further bloodshed. The balance of our main force had already passed




THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


537


around the mountains or over the mountain trails to the north
side of the island in spite of every and all opposition of the
Spaniards, and our forces were then in such a position as to
make that of the Spanish forces, outside of the garrison at San
Juan, utterly untenable. The Spaniards had been defeated,
or captured, in six different engagements, and driven from
every position they had taken up to that time. The number
of troops then in Puerto Rico on our side did not exceed
I4,365, only 6,342 of whom had actually engaged the enemy;
and I had advised the Secretary of War that no more of the
large force which had been designed by the Department for
this expedition need be sent.
When the protocol was signed at 4:23 P. M., the bombardment of Manzanillo had been in progress for an hour, and it
continued until the next morning, when the news of the cessation of hostilities arrived and put an end to the bombardment.
Captain Goodrich commanded the attacking squadron, which
consisted of the Newark, Hist, Suwanee, Osceola and Alvarado.
On that same morning hostilities were renewed at Manila,
where the war had so gloriously opened on the ist of May.
The attack upon that city by Dewey and Merritt began as
previously planned, as it was impossible to get news of the
signing of preliminaries of peace much within a week. A
division of the naval squadron shelled the forts on the
south side of the city, while the trenches were occupied by
the land forces under command of General Merritt.  The
squadron had no casualties; no vessels were injured, and the
losses among our troops were only five men killed. General
Merritt's men followed the retreating Spaniards into the
walled city, where their commander agreed upon terms of
capitulation. It will thus be seen that on the morning of
August 13 actual fighting was in progress between the
Spanish and American armed forces in Puerto Rico and in the
Philippines-an extreme distance of 175 degrees of longitude,
about 12,500 miles. At the same time preparations were in
an advanced stage of progress for a demonstration upon the
Spanish coasts and the islands of Spain, in the Mediterranean as well as in the Atlantic, and a state of hostilities would
undoubtedly have been in operation there within a very few




538


THE A    IC TCAk Tf A XT OWn A YTTT xTr AY
1 Ian  IiI infL-.J1N 11  alo VYews.


weeks at the furthest had not the preliminary terms of peace
been agreed upon.
It is plain now to all, as it was to a few at the beginning,
that grand strategy required the seizure of Puerto Rico immediately upon the commencement of hostilities. That island,
having enjoyed a long period of peace, was then totally unprepared to resist any considerable attacking force, either naval or military. That island in our possession, reinforcements of Cuba, naval or military, would have been out of the
question; that is to say, any attempt to reinforce or re-provision the Spanish forces in Cuba would have resulted in failure.
What are the lessons that have been taught by our recent
war with one of the ancient powers?  The history of the
downfall of Spain should be a warning to the enlightened nations of the earth that they cannot successfully rule a people
by tyranny and cruelty; that past achievements, military and
naval glory and renown, count as naught in a crisis where intelligence, skill, enterprise and thorough knowledge of modern
appliances of war determine the fate of a nation. The theory
that we can remain indifferent to the progress that is being
made every day in the art of war, that we can rely upon the
enthusiasm of the hour, the uprising of the patriotic yeomanry, and that our people will rush to arms and in a short
time achieve victories, is a dangerous illusion. When our
forefathers were accustomed to keep their hunting rifles on the
antlers, ready to kill wild beasts or encounter a savage foe
skilled in the land-crafts and the essential knowledge of the
woodman and the hunter, they constituted an irregular force
that was irresistible and unconquerable in the sparsely populated timber country of one hundred years ago. So in our
great war, when the national capital was in danger, it is our
pride and glory to point to the fact that tens of thousands of
men suddenly left their farms and counting-houses, their workshops and colleges, and rushed to the defence of the national
capital. Yet in the Ball's Bluffs, the Bull Runs and the Shilohs, it was the result of one irregular, sparsely equipped, undrilled and undisciplined force against another in the same
condition, and with the same amount of spirit, enterprise




THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.


539


and American courage. The success gained by a mass of such
physical forces against another of the same character is no
proof that such a force could stand against a well-disciplined,
well-drilled military body, armed with the destructive appli'
ances of modern warfare.
The two great wars that preceded our recent one demonstrated this fact, that the pride and glory of the greatest
military nation of modern times, shouting " On to Berlin! i
soon met its Sedan, and witnessed the triumphant occupation
of the city of Paris by the more skilled and better equipped
German forces. The vast hordes of brave Chinese were no
match for the skillful Japanese, though they outnumbered the
latter twelve to one. While we, in the last war, raised the great
force of 278,000 men, it is perfectly well known to all military
men that some of the appliances were obsolete and insufficient,
either for effective service or to protect the lives and health
of the heroic men who had volunteered in their country's service. From the days of Valley Forge to the present, the
suffering and death of large numbers of men can be traced
directly to the want of thorough and proper system, of efficient organization, of rigid responsibility and accountability
on the part of all officials, added to the fact that the conduct
of military affairs has not been in the hands of military men
whose experience and record for efficiency and integrity has
been demonstrated by years of service. If thousands of men
are mustered into service when there is not sufficient clothing,
camp equipage and garrison equipage, tentage, transportation
and proper supplies of quartermnaster's, commissary, and
medical stores to furnish them the requirements and necessities of life, they cannot be considered an efficient army or
army corps. They are simply so many men employed and
kept or bound to service by the sanctity of their oath of enlistment. Inferior, insufficient and conspicuous white canvas,
inferior clothing material, inferior and unsuitable food, inferior
artillery, short-range, single-breechloading rifles, black powder,
are things obsolete, and should be classed with the spear, the
bow and arrow, the pike, the flint-lock, the smooth-bore, and
other implements of the past. This is the age of progress in
the art of war, as well as in all the other arts and sciences. It




540


I4  T   AIvEtK1UAiN-SPANIilS WAR.


is the day of the long range, low trajectory, wonderfully
penetrating, smokeless powder rifle. It is the age of the
rapid-fire machine gun, capable of thiowing from 400 to 700
projectiles per minute; the enormous Ioo-ton gun, capable
of throwing a projectile weighing one ton I4 miles; the day
of dynamite guns, throwing from io to 500 pounds of high
explosives; the day of the range finder and plotting-board;
of well-directed and well-controlled military balloons; of the
electric telegraph and telephone; steam power-all utilized in
modern appliances, the most destructive in warfare.
The achievements of our Army in ioo days, notwithstanding all its defects and embarrassments, have added a chapter
of glory to the military history of the United States. Her
sons have exhibited the grandest patriotism, heroism, fortitude
and sacrifice. The campaign was offensive from start to
finish. There was scarcely a check. There was not a single
reverse or disaster or retreat.  Not an inch of ground was lost,
not a soldier captured.  It was one series of successes, notwithstanding the trials and difficulties and obstacles to be
surmounted. Nearly twelve millions of people have been
liberated from the cruel despotism of a monarchical government and admitted to the sunlight of freedom, where justice
and independence and liberty are assured. The territory
acquired is of enormous area, although portions of it may yet
be given to the native occupants. Yet the island of Puerto
Rico alone, which will remain as part of the territory of the
United States, is valued at more millions than the entire cost
of the war with Spain, and we may well greet our noble sailors
and soldiers with the cheerful welcome, " Hail and well done."








F"............................... 
I~               1~~1




ADDENDUM.
CONDITION OF CUBA UNDER SPANISH MISRULE.
SPEECH OF
HON. REDFIELD PROCTOR
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MARCH 17, 1898.
Mr. President, more importance seems to be attached by
others to my recent visit to Cuba than I have given it, and it has
been suggested that I make a public statement of what I saw and
how the situation impressed me. This I do on account of the
public interest in all that concerns Cuba, and to correct some
inaccuracies that have, not unnaturally, appeared in reported
interviews with me.
My trip was entirely unofficial and of my own motion, not
suggested by any one. The only mention I made of it to the
President was to say to him that I contemplated such a trip and
to ask him if there was any objection to it-; to which he replied
that he could see none. No one but myself, therefore, is responsible for anything in this statement. Judge Day gave me a brief
note of introduction to General Lee, and I had letters of introduction from business friends at the North to bankers and other
business men at Habana, and they in turn gave me letters to their
correspondents in other cities. These letters to business men
were very useful, as one of the principal purposes of my visit was
to ascertain the views of practical men of affairs upon the situation,
Of General Lee I need say little.  His valuable services to
his country in his trying position are too well known to all his
countrymen to require mention. Besides his ability, high character and courage, he possesses the important requisites of unfailing tact and courtesy, and, withal, his military education and
training and his soldierly qualities are invaluable adjuncts in the
equipment of our representative in a country so completely under
military rules as is Cuba. General Lee kindly invited us to sit at




A2


A fllXTfTT1If
-- - -   -   I.,-   -  4._.,


his table at the hotel during our stay in Habana, and this opportunity for frequent informal talks with him was of great help to
me.
In addition to the information he voluntarily gave me, it furnished a convenient opportunity to ask him the many questions
that suggested themselves in explanation of things seen and heard
on our trips through the country. I also met and spent considerable time with Consul Brice at Matanzas, and with Captain Barker, a stanch ex-Confederate soldier, the consul at Sagua
la Grande. None of our representatives whom I met in Cuba are
of my political faith, but there is a broader faith, not bounded by
party lines. They are all three true Americans, and have done
excellent service.
THE MAINE.
It has been stated that I said there was no doubt the Maine
was blown up from the outside. This is a mistake. I may have
said that such was the general impression among Americans in
Habana. In fact, I have no opinion about it myself, and carefully avoided forming one. I gave no attention to these outside
surmises. I met the members of the court on their boat, but
would as soon approach our Supreme Court in regard to a pending. cause as that board. They are as competent and trustworthy
within the lines of their duty as any court in the land, and their
report, when made, will carry conviction to all the people that
the exact truth has been stated just as far as it is possible to
ascertain it. Until then surmise and conjecture are idle and
unprofitable. Let us calmly wait for the report.
SECTIONS VISITED.
There are six provinces in Cuba, each, with the exception of
Matanzas, extending the whole width of the island, and having
about an equal sea front on the north and south borders. Matanzas touches the Caribbean Sea only at its southwest corner,
being separated from it elsewhere by a narrow peninsula of Santa
Clara Province. The provinces are named, beginning at the west,
Pinar del Rio, Habana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe,
and Santiago de Cuba. My observations were confined to the
four western provinces, which constitute about one-half of the
island. The two eastern ones are practically in the hands of the
insurgents, except the few fortified towns. These two large
provinces are spoken of to-day as " Cuba Libre."




ADDENDUM.


543


Habana, the great city and capital of the island, is, in the eyes
of the Spaniards and many Cubans, all Cuba, as much as Paris is
France. But having visited it in more peaceful times and seen
its sights, the tomb of Columbus, the forts-Cabana and Morro
Castle, etc.-I did not care to repeat this, preferring trips in the
country. Everything seems to go on much as usual in Habana.
Quiet prevails, and except for the frequent squads of soldiers
marching to guard and police duty and their abounding presence
in all public places, one sees few signs of war.
Outside Habana all is changed. It is not peace nor is it war.
It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town
and village is surrounded by a " trocha " (trench), a sort of rifle
pit, but constructed on a plan new to me, the dirt being thrown
up on the inside and a barbed-wire fence on the outer side of the
trench. These trochas have at every corner and at frequent intervals along the sides what are there called forts, but which are
really small blockhouses, many of them more like large sentry
boxes, loopholed for musketry, and with a guard of from two to
ten soldiers in each.
The purpose of these trochas is to keep the reconcentrados in
as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the surrounding
country the people have been driven in to these fortified towns
and held there to subsist as they can. They are virtually prison
yards, and not unlike one in general appearance, except that the
walls are not so high and strong; but they suffice, where every
point is in range of a soldier's rifle, to keep in the poor reconcentrado women and children.
Every railroad station is within one of these trochas and has
an armed guard. Every train has an armored freight car, loopholed for musketry and filled with soldiers, and with, as I observed usually, and was informed is always the case, a pilot
engine a mile or so in advance. There are frequent blockhouses
inclosed by a trocha and with a guard along the railroad track.
With this exception there is no human life or habitation between
these fortified towns and villages, and throughout the whole of
the four western provinces, except to a very limited extent among
the hills where the Spaniards have not been able to go and drive
the people to the towns and burn their dwellings. I saw no
house or hut in the 400 miles of railroad rides from Pinar del Rio
Province in the west across the full width of Habana and Matanzas provinces, and to Sagua La Grande on the north shore, and to




544


A DDEF NThT TT 


Cienfuegos on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the
Spanish trochas.
There are no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields and
pastures except such as are under guard in the immediate vicinity
of the towns. In other words, the Spaniards hold in these four
western provinces just what their army sits on. Every man,
woman and child, and every domestic animal, wherever their
columns have reached, is under guard and within their so-called
fortifications.  To describe one place is to describe all.  To
repeat, it is neither peace nor war. It is concentration and desolation. This is the "c pacified " condition of the four western
provinces.
West of Habana is mainly the rich tobacco country; east, so
far as I went, a sugar region. Nearly all the sugar mills are destroyed between Habana and Sagua. Two or three were standing in the vicinity of Sagua, and in part running, surrounded, as
are the villages, by trochas and " forts " or palisades of the royal
palm, and fully guarded. Toward and near Cienfuegos there
were more mills running, but all with the same protection. It is
said that the owners of these mills near Cienfuegos have been
able to obtain special favors of the Spanish Government in the
way of a large force of soldiers, but that they also, as well as all
the railroads, pay taxes to the Cubans for immunity. I had no
means of verifying this. It is the common talk among those who
have better means of knowledge.
THE RECONCENTRADOS-THE COUNTRY PEOPLE.
All the country people in the four western provinces, about
400,ooo in number, remaining outside the fortified towns when
Weyler's order was made were driven into these towns, and these
are the reconcentrados. They were the peasantry, many of them
farmers, some landowners, others renting lands and owning more
or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small
patches; and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support
a family.
It is but fair to say that the normal condition of these people
was very different from what prevails in this country. Their
standard of comfort and prosperity was not high measured, by
ours. But according to their standards and requirements their
conditions of life were satisfactory.
They lived mostly in cabins made of palms or in wooden




ADDENDUM.


545


houses. Some of them had houses of stone, the blackened walls
of which are all that remain to show the country was ever inhabited.
The first clause of Weyler's order reads as follows:
I ORDER AND COMMAND
"First. All the inhabitants of the country or outside of the line
of fortifications of the towns shall, within the period of eight days,
concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops.
Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found
in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as
such."
The other three sections forbid the transportation of provisions from one town to another without permission of the military
authority, direct the owners of cattle to bring them into the
towns, prescribe that the eight days shall be counted from the
publication of the proclamation in the head town of the municipal
district, and state that if news is furnished of the enemy which
can be made use of, it will serve as a " recommendation."
Many, doubtless,, did not learn of this order. Others failed to
grasp its terrible meaning. Its execution was left largely to the
guerrillas to drive in all that had not obeyed, and I was informed
that in many cases the torch was applied to their homes with no
notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have
on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the
guerrillas. When they reached the towns, they were allowed to
build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within
the trochas, and left to live, if they could.
Their huts 'are about io by I5 feet in size, and for want of
space are usually crowded together very closely. They have no
floor but the ground, no furniture, and, after a year'sv wear, but
little clothing except such stray substitutes as they can extemporize; and with large families, or more than one, in this little
space, the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Conditions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes,
with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none, what
wonder that one-half have died and that one-quarter of the living
are so diseased that they cannot be saved? A form of dropsy
is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little
children are still walking about with arms and chests terribly
emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the
natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless..




r AA
Jo -


A fTh3~I TTh TT
flIJLJi2dlN Li U lVI.


Deaths in the streets have not been uncommon. I was told
by one of our consuls that they have been found dead about the
markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping to get
some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that there
had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market
surrounded by food. Before Weyler's order, these people were
independent and self-supporting. They are not beggars 'even
now. There are plenty of professional beggars in every town
among the regular residents, but these country people, the reconcentrados, have not learned the art. Rarely is a hand held out to
you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them
makes an appeal stronger than words.
THE HOSPITALS.
Of these I need not speak. Others have described their condition far better than I can. It is not within the narrow limits of
my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; that a few cases of
starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press
correspondents, and that they had given free play to a strong,
natural and highly cultivated imagination.
Before starting I received through the mail a leaflet published
by the Christian Herald, with cuts of some of the sick and starving reconcentrados, and took it with me, thinking these must be
rare specimens, got up to make the worst possible showing. I
saw plenty as bad and worse; many that should not be photographed and shown.
I could not believe that out of a population of' i,6oo,ooo, two
hundred thousand had died within these Spanish forts, practically
prison walls, within a few months past from actual starvation and
diseases caused by insufficient and improper food. My inquiries
were entirely outside of sensational sources. They were made of
our medical officers, of our consuls, of city alcaldes (mayors), of
relief committees, of leading merchants and bankers, physicians
and lawyers. Several of my informants were Spanish born, but
every time the answer was that the case had not been overstated.
What I saw I cannot tell so that others can see it. It must be
seen with one's own eyes to be realized.
The Los Pasos Hospital, in Habana, has been recently described by one of my colleagues, Senator Gallinger, and I cannot say that his picture was overdrawn, for even his fertile pen




ADDENDUM.


547


could not do that. But he visited it after Dr. Lesser, one of Miss
Barton's very able and efficient assistants, had renovated it and
put in cots. I saw it when 400 women and children were lying on
the floors in an indescribable state of emaciation and disease,
many with the scantiest covering of rags-and such rags!-sick
children, naked as they came into the world; and the conditions
in the other cities are even worse.
MISS BARTON AND HER WORK.
Miss Barton needs no indorsement from me.   I had known
and esteemed her for many years, but had not half appreciated
her capability and devotion to her work. I specially looked into
her business methods, fearing that here would be the greatest danger of mistake, that there might be want of system and waste and
extravagance, but found she could teach me on these points. I
visited the warehouse where the supplies are received and distributed; saw the methods of checking; visited the hospitals
established or organized and supplied by her; saw the food distributions in several cities and towns, and everything seems to me
to be conducted in the best manner possible. The ample, fine
warehouse in Habana, owned by a Cuban firm, is given, with a
gang of laborers free of charge to unload and reship supplies.
The Children's Hospital in Habana, a very large, fine private
residence, is hired at a cost of less than $ioo per month, not a
fifth of what it would command in this city. It is under the admirable management of Mrs. Dr. Lesser, of New York, a German
lady and trained nurse. I saw the rapid improvement of the first
children taken there. All Miss Barton's assistants seem excellently fitted for their duties. In short, I saw nothing to criticize,
but everything to commend. The American people may be
assured that their bounty will reach the sufferers with the least
possible cost and in the best manner in every respect. If our
people could see a small fraction of the need, they would pour
more " freely from their liberal stores" than ever before for any
cause.
When will the need for this help end?   Not until peace
comes and the reconcentrados can go back to the country, rebuild
their homes, reclaim their tillage plots, which quickly run up to
brush in that wonderful soil and clime, and until they can be free
from danger of molestation in so doing. Until then the American
people must in the main care for them. It is true that the
alcaldes, other local authorities, and the relief committees are now




546


54  AD T EUT T M 
A3Ij Ul N D U IV L.


trying to do something, and desire, I believe, to do the best they
can. But the problem is beyond their means and capacity, and
the work is one to which they are not accustomed.
General Blanco's order of November I3 last somewhat modifies the Weyler order, but is of little or no practical benefit. Its
application is limited to farms " properly defended " and the owners
are obliged to build "centers of defense." Its execution is completely in the discretion of the local military authorities, and they
know the terrible military efficiency of Weyler's order in stripping the country of all possible shelter, food or source of
information for an insurgent, and will be slow to surrender this
advantage. In fact, though the order was issued four months
ago, I saw no beneficent results from it worth mentioning.
I do not impugn General Blanco's motives, and believe him
to be an amiable gentleman, and that he would be glad to relieve
the condition of the reconcentrados if he could do so without loss
of any military advantage; but he knows that all Cubans are insurgents at heart, and none now under military control will be allowed to go out from under it.
I wish I might speak of the country-of its surpassing richness. I have never seen one to compare with it. On this point I
agree with Columbus, that this is the " most rich and beautiful
that ever human eye beheld," and believe every one between his
time and mine must be of the same opinion. It is indeed a land"Where every prospect pleases
And only man is vile."
THE SPANIARD.
I had little time to study the race -question, and have read
nothing on it, so can only give hasty impressions. It is said that
there are nearly 200,000 Spaniards in Cuba out of a total population of i,6oo,ooo.0 They live principally in the towns and cities.
The small shopkeepers in the towns and their clerks are mostly
Spaniards. Much of the larger business, too, and of the property
in the cities, and in a less degree in the country, is in their hands.
They have an eye to thrift, and as everything possible in the way
of trade and legalized monopolies, in which the country abounds,
is given to them by the Government, many of them acquire property. I did not learn that the Spanish residents of the island had
contributed largely in blood or treasure to suppress the insurrection.




ADDENDUM.


*549


THE CUBAN.
There are, or were before the war, about i,000,ooo Cubans on
the island, 200,000 Spaniards (which means those born in Spain),
and less than half a million of negroes and mixed bloods. The
Cuban whites are of pure Spanish blood and, like the Spaniards,
dark in complexion, but oftener light or blond, so far as 1 noticed.
The percentage of colored to white has been steadily diminishing
for more than fifty years, and is not now over 25 per cent of the
total. In fact, the number of colored people has been actually
diminishing for nearly that time. The Cuban farmer and laborer
is by nature peaceable, kindly, gay, hospitable, light-hearted and
improvident.
There is a proverb among the Cubans that " Spanish bulls can
not be bred in Cuba "-that is, the Cubans, though they are of
Spanish blood, are less excitable and of a quieter temperament.
Many Cubans whom I met spoke in strong terms against the bull
fights; that it was a brutal institution, introduced and mainly
patronized by the Spaniards. One thing that was new to me was
to learn the superiority of the well-to-do Cuban over the Spaniard
in the matter of education. Among those in good circumstances
there can be no doubt that the Cuban is far superior in this respect. And the reason of it is easy to see. They have been
educated in England, France, or this country, while the Spaniard
has such education as his own country furnishes.
THE NEGRO.
The colored people seem to me by nature quite the equal
mentally and physically of the race in this country. Certainly
physically they are by far the larger and stronger race on the
island. There is little or no race prejudice, and this has doubtless been greatly to their advantage. Eighty-five years ago there
were one-half as many free negroes as slaves, and this proportion
slowly increased until emancipation.
THE MILITARY SITUATION.
It is said that there are about 6o,ooo Spanish soldiers now in
Cuba fit for duty out of the more than 200,000 that have been
sent there. The rest have died, have been sent home sick, or are
in hospitals, and some have been killed, notwithstanding the
official reports. They are conscripts, many of them very young,
and generally small men. One hundred and thirty pounds is a
fair estimate of their average weight. They are quiet and obe



eJe


ADDENDUM.


dient, and if well drilled and led, I believe would fight fairly well,
but not at all equal to our men. Much more would depend on
the leadership than with Us. The officer must lead well and be
one in whom they have confidence, and this applies to both sides
alike. As I saw no drills or regular formation, I inquired about
them of many persons, and was informed that they had never
seen a drill. I saw perhaps io,ooo Spanish troops, but not a piece
of artillery or a tent. They live in barracks in the towns, and are
seldom out for more than the day, returning to town at night.
They have little or no equipment for supply trains or for a
field campaign such as we have. Their cavalry horses are scrubby.
little native ponies, weighing not over 8oo pounds, tough and
hardy, but for the most part in wretched condition, reminding one
of the mount of Don Quixote. Some of the officers, however,
have good horses, mostly American, I think. On both sides cavalry is considered the favorite and the dangerous fighting arm.
The tactics of the Spanish, as described to me by eye-witnesses
and participants in some of their battles, is for the infantry, when
threatened by insurgent cavalry, to form a hollow square and fire
away ad Zibitum, and without ceasing until time to march back to
town.
It does not seem to have entered the minds of either side that
a good infantry force can take care of itself and repulse anywhere
an equal or greater number of cavalry, and there are everywhere
positions where cavalry would be at a disadvantage.
Having called on Governor and Captain-General Blanco and
received his courteous call in return, I could not with propriety
seek communication with insurgents. I had plenty of offers of
safe conduct to Gomez's camp, and was told that if I would write
him, an answer-would be returned safely within ten days at most.
I 1 saw several who had visited the insurgent camps, and was
sought-out by an insurgent field officer, who gave me the best information received as to the insurgent force. His statements
were moderate, and I was credibly informed that he was entirely
reliable. He claimed that the Cubans had about 30,000 men now
in the field, some in every province, but mostly in the two eastern
provinces and eastern Santa Clara, and this statement was corroborated from other good sources. They have a force all the
time in Habana Province itself, organized in four small brigades
and operating in small bands. Ruiz was taken, tried and shot
within about a mile and a half of the railroad and about fifteen




ADDENDUM.


55 I


miles out of Habana, on the road to Matanzas, a road more traveldd than any other, and which I went over four times.
Arranguren was killed about three miles the other side of the
road and about the same distance, fifteen or' twenty miles, from
Habana. The Cubans are well armed, but very poorly supplied
with ammunition.  They are not allowed to carry many cartridges; sometimes not more than one or two. The infantry, especially, are poorly clad. Two small squads of prisoners which I
saw, however, one of half-a-dozen in the streets of Habana, and
one of three on the cars, wore better clothes than the average
Spanish soldier.
Each of these prisoners, though surrounded by guards, was
bound by the arm and wrists by cords, and they were all tied
together by a cord running along the line, a specimen of the
amenities of their warfare. About one-third of the Cuban army
are colored, mostly in the infantry, as the cavalry furnished their
own horses.
This field officer, an American from a Southern State, spoke
in the highest terms of the conduct of these colored soldiers; that
they were as good fighters and had more endurance than the
whites; could keep up -with the cavalry on a long march and
come in fresh at night.
THE POLITICAL SITUATION.
The dividing lines between parties are the straightest and
clearest cut that have ever come to my knowledge. The division
in our war was by no means so clearly defined. It is Cuban
against Spaniard. It is practically the entire Cuban population on
one side and the Spanish army and Spanish citizens on the other.
I do not count the autonomists in this division, as they are so
far too inconsiderable in numbers to be worth counting. General
Blanco filled the civil offices with men who had been autonomists
and were still classed as such. But the march of events had satisfied most of them that the chance for autonomy came too late.
It falls as talk of compromise would have fallen the last year
or two of our wvar. If it succeeds, it canx only be by armed force,
by the triumph of the Spanish army, and the success of Spanish
arms would be easier by Weyler's policy and method, for in that
the Spanish army and people believe.
There is no doubt that General Blanco is acting in entire good
faith-; that he desires to give the Cubans a fair measure of autonomy, as Campos did at the close of the ten-year war. He has, of




952


ADDENDUM.


course, a few personal followers, but the army and the Spanish
citizens do not want genuine autonomy, for that means government by the Cuban people. And it is not strange that the Cubans
say it comes too late.
I have never had any communication, direct or indirect, with
the Cuban Junta in this country or any of its members, nor did I
have with any of the juntas which exist in every city and large
town of Cuba. None of the calls I made were upon parties of
whose sympathies I had the least knowledge, except that I knew
some of them were classed as autonomists.
Most of my informants were business men, who had taken no
sides and rarely expressed themselves. I had no means of guessing in advance what their answers would be, and was in most
cases greatly surprised at their frankness.
I inquired in regard to autonomy of men of wealth and men as
prominent in business as any in the cities of Habana, Matanzas,
and Sagua, bankers, merchants, lawyers and autonomist officials,
some of them Spanish born but Cuban bred, one prominent Englishman, several of them known as autonomists, and several of
them telling me they were still believers in autonomy if practicable,! but without exception they replied that it was " too late "
for that.
Some favored a United States protectorate, some annexation,
some free Cuba; not one has been counted favoring the insurrection at first. They were business men and wanted peace, but said
it was too late for peace under Spanish sovereignty. They characterized Weyler's order in far stronger terms than I can. I could
not but conclude that you do not have to scratch an autonomist
very deep to find a Cuban. There is soon to be an election, but
every polling place must be inside a fortified town. Such elections
ought to be safe for the " ins."
I have endeavored to state in not intemperate mood what I saw
and heard, and to make no argument thereon, but leave every one
to draw his own conclusions. To me the strongest appeal is not
the barbarity practiced by Weyler nor the loss of the vfaine, if
our worst fears should prove true, terrible as are both of these
incidents, but the spectacle of a million and a half of people, the
entire native population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverence from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had
knowledge. But whether our action ought to be influenced by any
one or all these things, and, if so, how far, is another question.




ADDENDUM.


553


I am not in favor of annexation; not because I would apprehend any particular trouble from it, but because it is hot wise
policy to take in any people of foreign tongue and training, and
without any strong guiding American element. The fear that if
free the people of Cuba would be revolutionary is not so well
founded as has been supposed, and the conditions for good selfgovernment are far more favorable. The large number of educated and patriotic men, the great sacrifices they have endured,
the peaceable temperament of the people, whites and blacks, the
wonderful prosperity that would surely come with peace and
good home rule, the large influx of American and English immigration and money, would all be strong factors for stable institutions.
But it is not my purpose at this time, nor do I consider it my
province, to suggest any plan. I merely speak of the symptoms
as I saw them, but do not undertake to prescribe. Such remedial
steps as may be required may safely be left to an American President and the American people.








APPENDIX.
- MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONGRESS
ON THE
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO SPAIN
BY REASON OF
WARFARE IN THE ISLAND OF CUBA.
To the Congress of the United States:
Obedient to that precept of the Constitution which commands
the President to give from time to time to the Congress information of the state of the Union and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, it
becomes my duty now to address your body with regard to the
grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United States
to Spain by reason of the warfare that for more than three years
has raged in the neighboring island of Cuba.
I do so because of the intimate connection of the Cuban question with the state of our own Union and the grave relation the
course which it is now incumbent upon the nation to adopt must
needs bear to the traditional policy of our Government if it is to
accord with the precepts laid down by the founders of the Republic and religiously observed by succeeding Administrations to the
present day.
The present revolution is but the successor of other similar
insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion
of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of
which, during its progress, has subjected the United States to
great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality laws, caused
enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoyance, and disturbance among our citizens, and, by the
exercise of cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of warfare,
shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of
our people.
Since the present revolution began, in February, i895, this
country has seen the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by
fire and sword in the course of a struggle unequaled in the history
of the island and rarely paralleled as to the numbers of the com



APPENDIX.


batants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolution of
modern times where a dependent people striving to be free have
been opposed by the power of the sovereign state.
Our people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced
to comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed,
its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its
mills in ruins and its people perishing by tens of thousands from
hunger and destitution. We have found ourselves constrained, in
the observance of that strict neutrality which our laws enjoin,
and which the law of nations commands, to police our own waters
and watch our own seaports in prevention of any unlawful act in
aid of the Cubans.
Our trade has suffered; the capital invested by our citizens in
Cuba has been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our
people have been so sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest
among our own citizens which has inevitably found its expression
from time to time in the National Legislature, so that issues
wholly external to our own body politic engross attention and
stand in the way of that close devotion to domestic advancement
that becomes a self-contained commonwealth whose primal maxim
has been the avoidance of all foreign entanglements.- All this
must needs awaken, and has, indeed, aroused the utmost concern
on the part of this Government, as well during my predecessor's
term as in my own.
In April, i896, the evils from which our country suffered through
the Cuban war became so onerous that my predecessor made an
effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of this
Government in any way that might tend to an honorable adjust-.
ment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colony, on
the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba
under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed through the
refusal of the Spanish Government then in power to consider any
form of mediation or, indeed, any plan of settlement which did
not begin with 'the actual submission of the insurgents to the
mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself
might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated. The resistance of the insurgents was in no wise diminished.
The efforts of Spain were increased, both by the dispatch of
fresh levies to Cuba and by the addition to the horrors of the
strife of a new and inhuman phase happily unprecedented in the
modern history of civilized Christian peoples. The policy of




APPENDIX.


557


devastation and concentration, inaugurated by the Captain-General's bando of October 2I 1i896, in the Province of Pinar del
Rio was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which
the power of the Spanish arms was able to reach by occupation or
by military operations. The peasantry, including all dwelling in
the open agricultural interior, were driven into the garrison
towns or isolated places held by the troops.
The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and
fired, mills destroyed, and, in short, everything that could desolate the land and render it unfit for human habitation or support
was commanded by one or the other of the contending parties and
executed by all the powers at their disposal.
By the time the present administration took office a year ago,
reconcentration-so called-had been made effective over the
better part of the four central and western provinces, Santa
Clara, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio.
The agricultural population to the estimated number of 300,000
or more was herded within the towns and their immediate vicinage, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute of
shelter, left poorly clad and exposed to the most unsanitary conditions. As the scarcity of food increased with the devastation
of the depopulated areas of production, destitution and want
became misery and starvation. Month by month the death rate
increased in an alarming ratio. By March, 1897, according to
conservative estimates from official Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentrados, from starvation and the diseases
thereto incident, exceeded 50 per centum of their total number.
No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering from the general dearth, could
give no aid. So-called " zones of cultivation " established within
the immediate areas of effective military control about the cities
and fortified camps proved illusory as a remedy for the suffering.
The unfortunates, being for the most part women and children,
with aged and helpless men, enfeebled by disease and hunger,
could not have tilled the soil without tools, seed or shelter for
their own support or for the supply of the cities. Reconcentration, adopted avowedly as a war measure in order to cut off the
resources of the insurgents, worked its predestined result. As
I said in my message of last December, it wvas not civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was
that of the wilderness and the grave.




558                   APPENDIX.
Meanwhile the military situation in the island had undergone a
noticeable change. The extraordinary activity that characterized
the second year of the war, when the insurgents invaded even the
hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and
destruction up to the walls of the city of Havana itself, had relapsed. into a dogged struggle in the central and eastern provinces.
The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio
and parts- of Havana, but,:under the existing conditions of the
rural country, without immediate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus partially restricted, the revolutionists
held their own, and their conquest and submission, put forward
by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far
distant as at the outset.
In this state of affairs my Administration found itself confronted with the grave problem of its duty. My message of last
December reviewed the situation and narrated the steps taken
with a view to relieving its acuteness and opening the way to
some form of honorable settlement. The assassination of the
prime minister, Canovas, led to a change of government in Spain.
The former administration, pledged to subjugation without concession, gave place to that of a more liberal party, committed
long in advance to a policy of reform involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Puerto Rico.
The overtures of this Government, made through its new envoy,
General Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective
amelioration of the condition of the island, although not accepted
to the extent of admitted mediation in any shape, were met by
assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase, would be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and that
more humane methods should thenceforth prevail in the conduct
of hostilities. Coincidentally with these declarations, the new
Government of Spain continued and completed the policy already
begun by its predecessor, of testifying friendly regard for this
nation by releasing American citizens held under one charge or
another connected with the insurrection, so that, by the end of
November, not a single person entitled in any way to our national
protection, remained in a Spanish prison.
While these negotiations were in progress the increasing destitution of the unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortality among them claimed earnest attention. The success which
had attended the limited measure of relief ektended to the




APPENDIX.,


suffering American citizens among them by the judicious expenditure through the consular agencies of the money appropriated
expressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May
24, i897, prompted the humane extension of a'similar scheme of
aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was
acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities. On the 24th of December last, I caused to be issued an appeal to the American people,
inviting contributions in money or in kind for the succor of the
starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of January
by a similar public announcement of the formation of a central
Cuban relief committee, with headquarters in New York City,
composed of three members representing the American National
Red Cross and the religious and business elements of the community.
The efforts of that committee have been untiring and have
accomplished much. Arrangements for free transportation to
Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work. The president of
the American Red Cross and representatives of other contributory
organizations have generously visited Cuba and co-operated with
the Consul-General and the local authorities to make effective distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central
committee. Nearly $200,000 in money and supplies has already
reached the sufferers and more is forthcoming. The supplies are
admitted duty free, and transportation to the interior has been
arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to
Havana and the larger cities, is now extended through most, if
not all of the towns where suffering exists.
Thousands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for
a change in the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized by
the Spanish Government. Within a few days past the orders of
General Weyler have been revoked; the reconcentrados, it is
said, are to be permitted to return to their homes, and aided to
resume the self-supporting pursuits of peace. Public works have
been ordered to give them employment, and a sum of $6oo,ooo
has been appropriated for their relief.
The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of. subjugation
or extermination a final military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alternative lies in the physical exhaustion of
the one or the other party, or perhaps of both-a condition which
in effect ended the ten years war by the truce of Zanjon. The
prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the present strife




56o


APPENDIX.


is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by
the civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected
and injured as we are, deeply and intimately, by its very existence.
Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty, in a spirit of true
friendliness, no less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so
much to lose by the prolongation of the struggle, to seek to bring
about an immediate termination of the war. To this end I submitted, on the 27th ultimo, as a result of much representation
and correspondence, through the United States minister at Madrid, propositions to the Spanish Government looking to an armistice until October i for the negotiation of peace with the good
offices of the President.
In addition, I asked the immediate revocation of the order of
reconcentration, so as to permit the people to return to their
farms and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies
from the United States, co-operating with the Spanish authorities,
so as to afford full relief.
The reply of the Spanish cabinet was received on the night of
the 31st ultimo. It offered, as the means to bring about peace in
Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the Insular Parliament,
inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to
reach a final result, it being, however, understood that the powers
reserved by the constitution to the Central Government are not
lessened or diminished. As the Cuban Parliament does not meet
until the 4th of May next, the Spanish Government would not object, for its part, to accept at once a suspension of hostilities if
asked for by the insurgents from the general-in-chief, to whom it
would pertain, in such case, to determine the duration and conditions of the armistice.
The propositions submitted by General Woodford and the reply
of the Spanish Government were both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of which are before me, and are substantially in
the language above given. The function of the Cuban Parliament
in the matter of " preparing " peace and the manner of its doing
so are not expressed in the Spanish memorandum; but from General Woodford's explanatory reports of preliminary discussions
preceding the final conference it is understood that the Spanish
Government stands ready to give the Insular Congress full powers
to settle the terms of peace with the insurgents-whether by
direct negotiation or indirectly by means of legislation does not
appear.




APPENDIX


With this last overture in the direction of immediate peace, and
its disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive is brought to
the end of his effort.
In my annual message of December last I said:
Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the
insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the independence of
Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational
compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of
one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for
that can not be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would
be criminal aggression.
Thereupon I reviewed these alternatives, in the light of President Grant's measured words, uttered in i875, when after seven
years of sanguinary, destructive and cruel hostilities in Cuba he
reached the conclusion that the recognition of the independence
of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible; and that the recognition of belligerence was not warranted by the facts accoding
to the tests of public law. I commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question, pointing out the inconveniences and
positive dangers of a recognition of belligerence which, while adding to the already onerous burdens of neutrality within our own
jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our influence or effective
offices in the territory of hostilities.
Nothing has since occurred to change my view in this regard;
and I recognize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition
of belligerents is published, could, of itself and unattended by
other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which
we labor-the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of
the misery that afflicts the island.
Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the independence of the present insurgent government in Cuba, we find
safe precedents in our history from an early day. They are well
summed up in President Jackson's message to Congress, December 2!, I836, on the subject of the recognition of the independence of Texas. He said:
In all the contests that have arisen out of the revolutions of
France, out of the disputes relating to the Crowns of Portugal and
Spain, out of the separation of the American possessions of both
from the European Governments, and out of the numerous and
constantly occurring struggles for dominion in Spanish America,




562


APPENDIX.


so wisely consistent with our just principles has been the action
of our Government, that we have, under the most critical circumstances, avoided all censure, and encountered no other evil than
that produced by a transient estrangement of good will in those
against whom we have been by force of evidence compelled to
decide.
It has thus made known to the world that the uniform policy
and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in
disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other
nations, and eventually to recognize the authority of the prevailing party without reference to our particular interests and views
or to the merits of the original controversy.
* * * But on this, as on every other trying occhsion, safety
is to be found in a rigid adherence to principle.
In the contest between Spain and the revolted colonies we
stood aloof, and waited not only until the ability of the new States
to protect themselves was fully established, but until the danger
of their being again subjugated had entirely passed away. Then,
and not until then, were they recognized.
Such was our course in regard to Mexico herself. * * * It
is true that with regard to Texas the civil authority of Mexico has
been expelled, its invading army defeated, the chief of the Republic himself captured, and all present power to control the
newly organized government of Texas annihilated within its confines; but, on the other hand, there is, in appearance at least, an
immense disparity of physical force on the side of Texas. The
Mexican Republic, under another Executive, is rallying its forces
under a new leader and menacing a fresh invasion to recover its
lost dominion.
Upon the issue of this threatened invasion the independence of
Texas may be considered as suspended; and were there nothing
peculiar in the relative situation of the United States and Texas,
our acknowledgment of its independence at such a crisis could
scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve with
which we have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat all similar
questions.
Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that
there might be imputed to the United States motives of selfish interest in view of the former claim on our part to the territory of
Texas, and of the avowed purpose of the Texans in seeking recognition of independence as an incident to the incorporation of
Texas in the Union, concluding thus:
Prudence, therefore, seemns to dictate that we should still stand
aloof and maintain our present attitude, if not until Mexico itself,
or one of the great foreign powers shall recognize the independence of the new government, at least until the lapse of time or the
course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the




APPENDIX.


563


ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate
sovereignty and to uphold the government constituted by them.
Neither of the contending parties can justly complain of this
course. By pursuing it we are but carrying out the long-established policy of our Government, a policy which has secured to us
respect and influence abroad and inspired confidence at home.
These are the words of the resolute and patriotic Jackson.
They are evidence that the United States; in addition to the test
imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition of independence by a neutral state (to wit, that the revolted state
shall "constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in
substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability," and forming defacto, " if left to itself, a state among the nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a state,")
has imposed for its own governance in dealing with cases like
these the further condition that recognition of independent statehood is not due to a revolted dependency until the danger of its
being again subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed
away.
This extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case of Texas.
The Congress to whom President Jackson referred the question
as one " probably leading to wvar," and therefore a proper subject
for " a previous understanding with that body by whom war can
alone be declared and by whom all the provisions for sustaining
its perils must be furnished," left the matter of the recognition of
Texas to the discretion of the Executive, providing merely for the
sending of a diplomatic agent when the President shall be satisfied
that the Republic of Texas had become " an independent State."
It was so recognized by President Van Buren, who commissioned
a charge d'affaires March 7, i837, after Mexico had abandoned an
attempt to reconquer the Texan territory, and when there was at
the time no bona fide contest going on between the insurgent Province and its former Sovereign.
I said in my message of December last, "It is to be seriously
considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor."  The same requirement
must certainly be no less seriously considered when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in question, for no less positive
test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while,
on the other hand, the influences and consequences of the struggle




5u4


APPENDIX.


upon the internal policy of the recognizing State, which form important factors when the recognition of belligerency is concerned,
are secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factorsv when the real
question is whether the community claiming recognition is or is
not independent beyond peradventure.
Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be
wise or prudent for this Government to recognize at the present
time the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such
recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States
to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now
to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might
subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation
toward the organization so recognized. In case of intervention
our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of
such government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally.
When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a
government capable of performing the duties and discharging the
functions of a separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the
proper forms and attributes of nationality, such government can
be promptly and readily recognized and the relations and interests
of the United States with such nation adjusted.
There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the
war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, or as the active ally of the one
party or the other.
As to the first, it is not to be forgotten that during the last few
months the relation of the United States has virtually been one of
friendly intervention in many ways, each not of itself conclusive,
but all tending to the exertion of a potential influence toward an
ultimate pacific result, just and honorable to all interests concerned. The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest,
unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by
differences between us and Spain, and unstained by the blood of
American citizens.
The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to
stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents where neighboring States have
interfered to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by internecine
conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable on rational grounds.
It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to




APPENDIX.


the contest as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual
settlement.
The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized
as follows:
First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the
barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable
or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all
in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore
none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at
our door.
Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that
protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the
conditions that deprive them of legal protection.
Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very
serious injury to the commerce, trade and business of our people,
and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the
island.
Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present
condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace,
and entails upon this Government an enormous expense. With
such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with
which our people have such trade and business relations-when
the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and
their property destroyed and themselves ruined-where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door
by war-ships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering
that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating
questions and entanglements thus arising-all these and others
that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are
a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a
semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.
These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out
have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has
deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already
transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of inquiry
on the destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of
Havana during the night of the i5th of February. The destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and




566


APPENDIX.


marines and two officers of our Navy, reposing in the fancied
security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and
want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation.
The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the unqualified confidence of the Government, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the Maine was
caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It
did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be
fixed,
In any event the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior
cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in
Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be
such that the Spanish Government cannot assure safety and
security to a vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of
Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there.
Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic correspondence, a dispatch from our Minister to Spain, of the 26th
ultimo, contained the statement that the Spanish minister for
foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do all that
the highest honor and justice require in the matter of the Maine.
The reply above referred to of the 3Pst ultimo also contained an
expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration
all the differences which can arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by the note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the ioth instant, as follows:
As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of
views between the reports of the American and Spanish boards,
Spain proposes that the facts be ascertained by an impartial
investigation by experts, whose decision Spain accepts in advance.
To this I have made no reply.
President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the
contest as it then appeared, and its hopeless and apparent indefinite prolongation, said
In such event, I am of opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the responsibility which devolves upon them,
and to seriously consider the only remaining measures possiblemediation and intervention. Owing, perhaps, to the large expanse of water separating the island from the peninsula, * * *
the contending parties appear to have within themselves no
depository of common confidence, to suggest wisdom when pas



APPENDIX.


sion and excitement have their sway, and to assume the part of
peacemaker.
In this view in the earlier days of the contest the good offices
of the United States as a mediator were tendered in good faith,
without any selfish purpose, in the interest of humanity and in
sincere friendship for both parties, but were at the time declined
by Spain, with the declaration, nevertheless, that at a future
time they would be indispensable. No intimation has been received that in the opinion of Spain that time has been reached.
And yet the strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its
injuries to the interests of the United States and of other nations.
Each party seems quite capable of working great injury and
damage to the other, as well as to all the relations and interests
dependent on the existence of peace in the island; but they seem
incapable of reaching any adjustment, and both have thus far
failed of achieving any success whereby one party shall possess
and control the island to the exclusion of the other. Under
these circumstances, the agency of others, either by mediation or
by intervention, seems to be the only alternative which must
sooner or later be invoked for the termination of the strife.
In the last annual message of my immediate predecessor during
the pending struggle, it was said:
Whe~n the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her
sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has
degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very
subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in
which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to
recognize and discharge.
In my annual message to Congress, December last, speaking to
this question, I said:
The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable
condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to
Spain, as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately
involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not,
the exigency of further and other action by the United States
will remain to be taken. When that time comes that action will
be determined in the line of indisputable right and duty. It will
be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this Government owes to itself, to the people who have
confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to
humanity.
Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actu



568


APPFNDTX.


ated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither
by passion nor selfishness, the Government will continue its
watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens
and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful
agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it
shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to
ourselves, to civilization and humanity to intervene with force, it
shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity
for such action will be so clear as to command the support and
approval of the civilized world.
The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has
Waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may
flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not been
and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present methods.
The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no
longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the
name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty
to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.
In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures
to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the
Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in
the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of
maintaining order and observing its international obligations,
insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as
well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the
United States as may be necessary for these purposes.
And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the
lives of the starving people of the island I recommend that the
distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public Treasury to supplement the
charity of our citizens.
The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable
condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute
every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the
law, I await your action.
Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message,
official information was received by me that the latest decree of
the Queen Regent of Spain directs General Blanco, in order to
prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities,




APPENDIX.                      569
the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me.
This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am
sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains
a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another
justification for our contemplated action.
WILLIAM MCKINLEY.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, April ii, 1898.




570


APPENDIX.


RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS.
Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independence of the people of
Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and
government in the Island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval
forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the
United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry
these resolutions into effect.
WHEREAS, the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more
than three years in the Island of Cuba, so near our own borders,
have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States,
have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as
they have, in, the destruction of a United States battleship, with
two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a
friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and can not longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States
in his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was invited:
Therefore,
Resolved by fie Senate ard House of Representatives of the United
States of Amterica in Congress assembled,
First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right
ought to be, free and independent.
Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand,
and the Government of the United States does hereby demand,
that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and
government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and
naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
Third. That the President of the United States be, and he
hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such
extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.
Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof, and
asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the
government and control of the Island to its people.
Approved, April 20, I898.




APPENDIX.


5711


DECLARATION OF WAR.
An Act Declaring that war exists between the United States of America
and the Kingdom of Spain.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
First. That war be, and the same is hereby, declared to exist,
and that war has existed since the twenty-first day of April, anno
Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including said day,
between the United States of Arnerica and the Kingdom of
Spain.
Second. That the President of the United States be, and he
hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such
extent as may be necessary to carry this Act into effect.
Approved, April 25, I898.




5 72


APPENDIX.


BLOCKADE.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
WHEREAS, by a joint resolution passed by the Congress and approved April 20, i898, and communicated to the Government of
Spain, it was demanded that said Government at once relinquish
its authority and Government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw
its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters; and the
President of the United States was directed and empowered to
use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to
call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the
several States to such extent as might be necessary to carry said
resolution into effect; and
Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the President of
the United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain
a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including all ports on said
coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba:
Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United
States, in order to enforce the said resolution, do hereby declare
and proclaim that the United States of America have instituted,
and will maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including
ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and the
port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, aforesaid, in pursuance of the. laws of the United States and the law of nations
applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as
to prevent the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any neutral vessel approaching any of said ports, or attempting to leave the same, without notice or knowledge of the
establishment of such blockade, will be duly warned by the Commander of the blockading forces, who will endorse on her register




APPENDIX.                     5 73
the fact, and the date, of such warning, where such endorsement
was made; and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter
any blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest
convenient port for such proceedings against her and her cargo
as prize, as may be deemed advisable.
Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time of the establishment of such blockade will be allowed thirty days to issue
therefrom.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this 22d day of April, A. D.
i898, and of the Independence of the United States,
[SEAL] the one hundred and twenty-second.
WILLIAM MCKINLEY.
By the President:
JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State.




574


APPENDIX.


FIRST CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
A PROCLAMATION.
WHEREAS, a joint resolution of Congress was approved on the
twentieth day of April, I898, entitled " Joint Resolution For the
recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding
that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval
forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President
of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the
United States to carry these resolutions into effect," and
Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled " An Act to provide
for temporarily Increasing the Military Establishment of the
United States in time of war and for other purposes," approved
April 22, 1898; the President is authorized, in order to raise a
volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers to
serve in the Army of the United States:
Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United
States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution
and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have
thought fit to call forth and hereby do call forth, volunteers to
the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry into effect the
purpose of the said Resolution; the same to be apportioned, as
far as practicable, among the several States and Territories and
the District of Columbia, according to population, and to serve
for two years, unless sooner discharged. The details for this
object will be immediately communicated to the proper authorities
through the War Department.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-third day of April,
A. D. I898, and of the Independence of the United
[SEAL] States the one hundred and twenty-second.
WILLIAM McKINLEY.
By the President:
JOHN SHERMAN, Serretary of State.




APPENDIX,5


5 75


PRIVATEERING, ETC.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
WHEREAS, by an Act of Congress approved April 25, I898, it is
declared that war exists and that war has existed since the 2jSt
day of April, A. D. i898, including said day, between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of Spain; and
Whereas, it being desirable that such war should be conducted
upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations and
sanctioned by their recent practice, it has already been announced
that the policy of this Government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris;
Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United
States of America, by virtue of the power vested in me by the
Constitution and the laws, do hereby declare and proclaim:
i. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception
of contraband of war.
2. Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag.
3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective.
4. Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places within the
United States, shall be allowed till May 21, I898, inclusive, for
loading their cargoes and departing from such ports or places;
and such Spanish merchant vessels, if met at sea by any United
States ship, shall be permitted to continue their voyage, if, on
examination of their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes
were taken on board before the expiration of the above term;
Provided, that nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish
vessels having on board any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, or any coal (except such as may be necessary
for their voyage), or any other article prohibited or contraband
of war, or any despatch of or to the Spanish Government.




A DDV XT NTV
4 —X L x AU15  A I-  s, 6


5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21, 1898,
shall have sailed from any foreign port bound for any port or
place in the United States, shall be permitted to enter such port
or place, and to discharge her cargo, and afterward forthwith
to depart without molestation; and any such vessel, if met at sea
by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue her
voyage to any port not blockaded.
6. The right of search is to be exercised with strict regard for
the rights of neutrals, and the voyages of mail steamers are not
to be interfered with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion
of a violation of law in respect of contraband or blockade.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, on the twenty-sixth day of
April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hun[SEAL] dred and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the
United States the one hundred and twenty-second.
WILLIAM MCKINLEY.
By the President:
ALVEY A. ADEE, Acting Secretary of State.




APPENDIX.


577


SECOND CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
A PROCLAMATION.
WHEREAS, an Act of Congress was approved on the twenty-fifth
day of April, i898, entitled " An Act Declaring that war exists
between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain,"
and
Whereas, by an Act of Congress entitled "An Act to provide
for temporarily increasing the Military Establishment of the
United States in time of war and for other purposes," approved
April 22, I898; the President is authorized, in order to raise a
volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers
to serve in the Army of the United States:
Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United
States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution
and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have
thought fit to call forth and hereby do call forth, volunteers to
the aggregate number of 75,000 in addition to the volunteers
called forth by my proclamation of the twenty-third of April, in
the present year; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the several States and Territories and the District of
Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years,
unless sooner discharged. The proportion of each arm and the
details of enlistment and organization will be made known through
the War Department.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-fifth day of May,
in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
[SEAL] and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the
United States the one hundred and twenty-second.
WILLIAM MCKINLEY.
By the President:
WILLIAM R. DAY, Secretary of State.




.578


APPENDTIX


EXTENDING BLOCKADE.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
WHEREAS, for the reasons set forth in my Proclamation of
April 22, i898, a blockade of the ports on the northern coast of
Cuba, from Cardenas to Bahia Honda, inclusive, and of the port
of Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba, was declared to have
been instituted; and
Whereas, it has become desirable to extend the blockade to
other Spanish ports:
Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United
States, do hereby declare and proclaim that, in addition to the
blockade of the ports specified in my Proclamation of April 22,
1898, the United States of America has instituted and will maintain an effective blockade of all the ports on the south coast of
Cuba, from Cape Frances to Cape Cruz, inclusive, and also of the
port of San Juan, in the island of Porto Rico.
Neutral vessels lying in any of the ports to which the blockade
is by the present Proclamation extended, will be allowed thirty
days to issue therefrom, with cargo.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-seventh day of
June, A. D. i898, and of the Independence of the
[SEAL]  United States the one hundred and twenty-second.
WILLIAM MCKiNLEY.
By the President:
J. B. MOORE, Acting Secretary of State.




APPENDIX.


5 79


RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS.
Joint Resolution To provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the
United States.
WHEREAS, the Government of the Republic of Hawaii having, in
due form, signified its consent, in the manner provided by its
constitution, to cede absolutely and without reserve to the
United States of America all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever
kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies,
and also to cede and transfer to the United States the absolute
fee and ownership of all public, Government, or Crown lands,
public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment,
and all other public property of every kind and description belonging to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, together
with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining:
Therefore,
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That said cession is accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and that the said Hawaiian Islands
and their dependencies be, and they are hereby, annexed as a part
of the territory of the United States and are subject to the
sovereign dominion thereof, and that all and singular the property and rights hereinbefore mentioned are vested in the United
States of America.
The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands
shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands; but the
Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their
management and disposition:
Provided, That all revenue from or proceeds of the same, except
as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for the
civil, military, or naval purposes of the United States, or may be
assigned for the use of the local government, shall be used solely
for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for
educational and other public purposes.




-58o


APPENDIX.


Until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands
all the civil, judicial, and military powers exercised by the officers
of the existing government in said islands shall be vested in such
person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the
President of the United States shall direct; and the President
shall have power to remove said officers and fill the vacancies so
occasioned.
The existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign
nations shall forthwith cease and determine, being replaced by
such treaties as may exist, or as may be hereafter concluded,
between the United States and such foreign nations. The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with
this joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution of the
United States nor to any existing treaty of the United States,
shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States
shall otherwise determine.
Until legislation shall be enacted extending the United States
customs laws and regulations to the Hawaiian Islands the existing
customs relations of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States
and other countries shall remain unchanged.
The public debt of the Republic of Hawaii, lawfully existing at
the date of the passage of this joint resolution, including the
amounts due to depositors in the Hawaiian Postal Saving Bank,
is hereby assumed by the Government of the United States; but
the liability of the United States in this regard shall in no case
exceed four million dollars. So long, however, as the existing
Government and the present commercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands are continued as hereinbefore provided said Government shall continue to pay the interest on said debt.
There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the
Hawaiian Islands, except upon such conditions as are now or may
hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States; and no
Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed
to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands.
The President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of
whom shall be residents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as
soon as reasonably practicable, recommend to Congress such
legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they shall deem
necessary or proper.
SEC. 2. That the commissioners hereinbefore provided for shall




APPENDIX.                      5SI
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
SEC. 3. That the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, or so
much-thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated, out of
any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropiated, and to be
immediately available, to be expended at the discretion of the
President of the United States of America, for the purpose of
carrying this joint resolution into effect.
Approved, July 7, 1898.




q82


APPENDIX.T._-  -. =


[TRANSLATION.]
DON ALFONSO XIII
BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN,
AND IN HIS NAME DURING HIS MINORITY,
DONA MARIA CRISTINA,
QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM.
WHEREAS it has become necessary to negotiate and sign at
Washington a protocol in which the preliminaries of peace between Spain and the United States of America shall be settled,
and as it is necessary for me to empower for that purpose a
person possessing the requisite qualifications; Therefore, I have
decided to select, after procuring the consent of His Excellency
the President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio Cambon,
ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the French
Republic in theJUnited States of America, as I do, by these presents, select and appoint you to proceed, invested with the character of my plenipotentiary to negotiate and sign with the plenipotentiary whom His Excellency the President of the United
States of America may designate for that purpose the aforesaid
protocol. And I declare, from the present moment, all that you
may agree upon, negotiate, and sign in the execution of this commission acceptable and valid, and I will observe it and execute it,
and will cause it to be observed and executed as if jt had been done
by myself, for which I give you my whole full powers in the most
ample form required by law. In witness whereof I have caused
these presents to be-issued, signed by my hand, duly sealed and
countersigned by the undersigned, my minister of state. Given
in the palace at Madrid, August II, 1898.
[L. s.] MARIA CRISTINA.
JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ Y GUTIERREZ DE CASTRO,
MAinister of State.




APPENDIX.


583


PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN.
William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and
His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this purpose full authority from the Government of the United States and the Government of Spain, have
concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms
on which the two Governments have agreed in respect to the
matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of
peace between the two countries, that is to say
ARTICLE }.
Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to
Cuba.
ARTICLE II.
Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico
and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the WVest
Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the
United States.
ARTICLE 1II.
The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which
shall determine the control, disposition and government of the
Philippines.
ARTICLE IV.
Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico and other
islands nowrunder Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to
this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing




584


A ff lT7NT ThT
I-xI ThINl-lA


of this protocol, appoint Commissioners, and the Commissioners
so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this
protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying
out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Government will, within ten days
after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other Commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging
and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto
Rico ahd other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the
West Indies.
ARTICLE V.
The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than
five Commissioners to treat of peace, and the Commissioners so
appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October i, I898, and
proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace,
which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the
respective constitutional forms of the two countries.
ARTICLE VI.
Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol, hostilities
between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that
effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to
the commanders of its military and naval forces.
Done at Washington in duplicate, in English and in French, by
the Undersigned, who have hereunto set their hands and seals,
the i2th day of August, i898.
[SEAL    WVILLIAMx R. DAY.
[SEAL]   JULES CAMBON.




APPENDIX.


585


SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
WHEREAS, by a protocol concluded and signed August I2, i898,
by William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and
His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively representing for this purpose the Government of the United
States and the Government of Spain, the United States and Spain
have formally agreed upon the terms on which negotiations for
the establishment of peace between the two countries shall be
undertaken; and
Whereas, it is in said protocol agreed that upon its conclusion
and signature hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and that notice to that effect shall be given as soon as
possible by each Government to the commanders of its military
and naval forces:
Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United
States, do, in accordance with the stipulations of the protocol,
declare and proclaim on the part of the United States a suspension of hostilities, and do hereby command that orders be immediately given through the proper channels to the commanders of
the military and naval forces of the United States to abstain from
all acts inconsistent with this proclamation.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this x2th day of August, in
the year of our Lord one thousand eighty hundred and
[SEAL]  ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United
States the one hundred and twenty-third.
WILLIAM MCKINLEY.
By the President:
WILLIAM R. DAY, Secretary of State.




5 1


APPENDIX.


THANKSGIVING.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
A PROCLAMATION.
THE approaching November brings to mind the custom of our
ancestors, hallowed by time and rooted in our most sacred traditions, of giving thanks to Almighty God for all the blessings He
has vouchsafed to us during the year.
Few years in our history have afforded such cause for thanksgiving as this. We have been blessed by abundant harvests, our
trade and commerce have wonderfully increased, our public credit
has been improved and strengthened, all sections of our common
country have been brought together and knitted into closer bonds
of national purpose and unity.
The skies have been for a time darkened by the cloud of war;
but as we were compelled to take up the sword in the cause of
humanity we are permitted to rejoice that the conflict has been of
brief duration and the losses we have had to mourn, though grievous and important, have been so few, considering the great results
accomplished, as to inspire us with gratitude and praise to the
Lord of Hosts. We may laud and magnify His Holy Name that
the cessation of hostilities came so soon as to spare both sides the
countless sorrows and disasters that attend protracted war.
I do therefore invite all my fellow-citizens, as well those who
may be at sea or sojourning in foreign lands as those at home, to set
apart and observe Thursday, the twenty-fourth day of November,
as a day of national thanksgiving, to come together in their several
places of worship, for a service of praise and thanks to Almighty
God for all the blessings of the year; for the mildness of the seasons and the fruitfulness of the soil, for the continued prosperity
of the people, for the devotion and valor of our countrymen, for
the glory of our victory and the hope of a righteous peace, and to
pray that the Divine guidance which has brought us heretofore to
safety and honor may be graciously continued in the years to come.




APPENDIX.                     587
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-eighth day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hun[SEAL] dred and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the
United States the one hundred and twenty-third.
WILLIAM MCKINLEY.
By the President:
JOHN HAY, Secretary of State.




588


APPENDIX.


RESERVATION FOR NAVAL PURPOSES-HAWAII.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
A PROCLAMATION.
WHEREAS, by joint resolution "to provide for annexing the
Hawaiian Islands to the United States," approved July 7, I898, the
cession by the government of the Republic of Hawaii to the
-United States of America, of all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies, and the transfer to the United States of the absolute fee
and ownership of all public, Government or Crown lands, public.
buildings, or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment, and all
other public property of every kind and description belonging to
the government of the Hawaiian Islands, was duly accepted, ratified and confirmed, and the said Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies annexed as a part of the territory of the United States and
made subject to the sovereign dominion thereof, and all and singular the property and rights hereinbefore mentioned vested in the
United States of America; and
Whereas, it was further provided in said resolution that the
existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall
not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands, but the Congress
of the United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition; and
Whereas, it is deemed necessary in the public interests that
certain lots and plats of land in the City of Honolulu be immediately reserved for naval purposes:
Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United
States, by virtue of the authority in me vested, do hereby declare,
proclaim and make known that the following-described lots or
plats of land be and the same are hereby reserved for naval pur



APPENDIX.


589


poses until such time as the Congress of the United States shall
otherwise direct, to wit:
ist. The water front lying between the Bishop Estate and
the line of Richard Street including the site of prospective
wharves, slips, and their approaches.
2nd. The blocks of land embracing lots No. 86 to 91, ioo
to 131, including Mililani Street to the intersection of Halekauwali Street; and the Government water lots lying between
the Bishop Estate and Punchbowl and Allen Streets.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand, and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this second day of November,
in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety[SEAL]  eight, and of the Independence of the United States
the one hundred and twenty-third.
WILLIAM MCKINLEY.
By the President:
JOHN HAY, Secretary of State.




590


APPENDIX.


MESSAGE
FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS ON DECEMBER 10, 1898.
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herexvith, with a view to its ratification, a treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at the city of
Paris on December 10, 1898; together with the protocols and
papers indicated in the list accompanying the report of the Secretary of State.
WILLIAM MCKINLEY.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, January 4, 1899.
To the President:
The undersigned, Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before
the President, with a view to its submission to the Senate if
deemed proper, a treaty of peace concluded at Paris on December IO, 1898, between the United States and Spain.
Accompanying the treaty are the protocols of the conferences of
the Peace Commission at Paris, together with copies of statements
made before the United States Commissioners, and other papers
indicated in the inclosed list.
Respectfully submitted.
JOHN HAY.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, January 3, 1899.




APPENDIX.


591


TREATY OF PEACE
BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN.
THE United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen
Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso
XIII., desiring to end the state of war now existing between the
two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries:
The President of the United States,
William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George
Gray and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States;
And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain,
Don Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the senate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of
the Crown; Don Jose de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and associate justice of the supreme court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de
Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary
at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, general of division;
Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their
full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have,
after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles
ARTICLE I.
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to
Cuba.
And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such
occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that
may under international law result from the fact of its occupation,
for the protection of life and property.
ARTICLE II.
Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and
other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies,
and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.




. 592


APPENDIX.


ARTICLE III.
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the
Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within
the following line:
A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth
parallel of north latitude, and through -the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth
(iI8th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree
meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east
of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes (40 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four
degrees and forty-five minutes (40 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen
degrees and thirty-five minutes (I 190 35') east of Greenwich,
thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen
degrees and thirty-five minutes (II90 35') east of Greenwich to
the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (70 40')
north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and
forty minutes (70 4o') north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (I I6th) degree meridian of longitude east of
Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth
(ioth) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and
eighteenth (i i8th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich,
and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (ii8th) degree
meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.
The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million
dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of
the ratifications of the present treaty.
ARTICLE IV.
The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date
of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit
Spanish ships and merchandise to- the ports of the Philippine
Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the
United States.
ARTICLE V.
The United States will, upon the signature of the present
treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers




APPENDIX.


593


taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the
American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be
restored to them.Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the
island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the
Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto
Rico and other islands in the WVest Indies, under the Protocol
of August 12, i898, which is to continue in force till its provisions
are completely executed.
The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands
and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the'two Governments.
Stands' of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all
calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition,
livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the
land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam,
remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defences, shall
remain in their emplacements for the term of six months to be
reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and
the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material
from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two Governments on the subject shall be reached.
ARTICLE VI.
Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all
prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offences, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the
Philippines and the war with the United States.
Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made
prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake -to
obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the
insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.
The Government of the United States will at its own cost return
to Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return
to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners
released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this
article.




594


APPENDIX.


ARTICLE VII.
The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for
indemnity, national and individual, of- every kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late
insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of
the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost
of the war.
The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its
citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.
ARTICLE VIII.
In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of
this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico
and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and
in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, bar.
racks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable
property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public
domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession,
as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers,
cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law
belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of
provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal
capacity to acquire and possess property in -the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever
nationality such individuals may be-.
The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be,
includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty
relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part, relates
to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. -Like rules shall be reciprocally
observed in favor of Spain. in respect of documents in the archives
of the islands above referred to.
In the aforesaid relinquishment- or cession, as the case may- be,
are also included such rights as the Crown of.Spain and its
authorities possess in respect of the official archives and reqords,
executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to,




APPENDIX.


595


which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their
inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the
right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of
the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive
or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.
ARTICLE IX.
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes
her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove
therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property,
including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its
proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their
industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case
they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within
a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty,
a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in
default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced
it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which
they may reside.
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of
the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.
ARTICLE X.
The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes
or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of
their religion.
ARTICLE XI.
The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by
this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject
'in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts
of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws
governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear




596


APPENDIX.


before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of
the country to which the courts belong.
ARTICLE XII.
Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according
to the following rules:
i. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private
individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned,
and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review
under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be
executed in due form by competent authority in the territory
within which such judgments should be carried out.
' 2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the
date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment
before the court in which they may then be pending or in the
court that may be substituted therefor.
3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the
Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by
this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the competent
authority of the place in which the case arose.
ARTICLE XIII.
The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents
acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico,
the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the
exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be
respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue
to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of
ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the
ratifications of this treaty.
ARTICLE XIV.
Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the
ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which
has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.




APPENDIX.


597


ARTICLE XV.
The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years,
accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same
treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and
clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its
own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade.
This article may at any time be terminated on six months'
notice given by either Government to the other.
ARTICLE XVI.
It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by
the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of
its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such
occupancy, advise any Government established in the island to
assume the same obligations.
ARTICLE XVII.
The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the
United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain; and
the ratification shall be exchanged at Washington within six
months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.
In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have
signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.
Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the
year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.
[SEAL] WILLIAM R. DAY.
[SEAL] CUSHMIAN K. DAVIS.
[SEAL] WILLIAM P. FRYE.
[SEAL] GEO. GRAY.
[SEAL] WHITELAW REID.
[SEAL] EUGENIO MONTERO RIOS.
[SEAL] B. DE ABARZUZA.
[SEAL] J. DE GARNICA.
[SEAL] W. R. DE VILLA URRUTIA.
[SEAL] RAFAEL CERERO..1




N ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~   ~~~    ~~~   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I~ ~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I~~~~~~~~




CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.


1898.
JAN.   23. U. S. Fleet assembled at Key West. 
24. The battleship Maine ordered to Havana.
25. The battleship Maine arrived at Havana.
26. Spain ordered the battleship Vizcaya to visit America.
"  29. Spain ordered a squadron to sail for Havana.
FEB.   8. Translation of a letter written by the Spanish minister at
Washington, speaking disparagingly of President McKinley, published by the Cuban Junta in New York.
9. The Spanish Minister at Washington recalled.
14. Spain appointed Senior Louis Polo de Bernabe to succeed
Senfor Dupuy de Lome as Minister at Washington.
i* 5. At 9: 40 P. M., wvhile moored to the buoy assigned her by the
Government pilot in the harbor of Havana, the battleship
Maine was destroyed by an explosion.
17. A Court of Inquiry on the Maine disaster appointed.
The Spanish Government disavowed the reflections on President McKinley by its late Minister at Washington, Seflor
Dupuy de Lome.
i 8. The Spanish cruiser Vizcaya reached New York.
The remains of 135 of the crew of the Maine wvere given a
public funeral in Havana, and buried in a local cemetery
at the expense of the Spanish authorities.
19. The United States Government declined a request by Spanish
officials for a joint examination of the Maine wreck.
20. Spanish officers made an examination of the Maine wreck.
21. The Maine's Court of Inquiry held its first session.
The Senate directed its Naval Committee to investigate the
Maine disaster; voted $200,000 for the investigation.
25. The Vizcaya left New York for Havana.
"    27. Premier Sagasta declared that no Spanish Government would
arbitrate the Cuban trouble.
MAR.    i. United States Senator Proctor arranged an investigating trip
from Havana to the Cuban provinces.
2.  The Navy Department decided to send two war ships to Cuba
with supplies for the reconcentrados.




' - -
U ) 


CHROUNOLOGICAL TABLE.


MAR.    4. Spain began assembling a naval fleet at Cadiz for Cuba.
4'   6. Spain asked the recall of Consul-General Lee from Havana,
and the substitution of merchant for war-vessels for the
transport of relief supplies.
Both requests were refused.
"4   7. Spain withdrew her request for the recall of Consul-General Lee.
' 8. In Congress, the House passed the $5o,ooo,ooo000 National Defense Bill unanimously.
9. Senator Proctor completed his tour of the Cuban provinces.
In Congress, the Senate adopted the $5o,ooo,ooo National Defense Bill unanimously.
ii. In Congress, the House Naval Committee provided for three
new battleships to cost $5,ooo,ooo each.
13. A special Board was appointed to examine all vessels the U. S.
Government might wish to buy or lease.
i 6. Spain remonstrated to the United States against the presence
of the White Squadron at Key West.
Speech of Senator Proctor in United States Senate on the condition of Cuba.
de   17. The Navy Department divided Admiral Sicard's fleet and
ordered a formidable squadron to Hampton Roads.
19. The United States battleship Oregon left San Francisco for the
Atlantic Station.
In Congress, the House adopted a bill to admit war supplies free.
"    21. The Court of Inquiry on the Maine disaster completed its investigation and reported its inability to fix the responsibility.
e   23. The Navy Department increased the fleet at Key West.
"    25. The light-house tender Mangrove was ordered to Havana to
convey to Key West all American officials excepting Consul-General Lee.
A flying squadron was organized at Hampton Roads.
26. President McKinley announced his intention to ask Congress
to appropriate $500,000 for the relief of Cuban reconcentrados.
l    29. American ultimatum on Cuban situation presented to Spain.
APRIL i. Spain replied to American ultimatum in unsatisfactory terms.
Spanish torpedo flotilla arrived at Cape Verde Islands.
I     5. Consul-General Lee directed to return home.
7. Representatives of the Powers at Washington presented a joint
~~*  ~    expression of a hope for peace, to the President.
8. Premier Sagasta announced a termination of negotiations.
ii. President McKinley sent message on Cuba to Congress.




CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.


6oi


APRIL I2. In Congress, the Foreign Committees of the two Houses practically agreed to authorize the President to intervene in
Cuba, and favored a recognition of independence.
1t 13. Spanish Cabinet delared the United States policy incompatible
with Spanish sovereignty and voted a large war credit.
1 14. The Spanish Minister at Washington arranged to turn the
Legation over to the French Ambassador.
i 5. The Navy Department chartered the steamships St. Paul, St.
Louis, City of Paris and City of New York.
The British Government notified its officials at Jamaica that
coal would be contraband of war.
IC i6. In Congress, the Senate adopted the intervention resolution.
1e i9. A conference committee's report on the Senate resolution for
intervention, with the recognition clause stricken out, was
adopted by each House of Congress.
20. President McKinley signed the intervention resolution and sent
an ultimatum to Spain.
Spanish Minister at Washington demanded his passports.
49  21. The Spanish Government sent the United States Minister at
Madrid his passports before he delivered the ultimatum.
Sampson's fleet at Key West ordered to blockade Havana.
22. President McKinley proclaimed a blockade of Havana and
other Cuban ports, and the United States cruiser Nashville
captured the first prize of war off 'Key West.
The United States squadron at Hong Kong, under Commodore
Geo. Dewey, sailed for Manila, Philippine Islands.
cc  23. President McKinley issued a call for i25,000 volunteers.
In Congress, the Army Reorganization Bill was adopted and a
War Revenue Bill introduced, both in the House.
25. President McKinley recommended to Congress the recognition
of a state of war with Spain, and a resolution declaring
that war had existed since April 2I, was adopted in both
Houses.
John Sherman, Secretary of State, resigned and Wm. R. Day,
Assistant Secretary, was appointed his successor.
"   27. The United States warships, New York, Puritan and Cincinnati shelled the batteries of Matanzas, Cuba.
SC  29. Portugal issued a neutrality proclamation, thus forcing the
Spanish squadron, under Admiral Cervera, to leave the Cape
Verde Islands.
The Senate adopted conference report on Naval Appropriation
Bill.
The House passed the War Revenue Bill.




602


CHRONOI.OCTGCAT. TABLE.


MAY     i. Commodore Dewey's squadron of six warships destroyed
Spanish fleet of eleven vessels, without the loss of a ship
or a man.
-4    2. In Congress, both Houses voted a war emergency appropriation
of $34,625,725.
"4    4. Admiral Sampson's fleet sailed from Key West.
"     7. President McKinley appointed  Commodore Dewey, Acting
Rear-Admiral.
9. Congress adopted resolutions of thanks to Admiral Dewey.
"    ii. Three United States vessels engaged the batteries at Cardenas,
Cuba, and Ensign Bagley was killed.
General Merritt appointed Military Governor pf the Philippines.
1 2. Admiral Sampson bombarded the fortifications of San Juan.
14. The cable at Cienfuegos, Cuba, was cut by Americans.
15. The Atlantic Coast Patrol Squadron went on duty.
All members of the Spanish Cabinet resigned.
17. In Congress, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported
favorably on the annexation of Hawaii.
"    I8. Senor Sagasta formed a new Cabinet.
"    19. Admiral Cervera's fleet reached Santiago.
23. The first United States troops for the Philippines embarked.
24. It was reported that the combined squadrons of Admiral
Sampson and Commodore Schley had securely trapped
Admiral Cervera's fleet in Santiago Harbor.
25. Three more transports left San Francisco for Manila.
United States Government decided to seize Porto Rico.
The battleship Oregon reached Jupiter Inlet, Fla.
27. Amendments were offered to the War Revenue Bill in the
Senate, providing for the annexation of Hawaii.
28. General Shafter was ordered to move the army at Tampa.
d    31. Fortifications at the entrance of Santiago Harbor bombarded.
JUNE    2. In Congress, the House passed an Urgent Deficiency Bill.
3. Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson sank the collier Merrimac
across the entrance of Santiago Harbor.
4. The Senate adopted the War Revenue Bill.
Captain Charles V. Gridley, U. S. N., commander of Admiral
Dewey's flagship, died in Kobe, Japan, aged 53 years.
7. Fortifications at Caimanera bombarded by United States ships.
9. Admiral Sampson seized Guantanamo Bay.
"    io. A force of 6oo00 United States Marines was landed at Caimanera.
In Congress, the Senate adopted the conference report on the
War Revenue Bill.




CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.


603


JUNE 12. The United States Marines holding Caimanera were engaged
for thirteen hours by Spanish regulars and guerrillas.
44  13. President McKinley signed the War Revenue Bill.
"   14. The Fourth Army Corps, under Major-General John J. Coppinger, was selected to occupy Porto Rico.
4'  15. Captain-General Blanco received authority to treat for the
exchange of Naval Constructor Hobson and his comrades.
The House adopted the resolution for the annexation of Hawaii.
22. General Shafter's army began landing at Baiquiri.
24. Americans marching towards Santiago attacked by Spaniards.
Rough Riders had a severe engagement at La Quasina.
'  27. It was decided to send a squadron under Commodore John C.
Watson to attack Spanish coast cities.
t  29. Flying squadron merged into Admiral Sampson's fleet off
Santiago.
30. Admiral Camara was requested by the Egyptian Government
to withdraw from Port Said as soon as possible.
The first expedition to Manila arrived at Cavite.
JULY   i. El Caney and San Juan Hill captured by United States troops.
The War Revenue Bill went into effect.
"    2. The army and navy resumed the attack on Santiago.
3. On orders from Spain, Cervera attempted to escape from
Santiago Harbor. Fleet totally destroyed by Americans.
General Shafter demanded the surrender of Santiago before
July 5.
a    5. Admiral Camara's squadron entered Suez Canal.
The threatened bombardment of Santiago was delayed.
"    6. Naval Constructor Hobson and his comrades were exchanged.
The Senate adopted the Hawaiian Annexation Resolutions.
7. President McKinley signed the resolutions for the annexation
of Hawaii.
Cruiser Philadelpzhia ordered to Honolulu.
8. Admiral Camara ordered to return to Spain immediately. 
General Shafter informed General Toral that the attack on
Santiago would be renewed if the city was not surrendered by noon, July 9.
Congress adjourned till December 5.
9. General Toral offered to surrender Santiago on condition that
his army be allowed to retreat, but General Shafter refused.
Io. General Toral declined to surrender and was notified that bombardment by the army and navy would be opened at four
P. M. A further delay however occurred.
"   ii. General Miles landed in Cuba with additional reinforcements.
All members of the Spanish Ministry resigned.




6n4


CLRONAUNOLUGLUsCAL TABLE.


JULY 12. General Toral was given until noon of the 14th to surrender.
14. General Toral agreed to surrender.
Popular subscriptions to the war-loan exceeded $1,300,o000,000.
1 I7. General Toral formally surrendered to General Shatter.
J I 8. President McKinley proclaimed temporary government for
Santiago.
Advance force of the United States expedition to Porto Rico
sailed.
20. General Leonard Wood appointed      Military Governor of
Santiago.
25. General Miles landed the Porto Rico expedition at Guanica.
26. General Merritt, the United States Governor of the Philippines,
arrived at Manila with the second military expedition.
28. Orders were issued to General Shatter to send his army to the
United States as soon as possible, because of the fever.
City and port of Ponce surrendered to General Miles.
30. President McKinley and Ambassador. Cambon reached an
agreement on a basis for peace. President demanded surrender of sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Rico; cession
of one of the Ladrone Islands, and possession of Manila.
pending disposition of the Philippines by a joint commission.
AUG.    i. Camp Alger was ordered abandoned.
"*    2. President McKinley made public the terms of peace.
3. Spain accepted the United States terms of peace.
Troops at Camp Alger transferred to Manassas.
{  5. Guayama, Porto Rico, captured by United States troops.
*4    6. The Infanta Maria Teresa, Admiral Cervera's flagship, raised.
9. Spaniards made a night attack on United States troops at
Malate.
io. Peace protocol was agreed upon by Judge Day, Secretary of
State, and Ambassador Cambon of France, in behalf of
Spain.
A new tariff for Cuba was promulgated by the War Department.
i I. The Spanish Cabinet approved the peace protocol.
i12. Peace protocol signed in Washington. President immediately
proclaimed an armistice, ordered cessation of hostilities
and raised the blockade of Cuba, Porto Rico and Manila.
13. Ignorant of the armistice, the United States troops captured
Manila.. 17. The War Department promulgated a tariff for the Philippines.




CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.


605


AUG. 18. The United States troops occupied all former Spanish positions at Manila.
"    20. New York gave a grand reception to Admiral Sampson's fleet.
First mail to Spain since war opened, sent from New York.
a    23. Surgeon-General Sternberg recommended that all sick troops
in Cuba and Porto Rico be sent north immediately.
The Navy Department opened bids for the construction of
twenty-eight torpedo boats and destroyers.
do   24. Severe fighting between Spaniards and insurgents in the
Visaya Islands was reported.
4    25. Red Cross steamer Coma? sailed from Tampa with iooo,oo
rations for the destitute in Havana.
4    z 26. The United States Peace Commission was completed as follows:-Wm. R. Day (President), Cushman K. Davis,
Wm. P. Frye, Edw. D. White and Whitelaw Reid.
SEPT.   3. President McKinley inspected Camp Wikoff at Montauk Point.
5. The Spanish Cortes re-assembled.
if    9. Associate Justice White declined appointment to the Peace
Commission and Senator George Gray was selected.
The United States and Spanish Military Commissions for Porto
Rico held their first joint session in San Juan.
4    12. The United States and Spanish Military Commissions for
Cuba held their first joint session in Havana.
i    13. The Spanish Cortes ratified the peace protocol.
i' 16. Spain appointed the following Peace Commission:-Montero
Rios (President), WV. R. de Villa Urrutia, Buenaventura
de Abarzuza, General R. Cerero and Jose de Garnica.
Judge Day resigned the office of Secretary of State.
"6* x8. Admiral Montojo suspended by Spanish Council of War.
"    19. Spain recalls her troops remaining in the West Indies.
'O   24. President McKinley demanded that Spaniards begin evacuation
of Cuba by October i 5, and complete it by December 31.
OCT.    i. The Peace Commissioners held their first joint session.
6*    3. Admiral Dewey was instructed to send two wvarships to China.
"4    6. Rear-Admiral Howell was succeeded in the command of the
North Atlantic Squadron by Commodore Philip.
"6    7. President McKinley decided that Porto Rico must be evacuated
October i8, and Cuba by December i.
4<    8, The Navy Department reported that during the war only
seventeen sailors were killed and sixty-seven wounded.
Two sessions of the Peace Commissioners were held separately.
Spain insisted on the assumption of the Cuban debt by the
United States.




6o6               CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.
OCT. iI. A Naval Board of Inquiry decided that the battle of Santiago,
was fought on   plans originating with Rear-Admiral
Sampson.
" 6. Captain-General Macias of Porto Rico sailed for Spain.
i 8. Spanish evacuation of Porto Rico was officially completed.
24. The limit for evacuation of Cuba extended to January I, I899.
25. Nine warships took part. in the Peace Jubilee at Philadelphia.
z6. Admiral Dewey released the Spanish sailors captured at Manila.
27. The Spanish Peace Commissioners accepted declaration of
United States-Commissioners on question of Cuban debt.
Philadelphia celebrates Peace Jubilee with military parade.
31. United States Commissioners demanded whole of Philippines.
Nov.    x. The Infanta Maria Teresa foundered off the Bahamas.
3. A United States Naval Reservation at Honolulu was established.
5. Secretary of State Hay made public the protocol of peace.
1 2. The Washington Cabinet instructed the United States Pe-ace
Commissioners that the right to consider the disposition of
the Philippines would not be debated further.
13. In reply to a request for further time, the United States Government notified Spain that Cuba must be evacuated by
Jan. i.
I6. At the joint meeting of the Peace Commission the Spaniards
asked that the Philippine clause be submitted to arbitration.
The Navy Department abandoned the I)fanta Maria Teresa.
" x8. Contracts were signed for the raising and refitting of three
Spanish warships, sunk in the battle of Manila, for
$500,000.
20. Commercial bodies in Spain urged a speedy conclusion of peace.
2 I. The United States Peace Commissioners delivered an ultimatum
rejecting the proposal for arbitration, offering $20,000oo,0
*for the Philippines, and insisting on resignation of all
claims arising since the beginning of the Cuban insurrection.
23. The Hawaiian Commission held its first meeting in Washington.
24. British officials at Manila celebrate American Thanksgiving.
26. Marshal Blanco resigned the office of Captain-General of Cuba.
28. Spanish Peace Commissioners accepted United States ultimatum.
DEC.    i. Filipino Independents declared that they would fight for independence before they would accept the bartering of the
islands.
"6    2. The Spanish Supreme Court at Santiago de Cuba was reorganized and installed as a United States judicial authority.




CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.


DEC.   3. John McCullagh, ex-Superintendent of Police of New York,
was commissioned to reorganize the police force of Havana.
6. The chief differences in the Peace Commission adjusted; treaty
to be signed in a few days.
7. Hawaiian Commissioners' report sent to Congress.
9. Assistant Secretary Vanderlip reported that the customs collections in Porto Rico aggregated more than $ioo00,000ooo since
American occupation.
*l  io. Treaty of Peace signed by the Peace Commissioners in Paris.
i i. Major-General Lee left Savannah on the transport Panama for
Havana.
Red Cross steamer Comal sailed for Havana with 1,250,000
rations for starving Cubans.
General Calixto Garcia, Cuban patriot, died in Washington.
General John R. Brooke appointed Military Governor of Cuba.
"  12. General Wm. Ludlow appointed Military Governor of the city
of Havana.
13. Brooklyn, Texas, Castine and Resolute ordered to Havana.
17. Battleships Oregon and Iowa arrived at Valparaiso, Chili, on
their way to the Pacific.
1899.
JAN.    i. Formal transfer by Spain to the United States of the sovereignty of Cuba.
x 6. President appointed commission of five to study commercial and
social problems of the Philippines.
FEB.   6. Treaty of Peace ratified by the United States Senate. Yeas, 57;
nays, 27.
I 5. Anniversary of destruction of battleship Maine. Appropriate
exercises held at Havana.
20. Bill appropriating $20,000,000 for payment to Spain under the
provisions of the treaty of peace, passed by the House of
Representatives.
24. Triumphal entry into Havana of General Gomez and 500 of his
troops.
MAR.    i. Bill making Rear-Admiral Dewey an Admiral passed by the
Senate.
"    6. United States Commission to the Philippines arrived at Manila.
"    17. Treaty of Peace signed by the Queen Regent of Spain.
Apr. ii. Exchange of treaties of peace at Washington between Secretary
of State Hay and M. Cambon, French Ambassador who
acted for Spain.


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