E I,,
I?,
".MzC?,rI~




UaMws


qrtte.tinuenietis












ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
DURING THE
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR




^>^~~~~~~~~~~~~~-a
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK  BOSTON * CHICAGO * DALLAS
ATLANTA * SAN FRANCISCO
MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED
LONDON * BOMBAY * CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO




Anglo-American Relations
DURING THE
Spanish-American War
BY
BERTHA ANN REUTER, PH.D.
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR IN WESLEYAN COLLEGE, GEORGIA


jTeSt pAork
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1924


All rights reserved




r;
-a -e
A:j
RA7
4. ---1  ~  1
n,/ / 7


COPYRIGHT, 1924,
BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.
Set up and printed.
Published May, 1924.


Printed in the United States of America by
J. J. LITTLE AND IVES COMPANY, NEW YORK




INSCRIBED WITH LOVE AND REVERENCE
TO THE MEMORY OF
MY FATHER AND MOTHER




I




PRLECFACE
THIS manuscript was begun early in the falof 1921
as a study in the diplomatic relations existing between
the United States and Great Britain during the
Spanish-American War. It was soon discovered that
official negotiations of the two countries could only be
understood when they were considered in connection
with the record of contemporary public opinion. Consequently the plan was altered and enlarged for the
purpose of coordinating -,the study of governmental
documents with a critical review of the periodical
literature and other source material that might serve
to show the interplay between governmental action
and public opinion.
The writer wishes to acknowledge grateful appreciation for the many courtesies extended her during
the preparation of the study. Sincere thanks are due
to Professor B. F. Shambaugh for the privileges
granted in the library of the State Historical Society
of Iowa and to the officials and attendants of the Chicago Public Library, Newberry Library at Chicago,
the Company Library at Philadelphia and the Library
of Congress at Washington. In the latter institution
Dr. Charles Moore of the Manuscript Division rendered valuable assistance in securing a number of very
helpful interviews and much unpublished material.
She is grateful to Professor H. G. Plum of the State
Vii




viii               PREFACE
University of Iowa whose kindly suggestions have
been a source of much encouragement. Especially
is she indebted to Professor A. M. Schlesinger, also of
the State University of Iowa, whose critical comments
and careful advice have been of inestimable value
both in the search for material and in the preparation
of the manuscript.




CONTENTS
CHAPTER                                     PAGE
I. ANGLO-AMERICAN BACKGROUND...             1
II. THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND....        17
III. THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897..  31
IV. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE BEGINNING OF THE
WAR WITH SPAIN...                   61
V. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE WEST.   85
VI. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE EAST.  110
VII. THE   ANGLO-AMERICAN  RAPPROCHEMENT-A
CONCLUSION.....              150
BIBLIOGRAPHY.... 191
INDEX............ 205








ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
DURING THE
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR








Anglo-American Relations
During the Spanish-American War
CHAPTER I
ANGLO-AMERICAN BACKGROUND
A prejudice or opinion when cherished by a people
through several generations becomes embedded in common belief. The latter stage having once been reached,
the feeling or judgment of the people is no longer susceptible to calm reason or sane argument. Such was
the force of the anti-British feeling held by a great
many Americans at the beginning of the last decade of
the nineteenth century. It was an hostility rooted in
colonial history and handed down by successive generations, each one finding some new grievance to add.'
An analysis of those factors which tended to hold the
1A number of general discussions of the attitude of the American
people toward Great Britain are of particular interest: Adams,
George Burton, Why Americans Dislike England (Philadelphia,
1896); Wister, Owen, A Straight Deal or the Ancient Grudge (New
York, 1920); Dos Passos, John R., The Anglo-Saxorn Century (New
York and London, 1903); Gardiner, A. G., The Anglo-American
Future (New York, 1921); Hale, S. Reynolds, A Little Tour in
America (London, 1895).




2      ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
United States and Great Britain apart is essential in
order to appreciate the force of their friendship engendered in the nineties and brought to fruition by the
Spanish-American war.
The beginning of this anti-British antipathy is found
in the inherent character of the early colonial settlers
who, to a very marked degree, were composed of people
too radical either in religion or politics or both to live
peaceably in their original home. This characteristic
of temperament, added to the facts that the colonists
possessed almost exclusive control both in their local
government and religion and that they were three
thousand miles distant from the homeland, created an
intense feeling of colonial authority and self-sufficiency. The result was the development of a new
theory of colonial rights and privileges which led the
colonists eventually into the Revolution. Great Britain
thus became recognized by the Americans not as the
most lenient and beneficent colonizing nation of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but as a tyrant
and an oppressor of subject states. This interpretation,
due to the force of tradition and faulty methods of instruction, has tended to continue among the mass of
the American people ever since.
With the establishment of peace in 1783 the Americans found that their relations to their former mother
country had changed in a significant, and not altogether favourable way. The same war which had
brought them independence had also deprived them of
the special rights and privileges of trade which they
had enjoyed as members of the British empire. Besides this, the British still held the western forts; ru



ANGLO-AMERICAN BACKGROUND


3


mours that Great Britain was about to turn loose upon
the West the horrors of Indian warfare persisted; and
Jay's treaty, negotiated somewhat later in an effort to
solve these difficulties, aroused an outburst of indignation. Finally, the British misuse of the right of search,
together with the commercial difficulties incident to the
Napoleonic wars, led the United States into a second
war with England.
An unpopular and indecisive war followed. After
peace was restored the Americans rapidly developed an
air of buoyancy and self-confidence which was often
interpreted as youthful insolence. At heart, however,
many of them were anxious for British praise and acceptance of all that they did. As a result all adverse
criticism was repeated and remembered while all comments of praise were accepted as a matter of course
and forgot. Unfortunately, as time passed, British
writers hurled upon the Americans criticism after
criticism which contained just enough of unpleasant
truth to make them exceedingly exasperating and unfair. Many, if not most, of the Americans were described as being lawless, ignorant, crude, and rude.
Their newspapers were pronounced unreadable and
their press reporters overzealous while travel was slow
and full of discomfort. Their social activities were
boorish, their travelling manners were abominable
they talked loudly, spat frequently and vigorously, and
behaved ostentatiously. Actually, America was a frontier country with its usual mixture of good and bad,
desirable and undesirable, refinement and crudity. A
traveller saw whatever he might look for, and a few
British stirred up an American antagonism which one




4       ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
hundred years of peace have since failed to eliminate
entirely.2
During Jefferson's presidency the United States
began a policy of active continental expansion in which
Great Britain held an interest scarcely secondary to
that of the United States. British supremacy in Europe was dependent, in part, upon the restrictions of
continental colonial and commercial expansion in the
New World. The revolt of the Spanish colonies in
South America combined with the threatened interference of the monarchial powers of Europe in behalf
of Spain aroused the apprehension of both the United
States and Great Britain. Consequently, in 1823,
George Canning, British minister for foreign affairs,
suggested to Richard Rush, the American minister to
Great Britain, the expediency of an understanding between the United States and Great Britain on the question of the Spanish colonies. Such a policy of joint
action was inconsistent with the isolated position previously maintained by the United States and with her
own national welfare. As a result the United States
acted upon her own initiative and proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine which did not limit British trade expansion but which did restrict European colonial
expansion.
From such a background of Anglo-American discords
a series of situations developed which constantly added
fuel to Anglo-American hostility for over fifty years.
2 Dickens, Charles, American Notes (London, 1843); Trollope,
Frances, Domestic Manners of the Americans (London, 1828); Seybert, Adam, Statistical Annals of the United States (Philadelphia,
1818).




ANGLO-AMERICAN BACKGROUND


5


In the first place, the Monroe Doctrine unmistakably
made the two states rivals rather than joint actors in
the struggle for control of affairs in the Western Hemisphere.3  In the next place, because of this rivalry,
conflicts of interest incident to the development of
Canada, to the promotion of trade, and to relations
with the British West Indies, constantly occurred.
With the outbreak of the Civil War, the states of
the Union found several reasons for additional hostility toward Great Britain. Some members of the
British upper classes, together with the cotton manufacturers, expressed open sympathy for the South.
This friendship was due to a number of causes. To
begin with, British industry was involved. Great
Britain required a constant and regular supply of cotton. Much of this was purchased from the South and
any war would be sure to interrupt cotton shipments.
Besides this, the South preferred free trade. Furthermore, the South had always been more closely related
to the British in temperament, in religion, in education, and in ideals than had the North.4 Immediately
upon the outbreak of the war a few Englishmen began
to compare! the causes of the Civil War as they were
enunciated by the South with the causes of the Revolution as they had been advanced by the colonists.
The colonists had asserted that government was just
only when sanctioned by those governed-. Since the
South did not sanction the federal government then
8Dunning, William Archibald, The British Empire and the United
States (New York, 1914), p. 55.
4 Cf. Pierce, Edward Lille, Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner
(Boston, 1877-1893), Vol. VI, p. 159.




6       ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
certainly it had as much right as did the thirteen
colonies to set up an independent state. If this were
true, then Lincoln was obviously a second George III.5
In May, 1861, the Queen issued a proclamation of
neutrality. To the North, which considered the war
purely a domestic question and looked upon the Confederacy as an organization of rioters and traitors,
the British proclamation seemed hasty, if not hostile.6
In November of the same year another grievance arose
when Captain Charles Wilkes stopped the Trent, a
British mail steamer, and seized Messrs. James Murray Mason and John Slidell, Confederate commissioners, as prisoners. Immediately British opposition
assumed a serious aspect and Lord Palmerston, the
British premier, and Lord John Russell, secretary for
foreign affairs, demanded the release of the men.7
Scarcely was the Trent affair closed when another
difficulty arose between the two countries. In 1862,
the Florida, a Confederate cruiser built in Liverpool,
sailed for the Bahamas. Later in the same year, in
spite of the efforts of Charles Francis Adams, the
American minister at London, the Alabama, a second
destroyer, sailed from the same port for the Azores.
By 1863, due to the more stringent neutrality of the
Palmerston government and to the persistent efforts
of Mr. Adams, three other destroyers, then being constructed under the same conditions as the Alabama
and the Florida, were prevented from leaving Liver'Dunning, op. cit., pp. 200-203.
'Moore, John Bassett, A Digest of International Law (Washington, 1906), Vol. VI, p. 6.
'Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 768-779.




ANGLO-AMERICAN BACKGROUND


7


pool. Aggressive agitation over these violations of
neutrality continued until 1871 when Great Britain
accepted the Geneva award.
Unfortunately, a number of factors served to minimize the propitiation of this compromise in the eyes
of both the Americans and the British. Canada was
seething with unrest, and revolt seemed possible. The
United States recognized this and felt that Great
Britain's acquiescence in the Geneva decision was due
to fear of American intervention in Canada. Furthermore, J. C. Bancroft Davis, who represented the
United States in the Geneva Conference, had demanded remuneration not only for direct losses but
for indirect losses, due to the exclusion of American
shipping from the seas and for the general expense
of maintaining the war after July, 1863. His failure
to secure these sweeping demands only served to arouse
further American hostility against Great Britain.
Another source of American prejudice was to be
found in the anti-British agitation stirred up by Irish
immigrants and Irish-American citizens. Mr. Alexander Mackay who visited the United States as early
as 1846 said: "In the Irish population of the United
States is the true source of the enmity towards this
country which is sometimes exhibited. Originating
among these, unscrupulous politicians fan the flame
to serve their own purposes..  8 In 1865, Great
Britain began to combat actively the Fenian agitations in Ireland; and with the suspension of the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1866, large numbers of Irish
8 Mackay, Alexander, The Western World (Philadelphia, 1849),
Vol. II, p. 294.




8       ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
fled to the United States. Gradually a Fenian army
numbering in all about twelve hundred was recruited
from among the Irish immigrants and restless demobilized Irish-American Civil War veterans for the purpose of invading Canada. The invasion was checked
by prompt action on the part of the American government but not before actual depredations had been
committed or the agitation had stirred up much bad
feeling both in the United States and Great Britain.
After 1867, Irish agitators in America devoted their
energies persistently toward the prosecution of the
Irish cause. New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago,
and St. Louis fell under their domination and became
centres of propaganda. Their offices were filled with
Irish incumbents and their taxes became the prey of
Irish graft. A number of other cities of lesser importance fell equally under their influence. So far as
state elections were concerned, it is impossible to determine the extent of Irish influence. It is safe to
say, however, that in a number of cases senators and
congressmen, angling for Irish-American votes, were
elected who used their offices very largely as a means
of promoting Irish politics. Irish influence in national
elections is even more difficult to estimate. But again
it seems safe to say that while they may not have been
directly responsible for controlling a considerable number of votes, Irish enthusiasm for political expression
undoubtedly gave them an influence out of proportion with their actual number.9 Besides this, tens of
9Consult the following party platforms for references to the Irish
question: Democrat, 1868, 1876, 1884, 1888, 1892; Republican, 1868,
1872, 1876, 1884, 1892.




ANGLO-AMERICAN BACKGROUND


9


thousands of dollars were raised throughout the United
States, both for the support of suffering Irish in Ireland and for the prosecution of Irish propaganda and
home rule.'0
Another important though somewhat intangible
cause of Anglo-American antagonism was to be found
in certain common racial characteristics. As members
of the same family are prone to criticize each other
most sharply, so were the British and Americans, once
members of the same empire. American sensitiveness
on the one hand felt and resented English criticism
keenly. English travelers in the United States, accustomed to English ways and conveniences, resented
their absence in the United States and refused to adapt
themselves to the strange surroundings. On their return home they forgot to be charitable in their descriptions. The gentle old English lady of long
10 O'Brien, R. B., Life of Charles Stewart Parnell, 1846-1891 (New
York, 1898), passim; Congression Record, 48th Congress, 2d session,
Vol. XVI, pp. 983, 997, 1000, 1007, 3755, 4073; ibid., 51st Congress,
1st session, Vol. XXI, p. 10397; Foreign Relations, 1884, p. 216;
ibid., 1885, p. 445; ibid., 1887, pp. 520-521, 539-540; Merwin, Henry
Charles, "The Irish in American Life," Atlantic Monthly, Vol.
LXXVII (March, 1896), pp. 289-301; Russell, T. W., "American
Side-Lights on Home Rule," Fortnightly Review, Vol. LIX (March,
1893), pp. 340-351; Lowell, A. Lawrence, "Irish Agitation in
America," Forum, Vol. IV (December, 1887), pp. 397-407; Matthews, Byron C., "A Study in Nativities," ibid., Vol. XXVI (January, 1899), pp. 621-628; O'Shea, John J., "Irish Leaven in American
Progress," ibid., Vol. XXVII (May, 1899), pp. 285-296; Bocock,
John Paul, "The Irish Conquest of Our Cities," Forum, Vol. XVII
(April, 1894), pp. 186-195; "The Extradition of Dynamite Criminals," North American Review, Vol. CXLI (July, 1885), pp. 47-60;
"The Irish in America," Westminster Review, Vol. CXXIX (June,
1888), pp. 713-732; New York Nation, March 20, 1884, January 29,
1885.




10     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
generations of aristocratic training resented keenly the
kind but crude courtesy which prompted the railway
conductor to call her "Grandma" as he gave her the
most gracious assistance possible.
As better traveling facilities developed and wealth
increased, large numbers of Americans flocked to
England. Many of them were socially untrained people who had recently acquired financial independence
and were in no way representative of American culture. British magazines and newspapers ridiculed
these people in cartoon and description. British critics
constantly revealed the superiority which they felt;
they denied a common civilization, yet resented whatever in America differed from that in Great Britain.
Thus a common language had its objection for it enabled the people of the two countries to learn all the
petty comments made by the other. All this antiBritish criticism found its way into the American educational system. Particularly was this true in the
study of history where writers have too often seen fit
both to interpret unfairly from the American point
of view and to magnify all American accomplishments
in order to instill lessons of national pride and patriotism. "Writers of school histories have thought it
necessary to provide strong food for little minds. Entirely out of focus are the trifling details that the
colonists were English; that they had the freest selfgovernment then known to mankind; that at least a
third of the people in the colonies were opposed to
independence; that no taxes were ever laid on the
colonies for the support of the government or military
authorities outside of America; and that a strong




ANGLO-AMERICAN BACKGROUND


11


minority in England were opposed to the war
[Revolution]." 11
Strong as was the centrifugal force that had been
operating for over a century between Great Britain
and the United States, it was opposed and gradually
counteracted by a centripetal force ever more powerful. In the first place most of the colonists were
Anglo-Saxons. To them Great Britain was home.
Their self-imposed exile only intensified their feeling
of kinship. Just as the individual, deprived of his own
home through his own actions, often appreciates for
the first time the real significance of that home, so the
colonists, frequently critical and hostile toward Great
Britain, often maintained within their inner consciousness a profound feeling of kinship.
Sharing the same language, the English literature
with its wealth of tradition and history became also
the possession of the colonists. It was, indeed, the
primal and fundamental bond existing between them.
The King James Bible, Cranmer's Book of Common
Prayer, Foxe's Lives of the Martyrs, and the old
English hymns, together with Milton's Paradise Lost
and Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress were the treasured
and essential volumes in every American library. In
fact, it was not until nearly a quarter of the nineteenth
century had passed that there can be said that an
American literature existed.
' Hart, Albert Bushnell, Preface to Documents 39-49, Association
for International Conciliation, American Branch (Washington, 1897);
Cf. Hart, A. B., School Books and International Prejudices, American Association for International Conciliation (New York, 1911);
Altschul, Charles, The American Revolution in Our Textbooks
(New York, 1917).




12     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
During the colonial period and the early part of the
nineteenth century, cultured Americans, particularly
those of the South, went to England for a portion of
their education. The training received during their
years abroad, combined with a common racial inheritance and literature, led to a community of thought
which served to unite the people of the two countries
in a fixed friendship. It is true that it was a onesided relationship in the beginning, for Great Britain
received American ideas with reluctance, but as time
passed a common philosophy, ethics, and political
theory served not only to reveal mutual interests and
sympathies but an actual unity of fundamental principles and ideals. For example: the Puritan Sunday
of Cromwell became the Puritan Sunday of Increase
and Cotton Mather; the faith of the Wesleys and
George Whitefield became the faith of the Methodists
in America; the attitude of the Baptists toward the
state in England became the attitude of the Baptists
toward the state in Rhode Island. British common
law became the basis of American common law; Sir
William Blackstone became the foremost authority for
American jurists; Jeremy Bentham and the English
Utilitarians became the exponents of American social
legislation; while the great British reform bills of the
nineteenth century contained little that had not found
previous expression in the United States.
A common legal and constitutional theory has probably been one of the leading factors in promoting
Anglo-American friendship. Edmund Burke, in a
speech delivered before the House of Commons in
1775, asserted that nearly as many copies of Black



ANGLO-AMERICAN BACKGROUND


13


stone's Comrmentaries had been sold in the colonies
as in England. For over a hundred years it was considered the foundation of all legal education in America. A British magazine put it thus: that the courts
of Michigan are more Anglo-Saxon than those of Edinburgh.12  Specific differences there were but the underlying principles and ideals were usually identical.
In the determination of the status of the IrishAmerican, common legal theories have always been
utilized to maintain peace. In 1866, the Fenians
planned to send an expedition composed of IrishAmericans, Civil War veterans and Irish immigrants
from New York against Canada. A proclamation of
neutrality was immediately issued by the President
warning all citizens against the violation of the laws
of neutrality and exhorting the United States officials
to employ all their lawful authority to defeat the expedition and to bring to justice all persons engaged
therein.'3 This declaration was in entire harmony
with the previous American demand, fully complied
with by Great Britain, that Canada should not in any
way be used by the Confederates as a base of their
military operations.- Again in 1866 naturalized IrishAmericans when arrested while traveling or sojourning
in Ireland upon complaints of complicity in seditious
proceedings began to demand protection accorded by
their American citizenship. Mr. Charles Francis
'a"Are the Americans Anglo-Saxons?" Spectator, July 30, 1898.
"Public Laws of the United States, 39th Congress, 1st session,
Appendix p. iii. This proclamation was embodied in the form of a
House Bill and passed in the House with a large majority. Cf.
Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st session (July 26, 1866), p.
4193.




14        ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Adams, minister to Great Britain, read to the Earl of
Clarendon a confidential dispatch from William Henry
Seward, secretary of state, which has served as a solution of that question ever since. Mr. Seward declared
that Americans "whether native born or naturalized
owe submission to the same laws in Great Britain as
British subjects while residing there and enjoying the
protection of the British government..J' 14
For a period of nearly fifty years American theories
of democracy had served as a source of irritation between the two countries but in 1830 the Whigs, under
the leadership of Earl Grey, as prime minister, came
into power with a policy of internal reform. With the
adoption of the Reform bill of 1832 Great Britain entered upon an era of democratic development that was
to continue throughout the century.'5 One event after
another occurred to shorten the distance between the
two political systems."' During the Civil War when
' Flower, B. O., "Federation of the Anglo-Saxon Races," Arena,
Vol. XX (August, 1898), pp. 223-238; Cf. Gladden, Washington,
"Are the Americans Anglo-Saxons?" Spectator, July 30, 1898.
'In 1835 De Tocqueville's [Alexis Charles Henri Clerel] volume,
De La Democratie En Amerique, was published. The same year
the author visited England, where the Whigs gave him a most
enthusiastic welcome. During that visit De Tocqueville, who was
a student of American democratic principles, gave them their first
unbiased and scholarly interpretation in England. Fortunately
Richard Cobden's pamphlet England, Ireland and America appeared
contemporaneously with the former great study. As a member of
the Manchester school American democratic principles not only
found considerable favour with him but he announced for the
first time that Great Britain's chief interest lay in the promotion
of her economic welfare through the development of Anglo-American
trade.
" Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, pp. 68-87.




ANGLO-AMERICAN BACKGROUND


15


William E. Gladstone and Lord Palmerston spoke for
the upper middle classes and the titled aristocracy, and
John Bright and Richard Cobden spoke for the lower
middle and working classes, the friendship of the latter with the North and the former with the South
represented alliances between people of common political ideals in both cases.
The victory of the federal government in the United
States and the Liberals in Great Britain represented a
common victory for democracy. "As a matter of fact,
a fundamental influence in fixing the sympathies of the
Britons was the more or less unconscious perception of
a relation between the American problem and their
own. The liberalizing and democratizing spirit was
disintegrating both the old political parties. Those
who welcomed this spirit longed for the preservation
intact of the American union as the model of a great
and prosperous democracy. Those who dreaded the
approach of democracy were quick to see in the American war a proof of its weakness and futility." 17
With the great English middle class in control of
British politics, as it was after the great reform bills
of 1867 and 1885 were passed, the two countries drew
rapidly together as a result of their common democratic
ideals. Speaking of this latter-day British regard for
American democracy, Mr. James Bryce said, "Rather
than being dreaded as a fountain of democratic propaganda, America is looked upon as the champion of
1 Ibid., pp. 228-229; Cf. Schurz, Carl, "The Anglo-American
Friendship," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXXXII (October, 1898), pp.
433-440.




16     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
popular government against the great military monarchies of continental Europe." 18
Other characteristics much more intangible than
those thus far mentioned but which contributed greatly
to draw the British and Americans together include
common moral and social ideals, and a profound respect for the family and the home based largely on
the influence of the mother. These led to free intermarriage with little or no question of social differences.
Thus it was that, in spite of frequent and bitter differences, a number of fundamental forces were operating
to bring the two countries together. Common theories
of law, government, and social order were being rapidly
revealed.  Great Britain was accepting American
theories of democracy. The United States, having successfully passed through the formative period of democratic political organization, was accepting British
theories of ordered administrative development. New
ties of kinship, mutual regard, and national interest
were displacing old ideas of suspicion and selfish
competition.
' Bryce, James, "The Essential Unity of Britain and America,"
Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXXXII (July, 1898), pp. 22-29.




CHAPTER II


TmH INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND
By 1890 it was apparent to thoughtful students of
world politics that the next decade would bring a complete readjustment of international relations. One
cycle of events was drawing to a close; another, having already assumed definite form, was ready to emerge
into a tangible and concrete existence. The new imperialism which had been developing since the FrancoPrussian War had assumed important aspects and proportions. Old international alliances were outgrown
and new ones were in process of formation.
In 1887, the Triple Alliance, composed of Germany,
Austria, and Italy, had been renewed. Three years
later the Russo-German Convention and the Three
Emperors' League was abandoned. The significance
of these two events was fourfold. It marked a victory of the north German merchants over the conservative national policy of Bismarck.  It freed
Germany from the possibility of being dragged into
the Russo-British quarrels in Europe and Asia. It
left her in position to make the most of the situation
should she be dragged into the Russo-Austrian quarrels in the Balkans. It left the Triple Alliance as the
only active European alliance while the other three
great states, Great Britain, France, and Russia, stood
isolated.
17




18   ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


Gradually Russia discovered that her natural hostility toward Germany made closer relations with
France advisable. This induced her to borrow vast
sums of money from France for the promotion of internal improvement and industry. At the same time
Russia kept a constructive foreign policy in mind. She
would block German expansion on the west, British
expansion in the Near East, and both German and
British expansion in China. In France the dominating policy was anti-Germanic. France had neither
forgot nor forgiven the Franco-Prussian peace settlement, but so long as Bismarck had been in power
his pro-Russian policy had prevented the consummation of an alliance between France and Russia which
their common interests required. In 1891, the French
fleet landed at Cronstadt. The Marseillaise was
played at the Tsar's request while he stood at respectful attention. In 1893, the Tsar returned the visit
by calling at Toulon. The two rulers exchanged complimentary telegrams and the Tsar made allusion to
the bonds that united the two countries. Thus was
laid the basis of a Franco-Russian alliance, the protocol of which was actually signed in 1891. The military agreement followed in 1894.
So far as Italy was concerned, the Triple Alliance
had been signed for protection only. She feared both
the French policy of expansion in Africa and the
Austro-Hungarian occupation of Trieste and Trent.
Furthermore, in the Adriatic region, there were still
a number of Italian communities not yet incorporated
into the Italian state which were being closely watched
by the dual monarchy. Finally, Italy feared European




THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND             19
intervention in behalf of the papacy. In 1882, the
friendly overtures of Bismarck, together with the
French imperial policy, had driven Italy into the German alliance. Just how strong this alliance was when
it was renewed in 1887 it is difficult to say. Soon
after 1890, however, it began to be evident that Italy
was not wholly comfortable in her European alliance.
She had begun to transfer her fear from France to
Austria, her natural enemy in the Adriatic, and her
confidence from Germany to Great Britain.
Great Britain, in the meantime, stood as she had
been since the Crimean War, alone in her "splendid
isolation." In 1895, the Conservative party, led by
the Marquis of Salisbury and supported by Joseph
Chamberlain, came into power with a new policy of
colonial expansion and imperial solidarity. This policy, if adopted, would serve to destroy the existing
balance of power as well as Great Britain's scheme of
isolation. A program of aggressive colonial expansion
would bring her immediately into direct conflict with
the dominating member of each of the European alliances. Great Britain would thus be forced to prepare
to meet the possibility of a combined alliance of the
two groups of powers or else to forsake the policy of
expansion as advocated by the Salisbury administration. The latter neither political party was willing to
do for, strange to say, while the Conservative party
had initiated the new policy, the Liberal party was
fully committed to it; and, backed by a strong newspaper sentiment, and a powerful minority in the House
of Commons, censured severely what they considered
the dilatory or feeble policy of the Conservatives.




20     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Thus the Liberal leaders of the Opposition were in full
harmony with the foreign policy of the Conservatives,
but, due to their failure to understand the danger of
Great Britain's isolation, they urged prompt and decisive action.
On the other hand, the Conservatives, due to the
diplomatic foresight and influence of Mr. Joseph
Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury, appreciated the danger which Great Britain, without allies, or without
assured colonial support, was facing in territorial and
commercial expansion in Africa and in the East; and
they were doing their utmost to block any possible
union between the two military alliances of the continent. Especially helpful for their purpose were the
intense Franco-German hatred and the friendship of
Theophile Delcasse of the French colonial office, 1893 -1898, for Great Britain. But for all immediate or
practical purposes Great Britain stood isolated, facing
the possibility of an attack by each of the two alliances. Should she have been forced into such a war
under existing conditions, she would have, in all probability, been seriously defeated. It was this perilous
isolation which the Salisbury ministry faced and understood and which the Opposition failed to appreciate- an isolation whose significance was stated
openly and frankly on May 13, 1898, by Joseph
Chamberlain in an address to his constituency at
Birmingham.
This address set forth three fundamental propositions: first, that Great Britain had maintained a
policy of strict isolation since the Crimean War, but
now a new situation had arisen and she was liable to




THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND 21
be confronted at any moment with a combination of
the Great Powers; second, that it was her first duty
to draw all parts of her empire closer together and to
infuse into them a spirit of united and imperial patriotism; third, that it was her next duty to establish
and maintain bonds of permanent amity with her
kinsmen across the Atlantic.' If this scheme could
have been executed and a definite alliance been formed
between the British Empire and the United States it
would have given to the English speaking countries
the balance of world power, and, at the same time, it
might have nullified the two European alliances and
restricted the German and Russian policies of colonial
and commercial expansion.,While the two great European alliances were assuming definite organization, a new power appeared
in international politics. By 1890 the United States,
a western nation hitherto unrecognized as a force in
world politics, had come to be openly involved in the
Far East. This situation which had been developing
for a century had come about so gradually and so naturally that the majority of the people of the nation
were generally unaware of either its growth or its existence. It had come as the normal result of the expansion of its industry and commerce. There were
four different spheres around which this trade had developed: the Hawaiian Islands which were in the path
of trade between the United States and China; Japan
which was both an objective in itself and in direct line
with China; and Samoa which was in the path of trade
both between the United States and Australia, and
'London Times, May 14, 1898.




22   ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


Panama and Australia. The fourth sphere included
a group of guano islands scattered far and wide
throughout the Pacific.
As early as 1800, Honolulu had become a base for
fur traders operating between the Pacific Northwest,
China, and the New England states. By 1820 American missionaries had entered the Hawaiian islands,
and in September of the same year John C. Jones was
appointed to reside there as the agent of the United
States for commerce and seamen. As early as 1842,
Daniel Webster pointed out the commercial significance
of Hawaii to the United States when he said that since
most of the vessels which visit the islands belong to
the United States, she was therefore more interested
in their fate and government than any other nation
could be. This consideration led the president to declare that the integrity and sovereignty of their government should be maintained.2 From this time on
the question of Hawaiian annexation remained before
the American people. In January, 1893, a revolution
broke out in Honolulu. The abdication of the Queen
was secured and a provisional government was set up
which continued until annexation with the United
States was complete. On February 15, President Harrison submitted such a treaty to the Senate. Two
sentences of the accompanying message indicated the
attitude of the administration toward expansion. "It
is essential that none of the other great powers shall
secure these islands. Such a possession would not consist with our safety and with the peace of the world." 3
2 Moore, Internatioual Law Digest, Vol. I, pp. 476, 482.
'Ibid., p. 497.




THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND 23
With the return of the Democratic party to power the
treaty of annexation was withdrawn from the Senate
by President Cleveland. In the next few years American
commercial interests in the Orient developed rapidly.
This, together with the outbreak of the SpanishAmerican War, indicated the imperative necessity of
annexation which was finally effected in July, 1898.
Japan, the second centre of American activities, was
developed largely through the influence of a few
traders and statesmen who saw the necessity for
prompt action if American prestige was to be maintained in the East. In 1832, Edmund Roberts was
sent by President Jackson to investigate commercial
possibilities in the Indian Ocean. He was instructed
to obtain information respecting Japan, the means of
beginning communication with it, and the value of
its trade with the Dutch and Chinese. In 1846, Commodore James Biddle was sent to open Japan to
American trade and failed. A second expedition sent
out five years later under Commodore Matthew C.
Perry was successful. The Townsend Harris treaty
of commerce and navigation, drawn up soon after this,
1858, in an effort to forestall European action, indicated the future attitude of the United States toward
trade in the Far East.4
As early as 1853, if not earlier, the United States
was represented by a commercial agent at Apia in
the Samoan islands. The following year a consul was
provided. In 1872, Commander Richard W. Meade
entered into an agreement with Chief Maunga of the
Bay of Pagopago in the island of Tutuila which pro4 Compilation of Treaties in Force (Washington, 1899), pp. 327-332.




24     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
vided for the establishment in that harbour of a naval
station for the use and convenience of the vessels of
the United States. About this time traders began to
urge the growing importance of the Samoan trade
with the result that in 1873 the United States government sent a special agent there for investigation.
From then on trouble between the nations interested
in Samoan trade, Great Britain, Germany, and the
United States, grew in proportion to the determination
of each to increase her trade. After 1884 German
statesmen undertook a systematic policy of expansion
in the islands. The United States and Great Britain,
previously in control of the Samoan trade, objected
strenuously. By the close of the decade, American
popular interest had reached such a pitch that American warships were sent to defend her trade. With
American, British, and German warships gathered
there, each nation determined upon the protection of
commercial interests, trouble seemed inevitable. Fortunately, a hurricane swept the island at an opportune moment. The good feeling engendered as a
result of the sincere cooperation extended in the work
of rescue led to the compromise of 1889 in which
the three nations agreed to a policy of joint control.
The real significance of the episode lay in its prophetic
nature. Germany had contended vigorously for foreign monopoly of the trade of the islands. The United
States had contended with equal force for open trade
under native control, protected, if need be, by American guarantee. This policy of joint control existed
until 1900 when the islands were divided between
the United States and Germany.




THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND            25
By 1856 the guano industry in the Pacific had
become of sufficient importance to warrant legislative
administration and control. It was accordingly enacted that territory yielding guano, discovered by
citizens of the United States and not in the possession
of subjects of any other country, might, at the discretion of the President, be considered as belonging to the United States. Further legislation guaranteed rights of inheritance, established the price of
guano, extended the laws of high seas over the islands,
and finally authorized their protection by the use of
naval and land forces. During the decade of the
eighties the United States had appropriated and extended temporary control over no less than fifty guano
islands.5
By about 1890, therefore, there had developed in
the Pacific a new maritime area of international commercial activity destined to be the scene of an intense struggle for trade and colonial expansion in
the coming era. This field was to hold in the closing
years of the nineteenth century the same significance
as had the North Atlantic a little more than a century
earlier.
Six nations were to operate in this field: France
which was pledged to avenge her defeat of the FrancoPrussian War; Italy which aspired to the rank of one
of the great nations in Europe; Russia which had
entered upon a new program of expansion in northern
Asia and the Near East; Germany which had just
inaugurated a new policy of commercial expansion
and colonial conquest in the Near East, Asia, Africa
'Moore, op. cit., pp. 565-580.




26     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
and Oceanica; Great Britain whose naval supremacy
had remained unchallenged for a century and which
sought to dominate the new expansion in the Orient
and the Pacific as she had the earlier expansion in
the North Atlantic; and, finally, the United States.
They represented the two great alliances of Europe
with Great Britain and the United States as isolated
powers, the very danger of whose isolation was bound,
sooner or later, to bring them into contact with each
other.
Two new policies were destined to influence commercial expansion in the new area. The United States
was responsible for both of them. Upon her entrance
into Oceanica she had carried with her the same
theories of trade that she held in the Western Hemisphere. These provided briefly that all undeveloped
areas should be subject to native control and that
the native governments should grant equal trading
opportunities to all foreign nations. In order to secure
this condition the United States had negotiated treaties
with Hawaii, Japan, and Samoa. President Tyler, in
his message of December 30, 1842, spoke concerning
Hawaii. Any attempt, he said, by any power to take
possession of the islands, colonize them, and subvert
the native government could not but create dissatisfaction on the part of the United States. The United
States seeks no peculiar advantages, no exclusive control over the Hawaiian government. Its forbearance
in this respect would justify the American government, "should events hereafter require it, in making
a decided remonstrance against the adoption of an
opposite policy by any other power." The following




THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND 27
year, 1843, Great Britain renounced a deed of cession
of the Hawaiian islands on the demand of the United
States, declaring the act entirely unauthorized by Her
Majesty's Government. A few years later these principles were incorporated in the treaty of 1849.6  The
treaty of 1858, with Japan, was equally specific. After
outlining the two principles which the United States
maintained should govern the development of new
areas, the treaty continued, "The president of the
United States, at the request of the Japanese Government, will act as friendly Mediator, in such matters of difference, as may arise between the Government of Japan and any European Power." 7       The
treaty of friendship and commerce of 1878 with Samoa
was similar in nature. "If, unhappily, any differences
should have arisen, or shall hereafter arise, between
the Samoan Government and any other government in
amity with the United States, the government of the
latter will employ its good offices for the purpose
of adjusting those differences upon a satisfactory and
solid foundation." 8 Great Britain acquiesced in the
American policy in the Pacific as she had in the Western Hemisphere. This acquiescence laid the basis, as
will be seen later, for future Anglo-American relations in the Far East.
Three causes were operating to promote intense
rivalry among the European nations who were expanding in this new sphere of commercial activity. They
'Cf. Treaty of December 20, 1849, ibid., p. 479; and ibid., passim,
pp. 476-482.
'Cf. Treaty of July 29, 1858, Compilation of Treaties in Force
(1898), pp. 327-331.
'Cf. Treaty of January 17, 1878, ibid., pp. 551-552.




28     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
were the same as those which had induced them to
enter upon a new policy of colonial aggression. New
fields of trade would give increased power. They would
likewise serve as a source of supply for raw material,
but above all, they would afford a market for manur
factured goods and a field for the investment of
capital.
The causes of American expansion were much the
same. By 1890, the frontier of the United States had
disappeared and national consciousness had begun to
find expression in international politics and commercial
enterprises. Capitalists who had formerly found a
field of investment in undeveloped home territories,
and manufacturers whose products had been consumed
in the home market now sought a foreign market. The
annexation of colonial territories and the opening of
new avenues of commercial activity were the logical
result.
The indirect causes which had led to this expansion
were likewise common. Rapid means of communication had shortened distances. Missionary zeal had
opened up vast areas hitherto little known. Scientific
progress had created scores of new wants and new commodities to supply those wants. Methods of agriculture had been improved, manufacturing and industries of all sorts were producing a surplus of goods.
In fact, with the exception of the United States, all
of the countries involved had probably outgrown the
bounds of their original territory, both in capital and
population. Either territorial expansion or national
stagnation seemed inevitable to them. The natural
result of this progress was an unprecedented increase




THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND 29
in the volume of industry and commerce, with a corresponding growth in national rivalry.
The international situation of the last decade of
the nineteenth century, therefore, can be understood
only in the light of the various conflicting movements of national expansion which found expression in
Asia, Africa, and Oceanica. In the gradual development of affairs three factors of peculiar interest to
Great Britain and the United States had assumed
significance; that by 1890 the United States was committed to a policy of aggressive commercial expansion;
that that policy must inevitably lead her into European international politics; and that the beginning of
an Anglo-American trading policy in opposition to
the current European methods of expansion had already been laid in Samoa and Hawaii.
In 1890, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan began an
active effort to draw the attention of the two great
English speaking races to this intimate association
which was slowly developing between them. In that
year he published his first great naval study, The
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. A
second study was published in 1892, The Influence of
Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire.
These were followed by a number of short articles in
prominent American magazines.9 Through them all
'Mahan, A. T., "The United States Looking Outward," Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. LXVI (December, 1890), pp. 816-824; ibid., "The
Isthmus and Sea Power," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXXII (October,
1893), pp. 459-472; ibid., "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power,"
Forum, Vol. XV (March, 1893), pp. 1-11; ibid., "Possibilities of an
Anglo-American Reunion," North American Review, Vol. CLIX
(November, 1894), pp. 551-573; ibid., "The Future in Relation to




30       ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
the author sought to convey two central ideas to the
general public: that the destiny of nations is explicable
only through a study of the potency of sea power
and that British sea power was closely related to
American progress. The extent of the influence exerted by Captain Mahan was probably very great.
Thousands of people, both British and American, began
to realize, for the first time, the close relation that
was developing between the two countries.10 It was
this relation which was destined to have a large part
in the direction and control of international politics
during the next decade.
American Naval Power," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, Vol.
XCI (October, 1895), pp. 767-775. These articles together with a
number of others were published in volume form later with the
title The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future
(Boston, 1898).
"'Cf. Taylor, C. Carlisle, Life of Admiral Mahan (New York,
1920), pp. 42-52, 61-77, 112-118.




CHAPTER III


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897
ALTHOUGH over eighty years of uninterrupted peace
had passed since the treaty of Ghent was signed, relations between the United States and Great Britain
had never become friendly. Open hostility and sincere
friendship each found expression as occasion warranted. It seemed as if only an event so important
that it threatened the welfare of both nations would
be able to remove the hostile sentiments existing between the two nations and promote a feeling of friendly
relationship. Such an event actually occurred in 1895
when the Venezuelan boundary controversy was suddenly added to the perplexing problems which Great
Britain was already facing in European politics.
In June, 1895, the Marquis of Salisbury, coalition
leader of the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists,
came into power. At the general election held one
month later his appointment was confirmed by the
return to parliament of a majority of one hundred
fifty-two of his adherents. This unequivocal victory
was largely due to the adoption of a new foreign
policy, for Great Britain was determined to restore
her former international prestige. As has already
been suggested, the Salisbury program involved the
formation of an international alliance of such strength
as would assure Great Britain the balance of world
31




32   ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


power. The natural sources for such a combination
were to be found in the loyalty of the British colonies
and in the United States.
The new Government included a group of men of
varied interests and unusual political ability. Mr.
Arthur Balfour became first lord of the treasury and
leader of the House of Commons. Sir Michael Hicks
Beach was chancellor of the exchequer; Mr. Joseph
Chamberlain, colonial secretary; and Lord Salisbury,
prime minister. So far as the United States was concerned the last two appointments were by far the
most significant. In general, those people of the
United States who know Lord Salisbury both feared
and hated him. They thought him reactionary, conservative, autocratic, and aristocratic. At the same
time, they considered him not only the greatest man
of his own party, but by far the most influential
British citizen of the time. Furthermore, as a firm
believer in an aggressive foreign policy, it was inevitable that he should influence Anglo-American
relations in the Pacific.
Mr. Chamberlain, a Liberal Unionist in politics,
was the most energetic, the most dynamic, and probably the most popular member of the cabinet. Coming
as he did from Birmingham, a manufacturing centre,
and considered the friend of all British manufacturing interests, he spoke for British trade the world over.'
As early as 1888 he had stated publicly that the future
of Great Britain was inseparably bound up with that
'Low, Sidney, and Sanders, L. C., History of England During the
Reign of Queen Victoria (William Hunt and R. L. Poole, ed., The
Political History of England. Vol. XII), (London, 1907), p. 431.




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897


33


of her colonies and the United States. With the former, he advocated a commercial union and a union
for defence; with the latter, a "durable friendship." 2
The opportunity to carry out his policy came with the
election of Lord Salisbury and the adoption of the new
British foreign policy. Mr. Chamberlain was given
what had previously been considered a relatively unimportant portfolio. His plan, however, was to make
the office of colonial secretary the pivotal position in
the promotion of the new British foreign program.
Within six months after his appointment Mr. Chamberlain was actively engaged in the prosecution of
his plans.3
The new Coalition Government was plunged immediately into foreign complications. The revival of
Armenian persecutions by the Turks brought the Near
Eastern question into prominence. It was here that
Lord Salisbury received American criticism for the first
time, since many Americans placed upon the British
full responsibility for the continuation of the Armenian
atrocities. The situation was even more serious in the
Far East. Chitral was permanently garrisoned, an
event which meant the revival of Anglo-Russian competition in Indian territory. The Chino-Japanese War
showed China to be a decadent nation; and Russia,
France, and Germany, each prepared for immediate
'Speech before the Devonshire Club, April 9, 1888, Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches, Charles W. Boyd, ed. (London, 1914), Vol. I,
318-324.
'On August 22, 1895, Mr. Chamberlain presented his first statement of his colonial policy in Parliament. Cf. The Parliamentary
Debates (Hansard's), Fourth series, Vol. XXXVI (August 22, 1895),
pp. 639-643.




34     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
aggression, began at once to seek concessions and
"spheres of influence." In Africa the British faced a
variety of problems, for the entire continent was being
opened to foreign conquest. General Charles Gordon's
death in the Sudan had not yet been avenged. French
interests were being asserted throughout the North.
German expansion was moving forward so rapidly toward the South that it threatened not only to prevent
further British expansion, but to jeopardize the British
colonies already established there.
Since Lord Salisbury proposed to prosecute an active
foreign policy, it was necessary that he should meet all
of these situations at once. But Great Britain was
without allies; and every one of the nations which
he would oppose was a member of one of the two great
European alliances. Thus, Lord Salisbury was limited
to a policy of diplomacy, for war could be justified
only upon the greatest provocation. Into this crisis
in British affairs an event of unusual significance was
now projected.
On December 29, 1895, Dr. Leander Jameson
made his famous raid into the Transvaal. This was
followed on January 3, 1896, by a friendly note from
the German foreign office to President Paul Kruger.4
A few days of frenzied activity on the part of the
British Government followed, and the "Flying Squadron" was made ready for action. War seemed almost
inevitable. Immediately promises of sympathy and
support arrived from the principal British colonies.
It had been understood for some time that Mr. Cham'Eckardstein, Baron von, Ten Years at the Court of St. James,
1895-1905 (London, 1921), pp. 82-86.




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897          35
berlain had been engaged in investigating conditions
in the colonies, and this event served as an opportunity
for him to announce both British dependence on colonial loyalty and his policy of imperial federation.
On January 21, 1896, a dinner was given in honour
of Lord Lamington, who was leaving England to assume his duties as governor of the colony of Queensland. After having spoken of the greatness of the
Australian colonies, Mr. Chamberlain called attention
to the South African affair and to the significance of
the assurances of colonial support in case of war.
Then, quoting from Tennyson, he said, "let
'Britain's myriad voices call,
"Sons, be welded each and all,
Into one Imperial whole,
One with Britain, heart and soul!
One life, one flag, one fleet, one Thronel" ' 6
Serious as the Anglo-German episode may have been
it was exceedingly opportune in that it served to
crystallize the policies of the new British Government
and to reveal to the British people the fundamental
weakness of their international position. This weakness having once been demonstrated, it became possible for Mr. Chamberlain to urge the second step
in his foreign policy-the promotion of a "durable
friendship" with the United States. His opportunity
came when the Venezuelan boundary controversy was
projected into 'the complication of British affairs in
December, 1895.
'Speech at Whitehall Rooms, London, January 21, 1896, Chamberlain, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 359-365.




36      ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
The boundary line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana had never been accurately
determined. About 1840 settlers began to enter the disputed region and the two Powers concerned became
determined to secure possession of as much territory
as possible. The controversy which resulted was not an
important one. There were no great theories of international law nor any delicate international agreements previously arranged to be disturbed, whatever
might be the result of the boundary controversy. Considered from this latter standpoint, the Anglo-German
affair in South Africa, or the protection of the Armenians was of far greater significance. A number of
events, however, had recently occurred which stimulated both American and Venezuelan interest in the
disputed area. European trade rivals, particularly
Great Britain and Germany, had begun to encourage
their trade in Venezuela." This fact led a few American merchants and consuls to investigate means of furthering American trade. In December, 1886, the
United States, for the first time, officially offered
arbitration in the boundary controversy if acceptable
to both countries concerned.7  By 1891 the United
States had definitely begun to abandon her attitude
of disinterestedness and to urge upon Great Britain
the need of arbitration. American concern in the
boundary controversy seemed to develop in proportion to the efforts of American traders to encourage
6Consular Reports, Vol. XLIV (February, 1894), p. 389; ibid., Vol.
LIV (April, 1897), p. 474; Commercial Relations of the United States
with Foreign Countries, 1894-1895, Vol. I, pp. 527, 532.
'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895 (Washington, 1896),
part 1, pp. 549-550.




PERIOD     OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897             37
American interest in Venezuela.8      In his reports for
December, 1894,9 and July, 1895,10 Mr. E. H. Plumacher, the American consul at Maracaibo, earnestly
advocated American intervention as a means of securing trade advantages. Besides this, the discovery of
gold and the realization that the Orinoco River controlled the trade of about one-fourth of the continent
encouraged a few Venezuelans to urge upon the American merchants and the American department of state
the necessity of intervention.1
Throughout the year 1895 sentiment developed
rapidly in the United States in favour of intervention.
In his second annual message of December 3, 1894,
President Cleveland suggested that he would renew
the efforts heretofore made to bring about a restoration of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and
Venezuela and to induce a reference of the question
to arbitration.12   On February 20, 1895, Congress
passed a joint resolution recommending the favourable
consideration of the President's suggestion.13 The
reasons for American intervention, as brought out dur8Consular Reports, Vol. XXVIII (December, 1888), pp. 20-22; Vol.
XXIX (April, 1899), pp. 758-762; Vol. XXXIII (August, 1890), p.
703; Vol. XXXIX (May, 1892), pp. 184-185; Commercial Relations
of the United States with Foreign Countries (Washington, 1894),
1892-1893, pp. 341-393; 1894-1895, Vol. I, pp. 525-530; 1895-1896, Vol.
I, pp. 148-149.
9 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 527-529.
10 Consular Reports, Vol. IXL (October, 1895), pp. 204-207.
Congressional Record, 53d Congress, 3d session, Vol. XXVII, part
2, p. 1833; Foreign Relations, 1895, part 1, p. 559; Consular Reports,
Vol. L (April, 1896), pp. 446-447.
'Richardson, James D., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, 1898), Vol. IX, p. 526.
13 United States Statutes at Large, Vol. XXVIII, p. 971.




38   ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


ing the debate in the House of Representatives, were
three in number: the maintenance of the Monroe
Doctrine; the protection of Venezuela in her demands
for the possession of the mouth of the Orinoco River
as essential to her commercial development; and the
promotion of American trade interests in Venezuela.14
In July, Mr. Richard Olney wrote his famous Venezuelan note to Great Britain. The controversy, he
said, was one in which both American interests and
honour are involved and the continuance of which
it cannot regard with indifference. While it was one
of the most undiplomatic notes ever drawn up by an
American secretary of state, it succeeded in calling
out an immediate statement of the British attitude
toward the new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine
as it had been presented by President Cleveland. The
note left but two possibilities open for the settlement
of the boundary dispute-war or arbitration.
Great Britain's position was precarious and her
national honour was involved. War with the United
States was an impossibility, both because of the immediate delicacy of the British international position
and because it must of necessity preclude any AngloAmerican "durable friendship" for a period of years.
On the other hand, any obvious display of hasty conciliation was liable to be interpreted, both in the
United States and in Europe, as an evidence of internal
weakness.
On November 26, 1895, Lord Salisbury sent a reply
14 Congressional Record, 53d Congress, 3d session, Vol. XXVII,
part 2 (February 6, 1895), p. 1833, part 3 (February 16, 1895), p.
2297.




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897


39%


to the Olney note. It was an example of British
diplomacy at its highest degree of efficiency. Realizing that his reply would eventually be made public,
he outlined his dispatches in such a manner that while
they met British popular demands they served both as
an answer to Mr. Olney's note and as information for
the Americans. The Monroe Doctrine, he said, while
sound in theory, was not a part of international law
and could not be interpreted as covering the determination of the frontier of a British possession. He concluded with a complete statement of the British case
in Venezuela, the first that had been given.15     On
December 17, President Cleveland sent a special message to Congress in answer to Lord Salisbury which
was hardly more tactful than Secretary Olney's note.
He asserted that American intervention in the boundary controversy was within the original scope of the
Monroe Doctrine, that the Monroe Doctrine was recognized in international law, and that Great Britain had
refused arbitration. In conclusion he asked Congress
to authorize a special commission to investigate and
ascertain the true divisional line between Venezuela
and British Guiana. "When such a report is made and
accepted it will in my opinion be the duty of the United
States to resist by every means in its power as a
willful aggression upon its rights and interests the
'Foreign Relations, 1895, part 1, pp. 563-576. A few months later
a reprint of Senate Document No. 226 was called for because there
was but one copy of it available for the use of Congress. This document was a statement of the boundary controversy from its beginning
down to July, 1888. For a copy of it see Senate Executive Documents, 50th Congress, 1st session, Vol. XI, 1887-1888 (Washington,
1888).




40      ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the
exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of
right belongs to Venezuela. In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that
may follow."'16
Whatever may have been President Cleveland's
motive in presenting such a warlike message, it had
two far-reaching results. It served as a definitive statement of his new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine,
and the danger of its threat served to call forth an
expression of Anglo-American opinion both in the
United States and in Great Britain. It became, however, a peace message, forcing the expression of mutual
good will to such an extent that it overcame the ill
will which was likewise expressed.17
On the same date, December 17, the Olney note
and Lord Salisbury's reply were given to the American
public.18 People were amazed. Many knew that
trouble had been brewing but only a few realized that
the Government was actually creating a crisis that
under ordinary circumstances would produce war. Immediately every anti-British element in the country
was turned loose. Out of this confusion there gradForeign Relations, 1895, part 1, pp. 542-545.
1 Cf. British Annual Register, 1895, part 1, new series, p. 378. This
is one of the best accounts of the reception given the message by
Congress, Wall Street, the public and the "jingoes"; Gladden, Washington, England and America (London, 1898), pp. 23-26; Public Opinion, December 26, 1895.
1 Congressional Record, 54th Congress, 1st session, Vol. XXVIII,
part 1, pp. 191-198.




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897


41


ually came the voice of deliberation. A few pleas for
justice, for delay and for British friendship were made
in Congress.19 Then came a fall in stocks and bonds.20
On December 19, a memorial was read in the Senate,
signed by three hundred fifty-four members of the
British House of Commons, advocating a treaty of
general arbitration.21 On December 20, Congress voted
to place $100,000 at the disposal of the President to
provide for the expense of a commission which should
investigate and report upon the true divisional line
between the Republic of Venezuela and British
Guiana.22   Then came the Christmas season with its
spirit of good will.   Passion was tempered by sentiment. From thousands of pulpits and scores of religious publications all over the land came indignant
denunciations of the war craze. Equally insistent was
the almost unanimous expression of the colleges and
universities.23  Influential people of both countries at
once recognized that diplomats had produced the crisis.
They demanded that the same diplomats should find
a way to save the honour of both nations by means
of peaceful negotiations.24
In Great Britain the President's message generally
"Ibid., pp. 240, 242, 244, 246, 247, 258, 260, 261.
=Ibid., p. 261.
' Ibid., p. 24.
' Statutes at Large, Vol. XXIX, p. 1.
Gladden, England and America, pp. 26-30; New York Nation,
January 2, 1896; Literary Digest, January 4, 1896; Public Opinion,
January 2, 1896.
24For the development of American opinion consult New York
Nation, December 19, 26, 1895, January 2, 9, 1896; Literary Digest,
December 21, 28, 1895, January 4, 1896; Public Opinion, December 19,
26, 1895, January 2, 9, 1896.




42      ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
brought surprise and horror. On December 24, an
appeal was issued by British authors, signed with
thirteen hundred names, urging their confreres in
America to use every possible means to avert a fratricidal war.25 During the same week a series of British
peace messages, originally sent to the New York World,
appeared in various papers throughout the United
States. Among the contributors were the Prince of
Wales and Duke of York, Cardinal Vaughn, Archbishop of London, Archbishop Walsh of Dublin, and
Mr. Henry Labouchere. Just after President Cleveland's message went to Congress, William Watson
made the great British poetic appeal:
"O towering Daughter, Titan of the West,
Behind a thousand leagues of foam secure;
Thou to whom our inmost heart is pure
Of ill intent: although thou threatenest
With most unfilial hand thy mother's breast,
Not for one breathing space may earth endure
The thought of War's intolerable cure
For such vague pains as vex to-day thy rest!
But if thou hast more strength than thou canst spend
In tasks of Peace, and find'st her yoke too tame,
Help us to smite the cruel, to befriend
The succorless, and put the false to shame
So shall the ages laud thee, and thy name
Be lovely among nations to the end." 26
Suddenly Great Britain's attention was directed
to the South African situation. On January 2, 1896,
'Public Opinion, January 2, 1896.
0 Watson, William, "England to America" in The Purple East
(London, 1896), pp. 25-26, an early copy may be found in Public
Opinion, January 9, 1896.




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897


43


the Jameson raid met with its humiliating defeat, and
on the following day the congratulatory note from the
German Emperor to the Boer President was made
public. Besides this, Great Britain was threatened
with trouble in the Far East and in Turkey.
On January 1, 1896, President Cleveland announced
the appointment of the boundary commission. The
task before the commission proved of unexpected difficulty. Early in February, Mr. Thomas Bayard,
American ambassador to Great Britain, asked Lord
Salisbury that the British facilities be placed at their
disposal.27  Strange as the request was, it was so
promptly and graciously granted that the reply served
to attract quite a little attention in the United States.28
Early in February, Parliament went into session. It
immediately recognized the seriousness of the situation
and adopted a spirit of conciliation. The Queen spoke
first in behalf of peace.29  Immediately the Opposition, led by Sir William Harcourt,30 and the Government, led by Sir Arthur Balfour,31 began to vie with
each other in offers of conciliation. Both accepted
the Monroe Doctrine; both admitted the right of
American intervention in Venezuela; both announced
their friendliness toward the American boundary commission, and both asserted their willingness to arbitrate. The climax in the discussion came when Lord
"Foreign Relations, 1895, part 1, p. 576; ibid., 1896, pp. 243-247;
British State Papers, Vol. LXXXVIII (1895-1896), p. 1242.
"Ibid., p. 1243; Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 576.
'Parliamentary Debates (Hansard's), Fourth series, Vol. XXXVII
(February 11, 1896), pp. 3-6.
" Op cit., February 11, 1896, pp. 81-105, 511-515.
"Ibid., pp. 105-118.




44   ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


Salisbury himself concurred in all that Mr. Balfour
said.82
It was inevitable that arbitration should grow out
of the American assurances of good will and the British
offers of conciliation. On February 27, 1896, the
American Government proposed to Lord Salisbury that
negotiations be begun at once at Washington in an
effort to settle the boundary controversy. The British
Government agreed and on November 12, 1896, a treaty
of arbitration was signed. The treaty for settlement
was finally signed on February 2, 1897.33  But the
fundamental result of the Venezuelan boundary controversy was not the establishment of the frontier
line of an undeveloped South American state. It was
rather the fact that the negotiations which settled
the controversy laid the basis for the future attitude
of the United States and Great Britain, not only toward each other, but toward the rest of the world. The
immediate result of the controversy was also of significance. When the British Government agreed to
enter into negotiations at Washington it thereby accepted the new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.
This meant that the British had conceded to the demands of Secretary Olney and President Cleveland
and in so doing had laid the foundation for the "durable friendship" which had been advocated by Mr.
Chamberlain.
The first test of the "durable friendship" came with
the election of 1896 and the free silver controversy.
The currency question had been before the people con"2Ibid., p. 52.
8 Foreign Relations, 1896, pp. 240-241, 247-255.




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897


45


stantly since the adoption of the Bland silver act
of 1878. In July, 1890, the Sherman silver law had
'been enacted. Three months later the McKinley
tariff act, closely associated with the silver question in
its immediate effect upon Anglo-American friendship,
was passed. Both acts endangered Anglo-American
harmony, the former because it was supported by a
constituency which was opposed to a gold standard,
the latter because it advanced tariff rates.34
Following the enactment of those measures, American financial conditions became very complicated.
Poor crops, low prices, and social and industrial unrest
increased the difficulties. New England manufacturers
and capitalists who were in constant touch with the
London money market desired the adoption of a gold
standard. With the increase in the production of
silver in the West the ratio of value between gold
and silver had been disturbed. This prompted the
silver producers to contend that a gold standard was
directly responsible for the low price of silver and
agricultural products. As a result the western silver
producers and agriculturists demanded a system of
bimetallism in which a parity should be established
between the two metals. The controversy which resulted seemed to threaten Anglo-American relations
seriously. Vast sums of British capital had been invested in the development of American industry and
millions of dollars were advanced by the Americans
in gold, or its equivalent, in payment of the interest.
This led the silver forces to direct much criticism
" Cf. Parliamentary State Papers, Vol. CV, "Currency Correspondence," Enclosure 2 in No. II; New York Times, February 18, 1897.




46     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
against Great Britain whom they considered directly
responsible for the maintenance of the gold standard
on the London exchange. On the other hand, British
and New England capitalists were of necessity greatly
concerned, since the establishment of a silver standard
in the United States would result in a decrease in the
value of their property.
At the same time Europe, like the United States,
was passing through a period of low prices, high interest rates, and industrial depression. This condition
led banks and trust companies, as well as creditor
nations, to call in gold reserves. In 1892, AustriaHungary resumed specie payment and searched the
money markets of the world for a gold redemption
fund. In the same year Russia began to hoard gold
for secret reasons, and France began to accumulate
it to promote an increased note circulation. In 1893,
due to natural financial caution and urged on by
frequent bank failures, Great Britain began to
strengthen her reserves. The result was that debtor
nations and institutions found themselves deprived
of not only all surplus gold but the necessary reserve
funds as well. The United States, which had borrowed heavily, particularly from Great Britain, during the previous years of industrial expansion, was
seriously concerned. Gold exports increased, money
rates advanced and stocks fell. Domestic financial
disorders, added to the foreign complications, produced the panic of 1893.
The apparent scarcity of gold on the market induced many Europeans to advocate bimetallism. In
1893 a momentary conference was held at Brussels




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897


47


with about twenty countries represented. Although
the silver forces were defeated, predictions indicated
that another conference would be held soon. The
silver forces in the United States had followed the
conference closely. As a result two questions arose
among them: was it advisable to wait for European
support or should they make the fight for bimetallism
alone?
This difference of opinion led to much international bitterness. Germany, France, Great Britain,
and the United States were generally considered as
possessing sufficient financial prestige to control the
world money market. Great Britain, as an extensive
creditor nation, held the balance of power. As a
creditor nation, however, she did not want bimetallism.
In 1893 she gave proof of that by closing the Indian
mints to the free coinage of silver. Immediately she
became the recipient of the hatred of the American
bimetallic forces. Furthermore, the British felt that
certain Europeans, particularly the French and Germans, proposed to keep the good will of the American
debtor classes by advocating bimetallism and at the
same time to injure Great Britain by laying the failure
of silver legislation upon her.35
On October 30, 1893, the Sherman silver act was
finally repealed. The debate represented an effort
of the seven silver mining states, a minority group,
to block legislation and transfer political and economic
power from the eastern capitalists to the western farmers and silver producers.   Anti-British  antipathy
6Cf. Parliamentary State Papers, Vol. CV, "Currency Correspondence," Enclosure 2 in No. II; New York Times, February 18, 1897.




48       ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
was one of the weapons used.36     Immediately after
their defeat in October, the silver forces began an
unprecedented educational campaign for votes. Again
anti-British prejudice became one of their tools. The
United States, they contended, was Great Britain's
most formidable rival in finance; nevertheless, she
was paying Great Britain two hundred million dollars
annually in gold in payment of interest on bonds.
To pay this interest the Americans sacrificed four
hundred million dollars in property, since silver was
worth only fifty cents on the dollar. In the impending struggle for the commercial mastery of the world,
a financial combat between the two countries could
not be avoided if the American people hoped to retain their own self-respect, freedom, and prosperity.
A war with England, said the "jingoes," would be
the most popular war ever waged.37
In May, 1895, the Harvey-Laughlin debate occurred
in Chicago. Mr. Harvey urged the danger of American financial dependence upon Great Britain. The
remedy he proposed was silver at the ratio of sixteen
to one. The result of such action would be to increase the cost of silver which Great Britain bought
from the American silver producers for use in her
Indian mints; advance the price of Indian wheat in
" Congressional Record, 53d Congress, 1st session, Vol. XXV, part 1,
pp. 400-411; ibid., p. 1235; Stewart, William M., "Misrepresentation
of the Senate," North American Review, Vol. CLVII (November,
1893), pp. 513-522.
" For popular pamphlet arguments consult Harvey, William Hope,
Coin's Financial School (Chicago, 1894); ibid., Tale oj Two Nations
(Chicago, 1894); White, Trumbull, Silver and Gold (Publisher's
Union, 1895).




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897


49


proportion, reduce the value of gold and, as a result,
advance the price of American fruit, wool, cotton, and
silver bullion.38  Mr. J. Lawrence Laughlin, who responded to Mr. Harvey, saw the currency question entirely apart from Anglo-American relations. In spite
of Great Britain's wealth, the money market was controlled by the entire world and free silver would advance prices, lower wages, injure the debtor class, and
produce silver monometallism.39 Gold standard advocates uniformly agreed with Mr. Laughlin.40
Certain other influences combined to increase this
hostility. The Democrats, who advocated a low tariff,
accepted free silver with all its anti-British theories.
Their platform for 1896 described gold monometallism
as a British policy, both un-American and anti-American, which had brought other nations into financial
servitude to London. The National Silver party and
the Populists both declared a gold policy dangerous
to American interests.4' Besides this, it had been a
Democratic government which had declared the new
Monroe Doctrine and which had forced Venezuelan
arbitration only a short time previously.
So far as the Republican party was concerned the
British could hardly hope for more friendliness. Great
Britain had never been disposed to look kindly upon
the nomination of Mr. McKinley. As the originator of
the tariff bill of 1890, they were inclined to look upon
'MWhite, Silver and Gold, pp. 26-40.
s9Ibid., pp. 49-70.
Cf. Roberts, George E., Coin at School and in Finance (Chicago,
1895).
' For a partial list of campaign speeches and the party platforms
consult Bryan, William J., The First Battle (Chicago, 1896).




50   ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


him as the champion of anti-British policies.42 Furthermore, the Republicans had declared allegiance- to protection and the new Monroe Doctrine. There was,
however, one great point of agreement-the Republicans were pledged to "sound mony" and "the existing gold standard" unless bimetallism should be
adopted by international agreement.
Finally order and Anglo-American harmony began
to emerge from this confusion of anti-British sentiment. In the first place, a few prominent British
thinkers comprehended the dual nature of the campaign probably better than the majority of Americans
did. They realized that the hostility of the silver forces
would cease with the return of financial prosperity.43
In the next place, John Hay, who held the confidence
of the members of the Coalition Government, visited
England during the summer of 1896. In a number of
confidential conversations with Mr. Balfour, Mr.
Chamberlain, Lord Curzon, and Sir William Harcourt,
Mr. Hay accomplished much toward retaining the
British friendship previously stimulated. The Republicans, he said, would sustain to the limit the action
of Mr. Cleveland concerning Venezuela and Mr. McKinley was both a sound money man and friendly
toward Great Britain.44    Furthermore, a few British
4 New York Tribune, November 6, 8, 22, 1896.
e Cf. Shriver, Edwin J., "Silver Politics across Seas," Westminster
Review, Vol. CXLVI (November, 1896), pp. 487-495; Spectator,
July 4, 11, 1896.
" Thayer, William Roscoe, The Life and Letters of John Hay,
Vol. II (New York, 1915), pp. 143-144, 147, 150,169. These conversations
were particularly significant since they marked the beginning of the
policy of the Opposition to overbid the party in power for American




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897


51


leaders were in constant touch with certain prominent
members of the Republican party. Senator Joseph B.
Foraker had spent part of the summer in England
and J. P. Morgan was in close association with the
Rothschilds. Joseph Chamberlain and his wife, the
daughter of William C. Endicott of Massachusetts,
had visited in the United States. Finally, the papers
generally read and quoted in London, were the three
conservative New York dailies, each of which was
uniformly fair, if not friendly, toward Great Britain.
What, then, was the effect of the currency struggle
and the election of 1896 on Anglo-American relations?
Great Britain was in a serious position throughout
the controversy. Had the silver forces won in the
United States the immediate loss to British capital
would have run into the tens of millions of dollars
and the consummation of any Anglo-American friendship would have been delayed for years. As it was,
the thoughtful and considerate attitude shown by leading British statesmen and by the British newspapers
revealed for the second time British friendship for the
United States. Furthermore, with the defeat of free
silver and the resumption of prosperity, which fortunately began soon after the election, the "jingoistic"
hostility of the silver forces almost ceased. Indeed,
it was always shallow and blustering in its nature, and
friendship. Two years later this policy had become so pronounced
that Mr. Hay was led to urge upon Mr. Chamberlain the necessity
for the party in power to state openly their attitude toward the
United States in order to prevent the Americans from believing that
the Opposition rather than the Government was friendly toward
them. Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham on May 13, 1898,
was the reply to Mr. Hay's request.




52   ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


had exerted an influence out of proportion to its real
significance. On the other hand, the good will promoted between the capitalists and manufacturers of
Great Britain and the United States through the
recognition of their common financial interests, was
of considerable significance in creating common AngloAmerican commercial policies.
Throughout almost the entire time that the interest
of the United States and Great Britain had been directed toward the Venezuelan boundary controversy,
the currency question and the election of 1896, a few
individuals, both British and American, sought to find
some method by which war might in the future be
eliminated between the two countries. On March 5,
1896, the British proposed a treaty of arbitration. Although it received the sincere support of both Mr.
Olney and Mr. Cleveland, nothing was gained.45 Sentiment, however, grew steadily stronger in favour of
arbitration and on January 11, 1897, just three weeks
before the conclusion of the treaty which sent the
Venezuelan boundary controversy to arbitration, Mr.
Olney and Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British ambassador at Washington, signed a general treaty of arbitration. On the same day President Cleveland sent
it to the Senate, with an earnest request for its favourable consideration.46
The press, the pulpit, the colleges and universities,
and the business world generally favoured the treaty.47
'Foreign Relations, 1896, pp. 222-237.
"Ibid., pp. 237-240.
" London Times, January 12, 14, 16, 1897; New York Times,
January 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 23, 1897; New York Herald, January 12,
14, 1897; The Sun was the only prominent New York paper adverse.




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897


53


On January 14, opposition was first reported in the
Senate. Next, the anti-British elements in the United
States, having learned that both Lord Salisbury and
the British people were extremely anxious for the
early ratification of the treaty, argued that there must
be some sinister motive back of it and they began
to fight it.48 On January 19, Mr. Olney appeared before the Senator committee on foreign relations in behalf of the treaty. Immediately a few senators began
to argue against "coercion" from the state department. Besides this, they disliked Lord Pauncefote.49
After February 1, the fight for the treaty became
hopeless and on February 18, the treaty was turned
over to the Republican administration.50 On March
18, the treaty went to the Senate once more, where the
contest continued with considerable bitterness until
May 5, when it was voted down by a vote of forty-three
to twenty-six.'61 The causes for the defeat of the bill
were numerous and conflicting. A minority in the
Senate objected to what they         considered   coercion
from  the state department and the general public.52
48'London Times, January 14, 20, 1897.
'Smalley, George W., Anglo-American Memories (London, 1912),
p. 178.
"0New York Times, January 23, February 11, 1897; London Times,
February 2, 15, 1897; Annual Register, 1897 (new series), part 1,
p. 386.
61 The vote was divided with thirty Republicans and ten Democrats
in the affirmative and ten Republicans, eleven Democrats, and five
Populists in the negative. For a British analysis of the votes consult
London Times, May 7,1897.
" Out of nearly 250 petitions presented in the Senate carrying signatures varying in number from several thousand to one, only fifteen
were in opposition. Of those fifteen the majority were from organizations with a membership largely Irish. The New York Times,




54        ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Some senators felt that it would force the Senate
to yield up its constitutional function as a part of
the treaty-making power.53      Some preferred that all
questions should be approved by the Senate before
sending them    to arbitration.    Others "thought they
were striking a blow at the chief gold standard
nation." 55 Senator Morgan of Alabama was accused
of opposing arbitration until the government should
pass the hundred million dollar Nicaragua canal bond.
The outcome of the treaty contest was the moral
equivalent of a victory for the development of AngloAmerican good will. It proved to Great Britain that
many of the American people, the press, the church,
and the President favoured British friendship. One
tragedy grew out of its defeat. Sir Julian Pauncefote
and Mr. Olney had begun the work on the treaty
"as a labour of love."   Into its development Sir Julian
had crowded the thought and energy of years of work,
for he loved the American people next to his own.
The failure of the Senate to ratify the treaty came
January 23, 1897, reported Senator George F. Hoar as saying, "I hold
this meddling with important diplomacy by angry and impassioned
utterances mischievous and foolish." Senator Shelby Cullom was
supposed to agree with Mr. Hoar; New York Times, January 27, 1897,
"The whip and spur of public opinion ought to be applied mercilessly"
since one motive for delay is the hostility toward the President and
the Secretary of State.
New York Times, February 10, 1897.
' London Times, March 19, 1897.
" New York Times, May 7, 1897-with very few exceptions the
twenty-six Senators who voted against ratification were free silver
men. Party politics counted for little or nothing. It was a free silver
and anti-Cleveland vote that killed the treaty. Race hostility to
England may have influenced Senator Murphy who represented the
state of New York in the Senate. Silver was the main thing.




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897


55


as his first great disappointment. Indeed, so serious
was his feeling of defeat that his health was permanently impaired.
Beginning almost immediately after the inauguration of President McKinley there followed a series
of events which may be described not inaccurately
as the era of Anglo-American good will of 1897. The
first of these was found in the unqualified assurances
of American friendship which had been brought out
during the debate on the general treaty of arbitration. The second of these was the appointment of
John Hay as ambassador to Great Britain. Probably
no other American has ever held the confidence and
respect of the British government and people as he
did. Happy in the English environment of culture
and refinement he became at once the champion of
Anglo-American amity. "... the dearest wish of my
heart," he said, "is that the happy relations now
subsisting between the two great nations may be not
only continued, but if possible, drawn closer together
during the time that I shall hold the office of ambassador." 56 In all probability Mr. Hay was responsible for the elimination of more Anglo-American
prejudice than any other man of the century. Cultured, capable, and tactful he brought to the British
people all that was best in American manhood and
statesmanship.
Following closely upon the appointment of Mr.
TMHay, John, Addresses of John Hay (New York, 1907), pp. 63-65.
For the British attitude toward Mr. Hay consult London Times,
February 22, March 3, 1897; New York Times, January 7, March 3,
1897.




56   ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


Hay came the third event of interest. The Log of
the Mayflower or the Bradford Manuscript had been
in England for many years. No less than four attempts had been made to secure possession of it.
Finally through the efforts of Senator George F. Hoar
and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Queen Victoria
secured the authorization for its return in the care
of Mr. Bayard. Speaking later of this act Senator
Hoar said, "... the restoration of this priceless manuscript did more to cement the bonds of friendship
between the people of the two countries than forty
canal treaties. In settling Imperial questions both
nations are thinking, properly and naturally, of great
interests. But this restoration was an act of purest
kindness." 57
In June, Great Britain planned to celebrate the
Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria. Mr. Hay recognized the importance of America's part in that event
and, largely through his efforts, made it an occasion
for a display of mutual friendliness. The army and
navy were represented with detachments under the
command of Admiral Joseph N. Miller and General
Nelson A. Miles. Mr. Whitelaw Reid was made ambassador extraordinary on special mission. Mr. John
Sherman, secretary of state, sent a formal note of congratulation on the Queen's birthday. This was followed
four days later by an informal note over the personal
signature of President McKinley. The tact, good
will, and genuine friendship of the note touched not
only the emotion of the Queen but all England.
5 Hoar, George F., Autobiography of Seventy Years (London,
1904), Vol. II, pp. 247-251.




PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897                 57
British papers copied it, commented upon it, and
praised 1
Throughout the United States Jubilee services were
held in all Episcopal churches with special ritual prepared for the occasion. In many of the churches, particularly of the East, Jubilee services were held regardless of denomination. Of the large cities of the
country celebrations were held in San Francisco, Chicago, St. Louis, Boston, Kansas City, and New York.
A number of the leading pupits of London were occupied by American preachers, all of whom       delivered
Jubilee addresses. The general decorations for the
churches were a mingling of the British and American
flags. The British National Anthem was always sung.59
Scores of messages of congratulation were sent by
American commercial organizations. The Chamber of
Commerce of the state of New York sent congratulations. The New York Exchange sent greetings to
68"Great and Good Friend: In the name and behalf of the people
of the United States, I present their sincere felicitations upon the
sixtieth anniversary of Your Majesty's accession to the Crown of
Great Britain. I express the sentiments of my fellow-citizens in
wishing for your people the prolongation of a reign illustrious and
marked by advance in science, arts, and popular well-being. On
behalf of my countrymen, I wish particularly to recognize your
friendship for the United States, and your love of peace, exemplified
upon important occasions. It is pleasing to acknowledge the debt
of gratitude and respect due to your personal virtues. May your
life be prolonged, and peace, honor, and prosperity bless the people
over whom you have been called to rule. May liberty flourish
throughout your Empire, under just and equal laws, and your Government continue strong in the affections of all who live under it.
And I pray God to have Your Majesty in His holy keeping." It
was signed simply "Your good friend, William McKinley." Foreign
Relations, 1897, p. 252.
New York Tribune, June 20, 1897.




58     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
the London Stock Exchange. The New York Cotton Exchange sent greetings to the Liverpool Cotton
Association. The dominant note of all the messages
was the desire that the feeling of friendship between
the two nations be permanent.6
On the arrival of the American mission nothing was
left undone that might show favour or give pleasure.
Two things impressed Mr. Reid most: the great devotion shown to the Queen and "the obvious and
continuous cordiality toward America." 61 During the
procession the Americans received almost continuous applause.62  Entire columns were given in the
British papers to appreciation of the interest of the
United States in the celebration, her love for the
Queen, her good will toward Canada and her friendship for Great Britain.63
The effect of the Jubilee upon Anglo-American relations was significant. It had afforded an opportunity
for the free and open expression of international good
will. It served to give confidence to the Canadians
in their relation to the United States. It showed that
the bad spirit stirred up by the Venezuelan controversy, the currency struggle and the election of 1896
was gone. And, finally, it showed that the Americans,
in spite of their national independence, were profoundly proud of their racial inheritance.
Throughout the year other incidents, perhaps in' Cf. New York Times, June 20, 21, 22, 1897; New York Tribune,
June 20, 21, 22, 1897.
o'Cortissoz, Royal, The Life of Whitelaw Reid (New York, 1921),
p. 216.
aIbid., p. 216.
" London Times, June 21, 22, 23, 1897.




- PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1890-1897


59


significant in themselves, revealed the growing AngloAmerican harmony. Only a few can be mentioned.
On March 10, occurred the formal presentation of
the diplomatic corps to the President. The body
was headed by Sir Julian Pauncefote as doyen. Contrary to custom a short conversation ensued when
President McKinley greeted Sir Julian, in which the
former expressed his appreciation of the services he
had rendered with respect to the arbitration treaty. Sir
Julian responded by congratulating the President on
his election and his inaugural address. The incident
marked the beginning of a sincere friendship between
the two. The incident was but the first of a series
in which Mr. McKinley gave full assurance of his
respect and friendship for the British nation.64
In June, 1897, speaking at Nashville, Mr. McKinley
said, "The builders of this State brought with them
the same high ideals and fearless devotion to home
and country, founded upon resistance to oppression,
which have ever made illustrious the Anglo-American
name." Two British comments followed. "The jingoes will not like his phrase. It may be taken as
a mark of the President's sincere good will for the
mother country." 65
By the close of October it is safe to say that Mr.
McKinley had secured the confidence of the British
party in power. He had accomplished this through
the work of Mr. Hay, through his sincere cooperation
"London Times, March 12, 1897; New York Times, March 11, 1897.
" London Times, June 12, 1897; See London Times, October 31,
1897; New York Times, October 31, 1897, for comments on Mr. McKinley's speech before the Commercial Club at Cincinnati, October 30.




60     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
in the Jubilee, his letter to the Queen, his pronouncement of Anglo-American ideals, his preference for Sir
Julian and arbitration and his good will toward Great
Britain generally. In their friendship for Mr. McKinley, the British openly recognized the conflict between the Senate and the President as head of the department of state. The Senate and John Sherman,
as they saw it, had killed arbitration in opposition to
Mr. McKinley and the will of the people. "People,"
said the London Times of April 4, 1897, "have ceased
to expect the Senate to acquire the art of minding
its own business."
Assurance of British confidence in American friendliness and in sound money came in this way. Immediately after the election of Mr. McKinley, Mr.
E. 0. Walcott went to Europe in the interests of
bimetallism. The French and Germans were open in
their offers of cooperation but everything was made
dependent upon Great Britain's opening the Indian
mints. This, of course, she would not do. Negotiations continued until September 16, 1897, when the
Indian office recommended rejection of the proposals.
On October 19, Lord Salisbury forwarded its decision
to the American Government. The announcement
caused hardly a ripple of comment in the United
States.




CHAPTER IV


GREAT BRITAIN AND THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
WITH SPAIN
EARLY in 1897 it was apparent that the Cuban revolution had assumed an international significance. In
the last days of 1896 Spain had refused the joint request of France, Great Britain, and Germany that she
should accept the good offices of the United States with
a view to assuring a prompt termination of the war.
As a result of this joint action, however, she had published, on February 6, 1897, a decree which granted
Cuba a reformed system of government to go into
operation as soon as the state of war in Cuba would
permit.1
This decree served only to complicate the situation.2
The insurgents were steadily growing more determined
in their demands for independence, while Spain was
equally resolved that no amelioration of Cuban conditions should be granted until the parties demanding the reforms should put themselves at her mercy
by throwing down their arms. The insurgents felt
that Spain's promise was worthless,3 that nothing
Chadwick, French Ensor, The Relations of the United States and
Spain, Diplomacy (New York, 1909), p. 487; Chicago Daily Inter
Ocean, February 6, 1897.
'Inter Ocean, February 7, 1897.
"Pall Mall Gazette, February 5, 1897.
61




62       ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
short of complete independence could now be accepted.4
The projected reforms received much critical comment both in the United States and in Great Britain.
In the United States many considered them merely
as a subterfuge to divert American interest until General Weyler had completed his conquest of the island.5
Others felt that the reforms had been offered in good
faith and that they granted all that could reasonably
be expected.6 In British comment the proposed reforms were generally spoken of as a dead letter. Public
opinion was unanimous in considering them unavailing for the purpose of terminating the war.7
Following the February decree the insurrection became, on the part of Spain, a war of annihilation
or complete subjection. Immediately American sentiment began to respond to the situation for both
humanitarian and commercial reasons.8 In March the
Republican party came into power, pledged'to secure
peace and independence in Cuba. On May 24, a bill
was passed and approved by the President appropriating fifty thousand dollars for the relief and transporta4 Cf. Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain, pp. 487 -488; Inter Ocean, February 10, 1897, contained an interview granted
by Maximo Gomez to its correspondent on January 31. It is difficult
to determine when the insurgents became united in their demands
for independence but it was probably between January 8 and January
31. Cf. Pall Mall Gazette, January 8, 16, 17, 1897.
6 Callahan, James Morton, Cuba and International Relations
(Baltimore, 1899), p. 472.
Chadwick, op. cit., pp. 487-488; Pall Mall Gazette, January 8, 1897.
'London Times, February 2, 1897.
'Inter Ocean, February 26, March 2, 3, 1897; Congressional Record,
Vol. XXIX, part 3, 54th Congress, 2d session, p. 2287.




GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN


63


tion of suffering 'American citizens in the island of
Cuba.9 On June 26, the secretary of state, John Sherman, in a note to Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister at Washington, issued a protest against the
Spanish policy of'devastation and reconcentration in
Cuba.10 On September 13, General Stewart L. Woodford succeeded Hannis Taylor as American minister at
Spain. Ten days later he presented a note to the
Spanish court setting forth the views of the McKinley
administration on the Cuban situation and tendering
the services of the United States once more in an effort
to secure peace.l1 Six days later the conservative
ministry of Canovas del Castillo resigned to be succeeded on October 14 by the liberal ministry of
Praxedes Mateo Sagasta. On October 17, General Don
Raymon y Erenas Blanco was appointed as governor
and captain-general of Cuba.
Throughout the earlier part of the year the British
press followed the Cuban situation with keen interest.12
General Weyler y Nicolau was condemned as a soldier
and declared incompetent as a civil administrator.'3
Mr. McKinley's determination to form his own plans
and keep them conservative was fully respected and
approved.14 His opposition, it was contended, did not
come from the American people but from the Senate.
' United States Statutes at Large, Vol. XXX, 55th Congress, 1st
session, p. 520.
10 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897, pp. 507-508.
"Ibid., 1898, pp. 568-573.
"The Pall Mall Gazette and London Times commented almost
daily on the Cuban situation.
"London Times, January 4, 1897.
4 Ibid., May 20, 1897.




64       ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
It was a continuation of the same struggle which Mr.
Cleveland had waged with his Senate.15 Silver and
Cuban "jingoism" were 'associated together in some
vague way on the theory that war would force the
United States on a silver basis.'6
Generally speaking, the British Government understood and approved of'the Cuban policy advanced by
the President. This sympathetic reaction was probably due to two facts: as an Anglo-Saxon nation she
could interpret Anglo-Saxon motives, and she hoped
to receive in return an expression'of American interest
in British affairs in Europe.'7  On September 13, Mr.
Woodford was received by the Queen of Spain and
presented his letters of credence. Five days previous
to this Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, the British ambassador, called upon Mr. Woodford. A "friendly
interview" followed, in which the American minister
outlined the Cuban situation carefully.    Mr. Woodford first assured Sir Henry that the United States
desired neither to annex Cuba nor to establish a protectorate over the island. He then mentioned various
respects in which the United States was closely associated with Cuba. Nearly every epidemic of yellow
fever in the United States had originated in Havana
or at some point in Cuba, from which the disease had
" lbid., May 20, 1897.
' Ibid., May 20, 1897; British Weekly, November 11, 1897.
'Beginning in the early days of January, 1898, the New York
Herald published extracts from British newspapers on the average of
not less than twice a week, setting forth American interests in China
and their similarity to British interests. Among the British papers
emphasizing the similarity of interests were the London Times, Pall
Mall Gazette, Daily News, Statist and the British Weekly.




GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN


65


spread to the American coast. Cuban sugar was as
vital to America as the wheat and 'cotton of India
and Egypt were to Great Britain. The war had inflicted great pecuniary losses on the American people.
Exports and imports had declined heavily. He next
mentioned'the fact that, although Spain had early
acknowledged the belligerency of the South in the recent Civil War, the United States had consistently
for thirteen years observed all the obligations of neutrality. Next he told Sir Henry something "of the horrible and unchristian and uncivilized manner in which
the present struggle in Cuba" was carried on. Then
he "put the direct question to him whether, if'Cuba
lay about 100 miles west of the United Kingdom, and
if all the conditions existed therein and between Cuba
and the United Kingdom which'now exist in Cuba
and between Cuba and the United States, England
would not be compelled in the interest of her people
and of humanity and of civilization to find some way
of putting promptly an end to the struggle?"  He
proposed no remedy for the situation other than that
some means of restoring peace must be found before
Congress met in December. He assured Sir Henry
that not only had the Spanish government'failed to
repress the rebellion but that the rebellion was stronger
than ever. He concluded by saying that the United
States stood ready to offer her services in an effort to
restore peace and that should Spain see fit to offer
"without any evasion or reservation" such autonomy
as Great Britain granted Canada there would be a
reasonable certainty of Cuban peace and prosperity.18
'Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 562565.




66      ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
A summary of this conversation was forwarded immediately to Lord Salisbury. It represented the first
authoritative or official statement that Great Britain
had received from the United States on the Cuban
question.
On September 14, Mr. Woodford reported his conversation with the Spanish minister to John Sherman.
At the same time he set forth his relations with the
British embassy. "He [Mr. Wolff] has received me
with very prompt and exceedingly generous and hospitable welcome, and I trust and believe that the
relations between our legation and the British embassy
will continue upon the same friendly and cordial relations as heretofore. No effort on my part shall be
wanting to secure this most desirable result." 19
The earnest desire of the Spanish Government to
meet the demands of the United States was shown on
October 6, when the order for General Weyler's recall
was given. On October 31, General Blanco succeeded
as governor-general of Cuba. Immediately he began
a campaign to relieve the suffering of reconcentration. It was without result, however, for the American
consuls continued to'report the conditions daily observed, as beyond belief.20
"Ibid., p. 565. On January 30, 1899, the Pall Mall Gazette quoted
Mr. Woodford as saying that "... had it not been for the unfaltering, unchanging, and loyal friendship of England, and the attitude
of her minister in Madrid, I might have failed to do the little I did
do because the representatives in Madrid of Continental Europe were
ready at any time to interfere with the plans of the United States, if
the British Minister would only join them." This was taken from
Mr. Woodford's speech given before the Army and Navy Club in
New York on Saturday, January 28, 1899.
X Chadwick, The Relations of the United States and Spain, p. 522.




GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN


67


On November 23, the Queen Regent granted
autonomy to the Cubans subject to the consent
of the Cortes. Both 'the United States and Great
Britain recognized this as entirely inadequate to meet
the Cuban demands, since at different times throughout the year they had called attention to the different
interpretations placed on colonial autonomy by AngloSaxon and Spanish officials.2' It was in the former
sense that the Cubans understood it.
Throughout the early months of 1898 the British
press'followed the rumours of a Spanish-American war
assiduously. On February 9, the Cuban Junta gave
the Dupuy de Lome letter to the press. One paragraph of it revealed de Lome's distorted interpretation
of Anglo-American events. "I do not believe you
[the Spanish] pay enough attention to the role of
England. To my mind the only object of England
is that Americans should occupy themselves with us
and leave her in peace, and if there is a war, so
much the better, for that would further remove what
is threatening her, although that will never come." 22
In all probability Mr. de Lome felt that Great Britain
was endangered by American commercial expansion
and that a war with Spain would serve to cripple the
United States and enable Great Britain to maintain
her own prestige.
The British press, throughout, chose to ignore the
reference to Great Britain's interest in American affairs
London Times, February 9, 12, October 10, 1898; Northern Trade
and Finance, December 15, 1897; Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 522;
Statist, March 19, 1898.
' Public Opinion, February 17, 1898.




68      ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
in Cuba, but condemned the letter unreservedly as a
violation of the ethics of international diplomacy.23
This attitude was highly acceptable to the American
press. On February 14, the London correspondent
of the New York Tribune wrote thus: "English comments on the Spanish minister's breach of international
etiquette have been inspired by a sense of justice and
a spirit of good-will toward the United States. Nearly
every journal describes the letter as an unpardonable
outrage." It is a new thing to find the English journals cordial and outspoken in their admiration of Mr.
McKinley. "There is a change of temper and spirit
which can only be explained as a direct effect of American expressions of respect and good-will toward England on the Chinese question. One good turn deserves
another; the American press was just to England and
the English press is now equally fair to America."
Hardly had the British press ceased to comment on
the de Lome incident when the U.S.S. Maine was sunk
in the harbour of Havana on February 15. On the
following day Sir Julian Pauncefote called on President
McKinley to express his regret over the disaster.
Throughout February 16 and 17, numerous messages
of sympathy came from Great Britain. Among those
sending them were the Queen, the Prince and Princess
'London Times, February 11, 1898, "It is from every point of
view deplorable and lamentable that so useful a career [that of de
Lome] should have been terminated by an act of basest treachery."
The London Telegraph, February 11, 1898, declared the letter hardly
"consonant" even as a private letter, "with a tenure of a high diplomatic post." The Statist, February 12, 1898, called it "merely an
unpleasant diplomatic incident." Cf. Literary Digest, March 12,
1898; Public Opinion, February 18, 1898; Spectator, February 12,1898.




GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN


69


of Wales, the Duke of Connaught, Lord Mayor of
London, the Earl of Aberdeen, Governor General of
Canada, the Duke and Duchess of York, N. M. Rothschild and Sons, and many others. Sir Algernon Borthwick, owner of the Morning Post, asked to be allowed
to open' subscriptions in his newspaper for the relief
of the families of those lost in the Maine.24  The
British journals of February 16 expressed profound sorrow. The headlines of the evening papers hinted at
treachery, either Cuban or Spanish. The morning
papers of February 17 commented very soberly but
complimented the United States on the good sense,
good feeling and dignity exhibited.25  Sympathy with
the American government will be world-wide, said
the London Times, "but nowhere will the feeling be
so general or profound as amongst their British and
Irish kinsfolks at home and in the colonies." 28 Gradually an appreciation of this spirit of British sympathy
spread throughout the United States leaving a new
and enlarged feeling of good will as it went.27
After the sinking of the Maine, Great Britain was
convinced that war was imminent between Spain and
the United States.28  Gradually it had become apparent to her that in the event of such a war France,
Germany, and Austria would extend their sympathy if
2 Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 1054-58.
'St. James Budget, March 25, 1898; London Times, February 17,
1898; Pall Mall Gazette, February 17, 18, 1898; Foreign Relations,
1898, pp. 1054-58.
'London Times, February 17, 1898.
"New York Times, February 25, 1898; Public Opinion, February
18, 1898.
Statist, February 19, 1898.




70      ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
not their actual aid to Spain. At the same time,
Great Britain realized that she herself faced the possibility of an alliance of France, Germany, and Russia in
the East.29
Out of these complications there developed a diversity of rumours both in the United States and in
Great Britain indicative of the growing appreciation
and association of Anglo-American interests. On
March 8, Sir Julian Pauncefote, accompanied by the
American secretary of state, visited President McKinley. Whatever may have been the object of his visit,
the conjecture immediately arose that he carried a
message of good will from the British Government.30
"America fully believes," reported the London Times,
"that she has England's moral support in the policy of
which she accepts the President as exponent." 31
On March 10, the rumour became current in Great
Britain that in case of an emergency the British fleet
might show itself as a friend on the American coasts.32
On the same day, in the House of Commons, Sir
James Fergusson asked Mr. G. N. Curzon, as representative of the Government, whether his attention had
been called to telegraphic reports as to alleged communications on the Cuban question between the British
ambassador at Washington and the United States Government; and whether there was any truth in those
"Cf. Parliamentary Debates of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland (Hansard's), Vol. LIV, pp. 1252, 1342.
~ New York Times, March 9, 1898.
" London Times, March 9, 1898.
' London Times, March 10, 1898; New tork Times, March 11,
1898. This rumour was sometimes referred to as the Des Voeux
suggestion.




GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN


71


reports. Mr. Curzon replied that there was no truth
in the report, that no communications on the Cuban
question had passed between the British and the United
States Governments.33
On March 10, Pauncefote made another call on
the President. While they were in conference, they
were joined by the Japanese minister. As a result,
the evening papers carried reports of the possibility
of a triple alliance. Even Parliament was moved. Mr.
H. V. Duncombe, M.P., was reported as saying that
the opinion was widely held in the House that foreign
powers should be told that a blow struck at either
England or the United States was a blow at the other.84
By the middle of March, Great Britain began to
realize that the United States would be forced to
enter Cuba because of humanitarian motives.35          The
principal factor that was operating for peace was
the policy of "firmness, caution, and pacific circumspection" which President McKinley pursued in regard to foreign affairs. In that policy he was sup" Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LIV, pp. 1243-1244.
'London Times, March 11, 1898; New York- Times, March 11,
1898; Chronicle, March 19, gave the story of this incident. On
Thursday of last week, Mr. Duncombe asked "whether, in the event
of complications between the United States and a foreign Power, the
British fleet would not be put at this country's [United States]
service." The propounder was allowed to withdraw the question.
The question met with no rebuke, however. (This explains why the
incident does not occur in Hansard's.)
"The Spanish Crisis," Blackwood's Magazine, Vol. CLXIII
(February, 1898), pp. 238-253; Spectator, March 14, 1898; "The
United States and Spain," Quarterly Review, Vol, CLXXXVIII
(July, 1898), pp. 216-241; Statist, March 26, 1898; Graphic, March 5,
1898 contains a number of illustrations showing terrible poverty
existing among the Cubans.




72   ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


ported by the "sober and conscientious mass of the
American people." 36
On March 14, rumours of an Anglo-American alliance again reached Parliament when Michael Davitt
asked the Under Secretary of State for War whether
any British war vessels were to be loaned to the American government in case of war between that republic
and any European power. Mr. W. St. John Brodrick
replied in the negative.37 Not yet satisfied, Mr. Davitt
immediately asked the Under Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs if Lord Pauncefote had made proposals
to the United States for an alliance between the two
governments in the event of serious complications arising out of present difficulties in the Far East; if similar
proposals had been tendered by President McKinley
to the British government; or if offers of mediation
between the United States and Spain in the relation
to Cuban troubles had been made from "exalted quarters" in England to President McKinley. Lord Curzon
replied that the character of the questions was such
that it would be inexpedient for him to reply to them.38
On March 17, Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont
reported in the Senate on his unofficial visit to Cuba.39
The speech   aroused  considerable attention.  The
London Times after commenting on the integrity of
the witness called the speech the one incident, if there
was one, not making for peace. "He avoids exaggeration and emotion, even inference, and fiis statement
London Times, March 8, 1898; Statist, March 26, 1898.
tHansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LIV, p. 1526.
Ibid., p. 1526.
Congressional Record, Vol. XXXI, part 3, 55th Congress, 2d
session, pp. 2916-2918.




GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN


73


tells heavily for intervention or mediation for the
rescue of Cuba from an impossible situation." 40
Throughout March the United States and Great
Britain began to recognize the unanimity of Continental opinion in favour of Spain.4' The Austrian
and French Governments expressed open sympathy for
her.42 In Germany many of the people and some
of the unofficial journals supported her. Outwardly,
at least, however, the German Government expressed
full neutrality. Commercial interests, as well as regard for the German-Americans and for international
expediency, demanded this.43
On March 28, President McKinley forwarded the
report of the naval court of inquiry on the Maine disaster to Congress. This address represented his last
attempt to prevent war, and Great Britain noted it
with intense interest. The Times maintained that
peace was still in his hands. "We may yet be saved
from the sad spectacle of a contest between two
friendly nations both bound to us by the bonds of an
old friendship, though, should the worst come to the
worst, we shall not of course forget, whilst maintaining the duties of neutrality towards both, that one
of them is knotted to us more closely by the ties of
blood." 44 The Statist spoke of the message as "admirable in tone." Its effect would be to calm public
'London Times, March 19, 24; Pall Mall Gazette, March 19, 1898;
Public Opinion, March 24, 1898.
' New York Times, March 22, 1898; London Times, March 15,
1898.
"Public Opinion, March 17, 1898.
4 London Times, March 21, 1898.
'London Times, March 28, 1898.




74   ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


excitement and assure Spain that the measure of
autonomy already granted the Cubans was entirely insufficient. The message, it said, was received in the
United States with a calmness that was honourable to
the American people.45
On the following day, March 29, British interest
reached unprecedented heights. "It must be admitted
that, with every desire to excuse the reluctance of
Spain to yield to pressure... we cannot refuse our
sympathy to the people of the United States in circumstances which would have made it difficult even
for our own countrymen to preserve their boasted
calm." The relation between the two countries is not,
and ought not to be, one of sentiment only. "The
two great English-speaking communities have immense, permanent, and increasing interests in common, and recent events have strongly illustrated this
community of interests in the Far East. Commerce
and civilization in those lands and seas mean far more
to the English and the Americans, who were the first
to open them up to western intercourse, than they
can possibly mean to Powers which look immediately
and chiefly for political domination and which do not
understand the policy of the open door." 46 The same
day Alfred Austin, British poet laureate, published
his poem, "A Voice from the West," on an AngloAmerican alliance.47 It was cabled to the New York
"Statist, April 2, 1898.
'London Times, March 29, 1898.
"What is the voice I hear
On the winds of the western sea?
Sentinel, listen, from out Cape Clear
And say what the voice may be.




GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN                        75
Herald and appeared simultaneously in that journal
and in the London Times.
Throughout the earlier part of April, while Great
Britain's situation in the East was growing darker,
'Tis a proud free people calling loud
to a people proud and free.
"And it says to them: 'Kinsmen, hail;
We severed have been too long.
Now let us have done with a worn-out taleThe tale of ancient wrongAnd our friendship last long as our love doth last,
and be stronger than death is strong.'
"Answer then, sons of the self-same race,
And blood of the self-same clan;
Let us speak with each other face to face
And answer as man to man,
And loyally love and trust each other as
none but free men can.
"Now fling them out to the breeze,
Shamrock, Thistle, and Rose,
And the Star-spangled Banner unfurl with theseA message to friends and foes
Wherever the sails of peace are seen and
wherever the war wind blows"A message to bond and thrall to wake,
For whenever we come, we twain,
The throne of the tyrant shall rock and quake,
And this menace be void and vain,
For you are lords of a strong land and we
are lords of the main.
"Yes, this is the voice of the bluff March gale;
We severed have been too long;
But now we have done with a worn-out taleThe tale of an ancient wrongAnd our friendship shall last as love doth last
and be stronger than death is strong."




76       ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
America's situation in Cuba was likewise clouding.
In both cases the common enemies included Germany
and France, though Russia, an enemy of Great Britain,
was still looked upon with favour by many in the
United States. The manufacturing interests of the
United States, however, had become by this time quite
generally conscious of America's relation to Great
Britain's foreign policy. On April 4, the New York
Times declared that it was a pity that the American
State Department had been unable to force American
assistance for Great Britain in the Far East. In May
the British Review of Reviews indicated the growing
commercial relation of the two Powers in a parody by
"Ouida" on "A Voice from the West," entitled, "A
Voice from   the Sea." 48
8 "What is the voice I hear
O'er the wires of the Western Sea?
'Stockbroker! Listen from Mincing Lane
And say what the voice may be '
'Tis the voice of Pharisee people, calling loud
To a People as Pharisee '
"And one says to t'other,
'Old man  We've growl'd and scowl'd too long;
We haven't seen our interests right,
We both know we can't do wrong;
We both love swagger and rot,
Alone, each can lick Creation; together
we'll give it 'em hotI
"We're brothers, like Cain and Abel;
We're friends, like the cat and the dog;
But we'll boom the self-same paper,
And we'll roll the self-same log;
For the same blood runs in our veins-oh, my eyes I
lestways, when it t'aint otherwisel




GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN


77


Throughout the first week of April, war spirit developed rapidly.49   On April 5, Mr. Woodford notified
Secretary Sherman that, in view of the very critical relations between Spain and the United States, he had
asked the British charge d'affaires at Madrid to assume
charge of American interests in Spain.50 The following day representatives of the six Powers, Great
Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia,
and Italy, addressed a note to the American government in behalf of peace.5' Two days later the London
Times explained that Great Britain's signature to the
peace note was in no way hostile to           the United
"So fling 'em out on the breeze
Bluster, and Bully, and Brag!
And the standard of Spangled Shoddy
Shall wave o'er a Sea of Swag,
Wherever the Press shall vapour and
wherever the Purse shall wag.
"For wherever we come, we twain,
The machine gun shall bellow of Jesus,
And the Bible preach gin and gain,
For our greed and gospel's the same.
And if we've made an end of the Redskin,
so have you of his Maori kin.
"'Yes; this is the voice on the bluff March gale;
We've squabbled and sniggered too long,
But now we'll tell quite another tale
And on 'Change sing another song.
We'll smoke our pipes together,
long as our bacey'll hold,
And face the dirty weather
safe in each other's gold."'
49Pall Mall Gazette, April 4, 6, 1898.
"Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 739-740.
Ibid., pp. 740-741.




78     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
States. On April 19, rumour that the United States
had resented this action as unwarrantable interference
with her responsibilities was considered in the House
of Commons.52
Early in the winter of 1902 these last efforts to secure
peace led to the final attempt on the part of Germany
to discredit the friendship which Great Britain had
extended to the United States during the Spanish
American War. The Kaiser ordered a racing yacht
to be built in the United States. Later, he decided
to send Prince Henry on an unofficial visit to be
present at the launching of the boat. Miss Alice
Roosevelt was asked to christen it. Both the German
and the American press made much of the proposed
visit. The British, unwisely, considered the situation
with alarm, feeling that it might endanger the AngloAmerican friendship. In all probability the British
press went too far in their protestations of friendship for the United States, since the German press
saw fit to retaliate. On February 6, the New York
Times published what appeared to be a semi-official
report. "Almost exactly four years ago the Spanish
ambassador here asked Germany whether Germany
would lead in action against the United States for
the protection of the monarchial principles. The
answer was a definite refusal, and the same was given
a month later, about the middle of March, when the
invitation reached Germany to participate in the
intervention undertaken upon the initiative of
Austria.... After that, several attempts were made
to induce Germany, or the Dreibund, to agree to inter' Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LVI, pp. 418-419.




GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN


79


vention, in which attempts the Pope was especially
active. The final result was that Dr. von Holleben,
German ambassador to Washington, was instructed
to join in the steps proposed by Austria only in case
all the other five great Powers participated." The
article continued that on April 7, a collective note,
signed by the six Powers, was handed to the officials
at Washington, advising a peaceable settlement. On
April 14, Great Britain, through her ambassador,
proposed a new collective note, in which the Powers
should declare that Europe regarded America's
armed intervention in Cuba as unjustifiable. The ambassadors telegraphed to their home governments asking for instructions. The step failed through Germany's refusal. "Afterwards, in June and July, while
the United States was making great progress in the
Philippines, England actively tried to induce the Spanish commission in England to ask for peace proposals,
for to no power was American encroachment in the
Pacific more annoying than to England."
The Associated Press denied the story the day
previous in London.53 On the following day the New
York Times declared that it "put no faith whatever
in the report" from the Kreuz Zeitung. On February 14, it was asked in the House of Commons if Great
Britain ever proposed the note in question. Viscount
Cranborne, under secretary of state for foreign affairs,
replied, "No, Great Britain never proposed, through
Her Majesty's ambassadors, or otherwise, any declaration adverse to the United States in regard to their
intervention in Cuba. On the contrary, Her
' New York Times, February 6, 1902.




80     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Majesty's Government declined to assent to any such
proposal." 54
The actual story of events would seem to be simple. On April 14, 1898, through the efforts of the Spanish ambassador, a meeting was called in the office of
Lord Pauncefote. The Powers had previously agreed
that as doyen the British ambassador should be asked
to draft a note of intervention. They felt that the
Spanish note of April 10 might alter the situation.
Sir Julian drafted the note, feeling that he might be
able to make it more moderate than it might otherwise be. After the preliminary note had been read,
M. Cambon, the French ambassador, took the note
and revised it, changing the spirit of the note but
scarcely altering the wording. Lord Pauncefote failed
to see what had been done and signed the note as his
own. Copies of the Cambon note were sent to the
different foreign offices. When Dr. von Holleben
cabled the note to Berlin he added these words:
"Personally, I regard this demonstration somewhat
coldly." The Emperor appended the following marginal note to the copy: "I regard it as completely futile and purposeless and, therefore, prejudicial. I am
against this step." This note was said to have remained in the foreign office until in 1902 when it was
used to refute the British protestations of friendship
for the United States. Naturally the event grieved
Lord Pauncefote greatly, particularly since the British
Government, in its own statement, had not exonerated
him. Some time later George Smalley, a newspaper
' St. James Budget, February 14, 1902; Hansard's Parliamentary
Debates, Vol. CIII (February 14, 1902), pp. 38-39.




GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN


81


correspondent, and a friend of Lord Pauncefote, secured the real story. This was cabled to the Times,
together with a statement from President Roosevelt:
"Not only do I not believe this Berlin story, but I
know it is false." Lord Pauncefote died a few weeks
later. It would seem safe to say that the "Holleben
story" is false, and that Lord Pauncefote, through
his failure to see the spirit of the Cambon note, had
opened the way for this malicious report. At any rate,
its effect had been simply to give added strength to
the Anglo-American friendship.55
On April 9, General Fitzhugh Lee left Havana placing the American consulate in charge of the British
consul-general. On the same day representatives of
the six great Powers of Europe called upon the Spanish
minister of state at Madrid and recommended a cessation of hostilities in Cuba. As a result, General Blanco
was instructed to proclaim a truce, the length of which
would depend upon his discretion.56     Two days later
President McKinley, wearied of Spanish evasion and
suspicion, sent his war message to Congress.57   While
the members of the British government praised the
moderate character of the note they regretted that
President McKinley had turned affairs over to Congress, feeling that in so doing he had renounced his
6New York Times, February 6, 7, 13, 1902; London Times, February 6, 7, 8, 14, 1902; St. James Budget, February 13, 14, 21, 1902;
Smalley, George W., Anglo-American Memories, second series (London, 1912), pp. 170-188.
"6Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LVI, p. 418; London
Times, April 11, 1898.
"Richardson, Messages and Papers of the President. Vol. X,
pp. 139-157.




82      ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
future right of initiation and surrendered power to Congress.58 They regretted too that although Spain had
delayed so long, Mr. McKinley had been unable to
give the Sagasta ministry time to carry out their last
promises.59 On the other hand, "The wonder to most
of us," said Justin McCarthy, "was, not that the
United States should have intervened at last, but that
she had not intervened long before.... if America
cared nothing as a State for the pleading of mere humanity, she would have to consider whether her own
interests as a State did not compel her to the work
of intervention." 60 Generally, however, the British
press praised the moderation of the note and felt that
it had not brought war particularly nearer.6'
Perhaps the most suggestive indication of Great
Britain's attitude toward the United States during the
interval of April 4 and 11 when the entire world felt
that war was inevitable 62 is to be found in the Saturday Review which was always hostile to American interests. "When we find the bulk of the English newspapers calling on us to admire the attitude of the
United States and accord our moral support to the
Washington Government, it is time to protest." 63
In general, Great Britain interpreted the causes of
the war in a manner highly favourable to the Americans. While her own interests may have influenced,.
'London Times, April 11-14,1898.
Ibid., April 12, 1898.
McCarthy, Justin, "What England Feels," The American-Spanish
War-A History by the War Leaders (Norwich, 1899), p. 492.
'British Weekly, April 14, 1898.
'Pall Mall Gazette, April 14,1898.
Saturday Review, April 9, 1898.




GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN


83


and probably did influence, this decision, there is no
more reason to doubt the integrity of her sympathy
than to discredit the sincerity of America in entering
the war.64 Most of the British newspapers agreed that
the war had been brought on by three causes: humanitarian, in which she placed primary significance,
the need for the protection of American commercial
interests in Cuba, and the safety of American citizens
resident in Cuba.65
On April 15, the Pall Mall Gazette, less hostile to
the United States by far than the Saturday Review,
but never actively friendly, said, "... they [the American people] are by no means clear either for what they
are going to fight, or to what use they will put the
success which, sooner or later, is bound to attend their
arms. They intend, of course, to bundle the Spaniards
out of Cuba, neck and crop; but for what purpose?
Mr. McKinley has told Congress that there is no Government in Cuba that the States ought to recognize;
nevertheless it is more than probable that unless the
States do not recognize the 'so-called Republic of
Cuba' the insurgents will receive their deliverers as
they have the Spaniards.".
On April 21, Secretary Sherman cabled Mr. Woodford to turn the legation over to the British embassy
and to leave for Paris immediately. On the same day
" Cf. Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, pp.
321-322.
London Times, April 2, 4, 1898; Spectator, March 14, 1898; "The
United States and Spain," Quarterly Review, Vol. CLXXXVIII
(July, 1898), pp. 216-241; McCarthy, Justin, "What England Feels,"
The American-Spanish War-A History by the War Leaders,
pp. 489-508.




84       ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
the Consul-General at Barcelona was ordered to turn
over all consular affairs to the British consuls and leave
Spain at once.06 At the same time a fund was placed
subject to British call for the relief of American citizens resident in Spain.67
Throughout April Great Britain took the utmost
precaution to observe a strict technical neutrality. The
British consuls everywhere sent formal notices of neutrality in response to a general proclamation issued at
London.68    Neutral trade privileges were carefully
maintained, consular negotiations were carried on with
the utmost precaution, and international law was zealously respected. It is safe to say that although British sympathy was usually exhibited in all British ports
for American interests, there were very few, if any,
open violations of official neutrality. It was, indeed,
this very precaution which enabled Great Britain to
be of the service she was to American interests.
'Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 766.
"Ibid., p. 768.
' For a complete text of the Proclamation see the London Gazette,
April 26, 1898; Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 842, 843, 844, 850-851,
865-871; London Times, April 27, 1898.




CHAPTER V
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE WEST
WAR with Spain became certain on April 19, 1898,
when Congress passed a resolution authorizing and
directing the President to intervene at once to stop
the war in Cuba. The previous day Henry Cabot
Lodge of Massachusetts had introduced a bill in the
Senate which provided that money be appropriated
for the payment of the Bering Sea award to Great
Britain pursuant to the stipulations of the Convention
of February 8, 1896. The bill of appropriation had
been drawn up by John T. Morgan of Alabama of
the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations.1
'This bill was of peculiar interest to Great Britain at this time,
for the following reasons: the sum of $473,151.26 had been awarded
Great Britain by the commissioners appointed pursuant to the
stipulations of the convention of February 8, 1896, which provided
for the settlement of the claims presented by Great Britain against
the United States in virtue of the convention of February 28, 1892.
(See United States Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXIX, 55th Congress,
2d session, p. 470.) The Bering Sea controversy had continued a
constant source of irritation between the two powers after the latter
date, and the United States had failed to make the necessary appropriation for the award granted. On April 18, 1898, Senator Lodge of
the Committee on Foreign Relations proposed a bill for its payment.
"I desire to say," he said, "on the question of the reference of the
bill, that the message of the President of the United States communicating the report of the commissioners came to the Senate on
the 14th of January, 1898. In the pressure of the great question
which has been before the country the matter I suppose has been
85




86   ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


A second event following immediately upon the introduction of the Lodge bill was highly pleasing to the
British merchants. As early as 1896, Great Britain
had begun to be concerned over the fact that neither
the United States nor Spain had signed the Declaration of Paris. At no time before the outbreak of the
war had either state indicated what action she would
pursue either toward privateering or toward enemy
goods in neutral ships, or neutral goods in enemy
ships.2 In the earlier days of April, 1898, the British
press suggested that if Spanish privateers should intercept American wheat and cotton ships they might
throw half of Europe into a passion of apprehension
and annoyance. On April 20, a semi-official report
reached Great Britain that the United States would
act under the Declaration. British comment was very
favourable.4    On April 26, President McKinley officially announced that the United States would dislost sight of.... It is a debt of honor and good faith." During
the brief discussion of the bill Senator Lodge gave assurance that
every member of the Foreign Relations Committee desired its payment. Even Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama spoke in its behalf.
This act meant, then, that the United States was not -only going to
meet a debt long overdue to Great Britain and thereby help close
the long controversy, but that the two men on the Senate who had
been most critical of Great Britain in the past three years had acted
in her behalf. (Congressional Record, Vol. XXXI, part 4, 55th Congress, 2d session, p. 4004.) Final settlement was made on June 15,
1898. (Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 371-373.) The Times of April 23,
definitely intimated the significance placed by the British press on
this act. Cf. post, p. 89.
'Pall Mall Gazette, April 16, 21, 1898: Statist, April 5.
'British Weekly, April 28, 1898.
'British Weekly, April 28, 1898; Pall Mall Gazette, April 21;
Statist, April 23, 1898.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


87


countenance privateering. This decision at once
lifted the war, so far as the United States was concerned, to a high plane of international law, a standard maintained throughout to the satisfaction of the
British and the advantage of the Americans.
Convinced of the reciprocal interests of the United
States and Great Britain as shown through these two
events, the London Times of April 21 openly expressed
British sympathy for the United States in the war.
"They [the United States] will probably make some
mistakes, as we almost invariably do, but with them
as with ourselves, mistakes will only increase the
dogged tenacity of purpose which knows how to convert mistakes themselves into stepping stones to success. Whether the struggle be brief or protracted,
there can be as little doubt of the result as there is
of the direction in which lie the sympathy and the
hope of the English people."
The Pall Mall Gazette openly criticized the action
of the London Times. It had already expressed support for the United States.5  "The Times," said the
Pall Mall Gazette, "signifies its [the war] arrival by
the tardy declaration that there can be no doubt in
which direction British hopes and sympathies will lie.
It was inevitable that the Times would say that in the
end, though those who have not made a study of its
ways might not have thought so from its querulous
tone hitherto, depending now upon one hasty view of
things, now on a diametrically opposite one. But it
was inevitable because there is no doubt of the trend of
sympathy among the mass of this country. Of course,
'Pall Mall Gazette, April 16, 20, 1898.




88     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
like every other Powerr, we shall observe a strict neutral attitude.... The Americans will fight in a cause
that commands the sympathies of this nation, and
they are our kinsmen. For these reasons, and because
the time has come when it is possible to abolish the
ancient grudge and stimulate in America those feelings
which have long been alive in England, the Times is
right in its estimate of our hopes and sympathies." 6
Following these statements of American appreciation, particularly that of the Times, various rumours
began to develop in Great Britain to the effect that
British interest was turning from the United States
to Spain.7 On April 28, it was suggested in the morning papers that a majority of Parliament favoured
Spain. Two methods were used by the London Times
to counteract these reports. On April 23, President
McKinley's answer to the Times' article of April 21
was published. "You can say that the whole of the
United States responds" to the expression of British
friendship. Five days later the Times stated the
American attitude toward Great Britain in specific
terms.
"The United States," it said, "was anxious for British
friendship. The President and the Americans in general have an opinion of England above that of all other
states. She desires to consider English interests wherever possible. Before the blockade of Havana was
declared, instructions were sent to the commander of
the fleet to facilitate in every way the departure of
the British residents. She is anxious to facilitate dip'Pall Mall Gazette, April 21, 1898.
'London Times, April 29,1898; New York Times, April 29,1898.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


89


lomatic relations. An agreement for the reference of
the North Atlantic fishery question and Canadian
trade and commerce is nearly ready for British acceptance. The payment of the Bering Sea award is declared. Mr. John Adam Kasson has been substituted
for John W. Foster on the Anglo-American Joint
High Commission to settle disputes between the United
States and Canada. Finally the President is not only
willing that his good will toward Great Britain should
be made known, but he desires that there may be some
way provided by means of which cooperation on a
large scale may be carried on between the United
States and Great Britain." 8
During the same days that the rumours of British
friendship for Spain were being reported, suggestions
of possible continental interference were likewise appearing. On April 23, the Statist said that some
powers may have wanted to intervene, but they knew
that Great Britain would never consent. She is
friendly to the United States but she will be neutral.
A week later this same paper became even more specific. "When the war between China and Japan broke
out, the Powers did not intervene, largely because the
British Government refused to join. The action of the
Continental Powers is stopped in the West Indies just
as it was stopped in the Far East.... The Continental Powers will not risk a war with the whole
English-speaking people. But if we allow matters to
drift, if we lap ourselves in the hope that no difficulties will arise, if we put off taking thought for tomorrow, we may suddenly wake up one morning to
8London Times, April 29, 1898.




90     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
find that the Continental Powers have addressed an
ultimatum to the United States." This time, the
British people, "must not be found napping." 9
After the declaration of war on April 25, AngloAmerican relations in the West centred around three
activities: the coast patrol and the blockade of Cuba,
the maintenance of neutrality, and the protection of
American interests in Spanish territory by British consuls. Early in January, 1898, Secretary John D. Long
of the Navy Department began to organize the navy
in preparation for possible action in Cuba. He proposed two lines of defence for the West. Patrol
squadrons would be formed whose purpose it should
be to protect the coast towns from bombardment and
insure the safety of American trade. In this way he
hoped to calm the fears felt by some Americans that
the Spaniards might send privateers or a blockading
squadron to the American coast, immediately upon the
outbreak of hostilities. Furthermore, he hoped by the
same means to assure Continental merchants and
financiers, particularly the British, that the American
trade would not be disturbed or endangered. So effective was this plan that although both the New York
and London exchanges showed frequent slight disturbances, trade not only remained excellent throughout
the months of January, February, and March, but
actually improved.'0 By the close of the first week
of April, 1898, British shippers had become so generally reassured that the Statist suggested that al9Statist, April 30, 1898.
"Bradstreet's, February 26, March 5, 12, 1898; see also Statist,
March 5, 1898.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


91


though Spain might be victorious in the beginning of
the war, and might even blockade a few American
towns, thereby temporarily disturbing the immediate
British supply of wheat and cotton, little damage
would be done, either to American property or AngloAmerican trade.'1
On April 30, 1898, Bradstreet's reported the business
hesitation incident to the outbreak of the war so little
as to amount almost to indifference.'2
Mr. Long's second plan of campaign was the establishment of an effective blockade of Cuba immediately
upon the outbreak of actual hostilities. He hoped in
this way to prevent the landing of Spanish reinforcements, either of troops or munitions. On April 21,
Secretary Long instructed Admiral Sampson to blockade Cuba from Cardenas to Bahia Honda if he considered it advisable, and on the same day he [Secretary Long] notified the Boston and Norfolk navy yards
that although war was not yet declared it might be
declared at any moment and that the North Atlantic
Squadron was blockading Cuba.13
Statist, April 9, 1898; Cf. ibid., March 12, 1898.
"It is impossible to say just how definitely the financial world
knew of Secretary Long's plans. Many, if not most of his naval
orders were secret and confidential, still it would seem that a general
idea of naval preparation was allowed to permeate business circles
thoroughly.
'The organization of the fleet in the West was as follows: Rear
Admiral W. T. Sampson, was commander-in-chief; Blockading
Squadron, Commodore J. C. Watson, commanding from May 6, 1896,
to June 21, 1898; First North Atlantic Squadron, Commodore J. C.
Watson, commanding from July 21, 1898, to June 27, 1898; Commodore J. A. Howell, commanding from July 1, 1898, to close of
hostilities; Second North Atlantic Squadron, Commodore W. S.
Schley, commanding after June 21, 1898, to the close of hostilities;




92        ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
On April 28, Secretary Long received information
through a London agent that the Spanish fleet under
Admiral Pasqual Cervera was still coaling at the Cape
Verde islands.'4    The following morning Mr. Long
learned through the same source that four cruisers
and three destroyers had just sailed west.'5      As a result of these notices, Mr. Long dispatched Captain C.
F. Goodrich in command of the U.S.S. St. Louis and
Captain C. S. Cotton in command of the U.S.S. Harvard to ascertain whether the Spanish fleet which had
just left the Cape Verde islands intended moving upon
the West Indian islands, and, if so, toward what
locality."6
On April 30, Mr. Long learned through the same
London agent that the steamer Avery Hill on arrival
at the Cape Verde islands reported the Spanish fleet
continuing westward at full speed.'7        For the next
two weeks no definite information was received. The
most rigid blockade of the West Indies was maintained,
and Admiral W. T. Sampson held his fleet ready for
Flying Squadron, Commodore W. S. Schley, commanding from the
beginning of the war to May 24, 1898, independently-from May 24
to June 21, under the orders of Admiral Sampson; Naval Base, Key
West, Florida, Commodore George C. Ramey, commanding May 7,
1898, to August 24, 1898. At the beginning of the war Commodore
Howell was given command of the Northern Patrol Squadron whose
duty it was to protect the coast and the coastwise trade between the
capes of Delaware and Bar Harbor, Maine. See Annual Report of
the Navy Department, 1898, pp. 37-41.
14Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 359. The same
material with similar pagination may always be found in House
Documents, Vol. XII, No. 3, 55th Congress, 3d session, p. 359.
15 Ibid., p. 360.
"6Ibid-, pp. 360-364.
` Ibid., p. 364.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


93


immediate attack whenever he should receive notice
from the Navy Department of the exact location of the
Spanish fleet.
During this time the British policy of benevolent
neutrality was tested to the limit as a few illustrations
will show. On April 27, notice was given the Somers,
a torpedo boat, stationed at Falmouth, England, to
leave at once. The boat did not have sufficient crew
for immediate sailing, and enlistment in a foreign port
was illegal. As a result, it remained interned in the
British port throughout the period of the war. It was
not until December, 1898, that Great Britain sanctioned its return, and then only when the United States
had given an assurance that, in the event of hostilities
being resumed with Spain, no use would be made of
it.1 8
A comparison of this act with another will illustrate Great Britain's policy of technical neutrality.
A Spanish ship was docked at Cork, Ireland, for repairs. On April 21, Mr. Arthur Balfour declared its
detention in the event of war between Spain and the
United States as contrary to the practices of war since
its repairs were uncompleted.19 In either case the boat
was of considerable immediate importance to the country owning it. The British might easily, in the first
instance, through careless or intentional negligence,
have allowed the enlistment of a foreign crew. It
would have been almost impossible for Spain to secure
evidence of British guilt. In the latter instance a
reasonable delay in rendering a decision would not
'Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 1006-7.
1 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LVI, p. 962.




94       ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
have been unusual, but it would have inconvenienced
Spain.
On May 1, the English "tramp" steamer, Strathdee
of Glasgow, was stopped by an American patrol ship
and boarded by the United States for the third time
on her trip between Progreso, Mexico, to Sagua. The
captain was very amiable over it and suggested that he
would probably be stopped several times more.20 Between the time when it was first assigned to blockade
duty and May 10, the U.S.S. Eagle stopped and
boarded the British brigatine Harry Stewart and the
British steamer Adula. The Adula, at the time it was
stopped, was carrying refugees from Cienfuegos to
Kingston, Jamaica. The passengers seemed free and
willing to give any information they knew concerning
the blockading activities.21
Out of a total of ten British prizes captured by the
North Atlantic Fleet, five were condemned, three were
released, and the disposition of two is given as "unknown." 22   The capture of one, the Restormel, attracted considerable attention. In April the rumour
appeared, both in England and in the United States,
that a shipment of Cardiff coal, intended for Spanish
London Times, May 5,1898.
" Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, pp. 186-187, 350;
Sampson, Rear-Admiral William T., "The Atlantic Fleet in the
Spanish War," Century Magazine, Vol. LVII (April, 1898), pp. 886 -912. In no case noted did the British vessels seem at all disposed to
object to being stopped. They showed their papers willingly and
accepted the request as an acknowledged measure sanctioned by international law. Furthermore, particularly those destined for Kingston,
Jamaica, frequently carried Cuban refugees.
2 Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, gives a total list
of the prize, pp. 316-325.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


95


use, had been made. On May 10, the Navy Department received information from London that a quantity of coal had been placed in English ships and sent
somewhere along the north coast of Venezuela for the
purpose of supplying the Spanish squadron.23 On the
morning of May 25, the U.S.S. St. Paul gave chase
to a steamer which was attempting to enter the harbour of Santiago. She proved to be the British steamer
Restormel, from Cardiff, Wales, with 2400 tons of coal,
evidently for the Spanish fleet. She had been at San
Juan, Porto Rico, thence had gone to Curasao, where
she had been informed that the Spanish fleet had left
two days before her arrival. She was then "directed
to proceed to Santiago." Her captain frankly stated
that he had expected to be captured. Both he and
the crew seemed pleased with their failure to reach the
Spanish. The collier, according to the captain, was
one of a group of three sent from the same company
under similar instructions. If the report be true that
there were less than one thousand tons of coal in the
possession of Cervera, the capture of the Restormel
was a serious loss for the Spaniards.24  The following
morning another collier was captured, probably a second of the group of three.25
Immediately following the declaration of war all
American consulates and embassies were turned over
23 Ibid., p. 390. This information from London had probably come
from the same London agent to whom reference has been made
previously. Although his name cannot be ascertained, his informal
tion seems to be considered authoritative.
"Ibid., pp. 410-411, 413; Cf. also War Notes No. 1, Office of Naval
Intelligence, Information from Abroad, pp. 34-36.
'Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 399.




96     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
to the resident British officials. The extent of the
services they performed can hardly be estimated. They
provided for the safety of the lives of American citizens and for the protection of their property and their
business interests. They served as mediators between
the American and Spanish officials providing for the
comfort and exchange of American prisoners and for
the facilitation of official communications. Wherever
possible, in a besieged city, they cared for the needy
natives, distributed food and clothing, and cared for
the sick.
Generally, the Spanish officials recognized the British consuls as neutral and cooperated with them willingly. In some cases they curtly refused every favour
that the British Government had been commissioned
to request for American citizens.26   The Spanish
civilian population, unaccustomed to the exchange of
international courtesies, often looked upon the British
with little less hostility than upon the Americans. The
correspondent for the London Times reported that
the populace about Corunna believed that the British
were allies of the Americans and planned to share in
the spoils of war.27 Rumours were constantly appearing in Great Britain that certain consulates had been
attacked by Spanish mobs.28
A few illustrations will show the varied and painstaking work done by the British consuls in Cuba. The
blockade, necessary for the conquest of the Spanish
26 Kelly, Edmond, "An American in Madrid during the War," The
Century Magazine, Vol. LVII (January, 1899), pp. 450-457.
2 London Times, April 29, 1898.
' Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LVII, pp. 188-189.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


97


army on the island, brought even keener suffering on
the Cubans than it did on the Spaniards. Food was
not to be procured. Dogs died of starvation in the
open streets; horses, weakened from lack of food, fell
in their traces and were left to die at the roadside;
men, women and children were freqently found dead
on the paths leading to the market place whither they
had gone early in the morning hoping to procure a
few morsels of food. Not only the American Government but private charities as well were anxious to extend relief.
About the 10th of May two volunteers, correspondents for the New York World, Thrall and Jones, were
landed near Mariel for the purpose of instructing the
rebels to come to the coast to receive supplies. The
men were captured the same day by a Spanish patrol
and taken to Havana for trial. Their only hope for
escape from death as spies was in the influence of the
British consul, who might secure a suspension of the
extreme penalty. The United States Government on
the evening of May 15, sent the gunboat Uncas under
a flag of truce into the harbour of Havana in an endeavour to make terms and save the lives of the two
men. Through the efforts of the British consulgeneral, Alexander Gallan, an exchange was secured,
and the two correspondents were released.29
A few weeks later than this Lord Pauncefote informed Secretary Day that he had just received a telegraphic report from acting Consul-General Jerome
saying that many United States citizens in Cuba who
were in danger of starvation had applied to him for
Lodon Times, May 16, 1898.




98  ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


relief. He desired to know what he should do in the
matter. The State Department at once placed two
thousand dollars to the credit of the consul-general
together with the request that the United States be
kept informed as to the extent to which relief might
be required in the future. A few days later Lord
Pauncefote reported that a total of 107 American
families had applied for relief; 34 were given aid;
4 were refused; and the remaining 69 families were
still under consideration. On August 10, Secretary
Day asked that "an expression of the Department's
high appreciation of his continued efficient and conscientious execution of its request" be extended Mr.
Jerome.30
A third illustration will show a still different type
of consular service. The Home Mission Board of the
Southern Baptist Convention owned a considerable
amount of property in Havana and San Miguel. It
was in charge of Dr. Ed Beloit, a French citizen, who
died early in the summer. The Mission Board then
authorized Miss Joerg, a niece and an assistant of Dr.
Beloit, to assume control. At the same time it requested the Department of State to notify the British
consul of the new appointment in order that he might
render such good offices as might be needful and proper.
Soon after this an attempt was made by a man named
Sanchez to extort money from the Joerg mission-in
connection with the will of the late Dr. Beloit. The
former American vice-consul at Havana was an executor under the will. Mr. Jerome, acting British consul,
served with the French consul to protect the rights of
'Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 998-1000.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


99


the French and American heirs.31 In September, Mr.
Porter King, chairman of the Southern Baptist Convention, and Miss Joerg sent to the British consul
through Secretary Day a vote of thanks expressing
their appreciation of the kindness and courtesy that
he had shown them.32
By far the most spectacular instance of consular
service was rendered by Frederick W. Ramsden, British
consul at Santiago. After sinking the Merrimac in an
effort to block the entrance to the harbour at Santiago,
Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson and his crew
of seven men were captured by the Spanish and put
into the old Morro prison. The cells were badly
lighted, unsanitary, and poorly furnished. Within an
hour after the arrival of the Americans, men began to
bring in furniture from Santiago. A table, a washstand, a pitcher, a basin, a cot with a double blanket,
and several chairs-one of them a rocker-were given
to Lieutenant Hobson. A cot and a blanket were provided for each of the men. These were gifts from Mr.
Ramsden and were but the first of many acts of kindness and attention on his part. Shortly after the
arrival of the furniture, the Consul, himself, came in
order to investigate the safety and comfort of the prisoners. On June 6, a general bombardment began and
Morro Castle was in direct line of the firing. Fortunately none of the Americans were killed. The following day Mr. Ramsden secured their transfer to
Santiago. From then on the Consul called at least every
third day on both Lieutenant Hobson and his men.
Ibid., 1898, pp. 987-989.
Ibid., pp. 987-989.




100     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
He sent them fruit, coffee, sugar, crackers, bread, tobacco, and cards. He secured hospital attention for the
sick and out-of-doors exercise for all. Later he negotiated an exchange for them. Throughout the entire
time of their imprisonment, he constantly guarded
their safety, health, and comfort.33
Soon after this the struggle at El Caney began. In
spite of the heat and exhaustion from overwork Mr.
Ramsden remained in the city, sparing himself no
strain in caring for the sick and wounded. It cost
him his life, for he contracted the fever and died on
August 10, at his home in Kingston, Jamaica. The
"good-Samaritan of Santiago" had given his life to
the cause of the American people and suffering humanity. There is probably no greater example of
sincere, unselfish, loyal service to duty and humanity
to be found in the entire history of the war.
As a recognition of his service General Wood
ordered, on August 12, that all flags be put at halfmast.   This act was reported at once by Lord
Pauncefote to Mr. Alvey A. Adee of the Department of State. On September 17, Mr. Adee forwarded a note of appreciation to the British Government for the services rendered by Mr. Ramsden.
This was followed a few days later by a second
note of appreciation of the gratification of the
British Government for the respect shown Mr.
3' Hobson, Richmond Pearson, The Sinking of the Merrimac (New
York, 1899), pp. 228-251. The same story appeared previously in
The Century Magazine, Vol. LVII (December 1898), pp. 265-283;
(January, 1899), pp. 427-450; (February, 1899), pp. 580-604; (March,
1899), pp. 752-779.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


101


Ramsden, and a further eulogy of the consul
himself.34
No study of Anglo-American relations in the West
would be complete without a consideration of the attitude of the British colonies toward the United States.
There has grown up a generally accepted idea that
the colonials were not friendly toward the Americans.
Not only is this notion false but it seems safe to say
that the colonials usually maintained an attitude of
benevolent neutrality. It is true that Great Britain
held as the fundamental requisite in her new foreign
policy the promotion of good will between herself and
her colonies. No matter what her immediate foreign
situation might be she could not afford to scrifice for
American interest her colonial support measured in
terms of men, money, and munitions, and her own immediate necessity.35 But Great Britain in her original
declaration of neutrality left its maintenance entirely
in the control of her colonials within their own
borders. Althougth there were various rumours of
broken neutrality on their part, favourable to Spain,
no situation was reported in which the United States
saw fit to refer the matter to the British Government.
On July 17, Michael Davitt asked the House of
Commons if attention had been directed to the reports
"Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 380-381. After the close of the war
Mr. R. U. Johnson of the Century Magazine suggested to Mr. Long
that a suitable memorial be erected for Consul Ramsden. This was
done, and a heavy bronze tablet was designed by Robert G. Skerrett
of the Navy Department and cast in the Washington Navy Yards.
It is now affixed to the house in Santiago where Mr. Ramsden lived.
A replica was set at the Naval Academy at Annapolis.
"Literary Digest, March 12, 1898.




102    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
that war supplies had been provided at Jamaica for
the Spanish and what steps had been taken in that
colony to enforce neutrality. Lord Curzon replied that
the American Department of State had made no such
representation. Jamaica had been provided with a
copy of the Declaration of Neutrality and might be
expected to provide for its observance.36
As a matter of fact, the U.S.S. Harvard had been
forced to stop at Kingston, Jamaica, for coal and water.
Since it was impossible for Captain Cotton to take on
board this ship in twenty-four hours, with the facilities available at Kingston, the amount of coal necessary to carry her to the nearest home port, Key West,
he asked to be allowed to remain in port thirty-six
hours. The request was granted, together with a second request for an extension of time. The Harvard
was allowed seven hundred and fifty tons of coal, and
all the fresh water needed. "There was an apparent
disposition on the part of the British colonial authorities to render every assistance that the attitude of the
British government as a neutral power would
warrant." 37
Lieutenant W. H. Allen, in describing his trip
around Cape Horn with the Oregon, reported that,
although strict neutrality was observed at the British
Barbadoes, "The sympathy of the Barbadians was
clearly with us, and we were constantly advised to
go in and whip the Spaniards." 38 Early in May, the
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LX, p. 945.
Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, pp. 406-407, Report of Captain C. S. Cotton of the U.S.S. Harvard.
3 Allen, Lieutenant W. H., "The Voyage of the Oregon," The
American-Spanish War-A History by the War Leaders, p. 175.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


103


London Daily Mail collected a group of editorials from
British colonial journals illustrating their attitude toward the United States and the Spanish-American War.
Praise, support, and appreciation were expressed for the
United States by nearly every important colonial paper
not only in the West but in the East as well. The
Singapore Free Press was quoted as saying "opinions
may differ as to the manner and occasion of that interposition, but no doubt this will liberate Cuba from a
dominion that has long become intolerable." The
Shanghai Mercury said, "It is in the interest of peace
that America will fight. It is in the interests of civilization, order and good government that President McKinley has decided, and very properly, to intervene.
'We cannot but reecho the sentiment of the Yankee
captain taken at Taku-"Blood is thicker than water"
and hope for the triumph of Anglo-Saxon civilization.'"
The Kingston Press suggested that "America is more
than justified in intervening in Cuba.... In stepping
in and saying, 'these crimes against humanity and
civilization must cease,' America has the sympathy and
support of the civilized world." The Kingston News
Letter said, "the Republic [the United States] will
have the sympathy, and support of Great Britain and
her colonies all the world over." The Gazette [Indian]
said, "There is only one feeling among Britons in
India, and that is that America's position is impregnable from the point of view of humanity." 39 In New
South Wales one hundred men offered their services
to the American consul.
"Cf. Public Opinion, May 5, 1898, for extracts from the London
Daily Mail symposium entitled, "Anglo-Saxon's Solid."




104    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
The attitude of the Canadians is probably more
difficult to evaluate than that of any of the other British colonies. There was some, perhaps considerable,
anti-American comment. A Study of four Canadian
newspapers for the first half of the year 1898 will reveal this. At the same time it will give proof of considerable Canadian friendship. The Montreal Daily Witness was always frankly friendly. The editorials following the battle of Manila and the battle of Santiago
expressed satisfaction over the American victories.
Nevertheless, on May 3, 1898, it said, "Nothing strikes
the close observer here [Toronto] more forcibly just
now than the almost unanimity of the people in their
sympathy for Spain in the present struggle.... The
redeeming feature of the situation is the hope of an
Anglo-American Alliance one outcome of which would
be the more kindly and respectful treatment of Canada
by the United States politicians." 40 The Toronto
Globe seemed equally friendly. On May 2, 1898, it
denied that the French Canadians were in sympathy
with Spain and asserted that the chief interest of all
Canadians was the development of Canadian nationality. There are, it concluded, neither "English Canadians" nor "French Canadians." On May 6, it suggested that an Anglo-British "unity" would be the
welcome development of Commodore Dewey's guns at
Manila. A few comments from the Globe for July 5,
are suggestive: "It's in the blood; Britannia and
Columbia rule the waves; we rather think now that
the United States is an Anglo-Saxon nation." In an'Montreal Daily Witness, May 3, 1898, see also May 2, 4, 6, 7;
June 28, July 4, 5, 6, 1898.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


105


other issue it said, "On the sea the Americans are real
sons of old mother England." 41 The Ottawa Citizen
was inclined to be sarcastic and critical of the United
States, but it was not particularly friendly toward
Spain. On July 1, after criticizing the New York Sun
bitterly for its tardy professions of British friendship,
it said, "It seems to us that the English papers are
getting altogether too sloppy in their Anglo-AmericanAlliance admiration of the prowess of Uncle Sam's
troops." On the whole the paper often failed to be
guarded or careful in its discussions of Spanish-American affairs. It cannot, though, be said to have been
very unfriendly toward the United States.42    The
Montreal Gazette, though friendly to the United
States, was inclined to emphasize the importance of
Canadian nationality. At times it maintained an attitude that was critical toward both the United States
and Great Britain.43  Generally, then, it may be said
that anti-American comment came almost entirely
from three sources: the French-Canadians, the Canadian-nationalists, and a few anti-Americans who failed
to understand the importance to Canada of the new
relation which was developing between the United
States and Great Britain.
Early in the war a few Canadian merchants began
to realize that Canada would benefit from an AngloAmerican alliance during the war. Inevitably AngloAmerican friendship would lead the American people,
in proportion as they desired British friendship, to
4 Toronto Globe, May 4; see also May 2, 5, 6, July 4, 5, 1898.
4' Ottawa Citizen, May 1-8, July 1, 4, 5, 1898.
' Montreal Gazette, May 2, 42 9, June 30, July 4, 5, 12, 1898.




106  ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


seek a settlement of all those questions of trade and
boundary lines which had been accumulating between
Canada and the United States for years.44  But at this
point the Canadian nationalists caused difficulty. As
nationalists they desired that all the negotiations be
conducted by Canadians in behalf of Canadian interests. They were suspicious of both the British and the
Americans, for they realized that the former would
make concessions which the Canadians would not.45
Perhaps the chief factor leading to friendship between the United States and Canada was the growing
maturity of the two nations. With such a development petty jealousies became a matter of the past.
Canada ceased to be afraid of American aggression as
the United States abandoned her attitude of national
superiority. Gradually Canada recognized herself as
a great democratic nation in harmony with the political principles of both Great Britain and the United
States and opposed to the monarchial theories of the
nations of Europe. Out of this grew the idea that in
case of war between Great Britain and the continental
nations, the United States, under the Monroe Doctrine,
would support Canadian nationality.46
Only once during the entire war did Canada's proximity to the United States endanger her neutrality.
Early in June the secret service bureau obtained possession of a letter written by Lieutenant Ramon Car'Literary Digest, April 9, 23, 1898.
4 Congressional Record, Vol. XXXI, 55th Congress, 2d session,
p. 2471; "The Anglo-American Joint High Commission," North
American Review, Vol. CLXVIII (August, 1898), pp. 165-175; London Times, January 1, May 24, 1898.
" Literary Digest, March 12, 1898; Public Opinion, June 16, 1898.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


107


ranza, a former Spanish naval attache. The writer declared himself to be the organizer of Spain's spy system in this continent, and acknowledged the capture
by the United States authorities of two of his best
spies. The letter in itself was of little importance,
but the United States, Canada, and Great Britain were
equally disturbed over its publication.47  This feeling
was intensified by the fact that the former Spanish
minister to Washington had taken up his residence in
Toronto,48 and that a number of Spanish speakers had
appeared from time to time in the city. A few Canadians as a result openly expressed sympathy for
Spain.49  The majority of the Canadians, however,
were entirely neutral and critical of the Spanish attempts to influence Canadian sympathy. In July
sufficient proof had been obtained of Spanish activities
to warrant British intervention, and a number of Spaniards fround guilty of violation of neutrality were asked
to leave.Y0
Closely allied to British colonial sympathy in its
importance to Anglo-American relations in the West
were certain elements of British appreciation of American activities. Nothing could be more pleasing to the
American people than British praise. When the raw
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LVI, p. 1210.
4 Ibid., Vol. LIX, p. 47.
'Montreal Gazette, July 12, 1898.
' Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LXIII, p. 437. This
action was taken by the direction of Great Britain rather than
Canada. "The authority for such action rests upon the power of
the Crown in such a case to expel an alien from Canadian territory."
See Public Opinion, June 6, 1898, for American comments on the
letter.




108  ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


American troops assembled at Tampa no one knew
their deficiencies better than the American Government. Yet with the exception of a very few British
papers, chief among them being the Saturday Review,
the British press was united in its favourable comments. They spoke of the infantry as seasoned men
who appeared throughout as a most thoroughly "workmanlike" body of soldiers. They did not have the smart
appearance that one looked for in a British Tommy
Atkins nor was there the strict discipline and deference
from men to officers when off duty customary in
Europe. But there was a morale and an individual
efficiency which was superior even to that of British
soldiers. Seventy-five per cent of them were expert
marksmen.5'"
Later on, as time passed and American action in
Cuba seemed slow and inefficient, the British comments
continued to be favourable.52  Spanish delay in attack
signified Spanish defeat. Great Britain saw, even better
than the majority of the American people, the true situation. Spain was defeated on the sea, although the
army in Cuba was untouched. The Americans might
expect to meet resistance from those natives both in
Cuba and the Philippines who hoped to reap the political fruits of victory. Great Britain saw also that the
'London Times, May 23, 1898. The Illustrated London News,
April 30, 1898, gave pictures of "Types of the United States Navy."
The men represented were of a very high order. On the same day
it gave a picture of an American man-of-war preparing for action.
The men were again pictured as of high order; Graphic supplement,
April 30, May 14, June 11, 1898, gave representations of American
sailors and naval officers which were very complimentary to the
United States.
'Pall Mall Gazette, May 21, 23, 27, 31, 1898.




RELATIONS IN THE WEST


109


only solution possible for the native insurrections
would be the conquest and civilization of those peoples.
The Americans did not realize this until the urgency of
the situation forced them to assume this responsibility.
Furthermore, Great Britain realized that these islands
must be kept safe from European vultures, principally
Germany, who would not only snatch the islands but
American trade as well.53  Strange as it may seem,
the British public were generally very late in their
receipt of American news. It was not until June 6,
that they knew what was happening in Cuba, and then
only two subjects were cleared up. Admiral Cervera
with six vessels was in the harbour of Santiago, and
Admiral Sampson was on the outside of the harbour
maintaining a blockade. It was not until July 5, that
the news of the battle of Santiago on July 3 was published. The chief result was that when information was
published in Great Britain it was generally accurate.
In conclusion, the war in the West had led to the
development of Anglo-American friendship in a number of respects. In the first place, the United States
realized for the first time the importance of British
friendship. The western Atlantic had definitely become an Anglo-American sea with the United States
and Great Britain in joint control. Furthermore, a
new harmony had developed between the British colonies and the United States, which was essential to the
development of Anglo-American harmony. Finally,
Great Britain had recognized the United States as a
world power and as essential to the development of the
great theory of Anglo-Saxon politics.
' London Times, June 3, July 9, 1898.




CHAPTER VI


ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE EAST
ON January 3, 1898, Commodore Dewey assumed
command of the Asiatic squadron then stationed in
the harbour of Nagasaki, Japan. The records which
were turned over to him by Acting Rear-Admiral F. B.
McNair mentioned little of interest. There was slight
indication in them of the approaching trouble that was
soon to assume critical aspects in China. They spoke
of an uneasy state of affairs in Korea, some antimissionary riots in Japan, the seizure of Kiaochow
bay by the Germans one month earlier, and a few
minor international matters. There was no suggestion of trouble in the Philippines and "... in no manner was there any forecast given of the work in which
the squadron would soon be so vitally interested." 1
The Asiatic station, however, as Commodore Dewey
saw it at that time, held a strategic significance. The
United States was inevitably drifting into a war with
Spain. In command of an efficient fleet in the Pacific,
with a freedom to act in consequence of being so far
distant from Washington, he could strike promptly
and successfully at the Spanish forces in the Philippines.2 In every respect Commodore Dewey was the
1Dewey, George, Autobiography of George Dewey (New York,
1913), pp. 174-175.
'Ibid., p. 168.
110




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


ill


man best fitted to assume command of the Asiatic
squadron. Thoroughly trained in the old school of
naval efficiency, he had, nevertheless, become a
profound student of modern naval science and procedure and international law. In temperament, in
ability, and in experience he was thoroughly prepared
to meet European naval tactics and diplomatic
strategy.
Commodore Dewey's first concern, immediately after
his appointment in October, 1897, had been relative to
ammunition. Inquiry soon revealed the fact that there
was not even a peace allowance on hand. A further
supply had been ordered, but no effort had been made
to facilitate its shipment. Largely through the efforts
of Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, who was then assistant
secretary of the navy, Commodore Dewey was able to
have nearly thirty-five tons, or about one-half the total
supply, shipped from San Francisco just before his
departure on December 7. The remainder, about
thirty-seven tons, was shipped to Honolulu, where it
was transferred to the Baltimore in March, 1898. It
finally reached Hongkong only forty-eight hours before the American fleet was forced to leave that harbour. It was actually transferred to the various vessels of the squadron on the day of the declaration of
war. Even with this consignment they went into action in Manila Bay with but sixty per cent of their
full capacity. There was no reserve.
Shortly after his arrival in Nagasaki, Commodore
Dewey asked for an audience with the Emperor of
Japan. This had long been the custom of each new
'Ibid., pp. 171-172.




112    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
commander-in-chief of the Asiatic squadron, but it
had recently fallen into neglect. The diplomatic courtesy proved valuable, however, for it established pleasant relations between Commodore Dewey and the
Japanese Government which were to hold throughout
the trying days of the blockade in the harbour of Manila.4 On February 11, he sailed for Hongkong where
he was to remain until the outbreak of SpanishAmerican hostilities.
When Commodore Dewey had accepted his appointment in October, 1897, a war with Spain had seemed
possible to many Americans, but there had seemed
little or no possibility of European complications.
Indeed, for the time being Europe appeared outwardly,
singularly peaceful. On September 18, 1897, the Spectator, in an article entitled "England's Isolation," illustrated this fact very well. It maintained that Great
Britain was the keeper of the peace in Europe for three
reasons. In the first place, there were two great alliances in Europe, neither one of which held a balance
of power, without British support. Since a combination of the two alliances was highly improbable and
since Great Britain refused to ally herself with either
one, war was quite impossible. In the second place,
England was really stronger than she felt herself to
be a short time previously, and finally there had been
a gradual awakening of European statesmen to the
fact that Great Britain was no one's enemy. England,
it concluded, had gained rapidly in the last eighteen or
twenty months. The next issue of the Spectator called
attention to "persistent reports" of American interven41bid., pp. 177-178.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


113


tion in Cuba, but it gave no indication of European
complications.a
A few days later the New York Times reviewed the
earlier article from the Spectator. England's security,
said the Times, "depends upon her own course, and
nothing but rash aggressiveness of which she shows
no indication in this generation can bring about any
formidable hostile combination. This is the situation which the Americans can regard with satisfaction for whatever may from time to time be our differences with our elder brothers, we cannot be blind
to the fact that they and we are the joint representatives and guardians of a principle of government that
no other nation even fully understands-the principle
of orderly freedom which is the hope of the race."
The Times, too, saw no indication of approaching
trouble.
In November, two German missionaries were murdered in China. China promptly offered immediate
and full redress, but Germany seized upon the incident
as a pretext for securing possession of Kiaochow.6
Russia and France, alert to the situation, likewise demanded concessions. Europe at once faced the horrors of a world war. Quickly two policies of action
assumed shape: Great Britain's theory of the "open
door" and American penetration of Eastern trade and
politics.
During the first days of January, 1898, the British
'Spectator, September 25, 1897.
'London Times, January 4, 1898; consult Accounts and Papers,
1898, Vol. LIV (State Papers, Vol. CV), for "Correspondence respecting the Affairs in China."




114     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
press announced the fundamental principles of the new
British policy in China. "Our real interest in China
is trade.... What therefore concerns us is that the
Chinese markets should not be closed against us....
We do not for a moment suppose that either Russia
or France or Germany will attempt to shut us out
from these markets; and, provided they do not, it is
no affair of ours to drive Russia out of Port Arthur,
or Germany out of Kiaochow. Whether we ought to
take possession of any portion of the Chinese territory
requires serious consideration. If China is divided it
may be necessary that we have certain parts under
our control or other coaling stations than Hongkong.
What would suit best our purposes would be a reform
of the existing Chinese government and the throwing
open of the whole empire to the world's trade. If this
cannot be done without European seizure of Chinese
ports, then the government must necessarily consider
what our interests require. But nothing should be
done hastily or out of mere jealousy of continental
powers." 7
Early in January, China appealed to Great Britain
for a loan of sixteen million pounds sterling in order
to pay off what remained of the indemnity due to
Japan and secure the relief of Weihaiwei. With this
loan as a basis for its discussion, the Statist carried
the arguments which it had previously developed to
Statist, January 1, 1898; the Economist made no attempt to develop a definite trade policy on that date. It did advise, however,
popular support for Lord Salisbury's "policy of waiting." England's
strength, it said, lay in the most powerful fleet in the Far East and
in the fact that she controls every coaling station on the way to
China; Cf. Manchester Guardian, January 3, 1898.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


115


their logical conclusion. The result was the press
draft of the British policy of the "open door." "Unquestionably," said the Statist, "we have no interest in
getting Japan out of China. In the first place, when
the war was over, one of the objects to which Japan
applied herself was the opening up of China to all
countries. Therefore, any influence that Japan may
be able to exercise in China will be for the benefit of
trade and not against it. In the second place, we have
no reason either to fear or dislike Japan, and have no
object, consequently, in hurrying her out of Weihaiwei. Nor does China herself seem to have any sufficient interest in hastening the withdrawal of Japan.
If Germany is to retain Kiaochow, and Russia is to
remain at Port Arthur, and France is to get some compensation, does it make any real difference to China
whether or no Japanese troops remain in Weihaiwei
for a few years longer." Finally, what we do want
is a "free field and no favour." We want our trade
to be unhampered, that we may have free competition for all concessions, and that there "may be no
objectionable monopolies." If the Germans and Russians choose to hold concessions, that is none of our
business. But it is our business to see that no prohibitive tariffs are imposed, and we ought to make it
clearly understood to the Continental Powers that so
long as they confine themselves to land grabbing we
do not mean to offer material resistance, but that we
will not tolerate pilfering from China if the pilfering
is to be used to the detriment of our trade. As regards the Chinese Government we owe it no consideration. We should make it clearly understood at Pekin




116     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
that if monopolies and unfair advantages are given
to our rivals, we shall visit upon the Chinese Government the consequences of her own partiality. It may
be necessary that we have additional coaling stations
in the Far East and one or two ports in which we
can refit vessels. If there is need, there is no reason
why we should not help ourselves if Russia, Germany,
and France set the example. "On the other hand,
if [they] are willing to keep hands off, we [the European powers] might maintain the status quo as long
as China will hold together." 8
On January 10, 1898, Mr. Arthur Balfour, in a speech
at Manchester, outlined the proposed policy of the
Government in China. Our interests are commercial
and trading interests, not territorial. Great Britain
owns eighty per cent of the combined trade of the
world with China. All we intend to do is to insist
that "the policy of that government shall not be directed toward the discouragement of foreign trade."
We do not want great accessions of territory carved
out of the Chinese Empire. We are not opposed to
the extension of commerce of any other nation in
China, but England must be allowed to go there as
well. Foreigners shall not destroy the equality of opportunity for trade for all in China.9
Hardly had the "open door" policy been generally
8Statist, January 8, 1898. This article gives probably the first and
best complete outline of the new British "open door" policy in
China. It makes no allusion to American interests in China or for
the need of Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East; Cf.
Graphic, January 8, 1898.
9Economist, January 15, 1898; London Times, January 5, 11, 1898;
Chronicle, January 15, 1898.




- RELATIONS IN THE EAST                     117
announced when arguments began to be advanced to
the effect that "spheres of influence" in China were
incompatible with the treaty of Tientsin of 1858.10
On February 8, Lord Salisbury, in an address before
the House of Lords, answered these arguments and
developed the final step in the "open door" policy.
"We have not surrendered one iota of our Treaty
rights. We have no intention of surrendering one iota
of our Treaty rights... and there is no effort that
this country will not make rather than allow those
rights to be over-ridden." 11 Lord Salisbury then concluded that nobody [meaning any European statesman] has ever suggested the slightest intention of infringing any of the rights we enjoy under the treaty.
Both the Russian and the German governments have
given full assurance that any ports received by them
would be made free ports.12
The weakness of the British "open door" policy as
it was outlined in the early weeks of 1898, was this.
It was based solely upon the guarantee of Russia and
Germany. Both nations had voluntarily announced
10 Statist, January 21, 1898.
' Under the treaty of Tientsin three articles were of peculiar interest. Article 24, Great Britain shall pay the same duties but none
higher than are imposed upon other foreign states. Article 52, British
ships of war with no hostile purpose shall be at liberty to enter all
Chinese treaty ports and receive every facility for obtaining provisions and water. Article 54, the British government and its subjects
will be allowed free and equal participation in the privileges, immunities, and advantages that may have been, or may be hereafter,
granted by the Emperor of China to the government or subjects of
any other nation.
"Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LV, pp. 38-39; Accounts
and Papers, Vol. LIV (State Papers, Vol. CV), 1898, Nos. 84, 151;
see also Statist, March 5, 9, 12, 1898; Chronicle, February 12, 1898.




118    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
that British rights in the ports which they held in
China would be respected, and that those ports would
be open equally to the trade of all nations. Great
Britain could only be sure of the maintenance of the
policy in proportion as she was willing to back it up
with force. She recognized this weakness and proposed to secure the support of both Japan and the
United States. Such an alliance she felt would be
of sufficient importance to prevent any violation of
the guarantee.
Fortunately for British purposes, conditions were
operating in the United States which served to make
Anglo-American cooperation in the East desirable.
Business had been prosperous for about two years.
The total output of manufactured goods was increasing rapidly. American traders were searching for new
markets at the same time that China was being opened
up to European exploitation.'3 A few Americans, particularly those who were interested in commerce and
finance, began to think in terms of British diplomacy.
They recognized, first of all, the similarity of AngloAmerican relations in Asia, but they did not appreciate the inability of Great Britain to protect those
interests without allies. In the latter respect they
were in harmony with the criticisms advanced against
the British coalition government, not only by the Opposition but by many of the members of the party
in power. On December 27, 1897, the New York Times
suggested, "We do not like Lord Salisbury's timid and
inactive policy in the East. We in the United States
3 Chronicle, January 1, May 9, June 11, 25, 1898; American Review
of Reviews, Vol. XVII (January, 1898), p. 13.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


119


shall be the worse for it. Our interest in the cutting
up of China is that the British lion shall get his share."
On January 3, the Manchester Guardian presented
an excellent outline of the British policy in China.
The article, which was very acceptable to American
exporters, was quoted freely in American papers.14
A few American traders promptly recognized the importance of this opportunity and began to urge support for the British policy in the "open door."
Throughout January the New York Evening Post ran
a series of letters by Mr. Charles Denby, jr., and Mr.
Clarence Cary, urging the importance of American interests in China. In the partition of China, said the
Post, the United States has an interest, as our trade
there is second only to that of England. The present
Chinese tariff treats all alike, and China is the only
great field where the American manufacturer meets all
rivals on equal terms. The United States cannot tolerate the creation of spheres of influence since with the
seizure of territory our treaties with China which provide that American goods shall not be discriminated
against, and that no monopoly shall be granted to any
one, fall to the ground.15 A few days later the Review
of Reviews again urged the necessity of the maintenance of American treaty rights in China. Our treaty
ports in China must be kept open to us on the present
terms. England has said plainly that she will not
allow the Continental Powers to seize China for pur4New York Times, January 4, 1898; New York Evening Post,
January 3, 5, 1898.
'New York Evening Post, January 1, 3, 5, 8, 1898; Outlook,
January 1, 1898.




120    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
poses of trade monopoly; and we must heartily join
England in this righteous position.
The New York Times urged American support for
the British "open door" policy from the first. Early
in January it said, "England has acted with deliberation, but very much to the purpose in the matter of
German and Russian expansion in China. It is clearly
a great injustice to represent England as engaged in
a game of grab. She does not want more territory,
she wants more trade. This trade is as free to traders
and ships of other nationalities, as the trade of other
treaty ports in which she is upon the same footing
with other powers." 16
About a month later it advocated governmental
action. The measure of our interests is the growth to
us during indefinite future time of the right of export
and import trade with the Chinese people. "The
United States Government should employ serious measures for the protection of this trade. It may be that
the United States has neglected English recognition
already too long." 17 A few weeks later the Times
took occasion to say that our own Government should
express its sympathy with the British position. Instead of doing this, the administration merely gave
out an announcement that our interests were not
threatened by the German and Russian proceedings.
It is to be hoped that the American government will
immediately appreciate the laxity of its action and
will come immediately to the English point of view.
New York Times, January 4, 1898. Cf. ibid., January 9, 1898;
New York World, January 4, 1898.
1 New York Times, February 7, 1898.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST                     121
We left England to make her fight alone, and if she
has made it for her own exclusive benefit we cannot
complain.'8    Four days later the Times announced
the condition of Anglo-American relations as it saw
them. The London dispatches are entirely credible
which assure us that the sympathy of England is with
us in respect to Cuba and also that England would be
very glad of our support in the contest that she is carrying on single-handed, Japan excepted, in the Far East.
England was bound to sympathize with us in Cuba.
The British press understands the evils to trade of
the chronic condition of war in Cuba, and she refrains
from imputing to us motives of aggrandizement and
conquest. We are fighting England's battles in Cuba,
as England is fighting our battles in the East.'9
On January 7, the Tribune stated that "the trade of
China must remain open on equal terms to all the
Powers," declares Great Britain. "The question for
American consideration is whether or not this country
18 Ibid., March 6, 1898.
' New York Times, March 10, 1898. No better illustration can be
found of the intense interest of the American commercial world in
the British "open door" policy than is to be obtained from a consideration of the reception given to Lord Charles Beresford by the
American Chambers of Commerce when he was in the United States
early in 1899. Lord Beresford was then returning to England on
his way from China where he had gone to investigate trade conditions for the British associated chambers of commerce. He
addressed the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. In Chicago
business on the Board of Trade ceased entirely for the moment when
he was introduced-an event absolutely without precedent. At
Washington he was greeted both by President McKinley and John
Hay. Letters of regret were sent him by a number of American
trade organizations because of his inability to address them. SeeBeresford, Lord Charles, The Break-up of China (New York, 1899),
especially pages 433446.




122 ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
is to join them [European Powers] to secure Chinese
trade.... Of all the great Western Powers, it lies
nearest to China.... It is by nature and by situation fitted to enjoy the major share of all Pacific
commerce. It rests with it now, without delay, whether
it shall improve or shall forfeit its matchless opportunity." A few days later, January 10, the same paper
commented, "of all the European Powers Great Britain is the one that stands for equal rights in international dealing. For any other to gain control of China
would mean exclusion of all rivals from Chinese trade,
or at least such handicaps as would practically amount
to that. But wherever the British flag is raised there
is freedom. When Great Britain secures the opening
of another Chinese port or the free navigation of a
river it is not for herself alone, but for all comers on
equal terms."
Naturally the British sought to crystallize this growing American policy of intervention in China into a
definite alliance with Great Britain in the East. On
January 1, 1898, the Statist in its first appeal for the
"open door" declared that "the United States has precisely the same interest in China" as Great Britain.20
Early in the year Li Hung Chang had issued an appeal
to the United States for support. "Should China be
distressed by having her shores invaded and her territory occupied because of an occurrence which Western countries would deal with by law? Our desire is
to preserve our territory intact and steadily improve
it as a field open to all countries equally for the development of commerce." This appeal was distinctly
Statist, January 1, 1898; see also Statist, May 5, 1898.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


123


pleasing to the London Times for it placed American
interest in China on a humanitarian basis. Such a call
would move the American people more easily and
quickly than a call for new markets. On January 5,
the London Times published a brief symposium of
American opinion quoting from three New York dailies, the Times, the Herald and the World. Quoting
from the Times it said that Great Britain is not the
champion of British interests alone; she is the champion of civilization and humanity, and deserves the
support of all mankind, especially of the United States,
for American interests in the East are the same as hers.
According to the Herald, Americans know well where
American interests lie. Germany, Russia, and France
will set up a monopoly, each for its own behoof; but
England will set up free trade, admitting American
products as freely as English. The comment from the
World was even more suggestive. The protest of Great
Britain will stop the proposed spoliation of China and
be indorsed by the conscience of the civilized world.
The best of American opinion is with England and
England knows it in spite of the jingo press. The
Executive and Senate are in accord on the Chinese
question. "A vigorous query will be put by the United
States to any European Power occupying any one of
our twenty or more treaty ports." 21
Upon his arrival at Hongkong on February 17,
1898, Commodore Dewey must have begun to view the
situation in the East with a new vision. The exploita2' The last sentence quoted from the World was attributed to
Cushman K. Davis, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations.




124 ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


tion of Chinese trade seemed inevitable unless Great
Britain was able to require Germany and Russia to
keep their promises to grant an "open door" to trade
in all Chinese ports which were occupied by them.
American manufacturing interests had expressed
strong approval of the British policy. The British
were urgent in their appeal for American cooperation
in the Far East. Events fraught with startling import occurred in rapid succession.
On March 8, Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the
German Kaiser, arrived at Hongkong with the rank
of rear admiral. The event was significant in that
it indicated that Germany was prepared to maintain
her interests in the Far East. To interpret his being
sent there as an act hostile to the United States is at
once illogical and inaccurate. Should an European
war ensue, German interests as well as British depended upon American friendship. The British would
need active American cooperation and Germany would
desire American neutrality. Any hostility shown by
Germany toward the United States would accomplish
only what it was to Germany's interest to prevent,
namely: to draw Great Britain and the United States
into commercial accord in China.
By the beginning of April, it had become clear to
Commodore Dewey that in case of war with Spain
the position of the American squadron in the East
would be very critical. Once hostilities had actually
begun, there would be no place close at hand where
supplies of coal could be procured or repairs made on
any vessels. He had made every effort possible before
he had left the United States to insure a prompt ship



RELATIONS IN THE EAST


125


ment of munitions. Now he proposed to buy coal in
the East and with a full supply of coal and munitions
to avoid the necessity of having to seek shelter in any
neutral harbour. In other words, he planned to be so
well prepared and equipped for action that he would
defeat the Spaniards in his first engagement.
On April 4, he cabled Secretary Long of the Navy
Department that he had chartered the British steamer
Nanshan, which had over 3,000 tons of coal on board.
At the same time he advised the purchase of the vessel
before the outbreak of hostilities.22  Two days later
the Government not only approved his action but
advised him to buy that ship and one more. The
crews in charge were to be enlisted, if possible, for a
period of one year unless sooner discharged.23  On
April 6, the Nanshan was bought and her crew enlisted. On April 9, the British steamer Zafero, with
supplies, was purchased in addition. The crew of this
ship also was retained.24
Between March 8 and April 25, the date on which
the American squadron left Hongkong, a number
of events occurred to test Admiral Dewey's knowledge
of diplomacy and international law. Shortly after the
arrival of Prince Henry, a sailor believed to be a deserter from the American navy was located on the
German cruiser Gesion. The American demand for
his surrender was met by the assertion that he was
a German subject and a seaman in the German navy,
"Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 66; Dewey,
Autobiography, p. 188.
'Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 66.
Ibid., p. 66. Cf. Barrett, John, Admiral George Dewey (New
York, 1899), p. 57.




126    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
and in neither capacity could he be given up.25 Some
time later Prince Henry gave a dinner on board the
Deutschland, his flagship, at which representatives of
Great Britain, Russia, and the United States were
guests of honour. In the toasts the President of the
United States was relegated to the last place. The
absence of the American officers from a few entertainments given in the Prince's honour soon brought
a sincere apology from the Prince in person. His
plea was that his lack of experience was responsible
for the slight.26 Considerable reliance may well be
placed upon his apology. The Prince was young, impetuous, and inclined to act according to his own
fancy rather than according to naval etiquette. Commodore Dewey's reply to the indiscretion indicated
his knowledge of social naval procedure and his determination to have the respect due his country.
Throughout this period of naval inactivity Germany
was very much concerned over America's intentions
both in Cuba and in the East. She was in no way
pleased to see the United States acquire territory in
either sphere. During one of the frequent conversations in which Commodore Dewey and Prince Henry
engaged, the latter remarked that he did not believe
that the Powers would permit the United States to
acquire Cuba. Commodore Dewey replied that the
Americans did not desire to annex Cuba but that
they could not permit existing conditions to continue
there at our very doors. Some time later the Prince
jokingly asked concerning the "general scramble" for
'Dewey, Autobiography, p. 182.
Ibid., pp. 182-184.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


127


a foothold in the Far East, "and what are you after?
What does your country want?" To this Commodore
Dewey responded, "Oh, we need only a bay." 27 The
answer was evasive and insinuated just enough about
the German seizure of Kiaochow to worry Germany.
Unfortunately it was just such statements as this
that served to stimulate German activities in Manila.
Her interests were highly involved in the East. She
felt that she must know what was to be done with
every foot of territory. Weak Spain was a most satisfactory neighbour in the Philippines; Great Britain or
the United States would not be so.
During the delay at Hongkong the sympathy and
good will of the British naval and army men were
constantly with the Americans. American officers and
men were welcome guests at all British clubs and social
gatherings. A spirit of camaraderie gradually developed between the two services that was highly indicative of the feeling that was developing between
the two nations. There was, however, a strong tendency among the British to exaggerate the difficulties
and dangers of an isolated attack upon the Spaniards
at Manila. In the Hongkong club it was not possible to get bets, even at heavy odds, that the American expedition would be a success. Commodore Dewey
was told, after a dinner at which his officers had been
entertained by a British regiment, that the general
comment among the British was, "A fine set of fellows, but unhappily we shall never see them again." 28
T Dewey, Autobiography, pp. 184-185.
"Ibid., p. 192; Cf. Barrett, Admiral George Dewey, p. 63; London
Times, March 28, 1898.




128     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
On April, Commodore Dewey sailed out of Hongkong. As the American ships passed the vessels of
the British fleet, the bulwarks of the latter were
thronged with eager soldiers and sailors. The latter
might not cheer, but the convalescent soldiers of the
hospital-hulk were able to express British feeling by
a hearty round of applause.29
The British press followed Admiral Dewey very
closely after he left Hongkong. It rightly judged
that he had orders "to see that the Spaniard squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast," and then conduct "offensive operations in the Philippine Islands." 30
It admitted little question of the issue of such a battle.3' On May 1, the New York Times gave a careful
review of the attitude of the British press towards
the United States. "Of all the English newspapers
of London only two, and they are minor ones, in any
way suggest any pro-Spanish feeling. These are the
Morning 32 and the St. James Gazette.      Among those
who stand firm for American friendship is the old Tory,
' Calkins, Lieutenant C. G., "The Naval Battle of Manila," The
American-Spanish War-A History by the War Leaders (Norwich,
1899), pp. 103-128; Lieutenant Calkins gives one interesting rumour
concerning the entering of Manila Harbour. The Americans were
accused of having a British pilot and a gunner who had been recruited
at Hongkong and that they were aided in getting into the harbour
by a British steamer that led the way. The rumour is without
foundation. It was later reported and denied in the House of
Commons on July 19, 1898. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol.
LXII, p. 297.
Dewey, Autobiography, p. 195; Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 65.
'London Times, April 26, 1898.
" The Morning as Morning Herald, was incorporated with the
Daily Express in 1899.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


129


the Globe. The Westminster Gazette suggests freely
that if anything should happen England would suffer
immense grief. Going straight through, the English
press stand unanimous in favor of the United States."
The Times failed to mention that the Saturday Review
was exceedingly bitter toward the United States.
On May 1, Commodore Dewey defeated the Spanish
squadron in the harbour of Manila. In the afternoon
Consul 0. F. Williams was sent on board a British
ship with instructions to request her captain to be
the bearer of a message to the Spanish captain-general. The message was finally delivered by the British
consul, Mr. E. H. Rawson-Walker. It contained the
general plan for further American action in the harbour. If another shot was fired at the American ships
from the Manila batteries, the American ships should
destroy the city. If there were any torpedo-boats in
the Pasig River, they must be surrendered. If the
Americans were allowed to transmit messages by the
cable to Hongkong, the captain-general would also
be permitted to use it. So carefully did these instructions cover the situation, and so faithfully was
the Spanish promise of their maintenance kept that
Admiral Dewey actually acquired a safe base seven
thousand miles from home.33
' The Spanish captain-general refused Dewey's request for a joint
use of the cable. On the next morning Admiral Dewey ordered the
Zafero to cut the cable, and both the Spaniards and Americans were
cut off from all communications with the rest of the world. Dewey,
Autobiography, pp. 223-225; Barrett, Admiral Dewey, p. 86; Annual
Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 68; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LVII, p. 268. The writer has recently been informed through reliable sources that one line was actually left uncut




130  ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


On May 2, news of the battle of Manila began to
filter into Europe through Spanish sources. It was
generally admitted that Spain was defeated. Secretary Alger declared that it was a glorious victory but
refused to make any further comment. Both Secretary Long and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt refused
to talk.34
Vague rumours continued to come in throughout
May 3. London was the real centre of American news.
Secretary John Hay became the centre of questions and
congratulations. Even the Parnell members of Parliament sent a note of congratulation to President McKinley.35 British naval officers were unanimous in
sympathy and congratulations. On May 4, no news
came. The suggestion began to be made that the
Philippines might be turned over to Great Britain.36
On May 5 and 6, no news arrived, but no fear was
felt for Commodore Dewey. On May 7, certain circles
in Great Britain began to be anxious. Some gloomy
and messages came into the United States Naval Department regularly by way of London and New York. The Pall Mall Gazette,
May 3, 1898, reported a rumour both from Paris and Madrid to the
effect that the Americans had cut the cable at Manila and taken the
end of it on board the cruiser Olympia for the purpose of establishing
communications with the United States.
'New York Times, May 2, 1898; Pall Mall Gazette, May 2, 1898.
' The note read as follows: "In the names of millions of Irishmen
the Parnellite Members of the House of Commons send you their
congratulations on the most brilliant victory of the American fleet."
It was signed by John Redmond. This is quoted from London Times,
May 2, 1898.
'MNew York Times, May 4, 1898. On May 3, the New York Times
reported that on the Saturday previous a speaker in the Cortes had
suggested that the Philippines might be used as security on which
to invoke the intervention of some European Power.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


131


conjectures were made.37 On May 8, definite information finally came and Great Britain and the United
States were both elated.38
Colonel George A. Loud, who went on board the
McCulloch when it was sent to Hongkong to carry
news of the victory, said that it was most pleasing to
see the gratification of the English people at Hongkong over the American victory. It seemed that the
Americans at home could not be more delighted. "As
they [the British] put it: Blood is thicker than
water." 39 The British at Hongkong throughout Commodore Dewey's occupation of Manila never lost this
uniform interest and cordiality. Indeed, they were so
liberal in their interpretation of the laws of neutrality that he had to be especially careful to commit
no act that might be misconstrued.40
The relation of the American fleet to foreign vessels
in Manila Bay was of necessity covered by international law. In general, it might be expected that the
leading naval nations of Europe would send vessels
there with the purpose of securing naval educational
information together with a small naval squadron relative in size to the importance of their commercial
interests and the number of their citizens in the
islands.41 In every case these vessels were supposed to
37 London Times, May 7,1898.
New York Times, May 2-8, 1898; New York Herald, May 2-8,
1898; London Times, May 2-8, 1898; Literary Digest, May 14, 1898.
Cf. speech by Lord Salisbury-reported in London Times, May 9,
1898.
89 Loud, Colonel George A., "The Battle of Manila," Century
Magazine, Vol. LVI (September, 1898), p. 618.
40 Dewey, Autobiography, pp. 240-241.
4Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LVII, pp. 42, 176.




132    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
apply to Commodore Dewey for anchorage space, to
report all movements in or out of the harbour, and to
carry on no intercourse either with the insurgents or
the Spanish land forces.
Immediately after the battle of Manila foreign menof-war began to arrive. The British ships Linnet and
Immortalite came on May 2 and May 7 respectively.
The German cruisers Irene and Cormoran arrived on
May 6 and 9.
Quickly international complications arose.  The
American flagship Olympia was off Cavite; the American colours were flying over the Cavite naval station,
and the authority of the United States was clearly
paramount in the bay. In view of these facts, the
British, French, and Japanese steamers as they came in
reported to Commodore Dewey and secured proper
anchorage. The Irene, sailing from Nagasaki, may not
have known of the victory before leaving Japan, but
she did receive definite information from a British
steamer on the morning of her arrival. Nevertheless,
she steamed past the Olympia and dropped anchor
where she chose. Commodore Dewey overlooked this
first instance of the violation of the law of blockade.42
The second German cruiser, the Cormoran, came in
at three o'clock in the morning. A steam launch was
sent out at once to meet her and identify her. The
Cormoran paid no attention to the launch. As a result the Raleigh fired a shot across her bows. She
stopped immediately. The boarding officer assured
the Captain of the Cormoran that the Americans had
no thought of being discourteous and had no desire to
4 Dewey, Autobiography, pp. 254-255.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


133


raise any ill feeling. Their only desire was to fulfill the
laws of blockade and to protect the American ships
against any Spanish ruse that might be attempted.43
The reasons for these violations of neutrality would
seem to be clear. Germany was insistent upon knowing what the United States proposed to do in the
harbour.  If the Philippines were to be opened to
exploitation, she proposed to have her share of the
spoils since the geographical location of the islands
was such that the nation or nations that secured
control of them acquired considerable influence in
the Far East. The situation was unique and critical.
Germany proposed to place herself in a position to
secure Spanish favour and to demand concessions
equivalent to those received by her rivals in China.
Her attitude toward the United States is less easily
stated. Until the battle of Manila the German press
had been, in the main, openly hostile to the United
States. The officers of the Government, however, repeatedly gave semi-official assurances of German neutrality both through statements to the press and to
diplomatic officials.44
On May 12, Vice-Admiral Otto von Diedrichs arrived in his flagship, the Kaiserin Augusta. This made
the third German cruiser in the Bay. On May 6, the
Darmstadt, a transport, had arrived with fourteen hundred men for relief crews. Commodore Dewey gave
permission for the transfer, which should have been
Ibid., pp. 255-256.
White, Andrew Dickson, Autobiography (New York, 1905), Vol.
II, pp. 144, 160-161, 170, 177; Literary Digest, April 30, May 7, 1898;
Public Opinion, May 5, 1898; New York Times, May 1, 7, 8, 1898.




134     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
accomplished promptly. The Darmstadt, however,
with her force of men nearly equal to the total number
of Dewey's crew, remained at anchor for four weeks.45
Since Vice-Admiral von Diedrichs' rank was superior
to that of Dewey's, it was necessary that the latter
make the first call. This he did, and, in the course
of the conversation, he referred to the presence of
the large German force and to the limited extent of
German commercial interests. This really amounted
to a polite inquiry as to the intentions of the German government. Admiral von Diedrichs' only answer
was: "I am here by order of the Kaiser, sir."
On May 20, Secretary Long notified Admiral Dewey
that reports were current to the effect that some
Spanish transports with a large body of troops were
sailing to the Philippines. Nine days earlier the London Times had stated that the American attache at the
London embassy had cabled his Government that four
cruisers and three torpedo boats belonging to the Cape
Verde Fleet had arrived at Cadiz on May 10.46 This
meant that, in all probability, the Americans would
be required to fight a second naval battle for which no
adequate preparation could be made. Troops, ships,
and munitions were all needed. On May 27, Secretary
Long cabled that the Monterey was being sent to the
Asiatic station. Three days later the Monadnock was
likewise ordered to the East.47
'Dewey, Autobiography, p. 57.
" On May 12, Commodore Dewey reported to Secretary Long that
this fleet had left the Cape Verde Islands April 29. Its present whereabouts was unknown. This report was not officially confirmed until
June 18. See Annual Report of Navy Department, 1898, p. 97.
' Ibid, pp. 101-102.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


135


On May 29, Secretary Long gave Admiral Dewey
temporary relief by reporting that the Spanish force
was not then en route to the Philippines. This meant
that the Charleston and transports of troops under
Brigadier-General Anderson might arrive in time to
assist in the battle which might be necessary.48
Throughout the latter days of May, Anglo-American cordiality in the East continued to develop. On
May 17, the New York Tribune suggested that the
American fetish of isolation must be cast down, that
the United States could no longer be a political hermit. Even Western newspapers began to see the desirability of an Anglo-American cooperation. They
saw need for an "open door" for the American merchant marine, and the need of a navy to protect the
great American carrying trade that should once more
be revived.49 At the same time Great Britain was becoming more definite in her opposition to any European conquest of the Philippines. On May 25, the
New York Times quoted directly from the London
Times of the day previous. "We could not look with
indifference upon the acquisition of the Philippines by
either France, Russia, or Germany"; though we have
enough on our own hands not to care to add to our
responsibilities in that quarter unless we should be
compelled to do so "in order to prevent the islands
from being used to obstruct the development of open
trade.... We could contemplate their possession,
however, by the United States with equanimity, and,
indeed with satisfaction. We can only say that while
4 Ibid., p. 101.
wPublic Opinion, May 18, 1898.




136    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
we would welcome the Americans in the Philippines
as kinsfolks and allies, united with us in the Far East
by the most powerful bonds of common interest, we
should regard very differently the acquisition of the
Archipelago by any other power."
Unfortunately during the weeks of May and June
when the relations between the British and the Americans had been growing more cordial, the attitude of
Germany toward the United States had been growing more and more open to question. Rumours of
German hostility toward the American invasion of the
Philippines began to appear simultaneously with the
arrival of Admiral von Diedrichs in Manila on May
12. On May 11, it was reported in London that Germany was actively preparing to signify her disapproval
of an American occupation of the Philippines, and
that this plan was acceptable to Austria. The German consul at Manila was said to have received definite
instructions concerning Admiral Dewey.50 On May
12, it was reported in London that Germany had demanded an interest in the Philippines and might demand exclusive control of Samoa as her price of acquiescence to American control in the Philippines.
On the same day it was reported that three great
powers were determined to prevent America from
bringing war into Europe and that German intervention alone prevented the bombardment of Manila by
Commodore Dewey.51
About this time the German press seemed to change
its tone. Actually it did not. The important jour'New York Times, May 12, 1898; London Times, May 11, 1898.
'New York Times, May 13, 15,1898.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


137


nals, under Government orders probably, began openly
to favour the American cause.52  The less important
papers still printed vast pages of news, most of it
not true, and most of it in favour of Spain. On
May 15, the London Times reported the German
Kaiser as saying "the Emperor may be trusted not
to suffer the friendship of a hundred years with the
State in which millions of Germans have found a
second home to be disturbed without serious reasons."
At the same time rumour continued to associate the
Philippines and Great Britain together. They were
to be offered to the British to cement the Anglo-Saxon
alliance.53 The British in turn would give the Americans a trading post. Much of this confusion came
of necessity from the fact that the greater proportion
of the American people were not ready, as yet, to
embrace an imperial policy of commercial and colonial
expansion. Had the United States openly asserted
after the capture of Manila its intention of remaining in the Philippines, there is much reason to believe
that the Germans would never have entered the Bay
with military intent.
Within a week after Dewey's victory at Manila an
official of the German foreign office called at the American embassy in Berlin and formally inquired whether
the Americans intended to remain in the Philippines or
whether they would withdraw. Andrew D. White happened to be out of the office at the time; so Mr. John
52White, Andrew Dickson, Autobiography (New York, 1905), Vol.
II, pp. 160-161, 168; Literary Digest, April 30, May 7, 1898; Public
Opinion, May 5,1898; New York Times, May 1, 1898.
'New York Times, May 15, 16, 1898.




138  ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


Brinkerhoff Jackson, first secretary of the legation, gave
the reply. He was unable, he said, to say anything on
the subject, as he had no means of knowing the intentions of the American Government. The answer
might have been quite different had Mr. White
been present. Mr. Jackson's own opinion was that
the Germans wished to take advantage of the
slightest opportunity to land a force and thus
pave the way to a kind of protectorate over the
Philippines.54
The whole situation actually amounted to this: Germany wanted a foothold in the Philippines. Had
Spain been victorious in the battle of Manila, the
islands would have remained in the hands of a weak
state, much to the satisfaction of Germany. With
the United States victorious the situation became complicated. Obviously a large proportion of the American people would not consent to a permanent occupation of the islands. This would mean that the islands
must either be returned to Spain or transferred to
some European power. In the latter case Germany
was determined that she must have such recognition
as would balance her strength in the East with that
of Great Britain.55
During the first week of June the repeated assertions
of the German Government in favour of American
friendship began to influence American opinion. Gradually the rumour began to appear that the United
i The writer is indebted to Lieutenant-Commander Edward Breck,
Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin during the Spanish-American war,
for this information.
'New York Tribune, June 6, 1898.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


139


States had nothing to fear from Germany. It was reported upon the authority of Andrew D. White that
Germany was not hostile to the United States. On
June 5, 1898, the New York Tribune reported a
prominent American as saying that there had been
a complete change of public opinion in Germany. The
German official telegraph agency published a dispatch
to the effect that the German warships had gone to
Manila for the sole purpose of protecting subjects of
the German Empire. This was quoted freely in the
United States.'6 On the same date the New York
Times reported that the Frankfurter Zeitung and the
Cologne Gazette had become friendly to the United
States.
At the same time Germany's real motives began to
appear more definitely. She wanted a share in the
spoils. On June 13, it was reported from Singapore
that the German Consul at Manila had been in prolonged conferences with the Spanish authorities. This
had led to the belief that Germany had designs on
the Sulu Archipelago. Prince Henry of Prussia, at
Kiaochow, was kept constantly informed as to the
developments in the war. During these same days,
June 14 and 15, dispatches from Madrid urged German intervention and assistance.Y  On June 17, the
Berlin Marine Politische Correspondenz was reported
as saying, "For the same reasons which justified us in
demanding the cession of a harbor from China we
must claim one from the 'Republic of the Philippines'
which to all appearances will be the issue of the present
I New York Times, June 4, 5, 7, 17, 1898.
W New York Tribune, June 14,15,1898.




140    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
affairs." 58 On June 27, the New York Times called
attention to the fact that the Kaiser felt that the
Americans were exhibiting a tendency to depart from
their policy of seclusion and to interfere in the affairs
of the Old World. The German and Spanish fleets,
the Kaiser continued, would be more than a match
for any fleet America could produce which would not
tax the Union in ships and sailors. "It is not certain
that Germany has not a motive for such an alliance,
for the United States with Monroeism is nearly as
much in the way of Powers desiring to expand as
Great Britain." 55
This, then, was the situation in Manila at the
end of the month. Admiral Dewey had received no
supplies either of munitions, ships, or men. There
were five German men-of-war in the harbour, two
of them having a greater displacement than any of
the American ships. Admiral Camara, who was in
command of the Cadiz reserve squadron, might appear
in Manila at any time. He had with him two powerful armoured cruisers the total displacement of which
was 18,200 tons, while the displacement of Dewey's
squadron was but 19,098 tons.60 Besides this, the
Spanish vessels carried two 12.6-inch and four 11-inch
guns while Dewey's largest calibred guns were but 8 -inch. The relief crews brought in on the Darmstradt
had not yet been transferred.
It was during the days of June 26-July 1, that the
London Times, June 17, 1898.
"New York Times, June 27, 1898; Spectator, June 18, 1898.
' Dewey, Autobiography, p. 259; Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 108.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


141


American situation was most critical. On June 26,
Admiral Dewey cabled Secretary Long that the British
consul had informed him that he had orders to telegraph in cipher to his Government all movements of
the German men-of-war in the Philippines.6' On June
27, Admiral Dewey suggested to Secretary Long that
should the coast of Spain be threatened the fleet under
Admiral. Camara would have to return. Two days later
Secretary Long cabled Admiral Dewey that a squadron
under Commodore J. C. Watson was being prepared
with all possible dispatch for operations on the
Spanish coast.  "The Spaniards know     this." 62  On
June 29, the report was given out that an American
fleet under Rear Admiral Watson had sailed for
Spain.63 The next day General Anderson arrived at
the Philippines with the first land troops as reenforcements for Admiral Dewey.
On June 30, the New York Times suggested that the
presence of the British warships at Manila would
destroy the probability of any undesirable disproportionate and unbalanced display of naval strength there
by any other power.64    On July 1, the same paper
called attention to the fact that, in view of the German military display in the Philippines, England
might think it desirable to bring her squadron to the
' Cipher Messages, Vol. II, "Communications in the Office of Naval
Operations," p. 253.
'Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 109.
6This fleet was actually never sent abroad. See Annual Report of
the Navy Department, 1898, pp. 37, 38, 109. See also New York
Tribune, July 22, 1898.
'There was a British fleet of three ships under Sir Edward Chichester in the harbour.




142    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
same force as Germany. If so, America would not
feel obliged to object.
Late in June, the New York Post reported that an
agreement had been arrived at between the German
Ambassador and the American Secretary of State concerning the mission of Admiral von Diedrichs. The
German press was greatly aroused. On July 1, the
Cologne Gazette stated that, "Admiral von Diedrichs
requires no instructions from Washington as to what
he is to do or leave undone. So long as he does not
interfere so as to obstruct or to promote the enterprise
of the two belligerents, neither Admiral Dewey nor
Secretary of State Sherman [sic] is competent to give
him any directions whatever." On the same day the
Berliner Lokalanzeiger asserted that, "A German Admiral knows quite well in what fashion he has to
maintain the interest of his countrymen. He would
most energetically repel any impertinent attempt to
meddle in his affairs. This is the proper answer to
the presumptuous Yankee." 65 The results of these
statements seem obvious.
At this time the British formed the opinion that
the Germans were determined to secure a footing in
the Philippines.66 This meant that although Great
Britain would maintain a technical neutrality she
would lend all support possible to Admiral Dewey at
Manila. This opinion is well illustrated in the attitude of the British toward Admiral Camara at Port
Said. As usual the imperial government depended
upon the colonial officials to enforce the neutrality
Cf. London Times, July 2, 1898.
"Hanward's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LX, p. 800.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


- 143


laws. First the Egyptian government prohibited the
sale of coal to the Spanish vessels other than a sufficient amount to carry them back to Spain, and, at
the same time, limited their stay in the port to twentyfour hours. After this Camara attempted to buy coal
in spite of orders. This was again refused. Next
he tried to re-coal from his own colliers, enlisting
Egyptian stokers. Then he was ordered to leave at
once. As he passed through the canal, he stopped
at Suez, but was again warned off.67   In this way
Egyptian neutrality prevented Spanish action.
Throughout the latter part of June and the early
part of July, Admiral Dewey was forced to use the
utmost diligence in order to enforce the laws of neutrality upon the German Admiral. German officers
frequently landed at Manila and were on cordial terms
with the Spaniards. Indeed, the rumour was current in the city that the Germans would intervene
in behalf of the Spaniards.08
On July 5, Admiral Dewey on board the McCulloch
sailed around the German ships in an effort to convey
the idea that he was not pleased with their proceedings. On the 6th he was informed that the German
cruiser Irene was interfering with the operations of the
insurgents against the Spaniards in Subig Bay. This
was contrary both to international law and to Dewey's
wishes. On July 7, Dewey sent the Raleigh and Concord to Subig to inquire into the truth of this report.
'Dewey, Autobiography, p. 260. Cf. London Times, July 1, 1898.
e Cf. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 262; Kraft, Herman F., and Norris,
Walter B., Sea Power in American History (New York, 1920), pp.
318-320.




144  ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


When they steamed into the harbour, the Irene
promptly steamed out.69 Later Prince Henry attempted to explain this incident. The Irene, so he
said, had gone to Subig Bay to take off some Spanish
women and children.70
The British frankly accepted the opinion held by
the Americans concerning the Irene incident; that is,
that Admiral von Diedrichs had disregarded comity, if
not law, and that his act was one which the German
Government ought either formally to approve or to
disapprove.71
After the first of July with the information concerning Admiral Sampson's victory at Santiago and
Camara's return at hand, Admiral Dewey was free to
state his position concerning the laws of blockade to
Admiral von Diedrichs. This he did in a most positive
manner. The German Admiral denied Admiral Dewey's
contentions but agreed to submit the point to a conference of all the senior officers of the men-of-war in the
harbour. At this meeting, only Captain Chichester of
the Immortalite appeared. He not only sustained Admiral Dewey's interpretations, but informed von Diedrichs that the British Government had ordered its
'Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 110; Dewey,
Autobiography, p. 264; Barrett, Admiral George Dewey, p. 115.
70 New York Times, July 28, 1898. Cf. Stickney, Joseph L., Life of
Dewey (Chicago, 1898), pp. 287-288; New York Tribune, July 7,
August 3, 1898.
n London Times, July 15, 16, 1898. Later Baron von Billow, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that Germany had never been disloyal
to neutrality in the East and that the newspaper reports of alleged
German designs or German support of the Filipinos against Americans were the most barefaced falsehoods. London Times, July 25,
1898.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


145


ships to comply with even greater restrictions.72  The
British had now for the first time openly and positively
asserted their support of the Americans.
Admiral von Diedrichs was still unwilling to accept
Admiral Dewey's regulations. Presently the Cormoran
appeared in the Bay. Determined that she should report, in keeping with the custom of other men-of
war, Admiral Dewey sent the McCulloch under FlagLieutenant F. Brumley to meet her. The Cormoran
then turned and steamed toward the northern part of
the Bay, compelling the McCulloch to follow her.
Lieutenant Brumley, after first giving a signal for
communication, fired a shot across the bows of the
Cormoran.
The following day Admiral von Diedrichs sent an
officer to Dewey with a list of grievances. Admiral
Dewey then took occasion to give the officer a firm
and positive statement of his attitude toward the
actions of the Germans in the Bay. Admiral von
Diedrichs went immediately to Captain Chichester
for advice. His reply was "that only Admiral Dewey
and himself knew what would happen if the situation
came to the worst." 73
Throughout the latter part of July and the first
of August events drew rapidly to a close in the Philippines. On July 17, the second expedition of land
forces under Brigadier-General Francis V. Greene
' Dewey, Autobiography, p. 266. Cf. Stickney, Life of Dewey,
pp. 87-93.
Palmer, Frederick, George Dewey, Admiral, p. 17. The writer
has been informed by Mr. Palmer that he secured this information
from conversations with Admiral Dewey and with Flag-Lieutenant
Brumley.




146    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
entered Manila.74 On July 25, the third expedition of
troops under Major-General Wesley Merritt arrived,75
and six days later Brigadier-General Arthur McArthur
followed with the fourth division. On August 4, the
Monterey and the Brutus at last sailed into Manila.
Under the cover of darkness the first of the German
vessels sailed out of the harbour that night.
Admiral von Diedrichs made one more attempt to influence the British. Since reinforcements had arrived, it became necessary for the Americans to occupy the city. Admiral Dewey tried, without success,
to secure the unconditional surrender of the Spaniards.
A bombardment thus became necessary. Admiral
von Diedrichs, in an effort to spare the city, sent
word to Captain Chichester that he was coming on
board the British ship in order to induce him to
join in a protest against Dewey's proposed action.
Captain Chichester looked up international law and
spread a number of books out on his cabin table with
the pages opened and marked. When the German
Admiral arrived Sir Edward simply suggested: "What
can I do? This American admiral is so deadly right
in all that he has done and all that he proposes to
do, that, if we protest, we will surely show that we
do not understand the law. Of course there was nothing to be done and I did it." 76
On August 9, the foreign men-of-war were notified
to move out of range. The British moved to the southward on the American side; the Germans drew to the
'Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 117.
Ibid., p. 118.
T6Kraft and Norris, Sea Power in American History, p. 319.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST


147


northward, opposite the city, where they were still in
the range of high shells. On August 13, the battle
occurred. As the American vessels sailed for action the
officers and men of the Immortalite# crowded on her
deck. Her guard was paraded, and her band played
a favourite number of Admiral Dewey's, "Under the
Double Eagle." As the American vessels came into
action, Captain Chichester, with the two ships Immortalite and Iphigenia, moved into position between
the American and German ships.77 The British had
spoken with a decision that left no question. The
city surrendered without German interference.
The next morning the foreign men-of-war were officially notified that the city had been taken and the
port was open. Captain Chichester alone of all the
foreign officers acknowledged the notification by firing
the national salute of twenty-one guns with the American ensign at the main.78
In summary, the attitude of Great Britain in the
East during the Spanish-American war was as follows:
First of all, she had maintained a technical neutrality
throughout. She had extended no favours to the Americans at Hongkong that were not sanctioned by international law. She had accepted and obeyed the blockade at Manila. She had furnished no supplies nor
aid that were forbidden. She had assisted in the
care and transportation of Spanish refugees. It was,
however, a benevolent neutrality which left no question as to which belligerent she favoured. On May
25, Admiral Dewey cabled Secretary Long that the
'Dewey, Autobiography, p. 277.
" Ibid-, p. 280.




148  ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


British both in Manila and Hongkong were most
friendly.79 British subjects sold both coal and ships
when war was inevitable, and British seamen were enlisted as their crews under American service.80 Great
Britain provided most of the coal that Admiral Dewey
was able to secure. In Egypt in the case of Camara
she enforced a neutrality that worked to the advantage
of America. At Hongkong, where no Spanish ships
were at hand, she offered equal privileges to both
nations. Her consuls at both Cairo and Hongkong
were frankly friendly to American interests. At Manila
her consul, E. H. Rawson-Walker, performed the trying duties of Acting United States Consul in a most
able and painstaking manner. He was of "invaluable
assistance" to Admiral Dewey, being his "only means
of communicating with the Spanish authorities and
the chief agent in the protection of foreign residents." 81
The British press with few exceptions was always
favourable toward Admiral Dewey and American interests in the East. The members of her Government were openly friendly.
Considerable question has always been raised as
to the extent of Captain Chichester's influence in
Manila. In the first place, he and Admiral Dewey
7 Cipher Messages, Vol. II, "Communications in the Office of Naval
Operations," p. 189.
s Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 66; Dewey,
Autobiography, pp. 191-192. Admiral Dewey did not man and arm
the Zafiro and the Nashan as directed by the Navy Department. He
registered them with their English crews as American merchant
steamers cleared for Guam.
'Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 375; Dewey, Autobiography, p. 234.
Mr. Rawson-Walker's health was broken down during this period
largely because of the added burdens. He died August 2, 1898.




RELATIONS IN THE EAST               149
were firm personal friends, spending much time together.82 On at least four different occasions during
the blockade Chaptain Chichester rendered a positive
decision in favour of the Americans. While it may
be true that the Americans by themselves might have
been able to withstand German aggression in the
Philippines, the position maintained by Captain Chichester convinced Admiral von Diedrichs that Great
Britain would resist German aggression to the limit.
In other words, Germany was not yet prepared to
meet the British in a great conflict. The union of
the American and British nations held the balance
of world power as Joseph Chamberlain had planned.
Barrett, Admiral George Dewey, pp. 26, 70, 101, 113, 131.




CHAPTER VII


THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENTA CONCLUSION
THROUGHOUT January and February of 1898 there
was a constant agitation in the United States and in
Great Britain in favour of the promotion of AngloAmerican friendship. In March, the first distinct
rumours of the need for a definite alliance began to
appear. On March 14, the London Times correspondent at Madrid reported the possibility of an AngloJapanese-American entente. About the same time it
was reported that a majority of the members of the
House of Commons were in favour of an alliance.
During the first week in April, the rumour of an actual
Anglo-American alliance reached New York and spread
rapidly over the country.' The press of both countries
accepted it seriously and, in the main, favourably.2
It was the type of report most opportune as the
background for Mr. Chamberlain's great speech at Birmingham on May 13.
1 Callahan, James M., Cuba and International Relations, p. 490.
'Literary Digest, April 30, 1898; "An Anglo-American Alliance,"
an editorial, Outlook, Vol. LVIII (April, 1898), p. 1060-1062. On
April 9, the Spectator, always very friendly to the United States, said,
"...if America were really attacked by a great Continental coalition, England would be at her side in twenty-four hours." The
comment attracted considerable attention both in the United States
and in England and was quoted freely.
160




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 151
Throughout this period John Hay was directing
American interests in Great Britain. On April 21, he
responded to the toast of Mayor Davies at the Lord
Mayor's banquet with the significant speech of the
evening. After calling attention to the fact that for
nearly three generations there had been constant peace
with a growing friendship existing between the two
countries he said: "The good understanding between us
is based on something deeper than mere expediency.
All who think cannot but see there is a sanction like
that of religion which binds us in partnership in the
serious work of the world.... We are joint ministers
in the same sacred mission of freedom and progress,
charged with duties we cannot evade by the imposition of irresistible hands." 3
The speech was greatly appreciated by the British
in that it expressed all that was highest in AngloSaxon idealism.  Furthermore, it interpreted and
stated Anglo-American relations in terms of peace and
progress rather than of aggression and commercialism.
An editorial in the Century Magazine expressed this
reciprocal feeling well. Great Britain, in the present
crisis, "appreciates the dignity of the position maintained by our government, and recognizes, to some extent at least, the fact that our people in general are
dominated in this matter by sentiment and a sense of
justice, and not by covetousness." 4 However, commercial and selfish may have been the motives of the
few who urged an Anglo-Saxon agreement, by far the
'New York Times, April 21, 1898; John Hay, Addresses of John
Hay (New York, 1907), pp. 77-80.
'Century Magazine, Vol. LVI (April, 1898), p. 152.




152    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
greater majority were influenced entirely by principles
of sentiment and altruism.
Throughout the early part of the year the Opposition criticized the Coalition foreign policy severely.
This criticism was directed, however, against British
foreign inactivity rather than against the possibility
of an Anglo-American alliance. Unfortunately, very
few, even of the members of the party in power, realized the danger of Great Britain's "splendid isolation" and her absolute dependence upon a foreign
alliance. Consequently, soon after the victory of
Commodore Dewey at Manila, Joseph Chamberlain
considered that the time had come to present the
Coalition foreign policy openly to the British people.
His reasons were these. In the first place, the importance of American trade interests in the East was constantly becoming better understood and appreciated
in the United States. At the same time, due to the
determination of the Opposition to force Lord Salisbury to adopt an active, aggressive policy in his relations with Germany and Russia, Great Britain's position in China was becoming very serious,5 and her
need for an ally was growing correspondingly imperative. Moreover, the Opposition, under the leadership
of Sir William Harcourt, had seemed to assume leadership in the promotion of Anglo-American friendship.
Finally, after having been advised by Mr. Hay not "to
let the Opposition have a monopoly of expressions of
good will to America," 6 Mr. Chamberlain decided to
'New York Times, April 3, 1898.
'Thayer, William Roscoe, The Life and Letters of John Hay
(Boston and New York, 1908), Vol. II, p. 169.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 153
take his own constituency at Birmingham into his confidence, and on Friday, May 13, he gave them a frank
analysis of his own views.7 He hoped thus to allay
the growing British opposition to Lord Salisbury's policy of foreign inactivity and to assure the American
people of the friendship of the Coalition government.
This speech was at once the most significant and
the most strategic of Salisbury's third ministry. It
revealed with unmistakable clarity both Great Britain's military weakness and her imperative need of
an alliance. It was immediately subjected to a storm
of criticism. Within a few days, however, Parliament
rightly arrived at the decision that Mr. Chamberlain
had spoken in complete harmony with the policy of
Lord Salisbury,8 and that the Government was committed to a policy of Anglo-American friendship which
should break down Great Britain's isolation and give
to the English speaking race again the balance of world
power. In general, the British press interpreted the
speech accurately. They admired its honesty and the
virility of its challenge. They commented upon its
Far Eastern policy according to their own political
predilections. Almost without exception, however,
they urged the wisdom of an Anglo-American alliance.9
On May 16, the London Times gave a frank sum'See London Times, May 14, 1898, for a complete text of the
speech. See ante Chapter II, pp. 20-21, for an analysis of the speech.
8 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LVII, pp. 1386-1519,
passim.
9 London Times, May 14, 15, 16, 17, 1898; Pall Mall Gazette,
May 14, 17, 1898; Spectator, May 21, 28, 1898; Literary Digest,
May 28, 1898; Public Opinion, May 19, 26, 1898.




154    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
mary of the foreign comment on the speech. Its absolute honesty and daring, so different from European
methods of diplomacy, astonished and confused Continental diplomats and critics. From Paris to Berlin
and from Vienna to Madrid, they were in a quiver over
the speech. The Germans were almost shocked by its
clear, vigorous, and unconventional language. Some
said that it was a "declaration of the bankruptcy not
only of the past English policy, but-what is moreof the whole power of England." Others declared that
Mr. Chamberlain underestimated the power of Great
Britain, and that in so doing he had killed all possibility of an Anglo-American alliance. The United
States would not attack Russia to pull the chestnuts
out of the fire for England. Besides this, he had threatened Russia and had admitted the overthrowing of
the Anglo-Japanese policy of cooperation. The comments proved that Mr. Chamberlain was right in his
belief that the speech would not injure England in
Europe. Europe did not believe what he said. On
May 15, the New York World analyzed the effect of
the speech in London. Uneasiness was produced on the
stock exchange, war rumours were freely circulated,
grave international complications were predicted, and
precautionary insurances were reported to have been
effected at fifteen guineas per cent against the risk of
war between France and Great Britain within the next
six months. "The British heart throbs for" the United
States.
The French comments were equally suggestive. No
after-dinner speech had ever produced such an effect.
Certain papers held that it was an attack on France.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 155
Others declared than an Anglo-American alliance would
be challenged by Europe at large, beginning with Germany and Russia; while still others were very much
concerned over the nature of the alliance that was to
be formed. It cannot be, they said, with either Germany or Russia.'0 Neither nation saw that Mr. Chamberlain was actually offering the United States naval
protection in Manila in return for American support
in China." 
The satisfaction with which the speech was received
in the United States was astonishing.12      On May 14,
the Chicago Tribune said, "There may never be such
an alliance in formal written terms. And there may
be. But what is unmistakable, not only inevitable, in
the future but actual in the present, actual and potent,
is this: that the two great branches of the AngloSaxon race are drawing nearer and nearer together
for cooperation in peace, and, in logical sequence, in
war as well. Every word that promotes that movement is to be welcomed and applauded. Well to the
' Literary Digest, May 28, 1898; Public Opinion, May 19, 26,
1898; London Times, May 16, 1898; Pall Mall Gazette, May 14, 15,
16, 1898.
Thayer, Life and Letters of John Hay, Vol. II, p. 165.
The significant sentences in the speech as most Americans interpreted them read thus: Our next duty "is to establish and to
maintain bonds of permanent amity with our kinsmen across the
Atlantic. I do not know what arrangements may be possible with
us, but this I know and feel, that the closer, the more cordial, the
fuller, and the more definite these arrangements are, with the consent
of both peoples, the better it will be for both and for the world.
And I even go so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, even
war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great and noble cause
the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over
an Anglo-Saxon alliance."




156    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
fore among such words are those spoken by Mr. Chamberlain, directly to an English audience, but indirectly
and no less meaningly to all the world."
On the following day the Tribune expressed the
opinion that while an Anglo-Saxon alliance was not
"likely" the two nations "should live on terms of
amity, so that if it is best at any time that they
should act together there will be no existing bad
feeling to make it more difficult for them to do so."
The following day, May 16, the Tribune's comment
was exceedingly suggestive. After noting that the
speech had "aroused the wrath of the Dons," it continued: "It is evident that Spain looks at it [an
Anglo-American alliance] as a possible avenue of
escape from its present desperate situation and will
seek to arouse the hostile prejudices of the powers by
calling their attention to the menace to their interests
involved in such an Anglo-Saxon combination in the
hope that Europe may take Spain's part." 13
On May 14, the New York Times quoted the speech
freely but with little comment. On May 15, it said
that the speech read more like a revelation than a
forecast. If the President had power to draw up secret
treaties, it would seem that there was an alliance in
existence much stronger than a friendly understanding.
Mr. Chamberlain "completed the most memorable
speech that an English audience in either hemisphere
had listened to in a generation. We as well as
continental countries will certainly conclude that the
understanding has reached a more definite stage than
was believed." Whatever may be the possibility of an
' Cf. New York Times, May 16, 1898.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 157
European combination, the Times continued, this will
lessen it.14
In the Anglo-American comment that followed Mr.
Chamberlain's address, certain factors became evident.
Foremost among them was the assurance that neither
the mass of the British nor American people were yet
ready for an alliance as that word is generally understood in European diplomacy. Equally clear was the
fact that the two great English speaking peoples understood each other as never before and that out of
this understanding there might come a mutual recognition on the part of the leaders of both that was to
be more effective and more lasting than any paper
alliance of modern times. A consideration of public
opinion in the two states during the next few weeks
will show this conclusion to be correct.
Among those prominent Americans who sought to
promote an Anglo-American friendship, if not an
agreement, throughout the critical months of 1898,
certain names stand out in prominent relief. First
among them, of course, was John Hay, who more than
anyone else represented in Great Britain the highest
ideals of American citizenship and diplomacy. To
him more than to any other American belongs the
credit of creating and directing British support for the
United States throughout the war. Closely associated
with him in his immediate work were President McKinley and Secretary of State William R. Day. These
two, together with Sir Julian Pauncefote, moulded
14New York Times, May 14, 15, 1898. Cf. Literary Digest, May 28,
1898; Public Opinion, May 19, 26, 1898; Harpers Weekly, May 28,
1898.




158     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Anglo-American diplomatic relations and public
opinion in the United States in much the same way
as Lord Salisbury, Joseph Chamberlain, and John Hay
did in Great Britain.
Following closely behind these three in personal influence came Richard Olney, former secretary of state.
He can state his own position best. "There is a patriotism of race as well as of country-and the AngloAmerican is as little likely to be indifferent to the
one as to the other. Family quarrels there have been
heretofore and doubtless will be again, and the two
peoples, at the safe distance which the broad Atlantic
interposes, take with each other liberties of speech
which only the fondest and dearest relatives indulge
in. Nevertheless that they would be found standing
together against any alien foe by whom either was
menaced with destruction or irreparable calamity, it
is not permissible to doubt. Nothing less could be
expected of the close community between them in
origin, speech, thought, literature, institutions, ideals,
in the kind and degree of civilization enjoyed by
both." 15
Agitation in favour of an Anglo-American alliance,
as has been intimated already, came in a number of
well-defined movements. Throughout the winter and
spring of 1898, many individuals and most journals
"Olney, Richard, "International Isolation of the United States,"
Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXXXI (May, 1898), pp. 577-588. This was
considered one of the most significant articles of the month. It was
quoted freely both in Great Britain and in the United States. Bryce,
James, "The Essential Unity of Britain and America," Atlantic
Monthly (July, 1898), p. 28, gives a British consideration of this
article.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 159
had spoken urgently in favour of the promotion of
good will between the United States and Great Britain. Gradually, as the Spanish-American War drew
on, rumours of an alliance began to appear through
the same sources. On May 13, the British ministry,
speaking through Joseph Chamberlain, declared themselves in favour of an alliance.16 In the weeks that
immediately followed, the majority of the British press
announced themselves in full sympathy with the proposed alliance.
On July 13, the Anglo-American League, representative of the British public, was organized at Stafford
House. Its purpose may be stated best in the text
of the resolution as it was unanimously adopted.
"Considering that the people of the British Empire
and the United States are closely allied by blood, inherit the same literature and laws, hold the same principles of self-government, recognize the same ideas of
freedom and humanity in the guidance of their National policy and are drawn together by strong common interests in many parts of the world, this meeting is of opinion that every effort should be made in
the interests of civilization and of peace to secure the
most cordial and constant cooperation on the part of
the two nations." 17 The General Committee, which
was composed of several hundred individuals, included
prominent men from the Government, the church, the
universities and colleges, literature, law, manufactur1 Chamberlain, Joseph, "Speech delivered at Birmingham, May 13,
1898," London Times, May 14, 1898.
17 An American Response to Expressions of English Sympathy
(New York, 1899), introduction.




160    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
ing and commerce, banking, and private life.18 The
honourary officers of the Committee were James Bryce
as chairman, the Duke of Sutherland as treasurer, and
T. Lee Robert, R. C. Maxwell, and Sir Frederick Pollock as secretaries.
The League met with a very favourable reception
in the United States. Various efforts were made to
secure a satisfactory response, and on July 27, the
Anglo-American Committee in New York was formed.
Its officers included Whitelaw Reid as chairman. Three
members of the committee, Daniel S. Lamont, John G.
Carlisle and William C. Whitney, had served in Mr.
Cleveland's cabinet.  Three other members Carl
Schurz, Thomas L. James and Benjamin F. Tracy, had
served in Republican cabinets. Two members, John
L. Cadwalader and George L. Rives, had served in the
department of state. It included representatives of
every administration from Lincoln to McKinley. It
likewise crossed lines both of race and religion, for it
included the Frenchman, Frederic R. Coudert; the
German, Carl Schurz; the chief Catholic prelate of
New York, Archbishop M. A. Corrigan, and the chief
Episcopal dignitary, Bishop Henry C. Potter.
The following address was drawn up: "We, citizens
of the United States of America, desire to express our
most hearty appreciation of the recent demonstrations
of sympathy and fellowship with this country on the
part of citizens of the various countries comprised in
the British Empire. We earnestly reciprocate these
' See Century Magazine, "A Step toward Universal Peace," Vol.
LVI (September, 1898), pp. 794-799, for a complete list of the
committee.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 161
sentiments, recognizing as we do that the same language and the same principles of ordered liberty should
form the basis of an intimate and enduring friendship
between these kindred peoples-a friendship destined
to hasten the day of peace and good-will among all
the nations of the earth."
The address was sent confidentially to about fifteen hundred prominent Americans of every state in
the Union representatives of all lines of thought and
occupation, who were asked to sign the address if it
met with their approval. "Practically none" refused
their endorsement. The list of men who thus announced their interest in an Anglo-American friendship
was particularly. significant in that it included many
well-known lawyers and judges, the editors of most of
the leading magazines and newspapers, the presidents
of most of the standard colleges and universities, leading clergymen of all denominations, representatives of
prominent publishing houses, and leaders in finances,
business and industry.19
After the formation of the two branches of the
Anglo-American League, came the next movement for
the proposed alliance in the form of an extended
magazine publicity. In June, the Century in a strong
editorial discussed the recent services rendered by Great
Britain to the United States. It was a sympathy
which was shown in the warmth of the greeting given
to Mr. Hay by the members of the royal family at a
moment of great tension; in the ill-restrained outburst
-of cordiality toward us in Parliament; in the well'See An American Response to Exressions of English Sympathy
for a complete list of signatures.




162    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
timed call of the British Ambasador upon the Captain
of the Maine; in Sir Julian's discreetly worded address
to the President on behalf of the powers; and in the
friendly tone of the prominent newspapers in London.
"This new interchange of sympathy realizes the statesman's noble vision of race patriotism, and signifies the
extinction in America of the anti-British jingo." 20
During the month of July a number of magazines
seemed to indicate that a decided change was taking
place in the attitude of both the Americans and the
British toward an Anglo-American alliance or understanding. Sentimental arguments, based largely on
the theory of a common race, and arguments of mutual
trade advantage were lost sight of before the imperative questions of national policy created by the victory of Commodore Dewey in Manila Bay. This was
particularly true of the United States for Great Britain, ever since the beginning of the Salisbury ministry, had been largely motivated in her attitude toward
the United States by the exigency of her relations with
the great European Powers. In general, the discussions of the month considered one of two questions:
the conflict between republicanism and monarchy or
the protection of British and American interests in
the Far East. A few citations will illustrate this
conclusion.
"The day," [the Fourth] said the Century, "will be
distinguished by the omission of the occasional tirades
against England. There is no progress of the world
that is not marked by somebody's change of mind, and
'"A Service of England to America," an editorial, Century Magasine, Vol. LVI (June, 1898), p. 314.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 163
in the last three months even the most violent prejudices among our people against our English kinsmen
have disappeared in the face of unmistakable evidence
of her sympathy with America in the irrepressible
conflict between the ideas of the sixteenth century
and those of the nineteenth... the two great divisions of the Anglo-Saxon race are "in closer sympathy than ever before." 21
The Atlantic Monthly indicated this change in attitude toward an Anglo-American agreement in two
significant articles. The first, by James K. Hosmer,
was entitled the "American Evolution. Dependence,
Independence, and Interdependence." "There is no
other kinship among peoples," said Mr. Hosmer, "so
marked as that between the two great branches of the
English-speaking race": the United States, a democracy, and England, both "practically a democratic republic" herself, and "the parent of vast republics."
Only a "moral union" is possible or desirable between
them, but, "The welfare of the world depends upon
their accord; and no other circumstance at the present
moment is so fraught with hope as that, in the midst
of the heavy embarrassments that beset both England
and America, the long-sundered kindred slowly gravitate toward alliance." 22 In the second article, Lord
Bryce first developed Great Britain's foreign relations
and found her isolated and looked upon with jealousy,
if not unfriendliness, by Germany, France, and Russia.
="Reflections Appropriate to 'the Fourth,"' an editorial, Cenrtury
Magazine, Vol. LVI (July, 1898), p. 474.
' Hosmer, James K., "The American Evolution. Dependence, Independence, Interdependence,." Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXXXII
(July, 1898), pp. 29-36.




164     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
The United States, however, with whom she had ties
of sentiment, of common theories of politics, and of
"common material benefit" held for her "the most
natural affinity and the least likelihood of any clash
of interests." Furthermore, Great Britain would regard the entrance of the United States into the Philippines "with nothing but satisfaction." There were
some obvious difficulties, however, in the way of immediate formal alliance. Meantime, there were certain things which might be done to perpetuate the
good relations which happily prevailed. One was the
conclusion of a general treaty of arbitration, the second was "the agreement to render good services to each
other" such as "giving to a citizen of either nation the
right to invoke the good offices of the diplomatic or
consular representatives of the other in a place where
his own government has no representative"; and the
"recognition of a common citizenship," and, finally,
the realization "that the best and surest foundations
of the future policy of each is to be found in relations
of frank and cordial friendship with the other." 23
In the same month Frederick Greenwood carried the
new interpretation of an Anglo-American understanding to its logical conclusion. The need for an alliance
on the American side first came with the threat of
European intervention in the Spanish-American War.
On the British side it arose about the time and for
the reason that Mr. Chamberlain spoke of the British
need of alliances. "That it rose on either side at the
prompting of self-interest takes nothing from its
3 Bryce, James, "The Essential Unity of Britain and America,"
Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXXXII (July, 1898), pp. 22-29.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 165
worth. If at bottom it really meant partnership in
armed defence, it could find base in no other origin
to be sound. Say that it sprang from the consideration that 'blood is thicker than water,' and if you
really think that you give expression to a stronger or
a trustier motive than mutual need you may depend
upon it that you are mistaken." Meanwhile, with the
victory of Commodore Dewey at Manila and the enthusiastic vote of the House of Representatives, 209 to
91, in favour of the annexation of Hawaii, the United
States passed from a national to a world power. Thus
another great fighting power had appeared in the world
and, as matters stood, that should be to the advantage of Great Britain. According, then, to Mr. Greenwood's theory the alliance had passed from its first
stage-one actually of national interest, though it was
often concealed under the guise of race sentiment-to
its second phase, that of a fighting, imperialistic alliance. The new field of Anglo-American interests was
the Far East. 24
By the middle of July, 1898, it was apparent that
the Spanish-American War was practically at an end.
Spain had paid her debt of honour to the full and
further humiliation was useless. On July 22, the Spanish Government drafted a formal message in behalf of
Greenwood, Frederick, "The Anglo-American Future," The
Nineteenth Century, Vol. XLIV (July, 1898), pp. 1-11. For further
illustrations see Collier'8 Weekly, July 2, 9, 1898; Diplomaticus, "Is
there an Anglo-American Understanding," Fortnrightly Review, Vol.
LXX (July, 1898), pp. 163-174; Lecky, W. E. H., "The Relation
Between the United States and Other Powers," Independent, Vol. L,
second half (July, 1898), pp. 15-17; Norman, Henry, "America Revisited in War Time," McClure's Magazine, Vol. XI (July, 1898),
pp. 297-302.




166    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
peace. It was presented four days later to Mr. McKinley by Mr. J. Cambon, the French Ambassador.25
On July 30, President McKinley submitted the following terms on which peace might be negotiated: first
the relinquishment by Spain of sovereignty over Cuba
and the immediate evacuation of the island; second,
the cession of the island of Porto Rico and one of the
Ladrone islands in lieu of any indemnity; third, the
American occupation of the city, bay and harbour of
Manila "pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace
which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines." 26
On August 7, Spain replied to the terms of peace
offered by the United States. She accepted the first
two, but maintained that the third, relative to the
Philippines, was "quite indefinite." The United States,
said the minister of Spain, cannot believe herself entitled to occupy the bay, the harbour, and the city of
Manila, pending the conclusion of peace, on the ground
of conquest. The Spanish flag still waves over the
city of Manila and the whole archipelago is in the
power and under the sovereignty of Spain.27  President McKinley was annoyed at the message and submitted the American terms once more on August 10,
in the form of a formal protocol.28 The wording concerning the disposition of the Philippines was exactly
the same as in the previous message. October 1 was
designated as the date for the meeting of the peace
'Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 819-820.
26Ibid., pp. 820-821.
'Ibid., pp. 822-823.
'Ibid., pp. 824-825.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 167
commissioners. Two days later the protocol was signed
by Secretary Day for the United States and Jules
Cambon for Spain.29 The following day, August 13,
General Merritt, aided by Admiral Dewey, completed
the capture of Manila.
Thus far during the year, or until the close of the
Spanish-American War early in August, Anglo-American friendship had found expression chiefly in three
ways: British support for the United States in the
prosecution of the war, American cooperation in the
British "open door" policy in China, and an attempt
to form a general Anglo-American agreement or understanding. Commodore Dewey's victory at Manila
had opened the Philippines to exploitation. Should
the United States enter upon an imperialistic program and keep possession of the islands, the similarity
of her interests and those of Great Britain might lead
to a policy of Anglo-American cooperation in the Far
East. This would restore to Great Britain her former
assurance of a balance of power in European politics.
Opportunity for a reciprocal expression of cooperation
existed in the West. With the fall of Spanish power
in the West Indies, the United States became a close
rival of Great Britain for the naval supremacy of the
Caribbean Sea. As it was, Great Britain could maintain her prestige there only by stationing a powerful
fleet in the Western Atlantic and by holding joint control over any isthmian canal that might be constructed.
Such a policy was inexpedient for a number of reasons.
It would either necessitate a decided increase in the
British naval appropriations or it would weaken the
Ibid., pp. 828-830.




168 ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


British fleet in the Far East. Besides this, it was almost
sure to incur the ill will of the American people in that
during the last few years they had been steadily developing the theory that they must possess exclusive
control over any isthmian canal. Could the friendship
which was begun between the two peoples during the
Venezuelan boundary controversy, and which had been
steadily developed throughout the two years following,
be maintained and further established, it must naturally lead to a policy of division of power. Whatever
was accomplished, however, would rest not upon governmental negotiations but upon the growing friendship of the people of the two Powers. The United
States would cooperate with Great Britain in order to
establish British supremacy in the Far East. This
would, of course, demand the assurance of the protection of American trade and territorial possessions in
that region. Great Britain would, in turn, yield the
supremacy of the Caribbean together with the control
of the isthmian canal to the United States. In this
case, the American people would guarantee the safety
of the British trade interests and possessions south of
the United States. A consideration of events during
the next few months following the close of the Spanish-American War will show that Anglo-American diplomacy actually developed these two new policies.
As early as the latter part of April, 1898, the British
press began to suggest the results that would attend
the American capture of the Philippines. "If... the
United States annexes the Philippines," said the
Statist, and "establishes there not only a coaling station but a strongly fortified port, and if especially it




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 169


takes Hawaii as a kind of stepping stone, the change
in international relations will be very marked, not
merely in the Far East alone, but in Europe as well."
Furthermore, if the United States adopts an active
policy in China, she will be compelled to take a new
attitude in Europe.30
Immediately after the battle of Manila, the British
press began to consider the disposition of the islands.
Certain Americans, it said, wanted to keep them,
others wanted to dispose of them-preferably to Great
Britain.31 In the latter case some felt that the maintenance of a coaling station would be sufficient to protect American trade interests.32  Should the United
States annex both Hawaii and the Philippines and a
close Anglo-American alliance be formed it would enable the two English speaking peoples to "keep China
open to the trade of the world," to prevent "the military Powers from pursuing the policy of grab," and to
"render it possible for China to be re-awakened and
start once more upon the path of progress." 33 During these same days the American press seldom advocated annexation and seemed to ignore the possibility
or necessity of an Anglo-American alliance in the Far
East.84
About the middle of the month the British press
began to recognize a change in the American attitude
'Statist, April 30, 1898. Cf. ibid., May 7, 1898.
'British Weekly, May 5, 6, 1898; Economist, May 7, 1898; London
Times, May 4, 1898.
'London Times, May 4, 1898.
8Statist, May 7, 1898. Cf. Pall Mall Gazette, May 2, 1898;
Chronicle, May 7, 14, 1898; Economist, May 28, 1898.
'Public Opinion, May 12,1898; Chicago Chronicle, May 14,1898.




170      ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
toward the Philippines.3 This was expressed first in
the determination of certain Americans to defy European interference in the disposition of the islands. The
United States might trade them to Great Britain for
certain British possessions in the West Indies,36 or she
might sell them   outright.37  A few days later it was
suggested that Great Britain looked upon the expansion of American industry with alarm but not hostility.
This was particularly true of the iron industry.38  During the last days of the month the press outlined
the future American policy in the islands with a fair
degree of accuracy. The United States would retain
them, herself,39 setting up some form of a protectorate.
Furthermore, the American policy in the Far East
would be very agreeable to Great Britain. The United
States would demand peace, order, and freedom to
trade everywhere at will subject only to custom house
duties enforced against all nations alike.40
British press opinion toward the Philippines was
expressed freely during June. The fact that an agreement had been signed between Great Britain and the
United States whereby the Canadian boundary dispute was referred to a joint high commission seemed to
Statist, May 14, 1898.
'Pall Mall Gazette, May 16, 1898.
Chronicle, May 14, 1898.
'Statist, May 20, 1898.
British Weekly, May 28, 1898; Statist, May 28, 1898. This report was based upon the departure of American troops for Manila.
British Weekly, June 2, 1898; Economist, May 28, 1898. This
article also called attention to the idea expressed several weeks later
in the reliable magazines-that the two countries would be "almost
forced into partnership" and though a "business partnership is not
exactly an alliance the distance between them is not very wide."




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 171
urge the press to considerable cordiality.41 As a result the press was quick to note anything that indicated German-American discord.42
On June 14, Mr. W. J. Bryan, speaking at Omaha,
denounced territorial aggrandizement and advocated
giving up the Philippines. About the same time it
became equally evident that the Republican party
leaders were going to advocate annexation.43
Events in China, meanwhile, began to grow serious
again. On June 9, 1898, Great Britain leased the island
of Lan-tao to the west of Hongkong for 99 years.
The Coalition government was not anxious to acquire
Chinese territory, but if it could not obtain the establishment of the "open door" it was necessary that
British trade interests be protected from the territorial
encroachments of the other Powers.44 The next month,
July, 1898, the British flag was raised over Weihai
Wei. Fortunately, however, for the safety of AngloAmerican trade interests in the East, the United States
entered upon a policy of imperialism at the same
time that the British supremacy in China was being
questioned.
On July 7, President McKinley signed the joint resoBritish Weekly, June 2, 1898; London Times, June 21, 1898.
'Pall Mall Gazette, June 6, 10, 11, 15, 1898; Economist, June 18,
1898. On June 15, the Pall Mall Gazette printed a symposium of
American press opinion to show that the United States resented
German interference in the Philippines and was disposed to keep
the islands herself. On June 21, the same paper said, "Let Germany
say that the United States shall not annex the Philippines and there
will be an uprising in favor of it."
'See New York Times, June 21, 22, 1898; New York Journal, June
24, 1898; Pall Mall Gazette, June 23, 1898.
"Pall Mall Gazette, June 10, 1898; British Weekly, June 10, 1898.




172  ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


lution which provided for the annexation of the Hawaiian islands. During the previous year, June, 1897,
the President had negotiated a treaty which provided
for the annexation of the islands. After nine months
of fruitless debate the friends of the treaty gave up
all hope of being able to secure its ratification. After
the victory at Manila sentiment in favour of annexation developed very rapidly. The reasons advanced
were almost entirely in behalf of national defense and
trade. Hawaii provided a coaling station and a basis
of attack only two thousand miles away from San
Francisco. Shut out from there an enemy would be
thrown back for supplies of fuel to a distance of nearly
four thousand miles. But more important than this
was the fact that the American commercial interests in
the Pacific were too great to be sacrificed. Hawaii was
sure to be taken over soon by some nation. If the
United States refused to annex it herself, she could
not object if another nation took possession of it.
Finally, our traditional policy of government was not
opposed to annexation.   On June 5, a joint resolution in favour of annexation pased the House; on July
6, it was passed by the Senate.
The British looked upon the American acquisition of
the islands with hearty favour. This, they said, would
silence those Americans who had claimed that Great
Britain desired the islands herself and would oppose
their annexation by the United States. But, more
Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2d session, Vol. XXXI.
pp. 2837, 2866, 2872; New York Times, April 30, May 21, June 11,
25,1898; London Times, August 11, 1898; Chicago Tribune, June 25,
1898.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 173
significant by far was the. fact that Hawaii was but a
stepping stone to the Philippines and the Far East.
Once in possession of the Hawaiian islands the United
States was bound to keep the Philippines. This, in turn
would lead the United States to assume an active share
in the struggle to maintain the "open door" in China.46
After the annexation of Hawaii had been completed
the British followed the American attitude toward the
Philippines with keen interest. Some said that President McKinley preferred to keep only a coaling station.47 Others believed that Spain would be left in
possession of the islands.48  Still others were convinced
that the United States would keep all of them.49 They
were generally agreed, however, that the United States
would tolerate no interference in the ultimate disposition of the islands.50 None of the European powers,
however, would look upon the Americans in the Philippines with favour except the British and the Japanese.51
When the American peace commissioners sailed for
Paris they left without definite instructions concerning
the Philippines. This was probably due to President
McKinley's reluctance to act without the full support
of the people, and the Americans were not yet prepared
to see the full importance of the Philippines in their
'London Times, March 22, May 6, July 8, 1898; Economist, July 9,
1898; Statist, July 28, 1898; New York Tribune, July 29, 1898.
'Pall Mall Gazette, July 16, 1898.
'8Ibid., July 27, 1898.
49 Statist, July 28, 1898; London Times, July 30, 1898.
Statist, July 9, 28, 1898; Pall Mall Gazette, July 5, 1898.
London Times, July 29, 1898; Pall Mall Gazette, July 28, 1898.
Cf. New York Tribune, July 28, 1898.




174     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
relation to American trade in the East. The letter of
instructions, of September 16, indicated the general
lines of argument used by the imperialists. The American victory in the war had placed upon the nation
certain new duties and responsibilities which "we must
meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose
growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of
Nations has plainly written the high command and
pledge of civilization. Incidental to our tenure in the
Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which
American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. It is
just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in
the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only
the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord
the open door to others." The commercial opportunity
which is associated with this new venture depends
less upon large territorial possessions than "upon an
adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal
privileges" but the "United States cannot accept less
than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the
island of Luzon." 52
British sentiment, however, seemed to be assured
that, while the situation in China was becoming more
serious, American sentiment was growing rapidly in
favour of an Anglo-American commercial agreement,53
'Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 907-908.
' See Pall Mall Gazette, September 6, 9, 10, 15, 16, 19, 1898;
London Times, September 4, 22, 1898; British Weekly, September 25,
1898. By September 16, with the exception of the Post and the
World, every important New York paper was advocating the acquisition of the Philippines and the prosecution of a policy of commercial
expansion in the Far East.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 175
under the British policy of the "open door." 54 On
September 13, the Statist spoke very specifically. The
Continental papers are indulging in their usual quips
at Great Britain's expense to the effect that an European alliance against her is imminent and that once
the Spanish-American trouble is settled the United
States will have little inclination for an Anglo-American alliance. "But in reality our position in China
was never so strong as it is at present, for not only
are we ourselves interested in preventing Russia, Germany, and France-whether singly or in combination-from closing a large part of China against the
rest of the world, but so also axe the United States
and Japan.... And what the United States and the
British do, Japan will back up.... We shall neither
allow ourselves to be bullied nor drawn into action
that our interests do not require." 55
One of the strongest assurances of the development
of Anglo-American good will was found in the attitude
of Germany toward both Great Britain and the United
States. By the middle of September Germany was
actively attempting to win the friendship of both
powers.68
During October President McKinley was scheduled
to speak at the Trans-Mississippi Exposition at
Omaha, Nebraska. He utilized the trip, both going
there and returning, to put the Philippine situation
'Cf. Pall Mall Gazette, September 15, 16, 1898.
"See also Temple, Sir Richard, "An Anglo-American versus an
European Combination," North American Review, Vol. CLXVII,
pp. 306-316.
"Statist, September 10, 1898; New York Herald, September 7, 17,
1898.




176     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
before the American people. He made no less than
sixteen speeches, exclusive of his address at Omaha,
to large popular audiences. His theme was always
the same. The United States was exceedingly prosperous, her need for a new market was imperative
both for the manufacturer and for the farmer, her
debt to humanity and civilization opened up to her
by her new territorial acquisition must be paid.57 The
reception extended to him both by the people and
the press was sufficiently enthusiastic to assure him
that the policy of imperialism was growing rapidly in
public favour. It was this conclusion that determined his instructions of November 13 to the peace
commission.
The peace commission met in Paris, October 1. The
American delegation included William R. Day as
Chairman, Cushman K. Davis of Minnesota, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations;
Senator William P. Frye of Maine, Senator George
Gray of Delaware, and Whitelaw Reid, editor of the
New York Tribune and former ambassador to Germany.
The entire month of October was consumed in the
discussion of Cuba. On October 31, after the American people had had ample opportunity to express
themselves, the real struggle for American expansion
began. On November 11, the commissioners asked
for definite instructions concerning the Philippines,
and on November 13, they were authorized to offer
6' It is almost impossible to give any definite estimate of the actual
influence of these addresses. Mr. McKinley probably spoke to no
less than 20,000 or 25,000 people daily for ten days. Complete reports
of each of the speeches appeared in most of the papers throughout
the country.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 177
Spain between ten and twenty million dollars in payment for the island.68 Spain accepted the latter
amount, under protest, and on December 10, 1898,
the treaty was finally signed.59
There was little change in Anglo-American relations
during the last two months of the year. The British
press continued to express satisfaction over the American occupation of the Philippines.60 On November 4,
the New York correspondent of the Pall Mall Gazette
said, "If Russia closes the treaty port of Newchwang
and thus directly raises the 'open door' question,
England's subsequent action would appeal powerfully
to the sympathy and moral support of the United
States." It is recognized that American interests are
as great as British in maintaining treaty rights in
China.
A number of times during those weeks American
audiences paid tribute to Great Britain. One illustration will show the trend of both the British
and American feeling. On November 11, General
Nelson A. Miles, speaking at a banquet given in his
honour in New York, said, "The war has given us
reason and opportunity to appreciate our obligations
to the mother country." Captain Paget responded,
"We shall be proud in the future whenever we see
the Stars and Stripes on a warship or a merchantman,
68 Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 945.
Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 831-840; see Cortissoz, Royal, The
Life of Whitelaw Reid (New York, 1921), Vol. II, pp. 228-235, for
Mr. Reid's story of the peace conference.
"London Times, November 4, 5, 7, 11, 1898; Denby, Sir Charles,
"Shall We Keep the Philippines," Forum, Vol. XXVI (November,
1898), pp. 278-281; Smalley, Anglo-American Memories, pp. 191-194.




178     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
for we shall know that on board we have, if not a
brother, an ally."61
On January 4, 1899, President McKinley transmitted
the treaty to the Senate for ratification. It was finally
ratified on February 7, after nearly five weeks of bitter
debate. During these days of suspense the British
press seemed strangely silent. In general, it seemed
sure of three facts: that the United States would keep
the Philippines; that she would be a successful colonizing nation; and that high colonial tariff duties were
not inconsistent with the "open door" policy.   On
January 6, the London Times spoke positively. "A
long debate is expected" but "the treaty will be ratified without amendment." On January 12, it said
that the treaty would be ratified in spite of the opposition. On January 19, it quoted Senator Davis and
Senator Lodge as being sure that the treaty would
pass. The following day it accused those senators
who were in favour of the Nicaragua canal bill of
deliberately trying to postpone debate on the peace
treaty until the canal bill was passed. On January 27,
it said again that the prospect of ratification without
amendment was good. On February 6, it admitted
that the fate of the treaty depended on doubtful senators.  It still maintained, however, that should the
treaty fail on this vote, it would be passed by the next
Congress. On February 7, it declared the action of the
Senate worthy of congratulation. The Pall Mall
'New York Times, November 12, 1898; Pall Mall Gazette, November 12, 1898. For further illustrations, see London Times,
November 17, 1898; New York Times, November 17, 1898, for an
account of the annual dinner of the New York Chamber of Commerce, November 16,1898.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 179
Gazette was equally sure of the action of the Senate.
As America must stay in Cuba, it said, so must she
stay in the Philippines; foreign intervention is sure.62
A typical statement of the British opinion of the
ability of the United States as a colonizing nation
was given by the Quarterly Review. "We have no
doubt whatever of the capacity of our kinsmen to
grapple effectively with all the difficulties and dangers
which they may encounter in the Philippines. We
believe that they share the British secret of governing
inferior races at a distance with justice and firmness,
and with the smallest possible exercise of military
power.63  The London Times said the same thing in
a briefer way. "Anglo-Saxon vigor will call our latent colonial abilities in the United States." 64
The third subject of British interest was of peculiar
significance. With the possession of the Philippines,
the United States became a power in the Far East.
Certain Americans had expressed an active sympathy
for the British "open door" policy. The question then
became this: Would the United States, a high tariff
nation, support the "open door" in her new possessions? A high tariff and the "open door" seemed incompatible to many. Furthermore, if the United
States did not maintain the "open door" in Hawaii
and the Philippines, would she support the British pol' Pall Mall Gazette, January 12, 1898. See also Statist, January 7,
1899,' Schurz, Carl, "The Issue of Imperialism," Chicago University
Convocation Address, January 4, 1899, Speeches, Correspondence and
Political Papers, Vol. VI, p. 19.
a "Democracy and Foreign Affairs," Quarterly Review, Vol.
CLXXXIX (January, 1899), pp. 241-265.
"London Times, December 12, 1898. Cf. Statist, January 7, 1899.




180     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
icy in China? Apparently the British traders soon
realized the expediency of finding a way of harmonizing
the American tariff and the British "open door." On
November 28, 1898, the Times suggested that there was
no relation between tariff and the "open door." The
"open door" meant equality of trade. A few days
later the Statist assumed the same theory. "High
duties are not inconsistent with the 'open door.' What
the open door means is that traders of all nationalities shall have equal opportunities, not that there shall
be absolute freedom of trade." We have no shadow
of doubt that the United States will maintain the open
door in the Philippines.65 There had been one paramount issue for which the British had contended
throughout the negotiations concerning the Philippines-the United States must be induced to hold
the islands and thereby become a power in the East.66
While negotiations had been in progress, AngloAmerican friendship had been steadily developing,
both in the Caribbean region and in the Pacific. Their
first joint action came in the settlement of the Samoan
question. The trouble had begun at Apia, April, 1898,
when an unfortunate engagement occurred in which
one British and two American officers were killed.
German treachery was suspected.67      Within a few
6 Cf. Statist, December 3, 24, 1898.
66Cf. Denby, Charles, "Shall We Keep the Philippines," Forum,
Vol. XXVI (November, 1898), pp. 279-281; Schurz, Carl, Letter to
Charles Francis Adams, Speeches, Letters and Political Papers, Vol.
IV, p. 38; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LXVII, p. 503.
67Chronicle, April 15, 1899; Independent, February 23, 1899, suggested that the German policy in Samoa was similar to that of
Admiral Diedrichs at Manila. The Germans proposed to join with




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 181
days Great Britain agreed to accept the German proposal for the appointment of a joint commission to
inquire into the difficulty. Negotiations dragged on
for several months. Fortunately, none of the European powers saw fit to intervene. Feeling in Germany
continued to grow more bitter.68 The United States
and Great Britain continued to place the responsibility
for the loss of lives on the German consul. 69 On November 14, 1899, an agreement was concluded between
Germany and Great Britain, subject to the approval of
the United States. The United States was to hold
Tutuila with its harbour of Pagopago which was really
the key to the entire group.70 Germany received the
remainder of the islands. Great Britain was compensated for her loss in the islands in a number of ways.
In the first place, she received a number of small
islands long desired by the Australian colonies.71 A
demarcation line was drawn between German and
British possessions in Africa, and Germany renounced
all extraterritorial rights in Zanzibar. Both Germany
and the United States agreed that commerce was to
be open on equal terms to each of the three nations
in all of the islands.72  The treaty was signed, finally,
on December 2, 1899. The United States and Great
the native forces to secure definite possession of the territory.
Cf. Pall Mall Gazette, March 23, 1899; Lokal Anzeiger, March 23,
1899.
"Pall Mall Gazette, April 14, 1899.
London Times, April 14, 1899; New York Times, April 13, 1899.
oLondon Board of Trade Journal, Vol. XXVII (December, 1899),
pp. 737-738.
'Statist, November 11, 1899; St. James Budget, November 17,1899.
" Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. I, p. 553.




182      ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Britain had acted throughout the entire negotiations
in full harmony.73    Furthermore, in relinquishing all
territory in the islands, Great Britain accepted the
American possession of Tutuila as a guarantee of
British interests in the islands.74
While the Anglo-German negotiations were at their
height concerning Samoa, the British began their war
with the Boers. The test of American friendship was
severe for the sympathy of the Americans had always
gone instinctively to a people who were struggling for
self-government. Nevertheless, throughout the entire
war, the United States maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality highly pleasing and favourable to
the British. A few illustrations are significant. The
Canadians were allowed to compress a shipment of
hay in New York and Boston, consigned for the use
of the British forces in South Africa.75    The hospital
ship, Maine, was wholly equipped by means of American subscriptions and with an American staff, for
service in the Transvaal.76 The British press considered the President, the Cabinet and the American pub' Pall Mall Gazette, April 25, 1899, quoted Chief Justice Fort of
the New Jersey Court of Common Pleas as saying: "The power of
unity of purpose of the two nations [Great Britain and the United
States] cannot be over-estimated. The Samoan incident proves that
if Germany had fired alone, or America or Great Britain had fired
alone, international complications beyond estimation might have
followed. When England and the United States fired together, there
was silence in all the capitals of the world."
' St. James Budget, November 17, 1899; Statist, November 11, 1899;
London Board of Trade Journal, Vol. XXVII (December, 1899),
pp. 737-738; Pall Mall Gazette, June 3, 1899.
"Pall Mall Gazette, November 4, 1899.
'6Annual Register, 1899, part 1, new series, p. 390; Pall Mall
Gazette, November 7, 1899.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 183
lie friendly  toward   Great Britain.77    The reasons
usually ascribed by the British for the American
friendship were largely those of self-interest rather than
sentiment. They had not forgotten British friendship
during the Spanish-American War;78 British cooperation was still necessary in the Philippines;79 American
trade interests desired a British victory;80 and the
United States were engaged in a similar war in the
Philippines.8'
While Great Britain and the United States were becoming more and more closely associated in the East,
affairs dragged in the West. The British people generally recognized the necessity for American cooperation in the East, but they were not yet ready to grant
reciprocal favours in the West. Soon after the close
of actual hostilities in 1898, a few Americans and
British began to urge the importance of an isthmian
canal to American trade interests in the Far East. Mr.
Sidney Low set forth the situation in December, 1898.
American trade interests in the Far East and the
Pacific are intimately associated with the future of the
Isthmus of Panama and the adjacent territories, he
said. "The key to the Pacific is the Caribbean sea and
the Mexican gulf. Peking and Yokohama may be
'Pall Mall Gazette, October 9, 1899; quoting from New York
World, October 9, 1899; St. James Budget, May 25, 1900; Statist,
November 11, 1899; Chronicle, April 4,1900.
' Annual Register, 1899, part I, new series, p. 390; Pall Mall
Gazette, February 5, March 2, 21, 1900.
T' Pall Mall Gazette, April 11, 1900.
' St. James Budget, January 5, 1900; Chicago Economist, November 4, 1899.
Pall Mall Gazette, May 12; Chicago Economist, February 17, 24,
1900.




184    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
menaced or defended at Porto Rico, Jamaica, or Santiago de Cuba." The Anglo-American contest for control of the isthmus had at an earlier time culminated
in 1850 in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The United
States has always been restless under that treaty.
America now holds an opening to the East in Hawaii
and the Philippines, and a canal has become essential.82
Two days later, he said, "The United States' trade with
the American as well as the Asiatic shores of the Pacific cannot reach its full development so long as the
products of industrial districts of the Atlantic seaboard
are compelled to take the devious route around Cape
Horn." The American Republic is now the dominant
power in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. The
only power who could dispute her is England, and
her interests are declining. Great Britain refuses to
reconsider the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Great Britain,
in order to hold her control in the Caribbean, would
have to station a fleet there as large as at Malta.
"And on the other hand the United States can now
offer England assistance and support outside the
American continent and the American waters, which
might, in certain eventualties, prove of the greatest
possible value." The abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty is quite likely to be suggested by the State
Department at no distant date.
The Bankers' Magazine saw the need for a canal
from a somewhat different point of view. The annexation of Hawaii and the acquisition of the Philippines
will render it very necessary that there should be some
short route for the navy between the Atlantic and the
' Pall Mall Gazette, October 5, 1898.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 185
Pacific. The journey of the Oregon proved that.83
During the closing days of the year, Senator George
Hoar of Massachusetts, Senator John T. Morgan of
Alabama, and Senator Lodge struggled to keep the
necessity for the canal before the American people.84
The Economist suggested another argument. The
possibility of war between the United States and Great
Britain does not alter the situation since it would be
fought in the Atlantic. Paper rights to the canal would
not be worth anything. It will always be necessary
for the British to maintain a fleet in the West. Meanwhile, it became certain that some definite action was
near at hand.
On the same day that the news reached England
that the American Senate had ratified the Paris peace
treaty, Sir Charles Dilke outlined the new British policy of Anglo-American friendship. "There is a very
acute point which concerns our relations with the
United States and with regard to that question I think
we are in a position to put a definite question to the
Government. Some years ago, Great Britain, in conjunction with the Government of France, considered
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. When the Treaty was
last under discussion between the Governments of
Great Britain and the United States, Great Britain
took up an anti-American attitude, and took up that
position in conjunction with the Government of France.
The Governments of France and England acted together more or less diplomatically against the Gov' Bankers' Magazine, Vol. LVII (December, 1898), p. 891.
'4 Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3d session, Vol. XXII,
part 1, pp. 297, 301, 303, 305.




186    ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
ernment of the United States. Those of us who have
given much attention to this subject are under the impression that the time has come when the country
ought to make a new departure in this matter; that
we have no interest which ought to lead us to adhere
in this Treaty to the position which in common with
France we took up a good many years ago. If that is
so,... we ought to take the first step ourselves by
offering to the United States those conditions as regards the future of the inter-oceanic canal which seem
to us to be good." 85
Meanwhile, on February 5, 1900, Secretary Hay
and Lord Pauncefote had signed a canal treaty.86 The
Senate debate on the treaty revealed two weaknesses:
it did not provide for the abrogation of the ClaytonBulwer Treaty, and it failed to secure for the United
States the sole right of neutralization and control.
The British Review of Reviews stated the attitude of
many of the British toward the objections advanced by
the Senate. The attack by the United States is concentrated on the clause by which the United States
binds herself not to fortify the new canal. "This is denounced as a scandalous concession to England, and
all the resources of journalistic vituperation with pen
and pencil have been launched upon the President and
Secretary Hay for their alleged surrender to England.
As a matter of fact, no one in England cares two
straws about the matter and the hubbub on the other
side of the Atlantic has produced no echo here. The
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty has long been an anachronHansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LXVI, p. 152.
"Senate Documents, 56th Congress, 1st session, No. 160.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 187
ism, and could not possibly apply to a canal constructed
by the United States with its own capital and on its
own responsibility."  The importance of the outcry
against the Nicaraguan Treaty "lies in the evidence
which it affords as to the recrudescence of the strong
anti-English feeling on the part of the American people." 87 After several months of debate the Senate
ratified the amended treaty. The British Government
refused to accept the amendments.88   After the lapse
of almost a year a new treaty was submitted, which
met the deficiencies of the earlier treaty. It abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer convention and practically
placed the canal under the absolute control of the
United States.89 The treaty was finally ratified December 16, 1901. The significance of this act is obvious.
British sentiment had developed to the degree which
warranted the Government in accepting an unwritten
agreement of American protection of British trade in
the West in return for American concessions in the
Far East.90
Throughout the latter part of 1898 it became apparent that Great Britain was not going to be able to
maintain her "open door" policy in China. In April,
1899, England and Russia signed an agreement by
which England agreed not to seek any railway con"British Review of Reviews, "Isthmian Canal," Vol. XXI (March',
1900), p. 205. Cf. Statist, February 10, May 14, December 22, 1900;
Rogers, Henry Wade, "The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty," Forum, Vol.
XXIX (May, 1900), pp. 355-369.
8 Moores' International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 211.
"Latane, John Holladay, America as a World Power (New York
and London, 1907), p. 207.
"9St. James Budget, October 11, November 22, December 13, 20,
27, 1901. 




188     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
cessions north of the great wall of China; Russia
agreed to give England a free hand south of the wall.9'
American expansion into the East made the maintenance of the British policy essential for her trade interests. Accordingly, on September 6, 1899, Secretary
Hay sent notes to the Powers of Europe requesting
a declaration of their interests in China.
The note which was sent to Great Britain is typical
of the others: "It is the sincere desire of my Government that the interests of its citizens may not be
prejudiced through exclusive treatment by any of the
controlling Powers within their respective 'spheres of
interest' in China, and it hopes to retain there an open
market for all the world's commerce, remove dangerous
sources of international irritation, and thereby hasten
united action of the Powers at Peking to promote administrative reforms so greatly needed for strengthening the Imperial Government and maintaining the
integrity of China, in which it believes the whole
Western world alike is concerned. It believes that such
a result may be greatly aided and advanced by declarations of the various Powers claiming 'spheres of interest' in China as to their intentions in regard to the
treatment of foreign trade and commerce therein, and
that the present is a very favourable moment for informing Her Majesty's Government of the desire of
the United States to have it make on its own part,
and to lend its powerful support in the effort to obtain
"Sessional Papers, 1900, Vol. CV (State Papers, Vol. LIX), Correspondence respecting affairs in China; Congressional Record, Vol.
XXXIII, part 4 (56th Congress, 1st session), p. 3408. House Document No. 547, 56th Congress, 1st session, Vol. XCVIII.




ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT 189
from each of the various Powers claiming 'spheres of
interest' in China a declaration substantially to the
following effect: (1) That it will in no way interfere
with any Treaty port or any vested interest within
any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased territory
it may have in China. (2) That the Chinese Treaty!
Tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within
such 'sphere of interest' no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties leviable shall be
collected by the Chinese Government. (3) That it
will levy no higher harbor duties on vessels of another
nationality frequenting any port in such 'sphere' than
shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality." 92
Lord Salisbury submitted his reply on November
30. "I have much pleasure in informing your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government will be prepared
to make a declaration in the sense desired by your
Government in regard to the leased territory of Weihai-Wei and territory in China which may hereafter
be acquired by Great Britain by lease or otherwise,"
provided that similar declarations may be obtained by
the other Powers concerned.93 Favourable returns were
received from each of the other powers. France replied on December 16, Russia on December 30, 1899,
and Berlin on February 19, 1900. On March 30, 1900,
the United States notified the European Powers that
the notes had been agreed to by each and that the
"Sesional Papers, Vol. CV (State Papers, Vol. LIX), Correspondence respecting foreign trade in China; House DocumentNo. 5475,
56th Congress, 1st session, Vol. XCVIII.
Ibid.




190     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
policy proposed would be considered effective.94    Apparently each of the powers had been afraid to refuse
assent to a policy which was supported by both the
United States and Great Britain.
Thus the United States, under the leadership of John
Hay, had completed the work begun by Great Britain
early in 1898. The reason for the success of Mr. Hay
seems obvious. In 1898, Great Britain had stood
alone in her demands upon the European powers. In
1900, the commercial relation of the United States
and Great Britain in the Far East was so clearly established that the Continental Powers dare not risk
opposition to the American demand for the "open
door." 95 The United States had accomplished what
Great Britain tried to do two years earlier.
9Ibid.
Brooklyn Daily Eagle, January 5, 6, March 16, 28, 1900; New
York Times, January 6, 18, February 19, 1900; London Times,
January 10, 15, February 20, 1900; Pall Mall Gazette, November 23,
1899; St. James Budget, March 20 1900; Economist, November 11,
1899; Spectator, December 9, 1899, April 4, 1900.




BIBLIOGRAPHY


PRIMARY SOURCES
a. Government Documents
"Affairs in Cuba," Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. 55th Congress, 2d session,
Report No. 885, 1898. The same material was also published by order of the 56th Congress, 2d session, as Senate Document No. 231, part 7, 1901. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1898.
The Annual Register, A Review of Public Events at Home
and Abroad. New series, 1897-1901. Longmans, Green
& Co., London, New York, Bombay.
Annual Report of Navy Department, 1898. The same material was also published by order of the 55th Congress, 3d
session, as House Document, Vol. XII, No. 3. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1899.
Annual Report of the War Department, 1898. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1899.
British and Foreign State Papers. Vol. LXXXIX (1896 -1897), Vol. XCII (1899-1900). Harrison & Sons, London, 1897-1900.
Bryan, L. Henry, compiler, Compilation of Treaties in Force
July 7, 1898. 55th Congress, 3d session, House Document,
No. 276. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1899.
Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign
Countries, 1891-1896. Annual volumes. Government
Printing Office, Washington.
"Communications in the Office of Naval Operations," Cipher
Messages. Vol. II.
Congressional Record.  54th Congress, 1st session, Vol.
XXVIII, part 1 (December, 1895); 57th Congress, 1st
191




192     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
session, Vol. XXXV, part 1 (December, 1901). Government Printing Office, Washington.
"Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of China," Accounts
and Papers. Vol. LIV (State Papers, Vol. LV). Parliamentary Papers. Vol. CV, 1898. London, 1898.
"Correspondence Respecting the Proposals on Currency,
made by the Special Envoys from the United States,"
Enclosure 2 in No. II, Parliamentary Papers. Vol. CV,
1898. London, 1898.
Ellis, George D., compiler, Platforms of the Two Great Political Parties. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1920.
Grimshaw, W. H., compiler, Miscellaneous Documents and
Speeches on Cuba and Philippines, 1897-1899. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1899.
Grimshaw, W. H., compiler, Tariff, International Bank and
Miscellaneous Speeches-Trust, Free Silver and War
Revenue, 1897-1899. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1899.
Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate. Vols.
XXX-XXXI. Government Printing Office, Washington,
1909.
Moore, John Bassett, ed., A Digest of International Law.
8 v. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1906.
Also published by order of 56th Congress, 2d session, as
House Document, No. 556, 1900-1901.
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1895-1901. Government Printing Office, Washington.
The Parliamentary Debates (Hansard's). Fourth series,
Vol. VL (January 19, 1897); Vol. IXC (August, 1901).
Wyman & Sons, London.
Richardson, James D., ed., A Compilation of the Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897. 10 v. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1898; Supplement,
1897-1902, compiled and arranged by George Raymond
Devitt, Bureau of National Literature and Art, Washington, 1903.




BIBLIOGRAPHY


193


The Statutes at Large of the United States of America.
Vols. XXVIII, XXIX. Government Printing Office,
Washington.
"United States Naval Intelligence," Information from
Abroad. Numbers 1-8. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1899-1900.
"War Notes," No. 1, Office of Naval Intelligence, Information from Abroad, 1898.
b. Correspondence, Speeches, Memoirs and Autobiographies.
Allen, Lieutenant W. H., "The Voyage of the Oregon,"
The American-Spanish War-A History by the War
Leaders. Chas. C. Haskell and Son, Norwich, Conn.,
1899.
An American Response to Expressions of English Sympathy. Printed for the Anglo-American Committee, New
York, 1899.
The American-Spanish War-A History by the War
Leaders. Chas. C. Haskell and Son, Norwich, Conn.,
1899.
Archer, William, America To-day. Charles Scribner's Sons,
New York, 1899. A series of letters and essays which
first appeared in the London Pall Mall Gazette, the Pall
Mall Magazine, and the New York Times.
Barrett, John, Admiral George Dewey. A Sketch of the
Man.   Harper & Brothers, New     York and London.
1899.
Atkins, John Black, The War in Cuba, the Experiences of
an Englishman with the United States Army. Smith,
Elder & Co., London, 1899.
Beresford, Lord Charles, The Break-up of China, an Account of its Present Commerce, Currency, Waterways,
Armies, Railways, Police and Future Prospects. Harper
& Brothers, New York and London, 1899.
Bryan, William J., The First Battle. W. B. Conkey Company, Chicago, 1897.
Calkins, Lieutenant C. G., "The Naval Battle of Manila,"




194     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
The American-Spanish War-A History by the War
Leaders. Chas. C. Haskell & Son, Norwich, Conn., 1899.
Chamberlain, Joseph, Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches. Chas.
W. Boyd, ed. 2 v. Constable and Company, London,
1914.
Dewey, George, Autobiography of George Dewey. C.
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1913.
Dickens, Charles, American Notes. The Macmillan Company, London and New York, 1893.
Eckardstein, Baron von, Ten Years at the Court of St.
James, 1895-1905. Translated and edited by Prof. George
Young. Thornton Butterworth, London, 1912.
Evans, Robley D., A Sailor's Log, Recollections of Forty
Years of Naval Life. Appleton and Company, New
York, 1901.
Gladden, Washington, England and America. Addresses
delivered in England during the summer of 1898. J.
Clarke & Co., London, 1898.
Hale, S. Reynolds, A Little Tour in America. Edward
Arnold, London and New York, 1895.
Harvey, William Hope, Coin's Financial School. Coin
Publishing Company, Chicago, 1894.
Harvey, William Hope, A Tale of Two Nations. Coin
Publishing Company, Chicago, 1894.
Hay, John, Addresses of John Hay. The Century Company, New York, 1907.
Hoar, George F., Autobiography of Seventy Years. C.
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1903.
Hobson, Richmond Pearson, The Sinking of the Merrimac.
The Century Company, New York, 1899.
Hurd, Archibald, An Incident of War. Sir Joseph & Sons,
London, 1916.
Kipling, Rudyard, American Notes. Frank F. Lovell Co.,
New York, 1899.
McCarthy, Justin, "What England Feels," The AmericanSpanish War-A History by the War Leaders. Chas.
C. Haskell & Son, Norwich, Coma., 1899.
Mackay, Alexander, The Western World, or Travels in the




BIBLIOGRAPHY


195


United States in 1846-1847. Lea & Blanchard, Philadelphia, 1849.
McKinley, William, Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley. March 1, 1897-May 30, 1900. Doubleday &
McClure Co., New York, 1900.
Palmer, Frederick, George Dewey, Admiral: Impressions of
Dewey and the Olympia on their Homeward Progress
from Manila. Doubleday & McClure Co., New York,
1899.
Reid, Whitelaw, "Our New Duties," A Commencement Address at the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of Miami University, June 16, 1899. Printed for the University, New
York, 1899.
Roberts, George E., Coin at School and in Finance. W. B.
Conkey Company, Chicago, 1895.
Schurz, Carl, Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers
of Carl Schurz. Frederic Bancroft, ed. 6 v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1913.
Smalley, George W., Anglo-American Memories, second series. 2 v. Duckworth & Co., London, 1912.
Stickney, Joseph L., Life and Glorious Deeds of Admiral
Dewey. C. B. Ayer Company, Chicago, 1898.
Thayer, William Roscoe, Life and Letters of John Hay.
2 v. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston and New York,
1915.
Trollope, Frances, Domestic Manners of the Americans.
2 v. Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1894.
Watson, William, "England to America," The Purple East.
John Lane Company, London, 1896.
White, Andrew Dickson, Autobiography, 2 v. The Century
Company, New York, 1905.
White, Trumbull, Silver and Gold. Publisher's Union, Chicago, 1895.
c. Newspapers and Weekly Periodicals
Chicago, Ill.: Daily Inter Ocean, January 1, 1897 to
March 15, 1898.
Chicago, Ill.: The Economist, A Weekly Financial, Comn



196     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
mercial and Real Estate Newspaper, January, 1898, to
June, 1900; July to December, 1901.
London, Eng.: British Weekly, January, 1897, to March,
1902.
London, Eng.: The Economist, A Weekly Commercial
Times, Bankers' Gazette and Railway Monitor, January,
1897, to December, 1901.
London, Engl.: The Graphic, January to December, 1898.
London, Engi: Illustrated London News, 1898.
London, Engi: London Gazette, April 26, 1898.
London, Engi.: The Pall Mall Gazette, January, 1897, to
March, 1902.
London, Engi: Saturday Review, 1897 to 1898.
London, Engi: Spectator, January, 1897, to March,
1902.
London, Engi.: The Statist, A Journal of Practical Finance
and Trade. January, 1897, to March, 1902.
London, Engi.: St. James Budget, March, 1898, to March,
1902.
London, Engi: London Times, January 1, 1897, to March
15, 1902.
Manchester, Engi: Northern Trade and Finance, October 1,
1897, to January 1, 1898.
Montreal, Can.: Montreal Gazette, January 1, 1898, to
July 15, 1898.
New York, N. Y.: The Bankers' Magazine, January 1, 1897,
to March 15, 1902.
New York N. Y.: Bradstreet's, January to June, 1898.
New York, N. Y.: The Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
January, 1898, to December, 1900.
New York, N. Y.: New York Evening Post, January 1 to
31, 1898.
New York, N. Y.: New York Herald, January 1, 1898, to
March 1, 1902.
New York, N. Y.: New York Journal, April 1, 1898, to
September 15, 1898, passim.
New York, N. Y.: Literary Digest, December, 1895, to
March, 1902.




BIBLIOGRAPHY                     197
New York, N. Y.: Public Opinion, December, 1895, to
March, 1902.
New York, N. Y.: New York Times, January 1, 1897, to
March 15, 1902.
New York, N. Y.: New York Tribune, January 1, 1898,
to March 1, 1902.
New York, N. Y.: Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1900, to
December 31, 1901.
New York, N. Y.: New York World, April 1, 1898, to September 15, 1898, passim.
Ottawa, Can.: Ottawa Citizen, January 1, 1898, to July 15,
1898.
Toronto, Can.: Toronto Globe, January 1, 1898, to July
15, 1898.
d. Articles
Abbott, Lyman, "The Basis of an Anglo-American Understanding," North American Review, Vol. CLXVI (May,
1898), pp. 513-521.
Adams, Brooks, "The Spanish War and the Equilibrium
of the World," Forum, Vol. XXV (August, 1898), pp.
641-651.
"American Greetings and Tributes to Britain," a body of
selected verse, Review of Reviews, Vol. XXVIII (July,
1898), pp. 71-73.
Archer, William, "America and the English Language,"
Pall Mall Magazine, Vol. XVI (October, 1898), pp. 231 -235.
Bryce, James, "The Essential Unity of Britain and
America," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXXXII       (July,
1898), pp. 22-29.
[By a Canadian Liberal], "The Anglo-American Joint High
Commission," North American Review, Vol. CLXVI1
(August, 1898), pp. 165-175.
Carnegie, Andrew, "Distant Possessions-The Parting of
the Ways," North American Review, Vol. CLXVII
(August, 1898), pp. 239-248.




198     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, "Recent Developments of
a Policy in the United States and their Relation to an
Anglo-American Alliance," Scribner's Magazine, Vol.,
XXIV (December, 1898), pp. 674-682.
Clarke, Sir George Sydenham, "England and America,"
Nineteenth Century, Vol. XLIV (August, 1898), pp.
186-195.
Copeland, Walter, "An Anglo-American Alliance," Westminster Review, Vol. CL (August, 1898), pp. 168-170.
"The Crisis in America," Edinburgh Review, Vol. CLXXXV
(April, 1897), pp. 382-404.
Crowninshield, Captain A. S., "Advantages of the Nicaragua
Canal," Century Magazine, Vol. LVII (January, 1899),
pp. 458-466.
Denby, Charles, "Shall We Keep the Philippines?" Forum,
Vol. XXVI (November, 1898), pp. 279-291.
Dicey, Albert Venn, "England and America," Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. LXXXII (October, 1898), pp. 441 -445.
Dicey, Edward, "The New American Imperialism," Nineteenth Century, Vol. XLIV (September, 1898), pp. 487 -501.
Dilke, Charles, "An Anglo-American Alliance," Pall Mall
Magazine, Vol. XVI (September, 1898), pp. 37-38.
Dilke, Charles, "The Future Relations of Great Britain
and the United States," Forum, Vol. XXVI (January,
1898), pp. 521-528.
Dilke, Sir Charles; Barrett, Hon. John; Lusk, Hugh H.,
"The Problem of the Philippines," North American Review, Vol. CLXXVII (September, 1898), pp. 257-277.
[Diplomaticus], "Is there an Anglo-American Understanding?" Fortnightly Review, Vol. LXX (July, 1898), pp.
163-174.
Dunnell, Mark B., "Our Policy in China," North American
Review, Vol. CLXVII (October, 1898), pp. 393-408.
Fisher, Horace N., "The Development of our Foreign
policy," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXXII (October, 1898),
pp. 552-559.




BIBLIOGRAPHY


199


Flower, B. 0., "The Proposed Federation of the AngloSaxon Nations," Arena, Vol. XX (August, 1898), pp.
223-239.
Gladden, Washington, "Are the Americans Anglo-Saxons?"
Spectator, Vol. LXXX    (July 30, 1898), pp. 614 -615.
Greenwood, Frederick, "The Anglo-American Future," Nineteenth Century, Vol. XLIV (July, 1898), pp. 1-11.
Hobson, Richmond Pearson, "The Sinking of the Merrimac,"
Century Magazine, Vol. LVII (December, 1898), pp.
265-283, (January, 1898), pp. 427-450, (February, 1899),
pp. 580-604, (March, 1899), pp. 752-779.
Hosmer, James K., "The American Evolution, Dependence,
Independence, Interdependence," Atlantic Monthly, Vol.
LXXXII (July, 1898), pp. 29-36.
Kelly, Edmund, "An American in Madrid during the War,"
Century Magazine, Vol. LVII (January, 1899), pp.
450-457.
Lecky, W. E. H., "The Relation Between the United States
and Other Powers," Independent, Vol. L, second half
(July, 1898), pp. 15-17.
Loud, Colonel George A.; Kindleberger, Dr. Charles P.;
Evans, Joel C., "The Battle of Manila," Century Magazine, Vol. LVI (September, 1898), pp. 611-627.
Low, Sidney, "The Change in English Sentiment toward
the United States," Forum, Vol. XXVI (November,
1898), pp. 364-373.
McDermot, Rev. George, "The Anglo-American Alliance
and the Irish-Americans," Catholic World, Vol. LXVIII
(October, 1898), pp. 75-88.
Mahan, A. T.; "The Future in Relation to American Naval
Power," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, Vol. XCI
(October, 1895), pp. 767-775.
Mahan, A. T., "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," Forum,
Vol. XV (March, 1893), pp. 1-11.
Mahan, A. T., "The Isthmus and Sea Power," Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. LXII (October, 1893), pp. 459-473.
Mahan, A. T., "Possibilities of Anglo-American Reunion,"




200  ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


North American Review, Vol. CLIX (November, 1894),
pp. 551-573.
Mahan, A. T., "The United States Looking Outward,"
Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXIV (December, 1890), pp. 816 -824.
Matthews, Byron C., "A Study in Nativities," Forum,
Vol. XXVI (January, 1898), pp. 621-632.
Mills, Hon. David, "Which Shall Dominate-Saxon or
Slav?" North American Review, Vol. CLXVI (June,
1898), pp. 729-739.
"Money and Masses in America," Quarterly Review, Vol.
CLXXXIV (October, 1896), pp. 564-588.
Norman, Henry, "America Revisited in War Time," McClure's Magazine, Vol. XI (July, 1898), pp. 297 -302.
Olney, Richard, "International Isolation of the United
States," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXXXI (May, 1898),
pp. 577-588.
O'Shea, John J., "The Irish Leaven in American Progress,"
Forum, Vol. XXVII (May, 1899), pp. 285-296.
Persins, Captain Von L., "How Manila Surrendered,"
The Living Age, Vol. CCOXVIII (September 15, 1923),
pp. 500-505.
[Politicus], "The Collision of the Old World and the New,"
Contemporary Review, Vol. LXXIII (May, 1898), pp.
609-617.
Ralph, Julian, "Anglo-Saxon Affinities," Harper's Magazine,
Vol. XCVIII (February, 1899), pp. 385-391.
Redpath, John Clark, "The United States and the Concert
of Nations," Arena, Vol. XX (August, 1898), pp. 145-167.
"Reflections Appropriate to the Fourth," Century Magazine,
Vol. LVI (July, 1898), p. 474.
Reid, Whitelaw, "The Territory with Which We are
Threatened," Century Magazine, Vol. LVI (September,
1898), pp. 788-794.
Ross, Edward Alsworth, "England as an Ally," Arena,
Vol. XXIII (June, 1900), pp. 583-592.
Sampson, Rear-Admiral William T., "The Atlantic Fleet




BIBLIOGRAPHY


201


in the Spanish War," Century Magazine, Vol. LVII
(April, 1899), pp. 886-912.
Schurz, Carl, "The Anglo-American Friendship," Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. LXXXII (October, 1898), pp. 433-440.
lchurz, Carl, "Thoughts on American Imperialism,"
Century Magazine, LVI (September, 1898), pp. 781-788.
"A Service of England to America," editorial, Century
Magazine, Vol. LVI (June, 1898), p. 314.
Shriver, Edwin J., "Silver Politics Across Seas," Westminster Review, Vol. CXLVI (November, 1896), pp. 487 -497.
"The Spanish Crisis," Blackwood's Magazine, Vol. CLXIII
(February, 1898), pp. 238-253.
"A Step Toward Universal Peace," Century Magazine, Vol.
LVI (September, 1898), pp. 794-799.
Temple, Richard, "Anglo-American versus European Combination," North American Review, Vol. CLXVII (September, 1898), pp. 306-317.
Tourgee, Albion W., "The Twentieth Century PeaceMakers," Contemporary Review, Vol. LXXV (June,
1899), pp. 886-908.
"The United States and Spain," Quarterly Review, Vol.
CLXXX (July, 1898), pp. 216-241.
Vanderlip, Frank A., "Facts About the Philippines,"
Century Magazine, Vol. LVI (August, 1898), pp. 555-563.
Waldstein, Charles, "The English-Speaking Brotherhood,"
North American Review, Vol. CLXVII (August, 1898),
pp. 223-238.
Wheeler, Benjamin Ide, "The Old World in the New,"
Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXXXII (August, 1898), pp.
145-153.
SECONDARY SOURCES
e. Books and Monographs
Adams, George Burton, Why Americans Dislike England.
Henry Altemus, Philadelphia, 1896.
Alger, R. A., The Spanish-American War. Harper &
Brothers, New York and London, 1901.




202 ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


Altschul, Charles, The American Revolutiorn, in our
Text-books. George H. Doran Company, New York,
1917.
Benton, Elton J., International Law and Diplomacy of the
Spanish-American War. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1908.
Callahan, James Morton, "American Relations in the Pacific
and Far East, 1784-1900." Johns Hopkins University
Studies in Historical and Political Science, series XIX,
Nos. 1-3. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1901.
Callahan, James Morton, "Cuba and Anglo-American Relations," Annual Report of the American Historical Assosociation, 1897, pp. 195-215, Washington, 1898.
Callahan, James Morton, Cuba and International Relations, A Historical Study in American Diplomacy. Johns
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1899.
Chadwick, French Ensor, The Relations of the United
States and Spain, the Spanish-American War. 2 v. C.
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1911.
Cook, J. G., Anglophobia, an Analysis of anti-British Prejudice in the United States. The Four Seas Company,
Boston, 1919.
Coolidge, Archibald Cary, The United States as a World
Power. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1912.
Cortissoz, Royal, The Life of Whitelaw Reid. 2 v. Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1921.
Dawson, Thomas Fulton, Life and Character of Edward
Oliver Wolcott. 2 v. The Knickerbocker Press, New
York, 1911.
Dos Passos, John R., The Anglo-Saxon Century and the
Unification of the English-Speaking People. Putnam's
Sons, New York, 1902.
Dunning, William Archibald, The British Empire and the
United States, a Review of their Relations during the
Century of Peace following the Treaty of Ghent. Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1914.
Fish, Carl Russell, American Diplomacy. Henry Holt and
Company, New York, 1915.




BIBLIOGRAPHY


203


Gardiner, A. G., The Anglo-American Future. Thomas
Seltzer, New York, 1912.
Gardiner, Charles Alexander, The Proposed Anglo-American
Alliance, an address delivered before the American Social
Science Association at its Annual Meeting at Saratoga,
August 31, 1898. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1898.
Harrison, Mrs. Burton, The Anglomaniacs. The Century
Company, New York, 1899.
Hart, Albert Bushnell, The Monroe Doctrine, an Interpretation. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1917.
Hart, Albert Bushnell, Preface to Documents, 39-49. Association for International Conciliation, New York, 1911.
Hart, Albert Bushnell, School Books and International Prejudices. American Association for International Conciliation, New York, 1911.
Keim, Jeanette, Forty Years of German-American Political
Relations, University of Pennsylvania Series, 1919.
Kraft, Herman Frederick, and Norris, Walter B., Sea Power
in American History. The Century Company, New York,
1920.
Latane, John Holladay, America as a World Power
(Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., The American Nation: a History, Vol XXV). Harper & Brothers, New York, 1907.
Latane, John Holladay, From Isolation to Leadership, a
Review of American Foreign Policy. Doubleday, Page
& Company, New York, 1918.
Latane, John Holladay, The United States and Latin America. Doubleday, Page & Company, New York, 1920.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, The War with Spain. Harper &
Brothers, New York and London, 1899.
Long, John D., The New American Navy. 2 v. The Outlook Company, New York, 1903.
Low, Sidney, and Sanders, L. C., History of England During the Reign of Queen Victoria (William Hunt and R.
L. Poole, ed., The Political History of England, Vol.
XII.) Longmans, Green and Company, London, 1907.
Mahan, Captain A. T., Lessons of the War with Spain.
Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1899.




204     ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Marburg, Theodore, The War with Spain. John Murphy
& Company, Baltimore, 1898.
O'Brien, R. B., Life of Charles Stewart Parnell, 1846-1891.
2 v. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1898.
Olcott, Charles S., William McKinley (American Statesman, second series). 2 v. Houghton, Mifflin Company,
New York, 1916.
Prince, Morton, Psychology of the Kaiser. Richard G.
Badger, Boston, 1915.
Reid, Whitelaw, American and English Studies. Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1913.
Reid, Whitelaw, Problems of Expansion. The Century
Company, New York, 1900.
Schieber, Clara Eve, The Transformation of American
Sentiment Towards Germany, 1870-1914. The Cornhill
Company, Boston, 1923.
Streator, Martin Lyman, The Anglo-American Alliance in
Prophecy; or, The Promises to the Fathers. Our Race
Publishing Company, New Haven, Conn., 1900.
Taylor, C. Carlisle, Life of Admiral Mahan. George H.
Doran Company, New York, 1920.
Wister, Owen, A Straight Deal or the Ancient Grudge.
The Macmillan Company, New York, 1920.
Whates, H., The Third Salisbury Administration 1895-1900.
Vacher & Sons, Westminster, 1900.




INDEX


Anglo-American accord, forces
for, 11-16.
Anglo-American Alliance, promotion of, 150; press comment
on, 150; Hay's speech, interpretation of relations, 151; British
Opposition, criticism of foreign
inactivity of Government, 152;
Chamberlain,   statement   of
foreign policy, 152-157; AngloAmerican League in England,
159,160; Anglo-American Committee in United States, 160,
161; magazine publicity, 161 -165; mutual expressions of
friendship, 167.
Anglo-American    relations  in
West, coast patrol and blockade of Cuba, 90-92; British
neutrality   benevolent    to
United States, 90, 93-100;
Colonial   attitude,  101-107;
British appreciation of American activitites, 107-109; effects of war in West on,
109.
Anglo-American trading policy,
beginnings of, 29, 30; influence
of Captain Mahan in formation of, 30.
Anti-British feeling in Nineteenth
Century, causes of, 1-10.
Armenian persecutions, 33.
Asiatic Squadron, United States,
in Japan, 110-112; at Hongkong,   123-128;  Battle   of
Manila, 129; in Manila harbor,
130-134, 144-146; second Battle of Manila, 146, 147.
Bering Sea award to Great
Britain, 85.


Boer War, American attitude in,
182, 183.
Bradford Manuscript, return of
to United States, 56.
British capital in United States,
effects of, 45.
British friendship with Spain,
rumors of, 88, 89.
British neutrality in Spanish
War, benevolent to United
States, 84, 90, 93-95, 147-149;
protection of American interests in Spanish territory, 96 -100;   Colonial   enforcement
of, 101-107, 142, 143; Canadian attitude toward, 107,
109.
Brussels Conference on free Silver, 47.
China, plans for European aggression in, 33, 34; European
penetration of, 113; British
policy of "Open door," 114 -118; American trade interests
in, 118-122; Prince Henry of
Prussia in Hongkong, 124 -127; British lease of territory
in, 171; Anglo-Russian agreement in, 187, 188; United
States, notes to Powers regarding policy in, 189, 190.
Civil War, British sympathy
with South, 5; neutrality violated, 6, 7.
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, British
sentiment toward abrogation
of, 184-186.
Colonial expansion, British, international complications of,
20, 21.
Commercial expansion, United


205




206


INDEX


States' aggressive policy of,
29.
Continental   interference   in
Spanish War, questions of, 89,
90.
Cuba, revolution of, 61; international  significance  of,  61;
United States offers of arbitration refused, 61; reform
government offered by Spain,
61, 62; change in Spanish attitude toward, 62; United States'
protest against Spanish policy
in, 62, 63; United States' interest in outlined, 64-66; efforts
of Spain to meet American demands, 66, 67; press comment
on, 67, 68; U. S. S. Maine, 68 -74; blockade of, 90-92; war in,
97-100.
Declaration of Paris, United
States' attitude toward, 86;
effect of on Spanish War, 87.
Dewey, Commodore, assumed
command of Asiatic Squadron,
110; in Japan, 110-112; audience with Emperor of Japan,
111, 112; at Hongkong, 112;
supplies purchased from British, 124,125; German disregard
of naval etiquette, 125, 126;
German concern over United
States' intentions, 126, 127;
Battles of Manila, 129, 146,
147,  167;   Manila    harbor,
foreign ships in, 131-134, 142,
143, 147.
Diplomatic relations with Spain,
broken, 81, 83, 84.
Far East, early commercial relations of United States in,
21-26.
France, demands for concessions
in China, 113.
Franco-Russian Alliance, 18.
Free silver controversy, financial  conditions  in   United
States, 45; effects of British
capital in United States, 45;


panic of 1893, 46; Brussels
Conference, 47; Sherman Silver Act, repeal of, 47, 48; antiBritish sentiment, 48; HarveyLaughlin debate, 48-49; AngloAmerican harmony, movement
toward, 50, 51; effects of controversy, 51, 52.
Geneva Conference, effects of,
7.
German attitude in Far East,
hostility to United States, rumors of, 136; press propaganda,
137, 139, 142; motives in, 138 -140; aggression in Manila, 142,
143; opposition to American
blockade, 145.
Great Britain, foreign policy of
in 1895, 19-21; Lord Salisbury
and Mr. Chamberlain, significance in election of, 19, 20, 31 -33; Colonial expansion, international implications of, 20, 21;
foreign complications, 33-35.
Harvey-Laughlin debate on free
silver, 48, 49.
Hawaii, United States' commercial base in, 22; annexation of,
22, 23, 172; British approval of,
172; significance of, 173.
Hay, John, Ambassador to England, 55, 56, 59, 151, 190.
Hay-Pauncefote t r e a t y fo r
Panama Canal, terms of, 186;
United States' objections to,
186;  British  objections  to
amendments of, 187.
Imperialism, United States' policy of, benefit to Anglo-American trade in East, 171; annexation of territory, 172-177;
India, Anglo-Russian competition in, 33.
International alliances in late
Nineteenth Century, 17-19.
International relations in Far
East, British cordiality, 135;
British sentiment in Philip



INDEX


207


pines, 136; German hostility,
rumors of, 136, 137, 139, 142;
German motives in Far East,
138-140; German aggression,. 142, 143, 145.
International trade expansion,
significant features of, 29, 30.
Irish agitation in America, 7, 8,
13, 14.
Japan, Commodore Perry opened
communication     with,   23;
Townsend-Harris treaty with,
23.
Jubilee of Queen Victoria, American part in, 56, 57; effect of
on Anglo-American relations,
58.
Kiaochow, German seizure of,
113.
Maine, U. S. S., sinking of, 68;
British sympathy expressed,
68, 69; international significance of, 69, 70; effect of on
Anglo-American interest, 70 -73; McKinley's report on, 73,
74.
Manila, Battle of, 129; Dewey's
instructions to Spanish command, 129, 130; foreign ships
in harbor of, 131-134; German
aggression, 142, 143; United
States position in blockade of,
144; German opposition to
blockade of, 145; second battle
of, 146; British ships, significance in position of, 147; capture of completed, 167.
Monroe Doctrine, formulation
of, 4; effects of, 5; Cleveland's
interpretation of, 38-44.
Neutrality, British, in Civil War,
5-7; British, in Spanish War,
84, 90, 93-109, 142, 143, 147 -149; American in Boer War,
182, 183.


Olney-Pauncefote treaty of arbitration, debate of, 53; causes
for defeat of, 53, 54; results of,
54, 55.
"Open Door," British policy of,
formulation of, 114-116; arguments against, 117; weakness
of, 117, 118; abandonment of
in China, 187, 188.
Pacific islands, growth of guano
industry in, 22, 25; important
area of international trade activity, 25; nations participating
in, 25, 26.
Panama Canal, growing necessity for, 183-185; ClaytonBulwer treaty, 184-186; HayPauncefote treaty, 186, 187;
Anglo-American    treaty  for
signed, 187.
Panic of 1893, 46.
Peace, efforts to maintain between Spain and United States,
73-77; Six Powers, note of to
United States, 77, 78; Germany,
attempt to discredit AngloAmerican friendship, 78, 79;
Pauncefote-Cambon note of
intervention, 80, 81; Spanish
cessation of hostilities recommended, 81.
Peace of 1783, effects of on
American trade, 2, 3.
Philippines, American attitude
toward annexation of, 169, 170,
175, 176; British comment on,
170, 177; terms of annexation,
177.
Russia, demands for concessions
in China, 113.
Russo-German Convention, abandonment of, 17, 18.
Samoa, early commercial relations of United States with,
23; United States naval base
in, 24; international trade expansion in, 24; joint international trade control in, 24;




208


INDEX


trouble  in,   180;  German
treachery suspected, 180; joint
commission of inquiry for, 181;
terms of agreement of, 181.
Sherman Silver Act, repeal of,
47, 48.
Three Emperors' League, abandonment of, 17,18.
Townsend-Harris treaty with
Japan, 23.
Trade expansion in Pacific, importance of, 25, 26; United
States' policy of, 26, 27; causes
of European rivalry in, 27,
28.
Transvaal, Anglo-German episode in, 34, 35.
Treaty of United States and
Spain, Spanish note on behalf
of peace, 165; United States'
terms of peace, 166; protocol
signed, 166; American Peace
Commission in Paris, 173, 174,


176, 177; treaty signed, 178;
British comment on, 178-180.
Triple Alliance, renewal of in
1887, 17; Italy's attitude toward, 18, 19.
United States, beginning of commercial relations of with Far
East, 21-26.
United States, enters European
international politics, 29.
Venezuela    Boundary    dispute,
reasons for importance of, 36;
United States offers of arbitration in, 36-38; Monroe Doctrine, Cleveland's interpretation of, 38-44; British position,
38, 39; Boundary Commission
for, 43; results of arbitration
in, 44.
War message to Congress, 81;
British opinion of, 82, 83.
War of 1812, causes of, 3.












I




.f
I
i












'i 8,  hi,. - ' -  i' '. i', 
UNV.V OF MICHIGAN