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EDITED BY
JOHN T. MORSE, JR.








bmerican Oateameon


JOHN C. CALHOUN
a   t?. Z'
BY
DR. H.' VON HOLST
BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY
<be ftiberibe pre##, Cambriige
1900




Copyright, 1882 and 1899,
By HOUGHTON, MtEFUNW & Co.
All Tights reserved.




CONTENTS


CHAP.
I. YOUTH.
H1. HOUSE OF Ri
III. SECRETARY 0.
IV. VIECE-PRESID.E
V. THE SENATE
VI. SLAVERY
VII. UNDER VAN
VIII. TEXAS
IX. OREGON AND
INDEX.


PPRESENTATIVES.
IF WAR:NT.


PAGB
I
12
*         38
*      61
103
*  123
*     183
*  221
* 260
3513


BUREN


THE MEXICAN WAR








JOHN C. CALHOUN


CHAPTER I
YOUTH
LIFE is not only " stranger than fiction," but
frequently also more tragical than any tragedy
ever conceived by the most fervid imagination.
Often in these tragedies of life there is not one
drop of blood to make us shudder, nor a single
event to compel the tears into the eye. A man
endowed with an intellect far above the average,
impelled by a high-soaring ambition, untainted
by any petty or ignoble passion, and guided by
a character of sterling firmness and more than &
common purity, yet, with fatal illusion, devoting
all his mental powers, all his moral energy, and
the whole force of his iron will to the service of
a doomed and unholy cause, and at last sinking
into the grave in the very moment when, under
the weight of the top-stone, the towering pillars
of the temple of his impure idol are rent to
their very base,- can anything more tragical
be conceived?




2


JOHN C. CALHOUN


That is, in a few lines, the story of the life
of John C. Calhoun. In spite of his grand career, South Carolina's greatest son has had a
more hapless fate than any other of the illustrious men in the history of the United States.
With few exceptions it is probable that the readers of these pages will consider this a strange
or even an absurd assertion, and thereby themselves will furnish another proof of its truth.
Alexander Hamilton, America's greatest political genius, has been obliged to wait three quarters of a century to have a statue erected to his
memory, and then it had to be done by his own
offspring. Calhoun has not had to complain of
the same neglect, though nobody could have
been justly accused of ingratitude if this honor
had not been vouchsafed to him; for he has no
claims upon the gratitude of his country, although his name will forever remain one of the
foremost in its records. But, in common with
Alexander Hamilton, he is still waiting for the
only monument worthy of his memory, a biography which does him full justice; and he will
probably have to wait much longer for such a
memorial, - cre perennius, - which indeed, it
is not unlikely, may never be erected. As yet
it is hardly possible to pass an unbiased judgment upon him, because the wounds of the terrible conflict, in which he was during the life



YOUTH


3


time of a whole generation the acknowledged
leader, have not fully healed, and therefore those
passions have not completely died away which
were engendered by the catastrophe in which
that conflict ended.  Meanwhile, it becomes
every day more difficult really to understand
that struggle. Even the present generation,
which has grown into manhood since the civil
war, hardly realizes that it is not a soul-stirring
romance, but sober history. The next generation will find it easier to form an adequate conception of the life of the ancient Indians and
Egyptians than of that of their own grandfathers; for there is no other instance in all the
history of the world where the civilizations of
two different ages, with their antagonistic pririciples and modes of thinking and feeling, have
been so intricately interwoven as in the United
States during the times of the slavery conflict.
It is only the part played by Calhoun in this
conflict which puts him into the very first rank
of the men who have acted on the political
stage of the United States, though he has done
enough else to secure for his name a permanent
place in the annals of his country.
As the years roll on, the fame of Daniel
Webster and Henry Clay is gradually growing
dimmer, while the name of Calhoun has yet
lost hardly anything of the lurid intensity with




4


JOHN C. CALHOUN


which it glowed on the political firmament of
the United States towards the end of the first
half of this century. Nor will it ever lose
much of this. The fact is easily explained,
though it may seem strange to the superficial
student. The number of Calhoun's admirers
in his later years was insignificant in comparison with the enthusiastic hosts who knew no
more powerful charm than the captivating voice
of the eloquent Kentuckian, and to-day it will
not be seriously questioned that Webster was
intellectually more than the peer of Calhoun.
Neither of the three can lay claim to the name
of a statesman in the highest acceptation of the
term without more than one qualifying restriction, but Calhoun is certainly less entitled to it
than either of his great rivals. Moreover, these
had so many peculiar traits of character, habits,
and fancies, that their lives are a rich source of
pleasant anecdotes; and from the background
of the general historical development, their figures spring forth in bold relief with a vividness
equalling that of Washington, Jefferson, and
John Adams. Of Calhoun the man, on the
contrary, but very little is to be told. Even
his contemporaries, with perhaps the exception
of his nearest neighbors, did not know much of
his doings as a private individual, or at least
do not seem to have thought them of suffi



YOUTH


5


cient interest to be handed down to posterity.
Whether his private correspondence, which is
still withheld from the public, will throw much
light on this side of his life cannot be told.
I have to state with regret that, according to
my information, not very much is to be expected. I was assured in Charleston, by an
intimate younger friend of Calhoun, that he
had not been in the habit of carefully preserving his private letters, and that many of his
papers, which are at present intrusted to Mr.
Hunter, of Virginia, were lost during the civil
war. However that may be, the newspapers of
the times and the published private correspondences of his co-actors tell hardly anything of
the personal relations and the home-life of the
man whose slightest public act was watched
with interest by the whole nation. We hear
that he was a just and kind master to his slaves,
that he was possessed of an uncommon conversational talent, and that he exercised an especial
fascination upon young men. This is about all.
From the historical standpoint it is, of course,
deeply to be regretted that we are so little informed about the everyday life of so remarkable a man; and yet one cannot help feeling
at the same time a certain satisfaction that we
learn no more about it. There is no better
proof of the personal purity of a public man




1


JOHN C. CALHOUN


than the complete stillness of all gossiping
tongues, among friends as well as foes. The
consequence of this silence is, however, that.so
soon as the grave closes over such a public personage, the figure begins to assume a shadowy
appearance. A well-read student of the history
of the United States may often easily imagine
himself seated next to Webster and Clay at the
social board, or walking with them in the lanes
of their farms, though he may have been born
after their eyes had been closed forever. But
no one who has not actually grasped Calhoun's
hand and looked into the depth of those steady
and keen eyes will ever be tempted to indulge
for a single moment in such an illusion with
regard to him. Twenty or thirty years hence
there will not be a single person left to whom
he is or ever has been fully a man of flesh
and bone. The Representative, the Secretary
of War, the Vice-President, the "great Nullifier," the Senator, our posterity like ourselves
may be perfectly acquainted with; but the Calhoun off the political stage, the Calhoun who
ate and drank like other mortals, who laughed,
chatted, and sorrowed, who enjoyed life and battled with its small and great cares, is long ago
dead, and no pen will ever be able to recall him
to life in the same sense in which Webster and
Clay still are and will remain alive so long as




YOUTH


7


the American people cherish the memory of
their great men.
Yet it is unquestionably true, as it was asserted before, that the name of Calhoun already
conveys a much more definite idea to the American people than that of either Webster or
Clay, and that this difference will be steadily
increased in his favor. The simple explanation of this remarkable fact is, that Calhoun
is in an infinitely higher degree the representative of an idea, and this idea is the pivotal
point on which the history of the United States
has turned from 1819 to nearly the end of the
first century of their existence as an independent republic. From about 1830 to the day of
his death, Calhoun may be called the very impersonation of the slavery question. From the
moment when he assumes this character, his figure towers far above all his contemporaries, even
Jackson not excepted; while up to that time he
is, in spite of his uncommonly brilliant career,
only an able politician of the higher and nobler
order, having many peers and even a considerable number of superiors among the statesmen
of the United States. These introductory remarks seem necessary in order to justify the
brevity with which we are compelled to treat
the youth of Calhoun and the first period of his
public life.




8


JOHN C. CALHOUN


It 1733 James Calhoun is said to have emi.
grated from Donegal in Ireland to the United
States. He first went to Pennsylvania, then
settled on the Kanawha, in Virginia, and at
last, in 1756, removed to South Carolina. In
1770 his son Patrick married Martha Caldwell,
the daughter of a Presbyterian emigrant from
Ireland. John Caldwell Calhoun, the third son
of Patrick and Martha, was born March 18,
1782, in the Abbeville District, South Carolina.
Though his father died while he was still a boy,
the ardent temper of the zealous revolutionary
patriot seems to have exercised a marked influence on the formation of the character of the
son. John remained with his mother on the
farm. There he led a quiet and simple life, for
his father had left the family in very modest
circumstances. No opportunity was offered him
to attend regularly a good school, and his solitary rambles in the woods had to serve in
lieu of systematic instruction. Being from his
early childhood of a meditative turn of mind,
the youth learned to think before his memory
had become burdened with the thoughts of other
people. This defective education in his boyhood made itself felt through his whole life.
In spite of the diligence with which he applied
himself later, for some years, to his books, the
stock of positive knowledge which he had to




YOUTH


9


fall back upon was never large, and the peculiar
kind of narrowness which is inseparable from
one-sidedness was among the most prominent
traits in his mental and moral structure. But
what he lacked in breadth of view he fully
made up by penetrating intensity, bold independence of thinking, and a keen instinct for
the true nature of the things which fell within
the limited circle in which his mind moved.
Calhoun had completed his eighteenth year,
when he began an uninterrupted course of systematic study in order to fit himself for the
higher walks of life. Under the direction of
his brother-in-law, Dr. Waddel, a Presbyterian
clergyman, he prepared himself for college, and
after two short years he was able to enter the
junior class at Yale. In 1804 he was graduated
with high honors, and then devoted himself for
three years to the study of law, spending eighteen months of the time at the law school at
Litchfield, Connecticut. Of much more importance than the often-repeated story, that
while at Yale he had been declared fit and
likely to become some day President of the
United States, is the unmistakable fact that
his prolonged sojourn in New England exercised a marked influence upon the formation of
the political opinions which he held in the beginning of his political career.




10


JOHN C. CALHOUN


Having returned to Abbeville, he began to
practise law; but it does not appear that the
public were especially eager to avail themselves
of his services as an attorney and counsellor,
nor that he distinguished himself in any case
of importance. A man of his general ability
and uncommon logical acuteness could not have
failed to acquire a prominent standing in this
calling if he had devoted himself to it with
his whole energy. Yet he would undoubtedly
never have become a great lawyer, because he
was not objective enough to examine his pit;mises with sufficient care, while he built his
argument upon them with undeviating and most
incisive logic, thereby frequently arriving at
most shocking conclusions with nothing to stand
upon except a basis of false postulates. Moreover, such natures never attain greatness, unless
they pursue an aim which fills the whole head
and heart with the force of a burning passion,
a frame of mind into which but few men can
be put by the common law; and of these few
Calhoun certainly was not one. He was a born
leader of men, and nature had destined him
for a political career.  While at college the
exciting questions of the day had engrossed his
whole attention, and the intelligence and earnestness with which he discussed them proved
that he would try to have a hand in shaping




YOUTH                  11
the events of the future. Sooner and in a
higher degree than he himself had probably
dared to anticipate, this wish was to be fulfilled.
He had barely had time to get again familiar
with the surroundings of his youth, when he
was sent by his district to the state Legislature.
The stage was too small to draw the eyes of
the nation upon the young man, but it was the
right place to prove his fitness for a larger one.
In 1811 he was elected a member of Congress,
and in the same year he married his cousin,
Floride Calhoun. She was possessed of a modest fortune, which enabled him to steer with all
sails set into the open sea of politics. On
November 4 he took his seat in the House of
Representatives, having previously removed to
Bath on the Savannah.




CHAPTER II


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
THE times were most favorable for a clever
and ambitious young statesman to make a brilliant debut. The policy of commercial restrictions, with which Jefferson and Madison had
tried to force England and France to respect
the rights of neutrals, had signally failed. The
party in power had not the candor and moral
courage to acknowledge that it had stumbled
into grave mistakes, but it was apparent that
it could no more, for any length of time, pursue its old course. If the great European war
should last much longer- and there was no
prospect of its speedy termination - the United
States would evidently be forced to abandon
all half-hearted and two-edged measures, and to
adopt a clear and decisive policy. It was perhaps impossible to satisfy the commercial States;
but thus much was certain, that their dissatisfaction was too great and too well-founded to
permit an expectation that they would jog on
with impunity in the old ruts. Nor would either
the honor or the vital interests of the Union




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


13


allow that it should bow its head in meekness,
and receive with folded arms the stripes which
the belligerent powers were pleased to lay on
its back. Whatever might be resolved upon
and done, it was sure to raise a great clamor
among a considerable portion of the people; yet
something must be done, and in such circumstances the race generally is to the swift and
the battle to the strong.
It was a coincidence of the utmost importance that the ranks of the revolutionary patriots had, by this time, become so thinned
that the representatives of a new generation
could grasp the helm without having to encounter the opposition of long acknowledged
authority. It so happened, also, that among
these newcomers on the political stage there
were some exceptionally young men, possessed
of a much higher order of talent than most of
their seniors. So the leadership of the nation
in this great crisis fell into the hands of untried
and inexperienced men, who had hardly reached
maturity, yet were fully conscious of their own
power and worth, and who were impelled by
a high-toned pride and ardent patriotism, and
urged on by the glowing visions of an unbounded ambition. It was therefore to be expected that, true to the nature of hot-blooded,
daring, and self-relying youth, they would ad



14


JOHN C. CALHOUN


vise the cutting of the Gordian knot which the
silver-haired sages of the Revolution had vainly
tried to disentangle. At which side of it, in
their opinion, the stroke of the sword should
be dealt, could not be doubtful from the first.
In spite of Napoleon, the majority of the peon
ple had not yet entirely lost the enthusiastic
sympathy awakened by the French Revolution,
and the services rendered by France to the
United States in the war of independence were
still unforgotten. On the other hand, the old
wounds which had been inflicted by the blows
exchanged with England had not quite ceased
to rankle; the emancipated daughter smarted
under the overbearing haughtiness of the mother, whom she had once forced to submit to
her just claims. Then, too, above all else, Napoleon's violent decrees against the rights of
neutrals were to a considerable extent mere
stage lightnings, while the English Orders in
Council told with terrible effect upon the commerce and the general prosperity of the United
States, and the pretended right of visitation,
which was frequently exercised with studied
insolence, cut the American pride to the quick.
Prudential reasons of great weight-might be
urged against resenting all these injuries at this
time with powder and lead, and personal interest as well as party spirit would surely put these




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


15


reasons into the strongest light. But it was no
less certain that the passionate and indignant
appeals to the counter-reasons would awaken a
loud echo in numberless bosoms, since every
patriot had to confess to himself that they too
had great weight.
The general elections for the Twelfth Congress had resulted in favor of the war party. It
was principally due to his position towards this
overshadowing question that Henry Clay owed
his election to the speakership; and for the same
reason the Speaker awarded the second place on
the Committee on Foreign Relations to the new
member from South Carolina. Mr. Cralle, the
editor of Calhoun's works, assures us that at
the first meeting of the members Calhoun was
- on motion of Mr. Porter, of Pennsylvania, to
whom the Speaker had assigned the chairmanship -unanimously chosen to preside over their
deliberations. So he held from the first the
place which, next to the speakership, was the
most important in the House of Representatives.
On November 29, 1811, the committee,'to
which that part of the President's message relating to foreign affairs had been referred, submitted its report. Although the report was
presented by Mr. Porter, it seems likely that
it was mainly written by Calhoun. The essence
of it was contained in the following sentences: —




16


JOHN C. CALHOUN


"To wrongs so daring in their character, and so
disgraceful in their execution, it is impossible that the
people of the United States should remain indifferent. We must now tamely and quietly submit, or
we must resist by those means which God has placed
within our reach.
"Your committee will not cast a shade on the
American name by the expression of a doubt which
branch of this alternative will be embraced;... the
period has arrived when, in the opinion of your committee, it is the sacred duty of Congress to call forth
the patriotism and the resources of the country."
The report concluded with six resolutions,
which were designed to give effect to this opinion.
So the first act of Calhoun on the national
stage was to sound the war-trumpet. Henceforth incessant war, war to the bitter end, was
to be his destiny to the last day of his life;
though it was in later years to be waged not
against a foreign aggressor, but against internal
adversaries, against the peace of the Union,
against the true welfare of his own section of
the country.
On December 12 Calhoun delivered his first
set speech in Congress, defending the resolutions and refuting the arguments of John Randolph, who was himself a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. On a former




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


17


occasion Calhoun had addressed to the House
a few remarks on a question of little importance, which he had concluded with an allusion
to the diffidence and embarrassment which a
young man necessarily felt in speaking to the
assembled representatives of the nation. Now,
however, there was in his whole tone and manner no more the slightest trace of such a feeling. He did not speak with arrogance, and
still less was there anything personally offensive in what he said, or in the manner with
which he said it. From the beginning of his
public career he observed the parliamentary
proprieties with the rigor and naturalness of
the born gentleman. Often did he prove that
he could wield with equal force and dexterity
the trenchant sword and the massive club, but
he always attacked the argument of his adversary and not his person, and he was never
guilty of the hectoring and bullying tone in
which so many of the Southern politicians indulged with keen relish. From the first he
entered the lists with the proud conviction of
being fully the equal of any man, and he always spoke in the weighty tone of authority.
Upon him the shaking of Randolph's long finger made no impression. With open visor he
met the much-dreaded antagonist, and though
he did not throw him to the ground, yet the




18


JOHN C. CALHOUN


Virginian came out of the fight only second
best. They exchanged many a tilt, and the
ill-huimor with which Randolph spoke of Calhoun, in his private correspondence, shows how
much he felt the wounds received from the
lance of that adversary.
Calhoun began his speech with the open
avowal " that the committee recommended the
measures now before the House, as a preparation for war; " and he added, " such, in fact, was
its express resolve, agreed to, I believe by every
member, except that gentleman [Randolph].
*.  Indeed, the report could mean nothing but
war or empty menace."    With lofty indignation he repelled the insinuation that, though
there was adequate cause for war, the people
would not deem their violated interests and
outraged rights of sufficient moment willingly
to defray the costs of fighting for their vindication.
" But it may be, and I believe it was said, that the
people will not pay taxes, because the rights violated
are not worth defending; or that the defence will
cost more than the gain. Sir, I here enter my solemn protest against this low and 'calculating avarice' entering this hall of legislation. It is only
fit for shops and counting-houses; and ought not to
disgrace the seat of power by its squalid aspect.
Whenever it touches sovereign power, the nation is




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


19


ruined. It is too short-sighted to defend itself. It
is a compromising spirit, always ready to yield a part
to save the residue. It is too timid to have in itself
the laws of self-preservation. It is never safe but
under the shield of honor.... Sir, I am not versed
in this calculating policy; and will not, therefore,
pretend to estimate in dollars and cents the value of
national independence. I cannot measure in shillings
and pence the misery, the stripes, and the slavery of
our impressed seamen; nor even the value of our
shipping, commercial, and agricultural losses under
the Orders in Council and the British system of
blockade."
With equal candor he answered Randolph's
question, why then, if all this was so, war was
not declared immediately: "Because," he said,
"we are not yet prepared."    That there was
any danger in avowing this and, at the same
time, using the threatening language employed
by himself and those who shared his views, he
denied; because, he said, England would never
be provoked into beginning hostilities from a
fear of uniting " all parties here."
After this speech the passing of the resolutions by the House could not be understood
otherwise than as a formal announcement that
war would be declared so soon as, in the opinion of the war party, the country should be
sufficiently prepared. So far as it depended




20


JOHN C. CALHOUN


upon the House, the great question was virtually decided, and the war party pushed vigorously on towards the bloody goal. They needed
half a year more to reach it. President Madison was about the last man to long for the
laurels of "the conquering hero." His whole
character as well as his political convictions
made him exceedingly loath to gratify the
wishes of the young Hotspurs, who nevertheless dragged him along by a strong rope. As
Jefferson's Secretary of State and as President
he had advocated and pursued a policy, the
legitimate consequence of which was war. He
could not now take a decided stand against the
war party without acknowledging that this policy
had been, from beginning to end, a mistaken
one, - an avowal which no statesman will easily
make, and which, on the part of Madison, would
have been a formal renunciation of his aspirations
for a second term. That was the vise in which
he was held by the war party, and mercilessly
they screwed it tighter and tighter. In vain he
tried to conciliate them by consenting to follow
their lead; they insisted that he should assume
the full responsibility, and they would be satisfied
with nothing less.
On April 1 the President sent a message to
Congress, recommending an embargo. Mr.
Grundy said that he understood it "as a war




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


21


measure, and it was meant that it should directly
lead to war," and Calhoun afterwards declared
"its manifest propriety as a prelude tq war."
Without granting to the opposition the necessary
time to develop their views, Congress, on April 4,
passed the bill laying an embargo on all vessels.
It was limited to sixty days solely because those
who held the destiny of the country in their
hands were fully resolved that it should not " be
permitted to expire without any hostile measure
being taken against Great Britain."
It was not due to the President that this announcement, indirectly made by Calhoun on
May 6, was not fulfilled to the letter. Another
message laid before Congress at length all the
wrongs which the United States had suffered
for so many years. "We behold," it said, "in
fine, on the side of Great Britain a state of war
against the United States, and on the side of the
United States a state of peace towards Great
Britain." Therefore it was now incumbent on
Congress to decide whether force should be opposed to force. This was virtually a recommendation of war. In the name of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, Calhoun presented a report
to the House, advising "an immediate appeal
to arms," and, at the same time, he moved that
a formal declaration of war should be issued
against Great Britain. On the following day




22


JOHN C. CALHOUN


the House passed this to the third reading, after
Randolph's motion, renewed by Milnor, to open
the doors, and Stow's request to postpone the
final action to the next day, had both been rejected. Thus the majority crowned the highhanded recklessness with which, ever since the
beginning of the session, they had bent the just
claims of the minority under their imperious
will. In later years Calhoun learned well
enough to clamor for the rights of the minority,
while he was but too apt to forget that the majority also had rights, and, above all others, the
right to rule. Perhaps the time was not far
dlstant when he and his associates would have
reason to rue their present abuse of power, for
the declaration of war received a majority of
only thirty votes, although the Democratic majority in the full House was seventy.
In the Senate, the defection from the party
even threatened to become fatal to the wishes
of the war party. On motion of Mr. Gregg, of
Pennsylvania, the bill providing for the declaration of war was recommitted by a majority
of four. Not until June 17 did a sufficient
number of reluctant Democrats yield to allow
the amended bill to be passed to a third reading.
The House agreed to the amendments on the
following day.
A few days after the declaration of war, the




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


23


House took up the question whether and how
far the restrictive policy concerning commerce
should be abandoned. The Committee on Ways
and Means reported a bill for the partial suspension of the Non-Importation Act. This was
not deemed sufficient relief in the States on
which the mistaken policy hitherto pursued had
weighed most heavily.   Mr. Richardson, of
Massachusetts, moved the total repeal of the
whole restrictive system. The motion was not
agreed to; but when it was renewed the following day in a modified form, rendering the
proposition somewhat less sweeping, the casting
vote of the Speaker was required to carry the
day against the opposition. For two years more
the pernicious policy was persisted in.
Calhoun had separated himself on this important question from the majority. He earnestly advocated the repeal of the Non-Importation Act. His obligations as a party pan
he satisfied by denying that Jefferson's and
Madison's policy could be justly charged with
pusillanimity,- a compliment the more empty,
because the closing remarks of his speech proved
that he himself was not convinced of the truth
of the assertion. It was a question not of motives, but of policy, and as to that he said: " The
restrictive system, as a mode of resistance, and
a means of obtaining redress of our wrongs, has




24


JOHN C. CALHOUN


never been a favorite one with me." The reasons on which he supported his opinion were
sound, and the whole manner in which he treated
the subject was that of a statesman standing
on sufficiently elevated ground to take in the
whole view, and not to be misled by petty
details. On the past he bestowed but a slight
glance, very properly confining himself to the
effect which the maintenance of the old policy
would have under the altered circumstances.
From this point of view, he condemned it without qualification in measured but severe terms.
" With no small mortification," he asked those
who had supported the war, and now thought its
success dependent upon the continuation of the
Non-Importation Act, whether the war was to
be " an appendage only" of this act. " If so,
I disclaim it. It is an alarming idea to be in a
state of war, and not to rely on our courage or
enemy, but on a measure of peace."  The assertion that, if the Non-Importation Act should
be continued, a speedy restoration of peace
might be relied upon, he declared to be delusive
and a cause of alarm, for " it will debilitate the
springs of war.... We have had a peace like
a war. In the name of Heaven, let us not have
the only thing that is worse, a war like a peace."
This solemn warning was certainly not out of
place; but if it was necessary to utter it within




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


25


a week after the declaration of war, he ought to
have pondered well ere he did his best to push
the country into a conflict which, whatever it
might become in the course of time, was originally not a national but a party war, or rather
a war of the party leaders.
This all-important point had not been soon
enough taken into due consideration, either by
him or his associates. This is the one great
blame resting upon the war party, which even
those cannot gainsay who otherwise fully approve of their course. The whole war was one
uninterrupted struggle against the evil conWequences of this fact. There was much truth in
what Calhoun had asserted in his speech on
May 6. It was, indeed, to a great extent, the
second war for the liberty and independence of
the United States, but it was irretrievably vitiated by its party origin. How the ambitious
plans of the young leaders were dashed to pieces!
Instead of Canada being conquered, the time
came when Calhoun, with tears in his eyes, had
to ask the assistance of Webster to pull the
government out of its financial difficulties, which
had come to such a climax that the worst might
be apprehended. It was a deep humiliation.
Yet where is the American patriot who would
wish to erase these pages from the tablets of the
history of the Union? Much less could any one




26


JOHN C. CALHOUN


wish to miss them in the career of Calhoun, for
in one respect, and that the most important one,
they are the most attractive and satisfactory in
the record of his life. There is at this time
nothing of sectional prejudice and narrowness
in him. He stands on the broadest national
ground, and his political sins are mainly due to
the impatient ardor and buoyancy of his patriotism. Undoubtedly he pursues the aims of his
personal ambition with full consciousness; he
does not, however, seek its satisfaction at the
expense of the Union, but by promoting what
he is fully convinced that the interests and the
honor of his country demand. "The word "nation," which Calhoun in later years struck from
the political and constitutional dictionary of the
United States as having no basis whatever to
rest upon, either in fact or in law, is at this
time frequently in his mouth. How could it be
otherwise, as the idea of it was deeply imbedded
in his heart and constantly occupying his mind?
His solicitude for the national interests did not
cease with the war, nor was it confined to objects
immediately connected with the war or referring
exclusively to the relations of the Union to foreign powers.
In a speech delivered January 31, 1816, on
a motion to repeal the direct tax, he drew a
sketch of his views concerning the lessons to be




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


27


derived from the experiences of the war as to
the policy which the United States ought to
pursue in future. The starting-point of his
argument was the assertion that "future wars
with England are not only possible, but...
highly probable, - nay, that they will certinly
take place," because the United States would
"have to encounter British jealousy and hostility in every shape; not immediately manifested by open force or violence, perhaps, but
by indirect attempts to check your growth and
prosperity." He therefore deemed it necessary
gradually to prepare for this emergency, not
only by increasing the military forces of the
Union, but also by systematically developing
those germs of giant strength which Providence
had bestowed upon and intrusted to the American people. "As to the species of preparation,... the navy most certainly, in any point
of view, occupies the first place. It is the most
safe, most effectual, and cheapest mode of defence."  The internal strife during the war
would have lost much of its bitterness, if the
majority had from the first understood this obvious truth, and acted accordingly. The violation of the rights and interests of the citizens
of the States, as a seafaring people, had given
rise to the war, and yet the demand of the New
England States to wage it principally by sea




28


JOHN C. CALHOUN


bad remained unheeded, until experience forced
the majority to acknowledge, if not in words, at
least by deeds, that for once the opposition was
not prompted exclusively by local interests and
a factional spirit. If the party had listened to
the advice of Calhoun with regard to the wishes
and complaints of the opposition, the animosity
of the Northeastern Federalists would never
have reached the pitch to which it finally came.
In the light of later events, it is one of the most
interesting facts in the life of Calhoun that, in
the course of the war, the question was for a
while seriously discussed in New England whether the people of that section should not try to
form an alliance with South Carolina against
the narrow anti-commercial policy of Virginia
and her followers.
The above-mentioned speech also contains the
first declaration in favor of internal improvements. " Let us make great permanent roads;
not, like the Romans, with views of subjecting
and ruling provinces, but for the more honorable purposes of defence, and of connecting
more closely the interests of various sections of
this great country." It is true that Calhoun's
immediate object in this is also the safety of the
country in future wars; but he is not only gratified that the building of roads will incidentally
tend towards nationalizing the Union; he urges




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


29


upon Congress the measure because it will have
this effect.  Always starting from    the same
point, he furthermore comes to the conclusion
that the national government should bestow its
protecting care upon the industrial interests of
the country; and here, too, he expressly states
that other reasons also should induce Congress
to adopt this policy.
" In regard to the question how far manufactures
ought to be fostered, it is the duty of this country,
as a means of defence, to encourage its domestic industry, more especially that part of it which provides
the necessary materials for clothing and defence....
The question relating to manufactures must not depend on the abstract principle that industry, left to
pursue its own course, will find in its own interests
all the encouragement that is necessary. Laying the
claims of manufacturers entirely out of view, on
general principles, without regard to their interests,
a certain encouragement should be extended at least
to our woollen and cotton manufactures."
It is remarkable that in the whole speech
there is no mention whatever made of the Constitution. The thought does not enter his head
that constitutional objections could possibly be
raised. The reason of this is simply that the
statesman has not yet been transformed into the
attorney of a special cause. He proceeds, as a
matter of course, from the assumption that the




30


JOHN C. CALHOUN


first question a statesman has to ask himself is
not what is constitutional, but what is wise and
politic, unless it manifestly contravenes a provision of the Constitution, and to take it for
granted that the constitutional power exists,
until the contrary is proved. As the people
have not been created for the sake of the Constitution, but the Constitution has been established by the people to secure and further the
welfare of the people, this is the only rational
course; and it is perfectly safe, since, as every
measure is sure to meet with some opposition,
any constitutional flaw with regard to the proposition will certainly be pointed out, if it can
be discovered without the aid of a microscope
and hair-splitting sophistries of pettifogging lawyers. Only when, instead of the national interests, the interests of the slave-holders had become
the glasses through which Calhoun viewed everything, he began to search the Constitution for
the power to do what he had once recommended
as prudent and even necessary, and then he discovered things in it which he had never dreamed
of before; nay, its general spirit underwent a
radical change in his eyes.
On January 8, 1816, Calhoun, as chairman
of the Committee on National Currency, reported a bill " to incorporate the subscribers to
the Bank of the United States." In a speech




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


31


which he delivered on February 26, in support
of the bill, he referred to the constitutional
question, but merely in order to state that it
"had been already so freely and frequently
discussed, that all had made up their minds on
it." So, according to his own statement, he had
most deliberately come to the conclusion that
Congress had the constitutional power to establish a national bank. Though this has necessarily to be inferred from the fact of his reporting the bill, it had to be expressly stated on
account of his subsequent attempts to make
himself and others believe that he had been compelled by the financial embarrassments of the
government to waive the constitutional question.
That these embarrassments exercised a powerful influence upon the formation of his opinions
cannot be doubted, but even in regard to the
expediency of the measure he was not solely controlled by them. " As to the question whether
a national bank would be favorable to the administration or the finances of the government,
it was one on which there was so little doubt,
that gentlemen would excuse him if he did not
enter into it."  He does not say "now," or,
"under the present circumstances," but makes
a general statement without any restriction
whatever. There is nothing astonishing in this,
for the additional strength which it was sup



32          JOHN C. CALHOUN
posed that the national government would derive from the bank was at this time no cause of
alarm to him; and as to the other political and
economical considerations involved in the problem, he moved as yet in as thick a fog as the
whole people. The fact is, that with regard to
all the great economical problems, which were
soon to agitate the country so deeply, Calhoun
held exactly the opposite ground to that which
he afterwards occupied, on the constitutional
question as well as on that of expediency. He
and his partisans have done their very best to
invalidate the charge of inconsistency, but they
have not been able to succeed; for although an
edition of his speeches was published in which
those earlier efforts were omitted, the speeches
themselves could not be wiped from the records
of Congress, and, as was his wont, he had expressed himself too plainly and explicitly to
render the art of subsequent interpretation of
any avail. One would greatly wrong him by
doubting whether he was afterwards as sincere
as now, but his sincerity does not alter the fact
that he completely reversed his position. His
partisans have paid him a bad compliment by
asserting that his earlier utterances cannot with
fairness be called upon to bear witness against
his later doctrines, because they were but his
first impressions, put before the public without




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


33


due deliberation, in an unguarded manner, on
the spur of some particular occasion. Had the
House of Representatives sunk to such a bottomless depth that it followed the leadership of
a young zealot who did not know how to bridle
his tongue, but on the gravest questions of the
day babbled out the first thoughts that happened
to flit through his giddy brain? What, then,
were the subjects which this chairman of most
important committees seriously reflected upon,
if not these, almost the only ones on which
he deemed it worth his while to make long
speeches? Moreover, this unpardonable levity
and thoughtlessness must have lasted a long
while, for he clung to these opinions for years,
frequently repeating them and urging them
upon Congress with increased energy.
His speech on the New Tariff Bill (April 6,
1816) was a long and carefully prepared argument in favor of the whole economical platform
on which the Whig party stood to the last day
of its existence. He started with the bold proposition that it was a matter of "vital importance, touching... the security and permanent
prosperity of our country," to afford adequate'
protection to the cotton and woollen manufactures. Even Henry Clay and Horace Greeley
have not been able to put their favorite doctrine
into stronger language. Nor was he satisfied




34


JOHN C. CALHOUN


to have the fostering care of the government
confined to these goods. His final aim was the
industrial independence of the United States
from Europe, and this, he thought, could be
attained by protective duties. He bitterly complained of the unexpected "apathy and aversion" which manifested themselves on this subject. In his opinion the country was " prepared,
even to maturity, for the introduction of manufactures." If he deemed it nevertheless necessary to assist them with protective duties, it was
in order " to put them beyond the reach of contingency." There is not one word in the whole
speech warranting the interpretation that he
demands only momentary aid for the manufactures, which had been stimulated into existence
by the war, and would now inevitably have to
succumb to English competition, if they should
not be propped up by artificial means. He
advocated a "system," to which the only wellfounded but not " decisive objection" was "that
capital employed in manufacturing produced a
greater dependence on the part of the employed
than in commerce, navigation, or agriculture."
Though this was to be regretted, it was "more
than counterpoised" by other "incidental political advantages."
"It produced an interest strictly American, - as
much so as agriculture, in which it had the decided




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


35


advantage of commerce or navigation.... Again, it
is calculated to bind together more closely our widely
spread republic. It will greatly increase our mutual
dependence and intercourse; and will, as a necessary
consequence, excite an increased attention to, internal improvements, a subject every way so intimately connected with the ultimate attainment of
national strength and the perfection of our political
institutions."
He regarded the fact that it would "make
the parts adhere more closely; that it would
form a new and most powerful cement, and outweigh any political objections that might be
urged against the system."
In a speech on February 4, 1817, on a bill to
set aside the bank dividends and bonus as a
permanent fund for the construction of -roads
and canals, Calhoun, for the first time, entered
upon an extended argument on the constittutional question with regard to internal improvements. The objection that it is necessary to
secure the previous assent of the States, within
the limits of which the internal improvements
are to be made, he declared to be not "worth
the discussion, because the good sense of the
States may be relied on. They will, in all
cases, readily yield their assent." Also as to
the power of Congress he is so explicit that,
when he afterwards positively denied it, his




36


JOHN C. CALHOUN


opponents need not have troubled themselves
about an argument of their own; so far as he
was concerned it would have sufficed to read
some extracts from this speech: -
" It is mainly urged that the Congress can only apply the public money in execution of the enumerated
powers. I am no advocate for refined arguments on
the Constitution. The instrument was not intended
as a thesis for the logician to exercise his ingenuity on.
[If he had but followed the example of the Persian
king, and charged his body servant to repeat to him
these two sentences every morning!] It ought to
be construed with plain good sense; and what can
be more express than the Constitution on this point?... If the framers had intended to limit the use of
the money to the powers afterwards enumerated and
defined, nothing could have been more easy than to
have expressed it plainly.... But suppose the Constitution to be silent, why should we be confined in
the application of moneys to the enumerated powers?
There is nothing in the reason of the thing, that I
can perceive, why it should be so restricted; and the
habitual and uniform practice of the government
coincides with my opinion.... In reply to this uniform course of legislation, I expect it will be said
that our Constitution is founded on positive and written principles, and not on precedents. I do not deny
the position; but I have introduced these instances
to prove the uniform sense of Congress and the country (for they have not been objected to) as to our




HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


37


powers; and surely they furnish better evidence of
the true interpretation of the Constitution than the
most refined and subtle arguments. Let it not be
argued that the construction for which I contend
gives a dangerous extent to the powers of Congress.
In this point of view I conceive it to be more safe
than the opposite. By giving a reasonable extent to
the money power, it exempts us from the necessity
of giving a strained and forced construction to the
other enumerated powers."
Thus he was not only the champion of the
constitutionality of internal improvements, but
he boldly avowed latitudinarian principles with
regard to the general construction of the Constitution. It was a rather remarkable coincidence that this was the last great speech which
he delivered as a member of the House of Representatives. He was called to act on another
stage, where less, or no, opportunity was offered
to develop his views on these subjects before
the whole people, but there is no proof lacking
that he adhered to them for some time longer.




CHAPTER III


SECRETARY OF WAR
ALTHOUGH Calhoun, in a speech delivered
on January 17, 1817, had deprecated the feeling which made "the very best talents of the
House, men of the most aspiring character,
anxious to fill the departments or foreign missions," he himself, less than two months afterwards, readily accepted a place in Mr. Monroe's
Cabinet as Secretary of War. The duties of
his office stood in no direct relation to the economical policy of the Federal government, but,
as he was anxious to see his views adopted, he
had no difficulty in laying them again before
Congress. A resolution of the House of Representatives, of April 4, 1818, had called on
him for "a plan for the application of such
means as are within the power of Congress, for
the purpose of opening and constructing such
roads and canals as may deserve and require
the aid of government, with a view to military
operations in time of war."  His report of
January 14, 1819, began by laying down the
sound and broad principle that,




SECRETARY OF WAR


39


"t a judicious system of roads and canals, constructed for the convenience of commerce and the
transportation of the mail only, without any reference to military operations, is itself among the most
efficient means for ' the more complete defence of the
United States.' Without adverting to the fact that
the roads and canals which such a system would require are, with few exceptions, precisely those which
would be required for the operation of war, such a
system, by consolidating our Union [!], and increasing our wealth and fiscal capacity, would add greatly
to our resources in war."
He then traced in general outlines a vast plan
of roads and canals, concluding his argument
with the following significant remarks: -
" Many of the roads and canals which have been
suggested are no doubt of the first importance to the
commerce, the manufactures, the agriculture, and political prosperity of the country, but are not, for that
reason, less useful or necessary for military purposes.
It is, in fact, one of the great advantages of our
country, enjoying so many others, that whether we
regard its internal improvements in relation to military, civil, or political purposes, very nearly the same
system, in all its parts, is required.... If those
roads or canals had been pointed out which are necessary for military purposes, the list would have been
small indeed."
In a report of December 3, 1824, "on the,ondition of the military establishment," etc.,




40


JOHN C. CALHOUN


he recurred once more to the subject with
the same explicitness and emphasis. There is
therefore no reason to suppose Mr. Nathan
Sargent guilty of exaggeration, when he writes
that in June, 1824, "Mr. Calhoun spoke of his
projected improvements and the great benefits
that the country would derive from them with
a warmth, earnestness, and enthusiasm which
indicated that his whole soul was in ' the system' he had projected." After he had exchanged the Secretaryship of War for the VicePresidency, at a public dinner given in his
honor in the Pendleton District on April 26,
1825, the following toast was received with
great enthusiasm: "Internal improvement:
guided by the wisdom and energy of its able
advocates, it cannot fail to strengthen and perpetuate our bond of union." Again, on May
27, 1825, at Abbeville, on a similar occasion, he
himself said, " I gave my zealous efforts to all
such measures:... a due protection of those
manufactures of the country which had taken
root during the period of war and restrictions:
and finally, a system of connecting the various
portions of the country by a judicious system
of internal improvement."  With the approval
of South Carolina, he still pointed with satis,
faction and pride to his agency in promoting
what she and he were soon so decisively to con'




SECRETARY OF WAR


41


demn as impolitic, unjust, dangerous to the independence of the States, and unconstitutional.
In later years, Calhoun would have given
much if he could have torn these leaves from
his book of record as a Representative and as
Secretary of War. Else these were the brightest and happiest years of his public life, though
the first premonitory gusts of the storms which
were to rage through all the rest of it began
while he held the latter office. Many of his
friends and admirers had with regret seen him
abandon his seat in the legislative hall for a
place in the President's council. They apprehended that he would, to a great extent, lose
the renown which he had gained as a member
of Congress, for they thought that the dialectic
turn of his mind rendered him unfit to become a
successful administrator. He undeceived them
in a manner which astonished even those who
had not shared these apprehensions. The Department of War was in a state of really astounding confusion when he assumed the charge
of it. Into this chaos he soon brought order, and
the whole service of the department received an
organization so simple and at the same, time so
efficient that it has, in the main, been adhered to
by all his successors, and proved itself capable of
standing even the test of the civil war. Niles's
"Register " said on March 27, 1824:



42


JOHN C. CALHOUN


"Judging from the various reports that all of us
have seen from the War Department, the order and
harmony, regularity and promptitude, punctuality and
responsibility, introduced by Mr. Calhoun in every
branch of the service, have never been rivalled, and
perhaps cannot be excelled; and it must be recolo
lected that he brought this system out of chaos.
Never was the business of any department in such
a state of perfect confusion as that now under his
charge at the time when he was placed at the head
of it. The open or unsettled accounts, of all sorts,
must have amounted to nearly fifty millions of dollars. How great was the labor to cleanse this Augean stable! But, mightily supported by the acute
and indefatigable Mr. Hagner, the old and filthy
accounts are nearly disposed of."
Calhoun himself said, with just pride, in a
report to the President, " The result has been
that, of the entire amount of money drawn
from the Treasury in the year 1822 for the
military service, including the pensions, amounting to $4,571,961.94, although it passed through
the hands of no less than two hundred and
ninety-one disbursing agents, there has not
been a single defalcation, nor the loss of a cent
to the government."    And the principal employees of the department, in taking leave of
him in a short address (February 28, 1825),
bore the following testimony to his administration: -




SECRETARY OF WAR


43


" The degree of perfection to which you have carried the several branches of this department is believed to be without parallel.... From these (your
personal character and private virtues) have proceeded the harmonious interchanges which have
made the burden of details with which the undersigned are charged comparatively light."
Neither, on the other hand, were severe criticisms lacking. John Quincy Adams writes in
his Diary:
" The truth is that of the reforms in the War Department while he [Calhoun] was at its head, the most
important was the reduction of the army from ten
thousand men to six thousand men, utterly against
his will, against all the influence that he could exercise, and to his entire disapprobation; and all the
other changes of organization were upon plans furnished by Generals Brown and Scott, and carried
through Congress chiefly by the agency of John
Williams, of Tennessee. Mr. Calhoun had no more
share of mind in them than I have in the acts of Congress to which I affix my signature of approbation."
Even the most thorough examination of the
records of the War Department would probably not clearly show whether and how far the
latter assertion is true. For argument's sake,
however, it may be granted that it is true to the
letter. Would that really deprive Calhoun of
all merit in the reforms? Is it not one of the




44


JOHN C. CALHOUN


most indispensable qualities of a statesman to
know where to go for advice, and to follow wise
counsels?
Others were not satisfied with denying that
the reforms were due to the initiative of the
Secretary. We read in the same Diary, under
date of June 2, 1822, that General D. Parker
said to the writer, "The management of the
War Department had been inefficient and extravagant, which was very susceptible of demonstration." The reproach of extravagance was
not wholly Without apparent foundation. Calhoun very properly considered himself in duty
bound to advocate and promote the interests of
the army in every way not incompatible with
the true interests of the United States, and as
to these he, with equal propriety, refused to
accept the amount of money to be spent as constituting the principal consideration. The best
is the cheapest, though the first outlay is larger.
In private life this maxim is nowhere better and
more commonly understood than by the people
generally in the United States. The American
politicians, however, partly for demagogical purposes and partly from honest stupidity, up to
this day but too frequently consider it an absurdity, though they are in other respects lavish
to the verge of criminality with the public money.
Calhoun fully understood that with regard to




SECRETARY OF WAR


45


great public interests the miser's policy is the
worst extravagance. It was, perhaps, not quite
so certain as Adams thought, that the reduction
of the army was really a " reform," and the Secretary undoubtedly deserved much praise for
taking a decided stand against those who wanted
to screw down the rations and the wages of the
privates, and to some extent even those of the
officers, to the lowest possible point.
As to "abuses" in other respects, it is too
much to say that Calhoun is absolutely blameless. In one important instance he has laid
himself open to the charge of unfair dealing in
the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty with
an Indian tribe. Upon the whole, however, he
advocated a policy towards these wards of the
nation, which it would have been well for all
the parties concerned to adopt and pursue with
undeviating honesty. Even in our days his
Indian reports might be profitably studied with
regard as well to the cardinal mistakes committed in the Indian policy as to what ought to
be done. To those who try to lift the responsibility for the hapless fate of the Indians from
the shoulders of the American people, and allege
a decree of Providence, the following testimony
of Calhoun will be unsavory reading:" As far, however, as civilization may depend on
education only, without taking into consideration the




46


JOHN C. CALHOUN


force of circumstances, it would seem that there is no
insuperable difficulty in effecting the benevolent intention of the government. It may be affirmed, almost without qualification, that all the tribes within
our settlements and near our borders are even solicitous for the education of their children. With the
exception of the Creeks, they have everywhere freely
and cheerfully assented to the establishment of schools,
to which, in some instances, they have contributed.
The Choctaws, in this respect, have evinced the most
liberal spirit, having set aside $6000 of their amnesty
in aid of the schools established among them. The
reports of the teachers are almost uniformly favorable, both as to the capacity and docility of their
youths. Their progress appears to be quite equal to
that of white children of the same age, and they appear to be equally susceptible of acquiring habits of
industry. At some of the establishments a considerable portion of the supplies are raised by the labor
of the scholars and the teachers. With these indications, it would seem that there is little hazard in pronouncing that, with proper and vigorous efforts, they
may receive an education equal to that of the labor-.
ing portion of our community."
Whether his theorizing propensities had anything to do with his taking such a favorable
view of the capability and the desire of the Indians to raise themselves out of the darkness
and sloth of their savage state need not here be
inquired into. In judging this question Calhoun




SECRETARY OF WAR


47


was, at all events, a sufficiently matter-of-fact
man to see that, in spite of this supposed natural
capability for becoming civilized, their actual
civilization was impossible so long as the leading principle of the Indian policy hitherto pursued was not abandoned:" The political relation which they bear to us is by
itself of sufficient magnitude, if not removed, to prevent so desirable a state from being attained. We
have always treated them as an independent people;
and however insignificant a tribe may become, and
however surrounded by a dense white population, so
long as there are any remains it continues independent of our laws and authority. To tribes thus surrounded, nothing can be conceived more opposed to
their happiness and civilization than this state of
nominal independence. It has not one of the advantages of real independence, while it has nearly all
the disadvantages of a state of complete subjugation.
The consequence is inevitable. They lose the lofty
spirit and heroic courage of the savage state, without
acquiring the virtues which belong to the civilized.
Depressed in spirit and debauched in morals, they
dwindle away through a wretched existence, a nuisance to the surrounding country. Unless some system can be devised gradually to change this relation,
and with the progress of education to extend over
them our laws and authority, it is feared that all efforts to civilize them, whatever flattering appearances
they may for a time exhibit, must ultimately fail.




48


JOHN C. CALHOUN


Tribe after tribe will sink, with the progress of our
settlements and the pressure of our population, into
wretchedness and oblivion. Such has been their past
history, and such, without this change of political
relation, it must probably continue to be."
Who would to-day venture to deny that the
main error of the Americans in dealing with
the Indian problem is here pointed out with the
utmost clearness, and that subsequent history
has fully borne out these assertions?  With the
same keen-sightedness with which Calhoun discerned the causes of the evil, he also found the
means for its gradual cure: -
" Preparatory to so radical a change in our relation
towards them, the system of education which has been
adopted ought to be put into extensive and active
operation. This is the foundation of all other improvements [?]. It ought gradually to be followed
with a plain and simple system of laws and government, such as has been adopted by the Cherokees, a
proper compression of their settlements, and a division
of landed property. By introducing gradually and
judiciously these improvements, they will ultimately
attain such a state of intelligence, industry, and civilization as to prepare the way for a complete extension
of our laws and authority over them."
It is not probable that Mr. Schurz has ever
read this long-forgotten report, but whoever has
been acquainted with it, and has also paid some




SECRETARY OF WAR


49


attention to the Indian policy of Mr. Hayes's
Secretary of the Interior, must have been struck
by the coincidence of the views of South Carolina's great doctrinarian and of the modern
"theorist," who, sixty years later, has dealt more
successfully with the Indian problem than perhaps any other man.
Of the other charges brought against the
management of the War Department, but one
more need be mentioned, and this one because it
had a long history and made considerable noise
at the time. We allude to the so-called RipRap contract. A government contract for the
delivery of a large quantity of stones at Old
Point Comfort had been awarded to a certain
Elijah Mix, a man of ruined commercial reputation. Calhoun was not aware of this fact
concerning Mix, and he was satisfied that the
conditions agreed upon were as favorable for
the government as any that could' be obtained
at the time; but he had awarded the contract
without publicly advertising, it, as the law required. This fact became known when Mix
failed to fulfil his obligations, and the House
of Representatives prohibited any further disbursements from the appropriation made for
this purpose. This untoward occurrence was
the more annoying because the chief clerk of
the department, a brother-in-law of Mix, had,




so


JOHN C. CALHOUN


with the knowledge of the Secretary, afterwards
bought a part of the contract. Calhoun had not
approved of his doing so, warning him that he
would expose himself to disagreeable insinuations; but neither, on the other hand, had he
forbidden it, since it was not " illegal." After
Calhoun had become Vice-President, this story
was revived by an application from Mix for another government contract. Although his bid
was the lowest, it was refused, because the history
of the Rip-Rap contract proved him to be an
irresponsible person. In the course of these
transactions a private letter from Mix, in which
he charged Calhoun with having received a
share of the profits of the Rip-Rap job, found
its way into the press. Calhoun thereupon
(September 29, 1826) addressed a letter to the
House of Representatives, "claiming investigation by the House" "in its high character of
grand inquest of the nation," at the same time
announcing to the Senate that he would not preside over its deliberations until the vile calumny
had been duly disposed of, - two steps of doubtful propriety, and if not unconstitutional, at all
events extra-constitutional. The House of Representatives might easily find itself left with no
time at all for transacting its legitimate business, if it could be required to grant the claim
of every government official of a certain rank




SECRETARY OF WAR


51


for an investigation of charges privately preferred by any private individual; and it would
be strange indeed if a United States official
had the right to refuse to attend to his constitutional duties because somebody had been
pleased to calumniate him. If the Vice-President might do so why not the President, the
Justices of the Supreme Court, the President
pro tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House,- nay, any member of Congress?      Neither of these objections was entirely overlooked
at the time, but the House nevertheless appointed
a committee of investigation. Calhoun was far
from being satisfied with its proceedings, although
the report declared, "They are unanimously of
the opinion that there are no facts which will
authorize the belief, or even suspicion, that the
Vice-President was ever interested, or that he
participated, directly or indirectly, in the profits
of any contract formed with the government
through the Department of War."
No decent person had ever doubted that such
was the case. The whole scandal was an empty
bubble, but, like every scandal, it was filled with
mal-odorous gases. Calhoun would have done
well to treat it with silent contempt, instead of
1 Calhoun's assertion that the accusation had been accorded
a place in the official records of the Department of War was
proved to be wholly unfounded.




52


JOHN C. CALHOUN


pricking it, for neither in Congress nor out of it
was there a lack of persons who willingly used
against him everything which they could lay
their hands on, and the old truth semper aliquid hceret applied to him as well as to any
other person. In spite of the praise bestowed
upon his administration of the War Department by all impartial men, many members of
Congress selected just this department as the
principal butt of their ill-humor. John Quincy
Adams writes on June 2, 1822, "The President had enough to do to support the Secretary
of War. He had already brought himself into
collision with both Houses of Congress by supporting him." Though these animadversions
were, in the opinion of Adams, not wholly unfounded, yet he was far from thinking them
quite justified. This latter fact is the more to
be noticed, because Adams cannot be considered
an entirely unprejudiced witness, though the
stern old man was certainly most honestly convinced that he judged his colleague with the
strictest impartiality and justice.
Adams leaves us in no doubt about the true
cause of these attacks upon Calhoun:There was a time during the last session of Congress when so large a proportion of members was enlisted for Calhoun that they had it in contemplation
to hold a caucus formally to declare him a candidate




SECRETARY OF WAR


53


[for the presidency]. But this prospect of success
roused all Crawford's and Clay's partisans against
him. The administration of his department was scrutinized with severity, sharpened by personal animosity and factious malice. Some abuses were discovered,
and exposed with aggravations. Cavils were made
against measures of that department in the execution
of the laws, and brought the President in collision
with both Houses of Congress. Crawford's newspapers commenced and have kept up a course of the
most violent abuse and ribaldry against him."
The presidency was at the bottom of these
acrimonious bickerings, and though Adams
would never have committed the slightest conscious wrong in order to secure this prize, yet
he coveted it too ardently to be favorably disposed toward a prominent rival.
The estrangement between Adams and Calhoun cannot be ascribed solely to this reason,
but nobody who has the least knowledge of human nature will doubt that this must have had
a great deal to do with it. When the two
statesmen came into such close official relation
by becoming members of Mr. Monroe's Cabinet,
Adams must be considered, if we take his usual
austerity and chilliness into due consideration,
to have spoken almost enthusiastically of his
younger colleague. On January 6, 1818, he
says, "' Calhoun thinks for himself, independ



54=         JOHN C. CALHOUN
ently of all the rest [namely, the other members of the Cabinet], with sound judgment,
quick discrimination, and keen observation. He
supports his opinions, too, with powerful eloquence." For several years this good opinion
grows ever stronger:"Mr. Calhoun is a man of fair and candid mind,
of honorable principles, of clear and quick understanding, of cool self-possession, of enlarged philosophical views, and of ardent patriotism. He is above
all sectional and factious prejudices more than any
other statesman of this Union with whom I have ever
acted. He is more sensitive to the transient manifestations of momentary public opinion, more afraid of
the first impressions of the public opinion, than I
am."
Thus Adams wrote on October 15, 1821;
and again, only twenty-five months later, he
says, "Calhoun, who in all his movements of
every kind has an eye to himself;" and on the
2d of April, 1824, "Precedent and popularity,
- this is the bent of his mind. The primary
principles involved in any public question are
the last to occur to him. What has been done
and what will be said are the Jachin and Boaz
of his argument." As Adams did not accuse
Calhoun of any special dishonorable act, this
change of opinion is certainly so great that the
explanation for it must be partly sought in the




SECRETARY OF WAR


55


last sentence of the following entry in his Diary
(September 5, 1831):"Mr. Calhoun was a member of Mr. Monroe's
administration, and during its early part pursued a
course from which I anticipated that he would prove
an ornament and a blessing to his country. I have
been deeply disappointed in him, and now expect
nothing from him but evil. His personal relations
with me have been marked, on his part, with selfish
and cold-blooded heartlessness."
It is well known how much inclined Adams
was to charge with ingratitude and base intrigues those with whom his political life had
brought him into close personal contact; and
furthermore, that the real experiences which he
actually encountered in this respect were bad
enough to sour a less distrustful and sweeter
temper than his. Calhoun, too, he did not
blame without reason, and, so far as our present sources allow us to judge, by far the larger
part of the responsibility for the unkind feeling
between the two rested upon the Carolinian.
Adams's well-founded complaints against Calhoun, however, chiefly arose after the presidential contest had been decided for this time.
Calhoun professed to think that Monroe should
be succeeded by a Northern man, and declared
that, if such should be the case, his first choice
would be Adams. If he, nevertheless, vigor



56         JOHN C. CALHOUN
ously pushed his own candidacy, it was, as he
a asserted, because he thought that of all the
prominent candidates Mr. Crawford, of Georgia,
had the best chance, and him he would oppose
to the utmost extent of his power, because he
not only had no high opinion of his talents, but
could not respect him as a man. So far as
Calhoun was concerned, the war was, indeed,
principally waged between his partisans and
those of Crawford. " As Calhoun stands most
in his [Crawford's] way," says Adams's Diary
on May 2, 1822, "' the great burden of his exertions this session and the last has been against
the War Department; while Calhoun, by his
haste to get at the presidency, has made a cabal
in his favor in Congress to counteract Crawford's
cabal, and the session has been little more than
a violent struggle between them; both, however,
countenancing the insidious attacks upon the
Secretary of State."
Calhoun was thrown in this tussle with his
crafty colleague of the Treasury. The same
authority, which is unimpeachable on this question, says, Calhoun's " projected nomination for
the presidency has met with hardly any countenance throughout the Union. The principal
effect of it has been to bring out Crawford's
strength, and thus to promote the interest of
the very man whom alone he professes to op



SECRETARY OF WAR


67


pose. Calhoun now feels his weakness, but is
not cured of his ambition."  Crawford, however, was to be still more disappointed than
Calhoun, and so far as the struggle between
these two is concerned it was the former infinitely more than the latter who could, with justice, be accused of double-dealing and an unfair
underground warfare. Yet no sincere friend of
Calhoun can look quite undismayed upon this
chapter of his public life. The presidential
fever, that typical disease which has proved
fatal to the true glory of so many statesmen of
the United States, permeated the very marrow
of his bones. His ambition did not betray him
into any dishonorable act, but his eye became
dimmed with regard to the public weal, because,
consciously or unconsciously, the fatal consideration, what effect his course would have upon
his standing as a candidate, entered more or
less into every question. His blind admirers, if
there still be any left, will, of course, not admit
the truth of this assertion, and will claim that
to him, too, the celebrated saying of Henry
Clay applies, that he would rather be right
than be President.  The cool, unbiased student will, indeed, probably come to the conclusion that there was not much difference between
the two in this respect; but if there were nothing else to sustain the charge against Calhoun,




* s8        JOHN C. CALHOUN
it would be sufficiently proved by the influence
vich he allowed his presidential aspirations to
exercise upon his personal relations. The lofty
independence of mind and truly chivalric spirit,
which were his real nature, appear blunted. He
stoops to cover with an approving and admiring
smile a resentment which is lurking in a corner
of his heart, and on the other side to break off all
social intercourse with old and highly respected
associates, merely because others, whose good
services he wishes to secure, might not like these
connections. The champion of slavery, who, with
head erect, flashing eye, and the deep-toned voice
of solemn conviction and apostolic infallibility,
dares the whole civilized world, is every inch a
man, though a sadly mistaken one; but the politician, who is craving with thirst for the presidency, is like Ulysses before the suitors, still a
hero, but with the beggar's rags of human frailty
and weakness covering the "divine " shoulders.
Calhoun's hopes rested mainly on his popularity in Pennsylvania, the grateful affection
of the army, and the admiration of the young
men. With them his comparative youth was
an additional claim on their support; for it was
on account of his age that his career seemed to
shine with uncommon lustre. With his elders,
however, this was one of the principal objections against his being already put at the head




SECRETARY OF WAR             59
of the nation. Joseph Story wrote, on September 21, 1823, to the Hon. Ezekiel Bacon" I
have great admiration for Mr. Calhoun, and
think few men have more enlarged and liberal
views of the true policy of the national government. But his age, or rather his youth, at the
present moment, is a formidable objection to
his elevation to the chair." But even if he had
stood in the beginning of the sixth instead of
the fifth decade of his life, his wishes would
probably not have been gratified. The whole
movement in his favor was premature, and had,
at this time, something artificial in it. There
was, after all, nothing in his career to stir up
a general enthusiasm, by means of which he
might have ridden on the crest of a great popular wave over the heads of all his competitors
into the White House. The mass of the people were in'a sober mood, verging upon indifference. The election, therefore, turned much
less upon principles or great questions of policy
than upon personal predilections; and this being
the case, it soon became evident that Calhoun
had no chance whatever. Even in Pennsylvania, where he owed his popularity partly to
the vigor with which, in 1816, he had advocated
a protective tariff, he was dropped. The Harrisburg convention nominated Jackson, but gave
to Calhoun the second place on the ticket as




60


JOHN C. CALHOUN


candidate for the vice-presidency. This was a
solution of the question with which he could be
well satisfied. If he had been from the first the
weakest candidate for the presidency, he was undoubtedly the strongest for the vice-presidency;
and as he had already been spoken of for the
first place, his election to the second would, in
the eyes of many people, give him a kind of
equitable claim to be, in due time, elevated
" to the chair."  Niles's " Register " of November 6, 1824, said, " He is the only candidate in
whose favor the people have moved, and the
voice of the people should always be respected."
Adams had already, in the preceding February,
spoken of the "1 courtship of the New England
Federalists by Mr. Calhoun," and of " the newspapers set up in Massachusetts to support Mr.
Calhoun." Webster wrote to his brother Ezekiel, on March 14 of the same year " I hope all
New England will support Mr. Calhoun for the
vice-presidency. If so, he will probably be
chosen, and that will be a great thing. He is a
true man, and will do good to the country in
that situation." Webster's hopes were not disappointed. The Jackson and the Adams parties
united on Calhoun. He received 182 of the 261
electoral votes, and among these were all the
New England votes, with the exception of those
from Connecticut and one from New Hampshire.




CHAPTER IV


VICE-PRESIDENT
As the presidential election turned out, the
combination vote by which he had been chosen
put Calhoun into an annoying and very embarrassing position with a view to his own presidential aspirations. Although Jackson had received a plurality of the electoral votes, Adams
was elected by the House of Representatives.
That the House was perfectly justified in doing
this, not only by the letter, but also by the spirit
of the Constitution, no person can deny who is
possessed of common sense and is willing to use
it. Article XII., section 1, of the Constitution
would be an absurdity if the House were morally
obliged to choose the person upon whom a plurality of the votes had been bestowed. Besides,
to whom would the preference have to be accorded, if the person receiving the plurality of
the electoral votes had not also received a plurality of the popular votes? The Jackson partisans, however, were determined to seal their
ears and eyes hermetically against every suggestion of reason. They declared Adams's elec



62


JOHN C. CALHOUN


tion to be an outrage, a rebellion of the servants against the masters, for no matter what
the Constitution said and required, the " demos
krateo principle," as Senator Benton expressed
it, with a somewhat sorry display of his knowledge of Greek, had been trampled under foot.
The nomination of Henry Clay, whose influence had given the decision in favor of Adams,
for Secretary of State filled the cup of their
wrath to overflowing. The cry of "bargain"
was raised, and though it was proved over and
over again to be a base calumny, it did not completely die out until long after Adams and Clay
were resting in their graves.
So the two camps, to whose union in his behalf Calhoun owed his elevation, stood arrayed
in deadly conflict against each other. To remain neutral between them was to put himself
between anvil and hammer. But with which
party was he to side? Justice pleaded for
Adams, ambition spoke eloquently for Jackson.
Can there be any doubt that this keenest logician, who had never been and never became a
fanatic of the " demos krateo principle" as it
was now understood by the Jackson party, took
a correct view of the constitutional question?
In 1837, in the debate on the bill for the admission of Michigan as a State into the Union,'he
very emphatically reproved his adversaries for




VICE-PRESIDENT


63


an argument, according to which "the authority of numbers sets aside the authority of the
law and the Constitution."  And he added,
"Need I show that such a principle goes to the
entire overthrow of our constitutional government, and would subvert all social order?"
But from the beginning it was evident that the
majority of the people would declare for Jackson. To support Adams was therefore to postpone to a remote future, if not to renounce altogether, the realization of his wishes.
The temptation proved too strong for Calhoun. It is possible, and perhaps not unlikely,
that Adams judged him too harshly in attributing everything he did and left undone to
the wish of undermining the administration.
Thus, for instance, it seems hardly probable
that the reason for Calhoun's celebrated decision, which denied the right of the Vice-President to call a Senator to order, was really, as
Adams believed, only unwillingness to check
Randolph's violent abuse of the administration. There was more than enough of the doctrinarian in him to render it likely that he
honestly thought this power would be, or at
least could lead to, an abridgment of the liberty
of speech. This much, however, is certain:
that the Vice-President was far from anxious
to sustain the political credit of the President;




64


JOHN C. CALHOUN


nay, though he knew how to maintain the decorum of his office, he was in fact one of the
leaders of the opposition. Mr. Nathan Sargent
relates that Calhoun had said to him in December, 1825, or January, 1826, " Such was the
manner in which it [Adams's administration]
came into power that it must be defeated at all
hazards, regardless of its measures." Charity
bids us assume that he deceived himself at the
time; but when, instead of ardent desire, bitter
disappointment became his constant companion,
whispering its suggestions into his ear, the man
and the statesman would have been ashamed
to have this sentiment recalled to his memory.
For a while it seemed as if Calhoun had not
been betrayed by his ambition into a miscalculation. In the presidential election of 1828,
Jackson carried everything before him, and
Calhoun was reilected Vice-President by 171
electoral votes. As it was understood that
Jackson did not intend to be a candidate for
reflection, Calhoun was apparently more likely
than ever to reach the goal of the White House.
But in fact, so far as this wish was concerned,
his star had already passed its zenith. The
personal relation between Jackson and Calhoun was no longer what it was supposed to
be. On the surface the waters were still perfectly smooth, but in the hidden deep they




VICE-PRESIDENT


65


were agitated to a degree boding no good to
either Calhoun or the country. In the formation of his Cabinet Jackson had recognized the
claims of Calhoun to his consideration by inviting Mr. Branch, of North Carolina, Mr. Berrien, of Georgia, and Mr. Ingham, of Pennsylvania, to seats in it. Calhoun, however, thought
himself not well treated, because-with the
exception, perhaps, of Ingham - these were
not the men he had wished to see in the council
of the President, though they were reputed to be
his fast friends. Yet this was not a cause of the
breach which was soon to occur between the two
men, but merely a symptom of a certain coolness and an incipient mutual distrust, antedating
the inauguration of Jackson, and originating in
the leading political question of the day.
In 1824 the tariff question had deeply agitated the whole country. The protectionists had
carried the day, but only by a slender majority,
and the opposition, especially in the plantation
States, had assumed a threatening aspect. Not
only the expediency and justice of a protective
tariff was violently contested, but also its constitutionality was most strenuously denied. The
excitement reached such a height that the
"Southron" and the Columbia "Telescope"
advised the calling of a congress of the opposition States.




66


JOHN C. CALHOUN


Calhoun did not approve of the passionate
way in which the question was treated. Yet
in the summer of 1825 he declared at a dinner
given in his honor at Augusta, Georgia, that
" No one would reprobate more pointedly than
myself any concerted union between States for
interested or sectional objects. I would consider all such concert as against the spirit of
our Constitution." The national tendencies still
prevailed with him, and, as has been proved
before, he had not yet forsworn the economical tenets which he had so zealously defended
for years. His faith in them had, however,
begun to be strongly shaken, and after he had
once entered upon their reexamination he felt
compelled to become their most irreconcilable
enemy.
It was no whim or "gray theory" which
caused the steadily progressing consolidation of
the Southern States with regard to the economical questions. Slavery, in consequence of the
enormous development of the cotton culture,
had become the determining principle of the
whole political, economical, and social life of the
Southern States, and a protective tariff was absolutely incompatible with the interests of the
slave-holders. Indolence and a certain slovenliness pervaded the whole life of the South, because some kinds of honest labor- all that the




VICE-PRESIDENT


67


South was pleased to call "menial services "were dishonored by slavery; and thereby all
work, except the "living by one's wits," had
come to be looked upon more or less as a dire
necessity, instead of the blissful destiny of man.
No white man could ever lose "caste."   No
matter how lazy, poor, ignorant, and depraved
he might be, yet, by virtue of the color of his
skin, he was a born member of the aristocracy,
and absolutely nothing could deprive him of
his place in it; for the gulf which separated the
whites from the negroes could no more be
bridged over than that between heaven and hell.
As the human mind is constituted, no more
powerful incentive could be offered to the mass
of the population to sink deeper into nerveless
shiftlessness. The middle classes are the backbone of every civilized community, and slavery
prevented the formation of a well-to-do, intellectual, and progressive middle class more effectually than any express law could have done.
To work one's way up from the lower strata
of society into the real aristocracy of the great
land-owners, that is the great slave-holders, was
an enterprise beset with almost insuperable
difficulties, and the spirit of the community
did not encourage the undertaking of the arduous task. The greater the difference between
this real aristocracy and the bulk of the white




68


JOHN C. CALHOUN


population actually was in every respect, the
more the former was forced to affect absolute
equality with the lowliest of their fellow citizens. These had to be persuaded that their
interests were identical with those of the rich
planters; and, as they had in fact more to suffer
from the effects of slavery than the slaves themselves, this could only be accomplished by systematically instilling into them a dull self-conceit and suicidal arrogance, which mistook
shreds and tatters for purple and ermine. They
looked down upon every other form of civilization with an air of contemptuous superiority,
which would have been exceedingly ludicrous
if it had not been infinitely sad. That was
an education rendering those who were cursed
with it eminently fit to listen to political discussions, and to retail the pretentious and vain
political wisdom that had been showered upon
them from the stump, in their idle neighborly
chats, but making them bad farmers, while unfitting them for everything but farming. The
population could never become dense, for the
slave, who had to work without the spur of
self-interest, tilled the soil, in spite of all overseers and whips, in a manner which, instead of
improving it, exhausted it in the shortest possible time. Those who did the work could
afford utterly to dispense with thinking, and




VICE-PRESIDENT


69


the one head of the master could not supply
this want, nor did he, in most cases, even try
to do so. More and more it became the rule
that the planter lived on credit, eating up his
crop before it had been harvested; and if he
was rich enough to grow richer, the surplus
was almost invariably invested in more land
and slaves. What did it matter if the rich soil
was speedily turned into a barren waste! There
were boundless tracts of land of still richer soil
left for him to go to, with his " hands."
In a community thus constituted there is little need of artisans, and still less of efficient and
skilful ones. " The upper ten thousand " had
the means to supply their wants from any distance; with the mass of the people neither the
means nor the wishes extended much beyond
the necessaries of life; and, finally, the claims
of the slaves upon life were confined to a hut,
coarse raiment, coarse food, and the coarsest
agricultural implements. The artisan, however,
is the necessary precursor of the manufacturer.
Where the standard of civilization is too low to
require a numerous class of laborers skilled in
all sorts of handiwork, manufacturing on a large
scale is as impossible as the putting up of the
roof before the building of the walls which are
to support it. Moreover, the landed aristocracy,
which, under democratic forms, wielded the




70


JOHN C. CALHOUN


whole political and social power, could not but
be averse to the development of a middle class
such as the North and all Europe - with the
exception of the southeastern parts and Russia
-had to boast of. There was, in later years,
much talking and passing of resolutions upon
the duty and necessity of bringing about the industrial and commercial development to which
the bounties of nature had evidently destined
the South. At the same time, however, the
spirit which animated those middle classes in
the North and in Europe, and which alone
made them what they were, was denounced and
abused as a deadly poison, the introduction of
which into the South was more to be feared
than the plague. And these denunciations, dictated by the instinct of self-preservation, were
but too well founded. With the building up
of commerce and the industrial pursuits, that
is, with the spreading of culture and prosperity, the delusion would inevitably vanish that
the interests of the small slave-holders and the
rest of the white population coincided with those
of the great planters. These last would have
planted abolitionism at the very doors of their
mansions, and would have invited it to the seat
of honor at their hearth-stones. Slavery doomed
the South to be and to remain an almost exclusively agricultural country, and, at the same




VICE-PRESIDENT


71


time, to use up at a steadily advancing rate the
capital which Providence had bestowed upon
her in the shape of a fertile soil and a genial
climate. So long as slavery remained the dominant interest in the Southern States, they, for
that very reason, had to be hostile to a home
industry, if it needed to be artificially nursed
into existence by high protective tariffs. Everything they needed of industrial products they
were obliged to buy from elsewhere, and they
of course wanted to buy where they could get
the articles best and cheapest. But the protective tariffs forced them to buy inferior American goods at a higher price, or to pay for the
European wares much more than their real
value. We need not here inquire into the wisdom of this " American system " from a national
point of view. Thus much was incontestable,
that it ran counter to the immediate interest of
the South, or, to speak more correctly, of the
great slave-holders. Therefore, as the nature
of things cannot be changed, this had to remain
a "fixed fact" so long as the interests of the
slave-holders held undisputed sway over the
slave States. If, however, a government pursues an economical policy, which is permanently
opposed to the immediate interests of a geographical section of the country, this section
will never acknowledge that the policy is or




72


JOHN C. CALHOUN


can be compatible with the true national interests.
Thus far no statesman, either south or north
of Mason and Dixon's line, had fully grasped
the question. The plantation States felt the effect of the American system, but they did not
understand the original cause of the irreconcilable
conflict of interests between the two sections
of the Union, nor was any one aware that the
conflict was irreconcilable to the fullest extent
of the word. This fact was the more obscured
because some special interests, as those of the
sugar and indigo planters, caused an alliance
between a part of the extreme South and the
protectionists; and furthermore, because the border States, in consequence of their geographical
situation and the contest between the slave-holding interest and the free-labor system, limped on
both sides. Yet it was as certain as a proposition
of Euclid that the conflict was irreconcilable,
and therefore "irrepressible," because freedom
and slavery are antagonistic ideas, acting with
equal energy upon the intellectual, political,
economical, social, and moral life of a people.
It has been truly said that "compromise is the
essence of politics;" genuine compromises,
however, can only be concluded with regard to
measures, never between principles, that is, between intellectual and moral conceptions which,




VICE-PRESIDENT


73


in their very essence, are the opposite poles of
an idea.
In relation to the concrete question, these
plain truths were, at the time, as little understood by Calhoun as by any other statesman of
the country. As he was not a member of Congress during the contest which terminated in
the Missouri compromise, we know but little of
his position towards the slavery question at this
memorable period. Enough, however, is known
of it to prove that he had not as yet deeply reflected upon it. Like all the other members of
Mr. Monroe's Cabinet, he admitted the constitutional right of Congress to prohibit slavery in
the Territories. If he had perceived that this
was the pivotal point on which the whole slavery
question was ultimately to turn, and that upon
its decision the existence of slavery depended, he
certainly would not have done so. Not that he
would have wittingly misinterpreted the Constitution, but he would have seen the whole
instrument in a totally different light. Already
the maintenance of slavery was, in his view, an
incontestable right under the fundamental law
of the land, and also it was an absolute necessity.
Already it was a matter of course with him that
everything else must yield to this consideration.
Adams writes on February 24, 1820, in his
Diary: -




74


JOHN C. CALHOUN


"I had some conversation with Calhoun on the
slave question, pending in Congress. He said he did
not think it would produce a dissolution of the Union,
but if it should the South would be from necessity
compelled to form an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Great Britain.
" I said that would be returning to the colonial
state.
" He said, Yes, pretty much, but it would be forced
upon them."
Ten years after Calhoun's death the South
tried the realization of this programme. Long
before he had begun to concentrate the whole
power of his intellect upon the examination of
this problem, his unerring instinct unveiled the
remote future.   While the thinker and the
practical statesman but just enter' upon the
task which was to constitute the dark glory of
his life, the seer points to the end, which is to
come after his own bones have been turned into
dust.
It was not the territorial but the economical
question which opened the eyes of Calhoun and
pushed him with irresistible force into a new
path, so that Adams said rather too little than
too much when he declared that " his career as
a statesman has been marked with a series of
the most flagrant inconsistencies." But he
wronged him grievously in asserting that "his




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75


opinions are the sport of every popular blast,"
and that he "veers round in his politics, to be
always before the wind, and makes his intellect
the pander of his will." If these reproaches
ever had any foundation, he mastered this weakness just while and because he abjured his former political faith. Mr. Curtis most justly
says, in his "Life of Daniel Webster," "Mr.
Calhoun was a man of deep convictions." His
veering round was gradual, because it was not
done to serve some' impure personal end, but
was the result of an honest change in his opinions. After it had once begun, it went steadily
on without pausing for a single moment, because he had taken his stand on a principle, and
followed up the consequences of it with masterly
logic and fatalistic sternness of purpose.
The tariff of 1828 gave birth to his first great
political manifesto, the so-called South Carolina
Exposition. The document issued by the legislature of that State does not concern us here;
we have only to deal with Calhoun's original
draft of it. Nor is it now of any interest
whether his economical reasoning was correct
or fallacious; only the political conclusions
which he drew from his economical premises
are of historical importance. The essential
point of these economical premises is that, according to him, there is a permanent conflict of




76


JOHN C. CALHOUN


interest with regard to the tariff policy between
the "staple States" and the rest of the Union.
The reason of this is simply that the staple
* States are exclusively devoted to agriculture,
and will forever remain purely agricultural communities, because " our soil, climate, habits, and
peculiar labor are adapted " to this " our ancient
and favorite pursuit." This was the wizard's
wand which worked such an astonishing metamorphosis in the mind of Calhoun that one is
tempted to believe that a new man, whom we
have never met before, has stepped upon the
stage. In the beginning of his career we have
heard him praised as absolutely free from sectional prejudices; and we have seen that he, indeed, judged everything from a national point of
view, hardly deigning to answer the objections
which legal quibbles, party passion, and local
interests raised against what the welfare and the
honor of the " nation " demanded. But now he
speaks of " our political system resting on the
great principle involved in the recognized diversity of geographical interests in the community,"
and adopts this for tile rest of his life as the
basis of all his political reasoning and his whole
political activity. The "' Exposition " fills fiftysix printed pages, but it does not contain a
single sentence bearing directly on the national
interest. This point is only incidentally men



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tioned, with the assertion that the pretended
unconstitutional usurpation of the Federal government, which has called forth the "Exposition," seriously endangers the political morality
and the liberty of the republic. The national
statesman is transformed into the champion of
the interests and the rights of the minority, and
the reason of the change is that the minority is
a geographical section with a " peculiar labor "
system, which creates a " recognized diversity "
of interests. His first question is no more, What
ought the Federal government to do, and what
has it the right to do? but, What effect has the
policy of the Federal government on the staple
States in their peculiar situation, and what constitutional means have they for counteracting
the pernicious effects of the Federal policy? The
corner-stone of the political edifice of the United
States is henceforth to him no more the principle that the majority is to rule, but that the
minority has the right and the power to checkmate the majority, whenever it considers the
Federal laws unconstitutional; in other words,
whenever different views are entertained about
the powers conferred by the Constitution upon
the Federal government, those of the minority
were to prevail, provided it was deemed worth
while to have recourse to the last "constitutional" resort.




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


The Articles of Confederation had been sup.
planted by the Constitution in order to render
the Union "more perfect."   If this purpose
was to be fulfilled, the Union must continue to
grow more perfect, for where life is there is
also development. Either it was an illusion
that the historical destiny of the North American continent could be fulfilled by welding it
into one Union composed of many republican
commonwealths, and then the Union would,
sooner or later, fall to pieces, no matter what
the Constitution said; or the authors of the Constitution had correctly understood the genius of
the American people, and had skilfully adapted
their work to the peculiar natural conditions
of the country, and in that event the States
would steadily go on growing together as the
parts of an organic whole, no matter what this
or that man, or even this or that section, might
be pleased to proclaim as the correct interpretation of the Constitution. Calhoun had been
so well aware of this fact that a favorite argument of his in support of the policy advocated
by him had been the favorable effect it would
have upon the "consolidation of the Union."
Now there was in the whole political dictionary
no term more abhorred by him than this. The
sovereignty of the States, in the fullest sense
of the term, is declared to be the essential prin



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ciple of the Union; and it is not only asserted
as an incontestable right, but also claimed as an
absolute political necessity in order to protect
the minority against the majority. The authority quoted for this opinion is not any section of
the Constitution, but the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, with their doctrine, that the
States have the right " to interpose " when the
Federal government is guilty of a usurpation,
because, as there is no common judge over
them, they, as the parties to the compact, have
to determine for themselves whether it has been
violated. This theory is brought by Calhoun
into the more precise formula that each State
has the right to " veto" a Federal law which it
deems unconstitutional. Whether such a veto
is to be an injunction against the execution of
the law throughout the Union, or only in the
individual State, and, in the latter case, what is
to become of the principle that different Federal
laws cannot prevail in different parts of the
Union, we do not learn from the " Exposition."
We are only told that the veto ought to be pronounced by a convention as representing the
sovereignty of the State, but it is left undecided
whether it might not also be done by the legislature.
Calhoun was very far from having completely
killed the old national Adam in his bosom. He




80


JOHN C. CALHOUN


therefore could not entirely suppress the feeling that, if this theory were to be put into practice, it might lead after all to very strange consequences with regard to the legislative activity
of the Federal government; nay, with regard
to the life of the Union itself. So he hastened
to show that the veto was by no means so terrible a thing as it might appear at the first
glance. In adopting the Constitution the States
had so far abandoned their sovereignty that
three fourths of them could change the compact as they pleased. If, therefore, it was desired that the Federal government should have
the contested power, it was only necessary that
three fourths of the States should say so, and
all the damage done would be that the exercising of the power had been postponed for a
while. How was it that these penetrating eyes
failed to see that the Federal legislation might
thereby be turned into a bulky machine, more
fatal to healthy political life than Juggernaut's
car to the fanatical worshippers? But leaving
this practical objection aside, how was it that
he failed to see that thereby one fourth of the
States would get the power to change the Constitution at will? Suppose - and the case might
certainly very easily happen - that the Federal
government exercises a power which has been
actually granted to it by the Constitution, and




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that a State sees fit to veto the law, that the
question, as must be the case, is submitted to
all the States, and the objecting State is supported by one fourth of the whole number. Is
any dialectician sharp enough to disprove the
fact that, in such a case, the Constitution,
though not a single letter is either added or
erased, has been actually changed by one fourth
of the States, though that instrument expressly
requires the consent of at least three fourths to
effect the slightest change? Working in defence of the peculiar interests of the slave-holders with the lever of the state sovereignty, Calhoun thus begins to subvert the foundation of
the whole fabric of the Constitution.
The practical conclusion to which Calhoun
came was, "that there exists a case which
would justify the interposition of this State, in
order to compel the general government to
abandon an unconstitutional power, or to appeal to this high authority [the States] to confer it by express grant."  He, however, deemed
it "advisable " "to allow time for further consideration and reflection, in the hope that a returning sense of justice on the part of the majority, when they come to reflect on the wrongs
which this and the other staple States have suffered, and are suffering, may repeal the obnoxious and unconstitutional acts, and thereby pre



82


JOHN C. CALHOUN


vent the necessity of interposing the veto of the
State."
Daniel Webster wrote on April 10, 1833, to
Mr. Perry, "In December, 1828, I became
thoroughly convinced that the plan of a Southern confederacy had been received with favor
by a great many of the political men of the
South." If this suspicion was well founded
the above-quoted sentence of the Exposition
proves that Calhoun, at all events, was not
privy to such a plot. He not only had no desire to force a crisis upon the country, but he
had strong hopes that it would be avoided, and
he plainly stated his reasons for these hopes.
He was "further induced, at this time, to recommend this course, under the hope that the
great political revolution, which will displace
from power on the 4th of March next those
who have acquired authority by setting the will
of the people at defiance, and which will bring
in an eminent citizen, distinguished for his services to the country and his justice and patriotism, may be followed up, under his influence, with a complete restoration of the pure
principles of our government." But it is to be
noted that he meant exactly what he said, neither more nor less. He hoped that by the influence of Andrew Jackson the protectionists
would be defeated, but he did not feel quite




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sure of it; and if his hopes should not be realized, he had explicitly stated what, in his opinion, ought to be done.  In order to leave no
doubt whatever on this point, he followed up
the last-mentioned sentence with the declaration
that, in thus recommending delay, he wished it
"to be distinctly understood that neither doubts
of the rightful power of the State nor apprehension of consequences" constituted the smallest part of his motives.
Calhoun's reason for not trusting too implicitly in Jackson's influence to bring about a revolution in the economical policy of the Federal government was the double programme
on which the general had been elected. In the
South he had been sustained as a friend of
"Southern interests," i. e., as an anti-protectionist; while in New York, Pennsylvania, and
the West he had been supported as the firm
friend of the tariff and of internal improvements.  The inaugural address touched this
leading question of the day but very slightly,
and with such cautious vagueness that neither
party was satisfied, because neither knew what
it had to expect from the new President. The
first annual message, which had been looked for
with keen expectation, gave no more satisfaction to either. All that could be safely inferred
from it was that the President would gladly see




84


JOHN C. CALHOUN


some duties reduced, but it contained nothing
to justify the hope of the South that he would,
on principle, throw his whole weight into the
scales against the entire protective system.
Calhoun even saw a direct bid for the favor of
the protectionists in the proposal to divide the
expected yearly surplus among the States for
the execution of internal improvements. He
began to look upon the President with a certain
distrust, and this feeling was fully reciprocated
by Jackson. Those who had no opportunity to
observe the actors closely, while the curtain was
down, did not, however, become aware of the
fact that an ominous disturbance in the friendly
relations between the two first officers of the
government had occurred, until the society of
the capital had begun to become convulsed by
the tragicomical intermezzo of the Mrs. Eaton
affair.
* No serious historian will be expected to enter
upon the details of this once celebrated case of
the American chronique scandaleuse. It is the
less necessary to do so because it in fact only
helped on and accelerated the important political events, of which it has frequently been said
to have been the main cause. It suffices to recall to the memory of the reader that Mrs.
Eaton was reported to have had before her second marriage illicit intercourse with her present




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husband, the Secretary of War, and that therefore many ladies refused to admit her into their
company. Jackson, prompted partly by his
generous temper, and partly by the bitter recollections of what had been said against his own
wife, exerted all his influence to break the social
ban under which the wife of his Secretary and
personal friend had been put. The ladies, however, were not to be dictated to, and they carried the day against the victor of New Orleans.
Against the wives of the members of his Cabinet even the President's iron will was powerless, and Calhoun, the Vice-President, according
to his own statement, considered it his duty
to take the lead in this determined opposition
against the attempt to force the suspected lady
upon society. Van Buren, on the contrary, who
was a widower and led a bachelor's life, even
surpassed his wonted politeness in his treatment
of Mrs. Eaton. Jackson, however, was utterly
unable to draw the correct line between private
and public affairs whenever his feelings were enlisted in a cause. Van Buren therefore greatly
ingratiated himself with the President by assiduously paying his court to Mrs. Eaton, while
Calhoun, by strictly adhering to the rigid
course of morality, which has always distinguished the family life of South Carolina, had
to pay for it by a corresponding decline in Jack



86


JOHN C. CALHOUN


son's good will. Both Van Buren and Calhoun
ardently wished to succeed the general in the
presidency, and neither of them failed to see
that Jackson's favor might go far towards deciding who should be the next occupant of the
White House. Moreover, Calhoun was serving
his second term  as Vice-President. All the
precedents were against his presenting himself
once more as a candidate for reelection, and he
justly apprehended that to return for four years
into private life might postpone the realization
of his long-deferred hopes ad calendas Grcecas.
He was therefore most anxious that Jackson
should serve but one term, while, for the same
reason, Van Buren and his partisans were not
less zealous advocates of Jackson's reelection.
So, while everything was yet quiet and
smooth on the surface, the mine was dug and
charged; one spark sufficed to lead to a great
catastrophe. Calhoun himself remained to the
end of his life firmly convinced that Van Buren
was the engineer who had constructed the ingenious battery for the explosion.  Though
there is no documentary proof for it, yet it can
hardly be doubted that Van Buren did in fact
take part in devising the scheme; but he was
too wary and too cunning in such transactions
ever to do himself what could be done as well,
or even better, by some devoted friend. Ad,




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ams, however, writes on January 30, 1831,
"Wirt concurred entirely with me in opinion
that this was a snare deliberately spread by
Crawford to accomplish the utter ruin of Calhoun." The opportunities for these two men
to be well informed were too good not to require that the greatest weight be accorded to
their opinion. Besides, the powder for the
petard was confessedly furnished by Crawford's guilty indiscretion. He divulged the
secrets of certain of the Cabinet meetings of
Monroe's administration, which filled Jackson's
mind with deep hatred and contempt against
Calhoun. If we were writing the biography of
Andrew Jackson, it would be necessary, in this
connection, to review the whole controversy
concerning the general's conduct in the Seminole war. But in a life of Calhoun we can
with propriety dispense with that thankless
task, confining our remarks to a single point in
it, and even that may be treated with great
brevity.
In the course of his operations against the
Seminoles, General Jackson had not only crossed
the Florida boundary, as he was authorized to
do in case the object of the campaign could not
otherwise l;e attained, but he had forcibly taken
possession of the Spanish forts at St. Mark's
and Pensacola. In July, 1818, the question as




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


to whether and how far these high-handed proceedings should be sustained by the administration formed the subject of long and earnest
discussions by Mr. Monroe and his Cabinet.
The general had acted in good faith. A letter
to the President, in which he communicated his
intentions, having accidentally remained unanswered, be mistook the silence for tacit consent,
and afterwards, without regard to dates, even
adduced a subsequent letter of the Secretary of
War to a third person as proof that the government had given him full discretion. This was
by no means the view which Mr. Monroe and
his Cabinet took of the matter. Even Adams,
who went farthest in supporting the general's
course, did not undertake to justify it wholly by
rules of international law, but deemed it necessary to adduce considerations of high policy for
his opinion. Calhoun, as Adams states in his
Diary, "principally bore the argument against
me, insisting that the capture of Pensacola was
not necessary upon principles of self-defence,
and therefore was both an act of war against
Spain and a violation of the Constitution; that
the administration, by approving it, would take
all the blame of it upon themselves; that by
leaving it upon his responsibility they would
take away from Spain all pretext for war and
for resorting to the aid of other European pow



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ers, - they would also be free from all reproach
of having violated the Constitution, - that it
was not the menace of the Governor of Pensacola that had determined Jackson to take that
place; that he had really resolved to take it
before; that he had violated his orders, and
upon his own arbitrary will set all authority at
defiance." He therefore demanded an investigation of the general's conduct; but although
" all the members of the Cabinet, except myself
[Adams] are of opinion that Jackson acted not
only without, but against, his instructions," and
"that he has committed war upon Spain," a
middle course was finally adopted, which, with'out directly and formally disavowing the general, satisfied Spain.
Jackson knew that his conduct had not met
with the approval of the administration, but he
had heretofore believed that the contemplated
proceedings against him had been principally
urged by Crawford, and that, on the other
hand, Calhoun had exerted himself in his defence. Now, however, a letter from Crawford
to Senator Forsyth (April 30, 1830), which had
been written for this purpose, was put into his
hands, and undeceived him on the latter point,
at the same time giving a false and malicious
coloring to the whole transaction. If any member of the administration had been animated




90


JOHN C. CALHOUN


by a really hostile spirit against the general, it
had been Crawford; yet Crawford now pretended that, upon learning all the attending circumstances, he had become satisfied that Jackson was fully excused, if not justified. And
the weight which he thus shook from his own
shoulders he shifted upon the back of Calhoun,
by the bold exaggeration that the latter had
persistently demanded the punishment of the
general.
These revelations threw Jackson into a tow.
ering passion. On May 13 he sent Crawford's
letter with a curt note to Calhoun, demanding
"to learn of you whether it be possible that
the information given is correct."  Calhoun
might have declined to answer the interrogatory, because nobody had a right to demand
from him a confession concerning what had
passed in the Cabinet meetings of the administration, of which he had been a member. He,
however, replied with a long statement and
elaborate argument, which had too much the
character of a justification of his conduct and
of an impeachment of Crawford's behavior and
motives. Though he proved that Jackson could
and ought to have known that the proceedings
in Florida were, at the time, considered by him
(Calhoun) transgressions of the orders issued
from his department, and that he had, without




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any personal hostility, acted according to his
convictions of duty, for which he owed no account to the general either then or now, all such
arguments did not avail him anything, and his
dignity would have been better served by taking higher ground. Most truly did he say, "It
was an affair of mere official duty, involving
no question of private enmity or friendship;"
but that was a view which Andrew Jackson was
absolutely unable to understand. In theory he
may have admitted the possibility of an honest
difference of opinion, but whatever related to
himself he could only see in an eminently personal light; and if any one whom he deemed
his friend had the misfortune and audacity to
differ with him, the brand of Cain was indelibly
stamped on that man's forehead. All Calhoun
got for his pains was violent, impudent, and
absurd abuse, mingled with ludicrous pathos.
He was charged with "secretly endeavoring to
destroy my reputation," while the poor victim
" had too exalted an opinion of your honor and
frankness to believe for one moment that you
could be capable of such deception.... I repeat, I had a right to believe that you were my
sincere friend, and, until now, never expected
to have occasion to say of you, in the language
of Cesar, Et tu, Brute! "
The reproach of a lack of frankness was,




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


however, not quite unfounded, but it was now,
rather than heretofore, that Calhoun was guilty
of it. He declared in his reply of May 29, "I
neither questioned your patriotism nor your motives." Adams's Diary, that invaluable source
of historical information, furnishes the proof
that this was not strictly true. On July 14,
1818, Adams gives it as his impression that
"Calhoun, the Secretary of War, generally of
sound, judicious, and comprehensive mind, seems
in this case to be personally offended with the
idea that Jackson has set at naught the instructions of the department." Again, in a short
synopsis of a conversation between himself and
Calhoun, on March 2, 1831, two weeks after the
publication of the correspondence with Jackson,
Adams writes, -
"He said, too, that his remark in the Cabinet meeting, in reply to my argument that Jackson's taking
the Spanish forts had been defensive, to meet the
threats of Masot, namely, that Jackson had determined to take the province before, was not with allusion to the letter of January 6, 1818,1 but to a rumor
that Jackson had been personally interested in a previous land speculation in Pensacola."
This breach with Jackson was the deathblow to the presidential aspirations of Calhoun.
i Jackson's letter to the President, before alluded to, which
had accidentally remained unanswered.




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Mr. Wirt thought "that he had blasted his
prospects of future advancement forever," and
Adams called him t"a drowning man," at the
same time, however, asserting that he "nevertheless entertains very sanguine hopes." Perhaps this expression was a little too strong, but
at all events Calhoun maintained his candidacy
a while longer, although he not only had to
encounter the enmity of Jackson's partisans,
but could also no longer count upon the support
of New England, which had become ill-disposed
towards him by reason of the political course of
his friends in Congress. It was rumored that
Clay's Western friends were inclined to take
him up, in case they should find the chances
of their own champion desperate, and Calhoun
himself seems to have thought it possible that,
if he should conclude to run against Jackson,
the election might revert once more to the
House of Representatives. But the drift of
public opinion was too strong not to destroy
these illusions very speedily. Calhoun's disappointment was, undoubtedly, very bitter; but
those strangely misjudged the man who attributed to it the terrible energy with which he
henceforth pursued the course upon which he
had entered with the South Carolina Exposition. He was not driven by disappointed ambition into a sectional policy with a view to



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JOHN C. CALHOUN


wards tearing the Union asunder, in order to
become the chief of one half, because he could
not be the chief of the whole. Slavery had
split the Union into two geographical sections,
and, in spite of everything man could do, the
rent widened into a chasm, and the chasm into
an abyss. That was not the work of Calhoun,
but the unavoidable consequence of the fact
that the Union was composed of free and slaveholding States. He could not have done it if
he had wanted to, and he was as far as any man
from wanting to do it. The only effect of the
disappointment of his ambition was the quick
dispersion of the mist which had hitherto been
lying over his eyes as over those of the whole
people. The shackles of minor considerations
and personal interests began to fall from his
limbs. 'Embittered but free, he henceforth pursu0ed his course, forming alliances without heeding the claims of old or new party connections,
and not afraid to encounter the enmity of any
one; never ceasing to love and cherish the
Union, Tiit learning to love slavery better and
better. He was not a demi-god, but a man,
having his full share of human weakness and
littleness. But nature had not only endowed
him with a powerful brain; the marrow of his
bones and the core of his heart were sound.
Not for the world would he have betrayed his




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country, and even slavery could not turn him
into a dark conspirator. Yet it has been pretended that he was guilty of such betrayal and
conspiracy merely in order to see the title President prefixed to his name. Those who, like
Senator Benton, honestly believed this, stumbled into an egregious blunder, because, in spite
of all their keen-sightedness, they remained
blind to the fact that the wedlock between slavery and freedom could not be a lasting one.
What they attributed to the traitorous machinations of his disappointed ambition would have
happened, even though out of every fibre of
John C. Calhoun a Henry Clay, a Daniel Webster, and a Thomas Benton had been made. It
was not a crime, but it was his misfortune, that
he saw everything relating to slavery with such
appalling clearness, discerning, with unerring
eye, the last consequences at the first glance.
As soon as all hope had to be given up that
the protective system could be destroyed with
Jackson's help in the regular parliamentary way,
Calhoun resumed the contest at the point where
he had left it with the South Carolina Exposition.  His second manifesto -" Address to
the People of South Carolina," dated Fort Hill,
July 26, 1831 - was published in the " Pendleton Messenger." The whole question of the
relation which the States and the general gov



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JOHN C. CALHOUN


ernment bear to each other, i. e., of state sovereignty, was reargued. The key-note of his
whole argument and of his whole subsequent
political life is the assertion, " The great disi similarity and, as I must add, as truth compels
me to do, contrariety of interests in our country
*.. are so great that they cannot be subjected
to the unchecked will of a majority of the whole
without defeating the great end of government,
without which it is a curse, —justice." This
is the real broad foundation of his doctrine
that the Union could never have a safe foundation upon any other legal basis save state sovereignty, which enables the minority to defend
themselves against usurpations. No new argument is adduced either on the constitutional or
on the economical question, but the whole reasoning is closer and the language is more direct
and bolder. The Federal government has dwindled down to a mere " agent" of the " sovereign
States," and the veto power of these is termed
" nullification."
Calhoun had, of course, not expected to convince his adversaries. What he wanted was to
mark off the old, widely trodden road with the
utmost precision, so that in future no gap could
be reasoned into it, and to consolidate his own
party, and to inspire it with resolution to live
up to its profession of faith. The apprehen



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sion that this would be done was great enough
to dampen the ardor of the protectionists when
the tariff question came again before Congress.
The duties were considerably reduced, but the
plantation States were not satisfied either with
the amount or with the manner in which the
reduction was effected. South Carolina received the new tariff as a declaration that the
protective system was "the settled policy of
the country," and on August 28, 1832, Calhoun
issued his third manifesto, determined to have
the die cast without further delay. This letter
to Governor Hamilton, of South Carolina, is the
final and classical exposition of the theory of
state sovereignty. Nothing new has ever been
added to it. All the later discussions of it
have but varied the expressions and amplified
the argument on particular points. Thirty
years later the programme laid down in it was
carried out by the South piece by piece, and
the justification of the Southern course was
based, point by point, upon this argument.
The late champion of a national policy and;
of consolidating measures now takes for hisi
starting-point the assertion that, "so far from
the Constitution being the work of the American
people collectively, no such political body, either
now or ever, did exist."  The historical review
by which he tried to prove this assertion con



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JOHN 'C. CALHOUN


tains two seemingly slight, but in fact very
important, errors. The colonies did not "by
name and enumeration " declare themselves free
and independent States, nor is the Constitution
declared "to be binding between the States so
ratifying," but Article VII. of the Constitution
reads, "The ratification of the conventions of
nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying."  From  these historic "facts" he
draws the conclusion "that there is no direct
and immediate connection between the individual
citizens of a State and the general government."
Strange indeed! for the authors and the advocates
of the Constitution thought that the most important change effected in the political structure
of the Union, by substituting the Constitution
for the Articles of Confederation, was exactly
the establishment of direct and immediate connections between the individual citizens and the
Federal government; and not a single day passed
in which a great number of' citizens were not
actually brought into contact with the Federal
government, in the courts, in the custom-houses,
in the departments, etc., without being reminded
in any way whatever that they were citizens of
this or that particular State. If the relation
between the individual citizen and the Federal
government were, in fact, exclusively through the




VICE-PRESIDENT


99


State, then, indeed, it might have been true that
"it belongs to the State as a member of the
Union, in her sovereign capacity in convention,
to determine definitely, as far as her citizens
are concerned, the extent of the obligation which
she has contracted; and if, in her opinion, the
act exercising the power [in dispute] be unconstitutional, to declare it null and void, which
declaration would be obligatory on her citizens."
The Federal government is floating in the air
without a straw of its own to rest upon, the
sport of the sovereign fancies of the States.
"Not a provision can be found in the Constitution authorizing the general government to
exercise any control whatever over a State by
force, by veto, by judicial process, or in any
other form,-a most important omission, designed, and not accidental."  And the actual
state of the case corresponds with the right,
for "it would be impossible for the general
government, within the limits of the States, to
execute, legally, the act nullified, while, on the
other hand, the State would be able to enforce,
legally and peaceably, its declaration of nullification."  Yet nullification is declared to be " the
great conservative principle" of the Union.
Undoubtedly, there is method in this madness,
but madness it is nevertheless; for the whole
theory is neither more nor less than the system



100


JOHN C. CALHOUN


atization of anarchy. The Union is constructed
upon the principle that the essence of the idea
State, the supremacy of the will which has to
act for the whole, -that is, in a free State, the
government of the laws, - is by principle excluded from its structure. If there ever was an
illustration of the " tragedy of Hamlet with the
part of Hamlet left out," here it is. This vast
republic, to which the future belonged more
than to any other state of the globe, was to be
a shooting star, a political monster without a
supreme will, because this could be lodged nowhere with safety. The resort to force - "should
folly or madness ever make the attempt " -
would be utterly vain, if at all possible, for " it
would be... a conflict of moral, not physical,
force." This moral force, however, was also but
a rope of sand, if a sovereign State should so
will it. Even a decision by three fourths of the
States would by no means be unconditionally
binding upon all the members of the Union.
" Should the other members undertake to grant
the power nullified, and should the nature of the
power be such as to defeat the object of the
association or union, at least as far as the member
nullifying is concerned, it would then become an
abuse of power on the part of the principals, and
thus present a case where secession would apply."
The Union was to have laws only so long and just




VICE-PRESIDENT


101


so far as every constituent member of it was
pleased to submit to them. In his great political
testament, the "Disquisition on Government,"
Calhoun directly says, "Nothing short of a
negative, absolute or in effect, on the part of
the government [!] of a State can possibly protect it against the encroachments of the united
government of the States, whenever [!] their
powers come in conflict." And as even this
might prove not to be a sufficient protection,
each State was to have, in the form of the right
of secession, a most absolute veto against all
its co-States.  What a nice checker-board the
United States might become, if the exercise of
this right should get to be the political fashion!
Suppose the States at the mouths of the great
streams, and four or five others commanding a
part of their navigable waters, should secede,
what a pretty picture the map of the United
States would present! Why, the German Bund
of bygone days would have had a most formidable rival. Calhoun himself would have
turned with disgust and contempt from the idea
of thus bridging over the craggy actualities of
life with the cobwebs of an over-subtle logic, if
he had conceived the possibility of his theory
being ever put into practice in this manner. It
seemed to him so plausible only because he was
fully conscious of the fact that, if it were ever




102          JOHN C. CALHOUN
put to the test, the Union would split into two
solid geographical sections. Never would he
have stultified his intellect by this ingenious
systematization of anarchy, if he could not have
written, -
" Who, of any party, with the least pretension to
candor, can deny that on all these points [the great
questions of trade, of taxation, of disbursement and
appropriation, and the nature, character, and power
of the general government] so deeply important, no
two distinct nations can be more opposed than this
[the staple States] and the other sections? "




CHAPTER V


THE SENATE
ON November 24 the South Carolina con.
vention passed the nullification ordinance, which
was to take effect on February 1, 1833. Calhoun at once resigned the vice-presidency, in
order to take the seat in the United States Senate, vacated by General Hayne, who had been
elected Governor of South   Carolina. Hundreds of eyes closely scrutinized the face of the
" great Nullifier " as he took the oath to support the Constitution, but the firm repose of his
countenance dispelled all doubts of his sincerity. His personal courage, however, was seriously questioned by many. Benton and others
assure us that he finally yielded, because he had
been informed that Jackson had threatened to
hang him as high as Haman.    This dramatic
anecdote has been repeated so often that the
mass of the American people have come to believe it as an undoubted historic fact. That
Jackson may have uttered some such threat is
probable enough, but Calhoun never betrayed
such a weakness of nerves as to justify a sus



104


JOHN C. CALHOUN


picion that an empty threat could wipe from his
brains all remembrance of the Constitution.
And an empty threat this most certainly was,
if it was ever made. Jackson was not now
the general commanding in the wilds of Florida,
but President of the United States; and Calhoun was not an Arbuthnot or Ambrister, but
a senator of the United States. The section of
the Constitution, however, has yet to be written
which empowers the President to hang any
man, and especially a United States senator.
The hanging story may have been good enough
at the time for political purposes, but it deserves no place in history. Yet Calhoun knew
well enough that not only he personally, but
also his State, was playing a high game, in which
eventually powder and lead, and perhaps even
the hangman, upon the requisition of the courts
or of a court-martial, might speak the last word.
He therefore did yield, but only because Congress and Jackson - notwithstanding the justly
celebrated " proclamation " - yielded still more.
The explanations with which Calhoun accompanied his affirmative vote on a certain provision
of the tariff bill, after he had declared it unconstitutional, were vain talk; he bent his proud
neck, because Mr. Clayton had left him no alternative except to submit, or to let the whole
compromise fail. On the other hand, however,




THE SENATE


105


the new tariff conceded in the main the demands of South Carolina, and the so-called
Force Bill, which gave the President the means
to subdue by force of arms any resistance to
the laws of the Union, was only passed after
the passage of the tariff bill had been fully secured. Congress, with the reluctant approval
of the President, bought the acquiescence of
South Carolina, and then the daring little State
was told that she would have been crushed had
she persisted in her mad course. A dread —
honorable and patriotic indeed, but on the part
of the Federal government much to be regretted
— of the consequences had forced both parties
from their original standpoint. The principle
was purposely left undecided, and, as to the
immediate practical questions, a compromise
was effected; but if either party had a right to
claim the victory, it was certainly not Jackson
and the majority of Congress, but Calhoun and
South Carolina.
Another, and perhaps the best, proof that apprehensions for his personal safety, on account
of Jackson's reported threats, had nothing to do
with the course pursued by Calhoun, is the calmness with which he reviewed the field after the
contest was over. There was not a single man
in either camp who judged the results of it
more correctly than he. Whenever a suitable




106


JOHN C. CALHOUN


opportunity was offered, he claimed, in a calm
and dignified but very decided manner, that
the overthrow of the protective system was due
to the resistance offered by South Carolina, and
that the conservative and beneficial character
of nullification had been proved by experience.
At the same time, however, he never failed to
acknowledge that the doctrineLf sta te-rglts
had suffered a defeat by the passage of the
Force Bill. He even laid greater stress upon
this'fact, and exaggerated its significance. On
April 9, 1834, he delivered a speech in support
of a bill, which he had introduced, to repeal the
obnoxious act, although by its own limitation
the power conferred by it on the President was
to expire at the termination of this session.
Those who charged him with doing so only
in order to appear consistent greatly deceived
themselves. From the moment that he had assumed the leadership of the states-rights party
the principiis obsta was always present to his
mind, and the unswerving rigor with which he
applied it goes far to explain why he held such
a unique position among the Southern statesmen
in the slavery conflict. " The precedent, unless
the act be expunged from the statute-book, will
live forever, ready, on any pretext of future
danger, to be quoted as an authority to confer
on the chief magistrate similar or even more




THE SENATE


107


dangerous powers, if more dangerous can be devised."  Therefore he declared it "subversive
of our political institutions, and fatal to the liberty and happiness of the country," although,
as to the immediate object for which it purported to be passed, the compromise tariff had
rendered it a piece of waste paper ere it had
been inscribed on the statute-book.  He was
not lulled into the sleep of false security by the
calm after the first blast of the storm. Already in the so-called Edgefield letter of March
27, 1833, declining an invitation to a public
dinner, he had written, "The struggle to preserve the liberty and Constitution of the country, and to arrest the corrupt and dangerous
tendency of the government, so far from being
over, is not more than fairly commenced....
Let us not deceive ourselves by supposing that
the danger is past. We have but checked the
disease. If one evil has been remedied, another
has succeeded."
As he declined all public demonstrations proposed to be given in acknowledgment of the
stand he had taken against the Federal government, because he did not want to carry fuel to
the fire of his calunniators, who attributed his
course solely to impure personal motives, so also
he abstained from currying the favor of his own
party by shouting triumph and flattering them




108


JOHN C. CALHOUN


with paeans.  To sound the tocsin was the ungrateful task of the rest of his life, and the
greater the success of the slave power the harder
he pulled the rope.  In August, 1833, he wrote
to the citizens of Newton County, who had tendered him a public dinner, -
"I utter it under a painful but a solemn conviction
of its truth that we are no longer a free people, - a
people living under a Constitution, as the guardian of
their rights; but under the absolute rule of an unchecked majority, which has usurped the power to do
as it pleases, and to enforce its pleasure at the point
of the bayonet.... This condition we had been long
approaching; and to it we are now absolutely reduced by the proclamation and force act.... So
long, then, as the act of blood stains our statute-book,
and the sovereignty of the States is practically denied
by the government, so long will be the duration of
our political bondage."
This is the ceterum censeo, which recurs in all
his speeches during the next years. In his first
great speech after the nullification session, he
declared, -
" I stand wholly disconnected with the two great
parties now contending for ascendency. My political
connections are with that small and denounced party
which has voluntarily retired from the party strifes
of the day, with a view of saving, if possible, the liberty and the Constitution of the country in this great
crisis of our affairs."




THE SENATE


109


He bad not become a Whig, nor had he ceased
to be a Democrat, but he was one of the most
uncompromising adversaries of Jacksonism. In
all the leading questions of these years, so full
of bitter strife, he stands in the front rank of
the opposition, but he has no more in common
with Clay and 'Webster than before. He and
they fought side by side against a common
enemy, but he did not fight with them for a
common cause.   In their defensive warfare
against the removal of the government deposits
from the United States Bank, these three
occupied the same ground; but when it came
to the question of renewing the charter of the
bank, or to the general problem of the currency,
their ways separated, though they did not diverge so much as one would suppose from Calhoun's subsequent course.
With regard to the bank, he sat as yet, so
to say, on the fence. He did not conceal the
lively distrust and grave apprehensions with
which he viewed the close connection of the government with a privileged moneyed corporation
of such enormous means, but the reasons of
expediency still prevailed over the objections
which would have been decisive with him, if
he had felt free to follow his inclination and
general principles. He himself even reminded
the Senate of the fact that the bank would




110


JOHN C. CALHOUN


probably not have been established, if it had
not been for his exertions.  His argumentation
was as clear and logical as usual, and it led him
to definite practical propositions; and yet his
speeches leave the impression upon the reader's
mind that he himself did not know exactly
what to think and what to will. Like the country, he was in a state of transition with regard
to this perplexing problem, and it is a curious
fact that so early as 1834 he pointed out the
ultimate solution of it; but he did it in such a
way that it would be absurd to claim for him
the honor of the discovery. In his speech of
January 13, on the removal of the deposits, he
said, -
" So long as the question is one between a Bank of
the United States, incorporated by Congress, and that
system of banks which has been created by the will
of the Executive, it is an insult to the understanding
to discourse on the pernicious tendency and unconstitutionality of the Bank of the United States. To
bring up that question fairly and legitimately, you
must go one step farther: you must divorce the government and the banking system. You must refuse
all connection with banks. You must neither receive
nor pay away bank-notes; you must go back to the
old system of the strong-box, and of gold and silver... I repeat, you must divorce the government entirely from the banking system; or, if not, you are




THE SENATE


111


bound to incorporate a bank as the only safe and
efficient means of giving stability and uniformity to
the currency."
Calhoun was not a " statesman " of the type I
which, at this time, began to become only too
common in the United States. He did not owe
his position to the grace of King Caucus and the
favor of his grandees, the washed and unwashed
patriots of the primary meetings. He therefore
did not know and understand everything by
intuition, as this privileged class of mortals do,
but he was obliged to study and reflect upon the
subjects with which he had to deal as a legislator. As a seat in the legislative hall was in
his opinion as well the most responsible as the
most honorable post in which a man can be put
by the confidence of his fellow citizens, he applied himself to this task with all the thoroughgoing earnestness of his nature.  It is therefore
a matter of course that his speeches never
lacked a positive element of more or less, and
not unfrequently of considerable, merit. Yet
ever since the Southern Samson has put his
head into the lap of the Delilah of state sovereignty, his strength is on the wane whenever
he returns to his old place among the builders
of his country's greatness and happiness. Critically to dissect the arguments of others and to
expose the weak points of their devices, to de



112


JOHN C. CALHOUN


nounce their inconsistencies and mercilessly to
lash the moral shortcomings of their policy,
and, above all, to point out the breakers ahead
of the ship of state, -these are the things in
which he excels.
Jackson's administration offered a wide field
for the vigorous application of all these peculiar
qualities, and it was but human that Calhoun
should avail himself the more willingly of the
opportunity on account of his personal relations
with the President. His speeches on the rel moval of the deposits and on Jackson's protest
against the resolution of the Senate, denouncing
it as an unwarrantable assumption of power, exposed the President's high-handed way of dealing with the Constitution and the laws, also the
gross fallacies and inconsistencies of his reasoning, in a truly masterly way, and were not less
admirable defences of the constitutional rights
and privileges of the legislative branch of the
government. He did not spare the President,
but neither his personal grievances nor the intensity of his political anger and disgust carried
him beyond the line which respect for the office
ought to draw whenever the chief magistrate of
the republic is spoken of; and his most vigorous
thrusts were not aimed against the person, but
against the system which had been inaugurated
by Jackson.




THE SENATE


113


If the hig-h-toned moral severity of the abovementioned speeches was seasoned now and then
with cutting irony and haughty defiance, Calboun's remarks on the wholesale dismissal of
Federal office-holders without cause betray patriotic sadness and deep anxiety for the future
of his country. The subject was of too serious
a nature to permit him, to indulge in personal
animosities or party bickerings. The removal
of the deposits, the protest, the whole bank
question, though all of great import, were after
all but questions of the day, which would soon
be dead issues, of no interest to anybody except the student of history. But would not the
very life-blood of the body politic be poisoned
if the government should fall into the hands of
mercenaries, with whom politics constituted only
a trade, to which they devoted themselves for,
the sake of the "spoils " of office?  Was not;
the love of country in danger of being drowned
in the whirlpools of party strife, if the official
spokesmen of the national parties should be
men who owed their position to the dexterity
with which they gathered followers around their
standards by means of the spoils? Would not
the politics of the republic degenerate more and
more from a contest about great public measures,
principles, and ideas, into a mean scuffle about
the husks, if it should become an acknowledged




114


JOHN C. CALHOUN


principle that " to the victor belong the spoils "?
Would not every party be forced to follow suit
if the example should be once successfully set,
- for what party could hope to vanquish with
untrained volunteers the skilled bands of lansquenets fighting for booty? Would not the
management of the public affairs rapidly sink
until it became a byword, if, instead of fitness
for the office, the services rendered to the party,
or rather to the chiefs of the party, should become the criterion for all the appointments, and
if the Federal offices should come to be filled
with those who had not succeeded in private
life; for would not the others at best consider
the Federal offices but momentary make-shifts, if
ability and faithfulness could no longer secure
their tenure? Last, but not least, would not the
people begin to turn with disgust from politics
when they saw the statesmen more and more
ousted by mere bread-and-butter politicians?
And what is the life of a democratic republic
worth if the people accustom themselves to consider politics the monopoly of a set of men whom
they do not respect?
In his speech on the removal of the deposits,
Calhoun had said, with burning indignation:" Can he [Secretary Taney] be ignorant that the
whole power of the government has been perverted
into a great political machine, with a view of cor



THE SENATE


115


rupting and controlling the country? Can he be
ignorant that the avowed and open policy of the
government is to reward political friends and punish
political enemies?... With money we will get partisans, with partisans votes, and with votes money, is
the maxim of our public pilferers.... With money
and corrupt partisans a great effort is now making to
choke and stifle the voice of American liberty through
all its constitutional and legal organs by pensioning
the press; by overawing the other departments; and
finally by setting up a new organ, composed of officeholders and partisans, under the name of a National
Convention, which, counterfeiting the voice of the
people, will, if not resisted, in their name dictate the
succession."
In a speech of February 13, 1835, he summed
up the ultimate results of the spoils system in
the following words -
" When it comes to be once understood that politics are a game; that those who are engaged in it but
act a part; that they make this or that profession not
from honest conviction or an intent to fulfil them, but
as the means of deluding the people, and through
that delusion to acquire power, - when such professions are to be entirely forgotten, the people will lose
all confidence in public men; all will be regarded as
mere jugglers, - the honest and the patriotic as well
as the cunning and the profligate; and the people will
become indifferent and passive to the grossest abuses
of power on the ground that those whom they may




116


JOHN C. CALHOUN


elevate, under whatever pledges, instead of reforming
will but imitate the example of those whom they
have expelled."
Does not this passage read like a cutting from
an editorial of the last number of an " independent " newspaper of the present day, advocating
civil service reform? But though he foresaw
with astonishing perspicacity what this mischievous innovation must inevitably lead to, the
root of the evil and the remedy for it he discovered no more than did any of his contemporaries. The uniform practice of the preceding
administrations concerning dismissal from office
- even Jefferson's hardly forming an exception,
although the loud complaints of the opposition
had not been wholly unfounded - made him
believe that nothing more was needed than to
deprive the President of the power which, as
he contended, had been conferred upon him
under a mistaken construction of the Constitution. He himself, as he openly avowed, had
formerly held the opposite opinion, and the argument with which he supported the assertion
that the power of appointing did not imply that
of dismissing was more ingenious than profound
and sound. But whatever the true answer to
the constitutional question be, the great mistake
lay in the supposition that the evil could be
cured by putting the power of dismissal from




THE SENATE


117


office under the direct control of Congress or the
Senate. Experience has proved that Congress
was more to be feared than the President; for,
in spite of the clear provision of the Constitution, even the power of appointment has in the
main virtually passed from the hands of the
President into those of the members of Congress; and the civil service reformers of our
days usually consider this the worst feature of
the actual system. Calhoun, like the whole
Whig opposition, mistook a mere symptom for
the cause of the disease. Because Jackson's
administration assumed more and more the
character of the reign of an autocrat, they apprehended that the encroachments of the Executive upon the domain of the other departments
of the government, and more especially the
legislative, would continue to undermine the
Constitution until the whole fabric of republican liberty should be in danger of toppling to
the ground. The above-quoted denunciation of
the National Convention, "composed of officeholders and partisans," which was to "dictate
the succession," closed with the following words:
" When the deed shall have been done, the
revolution completed, and all the powers of our
republic, in like manner, consolidated in the
Executive and perpetuated by his dictation."
Calhoun and the Whigs failed to see that, who



118


JOHN C. CALHOUN


soever might become President, it could not
possibly be an Andrew Jackson I. Jackson
might be powerful enough virtually to nominate his successor, but to appoint an heir was
beyond his power. The presidential office was
only the means of exercising this extraordinary
power; but the source of it was the peculiar
disposition of the majority of the people towards
him, and this peculiar disposition was a thing
which he could not bequeath to anybody. Van
Buren knew this so well that in his letter accepting the nomination by the Baltimore Convention he humbly declared, "As well from inclination as from duty, I shall, if honored with
the choice of the American people, endeavor to
tread generally in the footsteps of President
Jackson."  He was Jackson's choice, but the
heirs of the general were the politicians, and
Van Buren would never have occupied the
White House if he had not been one of the
master minds of the politicians. If he had ever
presumed to speak in Jackson's tone and to act
in his autocratic spirit, the "Sage of Kinderhook" would have been considered by his own
party to be out of his senses.
March 4, 1837, did not inaugurate a second
"era of good feeling."  The opposition remained loud and passionate, but the melodies
of their war-songs were changed, or they were




THE SENATE


119


at least sung in another key. To pretend that
Martin Van Buren would " name " his successor,
and that there was still immediate danger of
the liberties of the country being crushed by
the consolidation of all powers in the Executive,
would have been simply ridiculous. The fears
entertained on this head during the administration of Jackson had certainly not been fictitious,
though they had been generally very highly
colored for the sake of effect. The best proof
of fheir serious character was furnished by a
movement for an amendment to the Constitu-I
tion, abolishing the veto power of the President.
Calhoun, however, had not so far lost the sobri-'
ety of his judgment as to approve of this idea. I
He declared the veto "indispensable," because
without it "the independence of the President,"
so far as concerned Congress, would be destroyed.
He shared for the moment the erroneous views
of the Whigs as to the future, but as to the
past, i. e., the origin of the evil, he went farther
back than they. The encroachments of the
Executive upon the legislative and judicial
department of the government were with him
"the second stage of the revolution;" but it
had begun "many years ago, with the commencement of the restrictive system, and terminated its first stage with the passage of the
Force Bill of the last session, which absorbed




120


JOHN C. CALHOUN


all the rights and sovereignty of the States, and
consolidated them in this government." Thus
his argument returned to its starting-point.
The only way to secure " the preservation of
our institutions " was to adopt the doctrine of
state sovereignty with all its consequences; and
the last cause of all the evils complained of, by
which the liberty of the country, and perhaps
even the existence of the republic, were put in
jeopardy, was the violation of this fundamental
principle by the Federal government.
From this time forward, every speech of Calhoun which is not strictly confined to some special subject, contains a repetition of these two
assertions in some form or other, and his inclination is constantly growing to make the range
for his observations, on all subjects whatsoever,
wide enough to permit some remarks on these
topics, or at least a passing allusion to them.
The wiseacres, who laughed all the warnings of
the alarmists to scorn, began to consider him a
kind of monomaniac on this head. Yet it was
they whose minds wandered through the dales
and o'er the hills of cloud-land, while his feet
remained firmly planted on the rock of actualities. Every day the slavery question became
more exclusively the needle which determined
the course of the politics of the country, and if
safety for the interests of the slave-holders




THE SENATE


121


could be obtained at all in the Union, it was
only through the doctrine of state sovereignty.
No one understood so well as Calhoun that the
appearance of the abolitionists had laid the axe
to the root of slavery, though they were but a
handful of men and women, with neither fame,
social position, office, money, nor the general
approbation of the public mind to make them
formidable adversaries; and therefore as yet no
one fully understood how terribly in earnest
he was and how correctly he read the future,
when he declared at every opportunity that the
minority, that is the South, was doomed, if state
sovereignty was not recognized as the central
pillar on which the dome of the Constitution
rested.
In January, 1831, William Lloyd Garrison
had established in Boston " The Liberator," with
the programme of " immediate and unconditional
emancipation," and in December, 1833, the
American Anti-Slavery Society had put forth
its " declaration of principles," declaring against
slavery a war which excluded the possibility
of peace. The slave States were thrown into
a wild excitement by the proceedings of the
enthusiastic little band, and in the North the
mob, very generally countenanced by public
opinion and even by the authorities, had begun
to hunt the agitators down as criminals who,




122         JOHN C. CALHOUN
like Western horse-thieves, were of too dangerous a character to be admitted within the pale
of the law. Some time, however, was yet to
elapse ere the question came directly before
Congress. An occasional remark on "the fanatics and madmen of the North, who are waging
war against the domestic institutions of the
South, under the plea of promoting the general
welfare," is therefore about all we hear from
Calhoun on this subject, during the first years.
But when at last the discussion made its way
into the halls of legislation he at once took part
in it in a manner which proved that for a long
time all his faculties had been concentrated
upon the topic; for he, and he alone, fully mastered it.




CHAPTER VI


SLAVERY
IN the Senate the floodgates of debate were
opened by Calhoun's motion (January 7, 1836)
not to receive two petitions for the abolition of
slavery in the District of Columbia. The war
of words, in which nearly one half of all the
senators took part, lasted until March 11. Even
by his Southern colleagues Calhoun was severely
reproved for opening this box of Pandora. They
accused him of going on a quixotic expedition
in search of abstract political principles, because
he himself declared that the abolitionists could
not possibly " entertain the slightest hope that
Congress would pass a law, at this time, to
abolish slavery in this District,... and that
seriously to attempt it would be fatal to their
cause." Was it not a frivolous playing with
fire and powder to force the discussionof this
question upon Congress, since the material rights
and interests of the South were absolutely secured by the perfect unanimity of Congress,
most energetically backed by public opinion
in all the Northern States?  Would not this




124:


JOHN C. CALHOUN


uncalled-for debate do more to promote the
cause of abolitionism than all the pamphlets
and emissaries of the abolitionists had been
able to do? For whether his constitutional
argument was sound or not, it was an incontestable fact that his motion was considered by
the North a wanton attack upon the right of
petition.
There was undoubtedly a good deal of truth
in all these objections to the course pursued by
Calhoun. Yet the charge was wholly unfounded
that he was endeavoring intentionally to incense the North and the South against each
other, in order to promote the purposes of his
party. He spoke the simple truth when he
asserted, in his speech of  ch 9,1836,1 that,
"however calumniated and slandered," he had
"ever been devotedly attached " to the Union
and the institutions of the country, and that he
was " anxious to perpetuate them to the latest
generation."  He acted under the firm conviction of an imperious duty towards the South
and towards the Union, and his assertion was
but too well founded that these petitions for the
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia
were blows on the wedge, which would ultimately break the Union asunder.
That the attack of the abolition petitions was
not directed against slavery in the States, but




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merely against slavery in the District, was,
though not from the legal point of view, yet as
to the ultimate practical result, matter of absolute indifference. If, as all the petitions asserted, the nature of slavery made its existence
in the District a national disgrace and a national
sin, the same disgrace and the same sin weighed
down every Southern State. Calhoun's assertion, therefore, could not be refuted, that "the
petitions were in themselves a foul slander on
nearly one half of the States of the Union."  If
the national legislature now, in any way, offered
its assistance to brand the peculiar institution
of one half of the constituent members of the
Union, it certainly violated the spirit of the Constitution; for the Constitution, as everybody admitted, not only tacitlecoizedslavers.a
fact which the States exclusively had power to
deal with but moreover served in many essential respects as its direct support and protection.
Calhoun was therefore unquestionably right
when he said that, unless an undoubted provision of the Constitution compelled them to receive such petitions, it was their duty to reject
them at the very threshold; and he proved that
there was no such absolute compulsion by an undoubted constitutional provision. On the other
hand, however, inasmuch as some obligations
were imposed upon the whole Union with re



126


JOHN C. CALHOUN


gard to slavery, the existence of slavery in some,
of the States was actually and legally also a concern of those States in which it did not exist.
And in respect to whatever actually and legally
concerned the people, they had a constitutional
right to demand that their representatives should
listen to their wishes and grievances presented
in the form of petitions. Besidesno ingenuity
could reason out of the Constitution the power of
Congress over slavery in the District/for somewhere the power had to be lodged, and the
legislative power of Congress oy er the District
was expressly declared to be 'exclusive in all
cases whatsoeverZ To lay down the principle
that Congress was in duty bound to shut its
door against all anti-slavery petitions was therefore most certainly an abridgment of the right
of petition. The opponents of Calhoun were,
in fact, no less right than he. Not their arguments, but the facts, and the Constitution,
which had been framed according to the facts,
were at fault. The founders of the republic
had been under the necessity of admitting
slavery into the Constitution, and the inevitable consequence was that conclusions which
were diametrically opposed to each other could
be logically deduced from it by starting the
argument first from the fact that slavery
was an acknowledged and protected institution,




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which, so far as the States were concerned, was
out of the pale of the Federal jurisdiction; and
then from the no less incontestable fact that the
determining principle of the Constitution was
liberty, and that the spirit and the whole life
of the American people fully accorded with they
Constitution in this respect.
The flaw in all the reasoning of Calhoun on
the slavery question was, that he took no account whatever of the latter fact. The logical
consequence of this was that his constitutional
theories were of a nature which rendered the
acquiescence of the North in them an utter impossibility. He never became fully conscious
of this fact, which rendered all his exertions to
obtain absolute safety for slavery in the Union
as vain as the pouring of water into a cask without a bottom. His reasoning on the dangers
which threatened slavery in the actual Union,
under the actual Constitution, was, however,
not in the least affected by it. From the first
he saw them with such an appalling clearness
that his predictions could not but seem hallucinatibns of a diseased mind so long as the people, both at the North and at the South, had
not been taught by bitter experience that the
conflict was irrepressible, because a compromise
between antagonistic principles is ab initio an
impossibility. From the first he saw, predicted,




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


and proved that, unless his constitutional doctrines were accepted, slavery could not be safe
in the Union, and that therefore the slave States
would have to cut the ties which bound them
to the North.
" Our true position [he declared in the abovementioned speech], that which is indispensable to
our defence here, is that Congress has no legitimate
jurisdiction over the subject of slavery either here or
elsewhere. The reception of this petition surrenders
this commanding position; yields the question of jurisdiction, so important to the cause of abolition and
so injurious to us; compels us to sit in silence to witness the assault on our character and institutions, or
to engage in an endless contest in their defence. Such
a contest is beyond mortal endurance. We must in
the end be humbled, degraded, broken down, and
worn out.
" The senators from the slave-holding States, who,
most unfortunately, have committed themselves to
vote for receiving these incendiary petitions, tell us
that whenever the attempt shall be made to abolish
slavery they will join with us to repel it.... But I
announce to them that they are now called on to redeem their pledge. The attempt is Now being made.
The work is going on daily and hourly. The war is
waged not only in the most dangerous manner, but
in the only manner that it can be waged. Do they
expect that the abolitionists will resort to arms, and
commence a crusade to liberate our slaves by force?




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Is this what they mean when they speak of the attempt to abolish slavery? If so, let me tell our
friends of the South who differ from us that tie war
which the abolitionists wage against us is of a very
different character, and far more effective. It is a
war of religious and political fanaticism, mingled, on
the part of the leaders, with ambition and the love
of notoriety, and waged not against our lives, but our
character. The object is to humble and debase us
in our own estimation, and that of the world in general; to blast our reputation, while they overthrow
our domestic institutions. This is the mode in which
they are attempting abolition, with such ample means
and untiring industry; and now is the time for all
who are opposed to them to meet the attack. How
can it be successfully met? 'This is the important
question. There is but one way: we must meet the
enemy on the frontier, - on the question of receiving; we must secure that important pass, -it is our
Thermopylahe The power of resistance, by an universal law of nature, is on the exterior. Break
through the shell, penetrate the crust, and there is
no resistance within. In the present contest, the
question on receiving constitutes our frontier. It is
the first, the exterior question, that covers and protects all others. Let it be penetrated by receiving
this petition, and not a point of resistance can be
found within, as far as this government is concerned.
/If we cannot maintain ourselves there, we cannot on
any interior position.... There is no middle ground
that is tenable"'




130         JOHN C. CALHOUN
Has not the history of the slavery conflict
-fully borne out every one of these assertions?
Calhoun reads the future as if the book of fate
were lying wide open before him/ Only as to
the means by which he proposed to avert the
impending dangers he was as blind as all the
rest of the people. If the enlistment of the
moral and religious sentiment of the world
against slavery was a war, in which the South
must ultimately break down, what was the use
of hermetically closing the Capitol at Washington against all the manifestations of the spirit
of abolitionism? Since when did the civilized
world or even the American people wait for
the gracious permission of Congress, ere they
dared to form their religious opinions or moral
convictions? And if the religious, moral, and
political convictions of Congress and of the
people did not agree, which of the two would
finally have to yield, Congress or the people?
/Even if it had been but a political question,
the attempt would have been simply absurd
to decree it out of existence by a resolution
of the legislature not to listen to what the people had to say about it. But if it was also
a moral and religious question-which most
certainly it was - the attempt was doubly absurd. There is no "frontier" which can be
sucessfully defended against ideas, and no




SLAVERY


131


"shell" is so hard that such ideas cannot penetrate it. The confession that, if the shell were
broken through, there was no resistance within,
amounted therefore to a confession that slavery
would at last succumb, if the slave-holding
States remained in the Union.
From all sides Calhoun was accused of stirring up sectional animosity and strife in a most
unwarrantable manner, by exciting the South
with his wild talk about awful dangers, which
had nowhere any existence except in his own
feverish brain. The truth, however, was that
he did not see spectres in broad daylight, but
that he took too hopeful a view of the future.
What in his opinion was but a dire eventuality,
which could be easily averted, was, by his own
showing, the inevitable end of the slavery conflict. Abolitionism tolled the death-bell of sla-j
very in the Union, and dearly have the American people had to pay for it, that they ever
doubted Calhoun's declaration that, whenever
the slave-holding States had to choose between
the Union and slavery, they would not hesitate
for a moment to decide in favor of slavery.
" We love and cherish the Union; we remember
with the kindest feelings our common origin, with
pride our common achievements, and fondly anticipate the common greatness and glory that seem to
await us: but origin, achievements, and anticipation




132


JOHN C. CALHOUN


of common greatness are to us as nothing, compared with this question. It is to us a vital question. It involves not only our liberty, but, what is
greater (if to freemen anything can be), existence
itself. The relation which now exists between the
two races in the slave-holding States has existed for
two centuries. It has grown with our growth, and
strengthened with our strength. It has entered into
and modified all our institutions, civil and political.
None other can be substituted. We will not, cannot,
permit it to be destroyed.... Come what will,
should it cost every drop of blood and every cent of
property, we must defend ourselves; and if compelled,
we would stand justified by all laws, human and divine;... we would act under an imperious necessity. "There would be to us but one alternative, - to
triumph or perish as a people.... I ask neither sympathy nor compassion for the slave-holding States.
We can take care of ourselves. It is not we, but the
Union, which is in danger.... We cannot remain
here in an endless struggle in defence of our character, our property and institutions."
Calhoun spoke to deaf ears. The petition
was received, but the prayer of the petitioners
was rejected by an overwhelming majority after
a short and unimportant debate, in which the
South was repeatedly and emphatically assured
that thus a precedent was to be established for
the rejection of all similar petitions, without
any discussion, directly after their reception.




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James Buchanan was the father of the great
device of thus, with an obliging compliment to
both sides, slipping through between the hammer and the anvil. It was a new trial of the old
art of cloaking by empty formulas the contradiction of principles and the collision of facts. The
petitioners did not see any material difference
between a refusal to receive and a rejection on
principle without any discussion; and the principle, on the unconditional maintenance of which
alone, in Calhoun's opinion, the safety of slavery depended, was surrendered. Ill-will against
the South had nothing whatever to do with
that. Though slavery was not liked in the
Northern States, they were as yet but too willing to satisfy the demands of the South. They
shunned the agitation of the slavery question
more than did the South, and they were most
willing to suppress abolitionism. The trouble
only was that there was no way of doing it.
It is hardly to be supposed that the more intelligent and educated Southerners can have
deemed it possible for the North to adopt the
means which the Southern radicals proposed,
with insulting imperiousness; and yet there was
a goodly number of Northern politicians who
readily consented to decree even the impossible.
President Jackson's message of December 2,
1835, had invited Congress to pass a law pro.




134


JOHN C. CALHOUN


hibiting, "under severe penalties, the circula.
tion in the Southern States, through the mail,
of incendiary publications intended to instigate
slaves to insurrection." In point of fact, no
such publication had ever been issued by any
American press; but what the President really
wanted was, of course, clear enough: the mails
should be closed to all publications tainted with
the spirit of abolitionism. On Calhoun's motion, this part of the message was referred to a
special committee, which, on February 4, 1836,
introduced a bill, accompanie   f  a repot.
Calhoun, who was the author of the bill and of
C   the report, defended them on April 12. 1836
in one of the most remarkable speeches ever
delivered either by him or by anybody else in
Congress. The recommendation of the President was rejected, because a law "discriminating, in reference to character, what publications shall not be transmitted by the mail,"
would be an abridgment of the liberty of the
press. Moreover, and above all, the principle
upon which such a law would have rested delivered the South, bound hand and foot, to the
discretion of the Federal government. If Congress had the right to determine what publications were incendiary and to forbid their transmission through the mail, it evidently had also
the right to decide what publications were not




SLAVERY


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incendiary and to enforce their transmission
through the mail. Both objections were unquestionably well founded, and an unsophisticated mind would have naturally expected to
see the conclusion drawn from them that the
publications of the abolitionists could not be
legally excluded from the mail. The bill, however, prohibited "deputy-postmasters from receiving and transmitting through the mail, to
any State, Territory, or District, certain papers
therein mentioned, the circulation of which is
prohibited by the laws of said State, Territory, or District." Calhoun, in fact, demanded
at least as emphatically as Jackson the exclusion of abolition publications from the mail, and
even the means by which he proposed to attain
his end were virtually the same, though they
appeared under a different nomenclature. The
only real difference between the President and
the senator was the constitutional doctrine on
which they based their respective demands; but
that was indeed a difference of the last importance. Jackson's idea was simply that, as slavery was an institution recognized by the Constitution, the Federal government could not
allow itself to be used for undermining it, but
was obliged to protect it against attacks which
were not only "unconstitutional," but "repugnant to the principles of our national compact




136


JOHN C. CALHOUN


and to the dictates of humanity and religion."
Calhoun, on the other hand, took exactly the
opposite view. According to him, the Federal
government had no right to meddle in any way
whatever with this question; all it could do,
and what at the same time was bound to do, was
to enjoin upon its officers to conform themselves
strictly to the laws of the State in which they
happened to be employed.
"The internal peace and security of the States
are under the protection of the States themselves, to
the entire exclusion of all authority and control on
the part of Congress. It belongs to them, and not
to Congress, to determine what is or is not calculated
to disturb their peace and security.... In the
execution of the measures which may be adopted by
the States for this purpose [to prohibit the circulation
of any publication or any intercourse calculated to
disturb or destroy the relation between master and
slave], the powers of Congress over the mail, and of
regulating commerce with foreign nations and between
the States, may require cooperation on the part of the
general government; and it is bound, in conformity
with the principle established, to respect the laws of
the State in their exercise, and so to modify its acts
as not only not to violate those of the States, but, as
far as practicable, to cooperate in their execution."
Calhoun's bill, therefore, provided that postmasters who "knowingly" transmitted or delivered any "paper" treating of slavery in a




SLAVERY


137


way contrary to the laws of the State should
be punished by fine and imprisonment. Which
clause of the Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to enact national laws for furthering the execution of the state laws, this
strictest of the strict constructionists forgot to
tell. Like a noble steed on the race-course he
did not look to the right nor to the left, his
course leading in a straight line to the goal. If
he had but once cast a passing glance on either
side, he could hardly have helped being himself
amused at the strange consequences of his theory, if nature had not denied him all sense of
humor so far as politics were concerned. The
laws of the States on the incriminated publications might be as different as the glass splinters
and the little pebbles in a kaleidoscope vary in
shape and color. The Federal law, therefore,
would enjoin upon the postmasters to obey and
execute some dozen different and perhaps even
contradictory laws relating to the same subject,
-a law which would at all events have the
merit of novelty in the history of legislation.
A postmaster in Massachusetts imprisoned for
omitting to do a certain thing, and a postmaster in South Carolina imprisoned for doing this
very thing, both punished in pursuance of th6
same Federal law, - these two gentlemen, if no
one else, would certainly not be convinced of
the soundness of Calhoun's theory.
41




138


JOHN C. CALHOUN


The United States statutes were not disfigured by such a monstrous law. The blot is
sufficiently ugly that it received in the Senate
nineteen votes, four of which were cast by Northern senators. Calhoun himself had probably not
expected a more favorable result, for even of the
four Southern members of the committee only
Mangum, of North Carolina, besides himself,
had given the report and the bill an unqualified
approval. The whole speech of April 12, 1836,
gives the impression that its real purpose was
not so much to convince the Senate of the necessity or propriety of passing this particular bill
as to get the argument before the country as a
new manifesto, or rather pronunciamento, of the
slave power. At all events, it is only from this
point of view that it is of great importance.
Calhoun had taken a great step beyond the
standpoint which he had occupied during the
nullification controversy.  Then he had said
that the Federal government and the States
were parties to a compact having no common
judge, and therefore each was entitled to decide
for itself as to the extent of its obligations
under the compact, as to the violations of the
same by the other party, and as to the means
and the measure of the remedy. Only at this
subsequent stage, and in evident contradiction
of the alleged " party " relation, was the national




SLAVERY


139


government made to assume the position of an
" agent" of the States. Now we hear nothing
more of a compact; the Federal government
stands no more on an equal footing with the
States; it appears only in the character of their
agent, and a most humble, nay, a pitiful and
despicable agent it is, for it is bound to do the
bidding of every one of its constituent members,
no matter how contradictory, how absurd, how
outrageous their behests may be. Yet Calhoun
has not changed his general constitutional theory
concerning the relation between the Federal
government and the States. It appears in a
modified light only because he does not confine
his reasoning to the constitutional question.
The history of the slavery question has forced
him boldly to step beyond it? and plant his foot
on the higher and firmer ground of the unalterable facts. He holds fast to the Constitution,
for he shares the almost idolatrous veneration of
the whole people for it; he knows how to find
in it what he needs, and he is fully conscious that
he would be a general without a single soldier
in his army from the moment when his theories
and his practical demands should avowedly
come into conflict with its provisions. But the
leading idea of his whole argument is the too
well-founded conviction that, whether in conformity with the Constitution or not, the issua:




140


JOHN C. CALHOUN


would be decided according to the facts. Slavery is, in his opinion, not only a fact, but an
immutable fact, because it is the direct outgrowth of the natural relation between the white
and the black races.
/   " To destroy the existing relations would be to destroy this prosperity [of the Southern States], and to
place the two races in a state of conflict, which must
end in the expulsion or extirpation of one or the
other. No other can be substituted compatible with
their peace or security. The difficulty is in the diversity of the races. So strongly drawn is the line
between the two in consequence, and so strengthened
by the force of habit and education, that it is impossible for them to exist together in the community, where
their numbers are so nearly equal as in the slave-holding States, under any-other relation than tat which
now exists. Social and political equality between
them is impossible. No power on earth can overcome
the difficulty. The causes lie too deep in the principles of our nature to be surmounted. But, without
such equality, to change the present condition of the
African race, were it possible, would be but to change
the form of slavery."
When the Republicans, many years later,
made the political and social equality of the
freedmen one of the principal planks of their
party platform, they never, to the knowledge
of the author, quoted this declaration of Cal



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houn, though a higher authority than the foremost representative of the slave-holders could, of
course, not be adduced for the necessity of such
a radical change in the relation of the two races.
This is the best proof that, although, or perhaps
precisely because, Calhoun was the fanatical
champion of the ideas of the Middle Ages with
regard to slavery, he was so far in advance of
his times with regard to the slavery question,
that his prophetic warnings could not possibly
be of any use to the country. They were always
attentively listened to, here with patriotic anger,
there with scorn and disdain, and by some with
an involuntary shudder; but nobody really
brought them home to his understanding, and
therefore they were too soon forgotten, to be
transmitted as a portentous bequest to the generation which was to work out their fulfilment
in wading through an ocean of blood. Many
suspected him of treason, while he performed
only with a sorrowing heart the office of a Cassandra; they accused him of planning the destruction of the Union, while he heaped one irrefutable argument upon another, proving the
impossibility of the maintenance of slavery in
the Union; and when the very "dough-faces"
began to see that their clamoring for peace was
as the whistling of a boy against the storm, they
charged him with being the principal author of




142


JOHN C. CALHOUN


the catastrophe, because he had foretold it.
His claim to a place among the first men who
have acted a part on the political stage of the
United States has never been contested, and yet
he has been handed down to posterity a mere
distorted shadow of the real man, because his
incessant cries of "Beware!" and ";Woe to
you!" remained fresh in the memory of the
people, while the reasoning of which these warnings had been but the last conclusion was forgotten or misconstrued. Yet in spite of all this,
he and those to whom his memory has been
dear have had no right to complain, because,
though he was no traitor, but honestly and earnestly wished to see the Union preserved, still
the Union and all that made it valuable and
dear to him were " as nothing " to him compared
with slavery.
This being the case in the fullest sense of the
term, and slavery being an immutable fact, the
word " compromise " is not to be found in his
political vocabulary with regard to the slavery
question. In a second speech on abolition petitions (February 6, 1837), be declares, " I hold
concession or compromise to be fatal. If we
L-e    concede an inch, concession would follow concession, compromise would follow compromise, until
our ranks would be so broken that effectual
resistance would be impossible." So as every




SLAVERY                143
agitation of the slavery question in a hostile
spirit eo ipso touches the vitals of the " peculiar
institution," it must be suppressed, if the Union
is to be preserved. In the discussion of the
abolition petitions, his love of the Union had betrayed this slave of his own implacable logic
into the gross mistake of regarding the exclusion of the slavery question from the halls
of Congress as substantially identical with a
total and permanent extinction of its agitation
everywhere and in every form/ He clung to
this fallacy, because to renounce it was to acknowledge that, if the rest of his argumentation
was correct, his attempts to save slavery and
the Union were ab initio absolutely idle. Now,
however, he did not recur to this point, but
drew directly from his premises the conclusion
that the Federal government was bound to effect the suppression of the agitation without
meddling in any way whatever with the "peculiar institution;" that is, that within the
sphere of its legitimate action, and to the fullest extent of its constitutional powers, it was
bound to do what the States demanded. No
justification for refusing to do so did or ever
could exist. Even the exercise of an unquestioned constitutional power was no valid excuse.
The discretion of Congress had its limit in the
notion of every single State as to what its indi



144


JOHN C. CALHOUN


vidual security demanded.     A   constitutional
Federal law would instantly lose its validity and
constitutionality, if a State should see fit, under
the plea of securing its peace, to pass a conflicting law: -
"The low must yield to the high; the convenient
to the necessary; mere accommodation to safety and
security. This is the universal principle which governs in all analogous cases, both in our social and political relations. Whenever the means of enjoying or
securing rights come into conflict,- rights themselves
never can, - this universal and fundamental principle
is the one which, by consent of mankind, governs in
all such cases. Apply it to the case under consideration, and need I ask which ought to yield? Will
any rational being say that the laws of eleven States
of the Union which are necessary to their peace, security, and very existence ought to yield to the laws
of the general government regulating the post-office,
which at the best is a mere accommodation and convenience, - and this when the government was formed
by the States, mainly with a view to secure more perfectly their peace and safety? But one answer can
be given. All must feel that it would be improper
for the laws of the States, in such case, to yield to
those of the general government, and of course that
the latter ought to yield to the former. When I say
ought, I do not mean on the principle of concession.
I take higher ground: I mean under the obligation of
the Constitution itself."
/




SLAVERY


145


This obligation he found in the clause which
empowers Congress "to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution " the powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States,
whence he drew the seemingly so simple and
unanswerable conclusion that no law, relating
to a mere accommodation and convenience, could
be proper, if it endangered the peace, security,
and very existence of any one of the States.
Each State being the exclusive judge of what its
peace and security demanded, the direct consequence was that each State had to decide upon
the necessity and propriety of the Federal laws.
Thus the final result of Calhoun's reasoning is
again a systematization of anarchy, but it is an
anarchy of a higher order than that which he had
arrived at in the tariff controversy. Then he
had claimed for each State the right to nullify,
so far as itself was concerned, a Federal law
which it deemed unconstitutional, and now he
attributed to each State the right to invalidate
a constitutional Federal law, and to render it
unconstitutional by passing a conflicting law.
Whether the law was to be invalidated only as
to the particular State, or for the whole Union,
we are not told. According to the theory, it
ought to have been the former; but then the
old difficulty arose, that there was a Federal law




146


JOHN C. CALHOUN


which was a law but for a part of the Union,
while, if it was invalidated for the whole Union,
twenty-three sovereign States, which took no
exception to what their senators and representatives in Congress had seen fit to do, had to
submit to the will of one sovereign State.
We are not informed which horn of the dilemma Calhoun preferred; but in either case
the absurdity was so glaring that he again could
not have failed to see it, if, in the particular
matter on which he reasoned, there had not
been a solidarity of interests of all the slaveholding States. This is the more evident as,
throughout the report and the speech, each State
and the slave-holding States are interchangeably
used as equivalent terms with regard to the
question in hand. The constitutional question
is argued in such a manner that the right and
the power claimed belong to each State individually; and whenever he came to speak of the
facts, that is to say, whenever he applied the
theory to the legislative problem before the
Senate, he said the South, the eleven slave-holding States, etc. In the report, too, as well as in
the speech, the consideration of the fact predominates in a very remarkable degree over the
constitutional argument:" He must be blind, indeed, who does not perceive
that the subversion of a relation which must be folb




SLAVERY


147


lowed with such disastrous consequences can only be
effected by convulsions that would devastate the country, burst asunder the bonds of the Union, and engulf,
in a sea of blood, the institutions of the country. It
is madness to suppose that the slave-holding States
would quietly submit to be sacrificed. Every consideration - interest, duty, and humanity, the love of
country, the sense of wrong, hatred of oppressors, and
treacherous and faithless confederates, and, finally,
despair - would impel them to the most daring and
desperate resistance in defence of property, family,
country, liberty, and existence."
Yes, it is madness to suppose that the slaveholding States would quietly submit to be sacrificed, - that is the pivot on which the report,
the speech, and the bill turn, and not on any
clause of the Constitution. If " existence " was
at stake and " despair" sat at the council-table,
then, indeed, it was a matter of course that not
only the Union, but also the whole Constitution,
was "as nothing." Therefore, also, the speech
did not conclude with a maxim or rule of constitutional law, but with the announcement of a
fact:" I must tell the Senate, be your decision what it
may, the South will never abandon the principles of
this bill. If you refuse cooperation with our laws
and conflict should ensue between yours and ours, the
Southern States will never yield to the superiority of




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yours.... Let it be fixed, let it be riveted, in every
Southern mind that the laws of the slave-holding
States for the protection of their domestic institutions
are paramount to the laws of the general government
in regulations of commerce and the mail; that the
latter must yield to the former in the event of conflict."
f    In the opinion of those who neither saw nor
thought beyond the immediate future, this announcement proved to be less than an empty
threat. Not only was Calhoun's bill rejected,
but in the same year another bill was passed
by both Houses of Congress, and approved by
the President, prohibiting postmasters, under
severe penalty, from " unlawfully" detaining in
their offices " any letter, package, pamphlet, or
newspaper with intent to prevent the arrival
and delivery of the same." Nowhere was the
nullification of this law spoken of, and never
again was an attempt made by Federal legislation thus indirectly to abridge the liberty of the
press. Yet Calhoun was right in the most essential point.- The South never did abandon
the principle of this bill; that is to say, the
principle that slavery had to be protected and
defended at all hazards, - with and under the
Constitution, if possible, but protected and defended it must and should be, under all circumstances and by any necessary means. Calhoun




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knew that well enough, and he therefore did
not wear the dismayed mien of a defeated man.
With the same tone of deep, immutable conviction he repeated at every opportunity the
declaration that the South would never yield
in the slavery question, because it could not do
it. He did not live to see the day when this
declaration was put to its final test; but the delay was so long only because, through all these
gloomy years, the resistance of the North invariably broke down before the attacks of the
solid phalanx of the slave power. Calhoun had
been defeated in the question of vthe abolition
petitions and in that of the incendiary publications, because the South had not come up to the
mark; but the inglorious victories of the North
augured nothing but ignominious defeats for
the future, while Calhoun could anticipate brilliant - but alas, how terribly disastrous - victories, for he was sure that the South would
steadily advance towards the mark which he had
drawn for it. Therefore it would have been a
most egregious mistake to judge the situation by
the immediate result of his movement in those
two questions. The defeated " doctrinaire "
was not " shelved; " on the contrary, his influence
was on the increase, though he dared once more
to throw the gauntlet into the face of public
opinion.




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Nearly a year passed ere Calhoun addressed
the Senate again on the slavery question. The
old economical questions pushed themselves
once more into the foreground. In spite of the
compromise tariff, the revenues of the government increased at such a rate that the apprehension arose anew of seeing a vast surplus
accumulate. The various propositions for averting that "calamity" or employing the superfluous money do not concern us here. It need
only be mentioned that Calhoun considered it
a serious danger, and as, in his opinion, the accumulation of the surplus could not be prevented, he earnestly advocated that it should
be " deposited " in the treasuries of the States,
according to their Federal representation.
It is a very curious and even important fact,
which, so far as our knowledge goes, has thus
far been entirely overlooked, that Calhoun, besides his general reasons, had a special purpose
in proposing such a disposal of the surplus revenue. In a letter to some citizens of Athens,
Georgia (August 5, 1836), he writes: -
" Instead of being cut off from the vast commerce
of the West, as had been supposed, we find, to our
surprise, that it is in our power, with proper exertions,
to turn its copious stream to our own ports. Just at
this important moment, when this new and brilliant
prospect is unfolding to our view, the Deposit Bill is




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about to place under the control of the States interested ample means of accomplishing, on the most
extended and durable scale, a system of railroad communication that, if effected, must change the social,
political, and commercial relations of the whole country vastly to our benefit, but without injuring other
sections."
The Federal government dares not do indirectly what it has no right to do directly - how
often had he declared this to be a fundamental
principle of constitutional law! And yet what
was this proposed distribution if not "internal
improvements" by indirection? True enough,
not internal improvements which Congress
deemed of national importance, but under the
exclusive control of the separate States, and intended, in the first place, to serve state interests.
But it is not because the consistency of Calhoun
might be called into question that this idea
deserves more attention than it has hitherto
received from historians. The arch-doctrinaire
was one of the first in the South to see that
with the railroads a force had been introduced
which was to exert a most powerful influence in
shaping the destinies of the country, not only in
general, but also with regard to the relation of
the two geographical sections lying respectively
north and south of Mason and Dixon's line.
He himself proposed a certain route through




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the Alleghanies, spending eight days on his
exploring expedition, and walking over a considerable part of the ground.  The interest
which he manifested in this problem was so
great that the Southern papers spoke of him as
the fittest man to be made the president of the
great Southern and Western Railroad Company.
He was fully awake to the importance of the
fact that the difference in the wealth of the two
sections increased every year in favor of the
North; and he saw that, as the general economical development would go on at an unparalleled
rate in consequence of communication by steam,
this difference would necessarily increase at the
same ratio if the South should lag behind the
North in realizing the possibilities created by
the new invention.  Yet his last conclusion
could not have been more wrong, if every one
of his premises had been erroneous. Not Congress and its tariff laws, as he supposed, but
slavery was the cause of the remarkable phenomenon which justly rendered him so uneasy;
and therefore the new invention, which was a
blessing to all mankind, was sure to prove a
curse to the slave-holders.  As early as 1817
a representative of Louisiana had declared in
Congress, " We need no roads;" and a country
which needs no roads cannot have railroads.
The will of the South was as nothing in this




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question. The principal cities might indeed be
connected by rail, and it was done in the course
of time; but there were, so to speak, no brooks
and rivers to feed the main streams, and, whatever the South might do, it could not create
them. The idea of Calhoun, to make up for
lost time and overtake the North by means of
railroads, was a more preposterous delusion than
any he had indulged in heretofore. No power
on earth could spur the South into a livelier
pace, because it is the very nature of the "peculiar institution" to move in a jog trot. The
railroads only served to put this fact into a more
glaring light; while in the North they accelerated the economical development more than the
wildest imagination could have anticipated at
that time.
It was neither all nor the worst that Calhoun's hopes were to be wholly disappointed,
and that a new impetus was to be given in the
direction in which the economical development
of the country had been moving ever since the
adoption of the Constitution. He was undoubtedly right in doing his best for an extensive
railroad system, for the less the South kept up
in this respect with the North the more unfavorably would it compare in every respect with
the non-slave-holding States. But every spike
which fastened a rail in Southern soil was a




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nail driven into the coffin of slavery; for every
engine, nay, every traveller and every bale of
goods, came impregnated with the spirit of the
times, which would not and could not brook
slavery. The South had no choice; Calhoun
was right in believing that self-preservation
bade the South to grasp even more eagerly than
the North at the cup which was to mankind
what the alchemists had vainly tried to find
for the individual, — an elixir of life; but slavery turned it into poison. The irrepressible
conflict between North and South was to end
with the disruption of the Union; but another
and more intense irrepressible conflict gnawed
the intestines of the South, and it was this
that rendered the doom of slavery inevitable.
Whatever the merits or demerits of the deposit
scheme were from a general point of view, if
the Southern States should invest their share in
railroads, it would certainly have been the best
use they could make of the money, and yet it
would have been better for them to throw all
the surplus into the sea.
The adoption of Calhoun's device led to one
of the most curious episodes in the financial
history of the United States, which abounds
with strange incidents. But whatever may be
thought of the remedy, it will not be denied that
Calhoun was right in asserting that the govern



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ment ought not to take more out of the pockets
of the citizens than it really needed for its
legitimate purposes, and that a chronically plethoric treasury might have grave consequences.
Calhoun chiefly apprehended that such a constantly overflowing purse would be a powerful
means to corrupt the whole government machinery still more than heretofore, by leading to a
further increase of the vast patronage of the
Federal government, and by enlisting all the
Federal officers still more exclusively in the
party service, and that the independence and
sovereignty of the States would thereby be still
more endangered.
It had evidently become with him a matter
of course that every legislative problem of a
general character must, in some way or other,
stand in close connection with these two questions. The alarming increase of the revenues
was partly due to the enormous sales of the
public lands, which were, to a great extent,
bought on speculation. Here was certainly a
problem of the first magnitude and beset with
extraordinary difficulties; but it is, to say the
least, rather surprising to see the greatest stress
laid on the dangers which were to arise in those
two respects from this source. This is not the
place to discuss the great land question, and
we will therefore not inquire into the merits or




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


demerits of Calhoun's general opinions concerning it. The reason for his proposition (February, 1837) to cede the public lands to the new
States, namely, "to place the senators and representatives from the new States on an equality
with those from the old, by withdrawing our
local control, and breaking the vassalage under
which they are now placed," would, however,
hardly admit of a serious criticism.
A less far-fetched opportunity was offered
him to discuss state sovereignty, from a new
point of view and in a thorough manner, in the
debate on the question of admitting Michigan
as a State? Congress had made the admission
dependent upon the condition that Michigan
should agree to a certain boundary line. This
agreement had been made, but opinions differed
as to whether it had been made in a legal or
illegal manners As to the concrete question, it
suffices to say that Calhoun was of the latter
opinion. We have to look somewhat more
closely only at the general theory, which he
proclaimed on this occasion.
Calhoun asserted that the condition concerning the boundary attached " simply to her admission into the Union," and did not affect in
the least either the acceptance of her constitution by Congress or '" the declaration that she
is a State." There was no difference of opinion




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as to the first part of the assertion, but it was
contended on the other side that Michigan was
not and could not be a State before her admission into the Union. Calhoun proved that this
assertion was incompatible with the act of Congress imposing the boundary condition.    That,
however, could not be decisive as to the main
question. Contests upon great constitutional
principles cannot be decided by appealing to
the wording of a statute, because this might be
grossly inaccurate and careless; besides, the
Constitution would then be but a piece of wax
in the hands of Congress, for Congress might at
first pass a law to suit itself, and then declare
the correct reading of the Constitution to be
thus and thus, since this law says so and so.
But Calhoun did not rest his case solely upon
this act of Congress. He said: -
" I now go farther, and assert that it [the position
of the friends of the bill before the Senate] is in direct opposition to plain and unquestionable matter of
fact. There is no fact more certain than that Michigan is a State. She is in full exercise of sovereign
authority, with a legislature and a chief magistrate.
She passes laws; she executes them; she regulates
titles, and even takes away life, - all on her own
authority. Ours has entirely ceased over her; and
yet there are those who can deny, with all these facts
before them, that she is a State. They might as well
deny the existence of this hall! "




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


If Calhoun had been able under any circumstances to consider a question of this nature with
a judicial mind, instead of entering upon its
examination with the foregone conclusions of a
passionate partisan, he would have perceived at
the first glance that the case was far from being so plain as he made it out. Michigan was
unquestionably no longer a Territory, and she
did - and she did of right - all that he had
mentioned. The most appropriate - or it is
perhaps more correct to say the least inappropriate -name to be found in the insufficient nomenclature of political science for the commonwealth, therefore, was possibly a " State." That,
however, was of very little consequence with
regard to the point made by Calhoun. Everything depended upon the answer to the question what kind of a State it was, or, in other
words, what the term " State " signified in this
particular case. That Michigan was not at this
moment a State in the most general acceptation
of the term, even Calhoun would hardly have
ventured to deny. Would he have dared to assert that, while the question of her admission
into the Union was pending, she would have the
right to declare war against some other sovereign power, to conclude treaties, to coin money,
to grant letters of marque and reprisal, etc.?
Undeniably she lacked many of the most essen



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tial powers inherent to sovereignty, and, in
consequence, she evidently was not a State as
that phrase is most frequently used. Just as
evidently she was not a State of the Union
in the sense of the Constitution, for the question under consideration was her admission into
the Union. Yet no one pretended that she was
out of the Union. Whatever her legal relation towards the Federal government might be,
she certainly was a part of the great commonwealth known by the name of the United States
of America. Calhoun could the less contest
this fact, because another proof which he adduced for his assertion was that Michigan had
elected senators, and, according to the Constitution, only States elect senators. This argument clearly went too far the other way. In
correct language, Michigan had not elected
senators of the United States, but she had
elected two men, who were to be her senators
in Congress after she had been admitted into
the Union. Also, since Michigan was a part
of the republic, the authority of Congress over
her had incontestably not " entirely ceased,"
for there is and can be no part of the republic
over which Congress has not some authority.
Whether this authority went so far as to give
Congress the right to remand Michigan into
her former territorial status, if she refused to




160


JOHN C. CALHOUN


comply with the conditions imposed upon her
admission into the Union, need not here be
inquired into. Calhoun's argument is like a
sword without a blade, if it be proved that Michigan was but a State in an inchoate condition,
which could be perfected only by the act of
Congress admitting her into the Union.
Calhoun did, of course, not contest that an
act of Congress was needed to make Michigan
a State of the Union, but he did not assent any
further to the proposition just stated.
"I am told, if this be so, if a Territory must become a State before it can be admitted, it would follow that she might refuse to enter the Union after
she had acquired the right of acting for herself. Certainly she may. A State cannot be forced into the
Union. She must come in by her own free assent,
given in her highest sovereign capacity through a
convention of the people of the State. Such is the
constitutional provision; and those who make the
objection must overlook both the Constitution and the
elementary principles of our government, of which
the right of self-government is the first, - the right of
every people to form their own government, and to
determine their political condition."
The right here claimed is not the right of secession. If secession, not as an eventually justifiable revolutionary act, but as a constitutional
right, is a monstrous political absurdity, this




SLAVERY


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right thus asserted concerning Michigan is an
absurdity in comparison with which the right
of secession is the soundest political conception,
and even, like nullification, " a conservative
principle." Calhoun now and afterwards maintained that a so-called enabling act of Congress
was required to give a Territory the right to
erect itself into a State. But if any political
proposition can be called self-evident, it is certainly this: that an enabling act can only give
permission to a Territory to erect itself into
a State of the Union. Even if Congress could
ever be so regardless of duty, and so mad as to
give a Territory permission simultaneously with
adopting a state constitution to will itself out
of the Union, in which clause of the Constitution did this strict constructionist find the
power granted to Congress to commit such a
suicidal act? The Constitution, which Calhoun
proclaimed the grandest embodiment of political
wisdom thus far seen by the world, would have
been the greatest monstrosity ever conceived
by the human mind, if the Union could constitutionally lose all its territorial possessions,
merely because the inhabitants of the Territories
were pleased to bow themselves out of it, by
way of acknowledging the privilege accorded
them to become full members of the Union.
That " so long as these sound principles are ob



162


JOHN C. CALHOUN


served" no State would ever "reject this high
privilege," or would " ever refuse to enter this
Union," but rather would "rush into your embrace, so long as your institutions are worth
preserving," was an assertion of no consequence
whatever. The possibility stamps the theory
as such an infinite absurdity that it would be
an insult to the reader to discuss it at all, if
John C. Calhoun had not been its advocate.
But one month later he very correctly spoke
of " the public domain " as being " the property
of the whole people of the United States." So
an insignificant minority —the inhabitants of
the Territories - had the right to deprive the
whole people of this inestimable property, and
appropriate it exclusively to themselves, and,
with the indirect sanction of Congress, given
by the permission to adopt state constitutions,
set up in business for themselves, without perhaps even deigning to say good-by to this.
Union, which improved so wonderfully upon
the example of King Lear. But enough, and
more than enough, of this doctrine, which every
schoolboy will pronounce to be utter nonsense.
Yet one of the most acute political reasoners
produced by America honestly believed it, because it was a logical outgrowth of the doctrine
of state sovereignty, and because the doctrine
of state sovereignty was the sheet-anchor which




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held the worm-eaten bark of slavery to her
moorings.
/   Poor man! Adamswrote some monthslater:
" Calhoun looks like a man racked with furious
passions and stung with disappointed ambition,
as he is." Certainly, Calhoun had not forgotten his bitter disappointments, nor had he
ceased to hope that he would, after all, some
time reach the goal of his wishes; but his personal ambition had long ago become wholly
subordinate to the passions which the slavery
conflict had awakened in his bosom. The encroachments of the slave power upon the domain of liberty went on at an alarming rate;
but Calhoun derived no satisfaction from any
success, because every advance disclosed to his
mind more clearly the immensity of the space
still to be traversed, ere the slave-holders could
say to themselves: Put out the watch-fires, let
us rest and enjoy the fruits of our toils, for
there is nothing more to be apprehended. In
his second speech on the admission of Michigan,
he had thus very correctly characterized himself: -
"It has perhaps been too much my habit to look
more to the future and less to the present than is
wise; but such is the constitution of my mind that
when I see before me the indications of causes calculated to effect important changes in our political




164


JOHN C. CALHOUN


condition, I am led irresistibly to trace them to their
sources, and follow them out in their consequences."
/ His name would appear in smaller letters in
the history of the United States, but his happiness as a man would have been greater, if it
had been otherwise. What wonder that passion
raked its deep furrows into the face of a man
who fought with all the fervor of his hot blood
and all the energy of his iron will for a cause,
and yet perceived that every victory gained increased the number and determination of its
enemies, and rendered their ultimate triumph
more probable, if not certain! If he had still
been open to arguments on this head, this condition of the struggle would have necessarily
awakened doubts in his mind concerning the
justice of his cause; but as his stand had been
irrevocably taken, the remarkable phenomenon
had just the opposite effect. The denunciations
of slavery by the abolitionists incited him to
extol it in unmeasured terms.
/i   In a brief but most important speech (February 6, 1837) the question of receiving the
abolition petitions was taken up by him once
more. It was not done with a view to a reconsideration of the memorable decision of the
Senate, though he tried to prove that his opinion had been fully borne out by the course of
events. He saw his prophecies about to be ful



SLAVERY


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filled, and his object was to warn the Senate
once more to arrest its fatal course down the inclined plane, which terminated in an abyss.
" I then said that the next step would be to refer
the petition to a committee, and I already see indications that such is now the intention.... We are
now told that the most effectual mode of arresting the
progress of abolition is to reason it down; and with
this view it is urged that the petitions ought to be
referred to a committee. That is the very ground
which was taken at the last session in the other
House; but instead of arresting its progress, it has
since advanced more rapidly than ever. The most
unquestionable right may be rendered doubtful if
once admitted to be a subject of controversy, and that
s would be the case in the present instance."
This was all very true, but Calhoun was
mistaken in supposing that it could be helped.
In this very speech, he himself furnished the
best proof that nothing, which either the Senate or any other earthly power could do, would
alter any of these facts in the least. True
enough, the attempt of the House of Representatives to reason abolitionism  down had
been worse than futile. The anti-slavery spirit
Zcould not be reasoned down; and yet Calhoun's
whole speech was nothing but an attempt to do
this very thing, and to do it with arguments
which unanswerably proved the truth of his
first assertion, that it could not be done.




.166


JOHN C. CALHOUN


" They who imagine that the spirit now abroad in
the North will die away of itself, without a shock or
convulsion, have formed a very inadequate conception of its real character; it will continue to rise and
spread, unless prompt and efficient measures to stay
its progress be adopted. Already it has taken possession of the pulpit, of the schools, and, to a considerable extent, of the press, - those great instruments by which the mind of the rising generation will
be formed.
" However sound the great body of the non-slaveholding States are at present, in the course of a few
years they will be succeeded by those who will have
been taught to hate the people and institutions of
nearly one half of this Union with a hatred more
deadly than one hostile nation ever entertained towards another. It is easy to see the end. By the
necessary course of events, if left to themselves, we
must become, finally, two peoples. It is impossible,
under the deadly hatred which must spring up between the two great sections, if the present causes
are permitted to operate unchecked, that we should
continue under the same political system. The conflicting elements would burst the Union asunder,
powerful as are the links which hold it together.
Abolition and the Union cannot coexist. As the
friend of the Union, I openly proclaim it, and the
sooner it is known the better.  The former may
now be controlled, but in a short time it will be
beyond the power of man to arrest the course of
events."




R, AV.1RV


1~7


What a bewildering tangle of contradictions!
If the anti-slavery spirit, left unchecked, was
sure to spread, and if it had already taken possession of the pulpit, of the schools, and of a
considerable part of the press, - that is to say,
of the three great formative agencies of public
opinion,- who and what should then check it?
Besides public opinion, there was no other power
except the public authorities. In a democratic
republic, however, the public authorities are the
creatures of public opinion, and not its masters.
And what did Calhoun want the public authorities to do? They were not to reason with the
anti-slavery spirit, for to argue the case at all
was to render the unquestionable right doubtful, and, as experience had taught, only served
the cause which was to be put down. Was
Congress to pass penal laws against the manifestation of the anti-slavery spirit in the pulpits, in the schools, and in the press? Would
not the mere suggestion of such a law raise a
storm of passionate debate, such as had never
before swept through the halls of Congress?
And if such laws could be passed in the face of
the express provisions of the Constitution and
against public opinion, how long could they remain in the statute-book?  But if Congress
should not reason with the anti-slavery spirit,
and could not pass penal laws against it, what




168


JOHN C. CALHOUN


could it do but maintain an indignant silence?
Yet that would have been the policy of the
ostrich. The danger does not disappear because we shut our eyes against it. Nobody
knew this better than Calhoun, and so he spoke
in tones which would have chilled the blood in
the veins of his audience if they had had the
faintest idea in what an awful manner every
word of his predictions would be fulfilled in
due time. Therefore it was, by his own showing, a delusion, without the smallest particle
of firm ground to rest upon, that the anti-slavery spirit could yet be controlled. It was the
natural offspring of the moral convictions and
the political sentiments of the times; and, in
consequence, every attempt to fetter it necessarily acted upon it as a spur. Calhoun could
not have failed to understand that he had
knocked the last vestige of his argument from
under his feet, if it had not been so true that
t he spoke as a friend of the Union. Slavery
had to be maintained though the skies should
fall, yet that the days of the Union were numbered he would not believe until it was actually
rent in twain. But abolition and this Union
could not coexist; therefore there had to be
some means of crushing abolitionism, though he
himself had been forced to demonstrate that
there was and could be none.




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169


A man of so lucid a mind as Calhoun, and
so incapable of consciously shutting his eyes to
any truth because he did not like it, could not
rest satisfied with being snugly spun into such
a Gordian knot of contradictions. If it could
not be unravelled, perhaps it might be cut by
a bold stroke. The sword must, of course, be
taken from the armory of reason. Did not the
assertion that the anti-slavery spirit could not
be reasoned down admit of a restrictive qualification? Denunciations, constitutional arguments, warnings, and threats were alike powerless. But could not the flood be stemmed, if
the anti-slavery spirit were proved to be an
egregious mistake and a gross blunder?  This
it was that he now undertook to do.
The Philadelphia Convention had nearly despaired of overcoming the difficulties thrown by
slavery in the way of a " better Constitution,"
although the moral view taken of slavery by the
North and the South differed at that time comparatively little. The more exacting the Southern States were with regard to slavery, the more
readily did they admit that it was a moral,
political, q.nd economical evil. There was no
hypocrisy in these declarations, though unquestionably the intensity of conviction did not
generally correspond with bli emphasis of language. The confessions would have been much




170


JOHN C. CALHOUN


more guarded if it had been apprehended that
they might lead to disadvantageous consequences,
Why should slavery not be called a mildew and
a curse, since the North had no objection to having the whole responsibility for the existence
of the evil thrown upon England, and since it
was honestly believed that the prohibition of
the foreign slave-trade would cause its gradual
extinction? Was it not rather to be supposed
that the resistance of the North against the
demands of the South would be weakened by
an appeal to the sympathy of Northerners with
the unfortunate condition of their Southern
brethren, and by strengthening the hope that
the Southern States, prompted by their moral
convictions and by what they considered their
true interest, would make all possible exertions
to render the constitutional compromises in favor of slavery only temporary make-shifts? The
more these hopes proved to be vain delusions,
the more it became the settled policy of the
South to season its exactions with a strong
dose of sound moral sentiments. The South
had begun with honest self-deception, and it
gradually sunk into conscious deception of others; hollow declamations took the place of trrue
and more or less deep sentiments. Now and
then a voice ws. hbo:ra energetically disclaiming the least hostility against negro slavery




SLAVERY


171


from any point of view. These bold confessions were, however, hardly noticed amid the
din of general protestations against " slavery in
the abstract," and though they were ominous
signs of the times, they were, in fact, of themselves of no great importance, because they
were after all but personal opinions.    Only
when placed on the basis of a general principle
did they become a vital force, which pushed the
slavery conflict into a new phase of development.   Calhoun now took this decisive step,
with full consciousness of its significance. He
not only denied that slavery "in the abstract"
was an evil, but he emphatically proclaimed
negro slavery to be a good.
" But let me not be understood as admitting, even
]^!   by implication, that the existing relations between
the two races in the slave-holding States is an evil:,    far otherwise, I hold it to be a good, as it has thus
far proved itself to be to both, and will continue to
prove so if not disturbed by the fell spirit of abolition... The relation now existing in the slave-holding
States between ~he two [races] is, instead of an evil,
a good, - a positive good."
The argument that the negroes were greatly
benefited by slavery, because physically, intellectually, and morally their actual condition was
infinitely better than it would have been in
the wilds of Africa, was very old, and one still




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


meets with it occasionally. Was it not, then,
cruel and unchristian to declare the African
slave-trade piracy, and thereby deprive the poor
benighted Africans of every chance of undergoing this blissful change? But, however that
might be, why was it a blessing for native-born
Americans of the negro race to be kept in slavery, because it had been a blessing to their
ancestors, two or more generations back, to be
transported from Africa to America, though
they were sold into slavery? But we need not
dwell upon the threadbare sophistry of the argument, because Calhoun only repeated what
had been said a thousand times before.
Of much more importance was his "appeal
to facts" to support the other assertion: That
slavery was also " a positive good " for the other
race. " In the mean time," he said, "the white
or European race has not degenerated. It has
kept pace with its brethren in other sections of
the Union, where slavery does not exist. It is
odious to make comparisons; but I appeal to all
sides whether the South is not equal in virtue,
intelligence, patriotism, courage, disinterestedness, and all the high qualities which adorn our
nature." Inefficient and unreliable as were the
statistics of the United States at that time, they
were full and accurate enough to tell a strange
story about how the South had kept pace with




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173


the North with regard to intelligence, so far as
intelligence depends upon school instruction and
upon the whole character of the life of the community in which an individual happens to live.
The history of the slavery conflict and of the
questions which stood in close connection with
it furnished an odd commentary on the peculiar disinterestedness of the South. Some parts
of the local news and the advertising columns
of the Southern papers concerning slaves were
strange reading for one wanting to inform himself about certain virtues and high qualities
which adorn our nature. Yet Calhoun spoke
in good faith, -only he had "the upper ten
thousand" in mind, while he spoke of the white
race. Every year it became more evident that
the curse of slavery weighed upon the white
race as heavily as upon the negroes, if not even
more so. Only in one thing did Calhoun admit
the inferiority of the South, - in "the arts of
gain:" a most important thing, indeed, since
the arts of gain are the most powerful agencies of civilization. But the South was not responsible for this one weak point in its case, for
he traced it " mainly to the fiscal action of this
government." Adam was more successful in
covering his nudity with a fig-leaf than the
South in the attempt to account for its unsatisfactory economical condition by this charge




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against the economical policy of the Federal
government. Whether good or bad, that policy
had been the same for the whole country, and
the North had advanced with giant strides, while
the South, in spite of its natural advantages, its
cotton monopoly and the unparalleled increase
of the cotton culture, complained that " the fox
dwelt amid the hearth-stones of once blooming
plantations." There was no other essential difference in the condition of the two sections than
slavery and what had resulted from it, and to
slavery, therefore, the inferiority in the arts of
gain had ultimately to be traced.
This "appeal to facts" more than sufficed
to prove that heavy clouds, laden with storm
and lightning, overhung the sky of the sunny
South, if it adopted this doctrine of the positive
good of slavery to both races. For then it had
sealed with its own hands the decree of fate,
that it had steadily to go on from bad to worse.
But all this was as nothing compared with the
general principle, upon which Calhoun rested
his assertion: "I take higher ground.... I
hold, then, that there never has yet existed a
wealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did not, in point of fact,
live on the labor of the other." Almost innumerable have been the devices - "1from the
brute force and gross superstition of ancient




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times to the subtle and artful fiscal contrivances of modern"- by which so small a share
of the wealth of all civilized communities has
been allotted to those by whose labor it was
produced, and so large a share given to the nonproducing classes.
"I might well challenge a comparison between
them and the more direct, simple, and patriarchal
mode by which the labor of the African race is,
among us, commanded by the European. I may say
with truth that in few countries so much is left to
the share of the laborer, and so little exacted from
him.... But I will not dwell on this aspect of the
question; I turn to the political, and here I fearlessly assert that the existing relation between the
two races in the South, against which these blind
fanatics are waging war, forms the most solid and
durable foundation on which to rear free and stable
political institutions. It is useless to disguise the
fact. There is and always has been, in an advanced
stage of wealth and civilization, a conflict between
labor and capital. The condition of society in the
South exempts us from the disorders and dangers
resulting from this conflict; and explains why it
is that the condition of the slave-holding States has
been so much more stable and quiet than that of the
North. The advantages of the former, in this respect, will become more and more manifest if left
undisturbed by interference from without, as the
country advances in wealth and numbers. We have,




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


in fact, but just entered that condition of society
where the strength and durability of our political institutions are to be tested; and I venture nothing in
predicting that the experience of the next generation
will fully test how vastly more favorable our condition of society is than that of other sections for free
and stable institutions, provided we are not disturbed
by the interference of others, or shall have sufficient
intelligence and spirit to resist promptly and successfully such interference."
This was a manifesto of infinitely more import than all his writings and speeches on nullification. His warfare against the anti-slavery
spirit had been in the beginning strictly defensive. Because the broad shield of the Constitution completely covered the "peculiar institution" of the South against all legislative
interference by the Federal government, therefore he had thought that it must also prove impenetrable to the arrows of abolitionism; and
with the doctrine of state sovereignty he had
built the citadel of nullification, which would in
all emergencies furnish a last unconquerable refuge. Strong as this position was, he soon became convinced that it was not strong enough.
Without abandoning it, he now warned the
North that the permanent and absolute security
of slavery was a question of life and death with
the South, and that this plain fact would deter



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mine its action, if the anti-slavery spirit was not
promptly and forever crushed out. A constant
warfare, calculated morally to ruin the slaveholding States in their own eyes and in the
eyes of the civilized world, would not and could
not be endured by them. Now he himself challenged not only the abolitionists, but the whole
North and the whole civilized world, to a decisive combat with those moral and intellectual
arms from which, according to his own statement, the slave-holding States alone had anything to apprehend, - a most audacious but unavoidable step. If a successful defence was at
all possible, the attack had to be met with the
same weapons with which it was made. As long
as the South apologized for slavery as a dire necessity, a vast majority of the Northern people
would insist upon having the constitutional
obligations scrupulously fulfilled by the Federal
government. But they would do it less and less
willingly, because the anti-slavery spirit, which
was the spirit of the times, could not be checked
by the Constitution; for the Constitution was a
rule of action, but not a law for the thoughts
and sentiments of the people. If the hostile
feeling against slavery was to be conquered, the
people had to be convinced that it was mistaken
and wrong. And as slavery could not be an indifferent thing, if its maintenance was a ques



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tion of life and death with the South, it must necessarily be a blessing. Thus the necessities of
defence imperatively demanded the transformation of slavery from a curse into a most enviable
institution, for moral and political reasons.
That there was some truth in Calhoun's assertions could not be gainsaid. The conflict
between labor and capital constituted the significance of the times in the western world,
and the slave-holding States knew nothing of it,
because labor was owned by capital, and therefore capital arranged the relation in every respect wholly to suit itself. So long as labor did
not appeal to brute force, the South was, in consequence, exempt from the dangers and disorders which result from this conflict in communities where labor, too, has its rights and is in a
condition to defend its interests; there it was
navigation on a pond, here on a never motionless and sometimes tempestuous sea; but there
the sun bred poisonous miasmas in the stagnant
waters, and the navigator was in danger of suffocating in the mire if the boat capsized by some
accident, while here were the dangers, but also
the vigor and all the resources, of real, ever progressing life. Had Calhoun so entirely forgotten
all that he had seen during his college years in
New England that this difference really escaped
his keen eye? Had he grown to be so impreg



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nated with the spirit of slavery that the spirit of
the people of the free States had become to him
a book closed with seven seals? Could they ever
be made to believe that slavery was " a positive
good "?  And if this declaration would always
have the sound of a blasphemy in their ears,
what would he have gained for the security of
slavery in the Union, even if his assertion were
true? The hatred of slavery in the North was
as yet very far from being so deadly as he expected it to become in a little while; but still
slavery was hated upon political, moral, and
religious principles. Principles, however, are
vital forces in the history of mankind, and what
a man believes to be a principle works with him
as such. Therefore, even if Calhoun were right,
his declaration could only fan the flames of the
conflict between South and North. It was the
formal announcement that this conflict never
could terminate in a peace, nor even be interrupted by an honest truce.
All the free States were genuine democracies,
and therefore the assertion that slavery is the
most solid and durable foundation upon which
to rear free institutions was in their eyes simply
a contradictio in adjecto. Whether the institutions which the South reared on this base were
good or bad, they were confessedly the products
of a different civilization, - of a civilization dif



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fering from that of the North not only in details,
but in the formative principle. It is, however,
self-evident that two civilizations, with antagonistic formative principles, cannot permanently
coexist in one political organism, because they
move in opposite directions. Instead of reconciling the North and the civilized world to the
existence of slavery, Calhoun's new gospel of
slavery was a declaration of aggressive war.
But one step more could be taken in this direction: the deeds could be made to conform to the
theory, the conversion of the heathen to the new
gospel could be undertaken; the logical consequence of the doctrine of the " positive good"
was the propagandism of slavery.
The time was not far off when the South,
with Calhoun as its foremost leader, was to take
this last step, which proved to be the beginning
of the end. For a while, however, the attention
of the country was diverted from the slavery
conflict by financial and other economical questions, which pressed themselves into the foreground in a most unpleasant manner.
We have seen how many wise heads in the
Capitol at Washington, and among them that
of Calhoun, were troubled by the fear that the
United States government stood in danger of
something like the fate of King Midas. But
instead of having to deal with an overflowing




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treasury, they bad to struggle with the disas.
trous consequences of the crash of 1837, the
worst economical crisis the country had as yet
experienced since the war of independence. Calhoun took a prominent but not a leading part
in all the questions mediately and immediately
connected with this catastrophe. To present
the reader with an intelligent synopsis of his
views would require a discourse on the general
history of the times, which cannot be compressed within the small frame of this biography. It appears, however, the less necessary to
enlarge upon them, because no new principles
were involved in the discussion, and the stand
taken by Calhoun did not mark a new epoch in
his general career. From the personal point of
view it is almost of more interest that, in February, 1837, he had a last direct encounter with
General Jackson, who had taken him to task
for some remarks supposed to have been made
by Calhoun in a speech on the land question.
As the hot-tempered President had based his
grossly abusive letter on an inaccurate report,
Calhoun had no difficulty in chastising him severely for this attempt " upon the privileges of
a United States senator; " this time, however,
himself overstepping the limits which the official station of his adversary should have imposed upon him.




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


Perhaps this incident influenced to some extent his language in the speech which he delivered a few days later on the relations of the
United States to France; but it would be ridiculous to suppose that personal hostility to Jackson was the reason of his opposition to the
policy of the President in the indemnity question. He proved beyond contradiction that the
untoward turn which this affair had taken was
mainly due to the false steps of the administration, and he conclusively showed that in a war
between the United  States and France the
former would have infinitely more to suffer,
while neither could derive any advantage from
it. The national pride was flattered to hear the
victor of New Orleans blow the war trumpet
so lustily and defiantly; but the sober second
thought of the people entirely agreed with Calhoun, that it would be madness, on a mere question of "etiquette," to provoke a war with the
oldest ally of the United States, who had rendered them such signal services in their hour of
need.




CHAPTER VII


UNDER VAN BUREN
MUCH time was to elapse ere justice was
rendered Calhoun with regard to the course he
saw fit to pursue upon the leading question of
the day, - President Van Buren's sub-treasury
scheme, which was to sever entirely and forever the connection between the government
and banks of every description. It was but
natural that the Whigs were deeply chagrined
to see Calhoun part company with them in the
moment when, as he himself freely admitted,
the continuation of the alliance would have led
to the overthrow of the administration party;
but they had no right to expect anything else
from him. He was not guilty of any treachery,
nor could he be justly charged with inconsistency, though in 1835, when the sub-treasury
scheme was first introduced by General Gordon,
he had declared it "premature," and in 1836,
when the proposition was renewed by Benton,
1" impracticable at the time;" nay, even though
he had himself proposed the establishment of a
United States Bank for twelve years "as a




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


better and more practical plan to unbank the
banks."  It accorded strictly with the facts
when he declared, " We joined our old opponents on the tariff question, but under our own
flag and without merging in their ranks*" Nobody had ever pretended that he had become a
Whig; he had concluded an alliance with the
Whigs for the specific purpose of opposing the
encroachments of the Executive upon the domain of the other departments of government,
and of counteracting all the dangerous tendencies of Jackson's unscrupulous autocratic rule.
From Martin Van Buren, however, nothing was
to be apprehended.   " Executive usurpation
had been arrested. The Treasury was empty,
and the administration had scarcely a majority
in either House or in the Union." The object
of the alliance had been accomplished. The
questions which were now the order of the day
left the two great national parties intact, but
Calhoun was free to join either side, because
he belonged to neither. " He was master of
his own move, and acknowledged connection
with no party but the state-rights party, - the
small band of nullifiers, - and acted either with
or against the administration or the national
party, just as it was calculated to further the
principles and policy which we, of that party,
regarded as essential to the liberty and insti



UNDER VAN BUREN


185


tutions of the country." Viewing the general
situation of the country in the manner he did,
it was therefore a matter of course that he
pitched his solitary tent for the present next
the camp-fires of the administration party.
"We have, Mr. President, arrived at a remarkable
era in our political history. The days of legislative
and executive encroachments, of tariffs and surpluses,
of bank and public debt and extravagant expenditure,
are past for the present. The government stands in
a position disentangled from the past, and freer to
choose its future course than it has ever been since
its commencement. We are about to take a fresh
start. I move off under the states-rights banner,
and go in the direction in which I have been so long
moving. I seize the opportunity thoroughly to reform the government; to bring it back to its original
principles; to retrench and economize; and rigidly
to enforce accountability.  I shall oppose strenuously all attempts to originate a new debt; to create
a national bank; to reunite the political and money
powers (more dangerous than church and state) in
any form or shape; to prevent the disturbances of the
compromise, which is gradually removing the last
vestige of the tariff system. And, mainly, I shall use
my best efforts to give an ascendency to the great
conservative principle of state sovereignty over the
dangerous and despotic doctrine of consolidation."
Had the Whigs, then, quite overlooked that,
although he had fought with them against Jack



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JOHN C. CALHOUN


son, it was an utter impossibility that he should
ever exert himself for their ascendency? That
the man who declared that he "wished to be
considered nothing more than a plain and an
honest nullifier" should "join the friends of
the tariff, of a national bank, and the whole
system of congressional usurpations, and utterly
break down his old friends of 1827, who had
taken shelter under his position, and thus give
a complete and final victory to his old opponents of that period, and with it a permanent
ascendency to them and their principles and
policy, which, he honestly believed, could not
but end in consolidation, with the loss of our
liberty and institutions," - this, indeed, was a
most preposterous idea. Calhoun, however, was
mistaken in one point, and that the most material. The victory of the administration could
never turn to the advantage of the states-rights
party. The independent Treasury gave the administration of the finances a really political
character for the first time, and it therefore
necessarily contributed to the growing together
of the " sovereign " States into a national Union.
Our sources do not inform us whether Calhoun ever became aware of this fact. His first
great movement to bring the government "back
to its original principles " looks less like the hopeful beginning of a thorough reform than like the




UNDER VAN BUREN


187


desperate effort of a man who is in danger of
being swallowed up by the surging waves, to pile
up dike upon dike till he has a wall so broad
and high that he can laugh the most furious
storms to scorn. Vain exertions, for his dikes
are not constructed of earth, stone, and mortar,
but of mere assertions. The most strenuous
efforts of the North to put down abolitionism by
public opinion had been met by the South with
the contemptuous remark that all the satisfaction the South got for its just complaints was
" words, mere words;" and now the great
leader of the slave power had nothing more
substantial to throw into the way of the antislavery spirit than 4" words, mere words." The
last aim and end of the bringing back of the
government to its original principles was the
security of slavery; and this was to be obtained
not by legislation, but by resolving this and that
with regard to the constitutional and political
aspect of the slavery question. Did these long
strings of resolutions, by being spread over the
journal of the Senate, acquire any secret virtue
which made them a wall of adamant, against
which all the arms of the anti-slavery spirit
would splinter like glass? Whom did they
bind?   Not even the Senate itself, and yet
infinitely less the other departments of the
government or even the people. They had no




M           JOHN C. CALHOUN
legal authority whatever, and though they might
be of great moral weight with many persons,
what effect was to be expected from the mere
opinion of the temporary majority of the Senate,
which might be changed at any moment, if all
the bulwarks of the Constitution were no longer
deemed in themselves sufficient protection for
the peculiar institution? Surely, the resolution
mania, which from this time possessed Calhoun,
is alone ample proof how justly he was charged
with being a doctrinaire.
But it was a great mistake to suppose that all
the weeks which the haughty planter forced the
Senate, at the expense of its legitimate legislative business, to pass in debate on his constitutional opinions were spent to no purpose. It has
been said before that, with regard to the slavery
question, this doctrinaire was the only one who
moved on at even pace with the events, and he
knew now as well as ever what he was about.
So far as he expected anything from his resolutions for the greater security of slavery he was
not only disappointed, but he did in fact, as he
was charged on all sides with doing, pour oil
upon the flames. But the resolutions were not
only designed to serve as additional guards for
the "positive good" of the South; they were
besides a programme for the future, and as such
they were a political event of the first magnitude.




UNDER VAN BIUREN


189


The central idea of the resolutions of December 27, 1837, was, of course, that the safety of
the South depended entirely upon the doctrine
of state sovereignty, and their immediate purpose was to get the Senate formally pledged to
this principle in its direct bearings on the slavery
question. Hence the series was very logically
opened by stating how the Union came into
existence under the Constitution. It is declared
that every State " entered into the Union " by
its own voluntary act. The old Union under the
Articles of Confederation, therefore, evidently
had ceased to exist some time before; when and
how, Calhoun unfortunately forgot to say. The
Senate, however, with thirty-one against thirteen
votes, assented to this bold falsification of a
plain historical fact.
This premise once secured, Calhoun had won
the game. From the purely Confederate nature
of the Union the second resolution was deduced:
that the intermeddling of States or of a " combination of their citizens with the domestic institutions or police of the others, on any ground,
or under any pretext whatever, political, moral,
or religious, with a view to their alteration or
subversion," is " not warranted by the Constitution." Pompous and positive as this resolution sounded, it was of so gelatinous a character that, while the political agitator could do




190


JOHN C. CALHOUN


anything he pleased with it, the constitutional
jurist could not keep the smallest particle of it
firmly between his fingers. Who was able to
enumerate " the domestic institutions" to which
the doctrine of the resolution could be rightfully
applied?  Webster showed conclusively that
slavery, for one, did not belong to them. Where,
too, was the master mind which could give a
serviceable definition of "intermeddling," or of
"with a view to their alteration," or of "not
warranted by the Constitution"?  If all this
was to have so precise a meaning that the
doctrines of rights should and could be fixed in
laws, and their observance secured by compulsory
legal measures, - and it was, obviously, only on
this supposition that they could serve the purpose
intended, - then everything which had relation
to the domestic institutions of other States would
become a punishable violation of the Constitution.
The existence of slavery had to vanish from the
consciousness of the free States; for until this
happened their thoughts must be in some degree occupied with it; the thoughts must manifest themselves, and every manifestation of the
thoughts had, in and of itself, a tendency to
operate an "alteration" of the existing state of
things. Yet the resolution served well enough
Calhoun's main purpose. What this was, he
plainly told in his rejoinder to the suggestion to




UNDER VAN BUREN


191


strike out the word "religious," -that "the
whole spirit of the resolution hinged on that
word." The Senate was to declare that the
anathema of the Constitution rested on the heads
of the fanatics who presumed to question the
rightfulness of negro slavery on moral and
religious grounds; and the Senate complied with
the demand; only fourteen out of forty-five votes
being recorded in favor of striking out the words
"moral" and "religious." But what had Calhoun
gained by that, even supposing that his interpretation of the spirit of the Constitution was
correct? Would the religious convictions of the
people be subverted by the Constitution, or would
the latter become a dead letter from the moment
when it stood in acknowledged antagonism to
the former? Always there was the same fundamental error in all his reckoning. He clearly
perceives that the whole slavery question hinges
upon the political, economical, and moral antagonism between slavery and liberty, tries to
suppress some manifestations of it, and draws
from that suppression conclusions, as if it were
identical with the suppression of the antagonism
itself. But the futility of his efforts has pressed
him another step forward: instead of merely
forbidding the agitation to enter the Capitol, he
now bids Congress declare that the Constitution
wants to see every door in the free States
hermetically closed against it.




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


To understand the whole import of the second resolution it is, however, necessary to read
it in connection with the third, which indirectly
overthrew the demand of the former, but of
course in favor of slavery. This third resolution declared it to be the duty of the Federal
government to use its powers in such a manner
as "to give... increased stability and security to the domestic institutions of the States
that compose the Union." The people of the
free States were to have no political, moral, or
religious thoughts on slavery, or at least not to
manifest them in any way whatever disagreeable to the slave-holding States; but they were
bound, through the Federal government, actively to exert themselves in its favor. It is
not said in what manner and to what extent
this was to be done; but did not the very generality of the terms used imply that it had to
be done in any manner and to any extent declared necessary by the slave-holding States?
For they alone had the right to judge what the
stability and security of their peculiar institution demanded. There was not a trace of doctrinarian spirit in this resolution. It was a positive programme, big with consequences which
would have curdled the blood in the veins of
Calhoun himself, if he had foreseen them all.
It was the first step towards deriving the prac



UNDER VAN BUREN


193


tical results of the doctrine of the "positive
good;" the first step towards securing the services of the Federal government for the glorious
work of slavery propagandism.
The fourth resolution applied the foregoing
doctrines by name to slavery, declaring all attacks on it "a manifest breach of faith, and a
violation of the most solemn obligations, moral
and religious." The Senate called upon to instruct the people in this spirit about their religious obligations; abolition, according to Calhoun, in possession of the pulpits, the schools,
and the press; the abolitionists declaring slavery " the sum of all villainies," - was anything
more needed to prove that two antagonistic
principles were here in deadly conflict? With
this one line Calhoun had,irrefutably demonstrated the vanity of all his efforts to save slavery and the Union.
The next resolution read, -
"Resolved, That the intermeddling of any State
or States, or their citizens, to abolish slavery in this
District, or in any of the Territories, on the ground
or under the pretext that it is immoral or sinful, or
the passage of any act or measure of Congress with
that view, would be a direct and dangerous attack on
the institutions of all the slave-holding States."
If all that had been asserted in the preceding
resolutions was correct, this one was certainly




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


incontrovertible; therefore it was all the more
significant that Calhoun refrained from declaring the abolition of slavery in the District
of Columbia unconstitutional, although he expressly stated this to be his opinion. But while
he thus politely and obligingly bowed to the
constitutional doctrines of the North, its moral
and religious convictions were once more imperiously bidden to leave this question alone.  "The
deluded agitators must be plainly told that it is
no concern of theirs what is the character of
our institutions." Not a finger was to be raised
against slavery "under the pretext" of its immorality or sinfulness, not only where it actually existed, but also, added the sixth and last
resolution, where it might exist in future.
" To refuse to extend to the Southern and Western
States any advantage which would tend to strengthen
or render them more secure, or to increase their limits
or population by the annexation of new territory or
states, on the assumption or under the pretext that
the institution of slavery, as it exists among them, is
immoral or sinful, or otherwise obnoxious, would be
contrary to that equality of rights and advantages
which the Constitution was intended to secure alike
to all the members of the Union."
One great merit this last resolution had: its
language was so plain that no child could misunderstand it. The principle of slavery pro



UNDER VAN BUREN


195


pagandism was proclaimed with the utmost boldness, and the Federal government was absolutely
denied the right to interfere with it on any
ground or pretext connected in any way whatever with slavery. Not to interfere was, however, in this case, identical with an obligation to
lend a helping hand, for " the annexation of new
territory or states" could be effected only by the
Union. And why should the Union not exultingly march on under the black flag of slavery
as far as the South was good enough to lead it?
It is true, " many in the South once believed that
it was a moral and political evil," but " that folly
and delusion are gone. We see it now in its
true light, and regard it as the most safe and
stable basis for free institutions in the world..    The blessing of this state of things extends beyond the limits of the South. It makes
that section the balance of the system; the
great conservative power, which prevents other
portions, less fortunately constituted [!], from
rushing into conflict." Verily, here is a doctrinaire with a positiveness in his doctrines
powerful enough to grind into dust the columns of the most gigantic political edifice. Not
long ago Calhoun had declared that nothing
was needed to render the South perfectly safe
save concert of will and action. Now, Providence had thrown ample opportunities into the




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way of the Union to test whether that was
sufficient to cajole and whip the North into
obedience, and to force upon it this programme
of the slave power, which, by the very consciousness of its hopeless weakness, was under the imperious necessity of rendering itself the despotic
master of the Union, in order to save itself.
After this great sally, several years passed
ere Calhoun thought it opportune to make the
next decisive move in the cause of self-government and republican liberty on the basis of
slavery. The waves of party strife rolled high
during all these years, and Calhoun was far
from being an unconcerned and idle spectator.
His speeches of this period fill a stately volume,
and are fully on a level with his other parliamentary efforts on general legislative topics.
Yet the biographer, who confines himself to
what is really characteristic of the man or to
what has exerted a determining influence on the
history of his country, can pass them over with
a few general remarks. What he himself said
of the extraordinary session of Congress in 1841
applies, so far as he is concerned, to this whole
time. " What are we doing, and what engrosses
all our attention from morn to noon, and from
week to week, ever since our arrival here at the
commencement of this extraordinary session,
and will continue till its end? What but banks,




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loans, stocks, tariffs, distribution, and supplies? "
The old economical controversies, more or less
altered by circumstances, are the battle-ground of
the parties, fighting with undiminished ardor and
varying success. The old arguments are repeated
ad nauseam. Though all the questions were of
the highest importance, and much erudition, ingenuity, eloquence, and passion were displayed
on both sides, the continuous reading of the
debates is simply treadmill work. Calhoun's
speeches, too, abound with repetitions. The statistical data, the illustrations, the arrangement
of the thoughts, change; but he fights for his
old doctrines with the old reasons: independent
treasury, no bank, no internal improvements, no
protective tariff, no distribution of the proceeds
of the sale of the public lands, cession of the
public lands to the States in which they are situated, nd loans, etc. A good deal of sound reasoning, a good deal of bold and sometimes reckless generalizing, now and then exaggerated into
a downright absurdity, may be found in all his
speeches on these interesting subjects.  The
thorough student of the general history of the
United States cannot dispense with perusing
them all carefully, but they do not show either
the man or the statesman in a new light. From
the personal point of view, they are the most
interesting on account of some sharp encounters




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which he had with Clay and Webster. Each
of the three great senators tried to demonstrate
his own consistency throughout his political career, and the inconsistency which had marked
that of his adversary; and each of them was perfectly successful as to the latter task, and, in
spite of infinite ingenuity and eloquence, sadly
failed as to the former. With the change
of conditions, their political convictions had
changed, and, by changing these, they had
learned to read the Constitution in a different
way. Neither of them lost anything in the estimation of the people by this fact, because it
was an honest change of opinion, and since their
constituents had gone through the same process
they might have had the manliness and candor
to avow it unreservedly. But perhaps the reproach that not one of them ventured upon a
standpoint of such moral elevation rests more
upon the general tendency of American politics
than upon them personally. Once, indeed, Calhoun openly confessed that he had been originally
inclined to take a latitudinarian and national
view of the powers of the Federal government;
but when he spoke in the deep and incisive
tones of an authority, - and that became more
and more his habitual way of speaking, -or
when an opponent had nettled his self-love, he
was but too easily betrayed into wasting his




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time and his ability in vain attempts to knead
his earlier sayings and political acts into the
mould of his present convictions.
Some of the speeches of this period require
particular notice, but they are precisely those
which were only remotely or not at all connected with the party issues.
The illegitimate connection of the civil service with party politics had become such a crying evil that another effort was made to strike
it at the root; but again the would-be reformers sought the root where it did not lie. A bill
was introduced and debated upon, which, as
Calhoun expressed it, proposed "to inflict the
penalty of dismission on a large class of the officers of this government, who shall electioneer,
or attempt to control or influence the election
of public functionaries either of the general or
state governments, without distinguishing between their official and individual character as
citizens." Calhoun, who spoke on the bill on
February 22, 1839, declared it for this reason
unconstitutional. We need not inquire whether
this charge was well founded, or whether he
made good his case as to the constitutional question. Supposing that he was right, this defect
of the bill could have been easily mended; but
he very justly asserted that such a law would
" prove either useless, or worse than useless."




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" But suppose the immediate object of the bill accomplished, and the office-holders rendered perfectly
silent and passive, it might even then be doubted
whether it would cause any diminution in the influence of patronage over elections. It would indeed
greatly reduce the influence of the office-holders.
They would become the most insignificant portion of
the community, as far as elections were concerned.
But just in the same proportion as they might sink,
the no less formidable corps of the office-seekers
would rise in importance. The struggle for power
between the ins and the outs would not abate in
the least, in violence or intensity, by the silence or
inactivity of the office-holders, as the amount of
patronage, the stake contended for, would remain
undiminished. Both sides, those in and those out of
power, would turn from the passive and silent body
of the incumbents, and court the favor of the active
corps, that panted to supplant them; and the result
would be an annual sweep of the former, after every
election, to make room to reward the latter, - and
this on whichever side the scale of victory might
turn. The consequence would be rotation with a
vengeance. The wheel would turn round with such
velocity that anything like a stable system of policy
would be impossible. Each temporary occupant, who
might be thrown into office by the whirl, would seize
the moment to make the most of his good fortune,
before he might be displaced by his successor, and a
system (if such it might be called) would follow, not
less corrupting than unstable."




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That was all true enough, but what had he
to propose instead?  "Place the office-holders,
with their yearly salaries, beyond the reach of
the executive power, and they would in a short
time be as mute and inactive as this bill pro.
poses to make them. Their voice, I promise,
would then be scarcely raised at elections, or
their persons be found at the polls." If he had
changed but one word, - if he had saidparty in
power instead of executive power, - this advice
would, indeed, have been the egg of Columbus.
The context hardly allows a doubt that he now,
as before, only wished to assign a controlling
influence over the removals to Congress or the
Senate; and if that was to be the whole reform,
his law, like the bill under discussion, would
have been " useless, or worse than useless." As
concerning the slavery conflict, so also in this
question, he foresaw and foretold the impending
dangers and inevitable evil consequences, and
he showed great ability in criticising the opinions of the other political physicians; but his
own prescriptions were poisonous drugs.
In respect to the civil service, this is not
very surprising, because, though Calhoun saw
clearer than most of his contemporaries, he had
after all not made a serious effort to push his
examination beyond the surface of the ques.
tion; another generation was to grapple with




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this problem, for it bad to grow infinitely worse
ere the necessity of getting at the bottom of
it could be fully realized. But of the slavery
conflict he had a better right than anybody to
say, as he frequently did, that he had thoroughly examined it in all its bearings, and that
be understood it. Therefore the apodeictic manner in which he promised a radical cure, if but
the application of his remedies would be consented to, exposes him to the charge of having
been a dishonest quack, if he is not admitted
to have been an honest fanatic, who, like all
fanatics, viewed his subject but from one fixed
point and under one unchangeable visual angle.
This deep conviction of his own infallibility
in relation to everything concerning slavery
rendered it a very significant fact that he once
was compelled to admit that he was at his wits'
end, and had no advice to offer. Of course
neither pride nor policy allowed the very words
to fall from his lips, but the folded arms and
knitted brow with which, after reiterated loud
complaints, he suffered the government to remain in the embarrassing situation, into which
it had been thrown by trying to serve the interests of the slave-holders, spoke with a most
impressive eloquence.
Two American vessels with negroes on board,
the Comet and the Encomium, had been




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stranded, in 1830 and 1834, on the false keys
of the Bahama Islands, and the local authorities
of Nassau, New Providence, had refused to recognize the negroes as slaves and deliver them
up to their owners. In 1835 a very similar case
occurred. The brig Enterprise was forced by
stress of weather into Port Hamilton, Bermuda, and the local authorities detained the
slaves, pretending that they had become freemen by coming within English jurisdiction.
The United States government took up all
three cases in behalf of the owners, and claimed
a fair compensation. England at last yielded
as to the first two, but persisted in her refusal
as to the last, and, at the same time, declared
that no such claim would ever again be allowed.
This distinction was based upon the fact " that
before the Enterprise arrived at Bermuda slavery
had been abolished in the British Empire."
On March 4, 1840, Calhoun introduced in
the Senate a set of resolutions declaratory of
what he conceived to be the principles of the
law of nations applying to the case, and severely
condemning the course of the English authorities. Some days later he delivered a long
speech in support of the resolutions, and had
the satisfaction of seeing them unanimously
adopted. The South liked to dwell upon this
fact as a striking proof of the justice of its




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claims. The unanimity of the Senate was, however, only apparent. Of fifty-two senators, only
thirty-three voted; nineteen were evidently not
satisfied that Calhoun had made good his case,
but for reasons best known to themselves they
preferred not to say. so. The "unanimous"
vote of the Senate was, in fact, a proof of the
awe in which almost all the Northern politicians stood of the slave power, but there was
very little reason to draw from it the conclusion that the doctrine propounded in the resolutions could not be called into question. Adams,
who certainly knew as much of the law of nations as any member of Congress, wrote concerning the Enterprise resolutions, "Calhoun
crows about his success in imposing his own
bastard law of nations upon the Senate by his
preposterous resolutions, and chuckles at Webster's appealing to those resolutions now, after
dodging from the duty of refuting and confounding them then."
The essential point of Calhoun's doctrine was
that he denied the right of England, with regard to citizens of foreign countries, to make
any difference between slaves and other property, if by some unavoidable cause the slaves
should momentarily come within the limits of
her jurisdiction. This opinion was based upon
the assertion that slavery was fully recognized




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by the law of nations. England did not directly
and in so many words assert the contrary, but
she proved by her acts that, at least so far as
any positive obligations could be deduced from
this principle, she refused to acknowledge its
existence or its binding force upon her. This
fact was in itself proof absolute that Calhoun's
assertion could at best be true only with a most
important qualification. He overlooked the fact
that the law of nations is not immutable, but
constantly changing and developing with the
general development of civilization. The very
fact that England assumed the position she did
sufficiently proved that this law was in a state
of transition as to the principle in question.
The law of nations rests upon the free consent
of the civilized peoples. If, therefore, the greatest maritime power of the world, with most extensive possessions adjacent to the sea or surrounded by it in all parts of the globe, withdrew
its assent to a principle of which the practical
application was confined to the seacoast, it
could no longer be maintained. That this was
so with regard to the case in hand was the more
evident, because none of the other European
powers of any consequence had a practical interest in the question, and the hostility of public opinion all over the civilized world against
slavery was constantly and rapidly increasing.




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Calhoun's resolutions, therefore, were neither
more nor less than a vain protest against the
onward course of civilization, and the Senate,
by "unanimously" adopting them, announced
to the world that the most democratic and most
progressive state of the universe was bound to
cry Halt! and pull back the wheel of time
whenever and wherever the interests of the
slave-holders were in danger of being crushed
by it.
To oblige the slave power, the Senate had
made an ugly blot on the record of the United
States, and the slave power did not derive the
least advantage from it, nay, it even sustained
positive damage. England did not change her
course by a single point on account of the resolutions, and the attention of the world had again
been called in the most pointed manner to the
allegation that slavery was indeed a "positive
good" and the best foundation of liberty. That
was a positive damage, and no small one, for
every syllable of what Calhoun had said years
ago, with such impressive emphasis about the
part played by the moral convictions in the
tragedy of this conflict, was true. Every such
manifestation of the slave power caused its opponents to write with larger letters on their
own banner the device under which the slavocracy had been sailing ever since the adoption




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of the Constitution: Let us alone! Slavery is a
state institution with which the Federal government has no concern. Let us alone! To be
left alone in this sense was, however, to be
delivered over to destruction by the moral and
economical agencies which rule the world. The
"Let us alone" of the slave-holders meant,
You have not only to shut your eyes and ears,
but also to lock up your thoughts and your consciences, whenever our interests require you to
do so; for slavery is a domestic institution of
the sovereign States; but it is your duty to
throw the whole weight of the Union for us
into the scales, whenever we tell you that our
safety demands it, for the Constitution recognizes and "guarantees" slavery. How long
would the North submit to such a bargain?
That question nobody could answer as yet; but
two things were certain: every time that the
Federal government submitted to its enforcement, the number of those in the North who
grew restive under it increased; and every time
that the slave-holders had succeeded in enforcing it, they were compelled to push both sides
of their claim a long step farther. Calhoun,
understanding the nature of the slavery question better than any other Southern man, had
to march far ahead on both diverging lines, and
therefore, while no other single man has done




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so much to erect the temple of the slave power,
also no other single man has done so much to
render its sudden downfall inevitable and to
hasten the catastrophe. So it was in this case.
What a triumph that not a single senator dared
to raise his voice against the "bastard law of
nations," and what a portentous humiliation to
have nothing but " words, words, and again
words" to oppose to England's "outrageous
course "! The South pocketed at the same time
the glorious impotent resolutions and a signal
defeat.
There is no question that Calhoun. very
keenly felt the defeat, for he had declared that
a " vital principle " was involved for the South,
and that England "interdicted nearly as effectually the intercourse by sea between one half
of this Union and the other, as to the greatest
and most valuable portion of the property of
the South, as if she was to send out cruisers
against it." Yet he soon scrupulously avoided
touching upon the question even in private conversation. But he deemed the success which
he had obtained over the North of more import,
for the obvious reason that the fate of the slave
power depended not upon the international, but
upon the national, standing of slavery. In November, 1841, the English authorities of Nassau dared to repeat their former offence under




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most aggravating circumstances, for the brig
Creole was brought into the harbor by the very
slaves who had successfully revolted and killed
one of the slave-holders in the struggle. Yet
Calhoun did not deem it necessary to hurl a new
set of resolutions against England; nay, he even
refrained from venting his wrath in a speech;
but he did not omit to commend very heartily
the remonstrance of Webster, as Secretary of
State, which was, indeed, based entirely on the
resolutions of March 4, 1840. " The letter
which had been read," he said, "was drawn up
with great ability, and covered the ground which
had been assumed on this subject by all parties
in the Senate." He hoped that it would "have
a beneficial effect, not only upon the United
States, but Great Britain. Coming from the
quarter it did, this document would do more
good than in coming from any other quarter."
Was it not an ominous sign of the times that
such praise, in such an affair, was bestowed
upon Daniel Webster from these lips? Further, the great statesman of Massachusetts could
boast of having won the approval of the great
Carolinian in another question relating to slavery. To the surprise of most people, as well
in the North as in the South, Calhoun was in
favor of the ratification of the treaty concluded,at Washington, on August 9, 1842, in which




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the high contracting powers, England and the
United States, obligated themselves to maintain a squadron of a certain strength on the
African coast for the purpose of suppressing
the slave-trade. It seems hardly necessary to
state that Calhoun was not pleased with the
agreement; very far from it, indeed. He premised his affirmative vote by the declaration
"that there were several circumstances which
caused no small repugnance on his part to any
stipulations whatever with Great Britain on the
subject of those articles; and he would add
that he would have been gratified if they and
all other stipulations on the subject could have
been entirely omitted; but he must, at the same
time, say he did not see how it was possible to
avoid entering into some arrangement on the
subject," and, considering all the circumstances
of the case, he did not think this agreement
bad enough to justify the rejection of the whole
treaty, while it was better than to maintain the
dangerous status quo. If Calhoun thought
thus, it is not astonishing that Adams declared
"the negotiation itself a Scapinade; a struggle
between the plenipotentiaries to outwit each
other, and to circumvent both countries by a
slippery compromise between freedom and slavery." But Calhoun was certainly no friend of
slippery compromises. Was it then really only




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the embarrassing situation of the United States
which caused him to consent to this? Adams
thought not. He writes, "There is a temperance in his [Calhoun's] manner, obviously aiming to conciliate the Northern political sopranos,
who abhor slavery, and help to forge fetters
for the slave." But what reason did he have to
wish just now to conciliate this numerous family
of the species " dough-face "?
The ambitious wish which had so long and
so violently agitated Calhoun's life while he
stood in his prime had once more taken hold
of his mind, now that he had entered upon the
years in which all that this earth has to bestow begins to lose its charm and gloss, because
the twilight has set in and the evening shades
are darkening. The deep animosity which the
nullification conflict had excited against him
throughout the North had so far subsided that
South Carolina ventured to urge upon her sister
States his claims on the presidency. She intended no empty compliment. Her own admiration for her favorite son did not so entirely
becloud her judgment that she flattered herself and him with the anticipation of certain
success; but she deemed it so far possible that
she entered his name upon the list of candidates with all the hot and overbearing impetuosity with which she was wont to take up every




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important question. Calhoun, too, indulged in
the hope that the dream of his earlier manhood
might at last be realized. At the end of 1842
he resigned his seat in the Senate, the resignation to take effect from the close of the 27th
Congress. The Legislature of South Carolina,
immediately upon the acceptance of the resignation, unanimously nominated him a candidate for election as President of the United
States.
To-day nobody will question that Calhoun
was by far the superior of all his Democratic
competitors in intellect and in justly acquired
fame and character; and even at that time but
few failed to see this, though many did not see
fit publicly to acknowledge the fact. But in
spite of his great superiority in all the essential
qualities, no calm observer could doubt for a
moment that his hopes were sure to be disappointed. The second and third rate politicians
exerted, directly or indirectly, so great an influence upon the party nominations that the
chances of the first men of the nation to reach,
in ordinary times, the goal of the presidency
had become exceedingly small. The special interests of this class of people were better served
by sending one of their own chiefs into the
White House than by elevating to the chair a
leading statesman, whose renown and influence




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were not based upon their cheap cunning and
petty arts. But even if this had been otherwise, Calhoun would have had no chance whatever. It was, to say the least, exceedingly
doubtful whether he could ever be elected, if
nominated by the party, and therefore it was
certain that he would never receive the nomination. It is true that he was not entirely without support in some of the Northern States.
The Irish especially manifested everywhere
some predilection for him, on account of his
pedigree, and in New York, where the Whigs
indulged very freely in their nativist and antiCatholic tendencies, this predilection could almost be mistaken for genuine enthusiasm. But
as the first commandment of the political decalogue of the Irish masses was to vote the regular ticket, and as his Irish extraction was nearly
all they knew of him, their support was of very
little avail, unless his other partisans were numerous and enthusiastic enough to scare his opponents within the party into submission. If
the Southern wing unanimously and emphatically declared themselves for him, the Northern
would, perhaps, not dare to resist.
But only ignorance or blind admiration could
suppose for a moment that the Southern Democrats could be marched up in serried ranks to
sustain his candidature. Ever since he had ab-::..-,.




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jured his early national and latitudinarian bias,
and become an "honest nullifier" in the service of the slavocracy, he had unfitted himself
to be the leader of a great national party, because he had assumed the leadership of an extreme sectional faction. Perhaps this extreme
faction was destined, in the course of time, to
develop into a party which would exercise despotic sway over the whole South. Nay, it was
sure to come to that, because the correct understanding of the slavery conflict must spread
with its own development. As yet, however,
ninety-nine out of a hundred saw the slavery
question through a mist, and therefore even
those who would have followed Calhoun through
thick and thin, to even out-Heroding Herod,
were now shocked and dismayed by his radicalism. There was probably not a single slaveholder in the whole Union who was not glad to
have in the United States Senate such a champion of the peculiar institution, whose courage
and will were equal to any emergency; but
outside of South Carolina, the number of those
who were very anxious to see him at the head
of the government was comparatively small.
The Calhounites fought stubbornly and carried
their point in the first preliminary question —
the postponing of the national convention to the
spring of 1844 - against the adherents of Van..b -*;.
'"' "  a




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Buren, who had wished to set it for as early a
date as November, 1843. In the other controverted previous question, however, the partisans
of Van Buren were all the more unyielding.
The Calhounites wanted the delegates to the
national convention elected by districts, while
their opponents would have the decision as to
the mode of election left to the States. If the
national convention was to represent, so far as
possible, not the political log-rollers, but the
party, the preference had undoubtedly to be
accorded to the proposition of the Calhounites;
but it was certainly somewhat strange that they,
who believed themselves to have a monopoly of
the pure states-rights doctrine, ventured to wish
to give prescriptions to the " States."
So far as their course was determined by
what they supposed to be the interest of their
respective candidates, both factions might have
saved their time and temper, and allowed this
question to take care of itself. Van Buren was
successful in the trial heat, but his final mortification was only the greater; for after all he
lost the race, although his foremost competitor
had taken the wise resolution to withdraw from
it altogether on January 20, 1844.
South Carolina was dismayed, but she did
not, as she had done heretofore, throw away her
electoral votes by voting for some candidate of




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her own. This time she submitted to the party
behest, although she did it with anything but
good grace. The defeat of Calhoun's candidature had, however, but little to do with her anger.
She indulged once more in a spasm of loudmouthed passion on account of the double face
which James K. Polk, the Democratic candidate,
had seen fit to put on with regard to the tariff
question, in order to secure for himself the
electoral vote of Pennsylvania, without which
his election was deemed impossible. Polk was
accused of having gone over, bag and baggage,
to the camp of the protectionists; indignation
meetings and dinners, with an abundance of
furious toasts, denunciations, and threats, were
the order of the day; the " Charleston Mercury "
was not satisfied with urging " legislative nullification," but invited the people of the State to
adopt "ulterior measures," in case that "should
prove inadequate."
There is always a fire where such volumes of
smoke becloud the sky; but this time the quantity of smoke stood in no proportion to the size
or heat of the fire. Calhoun disapproved of
this wild ado about so little, and that now happened quite frequently which but a few weeks
before had seemed impossible, - that his name
was not mentioned at all at the political festivities of the radicals. He did not take this slight




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much to heart, nor had he any reason to do so.
Not only was it a matter of course that Polk
had not become a protectionist, but it was also
perfectly evident that for the present the tariff
was but a question of the second or third order.
In both parties the opinions were far from being in full accord on this head, and in neither
did the masses of those who were not most
immediately interested in it feel very deeply
about it. And now should a storm be artificially raised about a little more or less of duties,
and thereby the gauntlet thrown into the face
not only of the whole Whig party, North and
South, but of all those who were too dull of
comprehension to see the conservative force of
nullification, and who clung to the old-fashioned
idea that a law is a law, and has to be obeyed,
- now, when the opportunity was offered of
securing a prize of incalculable value to the
democracy? Holmes and Rhett might amuse
their followers by a revival of the nullification
idea, " meditate ulterior measures," talk of disunion, and declare that "to this complexion it
must come at last;" Calhoun had packed away
his thunderbolts, and thus far he alone knew
how to use them effectually.
So early as 1839 he had, in the face of almost countless declarations to the contrary,
and yet apparently in good faith, astonished




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the Senate by the emphatic assertion that a dissolution of the Union ever had been, and would
remain in all future time, an imaginary danger.
Replying to Mr. Buchanan, he had said:" The senator has done no more than justice to
that measure [the compromise tariff]. It terminated
honestly and fairly, without the sacrifice of any interest, one of the most dangerous controversies that
ever disturbed the Union or endangered its existence. Not the danger of dismemberment, as we learn
from the senator, was anticipated abroad. No, the
danger lay in a different direction. Dismemberment
is not the only mode in which our Union may be
destroyed. It is a Federal Union, an Union of sovereign States, and can be as effectually and much
more easily destroyed by consolidation than by dismemberment. He who knows anything of the history
of our race and the workings of the human breast
best understands the great and almost insuperable
difficulties in the way of dissolution. There is scarcely
an instance on record of any people, speaking the
same language and having the same government and
laws, who have ever dissolved their political connections through internal causes or struggles.... The
constant struggle is to enlarge, and not to divide; and
there neither is nor ever has been the least danger
that our Union would terminate in dissolution."
That was no bait thrown to "the political
sopranos" of the North. He believed what he
said, yet he did not mean to retract a single syl



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lable of what he had declared so often before.
The Union and abolition, as he had once expressed it, cannot coexist. If the spirit of the
fanatical visionaries of the North is not chained
down, then the Union is irretrievably gone, for
between the Union and slavery the South has
no choice. But he is satisfied that the South
will never be pressed before this alternative.
In the letter, before mentioned, to the citizens
of Athens, he had written: -
"Of all the questions which have been agitated
under our government, abolition is that in which we
of the South have the deepest concern. It strikes
directly and fatally, not only at our prosperity, but
our existence as a people. Should it succeed, our fate
would be worse than that of the aborigines whom we
have driven out, or the slaves whom we command.
It is a question that admits of neither concession nor
compromise..... There is one point in connection
with this important subject on which the South
ought to be fully informed. From all that I saw and
heard during the session, I am perfectly satisfied that
we must look to ourselves, and ourselves only, for
safety. It is perfectly idle to look to the non-slaveholding States to arrest the attacks of the fanatics.... Nor would it be less vain to look to Congress.
The same cause that prevents the non-slave-holding
States from interference in our favor at home will
equally prevent Congress.... But, if true to ourselves, we need neither their sympathy nor aid. The




220         JOHN C. CALHOUN
Constitution has placed in our power ample means,
short of secession or disunion, to protect ourselves."
We have seen more than once that he had
his hours of despondency, when this conviction
was severely shaken, but it was never wholly
relinquished. And now he thought that the
day had come when a pillar of such gigantic
dimensions could be put as an additional support under the dome of slavery that it would
be able to withstand all the assaults of abolitionism. The annexation of Texas was to render the Union indissoluble by strengthening the
slave power so much that it would have nothing
more to apprehend.




CHAPTER VIII


TEXAS
As early as May 23, 1836, Calhoun had declared in the Senate that he -
"had made up his mind not only to recognize the
independence of Texas, but for her admission into
this Union; and if the Texans managed their affairs
prudently, they would soon be called upon to decide
that question. No man could suppose for a moment
that that country could ever come again under the
dominion of Mexico; and he was of opinion that it
was not for our interests that there should be an independent community between us and Mexico. There
were powerful reasons why Texas should be a part
of this Union. The Southern States, owning a slave
population, were deeply interested in preventing that
country from having the power to annoy them."
Thus, but one month after the battle of Ja.
cinto, he publicly and formally announced his
programme with regard to the question which
was to be the pivotal point on which the fate
of slavery was to turn. No other single individual did so much as he to bring about
the annexation.  He himself has emphatically




222


JOHN C. CALHOUN


claimed that merit, and he considered it the
greatest and most beneficent achievement of his
public career. Perhaps it was, as things finally
turned out, but he would have cursed the day
on which he put his hand to the plough, if
he had known what a dragon seed was to be
planted. On F-Ibruary 24, 1847, when the harvesting of the fatal crop had already begun, he
said in the Senate: -
"I trust, Mr. President, there will be no dispute
hereafter as to who is the real author of annexation.
Less than twelve months since, I had many competitors for that honor: the official organ here claimed,
if my memory serves me, a large share for Mr.
Polk and his administration, and not less than half a
dozen competitors from other quarters asserted themselves to be the real authors. But now, since the
war [with Mexico] has become unpopular, they all
seem to agree that I, in reality, am the author of
annexation. I will not put the honor aside. I may
now rightfully and indisputably claim to be the author of that great measure, - a measure which has
so much extended the domains of the Union; which
has added so largely to its productive powers; which
promises so greatly to extend its commerce; which
has stimulated its industry, and given security to our
most exposed frontier. I take pride to myself as
being the author of this great measure."
Though there is no positive proof for it, Benton's allegation is therefore probably true, that




TEXAS


223


Calhoun was also the real author of the intrigue
which was to give the annexation wheel the
necessary impetus, after several years had been
spent in unsuccessful attempts to put it properly into motion. Other circumstances point
in the same direction, and that he at first carefully kept himself concealed in the background
is satisfactorily explained by the fact that the
immediate purpose of the intrigue was to bring
the still enormous influence of Jackson into
play.
In the beginning of 1843 a Baltimore newspaper published a letter of Gilmer, dated January 10, to " a friend " (Duff Green) in Maryland, on the necessity of the annexation of
Texas. Benton says that the letter was like a
flash of lightning from a clear sky. The public,
however, were allowed to settle down once more
into indolent unconcern, for what followed was
played under cover. The letter touched most
strongly the two chords which were sure to find
the loudest echo in Jackson's breast: preservation against England's ambitious desires and the
strengthening of the Union. But as the name
of Gilmer, as well as Green, awakened the suspicion that Calhoun was seated in the prompter's box, the letter was sent to the "Sage of
the Hermitage" by Aaron V. Brown, of Tennessee, who was but an unconscious tool in




224


JOHN C. CALHOUN


other hands. Jackson answered at once in the
tone desired, and although the letter had been
confessedly asked for only for the purpose of
working on the masses, it was now carefully put
away until the opportune moment for its publication should come.  Those who held the
wires behind the curtain had attained their immediate end. Jackson had irrevocably engaged
himself for immediate annexation.  Without
himself being aware of it, he had thereby deprived himself of the possibility of throwing his
whole weight into the scales in favor of Van
Buren; for immediate annexation was to be
made the leading issue of the presidential campaign of 1844. This was another reason for
the Calhounites to insist upon the postponement
of the nominating convention, for they needed
time to tie the South so closely down to this
programme that it could not afterward draw
back for the sake of a question of persons.
A few months later, one of the greatest obstacles in the way of the annexationists was
removed by Webster's exit from the Cabinet.
Upshur, who, after a short interregnum under
Legare, became Tyler's Secretary of State,
worked with his whole energy and with considerable skill at the solution of this problem. On
October 16, 1843, he proposed a treaty of annexation to the Texan agent. Texas, however,




TEXAS


225


was not now quite so eager to grasp the outstretched hand as she had been heretofore.
Thanks to the efforts of England and France,
there was an armistice between her and Mexico,
and negotiations tending to a formal peace had
been begun. Van Zandt, the Texan charge d'affaires in Washington, in a letter of January
17, 1844, called the attention of Upshur to the
fact that, under these circumstances, a treaty of
annexation would drive Mexico to the immediate resumption of hostilities, and that it would
also cost Texas the friendship of the mediating
powers. He therefore confidentially inquired
whether, in case the proposal of annexation
were accepted by the Texan executive, the
President would, even before the ratification of
the treaty, protect Texas by a sufficiently strong
land and maritime force against all attacks.
Upshur dared not answer either yes or no. To
refuse the request was to drive Texas wholly
into the arms of England, while to grant it
was to pledge the President to assume, on his
own responsibility, as the price of Texas, the
war of Texas against Mexico.
The bursting of the cannon Peacemaker on
board the Princeton, on February 28, 1844,
ended the embarrassment of the Secretary. To
whose hands should the consummation of the
annexation now be confided? The answer to




226


JOHN C. CALHOUN


this question was not given, as one would have
expected, by the President, but by Henry A.
Wise. Already, more than two years before,
in a speech delivered in the House of Representatives, the hot-blooded Virginian had gone
into ecstasy over the idea "of planting the lone
star of the Texan banner on the Mexican capitol," of extending slavery to the Pacific, and of
robbing the Mexican churches. Now he thought
that the time had come to enter upon the realization of this sublime programme, and he was
too great a man to let the trifling considerations
of propriety, honesty, and right stand in his
way. He had the effrontery to go to McDuffie
and induce him to urge upon Calhoun the acceptance of the Secretaryship of State, causing
him (McDuffie) to believe that he (Wise) had
been sent by the President. Then he urged
Tyler to offer the place to Calhoun. The President at first declined to comply with the wish,
but he finally submitted, when he had been told
what his devoted friend had presumed to do.
Calhoun accepted, declaring at the same time
that he would resign the office so soon as annexation should become an accomplished fact.
It was the universal understanding that it was
only for this special purpose that he had been
called to the helm, and that only for this reason
he consented to become a member of the Cabinet




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227


of the President, who had no party in Congress,
and but a corporal's guard of office-holders
among the people, to sustain him. He afterwards fully confirmed this view. On February
12, 1847, he said in the Senate:"According to my view, the time was not propitious in one respect. The then President had no
party in either House. I am not certain that he had
a single supporter in this, and not more than four or
five in the other. It appeared to me to be a very
unpropitious moment, under such circumstances, to
carry through so important a measure. When it
was intimated to me that I was to be nominated for
the office of Secretary of State, I strongly remonstrated to my friends heref but before my remonstrance reached them, I was unanimously appointed,
and was compelled to accept. I saw the administration was weak, and that the very important measure
would be liable to be defeated. But circumstances
made action on it inevitable."
Niles's " Register " of March 23, 1844, said:
" The nomination of John C. Calhoun to the office
of Secretary of State, and the entire unanimity with
which that nomination has been approved, not only
by the Senate, but the public press of the country,
presents the incident, in our judgment, as one of the
most eventful, certainly in the life of that distinguished and talented statesman, and very possibly,
also, in the future and fate of the country, the inter



228


JOHN C. CALHOUN


ests of which, to a vast extent, indeed, are thereby
confided to him, at a moment of exceeding delicacy."
That the Senate unanimously confirmed the
nomination of a man of Calhoun's standing was
a matter of course; but it would have been
strange indeed if it had with entire unanimity
"approved" it, and stranger still if the whole
press, and consequently also the whole people,
had rejoiced at it, - too strange to be believed,
although some years later he himself asserted
that he had been called " by the unanimous
voice of the country to take charge of the
State Department." Just because it was in
fact "a moment of exceeding delicacy" and
" the future and the fate of the country " were,
"to a vast extent," confided to his hands, the
nomination of this most thorough-going and
most daring partisan inevitably caused the deepest concern to all the opponents of annexation,
while it gave the greatest satisfaction to all its
advocates. And he fully justified as well the
expectations of the latter as the apprehensions
of the former; but in doing so he blurred his
fair fame. The man who had had the courage
to become "an honest nullifier" ought to have
had the courage to manage this annexation
business with perfect honesty, though with a
high hand, and not stoop to sail under false col



TEXAS


229


ors. He would never have forgotten so far as
he did what he owed to the dignity of his country and his personal honor, if he had not thought
the annexation of such vital importance that
almost anything seemed justifiable to render
success more certain.
From the moment when Calhoun arrived in
Washington, the negotiations, which had been
rather stagnant during the interregnum, were
resumed with zeal, while public opinion was
aroused by the publication of Jackson's letter
of February 12, 1843, postdated 1844. John
Nelson, who provisionally had charge of the
State Department, had declined to accede to
the before-mentioned condition of Texas, for
the obvious reason that the President had not
the constitutional power to employ armed force
against a state with which the Union was at
peace. He had, however, assured the Texans
that Tyler was "not indisposed" to make the
desired disposition of the troops, in order that
they might be able to protect Texas at the
" proper time." Calhoun now tried his luck with
similar vague phrases, but the Texan agents
would not be paid off in such a way. On April
11 he yielded with a heavy heart, informing the
two plenipotentiaries that an order had been
issued to concentrate a powerful squadron in the
Gulf of Mexico, and "to move the disposable




230


JOHN C. CALHOUN


forces " on the southwestern frontier "to meet
any emergency." The only object he attained
was that he was allowed to evade the greatest
difficulty by one word, which left a possibility
open to him, not, indeed, to justify the action of
the administration, but to defend it by dialectic
subtleties. He declared that, " during the pendency of the treaty of annexation, the President
would deem it his duty to use all the means
placed within his power by the Constitution to
protect Texas from all foreign invasion." On
the following day the treaty was signed.
Ten days elapsed ere the treaty was submitted to the Senate. The reason of this, under
the circumstances, very surprising delay was
the wish of the Secretary to lay simultaneously
before the Senate a copy of a letter, which was
formally a reply to a dispatch of Lord Aberdeen,
and addressed to Mr. Pakenham, the English
plenipotentiary, but which, in fact, was a piece
of special pleading in justification of annexation,
directed to the people of the United States. A
more remarkable and more revolting document
has never been issued from the State Department of the country.
In the dispatch of December 26, 1843, which
had been communicated by Mr. Pakenham to
Secretary Upshur on February 26, 1844, Lord
Aberdeen had said: -




TEXAS


231


"We desire to see [slavery] abolished in Texas.
With regard to the latter point, it must be and is
well known, both to the United States and to the
whole world, that Great Britain desires, and is constantly exerting herself to procure, the general abolition of slavery throughout the world....  With regard to Texas, we avow that we wish to see slavery
abolished there, as elsewhere, and we would rejoice
if the recognition of that country by the Mexican
government should be accompanied by an engagement on the part of Texas to abolish slavery eventually, and under proper conditions, throughout the
republic."
Calhoun declared in his letter of April 18,
1844, to Mr. Pakenham, that these avowals
of Great Britain had made it, in the opinion
of the President, "the imperious duty of the
Federal government" to conclude, "in self-defence," a treaty of annexation with Texas as
the most effectual measure to defeat England's
intention.
"The United States have heretofore declined to
meet her [Texas'] wishes; but the time has now arrived when they can no longer refuse, consistently
with their own security and peace, and the sacred
obligation imposed by their constitutional compact
for mutual defence and protection.... They are
without responsibility for that state of things already
adverted to as the immediate cause of imposing on
them, in self-defence, the obligation of adopting the




232


JOHN C. CALHOUN


measures they have. They remained passive so long
as the policy on the part of Great Britain, which
has led to its adoption, had no immediate bearing on
their peace and safety."
It may not be correct to apply, without modification, the code of private ethics to politics;
but, however flexible political morality be, a lie
is a lie, and Calhoun knew that there was not
one particle of truth in these assertions. Almost eight years before, on May 23, 1836, as
we have seen, he himself had declared annexation to be necessary, and the first and fore.
most reason which he alleged for it was the
interest which the Southern States had in it,
on account of their peculiar institution. Two
years later his colleague, Mr. Preston, had
moved in the Senate, and Mr. Thompson, of
South Carolina, had also moved in the House
of Representatives, to declare annexation expedient. Several state Legislatures, as those of
Mississippi, Alabama, and Tennessee, had agitated the question with hot zeal, unreservedly
avowing that they did so "upon grounds somewhat local in their complexion, but of an import infinitely grave and interesting to the people who inhabit the southern portion of this
confederacy." In December, 1841, it was a pub.
lie secret in the political circles of Washington
that Tyler had again taken up the annexation




TEXAS


233.


project. It had, in fact, never been abandoned,
but only temporarily put off the order of the
day, because, for various reasons, the time had
not been deemed opportune. But on October
16, 1843, more than two months before Lord
Aberdeen's dispatch was written, and more than
four months before it was delivered, Upshur
had made the formal proposition of annexation.
Whether Calhoun had any knowledge of the
existence of this dispatch before he had consented to become the successor of Upshur we
do not know; but that he would have accepted
Tyler's invitation, and entered upon the office
with exactly the same programme, if Lord
Aberdeen's dispatch had never been written,
nobody has ever ventured to question. It is,
therefore, an incontestable fact that there was
not a particle of truth in those allegations of
the Secretary, and that he was fully conscious
of it.
To pervert the truth in such a manner required indeed a bold front. Even if the whole
world had not been familiar with the fact that
ever since the battle of San Jacinto the annexation of Texas had been but a question of time
with the whole South and the Democratic party,
Calhoun's assertion would have been simply
ridiculous. Lord Aberdeen's dispatch contained
absolutely nothing to startle or even to surprise




2314


JOHN C. CALHOUN


the United States. The avowals which, according to Calhoun, the President regarded with
such "deep concern," only stated a fact as notorious as the existence of slavery itself. That
England's hostility to slavery and her desire to
see it everywhere abolished was "for the first
time" avowed "to this government" was evidently of no consequence whatever, for it did
not add a grain's weight to the importance of
the fact. Lord Aberdeen expressly declared
that England's policy remained unaltered, and
Calhoun did not pretend to doubt in the least
the truth of this assurance. The mere fact
that England had seen fit to state, in an official
dispatch, what every schoolboy already knew
to be the case could not be a cause of alarm,
and the reason which had induced her to do it
was calculated to have exactly the opposite effect. Lord Aberdeen had not indulged in any
threats, but the only purpose of his dispatch was
to dispel any apprehensions which the United
States could possibly entertain. He said: -
" We should rejoice if the recognition of that country by the Mexican government 'should be accompanied by an engagement on the part of Texas to abolish slavery eventually, and under proper conditions
throughout the republic. But although we earnestly
desire and feel it to be our duty to promote such a
consummation, we shall not interfere unduly, or with




TEXAS


235


an improper assumption of authority, with either
party, in order to assure the adoption of such a course.
We shall counsel, but we shall not seek to compel or
unduly control, either party.... She [Great Britain] has no thought or intention of seeking to act directly or indirectly, in a political sense, on the United
States, through Texas.... The governments of the
slave-holding States may be assured that, although we
shall not desist from those open and honest efforts
which we have constantly made for procuring the
abolition of slavery throughout the world, we shall
neither openly nor secretly resort to any measures
which can tend to disturb their internal tranquillity,
or thereby to affect the prosperity of the American
Union."
It did not require the keen intellect of a Calhoun to see that these emphatic disclaimers
were meant to be the essential part of Lord
Aberdeen's dispatch, and not the sentences on
which he based his reply to Mr. Pakenham.
Yet it would be a great mistake to suppose that
they only served him as a pretext, because he
could find no better one, and that his uneasiness
on account of England's policy was feigned.
His alarm was not only most real, but it was
also fully justified. In the course of the negotiations with Texas, Upshur had repeatedly
avowed that the alleged ambitious designs of
Great Britain, and especially her exertions for




236


JOHN C. CALHOUN


the abolition of slavery in the republic, imperatively demanded that the annexation should no
longer be delayed. At the same time, however,
it was acknowledged on all sides that slavery
was doomed in Texas, independently of anything England might do. Leading Texans —
e. g. Ex-President Mirabeau B. Lamar -had
frequently declared that the anti-slavery party
would soon acquire the ascendency, and that the
abolition of slavery could be effected " without
the slightest inconvenience." The most zealous
advocates of annexation in Congress had emphatically indorsed this opinion, and Upshur
himself had written to Mr. Murphy, "If Texas
should not be attached to the United States, she
cannot maintain that institution [slavery] ten
years, and probably not half that time." Calhoun held the same opinion. He informed Mr.
Pakenham that the President had " the settled
conviction that it would be difficult for Texas,
in her actual condition, to resist what she [Great
Britain] desires, without supposing the influence
and exertions of Great Britain would be extended beyond the limits assigned by Lord Aberdeen;" and h/e added, "and this, if Texas could
not resist the consummation of the object of her
desire, would endanger both the safety and prosperity of the Union."
An independent Texas without slavery and




TEXAS


237


the permanent continuance of slavery in the
Union were, however, irreconcilable. Even if
this had been a mistake, as it undoubtedly was
not, the opponents of the slavocracy had no reason to contest the truth of this confession, for
it was the most destructive judgment which
could be passed on slavery. The slavocracy declared through its most gifted representative, in
an official document, that between it and liberty
there existed a conflict of principle so irreconcilable, that by the simple fact of the neighborhood of independent States in which slavery did
not exist, it was brought face to face with the
question of life or death. Did it not follow
directly from this that its political connection
with free States was possible only on the supposition of the complete subservience of the latter?
Was there a more forcible proof needed, or even
possible, than the very demand which the slavocracy now made, in consequence of that fact?
Because the slave-holding States thought their
peculiar institution endangered by the existence
of an independent free State, it was declared to
be the " imperative duty " and a " sacred obligation" of the United States, imposed 'by their c
constitutional compact, to absorb that State into
the Union, in order to prevent the abolition of
slavery in it. It was not only a fact that Texas
was to be annexed to make the continued exist.




238


JOHN C. CALHOUN


ence of slavery possible there, but the fact was
officially declared before the whole world by the
executive of the Union. The democratic republic, which had based its existence upon the rights
of man, was morally and constitutionally bound
to prevent the breaking of the chains of the
slave in a neighboring republic, though it could
be done only by adding these very chains to
those which already bound its arms. Calhoun's
letter to Pakenham was the official proclamation
of the " nationalization " of slavery, only, however, so far as it imposed duties upon the Union,
but by no means with regard to any corresponding rights. "With us," the Secretary declared,
the policy to be adopted in reference to the African race " is a question to be decided not by the
Federal government, but by each member of this
Union, for itself, according to its own views of
its domestic policy, and without any right on
the part of the Federal government to interfere
in any manner whatever. Its rights and duties
are limited to protecting, under the guarantees
of the Constitution, each member of this Union
in whatever policy it may adopt in reference to
the portion within its respective limits." The
slave-holding States had to say what was necessary to protect them in the policy they had been
pleased to adopt, and the Federal government
had to act accordingly. The President had had




TEXAS


239


no choice. The annexation of Texas was " the
most effectual, if not the only means of guarding against the threatened danger," and therefore he had acted simply " in obedience " to the
constitutional obligation of the Union. In other
words, it was the constitutional obligation of the
Union to engage in slavery propagandism in the
defence of the interests of the slavocracy, and,
confessedly, even at the risk of a war; for the
Secretary declared, in an official dispatch to
the American representative in Mexico, that the
step had been taken " in full view of all possible
consequences."
If the United States had indeed assumed such
sacred obligations towards the slave-holders, in
establishing the Constitution, there could be no
impropriety in it that Calhoun concluded his
letter with a short but enthusiastic exposition
of his theory of the "positive good."  But what
were those to think of it who did not acknowledge those obligations? Surely, the history
of the United States had entered upon a new
phase, if the Secretary of State could dare, in
an official communication and in the name of
the Federal Executive, to lecture a foreign state
upon the blessings of slavery. And by his own
testimony he stands convicted of having engaged in this whole correspondence partly for
the very purpose of doing that, and of having




240


JOHN C. CALHOUN


been grievously disappointed that the rejection
of the treaty prevented him from enlarging
upon this exalted theme.     The "Charleston
Mercury" of November 28, 1860, published a
previously unknown letter, dated July 2, 1844,
in which Calhoun says: —
"If an opportunity should offer, I had hoped to
draw out a full correspondence by my letters to Mr.
Pakenham. They were, in part, written with that
view, and were intended to lay the foundation of a
long and full correspondence; and I doubt not what
was intended would have been accomplished, had the
Senate done its duty [!] and ratified the treaty. Their
neglect to do so, I fear, will not only lose Texas to
the Union, but also defeat my aim in reference to
the correspondence. Had the treaty been ratified,
my last letter to Mr. Pakenham, which he transmitted to his government, would not have been left
without a reply, which would have brought on what
I intended. As it is, it will not be answered, as I
infer from Mr. Pakenham's conversation recently.
His government is content to leave to our Senate
the defence of its course, and is too wise, when it can
be avoided, to carry on a correspondence in which
they see they have little to gain. I regret it. It
will, I fear, be difficult to get another opportunity to
bring out our cause fully and favorably before the
world. I shall omit none which may afford a decent
pretext for renewing the correspondence."
Even ultra-Democratic papers and journals




TEXAS


241


in the North criticised the Pakenham letter in
the severest terms. The "Democratic Review,"
though it advocated immediate annexation, and
professed "exalted admiration, respect, and
even attachment" for Calhoun, complained
with bitterness that the President and his
Secretary had not left a shred of the Southern
doctrine, which was also that of the Northern
Democrats, that slavery was a local institution,
"with which the free States had nothing to do,
for which they were in no wise responsible."
It reproved with indignation the "volunteer
discussion of the essential merits of this peculiar local institution through the peculiar organ
of our collective nationality, for which, if for
anything, the Union, and the whole Union, is
emphatically responsible." Without reserve, it
avowed that Calhoun had "nationalized" and
"federalized" slavery, "actually pledging the
military intervention of the country, by a simple
unconstitutional executive promise, to plunge
directly into war with Mexico if she should
execute her threat of immediate invasion of
Texas;" and all this " on the avowed ground, the
almost exclusively avowed ground, of strengthening and preserving the institution of slavery."
Such language from a leading organ of their
own party might well have induced the President and his Secretary to pause and ponder.




242


JOHN C. CALHOUN


Even if they succeeded, they were evidently
playing a dangerous game. The deep-seated
dissatisfaction in their own camp indicated that
it would probably not be ended by their winning
the stakes, and the sequel might be very far
from corresponding with the beginning. But
Calhoun, who so justly boasted of being wont to
look to the farthest consequences of every question, bad now neither ears nor eyes for anything
except his immediate object. It is asserted that
he obtained from Archer, of Virginia, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
the solemn promise that he would delay the
Senate forty days with regard to the annexation
treaty. The alleged reason for this wish was
that Mexico's answer to the notification of the
treaty was expected by the last day of that
term. That was unquestionably an empty pretence, for in various ways this time might have
easily been shortened a little; and, besides, it
had been declared from the first that Mexico
would not be allowed to interfere in any way
whatever in this question. The term was evidently fixed with relation to the national convention of the Democratic party, which was to
meet two days earlier at Baltimore. Calhoun
wanted to make sure of the party with regard
to the main question, ere he allowed the Senate
to come to a decision on the treaty. The " Spec



TEXAS                243
tator," the reputed organ of Calhoun in Washingiton, had formally declared that Van Buren
was to be considered " as beside the presidential
canvass," because he had refused to pledge
himself for immediate annexation. Therewith
the programme was announced which the annexationists were resolved to impose upon the
convention at all hazards. After a long and
arduous struggle over the preliminary questions,
they triumphed completely. The majority vote
which Van Buren received at the first ballot
was a bootless compliment. His partisans knew
that they had lost the game before the voting
commenced. On the eighth ballot the name
of Governor Polk, of Tennessee, appeared for
the first time, and on the next ballot he was
nominated. Polk was what, in the political
slang of to-day, is called "a dark horse;" but
as to the test question, he could have been implicitly trusted, even if the platform had not
pledged the party to " the re-annexation of
Texas at the earliest practicable period."
The impatience which Calhoun had betrayed
in the first stages of his annexation campaign
proved that he would have manceuvred with
more quickness and boldness if he had not had
good reason to apprehend that the Senate would
take serious objection to his policy. It was well
known that the treaty would not be supported




244


JOHN C. CALHOUN


by all those who were in favor of speedy annexation. The Pakenham correspondence was a
two-edged sword. Calhoun had cut himself as
badly as he had cut his opponents. He had
succeeded in consolidating the South to the extent that he had expected; but, at the same
time, he had aroused the feeling of the North
to such a degree that even the best disposed
senators were afraid that they would commit
political suicide by voting for this treaty, after
it had been officially based on such grounds.
Besides, they did not see why such immoderate
haste should be necessary. Tyler's and Calhoun's interests might be well enough served
by it, but that was only another reason for them
to curb the over-zealous administration. While
there were but few, if any, senators who, under
any circumstances, wouldh have been anxious to
smooth the way of either the President or the
Secretary in the pursuit of any personal ends,
the majority deemed it a duty to administer to
them a severe rebuke for their gross infringements upon the rights of Congress and the lack
of consideration for the Senate, which had characterized the whole transaction. Even zealous
annexationists indulged in searching and caustic criticisms of the treaty and all the attendant
circumstances, and on June 8 it was rejected by
a vote of thirty-five against sixteen.




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245


The dismay of Tyler and Calhoun was great,
but they were not in the least daunted. They
were bent upon attaining their end. If it was
not to be secured in this way, nothing was to
deter them from trying any other which promised success, though they might have to ride
rough-shod over the Constitution and all the
constitutional doctrines which they had heretofore professed. On the second day after the
rejection of the treaty, the President sent a message to the House of Representatives, accompanied by all the documents relating to the question. The essence of the message was contained
in the declaration that Congress was "fully
competent, in some other form of proceeding,
to accomplish everything that a formal ratification of the treaty could have accomplished."
That was in fact an appeal from the Senate,
which had the unquestionable right to reject
a treaty, to the House of Representatives, to
which no power has been given by the Constitution in relation to treaties. What was the
sense of rendering the consent of two thirds of
the Senate indispensable for the conclusion of
every treaty, if, after a treaty had been rejected
by the Senate, a simple majority of both Houses
of Congress had the right -virtually to ratify
it, by accomplishing in some other form what
the treaty was to have accomplished? Like a




216


JOHN C. CALHOUN


French cavalier of the old regime, Tyler waived
away this question with the bold reply, "The
great question is, not as to the manner in which
it shall be done, but whether it shall be accomplished or not." That such an answer would
not have been given, unless it was fully approved by Calhoun, will not be doubted. But
when had the most reckless Federalists ever
dared to profess such an unblushing latitudinarianism, or to nationalize the Union to such an
extent by pushing the Constitution aside, and
giving the Federal government carte blanche in
a question more important than any other ever
submitted to it? Verily, the country had fallen
upon strange times, if such a doctrine could be
officially proclaimed by the President, under the
sanction of the man who had come very near
plunging the Union into a civil war, by pushing
his states-rights theory to such extremities that
he found, in the right of nullification, the mainstay of the Union and its great conservative
principle.
The President had made no definite proposition to Congress, but the language of the message of June 10 was too plain to admit any
doubt that the administration would not let
matters quietly take their own course after the
close of the session. The check which it had
received had made it only more determined and




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247


bolder. Upon a notification from the Texan
Secretary of State that Mexico intended a new
invasion, Calhoun stated that his letter of April
11 had promised armed intervention only in
case this emergency should occur while the
treaty of annexation was pending. We have
seen how loath he had been to give this promise,
which his immediate predecessor, Nelson, had
declared unconstitutional, and yet he now, September 10, after the treaty had been rejected,
volunteered to extend the obligation to the whole
time during which "the question of annexa,
tion" should remain "pending."  In a formal
and constitutional sense, however, annexation
was not now at all a pending question. That
the President had expressed the wish to see it
ultimately accomplished, no matter in what
way, and that some members of Congress had
suggested this and that, did not and could not
make it a question in this sense. The treaty
had been rejected, the Executive had not entered upon new negotiations with Texas for another treaty, and Congress was not even in session. The annexation of Texas was, therefore,
no more a " pending question " than the tariff,
the bank, or any other political problem in
which the people took a lively interest. There
was absolutely nothing to be found in the astual condition of things from which even the




248


JOHN C. CALHOUN


most subtle dialectics could deduce any internal
tional rights or obligations, Besides, the Senate had given it to be understood, in no very
ambiguous manner, that, at least in what concerned the President's independent initiative,
it did not approve of the promises made in the
letter of April 11. Calhoun, therefore, forbore
to announce, in express words, an armed intervention; but the declaration that the United
States would feel themselves " highly offended"
by a renewal of the war, and that they would
not 1' permit it," virtually amounted to the same
thing. When the news came that Mexican
agents were agitating the Indians at the frontier, - news which never failed to reach Wash.
ington, whenever it was opportune that it
should come, - Calhoun followed up his protest
of September 10 by authorizing (September 17)
the Union troops to enter Texas as soon as the
Texans should desire it.
In their hot pursuit of the long-coveted prize,
which had so unexpectedly slipped through their
fingers, Tyler and Calhoun were, in fact, as
ready "to assume the full responsibility" for
any step which promised to bring them nearer
the goal as Andrew Jackson had ever been
when the constitutionality or legality of his acts
was called into question. Perhaps they would
have proceeded with a little more caution, if the




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249


Southern annexationists had not set them the
example of an unblushing recklessness, which
was without a parallel in the whole history of
the Union. The threats of disunion, if the
North dared to resist this extension of the domain of slavery, were too common to make the
desired impression. Much more effect had the
announcement that the North would have to
choose between Texas and the abolition of the
tariff of 1842. There were many respectable
men in the North who honestly believed slavery
to be a sin and a curse, but who loved their
pockets more than they hated slavery. With
others, again, their party attachment was
stronger than their hatred and fear of slavery.
They benumbed their consciences with the illusion that they could cleanse their skirts of all
responsibility by protesting against the annexation and recommending the election of anti-annexationists to Congress, while they voted for
Polk. As to the office-seekers, a slight raising
of the party whip was, of course, sufficient to
make them all zealous annexationists, no matter
what their convictions had been before the Baltimore Convention; their convictions had to be
stored away for the time being, for it would
have been foolhardiness to carry such heavy baggage in so hot a race, with so many competitors.
So the annexationists could count upon the




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


whole Democratic party of the North, though
a considerable part of it either entirely disapproved of annexation, or, at least, thought immediate annexation inexpedient. Yet, in spite
of that and of their complete control over the
Federal patronage, the annexationists would have
lost the election, if the Liberty Party, instead
of putting up a candidate of their own, had supported the Whigs, in order to bar the way to
the former. The votes of that party caused
the Whigs to lose the States of New York and
Michigan, and with them the election. Polk
was elected, but the history of the election
proved beyond contradiction that the majority
of the people were opposed to immediate annexation. Tyler's annual message of December 3,
however, not only asserted the contrary, but declared that both Houses of Congress had been
instructed, - by "a controlling majority of the
people, and a large majority of the States," —
"in terms the most emphatic," to accomplish
annexation immediately, and he therefore recommended it to be done in the most simple way,
namely, by joint resolution.
How often had the holy anger of Calhoun's
constitutional and political conscience been
aroused by Jackson's daring to put such interpretations upon elections! Yet everything with
which Jackson could be justly reproached in




TEXAS


- 251


this respect was mere child's play, in comparison with the monstrosity of the political heresy
of this assertion and with its brazen disregard
of truth; and that Tyler neither would nor
could have ventured to make it without Calhoun's consent nobody will contest.   It was
simply not true that the election had pre.
sented to the people for its decision " the isolated question of annexation." If it had been
true, the result could, perhaps, by means of
Benton's " demos krateo " principle, have been
tortured into an instruction "to both branches
of Congress, by their respective constituents;"
but neither the most searching chemical analysis nor the most powerful microscope could
discover the slightest vestige of this " demos
krateo principle " in the Constitution. Besides,
the theory of the message refuted itself in such
a way that not another word is needed to show
it up as a political counterfeit of the most
bungling kind. If the electoral votes of the
several States were binding instructions to the
respective senators, the eleven States which had
voted for Clay had instructed their senators,
"in terms the most emphatic," against annexation. The Union, however, consisted at the
time of but twenty-six States, and the least important of treaties required the assent of two
thirds of the senators. Thus the "instruc



252


JOHN C. CALHOUN


tions" which the senators had received from
the " States " made it impossible to accomplish
annexation in the way which Tyler himself had
acknowledged to be at least " the most suitable."
Yet the "instructions " from a simple majority
of States would, by the theory advanced, have
made it the imperative duty of the Senate to
conclude, without any further previous consideration, a compact with a foreign power, than
which it is impossible to imagine one more important. If the "people," by means of a presidential election, could oblige Congress to incorporate a foreign state, and if Congress could
effect such incorporation by a simple majority
resolution, the "consolidation" of the Union
was complete, and its confederate character was
completely and forever lost. The theory of the
message was, in fact, the subversion of all the
\ underlying principles of Calhoun's political doctrines, upon which he had based his defence of
the "peculiar institution." In spite of that,
however, he consented to this theory without
any compunction, because the slavocracy would
have to die, and to die beyond resurrection, if it
could not get more land and create more slaveholding States.
Congress did not accede to the proposition of
the President without a little more ado. The
House of Representatives, indeed, was satisfied




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253


with having the line of the Missouri Compromise continued through Texas; but, in the Senate, a back door had to be provided for the consciences of those annexationists who held that
the only constitutional way of effecting the annexation was by treaty. The resolution of the
House of Representatives was amended, by authorizing the President to negotiate another
treaty of annexation, if he should deem it more
advisable to do so than to submit the joint resolution to Texas. Benton and the other senators, who had sustained the above-mentioned
constitutional view, never deigned to inform the
people whence they derived the right to give
the President the choice to bring about the annexation, either in the constitutional or in an
unconstitutional way, as he should think best.
The crutch with which they limped over this
obstacle was McDuffie's declaration that Calhoun would not have the " audacity" to choose
the unconstitutional way, and submit the joint
resolution to Texas. Did they really so little
know the man who had dared to become " an
honest nullifier"? On March 1, 1845, the joint
resolution was approved by the President. On
Calhoun's advice "to act without delay," the
Cabinet were summoned the next day, and concurred in the opinion of the Secretary of State,
who wrote his dispatch, inviting Texas to ac.




254


JOHN C. CALHOUN


cept the terms of the joint resolution, the same
night, and sent it off "late in the evening of
March 3," a few hours before the expiration of
Tyler's term of office. His reasons for acting
thus he has repeatedly stated with a candor
which proves that he would have been equal to
a much greater " audacity," if it had been necessary to secure his object. In the dispatch to
Mr. Donelson he wrote, " But the decisive objection to the amendment of the Senate is that
it would endanger the ultimate success of the
measure.... A treaty...must be submitted
to the Senate for its approval, and run the hazard of receiving the votes of two thirds of the
members present; which could hardly be expected, if we are to judge from recent experience."  And on February 24, 1847, he declared
in the Senate, " I selected the resolution of the
House in preference to the amendment of which
the senator from Missouri was the author,...
because I clearly saw, not only that it was
every way preferable, but the only certain mode
by which annexation could be effected...
That the course I adopted did secure the annexation, and that it was indispensable for that purpose, I have high authority in my possession."
Thus it was that he triumphed over all ob.
stacles, and succeeded in virtually accomplishing the purpose for which he had consented to




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255


become a member of Tyler's Cabinet. What
right had he to complain that the work was
continued by his successors in the spirit in
which it had been begun by him? Why should
Polk's diplomatic conscience be more conformable to the code of private morals than his
own? In order to get Texas, he, the sternest
and most jealous partisan of strict construction,
had loosened the bridle of the Constitution more
than any of his predecessors had ever dared to
do. What right had he to cry out and wash
his hands of all responsibility, when his disciples refused to listen to his warning voice, and
rushed on in mad zeal along the track upon
which he had started them? He had hit the
mark, but the ball pierced the target and continued its fatal flight.
"Calhoun's friends expected that he would be
called upon to finish the great work which he
had directed with so much skill and energy,
and it is asserted that he shared their opinion.
We cannot prove the contrary, but are inclined
to think that he judged Polk more correctly.
If he really expected to remain at the head of
the Cabinet, the wish was father to the thought.
Polk certainly never intended to tender him the
office. Now, after the annexation of Texas was
as good as accomplished, the whole party would
probably have been rather dissatisfied to see the




256


JOHN C. CALHOUN


first place awarded to the leader of the small
faction on its extreme left wing, which was so
easily tempted to break through the bonds of
party discipline and assume an independent
position. Especially Jackson would have been
deeply mortified, and Polk, who would never
have reached the top of the ladder if he had not
clung so faithfully to the heels of the general,
was not inclined to array Jackson's still enormous influence against the administration. Besides, it was asserted that the offended politicians of New York had exacted the promise that,
in consideration of their supporting the nominees
of the Baltimore Convention, Calhoun should be
discarded. But, above all, Polk was personally
not at all desirous to put a political star of
this magnitude and brilliancy in too close proximity with the rushlight of his own talents and
achievements. Calhoun's character and whole
political course absolutely forbade his honest
subordination under another man's mind and
will, and Polk was, too ambitious and self-conscious to be a mere figure-head where it was his
right and even his duty to be the real chief.
On the other hand, he was well aware that
openly to slight the Calhounites in the person
of their leader would be the extreme of folly.
He therefore offered him the first diplomatic
office, the legation at the Court of St. James,




TEXAS


257


undoubtedly fully satisfied that the honor would
be politely declined.
Many years before, at the end of 1819, when
Mr. Gallatin had expressed the wish to be recalled from Paris, Adams had asked Calhoun
whether he would accept the post. Calhoun had
then answered "that he was well aware that a
long and familiar practical acquaintance with
Europe was indispensable to complete the education of an American statesman, and regretted
that his fortune would not bear the cost of it."
Calhoun devoted much time to the management of his estate, and he had the reputation
of being an uncommonly experienced and efficient planter; but his pecuniary circumstances
remained modest, though he lived with his numerous family in unostentatious but solid comfort, and could indulge in the true luxury of
always bidding a hearty welcome to the throngs
of friends who came to enjoy the hospitality of
his table and the pleasure of his genial company. It is, therefore, very possible that he
would have declined, under all circumstances,
Polk's offer, for the same reason which had dictated his answer to the overtures of Adams. But
it is unquestionable that he would have taken
the same course for political reasons, if he had
been the wealthiest man on the continent. Polk
knew perfectly well that he paid Calhoun an




258


JOHN C. CALHOUN


empty compliment, for it was certain that his
going to London in such critical times would
be considered by himself and by his political
friends a kind of desertion. It was too late in
the day to go to Europe in order to finish his
education as a statesman. If he now accepted
a diplomatic post, it could only be for one of
two reasons: either because he wanted to gratify his ambition and vanity, or because he
thought that he could render his country important services. This kind of ambition, however, though its fire had not entirely ceased
to burn in his bosom, was no longer strong
enough to determine his resolution in a question
of such moment; and though it might soon become of great consequence who was the representative of the United States in London, yet
he could evidently do much more to avert any
dangers which might possibly arise if he should
stay in his old place in the Senate, where he
was not obliged to follow the instructions of
other people, but was entirely free to be guided
by his own opinion. His character and the
peculiar part which he had played these last
fifteen years in the history of the Union absolutely forbade his being an instrument in other
men's hands; either he had to direct the policy
of the Union, so far as that could be done by
the Executive, or he had to remain the inde.




TEXAS


259


pendent senator, the foremost champion of the
slavocracy and the leader of the ultra statesrights faction. The former he could not do,
and weighty reasons demanded that he should
once more return to the post which he had occupied so long with so much distinction. Unhesitatingly he had thrown his influence into
the scales for Polk, because he had only to
choose between him and Clay; but the late Governor of Tennessee and Speaker of the House
of Representatives would not have been his own
first choice, and he was far from being satisfied
that either the foreign or domestic policy of the
new President would entirely accord with his
own views. The wild denunciations in which
the radicals of South Carolina had indulged
during the campaign had been disapproved by
him, but he thought it wise not only to wait,
but also to watch. He therefore readily returned to his seat in the Senate, which was
vacated by his successor as a matter of course.
His position in his State was such that he might
consider the seat as belonging to him of right,
so long as he was willing to remain in public
life.




CHAPTER IX


OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR
WHEN Calhoun was invited to become the
head of Tyler's Cabinet, the "Richmond Enquirer" said, "We cannot entertain a moment's doubt that he has been selected with a
special regard to the question of Oregon and the
annexation of Texas." The order of the two
matters ought to have been reversed, but it
I was correct that, next to Texas, Oregon was the
most important subject in the order of the day,
and that it required a master's hand to bring
the negotiations with England to a mutually
satisfactory termination. Yet it is very unlikely that Calhoun himself harbored the delusion that he would add a new laurel leaf to his
wreath by accomplishing that task. Everything
that could be said in support of the claims of
the United States he counted up with his customary ability, but he had no new fact and no
new argument to add to what had been repeated
already a dozen times. He, therefore, made no
more impression upon Pakenham than Pakenham made upon him by reiterating for the




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 261
tenth time what England had to say in support of her claims. In this way it was evidently
impossible to advance a single inch on either
side. The two powers could go on telling their
respective stories to the end of days, and the
only result of it would be the heaping of proof
upon proof that nothing could be thus attained.
The journals of the discoverers and the legal
arguments were certainly of some weight, and
an impartial examination of them undoubtedly
leads to the conclusion that of the two incomplete and contestable titles that of the United
States was the better. But no log-books and
no principles of public and international law, as
laid\down by Hugo Grotius, could avail anything against the simple fact that, by a solemn
and repeatedly renewed agreement, the Territory was held in joint occupancy by the two powers, and that the possession of it was deemed
by both an interest of such moment that neither
would ever voluntarily yield the whole ground
to the other. As neither wished to continue
the status quo, and still less to cut the knot
with the sword, a compromise was the only way
to settle the controversy. Great Britain there4re proposed to submit it to an arbitrator; but
on January 21, 1845, Calhoun, in the name of
the President, declined this offer, upon the
ground that "it would be unadvisable to enter



262


JOHN C. CALHOUN


tain a proposal to resort to any other mode, so
long as there is hope of arriving at a satisfactory settlement by negotiation."
There the matter was allowed to rest for the
time. Tyler and Calhoun left it to their successors exactly as they had found it. Yet it is
to be supposed that Calhoun was tolerably well
satisfied, and thought that he had done the best
thing possible, under the circumstances, for the
interest of the United States. In the beginning
of 1843 a bill for the occupation and settlement of the Oregon Territory had been before
Congress. Calhoun opposed its passage, because he thought that the United States had no
right, under the convention of 1818-27, to offer
land bounties to settlers. With many others,
he apprehended that this might lead to a breach
with England, and he deprecated it as the greatest folly on the part of the United States to do
anything tending to provoke a decision by arbitrament of arms. In six weeks England could
bring a strong naval and military force from
China to the mouth of the Columbia River,
while the American fleet, which would have to
double Cape Horn, would need about six months
to reach that point; and the overland march
from Missouri would require at least one hundred and twenty days, if indeed it were possible
to sustain any considerable force in a region so




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 263
destitute of supplies. The United States would,
therefore, surely be worsted in a conflict of
arms for the dominion over that distant country. On the other hand, the almost miraculous
growth of the population of the United States
and the impetus with which it was " rolling towards the shores of the Pacific" rendered it
an absolute certainty that, in a comparatively
short time, the United States would be as much
stronger in Oregon than England as England
was now stronger than they. Therefore Calhoun's advice was, " Let us be wise and abide
our time; it will accomplish all that we desire
with more certainty and with infinitely less sacrifice than we can without it." " All we want,
to effect our object in this case, is 'a wise and
masterly inactivity.'"
Calhoun had now acted in strict conformity to
this programme, and, as a settlement of the controversy according to the wishes of the United
States was as yet impossible, it is to be presumed that he was not exactly dissatisfied that
the negotiation had had no result except to add
another bundle of useless papers to the archives
of the State Department.
President Polk's inaugural address made a
sharp cut through this policy of "wise and
masterly inactivity" by declaring the title of
the United States to the Territory " clear and




264


JOHN C. CALHOUN


unquestionable." The whole country was thrown
into wild excitement by this declaration, for if
Congress took the same view of the question
the breach with England seemed almost inevitable. That the President, in spite of his
" blustering announcement," as Lord John Russell called that declaration, addressed a compromise proposition to England was a surprise;
but the chances of an amicable settlement were
not thereby increased, for in one of the earlier
negotiations the United States had been willing to yield more than what was now offered
by Polk. Since England had then rejected
the greater concession as insufficient, it was a
matter of course that she would not now accept
the smaller offer. Besides, Polk had accompanied it with the declaration that "he would
not have consented to yield any portion of the
Oregon Territory had he not found himself
embarrassed, if not committed, by the acts of his
predecessors." He therefore withdrew his offer
after it had been rejected by England, and his
annual message declared " that no compromise
which the United States ought to accept can be
effected." At the same time he advised the
abrogation of the convention of 1818-27. The
consequence was that, as Calhoun afterwards
stated, "stocks of every description fell, marine
insurances rose, commercial pursuits were sus



OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 265
pended, and our vessels remained inactive at the
wharves." General Cass, after previous consultation with the President and Secretary of State,
poured oil into the flames by a violent speech
(December 15, 1845), which culminated in the
assertion that " war is almost upon us." Several
senators expressed in strong terms their dissatisfaction with the course which the influential senator from Michigan had seen fit to pursue. It seemed, however, as if the majority of
both Houses of Congress would only too willingly follow the lead of the administration.
On December 18, Senator Allen, the chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, moved
a joint resolution, advising the President "to
give, forthwith, notice to Great Britain that
the government of the United States... will
terminate the convention existing relative to
the joint occupancy of the Oregon Territory."
And on January 5, 1846, the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the House moved a resolution, peremptorily demanding "that the President of the United States forthwith cause notice to be given to the government of Great
Britain," etc.
The right to give notice at any time they
pleased had been expressly stipulated by the
high contracting powers in the convention of
1827. The adoption of those resolutions, there



266


JOHN C. CALHOUN


fore, would not have given Great Britain any
just cause of complaint. The spirit, however,
which actuated the hotspurs made the words
almost equivalent to a declaration of war. The
notice that the United States wanted the joint
occupancy to terminate was understood to be
a notification that Great Britain must abandon
her claims at once and absolutely, or take the
consequences. "Fifty-four forty or fight " was
the plain language of the radicals. A set of
resolutions, introduced by Senator Hannegan,
boldly denied even the power of the government to settle the controversy by any compromise or to concede one foot of the Territory to
England. Calhoun, on December 30, 1845, introduced a set of counter-resolutions, asserting
the power of the government which Hannegan
denied; stating the fact that, however clear the
title of the United States to the whole Territory
might be in their opinion, there were conflict-,; ing claims to the possession of the same be'tween them and Great Britain; and declaring
that the President, in proposing the forty-ninth
degree as a compromise boundary, did not \
" abandon the honor, the character, or the best
interests of the American people."          J
These counter-resolutions rolled a heavy load
from the breasts of all those in whose opinion
it was a criminal folly to treat this question in




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 267
a manner which, if it was not intended to pro.
voke a war, actually pressed the British lion
to the alternative of crouching like a whipped
spaniel, or of using his powerful claws. It was
generally believed that it depended upon Calhoun whether passion and ambition or cool
statesmanship should rule the day, and though
the resolutions were clad in a strictly negative
form they left no doubt which side could count
upon his determined support.
To-day, probably, nobody will contest that
this is one of his best claims upon the gratitude
of his country, and yet it cannot be denied that
there was a good deal of solid matter in the
avalanche of bitter complaints and stinging reproaches which the Northwestern radicals hurled
against him and all the Democrats of the South.
Calhoun had carefully abstained from laying
down any positive programme in his resolutions, because his programme was now, as it
had been in 1843, to have none, -the policy
of "wise and masterly inactivity."  And the
reasons which he had then adduced for this
course were now as good as they had been at
that time. He was probably right in supposing that a war would result in the loss of
" every inch" of the Territory; nor could anybody question that time was the ally of the
United States, and was working in their favor




268


JOHN C. CALHOUN


with a force which Great Britain would ulti.
mately be unable to resist. But this being so,
why did he not pursue his reasoning to the last
consequences? According to his argument, the
United States were sure to get the whole Territory, if they would but have patience and bide
their time; yet he did not contend for the continuation of the joint occupancy so long as
England could be prevailed upon not to give
notice. He still asserted that, in his opinion,
the title of the United States to the whole Territory was good, and that he wished to secure
the possession of the whole to them; but the
whole tenor of his resolutions, and especially
the last one, which declared that the offer of
the forty-ninth degree was not an abandonment of their "best interests," clearly indicated
that a fair compromise would meet with his
approval.
That was the wisest and therefore a truly
patriotic policy, but would he have advocated
it if Oregon had been situated south of Mason and Dixon's line?   The history of the
annexation of Texas answers this question in
an unmistakable manner. Only party passion
could doubt that the patriotism of the South
was strong enough to defend with energy the
rights of the Union, whenever these rights were
really "clear and unquestionable." But it is




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 269
equally certain that Calhoun and the other representatives of the South were not at all anxious to assume any burdens and submit to any
sacrifices in the defence of questionable rights,
if the North was to have the benefit of them.
As in the opinion of Giddings, the indomitable
enemy of slavery, the necessity to restore the
equilibrium between the two sections, which
had been disturbed by the annexation of Texas
in favor of the South, imperatively demanded
that the United States should maintain their
claims to Oregon at every hazard, so the South
apprehended that this equilibrium would be
disturbed in favor of the North by securing the
whole Territory to the Union, and therefore
was determined not to go a hair's breadth beyond what the honor of the republic really required. Calhoun had openly avowed that, so
far as it depended upon him, the annexation of
Texas should be effected without delay, though
it should lead to a war, in which England might
be found on the side of Mexico. With regard
to the Oregon question, however, he was sure
to oppose with the utmost energy any policy
tending to endanger the peace of the Union,
and the more energetically, the more that policy
was likely to result in an extension of the
Union territory in the north. For a war with
Great Britain would be, under all circumstances,




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


most detrimental to the interests of the South,
and might easily put the very existence of slavery into imminent danger. In and out of Congress, leading men of the South openly avowed
that these considerations for the special interests of their section determined their course,
and there was in fact no reason to conceal the
truth. If the policy of the radicals was sure to
do much harm to the South, and if it was, to
say the least, very doubtful whether the United
States as a whole would derive any benefit from
it, the adoption of it would have been not only
an act of folly, but a wrong on the part of the
North. But, however sound the arguments of
Calhoun and the other representatives of the
South were, their sayings and doings, now that
an interest of the North was at stake, did not
agree with what they had said and done when
they had contended for the interests of their
"peculiar institution." The difference was the
less justifiable because then the United States
had had to deal with a political problem, while
they had now to maintain, as they contended,
an existing right. Besides, the South stood
"pledged," as Bedinger, of Virginia, admitted,
to support the policy of the West with regard
to Oregon, in consideration of what the West
had done for the South with regard to Texas.
It is true, Calhoun had been personally no




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 271
party to this bargain, which had been concluded
and solemnly proclaimed to the whole world
by the Baltimore Convention. The charge of
"Punic faith," which Hannegan hurled against
the South, was therefore too strong a term, so
far as he was concerned. But he had not uttered
a single syllable against this bargain, and the
West had a right to infer from his silence that
he approved and sanctioned it as well as the
rest of the Baltimore platform. As he was the
foremost leader of the annexationists, perfect
candor would have required a declaration that
he personally intended to stick to his policy of
"masterly inactivity;" and now he even abandoned that, and declared himself in favor of a
compromise. Public opinion and history have
decided the controversy in favor of this policy.
No blame rests upon Calhoun for what he did
now. His annexation game had not been played
entirely above board, and for this wrong he had
now to pay the just penalty. What he had done
then exposed him now to the charges of inconsistency and bad faith. And that was but the
first drop of the bitter cup, which his own hand
had pressed to his lips by the deed concerning
which he declared to the last, " To no act of my
life do I revert with more satisfaction."
On January 17, 1846, Webster had written
to Mr. Sears, "Most of the Whigs in the Sen



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JOHN C. CALHOUN


ate incline to remain rather quiet, and to follow
the lead of Mr. Calhoun. He is at the head
of a party of six or seven, and as he professes
still to be an administration man it is best to
leave the work in his hands, at least for the
present." Seward was very indignant at this
"'ill-starred coalition of nullifiers with Whigs,
to save slavery and free trade."  Webster,
however, was certainly right in believing that
the surest way to check the wild policy of the
Western radicals effectually and in time was to
confide the lead of the opposition to a professed
"administration man; " and Seward labored
under a great mistake in supposing that he
and the Western radicals were fighting at the
side of the administration, against this opposition, by contending in full earnest for the
extreme views of President Polk's messages.
Calhoun and his followers and allies would
probably have succeeded in enlisting public
opinion as strongly in favor of a sensible and
sober policy, even if Polk had really wished to
see the uncompromising course, which he officially advocated, adopted by Congress. But
their task was undoubtedly rendered much easier by the fact that the President was secretly
as anxious as they to see the fire quenched,
which he had stirred up into so dangerous a
conflagration. As to this question, Calhoun was




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 273
a much better administration man than he was
himself aware of. But in serving the President
here, where he apparently crossed the policy
of the administration, he also unwittingly promoted its ultimate designs, which filled his mind
with the greatest apprehensions for the future
of the country.
On March 16, 1846, Calhoun had said in the
Senate, " A further inducement for dispatch in
settling the Oregon question is that upon it depends the settlement of the question with Mexico." In this Polk perfectly agreed with him.
Their ways parted only when they came to the
question how and under what conditions the
settlement with Mexico was to be effected. One
of the main reasons why Calhoun so earnestly
strove to bring about a compromise with England was the delusion that this was the surest
way to avert a war with Mexico, while, in fact,
the apprehension of a war with England was
the only thing which, perhaps, could have deterred Polk from his aggressive policy towards
Mexico. No more unjust accusation could be
brought against Polk than that he wished a war
with Mexico. He and his Cabinet infinitely preferred the crooked ways of diplomacy to a war
even with an enemy so weak that they could
afford to despise him. They only were irrevocably determined to obtain from Mexico what




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they could not get without a war, and thus it
became a "necessity" to "compel" Mexico,
just as Calhoun had been "compelled" to accept the office of Secretary of State, because the
annexation of Texas was a "necessity."
Calhoun had accompanied to the Mexican
government the notification of the treaty of annexation with the assurance "that it is his [the
President's] desire to settle all questions between the two countries which may grow out of
this treaty, or any other cause, on the most liberal and satisfactory terms, including that of
boundary." On March 31,1845, his declaration
was repeated almost literally by Mr. Shannon
on behalf of President Polk. Calhoun, how-1
ever, had intended to negotiate honestly with
Mexico about the contested boundary of Texas,
while, according to Polk, " the most liberal and
satisfactory terms " were, that not a single inch
of the territory claimed by Texas could, under
any circumstances, be granted to Mexico, and
that, in order to prevent future conflicts, New
Mexico and California should be sold by Mexico to the United States. As Mexico could not
be prevailed upon to see the question in the
same light, the American army, under General
Taylor, was ordered (January 13, 1846) to take
possession of the contested strip of land, and to
assume such an attitude that an appeal to the




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 275
arbitrament of the sword was inevitable, unless
Mexico had entirely lost her self-respect.
Calhoun heard of the fatal order only "a
long time after " it had been given. He deprecated it, because he clearly foresaw its pernicious consequences, and wished the Senate to
take some action forcing the President to recall it. But he himself refused to move in the
matter, because, as he said, "it was important
I should maintain the kindest and most friendly
relations, in order that I should have some
weight in bringing the Oregon question to an
amicable settlement." That this was no afterthought is fully proved by his whole subsequent
course with regard to the Mexican war. But it
is equally certain that Calhoun here committed
the greatest and most fatal political blunder of 1
his whole career. Polk knew as well and better than he that Taylor's advance from Corpus
Christi would lead to a war with Mexico, and
it was folly to think it possible that a President
of the United States could see a double war
with Mexico and Great Britain in the same
light as it would be seen by a demagogical
stump-speaker, intoxicated by his own spreadeagle harangues. The order of January 13,
1846, would never have been issued if Polk had
not made up his mind to satisfy England with
regard to Oregon. Calhoun could have crossed




276


JOHN C. CALHOUN


the way of the President in the most determined
manner, without risking anything except his
standing as an "administration man," and that
he was sure to lose at any rate.
On Saturday, May 9, 1846, Polk received the
welcome news that a skirmish had taken place
on the eastern bank of the Rio Grande. On
the following Monday he sent a message to Congress, which culminated in the assertion that
" war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts
to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself."
The House of Representatives at once indorsed
the bold statement, without any examination
of its truth, and without allowing the minority
a single minute to develop their views of the
question. In the Senate a short debate could
not be avoided, but here, too, the administration
party succeeded in preventing the minority from
entering at all upon a previous examination of
the main question. Calhoun demanded in vain
"at least one day" to consult the documents
accompanying the message, "as containing the
ground on which the bill ["for the prosecution
of the existing war"] was to pass." In vain
did he and those who acted with him repeatedly
express their willingness to vote at once "the
amount of supplies contained in the bill, or even
a greater amount," so that the succoring of
Taylor might not be delayed one hour, in case




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 277
he should really stand in need of it. In vain did
Calhoun demonstrate that hostilities did not necessarily constitute a war, and that the President's
assertion was not and could not be true, because
the right to declare war was granted by the
Constitution exclusively to Congress. In vain
was attention called to the fact that it was not
known as yet whether the Mexican government would approve of General Arista's crossing the Rio Grande. In vain was the majority
reminded that the history of the United States
afforded more than one example of most outrageous hostilities, in which they had been the
assailed party, and which yet had not led to a
war, and much less had anybody ventured to
assert that these in themselves constituted a
war. Like the President, the majority wanted
the war in order to conquer New Mexico and
California, and therefore no reasons, however
weighty and unanswerable, could be of any
avail. On May 13 the war bill was passed by
a vote of forty against two. Calhoun had abstained from voting, for "' he could neither vote
affirmatively nor negatively," because "he had
no certain evidence to go on." " He could not
agree to make war on Mexico by making war
on the Constitution." Therewith he ceased to
be an " administration man, without joining
the oppositionD More solitary than ever before,




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


he pursued his independent course. He neither
broke nor bent, but the furrows on his forehead
deepened, and his eyes looked more gloomy and
careworn than ever; for without abandoning a
single delusion as to the nature or future of
slavery, he saw but too clearly that the more
successfully the war was waged, the more the
"peculiar institution" and, in consequence, the
existence of the Union, became endangered.
Two presidential messages —one of August
4, 1846, addressed to the Senate, and the other
of the 8th of the same month, addressed to Congress-indirectly avowed the real purposes of
the war, which everybody had known from the
first. Polk asked two million dollars to negotiate a peace, in which he proposed to pay "a
fair equivalent " for some territory which Mexico was to cede, in order to adjust the boundary
by a line "securing perpetual peace and good
neighborhood between the two republics." The
House promptly acted on the suggestion of the
President, but on motion of Mr. Wilmot, of
Pennsylvania, a proviso was attached, by which
slavery and involuntary servitude were forever
prohibited in any territory which might be acquired from Mexico. An amendment, moved
by Mr. Wick, of Iowa, which divided the eventual acquisitions by the line of the Missouri Compromise, was rejected by a vote of 69 against




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR            279
54. The fulfilment of the dark forebodings
which had caused Calhoun to oppose the war
with all his energy had therewith begun. On
February 24, 1847, he said in the Senate:"Every senator knows that I was opposed to the
war; but none save myself knows the depth of that
opposition. With my conceptions of its character
and consequences, it was impossible for me to vote
for it. When, accordingly, I was deserted by every
friend on this side of the House, including my then
honorable colleague among the rest [Mr. McDuffie],
I was not shaken in the least degree in reference to
my course. On the passage of the act recognizing
the war, I said to many of my friends that a deed
had been done from which the country would not be
able to recover for a long time, if ever; and added,
It has dropped a curtain between the present and
the future, which to me is impenetrable; and for the
first time since I have been in public life I am unable to see the future. I also added, It has closed the
first volume of our political history under the Constitution, and opened the second, and that no mortal
could tell what would be written in it."
For many years, he had been the trusted
leader of the South with regard to everything
relating to slavery, though but a small band
had kept pace with him. And in those portentous May days, when he, who had always rushed
on in advance of all, the most radical of the




280


JOHN C. CALHOUN


radical slavocracy, cried  Halt! beware! all
dashed past him with indignant impatience, as
if he had been the last and most insignificant
among all the political apprentices. Now they
began to ask themselves whether he had not
after all been right. The day after the war bill
had been passed by the House of Representatives, Giddings had said:s" We sought to extend and perpetuate slavery in a
peaceful manner by the annexation of Texas. Now
we are about to effect that object by war and conquest.... Now I say to those gentlemen who are
so zealous for this conquest that our slave States will
be the last to consent to the annexation of free States
to this Union. I know that Southern men are now,
and have been, zealous in bringing on this war and
for extending our territory; but they will, at no distant day, view the subject in its true light, and will
change their position, and will oppose the extension
of our territory in any direction, unless slavery be
also extended."
As soon as the words "territorial acquisitions" were officially pronounced, the verification of this prediction began. The din of war
on the Mexican battlefields was almost drowned
by the vociferous passion with which the victors quarrelled over the expected spoils of the
vanquished. The Southern President, acting in
perfect unison with the slavocracy, had not




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 281
been disappointed in the expectation that the
bloody flag, which he had dug out of the graves
of the Spanish conquistadores, could be carried
to the shores of the Pacific with the hearty approval of the North. But had he quite forgot.
ten that it was absolutely impossible to make
any conquest simply for the Union? The United
States had ceased long ago to be a Union merely
of States; they were above all a Union of two
heterogeneous sections. There was not a foot of
Union territory which was not the legal domain
of one or other of these two sections, and much
less could an inch of new territory be acquired
without legally assigning it to one or other of
them. And now a stanch Democrat and an ardent supporter of the annexation of Texas met
the intimation that new territory was to be acquired with the demand that the South should
be at once legally excluded from all participation in the fruits of the common exertions. The
South would not and could not submit to that,
for it was not only not fair, but it was the death
sentence of slavery. The balance of power between the two sections would be irretrievably
destroyed, and that in itself would be the deathknell of the "peculiar institution."  And did
the past history of the slavery conflict admit
any doubt that the slavocracy would resist its
doom to the knife? On the other hand, how



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JOHN C. CALHOUN


ever, was it likely that the North would yield,
if a man of the antecedents of Mr. Wilmot demanded such a proviso?
Every day brought new proofs how true Calhoun's prediction had been, that in the North
the future belonged to the spirit of abolitionism.
Just now it had received by the annexation of
Texas a more powerful impetus than ever before, and the South undertook to force the
North into a concession, in comparison with
which all the other demands of the slavocracy
were as nothing. Mexico had abolished slavery long ago. To allow the South to carry its
" peculiar institution " into a part of the conquered territory was therefore nothing less than
slavery propagandism with powder and lead.
The Northern freemen were to allow millions of
dollars, which they had earned with the sweat
of their brows, to be spent, and the blood of
their sons and of the Mexican patriots to be
spilled like water, in order to open a new field
of activity to the slave-driver's whip on a soil
which was consecrated to universal liberty and
legally protected against pollution by the tread
of a slave. Were the descendants of the Revolutionary patriots willing to present the world
with such a commentary on the Declaration of
Independence, and to hide their faces in shame
before the semi-barbarians of Mexico? Thus




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 283
the story of the treasure-digger, in whose hand
the gold turned into glowing coals, had become
true; but, unlike that fabled personage, who
threw down the present of the evil spirit with
a curse, the United States had to keep at least
a part of their conquests. It was folly to expect that a war which, under false pretexts, had
been undertaken for the purpose of making certain territorial acquisitions would, under any
circumstances, be terminated by the administration and the majority of Congress without
securing any compensation, after more territory
than they had ever coveted had been actually
conquered.
Here was a mass of difficulties boiling and
seething in the caldron of the Mexican war,
which was beyond the skill of any political cook.
Perhaps some means could be discovered to let
the steam escape, so that no explosion would
ensue, but nothing could prevent the gradual
corrosion of all the rivets by the poisonous
funes. Ardent Northern patriots helped the
President to cover the whole width of the continent with the folds of the star-spangled banner,
and thereby rendered the temporary destruction
of the Union inevitable; hot-headed slavocrats
sustained Polk's policy and urged him on, in
order to realize the prediction of Henry A.
Wise, that the "peculiar institution" would




284


JOHN C. CALHOUN


irresistibly press on, until the waves of the Pa.
cific put a stop to its conquering march; and
thereby they sealed the fate of slavery.
Calhoun acknowledged that he was "unable
to see the future," and that he did not know
what the second volume of the history of the
United States under the Constitution would
contain. If he had probed his own mind to the
bottom, he would have been forced to add that
he was glad of it. He would have shut his
eyes with a shudder, if they could have pierced
through the mist, for a voice, which nothing
could silence, constantly whispered into his ear
that it covered an unfathomable abyss. Now
and then he tried to ease his heavy mind by reminding the South how earnestly and persistently
he had raised his warning voice. But that could
bring no comfort either to himself or others.
On the contrary, his reproaches were met by
the charge that he more than anybody else was
responsible for the war, because it was the legitimate or even unavoidable consequence of the
annexation of Texas. With hot indignation he
repelled the charge as an absurd calumny; for
the annexation of Texas had been an imperative patriotic duty towards the Union, and he
had.been willing to meet Mexico with regard
to the boundary question in a most conciliatory
and liberal spirit.




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR          285
The latter assertion was probably true, but
was it thereby proved that Benton's accusation
had absolutely nothing to rest upon? Let it
be granted, for argument's sake, that he would
have come to an amicable understanding with
Mexico, had it been certain or even likely that
the unravelling of this snarl would be left to
his discretion. The war was the legitimate
consequence of the annexation, though it might
have been prevented if the helm had remained
in his hands. He had taught the people that
it was not only right, but a national duty, to
make territorial acquisitions, if the slavocracy
declared its need of them for the safety of slavery, and that the stays of moral scruples might
be loosened to almost any extent for this laudable purpose. He, therefore, had no right to
blame Polk and the war party for anything, ex.
cept that they were not satiated when he cried
Halt! enough! They were over-zealous and
maladroit disciples, but still they were his disciples. It was the old story: the wizard had
called the spirits merely to prepare a bath, and
his half-taught apprentices had them go on carrying water, till the house was flooded and destructive streams burst through every door and
window.
But what was the use of these criminations
and recriminations? What had been done could




286


JOHN C. CALHOUN


not be undone. There the facts were, and they
had to be dealt with. Calhoun did not retire
to his tent like the irate Achilles. Just because
Polk's policy had led the slavocracy into a dangerous defile, it was all the more sure that the
shield and the spear of its veteran hero would
be seen at their wonted place in the thickest of
the fight. But to demand that he should now
simply step into the ranks of the administration
columns and obey the commands of their leader,
and to denounce him because he refused to do
so, was folly. Senator Turney, of Tennessee,
charged that he was prompted by his presidential aspirations to obstruct the passage of
bills necessary for the successful prosecution of
the war. Calhoun repelled the charge (February 12, 1847) with passionate indignation: " If
the senator speaks of me as an aspirant for the
presidency, he is entirely mistaken. I am no
aspirant, —never have been. I would turn on
my heel from the presidency, and he has uttered
a libel upon me.... No, sir. The whole volume of my life shows me to be above that."
We have seen that as to the past the facts
were pretty far from bearing out his self-laudatory assertion, but as to the present the insulting intimation was indeed utterly unfounded.
It was a little too early after the last presidential
canvass for him to declare, "At my time of life




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR          287
the presidency is nothing;" but the history of
that canvass had taught him that to indulge
any longer in such aspirations would be folly,
with a tinge of ridiculousness. Never again
would he have permitted his name even to be
mentioned as a candidate. And even if he had
not understood the lessons of that canvass as
well as he did, he would have scorned every
temptation, at this critical juncture of affairs,
to allow his course to be in the least influenced
by any personal considerations.
On the other hand, it is easily to be understood how the war party came to suspect him
of personal motives. He was so deeply convinced that the war was a blunder and a calamity that he allowed once more the doctrinarian
bent of his mind to get the better of his cool
practical judgment.  Turney had been provoked into his accusation by a speech, in which
Calhoun had very elaborately advocated the
policy of a "defensive line." The active military operations were to be entirely stopped.
The United States should confine themselves
to holding the conquered territory on a certain
(line, quietly waiting for Mexico to make up her
mind to come to terms on this basis. This he
declared to be "the policy best calculated to
bring the war... with certainty to a successful termination, and that with the least sac



288


JOHN C. CALHOUN


rifice of men and money, and with the least
hazard of disastrous consequences and loss of
standing and reputation to the country." The
difficulties which the enormous distances, the
climate, and above all the obstinate patriotic
pride of the Mexicans opposed to a successful
termination of the war, in spite of the brilliant
achievements of the American arms, were so
great, that one can understand how a clever
man could hit upon this strange plan, which today must appear simply absurd to everybody
who is not acquainted with all the details of
those countless embarrassments. Nevertheless,
though the idea certainly could not stand the
test of a sober and somewhat close examination, yet if the partisans of the administration
had been familiar with what had occurred behind the curtain, they would have felt less
tempted to ridicule it, and to give it a slight
coloring of that "moral treason" with which
they charged all the opponents of the war. The
President himself had been in favor of this
strange project of the "defensive line."  The
original draft of his message had recommended
it to Congress. Calhoun had known this; but
he had not been informed of the alteration
which Polk had made at the instigation of Benton, who had convinced him that such a passive
policy of " masterly inactivity" was utterly in.




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR            289
compatible with the genius of the American
people.
This was so true that probably neither Congress nor the people would have hesitated one
moment to reject the proposition as not only inexpedient, but also pusillanimous and derogatory to the national honor, even if the administration had supported it with all its influence.
As the personal opinion of a single senator,
it was, therefore, of no consequence whatever.
The majority could have afforded very well to
pass it over with a few indifferent remarks, and
consideration for the man as well as policy ought
to have advised such a course. With regard
to the main question, Calhoun had announced
in the same speech his complete acquiescence in
the unalterable facts: -
" It would be vain to expect that we could prevent
our people from  penetrating into California...
Even before our present difficulties with Mexico, the
process had begun. Under such circumstances, to
make peace with Mexico, without acquiring a considerable portion, at least, of this uninhabited region, would
lay the foundation of new troubles and subject us to
the hazard of new conflicts.... But it is not only in
reference to a permanent peace with Mexico that it
is desirable that this vast uninhabited region should
pass into our possession. High considerations connected with civilization and commerce make it no less




290


JOHN C. CALHOUN


so. We alone can people it with an industrious and
civilized race, which can develop its resources, and
add a new and extensive region to the domain of commerce and civilization."
Once admitted that extensive territorial acquisitions had become inevitable, the other question, how they should be disposed of with regard to slavery, had also to be met directly. If
Calhoun did not at once give a full answer to it,
his delay did not arise from any desire to conceal his views. The object of his speech was
to recommend the "defensive line," and for
that purpose it sufficed to say how the territory to be acquired should not be disposed of.
That he did with great emphasis:" We are told - and I fear that appearances justify
it —that all parties in the non-slave-holding States
are united in the determination that they shall have
the exclusive benefit and monopoly; that such provisions shall be made by treaty or law as to exclude all
who hold slaves in the South from emigrating with
their property into the acquired country.... Be assured, if there be stern determination on their part to
exclude us, there will be determination still sterner on
ours not to be excluded."
"This known pointed division of opinion"
as to the ultimate disposition of the territory
seemed to him to render the vigorous prosecution of the war impossible: -




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 291
"Now, if I may judge from what has been declared on this floor, from what I hear on all sides, the
members from the non-slave-holding States, if they
were sure that slavery would not be excluded from
the acquired territory, would be decidedly opposed
to what they call vigorous prosecution of the war, or
the acquisition of a single foot of territory. Can they
then believe that the members of the slave-holding
States, on the opposite supposition, would not be
equally opposed to the further prosecution of the war
and the acquisition of territory?"
Ten days after the delivery of this speech,
on February 19, 1847, Calhoun presented a set
of resolutions to the Senate, covering the whole
ground of the slave question with regard to the
Territories. The key-note of the remarks with
which he prefaced them was the assertion, that
" the day that the balance between the two sections of the country... is destroyed is a day
that will not be far removed from political revolution, anarchy, civil war, and widespread disaster." This was not intended as a threat, nor
even as a warning, for he knew that it would
not be heeded. It was simply the statement of
the solemn conviction by which his course was
determined. In his opinion he had been forced
upon the position which he was about to assume.
Adams's journal is documentary proof that he
had not " always," as he now asserted, considered




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


the Missouri Compromise a surrender of the
"high principles of the Constitution."  But it
was of little consequence when he had come to
that conviction. At all events, he now consid[ ered that compromise "a great error," and, in
spite of that, it had been at his suggestion, as
he informed the Senate, that the continuation
of the compromise line had been proposed in
the House of Representatives, as a settlement
of the controversy about the territory to be acquired from Mexico. He had not wanted the
Southern members to be "disturbers of this
Union." But the proposition had been twice
voted down by a decided majority; therefore his
advice was now, "Let us have done with compromises. Let us go back and stand upon the
Constitution!"
The resolutions affirmed: The Territories are
the common property of the several States composing the Union. Congress has no right to
do any act whatever that shall directly, or by
its effects, deprive any State of its full and
equal right in any Territory: a law which
would prevent the citizens of certain States
from emigrating, with their property, into any
Territories would be such an act. Admission
of a State into the Union may not be made
dependent upon any other condition, except
that its Constitution shall be republican.




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 293
A refutation of this doctrine cannot here be
attempted, for that would require a recapitulation of the whole slavery question and of the
doctrine of state sovereignty. As to the question of constitutional law, it suffices here to say
that, whether Calhoun was right or wrong, the
whole history of the United States proved the
assertion to be an absurdity; that what he
claimed to be a "high constitutional right" of
the slave-holders was " not the less clear because
deduced from the entire body of the instrument,
and the nature of the subject to which it relates, instead of being specially provided for."
If this "constitutional right " was as clear as if
it had been specially provided for by the Constitution, then all the Southern statesmen, ever
since the adoption of the Constitution, must
have been utterly devoid of brains or absolutely
nerveless, for the right had never been acknowledged or exercised.   Calhoun himself
opened "the second volume" of the history of
the United States " under the Constitution,"
and, by his resolutions, he marked a new era,
because they were not mere legal abstractions,
but a political manifesto, announcing a revolutionary programme of fearful import.
" The Constitution which we now present
is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that
mutual deference and concession which the pe



294


JOHN C. CALHOUN


culiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable." Thus the framers of the Constitution had characterized their own work. North
and South had always declared with one voice
that the constitutional convention at Philadelphia would have labored in vain if the compromises concerning slavery had not been agreed
upon. Compromise had ever since been the
unsteady compass by which the course of the
Union ship had been directed in the slavery
question. To that, and to that alone, it was
due that the domain of slavery and the sway of
the slavocracy over the national politics had constantly increased. And now Calhoun demanded
that a heavy line should be drawn through this
'word "compromise," and that it should for all
time to come remain expunged. It is true, he
only wanted "to go back and stand upon the
Constitution," but in the eyes of the North his
interpretation of it absolutely divested it of
the character of a compromise, and exacted the
unconditional surrender of the Union to the
slavocracy. Suppose he read the Constitution
correctly: that did not change the fact that it
was understood very differently by the North.
The Constitution in itself, however, was nothing but a dead piece of parchment, not even
able to resist the attacks of moths and mice.
There was no magical force in it, by which it




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 295
could of itself make known and enforce its true
will and intent. Like every other law, it became an active force only by the agency of the
people and their several constituted organs.
Whether right or wrong, that construction of
the Constitution had to prevail which the people
and their constituted organs believed to be
correct. Was it, then, possible that they would
ever adopt the doctrine of Calhoun's resolutions,
according to which slaves could be brought into
" any Territory of the United States, acquired
or to be acquired," and according to which, in
consequence, the slave-holders had been most
grievously wronged, ever since the establishment
of the Constitution, by excluding their human
chattels from all the Territories north of Mason
and Dixon's line?
The free States had by far the larger part of
the population of the Union, and they went on
steadily and rapidly gaining upon the South.
Many years ago, however, Calhoun had declared
with the utmost emphasis that, in the North,
the future inevitably belonged to the spirit of
abolitionism; and by this time the prediction
was so far fulfilled that, according to his own
testimony, all parties in the free States were
united in the determination to exclude slavery
from the territory to be acquired from Mexico.
The experience of the past certainly justified




296


JOHN C. CALHOUN


the hope that it would be possible to break up
this unanimity, but would it ever be possible to
unite the majority of the whole people, irrespective of Congress, upon the basis of Calhoun's
claim?   The acknowledgment of this claim
would have been nothing less than the renunciation on the part of the Union of any policy
and will as to the future of its own political
nature; for the Territories were but inchoate
States, and experience had taught that, wherever slavery gained a firm foothold, it became
the paramount formative principle. Calhoun
certainly believed in his own doctrine, but that
he should have expected ever to reconcile the
majority of the people to it seems hardly credible. His idea probably was to obtain a good
deal by imperiously demanding all. But he had
too carefully studied the history of the slavery
conflict not to know that, by thus demanding
all, the hatred of slavery and the opposition to
the slavocracy would be greatly intensified with
a very considerable portion of the Northern people. The formation of a majority upon any
positive programme, therefore, evidently presupposed the consolidation of the whole South
upon the slavery question, and the application
of very powerful levers to induce the rest of the
Northern people to support the slavocracy, in
spite of the prevailing current of public opinion
in their own section.




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR            297
The framers of the Constitution had declared
"the consolidation of the Union" to be "the
greatest interest of every true American, in
which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety,
perhaps our national existence." We have seen
how ardently Calhoun professed the same faith
in his earlier years. Now, he boldly proclaims
the unrestrained expansion of slavery over all
the Territories of the Union to be the shibboleth around which the whole South must rally.
" Henceforward, let all party distinction among us
cease, so long as this aggression on our rights and our
honor shall continue, on the part of the non-slaveholding States. Let us profit by the example of the
abolition party, who, as small as they are, have acquired so much influence by the course they have pursued. As they make the destruction of our domestic
institution the paramount question, so let us make, on
our part, its safety the paramount question; let us regard every man as of our party who stands up in its
defence, and every one as against us who does not,
until aggression ceases."
That is the only means to save slavery and
with it the Union. It is the only means, but it
is also infallible.
"But if we should act as we ought,- if we, by
our promptitude, energy, and unanimity, prove that we
stand ready to defend our rights, and to maintain our
perfect equality as members of the Union, be the con



298


JOHN C. CALHOUN


sequences what they may, and that the immediate
and necessary effect of courting abolition votes, by
either party, would be to lose ours, - a very different
result would certainly follow. That large portion of
the non-slave-holding States who, although they consider slavery as an evil, are not disposed to violate the
Constitution, and much less to endanger its overthrow,
and with it the Union itself, would take sides with us
against our assailants; while the sound portion, who
are already with us, would rally to the rescue. The
necessary effect would be, that the party leaders and
their followers, who expect to secure the presidential
election by the aid of the abolitionists, seeing their
hopes blasted by the loss of our votes, would drop
their courtship, and leave the party, reduced to insignificance, with scorn. The end would be, should we
act in the manner indicated, the rally of a new party
in the non-slave-holding States, more powerful than
either of the old, who, on this great question, would
be faithful to all the compromises and obligations of
the Constitution; and who, by uniting with us, would
put a final stop to the further agitation of this dangerous question."
In truth, he was no novice in all the arts and
artifices of party politics. How well he was
acquainted with the most sterling political quality of the Northern people, their unfaltering
loyalty and their religious respect for the law,
and how well he knew how to make use of that
for his purposes! Still better was he acquainted




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 299
with the doughty character of the professional
Northern politician, and he knew more thoroughly how to profit by it for the benefit of the
slavocracy. But there was still the old mistake
in his calculation, which vitiated it from one end
to the other. The more unanswerably he proved
the irrepressible character of the conflict between slavery and liberty, and the more violently he pushed it to its climax, so much the
more closely he shut his eyes to the fact that
slavery and the Union could not be saved, and
so much the more loudly he cried that this
could and would be done. He was only too successful in the consolidation of the South, and
the effect of that upon the Northern politicians
probably surpassed his own expectations. The
slavocracy achieved triumphs, in comparison
with which all its former victories appeared almost ridiculously insignificant. But all these
triumphs only hastened the last inevitable consequence of the consolidation of the South,
namely, the corresponding consolidation of the
North. The perfecting of the consolidation of
the two sections upon the slavery issue, however, was the breaking up of the Union.
The left wing of the Northern Democrats,
which used to be called " Copperheads," throws
the moral responsibility for the civil war upon
the Republicans, because they forced the South




300


JOHN C. CALHOUN


into secession by forming a sectional party.
This view of the case takes the symptom for
the cause. The Union was not broken up because sectional parties had been formed, but
sectional parties were formed because the Union
had actually become sectionalized.  The beginning of this process dated back to the constitutional convention at Philadelphia, and its
roots were imbedded in the slavery compromises
of the Constitution. The abolitionists- that
is to say, the abolitionists proper, and not all
whom   Calhoun was pleased to call so-had
been the first to recognize this fact, but they
were not, properly speaking, a political party,
because they refrained by principle from acting
as such. The slavocracy was the first to pro.
claim the principle that the slavery issue must
be the division line of the political parties. It
did this with full consciousness of the import of
the declaration; it carried the principle much
farther than the Republicans did, until long
after the beginning of the civil war; and CalIhoun was in this respect, as in all others, the
foremost leader of the slavocracy. The Republicans only opposed the extension of slavery.
Calhoun, however, demanded that the South
should unite in making the slavery question in
all its forms and bearings the main plank of its
political platform, and, in this shape, he wanted




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 301
"to force the issue upon the North." He writes
to a member of the Legislature of Alabama, " I
would even go one step farther, and say that it
is our duty -due to ourselves, to the Union,
and our political institutions - to force the issue on the North.... I would regard any compromise or adjustment of the [Wilmot] proviso,
or even its defeat, without meeting the danger
in its whole length and breadth, as very unfortunate for us. It would lull us to sleep again,
without removing the danger, or materially diminishing it." And how did he propose thus
to meet the danger? " There is and can be but
one remedy short of disunion, and that is to retaliate, on our part, by refusing to fulfil the stipulations in their favor, or such as we may select
as the most efficient."  He proposed a convention of the Southern States, which should agree
that, until full justice should be rendered the
South, all the Southern ports should be closed
to the sea-going vessels of the North. The
northwestern States would be detached from
the northeastern by leaving open the trade by
river and railroad, and the northeastern States
would surely come to terms, for "their unbounded avarice would, in the end, control
them." To-day, the South knows whether the
avarice of the northeastern States is quite so
unbounded as Calhoun thought, and whether




302


JOHN C. CALHOUN


the northwestern States are willing to let it depend upon the gracious good will of the South
whether the national rivers, and especially the
mouth of the Mississippi, shall be open to their
trade.
One thing, however, Calhoun ought to have
known already at that time, namely, that the
North would never acknowledge such a measure to be a " retaliation."  He said, " That the
refusal on their part would justify us in refusing to fulfil those [stipulations of the national
compact] in their favor is too clear to admit
of argument."  It was, in fact, too clear to
admit of argument that, in the most essential
point, the two cases had no more in common
than yes and no. The opponents of slavery
were convinced that Congress had the constitutional right, or even that it was in duty bound,
to prevent slavery from entering the free territories to be acquired from Mexico; and even
Calhoun forbore to charge them directly with
doing violence to their consciences and acting
against their better knowledge. He, on the
contrary, unreservedly acknowledged that he
a intended to deprive the North of its constitutional rights.
Benton very correctly said that such a resolution on the part of the South was the breaking up of the Union; and now, as before, there




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR            303
were not lacking people who maintained that it
was this that Calhoun was aiming at. They
understood the man the less in proportion as the
crisis and catastrophe more nearly approached.
In the same letter, above quoted from, he said:
" This brings up the question, How can it [the danger] be so met, without resorting to the dissolution of
the Union? I say without its dissolution, for, in my
opinion, a high and sacred regard for the Constitution, as well as the dictates of wisdom, make it our
duty in this case, as well as all others, not to resort
to, or even to look to, that extreme remedy, until all
others have failed, and then only in defence of our
liberty and safety."
That he honestly and ardently wished the pre-'
servation of the Union is, indeed, as certain as
it is certain that his remedies had the effect of
sledge-hammer strokes. The consciousness of
weakness drove him to the desperate resolution
to burn the ship of compromise, which had carried the slavocracy so far, and to demand the
unconditional submission of the North.   "VWe
are now stronger relatively than we shall be
hereafter, politically and morally." He thought
the last moment had come, when it was still
possible to chain down the North so absolutely
by positive law that slavery could scorn all the
assaults of the brutal facts and the spirit of the
times. In truth there never had been a time




304


JOHN C. CALHOUN


when that could be done, and it grew every
day less possible to do it, because this growing
weakness of the slavocracy was no secret to the
North. The forging of new chains for the
Northern States made them feel more than ever
the weight of those which they already wore;
and in shaking these, while listening to the complaints of the Southern States that their political and moral strength was irremediably on the
wane, they learned better to know their own
strength. The will and the ability of the North
grew to do what, in its opinion, every 'political
and moral consideration bade it do. The more
the South succeeded in chaining down the North
by positive law, the louder and the more energetic the protest of the spirit of the times and
of the facts became. And had Calhoun quite
forgotten that many years ago he himself had
declared that the ultimate decision would be
given not by the law, but by the facts? So far
from swinging the firebrand of sectional agitation without cause, and only to further secret
treacherous designs, as so many accused him of
doing, he now, as heretofore, shrunk back from
drawing the last conclusion from his own premises, because he would not believe that slavery
and the Union could not both be saved. With
every new contest, it became more apparent
that the curse resting upon slavery was, that




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 305
every new success of the slavocracy was an.
other step towards the judgment and doom of
the "peculiar institution."  This curse, therefore, necessarily weighed most heavily upon the
thoughts and the deeds of him who, in all the
tremendous exertions of the slavocracy against
the onslaughts of the spirit of the times and of
the facts, proved himself to be alone " a host."
With the consolidated South, he now drove the
North from the battlefield of the Wilmot proviso, but the quiver on his back was almost
empty, the bow in his hand was cracked, and
the field proved to be a barren conquest, so that
the ultimate effects of the victory were those of
a cushing defeat.
Benton, in his "Thirty Years' View," lays
great stress upon the fact that Calhoun never
called up his resolutions to be acted upon by the
Senate, because they had been received with general disfavor. It is hard to imagine how Benton,
after witnessing the further development of the
controversy, could still think that this afforded
any reason for exultation. Calhoun continued
to oppose, with the utmost energy, the giddy
agitators of unbounded territorial aggrandizement, though the contemplated acquisitions lay
so far to the South that the slavocracy would
probably have been able to secure the prey for
the " peculiar institution." When there seemed




306


JOHN C. CALHOUN


to be some danger that it would be impossible
" to conquer peace " unless the whole Mexican
republic was taken possession of, he still advocated his "defensive line," and he sternly
put himself against Polk's recommendation of a
temporary military occupation of Yucatan. But
while he did his best to prevent the sea of difficulties, into which the Union had been thrown
by the craving for more land, from being agitated even more profoundly, he did not recede
one inch from the position which he had taken
with regard to the equal right of the Southern
States to all the Territories. He had refrained
from calling up his resolutions, but the number
of converts to his doctrines increased at such
a rate that the " abstractions " rapidly changed
into a positive programme.
A bill for the organization of the Oregon
Territory had been passed by the House of Representatives at the second session of the 29th
Congress. The Senate committee, to which the
bill was referred, moved to strike out the clause
which, in conformity with the provisional laws
enacted by the inhabitants of the Territory,
prohibited slavery. As this motion would have
led to endless debates, the bill was laid on
the table, and Oregon remained unorganized.
Benton asserts that the motion to strike out was
made at the instigation of Calhoun. However




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 307
that be, at all events the fate of the bill in the
Senate lay in the announcement on the part of
the South that Oregon, although lying entirely
north of Mason and Dixon's line, should not
without more ado be given up to the North, and
the resistance was based upon the doctrine of
Calhoun's resolutions.
When the subject was taken up again by
the 30th Congress, it was openly avowed that
slavery was not expected to gain a firm footing
in these high latitudes. The South declared
itself to be contending merely for the principle.
To force upon the North the acknowledgment
of the principle was, however, evidently an utterly hopeless undertaking. The slavocrats, Calhoun not excepted, knew that well enough, and
they were not such doctrinaires as to risk their
bones in charging windmills. Calhoun was undoubtedly thoroughly convinced of the soundness of his theories, but the practical aim and
end of his struggle for the principle was to
wring from the North acceptable concessions
with regard to all present and future Territories
which were sufficiently well adapted for slave
labor. So far from receding from the position
which he had taken in his resolutions, he now
carried their doctrine to its last legitimate consequence by denying the binding force of the
former compromises. In his speech of June 27,




308


JOHN C. CALHOUN


1848, on the Oregon bill, he said of the Missouri Compromise:"A compromise line was adopted between the
North and the South; but it was done under circumstances which made it nowise obligatory on the latter.... The South has never given her sanction to
it, or assented to the power it asserted. She was
voted down, and has simply acquiesced in an arrangement which she has not had the power to reverse,
and which she could not attempt to do without disturbing the peace and harmony of the Union, to
which she has ever been averse."
Calhoun was too candid and daring a man, he
had too much of the fanatic, and, above all, he
understood this question too thoroughly to approve of the covering up and concealing of the
depth of the antagonism which necessarily aggravated the evils. He shares with the abolitionists the merit of having always probed the
wound to the bottom, without heeding in the
least the protesting shrieks of the patient. The
return of the left wing of the Northern Democrats into the service of the slavocracy was acknowledged by him with a gracious smile, but
he spurned the cunning device which made the
bitter morsel palatable to the peace-craving
masses. As his immediate purposes were served
by it, he of course received with satisfaction the
announcement that the reintegration of the De



OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 309
mocratic party could and should be effected upon
the basis of his doctrine of " non-interference."
But no blame rested upon him for the fact that
it was a reunion over the bottomless chasm of
a conscious falsehood, because the " non-interference " as understood by the Northern Democrats
had nothing in common with the " non-interference" demanded by him and the Southern radicals, except the abandonment of the right to
have a national policy with regard to slavery
in the Territories. When Cass and Dickinson
now proclaimed the doctrine of squatter sovereignty, the cudgel of his logic with a few strokes
smashed into atoms the coarse and bold sophisms.
Whatever of legislative powers the Legislatures
or the inhabitants of the Territories had, was
derived from an act of Congress. If, therefore,
Congress had no right to take any action whatever in respect to the introduction of slavery
into the Territories, the former evidently could
do so much less. Calhoun called the doctrine
of Dickinson and Cass "the most absurd of
all the positions ever taken."  "The first half
dozen of squatters would become the sovereigns,
with full dominion and sovereignty over them
[the Territories]; and the conquered people of
New Mexico and California would become the
sovereigns of the country, as soon as they became the Territories of the United States, vested




310


JOHN C. CALHOUN


with the full right of excluding even their conquerors."
Calhoun's own doctrine was certainly more
logical, and he was perfectly consistent in denying to Congress, to the territorial Legislatures,
and to the squatters, as well the right to establish slavery as the right to prohibit it. But
nevertheless his theory also had a logical hitch.
He claimed for the slave-holders the right to
bring their human chattels into all the Territories as a right under the Constitution, but he
did not dare to assert that the Constitution
established slavery either in the Territories or
anywhere else. It had, however, thus far been
universally acknowledged that, wherever slavery
existed, it was the creature of municipal law.
Whence, then, should slavery derive its legal
existence in Territories where it did not actually
exist, or where thus far it was even expressly
forbidden by law, as in New Mexico and California? Was it now to be denied that slavery
could only be the creature of positive, though
perhaps unwritten, law, - i. e., was the right
to hold slaves in any Territory to be derived
from the law of nature? If so, by what process
of logic could this natural right be limited to
negroes, and even to negroes who were already
slaves in certain other places? This course led
no less to sheer absurdity than the doctrine of




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR          311
squatter sovereignty; and yet there was no
other course, unless the Constitution was to be
construed to establish slavery in all the Territories.
Conclusive as this logical hitch in the "noninterference " doctrine was, it dwindled down
into absolute insignificance, when compared with
the political absurdity of the theory. Calhoun's
doctrine made it a solemn constitutional duty
of the United States government and of the
American people to act as if the existence or
non-existence of slavery in the Territories did
not concern them in the least. If they could not
help taking an interest in it, at least that interest had to be purely academical, as if the Territories had been situated on some distant planet.
The question was not allowed to be a question
at all. Yet the fact was that North and South
were perfectly agreed in considering it the question, in comparison with which everything else
was as nothing. Thus the theory and the facts
clashed in a most ridiculous manner; and in
such a conflict between theory and facts the
former has always to yield, though it be written
in giant letters and with living fire in the Constitution. No people with the least vestige of
political vitality ever will or can turn their backs
upon a question which they consider of paramount importance to their whole future, look




312


JOHN C. CALHOUN


at the sky and whistle, because the Constitution
says that the matter must not be touched ever
so lightly with a single finger. And if the
Constitution does not say that in so many words,
but only an endless string of hotly contested
assertions, deductions, and conclusions leads to
this result, then the sole effect will be that
another huge monument of human folly has been
erected.
Nothing shows in so drastic a light the fearful
embarrassment into which the policy of territorial aggrandizement had thrown the country
as the recommendation of a committee of the
Senate to solve the problem by adopting this
ostrich policy. On July 18, 1848, Mr. Clayton,
with the consent of Calhoun, who was a member
of the select committee, introduced a compromise
bill, which acknowledged the provisional laws of
Oregon "till the territorial Legislature could
enact some law on the subject of slavery." New
Mexico and California were to be organized as
Territories by the appointment of a governor,
secretary, and judges, to compose a temporary
Legislature, "but without the power to legislate
on the subject of slavery; thus placing that
question beyond the power of the territorial
Legislature, and resting the right to introduce
or prohibit slavery in these two Territories on
the Constitution, as the same should be ex



OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 313
pounded by the judges, with a right of appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States. It
was thought that by this means Congress would
avoid the decision of this distracting question,
leaving it to be settled by the silent operation
of the Constitution itself."
By acquiescing in this arrangement, Calhoun
abandoned his position on the "rock" of the
Constitution, and took once more the old track
of compromises. No better proof can be exacted
that he had'claimed all in order to get enough.'
But this comparative moderation was not yet to
be rewarded. Even Democratic organs emphatically protested against " the cowardly conduct of
Congress in seeking to shove [the responsibility
of the decision] upon the Supreme Court." By
the Senate the bill was passed, but in the House
it was laid on the table, on motion of Alexander
H. Stephens. Calhoun was of course free to
climb again to the top round of the ladder of
principle, but his doing so could no longer produce the same effect as heretofore. He knew
this well enough, and his discomfiture was the *
greater because a leading Southerner had felt
himself called upon to move the rejection of the
compromise. The consolidation of the South
on the basis of the slavery question had indeed
so far been effected that every Southerner
peremptorily demanded for his section some




314


JOHN C. CALHOUN


share of the Mexican spoils; but the representatives of the South were very far from being
agreed as to the arguments on which to rest
the claims, or as to the means with which their
realization should be attempted. Calhoun had
yet one arrow left in his quiver, and he did not
hesitate to take it out; but its point was broken
off by Southern hands ere he could shoot it.
After a most tenacious resistance on the part
of the Senate, the first session of the 30th
Congress was brought to a close by the passage
of the Oregon bill as it had come from the
House; that is, with the exclusion of slavery.
California and New Mexico, however, had remained unorganized. The rapid and most abnormal development of the former, in consequence of the discovery of gold, imperiously
demanded that Congress should at last do its
duty towards the newly acquired possession.
From all sides the cry was raised that it was
a shame and an inexcusable wrong to give up
the Territory to anarchy, because Congress
* would not come to a decision on the slavery
question. But there seemed to be little chance
that the knot would be unravelled by this Congress at its second session. The South showed
no more disposition to yield than before, and
the North had good reason to hope that a decisive victory could be gained, if it but braced




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 315
up its strength and persisted. California had
as yet only two newspapers, and both declared
that the population was unanimously of opinion
that "the simple recognition of slavery" in the
Territory would be the greatest misfortune.
"The people of New Mexico, in convention
assembled" at Santa Fe, sent a petition to
Congress, emphatically asking protection against
the introduction of slaves. Calhoun called the
petition most impudent, and Westcott thought
it an abuse of the right o~ petition. But that
did not change the fact that, if the introduction
of slaves into these Territories should be permitted, it would be done against the solemn
protests of the inhabitants. Squatter sovereignty, however, was the utmost limit to which
the Democratic politicians of the North could
hope to lead their constituents in the service of
the slavocracy. The determined opponents of
the slave power, therefore, felt sufficiently elated
to take the offensive. In the House of Representatives, several motions with a view to the
abolition of the slave-trade, and even of slavery
itself in the District of Columbia, were made,
and it was with some difficulty that the more
moderate of these attacks were repelled by the
South.
These signs of the times appeared to Calhoun
so ominous that he deemed it necessary to




316


JOHN C. CALHOUN


prove to the North by an extraordinary demonstration that in this question the South thought,
and eventually would act, as one man. At his
instigation, sixty-nine senators and representatives from the South mef for deliberation on
December 23, 1848, in the Senate chamber. A
committee of fifteen was appointed, which appointed a sub-committee to draw up an address.
When this sub-committee met, Calhoun submitted to it the draft of an " Address of the
Southern Delegates in Congress to their Constituents." Of its object the address itself said
that it "is to give you a clear, correct, but
brief account of the whole series of aggressions
and encroachments on your rights, with a statement of the dangers to which they expose you.
Our object in making it is not to cause excitement, but to put you in full possession of all
the facts and circumstances necessary to a full
and just conception of a deep-seated disease,
which threatens great danger to you and the
whole body politic." It did not pretend to
have any new fa6ts or arguments to lay before
the people. It was throughout the old story,
which, in and out of Congress, had been repeated many thousand times. Nevertheless, a
short recapitulation of it in calm but incisive
and even bitter language could of course produce a great effect. Calhoun, however, did not




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 317
rely principally on that. The fact in itself,
that all the Southern members of Congress
united in addressing their constituents in such
a solemn form, was to make an overpowering
impression not only on the South, but also on
the North. Men of all parties believed that his
designs went much farther and were of much
darker complexion. The old charge was renewed that he was driving directly at a dissolution of the Union, and some of the accusers had
evidently some apprehension that this time he
might possibly succeed. So far as his wishes
were concerned, however, the suspicion was
now as unfounded as it had been on all former
occasions. The possibility - and, in his opinion, perhaps no more an improbable one- of
the withdrawal of the slave-holding States from
the Union, he kept steadily in view. There is
no question about that, for he had often declared it in express words, and he had not now
made the concession to his more moderate colleagues to conceal it in the least in the address.
As the address was to impress the people with
the gravity of the crisis, it was a matter of
course that this eventuality had to be pointed
to in a forcible manner. Nay, more. One of his
purposes undoubtedly was to prepare the South
for it, and to make the South equal to the emergency, if it should come to the worst. But a




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


calm and attentive perusal of the curious document cannot fail to satisfy every reader that
its main object was exactly to prevent this dire
eventuality from becoming an actuality.
The assertion that if the North was allowed
"to monopolize all the Territories" " she would
emancipate our slaves, under the color of an
amendment of the Constitution," and then the
white population would "change conditions"
with the slaves, absolutely excluded the possibility of submission, if all the Territories should
be closed to slavery by the verdict of the majority. "As the assailed you would stand justified by all laws, human and divine, in repelling a blow so dangerous, without looking to
consequences, and to resort to all means necessary for that purpose." But, at the same time,
the address declared it probable that the calamity could still be averted by the South. "If
you become united, and prove yourselves to be
in earnest, the North will be brought to a
pause, and to a calculation of consequences;
and that may lead to a change of measures, and
the adoption of a course of policy that may
quietly and peaceably terminate this long conflict between the two sections." This expectation caused Calhoun to leave the last decisive
word unpronounced. He had no positive measures of any kind whatever to propose. The ad



OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 319
dress, so to speak, lacked an end. It was a long
string of premises, which suddenly broke off
without a conclusion. All the advice it had to
give was, "We earnestly entreat you to be
united, and for that purpose to adopt all necessary measures. Beyond this, we think it would
not be proper to go at present."
On January 13, 1849, the sub-committee reported to the committee of fifteen. A long and
animated debate ensued. The Whig members
showed very little inclination to follow the lead
of Calhoun, and they afterwards avowed that
they had consented to help dig the mine only
in order to pour water on his powder. The address was adopted with a majority of but one
vote. Two days later, over eighty members of
Congress met and deliberated with closed doors.
Considerable excitement prevailed in Washington, for "many of the most intelligent men"
believed, as Horace Mann wrote on the same
day, that " Mr. Calhoun is resolved on a dissolution of the Union." They were mistaken.
"We hope that, if you should unite with anything like unanimity, this may of itself apply a
remedy to this deep-seated and dangerous disease; but if such should not be the case, the
time will then have come for you to decide
what course to adopt." This last paragraph
of the address stated with perfect truthfulness




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JOHN C. CALHOUN


what he intended. To unite the South, -that
was his purpose, neither more nor less, -to
unite the South for good or for evil, as the case
might be. He " hoped" that the North would
yield when it should be convinced, by the unanimity of the South, that " the refusal of justice " would be promptly followed by the dissolution of the Union. This calculation was not
to be submitted to the test of facts. Washington's anxious expectations came post festum.
The reception which the address had met from
the committee had already proved that the
South could not as yet be united on the slavery
question in such a manner that thereby the
Union could either be saved or destroyed. The
attempt to form a Southern party had completely failed. The address was finally issued,
but among the signatures were the names of
only two Whigs, while even several Democrats
had refused to sign it. The whole number of
signatures was forty, just enough to save the
movement from ridicule.
If the private correspondence of Calhoun
should still exist, and some time see the light,
we shall perhaps be authentically informed of
the effect which this signal and probably unexpected defeat had on his mind. His public
utterances contain no explicit answer to this
question. But we can form a conception, prob



OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 321
ably nearly correct, of his frame of mind, if we
direct our attention principally to what he did
not say and do. Nothing betrays the least personal disappointment. There is left hardly a
glimmering spark of the fire of ambition, which
once burned so fiercely in his bosom, for he
knows that he stands on the brink of the grave.
He is wholly and exclusively devoted to the
cause with which he has absolutely identified
himself. As faithful and determined as ever,
he stands at what he considers his post of duty,
- of duty towards his section, and therefore
also towards the Union. Every device calculated to hinder the North yet a little longer in
securing a "monopoly " of all the Territories, or
to open a new chance to the South, by means
direct or indirect, could count upon his earnest
support, provided it appeared to him not derogatory to the honor of the South, and to promise
at least a postponement of the evil day, on
which the balance of power would be irretrievably lost. Once (February 24, 1849) he had a
sharp passage of arms with Webster on the question whether the Constitution extends of itself to
the Territories, and it was one of the strangest
incidents in the strange story of the slavery conflict and states-rightism, to see the affirmative of
this proposition sustained by the "great nullifier" against the great " defender of the Con



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JOHN C. CALHOUN


stitution." Upon the whole, he unquestionably
got the better of his antagonist in this contest,
which, short as it was, fully proved that his
mental vigor was absolutely unimpaired. Yet a
certain languor had evidently taken possession
of him. The last weeks of the 30th Congress
were the stormiest of Polk's stormy administration, but Calhoun refrained from increasing the
excitement by a set speech. He had nothing
new either to say or to propose. Too deeply
was he convinced of the justice of his cause to
despair of its ultimate triumph; but care sat
heavily on his brow, for nothing would silence
the voice which night and day whispered the
maddening question into his ear, How is this all
to end? Every day he found himself less able
to answer the problem. Yet there was no halting; for something must be done, and he had
become thoroughly convinced that nothing more
was to be expected from Congress, unless an irresistible pressure from outside was brought to
bear upon it. The time had come to write the
omitted end of the " Address of the Southern
Delegates in Congress to their Constituents,"
- to draw the practical conclusion from the
premises therein enunciated.
The public did not know what share he had
in the new movement. Even a leading politician like Henry S. Foote had no knowledge of




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 323
it, though he himself was one of the principal
instruments in the hands of Calhoun. So late
as February 8, 1850, Foote indignantly rebuked
Senator Houston for intimating that "the sovereign State of Mississippi, in the incipient
movement towards the Nashville Convention,... was instigated by South Carolina, or her
statesmen." And he added, (" I know that what
he has said will be understood as intimating,
at least, that this Conventional movement of
ours was stimulated by South Carolina, and was
the result of concert between certain South
Carolina politicians and certain politicians in
Mississippi, with a view of having that movement originate in the State of Mississippi instead of South Carolina, in order to avoid any
odium that might thereby arise. I am sure he
did not intend to be so understood, and yet he
will be, if he does not correct his remarks." Mr.
Houston replied, "I can assure the honorable
senator that this is a very delicate and complicated question. But I believe that if South
Carolina had never existed, and if it had not
been for her disposition and the movement
which began there, Mississippi would never
have thought of it." The senator from Texas
probably was not himself fully aware at the
time how true this assertion was. In December, 1851, Foote had to retract his former pas



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JOHN C. CALHOUN


sionate and haughty disclaimer, and to excuse
himself by stating that, at that time, " I did not
believe that any human being in the world had
received a letter from Mr. Calhoun on the subject, except one which I myself received." He
now had to avow not only that Calhoun had
"bad a pretty extensive correspondence with
persons " in Mississippi, but also that his
(Foote's) mind had become satisfied by the perusal of these letters "1 that the modus operandi
of the Convention was more or less marked out
by his great intellect." Nay, he even declared
with considerable pride, "It was through me,
in the first instance, that Mr. Calhoun succeeded in instigating the incipient movements
in Mississippi, which led to the calling of the
Nashville Convention."
Foote, in the above-quoted rejoinder to Mr.
Houston, has stated correctly the reason which
prompted Calhoun to assign the part of ostensible leader to Mississippi, and which made him
so anxious not to let anybody see that his hand
held and pulled all the wires. The best proof
of the consummate skill with which he played
his game is the fact that even the chief actors
had not the slightest suspicion of their being
but tools in his hands. The details of the intrigue are not likely ever to be unveiled, because
the greatest part of that secret correspondence




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR            325
is probably no more in existence. The loss is,
however, of comparatively little importance, as
one of those letters, -dated July 9, 1849, and
addressed to Collin S. Tarpley, of Mississippi,
-which came to light some time after his
death, fully informs us about his intentions. He
says:" In my opinion there is but one thing that holds
out the promise of saving both ourselves and the
Union, and that is a Southern convention; and that,
if much longer delayed, cannot. It ought to have
been held this fall, and ought not to be delayed beyond another year. All our movements ought to
look to that result. For that purpose, every Southern State ought to be organized with a central committee, and one in each county. Ours is already. It
is indispensable to produce concert and prompt action. In the mean time, firm and resolute resolutions
ought to be adopted by yours, and such meetings as
may take place before the assembling of the Legislatures in the fall. They, when they meet, ought to
take up the subject in the most solemn and impressive
manner.
" The great object of a Southern convention should
be to put forth, in a solemn manner, the causes of
our grievances in an address to the other States, and
to admonish them, in a solemn manner, as to the consequences which must follow, if they should not be
redressed, and to take measures preparatory to it, in
case they should not be. The call should be ad



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JOHN C. CALHOUN


dressed to all those who are desirous to save the
Union and our institutions, and who, in the alternative, should it be forced on us, of submission or dissolving the partnership, would prefer the latter.
" No State could better take the lead in this conservative movement than yours. It is destined to be
the greatest of sufferers if the abolitionists should
succeed; and I am not certain but by the time your
convention meets, or at farthest your Legislature,
that the time will have come to make the call."
It is the old programme; only the way of
executing it is somewhat changed, and changed
exactly in the manner which he had repeatedly
pointed out in his speeches and addresses. It
was another attempt to save the Union, but, at
the same time, another step forward towards
its final dissolution, if the North should persist
in rejecting the conditions of the South. Calhoun's last great speech in the Senate proves
that he had not intended the Nashville Convention to present an ultimatum to the North,
though, for greater effect, he had perhaps
wished to see its propositions clad in the most
peremptory language. Whether or not he would
have liked to come at once to "an end with terror" rather than to endure still longer "the
terror without end," he knew that the South
was not yet ready to act. Therefore he did not
expect from the Nashville Convention what the




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 327
faint.hearted and weak-kneed peace fanatics of
the North apprehended from it, and it was very
far from fulfilling even what he expected. He
did not live to drink this new cup of bitterness, but he lived long enough not to derive
any consolation from the vain hope that this
last attempt to save the Union by rendering
slavery absolutely safe in the Union would be
successful. His eyes were too keen not to see
the fast-accumulating indications that another
disappointment - more bitter than all the disappointments he had experienced heretoforewas in store for him. His weary limbs longed
to stretch out and rest, but he knew only too
well that so long as his mortal eyes saw the
light of the sun there was no rest for him. By
their very keenness, these eyes became his worst
tormentors.
How often had he told the country that, by
everything dear to man and making life worth
living, the South would be compelled to sever
its connection with the North, if its equal rights
in the Territories were not recognized! But he
had never ventured to assert that, if this were
done, the peace of the country could never
again be disturbed by the slavery question, because slavery would thereby be absolutely secured against all attacks. His arguments were
always presented in such an ingenious form




328


JOHN C. CALHOUN


that to the blunt logic of many of his hearers
this would appear to be the self-evident conclusion; but though he certainly deceived himself
to some extent in this respect, he had never directly and expressly asserted the fact. On the
contrary, all his speeches were replete with irrefutable arguments, proving that the slavery
question could not be decreed out of existence,
because the moral, economical, and political antagonism  between slavery and freedom was a
fact, and would assert itself as a fact in all eternity. The people, therefore, neither would nor
could acquiesce in it, if Congress should attempt
to ignore it, or even forbid noticing it. No matter how high the "peculiar institution" was
placed on "the rock of the Constitution," the
waves of the sea of facts unceasingly beat against
it, and gradually washed it away.
In his great speech on the Oregon question
(March 16, 1846), Calhoun had said: —
"But I oppose war, not simply on the patriotic
ground of a citizen looking to the freedom and prosperity of his own country, but on still broader grounds,
as a friend of improvement, civilization, and progress.
Viewed in reference to them, at no period has it ever
been so desirable to preserve the general peace which
now blesses the world. Never in its history has a
period occurred so remarkable as that which has
elapsed since the termination of the great war in Eu



OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 329
rope with the battle of Waterloo, for the great advances made in all these particulars. Chemical and
mechanical discoveries and inventions have multiplied
beyond all former example, - adding, with their advance, to the comforts of life in a degree far greater
and more universal than all that was ever known before. Civilization has, during the same period, spread
its influence far and wide, and the general progress in
knowledge, and its diffusion through all ranks of society, has outstripped all that has ever gone before it.
The two great agents of the physical world have become subject to the will of man, and have been made
subservient to his wants and enjoyments; I allude to
steam and electricity, under whatever name the latter
may be called. The former has overcome distance
both on land and water, to an extent which former
generations had not the least conception was possible.
It has, in effect, reduced the Atlantic to half its former width, while, at the same time, it has added threefold to the rapidity of intercourse by land. Within
the same period, electricity, the greatest and most diffuse of all known physical agents, has been made the
instrument for the transmission of thought, I will not
say with the rapidity of lightning, but by lightning
itself. Magic wires are stretching themselves in all
directions over the earth, and when their mystic
meshes shall have been united and perfected our
globe itself will become endowed with sensitiveness,
so that whatever touches on any one point will be instantly felt on every other. All these improvements,
all this increasing civilization, all the progress now




330


JOHN C. CALHOUN


making, would be in a great measure arrested by a
war between us and Great Britain. As great as it is,
it is but the commencement, the dawn of a new civilization, more refined, more elevated, more intellectual,
more moral, than the present and all preceding it.
Shall it be we who shall incur the high responsibility
of retarding its advance? "
Could he altogether refuse to see how much
the advance of this new civilization was retarded by the " peculiar institution "?  The
most exaggerated eulogies on its conservative
virtues could not banish from his sight the
glaring contrasts between the two sections;
the most positive assertion that these were
wholly due to the unjust and unconstitutional
economical policy of the Federal government
could not conceal the fact that, no matter what
this policy was with regard to tariffs and internal improvements, these contrasts became more
glaring every year. No ingenuity, displayed in
the attempt to prove that the North would lose
infinitely more by a disruption of the Union
than the South, could disprove the fact that
these contrasts indicated the increasing weakness of the South, not only morally and politically, as he had himself avowed, but in every
respect; no prophecy that, after the breaking
up of the Union, the economical development
of the unfettered South would be unparalleled,




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR         331
could cover up the fact that whatever touched
any one point of the civilized part of the globe
was instantly felt on every other, and that this
economical, moral, and mental consolidation of
the civilized world rendered the perpetuation
of the "peculiar institution" inmpossible, because slavery, whether in itself good or bad,
grew every day more incompatible with all the
laws governing the life of this civilized world.
Much duller eyes than his had begun long ago
to be struck and alarmed by the fast-accumulating proofs of this all-important fact, furnished by the under-currents in the slave-holding States themselves. The non-slave-holders
had begun to doubt the heretofore unquestioned identity of their interests with those of
the slave-holders. In the border States the old
creed was revived that slavery was a "mildew" and a "curse;" in some of them an
earnest agitation for its gradual extinction
was entered upon. The old cotton States, and
among them principally South Carolina, not
only bitterly complained of the heavy drafts
which the emigration as well to the northwestern as to the Mississippi States constantly made
upon their wealth and their population, but
they also saw the day approach on which a
modified abolitionism  would boldly raise its
head actually among themselves, if nothing




332


JOHN C. CALHOUN


should be done to improve the miserable condition of their poor white people. But all the
proposed remedies proved, upon closer examination, to be deadly poisons. The man who had
been the zealous advocate of the first great
Southern railroad, and who still bitterly accused the Federal government of having crippled the South economically, now gave it as
his opinion that the South would commit suicide
by introducing factories and stimulating all
sorts of industrial pursuits, because the artisan
and mechanic are born enemies of slavery.
All this could not shake in the least Calhoun's
conviction that slavery was "a good, a positive
good." But how could he have seen all this,
and failed to perceive that, even if all the Territories were thrown open to the slave-holders,
the " peculiar institution" would be as far as
ever from being safely anchored in haven? The
future was still completely hidden from his view,
and had forever to remain so; for, as his theory
of slavery had become with him a dogma, he
was determined not to see it, and had become
incapable of seeing it, unless he lived to see the
dogma crushed by the accomplished facts. But
he could not help seeing that the entanglements
of the slavery question grew ever more labyrinthine, and he could not help feeling that the
whole ground was thickly strewn with thorns.




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 333
Wearily he turned away from the facts, which
he neither would nor could understand any
more.
The 30th Congress had expired, leaving the
question of the disposal of the newly acquired
Territories where it had found it, and a Whig
President had taken possession of the White
House. Nine long months the people had to
go about their business in this thick and sultry political atmosphere, ere their law-makers
returned once more to the well-nigh hopeless
task of solving this problem. Calhoun did not
pass this time in idleness. The world of stub,
born facts he had been unable to master, but
he still thought himself able to prove on paper
that he was nevertheless right. In these months,
the "Disquisition on Government" and the
" Discourse on the Constitution and Govern
ment of the United States " were in the main,
if not entirely, penned. That he expected to
exercise an influence on the decision of the impending question by these essays is hardly to be
supposed. His idea seems rather to have been
to leave an authentic exposition of his political
creed as a political testament and solemn warning to posterity. At all events, it is only in this
quality that they can claim a place in the history of the United States. Unlike so many of
his speeches, they were not political deeds, and




334


JOHN C. CALHOUN


did not help to shape the course of events. Besides, when they appeared in print, he already
rested in his grave, and every day the futility
of the attempt to smooth down the wild breakers of realities by pouring on the oil of ab- t
stract theories became more apparent. To the
student, these two essays will always remain
among the most curious books of the political
literature of the United States, and they may
be read with great profit, though for the most
part not exactly in the spirit intended by the
author. The people have passed judgment on
them without reading them; and have repudiated states-rightism, as Calhoun understood
it, that is, state supremacy, as emphatically as
they have repudiated the doctrine of the "positive good " of slavery.
When the 31st Congress met, December 3,
1849, the slavocracy was smarting under a defeat, the importance of which could not be
overestimated. California, with the informal
sanction of the President, but without any authorization from Congress, had adopted a state
Constitution prohibiting slavery and involuntary
servitude, and this clause had received the unanimous vote of the constitutional convention,
although many of its members were Southerners. This was a commentary on the doctrine
of the "positive good" of slavery which told




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR         335
more than all the abolition speeches ever made.
California was irretrievably lost to the slavocracy, for to think that Congress could be compelled to force slavery upon her would have
been sheer madness. Therefore it had become
only the more necessary to struggle with the
utmost energy for the rest of the Mexican
booty, and for the principle, upon the acknowledgment of which those Territories which might
be acquired at some future time could depend.
The formal irregularities with which the proceedings in California were tainted furnished
the South with a position of sufficient tactical
strength to continue the struggle, with the hope
that, after all, the strenuous exertions would be
ultimately rewarded at least by a partial success. California was not to be admitted into
the Union as a State until the North had
made satisfactory concessions on all the other
controverted points. At last, the slavocracy was
apparently unanimous in the determination " to
resist the aggressions of the North " to the last
extremity. In the House of Representatives,
the very same Southern Whigs who had so
recently defeated Calhoun in his attempt to
form a Southern party seemed ambitious to
assume the leadership of the " fire-eaters." The
gigantic edifice of the Union trembled to its
very foundations, and, for a while, many patri



336


JOHN C. CALHOUN


ots hardly dared hope that its proud pillars
could be steadied once more. Week after week,
the storm of debate raged on with unabated
fury. Now and then the dark clouds were torn
by a compromise proposition, but in the next
moment they were again blown together by a
counter-blast, and the darkness seemed but the
greater for the passing ray of light.
No one watched the progress of the storm
with intenser interest than Calhoun, though
his voice had as yet hardly been heard at all in
the Senate hall. The hand of death lay heavily
on his shoulder. His body was sadly bent under its weight, so that the tears involuntarily
pressed into the eyes of those who remembered
what an image of strong and noble manhood
he had been. A dying man he was, though his
mental faculties were still unimpaired. But it
was not hope that fed the flickering flame of
his mind, so that it shone to the last in all its
original brightness. The knitted brows and
the deep lines, which care had chiselled into his
fleshless face, told with most impressive eloquence with what a heavy load he stepped into
his grave. Two years ago he had repelled
the charges of Mr. Turney with the proud assertion, "For many a long year, Mr. President,
I have aspired to an object far higher than the
presidency; that is, doing my duty, under all




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 337
circumstances, in every trial, irrespective of
parties, and without regard to friendships or
enmities, but simply in reference to the prosperity of the country." The sense of duty was
now the strong staff on which the expiring
man leaned, and his iron will bade death stay
its hand till he had done and the country had
heard his parting words. Surely, he had a
right to demand that the country should attentively listen to them. Now nobody could
accuse him of being actuated by presidential
aspirations, and his most embittered adversary
could not dare to intimate that he was a fiend
in human shape, who would willingly and wittingly kindle with his dying hand a fire which
was to consume his country's peace, prosperity,
and glory. Perhaps his political testament contained the best proof that what he had proclaimed to be white was black, and that what
to him appeared black was white, but he certainly revealed in it his solemn conviction, and
he could not have anything in view but what,|
in his innermost heart, he believed to be con-\
ducive to the true welfare of his country.
Calhoun had suffered for some time from an
acute pulmonary affection, which had recently
become aggravated by a heart disease. He himself was no more able. to address the Senate for
any length of time. On March 4, 1850, his




338


JOHN C. CALHQUN


carefully prepared speech was read by Mr. Mason, of Virginia, to the Senate. Every senator
listened with profound attention and unfeigned
emotion; the galleries were hushed into the
deepest silence by the extraordinary scene,
which had something of the impressive solemnity of a funeral ceremony.
" I have, senators, believed from the first that
the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if
not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in disunion." What a melancholy satisfaction for the man who, for nearly forty years,
had been one of the brightest stars of the Federal
government, in one capacity or another, thus to
open his last speech! He had contributed his
full share to the glory and greatness of the republic, and now the last question which he had
to argue in the Federal Capitol was, "How can
the Union be preserved?"  Every line of the
speech bears witness how thoroughly he himself
is pervaded by the consciousness that it is " the
greatest and the gravest question that can ever
come under your consideration." Every word
is carefully weighed; not one syllable of angry
and passionate declamation is to be found in
it, - nothing that the most sensitive mind can
construe into a threat. A "widely diffused and
almost universal discontent" pervades the Southern States, caused by the belief " that they can



OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 339
not remain, as things now are, consistently with
honor and safety in the Union," because "the
equilibrium between the two sections... has
been destroyed," -these undeniable facts are
the basis of his argument. He admits that if
this destruction of the equilibrium had been
" the operation of time, without the interference
of government, the South would have no reason
to complain; " but he denies that such is the
fact.
The facts and assertions on which he based
this denial are familiar to us, and therefore
need not be repeated here. Nor is it necessary
to recapitulate his version of the story of the
anti-slavery movement, and the reasons why this
hostility of the North to the "peculiar institution" would inevitably subject the Southern
States "to poverty, desolation, and wretchedness," after " all the power of the system " had
been concentrated in the Federal government,
and the North had " acquired a decided ascendency over every department of this government."
Ile declared " the views and feelings of the two
sections " in reference to slavery to be " as opposite and hostile as they can possibly be," and
he avowed once more that " all the elements of
influence on the part of the South are weaker,"
while " all the elements in favor of [the anti-slavery] agitation are stronger now than they were




340


JOHN C. CALHOUN


in 1835, when it first commenced."  He therefore asked, "Is it, then, not certain that, if
something is not done to arrest it, the South
will be forced to choose between abolition and
secession? " And he added, " Indeed, as events
are now moving, it will not require the South to
secede, in order to dissolve the Union. Agitation will of itself effect it, of which its past history furnishes abundant proof."
This startling assertion was probably deemed
by many one of those wild exaggerations, verging upon the absurd, of which he had so often
been guilty in the eyes of all the moderates and
conservatives. Upon more mature reflection it
could, however, not be denied that the split in
several of the great religious denominations, to
which he principally alluded, went far to warn
the people that this opinion was not a daydream of the diseased imagination of a fanatic.
Just now he proved, in a manner most unexpected to most of his hearers, that he judged the
situation with more calmness and sobriety of
mind than the great majority of them. " It is
a great mistake," he said, " to suppose that disunion can be effected by a single blow. The
cords which bound these States together in one
common Union are far too numerous and powerful for that. Disunion must be the work of
time. It is only through a long process, and




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 341
successively, that the cords can be snapped, until the whole fabric falls asunder." The history
of the next ten years decided in an unmistakable manner the question whether he was right,
or those who thought that the 31st Congress
would be the last of the old Union. At the
same time, the sentences just quoted are proof
absolute of the injustice of the accusation that
Calhoun was consciously aiming at the dissolution of the Union, in order to become President
of a part, since he could not become President
of the whole. Even if he had been such a black
traitor at heart, he knew that his foul designs
could not be executed in time to gratify such a
mad and petty ambition. Who can tell what
" the second volume of the history of the United
States under the Constitution " would contain,
if the conservatives of the North had known as
well as he knew how strong the Union was?
He was no more thoroughly convinced of the
inevitability of its disruption than of the impossibility to " snap the cords " in this moment and
by one blow. And so far from wishing that it
could or should be done, his last bequest to his
country was an answer to the question how the
Union could and should be saved.
Ere he proceeded to answer this question, he
stated how it could not be done. " Nor can the
plan proposed by the distinguished senator from




342


JOHN C. CALHOUN


Kentucky [Henry Clay], nor that of the administration, save the Union." The course of
events has proved the correctness of this opinion. Such compromises could postpone the evil
day, but the catastrophe became only the more
certain and terrible. No more could eulogies
on the Union and appeals to Washington's
warnings in his Farewell Address avert the
danger.  "The cry of 'Union, Union, - the
glorious Union!' can no more prevent disunion
than the cry of 'Health, health, -glorious
health!' on the part of the physician, can save
a patient lying dangerously ill." The only way
to cure the disease was to remove its causes.
Sure enough; but could that be done? He
answered, "Yes, easily; not by the weaker
party, for it can of itself do nothing, - not even
protect itself, - but by the stronger. The North
has only to will it to accomplish it; to do justice
by conceding to the South an equal right in the
acquired territory, and to do her duty by causing
the stipulations relative to fugitive slaves to be
faithfully fulfilled; to cease the agitation of the
slavery question, and to provide for the insertion
of a provision in the Constitution, by an amendment, which will restore to the South, in substance, the power she possessed of protecting herself, before the equilibrium between the sections
was destroyed by the action of this government."




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 343
Now, if that was needed to save the Union,
and nothing less would do, then the Union could
not be saved.   For the first time, Calhoun
directly asserted that, if the North would but
follow his advice, "discontent will cease; harmony and kind feelings between the sections be
restored, and every apprehension of danger to
the Union removed;" and he followed up this
assertion by demanding what was in the strictest sense of the word impossible. The members
of Congress from the North could not only con.
cede to the South an equal right in the acquired
territory, but even abandon it entirely to the
slavocracy, and they could bid the people deliver fugitive slaves " with alacrity," as Webster
afterwards did; but the North could not cease
agitating the slave question, because it could
not will it. It was a question, as Calhoun himself had correctly called it, and it is a physical
impossibility to will a great economical, moral,
and political question out of existence; and if
it had not been physically impossible, the North
could not have overcome the moral impossibility
to will what it actually did not will; that is to
say, she could not will to change or annihilate
her economical, moral, and political convictions
relative to slavery, - she could not will it, simply because they were convictions.
Nor is that all. Calhoun did not say in




344


JOHN C. CALHOUN


his speech how the Constitution ought to be
amended, in order to restore and secure to the
South, for all time to come, the lost equilibrium,
but the answer to this question is to be found
in the second of the above-mentioned essays.
He had the candor there to admit that a constitutional amendment would in itself not be
sufficient. The necessary preliminary step was
to expunge from the statute-book all the laws
by which the Federal Union of the Constitution
had been changed into a national Union. Suppose this was granted: would the actual consolidation of the Union, with its nationalizing
tendencies, which had been uninterruptedly going
on ever since the adoption of the Constitution,
be also wiped away thereby? Calhoun took
good care not to propound this question. He
confined himself to the statement that the lost
equilibrium between the two sections could not
be thus restored. But if it was impossible to
undo what had been done, it was at least possible
to prevent the sins of the past from having any
practical effect in the future. This he proposed
to do by giving to the weaker section " a negative
on the action of the [Federal] government." He
admitted that the government might thereby
"lose something in promptitude of action," but
he asserted that, "instead of being weakened,"
it would be "greatly strengthened," for it would




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 345
"gain vastly in moral power." As the surest
and simplest of the various ways in which the
desired object could be effected, he recommended
a reorganization of the executive power,
" so that its powers, instead of being vested, as they
now are, in a single officer, should be vested in two;
to be so elected that the two should be constituted
as the special organs and representatives of the respective sections in the executive department of the
government and requiring each to approve all the
acts of Congress before they shall become laws. One
might be charged with the administration of matters
connected with the foreign relations of the country.
and the other, of such as were connected with its
domestic institutions; the selection to be decided by
lot.... As no act of Congress could become a law
without the assent of the chief magistrates representing both sections, each, in the elections, would choose
the candidate who, in addition to being faithful to its
interests, would best command the esteem and con'
fidence of the other section. And thus the presidential
election, instead of dividing the Union into hostile
geographical parties, - the stronger struggling to
enlarge its powers, and the weaker to defend its
rights, as is now the case, - would become the means
of restoring harmony and concord to the country and
the government. It would make the Union a union
in truth, a bond of mutual affection and brotherhood."
That was the " conservative principle " of nullification in its highest perfection, coupled with




346


JOHN C. CALHOUN


the total abandonment of the Federal structure
qn the basis of state sovereignty. The Constitution, as has been stated before, knew nothing
whatever of sections, and their actual formation
was in itself the first step towards the dissolution of the Union. The Union was endangered,
not because the original equilibrium between
the sections had been destroyed, but because,
by the agency of the slave question, it had been
actually split into two geographical sections, of
unequal strength. And now this fact, which
ran directly counter to the constitutive principle
of the Union, as established by the Constitution,
was to be made its determining principle; that
is to say, the disease was to be cured by making
the cause of the disease the vital principle of
the body politic. Nothing, absolutely nothing,
was left of the equality of the States, which
was the basis of the states-rights doctrine, and
in a modified form also of the Constitution, if a
permanent minority of the States forming a geographical section had an absolute veto against
the majority in all Federal concerns. It was a
misnomer-nay, one might justly say, it was
a bold abuse of the name —still to speak of a
Union, if the constituent members of the commonwealth were to be constitutionally consolidated into a permanent geographical minority
and a permanent geographical majority, which,




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 347
in every question, had to come to a complete understanding, ere the body politic became capable of political action in any manner whatever.
Calhoun's remedy, which was to effect the cure
so "easily," was in fact nbthing less than the
actual dissolution of the Union, thinly covered
by some artificial contrivances, which could not
serve any purpose except to keep it for a little
while mechanically together, and to expose it to
the scorn and ridicule of the whole world.
" Having faithfully done my duty to the best
of my ability, both to the Union and my section, throughout this agitation, I shall have the
consolation, let what will come, that I am free
from all responsibility." Those were the last
words of the last speech of the great and honest
nallifier. He could no more support himself.
Two friends had to lead him out of the Senate
chamber. Slowly and heavily the curtain rolled
down to shut from the public gaze the last scene
of the grand tragedy of this brilliant life. For
nearly twenty years the suspicion and even the
direct accusation had weighed on his shoulders,
that he was systematically working at the destruction of the Union. By doing more than
any other single man towards raising the slavocracy to the pinnacle of power, he had actually
done more than any other man to hasten the
catastrophe and to determine its character, and




348


JOHN C. CALHOUN


yet he labored to the last with the intense anxiety of the true patriot to avert the fearful calamity. But the last efforts of his powerful mind
were a most overwhelming refutation of all the
doctrines whose foremost champion he had been,
ever since the days of nullification. It would
have been impossible to pass a more annihilating judgment on them than he himself did in
his speech of March 4, 1850, and in the Discourse on the Constitution. Yet he had been
absolutely sincere in everything he had said.
On March 5, in a short running debate with Mr.
Foote, of Mississippi, he declared, "As things
now stand, the Southern States cannot remain in
the Union;" and a few minutes later he asserted,
" If I am judged by my acts, I trust I shall be
found as firm a friend of the Union as any man
within it."
Calhoun closed this colloquy with the remark,
"If any senator chooses to comment upon what
I have said I trust I shall have health to defend
my own position." This hope was not to be
fulfilled, though he still spoke in the Senate as
late as March 13, and in a manner, as Webster
stated in his eulogy, "by no means indicating
such a degree of physical weakness as did in
fact possess him." On the last day of the month,
the " magic wires " carried the tidings into every
part of the Union that John Caldwell Calhoun




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR         349
was no more. To the last moment, he manifested the deepest interest and concern in the
troubles of his country. " The South! The
poor South! God knows what will become of
her!" murmured his trembling lips; but he
died with that serenity of mind which only a
clear conscience can give on the death-bed.
On February 12, 1847, he had said in the Senate, "If I know myself, if my head was at
stake, I would do my duty, be the consequences
what they might." It was his solemn conviction that throughout his life he had faithfully
done his duty, both to the Union and to his
section, because, as he honestly believed slavery
to be "a good, a positive good," he had never
been able to see that it was impossible to serve
at the same time the Union and his section, if
his section was considered as identical with the
slavocracy. In perfect good faith he had undertaken what no man could accomplish, because
it was a physical and moral impossibility: antagonistic principles cannot be united into a
basis on which to rest a huge political fabric.
Nullification and the government of law; state
supremacy and a constitutional Union, endowed
with the power necessary to minister to the
wants of a great people; the nationalization
of slavery upon the basis of states-rightism in
a federal Union, composed principally of free




350


JOHN C. CALHOUN


communities, by which slavery was considered
a sin and a curse; equality of States and constitutional consolidation of geographical sections, with an artificial preponderance granted
to the minority, - these were incompatibilities,
and no logical ingenuity could reason them together into the formative principle of a gigantic
commonwealth. The speculations of the keenest political logician the United States had ever
had ended in the greatest logical monstrosity
imaginable, because his reasoning started from
a contradictio in adjecto. This he failed to see,
because the mad delusion had wholly taken possession of his mind that in this age of steam and
electricity, of democratic ideas and the rights
of man, slavery was "the most solid foundation of liberty." More than to any other man,
the South owed it to him that she succeeded
for such a long time in forcing the most democratic and the most progressive commonwealth
of the universe to bend its knees and do homage to the idol of this " peculiar institution;"
but therefore also the largest share of the responsibility for what at last did come rests on
his shoulders.
No man can write the last chapter of his
own biography, in which the Facit of his whole
life is summed up, so to say, in one word. If




OREGON AND THE MEXICAN WAR 351
ever a new edition of the works of the greatest
and purest of proslavery fanatics should be
published, it ought to have a short appendix,
- the emancipation proclamation of Abraham
Lincoln.








INDEX


ABERDEN, LoaD, sends dispatch to
Upshur, 230; desires to see slavery abolished in Texas, 231; his
statements held by Calhoun to
force annexation of Texas, 231 -233; character of his dispatch,
233, 234; tries to dispel fears of
South, 234, 235.
Abolitionists, begin agitation, 121,
122; persecuted, 121; remarks of
Calhoun on, 122; their agitation
understood by Calhoun, 128, 129;
inadequacy of his proposals to
combat by law, 130, 131, 143,165;
their gains in North described by
Calhoun, 166; impossibility of
their suppression, 167,168; their
religious pretexts condemned by
Senate, 191, 193; hopelessness of
expecting North to stop, admitted
by Calhoun, 219; South wished
by Calhoun to imitate, 297.
Adams, John Quincy, denies any
credit to Calhoun in reforms of
War Department, 43; accuses him
of extravagance, 44; calls him
unpopular in Congress, 52; describes attacks on Calhoun to
Clay's and Crawford's partisans,
53; praises Calhoun as independent and eloquent, 53, 54; later
accuses him of seeking popularity,
54; and of personal ingratitude
and malice, 55; not unreasonable
in his complaints of Calhoun, 55;
declarations of Calhoun in support of his candidacy, 55; describes struggle between Crawford
and Calhoun, 56; speaks of Cal

houn's courtship of New England
Federalists, 60; elected President by House, 61; appoints Clay
Secretary of State, bargain cry
raised, 62; Calhoun joins opposition to, 63, 64; abused by Randolph, 63; describes Calhoun's
view of course of South in case
of disunion, 74; accuses Calhoun
of fickleness, 74, 75; on Crawford's betrayal of Calhoun to
Jackson, 87; describes his defence and Calhoun's censure of
Jackson's Florida campaign, 88 -92; thinks Calhoun ruined by
quarrel with Jackson, 93; considers Calhoun embittered by disappointments, 163; his contempt
for Webster's slave-trade negotiations, 210; thinks Calhoun aims
to conciliate North, 211; offers
Calhoun mission to France, 257.
Alabama, demands annexation of
Texas, 232.
Allen, William, moves resolution
calling for notice of termination
of joint occupancy of the Oregon
Territory, 265.
Archer, William S., said to have
promised Calhoun to delay consideration of Texas annexation
treaty until after Democratic convention, 242.
Arista, General, crosses Rio Grande,
277.
Aristocracy in South, 67, 69; averse
to middle-class ideals, 70.
Army, attitude of politicians toward, in United States, 44,45.




354


INDEX


BAcon, EzKr=BL, letter of Story to,
on Calhoun, 59.
Bank of the United States, bill to
incorporate, introduced by Calhoun, 30; his argument for, 31,
32; position of Calhoun regarding, 109, 110.
Bedinger, Henry, says South is
pledged to support Western claim
to Oregon, 270.
Benton, Thomas H., asserts demos
krateo principle, 62; thinks Calhoun was driven by disappointment of presidential hopes into
nullification, 95; on Calhoun's
fear of Jackson's threats, 103; introduces sub-treasury scheme, 183;
asserts Calhoun to be author of
Texas intrigue, 222; on Gilmer's
letter to Green, 223; votes to allow Tyler to violate Constitution
or not, 253; accuses Calhoun of
bringing on Mexican war, 285; calls
commercial retaliation on part
of South practical disunion, 302;
lays stress on Calhoun's failure to
bring resolutions to a vote, 305;
says Calhoun instigated motion to
strike out clause prohibiting slavery in Oregon, 306.
Berrien, John M., appointed to Cabinet by Jackson as friend to Calhoun, 65.
Bonaparte, Napoleon, reasons why
his policy does not bring on war
with United States, 14.
Branch, John, appointed to office by
Jackson as a friend of Calhoun,
65.
Brown, Aaron V., sends Gilmer's
Texas letter to Jackson, 223.
Brown, General, his share in reforming military establishment,
43.
Buchanan, James, suggests receiving and rejecting without discussion all abolition petitions, 132,
133; reply of Calhoun to, that
abolition and Union were impossible, 218.


CALDWELI, MABTA, mother of Calhoun, 8.
Calhoun, Floride, marries J. C. Calhoun, 11.
Calhoun, James, emigrates from
Irelankd to America, 8.
Calhoun, John Caldwell, his tragic
career, 1; lacks a complete biography, 2; his fame compared with
that of Clay and Webster, 3, 4;
lack of personal knowledge about,
4-6; loss of his papers, 5; stands as
representative of an idea, the slavery question, 7; from this gains
his importance, 7; ancestry, 8;
birth and childhood, 8; defective
early education, 8; consequently
lacks breadth, 8, 9; studies for
college, his career at Yale, 9;
studies law, 9; influence of New
England on his early opinions, 9;
practices law at Abbeville, 10;
fails to attain eminence at bar,
reasons, 10; more interested in
politics than in law, 10; elected
to Legislature, then to Congress,
11; marries his cousin, 11.
In House of Representatives.
Appointed by Clay to Committee
on Foreign Relations, 15; chosen
chairman, 15; probably prepares
report of committee, 15; declares
for resistance to England, 16; defends report against Randolph, 16;
self-confident without being arrogant, 17; a strict parliamentarian,
17; too strong for Randolph, 17,
18; his speech advocating war on
ground of honor, 18, 19; approves
of embargo as preparation for war,
21; presents report moving formal declaration of war, 21; disregards protests of minority, 22;
advocates repeal of Non-importation Act, 23; his reasons, 23, 24;
guilty of precipitation in causing
war, 25; acts as, and avows himself, a national leader, 26; in 1816
advocates preparation for future
wars with England, 26, 27; favors




INDEX


355


a navy, 27; his advice regarding
claims of opposition not heeded
by Republicans, 28; advocates
road-building for defence, 28;
supports protection to manufactures, 29; does not consider constitutional objections, 29; thinks
of measures purely from standpoint of policy, taking Constitution for granted, 30; reports bill
to incorporate bank, 30; considers constitutional objections not
worth answering, 31; later says
he was compelled by financial
situation to waive constitutional
question, 31; unable to disprove
charge of inconsistency between
earlier and later parts of career,
32; his sincerity in these utterances not to be questioned, 32,
33; in speech on tariff of 1816,
advocates protection as vitally
necessary, 33-35; wishes to make
United States economically independent, 34; wishesto bind country together, 35; argument on
constitutionality of internal improvements, 35-37; advocates
broad interpretation of powers of
Congress, 36, 37; deprecates strict
construction, 37.
Secretary of War. Appointed
by Monroe, 38; called upon by
Congress to plan military roads
and canals, 38; reports in 1819,
38, 39; recommends internal communications   as   consolidating
Union, 39; and benefiting industry and commerce, 39; in 1824
repeats  recommendation,    40;
later utterances in favor of internal improvements, 40; in 1825
prides himself on having aided
both protection and internal improvements, 40; contrast of these
with later utterances, 41; surprises friends by showing executive ability, 41; reorganizes War
Department, 41; adjusts old accounts and takes pride in absence


of defalcation, 42; testimonial of
employees to his efficiency, 43;
denied credit of reforms by Adams, 43; accused also of extravagance, 44; advocates considerable
expenditures for army, 44; deserves credit for withstanding efforts to starve military establishment, 45; advocates reasonable
policy toward Indians, 45; his high
opinion of Indian capacity for
progress, 45, 46; criticises anomalous political position of Indians,
47, 48; urges education and gradual civilization, 48; resemblance
of his view to Schurz's, 48, 49;
awards Rip-Rap contract to Mix,
49; unaware of Mix's reputation,
49; fails to forbid sub-letting of
contract to his chief clerk, 49,
50; later charged by Mix with
corruption, 50; demands investigation by House, 50; refuses to
act as Vice-President until cleared
by House, 50, 51; dissatisfied with
report of House, although exonerated, 51; would have done better to ignore attack, 51; attacked
by Crawford's and Clay's partisans in House as a rival for presidency, 52, 53; disliked by Adams as a rival, 53; at first praised
by Adams for independence and
fairness, 53, 54; later accused by
Adams of demagogy, 54; and of
ingratitude, 55; professes to favor
Adams for presidency, 56; pushes
his own candidacy, particularly
against Crawford, 56; outdone by
Crawford in securing support,
56; feels presidential ambition,
57; does nothing dishonorable,
but acts with a view to securing
popular support, 57, 58; allows
ambition to influence personal
relations, 58; relies on Pennsylvania's support and on younger
men, 58; opposed by older Republicans as too young, 58, 59;
lacks qualities to cause enthusio




356


INDEX


asm, 59; nominated for vice-presidency, 60; endeavors to secure
support of New England for vicepresidency, 60; praised by Webster, 60; elected by Jackson and
Adams men, 60; receives New England electoral vote, 60; obliged to
choose between Adams and Jackson after election, 61, 62; led by
ambition to join Jacksonian party,
63.
Vice-President. Denies his power
as Vice-President to call a Senator to order, 63; thought by
Adams to have held so in order to
allow Randolph to attack administration, 63; a strong opponent
of Adams's administration, 64; reelected in 1828 with Jackson, 64;
but does not really approach
nearer to presidency, 64; fails to
keep on good terms with Jackson,
64; dissatisfied with Jackson's
Cabinet, 65; in 1825 disapproves
of concerted action in South as
sectional, 66; still maintains national tendencies, 66; does not
clearly understand slavery question, 73; in Missouri Compromise struggle, admits power of
Congress over slavery in Territories, 73; but holds to necessity of
maintaining slavery, 73; thinks
South may be forced into disunion and an English alliance, 74;
led by economic, not political,
side of slavery to change opinions, 74; accused by Adams of
fickleness, 74, 75; his change due
to conviction, 75; issues South
Carolina Exposition, 75; its main
interest not his economic but his
political reasoning, 75; points
out conflict of interest of slave
States and others as to tariff, 76;
adopts sectional attitude contradicting previous position, 76,
77; becomes champion of rights
of minority, 77; views Federal
policy solely as to its effect on


South, 77; begins to abhor " consolidation," 78; asserts state sovereignty to be essential princi.
pie of union, 79; quotes Virginia
and Kentucky resolutions, 79;
claims right of State to " veto"
an unconstitutional law, 79; tries
to show naturalness of veto by
pointing out that three fourths
of States can override it, 80, 81;
does not see destructive nature
of argument, 81; urges delay in
exercise of the veto, 81; not a
disunionist in 1828, 82; hopes to
avoid a crisis, 82; hopes relief to
South from Jackson's administration, 82; led to distrust Jackson
by conflicting claims made for
him in campaign, 83; considers
proposal to distribute surplus a
bid for protectionist support, 84;
takes the lead in opposing Jackson's attempt to force Mrs. Eaton
on society, 85; alienates Jackson,
85; yet anxious to succeed Jackson, 86; thinks Van Buren plots
to overthrow him, 86; said by
Adams to have been exposed by
Crawford, 87; his previous denunciation of Jackson's Florida
career in Monroe's cabinet, 88,
89; said by Crawford to Jackson
to have demanded his punishment, 90; asked by Jackson to
explain, 90; replies justifying
his conduct on point of duty, 91;
denounced by Jackson as perfidious, 91; in spite of disclaimer,
had previously questioned Jackson's motives, 92; his presidential
chances ruined by this quarrel,
92, 93; slow to abandon candidacy, 93; loses support of New
England, 93; hopes to throw election into House, 93; abandons
hope, his disappointment, 93;
this downfall not the cause of
his later career, 93, 94; it merely
hastens his conversion into a sectional leader, 94; henceforth a




INDEX


357


free lance in politics, 94; not a
traitor or conspirator, 94, 95; his
misfortune to see danger to slavery more clearly than others, 95;
resumes attack on tariff with
"Address to    Pecple of South
Carolina," 95;   repeats States'
rights argument, 95, 96; admits
rule of majority may endanger
country, 96; considers Federal
government merely agent of
States, 96; uses term " nullification," 96; his policy to consolidate party, 96; after tariff of
1832, writes letter to Governor
Hamilton, 97; this his final statement of position, 97; the basis
for Southern action in 1861, 97;
denies existence of "American
People," 97; his historical argument, its flaws, 98; denies relation between citizen and Federal
government, 98; holds it impossible for Federal government to
coerce a State, 99; fallacy of his
argument, 99, 100, 101; denies
power of even three fourths of
States to bind the minority, 100;
in other words, holds every State
to possess a veto on any act of
Federal government, 101; realizes
that in fact it is not a question of
single States but of sections, 101,
102.
Member of Senate. Resigns vicepresidency to enter Senate, 103;
takes oath to Constitution, 103;
asserted by Benton to have been
terrified out of resistance by
Jackson's threats, 103; not afraid
of Jackson's hanging threat, 104;
realizes danger of South Carolina's game, 104; yields only because Congress yields, 104; forced
by Clayton to accept compromise, 104; yet gains main demands by the tariff, 105; better
able to claim victory than Jackson, 105; claims overthrow of
tariff of 1832 proves success of


nullification, 105, 106; at same
time, admits defeat of States'
rights by Force Bill, 106; introduces bill to repeal it, 106;
wishes to expunge precedent, 106;
considers bill a danger to liberty
as such, 107; considers safety of
South by no means secured, 107;
declines personal testimonials in
South Carolina, 107; conceives it
his duty to continue fight against
Force Bill, 108; proclaims his independence of party in order to
save liberties of country, 108;
bitterly opposes Jackson's administration, 109; at one with
Clay and Webster only in opposition, not in policy, 109; doubtful
as to bank, 109; distrusts bank
on principle, 109; points out necessity of divorce of government
from banking, 110; not a party
mouthpiece, 111; his serious
study of and devotion to legislative problems, 111; ability of his
speeches, 111; excels as critic,
111, 112; denounces Jackson's
removal of deposits and protest
to Senate, 112; but refrains from
personalities, 112; attitude on
spoils system, 113-116; denounces
office-seekers, 115; wishes to
deprive President of power to
remove, 116; dreads executive
usurpation, 117; fails to realize
exceptional presidency of Jackson, 118; yet upholds veto
power, 119; considers Jackson's
usurpations only part of a centralizing revolution, 119, 120;
considers state sovereignty only
cure for it, 120; harps on this
point, 120; laughed at as a monomaniac, 120; the only person to
realize significance of appearance
of abolitionists, 121; opens debate on slavery by moving not to
receive petitions for abolition in
District of Columbia, 123; censured by South for raising ques



358


INDEX


tion, as unnecessary, 123; not
guilty of trying to cause sectional
strife, 124; honest in asserting
devotion to Union, 124; wishes
to save it by attacking dangerous
petitions, 124; considers petitions
a slander on one half Union, 125;
holds Congress bound not to receive them, 125; his theories,
taking no account of liberal side
of Constitution, are impossible of
acceptance, 127; in advance of
both North and South in foreseeing irrepressible conflict, 127;
demands meeting attacks on slavery by maintaining absence of
congressional jurisdiction, 128;
points out danger of abolitionist
attack, 128, 129; asserts impossibility of compromise, 129; inadequacy of his proposed defence,
130; accused of stirring up strife
over imaginary dangers, 131;
predicts that South will prefer
slavery to Union, 131, 132; his
resolution rejected, 132; introduces bill to exclude incendiary
publications from mail, 134; rejects Jackson's recommendation
as infringing liberty of press and
of States, 134; holds it the
duty of States, not Congress, to
decide on character of publications, 136; advocates punishing
postmasters for infringing state
law, 136, 137; impossibility of
his scheme, 137; does not expect
passage of bill, 138; now advances
beyond nullification position, 138;
holds Federal government mere
agent of States, 139; continues to
base arguments on Constitution,
139; his real principle is incompatibility of white and black races,
140; fails to convince people, 141;
charged with bringing on dissension when he tries to prevent it,
141, 142; denounces compromise
as fatal to slavery, 142; demands
extinction of agitation, 143; treats


exclusion of question from Congress as vitally necessary, 143;
demands that congressional laws
yield to state laws, 143, 144; that
is, the States may nullify not
merely unconstitutional but valid
Federal laws, 145; his arguments
based on right of each State, but
he means the South, 146; predicts that South will do anything
to defend slavery, 146, 147; and
that, whatever Congress decides
on any point, the South will continue to defend it, 147, 148; not
cast down by failure of threat to
impress North, 148, 149; really
gains influence, 149; considering
surplus a danger, advocates distribution, 150; hopes South will
use its share to build railroads,
150, 151; one of first to appreciate importance of railroads, 151;
explores a route across mountains, 152; wishes by railroads to
prevent superior growth of North,
152; asserts that Michigan is a
State prior to admission, 157; discussion of his position, 158-160;
holds that a State cannot be forced
to enter Union, 160; recognizes
necessity of an enabling act, 161;
absurdity of his theory, 161, 162;
considers public domain as belonging to "people of United States,"
162; does not realize inability of
South to build or utilize railroads,
152, 153; apprehends corruption
from treasury surplus, 155; and
danger to sovereignty of States,
155; proposes cession of public
lands to new States, 156; on admission of Michigan, 156-161, 163;
embittered appearance described
by Adams, 163; not encouraged
by slave power's successes, 163;
still sees dangers of future, 163,
164; his energy and passion as
advocate of slavery, 164; repeats
that abolition petitions should not
be received, 165; points out futil



INDEX


359


ity of trying to reason abolition
down, 165; proves truth of his
own statement, 165; predicts that
abolition, if unchecked, will divide Union, 166; yet unable to
suggest repression, 167, 168; undertakes to confute anti-slavery
arguments, 169; proclaims slavery a positive good, 171; points
to white race in South to prove
beneficent effect of slavery, 172;
really has only ruling class in
mind, 173; considers economic
inferiority of South due to tariff,
173; asserts general principle that
slavery is necessary to civilization, 174-176; and that it is superior politically to free labor,
175, 176; progressive growth of
his opinions, 176, 177; now challenges attack, 177; impossibility
of his appeasing North by such
an argument, 178-180; his share
in panic of 1837, 181; abused by
Jackson, his severe reply, 181;
censures Jackson's policy toward
France, 182; abandons Whigs to
support sub-treasury, 183; not
guilty of treachery or inconsistency, 183; proposes bank as a
better plan, 183; not a Whig,
184; free, after collapse of Jacksonian system under Van Buren,
to act alone, 184; announces intention to act solely with view to
States' rights, 185; hopes, by
supporting administration against
Whigs, to help States' rights, 186;
futility of his resolutions against
abolition, 187; introduces series
in 1837, 189; secures support of
Senate to his view of origin of
Union, 189; deduces unconstitutionality of any meddling with
internal affairs of a State, 189;
vagueness of his resolution, 190;
demands censure of interference
on religious grounds, 191; secures
support of Senate, 191; far-reaching plans, 191; demands that


Federal government use powers
to strengthen slavery, 192; denounces attacks on slavery as
violations of Constitution, 193;
denounces attempts to abolish
slavery in District or Territories
as an attack on South, 193; and
finally denounces any attempt to
prevent spread of slavery on moral
grounds as contrary to Constitution, 194; summary of his positions, 195; allows several years to
pass without anything on slavery,
196; his share in ordinary con.
gressional politics, 196, 197; char.
acteristics of his debating, 197;
has personal controversies with
Clay and Webster, 198; once confesses alteration of views, but usually tries to prove consistency,
198, 199; opposes bill to punish
partisan officials as unconstitutional, 199; and useless, 199;
points out evils of rotation in office, 200; advocates placing officeholders beyond reach of executive, 201; belief in his own infallibility concerning slavery, 202;
at his wits' end, refuses to admit
fact, 202; introduces resolutions
censuring England for course in
Enterprise case, 203; supported
unanimously, 203, 204; denies
right of England to discriminate
between slaves and other property, 204; unable to prove fixity
in law of nations, 205; his resolutions a real defeat, 208; yet considers them a success over North,
208; commends Webster's protest in Creole case, 209; favors
ratification of treaty to aid in
suppressing slave trade, 209; asserts unavoidable necessity, 210;
said by Adams to be trying to
conciliate North, 211; again a candidate for presidency, 211; resigns
seat in Senate, 212; nominated
by South Carolina, 212; hopelessness of his candidacy, 212,




360


INDEX


213; supported by Irish vote, 213;
unfitted by nullification principles
to lead a national party, 214; not
supported even by slaveholders,
214; struggle of his followers
against Van Buren in 1843, 215;
withdraws candidacy in 1844, 215;
disapproves of denunciation of
Polk in South Carolina, 216; asserts impossibility of dissolution
of Union, 218; while pointing out
danger to South of abolition, yet
asserts secession unnecessary, 219,
220; in 1836, d '"res for admission of Texas tot;    "lavery,
221; claims credit of sect
nexation, 221, 222; said by BeiS
ton to be real author of intrigue
under Tyler, 223; urged for secretaryship of state by Wise, 226;
accepts office to secure annexation, 226.
Secretary of State. Describes
reasons for accepting place in
Tyler's Cabinet, 227; comments
of Niles upon, 227; unanimously
confirmed by Senate, 228; asserts
unanimous demand of country,
228; damages character for honesty by his desire for annexation, 228, 229; tries at first to
delude Texan envoy into believing Tyler will protect Texas, 229;
forced to promise protection " by
powers under Constitution," 230;
delays submission of Texas treaty
to Senate, 230; lays it before Senate with letter to Pakenham, 230;
declares England's desire to see
abolition in Texas makes annexation necessary, 231; tries to
throw responsibility for annexation on England, 232; falsity of
this assertion, 232,233; overlooks
Aberdeen's disclaimers of purpose
to influence slave States, 235;
honest in his fear of England,
235; fears that, even with Texas
independent, slavery in it is
doomed, 236; proclaims national

ization of slavery, 238; under di.
rection of slave States, 238, 239;
concludes letter by praising slavery as a good, 239; hopes to
draw Pakenham into a correspondence, 240; prevented by rejection of treaty, 240; his letter
bitterly criticised by Northern
Democrats, 240, 241; makes Committee on Foreign Relations promise to delay Senate forty days,
242; his purpose to wait until
utterance of Democratic national
convention, 242; apprehends resistance in Senate to annexation,
243; damages annexation feeling
in North by Pakenham letter,
244; dismayed at rejection of
treaty, 245; probably approves
Tyler's appeal to House to accomplish annexation in some other
way, 246; volunteers to protect
Texas while question is pending,
247, 248; authorizes troops to
enter Texas on pretext of Indian
troubles, 248; his theories at
odds with Tyler's claim of a popular mandate to annex Texas,
251, 252; said by McDuffie not to
have audacity to submit joint resolution to Texas, 253; sends dispatch to Texas on last night of
term, 254; defends course as necessary, 254; probably does not
expect to be continued by Polk,
255; incompatibility with Polk,
256; offered mission to England,
257; his reasons for declining diplomatic mission, 257, 258; prefers to remain in Senate, 259;
does not probably expect to settle
Oregon question, 260; futile negotiations with Pakenham, 260,261;
declines offer of arbitration, 261;
had previously opposed bill to
settle Oregon as likely to cause
war with England, 262; advises
waiting, 263.
In the Senate. Resumes seat,
259; describes effect of Polk's




INDEX


361


Oregon policy, 264; introduces
resolutions upholding offer of
forty-ninth parallel, 266; statesmanship of his position, 267; denounced by extremists, 267; abandons policy of delay for compromise, 268; not anxious to extend
territory of North, 269; willing
to fight England for annexation
of Texas, 209; difference of his
foreign policy where slavery is
or is not concerned, 269-271;
open to charge of bad faith, 271;
his influence in Senate described
by Webster, 271, 272; really in harmony with Polk, 272, 273; wishes
to settle Oregon question in order
to have hands free for Mexico,
273; his liberal announcement to
Mexico, 274; deprecates Polk's
order to Taylor, 275; declines to
oppose it in order to be able to
influence Polk on Oregon matter,
275; his position unnecessary,
275, 276; asks delay in declaring
war in order to examine documents, 276; makes vain objections to declaration on Polk's assertion, 277; abstains from voting
on war bill, 277; foresees gloomy
consequences, 278, 279; charged
with being author of war, 284;
his real responsibility, 285; repels charge of presidential aspirations, 286; advocates a merely
defensive war, 287; absurdity of
his plan, 288; admits inevitableness of acquisition of territory,
289; predicts that South will not
consent to exclusion of territory, 290; opposes conquest on
these terms, 291; presents resolutions in 1847 on slavery in Territories, 291; asserts necessity of
balance between North and South,
291; considers Missouri Compromise a great error, 292; holds
that Congress has no right to prevent entrance of slavery into Territories, or to insist on its exclu

sion in a state constitution, 292;
discussion of his doctrines, 293;
wishes to abandon compromise
spirit of the Constitution, 294;
impossibility of acceptance of his
position by North, 295,296; probably wishes to obtain a good
deal by demanding all, 296; proclaims slavery in Territories as
necessary policy of South, 297;
and as only way to save Union,
297, 298; hopes assistance from
North, 298; success of his policy
of coercing North, 298, 299; yet
only hastens consolidation of
North, 299; his responsibility for
war of 1861, 300, 301; not satisfied with mere defeat of Wilmot
Proviso, 301; proposes convention of Southern States to put
commercial pressure on North,
301; considers such action justified by failure of North to accede
to all demands, 302; advocates
dissolution of Union as last remedy, 303; really wishes to preserve Union, 303; urges that time
has come to insist on submission
of North, 303, 304; forgets that
facts, not law, rule, 304; never
calls up resolutions for action,
Benton's comments, 305; opposes
annexation of Mexico, 305, 306;
his policy regarding Territories
gains advocates, 306; moves to
strike out clause prohibiting slavery in Oregon, 306; hopes to
win concessions in South, 307;
denies binding force of Missouri
Compromise, 308; does not shrink
from facing whole question, 308;
on return of Northern Democrats
to party on basis of non-interference, 308, 309; attacks doctrine
of squatter sovereignty, 309; denies power of Territories to settle
slavery question themselves, 310;
does not assert that Constitution
establishes slavery in Territories,
310; unable to compel country to




362


INDEX


ignore slavery, 311; acquiesces in
Clayton's compromise, 312, 313;
loses logical standing by so doing,
313; calls anti-slavery petition
from New Mexico impudent, 315;
calls caucus of Southern members, 316; submits draft of address to constituents, 316; believed by North to have planned
secession, 317, 319; admits possibility of disunion, 317; wishes to
prepare South for it, 317; main
purpose to coerce North by union
of South, 318; proposes nothing
but union, 319; dislike of Southern Whigs to follow, 319; fails to
form a Southern party, 320; gives
no outward sign of disappointment, 321; continues struggle,
321; upholds, against Webster,
the extension of Constitution over
Territories, 321,322; grows weary
in session of 1849, 322; his share
in Nashville Convention not generally known, 322, 323; instigates movement in Mississippi for
Southern convention, 324; desires
to remain concealed agent, 324;
evidence of his influence in letter
to Tarpley, 325, 326; wishes a
thorough organization in South
and a Southern convention, 325;
wishes to save Union by threatening North, 326; knows that South
is not ready to act, 326; lives
long enough to foresee failure
of convention, 327; never ventures to assert that slavery question can be settled, 327, 328;
speech on economic and industrial
progress, 328-330; wishes South
to introduce factories, 332; his
theory of slavery a dogma unrelated to facts, 332; writes disquisition on government and discourse
on Constitution, 333; wishes to
leave them as political testament,
333; their character, 334; physical breakdown in 1850, 336; held
only by sense of duty, 337; unable


to address Senate, his last speech
on Compromise of 1850 read by
Mason, 338; points out again
danger to Union by disturbance
of equilibrium, 339; asserts that
growth of anti-slavery sentiment
at North threatens South, 339;
says disunion will be a difficult
process, 340; absurdity of charge
that he wished to be president of
a Southern Confederacy, 341; declares Clay's compromise insufficient, 342; only North can prevent disunion by ceasing agitation
and yielding Southern rights, 342;
his conditions impossible in the
statement, 343; wishes to restore
power of South by abolishing all
national laws, 344; and by giving
South a veto on acts of North
through a double executive, 344,
345; does not realize that his plan
itself involves a dissolution ot the
Union, 346; with last words disclaims responsibility, 347; his exit
from Senate, 347; sincere in asserting devotion to Union, 348;
continues in Senate, 348; dies,
last words, 348, 349; his solemn
conviction of duty, 349; review
of his task and his failure, 349 -351.
Characteristics. General view,
1-7, 349-351; ambition, 1, 57, 93,
163, 258, 341; courage, 1, 7, 104,
105, 228, 286, 308; dignity, 1, 7, 91,
106; disingenuousness, 230, 232,
233; education, 8, 9; executive
ability, 41-44; friends, 5, 41, 57;
imprudence, 123, 124; inconsistency, 32, 58, 74, 75, 151, 198, 271;
independence, 54, 94, 111, 181,
258; infallibility, sense of, 202; integrity, 1, 5, 50; intellectual
strength, 1, 9, 54, 74, 94, 327;
leadership, 10, 258; legal success
small, 10; logical mind, 10, 41,106,
109, 127, 149, 308, 322, 338, 350;
moral force, 1, 113, 337; narrowness, 8, 9,111,333; parliamentary




INDEX


363


ability, 17, 197, 321; patriotism,
18, 54, 95,124,142, 348; partisanship, 63, 64, 229, 252; personal
appearance, 336; presidential ambition, 54-59, 211-213, 286; sincerity, 32, 75, 92, 94, 107, 178,
337, 348; statesmanship, 4, 267;
theories, love of, 106, 169, 188,
201; transformation in 1828, 76,
77; will power, 1, 164, 337.
Political Principles and Opinions. His creed, 185; abolition in
District of Columbia, 124, 125;
abolitionists, 122, 128, 129, 219,
297; army, 44, 45; balance between North and South, 291, 339,
342, 344-346; bank, 30-32, 109,
110, 185; compromises, 142, 294,
301, 313; compromise of 1833,
105, 106, 165; compromise of
1850, 338-347; conflict, irrepressible, between North and South,
75, 76, 96, 148, 237, 339; Constitution, earlier interpretation of,
29, 30, 36, 37, 63, 78; later interpretation of, 80, 81, 97, 108, 125,
134, 139, 160, 161, 183, 199, 238,
246, 255; direct tax, 26; diplomatic service, 257; distribution
of surplus, 150; disunion, 74, 218,
303, 317, 318, 326, 338, 340, 341,
347; Force Bill, 166; France,
policy toward, 182; Indians, 45 -48; industrial civilization, 328 -330; internal improvements, 28,
29, 39, 40; mails, abolition literature in, 134-137; Michigan, admission of, 156-162; minority,
right of, 77; Missouri Compromise, 73, 292; Nashville Convention, 323, 325, 326; nationalist
views, 26, 27, 28, 32, 35, 76, 78;
navy, 27; non-importation, 23,
24; nullification, 79-82, 99; Oregon, 260-263, 266-268, 270, 271;
petition, right of, 123, 128, 165;
protection, 29, 33-35, 59; public
lands, 155, 156; railroads, political importance of, 151, 152; reso*     lutions, abstract, mania for, 188,


303; slavery, 73, 127, 129, 132,
140, 146, 164, 171-176, 177, 195,
239, 332, 349; slavery in international law, 203, 204, 205; slavery
under Constitution, 190, 192;
slave trade, suppression of, 209,
211; spoils system, 113-115, 199;
squatter sovereignty, 309; States'
rights, 78, 79, 96, 119, 120, 136,
139, 144, 157, 162, 185, 189, 238,
251, 334; sub-treasury, 183, 184;
Territories, powers of Congress
over, 73, 162, 194, 291-293, 311,
321; Texas, annexation of, 221,
227, 228, 231-235, 254; Union, attitude towards, 94, 124, 127, 131,
132, 142, 166, 219, 299, 303, 326,
349; union of South, 66, 96, 149,
188, 296, 297, 301, 302; veto
power, 119; war of 1812, 16, 18,
19; war, Mexican, 273, 274, 277,
279, 284, 287.
Calhoun, Patrick, father of Calhoun, a Revolutionary patriot, 8.
California, desire for conquest of,
277; organization provided for in
Clayton's compromise, 312; remains unorganized, 314; protests
against slavery, 315; adopts state
constitution prohibiting slavery,
334; resolution of South to keep
out, 335.
Canada, failure to conquer, in 1812,
25.
Cass, Lewis, asserts nearness of
war on Oregon question, 265; proclaims squatter sovereignty, 309;
attacked by Calhoun, 309.
Cherokees, adopt a system of laws,
48.
Choctaws, appropriate money for
schools, 46.
Clay, Henry, recent diminution of
fame, 3; better known personally than Calhoun, 6, 7; leader
of war party in Congress, chosen
Speaker, 15; appoints Calhoun to
Committee on Foreign Relations,
15; gives casting vote for continuance of non-importation, 23; his




364


INDEX


views on protection compared
with Calhoun's, 33; his supporters in Congress criticise Calhoun's
administration of War Department, 53; his appointment by
Adams to State Department
causes bargain cry, 62; his compromise of 1850 opposed by Calhoun, 342.
Clayton, John M., forces Calhoun
to support whole compromise
tariff, 104; introduces compromise bill, 312.
Comet, slaves of, freed, 202, 203;
compensation paid for, 203.
Compromise of 1850, Calhoun's
opinion of, 342.
Confederation, Articles of, purpose
of amending, 78, 98.
Congress, carried by war party in
1811, 15; passes embargo, 21;
declares war, 22; criticises Calhoun's management of War Department, 52, 53; yields in nullification controversy, 104; its
participation in spoils system not
foreseen by Calhoun, 117; its
power over District of Columbia,
125-127; passes bill punishing
postmasters for meddling with
mail, 148; admits Michigan conditionally, 156; question of its
authority over Michigan, 159,160;
Tyler's claim of popular mandate
to, discussed, 251, 252; considers
bill to occupy Oregon, 262; held
by Calhoun to have no right to
interfere with slavery in Territories, 292.
Constitution, Calhoun's early interpretation of, 29, 30, 36, 37, 66,
78; his later attitude toward, 77,
78, 79, 97-99; in relation to Calhoun's refusal to act as Vice-President until exonerated, 50, 51;
in connection with election of
Adams, 61, 62; historical origin
of, 98; protects Calhoun against
Jackson's threats, 104, 105; proposition to amend by abolishing


veto, 119; held by Calhoun to forbid reception of abolition petitions, 125; in relation to power
of Congress over District of Columbia, 126; contradictions in,
126, 127; in relation to exclusion
of incendiary publications from
mail, 134-137; held to oblige Federal government to follow state
law, 144-146; in relation to status
of a State before formal admission, 157-162; not a law for sentiments of people, 177; held to
forbid any meddling by States
with other States, 189; in relation to annexation of Texas, 245,
248, 253; to Mexican war, 277;
to right of slaveholders to enter
Territories, 292, 293, 310; impossibility of his construction of it,
294, 295; question of its extension over Territories, 321, 322;
Calhoun's proposal to amend by
a double executive, 344-346.
Cralld, editor of Calhoun's works,
quoted, 15.
Crawford, W. H., his partisans in
House attack Calhoun's administration of War Department, 53,
56; opposed by Calhoun for presidency, low opinion of, held by
Calhoun, 56; defeated Calhoun in
gaining support of South, 56, 57;
his unfair methods, 57; tells
Jackson of Calhoun's proposals to
"punish" him for Florida campaign, 87, 89, 90; denies his own
hostility to Jackson, 90.
Creeks, attitude toward education,
46.
Creole, case of freed slaves on, 209;
Webster's remonstrance against
their liberation by England, 209.
Curtis, G. T., calls Calhoun a man
of deep convictions, 75.
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, begins as Jacksonian opposition, 62; Calhoun a
member of, 109; its national
- convention denounced by Cal



INDEX


365


houn, 115, 117; nominates Van
Buren, 118; supported by Calhoun, 183,184; desire of Calhoun
for nomination by, 213, 214; convention of, postponed, 214, 215;
hope that its national convention
may influence Senate, 242; defeats Van Buren, nominates Polk,
and demands annexation of Texas,
243; drives reluctant members
into support of Polk, 249, 250;
elects Polk through Liberty vote,
250.
Dickinson, Daniel S., proclaims doctrine of "squatter sovereignty,"
309.
Diplomatic history, Jackson's dealings with France, 182; Upshur's
negotiations for annexation of
Texas, 224, 225; Calhoun's diplomacy as Secretary of State, 229,
230; Aberdeen's dispatch and
Calhoun's reply to Pakenham,
230-236; negotiations of Calhoun
and Pakenham, about Oregon, 260,
261; further negotiations under
Polk, 262-268.
Distribution of surplus, Calhoun's
view of, 150,151.
District of Columbia, petition for
abolition of slavery in, 123; abolition in, denounced by Senate,
193; motions to abolish slavery
and slave trade in, 315.
Disunion, threatened, in 1820, 74;
thought by Webster to be planned
in 1828, 82; said by Calhoun to be
imaginary danger, 218; threatened in case of failure of Texas
annexation, 249; danger of, in
1849-1850, 335, 336.
Donelsbn, -, Calhoun's dispatch
to, 254.
EATON, MRS. " PEGGY," scandal concerning, 84; attempt of Jackson
to break ban against, 85; opposed
by Calhoun, 85; treated politely
by Van Buren, 85.
Embargo, recommended as a war


measure by Madison, 20; passed
by Congress, 21.
Encomium, slaves of, freed on Bahamas, 202, 203; compensated for,
203.
England, reasons why United States
resented its commercial policy
more than France's, 14, 15; war
declared against, 20-22; alliance
with, expected by South in case
of disunion, 74; responsibility for
slavery thrown upon, in 1788,170;
pays for slaves of Comet and Encomium, 203; refuses compensation for Enterprise slaves, 203;
censured by Senate, 203, 204; refuses to recognize slavery in
international law, 205, 206; its
action a defeat for South, 206;
remonstrated against in Creole
case, 209; treaty with, for suppression of slave trade, 209, 210;
mediates between Texas and Mexico, 225; its desire to secure abolition in Texas, 231; its attitude
used by Calhoun as pretext to
justify annexation, 231-236; disclaims any desire to interfere
with South, 235; proposes to arbitrate Oregon question, 261; its
superior military power in the
Pacific, 262; rejects Polk's offer,
264; danger of war with, 264,
265; folly of conduct to, 267;
compromise with, advocated by
Calhoun, 268; dread of South to
war with, 269, 270; desire of Polk
for peace with, 272.
Enterprise, its slaves freed on Bermudas, compensation refused,
203; Adams's opinion of vote on,
in Senate, 204.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, held by Calhoun to be mere agent of States,
98, 99; yields to South Carolina
in 1833, 105; its relation to slavery according to Jackson, 135,
136; according to Calhoun, 136,
139; bound to suppress abolition



366


INDEX


ism, 143; bound to follow state
law, 144; bound to protect and
strengthen slavery, 192, 194, 238.
Federalists, oppose war of 1812, 28;
efforts of Calhoun to placate, in
1824, 60.
Florida, Jackson's campaign in, 87,
92.
Foote, Henry S., unaware of Calhoun's instigation of Nashville
Convention, 322; denies itin 1850,
323; retracts statement in 1851,.23, 324; admits Calhoun's influence, 324.
Force Bill, not passed until after
tariff, 105; denounced by Calhoun, 106, 107, 108; bill to repeal,
advocated by Calhoun, 106.
Forsyth, John, letter of Crawford
to, 89.
France, policy of Jackson toward,
attacked by Calhoun, 182; mediates between Texas and Mexico,
225.
French Revolution, enthusiasm of
people for, 14.
GALLATmI, ALBEBT, asks to be recalled from France, 257.
Garrison, William Lloyd, establishes
" Liberator," 121.
Giddings, Joshua R., demands Oregon as counterpoise to Texas, 269;
predicts opposition on part of
South to admission of free States,
280.
Gilmer, John A., writes letter on
Texas annexation, 223.
Gordon, General, introduces subtreasury scheme, 183.
Greeley, Horace, his views on protection compared with Calhoun's,
33.
Green, Duff, letter of Gilmer to, on
Texas annexation, 223.
Gregg, Andrew, secures recommitment of declaration of war against
Great Britain, 22.
Grundy, Felix, considers embargo a
prelude to war, 20.


HAaNes, -, aids Calhoun in reorganizing War Department, 42.
Hamilton, James, letter of Calhoun
to, on nullification, 97.
Hannegan, E. A., introduces resolution denying power of govern.
ment to compromise Oregon question, 266; charges South with
bad faith, 271.
Hayne, Robert Y., resigns seat in
Senate to be governor of South
Carolina, 103.
Holmes, Isaac E., threatens disunion in 1844, 217.
House of Representatives, election
of Calhoun to, 11; elects Clay
Speaker, 15; organized by war
party, 15; passes Calhoun's resolutions to resist England, 19;
passes declaration of war in haste,
21, 22; continues non-importation by casting vote of Speaker,
23; calls on Calhoun to plan military roads and canals, 38; prohibits payments on Rip-Rap contract, 49; examines contract and
exonerates Calhoun, 51; elects
Adams President, 61; its constitutional power, 61; asked by Tyler to annex Texas in some way,
245; passes annexation resolution, 253; motion in, to terminate joint occupancy of Oregon,
265; declares war with Mexico
on Polk's word, 276; attaches
Wilmot Proviso to two-million
bill, 278; passes bill to organize
Oregon without slavery, 306; lays
Clayton's compromise on table,
313; motions in, to abolish slavery in District of Columbia, repelled, 315.
Houston, Sam, asserts that South
Carolina instigated  Mississippi
to call Nashville Convention,
323.
Hunter, R. M. T., possessor of Cal.
houn's papers, 5.
INDINs, treaty with, 45; policy of




INDEX


367


Calhoun toward, 45-48; of Schurz
toward, 49.
Ingham, Samuel D., appointed to
office by Jackson as supposed
friend of Calhoun, 65.
Internal improvements, advocated
for military purposes, 28, 39; argument as to constitutionality of,
35-37.
International law, in relation to
slavery, 203-209.
Irish, popularity of Calhoun with,
213.
JACKsoN, ANDREW, nominated for
President, 59; his followers support Calhoun for Vice-President,
60; defeated for President in
House of Representatives, 61;
claims of his followers, 61, 62;
evidently a popular favorite, 63;
preferred by Calhoun to Adams,
63; elected President, 64; appoints supposed friends of Calhoun to Cabinet, 65; hoped by
Calhoun to oppose protection, 82;
his double-faced campaign, 83;
takes no decided ground in message, 83; distrusts and is distrusted by Calhoun, 84; his social
campaign in behalf of Mrs. Eaton,
85; dislikes Calhoun for opposing
her, 85; his Florida campaign,
87; his good faith in matter, 88;
censured in Cabinet by Calhoun,
defended by Adams, 88, 89; told
by Crawford of Calhoun's action,
89; demands explanation from
Calhoun, 90; Calhoun's defiant
reply to, 90, 91; retorts, abusing
Calhoun for his duplicity, 91;
story of his threat to hang Calhoun, 103, 104; really yields to
South Carolina, 104; opposition
of Calhoun to, in Senate, 109,
112; not attacked personally by
Calhoun, 112; able to appoint a
successor, not an heir, 118; proposes a law prohibiting circulation of incendiary matter through


mails in South, 133, 134; his proposal criticised by Calhoun, 134;
approves bill prohibiting postmasters from interfering with
mails, 148; abuses Calhoun for
supposed remarks on land bill,
181; censured by Calhoun, 181;
his policy to France condemned
by Calhoun, 182; writes letter in
1843 on Texas annexation, 224;
his letter postdated and published, 229.
Jefferson, Thomas, his policy defended by Calhoun, 23.
KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS, quoted by
Calhoun, 79.
LAMAR, MIRABEAU B., on probability of abolition of slavery in
Texas, 236.
Lands, public, speculation in, effect
of, 155; their cession to new
States advocated by Calhoun,
156.
Legar4, Hugh S., in Tyler's cabinet,
224.
Liberty party, causes defeat of
Whigs, 250.
Lincoln, Abraham, his emancipation
proclamation the logical end of
Calhoun's labors, 351.
McDUFFIE, GEORGE, induced by
Wise to persuade Calhoun to accept State Department, 226; declares Calhoun will not submit
joint resolution to Texas, 253; deserts Calhoun on Mexican war
question, 279.
Madison, James, dragged into war
with England by "young Republicans," 20; forced by them to
assume responsibility, 20; sends
embargo message as prelude to
war, 20; sends message advocating war, 21; his policy defended
by Calhoun, 23.
Mails, exclusion of abolitionist publications from, recommended by




368


INDEX


Jackson, 134; by Calhoun, 134,
135; his reasons, 135-137; their
impossibility, 137.
Mandate, popular, Tyler's theory
of, 250; incompatible with Constitution, 251; or with States'
rights, 251, 252.
Mangum, Willis P., supports Calhoun's bill to impede the circulation of anti-slavery papers, 138.
Mann, Horace, thinks Calhoun plotting a dissolution of the Union,
319.
Mason, James M., reads to Senate
Calhoun's last speech, 338.
Mexico, armistice with Texas, 225;
said to be preparing a new invasion, 247; said to be instigating
Indian troubles, 248; danger of
war with, causes Polk to hasten
settlement of Oregon trouble,
273; war with, not desired by
Polk, 273; but made inevitable
by Polk's claims, 274; war with,
brought on by Taylor, 274, 277
(see War, Mexican); expectation
of territorial cessions by, 278;
proposal to annex, opposed by
Calhoun, 305, 306.
Michigan, debate on admission of,
62, 156; admitted conditionally,
156; Calhoun's opinion of, 156;
held by Calhoun to be a State before admission, 157; discussion of
his views, 158-162; lost by Whigs
through Liberty vote, 250,
Milnor, James, renews Randolph's
motion to open doors of House,
22.
Mississippi, demands annexation of
Texas, 232; calls for Southern
convention at Nashville, 323.
Missouri Compromise, attitude of
Calhoun on, 73, 74; its line continued in annexation of Texas,
253; rejected by House, 278; called
agreat error by Calhoun, 292; denied to be binding on South, 308.
Mix, Elijah, awarded Rip-Rap contract by Calhoun, his character,


49; fails to fulfill obligations, 49;
sublets contract to chief clerk of
War Department, 49; applies for
another contract, 50; accuses Calhoun of corruption, 50.
Monroe, James, appoints Calhoun
Secretary of War, 38; said by
Adams to have difficulty in supporting Calhoun, 52; discussion
as to his succession, 55, 56.
Murphy, Henry C., letter of Upshur
to, on slavery in Texas, 236.
NASHVI5E   CONVENTION, share of
Calhoun in instigating, 323, 324;
called by Mississippi, 323; not
desired by Calhoun to present an
ultimatum, 326; its failure, 327.
Navy, favored by Calhoun, 27.
Nelson, John, tries to satisfy Texan
demand for protection by vague
promises, 229.
New England, influence of residence
in, upon Calhoun, 9; demands a
naval war, in 1812, 27; wishes
an alliance with South Carolina
against Virginia, 28; urged by
Webster to support Calhoun for
vice-presidency, 60; does so, 60;
loses confidence in Calhoun, 93.
New Mexico, desire for conquest of,
277; slavery forbidden in, 310;
question as to how slavery was
to enter, 310, 311; organization
of, by Clayton's compromise, 312;
remains unorganized, 314; people
of, petition against slavery, 315.
New York, supports Jackson as protectionist, 83; native American
movement in, 213; its loss by
Whigs defeats party, 250.
Niles's " Register," on Calhoun's appointment as Secretary of State,
227.
Non-importation, failure of attempt
to repeal, 23; Calhoun's views
on, 23, 24.
North, persecutes abolitionists, 121;
resents Calhoun's motion not to
receive petitions, 124; not india




INDEX


369


posed toward South in 1838, 133;
unable, if willing, to suppress
abolitionists, 133; yields to South,
149; growing hold of abolition
in, described by Calhoun, 166;
its early attitude toward slavery,
169, 170; its turbulence contrasted
with peace of South by Calhoun,
175; impossibility of convincing,
179; roused to aggressive action
by Calhoun, 180; impossibility of
satisfying South, 207; hopes of
Calhoun for presidential support
in, 213; criticises Calhoun's Pakenham letter, 241, 244; driven
into support of Polk, 249; supports Mexican war, 281; but grows
increasingly anti-slavery, 282, 283;
denounced by Calhoun for trying
to keep slavery out of new Territories, 290, 291; impossibility of
its yielding to Calhoun's theory
on the Territories, 295, 296, 311;
expected by Calhoun to yield to a
solid South, 298, 301, 303; driven
by Calhoun into sterner resistance, 304; only its submission
to Southern demands can save
Union, 342; impossibility of its
ceasing agitation, 343.
Nullification, borrowed by Calhoun
from Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, 79-82; possibility of
overriding, by three fourths of
States, 80; held to be conservative principle of Union, 99; its
impossibility, 100, 101; tried by
South Carolina, 103; later held
to include any Federal law, constitutional or not, 144, 145.
OREGON, negotiations of Calhoun
with Pakenham concerning, 260,
261; situation in, and claims to,
261; bill to occupy, opposed by
Calhoun, 262; desire of Calhoun
to gain by simply awaiting growth
of United States population, 263;
claims of Polk to, 264; termination of joint occupancy of, de

manded, 265; "fifty-four forty
or fight," 266; Calhoun's resolutions concerning, 266-268; demand of Giddings for, to counterbalance Texas, 269; compromise
concerning, hastened by approach
of Mexican war, 273; excludes
slavery, 306; bill to organize laid
on table, 306; in Clayton's compromise, 312; organized without
slavery, 314.
PAKENHAM, British minister, communicates Aberdeen's letter to
Upshur, 230; Calhoun's reply to,
231-234; letter of Upshur to, 236;
desire of Calhoun to draw into
a correspondence, 240; negotiates
Oregon question vainly with Calhoun, 260, 261.
Parker, General D., accuses Calhoun of extravagance in War Department, 44.
Pennsylvania, popularity of Calhoun in, 58, 59; supports Jackson
as a protectionist, 83; supports
Polk as a protectionist, 216.
Petition, right of, in regard to abolition petitions, 123, 125, 126.
Polk, James K., denounced in South
Carolina for his double-faced canvass, 216; nominated for President by annexationists, 243;
elected through Liberty vote, 250;
doubtful if Calhoun expects him
to continue him in office, 255;
not desirous to have a man like
Calhoun in Cabinet, 256; too ambitious to be a mere figure-head,
256; offers Calhoun mission to
England, probably expecting him
to decline the honor, 256, 257;
his relations with Calhoun, 259;
in his inaugural address declares
American claim to all of Oregon,
263, 264; withdraws offer of compromise, and advises abrogation
of commercial convention, 264;
secretly anxious to prevent quarrel with England, 272; wishes to




370


INDEX


settle Oregon question in order to
be free to deal with Texas, 273;
does not wish a war with Mexico, 273; prefers diplomacy, 273;
bound, however, to get territory,
even at cost of war, 274; his demands, 274; orders Taylor to
force a war, 274, 275; at same
time determines to satisfy England in Oregon, 275; sends message announcing war, 276; asks
two millions to negotiate a peace,
278; does not realize impossibility of making conquests for the
Union, 281; merely carries on
Calhoun's policy too far, 285;
favors a defensive war at first,
288; recommends occupation of
Yucatan, 306.
Porter, Peter B., assigned chairmanship of Committee on Foreign Relations, moves choice of
Calhoun, 15; presents report on
foreign affairs, 15.
Preston, William, moves to annex
Texas in 1838, 232.
Protection, Calhoun's earlyfavor towards, 29, 33-35, 59; injustice of,
toward South, 71.
RAILROADS, their importance recognized by Calhoun, 151-153.
Randolph, John, his attack on war
policy met by Calhoun, 16; defeated by Calhoun in debate, 17,
18; his arguments answered, 18,
19; his motion to open doors of
House rejected, 22; his abuse
of Adams's administration not
checked by Calhoun, 63.
Republican party, failure of its
commercial policy toward England and France, 12; old and new
leaders of, 13; war party in, 14;
forces Madison into war, 20; division in, on declaration of war, 22.
Republicans, not the originators of
civil war, 299, 300.
Rhett, R. B., threatens disunion in
1844, 217.


Rip-Rap contract, awarded by Calhoun to Mix, 49; failure of Mix
to perform, 49; sublet by Mix,
49; Calhoun said to have profited
from, 50; examined by House,
50, 51.
Richardson, William M., moves repeal of commercial restrictions,
23.
Russell, Lord John, calls Polk's
claim to Oregon a " blustering announcement," 264.
SARGENT, NATHAN, describes Calhoun's attitude on internal improvements, 40; on Calhoun's
determination to break down Adams's administration, 64.
Schurz, Carl, resemblance between
his Indian policy and that of
Calhoun, 48, 49.
Scott, General Winfield, his share
in reforming military estabishment, 43.
Sears, -, letter of Webster to, 271.
Seminole war, Jackson's conduct
in, 87.
Senate, recommits war bill, 22;
finally passes it with amendments,
22; Calhoun's presiding over, 63;
election of Calhoun to, 103; debates anti-slavery petitions, 123,
132; receives and rejects petitions,
132; rejects Calhoun's bill to exclude incendiarypublications from
mail, 138; adopts Calhoun's theory
of origin of Constitution, 189; and
condemns religious anti-slavery
agitation, 191, 193; adopts Calhoun's amendments censuring
England in Enterprise case, 203;
character of vote in, for, 204; significance of, 208; confirms Calhoun's appointment as Secretary
of State, 228; disinclined to follow
Calhoun, 244; rejects annexation
treaty, 244; amends and passes
annexation joint resolution, 253;
motion in, to terminate joint occupancy of Oregon, 265; debate




INDEX


371


in, on Oregon question, 266, 267;
debate on Mexican war, 276; refuses Calhoun's demand for time
to consult documents, 276, 277;
lays bill to organize Oregon without slavery on table, 306; passes
Clayton's compromise, 313.
Seward, W. H., indignant with alliance of Whigs with nullifiers, 272.
Shannon, Wilson, assures Mexico
that Polk desires to settle all
questions on liberal terms, 274.
Slave trade, treaty for suppression
of, 209, 210; attitude of Calhoun,
210.
Slavery, its economic effect upon
South, 66-71; damages middle
class, 67-69; prevents artisan
class, 69; not understood by South
or North to be real cause of
Southern conditions, 72; any attack upon, a slander on South,
125; dangers to, foreseen by Calhoun, 127-129; not endangered
from force but agitation, 128,129;
considered more vital to South
than Union, 132, 147; impossibility of abolition of, 140, 146; endangered by railroads between
South and North, 153,154; praised
by Calhoun, 164; admitted to be
an evil by South, 171; held to be
a positive good for both races,
171-176; necessary to full civilization, 174,175; necessity of converting North to belief in, 177,
178; its real economic effect, 178;
its right to protection by Federal
government, 192, 194; its right
to extension into Territories, 194,
195; its relation to international
law, 203-209; danger to it from
emancipation in Texas, 236, 237;
endangered by a war with England, 270; first made dividing
question in politics by South, 300;
its hopelessness as foundation of
society, 330.
South, opposes tariff of 1824, 65;
union of, against, proposed, 65;


opposed by Calhoun, 66; economic
effect of slavery upon, 66-70;
classes in, 67-70; justified in
hostility to protection, 71; does
not understand real reason, 72;
thought by Webster to plan secession in 1828, 82; supports Jackson as anti-protection, 83; effort
of Calhoun to unite in defence of
interests, 97; meant by Calhoun
when he says "States," 101, 102,
146; denounces abolitionists, 121;
any attack on slavery a slander
on, 125; necessity of its meeting
abolitionist attacks at once, 128;
holds slavery more precious than
Union, 131, 132; insists that North
suppress abolitionists, 133; will
never cease to assert paramount
importance of slavery, 140, 147;
continually forces North to yield,
149; desired by Calhoun to introduce railroads, 151, 152; unable
to profit by them, 153; really endangered by them, 153, 154; admits slavery to be an evil, 169,
170; gradually alters sentiments,
170, 171; held by Calhoun to be
benefited by slavery, 171, 172; inferior only in trade, 173; economic
contrast with North, 178; dissatisfied with efforts of North to put
down abolitionists, 187; its demand to be let alone involves denial of criticism even, 206, 207;
does not favor Calhoun for President, 214; demands annexation of
Texas, 232; threatens to repeal
tariff of 1842 in default of Texas
annexation, 249; reproached by
Northwest for abandoning Oregon, 267; dreads a war with Eng.
land as danger to slavery, 270; its
unwillingness to accept free States
predicted by Giddings, 280; driven
to desperation by Wilmot Proviso,
281, 290; necessity of its consolidation to obtain rights in Territories, 296, 297; causes civil war by
forcing North to form a sectional




372


INDEX


party, 300, 301; proposal by Calhoun that it boycott the North,
301, 302; in opposing exclusion of
slavery from Oregon, admits contending for a principle, 307; refuses to yield in 1849, 314; attempt
of Calhoun to unite in a party,
316-320; wish of Calhoun to prepare it for the worst, 317; its
members of Congress confer and
adopt address but fail to unite,
320; plan of Calhoun to unite by
Nashville Convention, 325; continues to lose ground relatively
to North, 330; dissatisfaction in,
with slavery, 331; determines to
keep out California until North
makes concessions, 335; Calhoun's anxiety for, on death-bed,
349.
South Carolina, proposed coalition
of New England with, against
Virginia, 28; approval of internal
improvements, 40; "Exposition"
written for, by Calhoun, 75; high
morality of family life in, 85; its
reception of tariff of 1832, 97;
passes nullification ordinance, 103;
elects Hayne governor, 103; tariff
of 1833 a yielding to, 105; urges
claims of Calhoun for presidency,
211; nominates him, 212; dismayed at his failure, 215; denounces Polk for supposed protectionist leanings, 216; complains of
loss by emigration to Mississippi
and Northwestern States, 331.
Spoils system, denounced by Calhoun, 113-115; proposal of Calhoun to remedy, 116, 117, 201;
bill to punish partisan officials
opposed by Calhoun, 199, 200.
States' rights, held by Calhoun to
be corner-stone of Union, 78, 79,
96, 98, 99; means, in Calhoun's
mind, Southern rights, 101, 146;
held by Calhoun to be infringed
by Force Bill, 106, 119, 120; in
relation to Federal law, 136,139,
144; opinion of Calhoun that a


State cannot be forced into Union,
160, 161; the origin of Union. 189.
Stephens, Alexander H., moves to
lay Clayton's compromise on table, 313.
Story, Joseph, admires Calhoun,,but
thinks him too young for presidency, 59.
Stow, Silas, moves to postpone war
action, 22.
Sub-treasury, attitude of Calhoun
toward, 183, 184; its adoption
strengthens central government,
186.
Supreme Court, left by Clayton's
compromise to settle question of
slavery in new Territories, 313.
TAiEY, ROGER B., denounced by
Calhoun, 114.
Tariff, of 1816, argument of Calhoun
for, 33-35, 59; of 1824, causes excitement in South, 65; of 1828,
calls for Calhoun's South Carolina
Exposition, 75; of 1832, fails to
satisfy South, 97; causes nullification movement, 97; of 1833, a
yielding to South, 104; Calhoun
forced to support, 104; threat of
abrogation of, frightens North into
supporting Texas annexation, 249.
Tarpley, Collin S., letter of Calhoun
to, suggesting Nashville Convention, 325, 326.
Taylor, General Zachary, ordered
to occupy up to Rio Grande, 274;
as President, sanctions action of
California, 334.
Tennessee, demands annexation of
Texas, 232.
Territories, right of slaveholders to
enter, 194,195; question of slavery
in, brought on by Mexican war,
280-283, 290; Calhoun's resolutions on, 291-293; their impossibility of acceptance, 294-296, 311;
squatter sovereignty in, 309; question as to extension of Constitution over, 321, 322.
Texas, annexation of, favored by




INDEX


373


Calhoun, 221, 222; intrigue for
annexation of, under Tyler, 223 -254; part played by, question in
defeating Van Buren's nomination, 224, 242, 243; negotiations
of Upshur with, 225; demands
protection during negotiations,
225; receives promise from Calhoun, 229; agrees to treaty, 230;
attitude of England toward, 231,
234; necessity of annexing, to
prevent emanicipation, 231, 232,
235-238; popular agitation for, in
South, 232; annexation demanded
by Democratic party, 243; treaty
with, rejected, 244; notifies Calhoun of threatened invasion from
Mexico, 247; gains promise of continued protection, 247; Tyler's
theory of popular mandate to annex, 250-252; resolution to annex,
passed and signed, 253.
Thompson, Waddy, moves to annex
Texas, 232.
Turney, Hopkins L., charges Calhoun with obstructing war for
presidential motives, 286; provoked by Calhoun's advocacy of
a defensive war, 287.
Tyler, John, appoints Upshur Secretary of State, 224; persuaded by
Wise to appoint Calhoun, 226;
said by Nelson to favor protecting
Texas, 229; known to favor annexation in 1841,232; said by Upshur to fear abolition in Texas
under English influence, 236; criticised by Northern Democrats for
Calhoun's Pakenham letter, 241;
dismayed by rejection of treaty,
245; sends message urging Congress to secure annexation in some
other way, 245; waives constitutional question, 246; as ready as
Jackson to "assume responsibility," 248; asserts election of 1844
to be a mandate, by a controlling
majority of people and States, to
annex Texas, 250; approves joint
resolution of annexation, 253.


UMIor, historical growth of, 78, 98;
Calhoun's theory of, 78, 79,97-99,
189; impossibility of his theory,
100, 101; Calhoun's devotion to,
124, 131, 142, 299; endangered by
attack on slavery, 132, 166; its
actual division causes sectional
parties, 300; impossibility of saving, on Calhoun's own statement,
343.
Upshur, Abel P., succeeds Webster
as Secretary of State, 224; proposes annexation to Texas, 224;
dares not either grant or deny
Texas' request for protection, 225;
killed, 225; Aberdeen's dispatch
to, 230 if.; avows English designs on slavery in Texas as cause
for annexation, 236; thinks Texas
cannot maintain slavery unless
annexed, 236.
VAN BtBUEN, MARTIN, gains Jack.
son's favor by attentions to Mrs.
Eaton, 85; Calhoun's rival for
succession to Jackson, 86; wishes
Jackson's reflection, 86; suspected by Calhoun of having betrayed him to Jackson, 86; too
cunning to show his hand, 86;
promises to follow in Jackson's
footsteps, 118; does not imitate
Jackson's methods, 118; his subtreasury scheme supported by
Calhoun, 183; considered powerless for evil by Calhoun, 184; his
nomination opposed in 1843-1844
by Calhoun's followers, 214, 215;
his followers succeed in postponing date of convention, 215; defeated for nomination at Baltimore convention by Texas annexationists, 243.
Van Zandt, Isaac, Texan envoy,
asks United States to protect
Texas during negotiations, 225.
Virginia, its anti-commercial policy
opposed by New England, 28.
Virginia resolutions, quoted by Calhoun, 79.




374


-INDEX


WADDEI, Da. MOSS, prepares Calhoun for college, 9.
War Department, Calhoun's man.
agement of, 41, 53.
War of 1812, declaration urged by
Calhoun, 18, 19; war message
sent by Madison, 21; declaration,
21, 22; not a national but a party
war, 25; yet worth fighting, 25;
mistake in conduct of, 27, 28.
War with Mexico, causes of, 273,
274; Taylor's advance to Rio
Grande, 274; deprecated by Calhoun, 275; not opposed by him in
order to help administration settle Oregon question, 275; Polk's
war message, 276; accepted by
Congress, 276, 277; Calhoun's
opinion of, 277, 279, 284; Calhoun's responsibility for, 285; defensive character for, advocated
by Calhoun and Polk, 287, 288.
Webster, Daniel, modern diminution of his fame, 3; compared
with Calhoun, 4, 6; asked by
Calhoun to help country out of
financial difficulties, 25; hopes
New England will support Calhoun for vice-presidency, 60; on
plan for a Southern Confederacy
in 1828, 82; his remonstrance in
Creole case approved by Calhoun,
209; his treaty for suppression of
slave trade approved by Calhoun,
209, 210; leaves Tyler's Cabinet,
224; on Calhoun's influence with
Whigs in 1846, 272; debates with
Calhoun the status of Constitution in Territories, 321, 322; his
eulogy of Calhoun, 348.


Webster, Ezekiel, letter of Webster
to, 60.
Westcott, James D., calls anti-slavery petition from Santa Fd an
abuse of right, 315.
Whig party, its protection principles foreshadowedby Calhoun,
33; Calhoun not a member of,
109; mistaken in opposing executive, 117, 118; accuses Calhoun
of treachery in supporting Van
Buren, 183, 184; incompatibility
with Calhoun's principles, 186;
defeated by Liberty vote, 250;
Southern members reluctant to
follow Calhoun, 319, 320; later,
leads Southern attacks, 335.
Wick, William W., moves'extension
of Missouri Compromise line in
place of Wilmot Proviso, 278.
Williams, John, carries reforms in
War Department through Congress, 43.
Wilmot, David, moves anti-slavery
proviso to two-million bill, 278.
Wilmot Proviso, adopted, 278; its
defeat by South a barren victory,
305.
Wirt, William, on Crawford's betrayal of Calhoun, 87; thinks
Calhoun ruined by quarrel with
Jackson, 93.
Wise, Henry A., enthusiastic over
Texas, 226; succeeds in inducing
Tyler to appoint Calhoun Secretary of State, 226; predicts Western progress of slavery, 283, 284.
YALE COnLLEG, studies of Calhoun
at, 9, 10.




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