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SPEECH]
OF  "I
HON. A. COLLAMER, OF VERMOiT,
.~y
SLAVTERY IN THE TERRITORIES.
DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THiE UNITED STATES, MARCH 8, 1860.
-The Senate having resumed  the consideration of the following resolutions,  sub n- fitted by Mr. BRowN on the 18th of January:
-     B"loed, That the Territories are the common property of all the States, and that it is the privi.
lege of the citizens of all the States to go into the Territories with every kind or description ol' pro-      perty recognized by the Constitution ofhe e Itited States and held under the laws of any of the
-    States, and that it is the constitutional duty of the law-making power, wherever lodged, and  by
'rhomsoever exercised, whether by the Congress or the Territorial Legislature, to enact such laws
-:as may be found necessary for the adequate and sufficient protection of such property.
_      BResoeled, That the Committee on Territories be instructed to insert, in any bill they may  report
- for the organization of new Territories, a clause declaring it to be the duty of the Territorial Legis l- ature to enact adequate and sufficient laws for the protection of all kinds of property, as above de      scribed, within the limits of the Territory, and that upon its failure or refutsal to do so, it is the ad      mitted duty of Congress to interpose and pass such laws.
The question is on the amendment of Mr.  WILKINSON, to strike out all after  the
word "resolved," where it first occurs, and insert the following:
That the Territories are the common property of the peopZe of the United States; that Congress
-    has fall power and authority to pass all laws necessary and proper for the government of sach; Ter          ritories; and that, in the exercise of such power, it is the duty of Congress so to legislate in relation
-   to slavery therein that the interests of free labor may be encouraged and protected in such Terri           tories.
-     roeselved, That the Committee on Territories be instructed to insert in any bill they may report
for the organization of new Territories a clause declaring that there shall be neither slavery nor in. —-=       voluntary servitude In such Territories, except in punishment for crime whereof the party has been
truly convicted.
— _-Zf:Mr. COLLAMER.   Mr. President, the resolutions under consideration relate to
-   the condition of slavery in the Territories, and propose to provide legislation in re           lation to t.hat subject, especially legislation to protect and preserve it there.  The
discussion on this subject, as it was begun and has gone on in the Senate during the
progress of this session, has taken a very wide range.   I have no fault to find with
that; but it seems to me, after all, that we might bring ourselves a li,ttle nearer Lo
-    some practical application of principles.  When  we consider the condition of our
country-I mean of our whole country-the condition of society which exists in it,
and the adaptation of our measures to that condition of society, we may bring our           selves to the practical application of some important principles.
Now, what is the state of society here   Take our nation, for which we legislate,
the whole of which is a proper subject of our consideration, the whole of which is
to be considered in measuring out our different degrees of policy, and the measures
ecalealated to advance its interests   No legislation  can be valuable, unless upen
the whole it is an advantage to the country for which it is made, and we must con           _ider the actual condition of that country at the time, in order to see the practical
application of the mneasures we are about to pursue.
We have, it seems, Mr. President, two conditions of society existing in this coun           try-that existing in the slaveholding States and that existing in the non-slavehold           ing States, which I, for brevity, shall call, as they are usually called, the free States.
The condition of society in the free States, which include, in round  numbers, about
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two-thirds of the inhabitants of tflis counitry, is based on this idea, that all men ire
to be educated; that there is to be universal suffrage; that men are to be educated
with a view to discharge this duty and privilege of suffrage.  When our fathiers at
the East entered upon this experiment at first in New England, all the notion&
which had existed for ages in other regions of the world, in relation to landlord and
tenant, lord and vassal, patrician and plebian, master and slave, were entirely to be
obliterated, and all the notions which had prevailed, too, of primogeniture and of
entail, and everything that was calculated to perpetuate those distinctions in society,
-— were to be done away with.  In short, they proposed, and the idea they entertained
wau,-t     r upon an experiment of a free aid equial system of republican govern-,
ment; that ever-m.n should own the land he cultivates, and every man should
cultivate the land he of  that there should be none to rule and irone to serve that every man should serve him   and then he of course would have a faithful
servant.
That system is not merely ideal.  It practically prevails th"i" the!arge body
of the free States-not so much in the cities, not so entirely in the more"" ensely
populated regions; but such is the actual condition of the landholding part of the
people of the free States.  I will not wpend time to elaborate this system any more,
I do not propose now, or at any other time in the course of my remarks, to say any thing to commend it particularly to the aceeptance of any one.   I simply wish to,
state it, and briefly to describe it, and there rest in relation to lthat.
The other condition of society, existing irn the slavebolding States of this Union, I
would rather cite as described by another, than undertake to do it myself.   Mr.
Calhoun, in 1837, said:
" Many in the South once believed that it (slavery) was a moral and politiceal evil; that folly andi
delusion are gone. We see it now in its true light, and regard it as a most safe and stable basis for
free institutions in the world.  * * * The southern States are an aggregate, in faict, of communi ties, not of individuals. Every plantation is a little eommonnity, with the master at its head, who
concentrates in himself the united interests of capital and labor, of which he is the eommont repre sentative. The small communities aggregated niake the State, in all whose action, labor and capi
tal are equally represented and perfectly harmonized."
I am not about to make any remarks in relation to the questioin of whether this
is a desirable or undesirable eondition.  I simply desire briefly to elaborate a little
what Mr. Calhoun here says of it.  From these remarks, two things are quite ob vious. In the first place, it is obvious that is an aristocracy. He says that these
communities, of which the master or owner is the head, aggregated, make the State,
and the owner is the representative of these separate conmmunities.  That meets my
idea of nothing more nor less than an aristocracy.   I do not say that this condition
of things is censurable.  I do not use the word " aristocracy" in any bad sense.
I say it is simply that. Another thing, which is perhaps but an ingredient of the
first, is, that the mlass of the commnunity-I do not speak now of the slaves-are,,
in effect, practically ignored.  The masters representing, as Mr. Calhoun says, these
separate communities, make the State, and, as the representatives of the labor and
property of which they are masters and ownei-s, they of course guide the State, and
hence, he says, there comes to be no collision. We all understand that a large
mnajority of the southern people are not slaveholderis, and they never will be proba  bly. Of course, according to his own statement, they are essentially left out of the
account.
These two conditions of society, inasmuch as they are both in existence in our
country, and no doubt will be during our lives, and probably for centuries to eome,
present to us a problem to solve; and the question is, what is our duty here, for
this body is the representative of these two interests. I regard it as the duty of
Congress, so far as the powers whlich have been delegated to it will enable it to do,
to endeavor to promote and advance the prosperity of all parts of this country; of
both these sections, if you call them sections; of both these conditions of society.
That may De a very difficult problem; but the more difficult it is, the more we
should be willing to grasp it, meet it, do our duty in relation to it.  I think we are
not at liberty to set aside any one part of our country, or any one of these condi  tions of society, on the ground that we cannot exactly reconcile its privileges, its  interests, its duities, with those of the other. That problem is put into our hands in
the formation of our Government, in the existence of this Government, and we  can  not do our duty if we avoid it.
It is, I say, M~i. President, not an easy task to shape the policy of this Govera  ment, to orsder the forms of our eommercial intercourse, to lay our duties and taxes,
to flame all our laws in such a manner as shall best promote the advantage of the
whole of this people, and both of these classes, and this whole community. It may i
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tvne, at times, that we shall find the interescts of one part conflicting in somne degr-ee
with the interests of another part, and therefore it is that the problem may be diffi  elllt of solution, practically in our hands; but it is nevertheless the probleni put into
our hands.  It is to that we must address ourselves.  It is that we must perform as
far as we can, and as much as in us lies.
The first thing that occurs to my mind is this question: is it at all probable that
we can, eitiher- of us, induce the other to adopt lour system of society?  Argue it as
long as we please, spend as much of our time and breath about it as we may, it
commendation of the respective system which we  represent, and to which  we
belong, after all, I believe there is -very little reason to suppose that in this Hall one
party will be able to induce the other to a(dopt its system.  It is not ve.y likely, it
is not very probable.  Whenever the system of either party is attacked, and its
weaknesses attempted to be exposed, eaci may stand on the defensive) and that is
well enouglh, if so be tltat it is condiucted in appropriate spirit, and with that courtesy
and urbanrity which shlould become the places that we occupy in this, which ought
to be regarded as an august body.
It will hardly do to say that these two conditions of society cainnot exist in the
same nationes. There is a coexistence in the saite n)atiol There is another klind of
coexistence in the same ntiunicipal government.  They are not the sanme thing.  I
fancy that after an experient of eighty years or more, we may at least say that
they can exist, and prosperously, too, in the same nation.  The lesson of our own
experience teaches as much as that these two conditions can exist, and exist lrosper ously, in the same nation.  But when we say that, we should recollect tht  the
worod "natibon," as applied to a people like otirs, is a term composed of an aggr-egate
of separate nations, in one sense separate sovereigaties; and all the inteinal and
municipal regulations to which the condition of so-iety belongs, fall appropriately
and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the local authorities of tlhe Sovereign
States.
Then there may be a well-shaped and well-conducted and prospeiously-conducted
nation, with one condition of society, in one State, in one municipality, and another
in anothei State.  They may both be prosperous within the same nation; but, after
all, they cannot coexist in thie same municipal government.  That is a nierie truism,
perhaps.  It reuiires one simply to state it to apprehend it. I say a State cannot
be a non-slaelioldinrg State and a slaveaolding State at the same titne; and I may
say, I mray add with equal truth, that I think our experiece  shows us that, under
a territorial government, a Territory cannot be at the same time a slaveholding and
a free Territory.  I believe that experiment has been attempted, and it is a failure;
the thing cannot be.  It would seem to be very obvious on the mere statement.  Il
would involve a paradox.
Well, now, sir, what shall we do with ths country, having these two conditions
of society spread over it and existing in it?  What  is our duty in relation to the
matter?  We have no quarrel or difficulty in relation to slavery, so far as it exists
within the separate States   It exists under the operation and protectioii of the gov ernrneits of those separate States, peaceably and quietly.  But the question arises,
what shall we do in relation to it when we cornme to the territory which lies out of
and beyond the julisdietion of the several States?  We  must keep the peace about
it; it mnust be arraiiedi in some way.   What can we do with it?  How can wve get
along with it, qutetly and peaceably.?  I think we, like aiiy other people, iigit be
enabled, if we,ere so inclined, to draw somrne lessons of advantage from our own
experience, and fiom the history of our own country.  We are apt to forget, in the
hurry of nrew and unrtried experiments, that after all, experience is the safest guide
for to-day and( the safest guide for truth.  We  speak of our fathers-thley whe
established this Government.  How did thley manage it?  Is it not well enough for
us occasienaily to look at the old way, and ascertain how it was?  The further we
get into dificulty, the miore troubles we experience in trying new modes  and new
experiments, the m ore we ought to be inclined to see how this matter was managed
originally, and how that managemnent succeeded.   How was it?  I think n iothiing
can be more clear, on a candid examinration, than that they looked upon slavery as
a great evil.  So adnmits 5Ir. Calhoun himself; undoubtedly it was trule. No  nina
disputes that now.  ITow did they propose to manage it?  It was in this way: the
old Congress of the Confederation was sitting at the time the convention was sitting
ill Pliladelphia.  In that Confederation Congress they acted in relation to the thela
known and then owned territory of the United States, lying out of and beyond the
limits of the separate States; and, in providing a Government for it, enacted that
slavery or involuntary servitude, except for crime, should  not there exist; it was 
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entirely forbidden.  Thit provision was handed over and duly notifiled to the co-nm
vention that was sitting to form the Constitution; sitting cotemporaneouslv.  They
understood that, and it was in no way disapproved by them.  They- provided in ths
Coinstitution that Congress should leave power "to make all needful rules and reguo
lations" for the disposition of the territory and otiher property of the United States;
thIus bestowing on the new proposed Government the power of control over ths
Territories, and they immediately exercised it in the First Congress, by legitimat'Dng
and adapting the provisions of the ordinance of 1787 to the then existing form of
government.
There was another thing, They did not look upon slavper then as a mere local
mnatter-a matter of mere local interest,  The nation provided for the Northwest
Territory; but that was neot all.  It was then undoubtedly the general prevailing
opinion that if thev cut off tne supply of slaves by prohibiting the African slave
trade, and limited thie extent of territory in which slavery shouldt exis.t, by eonfininLi,
it to its then existinlg limits, it wotld finally die out.  There is no doubt that they
entered upon that experiment.  They vested in Congress the power, after 1808, to(
whiceh time the extreme southern States then desired to continue thIe trade, to cut
off that foreign supply-to  cut of the African slave trade; and they had in the
ordinance of i787, the continuance of which  th.I  new Constitutiton eontemlplated,
a provision for Imiting thie extent of territory in which it should prevail.
I have heetn charged ever andt over-I can remember at least three timnes bv three
different got~emen in the Senate, in the progress of this distussion —-wNth having
said, which was true, that I believed the mere  limited the  extent of territory to
which slae'-. ry was (conflned, the sooner it would come  to an end.  The honorable
Senator from Alabamia, (Mr. Ct'Av,) the honorable Senator from North Carolinad
(Mr. CLaI'oN AN,) and, I believe, other gentlemen, have seemed to think that, in approving of that sentiment, I am anr Abolltionist; and one  Senator says  that is
nothing more iror less than a plan to smoke them out-not a very elearit erptession
Ilave I entertained any new thought on that s'bject?  I desire to call atitention
for one moment to a single remark made by the  Senator from Virginiai at this
session.  llr. MAso; said, on the'23d of January, speaking of these who made the
Constitution:
I believe this wa,s thbe.r optio: thieir leJdiee was aimed against the freign r ilave trade, the'
African slave trade, and their belief was, that by cutting that off, slavery would die out or itself,
without any act of abolitio-n. I attempted at one time to show, by the recorded opinions of Mr.
.Idaidison, that the famous ordinarnce of 1IS7, so far as it prohibited slavery in the  erritory northwes i
of the Ohio, was aimed at t'e Afriean slave trade, and aimed at that alo' e; the idea being that ie
they could restrict the area into which sl*very could be introduced from abroad, they would, to that
extent, prevent the importation of slaves; and that, when it was altogether prevented, the con dition
of slavery would die out of itself; but they were not Abolitionists, far less within the meaning and
splrit of the Abolitionist of thle present day.1
That is the view I wished to present, irn shorter words.  They entertained  the
idea that if the nation would cut off the foreign supply, anid would limit the area
into which slavery was to go, it would die aout.  I ars,ot now proposing  to say
how far this idea of theirs was errect; but I mnst iay that I have a strong desire
to play out that play.  Let -(s go on and eatry through the experiment on whiel,
this Government was founded; because it was under this idea-in the  meridiar
blaze of this idea-that our Constitution was franmed.  It was framed  by men  whl
entertained this thought, and it was framed for the purpose of carrying it out.
IHece it was that the power to, cut off the fot eigrn supply wt;s vested in Cougres.
and the limitation in the Territories was done in tie ordinance approved by Coingress.
Mr. President, is there antytling new in tlie idea whic'h  now eonstitutes the leading feature of the Republican platformn-that is, keeping slavery out of the Territories, and keeping the foreign supply still cut offt   Oit would suppose,  whlo had
come into this body for the last two or three months, that somriehow or other this
sentiment, this principle, this proposed otleet, was a new  and unhearid  of aggreseion that was utterly unexampled; th.at there was no precedent  for  it in the Gov
einruent; that it called upon all men, everywhere,. to raise th eir vices  int utter
execration of the whole of it; and we have been called upon  froml day to (ay, instead of proposing to carry out this principle, to disband utterly, throw down otu'
arms, and disperse, as thle English said to our fathlers upon  the feld tf Lexington.
Sir, there is nothing new in it at all.  It was the very franmework, it coirstituted tlie
great,especial element of the Constitution; it was one of the great leading purposes
of its formation.  Gentlemen have wandered so far and s6 fast fromn thi;s principle,
.eiidthe variety of dogmnas now  set up, one of them being parent to the otlher.
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they hare made so large a departure, that when  they come  to look at the thling in
its modern aspect, men are startled at it, because it does violence to their nlewly invented dogmas, not because there is anything new or strange in it.
But, Sir. President, we acquired other and further territory than what was owned
at the time the Constitution was formed.  We did not at that time, if you please,
properly own that part of the country which now makes Mississippi and Alat)bama.
It belonged to Georgia.  Our people claimed it-claimned that the title to a large
part of it, at least, was iil the United States, and not in Georgia.  That was  not
merely the part ceded by South Carolina.  There was anotlher small piece; whiclh
was, the difference of the line of Florida as nlade by  the British treaty, anid as
prac(tically run.  How did the United States arrange the matter  when  they  ae quired more territory- that part which they got from North Carolina which makes
Tennessee, and that part -which they obtained from Franice-the Louisiana pur ehase?  IHow did they mnanage under this sarie Constitution in relation to the sulb ject of slavery in that country?  I had occasion to examine, with some care, this
very quoestlon, some time since, and I presented it in as brief words as I could ill the
report which I made in 1856, in relation to the Kansas difficulties.  As  I said then,
I desire to inquire what our Government did in relation to that, for two purposes:
in the first place, to show what power they exercised, and then the manner of ex ercising it.  I think tihe manner in which they  exe.cised it will clearly show us
what power they understood themrselves to possess; and not only so, but the man ner in which they executed that power, so as to show us clearly their purposes.
What did they do? I grant to the Senator firom Georgia, for I believe he has
called our attention two or three times this session to the act of 179S, that it is not
true that Congress always prohibited slavery in the Territories; not that they had
not the power to do it, but because of its inexpediency.  The true ground on which
they went, the rule they followed, was this, as the whole lesson of our history will
show, wleire  slaveryv was actually existing in the country to any considerable or
general extent, it was, though somewhat modified in Misstssippi and Orleans Terri tories, suffered to ir emain   The fact that it had been taken there and existed there
was deemed an indication of its adaptation and local utility. Where slavery did
iot in fact exist to any appreciable extent, it was Iby Congress expressly prohibited,
so that in either case, the country settled up without any difficulty or doubt as to
the chlaracter of its institutions.  In no instance was this difficult or disturbing
question left to the people who might settle in the Territories, to be there an ever lasting bone of contention as long as the territorial government existed.  It was re garded as a subject in which the whole cou-ntry had an interest, and therefore im proper for local legislation.
To illustrate this, I will not go on with the history of governmental action from
time to time, as Congress made different territorial governments in the country
northwest of the Ohio.  I need not show how they continued to repeat over and
over  again thlie utter prohibition of slavery; but I will call attention  to the  act
which has been remarked upon by the Senator from Georgia, in relation to Mississippi.  As to Tennessee, we all know that North Carolina, in making the cession of
the territory to the United States, prohibited them from doing anything tending to
the abolition of slavery.  In relation to Mississippi, I do not understand thie action
of Conr)gress exactly as the gentleman from Georgia presents it.  The truth is, that
the United States claimed a large part of that country,  now forming Alabama and
Mississip1)i, and Georgia claimed nearly the whole of it.  When the MississipI)i territorial act was passed, in 179S, it was formed in anticipation of, and it appointed a
way of fixig commissioners for, the settlenent of that dispute with Georgia.  The
teriritory was settled, as far as it was settled, with slaveholders and slaves.  It was
eirpected that Georgia, in mraking her cession, would do as North Carolina had done
in relation to Tennessee.  That territorial act of t1798 remained unexecuted until
1802.  In t8()2, the commissioners of Georgia made settlement  withl the United
States, and then the United States agreed to pay Georgia $1,250,000, for which she
quit-clairaed all her right, clainm, and title, with certain reservations; and, amongst
other things, slhe pulit ill a clause forbidding the extension of the anti-slavery clause
of the ordinance of 1787 over that territory.  They made their grant on that conditioli.
What does that show? The Senator from Georgia says:
"In 1798, when Congress legislated in reoation to Mississirppi Territory, they did not prohihit
slavery."
No, sir, it was already there; actually established, and it was expected that
Georgia would insist on keeping it there, and she did insist on keeping it there. 
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But that was not aII.  The United States then, in that very act, prohibi6tecd the iriportation of slaves fi-om abroad, thoughl they could not prohibit it in the rest of the
United States until 1808.  By what power did Congress do that?  Certaiiily they
received no power for it f-rom the provision of the Constitution that "the migration
or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing sihall think proper
to admit shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1508." That did not
give themrn any power about it except to prohibit it in all the States aftel 1808; but
t,hey did proceed to prohibit the introduction of slaves into the Mississippi Territory
in 1798.  Why?   Simply for the same reason that they  did the rest: they considered themselves as possessing the power, in frairing territorial governments, to
frame themn in such a way, and with such prohibitions and eonditions, as they thought
would best promote the interests of the nation.  They derived the power, no doubt,
at that time, fromn that clause of the Constitution called the territorial clause, by
whichl they were empowered to make all needful rules and regulations for the Teiritories.  None other can be found.  There cannot be found a clause in the Conistitution, which gave them the power, unless it was that.  I know that it is said, witli,
regard to Louisiana and other acquisitions obtained by treatv with foreign nations,
inasmuch as they have poweri to acquire, they have the necessarily irncidental powser
to govern; but that cannot apply to Mississippi  It was not acquired  by  treaty
from a foreign niation at all.  They exercised the power there under the territorial
clause.
Again, when our country made the Louisiana purchase from France, in the first
aet forming the territorial government of Orleans Territory, now Louisiana, which
was in 1803 or 1804, Congress did not prohibit slaveryv; because it was already
there, and because it was adapted to the country, I suppose they thoughlt.  They
suffered it, but they did not leave it so.  They provided that no slaves should go irn
there except in families for settlemenrt; arid in thle next  place, they provided that
iio slave should be taken in there ill any way that had been imported into the United States after 1798.  WAhy 17948.  Iii 1798 they passed that Mississippi act prohibiting the importation of slaves from abroad into AMis-issippi.  They soon learied
that it afforded very little security  to keep out imported  slaves from  Mississippi,
when they could be imported into Georgia and taken over i, to Mississippi.  Congress, tlhei efore, provided in the aot for Orleans Territory, that nio slave should be
taken in there in any way in families or in any other way, that had been imported
after 1798.  Now, I would ask, did iiot the people of South Carolina, oi Georgia,
or any other slavelolding State —and  a great miany  of tihem wveie such at that
time-owni their slaves whielc they had imported from Africa inI 1800, and 1801, arind
1802, and 1803, just as they owned any other slaves they held? If any of them
were property, were not those slaves property?  Clearly they were.  A9ell, then,
how did Congress have a right to prohibit their taking thiem into Louisiana?  They
did exercise the power, and no man doubted it.  It remained for fifty years, and no
man questioned it.
It is unnecessary, in order to show what was the power, as then understood by
them, that they should, on all occasions, have prohibited slavery entirely.  TIle fact
that they did not do that does not showv that thev had not the powei to do it.  No,
.Mr. President, a power to regulate is a power to prohibit.  Nothing is mnorie fully
settled, for instance, than that the power to regulate commerce is a power to prohibit commerce altogether, as was fully settled in relation to the embargo.  Congress did regulate this matter in the Territories precisely as they pleased.  If the
cotemnporaneous exposition, if the usages and practices, under  the Government, by
those who made it, and, immediately after its formation, continie  iid )d pei-sisted ill,
uniform in its operation, can prove anything-and it seenis to icle the best possible
proof, when any doubt exists as to the construction of a paperi-tlhen, I say, it is
clear Congress had and exercised the power, both in the territory they owned at
the time the Constitution was adopted, and in that which they acquired afterwards,
either from any of the confederated States, or fromy a foreigi-i country.  They exe,cised thlis power of regulating, curtailing, or proliibitig,, as they in their judgrmeiit
believed to be best for the country.
Such is the lesson of our experience as to how this matter was originally settled.
In the progress of affairs, and inl thus arranging fori- the Territories and settliug them
peaceably, they brought up State after State in perfect peace aud success and prosperity until, I believe, fourteen States had been adnitted out of those Territories,
one-half slave and one half fi-ee; they liad grown up, under this patronage and this
administration of the General Goverunient, in the full exerc ise of this power.  In
the progress of this history a difficulty was found in relation to the State of Mis
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nvui-.  ~-e had tlbhen a la'g,e tract of l-and utterly unsettled; the settlements in the
Louisiana purchase had commenced near the mouth of the Mississippi, and gadually proceeded up; but a large part of the Territory was entirely a wilderness, and
?ongress found themselves ill difficulty as to the question of slavery aud freedom
in that Territory.  What did they do?  It occurred to the mind at once, "it cannot be slaveholding and free territory at the same time; we cannot hav~e it both at
once."  I can hardly conceive of any result that would more naturally occur to the
mind than to divide it.  If two men own a field, and one wants to sow it with oats
and the other with wheat, and they cannot have oats and wheat together with any
success, I do not know any other way to get along with it peaceably but to divide
the field, and then it may be cultivated with mutual  advantage.  This is an cId
lesson; it began very early-I have had occasion before to call attention to it, and
will again.  "And Abraham said unto Lot, let tihere be no strife, I pray thee, between me and thee, and between nmy heirdmen and thy herdmen, for we be bretlihren."  "If thou wilt take the left hand, then I will go to the right; or if thou depart to the right hand, then I wil go to the left."
Thlistterritory was divided; Missouri was admitted; the line of 36~ 30' was run,
and ift was declared that shall be our division.  Was there anything wrong in that.
Was there anything so extravagant and extraordinary in it that we should now go
to war with our fathers who made peace among themselves by it?  Is not their
example worthy of imitation?  It certainly is by all those who realIly desire peace;
but if politicians and other men can make themselves capital out of 9 constant turmnoil and trouble, I suppose they will never agree to it.
Now, Mr. President, what is the proposition of the Republican party? Nothing
more, nothing less than to restore that line.  I do not suppose that those who obiterated it will render any assistance to again drawing it upon the surface of the
earth, but that is the proposition, and that is all there is to it; for if we say that
slavery shall not go into the Territories, it amounts to that, for there are no Territories for slavery to go into, but what are ariranged, as things now are, to any extent,
unless it is north of that line. If we go no further than that, we simply say you
shall take nothing by that vote that repealed it. That is all.  Exclusion of slavery
from the Territories, and leaving it uninterfered with in the States whei- it exists,
as insisted on by the Republlean platform, is, in my estimation, but practically restoring the Missouri compromise, and I shall so call it in miy remarks.
There may be other aspects of the question; but really when we disembairass it,
strip it of its collaterals and contingencies, and present it in its practical light there
is all there is of it. Is it then one of those subjects that call so loudly on all parts
of the oountry, and especially on the South, for expressions of execration of us? It
seems to me not.  There is not only nothing new in it, but there is nothing of the
least apparent injustice in that which has been once fully agreed to, and I think
never should have been disagreed to.
Mr. BENJAMIN. I will not interrupt the Senator from Vermont by a question,
if it embarrasses him at all in the course of his argument; but I would ask himn if
lie intends referring, in the course of his remarks, to which  I am list,ening with
great interest, to the fact that the whole South endeavored, by every possible
means-by remonstrance, entreaty, and every other possible means-to get the gentlemen who now compose the Republican party to agree to just what that Senator
says is what they now want?
Mir. COLLAMIER.. You mean to extend it to the Pacific?
Mr. BENJAMIN.   Yes; to leave that line, not only as a sacred line, as established
in 1820, but to extend it to the Pacific; and the proposition now is to put it back,
after you have extended the free States south of that line.
Mr. COLLAMIER. What do you mean by that? California?
Mr. BENJAMIN.   You tookl possession of a Territory south of the line; and after
you have got that, now you say, restore the line back again.
Mr. COLLAMEtl.  If the gentleman will be a little patient, he will find that I
shall not blisik that point at all; but I do not understand it as lie does.  I have,
however, no desire to avoid it.  I expect to call attention to it.  I said that, in ray
opinion, that line should not have been obliterated.  I cannot here but remark, in
the first place, as to the making of it. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. IHUNTZR)
in the course of this session spoke of that as being a northern aggression; and he
made a discovery new to me, when he supposed the North made the line. The
truth is the South made that line.  I do not say that no northern men voted for lt.
There were a very few, enough, with the southern votes, to make a majority; but
the great;body, the majority, of its supporters were southern men,  They made it.
li, 
8
I actually heard witl astonishment the honorable Senator from Virginia put that
down as one of the northern aggressions.  That is a new discovery to me.  To my
mind, that is very much like the man of whom I heard during the Canadian difficulties, who said he was willing to go over there and help the Canadians to fight the
British any time; and when asked why, he said, "the British are always pecking
at somebody; at one time they came into Boston and threw all our tea into the
harbor, and we have not got over that yet." (Laughter.) I think this is about as
sew a reading of history as that.  But, sir, what purpose had that compromise line
answered?  What had the South got out of it?  First, the making of that line admitted Missouri; it left Arkansas to be admitted south of it, and left all the country
that could be formed into States anywhere south of 36~ 30' to be made slaveliolding
Territories, and so, of course, slavehlolding States.  In the next place the South
wanted Texas; we know what for.  Undisguised was the object.  Mr. Calhoun officially, as Secretary, of State, announced to the world that it was to be obtained to
perpetuate slavery.  There was no disguise about that.  They wanted that.  How
did they get it?  One among the means by which they obtained it, was this: they
provided that the line of 36~ 30' should be continued across Texas. I know it
would not give much even if that had been kept. It did not amount to a great
deal; but I shall have occasion to refer to that again. Whatever was north of that
line in Texas, was sequestered to the cause of freedom. That was one of the elements that entered into the obtaining of the annexation of Texas. It was one of
the means by which they effected that. Afterwards, there was a dispute growing
out of what I thought there was never much ground for-a claim of Texas to a
large quantity of land now forming part of New Mexico, and which was thus sequestered to the cause of freedom, if in Texas. The United States finally gave Texas
$10,000,000 to quit-claim all her right to that territory and have it belong to New
Mexico, where it would stand a chance of being slave territory, and would not fall
within the saving of this clause of the Texas annexation resolutions.
It is not necessary to trace the history of the difficulties which  were attempted
t9 be settled, and in some measure were settled, by what were called the compro mise measures of 1850; but the great point which was desired to be obtained by
the action of that year-professedly desired, and I do not know but really-was
that Congress should settle the subject of slavery for all the country we then owned,
as the compromise line of 1820 had settled the condition of the country in relation
to all we then owned, and the ordinance of 1787 as to all we then owned. Ihow
was it settled in 1850? It was said that if Congress passed the measures in relation
to Utah and New Mexico, and the other compromise measures then agreed upon,
there would be no territory left about which to quarrel in relation to the subject of
slavery; it would all be settled and arranged, and there would be, as they said at
that time, a finality of that topic.; Those compromise measures were passed. They
were passed because the Missouri compromise line had settled all tihe Louisiana purchli,ase, and they took it up there and settled all beyond; and these two standing together made a perfect provision for the whole subject in the whole Union. Thus it
was that the Missouri compromise line entered as a very large element into the
formation of the compromise measures of 1850.  It was the leading ingredient in it,
because that settlement was in relation to a larger and more important part of the
country than the other.
Bv means of this compromise line, the South had, from step to step, as I have
stated, obtained these several advantages; and what do we come to next?  This
had operated as a sort of stool-pigeon, a decoy, to enable them to go on, step after
step, with these various arrangements as they wanted. It quieted the North; it
enabled them to obtain from the North these various measures.  But, sir, when they
had gotten them all through; when there was no more expectation of obtaining
anything south of the line; when they had secured every advantage it was practicable to have from it, now they must just at once take down the stool-pigeon, destroy this decoy, obliterate the line, and spread their peculiar institution as much
north of it as they could.  That was attempted to be done in 1854, by the legislation of that year.
Now I come to the point that the Senator from Louisiana suggests.  Wby was
that compromise repealed? Why was that line obliterated?  Here let me say, that
the more excuses a man makes for a thing, the less we are satisfied with it. A good
excuse or reason is perfect in itself; it is not made by collecting together half a
dozen imperfect ones; and I will now call attention to sore of what are said to be
the causes of that obliteration. First, we are told by the honorable Senator from
Louisiana that the North were unfaithful to the agreement. I know the honorable 
neecded anly.    lWhen one Tnaii )ropose to anotlher to enrter into a  conipact, lie has
simpily to say, "I do not intend to euteitaini it."  What  then?  It is very obvious
that the gentlemen who repiesetlled the free States on th.ait occasion were in a very
difflerient condition about, that tefrito r, for the country obtained froni Mexico  had
no slavery in it: it had been a,bolisieied while the counltry belonged to  MIexico; it
wVas not a slaveholdiug cotuntr-y  at all; and  therefore they  probaLbly  may  have
tlhoughlt, thoughi  I do not know it, that their constituents would not have approved
of their nmakilug a bargain to give awayv andi( i make into slave territory that which
was aliready free, )by any means.    ut gentlemen say they agreed to divide the new
Territories that  were slavehliolding.  Very  well; you may  hiave  been generous  on
that occasion; that makles no deimand on thle otlier side to  recipr ocate it on a differ ent occasion.   LBut that is iiot the gleat difficulty with  the thing.  Supl)ose the
l'ortlh, as you say, would not agiee to extend tlihat line over the newly acqnired ter ritoiy: what then?  You mnigllt fiud fault, if youi pleased; perlhapas  you  would
have occasion to do so; I dlo not say wlietlie i you   woulil or not; but this I say
wbhaitt sort of exens-. can a liani of comnioli discernoment i m Iake to ai. other of similar
charaIicter,, to say, "Sir, because yotI will not imake thIis othleI  idditioiinl bargain, I
will )break'in the onle I miade mv,self.   That is whlat yo   (lid do.   Yoi  repealed
the iMissoiiri compromise line iii the country called the  ouisiaa pulrclhase, for which
it was inride, and to which it was coufinred.   To nay ninud this is riather  a lame exctise; in short, it is no excuse at all; but it is saidl that that was th,e   reason why it
was repealed.
The next reason is thle oine which is put into thle repealiig bill.  Tlhat bill, called
the IKaiisas-hrebraska act,  vlwhich el  repealed the eiglhthl sectioni  of the Missourii act
does not say that it was repealed for aniy such cause its that whichll I lhav-e just loticed.  It s:s that it was to be declared null and void; because it w, inconsistent
with the principles of the comproinise acts of 1850.  T'iatit is thle reason given in the
bill.  I caii merely say, that those  who passed it put on the record that as the
i-ecson, and it is-I will not give it any bad name- a sort of equivo  atioli for anyman to resort to any other reason wheti hlie has recorded the ore wbhiclh lie gave at
tIle time; lie is estopl)ed ftorL  givillg any otlhers.  That is an iientirely  differeut reason, amd utterly ineotsistent with the fist; aid, l)besides, they are both false; for
thie latter one, tlioligh it was put on record that it was inconsistent  wTithl thle coilpronlise of 1850, is just as wrong as the othler.  Thle fact, is, that  compromise of
1850 was made on the l-i ground thiat the fo mner one of 1820  was part acud lparcel of
the arranf,enientt; and therefore thlis excuse is equally unfiounded with the other.
But, Mr. President, [ have now  attended to three reasons for the  repeal.   The
gentlerian from  Virginia foiund fault with thle compronlise (of 1S20, because, he said,
thle North inma(Ie it, and it was an aggressioli w-hen it was made.  The  next reason
that is giveri is, that they would not extend it.  The third reason is the one pu)t into
the bill, that it was contrary to t]he comprouise of 1850; but we have this session,
and perhaps within a short period before, got another reason.   It is said t,hlat it is 
10
unconstitutional; that Congress was well justified in repealing it, because  it mwas
unconstituti on al.
Mr. WIGFALL.  WAith the consent of the Seuato', I will as'  him  a questiol.  I
do not want to protract this delbat,e, because I ha.ve a ]ittle imatter tfhat,i I waniit to
get up after it is over; btut, just as a Imatter of culiriosity, I should likle to  klowV
what the Senator understand(s to have been the principle of the compromise of 18-50
as to Utah and New Mexico?
Mr. COLLAMEIR.   It was this: there hadl been difficulties and controversies albout
the forming of territorial goveirirneiits in those Territories.   Colgress could not
agree on it.  At first we had Californiat inl vwitli them
Mr. WIGFALL.  Leave California out.
Mr. COLLAMER.  It was in it, and we cannot help it.  It was in it for a year or
two, until Califorinia f&)rmied a State goveitirnent.  Then, when it came to th,e (orupromise period of 185)O, as part of the corlpromise, California wtas admnitted( as a
State.  As to Utah aul New Mexico, there hiti:-l been bills, especially for New 3iexieo,
pending in Conlgress before tlhat.  Variots    asurs had been proposed( iii relationl
to them; the northern people insistingi oII the application of the provision of tile
ordinance of 1787, declaring that slavery should never exist tlhere.  Thely wNotl(l not
pass them without it.  WhIen  poagress passed them, they were passe(d w-ithout tliat,
and with a provision that the people miiht makel tlhem  free or silve Sl,ates, andl that
they should be admitted as they should be formiied, whenever they should beconmie
States.
Mr. WFGFALL.   Tlhat was the principle?
3:r. COLLAMEPR.   That was the provision in relation to tlhem.
Mr. WIGFALL.   That the Territories should settle it for themnselves; anld thlit
Congress should not, in the meantime, interpose to i)rohibit the introduction of
slavery v?
Mr. COLLAMIE.  No, sir.  7Whlen  the gentlemi  sai         s  the Territories slhouldI
settle it for tlhemselves, lie includes more than I understirid it
Mr. WIGFALL.  I amr not a.uatter-sovereignty man.
MIr. COLLAMERI.   That is a point you have got in that was not put in.  It wais
put in in relation to Nebralska and IKansas; but it wis not put in in relation to the
otlhers.
Mr. WIGFALI.  Did they not have the right to regulate their own affairs, wititout any interposition of Congriess as to slaveiry 
Mr. COLLAMER.   There was nnothiri  said about thit.
Mr. WlGFALL.  Was there any interposition on tlie part of Congress, either to
establishi or prohibit slavery th ere?
Mr. COLIAMER.  Tthere was none.
Mr. WIGIFALI.   Then the piricip)le, if there was any principle involvedl in flie
Utah and New Mexico bills, was, thbt Corgress should ilot legislate either to estab lish or protect   Mr. CoOL]AMIER.  You are drawing a conclusion.
Mr. WIGFI\LL.  I am asking for inlforrmation.
Mir. COLLIAM YIE.  The bills, are very plai.
Mr. WIGFALL.  These are historical facts; only philosophers can give reasons.
I was asking for a rea,so), Ios-siblv: but 1 want the Senator, before h'   grles on, to(
'answer thai.  Aou se I e      a new Senator yet,, ad do noet understanrd these ques tions.  Novw, I understand-at leaset before I got Iee I had selppIosed that the Utahl
and New Mexico bills left thlis quest,ion beyonrd all d(oubt-that Congress dild not, inA
thlose bills, either irnterpose br or agairiist slavery.  Is that true, or is it rnot I
AIr. COLLAMEAl".  I laive stated about that. Thele had been ta difliculty in formn ing those territorilit governmelts, because a part of the country insisted on putting
in the oridinance of 1787.
Mr. WIGFALL,  Yes, sir.
Mr. COLLAMLER.  Congress could not agree to it; but when they had the makling
of the conmpioruise of 1850, is part arnd parcel of it, these two Territories had ter iitorial acts passed for tihen, which will speakl for themselves, but tley were passed
without the prohibition of the orditnance of 1787
Mr. WIGFALL.  P ecisely.  Thea I want to ask the Senator, \when you come  to
form a new territorial bill as to ltansas andI Nebraska, if you,ire not following out
the precedent?  I do not talk about tIle principle spoken of in the great speeches
that were circulated in thousands aud Bundreds of thousansds. but if the precedent
was not followed when the Miissouri restriction was repealed and the IKansas-Nebraska
4 
11
bill was passed, as the Utahl and New Mexico bills were passed, without any provisioiI eitlher favoring or disfavoring slavery?  That is the question.
Mr. COLLAMER.  The gentleman has made his own speech, taking his own premises,,ri.d drawing his own concelusions.  I can present very different views.   I
thirik that tl-at whole conpromise nust be taken tov_el-'tier.
Mr. AVIGFALL.  The onaibus was turned over, and they were passed as separate
bills.
Mr. COLLAMIER.   They were p)assedl as secarate bills, but they all constituted a
comrpromise, and are so sI)okeni of in the Shbrska act.  It wa.s a comnpromise consistilg of lhree or four' acts pasied here.   That corli)rorrise put together  made a
whole, iid I insist that it wits a d(isiritegration ai-d (idesti'retior of the principle on
wvhicht they weqit when you repealed tile u(rrrpr'omise line whicht settled tire condition
of a large part of the teriitori, adid wtiici settlement etertered into tnd constituted
part of the very comipi-oroiise of 1 S.t)
Mr. WIGFAALL.   V ith lthe permtission of the Senator, I will again draw his attention to the fict that the Utali aind New M5exico bills were passed witiout any provit,ioIn either Cstablishin g or' piolibihing slavery, and tlat thle l](ansas-Nebrska bill,
in order to lbe passedl inl accoridltnce wril;h tliat peceleiit,, riist necessarily have repeaied tile Missnuri rest rictio,,i or it wol(rd hIave reco(,tiiz7ed the rihlt of Congress to
ilterli)c,se.  Therefore, whatl the Senator     u oild call iioi-initerposition, I call interpositionI.  Allat le would call non-intervention, I call intervention.  As there had
I-reviously passed a bill in 1890  M-. COLI-AMER.  The gentleyman is maling a speech  of his own  hie  haz2 not
asked me a question.  Hle is making up his own logic, statinlg his premises, and
diriawinfg ]is coiil(us-ions iin his ovrwn way.  I say all the parts of that comnpionriso
constitute a whole.'hey should be left to stand together  and I have already explained vl-what I considered eintered into and constituted a part of it.  Now gentlemen
say, that lwhenr tlevy camne to pass a law makiing a teriitorial ttovernment for Kansas and Nebraskla, they had to pass it like those for vhicli they had a precedent.
Ilow was there any obligation to do that?  Not the least; in the world.  If a mnan
had sold land for ten dollars an acre, a lar-,e tract, and should afterwards sell a similair' amnount to the same purlchaser for twenty dollars, could lie then say, "now you
must five nie twenty dollars foI the fist.f They hiai] made arrangements all about
tl-at line beforre; tile corlprom ise was made on that basis; and now, when  they
camie to make a territorial  overnmeirt, were  they obliged to miake it on the basis
of the Utahl  act, passed since the line wvas ar ranged?
I was stating the reasons whicah were attemrpted to be given for that repeal. The
first, mentioned here by the Senator from Virginia, was that tihe North made it, and
tliit it was an aggressio)n  the second was that it was not extended over other Territor'ies bit a new bargain m-ade for them; the third( was, that it was inconsistent
with the comnpromrise of 31850; arid the fourth is. tlirt it was unconstitutional all the
while.  Tlo my mrind, this last is pretty much like Jack Falistaif's "I knew you all
the while."  It is an afteir-thought, a inew discovery.   Is. it possible that these gentlemnen can give tirat as an excuse for doinge thie thing when they did not explain it
or state it at the time thley did it?
Again, is it becorning in these people to say, "We agreed to this proposition;  we
maide this arrangernemit with you in 18920- wve have  had our States admlitted southl
of the line, according to it; we have had the consideration on our part, and now
we turn around on you and tell you we never had any authority to -lafke it, and.
we knew ave had not when we did it; it Vwas a great delusion  fromn beginaning to
endS,"  The trutlr is, that, in conimoin  ethli,,s, as well as in law, wirena mal exerises the power to do. thing, he is estol)ped firom savira lie hald not the power.  If
a imain sells me a horse as lis ie cannot afterwards, a fter tlaking his pay, tell rue
tlhat the hIorse belonged   to another man.   Ie has ro riglt to say it;l he is estopped
f orm sayinrg it.  So with thlose who exercised this power.  They are not at liberty
ini law oi in n iorality, to say that thliev had not the righit to do it.  It is totally i-nmiaterial whether they had or had not the power.   With thlemn, it should be held
sacr ed; for they did it.
Bu13t, Mr. Pr esidenrt, I have been unable to see what was the difficulty in this compromise line, nmalirig it constitutional.  Was it unconstitutional because it was not
lonrg enoughl? Is it possible for v yo  to say that if it hrid been extended to the Pacific it
ould lave   een a good  rind( constiuitional line?   Here stands the honorable Senat11o from Louisian;  ore ingenious lawer certainly can seldom  be found,  whatever may have been said about tire Pliladtelphia lawyers'  bu~t lie stands here  and
puts to me a question iniplying plainly thlat tle dlifficulty was, we would not extend 
12
tle line   Then you were willing to extend it and forbid slavery north of it olear to
the Pacific?   Yes.  Titeii how Iad you a riglit to do it; or do you mean  to acknowledge tlht you were  then t,Ir-inr to pliy  another trick on 1us?  I do not believe a:y1 t,li,'Jg of his loti onl; youi did not believe it at the timoe; and it is an excuse
that sbol ii not be)'i)eritted to be nmade by ti iiilari.
But,   r. P,e,sileit, l"ow has the exlerirelnt of tle repeal of the Misson'i coniplomise, acd thle ilmeao    es s whliel  followcd it, woirked(i?  \hat  was involved in it?,
AV]iat did it 1)Irol)ose to do?  If the lhonorable  Se;itoor fioiiit Texas (r. WmIFiALL)
were nowV bele, ae111d desianeod to ob)tIinr1 Yiv idea on this sul)ject, hle would( probably
(btailn it.  TIhe  l(insas bill wvsi entirely a differlent  bill flirm ilie Nevw Mexico and
Ut.tl  ct.   In that Section repel,tlinir tIe Alissouri (nota-rom ise  line, it not olnly deolaterd t!it, l)iiirf iinconsistent  with the plini(les of th, l oi)nproniise of 1850), that
line w,sa  tlerele)v declared i(leradtive ald v )id, 11bllt it furthler went onl to l1irovide
thait (,iigre;,is woil(ld i(eitlihe  legis liie sla,veyiv into the Te iiit-oiry, n1o0 excllude it tlherefrom'  liul; tlit tlh e people tlereol l( f shlould le left   perfectliv free tto regulate t,lieir doniestic institutiiin~ in thleir ownl wViay, sulbject ol  to t,lie Constitutio of tihIe U Unlited
States   Wltil did tlei  p)iit in tli it last  I ctse    I ar  veciy apt to'foIget it,.,aseii
I have alw-ays sol-osed tlhat.l1l 1aiws nialle wvitliii tis liittion, whethle  l)I a State
1,egisl'tture 1), l)V Coiigress, were s0ubject to tlie Coistilnltioli ais -I lmatter of ouise.
] (lid  i}ot Sil)l)ose  repeating that ctou(ld alt ei tlle ft.    till, ti e,e wC     s C   Stli'eSs
laid onil tliat.  Boiie geintleoieii liave se d il  the Se1llte,  "     0V 1e dii(I  tli,i   that tlle
r)eo01le wereo   i ivested wvithlt power t,) iegulate t,lis itstitlation ini thleiru  owii  way, coiIstititionally " and yet tlhey vote] f)or tlhat I-ill, with tlhat expr essionl in it.
The liiiotr ble Selnatoi- f10   Virginiai sid,  last session, tlit lie dlid not believe
Congress had l)oweI- to invest the people of ai Teriiito V with the iuthot iiy of lelslating iand settling its institutions in thlei own lvii   y iiidr   the Constitution;, but lie
agreedtl to give it to then, s01)tie t to Ilie Constittion-i-eanin g, thlereo)v, t, leave it
to the courts.  rTll'lt seelm  to ml1e to be a very extllraordilnaly iiientit,al iservatiolt to vote for a law wlih was, in the opinioni  of thie votei, unconstitutional, ii) oder
to leave tlle q(testion to thle coits!  Colress  did invest tlie people of the Terri tory with thab power, it tley coill, sulject to the olpilniot)n of the courts,  wletl,er
they could: or not.  I canlinot but sa,v titio?'li it, aiy be rather a lhirsh iiiollt(e of illii? trating it, that it is like the Frelnch infidel oificeri going iit+,o battle, and pi)'-ayin1g tlhe
Lord, if there was one, to slave his soul, if lie had  lly.  (_L mgitey.     )  Thait is to sytv,
we give this poweo, if w-e have power to give it; but we do not believe  we  hatve
any power to give it." That is your positiion.
That a tas  very diffel ent bill fi o  the otlhers, Utah aliiicld  ew Mexico.    I know it has
beei said since, that really and( in fict nothingr  was m leant b)v all that rigmar-ole of words,
except thatt when the p)eople caine to foiii  a i. Sta-te constitution, they could niake it a
free or t sltave State, as they pleased. T1e0, ltat action wast  very unnecessary.  There
is 11o dolubt that, if lentleneon desire to nitake 1issues'iaongst themselves, that is a
matter for their considetitili).   No  ntTI cann ilistake tle expressi.iols of that lill;
and those expressions were not put in tlhere for alny sluch purpose Ls i        s now pietend ed by soiiie; and I can tell yon wliy.  Thle verv provision of the  eow  Mexico ani
Utahl- act, wherein it was plrovided that they shlould be aidrnitte(1 either withi or
without slavery, as should be provided in the constitutions when they c  le to form
a State-t,that very expiession was aliready in the Kansas-Nebraska aet, eight sec tioIis lefore the other wvords to whichl  I havee  alltllled.  It was all provided for be fore you canme to  the repealing  pro1vision0.  That  was not there, then, for  itiy sul(s
p1-rpose.  It evidently ldoes n.e011, a.s it priovi(le, tliat the peol)0le there, wtiile a Teo ritory, and -:s't Territory, should settle thie nla,ter in thlei own  wav.
I will not now entel into tlhe question wvlletlier tlley couldl or cotuld not-  but that
was thle power given. We   e thley left to foi r it in their owiin wvay?  Certaiiily iot.  ILi
the verly be,oinrling, in the clioosino, of t!ie very first ITet'itor:ial Legislttiure,  moreo
than four thousand mieti niildei tinris fioni MIissoui invaded and subjugated 11them, and
made their election.  Thev   eve  rv weie left free to act in their own way;  antd  then fol  lowved all the exti aordirll iy laws and nmeiins whichl were resor ted to, and all the vio lece vlwhich resulted; this Coveirrnment saying -that it would not correct anytlhing,
and t,lose laws sihould be cairried into effect  with  the whole powlver of the Gove rn menit; togetlier withi the ravages of wai, and Mloodshied, and buining, and desolaition,
whllich went over Kannsas Teiritory.  These all followed your act.  Did yoi  thin's
they  weoe' worse thi  otlier  1p01eop)le?  Whbat were  yoci a{ttelupting to ido?   You
were attempting to llave a Territoly that sihoul1  be a slaveboldiuag  Territory and a
fiee Territor'y at the same timiie; and y on could I1t nike it go thirougl.   In the
inatui'e of tliii~-;s it ca11innt.   The  poeple supposed their teirritorial government  was
I 
13
to settle the question.  The Missom ians went over, and chose the territorial governi-nert, becautse t,iey uin(lei stood it wvas to settle it.  All tuniderstood it so at that time.
That was arl entirely differeint tlhing fiomt thle New  Mexico and Utltl bills.   That
wvas a new expelilorent atteipte(d.
}l(ow l-ts it vwoilred?  Is aitybiiy l  so  muclh   satisfied with thle reslts  and effeets
of thlat experiment   that lie do esis  to  )ush3 it fulrtheri    I do not believe  tlhere are
nmany.'Ihle people  of the,orth  believe  tlat  ve.s  ill w viorog; in the first place,
because it wis eontr -ary to tle originaul  )oli(yv of  the  Goverirmient.   In the  lnext
phltce, they dlo not believe it is beieticital to tlhe coulltiv to turn it oveI to the  peopile, onl the plilins of Kansas, to ight out a subject of t,i'is lki(d in whllichl the nationi
is inteiested.  It iievei was tried before, acnd I trust w-ill never be tried again.
But, Ml-. 1residertl;, it is said great danger will resultl front the action of the I-epublipcanlr ty if t:'ey sl[ouil  ealiv  lpply theliri pai ei0 piei'i  if they should reestablisll the
5IiSsoiUri  coll~liitotrise line,toLd stil) t1e sprea d of slavery in the Teiriitoriie, whichl the
riepeal oi tlle 1inie Ittei1tcdl to effect. VW e pro)ose to do notlit niolre arid rnotliilg les
than restore the Mlisouri  ci(rpiouj-ise by exeluding  slavery from thle TerritorieS   aii(l
if we sliouli( carrv it, out, does i ot that maikie i  IL)retty f'lir  division  of this collitry?
~\re liave, i11 rotinl( I  bll'.ir, ibout ot(e-,llr(l of ourt leol)lec iii the slaivehuolding States.
W'e lhavte al)ott t'wo-t hi(rds of i1heln iii the filee( Slates   AVe have about three  million
s(luale iilies, il round Iuiibeis.  It does nriot diiffer a lhundred tlhousand fronm that.  It
is Very fully shown, frolit the best evidence tand tlle best iinformaitioi, as collected(  a1nd
collated by Prof esor I rery, a,i i to be found iii the a[reicultural 1epo)t, in 1850, that
theie is a' littIle i lore than one-third( of this  whole  conlitry that is inceapbl)le of  settlelielit.   We lta  be tunwillingr to a(4knowvle(ise tliht to ouiselves; but that is thle
fGet.   As statte(1 b.r the Senator ftioni Georgia, and wiNicli I believe is trule, the slav elioldiug Stat-e         as nov htve w ithiii tl)eir territory, (anud they  are in the occ1pan(c v of
eighlt I.hndled land fifty thousand square minles,) tlnost one nillion, of the best part
of the country.  T1hev are buh  about olie-tlidii  of the people. There will be left,
then, for tIlle other two-t,hllilds of tlhe ilnhabiltable part of our country, one0  millioii
one u itnidirel'ret)d fifty thlousand square miles.  I-ave they not niuch the lagel- part?
Ilave they not got the best part?   Can gentlemen say now, that,, when  we  declal'e
they sllall bIe and oiught to be confined to thlat, w e  lare t ying to smnole thorn out?
It is thle other side that is iii trouble.   Thle freei   people, withi  their institutions, 1accoird(iing to nulibers, are  about to be res,ricted to less than  their pop)otioni of the
country, and they are to be smoke(l out oC starved o)tt, if eitlier.
Wla,t, thlen, sliould prevent us fiomi doi)ng  this justice?  lWhat is there wronog irt
it?   WlIat is there unprecedented  in it? f Vhat is  thlere  unjust iii it?  Certainly
nothing.  PBut still it will not do, they say, to have a IRepublican President clhosen;
it will be a cause of dissolution.   Why?         3Because they say some of the firee States
hlave p)assed ui-fiendlly laws to that provision of the  Constitutiou about fugitives
front rl iabor.  Mi-. Presidlent, in relation to those laws, I would call gentlem nii's atteition to this'  it certainly is the exclusive duty and obligation  as well as privilege, of
every State to protect the liberties tand lives arnd property of its ownI citizens.   I say
it is exclusively their duty wvithin their own terlitolyv.
I not very uiftequeintl, especially amonag iirlettered people, hear it askled, why
Cori,iessi  ecannot abolishl slavery 8 ard I caenot but sav that  I thilnk at times there
h]ave been sornie mistaklen notions, like( those  suti(gested by the Senatori friom Texas,
about this beini, a consolidited  (Goverinment, art11t tllk of  that  kitid.  Take  tlhe
plainest case irginable.  ILere is a maln, if  o1 please,             ii a   ortlhein State, confirie(1
by aniot,lher as a laborer in his cellai, chained, foi years.  The  whole power of the
lUnited States (overnienrit cannot affect it.  TlIhey have no power to grant any irelief.
Just so in the souithern States; no matter hlow miany men  thley bold in bonrdage, if
you call it such, it is a mtittoer exclusively thleirs; Congress  1(has no power  over it.
If' tlhey,,is soe of theni do, propose to redu(e to )botdage a Ilarge  niu-mber of  10el1
who are free, no mattei how wve may lookl  onl it, it is utterly beyond  the reach iof
the power of Congress.  So, on the otlier lhandt, I take it, tlhe right and duty to protect thleir own citizens in their liberties rand lives is thle exclusive duty and privilege
of the States.
It is not true, as was propeily suglested bvy the honorable Senator from  lOhio
(Mr. WA. n) yesterday, theat because the South have a right to pursue and take their
slaves thlit run away, and bring thero hlome, theiefore every rnan in a free State is
subject to being taken away.  Let us think for a few morments, of the decisions on
that subjct.   In 1814, came the decision of the Prigg case.  That  case contained
s0o111 pretty importaut things, new to the  country  alt that tioie.   We  utay have
beconie fiamiliaiized with them now; but they caflled for the action of the States.
t 
14
The Supreme Court decided in that case that the owner of a fugitive slave had
the  ight to pursue him into a free State, without aiy process whatever, to take tl-hat
slave, Iecapture him, ind ca'rv hi  hoiie.  I take it thait it is the privilege arnd duty
of every State to so arrant ge the niner in which a nmia-i exercises his rights, that
tlhe riiglts and privileges of otihers ii)ay T)e secure.  Tuhat is a matter of legitimrate
legislation.  We have, for iiistai)ce, in the State in which  I live, a colisideicble
numiber of fiee colored citizens.   I do not know thieir  uiiihiber now-c thousand,
perlial:)s more.  They a,re just as much entitled to the protection of the laws at4 the
white men.  When this opinion was prolioun(ed( by the Suti)eie Court, lthiat a person could come there aud take a timtn, claiming  him  as a fiig(itive slave, and carry
liiiii i way without any process whiatever-ifor the ourit said l-e mright (lo it, if so be
that lie conmitted no illegal violeice-wias it not obvious that 0111o colored pol)tilation could be in no way safine, I do Inot say against honest and hlonorable slavehollders,
but against all men whlo might come to claim tlihe(m-slave dealers?  Tlhey could not
be safe, if there was to be no process, if 0o court was to pItss upon it, if nobody
wvas to interfere with it..  If hlie was to exercise this riolit wilthout any limritation, or
without aany arrangement or control, how could they be safe?   It was very natural,
and did happen, as the Senator firom Georgia says, that in Verimoit they began as
eaily as 1844; yes, siI, two years after that decision.  When  tlhey understood the
detision, thley did say, "Now, this will not do.  We  cannot have our people subjeerted to this sort of arrest.  If these cieii have the power  to arrest himi  if they
are entitled to a man as a slave, let there be due process-  let there be given to
our people sonme sort of socurity."  Therefore they did provide that the taking of
a slave without process should be unlawful-illegal.  Was there anythilug extreaordinary in that.   Can you see in that nothing but etmrity to that provision of the Constitution?  Clearly, not at all.
That case further decided, too, that State magistrates misht act under the law of
1793, if they pleased, not otherwise; but if the States foirbade it, they could not.
They decided anotlher thing: that this subject of the reclaiming of fugitives fiom
labor was peculiarly and exclusively tlhe business of the General Governmeit.
Thley decided not orly that the States had  no right to interfere with it, but they
said they had no righlt even to make  a law to carry it iinto effect.   I know that
Judge Taney and Judge Daniel differ as to that; they dissented on that point; blut
all the rest of the court, I believe-unless, perhaps, Judge Mc]Leaii, certainlyv Judge
Story and a majoity of the court-decicded that all laws made by the States,  teidirn,g
to secure fugitives, were utterly null and void.  Therefore the States were, bv that
decision, released from  all obligations.  They were not expected  to do aclything
about it, friendly or unfiiendly.   It does not seem to me that there can be ally good
ground to complain in relationi to the States not carrying into effect the fugitive
slave law, or that provision of the Constitution, when  they were distinctly and exp])iessl- told it was none of their business; and that all the laws they  could pass
about it, or in any way inconsistent with that provision of the Coilstitutioil, were
simply and utterly void.
The legislation which was made on that occasion in my State provided for the
security of our citizens by the act of 1844, of which the Senator from Georgia coinplains, though I do not understand from his note one thing.  He  says that oui act
deinies to the district court of the United States powec  to entertain a habeas copu)s.
I do not know but that may be so; but it is out of rmy mind, and I think it is not
the fact.  But when our people said their sheriffs and. justices should not inteifere
withl it, and that our people should not be taken without process of law, they further provided that nothing in that act should be considered as extendicog to any
person that was acting as a United States judge or arislial, or anyhbody acting under
l,im.  It is true that other legislation has since taken place.  Wheii iii 180, t       he
new  fugitive slave law was made, it is true that was received  in that  quarter
much  as the Senator from Ohio says it was in his State.  It was obnoxious, ablhorrent;  it was against the feeling of our people, and especially that part of it which
required them to become aids and assistants in following and running after alleged
fugitives, under heavy penalties.
It is said that this act was essentially the act of 1793.  We did not view it so
we do not now.  By this act, certain men called comnmissioners, who were appointed
by the district courts, are clothed with certain powers.  Those commissioners had
existed hefore that.  Tlhey existed by law, appointed hy the courts for certain pur poses.  Those puiposes were to take depositiocs, to bind over criminals, talke bonds in shoit, all the prepaiatory steps look~ing to a trial in some court.   But'hey were
mere miiiisterial officers, with no power of adjudication, lio power of decision.
4 
~:~:' iii,?zt                    2,/               t
15
UInder the law of 17.q93, in relation  to fugitives from justice, all llat is done  is to
returin the manl who is a fugitive fiomr justice to sonie other St-,ate, for the purpose of
t,laking his trial there.  It looks to   tia l.  It is a niere prepaiatory step.  B.tit when
you comie to this law of 1850, to all practical  purploses the coinriissioiier is clotlled
with filal power of adjudicatioi, which is entirely a new feature.
I know juistices nmight serid a iriani out under the act of 1793, if they pleased to act;
but that was all safe. as, they weie our ownil officers.  So far as the courts, the district
judges, or circuit judges, are clothed with aulitlority, the acts of 1850 and 1793 are
alike; but, as respects th-e powers withi whlichi the cornmissionllers are clothled, they
are utterly unlike.  When aii al)plicatioli is niade to a commissioner, and a, manl is
brought before him, said to be a fugitive fromr labor, hie hears  ind decides the case.
Ie sernds him, if you please, fronm New England to Texas.   I do lnot know but thlat
a man might claimi  anriother as a fugritive from labor who was anl apprentice.  Tihe
very first manl, if you please, of the State of Virginia or Georgia,  in ght findr( solme
one coming and claiming his son as an apprentice, for service due iin Califinia; aind
the commissio     ner st send him there.  -You will observe, the corrmrissioner does not,
in this case, send back the mat, as the fugitive frorn justice is sent, for the purpose
of takinig his trial inr somie court.  Ile sends him definitely; it d(oes nrot oolk to anily
court.  It is not a ministeiial act, preparatory to trial anywihere.  It is not; i step
preparing him to be tried by any court.  It is ultimate, definitive, to all practical
purposes.  Our people loolk upon this as different entirely.
Mr. MASON.  lThe Senator will allow me to make an inquiry of him.  I i uiderstood tje Senator to say that there were powers coniferred onl  thiese comrmissioners,
by the act of 1850, which had not been conferred upon the judicial  officers nientioned in the act of 1"98.
Mr. COLLAM,El-.   I did not say so.
Mr. MASON.   Well, I understand the Senator to say that power is conferred otn
these comissionersto adjudicate.  Now I ask the Senator, power to adjudicate what?
Mir. COLLAMIER.  Whletheri tuhe tan is a fugitive from labor or not.
Mr. MASON. The Constituitioni of the United States says that if a person held to
labor or service in one State shall escape into another, he shall be delivered up upon
the demand of the claimant.
Mr. C-OLLAMER. To whom the service is due.
Mr. MIASON.  Upon the demand of the claimant to whom the service is alleged
to be due, or is due.
The iequniremeit of the Constitution is, that if a person held to service escape, lie
shall be delivered up to that person to wihom the service is due.
Mir. SEWAID.  On claim.
Mr. MASON.  I-e shall be delivered up, not to the person to whom the service is
due, because that \worilc lead to that inquiry; but lie shall be delivered up  to the
claimant.  Now,  I wotild submit to the Senator tihis: what does the Coristitiutioi
submit to tihe paitv who is to aidjudicate?  Does it submit alnyt,hing more  than the
questionL, wliethei the alleged fugitive vwais held to service in the Stiate from whNichi
hlie escaped   I)oes it submit ani inquiry whether lie was rightfuilly held to service, or
does it submit the single question,  was lie held to service,  whletlher rightfiully or
w-roiigfully, and did hlie escape?  hlaving had somiething to do witlh the law of 1850,
I aver that thlat law submr)its to the judicial authority t,lutlt single inquiry: was l:)e
held to s,ervice? withlout iinquiririg whlether lie wvtas rightfully or wrolgfuTlly heldwas he held to service, and did lie escape?  lf it is fibind that lie was held to service, and did escape, the Constitution requires that he shall be delivered up, and the
law says so. That is the whole of it.
Mr. COLLAMALEt.  All that does inot relieve the subject at all.  The gentleman all
the while seemrs to presume that no main cta be taken uip unideli that law, unless lie
is a runaway slave.  That is an  lt,ilre assiumptionl.  A mani, anud especially a colored
mnian, iii New  Englaind,  who  nlever was out (of the State of Verimont, might  be
claimed as a slave and arrested and br-oulght before a corririiissioiier.   IThose are lthe
people we are ti-yiiig to protecit, anid those are the people we are bound to protect,
and those are people whom our law is meantt to protect.   The gentleiman from Virginia riiay state it as formally as hlie pleases; after all, lihas nriot the comrniissioner to
decide this: was John Doe, now standing before me, defacto, if the gentleman pleases,
not de ju?e-I do not make that point, but I an putting it onl his own (rounid-bound
to service, under the laws of -Virginia,, to the honorable Senator f:'oin Virginia?  Were
you, or were you niot? that is the question.   i do not, say that tfhe comnissioner is to
go into ait inquiry of whether the law that bound him was good or not.  That is not
the point I ani at; but when he is claimed to have run away friom Texas as afugitive
;iII..,
. I 
slave, aind he is brought before the commimsioner, the question for t          ohe commissioner
Is, is this manl a fugitive slave 7 and if he (lecides that hle is, goes to Texas ito  slaveiry
wVithlolit any ti ial, unless you call tlhatt a trial.  T.hat is not a preparatory s lep  that
is not iyiisiiterial; that is not introductory to sonie other pIroceding; it is definitive,
j)ractically final.
Our people dislike this feature of the law.  It submits to thle commninissioner the
question as to idenitity of the man claimed, wihether lie is a iiani bound to service or
not.  I do iiot say lie is to decide vwhlether the man  was rightfully  or wrongfully
b)ound to service; l)tiut I mean helis to decide whether hle was the nii thlt esc)apedi
-the fugitive- and if he is, what tlhen i   Are you to take him back, as you wouldtl
a fugitive from Justice, for a trial?   Not at all.  That is the trial, prictically tlhe
only trial.  Our people look upon that as a different thiig.  Tlhey did indeed  provide, as the genitlemain fi'mi Georgia char'ges, and I desire to ti-rn  attention to that.
lie complains, in thile appendix to hiis speech, that
"Vermont pledges the whole power of the State to maintatn the elaim of the slaves to freedom."
No such thing.  It does provide
.IIr. MiASON.  If the Senator will a'llow mne to interrupt him-I will 11not nless
it is agreeable to him -I wishl this thi ii riglht as far tas t,he law folr the reelallation
of fugitive slaves is colncerned;tid I do not see that thete should be any difference
between the honorable Senatort.1(and iiyself.  The honorable Seinator says nlow that
I reason upOlnl the law as if it wvas a law itiade to ieclaini fugitive slaves, but that  I
do not reason upon it as if it might possibly be extended to one who was iiot a slave.
Now, sir, the Conistituition says nothing about slaves, iior does the law. 
MIr. COLLAMER. I used the shortest term.
Mrit. MASON.   Very well.  The law follows the Constitution.   The Constitution
says that
"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another,
shall, in conseqneoce of ainy law or regulation therein, be discharged fiom suchl service or labor,
but shlall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."
The law follows the  Constitution.  Its provisions are these, very  briefly:  upon
the proofs to be adduced by the claimant, if it shaill appear to the juidicial officer in
the State where the fugitive is arrested, thwat he was held to service or labor in the
State fromn which he escaped, anrd that such service ot labor was due to thle claimrant, lie shall be delivered up oIl the faith of the Constitution-no inquiry whetlher
that service or labor was rightfully or wiongfully due.
Now, the honorable Senator says that that isl final; that it is not, as in the case
of a fugitive from justitCe, prelinmitnary onily as to the guilt, but it is fial. Fit-al
low?  Does thati honor able Setiat;o  metal  to intiiiiat,e that there is a State of this
U11ioti where Africall  ondairge is I ecognized-a.mnd to one of those States this fugitive
slave must be reconveved- iwhere the most aiimple, plenary, sedlllous provision is
not made to give every negio who is claimed as a slave the amplest opportunity
without fee ol reward, to have tihe question tried there whether lie is it slave or
not?   If that be true, the proceediiies iof the comlmiissionier  ioav be finial or not, as
the case mtay be.  If the )perrson is really a slave,  wvhel  lie is suirrendered to iiis
master, it is final.  If he is not a slave, let himn be takent wherever the sui1 shilles
upon a slave State, to makle a complaint anywhere,' in any village, at anly cross- road
or on any highway, to the neighbors, tlhat hie is a freeman. and I will tell tlhat ]:ion-1
orable Senator, if he does not know it, that there would itot be a voice in thlat whole
communrity that would not insist upon his beiig retmiitted to all the l)rivileges  aild
securities which  the law giv es hinm-to a trial wlhii(h is provided for at tle public
ex)ense-to decide whethe  hlie be a slave or not.  Tthose are the facts.
Mr. COLLAMER.  I chloose to make no issue  witi getltlemen from the slaveholding States in relatiotn to the generosity, libetality, ort  rytliing of that kind, of their
people.  Indeed, I am  free to ackitowledge that I tthink they are generially quite as
franlk and liberal people as any, and I  think they are great deal better than thleir
institutions.  Theit institutions I regret; the goodness of the people I do niot.  I sa d
that the cotnmissioner's decision was final to.ft practical purposes.  I know it is said
the courts are opeti to him; and Dr. Johnson said, "so is the city coffee-house free lo
furnishl a mani with a good diuner, if he has the imoniey."  I said this step was inot pre —
liminary to any suit.  I say so now.  I can be easily understood in that, if you desire
to understand mne.  Whlen y ou enter a regulas cotipiainlt against a tian or a crinte,
and you send to anotlier State to b        hing  mim, it is to bring hm in to court to answei
to                                        that offense chaiged againstthim in a  proceeding already instituted alid pendiug
in a court.  Then I say the order to return such a                              man,  fo r sic h  a    purpose, is pre
16
i 
17
liminary; but when you come to a fugitive from labor or service, is the action of
tho commissioner a step preliminary to anything of that kind?  I do not say there
could not be a suit brought afterwards by the man who is carried away as a slave
to Texas
Mr. MASON.  I will not interrupt the Senator hereafter.  If he will fasten that
quarrel upon the Constitution, I will not defend the Constitution; but I insist upon
the quarrel being fastened upon the Constitution, and not upon the law.
Mr. COLLAMER. Well, I do not choose to make thi at a point. I arn not like the
man who when the sermon did not please him, found fault with the text.  I shall
not find fault with the text any way.  (Laughter.)  Certain it is, thlen, that I am
well founded in mny distinction, that this is not a preliminary proceeding.   It may
be that the man can bring all action after he is carried away to Texas. I mention
Texas simply because it is one of our most distant States. He is carried away to
Texas, an entire stranger, and in utter poverty and destitution.  Perhaps he could
assert his rights there, but he would be much like the man getting his dinner at the
city coffee house, if he had no money to buy it.  The court being open does not
assist him any.  Besides he is not in a condition to go there.  All his witnesses are
in Vermont or Massachusetts where he was born.
The whole of these arguments go on the ground that gentlemen from the South
really suppose, they have it at all times on their mninds, that nobody else will be
arrested but a fugitive.  We are not safe that way, and our people have made some
laws with a view to the security of their citizens on that account.  They were not
satisfied with leaving the question entirely to these commissioners, who, the Sena  tor says, are judicial officers, but with no judicial powers in them; who are not sub ject to impeachment or trial. They were not satisfied with that condition of things.
They did not like the law; but that was not all.
Another crisis came.  Some time afterwards it was regularly decided by the Su preme Court that the descendant of an African negro was not entitled to any rights
which'white men were bound to respect at all.  Suppose a man comes after a fugi tive slave, as you choose to call him-perhaps one of your slave stealers in the
southern States may come North, and steal easier there-he gets a description of
the man, and gets affidavits in due form, comes into the New  England States, or
New York, and seizes a man answering that description; takes him to a commis sioner, a stranger, and adduces his proof.  How can we be safe?   How  can our
people be secure against this; especially, I say, when it was holden, as I have stated,
that he had no rights?  Then it comes to this: if you come and get a fugitive slave,
all very well; if you get a man that never was a fugitive slave at all, it is just as
well, because he has no rights that you are bound to respect.
So we saw, from step to step, that there was no security for our colored popula tion whatever, except what the State. in its almnost utter imbecility, might give.
Now, I can say, that whatever statutes have been passed, so far as my State is con cerned, I believe were passed with no intention to avoid and break down this pro vision of the Constitution.  They mnay run counter to it; they may look, upon their
face, as if they were intended to defeat it; but our people always expect their laws
to be subject to the Constitution.  They expect that their own courts and the Su pieme Court of the United States will set aside as void any law they makle that
contravenes any provision of the Constitution.  They expect that, though they do not
put irn the words, "subject to the Constitution of the United States." (Laughter.)
I may say further to geiitlemen, that if there be any such statutes in Vermont as do
contravene that provision, they will be as readily decided to be unconstitutional,
I venture to declare, by the supreme court of that State as they would be by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
I kinow, Mr. President, that our supreme court is chosen annually by the Legislature, but they make 110no distinction amongst parties.  The present chief justice of
that court has been upon that bench for twenty-three years, always a Democrat; a
Democrat to begin with, and is now and always has been, and I am afraid always
will be, for he recently published a letter in favor of the whole programme. His
sentiments are well known. We expect our laws to be decided constitutional or
unconstitutional by our own courts, and especially to abide by the decisions of the
Suprieme Court of the United States.  We have no expectation of making any war
on them.  If it should happen that any of our laws are really unconstitutional, I
hardly think that it lays the foundation of charging men with perjury and treason,
and all the words of vituperation and invective that the English language can furniih, because we may happen to be mistaken.
Sir, when the State of Georgia passed a law, that a man who resided in the Indian
4' 
18
territory in that State, by license of the President, and by consent of the nation, as
a missionary for a long time, should not be allowed to remainr there without license
from their Governor, and made it finally a penitentiary offense if he did, they took
a citizen of Vermont and imprisoned  him  in the penitentiary. The  Supreme
Court of the United States decided that law of theirs was unconstitutional. The
gentleman (Mr. TooaIBS) says that, after all. the man  did not get that certified, so
that the court of Georgia did not disobey it. True it is, that man, with the other
gentleman in the same position, was given very distinctly to understand that
he could not get out of prison in that way, but that if he would cease his prosecution he nmight be pardoned; and as the only hope to get out they did cease, and
they were pardoned.  iNow, sir, I do not think that the State of Georgia should
have imputed to it any bad design or improper motives about that.
Mr. President, I cainnot but here say, that, to my mind, the fact of a State passing
unconstitutional laws, furnishes no foundation for what gentlemen claim. I deny thlat
any State in this Union cal lay the foundation for a dissolution of the Union by passing
unconstitutional laws.  The doctrine of the Senator fiom Georgia is, that if a State, or
several States, pass laws contravening the Constitution of the United States and which
if you please, are injurious to others; in that case the compact is broken and the other
States are at liberty to treat it as vacated whenever they please.  I deny that doetrinte. I deny, in the first place, that the States, as several States, entered into this
compact.  That, however, is repeated so often that, upon the whole, I do not know
but it is believed.  When a State acts, it acts in its organized capacity, by its organs,
by its legislature, or by its Executive.  There never was one of the States of this
nation that acted in that way in the adoption of the present Constitution.  The
people of the United States, meeting in the conventions in their several States,
adopted the United States Constitution.  The States never acted on it as States. It
would be a paradox that they should have done so. How could the Legislature of
North Carolina, for instance, invested as it was, at that time, by the people with
the power to levy and collect duties upon imports; how could the State, in its organized capacity, through that organ delegate that power to another body? It
could not be done.  It never was done.  It nev er was attempted to be done.  The
people of the United States had to meet in their several States in their original
condition, as people in convention, for these reasons: first, it was more convenient;
next, if the people of North Carolina had invested their Legisl,ature with the power
to levy and collect duties, the people of ~North Carolina alone would have the power
to invest that in another body; to wit, Congress.  If you called the whole people
of the United States, it would be a different set of people to take that power away
from the one who gave it.  No, sir, it is not true that this is in that sense a Confederacy.  It is a national Government.  I say it is a national Government, operating
by its own act on individuals, and enforcing its own  laws by its own executive
power. The old Confederation was a failure. This is a national Government.
If these things be true, can it be possible that any State in this Union can dissolve
it, or, if you please, lav a foundation for others to dissolve it, by passing unconsti tiutional laws?  It is utterly destructive of the whole principle of this Government.
There is no foundation for it at all.  Then I deny that, because laws may have been
passed, mistakenlv if you please, that were unconstitutional, against the United
States Constitution, that is any foundation for a dissolution of this Government.
But there is another very strange thing in all these assertions; and that is, that
upon a certain contingency, the election of a Republican President, the Union is to
be dissolved on account of those laws.  Pray, what relationship is there between
them?  It is pretty much like one man telling another, "If you had not caned me to day for my insolenice, I would have paid you that debt a month ago."  (Laughter.)
The next point made upon us is, that it will not do to go on with the Republican
party in possession of the Government, because gentlemen say  wve are going  to
break down the Supreme Court.  There is another principle of our party mentioned
in this connection, and that is, that we are going to exclude the South from the Ter ritories.  On this last point I have already said all that I wish to saT.  ThIis is ex actly what has been done from the beginning.  It is the very thing thie Government
was made for.  Now, in relation to breaking down the Supreme Court, I have but a
fewv words to say.
I have always understood, as a lawyer, that the judgment of a court was binding
upon the parties and privies-no more.  It is binding upon the parties to the suit
aud upon all who claim under them, who are privy to it. Ther e it ends.  The judg ment of a court of competent jurisdiction isnto be executed to that extent, and there
it stops. The United States, 1 take it, were never a party to the Dred Scott decis
I 
a              ",
19
ion, nor a privy to it in any legal sense.  Then it has no binding force, as a judg  ment, on the United States.  Should it have any force as a precedent or authority?
It was a political decision as to the power of the Government to forbid slavery in
the Territories. That is a question relating to the exercise of the political power
of a coordinate branch of the Government. If that is not political, I do not know
what is.  Well, now, how has that always been viewe'd?
Some years since, the Supreme Court very deliberately decided that the Bank of
the United States was constitutional.  The Democratic platform, I believe, even in
the last version, following its predecessors, contains an express resolution that it is
unconstitutional.  We see, then, how it is understood, by that par-ty at any rate,
that a decision of the Supreme Court on a point of that lkind is good for nothing at
all, unworthy of any respect, and that their own party decisions in their platform
are of higher authority, more validity,  and more  binding.  I do not choose to
quarrel about that. It is a matter between them and the court. I take it, how ever, as authority, and it seems to nme that, at any rate, gentlemen wl-ho stand upon
that platform ought not to insist much on the deelsions of the court.
But, Mr. President, the Dred Scott decision, as a precedent-and certainly that is
its only effect onll us ill point of law-I take it, is neither infallible'ror inscrutable.
1 hardly think any gentleman will stand here and say that he claims for the decis ion of the Supreme Court, as precedent and authority, that we should bow down to
it as we would to the inscrutable dispensation of Divine Providence; or that we
should even say blasphemously of it, "the Lord las given, the Lord  has  taken
sway; blessed be the name of the Lord." This will not be claimed, I apprehend.
Then it is to be examined; arnd its worth as a precedent depends on the soundness of
the arguments that sustain it and the principles on which it stands.  If it has any
weight, it is that; arid, by the way, if the arguments are good to'sustain the prin ciple, they would be just as good without the decision of the Supreme Court as
with it.
Now, Mr. President, I wish to examine this decision of the Supreme Court a little.
They expend a great amount of time in undertaking to show that the power of the Gov erirnent over the territory beyond the Mississippi, territory which was not owned at
the adoption of the Constitution, does not arise arid exist under the territorial clause
of the Constitution-I mean the clause giving Congress power to make  all needful
rules and regulations.  I care verv little about that.  I think it is totally unfounded
in its reasons on that point, but 1 care very little about it for another reason.  The
court say that there is, after all, a power in this Government to obtain territory by
conquest or treaty.  They further say, that there must  necessarilv be, incident to
that power and to the power to admnit States, authority, when the Governmelt has
acquired a Territory, to firame a Government for it, so as to pass it through a conditioril of pupilage, and prepare it for admnission as States. I care very little whether
the power came from that clause or not; they say there is that power, any way
and they say that, in frarinig the laws for that purpose, it is in the discretion of
Congress to make provision: it is not for the court to say what form of government
they shall give it. They say further, that, the territory being a part of the United
States, "the citizens enter it under authority of the Constitution, with their respective rights marked out and defined." But they say "this power is in the discretion
of Congress," and that, of course, they are to frame the formn of government in such
a way as they believe will best adrance the interests of the whole people.
They then spend some time discussing whether, in doing that, Congress can exercise any powers except some that are delegated expressly by the Constitution.  I
look upon all that part of the opinion as mere talk, biecause they say that the Constitution has not delegated to Congress any power to govern the territory obtained
after the Constitution was adopted; that that is merely incidental to their power
to obtain territory.  Of course there is nothing in the Constitution by which it is
said what the forms of power shall be that they shall exercise there.  But they then
come to talk about another topic.  They say that Congress, in the exercise of power
in the Territories, can do nothing that is expressly prohibited by  the ConstitutioL
Verv well; let us take it so.  They go on to enumerate a nurrmber of things that
they say Congress cannot do. For instance: they cannot estabtlish a religion, cannot abridge the freedom of speech or of the press, cannot abolish trial by Jury, and
so on, naming things that are expressly forbidden in the Constitution.  Is it anywhere forbidden in the Constitution that Congress shall prohibit slaves being carried
there? All the prohibitions they mention are express prohibitions. Is there such
an express prohibition as that. iow can you read into the Constitution a prolibition aniong those that are there, which is not there}  That is what is attempted to
::, 
be done.  How do they get at it?  In this way: they say, in the first place, that
slaves are property, so recognized by the Constitution; in the second place, that
everybody has a right to go to the Territories with every kind of property; and,
in the third place, that to prohibit their doing so, is to violate the fifth amendment
of the Constitution, which says that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.
In making up this syllogism, each proposition in it, whether major or minor, and
the ultimate conclusion, are equally important.  In the first place, then, are slaves
property? The court utterly disregarded their own decisions on that subject in
making this.  I think if anything can be established fron the decisions of courts it
is that slavery exists by local law, confined to thie territory over which the law is
operative; and if persons held in slavery go out of and beyond that territory, they
are no longer slaves; and if slaves are property by the law within that territory,
they are not without it.  In relation to this point, whether slaves are property
beyond the States so recognizing them, I deny the major proposition, to begin with.
I say the very language of the Constitution implies the contrary.  It says that if
a person holden to service under the laws of one State escape into another, he shall
be returned.  "Held to service!"-how?  Under the laws of a State.   "HIeld to
service under the laws thereof," is the language.
When that man bound to service in one State escapes into another State, is he
property there?  Can the master go and take him there, and keep him there, and
sell him there, and use him there? If he is like other property, and the Supreme
Court says it is precisely the same as other property, all that would be true; but we
know it is not. That provision of the Constitution declares all laws of other States
that would release him from the service void; that is all.  It contemplates that
such laws might be passed, but says they shall not have that effect.  It does not
discharge him from the service in the State where he belongs, and only provides for
the man being surrendered up and taken where he belongs, and where he owes the
service.  The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, decided the very same thing.  They in so many words decided that slavery
was a mere local matter; I will cite their very words:
"The state of slavery is deemed to be a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to
the range of territorial laws."-10 Peters's Repoort, page 611.
What did the Supreme Court do with that decision of theirs when they decided
he Dred Scott case?  Never said a word about it; utterly disregarded it; never
ven explained ib-; never qualified it at all.  I hold in my hand the authorities, as
ollected in Burie's ComTmentaries on Colonial and Foreign Laws on the subject of
le conflict of laws with regard to slavery.  I will not read it at length, but here
nd there.  I hold, first, that at common law, by which I mean the common law of
Flgland, slaves could not be ho,den at all.  They never were holden lawfully in
lugland.  When the question arose, it was at once so decided in Sommersett's cas.
know there had been an opinion given before that time, when a question arose in
elation to their navigation act, whether, under the navig tion act, slaves were mehandise.  It was not decided by any suit, but an opinion being called for by the
rivy council, an opinion was given that they were, and therefore, foreigners could
ot earry on the slave trade with the Britislh colonies; they wanted it all themelves.  The board of trade with the King in council, had their negative on the
olonial laws.  They disagreed to them whenever the colonies attempted tc pass
aws against the slavery carried there under the Assiento contract, which the gen1emanl (Mr. BENJAMIN) well understands.  It was a profitable business to the trade
f England; and whenever the colonies attempted to get rid of it, they immediately
naterfered.  By the colonial charter, the King in council, had a negative on the
cts of the colonial Legislature.   Sometimes they were  negatived in that way;
ometimes acts were passed effecting the same end. In short, they forced the slave
rade and the holding of slaves on the colonies by statute.   By their power to
egulate trade, they forced it upon the colonies when it was always against the common law.  Such was clearly the cause as laid down in the authorities as collected
by Burge.  They passed, from time to time, statutes to aid and encourage the trade.
ie says:
"Sir John Hawkins was the first Englishman who, in 1562, introduced the practice of buying or
idnapping negroes in Africa, and transporting and selling thenm I)r slaves in the West Indies. In
620, a Dutch vessel carried a cargo of slaves from Africa to Virginia."
After that was the opinion under the navigation act.  lIe says:
P' , , 1  4  1  i
0
20
-4
i
I 
' Te Legislature of Peilhsylvania, when the lBritish colonhy, passed, on the 1ith of Jutle, iT12. af
tct to prevent the importation of negroes and Indians into that province.  It was disallowed by
Great Britain, and accordingly repealed by an act of Queen Anne, on the 20th of February, 17183.
*      *             *   *         A*      *      *      *l     *       *      *      *,    *
In 1765, the Governor of Jamaica informed the Assembly of that Island, that, consistently with
his instructions, he could not give his assent to a bill, which had then been read twice, for limiting
the importation of slaves into that colony.  In 1774, the Jamaica Assembly attempted to prevent the
further importation by an increase iOf duties thereon, and for this purpose passed two acts.  The
merchants of Bristol and Liverpool petitioned against their allowance.  The bo)ard f trade made a
report against them. The agent of Janaica Was heard against that report; but upon the recomriendation of the privy council the acts were disallowed, and the disallowance was accompanied by an
instruction to the Governor, dated tlie 28th of February, 1775, by which he was pirohibited,'upon
pain of being remeved from his government,' froni givynlg his assent to any art by WhiCh the dutieS
on the importation of slaves should be augmented."
The same author declares:
"Upon the disalppearancd of slavery in Eutrope, it commenced in AmeriCa,  Thie g"eat PoWers,
Fngland, France, Itolland, Spain, aind Portugal, some of whom boast of the freedom'of their iisti,
tations, exerted all their energies and authority to introduce and maintain it in their colonies, by
mrheans of the African slave trade. Their resources were employed, and their subjects invited and
encouraged to ftill their colonies with slaves. We turn with disgust from the various expedients by
which these States et(leavored to secure to themselves the monopoly of this odious trafric, to the
revenues which they derived from it, and to the remorseless perseverance with which England and
France uniformly resist,od every attempt on the part of their colonists to check its progress.
"To the existence of slavery in their colonies, the parent States gave the lullest and most acetiv
encouragement.  Under the sancetion of their laws and the decisions of their courts, slaves became
property.  But whilst they sanctioned, encouraged, and recogniized the legality of slavery in their
colonies, they denounced its existence in their poessessions in Europe."
This was not peculiar to England, but extended to the other nations mentioned.
Mr. BENJAMIN.   Will the Senator perm,it me a moment    I  ask him jutst  there;
whether the author cites any authority showing that the English Government  diseouraged slavery in England at the time these  colonies  had it introduced  among
them-whether he cites a solitary authority or historian 
Mr. COLLAMER.  I will read:
"There exists, then, a statu.s which is legal in the countries in which it is constituted, but illegal
in another country to wlhich the person may resort.
"In this conflict there has been a uniformity of opinion among jurists, and of decision y jildicial
tribunals, in giving no etfiect to the st,tus, however legal it may have been in the country in which
the person was born, or in which he was previously domiciled, if it be not recognised by the law of
his actual domicile.
"This principle was adopted by the supreme council of Mechlin as its established law.  In 1881
it refused to issue a warrant to take up a person who had escaped Irom Spain, where he had been
bought and legally held in slavery."
*      *      *      *       *     *       *      *      *      *       *     *       *,t
"Although the Edits of April, 1615, and May, 16b, had recognized the title to slaves and the legality of slavery in the colonies of FranCe, yet within that kingdom it was illegal."
Mr. BENJAMIN.  The Senator perhaps does not understand the precise question
I put to him. If I understand him aright, he says that that author declares that,
although the English Government established slavery, and forced slavery oni its colonies on this continent it discountenanced slavery at home, and slaveiy was not renognized at home,
Mr. COLLAMER.   I did not say discountenanced
Mir. BENJAMIN.  Refused to acknowledge it.
Mr. COLLAIMER.  Certainly.
Mr. BENJAMIN.  I ask for the authority for that,
Mr. COLLAMER~ It is frequently the case in the world that strength and power
overcome right for the time being, until justice and the prop)er tribunals of justice
are appealed to.  That proves nothing.  It is when the competent authorities are
appealed to and a decision is made, that we begin to ascertain what is the law oI
the country.  As to what the gentleman asks Mie, now I will read to him further
from the same volume
" tn 1729, Sir P. York, then Attorney General and Mr;'albot, the Solicitor Oeneral of England4
gave their opinion, that a slave, by coming from the West Indies, either with or without his master,
to Great Britain or Ireland, did nut become free I and that his Mtaster's property or right in lhli
was not thereby determinedt or varied."
That was not the decision of a court; it was the opinion of the Attorney and So.
lieoltor General.
"This opinion was acted on. Slaves who had arrived in Englaffd from the British colonies e'ere
bought and sold publicly in the cities of London, Bristol, and Liverpool; and in the year 1771, When
the negro Sotnmersett's case wan decided, it wa4 said there were at least fourteeo tbhousand' s*G e
iti ondon,"
I
.111I 
, 22
That was without law.  They got there, as the author states, by virtue of the
opinion expressed by Sir Philip York, who had no judicial power whatever:
"The court of King's Bench in that case [Somersett] distinctly and expressly recognized the
principle that the status of slavery' was a municipal relation, an institution, therefore confined to
certain places, and necessarily dropped by passage into a country where such municipal relation
did not subsist.  The negro, making choice of his habitation in England, had subjected himself to
the penalties, and was therefore entitled to the protection of the laws.'
"A few years afterwards the case of Knight vs. Wedderburn was brought before the court of
session, in Scotland. The master claimed Knight as a slave, but the court adopted the principle
that slavery was not recognized by the laws of that kingdom, and was inconsistent with the principles thereof; that the regulations in Jamaica concerning slaves did not extend to that kingdom, and
repelled the defender's claim to a perpetual service."
In a more recent case, Mr. Burge says:
"It has been applied when the person has placed himself beyond the limits of the country in
which the status existed bv law, and became subject to the law of mother country whose institutions
did not recognize that statots though he did not put his foot on her shores."
That was where he went on board ship, and the ship carried him off.  I also cite
in the second Barnewall & Cresswell, decided by Chief Justice Best, where the whole
subject is very fully examined, and where the same decision as in the case of Sommersett was made.  I next cite not merely that case, but cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.  I have already alluded to Prigg rs. Pennsylvania.
There is also the case of Groves rs. Slaughter.  That was a case from  the State of
Mississippi.  Mississippi had forbidden the bringing of slaves there for sale; but if
they were personal property, as the Supreme Court say in the Dred Scott case, the
same as other personal property, the States could not regulate the trade in chattels
of any kind between them. I take it, if slaves be property at all, they are personal
property; for the Constitution says they are persons, and you say they are property.  The States have no power to regulate trade between each other.  The Supreme
Court of the United States were appealed to on that subject, and it was insisted that
the power was vested in Congress to regulate trade bebween  the other States and
the State of Mississippi, and that no State can forbid the sale of the property of
another State within its territory.  The Supreme Court, however, sustained  the
right of Mississippi to do what she did, clearly because slaves were not like other personal property.'Ihe States, the court said, had the right to prohibit such sale. In a
case in Kentucky, Rankin rs. Lydia, in second Marshall, the words of the court are:
"We view this (slavery) as a right existing by positive law, of a municipal character, without
foundation in the law of nature, or in the unwritten common law."
I do not wish to elaborate this point any more.
Mr. MALLORY.   Will my frieind from Vermont permit me to draw his attention
to a single point?  I perceive that he has quoted from the Sommersett case, and it
has been referred to a great deal onII the otlier side of tile Chamber. I have not a
very distinct recollection of it, but I will ask him whether, in that ease, which is
regarded here as a leading one, the s)ole question before the court of Kinrg's Bench
was not as to the right of any man to take another one out of the realm of England
without his authority or the authority of law; and whether the principle that a
slave brought fi'oyn the West Indies ceased to be a slave because he was brought to
England was mooted there at all?
Mr. COLLAMER. The gentleman seems to have put together in his mind the case
of the slave Grace which was before Lord Stowell, and the Somersett ease, that was
before Loid Mansfield. Thie Somersett case was clear and distilnct enough.  The fact
was, if the slave was the man's property, he had a iight to take him. So the Supreme
Court decided in the Prigg case, no distinction of that kind can be made.  He had a
right to take him away if he was property, but the court, in Somersett's case, held
he was free in England.  It is true that, in the case of the slave Grace, before Lord
Stowell, a question arose as to what would be the effect of returning voluntarily into
the master's service in the State where the service was due, after the slave had been
brought out, and had been in England or France.  Lord Stoweli said that, if the
servant Grace returned with her master, voluntarily,.to her former status, she would
be a slave still in Jamaica. I think that was the decision. That has been quite a
mooted question here. Our Supreme Court, I believe, decided that in the Kentucky
case of Graham vs. Stiader; and if the Supreme Court, in the Dred Scott case, had
simply confined itself to the fact that Dred Scott, wherever he was, voluntarily went
back with his master to Missouri, and thereby returned to his former status, no man
would ever have made a word about the decision at all.
There is another nice distinction about that made by Lord Stowell, and made, also, 
23
in a case in Pickeringf, in Massachusetts; and that is, as to whether the State or country into which the man goes, forbids slavery absolutely, or whether it only forbids
the master from using power, as a master, over him there. If it is the latter, and he
voluntarily returns, he waives that; but, if it is the former, and the slavery is decldared absolutely void and ended, then the return would not affect it. That is, however, a nice distinction, which it is not necessary now to make.
The next point in the syllogism is, that slaves, being property like any other
property, their owners have a right to go to the Territories with them. What is
that founded on? I have no doubt that slaves are not property, though, perhaps,
they may be called such where slavery is authorized by law; but even if they were,
how does this follow?  What is the reason that the slaveholder has a right to take
his slave there? You say the territory which we have acquired belongs to the people of the several States.  That is not true.  It belongs to the people of the United
States. If it belongs to the people of the several States, each several State would
have its right to a proportion of it; and if it was sold by the General Government,
they would have a right to their proportion of the money. Clearly so, if the General Government holds it as a mere trustee for the States, as cestui q?ue trusts. Now,
how idle is that.  tiere you hear one day that we own the territory, and that every
man has a right to go there with his property, because each man has his share in the
land; and the next day we admit it as a free State, and there is not a quarter of the
land sold.  Now, according to this doctrine, the people of the slaveholding States
have lost all their land there.  It is a most palpable inconsistency.  The assiumption
that the several States have an interest in the land there, is not true. The whole
theory of it is founded on a wrong doctrine.
In the next place, it is said that, inasmuch as slaves are property, and recognized
as property by the Constitution of the United States, (which argument I have  already answered,) if we do not allow the owners to go there with them, it is an infringement of their rights, and a breach of the fifth section of the amendments of
the Constitution, which declares that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.  It is a curious fact, that the extremes of this
question seem to meet on this common ground. One man says we cannot permit
slaves to exists in a Territory at all.  Why?  Because, he says, we cannot deprive
any man of his life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.   Now, if you
permit slaves to be holden in a Territory, you deprive a man of his liberty. I say
you do not. I do not understand that when they allowed slavery to continue to
exist in Louisiana, they deprived any man on earth of his liberty.  It was gone be- 
foie.  So, too, when they allowed slaves to be taken, as they did, into Mississippi
from Georgia, did they deprive any man of his liberty?  No; he  was deprived  of
it before. So the opposite extreme of the question cite not only the Constitution to
support their doctrine, that you cannot prohibit slavery in the Territories, but cite
the very same words.  They say you cannot prohibit it, because it will deprive the
owner of his property. The others say you cannot allow it, because it will deprive
somebody of his liberty.
The fact is, neither is well founded.  When  the Missouri compromise line was
made, there was not a white inhabitant, or black inhabitant, in all the vast uninhabited region, north of that line-not a settler in it. When the line was run, and it was
provided that no slavery should be admitted north of it, I want to know if there was
a slaveholder in the United States that parted with any of his slaves? Was there a
slaveholder in the Lnited States whose slaves were confiscated?  Was there a slaveholder in the United States whose slaves were set free?  How, then, can you say
that the adoption of the Missouri compromise line confiscated any one's property;
or, in other words, deprived a man of his property without due process of law?  It
did not deprive any man of his property at all, with or without process of law.
You have laws in your own States —Vigigia lhas one, and, I think, Maryland; most
of the slave States-against bringing in blacks, and especially slaves, for sale; they
forbid it. Does that confiscate any of the property of the slaveholders of Maryland,
or of any other State? Not at all. Does it deprive any man of his property? Certainly not at all.
I have stated all there is in the Dred Scott decision.  The only reason given in
the world, the only one suggested, why Congress cannot forbid the taking of slaves
into the Territories, is because it would infringe that article of the Constitution, and
deprive some man of his property without due process of law.  It is a mere assumption, totally unfounded; for, when the act was made, it did not deprive any man
of his property, and could not, and never could.
I.. 
24
Mr. Plresldett, when we consider that this court have utterly disregarded their
own decisions, have made assumptions on which they have founded their opinions,
which are thus utterly inconsistent; when we examine this decision in the light any
of us possess, I say it is Lot entitled to respect, even as a precedent;  and further,
in all this there is no intention to break down the Supreme Court, They have disregarded their own decisions in making this. I take it they will disregard this when
they come to mnake another.  They have certainly the power of revision.
And now, Mr. President, I will bring my remarks to a termination.  The whole
question is, in effect: shall we restore the compromise line by excluding slavery
from the territories?  Is not that peace?  Was it not peace while it ex;isted? Is not
this the olive branch?  Is it not the harbinger of repose?  Is it wrong?   Is it outrageous?  Is it any violence  It is simply to bring back things to where they were
and all I can now say is, that if the Reepublican party is true to its purpoes, and
can effect them, it will effect that peace, even to the Soutth-for I do nriot believe
they ever asked for that repeal, or ever wanted it.  I believe it was altogethel the
exertion of politicians and a scramble for the Presidency.  If anybody, by that repeal and that Kansas-Nebraska bill, shall ever get to be President by viutue of it,
and succeed in the purposes for which it was entered upon, I am inclined to think
that so far from being a cure, it will only add another evil to come out of this box of
landora.
do