- - congression AL REPORTs ON WOMAN SUFFRAGE. The Majority and Minority Reports OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE EIOTUTSE OF ERIEEEESENTTATIVES ON THE wooDHULL MEMORLA.L. N E W YORK : - wooDHULL, CLAFLIN & CO, No. 44 BROAD STREET. 1-71. CONSTITUTIONAL ** To the Hos. The Judiciary Coyºtriters of THE SENATE AND THE House of REPRESENTATIVES OF THE Congress of the UNITED STATES : The undersigned, VICTORIA C. WooDHULL, having most respect. fully º Congress for º bassage of such laws as in its wis- domshah see ecessary and proper to carry into effect the rights vested by the Constitution of the United States in the citizens to vote, without regard to sex, begs leave to submit to your honorable body the following in favor of her prayer in said Memorial which has been referred to your Committee: - The public law of the world is founded upon the conceded fact that sovereignty cannot be forfeited or renounced. The sovereign power of this country is perpetual in the politically-organized people of the United States, and can neither be relinquished nor abandoned by any portion of them. The people in this Republic who confer sover. eignty are its citizens: in a monarchy the people are the subjects of sovereignty. All citizens of a rep biº. y rightful act or implication confer sovereign power. All people of a monarchy are subjects who exist under its supreme shield and enjoy its immunities. The subject of a monarch takes municipal immunities from the sovereign as a gracious favor; but the woman citizen of this country has the inalienable “sovereign" right of self-government in her own proper person. Those who look upon woman's status by the dim light of the common law, which unfolded itself under the feudal and military insti- tutions that establish right upon physical power, cannot find any anal- ogy in the status of the woman citizen of this country, where the broad sunshine of our Constitution has enfranchised all. As sovereignty cannot be forfeited, relinquished or abandoned, those from whom it flows—the citizens—are equal in conferring the power, and should be equal in the enjoyment of its benefits and in the exercise of its rights and privileges. One portion of citizens have no power to deprive another portion of rights and privileges such as are possessed and exercised by them. - º - - // º/ º - - - - - ſº Gº - - - - SECOND PRON UN CLAMENTO. 40c selves. The male citizen has no more right to deprive the female citi- zen of the free, public, political expression of opinion than the female citizen has to deprive the male citizen thereof. The sovereign will of the people is expressed in our written Con- stitution, which is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution makes no distinction of sex. The Constitution defines a woman born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, to be a citizen. It recognizes the right of citizens to vote. It declares that the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of “race, color or previous condition of servitude.” - Women, white and black, belong to races; although to different races. A race of people comprises all the people, male and female. The right to vote cannot be denied on account of race. All people included in the term race have the right to vote, unless otherwise prohibited. --- --- Women of all races are white, black or some intermediate color. Color comprises all people, of all races and both sexes. The right to vote cannot be denied on account of color. All people included in the term color have the right to vote unless otherwise prohibited. With the right to vote sex has nothing to do. Race and color include all people of both sexes. All people of both sexes have the right to vote, unless prohibited by special limiting terms less compre- hensive than race or color. No such limiting terms exist in the Con- stitution. - - - - - Women, white and black, have from time immemorial groaned under what is properly termed in the Constitution “previous condition of servitude.” --- - - Women are the equals of men before the law, and are equalin all their rights as citizens. - - - - - Women are debarred from voting in some parts of the United States, although they are allowed to exercise that right elsewhere. Women were formerly permitted to vote in places where they are now debarred therefrom, - - - - - The Naturalization Laws of the United States expressly provide for the naturalization of women. - But the right to vote has only lately been distinctly declared by the Constitution to be inalienable, under three distinct conditions—in all of which woman is distinctly embraced. The citizen who is taxed should also have a voice in the subject 400 SECONI). PRON UNCLAMENTO. matter of taxation. “No taxation without representation" is a right which was fundamentally established at the very birth of our country's independence; and by what ethics does any free government impose taxes on women without giving them a voice upon the subject or a participation in the public declaration as to how and by whom these taxes shall be applied for common public use? Women are free to own and to control property, separate and apart from males, and they are held responsible in their own proper persons, in every particular, as well as men, in and out of court. Women have the same inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness that men have. Why have they not this right politically, as well as men? Women constitute a majority of the people of this country—they hold vast portions of the nation's wealth and pay a proportionate share of the taxes. They are intrusted with the most holy duties and the most vital responsibilities of society; they bear, rear and educate men; they train and mould their characters; they inspire the noblest im- pulses in men; they often hold the accumulated fortunes of a man's life for the safety of the family and as guardians of the infants, and yet they are debarred from uttering any opinion, by public vote, as to the management by public servants of these interests; they are the secret counsellors, the best advisers, the most devoted aids in the most trying periods of men's lives, and yet men shrink from trusting them in the common questions of ordinary politics. Men trust women in the market, in the shop, on the highway and the railroad, and in all other public places and assemblies, but when they propose to carry a slip of paper with a name upon it to the polls, they fear them. Never- theless, as citizens women have the right to vote; they are part and parcel of that great element in which the sovereign power of the land had birth: and it is by usurpation only that men debar them from their right to vote. The American nation, in its march onward and upward, cannot publicly choke the intellectual and political activity of half its citizens by narrow statutes. The will of the entire people. is the true basis of republican government, and a free expression of that will by the public vote of all citizens, without distinctions of race, color, occupation or sex, is the only means by which that will can be ascertained. As the world has advanced in civilization and cul- ture; as mind has risen in its dominion over matter; as the principle of justice and moral right has gained sway, and merely physically or ganized power has yielded thereto; as the might of right has sup- SECONI) Plzon UNCLAMENTO. 40E planted the right of might, so have the rights of women become more fully recognized, and that recognition is the result of the development of the minds of men, which through the ages, she has polished, and thereby heightened the lustre of civilization. , - It was reserved for our great country to recognize by constitutional enactment that political equality of all citizens which religion, affection and common sense should have long since accorded; it was reserved for America to sweep away the mist of prejudice and ignorance, and that chivalric condescension of a darker age, for in the language of Holy Writ, “The night is far spent, the day is at hand, let us therefore cast off the work of darkness, and let us put on the armor of light. Let us walk honestly as in the day.” |-- - It may be argued against the proposition that there still remains upon the statute books of some States the word “male” to an exclu- sion, but as the Constitution in its paramount character can only be read by the light of the established principle, italez Scripta est; and as the subject of sex is not mentioned and the Constitution is not limited either in terms or by necessary implication in the general rights of citi. zens to vote, this right cannot be limited on account of anything in the spirit of inferior or previous enactments upon a subject which is not mentioned in the supreme law. A different construction would destroy a vested right in a portion of the citizens, and this no legislature has a right to do without compensation, and nothing can compensate a citizen for the loss of his or her suffrage—its value is equal to the value of life. Neither can it be presumed that women are to be kept from the polls as a mere police regulation: it is to be hoped, at least, that police regulations in their case need not be very active. The effect of the amendments to the Constitution must be to annul the power over this subject in the States whether past, present or future, which is contrary to the amendments. The amendments would even arrest the action of the Supreme Court in cases pending before it prior to their adoption, and operate as an absolute prohibition to the exercise of any other juris- diction than merely to dismiss the suit. - 3 Dall, 382; 6 Wheaton, 405; 9 Id., 868; 3d Circ., Pa., 1832. And if the restrictions contained in the Constitution as to color, race or servitude, were designed to limit the State governments in ref. erence to their own citizens, and were intended to operate also as re- strictions on the Federal power, and to preventinterference with the rights of the State and its citizens, how then can the State restrict citizens of the United States in the exercise of rights not mentioned in any restric- 40F SECOND PRON UNCIAMENTO. tive clause in reference to actions on the part of those citizens having reference solely to the necessary functions of the General Government, such as the election of representatives and senators to Congress, whose election the Constitution expressly gives Congress the power to regu. late? - S. C., 1847: Fox vs. Ohio, 5 Howard, 410. Your memorialist complains of the existence of State Laws, and prays Congress, by appropriate legislation, to declare them, as they are, annulled, and to give vitality to the Constitution under its power to make and alter the regulations of the States contravening the same. It may be urged in opposition that the Courts have power, and should declare upon this subject. - The Supreme Court has the power, and it would be its duty so to declare the law; but the Court will not do so unless a determination of such point as shall arise make it necessary to the determination of a controversy, and hence a case must be presented in which there can be no rational doubt. All this would subject the aggrieved parties to much dilatory expensive and needless litigation, which your memorialist prays your Honorable Body to dispense with by appropriate legislation, as there can be no purpose in special arguments “ad inconvenienti," enlarging or contracting the import of the language of theoonstitution. Therefore, Believing firmly in the right of citizens to freely ap- proach those in whose hands their destiny is placed, under the Provi- dence of God, your memorialist has frankly, but humbly, appealed to you, and prays that the wisdom of Congress may be moved to action in this matter for the benefit and the increased happiness of our beloved country. Most respectfully submitted, - victor.I.A. C. wooDHULL. Dated New York, January 2, 1871. - THE MEMORIAL OF VICTORIA C. WOODEIULL. To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, respectfully showeth: That she was born in the State of Ohio, and is above the age of twenty-one years; that she has resided in the State of New York during the past three years; that she is still a resident thereof, and that she is a citizen of the United States, as declared by the XIV. Article of Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. That since the adoption of the XV. Article of Amendments to the Constitution, neither the State of New York nor any other State, nor any Territory, has passed any law to abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote, as established by said arti- cle, neither on account of sex or otherwise: That, nevertheless, the right to vote is denied to women citizens of the United States, by the operation of Election Laws in the several States and Territories, which laws were enacted prior to the adoption of the said XV. Article, and which are inconsistent with the Constitution as amended, and therefore, are void and of no effect; but which, being still enforced by the said States and Territories, render the Constitution inoperative as regards the riºt of women citizens to vote: And whereas, Article VI., Section 2, declares “That this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and all judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution and laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding:” - - And whereas, no distinction between citizens is made in the Constitution of the United States on account of sex; but the XV. article of Amendments to it provides that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immuni- ties of citizens of the United States, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” And whereas, Congress has power to make laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers wested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, and to make or alter all regulations in relation to holding elections for sen- ators or representatives, and especially to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro- visions of the said XIV. Article: And whereas, the continuance of the enforcement of said local election laws, deny- ing and abridging the right of citizens to vote on account of sex, is a grievance to your me- morialist and to various other persons, citizens of the United States, being women— Therefore, your memorialist would most respectfully petition your Honorable Bodies to make such laws as in the wisdom of Congress shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens of the United States to vote, without regard to sex. And your memorialist will ever pray. VICTORIA. C. WOODHULL. Dated New York City, December 19, 1870. - - - - - --- 96 *āº; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES º' -- - -- -- - - - - - - --- VICTORIA. C. WOODHULL - - - -- - January 30, 1871.-Recommitted to the Committee on the Judiciary and ordered to be printed. Mr. BINGHAM, from the Committee on the Judiciary, made the following REPORT. The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the Memorial of Victoria C. Woodhull, having considered the same, make the following report: The Memorialistasks the enactment of a law by Congress which shall secure to citi- zens of the United States in the several states the right to vote “without regard to sex." Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, there is no longer any reason to doubt that all persons, born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and ot the State wherein they re- side, for that is the express declaration of the amendment. The clause of the fourteenth amendment, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni ºs of citizens of the United States,” does not, in the opinion of the committee, refer to privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States other than those privileges and immunities embraced in the original text of the Con- stitution, Article 1\,..., Section 2. The fourteenth amendment, it is believed, did not add to the privileges or immunities before mentiºned, but was deemed necessary for their en- forcement, as an express limitation upon the powers of the States. It has been judicially determined that the first eight articles of amendment of the Constitution were not limita- tions on the power of the States, and it was apprehended that the same might be held of the provision of the second section, fourth article. To remedy this defect of the Constitution, the express limitations upon the States contained in the first section of the fourteenth amendment, together with the grant of power in Congress to enforce them by legislation, were incorporated in the Constitution. The words “citizens of the United States,” and “citizens of the States,” as employed in the fourteenth amendment, did not change or modify the relations of citizens of the State and Nation as they existed under the original Constitution. Attorney General Bates gave the opinion that the Constitution uses the word “citi- zen,” only to express the political quality of the individual in his relation to the Nation; to declare that he is a member of the body politic, and bound to it by the reciprocal obliga- tion of allegiance on the one side and protection on the other. The phrase “a citizen of the United States,” without addition or qualification, means neither more nor less than a member of the Nation. (Opinion of Attorney General Bates on citizenship.) The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that, according to the express words and clear meaning of the second section, fourth article of the Constitution, no privi- leges are secured by it except those which belong to citizenship. (Connor et al. vs. º: et al., 18 howard, 593., In Corfield vs. Coryell, 4 Washington Circuit Court Reports, 380, the court say: The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in 97 their nature fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments; and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this tºnion. from the time of their becoming free, independent and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are would, perhaps, be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all compre- hended under the following general heads: Protection by the Government: the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain º: and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the Government may justly pre- scribe for the general good of the whole; the right of a citizen of one state to pass through or to reside in any other state, for the purpose of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas jus: to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state: to take, hold, and dispose of º: either real or personal; and an ex- emption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State, may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges...deemed tº be fundamental; to which may be added the effective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or Constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. - - - But we cannot accede to the proposition which was in sisted on by the counsel, that under this provision of the Constitution, sec. 3., art. 4, the citizens of the several States are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of any other particular State. - - The learned Justice Story declared that the intention of the clause—“the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizensin the several States”—was to confer on the citizens of each State a general citizenship, and communi- cated all the privileges and immunities which a citizen of the same State would be entitled to under the same circumstances. (Story on the Constitution, vol. 2, p. 605.) In the case of the Bank of the United States vs. Primrose, in the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Webster said: That this article in the Constitution (art. 4. sec. 3) does not confer on the citizens of each state political rights in every other State, is admitted. A citizen of Pennsylvania cannot go into Virginia and vote at any election in that State, though when he has acquired a residence in $º. and is otherwise qualified and is required by the constitution ºf Virginia), he becomes, without formal adoption as a citizen of Virginia, a citizen of that State politically. (Webster's works, vol. 6, p. 112.) It must be obvious that Mr. Webster was of opinion that the privileges and immuni- ties of citizens, guaranteed to them in the several States, did not include the privilege of the elective franchise otherwise than as secured by the State Constitution. For, after making the statement above quoted, that a citizen of Pennsylvania cannot go into Vir- ginia and vote, Mr. Webster adds, “but for the purposes of trade, commerce, buying and selling, it is evidently not in the power of any State to impose any hindrance or embrass- ment, &c., upon citizens of other States, or to place them, going there, upon a different footing from her own citizens.” (Ib) The propºsition is clear that no citizen of the United States can rightfully votein any State of this Union who has not the qualifications required by the Constitution of the State in which the right is claimed to be exercised, except as to such conditions in the constitutions of such States as deny the right to vote to citizens resident therein “on ac- count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The adoption of the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution imposing these three limitations upon the power of the several States, was by necessary implication, a declara- tion that the States had the power to regulate by a uniform rule the conditions upon which the elective franchise should be exercised by citizens of the United States resident therein. The limitations specified in the fifteenth amendment exclude the conclusion that a State of this Union, having a government republican in form, may not prescribe conditions upon which alone citizens may vote other than those prohibited. It can hardly be said that a State law which excludes from voting women citizens, minor citizens, and non-resident citizens of the United States, on account of sex, minority or domicil, is a denial of the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. It may be further added that the second section of the fourteenth amendment, by the provision that “when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors of President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, or execu- tive and judicial officers of the State, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any ºf the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, a citizen of the United Sates, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State,” implies that the several States may restrict the elective fran- chise as to other than male citizens. In disposing of this question effect must be given, if possible, to every provision of the Constitution. Article 1, section 2, of the Constitution provides: That the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each Stateshall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature. This provision has always been construed to vest in the several States the exclusive right to prescribe the qualifications of electors for the most numerous branch of the State 98 legislature, and therefore for members of Congress. And this interpretation is supported by section 4, article 1, of the Constitution, which provides- That the time, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations except as to the place of choosing Senators. Now it is submitted, if it had been intended that Congress should prescribe the qual- ificatiºns of electors, that the grant would have read: The Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, and also prescribe the qualifications of electors, &c. The power, on the contrary, is limited exclusively to the time, place and manner, and does not extend to the qualification of the electors. This power to prescribe the qualifica- tiºn of electors in the several States has always been exercised, and is, to-day, by the several States of the Union; and we apprehend, until the Constitution shall be changed, will continue to be so exercised, subject only to the express limitations imposed by the Constitution upon the several States, before noticed. We are of opinion, therefore, that it is not competent for the Congress of the United States to establish by law the right to vote without regard to sex in the several States of this Union, without the consent of the people of such States, and against their constitutions and laws; and that such legislation would be, in our jndgment, a violation of the Constitution of the United States, and of the rights reserved to the States respectively by the Constitution. Is it is undoubtedly the right of the people of the several States so to reform their constitutions and laws as to se- cure the equal exercise of the right of suffrage, at all elections held therein under the Con- stitution of the United States, to all citizens, without regard to sex; and as public opinion creates constitutions and governments in the several States, it is not to be doubted that whenever, in any State, the people are of opinion that such a reform is advisable, it will be made. If, however, as is claimed in the memorial referred to, the right to vote “is vested by the Constitution in the citizens of the United States without regard to sex,” that right can be established in the courts without further legislation. - The suggestion is made that Congress, by a mere declaratory act, shall say that the construction claimed in the memorial is the true construction of the Constitution, or in other words, that by the Constitution of the United States the right to vote is vested in citizens of the United States “without regard to sex,” anything in the constitution and laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. In the opinion of the committee, such declaratory act is not authorized by the Constitution nor within the legislative power of Congress. Wetherefore recommend the adoption of the following resolution: Resolved. That the prayer of the petitioner be not granted, that the memorial be laid on the table, and that the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from the further con- sideration of the subject. - º; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. }*º W., VICTORLA. C. WOODHULL. FEBRUARY 1, 1871.-Ordered to be Printed. Mr. LoughRidge, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the - following as the VIEWS OF THE MINORITY. In the matter of the Memorial of Victoria C. Woodhull, referred by the House to the Committee on the Judiciary, the undersigned, members of the Committee, being unable to agree to the report of the committee, pre- sent the following as their views woon the suºject of the Memorial: The memorialist sets forth that she is a native born citizen of the United States, and a resident thereof; that she is of adult age, and has resided in the 8tate of New York for three years past; that by the Constitution of the United States she is guaranteed the right of suffrage; but that she is, by the laws of the State of New York, denied the exercise of that right; and that by the laws of different States and Territories the privilege ºf voting is denied to all the female citizens of the United States; and petitions for relief by the enactment of some law to enforce the provisions of the Constitution, by which such right is guaranteed. The question presented is one of exceeding interest and importance, involving as it does the constitutional rights not only of the memorialist but of more than one half of the citizens of the United States—a question of constitutional law in which the civil and natural rights of the citizen are involved. Questions of property or of expediency have nothing to do with it. The question is not “Would it be expedient to extend the right of suffrage to women,” but, “Have women citizens that right by the Constitution as it is.” A question of this kind should be met fairly and investigated in that generous and liberal spirit characteristic of the age, and decided upon principles of justice, of right, and of law. It is claimed by many that to concede to woman the right of suffrage would be an innovation upon the laws of nature, and upon the theory and practice of the world for ages in the past, and especially an innovation upon the common law of England, which was originally the law of this country, and which is the foundation of our legal fabric. If we were to admit the truth of this, it is yet no argument against the proposition, if the right claimed exists, and is established by the Constitution of the United States. The question is to be decided by the Constitution and the fundamental principles of our Govern- ment, and not by the usage and dogmas of the past. It is a gratifying fact that the world is advancing in political science, and gradually adopting more liberal and rational theories of government, The establishment of this Government upon the principles of the declaration of Inde- pendence was in itself a great innovation upon the theories and practice of the world, and opened a new chapter in the history of the human race, and its progress toward perfect civil and political liberty. - But it is not admitted that the universal usage of the past has been in opposition to the exercise of political power by women. The highest positions of civil power have from time to time been filled by women in all ages of the world, and the question of the right of woman to a voice in government is not a new one by any means, but has been agitated, and the light acknowledged and exercised, in governments far less free and liberal than ours. 100 In the Roman Republic, during its long and glorious career, women occupied a higher position, as to political rights and privileges, than in any other contemporaneous govern- ment. In England unmarried women have, by the laws of that country, always been com- petent to vote and to hold civil offices, if qualified in other respects; at least such is the weight of authority. In “Callis upon Sewers,” an old English work, will be found a discussion of the question as to the right of women to hold office in England. The learned and distinguished author uses the following language: -And for temporal governments. I have observed women to have from time to time been admitted to the highest places: for in ancient Roman histories I find Eudocia and Theodora admitted at several times into the sole government of the empire: and here in England our late famous Queen Elizabeth, whose government was most renowned; and Semiramisgoverned Syria; and the Queen of the South, which cane to visit Solomon, for anything that appears to the contrary, was a sole queen; and to fall a degree lower, we have precedents that king-izichard the First and King Henry the Fifth appointed by cºmmissions their mothers to be regents of this realm in their absence in France. But nºt I will descend a step lower; and doth not our law, temporal and spiritual, admit of women to be ºutrixes and administratrixes?. And thereby they have the rule or ordering of great e-tates and º times they are guardianesses in chivalry, and have hereby also the government of many ºutlººrs in the kingdom and of their own estates. - - - so ºthese cases it appeareth that the cºmmon law of this kingdom submitted manythings to their government; yet the statute of justices of the peace is like to Jethro’s counsel to Moses, for there they speak of men to be justices, and thereby seeneth to exclude women; but our statute of sewers is, “Commission of sewers shall be granted by the King to such person and persons as the lords should appoint.” So the word persons stands indifferently for either sex. I am of the opinion, for the authorities, reasons and causes *:::::::::: that this honorable countess being put into the commission ºf the sewers, the same is warrantable by the law; and the ordinances and decrees made by her and the other commissions of sewers are not to be impeached for that cause of her sex. As it is said by a recent writer: Even a present in England the idea of women holding official station is not so strange as in the United states. The Countess of Pembroke had the office of sheritrof Westmoreland and exercised it in person. At the assizes she sat with the judges on the hench. In a reported case it is stated by º and assented to by the court that a woman is capable of serving in almost all the offices of the kingdom. As to the right of women to vote by the common law of England, the authorities are clear. In the English Law Magazine for 1868–69, vol. 25, page 120, will be found re- orted the case ºf the application of JANE ALLEN, who claimed to be entered upon the ist of voters of the Parish of St. Giles, under the reform act of 1867, which act provides as follows: Every man shall, in and after the year 1868, be entitled to be registered as a voter, and when registered to vote for a member or members to serve in Parliament, who is qualified as follows: 1st. Is of full age and not subject to any legal incapacity, &c., &c. It was decided by the court that the claimant had the right to be registered and to vote; that by the English law, the term man, as used in that statute, included woman. In that case the common law of England upon that question was fully and ably reviewed, and we may be excused for quoting at some length: And as to what has been said of there being no such adjudged cases, I must say that it is per fectly clear that not perhaps in either of three cases reported by Mr. Shaan, but in those of Catharine vs. Surry, Coates vs. Lyle, and Holt-tº-Lyle, three cases of somewhat greater antiquity, the right of women freeholders was allowed by the courts. These three cases were decided by the judges in the reign of James I (A.D. 1812). Although nº printed report of them exists, I find that in the case of olive vs. Ingraham, they were repeatedly cited by the lord chief justice of the Kings. Bench in the course of four great arguments in that case, the case being reargued three times (7 Mod. 264), and the greatest respect was manifested by the whole court for those precedents. Their importance is all the greater when we consider what the matter was upon which King James' judges sitting in West- minster Hall had to decide. It was not simply the case of a mere occupier, inhabitant, or scotorio: voter. Therefore the question did not turn upon the purport of a special custom, or a charter, or a local act of Parliament...or even of the common right in this or that borough. But it was that very matter and question which has been mooted in the dictum of Lord Coke, the freeholder's franchise in the shire, and #". that the decision in each case expressly was, that a feme sole shall vote it she hath a freehold, and that if she be not a feme sole, but a femme covert having freehold, then her husband during her coverture shall votein her right. These, then, are so many express decisions which at once displace Lord Coke's unsupported assertion and declare the law so as to constrain my judgment. It is sometimes said, when reference is made to Pºº": of this kind, that they have never been approved by the bar. But that cannot be said of these. IIakewen, the contemporary of Lord Coke and one of the greatest of all parliamentary lawyers then living—for even Selden and Granvil were not greater than Hakewell-left behind him the manuscript to which I have referred, with his comments on those cases. Sir William Lee, chief justice, in his judgment in the case of Olive vs. Ingraham, ex- pressly says that he had persued them, and that they contained the expression of Hake- well's entire approval of the principles upon which they were decided, and of the results deduced: and we have the statement of Lord Chief Justice Lee, who had carefully ex- amined those cases, that in the case of Holt vs. Lyle, it was determined that a reme sole freeholder may claim a vote for Parliament men; but if married, her husband must vote for her. In the case of Olive vs. Ingraham, Justice Probyn, says: The case of Holt vs. Lyle, lately mentioned by out Lord Chief Justicº is a very strong case: “They who pay ought to choose whom they shall pay." And the Lord Chief Justice seemed tº have assented to that general proposition, as authority for the correlative proposition, that “women, when 101 sole, had a right to vote.” At all events, there is here the strongest possible evidence that in the reign of James I, the feme sole, being a freeholder of a country, or what is the same thing of a county, of a city, or town, or borough, where, of custom, freeholders had the right to vote, not only had, but exercised the parliamentary franchise. If married, she could not votein respect merely of her freehold, not because of the incapacities of coverture, but for this simple reason, that, by the act of marriage, which is an actoflaw, the title of the ſeme sole freeholder becomes wested for life in the husband. The qualification to vote was not personal, but real; Consequently, her right to vote became suspended as soon and for as long as she was married. I am found to consider that the question as to what weight is due to the dictum of my Lord Coke is entirely disposed of by those cases from the reign of James I and George II, and that the authority of the latter is unimpeached by any later authority, as the cases of Rex, vs. Stubles, and Regina vs. Aberavon, abundantly show. In Austey's Notes on the New Reform Act of 1867, the authorities and nººdents upon the right of women to vote in England are examined and summed up, and the author concludes: It is submitted that the weight of authority is very greatly in favor of the female right of snr. frage. Indeed, the authority against it is contained in the short and hasty dictiºn of Lord Coke. refered to above... It was set down by him in his last and least authoritive institute, and it is certain that he has been followed neither by the great lawyers of his time nor by the ju ture. The princi- les of the law in relation to the suffrage of females will be found in Cºates vs. Lyºffalº Tºra- am, and The King vs. Stubles, cases decided under the strict rules for the construction of statutes. It cannot be questioned that from time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, unmarried women have been by the laws of England competent voters, sub- ject to the freehold qualification which applied alike to men and women. Married women could not vote because they were not freeholders; by the common law their property upon marriage became vested in the husband. - So that it appears that the admission of woman to participation in the affairs of government would not be so much of an innovation upon the theories and usage of the pastasis by some supposed. In England the theory was that in property representation, all property should be rep- resented. Here the theory is that of H. representation, which of course, if carried out fully, includes the representation of all property. In England, as we have seen, the owner of the property, whether male or female was entitled to representation, no distinction being made on account of sex. If the doctrine contended for by the majority of the committee be correct, then this Government is less liberal upon this question than the gºvernment of England has been for hundreds of years, for there is in this country a large class of citizens ºf adult age, and owners in their own right of large amounts of property, and who pay a large proportion of the taxes to support the Government, who are denied any representa- tion whatever, either for themselves or their property—unmarried women, of whom it can- not be said that their interests are represented by their husbands. In their case, neither the English nor the American theory of representation is carried out, and this utter denial of representation is justified upon the ground alone that this class of citizens are women. Surely we cannot be so much less liberal than our English ancestors! Surely the Constitution of this Republic does not sanction an injustice so indefensible as that By the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, what consti- tutes citizenship of the United States, is for the first time declared, and who are included by the term citizen. Upon this question, before that time, there had been much discussion judicial, political and general, and no distinct and definite definition of qualification had been settled. - - The people of the United States determined this question by the fourteenth amend- ment to the Constitution, which declares that- All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive º person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. . This amendment, after declaring who are citizens of the United States, and thus fixing but one grade of citizenship, which insures to all citizens alike all the privileges, immunities and rights which accrue tº that condition, goes on in the same section and pro- hibits these privileges and immunities from abridgment by the States. Whatever these * rivileges and immunities” are, they attach to the female citizen equally with the male. It is implied by this amendment that they are inherent, that they belong to citizenship as such, for they are not therein specified or enumerated. The majority of the committee hold that the privileges guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment do not refer to any other than the privileges embraced in section 2, of article 4, of the original text. - - The committee certainly did not duly consider this unjustified statement. - Section 2, of article 4, provides for the privileges of “citizens of the States,” while the first section of the fourteenth amendment protects the privileges of “citizens of the United States.” The terms citizens of the States and citizens of the United States are by no means convertible. 102 A circuit court of the United States seems to hold a different view of this question from that stated by the committee. - In the case of The Live Stock Association vs. Crescent City (1st Abbott, 396), Justice Bradley, of the Supreme Court of the United States, delivering the opinion, uses the following language in relation to the 1st clause of the 14th amendment: The new prohibition that “no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” is not identical with the clause in the Con- stitution which declared that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” It embraces much more. It is possible that those who framed the article were not themselves aware of the far-reaching character of its terms, yet if the amendment does in fact bear a broader meaning, and does extend its protecting shield over those who were never, thought of when it was conceived and put in form, and does reach social evils which were never before prohibited by constitutional enactment, it is to be presumed that the American people, in giving it their imprimatur, understood what they were doing and meant to decree what in fact they have decreed. The “privileges and immunities” secured by the ºriginal Constitution were only such as each state gave to its own citizens, - - - - but the fourteenth amendment pro- hibits any state from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of ºne United States, whether its own citizens or any others. It not merely requires equality of privileges, but it demands that the privileges and immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged and unimpaired. In the same opinion, after enumerating some of the “privileges” of the citizens, such as were pertinent to the case on trial, but declining to enumerate all, the court further says: - - These privileges cannot be invaded without sapping the very foundation of republican govern- ment. A republican government is not merely a government of the people, but it is a free govern- ment. - - - - It was very ably contended on the part of the defendants that the fourteenth amendment was intended only to secure to all citizens equal capacities before the law. That was at first our view of it... But it does not so read. The language is, “No State shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." whº are the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States? Are they capacities merely? Are they lot also rights? -- The court in this seems to intimate very strongly that the amendment was intended to secure the natural rights of citizens, as well as their equal capacities before the law. In a case in the supreme court of Georgia, in 1869, the question was before the court whether a negro was competent to hold office in the State of Georgia. The case was ably argued on both sides, Mr. Akerman, the present Attorney-General of the United States, being of counsel for the petitioner. Although the point was made and argued fully, that the right to vote and hold office were both included in the privileges and immunities of citizens, and were thus guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, yet that noint was not directly passed upon by the court, the court holding that under the laws and constitution of Georgia the negro citizen had the right claimed. In delivering the opinion, Chief Justice Drown said: - It is necessary to the decision of this case to inquire what are the “privileges and immunities” of a citizen, which are guaranteed oy the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Whatever they may be they are proºted againstallabridgement by legislatiºn - - Whether the “privileges and immunities" of the citizen embrace political rights, including the right to hold office, I need not now inquire. If they do, that right is guaranteed alike by the cºnstitution of the United states and of Georgia, and is beyond the control of the legislature. In the opinion of Justice McKay, among other propositions, he lays down the following. 2d. The rights of the people of this State, white and black, are not granted to them by the constitution thereof; the object and effect of that instrument is not to give, but to restrain, deny, regulate and guarantee º and all persons recognized by that constitution us citizens ºf the State have equal, legal and political rights, except as otherwise expressly declared. 3d. It is the settled and uniform sense of the word." citizen”, when used in reference to the citizens of the separate States of the United States, and to their lights as such citizens, that it describes a person entitled to every º legal and political, enjoyed by any person in that State, unless there be some express exceptions made by positive law covering the particular persons, whose rights are in question. - In the course of the argument of this case, Mr. Akerman used the following language upon the point, as to whether citizenship carried with it the right to hold ºffice: “It may be profitable to inquire how the term (citizen) has been understood in Geor- gia. " - - It will be seen that men whom Geºrgians have been accustomed to revere believed that citizenship in Georgia carried with it the right to hºld office in the absence of positive restrictions.”. - - - The majority of the committee having started out with the errºneºus hypothesis that the term “privileges of citizens of the United States,” as used in the fourteenth amend- ment, means no more than the term “privileges of citizens,” as used in section 2 of article 4, discuss the question thus. º “The right of suffrage was notincluded in the privileges of citizens as used in section 2, article 4, therefore that right is not included in the privileges of citizens of the United States, as used in the fourteenth amendment.” - - Their premise being erroneous their whole argument fails. But if they were correct _º 103 in their premise, we yet claim that their second pºsition is not sustained by the authorities, and is shown to be fallacious by a consideration of the principles ºf free gºvernment. . we claim that from the very nature of our government, the right of suffrage is a fundamental right of citizenship, not only included in the term “privilegºs of citizens of the United States,” as used in the fourteenth amendment, but also included in the term as used in section 2 of article 4, and in this we claim we are sustained both by the authorities and by reason. In Abbott vs. Bayley, (6 Pick, 92,) the supreme court of Massachusetts says: “The privileges and immunities” secured to the people of each State, in every other State, can be applied only to the case of a removal from ºne State into another. By such removal they become citizens ºf the adopted State without naturalization and have a right to sue and be sued as citizens; and yet this privilege is qualified and not absolute, for they cannot enjoy the right of suſ: frage or eligibility to office without such term of residence as shall be prescribed by the constitution º laws of the state into which they shall remove. This case fully recognizes the right of suffrage as one of the..º. of the ciizen,” subject to the right of the state to regulate as to the term of residence—the same principle was laid down in Corfield rs. Correll. - - - In the case of Corfield vs. Correllin the Supreme Court ºf the United States, Justice Washington, in delivering the opinion of the court, used the following language. * The privilege and immunities conceded by the Constitution of the United States to citizens in the several States,” are to be confined to those which are in their nature fundamental, and belong of right to the citizens of all free governments. Snºhºre the rights of prºtection of life and liberty, and tº acquire and enjoy property, and to pay no higher impositions than other citizens, and to pass through or reside in the State at pleasure, and to sº the elective franchise as regulated and estab- ºf by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. And this is cited approvingly by Chancellor Kent. (2Kent, see.72.) This case is cited by the majority of the committee, as sustaining their view of the law, but we are unable so to understand it. It is for them an exceedingly unfortunate citation. - - - - - - - In that case the court enumerated some of the “privileges of citizens,” such as are “in their nature fundamental and belong of right to the citizens ºf all free governments,” (mark the language), and among those rights, place the “right of the elective tranchise” in the same category with those great rights of life, liberty and property, Andyet the com- uittee cite this case to show that this right is not a fundamental right of the citizen! But it is added by the court that the right of the elective franchise, “is to be enjoyed as regulated and established by the State in which it is to be exercised.” These words are supposed to qualify the right, or rather take it out of the list of fun- damental rights, where the court had just placed it. The court is made tº say by this attempt in the same sentence, “the elective franchise is a fundamental right of the citizen, and it is not a fundamental right.” It is a “fundamental right,” provideº the State sees fit to grant the right. It is a “fundamental right of the citizen,” but it does not exist, unless the laws of the State give it. A singular species of “fundamental rights!" Is there not a clear distinction between the regulation of a right and its destruction? The State ulay regulate the right, but it may not destroyit. - What is the meaning of “regulate” and “establish?" Webster says:-Regulate— to put in good order. Establish—to make stable or firm. - - - is decision thenis, that “the elective franchise is a fundamental right of the citi- zen of all free governments, to be enjoyed by the citizen, under such laws as the State may enact to regulate the right and make it stable or firm.” Chancellor Kent in the section referred to, in giving the substance of this opinion, leaves out the word establism, regarding the word regulate as sufficiently giving the meaning of the court. This case is, in our opinion, a very strong one against the theory of the majority of the committee. - rº. committee cite the language of Mr. Webster, as counsel in United States vs. unrose. We indorse every word in that extract. We do not elaim that a citizen of Pennsyl- vania can go º and vote in Virginia, being a citizen of Pennsylvania. No person has ever contended for such an absurdity. We claim that when the citizen of the United States becomes a citizen of Virginia, that the State of Virginia has neither right nor power to abridge the privileges of such citizen by denying him entirely the right of suffrage, and thus all political rights. The authorities cited by the majority of the committee do not seem to meet the case—certainly do not sustain their theory. The case of Cooperts. The Mayor of Savannah, (4 Geo. 72) involved the question whether a free negro was a citizen of the United States? The court, in the opinior Bays: Freepersons of color have never been recognized as citizens of Georgia: they are not entitled to bear arms, vote for members of the legislature, or hold any civil onice; tuey have no poli ical rights, but have personal rights, one of whicu is personal liverty. - - 104 That they could not vote, hold office, &c., was held evidence that they were not re- garded as citizens. In the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Scott ºs. Sanford, (19 Howard, p. 476,) Mr. Justice Daniel, in delivering his opinion, used the following language as to the rights and qualities of citizenship: For who it may be asked is a citizen? What do the character and status of citizens import? Without fear of contradiction, it does not import the condition of being private property, the sub- ject of individual power and ownership. Upon a principle of etymology alone, the term citizen, as derived from cintos, conveys the idea of connection or identification with the state or govern- ment, and a participation in its functions. But beyond this there is not, it is believed, to be found, in the theories of writers on government, or in any actual experiment heretofore tried, an exposition of the term citizen which has not been understood as conferring the actual posse sign and enjºyment, or the perſect right of acquisition and enjoyment, of an ºn ire equality of priv- lºgºs, civil and political. And in the same case chief Justice Taney said: “The words “people of the United States' and ‘citizens' are synonymous terms, and *n the same thing: they both de- scribe the political body, who, according to our republican institutions, form the sove- reignty, and who hold the power, and conduct the Government through their repre- sentatives. They are what we familiarly call the sovereign people, and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty." (19. Howard, 404.) In an important case in the Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Justice Jay, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “At the Revolution the sovereignty de- volved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects, (unless the African slaves may be so called.) and have none to govern but themselves. The citizens of America are equal as fellow-citizens, and joint tenants of the sovereignty." (Chishol vs. Georgia, 2 Dallas, 470.) In Conner vs. Elliott, (18 Howard.) Justice Curtis, in declining to give an enumera- tion of all the “privileges" of the citizen, said “According to the express words and clear meaning of the clause, no privileges are secured except those that belong to citi- zenship." The Supreme Court said, in Corfield vs. Coryell, that the elective franchise is such privilege; therefore, according to Justice Curtis, it belongs to citizenship. In a case in the Supreme Court of Kentucky, (1 Dittell's Ky. Reports, p. 333,) the court say: No one can, therefore, in the correct sense of the term be a citizen of a state who is not entitled upon the terms prescribed by the institutions ºf the State to all the rights and privileges conferred by these institutions upon the Liguest class of society. Mr. Wirt, when Attorney General of the United States, in an official opinion to be found on p. 508, 1st volume Opinions of Attorney Generals, came to the conclusion that the negroes were not citizens of the United States, for the reason that they had very few of the “privileges" of citizens, and among the “privileges of citizens" of which they were deprived, that they could not vote at any election. Webster defines a citizen to be a person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of voting for public officers, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people. Worcester defines the word thus: “An inhabitant of a republic who enjoys the rights of a citizen or freeman, and who has a right to vote for public officers as a citizen of of the United States." Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, defines the term citizen thus: “One who, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, has a right to vote for Representatives in Congress and other public officers, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people.". Aristotle defines a “citizen” to be one who is a partner in the legislative and judicial power, and who shares in the honors of the state." (Aristotle do Repub, lib. 3, cap. 5, D. *. essential properties of Athenian citizenship consisted in the sharo possessed by every citizen in the legislature, in the election of magistrates and in tuo courts of justice. (See Smith's Dictionary of Greek Antiquities, p. 289.) the possession of the jus suffragii, at least, if not also of the jus honorum, is the principle which governs at this day in defining citizenship in the countries deriving their jurisprudence from the civil law. (Wheaton's International Law, p. 802.) The Dutch publicist, Thorbecke, says: what constitutes the distinctive charactºr of our epoch is the development of the right of citi- zenship. In its most extended, as well as is most restric-ed seuse, it includes a great many prop- *: right of citizenship is the right of voting in the government of the local, provincial or na- tional community of which one is a member. In this last sense the right or cºizenship signities a participation in the right of voting, in the general government, as mueauber of the State. (Rev. & Fr. Etr., tom. v. p. 383.) - - In a recent work of some research, written in opposition to female suffrage, the