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63D CONGRESS
2d Session
GENER
IF
1071
MAY 11 1914
H67
}
SENATE
{
DOCUMENT
No. 359
7/2
EFFECTIVE VOTING
AN ARTICLE
ON
PREFERENTIAL VOTING AND
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
BY
C. G. HOAG
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN
PROPORTIONAL REPRESEN-
TATION LEAGUE
PRESENTED BY MR. OWEN
JANUARY 13, 1914.-Ordered to be printed
WASHINGTON
1914

OF AMERICA
#
09 TINITED ST
GOVERNMENT
RINTING OFFICE
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
PREFERENTIAL VOTING AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
INTRODUCTION.
Voting is the very basis of our governments, Federal, State, and
municipal. If, therefore, the voting systems generally used through-
out the country hitherto can be shown to be gravely defective and
to be easily replaceable by correct systems, we have at once the
explanation of some of the worst political evils from which we suffer
and the key to political reform that is truly fundamental.
PRIMARIES, PARTY NAMES, AND THE ADEQUATE BALLOT.
The demand for primary elections is due entirely to two features of
our final elections as usually conducted hitherto. The first of these
features is allowing party names on the official ballots. The second.
is restricting the voter to the expression on the ballot of so small a
part of his will that a preliminary election is serviceable in cutting out
the weaker candidates of any party or group before the final election.
If all party names and emblems were kept off the ballot, primaries
would not be needed to determine whether, for example, a Taft or a
Roosevelt had the better right to use the name Republican on the
official ballot; both could be admitted to the ballot, unassociated
with any party name, and the struggle between them could be settled
on its merits by the voters at the clection itself. And if every voter
were allowed to express his will on the ballot at the election itself
fully instead of limitedly, adequately instead of inadequately, pri-
maries would not be needed to cut down the number of candidates
before the final election.
The only adequate ballot, of course, is what is usually called the
"preferential" ballot, that is, the ballot that permits the voter to
express his will so fully that it can be made effective by the counting
officials no matter what circumstances of grouping may be found to
have arisen among the voters. If, when you sent a boy to the news-
stand for a paper, you were restricted to naming only one, you might
have to go without any whenever the boy found, on reaching the
stand, that the particular paper named was sold out. If, however,
you could name several papers in the order of your preference, you
could be almost sure of getting one, and that the one you liked best
among those it was possible to get. The boy in this case, of course,
takes the place of the chief election officials in the case of an election;
and the restriction to the naming of but one paper takes the place of
a similar restriction on the inadequate ballot we have been satisfied
with hitherto.
the inadorants
317176
3
4
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
Such a ballot is a weak and unstable basis for democracy to rest
upon. Consider the last (1913) State election in Massachusetts.
Mr. Walsh, who was elected governor-
received¹ only 183,267 votes, or less than 40 per cent of the total vote; and it may
well have been that nearly all of the other 60 per cent preferred any one of the other
candidates to Mr. Walsh. In three of the last four Boston city elections the same can be
said of the successful candidate for mayor. In the autumn of 1909 a mayor of Salem,
Mass., was elected by 24 per cent of the voters, and in the opinion of a prominent
Salem lawyer each and every one of the five unsuccessful candidates was, by a strong
majority, preferred to the winner. The splitting of the vote which causes this injus-
tice is frequently brought about by design.
Another defect of the inadequate or non-preferential ballot is the discouragement
which the prospect of a split vote offers to candidacy. A strong and good man thinks
of running. A weaker man who has some following, perhaps very small, enters the
lists against another candidate not desired by the supporters of either of the two first
mentioned. The strong man refuses to run unless the weaker man mentioned will
withdraw. The latter refuses to withdraw, and thus uses the danger of splitting the
vote as an effective ladder to self-advancement. This often occurs without reaching
public knowledge.
Another defect is the frequent necessity voters are under of voting, not for the can-
didate they prefer but for the one who, in their judgment, is more available. In
the next to last Boston mayoralty election many thousands who really desired to re-
elect Mayor Hibbard did not vote for him.
Another defect is the discouragement to voting and registering that is brought about
through the citizen's knowledge that the man really desired by him is not a candi-
date, or his belief that, though a candidate, he cannot be elected. The knowledge
or the feeling that something is wrong with the system, combined, perhaps, with the
other demands upon his time, keeps him from registering or from voting. In mayor-
alty elections in large cities the actual vote cast probably does not average more than
70 per cent of the registered voters or 60 per cent of those qualified to register.
It is clear, therefore, that our usual plurality system, first, may not elect the candi-
date desired by a majority of those who vote; secondly, may discourage desirable
candidacy; thirdly, may induce voters to express other than their real opinions; and
fourthly, discourages many from registering and voting.
In connection with all our voting, then, the ballots should be ade-
quate or preferential ballots; nominations should be made by peti-
tion; party names and emblems should be excluded from the ballot;
party conventions, though freely permitted, should not be officially
supervised or recognized; and primary elections should be discon-
tinued.
We have now to consider-
THE TWO OBJECTS OF VOTING.
There are two distinct objects to be carried out by voting. Not
only has neither of these objects been carried out by the voting sys-
tems we have generally used hitherto with even an approximation
to correctness, but the distinction itself has not been clearly under-
stood.
One of the objects to be carried out by voting is to make decisions,
either between policies (measures) or between candidates for admin-
istrative positions. To carry out this object what is obviously
required by the fundamental principles of democracy is majority
voting, that is, a system that will range the majority of the voters.
concerned against the minority.
The other object to be carried out by voting is to make up a body
fit to make decisions subject to the operation of the initiative and
the referendum where they are in force-on behalf of all the voters, in
1 The quotations in this paper not otherwise credited are by William Hoag, Esq., of Boston, a former
secretary of the American Proportional Representation League.
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
5
other words, to make up a deliberative or representative body. Now,
though the principles of democracy require that the decisions made in
such a body should be made by majority voting, they by no means
require that the body itself should be made up by majority voting.
In making up such a body, indeed-as has been recognized universally,
though until recently only very confusedly-each member's right
to a seat should rest on his being the choice not of a majority of all
the voters represented by the body but merely of such part of them
as we call a constituency." In other words, what is wanted, when
the object in view is the making up of a representative body, is
simply a condensing system.
This distinction between the two objects of voting is the prime
secret of fundamental electoral reform, transcending in importance
even the adoption for all voting of the preferential or adequate ballot.
It reveals to us in what cases rational reform means replacing our
present plurality system by a majority system without primaries
and in what cases it means replacing our present plurality-and-primary
system, as applied to the election of representatives by wards or
other geographical constituencies, not by a majority-of-a-geograph-
ical-constituency system but by a unanimous-constituency, con-
densing, or "proportional" system.
Plurality-and-primary voting should be replaced by majority
preferential voting without primaries wherever, as I have said, a
decision is to be made. That means wherever measures are voted
on in deliberative bodies, wherever measures are voted on directly
at the polls, and wherever administrative officials are selected or
removed by deliberative bodies or are elected or recalled at the
polls.¹
爷
​Wherever, however, the object of an election is to make up a body
fit to make decisions and choose adminstrative officials on behalf
of all, our present system should be replaced, as explained in Part II,
by a rational unanimous-constituency or condensing system, in
which a form of adequate or preferential ballot is used but in which
not only primaries and pluralities but even majorities have no place
whatever.
PART I.
MAJORITY PREFERENTIAL VOTING (COMMONLY CALLED "PREF-
ERENTIAL VOTING.")
Ballots that allow the voter to express his will adequately with a
view to revealing how the majority is ranged against the minority
have usually been called simply "preferential ballots," and the
systems of applying them simply "preferential voting" systems.
Those names, however, must be somewhat restricted if they are not
to be ambiguous, for, as has been said above, the adequate or prefer-
ential ballot can and should be used not only to reveal the will of a
majority, but to carry out the other object of voting, namely to
elect a representative body by a process of condensation through the
formation of unanimous constituencies.) It is best, therefore, when
we mean to refer to the adequate ballot as applied only to revealing
the will of the majority, to add to the words "preferential ballot
¹ But see passages in Part II, where it is suggested that such officials should not be elected a. the polls
at all.
6
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
་
and “preferential voting" the word majority, so that the names be-
come majority preferential ballot and majority preferential voting.
In one form or another majority preferential voting is in use for
final elections in Queensland, Western Australia, Grand Junction,
Colo., Spokane, Denver, Cleveland, and elsewhere, and for primary
elections in Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, and elsewhere.
Unfortunately these systems are applied in the places mentioned
not only to the election of administrative officials, where majority¹
voting is desirable, but to the election of representative bodies, where
majority voting, as I have said and as I hope to make quite clear in
Part II, is utterly out of place.
We may now consider the methods by which majority preferential
voting is carried out in these places, and that by which it ought to
be carried out.
THE WARE SYSTEM.
Under this system, which was first proposed for actual use by
Prof. W. R. Ware, of Harvard University, the voter is allowed to
indicate his preferences among the candidates as many or as few
as he pleases by putting the figure 1 opposite the name of his first
choice, the figure 2 opposite the name of his second choice, and so on.
The first count is only of the first-choice votes. If no candidate has a majority, the
lowest candidate is excluded and his votes only are scrutinized again and added to the
votes of the other candidates as the preferences indicate. The candidates are thus
successively excluded until only two are left, of whom the higher will have a majority
vote [as between the two left], and be elected.
This system, which in Great Britain is called the "alternative
vote," is known in Western Australia, where it is used in its com-
plete form, and in Queensland, where it is used in truncated form, as
the "preferential vote." That it is preferable to the "second bal-
lot" used in Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Norway,
and other European countries, is generally conceded by those who
compare the two. It does at a single election more than the second
ballot system does in two, and does it better. That it is preferable
to the primary and plurality system still common in this country,
goes without saying. It is not, however, a perfect majority system.
For, like the second ballot system, on which it is so obviously an im-
provement, and like our own double election system, on which it is a
still greater improvement, it may drop out at some stage of the
whole process of election a candidate who is really preferred by a
clear majority to any other candidate in the field taken singly.
The preferential voting system used in the primary elections of
Wisconsin and Minnesota is the Ware system modified (1) by the
restriction of the voter to the expression of but two preferences for
any office, (2) by provision for a first-choice and a second-choice col-
umn, instead of the numerals 1 and 2, for the indication of prefer-
ences, and (3) by the adaptation of the rules for counting the votes to
the provision that a voter may express only two preferences. This
1 Note that I do not say here majority voting at the polls, but simply "majority voting," the faster we
move toward having all the chief administrative officials in populous communities elected, or rather se-
lected, by majority vote of the representative body, instead of at the polls, the sooner we shall have the
highest efficiency in the administration of public affairs; but, wherever the election of such officials is
carried out, it should be carried out by majority voting.
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
7
modified Ware system-the Remsen system, as it should be called-
was devised by Daniel S. Remsen, Esq., of New York City, with
the twofold intention of making possible the completion of the
count without bringing all the ballots or a full transcript record of
them together from the voting precincts, as must be done under the
complete Ware system, and of simplifying the marking of the ballot
by the voter himself. The elimination of the necessity of bringing
together either ballots or a full transcript record of the preferences
marked on each is a matter of some practical importance at the
present time when the voters of this country generally do not
realize their need of effective voting keenly enough to be willing to
go to much bother or expense to get it. That the Remsen system
appreciably simplifies the voting itself, however, I question. Cer-
tainly high officials in Tasmania, Western Australia, and elsewhere
say flatly that the indication of preferences by the figures 1, 2,
3, etc., is found to be easy by the voters of those countries. For
example, Mr. E. J. Stenberg, chief electoral officer of Western Aus-
tralia, wrote on this point as follows in his official report on the
election of 1908, the first one held there under the preferential
system:
Speaking generally in regard to the novel method of voting, it would seem that
the fears expressed as to the likelihood of a much increased "informal vote list''
[i. e., an increased number of invalid ballots] have not been borne out by experience
(the percentage being 1.22 only), although the new system appears to have been
better understood in some districts than in others.
THE BUCKLIN SYSTEM.
The majority preferential system used in Grand Junction (Colo.),
Spokane, Denver, Portland (Oreg.), Cleveland, and North Dakota,
was proposed by Condorcet in 1793 as a system which, though
incorrect, was the best he could think of in which the counting
would be easy. It is said to have been used for a time in Geneva,
Switzerland. In recent times, however, it first came into promi-
nence on its adoption in 1909 by Grand Junction, Colo., under the
leadership of the Hon. James W. Bucklin of that city.
Aside from certain unessential features of this system as thus far
actually applied in America, which are discussed below, it differs
from the Ware only in the rules of the count. The Ware rules
prescribe if there is no majority of first choices-the dropping out
of the candidate lowest on the poll and the distribution of his ballots
only according to the second or the next highest available preference
marked on them, then the dropping of the next lowest candidate in
the same way, and so on until one candidate has a majority of the
votes behind him. The Bucklin rules, on the other hand, prescribe-
if there is no majority of first choices-the adding together of the
first-choice and the second-choice votes for each candidate to see
whether any candidate has a majority, counting both; next, if no
candidate has such a majority, it prescribes the adding together of
the first-choice, second-choice, and third-choice votes for each can-
didate to see whether any candidate has a majority, counting the
three grades of votes together; and so on until some candidate has
behind him a majority, counting all the grades of votes thus far
taken into account, when that candidate is declared elected.
Um
8
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
THE NANSON SYSTEM.
A majority preferential system that differs from the Ware and the
Bucklin essentially only in the rules of the count was devised by
Prof. E. J. Nanson of the University of Melbourne, Australia, and
described by him in a paper read before the Royal Society of Victoria
in 1882 and reprinted in the Blue Book of the British Government
designated "Miscellaneous No. 3, 1907." Under this system a first
choice is given more credit than a second throughout the entire
count, a second more than a third, and so forth. Then, in accord-
ance with simple rules formulated by Prof. Nanson on the basis of a
complete mathematical solution of the problem, those candidates
whose total credits show them to be unquestionably inferior to other
candidates in the opinion of the voters as indicated on the ballots
are successively dropped out as defeated until the candidate pre-
ferred to any other is left and declared elected. Following are com-
plete rules suitable for incorporation in legislation. The notes not
printed in italics are not a part of the rules themselves.
NANSON SYSTEM RULES.
1. At the voting precincts transcribe on coordinate paper (ruled to
correspond with the spacing of the names of the candidates on the ballot)
the figures marked on the ballots by the voters, using a separate column
for each ballot and numbering both ballot and column with a distinctive
number in order to be able at any time to compare the original ballot
with its record. Send the record to the central electoral board, as ordered
by that board.
2. On the record, but not on the ballots, let the central electoral board
fill in all blank spaces with a figure found by dividing by two the sum
of the number of candidates and a number one higher than that indi-
cating the last preference marked on the ballot by the voter. [See p. 14.]
[This is merely finishing the voter's work by giving each unmarked
candidate the average to which all unmarked candidates are entitled.
It insures the counting of the ballot in the subsequent addition to
the disadvantage, and to the equal disadvantage, of the unmarked
candidates, just as the voter intended. Example: If there were
seven candidates, the blank spaces on ballots showing only three
preferences would all be filled in with the number 51; those on bal-
lots showing four preferences, with the number 6; etc.]
3. Add the figures of each candidate.
4. Exclude as defeated every candidate whose total is equal to or more
than the average. [This is reasonable because the voter used larger
figures to represent lower preferences.]
5. If more than two candidates remain, set down on record sheets fig-
ures representing the preferences on all the ballots as among the candi-
dates remaining. Add again, and again eliminate`all candidates whose
total is equal to or more than the average.
6. Proceed again, if necessary, as prescribed in rule 5, until only two
candidates remain. When only two remain, examine the record to see
record_to_see
which of those two was preferred to the other by the voters, and declare
him elected.
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
9
7. If only one candidate remains after an elimination of candidates,
declare him elected.
NOTE. The reader who wants to read only the most important parts of this
paper will do well to skip everything between this point and the last paragraph of
Part I (p. 16), except the section entitled "The Condorcet Test Applied to the
Three Systems" (p. 13).
COMPARISON OF THE THREE SYSTEMS OF COUNTING MAJORITY PREF-
ERENTIAL BALLOTS.
Each of the three systems of majority preferential voting_just
described has its enthusiastic supporters in this country, and I am
inclined to think that for a time each of them may have a place in
the broad and varied field of our political life; but it is unnecessary
that any blind struggle for supremacy should arise among them, for
there can be no question in regard to the true nature of each in the
mind of anybody who is willing to look at the facts and to give the
matter a little thought.
The Ware rules tend, just as does our present system of double
elections, to bring the votes of persons belonging to the same party or
group together in support of some one candidate of that party or
group by the sacrifice of its other candidates. If, therefore, what
is wanted is a majority voting system that will encourage group
solidarity, this system has much to be said for it. The ultimate cri-
terion of the correctness of a majority system of voting, however,
would seem to be that clearly defined by Condorcet in 1785 in a pas-
sage translated as follows:
There exists but one rigorous method of ascertaining the wish of a majority in an
election. It consists in taking a vote on the respective merits of all the candidates
compared two by two. This can be deduced from the lists upon which each elector
has written their names in order of merit.
But this method is very long.¹
H *
Judged by this test, the Warc method (as also the Bucklin) is
defective, for it may drop out a candidate preferred by a majority of
the voters to any other one of the candidates taken singly. The
truth of this is proved below (p. 14) in connection with 15 actual
ballots. It can also be seen from a still simpler example. Suppose
that in an election to elect one person from three candidates, Smith,
Brown, and Jones, 5,000 of the voters record first choices for Smith,
4,000 first choices for Brown, and 3,000 first choices for Jones. Then,
according to the Ware rules, Jones is declared out of the running, and
his ballots distributed according to second choices. Let us suppose
that, as set forth in the result table below, 400 of the distributed votes
go to Smith and 2,600 of them to Brown, and that Brown is therefore
declared elected with 6,600 votes (his original 4,000 plus the 2,600
received on the distribution of Jones's ballots). In that case the
result is wrong if, as we may suppose for the sake of revealing the
fallibility of the system, Jones is preferred to Brown by a sufficient
number, say 4,000, of those whose first choice was Smith. For in
that case no less than 7,000 of the voters (the 3,000 who gave first
choice to Jones plus the 4,000 who gave first to Smith and second to
Jones) have clearly expressed on the ballots their preference of Jones,
1 Oeuvres de Condorcet, vol. XV, pp. 28, 29, edition of 1801.-It is precisely the comparison "two by
two," said by Condorcet to be the ultimate test, though "very long," that the ingenious Nausɔn rules
accomplish quickly.
S. Doc. 359, 63—2——2
10
EFFECTIVE VOTING,
the candidate dropped out by the Ware rules, to Brown. The 6,600
votes by which in this case Brown was declared to be elected, though
a majority, were made up, it is to be borne in mind, of 4,000 voters
who indicated on their ballots that they preferred Brown to either
of the other candidates and of 2,600 voters who indicated not that
they preferred Brown to Jones, but only that they preferred Brown
to Smith. It is doubtless true that the probabilities are against the
elimination thus under the Ware rules of the candidate who, accord-
ing to the record on the ballots, could command a clear majority of
the votes against any other candidate taken singly; and the system
is by no means to be condemned for political uses where a perfect
majority preferential system cannot yet be adopted; but that it is
not infallible in giving the result demanded by the criterion of
Condorcet must be admitted.

First choice.
Smith.....
5,000
Brown.
Jones
Second choice.
500 on ballots marked for Brown as first choice.
400 on ballots marked for Jones as first choice.
4,000 1,000 on ballots marked for Smith as first choice.
2,600 on ballots marked for Jones as first choice.
3,000 4,000 on ballots marked for Smith as first choice.
3,500 on ballots marked for Brown as first choice.
The essential principle of the Bucklin system can be understood
from a brief analysis of the counting under this system of the same
12,000 ballots we have just considered in connection with the Ware
rules. Those ballots would be tabulated for the Bucklin count as
follows:

First choices. Second choices.
Smith.
5,000
900
Brown....
4,000
3,600
Jones.
3,000
7,500
With the votes cast thus an election board canvassing the returns
under the Bucklin rules would proceed, on finding that no candidate
had a majority of first choices, to add firsts and seconds together.
And on finding that both Brown and Jones had behind them a ma-
jority, counting the votes of these two grades, the board would
declare elected that one of them who had most, namely Jones.
Now, what is the principle on which Jones is thus declared elected
under the Bucklin rules? In other words, what is the nature of that
majority which the Bucklin count gets together behind the candidate
whom it elects?
To answer the question in connection with our example, the ma-
jority of 10,500 votes that elects Jones under the Bucklin rules is
undoubtedly composed of 10,500 different persons, the system clearly
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
11
preventing the counting into such a total of two choices voted by any
one voter; but it is composed of voters of three groups, (1) those who
gave their first choice to Jones, (2) those who gave their first to Smith
and their second to Jones, and (3) those who gave their first to Brown.
and their second to Jones; and these groups are united only in this
one respect, that they consider Jones to be one of the two best candi-
dates for the office to be filled. The principle of the Bucklin system,
then, is that if no candidate is considered by a majority better than
the field, the election goes to that candidate, if any, who is consid-
ered by a majority-or by the larger majority, in case there is more
than one-to be one of the two best in the field; that if no candidate is
considered by a majority one of the two best, the election goes to
that candidate, if any, who is considered by a majority-or by the
largest majority if there is more than onc-one of the three best in
the field; etc.
This principle that underlies the Bucklin rules is not an altogether
unreasonable one; but it is certainly not the correct one, for it
frequently elects a candidate other than the one who should be elected
according to the sound criterion of Condorcet. Suppose the 3,500
voters who gave Brown their first choice and Jones their second,
though they all greatly preferred Jones to Smith, had not recorded
any second choice. Then the result of the second count would have
been, Smith 5,900, Brown 7,600, Jones 7,000; and in that case Brown
instead of Jones would have been declared clected, under the Bucklin
rules, in spite of the fact that, according to the record on the ballots,
7,000 of the voters (namely, the 3,000 who gave their first choice to
Jones and the 4,000 of Smith's supporters who gave their second
choice to Jones) clearly preferred Jones to Brown.
It may be argued that the failure of the Bucklin rules in this case
is due to the fact that Brown's supporters did not record on the ballots
their real will. The reply to that is twofold. In the first place, the
Bucklin rules do not in this case elect the candidate clearly pre-
ferred by a majority of voters, to any other in the field taken singly,
according to the ballots as cast; and perfect rules of counting would do
just that every time. In the second place it was nothing but the
rules of the count that led Brown's supporters not to record their real
will fully on the ballot; and the fact that the rules would be likely to
have such an effect on the voters suggests a defect in them. This
point, however, the effect of the rules of counting on the voters,
should be considered not only in relation to the Bucklin system but
also in relation to the other two systems we are analyzing.
EFFECT OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS ON THE VOTER.
lower
Under the Ware rules the voter knows that his second or any
choice that he may mark on the ballot cannot under any circum-
stances lessen the chances of election of a candidate whom he marks
as higher in his scale of preferences. This is justly regarded by sup-
porters of the Ware system as a strong argument in its favor. But
such persons ought not to forget, as they frequently do, that although
under the Ware rules it can never lessen the chances of the candidate
you actually mark as first choice to mark another candidate as sec-
ond, yet, if you can foresee that your first choice cannot win and
12
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
•
that your second is in danger of being dropped out after the first
count, it may seem best to you, under the Ware rules, to mark your
first choice for the candidate who is really your second in order to
help elect him against one or more others who will be strong rivals
and whom you like still less. This can readily be seen in the case of
the supposed election used above in illustrating the fallibility of the
Ware count. If it were understood that the Ware rules were to be
used in the count, many of the 4,000 voters who gave their first
choice to Smith and their second to Jones, if they could foresee
that Smith would be beaten by either Brown or Jones, would find
it advantageous to mark Jones instead of Smith as first choice, de-
spite their real preference of Smith to Jones, in order that Jones, not
being dropped out after the count of first choices, should be elected
instead of Brown. And, of course, if the chances of Smith's own
election had been considerably less than they were in the case sup-
posed, it might have seemed so probable that the election must fie
between Jones and Brown that to voters of the group mentioned
the inducements to mark Jones as first choice, though in fact he
was not, might have been very strong.
The possibility, under the Bucklin rules, of injuring the chances of
your first choice by marking a second has been mentioned above.
It is equally true that, under the Bucklin rules, there is the possibility
of injuring the chances of either your first choice or your second by
marking a third. And so forth. We have now to ask why this is so.
It is so because on the second count, which will be taken if no candi-
date has a majority on the first count (of first choices), a voter's
second choice will count equally with his first, so that in case a second
count has to be taken, the effect of a voter's marking a second choice is
completely to neutralize his first choice so far as those two candidates are
concerned. Likewise, of course, the effect under the Bucklin rules
of a voter's marking a third choice, in case a third count has to be
taken, is completely to neutralize his first choice and his second so
far as those three candidates are concerned. Whether, therefore,
in an election to be carried out under the Bucklin rules, it is wise
for a voter to abstain from marking a second choice depends simply on
whether it seems to him more important, all things considered, to
help his second choice along with his first against all the rest or to
help his first choice against his second. This question, in turn, will
depend (1) on where the big gap in the gradation of his preferences
comes and (2) on which candidates he thinks the election probably
lies between. And whether or not, if it seems to him best to mark
a second choice, it will seem best to mark a third also, and so forth,
depends on precisely similar considerations.
Under the Nanson rules no candidate is dropped out until it is
mathematically certain that he is not the strongest according to
Condorcet's test; and a lower choice is not reckoned as equal to a
higher choice in any contingency; from first to last the gradations
of each voter's preferences are preserved and given effect in the count.
From these facts it might be inferred that under these rules it would
be impossible for a voter to help a candidate whom he wanted to elect
in any other way than by indicating his real preferences on the ballot
as fully as possible. Yet that is not the case; though these rules,
unlike the Ware and the Bucklin rules, are infallible in their inter-
pretation of the ballots as actually marked, they cannot event a voter
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
13
who is able to predict which candidate will be his favorite's strongest
rival from helping his favorite against that rival by marking the latter
as his last choice even though he may regard him as really his second.
This possibility is the only point I have ever seen advanced as a sup-
posed weakness of the Nanson rules. But is it really a weakness?
I think not. It amounts simply to this, that a voter who feels sure
that he can predict which candidate will prove to be his favorite's
strongest rival has the privilege of taking the risk of injuring the
chances of that supposed rival, against others still less desirable, in
order to avoid helping that rival's chances against the candidate of
the voter's first choice to the extent that he would by marking the
rival as second choice under rules providing that under no circum-
stances can a second choice count equally with a first. And I see
no grave objection to a voter's having this privilege. With the num-
ber of candidates and the spontaneity of grouping that may be ex-
pected after the preferential ballot is adopted for majority voting,
voters will probably seldom be able to predict the situation accurately
enough to care to take the risk mentioned; and the possibility that
occasionally some voters may take it does not seem likely to have
any harmful political effects.
Nothing short of experience can prove to just what extent each of
the three sorts of rules for majority preferential voting will lead
voters to mark their ballots otherwise than according to their real
will or to abstain from expressing their will fully. And nothing short
of experience can prove just what harm, if any, will result from any
such effect that may be produced from any one of the sets of rules.
I venture, however, to express the opinion that in their effect on the
marking of their ballots by the voters the Nanson rules will work out
best, the Ware rules next best, and the Bucklin rules third best. In
this ranking list our present system-the non-preferential ballot,
etc.-would be, of course, in respect to the points considered in this
paragraph, a very bad fourth.
THE CONDORCET TEST APPLIED TO THE THREE SYSTEMS.
Suppose A, B, C, D, and E are candidates for a single office that
is to be filled by majority vote, and suppose the ballots cast in the
election, 15 in number, are marked as indicated below, where cach
line of figures running up and down the page represents the prefer-
ences of one of the 15 voters as expressed on his ballot:
E
ARUDD
A 2 3
2 3 2 2
2
B
3
1 1
3 4 3
2 2 1
3
2 2
2 1
3
C
4
4 1
2
1
3 4 4
4
1 1
1 2 4
3 4 3 4 2
1 3
2 1 1
1 1 3 2
4
3
1 4
2✓
L-
An examination of these ballots will show the reader that if counted according to
the non-preferential plurality system still prevalent in this country, C or E would be
regarded as the choice of the voters (though a new election would be necessary), the
vote standing:
A 1, B 3, C4,
D 3,
E 4.
If the ballots were counted according to the Ware rules, candidates A, D, and E would
be dropped one after another in that order, and C would win over B and be declared
elected.
14
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
If the ballots were counted according to the Bucklin rules, A would be declared
elected; for as no candidate has a majority of first choices, firsts and seconds would
be added together, and A would win on the two together thus:
A 9, B4, C 5, D 7,
E 5.
The election of either C, E, or A, however, would be defeating the real will of the
voters, the ballots showing clearly that 10 of the 15 voters preferred D to C, that 8
of them preferred D to E, and that 9 of them preferred D to A.
Following is the record of the ballots according to the Nanson system, showing how
the true will of the voters, the election of D, is ascertained by that system:
Record or transcript of the 15 ballots shown above.
[The figures in italics are those supplied to the record, in accordance with No. 2 of the Nanson rules
printed on a preceding page to make the record of each ballot arithmetically complete.]
4 2 2 4-42
A 2 3 2 2 5 2 5
4
2
2 1
B 3 5 1
1 3
4
3
4
5
3
2
1 5 3
4=47
C 4 4 5
4
1
5
2
1
3
4
4
4 4 1
1=47
D 1 2 4
3
4
3
4
2
1
1
3
2 3 5 2=40
E 4 1 3
5
2
1
1
4
4
5
5
4 1
4
4=483
5)225
45
Divide total by number of candidates,
Average is..
B, C, and E, being above the average, are eliminated, according to No. 4 of the
Nanson rules (p. 8).
On examining, in accordance with No. 6 of the Nanson rules, the record of all the
votes to ascertain the preference of the voters between A and D, it appears that six
prefer A to D and nine prefer D to A. D is therefore declared elected.
To test the accuracy of the Nanson method in this election, apply Condorcet's rule
of a two-by-two comparison. On comparing D thus with each of the others singly, it
is seen that he defeated-
A
9 to 6,
B
8 to 7,
C
10 to 5,
and E
8 to 7.
D is, therefore, clearly entitled to win.
Fortunately the Nanson count can give nothing but such a correct
result in any case, for it is simply a convenient formulation of a
mathematical principle that covers all cases. Virtually, indeed, it
makes the comparison of each candidate with every other one
separately, thus rendering its verdict according to the "rigorous
method" (see quotation from Condorcet on p. 9) which everybody
must admit to be correct. It is, therefore, the ultimate system to
which other systems must eventually yield, for deducing from prefer-
ential ballots the will of the majority.
RELATIVE DIFFICULTY OF THE THREE COUNTS.
The work of the election officials, all told, is undoubtedly greater
under the Ware system or the Nanson than under the Bucklin.
Under either of the former systems, however, the only work at the
voting precincts in addition to that required under the non-preferen-
tial system is the numbering of each ballot and the column of the re-
turn sheet on which its preferences are to be entered and the copying
of those preference numbers in the column. As the record sheets
would be ruled to correspond with the spacing of the names on the
ballot, so that the copying of the preference numbers in the right
squares could be done quickly and correctly by men of average ability,
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
15
this extra work at the precincts is not a serious obstacle to the adop-
tion of either the Ware or the Nanson system. It should be noticed
that the reading off of the figures called for by No. 5 of the Nanson
rules can be done very rapidly if a line is drawn on the record sheets
through the figures credited to each of the candidates being excluded.
THE BEST FORM OF BALLOT.
The form of ballot customary under the Ware and the Nanson
system is this:

A...
3
2
B....
C....
1
D....
E.
F.
G
4
}
Of course, rotation of the names (see sec. 2 of the Hare rules in
Part II), or any other method of arranging the names on the ballot
fairly, may be substituted for the alphabetical order indicated on the
form above. The use of numerals to indicate preferences-first for
D, for example, second for B, etc., as on the form above-reduces
the chances of error in marking the ballot and makes it possible for
the voter to indicate as many preferences as he pleases in a single
column which can conveniently be held close to the column on the
record sheet on which the preference numbers are to be transcribed.
The form of ballot customary under the Bucklin system is this:

A..
B...
First Second Other
choice. choice. choices.
C..
D...
X
E.
F...
G.
Ꮐ
X
X
X
ہٹا
The reasons for the adoption of this form of ballot were, I think,
two: first, it made possible the designation of preferences by means
of the X, to which our voters are accustomed; secondly, it was
thought to be easier for the election officials to call off the different
orders of preferences from the three separate columns than to call
them off from different numerals in a single column. These reasons
have some weight; but they are greatly outweighed, in my opinion,
16
EFFECTIVE VOTING,
by the advantages of using in connection with the Bucklin system,
where that system can not be supplanted by the Nanson system
immediately, the ballot customary under the Ware and the Nanson
system.
In the first place, the column for "other choices" undiscriminated
from each other leads to an error in the count that is altogether
unnecessary and not easily defensible. For inevitably, if the prefer-
ences lower than the second are not distinguished from each other,
the counting rules must provide, as in fact they do in most places
where the Bucklin system is in use, that if no candidate has a majority
of first choices or a majority counting firsts and seconds together,
all the "other choices" to the credit of each candidate shall be added
to his firsts and his seconds, and that the candidate who then has
most votes of all grades together shall be declared elected. But it is
certainly an error to add in fourth, fifth, and lower choices until it
has been ascertained that no candidate has a majority of the voters
behind him when only firsts, seconds, and thirds are taken into
account. In other words the system is gravely inconsistent if it
does not provide for a separate reckoning of the total for each candi-
date after the admission to the count of cach lower order of prefer-
ences.
In the second place, the ballot of the single column, for the indi-
cation of preferences by numerals, gives the voter the opportunity of
indicating as many preferences as he pleases without covering a wide
sheet of paper with columns for crosses. And as we certainly ought
to permit the voter, as soon as it is feasible to provide for it, to
express his will on the ballot not only as exactly but as fully as he
wants to, this is an important point.
Finally, the ballot of the single column is the ballot we shall
unquestionably want for our voting to make up representative bod-
ies (see Part II of this paper), and it is unfortunate to have two
forms of ballot in use when one will do. It is true that under two of
the systems of voting for representatives explained in Part II crosses
are used instead of figures; but that is only because under those
systems one mark suffices. Under the Hare system, which is thought
by the leading authorities to insure the truest results of all, the use
of numerals for the indication of preferences is universal.
So much for systems of voting designed to range the majority of
the voters against the minority, as when a decision is to be made in
respect to measures or in respect to officials, such as the chief admin-
istrators, who should be satisfactory to the majority. When, how-
ever, the object of voting is not to make a decision at all, but to make
up a body fit to make them on behalf of all the voters-in other
words, a representative or deliberative body-then majority voting,
even by an infallible system, is only one degree less absurd and less
disastrous to democracy than plurality voting itself. Indeed, the
advantage of using the best preferential majority system instead of the
old system (of the unchangeable vote, the two elections, and the plurality
rule) where a majority vote is called for, is trifling in comparison with
the disadvantage of using such a majority system when the object of the
voting is the election of a representative body. For when that is the
object, the principles of democracy are gross violated if the system
of voting does not insure that no candidate can be elected to the
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
17
body unless he is supported not merely by a majority but by approxi-
mately the whole of a constituency, so that the process of electing the
body as a whole shall be simply a condensation of all the voters into
their true leaders.
PART II.
UNANIMOUS-CONSTITUENCY VOTING.
("PROPORTIONAL," OR TRUE, REPRESENTATION.)
The misrepresentation of the people in their "representative"
bodies is unnecessary. It is due to the blunder, which will seem
ridiculous to our children, of defining the constituency of each member
by an arbitrary geographical line and then allowing a plurality—or
a majority of the voters within the designated area to elect the
"representative." Such a method virtually disfranchises not only
all who vote against the candidate elected, who frequently comprise
from 40 to 60 per cent of the whole electorate, but also-to a less
degree--those who voted for that candidate in the final election not
because they preferred him to all others but only because they disliked
him less than any of the others who had come through the primaries
as officially recognized candidates. Thus our present system makes
it certain that most of the ballot swill be thrown away if marked for
the voter's first choice, thereby discouraging the expression of his real
will on the ballot, and makes it probable that a large percentage of
the ballots will be utterly ineffective even as marked.
•
How this crude single-member district or ward system works out
in the make-up, for example, of a city council, may be tested by the
returns of any city election. I will illustrate with the figures of the
clection of 16 councilmen by wards in Columbus, Ohio, on November
2, 1913. I take the figures of that city for no other reason than that
I happened to be there the day after the election. In the election of
the 16 ward councilmen the Democrats cast about 43 per cent of the
votes, the Republicans about 40 per cent, the Socialists about 13
per cent, and others about 3 per cent. Now, it is easy to see that if
the adherents of all these parties had happened to be distributed
quite evenly throughout the 16 wards, the Democrats would have
elected their man in every one. If, on the other hand, the distribu-
tion had been less favorable to the Democrats, they would have won
fewer scats. If, for example, the Democrats had happened to be
packed solidly into as few wards as possible, they would have filled
less than half of them and could not have elected more than 8 of the
ward councilmen. Finally, if the distribution of the voters had been
as unfavorable as possible to the Democrats, the latter might not
have elected a single one of the 16 councilmen. This is easily seen:
if the Democrats had been distributed evenly throughout the 16
wards, and their opponents had not, they might have been defeated
in 12 of the wards, for example, by the Republicans and in 4 of
them by the Socialists. Whether, therefore, the Democratic ballots
actually cast were to elect 16 ward councilmen, or 15, or 14, or 13, or 12,
or 11, or 10, or 9, or 8, or 7, or 6, or 5, or 4, or 3, or 2, or 1, or none
depended—and the same thing would have been true even if a perfect
system of majority preferential voting had been in use-on nobody's
opinion or will or vote, but only on blind chance-how the Democratic
S. Doc. 359, 63–2– 3
18
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
votes happened to be distributed geographically throughout the city
unless it depended on something still worse, the deliberate injustice
known as gerrymandering.
To get rid of this defect it is necessary only to substitute for the
arbitrary geographical_constituency of the ward system a constit-
uency defined as enough voters anywhere in the city, unanimous in the
support of a candidate, to deserve to send him in. In other words it is
necessary only to define the constituency in terms of unanimity of
will instead of in those of proximity of home.
The result of making this simple but extremely important change
is commonly called "proportional representation." "A name from
some points of view better would be unanimous-constituency, or
true, representation.
It is easy to see that if each of the constituencies is unanimous in
the desire to elect the candidate it does elect, and if the constit-
uencies are approximately equal in size, the general result of the
clection must approximate the ideal of an election to make up a
body that is to be entrusted with the power of making decisions on
behalf of all. For that ideal, as I have already suggested, is simply
the condensation, so to speak, of the many voters into the few leaders
fit to represent them.
Here is an example of such condensation, the election of mem-
bers of the Parliament of Tasmania, where the Hare system of
proportional representation explained below is in use:
ELECTION OF 1912.

Votes.
Seats
actually
obtained.
Seats in
proportion
to votes.
Labor...
33,634
14
13.66
Non-labor
40, 252
16
16.34
Labor..
Non-labor
ELECTION OF 1913.


Seats
Votes. actually
Seats in
proportion
obtained.
to votes.
30,896
14
14.14
34, 676
16
15.86
With such results compare those under our present crude system.
The number of Socialist votes for Congressman in 1908, relatively to
the number cast for Congressmen by other parties, entitled the
party to several Members, but they gave it only one. In 1912 the
party, though it doubled its vote, did not elect a single Congressman.
In the momentous general elections of January, 1910, in Great Brit-
ain and Ireland, where the same single-member geographical con-
stituency is in use-
there were 144 constituencies in which the successful member was returned by a
majority of less than 500. Of these constituencies 69 seats were held by the Minis-
terialists [the Liberals, Irish Nationalists, and Labor Party men] and 75 by the
Unionists Conservatives]. The majorities were in some cases as low as 8, 10, and 14,
The aggregate of the majorities in the Ministerialist constituencies amounted to
16,931, and had some 8,500 Liberals in these constituencies changed sides the Min-
་
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
19
-isterialist majority of 124 might have been annihilated. On the other hand, the
Unionists held 75 seats by an aggregate majority of 17,389, and had fortune favored
the Ministerialists in these constituencies their majority would have been no less
than 274. Such is the stability of the foundation on which the House of Commons
rests, such the method to which we trust when it is necessary to consult the nation
on grave national issues.¹
Many well-meaning citizens, realizing that there is something-
they have no clear idea what-wrong with the single-member dis-
trict system of representation, have proposed to elect all the mem-
bers of a city's council or "commission" at large together, and to
allow each voter to vote for them all. Such a proposal, of course,
means jumping from the frying pan into the fire. It means aban-
doning the only obviously good feature of the single-member district
or ward system-the constituency.
The simplest unanimous-constituency or proportional system for
electing a representative body-say a city council of nine, or the
nine Members of Congress elected from a district comprising a quar-
ter of the population of Pennsylvania-is arrived at by providing
merely that the Members shall be elected at large, that no voter
shall vote for more than one, and that the nine candidates who re-
ceive most votes shall be elected. This is the system actually used
for the election of the Japanese House of Representatives, Japan hav-
ing endured only from 1889, the year of her constitution, until 1900
the district system that still hinders political and social progress in
the United States.
Though the constituencies that elect Members under this system
are all unanimous, they may be very unequal in size; the candidate
who receives most votes may receive two or three times as many as
the weakest one of the nine elected. This possibility naturally leads
the parties to estimate carefully how many candidates they can
elect by dividing their strength, as nearly equally as possible, among
several; and to carry out such a program as this successfully it be-
comes necessary for the ordinary voter to cast his vote for one or
another of his party's candidates according to advice from the
party's headquarters. In spite of these obvious drawbacks this Jap-
anese system is far better than the single-member district system
and should be supported for the election of representative bodies in
cases where the obstacles in the way of the adoption of the still better
systems now to be described are really insuperable.
What is it that the Japanese system lacks? Simply the adequate
or preferential ballot that is found so useful in majority voting, the
ballot that permits the voter to express his will as fully as he wants
to, so that it can be carried out in the count under almost any cir-
cumstances that may be found to have arisen.
One of the simplest systems of unanimous-constituency representa-
tion in which a sort of preferential ballot is used is that covered by the
list-system provisions below. Its main features are these. Candi-
dates are nominated-by petition, preferably-in lists. The several
lists of candidates thus nominated are printed on the ballot under the
headings, "List 1," "List 2," etc., no party names or emblems being
necessary or desirable. You vote such a ballot by marking a cross
against one name on one list. Such a cross means that your vote is
to count one toward determining how many representatives the sup-
porters of that list are to elect and that it is also to help up toward
¹J. H. Humphreys: Proportional Representation, Methuen & Co., London, 1911, p. 27.
20
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
the top of that list the particular candidate marked. So if list 1, for
example, gets about three-ninths of the total vote cast for represent-
atives, it will be given three seats; and the particular candidates to
receive those seats will be the three on the list who got most votes
individually. This ballot is really a preferential ballot, you see,
though scarcely ever called by that name; for though the voter marks
only one candidate, he thereby expresses also the desire to give his
vote, if it cannot help the candidate marked, to such other candidate
on the same list as it can help.
A LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
Nomination and election provisions.
Revised January, 1914.
1
Section 1. Nomination of candidates for Representatives in Congress from cach districl
shall be by petition, signed by electors, who have signed no other petition to nominate any
candidate for Representative at the same election, to the number of
The petitions
shall include the domicile addresses of the candidates. Each such petition may nominate
as many persons, not nominated by any other petition, as there are seats to be filled from
the district, but it may nominate as few persons as the petitioners wish. Each petition
shall be signed, filed, and verified in the manner prescribed by law, shall contain the signed
consent of each candidate, and shall be filed with the election authorities at least twenty
days prior to the election.
Sec. 2. The several lists of candidates—all_the_persons, whether one or more, nomi-
nated by one group of petitioners being considered one list-shall appear on the ballots,
without party names or emblems, in an order determined by lot by the election authorities.
The names and domicile addresses of the candidates on each list shall be printed on the
ballot in the alphabetical order of the surnames.
Sec. 3. The form of the ballot shall be substantially as shown below.
DIRECTIONS TO VOTERS:
[Form of ballot.]
FOR REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS.
Mark a cross (x) opposite the name of one candidate only for whom you want to vote. (If the
candidate you vote for is found to be elected without your vote, or if he is found to have too few votes
to be elected with it, your vote will be counted for some other candidate on the same list.)
Do not mark more than one name. If you spoil this ballot, tear it across once, return it to the elec
tion officer in charge of the ballots, and get another from him.
List 1.
List 2,
List 3.


[Domicile address]
[Domicile address]
[Domicile address]
A.
C..
D..
"
CC
B...
"
G
L.
(
"
H
M..
"
J.
N..
·
P...
S..
"
T..
ཅ
V
"
(C
K...
Q.
Τ
(C
Y..
*The squares for the voter's cross would be at the right of the names, of course, in States in which custom
would require such a change.
1 See the footnote on p. 26 in connection with nominations under the Hare system of proportional
representation. The suggestion made there is equally applicable to the list system. though, of course,
the minimum of votes required should be, under a list system, a minimum for a list instead of a mini-
mum for a particular candidate, and the number of the minimum should be about a third of the number
of votes by which each member will probably be elected.
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
21
Sec. 4. The total number of valid ballots for Representative in Congress cast in the
district shall be divided by the number of Representatives to be elected from the distriet,
and the quotient shall be the "quota.
Sec. 5. The total number of full quotas contained in the total number of valid ballots
cast in the district for the candidates of a list shall be the number of candidates on said list
to be declared elected on the first assignment of seats.
Sec. 6. After this first assignment of seats, the remaining seats, if any, shall be assigned
as follows: The number of valid ballots for the condidates of each list shall be divided by
the number of seats, plus one, already assigned to such list, and to the list showing the largest
quotient shall be assigned one additional seat. This procedure shall be repeated until the
number of seats assigned shall be that to which the district is entitled.¹
Sec. 7. The candidates to be declared elected from any list shall be those individually
receiving the largest number of votes.
Sec. 8. A ballot marked for names on more than one list shall be set aside as invalid.
A ballot marked for more than one name on one list, but not for names on more than one
list, shall be counted as a vote for the list but shall not be counted in determining the
standing on that list of particular candidates.
Sec. 9. To any vacancy that shall occur, otherwise than by the operation of the recall,
in the delegation of Representatives in Congress from a district, thể
[here name
the proper clection authorities] shall appoint, to fill out the unexpired term, that candi-
date from the list on which the vacating Representative was nominated who, of all the un-
elected candidatos on that list, received most votes. [Here add provisions for filling the
vacancy in case the provision in this section fails.]
Three modification of these provisions should be mentioned.
The first is adding a square for the voter's cross in connection with
the title of each list, thus:
List 1.
List 2.
List 3.
This addition is permissible. If it is made, the "Directions to voters"
should be changed to read thus:
Mark a cross (X) opposite the title of one of the lists of candidates.
Mark also, if you have any preference among the candidates on the
list you mark, the name of one candidate only on that list.
A ballot is spoiled on which two lists are marked, or on which a list and
a candidate not on it are both marked. If you spoil, etc. If this addi-
tion is made to the list system provisions above, the wording of those
provisions should, of course, be changed slightly to conform to the
form of ballot used. A ballot marked for one individual candidate
but not separately for any list's title should be regarded as valid and
as exactly equivalent to a ballot on which the title of the candidate's
list is also marked.
The second modification that should be mentioned is the substitu-
tion of party names for the titles, "List 1," "List 2," etc. Though I
do not personally favor this modification, there is nothing in the
system of election itself to prevent making it. If it is made, however,
the simple provisions for nominating candidates covered by section 1
must be supplanted by far more elaborate provisions, such as legally
regulated primaries, to guard against the giving of a party name to a
list of candidates that has not a good right to it.
The third modification is changing section 6 to read thus: After
this first assignment of seats, the remaining seats, if any, shall be as-
signed to the lists showing the largest remainders of votes after the first
assignment. This provision is at least as fair as the other, and simpler.
The provision in the text of the rules, which is essentially the same as
that used in Belgium, favors the lists that receive most votes. There
1 The reasons for these provisions are explained on p. 22 in connection with a concrete illustration.
The provisions are essentially the same as those governing the assignment of seats to lists in the system of
proportional representation used for parliamentary elections in Belgium. See the alternative form of this
section explained below as the "third modification" to be considered.
22
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
is doubtless something to be said for favoring the largest parties or
groups thus, but there is also much to be said--in my personal opinion
more-for the simpler rule, which is as favorable to small parties as
to large ones.
Consider how these rules would work out in a concrete case. Sup-
pose the eastern district of Pennsylvania, which is to elect 9 of the
36 Members of the House of Representatives elected by the State,
polls valid votes as follows:
List 1.
Candidate A.
Candidate B.
Candidate O.
Candidate P.
Candidate S
40,000
60,000
4,000
52,000
1, 200
Candidate T.
Candidate V.
Candidate Y..
40
30,000
10, 200
197, 440
List 2.
Candidate C.
Candidate G.
Candidate H.
Candidate J.
10,000
4,000
6, 900
10, 220
Candidate K.
24,002
85, 122
List 3.
Candidate D.
20,000
Candidate L.
10,000
Candidate M.
22,004
Candidate N.
40, 850
Candidate Q.
60,408
2,208
155, 470
Candidate U
The ballots being marked as shown by these figures, the total vote
of the district would be 438,032. The quota would be that number
divided by 9, which is 48,6703.
As that last number is fully contained in the vote of the first list
four times, that list is given four seats on the first assignment. The
four candidates on the first list to receive these seats are (1) Candi-
date B, (2) Candidate P, (3) Candidate A, and (4) Candidate V.
As the quota is fully contained once in the vote of the second list,
that list is given one seat on the first assignment, the candidaté
receiving it being Candidate J.
As the quota is fully contained three times in the vote of the third
list, that list is given three seats on the first assignment, the candi-
dates receiving them being Candidates Q, N, and M.
Applying now the rule of section 6 above, we find that dividing
197,440 by 5 gives us 39,488; dividing 85,122 by 2 gives us 42,561;
and dividing 155,470 by 4 gives us 38,8671. We therefore assign the
ninth seat to the second list, the candidate receiving it being Čandi-
date K. Applying the alterative form of section 6 suggested above,
we assign the ninth seat to the second list because it shows the largest
remainder after the subtraction of full quotas for the seats already
assigned. In this case the two rules would give the same result, but
in many cases they would not.
The second of these two rules for the filling of seats not filled by the
first assignment explains itself. The first of them may seem merely
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
23
arbitrary. In fact, however, the first rule, though not, in my personal
opinion, so fair as the second one, is based on a principle. The prin-
ciple is that each seat remaining unassigned after the first assign-
ment on full quotas shall be assigned to the list which, if it is assigned
the additional seat in question, will have behind each of its members
the largest part of a full quota.
Compare the errors of this election with those of an election of
Representatives under our present single-member district system.
Under the latter the error involved in the election of a Member often
amounts, as we have seen, to from 40 to 60 per cent of all the voters
of a constituency, and it would often amount to nearly 50 per cent of
them even if a majority preferential system were substituted for our
usual system of pluralities and primaries. In the election we have
examined, on the other hand, the error, in the case of the election of
each Member, is only the difference between the number of votes
that elect him and a full quota. In the case of candidates B, P, A,
and V, for example, the error is the difference between 49,360 (the
number of times that 4 goes into 197,440) and 48,670%, which is the
full quota. In the case of candidates J and K the error is the differ-
ence between 42,561 (the number of times that 2 goes into 85,122) and
48,670%, the full quota. In the case of candidates Q, N, and M the
error is the difference between 51,823 (the number of times that 3.
goes into 155,470) and 48,6703, the full quota.
It should be noticed that every Member elected by this system is
elected by a constituency that may fairly be called unanimous. Take
the case of candidate V. It is true, of course, that many of the 42,561
votes by which candidate V is elected were cast by voters who pre-
ferred one of the other candidates, B, P, O, S, T, or Y. Yet every
one of those voters indicated, by marking candidates in the first list
after reading the "Directions to voters" at the top of the ballot, that
he wanted to help elect some other candidate in that list if his vote
could not be effective for the particular candidate he marked. It
may be objected that the list itself did not precisely suit every one of
the voters who decided to vote for some candidate on it. That is
true, but it must at least have suited nearly every politically intelligent
voter who supported it, for otherwise the unsatisfied would have
taken advantage of the opportunity, easily afforded them by section
1 of the election provisions, to nominate one or more other lists.
Within the limits of the flexibility of so simple a list system, therefore,
the constituency electing candidate V-and the same may be said of
any of the eight others clected-may be said to be unanimous.
The proportional system set forth above provides, therefore, a
means by which at a single election the voters of a large district can
form almost perfectly unanimous constituencies, each one of which
contains approximately the same number of voters that there would
be in an entire single-member district under our present system.
Under such a system, therefore, the delegation of nine Members of Con-
gress from the eastern district of Pennsylvania would represent the
voters of that part of the State almost perfectly; and as the same would
be true also of the three other large districts of the State and of all the
enlarged districts of the other States, the House of Representatives as
a whole would represent almost perfectly the voters of the Nation.
With various modifications, the list system of unanimous-constit-
uency or proportional representation is in use for the election of the
24
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
Parliaments of Belgium, Sweden, and Finland, for that of the councils
of about half the Cantons or States of Switzerland, and for that of
town councils in Sweden, Switzerland, and elsewhere. Its adoption
for parliamentary elections in France has already been voted by the
Chamber of Deputies more than once, and it is expected to pass the
Senate in the near future. President Poincaré and ex-Premier
Briand are among the supporters of the reform.
Besides the list system, two other systems of unanimous-constitu-
ency or proportional representation deserve special attention in this
country at the present time.
One of these, which is sometimes called the "single transferable
vote" but is best called, from the name of its chief originator, the Hare
system, is in use for the election of the Parliament of Tasmania, the
municipal councils of Denmark, the Upper House of Denmark, and
the Parliament of the Union of South Africa. The same system has
been incorporated in the "Home rule" bill for the election of all
members of the Senate and 31 members of the House proposed for
Ireland. I say the same system" though the details of the provi-
sions by which proportional representation is to be carried out in
Ireland are to be prescribed, according to the bill, by the "King in
Council." There is no doubt, since the Hare system is the only one
strongly supported in the United Kingdom, that the "King in Coun-
cil" will not think of prescribing any other. The clause of the bill
prescribing proportional representation for the Senate passed the
House of Commons on October 31, 1912, unanimously; that pre-
scribing the system for the House of Ireland passed the same body
on January 7, 1913, by a vote of 311 to 81. These votes were the
natural result of the agitation that has been carried on in Great
Britain for many years under the leadership of such men as John
Stuart Mill, Lord Courtney of Penwith, Lord Avebury (better known
to Americans as Sir John Lubbock), Earl Grey (recently Governor-
General of Canada), and Mr. John H. Humphreys.
The Hare system differs from the list system in that the names of
candidates, instead of being nominated and arranged on the ballot in
lists, are nominated singly and are arranged on the ballot in alpha-
betical order (with or without rotation of names) or in any other
order considered fair. It differs from the list system also in that the
voter, instead of marking one candidate on one list with the under-
standing that if his vote cannot help elect the particular candidate
marked it will help some other on the same list, indicates his own
personal preferences-as many or as few as he pleases-by the
figures 1, 2, 3, etc. Finally, of course, it differs from the list system
in the rules of the count, which must be adapted to the form of
ballot used. The dominating principle of the Hare rules is that each
ballot is to be counted for the voter's highest preference (as indicated
by the figures on the ballot) whom under the circumstances it can help.
The advantage of the Hare system over the list is that it gives the
individual voter the opportunity of having his vote count only in
accordance with his own personal preferences, whereas the list system
requires him to help a ready-made list when he helps one candidate
on it. The disadvantages of the Hare system, as compared with the
1 In the case of the Upper House of Denmark and the Senate of South Africa the system is applied not to
the voting at the polls but to that of the electoral colleges by which the two bodies mentioned are elected.
In Tasmania and in the municipal elections of Denmark the system is applied to popular elections.
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
25
list system or with the schedule system soon to be explained, are
(1) that it practically requires the bringing together for the comple-
tion of the count of all the ballots cast for the election of the several
representatives in question; (2) that the count is harder to explain
and longer to carry out, and (3) that, unless the rules of the count are
elaborated a good deal, small elements of chance remain involved
in them which, though of trifling practical importance, are per-
ceptible to critics and are sure to rouse opposition on the part both
of those who seek some flaw to peck at and of those who, not under-
standing the system thoroughly, honestly think the elements of
chance in its count seriously objectionable.
Hare ballot rules suitable for certain uses in this country, notably
for the election of city councils under the admirable city manager
plan of government, are printed below. It will be noticed that
section 11 is given in alternative form. "Alternative Form A" means
less work for the counters at the central bureau, but the retention
in the count of an element of chance that can be eliminated. "Alter-
native Form B" eliminates this element of chance absolutely; it
does it by the simple device adopted by the mother who, having three
equally beloved children and three very unequal apples, cut the big
apple, the middle-sized apple, and the mean little apple each into
three pieces and gave to each of the children one piece of each apple.
It may be asked why, since such a mathematically perfect device
can be adopted to get rid of the chance in Form A, that alterna-
tive of the rule is offered at all. The reason is that Form A is enough
simpler than the other to make a difference in respect to the adoption
of the system in some cases, and the objections to it are not really
serious. Ask yourself whether the voters whose ballots are left, under
Form A, to elect their first choice are treated fairly. Then ask your-
self whether those whose ballots are taken, under Form A, each to
help elect the next preference marked on it who can be helped by it,
are treated fairly. And no other voters
no other voters are concerned. It is
possible, of course, that distributing one group of a thousand
ballots instead of another might make a difference between the
election of one candidate and the election of another; but even if it
did so, the group of members elected would in any case be truly
representative of the voters who elected them, and there would be no
more unfairness involved than there is in certain other features of an
electoral system, for example the choice of Tuesday rather than Wed-
nesday as election day.
HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
Nomination and election provisions.
[Phrased suitably for a State law covering an optional charter plan for the municipalities of the State.]
Revised January, 1914.
Section 1. Nominations of candidates for the council shall be by petition, signed by elect-
ors (who have signed no other petition to nominate a candidate for the council at the same
election) to the number, in municipalities of not more than ten thousand inhabitants, of
three per cent of the number of electors who voted at the last preceding regular municipal
election; to the number, in municipalities of more than ten thousand but not more than
twenty-five thousand inhabitants, of two per cent of the number of electors who voted at
the last preceding regular municipal election, and to the number, in municipalities of more
than twenty-five thousand inhabitants, of one and a half per cent of the number of electors
who voted at the last_preceding regular municipal election: Provided, however, That in
no case shall the number required be more than two hundred.
26
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
Each such petition shall be signed, filed, and verified in the manner prescribed by
law, shall contain the signed consent of the candidate, and shall be filed with the election
authorities at least thirty days prior to the election.¹
Sec. 2. The ballots used in all elections provided for in this act shall be without party
marks or designations. The names of candidates on such ballots shall be printed in
rotation,² as follows:
The ballots shall be printed in as many series as there are candidates for the council.
The whole number of ballots to be printed shall be divided by the number of series, and the
quotient so obtained shall be the number of ballots in each series.
In printing the first series of ballots the names of candidates for the council shall be
arranged in alphabetical order. After printing the first series, the first name in the list of
candidates shall be placed last in such list and the next series printed, and the process shall
be so repeated until each name in the list of candidates shall have been printed first an equal
number of times. The ballots so printed shall then be combined in tablets, so as to have
the fewest possible ballots having the same order of names printed thereon together in the same
tablet. The ballots shall in all other respects conform as nearly as may be to the ballots
prescribed by the general election laws of the State.
The form of the ballot shall be as follows:
[Form of ballot.] ³
3
FOR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE COUNCIL.
DIRECTIONS TO VOTERS: Put the figure 1 opposite the name
of your first choice for the council. If you want to express also
second, third, and other preferences, do so by putting the fig-
ure 2 opposite the name of your second choice, the figure 3 oppo-
site the name of your third choice, and so on. You may express
thus as many preferences as you please. This ballot will not
be counted for your second choice unless it is found that it
cannot help your first; it will not be counted for your third
choice unless it is found that it cannot help either your first
or your second; etc. The more choices you express, the more
likely you are to make your ballot count for one of the candi-
dates you favor.
A ballot is spoiled if the figure 1 is put opposite more than one
name.
If you spoil this ballot, tear it across once, return it to the elec-
tion officer in charge of the ballots, and get another from him.
CANDIDATES FOR THE COUNCIL.
[Name.]
[Domicile address.]
A
B
C
D
E

F
G
II
T
J
K
I
1 These conditions for nominating candidates may be modified, if it is thought best, by reducing some-
what the number of signatures required and requiring the deposit in connection with each nomination of a
small amount of money, to be returned to the depositor if the nominee in question receives in the election a
reasonable number, say about a quarter of a quota, of first-choice votes and votes transferred from surpluses
put together.
Of course these provisions for rotation of the names on the ballots are not an essential part of the plan.
If rotation is not desired, put the words "alphabetical order" instead of the word "rotâtion" here and
omit the passage that follows as far as the words "The ballots shall in all other respects.
3 Of course the squares for the voter's marks should be at the right of the names instead of at the left
in States where custom would require such a change.
}
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
27
Sec. 3. The numerals thus marked on the ballot shall be understood to mean that the
voter wishes his vote to be effective in the election of his highest preference possible under the
rules, a candidate whose name is marked with a smaller number being always preferred to
one whose name is marked with a larger number and the latter to one whose name is not
marked at all, and that he desires his ballot, in case it appears on any count that it is not
needed by, or cannot under the rules be effective in the election of, that candidate for whom
it has been or would be counted, to be transferred to another candidate in accordance with
his preferences marked thereon.
Sec. 4. The ballots shall first be sorted and counted at the several voting precincts accord-
ing to the first choices of the voters. The valid ballots so cast for each candidate shall be
sorted into two groups, that of valid ballots on which the voter's second choice is clearly
indicated and that of valid ballots on which his second choice is not clearly indicated. Each
such group shall be tied up by itself and properly marked on the outside, and the two for each
candidate shall then be tied up in one bundle which shall also be properly marked on the
outside. All the bundles thus made up at a precinct, together with the invalid ballots and
a record of all the ballots cast at the precinct, showing the number of invalid ballots, the
number of valid ballots, the total number of first-choice ballots for each candidate, and the
number of ballots in each of the two groups of first-choice ballots received by each candidate,
shall be forwarded to the board of deputy State supervisors of elections or the board of
deputy Štate supervisors and inspectors of elections,¹ as directed by that board, and the
counting of the ballots shall proceed under its direction.
•
Sec. 5. First-choice votes for each candidate shall be added and tabulated as the first count.
Sec. 6. The whole number of valid ballots shall then be divided by a number greater by one
than the number of seats to be filled. The next whole number larger than the quotient thus
obtained shall be the quota or constituency.2
Sec. 7. All candidates the number of whose votes on the first count is equal to or greater
than the quota shall then be declared clected.
Sec. 8. All votes obtained by any candidate in excess of the quota shall be termed the
surplus of that candidate.
Sec. 9. The surpluses shall be transferred, successively in order of size from the largest to
the smallest, each ballot of the surplus being transferred to and added to the votes of that
continuing candidate for whom a preference is indicated on it. [If section 11 is adopted
in Form B, change the last clause of section 9 to read thus: the votes of the surplus
being transferred to and added to the votes of continuing candidates, according to the highest
available preferences indicated on the ballots capable of transfer, as prescribed in section 11.]
Sec. 10. "Ballots capable of transfer" means ballots from which the preference of the
voter for some continuing candidate can be clearly ascertained. Continuing candidates'
means candidates who have not been declared elected or defeated.
(C
}}
Sec. 11. Alternative Form A. The particular ballots to be taken for transfer as the sur-
plus of any candidate shall be those that come to hand indiscriminately, without selection,
from such of his ballots as are capable of transfer, and the order in which those ballots
shall severally be transferred shall be that in which they happen to come, without selection.
All the ballots not so transferred as surplus shall be set aside as effective in the election of
such candidate.
Alternative Form B. In transferring the surplus of any candidate, all the ballots capable
of transfer that were cast for him as first choice shall be transferred, each ballot being reckoned
for this purpose, however, only as such fractional part of a vote as is required to make the
total number of whole votes transferred that number-except as reduced by the disregard
of fractions prescribed in this section below—which was available for transfer. In crediting
votes thus transferred from the surplus of any candidate to any other candidate who may
receive them, fractional parts of a vote shall not be counted.³
3
1 In some States the proper officials would have some other title. The alternative title given would be
suitable for Ohio.
2 To see that section 6 accords with common sense one has only to consider that in any whole number of
votes there cannot be more than one group larger than half of the whole number, or more than two groups
each larger than a third of the whole number, or more than nine groups each larger than a tenth of the
whole number, etc.
002
1500
1002
3 Example: Suppose the quota is 10,001 votes, and Candidate A gets 20,027 first-choice votes, of which
19,980 are capable of transfer. Then, since Candidate A needs 10,001 votes to make up his own quota, he
needs, in addition to the 47 ballots cast for him that were not capable of transfer, 9,954 of the 19,980 votes
represented by the 19,980 ballots capable of transfer. Therefore only 10,026 votes are available for transfer
to other candidates, and in the transferring of the 19,980 ballots each of those ballots must be reckoned as
only 1998 of a whole vote. So when it is found that Candidate M, for example, reeeives 500 of the 19,980
transferred ballots, he ought to be credited with only 250 18999 votes, for that is 1 of 500. And as the
rule provides for the neglect of fractions in crediting votes, Candidate M is credited with 250 votes simply.
The use of such fractions has to be resorted to, of course, only for a single multiplication in connection with
each of the candidates who receives a batch of ballots on the transfer of a surplus. As this part of the count-
ing is all carried out at the central bureau, and the arithmetical calculations involved are few and simple,
the apparent complexity of the transfer of surplus votes according to Form B of Section 11 should not be
considered a serious objection to the adoption of the rule in that form. The transferring of votes thus
offers no difficulties in practice, according to the highest official evidence from Tasmania. (See testi-
mony of John M'Call, Agent-General of Tasmania, before the British Royal Commission in 1909-British
Blue Book "Cd. 5352," 1910, especially ¶3029.)
28
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
Sec. 12. After the transfer of all surpluses, the votes standing to the credit of each can-
didate shall be counted and tabulated as the second count.
Sec. 13. After the tabulation of the second count (or after that of the first count if no can-
didate received a surplus on the first) the candidate lowest on the poll as it then stands shall
be declared defeated and all his ballots capable of transfer shall be transferred to the contin-
uing candidates, each ballot being transferred to the credit of that continuing candidate
preferred by the voter. After the transfer of these ballots a fresh count and tabulation shall be
made. In this manner candidates shall be successively declared defeated, and their ballots
capable of transfer transferred to continuing candidates, and a fresh count and tabulation
made. After any tabulation the candidate to be declared defeated shall be the one then
lowest on the poll.
Sec. 14. Whenever in the transfer of a surplus or of the ballots of a defeated candidate
the votes of any candidate shall equal the quota, he shall immediately be declared elected
and no further transfer to him shall be made.
Sec. 15. When candidates to the number of the seats to be filled have been declared elected,
all other candidates shall be declared defeated and the count shall be at an end; and when
the number of continuing candidates shall be reduced to the number of seats to be filled, those
candidates shall be declared elected and the count shall be at an end; and in this case the
ballots of the last candidate defeated need not be transferred.
Sec. 16. If at any count two or more candidates at the bottom of the poll have the same
number of votes, that candidate shall first be declared defeated who was lowest at the next
preceding count at which their votes were different. Should it happen that the votes of
these candidates are equal to each other on all counts, they shall be declared defeated succes-
sively from the younger to the older.¹
Sec. 17. No ballot shall be counted in such a way as to make it effective in the election
of more than one candidate.
Sec. 18. On each tabulation a count shall be kept of those ballots which have not been
used in the election of some candidate and which are not capable of transfer, under the desig-
nation "Nontransferable ballots."
Sec. 19. On cach tabulation a count shall be kept of the invalid ballots; but no ballot
shall be declared invalid except one on which the first choice of the voter cannot be clearly
ascertained. A ballot marked with a cross opposite one name but with no other mark shall
be treated exactly as if it had been marked with the figure 1 opposite the same name but with
no other mark.
Sec. 20. Every ballot that is transferred from one candidate to another shall be stamped
or marked so that its entire course from candidate to candidate throughout the count can be
conveniently traced. In case a recount of the ballots is made, every ballot shall be made
to take in the recount the same course that it took in the first count unless there is dis-
covered a mistake that requires its taking a different course, in which_case such mistake
shall be corrected and any changes made in the course taken by ballots that may be required
as a result of such correction. The particular ballots the course of which is to be changed
in the recount as a result of such corrections shall be taken as they happen to come, without
selection.
Sec. 21. So far as may be consistent with good order and with convenience in the counting
and transferring of the ballots, the public, representatives of the press, and especially the
candidates themselves shall be afforded every facility for being present and witnessing
these operations.
The third of the three systems of unanimous-constituency voting
for the make-up of representative bodies that seems to me to de-
serve special attention in this country at the present time is the Gove
or schedule system, which was devised independently by William H.
Gove, Esq., of Salem, Mass., and Archibald E. Dobbs, Esq., of Ireland.
Under this plan the candidates' names are printed on the ballot in a
single column, as under the Hare. But under this plan each candidate
really stands for a whole list, the distinguishing feature of the plan
being that every ballot that cannot help elect the candidate for
whom it was cast-either because he has enough without it or because
he is hopelessly out of the running even with it-is to be counted to
help one of the other candidates in accordance with a list or schedule
of preferences handed in to the electoral officials by the candidate
himself and duly published several days before the election.
1 For the last 12 words of section 16 may be substituted the following, if they are preferred: "lots shall
be drawn to decide which candidate shall next be declared defeated.” The words in the text of therules
are in accordance with a reasonable practice embodied in the legislation of some countries.
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
29
Among the differences between the schedule plan and the list
plan are these:
(1) The former lends itself to the Australian form of ballot, whereas
the latter lends itself to the party-list form of ballot.
(2) The former offers the voter many lists, a different one for
each candidate, without making the ballot physically cumbersome,
whereas the latter either restricts the voter to his choice among a
few lists or makes the ballot cumbersome. Neither plan, of course,
makes the ballot "long" in the political sense of that word; for,
politically, a ballot is "long" that is hard to vote so as to make the
voter's will effective, and a ballot is "short" that is easy to vote so
as to produce that result; and it is very easy for the voter to vote
so as to make his will-or what, at least, closely approximates to his
precise will (see remarks on the Hare plan just below)-effective
with either a schedule-plan or a list-plan ballot.
(3) The schedule plan allows a candidate's name to be on more
than one list, whereas the list plan does not.
The significant differences between the schedule plan and the Hare
can be stated briefly. The schedule plan, like the list, does not offer
the voter the same opportunity that the Hare does to make his vote
count only in accordance with his own personal list of preferences.
Since any limitation whatever of the voter's power to make his ballot
count exactly in accordance with his own will is at least a slight
vitiation of democracy at the fountain head, this is a matter of some
importance. The schedule plan, however, like the list again, is far
simpler to explain than the Hare, does not require the bringing
together of the ballots from the precincts for the completion of the
count, and adapts itself to our custom of voting simply by making
a cross against one name. For many uses, notably where the terri-
torial area of the election is very wide, as in the case of the election
of State legislators, Congressmen, or presidential electors, these
practical advantages of the schedule and the list plan are important.
The principal provisions that should be included in a bill providing
the schedule plan for the election of a representative body are:
1. Nomination by petition (if not provided for by existing laws),
with domicile address of each nominee and with or without provi-
sions for a deposit as explained in a footnote above in connection with
section 1 of the Hare rules.
2. Permission-it should not be a requirement-for each nominee
to file within a specified time the names, arranged in an order of
preference, of one or more of the other nominees to whom votes cast
as first-choice votes for himself are to be transferred in case they can
not help him because, according to the rules of the count, he has
enough to be elected without them or so few as to be out of the
running with them.
Requirement that no such list is valid unless accompanied by the
signed assent, on the part of each nominee whose name appears in it,
to the presence of his name on the list in the position in which it
stands.
3. Specifications in regard to the publication of the lists before the
election.
4. Specifications in regard to the quota or constituency that en-
titles a candidate to election, like those of section 6 of the Hare pro-
visions in this paper.
30
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
5. Rules in regard to the distribution of the surpluses (of votes
received directly by any candidates), one after another in order of size,
to the other nominees, according to the preferential list, if any,
handed in by the nominee furnishing the surplus.
6. Provisions similar to those of sections 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19, and 21 of the Hare rules.
One modification of this system, affecting sections 2 and 5, deserves
mention. If it is thought best, the requirement that the names on a
list shall be in a definite order of preference (see section 2) may be
omitted, in which case the order in which the candidates on a list
shall be preferred in the transfer of votes (see section 5), shall be
that of their strength as indicated by the number of votes received
by them directly. This modification is thought by some propor-
tionalists to be an improvement. Though it gives the voter less
definite knowledge than the other provision does in regard to how
his vote will be transferred in case it cannot be used to help the can-
didate of his first choice, it has some advantages that will suggest
themselves readily to every reader.
TO WHAT ELECTIONS SHOULD PROPORTIONAL SYSTEMS BE APPLIED ?
Some proportional or unanimous-constituency system should be
applied to the election of every body whose chief function is to
deliberate and to make important decisions or appointments on
behalf of those who elect it. This includes city councils under the
Federal plan and the city manager-sometimes called the commission-
manager-plan of government. It does not include the commission
under the Des Moines plan, because under that plan the adminis-
trative functions of the commissioners are more important than their
representative functions. It includes both chambers of our State
legislatures so long as two chambers are elected at all. As soon,
however, as one chamber is made truly representative of the entire
body of voters of the State, the second chamber will doubtless be done
away with. It includes the House of Representatives of the United
States. It includes the National Electoral College. It includes the
standing committees of our representative bodies. It includes boards
of education and other such public boards until the powers of such
boards are given over to the truly representative legislatures and
city councils and their purely administrative duties are given over to
professional administrators. It includes representative committees
of clubs, college and school classes, and private organizations gen-
erally.
Where in these cases the difficulties of explaining the system and
counting the ballots are not insurmountable obstacles, the Hare system
is to be preferred to the list or the schedule. There is no reason why
the Hare should not be used for many purposes, including the election
of some of our city councils. Wherever, however, it seems necessary
to have recourse to a system easier to explain and providing an easier
count, the list or the schedule is to be recommended with confidence
that either of them will work admirably and give us a representative
body that really represents. For the election of Members of Congress
and members of the Electoral College the list system, the simplest of
all to explain and to introduce, seems especially suitable. În con-
nection with the Electoral College it may be added that if the list
system explained in this paper, without party names or emblems on the
EFFECTIVE VOTING,
31
ballot, were adopted for the election of the group of presidential elec-
tors assigned to each of the States, not only would the division of the
college between the several parties be much fairer than it has been
hitherto, but the need of a vast primary system to decide what candi-
date has the right to be called the candidate of any party would be
wholly obviated. It is to be hoped, therefore, that it may be possible
to get such a system for the election of presidential electors adopted
in the States generally before we undertake the big task of putting in
operation a direct primary system-which the greater and more easily
introduced reform proposed would make superfluous-for the nomi-
nation of party candidates for the Presidency.
TRUE REPRESENTATION AND EFFICIENCY.
1
A point of the greatest importance in connection with the intro-
duction of a unanimous-constituency system of representation, which
will simply condense the voters into a body made up of the true
leaders of all shades of opinion and interest, is that it opens the way
for taking all the chief administrative offices off the ballot altogether,
and for filling them by majority preferential vote of the representa-
tive body itself. Provide that such administrative officials shall hold
office indefinitely during the pleasure of the representative body,
that each representative shall affirm, as a condition of taking his seat,
that in voting for the selection or the retention of such an official he
will be guided only by considerations of fitness for the work after
thorough investigation, and you have the most democratic method
yet discovered for having the purely administrative work of govern-
ment done efficiently.
Though the brilliant work of the National Short Ballot Organiza-
tion has brought this principle to our attention recently under a new
name, there is really nothing new in the principle itself. The efficient
chief administrator of an English city, the city clerk, is selected by the
council to serve indefinitely during its pleasure. The efficient chief
administrators of Prussian cities, the bürgermeisters, are selected and
retained in office in the same way. And there is nothing undemocratic
about it; that is democratic which gives actual effect to the people's
will-not that which pretends to, but doesn't. The people's real
will is to have their business done economically and well; and as they
know that they are not in a position to select administrators at the
polls so well as their representatives can select them by giving the
matter thorough-going attention, they greatly prefer, as soon as their
eyes are opened to perceive the mockery of democracy now known
as the "long ballot," to let their representatives select these officials,
and then to hold the representatives strictly accountable for the
trust. Now the unanimous-constituency system of representation,
by insuring the election of a representative body fit to make selec-
tions, between men as well as between measures, on behalf of all—
subject, I should personally hope, to the operation of the initiative,
referendum, and recall (the last named as explained below)-opens
the way for the attainment of efficiency without the sacrifice of a
jot or a tittle of democracy.
1 For majority preferential voting in a representative body no other system than the Nanson need be
considered.
32.
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND THE RECALL.
Hitherto the recall has been applied only to officials elected by a
plurality or majority system. For officials elected thus the method of
applying the recall hitherto in use is perfectly reasonable. For a
representative elected under a proportional or unanimous-constitu-
ency system, however, the method of applying the recall should be
quite different. A representative elected under such a system holds
his seat by virtue of the unanimous support of a body of voters
numerous enough to have a right to fill one of the seats regardless of
the possible opposition of every other voter in the district. To pro-
vide, therefore, that a representative holding his seat on such a basis
could be ousted from it at any time by a mere majority of the voters
of the district would be absurd. But the way out of the difficulty is
simple: provide that when a sufficient number of voters of the district
demand it a multi-membered district, of course, as that is the sine
qua non of proportional representation-a recall election shall be held,
under the proportional rules governing regular elections, for all the
representatives of the district. The result of such an election will be
that every member for the district who still has a "quota" or con-
stituency behind him will get his seat again, and any member who
does not will lose his seat.
One other point in this connection should be covered. There is no
need of providing that officials holding office at the pleasure of the
representative body shall be subject to the recall at all. Why?
Because if it is time to recall such an official it is time to hold recall
elections covering the entire membership of the representative body
itself, for that body should be held absolutely responsible for an
official whom it has the power to replace at pleasure.
These are the principles that should govern the relations between
proportional representation and the recall. In actual practice,
however, it will be found that the use of the recall in connection with
representative bodies elected by good systems of proportional repre-
sentation will scarcely ever be resorted to.
CONCLUSION.
To sum up a few of the points covered by this article, there is no
place at all, in a plan of government suited to modern conditions, for
either primary elections or plurality voting. When the object of the
voting is to make a selection among more than two candidates for
one non-representative office or to make a decision among more
than two measures or policies, the voting should be done by one of
the majority preferential systems explained in the first part of this
article, preferably by the Nanson system where the counting of the
ballots by that system would not be seriously inconvenient. When
the object of the voting is to make up a selection-making or decision-
making body—that is, a deliberative, representative, legislative, policy-
determining body-the voting should be done by a unanimous-con-
stituency or proportional system, such as the Hare, the list, or the
schedule. In majority preferential voting the voter should be allowed
to express his will on the ballot as fully as he pleases; and the will of
the majority should be interpreted, as soon as it is feasible to sup-
plant the systems already in use, by the infallible system of Nanson.
EFFECTIVE VOTING.
33
In unanimous-constituency voting the voter should be allowed to
express his full will not only as fully as he pleases but as exactly as is
feasible; in other words the Hare system should be preferred to the
list or the schedule except where simplicity of counting is required.
The marking of majority ballots should in all cases be by the figures
1, 2, 3, etc.; that of unanimous-constituency ballots by the same
method under the Hare system, by a simple cross under the list or
the schedule system. A representative body elected by a system
insuring true representation should be given the power to select and
to retain in office indefinitely during its pleasure chief administrative
officials of professional experience and attainments.
Finally, to add one point, as bodies supposed to be representative
are made truly representative and the selection and retention of the
chief administrators is given into their hands, so that the majority
voting called for in the selection or retention of such officials is trans-
ferred from the polls to the representative chamber, majority voting
will gradually disappear from elections at the polls and the majority
voting done in the representative chamber will be by the Nanson
system.
Effective voting, the leading principles of which as applied to
American conditions have been explained in this paper, is the indis-
pensable basis of the mechanism of democracy demanded by the needs
of the present and the coming age.
C. G. HOAG,
Secretary of the American Proportional Representation League.
HAVERFORD, Pa.
О
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NOV 9 1978
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