H ■ r£ ■«5 \^ ■ ■ »**. W ■ ■I HI fit- t^ fc 3 SMBK3 PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE OK THE $*£*< Ot«g I Br T. COGAN, M. D. Format enim Natura prius nos intus ad om&ett Fortunarum habitum. — Hor: de Arte Poetic a. SECOND AMERICAN EDITION. NEW-YORK : PUBLISHED BY EVERT DUYCKINCK, G. LONG. AND WILEY AND HALSTID. J. «l J. Harper, Printers* 1821. CMS PREFACE. Amidst the numerous Branches of Knowledge .vhich claim the attention of the human mind, no one can be more important than that which constitutes the subject of the following Treatise. Whatever most intimately concerns ourselves must be of the first moment. The principle of self-love, which is inherent in our nature, immediately suggests that no other species of knowledge can stand in compe- tition with it. Every thing is justly deemed inte- resting which has an immediate relation to ourselves ; and the degrees of its importance are measured by the degrees of its influence upon our Well-being, Therefore, to attend to the workings of our own minds ; to trace the power which external objects have over us ; — to discover the nature of our emo- tions and affections ; — to comprehend the reason of our being affected in a particular manner, must have a direct influence upon our pursuits, our characters; and our happiness. It may with justice be advanced, that the history of ourselves in this department, is of much greater utility than abstruser speculations concerning the metaphysical nature of the human soul, or even the most accurate knowledge of its intellectual powers. For it is according as the pasions and af- fections are excited ; and directed towards the ob- H PREFACE. jecfs investigated by these intellectual powers, that we become useful to ourselves or others ; that we rise into respectability or sink into contempt , that we diffuse or enjoy happiness, diffuse or suir er misery. An accurate Analysis of the passions and pff ec . tions, is to the Moralist, what the science of Anato- my is to the Surgeon. It constitutes the first prin- ciples of rational practice. It is in a moral view, the anatomy of the heart. It discovers why it beats, and hozc it beats ; indicates appearances in a sound and healthy state; detects diseases with their cause \ and it is infinitely more fortunate in the power it communicates of applying suitable remedies. Yet, notwithstanding the superior importance of this Science, it has not engaged the attention of phi- losophers, to an equal degree with the intellectual powers of man. Those who are conscious of the acuteness of their own intellects, have loved to em- ploy them upon subjects the most difficult and ab- struse. Their chief delight has been in the study of natures and essences ; and their ambition, to solve difficulties which have repeatedly occupied and em- barrassed the strongest minds. Patient attention to facts appears to them an employment best adapted to plain and common understandings : it is the pro- vince of Genius to soar above the common level, and penetrate the mists which surround the regions of intellect. When it is asserted that the passions of the mind have not employed the attention of the philosophic world, equally with the other branches which relate to Man, the assertion implies that they have not been totally neglected. Philosophers, in their study of human nature, have not passed them over in si- lence. They have treated them occasionally, but generally speaking, superficially ; chiefly as appen- dages to their other philosophical pursuits. This circumstance, it is acknowledged, has been produc- tive of a train of thought peculiar to each specula- PREFACE. V tor ; and thus has each been able to throw some light upon a subject, which it was not his sole or pri- mary object to investigate. Among the authors who have paid the most atten- tion to the subject, Professor Hutcheson, Dr. Watts, Mr. Grove, the Writer of the article " on the Pas- sions of Men," in the British Encyclopaedia, and Mr. Hume, may justly be placed in the first rank. The observations of Mr. Hutcheson chiefly respect the moral uses of the Passions, which it is not the professed object of the present Treatise to investi- gate. Objections to some of the principles advan- ced by Dr. Watts, and Mr. Grove, as well as other Writers of eminence, are stated in the Introductory Chapter, and will occasionally appear in different parts of this Work. It will therefore be sufficient to remark at present, that the very small degree of information obtained respecting many essential points ; the imperfection of every arrangement hi- therto made ; the almost universal disagreement among philosophers, in their ideas concerning the precise nature of a Passion, Emotion, and Affection, or in what respect they specifically differ from each other, &c. were the principal inducements to the Author of the following Treatise, to pay much great- er attention to the workings of the human mind, than he would have done, had their remarks been more satisfactory. In order to find his way through perplexing labyrinths, he was determined to extend the analytical method much farther than it has hi- therto been pursued ; from a full conviction that, al- though it is not in general the most popular and ac- ceptable mode, it is much the securest, and best adapted to procure a strength of evidence, in philo- sophical, moral, and religious subjects, which ap- proaches to the nature of demonstration. The Treatise now submitted to public candour, contains the history and the result of this process ; in which, however slow and tedious the steps, the Author has been frequently relieved, and sometimes 1* VI PREFACE. amply rewarded, by discoveries which appeared to him equally new and important. If they should ap- pear so to others, he will feel himself completely recompensed for his labour. As he is not without apprehensions that the ana- lytical part will appear much too tedious and prolix, thus he fears that the philosophical observations and inquiries will appear much too superficial ; but he would remind the Reader that his sole object in the present treatise, is to give an epitome of general and influential principles, and not to pursue the develop- ment of any to the extent of which it is susceptible. The natural consequences of this immediate ap- plication to the genuine sources of knowledge, with- out any pre-conceived hypothesis, are, that, in some instances, the author has traced a perfect coinci- dence of opinion between his own and those of pre- ceding Writers on the Passions ; in many, he has corrected his own previous ideas ; in others, he thinks that he has not only discovered errors in preceding Writers, but also the causes of them. Wherever the subject has appeared peculiarly important, the discrepancy great, and the Authorities opposed, re- pectable, he has stated the subject, and his reasons in the adjoined Notes ; that the concatenation of ideas, so necessary in the analytical method, might not suffer interruption. Notwithstanding his utmost care, the Analyzer cannot flatter himself that nothing of importance has escaped his attention. Both the extent and intri- cacy of the subject will, it is hoped, furnish an apo- logy for many defects. Nor can he expect that of the numerous explanations and definitions proposed, they will all be equally acceptable and convincing. Some of them will probably be erroneous. But it may not be improper to remark, that the extraordi- nary versatility of language renders it extremely diffi- cult to seize the precise signification of terms, in every connexion ; and this will sometimes occasion a diversity of opinion, in cases where a criterion FREFACE. VII cannot always be found to which our judgments will uniformly submit. If the Reader should not agree with him in the precise signification of particular terms, the utmost care has been taken that the sense in which the Author has used them shall not be mis- understood : so that the principles he advances must either enforce conviction, or lay themselves fully open to confutation. The copiousness of the subject has principally confined the Work before us to a philosophical in- vestigation of the Passions. Yet in these abstruser investigations, many thoughts occasionally present themselves, properly belonging to the departments of Ethics, and requiring a larger amplification than would be consistent with the design of the present work. The Science of Ethics opens a field for con- templation still more extensive. Although it has so frequently engaged the attention of Moralists, it ap- pears to be inexhaustible ; nor ought we to despair of perpetual additions being added to our stock of knowledge, concerning the nature and importance of our duty. The degree of acceptance with which this Trea- tise has been received by the Philosophic World, encouraged the Author to prosecute his design, and he proceeded to consider the Passions and Affec- tions in a more practical, and perhaps still more in- teresting point of view. The apprehensions which naturally present them- selves, lest public expectation should not be grati- fied, by much novelty, on a subject which has been so frequently treated, are in some measure silenced by a conviction that his attempts will be received with an indulgence similar to that which he has al- ready experienced. Although attention has been paid in these subse- quent editions to several minuter corrections, yet the Author has been reluctant to make such altera- tions in them as might depreciate the value of the preceding, in the opinion of the Purchasers. The viii PREFACE. most considerable change consists in the divisions of the first two Chapters : the new Arrangements, and introductory Emotions being placed at the com- mencement of the second Chapter instead of termi- nating the Jirst : by which he thinks that a more lu- cid order is preserved. Several additions might have been made, but as these could, with equal pro- priety, be inserted in a future Volume, that mode has been preferred. ©©wrasstm PART I, ANALYSIS OF THE PASSIONS. CHAPTER I. GENERAL VIEW OF THE SUBJECT. Page Sect. I. On Passions, Emotions, and Affections ; the spe- cific difference between them ... 13 II. Plans of Arrangement examined . . .23 III. Love and Hatred; their Nature ... 28 IV. Desire and Aversion 35 V. Objects of Love and Hatred .... 38 CHAPTER II. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PASSIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR CHARACTERISTIC DIFFERENCES. Sect. I. Efficient causes of the Passions, &c. examined . 4 J II. Introductory Emotions 44 III, Classifications of the Passions and Affections, as they respect the Selfish or the Social Principle o\\ x CONTENTS. Pag, CLASS I. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS, WHICH OWE THEIR ORIGIN TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-LOVE 5 2 ORDER I. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS, &c. EXCI- TED BY THE IDEA OF GOOD . • 53 Joy, Gladness, &c ibid Contentment 55 Satisfaction ibid Complacency 56 Pride, he 50 Desire 6] Hope . . . . . . . To ORDER II. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS EXCITED BY THE IDEA OF EVIL . . . .72 1. SORROW. . 73 Grief, Melancholy, he 74 Patience, Resignation, Humility ... 75 2. FEAR 77 Consternation, Terror, Dread, Despair, &c. &;c. 7 8 3. ANGER 83 Wrath, Resentment, Indignation, kc. kc. . 8'i CLASS II. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS DERIVED FROM THE SOCIAL PRINCIPLE 90 ORDER I. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS, IN WHICH GOOD IS THE PREDOMINANT IDEA . 94 I. Benevolent Desires and Dispositions . . . ibid 1. Social Affections 95 2. Sympathetic Affections . . . .97 II. Affections derived from Good Opinion . 106 Gratitude 107 Admiration 10S Esteem, Respect . . . . . .112 Veneration, he 113 Fondness, &c 114 ORDER II. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS IN WHICH EVIL IS THE PREDOMINANT IDEA 11". I, Malevolent Desires and Dispositions . . .116 Malignancy, Envy, Rancour, Cruelty. &c, . 117 CONTENTS. Rage, Revenge, kc. Suspicion, Jealousy II. Displacency indicated by unfavourable opinions Horror, Indignation, Contempt, kc. . Page 122 125 ibid PART II. i'HILOSOPHICAL OBSERVATIONS AND INQUIRIES. CHAPTER I. OBSERVATIONS RESPECTING THE LAWS OF EX- CITEMENT . , 131 OBSERVATION I. Surprise the efficient Cause of Passion], ibid II. Affections alone permanent . . . 134 HI. Relations of Passions and Affections to each other . . . . . . 137 IV. Seat of the Passions .... 146 CHPATER II. ♦ VISES WHICH CREATE A DIVERSITY IN OUR AFFECTIONS, ENUMERATED . . 156 1. 2. Experience . Difference of Sex . 157 15S 3. 4. 5. Diversity of Temperament . Progress from Infancy to Age . National Customs . 162 163 . 165 6. Force of Habit 167 7 Self-Love . . . 168 8. Education .... 170 9. Novelty , . 172 10. Fashion 173 11. Love of Singularity . 1T5 12. 13. Popular Prejudices . Associated Affections . . 177 14. Manner in which information is c on- 15. veyed .... Imitative Tones and Representation; . 183 . 164 16. Rhetoric, Oratory, Eloquence . . 18.7 17. The Drams ..... . 190 18. Pre-disnosuig Causes . 191 xii CONTENTS* CHAPTER III. INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS, Sect. I. Medical Influence 195 II. Influence on Thought and Language . 209 III. Influence on Character ...... 216 IV. Influence on Happiness 222 PART I. ANALYSIS OF THE PASSIONS, CHAPTER I. GENERAL VIEW OF THE SUBJECT. SECTION 1. >>■ PASSrO.NS, EMOTIONS, AND AFFECTIONS; THE SPECIFIC Djjfc FERENCE BETWEEN THEM. By Passions, emotions, and affections, we under- stand those stronger or weaker feelings, with their correspondent effects upon the system, which are ex- cited within us, by the perception or contemplation of certain qualities, which belong, or are supposed to belong to the objects of our attention ; and which, in some respect or other, appear interesting to us. In all cases, when the violence of the emotion is not too powerful for the animal economy, the feelings or sensations excited, are pleasant or unpleasant, ac- cording to the nature of the exciting cause, the ideas entertained of it, or the intenseness with which the mind is struck by it. These feelings differ in degrees of strength, according to the apparent im- portance of their cause ; according to certain pecu- liarities of temperament ; and also according to the manner in which the influential qualities are pre- rented to the mind. 2 14 PASSIONS, One or other of the three terms, Passion, Emo- tion, Affection, is always employed to express the sensible effects which objects, or ideas concerning them, have upon the mind ; but they are so fre- quently employed in a vague and indeterminate manner, that some difficulty attends the attempt to restore them to their precise and discriminating sig- nifications. The word, Passion, is thus rendered subject to several peculiarities, in the application of it. Some- times it is used in a generic sense, as expressive of every impression made upon the mind. When we speak of the passions in general, or of a treatise on the passions, we mean not to express the stronger impressions alone, the mildest affections are also in- cluded ; and if we denominate any one to be a per- son of strong passions, we mean that he is subject to violent transports of joy, or grief, or anger, &c* indiscriminately. In one instance the word is em- phatically employed to express suffering / as our Sa- viours passion ; in another it indicates anger exclu- sively ; thus when it is said of any one that he is in a passion, it is universally understood that he is very angry. The term passion, and its adverb pas- sionately, often express a very strong predilection for any pursuit, or object of taste ; a kind of enthu- siastic fondness for any thing. Thus we remark that a person has a passion for music, or that he is passionately fond of painting, &c. &c. In a sense similar to this, is the word also applied to every propensity, which operates strongly and permanent- ly upon the mind ; as the selfish passions, the gene- rous passions. Yet when we mean to particularize any of these, a different law of phraseology is ob- served. The word passion is appropriated by the evil propensities which are uniformly operative. Thus we do not say, the affection of pride, or of avarice, but the passion* The term affection, on the other hand, is appropriated by the virtuous propen- sities ; as the social, friendly, parental, filial, aflfee- PASSIONS. Ij tions, &x. though philosophically considered, the re- lation they bear to the state and workings of the mind, is perfectly analogous. Nor is this capricious latitude of expression con- fined to common language, where accuracy is not always to be expected; it is also obvious among phi- losophers themselves, so that scarcely two authors, who have written upon the subject of the passions, are agreed in their ideas of the terms they emplo} r . While some consider the emotions as highly turbu- lent, others assert that they are in their own nature quiescent :* — Some suppose a Passion to constitute the strength of an emotion ; others confine the idea of a passion to the desire which follows an emo- tion : — Others again represent the Passions as the calmest things in nature, deeming them to be the steady uniform principles of action, to which reason itself is always subservient.f Hence it becomes highly necessary to seek after some rules, which may render our ideas more consistent and uniform. In most of these applications, no attention has been paid to the primitive signification of the word Passion ; although this appears to be the safest method to recall us from those aberrations to which we are perpetually exposed. Few expressions wander so far from their original import, as to con- vey a sense which is totally foreign. The primary idea annexed to the word is that of passiveness, or being impulsively acted upon. In this sense the term properly signifies the sensible effect, the feel- ing to which the mind is become subjected, when an object of importance, suddenly and imperiously, demands its attention. If our imaginations be lively, our temperaments susceptible, the object interesting to us, we cannot avoid being affected, or suffering some powerful change in our dispositions, by its re- cent appearance, or by the suggestion of a some- thing we deem of importance. In all such cases we are obviously passive ; we are acted upon without * Lord Kaims. t Mr, Hume. 16 PASSIONS. any previous determination of the will, or without any consent of our own. As several of our passions are of a disagreeable and painful nature, and as this passive or helpless state is so frequently connected with suffering, the transition from one signification to the other, is not only natural but almost inevitable ; and Passion will often be considered as synonymous with Suffering. In medical language, a person oppressed with dis- ease is called a Patient, an involuntary sufferer, and the calmness with which he submits is termed pa- tience ; that is, the mind yields with tranquillity to the pains and indispositions of the body. The word, Pathology, has also the same derivation : it is the history of the sufferings incident to the human frame. The Greeks expressed passions in general by n-aQoc., which signifies suffering ; and the Latin word Passio, from which we have adopted the term passion, has the same signification. The Stoics also gave the name of veiH to all extraordinary emotions of the soul, because they considered them as mental dis- eases, by which the soul, while under their influ- ence, was reduced to a state of suffering. But this secondary sense, as far as it conveys the idea of an unpleasant or painful sensation, is alone applicable to the effects produced by passions of a certain class: for others are in their own nature pleasing ; as joy and hope : whereas the primitive import of the word, that of passiveness, equally belongs to them all. The mind is equally passive in every effect sudden- ly and unexpectedly produced upon it, where its influence be of a pleasant, or unpleasant nature. (See Note A.) The term, Passion, therefore, may with strict pro- priety be used, and used exclusively, to represent the first feeling, the percussion as it were, of which the mind is conscious from some impulsive cause ; by which it is wholly acted upon, without any ef- forts of its own, either to solicit or escape the im- pression. EMOTIONS. IV Probably it is in allusion to this passive state of the mind, that the terms passion, and passionately, are employed to express the powerful attachment to particular objects mentioned above. They insi- nuate that the influence of these beloved objects, is irresistible ; and that the mind is completely un- der their dominion. The state of absolute passiveness, in consequence of any sudden percussion of mind, is of short dura- tion. The strong impression, or vivid sensation, im- mediately produces a reaction correspondent to its nature, either to appropriate and enjoy, or to avoid and repel the exciting cause. This reaction is very properly distinguished by the term Emotion, The sensible effect produced at the first instant, by the cause of the passion, greatly agitates the frame ; its influence is immediately communicated to the whole nervous system, and the commotions excited in that, indicate themselves by attitudes and motions of the body, and by particular expressions of countenance. These effects are such universal concomitants, that no very important change in the state of the mind can take place, without some visible change, of a correspondent nature in the animal economy. Emotions therefore, according to the genuine sig- nification of the word, are principally and primi- tively applicable to the sensible changes and visible effects, which particular passions produce upon the frame, in consequence of this reaction, or particu- lar agitation of mind. It is alone by these visible ef- fects that the subject is discovered to be under the influence of any passion ; and it is alone by the par- ticular changes produced, or kind of emotion, that we are enabled to judge of the nature of the passion. Thus, although the passion exists prior to the emo- tions, yet as these are its external signs, they must indicate its continued influence, as long as they con- tinue to agitate the system. In consequence of this immediate connexion, the words passions and emo- tions, are, in familiar discourse, where no philoso- 2* IS EMOTIONS. phical precision is requisite, used synonymously: though, in reality, the latter are uniformly the effects of the former. Here, as in innumerable other in- stances, figurative modes of expression are adopted. The Synecdoche is perpetually employed, by which, cause and effect are confounded, or substituted the one for the other. Since emotions are faithful indi- cations of their correspondent passions, and strong passions are always productive of emotions, we should deem it a pedantic precision to select, at all limes, the appropriate word, when we mean simply to express the general effect. However, the term Emotion is sometimes expres- sive of lively sensations which do not produce visi- ble effects, in any degree proportionate to their feelings. In emotions the mind is not so complete- ly, or necessarily passive. In general it possesses some power over the external signs ; and in many cases, where the feelings would be too strong to re- main concealed, were they totally void of control, some other influential affection, either of fear, re- spect, humanity, &c. may serve to repress or mo- derate their effects, and confine them to imoard emotions. Again, the term is frequently employed to mark the first impression, which particular objects make upon susceptible minds, whether they remain con- cealed or not. Thus in the fine Arts, the charms of musical compositions which are novel to us ; — the first view of a gallery of paintings possessing distinguished merit ; — the surprise of a beautiful or elevated sentiment, or poetic description, will gene- rally make a more vivid impression upon us, than that which is felt in a continued, or renewed con- templation of the same subjects ; and yet these im- pressions may not be so forcible as to produce the transports accompanying emotions from other cau- ses. But the difference is simply in degree, not in kind. This species of enjoyment is peculiar to minds highly cultivated, whose repeated enjoyments of AFFECTIONS. 19 similar nature have gradually moderated transports, and whose emotions have gradually subsided into gentler undulations, if I may thus express myself, in place of those agitations which the inexperienced would inevitably betray upon similar occasions. The third term, Affection^ has, in itself, a differ- ent signification from either of the above. It always represents a less violent, and generally a more dura- ble influence, which things have upon the mind. It is applicable to the manner in which we are affected by them for a continuance. It supposes a more de- liberate predilection and aversion, in consequence of the continued influence of some prevailing qua- lity. This distinguishes it from the transient im- pulse of Passion. • Nor is it intimately connected with any external signs; which distinguishes it from Emotions. The affections sometimes succeed to pas- sions and emotions, because these may have been excited by something which becomes permanently interesting ; or they may be gradually inspired, by a deliberate attention to the good or bad qualities of their objects. In this philosophic sense of the word, Affection is applicable to an unpleasant as well as a. pleasant state of the mind, when impressed by any object or quality. It may be produced by whatever torments qr corrodes the heart, as well as that which charms and delights it. Usage, however, chiefly applies the word to the kindly and beneficent affections. When we remark that a person has an affectionate heart, we mean to applaud his being under the in- fluence of the best affections, of a social and relative nature. With other writers on the Passions, we shall al- ways use the term in the philosophical sense ; and apply it equally to whatever produces more per- manent feelings in the mind, whether they be pleas- ing or painful, of a benevolent or malevolent cha- racter. 20 AFFECTIONS. As in Passions and Emotions, thus in the Affec- tions, several gradations of influence are observable. Some affections indicate themselves so strongly, that they approach to emotions ; some may require a penetrating eye to discover them ; — some may be powerfully indulged with such self command, that they shall elude the most critical observation ; — and some have such an equal and uniform influence as to blend, as it were, with the temper, and almost lose the name of affection ; as generosity, fortitude, hu- mility, patience, resignation. When there is a propensity to indulge one parti- cular affection, or class of affections, more than an- other, arising from peculiarity of temperament, edu- cation, connexions, habits, &c. we consider this propensity as an indication of Temper or habitual Disposition. Thus we speak of a benevolent, grateful, cheerful, timorous, revengeful temper. These characters do not imply, that the subject is perpetually under the influence of the particular af- fection, but they mark his propensity towards it. The Affections therefore refer to the actual impres- sion made upon the mind by certain qualities, real or supposed ; and the Temper or Disposition is that particular cast of mind, which renders the percep- tion of certain qualities capable of making a more prompt, or a more durable impression upon one per- son than upon another. We deem that man to be irascible, who is disposed to be angry at trifles; and him we praise as humane, who is always disposed to commiserate sufferings. It is hoped that the above explanations of the terms, Passions, Emotions, and Affections, will ob- tain the approbation of philosophic Readers, since they were suggested to the Author by an attention to the workings of the human mind. If approved, they cannot appear unimportant, as they will serve to indicate both mutual relations and characteristic differences, in the impressions which surrounding PASSIONS, &C. 21 objects, or ideas concerning them, make upon us ; and although an attention to these minute distinc- tions may not always he necessary in common lan- guage, and would sometimes be absurd, yet the want of precision has always been severely felt in philo- sophical investigations, and is a principal cause of the obscurities in which they are too frequently in- volved. It will be allowed by every attentive ob- server, that the process which we have character- ized by the above terms, does take place in the hu- man mind, when exposed to the sudden and power- ful influence of particularly interesting objects. Such objects are irresistibly forced upon his atten- tion, independent of a will or determination of his own ; they often produce great agitations hoth of mind and body; and when these agitations have subsided, the mind retains some degree of predilec- tion or aversion for them. As these distinctions are clearly and satisfactorily expressed, by the parti- cular terms we have given to each, this is- a full indication that they are the most appropriate. (Sec Note B.) The above observations are not confined to a simple process, which takes place from more sim- ple causes. After we have supposed a passion, in- dicated by an emotion, to be succeeded by some correspondent affection, we may still consider this affection as the parent of new passions, emotions, and affections, according to the variety of circum- stances connected with it. It may inspire fear, as when the object of our affection is in a perilous state; it may excite earnest desire, or sanguine hope. Some of these new passions and affections will arouse to action ; as when the strong sense of an injury excites to revenge : others chill and de- press the spirits, as sorrow and despair. Yet in the midst of all these diversities, the characteristic differences between Passions, Emotions, and Affec- tions, are equally obvious. 22 APPETITES. Confining ourselves, therefore, to what we deem the genuine import of the words, in opposition to the irregularities of custom, we shall, as often as it may he necessary to observe distinctions, uniformly apply the term Passion, to the violent impression made upon our minds, by the perception of some- thing very striking and apparently interesting ; Emotion, to the external marks, or visible changes produced by the impetus of the passion upon the corporeal system ; and Affections, to the less vio- lent, more deliberate, and more permanent impres- sions by causes which appear sufficiently interest- ing. The range of affection, may be from those stronger feelings which are proximate to emotions, to the mildest sensations of pleasure or displeasure we can possibly perceive. Most writers on the Pathology of the mind, agree to distinguish between Appetites and Passions. The former they refer to corporeal wants, each of which creates its correspondent desire ; and the in- dulgence of this desire is termed Gratification. The latter they ascribe immediately to the mind. In this the Moderns differ from the Ancients. The word Appetitus, from which that of Appetite is deriv- ed, is applied by the Romans and Latinists, to de- sires in general, whether they primarily related to the body or not : and with obvious propriety ; for the primitive signification is, the seeking after what- ever may conduce either to Gratification or Happi- ness. Thus Cicero observes, " Motus animorum duplices sunt ; alteri, cogitationis ; alteri Appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur ; Appetitus impeilit ad agendum." By two powers of action being thus placed in contrast to each other, and the one applied to thought simply, it is obvious that the other comprehends every species of desire, whether of a mental or corporeal nature. Meta- physicians also, who have written in the Latin lan- guage, use the word Appetitus in the same latitude. ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. 23 The modern distinction has the advantage of im- mediately pointing out a difference in the nature and character of the objects which interest us, ac- cording as they relate to the body or to the mind. But although we shall consider the appetites as con- fined to corporeal wants and cravings, we must still observe that they are as frequently the occasions of passions and emotions, as other objects which are peculiarly adapted to the mind. Eager hope, joy ; fear, anger, are daily manifested by the Infant, whose desires are wholly confined to animal wants ; and the keenest sensations of anger, jealousy, envy, &c. are intimately connected with the carnal Appetites of maturer age. Whatever is therefore beyond the mere instinctive appetite, becomes the province of the mind ; and the influence which various crav- ings of nature have upon its ideas and conceptions, give rise to mental affections and passions. The subject of the present discussion obviously relates to these, without requiring particular attention to the existing cause. SECTION II. PLANS OF ARRANGEMENT EXAMINED. So numerous and multifarious are the Passion?, Affections, and Emotions, in their connexions and ramifications, that it is difficult to propose a plan of Arrangement, which shall be, in every respect, un- exceptionable. By preferring one method, we may be deprived of some advantages attending another : and in all, it may be necessary to anticipate many things, which a rigid attention to order could not possibly permit. Some Writers on the Passions, have placed them in contrast to each other, as hope and fear, joy and sorrow : — Some have considered them as they are personal, relative, social : — Some 24 ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. according to their influence at different periods of life : — Others according as they relate to past, pre- sent, or future time ; as sorrow principally refers to things past, joy and anger to present senses, hope and fear respect futurity. The Academicians advanced, that the principal passions were fear, hope, joy, and grief. Thus Virgil : Hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque, dolentqut. They included aversion and despair under the fourth ; and hope, fortitude, and anger, under desire. But not to observe that this arrangement is much too general in some respects, and defective in others ; —that the characters of hope and of anger are too opposite to each other, to be placed under the same head ; — that anger has no particular claim to be classed with desire, excepting when it excites a de- sire of revenge, which is not always the case ; — and that desire is so comprehensive a term as to em- brace numberless other affections ; not to insist upon these objections, it is manifest that the passions enu- merated cannot be primitive or cardinal, since some other affections or passions must be prior to them : We must love, or hate, before we can either desire- rejoice, or fear, or grieve. Dr. Hartley has arranged the Passions under five grateful, and five ungrateful ones. The grateful ones, are love, desire, hope, joy, and pleasing recollec- tion; the ungrateful are hatred, aversion, fear, grief, displeasing recollection. The objections to this or- der are, that all these cannot be considered as car- dinal passions. Love must precede desire, hope, and joy ; and hatred must precede fear. Nor do the distinctions themselves appear sufficiently accu- rate. Hope is certainly a species of desire ; pleas* ing recollection is a modification of love ; aversion is only a particular manner of testifying hatred ; and displeasing recollections are sometimes the renew* al of grief, sometimes of anger. ARRANGEMEMTS EXAMINED. L 2o Dr. Watts divides the passions into primitive and derivative. The primitive he subdivides into two ranks : 1. Admiration, love, and hatred ; 2. The diverse kinds of love and hatred, as esteem, con- tempt, benevolence, malevolence, complacency, displacency. The derivatives are desire, aversion, hope, fear, gratitude, anger, &c. But the title of Admiration to be considered as a primitive passion, does not appear to be so valid as that of the other two associated with it. Love and hatred are in universal exercise ; Admiration is merely occasional. The former indicate themselves from the instant we have any powers of discern- ment, or the smallest degree of experience, respect- ing the nature of objects ; the latter is the result of some degree of knowledge : it implies a spirit of inquiry ; and demands some portion of taste for par- ticular qualities, adapted to excite this emotion. Minds the most infantile, and uncultivated, will ma- nifest that they love and hate, long before they have, an opportunity of testifying their admiration. We might also observe, that a subdivision of the primi- tive passions into two ranks creates a suspicion, if it do not fully indicate, that they cannot all be equally primitive ; and the instances given under the second rank, may justly be considered as differ- ent modifications of the two grand principles, and not as primitives of a distinct character. It is far- ther obvious, that the doctor's plan makes no dis- tinction between the Passions and Affections, which the nature of the subject not only admits, but re- quires. Mr. Grove, adopting in part the arrangement of Dr. Watts, reduces all the passions to the three heads of admiration, love, and hatred ; which he styles accordingly, the primitive passions. The Others he denominates mixed passions ; which he describes to be those which have admiration blend- ed with them, and those compounded of the pas- sions that fall under love and hatred. As the above 3 lb ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. remarks are no less applicable to this arrangement, I shall only observe, that since Mr. Grove has defin- ed admiration to be " That sudden surprise at the novelty of an object, by which the soul is fastened down to the contemplation of it," there seems to be a peculiar impropriety in his placing it among the primitive passions : and this impropriety is increas- ed by another observation which he makes, viz. that " Admiration seems to be a more speculative pas- sion, as being employed chiefly about the novelty or grandeur of objects." For which reason he places the chief energy of this passion u in the brain," which he denominates " the grand instrument, or condition rather, of thought and contemplation." He adds, " in the other passions, which, respecting the good or evil of objects, proceed from a princi- ple of self-preservation, the spirits agitated are in the heart, the fountain of life, and fittest residence of those motions of the animal spirits, which are in- tended for the benefit and preservation of life."* These observations certainly increase the diffi- culty of admitting admiration among the primitive passions. It may also be justly doubted whether the author's ideas of the nature of admiration be always admissible. But this is not the place to discuss that point. The above comments upon the most material arrangements which have hitherto been followed, render some other classification desirable, which may be exempt from similar objections. Perhaps the securest method to obtain this end, will be previously to recollect, what is the first and leading principle of our nature ; and then inquire what are the necessary consequences of this principle, in beings formed as we are, placed in various situa- tions, and surrounded by an infinite variety of circumstances. By thus attending to the history of the human mind, and tracing the manner in which it is affected by various causes, a proper arrangement •■ See System of Moral Philosophy j Chap. VII. of the Passions. ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. 27 may present itself. We shall, at least, avoid these mistakes and embarrassments, into which men of eminence have been betrayed, by pursuing other methods. It will be universally acknowledged, that it is es- sential to the nature of every sensitive and intelli- gent being, to be gratified with, or delight in Well- being, This is so evident a principle, that the con- trary cannot be supposed fora moment. Both reason and feeling unite to establish this axiom. We all feel the inestimable value of happiness, and we all know that to delight in misery, is a contradiction : it would be to annihilate misery. (See Note C.) This Well-being, or grateful state of existence, we unite to denominate an essential Good ; and its op- posite an essential Evil. Whatever promotes this state, we deem to be productive of good ; whatever is an impediment to it, or occasions a state of uneasy sensation, we consider as productive of evil. These ideas naturally lead us to esteem that as a Good also, which is productive of this desirable state ; and to characterize as an Evil, whatever is in- imical to it. Cause and effect are so intimately con- nected in our imagination, that we not only substi- tute the one for the other, by a figurative mode of speaking, but we o x uickly learn to consider that as a good in itself, which appears uniformly to be the means or instrument of good ; and to contemplate as an Evil, whatever we suspect to have a pernicious tendency. Under the impression of this sentiment, we indulge a predilection for the one, and feel an ab- horrence of the other. It is impossible for the attentive and considerate mind to view or contemplate objects so diametrically opposite as apparent Good, or apparent Evil, either with total indifference, or with the same kind of sen- sation. We inevitably look upon what we deem to be a Good, or conducive to happiness with a pleasant sensation. We deem it desirable, and it inspires the affection of Love. Whatever occasions, or threa- 28 LOVE AND HATRED. tens a privation of happiness, or inflicts positive mis- ery, we view with displeasure, we consider it as injurious, or as an absolute evil, and it inspires the affection of Hatred : that is, we feel a strong at- tachment of the heart to whatever may contribute to Well-being, and we contemplate the reverse with feelings of displeasure, detestation, and abhorrence. Although it may be said, without impropriety, that we all love to be happy, and hate to be misera- ble ; yet this is such a self-evident truth, that it is very seldom uttered. The two expressions there- fore, Love and Hatred, are almost entirely applied to the cause, means, or instruments of well-being or wretchedness ; and we are habituated to love what- ever is instrumental to our existing in a desirable state, and to. hate its opposite* SECTION III. LOVE AND HATRED; THEIR NATURE, These two affections arise, immediately and in- evitably, from our perpetual solicitude to enjoy the existence we possess. They are coeval with our ideas of Good and Evil. They are experienced by every one, in every situation, and in every period of life. They are inspired by every object which possesses some peculiarity, or is apparently endow- ed with some quality, of a beneficial or a pernicious tendency ; that is, by whatever is able, according to our conceptions, to promote or impede enjoyment or happiness : from the smallest gratification up to the most exalted felicity 5 from the smallest discom- fiture, to the depth of misery. They are also the parents of every other passion and affection ; and the history of the human mind is no other than a de- velopement of their operations, in that diversity of situations and circumstances, in which it may be occasionally placed. These characters will ua- LOVE. 29 doubtedly entitle them to the denomination of pri- mary or cardinal affections. As no others are in the same predicament, they cannot deserve the same appellations ; for they can only be considered as derived from these. We cannot therefore, commence our minute in- quiry into the passions, with greater probability of success, than by paying previous attention to these two affections. I. LOVE. Love may be considered either as a principle or as an Affection. As a principle, it may be defined an invariable preference of Good; an "universal and permanent attachment to Well-being or Happi-* ncss." In this point of view it has already been remarked, that the love of good, and solicitude to procure it, is not only the ruling principle of every sentient being, but it meets with the full approbation of every rational being. For nothing can excel that which is Good, and nothing can be valuable, but as it has a tendency to promote it. Hence when we speak of love abstractedly, we call it the Principle of love : for it is the principle by which the whole tenour of our conduct is directed ; and it retains that appellation, as long as we speak of it as a general principle of action. When this principle is directed towards any par- ticular object it becomes an Affection', that is, the mind becomes well disposed, or pleasingly affected towards that object ; and whenever this love is more violent in its effects upon the system, it is even deemed a Passion. The affection will be diversified, and acquire va- rious characters, according to the nature of the ob- ject, or the peculiar qualities it may seem to possess ; and also according to its various relations. This affection may relate to ourselves ; to those with whom we are connected, by the closest bonds 3* 30 LOVE. of nature or intimacy ; to the whole of our species ; to those beings of inferior order in the creation, which are rendered capable of possessing any por- tion of enjoyment ; and even to things inanimate. When the affection of Love immediately relates to ourselves personally, it is called Self-love ; and it marks the peculiar concern and solicitude we enter- tain for our own interest, prosperity, or enjoyment. The principle of self love generally operates with the greatest force upon the mind ; for every circum- stance which affects our own happiness, makes the most vivid impressions. This is naturally the source of many abuses which have brought the term itself into disrepute. But Self-affection, when it does not interfere with the claims of others, is not only an innocent affection, but it manifests the wisdom and benevolence of the great Source of good. By rendering every Being active in the pursuit of his own happiness, the greatest quantum of general good is most effectually secured. As the largest commu- nities consist of Individuals, were each individual to seek his own welfare, without prejudice to his neighbour, the individual stock of each would ren- der happiness universal* (See Note D.) When our love or desire of Good goes forth to others, it is termed Good will, or Benevolence. This usually operates with various degrees of force, ac- cording to our various connexions and degrees of intimacy. It may possibly render the interest and happiness of those with whom we are more imme- diately connected, by the bonds of nature or friend- ship, equally dear to us as our own. It has, in some instances, been known to exert a more powerful in- fluence. Of this truth, the love of Parents towards their own offspring frequently presents us with striking instances. Admiration of personal excel- lencies, habits of intimacy, gratitude for benefits re- ceived, &c. may also increase our attachment to in- dividuals, until it rival the natural influence of self* love. LOVE. 31 All these powerful ties are usually characterized by the term Affection ; as the conjugal, parental, filial affections ; and those who possess these at- tachments, in an exemplary degree, are termed affectionate parents, children, relatives, friends. When love extends to the whole human race, it is termed Philanthropy; a principle which com- prehends the whole circle of social and moral vir- tues. Considering every man as his neighbour, and loving his neighbour as truly and invariably as he loves himself, the Philanthropist cannot be unjust or ungenerous. In its utmost extent, the love of Benevolence em- braces all beings capable of enjoying any portion of good ; and thus it becomes universal Benevolence : which manifests itself by being pleased with the share of good every creature enjoys ; — in a dispo- sition to increase it ;— - in feeling an uneasiness at their sufferings ; — and in the abhorrence of cruelty, under every disguise, or pretext. When these dispositions are acting powerfully, towards every being capable of enjoyment, they are called the benevolent affections; and as these be- come, in those who indulge them, operative rules of conduct, or principles of action, we speak of the benevolent principle. It has been remarked, that predilection for Good, as the e/u?, enstamps a value upon the means pro- ductive of this end. This creates an affection for various qualities and propensities, which we pro- nounce to be Good, when they possess the power, or indicate the disposition to promote happiness or enjoyment. If these be eminently good qualities, we call them Excellencies ; and if they be connected with the characters and conduct of moral agents, they are moral excellencies. From the habitual pleasure which the contem- plation of Excellence inspires, without our advert- ing perpetually to the benefits which may accrue from it, we may be induced to imagine that we love 32 HATRED. things deemed excellent, for their own sakes ab- stracted from their power of becoming useful. But this is impossible. Every excellence contains a capability to possess or to communicate good. No- thing which deserves the name, can be in its own nature inert. An useless excellence is a contradic- tion. The propensity to love what is productive of good, extends itself much farther than to the powers and properties of moral agents. We naturally ac- quire an attachment to every object, animate or in- animate, which has been the habitual instrument of good to us, or is capable of contributing to our gra- tification or advantage. Their latent powers first induce us to value them as treasures in reserve ; our opinion of their capacity to become servicea- ble, inclines us to place our affections upon them ; and in process of time, they will, by the association of ideas, excite pleasing emotions, although their powers of utility are not always in our recollection* (See Note E.) II. HATRED. Hatred expresses the manner in which we are affected, by our perception of whatever we suppose to be an Evil. It is not confined to absolute suffer- ing ; it marks also our abhorrence of whatever ex- poses to the danger of absolute suffering, or the di- minution of that portion of good we enjoy, or wish to possess. Hatred of misery and its causes, is a natural and necessary consequence of our solicitude to possess Good ; and the affection of Hatred is as naturally inspired by that state, conduct, disposition, which is productive of, or threatens to induce pernicious or disagreeable consequences, as the affection of Love is attached to their contraries. Nor is our hatred at all times confined to that particular quality, or pe- culiarity of circumstance, which is immediately un- HATRED. 3$ friendly to us. It is apt to raise unpleasant ideas, and to create prejudices against many things, which in themselves are far from heing the objects of ha- tred, and which may be highly advantageous, merely because they have been displeasing or injurious to us in particular instances. As our predilection for whatever proves acceptable, will often prevent our discerning its pernicious qualities, thus do we fre- quently extend our hatred far beyond the just limits, until we betray our ignorance, or manifest that we are under the dominion of invincible prejudice. Personal Hatred, or Malevolence towards an in- dividual, commences with some circumstance, qua- lity, or disposition which is displeasing to us ; or with some species of injury committed or intended. It has these for its professed objects. But here also a quick and powerful transition is instantaneously made, in our imaginations, from an incidental blem- ish, to the whole of character ; — from a single act, we are prone to form unfavourable sentiments of general conduct ; — and the lively sense of an injury annihilates too frequently every species of merit in the offender. This is obviously the source of ha- treds, long and inveterate. But notwithstanding these excesses and exagge- f rations of Hatred and Malevolence, yet they can- not possibly be so extensive in their operations as the principle of Love. The affection of Hatred has particular and partial evils alone for its objects, while the principle of Love may embrace the uni- verse. As nutritious aliments are infinitely more numerous than the substances which are of a poison- ous quality, thus does the number of those things which are pleasing, beneficial, important in their nature, infinitely exceed those which are either in themselves comfortless, or detrimental, or calcula- ted to foster a malevolent disposition. The true object of Hatred is alone some particular and par- tial evil, which we experience or dread; — some in- cidental interruption to the usual tenour of our feel- 34 HATRED. ings ; — or some pernicious quality which may threaten this interruption. The objects of our fears, our anger, or our grief, are considered in the light of robberies, or painful privations, and not as permanent causes of the malevolent affections. They are not looked upon as streams perpetually flowing from one inexhaustible source, but as inter- ruptions to an usual or desirable state, by adventi- tious causes. Happiness appears to be our birth- right, of which all the painful sensations raised by hatred, are the professed guardians. The wish for happiness is perpetual and unlimited, while our evil affections expire with the causes which gave them existence. Nor can malevolence extend itself to every individual in the creation, in a manner simi- lar to the contrary virtue. That happy cultivation of our nature, which inspires a benevolence to- ward all animated beings, cannot possibly have a perfect contrast, or complete parallel, in the most uncultivated and brutalized. This would constitute a ferocity of character which can scarcely be found in the most insane. When tyrants, cruel and fe- rocious, are diffusing misery, in the wantonness of their power, their conduct does not proceed from an abstract principle of universal hatred ; — but from some low policy of self-defence ; — from an infernal spirit of revenge for supposed injuries ; — from inor- dinate self-love, which creates an insensibility to hu- man woes ; — from pride, vanity, and excessive igno- rance, which induce men to imagine that they shall be revered as deities, because they imitate the de- structive thunder of heaven ; and to dream that their favourite idol Power, can only be made known and established, by deeds which excite consterna- tion and horror! Indeed the affection of Hatred is of so unpleasant a nature, that the Being who could hate every thing, would be his own tormentor. The sole pleasure of which malevolence is capable, proceeds from the gratification of revenge ; which can only DESIRE AND AVERSION, be directed against particular objects. Nor is it merely bounded ; it is irritating, unsatisfactory, and purchased by the sacrifice of all the enjoyments which flow from the contrary disposition. SECTION IV. DESIRE AND AVERSION. With the affections of Love and Hatred, are in- timately connected the affections of Desire and Aversion. That is, we constantly desire, and are solicitous to possess or accomplish, whatever is pleasing or beneficial ; and we are averse from, and endeavour to shun, whatever is displeasing, or threatens to be pernicious. These two affections are therefore the necessary consequences of the preceding. They are accompanied with a certain eagerness of mind, either to obtain or escape, which is not so essential to the former. Love and Hatred may be inspired by a calmer contemplation of ex- cellence or demerit, or any of the causes of happi- ness or misery, without our having an immediate interest in them ; — as when we reflect upon benefi- cial discoveries or destructive errors. The princi- ple of Love may approve of worthy conduct or re- spectable characters, from which we can expect no benefit to ourselves ; and that of hatred may de- spise viilanies by which we cannot be injured. Desire and Aversion refer to particular objects, which have some relation to ourselves ; and they are indicated by some effort of mind, either to pos- sess the promised good, or to repel the impending evil. Desire and Aversion are to be considered therefore as manifestations of love and hatred ; and ihe earnest application of these principles, in each particular instance of their excitement. As Love and Hatred may be resolved into that 36 DESIRE AND AVERSION* one principle, the love of Well-being, thus may the affections of Desire and Aversion be resolved into Desire ; although the use of both terms is, in com- mon language, necessary, in order to distinguislvthe objects of our pursuit, from those we wish to shun. Strictly speaking, Aversion is no other than a par- ticular modification of Desire ; a desire of being liberated from whatever appears injurious to well- being. The objects in our possession, productive of this good, we desire to retain. We are con- scious of this desire every time we appreciate the worth of the object, and it is necessarily excited when we are under the apprehensions of privation. If the Good, or the means of good, be not in our possession, we desire to obtain them : if a privation be unjustly attempted by any one, and the passion of anger be excited, the desire of preserving or re- covering the object, is connected with a desire to chastise the aggressor : if it be in danger from any other cause, the fear of loss is excited by the desire of securing, and if we be actually deprived, the hopeless desire of regaining, is an essential ingre- dient in our grief for the loss. But although, in this philosophical sense, Desire may seem to be equally extensive with the affection of Love, yet it is necessarily more confined in its application. Love relates to all things which ap- pear good and beneficial in themselves, or to beings capable of receiving good. It comprehends the things enjoined, and the state of pleasing existence, in which those beings are actually placed, as well as the desirableness of such a state, and all the means and instruments of good. Desire mostly refers to the state in which we are not. It solicits some favourable change, and exerts itself to obtain it. Hatred also is universally applicable to what- ever appears pernicious or displeasing in itself: Aversion more immediately concerns whatever appears pernicious or displeasing to us* These Affections may be considered as the satellites of DESIRE AND AVERSION. 37 Love and Hatred, perpetually accompanying them, and prompt to execute their orders. Wherever love or hatred direct their immediate attention, desire &nd aversion seek to appropriate or repel. Thus it appears that the love of good and hatred of evil ; the desire of possessing good and escaping evil ; are the leading principles of our nature. The love of good commences with our existence, and the desire of good is coeval with our powers of discernment. Neither of them will leave us, until we cease to exist, or lose the consciousness of our own sensations and perceptions. Whatever diver- sity there may be in our situations, however various and opposite the objects engaging our attention, however versatile our humours, these remain the im- mutable principles of action. They pervade the animal system, as the electric fluid pervades the material ; and though, like that, they may sometimes be latent, yet, like that, they may be instantaneously roused into vivid action, and manifest both their existence and their power by the effects they pro- duce. Human nature possesses various sensitive and mental powers, to each of which an infinite diver- sity of objects is adopted : and as the gratification of each communicates pleasure, we are prone to estimate every thing as a Good, which is capable of contributing to these gratifications ; and every thing as an Evil which opposes them. However, a contrariety or opposition frequently takes place between the higher and inferior pursuits of our nature ; in consequence of which the interests or gratifications of the one, must yield to those of the other. As sensual objects, and things which ad- minister to our immediate desires, are apt to make the strongest impressions and captivate our atten- tion, in preference to things less sensual and more remote, though of superior importance, thus do we frequently deem that to be a Good, which is virtuaJ- 4 38 OBJECTS OF ly an Evil. We may also deem that to be an Evil which is virtually a Good, as being productive of extensive, exalted, or permanent advantage. But notwithstanding these facts, we still pursue every thing as an apparent Good ; and we avoid every thing under the idea of its being an Evil, of great- er or less magnitude. Our appetites, our particu- lar propensities, our imaginations, our passions may spread deceitful charms over some objects; and our want of attention, our ignorance, our impa- tience of present restraints and inconveniences, or the perverseness of our affections, may render ob- jects inimical in their appearance, which are bene- ficial in their tendency : yet our Desires are alone excited by the idea of some enjoyment or advan- tage ; and things are rendered objects of our aver- sion alone because they are disagreeable to our feelings, or threaten to endanger, some way or other, our Well-being. (See note F.) SECTION V. OBJECTS OF LOVE AND HATRED; THEIR CHARAC- TERISTICS. Should it be asked, "in what do this Good and Evil consist ?" it would be difficult to give a satis- factory answer. To say that they consist in a certain consciousness of well-being, or of a comfortless ex- istence, would be little more than to assert that hap- piness consists in being happy, and misery in being miserable. The following observations however, will discover to us what we expect in the means of good, and what we deem to be the causes of unhap- piness ; and they will indicate where these are prin- cipally to be found. Creatures formed like ourselves, with different organs of sense, with various powers of mind ac- companied with quick perceptions and high sensi- , 10VE AND HATRED. 39 bility ; creatures endowed with great diversities of dispositions, tastes, propensities, must be variously affected by every thing around them. We are, as it were, plunged into the universe " tremblingly alive all o'er," and we are rendered capable of receiving impressions, pleasant or unpleasant, from every object which addresses our senses, From every thing we perceive, and from every thing of which we can form an idea. Nothing in this vast uni- verse can, at all seasons, be totally indifferent to every person in it; nothing is so inert as to be in- capable of exerting some influence, in one connex- ion or other, and of calling forth a correspondent passion or affection. These effects are produced by our Perception or Supposition of certain powers, properties, or quali- ties, in the different objects, by which ideas of an agreeable or disagreeable nature, are excited within us. The diverse influences of these are to be ascribed to an apparent Aptitude or Correspon- dence, in some objects, with the frame and consti- tution of our nature, and to an inaptitude or want of correspondence in others ; to a certain coinci- dence between properties and relations in objects and circumstances, with the appetites, powers, pro- pensities of our nature, the gratification of which seems to promote our well-beings or to the want of this coincidence, or the exertion of a contrary power which constitutes our misery. The diversity of attributes, seated in different ob- jects, and the no less diversity in our situations, and in circumstances surrounding us, render it difficult to make choice of such terms as may be universally appropriate. It may therefore be necessary to ob- serve, that by attribute, property, quality, &c. is meant to express that peculiarity, whatever it may be, which exerts an influence upon us ; and these terms are used to indicate the distinguishing charac- teristics of various objects, as they are connected with some singularity in state, circumstance, or con- 40 OBJECTS OP LOVE AND HATRED* duct, without the real or supposed existence of which, the passions and affections could not have been excited. (See Note G.) The subjects possessing this real or apparent apti- tude and coincidence, or inaptitude, relate to our animal wants, to the various powers and employ- ments of our minds ; to our state and connexions as social beings ; and also to the opinions entertain- ed respecting our relation to a superior Being, or to a future state of existence. The various objects soliciting our attention under these heads ; the degrees of their suitability, excel- lence, importance, or the contrary : — our ideas and mistakes concerning them ; — the facility, or diffi- culty, with which some things are pursued, obtained, preserved, lost, dismissed ; — the uncertainty, dan- gers, contrarieties to which we are constantly ex- posed, respecting whatever may appear interesting, are perpetually engaging our affections, or exciting our passions, during the whole of our passage through life, from the cradle to the grave ! Thus is that love of Well-being which is one and simple in its principle, most wonderfully diversified in its operations ! Every object, every circumstance, every idea which can enter the mind, makes some impression upon us, of a pleasant or unpleasant na- ture ; it contributes a something towards, or deducts from, the Good we seek. They all contain powers and properties, by which we are attracted towards the grand desideratum, Happiness, or are repelled to various distances from it ! EFFICIENT CAUSES, &C. 41 CHAPTER H. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PASSIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR CHARACTERISTIC DIFFERENCES. SECTION I. THE EFFICIENT CAUSES OF THE PASSIONS, EMOTIONS AND AFFECTIONS EXAMINED. The Affections and Passions, to which the cir- cumstances stated in the preceding chapter, give rise, are not only extremely numerous, but like their exciting causes, they are so connected and in- termixed, that to arrange them in a lucid order, would be almost as impracticable as to form a regu- lar path through the Hercynian Wood. Very few of the passions or affections are perfectly simple ; some are extremely complex. Their complexities are so various, that it is almost impossible to restore each to its appropriate place ; and the most opposite affections are so intermixed, that it is very difficult to assign to each its due share of influence. In this labyrinth, an attention to the following facts may perhaps furnish us with something of a clue. Some of our passions and affections are inspired by circumstances which more immediately relate to ourselves, and to our own personal interests ; that is, they belong to the principle of Self-love : Some of them belong to the social principle, and refer to our connexions with our own species, or to all animated natures. In some of our Passions and Affections, the ideas q^ good are obviously predominant, in others the ideas of evil. The Passions and Affections, which relate to Self- love, and are excited by the idea of a Good, mav 4* 42 EFFICIENT CAUSES OF either refer to the good which is actually in ourpos* session, and communicate various degrees of enjoy- ment, from simple gratification to ecstacies ; or The good we love may not be in our possession ; but it may appear attainable, and become the object of our Desire ; or Though it be not in our possession, circumstances may appear highly favourable to our attaining it, and it may thus inspire Hope* The state in which Evil is the predominant idea, referring to ourselves, may relate ; To the loss of that good which we possessed, or to disappointments respecting the good we desired, and hoped to obtain ; inspiring Sorrow with its vari- ous modifications ; or We may be apprehensive concerning the loss of what we possess ; concerning the approach of some positive evil ; or concerning the accomplishment of our desires, which introduces the family of Fear. The cause of both sorrow and fear may be some Agent, whose designed conduct, or even whose in- advertency, may threaten or produce injuries, and thus excite Anger, in various degrees. The causes and excitements of our passions and affections respecting others, may also be arranged under the predominancy of Good, or Evil in our ideas. Under the former head may Benevolence be placed, which will indicate itself either by good Wishes, or good Opinions ; each productive of a large diversity of affections and passions, according to contingent circumstances. The predominance of Evil in our ideas will show itself in actual Malevolence of disposition concern- ing another ; or in a Displacency and disapproba- tion of their conduct. The above sketch seems to indicate a plan of in-r vestigation which, upon the whole, is the least con- fused and embarrassing. It is founded upon the re- marks which have been made, concerning the grand PASSIONS, EXAMINED. 43 propensity of human beings to seek felicity ; upon the ideas of Good and Evil, either relating to themselves or others ; and it seems to comprehend most of those contingent circumstances which sur- round us. That the idea of Good is most prevalent in the diverse kinds of gratification ; in the pursuit of vari- ous objects cf desire ; in the indulgence of hope : and in benevolent dispositions, no one will dispute : and that the idea of Evil, is prevalent in malevolence and displacency , is no less evident. It will also be obvious, upon a moment's consideration, that as the love of good may produce Hatred to what is inimi- cal to it, thus in the affections and passions corres- pondent with this principle, the primary and influ- ential idea is that of suffering. In sorrow, when we grieve for the loss of what we love, it is the privation which immediately presents itself to the mind, and the hatred of this privation is the efficient cause of sorrow. In fear the apprehension of impending evil takes the lead in our minds, though this evil may virtually consist in being deprived of some good. In anger, the evil intended or perpetrated, is the direct incitement to wrath, and we expatiate, with so much eagerness, upon all the circumstances of aggravation, that we cannot allow ourselves, at the first instant, to dwell upon the attributes or qualities of the good thus endangered or destroyed. These instances manifest that the perception of an Evil from privation, is stronger in every instance, than our estimation of the intrinsic value of that which occasions the painful emotion. But although these observations may suffice to justify the Order proposed, yet it is acknowledged that they are not comprehensive enough to embrace every thing relative to the passions. There is a class of emotions, in which distinct ideas of good or evil are not present to the mind, and which in fact may, with equal propriety, enlist themselves under each division. They are vivid impressions, produc- 44 INTRODUCTORY tive of effects which, strictly speaking, belong neither to the passions nor affections 5 and yet their presence frequently constitutes the difference be- tween an affection and a passion. This enigma will be best explained, by our atten- tion to the manner in which our ideas of those influ- ential and operative qualities, exciting passions and inspiring affections, are obtained. • SECTION II. INTRODUCTORY EMOTIONS. When the attention is steadfastly fixed upon any quality or number of qualities, apparent in an ob- ject, whether they be good or bad, some impression is made, or certain sensations are produced. These may dispose the mind to dwell yet longer upon the subject; and the qualities they exhibit may be at- tentively contemplated, with all their relations and connexions. Their former and their present influ- ence, future consequences, &c. may thus be placed before us. Numberless correspondent ideas will present themselves, each producing its particular ef- fect, until strong affections, either of love or hatred, desire or aversion, will be excited ; and these may gradually arise to the most violent passions and emo- tions. In this manner have persons been known to 7vork themselves up into ecstacies, or into phrensies : and the mind has been so completely occupied by its subject, that it has totally lost the power of self- command ; nothing foreign being able to gain ad- mission, and divide the attention. But on the other hand, whatever presents itself in a sudden and unexpected manner, has, in most cases, a much greater effect upon us, than subjects of very superior importance, for which we have been gradu- ally prepared. The more sudden, that is, the great- er the improbability of its appearing at that instant ; EMOTIONS. 45 and the more unexpected, that is, the greater distance the train of thought was from the expectancy, the more violent will be the first percussion ; and this circumstance will give peculiar energy to the exci- ting cause, whatever its peculiar complexion may be. A strong impulse is given, by the very mode of its appearance, previous to our being able to acquire a distinct knowledge of its nature. This impulse is the emotion, we term Surprise, Another circumstance which frequently attends the cause of any specific emotion, and produces its own characteristic effects, in subjects of seeming im- portance, is that of Intricacy ; in which the mind is thrown into an embarrassed state concerning the par- ticular object, or something material relative to it. This embarrassment also gives an additional impe- tus to the characteristic passion, whether it be of a pleasing or a displeasing nature, and is distinguished by the name of Wonder. A third adventitious effect is produced by an in- stantaneous perception of the extreme magnitude or extent, of the subject which calls forth any of the Passions and Affections. It seems to possess some* thing immeasurable, unfathomable, beyond the ut- most stretch of comprehension. This we call Aston* ishment. It now appears that some of our emotions may be excited, before the good or evil, seated in the ex- citing cause, can have arrested the attention. Yet even in these cases, Good or Evil is not excluded. For these emotions are most intimately connected with the idea of something peculiarly important ; but we can deem nothing important unless it pos- sess a power of producing Good or Evil. Their peculiar strength is even occasioned by the vivid idea of Importance, while the emotions themselves manifest our ignorance of its specific nature. These emotions, therefore, are excited by the confused idea of something peculiarly interesting in the cause : and they are manifestly intended to 46 INTRODUCTORY awaken and direct the attention to this cause, that its nature and character may be ascertained. Sur- prise, like a watchful centinel, is equally alarmed at a sudden approach, whether it be of a friend or an enemy. Wonder is excited by a curiosity which induces us to investigate the character of the intru- der, with peculiar keenness : and although Aston- ishment is almost overwhelmed with the subject, yet it is irresistibly attracted towards it, with a force proportioned to its magnitude. At the instant in which we feel our imbecility the most, we are the most eager to investigate those qualities which we acknowledge to exceed our comprehension I The above characters ascribed to them, plainly indicate that these emotions cannot be considered, strictly speaking, either as passions or Affections ; which are always inspired by the idea or perception of some specific Good or Evil, but merely as intro- ductory to these : and it is very singular, that com- mon language, without the suspicion of its being founded on philosophical investigation, uniformly characterises them by the term Emotions, We never speak either of the Passion or Affection of surprise, or of wonder, or of astonishment ; but consent with one voice to denominate them Emo- tions. It is also agreed that they are very distinct from the permanent calmness of an affection, and that they are common to the most opposite passions. The most violent passions, of every kind, are well known to proceed more frequently from the impulse of the moment, than from deliberate thought* They are equally excited also, by sub- jects of a pleasing or displeasing nature ; they are the precursors of many passions, and are able to communicate an energy to all. Thus we perceive that the passions, — using this term in a generic sense, may proceed both from our Ignorance, and from our real or supposed knozv* Udge of the nature and qualities of objects. As the • EMOTIONS. 47 excess of cold operates upon the corporeal system, with a stimulating power like the excess of heat ; thus the opposites of expectancy, of knowledge, of comprehension, become powerful stimulants to the awakened mind, and communicate a painful ener- gy, which is peculiarly instrumental in removing their cause. This effect is manifestly produced by the power of the Imagination which immediately creates alarms, forms numberless conjectures, and expands itself to the utmost, that it may equal if possible the vastness of the object. Surprise, Astonishment, JVonder, being excited by something novel, something embarrassing, or something vast and incomprehensible in the objects, without any reference to its peculiar nature, and exerting their influence, indiscriminately, in pas- sions of the most opposite characters, they may, with strict propriety, be contemplated as introduc- tory to those subjects, which, upon a minute investi- gation, seem calculated to exert their own specific influence. We shall therefore term them Introduc- tory Emotions. When the nature of the exciting cause is more ac- curately ascertained, it will be found to respect either the Selfish or the Social Principle. Hence arise two important distinctions, forming two dif- ferent Classes. In each Class the predominant idea of a Good, and the predominant idea of an Evil, will constitute two different Orders. The leading passions and affections, under each order, point out the Genera. The complicated nature of some of the passions, and other contingent circumstances, may be consi- dered as constituting Species and Varieties, under each characteristic Germs. These distinctions were suggested to the Author, by an attention to the natural progress of our pas- sions and affections, from the first exciting cause, to all the ramifications and diversities of which they 48 SURPRISE. are susceptible. The Reader will doubtless perceive a striking coincidence with the classification, which Nosological and Botanical writers have found it ex- pedient to adopt. The Introductory Emotions, from their nature and influence, demand a prior investigation. I. SURPRISE. We have described Surprise to be the strong emo- tion, excited by something which presents itself in a sudden and unexpected manner, when the mind was totally unprepared for it ; something we pre- sume to be highly important, and yet the kind or ex- tent of this importance has not been ascertained. It is the apparent novelty of the subject, or of some peculiarity relative to it ; or the unexpectedness of its introduction, at a particular time, or in a particu- lar manner, contrary to probability or expectancy, which produces the effect ; and whenever these cir- cumstances take place, Surprise may be equally ex- cited by things agreeable or disagreeable ; by objects of our love or hatred, admiration or horror. The primary or natural effects of Surprise, are to rouse the mind, to force it out of that train of ideas with which it was occupied, and compel it to advert to the novel object ; which is afterwards to exert a characteristic influence, according to its na- ture. The secondary effect of Surprise, is to add an impetus to the existing cause, whatever that may be. It renders pleasing sensations more delightful; and it gives an additional keenness to the unpleas- ing ones. This effect is evidently produced by the force of an awakened and active imagination ; which preceding either deliberate attention, or the exer- cise of judgment magnifies the apparent good or the apparent ill, as soon as their specific natures are obscurely perceived. In Surprise, the mind is to- tally passive. The Emotion can neither be produ- ced nor prevented by any exertions of the will. WONDER. 49 Nor is it its immediate province, either to reflect or investigate. Its pathological effect is that of a sim- ple stimulus, whose sole object is to arouse the at- tention. Sudden startings, earliest looks, extension of arms and hands, strong exclamations, are the characteristic signs of the emotion ; and when the violence of surprise excites an alarm, which is oft- times the case without the actual presence of dan- ger, the whole body is instantly placed in an attitude of defence. II. WONDER. Wonder expresses an embarrassment of the mind, after it is somewhat recovered from the first percus- sion of surprise. It is the effect produced by an interesting subject, which has been suddenly pre- sented to the mind, but concerning which there may be many intricacies respecting the subject itself, or the cause and manner of its introduction. In Wonder the mind begins to re-act, but its ideas are in a state of confusion. It attempts to examine and investigate, but it seems engaged in a fruitless inquiry. It rapidly collects together various cir- cumstances, from which to form conjectures, but rejects them as unsatisfactory, as soon as they are formed. Whenever the desired discovery is made, Wonder ceases, and gives way to the impression which is correspondent to the nature of the disco- very, and to those circumstances which are perceiv- ed to belong to the exciting cause ; whether they be productive of joy or grief, admiration or abhorrence, hope or fearful apprehension. As in this emotion, the mind begins to exert its active and discriminat- ing powers, so is it able to prolong or to shorten the effects of the emotion, either by dwelling upon the subject, and deliberately following its intricacies, or by diverting its attention to other objects. Being introduced by surprise, and partaking of its indefi- nite nature, the pathological indications of Wonder 5 50 ASTONISHMENT. are very similar. They are, however, less violent; and they are intermixed with stronger marks of mental embarrassment. The eyes are sometimes fastened upon the author or narrator of something wonderful ; sometimes they are directed upwards, to be more detached from every surrounding object, which might distract the attention ; sometimes thej roll about, as if they were in search of an object that may be equal to the explanation; and the half-open- ed mouth seems eager to receive the desired infor- mation. In very intricate and important concerns, total abstraction from every thing external, and depth of thought marked by countenance and pos- ture, indicate how busily the mind is employed in. searching out the mystery. III. ASTONISHMENT. Astonishment is the kind and degree of wonder introduced by surprise, which as it were, over- whelms or petrifies the soul. The mental powers are in a stupor, in a state of stagnation. High as- tonishment is the incubus of the mind, which feels nothing at the instant, so much as its inability to act. This emotion always relates to things of the highest importance, to things which appear too vast and ex- tensive for the grasp of intellect, rather than to intri- cacies. When it relates to human conduct, Aston- ishment is excited by great undertakings, or exten- sive projects ; by the accomplishment of plans which appeared more than human, whether beneficial or destructive ; or by some excess either of virtue or of vice. The body marks, in a striking manner, the singular state of the mind. That also becomes immoveable ; petrified as it were, or thunder- st ruck ; which are the favourite expressions, in aimost every language. The eyes are firmly fixed, without being directed to any particular object; the character of countenance, which was formed by the habitual in- fluence of some predominant affection, is for a time ASTONISHMENT. 51 effaced ; and a suspension of every other expression, a certain vacuity, strongly notes this singular suspen- sion of mind. Wonder and astonishment are expressions which in many cases, may he used synonymously ; as both causes and effects are very analogous : for the in- tricacy attending an important subject may be con- nected with its vastness ; and sometimes occasioned by it. When these are introduced by Surprise, that is, when subjects of the kind are suddenly and unexpectedly forced upon the attention, their united effects are extremely powerful ; and they give an infinite momentum to their causes, whether they be of a pleasing or displeasing nature. According to the above view of the emotion, it may obviously be connected with the causes either of happiness or misery ; causes which inspire those pleasing sensations, which so often accompany the perception of thines sublime and stupendous, or which excite painful sensations from things we deem horrible. It may introduce the excess of joy, or the excess of fearful apprehension ; call forth the most exalted admiration, or inspire the deepest in- dignation and contempt. The term Amazement, which is sometimes em- ployed, seems to express a medium between won- der and astonishment. It is manifestly borrowed from the extensive and complicated intricacies of a labyrinth ; in which there are endless mazes, with- out the discovery of a clue. Hence an idea is con- veyed of more than simple wonder; the mind is lost in wonder. Though all these emotions have, generally speak- ing, the greatest power in things which unexpect- edly arrest the attention ; yet they may also pro- ceed from contemplation. When the subject is complicated, the more we discern concerning it, the more will unexpected novelties present them- selves, and successfully become the causes of sur- prise. These novelties may be of such a nature. 52 CLASSIFICATION OF THE PASSIONS, &C as to amaze and confound the understanding. We may aiso be the more deeply penetrated with a conviction of the vastness and incomprehensibility of the subject, so as to be worked up into astonish- ment. The powers of the soul may become petri- fied as it were, or paralized by their fruitless at- tempts to comprehend whit is far beyond their reach, and to fathom that which is unfathomable ! SECTION III. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS, AS THEY RESPECT THE SELFISH OR THE SOCIAL PRINCIPLE. We are now prepared to contemplate the imme- diate effects of those particular qualities, supposed to be seated in the subjects themselves ; which the emotions of Surprise, Wonder, and Astonishment, mav have forced upon our attention, or which may have been discovered by calmer observation. According to the order proposed we shall first attend to those which are the most interesting to Ourselves, or which relate to the principle of Self- Love. CLASS I. OX THE PASSIONS AND AFFECTION'S, WHICH OWE THEIR ORIGIN TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-LOVE. These may be divided into two distinct Orders ; that in which Lovf, and the Idea of Good, that is. of something either beneficial or pleasing, are more immediately present to the mind ; and that in which Haired, and the Idea of Evil are most im- pressive. joy. 53 ORDER I. THE PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS FOUNDED ON SELF- LOVE. WHICH ARE EXCITED BY THE IDEA OF GOOD. These are of two Kinds : the one relates to Good in Possession, the other to that in Expectan- That in Possession inspires the following pas- sions and affections, Joy. Contentment, Satisfaction. Complacency, JOY. Joy is the vivid pleasure or delight, inspired bj the immediate reception of something peculiarly grateful ; of something obviously productive of an essential advantage ; or of something which pro- mises to contribute to our present or future well- being. This deiight may be communicated, bj our liberation from fearful apprehensions, or from a state of actual distress : — by obtaining some new acquisition, some addition to our stock of enjoyment : -^-or by the full assurance of this, without any mix- ture of doubt. The various degrees of Impetus produced by this passion, will depend upon the sensibility of the sub- ject, his supposed ignorance of the object, the sud- den and unexpected manner in which it has been communicated, and the contrast formed between the preceding and the present state. A sudden and instantaneous translation from extreme anxiety or the depth of distress, to an exalted pinnacle of hap- piness, constitutes the highest possible degree. In this case, Surprise. Wonder. Astonishment, take pos- session of the soul ; and though they may at first confound, they afterwards are productive of unut- terable transports. 5* 54 JOY, GLADNESS, On the first impulse of Joy, we are perfectly passive. No effort of the will can check the sensa- tion itself; and where the joy is excessive, it is not in the power of resolution to suppress every exter- nal sign. The state of passive impression is suc- ceeded by the exertions of a vigorous imagination. w r hich, with rapid confusion, runs over the many supposed advantages to be derived from the wel- come treasure : and these it is disposed to multiply and aggrandize, far beyond the bounds of reason or probability. This pleasing, I had almost said, intoxicated state of mind, produces correspondent effects upon the system. A brisk and delectable flow of the animal spirits diffuses a pleasurable sen- sation over the whole frame. Every species of torpor is subdued ; an exhilaration succeeds, indi- cating itself by emotions, which not only manifest the influence of the passion to spectators, but so- licit their participation. The subject feels himself too much animated to remain in a tranquil state. Unusual vivacity in the eyes, and smiles upon the countenance, are accompanied by joyful acclama- tions, clapping of hands, and various other lively gestures. Where the mind is strongly agitated, and under no restraint from a sense of decorum, or solicitude for character, loud laughter, jumping, dancing, and the most wild and extravagant gestures. indicate the frolicksomeness of the heart. Intense meditation upon some supposed good, the contemplation of its intrinsic worth, and of the hap- py consequences which are expected to flow from it, have sometimes raised the mind to transports, over which reason has lost its controul. But these instances seldom occur; as they require the union of strong conviction, lively imagination, and a warm heart. The transports of Joy usually proceed from sudden impulse ; and of consequence, ecstacies will sometimes be great, from very trivial causes. Gladness is an inferior degree of Joy ; it may be excited by incidents agreeable or desirable in them- CHEERFULNESS, SATISFACTION. 55 selves, which are not of sufficient moment to raise the ecstasies of joy ; or it may consist in that lively flow of spirits, which immediately succeeds to the transports of Joy. Cheerfulness is an emotion of still gentler influ- ence. It is often inspired by very trivial circum- stances, in persons of a lively disposition, and free from anxious care. Mirth is a higher degree of cheerfulness, gene- rally excited by things facetious, or ludicrous ; and greatly augmented by the power of social sympathy. Thus it frequently becomes noisy and boisterous, from causes not able to communicate the smallest emotion to an individual in a solitary state. When the mind is more composed, and we are able to reflect, with a degree of calmness, upon the good received or anticipated, we become variously affected, — according to the value we place upon the object, — according to its apparent suitableness to our state and situation, — and according to its correspondence with our previous desires and ex- pectations : and if the good be not transitory or evanescent, we remain under the influence of Con- tentment, Satisfaction, or Complacency. Contentment expresses the acquiescence of the mind in the portion of good we possess. It implies a perception that our lot might have been better, or that it is inferior to what others enjoy, or that it does not fully answer the expectations we had form- ed. An effort of reason or of prudence is neces- sary to produce it. We compare our present with our former situation, or with the inferior lot of others ; and thus learn to acquiesce in the degree of advantage obtained. Satisfaction denotes a pleasing state of mind, ex- ceeding that communicated by simple Contentment. The good obtained is duly appreciated ; it is found to be correspondent to our desires, and adequate to our wishes. The word Satisfaction is frequently employed to express the full accomplishment of 56 COMPLACENCY, some particular desire ; which always communicates a temporary pleasure, whatever may be the nature of that desire. This affection by no means implies, that felicity is complete, as it chiefly refers to parti- cular objects ; and when it respects our state and situation, it admits that greater good might have been our portion, though we are more than content- ed, we are well-pleased with what we possess. Complacency is full and continued satisfaction, connected with a considerable degree of Approba- tion. It has intrinsic value, or some species of worth for its object ; — some mental excellencies, or ad- vantages accruing from them ; — some sentiment, disposition, acquirement, conduct, performance, either of ourselves, or of others with whom we are immediately connected, which, upon close exami- nation, we deem deserving of esteem or applause. Complacency may be enjoyed as the reward of our own conduct, or of the purity and benevolence of our motives : it may be inspired by a review of con- duct, acquirement, disposition, on which we can pronounce that it was zuell done, or well intended. Complacency may also relate to the approved con- duct, sentiments, attainments, dispositions of others, for whom we are deeply concerned. In this case, the affection may be inspired, by their conduct and dispositions towards ourselves, or by the interest we take in whatever contributes to the promotion of their own honour and happiness. The Satisfaction produced by complacency, indi- cates that we have, in some respect or other, a personal interest in the object of it ; which distin- guishes the affection from that high gratification we may enjoy, when we contemplate and applaud the sentiments, dispositions, and actions of great and respectable characters, with which we have no im- mediate concern. The Approbation which accompanies complacen- cy, distinguishes its object from the more common causes of satisfaction. These causes may arise COMPLACENCY. 57 from whatever quadrates with our wishes and de- sires, without paying attention to their intrinsic me- rit. A suitableness to the occasion is the only re- quisite to inspire satisfaction ; but the Approbation implied in complacency, conveys the idea of some kind of Excellency, The term has never been pro- faned by the application of it to guilty pursuits, dis- honourable success, or unworthy sentiments ; how- ever they may flatter our vanity, or be the comple- tion of our wishes. Nor are things of a trivial or transient nature, deemed worthy of this affection. It is not said of a mere spectator, that he takes Com- placency in a ball, a concert, or at a theatrical ex- hibition ; however highly he may be delighted and satisfied with the performance. Nor can the term be applied with propriety to any beneficial acquisition, which has been purely accidental. The highest prize which ihe wheel of fortune may have thrown into our laps, may be re- ceived with joy, delight, and satisfaction ; but the terms Approbation and Complacency would be im- properly employed to express our feelings. Complacency may be inspired by some parts of the inanimate creation, in which we have an im- mediate concern, and which communicate pleasure on the review. Works of art well executed, may be contemplated with Complacency; certainly by the Artist, if he has succeeded to his wishes ; and the Possessor will enjoy something of a similar pleasure, if the performance be calculated to recall pleasing ideas, or if he should have manifested either taste or address in the purchase of it. (See Note H.) The above instances will evince that, in strict propriety of language, Complacency is alone appli- cable to that species of Good, which originates from some mental or moral excellence ; where there is an indication of propriety, ingenuity, wis- dom, address, or dignity in sentiment, design, exe- cution ; or of rectitude and benevolence in the mo- tive. 58 COMPLACENCY. . It is obvious that the affection of Complacency will possess different degrees of strength, according to the various kinds and degrees of excellence dis- cernible in the existing cause. The highest degree of Complacency can alone be inspired by the obvi- ous use of wise and pertinent measures, from benefi- cent motives, which are, or promised to be, produc- tive of the most desirable ends ; or by laudable dispositions, and powerful exertions, crowned with the success we most ardently desired. When the means have been as wise as. the nature of the thing would admit, the motives the most noble and gene- rous ; when the execution indicates skill, and the result proves as successful as could have been wish- ed. Complacency, respecting that object, is com- plete. High Complacency is the most grateful of all the Affections. It possesses an elevation and a suavity peculiar to itself. It is permanent satisfaction, enjoying the full approbation of reason ; and con- sequently suffers no ahoy from the struggle of con- tending passions, or opposite desires. When it is inspired by our own conduct, it is accompanied by self-approbation, or the testimony of an applaud- ing conscience, enlivened perhaps by the voice of gratitude, and enriched by the esteem of the worthy. If it proceed from the conduct of others, it augments the pleasures of affection, friendship, and gratitude. According to the above view of the affection, may a virtuous and comprehensive mind, contem- plate things in themselves of a displeasing nature, with Complacency : such as difficulties, w r hich are introductory to benefits ; and sufferings, which may be requisite for the production of the most essential good. But the affection of Complacency has its coun- terfeit. Being more complicate than either of the preceding, and the approbation of the mind form- ing a constituent part of it, an erroneous opinion of PRIDE. 59 ourselves may change the nature of this sublime affection, and render it the parent of vice and folly. Thus false conceptions of our own talents, acquire- ment, conduct, may inspire Pride, Vanity, Haugh- tiness, and Arrogance. Notwithstanding these affections are evil in their nature and tendency, yet as they are the illegiti- mate offspring of Complacency, violated by Self- love, and have the appearance of great good for their object, they demand a place in this arrange- ment. Pride is that exalted idea of our state, qualifica- tions, or attainments, which exceeds the boundaries of justice, and induces us to look down upon sup* posed inferiors, with some degree of unmerited contempt. When this elevated idea of ourselves becomes a motive to avoid and despise any thing mean and unworthy, its impropriety is overlooked ; and as it leads to worthy conduct, it is honoured with the appellation of laudable Pride. It sometimes consists in exaggerated ideas of the superiority of our own country ; of merit in our relatives or intimate connexions, whose character and conduct reflect some rays of honour upon our- selves ; — such as the pride of family descent, — that of children whose parents may have acquired cele- brity, — or of parents in the accomplishments of their children, or particular honours conferred upon them. This proceeding from the excess of affec- tion, where affection is natural, is called a pardona- ble Pride. When Pride is manifested by an ostentatious display of wealth, station, or accomplishments, it is deemed a vain Pride. When it is indulged to such an excess, that it looks down with disdain upon others, but little in- ferior, perhaps equal, possibly much superior in real merit, it is branded with the title of insufferable Pride. (See Note I.) 60 VANITY. Vanity is that species of Pride, which, while it presumes upon a degree of superiority in some particular articles, fondly courts the applause of every one within its sphere of action ; seeking every occasion to display some talent, or some supposed excellency. Generally speaking, it is the foible of superficial and frivolous minds, that think much more of their attainments, than of their remaining deficiencies. Yet it may be founded on the exces- sive love of praise, in those who possess no incon- siderable share of merit. Haughtiness is an overt act of Pride, manifested by some conduct or expression, indicative of an unmerited contempt of others. It may be deemed in this case, the swelling of Pride into an emo- tion. Arrogance indicates itself by some particular claims to precedency, or marks of distinction and respect, from those whom Pride considers its inferi- ors in station and character; or by impertinent pre- tensions to an equality with superiors. These indications of false complacency in their mildest influence, may be placed with strict pro- priety among the affections. Upon sudden occa- sions they rise into emotions ; and sometimes parti- cularly when connected with anger, from a supposed insult or neglect, they possess every characteristic of passion. Having considered the Passions and Affections immediately connected with the Possession of Good, we shall proceed to the Passions and Affections which are excited by the contemplation of Good, when it is not in our possession, but of which the attainment is deemed possible. Which constitutes our second division under the present Order. These are Desire and Hope. DESIRE. 0! DESIRE. The general nature of desire has already engaged our attention. It has been described as that in- fluential effect which the perception of Good or Evil produces within us, in consequence of which we seek to obtain the one and avoid the other. Our plan demands that we now contemplate Desire as it is excited by particular objects, conducive of some apparent good, either of benefit or pleasure, which we have not yet obtained. According to the common acceptation of the term, Desire may be considered as an eager longing for some Good centered, or apparently centered, in particular objects, situations, or circumstances. This description is made as general as possible, in order to comprehend two different acts of the mind concerning such objects ; which are signified by the terms Wish and Desire, Lord Kaims expresses this difference in the fol- lowing manner : " Desire, taken in its proper sense, is that internal act which by influencing the will, makes us to proceed to action. Desire, in a lax sense, respects also actions and events that depend not on us ; as when I desire that my freind may have a son to represent him ; or that my country may flourish in arts and sciences ; but such internal act is more properly termed a wish than desire."* Though this observation does not fully mark the difference, it plainly indicates there is one. We will therefore first consider the Desire which is influential to action : and then advert more par- ticularly to the characteristic distinctions between that and a Wish. In the first sense, Desire may be defined, that uneasy sensation excited in the mind by the view, or by the contemplation, of any desirable good, which is not in our possession, which we are solici- *Eleraents of Criticism, vol. i. p. 42. 6 62 DESIRE. tous to obtain, and of which the attainment appears at least possible. Desire is in its nature restless. Mr. Locke justly remarks that " it is the uneasiness it occasions, which excites the mind to pursue its object, and rouses it from its natural state of apathy and inacti- vity." Thus it is founded on some species of discon- tent ; for were we perfectly contented and satisfied with all our sensations, and with every circumstance surrounding us. all desire must cease. It relates to something which is not immediately in our power, and which requires either our own exertions, or the agency of others over whom we possess some in- fluence. It implies, therefore, that something is to be done, before the end can be obtained ; and this necessarily implies also that there is a possibility of success attending the attempt. It is not always dis- couraged by difficulties ; but our most active desires are never so ardent as to attempt known impossibili- ties. Desires are excited either by the wretchedness of our present situation. — by periodical wants, which demand gratification, — by comparing the defects and imperfections of our own state, with the pre- ferable state of others, — or by the recent percep- tion of some pleasing and useful quality in objects, which we wish to appropriate. When Desire is excited by wretchedness itself, it looks forwards towards Good $ towards liberation from this state, and the enjoyment of a better. Relief, and the means of relief, are the predominant ideas accompanying Desire. In this ca?e, the idea of a good is immediately engrafted on the stock of evil. The desires excited by periodical wants be- long to the appetites exclusively. When the com- parison of our own state with that of others implants desires, they proceed from the discovery of new sources of enjoyment, to which we were strangers, united with a conviction ibat there is a possibility of attaining them. The recent perception of pleasing DESIRE. 63 qualities in objects, has a similar influence. Our natural love of good inspires a wish to possess whatever promises an augmentation of our wel- fare. Hence it appears that our Ignorance is often the parent of contentment. We must acquire some knowledge of stations and qualities before we can desire them. The enlargement of our ideas becomes a copious source of discontent with our present possessions, and inspires ardent desires after new objects. Nothing can injure the good we possess, so much as the idea of a something better : and the superlative is equally injurious to the compara- tive. The objects of desire are infinite, and infinitely diversified. They relate to whatever is essential to our existence and welfare, and to every thing which may strike the fancy ; that is to all our natu- ral, and all our artificial wants. They refer also to all our social connexions, and to all our mental pursuits. These desires acquire such a diversity of character, according to their origin, the degrees of their strength, and other circumstances, as to render a minute analysis impossible. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a few remarks. It is observable that many of those Desires which are common to all men, and without which the usual offices of life could not be discharged, are of the mildest and most permanent natures ; such as the desire of preserving health, a desire of pro- curing a competency suitable to our station, to pro- vide for our families, &c. Desires of this class are not distinguished by any particular epithet ; nor are they denominated either Affections or Passions, though they obviously belong to the former. But when any extraordinary and unusual desire pre- sents itself, which exceeds the common tenour of disposition ; or when the object of desire is some- thing peculiarly striking and important, it is distin- guished by some discriminating epithet, and fre- 64 DESIRE. quently assumes the character of an affection, emo- tion, or passion. Thus, the moderate and legitimate gratification of the sensual appetites, is not marked by any par- ticular appellation ; but inordinate desires, which transgress the bounds of sobriety and decency, are stigmatised by the names of Gluttony, Drunken- ness, Debauchery, Lust, fyc. When we expatiate upon such a character, we remark that the person to whom it belongs, is passionately fond of good eating, or of his bottle ; that he is led by his pas- sions, &c. An exemplary command over such ex- cesses is honoured with the title of Temperance, and Chastity. These virtues, consisting in the love of moderation, and in purity of mind, deserve a place among the affections ; although, from the mildness of their perpetual influence, they are simply term- ed virtuous dispositions. The moderate desire of wealth has no particular name ; but when the de- sire becomes excessive, when it consists in amassing riches, without applying them either to utility or enjoyment, it is termed Avarice. This also is de- nominated a passion; not from the violence of any emotion, but from its permanent effects, and from the passive and abject state of the person who is under its influence. When riches are eagerly pur- sued, in defiance of justice and humanity, the con- duct is termed Rapaciousness. The wish to improve in any-valuable qualification or to acquire esteem, when moderate, has no distinguishing character ; but an eager desire to equal or excel others in any particular accomplishment, is called Emulation; and to seek pre-eminence in office, title, or station, is Ambition. These desires are frequently so inor- dinate as to require the name of Passions : thus the ambitious passions is a familiar expression. (See Note K.) The exemplary desire of regulating our thoughts and pursuits, by right principles, consti- tutes Virtue ; and all the duties which are per- formed with warmth and feeling are deemed the re- DESIRE. 65 suit of virtuous affections : the opposite propensi- ties and cond act constitute Vice, whose characteris- tic consists in depraved affections, and ungovern- cd passions. The desire of yielding obedience to the divine command, and habitual solicitude to ob- tain the divine favour, is Religion, This, under its mildest influence, is termed, a disposition or charac- ter. When a religious temper is indicated by prayer and meditation, which warmly interest the affec- tions, it is called devotion. If any one imagines that the divine favour is to be obtained by a scrupulous attention to frivolous ceremonies, he is considered as superstitious. Superstition is deemed a principle of action rather than an affection. It is, in fact, con- secrated frivolity, devoid of love or regard to the supposed duties it enjoins, or to its object. A tena- cious reverence for unimportant sentiments, with a censorious disposition towards those whose opinions are opposite, is the province of bigotry ; which, if it deserve the title of an affection, certainly does not belong to the benevolent class. An earnest desire, and unremitted endeavours, to propagate any parti- cular sentiment, or to enforce a particular rule of conduct, either out of love of truth, or of those we wish to become proselytes, orin order to recommend ourselves to some Principal, by our assiduity, is de- nominated zeal ; which is deemed an affection. When some particular object gains the ascendancy over every other, and occupies the greater portion of our attention, it is occasionally termed a passion; as a passion for music, kc. in what sense, and with what propriety has already been considered. Such an in- vincible predilection for any subject as shall occupy the choicest of our thoughts, and incite to the most vigorous exertions, with such an ardour and con- stancy as to brave difficulties and danger, is termed enthusiasm ; which has a place among the Passions, The very Motives by which we are actuated, and the choice of means in order to effectuate our pur- pose, form various species of desire, sufficient to cha- 6* 66 DESIRE. racterize the prevailing disposition. These consti* tute integrity, honesty, industry, honour, &c. or ar- tifice, deceit, cruelty, &c. according as the prevail- ing desire is under the influence of worthy, or base and unworthy principles and dispositions. It should also be recollected, that a particular de- sire may, in certain circumstances, become the pa- rent of various other affections and passions. Of this the Passion of Love presents us with striking- instances ; which, in its progress, is so frequently productive of hope, fear, joy, grief, and tormenting jealousies. In short, every pursuit, which prima- rily respected the gratification of our senses, may become the occasion of hope, joy, fear, anger, sor- row, envy, &c. according to the impediments or aids received from others, or according to our success or disappointments. The Novelty of an object will frequently elevate desire into a passion. This doubtless proceeds from the force of imagination, which greatly en- hances the value of those qualities which the object may possess, and is very prone to supply defects. Love at first sight illustrates and confirms this idea. Those charms which had seized the mind by sur- prise, become both unrivalled and irresistible to a heated imagination. Impediments to our desires, if they be not suff- iciently powerful to subjugate them, redouble their ardour. The affections being once engaged, desires being once enkindled, we are placed in a very dif- ferent state of mind, from that we experienced previous to the excitement. We know that the dis- appointment of our wishes will not leave us in the former state of tranquillity, but will become a source, of unhappiness ; we therefore redouble our energy not to suffer a disappointment. This also is strong- ly exemplified in the passion of Love. Pride, an- ger, &c. are sometimes called in as powerful auxili- aries ; and they exert all their impetuosity in sup- port of our pretensions. Inordinate Ambition abun- DESIRE, £7 dantly illustrates this fact. It engenders a thousand evil passions, which like the Imps of Sin in Milton. yelp around it. Where it meets with obstacles, it is not scrupulous about the means of opposing them. Success increases its powers : and contrary to every other monster, it is rendered more insatiable and ravenous by being fed. In either state, therefore, it becomes the terror and the scourge of the earth. • Mental pursuits seem to be the most remote from every thing passionate and turbulent. An affection for science is, in general, the most productive of a pleasing serenity of mind. Yet even here no small diversity is observable, according as the memory, the reasoning powers, or the imagination are em- ployed. The knowledge of interesting facts, and the examination of the relation of things to each other, are generally of the calmest nature ; though the latter may justly be deemed of a more elevated character than the former. It is sometimes also re- warded with the transports of joy, inspired by the surprise of some new and important discovery. The creative powers of the mind are as various in their effects, as they are unlimited in their opera- tions. They are the sources of lively amusement, and they may excite ecstacies. Where the imagi- nation is the most vivid, its pleasures are the strongest ; but they are of short duration : whereas the pursuits of knowledge furnish a temperate per- petuity of gratification, sufficient to comfort and support the indefatigable student, in his most ardu- ous researches. The Motives to study are accompanied with vari- ous effects upon the mind. When science is pur- sued simply from the pleasure which knowledge af- fords, that pleasure is placid and mild. When the primary motive is to benefit mankind by useful com- munications, the pursuit itself has self-complacency for its companion. When the object is personal advantage, either of fortune or of reputation, ad- ventitious passions will arise according to the pros- 68 DESIRE, pect of success, or the actual accomplishment of our desires ; according to apprehensions entertain- ed, or to disappointments experienced. When high ambition is the primary object, the passions pro- ceeding from success, renown, disappointment, un- certainty, rivalship, disgrace ; such as joy, sorrow, vexation, hope, fear, jealousy, &c. &c. will agitate the mind. The desires respecting our social connexions, are for the reasons given above, and according to the plan proposed, referred to a distinct class. Desires, inspired by religious principles, are of all others the most diversified, both in kind and de- gree ; they are according to the notions we enter- tain of religion, and the stronger or weaker effect of these notions upon our feelings. The most exten- sive signification of the term Religion, that which comprehends the greatest diversity of opinions, and meets the ideas of most philosophers, seems to be the following : An impressive sense of the irresistible influence of one or more superior Beings, over the con- cerns of mortals, which may become beneficial or ini- mical to our welfare. It is evident, that a great di- versity of the most opposite principles may be in- cluded under this general definition ; and it is no less evident, that these principles, as often as they become influential, will be productive of effects correspondent with their natures ; will form the temper, and implant desires, most congenial with themselves, but the most opposite to each other. Zeal and enthusiasm are common to them all ; but their indications will be correspondent with the sup- posed characters of the Powers they revere, and the methods supposed to be necessary to conciliate their favour, and avert their displeasure. Fear, terror, bigotry, superstition, cruelty, may thus be engendered ; every evil propensity and atrocious vice may thus be consecrated, however inconsistent with the genuine dictates of religion, or the feelings of humanity. (See Note L.) WISH. 6$ When, on the contrary, the mind is inspired with the most exalted conceptions of Deity, and with correspondent sentiments of moral obligation, reli- gion may cherish the purest dispositions and affec- tions. It may moderate and restrain inordinate de- sires, — elevate the mind by the contemplation of perfection in character, and by a warm desire ta imitate. It may inspire love, joy, hope, gratitude : — correct impatience and discontent ; — foster the principles of universal benevolence, and of every social virtue. Thus may Religion, according to the ideas formed of its object and duties, be render- ed capable of exciting the most despicable, or the most noble affections ; and of forming the most ab- ject, or the most elevated of characters ! Mr. Hume has remarked, that Religion is the fulcrum, which Archimedes required, to enable him to move the world. He might have added, that according to the manner and address exercis- ed, in applying the lever of opinion to this ful- crum, will the world be raised up to the heavens, or depressed down to the abyss. A Wish is an inactive desire. It is the result of that longing after happiness so natural to man, in cases were no expectations can be formed, no efforts can be made. It is the breathing after something desirable, where the means to obtain it are not in our power ; or where the opportunity may be for ever lost. It is excited by the contemplation of a something, which if it could possibly be obtained, might augment our portion of good ; or by reflect- ing upon something, which, had it been possessed, performed, or avoided, might have proved peculiar- ly advantageous. Thus we may wish for impossi- bilities, which cannot be the objects of our active desires. The beggar may wish to be a King, who cannot seriously desire it. We may wish that we could fly, even without wings, and pay a visit to some of the planets ; though we know that the wish will fee in vain. 70 HOPE. A Wish may refer to past scenes, where desire is totally inapplicable. The essence of repentance consists in wishing that we had conducted ourselves in a different manner. These instances abundantly confirm the remark of Lord Kaims, that we may wish for things not in our power ; and they show that the range of our wishes is of an infinite extent, comprehending im- possibilities, that have a reference to the past, pre- sent, or future. (See Note M.) Hope is the encouragement given to desire ; the pleasing expectancy that its object shall be obtain- ed. Without this affection, desire would sink into despondency ; like a simple wish it would remain inactive, and prey upon itself; producing perpetual uneasiness, destitute of any advantage. Hope is so pleasing, and so invigorating an affection, that it is emphatically styled the Balm of Life. It preserves the mind from stagnating in its present possessions, corrects the uneasiness of desire, and animates it to struggle with the difficulties it may have to encoun- ter. Hope possesses the happy secret of anticipating the good we desire. By the pleasing sensation it communicates, we already taste the pleasures we seek. Where the object has not been of the first importance, the pleasures of Hope have frequently been experienced to surpass those of actual posses- sion ; for the imagination is, in this affection, solely occupied by the supposed advantages and elligible qualities of its object, without attending to any of its imperfections. In its general operation, the in- dulgence of Hope is mixed with certain portions of doubt and solicitude ; but when doubt is removed, and the expectation becomes sanguine, hope rises into joy, and it has been known to produce trans- ports and ecstacies, equally with the full accomplish- ment of ardent desires. Thus, according to the degrees of force with which it affects the mind, it may be considered either as'an affection ora passion. It also appears that Joy and Hope are very si mi- HOPE. 71 larin their natures ; and that the pleasing sensations they inspire, are very correspondent. The diffe- rence consists in the degree of uncertainty which in- tervenes before possession, and checks the ardour of hope ; and as the object was in expectancy, the plea- sure is not so powerfully quickened by the influence of Surprise. Yet where the object has been highly valued, and the anxiety great concerning its attain- ment, a release from this anxiety has communicated a delectable elasticity to the mind, and rendered its sensations as vivid as those excited by more unex- pected causes. As the above Passions and Affections are inspired by the contemplation of Good, thus are most of them of a pleasant nature. This is obviously the case with Joy, and all the affections connected with it. Hope is also, uniformly, a pleasant affection. Desire will vary according to its object, degrees of strength, and the different passions and affections so frequently arising from it. Although in its mildest state, it possesses a degree of restlessness, which serves as a stimulus to exertions, yet its immediate attendants give a preponderancy in its favour. De- sire, as defined above, has always some species of Good for its object, which is always a pleasant ob- ject ; and it is encouraged in its attempts, by the possibility or probability of attainment. These two circumstances united, more than compensate for the degree of restlessness it in general occasions. The sportsman who delights in the chase, who endures cold, hunger, and fatigue, with more than patience, inspired by the hopes of exercising his skill, and carrying home the triumphant, though trifling, re- ward of his assiduity, is a just emblem of the state of our minds, in the pursuit of objects we deem of superior importance. Desires are not only comfort- less, but approach to misery, — when they are impe- tuous and ungovernable, — when hopes are frequent- ly checked by disappointments — when patience is wearied out by procrastinations, — and when desires 72 SORROW. are borne away by the whirlwind of turbulent pas- sions, which they have excited. The Wish, which characterises the benevolent heart, is of a pleasing nature. When it refers sim- ply to the melioration of our state, not being sup- ported by hope, it subsides almost as soon as it is formed. It is most painful, when it is excited by our own improper conduct, or by the neglect of advan- tages which are never to return. ORDER IL We proceed to consider those Passions and Affec- tions operating upon the Principle of Self-Love, in which the idea of Evil is immediately present to the mind. These are distinguished into three kinds : the first relates to actual losses and disappointments ; the se- cond, to evils of which we are apprehensive ; and the third, to the conduct which seems to deserve reprehension. They inspire the passions of Sorrow, Fear, and Anger, with their different modifications and combinations. It is obvious from this general description of each, that they must be frequently blended together. Partial evils inspiring Sorrow, are frequently the harbingers of others which alarm our Fears ; and both the evils we lament, and those we dread, may be occasioned by a conduct calculated to excite our Anger. In consequence of such combinations, ma- ny of the affections under this class become so com- plicated, as to render it difficult to give them a spe- cific arrangement. Those which are the least complex demand Our first attention. SORROW. <3 ei I. SORROW, v 1 It is scarcely necessary to observe, that Sorrow is the direct opposite of Joy. It expresses a mental suffering, under the privation of some good which we actually possessed, or concerning which we en- tertained a pleasing expectation. The one we term Loss, the other a Disappointment. When the loss or disappointment has been very great, and we feel it as a privation of something upon which our af- fections were strongly placed ; when the event arri- ved in a sudden and Unexpected manner, so that the mind was not able to collect itself or prepare for it, this passion produces extreme anguish. Surprise, Wonder, and Astonishment, exert their powerful in- fluence, and greatly augment the pangs of sorrow. The senses are troubled ; the soul is overwhelmed, and sometimes sinks into a painful stupefaction. This state marks the Passion of Sorrow, according to the distinctions noticed in the preceding pages ; for it is here that the mind is perfectly passive. As soon as it is able to collect its powers, it wanders over, and exaggerates every distressingcircumstance, every possible disadvantage that may be consequent upon the loss, until tumultuous emotions are excit- ed, bordering upon phrensy. Violent agitations, and restless positions of the body, extension of the arms, clapping of the hands, beating the breast, tearing the hair, loud sobs and sighs, manifest to the spectator the inward agony of the soul. Such are the Emotions, which indicate the nature and strength of the Passion. Sometimes a flood of tears relieves these pathognomonic, symptoms. Univer- sal lassitude and a sense of debility succeed, with deep dejection of countenance, and languor in the eyes, which seem to look around, and solicit in vain for assistance and relief. Every thing, which used to communicate pleasure and inspire vivacity, ap- pears frivolous, or becomes indifferent to the mind. 7 74 ' SORROW. The only delight which is now enjoyed, is to cc ? ^ template the cause of its affliction ; to enumera all the excellencies and advantages of that whio was once possessed, or might have been possessed and fondly to dwell upon each. Thus the Emotions gradually sink into permanent Affections, Grief is sometimes considered as synonymous with Sorrow ; and in this case we speak of the transports of grief. At other times it expresses more silent, deep, and painful affections ; such as are inspired by domestic calamities ; particularly by the loss of friends and relatives ; or by the distress, either of body or mind, experienced by those whom we love and value. When the mind is very deeply impressed with a sense of calamity, for a continuance, and the atten- tion cannot by any means be diverted from it, the subject is in a state of Melancholy. This affection manifests itself by dejection of spi- rits, debility of mind and body, obstinate and insu- perable love of solitude, universal apathy, and a confirmed listlessness, which emaciate the corporeal system, and not unfrequently trouble the brain. It is a striking characteristic of deep Sorrow that it is of a tacit and uncommunicative nature. In this also it is the opposite to Joy. After the violent effusions of the mind, in the first emotions, it sub- sides into a pensive and reserved state. It attempts concealment, even from the bosom of a friend ; like Viola in Shakspeare, Who never told her love : But let concealment, like a worm in the bud, Feed on her damask cheek. This disposition may proceed from some peculiar delicacy in the cause of grief, — from that indolence, which is the reverse both of the vivacity and loqua- city of joy, — from the apprehension that the many will not sympathize with the sufferer, — and from a reluctance to afflict the few that will. SORROW. 75 The above remarks refer to Sorrow, when it is excited by more simple causes, and is unconnected with any other affection ; but it is very frequently blended with other affections, by means of which it is greatly diversified. Sometimes it assumes the appearance of discontent and dissatisfaction. The first is mostly inspired by a comparison of our situ- ation with that of others, and the discovery of an humiliating inferiority. The other principally re- fers to the disappointment of our desires, or to a partial and imperfect accomplishment of our ardent wishes. In disappointments, where the affections have been strongly placed, and the expectations sanguine, particularly where the agency of others is concerned, sorrow may degenerate into Vexation and Chagrin ; which are still higher degrees of dis- satisfaction. They all imply an irritated, as well as sorrowful state of mind. Impatience, is also a mixture of Sorrow and An- ger, under the immediate sensation of something irksome ; or at the causes of delay, where any desi- rable object is an expectancy. Repining, is Sorrow united with a degree of re- sentment against some superior agent, where the mind dares not to break forth into strong expres- sions of anger. Sympathetic Sorrow, is that species of sorrow we participate with others, in consequence of our so- cial connexions, or the general benevolence of our natures. This will be more amply considered here- after. Of the virtuous affections inspired by Sorrow, which are personal, the most conspicuous are, Pa- tience, Resignation, and Humility. These by their habitual influence often form the disposition and character. In the exercise of Patience, the mind has wisely determined to render the evil as light as possible, by counteracting the usual effects of sorrow or vex- ation. It endures actual sufferings with composure, 76 SORROW. or waits for expected blessings, without a culpable restlessness. In short, patience is a calm acquies- cence in a state of which we perceive the evils and discomfiture ; by this it is sufficiently distinguished from insensibility. Resignation, superadds to patience a submissive disposition, respecting the intelligent cause of our uneasiness. It acknowledges both the power and the right of a superior to afflict. It is usually con- nected with a confidence in his justice ; and it in- dulges a hope also in some future exemption. Thus it opposes a fretful repining temper of mind. Humility, is a degree of habitual sorrow, or of painful apprehension, — by which it is connected with fear, — concerning our deficiencies in intellec- tual or moral attainments. It is inspired either by comparing ourselves with others, who appear to be our superior in these excellencies ; or by the con- templation of their intrinsic value, importance, ex- tent, and the obstacles which we have suffered to impede our progress. (See Note N.) We have considered the principal cause of Sor- row to the privation ; because the loss of some good is, in most instances, the prevalent idea. Pecuniary losses, the loss of relatives and friends, of their good- will and affection, are obvious privations. Sickness is the privation of health ; imprisonment the priva- tion of liberty ; and the hardships endured in prison, the privation of accustomed indigencies; calumny and disgrace are the privations of a good charac- ter. Yet it is acknowledged, that being in the habit of considering these things as essential to comfort and happiness, we view this privation in a positive light ; and if we attend simply to the effects, the idea is doubtless pertinent ; for all misery, whatever be the cause, is a positive sensation. In bodily pains or corporal sufferings, the evil endured is uniformly considered as of a positive nature ; nor does the idea of a Loss present itself to the mind. It would be an affectation of philosophic precision, to consid- FEAR. 77 er the agonies of the torture as a privation of former ease. Perhaps the reason of this distinction is found- ed in our claiming an exemption from pain, as our natural and only inheritance. Every thing besides is an acquisition, either as a gift, or the purchase of our own labour. The following peculiarity confirms this idea ; the term Sorrow cannot with any pro- priety be applied to our bodily sufferings. We should smile at any one, who asserted that he was sorry because he had a fit of the gout, or suffered a public flagellation ; though, in fact, the body cannot suffer without the participation of the mind. Hence it appears that the prevalent cause of Sorrow is pri- vation, though the effects are positive misery. II. FEAR. The second effect produced by the hatred of Evil, that we shall mention, is Fear. Fear is a painful sensation, produced by the imme- diate apprehension of some impending Evil. This evil may consist in being deprived of what we at present enjoy, in being disappointed in what we had expected, or in the infliction of a positive misery. The passion of Fear is still more painful than that of Sorrow, which notwithstanding its severity has r when calmed into an affection, something soothing in its nature. Fear produces an agony and anxiety about the heart, not to be described ; and it may be said to paralyze the soul in such a manner, as to ren- der it insensible to every thing but to its own misery. Inertness and torpor pervade the whole system, uni- ted with a constriction of the integuments of the bo- dy, and also a certain sense of being fettered, or of being rendered incapable of motion. The eyes are pallid, wild, and sunk in their sockets ; the counte- nance is contracted and wan ; the hair stands erect, or at least this sensation is excited, which every child experiences, as often as he is terrified by sto- ries of ghosts, witches, &c. ; the bowels are strong- 7* FEAR. \y affected, the heart palpitate aion labo the lips tremble, the tongue falters, the limbs arc unable to obey the will, or support the frame. Preadful shrieks denote the inward anguish. Tl often succeeded by syncopic-?, which, while they manifest that the sufferings are greater than nature can sustain, afford a temporary reli Such are the external signs which indicate the wretched state of mind, under this horrid passion. Since torpor, debility, and painful constrictions, fre- quently accompany fear more than any other pas- sion, the Emotions will of consequence be less vivid. Instead of violent transports, a deep depression and numbness, as it were, both 01 body and mind, cha- racterize the passion. These may be visible to the attentive spectator, and are not less expressive of inward anguish. When the effects of fear operate powerfully, without any mixture of h le passive impres- sions arc predominant: but when there is a possi- bility ol escape, the mind re-acts with wonderful energy. Abject depression is changed into vie agitations ; collected force takes place of debility, and tremendous exertions succeed to a state of tor- por and immobility. When a personal attack is ap- prehended, momentary and trembling strength is thrown into the muscles : — the body instinctively places itself in the attitude of defence : — a mixture of fierceness and wild horror is expressed in the countenance, well adapted to alarm aud terrify the enemy. If escape be attempted, an unusual energy is thrown into the limbs, enabling the sufferer to precipitate his flight, by exertions that would have been impracticable in a more composed state of mind. Consternation. This species of fear is a strong foreboding of tremendous evils, which are likely to follow misfortunes that have already taken place. It may sieze an Individual, when surprised by the arrival of some dreadful disaster : or at the instant PEAR. 79 of his being made acquainted with the event. But it chiefly refers to alarms of a more extensive nature \ to those excited by some general calamity, which threatens evils beyond the power of calculation. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, inundations, con- flagrations, the sudden approach of an incensed and powerful enemy, are of this kind. Here the danger is widely diffused. Fear is rendered contagious ; and by the influence of social sympathy, the Conster- nation becomes universal, without having any parti- cular tendency, or being directed to any particular object. When calamities of this nature arrive in a sudden and unexpected manner ; particularly where the ideas of perfect security had been indulged, and perhaps were triumphant and insulting ; Surprise, Wonder, Astonishment, manifest their powers, by the augmentation of misery ; while a troubled ima- gination aggravates every possibility of horror. In all these cases, the expressions of fear are wild and frantic. Beating the breast, tearing the hair, loud lamentations, indicate the agony of the soul. Perhaps the panic which has sometimes seized a whole army, flushed with victory, will illustrate the preceding observations. Rapid success had inspi- red the arrogant idea of invincibility. An unexpect- ed defeat has not only subdued this delusion, but given an opposite direction to the active imagina- tion, and has transferred the idea of invincibility to the Enemy. The troops now think that it will be in vain, any longer to resist a power which has shown itself superior to their own wonted prowess ; and where resistance is supposed to be absolutely in vain, it never will be attempted. The force of su- perstition, either in depressing or animating courage, is well known. This has made the most valiant: tremble at shadows ; and consecrated banners have secured victory over an host of enemies. Even the war-like Achilles, who was the bulwark of the Gre- cian cause, and whose sole delight was in the tu- $0 FEAR. mults of war, trembled at the sudden appearance of Minerva.* Abject fear, which is accompanied by the more si- lent symptoms of depressed spirits, seems to be in- spired chiefly by the idea of an irresistible power in its cause. This also is the faithful companion of Superstition.. It is easily excited in feeble minds by every tale of horror. It is very observable in those wiio are led into captivity, or to prison ; in those de- tected in the commission of a crime, which exposes them to the severity of the law ; in those who are under the expectation of immediate punishment : that is, in cases which admit of no escape or redress. Terror is that species of fear, which rouses to de- fend or escape ; producing the violent agitations which have been already noticed. So painful is the passion of Fear, that the evil can scarcely exist, which induces anguish equal to its feelings. Innumerable are the instances in which the fear of a calamity of the greatest magnitude, has greatly exceeded the miseries inflicted by the cala- mity itself; and the mind has resumed a tranquillity under misfortunes, which, in the prospect, appeared unsupportable. Busy imagination always magnifies the evil, and casts the darkest shades over every pos- sible concomitant. It cannot indulge the supposi- tion, that any circumstances of alleviation can be at- tached to a state so much dreaded. But when the dreaded evil is arrived, an immediate release from the agonies of fear, is of itself a species of consolation. In the worst of circumstances, fear yields its place to sorrow ; which is certainly some mitigation of suffering *.: — habit reconciles to many things, which were at first repugnant to our nature : — experience in a short time points out many comforts, where they were least expected : in most cases, as soon as we cease to fear, we begin to hope ; for there are few situations so completely dark and gloomy, as to ex- clude every ray of consolatory hope. * ©»i^s^fv F A%i?&£vs» See Homer. Iliad. A. 1. 199. FEAR. 81 The union of such causes sufficiently explains the reasons why, in numberless instances, the ago- ny of actual sufferings, is not so great as the dread of their arrival. (See Note O.) The Affections, that is, the more permanent im- pressions of fear, unaccompanied with external signs to characterize emotions, are principally the fol- lowing : Dread, This is a degree of permanent fear ; an habitual and painful apprehension of some tremen- dous event, which may be too remote to excite any of the preceding passions. It keeps the mind in a perpetual alarm ; in an eager watchfulness of every circumstance which bears any relation to the evil apprehended. It is obvious, that this strong and painful affec- tion cannot be the result, or the residue of fear, in the same manner as satisfaction may be the result of joy, and melancholy of the transports of sorrow ; because it is not susceptible of a retrospect. When the evil is arrived, the dread of that evil is removed ; though the affection may become attached to some pernicious consequences, which may possibly fol- low. (See Note P.) Despair. This is a permanent fear of losing some valuable good, of suffering some dreadful evil, or of remaining in a state of actual misery, without any mixture of hope. It generally succeeds to in- effectual efforts, which have been repeatedly made ; and of consequence it is excited where no means can be devised, equal to the magnitude of the sup- posed evil. Remorse has already been placed under Sorrow : but whenever it is connected with a fear of pun- ishment, it deserves a place under this passion also, which greatly increases its agonies. When Re- morse is blended with the fear of punishment, and arises to despair, it constitutes the supreme wretch- edness of the mind. Cowardice, considered as distinct from the oc- 82 TEAR. casional panic mentioned above, is that habftual temper and disposition, which disqualifies from opposing the dangers and difficulties, which it is our duty or interest to combat. Every indication of cowardice, is an indication of culpable and un- manly fear. Pusillanimity is a feebleness of mind, still more disgraceful ; by which it is terrified at mere trifles, or imaginary dangers, unauthorized by the most distant probability. Timidity, though similar, is not so reproachful. The term is chiefly used where there is some apology, from sex, tender years, or feebleness of frame. Doubt, considered as an affection, and distin- guished from simple deliberation of the mind, is a comfortless state, occasioned by the uncertainty of an event, and the predominancy of fearful appre- hension concerning it, though a degree of hope is still indulged. (See Note Q.) Irresolution represents the mind as fluctuating between hope and fear ; between fits of courage and painful apprehensions, in cases where it ought to determine. It is suspended between probabili- ties of success, and apparent dangers of disappoint- ment. Shame is a painful sensation, occasioned by the quick apprehension, that reputation and character are in danger ; or by the perception that they are lost. It may arise from the immediate detection, or the fear of detection, in something ignominious. It may also arise from native diffidence in young ingenious minds, when surprised into situations where they attract the peculiar attention of their superiors. In the first instance, the glow of Shame indicates, that the mind is not totally abandoned ; in the last, it manifests a nice sense of honour, and delicate feelings, united with inexperience and ignorance of the world. Modesty may be deemed an habitual solicitude ANGER. 83 not to offend against any species of decorum ; either by unsuitable behaviour, in which it is opposed to indelicacy ; or by too exalted an opinion of our own good qualities, in which it is opposed to vani- ty. It sometimes manifests itself by resenting in- decencies in speech or conduct ; in this case it is united with anger. Fortitude, Courage, Intrepidity, are affections and dispositions opposed to fear. They are virtu- ous affections, excited alone by exposure to those evils, which are usually productive of that emotion, and therefore they deserve to be mentioned in this connexion. Fortitude expresses that firmness of mind, which resists dangers and sufferings. It is founded on a resolution of the will to counteract, or to surmount those cowardly impressions, which terrific objects will infallibly make upon inferior minds. It is se- cretly supported by hope, and greatly invigorated by some portion of the angry affections. Courage is active fortitude. It meets dangers, and attempts to repel them. Intrepidity, according to its etymology, proceeds yet farther: it expresses a courage perfectly un- daunted, a superiority to the very sensation of fear; boldly impelling the mind forwards to meet the greatest dangers to which a sense of obligation may expose it. III. ANGER. This is the third strong effect produced by the immediate perception of evil. Anger has been considered as a passion, direct- ed against the real, or supposed cause, of our dan- ger or our sufferings. In the first transport of the passion, a sense of personal evil, unjustly inflicted, is the primary idea ; and thus from the effect, the mind makes an instantaneous and powerful transi- tion to its cause. The primary idea entitles it to 84 ANGER, a place among the passions excited by Self-love ; but many of the effects derived from it properly belong to the social affections, and constitute no small portion of Malevolence and Displacency. The passions of Sorrow or of Fear, do not imme- diately or necessarily, direct the attention to their cause so as to have an influence upon their specific characters ; that of anger does. Thus it becomes, as it were, the connecting medium between our- selves and others ; exciting painful and irritating sensations, which relate to both. We shall there- fore consider, in this place, the general nature of the passion, as excited in consequence of a keen sense of personal injuries, without paying particu- lar attention to its objective cause; and refer its in- fluence over the social affections to the Order as- signed to them. Anger is the strong passion or emotion, impressed or excited by a sense of injury received, or in con- templation ; that is, by the idea of something of a pernicious nature and tendency being done or in- tended, in violation of some supposed obligation to a contrary conduct. It is enkindled by the percep- tion of an undue privation of that to which we thought ourselves, in some degree or other, entitled ; or of a positive suffering, from which we claimed an exemption. These are obviously the exciting caus- es ; though our ignorance, or inordinate Self-Love, may suggest erroneous ideas respecting our claims, or render the resentful emotion very disproportionate to the offence. The pain we suffer from the injury, the unexpectedness of the offence, our wounded pride, &c. are so apt to disturb our reasoning and discriminating powers, thatwe are, at the firstinstant, prompted to consider every injury received, as an injury intended. Nor are there wanting numerous instances, in which an heated and irritated imagina- tion attributes design to the irrational and inanimate creation, in order to gratify the passion of resentment. AXGER. 85 Anger, viewed as a Passion, that is, as referring to the first impression in which we are passive, — or the impression preceding the external signs, which con- stitute the Emotion, — may be considered as a pain« mi sensation of a heating and irritating nature. It is an irksome stimulus, by which the animal spirits are troubled and violently agitated. Yet the sen- sation is not so painful as in the excesses of Sorrow or of Fear. When the injury appears great, totally unprovoked, too recent or sudden for the mind to call up motives of restraint, — when surprise at re- ceiving an offence from a quarter the most remote from expectation, — or astonishment at base and un- grateful returns for benefits conferred, accompany the first impulse of passion, and ardent desire of re- venge is immediately excited. The imagination runs over every circumstance of aggravation ; de- picts the offence as a crime of the most atrocious nature ; and vengeance is denounced against the aggressor, as an indispensable obligation of justice, and as a retribution due to the violated laws of mo- rals, of honour, or of gratitude. The emotions stri- kingly correspond with this state of mind. The corporeal system immediately assumes attitudes and appearances, calculated to inspire the offender with terror, and preparatory to the infliction of the chas- tisement, he is supposed to have deserved. The countenance reddens, the eyes flash indignant fire, and the aspect speaks horror; muscular strength is abundantly increased ; and powers of exertion are acquired, unknown to cooler moments. This new appetite for revenge gains the ascendancy, not on- ly over every consideration of compassion, but of personal safety, and impels to dangerous encounters, totally regardless of the danger. In some instances, an apprehension of dreadful consequences, a kind of presage of the mischief which may possibly ensue, and become the subject of future regret, intermix- es fear with the paroxysms of anger ; and a pallid 86 ANGER. tremour unites with symptoms peculiar to wrath, or accompanies the first tokens of revenge. Anger is deservedly placed among the most vio- lent emotions. From its ungovernable excesses, it has almost appropriated to itself the term passion. When the paroxysms of anger are excessive, the subject is deaf to the most cogent reasons, or to the most pathetic representations of the mischief it may occasion ; and being worked up to a degree of phren- sy, he fully vindicates the adage, Ira brevis furor. While he is under the influence of this turbulent emotion, the incensed person often imagines that he is solely actuated by the purest love of equity, and an ardent desire to administer justice ; though, at the instant, he may be violating the dictates of compas- sion, in the perpetration of the most atrocious deeds. It is observable, that Sorrow and Fear, though they may be the result of culpable conduct, or even of criminality, are calculated to excite our compas- sion. The anguish manifested by the subject, calls aloud for our sympathy. But Anger, though it is a painful emotion, seldom excites our sympathy with the object himself, unless we suppose him to be in- sane. In most cases our sympathy is chiefly trans- ferred to the object of resentment ; prompting us to act as mediators, and to exert all our influence in order to mitigate or avert the punishment to which he is exposed. Anger, in the excess of its violence, when it is ex- cited to a degree of phrensy, so that the mind has totally lost self-command ; when it prompts to threats and actions extravagant and atrocious, is termed Rage. Wrath is violent and permanent anger ; and as such it may be deemed an affection. This may be seated in a breast possessing too much self-command to will the infliction of punishment, though it noti- ces and dwells upon every circumstance of aggra- vation ; and though it should resolve to punish, it is ANGER. 87 capable of being appeased by the concessions and penitence of the offender. Resentment is a lesser degree of wrath, excited by smaller offences, or by offences committed against less irritabie minds. It is a deep reflective displea- sure against the conduct of 'he offender. Indignation is a resentment against a conduct which appears peculiarly unworthy ; some atrocious viola- tion of the principles of gratitude, or something which appears peculiarly despicable and base. But we are now trespassing upon the affections winch properly belong to another Class, and which will demand our attention under the article of Dis- placency. Anger, and its principal ramifications are general- ly directed under the conduct of others, and al-e^p-V-v> most universally with superior degrees of violence; however they are sometimes directed against our- selves, when our conduct has been either negligent or criminal. Tn Repentance, Contrition and i?e- morse, Self-reproach, and even Indignation are largely intermixed with the affection of Sorrow. Vexation, Chagrin, Impatience, do not relate to Persons so much as to particular circumstances of a teazing nature. They are chiefly excited by dis- appointments, and tedious delays to the accomplish- ment of our wishes. Peevishness may be considered as a slighter de- gree of anger, perpetually recurring to irritable persons, from trifling causes. It is such a soreness of temper, that it can scarcely suffer the touch of the gentlest hand ; and it resents upon the most innocent, the vexations that have been excited by causes with which they had no concern. Although Fortitude, Courage, Intrepidity, have been considered under the article of Fear, as they are virtuous resolutions which oppose themselves to the objects of our fear, or to the dangers which threaten us ; yet tney n-nght with no great impro- priety have been placed under the passion of Anger. 38 ANGER. If we advert to the physiological, or rather patho- logical effects of anger, we shall perceive that it rouses the mind, increases muscular strength, braces the system for action, and renders the subject heed- less of danger : and these are the effects produced hy Fortitude and Courage. Though that strong ir- ritation of mind peculiar to anger, may not be sen- sibly felt by generous spirits, and self command may calm the agitations natural to this passion, as well as those peculiar to terror, yet some modi- fications of it obviously remain. Where courage is merely instinctive, it is manifestly quickened by anger ; although cultivation and noble principles may suppress the appearance, and almost the sen- sations, in minds endowed with the virtues of forti- tude and magnanimity. It may perhaps be asserted with justice, that some degree of anger is naturally excited by every object of hatred. Though Privation or Danger be the predominant ideas in Sorrow or Fear, yet these are mostly, it may be said, always, accompanied with a sense of injury, in minds not influenced by moral restraints. In sorrows inflicted by a Power against which we dare not to murmur, the irrita- tions natural to a wounded mind, may be subjugat- ed by motives of virtue and piety ; but without these it would be strongly disposed to burst forth into frantic and impotent rage. This may be ex- plained by the strength and quickness of our painful feelings, which at the first instant, dispose us to im- pute blame where no blame can be attached. His- tory makes us acquainted with many curious instan- ces in the heathen world, where the images of the deities worshipped have been very roughly treated, and even suffered public flagellation, for not having averted the calamities which had been deprecated ; and the repinings of those who have been better in- structed, manifest a similar temper, though it may be checked by reverential awe. It is an indication of no inconsiderable progress ANGER. 89 in reason and in resolution, always to distinguish, with accuracy, between an evil endured and its in- culpable cause ; and to support the calamity without the least mixture of Resentment. Nor are these observations confined to the occasions of Sorrows ; in the passion of Fear, the first object being safety, every other consideration may be suppressed for the instant : but in the emotion of Terror, not only some degree of courage, but a very considerable portion of Anger is perceptible ; the rage of a coward de- spairing of escape by flight is proverbial. The most accurate distinctions, thereof, which we have been capable of making in the above Ana- lysis of the Passions, have been to mark the leading characteristics of each. The primary idea exciting Sorrow, is that of loss, or painful privation ; that of Fear is danger ; and the genuine idea appropriate to Anger is that of injury or some species of injus- tice. These are very distinct in themselves, though inordinate self-love so frequently confounds them together. We have thus endeavoured to trace the various Passions and Affections, which are of a personal nature ; and which are more immediately excited in consequence of the principle of Self-Love. — A principle seated in the breast of every individual of our species, from the most ignorant to the most in- telligent ; from the capricious infant to the subli- mest philosopher. All who are able to discern, or who think that they discern, things conducive to their happiness or enjoyment, are occasionally placed in situations which expose them to the influence of one or other of the above Passions, Emotions, and Affections, in their individual capacities. The Passions and Affections, which belong to the social Principle, next demand our attention. 90 Social principle. CLASS II. ON THE PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS, DERIVED FROM THE SOCIAL PRINCIPLE. If our connexions with the inanimate creation, exposed us to be differently influenced by various powers and properties, discernible in every part of it ; if many things around us call forth our passions and affections, by sustaining certain relations with our corporeal and intellectual natures, is to be ex- pected that a still more intimate connexion with the animated creation, should implant within U3 various dispositions, correspondent to those higher qualities and properties belonging to it. The ani- mated beings around us, not only excite certain Pas- sions and Affections arising from the principle of Self-love, in common with other parts of nature, but they also are rendered capable of enjoying or of suffering, equally with ourselves ; and we possess the power of administering to their well-being, or of proving injurious to it. Rational and intelligent agents, being furnished with certain rules of conduct, which respect both themselves and others, are subjected to various de- grees of approbation or censure, according as they act comformably to such ruies, or in violation of them. These peculiarities introduce a train of Passions and affections, very distinct from those which are excited by the selfish principle alone. Self-love confines its attentions to certain qualities and pro- perties, merely as they have an influence upon our own personal welfare ; and we deem these qualities good or bad, solely as they produce certain effects upon Ourselves. The social Principle extends its regards to the state, the conduct, and the character of Others ; and it operates, according to the degrees SOCIAL PRINCIPLE, 91 of their connexion with us, — to their powers of communicating or of receiving from us either good or evil. — to their actual enjoyments or their suffer- ings. — to their prospects of future good or exposure to evil. — to their occasional or habitual deportment, — and to the degrees of merit or dement attached to their dispositions and conduct, as conscious and intelligent agents. Numberless are the Passions. Emotions, and Affections proceeding from these different causes : and they vary m their complexion and character, according to the peculiarities of their excitements. Yet they are all reducible to the two grand distinc- tions which have been already pointed out. They may be placed under the Cardinal Affections of i and Hatred, in which Good or Evil are the predominant ideas. Not can there be a disposition in the class of objects now under consideration, or of ourselves towards them, which may not, in one point of view or other, be ranged under these general head It is obvious that these affections of Love and Hatred, primarily relate either to the Persons or to the Characters of their objects. The Good refers to that which we behoid in ihem, or wish them to possess ; and the Evil to the supposed de- pravity of their characters, or the malevolence of disposition we may entertain towards them. The predominant ideas therefore of good and evil respect these alone. The affections of Love and Hatred are excited, by the immediate interest we take in the merits or the welfare of the objects. or by the personal resentments indulged against them. No one general term is adapted to all those passions and affections, which belong to the social principle. Dr. Hartley, however, has comprehend- ed them all under the name or character of Sym- pathy, This he divides into four Classes : rejoic- ing at another's happiness : grieving at his misery : 92 SOCIAL PRINCIPLE. grieving at his happiness ; and rejoicing at his misery. But the word sympathy, whether we advert to its genuine import or common usage, is ill adapted to the two last divisions. The usual idea of sympathy is that of suffering icith another : which is the most opposite possible to grieving at his happiness, or rejoicing at his misery: the last is not suffering, and the other is suffering in a manner directly contrary. These two opposite dispositions are usually ex- pressed by the opposite terms Benevolence and Malevolence ; the first referring to kindly dispositions towards its objects, and the other to the reverse. But should they be the best terms we are able to employ, yet they are not entirely unexceptionable j as they do not always convey ideas perfectly corres- pondent with the various differences comprised un- der these general heads. Benevolence, signifying good will, might, accord- ing to its etymology, be considered as applicable to Ourselves as well as to others: yet in its usual ac- ceptation the idea of Self is totally excluded : and it expresses a disposition directly opposite to the selfish Principle — This good-will does not indicate itself in all those affections which are ranged under Benevolence. Some characters inspire us with the deepest reverence and awe : which affections, though they do not exclude benevolence, are not immedi- ately inspired by it. Notwithstanding these slight objections, the word appears to be more deserving of being employed, as a generic term, than any other that can be adopted. Were we more familiarized to the signification given to the term Passion, in our introductory Chapter : were it confined to the idea of Passive- ness. whether the cause be of a pleasing or displeas- ing nature, then might we with the strictest pro- priety use the term Sympathy to express a fellov:- feeling with another, both upon joyful and mourn- ful occasions. It would be applicable to every SOCIAL PRINCIPLE. 93 coincidence of sensation, sentiment, and disposi- tion, comprehending our good wishes, good opi- nions, and that benignity which rejoices in their pros- perity. But even in this case. Sympathy can only be ap- plied to incidental indications of benevolence, and is- not to be substituted for the word itself. It will have the same relation to the benevolent Principle as Dfsire has to that of Love, The Principle of be- nevolence predisposes to these social virtues, and Sympathy engages in particular acts of benevolence. To this sense its etymology necessarily confines it; for we can neither suffer with another, nor have any kind of sensation in common with him. until he be placed in certain situations, with which we are be- come acquainted. There are much stronger objections to the word Malevolence, as a generic term, than to the preced- ing. It always conveys the idea of ill-will to a con- siderable degree : but hourly instances of displa- cency. and even of anger and resentment, present themselves without any mixture of that ill-will it describes. In some cases, painful resentments may be excited by the purest good-will ; as in the anger of a parent towards his child, on account of con- duct prejudicial to his welfare. Even the momen- tary ill-wili indulged by a passionate man, seeking revenge for injuries received, deserves not to be stigmatized by the odious name of malevolence, which conveys the idea of permanent ill-will. For the above reasons, aud from a reluctance to use a term so unfavourable in its complexion and character, more frequently than absolute necessity demands, I beg leave to substitute Displacency as a s;eneric term. Its superior propriety will be man- ifest from the consideration, that every instance of malevolence is an indication of Displacency to a high degree, although the latter is not at all times an in- dication of the former, 94 SOCIAL AFFECTIONS. The reader wili not be disposed to censure as su- perfluous these minute investigations respecting the signification of terms, when he recollects that the want of precision has been the grand source of con- fusion of ideas, even among philosophers. The least difference in our conceptions, respecting the force of words, may direct to very different conclu- sions. The smallest deviation from the requisite point of the compass, will in a short time steer the vessel into an improper latitude. In the prosecution of our Analysis under this Se- cond class, or in tracing the passions and affections which belong to the social Principle, I shall, accor- ding to the plan proposed, divide the subject into two Orders ; the first belonging to the principle of Benevolence, in which the idea of Good is the moire immediate and predominant idea ; and the second to Displacency, in which the idea of Evil prevails. The benevolent Pri nciple may refer to good Desires and Dispositions, and to good Opinions : which form two distinct kinds or genera. Displacency may also be divided into two kinds, Malevolence, properly so called ; and disfavourable Opinion or Displacency, according to its usual signification* ORDER I. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS EXCITED BY BENEVO- LENCE, IN WHICH GOOD IS THE PREDOMINANT IDEA. I. Those which respect Benevolent Desires and Dispositions. In our general remarks concerning Love as a Prin- ciple, we inevitably anticipated some things which properly belong to this branch of our Subject. It was then hinted, that our benevolent dispositions may be directed towards those who are connected SOCIAL AFFECTIONS. 95 with us, in various degrees of relation or intimacy ; — to the whole human race indiscriminately, in which it is termed Philanthropy ; and to all Beings rendered capable of any portion of enjoyment ; or universal benevolence, according to the most extensive sense of the expression. It will not be necessary, in the process of our in- vestigation, to have tne distinction between the ra* tional and irrational creation, always in our view. The dispositions towards each are similar ; though rational Beings, from their superior importance, are the most interesting, and the diversity of their situ- ations admits of a greater variety of correspondent affections. Both may be comprehended under the title of general benevolence It will however be proper to remark, that the be- nevolence which respects oar most intimate connex- ions, approximates very closely to the principle of Self-love, It considers every thing belonging to its immediate objects, as belonging also to ourselves, and thus constitutes one common interest. Of this kind are all those connexions which form the inti- mate relations of life, and create so large a portion of its happiness or its misery. Such are the conju- gal, parental, filial, fraternal relations, various de- grees of consanguinity, and particular friendships. Here the habitual attachments, and benignant dispo- sitions which the mind experiences, assume the cha- racter of affections^ by way of pre-eminence. For it is in these relations that the kindly affections mani- fest the greatest warmth and constancy. The ge- neral objects of our philanthropy may possess a portion of our good-will without particular interest being habitually taken in their welfare. The ope- ration of this principle is confined to particular cases and situations, in which they may be incidentally placed. Those animals to which we are the most strongly attached, or which we may have appropri- ated to ourselves, are considered as sustaining an oc easional and accidental connexion ; and when the) 96 SOCIAL AFFECTIONS. are the most requisite for our use and comfort, we chiefly value them as the instruments and means of our convenience and pleasure. Their influence is chiefly temporary. They are transferred with little regret. The mind may become versatile and changeable towards them, without the imputation of cruelty or injustice. But in the social relation, the kindly affections dwell with the well disposed mind, and are perpetually operative. These social affections may arise from various causes, which gave them their distinguished charac- teristics ; and they may possess various degrees of strength ; which, in most cases, is regulated by the degrees of their utility. Some are deemed instinc- tive ; that is, originally implanted in the breast, without the conscious aid of reason or reflection. The love of parents for their offspring is adduced as an evidence of instinctive affection. This is observ- able in persons who seem to have eradicated every other social affection. They still retain a solicitude for their young, after they have rendered themselves strangers to every other virtue ; and indulge a fond- ness here, amidst the greatest animosities against those around them. But whatever ideas we may affix to the word instinct, self-love seems to form its basis. Parents manifestly contemplate their child- ren as scions from the stem : and the selfish affections accompany them, not only as being their appoint- ed representatives, but as second selves. The supe- rior strength of affection natural to the female breast, which receives a daily increase by unremit- ted habits of care and attention, gives the appear- ance of a much stronger instinct to the maternal, than to the paternal affections. Some of the social affections arise from the per- ception, or the persuasion of amiable qualities, per- sonal or mental, for which a strong predilection is formed ; as in the conjugal relation. This predi- lection having also a sexual influence, may become a passion, the most impetuous and ungovernable. SOCIAL AFFECTIONS. 97 The sexual passion is rendered remarkable for its contrarieties. It ma)' be considered as the most generous and the most selfish ; — at once the most interested, and the most disinterested ; it is ready to sacrifice every thing, even life itself, for the be- loved object ; — but it is anxious to appropriate the beloved object entirely to itself. Where the impetuosity of passion is not succeed- ed by indifference, it gives place to the milder and more permanent joys of conjugal affection. Filial affections, if they do not originate from, are closely connected with an early sense of superiority, united with a conviction that this superiority is ex- ercised in perpetual cares and acts of kindness. Fraternal affection owes much of its strength to the closest habits of intimacy, the perception of one common interest, and an impressive sense of the in- estimable value of domestic harmony. The friendly affections are inspired by the con- templation of pleasing qualities, and the perception of a similarity in disposition. They are always cherished by reciprocal acts of kindness. All these connexions may be said to relate most intimately to Self. They manifest an adoption of others in our hearts. They blend and intermix in- terests so completely, that the ardent desire of good towards the particular objects of these affections, is not considered as a branch of disinterested benevo- lence. All the passions and affections which have been enumerated under the preceding Class, as pri- marily belonging to the selfish principle, may be ex- cited by the state and situation of those we love, with equal, and sometimes with superior vigour. In events incidental to them, Joy, Desire, Hope. Sorrow, Fear, Anger, become as quick and impetu- ous, as in cases where our own interests are exclu- sively concerned : and wherever the Universal Pa- rent has constituted us the agents, or the guardians of the good fortune of others, we enjoy the affec- tions of Satisfaction, Contentment, Complacency. 9 98 SYMPATHY. &c. according to the degrees of their prosperity, or f the value of circumstances contributing to it, as if this good immediately pertained to Ourselves. To the good-will which extends itself beyond the circle of personal attachments, and with which our own permanent welfare is not so intimately connect- ed, — to the good-will which is often exercised to- wards strangers, and which is sometimes exercised by generous minds towards enemies, is the title of Benevolence usually applied. Because it is here that the innate benignity of disposition appears the most conspicuously. In these instances of good- will, nothing selfish appears. The benevolence ac- quires the character of being pure and disinterested. Considering this benevolence as a Principle con- stituting a pre-disposition, or a readiness of temper to act in a manner correspondent to the particular situation of the object, the direct operation of this principle will manifest itself by emotions and affec- tions, to which the term Sympathy seems to be pe- culiarly applicable. According to the observations already made upon Sympathy, it may be considered as an inward feeling, which is excited by the particular and extraordinary situation of another ; or which harmonizes with the condition and feelings of its object. Sympathy in- dicates a mind attuned to correspondent vibrations, whether they be of a pleasing or displeasing kind. Consequently it operates with various degrees of strength, according to the degrees of danger to which its objects may be exposed ; — to the misery they suffer, and the aggravating circumstances attending it ; — to the good fortune with which they are sur- prised and delighted ; — and to their capacities of re- ceiving good. It also disposes the mind to accom- modate itself to the tastes, dispositions, and manners of others, in the social intercourses of life. In this enlarged sense of the term may sympathy be considered as a passion, an affection, and a dispo- sition. SYMPATHT. 99 In some urgent and extraordinary cases, Sympa- thy rises into an emotion, which yields not in strength and exertions, to the most violent of the selfish passions. When its object is suddenly ex- posed to some instantaneous and tremendous dan- ger, which demands immediate aid, the whole soul is devoted to the sufferer. Danger and relief are the thoughts which occupy the mind, to the total exclusion of every other. Impelled by this irresis- tible emotion, the sympathizer plunges into the ocean and braves its billows, or rushes into the midst of flames, regardless of their horrors, to snatch a wretched victim from destruction. He is insensi- ble to personal danger, where it is the greatest. I will not say that he does not listen to the sugges- tions of prudence, as prudential thoughts are not suggested. There is no passion, excepting anger, approaching to madness, which resembles the heed- less impetuosity of this emotion. Rage, eager to punish an offence or to revenge an insult, will also rush into danger, and expose its own life in order to glut its passion ; but its pallid countenance and the tremour of its limbs, indicate that Self is always predominant. The impulse of Sympathy renders the generous mind completely courageous. It is a stranger to personal fear ; all its anxieties are trans- ferred to the perils of the object. When the evil is less sudden and alarming ; when it is apparently of a permanent nature, sympathy with distress becomes an affection. Sympathetic affections are distinguished into various species, and discriminated by various ap- pellations, according to the peculiarities attendant upon their cause or the particular state of their object. They may be divided into those which respect Distress, Prosperity. Imitation, Of those which respect Distress, the following are the principal. Compassion, Compassion is that species of af- fection, which is excited, either by the actual dis* 100 SYMPATHETIC SORROW. tress of its object, or by some impending calamity which appears inevitable. It is a benevolent sor- row at their sufferings, or their approaching misery. The etymology of the word expresses this idea with strict propriety ; as it signifies suffering with the object. Compassion is always connected with a disposi- tion to relieve, and will always prompt to vigorous exertions, wherever there is a possibility of success ; unless some important considerations should render the endeavour improper or unjust. Compassion has not a necessary connexion with the character of its objects. Their distress is a suf- ficient excitement. It is frequently exercised upon the unworthy, whose reiterated imprudences or vi- cious conduct, may have been the cause of their wretchedness. From the great extent and univer- sality of this affection, it may justly be considered as a generic name, comprehending several other af- fections which have a more specific application ; as Mercy, Commiseration, Pity, fyc, Mercy is the most exalted branch of compassion. It particularly refers to that state of mind, which induces us to exercise our compassion upon persons whose fate is, in some respect, at our disposal. It disposes us to relinquish demands, which, if enforc- ed to the utmost, would render us the immediate agents of miserj r . It is peculiarly applicable to un- worthy or criminal behaviour towards ourselves, which would inevitably involve the offender in dis- tress, were we to be tenacious of our rights. In a word, it is that dignified compassion which induces us to suppress resentment, to pardon offences, or mitigate punishments, as far as discretion may ad- mit. Commiseration, Although this term seems syno- nymous with the preceding, yet in its general use, it is somewhat different. It is always preferred when we wish to express our sympathy for misfor- tunes, which it is not in our power to remove ; or SYMPATHETIC SORROW. 101 forVhich'there is no apparent remedy. Commise- ration, ruminating upon the state and sufferings of others, induces a permanent concern. In such cases it may be said that we commiserate the unfortunate sufferer, rather than that we have compassion upon him. But although this is a more helpless, it is not an useless affection. It sooths the mind of the af- flicted, and greatly alleviates their sorrows, when every other consolation fails. Condolence is the expression of our commisera- tion. Pity is also similar to the two preceding affections, but is more frequently applied to particular circum- stances, in the state and situation of the object, ra- ther than his immediate feelings. Thus we often pity those who have no pity upon themselves ; whose dispositions and conduct are leading them into evils, of which they entertain no apprehensions, or con- cerning which they are not solicitous. The decrepit and infirm also are the objects of our pity, though they may sustain their infirmities with an enviable cheerfulness. Children rendered destitute of wor- thy and affectionate parents, and exposed to future calamities, of which they are unconscious, are deemed peculiar objects of pity. Nay their igno- rance of their misfortunes augments the force of our sympathetic feelings. Generosity is the disposition which prompts us to bestow favours, which are not the purchase of any particular merit. It has not, like mercy, any im- mediate relation either to imprudences or criminali- ty. It is benevolence sympathising with some pe- culiarities in the state or circumstances of another, which demand our aid, either in the remission of pecuniary claims, in voluntary grants, or in dona- tions and benefactions to assist their indigence. It generally relates to some concessions, sacrifices, or peculiar exertions which have been made, in the exercise of the benevolent principle. The extent of generosity is measured by the advantages and 9* 102 SYMPATHETIC SORROW. pleasures, which have been relinquished in favour of another ; or according to the troubles and difficul- ties which have been encountered, by the benefac- tor on one hand, and the slender pretensions of the object to these benevolent offices, on the other. Liberality has sometimes a similar import with Generosity. Sometimes it has a particular refe- rence to the largeness of pecuniary or other dona- tions. In the present day it is frequently applied to sentiments respecting another. It is used in op- position to a narrow contracted mode of thinking, or to a censorious disposition, inspired by a diffe- rence of opinion. It expresses a freedom from the bias of prejudice or partiality. The man who is disposed to think well of, and act with kindness to- wards persons, whose religious or political creed differs materially from his own, is deemed Liberal- minded. Thus may Liberality be considered as a species of generosity, which usage chiefly applies to free donations, or to subduing unfavourable pre-posses- sions respecting the opinions of another. It is a li- beration from the confined manner of acting, or of thinking, which characterises either the parsimoni- ous or the bigot. Charity, in its original import, is synonymous with Love. In its application it is sometimes used to express a disposition to entertain a favourable opinion of the moral character or conduct of others, in opposition to unfavourable reports, until the strongest evidences implant conviction ; at other times, it signifies giving of alms, and doing good to inferiors. Benevolent exertions in behalf of the wretched, or the oppressed, are deemed acts of charity. Condescension is that species of benevolence, which designedly waves the supposed advantages of birth, title, or station, in order to accommodate our- selves to the state of an inferior, and to diminish that restraint which the apparent distance is calcu- SYMPATHETIC JOY, 103 Jated to produce in him. It greatly enhances the value of every other species of benevolence. From the above analysis we perceive, that Mer- cy, Commiseration, Pity, Liberality, &c. are diffe- rent branches of Compassion adapted to the pecu- liar situation and exigencies of its objects. While Compassion relates to distress, in general, without minute distinctions, its ramifications respect crimi- nality of character or conduct, — the permanency of distress,-- -state and situations which strike us as pe- culiarly unfortunate,- -minuter exigencies, — reputa- tion, — and inferiority of station. It is not always requisite to give to each species of compassion its appropriate term ; yet the diversity of misfortunes, and the diverse alleviations of each, have imper- ceptibly introduced a correspondent phraseology, which in particular cases, manifests its peculiar pro- priety. Another important branch of Benevolence con- sists in partaking of the good fortune of others ; in the participation of their Joy, upon the accession of good, or liberation from evil. If the term Sympathy be employed in this con- nexion, it will denote a pleasurable sensation ex- cited within us, similar to that enjoyed by the pri- mary participant of good. It is observable that no particular terms are ap- propriated to this species of sympathy. There are no nice discriminations which indicate the different kinds of good, or the circumstances relative to it, in a manner correspondent with those which have been traced under sympathetic sorrow. Freedom from distress, or the increase of actual enjoyment, produces, as it were, one simple effect upon the mind of the benevolent sympathizer, without those various and more complicated sensations, which a diversity in misfortunes may occasion. These pleasing sensations can only be expressed by the general terms of joy, gladness, happiness, fyc. We rejoice at the fortunate event which has made 104 SYMPATHETIC JOY. another happy ; we are glad to hear of their suc- cess ; are happy to be informed of their welfare, &c. In some instances, this species of benevolence becomes a very lively emotion, and the sudden im- pulse of joy may emulate that inspired by our own good fortune, although the object should be almost a stranger to us. When, for example, our minds have been previously and deeply affected with the knowledge of his distress ; — when a prosperous change has suddenly taken place ; — and particular- ly when this change has been accomplished by the triumph of the party over cruelty and oppression. In such cases, we enjoy this sudden transition from painful to pleasing sympathy, and we participate in that exultation over tyranny or injustice, to which every man entertains a hatred, unless it be his own act. But excepting upon extraordinary occasions of this nature, our sympathies with the good fortune of others, are much inferior in strength to those we ex- perience from their distress. Various reasons may be assigned for this difference. — The influence of many blessings, newly acquired, may not be so ex- tensive and important, as the influence of a single calamity ; it is scarcely possible for any one to be elevated to the pinnacle of happiness, in so rapid a manner as he may be plunged into the depth of dis- tress ; — good fortune, to whatever state or circum- stances we may apply the term, is generally of slow- er progress, is accumulated by almost imperceptible degrees, and therefore is not calculated to make a vivid impression at any one period of its progress ; — the object may be more deeply afflicted in his re- lative and social connexions, by the misfortunes or irregular conduct of an individual, than he could feel himself benefited by their prosperity ; conse- quently were we to sympathize with him in a man- ner correspondent with his own feelings, joyful events could not make an impression upon us equal SYMPATHETIC JOY. 105 to his afflictions ; — those distresses which call forth our sympathy of sorrow are generally promulgated to a considerable extent, while recent acquisitions of good with ail the striking circumstances attend- ing them, are mostly confined to the narrow circle of relatives and friends. — To these incidental causes we may justly add the wise constitution of our na- ture, as the final cause. Sympathy with the dis- tresses of another is infinitely more useful than re- joicing in his^rosperity. it is an incentive to ad- minister relief, to annihilate his distress, and to re- store the sufferer to the pristine state of ease and comfort; and therefore is it rendered, by the Great Source of Benevolence, more powerful in its influ- ence and operations, than the sympathy of Joy in their welfare ; which cannot be productive of equal good. The different kinds of sympathetic sorrow, are admirably adapted to the particular state of its objects, in order that each may receive its corres- pondent benefit. These considerations will explain the reason why an insensibility to the misfortunes of any one, is much more opprobrious than an indiffe- rence to his actual enioyments. The immediate expressions of our joy are termed Congratulations. All the affections excited by the contemplation of Good or Evil, which relate to others, are mani- festly compound. Sympathy with sufferings, is composed of benevolence and sorrow ; and cordial congratulations are the effusions of benevolence and joy. It is observable that, in the benevolence we are now contemplating, the affection of Love is not necessarily placed upon the object, personally, on account of any excellence of character, or peculiar amiableness of disposition. It rejoices in the wel- fare of another, unconnected with his virtues. The Capacity of enjoyment is a sufficient motive for attempting to impart it ; and a state of distress is a sufficient incitement to attempt relief. In its 106 COMPLACENTIAL AFFECTIONS. noblest exertions, benevolence indicates itself by the communication of good, in opposition to evil deserts, and in a strong propensity to protect from misery, which the bad conduct of the offender has not been able to subdue. It becomes a desire of promoting happiness, too ardent to be extinguished hy injury itself. Sympathy is also applicable to the Sociableness of the human character ; to the nature of man as formed to live in society. This is manifested by the reciprocal pleasure and satisfaction we experi- ence in our daily intercourse ; — by the eagerness with which we receive and communicate tidings that interest our fellow-men ; — by the love of imi- tation, and the readiness with which we conform to the customs, manners, and dispositions, and ac- qujesce in the opinions of others, without attention to the higher authority of propriety or impropriety, or weighing motives and arguments in the balance of reason. In short, it respects every act, habit f and sentiment, of which to participate in common is* gratifying to our feelings, and constitutes so large a portion of the enjoyments and seductions of life. This sympathetic Imitation brings us by imper- ceptible degrees to our Second Division. II. The Affections derived from Good Opinion, In this class of Social Affections, the operations of the Benevolent Principle are not so immediate. Though benevolence is associated, it is not the pri- mary agent. It is rather a consequence than a cause. It is not our benevolence which inspires us with these favourable opinions, but their good qua- lities which awaken and direct our benevolence. Our affections are drawn forth by an impressive sense of some species of excellence in character / and they may be placed upon objects, whose situa- tions do not require either our sympathetic joys or sorrows. These are most properly expressed by complacential regards ; for they consist both in the COMPLACENTIAL AFFECTIONS. 107 approbation of the mind, and feelings of the heart. They relate to conduct and qualities, concerning which our judgment pronounces that they possess merit, while they are rendered interesting by virtue of our social connexions. The nature of Complacency, as it refers either to ourselves, or to our most intimate connexions, has already been considered. I shall only observe in this place, that when we are rendered partici- pants of good, from those qualities which are the proper objects of complacency ; or when we con* template peculiar marks of mental or moral excel- lencies, in others with whom we are conversant, our approbation is accompanied with various degrees of affection for them, although they may not be with- in the sphere of our intimacy. Of these affections the following are the most conspicuous. Gratitude. Gratitude is a pleasant affection, ex- cited by a lively sense of benefits received or in- tended, or even by the desire of being beneficial. It is the lively and powerful re-action of a well dis- posed mind, upon whom benevolence has conferred some important good. It is mostly connected with an impressive sense of the amiable disposition of the person by whom the benefit is conferred, and it im- mediately produces a personal affection towards him. When the affection operates according to the natural course of influence, it will be correspon- dent to the importance of the good obtained, — the distance in station between the recipient and his benefactor, — the smallness of his claims, — perhaps the consciousness of deserving very opposite treat- ment. These circumstances unite to warm the heart into raptures. The grateful mind is impatient of a silent and passive reception of the blessing. It cannot be restrained from acknowledging its obliga- tions, either by expressions or deeds. It considers every return in its power as an act of the strictest 108 ADMIRATION. justice ; nor is it deterred by difficulties or dangers from making the attempt. The term most familiar- ly employed was originally suggested by this idea. The obligation is perceived, and felt; and the per- son benefitted considers himself as bound, in honour and justice, either to repay or acknowledge the debt, by a bond that cannot be cancelled. We shall not wonder at the peculiar strength and energy of this affection, when we consider that it is compounded of love placed upon the good com- municated, affection for the donor, and joy at the re- ception. Thus it has Goodness for its object, and the most pleasing, perhaps unexpected, if not unme- rited, exertions of goodness, for its immediate cause. Thankfulness refers to verbal expressions of gra- titude. Admiration. Although there is scarcely a word in more familiar use than the term admiration, yet much ambiguity has attended its precise significa- tion ; nor have authors of the greatest celebrity, been uniform in the sense they have affixed to it. Sometimes it has been deemed synonymous with Surprise ; sometimes it is used to express Wonder ; sometimes it is applied to subjects, as a mark of de- gradation ; at others, as expressive of excellencies. In Milton's Paradise Lost, it is more than once employed to denote wonder. -Let none admire That riches grow in helL book i. h. 690. In the following passage of ^hakspeare, it obvi- ously signifies wonder and astonishment. Lady Mac- beth says to her husband, terrified at the sight of Banquo's Ghost, You have displac'd the mirth, broke the good me&ting, with »ost admired disorder. MACBETH. ADMIRATION. J0& Mr. Pope has used it to express the indiscrimina* ting applause of Ignorance : For Fools admire, but Men of Sense approve. Mr. Grove defines admiration to he " That 9ud- den surprise at the novelty of an object, by which the soul is fastened down to the contemplation of it." He also asserts that " according to the diffe- rent characters of its object it is called esteem or contempt." These significations have doubtless been given in conformity to the Latin words, miror and admiratio, which are equally expressive of surprise, wonder, astonishment, and that vivid pleasure which the sudden perception of something extraordinary is calculated to produce in the mind. But in the most pertinent and appropriate use of the terms to admire, and admiration^ they are mani- festly deviating from a generic to a specific sense : and in proportion to our advances in precision and accuracy, we feel not only the advantage, but the necessity of applying them to some kind of excellency exclusively ; otherwise we shall be destitute of words to discriminate the finest feelings of the soul, from those which are common to the most ignorant and uncultivated. Even Idiots may be surprised : the most ignorant may wonder and frequently do wonder the most ; but neither of them are suscep- tible of that impression which is best expressed by admiration. If we adhere steadfastly to the rule, that no two words are perfectly synonymous, which cannot be used with equal propriety in every possible connex- ion ; we shall find that admiration is as superior to surprise and wonder, simply considered, as know- ledge is superior to ignorance ; for its appropriate signification is that act of the mind, by which we dis- cover, approve, and enjoy some unusual species of excellence. 10 110 ADMIRATIOX. The authority of Poets is of little weight, when we aim at philosophical precision. Their object is to produce some striking effect ; and this must be accomplished by other means, than by dividing and subdividing ideas into their component parts. Their subjects frequently borrow strength from foreign auxiliaries, which they claim a license to press into their service, as often as they require their aid, in direct violation of primitive rights. As the ancient Poets, by the personification of attributes and cha- racters, have peopled both Worlds with innumera- ble deities, which reason has found it very difficult to expel ; thus have Poets, in general, by the use of tropes and figures, by availing themselves of resem- blances and affinities of every species, given energy to their thoughts ; but they have inspired false ideas, which philosophical precision finds it difficult to eradicate. They have represented things which are not. as if they were ; and thus imposed a severe task upon philosophy, to discriminate the diffe- rences which they have confounded. Our best prose writers, whose subjects demand an attention tojust distinctions, generally apply ad- miration to some degree of Excellency. " When we have those elevated ideas of nature," says Mr. Dryden, " the result of that view is admi- ration, which is always the cause of pleasure." Mr. Addison observes, that " neither Virgil nor Ho- race would have gained so great reputation had they not been friends, and admirers of each other." In the following passage, Archbishop Tillotson gives a full and satisfactory explanation of the term. " There is a pleasure in admiration ; and this is that which properly causes admiration, when we disco- ver a great deal in an object which we understand to be excellent : and yet we see we know not how much more beyond that, which our understand- ings cannot fully reach and comprehend." (See Note R.) That Excellence which is the subject of admira- ADMIRATION. Ill lion, may either consist in the intellectual powers of mind, or dispositions of the heart. Admiration may be excited by the contemplation of greatness and extent of genius, by indications of superior ta- lents, by plans and projects which discover great ingenuity in contrivance and invention, or unusual skill in the execution. It is often excited by ex- traordinary exertions of benevolence ; such as dan- gers encountered to protect and save a friend, a stranger, or an enemy ; by the greatness of the sa- crifice made to misery, and the compassion that ex- cites to extraordinary acts of mercy. In short, the objective cause of admiration is whatever indicates a superior degree of wisdom, ingenuity, good sense, or benevolence. To such qualities it is properly confined. Power abstractedly considered is not the object of admiration ; though the dignified or bene- volent exertions of power, to the production of good, may excite the highest degree of admiration, and place it among the strongest of our emotions. It is obvious that the range of admiration is, from the simpler approbation of the mind, up to the most lively sensation, according to our conceptions of the extent of excellence, and the degrees of our interest in its effects. It is also blended with various other emotions, according to different circumstances at- tendant upon the passion. It is frequently intro- duced by Surprise ; when, for example, the disco- very of these excellencies is sudden and unexpect- ed ; and then it becomes a vivid emotion. It is ge- nerally connected with some degrees of Wonder; — as we are so frequently ignorant of the causes which enabled any one greatly to excel ourselves or others : but since it is always excited by the real discovery of some good qualities, it is not to be con* founded with an emotion which arises from igno- rance and embarrassment, previous to the disco- very. When the evidences of wisdom and goodness ex- ceed our utmost comprehension, or proceed far be- 112 ESTEEM, RESPECT. yond the usual extent of excellence itself, they may excite Astonishment. Whatever is Good, or productive of Good, is the proper object of Love. Excellence must of con- sequence be peculiarly calculated to excite this af- fection in a superior degree : hence the pleasing and intimate connexion between Love and Admiration. When these are united with Gratitude, they consti- tute the happiest and sublimest affections of the soul. When the object manifests extraordinary be- nevolence ; — when immeasurable extents of wis- dom and goodness direct power to execute their purpose; — when incalculable advantages are the issue of their united operations, admiration swells into delectable astonishment, and our conscious in- capacity to fathom is an augmentation of enjoy- ment. Esteem is the value we place upon some degree of worth. It is higher than simple ajyprobafion, which is a decision of the judgment. Esteem is the commencement of affection. It is a degree of love entertained for others, on account of their pleasing qualities, though they should not immediately in- terest ourselves ; by which it is distinguished from gratitude. The term is peculiarly applicable to vir- tuous and amiable dispositions of the heart, such as honesty, integrity, patience, kindness, gentleness, &c. which have no necessary connexion with the understanding. Thus may we entertain an Esteem for persons of merit, although they are at a remote distance from our intimacy : we esteem the charac- ter of a person merely from the report of his good qualities. Respect is that favourable impression which the goodness of a character has made upon the person contemplating it, united with a share of good sense. An union of both these qualities is requisite. Good- ness alone is not sufficient to create respect. For should it be seated in a mind which indicates ex- treme imbecility, it cannot be deemed respectable. VENERATION, &C. 113 On the other hand, superior sense in a mind desti- tute of goodness, will not inspire respect. It will either waste itself in idle speculations, which ren- ders it indifferent to us ; or it may degenerate into low cunning, which renders it hateful. Should it be connected with power, in a wicked and perverse mind, it will excite horror and dismay ; which are very remote from respect. This affection is always connected with a cauti- ous disposition not to disoblige its objects ; inspiring a solicitude to obtain their good-will. Veneration is a higher degree of Respect ; in which the mind seems to be more forcibly struck with wisdom, connected with the sterner virtues. Hence we speak of characters which are more vene- rable than amiable. The term is chiefly applicable to wisdom matured by years, or connected with some peculiar dignity of title or office, and indi- cated by integrity and uprightness. Thus we speak of venerable ancestors, venerable parents, magis- trates, &c. from a presumption of their superiority in wisdom. Awe is the impression made upon us by the lively idea of Power ; a power which would inspire dis- tressing fear or terror, were it not modified by other circumstances and qualities, suggesting the idea of safety. It may be inspired by things inanimate, when the perception of irresistible power is united with a confidence of safety. Thus lofty mountains, steep precipices, deep caverns, the tempestuous ocean, inspire the mind with Awe, in situations where they cannot injure us. When the emotion is inspired by Character, it acknowledges a power, restrained from pernicious exertions, either by jus- tice, or benevolence. Reverence is the veneration paid to superior sanc- tity, intermixed with a certain degree of awe. It is the high Respect paid to the sacred character of its object, attended with a conscious inferiority in moral worth. Esteem and Respect may be inspired by 10* Hi VENERATION, &C. the qualities observable in our equals, and the form- ermore particularly in our inferiors ; but Veneration. Awe, and Reverence imply various degrees of supe- riority in their objects. It is manifest from the above Analysis, that the qualities which influence our favourable opinions, are various degrees and modifications of Goodness, Wisdom, and Power ; that some of our complacen- tial affections are inspired by the predominance of one, some by the predominance of another : and in some there is almost an indistinguishable union* Gratitude refers to goodness indicated by our recep- tion of benefits. Esteem refers to goodness in its feeblest indications ; therefore it is that we frequent- ly express our esteem for the good qualities of the heart, in any one, more than for the soundness of his understanding. Respect and Veneration refer to various degrees of wisdom, or intellectual power united with goodness ; and Awe may relate either to physical or intellectual power, which becomes im- pressive without inspiring dread. Reverence relates to superiority in moral endowments, connected with awe at intellectual powers, and a consciousness of our own deficiencies upon a comparative view. Ad- miration may refer to an unusual display of either of these qualities, separately ; or to the union of them in an extraordinary degree. As self-complacency has its counterfeit in pride and vanity, thus are the complacential affections lia- ble to similar perversion, and give rise to the follow- ing imperfections. Fondness. Though this affection is frequently pardonable, and sometimes amiable, yet it is an ac- knowledged weakness. It indicates an attachment to whatever belongs to us, or is immediately connect- ed with us, beyond its intrinsic merit. Sometimes it is inspired simply by the idea of its being our own property ; sometimes it is contracted or strengthened by habit : — sometimes it is the excess of love, where love is most natural, which indicates itself by infan- tile manners, or culpable indulgences j — and some- MALEVOLENT DESIRES, &C I Id times it is the excess of affection manifested to in* ferior animals, to which their superiors have a much better claim. Partiality. This is such an excess of personal at- tachment as obscures the judgment, or corrupts the heart. It inclines to a more favourable opinion of the motives, conduct, and general merit of its object, than is consistent with the justice due to others. When any of the social and sympathetic affections are very strong, they rise to Emotions, and produce some correspondent tokens in the countenance. Complacency indicates itself by ineffable smiles ; the countenance becomes animated, and the eyes sparkle with delight. Sympathetic joy manifests itself by the indications characteristic of joy. Sympathy with distress retains something of the benignant smile, mixed with marks of dejection, of deep concern, or inward anguish. When admiration rises into trans- port, all the symptoms peculiar to surprise are some- times mixed with marks of complacential love, and sometimes checked by veneration and awe, in which some portion of fearful apprehension becomes an in- gredient. In all these sympathetic affections, the Eye is the most expressive. It is properly termed the Index of the Soul. Particular attitudes and gestures, and the various forms and plaits of the features may be counterfeited by the unfeeling heart ; but it cannot so easily imitate the brisk suffusions of joy, the sym- pathetic tear, the deep veneration and awe, and the eager admiration, which real feelings transmit imme- diately from the heart, into that wonderful organ. ORDER II. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS EXCITED BY DISPLACEN- CY } IN WHICH EVIL IS THE PREDOMINANT IDEA. The reason for preferring the word Disjplacency to Malevolence, as a generic term, has already been 116 MALEVOLENT DESIRES given. Malevolence is rejected, as not being so ap- plicable to every branch of that displeasure we ma/ possibly indulge against others ; whereas Displacen- cy comprehends those various kinds of discontent to which we are exposed, in our social intercourse* Displacency may indicate itself by dispositions ex- ceedingly inimical to its objects, or it may consist in warm disapprobation of their conduct. In the first sense, it is opposed to the operations of the benevo- lent principle ; and in the other, it is the reverse of complacency, which indicates various degrees of af- fectionate approbation. The word Displacency is solely applicable to our intercourse with the human species, and is not em- ployed to express discontent or uneasiness from any other source. Displacency divides itself also into two kinds. It may be indicated by malevolent desires and disposi- tions towards the object : or by unfavourable opi- nions and disapprobations, without any mixture of Malevolence. I. The displacency which is indicated by malevo- lent desires and dispositions. These may be either of a permanent nature, or merely occasional. The former relates to that Ma- levolence or ill-will which is constant and uniform in its influence ; the other to the passion of Anger and its various modifications, which have some par- ticular acts of an unpleasing and irritating nature foi their immediate objects. The first species of Malevolence is a branch of that general principle of Hatred, which has already occupied our attention. (See Ch. i. Sect, hi.) It originates from various incidental causes ; — such as from reiterated injuries, and vexations ; — from unjust or exaggerated representations of the tem- per, designs, motives, conduct of another, which are unpleasant or pernicious ; — from the partialities so intimately connected with our social intimacies and affections, which give rise to violent prejudices AX» DISPOSITIONS. |1? against those who appear inimical to their inte- rests ; — from a spirit of envy and jealousy, which connects hatred of the Person with repining at his good fortune. Clans and classes of Enmity may thus be formed, which, augmented by the power of social sympathy, will finally become inveterate and implacable. Malevolence therefore commen- ces with some idea of evil, belonging to and con- nected with the object ; and it settles into a perma- nent hatred of his person, and of every thing rela- tive to him. The principle thus formed gives rise to the fol- lowing malevolent affections. Malignancy or Malignity, Both these words express a disposition which cherishes inveterate hatreds, and maintains implacable war against its object; a disposition which deliberately plan* schemes of mischief, and employs every means that power, mental or physical, can furnish to the prejudice of another. These words are nearly synonymous. In some connexions, Malignity seems rather more pertinently applied to a radical depravity of nature, and Malignancy to indications of this depravity, in temper and conduct in particu- lar instances. Both may be manifested by the perversion of power, whether physical or intellectual ; and our dread of the disposition will be proportioned to our conceptions of the magnitude of this power. Hence the terror inspired by the idea of Demons and wicked Spirits, or Beings of a higher order, who are supposed to be devoid of every thing that is good, and replete with every thing that is evil. So that To do ought good never can be their task, But ever to do ill their sole delight. MlLTO^. To such Beings we ascribe Malignancy to an infinite extent. 118 MALEVOLENT DESIRES Malice, on the other hand, is more frequently em- ployed to express the dispositions of inferior minds, to execute every purpose of mischief, within the more limited circle of their abilities. It often shows itself by little incidents; such as, — by thwart- ing the favourite purposes of another: — by refusing the good that might be communicated without per- sonal injury ; by encouraging unfavourable reports ; — by raising unjust suspicions : — by perverse mis- representations, &:c. This temper is sometimes expressed by spite, or by having a spite against any one. Thus, if we ascribe Malignancy to Beings of a superior order, by way of pre-eminence, malice and a malicious disposition, may with peculiar pro- priety be reserved for the minor agents of mischief, whose power of doing evil is not proportionate to their inclinations. Envy. This is a painful sensation excited by the view of something desirable in the state and situa- tion of another, which self-love wishes to appropri- ate. To envy, is to repine at the good conferred upon another, or possessed by him. Thus it is a perfect contrast to the sympathy which rejoices at his welfare. Envy entertains a degree of sorrow that the good contemplated should escape ourselves, and of anger that it should fall to the share of another. The inordinate self-love which excites to envy, naturally induces the envious person to ima- gine that he is more deserving, than the object who has been favoured. He contemplates his own sup- posed merit, in opposition to the supposed demerit of the more happy object, until he becomes fully convinced, in his own prejudiced judgment, of the injustice of the distribution : and feels a spirit of resentment arising against the possessor, and every cause of his enjoyment. Thus is envy that species of malevolence, which is inspired by the conjoined influence of pride, sor- row, and anger. Envy is denominated a passion, together with AND DISPOSITIONS. 119 many other of the malevolent affections ; partly because it may be very strongly excited by particu- lar incidents, and partly in consequence of that sin- gular law of usuage which assigns the word Affec- tions to the benevolent feelings, and Passions to the powerful influence of vicious dispositions. (See Ch. i. Page 14.) Rancour is that degree of malice which preys upon the possessor. His heart is torn with vexa- tion when he contemplates the happiness of another, or when he is foiled in his evil purposes towards him. Cruelty. A cruel disposition respects the particu- lar temper manifested in the contemplation or in- fliction of absolute misery. It has various degrees. Sometimes it isexpre>sive of that hardness of heart, which is able to look upon extreme distress without any sensations of humanity. Sometimes cruelty is indicated by the voluntary and unnecessary inflic- tion of misery : and in its highest state it rejoices and triumphs in the diffusion of horrors ; in the wan- ton shedding of blood, and spreading desolation. It is gratitied with the convulsions of agony : groans and lamentations are music in its ears. This tiend-like temper may proceed from a natu- ral insensibility, strengthened by a perverse educa- tion ; — from envy : — from a spirit of revenge for supposed injuries : — from cowardice, resenting the panic it feels ; — or from insatiable ambition, which wades through torrents of blood, and renders the mangled bodies of the slain, stepping-stones to that pre-eminence of station after which it aspires. Censoriousness is a disposition to find fault with the conduct, sentiments, or dispositions of another, deeming every action improper, or ascribing it to improper motives. Prejudice is the reverse of partiality. This in- clines to the favourable side in judging or vindicat- ing of conduct, more than reason or charity de- mands : prejudice, on the contrary, is that degree of malevelence which disposes us to pre-judge the 120 MALEVOLENT DESIRES character, conduct, or motive of another to his disad- vantage, without having the proper evidences before us. It is obvious that the partiality indulged for one person, may excite, or greatly increase our prejudice against another. It is observable that the common use of each of these terms is not entirely correspondent with their original import. Partiality properly signifying a partial and imperfect view of the evidence, is in it- self applicable to an undue bias of opinion or dispo- sition, whether it he favourable or disfavourable to the object; and prejudice as it originally signifies pre-judging, is in itself equally applicable to a pre- cipitate decision for or against any one ; but custom applies the term partiality to a disposition in favour, and prejudice, without an expletive, to a disposition against another. There is a personal hatred, which has no specific name. It consists of an habitual dislike against some particular object, without being connected with ill-will, or a desire of his being unhappy. It avoids social intercourse with the party, or renders social intercourse irksome. It is sometimes the re- sidue of anger which forgive, as it is frequently ex- pressed, but does not forget. It is sometimes in- spired by unfavourable reports and misrepresenta- tions, constituting insufferable prejudices ; and not unfrequently, by some very disagreeable peculiarity of manners in the object. Ingratitude cannot be termed an affection. It is the negative of a virtue, which a feeling heart places among the first of obligations. It is an in- sensibility to benefits received, either arising from stupidity, culpable inattention, or innate pride, which annihilates the idea of a favour, and con- siders every service rendered as the discharge of a debt. Apathy is a singular stagnation of all the social feelings. It professes neither to love nor to hate ; it affects an indifference to which it cannot possibly attain, as it terminates in a disgust of life and all its AND DISPOSITIONS. 121 objects. Apathy is a kind of gangrene affecting the social principle, which like a mortified limb in the corporeal system, is an incumbrance to the patient, and a nuisance to others. Neither dislike, ingratitude, nor apathy, are abso- lutely chargeable with malevolence ; but as they are the disgraceful negatives of every social affection, and are much more prepared to hate than to love, this seems to be their proper department. The second species of Malevolence relates to those occasional and more transient fits of ill-will, which are excited by particular provocations, and which are not totally repugnant to the benevolent affections. These are indicated by Anger, and its various modifications. Anger has already been considered as the passion which is excited by a quick sense of injury ; and it has been described as having a double relation ; the one immediately respecting ourselves, the other respecting the offender. To the first we directed our thoughts under the selfish passions ; where the influence of anger upon our personal feelings, and effects upon the corporeal system, were particularly considered. We shall now confine our attention to the changes produced in our minds respecting its object. As long as we are under the influence of Anger, considered either as a passion or an affection, we experience a temporary suspension of our usual complacency, and even of our good will and general benevolence, towards the object of our displeasure. Under the impulse of the first emotion, we are con- scious of a desire that the offender should suffer, in some degree proportionate to this recent instance of his demerit ; we are prompted to imagine that jus- tice itself demands a punishment adequate to the offence ; we feel ourselves much inclined to become the ministers of justice, and are impatient of delay m the execution of her commands. When the provocation arises from the conduct of 11 122 MALEVOLENT DESIRES any one, with whom we are intimately connected, our habitual love of their persons and regard for their welfare, may restrain the passion within the bounds of justice, and the explosion which gave vent to the passion may restore the calm. When it arises from the misconduct of a person, for whom we are particularly interested, and when this mis- conduct endangers his welfare, the very principle of benevolence converts our complacency into. its contrary. In this case, being such an expressive indication of our displeasure as to inspire terror, it is admirably calculated to strike the offender with awe, and reclaim his conduct. As soon as passion is able to attend to the united voices of reason and affection, they will frequently join to palliate the offence, by ascribing it to some incidental cause ; to the common frailties of our nature, to the strong impulse of particular circumstances, &c. and the offender becomes reinstated in our favourable re- gards. But reiterated provocations being indubita- ble marks of culpable inattention, disrespect, or de- pravity of disposition, will entirely change our opinion of character, and inspire us with indif- ference or permanent displeasure against the cause. Rage has been described as the madness of anger. Revenge is an insatiable desire to sacrifice every consideration of pity and humanity, to the principle of vindictive justice. It renders the demands of that terrific giant paramount to every other claim. It is a propensity to retaliate evil, too fervent to be cooled by time, too deep and inveterate to be ob- literated by concessions and entreaties. It antici- pates joy in the contemplation of sighs and groans, and the only moment of transport is the instant of inflicting misery. We see that this disposition approaches very near to permanent malevolence, of the most despicable character. The abstract idea of justice, however, forms a partition between them ; for to this, malevo- AND DISPOSITIONS. 123 lence has no rightful claim. But its more honoura- ble distinction consists in that repentance, which humanity excites in the mind that is not totally ob- durate, after the gratification of this dreadful pas- sion. The avenger feels, too late, that he has sa- crificed realities to a phantom ; and that to inflict misery is in no case, the path to happiness. Wrathis a deep and irritating sense of an injury. It is deliberate anger ; being chiefly inspired by the contemplation of various aggravating circumstances attendant upon the offence. The desire of retalia- tion is not a constituent part of it ; by this it is dis- tinguished from revenge. But it occasions a ferment in the spirits incompatible with the indulgence of complacency. Resentment. This affection has been described to be a deep reflective displeasure against the con- duct of an offender. We may now observe, that re- sentment is chiefly excited by some personal offence, committed against the laws of social intercourse; of friendship, or of gratitude ; — by some affront, that wounds our self-love, it may be, our pride; — by some reprehensible inattention to our minuter claims ; — or by the want of respect and affection, to which we imagine that the tenour of our conduct towards the object, has given us an undoubted right. It may terminate in indifference, and, in weak minds, in malice ; but it is generally appeased by concessions and acknowledgments. Suspicion. This is a comfortless state of doubt concerning the conduct and character of another. The mind is greatly embarrassed respecting the de- gree of esteem, cordiality, or friendship, which is due to the object. Suspicion may be excited by some kind of accusation, not supported by evidence sufficient for conviction, but sufficient to trouble the repose of confidence. When exercised towards Intimates, it is an anxious suspension of mind be- tween complacency and displacency ; between that respect we were accustomed to entertain for them. 124 MALEVOLENT DESIRES and the painful apprehension that they no longer deserve it. We feel an incipient anger and resent- ment, which we dare not to indulge, and cannot suppress. Jealousy is a species of suspicion that relates to conduct, which still more intimately concerns our- selves. It is a painful apprehension of rivalship, in cases that are peculiarly interesting to us. It will of consequence increase in strength, according to the value we place upon the object, and to the degrees of danger to which we imagine it may be exposed. It is the inseparable companion of the ambitious, who view every competitor, and every one capable of becoming a competitor, with a jea- lous eye. It is sometimes engrafted upon pride, which is deeply wounded by appearances of neglect. It is a frequent attendant upon love ; and in a mild- er sense of the term, it may be considered as an anxious solicitude least we should be supplanted in the affections of those we most highly esteem* The passion is sometimes excited in weak minds, by the very excess of affection ; for this excess is prone to be perpetually upon the watch, and tor- ments itself with groundless fears. Jealousy, in the extreme, contains a complication of the most tremendous passions which can agitate the human breast. Though it has love for its basis, yet it suf- fers the united torments of every painful emotion. It finds equal danger in the most opposite appear- ances. Every token of innocence is interpreted into a proof of guilt; and every instance of affec- tion, as a mark of insulting hypocrisy. It is a green-ey'd monster, which doth make The meat it feeds on. — Trifles light as air Are to the jealous, confirmations strong As proofs of holy writ- SHAKSPEARE S OTHELLO Under the influence of this baneful passion the mind becomes, at intervals, the sport of transport- AND DISPOSITIONS, 125 ing hope, and wild despair ; is alternately torment- ed, by fits of rage and the depth of contrition, for excesses committed in its transports. In a word, uniting the extremes of dreadful hatred and pas- sionate fondness, it entertains most cruel suspicions of the object it most adores ; and is tempted to destroy that which it dreads to lose ! The class of evil passions under permanent Ma- levolence, are indications of the depraved character and dispositions of their subject, in whom they are seated, not having any immediate reference to the character of their object. Those which are now described as the modifications of anger, respect the impressions, which occasional deviations from the usual tenour of conduct, make upon the mind of the person most interested ; in which, both the feelings and indications of ill-will are of a more transitory nature ; so that they deserve not to be confounded with permanent hatred. We shall now proceed to consider those emotions and affections which are inspired by the contempla- tion of Evil; and in which neither malevolence, nor any of the selfish affections, are necessary in- gredients. II. The Displacency which is indicated by un- favourable opinions of conduct and disposition. This gives rise to the following emotions and affec- tions. Horror. Horror is that very strong and painful emotion, which is excited by the view or contem- plation of something peculiarly atrocious in the conduct of another ; by some vice which exceeds the usual extravagance of vice ; enormities that surpass the bounds of common depravity — such as impurities too gross to be named, profligacies too shocking to be repeated, and cruelties which make us shudder at the recital. It may also be excited by the extremes of agony, mental or corporeal, or by sufferings and punishments at which our natures recoil. 126 MALEVOLENT DESIRES This passion may be deemed the antipode of admiration. The one is inspired by the contem- plation of surpassing excellency ; the other by the excess of vice and wretchedness. As that is one of the most pleasing sensations we can possibly enjoy, this is among the most painful we can possibly suffer. Scenes of the above description excite a tremour upon the mind, a species of terror, scarcely equalled by the most lively apprehensions of danger. Indignation expresses a strong and elevated dis- approbation of mind, which is also inspired by something flagitious in the conduct of another. But it does not always suppose that excess of depravity which alone is capable of committing deeds of horror. Indignation always refers to culpability of conduct ; and cannot, like the passion of horror, be extended to distress either of mind or body. It is produced, by the violation of some indispensable obligation connected with circum- stances peculiarly aggravating : — by acts of treache- ry, the abuse of confidence, base ingratitude, &c. which we cannot contemplate without being pro- voked to anger, and feeling a generous resentment ; though we should not be interested in the con- sequences of the conduct we condemn. Indignant emotions are always excited by particular inci- dents. Contempt, This is a more calm and deliberate affection of the mind. It directs its chief atten- tion to the character and disposition, which is capable of committing unworthy and disgraceful actions. Its objects are radical baseness, and radical imbecility where it ought not to exist. Thus we despise the man who is capable of fraud, deceit, falsehood, and every species of moral de- pravity, which indicates an extraordinary degree of meanness. The man who makes great preten- sions to more exalted powers, and better qualities than he really possesses, and the man who vainly AND DISPOSITIONS. 127 boasts of much more than he can perform, or courts our admiration of accomplishments of which he is destitute, or which he possesses in a very inferior degree, renders himself also an object of contempt. Thus the characters which are sunk below the common level of humanity, and those which ar- rogantly and impotently attempt to rise above it, are universally deemed the proper objects of this emotion. Both indignation and contempt are accompanied with a certain elevation of mind. The observer feels and enjoys a conscious superiority > when he compares himself with the offender. This sense of superiority is more strongly marked in contempt. When it rises to a certain height it indicates, Disdain. Disdain is such a degree of contempt as precludes any commerce with the party despised. It considers him as totally unworthy of our notice : — even of our reprehension, which always supposes a possibility of reclaim. It feels as if there was something so repulsive in the character of the ag- gressor, that he is no longer entitled to the rights of social intercourse. Contempt and disdain are often accompanied with a satirical smile, which strongly insinuates that base- ness and meanness are also intermixed with large portions of folly. Irrision. This term is employed to express an affection, inspired by any peculiarity in sentiment, disposition, or conduct, that we deem an offence against some acknowledged law of congruity, some standard of propriety universally received and re- spected ; but which is not of sufficient magnitude to excite anger, or any of its ramifications. It chiefly refers to something odd, whimsical, absurd, which is calculated to excite laughter, rather than incur our displeasure. Various mistakes, and egregious blun- ders, which indicate culpable ignorance, inatten- 528 MALEVOLENT DESIRES tions, and extravagancies, are the proper objects of irrision. The above seem to be the principal emotions and affections which are inspired by the contemplation of conduct and character. They are strong marks of displacency, which does not arise from malevo- lence in our dispositions, but on the contrary, from the warm love of beneficent virtue. Nor are they necessarily connected with personal injuries, though a sense of injuries, will infallibly impart great energy to each emotion. As anger is the guardian of our own personal in- terests, thus is the present class of emotions and af- fections destined to be the guardians of virtue, de- cency, and propriety in general. It is remarkable that the mind is affected by transgressions against these, in exact proportion to the degrees of culpa- bility obvious in the offence. Horror rouses within us such a degree of resentment, as becomes the se- verest reproof to the enormities at which it shud- ders ; and when excited by deeds of cruelty it calls up a laudable spirit of revenge ; and it renders the mildest and meekest dispositions solicitous for a power of retaliation. Indignation is always direct- ed against the violation of some sacred law, which is respected by every man who is not destitute of virtue and honour. Contempt is the punishment directed against that meanness of character, and perverseness of conduct, which sink a man below the level of social intercourse, and disqualify him for decent and respectable society. Irrision and ridicule, are the protectors of order, decency, and propriety in the lesser departments ; against which the transgressor is thus made to feel his offence. He is taught to perceive that his conduct or princi- ples are inconsistent with common sense, and to suspect that he is in danger of being ranked in the ©pprobrious class of fools. The visible tokens of emotion under each species AND DISPOSITIONS. 129 of displacency, are characteristic of its nature. Those painful sensations which are peculiar to the most malevolent passions, legibly inscribe their marks upon the countenance. The deep sunk eye, the pallid anxiety of Malice and Envy, indicate the inward torments of the mind ; and the ineffectual attempts to smile, in transient gleams of satisfaction at misery, only serve to render horror more horrid. Fear and dread have been considered as the most painful emotions inspired by the selfish principle ; and their pathological symptoms manifest an insupe- rable anxiety and depression. Malignity has adopt- ed these feelings with their external marks ; inter- mixing them with the irritations of anger ; which, however, it attempts to repress from bursting forth into emotions, through the apprehensions of detec- tion. The displacency of anger manifests the tokens descriptive of anger, already noticed ; which, ac- cording to the degrees of their violence, strike ter- ror into great offenders, or inspire the thoughtless and inattentive with respect and awe. The horror excited by the excess of wickedness or of misery, approaches to terror, both in sensation and in external marks. Indignation, contempt and disdain, paint upon the countenance a singular mix- ture of dignified superiority and deep disapproba- tion. A certain elevation, becoming the majesty of insulted virtue, is united with a lively sense of the depravity and meanness of the offender ; and a contrast is instantaneously formed between exalted- ness of character, and the state of degradation into which he has fallen. The satirical jocularity accom- panying contempt, in irrision, throws into the coun- tenance, marks of exultation over the imbecility or absurdities of the person ridiculed. Without sub- scribing to the hypothesis of Mr. Hobbes, that pride is the efficient cause of laughter, it must be acknow- ledged, that this species of laughter is always accon> 130 MALEVOLENT DESIRES, &C. panied with an insulting consciousness of superi- ority. In the above Analysis we have attempted to trace the origin of the Passions, their exciting causes, their immediate objects, and their numerous ramifi- cations. We have contemplated the infinite diver- sity and contrariety of effects, which proceed from that one principle, the Love of Good, in Beings formed as we are, stationed in a world where every surrounding object is able to produce its own speci- fic impression ; Beings, whose individual, and whose social interests, are so many, various and compli- cated. But this Analytical survey does not terminate the history of the Passions. There are various other points of view in which it is proper to contemplate them, in order to increase our acquaintance with the rudiments of self-knowledge, and enable us to draw those moral and practical inferences, which may prove most conducive to the love and practice of Virtue. These are reserved for the Second Part of our Treatise. END OF PART THE FIRST. PART II. PHILOSOPHICAL OBSERVATIONS AND INQUIRIES, FOUNDED UPON THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS CHAPTER I. OBSERVATIONS RESPECTING THE LAWS OF EX- CITEMENT. OBSERVATION I. SURPRISE THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF PASSION. In different parts of our analysis of the Passions,, the influence of the introductory emotions, in quick- ening affections of the most opposite nature into a passion, has fully appeared. It has been shown, that whatever strikes us in a sudden and unexpect- ed manner, generally makes, for the instant, a more vivid impression, than things and circumstances of much greater consequence, with which we have been familiarized, or which have been more slowly and progressively introduced to our notice. It has been rendered obvious, that Wonder is compound- ed of surprise, and the impression made upon the mind ; by the idea of Intricacy ; — and that Aston- ishment unites the perception of vastness with sur- prise ; — we have remarked, that these are, by unj- i32 CAUSE or PASSION, versal suffrage, emphatically termed emotions; — and we have seen the influence of these introductory emotions, in passions of the most opposite charac- ters. These considerations united make it highly pro- bable, that the essential and characteristic difference between a Passion and an Affection, depends upon the Superaddition of Surprise, to the natural effect produced by the real or supposed quality of an ob- ject ; — that this Emotion, conjoined with the speci- fic nature of its exciting cause, is virtually the effi- cient cause of a Passion : the percussion of surprise rendering the affection visible, by characteristic signs, correspondent with its specific nature. Thus for example, in Joy, the pleasing part of the impression owes its origin to the possession, or un- doubted expectancy, of some desirable good. This, in its lowest influence, produces some degree of change in the corporeal frame. It is & sensation, and must be felt somewhere. The vividness of the im- pression occasioned by the impetus of surprise, ren- ders this sensation more vivid, diffuses its effects over the whole system, and occasions a delectable and ungovernable flow of spirits, which becomes con- spicuous to every spectator. But as novelty is the exciting cause of surprise, in proportion as the no- velty of good subsides, surprise gradually diminish- es, and leaves the mind under the influence of an affection, more proportionate to the real value of the object. Thus we may suppose the Passion of Anger, to consist of that disagreeable sensation, which a sense of injury will always occasion, quickened by surprise into an ungovernable emotion. The reluctance with which we part with any thing contributing to our benefit or enjoyment, will be quickened by sur- prise into the agonies of sorrow ; which is also able to convert painful apprehensions into the excess of Fear. Nor does the acknowledged fact, that our passioes CAUSE OF PASSIOX. 133 •re sometimes excited by deliberate contemplation, militate against the opinion. This can only take place in affairs of high impor- tance ; and in such cases the more deliberate sur- vey consists in examining, and reflecting upon every circumstance, relative to the nature of the exciting- cause, which necessarily produces a variety of new and unexpected combinations, each of which will be attended with a proportionate degree of surprise ; and although there may not be in any one circum- stance, that quantum of Novelty which so powerful- ly strikes the mind, in cases that are sudden and to- tally unexpected, yet the combined influence of the aggregate number of Novelties, may finally produce the most extravagant passions. Thus may the mind calculate the variety of benefits accruing from some prosperous event, until it be transported with joy ;-— enumerate the evils of privation, until it become; frantic with sorrow ; — dwell upon the number and magnitude of provocations which aggravate an in- jury, until resentment shall be converted into rage ; — and by ruminating upon the extent of danger, it may be driven into despa'wr. If this conjecture be admitted, it will give a beau- tiful simplicity to the theory of the Passions. It shows that they may be decomposed into the sim- plest elements : while it indicates the manner, bv which the combination of these elements may be productive 01 such an infinite variety, both in na- ture and strength. It shows, that the different de- grees of force in the quickening agent, or of its re- iterated influence, are calculated to give various de- crees of momentum to each particular atfection. 134 AFFECTIONS ALONfc OBSERVATION II. PASSIONS AND EMOTIONS ARE OF A TRANSITORY NATURE ; THE AFFECTIONS ALONE ARE PERMANENT. According to the distinctions which have been made between Passions, Emotions, and Affections, it clearly appears that the two former are in their nature transient, and that the affections are capable of much longer duration. The passions have been represented as vivid sensations, passively or invo- luntarily, produced by some strong idea excited in the mind ; and emotions as the external marks of these. But as this passive state of mind is transi- tory, so are its external marks ; and as both gradu- ally subside, they give place to some correspondent affection, which remains as long as our opinion, and the interest we take in the object, shall continue. It necessarily follows from these facts, that we are not to look to the passions and emotions either for permanent well-being, or for permanent wretched- ness. They must either die away and leave no im- pression, as in cases where the imagination was de- ceived, respecting the value or importance of the exciting cause, or they are the harbingers of some more durable affections ; and it is the influence of these affections which has the permanent effect upon our well-being. Thus, when we give ourselves over to the delectable tumults of Joy, the joy is in- cidental. It is hastily introduced by the sudden, perception or impressive sense of some acquisition, which we deem important to present or future wel- fare ; of a something which we expect to be more or less durable in its nature, or to diffuse its benefi- cent influence to a considerable extent. These ad- vantages are concentrated, as it were, in the ima- gination, at the instant of joy. They operate upon the mind as the solar rays collected in a focus dart upon the surface of a body ; and though the plea- sures of joy are often greater than those derived PERMANENT. 135 from its causes, yet we naturally expect more than the momentary well-being introduced by the emo- tion itself. In the first impulse of Sorrow, the magnitude of the loss is the most impressive idea. As the mind becomes more intimately acquainted with the na- ture and extent of the privation, the agonies of sor- row will either subside into indifference, from the perception that the loss was not of that importance as had been imagined, and that it has been amply supplied by some valuable and unexpected blessing; or the vivid impression will be effaced by time, which always piaces before us a variety of objects new and interesting ; or finally, the transports of sorrow will gradually give way to habitual grief and melancholy. Thus Fear is inspired, and becomes agonizing, from the apprehension of some species of calamity ; and the influential idea at the instant, is, that by the expected calamity we shall be lastingly deprived of some Good we wish to retain, or that it will be intro- ductory to some durable Evil ; though the fear it- self may be much more painful than the evil we dread. Anger is roused by an immediate sense of injury cpmmitted or threatened ; that is, by the ap- prehension of some robbery of the good to which we have a claim. Here again the mind, comparing the present with the past, or looking forwards to the future, perceives or apprehends a disagreeable change of circumstances or of state ; and is in- censed against the offending cause. When the first impulse subsides, it is succeeded by the affec- tions of grief, resentment^ indignation, &c. according to the nature of the insult suffered, or the aggrava- tions of the offence, and these become durable as the idea or perception of the injury received. Nor does the transition which it sometimes made from affection to passion invalidate these remarks. It has been observed, that when the object possesses many complicated and interesting circumstances, these, by being placed before the memory, and dis ( J6 AFFECTIONS, &C. tinctly examined, may gradually warm the imagina- tion, and increase the strength of the affection, until the party be worked up into violent emotions. But when the passions are excited in this manner, they are also of short duration. The preternatural state of mind demands too great an expenditure of ani- mal spirits, to render the passion lasting ; and it soon relapses into the kindred affection. In cases deem- ed peculiarly interesting, and in persons of quick and lively feelings, gusts and fits of passion may be frequently excited by the same cause, and the mind may be placed alternately under the influence of the passion and affection : but wherever passions and emotions are permanently vehement, it becomes an indication of insanity. It is a morbid irritation, over which reason has totally lost its controling power. The permanent Affections are therefore to be con- sidered as constituting that habitual state of mind, into which the primary passion impelled it. Our ideas, and with them our affections, concerning the object, are now changed. Instead of our former indifference, we contemplate it with some degree of pleasure or pain, become habitually attached to it, or indulge an habitual aversion respecting it. Thus it is obvious that none of the leading pas- sions and emotions constitute our permanent Wel- fare, or the contrary. They simply manifest the first impression which the sudden change of our state has made upon us. The lasting effects, in conse- quence of this change, are to be learned from the Affections. If the Good introduced by Joy prove itself to be a lasting good, though it may be partial and incomplete, it may inspire Contentment. If it be the completion of an ardent desire, it communi- cates Satisfaction. If it meet with approbation, and be reflected upon as the result of a plan well- intended, wisely formed, and successfully executed, it becomes the source of Complacency. Fear sinks into permanent Dread, or unmixed with any parti- PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 137 cle of hope, into lasting Despair ; Sorrow into con- firmed Melancholy ; and Anger into Resentment and Displacency. OBSERVATION III. RELATION OF THE PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS TO EACH OTHER. It has frequently been remarked, that the influ- ence of any particular passion or emotion, disposes the mind to be subjected to some other that is of a similar nature and tendency ; while it places the disposition at a remote distance from the affections of a contrary complexion. Dr. Hartley has observ- ed, correspondent to the grand division of the pas- sions which he had adopted, that " the five grateful passions, Love, Desire, Hope, Joy, and pleasing Recollection enhance each other; as do the five ungrateful ones, Hatred, Aversion, Fear, Grief, and Displeasure." Addison, Hume, Lord Kaims, have made similar remarks, and have adduced the asso- ciation of ideas as the cause. But as the temper of mind produced by one affection, predisposes to the affection which is most analogous, though it may not be immediately dependant upon it, may we not infer that the association of the Affections will be prior to, and introduce that of Ideas ? Thus, according to the division which has been adopted in this Treatise, not only are gladness, cheerfulness, mirth, contentment, satisfaction, com- placency, &c. the offspring of Joy, but while the mind is under their pleasing influence, it is dispos- ed to every affection of the pleasing kind, which may be inspired by very different causes, or by cir- cumstances too trivial to excite either of these emo- tions, or affections, in its calm and influenced state of mind. Let us suppose, for example, the excit- ing cause to consist in something merely personal ; 12* 138 RELATION OF vet the pleasing sensation produced, inclines at the moment, to the affections of generosity, charity, sympathy, compassion and mercy : nay, at such sea- sons, it is disposed to expand, that it may embrace all mankind ; and the humbler acts of virtue, with which we might have been contented, at another period, will now appear contracted and unsatisfac* tory. Upon this principle is the custom manifestly found- ed, of making valuable presents to the messengers of welcome tidings, or rewarding them with some peculiar marks of complacency : a custom which has been practised in every age and nation. The overflowings of joy inspire a generosity of temper, which absolutely requires an object ; and none can immediately appear more meritorious, than the per- son who has been the instrument, as it were, or the instrumental cause of Joy. The delectable sensa- tion communicated to the mind of the principal par- ticipant, immediately excites in his breast a grateful affection for the person whose communications have been the cause of it ; though he may have merely acted in an official capacity ; and possibly, contrary to his secret inclinations. The liberation of cap- tives, and prisoners of various descriptions, upon accession to the throne : — the institution of sports and pastimes, that joy may be diffused among the multitude, upon events apparently replete with much future happiness, as on births, marriages, and on the arrival of a young heir to the possession of an ample fortune ; — the pleasing incitements of illu- minations, fire-works, distributing good cheer to the populace, are universally felt as harmonizing with the exhilarated state of mind, which welcome ti- dings, of a private or public nature, are calculated to excite. In like manner does the lustre of great actions inspire us with a certain respect for those most intimately connected with the Agent, whom we consider as the parent stock, productive of me- rit in every ramification ; or as able to shed desert PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 139 over every connexion. Under the influence of these grateful and liberal principles, we are induced to imagine that children are entitled to share the rewards due to their parents. Hence those heredi- tary honours which too frequently irradiate the un- worthy, and demonstrate that the generous infe- rence is not always conclusive. From these associating affections it proceeds, that the perception of good qualities centered in the Mind of any one, disposes to an attachment to his Person. Favourable impressions inspire an inclina- tion to cultivate friendship ; and friendship between the sexes has a powerful tendency to inspire love. That love, which, in delicate minds, appears to be at the remotest distance from every thing sensual, will finally excite the stronger and warmer passions. Nor are we without many instances of these be- coming most impetuous, from their being founded upon sentimental refinements. As the passion of sorrow proceeds from the loss of what we have loved, it may imperceptibly dis- pose, — in persons whose passions are strong but very transient, — to the affection of Love towards the object commiserating our loss. No one can appear so worthy of the transfer, as the friend who sympathizes deeply with the affliction. The Poet has justly observed that " Pity is akin to love," In these moments, the commiserator forgets every fault, even where he knows that fault exists. He brings forward every good quality, which in his opi- nion, renders the Afflicted less deserving of their suf- ferings. We may also add that the gratitude which this pity inspires, is accompanied with the most fa- vourable sentiments of the humane disposition, and has a tendency to produce a predilection for the person of the sympathizer. In short, whatevergives birth to any of the kindly affections, may be pro- ductive of personal predilections, and terminate in love, both as an affection and a passion. Othello says of Pesdemona, 140 RELATION OP " She lov ; d me for the dangers I had pass'd. And I lov'd her that she did pity them." Nor can the dramatic Writer be accused of ex- aggeration, who represents the beautiful and accom- plished Zemira, as passionately fond of the gene- rous monster Azore, whom she at first viewed with horror and detestation. To this pleasing association is it also to be ascrib- ed, that we are so prone to be blind to the faults of those we love. We are eager to represent to our- selves those persons who have taken possession of our esteem, as being entirely worthy of it. We dwell upon every good quality ; we forget, or dis- cover excuses for every defect. It has been remarked, more than once, that when- ever an amorous temper has taken a religious turn, it excels in the warmth and fervour of its devotion. We might urge as an apology, that what appears excellent can alone be the object of love ; and where the mind is peculiarly susceptible of excel- lence, it will evince the warmth and strength of its affection, whether it be placed on our own species, or on beings of a superior order. These two causes united may serve to explain a fact, which has been noted by Rousseau and many others, that the language of religion and of love is so very similar. The Lover also has his idol ; adores her perfections, calls her angelic ; talks of al- tars, prostrations, vows, sacrifices, 4'C That is, what is human, in the warmth of his affection, he contem- plates as divine; and the person who has some strik- ing accomplishments, he pronounces to be perfec- tion itself. The connexion between the disagreeable passions and affections is not less obvious. The various af- fections originating from the idea of Evil, whether it be past, present, or apprehended, are so closely united, that they can scarcely be considered as il- lustrations of the subject. We are, for example, disposed to be angry at whatever occasions sorrow. PASSIONS AXD AFFESTIONS. 141 and there is a vindictiveness in fear, which may ren- der it dangerous to its most innocent cause. But predispositions to the indulgence of unpleasant af- fections, are generated in cases where the connex- ion is not so immediate. Disagreeable feelings, induced by their proper object, are productive of other disagreeable affections, where, strictly speak- ing, there is no proper object. Whatever irritates, renders the mind impatient, peevish, quarrelsome ; disposes it to magnify trifles into real grievances, and to imagine a just cause of offence, where, per- haps, approbation has been merited. It engenders suspicions and jealousies, and disposes to envy the peace, tranquillity, or good fortune of another. In this state of mind, a transition is also made from things to persons, and some degree of guilt is impu- ted to the latter, in consequence of the evil passions stirred up by the former. It is upon ihis principle that Tyrants have been known to sacrifice, in the impetuosity of their vexation and rage, the innocent messengers of evil tidings. Thus has Homer, that faithful historian of nature, represented Agamemnon, as pouring out a torrent of invectives against the harmless and venerable priest, who was compelled, by virtue of his office., to utter unwelcome truths. i( The Prophet spoke : when with a gloomy frown The monarch started from his shining throne ; Black choler filPd his breast, that boil'd with ire, And from his eye-balls flash'd the living fire. Augur accurst ! denouncing mischief still, Prophet of plagues, for ever boding ill ! Still must that tongue some wounding message bring, And still thy priestly pride provoke thy King ?" pope's homer, il. i. l. 127. It is thus that not only the " Genus Irritabile Vaturnf but controversial authors of all descriptions, have been so prone, in defence of their particular senti- ments against their opponent, to descend to person- alities. Theologians in particular have been accus- tomed to evince their zeal for sacred truths, by the most unchristian hatred against the imagined sup-? 142 RELATION OP porters of error ; and they have not failed to ascribe unworthy motives, or depravity of heart, to those who remain unconvinced by the force of their argu- ments. This is the latent cause of all those religious persecutions, which have deluged the world with blood, and disgraced humanity. As, in the transports of Gratitude, we are dispos- ed to imagine virtues, where they do not exist, thus in the transports of resentment, we are prone to the contrary extreme. A single cause of enmity black- ens the whole character of our antagonist ; and the man who has been guilty of one fault, that touches us to the quick, becomes, to an heated imagination, the vilest of miscreants. The friends and connex- ions of the Aggressor, are also considered as parti- cipants in his crimes : nay, the adherents and de- pendants upon the grand offender, are contaminated by his guilt. Thus have towns and countries been laid waste without remorse ; murder and rapine have been deemed laudable ; and the sacrifice of thousands, in resentment of the vices and disorders of a few, has been frequently celebrated, as an hero- ic display of vindictive justice ! Hence it is that dis- grace of character is unjustly spread over a whole family, on account of the ill conduct or ignominious punishment of one of its members. Even the un- conscious instruments of mischief, according to this propensity of our nature, are frequently treated as guilty, or as participants in the crime. Imprudent parents have thus nourished a spirit of revenge in their children, by encouraging them to beat the playthings which have accidentally given them pain, or the ground against which they have fallen. It is recorded of the celebrated Cranmer, who flourished in the reign of Queen Mary, that having repented of his impiety in yielding to the solicita- tions of the priesthood, and seductive promises of the court, and signed an acknowledgment of the Pope's supremacy, when he was brought to the in- fernal stake, he resolutely held the offending hand in PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 143 the flames, till it was consumed ; from a spirit of resentment at its having been the instrument of his apostacy. In this singular instance of imputed guilt, our sympathy with the sufferings of the unfortunate man, our admiration of his magnanimity, and our surprise at the strange manner in which he indicated a pious indignation at his former conduct, furnishes an apology for an act, which, under other circum-' stances, must have been contemplated as the excess of childish cruelty. (See Hume's History of Eng- land, Vol. iv. p. 431.) — For the same reason we admire the undaunted courage of Mucius Ssevola. who, as we are informed by Florus, thrust his hand into the fire, because it had not succeeded in its at- tempt to strike the King of Etruria, But had he caused a Dependant to be punished in this manner, for a similar failure, he would have been held forth to execration. It is upon the same principles that the strong im- pressions of Fear or of Sorrow, change the appear- ance of every thing around us. Every trifle be- comes the cause of terror ; and every object loses its power to charm, unless it should administer to our melancholy. Sorrow naturally disposes to im- patience, discontent, and fearful apprehension, in cases which have no connexion with the primitive cause. Heavy disappointment, where expectation was ill-founded, forbids us to indulge hope where the encouragement is the greatest. Fear and dread dispose to cruelty, to treachery, and sometimes to acts of desperation which resemble courage. As the passions and affections which are most analogous to each other, so readily blend together, or succeed in an easy currency, it is natural to sup- pose that those which are of an opposite nature and tendency must be repulsive ; as joy and sorrow, hope and fear, love and hatred. For although com- plicated circumstances may place the mind under their influence, at the same period, yet the one is calculated to oppose and check the other 5 each ex- 144 RELATION OF erting its characteristic influence. Thus when the success of any desired event is partial, sorrow may accompany joy. The effects of glad tidings are rendered incomplete, by the addition of some mourn- ful catastrophe. When victory, for example, is purchased by the death of a friend, or of a favourite general. In such chequered incidents, the mind passes over from one event to the other, and feels the influence of each, separately and alternately. In cases of a dubious nature, the mind is sometimes stagnated, or suspended between hope and fear ; and sometimes agitated by each passion by turns. In this manner may love have some intercourse with anger ; as in parents, whose resentment, at the im- proper conduct of their children, may even be in-, spired by the warmest affection ; and the lover may be tormented by the caprices of his mistress, whom he cannot resolve to hate. The opposite passions and affections are, in instances of the like nature, excited by different and opposite circumstances, re- siding in the same exciting cause ; each producing its own characteristic effect. Fear, anxiety, and joy in the extreme are so dia- metrically opposite, and their pathological effects upon the system so contrary, that an immediate transition from the one to the other is extremely difficult, if not impossible ; and by the violence committed upon the animal system, it might be pro- ductive of fatal consequences. It is observable that in such cases, the salutary transition is made through the medium of the pathological effects, which are the usual indications of Sorrow. Tears and joyful lamentations are the first tokens of the removal of excessive fear. A sudden relaxation, as it were, succeeds to the agnonizing constriction which ac- companies that passion, and this prepares the mind for the pleasing vivacity which is the natural cha- racter of joy. Every medical practitioner, as often as he has assisted at any painful and dangerous ope- ration, which has proved successful, must have ob- PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 145 served these effects produced upon the sympathi- zing attendants ; and every affectionate Female will recollect these singular emotions, upon the happy delivery of her friend, whom she has suppos- ed to be in imminent danger. The singularity may perhaps be explained in the following manner. Previous to the fortunate issue, Sorrow for the suf- ferings of the distressed object, and anxious Fears respecting the event, were intimately blended to- gether ; while the pathological tokens of the latter suppressed those of the former. Upon the sudden removal of Fear, its characteristic restrictions are removed, the residue of Sorrow becomes perma- nent ; and the agitated spirits are tranquillized by the effusion of tears. A melancholy state of mind is most soothed, at the commencement, by what seems to feed its me- lancholy. The excess of grief will listen to no- thing which is not somewhat in unison with it. It may afterwards be alleviated by a degree of cheer- fulness, in a friend who has wept for the distress, and whose sympathy has thus inspired a confidence. But no greater violence can be committed upon persons in the anguish of sorrow, than an attempt at gaiety, or the proposition of frivolous amuse- ments. Nothing so effectually subdues the violence of Anger, as the fortunate suggestion of ludicrous ideas. Whatever excites a smile or a laugh, excites a sensation totally incompatible with rage, or with deep resentment. It has often happened that a something ridiculous, in the ideas or conduct of the offender, has averted the punishment due to his carelessness and inadvertency ; or that some gay and cheerful thought has at once obliterated resent- ment, against a conduct not entirely trivial. We are told by ancient fabulists, that when Apollo was about to shoot Mercury, who was disguised as a herdsman, being incensed at this thievish deity, for having stolen some cattle which Apollo was destin- 13 146 SEAT OF THE edto watch, he applied to his quiver for an arrow> in order to revenge the offence ; but discovering that the arch thief had prevented the effects of his anger, by previously stealing all the arrows, he was so diverted at the jest that his anger immediately subsided. Iracundiam voluptate superante. In the quarrel between Jupiter and Juno, Homer represents the Queen of Heaven as terrified into si- lence, and merely attempting to suppress the signs of a resentment, which she could not subdue. But he informs us, that it was the jest of Vulcan, in taking upon him an office, for which he was so ill qualified, and becoming cupbearer, which effec- tually restored mirth and good-humour among the Celestials. Vulcan with awkward grace his office plies ; And unextinguished laughter shakes the skies. OBSERVATION IV. ON THE SEAT OF THE PASSIONS. It is usual for Writers on the Passions to specu- late concerning their Seat, whether it be in the. spiritual, or in the animated material part of Man. Some philosophers place the passions solely in the corporeal system. Among these was the celebrated Des Cartes. Mr. Grove, on the contrary, defines the passions to be " the affections attended with pecu- liar and extraordinary motions of the animal spirits j^ and in opposition to the sentiments of Des Cartes, he says, " I am inclined to think that a sensation of the soul generally precedes a change in the spirits ; external objects not being able to raise a ferment in the spirits, till they have first struck the mind with an idea of something noble, frightful, amiable, &c." Others again, ascribe some of the affections to the animal principle, and some to the rational. Dr. PASSIONS. 147 Reid is in doubt whether " the principle of esteem^ as well as gratitude, ought to be reckoned in the order of animal principles, or if they ought not ra- ther to be placed in a higher order." He has finally, however, placed the esteem of the Wise and Good in the order of animal principles ; not from any persuasion that it is to be found in brute animals, but because it appears in the most unimproved, and the most degenerate part of our species, even in those in whom we hardly perceive any exertion either of reason or of virtue. But, what is still more singular, the same affection is sometimes placed, by this philosopher, under the animal, and sometimes under the rational principle. Speaking of resentment he observes, " that sudden or instinctive resentment is an animal principle, common to us with brute animals ; but that resent- ment, which some authors call deliberate, must fall under the class of rational principles." He also excludes " the parental affection from the rational principle, because it is not grounded on an opinion of merit in the object." (See Reid's Essays on the active powers of Man. Es. in. Ch. 4.) This contrariety of opinions among philosophers themselves, the vague conjectures and arbitrary positions they have advanced, too plainly evince that we are not prepared for disquisitions of this kind. They prove that it will be impossible to ar- range the passions and affections, with any preci- sion, under these two heads, until we shall have ob- tained more accurate ideas of the nature of the ra- tional and spiritual part of man, on the one hand, and of the vivified matter which is supposed to con- stitute his animal nature on the other. Those who place the passions, or any of the af- fections, in the Body, confess that it must be an ani- mated Body. But they do not explain to us the cause of this animation ; or what is that vivifying principle, which so wonderfully changes the proper- ties of the dead, insensible, inactive matter. When 148 SEAT OF THE we shall know the Cause of sensation or of percep- tion, in its lowest stage ; and when we shall have discovered tchat that is which thinks, reasons, and wills, we may be better qualified to decide concern- ing the seat of the passions and emotions. The reason which induced Des Cartes and others, to make all the affections sensual, is obvious. It is easy to perceive that we cannot ascribe affections to the spiritual part of man. without admitting the passions also ; nor these without being perplexed with the appetites ; which, although confessedly sen- sual. frequently excite those emotions and passions, which must be ascribed to the Spirit, if it be suscep- tible of emotions. But this combination, or recipro- cal influence, they deem to be totally inconsistent with those intellectual honours which they are soli- citous of ascribing, exclusively, to our spiritual na- tures. Dr. Reid's embarrassment seems to arise from the expectation that the rational principle must always act rationally : which leads him to infer that when- ever the passions and affections do not receive the sanction of reason, they are to be assigned over to the animal principle. But this hypothesis will tempt us to doubt of the very existence of the rational prin- ciple, in numbers of our species. It leads us to con- clude that the two natures, deemed so diametrically opposite to each other, possess powers so perfectly similar, that it is difficult for the keenest discernment to distinguish between their operations : and it com- pels us to infer, that whenever some of our affections become conformable to reason, they have changed their seat from the animal to the rational principle. Philosophers and Divines, who distinguish Man into the three several parts of Body. Soul, and Spi- rit, which, notwithstanding the intimacy of their union, they suppose to be different in their natures : ascribe the appetites to the Body, the passions and affections to the Soul, and to the Spirit, those intel- lectual powers which seem remote from passions or PASSIONS. 149 emotions of any kind. By such an arrangement they mean to compliment the Spirit with the most exalted station : but the honour, like many other projects of ambition, is entirely at the expense of its happiness. If the affections pertain to the Soul ex- clusively, that alone is capable of enjoying. The Spirit is deprived of every motive for speculation ; and since it sometimes happens that speculations of the most obtuse kind, excite pleasing sensations, the Spirit must certainly perceive, though it has no facul- ties to lament its hard lot, as often as it is conscious that these delightful sensations, which are its own work, are transferred to the Soul. Without entering therefore into inquiries of this nature, which for want of data must be conjectural and unsatisfactory, it will be more correspondent with my plan, simply to state interesting facts, and leave it to the Metaphysician to draw such conse- quences as he may deem most legitimate. It must be admitted that every passion, emotion, and affection, proceeds from certain impressions or ideas excited, concerning the nature, orstate, or qua- lity, or agency of the exciting cause. These Ideas have undoubtedly their seat in that part of man we distinguish by the appellation of mind. The excit- ing cause therefore changes the state of the Mind, respecting the particular object. From total indif- ference it becomes some way or other interested. This new impression, if it possess a certain degree of strength, produces a correspondent change upon the body. Universal observation and universal phraseo- logy, which is doubtless founded upon this observa- tion, unite to evince that a very perceptible influence of every strong emotion is directed towards the heart. The Heart experiences various kinds of sen- sation, pleasant or unpleasant, over which it has no controul ; and from thence the influence of agitated spirits seems to be diffused over the body. Their more gentle effects are not visible to the spectator j nav. the subject himself is not conscious perhaps of 13* 150 SEAT OF THE any thing more than, either a change of sentiment, or the perception of the stronger influence of a form* er sentiment, connected with something agreeable or disagreeable in this perception ; a something which attaches more strongly to the object, or creates some degree of repugnance. This state of mind is styled an affection, and it appears to be totally mental ; but stronger influences produce such changes, that the inward disposition becomes obvious to the spectators, through the medium of the corporeal frame. It is now called an emotion, and this may increase in strength until the whole system becomes agitated and convulsed. From this statement it appears incontestible, that the Affections and Passions have their origin in the Mind, while Emotions are corporeal indications of what passes within ; according to the conjecture ex- pressed by Mr. Grove. It also proves, that to confine the affections to the Mind, and refer the passions to the animal principle, is to theorize in opposition to facts. For numerous instances have presented themselves, in the course of our Analysis, which indicate that the difference between the gentlest affection and the most turbu- lent passions, consists in degree, not in nature. What- ever produces silent satisfaction, in its mildest influ- ence, will produce the extravagance of joy in its strongest. Fearful apprehension, in its excess, is terror ; and displeasure, in its most inordinate ex- ertions, is rage. When the gentlest affections are rendered conspicuous, their existence is known by some visible change produced in the countenance, through the medium of the nervous system ; while the most violent agitations of the mind, operating up- on the same nervous system, produce ungovernable transports. Hence it is rational to infer, that the finest affections, and the strongest passions, are equally sensitive, or equally spiritual in their natures. It is natural for those who favour the hypothe- sis, that man consists of u different natures marvel- PASSIONS. 151 lously mixt," to ascribe the appetites solely to the corporeal system, or to the animal nature of man, and to call them carnal, because the immediate ob* jects of the appetites relate to the wants and grati- fications of the body. But do they recollect that these appetites are frequently awakened by the at- tention paid by the Mind, to their particular objects, exciting Concupiscence, which is always attributed to the Mind ? When the -desires considered as carnal, are excited by a particular state of the body, that is by certain changes made in the cor- poreal system, which generate particular wants, as in the sensations of hunger and thirst, the mental part of our nature is immediately conscious of these uneasy sensations, wills to remove them, and expects gratification in attending to the demands of appetite. Thus the whole man becomes inte- rested, without the possibility of placing a barrier, to arrest the operations of the mind, and render the appetite purely corporeal. When the power of immediate gratification is possessed, none of the accessary passions and emo- tions are called forth, and, in some cases, we are not conscious of mental exertions. But if the gratification cannot be immediate ; if it be uncer- tain ; if any formidable impediments present them- selves ; then the whole soul is powerfully aroused : hopes and fears are excited concerning the event : anger and jealousies are indulged against rivals and causes of impediments ; sorrows and vexations are inspired by our disappointment. These betray the interest which the Mind has taken in pleasures which are termed sensual. Where the indulgence has been illicit, repentance also, and remorse con- fess that the soul feels itself responsible for gratifi- cations which are deemed merely carnal. On the other hand, the finer affections of Love, such as the filial, the parental, the social ; and be- nevolence in its more tranquil exertions, being so much exalted above the appearance of every thing 152 SEAT OF THE selfish, and having no immediate personal gratifi- cation for their object, are generally attributed to the higher principle in our nature. But the love of beauty and of attractive qualifications between the sexes, becoming sexual, may create desires de- nominated carnal ; and benevolence becoming sym- pathy and compassion with deep distress, produces the corporeal effects of agonizing grief or fear, and is virtually as sensual or carnal as any of the appe- tites ; though usage is offended at such an applica- tion of the terms. Thus it appears that the grand principles of love and hatred, desire and aversion, produce their ef- fects upon the whole system, when they operate with a certain degree of force : though for the sake of discrimination we give different names to these effects ; and to manifest our sense of the superiority of one class of our desires and affections, when compared with another, we annex various degrees of respectability to those which are most remote from the gratification of corporeal wants. When the affections of love and desire are placed upon objects deemed the most sensual, they are called appetites ; and they are stigmatized with the epithet of carnal appetites, because they are merely corporeal in their object, and are peculiarly liable to the most shameful abuse. They begin and ter- minate in gratifications which do not call forth one amiable quality, or respectable exertion of the Mind. When indulged within the limits permit- ted, they are void of merit ; if illegitimate, or in- dulged to excess, they are accounted ignominious. In this singular predicament are those gratifications, which have for their final cause, the support or pro- duction of life, exclusively placed. The finer species of corporeal enjoyments, re- ject the degrading epithets of sensual and car- nal with disdain. No one is said to be carnally disposed, when his ears are gratified with the charms of music ; when his eye surveys the PASSIONS. 153 beauties of nature. He is not charged with hav- ing an insatiable Appetite for paintings, or con- demned for inordinate Concupiscence, though he should expend his fortune in making purchases, or exhaust his health by incessant application to the art. For though his senses are equally gratified, as in the other instances, yet the enjoyment is fur- nished by objects which are more dignified in their nature, and have been the result of skill and inge- nuity. It is here that merit commences, both in the power of enjoyment, and in the power of exe- cution ; and language distinguishes gratifications, from these sources, by the more elevated appella- tion of taste. This very term, by the way, is an in- dication of the power of the object of our pursuit, to elevate our ideas, respecting the expressions em- ployed. The word taste, although it is a metaphor borrowed from one of the carnal sensations, loses the grossness of its original meaning in the new mode of its application. It is ennobled by its ob- ject, till we forget that it is of a plebeian origin. The pleasure derived from agreeable odours being, as it were, the medium between the grosser appetites, and the pleasure inspired by harmonious sounds, or the objects of vision, neither exposed to the disgrace of the former, not possessing the merit of the latter, has no epithet either of contempt or respectability. When Love and Desire are placed upon nobler objects than any of the preceding ; such as know- ledge, virtue, or any other mental qualification, the superior dignity of these pursuits, and their ele- vation above every thing deemed sensual, and above the gratification of a refined taste, confer a dignity upon the affections themselves, until they seem to be of a higher origin, and emulate every thing we can conceive of the most exalted Spirits. For we cannot entertain more elevated sentiments of im- material created Intelligences, than that they pos- sess an ardent love of knowledge, wisdom, and moral obligation. 154 SEAT OF THE Nor have we any reason to ascribe those powers of the mind, which by way of pre-eminence we deno- minate intellectual, to any other principle than that which is the source of the affections, and is interest- ed in the cravings of the appetites. The state of mind, and its conscious perceptions, must vary ac- cording to the kind employment in which it is en- gaged. When its occupation is simply to investigate truths of any kind, to examine, deliberate, judge, and resolve, it is in a very different state, than when it is forcibly struck with the beneficial or pernicious nature and tendency of these truths, or of any in- fluential quality with which it is become acquaint- ed. It contemplates abstract ideas, which may have a distant reference to utility, in a mood very different from that which it experiences when very attractive, or very alarming properties present them- selves to the imagination, whose influence upon our well-being seems to be direct and immediate. Yet in the calmer exercise of the mind, in its most abstruse speculations, there is a species of permanent pleasure of which it is conscious, and which is preferred by the philosopher, to the stron- gest emotions, which are as transient as they are violent ; until by some new and interesting dis- covery, he is surprised into joy, or intricacies occur which disturb and irritate. He then experiences, that passions and emotions will sometimes intrude themselves into the apartment, where the door seems to be most obstinately shut against them. Nor can his more tranquil pleasures be ascribed to any other cause than to a strong predilection for the study which most occupies his attention, to his love of knowledge, to the gratification of his curi- osity, to the satisfaction derived from the enlarge- ment of his ideas and improvement of his under- standing, to his ardent desire of discovering some- thing which may extend his fame, or prove benefi- cial to humanity ; that is, to honourable, noble, and useful affections. PASSIONS* 155 The Reader will perceive that these remarks have not the most distant reference to the grand question, concerning the materiality or immeteriali- ty of the Soul. They are simply opposed to those unfounded hypotheses, and vague conjectures, which, instead of explaining any one phenomenon, render our ideas more embarrassed. They indicate that we ought not to multiply principles, until we are qualified to assign to them their distinct offices, without encroachments or confusion. What can be more unsatisfactory than to suppose the existence of principles, totally opposite in their natures, in order to explain the contrarieties observable in human character and conduct ; and yet to allow that, in some instances, the operations of these prin- ciples are so similar, that philosophers themselves cannot ascertain the distinct province of each ? Or what can be more superfluous than to imagine the existence of these distinct principles, merely to confer honour upon the one, and load the other with disgrace, when the nature of the object pursu- ed, and the disposition towards it, will solve every difficulty : will indicate an exalted or a depraved state of the Mind, without suggesting a single doubt whether the spiritual man ought, in any respect, to become responsible for the disgraceful propensities of the carnal man, with whom he is compelled to inhabit ? It has been alleged that, during the impetus of passion, the soul is in a state of much greater acti- vity than at any other period. In most instances that is probably the case. Yet we should recollect that during the excitements of passion, the soul must necessarily manifest the greatest activity to the spectator, from its peculiar exertions upon the corporeal system. Whereas in the exercise of deep thought, the activity of the soul is concentrat- ed within. Of consequence, when the mind is ab- sorbed in profound meditation, instead of indicating more activity than usual, the external appearance 156 CAUSES, &c. will indicate less. Hence it is that deep thinkers are so frequently confounded, by those who are not deep thinkers, with the stupid. In such cases, the activity of the soul can discover itself only by the result of its labours ; or by the injuries which in- tense application may have committed upon the constitution. Instances have existed in which mental occupation has produced an insensibility to every foreign impression. The subject has re- mained unmoved, in the midst of scenes calculated to excite the most horrid tumults of soul. When the Philosopher of Syracuse was so wrapped in contemplation, as to be insensible to all the hor- rors of a siege, his mind could not be less active than theirs who were the most agitated, by the scenes of complicated distress which surrounded them. CHAPTER II. CAUSES WHICH CREATE A DIVERSITY IN OUR AFFECTIONS, ENUMERATED. It may seem natural to expect that men, formed with similar, and often with equal powers of dis- criminating the nature of objects, — in whom the sensations of pleasure and pain, happiness or misery, are also similar — and who are exposed to similar causes of excitement, should indicate a correspon- dent similarity in their affections, instead of such a diversity which is so conspicuous, not only in dif- ferent persons, but frequently in the same person. It is well known that the predilections of individu- als, for the supposed means of happiness, are ex- tremely various ; that one man will pursue with ardour, what another will contemplate with indif- ference, or with disapprobation and disgust. Nor is there any person who entertains, invariably, the INFLUENCE OF EXPERIENCE. 167 »ame disposition towards the same object. At one instant, he will not only feel a much stronger af- fection for it than he did at the preceding, but he may to-day contemplate, with contempt and abhor- rence, that which yesterday may have excited rap- tures. It is of considerable moment to trace the princi- pal causes of these diversities, or point out some of the circumstances which have a very powerful in- fluence over our minds. The number and extent of these will permit little more than an enumeration. § 1. The influence of Experience, These di versities and changes may, in many cases, be ascribed to the difference observable between the suggestions of a lively imagination, and the more faithful reports of Experience. Our preconceptions are seldom accurate. If they be not entirely false, or totally opposite to the nature of the subject, they are almost sure to err on the side of excess or of defect. Experience, in numberless instances, cor- rects such errors, and teaches us to estimate the qualities of objects as they really exist, and not ac- cording to a prejudiced conception, or an heated imagination. This will of consequence teach us highly to prize many things, which we had before neglected or despised, and to dismiss, with indiffe- rence and contempt, many things on which a delu- ded imagination had placed our supreme happiness. Such changes will take place in every individual in his passage through life. Their nature, and the uses made of them, constitute the difference be- tween the wise man and the fool. But there are many other causes, which act more uniformly, upon whole classes and bodies of people, and give to each class a certain cast of character. Some of these are very similar in their effects : others dissimilar, irregular, and capricious. Among those which are more uniform in their in- 14 158 CAUSES, &c. fluence, may be placed the distinctions in character and dispositions observable in the § 2. Difference of Sex, In most animals, of the inferior order, there is a manifest difference between the male and female, both in external appearance and instinctive proper- ties, the former being generally of a stronger make than the latter ; and excepting at the moments when the powers of the female are called forth to the protection of their young, more courageous in dis- position. Similar laws manifestly prevail in the human spe- cies. The very form and constitution of the Man indicate that he is rendered capable of more robust employments ; and his stronger contexture is, gene- rally speaking, connected with a disposition to greater exertions : whereas the superior delicacy of contexture which distinguishes the Female, is most- ly accompanied with a much greater delicacy of character. Her dispositions to strong and vigorous exertions, either of body or of mind, are not so uni- versal, and she generally places her affections upon objects and duties which are more confined and do- mesticated. Nor do the customs prevalent in savage, or less polished nations, invalidate the above remarks. In those countries where bodily labour, or the fatigues of husbandry, are wholly consigned to the females, while their husbands appear indolent and inactive, this indolence is merely the repose enjoyed in the intervals of still greater exertions. War, or the chase, are exclusively their province, and when engaged in these, the men endure much greater fatigues and hardships than those allotted to their partners. It is readily acknowledged that these peculiarities of make and of character, are not so uniform as to resist the influence of causes which have a tenden- DIFFERENCE OF SEX. 159 cy to counteract them. Singularity of tempera- ment, the force of custom and education, particular situations in life, may place individuals of each sex out of their proper sphere, and induce a peculiarity of individual character. But this change seldom meets with the approbation of either sex. An effe- minate Man is despised, and a masculine Female has little power to charm. An essential difference is also observable in sexual predilections. The female prefers the strong, the bold and courageous, the spirited and enterprising. Her ideas of beauty and comeliness, are, instinctive- ly, such as correspond the least with the delicacy of her own person. Men in general are most ena- moured of those qualities and dispositions which in- dicate a contrary character. They talk of the de- licacy of form and amiable softness of the sex. They think that the milder virtues sit with peculiar grace upon the female ; such as gentleness, patience, compassion, and tenderness. It is expected that she should excel in piety, in faith, hope, and resig- nation. Men contemplate a female atheist with more disgust and horror, than if she possessed the hardest features embossed with carbuncles. They excuse, and many are disposed to be pleased with, such foibles as proceed from delicacy of frame, or greater sensibility of mind ; while they express their disapprobation of a bold forward temper, though it should be accompanied with a great superiority of talents. Although moral obligation, as referring to the grand standard of virtuous conduct, may be the same ; yet the rougher vices of oaths and intoxica- tion are appropriated by men ; while the evasive ones of artifice, &c. are deemed less opprobrious in the female. It is maintained that men are most impetuous, but that females are most deeply affected with the ten- der passion : that if the man have not a Speedy re- course to the pistol or the rope, he will probably survive the agonies of disappointment, under which 160 CAUSES, &c. the softer sex will gradually pine and die. These facts have induced a French author to remark, that women consider love as the serious business of life, and men render it subordinate to many others. It is however universally deemed to be the province of man, first to declare his passion ; and it is universal- ly expected that the female should receive the de- claration with a modest coyness, and experience some degree of struggle with her delicacy, before she acknowledge the passion to be reciprocal. The female has, in general, a stronger affection for every thing she pursues than men, who are more frequent- ly impelled to act from necessity. She generally follows her inclination in the discharge of her social and domestic duties, as well as in the pursuits of pleasure, elegant accomplishments, or of literature. Those who are of a scientific turn, compensate for any defect in extent of erudition, or depth of inves- tigation, with which they are sometimes charged, by brilliancy of language and beauty of sentiment, which so frequently pervade and embellish their writings. Females are supposed to be much fonder of ornaments than those of the other sex, who are not reputed fops ; and it is said that they more deeply resent any neglect or slight of their persons. They are warmer in their friendships, and their strong attachments can scarcely be weakened by any thing but rivalships. If slighter incidents more easily discompose their tempers, this is abundantly recompensed by their superior patience under se- verer trials. In cases of extreme danger and diffi- culty, they have not only been equal to the support of their own spirits, but they have set an example of heroic courage to their desponding Lords. But it is also allowed, that when the female mind be- comes thoroughly depraved, they greatly surpass the other sex in cruelty, revenge, and every enor- mity ; which is justly supposed to elucidate the com- mon proverb, " Corruptio optimi est pessimal In giving the above epitome, either of facts or DIFFERENCE OF SEX. 161 ©pinions, the author has purposely avoided entering into the controversy relative to rights and powers,, or to Equality or Superiority of capacities. He does not wish to draw a comparison between the lustre of the respective virtues, or nicely to balance the respective vices of each sex. His concern is with differences alone. If these exist ; if character- istic differences, commencing with early childhood, — when the little Miss delights in her doll, and ar- ranges her domestic play-things, while her more hardy brother is driving a hoop or whipping a top, — run through every period of life, it is of no mo- ment to the subject under consideration, whether they are to be ascribed to natural and physical, or to artificial or incidental causes ; or which charac- teristics have a preponderancy of excellence. (See Note S.) This manifest diversity, and in some respects to- tal contrariety in disposition and character, is ne- cessarily connected with an equal diversity and con- trariety of tastes and affections : for the former de- rive their origin from the latter ; the character be- ing itself both formed and indicated, by a series of predilections and aversions. If therefore each sex has its distinguishing characteristics, if their tastes and inclinations be not precisely similar, sexual dif- ference must be productive of different ideas res- pecting the qualities of objects, and create the most opposite affections respecting them : so that objects and circumstances perfectly the same, shall to each sex appear in different points of view. That which makes little or no impression on the one, being cal- culated to produce strong emotions in the other j becoming the source of pleasure or displeasure, of enjoyment, or of infelicity. Another cause which operates in a similar man* ner is 14* J 02 CAUSES, gular indulgence of the appetites, in themselves na- tural an4 innocent, thus are the most disorderly and malevolent affections the abuse of some affections, which in certain circumstances, may be allowable and beneficial. Envy is anger, unjust, and pettish, at the good fortune of another, mixed with a very false idea of our superior deserts. Cruelty is the excess of a severity, which in itself may be justifi- able ; and Malice the most inveterate, is the cruelty of envy, attempting by words and actions to destroy or diminish the good we cannot participate. Thus then it appears, that character depends upon the prevalent use or abuse of certain propen- sities or affections of our nature. Those who select and cultivate the most beneficial are the best of characters ; those, who are habituated to the most injurious, are the worst. SECTION IV, INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS ON HAPPINESS, Though the desire of Good is in reality the effi- cient cause of every passion, emotion, and affection, yet the immediate effects of each on our sensations, are correspondent to its own specific nature. To be under the influence of some, is productive of temporary well-being ; while others are comfortless, irksome, or productive of a great degree of wretch- edness. Love considered as an affection placed upon a deserving object, and recompensed with reciprocal affection, Joy, Ecstasy, Complacency, Satisfaction, Contentment, lively Hope, these are decidedly the sources of present enjoyment. The social affec- tions of Benevolence, Sympathy, Compassion, and ON HAPPINESS. 223 Mercy, are also other ingredients of happiness, from a less selfish and more refined source than the preceding. A steady, uniform disposition mani- fested by incessant endeavours to promote happi- ness, is invariably rewarded with a large portion of it. Benevolence places the mind at a remote dis- tance from little jealousies and envyings : it tempers the irritative nature of anger, and teaches compas- sion to subdue it. Through Benevolence, the good enjoyed by another becomes our own, without a robbery or privation. This divine principle harmo- nizes the mind with every thing around, and feels itself pleasingly connected with every living being. It generates, communicates, and enjoys happiness. When benevolence manifests itself by sympathy, compassion, and mercy, some portion of uneasi- ness, it is acknowledged, accompanies the sensation congenial to its nature : but the exercise of these af- fections communicates a phasing pain. The de- gree of uneasiness is more than recompensed, by the satisfaction enjoyed from the relief of distress ; and even from the consciousness of a disposition to relieve. There is often a luxury in sympathetic sorrow ; and the tear shed over distress becomes a pearl of inestimable price. Every species of Be- nevolence possesses the quality which our great dramatic Poet has ascribed to a merciful disposi- tion. The quality of Mercy's not restrain'd: It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven, Upon the land beneath. It is twice blessed ; It blesses him that givts, and him that takes. Shakspeabe. The mildest of the affections which belong to the family of Love, diffuse a pleasurable tranquillity over the mind. They constitute the healthy state of the soul, united with a consciousness of this health. The more lively affections invigorate the frame, exciting a delectable vivacity ; and the im- 224 INFLUENCE OP THE PASSIONS petuous emotions, termed ecstasies and transports^ infuse a wild tumultuous pleasured Immoderation leaves the helm ; the animal spirits uncontrolled, violently agitate the corporeal frame, and confound the mental faculties in a pleasing delirium. In some of these kindly emotions, circumstances and situations, in themselves displeasing, are ren- dered capable of communicating pleasure. Thus in the sudden possession of good conferred by a su- perior, Gratitude, though it is so closely connected with the idea of our own wants, and the dependency of our state, rises above these natural causes of de- pressed spirits. The attention is arrested by the Good received, and the heart glows with Affection towards the benefactor ; which is a more pleasing sensation than Independency itself could ensure. Thus in the contemplation of the unrivalled excel- lencies possessed by another, lively enjoyment be- comes intimately connected with the deepest sense of inferiority : as in the emotions of admiration, re- verence, and awe. Nor is Humility, notwithstand- ing its abject appearance, devoid of Dignity. It is accompanied with a strong Affection for excellen- cies, while it laments that it cannot attain them: and a conscious wish, to subdue remaining defects, inspires more Satisfaction than the self-sufficiency of arrogance can boast. Even Desire itself, which is an eager longing for gratification, — if it be not in- temperate, — if it be united with hope, — if it be not prolonged to the weariness of patience, is cherished with a great degree of pleasure. The expectancy of enjoyment more than counterpoises the pain created by suspense. Another set of emotions and affections are of the unquiet and irritating class ; as the whole family of Anger. The exciting objects are unwelcome to the mind which contemplates them, and the sensations they produce are turbulent and painful. It is true, some degree of satisfaction may be inspired by the vivid idea entertained, at the instant, of the justice ON HAPPINESS. 225 of our cause, as also by the gratification, or even the resolution to gratify, the newly-created desire of revenge, or by the conscious superiority which ac- companies contempt and disdain ; but these are purchased at the expense of the infinitely superior pleasures, infused by the opposite spirit of love, complacency, and benevolence. The mind finds itself in bondage to its emotions, and feels that it is driven by their impetuosity, not only to the greatest distance from the nobler sources of enjoyment, but to the verge of misery itself. Danger is appre- hended from the excess of passion, while it is in- dulged ; and the subject himself trembles, lest it should be productive of irreparable evil, repentance, and remorse. Sorrow and Grief, though they are certainly in the class of the most unpleasant affections, yet they have something so fascinating in them, that the mind under their influence, is arrested and absorbed, as it were, in the contemplation of their cause. The good of which we are deprived is now appreciated, perhaps, for the first time, according to its value ; perhaps beyond its value. This contemplation of qualities, which once gave delight, or which were fondly expected to give delight, mingles a pleasure with the severe pain, which privation or disappoint- ment has occasioned. Even Penitence and Contrition, when they are inspired by ingenuous motives, — when the detesta- tion of former conduct proceeds from a conviction of its baseness, and sorrow for the injury it has done, and not from the apprehension of punishment or the shame of detection, even penitence and contri- tion are not devoid of pleasure ! The Penitent, in the midst of his painful self-condemnation, feels a latent satisfaction in the disposition and resolution to return to the paths of virtue. The emotions and affections, of Fear, Dread, Horror, Despair, are of the most horrid and tremen* clous class. They vary in degrees of wretchedness, 226 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS according to the degrees of their intenseness, whether this be increased by temperament, by the extreme importance, or by the complicated nature of the exciting cause. Excessive Jealousy, Envy, Remorse, Despair, Shame arising from the detec- tion of guilt, are misery unmixed. They render life insufferable, and tempt the despondent and dis- tracted mind to venture upon all the horrors of an unknown state, rather than support the pangs of its present feelings. Surprise, Wonder, Astonishment, principally re- ceive their complexion from the subjects that in- spire them ; and they are introductory to happiness or misery, according to the nature of the cause ex- citing them. In Surprise particularly, the sudden and unexpected arrival of an interesting event, cor- respondent with the nature of the affection already indulged, will turn hope and joy into ecstasy, dis- pleasure into anger, and fear into terror and dis- may. Thus, in the pleasing emotions, the idea of Good necessarily predominates ; and in the painful ones, the idea of Evil. Accordingly, those emotions which are produced by complicated good, or by the union of such causes, as separately possess the power of calling forth pleasing emotions and affec* tions, contribute most to happiness. In the emo- tions of hope, satisfaction, and joy, when personal concerns are intimately connected with some com- mon interest, and the blessings received have an ex- tensive influence, the emotions receive additional vigour, and are enjoyed with peculiar suavity. Social affections are now blended with self-love. The two torrents which so frequently oppose each other, fortunately unite and enlarge the stream of enjoyment; and the most desirable branch of bene- volence, rejoicing with those that rejoice, is super- added to the natural pleasure we take in our own good. Again, Gratitude, unites to the joy inspired by a ON HAPPINESS, 227 benefit received, the pleasure derived frem an affec- tionate sense of the obligation, and of love to the benefactor ; and if the magnitude of the benefit, or the mode of conferring it, be productive of surprise, wonder, admiration, the delectable affections of joy, gratitude, and love, will, by the operation of these rivid passions, be proportionably augmented. Were the imagination commanded to paint the highest felicity to be enjoyed by created beings, it would surely point out the union of the following emotions and affections. Ardent Love for an object decidedly worthy of our love, chastened with high Veneration ; — Astonishment inspired by the contem- plation of the number and extent of its excellencies, and at the unremitted exertion of these excellencies in the diffusion of good ; — Admiration at the wise means adapted to the accomplishment of the inte- resting purpose ; — Joy and Gratitude for benefits al- ready received ; — lively Hope of good incalculable in reserve for ourselves, conjointly with others whose welfare we ardently desire, accompanied with a Consciousness that we also have contributed a something to the general mass of felicity, accord- ing to the extent of our ability ! These are ingre- dients to constitute the perfections of bliss ! Love, Joy, Gratitude, Surprise, Admiration, Complacency, Hope, and Benevolence unbounded, may thus oc- cupy the mind in a transporting variety, or by ex- erting their united powers at the same instant, ©o rasion inconceivable raptures ! ! ! T$0ttm TO THE PRECEDING TREATISE. 20 NOTES TO THE PRECEDING TREATISE. NOTE A. After " Whether its influence be of a pleasant or unpleasant nature." Page 18 This opinion has the support of respectable authorities. Dr. Watts remarks, that (: the word properly signifies receiving the action of some agent." (See Watts on the Passions.) Mr. Grove observes, that " the mind, in certain circumstances, and within certain degrees, has no dominion over itself, or the body. It i;- in a manner passive, can neither help the agitation of the blood and spirits, nor help being itself affected by them." (See Sys. of Moral Phil. Vol. 1. Ch. vii.) Seneca also thus expresses himself : " Omnes motus qui non voluntate nostra fiunt, invicti, et inevitabiles sunt : ut horror fri- gida aspersis ; ad quosdam ictus, aspernatio ; ad pejores nuntios subriguntur pili ; et ruber ad improba verba suffunditur ; sequi- tur vertigo praerupta cernentes. Ista ut ita dicam, palitur magi? animus quam facit." (De Ira. L. 2. C. 2.) Note B. After " Are the most appropriate." Page 21. It is acknowledged that these words are frequently used indis- criminately, and sometimes without manifest impropriety ; but if they cannot be used at nil limes, with equal propriety, there must be a specific difference between them. Now it Is observa- ble that the word Emotion is not frequently applied to those pas- sions in which the external signs are the least violent. We sel- dom say that any one is under the emotion of Fear ; because abject fear has something oppressive in its nature, and is fre- quently silent and motionless. When fear is indicated by violent agitations, it acquires the character of terror ; and we feel that the phrase emotioris of terror is strictly proper. We never apply the epithet to hope, distinctly considered, because, though it be lively and animating, it is not accompanied by external signs of transport. When these appear they are always ascribed to the 232 NOTES TO THE joy, which is frequently connected with hope ; and we perceive a peculiar propriety in the term joyful emotions, because joy is so frequently indicated by some eccentric tokens. Whoever attends to these circumstances, in addition to the principles already advanced, will be surprised at the assertion of Lord Kaims, that " an emotion is in its nature quiescent, and merely a passive feeling." (Elements of Criticism, 5th Edil. Vol. 1. Page 44.) Both the etymology of the word, and almost every connexion in which it is used with decided propriety, con- fute this strange position. The author was probably led into the idea by the very confined view he has taken of the passions, in his elegant Essay. He chiefly considers them as connected with the fine Arts', and subjects of taste ; and as expressive of those agreeable or disagreeable effects which they produce, when first presented to our notice. These effects, it is allowed, are seldom so violent, in cultivated minds, as to occasion the emo- tions which indicate themselves by strong and characteristic- marks. His Lordship having denied external signs to emotions, has transferred them to the passions. But in order to establish his hy- pothesis, he is obliged to give a very different definition of the passions from any that his predecessors have adopted, or that ei- ther etymology or usage will justify. According to his system, a passion is compounded of this quiescent emotion, and a desire to obtain the object which occasioned it. " An internal motion or agitation of the mind,*' says he, " when itpasseth away with- out desire, is denominated an emotion; when desire follows, the motion or agitation is denominated a passion." Numerous ob- jections might be opposed to the position. I shall only observe, that, according to this hypothesis, the external signs of the pas- sions would be the strongest where desires are the strongest : which is directly opposite to what we perceive in the avaricious man : — that joy can neither be considered as a passion nor an emotion ; because its visible transports would destroy its title to the latter, and its being excited, not by desire itself, but by the accomplishment of a desire, will exclude it from the former: — Nor can we discover what should, at any time, excite those transports which are sometimes both visible and tremendous ; for emotions being quiescent, and desires not being of themselves turbulent, their union, could they possibly exist together, is not !fke to produce those corporeal agitations so frequently observa- ble ; unless we were to admit a process similar to a chymical fer- mentation. But they cannot exist together, and consequently an emotion can receive no assistance from desire, by which it may be transformed into a passion ; for, according to his own system, desire succeeds to emotion. His Lordship's embarrassment on this subject, which he in- genuously acknowledges, manifestly proceeds from his not hav- ing made a fortunate selection of terms, to discriminate existing differences. To every simple impression he has given the name of an emotion ; and he has applied the term passion exclusively, to what is in its own nature an affection ; and whenever it is con- sidered as a Passion, it is merely in its secondary sense ; express- ing the captivating influence of any particular object of desire PRECEDING TREATISE. 233 or of an irresistible attachment to it. By admitting these few alterations, -what he has written on the subject may be read with much edification and pleasure. Note C. After " It would be to annihilate misery." Page 27. Dr. Hartley, in establishing the doctrine of vibrations ; and the hypothesis of associated ideas founded upon it, asserts, that " the desire of happiness, and aversion to misery, are not insepa- rable from and essential to all intelligent natures." Without venturing to oppose, unnecessarily, so cautious and conclusive a reasoner, I shall just observe, that the above asser- tion is expressed in much stronger language, than the principles which he attempts to enforce absolutely require. It is acknow- ledged that his theory opposes the existence of innate ideas ; and whoever admits the theory must allow, that there can be no desire after happiness, or fear of misery, before we have been made acquainted, some way or other, with their natures. There- fore, when he asserts that the desire of happiness, and aversion of misery, are hot inseparable from, and essential to, all intelli- gent natures, he can only mean, that they are not co-existent with the power of intelligence, and that they are desires and aversions acquired by experience ; not that the reflective mind can, at any time, be totally indifferent about happiness and mise- ry. For by whatever method we may have obtained a know- ledge of either, the position remains indubitable, that no one ever tasted of happiness,, or possessed the smallest degree of ease or pleasure, without contracting an affection for them ; or experienced misery and uneasiness, without contracting a ha- tred towards them. Note D. After "The individual stock of each would render happiness universal." Page 30- It would not only be a severe, but an absurd requisition, to expect that mankind should universally be more attentive to the welfare of others than to their own. This would be to love our neighbours better than ourselves, without ascribing to them any of the qualities requisite to attract our love. Nor would this mode of exercising benevolence be so productive of good as the present constitution of our nature, as it would be impossible to obtain an equal knowledge of their wants and desires ; nor wouid it be so favourable to the cause of benevolence as has been imagined. No mind, truly generous, or deserving of atten- tion, could possibly receive the gift of Well-being entirely at the expense of the Donor. Thus, were the selfish principle totally extinguished, the reciprocal communication of good would be little more than a complimentary exchange. 20* 234 NOTES TO THE Note E. After " Not always in our recollection.'' Page 32. Some Authors, of great respectability, have expressed them- selves in a manner which conveys ideas very different from those we have attempted to establish. Dr. Reid speaks of loving things for their own sakes, and considers the class of philosophers who suppose that the love of every object may be resolved into its utility, to be in an error. Lord Kaims maintains, that some af- fections are neither selfish nor social. These opinions seem to receive support from the sentiment of Cicero, who observes, " Est quiddam quod sua vi nos illiciat ad ?e ; non emolumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate i quod genus, virtus, scitntia } Veritas." It is so presumptuous to differ from such authorities, that I am reluctant to expose myself to the suspicion. Their doctrine is expressed in very ambiguous language. It is possible that a pro- per investigation of the subject will indicate that it does not, in its tenour, oppose the sentiments advanced in the text. If I fail in this attempt, it may still appear that it has not confuted them. When it is said that we love things for their own sakes, let us examine what signification can be attached to the expression. We could not possibly love any thing totally void of qualities, were it possible for such a thing to exist ; because there would be nothing to love. But the things specified by these authors, as being attractive by their dignity alone, manifestly possess quali- ties of the highest utility : lor their dignity itself consists in the superiority of their usefulness. When, therefore, it is alleged that such things are loved for their own sakes, the only consistent idea we can annex to the phrase must be, that we love them from their capacity of producing, in certain circumstances, some great and extensive good ; though we should not experience the good, or observe the application of this power, in particular in- stances, either in ourselves or others. For example, it is as cer- tain that virtue, science, truth, are of infinite importance to the welfare of the whole intelligent creation, as that they possess the powerful attractions ascribed to them by Cicero. A society of liars would create greater confusion than that of Babel ; nor could it exist for a day. Science dispels pernicious ignorance ; it makes us acquainted with the choicest qualities existent ; and universal Virtue would be productive of universal happiness. Every man, therefore, whose mind is not upon a level with the brute creation, and who has perceived, in a single instance, the beneficial effects flowing from these excellencies, or the baneful consequences engendered by their contraries, must respect them. This respect, however, will be founded either upon his own ex- perience, or upon his observation of their influence on othere. In the first case they are the result of personal love of good ; and in the second, of the benevolent principle. For it is very obvi- ous that the class of objects, of which it is asserted that they are loved for their own sakes, alone attract the attention of the cul- tivated mind, or of such as possess a considerable share of natu- ral benevolence. PRECEDING TREATISE. 2'3. r > Innumerable are the proofs that the very capacity of being use- ful, will inspire an affection for many things, which are permit- ted to remain in a dormant state. The miser loves his gold so in- tensely, that he will not part with it in exchange for the choicest blessing it is able to purchase. The man of science loves his li- brary, though it may contain many hundred volumes which he has never consulted. The good housewife delights in the plate of porcelain, which is perpetually locked up in her cabinet ; and the eastern monarch is watchful over a seraglio infinitely too ex- tensive for his enjoyment. The above instances point out the sense in which we may be said to love any thing for its own sake. These different objects are loved, as powers of utility or gratification in reserve, that is, we are so constituted that we cannot avoid approving, admiring, or loving, whatever possesses in a great degree, either the capa- city or the disposition to promote, what we deem to be good for us, or what is pleasing to us. Note F. After " Threaten to endanger our well-being." Page 38. Mr. Hume commences his Dissertation on the Passions in the following manner : " Some objects produce an agreeable sensa- tion, by the original structure of our organs ; and are thence de- nominated Good ; as others, from immediate disagreeable sensa- tions, acquire the appellation of Evil. Thus moderate warmth is agreeable and good ; excessive heat, painful and evil. " Some objects again, by being naturally conformable or con- trary to passion, excite an agreeable or painful sensation, and are thence called good or evil. The punishment of an adversary by gratifying revenge, is Good ; the sickness of a companion by af- fecting friendship, is evil." Will it be necessary to point out to any of my readers the per- nicious sophistry of this statement ? Is it not a wanton introduc- tion of a chaos, I will not say in morals, but in the nature and character of human motives and human conduct ? It gives the important appellation of Good, to the greatest opposites, without discriminating the specific natures of each : merely because, in some circumstances, and in some characters, they may procluce pleasing or painful sensations. Thus is moderate warmth placed upon a level with sentiments and dispositions, calculated to pro- duce the most exalted felicity ; and to the gratification of re- venge, is given the same colouring as to the pardon of an injury. or alleviating distress ! This studied confusion of ideas may, in some connexions, be productive of wit. It is always ** such stuff as conundrums are made o/," but it is directly opposite to the genius of true philo- sophy. If my ideas of a conundrum be accurate, it consists in an at- tempt to make two things appear closely to resemble each other, which are the most opposite in their natures. This is done by di- recting the attention to some medium thought or middle term, which may, in one sense or other, be applicable to each. For 236 NOTES TO THE example, if it be asked why is a person in the upper part of a house committing theft, like a man of the strictest virtue ? The answer is, because he is above, doing a bad action. The word above being in certain senses applicable to each subject, we are surprised and amused at the unexpected points of resemblance. Thus again if it be asked, In what does a person, who attempts to kill another in a fit of anger, resemble the man who protects his life? The answer of Mr. Hume will be, both actions excite agreeable sensations, and are therefore Good ! The first conun- drum is allowed to be better than the second ; but this will only prove that there are degrees of excellence in this kind of writing, as well as in every other ; and that it is much better adapted to subjects of amusement, than to philosophy. Note G. After " the passions and affections could not have been excited." Page 40. • Perhaps there is no branch of philosophy more difficult, than that of distinguishing between real and apparent qualities in ob- jects. Since all that we know of qualities is derived from the impression made upon us, a previous question presents itself, whether our susceptibility of impressions be always accurate, or perfectly correspondent with the real nature of the object? Un- til this point be settled, our ideas of qualities must be vague and indeterminate. Lord Kaims has, in one instance, made the at- tempt ; but his observations are so unsatisfactory, and his mode of reasoning so inconclusive, that I feel myself much relieved in not being obliged to imitate his example. In a chapter where he treats of Emotions and Passions as plea- sant and painful, agreeable and disagreeable, he attempts to prove that agreeable and disagreeable are qualities in the Object per- ceived, pleasant, and unpleasant are descriptive of the Emotions we feel. The former are perceived as adhering to the object, the latter are felt as existing in us. At first view, these distinctions appear specious, but, upon critical examination, apprehensions may be justly entertained, whether they be not instances of that inaccuracy w r hich he considers to be " not at all venial in the science of Ethics." " Viewing a garden," says he, " I perceive it to be beautiful or agreeable ; and I consider the beauty or agreeableness as be- longing to the object, or as one of its qualities. When I turn my attention from the garden to what passes in my mind, I am con- scious of a pleasant emotion, of which the garden is the cause ; the pleasure here is felt as a quality, not of the garden, but of the emotion produced by it. I give another example. A rotten carcase is disagreeable, and raises in the spectator a painful emo- tion : the disagreeableness is a quality of the Object; the pain is a quality of the Emotion produced by it." (Elements of Criti- cism, vol. i. chap. ii. part II.) With deference to so respectable an authority, this distinction does not appear to be just. Agreeable, according to its etymo- logy, manifestly relates to the effects produced upon us, as much as the word pleasant. The difference is in degree, not in nature. PRECEDING TREATISE. 237 Agreeable expresses something that appears suitable or corres^ pondent with our nature, dispositions, and tastes ; something that perfectly agrees with us ; exciting the idea of comfort, end inspiring contentment and satisfaction. What is pleasant goes far- ther. It excites a sensation within us, more nearly approaching to an emotion. That agreeableness cannot be allowed to exist in the subject itself, is plain, from the diversity of opinions con- cerning it, without the possibility of discovering a standard, by which to mark a deviation from the law of nature. Were it re- sident in Objects, the effect must be uniform and absolute, in every one whose powers of perception are not disordered. But this is not the case. Numberless causes conspire to change our ideas of the qualities of Objects, and may render some objects agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant to the same person at different times. To give a familiar instance. Sweet things are most agreeable to children ; but when they become adults the taste is changed. It is possible that the smoke of to- bacco, and the taste of porter may become agreeable to the man. who detested them when a child. Can we say, therefore, that there is an inherent agreeableness in tobacco which pleases the adult, and an inherent disagreeableness which disgusts the in- fant ? Or to admit his Lordship's example of a garden. It is ac- knowledged that the idea of a garden excites pleasant sensa- tions, in most persons. Plenty of the delicate luxuries of na- ture, beauty, verdure, variegated flowers, &c. elegant retirement from the noise and bustle of the world, crowd in upon the ima- gination. But are we agreed in every circumstance respecting a garden ? Was not the stiftest formality once deemed an essen- tial beauty ? Has not this taste given way to irregular clumps and clusters ? Are not thsse of late become the subject of ridi- cule, and a style more correspondent with the wild beauties of nature preferred ? And when these have been enjoyed for some time, a future race may possibly observe that the distinction be- tween a garden and a field is not sufficiently marked, and may again place their ideas of beauty in that formal regularity, which is at present so much despised. Note H. After " Either taste or address, kc." Page 57. Dr. Watts does not seem to have expressed himself with sufficient accuracy, when he observes, that " If any object ap- pear pleasing and fit to do us good, it raises the love of com- placency." These two expressions are not synonymous. Ma- ny things may be pleasing to us, from which we apprehend mis- chief ; and in these we cannot take complacency. Again he says, " Complacency dwells upon its object with de- light : We gaze upon a figure, we listen to music, we dwell long in a fine garden, we dwell in the company of our friends." All these instances contain attributes calculated to inspire compla- cency, as ingenuity and taste maybe manifested in the three first, and worth moral or mental, may be possessed by the last. Yet it may be justly doubted, whether precision of language will 238 NOTES TO THE permit us to apply the word Complacency to these cases, unless there be some kind or degree of appropriation. We may ap- prove ; we may enjoy great pleasure and delight in inanimate objects, when we view them as belonging to strangers : but it has never been said of a connoisseur, that he took complacency in the Apollo de Belvedere, or in the Venus de Medicis, in Slowe Gardens, or the Leasowes of Shenstone, however he may have been delighted by these objects. Some kind of relation, however slight, appears necessary, to enable even such objects to inspire complacency. If we take complacency in garments, or flowers, or gardens, it is when they belong either to ourselves or to our friend ; or when they manifest our own taste or skill, or that of another for whom we are interested. Nor will the most perfect Concert excite complacency in the audience at large, though it may in the composers, performers, directors, or any of their par- ticular acquaintances. Note I. After " Pride." Page 59. The above definition and descriptions of Pride, are founded upon the various acceptations of that word in common language, and supported by the authority of our best Writers. But Mr. Hume, in defiance of each, has given a very different definition of pride, which I believe to be totally his own, and ought of con- sequence tr possess great internal merit to justify its boldness. in opposing those ideas which have hitherto been received uni- versally. Let us examine it. He defines pride to be a " certain satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some accomplishment or possession which we enjoy." Again. " The object of pride is self, the cause, some excellence^ Again. " Our merit raises pride, and it is essential to pride to turn our view on ourselves with complacency and satisfaction/' (See Dissertation on the Passions, passim.) As Mr. Hume has made no distinction between real and sup- posed merit, he necessarily directs our thoughts to absolute me- rit ; nor can there, according to this statement, be any place for a vitious pride, or an ill-founded confidence in our own superiori- ty. This is excluded, by his definition, from the character of pride. Our Philosopher has also advanced, in another place, that " Self satisfaction, in some degree at least, is an advantage which equally attends the Fool and the Wise." (On Qualities neces- sary to ourselves. § 6.) Now what is the cause of this self-satis- faction, in the fool? According to the above position it must be Merit. And in the wise man ? Merit. Thus the wise man and the fool are made to resemble each other so closely, in the most interesting of all desirable qualities, merit, and self-satisfaction, that there is no material difference between them. What there is, will probably be to the advantage of the fool. As he will be much more liable to be pleased with himself, our Author's hypo- thesis leads us to suspect that he may possess the most merit. Should it be alleged that the above statement is a misrepre-- PRECEDING TREATISE. 239 sentation ; I would answer, that such an allegation can alone be supported by explanations which will militate against the senti- ments, so repeatedly and assiduously advanced. Recourse must be had to a distinction between real and supposed merit. This will demonstrate that there must be two species of pride included in the definition ; and that these are as opposite to each other as light and darkness, knowledge and ignorance ; and, consequent- ly, that it is not only very vnphilosophical to comprise the most opposite qualities under the same genus, but very ungenerous to confound the good principle with the evil one, by giving indis- criminately the same appellations to both. Note K. After "the ambitious passions is a familiar expression." Page 64. Dr. Reid places Desires among the animal principles; but he distinguishes them " from the Appetites by this, that there is not a sensation proper to each, and always accompanying it ; and that they are not periodical but constant, not being satiated with their object for a time as the appetite? are." He adds, " the de- sires I have in view are chiefly these three, the desire of power, the desire of esteem, and the desire of knowledge." This is not the place to inquire whether the desires, here spe- cified, Reserve to be ranked among the animal principles ; but as the above description of a particular class of desires, appears to oppose the sentiments we have advanced, it demands a few ob- servations. We may first remark that the distinction made between ap- petites and desires is inaccurate, for the appetites are doubtless one class of desires ; nor is there a sensual appetite totally sepa- rate from the mental affections and desires : if there were, the grossest appetites might be indulged without culpability. 2dly. The doctrine itself is very obscurely expressed. Does the doctor mean that one sensation is common to them all I Then must the desire of power be similar to that of knowledge. If he means that desires are not uneasy sensations, and adduces those specified as proofs, we may observe that they are here considered in their mildest state, and we are taught to imagine, from the description given of them, that this was their perma- nent character : whereas it is well known that the desire of Power is frequently as rampant as the strongest appetites, de- generating into insatiable ambition ; that the desire of Esteem may become so excessive as to stir up painful emulation, and still more painful envy ; and that the desire of Knowledge is frequently so restless as to induce the possessor to forego his ease, and encounter dangers and difficulties innumerable in or- der to gratify it. But although, in their mildest state, they may not equal the appetites, they are attended with a degree of uneasiness which impels to active endeavours after the desired objects. If no un- easy sensation accompanied either, there could be no motive to counteract the love of ease and indolence, so natural to man. The prospect of success may indeed inspire the pleasure of hope. 240 NOTES TO THE and the benefits promised by each pursuit, may be so powerfully anticipated by the imagination, that the pleasing sensations, from these adventitious causes, shall greatly preponderate ; but if no uneasy sensation were excited, by the comparison of our actual situation with that we may possibly attain, our endeavours after the attainment could never have been excited. The Professor's subsequent observations perfectly correspond with these remarks. He says that " the pursuits of Power, of Fame, and of Knowledge, require a self-command no less than virtue does :" which is an acknowledgment that they are not al- ways so pacific as was represented.* And when he observes, that " the desire of Esteem and of Knowledge are highly useful to society, as well as Power, and at the same time are less dange- rous in their excesses,'" he tacitly allows that they are not totally exempt. In support of another argument, he asserts, that " innumera- ble instances occur in life, of men who sacrifice ease, pleasure, and every thing else, to the lust of power, of fame, or even of knowledge." A demonstration this, that the sensations they sometimes excite, are not only uneasy, but ungovernable. If, by the expression, " there is not a sensation proper to each," we are to understand that one particular sensation is com- mon to them all, the proposition is still more extravagant. Our sensations, in every species of desire, are as different as the ob- jects desired. Nor is there a greater difference between hunger and thirst, than there is between the desire of wealth, and the desire of power. The desire of knowledge is also distinct from, and superior to, both. Note L, After " Feelings of bumanfy'." rage 68. Dr. Reid remarks, that " it seems to be false religion alone, which is able to check the tear of compassion." " We are told," lie adds, " that in Portugal and Spain, a man condemned to be burned as an obstinate heretic, meets with no compassion even from the multitude ;" observing, that " they are taught to look upon him as the enemy of God, and doomed to hell-fire. But should not this very circumstance move compassion ? Surely it would if they had not been taught that, in this case, it is a crime to show compassion, or even to feel it." (See Essay on Active Powers, Page 156.) In addition to the motive assigned, we may mention the influ- ence of custom, in rendering the heart insensible to the sufferings of these devoted objects. I was once passing through Moorfields with a young lady aged about nine or ten years, born and edu- cated in Portugal, but in the Protestant Faith, and observing a large concourse of people assembled round a pile of faggots on fire, I expressed a curiosity to know the cause. She very com- posedly answered, I suppose that it is nothing more than that they are going to burn a jew. Fortunately it was no other than roasting * This expression is also inaccurate, since it is the province of virtue to correct these as well as every other desire, when they are in danger of becomiflg inordinate. PRECEDING TREATISE. 241 an ox, upon some joyful occasion. What rendered this singula- rity the more striking, was the natural mildness and compassion of the young person's disposition. Another instance of the influence of perverted principles, oc- eurs to my remembrance in the conduct of a pious Mother, to- wards a most excellent and dutiful Son ; who, from a principle of conscience, in opposition to his interest, renounced the religious system in which he had been educated, for another, which he deemed more consonant to truth. She told him that " she found it her duty, however severe the struggle, to alienate her affec- tions from him, now he had rendered himself an enemy to liod, by embracing such erroneous sentiments " \