^ / 
 
 
 •_A "iC^ ,, } K . 
 
 >'V 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 
 
 I^UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
 ll^^ 
 
THE PERSONAL MEMOIRS AND 
 
 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 U. S. GRANT 
 
 VERSUS 
 
 THE RECORD OF THE ARMY OF THE 
 POTOMAC 
 
 CARSWELL McCLELLAN 
 
 BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL U. S. VOLUNTEERS, TOPOGRAPHICAI. 
 
 ASSISTANT, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, AND SPECIAL 
 
 AIDE, ON STAFF OF GENERAL ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS, 
 
 JUNE, 1862, TO APRIL, 1864 
 
 MAY 18^1887'/) 
 
 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 
 
 1887 
 
-Aim 
 
 ^' 
 
 Copyright, 1887, 
 Bt CARSWELL McCLELLAN. 
 
 AU rights reserved. 
 
 The Riverside Press, Cambridge : 
 Electrotyped and Printed by H. 0. Houghton & Co. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 % 
 
 I 
 
 This volume has grown from what was, at 
 first, intended to be a brief memorandum of 
 review for private use. It is offered to the 
 public, not as an attempt to write or correct 
 history, but earnestly to ask that history already 
 written shall be remembered. 
 
 Saint Paul, Minn., May^ 1887. 
 
y 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 CHAPTEB 1 
 
 I. Introductory 
 
 II. Generai. Grant's Command 
 
 ni The Relations established by General Grant 
 * WITH General Meade and the Army of the ^^ 
 
 Potomac 
 
 IV. General Grant's Statements with ^^^^^^ ^ 
 Movement to Spottsylvania Court House, and 
 HIS Reflections on General Meade in connec- ^ 
 
 TION THEREWITH 
 
 V. Cold Harbor. June 1, 1864. - Crossing of the 
 Chickahominy, June 13, 1864. - Attack on Pe- 
 
 TERSBURG, JuNE 15, 1864. - GENERAL MeADE AT ^^ 
 
 Jetersville, April 5, 1865 
 
 VI General Warren at Spottsylvania, C. H. . 
 VIL General Warren at Spottsylvania Court House, 
 May 19, and at Cold Harbor, June 1 and ^ . 
 VIH. White Oak Road and Dinwiddie Court House, 
 
 March 31, 1865 *t * qi 
 
 IX. General Warren from Afternoon of March 61 ^^^ 
 TO Morning of April 1, 1865 ^^^ 
 
 X. Five Forks • * * _ 
 
 XL General Sheridan's Richmond Raid, May, 1864. 
 
 Mention of General A. A. Humphreys in the 
 Memoirs. - Battle of Sutherland Station, 
 
 April 2, 1865 * 
 
 Xn. From Jetersville to Appomattox Court House . 
 
 101 
 
 129 
 
 152 
 
 177 
 196 
 
 220 
 252 
 
 INDEX 
 
 273 
 
GRANT VERSUS THE RECORD, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 With the emphasis of rapidly approaching 
 death upon his words, General Grant concludes 
 the Preface to his " Personal Memoirs " with 
 the words : " I have used my best efforts, with 
 the aid of my eldest son, F. D. Grant, assisted 
 by his brothers, to verify from the records every 
 statement of fact given. The comments are my 
 own, and show how I saw the matters treated 
 of whether others saw them in the same light 
 or not. 
 
 " With these remarks I present these volumes 
 to the public, asking no favor but hoping they 
 will meet the approval of the reader." 
 
 While through and between the characteristic 
 lines, and woven among statements of facts, er- 
 rors and omissions, in the work thus proffered 
 as an applicant for place in history, the thought- 
 ful reader finds much that surprises him, and 
 much that justice forbids should pass unnoticed ; 
 
2 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 no one can wish to doubt the sincerity of words 
 thus written, though obvious infatuation sadly 
 burdens faith with wonder. 
 
 Naturally one hesitates before taking ground 
 agamst testhnony given as General Grant's has 
 been. There cannot but be difadence in oppos- 
 ing one so exalted by his countrymen. It b 
 no grateful task to stand before the tomb at 
 Riverside and bring evidence against the words 
 of hhn whose form lies there. But there are 
 voices calling from other graves; there are 
 memories shrining other names precious to com- 
 rades and countrymen ; and it were craven to 
 stand in acquiescent silence while bias strives 
 anew to mar the record of manly effort with 
 
 detraction. 
 
 It is not contemplated to attempt a technical 
 criticism of the plans, on which were based the 
 campaigns of General Grant. However military 
 authorities may review them from the vantage 
 ground of science; however strong may seem 
 the theoretic proof that other plans, if carried 
 out with equal energy and the same support, 
 might, or would, have attained the same results 
 at a less cost of life and time and treasure, — 
 the fact remains established and accepted, that 
 success crowned the adopted method with prac- 
 tical approval. The campaigns of General Grant 
 have spoken for themselves for more than a 
 score of years. Doubtless the study of his oper- 
 ations will bear fruit should war come again 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 3 
 
 upon our land ; but it is not purposed now tp 
 enter upon tlie labor of conjecturing what might 
 have been or may be. „ tt c n 4-" 
 
 It is the "Personal Memours ot U. b. Ijrant, 
 in their relation to the record upon which they 
 purport to be founded, which now invite atten- 
 tion; for in them have been revived issues oi 
 the past which might well have been left be- 
 neath the veil that time was kmdly drawing 
 over them, and through them false impressions 
 find their way to-day into the hearts and minds 
 of thousands. , 
 
 In examining the legacy General Grant has 
 left, no reflection should be east upon his exer- 
 cise of the undoubted right to preferences for 
 individuals among those cooperating with or 
 under hhn. Such preferences were inevitable. 
 They were within his prerogative as much as 
 any exercise of judgment. Neither will an at- 
 tempt now be made to defend those of whom 
 tL Memoirs appear to treat unjustly further 
 than may be necessary to iUustrate the character 
 of the offered statements. Within the compass 
 of the work designed, an exhaustive criticism 
 would be impossible. The object a^ned at now 
 is to rneite investigation which shall decide the 
 historic mine of this widely jmhUshed work 
 
 Had General Grant confined himself to ex- 
 pressions of opinions, none would gainsay his 
 riffht; but when, in sustaining his opinions, he 
 throws broadcast on the winds assertions as to 
 
4 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 facts, the record claims its place beside his state- 
 ments. Some portions of the evidence seem to 
 have escaped the notice of the author of the Me- 
 moirs and his assistants, and the reader is now 
 asked to examine somewhat of the matters treated 
 of in the light of neglected facts and author- 
 ities. 
 
 It is difficult to separate the " Personal Me- 
 moirs" of General Grant from the "Military 
 History of U. S. Grant." So identical in sub- 
 ject matter, so harmonious in style and treat- 
 ment, so consistent in mutual inconsistency, and 
 so united in intent are the two works, it is 
 impossible to escape the conviction that each is 
 but the duplicate and authorized complement of 
 the other. While General Grant has noticeably 
 intensified some reflections contained in General 
 Badeau's books, he has offered no protest to any- 
 thing therein, except in the single instance of 
 General Butler's operations at Bermuda Hun- 
 dred. Moreover, he makes several references to 
 "Badeau's history of my campaigns " as reliable 
 authority, and thus accepts and endorses the 
 statements of the earlier work. Constant effort 
 will be made, however, to keep distinct all refer- 
 ences to either. 
 
 Able pens have commented on events leading 
 up to the operations of 1864 and 1865, and it is 
 only to the record of the campaigns of those 
 years, in which the Army of the Potomac par- 
 ticipated, that attention will now be directed. 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 5 
 
 The " Military History of U. S. Grant/' writ- 
 ten by General Adam Badeau, Military Secretary 
 and Aide-de-Camp to General Grant, was pub- 
 lished in 1881. In 1883 Charles Seribner's Sons 
 published " The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 
 1865," written by General Andrew A. Hum- 
 phreys, Chief of Engineers U. S. Army. The 
 well-known intimate acquaintance of General 
 Humphreys with all the campaigns of the Army 
 of the Potomac, he having served continuously 
 therein from 1861 to the close of the war in 
 1865 ; the positions of Chief of Staff of the 
 Army, and afterwards of Corps Commander, in 
 which he had served with marked distinction 
 during the campaign of which he wrote ; his 
 acknowledged ability as a soldier thoroughly 
 schooled and experienced ; and his character as 
 a man, — all combine to render his work an au- 
 thority of the highest order. It is believed that 
 not one material fact as recorded by him has 
 been questioned or controverted. To this Gen- 
 eral Grant bears silent but positive testimony. 
 Although General Humphreys has noted and 
 corrected some of the deviation^ from the record 
 into which General Badeau had wandered, and 
 which General Grant has persistently followed, 
 the entire ignoring in the Memoirs of the name 
 of General Humphreys, as far as the matters 
 treated of will in any way permit, is the only 
 discoverable evidence that General Grant, or his 
 assistants, have been aware of the existence of 
 
6 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 " The Virginia Campaign of 1864: and 1865." 
 The supposition that they were in actual igno- 
 rance of this authority cannot be entertained; 
 nor can it be believed that they would have 
 failed to produce antagonistic authorities had 
 such been obtainable. 
 
 It is proposed, therefore, for the convenience 
 of the reader, to use, with very little other ref- 
 erence, the work of General Humphreys, as em- 
 bodying substantially the established record, as 
 far as it shall be necessary to examine it. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 GENERAL GRANt's COMMAND. 
 
 Entering upon the proposed examination, it 
 is well, especially for the non-military reader, to 
 recall the position from which General Grant 
 contemplated and judged the events of the clos- 
 ing- year of the war. His authority and juris- 
 diction first suggest themselves in this connec- 
 tion. 
 
 On March 9, 1864, by order of the President, 
 General Grant assumed command of the armies 
 of the United States, and under circumstances 
 very different from those that had been accorded 
 to any predecessor. The battle of Gettysburg 
 had been fought and won ; the armies in the 
 field were veteran troops inured to all the de- 
 mands of war ; and at last it had come to be 
 acknowledged by the government at Washing- 
 ton, in theory at least, that but one chief must, 
 or could, direct. The Army of the Potomac 
 had not fought and suffered altogether in vain. 
 With his commission as lieutenant-general there 
 were pledged by the President to General Grant 
 absolute freedom of action and the heartiest sup- 
 port for all his plans. That the pledge was 
 
8 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 redeemed General Badeau bears testimony when 
 he says : " Probably no commander ever found 
 a government more anxious to assist him, or 
 more efficient in carrying out his plans ; " ^ and 
 again, when stating the effective strength of the 
 armies under General Grant's command to be 
 five hundred and thirty-three thousand men, he 
 says : " Over this force Grant was as absolutely 
 supreme, as free to dictate its every movement, 
 as any general not a monarch who ever took the 
 field." ^ The new era had dawned for the gen- 
 eral-in-chief. 
 
 Of the forces composing his command, a brief 
 summary only is necessary. He found the Union 
 armies divided into seventeen distinct commands 
 which had hitherto been acting separately and 
 independently. He writes : " I determined to 
 stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of 
 the Potomac as the centre, and all west to Mem- 
 phis along the line described as our position at 
 the time, and north of it^ the right wing ; the 
 Army of the James, under General Butler, as 
 the left wing, and all the troops south, as a 
 force in the rear of the enemy." ^ 
 
 His general plan, as stated, was to concentrate 
 all the force possible against the Army of North- 
 ern Virginia on the south bank of the Rapidan, 
 and against the Army under General Joseph E. 
 Johnston at Dalton, Georgia. To this end, he 
 
 1 Mil. Hist, vol. ii., p. 29. » Id., p. 32. 
 
 8 Mem., vol. ii., p. 127. 
 
GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 9 
 
 arranged for a simultaneous movement all along 
 the line of his extended command. General 
 Sherman v/as to move from Chattanooga, having 
 General Johnston's army and Atlanta for his ob- 
 jective points. General Crook, commanding in 
 West Virginia, was to move from the mouth of 
 the Gauley Kiver, and, with a cavalry force and 
 artillery, strike the Virginia and Tennessee Kail- 
 road. General Sigel, who was in command in 
 the Valley of Virginia, was to advance up that 
 valley. General Butler was to advance by the 
 James River, having Richmond and Petersburg 
 as his objective. General Banks, in the depart- 
 ment of the Gulf, was ordered to assemble at 
 New Orleans all the troops he had, in time to 
 join the general move, Mobile to be his ob- 
 jective. 
 
 The armies were to move for the accomphsh- 
 ment of a single object. They were to act as a 
 unit as far as such a thing was possible over 
 such a vast field. General Lee, with the capital 
 of the Confederacy, was the main end to which 
 aU were to work. General Johnston, with At- 
 lanta, was so important an obstacle in the way of 
 accomplishing the main result as to be almost 
 an independent objective. All other troops were 
 to be employed exclusively in support of the two 
 chief movements. This was the plan.' Truly a 
 mighty plan, and a tremendous line of battle, 
 that would tax the full ability and closest care 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 129-146. 
 
10 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 of the mightiest merely human mind to guide 
 in concert to success. 
 
 Of his lieutenants in chief subordinate com- 
 mands. General Sherman, commanding his ex- 
 treme right wing, was notedly his intimate friend 
 and trusted adviser; and General Meade, com- 
 manding the centre, was known to him as the 
 commander who, but three days after being 
 placed at the head of the Army of the Potomac 
 when in motion to overtake General Lee's invad- 
 ing army, had fought and won the battle from 
 which dated the downfall of the Confederacy. 
 
 On March 9, General Grant received his com- 
 mission as lieutenant-general. On March 10, he 
 for the first time visited the Army of the Poto- 
 mac, and, as General Humphreys states,^ then 
 announced to General Meade his intention of 
 making his headquarters with that army. March 
 11, he returned to Washington, and at once 
 started for Nashville to install his successor in 
 the command of the western, or right, wing of 
 his army. On March 17, he formally assumed 
 command of all the armies. On March 23, he 
 arrived again at Washington, and on March 26, 
 established his headquarters at Culpeper, a little 
 country town, not fifteen miles from the Rapi- 
 dan, " a few miles south of the headquarters of 
 the Army of the Potomac," ^ and about seventy 
 miles by rail southwest from Washington. 
 
 The order announcing the advancement of 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 5. ^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 121. 
 
GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. H 
 
 General Grant to the supreme command was is- 
 sued March 12, 1864, as foUows : — 
 
 "Major-General Halleck is, at his own re- 
 quest, reheved from duty as General-in-Chief of 
 the Army, and Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant 
 is assigned to the command of the Armies of the 
 United States. The headquarters of the army 
 will be in Washington, and also Avith Lieutenant- 
 General Grant in the field." ^ 
 
 On March 11, 1862, the President had issued 
 War Order No. 3, as follows: -Major-General 
 McUellan, having personally taken the field at 
 the head of the Army of the Potomac,"^ untH 
 otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the com- 
 mand of the other military departments, he 
 retaining command of the Department of the 
 Potomac." 
 
 These orders, separated by an interval of just 
 two years, while they furnish another indication 
 of the scope conceded to General Grant, do not 
 appear to show that the question of the proper 
 location for the headquarters of the general-in- 
 chief had been positively settled. The old plan 
 of division still obtained. WhHe the fact seems 
 to have been accepted that where the personal 
 presence of the directing chief could most aid 
 the accomplishment of the plans in hand, there 
 he should be, and there his headquarters must 
 for the time perforce accompany him, it was evi- 
 
 1 Mil, Hist, vol. ii., p. 14. 
 
 2 All italics are the writer's unless otherwise stated. 
 
12 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 dently held that the permanent location should 
 still remain at Washington. That there were 
 strong practical arguments sustanung this ^as* 
 conclusion General Grant bears witness. Writ- 
 ing of his arrival in Washington to assume his 
 new command, he says : 
 
 "It had been my intention before this to re- 
 main in the West, even if I was made lieutenant- 
 general ; but when I got to Washington and 
 saw the situation, it was plain that here was the 
 point for the commanding general to be. Wo 
 one else could, probably, resist the pressure that 
 would be brought to bear upon him^ to desist 
 from his own plans and pursue others." 
 
 General Badeau states the same, and adds : 
 "The transcendent miportance of the issues in 
 Virginia, upon which the fate of both the na- 
 tional and the rebel capital depended, made it 
 apparent at the outset that the new general-m- 
 chief must either remain at Washington, in or- 
 der to direct the movements in that vicinity, or 
 take the field in person with the Army of the 
 Potomac. For the entire rebel strength culnii- 
 nated in Virginia; whatever efEorts were made 
 elsewhere, however sturdy a defence at the bouth 
 or West, only here could the battles be fought 
 which would absolutely end the war."^ 
 
 Elsewhere this same authority would seem to 
 have offered strong arguments against the latter 
 alternative of assuming a personal command ot 
 
GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 13 
 
 the Army of the Potomac, or any other of the 
 armies composing his forces. Having stated the 
 firm determination of General Grant to neglect 
 none of the advantages of force or skill, to leave 
 no door open for failure, but to apply all the re- 
 sources at his command to secure the success of 
 his plans for the overthrow of the rebellion/ he 
 repeatedly impresses upon his readers the fact^ 
 necessary to be borne constantly in mind, " that 
 the campaign from the Rapidan was only one 
 part of a comprehensive scheme." ^ His impres- 
 sion (evidently the correct one) of the proper 
 and only location of the point from which the 
 influence of a guiding chief could best be exer- 
 cised, may be inferred from his statement, that 
 on May 12, before Spottsylvania Court House, 
 '' Grant's headquarters were in a thickly-wooded 
 dell, from which it was impossible to distinguish 
 any portion of the field, hut the necessity of re- 
 maining at a j^oint where he could be readily 
 reached by every corps commander left him no 
 option:'^ If that necessity existed upon the 
 comparatively contracted field at Spottsylvania 
 Court House, with practically but two corps 
 claiming his attention (for General Meade was 
 there in command of the Army of the Potomac), 
 it certainly applied with equal if not greater 
 force upon the mighty field which, stretching 
 from Virginia and the Ohio Eiver to the Gulf 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol, ii., p. 10. 2 i^^^ p, i37_ 
 
 3 Id., pp. 173, 174. 
 
14 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 of Mexico, and from the Atlantic Ocean to and 
 beyond the Mississippi River, claimed the care 
 of the general-in-chief . General Grant had been 
 elevated to the chief command expressly that he 
 might give his constant and most energetic su- 
 pervision to this field ; and only from Washing- 
 ton could he readily, and without loss of time or 
 power, reach the seventeen component parts of 
 his widespread command. 
 
 We learn from General Badeau : " During the 
 last year of the war, while Grant was actually in 
 the field, most of his orders to important subor- 
 dinates were transmitted first to Halleck, and by 
 him repeated in Grant's name. So, also, many 
 of the reports of generals at a distance were ad- 
 dressed originally to Halleck, as Chief of Staff, 
 and then forwarded to Grant. The lieutenant- 
 general himself, was obliged to send all his tele- 
 grams to Washington, as his only line of com- 
 munication lay through that city ; and he there- 
 fore proposed that, for the sake of uniformity, 
 all his messages for the government should be 
 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Army. In 
 consequence, very few communications passed di- 
 rect between the general-in-chief and the Pres- 
 ident or the Secretary of War." ^ 
 
 This, of course, was the only method practica- 
 ble in the absence of the commanding general 
 from the seat of government and centre of com- 
 munication. It was evidently hoped, if not ex- 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 81. 
 
GENERAL GRANT ^S COMMAND. 15 
 
 pected, that under the new dispensation it would 
 be found more satisfactory than previous experi- 
 ments could be said to guarantee. On the night 
 of May 4, while the Army of the Potomac was 
 crossing the Rapidan, General Grant and Gen- 
 eral Meade, while upon the southern bank dis- 
 cussing plans for the morrow, received the infor- 
 mation that Generals Sherman, Butler, and Crook 
 had advanced as contemplated and ordered. 
 Thereupon General Badeau's enthusiasm writes : 
 " It had never happened before in the history 
 of war that one man directed so completely four 
 distinct armies separated by thousands of miles 
 and numbering more than a quarter of a million 
 soldiers ; ordering the operations of each for the 
 same day, and receiving at night reports from 
 each that his orders had been obeyed. The 
 cooperation so long desired and planned had at 
 last begun." ^ 
 
 Subsequent experience, soon to be encoun- 
 tered, hardly sustained this sanguine conception. 
 It was three o'clock on the afternoon of May 7, 
 when a messenger from Washington reached 
 General Grant, with the information that Gen- 
 eral Butler had landed his force at City Point on 
 the 5th, and that General Sherman expected to 
 give battle to General Johnston on the Tth.^ It 
 was not until noon of May 9th that General 
 Grant learned that on the 7th, in a dispatch to 
 Washington containing " dubious " news, Gen- 
 
 1 Ma. Hist, vol. ii., p. 100. 2 id^ p 133 
 
16 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 eral Butler had applied for reinforcements.^ It 
 was only on May ITth that the lieutenant-gen- 
 eral received the news of General Sigel's defeat 
 at Newmarket on the 15th, and learned that 
 General Butler had been shut up within his in- 
 trenchments at Bermuda Hundred on the 16th ; 
 the information reaching him in General Hal- 
 leck's despatch, reading : " Sigel is in full retreat 
 on Strasburg. He will do nothing hut run ; 
 never did anything else. . . . Butler is falling 
 back. Don't rely on him." ^ 
 
 From the James Eiver, on June 24th, General 
 Grant informed the President as follows : " Dur- 
 ing the last raid, the wires happened to be down 
 between here and Fortress Monroe, and the cable 
 broken between there and Cherrystone. This 
 made it tahe from twelve to twenty-four hours, 
 each way, for desi^atches to pass. Under such 
 circumstances, it id as difficult for me to give or- 
 ders or directions, because 1 coidd not tell how 
 the conditions might change during the transit 
 of despatches.''^ ^ 
 
 These instances, taken at random from the 
 acknowledged record, would seem to intimate 
 that if the cooperation so long desired and 
 planned had at last begun, it was at best but 
 partial and temporary, and that the necessity of 
 remaining at a point where he could be readily 
 reached by his subordinate commanders offered 
 serious objections to the continued presence of 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 150. 2 i^., p. 2OO. s j^., p. 453. 
 
GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 17 
 
 General Grant with any one of the armies of his 
 command. 
 
 General Badeau suggests another argument 
 which seems to bear upon this point. Writing 
 of the relations which existed between General 
 Grant and General Meade, and the opinion en- 
 tertained by some of those attached to General 
 Grant's person and headquarters that it would 
 have been better had General Meade been re- 
 lieved from the command of the Army of the 
 Potomac, he says : " If Grant could communi- 
 cate direct with his corps commanders, it was be- 
 lieved that he might convey or infuse something 
 of his own spirit and character, but the result 
 of having a middleman was to make the whole 
 organization wooden. Meade severed the nerve 
 between the general-in-chief and the army. He 
 was a non - conductor." ^ It would seem that 
 this, also, applies with greater force to the greater 
 command, — in fact, that the application of the 
 idea embodied in the argument to the manage- 
 ment of all the armies in the field, was the 
 prime reason calling for the elevation of Gen- 
 eral Grant to the high rank he held. 
 
 This appears to have been President Lincoln's 
 impression. Having seen General Grant's de- 
 spatch of August 1, 1864, directing the disposi- 
 tions to be made after his discovery of the fact 
 that General Wright's pursuit of General Early 
 " was feeble because of the constant and con- 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 187. 
 
18 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 trary orders he had been receiving from Wash- 
 ington, while I (Grant) was cut off from imme- 
 diate communication by means of our cable 
 across Chesapeake Bay being broken/' ^ he de- 
 spatched to General Grant, under date of Au- 
 gust 3, 1864, as follows : — 
 
 " I have seen your dispatch in which you say, 
 ' I want Sheridan put in command of all the 
 troops in the field, mth instructions to put him- 
 self south of the enemy, and follow him to the 
 death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops 
 go also/ This I think is exactly right, as to 
 how our forces should move. But please look 
 over the dispatches you may have received from 
 here, even since you made that order, and dis- 
 cover, if you can, that there is any idea in the 
 head of any one here of ' putting our army south 
 of the enemy,' or of ' following him to the death ' 
 in any direction. / repeat to you it will neither 
 be done nor attempted unless you watch it every 
 day, and hour, and force it." 
 
 General Grant replied that he " would start 
 in two hours /or Washington'''^ 
 
 The character of the existing channels of 
 communication in and through Washington was 
 well known to General Grant even before he left 
 his western command. It certainly could not 
 have surprised him that when, on July 12, 1864, 
 General Early threatened Washington during 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 315, 316. 
 
 2 Id., vol. ii., pp. 318, 319. 
 
GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 19 
 
 the absence of the general-in-chief, the result 
 was what General Badeau terms "a period of 
 confusion and distracted counsels, of blunders in 
 the cabinet and mismanagement in the field, al- 
 most unparalleled during the war." ^ He does 
 not appear to have been surprised when General 
 Hunter informed him " that he was so embar- 
 rassed with orders from Washington moving him 
 first to the right and then to the left that he 
 had lost all trace of the enemy." ^ When, in 
 speaking of the orders he forwarded to General 
 Sheridan, about October 10th, he says : " But 
 this order had to go through Washington where 
 it was intercepted ; and when Sheridan received 
 what purported to be a statement of what I 
 wanted him to do it was something entirely 
 different,"^ he seems simply to be relating an 
 incident such as he had contemplated when de- 
 ciding that in Washington was the point for 
 the commanding general to be. 
 
 But General Grant himself suggests another 
 objection to the location of the headquarters of 
 the armies of the United States with one of the 
 armies in the field, when, bringing his gravest 
 imputation, often repeated in substance, against 
 General Warren, he says : " Warren's difficulty 
 was two-fold : when he received an order to do 
 anything, it would at once occur to his mind 
 how all the balance of the army should be en- 
 
 1 Mil. Hist , vol. ii., p. 444. ^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 319. 
 
 3 Id., p. 337. 
 
20 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 gaged so as properly to cooperate with him. 
 His ideas were generally good, but he would for- 
 get that the person giving him orders had 
 thought of others at the time he had of him. 
 In like manner, when he did get ready to exe- 
 cute an order, after giving most intelligent in- 
 structions to division commanders, he would go 
 in with one division, holding the others in re- 
 serve until he could superintend their movements 
 in person also, forgetting that division command- 
 ers could execute an order without his presence. 
 His difficulty was constitutional and beyond his 
 control. He was an officer of superior ability, 
 quick perceptions, and personal courage to ac- 
 complish anything that could be done with a 
 small command." ^ In other words, an instinct- 
 ive impulse on General Warren's part to com- 
 bine in his single person, at one and the same 
 time, the army, corps and division commands 
 and cares, and the resultant inability to confine 
 himself to his proper sphere of action, neutral- 
 ized his usefulness in spite of his ability, per- 
 ception and courage. General Grant mentions 
 no instance where General Warren exhibited the 
 fault imputed to him; but he does state what 
 would seem to be an illustrative case in point, 
 when he relates that, on May 10th, the general- 
 in-chief, whose attention had been absorbed by 
 the battle waged by the Army of the Potomac, 
 ordered General Burnside, who at the time was 
 
 ^ Mem.j vol. ii., pp. 214, 215. 
 
GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 21 
 
 not under General Meade's orders, to fall back 
 from a position he had gained within a few hun- 
 dred yards of Spottsylvania Court House, com- 
 pletely turning General Lee's right, as he (the 
 general-in-chief ) did not at the time know of the 
 advantage that had been gained.^ 
 
 No one will dispute the greatness of the fault 
 thus imputed to General Warren ; but many will 
 fail to see, even through the sophistries of Gen- 
 eral Badeau, how this specific trait, so reprehen- 
 sible in a subordinate, can become commendable 
 and prove unerring judgment in a superior. 
 
 Why the opinion formed by General Grant on 
 his arrival in Washington, March 9th, " that here 
 was the point for the commanding general to 
 be," was changed in the few hours intervening 
 between that arrival and his visit to the head- 
 quarters of the Army of the Potomac, is not 
 stated in terms. General Badeau says, in addi- 
 tion to what has already been quoted as bearing 
 on this point, that " from the moment, there- 
 fore, when it was decided that he should be en- 
 trusted with supreme command. Grant had no 
 doubt whatever of his duty or his design. In 
 Washington he would not stay in time of war ; 
 he must then direct in person the campaigns of 
 that renowned Army of the Potomac which had 
 passed through so many vicissitudes, encountered 
 so many hardships, and withstood so many dan- 
 gers, and still seemed as far from its goal as if 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 225. 
 
22 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 those vicissitudes and hardships and dangers liad 
 never been endured."^ Whether there is any 
 connection between this statement of General 
 Badeau and the remark of General Grant else- 
 where that " it was not an uncommon thins* for 
 my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers, 
 ^ Well Grant has not met Bobby Lee yet/ " ^ 
 can only be inferred. Whether the ultimate de- 
 cision was one of the " judgments, made appa- 
 rently at the moment, which he never reversed, 
 and which the world has never seen reason to 
 reverse," ^ it is not necessary now to decide. 
 
 Whether General Sigel would have retii-ed as 
 rapidly as he is said to have done, or General 
 Butler have caused what General Badeau calls 
 " the total failure of one part of his scheme ; a 
 part too, which he had every reason to expect 
 would have proved of so great assistance,'' had 
 they been more immediately under the direction 
 of the lieutenant-general, who had planned their 
 movements for them; whether General Banks 
 would have failed so utterly, or his failure have 
 so entirely " eliminated the use of forty thousand 
 veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign 
 had been expected ; " whether General Hunter 
 would have been better able to interpret the or- 
 ders he received, or to locate the enemy with 
 greater accuracy than has been credited to him ; 
 whether General Early could have terrified as 
 
 1 MU. Hist, vol. ii., p. 14. 2 jif^^n., vol. ii., p. 292. 
 
 8 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 21. 
 
 7W 
 
GENERAL GRANT'S COMMAND. 23 
 
 thoroughly as he is supposed to have done the 
 government at Washington, or Generals Forrest 
 and Morgan have preyed at will upon the Fed- 
 eral communications in the west; whether, in 
 fact, any advantage would have been gained, 
 had the directing general remained at a point 
 where he could be readily reached by, and from 
 which he could readily reach, his subordinates 
 in command of his widespread forces, can never 
 now be positively known. 
 
 It is sufficient for the present purpose to note 
 that, with reference to his command. General 
 Grant confessedly did not maintain a position 
 such as his authorized historian distinctly states 
 was necessary for the commander of an army to 
 occupy ; and that his choice and decision, while 
 undoubtedly in his judgment for the best, not 
 only were open to, but invited, criticism. Under 
 such circumstances, no matter how complete the 
 triumph which ultimately crowned the vicissi- 
 tudes, hardships and dangers of the Army of 
 the Potomac, Generals Grant and Badeau, as 
 historians of the campaign of 1864 and 1865, 
 labor at an irremediable disadvantage. Of this 
 the desperate rhapsodies, penned by General 
 Badeau and complacently adopted by General 
 Grant, bear witness. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE RELATIONS ESTABLISHED BY GENERAL GRANT 
 WITH GENERAL MEADE AND THE ARMY OF THE 
 POTOMAC. 
 
 Following an examination of the bearing of 
 the location of General Grant's headquarters 
 upon his authority and jurisdiction, and the con- 
 sequent effect upon his historical efforts, there 
 should be considered in the same connection the 
 relations established by that location between 
 General Grant and the Army of the Potomac 
 and its commander. 
 
 In his account of the advance from Shiloh 
 upon Corinth in 1862, General Grant says : 
 " General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing 
 on the 11th of April and immediately assumed 
 command in the field. ... I was named second 
 in command of the whole, and was also supposed 
 to be in command of the right wing and reserve. 
 . . . For myself I was little more than an ob- 
 server. Orders were sent direct to the right 
 wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were 
 made from one line of intrenchments to another 
 without notifying me. My position was so em- 
 
GRANT AND MEADE. 25 
 
 barrassing in fact that I made several applica- 
 tions during the siege to be relieved. 
 
 " General Halleck kept his head-quarters 
 generally^ if not all the time, with the right 
 wiiig, . . ." ^ 
 
 From his own experience, therefore, General 
 Grant understood the unenviable position in 
 which his choice of location for his permanent 
 headquarters would of necessity place General 
 Meade. Writing of the first meeting of the 
 lieutenant-general with the commander of the 
 Army of the Potomac, General Badeau says : 
 " The position of Meade was now one of pecul- 
 iar delicacy. . . . Although he had not, indeed, 
 been superseded, another was set over him, with 
 the especial idea of controlling the movements 
 of that army which he had led to decided vic- 
 tory. He might very naturally have been dis- 
 contented ; but no manifestation of such a feeling 
 was apparent. He displayed, on the contrary, a 
 marked magnanimity." ^ 
 
 Both General Grant and General Badeau re- 
 late how, in this first interview with his new 
 superior in command, General Meade himself 
 referred to the possibility that General Grant 
 might desire to place some one with whom he 
 was personally better acquainted in command of 
 the Army of the Potomac, and requested that, if 
 such was the case, he would not hesitate to act 
 as his judgment dictated, adding the assurance 
 
 1 Mem., vol. i., pp. 371-377. ^ mh ffigf^ y^i n^ p. 15. 
 
26 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 that, as for himself, he would serve to the best of 
 his ability wherever placed. General Grant com- 
 ments on this : " I assured him that I had no 
 thought of substituting any one for him. . . . 
 This incident gave me even a more favorable 
 opinion of Meade than did his great victory at 
 Gettysburg the July before. It is men who 
 wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from 
 whom we may always expect the most efficient 
 
 service." ^ 
 
 General Badeau adds his testimony, as fol- 
 lows : " It was this spirit which animated all of 
 Grant's greatest subordinates, which inspired 
 Sherman, and Thomas, and others whose story I 
 have yet to relate, and made them, instead of 
 rivals, co-adjutors of their chief, and enabled him 
 to be secure of their support in the most trying 
 emergencies, and with their aid to accomj^Iish 
 what, without just such cordial cooperation, 
 and just such self-sacrifice, could never have 
 been achieved. 
 
 " But Grant had no desire for the removal of 
 Meade. . . . The question of Meade's removal 
 was never mooted between the administration 
 and the lieutenant-general." ^ 
 
 In his official report General Grant specifically 
 defines the relations established between them. 
 He says : " Major-General George G. Meade had 
 the immediate command of the Army of the Po- 
 tomac, from where I exercised general super- 
 vision of the movements of all our armies. 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 117. 2 j^jn jUgi^^ ^ol. ii., pp. 15, 16. 
 
GRANT AND MEADE. 27 
 
 "... I may here state that, commanding all 
 the armies as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to 
 leave General Meade in independent command of 
 the Army of the Potomac. My instructions for 
 that army were all through him, and were gen- 
 eral in their nature, leaving all the details and 
 the execution to him. The campaigns that fol- 
 lowed proved him to be the right man in the 
 right place. His commanding always in the 
 presence of an officer superior to him in rank, 
 has drawn from him much of that public atten- 
 tion that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and 
 which he would otherwise have received." ^ 
 
 In his dispatch to the Secretary of War, dated 
 Spottsylvania C. H., May 13, 1864, he had pre- 
 viously put on record : " General Meade has more 
 than met my most sanguine expectations. He 
 and Sherman are the fittest officers for large 
 commands I have come in contact with."^ 
 
 It must be accepted that General Grant ap- 
 preciated, in some degree at least, the position 
 of his subordinate, the character he evinced, and 
 the consideration which was his due. 
 
 But commenting upon the despatch just quoted. 
 General Badeau says : " In this estimate of 
 Meade's ability Grant never wavered, although 
 soldiers and civilians of importance often sought 
 to change his mind. 
 
 " To some indeed of Grant's well-wishers, one 
 thing seemed evident, after this week of battle, 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 558, 563, 564. 2 i^_^ p, 235. 
 
28 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 and that was the impolicy of retaining an officer 
 in the position of Meade, who could not, it was 
 thought, exert a legitimate influence over his 
 own subordinates with a superior immediately 
 present, known to be directing all his move- 
 ments ; while Grant's personal traits lost half 
 their force, obscured by an intermediary. 
 
 "It does not need to suppose that Meade was 
 lacking either in ability or earnestness, to see 
 that he might be an impediment. He certainly 
 had succeeded when he had been more untram- 
 melled, and his magnanimous loyalty has been 
 already shown ; but, if his energies ever flagged 
 when Grant's were fresh, if he failed to appre- 
 ciate in any particular the designs of his chief, 
 if the two were not on every occasion in perfect 
 intellectual accord, there was one chance more 
 of failure. 
 
 " These ideas were pressed upon General 
 Grant by a few, to whom he allowed a sufficient 
 degree of intimacy, some of whom were besides 
 convinced that Meade lacked many of the quali- 
 ties essential in a great commander. The gen- 
 eral-in-chief, however, always defended his sub- 
 ordinate, and believed, as he said when the war 
 was over, that Meade was the right man in the 
 right place." 
 
 It seems manifest from these last quotations, — 
 
GRANT AND MEADE. 29 
 
 taken from six consecutive pages ^ devoted to the 
 subject by the versatile writer who, as has just 
 been seen, ranked General Meade among those 
 whose cooperation was a vital factor in the achieve- 
 ment of General Grant's success, that no matter 
 how clear may have been General Grant's convic- 
 tion of the merits of his subordinate, or how unin- 
 terrupted the friendliness of their relations, the 
 Q-eneral-in-chief of all the armies was surrounded 
 by an atmosphere at least threatenmg the mani- 
 tenance of the accuracy of his judgment. That 
 he was conscious the relations he had established 
 were debatable, if not incongruous, is indicated 
 by the acknowledged necessity for the statement 
 quoted from his official report ; and that the ar- 
 guments of the " soldiers and civilians of impor- 
 tance " who surrounded him had some influence 
 upon his mind may be inferred from the modi- 
 fied language with which, in the Memoirs, he 
 repeats in substance the frank statement in his 
 report. He says : " Meade's j^osition afterwards 
 proved embarrassing to me if not to him. He 
 was commanding an army and, for nearly a year 
 previous to my taking command of all the ar- 
 mies, was in supreme command of the Army of 
 the Potomac — except from the authorities at 
 Washington. All other general officers occupy- 
 ing similar positions were independent in their 
 commands as far as any one present with them 
 was concerned. I tried to make General Meade's 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., pp. 186-192. 
 
30 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 position as nearly as possible what it would have 
 been if I had been in Washington or any other 
 place away from his command. I therefore gave 
 all orders for the movements of the Army of 
 the Potomac to Meade to have them executed. 
 To avoid the necessity of having to give orders 
 direct, I established my head-quarters near his, 
 unless there were reasons for locating them 
 elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and I had 
 on occasion to give orders direct to the troops 
 affected." 1 
 
 These last sentences recall General Grant's 
 own embarrassing experiences in the Shiloh-Cor- 
 inth campaign and suggest one complication 
 certain to arise under the conditions deliberately 
 established here by himself. In a foot-note ap- 
 pended to his account of the movements of Gen- 
 eral Hancock's corps at Spottsylvania Court 
 House, May 9-10, General Humphreys remarks : 
 
 " There were two officers commanding the 
 same army. Such a mixed command was not 
 calculated to produce the best results that either 
 singly was capable of bringing about. It nat- 
 urally caused some vagueness and uncertainty as 
 to the exact sphere of each, and sometimes took 
 away from the positiveness, fulness, and earnest- 
 ness of the consideration of an intended opera- 
 tion or tactical movement that, had there been 
 but one commander, would have had the most 
 earnest attention and corresponding action." ^ 
 
 1 Mem.y vol. ii., pp. 117, 118. 2 Va. Camp., p. 83. 
 
GRANT AND MEADE. 31 
 
 It is not intended to criticise the judgment 
 which brought about the relations here consid- 
 ered, or to discuss the point of which commander 
 should have been withdrawn in favor of the 
 other, but only to recognize the facts ; and it is 
 enough at present to note, as an indication of 
 one disadvantage under which General Grant as 
 historian has labored, that, while General Meade 
 remained constantly in the definitely specified 
 command to which he had been assigned, it is 
 General Headers position which embarrassed 
 General Grant and called forth General Ba- 
 de'au s labored pleadings. When Lieutenant- 
 General Grant, exercising his command from the 
 position he himself selected, stood embarrassed in 
 the presence of his illustrious subordinate, one 
 scarce need wonder at the anomalies encountered 
 in the Memoirs. The urgently suggested but 
 ungrateful proposition that General Grant could 
 have succeeded better had he been relieved from 
 the presence and cooperation of General Meade 
 in command of the Army of the Potomac, is 
 now, at best, no less problematic than the convic- 
 tion held by many competent to judge, that the 
 tragedy which commenced in the Wilderness on 
 May 4, and ended at Cold Harbor on June 3, 
 1864:, would have been unnecessary had General 
 Meade been unhampered by the constant over- 
 ruling presence of General Grant. 
 
 No one will dispute with the author of the 
 " Military History of U. S. Grant " when he as- 
 
32 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 serts : " The whole campaign against Lee was his, 
 and the whole responsibility." ^ In his official 
 report General Grant says : " The movement of 
 the Army of the Potomac commenced early in 
 the morning of the 4:th of May, under the imme- 
 diate direction and orders of Major-General 
 Meade, jpursuant to instructions.''^ ^ There can 
 be no question on the point, and here the obli- 
 gations arising from the relations assumed to- 
 ward that army by the lieutenant-general sug- 
 gest themselves for brief consideration. 
 
 Describing the position held by General Lee 
 on the southern bank of the Rapidan, General 
 Badeau writes : " The right, commanded by 
 Ewell, was covered not only by Mine Run itself, 
 but by a strong entrenched line, outside of which 
 lay an impenetrable region called the ' Wikler- 
 ness,' a forest miles in extent, with few and 
 narrow roads, and a dense and tangled under- 
 growth, the most impracticable country possible 
 for the manoeuvres of an army ; . . . 
 
 " It was of course out of the question to make 
 a front attack on an army thus strongly situated, 
 and Grant's first problem was to force or tempt 
 the rebels out of their works to fight. With 
 this view, he decided to plunge direct into the 
 Wilderness, and threaten the right of Lee. It 
 was not his object to avoid the enemy ; not even, 
 as some have supposed, to pass beyond him ; he 
 did not desire to out-flank the rebel army, in a 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 49. ^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 564. 
 
GRANT AND MEADE. 33 
 
 purely strategic sense, so much as to bring it to 
 speedy battle. Lee could not possibly remain 
 within his works when the national troops ad- 
 vancedj for that would be to abandon his com- 
 munications and supplies ; so that by moving to 
 the right of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
 Grant really compelled either immediate battle 
 or the immediate retreat of Lee. Accordingly, 
 the orders were issued for the Army of the Po- 
 tomac to cross the Rapidan at Germanna and 
 Ely fords, and to march into the Wilderness by 
 the roads nearest the rebel lines." 
 
 And he remarks further, in a foot-note : " The 
 absurd idea that Grant hoped or desired to pass 
 unobserved by his right, and reach his rear with- 
 out a battle, could never have been entertained 
 by a soldier ; " and, recording the despatch sent 
 by General Grant to General Halleck on the 
 night of May 4, he notes : " This despatch suffi- 
 ciently disproves the assertion that Grant ex- 
 pected to advance without a battle." The de- 
 spatch was as follows : — 
 
 "Crossing of the Rapidan effected. Forty- 
 eight hours will now demonstrate whether the 
 enemy intends giving battle this side of Rich- 
 mond, Telegraph Butler that we have crossed 
 the Rapidan." ^ 
 
 General Humphreys says concerning this : 
 " The objection to moving by our left consisted 
 in the character of the country south of the 
 
 1 Mil Hist, vol. ii., pp. 96-100. 
 
34 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 Rapidan, through which we must pass for the 
 distance of ten or fifteen miles after crossing the 
 river, and in which we might be obliged to fight 
 the first battle. . . . There was some reason to 
 believe, however, from our experience in the 
 movement against Lee in the preceding Novem- 
 ber, that by setting the whole army in motion 
 at midnight, with its reserve artillery and great 
 trains of over four thousand wagons, it might 
 move so far beyond the Rapidan the first day 
 that it would be able to pass out of the Wilder- 
 ness and turn, or partly turny the right flank of 
 Lee before a general engagement took place." 
 
 He continues : " The movement by the left 
 flank was adopted, and I was requested by Gen- 
 eral Meade to prepare a project for it. Two 
 were sketched out by me, the one turning Lee! 8 
 right by the Catharpin and Pamunkey roads in 
 comparatively open country, the other by roads 
 having about the same general direction as the 
 Pamunkey, but from five to eight miles eastward 
 of it, passing tAvo to four miles west of Spottsyl- 
 vania Court House. The two projects were co- 
 incident for the first day and for a part of the 
 second, and both were subject to material modi- 
 fication or entire abandonment on the second 
 day, dependent upon the movements of Lee. 
 
 " The first project was adopted, and the order 
 of movement was prepared by me in conformity 
 to it. The order for continuing the movement 
 />n the 5th of May, issued on the evening of the 
 
GRANT AND MEADE. 35 
 
 4th, also conformed to it, but owing to indica- 
 tions of the enemy's movement on the 4th, the 
 order of march was partial only, and held in 
 view the probability of a general engagement on 
 that day." ' 
 
 In addition he refers directly to the account 
 given by General Badeau, as follows : " Greneral 
 Badeau, in his ' Military Life of General Grant,' 
 appears to intimate that General Grant intended 
 to bring on a general engagement on the 5th of 
 May, in the preliminary position directed to be 
 taken up in the order of march issued on the 
 4th. But that view is not consistent with the 
 orders issued nor with what was best to do. Had 
 he really wished to fight a battle on the 5th, the 
 Second Corps, after crossing at Ely's Ford on 
 the 4th, should have moved out the Orange 
 plank road to New Hope Church ; the Fifth 
 Corps out the pike to Robertson's tavern ; the 
 Sixth Corps to Old Wilderness tavern ; and, on 
 the morning of the 5th, to position between the 
 Second and Fifth Corps ; Wilson's cavalry out 
 the Orange plank road in advance of the Second 
 Corps, and moving to the left at New Hope 
 Church. That would have brought on a battle 
 in more open and better ground for the Army 
 of the Potomac than that of the Wilderness. 
 Had Lee gone into the strong, intrenched posi- 
 tion of Mine Run, or had he withdrawn to it 
 after the battle, we could have moved to turn his 
 
 1 Va. Camp., pp. 10-13. 
 
36 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 right as soon as the trains were sufficiently ad- 
 vanced to admit of it, and in doing so should 
 have found still more open country. I do not 
 perceive that there is anything to induce the be- 
 lief that General Grant intended or wished to 
 fight a battle in the Wilderness. His doing so 
 was, under the circumstances, unavoidable, not 
 a matter of choice. Further, it would have been 
 strange if the Chief of Staff of the Army of the 
 Potomac, whose special occupation concerned the 
 operations of that army, its movements and 
 battles and their object, should not have known 
 of this intention if it had any existence." ^ 
 
 Aside from the indisputable statement of Gen- 
 eral Humphreys, it is difficult to believe that the 
 general whose "first problem was to force or 
 tempt the rebels out of their works to fight," 
 would, as General Badeau seems intent on main- 
 taining, have projected, or expected, his first 
 battle itnmediately in front of the strong lines 
 of Mine Run, to which the enemy could retire 
 at will, and in " the most impracticable country 
 possible for the manoeuvres of an army : " a 
 country so densely wooded that, while neither 
 army might, before battle was joined, hold any 
 advantage of position, the attacked lines retained 
 advantages equivalent to intrenchments, and the 
 attacking forces (as General Hancock proved) 
 were debarred from discovering, or efficiently 
 following up, any success they might achieve. It 
 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 56. 
 
GRANT AND MEADE. 37 
 
 is far more reasonable to suppose that General 
 Grant, while determined to fight at any cost 
 wherever he met the enemy, desired and ex- 
 pected to carry out, in some measure at least, his 
 favorite movement '" to get south " of his adver- 
 sary before joining in a general engagement ; 
 but General Lee proved not to be General Pem- 
 berton. 
 
 But, be that as it may, the indignant protests 
 of General Badeau establish here another obsta- 
 cle to be overcome by General Grant and the 
 historian of his campaign, in that they mani- 
 festly feel called upon to offer ambiguous expla- 
 nation and defence of the initial and governing 
 movement of that campaign professedly aggres- 
 sive. 
 
 When General Warren, under orders pursuant 
 to instructions given by General Grant, halted 
 at the Wilderness Tavern on May 4, there re- 
 mained only to fight it out on that line, or retire. 
 After that halt, again and again the favorite 
 movement was attempted, and again and again 
 it was met and foiled, till the James River was 
 reached and crossed, and the army took breath 
 to count the strategic value of " mere attrition."^ 
 And through all, right loyally, that renowned 
 Army of the Potomac responded to the orders 
 and seconded the efforts of the lieutenant-gen- 
 eral commanding all the armies of the United 
 States. Repeating the story often told of Gen- 
 
 ^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 556. 
 
38 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 eral Warren's troops at Mine Eun in November, 
 1863, standing steadily before the impregnable 
 lines they expected to be hurled against, and 
 noting their recognition of the desperateness of 
 the task before them by quietly pinning upon 
 their blouse-breasts slips of paper bearing their 
 names and army designations, the Comte de 
 Paris writes : " If it is only a legend ... it is 
 worth being quoted, for it perfectly describes 
 the character of the Army of the Potomac." 
 That army fully understood the magnitude of 
 the price it must pay for victory in that spring 
 of 1864, no matter who might be its commander ; 
 and, — though " even Shiloh was not compara- 
 ble with theVilderness," ^ — through the Wil- 
 derness—through Spottsylvania, bloodier still 
 — to cruel, murderous Cold Harbor, right man- 
 fully it paid the price to the uttermost precious 
 
 drop. . . 
 
 What of its recompense? Reviewing the 
 Wilderness, General Grant declares : " More 
 desperate fighting has not been witnessed on 
 this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of 
 May. Our victory consisted in having success- 
 fully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the 
 face of the enemy, and in getting the army to- 
 gether as a unit. ... As we stood at the close, 
 the two armies were relatively in about the same 
 condition to meet each other as when the river 
 divided them. But the fact of having safely 
 
 1 Mil Hist., vol. ii., p. 127. 
 
GRANT AND MEADE. 39 
 
 crossed loas a victory.'' ^ When General Al- 
 bert Sidney Johnston marched his army unob- 
 served some sixteen miles from Corinth, and, 
 without loss, formed in triple line of battle 
 around the Federal camps which he pressed back 
 upon Pittsburg Landing in April, 1862, General 
 Grant denounced all claims to a Confederate 
 victory as absurd : " The victory was not to 
 either party until the battle was over."^ The 
 battle joined May 5, 1864, was not over until 
 April 9, 1865. Looking backward from Cold 
 Harbor, General Badeau cannot but admit : 
 " The campaign had lasted thirty days of inces- 
 sant battle, and the Army of the Potomac had 
 neither captured Richmond nor conquered Lee. 
 The contest was still at its height and appar- 
 ently undecided J' ^ 
 
 The campaign and the whole responsibility 
 were General Grant's, as his historian affirms. 
 However much his views may be regretted, no one 
 doubts the sincerity of his statement when, in 
 writing of his plans officially, he says : " Whether 
 they might have been better in conception and 
 execution is for the people, who mourn the loss 
 of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecu- 
 niary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I 
 have done has been done conscientiously, to the 
 best of my ability, and in what I conceived to 
 be for the best interests of the whole country ;" * 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 204. 2 j^?., vol. i., p. 364. 
 
 8 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 324. ^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 556. 
 
40 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 but, to account the leader of a campaign con- 
 fessedly fruitful almost solely of carnage, as the 
 untrammelled relator of its story, is to hold him 
 deified, — and this is not the day of Herod An- 
 tipas. 
 
 Concluding General Badeau's pages, bearing 
 upon the continuance of General Meade in the 
 command of the Army of the Potomac, from 
 which quotation has already been made, the fol- 
 lowing paragraph occurs : — 
 
 " But more than all, Grant had political rea- 
 sons for his course, political in the highest sense 
 of the word ; reasons based on the peculiarities 
 of human nature, as well as on purely military 
 considerations. He believed that the removal of 
 Meade would have a direct unfortunate influence 
 on the army, more than counterbalancing any 
 good which it might secure. There undoubtedly 
 existed in the Army of the Potomac a dissatis- 
 faction, half expressed, perhaps only half formed, 
 that a Western man should have been brought 
 to command it, who had not shared its earlier 
 campaigns and difficulties and dangers. If that 
 Western man should now remove the comman- 
 der who had already led it to decided victory, a 
 greater soreness still might be occasioned ; its 
 spirit might be galled, its working become less 
 harmonious. Grant's military ability was always 
 based upon his knowledge of human nature ; he 
 selected his generals for their personal character- 
 istics as well as for their professional qualities or 
 
GRANT AND MEADE. 41 
 
 acquirements, and he looked upon an army not 
 as a macliine, but as a mass of human beings, 
 with prejudices and partialities and passions, like 
 us all. He was also most unwilling to excite 
 anything approaching to sectional feehng. So, 
 while asserting always the military ability and 
 loyalty of Meade, he believed besides, that even 
 if some evils were created by his retention, others 
 still more alarming were certain to arise, in case 
 he was removed. In this view he persisted, and 
 with this view Meade was retained^ and Grant 
 stood by him unwaveringly." ^ 
 
 Concluding the one protest he has seen fit to 
 offer against anything written in the " Military 
 History of U.S. Grant," — in amends for a fig- 
 urative expression used in his official report, and 
 which was repeated by his historian, — General 
 Grant says : ^ — 
 
 " I make this statement here because, although 
 I have often made it before, it has never been in 
 my power until now to place it where it will cor- 
 rect history ; and I desire to rectify all injustice 
 that I may have done to individuals, particularly 
 to of&cers who were gallantly serving their coun- 
 try during the trying period of the war for the 
 preservation of the Union. General Butler cer- 
 tainly gave his very earnest support to the war ; 
 and he gave his own best efforts personally to 
 the suppression of the rebellion." And yet, af- 
 ter acknowledging the personal disadvantage he 
 
 1 Mil Hist, vol. ii., pp. 191, 192. 2 Mem., vol. ii., p. 152. 
 
42 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 caused General Meade to suffer by his (General 
 Grant's) continued presence with the Army of 
 the Potomac, and after his unqualified commen- 
 dations of his faithful subordinate as the right 
 man in the right place and the peer of the re- 
 nowned General Sherman, he silently sanctions 
 these stultifying statements of General Badeau. 
 Here candid history seems obscured. 
 
 General Grant silently acknowledges the views 
 imputed to him by his biographer. He could 
 not comprehend the Army of the Potomac and 
 its leaders. 
 
 That army was composed of citizens of our 
 entire Union — men of the North and South, and 
 East and West, stood side by side in its ranks 
 and led its columns. The conquering of " sec- 
 tional feeling " was the very duty that had called 
 out and created, from an untrained mass of pat- 
 riots, an army of loyal veterans — " the grandest 
 army gathered on this continent, at all times true 
 to its commander-in-chief, whoever it might be." 
 There was no vain boasting in the grim story 
 written all along the way from the James Kiver 
 up to Gettysburg, and invincible indeed must be 
 the prejudice that failed to read the deep-marked 
 crimson lines. Its soldiers had prejudices, it is 
 true. No unreasoning herd, they gave their toil 
 and suffering for freedom's sake, and not to set 
 on high a Gessler cap. They had partialities, 
 and strong ones ; but their patriotism was 
 stronger. However blind they may have been 
 
GRANT AND MEADE. 43 
 
 to the personal identity of " that Western man " 
 with the cause for which they fought/ they 
 never failed to see and own the authority of 
 their land vested in any accredited commander. 
 They had passions — yes — and brightest and 
 strongest among them burned their loyalty. The 
 haunted jungle of the Wilderness, the hideous 
 " angle " at Spottsylvania, and the death-filled 
 trenches at Cold Harbor, attest that duty could 
 ask no effort they would shrink from, — and 
 their leader proved it in himself. 
 
 ^ General Badeau (on p. 191, vol. ii.) describes "General 
 Rawlins, the nominal Chief of Staff of the General-in-chief," as 
 " simply an earnest, able man, who devoted himself absolutely to 
 serving his country, and for him this was synonymous with serving 
 Grant:' 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT's STATEMENTS WITH REGARD 
 TO MOVEMENT TO SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT 
 HOUSE, AND HIS REFLECTIONS ON GENERAL 
 MEADE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. 
 
 Specifying it as an evidence of unparalleled 
 confidence, General Badeau states that General 
 Grant " was anxious to give Sherman every op- 
 portunity to achieve a separate renown/' ^ and 
 certainly the Memoirs contain nothing antago- 
 nistic to the statement. General Grant seems 
 desirous of rendering unstinted tribute to the 
 splendid leadership of his eminent friend, and 
 the confidence thus manifested unquestionably is 
 unique, as regards his pages. To General Sher- 
 man and General Sheridan, alone of all his sub- 
 ordinates, is this recompense awarded. 
 
 One seeks in vain for words of commendation 
 of any specific act of General Meade in the con- 
 duct of his arduous and exacting duties, save in 
 the single instance of the " mine explosion " be- 
 fore Petersburg, which, at the request of Gen- 
 eral Meade, had been officially investigated by 
 order of the authorities at Washington. On the 
 
 1 Mil. Hist, vol. ii., p. 24. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 45 
 
 contrary, naturally resultant from the conditions 
 and relations which have been considered, much 
 is found not only adverse to the terms of general 
 commendation used, but inconsistent with a will- 
 ingness unqualifiedly to acknowledge the service 
 rendered by the commander of the Army of the 
 Potomac. The passages already quoted, which 
 sustain this statement, are not exceptional. 
 
 General Grant's version of the opening of the 
 battle of the Wilderness illustrates the unvary- 
 ing habit of his Memoirs in noting the move- 
 ments of the Army of the Potomac. In it he 
 says : " At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's 
 store, Warren discovered the enemy. He sent 
 word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt 
 and prepare to meet and attack him. . . . Meade 
 moved his head-quarters on to Old Wilderness 
 Tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as 
 it was light enough to see the road. I remained 
 to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in 
 position. Burnside at this time was not under 
 Meade's command, and was his senior in rank. 
 Getting information of the proximity of the en- 
 emy, / informed Meade, and, without waiting to 
 see Burnside, at once moved forward my head- 
 quarters to where Meade was." ^ 
 
 General Badeau says : " The general-in-chief 
 was promptly informed of the approach of Lee, 
 and, at 8.24 a. m., he sent word to Meade : 
 'Your note giving movements of enemy and 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 192, 193. 
 
46 GRANT VS, THE RECORD. 
 
 your dispositions received, . . .If any oppor- 
 tunity presents itself for pitching into a part of 
 Lee's army, do so, without giving time for dis- 
 positions.' " ^ And again, in a foot-note defend- 
 ing General Grant from the charge of having 
 been surprised in the Wilderness, he says : " As 
 early as 7.30 a. m., Meade infonned Grant of 
 the appearance of the enemy ^ ^ 
 
 General Humphreys states in substance that, 
 by six o'clock in the morning of May 5, General 
 Warren discovered the enemy in force on the 
 Pike about two miles from the Wilderness Tav- 
 ern. General Meade received a despatch to this 
 effect from General Warren at a quarter past 
 seven, when on his way to the headquarters of the 
 Fifth Corps. He at once hastened to General 
 Warren and ordered him to halt his column and 
 attack, sending at the same time orders to Gen- 
 eral Hancock to halt his corps at Todd's Tavern, 
 and to General Sedgwick to move out, attack the 
 enemy, and connect with General Warren on the 
 Pike. He also informed General Grant of the 
 situation and was soon after joined by him.^ 
 
 But the general terms of commendation vouch- 
 safed to General Meade by Generals Grant and 
 Badeau are modified by more than innuendo. 
 Positive statements invite investigation, and con- 
 cerning the movements from the Wilderness to 
 Spottsylvania Court House, it is necessary to 
 quote at length from General Badeau, who says : 
 
 1 Mil Histy vol. ii., p. 104. 2 7^?., vol. ii., p. 112. 
 
 3 Va. Camp., pp. 23, 24. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 47 
 
 "On Saturday, the 7th of May, the Brock 
 road, as far as Todd's tavern, was in the hands 
 of Grant, while the more western route, by Shady 
 Grove, remained in the possession of Lee. The 
 rebels also held the intervening country, a strip 
 about three miles wide, and in this space, cov- 
 ered by their entrenchments, were several less 
 important roads, by which they commanded a 
 somewhat shorter line to Spottsylvania. . . . Be- 
 yond Todd's tavern, the Brock road itself was 
 occupied by Stuart's cavalry, which had retreated 
 in this direction after Sheridan's fight on Satur- 
 day afternoon. This almost amounted to a pos- 
 session of Spottsylvania by the enemy ; ... he 
 might very well delay the national advance until 
 the rebel infantry arrived. 
 
 ..." The river Po, a tortuous stream, with 
 rugged banks and difficult to ford, crosses the 
 Catharpen road at Corbyn's bridge, two miles 
 west of Todd's tavern, and in its after-windings 
 strikes the road from Shady Grove to Spottsyl- 
 vania, at a wooden bridge west of the Block- 
 house; and again at Snell's bridge, it crosses 
 the road running south from the court-house to 
 Richmond. These bridges were of the first im- 
 portance, for they commanded Lee's only ap- 
 proaches to Spottsylvania, and Sheridan, who 
 had been ordered to keep a good look-out toward 
 the enemy, disposed his force so as to secure all 
 three positions. Wilson was ordered to advance 
 on the left, by the Fredericksburg road, to take 
 
48 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 possession of the court-house, and then move 
 into position at Snell's bridge ; while Gregg and 
 Merritt, on the right, were directed to proceed 
 to the same point crossing the Po at Corbyn's 
 bridge, and then advance by Shady Grove and 
 the Block-house road. The cavalry had been 
 marching and fighting incessantly for now four 
 days, and the battle at Todd's tavern, on the 
 7th, had lasted until after dark, but all three 
 divisions were to move again at daylight. Had 
 these orders been carried out, every avenue to 
 Spottsylvania would have been closed to the 
 rebel army. 
 
 "But Meade arrived at Todd's tavern at mid- 
 night, where Gregg and Merritt were bivou- 
 acked. Sheridan's orders had not yet arrived, 
 and Meade at once issued new and different 
 ones, Gregg being simply instructed to move to 
 the vicinity of Corbyn's bridge, and watch the 
 roads from Parker's store, while Merritt was or- 
 dered to open the Brock road to Spottsylvania ; 
 Snell's bridge and that on the Block-house road, 
 the most important points of all, being utterly 
 ignored. Meade, indeed, directed Merritt to 
 place a brigade at the Block-house, and to picket 
 the roads leading to the court-house ; but the 
 Block-house was a mile from the bridge, which 
 was not mentioned in the order ; and one brigade 
 could hardly withstand the rebel army. Sheridan 
 had ordered two divisions to hold these points. 
 
 " The blunders, however, were not all on one 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 49 
 
 side. Lee had early discovered the movement 
 of Grant's trains, . . . But the rebel leader read 
 the signs entirely wrong, and supposed that 
 Grant was falling back on Fredericksburg. Un- 
 der this delusion, on Saturday night, he ordered 
 Anderson, now in command of Longstreet's 
 corps, to move to Spottsylvania in the morning} 
 The woods, however, were on fire, and Anderson 
 could find no place to bivouac, and began his 
 march at once, without the sanction of Lee, who 
 remained in his mistake all night. Even on the 
 8th, Early, . . . was ordered ' to move by Todd's 
 tavern, along the Brock road^ to Spottsylvania 
 court-house, as soon as his front was clear of the 
 enemy ' ; and still later, Lee telegraphed the 
 good news to Richmond : ' The enemy has aban- 
 doned his position, and is moving towards Fred- 
 ericksburg. This army is in motion on his right 
 flank, and our advance is now at Spottsylvania 
 court-house.' His advance had arrived there so 
 soon, by accident, . . . the whole movement of 
 the rebel army was based on a blunder of its 
 commander, one entire corps being ordered to 
 move hy a road actually in possession of 
 Grant. Yet these very mistakes were destined 
 to thwart the well-laid scheme of the national 
 general. So manifold and marvellous are the 
 chances of war. 
 
 " Wilson moved promptly on the morning of 
 the 8th, according to Sheridan's orders, which, 
 
 ^ Italics in original. 
 
60 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 in his case, had not been reversed by Meade ; 
 . . . Merritt, meanwhile, had encountered greater 
 difficulty in carrying out Meade's instructions, 
 for the Fifth corps was already moving on the 
 Brock road, by which he had been ordered to 
 advance, and the infantry and cavalry soon be- 
 came entangled. Great confusion and delay en- 
 sued, and when Merritt's men at last made their 
 way to the front, they were met by Stuart's cav- 
 alry, which had thrown up temporary breast- 
 works to obstruct the national advance. . . . 
 But by this tune Anderson also had come upon 
 the field, having crossed the Po without opposi- 
 tion,^ . . . The two accidents, that Sheridan's 
 orders had been changed by Meade, and that 
 Lee's orders had been transcended by Anderson, 
 had frustrated the purpose of the national move- 
 ment. . . . Lee, however, could claim no credit 
 for having out-generalled his rival. He had ut- 
 terly misapprehended Grant's design, and acted 
 on the misapprehension. ... It was the sol- 
 dierly instincts of Stuart, leading him to oppose 
 the national advance, although he j^rohahly had 
 no idea of its meaning^ and the rapid marching 
 of Anderson, also loithout any specific object, 
 that secured Spottsylvania for Lee. . . . But if 
 fortune was thus thrust upon Lee by his lieu- 
 tenants, it was just the other way with Grant. 
 He had been baffled by the same accidents that 
 had assisted his adversary, and by circumstances 
 
 1 Mil. Hist.^ vol. ii., p. 137 et seq. 
 
SPGTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 51 
 
 which his own generals should have rendered 
 impossible. . . . and it certainly seems that a 
 greater degree of vigor shown by the corps com- 
 manders at the front would not have allowed 
 the prize of the entire movement to slip from 
 their grasp." ^ 
 
 General Grant, giving in the Memoirs an out- 
 line of the movement, endorses, substantially, 
 General Badeau's statements, even including 
 the indiscreet disparagement of the adversary 
 who for very nearly a year withstood his most 
 strenuous efforts, and writes specifically as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 " Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fight- 
 ing during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at 
 Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field 
 his at the close. He issued the necessary orders 
 for seizing Spottsylvania and holding the bridge 
 over the Po River, which Lee's troops would 
 have to cross to get to Spottsylvania. But 
 Meade changed Sheridan's orders to Merritt — 
 who was holding the bridge — on his arrival at 
 Todd's Tavern, and thereby left the road free 
 for Anderson when he came up. Wilson, who 
 was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his 
 division of cavalry ; but he could not hold it 
 against the Confederate corps which had not 
 been detained at the crossing of the Po, as it 
 would have been but for the unfortunate change 
 in Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted to 
 
 1 Mil. Hist, vol. ii., p. 145. 
 
52 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would 
 have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry 
 the bridge over the Po River which Anderson 
 had to cross, and must have detained him long 
 enough to enable Warren to reinforce Wilson 
 and hold the town." ^ 
 
 Not as an unnecessary defence of General R. 
 E. Lee, but as illustrative of the general charac- 
 ter of the " Military History" and " Personal Me- 
 moirs," a brief consideration of the strictures 
 upon General Lee's ability seems to be a perti- 
 nent introduction to the examination of the 
 further statements in these passages. 
 
 Both General Grant and General Badeau state 
 that General Lee supposed the Federal army 
 was falling back on Fredericksburg, and so tel- 
 egraphed to Richmond, and General Badeau 
 quotes, from a despatch without address or date, 
 in substantiation of the assertion. No such de- 
 spatch, however, appears in the official war rec- 
 ords. But it would really seem to matter little 
 whether General Lee clearly divined the ulti- 
 mate object of General Grant's movement on the 
 night of May 7, or not, so long as he compre- 
 hended enough to enable him to defeat it. The 
 Wilderness had already proven that unerring 
 prediction could not be demanded of the brightest 
 military mind. The course of the Federal trains 
 in the afternoon had, as was apprehended, told 
 General Lee that an eastern movement would be 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 211-213. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 53 
 
 attempted that night, and the presence of the 
 Federal cavalry informed him that the Brock 
 Road would be used. That his own cavalry were 
 pushed back upon the Catharpen Road only far 
 enough to clear Todd's Tavern, may have sug- 
 gested the thought that Fredericksburg was the 
 objective; but however strong this erroneous 
 surmise, he certainly did not move blindly or 
 inertly. Major H. B. McClellan, Assistant Ad- 
 jutant-General of the Cavalry Corps Army of 
 Northern Virginia, in his " Life and Campaigns 
 of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart," page 407, 
 says : "The movement was discovered in time, 
 and Fitz Lee's division was thrown in front of 
 the Federal column, to delay it until Longstreet's 
 corps, under Anderson, could reach Spottsylva- 
 nia Court House.'^ 
 
 In a recent communication the same authority 
 informs the writer that General Stuart rem^ained 
 with the main army, in close proximity to Gen^ 
 eral R. E. Lee, during the 6th and 7th, the 
 actual fighting of the cavalry being intrusted to 
 General Hampton and the two Lees ; and that, 
 on the night of the 7th, General Stuart bivou- 
 acked near General Anderson's (Longstreet's) 
 Corps, and marched with the advance of that com- 
 mand, that night, to Spottsylvania Court House. 
 His explanation of these unusual circumstances 
 is that, probably. General Lee wished to have 
 his chief of cavalry with or near him, to enable 
 him to direct the movements of that corps in 
 
54 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 the most certain and speedy manner, with the 
 view to obtaining the earliest and most accurate 
 information of the Federal movements, that he 
 might meet them promptly and properly; and 
 that he probably also desired to have the benefit 
 of General Stuart's judgment, on which he had 
 learned to place great reliance. It would seem, 
 therefore, that General Lee must be allowed a 
 share in the " soldierly instincts " accorded to 
 General Stuart by General Badeau. The Con- 
 federate cavalry divisions were not handled in 
 such a way as to indicate ignorance of the object 
 in view, and they undoubtedly succeeded in de- 
 laying the Federal column until General Ander- 
 son reached Spottsylvania Court House. 
 
 The statement that General Anderson was ac- 
 cidentally driven by the fires in the woods into 
 moving his corps during the night of the 7th, 
 instead of on the morning of the 8th, as it is 
 claimed his orders directed, is insisted upon by 
 both Generals Grant and Badeau as being one 
 of the explanations of the failure of the Federal 
 movement. But no authority is cited in either 
 the Memoirs or the Military History for the state- 
 ment that General Lee "ordered Longstreet's 
 corps — now commanded by Anderson — to 
 move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania," 
 nor for the declaration that "the woods were 
 on fire, and Anderson could find no place to 
 bivouac, and began his march at once, without 
 the sanction of Lee, who remained in his mistake 
 
SPOTTSLYVANIA COURT HOUSE. 55 
 
 all night." General Anderson had remained 
 in position duriiig the 7th, and until ordered 
 to move to Spottsylvania, in spite of the hum- 
 ing woods; and the supposition that he was 
 by that fire driven into transcending the orders 
 he received cannot be entertained on mere as- 
 sertion. The troops of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia have been everywhere credited with a 
 greater discipline than would have been evinced 
 by any commander who should, for any cause, 
 leave his post in line of battle eight hours before 
 the time assigned him and without the sanction 
 of his superior. 
 
 The report of Brigadier-General W. N. Pen- 
 dleton, Chief of Artillery Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia, from May 4 to December 1, 1864, and 
 dated February 28, 1865, contains the following 
 paragraph bearing on this point : — 
 
 " About dark of the 7th the general chief of 
 artillery [was] directed by the commanding gen- 
 eral to send to General Anderson, who had on 
 General Longstreet's being wounded succeeded 
 to the command of the First Corps, a staff -of&cer 
 who could guide that general along the new road 
 cut out that day. The general chief of artillery 
 went himself to General Anderson, described the 
 route, and left an officer as guide. Here a cir- 
 cumstance occurred which should be specially 
 noticed. General Anderson stated that his or- 
 ders were to march by 3 [o'clock] next morn- 
 ing. He was preparing to start at 11 [o'clock] 
 
58 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 that niglit. Those four hours anticipated proved 
 of incalculable value next day. The artillery of 
 the First Corps, which as already mentioned had 
 not been able to find opportunity in the battle 
 of the Wilderness, received orders to march on 
 the night of the 7th, and from its several posi- 
 tions struck into the column e/i route for Spott- 
 sylvania Court-House." 
 
 From this it appears that General Anderson 
 was ordered to march hy three o'clock on the 
 morning of the 8th, and that his being ready to 
 start at 11 o'clock p. m. on the 7th attracted the 
 particular attention of General Pendleton, who 
 does not mention the burning woods at all. It 
 is to be noticed also, that General Anderson's 
 march was guided by a staff officer, who accom- 
 panied him hy order of General Lee, and was 
 over a new road which had been cut out on the 
 7th, in anticipation of his movement; and 
 further, that it was about dark of the 7th, when 
 General Pendleton was ordered to send the guide 
 to the First Corps. The preparation of the new 
 road is inconsistent with the supposition that 
 the movement of the corps was without any 
 specific object, and it is highly improbable that 
 General Pendleton returned to General Lee from 
 General Anderson, or issued the orders necessary 
 to reunite the artillery with the First Corps, 
 without reporting the time at which it would 
 move ; or that General Stuart, after being de- 
 tained for two days in close proximity to Gen- 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 57 
 
 eral Lee, left with General Anderson's advance 
 without General Lee being aware of the time of 
 his departure. 
 
 In view of the further facts that General 
 Ewell in his report states : "On the night of the 
 7th the general commanding sent me word to 
 extend to the right in conformity to the move- 
 ments of the troojjs there, and if at daylight^ 
 I found no large force in my front, to follow 
 General Anderson toward Spottsjlvania " ; and 
 that General Early was ordered to move by 
 Todd's Tavern along the Brock Road to the 
 same place as soon as his front was clear of the 
 enemy, and, in carrying out those orders, de- 
 tained General Hancock at Todd's Tavern till 
 the 9th : there would really appear to have been 
 a specific object in General Lee's " blunder," if 
 such his movement can be called when bearing 
 the practical endorsement of success. And the 
 arguments of the Military History and Memoirs 
 are not subversive of the fact. In addition to 
 what has been quoted, General Badeau, in vol. 
 ii., page 143, states : " Meanwhile, the move- 
 ment of Early towards Todd's tavern had been 
 discovered, . . . Hancock at once sent out a 
 force on the Catharpen road, and the rebel ap- 
 proach was checked without much difficulty . . . 
 hut Hancoch was of course detained to cover 
 the right flank and the rear of the armyr In 
 a foot-note, on page 144, he explains further : 
 " The disposition thus made of Hancock's force 
 
58 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 has been severely criticised by writers who were 
 ignorant of the fact that Early's entire corps was 
 on the Catharpen road all day, on the 8th, mov- 
 ing towards Todd's tavern. Of course, if Han- 
 cock had not been detained at this very point. 
 Early might have advmiced upon the rear and 
 flank of Meade, and done infinite damage'^ 
 Then, on the next page, immediately opposite 
 this foot - note, he remarks : " Even when he 
 (General Lee) thought his enemy was retreating, 
 he did not propose to follow till the next day, 
 and then he divided his army and sent a third of 
 it on the wrong road, wasting the strength of 
 Early's entire command for twenty four hours!^ 
 General Grant remarks upon this point: "Early 
 only found that he had been following us when 
 he ran against Hancock at Todd's Tavern. His 
 coming detained Hancock from the battle-field 
 of Spottsylvania for that day ; but he, in lilie 
 manner, kept Early back and forced him to move 
 by another route." ^ 
 
 But to return to the narrative as it affects 
 General Meade. General Badeau's account states 
 that the Federal forces held the Brock Road as 
 far as Todd's Tavern, and that the Confederate 
 forces held the same road from beyond the tav- 
 ern, and the country up to the Shady Grove 
 Road, which " almost amounted to a possession 
 of Spottsylvania by the enemy." He states that 
 General Sheridan, who had been ordered to keep 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 215. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 59 
 
 a good look-out towards the enemyj disposed 
 his forces so as to secure the Corbin, Block- 
 house, and Snell bridges, and he further adds 
 that " the battle at Todd's tavern, on the 7th, 
 had lasted until after dark, but all three divi- 
 sions were to move again at daylight/^ and all 
 the avenues to Spottsylvania were to be closed 
 to the enemy by that movement. General Grant 
 says that General Sheridan "issued the necessary 
 orders," the context implying, immediately after 
 the fight at the tavern ; that General Merritt 
 under those orders " toas holding the hridgej^ 
 and that General Meade, on arrivinsr at Todd's 
 Tavern, " changed Sheridan's orders " ; while 
 General Badeau expresses it : " Sheridan's orders 
 had 7iot yet arrived, and Meade at once issued 
 new and different ones,'^ and both agree that, 
 by thus interfering with the cavalry corps. Gen- 
 eral Meade left Spottsylvania open to the enemy. 
 General Humphreys, in "' The Virginia Cam- 
 paign," pages 57-70, establishes the following 
 facts. After the cavalry engagement at Todd's 
 Tavern, on the afternoon of May 7, General 
 Hampton retired a short distance on the Cathar- 
 pen Road and held it with his division, while 
 General Fitz Lee with his command held the 
 Brock Road, east of the tavern. When General 
 Meade arrived at midnight he found General 
 Gregg bivouacked at the tavern, holding the 
 junction of the roads against General Hampton, 
 while General Merritt' s command was halted 
 
60 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 upon the Brock Road about a mile east of Gen- 
 eral Gregg and confronted by General Fitz Lee. 
 General Meade then discovered that neither Gen- 
 eral Gregg nor General Merritt had orders for 
 their further movement, and he directed General 
 Merritt to push forward, at once, to and beyond 
 Spottsylvania Court House, so as to open the 
 roads for the infantry, and also to hold the 
 Shady Grove Road at the Block-house and bridge, 
 and to picket the roads approaching the Court 
 House. General Gregg he directed to move at 
 once, to the vicinity of Corbin's Bridge and 
 watch the roads coming from Parker's Store ; 
 and, when the Second Corps arrived at Todd's 
 Tavern, to put a force to watch the Brock Road 
 in the direction of the Wilderness. These or- 
 ders loere given at one a. m. 
 
 General Merritt proceeded to carry out the 
 orders he received. There was no entangling of 
 cavalry and infantry, such as General Badeau 
 describes. General Merritt's command had made 
 its way to the front and had been met by Stu- 
 art's cavalry, late in the afternoon preceding, 
 and had bivouacked in contact with it. General 
 Warren, with the head of his column, did not 
 reach General Merritt's headquarters till about 
 half -past three a. m. Here he halted and 
 massed his troops while General Merritt con- 
 tinued his efforts, which had commenced some 
 time before General Warren's arrival. There 
 was delay, but it arose from the darkness 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 61 
 
 of the night, the thickness of the brush and 
 timber, and the obstructions that General Lee's 
 troopers had been able to improvise. General 
 Merritt forced his way ahead as rapidly as was 
 possible under such circumstances ; but at about 
 six A. M. he suggested to General Warren that 
 infantry with rifles could push the enemy faster 
 than he could with his carbines, and General 
 Warren then ordered up his leading division, 
 under General Robinson, who relieved General 
 Merritt's command without confusion or diffi- 
 culty. In reporting this change to General 
 Meade, General Warren noted his appreciation 
 of General Merritt' s efforts by the remark : "It 
 is difficult to do much with troops in an expedi- 
 tious manner in these dense woods." 
 
 General Gregg's division had not been able 
 to reach the vicinity of Corbin's Bridge. When 
 General Hancock reached Todd's Tavern about 
 nine o'clock on the morning of the 8th, he found 
 General Gregg still engaged with General Hamp- 
 ton's cavalry in front of the tavern. The ex- 
 planation is obvious, and not detrimental to 
 General Gregg. 
 
 General Anderson's command (Longstreet's 
 Corps), under orders for Spottsylvania Court 
 House, moved out from General Hancock's front 
 on the Wilderness lines, at eleven o'clock on the 
 night of the 7th. Following a road leading 
 south from the right of its position, this corps, 
 after marching about two miles, reached the Ca^ 
 
62 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 tharpin Boad between Todd's Tavern and Cor- 
 bin's Bridge, presumably about one a. m. They 
 then followed the Catharpin Road to the Shady 
 Grove Road, and thence to Spottsylvania Court 
 House, reaching the bridge crossing the Po 
 River, a mile west of the Block House, about 
 daylight of the 8th. 
 
 General Ewell was under orders to move at 
 daylight, if he then found no large force in his 
 front, and follow General Anderson to Spottsyl- 
 vania Court House. He moved accordingly past 
 Parker's Store and by the Shady Grove Road, 
 reaching Spottsylvania about five p. m. 
 
 General Early, having while on the road been 
 assigned to the command of General Hill's corps, 
 moving through by-roads leading into the Ca- 
 tharpin Road south of Todd's Tavern, en- 
 countered a reconnoissance from the Second 
 Corps under General Miles about half-past five 
 p. M., and was aided in the skirmish which fol- 
 lowed by General Hampton's division of cavalry, 
 which still held the Catharpin Road confronting 
 General Miles at Corbin's Bridge. 
 
 General Sheridan's order, the changing of 
 which by General Meade is claimed by General 
 Grant and General Badeau to have cost General 
 Grant the possession of Spottsylvania Court 
 House, was not received when General Meade's 
 order was given. This General Badeau con- 
 fesses. The order, as General Gregg received 
 it, is as follows : — 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 63 
 
 " May 8th, 1 a. m. 
 
 ^' Move with your command at 5 a, 3i., ou the 
 Catharpin road, crossing at Corbin's bridge, and 
 taking position at Shady Grove Church. Gen- 
 eral Merritt will follow you, and at Shady Grove 
 Church will take the left hand, or Block House 
 road, moving forward and taking up position at 
 that point [viz.. Block House]. Immediately 
 after he has passed, you will move forward with 
 your division, on the same road, to the crossing 
 of Po Kiver, where you will take up position 
 supporting General Merritt. General Wilson 
 with his division will march from Alsop's by 
 way of Spottsylvania Court House and the Gate 
 to Snell's bridge, where he will take up position. 
 . . . The infantry march to Spottsylvania to- 
 night.''' 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to note the fact that 
 the order entirely ignores the presence of Gen- 
 eral Fitz Lee's cavalry on the Brock Road ; or 
 that the movements ordered were not to com- 
 mence until five a. m. on the 8th, by which time 
 the Fifth Corps was expected, as the order an- 
 nounces, to be in position at Spottsylvania Court 
 House ; nor is it necessary to make prominent 
 the fact that the order placing General Merritt 
 at the Block House, with General Gregg sup- 
 porting him at the bridge over the Po River, re- 
 versed the arrangement usual in such cases, and 
 placed the cavalry confronting the Fifth Corps 
 and with their backs to the enemy, for whom 
 
64 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 they were to watch. The one fact is sufficient 
 that when the order was written, the enemy, as 
 is stated by General Badeau and as is shown by 
 their movements just noted, held the Shady 
 Grove Road and the country intervening up to 
 the Brock Road, including that road from about 
 a mile and a half east of the tavern. They held 
 every avenue of approach to Spottsylvania Court 
 House from the west ; and the successful execu- 
 tion of General Sheridan's order required the 
 defeat of General Hampton's cavalry division 
 backed by at least one corps of Confederate in- 
 fantry. General Badeau's comment, " the whole 
 movement of the rebel army was based on a 
 blunder of its commander, one entire corps he- 
 ing ordered to move hy a road actually in 
 possession of Grant^^ reads here with a pecul- 
 iarly reflex emphasis. 
 
 It is evident to the most casual observation 
 that General Meade gave the only directions 
 that were in any way practicable when he found 
 his cavalry waiting orders at Todd's Tavern. 
 General Humphreys tells the whole story when 
 he says : ^ " The presence of Fitzhugh Lee's cav- 
 alry on the Brock road, and Hampton's cavalry 
 and Longstreet's Corps on the Shady Grove 
 road, settled the question as to who should first 
 hold the Court House with infantry, whatever 
 might have been the disposition of our cavalry." 
 
 Ignoring stated truth does not substantiate 
 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 70. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 65 
 
 repeated error, and it is impossible to escape re- 
 gret that General Grant should have seen fit not 
 only to endorse, but even to repeat with added 
 emphasis, the glaring errors which had been so 
 clearly exposed by General Humphreys's state- 
 ments. One cannot but believe it would have 
 been far better had he confined himself to the 
 simple candor of his official report, which says : 
 " On the night of the 7th, the march was com- 
 menced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the 
 Fifth Corps moving on the most direct road. 
 But the enemy having become apprised of our 
 movements, and having the shorter line, was 
 enabled to reach there first." ^ 
 
 This examination would be incomplete without 
 recalling that the orders for movements on May 
 7 were issued from headquarters of the Army of 
 the Potomac at three p. m. Trains were ordered 
 to commence moving at four P. M. and the 
 troops at half-past eight p. m. ; and Major-Gen- 
 eral Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, was 
 directed to have a sufficient force on the ap- 
 proaches from the right to keep the corps com- 
 manders advised in time of the approach of the 
 enemy .^ At half -past three a. m. on the 8th, 
 eleven and a half hours after the trains, accord- 
 ing to orders, had been set in motion, the head 
 of the infantry column found the cavalry only so 
 far advanced on the Catharpin Road as barely to 
 clear Todd's Tavern on the flank ; and so far on 
 1 Mem.y vol. ii., p. 565. ^ y^^ Camp., p. 425. 
 
66 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 the Brock Road, the direct line of march, as to a 
 point only about a mile and a half east of the 
 tavern. The cavalry corps of the Army of the 
 Potomac numbered about twelve thousand men, 
 and that of the Army of Northern Virginia 
 about eight thousand men/ 
 
 ^ Va. Camp., pp. 14 and 17. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 COLD HARBOR, JUNE 1, 1864. CROSSING OF THE 
 
 CHICKAHOMINY, JUNE 13, 1864. ATTACK ON 
 
 PETERSBURG, JUNE 15, 1864. — GENERAL MEADE 
 AT JETERSVILLE, APRIL 5, 1865. 
 
 Recalling General Badeau's reference to 
 General Meade as a detrimental intermediary be- 
 tween the general-in-chief and the Army of the 
 PotomaCj it seems well to notice an instance re- 
 corded as connected with the intermediary staff 
 attached by the exigencies of the service to the 
 headquarters of the lieutenant-general. 
 
 In General Humphreys's account of the Cold 
 Harbor movements we read : — 
 
 " General W. F. Smith had landed about 
 twelve thousand five hundred men at the White 
 House by three o'clock in the afternoon of the 
 Slst, and leaving General Ames there with two 
 thousand five hundred men to guard the land- 
 ing-place, marched with ten thousand men and 
 all his artillery, sixteen guns, toward New Castle 
 on the Pamunkey, to which place he had been di- 
 rected to proceed by despatches of the 28th from 
 General Rawlins, General Grant's Chief-of-Staff. 
 All his troops had not arrived, nor had any of 
 
68 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 his wagons or ammunition. About ten o'clock 
 at night he halted at Bassett's, near Old Church, 
 his troops suffering from the heat of the day, 
 and from being unaccustomed to heavy march- 
 ing. Reporting by despatch for orders, the 
 next morning at dayhght he received an order 
 from General Grant's Headquarters to proceed 
 at once to New Castle Ferry, and take position 
 between the Fifth and Sixth Corps. Cold Har- 
 hor was intended. Marching at once. General 
 Smith perceived, upon arriving at New Castle 
 Ferry, that there must be some mistake in his 
 order, and sent word to General Grant, who, in 
 the mean time, hearing of the mistake that had 
 been made, had sent Colonel Babcock to correct 
 it. Some four or five hours were lost in this 
 way, and the march of the troops increased sev- 
 eral miles." ^ 
 
 General Badeau's account of the same reads : 
 " Smith had arrived at the White House at 
 eleven o'clock on the morning of the 30th, with 
 sixteen thousand men on transports. He de- 
 barked his troops that afternoon, and as time 
 was of the first importance, took up his march 
 on the 31st, without waiting for supply wagons, 
 or even for ammunition, beyond what the men 
 carried in their cartridge-boxes. That night he 
 halted at Old Church, on the Cold Harbor Road, 
 and before daylight of the 1st of June, he re- 
 ceived an order to move direct to New Castle, on 
 
 1 Va. Camp., pp. 172, 173. 
 
COLD HARBOR. 69 
 
 the Pamunkey River, and place himself between 
 the Fifth and the Sixth Corps. A battle was 
 imminent, and he started at once, not even al- 
 lowing his men time to make their coffee; but 
 when he arrived at New Castle, the Fifth and 
 Sixth Corps were nowhere in the vicinity. A 
 mistake, it was evident, had occurred, and he 
 sent at once to ask for an explanation ; but be- 
 fore his messenger returned, another arrived 
 from Grant, to say that Smith should have 
 marched to Cold Harbor instead of to New Cas- 
 tle. The officer who wrote out the order had 
 substituted the wrong name. The command 
 was at once marched back over the road it had 
 just travelled, but this time in the direction of 
 Cold Harbor. The day was intensely hot, and 
 the dust stifling; the men from Butler's com- 
 mand were unused to marching, and fatigue and 
 exhaustion thinned their ranks ; one division had 
 been left at the White House, to guard that 
 point ; but the remainder of the column, now not 
 more than ten thousand strong, pushed on, and 
 soon after three o'clock. Smith had reached his 
 place between Wright and Warren. He had 
 marched more than twenty live miles." ^ 
 
 In the Memoirs (vol. ii., p. 265) we find : 
 '^ Smith, who was coming up from White House, 
 was also directed to march directly to Cold Har- 
 bor, and was expected early on the morning of 
 the 1st of June : but by some blunder the order 
 
 1 Mil Hist, vol. ii., pp. 278, 279. 
 
70 GRANT VS. THE RECORD, 
 
 which reached Smith directed him to New Castle 
 instead of Cold Harbor. Through this blunder 
 Smith did not reach his destination until three 
 o'clock in the afternoon, and then with tired and 
 worn-out men from their long and dusty march. 
 He landed twelve thousand five hundred men 
 from Butler's command, but a division was left 
 at White House temporarily and many men had 
 fallen out of ranks in their long march." 
 
 These three accounts are quoted at length for 
 comparison. They show that the mildest censure 
 is withheld from an officer in responsible position 
 upon the staff of the lieutenant-general, when he 
 had been guilty of a blunder which could have 
 originated only in either carelessness or igno- 
 rance of no ordinary degree. This is the more 
 striking for the reason that the order to General 
 Smith was to bring him into position in line of 
 projected battle ; and, on page 187 of his sec- 
 ond volume. General Badeau states that General 
 Grant " always wrote his own orders for battle, 
 and with rare exceptions, his orders in battle ; 
 he wanted no intermediary then." It has already 
 been seen, and will hereafter appear in even 
 stronger light, that General Meade and corps 
 commanders of the Army of the Potomac have 
 not escaped detraction when censure is based not 
 on facts, but solely on conjecture and assertion. 
 
 Continuing his remarks upon the page last 
 noted. General Badeau laments: "but having: 
 
COLD HARBOR. 71 
 
 sent his orders to Meade, they percolated through 
 two or three brains, before they reached a corps 
 commander." To illustrate the evils which 
 might thus possibly arise, in a foot-note on pages 
 187 and 188, he instances the fact that on May 
 11, in issuing his orders to his corps com- 
 manders. General Meade omitted to use a certain 
 expression contained in General Grant's instruc- 
 tions to him. It appears, however ("Virginia 
 Campaign," p. 91), that the conditions necessi- 
 tating the use of that expression did not exist at 
 the time General Meade's order was given, and 
 it is evident that General Badeau was in igno- 
 rance of the details of the line of battle of the 
 Army of the Potomac. 
 
 General Grant's order dated Cold Harbor,ya., 
 June 11, 1864, giving directions to General 
 Meade for withdrawing from Cold Harbor and 
 crossing the Chickahominy, is a more practically 
 suggestive illustration in this connection, though 
 with a significance directly opposite to that in- 
 tended by General Badeau. It contains the fol- 
 lowing expHcit instructions: "... The 5th 
 Corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on 
 the Long Bridge Road to its junction with 
 Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy. 
 
 "The other three corps will follow in such 
 
 order as you may direct, one of them crossing at 
 
 Long Bridge, and tv/o at Jones's Bridge. . . . " ^ 
 
 The general direction of the Long Bridge 
 
 p. 286. 
 
72 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 Road from the Chickalioniiny is south-westerly. 
 Six mHes out, it is entered by the Charles City 
 Road, running south-easterly from Richmond, 
 and by the Quaker Road, coming north from the 
 River Road at Malvern Hill. Riddle's Shop is 
 here located. About three miles still farther to 
 the south-west the Long Bridge Road is entered 
 by the Darbytown or Central Road, and about 
 a^mile still farther on it unites with the River 
 Road. Three direct lines of communication with 
 Richmond thus centre at Riddle's Shop. But, 
 about a mile east of Riddle's the Long Bridge 
 Road is entered by the road from White Oak 
 Swamp Bridge, a Httle more than a mile from 
 that bridge, which is not only reached by two 
 roads from Richmond, but is on the direct hue 
 of approach from Cold Harbor. The instruc- 
 tions which reached the Fifth Corps commander, 
 after percolating through the headquarters of 
 the Army of the Potomac, were : — 
 
 " 2. During Saturday, the 11th instant, Major- 
 
 General Warren will move the two divisions of 
 
 his corps now held in reserve to Moody's, by 
 
 way of Parsley's MiU and Prospect Church, etc., 
 
 so as to avoid the observation of the enemy. At 
 
 dark on the evening of the 12th instant, he wiU 
 
 move his whole corps to Long Bridge, by the 
 
 shortest route, across the Chickahommy, and 
 
 move on the road to White Oak Swamp Bridge 
 
 (called Long Bridge Road) and hold that road, 
 
 looking toward the crossing of White Oak 
 
CHICKAHOMINY. 73 
 
 Swamp and Charles City, Central and New 
 Market roads, during the passage of the army 
 toward James River." ^ 
 
 Explanatory of this, General Humphreys says : 
 " In preparing the programme of movement, it 
 appeared to me important that General Warren 
 should move out the Long Bridge Road, not only 
 far enough to cover the crossing of the Chicka- 
 hominy by the army, but so far as to hold the 
 bridge over the White Oak Swamp, and to look 
 toward the three roads to Richmond already 
 mentioned, which substantially met at Riddle's 
 shop, about a mile in advance of the position 
 General Warren was directed to take. He could 
 not loell advance to Eiddle's shop, since that 
 icoidd have exposed him to attack in rear from 
 White Oak Bridge. It was expected that such 
 a movement by General Warren would deceive 
 Lee, and give him the impression that the Army 
 of the Potomac was advancing upon Richmond, 
 or, if intending to cross the James, that it would 
 do so near Malvern Hill, at City Point, or above. 
 The movement made the desired impression upon 
 him, and to a greater extent than was contem- 
 plated, for, ... he was uncertain what the 
 Army of the Potomac was doing until the after- 
 noon of the 17th of June." ^ 
 
 General Grant simply says: "As soon as 
 Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy it 
 marched out and joined the cavalry in holding 
 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 426. 2 1^., pp. 20I, 202. 
 
74 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 the roads from Eichmond while the army passed. 
 No attempt was made by the enemy to impede 
 our march, however, but Warren and Wilson 
 reported the enemy strongly fortified in their 
 front." 1 
 
 General Badeau TVTites somewhat more at leno^th, 
 on pp. 348 and 349 of his second volume, and 
 states : " . . . Warren and Wilson now reported, 
 from the other side of the Chickahominy, that 
 the enemy in their front had seized and fortified 
 strong positions, north of the James. Lee, in- 
 deed, had discovered the movement at daybreak, 
 and telegraphed to Richmond that the army of 
 Grant had left his front. He seemed, however, 
 unable to divine the intentions of the national 
 commander, for Warren's disjjositions com- 
 pletely masked the operations of the Army of 
 the Potomac ; some sharp skirmishing occurred 
 at Riddle's shop, in the White Oak Swamp, and 
 Lee doubtless supposed a direct advance on 
 Richmond to be the object of Grant, for he 
 entrenched in front of Wilson and Warren. His 
 appearance here indicated one of the dangers to 
 which Grant's army was exposed, that of attack 
 on the right, in the midst of the flianking move- 
 ment. ..." 
 
 It is safe to say that if the original order of 
 General Grant had been carried out as given, a 
 more extended account and a more direct refer- 
 ence to the headquarters of the Army of the 
 Potomac would have been developed. 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 289. 
 
PETERSBURG. 75 
 
 Turning now to the accounts of the passage 
 of the James River by the Army of the Potomac 
 and the attack upon Petersburg by General W. 
 F. Smith, June 15, 1864, we find in the Memoirs 
 (vol. ii., pp. 293-295) as foUows : — 
 
 " I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran 
 up to Bermuda Hundred to see General Butler 
 for the purpose of directing a movement against 
 Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the 
 Potomac were crossing. 
 
 " I had sent General W. P. Smith back from 
 Cold Harbor by the way of White House, thence 
 on steamers to City Point for the purpose of 
 giving General Butler more troops with which to 
 accomplish this result. General Butler was or- 
 dered to send Smith with his troops reinforced, 
 as far as that could be conveniently done, from 
 other parts of the Army of the James. ... 
 
 " The distance which Smith had to move to 
 reach the enemy's lines was about six miles, . . . 
 Smith was to move under cover of night, up close 
 to the enemy's w^orks, and assault as soon as he 
 could after daylight ... I informed General 
 Butler that Hancock's corps would cross the river 
 and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case 
 the latter was successful, . . . 
 
 " I returned down the river to where the troops 
 of the Army of the Potomac now v/ere, com- 
 municated to General Meade, in writing, the 
 directions I had given to General Butler and 
 directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock's corps 
 
76 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 over under cover of night, and push them forward 
 in the morning to Petersburg; halting them, 
 however, at a designated point until they could 
 hear from Smith. I also inf orm-ed General Meade 
 that I had ordered rations from Bermuda Hun- 
 dred for Hancock's corps, and desired him to 
 issue them speedily, and to lose no more time 
 than was absolutely necessary. The rations did 
 not reach him, however, and Hancock, while he 
 got all his corps over during the night, remained 
 until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. 
 He then moved without them, and on the road 
 received a note from General W. F. Smith, asking 
 him to come on. This seems to be the first in- 
 formation that General Hancock had received of 
 the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that 
 anything particular was expected of him. Oth- 
 erwise he would have been there by four o'clock 
 in the afternoon." 
 
 On page 298 of the same volume. General 
 Grant continues this last thought as follows : " If 
 General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been 
 communicated to him, that of&cer, with his usual 
 promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon 
 the ground around Petersburg as early as four 
 o'clock in the afternoon of the loth. The days 
 were long and it would have given him consider- 
 able time before night. I do not think there is 
 any doubt that Petersburg itself could have been 
 carried without much loss ; or, at least, if pro- 
 tected by inner detached works, that a line could 
 
PETERSBURG. 77 
 
 have been established very much in rear of the 
 one then occupied by the enemy. This would 
 have given us control of both the Weldon and 
 South Side railroads. This would also have saved 
 an immense amount of hard fighting which had 
 to be done from the 15th to the ISth, and would 
 have given us greatly the advantage in the long 
 siege which ensued. " 
 
 It is difficult to see how General Grant's in- 
 sinuation can be applied justly to General Meade, 
 as it is evidently intended it shall be. General 
 Grant himself says that he went to see Gen- 
 eral Butler, "for the purpose of directing a 
 movement against Petersburg, while our troops 
 of the Army of the Potomac were crossing^ 
 The movement was to be made by General W. F. 
 Smith, who was to report back to General Butler 
 for that purpose, and who was to be reinforced 
 from General Butler's command. General Ba- 
 deau says that " Grant proceeded, by transport, 
 to Bermuda Hundred, to issue the necessary or- 
 ders for the immediate capture of Petersburg," ^ 
 and the circumstances would seem to justify the 
 confidence of the language used. Nearly four- 
 teen thousand infantry, two thousand four hun- 
 dred cavalry and a proper proportion of artillery, 
 certainly constituted a force that could reasonably 
 be expected to capture the city when guarded, as 
 it was, by far less than five thousand men all 
 told.^ General Grant evidently looked upon the 
 
 1 Mil Hist., vol. ii., p. 352. 2 y^. Camp., pp. 206, 207. 
 
78 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 matter in that light ; for he says that he informed 
 General Butler that General Hancock would 
 move to Petersburg " to support Smith in case 
 the latter was successful^ He also says that 
 " Smith was to move under cover of night, up 
 close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon 
 as he could after daylight^'' and that he directed 
 General Meade " to cross Hancock's corps over 
 under cover of night, and push them forward in 
 the morning to Petersburg." After using all 
 possible despatch, the Second Corps had only 
 crossed the James River at daylight of the 15th, 
 and then, by the most direct route, was at least 
 sixteen miles from the outer defences of Peters- 
 burg, and could not, by any possibility, partici- 
 pate in the assault as projected. Rations were 
 also to be issued ; and General Badeau states that, 
 when ordering the sixty thousand rations to be 
 sent to Windmill Point for General Hancock, 
 General Grant informed General Butler that 
 " without this precaution, the services of this corps 
 cannot be had /or any emergency to-morrow ^ ^ 
 General Grant directed General Meade, after 
 issuing rations with as little delay as possible, to 
 push the Second Corps " forward in the morn- 
 ing to Petersburg; halting them, however, at a 
 designated j^oint until they coidd hear from 
 Smith'^ ; and General Badeau states that, after 
 returning to Wilcox's Landing from Bermuda 
 Hundred, General Grant, at 8 p. m., sent word to 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 354. 
 
PETERSBURG. 79 
 
 General Butler that " General Hancock's corps . . . 
 will march in the morning direct for Petersburg, 
 with directions however to halt at a point on 
 that road nearest City Point, unless he receives 
 further orders. If the force going into Peters- 
 burg finds reinforcements necessary, hy sending 
 hack to General Hancock he will push for- 
 ward." ^ 
 
 General Meade's duty under the orders he 
 received would seem to have been to get Gen- 
 eral Hancock with his corps to this " designated 
 point " with the least possible delay, that the re- 
 inforcements might be available if needed ; and 
 this he certainly accomplished. 
 
 From General Badeau it appears that, at 
 half past eight a. m. of the 14th, General Meade 
 directed General Hancock to begin crossing the 
 James River on transports, and that, at half past 
 nine, he said : " You need not spend any time in 
 taking up a line, but hold yourself ready to move, 
 as you may receive orders to march to Peters- 
 hurg, in which case rations will be sent you from 
 City Point." 2 
 
 General Humphreys states as follows : "On 
 the evening of the 14th he [Hancock] was di- 
 rected by General Meade to hold his troops in 
 readiness to move, and was informed that it was 
 probable he would be instructed to march toward 
 Petersburg, and that rations for his command 
 would be sent him from City Point. At ten 
 
 1 Mil Hist, vol. ii., pp. 353, 354. 2 i^., pp. 351, 352. 
 
80 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 o'clock that night the following despatch was sent 
 him by General Meade : ' General Butler has 
 been ordered to send to you at Windmill Point 
 60,000 rations. So soon as these are received 
 and issued, you will move your corps by the most 
 direct route to Petersburg, taking up a position 
 where the Citj^^ Point Railroad crosses Harrison's 
 Creek, where we now have a work. After Bar- 
 low has crossed you will cross as much of your 
 artillery and ammunition train as possible up to 
 the moment you are ready to move, and if all is 
 quiet at that time the ferriage of the rest can be 
 continued and they can join you.' But the ra- 
 tions did not arrive, as expected, that night or 
 the next morning, and the corps marched with- 
 out them at half past ten on the 15th." ^ In a 
 foot-note he states further : — 
 
 "At 7.30 A. M. of the 15th, after receiving 
 several despatches from General Hancock con- 
 cerning the rations, and the readiness of the 
 corps for movement. General Meade sent a de- 
 spatch to him saying : ' You will not wait for the 
 rations, but move immediately to the position 
 assigned you last evening,' etc., etc. Then, con- 
 tinuing, ' Your despatch just received ' (concern- 
 ing the reported arrival of rations, which turned 
 out to be erroneous). ^ It is important you should 
 move. Exercise your judgment as to which will 
 be best, to issue rations now, or send them as 
 directed in the foregoing.' At nine o'clock, 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 205. 
 
PETERSBURG. 81 
 
 finding that the rations had not arrived, General 
 Hancock ordered the corps to move, but the 
 signal officer by whom the order was sent failed 
 in some way to communicate it ; and the boat in 
 which Colonel Morgan, who carried the same 
 order, crossed the river grounded, so that the 
 column did not begin to move until half-past 
 ten." 
 
 All accounts show that, as far as General 
 Meade and General Hancock were concerned, no 
 unnecessary delay occurred in crossing and start- 
 ing upon the march ; for the corps finally moved 
 without the rations which General Grant had, 
 with such emphasis, ordered to be supplied by 
 General Butler. It is clear also that — in crossing 
 the Second Corps as expeditiously as possible; 
 in starting it upon the prescribed route without 
 delay ; and in instructing General Hancock, who 
 never needed urging, that it was important he 
 should move immediately to the position as- 
 signed him — General Meade had carried out 
 General Grant's orders as General Grant says 
 they were given to him. 
 
 Unquestionably, General Hancock was in- 
 formed by General Meade that Petersburg was 
 his ultimate objective point ; but, under the 
 orders given hy General Grant, he could not 
 have reached, or have been expected to reach, 
 that place sooner than he did, for he was con- 
 fined to the indistinctly " designated point," 
 " where the City Point Railroad crosses Harri- 
 
82 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 son's Creek, where we now have a work/' until 
 he received further orders which could only 
 come from General Grant or hy his authority. 
 This is sustained by General Badeau's statement 
 that at 3.30 p. m., on the 15th, General Grant 
 said to General Butler : " The Second Corps, 
 28,000 strong, was directed to march this morn- 
 ing, on the direct road from Windmill Point to 
 Petersburg, stopping at Harrison's Creek, in the 
 absence of further orders. ... I have sent 
 back orders to hurry up this corps. If you 
 require it, send back to General Hancock, under 
 cover to General Gibbon, with directions for him 
 to read, and the corps will push forward with all 
 speed." ^ It is also sustained by the fact stated 
 by General Humphreys, on p. 208, that it was 
 ahout four o'clock in the afternoon when 
 General Grant, through a staff officer, informed 
 General Smith that the Second Corps was march- 
 ing towards him. Had his orders been simply to 
 move to Petersburg by the most direct route 
 from Windmill Point, General Hancock undoubt- 
 edly would have reached there by four o'clock 
 in the afternoon. The " designated point," 
 however, at which he was so expressly ordered to 
 halt, was at some unknown distance to the right 
 of the most direct route through Prince George 
 Court House, and he had not yet reached this 
 point, nor indeed been able to locate it, at 
 half past fivje in the afternoon, when he received 
 
 ^Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 379. 
 
PETERSBURG. 83 
 
 General Grant's order to hasten to the assistance 
 of General Smith, and General Smith's request 
 that he would come up as rapidly as possible.^ 
 
 General Hancock's report as quoted by Gen- 
 eral Badeau states ^ : " The messages from Lieu- 
 tenant-General Grant and from General Smith 
 which I received between five and six p. m., on 
 the 15th, were the first and only intimations I 
 had that Petersburg was to be attacked that day. 
 Up to that hour I had not been notified from 
 any source that I was expected to assist General 
 Smith in assaulting that city." General Grant 
 regards this as established. By his statement 
 that he "communicated to General Meade, in 
 writing, the directions I (he) had given to Gen- 
 eral Butler," and his suggestion that " if General 
 Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communi- 
 cated to him," success would have followed the 
 movements of the day, he evidently intends to 
 place upon General Meade the responsibility for 
 General Hancock's want of information and con- 
 sequent failure to reach Petersburg at four o'clock 
 in the afternoon. 
 
 In his "History of the Second Army Corps," 
 just published. General Francis A. Walker (then 
 assistant adjutant-general of the corps), after 
 referring to the delay caused by waiting for 
 rations and the endeavor to find the " desig- 
 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 209 ; and Walker's Hist. Second Army Corps, 
 pp. 529, 530. 
 
 2 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 377. 
 
84 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 nated point," on p. 528 states very positively : 
 " Although the immediate cause of this loss of 
 time was found in the misunderstandings and 
 miscarryings related, the real cause lay in the 
 failure of General Grant to inform General 
 Meade of Smith's contemplated attach^ Gen- 
 eral Walker is not disproved by General Grant 
 or General Badeau. 
 
 On p. 377 of his second volume, General 
 Badeau quotes General Meade's endorsement 
 upon General Hancock's request for an investi- 
 gation as follows : " Had General Hancock and 
 myself been apprised in time of the contemplated 
 movement against Petersburg and the necessity 
 of his cooperation, I am of the opinion that he 
 could have been pushed much earlier to the 
 scene of operations ; but as matters occurred, 
 and with our knowledge of them, I do not see 
 how any censure can be attached to General 
 Hancock and his corps." 
 
 General Badeau resents the intimation that 
 General Grant had not properly informed his 
 subordinates as to his plans, and presumably pre- 
 sents his strongest attainable arguments against 
 it. He first scouts the idea of ignorance, on the 
 part of Generals Meade and Hancock, of Gen- 
 eral Grant's plans as intimated by the movement 
 of the Second Corps, as refuted by the military 
 reputation of either officer. General Grant, how- 
 ever, does not agree with his historian on this 
 point ; for, as we have seen, he claims ignorance 
 
PETERSBURG. 85 
 
 on General Hancocivs part as the basis for an 
 attempted reflection on General Meade, but pro- 
 duces no evidence further than his own insinua- 
 tion. Continuing his argument, after repeating 
 as evidence the orders and despatches which have 
 been considered, and after stating that, on the 
 evening of the 14th, " Grant communicated his 
 plans to Meade in conversation^ as was often 
 the case," General Badeau says : " At 6.30 p. 
 M.^ on the 15th, hefore Meade could have heard 
 of Hancock^ s arrival at the front, he ordered 
 Burnside * to cross the river immediately and 
 move up to Harrison's Creek, and form on Han- 
 cock's left. Harrison's Creek is about two and 
 a half miles from Petersburg. General W. F. 
 Smith advanced on Petersburg this morning, 
 and has been engaged with the enemy all day, 
 Hancock left this morning for the same place 
 or Harrison's Creek, and is supporting Smith, 
 The commanding general directs that you do the 
 same.' " The italics in this quotation are General 
 Badeau's. He evidently feels that he here makes 
 a strong point. He seems to have forgotten that 
 but a few leaves back in this same volume, on 
 p. 363, he had said : " This day. Grant's head- 
 quarters were removed to City Point, and, during 
 the afternoon, the general-in-chief became satis- 
 fied that Lee was crossing the James, in force, 
 near Drury's Bluff. He at once sent word to 
 Meade, at Windmill Point, to dispatch another 
 corps to Peter shiirg. ' A night march,' he said, 
 
86 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 ' may be necessary.' This order was received at 
 six o'clock, and Bur7iside, still on the northern 
 bank, was immediately put in ^notion, crossing 
 the James by the pontoon bridge." Certainly 
 this does not weaken General Meade's state- 
 ment. 
 
 In the conclusion of his argument, on p. 379, 
 General Badeau states : " Hancock moved ex- 
 actly as he had been ordered; and when six 
 miles from Petersburg, received Grant's orders 
 to advance in support of Smith. He did advance 
 promptly, connecting with that commander, 
 ' about five o'clock.' The comhination was com- 
 plete. Grant found no fault with Meade or 
 Hancock, and so informed them, stating that 
 no investigation was necessary." 
 
 In consideration of the acknowledgments con- 
 tained in this passage one would willingly over- 
 look the inexactness of a few hours in the time 
 mentioned therein, but justice requires that the 
 subject should conclude with a further quotation 
 from General Walker's " History of the Second 
 Corps." In a foot-note on page 530, that author, 
 now unquestionably the highest living authority 
 upon the point in question, says : " A great deal 
 has been made of the despatch said to have been 
 sent by General Hancock to General Butler, in- 
 forming that officer that his (Hancock's) leading 
 division connected with General Smith ^ about 
 five o'clock.' Badeau uses this to disprove the 
 statements of Meade and Hancock relative to the 
 
JETERSVILLE. 87 
 
 operations of the 15th. Such a despatch was sent, 
 but the hour named was not five o'clock. At 
 that time Hancock was still several miles from 
 Petersburg, and had not the faintest notion that 
 General Smith was assaulting that place. The 
 hour written was probably eight o'clock, the 
 figures 5 and 8, when written in pencil, on a 
 scrap of paper, by the light of a camp-fire, being 
 easily confounded." The italics are General 
 Walker's. 
 
 One reference more will suiBce to indicate the 
 spirit manifest in both the " Military History " 
 and the "Personal Memoirs" towards General 
 Meade. In General Badeau's statement of 
 events connected with the movements around 
 Jetersville, April 3 to 5, 1865, we find ^ : 
 
 "Meanwhile, discovering that Lee and his 
 army were certainly at Amelia, Sheridan hurried 
 up the Fifth Corps, and ordered Griffin to in- 
 trench across the railroad until he could be rein- 
 forced. The isolated command went into position, 
 throwing up breastworks as it arrived, and Sheri- 
 dan at once sent information back to Grant that 
 he had intercepted Lee. As Meade, however, 
 was nearer than the general-in-chief, and time 
 was of inestimable importance now, he despatched 
 an aide-de-camp also to the head-quarters of the 
 Army of the Potomac, at Deep Creek, where 
 Humphreys had gone into camp — a long day's 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., pp. 553-556. 
 
88 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 march from Jetersville. It was well into the 
 night before the messenger arrived. Meade was 
 unwell, and had taken to his soldier's bed, but 
 he roused himself at the stirring news. His 
 men were weary with their march, and with 
 helping wagons out of the mire; they had no 
 rations in their haversacks, and the supply trains 
 were far in the rear. But the sick commander 
 issued an order to march at three o'clock in the 
 morning. 
 
 " At 10.45 p. M., he sent word to Grant : ' I 
 have ordered Humphreys to move out at all 
 hazards at three a. m. ; but if the rations can be 
 issued to them prior to that, to march as soon as 
 issued ; or if the temper of the men on hearing 
 the despatch of General Sheridan communicated 
 to them leads to the belief that they will march 
 with spirit, then to push on at once as soon as 
 they covdd be got under arms. . . . You may 
 rest assured that every exertion will be made by 
 myself and subordinate commanders to reach the 
 point with the men in such condition that they 
 may be availahlefor instant action, . . .' Meade 
 was full of fire on this occasion. Every-thing he 
 said and did was in splendid soldierly spirit. 
 ' The troops will be put in motion,' he said in 
 his order, ' regardless of every consideration but 
 the one of ending the war. . . . The major- 
 general commanding impresses on all, of&cers 
 and men, the necessity of promptitude, and of 
 undergoing the necessities and privations they 
 
JETERSVILLE. 89 
 
 are herein enjoined to. The major-general com- 
 manding feels he has but to recall to the Army 
 of the Potomac the glorious record of its repeated 
 and gallant contests with the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, and when he assures the army that, in 
 the opinion of so distinguished an of&cer as 
 Major-General Sheridan, it only requires these 
 sacrifices to bring this long and desperate contest 
 to a triumphant issue, the men of his army will 
 show that they are as willing to die of fatigue 
 and of starvation as they have ever shown them- 
 selves ready to fall by the bullets of the enemy.' 
 
 " Meade himself was willing to make his own 
 sacrifices. He was the senior of Sheridan in 
 rank and service, but he sent him word : ' The 
 Second and Sixth Corps shall be with you as soon 
 as possible. In the meantime your wishes or 
 suggestions as to any movement other than the 
 simple one of overtaking you will be promptly 
 acceded to by me, regardless of any other con- 
 sideration than the vital one of destroying the 
 Army of Northern Virginia.' This was the stuff 
 of which commanders should be made. 
 
 "Humphreys moved between one and two 
 o'clock, and Wright at three in the morning, both 
 corps without rations. Meanwhile Sheridan had 
 recalled Merritt and Mackenzie from the right, 
 and the head of Meade's command encountered 
 the cavalry marching in the darkness. The 
 double column crowded the road, and the infan- 
 try was delayed till Merritt's troopers had 
 
90 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 passed. ... It was indispensable, however, that 
 the cavalry should have precedence, and Hum- 
 phreys accordingly gave way, but took advan- 
 tage of the enforced halt to issue rations to his 
 command. Between seven and eiofht a. m. he 
 moved as^ain. 
 
 " At night on the 4th, Grant was at Wilson's 
 station, on the Southside road, with the Army of 
 the James. . . . 
 
 "Before daylight on the 5th, Grant received 
 Meade's despatch of the night before, and repHed 
 at once, from his bivouac at Wilson's station : 
 'Your note of 10.45 last night and order for 
 movement this morning is received. I do not see 
 that greater efforts can be made than you are 
 making to get up with the enemy. We want to 
 reach the remnant of Lee's army wherever it may 
 be found, by the shortest and most practicable 
 route. That your order provides for, and has my 
 very hearty approval. 
 
 After notinof that General Sheridan sent Gen- 
 eral Davies, on the morning of the 5th, to Paine's 
 cross-roads, and the result, General Badeau, on 
 page 559 of his third volume, says : " By two 
 o'clock Meade had arrived at Jetersville, in ad- 
 vance of the Second Corps, which came up an 
 hour later. Meade, however, was still unwell, 
 and requested Sheridan to put the Army of the 
 Potomac in position as it arrived. Accordingly 
 Sheridan put two divisions of Humphreys on the 
 left of the Fifth Corps, and one on the right. 
 
JETERSVILLE. 91 
 
 while Meade retired to a little house near by, 
 where Sheridan had slept the night before. Mer- 
 ritt had also now come up, and was placed on the 
 left of the infantry. The vigorous movement 
 against Crook on the left led Sheridan to believe 
 that Lee was attempting to escape in that direc- 
 tion, and he was anxious to attack at once with 
 the force in hand — his cavalry and two corps of 
 infantry ; but at this juncture Meade felt himself 
 well enough to come out and assume command, 
 and, much to Sheridan's mortification, he decided 
 not to attack until the arrival of the Sixth 
 Corps." 
 
 General Grant's account of the approach to 
 Jetersville is somewhat more condensed than that 
 of General Badeau. He says ^ : " Griffin's corps 
 was intrenched across the railroad south of Jeters- 
 ville, and Sheridan notified me of the situation. / 
 again ordered Meade up with all dispatch, 
 Sheridan having but the one corps of infantry 
 with a little cavalry confronting Lee's entire army. 
 Meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now 
 pushed forward with great energy, although he 
 was himself sick and hardly able to be out of 
 bed." 
 
 Continuing the narrative from where it is left 
 by the last quotation from General Badeau, he 
 adds^: "At this juncture Sheridan sent me a 
 letter which had been handed to him by a col- 
 ored man, with a note from himself saying that 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 465, 466. ^ j^j.^ pp. 468, 469. 
 
92 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 he wished I was there myself. ... I received 
 a second message from Sheridan on the Sth, in 
 which he urged more emphatically the importance 
 of my presence. This was brought to me by a 
 scout in gray uniform. ... It was nearly night 
 when this letter was received. I gave Ord direc- 
 tions to continue his march to Burkesville . . . 
 I then started with a few of my staff and a very 
 small escort of cavalry, going directly through the 
 woods, to join Meade's army. The distance was 
 about sixteen miles ; but the nig^ht bein<r dark our 
 progress was slow through the woods in the ab- 
 sence of direct roads. However, we got to the 
 outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and 
 after some little parley convinced the sentinels of 
 our identity and were conducted in to where Sher- 
 idan was bivouacked. We talked over the situa- 
 tion for some little time, Sheridan exj^laining to 
 me what he thought Lee was trying to do, and 
 that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the 
 right flank, would give him the coveted opportu- 
 nity of escaping us and putting us in rear of him. 
 "We then together visited Meade, reaching 
 his headquarters about midnight. I explained to 
 Meade that we did not want to follow the enemy ; 
 we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his 
 orders would allow the enemy to escape, and be- 
 sides that, I had no doubt that Lee was moving 
 right then. Meade changed his ordei^s at once. 
 They were 71oid given for an advance on Amelia 
 Court House, at an early hour in the morning, as 
 
JETERSVILLE. 93 
 
 the army then lay ; that is, the infantry being 
 across the railroad, most of it to the west of the 
 road, with the cavaby swung out still farther to 
 the left." 
 
 Why "Humphreys had gone into camp — a 
 long day's march from Jetersville " on the night 
 of the 4th, should here be briefly stated. On the 
 night of the 3rd, the Fifth Corps and the cavalry 
 camped at Deep Creek, the Second Corps not far 
 behind. General Grant and General Meade, with 
 the Sixth and Ninth Corps, camped at Sutherland 
 Station.^ At daylight on the 4th, General Mer- 
 ritt moved toward the Appomattox, General 
 Crook toward the Danville Road south of Jeters- 
 ville, and the Fifth Corps toward Jetersville. 
 General Grant accompanied General Ord's com- 
 mand on the Cox Road along the Southside Rail- 
 road. " The roads were all bad, and the cavalry 
 often cut into the infantry columns, which were 
 instructed always to give it way."^ General 
 Grant, at noon, was informed by General Sheridan 
 of his movements, and communicated the same 
 to General Meade, with the direction : " If you 
 cannot find roads free from trains, let your troops 
 pass them and press on, making as long a march 
 today as possible." ^ This was received by Gen- 
 eral Meade by 2.30 p. m., and is undoubtedly the 
 order to which General Grant refers when (Mem., 
 vol. ii., p. 464) he says : " After I had received 
 the despatch from Sheridan saying that Crook 
 1 Mil Hist., vol. iii., p. 547. 2 i^., p. 549. 3 la., p. 550. 
 
94 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 was on the Danville Road, I immediately ordered 
 Meade to make a forced march with the Army 
 of the Potomac." General Badeau, continuing, 
 says : " The Second Corps arrived at Deep Creek 
 between seven and eight o'clock. The men were 
 fatigued, having been marching, working, or 
 standing for fourteen hours ; they were out of 
 rations, expecting to receive them during the 
 night. Meade, therefore, directed Humphreys 
 to go into bivouac." ^ 
 
 General Humphreys says : " The Second and 
 Sixth Corps had followed the Fifth Corps closely 
 until about eleven o'clock in the morning of the 
 4:th, when Merritt's cavalry, coming in from the 
 right, and having precedence, necessarily delayed 
 the progress of the infantry, so that it was night 
 by the time it reached Deep Creek." ^ In a foot- 
 note on the next page he adds : " Large working 
 parties from the Second and Sixth Corps were at 
 work on the roads during the 3d, 4th, and 5th, for 
 they were nearly impassable for wagon trains." 
 
 According to General Badeau, it was well into 
 the night when the aide-de-camp sent by General 
 Sheridan to General Meade, to notify him of 
 the situation at Jetersville at the time that he 
 sent the same information to General Grant, 
 reached General Meade. He states also that, at 
 10.45 P.M., General Meade informed General 
 Grant as to the orders he had issued for the im- 
 mediate movement of the Second and Sixth 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., p. 550. 2 y^^ Camp., p. 374. 
 
JETERSVILLE. 95 
 
 Corps^ and that General Grant received and an- 
 swered General Meade's despatch " before day- 
 light on the 5th." General Grant was then at 
 Wilson's Station, and General Meade at Deep 
 Creek, about half-way between Wilson's Station 
 and Jetersville. If General Grant received Gen- 
 eral Meade's despatch at, say, four a. m., more 
 than an hour before day-break, it would have 
 been over five hours in reaching him. As General 
 Meade was halted on the most direct route from 
 Jetersville to Wilson's Station, it is not probable 
 that General Sheridan's communication reached 
 General Grant much, if at all, in advance of 
 General Meade's, if indeed it did not accompany 
 it. It is difficult, therefore, to understand how 
 General Grant could possibly have " again ordered 
 Meade up with all dispatch," and that order have 
 been the incentive to General Meade's exer- 
 tions ; for General Meade had started the Second 
 Corps upon the road at one o'clock, and the 
 Sixth Corps followed an hour later, or at least 
 an hour hefore General Grant could have re- 
 ceived the despatches from Jetersville, and at 
 least five hours before an order from General 
 Grant, based on those despatches, could have 
 reached him. General Grant evidently had 
 neither desire nor intention that General Meade 
 should '' achieve a separate renown." 
 
 In connection with the statements given of Gen- 
 eral Sheridan's anxiety to move at once, after the 
 arrival of the Second Corps at Jetersville, in an 
 
96 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 attack upon General Lee at Amelia Court House, 
 it is well to remember that, on the afternoon of 
 the 5th, General Lee advanced towards Jetersville 
 for the purpose of attacking General Sheridan 
 if he had not been reinforced.^ General Lee had 
 with him General W. H. F. Lee's cavalry ; and 
 General Longstreet's, General Ewell's, General 
 Anderson's, and General Gordon's corps : ^ ac- 
 cording to General Badeau's estimate (vol. iii., 
 p. 551), "more than forty thousand soldiers." 
 Informed by his cavalry that General Sheridan 
 had been reinforced, General Lee turned to the 
 right and crossed Flat Creek, about five miles 
 from the position held by General Meade ; Gen- 
 eral Longstreet, with the head of his column, 
 reaching Amelia Sulphur Springs just after sun- 
 set.^ At Sailor's Creek, the next day, the cav- 
 alry corps, with the Sixth Corps, were engaged 
 with not over one fourth of General Lee's com- 
 mand, attacking them in flank and rear while in 
 retreat and without artillery ; ^ and the record of 
 that affair would seem to indicate that General 
 Meade had made no injudicious decision when 
 he determined to await the arrival of the Sixth 
 Corps at Jetersville before making a front attack 
 upon the whole command in position to receive 
 him. 
 
 General Badeau's account of the situation on 
 General Grant's arrival at Jetersville on the night 
 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 376, 2 j^., p. 375. 
 
 8 Id., pp. 382, 383 ; and MU. Hist., vol. iii., p. 567. 
 
JETERSVILLE. 97 
 
 of the 5th, reads : " He found the eavahy com- 
 mander more than anxious lest Lee should effect 
 his escape. The Sixth Corps had arrived at six 
 o'clock, and was placed by Meade on the right 
 of the army, but no arrangement had been made 
 to advance before morning." And he says further : 
 "Meade's orders all contemplated a movement 
 by the right flank, . . ."^ General Grant is 
 equally vague in his statement with regard to 
 this order. Neither author offers any informa- 
 tion as to its requirements or instructions, and 
 both here ignore General Meade's despatch of 
 8.30 A. M. April 5, which is quoted by General 
 Badeau (vol. 3, p. 55S) as saying: "Sheridan 
 moving the cavalry would indicate the situation 
 of affairs at Jetersville changed. I have sent 
 forward to inquire, and if it is not necessary to 
 go to Jetersville, I will move on the most direct 
 road to FarmvilleJ^ 
 
 General Humphreys more explicitly says : 
 " At eight o'clock on the night of the 5th, Gen- 
 eral Meade, m Ms despatch to General Grant, 
 who had not yet arrived at Jetersville, informed 
 him that as the Sixth Corps could not get up 
 until about six o'clock, he was unable to attack 
 that night, but that he would attack Lee at six 
 o'clock on the morning of the 6th with the 
 Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, in conjunction 
 with General Sheridan. In accordance with that 
 despatch, he directed those corps to advance the 
 
 1 MIL Hist., vol. iii., p". 563. 
 
98 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 next morning at that hour on the enemy at 
 Amelia Court House, and attack him, the Fifth 
 Corps to move along the rail-road^ the Second 
 Corps on its left, the Sixth Corps on its right.'' ^ 
 There is in this no hint of any changed orders 
 or of any ordered movements by either flank. 
 
 As Jetersville is about two and a half miles 
 south, and over six miles west, of Amelia Court 
 House, and as General Lee must move west- 
 ward, or south, if he left the latter place at all, 
 one fails to understand how General Meade could 
 possibly have arranged, even in contemplation, 
 the project of a movement for attack hy his right 
 flank and in pursuit of his enemy. His estab- 
 lished reputation as a soldier forbids the suppo- 
 sition that, having reached Jetersville after the 
 severest toil and exertion, undergone for the 
 express purpose of intercepting General Lee's 
 retreat, his next movement would have been to 
 retrace, unnecessarily, any of the steps so pain- 
 fully taken.2 
 
 1 Va. Camp., pp. 377, 378. 
 
 2 Since the above was written, the following information, 
 kindly taken by General Fred. T. Locke from his diary while 
 assistant adjutant-general Fifth Army Corps, has been received : 
 "We received orders (the Fifth Corps) on the 5th of April, 
 1865, in the afternoon, I think, to report to General Meade, 
 commanding A. of P. Order came from General Sheridan. 
 The same evening received orders from General Meade to march 
 at 6 A. M. April 6th to Amelia C. H. April 6, marched at 6 
 A. M. in the direction of Amelia C. H., halted within three 
 miles of the C. H., and were ordered by General Meade in person 
 — General Grant being with him — to take the Pridenville road 
 
JETERSVILLE. 99 
 
 On the morning of the 6th, General Ord was 
 notified by General Sheridan that General Lee 
 was apparently moving direct for Burkes ville 
 Junction.^ On the morning of the 7th, General 
 Humphreys was informed from headquarters that 
 General Lee was probably moving toward Dan- 
 ville ; ^ and at about four o'clock in the afternoon 
 of the same day General Grant informed him 
 that General Lee could not recross to the south 
 bank of the Appomattox at Farmville.^ 
 
 Bearing these facts in mind, together with the 
 constantly close and often retarding connection 
 maintained between the cavalry corps and the 
 infantry of the Army of the Potomac, and re- 
 calling the accounts of the movement of the 
 Army of the Potomac from the Wilderness to 
 Spottsylvania Court House, one is not unpre- 
 pared to find Generals Grant and Badeau again 
 in error as to orders issued by General Meade. 
 
 We have more than once referred to General 
 Grant's acknowledgments of the character and 
 ability of General Meade, which culminate in 
 coupling his name with that of General Sherman 
 in official commendation. We have seen that 
 General Badeau repeats the same expressions; 
 and, in quotations just made, that he recognizes 
 the " splendid soldierly spirit " of General Meade, 
 
 and march via Painesville to Ligonton Ford on the Appomattox 
 — reaching the Ford about 8 p. m. that day after a march of 
 30 miles and building three bridges on the way." 
 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 385, and Mil. Hist., vol. iii., p. 567. 
 
 2 Va. Camp., p. 389. » Mil. Hist, vol. iii., p. 584. 
 
100 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 until he " assumed " command over General 
 Sheridan at Jetersville ; and that he could not 
 but acknowledge him possessed of much of " the 
 stuff of which commanders should be made." 
 We find on p. 538 of the second volume of the 
 Memoirs that, in his concluding estimate of the 
 character of his subordinate, General Grant de- 
 scribes him as an of&cer of great merit ; subor- 
 dinate to an uncommon degree ; brave and con- 
 scientious, and commanding the respect of all 
 who knew him ; and, in spite of some drawbacks 
 to his usefulness, arising from an unfortunate 
 infirmity of temper and his training and experi- 
 ence as an officer of the Engineer Corps before 
 the war, "a most valuable officer and deserves a 
 high place in the annals of his country." 
 
 It is to be regretted that the leader of the vic- 
 torious armies of our country could condescend 
 to laborious effort to modify, almost to retrac- 
 tion, his official commendations of the services 
 of a magnanimous lieutenant Tvho, even General 
 Badeau confesses, " never failed in soldierly 
 loyalty." 
 
 Before General Grant had been placed over 
 him in command. General George G. Meade had 
 achieved a separate renown ; and, even carping 
 criticism bearing witness, he held it unsullied to 
 the end. 
 
V 
 
 lUEe'S STATIOM ' 
 
 I UfASHINtTOM SCMaCMY 
 
 ^ 
 
 TOTOPOTOMOY 
 
 AND 
 
 COLO HARBOR 
 
 SCALE 
 
 i r 1' t 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 GENERAL WARREN AT SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H. 
 
 On p. 107 of the second volume of the " Mil- 
 itary History of U. S. Grant/' after relating the 
 story of General Warren's assault upon General 
 Ewell, in the Wilderness, May 5, 1864, General 
 Badeau comments as follows : " This assault 
 had been skilfully and gallantly made. Troops 
 enough to ensure complete success had been or- 
 dered to combine — all of the Fifth Corps and 
 two divisions of Sedgwick's ; while, as has been 
 seen, the ^^ro^/i/^^ness of the attack took the 
 rebels by surprise ; but the labyrinth in which 
 the movements were made rendered effectual 
 co-operation impossible, even among the troops 
 nearest each other, and Sedgwick's divisions 
 were unable to attack at all. Only these circum- 
 stances prevented the overthrow of Lee's entire 
 left, for the rout at first was absolute." Gen- 
 eral Grant condenses this into : " About this 
 hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favor- 
 able though not decisive results." ^ This con- 
 ciseness is significant here only because of its 
 
 1 Mem.f vol. ii., p. 193, 
 
102 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 being the first notice given by General Grant to 
 General Warren's services in action under his 
 supervision, and therefore introductory to the 
 frequent and complex statements to which atten- 
 tion must now be given. 
 
 In his account of the movement from the 
 "Wilderness to Spottsylvania Court House, on 
 the night of May 7, General Grant makes more 
 extended mention of the commander of the Fifth 
 Army Corps. Commencing on p. 210 of the 
 second volume of the Memoirs, he says : " Soon 
 after dark Warren withdrew from the front of 
 the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick. 
 Warren's march carried him immediately behind 
 the works where Hancock's command lay on the 
 Brock Eoad. With my staff and a small escort 
 of cavalry I preceded the troops. Meade with his 
 staff accompanied me. The greatest enthusiasm 
 was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed 
 by. No doubt it was inspired by the fact that the 
 movement was south. It indicated to them that 
 they had passed through the ' beginning of the 
 end' in the battle just fought. The cheering 
 was so lusty that the enemy must have taken 
 it for a night attack. At all events it drew 
 from him a furious fusillade of artillery and 
 musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us." 
 Then, following his speculations concerning the 
 reasons for the failure to win success in the 
 Wilderness engagement, and to reach Spottsyl- 
 vania Court House in advance of General Lee's 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 103 
 
 troops, on p. 213, he continues : " Anderson soon 
 intrenched himself — if indeed the intrenchments 
 were not abeady made — immediately across 
 Warren's front. Warren was not aware of his 
 presence, but probably supposed it was the cav- 
 alry which Merritt had engaged earlier in the 
 day. He assaulted at once, but was repidsed. 
 He soon organized his men, as they were not 
 pursued by the enemy, and made a second at- 
 tack, this time with his whole corps. He now 
 succeeded in gaining a position immediately in 
 the enemy's front, where he intrenched. His 
 riofht and left divisions — the former Crawford's, 
 the latter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cut- 
 ler — drove the enemy back some distance. 
 
 " At this time my headquarters had been ad- 
 vanced to Piney Branch Church. I was anxious 
 to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to 
 his support. To this end Sedgwick, who was at 
 Piney Branch Church, was ordered to Warren's 
 support. . . . Sedgwick was slow in getting up 
 for some reason — probably unavoidable, because 
 he was never at fault when serious work was to 
 be done — so that it was near night before the 
 combined forces were ready to attack. Even then 
 all of Sedgwick's command did not get into the 
 engagement. Warren led the last assault, one 
 division at a time, and of course it failed." 
 
 Here follows the description of General War- 
 ren's imputed twofold constitutional difficulty, 
 which has already been quoted at length in our 
 
104 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 second chapter. Then, after an explanation of 
 General Early's accidental detention of General 
 Hancock at Todd's Tavern, near the foot of 
 page 215, General Grant continues : — 
 
 " Had I ordered the movement for the night 
 of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put 
 Hancock in the lead. It would also have given 
 us an hour or more earlier start. It took all 
 that time for Warren to get the head of his 
 column to the left of Hancock after he had 
 got his troops out of their line confronting 
 the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity 
 to use his whole force when necessary, would, no 
 doubt, have enabled him to crush Anderson 
 before he could be reinforced. But the move- 
 ment made was tactical. . . . Then, too, I had 
 not yet learned the special qualifications of the 
 different corps commanders. At that time my 
 judgment was that Warren was the man I would 
 suggest to succeed Meade should anything hap- 
 pen to that gallant soldier to take him from the 
 field. As I have before said, Warren was a 
 gallant soldier, an able man ; and he was besides 
 thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and im- 
 portance of the duty he had to perform." 
 
 The first point to be noted in this account is, 
 that, up to the evening of May 7, 1864, General 
 Warren, as a gallant soldier and able man, actu- 
 ated by a thorough comprehension of his duty, 
 held a high place in the estimation of Lieutenant- 
 General Grant. It is to the record of subse- 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 105 
 
 quent events, therefore, one must look for an 
 explanation of the evident change which so 
 speedily occurred in the opinion of the com- 
 mander-in-chief. Here, first in order of move- 
 ments, is presented General Grant's insinuation 
 that General Warren was so unnecessarily tardy 
 in moving his troops from the Wilderness lines, 
 that perhaps, after all, it would have been better 
 had he (General Grant) risked the hazardous 
 experiment of a movement by his left flank, so 
 as to give General Hancock the lead on the road 
 to Spottsylvania Court House. 
 
 It is to be remarked, that while General 
 Grant's memory is tenacious of some facts con- 
 nected with the visit to General Hancock and 
 the night ride to Todd's Tavern, it is noticeably 
 oblivious as to others. General Badeau, whose 
 account as a whole agrees substantially with 
 General Grant's, makes no mention of dilatori- 
 ness on General Warren's part. He says simply : 
 " During the afternoon, Sheridan had a serious 
 fight at Todd's Tavern, driving the rebel cavalry 
 so as to make way for Warren ; and, as soon as the 
 darkness was deep enough to conceal the move- 
 ment, the Fifth Corps came out of its works, and 
 fell into the road to Spottsylvania."^ There 
 seems to be no question that the movement of 
 the Fifth Corps commenced as ordered, at half 
 past eight o'clock in the evening of the 7th, in 
 accordance with the project of General Grant. 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 134. 
 
106 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 General Humphreys says, concerning this : 
 " After overlooking, for a time, the commence- 
 ment of the movement, General Meade, with 
 General Grant, rode to General Hancock's head- 
 quarters on the Brock Eoad, near the left of his 
 line, to await there the arrival of the head of 
 Warren's column, and about eleven o'clock set 
 out for Todd's Tavern, in advance of the Fifth 
 Corps, reaching there about midnight." ^ In a 
 foot-note, on the same page, he adds : " While 
 at General Hancock's headquarters it was learnt, 
 about eleven o'clock, that the head of Warren's 
 column was near by, halted and seriously delayed 
 by the mounted troops of the Provost-Marshal- 
 General, which, following the headquarters, had 
 occupied the road instead of drawing out of it. 
 General Warren had remained in the vicinity of 
 the Lacy house to oversee the withdrawal of his 
 troops, the most important part of his duty. 
 Had he been at the head of his column the delay 
 would not have occurred, since he would at once 
 have notified General Meade of the obstruction, 
 and it would have been removed immediately. 
 The headquarters at once set out as the speediest 
 way of removing the obstacle, and rode rapidly to 
 Todd's Tavern, reaching there about midnight." 
 It is not to be supposed that the necessity which 
 shortened his visit to General Hancock that 
 night, escaped the attention of General Grant. 
 
 But had either General Warren or General 
 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 58. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 107 
 
 Hancock reached the point east of Todd's Tavern 
 at any time that night before half -past three a. m., 
 the time of General Warren's arrival, he would 
 still have found General Fitz Lee's division, across 
 the road to Spottsjlvania, confronting General 
 Merritt ; for General Sheridan had not succeeded 
 in " driving the rebel cavalry so as to make way 
 for Warren." The road must still have been 
 cleared, and there is no derogation in the belief 
 that General Hancock could have reached the 
 enemy in front of Spottsylvania Court House no 
 sooner than did General Warren. The insinua- 
 tion of reprehensible tardiness on General War- 
 ren's part would seem here to be as unmerited as 
 it is unnecessary. 
 
 General Badeau's account of the debouchment 
 of the Fifth Corps upon the field in front of 
 Spottsylvania Court House, and the ensuing op- 
 erations of the afternoon of May 8, differs from 
 that of General Grant only in that General 
 Badeau credits the troops with their march of the 
 previous night and their engagement with the 
 enemy since early that morning^ (which facts 
 General Grant ignores), and in that he delegates 
 to Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, the 
 duty of embodying in a despatch to the War 
 Department the reflections upon General War- 
 ren's leadership. General Grant's most tangible 
 accusation is when, concerning the closing opera- 
 tions of the day, he says : " Warren led the last 
 
 1 MU. Hist., vol. ii., p. 142. 
 
108 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 assault, one division at a time, and of course it 
 failed." Mr. Dana's despatch, while equally in- 
 accurate, is, at least, more specific. It is dated 
 May 9, and relates to the operations of the after- 
 noon of the 8th. As given by General Badeau 
 in a foot note on page 144 of the second volume 
 of the Military History, it is as follows : — 
 
 " Prisoners were taken by Wilson, who reported 
 that two divisions of Longstreet's " [Anderson's] 
 "corps had just come up, they having marched 
 all night. General Grant at once gave orders 
 for attacking these troops with the whole of 
 Warren's corps, to whose support Sedgwick was 
 hurrying up, in order to destroy them before the 
 rest of the rebel army could arrive. Warren, 
 however, proceeded with exceeding caution, and 
 when he finally did attack, sent a single division 
 at a time, and ivas constantly repulsed. The 
 general attack Generals Grant and Meade di- 
 rected was never made, for reasons which I have 
 not yet been able to learn, but successive assaults 
 were made upon this and that point in the rebel 
 positions, with no decisive results." 
 
 The definite record, established on pages 59 to 
 61 of " The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 
 1865," contains the following facts : After re- 
 lieving General Merritt's cavalry, about six o'clock 
 in the morning of May 8, General Robinson's 
 division, leading the Fifth Corps column and 
 pushing before it the enemy's cavalry that had 
 obstructed the road, reached the forks of the road 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, 109 
 
 near Alsop's about half-past eight o'clock. The 
 division, then moving down the left-hand road 
 about a mile to where the forks reunite, reformed 
 and moved across the open ground, which there 
 occurred, till they were met by a sudden and 
 heavy fire of musketry and artillery from the 
 enemy holding the wood covering the junction 
 of the old Court House Road with the Brock Road. 
 General Robinson was severely wounded while 
 leading his men and his division, its left having 
 been turned, finally fell back, followed hij the 
 enemy until they were checked by the Maryland 
 Brigade, which formed in the woods from which 
 the division had advanced. In the meantime 
 General Griffin's division had moved down the 
 right fork of the road, his leading brigade, under 
 General Barfclett, in line of battle, and came un- 
 der fire from the enemy very soon after General 
 Robinson's division. General Bartlett's brigade 
 was also somewhat disordered at first by the fire 
 it encountered, but it quickly reformed under 
 cover of its supports, and the division advanced 
 to the line it held for several days. General Craw- 
 ford coming up promptly with his division and 
 driving the enemy from General Griffin's left. 
 By this time. General Field's division of General 
 Anderson's corps had come up and threatened 
 General Griffin's right, but General Cutler's 
 division of the Fifth Corps, arriving in its turn, 
 pushed in to the attack, drove the enemy back 
 and established a line connectino- with General 
 Griffin. 
 
110 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 There was, in fact, but one attack upon the 
 enemy's line before noon. The Fifth Corps, 
 advancing with the head of its column deployed 
 only enough to clear the road in front, coming 
 suddenly upon the enemy in strong position, 
 promptly moved forward to the attack, the leading 
 divisions engaging practically together and the 
 remainder of the corps participating immediately 
 upon reaching the field. There does not appear 
 to have been any delay or any repulse of a first 
 attack followed by reorganization and advance by 
 the whole corps. The divisions as they reached 
 the ground fought their way, as they had done 
 at Gettysburg, from column into line of battle, 
 and the movement was continuous from com- 
 mencement to ending, through more than two 
 hours of what Confederate authority called 
 "stubborn" fighting. 
 
 Concerning the operations of the afternoon. 
 General Humphreys says : " At one o'clock Gen- 
 eral Meade ordered General Sedgwick to move 
 to Spottsylvania Court House and unite with 
 General Warren in an immediate and vigorous 
 attack upon the enemy. . . . The arrangements 
 for the attack of the Fifth and Sixth Corps were 
 not completed until late in the afternoon, and it 
 was then only partial, and not determined and 
 vigorous. The ground was new to everyone, and 
 the troops were tired. It was also made too late 
 in the day to be followed up advantageously if 
 successful. Some advance was made by a part of 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. Ill 
 
 the Sixth Corps, and Penrose's New Jersey brigade 
 of Wright's division, leading the advance in open 
 ground, was repulsed by a sharp fire from the 
 wood in their front. A little later, toward dusk, 
 General Crawford passed over the open ground 
 into the woods beyond — he had, it appears, passed 
 the right of Longstreet's corps, and had come 
 upon Rodes's division of Ewell's corps unexpect- 
 edly to them, while they were moving by a flank, 
 and forced them back three-quarters of a mile, 
 it is stated, taking some prisoners. After night- 
 fall Crawford fell back to the line of the corps." ^ 
 One cannot discover here any warrant for 
 General Grant's assertion that " Warren led the 
 last assault, one division at a time, and of course 
 it failed," or for Mr. Dana's statement that Gen- 
 eral Warren was " constantly repulsed," and that 
 "successive assaults were made upon this and 
 that point in the rebel positions." At one 
 o'clock General Sedgwick, who was at Piney 
 Branch Church,^ was ordered to move to Spott- 
 sylvania and unite with General Warren in an 
 immediate attack upon the enemy. General 
 Sedgioick therefore, by seniority of rank, com- 
 manded the proposed combined attack ; and as no 
 one will for a moment question General Grant's 
 statement that " he was never at fault when se- 
 rious work was to be done," it must be accepted 
 that the failure to make the attack as ordered 
 was "probably unavoidable," or at least had some 
 
 ^ Va. Camp., pp. 65, 66. ^ Mem., vol. ii., p. 214. 
 
112 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 excuse, as General Humphreys has suggested, and 
 was not to be charged to any inefficiency of the 
 junior corps commander. General Humphreys 
 assigns the credit for leading the only " assault " 
 made that afternoon, by troops of the Fifth 
 Corps, to General Crawford, whose movement 
 was at least so far successful that he was not 
 repulsed, but fell back unmolested after night to 
 the line held by the corps. 
 
 General Grant states that General Warren was 
 not aware of General Anderson's presence at 
 Spottsylvania, " but probably supposed it was the 
 cavalry which Merritt had engaged earlier in 
 the day." The statement is not improbable. 
 General Warren, though leading the advance of 
 the Federal infantry, had at his command no 
 means of learning the numbers and character of 
 the troops opposing him, except through the 
 developments of attack. 
 
 The cavalry force he had engaged at six 
 o'clock in the morning was still confronting him 
 late in the afternoon ; for General Stuart, who 
 reached the Court House with General Ander- 
 son's column, extended the left of the Confeder- 
 ate infantry line with General Fitz Lee's cavalry 
 division, and occupied that position until the ar- 
 rival of the main body of the army.^ With the 
 Federal advance it was different. Thouo^h Gen- 
 eral Merritt's cavalry division remained on and 
 
 1 McClellan's Life and Campaigns of Maj .-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart^ 
 pp. 408, 409. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 113 
 
 near the Brock Road until near noon, after being 
 relieved by the Fifth Corps in the early morning, 
 and was engaged nowhere else that day, it was 
 assigned no part whatever in the further advance 
 of the infantry. General Wilson's cavalry di- 
 vision, which had reached Spottsylvania Court 
 House early in the morning, and was therefore 
 in the rear of the enemy's right flank when 
 General Warren attacked, was ordered to retire 
 from the field and accordingly withdrew. Of this 
 General Badeau (vol. ii., pp. MO, 141) says : — 
 
 " Wilson moved promptly on the morning of 
 the 8th, according to Sheridan's orders, which, 
 in his case, had not been reversed by Meade ; 
 and brushing away a mounted picket, crossed the 
 Ny and pushed into Spottsylvania, where he en- 
 countered and dispersed a body of rebel cavalry. 
 He was about advancing upon Snell's bridge, to 
 make the junction ddered with Merritt and 
 Gregg, when he heard heavy firing from the 
 north, on the roads from Todd's Tavern and 
 Piney Branch Church, and moving towards the 
 sound of battle, his advance soon found itself 
 behind a line of rebel infantry — two divisions 
 of Anderson's command. . . . But by this time 
 Anderson . . . obliged Wilson to evacuate Spott- 
 sylvania, etc. etc." In a foot-note he adds : 
 "As soon as Sheridan learned the change which 
 Meade had made in the orders to Merritt and 
 Gregg, and the consequent isolation of Wilson, 
 he sent orders to that of&cer to fall back from 
 Spottsylvania." 
 
114 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 It is sufficient now to notice only that General 
 Wilson started for Spottsylvania at ^ye o'clock 
 in the morning;^ and that General Sheridan's 
 order retiring him from the Court House must 
 have been received about ten o'clock, and must 
 have been issued after it was known to General 
 Sheridan that General Warren was advancing 
 toward the same objective with his progress im- 
 peded by a force which might readily have been 
 attacked successfully in flank and rear by Gen- 
 eral Wilson had he been promptly advised. 
 
 The report of Brigadier-General W. N. Pen- 
 dleton, Chief of Artillery Army of Northern 
 Virginia, touches upon this point and says : 
 " About 9 A. M. of the 8th the head of the 
 column came in sight of the court-house, and 
 found the enemy just getting into view on the 
 Fredericksburg road, driving back a small cavalry 
 force which there opposed them. At the same 
 time a strong infantry column assailed another 
 cavalry force which disputed their entrance on 
 the Todd's Tavern road. General Alexander, 
 accompanying General Anderson with his ad- 
 vanced column, immediately sent Major Haskell 
 with two batteries to the assistance of our cav- 
 alry. On the Todd's Tavern road two infantry 
 brigades also went in support. These batteries 
 were stubbornly engaged for two hours. Their 
 ammunition being then exhausted and consider- 
 able loss experienced, they were withdrawn. 
 
 ^ See Gen. Sheridan's Order, quoted in chapter iv. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 115 
 
 During a part of the action they had suffered 
 under a flank reverse fire from a battery he- 
 longing to that force of the enemy which had 
 reached the court-house by the other routed' 
 
 The report of Brigadier-General John Bratton, 
 C. S. Army, states : " We moved, in accordance 
 with orders, across the raiboad by the Cathar- 
 pin road to Spottsylvania Court-House, and ar- 
 rived in the vicinity on the next morning (the 
 8th) at about 10 o'clock to find the enemy's cav- 
 alry in possession of and between us and the 
 court-house. My brigade formed on the right 
 of the road and moved down to the court-house, 
 the enemy retiring before us and abandoning 
 the place without a fight J^ 
 
 It would seem that General Grant's order — 
 " Push the enemy with all your might. That 's 
 the way to connect." ^ — would have been in place 
 with the commander of the cavalry corps at this 
 earlier date. One finds grounds for more than 
 mere idle speculation in the almost certainty of 
 what might have been, had the hardy veterans 
 of the First Cavalry Division been thrown in, as 
 they could well have been, upon the left of Gen- 
 eral Warren's line, and had General Wilson been 
 pushed home upon the exposed Confederate 
 right. 
 
 General Grant expresses his regret that Gen- 
 eral Meade's orders to his cavalry prevented 
 General Warren from reinforcing General Wilson 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 177 (foot-uote). 
 
116 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 and holding the town/ but he omits all mention 
 of General Sheridan's order, which called off 
 General Wilson when he might have reinforced 
 General Warren and have enabled him to gain 
 the Court House. 
 
 On May 10, Mr. Dana informed the authori- 
 ties in Washington : " Further to the left, where 
 Mott's division held ground between Wright and 
 Burnside, we were disgraced hy the retreat of 
 that dimsion without loss, and apparently with- 
 out any considerable force to oppose them.'' ^ If 
 he forwarded any comments on the withdrawal 
 of General Wilson from Spottsylvania, General 
 Badeau has failed to reproduce them. 
 
 With regard to these despatches from Mr. 
 Dana, it is well to note General Badeau's state- 
 ment of their origin, character, and purpose. At 
 the foot of page 144 of his second volume, that 
 historian explains as follows : — 
 
 " Grant was so averse to writing long despatches 
 that the government sent the Honorable Charles 
 A. Dana, at this time Assistant Secretary of War, 
 to his head-quarters, to report more fully than 
 the general-in-chief was in the habit of doing. 
 Dana's despatches were not submitted to Grant, 
 and furnish evidence which will not be suspected 
 of partiality." 
 
 In a note appended to his account of the Cold 
 Harbor movements, on page 277 of the same 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii. p. 213. 2 j/j^. ^^^^^ y^i. ^i p. 157 (note). 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 117 
 
 volume, he again remarks : " It must be remem- 
 bered that Mr. Dana's criticisms were not invari- 
 ably those of the general-in-chief , although they 
 frequently, perhaps generally, concurred. Mr. 
 Dana was naturally freer in his censures than the 
 ofdcer whose responsibilities not only to those 
 he commanded, but to the government and the 
 country, were so great. Besides this, strictures 
 often seemed warranted at the moment, which a 
 fuller knowledge and later judgment quite re- 
 versed. Probably, Dana himseK would not have 
 hked to endorse all the despatches he sent from 
 the turmoil of the camp and the battle-field. His 
 opinions were his own ; but as a rule, the state- 
 ments of fact that he made to the government 
 were identical with what Grant believed at the 
 tune." 
 
 The concluding sentence demands notice of 
 the despatches here. The impressions upon 
 which they were based were unquestionably re- 
 ceived in great part from General Grant, for 
 whose rehef Mr. Dana was detailed, apparently 
 in the especial character of censorial assistant, 
 from the War Department. Doubtless also, 
 willing aid was never lacking from Mr. Dana's 
 companions on the lieutenant-general's staff — 
 his despatches all evidencing the spirit declared 
 by General Badeau to have prevailed at the 
 headquarters of the armies of the United States. 
 General Grant has entered no protest against 
 their reproduction, although General Badeau, 
 
118 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 even while proffering them in evidence, acknowl- 
 edges their possible injustice. Had they been 
 revived simply as illustrations of what General 
 Grant and those surrounding him " believed at 
 the time/' there would be no occasion to remark 
 upon them ; but when they are propounded as 
 " evidence which will not be suspected of parti- 
 ality," in support of statements opposed to facts 
 established by a " fuller knowledge and later 
 judgment," their character should be examined. 
 In addition to what has been already quoted 
 from them, one more example will suffice. 
 
 On page 163 of his second volume. General 
 Badeau adds a foot-note, saying : " Mr. Dana 
 thus reports : ' The general assault took place 
 about 6.30 p. m. I witnessed it on Warren's 
 front, where it was executed with the caution 
 and absence of comprehensive ensemble which 
 seem to characterize that officer.' This criticism 
 appears to me too severe." 
 
 This report, formulated by a civilian bureau 
 officer against the corps commander who but four 
 days previously was regarded by General Grant 
 as the possible successor to the command of the 
 Army of the Potomac, is, singularly enough, 
 appended by General Badeau to his account of 
 General Warren's assault, which was made at 
 about four o'clock in the afternoon of May 10, 
 and which General Grant says was iwom'ptly 
 made on a field which " was so densely covered 
 with forest that but little could be seen, by any 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 119 
 
 one person, as to the progress made." ^ In his 
 account, General Badeau had said : " The point 
 of attack was a densely wooded hill in front of 
 Warren, its crest crowned with earthworks, and 
 the entire front swept by cross and enfilading 
 fires of musketry and artillery. . . . Grant and 
 Meade took position on an elevated plateau op- 
 posite the hill, to watch the battle ; but here, 
 as in the Wilderness, the woods prevented them 
 from observing in detail the progress of the fight. 
 All they could discern was the wooded ridge in 
 the background, the swamp at its base covered 
 with underbrush, and nearer still, the lines of the 
 troops about to enter the thicket. . . . Across 
 the open plain, through reaches of wood, through 
 depths of swamp, the lines of the battalions strug- 
 gled forward under a fearful fire, until they were 
 lost to view in the jungle and the smoke of bat- 
 tle. . . . the troops pressed on and up within the 
 woods, until at one or two points they mounted 
 the enemy's breastworks. But their greeting was 
 too terrible ; they stood for a moment on the 
 crest, then wavered, and fell back, disordered by 
 the enfilading fire on either side. ..." 
 
 On the next page, he says of the assault Mr. 
 Dana claims to have witnessed and which General 
 Grant states was " gallantly made " : ^ — 
 
 " Hancock had by this time arrived upon the 
 field, with Birney's division. A furious cannon- 
 ade was maintained while the troops that Warren 
 
 1 Mem.f vol. ii., p. 223. 2 j^j,^ yoj jj^ p 224. 
 
120 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 had led were re-formed, anda< haJf-past six, the 
 untired and undaunted Fifth corps, with two 
 divisions of the Sixth, again advanced, this time 
 under the immediate command of Hancock 
 But the same obstacles were encountered which 
 had forced the troops to retire two hours before 
 and although they again reached, and again even 
 overleapt the breastworks, they were unable to 
 hold them, and fell back at dark, with serious 
 loss. Price, a gaUant brigadier in the Fifth 
 corps, was killed in the advance. That corps 
 mdeed never bore less than its share of the hrunt 
 of any battle, and none of its officers, of what- 
 ever grade, failed to set a worthy example to 
 their soldiers." 
 
 Further comment on Mr. Dana's despatch 
 would be superfluous. 
 
 Of General Warren's part in the assault upon 
 the salient. May 12, General Grant' states: 
 _ . . Warren and Wright were ordered to hold 
 themselves in readiness to join in the assault if 
 circumstances made it advisable. . . About 
 SIX o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the sup- 
 port of Hancock. ... At eight o'clock Warren 
 was ordered up again, but was so slow in makino- 
 his dispositions that his orders were frequently 
 repeated and with emphasis. At eleven o'clock 
 1 gave Meade written orders to reheve Warren 
 from his command if he failed to move promptly. 
 
 ' ■*/«»!., vol. ii., pp. 228 to 233. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 121 
 
 ... If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had 
 been as prompt as Wright was with the 6th 
 corps, better results might have been obtained. 
 
 " Lee massed heavily /rom Ms left flank on the 
 broken point of his line. . . . 
 
 " Warren's corps was now temporarily broken 
 up, Cutler's division sent to Wright, and Grifiin's 
 to Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff, 
 General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and 
 the remaining division, and authorized him to 
 give it orders in his name." 
 
 This was the occasion upon which General 
 Grant's headquarters " were in a thickly wooded 
 dell, from which it was impossible to distinguish 
 any portion of the field, but the necessity of 
 remaining at a point where he could be readily 
 reached by every corps commander left him no 
 option." 
 
 Concerning General Warren, General Badeau 
 amplifies substantially the same account as that 
 outlined by General Grant, but states that Gen- 
 eral Warren was ordered "to attack" instead of 
 " to the support of Hancock." ^ On pages 182 
 and 183, he remarks : "... No absolute tactical 
 result was achieved by the exploit of the Second 
 corps. 
 
 " Hancock had indeed dealt the severest blow 
 of the campaign, but, as happened in the Wilder- 
 ness, under the same commander, after a brilliant 
 and successful onset, his troops became disorgan- 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., pp. 177 to 185. 
 
122 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 ized by victory, and he seemed unable to follow 
 up his advantage, or even to retain all that he had 
 gained, until fresh supports arrived. He could 
 inspire, but apparently not control his soldiers. 
 In the Wilderness, all the splendid results of his 
 success on the 6th of May, were lost by this 
 same incapacity ; . . . But there are hundreds 
 of men who can lead a charge, for one who can 
 control his soldiers or his own faculties in the 
 hurly-burly afterwards. One achievement re- 
 quires physical courage and personal magnetism ; 
 the other, mental and moral power. 
 
 "It was, however, Warren's feebleness which 
 especially prevented Grant from following up the 
 advantage that Hancock had obtained ; and the 
 trait which afterwards occasioned Warren's down- 
 fall on the field of battle, was in this emergency 
 at least equally conspicuous, and still more inop- 
 portune. ..." 
 
 The paragraph concerning General Hancock 
 is here quoted as a specimen of the insatiable 
 spirit of criticism, which is not only characteristic 
 of General Badeau's writing, but, by his showing, 
 was the unvarying sentiment of those surround- 
 ing General Grant, who would seem to have felt 
 called upon to neutralize as far as possible, all 
 unavoidable acknowledgments of worth in his 
 subordinates of the Army of the Potomac. The 
 pages of the Memoirs indicate that General Grant 
 himself sympathized with his historian. 
 
 Referring to General Humphreys's account, on 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 123 
 
 page 89, we find that, on the afternoon of the 
 11th, General Meade received General Grant's 
 order dated 3 P. M., instructing him " to move 
 three divisions of the Second corps by the rear 
 of the Fifth and Sixth corps under cover of 
 night, so as to join the Ninth corps in a vigorous 
 assault on the enemy at four o'clock a. m. to- 
 morrow. . . . Warren and Wright should hold 
 their corps as close to the enemy as possible to 
 take advantage of any diversion caused by this 
 attack and to break in if the opportunity presents 
 itself. . . ." It is concerning the transmission 
 of this order to the corps commanders that Gen- 
 eral Badeau makes some characteristic remarks, 
 to which attention was called in our last chapter, 
 and referring to which General Humphreys, in a 
 note on page 91, says : " From the hour of our 
 arrival before Spottsylvania Court House, the 
 greater part of my time was passed with the 
 troops; the ground occupied by them, and be- 
 tween them and the enemy, was therefore well 
 known to me. 
 
 " Badeau, not acquainted with it or the enemy's 
 works, and because the direction of General Grant 
 that Warren and Wright should hold their corps 
 as close as possible to the enemy was not repeated 
 by Meade in his order [their corps being already 
 as dose to the enemy as was judicious), descants 
 upon the loss of Grant's spirit and force by his 
 orders percolating through three brains before 
 they reached a corps commander. But he does 
 
124 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 not attempt to point out in what manner the dis- 
 positions ordered by Meade were inapplicable, nor 
 how, with any reference to the ground and the 
 enemy's works, they could have been bettered, 
 nor where, nor how they caused any failure in 
 promptitude or efficiency to meet the necessities 
 of the day. On the contrary, it is very evident 
 from what took place that they met in the best 
 possible manner the requirements of the day. 
 Badeau does not seem to have known, evea when 
 he wrote his account of the operations of the 12th 
 of May, that Longstreet's troops remained that 
 day in their intrenchments as strong as they were 
 on the 10th of May, when the repeated assaults 
 on their position proved it to be too strong to be 
 carried by assault, if well manned} It was of 
 the utmost importance to the enemy to maintain 
 that part of their works, for if it had been 
 carried the troops in the salient w^ould have been 
 taken in rear and flank. It was their point of 
 support and the hinge upon which Lee was to 
 swing back from the salient, and its giving way 
 would have j^roved disastr^ous to Aim." 
 
 On page 91 we also learn that General Wright 
 and General Warren "were directed to have 
 their troops in readiness at the hour named for 
 the combined attack of Burnside and Hancock, 
 when, it was understood, they might be required, 
 according to the developments of the day, either 
 to attack in their front s, or move elsewhere and 
 
 ^ Italics in original. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 125 
 
 attachr On page 100, continuing the narrative of 
 the Fifth Corps, General Humphreys says : '^ Early 
 in the morning of the 12th, General Warren 
 opened with all his artillery, and pressed forward 
 his skirmish line. The intrenchments of the 
 enemy gave no sign of having been stripped of 
 any of their troops to meet Hancock's and 
 Wright's attacks on the salient, but the manner 
 m which the contest there was carried on and the 
 reinforcements the enemy received, together with 
 the fact that Burnside was attacking on the east 
 face of the sahent, led to the conclusion that the 
 enemy could not be very strong in Warren's 
 front, and at 9.15 a. m. he was ordered to attack 
 at once at all hazards, with his whole force if 
 necessary. He accordingly prepared to do so, 
 and assaulted, but was repulsed, for Longstreet's 
 corps was holding its intrenchments in force, the 
 only change made in his line being the extension 
 of his right to fill the place from which Ramseur's 
 brigade had been taken. . . . Immediately upon 
 the failure of Warren's attack he was directed to 
 send General Cutler's division to General Wright 
 and leiwejpared to follow with his whole corps, 
 ... It appearing probable that the enemy's in- 
 trenchments in the vicinity of the west angle 
 could be carried if assaulted by the whole Fifth 
 Corps, General Warren was directed to withdraw 
 from his front and move with his whole corj)s 
 to the desig?iated point and attack. Grifan's 
 division followed Cutler's closely. The other 
 
126 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 troops of the Fifth Corps were following, except 
 Crawford's division, when the project of further 
 assault was given up, as it did not appear to 
 promise a complete success. ..." 
 
 In his report of the battle in the salient, Gen- 
 eral Ewell says : " General Kershaw ^ extended 
 so as to allow Kamseur to be withdrawn, and as 
 Daniel's right was unprotected, Ramseur was sent 
 in there. ... But the salient was still held by 
 the enemy, and a most deadly fire poured -on his 
 right flank. Accordingly, Harris's Mississippi 
 brigade, which came to my assistance about 9 
 A. M., was sent to Ramseur's right ; but as it still 
 failed to fill the trenches, McGowan's South 
 Carolina brigade, which arrived an hour later, 
 was ordered to the same point. . . . The en- 
 gagement was spoken of in Northern papers as a 
 general attack by their army. It was met only 
 by my cor2os and three brigades sent to my aid, 
 etc." 
 
 It appears, then, that General Warren was not 
 ordered to support General Hancock, but to 
 attack the enemy in his own front, and that he 
 wasted no time in dispositions, they having been 
 already made according to order ; but, early in 
 the morning, attacking by opening with his 
 artillery and pressing forward his skirmish line, 
 he demonstrated that Longstreet's corps still 
 held their intrenchments in force. As the 
 
 ^ General Kershaw's division, on the east of the Brock Road, 
 extended beyond the left of the Fifth Corps. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 127 
 
 attacks of the lOtli had proven the enemy's 
 lines to be impregnable when thus held. General 
 Warren, reporting the situation, waited further 
 orders instead of sacrificing his men uselessly. 
 General Grant, however, could not bring himself 
 to believe that General Lee was keeping well 
 guarded the lines which protected the left flank 
 and rear of the salient he held so stubbornly, 
 and which formed his point cCappui if his right 
 should be forced back ; and, refusing to under- 
 stand otherwise than that General Warren must 
 be at fault, he persisted in ordering the assault 
 along his front. It is also evident that, imme- 
 diately after General Warren's second attack 
 failed and he reported at about 9.30 a. m. " I 
 cannot advance my men farther at present," ^ 
 General Meade and General Humphreys were 
 personally present with the Fifth Corps and had 
 examined into the condition of the field in its 
 front ; for General Meade's order, of 10.33 a.m., 
 to General Humphreys, reads : " Please remain 
 here, and in my name attend to the shortening 
 of the line and the sending reinforcements to 
 Wright and Hancock."^ That their investiga- 
 tions led in no way to General Warren's discredit 
 is indicated by the fact that, despite the unjust 
 censures and threatening order for removal by 
 General Grant, there was no temporary breaking 
 up of his command, as is alleged ; but that, as had 
 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 101. 
 
 2 Mil Hist., vol. ii., p. 181. 
 
128 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 from the beginning of the movement been antici- 
 pated as possibly necessary, he was ordered to 
 transfer his efforts from his own front to aid the 
 Sixth Corps in the vicinity of the west angle, 
 leaving General Crawford's division to hold his 
 intrenchments. 
 
 What General Badeau assumes to call General 
 Warren's " feeble attempts to assault," the enemy 
 described as "two violent assaults" on ^ General 
 Field's lines, and upon General Bratton'ff line, a 
 beautiful advance over open ground, in two lines 
 of battle, pushed up to within fifty yards of 
 their intrenchments, where it was broken by 
 theh: fire; and the men of Longstreet's corps 
 were veteran judges. General Humphreys says : 
 " I was overlooking the right of the army, and 
 gave the order for the assaults there to cease, as 
 soon as I was satisfied they could not succeed ; 
 and directed the transfer of the troops to the 
 centre for attack there." ^ When General An- 
 drew A. Humphreys decided that an assault by 
 the Fifth Army Corps could not succeed, few ex- 
 perienced military men would wish to disregard 
 his judgment, and small room was left for criti- 
 cism of defeated effort. 
 
 Unquestionably, an "absence of comprehen- 
 sive ensemble'' was noticeable in the conduct of 
 the battle of May 12, but the record does not 
 trace it home to General Warren. 
 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 101. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 GENERAL WARREN AT SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT 
 HOUSE, MAY 19, AND AT COLD HARBOR, 
 JUNE 1 AND 2. 
 
 In the report of Lieutenant-General R. S. 
 Ewell, C. S. Army, of operations May 4 to 29, 
 we find : " On May 19tli General Lee directed me 
 to demonstrate against the enemy in my front, 
 as he believed they were moving to his right and 
 wished to ascertain. As they were strongly in- 
 trenched in front I obtained leave to move round 
 their right. After a detour of several miles 
 through roads impassable for my artillery I came 
 on the enemy iwejyared to receive me. My force 
 was about six thousand, his much larger. His 
 position being developed and my object attained, 
 I was about to retire when he attacked me. Part 
 of my line was shaken, but Pegram's brigade, of 
 Early's division, (Colonel Hoffman commanding,) 
 and Ramseur's, of Rodes', held their ground so 
 firmly that I maintained my position till night- 
 fall, then withdrew unmolested." 
 
 Concerning the operations of that day, Gen- 
 eral Grant states : " Up to this time I had re- 
 
130 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 ceived no reinforcements, except six thousand 
 raw troops under Brigadier-General Robert 0. 
 Tyler, just arrived. They had not yet joined 
 their command, Hancock's corps, but were on 
 our right. This corps had been brought to the 
 rear of the centre, ready to move in any du-ec- 
 tion. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my 
 part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, 
 moved Ewell's corps, about five o'clock in the 
 afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us 
 in that quarter. Tyler had come up from Fred- 
 ericksburg, and had been halted on the road to 
 the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade of 
 Warren's corps. Tyler received the attack with 
 his raw troops, and they maintained their posi- 
 tion, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of vet- 
 erans. 
 
 " Hancock was in a position to reinforce speed- 
 ily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting 
 to make dispositions. Birney was thrown to 
 Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gib- 
 bon as a reserve ; and Ewell was whirled back 
 speedily and with heavy loss. 
 
 " Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's 
 flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his 
 intrenchments. But his efforts were so feeble 
 that under the cover of night Ewell got back 
 with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, 
 besides his killed and wounded. The army be- 
 ing engaged until after dark, I rescinded the 
 order for the march by our left flank that night. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 131 
 
 " As soon as it was discovered that the enemy 
 were coming out to attack, I naturally supposed 
 they would detach a force to destroy our trains. 
 The withdrawal of Hancock from the right un- 
 covered one road from Spottsylvania to Freder- 
 icksburg over which trains drew our suppHes. 
 This was guarded by a division of colored troops, 
 commanded by General Ferrero, belonging to 
 Burnside's corps, Ferrero was therefore promptly 
 notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pick- 
 ets out to the south and be prepared to meet 
 the enemy if he should come ; if he had to re- 
 treat to do so towards Fredericksburg. The en- 
 emy did detach as expected, and captured twen- 
 ty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were 
 soon retaken." ^ 
 
 General Badeau's account (vol. li., pp. 206- 
 208) in outline is identical with that of General 
 Grant. He amplifies somewhat, however, say- 
 ing : " The assault was sudden and vigorous, but 
 Grant at once ordered up the Second and Fifth 
 corps to the support of Tyler, who held his own 
 splendidly. . . . Hancock himself soon came 
 upon the field, and found Tyler in the midst of 
 a hot engagement. Birney's division was hur- 
 ried forward, and thrown in on the right, and 
 Warren moved Crawford rapidly up on Tyler's 
 left. The two other divisions of the Second 
 corps were in reserve. 
 
 " Ferrero with his colored division was on the 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 239, 240. 
 
132 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 road to Fredericksburg , in rear and on the right 
 of Tyler, and near the point where Ewell struck 
 the national line." Then, after repeating General 
 Grant's cautionary directions to General Ferrero, 
 including the " cavalry pickets well out on the 
 plaiih road, and all other roads leading loest and 
 south/' he continues : " The rebels- did indeed 
 push on as far as the Fredericksburg road, but 
 Ferrero and his colored division handled them 
 severely. Twenty-seven wagons were captured 
 in the first surprise, but all retaken ; and on the 
 soil of Virginia, men who had once been slaves 
 beat back the forces of those who had held them 
 in slavery. . . . 
 
 " By dark, the whole movement of Ewell was 
 repulsed, and several hundred prisoners were left 
 ih Tyler's hands. . . . Warren had participated 
 in the battle, on the left of the Second corps, and 
 when the rebels were seen to be repelled, he was 
 ordered to fall upon their flank and rear with the 
 view of cutting off and capturing Ewell's entire 
 column ; but he failed to carry out his instruc- 
 tions, and under cover of night the enemy re- 
 tired." 
 
 The Ferrero episode is pertinent to the present 
 consideration as being another example of the 
 imaginative inexactness of many of the results of 
 General Badeau's historical investigations. Gen- 
 eral Grant states that General Ferrero' s division 
 was guarding a road from Spottsylvania to Fred- 
 ericksburg over which trains were drawing sup- 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 133 
 
 plies for the army, and which had been uncovered 
 by the withdrawal of General Hancock from the 
 right. General Badeau locates the colored di- 
 vision " on the road to Fredericksburg, in rear 
 and on the right of Tyler, and near the point 
 where Ewell struck the national line," and adds 
 that " The rebels did indeed push on as far as 
 the Fredericksburg road." As neither General 
 Ewell nor General Ramseur who commanded his 
 leading brigade make any mention of having 
 reached the Fredericksburg Road, although the 
 latter claims to have driven " the enemy rapidly 
 and with severe loss," the presumptive evidence 
 from the Confederate side is opposed to General 
 Badeau's statement on that point. In addition 
 to this — the order sent by General Grant to 
 General Ferrero to keep his " cavalry pickets well 
 out on the plank roady and all other roads leading 
 west and south/^ is inconsistent with the location 
 assigned to the division by Generals Grant and 
 Badeau. The roads west and south of that 
 location were then occupied, in full force, by the 
 Army of the Potomac, and General Ferrero, as 
 located, would have been exposed only on the 
 north. General Humphreys, in a note on page 
 115, states facts more in accordance with the 
 order. He says : — 
 
 "Ferrero's division of colored troops was not 
 in rear and on the right of Tyler, nor near the 
 point where Ewell struck the National line, nor 
 was he on the road forming Grant's direct com- 
 
134 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 munication with his base (the Fredericksburg and 
 Spottsylvania Court House road) but on the plank 
 road from Orange Court House to Fredericks- 
 hurg, not far from Salem Church, and over five 
 miles north of the Harris farm where Ewell was 
 encountered as narrated by me. General Ferrero 
 had with him besides his division, the Second Ohio 
 and the Third New Jersey (both white veteran 
 cavalry regiments) thrown out in advance of his 
 infantry, and this cavalry had an outpost on the 
 road from Alsop's to Silver's on the Orange 
 plank road. This outpost was driven in about 
 half-past five in the afternoon by some cavalry 
 and artillery force of the enemy. This force the 
 Second Ohio and the Third New Jersey engaged, 
 and Ferrero formed his division in line to support 
 them. The enemy fell back with slight loss, our 
 two cavalry regiments losing two enlisted men 
 killed, seven wounded, and two missing. The 
 colored division had not a casualty of any kind 
 whatever, handled nobody, severely or other- 
 wise ; in fact, were not engaged, 
 
 "The wagons captured were taken near the 
 Harris farm, and were retaken by the troops 
 there, not by Ferrero's troops." 
 
 General Ewell states that his movement was 
 made through roads impassable for his artillery. 
 Brigadier-General A. L. Long, C. S. Army, Chief 
 of Artillery of General Ewell's corps, says in his 
 report: "In the afternoon, [the 19th,] General 
 Ewell having determined to make a flank move- 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 135 
 
 ment, Lieutenant-Colonel Braxton was directed to 
 accompany him with six guns of select calibre. 
 After proceeding two or three miles the roads 
 were found to be impracticable for artillery, and 
 Braxton was ordered to return to his former posi- 
 tion." The attack upon General Ferrer o's cavalry 
 outpost could not possibly have been made by a 
 detachment from General Swell's command ; for 
 General Ferrero was at least five miles from the 
 point of General EwelFs attack, and his pickets 
 were driven in by a cavalry force with artillery 
 at the same hour that General Tyler was en- 
 gaged. 
 
 Referring now to pages 111 to 114 of the 
 " Virginia Campaign/' we find that, on the night 
 of the 18th, the divisions of the Second Corps 
 commanded by Generals Barlow, Gibbon, and 
 Birney were moved to the vicinity of Anderson's 
 Mill on the east side of the Ny River and below 
 the left of the Sixth Corps. This accords with 
 General Grant's statement that the " corps had 
 been brought to the rear of the centre." Gen- 
 eral Tyler's division was posted on the road from 
 Spottsylvania Court House to Fredericksburg near 
 the Harris House, and Colonel Kitching's brigade 
 of the Fifth Corps was stationed in the same 
 vicinity and on the left of General Tyler. The 
 Second Corps, therefore, was stationed between 
 two and three miles south, and a little east, from 
 General Tyler's command. It was held, under 
 orders, ready to move southward the night of 
 
136 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 the 19tli. The Fifth Corps, however, held the 
 right of the army, its intrenchments crossing the 
 Ny River above the Fredericksburg road-crossing 
 about one mile south and west from the Harris 
 House. The commands of Colonel Kitching and 
 General Tyler, therefore, extended the right of 
 the Fifth Corps, and covered the road to Fred- 
 ericksburg, and General Warren's reserve was 
 available for support if needed. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 19th, Colonel Kitching 
 discovered indications of the enemy's movement, 
 and preparations were made to meet it, as Gen- 
 eral Ewell has reported. The firing began about 
 half -past five o'clock, and as it became heavy. 
 General Meade directed General Hancock to send 
 one division in double quick to General Tyler's 
 aid, and hold his corps ready to follow; and 
 General Warren, being the nearest to the battle, 
 was also ordered to support. He at once de- 
 spatched the Maryland Brigade, which arrived in 
 time to take an active part in the fight on the 
 left, while the First Maryland Regiment, reaching 
 the ground on a return march from Fredericks- 
 burg, immediately joined in the encounter on 
 General Tyler's right. General Grant ignores 
 Colonel Kitching and the Maryland regiments. 
 
 General Hancock, on receiving orders, directed 
 General Birney to move at once to the support 
 of the troops engaged, and Generals Barlow and 
 Gibbon to be ready to follow, and went directly 
 to the ground himself. General Birney arrived 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 137 
 
 shortly before dark and was thrown in upon the 
 right of General Tyler's troops, and General 
 Crawfordj arriving soon after, supported the left 
 of the Federal line. Though General Hancock 
 says the fighting was obstinate till about nine 
 o'clock, it seems that the severity of the action 
 was over before the arrival of Generals Birney 
 and Crawford. General Hancock was the corps 
 commander present, and General Warren does not 
 appear to have taken personally any part in the 
 action. General Badeau, however, says that 
 General Warren " participated in the battle, on 
 the left of the Second corps, and when the rebels 
 were seen to be repelled, he was ordered to fall 
 upon their flank and rear." It is not at all prob- 
 able that on such a field as that of May 19, after 
 the enemy was seen to he repulsed, either General 
 Meade or General Hancock would have ordered 
 General Warren, or any other commander in the 
 line of battle, to fall upon the flank and rear of 
 the retreat ; and General Badeau here entirely 
 ignores the fact that General Early was in posi- 
 tion to threaten the right of General Cutler's 
 division of the Fifth Corps and protect the right 
 flank of General E well's command. General 
 Grant is equally forgetful. But there is positive 
 refutation of this item in the systematic detrac- 
 tion, so apparent in the Military History and 
 Memoirs, in what relates to General Warren. In 
 a note on page 114 of the " Virginia Campaign," 
 in answer to General Badeau's erroneous account, 
 General Humphreys says : — 
 
138 GRANT VS, THE RECORD. 
 
 " The troops from both corps engaged received 
 the same orders from General Meade, and con- 
 tinued the action together, both equally close to 
 the enemy until its close. Nothing took place 
 on the field nor is there anything on record to 
 support the statement of Badeau. Ewell was 
 close to the ford near Landron's when the fight- 
 ing terminated, two miles from Warren, who 
 was with Grifiin's and Catlin's divisions close up 
 to the Spottsylvania intrenchments, under orders 
 to attack them if there was promise of success." 
 This correction General Grant entirely overlooks. 
 
 It is not gratifying to be obliged to reconcile 
 the sincerity one must accord to the views of 
 General Grant, with this persistence in gratuitous 
 aspersion of one confessed to be an able, dutiful, 
 and gallant soldier. 
 
 From May 19 to June 1, General "Warren is 
 fortunate in that he at least escapes unfavorable 
 mention. Recalling the exigencies of Cold Har- 
 bor seems to have revived the flagging memory 
 of his claims ; and, of the movements of the lat- 
 ter date. General Badeau says : " Grant had ex- 
 pected a serious battle before obtaining posses- 
 sion of Cold Harbor, and the moment he heard 
 of its capture, the Sixth corps was ordered from 
 the right to the relief of Sheridan ; while Smith, 
 now moving up from the Pamunkey, was directed 
 to march upon the same point. . . . But Lee at 
 once discovered the manoeuvre, and withdrew 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 139 
 
 Anderson's corps from the rebel left, marching it 
 towards Cold Harbor, — a movement exactly 
 parallel to that of the Sixth corps. 
 
 " Meanwhile, exactly as Lee had discovered 
 the movement of Wright, so Grant detected the 
 transfer of Anderson. At an early hour on the 
 1st of June, a heavy column was observed passing 
 in front of the Fifth corps, towards the right of 
 Lee, and Warren was at once ordered to fall upon 
 it in flank, while Wright was directed to attack 
 the head of the column with his whole command, 
 and crush the rebels on their arrival, before they 
 could have time to entrench. If these orders 
 had been carried out, the destruction of Lee's 
 army might have been consummated at Cold Har- 
 bor. But Warren opened with artillery instead 
 of attacking in force, and at three p. m., he re- 
 ported that the entrenchments of the rebels were 
 exceedingly strong, and his own lines so long 
 that he had no mass of troops to assault with. 
 Wright also reconnoitred and skirmished, until at 
 two p. M., he found no rebels in his front : the 
 enemy had fallen back and fortified, as soon as 
 it was certain that Old Cold Harbor was lost to 
 Lee. The condition of the Sixth corps, after a 
 long and fatiguing night march, and its new- 
 ness on the ground, accounted, indeed, for its 
 delay ; yet the enemy had the same difficulties 
 to overcome ; Anderson marched nearly as far 
 as Wright, and then began entrenching ; while 
 
140 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 Warren's failure to assault was doubtless the 
 result of those peculiarities already described, 
 which made this officer hesitate so often and so 
 long, before an action, although when once en- 
 gaged, no soldier in the army excelled him." ^ 
 
 General Grant repeats the story, as follows : 
 " Finding at daylight that Wright had left his 
 front, Lee evidently divined that he had gone 
 to our left. At all events, soon after light on 
 the 1st of June Anderson, who commanded the 
 corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along War- 
 ren's front. Warren was ordered to attack him 
 vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed 
 to move out and get on his front. Warren fired 
 his artillery at the enemy ; but lost so much 
 time in making ready that the enemy got by, and 
 at three o'clock he reported the enemy was 
 strongly intrenched in his front, and besides his 
 lines were so long that he had no mass of troops 
 to move with. He seemed to have forgotten 
 that lines in rear of an army hold themselves 
 while their defenders are fighting in their front. 
 Wright reconnoitred some distance to his front : 
 but the enemy finding Old Cold Harbor already 
 taken had halted and fortified some distance 
 west." 2 
 
 For a correct understanding of these state- 
 ments, a brief review of the relative positions of 
 the opposing corps is necessary. Referring to 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., pp. 275-278. 
 
 2 Mem.f vol. ii., pp. 265, 266. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 141 
 
 pages 165 to 174 of the " Virginia Campaign " 
 we find that, on the 28th of May, General EwelFs 
 corps, under the command of General Early, was 
 in position covering the road from Hanover 
 Town to Richmond by way of Hawes's Shop, and 
 the road from White House to Richmond by way 
 of Old Church and Shady Grove Church. His 
 right rested near Beaver Dam Creek and his left 
 on the Totopotomoy, near Pole Green Church. 
 General Anderson, with Longstreet's corps, was 
 in position covering the road from White House 
 to Richmond by Old Church, Bethesda Church, 
 and Mechanicsville, and therefore on the right of 
 General Early. From General Early's left the 
 command of General Breckinridge, and General 
 Hill's corps, extended the Confederate lines along 
 the Totopotomoy to the vicinity of Atlee's Sta- 
 tion, crossing the railroad a mile north of that 
 point. This whole line was well intrenched. On 
 the 30th General Hancock's corps was in position 
 on the road from Hawes's Shop to Richmond, 
 one division on the left and the remainder of the 
 corps to the right of the road. The Sixth Corps 
 came into position still farther on the right, in 
 the afternoon. These two corps confronted Gen- 
 eral Breckinridge's command and General Hill's 
 corps, on the Confederate left, and General Han- 
 cock's left also extended in front of General 
 Early's extreme left. General Burnside's corps 
 came into position on the left of General Han- 
 cock, its right being near the Whitlock House, 
 
142 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 and its left near the Shady Grove Church Road. 
 While General Warren was moving into position 
 on the left of General Burnside, General Early 
 moved out by his flank, on the Old Church Road, 
 to attack him, and General Anderson moved up 
 into the position thus vacated by General Early. 
 At evening General Warren had driven General 
 Early back till he formed the right of General 
 Anderson's line, while the Fifth Corps took po- 
 sition holding the left of the Federal infantry 
 lines. General Sheridan, with two divisions of 
 cavalry, covered the left of the army. 
 
 On the 31st General Early extended to the left 
 so as to place one division west of Beaver Dam 
 Creek, and General Anderson's corps was moved 
 to the right of General Early, General Kershaw's 
 division being placed near Beulah Church, about 
 a mile north of Cold Harbor, General Pickett's 
 division on General Kershaw's left extending in 
 the direction of the Walnut Grove Church Road, 
 and General Field still farther to the left, his 
 left flank resting on the Mechanicsville Pike. 
 General Hoke, who had come up with his divi- 
 sion during the night, was placed on the ex- 
 treme right of the Confederate line, near Cold 
 Harbor. This extension of the lines to General 
 Lee's right was at once partially intrenched. 
 General Sheridan was holding Cold Harbor with 
 his two cavalry divisions, confronting General 
 Fitz Lee's cavalry and one brigade of General 
 Hoke's division of infantry. General Humphreys 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 143 
 
 says : " The presence of General Hoke near Cold 
 Harbor was known to General Meade from 
 Sheridan's reports, but it was not known that 
 Kershaw was near him, or that Anderson's 
 (Longstreet's) corps was on the right of Early, 
 between Bethesda Church and Cold Harbor." 
 
 Of the situation on the 31st General Hum- 
 phreys says: "The infantry corps were pressed 
 up against the enemy as close as practicable 
 without assaulting, but the position was so strong 
 naturally, and so well intrenched, and the in- 
 trenchments so strongly held that an assault was 
 not attempted ; the skirmish lines, however, were 
 kept up against the enemy's, and an attack 
 threatened." 
 
 On page 172, General Humphreys continues : 
 " An attack on the enemy's position on the 
 Totopotomoy, and covering the Shady Grove 
 Church road and Mechanicsville pike, giving no 
 promise of success, it was determined to send two 
 infantry corps to maintain possession of Cold 
 Harbor, and attack the enemy there before they 
 and tho troops sent to their support could in- 
 trench. General Wright was directed to move 
 that night, and make every effort to get to Cold 
 Harbor by daylight of the 1st of June, for it 
 was believed that Sheridan would be attacked 
 heavily at daybreak. But Wright's only practi- 
 cable route was by Hawes's shop and across to 
 the road from Old Church to Cold Harbor, a 
 night march of more than fifteen miles, through 
 
144 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 a strange country covered with an intricate net- 
 work of narrow, ill-defined roads." 
 
 General W. F. Smith was also expected to be 
 at Cold Harbor early in the morning of June 
 1 with his troops, which had landed at White 
 House on the afternoon of May 31. On the 
 morning of the 1st, General Hoke did not be- 
 come engaged, but established his position on 
 the right. General Kershaw, however, made two 
 attacks upon General Sheridan, both of which 
 were repulsed ; and at nine o'clock General 
 Wright arrived with the head of the Sixth Corps 
 column and relieved the cavalry, which moved 
 toward the Chickahominy, covering the left of 
 the army. 
 
 General Humphreys here continues : " The 
 arrival of the Sixth corps was observed by the 
 enemy, and Kershaw at once closed in to the 
 right on Hoke, Pickett on Kershaw, and Field 
 on Pickett. 
 
 " This closing in to the right by Longstreet's 
 corps, which occupied about an hour, and was 
 made under cover of intrenchments in Warren's 
 front and beyond his left, was observed by him at 
 half-past ten, and under General Meade's order 
 to attack, he deployed Lockwood's and Cutler's 
 divisions, but these troops were embarrassed and 
 delayed in forming by the wooded swamps of the 
 Totopotomoy and Matadequin, and by the time 
 they were in line in open ground the enemy's 
 movement to the right had ceased. Their in- 
 trenchments were too formidable to attack. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 145 
 
 '' By two o'clock in the afternoon the Sixth 
 Corps was all up, and covered the roads to Cold 
 Harbor from Bethesda Church, New Bridge, and 
 Despatch Station on the York River Railroad 
 near the Chickahominy." 
 
 Investigation, therefore, develops that Gen- 
 eral Lee did not withdraw General Anderson 
 " from the rebel left " and make with his corps 
 "a movement exactly parallel to that of the 
 Sixth Corps," for General Anderson's corps never 
 occupied the Confederate left at any time from 
 May 28 to June 1, but held the right centre, 
 and right, of General Lee's line. For the same 
 reason General Grant could not have " detected 
 the transfer of Anderson," and the statement 
 that " Anderson marched nearly as far as Wright 
 and then began intrenching" is merely another 
 of General Badeau's characteristic inaccuracies. 
 The Confederate lines at Cold Harbor were at 
 least partially intrenched on May 31. General 
 Warren himself discovered the movement, which 
 was not that of any corps moving in column 
 from any part of the line, but the closing to- 
 gether of the troops holding the intrenchments 
 in his front and beyond his left, that they might 
 connect firmly with General Hoke when General 
 Wright had reached Cold Harbor. On report- 
 ing the movement and receiving orders to attack. 
 General Warren not only opened with his artil- 
 lery, but immediately advanced two divisions of 
 his corps. His troops, however, could not force 
 
146 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 their way across intervening swamps before the 
 movement^ which occupied in all but about an 
 hour, had ceased and the enemy were ready to 
 receive them from behind intrenchments already 
 decided, by his superiors in command, to be too 
 formidable to be attacked with promise of suc- 
 cess. In fact, when it is remembered that the 
 movement to Cold Harbor was necessitated by 
 the ascertained strength of the lines held by the 
 enemy from General Warren's front to the Con- 
 federate left, and that it was over three hours 
 after all movement in General Lee's lines had 
 ceased, when General Warren is said by General 
 Grant to have reported himself unable to assault, 
 the attempted slur written in the Memoirs be- 
 comes as meaningless as it is unjust. 
 
 We find, further, that the Sixth Corps was not 
 all up at Cold Harbor until two o'clock in the 
 afternoon, and that the fulfilment of the orders 
 General Wright is said to have received, " to at- 
 tack the head of the column" or^^ get on his 
 front," would have necessitated the carrying of 
 the lines in Ms front, for which purpose General 
 Grant himself considered the cooperation of, at 
 first, two, and, afterwards, three corps necessary. 
 
 It is to be remembered that these events oc- 
 curred upon the day when some one connected 
 with the headquarters of the general-in-chief had 
 ordered General W. F. Smith, with his com- 
 mand, to New Castle Ferry instead of to Cold 
 Harbor. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 147 
 
 In his account of the operations of June 1 
 and 2, General Grant has said : " Hancock was 
 moved from his place in line during the night 
 and ordered to the left of Wright. I expected 
 to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d, 
 but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so 
 excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to 
 keep, that the head of column only reached Old 
 Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position 
 at 7.30 A. M. Preparations were made for an 
 attack in the afternoon, but did not take place 
 until the next morning. Warren's corps was 
 moved to the left to connect with Smith : Han- 
 cock's corps was got into position to the left of 
 Wright's, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda 
 Church in reserve. While Warren and Burn- 
 side were making these changes the enemy came 
 out several times and attacked them, capturing 
 several hundred prisoners. The attacks were re- 
 pulsed, but not followed up as they should have 
 been. I was so annoyed at this that I directed 
 Meade to instruct his corps commanders that 
 they should seize all such opportunities when 
 they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our 
 manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of 
 getting the enemy out of his cover." ^ 
 
 On pages 177 to 180 of the " Virginia Cam- 
 paign," a detailed account of the operations of 
 June 2 is given. General Humphreys there 
 states : " On the morning of the 2d, General 
 
 1 Mem.^ vol. ii., p. 268. 
 
148 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 Warren was directed to extend his left so as to 
 unite with Smith at Woody's, and to contract 
 his right to such extent as to make one-half 
 his force available for attack. This, it was ex- 
 pected, would bring his right to the vicinity of 
 Bethesda Church. General Burnside was di- 
 rected to withdraw his force and mass it in rear 
 of Warren's right, to protect that flank and sup- 
 port Warren. But this gave General Warren a 
 line about three miles long, the left of which he 
 held chiefly with artillery. It was interrupted 
 here and there by the swamps of the Matade- 
 quin, which virtually shortened his lines, as he 
 could command the swamps without occupying 
 them. General Wilson was directed to cover the 
 right of the army from the vicinity of Bethesda 
 Church to the Pamunkey. The main body of 
 the Confederate cavalry was on Lee's left, Fitz 
 Lee's division on his right. 
 
 " Early on the night of the 1st, General Han- 
 cock began to withdraw . . . 
 
 "Perceiving the withdrawal from our right, 
 General Lee, on the morning of the 2d, sent 
 General Breckenridge and General Hill, with Wil- 
 cox's and Mahone's divisions, to his right, . . . 
 Early remained on the left with his own corps 
 and Heth's division. Intrenching went on all 
 day, with heavy skirmishing and artillery fire. 
 
 " But General Lee directed General Early to 
 get upon our right flank and drive down in front 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR. 149 
 
 of the Confederate line. To carry out this order 
 Rodes's division moved out the Shady Grove 
 Church road in the afternoon, Gordon swung 
 around to keep pace with Rodes, and Heth, fol- 
 lowing Rodes, took position on his left. This 
 movement brought on sharp fighting, which 
 lasted until night, but did not accomplish what 
 was designed. It found General Burnside's 
 withdrawal unfinished, and his skirmish line, 
 occupying the corps intrenchments, was driven 
 from them by Rodes's division, and a large num- 
 ber of prisoners taken from it. In this way 
 Rodes's troops got in rear of the Fifth Corps 
 skirmishers unperceived, and captured a number 
 of them. 
 
 " Cutler and Crawford held the long line from 
 Bethesda Church to Smith's right. Griffin's 
 division was massed at Bethesda Church, but as 
 soon as Early's movement was discovered it was 
 formed in line, Ayres on the left, Bartlett in the 
 centre, Sweitzer on the right, and moved forward 
 under musketry and artillery fire, to the attack 
 of Rodes's division, which had advanced from 
 the Shady Grove Church road. Rodes was 
 forced back to the road, and in this encounter 
 lost a gallant officer, Brigadier-General Doles, 
 who was killed. 
 
 " General Crittenden's division brought up 
 the rear in the withdrawal of Burnside, and was 
 attacked with some vigor in doing so, but held 
 Heth in check until Willcox and Potter got into 
 position and stopped his further advance, 
 
150 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 " Early's troops remained on the Shady Grove 
 Church road, and intrenched during the night, 
 while Ramseur's division held the intrenchments 
 on the left of Anderson's (Longstreet's) corps.'* 
 
 General Badeau's account, on pages 281 and 
 282 of the second volume of his Military History, 
 is essentially the same as that given by General 
 Grant, except that he mentions only one attack 
 by the enemy, and undoubtedly he is to that ex- 
 tent less inaccurate. The spasmodic tactics im- 
 puted to the Confederate troops by the author 
 of the Memoirs is not consistent with the estab- 
 lished character of those troops, or the posssibil- 
 ities of the field. Had he been content to write, 
 " several of the enemy came out and attacked 
 them," his statement woidd have been equally 
 euphonious and more in accordance with the 
 probabilities in the case. It is evident, also, 
 that the enemy did not come out so far from his 
 cover, or in such a manner, as to endanger his 
 return should he desire, or be obliged, to fall 
 back. General Gordon on his right held fast to 
 his lines and could only be attacked by General 
 Warren at the expense of the already attenuated 
 line of the Fifth Corps. General Griffin did not 
 " repulse " any attack that day, but attached 
 General Rodes's division and forced it back to 
 the Shady Grove Church Road. 
 
 How more than was done could have been 
 done, neither General Grant nor General Badeau 
 has indicated ; and it is believed that, as far as 
 
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SPOTTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR- 151 
 
 the Fifth Corps is concerned, in default of any- 
 thing more tangible than the indefinite complaint 
 as made, the names of Warren, Griffin, Ayres, 
 Bartlett, and Sweitzer will be a sufficient guaran- 
 tee that all that the circumstances of the case 
 permitted was accomplished. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 WHITE OAK ROAD AND DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE, 
 MARCH 31, 1865. 
 
 In a foot-note on page 449 of his third vol- 
 ume, General Badeau remarks : " It is a common 
 manoeuvre for some rebel advocate or apologist 
 to assert that such and such was the intention or 
 result of a certain operation, without giving the 
 slightest proof of the correctness of the state- 
 ment ; and then for all the rest to quote him as 
 authority. . . . 
 
 " No statement of national or rebel intentions, 
 or strength, or losses, or of any material fact on 
 either side, should he accepted without j^ositive 
 proof of its correctness ; and it is not sufficient 
 to mention an authority ; the absolute quotation 
 should be verified." 
 
 Nevertheless, thus far at least, the reflections 
 upon General Warren have been of a very gen- 
 eral and indefinite character, and have been pro- 
 jected upon very vapory evidence, if even such 
 it can be called. We come now to consider the 
 close of his career as commander of the Fifth 
 Army Corps. 
 
 Early in the morning of March 29, 1865, 
 
WHITE OAK ROAD. 153 
 
 General Warren moved with the Fifth Corps as 
 ordered, crossing Hatcher's Run at Monk's Neck 
 Bridge. He was to proceed no farther than the 
 junction of the Yaughan and Quaker roads until 
 the Second Corps was in position on his right, 
 when he was to advance toward the enemy's 
 lines by the Boydton Road. At mid-day, how- 
 ever, liis orders were modified ; and, as then 
 directed, he moved up the Quaker Road in the 
 afternoon, and, about a mile from its junction 
 with the Boydton Road, encountered two bri- 
 gades of General Anderson's command which 
 were forced to fall back into the intrenchments 
 on the White Oak Road after a sharp engage- 
 ment and severe loss. 
 
 On the 30th, General Warren moved up the 
 Quaker and Boydton roads as far as the Dabney 
 Mill Road, and occupied a line covering the 
 Boydton Road as far as Gravelly Run. General 
 Ayres, with his division, made a reconnoissance 
 northwestward to the vicinity of the point where 
 the Confederate intrenchments turned north to 
 cover the Claiborne Road, and established a 
 picket Hne in that direction, supported by part 
 of his division, the other part remaining on the 
 left of General Grif&n in advance of the Boydton 
 Road. Late in the afternoon, in reporting Gen- 
 eral Ayres's reconnoissance, General Warren sug- 
 gested that a division of the Second Corps 
 should take the place of General Griffin's divi- 
 sion during the night, and that the Fifth Corps 
 
154 GRANT VS, THE RECORD. 
 
 should occupy the White Oak Road early the next 
 morning. This suggestion was in part approved. 
 General Humphreys was directed to, and did, 
 relieve General Griffin's with General Miles's 
 division before daylight of the 31st ; and General 
 Warren was ordered to place General Crawford's 
 and General Griffin's divisions within supporting 
 distance of General Ay res. General Ay res was 
 directed by General Warren to reinforce his 
 advance, by daylight of the 31st, with his whole 
 division ; General Crawford to hold his command 
 ready to follow General Ayres ; and General 
 Griffin to take up the position General Ayres 
 had held at Mrs. Butler's, as soon as his division 
 was relieved by General Miles. General Ayres's 
 advanced position was in open ground south of 
 the White Oak Road near W. Dabney's. 
 
 At 7 A. M. of the 31st, General Crawford 
 moved out, taking position at the Halliday 
 House about five hundred yards in rear of Gen- 
 eral Ayres. General Griffin was about one thou- 
 sand yards in the rear of General Crawford and 
 on the south-east side of a branch of Gravelly 
 Run. These dispositions will be again noted 
 further on. General Ayres, who was informed 
 of the presence of General Pickett at Five Forks, 
 about four miles from his left, prepared to meet 
 attack from that quarter as well as in front. He 
 formed his division with General Winthrop's 
 brigade looking north, fronting the White Oak 
 Road ; the Maryland Brigade along a ravine on 
 
WHITE OAK ROAD. 155 
 
 General Winthrop's left, looking west ; his third 
 brigade to General Winthrop's right, and one of 
 General Crawford's brigades in rear of his centre. 
 
 At half-past eight a. m., corps commanders 
 were notified that there would be no movement 
 that day ; but at 9.40 a. m., General Warren 
 reporting that he had directed General Ayres to 
 drive the enemy's pickets off the White Oak 
 Road or ascertain with what force the road was 
 held, he was instructed by General Meade that, 
 if he found he could get possession of the road 
 and hold it, he was to do so, notwithstanding 
 the order suspending operations. 
 
 At eleven o'clock, General Winthrop's brigade 
 moved forward, supported by General Gwyn's 
 brigade on the right. When within fifty yards 
 of the White Oak Road, the enemy in line of 
 battle, suddenly breaking cover, moved across 
 the road and forward to meet them. General 
 Ayres's advance had developed the fact that 
 General Lee was, in person, directing a movement 
 for the purpose of attacking the left of the Fifth 
 Corps. He had sent General McGowan with two 
 brigades to get across the flank of General 
 Ayres's command, and had drawn up General 
 Hunton's brigade in the woods along the north 
 side of the White Oak Road, with General Wise's 
 brigade formed on his left. General Hunton's 
 formation was scarcely completed when General 
 Winthrop advanced upon his position, and Gen- 
 eral McGowan had not completed his movement 
 
156 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 across the flank when the firing in front began, 
 and he at once ordered the charge. Despite 
 General Ayres's efforts, his command was driven 
 back to where General Griffin was in position, 
 and General Crawford's division fell back in 
 confusion. 
 
 Warned by the heavy musketry firing and the 
 drifting of stragglers to the rear, General Hum- 
 phreys, divining that General Warren needed 
 support, ordered General Miles to advance at once 
 with two brigades and attack the left flank of 
 the advancing enemy. General Miles's other two 
 brigades followed soon after. General Himi- 
 phreys also ordered General Mott and General 
 Hayes to attack the lines in their front. These 
 orders were similar to those afterwards received 
 from General Meade. General Miles struck 
 General Wise's brigade in front and flank, and 
 drove him back, capturing the flag of an Ala- 
 bama regiment and over three hundred prisoners. 
 This forced General Hunton also to fall back, 
 and General Warren having got a part of Gen- 
 eral Griffin's division across the run and upon 
 General McGowan's flank, the whole attacking 
 force fell back to the position occupied by Gen- 
 eral Ayres in the morning. 
 
 By half-2oast two o'clock, General Warren had 
 re-formed his corps on the north side of the branch 
 of Gravelly Run, and moved forward, General 
 Griffin's division in the centre, with General 
 Ayres's division on the left and General Craw- 
 
WHITE OAK ROAD. 157 
 
 ford's on the right, both in echelon. After a 
 short but sharp encounter the brigades of Gen- 
 erals Chamberlain and Gregory drove the enemy 
 back within the White Oak Road intrenchments.^ 
 
 On page 435 of the second volume of the 
 Memoirs, General Grant, referring to these oper- 
 ations, says simply : " There was considerable 
 fighting in taking up these new positions for the 
 2d and 5th corps, in w^hich the Army of the 
 James had also to participate somewhat, and the 
 losses were quite severe. 
 
 "This was what was known as the battle of 
 White Oak road." 
 
 On page 445 of the same volume, he states 
 that he was much dissatisfied with General War- 
 ren's " dilatory movements " on that occasion. 
 His historian, however, attempts a more extended 
 account of the affair and of General Warren's 
 alleged faults therein. (See Mil. Hist., vol iii., 
 pp. 460-466.) He charges that, on the night of 
 March 30, General Warren, " in direct violation 
 of his orders, stretched out his three divisions in 
 echelon ; placing Ayres on the left, then Craw- 
 ford, and Grifiin in the rear," and produces as 
 evidence a despatch from General Webb, chief 
 of staff, to General Warren, dated 9.30 a. m. of 
 March 30, saying : " He [General Meade] is very 
 anxious to have you cover as much of the front 
 line as possible, and his idea was that you would 
 put both Griffin and Crawford in front, keeping 
 
 1 Va. Camp., pp. 324-334. 
 
158 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 a portion of each as a reserve, and keeping Ayres 
 to cover your left flank." He does not, how- 
 ever, quote another despatch which will be noted 
 a little further on. After relating the repulse of 
 the morning of the 31st, he states : " There was 
 a delay of several hours before the Fifth corps 
 was ready, and Meade evidently shared the feel- 
 ing in regard to Warren that was entertained by 
 Sheridan and Grant." In support of this asser- 
 tion he repeats his theories regarding General 
 Warren's peculiarities, and appends in fancied 
 substantiation a selection of despatches and ex- 
 tracts which, if they prove anything further than 
 the weakness of his own position, show merely 
 that both General Meade and General Warren 
 could be impatient on occasion ; that gallant 
 General "Andy" Webb could sometimes irritate 
 with pen as well as sword; and that General 
 Badeau was incapable of comprehending soldiers 
 of the grade of those whose words he strives to 
 marshal to his aid. General Badeau apparently 
 forgot his criticism of General Meade, on page 
 370 of his second volume, and his softening ad- 
 mission : " Unjust at times, as every intense soldier 
 is apt to be, when his orders are not carried out 
 — for reproof will come, even though the fault 
 is not with him who is reproved — yet Meade 
 did amjjle justice afterivardsJ' It is to be re- 
 gretted that General Meade's example, in this 
 last respect, was not more contagious. 
 
 It is not easy to see just how the charge of 
 
WHITE OAK ROAD. 159 
 
 " dilatory movements/' in this affair, can be main- 
 tained against General Warren. The Fifth Corps 
 was in position before the order suspending opera- 
 tions for the day was received by the corps com- 
 manders ; the advance of General Ayres's troops 
 which precipitated General Lee's attack, was 
 made at General Warren's own suggestion ; and 
 as but three hours and a half intervened between 
 the time of starting General Ayres's advance in 
 the morning, and the final advance of the corps 
 which drove the enemy within his works, it is 
 manifest there could have been no " delay of 
 several hours " in reforming the corps after the 
 severe repulse at first encountered. 
 
 In his official Report (see Mem., vol. ii., p. 622) 
 General Grant had said : " On the morning 
 of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably 
 to getting possession of the White Oak road, and 
 was directed to do so. To accompHsh this, he 
 moved with one division, instead of his whole 
 corps, which was attacked by the enemy in su- 
 perior force and driven back on the 2d division 
 before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced 
 back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was 
 checked. A division of the 2d corps was im- 
 mediately sent to his support, the enemy driven 
 back with heavy loss, and possession of the 
 White Oak Road gained." 
 
 At the request of General Warren, a court of 
 inquiry was appointed by the President to inves- 
 tigate this and other matters connected with the 
 
160 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 operations of March 30 to April 1. Concerning 
 the imputation contained in this passage in Gen- 
 eral Grant's report, that court rendered the 
 
 following : — 
 
 " Opinion. 
 
 " There seems to be no evidence that General 
 Warren, on the morning of March 31, or at any 
 other time, reported favorably to getting posses- 
 sion of the White Oak road except in his de- 
 spatch (y.) of 4 p. M., March 30, already referred 
 to, and the movement suggested in that was prac- 
 tically set aside by General Grant's despatch (viii.) 
 of March 30, heretofore quoted. General War- 
 ren's report, in his despatch (lxxxiy.) of 9.40 A. 
 M., March 31, quoted above, that he had given or- 
 ders to drive the enemy's pickets off the White 
 Oak road or develop what force of the enemy 
 held it, could not be fairly construed as being 
 able to take possession of it. 
 
 " With regard to that portion of the imputation 
 contained in the statement that General Warren 
 was directed to take possession of the White Oak 
 road, the following despatch from General Meade 
 is the only one that can bear that construction : — 
 
 LXXXV. 
 
 "'U. S. M. T. 
 
 « * Headquarters Armies U. S., 
 
 10.30. A. M., March 31, 1865. 
 
 " * To Major-General G. K. Warren. 
 
 " ' Your despatch giving Ayres's position is re- 
 
WHITE OAK ROAD. 161 
 
 ceived. General Meade directs that should you 
 determine by your reconnoissance that you can 
 get possession of and hold the White Oak road, 
 you are to do so, notwithstanding the orders to 
 suspend operations to-day. 
 
 Alex. S. Webb, 
 
 Bt. M. G. C. S.' 
 
 " And the evidence before the court shows that 
 the order was not received by General Warren 
 till after the fighting that resulted from the 
 attempted reconnoissance had begun. 
 
 " It is in evidence by Ayres's and Crawford's 
 testimony that General Warren had in his ad- 
 vance two divisions, though the testimony does 
 not clearly show how long before the attack of 
 the enemy upon Ayres the division of Crawford 
 reached him. 
 
 " Griffin's division was held in reserve along 
 the branch of Gravelly run nearest to and north- 
 west from the Boydton plank road, and it may 
 have been so held to carry out the intention of 
 the following despatch from General Meade's 
 Headquarters. 
 
 LXXIX. 
 
 "'8.32 a. m., U. S. M. T. 
 " ' Headquarters A. of P. 8.25, March 31, '65. 
 " * To Major-General Warren. 
 
 " ^ There is firing along Humphreys's front. 
 The Maj. Gen. Comandg. desires you to be ready 
 
162 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 to send your reserve if it should be called for, to 
 support Humphreys. There will be no move- 
 ment of troops to-day. 
 
 A. S. Webb, 
 
 B. M. G. 
 '"Rec^ 8.40 A. M., G. K. W.' 
 
 "The Court is further of the opinion that, 
 considering the Fifth Corps constituted the ex- 
 treme left wing of the armies operating against 
 Richmond, and that the corps was in a delicate 
 position and liable to be attacked at any moment, 
 of which liability General Warren had been re- 
 peatedly warned, he should have been with his 
 advanced divisions, guiding and directing them, 
 and that he should have started earlier to the 
 front than he did and not have waited at the 
 telegraph office to keep in communication with 
 General Meade's Headquarters, unless he had di- 
 rect orders that morning so to do, which however 
 does not appear in the evidence." 
 
 The despatches referred to, but not quoted, in 
 this opinion, are as follows : — 
 
 V. 
 
 « 4 p. M., March 30. 
 " General Webb, Chief of Staff. 
 
 " General : General Ayres's advance now sees 
 the White Oak road near W. Dabney's for | of 
 a mile. There is a difficult swamp between the 
 plank road and that place. I have now a con- 
 tinuous intrenched line from my right across 
 
WHITE OAK ROAD. 163 
 
 Griffin's front and along the plank road nearly 
 down to Gravelly Run. If General Humphreys 
 can take charge of Griffin's front, about 500 
 yards west of plank road with the return down 
 it I can take my corps and block the White Oak 
 road. 
 
 G. K. Warren, M. Gr 
 
 VIII. 
 
 " U. S. Mily. Telegraph. By telegraph from Gravelly Run. 
 
 March 30, 1865. 
 " To Major-General Meade. 
 
 "Your orders to Warren are right. I do not 
 expect to advance him in the morning. I sup- 
 posed, however, that he was now up to the White 
 Oak road. If he is not, I do not want him to 
 move up without further orders. 
 
 U. S. Grant, Lt-Genr 
 
 The first part of this Opinion, deahng with 
 matters of fact, speaks clearly for itself, and cer- 
 tainly vindicates General Warren as far as Gen- 
 eral Grant's official imputation is concerned. 
 
 Of the second part it may be remarked, that 
 it expresses an opinion upon a point of tactical 
 detail which might possibly have been materially 
 modified, if not entirely reversed, had the Court 
 been in possession of evidence which would have 
 been attainable during the lifetime of General 
 Meade. That General Grant could not have 
 considered such a difference of opinion as reflect- 
 
164 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 ing seriously upon General Warren, may confi- 
 dently be inferred from his well-known approval 
 of the location adopted by the commander of the 
 Federal forces at Pittsburg Landing, April 5, 
 1862 ; and from the approved movements of the 
 commander of the cavalry corps Army of the 
 Potomac, on March 30, 1865, when all the cir- 
 cumstances noted in the Opinion applied with 
 pecuHar force to that corps. It is to be remem- 
 bered that General Warren remained constantly 
 within the Hmits of his corps, and that he had 
 intrusted his advance to a command and com- 
 mander both acknowledged as preeminently re- 
 liable. 
 
 It is necessary now to review briefly the oper- 
 ations on the extreme left of General Grant's 
 lines. On the 28th, General Grant instructed 
 General Sheridan : " The Fifth corps will move 
 by the Yaughan road at three a. m. to-morrow 
 morning. . . . Move your cavalry at as early 
 an hour as you can, and without being confined 
 to any particular road or roads. You may go 
 out by the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth 
 corps, pass by its left, and, passing near to or 
 through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of 
 the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the in- 
 tention to attack the enemy in his entrenched 
 position, but to force him out ifj^ossihle. Should 
 he come out a7id attack us, or get himself where 
 he can he attacked, move in with your entire 
 
DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 165 
 
 force in your own way, and with the full reli- 
 mice that the army will engage or follow, as 
 circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the 
 field, and will probably be able to communicate 
 with you." ^ The italics are General Badeau s. 
 
 At dark on the 29th, General Sheridan had 
 reached Dinwiddle Court House, and General 
 Grant sent him word there : "... In the 
 morning, push around the enemy, if you can, 
 and get on his right rear. The movements of 
 the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your 
 action. We will all act together as one army, 
 until it is seen what can be done with the 
 
 enemy " ^ 
 
 \j±xxy » 
 
 On the night of the 29th, General Grant s 
 headquarters were on Gravelly Run, south of the 
 crossing of the Yaughan Road. All through the 
 night the rain fell in torrents, and before morn- 
 ing it became impossible to move anything on 
 wheels except as corduroy roads were laid. All 
 was gloomy and uncomfortable at headquarters, 
 " until, like a gleam of light, Sheridan, with his 
 cheery manner and never - failing confidence, 
 came riding up from Dinwiddie, to confer with 
 Grant about 'ending the matter r' After a 
 conference with the general-in-chief ," Sheridan 
 went back to Dinwiddie with orders to gam pos- 
 session of Five Forks," and then "Sheridan 
 pushed out a division from Dinwiddie, but found 
 
 1 Mil Hist., vol. iii., pp. 450, 451. 
 
 2 Id., p. 453. 
 
166 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 the enemy in force at the junction, and the con- 
 dition of the roads still prevented any serious 
 attack by the cavalry." ^ 
 
 Referring to the Thirteenth Chapter of " The 
 Virginia Campaign/' we find that, on March 28, 
 General R. E. Lee directed General Fitz Lee to 
 move at once to Five Forks, assume command of 
 all the cavalry, and, with the infantry supports 
 he would send, attack General Sheridan in that 
 vicinity. General Fitz Lee reached Sutherland 
 Station with his division on the night of the 
 29th, and early on the morning of the 30th, 
 marched by the most direct route to Five Forks ; 
 and, advancing from there toward Dinwiddie 
 Court House, encountered General Sheridan's 
 cavalry. At dark on the evening of the 30th, 
 General W. H. F. Lee and General Rosser joined 
 General Fitz Lee with their commands; and 
 about the same time General Pickett arrived at 
 Five Forks by way of the White Oak Road, 
 from the intrenched lines at the Claiborne Road 
 Forks, with three brigades of his own division 
 and two from General Johnson's division. 
 
 ^ When, therefore. General Sheridan halted with 
 his thirteen thousand troopers at and near Din- 
 widdie Court House, on the evening of the 29th, 
 there was no enemy before him excepting the 
 small brigade of General Roberts picketing the 
 White Oak Road -, while the division of General 
 Fitz Lee, not two thousand strong, on his right 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., pp. 456, 457. 
 
DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 167 
 
 front at Sutherland Station, was more than eight 
 miles distant in a straight line. But while Gen- 
 eral Sheridan rode on the morning of the 30th 
 to General Grant's headquarters, about eight 
 miles east of Dinwiddie Court House, for the 
 purpose, apparently, of having his orders re- 
 peated yet again, General Fltz Lee was moving 
 his division from Sutherland Station to Five 
 Forks. The importance of the possession of 
 that point was thoroughly understood ; and, even 
 admitting necessity for General Sheridan's morn- 
 ing ride to General Grant's headquarters, one 
 cannot understand why, with the force at his dis- 
 posal, he could not occupy it before noon on the 
 30th ; for it is evident that till the evening of 
 that day it was defended only by General Fitz 
 Lee's division and General Roberts's brigade. It 
 was nearer to Dinwiddie Court House than to 
 Sutherland Station by more than two miles. The 
 roads were not impassable, for General Lee 
 moved from Sutherland Station between early 
 day and the time of his meeting General Merritt 
 half-way between Dinwiddie and Five Forks. 
 General Badeau is manifestly in error when he 
 says, " the condition of the roads still prevented 
 any serious attack by the cavalry ; " for, at J. 
 Boisseau's, General Lee, with a command much 
 less than half the size of that led by General 
 Merritt, held two roads, after " sharp skirmish- 
 ing." General Grant, however, gives no sign of 
 finding dilatoriness here. He remembers, and 
 
168 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 recounts approvinglyj the visit of General Sher- 
 idan to his headquarters, but fails to give the 
 date or to recall to mind the orders issued to the 
 cavalry on the days preceding. 
 
 During the 30th, General Grant decided to re- 
 inforce General Sheridan with an infantry corps, 
 and, with his command thus strengthened, at- 
 tempt to turn General Lee's right, and then as- 
 sault along his whole line. He said to General 
 Sheridan : " If your situation is such as to jus- 
 tify the belief that you can turn the enemy's 
 right with the assistance of a corps of infantry 
 entirely detached from the balance of the army, 
 I will so detach the Fifth corps, and place the 
 whole under your command for the operation. 
 Let me know, as early in the morning as you 
 can, your judgment in the matter, and I will 
 make the necessary orders." On the morning of 
 the 31st, General Sheridan replied : "... If 
 the ground would permit, I could, with the Sixth 
 corps, turn the enemy's right, or break through 
 his hues ; but I would not like the Fifth corps 
 to make such an attempt." General Grant re- 
 plied at once : " It will be impossible to give 
 you the Sixth corps for the operations by our 
 left. ... I could relieve the Second with the 
 Fifth corps, and give you that." General Badeau 
 here remarks : " Sheridan evidently did not want 
 the Fifth corps, doubtless because he was aware 
 of the idiosyncrasies of its commander ; and 
 
DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 169 
 
 Grant desired to regard his preference. Events, 
 however, settled the point for them all." ^ 
 
 General Grant's official report (Mem., vol. ii., 
 p. 622), referring to General Sheridan's advance 
 towards Five Forks, and the engagement which 
 resulted on the 31st, says : " Sheridan advanced, 
 and with a portion of his cavalry got possession 
 of the Five Forks ; but the enemy, after the af- 
 fair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel 
 cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and 
 forced him back towards Dinwiddie Court House. 
 Here General Sheridan displayed great general- 
 ship. Instead of retreating with his whole com- 
 mand on the main army, to tell the story of su- 
 perior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry 
 on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to 
 take charge of the horses. This compelled the 
 enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded 
 and broken country, and made his progress slow. 
 At this juncture he dispatched to me what had 
 taken place, and that he was dropping back 
 slowly on Dinwiddie Court House." 
 
 In his account, on page 442 of the second 
 volume, he says : " Sheridan moved back to 
 Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th, 
 and then took a road leading north-west to Five 
 Forks. He had only his cavalry with him. Soon 
 encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a 
 very stout resistance. He gradually drove them 
 back however until in the neighborhood of Five 
 
 1 Mil. Hist, vol. iii., pp. 458-460. 
 
170 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 Forks. Here he had to encounter other troops 
 besides those he had been contending with, and 
 was forced to give way. 
 
 " In this condition of affairs he notified me of 
 what had taken place and stated that he was 
 falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and 
 slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to 
 his assistance. . . ." 
 
 Before noting the peculiarities of these ac- 
 counts given by General Grant, reference should 
 again be made to the record as stated in the 
 thirteenth chapter of " The Virginia Campaign," 
 which in substance is as follows : — 
 
 On the 30th, General Merritt, with General 
 Devin's division and General Davies's brigade of 
 General Crook's division, moving under orders 
 from General Sheridan to gain possession of Five 
 Forks, encountered, as we have before noted, 
 General Fitz Lee's command, about two thousand 
 strong, just beyond the point where the road 
 from J. Boisseau's, leading past Dr. Boisseau's, 
 to the White Oak Road, leaves the direct road 
 from Dinwiddie Court House to Five Forks, and 
 about midway between those points. Both roads 
 were held by the enemy. General Devin halted 
 for the nio-ht at the forks near J. Boisseau's. 
 
 At dark. General W. H. F. Lee and General 
 Rosser reinforced General Fitz Lee with their di- 
 visions, giving him, in all, about eight thousand 
 cavalry, and General Pickett reached Five Forks 
 at about the same time, with six thousand six 
 
DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 171 
 
 hundred infantry. General Pickett assumed 
 command of the combined force. On the morn- 
 ing of the 31st, General Fitz Lee, moving with 
 his cavalry on the direct road to Dinwiddie Court 
 House, met General Devin's division, advancing 
 upon Five Forks, near the fork of the Gravelly 
 Run Church Road. Leaving General Munford 
 with one division confronting General Devin, 
 General Lee moved with his other two divisions 
 of cavalry by way of Little Five Forks, west of 
 Chamberlain's Bed, or Run, to Fitzgerald's and 
 Danse's crossings of that stream, General Pickett 
 following with the infantry command. General 
 Crook held Fitzgerald's crossing with General 
 Smith's brigade, Danse's crossing, a mile above, 
 with General Davies's brigade, and General Gregg 
 was in reserve. 
 
 Immediately on arriving. General W. H. F. 
 Lee attempted to force the passage of Fitzgerald's 
 crossing. He got over, but was driven back 
 with heavy loss. The enemy's cavalry failed also 
 to effect a crossing at Danse's ; but the infantry 
 coming up, General Corse's brigade leading, suc- 
 ceeded after sharp fighting and severe loss. Gen- 
 eral Gregg holding them for a time. Meanwhile, 
 General Munford was forcing General Devin 
 back, and General Pickett's infantry now pushing 
 General Davies upon General Devin's left, forced 
 their way in between General Devin and General 
 Crook. General Gibbs, however, withdrew his 
 brigade of General Devin's division, in time to 
 
172 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 join General Crook. This closed the direct road 
 to Dinwiddie Court House to Generals Devins 
 and Davies, and they were ordered to fall back 
 fighting towards the Boydton Road and by that 
 road reach the Court House. 
 
 General W. H. F. Lee had now forced his way 
 at Fitzgerald^s crossing ; had obHged General 
 Smith's and General Gregg's brigades to fall 
 back ; and, moving over by the road through 
 the Adams farms, had taken position on the 
 right of General Pickett's line, General Mun- 
 f ord forming the left. Under General Sheridan's 
 order General Gibbs and General Gregg attacked 
 the rear of General Pickett's line, which was ex- 
 posed as it advanced on General Devin, and 
 General Custer joined them in the attack with 
 two of his brigades. This freed Generals Devin 
 and Davies, by forcing General Pickett to face 
 about and confront General Sheridan's line in 
 front of the Court House. A severe contest now 
 ensued, lasting until night. General Devin and 
 General Davies reached the Court House by way 
 of the Boydton Road, but not in time to take 
 part in the action. 
 
 That night General Pickett's infantry lay 
 across the road from Dinwiddie Court House to 
 Five Forks, with cavalry on either flank extending 
 with pickets to Fitzgerald's crossing of Cham- 
 berlain's Run on the right, and nearly to the 
 Boydton Road in the vicinity of G. U. Brooks's 
 on the left. General Custer held the Federal 
 
DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 173 
 
 front supported by General Devin. The ground 
 fought over during the day was generally very 
 heavy and in large part densely wooded. 
 
 General Grant states in his report : " Sheridan 
 advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got 
 possession of the Five Forks/' and in the Me- 
 moirs he expresses it : " Sheridan moved back to 
 Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th, 
 and then took a road leading north west to Five 
 Forks. He had only his cavalry with him. 
 Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with 
 a very stout resistance. He gradually drove 
 them back however until in the neighborhood 
 of Five Forks." 
 
 The record, reads that on the night of March 
 30, General Devin, with General Sheridan's ad- 
 vance, halted for the night at the forks of the 
 road near J. Boisseau's, having encountered Gen- 
 eral Fitz Lee's division near that point ; and that 
 on the morning of the 31st, General Devin, 
 again advancing, reached the fork of the Grav- 
 elly Run Church Road, where he again met Gen- 
 eral Fitz Lee. This point is about a mile and a 
 half south east of Five Forks, and no part of 
 General Sheridan's command advanced beyond 
 it on the 31st; but, on the contrary. General 
 Devin was driven backward from it, and at even- 
 ing had returned to Dinwiddie Court House. 
 
 General Grant's report continues : " but the 
 enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, rein- 
 forced the rebel cavalry, defending that point 
 
174 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 with infantry, and forced him back toward Din- 
 widdie Court House." The Memoirs state it ; 
 " Here he had to encounter other troops besides 
 those he had been contending with, and was 
 forced to give way." 
 
 When considering the battle of White Oak 
 Road, we have seen that, at eight 6* clock in the 
 morning of the 31st, General Ayres was notified 
 of General Pickett's presence at Five Forks and 
 cautioned to be prepared for an attack on his 
 left flank, and also that at eleven o'clock Gen- 
 eral Ayres advanced to the White Oak Road 
 and thereby brought on " the affair with the 
 5th corps," wdiich was not concluded until about 
 tliree o^clock in the afternoon. General Grant 
 says on page 440 of the second volume of the 
 Memoirs, that General Lee, on the SOth, sent 
 " Pickett with five brigades at reinforce Five 
 Forks." General Badeau, on page 468 of his 
 third volume, states that General Pickett's attack 
 on Fitzgerald's crossing of Chamberlain's Bed 
 was made at ten o'clock. It is manifest that 
 General Pickett received no aid from the main 
 lines " after the affair with the 5th corps." 
 
 General Grant's report states that " Here 
 General Sheridan displayed great generalship/' 
 As proof of this he states that General Sheri- 
 dan " deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only 
 mounted men enough to take charge of the 
 horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy 
 over a vast extent of wooded and broken coun- 
 
DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 175 
 
 try, and made his progress slow." Coming 
 from any other source than the lieutenant-gen- 
 eral in command of the armies of the United 
 States, such proof would need no notice. Prof- 
 fered as it is, it needs but to be noted — it 
 speaks for itself. General Grant says that Gen- 
 eral Sheridan's tactics were adopted " instead of 
 retreating with his whole command on the main 
 army to tell the story of superior forces encoun- 
 tered." General Sheridan certainly retreated 
 with his whole force to within reach of the 
 main army, and General Grant states that he at 
 once asked to be reinforced with the Sixth 
 Corps. Somebody told the story of superior 
 numbers, and has continued to tell it to this day. 
 The morning report of March 31, 1865, gives 
 the strength of General Sheridan's cavalry com- 
 mand at thirteen thousand enlisted men present 
 for duty. General Badeau states that the com- 
 bined force under General Pickett, confronting 
 General Sheridan at Dinwiddle Court House, 
 was nearly eighteen thousand strong. Fourteen 
 thousand was much more nearly correct, and 
 still in excess ; but, allowing General Badeau's 
 estimate, the odds, even then, against General 
 Sheridan were no greater than those that many 
 of the veterans of the unappreciated Fifth Corps 
 had stood steadily against under General Fitz 
 John Porter at Gaines's Mills, and on more than 
 one field thereafter ; and were as nothing com- 
 pared with what the First Cavalry Division, 
 
176 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 under General John Buford, had held its own 
 against at Gettysburg. It is also proper to note 
 that the superior numbers claimed by General 
 Badeau to have here opposed General Sheridan's 
 command, give not quite the odds against him 
 that undoubtedly existed in his favor on the 
 afternoon of May 7, 1864, when the Brock Road 
 was not opened for the movement of the Fifth 
 Corps to Spottsylvania Court House. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 GENERAL WARREN FROM AFTERNOON OF MARCH 
 31 TO MORNING OF APRIL 1, 1865. 
 
 Continuing his report from where it speaks 
 of General Sheridan " dropping back slowly on 
 Dinwiddie Court House/' Lieutenant-General 
 Grant says : " General Mackenzie's cavalry and 
 one division of the 5th corps were immediately 
 ordered to his assistance. Soon after receiving 
 a report from General Meade that Humphreys 
 could hold our position on the Boydton Road, 
 and that the other two divisions of the 5th 
 corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered 
 at once. Thus the operations of the day neces- 
 sitated the sending of Warren, because of his 
 accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was in- 
 tended, and precipitated intended movements. 
 On the morning of the 1st of April, General 
 Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove 
 the enemy back on Five Forks, where, late in 
 the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly 
 fortified position, capturing all his artillery and 
 between five and six thousand prisoners. 
 
 " About the close of this battle. Brevet Major- 
 General Charles Griffin relieved Major-Gen eral 
 
178 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 Warren in command of the Sth corps. The 
 report of this reached me after nightfall." 
 
 Eesuming General Grant's narrative at the 
 same point, we find in the Memoirs : " In this 
 condition of affairs he [Sheridan] notified me 
 of what had taken place and stated that he was 
 falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and 
 slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to 
 his assistance. I replied to him that it was im- 
 possible to send Wright's corps because that 
 corps was already in line close up to the enemy, 
 where we should want to assault when the 
 proper time came, and was besides a long dis- 
 tance from him ; but the 2d (Humphreys's) and 
 5th (Warren's) corps were on our extreme left 
 and a little to the rear of it in a position to 
 threaten the left flank of the enemy at Five 
 Forks, and that I would send Warren. 
 
 " Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to 
 move at once that night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie 
 Court House and put himself in communication 
 with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to 
 him. He was very slow in moving, some of his 
 troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next 
 morning. When he did move it was done very 
 deliberately, and on arriving at Gravelly Run he 
 found the stream swollen from the recent rains so 
 that he regarded it as not fordable. Sheridan of 
 course knew of his coming, and being impatient to 
 get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to 
 him to hasten. He was also hastened or at least 
 
GENERAL WARREN. 179 
 
 ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade. 
 He now felt that he could not cross that creek 
 without bridges, and his orders were changed to 
 move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank 
 or get in their rear ; but he was so late in getting 
 up that Sheridan determined to move forward 
 without him. However, Ayres's division of 
 Warren's corps reached him in time to be in the 
 fight all day, most of the time separated from the 
 remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly 
 under Sheridan. 
 
 " Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock 
 on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not 
 up so as to be much engaged until late in the 
 afternoon. Griffin's division in backing to get 
 out of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy 
 was found marching away from the fighting. 
 This did not continue long, however ; the division 
 was brought back and with Ayres's division did 
 most excellent service during the day. Craw- 
 ford's division of the same corps had backed still 
 farther off, and although orders were sent re- 
 peatedly to bring it up, it was late before it 
 finally got to where it could be of material as- 
 sistance. Once there it did very excellent ser- 
 vice. 
 
 " Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the af- 
 ternoon or a little later, in advancing up to the 
 point from which to make his designed assault 
 upon Five Forks itself. He was very impatient 
 to make the assault and have it all over before 
 
180 GRANT VS. THE RECORD, 
 
 night, because the ground he occupied would be 
 untenable for him in bivouac during the night. 
 Unless the assault was made and was successful, 
 he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddle 
 Court-House or even further than that for the 
 night. 
 
 '^ It was at this junction of affairs that Sheri- 
 dan wanted to get Crawford's division in hand, 
 and he also wanted Warren. He sent staff 
 officer after staff officer in search of Warren, di- 
 recting that general to report to him, but they 
 were unable to find him. At all events Sheridan 
 was unable to get that officer to him. Finally he 
 went himself. He issued an order relieving 
 Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of 
 the 5th corps. The troops were then brought 
 up and the assault successfully made. 
 
 "I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's 
 dilatory movements in the battle of White Oak 
 Eoad and in his failure to reach Sheridan in 
 time, that I was very much afraid that at the 
 last moment he would fail Sheridan. He was a 
 man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick 
 perception, and could make his dispositions as 
 quickly as any officer, under difficulties when he 
 was forced to act. But I had before discovered 
 a defect which was beyond his control, that was 
 very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies 
 like the one just before us. He could see every 
 danger at a glance before he had encountered it. 
 He would not only make preparations to meet 
 
GENERAL WARREN. 181 
 
 the danger which might occur, but he would in- 
 form his commanding officer what others should 
 do while he was executing his move. 
 
 " I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan 
 to call his attention to these defects, and to say 
 that as much as I hked General Warren, now 
 was not a time when we could let our personal 
 feelings for any one stand in the way of success ; 
 and if his removal was necessary to success, not 
 to hesitate. It was upon that authorization that 
 Sheridan removed Warren. I was very sorry 
 that it had been done, and regretted stiU more 
 that I had not long before taken occasion to 
 assign him to another field of duty." 
 
 General Grant here expresses regret that Gen- 
 eral Sheridan had acted on his plain suggestion, 
 and yet, — while, as will be seen hereafter. Gen- 
 eral Sheridan extended the authority given him 
 by General Grant, and removed General War- 
 ren from his corps command after he had with 
 that corps secured success for General Sheridan, 
 — through all the years in which he had the 
 power, General Grant denied to General War- 
 ren the meagre justice of official inquiry and 
 statement of the facts pertaining to the case. 
 
 General Warren,^ while at W. Dabney's on 
 the White Oak Road, about five o'clock in the 
 afternoon of March 31, heard the sound of Gen- 
 eral Sheridan's engagement coming from the 
 south-west, and, as it appeared to him to be re- 
 
 1 Reference resumed to 13th chap. Va. Camp. 
 
182 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 ceding, he at once and without waiting for 
 orders sent General Bartlett with his brigade 
 of General Griffin's division toward the firing, 
 with directions to attack the enemy in flank. 
 This prompt and, as will be seen, efficient aid 
 from what General Badeau calls " Warren's dis- 
 organized flank," is not alluded to in General 
 Grant's Report or Memoirs, or in General Ba- 
 deau's History. 
 
 Soon after five o'clock. General Warren re- 
 ceived orders from General Meade to push a bri- 
 gade down the White Oak Road, so as to open 
 it for General Sheridan. He was directed to 
 support this brigade if necessary. At half-past 
 six this order was recalled, and he was directed 
 to send the brigade down the Boydton Plank 
 Road as promptly as possible, as it was reported 
 to General Meade, by an officer of General Mer- 
 ritt's staff, that the enemy had penetrated be- 
 tween General Sheridan's main command and 
 General Warren's position. As General Bart- 
 lett had by this time advanced too far to be 
 promptly recalled. General Warren directed Gen- 
 eral Pearson, who with three regiments was on 
 the Boydton Road, to move at once toward Din- 
 widdie Court House. The order was promptly 
 obeyed ; but the bridge at the Boydton Road 
 crossing of Gravelly Run had been destroyed 
 by the enemy on the 29th, and, the stream be- 
 ing swollen from the rain and unfordable for 
 infantry. General Pearson was compelled to halt 
 
GENERAL WARREN. 183 
 
 at that point. Why this bridge had not been 
 examined and repaired on the 30th, and held 
 ready for just such an emergency as this, does 
 not appear. Both General Grant and General 
 Meade seem to have been ignorant of this se- 
 rious break in the lines of communication with 
 the cavalry corps until informed by General 
 Warren. 
 
 At eight o'clock, General Warren was in- 
 formed that, as General Sheridan had been 
 forced back to Dinwiddie Court House and the 
 rear of the Fifth and Second Corps was thus 
 left exposed on the Boydton Road, the brigade 
 sent down that road should not go farther than 
 Gravelly Run. About half-past nine, however, 
 he was ordered to withdraw the Fifth Corps 
 from the White Oak Road to the Boydton Road, 
 and send General Griffin^s division at once to 
 General Sheridan by the Boydton Road. He 
 immediately sent a staff offi.cer, and then Cap- 
 tain Benyaurd of the Engineer Corps, to repair 
 or rebuild the bridge ; and, advising General 
 Meade of the situation and condition of his 
 command, prepared to withdraw from the White 
 Oak Road to the Boydton Road, and to send 
 General Grif&n, as ordered, to General Sheri- 
 dan. He was soon after notified that the divi- 
 sion ordered to General Sheridan '}nust start at 
 07icej and in reply stated the condition of the 
 bridge, and that he was making every effort to 
 have it passable by the time General Grif&n 
 
184 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 reached it. General Warren's headquarters were 
 on the Boydton Road; General Meade's were 
 at the Vaughan Road crossing of Hatcher's 
 Run, about five miles from General Warren, 
 and about two miles from General Grant's head- 
 quarters, which were near Dabney's Mill, a 
 point west from General Meade and about eight 
 miles from Dinwiddle Court House. The tele- 
 graph lines between these headquarters were 
 working badly. 
 
 At 8.40 p. M. General Warren had telegraphed 
 General Meade, suggesting that, if the enemy 
 did not threaten south of Gravelly Run and 
 east of the Boydton Plank Road, he could move 
 with his corps and attack the enemy near Din- 
 widdle Court House on one side, while General 
 Sheridan attacked on the other. In a note on 
 page 477 of his third volume, General Badeau 
 gives General Warren's despatch as follows : 
 " The fine along the plank road is very strong. 
 One division, with my artillery, I think, can 
 hold it, if we are not threatened south of Gra- 
 velly run. East of the plank road. General 
 Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could 
 hold this securely, and let me move down and 
 attack the enemy at Dinwiddle court-house on 
 one side, and Sheridan on the other. On ac- 
 count of Bartlett's position, they [the enemy] 
 will have to make a considerable detour to rein- 
 force their troops at that point from the north. 
 Unless General Sheridan has been too badly 
 
GENERAL WARREN. 185 
 
 handled, I think we should have a chance for an 
 open-field fight that should be made use of." At 
 9.45 p. M. this proposition was submitted to Gen- 
 eral Grant by General Meade, who at the same 
 time stated the position of General Bartlett's 
 brigade near Gravelly Run, on the road from 
 Dinwiddie Court House, past J. Boisseau's, to 
 the White Oak Road. General Meade also stated 
 that in this way General Warren could move at 
 once and take the enemy in rear, or he could 
 send one division to General Sheridan near Din- 
 widdie Court House, and move on the enemy's 
 rear with the other two divisions of his corps. 
 General Grant replied, " Let Warren move in 
 the way you propose, and urge him not to stop 
 for anything. Let Griffin go on as he was first 
 directed," 
 
 At 10.50 p. M. General Warren received Gen- 
 eral Meade's reply to his suggestion made at 
 8.40 p. M. He was now directed to send General 
 Griffin's division promptly, as ordered, by the 
 Boydton Road; and with the rest of his corps 
 to move, very promptly and without encumber- 
 ing himself with anything that would prevent 
 his moving in any direction or impede him in 
 any way, by the road General Bartlett was on, 
 so as to strike the enemy in rear, and get the 
 forks of the Brooks Cross-Roads so as to open 
 communication with the Boydton Road. Both 
 General Grant and General Meade informed 
 General Sheridan of the steps taken to reinforce 
 
186 GRANT VS. THE RECORD, 
 
 him. General Warren answered General Meade's 
 despatch, received at 10.50, saying that, as in 
 withdrawing his corps to the Boydton Koad, as 
 previously ordered. General Ayres's division was 
 necessarily the first to reach the road, he would 
 send him, instead of General Griffin, to General 
 Sheridan by the Boydton Road, and move with 
 General Crawford and General Griffin to strike 
 the rear of the enemy as just directed. He at 
 the same time gave the preliminary orders for 
 the movements of these divisions. 
 
 Not till one o'clock in the morning of April 1, 
 did General Warren receive a reply from Gen- 
 eral Meade to his despatch concerning the de- 
 struction of the bridge over Gravelly Run. It 
 was then suggested that the troops for General 
 Sheridan should be sent over the Quaker Road, 
 or hy both roads if necessary, and the rear 
 attack he given up, as time was of the utmost 
 importance ; for General Sheridan could not 
 maintain himself at Dinwiddle Court House 
 without reinforcements, and General Warren 
 must use every exertion to get troops to him as 
 soon as possible. It was also stated that if 
 General Sheridan was not reinforced and must 
 fall back, he would retire by the Vaughan Road. 
 It was nine or ten miles from General Warren's 
 position to Dinwiddle Court House by way of 
 the Quaker Road, and by that route reinforce- 
 ments could scarcely reach General Sheridan 
 before eight o'clock in the morning. While 
 
GENERAL WARREN. 187 
 
 advising General Meade of this. General Warren 
 assured him that if he failed to get his troops 
 through by the road they were on, he would do 
 so by the Quaker Road. 
 
 As the tenor of the despatch appeared to Gen- 
 eral Warren to leave to his discretion the deci- 
 sion of how he could best reinforce General 
 Sheridan, he decided to persevere in the move- 
 ment in progress, as in his opinion he could best 
 reach the rear of the enemy by the Boydton 
 Road, should General Sheridan, through failure 
 of reinforcements to reach him in time, be forced 
 to fall back by the Vaughan Road. At two 
 o'clock in the morning General Ayres was cross- 
 ing the repaired bridge over Gravelly Run and 
 advancing with his division toward Dinwiddie 
 Court House. General Meade was informed of 
 this fact. An hour before daybreak of April 1, 
 an officer of General Sheridan's staff met Gen- 
 eral Ayres about two miles from Dinwiddie 
 Court House, and led him back about a mile to 
 the Brooks Cross-Road, and along that road to 
 its intersection with the direct road from the 
 Court House to Five Forks. In this vicinity 
 General Ayres's division was massed to await 
 further orders. Soon after the division entered 
 the Brooks Road, about the dawn of day, one of 
 General Munford's videttes was seen retiring. 
 
 At half-past four a. m. General Warren learned 
 that General Ayres had communicated with 
 General Sheridan. The tenor of all General 
 
188 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 Meade's instructions to him had been that the 
 most important duty assigned him was to make 
 sure that a division reached General Sheridan 
 in time to go into action at daylight. Hamng 
 fulfilled that duty, he was about joining the 
 remaining divisions of his corps to move them, as 
 he had also been directed, when he received Gen- 
 eral Sheridan's despatch sent at three a. m. This 
 despatch said : " I am holding in front of Din- 
 widdie Court House, on the road leading to Five 
 Forks, for three-quarters of a mile, with General 
 Custer's division. The enemy are in his imme- 
 diate front, lying so as to cover the road just 
 this side of the Adams' House, which leads out 
 across Chamberlain's Bed or Run. I understand 
 you have a division at J. Boisseau's ; if so, you 
 are in rear of the enemy's line, and almost on 
 his flank. I will hold on here. Possibly they 
 may attack Custer at daylight ; if so, have this 
 division attack instantly and in full force. At- 
 tack at daylight anyway, and I will make an 
 eif ort to get the road this side of Adams' House, 
 and if I do, you can capture the whole of them. 
 Any force moving down the road I am hold- 
 ing, or on the White Oak road, will be in the 
 enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force 
 that may escape you by a flank attack. Do not 
 fear my leaving here. If the enemy remain I 
 shall fight at dayhght." 
 
 At five o'clock in the morning of April 1, 
 General Grifi&n's division moved from the White 
 
GENERAL WARREN. 189 
 
 Oak Road, followed by General Crawford's divi- 
 sion, to Crump's, and thence to the forks of the 
 road near J. Boisseau's. Here General Devin's 
 cavalry division was met about seven o'clock, and 
 General Sheridan directed General Warren to 
 remain at J. Boisseau's to rest his men, holding 
 them ready to move to the front when required. 
 
 General Bartlett, when ordered by General 
 Warren, at five o'clock on the afternoon of the 
 31st, to proceed from near W. Dabney's house 
 on the White Oak Road toward the sound of 
 firing in the direction of Dinwiddie Court House, 
 had moved by a wood road, which led him to 
 Dr. Boisseau's house on the direct road from the 
 White Oak Road to the Court House. Here his 
 skirmishers met those of the enemy and drove 
 them across Gravelly Run on the road at Crump's. 
 At dark General Bartlett established his picket 
 line along the run. 
 
 About ten o'clock at night (March 31) General 
 Pickett was informed of the presence of General 
 Bartlett on the road near Crump's, and thinking 
 it to be the advance of the Fifth Corps he decided 
 to fall back to Five Forks during the night. 
 His ambulances and ammunition trains and the 
 artillery began to move back at about midnight, 
 and were followed by the infantry on the most 
 direct road to Five Forks ; General Corse's bri- 
 gade bringing up the rear of the infantry and 
 getting off just before daylight. General Mun- 
 ford's division of cavalry followed the infantry 
 
190 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 about daylight ; and about the same time Gen- 
 eral W. H. F. Lee and General Rosser, with 
 their cavalry divisions, recrossed Chamberlain's 
 Bed and moved back through Little Five Forks. 
 The Opinion of the Warren Court of Inquiry 
 upon the second imputation or accusation laid 
 before it was as follows : — 
 
 "Second Imputation. 
 
 " The second imputation is found in the fol- 
 lowing extract from General Sheridan's report of 
 May 15, 1865 (see Record, pp. 21 and 48), as 
 follows : — 
 
 " ' . . . had General Warren moved accord- 
 ing to the expectations of the Lieutenant Gen- 
 eral, there would appear to have been but little 
 chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry in 
 front of Dinwiddle Court House.' 
 
 " Opinion. 
 
 " It is supposed that the expectations of the 
 Lieutenant General, referred to in the imputation, 
 are those expressed in his despatch to General 
 Sheridan of 10.45 p. m. of March 31, 1865, as 
 follows : — 
 
 CLXXIX. 
 
 " ' Dabney's Mills, 
 
 Alarch 31, 18C5, 10.45 p. m. 
 " * Major-General Sheridan, 
 
 " ' The Fifth corps has been ordered to your 
 support. Two divisions will go by J. Boisseau's 
 
GENERAL WARREN. 191 
 
 and one down the Boydton road. In addition to 
 this I have sent Mackenzie's cavalry, which will 
 reach you by the Vaughan road. All these 
 forces, except the cavalry, should reach you by 
 12 M. to-night. You will assume command of 
 the whole force sent to operate with you and use 
 it to the best of your ability to destroy the force 
 which your command has fought so gallantly to- 
 day. U. S. Grant, Lieut, Gen J 
 
 In which he says, ^all these forces except the 
 cavalry, should reach you by 12 to-night.' 
 
 " If this supposition be correct, the Court is 
 of the opinion, considering the condition of the 
 roads and surrounding country over part of which 
 the troops had to march, the darkness of the 
 night, the distance to be travelled, and the hour 
 at which the order for the march reached General 
 Warren, 10.50 P. M., that it was not practicable 
 for the Fifth corps to have reached General Sher- 
 idan at 12 o'clock on the night of March 31. 
 
 "Notwithstanding that dispositions suitable 
 for the contingency of Sheridan's falling back 
 from Dinwiddle might well have occupied and 
 perplexed General Warren's mind during the 
 night, the Court is of the opinion that he should 
 have moved the two divisions by the Crump 
 road in obedience to the orders and expectations 
 of his commander, upon whom alone rested the 
 responsibility of the consequences. 
 
192 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 " It appears from the despatches and General 
 Warren's testimony, that neither Generals Meade, 
 Sheridan, nor Warren expressed an intention of 
 having this column attack before daylight. 
 
 " The Court is further of the opinion that 
 General Warren should have started with two 
 divisions, as directed by General Meade's de- 
 spatch (civ., heretofore quoted), as early after 
 its receipt at 10.50 p. m., as he could be assured 
 of the prospect of Ayres's departure down the 
 Boydton plank-road, and should have advanced 
 on the Crump road as far as directed in that de- 
 spatch, or as far as might be practicable or 
 necessary to fulfil General Meade's intentions ; 
 whereas the evidence shows that he did not start 
 until between five and six o'clock on the morning 
 of the 1st of April, and did not reach J. Bois- 
 seau's with the head of the column till about 
 seven o'clock in the morning. 
 
 " The despatches show that Generals Meade 
 and Warren anticipated a withdrawal during the 
 night of the enemy's forces fronting General 
 Sheridan, which was rendered highly probable 
 from the known position in their rear of a por- 
 tion of the Fifth corps (Bartlett's brigade) at G. 
 Boisseau's, and the event justified the anticipa- 
 tion." 
 
 General Grant's official report states only the 
 fact that, on the night of the 31st, the Fifth Corps 
 was ordered to move to the support of General 
 Sheridan. The narrative of the Memoirs, how- 
 
GENERAL WARREN. 193 
 
 ever, charges that, being ordered on that night 
 to report to General Sheridan, General Warren 
 was very slow in moving ; — that when he did 
 move it was very deliberately done ; and that, in 
 spite of hastening orders from Generals Meade 
 and Sheridan, he allowed his command to be un- 
 necessarily delayed by the broken bridge over 
 Gravelly Run, and thereby failed to reinforce 
 General Sheridan as promptly as he should have 
 done. 
 
 We find from the Record, however, that Gen- 
 eral Warren was the first to move in sending 
 aid to General Sheridan ; for, acting on the au- 
 thority of his soldierly intelligence alone, before 
 General Grant was aware of General Sheridan^ s 
 discomfiture, he had sent General Bartlett with 
 his brigade toward the sound of General Sher- 
 idan's battle as soon as it reached his ears, and 
 by this timely aid effectually reinforced General 
 Sheridan against General Pickett's " superior 
 forces," which dare not remain confronting him 
 with this threatening force upon the rear of 
 their left flank. 
 
 We find also that it was General Warren 
 who proposed the movement of the Fifth Corps 
 upon the rear of the enemy at Dinwiddie Court 
 House ; and that when his suggestion was sent 
 back to him approved, it was too late to make 
 the movement he had proposed successfully, for 
 General Pickett had been warned nearly an hour 
 before General Warren received permission to 
 
194 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 move against him, and was, of course, prepared 
 to meet him. In addition, General Warren's or- 
 dered movement was hampered with the repeated 
 and positive injunction to make sure that one 
 division of his corps reached General Sheridan 
 before daylight by the Boydton Road; and by 
 his anxiety faithfully to fulfil this additional 
 obligation laid upon him, he incurred the only 
 censure put upon his actions in this movement 
 by the Court. 
 
 It is to be remembered that it was not till one 
 o'clock in the morning of April 1, that General 
 Meade became aware of the destruction of the 
 bridge over Gravelly Run ; that his orders to 
 General Warren subordinated everything to the 
 necessity of reinforcing General Sheridan by the 
 Boydton Road ; that he even proposed to aban- 
 don the movement by Boisseau's to insure the 
 arrival of a division at Dinwiddle Court House ; 
 and that his death, here also, deprived the Court 
 of evidence very material to the question as to 
 which of the orders he received demanded the 
 first and greatest care from General Warren. 
 No word in the Opinion of the Court implies 
 that anything of negligence or want of energy 
 was shown by General Warren ; and when we 
 consider the expressed opinion that it was imprac- 
 ticable for the Fifth Corps to have reached Gen- 
 eral Sheridan as soon as General Grant expected, 
 and the further statements of the Court as to the 
 expectations of attacking the enemy, and the 
 
GENERAL WARREN. 195 
 
 evidence with regard to the removal of General 
 Pickett's forces, — it may be safely said that 
 the fault of which General Warren was in the 
 opinion of the Court guilty, was at the most 
 technical, rather than culpable, in character. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 FIVE FORKS. 
 
 Being directed by General R. E. Lee to main- 
 tain the position at Five Forks, General Pickett 
 at once intrenched himself along the White 
 Oak Road, his line extending from Five Forks 
 to the west about a mile, and to the east about 
 three quarters of a mile, with a short return 
 about a hundred yards long at his left. Gen- 
 eral W. H. F. Lee's cavalry division was on his 
 right along the west line of the Gilliam Field. 
 General Corse's infantry brigade, next on the 
 left, lay along the north side of the same field ; 
 and then in order came Colonel Mayo's, General 
 Steuart's, General Ransom's, and Colonel Wal- 
 lace's brigades of infantry, with General Mun- 
 ford's cavalry division, dismounted, on the ex- 
 treme left, covering between Colonel Wallace's 
 left and Hatcher's Run. Three guns of Colonel 
 Pegram's battalion of artillery were posted on 
 General Corse's right, and three at the Five 
 Forks. McGregor's battery of four guns was 
 on the left. General Roberts's cavalry brigade 
 picketed from General Munford's left towards 
 
FIVE FORKS. 197 
 
 the right of the main line of works covering 
 the Claiborne Koad ; and General Rosser guarded 
 the trains on the north side of Hatcher's Run, 
 near the Ford Road. 
 
 At daylight of April 1, General Merritt 
 moved forward toward Five Forks with General 
 Sheridan's cavalry, pressing the rear of the 
 enemy. General Custer's division, dismounted, 
 moved along Chamberlain's Bed or Run ; Gen- 
 eral Devin's division advanced on the right ; and 
 General Crook's division was held in reserve. 
 General Merritt pressed close up to General 
 Pickett's intrenchments. 
 
 General Sheridan's plan of attack was to 
 manoeuvre as if to turn the enemy's right flank 
 with his cavalry, and assault their left with the 
 Fifth Corps ; General Merritt to attack the in- 
 trenchments in his front as soon as the infan- 
 try became engaged. At one o'clock he directed 
 General V/arren to bring up the Fifth Corps 
 and form it on the right of General Devin, 
 six or eight hundred yards south of the White 
 Oak Road. Captain Gillespie, engineer officer 
 on General Sheridan's staff, had examined the 
 ground where the Fifth Corps was formed. 
 General Mackenzie had been sent from Din- 
 widdle Court House to get possession of the 
 White Oak Road at a point about three miles 
 east of Five Forks. He succeeded after a brisk 
 skirmish with some of the enemy's cavalry, and 
 moved down to the right of the Fifth Corps, 
 
198 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 being ordered to move in conjunction with that 
 corps, on its right, and gain the flank and rear 
 of the enemy, and hold the Ford Road crossing 
 of Gravelly Run to cut off their retreat. 
 
 General Sheridan, besides informing General 
 Warren as to the general plan of the battle, in- 
 structed him that the enemy was in line of bat- 
 tle along the White Oak Road, their left resting 
 not far from the crossing of the Gravelly Run 
 Church Road ; that he was to form his line so 
 that he could strike with his right centre on the 
 angle of the works and let his left engage the 
 front ; that he was to place one division behind 
 his right to support the attack on the angle, 
 and to give his line such a direction that its 
 obliquity to the road would correspond with the 
 supposed position of the works of the enemy. 
 The matter was talked over at length, and Gen- 
 eral Warren drew a diagram of the proposed 
 plan and wrote upon it the instructions he had 
 received for the assault. 
 
 General Crawford with his division arrived 
 first upon the ground, and was followed by Gen- 
 eral Griffin, General Ayres arriving last. Gen- 
 eral Crawford's division was placed upon the 
 right of the Gravelly Run Church Road ob- 
 liquely to that road, so that his centre would 
 strike where it was supposed the angle was 
 located, and be the first to reach the works. 
 General Griffin's division was placed in rear of 
 General Crawford. General Ayres's division, 
 
FIVE FORKS. 199 
 
 the smallest, was placed on the left of the road, 
 and was to engage the enemy's front and pre- 
 vent support being sent to the angle when Gen- 
 eral Crawford should become engaged at that 
 point. A copy of General Warren's diagram, 
 with the instructions noted upon it, was given 
 to each division commander and the plan ex- 
 plained to them verbally in addition. The line 
 was to move forward as formed till it reached 
 the White Oak Road, when it was to swing 
 around to the left until perpendicular to that 
 road. 
 
 About four o'clock in the afternoon, as soon 
 as General Ayres's division was formed, the 
 Fifth Corps was ordered to attack. Advancing, 
 and receiving only a skirmish fire as he crossed 
 the White Oak Road with his right. General 
 Warren, thinking the enemy's line of battle was 
 probably in the edge of the woods about three 
 hundred yards north of the road, continued to 
 advance in the direction in which he had started 
 until the left of General Ayres's division had 
 crossed. General Ayres then received a mus- 
 ketry and artillery fire on his left, which evidently 
 came from the enemy's intrenchments at the re- 
 turn, which was, in fact, seven or eight hundred 
 yards west of the Gravelly Run Church Road, 
 instead of in the near vicinity of that road as 
 General Sheridan had supposed it to be. On re- 
 ceiving this fire General Ayres at once changed 
 front and faced the return. General Winthrop's 
 
200 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 brigade, which was in reserve, was brought in 
 double quick to the left of the line, which then 
 advanced and finally carried the works, captur- 
 ing a large number of prisoners and many battle 
 flags. 
 
 When the fire opened on General Ayres's left. 
 General Warren, seeing that the fight at the 
 angle would fall on General Ayres and not on 
 General Crawford as had been planned, at once 
 ordered General Winthrop to General Ayres's 
 left to connect w4th General Devin, and sent 
 word to General Griffin to support General 
 Ayres's right as quickly as he could, and to Gen- 
 eral Crawford to change direction to the left at 
 right angles to the line he was following. Gen- 
 eral Sheridan, who was with General Ayres's 
 division through the greater part of the battle, 
 also sent orders to General Griffin and General 
 Crawford to come in on General Ayres's right. 
 But a large part of both General Crawford's 
 and General Griffin's divisions had entered the 
 woods north of the White Oak Road. 
 
 General Warren also directed Colonel Kellogg, 
 commanding General Crawford's left, to form his 
 brigade at right angles to its first direction and 
 to hold it there for the division to align upon ; 
 and he then directed Colonel Coulter, who was 
 following in reserve, to form on Colonel Kellogg. 
 Searching through the dense woods for General 
 Crawford, and sending repeated orders for him 
 to change direction to the left and keep closed 
 
FIVE FORKS. 201 
 
 on Colonel Kellogg, so as to advance against the 
 rear of the enemy, General Warren returning to 
 Colonel Kellogg's position found that officer had 
 been removed by one of General Sheridan's aides. 
 All of General Warren's staff had now been sent 
 to bring General Griffin and General Crawford 
 to attack the enemy in rear, and many of General 
 Sheridan's staff had been dispatched for the same 
 purpose ; and in spite of the dense woods the di- 
 rection of both divisions had soon been changed, 
 and they came into the open ground of the Syd- 
 nor Farm about eight hundred yards from the 
 enemy's intrenchments near the return. 
 
 General Warren found General Griffin, and 
 directed him to attack General Ransom's bri- 
 gade, which, with part of Colonel Wallace's 
 brigade, had formed a new line, slightly in- 
 trenched, connected with and at right angles 
 to their main line. He then rode to General 
 Ayres ; and finding that he had carried the 
 return and was re-forming his troops to face 
 the new line taken up by the enemy, he started 
 to find General Crawford, who had passed 
 through the Sydnor field driving General Mun- 
 ford's dismounted cavalry westward before him. 
 Following in his track, General Warren found 
 General Crawford in the Young-Boisseau Farm, 
 with his command facing west and in good 
 order, Colonel Kellogg's brigade having rejoined 
 the division. First sending Colonel Spear to 
 hold the Ford Road crossing of Hatcher's Run, 
 
202 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 General Warren changed the direction of the 
 division to the south, and led it along the Ford 
 Road toward the rear of the enemy's lines, 
 meeting, however, at the edge of the woods on 
 the south side of the farm, a sharp fire from a 
 line which General Pickett, having reached the 
 field, had formed across the Ford Road with 
 Colonel Majo's brigade, some of General Ran- 
 som's troops just driven from the south-west 
 corner of the Sydnor field by General Grif&n, 
 and McGregor's four guns which had drawn 
 back from the return on the left. The resistance 
 here was brief, and General Crawford captured 
 the four guns. Part of General Bartlett's bri- 
 gade joined General Crawford in this field ; but 
 neither General Griffin nor General Ayres had 
 yet reached this point, the resistance of General 
 Ransom's and Colonel Wallace's men having 
 been stubborn and protracted for about half an 
 hour. 
 
 General Pickett, seeing that the line upon the 
 Ford Road could not be maintained, gave direc- 
 tion to General Corse to form a line along the 
 west side of the Gilliam field, at right angles to 
 the main intrenchments and extending into the 
 woods to the north, to cover as far as possible 
 the retreat of the infantry. General Warren, 
 with General Crawford's division, pursuing the 
 enemy as they fell back to the westward, came 
 upon the Gilliam field. Here General Craw- 
 ford's fine was formed in the edge of the woods 
 
FIVE FORKS. 203 
 
 on the east of the field, the right being north of 
 the White Oak Road. A sharp fire was being 
 kept up from the enemy's quickly occupied and 
 partially intrenched new line, and there was some 
 little hesitation in General Crawford's tired com- 
 mand about advancing to the attack ; but Gen- 
 eral Warren, riding forward with the corps flag 
 in his hand, led them across the field. General 
 Custer advanced from the south at the same 
 time, having sent word by a staff officer that he 
 would do so. The fire was severe. Close up to 
 the enemy's lines General Warren's horse fell 
 dead under him, his orderly was killed at his 
 side, and Colonel Richardson, of the Seventh 
 Wisconsin, springing between his chief and the 
 enemy, fell severely wounded ; but in a fcAv 
 moments the intrenchments were carried and 
 many prisoners taken. It was now dusk, and 
 General Warren, after continuing the pursuit 
 westward for half a mile, General Custer having 
 passed on his left with his cavalry division, and 
 there being no enemy in sight, halted his com- 
 mand and reported for further orders. This is 
 not what General Grant has written, hut it is 
 the Record. 
 
 General Custer's division, on the left in the 
 assault, had but one brigade dismounted. With 
 that he had kept up a constant fire upon the 
 enemy's lines. With his two other brigades 
 mounted, he charged General W. H. F. Lee's 
 right, and a spirited encounter took place ; but 
 General Lee held his position. 
 
204 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 General Devin's division advanced upon the 
 enemy's front dismounted, when the Fifth Corps 
 moved to attack, and kept up a constant fire. 
 When the enemy were falling back from the 
 Young-Boisseau field, Colonel Fitzhugh's bri- 
 gade charged and carried the Hues in its front, 
 capturing three guns, two battle flags, and over 
 a thousand prisoners. 
 
 General Mackenzie, moving on General Craw- 
 ford's right, had once crossed Hatcher's Run, 
 against which he was crowded by the infantry ; 
 but he recrossed to the south side, along which 
 he advanced westward to the Ford Road crossing, 
 which he had been directed to hold. 
 
 We are told by General Badeau that General 
 Crook's division " was south of Dinwiddle on the 
 1st of April, and as far from the battle field as 
 the left of the Army of the Potomac." ^ 
 
 General Pickett was routed with a loss of not 
 less than four thousand five hundred prisoners, 
 thirteen colors, and seven guns. Of these the 
 Fifth Corps captured over three thousand two 
 hundred prisoners, eleven colors, and four guns, 
 the larger part of the prisoners being taken by 
 General Ayres's and General Griffin's divisions. 
 The Fifth Corps lost — in killed, wounded, and 
 missing — in General Crawford's division three 
 hundred, in General Ayres's division two hun- 
 dred and five, and in General Griffin's division 
 one hundred and twenty-five. Total, six hun- 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., p. 495, note. 
 
FIVE FORKS. 205 
 
 dred and thirty-four. Among tlie killed was 
 General Fred. Winthrop. The proportion of 
 cavalry officers killed and wounded was large, 
 but the total casualties in that corps was not 
 large. 
 
 The success of General Sheridan's command 
 was complete, and after the last of the enemy 
 had been driven from or captured at Five Forks, 
 at seven o'clock in the evening, he sent an order 
 to General Warren relieving him from duty with 
 the Fifth Corps, and directing him to report for 
 orders to Lieutenant-General Grant. 
 
 On the morning of April 1, General Hunt, 
 chief of artillery, had sent Captain E. E. War- 
 ner, Third U. S. Artillery, to the old headquar- 
 ter's camp of the Fifth Corps on some artillery 
 duty. General Warren had insisted upon his 
 staff getting some sleep during the night of the 
 31st, and when he moved with his command 
 on the morning of the 1st, had left some of 
 them still sleeping, among them Colonel Locke, 
 assistant adjutant-general. Captain Warner was 
 directed by General Eawlins to ascertain where 
 the Fifth Corps was ; and m.eeting Colonel Locke 
 about nine o'clock, asked him for the informa- 
 tion. Colonel Locke replied that when he last 
 heard from them a portion of the corps had 
 halted to bridge a stream, meaning that he had 
 gone to sleep before the bridge was built and 
 had received no further information since. Upon 
 returning to headquarters about ten o'clock, 
 
206 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 Captain Warner stated to General Rawlins that 
 the Fifth Corps, or a portion of it, when last 
 heard from, was delayed building a bridge, and 
 that they were there still delayed. 
 
 We have referred already to the correspond- 
 ence between General Grant and General Sheri- 
 dan, on March 30, with regard to reinforcing 
 the latter with a corps of infantry, and Gen- 
 eral Sheridan's unwillingness to have the Fifth 
 Corps sent to him. In addition we are told by 
 General Badeau (vol. iii., pp. 497-499), with 
 reference to the operations of April 1 : " The 
 general -in -chief had three aides-de-camp with 
 Sheridan this day, sending them in succession to 
 communicate his views. Colonel Porter was in- 
 structed first to say that the movements of the 
 main army would very much depend upon the 
 result of Sheridan's operations ; that Grant 
 would have preferred to send him the Sixth 
 corps, but it was at too great distance to reach 
 him in time ; and that the Fifth corps, being 
 the nearest, had been dispatched instead. A 
 little before noon Colonel Babcock arrived with 
 a verbal messasre from Grant to the eifect that 
 Sheridan was to have complete control of his 
 own movement ; that the responsibility would 
 rest entirely with him ; and that, if in his judg- 
 ment, Warren should not 'pvone equal to the 
 task assigned him, Sheridan must not hesitate 
 to relieve him and put another in command of 
 the Fifth corps." 
 
FIVE FORKS. 207 
 
 And he adds further : " He hesitated some 
 hours before sending this permission, which was, 
 indeed, almost an invitation, to Sheridan." 
 
 He concludes his chapter with the inspired re- 
 mark, '- The success of the one is the explana- 
 tion of the failure of the other," which may well 
 bear a more candid construction than that its 
 author evidently intended. 
 
 General Humphreys has frankly stated that 
 " At times, during the campaign beginning in 
 May, there had been misunderstandings between 
 General Meade and General Warren, the latter 
 sometimes modifying the plan of operations pre- 
 scribed by the orders of the day for the Fifth 
 corps, so as to make them accord with his own 
 judgment, as the day went on, modifications 
 which General Meade sometimes did not approve, 
 and hence something like controversy grevr up 
 occasionally in the despatches that passed be- 
 tween them. It appears to be probable that 
 General Grant apprehended that something of 
 this kind might occur between General Sheri- 
 dan and General Warren, and considering the 
 time to be a critical one, sent the message 
 mentioned to General Sheridan." It is to be 
 remembered, however, that though the pages 
 of both the Military History and the Memoirs 
 of U. S. Grant teem with evidence of the im- 
 placable spirit in which every act of General 
 Warren, from the passage of the Rapidan to the 
 final shout of victory at Five Forks, has been 
 
208 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 assailed by his ruthless critics, not one specific 
 instance of culpable neglect of duty or tran- 
 scending of authority has been confirmed against 
 him. Intangible general assertions are freely 
 made, hut not one honest charge sustained. 
 
 General Sheridan's imputations against General 
 Warren, as embodied in his report of the battle 
 of Five Forks, dated May 16, 1865, are of this 
 same general and intangible character. He says : 
 " General Warren did not exert himself to get 
 up his corps as rapidly as he might have done, 
 and his manner gave me the impression that he 
 wished the sun to go down before dispositions for 
 the attack could be comj^leted." And again : 
 " During this attack [upon General Pickett's 
 position] I again became dissatisfied with Gen- 
 eral Warren. During the engagement portions 
 of his lines gave way when not exposed to a 
 heavy fire, and simply for want of confidence on 
 the part of the troops, which General Warren 
 did not exert himself to inspire. I therefore re- 
 lieved him from the command of the Fifth corps, 
 authority for the action having been sent to me, 
 before the battle, unsolicited." 
 
 General Humphreys well says : " These are 
 very grave accusations or imputations, and of 
 such serious character that no officer could rest 
 under them. Any officer against whom they 
 were made would be entitled, whatever his rank 
 might be, to an investigation of them before a 
 proper court." 
 
FIVE FORKS. 209 
 
 For nearly fifteen years this right of investi- 
 gation was denied to General Warren. While 
 General Grant remained in power as General 
 of the Army and President of the United 
 States, even this scant justice was withheld. 
 Finally, after repeated requests from General 
 Warren, and seven years after the death of Gen- 
 eral Meade had removed one of his most material 
 witnesses, in December 1879, by order of Presi- 
 dent Hayes, a Court of Inquiry was convened, to 
 which were submitted all the circumstances at- 
 tending the battle of Five Forks for its consid- 
 eration and statement of opinion. Many Confed- 
 erate as well as United States officers who had 
 been engaged in the battle appeared and testified. 
 
 General Sheridan explained to the Court that, 
 though his troops were victorious at Five Forks, 
 they were isolated from the Army of the Poto- 
 mac ; and that the extreme left of that army had 
 been thrown back to the Boydton Road, while the 
 enemy held strongly at the intersection of the 
 White Oak and Claiborne roads directly in his 
 rear, which they, being only about three and a 
 half miles distant, might attack early the next 
 morning. He does not appear, however, to have 
 stated that he had from the commencement of 
 the movement been instructed by General Grant, 
 in the event of the enemy offering him an op- 
 portunity for attack, to move in with his entire 
 force in his own way, and with the full reliance 
 that the army would engage or follow, as cir- 
 
210 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 cumstances might dictate ; and that he had rea- 
 son to believe that General Grant, in fulfilment of 
 that assurance, would, as he did before the dose 
 of the battle of Five Forks, cause the White Oak 
 Road to be held by advancing the refused left 
 wing of his army. 
 
 Colonel Gillespie, engineer officer on General 
 Sheridan's staif, April 1, 1865, testified that he 
 made no reconnoissance of the enemy's works 
 before the attack ; that the cavalry had moved 
 directly up the road and gradually pressed the 
 enemy behind his works ; that he did not know 
 there was a return, nor did he know its direction 
 from the position where the Fifth Corps was 
 formed ; that he was instructed by General Sher- 
 idan to select ground which would hold General 
 Warren's corps close under the right flank of 
 General Devin's command and beyond the obser- 
 vation of the enemy, as he wanted to put Gen- 
 eral Warren hi as a turning column. 
 
 As to the giving way of portions of General 
 Warren's troops, it was in evidence that the 
 skirmish line of General Ayres's division, on en- 
 tering the woods north of the open ground on 
 the north side of the White Oak Road, fell back, 
 lay down, and began to fire in the air ; and that 
 they were made to go forward again by General 
 Sheridan, General Ayres, and their stafP; and 
 further, that when General Ayres changed front. 
 General Gwyn's brigade, on his right, fell into 
 some confusion, which was also remedied by Gen- 
 
FIVE FORKS. 211 
 
 eral Sheridan, General Ayres, and their staff. 
 General Ayres, however, does not appear to have 
 regarded the disorder as serious. General War- 
 ren, it was also in evidence, was at that time en- 
 gaged in rectifying the position and direction of 
 movement of General Griffin's and General Craw- 
 ford's divisions. 
 
 The following are the reports and opinions of 
 the Court upon the imputations or accusations 
 quoted from General Sheridan's report : — 
 
 "Third Imputation. 
 
 " The third imputation is found in an extract 
 from General Sheridan's report of May 16, 1865 
 (see Record, pp. 21 and 48), as follows : — 
 
 " ^ . . . General Warren did not exert himself 
 to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have 
 done, and his manner gave me the impression 
 that he wished the sun to go down before dispo- 
 sitions for the attack could be completed.' 
 
 " On the afternoon of April 1st, the Fifth 
 Corps was massed as follows : Crawford's and 
 Griffin's divisions at the forks of the Crump 
 road and the main road from Dinwiddie Court 
 House to Five Forks, and Ayres' s division on 
 the Brooke's road, about one-fourth of a mile 
 east from the forks of that road and the road to 
 Five Forks. 
 
 " The distance from the position of Griffin and 
 Crawford to the place of formation of the Fifth 
 Corps, near Gravelly Run Church, was about two 
 
212 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 and a half miles, and the length of the corps, 
 when spread out in column of route, would be 
 about two and three-eighths miles. The last file 
 of the column required as much time to reach 
 the place of formation as it would have taken to 
 march about five miles. 
 
 " General Warren received his orders near 
 Gravelly Run Church to move up his corps at 
 1 p. M., and it took some time to communicate 
 those orders to the divisions and for the move- 
 ment to begin. 
 
 " The route to the place of formation was 
 along a narrow road, very muddy and slippery, 
 somewhat encumbered v/ith wagons and led 
 horses of the Cavalry Corps, and the men were 
 fatigued. The testimony of the brigade and di- 
 vision commanders is to the efPect that the corps 
 in line of march was well closed up, and that no 
 unnecessary delay was incurred. 
 
 " The corps reached its destination, and was 
 formed ready to advance against the enemy at 
 4 p. M. 
 
 " It is in evidence that General Warren re- 
 mained near Gravelly Run Church, directing the 
 formation, explaining the mode of attack to the 
 division and brigade commanders, with sketches 
 prepared for the purpose. 
 
 " General Warren also repeatedly sent out 
 staff officers to the division commanders in order 
 to expedite the march. 
 
FIVE FORKS. 213 
 
 " Opinion. 
 
 " The Court is of the opinion that there was 
 no unnecessary delay in this march of the Fifth 
 Corps, and that General Warren took the usual 
 methods of a corps commander to prevent delay. 
 
 " The question regarding General Warren's 
 manner appears to be too intangible and the 
 evidence on it too contradictory for the Court to 
 decide, separate from the context, that he ap- 
 peared to wish ' the sun to go down before dis- 
 positions for the attack could be completed ; ' 
 but his actions, as shown by the evidence, do 
 not appear to have corresponded with such wish, 
 if ever he entertained it. 
 
 "Fourth Imputation. 
 " The fourth imputation is found in an ex- 
 tract from General Sheridan's report of May 16, 
 1865 (see Eecord, pp. 22 and 48), as follows : — 
 
 " ' During this attack I again became dissatis- 
 fied with General Warren. During the engage- 
 ment portions of his line gave way when not 
 exposed to a heavy fire, and simply from want 
 of confidence on the part of the troops, which 
 General Warren did not exert himself to inspire.' 
 
 " When the Fifth Corps moved up to the at- 
 tack. General Sheridan said to General Ayres, ' 1 
 will ride with you.' General Warren was on the 
 
214 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 left of Crawford's division, between Crawford 
 and Ay res. 
 
 " When General Ayres's command struck the 
 White Oak road it received a fire in flank from 
 the enemy's ' return ' nearly at right angles to 
 the road. He changed front immediately at 
 right angles and faced the ' return/ his right 
 receiving a fire from Munford's Confederate di- 
 vision of dismounted cavalry distributed along 
 the edge of the woods to the north of the White 
 Oak road. There was some confusion, which 
 was immediately checked by the exertions of 
 General Sheridan, General Ayres, and other 
 officers. 
 
 " The evidence shows that General Warren 
 was observant of Ayres, because he sent orders 
 to Winthrop's reserve brigade to form on the 
 left of Ayres's new line. 
 
 " This necessary change of front of Ayres 
 increased the interval between him and Craw- 
 ford on his right ; the latter was marching with- 
 out change of direction until, as he expressed it, 
 he would clear the right of Ayres, when he was 
 also to change front to the left. 
 
 " At this moment Warren, who saw that Craw- 
 ford, with Griffin following, was disappearing in 
 the woods to the north of the White Oak road, 
 sent a staff-officer to Griffin to come as quickly 
 as he could to sustain Ayres; went himself to 
 the left brigade of Crawford and caused a line 
 to be marked out, facing to the west, directing 
 
FIVE FORKS. 215 
 
 the brigade commander to form on it; then 
 went into the woods and gave orders to the 
 right brigade of Crawford to form on the same 
 line. When he returned to the open ground 
 the brigade he had directed to change front had 
 disappeared, as appears by the evidence, in con- 
 sequence of orders given by an of&cer of Gen- 
 eral Sheridan's staff. General Warren sent re- 
 peated orders by staff-officers to both Griffin and 
 Crawford to change direction, and went himself 
 to both ; and finally by these means corrected, 
 as far as was possible under the circumstances, 
 the divergence of these two divisions. 
 
 " It appears from evidence that these two di- 
 visions were operating in the woods and over a 
 difficult countrv, and received a fire in their front 
 from the dismounted cavalry of Munford posted 
 in the woods to the north of the White Oak 
 road, which led to the belief, for some time, that 
 the enemy had a line of battle in front ; and this 
 may furnish one reason why it was so difficult at 
 first to change their direction to the proper one. 
 
 " Opinion. 
 " General Warren's attention appears to have 
 been drawn, almost immediately after Ayres re- 
 ceived the flank fire from the 'return' and his 
 consequent change of front, to the probability 
 of Crawford with Griffin diverging too much 
 from and being separated from Ayres, and by 
 continuous exertions of himself and staff sub- 
 
216 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 stantially remedied matters; and the Court 
 thinks that this was for him the essential point 
 to be attended to, which also exacted his whole 
 efforts to accomplish." 
 
 These are the reports and opinions of officers 
 of high rank and large experience, given under 
 the sanctity of an oath to examine into the mat- 
 ter submitted to them, and to decide and report 
 thereon according to the evidence, without par- 
 tiality, favor, affection, prejudice, or hope of 
 reward. 
 
 The established Record shows that there was 
 no noticeable fighting by General Sheridan's 
 command upon April 1, until after four o'clock 
 p. M., but that his cavalry simply followed closely 
 after the enemy as they retired upon Five Forks ; 
 that General Warren was not relieved before the 
 assault upon the enemy's intrenchments, as Gen- 
 eral Grant states in his Memoirs, but after the 
 enofasfement was ended, as General Grant's re- 
 port more correctly says ; that General Warren 
 promptly responded to the orders of General 
 Sheridan ; that the disorder incident upon the 
 opening of the assault was in no way attribut- 
 able to him, but was due to the erroneous infor- 
 mation concerning the enemy's works given him 
 by General Sheridan ; that he did what man could 
 do to remedy the matter ; and that, while he prob- 
 ably did not expend his energies in the role of 
 incarnate blasphemy and malediction, he directed 
 
FIVE FORKS. 217 
 
 and led his troops in a victorious sweep along 
 and beyond the length of the enemy's whole 
 line, himself carrying his corps flag in triumph 
 over their last intrenchment ; and therefore he 
 could not he found by General Sheridan. 
 
 One can readily imagine how, in the heat and 
 turmoil of active warfare, injustice may very 
 naturally result from laudable impetuosity and 
 earnestness. There has been no war but has its 
 record of wrong honestly inflicted ; there has 
 been no honorable peace succeeding, without its 
 recompense of manly acknowledgment and atone- 
 ment : but, in General Warren's case, the pages 
 of the Memoirs prove that prejudice again would 
 raise its unrelenting cry to drown, if possible, be- 
 neath assertion the muffled voice of tardy justice. 
 
 It is not difficult to understand how General 
 Badeau, in his effort to laud his chief, could fail 
 to see aright truth clear as light to others ; but 
 it is impossible to comprehend, with pleasure, 
 the motive which produced the alleged record 
 of events proffered by General Grant, and which 
 we have been considering. General Grant, as 
 to his statements of facts, has challenged refer- 
 ence to the Record. His work submitted to that 
 test, — we cannot but perceive that, as authority 
 upon historic facts, or as delineator of character 
 other than his own, the kindliest critic must 
 acknowledge " drawbacks to his usefulness, con- 
 stitutional and beyond his control." " How I 
 saw the matters treated of" may make clear the 
 
218 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 influence causing the exaggerated repetition of 
 disproved detraction ; but by no construction can 
 it defend or excuse it. 
 
 There had been no limit to the ready ofPering 
 of blood, limb, life, homes, happiness, or hope, 
 that at the bidding of General Grant had been 
 made for the safety of the land ; and there was 
 no limit to the recompense that land laid gladly 
 at the feet of the Chieftain of our victorious 
 hosts : as General, adding to the largess of the 
 present the stored memories of the past that 
 clung about the title ; as President, twice seated 
 in regal opulence, ruling the loyal confidence 
 and gratitude of his countrymen ; as Citizen, the 
 world receiving with glad hearts and generous 
 hands, and friends barring from him and his the 
 possibilities of toil or care ; not one leaf, or bud, 
 or flower that gratitude could gather was want- 
 ing to the garland placed upon his brow, — and 
 not least frequent or least fragrant of them all 
 was Charity. Death came : the world looked on 
 with bated breath at the stern struggle between 
 the Chief, crowned Victor, and the Destroyer; 
 and when the inevitable surrender came, — with 
 pageant seldom seen before on earth, midst re- 
 gathered ranks of war-worn comrades and clus- 
 tering groups of one-time foes now grown to 
 friends, and the bowed heads of a nation, — the 
 honored form was laid to rest. 
 
 Only the j^en of General Grant himself could 
 blot the name that had been so glorified. 
 
FIVE FORKS. 219 
 
 There was no waiting world without the door 
 — only a weeping family gathered round — when 
 Warren, the savior of Gettysburg, the hero of 
 Mine Kun, the victor of Five Forks, lay down 
 to die, slain in the house of his friends 1 But 
 as the wasted failing arms reached up to clasp 
 in last embrace a brother's neck, unconsciously 
 they appealed, with deathless power, to many a 
 heart bound by ties forged in battle fire and 
 shock, to the gallant comrade, noble chief, of the 
 Fifth Army Corps ! 
 
 The gratitude of patriotism has no authority 
 to hold the loyalty of friendship forever silent 
 under repeated wrong. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 GENERAL SHERIDAN's RICHMOND RAID, MAY, 1864. 
 
 MENTION OF GENERAL A. A. HUMPHREYS IN 
 
 THE MEMOIRS. BATTLE OF SUTHERLAND STA- 
 TION, APRIL 2, 18(55. 
 
 It was impossible that General Grant could, 
 in the compass of his Avork, accord mention to 
 all of those who under his command earned rec- 
 ojrnition of their services. There are instances, 
 however, when silence practically takes the place 
 of positive misstatement. Intentional omission, 
 intrenched in silence, is often more unjust than 
 active criticism that may be met with protest; 
 and undue commendation lavished upon one, 
 makes noticeable the unwarrantable silence or 
 shghting notice assigned to others. 
 
 General Grant devotes nearly four pages of 
 the Memoirs (vol. ii., pp. 153 to 157) to a de- 
 scription of General Sheridan's raid to Richmond 
 in May, 1864, which, he states, " attained in its 
 brilliant execution and results all the proportions 
 of an independent campaign." He says : — 
 
 " On the 8th of May, just after the battle of 
 the Wilderness and when we were moving on 
 
SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. 221 
 
 Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan verbally to 
 cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass 
 around the left of Lee's army and attack his 
 cavalry : to cut the two roads — one running 
 west through Gordonsville, Charlottesville and 
 Lynchburg, the other to Kichmond, and, when 
 compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, 
 to move on to the James River and draw these 
 from Butler's supplies. This move took him 
 past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders 
 were also given in writing through Meade. 
 
 " The object of this move was three-fold. 
 First, if successfully executed, and it was, he 
 would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of 
 supplies and telegraphic communications, and 
 destroy or get for his own use supplies in store 
 in the rear and coming up. Second, he would 
 draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus 
 better protect our flanks, rear and trains than 
 by remaining with the army. Third, his absence 
 would save the trains drawing his forage and 
 other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had 
 now become our base. He started at daylight 
 the next morning, and accomplished more than 
 was expected. It was sixteen days before he 
 got back to the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 "The course Sheridan took was directly to 
 Richmond. Before night Stuart, commanding 
 the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of 
 his command. But the advance kept on, crossed 
 the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station 
 
222 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four 
 hundred Union prisoners on their way to Rich- 
 mond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed 
 a larp'e amount of subsistence and medical stores. 
 
 " Stuart, ... by a detour and an exhausting 
 march, interposed between Sheridan and Rich- 
 mond at Yellow Tavern, only about six miles 
 north of the city. ... A severe engagement 
 ensued in which the losses were heavy on both 
 sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader 
 mortally wounded, and some guns and many 
 prisoners were captured. 
 
 " Sheridan passed through the outer defences 
 of Richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed 
 through the inner ones. . . . After caring for 
 his wounded, he struck for the James River below 
 the city, . . . 
 
 " He moved first between the Chickahominy 
 and the James, but in the morning (the 12th) he 
 was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. . . . 
 
 " He was now in a perilous position, one from 
 which but few generals could have extricated 
 themselves. The defences of Richmond, manned, 
 were to the right, the Chickahominy was to the 
 left with no bridge remaining and the opposite 
 bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Rich- 
 mond. This force was attacked and beaten by 
 "Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while Sheridan 
 turned to the left with the remaining division 
 and hastily built a bridge over the Chickahominy 
 under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing 
 
SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. 223 
 
 and soon dispersed the Confederates he found 
 there. The enemy was held back from the 
 stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in 
 bridge building. 
 
 "Sheridan in this memorable raid passed 
 entirely around Lee's army : encountered his 
 cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them 
 in all ; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners 
 and killed and captured many of the enemy; 
 destroyed and used many supphes and munitions 
 of war ; destroyed miles of railroad and tele- 
 graph, and freed us from annoyance by the 
 cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks." 
 
 It is not intended now to criticise either the 
 conduct or value of this " memorable raid," but 
 simply to note a few established facts in contrast 
 with General Grant's enthusiastic statements. 
 
 A glance at the map of Virginia will demon- 
 strate that Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia 
 Central Railroad, the most westerly point touched 
 by General Sheridan's command during this 
 movement, is about seventeen miles directly south 
 of the left of the lines held by General R. E. 
 Lee at Spottsylvania Court House. From there 
 the command moved by Yellow Tavern, Meadow 
 Bridge, Gaines's Mills, and Bottom Bridge to 
 Haxall's Landing. General Sheridan rejoined 
 General Grant, by way of V/hite House on the 
 Pamunkey, passing through Aylett's on the 
 Matapony to the vicinity of Chesterfield Station 
 
224 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 on the Fredericksburg Railroad. General Grant, 
 therefore, is in error when he states that " Sheri- 
 dan in this memorable raid passed entirely around 
 Lee's army." 
 
 Official reports state that on May 1, 1864, 
 General Sheridan's available cavalry force num- 
 bered about twelve thousand men. It is within 
 safe limits therefore to estimate that he set out 
 upon this raid with at least ten thousand cavalry 
 and a proper proportion of artillery. South of 
 the Ta River the rear of the command was at- 
 tacked by a brigade of General Stuart's cavalry, 
 and from that point, until the column had crossed 
 the North Anna and entered the Negro Foot 
 Road, about five miles from Ground Squirrel 
 Bridge, General Gordon's brigade of North Car- 
 olina cavalry clung to the rear. Early in the 
 morning of May 11, General Davies had a slight 
 skirmisli at Ashland, on the Fredericksburg 
 Railroad, and rejoined the command at Allen's 
 Station. General Sheridan then encountered 
 General Stuart, who, with General Fitz Lee's 
 command consistino^ of General Wickham's and 
 General Lomax's brigades, had made a circuit 
 and interposed between him and Richmond at 
 the Yellow Tavern on the Brook Pike, about six 
 miles from Richmond, while General Gordon's 
 brigade still followed the Federal rear. The 
 three Confederate brigades, constituting less than 
 half of the cavalry corps of the Army of North- 
 ern Virginia, according to official reports num- 
 
SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. 225 
 
 bered only about four thousand men. Here 
 followed the engagement which ended in the 
 defeat of the Confederate force and the mortal 
 wounding of General J. E. B. Stuart and Gen- 
 eral Jas. B. Gordon. The casualties on both 
 sides were severe. 
 
 On pages 135 and 136, General Humphreys 
 says : " Following up the part of Stuart's force 
 that fell back towards Richmond^^ General Sheri- 
 dan crossed Brook Run and entered the most 
 advanced line of intrenchments. Intending to 
 keep south of the Chickahominy, and passing by 
 Fair Oaks, to make a demonstration in favor of 
 General Butler, who, he was informed, was on the 
 south side of the James four miles from Rich- 
 mond, he massed his force at daylight of the 
 12th on the plateau at Meadow bridge. Some 
 force of the enemy's cavalry held the north bank 
 at the bridge, which had been so injured as to 
 be im^passable. Merritt's division repaired it, 
 crossed and followed up the other side to Gaines's 
 Mill. 
 
 ^ On page 412 of McClellan's Life and Campaigns of Major' 
 General J. E. B. Stuart, it appears that by two o'clock in the 
 afternoon General Sheridan held the Brook Pike between Yellow 
 Tavern and Richmond. Major McClellan recently states to the 
 writer: " General Humphreys is in error here. No part of Stuart's 
 force fell back towards Richmond. He had nothing on the Brook 
 Turnpike, although it was in sight of his position. Both Lomax 
 and Wickham were on the Telegraph Road ; and the Brook Pike 
 was left open as if to tempt Sheridan to move on it and expose 
 his flank to attack.'* The same authority also says : *' General 
 Gordon's arm wa^s broken by a shot, and was subsequently ampu- 
 tated. He died in hospital in Richmond several days after he 
 received the wound." 
 
226 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 " On the Mechanicsville road the defensive 
 works of Richmond extended out close to the 
 Chickahominy, and Wilson found that he could 
 not pass them. Two brigades of infantry, Bar- 
 ton's and Gracie's, with some dismounted cavalry, 
 advanced from these works, and in conjunction 
 with their artillery attacked Wilson and Gregg, 
 and at first with success, but finally they were 
 forced to withdraw within their Hues, and Wilson 
 and Gregg crossed the Chickahominy above the 
 Mechanicsville brido:e. . . . 
 
 " The casualties on our part in this operation 
 [the entire raid] were four hundred and twenty- 
 five killed, wounded, and missing. . . ." 
 
 The Record speaks of hut one engagement of 
 any importance, — Stuart's desperate stand at 
 the Yellow Tavern, — and considering the force 
 at General Sheridan's disposal, the circumstances, 
 numbers, and positions of those opposed to him 
 in front of Richmond, the remark, " He was now 
 in a perilous position, one from which hut few 
 generals could have extricated themselves,'^ ap- 
 pears, as a matter of fact, to be a feebly sup- 
 ported reflection upon the disparaged many. 
 
 General Grant states positively that General 
 Sheridan was directed to " pass around the left 
 of Lee's army and attack his cavalry. '' General 
 Humphreys expresses it : " In compliance with 
 his instructions of the 8th of May to concentrate 
 his available mounted force and j^^'oceed against 
 the enemy's cavalry, . . ." The only portions 
 
SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. 227 
 
 of the enemy's cavalry encountered in any force 
 were the brigade which clu7ig to the rear of 
 General Sheridan's column after it had crossed 
 the Ta River, and the two brigades which inter- 
 posed between the head of the column and Rich- 
 mond. These three brigades comprised less 
 than half of the enemy's cavalry force, and 
 numbered much less than half of the force un- 
 der General Sheridan's command. The enemy's 
 cavalry was at no time "attacked" or "pro- 
 ceeded against/' in force, except when it opposed 
 the march of the Federal column aivay from 
 the Confederate forces. If an attack upon the 
 enemy's cavalry was, as the reported orders in- 
 dicate, a material point in the projected raid, 
 it is impossible to see how the Federal cavalry 
 " accomplished more than was expected." Gen- 
 eral Grant does not so interpret slighter devi- 
 ations from the letter of his orders when im- 
 puted to others of his subordinates. 
 
 On the morning of June 22, 1864, General 
 J. H. Wilson, with a cavalry force consisting of 
 his own and General Kautz's divisions, and num- 
 bering in all about five thousand five hundred 
 men, set out upon the expedition against the 
 Petersburg and Lynchburg, and Richmond and 
 Danville railroads, to which he had been ordered. 
 He was instructed that the destruction of these 
 roads, to such an extent that they could not be 
 useful to the enemy in Richmond during the 
 future operations, was an important part of the 
 
228 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 plan of the campaign, and he was therefore to 
 continue their destruction till driven from his 
 work by such forces as he could no longer 
 resist. He was informed that General Sheridan 
 was at White House confronted by General 
 Hampton ; that General Hunter was supposed 
 to be near Lynchburg ; that the Weldon Rail- 
 road would be held by the Army of the Potomac 
 on the day of his departure ; and that it vvas 
 expected the Petersburg and Lynchburg road 
 would be taken possession of soon after. In a 
 note to General Humphreys, chief of staff Army 
 of the Potomac, written on the evening of the 
 21st, General Wilson said : " If Sheridan will 
 look after Hampton, I apprehend no difficulty 
 and hope to be able to do the enemy great 
 damage." General Meade, in his correspondence 
 with General Grant, had expressed the hope and 
 expectation that General Sheridan would keep 
 General Hampton occupied on the north side 
 of the James River during General Wilson's 
 raid ; and in reply to General Wilson General 
 Humphreys referred him, as an assurance, to the 
 close contact that had been maintained between 
 General Sheridan and General Hampton since 
 early in June. 
 
 General Wilson crossed the Weldon Railroad 
 at Reams's Station, which he destroyed ; and, 
 striking the Lynchburg Railroad about fourteen 
 miles west of Petersburg, destroyed it for about 
 thirty miles to the crossing of the Danville 
 
WILSON'S RAID. 229 
 
 Railroad at Burkesville. At Nottoway Court 
 House there was a sharp engagement with Gen- 
 eral W. H. F. Lee's cavalry division. Burkes- 
 ville Junction was destroyed, and also the 
 Danville Railroad to Staunton River, about 
 thirty miles southward. At Staunton River 
 General Wilson's advance was checked by a 
 large force of militia intrenched with artillery ; 
 at the same time General W. H. F. Lee attacked 
 his rear. Being now nearly one hundred miles 
 from Petersburg, General Wilson determined to 
 return. 
 
 But General Sheridan had left White House 
 on the 22d, the day that General Wilson had 
 started on his raid, and was crossing to the 
 south of the James River on the 26th. Conse- 
 quently, on arriving between Stony Creek Depot 
 and Reams's Station on the Weldon Railroad, 
 General Wilson found himself, on the 29th, 
 confronted and flanked by the cavalry divisions 
 of Generals Hampton, W. H. F. and Fitz Lee, 
 and two brigades of infantry, with artillery, 
 under General Mali one ; the Weldon Road not 
 having been occupied by Federal troops, as he 
 had expected. He was therefore forced back- 
 ward to the south of the Nottoway River. Then 
 moving eastward, he arrived at Light House 
 Point on the afternoon of July 2, having been 
 gone ten and a half days, during which he had 
 marched over three hundred miles and destroyed 
 sixty miles of railroad. At no place had he 
 
230 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 halted more than six hours, and for the last four 
 days at no time longer than four hours. His 
 casualties were two hundred and forty killed 
 and wounded, and one thousand two hundred 
 and sixty - one missing, — a total of one thou- 
 sand five hundred and one. Twelve guns were 
 abandoned and his wagons burned or captured. 
 General Sheridan, attempting to relieve General 
 Wilson, reached Reams' s Station after the enemy 
 had returned to their own lines on July 1.^ 
 
 Of this raid. General Grant (vol. ii., p. 303) 
 says : "In the meantime Meade had sent Wil- 
 son's division on a raid to destroy the Weidon 
 and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan 
 was safe and Hampton free to return to Rich- 
 mond with his cavalry, Wilson's position became 
 precarious. Meade therefore, on the 27th, or- 
 dered Sheridan over the river to make a demon- 
 stration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got back, 
 though not without severe loss, having struck 
 botli roads, but the damage done was soon re- 
 paired." 
 
 On page 172 of his second volume, describing 
 another raid. General Grant says : " Kilpatrick 
 started on the night of the 18th of August to 
 reach the Macon road about Jonesboro. He 
 succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around 
 the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back 
 again in his former position on our left by the 
 22d. These little affairs, however, contributed 
 
 1 Va. Camp., pp. 236-241. 
 
GRIFFIN, HUMPHREYS, AND MACKENZIE. 231 
 
 hut very little to the grand result. They 
 annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done 
 to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon 
 repaired." 
 
 General Grant does not thus dismiss General 
 Sheridan's raids. 
 
 In the Memoirs, on page 541 of volume ii., 
 we find: "Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie 
 were good corps commanders, but came into that 
 position so near to the close of the war as not 
 to attract public attention. All three served as 
 such, in the last campaign of the armies of the 
 Potomac and the James, which culminated at 
 Appomattox Court House, on the 9th of April, 
 1865. The sudden collapse of the rebellion 
 monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost 
 everything else. I regarded Mackenzie as the 
 most promising young officer in the army. Grad- 
 uating at West Point, as he did, during the 
 second year of the war, he had won his way up 
 to the command of a corps before its close. This 
 he did upon his own merit and without influ- 
 ence." 
 
 This, too-ether with the bare mention that on 
 May 13, 1864, he had asked the confirmation of 
 General Humphreys's appointment to the rank 
 of Major-General, comprises all of commendation 
 General Grant can find to say of one who, from 
 July 8, 1863, to November 26, 1864, had filled 
 the exacting position of chief of staff of the 
 Army of the Potomac ; and who after the latter 
 
232 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 date succeeded General Hancock in command of 
 the Second Army Corps : exhibiting in both po- 
 sitions, energy, devotion, and ability undeniably 
 preeminent. 
 
 When on the morning of March 25, 1865, 
 General Gordon attempted his sortie aimed at 
 the Federal supplies and material at City Point, 
 and pierced the right of the lines investing 
 Petersburg, General Humphreys, who was on 
 the left, received a telegram from General Hunt, 
 chief of artillery, a little before six o'clock a. m., 
 informing him of the situation. He immediately 
 got his corps under arms and advanced, capturing 
 the enemy's intrenched picket line in his front, 
 and, pressing toward their main works, developed 
 the fact that they had not been depleted to aid 
 in the attack upon the right and were still too 
 strong for successful assault. The intrenched 
 picket lines were held by him against repeated 
 attempts at recapture ; and thus the successful 
 assault on the Confederate lines, on April 2, was 
 made practicable. His action was duly reported 
 to and was approved by General Meade. 
 
 General Grant says of this : " After the re- 
 capture of the batteries taken by the Confed- 
 erates, our troops made a charge and carried 
 the enemy's intrenched picket line, which they 
 strengthened and held. This, in turn, gave us 
 but a short distance to charge over when our 
 attack came to be made a few days later." ^ 
 
 1 Mem.f vol. ii., p. 434. 
 
GENERAL HUMPHREYS. 233 
 
 Possibly the subject was exhausted by General 
 Badeau, who says: "When Meade arrived on 
 the field; he promptly ordered Wright and Hum- 
 phreys to advance and feel the enemy in their 
 respective fronts, west of Parke, but Humphreys 
 had already advanced without orders. . . ." ^ 
 
 It has been already shown that, on March 31, 
 General Humphreys becoming aware of the re- 
 pulse encountered by General Warren, on his 
 left, without waiting for orders promptly threw 
 General Miles with his division upon the left 
 flank of the enemy pressing upon the Fifth 
 Corps, and with General Mott and General Hays 
 attacked the intrenchments in his own front, 
 thus securing the repulse of the enemy and the 
 ultimate advance to, and occupation of, the 
 White Oak Koad. No mention of this circum- 
 stance can be discovered in the Memoirs, though 
 General Badeau afBrms that when the next day 
 General Sheridan with General Gibbs and Gen- 
 eral Gregg attacked the rear of General Pickett's 
 troops, when it was exposed in their pursuit of 
 General Merritt, and obliged them " to change 
 the direction of their march and the whole char- 
 acter of the battle," it " constituted one of the 
 most hrilliant strokes of military genius dis- 
 played during the war.'' 
 
 This silence on the part of General Grant 
 would be inoffensive, though ungracious, but 
 that in connection with other parts of the nar- 
 rative in the Memoirs it becomes noticeable. 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. ii., p. 447. 
 
234 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 Continuing his account of the assault upon 
 and capture of the Confederate lines in front of 
 Petersburg, April 2, 1865, General Grant says : — 
 
 " Sheridan, after he had returned to Five 
 Forks, swept down to Petersburg, coming in on 
 our left. This gave us a continuous line from 
 the Appomattox River below the city to the same 
 river above. . . . 
 
 " I had ordered Miles in the morning to report 
 to Sheridan. In moving to execute this order 
 he came upon the enemy at the intersection of 
 the White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road. 
 The enemy fell back to Sutherland Station on 
 the South Side Road and were followed by Miles. 
 This position, naturally a strong and defensible 
 one, was also strongly intrenched. Sheridan 
 now came up and Miles asked permission from 
 him to make the assault, which Sheridan gave. 
 By this time Humphreys had got through the 
 outer works in his front, and came up also and 
 assumed command over Miles, who commanded 
 a division in his corps. I had sent an order to 
 Humphreys to turn to his right and move to- 
 wards Petersburg. This order he now got, and 
 started off, thus leaving Miles alone. The latter 
 made two assaults, both of which failed, and he 
 had to fall back a few hundred yards. 
 
 ^^ Hearing that Miles had been left in this 
 position, I directed Humphreys to send a division 
 back to his relief. He went himself. 
 
 " Sheridan before starting to sweep down to 
 
SUTHERLAND STATION. 235 
 
 Petersburg had sent Merritt with his cavalry to 
 the west to attack some Confederate cavaby 
 that had assembled there. Merritt drove them 
 north to the Appomattox River. Sheridan then 
 took the enemy at Sutherland Station on the 
 reverse side from where Miles was, and the two 
 together captured the place, with a large number 
 of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put 
 the remainder, portions of three Confederate 
 corps, to flight. Sheridan followed, and drove 
 them until night, when further pursuit was 
 stopped. Miles bivouacked for the night on 
 the o^round which he with Sheridan had carried 
 so handsomely by assault. . . ." ^ 
 
 In the official report of Lieutenant-General 
 Grant, an account materially different in some 
 points is found. It says : " The report of this 
 [the battle at Five Forks] reached me after 
 nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind 
 lest the enemy might desert his lines during the 
 night and by falling upon General Sheridan 
 before assistance could reach him, drive him 
 from his position and open the way for retreat. 
 To guard against this, General Miles' s division 
 of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, 
 and a bombardment was commenced and kept 
 up until four o'clock in the morning (April 2) 
 when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. 
 
 . . . General Sheridan being advised of the 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., pp. 450- 452. 
 
236 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 condition of affairs, [the success of the assault], 
 returned General Miles to his proper command. 
 
 The enemy south of Hatcher's run retreated 
 westward to Sutherland's Station, where they 
 were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe 
 engagement ensued, and lasted until both his 
 right and left flanks were threatened by the 
 approach of General Sheridan, who was moving 
 from Ford's Station towards Petersburg, and a 
 division sent by General Meade from the front 
 of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost 
 confusion leaving in our hands his guns and 
 many prisoners." ^ 
 
 General Badeau appears again as a connecting 
 link between the Report and the Memoirs. In 
 his third volume, pages 522 to 525, we find : — 
 
 '^ Meanwhile Sheridan had been busy on a 
 more distant portion of the field. Miles reported 
 to him at daybreak, and was ordered to move 
 back towards Petersburg, and attack the enemy 
 at the intersection of the White Oak and Clai- 
 borne roads. The rebels were found at this 
 point, in force and in position, and Sheridan 
 followed Miles immediately with two divisions of 
 the Fifth corps. The enemy, however, withdrew 
 from the junction, and Miles pursued with great 
 zeal, pushing the fugitives across Hatcher's 
 run, and following them up towards Sutherland 
 station, on the Southside railroad. North of 
 1 Mem.f vol. ii., pp. 623, 624. 
 
SUTHERLAND STATION. 237 
 
 Hatcher's run, Sheridan came up with Miles, 
 who had a fine and spirited division, and was 
 anxious to attack, and Sheridan gave him leave. 
 About this time Humphreys also arrived with 
 the remainder of his corps, having made his 
 breach in the lines, and moved up from the 
 Boydton road. He now re-assumed command 
 of Miles, and Sheridan faced the Fifth corps by 
 the rear, and returning to Five Forks, marched 
 out by the Ford road to Hatcher's run. 
 
 " Grant, hoivever, had intended to have Sheri- 
 dan in command of Miles, and indeed in full 
 control of all the ojjerations in this quarter of 
 the field; and supposing his views to have been 
 carried out, it was at this juncture that he 
 ordered Humphreys to be faced to the right and 
 moved towards Petersburg. This left Miles un- 
 supported by either Humphreys or Sheridan. 
 Nevertheless, that gallant commander made his 
 assault. But the rebel position was naturally 
 strong as well as defended by breastworks and 
 artillery, and Miles was compelled to retire. A 
 second attack at half-past twelve met with no 
 better fortune, although supported by a vigorous 
 shelling from the artillery of the division. The 
 position was important, for it covered the right 
 of Lee's army ; the rebels resisted vigorously, 
 and Miles fell back to a crest about eight hun- 
 dred yards from the enemy's line. 
 
 " News of the repulse was carried to Grant, 
 now nearly five miles away, and for a while the 
 
238 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 general-in-chie£ was anxious about the fate of 
 Miles. . . . Humphreys was accordingly ordered 
 to send another division to the support of Miles. 
 He went himself with Hays's division. . . . 
 
 "Sheridan meantime had sent Merritt west- 
 ward to cross Hatcher's run, and break up the 
 rebel cavalry, which had assembled in consider- 
 able force north of the stream; . . . Sheridan 
 himself with the Fifth corps crossed Hatcher's 
 run, and struck the Southside railroad, north of 
 Five Forks; then meeting with no opposition, 
 he marched rapidly towards Sutherland, and 
 came up in flank and rear of the enemy oppos- 
 ing Miles, just as Humphreys was returning on 
 the right from Petersburg. 
 
 " Miles, in the interval, had devised a plan not 
 unlike the strategy of Sheridan at Five Forks, 
 though on a smaller scale. He made a feint 
 against the rebel right, pushing a strong skir- 
 mish line around that flank until he overlapped 
 it and reached to the railroad; and while the 
 enemy's attention was thus diverted, at 2.45 
 P. M. he assaulted the opposite flank, sweeping 
 rapidly down inside the breastworks, capturing 
 nearly a thousand prisoners and two pieces of 
 artillery, and putting the remainder of the force 
 to precipitate flight. 
 
 "Sheridan overtook the rebels in their rout 
 on the main road along the Appomattox river, 
 and the cavalry and Crawford's division attacked 
 them at nightfall ; . . . 
 
SUTHERLAND STATION. 239 
 
 " When Grant heard of the action at Suther- 
 land, he declared to Meade : ' Miles has made a 
 big thing of it, and deserves the highest praise 
 for the pertinacity with which he stuck to the 
 enemy and wrung from him victory.' " 
 
 General Sheridan, after his return to Five 
 Forks, could not have swept down to Petersburg 
 and come in on the left of a line from the Appo- 
 mattox River below the city to the same river 
 above, as General Grant states ; for the further 
 narratives of both General Grant and General 
 Badeau do not locate that officer, or his com- 
 mand, east of the Claiborne Road, at any time 
 during April 2, and General Badeau (vol. iii., p. 
 520) states: ''At noon, the left whig under 
 Sheridan was still unheard from? ^ 
 
 General Grant states that he ordered General 
 Miles to report to General Sheridan in the morn- 
 ing ; and that, in attempting to execute the 
 order. General Miles came upon the enemy at 
 the intersection of the White Oak and Claiborne 
 roads; and that, the enemy falling back. Gen- 
 eral Miles followed to Sutherland Station, where 
 General Sheridan overtook him, and gave per- 
 mission for him to attack; and that General 
 Humphreys then arrived and assumed command 
 of General Miles. 
 
 General Badeau's statement is, that General 
 Miles reported to General Sheridan at daybreak 
 and was ordered to move hack and attack the 
 enemy at the intersection of the roads ; and that 
 
240 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 General Sheridan followed General Miles imme- 
 diately with two divisions of the Fifth Corps, 
 and north of Hatcher's Run overtook him and 
 gave permission for the attack on Sutherland 
 Station ; and that, General Humphreys then ar- 
 riving and reassuming command of General 
 Miles, General Sheridan faced the Fifth Corps 
 by the rear and returned to Five Forks, and 
 moved again on Sutherland Station by way of 
 the Ford and Cox roads. 
 
 Without pausing to defend General Sheridan 
 from the suggestion that, having arrived with 
 the Fifth Corps at a point within two miles, at 
 farthest, of an anticipated battle field, he counter- 
 marched his command and made an unnecessary 
 detour of from twelve to fifteen miles to threaten 
 the flank of the enemy's position, because Gen- 
 eral Humphreys had resumed command of his 
 own troops ; it is to be observed that neither of 
 these statements by Generals Grant and Badeau, 
 accords with General Grant's official report that 
 when General Sheridan, after being reinforced 
 by General Miles during the night previous, 
 learned the condition of affairs on the morning 
 of April 2, he " returned General Miles to his 
 2)roper command.'^ 
 
 Both General Grant and General Badeau locate 
 General Sheridan with the Fifth Corps during the 
 2d : the first stating, in addition to what has just 
 been noted, that after sending his cavalry to the 
 west General Sheridan "then took the enemy 
 
SUTHERLAND STATION. 241 
 
 at Sutherland Station on the reverse side from 
 where Miles was ;" and the latter saying, "Sheri- 
 dan himself with the Fifth corps crossed Hatch- 
 er's run and struck the Southside railroad north 
 of Five Forks, etc." 
 
 On page 446 of volume ii., General Grant 
 states that, on the evening of April 1, General 
 Sheridan sent the Fifth Corps " across Hatcher's 
 Run to just south-west of Petersburg, and facing 
 them toward it ; " but this is manifestly an un- 
 intentional inaccuracy, since it would have bivou- 
 acked the corps within the Confederate lines. 
 After the victory at Five Forks, two divisions 
 of the Fifth Corps were posted for the night 
 across the White Oak Road near Gravelly Run 
 Church facing Petersburg, and one on the Ford 
 Road. General Mackenzie's cavalry division 
 guarded the Ford Road crossing of Hatcher's 
 Run, and General Merritt's cavalry were at or 
 near Five Forks.^ On the morning of April 2, 
 General Merritt was sent across Hatcher's Run, 
 and north-westerly across the Southside Railroad 
 to engage the enemy's cavalry in that direction. 
 On page 370 of " The Virginia Campaign," Gen- 
 eral Humphreys outlines the movements of the 
 Fifth Corps on the same day, as follows : " Gen- 
 eral Sheridan moved the Fifth corps up the 
 White Oak road two miles toward the Claiborne 
 road, when it returned to Five Forks and moved 
 across Hatcher's Run on the Ford road, and 
 
 1 MU. Hht, pp. 494, 495 ; and Va. Camp., p. 354. 
 
242 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 across the South Side Kailroad to the Cox road, 
 driving out of the way some dismounted cavalry, 
 then moved eastward along the Cox road to- 
 ward Sutherland Station, but turned off on the 
 Namozine road, and halted for the night near 
 Williamson's, at the intersection of the Namozine 
 by the River road. General Crawford's division 
 was sent forward to General Merritt at the cross- 
 ing of Namozine Creek." This is sustained by 
 the diary of General Fred. T. Locke, assistant 
 adjutant-general Fifth Army Corps, for April 
 2, 1865, from which we are permitted to quote, 
 as follows : " Marched at 6 a. m. toward the 
 Claiborne road. Received orders to cross Hatch- 
 er's Run to Cox's Station. Arrived at South 
 Side R. R. at 2 p. m. Captured one engine and 
 three cars, and tore up the rails. Moved up 
 to Sutherland's Station, thence to Williamson's 
 house, and went into camp about 6.30 p. M. 
 Crawford with 3rd Division moved out on the 
 Namozine road and had a skirmish about 8 P. m. 
 developing the enemy's force of two divisions of 
 infantry and one of cavalry." It is not possible 
 that the Fifth Corps could have marched from 
 the Gravelly Run Church Road on the White 
 Oak Road to the Claiborne Road, and thence 
 northward across, or to the vicinity of Hatcher's 
 Run, to within two or three miles of Sutherland 
 Station where General Miles was preparing to 
 attack the enemy, and then counter-marched to 
 its place of starting and again moved north to 
 
SUTHERLAND STATION, 243 
 
 Cox's Station, and the movement not have been 
 more fully noted by General Locke, if indeed it 
 could have been accomplished between the hours 
 of six A. M. and two p. m. on roads, partially 
 at least, occupied by the Second Corps moving 
 northward. 
 
 The consistent and authoritative narrative of 
 General Humphreys records that, at half -past five 
 in the afternoon of April 1, General Grant di- 
 rected the left of the Second Corps to be thrown 
 forw^ard so as to hold the White Oak Road and 
 prevent any force of the enemy being sent by 
 that road against General Sheridan at Five Forks. 
 General Miles's division was promptly advanced 
 and occupied the road in force. At nine o'clock 
 on the night of the 1st, General Grant, learning 
 of the defeat of General Pickett, and being 
 anxious lest General Lee should abandon his 
 lines and drive General Sheridan from his posi- 
 tion, ordered that General Humphreys should 
 feel for a vulnerable point in the enemy's in- 
 trenchments, and if such should be found, that 
 he should attack at once, and if successful 
 push after the enemy. General Humphreys 
 was further directed, if an attack should prove 
 impracticable, to send General Miles to reinforce 
 General Sheridan. A heavy fire was at once 
 opened from the corps artillery, and General 
 Miles's and General Mott's divisions attacked 
 with vigor ; but, though they forced their way 
 close to the slashings of the intrenchments, they 
 
244 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 could not carry them; and General Miles was 
 sent to General Sheridan shortly after midnight, 
 communication with his cavalry along the White 
 Oak Road having been previously opened. Gen- 
 eral Mott's left was then thrown back ; but both 
 he and General Hays held close up to, and con- 
 stantly felt, the enemy through the night, with 
 their divisions ready for immediate assault should 
 opportunity offer. 
 
 This occupation of the \Yhite Oak Road, and 
 subsequent laborious precautions for General 
 Sheridan's safety, are entirely ignored by Gen- 
 erals Grant and Badeau, except in that they 
 state that General Miles was directed by General 
 Grant to reinforce General Sheridan. 
 
 General Humphreys states that, his command 
 having been weakened by detaching General 
 Miles, he was directed not to attack the Crow 
 House redoubts during the night of the 1st and 
 2d. But about six a. m., on the 2d, learning 
 from General Meade of the success of the assault 
 on the right, and his preparations having been 
 made during the night, he directed General Hays 
 to assault ; which he did successfully, capturing 
 redoubts, artillery, and the greater portion of the 
 garrison. About half-past seven General Mott 
 captured the intrenched picket line in his front, 
 and about half-past eight the enemy were moving 
 out of their intrenchments by their right flank, 
 sharply atacked by General Mott. At nine 
 o'clock General Miles, on the White Oak Eoad 
 
SUTHERLAND STATION. 245 
 
 about two miles west of the Claiborne Road 
 Junction, reported his command as on its re- 
 turn, and General Humphreys directed General 
 Miles, General Molt, and General Hays to 
 pursue the enemy by the Claiborne Road to- 
 ward Sutherland Station. By this movement, 
 which was in strict compliance with general in- 
 structions repeatedly given by General Grant, 
 General Humphreys expected to close in upon 
 the rear of all of the enemy's forces which were 
 cut off from Petersburg, while General Sheridan 
 with his command would probably strike them 
 in front and flank. This force of the enemy 
 consisted of four brigades of General Hill's 
 corps, under General Heth ; General Johnson's 
 and General Pickett's divisions under General 
 Anderson; and General Fitz Lee's cavalry 
 division. 
 
 General Humphreys reported his intentions 
 immediately to General Meade, and his orders 
 were countermanded — General Badeau and the 
 Memoirs state — by direction of General Grant. 
 General Mott and General Hays were now or- 
 dered to move eastward by the Boydton Road 
 and connect on the right with the Sixth Corps, 
 and did so. General Miles was to move in the 
 same direction by the first road found after 
 crossing Hatcher's Run ; but when General Hum- 
 phreys overtook him near Sutherland Station, he 
 found that General Miles had there brought 
 to bay the four brigades under General Heth. 
 
246 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 General Miles was satisfied he could defeat the 
 force before him ; and being thus assured, 
 General Humphreys left the matter in his hands 
 and rejoined the remainder of his command then 
 moving toward Petersburg. 
 
 General Miles assaulted first with the brigades 
 of Colonels Nugent and Madill, but was repulsed. 
 A second attack was made at about half-past 
 twelve by Colonel Madill's brigade under Gen- 
 eral McDougall ; but this was also repulsed. 
 About three o'clock, General Miles, having en- 
 veloped the enemy's right with a heavy skirmish 
 line, successfully assaulted his left with Colonel 
 Ramsey's brigade, sweeping behind the breast- 
 works and capturing six hundred prisoners, one 
 battle flag, and two guns. 
 
 General Humphreys says : " About half -past 
 two General Meade, having learned that General 
 Miles needed support, directed General Hum- 
 phreys to take one of his divisions toward 
 Sutherland Station for that purpose. Arriving 
 there by the Cox road, General Humphreys 
 found that General Miles's last attack had been 
 completely successful. Probably the whole force 
 would have been captured in the morning had 
 the Second Corps continued its march toward 
 Sutherland Station." ^ 
 
 General Grant's remark, " By this time [Gen- 
 eral Miles having come up with the enemy at 
 Sutherland Station] Humphreys having got 
 1 Va. Camp., pp. 368, 369. 
 
SUTHERLAND STATION. 247 
 
 through the outer works in his front, came up 
 also and assumed command over Miles, who 
 commanded a division in his corps," is unjust; 
 inasmuch as General Humphreys had carried the 
 intrenchments in his front while General Miles 
 was yet on the White Oak Road two miles west 
 of the Claiborne Road Junction ; and further, in 
 that General Humphreys " assumed " no author- 
 ity, but simply resumed command of his sub- 
 ordinate who reported back to him with his com- 
 mand after the enemy's lines had been carried, 
 as General Grant has stated in his official re- 
 port. General Grant is unjust also when he 
 says : "I had sent an order to Humphreys to 
 turn to his right and move toward Petersburg. 
 This order he now [when finding General Miles 
 confronting the enemy at Sutherland Station] 
 got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone^ 
 Had this been the actual state of the case, Gen- 
 eral Humphreys would only have done in obe- 
 dience to orders what General Badeau states, 
 vv^ith evident satisfaction, was done by General 
 Sheridan in consequence of General Humphreys's 
 resumption of his legitimate authority. But 
 General Badeau has located General Sheridan 
 as crossing Hatcher's Run with the Fifth Corps, 
 and he must therefore have been at least five 
 miles distant from General Miles and General 
 Humphreys ; while the order taking the Second 
 Corps towards Petersburg was received by Gen- 
 eral Humphreys in time for him to direct the 
 
248 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 divisions of Generals Mott and Hays to move 
 by the Boydton Road. He had overtaken Gen- 
 eral Miles for the purpose of turning him also 
 toward Petersburg, but finding him confronting 
 the enemy, and being very willing his subordi- 
 nate should " achieve a separate renown," when 
 he was assured of General Miles' s confidence in 
 his ability to cojye with the force in his front, 
 he left him, in order that he might reap the 
 benefit of the opportunity he had gained. This 
 would appear to relieve both General Sheridan 
 and General Humphreys of the imputation of 
 having left General Miles in the lurch. 
 
 General Grant also reflects unnecessarily upon 
 General Humphreys in the petulant brevity of 
 his " He went himself," with which he closes his 
 statement that he directed him to send a division 
 back to General Miles's relief. General Badeau's 
 statement that General Grant had intended to 
 leave General Sheridan in full command of that 
 part of the field explains the irritability of the 
 notation ; but General Humphreys states that 
 General Meade directed him " to take one of his 
 divisions toward Sutherland Station," on learning 
 that General Miles might need support. Gen- 
 eral Meade was evidently unaware of any valid 
 reason for depriving General Humphreys of the 
 command of the Second Army Corps. 
 
 Both General Grant and General Badeau per- 
 sist in connecting General Sheridan with General 
 Miles's victory. General Humphreys frankly 
 
SUTHERLAND STATION. 249 
 
 credits the whole achievement to General Miles. 
 General Badeau claims that, after crossing Hatch- 
 er's Run with the Fifth Corps, General Sheridan 
 " marched rapidly towards Sutherland, and ccmie 
 iqj in jiank and rear of the enemy opi:>osmg 
 Miles, just as Humphreys was returning on the 
 right from Petersburg." General Grant is more 
 explicit, saying that "Sheridan then took the 
 enemy at Sutherland Station on the reverse side 
 from where Miles was, and the two together 
 captured the place," and further, that " Miles 
 bivouacked for the night on the ground which 
 he with Sheridan had carried so handsomely by 
 assault." 
 
 The plan adopted by General Miles in his 
 last and successful assault is stated by General 
 Badeau, as follows : " He made a feint against 
 the rebel right, pushing a strong skirmish line 
 around that flank until he overlapped it and 
 reached to the railroad ; and while the enemy's 
 attention was thus diverted, at 2.45 p. m. he 
 assaulted the opposite flank '^ In order, there- 
 fore, to come up " in flank and rear of the enemy 
 opposing Miles," General Sheridan, coming from 
 the west, would have been obliged to cross the 
 South Side Railroad to the River Road ; but, 
 according to General Badeau, it was nightfall 
 when General Sheridan overtook the routed 
 enemy on that road. It is difficult, also, to 
 understand how General Sheridan, as stated by 
 General Grant, took the enemy " on the reverse 
 side from where Miles was." 
 
260 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 General Badeau states that General Sheridan 
 " came up . . . just as Humphreys was return- 
 ing on the right from Petersburg.'' General 
 Humphreys states that ahout half-past two 
 General Meade directed him to return with one 
 division toward Sutherland Station. As he was 
 ahout five miles from that point when receiving 
 the order, it can hardly be doubted that it was 
 at least ybt«r o'clock before he reached the battle 
 field. General Badeau states that General Miles's 
 assault was made at 2.45 p. m. General Hum- 
 phreys says " about three o'clock/' and he states 
 unreservedly that on his return he " found that 
 General Miles's last attack had been completely 
 successful." The diary of the adjutant-general 
 of the Fifth Corps locates that command arriv- 
 ing at Cox's Station, at least three miles west 
 of Sutherland Station, at 2 p. m., tearing up the 
 railroad. That work could not have been com- 
 pleted even by the Fifth Corps, in time to take 
 any part in the assault made by General Miles 
 at 24o P- At- 
 
 The paragraph, on page 525, with which Gen- 
 eral Badeau closes his account of General Miles's 
 movements on April 2, illustrates the thorough 
 inconsistency of the attempts to share General 
 Miles's triumph with another. He says : " Miles 
 had been ordered to pursue the enemy towards 
 Petersburg, and advanced in that direction about 
 two miles, when he met Humphreys with Hays's 
 division coming up to his relief. He thereupon 
 returned to Sutherland and went into bivouac." 
 
SUTHERLAND STATION, 251 
 
 Only half a page back, he had described Gen- 
 eral Miles's assault upon the left flank of the 
 enemy which effectually cut them off from Peters- 
 burg, and but a few lines still further back he 
 had recorded General Sheridan as arriving " in 
 flank and rear of the enemy opposing Miles, just 
 as Humphreys was returning on the right from 
 Petersburg." 
 
 It would seem in fact that it would have been 
 wiser in General Grant had he adhered to the 
 statement credited to him by General Badeau, 
 on this same page 525, viz. : " Miles has made a 
 big thing of it, and deserves the highest praise 
 for the pertinacity with which he stuck to the 
 enemy and wrung from him victory, ^^ 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 FROM JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX COURT 
 HOUSE. 
 
 On the morning of April 6, 1865, General 
 Sheridan with his cavalry was dispatched from 
 Jetersville in the direction of Deatonville, and 
 General Meade, with the Second, Fifth, and 
 Sixth corps, moved toward Amelia Court House. 
 At half -past eight a. m., when about four miles 
 out from Jetersville, General Humphreys discov- 
 ered a strong column of the enemy moving west- 
 ward on the north bank of Flat Creek. He 
 immediately ordered General Mott to send a 
 brigade to attack and develop the force, and 
 halted the rest of his command ; sending the 
 information to General Meade and preparing to 
 cross the creek. General Miles opened fire upon 
 the column with artillery, and thus announced 
 that the rear of General Lee's army was over- 
 taken. General Meade directed the Second 
 Corps to move on Deatonville ; the Fifth Corps 
 through Painesville, on the right of the Second, 
 to Ligontown Ferry ; and the Sixth, through 
 Jetersville to the left of the Second.^ 
 
 1 Va. Camp., pp. 378, 379. 
 
JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 253 
 
 Of this, General Badeau says : " As soon as 
 the retreat of Lee from Amelia became a matter 
 of certainty, the direction of the Army of the 
 Potomac was changed, and the whole command 
 faced west instead of north. The Sixth corps, 
 which had been on the right, was moved across 
 the rear of the army to the left ; the Fifth 
 corps marched to the extreme right, and the 
 Second became the centre. This disposition af- 
 forded an admirable opportunity to attack the 
 rebels in flank, and was made under the imme- 
 diate direction of Grant." ^ 
 
 General Grant is here more candid than Gen- 
 eral Badeau. He says : " When the move to- 
 wards Amelia Court House had commenced that 
 morning, I ordered Wright's corps, which was 
 on the extreme right, to be moved to the left 
 past the whole army, to take the place of Grif- 
 fin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to 
 move by and place itself on the right. The ob- 
 ject of this movement was to get the 6th corps, 
 Wright's, next to the cavalry, with which they 
 had formerly served so harmoniously and so effi- 
 ciently in the valley of Virginia. 
 
 '' The 6th corps now remained with the 
 cavalry and under Sheridan's direct command 
 until after the surrender." ^ 
 
 General Grant is clearly in error in this last 
 statement. The Sixth Corps, changing position, 
 formed the left of General Meade's line, as 
 
 1 Mil. Hist, vol. iii., pp. 568, 569. « Mem., vol. ii., p. 473. 
 
254 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 stated. As such it took part in the engagement 
 at Sailor's Creek on the afternoon of the 6th. On 
 the 7th it moved to Farmville, and crossing the 
 Appomattox at that place, on the evening of the 
 same day, remained with the Second Corps under 
 General Meade's immediate orders until the end. 
 On the 6th, after changing position, the Fifth 
 Corps became the right of General Meade's line 
 and marched through Paineville to Ligontown 
 Ferry, a distance of thirty-two miles. On the 
 7th it was ordered by General Meade to Prince 
 Edward Court House. Early in the morning of 
 the 8th it moved toward Appomattox Court 
 House, joined the Twenty-second Corps at Pros- 
 pect Station, and, under General Ord's command, 
 the two corps reached Appomattox Court House 
 about ten a. m. on the 9th, as General Ord 
 states, barely in time, " for in spite of General 
 Sheridan's attempts the cavalry was falling back 
 in confusion before Lee's infantry ; . . ." 
 
 We return now to the morning of April 6. 
 General Meade's orders being received, the 
 Second Corps crossed Flat Creek, part of the 
 troops wading in water up to their armpits, and 
 part on bridges hastily constructed by them- 
 selves. General Gordon's corps was at once en- 
 gaged and a sharp running fight ensued which 
 continued uninterruptedly over a distance of 
 fourteen miles. The country was broken and 
 difficult in places, but artillery moved with the 
 skirmish line, and the lines of battle followed 
 
JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 255 
 
 closely " with a rapidity and good order that is 
 believed to be unexampled." ^ General Badeau 
 says : " the lines of battle followed the skirmish- 
 ers so closely and rapidly as to astonish veteran 
 soldiers." ^ Arriving at the forks near J. Hott's 
 house, where the road running north to Perkin- 
 son's Mills on Sailor's Creek leaves the road 
 from Deatonville to Rice's Station, General 
 Humphreys — leaving the commands of General 
 Anderson and General Ewell, together number- 
 ing about ten thousand men, but without any ar- 
 tillery, to be engaged on the Rice's Station Road 
 by the cavalry and Sixth Corps — pressed on 
 after General Gordon's corps, which turned down 
 the road to Perkinson's Mills, and continued his 
 running fight. Just before dark General Gordon 
 made his last determined stand at the mills, and 
 after a sharp engagement was again defeated. 
 In this fight, made by General Humphreys with 
 hut two divisions of his corps over fourteen 
 miles of country, several partially intrenched po- 
 sitions defended by artillery were carried, and 
 thirteen flags, four guns, seventeen hundred 
 prisoners, and a large part of the main trains of 
 General Lee's army were captured. One division 
 (General Barlow's) of the Second Corps was 
 not engaged on the 6th, having been detached 
 to the extreme right on erroneous information of 
 a column of the enemy being on the Paineville 
 Road. According to the Records of the War 
 
 1 Va. Camp., p. 379. 2 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., p. 578. 
 
256 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 Department, an aggregate of seven thousand 
 two hundred officers and men of General Gor- 
 don's corps were paroled, April 9, 1865. The 
 force encountered on the Rice's Station Road, 
 April 6, by the Sixth Corps and the cavalry 
 corps {two corps), under General Sheridan, 
 numbered but ten thousand men and was with- 
 out artillery. 
 
 In his official report of the movements of the 
 6th, General Grant says : " The movements of 
 the 2d corps and General Ord's command con- 
 tributed greatly to the day's success." -^ In the 
 Memoirs he is silent concerning the Second Corps 
 but, after relating the desperate combat and 
 gallant death of General Read, Colonel Wash- 
 burn, and their comrades (the only portion of 
 General Ord's command engaged that day) near 
 Farmville, about noon of the 6th, he conjectures 
 that " the Confederates took this to be only the 
 advance of a larg^er column which had headed 
 them ofP, and so stopped to intrench ; so that 
 this gallant band of six hundred had checked 
 the progress of a strong detachment of the Con- 
 federate army. 
 
 " This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt 
 saved to us the trains following." ^ 
 
 The Record fails to establish even this com- 
 pensation for the sacrifice of that little band of 
 heroes. General Ord, with the Twenty-fourth 
 Corps, arrived at Burkesville late at night on April 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 625. 2 i^^ pp. 474^ 475. 
 
JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 257 
 
 5, under orders from General Grant to intrench 
 for the night, " and in the morning to move west 
 to cut off all the roads between there and JFarm- 
 ville." ^ On page 567 of his third volumej Gen- 
 eral Badeau adds the following information : 
 " Grant had already directed Ord to cut the 
 bridofe at Farmville. . . . The Southside rail- 
 road crosses the Appomattox twice in this imme- 
 diate neighborhood, first at High bridge, five 
 miles east of the town, and again directly in 
 Farmville. The wagon road to Lynchburg also 
 crosses the Appomattox in the town. The river 
 was too deep to ford, and Farmville therefore 
 became the point aimed at hy both armies,'' 
 Nevertheless, though the reconnoissance of Gen- 
 eral Davies on the 5th had ascertained the move- 
 ment of the Confederate trains westward upon the 
 roads leading to the crossings of the Appomattox 
 at and below Farmville, the cavalry corps under 
 General Sheridan remained near Jetersville, and, 
 daring the night of the 5th, General Ord was 
 further instructed by General Grant to " move 
 west at eight a. m. tomorrow,^' and cautioned, 
 both then and upon the morning of the 6th, 
 that General Lee was apparently moving direct 
 for Burkesville? In obedience to his instruc- 
 tions, before daylight of the 6th, General Ord 
 sent two small regiments of infantry, together 
 numbering but five hundred men, and his head- 
 
 1 Mem., vol. ii., p. 468. 
 
 2 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., pp. 663, 567. 
 
268 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 quarter escort of eighty cavalry, under Colonel 
 Washburn, of the Fifth Massachusetts Regiment, 
 to burn the bridges at Farmville and High 
 Bridge, if not too strongly guarded, and then 
 fall back upon the main command. General 
 Theodore Read, of General Ord's staff, conducted 
 the party. General Ord, moving westward later 
 with his command, came upon General Long- 
 street's corps intrenched at Rice's Station; but 
 it was night before the Twenty-fourth Corps was 
 in position to attack. General Ord had endeav- 
 ored to communicate with General Read and 
 Colonel Washburn, to warn them of the Confeder- 
 ate movements, but was unsuccessful. The little 
 command passed through Farmville, and about 
 mid-day, when within about two miles of High 
 Bridge, encountered two divisions of Confeder- 
 ate cavalry under General Rosser. As a result. 
 General Read, Colonel Washburn, and all the 
 Federal cavalry officers were killed, and after a 
 magnificent fight the entire command was cap- 
 tured or destroyed. 
 
 General Longstreet with his corps left Amelia 
 Springs on the evening of April 5 ; and march- 
 ing during the night reached Rice's Station, on 
 the Lynchburg Railroad, about sunrise of the 
 6th, and there halted to wait till the troops m 
 his rear guarding the trains shoidd come iqj. 
 General Lee joined him here during the course 
 of the morning. General Fitz Lee's cavalry halted 
 for the night at Amelia Springs, but marched at 
 
JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 259 
 
 daylight, and reached the vicinity of Rice's Sta- 
 tion just before noon of the 6th. General 
 Anderson, with his command, followed General 
 Lono-street, halting: durino; the mornino^ at J. 
 Hott's house to protect the trains passing west 
 on the Jamestown Road. General Ewell, with 
 the remainder of the Confederate forces, left 
 Amelia Springs soon after eight o'clock in the 
 morning, General Gordon's corps being his rear- 
 guard.^ General Crook and General Merritt, 
 endeavoring on the morning of the 6th to push 
 through to Deatonville, found the moving trains 
 under a guard too strong to be forced until the 
 Second and Sixth corps had closed down upon 
 the retreating column ; and history says that 
 these trains were saved to the Federal troops 
 by the tireless energy and ability of General 
 Humphreys, seconded by the gallantry of his 
 command, rather than by any other agency. 
 
 The Second Corps resumed the pursuit at 
 half-past five in the morning of the 7th, and 
 came upon High Bridge just as the enemy had 
 set fire to the railroad bridge and were attempt- 
 ing cO burn the wagon road bridge. General 
 Barlow, being in the lead, sent his advance for- 
 ward at double-quick and secured the wagon 
 bridge ; and Colonel Livermore, of General Hum- 
 phreys's staff, with a party, extinguished the fire 
 on the railroad bridge while the enemy's skir- 
 mishers were fighting under their feet. 
 1 Va. Camp., pp. 377-379. 
 
260 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 Crossing the Appomattox at High Bridge, 
 General Humphreys pushed rapidly after the re- 
 treating enemy. General Gordon's corps retired 
 up the river, along the railroad bed ; and Gen- 
 eral Humphreys having been informed in the 
 morning, from headquarters, that General Lee 
 was probably moving toward Danville, directed 
 General Barlow to follow General Gordon. Be- 
 lieving that General Lee was moving toward 
 Lynchburg, he himself moved with the divisions 
 of Generals Miles and De Trobriand, on a road 
 intersecting the stage road to that place north of 
 the Appomattox Kiver ; and about one o'clock 
 came upon General Lee's whole army in position, 
 covering the plank and stage roads to Lynchburg, 
 at Cumberland Church. General Barlow had 
 overtaken and attacked part of General Gor- 
 don's corps and cut off and burned a large num- 
 ber of wagons. Farmville he found to be still 
 in possession of the enemy, who had set the 
 bridges on fire and were crossing a wagon train 
 to the north bank. 
 
 On coming in contact with the enemy General 
 Humphreys immediately made dispositions for 
 attack, and pressed a heavy skirmish line close 
 up to develop his position. He found General 
 Lee's whole army on the crest of a long slope of 
 ground, intrenched sufficiently for cover, and 
 Tvdth artillery in place. General Fitz Lee's cav- 
 alry command covered the rear toward Farmville, 
 supported by General Heth's infantry. General 
 
JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 261 
 
 Humphreys ordered General Barlow up from 
 his position opposite Farmville, and informed 
 General Meade of the fact that he had come up 
 with and was confronting General Lee's whole 
 remaining force ; and suggested that a corps 
 should attack from the direction of Farmville at 
 the same time that he attacked from the oppo- 
 site direction. General Meade sent directions 
 to General Gibbon with the Twenty - fourth 
 Corps, and General Wright with the Sixth Corps/ 
 both of which were at or near Farmville, to 
 cross the river there and attack jointly with 
 the Second Corps. Neither General Meade nor 
 General Humphreys were aware that the river 
 at Farmville was impassable. 
 
 General Badeau places General Grant in per- 
 sonal command at Farmville at this juncture, 
 and says : " He at once ordered Crook to ford 
 the river and proceed to the support of Hum- 
 phreys, and the cavalry waded belly-deep across 
 the Appomattox. Next a re-assuring message was 
 sent to Humphreys : ' Your note of 1.20 p. M. 
 to Major General Meade is just seen. Mott's 
 [Barlow's] division of your corps and Crook's 
 cavalry are both across the river at this point. 
 The Sixth and Twenty-fourth corps are here. 
 The enemy cannot cross at Farmville.' ^ The 
 Army of the James teas then ordered out of the 
 
 1 It is to be remembered that General Lee had but barely- 
 crossed from Farmville to the north side of the Appomattox 
 River burning the bridges behind him, when General Humphreys 
 closed in upon him with the Second Corps. 
 
262 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 way, to follow Sheridan on the road to Prince 
 Edward, and Wright was directed to build a 
 foot bridge for his infantry, and to bring up 
 pontoons for the artillery and the trains. These 
 orders were all obeyed, and before dark Wright's 
 column was filing across the Appomattox, Crook 
 was fighting on the northern bank, and Ord ivas 
 far on the road to Prince Edward'' 
 
 He continues : " The army of the Potomac 
 had pursued with tremendous vigor, the infantry 
 crossing at one bridge which had already been 
 fired, and building another, and the cavalry wad- 
 ing; the vanguard of both Humphreys and 
 Crook had come up with the enemy north of 
 the river, while on the southern side Sheridan, 
 followed by Griffin and Ord was stretching out 
 rapidly, once more to head the flying column of 
 Lee and cut off his hoped-for supplies." ^ 
 
 In his official report. General Grant says : 
 " It was soon found that the enemy had crossed 
 to the north side of the Appomattox; but so 
 close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got pos- 
 session of the common brido^e at Hio^h Brido-e 
 before the enemy could destroy it, and immedi- 
 ately crossed over. The 6th corps and a division 
 of cavalry crossed at Farmville to its support." ^ 
 In the Memoirs he amplifies somewhat, saying : 
 " Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon 
 road bridge near the High Bridge, and at- 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., pp. 584-596. 
 
 2 Mem., vol. ii., p. 626. 
 
JETERSVILLE TO APPOTTOMAX, 263 
 
 tempted to destroy it. He did set fire to it, but 
 the flames had made but little headway when 
 Humphreys came up with his corps and drove 
 away the rear-guard which had been left to pro- 
 tect it while it was burned up. Humphreys 
 forced his way across with some loss, and fol- 
 lowed Lee to the intersection of the road cross- 
 ing at Farmville with the one from Petersburg. 
 Here Lee held a position which was very strong, 
 naturally, besides being intrenched. Humphreys 
 was alone, confronting him all through the day, 
 and in a very hazardous position. He put on a 
 bold face, however, and assaulted with some 
 loss, but was not assaulted in return." ^ In ad- 
 dition he repeats, in substance, what General 
 Badeau has said about the Sixth Corps and Gen- 
 eral Crook's cavalry division crossing to the 
 support of the Second Corps. 
 
 General Crook crossed the Appomattox about 
 four o'clock in the afternoon. General Gregg's 
 brigade was in advance, and, moving out the 
 Plank Road, encountered General Fitz Lee's cav- 
 alry, supported by General Heth's infantry. 
 General Lee attacked, General Gregg was cap- 
 tured, and his brigade driven back. General 
 Crook was then recalled to Farmville^ and 
 moved to Prospect Station, about twelve miles 
 west, reaching there about midnight. 
 
 When General Humphreys — waiting the 
 arrival of General Barlow and fully expecting 
 
 1 Mem.y vol. ii., p. 476. 
 
264 GRANT VS, THE RECORD. 
 
 that an attack would be made from the direction 
 of Farmville (General Grant's "reassuring de- 
 spatch " not being received) — heard the sound 
 of the firing in General Gregg's affair, noticing 
 at the same time that the enemy was shortening 
 his right flank, he contracted his left, and ex- 
 tended his right to envelop the enemy's left. 
 While this movement was being made, General 
 Miles thought he saw an opportunity to attack, 
 and attempted it with a part of his First bri- 
 gade, but was repulsed with considerable loss. 
 General Barlow's division arrived about sunset 
 but could not get into position before dark. 
 General Lee, as was of course anticipated, moved 
 off in the night. General Fitz Lee with the 
 cavalry rear-guard left the ground about mid- 
 night. 
 
 As an example of what he calls " pressing up 
 against an enemy without serious fighting," 
 General Humphreys appends an extract from 
 " McGowan's South Carolina Brigade," upon the 
 situation when the tioo divisions of the Second 
 Corps overtook General Lee's forces at Cumber- 
 land Church. It is as follows : — 
 
 "The enemy seemed ubiquitous. We were 
 instructed to be prepared to fight on either 
 flank. On our right flank firing was pretty 
 steadily kept up ; in our front a regular battle 
 was going on. Mahone's division was engaged, 
 and a portion of Field's. . . . The firing in- 
 creased in rapidity and extent until three sides 
 
JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX, 265 
 
 were at once set upon by the enemy. ... I never 
 was so bewildered as on this occasion. ..." 
 General Badeau condenses this into "... the 
 vanguard of . . . Humphreys . . . had come 
 up with the enemy north of the river." 
 
 The loss of the Second Corps on the 7th was 
 five hundred and seventy-one officers and men 
 killed, wounded, and missing. 
 
 General Grant reached Farmville about four 
 o'clock in the afternoon. The "' reassuring mes- 
 sage" sent by him to General Humphreys is 
 worthy of attention. Except the item in regard 
 to General Crook's cavalry division, it imparts no 
 information not already had by General Hum- 
 phreys, and one seeks in vain for word of com- 
 mendation, encouragement, or promise of support. 
 It is to be remembered too that this despatch was 
 written, and the subsequent orders for the cross- 
 ing of the Sixth Corps to the north bank given, by 
 the same general-in-chief who just one week be- 
 fore had been so embarrassed and perturbed when 
 General Warren found it necessary to bridge 
 Gravelly Run before sending General Ayres's 
 division to aid General Sheridan at Dinwiddle 
 Court House. Of that Gravelly Run crossing, 
 General Badeau writes : " The infantry would 
 doubtless have had some difficulty in crossing, 
 but war is full of difficulties as well as dangers, 
 and the officer who allows them to deter and 
 overcome him is apt to terminate his career in 
 failure, and never pleases such superiors as 
 
266 GRANT VS. THE RECORD, 
 
 Slieridan and Grant." ^ Nevertheless, we read 
 that, with daylight in his favor and the enemy 
 almost in sight where they had been brought to 
 a stand by the Second Corps, General Grant 
 here ordered General Wright " to build a foot 
 bridge for his infantry, and to bring up pontoons 
 for the artillery and the trams.'' 
 
 General Badeau fixes the depth of the ford at 
 which General Crook crossed the Appomattox 
 at " belly-deep " — that is about three feet. 
 General Humphreys, on the 6th, had waded 
 Flat Creek armjnt or over four feet deejo, 
 with a portion of the Second Corps, to reach 
 the enemy he now held at hay. 
 
 In the " Magazine of American History " of 
 October, 1886, Major-General J. W. DePeyster, 
 commenting on the position, and the probable 
 results which would have obtained had the Sixth 
 and Twenty-fourth corps promptly crossed to 
 the north of the Appomattox, remarks: "Why 
 did not this occur? The problem is insoluble. 
 Troops have forded and bridged broader, more 
 boisterous and deeper rivers successfully, under 
 similar and more difficult circumstances, and 
 under fire, crossing victoriously in the teeth of 
 opposition through water arm-pit, even cravat 
 deep, on very many occasions. There was no 
 
 1 Mil. Hist, vol. iii., p. 481. It was in evidence before the 
 Warren Court of Inquiry that, at the Boydton Road crossing of 
 Gravelly Run, the banks were low and marshy, and the stream 
 about four and a half feet deep. The crossing of General War- 
 ren's troops was effected in the darkness of night. 
 
JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX, 267 
 
 lack of material of every kind — buildings and 
 large trees in abundance near at hand. . . . 
 Meanwhile, if the cavalry and infantry got 
 through, artillery could have been hauled across 
 by hand if the teams could not perform their 
 duty. . . . but nothing was done until too late, 
 and Meade telegraphed toward night -fall to 
 Humphreys : ' You must look out for yourself.' 
 He had done so, and he continued to do so." 
 This quotation suggests views held by able and 
 well-informed judges, of the position maintained 
 by General Humphreys on April 7, 1865. If, 
 as General Grant informed General Meade on 
 the 5th, the aim of his movements was "to 
 reach the remnant of Lee's army wherever it 
 may be found, by the shortest and most prac- 
 ticable route," ^ the opportunity was oifered, then 
 and there, by General Humphreys. 
 
 It is competent and proper to notice here the 
 undeniable effect had upon the ultimate result 
 by the conduct of the Second Corps on the 7th. 
 By detaining General Lee at Cumberland Church 
 until the night of that date. General Humphreys 
 enabled General Ord to reach Appomattox Court 
 House in time to intercept the further retreat of 
 the remnant of the Army of Northern Virginia. 
 General Ord's infantry which checked the Con- 
 federate advance as it was breaking through 
 General Sheridan's cavalry lines, did not reach 
 Appomattox Court House till ten o'clock in the 
 
 1 Mil. Hist., vol. iii., p. 556. 
 
268 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 morning of the 9th ; and but for the detention 
 at Cumberland Church, General Lee could readily 
 have reached Lynchburg before that time. 
 
 It is proper also to note the fact that, at Cum- 
 berland Church, on April 7, 1865, the last attack 
 of the war upon the Army of Northern Virginia 
 was made and maintained by the unsupported 
 Second Corps under the command of General 
 A. A. Humphreys. 
 
 These facts have entirely escaped the notice of 
 General Grant and his accredited historian. 
 
 About half-past eight o'clock in the even- 
 ing of the 7th, while General Humphreys, was 
 pressing against the enemy still at Cumberland 
 Church, General Seth Williams, Adjutant-Gen- 
 eral of the Army of the Potomac, brought to 
 him General Grant's first letter to General Lee, 
 written from Farmville, with the request that 
 it be delivered. General Humphreys at once 
 sent it through his picket line, and authorized a 
 truce for an hour to enable the enemy to carry 
 in their wounded lying between the lines. Gen- 
 eral Lee's answer was brought back within an 
 hour, and General Williams returned with it via 
 High Bridge to General Grant at Farmville. 
 
 At half -past five o'clock in the morning of the 
 8th the pursuit of the enemy was resumed by 
 the Second Corps, followed by the Sixth. While 
 on the march in the morning. General Williams 
 brought to General Humphreys General Grant's 
 
JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 269 
 
 second letter to General Lee. This was for- 
 warded throiigli General Fitz Lee's cavalry rear- 
 guard close in General Humphreys's front. Gen- 
 eral Lee's answer to this second letter was re- 
 ceived by General Humphreys about dusk and 
 was delivered to General Grant about midnight 
 by Colonel Whittier, Assistant Adjutant Gen- 
 eral of the Second Corps. General Grant and 
 General Meade had halted for the night at 
 Curdsville, about ten miles to the rear. 
 
 On the morning of the 9th, General Hum- 
 phreys received General Grant's third letter to 
 General Lee, written that morning at Curdsville. 
 General Longstreet's command was about three 
 miles distant in front of the Second Corps, and 
 Colonel Whittier was sent forward with the let- 
 ter. ^ Meeting first one of General Lee's couriers 
 and immediately afterwards Colonel Marshall, of 
 General Lee's staff, he was conducted by the 
 latter to General Lee, to whom he delivered Gen- 
 eral Grant's letter. General Lee dictated his 
 answer to Colonel Marshall, who wrote it. Gen- 
 eral Lee signed it and Colonel Marshall delivered 
 it to Colonel Whittier. The letter was written 
 about nine o'clock in the morning. Returning 
 to General Humphreys, Colonel Whittier was 
 sent to deliver General Lee's answer to General 
 Grant. 
 
 But, when nearing New Store that morning, 
 General Grant had turned off from the road 
 foUowed by the Second and Sixth corps, as Gen- 
 
270 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 eral Badeau states, " to join Sheridan's column/' 
 apparently deeming his personal aid now neceS' 
 sary to the commander of the advance of his 
 left wing. 
 
 Colonel Whittier, therefore, delivered General 
 Lee's letter to General Meade at about ten 
 o'clock. General Meade forwarded it, with a 
 note from himself, to General Grant by Lieu- 
 tenant Pease, of the headquarter staff of the 
 Army of the Potomac. After a ride of twelve 
 or fourteen miles from near New Store, Lieu- 
 tenant Pease delivered the letters to General 
 Grant, at 11.50 a. m., when about eight miles 
 from Appomattox Court House. General Grant's 
 answer was forwarded to General Lee through 
 General Ord's and General Sheridan's lines. 
 The world is familiar with accounts of the scene 
 which soon foUowed, with General Grant and 
 General Lee for the central figures. 
 
 There is another scene connected with that 
 day to which but little heed has yet been 
 given. It will find proper place in history. 
 Near three miles north-east of Appomattox Court 
 House, on the road to Petersburg, stands New 
 Hope Church. Covering the forks of the road 
 just south and west of this church. General Long- 
 street, w4th almost all that is left of the organ- 
 ized Army of Northern Virginia, stands at bay in 
 line of battle. 
 
 With the letters sent to him for transmission 
 to General Lee, General Humphreys had been 
 
JETERSVILLE TO APPOMATTOX. 271 
 
 notified that this correspondence was in no way 
 to interfere with his operations. About half-past 
 ten the Second Corps, with the Sixth following 
 closely, began to overtake the rear of General 
 Longstreet's troops. General Humphreys then 
 received two urgent verbal requests from General 
 Lee, by a staff officer bearing a flag of truce, 
 that he would not continue to press forward, but 
 halt and await the issue of pending negotiations 
 for a surrender. Under the instructions he had 
 received he did not feel authorized to comply 
 with these requests; and, having so informed 
 General Lee, he continued his advance. So 
 urgent was General Lee's staff officer in making 
 his last request, that General Humphreys was 
 obliged to send him word twice that compliance 
 was impossible, and that he must retire from the 
 position he occupied on the road not a hundred 
 yards distant from the head of the Second Corps 
 column. At eleven o'clock the Second Corps 
 came up with General Longstreet's intrenched 
 position. Dispositions were at once made for 
 attack, the Sixth Corps forming on the right of 
 the Second. But at the moment the assault 
 was about to be made. General Meade arrived 
 upon the ground. 
 
 There they stood, face to face for the last 
 effort of the war. Comrades through fiery years 
 confronted foemen grim with scars and staunch 
 in war-won honors. Who can doubt the trial 
 of that hour to General Meade ? Victory was 
 
272 GRANT VS. THE RECORD. 
 
 beckoning for his grasp^ — and dearly the soldier 
 loves the laurel plucked from under battle clouds. 
 No new order even was necessary. His match- 
 less lieutenant was ready ; he had but to keep 
 silent, and before the commander-in-chief could 
 have answered General Lee, the prize must have 
 been won. It would cost life and limb, of course, 
 — but what of that ? Look back over the gory 
 road from the Rapidan ! A few more graves, 
 a few more darkened homes and broken forms, — 
 what could they count beside the honor won? 
 
 But General Meade had read the answer of 
 General Lee before he forwarded it to General 
 Grant. He knew the end would come, and — 
 noblesse oblige — the truce was granted, the 
 long carnage ended ; and Generals Meade, Hum- 
 phreys, and Wright, with their veterans formed 
 around them, waited further orders from the 
 Lieutenant-General. Noblesse oblige f — Yes ; 
 with them it was constitutional. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Alexander, General, 114. 
 
 Ames, General, 67. 
 
 Anderson, General R. H., cora- 
 nxanding Longstreet's corps, 
 49; crossed Po River, 50; 52, 
 53 et seq.; 61, 62, 96, 109, 
 112, 113, 141, 142 et seq.; 
 153, 255, 259. 
 
 Ayres, General, 149, 151, 153 et 
 seq.; 157 et seq.; 179, 186, 
 187, 198 et seq. ; 210, 214, 
 265. 
 
 Babcock, Colonel, 68, 206. 
 
 Badeau, General, "Military His- 
 tory " by, 5 ; Grant sustained by 
 government, 8; Grant's head- 
 quarters located, 12, 13 ; com- 
 munication via Washington, 14 ; 
 cooperation begun, 15 ; Grant 
 and Meade, 17 ; Grant must di- 
 rect A. of P. , 21 ; first visit to 
 Meade 25 ; Meade discussed at 
 Grant's headquarters, 27, 28 ; 
 crossing of Rapidan, 32, 33 ; 
 retrospect from Cold Harbor, 
 39 ; Grant's political reasons for 
 retaining Meade, 40, 41 ; esti- 
 mate of Rawlins, 43 ; opening of 
 Wilderness battle, 45, 46 ; move- 
 ment to Spottsylvania C. H., 
 47 et seq. ; Smith en route to 
 Cold Harbor, 68, 69; Grant's 
 orders in battle, 70; orders 
 May 11, '64, 71 ; crossing of 
 
 Chickahominy, 74; movement 
 on Petersburg, 77 et seq. ; 
 movement on Jetersville, 87 et 
 seq. ; Warren in Wilderness 
 battle, 101 ; Warren moving 
 to Spottsylvania, 105; Warren 
 at Spottsylvania, 107; assault 
 May 10, '64, 119, 120; assault 
 May 12, '64, 121, 122 ; Ewell's 
 attack May 19, '64, 131 et 
 seq. ; Cold Harbor, June 1, 
 '64, 138 et seq.; 152, battle 
 of White Oak Road, 157, 158 ; 
 Grant's orders to Sheridan, 164, 
 165 ; Sheridan did not want 
 Fifth Corps, 168 ; force oppos- 
 ing Sheridan at Five Forks, 
 175 ; Grant invites Sheridan 
 to relieve Warren, 206, 207; 
 Sheridan's brilliant stroke, 233 ; 
 April 2, '65, 236 et seq. ; change 
 of direction April 6, '65, 253 ; 
 257, Grant at Farmville, 261 ; 
 265, 266, 269. 
 
 Banks, General, 9, 22. 
 
 Barlow, General, 80, 135, 136, 
 255, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264. 
 
 Bartlett, General, 109, 149, 151, 
 182, 184, 189. 
 
 Barton's brigade, 226. 
 
 Benyaurd, Captain, 183. 
 
 Birney, General, 131, 135, 136. 
 
 Bratton, General John, report of, 
 115, 128. 
 
 Braxton, Lieutenant-Colonel, 135. 
 
274 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Breekenridge, General, 111, 148. 
 Burnside, General, 20, 45, 85, 
 
 86, 124, 125, 141, 147, 149. 
 Butler, General B. F., 8, 15, 16, 
 
 22, 33; commended by Grant, 
 
 41 ; Petersburg movement, 75 
 
 et seq. ; 221, 225. 
 
 Chamberlain, General, 157. 
 Corse, General, 171, 189, 196, 
 
 202. 
 Coulter, Colonel, 200. 
 Court of Inquiry, Warren, 159; 
 
 Opinion, 160 et seq. ; Opinion, 
 
 190 et seq.; Opinion, 211 et 
 
 seq. 
 Crawford, General, 109, 111, 112, 
 
 126, 136, 149, 154 et seq.; 157 
 
 et seq. ; 179, 180, 198 et seq. ; 
 
 211, 214, 238, 241. 
 Crittenden, General, 149. 
 Crook, General, 9, 15, 93, 170 et 
 
 seq.; 197, 204, 259, 261, 262, 
 
 263. 
 Custer, General, 172, 188, 197, 
 
 203. 
 Cutler, General, 109, 121, 125, 
 
 149. 
 
 Dana, Hon. Charles A., 107, 108, 
 111, 116 et seq. 
 
 Daniels, General, 126. 
 
 Davies, General, 90, 170 et seq. ; 
 224, 257. 
 
 De Peyster, General, 266, 267. 
 
 De Trobriand, division of Gen- 
 eral, 260. 
 
 Devin, General, 170, 171 et seq. ; 
 189, 197, 204. 
 
 Doles, General, killed, 149. 
 
 Early, General, 18, 22, 49, 57, 
 58, 62, 141, 143, 148, 150. 
 
 Ewell, General, 32, 57, 62, 96, 
 111, 126, reconnoissance May 
 19, '64, 129 et seq. ; 255, 259. 
 
 Ferrero, General, 181, 133. 
 Field, General, 109, 128, 142, 144. 
 Fitzhugh, Colonel, 204. 
 Forrest, General, 23. 
 
 Gibbon, General John, 135, 136, 
 261. 
 
 Gibbs, General, 172, 233. 
 
 Gillespie, Captain, 197. 210. 
 
 Gordon, General, 96, 150, 224, 
 225, 232, 254, 255, 259, 260. 
 
 Gracie's brigade, 226. 
 
 Grant, General U. S., challenges 
 the Record, 1 ; indorses Ba^ 
 deau's "Military History," 4; 
 ignores Humphreys's "Virginia 
 Campaign," 5; assumes com- 
 mand of armies of U. S., 7 ef 
 seq. ; locates headquarters, 10, 
 12 ; his field of operations, 13, 
 14; communications cut, 16; 
 imputes twofold difficulty to 
 Warren, 19, 20; has not met 
 Bobby Lee, 22 ; relations with 
 Meade and A. of P., 24 et seq. ; 
 on Shiloh-Corinth campaign, 
 24; first visit to Meade, 26; 
 commends Meade, 27 ; embar- 
 rassed by Meade's position, 29, 
 30 ; the campaign his, 32 ; es- 
 timate of gain at Wilderness, 
 38, 39 ; apology to Butler, 41 ; 
 informed Meade, 45 ; move- 
 ment to Spottsylvania C. H., 
 51, 52; Smith's movement 
 June 1, '64, 69, 70; order 
 June 11, ' 64, 71 ; crossing of 
 Chickahominy, 73 ; passage of 
 James River, 75 et seq. ; Sheri- 
 dan and Meade at Jetersville, 
 91 et seq.; Warren in Wilder- 
 ness and at Spottsylvania C. H., 
 101 et seq. ; 115, assault May 
 10, '64, 118; assault May 12, 
 '64, 120 et seq.; 127, Ewell's 
 attack May 19, '64, 129 et seq. ; 
 
INDEX. 
 
 275 
 
 Cold Harbor June 1, '64, 140 ; 
 attacks on Warren and Burn- 
 side June 2, '64, 147 ; battle of 
 White Oak Hoad, 157 ; impu- 
 tation in report, 159; not sus- 
 tained, 160, 161 ; 163, instruc- 
 tions to Sheridan, 164 ; regards 
 Sheridan's preferences, 168, 
 169 ; report of advance on Five 
 Forks, 169 ; 170, 173, 174, 177 
 et seq. ; invites removal of War- 
 ren, 180, 181, 206; denies in- 
 quiry to Warren, 181, 209 ; 183 
 et seq. ; headquarters, 184 ; re- 
 port of Sheridan's Richmond 
 raid, 220 et seq. ; in error, 224 
 et seq.; Wilson's raid, 230; 
 Kilpatrick's Jonesboro raid, 
 230, 231; mentions Hum- 
 phreys, 231 ; narrative of 
 April 2, '65, 234 et seq.; com- 
 mends Miles, 239, 243, 246 et 
 seq. ; change of direction April 
 6, '65, 253 ; official report, 256 ; 
 at FarmviUe, 261; 262, 263, 
 264, 265, 266, 267 et seq. 
 
 Grant, F. D., 1. 
 
 Gregg, General, 48, 59 et seq. ; 113, 
 171 et seq. ; 222, 226, 233, 263. 
 
 Gregory, General, 157. 
 
 Griffin, General Charles, at Je- 
 tersville, 87 ; 91, 109, 121, 125, 
 149 et seq. ; 153, 154 et seq. ; 157 
 et seq. ; 177, 179, 180, 183, 185, 
 188, 198 et seq. ; 211, 214, 231, 
 253. 
 
 Gwyn, General James, 155, 210. 
 
 Halleck General, retired, 11 ; 24, 
 
 25, 33. 
 Hampton, General, 53, 59 et seq. ; 
 
 228, 229. 
 Hancock, General, 36, at Todd's 
 
 Tavern, 57 ; 58, 61, 102, 104, 
 
 120 et seq. ; 127, 130 et seq. ; 
 
 137, 141, 148. 
 
 Harris, General, 126. 
 
 Haskell, Major, 114. 
 
 Hays, General, 233, 238, 244, 
 245. 
 
 Heth, General, 148, 149. 
 
 HiU, General, 141, 148. 
 
 Hoffman, Colonel, 129. 
 
 Hoke, General, 142, 143, 144. 
 
 Humphreys, General A. A., 
 "Virginia Campaign" by, 5, 
 6 ; remarks on mixed command, 
 30 ; on crossing Rapidan into 
 Wilderness, 33 et seq. ; opening 
 movements in Wilderness, 46; 
 movement to Spottsylvania, 59 
 etseq.; 106, Smith's movements 
 June 1, '64, 67, 68; Warren's 
 orders, June 11, '64, 73; move- 
 ment on Petersburg, 79 et seq. ; 
 Jetersville movements, 86 et 
 seq. ; Fifth Corps at Spottsyl- 
 vania C. H., 108 et seq. ; as- 
 sault May 12, '64, 123 et seq. ; 
 128, Ewell's attack May 19, '64, 
 133 et seq. ; Cold Harbor June 
 
 1, '64, 141 et seq. ; movements of 
 Warren and Burnside June 2, 
 '64, 147, 148 ; relieves Griffin 
 March .30, '65, 154 ; attacks 
 with Miles, 156; narrative of 
 operations at Five Forks, 170 et 
 seq.; 177, 184, on Warren, 207 ; 
 narrative of Sheridan's Rich- 
 mond raid, 225, 226; writes 
 Wilson, 228 ; mentioned by 
 Grant, 231; March 25, '65, 
 232 ; March 31, '65, 233 ; April 
 
 2, '65, 234 et seq. ; dates move- 
 ments of Fifth Corps, 241, 242 ; 
 narrative, 243 et seq. ; attacks 
 Lee's rear April 6, '65, 252 ; 
 254, 255, 259 et seq. ; 266, 267, 
 268 et seq. 
 
 Hunt, General Henry J., 205, 232. 
 Hunter, General, 19, 22, 228. 
 Hunton, General, 155, 156. 
 
276 
 
 INDEX, 
 
 Johnson's division, 166. 
 Johnston, General A. S., claims 
 
 denounced, 39. 
 Johnston, General Jos. E. , 8, 9. 
 
 Kautz, General A. V., 227. 
 Kellogg, Colonel, 200 et seq. 
 Kershaw, General, 126, 142, 143. 
 Kilpatrick, General, 230. 
 Kitching, Colonel, 135. 
 
 Lee, General Fitzhugh, 53, 59, 63, 
 64, 107, 112, 142, 148, 166 et seq.; 
 224, 229, 258, 260, 264, 269. 
 
 Lee, General R. E., 9, 22, position 
 on Rapidan, 32, 33; deluded, 
 49 ; reflections on, considered, 
 52 et seq.; at Amelia C. H., 
 87; 96, 124, 127, 138, 155, 
 orders Fitz Lee to Five Forks, 
 166; directs Pickett to hold 
 Five Forks, 196; 243, 252, 
 256, 257, 258, 261, 267 et seq. 
 
 Lee, General W. H. F., 53, 96, 
 166, 170 et seq, ; 190, 196, 203, 
 229. 
 
 Livermore, Colonel, 259. 
 
 Locke, Colonel Fred. T., 98, 205, 
 diary of, 242, 250, 
 
 Lomax, General, 224. 
 
 Long, General A. L., report of 
 May 19, '64, 134, 135. 
 
 Longstreet, General, 96, corps, 
 111, 124, 125, 258, 269 et seq. 
 
 Mackenzie, General, 89, 177, 197, 
 
 204, 231, 241. 
 Madill, Colonel, 246. 
 Mahone, General, 148, 229, 264. 
 Marshall, Colonel, 269. 
 Mayo, Colonel, 196, 202. 
 McClellan, General George B., 11. 
 McCleUan, Major H. B., 53, 225. 
 McDougall, General, 246. 
 McGowan, General, 126, 155, 156, 
 
 264. 
 
 McGregor's battery, 196, 202. 
 
 Meade, General George G. , 10, his 
 delicate position, 25 ; Badeau's 
 testimony, 26; Grant's official 
 report on, 26, 27; embarrasses 
 Grant, 30, 31 ; retained because, 
 40, 41 ; no act of, specifically 
 commended by Grant, 44; at 
 Todd's Tavern, 48 et seq. ; 59 
 et seq. ; 70, passage of James 
 River, 75 et seq. ; JetersvUle 
 movements, 87 et seq. ; accom- 
 panies Grant, 102; 104, 115, 
 assault May 10, '64, 118; or- 
 ders Hancock to support Tyler, 
 136; unjust at times, 158; 161, 
 182 et seq. ; headquarters, 184 ; 
 sometimes did not agree with 
 Warren, 207; 232, 236, sends 
 Humphreys to Miles' s aid, 246 ; 
 at Jetersville April 6, '65, 252; 
 261, 267 et seq. 
 
 Merritt, General, 48, 50, 51, 59 et 
 seq. ; 89, 91, 93, 108, 112, 113, 
 167, 170, 197, 233, 235, 238, 
 241, 259. 
 
 MUes, General, 62, 154, 156, 233, 
 April 2, '65, 234 et seq ; 243 et 
 seq. ; 246 et seq. ; 250, 252, 260, 
 264. 
 
 Morgan, Colonel, 81. 
 
 Morgan, General, 22. 
 
 Mott, General, 233, 243 et seq. ; 
 252, 261. 
 
 Munford, General, 111 et seq. ; 
 189, 196. 
 
 New Jersey, Third cavalry (vet- 
 eran), 134. 
 Nugent, Colonel, 246. 
 
 Ohio, Second cavalry (veteran), 
 
 134. 
 Ord, General, 92, 93, 99, 254, 256, 
 
 257, 262, 267. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 277 
 
 Paris, Comte de, 38. 
 Pearson, General, 182. 
 Pease, Lieutenant, 270. 
 Pegram's artillery, 196. 
 Pegram's brigade, 129. 
 Pendleton, General W. W., report 
 
 of, 55, 56, 114. 
 Penrose, General, 111. 
 Pickett, General, 154, at Five 
 
 Forks, 166; 170 et seq. ; 189, 
 
 202, 204, 233, 243. 
 Porter, Colonel, 206. 
 Potter, General, 149. 
 Price, General, 120. 
 
 Kamseur, General, 126, 129, 133, 
 
 150. 
 Eanasey's brigade, 246. 
 Ransom, General, 196, 201, 202. 
 Rawlins, General, 43, 67, 205, 
 
 206. 
 Read, General Theodore, 256, 258. 
 Richardson, Colonel, 203. 
 Roberts, General, 166, 196. 
 Robinson, General, 61, 108, 109. 
 Rodes, General, 111, 149. 
 Rosser, General T. L., 166, 170, 
 
 190, 258. 
 
 Sedgwick, General John, 101, 103, 
 108, 110, 111. 
 
 Sheridan, General, 19, 44, 47, or- 
 ders of changed, 48 et seq. ; 58, 
 order May 8, '64, 63 ; orders to 
 May 7, '64, 65 ; at JetersviUe, 
 87 et seq. ; 105, withdraws Wil- 
 son from Spottsylvania C. H., 
 113 ; at Cold Harbor, 142 ; at- 
 tacked, 144; at Dinwiddie C. 
 H. , 165 et seq. ; don't want Fifth 
 Corps, 168, 177 ; relieves War- 
 ren of conamand of Fifth Corps, 
 180, 205 ; informed of aid sent 
 him, 185 ; attack on Five Forks, 
 197 et seq. ; imputations against 
 Warren, 208 ; explains to Court, 
 
 209 ; Richmond raid, 220 et 
 seq. ; at White House, 228 ; to 
 Wilson's relief, 230; April 2, 
 '65, 234 et seq. ; 243, 246 et 
 seq,; 253, 254, 257, 262, 265, 
 267, 269. 
 
 Sherman, General, 9, 10, 15, 44. 
 
 Sigel, General, 9, 16, 22. 
 
 Smith, General W. F., 67 et seq. ; 
 75 et seq. ; 138, 144, 146. 
 
 Spear, Colonel, 201, 
 
 Stuart, GeneralJ. E. B., 47, 50, 
 53, 54, 56, 57, 112, 221, 222, 
 224, 225. 
 
 Stewart, General, 196. 
 
 Sweitzer, General, 149, 151. 
 
 Tyler, General R. O., 130 et seq, 
 
 Wallace, General, 196, 201, 202. 
 Walker, General F. A., 83, 84, 86, 
 
 87. 
 Warner, Captain E. R., 205, 206. 
 Warren, General G. K., 19, 20, 37, 
 45, 52, 60, 61, 69, at Riddle's 
 shop, 72 ; 101, 112, 120 et seq. ; 
 128, EweU's attack May 19, 
 '64, 130, 132, 138 ; at Cold Har- 
 bor June 1, '64, 139, 142, 144 
 et seq. ; 146, 151, movements 
 March 29, '65, 152 et seq. ; so- 
 called dilatory movements, 157 
 et seq. ; vindicated and criticised 
 by Court of Inquiry, 163 ; 177 ; 
 sends aid to Sheridan, 181, 182 ; 
 headquarters at, 184; receives 
 additional orders, 185, 186; 
 gets Ayres through to Dinwid- 
 die C. H., 187; despatch from 
 Sheridan, 188; criticised by 
 Court of Inquiry, 191, 192, 193 
 et seq. ; ordered to attack Five 
 Forks, 197 et seq. ; sometimes 
 modified plans, 207; Court 
 granted by President Hayes, 
 209; vindicated by Court, 213, 
 
278 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 215 ; Record of Five Forks, 216 
 
 et seq. ; 265. 
 Washburn, Colonel, 256, 258. 
 Webb, General Alex. S., 157, 158, 
 
 161, 162. 
 Whittier, Colonel, 269, 270. 
 Wickham, General, 224. 
 Wilcox, General, 148. 
 Willcox, General, 149. 
 WiUiams, General Seth, 269. 
 
 Wilson, General, 47, 51, 63, 74, 
 108, at Spottsylvania C. H., 
 113, 115, 116 ; 148, 222, 226, 
 cavalry raid, 227 et seq. 
 
 Winthrop, General Fred., 154 et 
 seq. ; 205, 214. 
 
 Wise, General, 155, 156. 
 
 Wright, General, 17, 69, 120, 121, 
 123, 125, 127, 139, 143, 170, 
 253, 254, 261, 262, 272. 
 
^V P* ^* iHrClellam 
 
 THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF MAJOR-GENERAL 
 J. E. B. STUART, Commander of the Cavalry o£ the Army 
 of Northern Virginia. By H. B. McClellan, A. M., 
 Late Major, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Chief of 
 Staff of the Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. 
 With Portrait of Stuart and seven Maps. 8vo, ;^3.oo. 
 
 HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY, 
 
 Boston and New York. 
 
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