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 Price 35 Cents 
 
 PAN-GERMANY 
 
 THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 and 
 
 A PLAN FOR THE ALLIES 
 
 By ANDRE CHERADAME 
 
 PAN GERMANY IN 1917 
 
 OUTUHE Of THE PAI 8ERMI PU» OF 1911 — 
 PAI GERMAHY AS IT IS UXJX/vnJXn 
 
 ISSEKTUl STRATEGIC POSITJIMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
 *** SEA 
 
 Pan-Germany is an accomplished fact. Whether it shall remain 
 or not is for America to say. 
 
 This little book is of essential importance to the 
 understanding of the War. 
 
 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS 
 
 BOSTON 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 and 
 
 A PLAN FOR THE ALLIES 
 
 By Andre Cheradame 
 
 New and Greatly Enlarged Edition 
 
 containing not only all of the material of the 
 first Edition of 'Pan-Germany: The Disease 
 and Cure', but also articles from later issues 
 of The Atlantic Monthly and two chapters 
 never before published. 
 
 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS 
 
 BOSTON 
 
J 
 
 -w 
 
 Copyright, 1917 and 1918, by 
 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY COMPANY 
 
 Copyright, 1018, by 
 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS, Inc. 
 
 ©CI. A 4 97201 
 
 m -4 1918 
 
 ^ i 
 
[No student outside of Germany itself has studied the Pan- 
 German scheme in all its details more thoroughly than the 
 distinguished French publicist, Andre Cheradame. For more 
 than twenty years he has devoted all his energies and resources, 
 physical and intellectual alike, to a vigorous and exhaustive 
 investigation of the origin and progress of the monstrous con- 
 spiracy which threatens to overwhelm the liberties of the 
 entire world. 
 
 His articles from the Atlantic Monthly issued in paper- 
 covered book form under the name of 'Pan-Germany: The 
 Disease and Cure', have been distributed throughout the 
 country by the thousands. To meet the constantly changing 
 war conditions and to elaborate upon his earlier suggestions, 
 M. Cheradame contributes much timely material to the new 
 and enlarged edition. In the additional chapters, the author 
 not only emphasizes his delineation of the menace of Pan- 
 Germany and the proper means of meeting it, but he criti- 
 cizes fearlessly the failure of the Allies to adopt comprehen- 
 sive measures to that end, because of their belief that war 
 is to be won or lost on the Western Front. 
 
 Published in inexpensive form with special rates for patri- 
 otic distribution, the new edition offers to the American 
 people further understanding of the present crisis. 
 
 Besides the articles which M. Cheradame has contributed 
 to The Atlantic Monthly, the same author has written 'Pan- 
 Germany Plot Unmasked' and 'Pan-Germanism and the 
 United States' (Charles Scribners & Son). 
 
 The last two chapters in the present edition, pertaining to 
 'A Plan for the Allies,' have never before been published in 
 any form.] 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 I. How Cheaply Germany Has Fought The 
 
 War i 
 
 II. How Much Germany Has Won in The 
 
 War 18 
 
 III. The Necessity for a Decision 47 
 
 IV. The Allies and Pan-Germanism 62 
 
 V. Military Operations 81 
 
 VI. Pan-Germany's Strength and Weakness 91 
 
 VII. The Best Way to Crush Pan-Germany ... 113 
 
 VIII. Political Strategy 129 
 
 IX. The German Pacifist Manoeuvres 156 
 
 X. The Western Front 165 
 
 XI. The Western Front Theory Criticized. . . 182 
 
 XII. The Lesson of Three Years of War and 
 
 of Events in Russia 200 
 
 XIII. A Plan for the Allies 214 
 
Pan-Germany 
 The Disease and Cure 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 How Cheaply Germany Has Fought 
 the War 
 
 At the beginning of 1916, I said in my book The 
 Pan-German Plot Unmasked, — 
 
 ' Finally, when all negotiations for an armistice 
 have fallen flat and Germany's situation has be- 
 come still more critical, we shall see Berlin play 
 her trump card. Protests against territorial an- 
 nexations will become insistent beyond the Rhine, 
 secretly sanctioned by the German government, 
 which will finally say to the Allies: "Let this 
 slaughtering of one another cease ! We are willing 
 to listen to reason ; we resign our claims to those 
 territories of yours now occupied by our armies. 
 The game has been played to a draw; so let us 
 treat for peace on that basis." 
 
 'On the day when this proposition is put for- 
 ward, the Allies will find themselves face to face 
 with the most subtle move yet made by Berlin — 
 the most insidious German snare. Then, above 
 all things, must the steadfastness, the perspicacity, 
 
PA N -GERM A N Y 
 
 and the unity of the Allies be most brilliantly 
 made manifest. The trick of the "drawn game," 
 if successful, would involve an overwhelming tri- 
 umph for Germany and an irreparable tragedy for 
 the Allies and for the liberty of the world.' 
 
 Only a few months after these lines were print- 
 ed, the prophecy began to be fulfilled more and 
 more completely. Every possible step has been 
 taken by Germany to bring about peace on the 
 basis of a draw. The slogan, ' Peace without an- 
 nexations or indemnities,' was coined to that end. 
 At first the Allies believed that this formula origi- 
 nated in Russia ; as a matter of fact, however, it 
 was worked out in Berlin and then suggested to 
 the Russian Socialists through secret agents whom 
 Germany has successfully established in the Pet- 
 rograd Soviet. These Socialists, doubtless well- 
 meaning, but over-fond of theories and always 
 ready to embrace the wildest Utopian schemes, — 
 ignorant, too, of all realities, as has been shown by 
 the steady aggravation of the general situation in 
 Russia since they came into power with the Rev- 
 olution, — have declared enthusiastically for the 
 1 peace without annexations and indemnities.' As 
 there exist also in the other Allied countries groups 
 of Socialists with a stronger grip on theories than 
 on facts, and also because Allied sympathies natur- 
 ally rallied strongly to the support of the Russian 
 Revolution, the formula, ' peace without annexa- 
 tions or indemnities,' thanks to its apparent 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 origin, has unquestionably made serious inroads 
 on a certain section of Allied public opinion. 
 
 The Stockholm manoeuvres, engineered by all 
 the powerful and varied means at the disposal of 
 German propagandists, were designed to estab- 
 lish this formula as the fixed basis of all peace 
 negotiations. When the astuteness of the Allied 
 governments prevented the fulfillment of this 
 attempt within the period desired by Berlin, the 
 Vatican was persuaded through Viennese agencies 
 to throw its influence on the side of peace as deter- 
 mined by Germany. 
 
 As a matter of fact, the Pope's peace proposals, 
 while not embodying the exact terms of the Kai- 
 ser's formula, involved, in the last analysis, prac- 
 tically the same essential results. Berlin, there- 
 fore, in order to assure unceasing discussion of her 
 formula, — a discussion tending at least to bring 
 about an armistice, which would split up and mor- 
 ally disarm the Allies, thus making it possible for 
 her to deal with them separately, — outdid her- 
 self in mobilizing toward one end the most widely 
 divergent forces, from the Maximalist anarchists 
 of Petrograd to the most hidebound reactionaries 
 of the Sacred College. The extent, the vigor, and 
 the persistence of the amazing ' pacifist' offensive 
 launched by Germany were such that the expres- 
 sions 'peace without indemnities or annexations,' 
 'drawn game,' 'white peace,' ' paix boiteuse,' have 
 become as current in the Allied countries as if 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 they had some established connection with reality. 
 This is entirely contrary to the fact : with the best 
 intentions in the world, peace without annexations 
 or indemnities, as things stand now, is im possible. 
 There can be no 'white peace, 1 no 'drawn game,' 
 no ' paix boi tense.' 
 
 To tell the truth, a section of Allied opinion has 
 become befuddled by these formulae of Berlin, 
 whose function is to accomplish in the moral order 
 the same asphyxiating action as that of the gases 
 employed on the battlefield by the German Gen- 
 eral Staff. The result of this moral intoxication is 
 that important groups of the Allies begin to juggle 
 with words and lose sight of facts. As the natural 
 outcome of giving serious thought to impossibili- 
 ties, grave errors are made in weighing the present 
 situation, with an attendant weakening of the 
 joint action of the Allied democracies. It is im- 
 perative, therefore, that the pursuit of Utopias, 
 leading only to disaster, be abandoned, and that 
 we return to those realities which alone can lead 
 to victory and the establishment of a durable 
 peace. 
 
 If the formula 'peace without annexations and 
 indemnities' has been allowed to insinuate itself 
 into the general discussion, it is only because great 
 numbers of the Allied peoples fail to understand 
 the overwhelming ad vantages which Germany, by 
 means of the war. has been able to assure to her- 
 self for the present and the future. The object of 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 this paper is to show just what these advantages 
 are, and at the same time to brand the utter hy- 
 pocrisy of the slogan, 'peace without annexations 
 and indemnities,' which, regarded even in the 
 most favorable light, would allow Germany to 
 make off with immense booty, leaving the Allies 
 to face the incalculable losses incurred by them in 
 a war launched by their adversary. 
 
 The significance of the low rate 
 of German exchange 
 
 The continual fall of German exchange is re- 
 garded by many of the Allies as proof of the pro- 
 gressive and irremediable impoverishment of Ger- 
 many. When, for instance, the mark drops 47 per 
 cent in Switzerland, while the franc has depreci- 
 ated only 13 per cent, Frenchmen are for the most 
 part inclined to believe that the war has affected 
 the two countries in relatively the same propor- 
 tion ; they then conclude that Germany's financial 
 situation is infinitely worse than that of France. 
 In reality, such a comprehensive conclusion can- 
 not be reached simply through the rise and fall of 
 exchange, which reflects only certain special as- 
 pects of the financial situation of a country. 
 
 Among the various causes affecting exchange, 
 there are two principal ones. The first is moral. 
 It cannot be denied that the fluctuation of ex- 
 change responds to foreign confidence. If German 
 exchange is low, it implies, to a certain extent at 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 least, the existence of a universal conviction that 
 in the long run Germany cannot hold out against 
 her formidable ring of adversaries. As a result, 
 there is no great demand for the currency of a 
 state whose credit, it is thought, must finally col- 
 lapse. It should be noted, however, that the rea- 
 son for this fall of exchange is only a moral evalua- 
 tion anticipating a probable outcome; it is not 
 due to a mathematically certain estimate of what 
 Germany now stands to win or lose as a result of 
 the war. 
 
 The second great factor affecting exchange, on 
 the other hand, is based on present realities which 
 are susceptible of being accurately determined. 
 Germany, since she has been blockaded by sea, 
 exports infinitely less than formerly; consequently, 
 her ability to settle her accounts in foreign 
 countries is limited. When she was able to sell 
 the United States a million marks' worth of mer- 
 chandise, she then had at her disposal a million 
 marks with which to pay cash for such imports as 
 she needed. Now that her exports have been so 
 reduced, she has little money to spare for spending 
 abroad. If she wishes to increase these foreign 
 purchases, she must export her gold and conse- 
 quently reduce the security behind her bank- 
 notes. This results in a lowering of the basis of 
 German credit, with a resulting drop in exchange. 
 
 We shall now see that this falling exchange, 
 whatever its importance, does not take into ac- 
 
 6 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 count all the elements of the general financial situ- 
 ation. 
 
 If the blockade of Germany seriously compli- 
 cates her food problems, on the other hand it is 
 in a way advantageous from a financial point of 
 view. In a word, when Germany found herself 
 blockaded she was obliged to evolve means of ex- 
 isting on her own resources or those of her allies. 
 Our enemies had great difficulties of organization 
 to overcome, but they turned them to good ac- 
 count: for if Germany's exports are small, her im- 
 ports have been correspondingly reduced. Hence 
 she needs to send very little money abroad — a fact 
 which is financially in her favor. 
 
 Now, the case of France is radically different. 
 The French government, feeling assured of the 
 liberty of the seas and believing that the war 
 would be a short one, found it more expedient to 
 place enormous orders abroad than to rely on do- 
 mestic resources to supply the nation's need. As 
 a result, French imports, according to published 
 statistics, exceed exports by one billion of francs a 
 month. This means that, as things stand now, 
 France must pay to foreign countries the stagger- 
 ing sum of twelve billion francs a year, with no 
 corresponding compensation, since her purchases 
 consist of products which are destroyed in use. 
 For this reason France is undergoing serious im- 
 poverishment while Germany gets off compara- 
 tively easily. It is therefore plain that the fluctua- 
 
PAN- GERM A N Y 
 
 tions of exchange bear little relation to those con- 
 ditions which must be taken into consideration in 
 making an appraisal of the general situation ; they 
 reflect, in fact, only a special and limited aspect of 
 the financial situation as a whole. Popular con- 
 clusions drawn from the fall in the value of the 
 mark are false when attempts are made to give 
 them an absolute or general significance. 
 
 Why people are still ignorant of the vast advantages 
 gained by Germany from the war 
 
 Many of the Allies are hoodwinked by the 'great 
 illusion' which even now prevents them, to their 
 endless detriment, from seeing things as they ac- 
 tually are. In the Allied nations, in fact, people 
 continue to speak of Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
 Bulgaria and Turkey, as if these states remained 
 just as they were before the war. But these terms 
 have no longer any relation to reality. The 
 Quadruple Alliance of Central Europe is simply 
 a great illusion, studiously fostered by William 
 II, for by its means his plans are vastly facili- 
 tated. As a matter of fact, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
 and Austria-Hungary are not the allies, but the 
 vassals, of Berlin, and their influence with her is 
 less than that of Saxony or Bavaria. The rulers 
 at Constantinople, Sofia, Vienna, and Budapest 
 are simply marionettes moved by threads which 
 are pulled by Berlin according to her strategic 
 needs. 
 
 8 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Very often we hear it said, ' Germany has creat- 
 ed Mitteleuropa. 1 This is another mistake. Geo- 
 graphically speaking, Mitteleuropa includes only 
 Central Europe; and Germany's dominion is in- 
 finitely further flung, extending as it does from the 
 west front in France to the British front before 
 Bagdad. If we wish to see things in the light of 
 reality, we must say, for the present at least, 
 ' There is no longer any Germany; instead, there is 
 Pan-Germany.'' This is an essential assumption 
 if we are to reason justly. The map of Pan-Ger- 
 many at the beginning of 191 7, which is printed 
 above, shows clearly the essential, but all-too- 
 little-known elements of the present situation, 
 which is characterized by the fact that 73 million 
 Germans, aided by 21 million vassals, — Magyars, 
 Slavs, and Turks, — have reduced to slavery 82 
 millions of Latins, Slavs, and Semites, belonging 
 to thirteen different nationalities. Pan-Germany, 
 which has now almost completely reached the lim- 
 its set by the Pan-German plan of 191 1, consists, 
 therefore, of one vast territory containing about 
 176 million inhabitants and natural resources of 
 the greatest variety. 
 
 I beg my readers to refer to this map of Pan- 
 Germany every time it is made desirable by the 
 text. This repeated study of the map is indispen- 
 sable to a clear and complete comprehension of 
 the demonstration which follows. As regards the 
 profits which Germany has wrung from the war, 
 
 9 
 
PA N - GERM A N Y 
 
 it is particularly important, in order to grasp the 
 idea of Pan-Germany; for it is the direct result of 
 its creation that Germany, in spite of the losses 
 and expenses inevitably incurred by a warring 
 nation, has been able to assure herself of certain 
 advantages which, considered as a whole, far out- 
 balance her losses and expenses, as we shall see. 
 
 In order to understand the nature of these ad- 
 vantages, one point must first be made clear. 
 
 The war has cost the Germans comparatively Utile 
 
 For six fundamental reasons, the conduct of the 
 war has really cost the Germans far less than it 
 has cost their adversaries. 
 
 i. No Experimentation. Germany, in order to 
 produce a vast output of various types of guns and 
 projectiles economically evolved in times of peace, 
 needed only to extend, by means of machinery of 
 domestic manufacture, her arsenals and muni- 
 tion-factories, which before the war were already 
 considerable. On the other hand, the production 
 of war-material in France at the outbreak of hos- 
 tilities was very slack, while in England and Rus- 
 sia it was almost negligible. In these three coun- 
 tries, therefore, it was necessary to improvise, as 
 best might be, thousands of new plants, to equip 
 them with machinery purchased in America at 
 vast expense, and hastily to evolve new types of 
 cannon, projectiles, and the rest. Now, improvi- 
 sation, especially in war-time, means false starts 
 
 10 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 and inevitable bad work, which must be paid 
 dearly for. Germany was not obliged to incur 
 these very considerable expenses. 
 
 2. Regulated Wages. The fact that the problem 
 of German wages was worked out at leisure in ex- 
 act correlation to productions whose types were 
 exhaustively studied in the calm of peace-time 
 certainly allowed the Germans to obtain war-ma- 
 terials at a lower net cost than was possible for 
 the Allies. 
 
 3. The Prevention of Waste. The absence of ex- 
 perimentation and the simple extension to war- 
 work of highly efficient industrial methods tested 
 in peace-time, naturally allowed the Germans to 
 avoid in all spheres those immense losses of ma- 
 terial of every nature whose bad effects and heavy 
 cost were incurred by the Allies. This state of 
 affairs in France caused losses which were as 
 expensive as they were inevitable. One may 
 imagine the conditions existing in Russia, where 
 control is far more difficult of exercise than in 
 France. 
 
 4. Cheap Labor. The Germans have forcibly 
 enlisted the labor of about two million prisoners 
 of war. Moreover, the official French report of 
 April 12, 19 1 7, concerning acts committed by the 
 Germans in violation of international law, asserts 
 that in the occupied territories deportation of 
 workers has been a general measure. It has 'ap- 
 plied to the entire able-bodied population of both 
 
 11 
 
PAN-GER M A N Y 
 
 sexes, from the ages of sixteen to sixty, excepting 
 women with young children. ' 
 
 Now, the Germans requisition labor from among 
 7,500,000 Belgians, 3.000,000 French, 4.500,000 
 Serbians, 5,000,000 Roumanians, 22.000,000 
 Poles, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians — a total of 
 42.000,000 slaves. 
 
 Let us see what sort of remuneration is made. 
 Take the case of a young girl of Lille, twenty years 
 old, who was forced to work for six months, har- 
 vesting and threshing wheat and digging pota- 
 toes from six in the morning to twilight, receiving 
 all the while the vilest food. For her six months 
 of work she was given 9 francs. 45 centimes. The 
 Germans, therefore, have at their disposal a vast 
 reservoir of labor for which they pay next to noth- 
 ing ; moreover, the small amounts they do pay re- 
 main in Pan-Germany. 
 
 The Allies, on the contrary, pay high wages to 
 their workers, and, when they run short, must 
 needs pour out good gold in bringing reinforce- 
 ments from Asia. Africa, and America. This 
 means that a considerable part of the wages paid 
 these foreign workmen will leave France or Eng- 
 land for all time. 
 
 5. Free Coal and Iron Ore. In addition to their 
 own mines, the Germans have seized important 
 coal and iron mines in France, Belgium, and Po- 
 land. A vast proportion of their ore and coal 
 therefore costs them nothing. Naturally, then, a 
 
 12 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 German shell made with French iron and Belgian 
 coal costs far less than a French shell made with 
 American steel and English coal. As a result, the 
 net price of a greater part of German munitions 
 is much lower than that paid by the Allies. 
 
 6. Economical Transportation. By reason of 
 the grouping of the Central Powers, — a result of 
 the conquest of the Danube front by the Teutons, 
 — Germany profits by a geographical situation 
 which is infinitely more advantageous than that 
 of the Allies, as regards not only the speed, but 
 also the cheapness, of war-transportation. It is 
 evident that it costs far less to send a shell from 
 the Krupp factory to any one of the Pan-German 
 fronts than to send an American shell to France, 
 a Japanese shell to the Polish front, a French shell 
 to Roumania via Archangel, or an English shell 
 to the army operating in Mesopotamia. By the 
 same token, the cost of transporting a soldier of 
 Pan-Germany to any of the battle-fronts is infi- 
 nitely lighter than that of transporting Allied 
 soldiers from Australia or America. 
 
 We should note that each one of these six fac- 
 tors which we have just enumerated reacts pro- 
 foundly on the sum-total of general war-expenses, 
 and that, taken together, they involve a formid- 
 able sum. It can therefore truthfully be said that 
 Germany carries on the war much more econom- 
 ically than the Allies. Figures are so far lacking 
 which will give the true proportions, but we shall 
 
 13 
 
PAN- GERM A N Y 
 
 certainly remain well within the realities of the case 
 if we conclude that, as a result of the six factors 
 mentioned above, France must spend one hundred 
 and fifty million francs for war material to every 
 hundred million spent by Germany. When, 
 therefore, France spends thirty billions, Ger- 
 many evidently spends not more than twenty bil- 
 lions. And what is true of France applies even more 
 accurately to some of the other Allied nations. 
 
 This is a fact of the greatest general import- 
 ance in coming to a true understanding of the fin- 
 ancial situation created by the war — a fact 
 which takes on its full significance when we real- 
 ize that Germany is not only carrying on the war 
 cheaply, but that she has been enabled, by means 
 of this war, to win very important advantages. 
 
 They consist of seven principal elements. The 
 last six of these, it should be noted without fail, 
 depend solely on the existence of central Pan- 
 Germany — that is, on the hegemony exercised by 
 Germany over Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
 Turkey; they are therefore wholly independent 
 of the first element, which relates to Germany's 
 occupation of enemy territories, particularly to 
 the east and west. They may be summarized 
 as follows : — 
 
 SEVEN ELEMENTS IN TWO GROUPS 
 
 The first group includes: — 
 
 The advantages derived directly from Ger- 
 
 14 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 many's aggression, comprised in a single element, 
 namely, the plunder accruing from the occupa- 
 tion of enemy territory. This may be analyzed 
 thus : — 
 
 (a) The value of the 500,000 square kilometres 
 of Montenegrin, Serbian, Roumanian, Russian, 
 Belgian, and French land held by the Germans. 
 
 This value, estimated according to the national 
 fortunes of the respective countries before the 
 war, — the area and population of the occupied 
 portions being taken into consideration, — is in 
 the neighborhood of 155 billion francs. 
 
 This figure, though naturally only approximate, 
 is probably far below the real sum. We know that 
 the entire national fortune of France, with its 
 1536,000 square kilometres, was put before the war 
 at 325 billion francs. The valuation of the 500,- 
 000 square kilometres of occupied territory at 
 155 billions seems therefore an underestimate, es- 
 pecially when one remembers that these 500,000 
 square kilometres include Belgium and the North 
 of France — the richest districts in the world. 
 
 (b) The plunder of human beings, supplies, and 
 property (laborers, war-material, provisions, min- 
 erals, raw products, manufactured products, per- 
 sonal property, art objects, war levies, specie, 
 jewels, and securities) which has been going on, in 
 some cases for as long as three years, throughout 
 the occupied territories. This booty unquestion- 
 ably represents a value of tens of billions of francs. 
 
 15 
 
PAN- GERM A N Y 
 
 These tens of billions should be deducted from 
 the total of the national fortunes of the invaded 
 districts. The plunder in question is composed of 
 property or supplies already used up by the Ger- 
 mans or taken away by them into Germany ; the 
 value it represents, therefore, no longer exists in 
 the invaded districts. 
 
 The second group includes: — 
 
 The advantages which Germany has assured 
 herself for the present or for the future through 
 the creation of Pan-Germany, which in turn re- 
 sult from 
 
 (a) Germany's burglarization of her own allies 
 — Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. 
 
 (b) The seizure by Germany and her allies of 
 Serbia; in all six elements: — 
 
 I. The Pan-German loans, which throw Aus- 
 tria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey into a state of 
 absolute financial dependence on Berlin. 
 
 II. The value of Germany's monopoly in ex- 
 ploiting the latent resources of the Balkans and 
 Asia Minor, resulting from the Pan-German loans. 
 
 III. The inherent value of the creation of Eco- 
 nomic Pan-Germany. This cannot fail to be a 
 powerful instrument for the acquisition of wealth. 
 
 IV. The value of M ilitary Pan-Germany, which 
 is a guaranty of the security of Economic Pan- 
 Germany. 
 
 v. The value of the enormous economic profits 
 16 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 assured to Berlin through the existence of Pan- 
 Germany at the cost of Russia. These are a direct 
 consequence of the establishment of Military Pan- 
 Germany. 
 
 vi. The taking over by Germany of at least 
 2 1 billions of French credit. This is a consequence 
 of the establishment of Economic Pan-Germany. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 How Mich Germany Has Won in the War 
 
 Let us now take up, in their order, the seven 
 elements mentioned in the last chapter. 
 
 i 
 
 The first clement of German advantage: the booty 
 acquired from the occupation of enemy territory 
 
 Germany is getting direct war-profits from the 
 enemy territories occupied by her. These terri- 
 tories, listed in the ascending order of their rich- 
 ness, are: Montenegro, 14,000 square kilometres; 
 Albania, 20,000; Serbia, 87,000; Roumania, 70,000 
 (Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary share the pillage 
 of these four territories) ; dependent territories 
 of Russia, 260,000; Belgium, 2Q,ooo; and France, 
 20, 000 ; making a grand total of 500,000 square 
 kilometres. 
 
 In order to realize as clearly as possible the im- 
 portance of the booty wrung by Germany from 
 this enormous area, we may establish by means of 
 examples or statistics that this plunder comes 
 from nine principal sources: — 
 
 Seizure of Human Material. — Throughout 
 these 500,000 square kilometres of occupied terri- 
 tory, the Germans have scientifically enslaved 
 
 1S 
 
T a E I) I S E A 5 E AND C I! R E 
 42,000,000 human beings, who furnish a vast 
 
 amount of labor this labor being all the cheaper 
 
 because, as we shall see, the slaves are robbed in 
 various ways. 
 
 Seizure of War- Material. — By reason of their 
 lightning advances in Belgium, France, Serbia, 
 and Roumania the Germans have taken pOfl 
 sion of vast stores of war-material : cannon, rifles, 
 munitions, wagons, locomotives, cars, as well as 
 thousands of kilometres of railway, of which they 
 make full use, representing a certain value of 
 billions of francs. (The Belgian railway system 
 alone is worth three billions.) 
 
 Seizure of Food-stuffs. — The official report of 
 April 12, 191 7, on the acts committed by the Ger- 
 mans in France contrary to international law, 
 states: 'The inhabitants, subjected as they were 
 to annoyances of every sort, watched daily the 
 theft of such food-stuffs as they happened to pos- 
 sess. ' Everywhere the Germans steal horses, 
 cattle, domestic animals, grain, potatoes, food- 
 products of all kinds, sugar, alcohol, all of which 
 constitute the reserve supply of the- occupied 
 countries. Their harvests, too, are appropriated 
 through the cultivation of productive lands by 
 means of labor obtained almost without cost from 
 the enslaved people ,. 
 
 Theft of Raw Materials. — Throughout the 
 length and breadth of the occupied territories, the 
 Germans, at the dictates of expediency, have 
 
 19 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 seized raw materials: coal and iron ore, copper, 
 petroleum, and so forth. Metals — bronze, zinc, 
 lead, copper, tin — have been taken from private 
 citizens, as well as textile fabrics — wool, cotton 
 cloth, and the like. When one learns that from 
 the cities of the North of France alone the Ger- 
 mans stole 550 million francs' worth of wool, it is 
 easy to see that this single source of plunder has 
 been worth a number of billions to them. 
 
 Theft of Finished Products. — Every where in 
 the occupied territories, so far as means of trans- 
 portation permit, motors, steam-hammers, ma- 
 chinery, rolling-mills, lathes, presses, drills, elec- 
 trical engines, looms, and so forth, have been 
 taken to pieces by mechanics and transported into 
 Germany. The total value of this stolen material 
 in Belgium and the North of France alone — the 
 richest industrial districts in the world — is al- 
 most incalculable. 
 
 Theft of Personal Property. — The official 
 French report previously quoted states: 'In the 
 shops, officers and soldiers made free with what- 
 ever pleased their fancy. Every day the people 
 witnessed the theft of property which was indis- 
 pensable to them. At Ham, General von Fleck 
 carried off all the furniture of M. Bernot's house, 
 where he had been quartered.' The property 
 thus stolen is sent to Germany, as is proved by 
 this advertisement in the Kolnische Zeitung: 
 'Furniture moved from the theatre of military 
 
 20 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 operations to all destinations.' From this source, 
 war-booty to the value of several billions has al- 
 ready been divided among an army of Germans. 
 
 Seizure of Works of Art. — The Germans have 
 stolen countless works of art, ' in order' — so runs 
 a recent official note of their government — ' that 
 they may be preserved as a record of art and civil- 
 ization.' — 'It would be impossible,' declares Le 
 Temps, 'to find a more cynical admission of the 
 thefts committed by the German authorities in 
 our museums and public buildings.' If one re- 
 members that this methodical pillage has gone 
 merrily on among private individuals, drawing on 
 the unlimited stores of works of art which have 
 been accumulated throughout the centuries in 
 Poland, and particularly in Belgium and France, 
 it must certainly be apparent that the value of 
 these stolen art treasures is immense. 
 
 War Imposts. — Our official report establishes 
 that 'Requisitions have everywhere been contin- 
 uous. Towns that have had to meet the expenses 
 of troops quartered within their jurisdiction have 
 been overwhelmed by huge levies.' 
 
 Belgium is staggering under an annual war as- 
 sessment of 480,000,000 francs. Bucharest, after 
 its capture by the Germans, was forced to pay a 
 levy amounting to about 1900 francs per capita 
 of the population. At Craiova the levy was 950 
 francs per capita. An edict forbids the circulation 
 of paper money unless it has been specially 
 
 21 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 stamped by the Germans, who retain 30 per cent 
 of its nominal value. 
 
 In April, 191 7, the Frankfurter Zeitung an- 
 nounced that the leaders of the Austro-German 
 forces of occupation in Roumania would shortly 
 call for an obligatory internal loan of a hundred 
 million francs. In Poland, the German govern- 
 ment has just issued a billion marks in paper 
 money for enforced circulation. These are only 
 single examples. 
 
 Theft of Specie, Jewels, and Securities. — In 
 September, 19 16, the Germans seized three quar- 
 ters of a billion francs from the National Bank of 
 Belgium in Brussels, which was subsequently 
 transferred to Germany. In January, 191 7, on 
 the steamer Prinz Hendrick, they stole a million 
 francs from a Belgian who was traveling from 
 England, and took ten million francs' worth of 
 diamonds from the mail-bags. In the village of 
 Vraignes, on March 18, 191 7, the Germans, be- 
 fore evicting the inhabitants, stole from them the 
 13,800 francs they had in their possession. At 
 Noyon — we learn from the official report already 
 quoted — the Germans broke open and pillaged 
 the safes of banks and private citizens before re- 
 tiring from the town. The securities, jewels, and 
 silver plate of Noyon represented a value of about 
 eighteen million francs. And, as I have said, these 
 are only random incidents. 
 
 Taking into consideration, then, the present 
 
 22 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 high prices of food -products, coal, metal, petro- 
 leum, war-material, machinery, and the rest, it 
 can be seen at a glance that each one of the nine 
 sources of booty just enumerated, on which the 
 Germans have been steadily drawing, in some 
 cases for as much as three years, has unquestion- 
 ably yielded the value of several billions of francs, 
 — certain of them, perhaps, tens of billions. 
 Hence we may reasonably conclude that, without 
 fixing a definite figure for the yield of these nine 
 sources, the total plunder has mounted well up 
 in the tens of billions. 
 
 Another basis for calculating the worth of the 
 invaded territories to Germany lies in the fact 
 that the national fortunes of these countries, ac- 
 cording to ante-bellum statistics, amounted to 
 about 155 billions of francs. 
 
 We shall now examine the six other elements 
 of Germany's present advantageous situation — 
 those which result from the domination which the 
 war has enabled her to exert over her own allies, 
 Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. This 
 domination, which amounts practically to actual 
 seizure, has permitted her to fulfill the scheme of 
 Central Pan-Germany as a result of the crushing 
 of Serbia. 
 
 23 
 
PAN- GERM A N Y 
 
 II 
 
 The second element of German advantage: 
 the Pan-German loans 
 
 A portion of the approximate sum of 115 bil- 
 lion francs devoted by Germany, up to the end of 
 July, 1917, to the carrying on of the war has en- 
 abled her to burglarize her own allies by taking 
 advantage of the extremely bad financial situation 
 which faced them at the end of the Balkan wars. 
 As a result of this situation, Austria-Hungary, 
 Bulgaria, and Turkey, in order to sustain the 
 present long-drawn-out struggle, have been forced 
 to draw on the credit of Berlin. The sum total of 
 the loans made by Germany to her allies and se- 
 cured by her own war loans cannot yet be verified, 
 but there can be no doubt that it mounts up to a 
 respectable number of billions. 
 
 These loans have worked out to the immense 
 advantage of Germany, for the following reasons. 
 Established facts prove that, without the assist- 
 ance of Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turk- 
 ish troops, and without the numerous products 
 supplied her by the Orient, Germany would have 
 been beaten long ago, even in spite of the Allies' 
 blundering. As these troops and resources are of 
 priceless value to Germany, it would seem that 
 she must have paid dearly for them, and in gold. 
 However, as the reserve of the German Imperial 
 
 24 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Bank was 1,356,875,000 marks in July, 1914, and 
 2,527,315,000 in February, 1917, it is certain that 
 Germany has not lent gold to her allies, — in large 
 quantities, at any rate, — but only paper, whose 
 value depends solely on the strength of German 
 credit. 
 
 In reality, therefore, Germany, simply by keep- 
 ing a printing-press busy turning out little stamp- 
 ed slips of paper, has obtained troops, food-stuffs, 
 and raw materials which were indispensable to her 
 in avoiding defeat ; and at the same time she has so 
 established herself as a creditor as to give her the 
 right to exact final payment by her allies for ad- 
 vances which were primarily made to them in Ger- 
 many's own vital interest. 
 
 Now these obligations weigh so heavily on 
 countries like Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
 Turkey, already in sore stress, that they incur 
 loans which no one of these three countries can 
 ever hope to pay off unless a victory of the Allied 
 democracies should shatter the financial yoke of 
 Berlin. 
 
 In order to appreciate the nature of these loans 
 and their consequences, the example of Turkey is 
 particularly instructive. ' Germany's advances to 
 Turkey in no way represent Turkish war-expendi- 
 ture. We must add to them the requisitions 
 made in the country itself, and the war-material 
 purchased in Germany and Austria-Hungary 
 which is not yet paid for.' 
 
 25 
 
P A N - G E R M A N Y 
 
 At the beginning of 191 7 Djavid Bey arranged 
 in Berlin for a new loan of three million pounds, 
 simply to enable Turkey to pay her debts to the 
 Krupp firm, as well as the advances made her by 
 the different groups of financiers and the German 
 Minister of Finance. This means, therefore, 
 that, when Germany sends arms to the Turks in 
 order that they may use them to consolidate the 
 Pan-German scheme, she also finds a means of 
 making this consignment of arms serve to en- 
 tangle the Turks still more hopelessly in the finan- 
 cial web. ' In Pan-Germanist circles, there has 
 been much discussion of the compensations which 
 Turkey must make to Germany in return for serv- 
 ices rendered in the course of the war. It is the 
 unanimous opinion that Germany, without gain- 
 ing any territorial acquisitions in Turkey, must 
 have controlling rights in the Ottoman Empire, 
 so that the Pera-Galata bridge may be as near 
 Berlin as Constantinople.' 
 
 What has taken place in the spheres of finance 
 between Berlin and Constantinople has, by the 
 very nature of things, been duplicated between 
 Berlin and Sofia, though of course in a less pro- 
 nounced form. Germany, therefore, by means of 
 paper loans based on her own credit, has caused 
 colossal obligations to be assumed by her allies — 
 countries representing vast areas of land : Austria- 
 Hungary with 676,616 square kilometres, Bul- 
 garia with 1 14,104, and Turkey with 1,792,900, or 
 
 26 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 2,583,620 square kilometres in all. Now these 
 three countries are precisely the ones which are 
 indispensable to the carrying out of the Central 
 Pan-German 'Hamburg to the Persian Gulf 
 scheme; the loans, therefore, are Pan-Germanist 
 loans. 
 
 It should be borne in mind, on the other hand, 
 that although Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
 Turkey are financially encumbered in their quality 
 of states, the exploitation of these countries by the 
 Germans is very profitable. Their combined na- 
 tional fortunes were estimated, before the war, 
 at about 269 billion francs. We must realize also 
 that, although these loans granted by Berlin to 
 her allies are merely paper loans, they bind Tur- 
 key, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary to Germany 
 as closely as debtors can be bound to a creditor. 
 None of these three countries can reasonably 
 hope to get funds after the war from their present 
 adversaries, who, it is certain, will have none too 
 much money for their own needs; and so the 
 financial situation as a whole combines with the 
 enterprise shown by the Berlin General Staff to 
 strengthen the grip which Germany has obtained 
 over her allies through loans. 
 
 As this financial dependence of the three vassal 
 states, with its tremendous consequences, is, as I 
 have said, maintained simply by means of a print- 
 ing-press and little slips of paper, which cost very 
 little indeed; and since Germany receives in ex- 
 
 27 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 change for these slips of paper bearing her signa- 
 ture, men, food-stuffs, and supplies which, but 
 for the action of the Allies, would enable her to 
 establish Pan-Germany as mistress of Europe, 
 we may safely say that the Pan-Germanist loans 
 floated by Berlin at her allies' expense consti- 
 tute a powerful element of military advantage, 
 which, if one but examines the conditions of its 
 origin, must stand out as the most profitable and 
 extraordinary swindle ever perpetrated. 
 
 in 
 
 The third element of German advantage: the value of 
 a monopoly in exploiting the latent resources of 
 the Balkans and Asia Minor 
 
 The figure of 269 billions of francs quoted above 
 takes no account of the enormous agricultural 
 and mineral wealth, as yet unexploited and unap- 
 praised, of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. 
 Now, the business of tapping these vast reser- 
 voirs is entirely in the hands of the Germans, as a 
 result of the Pan-Germanist loans. 
 
 IV 
 
 The fourth element of German advantage: the value 
 resulting from the creation of an economic Pan- 
 Germany 
 
 Economic Pan-Germany, as it was outlined by 
 List, Roscher, Rodbertus, and other German econ- 
 
 28 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 omists, may be defined as follows: A territory 
 uniting under one supreme central control Cen- 
 tral Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey — a territory 
 large enough to include military and economic re- 
 sources entirely sufficient to provide for the needs of 
 the population in times of war; and to assure its 
 rulers in times of peace the domination of the world. 
 
 The seizure by Berlin of Austria-Hungary, Bul- 
 garia, and Turkey — all essential elements of Cen- 
 tral Pan-Germany — was accomplished in three 
 ways: militarily, by the supremacy acquired by 
 the German General Staff over the troops of the 
 vassal states; financially, by means of the paper 
 loans granted by Germany ; and diplomatically, by 
 the treaties signed in Berlin on January II, 191 7, 
 establishing the strongest sort of German protec- 
 torate over the Ottoman Empire. This done, the 
 consolidation of Pan-Germany was quickly under- 
 taken by Berlin in a great number of ways. 
 
 Control of Customs. — As the establishment of 
 the great Pan-German Zollverein (Customs Un- 
 ion) was not to be accomplished at one stroke, the 
 Kaiser's government set about preparing the nec- 
 essary steps. Numerous conferences held at Ber- 
 lin and attended by German, Austrian, and Hun- 
 garian statesmen and business men, resulted in the 
 following essential provisions. (1) An economic 
 customs agreement of long duration, which would 
 make a single economic unit of Germany and Aus- 
 tria-Hungary; (2) to bring this about gradually, a 
 
 29 
 
P A N - G E R M A N Y 
 
 progressive increase of duty — free articles, and 
 a unification of the customs charges on certain 
 goods; (3) a close economic union between Aus- 
 tro-Germany and Bulgaria and Turkey, to be ar- 
 ranged and established with the greatest possible 
 expedition. 
 
 Ethnographic Control. — Certain nations afford 
 considerable resistance to the Hamburg-Persian 
 Gulf scheme. The Serbians, who are morally irre- 
 ducible, are an obstacle to the permanent estab- 
 lishment of the Pan-German nexus between Hun- 
 gary and Bulgaria; and without this the entire 
 Pan-German programme falls flat. The system- 
 atic destruction of the Serbian people has been 
 entrusted to the Bulgars, who, under pretext of 
 quelling insurrections, slaughter not only the Ser- 
 bian men, but also women and children, down to 
 babies at the breast. In the Ottoman Empire the 
 Armenians happen to occupy those regions which 
 were characterized in the Reichstag by Herr Del- 
 bruck as ' Germanic India.' Berlin therefore puts 
 to good use the Turks' inherited taste for massa- 
 cres of Christians. Already more than one million 
 Armenians have been got out of the way. 
 
 Agricultural Control. — The food crisis in Ger- 
 many has led Berlin to proceed with the greatest 
 haste toward utilizing the rich farming districts 
 which the fortunes of war have put within her 
 grasp. Hundreds of experts, with thousands of 
 agricultural implements, have been sent to Rou- 
 
 30 
 
'/• // E D I S E A S E AND CURE 
 
 mania, Serbia, and Asia Minor. In this latter 
 country, two cultural centres in particular have 
 received attention. In the province of Adana cot- 
 ton-growing is being developer! ; on the plains of 
 Anatolia the intensive cultivation of grain is in 
 progress. These energetic efforts have had a two- 
 fold result: the Turks will not revolt against Ger- 
 manic domination — because of starvation, if for 
 no other reason; and, by reason of the increasing 
 yield of Serbian, Roumanian, and Turkish lands, 
 more of which are continually being brought into 
 service, the food-supply of the Central Empires 
 becomes more and more completely assured. 
 
 Banking Control. — The exploitation of Eastern 
 Pan-Germany calls for vast capital. The Ger- 
 man, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish 
 banks have formed powerful combinations. As 
 the leaders of this movement in Germany we find 
 the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the 
 Kolnische Bankverein; in Austria-Hungary the 
 Vienna Kredit-Anstalt and the Hungarian Bank 
 of Credit in Budapest. 
 
 Economic Control. — As the rapid exploitation 
 of the latent resources of the Balkans and Turkey 
 is the principal economic object of the Germans, 
 they have just established, in cooperation with 
 King Ferdinand, the 'Institute for Furthering 
 Economic Relations between Germany and Bul- 
 garia.' In order to facilitate the Germanic pene- 
 tration of Turkey, ten thousand Turkish boys be- 
 
 3i 
 
PA N - G ERM A N Y 
 
 tween the ages of twelve and eighteen years are to 
 come to Germany for their technical education. 
 These young Turks, living in German families, 
 learning German, and saturating themselves with 
 German ideas, will soon be able collaborators with 
 the Teutons themselves in germanizing Turkey 
 and exploiting the numerous concessions which, 
 if the war turns out successfully for them, will be 
 wrung from the Ottoman government by the sub- 
 jects of the Kaiser. 
 
 Railway Control. — The railway systems of Eu- 
 ropean Pan-Germany have been brought to the 
 highest degree of perfection. In Turkey, German 
 officers are absolutely in control of the railroads. 
 Out of the 2435 kilometres which separate Con- 
 stantinople from Bagdad, only 583 kilometres of 
 line remain to be constructed — and this distance 
 is traversed by automobile roads. As for the 
 Turkish railroads belonging to French and Eng- 
 lish companies, the German government has sug- 
 gested that the Turks 'purchase' them. One 
 should cherish no illusions as to the real meaning 
 of this word 'purchase.' It means, according to 
 Turco-German methods, that the expenses in- 
 volved in this purchase should be set down against 
 the war damages which the Central Powers con- 
 sider to be due them from the Allies. 
 
 Canal Control. — The canal project, outlined as 
 far back as April 26, 1895, by the Pan-Germanist 
 Dr. G. Zoepfl, was taken up and begun by the 
 
 32 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Economic Congress of Central Europe, which met 
 at Berlin on March 19, 191 7. This project is 
 made up of the following elements: (1) Union of 
 the Rhine with the Danube by the opening up to 
 navigation of the Main and of the canal from 
 the Main to the Danube. (2) Completion of the 
 central canal joining the Vistula and the Rhine. 
 (3) The Oder-Danube canal, joining the Baltic 
 and Black Sea. (4) Opening to navigation of 
 the Rhine as far as Bale. (5) Union of the Elbe 
 with the Danube by means of the river Moldau. 
 (6) Union of the Weser with the Main by means of 
 the Fulda-Werra. (7) Connection of the Danube 
 and the Vistula by means of canals. (8) Union 
 of the Danube with the Dniester by means of 
 the Vistula. (9) Opening to navigation of the 
 Save. (10) Opening to navigation of the Morava 
 and the Vardar as far as Saloniki. The Danube 
 is the base of this gigantic programme of con- 
 struction. 'The Danube means everything to 
 us,' declared General von Groener, in December, 
 1916. 
 
 This rapid sketch of the preparations now going 
 on in the economic sphere of Pan-Germany will 
 permit any clear-thinking man to understand the 
 crushing power which will lie in this formidable 
 system when all its latent resources have been de- 
 veloped by the Germans to the profit of their he- 
 gemony. The organization of Pan-Germany is 
 
 33 
 
PAN-l! E K M A N Y 
 
 only in its first stages; nevertheless, the concen- 
 trated military, economic, and strategic strength 
 which it has already put at the disposal of Berlin 
 is so great that it permits Germany to baffle her 
 far more numerous, but widely scattered, adver- 
 saries. What, then, would be the strength of a 
 completely organized Pan-Germany? It is unde- 
 niable, in fact, that a methodical, big-scale devel- 
 opment of all the mineral, vegetable, animal, and 
 industrial products of economic Pan-Germany, 
 together with the low-cost transportation afforded 
 by a complete system of canals, would make it 
 possible for the Germans to pay high wages to 
 their own workmen, and yet at the same time 
 bring about such a reduction of net prices in every 
 line of industry as to force Pan-German products 
 on the whole world by their sheer cheapness. 
 
 It is easy to see, then, that in the face of eco- 
 nomic Pan-Germany's overwhelming methods 
 any economic revival on the part of the European 
 nations now allied would be impossible. The eco- 
 nomic ruin of the Allies, after so exhausting and 
 costly a war as this, would by the nature of things 
 bring about their political subjection to Berlin. 
 Besides, there is not a country in the world which 
 could escape the clutches of economic Pan-Ger- 
 many on the one hand, or the consequences of the 
 irremediable ruin of the Allies on the other. The 
 fact that Pan-Germany is organizing itself is an 
 ominous event which should receive the concen- 
 
 34 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 trated attention of all the world's free peoples; 
 for it places in German hands the elements of such 
 an overwhelming economic power as has no prece- 
 dent in the world's history. 
 
 The fifth element of German advantage: the value of 
 military Pan-Germany 
 
 Berlin relics, above all else, on her military re- 
 sources to render secure for all time that economic 
 Pan-Germany which is destined to provide her, in 
 peace-time, with a permanent means of acquiring 
 wealth and world-dominion. Military Pan-Ger- 
 many is, therefore, the complement and the pledge 
 of economic Pan-Germany. The Kaiser's success- 
 ful seizure, through the fortunes of war, of new 
 sources of man-power — Austro-Hungarian, Bul- 
 garian, and Ottoman soldiery; of new strategic 
 points or regions of exceptional importance, lo- 
 cated in invaded countries or in those of his own al- 
 lies, has furnished him with the basis of military 
 Pan-Germany. In 19 14, Prussian militarism held 
 sway over only the 68 million inhabitants of the 
 German Empire. At the beginning of 191 7, it had 
 been extended by consent or by force to the 176 
 million people of Pan-Germany. 
 
 This result — evidently the consequence of an 
 immense extension of exclusive influence through- 
 out Central and Eastern Europe — has permitted 
 
 35 
 
PA N - GERM A N Y 
 
 the German General Staff to take over at will 
 certain strategic points or regions of the greatest 
 importance, over which it exerted no direct influ- 
 ence before the war. Zeebrugge, on the North 
 Sea, for instance ; Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro on 
 the Adriatic; the Bulgarian coasts of the ALgean; 
 the Ottoman Straits; the Turkish, Bulgarian, and 
 Roumanian shores of the Black Sea, have always 
 been strategic points or districts of exceptional 
 value. 
 
 This value, however, has become vastly greater 
 now that these points or districts form part of 
 a single military system under the directing and 
 organizing power of the Berlin General Staff. At 
 present, these essential strategic points and dis- 
 tricts are the strongholds of the Pan-German 
 frontiers. They are, in fact, connected by contin- 
 uous fortifications, defended in the most effective 
 way the world has ever known by an intensive 
 system of barbed-wire entanglements, deep-dug 
 subterranean shelters, machine-guns, and heavy 
 artillery. The internal military organization of 
 Pan-Germany is being carried forward with unin- 
 terrupted speed. Factories of war-material have 
 been judiciously distributed throughout the whole 
 territory, with the double object of utilizing raw 
 materials near their source of origin, thus avoiding 
 useless transportation, and of making possible the 
 swift dispatch of munitions to any threatened 
 sector of front. For this reason the Krupp firm, 
 
 36 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 at the outbreak of war, established important 
 branch factories, not only in Bavaria, but also in 
 Bulgaria and Turkey. 
 
 The railway system and strategic automobile 
 roads in Pan-Germany have been developed very 
 swiftly — notably in the Balkans and in Turkey, 
 where the need was relatively great. Back of 
 every military front railroads running parallel 
 with that front have been constructed, so that re- 
 inforcements may be sent to any given point with 
 the maximum of speed. All this, taken as a whole, 
 has converted Pan-Germany into one gigantic, 
 extremely powerful fortress. 
 
 A new phase is now in preparation. The Kai- 
 ser's General Staff, not content with holding the 
 high command of all forces in Pan-Germany, is 
 determined to standardize as far as possible their 
 arms, their munitions, and their methods of in- 
 struction. The Deputy Friedrich Naumann — 
 one of the sponsors of the Mitteleuropa idea — is 
 plainly smoothing the way toward this end, 
 which, because of geographic reasons, most inti- 
 mately concerns Austria-Hungary. In the Voss- 
 ische Zeitung he has just outlined a scheme of ' full 
 and complete harmony of the Central Empires in 
 so far as military matters are concerned.' He 
 boldly adds an avowal which is well worth remem- 
 bering. 'Mitteleuropa is in existence to-day. 
 Nothing is lacking save its organs of movement 
 and action. These organs can be provided by its 
 
 37 
 
PA N -GERM A N Y 
 
 two emperors, since they have at their disposal the 
 necessary elements for the creation of a common 
 army.' 
 
 This prophecy merits our close attention ; for it 
 can readily be seen that, if the unification of the 
 Armies of the two Central Empires were to take 
 place, neither Bulgaria nor Turkey, on whose mili- 
 tary resources the German General Staff is getting 
 an increasingly firm grip, could prevent the ab- 
 sorption of their armed forces into the Pan-Ger- 
 man system. 
 
 As for the military strength of Pan-Germany, 
 it is an easy matter to estimate it. Even if the 
 Kaiser's armies were to withdraw from Russia, 
 Poland, Belgium, and France, Pan-Germany 
 would still include 150,000,000 people. Now, as 
 Germany has mobilized about 20 per cent of her 
 own population and that of her allies, — who have 
 become vassals, — we see that Central Pan -Ger- 
 many can count upon approximately 30,000,000 
 soldiers. Prussian militarism, whose destruction 
 by the Allies has become the true, legitimate, es- 
 sential aim of the war, has therefore become far 
 more widespread, through the carrying out of the 
 Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, than it was in 
 1 9 14. It is proved by well-established facts that 
 Berlin, while vigorously pushing a peace campaign 
 destined to disunite the Allies, is doing everything 
 in her power to turn Pan-Germany into a fortress 
 the strength of which is unexampled in the world's 
 
 38 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 history. In any case it is undeniable that, as mili- 
 tary Pan-Germany is a pledge of the success of 
 economic Pan-Germany, its establishment consti- 
 tutes an important element of advantage for the 
 German cause. This will be further proved when 
 we come to examine the two final elements of ad- 
 vantage. 
 
 VI 
 
 The sixth element of German advantage: the im- 
 portance of the vast economic profits which accrue 
 to Berlin at the expense of Russia through the 
 establishment of Pan-Germany 
 
 We need only glance at the map to realize that 
 a really free Russian republic could never range 
 itself on the side of Pan-Germany. It is self- 
 evident that, if Pan-Germany were to succeed in 
 splitting Europe in two, her economic and mili- 
 tary pressure toward the East would be irresist- 
 ible. The countless agents whom Berlin already 
 maintains in the immense territory of Russia 
 would find their work becoming easier and easier. 
 Following up the hypothesis, then, Russia, suc- 
 cumbing to insoluble financial problems and un- 
 ending internal difficulties, would break up, from 
 the Baltic to the Pacific, into a series of anarchis- 
 tic republics — all of which is according to the 
 plans of Lenine, who is a creature of Berlin. After 
 that there would be nothing to prevent German 
 influence from becoming the controlling force in 
 
 39 
 
PA N -GERM A N Y 
 
 the economic exploitation of the immense natural 
 riches of European and Asiatic Russia. 
 
 We are well within the bounds of reason in pre- 
 dicting such a possibility. The fact that German 
 agents have already succeeded in stirring up most 
 serious trouble throughout the length and breadth 
 of Russia — that they have provoked separatist 
 movements in Finland, Ukrainia, and the Cauca- 
 sus, and that all China is seething with disturb- 
 ances which react on Asiatic Russia — proves to 
 the satisfaction of the most skeptical that the 
 break-up of Russia into little states inevitably 
 subject to the political and economic influence of 
 Berlin would be an inevitable consequence of a 
 successful Pan-Germany. 
 
 It is plain, therefore, that the huge profits 
 which the Germans would stand to gain by such a 
 state of affairs — a direct result of military Pan- 
 Germany — form an element of advantage wor- 
 thy of being considered by itself. 
 
 VII 
 
 The seventh element of German advantage: the trans- 
 fer to Germany of at least twenty-one billion francs 
 of French credit 
 
 The creation of military and economic Pan- 
 Germany makes possible a method of securing 
 war-booty planned in advance by the Pan-Ger- 
 manists, which may be stated as follows: The 
 
 40 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 transfer to Germany of funds owed to one of her ene- 
 mies by another enemy, or by one of her own allies. 
 
 In order to understand this method of extortion 
 one need only read a passage from Tannenberg's 
 book, Greater Germany, published in French trans- 
 lation in 19 1 6 by the firm of Payot. This work 
 possesses exceptional interest for two reasons: 
 first, it appeared in Germany in 191 1 ; its publica- 
 tion, therefore, was evidently inspired, as in many 
 other cases, by the ruling class at Berlin, in order 
 to prepare the German people for war by promises 
 of colossal booty; second, the facts of the case 
 show that the German General Staff, ever since 
 the outbreak of hostilities, has been modeling the 
 political conduct of the war on the exact lines laid 
 down by Tannenberg, who may be said to have 
 officially declared the Pan-German scheme of 191 1. 
 
 Now, independent of the 35 billion marks — 
 nearly 44 billion francs — which were to be im- 
 posed on France in the coming war by way of reg- 
 ular war indemnity, Tannenberg, in Article 5 of 
 the hypothetical treaty, outlined the following ad- 
 ditional extortion : — 
 
 'France cedes to Germany her claim to the 12 
 billion marks (15 billion francs) lent by her to 
 Russia.' This means nothing more or less than a 
 cession of credit. 
 
 On page 308 of Payot's edition, Tannenberg in- 
 dicates as follows the use to be made by Germany 
 of these Russian debts to France : — 
 
 4i 
 
PA N - GERM A N Y 
 
 'We shall not be able to give thanks to Holy 
 Russia for this splendid sum, for she has made 
 such vile use of these billions that to-day almost 
 nothing remains. There is no question of reim- 
 bursement. Russia is not a mortgaged property 
 subject to payment of interest, which can be sold 
 when this interest is not promptly forthcoming on 
 the day it is due. However, we shall be able to 
 collect our money in another way, simply by tak- 
 ing in exchange for these credits the territories of 
 the Poles in Posnania, East Prussia, and Upper 
 Silesia; of the Lithuanians on the banks of the 
 Niemen; of the Letts on the Duna; of the Estho- 
 nians on the Embach and the regions bordering on 
 the rivers of the northern coastal country; of the 
 Czechs in Bohemia, Austrian Silesia, and Mora- 
 via ; of the Slavs in Southern Ukrainia, Carinthia, 
 Styria, Croatia, Dalmatia, Goerz, and Gradiska, 
 in so far as they come within the southern and 
 eastern limits of Greater Germany. 
 
 'This procedure enables us to kill three birds 
 with one stone. Russia rids herself of the burden 
 of debts and interest-paying which is crushing her; 
 the Slavs of the West and South become citizens 
 of a Slavic country; and we Germans obtain, free 
 of debt and incumbrance, the much-needed terri- 
 tories for colonization.' 
 
 These words were written in 191 1 . On May 24, 
 191 7, the Berlin Tdgliche Rundschau thus exposed 
 Germany's future attitude toward Russia: — 
 
 42 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 ' If we reach an agreement with the new Rus- 
 sian government, or with the government which 
 succeeds it, so much the better; but in making 
 our terms we shall deliberately turn to account 
 the internal situation of the ancient empire now 
 in revolution. It is more essential to-day than 
 ever before that we should push our claims against 
 Russia for indemnity and for the annexation of 
 that territory which we so sorely need for coloni- 
 zation. ' 
 
 The similarity between this programme of an- 
 nexation and indemnity, written so recently, and 
 Tannenberg's outline, published six years ago, is 
 indeed striking. 
 
 Let us now see how, in the present state of af- 
 fairs, Tannenberg's plan for a transfer of credit 
 could be worked out. Suppose we suggest a hy- 
 pothesis. 
 
 In the first place, it is evident that, if Russia 
 should continue to submit to anarchy fostered by 
 German agents, her financial situation, already 
 perilous, would no longer permit her to pay the in- 
 terest on her bonds held abroad. Again, if Pan- 
 Germany, now momentarily established, con- 
 tinues to exist, Berlin will be able to take over 
 Russian obligations to France without the neces- 
 sity of a formal treaty. In fact, the tremendous 
 pressure against Russia, exerted by the mere 
 geographical contact of Pan-Germany as she lies 
 athwart Europe, would practically render unneces- 
 
 43 
 
P A X - G R R M A .V V 
 
 sary the formal cession of French credit. Berlin, 
 taking fullest advantage of the situation, would 
 then say to Petrograd, 'We consider that France 
 owes us a considerable sum by way of war-in- 
 demnity. We are unable to collect this, but you 
 Russians also owe an indemnity. We therefore 
 assume the position of France as your creditor, 
 and, as the strength of Pan-Germany has put you 
 practically at our mercy, we demand the pay- 
 ment of your debts in such and such a form.' 
 
 What resistance could disorganized Russia 
 make to this claim, presented with true German 
 cynicism? 
 
 Russian extremists need not hope, as certain 
 of them do, to avoid paying the debts contracted 
 by the old regime. If they do not care to fulfill 
 their obligations to France, which is working hard 
 to sustain the Russian Revolution, they will have 
 to pay those same debts to Berlin, where full use 
 would be made of them to exploit the Russian 
 people. 
 
 Moreover, the 'purchase' of French- and Eng- 
 lish-owned railroads in Turkey, suggested several 
 months ago by Berlin, of which we have already 
 spoken, proves convincingly that the Germans 
 intend also to follow out the system of transferring 
 credits in cases where money is owed by Ger- 
 many's allies to Germany's enemies. For a long 
 period great numbers of Frenchmen purchased 
 the state obligations of Austria-Hungary, Serbia, 
 
 44 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey. It is impossi- 
 ble to give the exact amount of French money 
 thus invested in Pan-Germanized Central and 
 Eastern Europe, for the securities of the above- 
 mentioned countries were generally floated in 
 several foreign financial centres at once; but per- 
 sons who have the most thorough knowledge of 
 French investments make a minimum estimate of 
 six billion francs. As for the French money in- 
 vested in Roumania and Serbia it will vanish into 
 thin air as soon as the Austro-German conquests 
 are consolidated. As for investments in Austria- 
 Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, the assumption 
 by Germany of French credits — supposing peace 
 to be concluded on the basis of the present war- 
 map — would be easily accomplished if she rea- 
 soned as follows with her allies: — 
 
 'France now owes you war indemnities which 
 you cannot collect. By putting them down 
 against the obligations owed by you to France, 
 you cancel this debt. However, we Germans have 
 lent you during the war great sums, and furnished 
 you with supplies without which you could never 
 have continued the struggle. Since you cannot 
 meet these obligations we shall secure ourselves, 
 in part at least, by assuming France's position as 
 your creditor.' 
 
 On the whole, if the present state of things 
 were to continue, Berlin, by the process of trans- 
 ferring credit, would be able to cause France the 
 
 45 
 
PA N - GERM A N Y 
 
 very considerable loss of about 15 billion francs 
 owed her by Russia, and 6 billions owed by Ger- 
 many's vassal states — a total of at least 21 
 billions. Now that the Pan-German scheme has 
 for the moment been accomplished, we can truth- 
 fully say that 21 billions of French money, at the 
 lowest estimate, represented by Russia, Austrian, 
 Hungarian, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Turkish se- 
 curities, have been virtually Pan-Germanized. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 The Necessity for a Decision 
 
 In the preceding chapters I have pointed out 
 that the advantages which Germany has already 
 gained through the war, or has assured for her- 
 self in the future, if the present situation remains 
 essentially unchanged, consist of seven chief 
 elements. Before we arrive at final conclusions 
 concerning these elements, let us establish the 
 following facts: — 
 
 I. In three years of war, Germany has spent 
 on the war 1612 francs per capita of her popula- 
 tion. France, in the same period, has spent 2200 
 francs per capita — that is to say, 608 francs, or 
 the immense figure of 38 per cent, more than Ger- 
 many. 
 
 If the formula ' without indemnity' be adopted, 
 with respect to the expenses of the war, far 
 indeed from serving the cause of the Right, it 
 would result in this unspeakable iniquity: each 
 Frenchman who desired peace would have to bear 
 a financial burden heavier by more than a third 
 than that of each German and loyal subject of 
 the Kaiser who loosed the dogs of war. There- 
 fore this enormous difference — 38 per cent — 
 in the per capita war-expenses between France 
 
 47 
 
PA N - GERM A N Y 
 
 and Germany would in itself suffice to make the 
 economic — and hence the political — downfall of 
 France, swift, complete, inevitable, and beyond 
 recall. 
 
 2. Unquestionably Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, 
 and Turkey, as separate states, have been ruined 
 by their war-expenses, but this ruin is all to the 
 advantage of Germany, as it throws her vassals 
 into a condition of absolute financial dependence. 
 As a result, if Pan-Germany is to continue to 
 exist, the Berlin government must be the unchal- 
 lenged controller of all the financial combinations 
 on which the peace and well-being of Pan-Ger- 
 many depend. Now these combinations evident- 
 ly can serve only to strengthen the German hege- 
 mony. 
 
 No parallel situation is to be found among the 
 Entente powers. The ruin of Russia, for example, 
 would simply make the ruin of France more inevi- 
 table, unless a decisive victory of the Allies were to 
 rob Germany of her iniquitous spoils and at the 
 same time guarantee to France the legitimate rep- 
 aration which alone can save her from irretriev- 
 able financial disaster. 
 
 3. If Germany can still continue to float new 
 internal loans with comparative ease, it is because 
 her wholesale territorial and Pan-German seizures 
 are considered by her people as new pledges of the 
 credit of the German state as the heart of Pan- 
 Germany. 
 
 48 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 4. France, which has spent in three years of war 
 2500 francs per capita of her population, has suf- 
 fered only loss: 20,000 square kilometres of her 
 territory have been invaded, and given over to 
 undreamed-of spoliation at German hands. Ger- 
 many, on the other hand, which has spent only 
 1 69 1 francs per capita for the war, has occupied 
 500,000 square kilometres of foreign soil, bur- 
 glarized her own allies, and piled up huge profits 
 from the war. 
 
 The diversity of these profits is so great, and 
 the mortgage that they have placed on the future 
 is so heavy, that no figures will convey the sum- 
 total of these advantages; but enough has been 
 said to show that the aggregate is enormous. If 
 one deducts the 115 billions of francs devoted by 
 Germany to the war from the total represented by 
 all the elements of advantage already enumerated, 
 one begins to realize that Germany has really 
 wrung from the war present and future profits 
 which can be computed only in hundreds of bil- 
 lions of francs. This war, therefore, has brought 
 Germany boundless material gain, such as no war 
 in history has ever brought to one people. It is 
 equally certain, on the other hand, that Germany 
 can utilize her advantages only on the express 
 condition of maintaining certain indispensable 
 conditions of the situation on which they are 
 based. We shall now see to what minimum these 
 conditions may be reduced. 
 
 49 
 
r a x - G B R M A N Y 
 
 Our table shows that out of the seven elements 
 of advantage won by Germany from the war, the 
 last six that is, those in the second group — 
 arc altogether independent of the first, except for 
 one small detail relating to the national fortunes 
 of the territories occupied by Germany to the 
 
 southeast that is, in Albania, Montenegro, 
 
 Roumania, ami Serbia. 
 
 If, therefore, the formula, "peace without an- 
 nexations and indemnities, 'were actually adopted, 
 Germany, by withdrawing from Belgium and 
 
 France to the west. Russian Poland to the east, 
 
 and Montenegro, Albania, Roumania, and Serbia 
 
 to the southeast, would renounce her first element 
 of advantage, represented by the value of the in- 
 vaded territories that is. about 155 billion 
 
 francs. From this, however, must be deducted 
 
 the tens of billions' worth of plunder carried out 
 of the invaded territories during these three 
 years, consisting either of products already used 
 up by the Germans, or of material, metals, and 
 securities which have already been removed to 
 Germany. Her renunciation of this fust element 
 of advantage would therefore be rendered rela- 
 tively incomplete were the formula adopted. 
 
 We should note also that there are excellent 
 reasons why Germany's renunciation could never 
 apply in reality to the territories invaded by her 
 to the southeast — to Serbia, at all events. 
 
 The six elements of German advantage forming 
 
 50 
 
7 // I: I) I $ J: A S E A N I) C (J R E 
 
 the second group of our table are infinitely more 
 
 important: to Berlin than the first foment 
 
 whif.li is in any case partially assured by die 'no 
 indemnity' formula, as we have seen. Although 
 they an: less directly apparent to the Allies, the 
 six elements of the second group are nevertheless 
 reals for they depend on incontrovertible military, 
 economic, and geographic facts. Now these six 
 elements, big with possibilities for the future, de- 
 pend entirely on the covert but certain seizure 
 which the war has enabled Germany to make of 
 her own allies. But this seizure was possible only 
 as a result of Serbia's destruction. Serbia, there- 
 fore, formed the geographic bulkhead which Ger- 
 many had to hatter down before her influence 
 could predominate over Bulgaria and Turkey. 
 '1 he destruction of Serbia was the sine qua -non 
 of the establishment of Central Pan-Germany, 
 
 which assures the Kaiser of the six principal ele- 
 ments of advantage from the war. Moreover, it 
 is undeniable that, the essential prop of Central 
 Pan-Germany has been furnished by the Berlin- 
 Bagdad Railroad, of which the most important 
 branch, that of Belgrade Nish Pirot, runs ad 
 Serbia. \ow, that Germany is fighting for the 
 Berlin-Bagdad line, Count Karoly, anally of Ber- 
 lin, admitted, speaking on December 12, 1916, 
 in the Hungarian Chamber. (See Le Journal de 
 Geneve, December 30, [916*) 
 
 To sum up, then, German victory and the 
 
 51 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 fruition of her most important war-advantages 
 depend directly on the maintenance of Central 
 Pan-Germany, made up of Germany, Austria- 
 Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Now 
 this maintenance is based on two prime condi- 
 tions. 
 
 i. The continuance of Serbia's state of subjec- 
 tion to Austro-Germany. 
 
 2. The preservation of the new economic and 
 military lines of communication between Berlin 
 on the one side and Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and 
 Constantinople on the other. These are, indeed, 
 the bonds which have enabled Berlin to reduce to 
 practical slavery the Poles, Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, 
 and Roumanians, — the adversaries of Pan-Ger- 
 many, — and then, without changing any names 
 or long-established frontiers, to make Austria- 
 Hungary and Bulgaria vassal-states of Berlin, 
 and, consequently, active elements of Central 
 Pan-Germany. 
 
 Finally, if the present order of things in Central 
 Europe is preserved, Germany can maintain the 
 Hamburg-Bagdad line. This would be assured 
 by the adoption of the formula, 'peace without 
 indemnities and annexations.' This is easily 
 proved. 
 
 As we have already seen, even if Germany were 
 to withdraw in the East and West, the stipulation 
 'no indemnities' would permit her to give back 
 the territories stolen from Russia, France, Bel- 
 
 52 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 gium, and Roumania in a condition of complete 
 economic, physical, and moral collapse: in a word, 
 sucked dry. By reason, too, of the principle of 
 'no indemnities, ' the reconstruction of these dev- 
 asted countries would be another cause of finan- 
 cial exhaustion for France, Russia, Belgium, and 
 Roumania, already overburdened with the costs 
 of the war. But, even assuming that the Ger- 
 mans withdraw from these occupied territories to 
 the East and West, — although at present there 
 is no reason for seriously considering such an 
 eventuality, — no one in his senses could believe 
 that they would give up Serbia unless forced to do 
 so by the most ruthless methods; for Serbia, by 
 reason of her geographic position, is absolutely 
 essential to the existence of Central Pan-Ger- 
 many, on which, in turn, Germany's vast advan- 
 tages depend. 
 
 Of course, it is easy to imagine that Germany 
 would give her signature to treaties of settlement, 
 even involving Serbia. But treaties signed by 
 Germany have no value whatever. ' We snap our 
 fingers at treaties, ' said the Grand Duke of Meck- 
 lenburg-Schwerin to Mr. Gerard, American Am- 
 bassador at Berlin. Besides, even supposing that 
 Berlin were party to a treaty concerning Serbia, 
 this treaty might allow Serbia to exist in theory, 
 but not in fact. We must look the situation in the 
 face: Serbia is one great graveyard. Her pop- 
 ulation has been systematically butchered by the 
 
 53 
 
P A N - G ER MA N Y 
 
 Bulgarians, with German approval. Serbia is ut- 
 terly ruined: the Bulgaro-Austro-Germans have 
 taken everything. 
 
 Now the principle ' no indemnities ' would keep 
 Serbia in this terrible and irremediable state of 
 misery. It is evident that under these conditions 
 the Serbian state would be hopelessly crippled. 
 If, therefore, Austria-Germany were to say to the 
 Allies, 'Very well; in conformity with the formula 
 "no annexations, no indemnities," we are willing 
 to recognize Serbia's dependence by treaty, ' who 
 would be deceived by this sinister and portentous 
 joke? Who could believe in the sincerity of a prop- 
 osition which, on the face of it, is rendered im- 
 possible of fulfillment by the 'no indemnities' 
 clause. And what guaranty would the Allies 
 hold that Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria would 
 withdraw from Serbia at the same time, in view 
 of the fact that such a withdrawal, if bona fide, 
 would imply Berlin's renunciation of the whole 
 Central Pan-German scheme and its vast attend- 
 ant profits? 
 
 To suppose such a thing possible implies a com- 
 plete ignorance of the Germanic spirit as it has 
 manifested itself since the beginning of history. 
 Besides, declarations made by the Germans them- 
 selves show that they will never recede from their 
 position as regards Serbia. As early as Decem- 
 ber, 191 6, the Frankfurter Zeitung prepared its 
 readers in advance for the ' pacifist ' tactics about 
 
 54 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 to be employed — tactics which are now being 
 tried out with the help of the Russian anarchists, 
 the Kienthal Socialists, and the Pope. 
 
 'Certainly,' said the Frankfort paper, 'if we 
 are to make a lasting profit from the military 
 situation, both in its favorable and in its less ad- 
 vantageous aspects, it is essential that special 
 questions should be severally considered in their 
 relation to the whole. To-day our point of view 
 should be as follows: in the East, the formulation 
 of definite demands, and in the West, negotiations 
 on a flexible basis. This is not a programme but 
 a general line of action. " Negotiation" is by no 
 means a synonym for "renunciation." ' 
 
 This last sentence should be read and pondered 
 over by all the Allies. Here we find an absolutely 
 clear statement as regards the fate of Serbia, 
 whose restoration, by means indicated later, is 
 the one thing which can save the world from 
 the consequences of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf 
 scheme. 
 
 On August 8, 191 7, at a banquet given at Lon- 
 don for M. Pachitch, the Serbian Premier, Mr. 
 Lloyd George acknowledged in decisive terms 
 Great Britain's obligations to Serbia — obliga- 
 tions which are practically those of the whole 
 Entente. 
 
 'What I have already said in the name of the 
 British Government regarding Belgium, I here re- 
 peat in the name of the same Government regard- 
 
 55 
 
V - G ER MA v V 
 
 Ulg Serbia. The first condition of peace must be 
 its complete and unrestricted restoration. I have 
 not come here to make a speech. I have simply 
 come to say that, no matter how long the war 
 should last. Britain has pledged her honor that 
 Serbia shall emerge from the conflict independent 
 and completely restored. Moreover, it is not 
 only a matter of honor. The security of civiliza- 
 tion is directly involved here. In the West, Bel- 
 gium has blocked Germany's way, and Serbia in 
 the East has been the check of the Central Pow- 
 ers. She must continue to mount guard over the 
 gateway to the East.' 
 
 To this the Berlin KreuzseUung made reply, — 
 
 'Mr. Lloyd George has said that the integral 
 restoration of Serbia was an essential condition of 
 peace and that British honor was pledged to this 
 restoration. The war-aims of England and those 
 of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria are in absolute 
 opposition on this point. ' 
 
 The Hamburger Fremdenblatt, speaking for Ger- 
 many as well, added, — 
 
 'Germany and Austria-Hungary have crushed 
 Serbia. They alone will decide what disposition 
 is to be made of King Peter's former realm. ' 
 
 There can be no illusion here. The formula 
 'peace without annexations and indemnities' can- 
 not apply to Serbia, which is the keystone of Pan- 
 Germany. 
 
 We now see that, even if the withdrawal of Ger- 
 
 56 
 
y // E D I S E A S E A ii I) i D R E 
 
 many from the territories of Belgium, France, and 
 Russia now held by her were to take place, Cen- 
 tral Pan-Germany would remain essentially in- 
 taet; and hf-r eommercial competition alone would 
 ,uffir r- to bring about the economic ruin of France, 
 England, and Russia. 'Hi'-- last named countries 
 would be staggering under their colossal war- 
 debts, with no offsetting compensation, whereas 
 O-rmany, thanks to six great elements of advan- 
 tage, would find her war-losses more than counter 
 balanced by her profits. What chance would the 
 Allied powers, exhausted by a deadly peat e, hav< 
 against the thirty million soldiers of Pan-Germany, 
 when Berlin, refreshed \>y a short respite, should 
 ( hoose to r'-n' •'// her hold over those western ter- 
 ritories which she had temporarily relinquished? 
 Is it. not. plain v. hat. depths of deception li': be- 
 neath that formula, 'pea< e without annexations 
 and indemnities/ which the Russian Social] 
 ignorant of the vast, advantages accruing to ( 3er- 
 many from the war, have adopted at. the sugges 
 tion of Berlin's Leninist agents? Let us look at 
 the facts, riot. at. the words. If the formula 'peace 
 without annexations and indemnities' is accept- 
 able to the Germans, it is simply because this for- 
 mula, in the opinion of Berlin, will assure the 
 maintenance of Centra] Pan-Germany, which, in 
 turn, pledges to Germany the domination of 
 Europe and the fulfillment of all other elements of 
 the Pan-German scheme. 
 
 57 
 
PAN- GERMANY 
 
 Now, if Central Pan-Germany were to survive, 
 thus assuring to Germany all its vast attendant 
 advantages, and leaving the Allies to face their 
 incalculable w r ar-losses, could such a peace prop- 
 erly be called a 'white peace'? Could a peace 
 which gave Germany the domination of Europe 
 be called a ' drawn game,' a ' peace without annex- 
 ations or indemnities'? What sort of 'limping 
 peace ' (paix boitcuse) would permit Prussian mili- 
 tarism to hold sway over the 150 million people 
 of Pan-Germany instead of the 68 millions of 
 1914, and put 30 million soldiers at Berlin's dis- 
 posal? What one of the exhausted states of 
 Europe could lift a hand under such conditions? 
 This would be no paix boiteuse; it would be the 
 peace of slavery. 
 
 If the Allies are to understand the crucial situa- 
 tion which lies before them, they must realize 
 that, as Lloyd George said, 'The security of civi- 
 lization is directly involved in the independence 
 of Serbia. ' But the independence of Serbia can 
 never be assured so long as Germany practically 
 exercises hegemony over the 50 million people 
 of Austria-Hungary, for the Austro-German unit 
 of 118 million inhabitants, all subject to Berlin, 
 is geographically the mistress of the Balkans. The 
 pledge of Serbia's independence, therefore, does not 
 lie in Serbia, but north of the Danube. This pledge 
 involves the liberation of the peoples under Haps- 
 burg domination, — the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, 
 
 58 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians, — which alone can 
 permit the creation of a barrier sufficiently strong 
 to block the Hamburg-Persian Gulf line, and, at 
 the same time, annul the vast advantages that the 
 definite establishment of the formidable economic 
 and military Pan-German scheme would assure to 
 the Kaiser and his people. 
 
 Now it is much easier to devise the destruction 
 of Pan-Germany than is generally supposed. This 
 fact will become plain as soon as the Allies as a 
 whole realize that the freedom of the nationalities 
 subject to the Hapsburgs should not only be an 
 object of the Entente victory, but also a means to 
 that victory. This, however, is a matter which 
 needs greater elaboration than I can give it at 
 this point. It is discussed at length in the con- 
 cluding chapters of this volume. 
 
 In a word, the solution of the Central European 
 problem means everything for the Allies. So long 
 as it shall remain unsolved, victory will be out 
 of their reach. On the other hand, when this one 
 point has been settled, all the other special war- 
 aims of each of the Allies can be fulfilled with 
 ease. 
 
 Assuming now that the problem of Central 
 Europe has been solved, could it be said that the 
 resulting peace would be 'without annexations 
 and indemnities ' ? Plainly not : for this peace, if 
 it is to break up forever the autocracies of the 
 Central Empires, must, for reasons of nationality, 
 
 59 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 change the existing frontiers, which have made 
 Austro-German imperialism possible. It might 
 involve also certain legitimate reparations. Can 
 it be said that peace on the terms of the Allies 
 would be a 'white peace' — a 'drawn game'? 
 Again we must say no; for such a peace would 
 bring incalculable benefits to the world : the end of 
 Prussian militarism, together with the possibility 
 of organizing the society of nations under other 
 and better conditions. Neither could it be 
 called a 'paix boiteuse,' for the destruction of 
 Prussian militarism would insure to the world a 
 long term of rest after the present awful struggle. 
 
 The formulae ' peace without indemnities or an- 
 nexations, ' 'white peace,' 'drawn game' and 
 ' paix boiteuse' have therefore no more connection 
 with reality in the event of an Allied victory than 
 in that of a German victory. The truth in a nut- 
 shell is that, by virtue of the prime importance of 
 the Central European problem, either the Allies 
 will win victory through the destruction of Pan- 
 Germany, or else the Germans, thanks to Central 
 Pan-Germany and its economic and military ad- 
 vantages, will reduce all Europe to slavery. 
 These are the two phases of the dilemma. 
 
 In any case, the fact that expressions without 
 any practical application, and hence absurd, are 
 constantly made use of in many Allied organs of 
 public opinion in the discussion of peace, proves 
 beyond doubt that certain Allied circles, poisoned 
 
 60 
 
THE D I $ E A S E AND C U R E 
 
 by the influence of Lenine or Kienthal, have losl 
 their sense of realities. With such insidious ene- 
 mies as the Germans, this involves a real Hanger 
 for that moral resistance of the Allies which is so 
 invaluable. The- Americans, through their prac- 
 tical common sense, can be of the greatest service 
 in helping the European Allies to set it at naught. 
 
 President Wilson, by his message to Russia and 
 his Flag Day address, has already done much for 
 the common cause by clearly setting forth the 
 concrete difficulties to be overcome by the Allies 
 if they are to live at liberty. Mr. Gompers has 
 done the same by his firm stand regarding the 
 Stockholm conference. By energetically oppo 
 ing the pernicious Socialist theoreticians, he has 
 supported those real So< ialistsin Prance, England, 
 and Russia who understand the vital importance 
 of killing Prussian militarism. 
 
 May all true Americans continue to speak as 
 these two men have done! The common sense of 
 their opinions, spread broadcast among the Euro- 
 pean Allies, will help us to neutralize the deadly 
 action of those among us who have become intoxi- 
 cated by theories. The cause of the Allies is an 
 ideal, but the triumph of this ideal can never be 
 insured by words; it can be compassed only by 
 the accurate knowledge of military and economic 
 realities. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 The Allies and Pan-Germanism 
 
 It is now twenty years that I have worked tire- 
 lessly to tear the veil from the Pan-German 
 scheme, which my investigations in all parts of 
 the world have enabled me to unearth. In spite 
 of the positive and abundant proofs of its exist- 
 ence which I have been publishing for nineteen 
 years, I was unable to persuade the responsible 
 authorities in France. Russia, or England, that a 
 formidable peril was swiftly and more swiftly 
 drawing near. Paris and London were steeped in 
 blind pacifist delusions. As for Petrograd, the 
 sinister Teutonic influences which, until only yes- 
 terday, were at work on the highest personages, 
 prevented the great Russian people from knowing 
 the real nature of Germany's projects. 
 
 If the Europeans most directly interested in 
 knowing the truth were, until the very outbreak 
 of hostilities, completely hoodwinked as to the 
 true intentions of William II, it is only natural 
 that Americans should take some time to realize 
 the staggering facts concerning the fantastic and 
 odious plan of world -domination so toilsomely 
 built up by the government at Berlin. In peace 
 times, too, the affairs of old Europe, especially the 
 
 62 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 intricate tangle of Austro-Hungarian and Balkan 
 politics, had no practical interest for so vast anrl 
 remote a nation as the United States. This was 
 
 particularly true of her Western citizens. To-day, 
 however, Americans as well as French, British, 
 Russians, and Italians, arc faced with the obliga- 
 tion of mastering the problems of Central Euro- 
 pean affairs; for, without exaggeration, it is on 
 the proper solution of these problems that the in- 
 dependent existence of the United States depends. 
 As events have justified the views I have held 
 for a SCOre of years, I trust, rny Ame-ru an readers 
 will hold this fact in my favor. If I should seem 
 to run counter to the ideas they now hold, they 
 should realize that I do so deliberately, in order to 
 save priceless time and better serve their own legi- 
 timate interests. 
 
 The present situation in Europe is due to two 
 
 factors: first, the almost complete fulfillment by 
 the Germans of a plan which they had long been 
 preparing with the utmost care; second, the re- 
 peated mistakes of the Allies in their carrying 01 
 of the war — mistakes which alone have permit- 
 ted the Germans to consummate their plan almost 
 without opposition. 
 
 The Pan-Germanist programme of 1911 called 
 for the establishment of Prussian hegemony over 
 a territory of nearly 4,015,000 square kilometres 
 
 63 
 

 in othei ? est in the 
 
 East and West . it meant the indirect, yi :th e 
 
 ot \. • *£« u "> • the Balk, • S .'.es. 
 
 d Vu:ko\ Ai I g -, 1917 Km 
 
 e capture ot Bagdad by the E tho 
 
 s-:-. . iu ■; in the West 
 
 — rJ . , stent 
 
 ;.cxVa\\ 1 - - that is. in nine- 
 
 ty. 
 rhe explanation of this achievement Res 
 
 act that, if the Germs is are outlaws 
 e \ m 3 intelligent outlaw s, perfectly trained 
 ig the on which they 
 
 \ in tho tact that the 
 ers of the Allies . . I by 
 
 st intent. . is . ugh the} are, have bt 
 
 d as to the multiple realities of 
 the European t. Houghgoing knowledge 
 
 of which is absolutely necessary tor the conduct 
 of the terrible war in progress. 
 
 [ne proof of tl ranee lies in th< 
 
 ed truth that the heads of the European states 
 now in nany were, « ithout ex 
 
 tion. taken by surprise when war broke out. 
 Posterity will look i this fact with amazement. 
 . governments of the Allies were no better p 
 . the war intellectually than wn 
 their gi to carry ii tonally. Now. the 
 
 intellectual prosecution of this war presents un- 
 cedented difficulties: it calls uncompromisingly 
 
 CM 
 
/ // /. i> i S E A S E AND C a R B 
 
 I', i a detailed knowledge, not onlyoi matters mili- 
 tary and naval, but oi geographic, ethnographic, 
 economic, and politic al questions which, by reason 
 <,\ the scale of the present conflict, read profound 
 ly on ;iil military operations oi general scope. As 
 ;i result oi this interpenetration <>l all the various 
 problems, the world conflict is not, as many pec 
 pie '.till believe, a purely military struggle, in 
 wlii' li i Ij<- mere ma< hinei y oi war pis y- a de< isi ■/< 
 role. In spite oi appearand on, miml that is, the 
 intellectual element dominates the material 
 element which, though indispensable, can attain 
 full effectiveness only when it is employed in J"j 
 therance oi a definite plan oi action, backed by 
 ( U;u- t hinking ; and su< I) a plan f an never be foi ni 
 ul.it » f ) unless iIj'- ethnographic, psychological, 
 economic, and geographic factoi - capable of ai 
 fecting every great movement oi a general strata 
 gic nature are ( alculated as< arefully as the purely 
 military factors. By reason oi the potency oi 
 these many factors invisible, f>uf vei / real and 
 powerful if. may he said: 'This v..ii is not a 
 mere war oi armaments it is a wai oi political 
 scieiu '■.' 
 
 It. is because I he strategists oi Berlin have long 
 recognized this conception oi modern warfare; it. 
 is foecau ■.'• i hey I j ■■)■/<-. at their fingers' ends & docu 
 mentation oi politic al s< irmr <•, slov. 1/ a< cumulated 
 
 ;nj'J oi unquestionable worth, that they are in a 
 position to meet endle . . problems as they present 
 
 65 
 
PA N - GERM A N Y 
 
 themselves, and to achieve successes against the 
 Allies which, on the surface, appear incomprehen- 
 sible. 
 
 As for the leaders of the Allies, it seems as if 
 many of them are not alive to the element of polit- 
 ical science in the war, even at the present mo- 
 ment. The reason is simple. The same men who 
 ignored the realities of Pan-Germanism before the 
 war are, naturally enough, unable to grasp the 
 politico-scientific, geographic, economic, ethno- 
 graphic, and psychological realities of all Europe 
 now that the conflict has burst on us. In the 
 realm of the intellectual there can be no improvi- 
 sation. To master the politico-scientific elements 
 necessary for the prosecution of this war, there is 
 need of minds trained by the unremitting applica- 
 tion of fifteen or twenty years. Among the lead- 
 ers of the Entente no man is to be found who has 
 bent his will to such intellectual effort; and the 
 pressing problems brought forth by each day give 
 no time for minute, deliberate study by the men 
 who have succeeded to the seats of power since 
 war began. 
 
 II 
 
 The caoital mistakes in the prosecution of the 
 war committed by the Entente proceed directly 
 from the defective equipment of its leaders which 
 I have just pointed out. They explain the differ- 
 ence in the results obtained by the two groups of 
 
 66 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 belligerents, although the courage and self-sacri- 
 fice of the Allies' soldiers are as great as those of 
 the Germans. They explain, too, why the three 
 hundred millions of the Allies — this takes no ac- 
 count of their colonial resources or of the support 
 drawn from trans-oceanic neutrals — have not yet 
 succeeded in defeating Germany, which entered 
 the war with a population of sixty-eight millions 
 and one ally, Austria-Hungary, of whose thirty 
 million people three quarters were directly antag- 
 onistic to Berlin. 
 
 These capital mistakes made by the Allies are 
 as follows. They believed that a friendly agree- 
 ment with Bulgaria was possible, although that 
 country was treaty-bound to Berlin and Constan- 
 tinople long before the war. They cherished illu- 
 sions concerning King Constantine, who, above all 
 else, was brother-in-law of the Kaiser. They or- 
 ganized the Dardanelles expedition, which should 
 never have been attempted. Even if this opera- 
 tion had been judged technically feasible, its futil- 
 ity would have been apparent if the Allies had 
 realized — and it was their arch-error not to realize 
 — that the strategic key to the whole European 
 war was the Danube. The mere occupation by 
 the Allies of the territory stretching from Monte- 
 negro through Serbia to Roumania, would have 
 resolved all the essential problems of the conflict. 
 Cut off from the Central Empires, Bulgaria and 
 Turkey, whose arsenals were depleted by the Bal- 
 
 67 
 
P A N - G ER MA N Y 
 
 kan disturbances of 1912-1913, would have found 
 it impossible to make a strong stand against the 
 Allies. Turkey, who had been imprudent enough 
 to defy them, would have been obliged to open the 
 Straits within a very short time, for sheer lack of 
 munitions to defend them. This opening of the 
 Straits would have been effected by a strong pres- 
 sure by the Allies on the south of Hungary. More- 
 over, by the same action the Central Empires 
 would have been barred from reinforcements and 
 supplies from the Orient. Germany, finding her- 
 self cut off on land in the South as she was block- 
 aded by sea in the North, would have been obliged 
 to come to terms. 
 
 Unhappily, the general staffs of the Allies in the 
 West were not prepared to grasp the politico-sci- 
 entific character of the war, especially the cardinal 
 importance of the economic factor. This igno- 
 rance remained unenlightened until Roumania was 
 crushed in 191 6. As a result, for twenty-seven 
 months the Balkans were looked on by the leaders 
 in the West as being of only secondary military 
 importance. During these twenty-seven months 
 the Allies were obsessed by the idea that they 
 would vanquish Germany on the Western front 
 by a war of attrition. This conviction delayed 
 the Saloniki-Belgrade expedition, and when it 
 was finally undertaken, it was on too small a scale 
 to insure success. Such a grave error would never 
 have been committed by the Allied strategists if 
 
 68 
 
THE DISEASE AND CUR E 
 
 they had fully realized that the principal objective 
 of the Pan-German scheme, for the attainment of 
 which Germany was primarily fighting, was the 
 seizure of the Orient. This point of view, how- 
 ever, was for a long time ignored, in spite of the 
 tireless efforts made by a few to demonstrate its 
 vital importance. 
 
 The Austro-Germans, profiting by this basic 
 mistake of the civil and military chiefs of the En- 
 tente, were able in October-November, 191 5, to 
 join hands with Bulgaria and Turkey over the 
 corpse of Serbia. From that time on, the General 
 Staff at Berlin has been profiting by this situation, 
 improving it and consolidating it by seizing half 
 of Roumania toward the close of 1916. The direct 
 result of the mistakes of the Allies, coupled with 
 the methodical procedure of Berlin, has been the 
 realization of nine tenths of Pan-Germany. 
 
 This Pan-Germany is composed of two ele- 
 ments. First, the great occupied territories taken 
 by Germany from Belgium, France, Russia, Ser- 
 bia, and Roumania. Second, the practical seizure 
 effected by her at the expense of her own allies: 
 Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; for, as a 
 matter of fact, the Quadruple Alliance is nothing 
 but a great illusion carefully fostered by the Kai- 
 ser for the purpose of concealing the true situa- 
 tion from the neutrals — particularly the United 
 States, which was then in that category. If one 
 wishes to see things as they are, one must realize 
 
 69 
 
P A N - G ER MA N Y 
 
 that Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are 
 not the allies — that is, the equals — of Germany. 
 These three states are practically the vassals of 
 Berlin, in whose sight they count for scarcely more 
 than Saxony or Bavaria. The principal proof of 
 this state of affairs lies in the fact that the Kaiser 
 wields an uncontested supremacy from Hamburg 
 to the British front at Bagdad. 
 
 Since the beginning of hostilities there has been 
 a formidable extension of Prussian militarism. At 
 first, it held in its grasp only the sixty-eight mil- 
 lion people of the German Empire. By April, 
 1915, it had extended and organized its influence 
 among the thirty millions of Austro-Hungarians, 
 who until that time had taken orders from their 
 own independent military chiefs. After October- 
 November, 1915, — the date of Serbia's downfall, 
 — the Prussian system reached out to Bulgaria 
 and Turkey. By taking account of these exten- 
 sions and adding together the populations of the 
 territories occupied by Germany, together with 
 those of her infatuated allies, one finds that to-day 
 Prussian militarism no longer controls sixty-eight 
 million souls, as at the beginning of the war, but 
 about one hundred and seventy-six million Euro- 
 pean and Ottoman subjects. 
 
 This is the brutal, overwhelming fact which 
 Americans must face if they wish to learn the sole 
 solution of the war which will assure to them, as 
 well as to the rest of the world, a durable peace. 
 
 70 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 The following figures will show how the three 
 groups of the population of Pan-Germany were 
 divided at the beginning of 191 7: — 
 
 1. The Masters 
 
 
 
 Germans 
 
 
 73,000,000 
 
 2. The Vassals 
 
 
 
 Magyars 
 
 10,000,000 1 
 
 
 Bulgars 
 
 5,000,000 
 
 21,000,000 
 
 Turks 
 
 6,000,000 , 
 
 
 3. The Slaves 
 
 
 
 French 
 
 (about) 3,000,000 " 
 
 
 Belgians 
 
 7,500,000 
 
 
 Alsatians, Lorrainers 
 
 1,500,000 
 
 
 Danes 
 
 200,000 
 
 
 Poles, Lithuanians, 
 
 22,000,000 
 
 
 Ruthenians 
 
 5,500,000 
 
 
 Czechs 
 
 8,500,000 
 
 • 82,000,000 
 
 Jugo-Slavs 
 
 1 1 ,000,000 
 
 
 Roumanians 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 
 Italians 
 
 800,000 
 
 
 Armenians 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 
 Levantines 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 
 Ottoman Greeks 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 
 Arabs 
 
 8,000,000 , 
 
 
 Total 
 
 176,000,000 
 
 To sum up, seventy-three million Germans rule 
 over twenty-one million vassals and eighty-two 
 million slaves, — Latin, Slavic, Semitic, belonging 
 to thirteen different nationalities, — who are 
 bearing the most cruel and unjustifiable yoke that 
 the world has ever known. 
 
 It is undeniable, moreover, that each extension 
 of Prussian militarism over a new territory has en- 
 abled Germany to prolong the struggle by obtain- 
 ing new supplies of food, new reinforcements to 
 
 7i 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 press into her service and territory to exploit, new 
 civil populations, whose labor is made use of even 
 in works of a military nature. As a result, the 
 technical problem now confronting the Allies in 
 Europe is, through the mistakes of their former 
 leaders, infinitely more complicated than at the 
 outbreak of hostilities. 
 
 To-day Berlin, by means of Prussian terrorism 
 methodically and pitilessly employed, disposes of 
 the military and economic resources of one hun- 
 dred and seventy-six million people, occupying a 
 strategic position in the centre of Europe which is 
 all to her profit. It is this very state of things, 
 founded on the slavery of eighty-two millions of 
 human beings, which is intolerable. 
 
 in 
 
 Many times, and rightly, the Allies have de- 
 clared that it was not their object to exterminate 
 the German people and bring about their political 
 extinction. On the other hand, it is just and es- 
 sential to proclaim that Pan-Germany must be 
 destroyed. On this depends the liberty, not only 
 of Europe, but of the whole world. This is the 
 point of view which, in the crisis of to-day, should 
 prevail with Americans, for the following reasons. 
 Suppose that Pan-Germany were able to maintain 
 itself in its present position. It cannot be denied 
 that its territory contains considerable latent mili- 
 tary and economic resources, as well as strategic 
 
 72 
 
THE D I S E A S E AND C U R E 
 
 positions of world-significance, like the Darda- 
 nelles. If these resources were freely exploited 
 and developed to their highest pitch by the relent- 
 less organizing spirit of Berlin, Prussianized Pan- 
 Germany, dividing Europe in two, would domi- 
 natethe Continent, uncontestably and indefinitely, 
 by means of her crushing strength. France, Rus- 
 sia, England, Italy, ceasing to exist as great pow- 
 ers, could only submit to Germany's will. And 
 Berlin, mistress of Europe, would soon realize, not 
 merely the Hamburg-Bagdad and Antwerp-Bag- 
 dad railways, but the Brest-Bagdad line as well ; 
 for Brest has long been coveted secretly by the 
 Pan-Germanists, who would make of it the great 
 military and commercial transatlantic port of 
 Prussianized Europe. 
 
 Moreover, if Germany achieved the ruin of the 
 Allies, it is entirely probable that the General 
 Staff of William II would launch a formidable ex- 
 pedition against the United States without delay, 
 in order to allow her no time to organize herself 
 against the Prussian tyranny hypothetically dom- 
 inating Europe. Even if Berlin felt it necessary 
 to defer this step, Americans would none the less 
 be forced to prepare for the inevitable struggle and 
 to serve an apprenticeship to militarism which 
 would be odious to them. If Americans; then, see 
 things as they really are, and perceive the dangers 
 to which they are pledging their future, they will 
 be convinced that they, as much as Europeans, 
 
 73 
 
P A N - G ER MA N Y 
 
 have a vital interest in the annihilation of Pan- 
 Germanism. In a word, it is clear that any peril 
 accruing to the United States from Europe can 
 arise only from so formidable a power as Pan-Ger- 
 many, and not from a Germany kept within her 
 legitimate frontiers, and forced to behave herself, 
 by the balance of other powers. 
 
 We must also realize that the moral considera- 
 tions at stake are a matter of the liveliest interest 
 to the United States. Can republican America 
 allow the feudal spirit which kindled the torch of 
 this war to triumph over the world? This spirit 
 is made up of the following elements: the feudal- 
 ism of the Prussian Junkers, chief prop and stay 
 of the Hohenzollerns; the feudalism of the great 
 Austrian land-owners; the feudalism of the Mag- 
 yar grandees, whose caste-spirit is precisely the 
 same as that of the Prussian lordlings; and the 
 Turkish feudalism of Enver Bey and his friends. 
 In other words, this four-ply feudal spirit which is 
 the basis of Pan-Germany is in radical and abso- 
 lute opposition to the democratic spirit of the 
 modern world. Granting for a moment that Ger- 
 many were victorious, Russia, after a frightful 
 reign of anarchy, would be forced to submit once 
 more to the yoke of autocracy. As for the peoples 
 of Western Europe, reduced to worse than slavery, 
 they could only renounce their dearest ideals — 
 the ideals for which they have shed their blood for 
 centuries. 
 
 74 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 The present war, then, is manifestly a struggle 
 & outrance between democracy and feudalism. To 
 Americans as well as to Europeans falls the task, 
 not only of preserving their corporeal independ- 
 ence, hut of saving our common civilization. This 
 can be accomplished only by the destruction of 
 Pan-Germanism. 
 
 It is plain that Berlin, failing so far to crush the 
 Allies completely, is bending every effort to main- 
 taining Pan-Germany in its present position, so 
 that, after peace is declared, it may crystallize and 
 swiftly develop its full power. When, in Decem- 
 ber, 1916, President Wilson requested the bellig- 
 erents to make known the causes for which they 
 were fighting, the government of Berlin issued no 
 definite statement. The reason for this attitude 
 is plain. If Berlin still hopes to enforce her out- 
 rageous pretensions by her immense military 
 power, she cannot possibly put down her terms in 
 black and white, in a document subject to general 
 perusal, without instantly calling down on her 
 head the blazing reprobation of the civilized 
 world. 
 
 The Allies, on the contrary, replied to Mr. Wil- 
 son's question easily and with precision. 
 
 The universal attention drawn to this reply 
 has entailed advantages and disadvantages. By 
 the very nature of things, the Allies definitely an- 
 nounced that the smaller nationalities in Turkey, 
 Austria-Hungary, and the Balkans must be set 
 
 75 
 
" I a GEE " .1 A' V 
 
 tree, thus implying a radical opposition to the 
 Hamburg Persian Gulf idea. This has enabled 
 Berlin, for one thing, to bind her accomplices at 
 Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople more 
 closely, if possible, to her cause, and also to gal- 
 vanize for a still longer period the forces of the 
 German people, who are resolved to endure the 
 bitterest suffering in order to insure, after peace 
 comes, the immense advantages accruing from 
 the •'■ ci Pan-Germanism, 
 
 By way of compensation for this, the publicity 
 given the reply of the Allies has accomplished 
 two excellent ends. First of all, it has permitted 
 every one to see that the common purpose of the 
 Allies is to solve the Central European problem. 
 which, as a matter of fact, is not only o\ European, 
 but of universal interest, since such a solution 
 puts a quietus on German dreams oi world-dom- 
 ination. This publicity, too. has made it possible 
 to compare the principles invoked by the Allies in 
 their peace-terms with those of President Wilson, 
 proclaimed in his message to the Senate on Janu- 
 ary rj. 1017. and to establish the fact that these 
 principles are identical. 
 
 IV 
 
 The reason for this harmonious point of view 
 lies in the adoption of the principle of nationality 
 by the Allies and by President Wilson as the fun- 
 damental basis for the reconstruction of the Eu- 
 
 76 
 
7 // li I) I S I: A S I: AND C V R E 
 
 ropeoi to-morrow. Because ol thispoinl in com- 
 mon, it is evident thai the war measures of the 
 Allies and the pacific endeavors oi Mr. Wilson 
 have in view the same general geographic solu- 
 tions of the problem of organizing Europe on the 
 lines oi a durable peace. This is a fa< t of Hie- ut- 
 most Importance, as I tried to show with the aid 
 of maps in an article in U Illustration, of Febru- 
 ary 27, 1917. Allies and Americans, then, may 
 join hands and press resolutely ahead, especi 
 ally since the Russian Revolution has come to 
 pass, for, with a common ideal, their general 
 practical solutions for meeting this formidable 
 crisis cannot but be identical. 
 
 In order to understand fully the seriousness of 
 
 the situation, one must distinguish clearly be- 
 tween the moral position of the- Allies and the 
 strategic positions of the two groups of belliger- 
 ents. 'I fie moral position of the Allies is excellent. 
 After Washington and Peking broke wit.h lierlin, 
 
 and especially after the magnificent revolution 
 in Russia, after Bagdad fell and a fraction of the 
 
 invaded French territory was won back, the 
 
 spirit of the Allies was all that could be desired. 
 But even while recognizing the excellence of this 
 
 moral strength and its potentialities of success, 
 
 we must first of all consider the general strategic 
 
 situation. The events of this war have plainly 
 shown that, unfortunately, brute force in the 
 service of the lowest passions can prevail over 
 
 77 
 
• N I IMA NY 
 
 the holiest rights, the purest aspirations. Since 
 August, 1914, incontestable rights have boon vie 
 
 lated, and noble nations martyrized. 
 
 I el us face the cruel truth and say: the Allies 
 may yet be completely vanquished it" certain de- 
 velopments come about, or if new strategic mis- 
 takes are added to those portentous ones which 
 nearly lost them the fight, in spite of therighteous- 
 
 nessof their cause and their immense, if badly em- 
 ployed, latent resources. It we w ish, then, really 
 to understand the crisis of to-day and the mighty 
 peril which still menaces the world's liberty, we 
 must not sin ink from meeting the realities of the 
 
 military situation. We must be ready to face the 
 
 most serious developments that can be conceived. 
 
 Such an attitude implies, not pessimism, but. that 
 readiness tor the worst which lies at the root of 
 
 military wisdom. 
 
 Let us now aeeept the following facts. The 
 troops of France are beginning to be exhausted. 
 
 The iniquitous administration of the Tsar had 
 seriously compromised the provisioning of the 
 Russian army with food and munitions. In that 
 
 vast country, where conditions were ripe for ideal- 
 istic extremists to guide the revolution toward 
 pacifism or anarchy, there are alarming symp- 
 toms of the prevalence of the latter condition. 
 The swarming agents of Germany are working 
 there without respite. If their efforts shall finally 
 succeed, the strength of Russia will swiftly dis- 
 
7 // I: I J / S E A S E A .'.' I J C V R E 
 
 solve. This would practically insure a German 
 victory, for, with the Russian armies demoralized, 
 
 all the forces of I'an-fJerrnany could be flung 
 
 against the Franco-British front.. Moreover, if, 
 from the moral standpoint, the Berlin govern- 
 menl is universally to be despised, the same can- 
 not be said about, her general technical military 
 ability, whose elements are as folio. 
 
 Berlin is incontestably mistress of Pan-Ger- 
 many that is, she has absolute disposal of vast 
 
 resources in men an'i in the manifold products of 
 
 a great territory with a population of one hun- 
 dred and seventy-six million-,. 'Jh<: Kaiser's 
 Great General Staff, whose intellectual resouro 
 
 fulness cannot, be rj Motioned, is quick to make the 
 most of every lesson taught by the war. '1 he 
 
 annual levies of men from the various territories 
 of Pan-Germany certainly outnumber the losses 
 sustained each year by her troops. It. is therefore, 
 in rny opinion, a grave error to assume, as the 
 Allies have done, that the Germans can 1/: beaten 
 by mere attrition of their forces. By organizing 
 under one uniform system the soldiery furnished 
 
 by the many different Countries of Pan-Germany, 
 
 Prussian militarism has unquestionably given its 
 troops a cohesion and a unity unknown to the 
 
 vassal -allies of firman y before the v,ar. 'J his 
 
 state of affairs has undoubtedly added to die 
 
 military effectiveness of the vast armies which 
 take their orders from Berlin. 
 
 79 
 
r A v i; E K \l A .V V 
 
 The German military authorities most advan- 
 tageously employed the respites given them by 
 the strategic errors of the Allies. Never have the 
 
 broad lines of trenches, the far-flung battle fron- 
 tiers, been more powerfully guarded than now. 
 Never have the Germans had more abundant 
 stores oi munitions. Never has the network of 
 railways covering the length and breadth of Pan- 
 Germany been so complete. Never has the Great 
 General Staff, making full use oi its central posi- 
 tion, been better able to concentrate on any front 
 with lightning speed. For these reasons, it is my 
 opinion that we may safely say that never before 
 has the Berlin government, from a military point 
 of view, been so strong. The various statistics 
 which justify such a conclusion are. 1 think, to be 
 relied on. Even supposing them to be exaggerat- 
 ed, it is much better to run the risk of overesti- 
 mating the enemy's strength than to underesti- 
 mate it. Many of the Allies' mistakes sprang from 
 neglect of this axiom. 
 
GHAITKR V 
 Military Operations 
 
 As a prelude to the further consideration of cer- 
 tain aspects of the world-war, J should like, if I 
 may, to quote a few paragraphs which I printed 
 early last summer, by way of forecast, and which 
 events have not wholly belied. 
 
 Let us now attempt to forecast the German 
 military plans for 1917. For some weeks persist- 
 ent reports have been telling of their tremendous 
 preparations for hurling an offensive against the 
 Russian front. As for the Franco- British front in 
 the West, it was stated that the General Staff at 
 Berlin would be glad to hold things stationary on 
 that side until, after winning the victory on which 
 they count in the East, they are free to devote 
 their attentions to the occidental theatre. This 
 project, of course, cannot be confirmed; but the 
 voluntary shortening of the western line by trie- 
 Germans would lend color to its probability. 
 Moreover, such a plan would coincide perfectly 
 with the present interests of Berlin, with the 
 habitual methods of the Kaiser's General Staff, 
 with the broad Ban-Germanist scheme, and with 
 the personal preferences of Marshal von Hin- 
 
 81 
 
PAN- GERM A N Y 
 
 denburg. It is natural also that the Germans 
 should avail themselves of the sinister and undeni- 
 able effects of the Russian imperial administra- 
 tion on the army and civil population of the coun- 
 try before the new government at Petrograd has 
 time to repair the all-too-abundant harm that 
 has been wrought. 
 
 We must cherish no illusions. As long as it can 
 dispose of the vast resources of Pan-Germany, 
 which, to my thinking, are still taken too lightly 
 by the Allies; while the results of the Russian 
 Revolution are still uncertain; while the reorgani- 
 zation of the Muscovite armies still remains un- 
 completed, the government at Berlin, in spite of 
 its serious problems connected with the food- 
 supply, is still convinced that it can win a decisive 
 military victory by dealing with its adversaries 
 one by one. And so we should foresee that the 
 German General Staff will meet its problems in 
 succession. 
 
 It seems probable, then, that it will follow the 
 basic principles of warfare and concentrate all the 
 forces at its disposal against the weakest front. 
 This, without question, is the Roumano-Russian 
 line. Its great extent, together with the formid- 
 able development of the German railway system, 
 — infinitely superior to that of the Russians, — 
 makes it easier to introduce the element of surprise, 
 which is of capital importance for swift, decisive 
 victory. The Russians, too, are certainly less well 
 
 82 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 provided with munitions of war than the Franco- 
 British troops; and the Germans have succeeded 
 in further weakening them by means of the ter- 
 rible explosions recently engineered by their spies 
 at Archangel. As a result of the execrable ad- 
 ministration of the former government, the food 
 situation in Russia is most critical, while the rev- 
 olutionists are not yet sure of the reorganization 
 of the military forces. The Germans, therefore, 
 have an unquestionable interest in profiting with- 
 out delay by this state of affairs. 
 
 A vigorous offensive on the Eastern front is 
 also in harmony with the Pangermanist plan, 
 which for twenty-five years has looked forward to 
 the seizure by Germany of Riga, Little Russia, 
 and Odessa. And a German success in the south 
 of Russia would be big with economic, naval, 
 military, and moral consequences of world-im- 
 port. The Germans would become masters of the 
 rich and boundless wheat-lands of Little Russia, 
 which, from the midst of their food-problems, 
 they watch with greedy eyes. The capture of 
 Odessa and the complete conquest of the Black 
 Sea, by means of transports (sent in large num- 
 bers down the Danube, thus permitting surprise 
 attacks at vital points), would end in the loss of 
 the Crimea and, probably, the fall of the Caucasus 
 into the hands of the Turco-Germans. The Brit- 
 ish, then, could no longer hold out at Bagdad. 
 Freed by such successes from all immediate fear 
 
 83 
 
P .1 N G E R M .1 A' v 
 
 oi Russia, the Germans could then turn in enor- 
 mous strength against the Balkan front of the 
 Allies, Under those hypothetical conditions, one 
 may assume that the Allied army north oi Salon- 
 iki. demoralized by the Russian reverses, would 
 bo taken prisoners or driven into the soa. 
 
 rhese various operations in the Bast vigorous- 
 ly taken in hand, as the General Staff at Ber- 
 lin knows so well how to do, Would i equiro tour or 
 
 five months tor their execution. This interval of 
 time, combined with the depressing moral effect 
 brought about In- the supposed German victories, 
 would aet. as it were, as aw automatic preparation 
 
 tor the final Teutonic offensive On the Western 
 front. It must be remembered that (.luring these 
 tour OT five months the submarine warfare, pur- 
 sued more and more ruthlessly, would consider- 
 ably impede neutral navigation and decimate the 
 tonnage ot the Franco-British merchant marine. 
 The food-problems and the war-expenditure of the 
 
 Allies would be enormously increased. Even if 
 
 their pressure has forced the Kaiser to evacuate 
 
 a considerable portion of France and Belgium, 
 the importance oi this retreat would be only rela- 
 tive, for it would be temporary. Following our 
 hypothesis, then, if Russia were beaten, the army 
 of Saloniki driven into the sea. and the food crisis 
 in the West intensified, the moral depression and 
 discouragement among the soldiers and civilians 
 of France would be most profound. Under the 
 
 84 
 
1 ii i. h I :, I: A $ E A N D C V I' E 
 
 given material and psychological condition** the 
 
 concentration ol all the Pan-fverrnan forces <>n 
 
 the Western front would probably permit them to 
 f,r<;ik through. 'I . : 'I spell ruin for France 
 
 and for England as well, and assure th« hre 
 
 German victory which would mean the mastery oi 
 Europe. 
 
 If this theoretical German plan is to be accom- 
 plished in i r > J 7. however, the general technical 
 situation irj Europe must remain much asil 
 at present No new power capable <A making it* 
 sell felt on the battle-field must come to the tup 
 port of the Alii'-,, ft. is necessary, then, that the 
 scheme be carried out in 19/7, before the Russian 
 Revolution, which is essentially favorable to the 
 Allies, has time to repair the damage done by the 
 former regime, and before the United 
 realizing that it- is to their vital interest, to take 
 part directly and without delay in die war on the 
 Continent, are ready to do so effectively. 
 
 1 he tactics of fieri in, after being forced to a 
 
 diplomatic rupture with Washington, consist in 
 doing everything to avoid actual blows with the 
 United while keeping up a rigoro is sub 
 
 marine campaign, and in making frantic effort-. 
 to effect a miscarriage of American military p 
 parat.ion especially as regards sending rein 
 fbrcements to Europe. In pursuance of this 
 
 scheme, Berlin instructed Vienna to '-.end Wash- 
 ington a dilatory answer concerning submarine 
 
 *5 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 warfare, in order to avoid a diplomatic break and 
 thus gain time. This procedure was specifically 
 intended to make America believe that Austro- 
 Hungary can act independently of Germany. 
 And so, by virtue of this delusion, William II veils 
 the existence of that Pan-Germany whose reality, 
 for the sake of his plans, must not be revealed 
 until the latest possible moment. 
 
 II 
 
 If the programme for 191 7, which we have good 
 reason to attribute to the Germans, were sub- 
 stantially carried out (and, after all, this is not 
 impossible), in six to eight months the United 
 States would find themselves face to face with 
 a Germany controlling the resources, not only of 
 the present-day Pan-Germany, but of all Europe. 
 And, Americans, do not think your turn would be 
 long in coming. Do not take it for granted that 
 the German people, worn out by the endless hor- 
 rors of war, would cry to their masters, ' Peace at 
 any price ! ' The German people, as I know them, 
 filled with enthusiasm by a victory that would be 
 without parallel in the history of the world, mad- 
 dened by incalculable plunder, would follow the 
 lead of their Emperor more blindly than ever. 
 The pride and ambition of the Kaiser and his 
 General Staff are so prodigious that, unless all 
 signs fail, they would give the United States no 
 chance to organize against a Prussianized Europe. 
 
 86 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 In eight or ten months, after new advances had 
 been made to Japan, who would be isolated by the 
 defeat of her allies in Europe, and with the aid 
 of the German- Mexicans and German- Americans 
 whose mission, as every one knows, is to paralyze 
 by every possible means the military organization 
 of the United States, it would be possible to look 
 for ruthless action against America by the Pan 
 germanized forces of Europe. 
 
 The prediction of such extraordinary eventuali- 
 ties will no doubt seem fantastic and improbable 
 to many of my American readers. I beg them, 
 nevertheless, to consider them seriously. As a 
 matter of fact, if we consider all that has been 
 achieved by the Germans since August, 1914, the 
 events which I have forecast are much less amaz- 
 ing than those indicated by me in 1901, when, in 
 my book V Europe et la Question d'Autriche au 
 Seuil du XXe Steele, I unmasked the Pan-Ger- 
 man plot, which was then looked on as a mere 
 phantasmagoria — although as a matter of fact 
 it was so real that it now stands almost completely 
 fulfilled. 
 
 You Americans, then, should learn your lesson 
 from the past. Your own best interest lays on 
 you the obligation to face facts which may at 
 present seem improbable, and to prepare your- 
 selves without losing a day for meeting the grav- 
 est perils. As the situation now stands, a delay 
 in making a decision may involve disastrous re- 
 
 87 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 suits. For instance, the three weeks of parleying 
 indulged in by the Allies before deciding to send 
 troops to Serbia were of the utmost significance. 
 Those three lost weeks simply prevented the 
 Allies from achieving victory, and resulted in an 
 unthinkable prolongation of the war. 
 
 The surest, the most economical way for Amer- 
 icans to avoid excessive risks is to prepare at once 
 for the severest kind of struggle, on the hypothe- 
 sis that the Allies may sustain grave reverses. 
 Everything favors concerted action by the United 
 States and the Allies. Their material and moral 
 interests are identical, and, in doing away with 
 autocracy, Russia removed the well-justified dis- 
 trust felt in the United States for the land of the 
 Tsars. As we have seen, a German victory over 
 Russia, involving the fall of Saloniki and, later, 
 the breaking of the Western front, would be un- 
 questionably the most dangerous eventuality 
 imaginable for the future security of the United 
 States. American interest therefore demands, 
 not only that support should be given France 
 and Great Britain, but that the United States 
 should hasten to help the Russians, who will prob- 
 ably be called on first to meet the onslaught. 
 
 On reflection, perhaps, Americans may even 
 find it worth while to give further thought to an 
 idea which, a few months ago, would have seemed 
 preposterous to them. Since President Wilson 
 cherishes the ideal of the brotherhood of nations, 
 
 88 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 — a noble conception, but one which can be 
 realized only after Prussian militarism is ground 
 in the dust, after the Hapsburgs and the Hohen- 
 zollerns have gone the way of the Romanoffs, — 
 why should not this world-crisis provide an op- 
 portunity for intimate cooperation between the 
 United States and Japan? 
 
 Even if Americans were to admit the necessity 
 of so doing, it will be long before they are in the 
 position to throw into the European conflict those 
 reinforcements which, by exercising a decisive 
 influence, would hasten the end of the mad 
 slaughter. At the present moment Japan alone, 
 outside of Europe, has at her disposal a trained 
 army capable of taking the field at once. Every- 
 thing considered, President Wilson might well de- 
 cide that the interests of humanity called for the 
 intervention of Japan in Europe. If he succeeded 
 in convincing Tokyo of this, he would stand out 
 as the great, decisive figure of the war. From the 
 technical point of view, it is certain that victory 
 for the Allies calls for a simultaneous concentric 
 attack on all the fronts of Pan-Germany. For 
 that reason, Japanese troops on the Russian line, 
 at Bagdad, Alexandretta, and Saloniki, would 
 furnish the Eastern positions of the Allies with 
 the supplementary strength that they need to 
 achieve decisive results and so hasten the end of 
 the whole war. 
 
 Let me again urge my point that the line of 
 
 89 
 
P A N - GER MA N Y 
 
 action morally and materially most profitable to 
 the United States is that which, by achieving 
 the total destruction of Pan-Germany and Prus- 
 sian militarism, will terminate the horrible car- 
 nage once for all. This is the moral pointed by the 
 past. If the Allies had undertaken the Saloniki- 
 Belgrade expedition in the beginning of 191 5, the 
 war would have ended a year ago. If you, Amer- 
 icans, had cast your lot with us a year ago, it 
 would be ending about now. If you act to-day, 
 with all your energies, and especially if you com- 
 pass the Japanese intervention, you will save 
 the lives of millions of men who, without your 
 military and diplomatic support, will surely be 
 sacrificed. 
 
 The real problem for America is clearly to dis- 
 cern Pan-Germany lurking beneath the Quad- 
 ruple Alliance of the Central Powers, and to de- 
 cide to strike this Pan-Germany quick and hard. 
 This is the one and only way to foil the odious 
 Prussian militarism which threatens the liberty 
 of the world. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 Pan-Germany's Strength and Weakness 
 
 In April last, when it was generally believed in 
 Paris that the Revolution at Petrograd made cer- 
 tain the end of German influence over the vast 
 former Empire of the Tsars, I wrote the study 
 referred to on page 81 and reprinted here as 
 Chapters IV and V. 1 I then said, [In Russia] 
 'Where conditions were ripe for idealistic extrem- 
 ists to guide the revolution toward pacifism or 
 anarchy, there are alarming symptoms of the 
 prevalence of the latter condition. The swarm- 
 ing agents of Germany are working there without 
 respite. If their efforts succeed, the strength of 
 Russia will swiftly dissolve. ' 
 
 Unhappily, events have justified this word of 
 caution in only too full measure. The efforts of 
 the Allies to reorganize the forces of Russia have 
 thus far met with small success. It is a task to 
 which their duty and their interests alike make it 
 imperative for them to devote themselves with 
 their utmost strength. But we must cherish no 
 illusions. The rebuilding of the forces of Russia 
 must inevitably be a long, arduous, and doubt- 
 ful undertaking. It is advisable, therefore, to 
 
 'See Atlantic Monthly, June, 1917, p. 721. 
 91 
 
F A N - G E R M A N Y 
 
 consider, at the same time, if there is not some 
 method of making up for the Russian default by 
 bringing into play, to further the victory of the 
 Entente, certain powerful forces which the Allies 
 have not thus far even thought of employing. 
 
 Now, these forces and this method do exist; 
 but in order to enforce clearly their reality, their 
 importance, and the way to make use of them, I 
 must, in the first place, call attention to a funda- 
 mental and enduring error of the Allies, set forth 
 the extraordinary credulity with which they allow 
 themselves to be ensnared in the never-ending in- 
 trigues of Berlin, and describe the principal shifts 
 which Germany employs, with undeniable clever- 
 ness, to annul to an extraordinary degree the effect 
 of the Allies' efforts. These essential causes of 
 mistaken judgment being eliminated, we shall then 
 be able to understand what the existing forces are 
 which will enable the Entente to make up with 
 comparative rapidity for the Russian default, and 
 to contribute with remarkable efficiency to the 
 destruction of Pan-Germany. 
 
 THE FUNDAMENTAL AND ENDURING ERROR OF 
 THE ALLIES 
 
 For three years past events have notoriously 
 proved that the concrete Pangermanist scheme, 
 developed between 1895 and 191 1, has been fol- 
 
 92 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 lowed strictly by the Germans since the outbreak 
 of hostilities. Now, the diplomacy of the Entente 
 is devised as if there were no Pangermanist 
 scheme. 
 
 This is the source of all the vital strategical and 
 diplomatic errors of the Entente — consequences 
 of the failure to understand the German military 
 and political manoeuvring. Here is proof derived 
 from recent events — one of many which it would 
 be possible to allege. 
 
 When it was announced a few weeks ago that 
 Austria would play an apparently preponderating 
 part in the reconstitution of Poland, a very large 
 number of newspapers in the Entente countries 
 decided that ' it is perfectly evident that the Aus- 
 trian policy has carried the day in Poland.' A 
 similar deduction has led Allied readers to believe 
 that Vienna has prevailed over Berlin. The re- 
 sult has been to strengthen the faith of those who 
 deem it possible to impose terms on Berlin through 
 the channel of Vienna, and even to induce Austria 
 to conclude a separate peace. Now, to convey 
 such an impression as this to Allied public opin- 
 ion is to lead it completely astray. If the Haps- 
 burgs are playing an apparently predominant 
 part in Poland it is solely because that part, as we 
 are about to prove, is assigned to them by the 
 Pangermanist scheme. 
 
 In the pamphlet, Pan-Germany and Central 
 Europe about IQ50, published in Berlin in 1895, 
 
 93 
 
P A N - G E R M A N Y 
 
 which contains the whole Pangermanist plan, we 
 find the following : — 
 
 ' Poland and Little Russia [the kingdom to be 
 established at Russia's expense] will agree to have 
 no armies of their own, and will receive in their 
 fortresses German or Austrian garrisons. In Po- 
 land, as well as in Little Russia, the postal and 
 telegraph services and the railways will be in Ger- 
 man hands.' 
 
 For twenty-two years the Pangermanist scheme 
 has been followed up. Tannenberg, in his book, 
 Greater Germany, which appeared in 191 1, — a 
 work whose exceptional importance has been dem- 
 onstrated by events, and which, in all probability, 
 was inspired officially, — prophesies very dis- 
 tinctly, — 
 
 1 The new kingdom of Poland is made up of the 
 former Russian portion, of the basin of the Vistula, 
 a nd of Galieia , a nd forms a part of the new A ustria. ' 
 
 These most unequivocal words appeared, it will 
 be admitted, three years before the war. Now Le 
 Temps of September 7, 191 7, said on the authority 
 of the Polish agency at Berne, which is subsidized 
 by Austria and publishes news communicated to 
 it by the government of Vienna, — 
 
 'Germany would take such portion of Russian 
 Poland as she needs to rectify her "strategic 
 frontiers." This portion would include almost a 
 tenth of Russian Poland. The rest would be an- 
 nexed to Austria. The Emperor Charles would 
 
 94 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 thereupon issue a decree of annexation of Russian 
 Poland to Galicia, under the title of Kingdom of 
 Poland. . . . The dual monarchy would then be- 
 come triple, and the first result of this readjust- 
 ment would be to compel all Poles to undergo mili- 
 tary service in the Austrian armies. All the dep- 
 uties representing Galicia would automatically 
 leave the Austrian Reichsrath, to enter the new 
 Polish Parliament, which would give the German 
 parties in the Austrian Parliament a certain ab- 
 solute majority.' 
 
 This result of the present action of Vienna and 
 Berlin, foreshadowed by the Temps apparently 
 for the near future, has been in view for twenty- 
 two years. In fact, in the fundamental pamphlet 
 of 1895, already quoted, it is said that ' Galicia and 
 the Bukowina will be excluded from the Austrian 
 monarchy. They will form the nucleus of the king- 
 doms of Poland and Little Russia . . . which, how- 
 ever, may be united, by the personal link of the 
 sovereign, to the reigning house of Hapsburg.' 
 
 So it is that, very far from having forced any- 
 thing on Germany in relation to Poland, Charles I 
 of Hapsburg has shown that he submits with do- 
 cility to the Pangermanist decrees, since he gives 
 his entire adhesion to the carrying into effect of 
 the plan followed at Berlin from 1895 to 1914 — 
 for nineteen years before hostilities began! The 
 actual fact, therefore, is the direct antithesis of 
 what the .conclusions of many Allied newspapers 
 
 95 
 
P A N - G ER MA N Y 
 
 have, of course in absolute good faith, permitted 
 their readers to believe. Now everything goes to 
 show that this error arises solely from a technical 
 ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme, of which 
 the guiding spirits of the Entente seem to have no 
 more conception than a considerable portion of 
 the Allied press. However, if they wish for vic- 
 tory, the Allies must inevitably act in systematic 
 opposition to the Pangermanist scheme. They 
 cannot therefore dispense with the necessity of 
 becoming thoroughly familiar with it. 
 
 Nor is there any more reliable guide, since the 
 events that have taken place for three years past 
 have demonstrated the absolute accuracy of the 
 Pangermanist outgivings anterior to the war. 
 Knowing what the Germans are going to do, we 
 can deduce therefrom the best means of opposing 
 it. If this method had been followed, no serious 
 error would have been committed by the Allies. 
 They would have understood that Germany was 
 making war in behalf of the Hamburg-Persian 
 Gulf enterprise, — which was intended to supply 
 her with the instruments of world-domination; 
 that, consequently, the Danube front, which the 
 Allies held, must be retained at whatever cost, 
 which would have been, comparatively speaking, 
 very easy, if they had recognized in time this im- 
 perative necessity. 
 
 Now, if the Allies had retained their hold of the 
 Danube front, the war would have been over 
 
 96 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 nearly two years ago. It is, in fact, solely because 
 they did not grasp the necessity of thus holding it, 
 that the Germans have been able to carry out 
 their Eastern plan and to constitute the Pan- 
 Germany which must now be destroyed in order 
 to avoid the defeat of civilization, and eventual 
 slavery. To effect this destruction is infinitely 
 easier than is generally believed, on the condition 
 that the most is made of the causes tending to the 
 internal dissolution of Pan-Germany. But, to 
 understand these available causes, familiarity 
 with the Pangermanist scheme is indispensable. 
 It is urgently necessary, therefore, to put an end 
 to this intolerable condition, namely, that, while 
 the Allies have an extraordinary opportunity to 
 become accurately acquainted with the whole pro- 
 gramme of procedure at Berlin, as contained in a 
 multitude of German documents, — that is to 
 say, the real objects of Germany in the war, — 
 while they have this opportunity, they go on act- 
 ing and arguing as if that programme did not 
 exist. It is this condition which proves most clear- 
 ly the extraordinary and enduring credulity which 
 the Allies exhibit in face of the endless German 
 intrigues. 
 
 II 
 
 THE CREDULITY OF THE ALLIES 
 
 The heads of the Allied governments, moved 
 by the best intentions but completely taken by 
 
 97 
 
V V 
 
 surprise by the war, are carrying it on far too 
 much in accordance with the ordinary procedure 
 of times of peace negotiations, declarations, 
 speeches* Notably in the gigantic palaver into 
 
 which Maximalist Russia has developed, men 
 
 fancy that they have acted when they have talk- 
 ed. The events of three years oi war prove con- 
 clusively that the Boches, turning to their profit 
 the predilection of the Allied leaders tor verbal 
 negotiations and manifestations. - a predilection 
 complicated by ignorance of the Pangermanist 
 scheme, have succeeded in nullifying to an ex- 
 traordinary degree the effect of the saeritieesof the 
 Entente, 
 I 'mil the Russian Revolution, Berlin brought 
 
 to hear on the diplomacy of the Entente those 
 
 allies of Germany who were then regarded by the 
 Entente as neutrals. Indeed, the declarations of 
 
 Radoslavoff, confirmed by the recently published 
 
 Greek WkiU Book) have conclusively established 
 
 the fact that the agreements between Germany, 
 
 Bulgaria, Turkey, and King Constantine, in etm- 
 
 .'."• v ■• ■•• antedated the opening of 
 
 hostilities - that certain ones of them go back as 
 far as April. 1014. Now. it is known that the En- 
 tente diplomacy had no knowledge of this situa- 
 tion, and that it allowed itself to be hoodwinked 
 for three months by the Turks, for thirteen months 
 by the Bulgarians, for thirty months by the King 
 of Greece, the Kaiser's brother-in-law. and even. 
 
 oS 
 
7 // fi i j I SEA J B /i // D C u i' E 
 to a oertain decree, doWH to a v:r/r'"ni period, 
 
 \>y ( haiics I of Hapsburg, certain Allied diplo 
 
 matintH having persisted in eoddlinj/ fh<: chimera 
 
 oi a peace with Austria against Germany. 
 
 Unhappily, to solve t. > j «■ - present problems, 
 which are, above all, technical, the best intentions, 
 
 or even the most genuine natural intelligent e 
 insufficient. /£ ?i necessary to know how, and one 
 cannot know how without having learned. The 
 AIIi'<'J Socialists who have placed themselves in 
 the spotlight have shown themselve! to be, gen 
 
 erally speaking, utopists, entirely ignorant of 
 
 Germany, of the German mind, of geography, 
 ethnography, and political economy, pinning 
 
 their faith, he-fore- all el/:, tO formula',, and know 
 ing even less than the official diplomat! of die 
 technique of the multifold problems imposed by 
 war and peace. As the anti-Prussian German, 
 
 Or. Roeemeier, ha! ftated it so fairly in the New 
 
 York lime:, these idealists, hy reason of their 
 radical failure to grasp the inflexible facts, are 
 doing as much harm to the world in general as the 
 Russian extremists and their German agents. 
 It is undeniable that Berlin ha! found it i 
 to profit hy the state of mind of the idealistic 
 
 ialists of the Entente by causing its own 
 rial Democrat! to put forth the 'sn-dimnt 'demo- 
 cratic' peaee formulas, v/hich for some months 
 past have been infecting the Allied countries with 
 ideas that are most pernicious because they are 
 
\ C F R \[ A X \ 
 
 of realisation. Depute the efforts of 
 realist Socialists, men like Hekhanoff, ECropot- 
 
 e, Comp&e-Morel, Gompers, and their 
 liko. the Stockholm lure, notwithstanding its clum- 
 siness, has helped powerfully to load Russia to 
 
 the brink of the abyss, and hence to prolong the 
 war and the sacrifices of the Allies. In France 
 and England a tow Socialists have boon so gen- 
 uinely insane as to say that tho occupations of 
 territory by Germany are of slight importance; 
 I we can begin to think about peace; that Ger- 
 many is already oonqw ty, and so forth. 
 
 In view of such results, duo to tho astounding 
 
 : .ulit> of the idealistic Socialists of tho Entente, 
 ir is quite natural that Germany should pursue 
 her so-called 'pacifist' manoeuvres, 
 
 1 ato in 1010. tho Frankfort ^ : .::..:y advised its 
 
 readers of the spirit in which these intrigues were 
 to be conducted by Berlin. ' The point of view 
 is as follows: to put forward precise demands in 
 the Fast, and in the West to negotiate on bases 
 
 \ 
 
 .- s I 
 
 This last sentence summarises the whole of 
 i tactics. All the proposals of Berlin have 
 but a single object : to deceive and sow discord 
 among the Allies by moans of negotiations which 
 would be followed by non-execution of the terms 
 agrei n, Germany retaining the essential 
 
 positions of to-day's war-map which would as- 
 
 too 
 
7 // I: D I I I: A $ E A :: D C V 8 E 
 
 sure her, strategically and economically, the domi- 
 nation of Europe and the world* 
 
 I row, it is an astounding (act that the warnings 
 given by 0/'; Germans themselves the occupa- 
 tion of more than 500,000 /.'jar'; kilo by 
 the Kaiser 7 ! troops, the burglarizing of Austria- 
 Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey by the govern- 
 ment of Berlin - have not yet availed to prevent 
 a considerable proportion of the Allies from con- 
 tinuing to be enormously deceived. At the very 
 moment when the German General Staff is 
 strengthening the fortifications of Belgium, es- 
 pecially about. Antwerp, there are those amc 
 the Allies who seriously believe that, by opening 
 negotiations, they will succeed in inducing Ger- 
 many to evacuate that ill-fated country and to re- 
 pair the immense damage that she has inflicted 
 on her. 
 
 'I here are those who '.vender what the objects 
 
 of the war on Germany's part can be, when the 
 
 occupations of territory by Germany, correspond- 
 ing exactly to the Pangermanist scheme dating 
 back twenty-two years, make these objects as 
 clear as day. 
 
 '1 here are those who attach importance to such 
 declarations as the German Chancellor may 
 
 choose to make, when every day that passes force- 
 US to take note of monumental and never-ending 
 German lies and of the unv/earying duplieity of 
 Berlin, 
 
 101 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 There are those who are willing to listen to 
 talk about a peace by negotiation, when the facts 
 prove that Germany respects no agreement, that 
 a treaty signed by Berlin is of no value, and that, 
 furthermore, it is the Germans themselves who 
 so declare. At the very outbreak of the war Maxi- 
 milian Harden said, 'A single principle counts — 
 Force. ' And the Frankfort Gazette printed these 
 words : ' Law has ceased to exist. Force alone reigns, 
 and we still have forces at our disposal. ' To Mr. 
 Gerard, United States Ambassador to Germany, 
 the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin said, 
 ' We snap our fingers at treaties. ' 
 
 After such facts and such declarations, the 
 persistent credulity of a certain fraction of the 
 Allies is a profoundly distressing thing, for which 
 the remedy must be found in a popular documen- 
 tary propaganda, thoroughly and powerfully pre- 
 pared. 
 
 The pacifist German intrigues are manifest 
 enough. We can particularize six leading exam- 
 ples, employed by Berlin, either separately or in 
 combination. 
 
 Ill 
 
 THE SIX LEADING PACIFIST GERMAN INTRIGUES 
 
 I. A separate peace between Germany and one of 
 the Entente Allies. The Alsace-Lorraine coup 
 
 It is evident that the defection of one of the 
 principal Allies would inevitably place all the 
 
 102 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 others in a situation infinitely more difficult for 
 continuing the struggle. If we assume such a 
 defection, the Germans might well hope to nego- 
 tiate concerning peace on the basis of their pres- 
 ent conquests. 
 
 That is why they have multiplied proposals for 
 a separate peace with the Russians. At Berlin 
 they are especially apprehensive of a continuance 
 of the war by Russia because of the inexhaustible 
 reserves of men possessed by the former Empire of 
 the Tsars. The time will probably come when 
 they will attempt also to lure Italy from the coali- 
 tion by offering her the Trentino, and if necessary, 
 Trieste, at Austria's expense, this last-named ces- 
 sion, however, being destined, in the German plan, 
 to be temporary only. 
 
 The desire to break up the coalition at any 
 cost is so intense among the Germans, that we 
 must anticipate that, at the psychological mo- 
 ment, they will even go so far as to offer to restore 
 Alsace-Lorraine to France. As for the sincerity of 
 such an offer, these words of Maximilian Harden, 
 written early in 1916, enable us to estimate it: — 
 
 'If people think in France that the reestab- 
 lishment of peace is possible only through the 
 restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, and if necessity 
 compels us to sign such a peace, the seventy millions 
 of Germans will soon tear it up. ' 
 
 Moreover, nothing would be less difficult for 
 Germany, thanks to the effective forces of Cen- 
 
 103 
 
P A N -GER MA N Y 
 
 tral Pan-Germany, than to seize Alsace-Lorraine 
 again, very shortly, having given it up momen- 
 tarily as a tactical manoeuvre. 
 
 2. A separate peace between Turkey, Bulgaria, or 
 Austria-Hungary, and the Entente 
 
 A particularly astute manoeuvre on the part of 
 Berlin consists in favoring, under the rose, not 
 perhaps a formally executed separate peace, but, 
 at least (as has already taken place), semi-official 
 negotiations for a separate peace between her 
 own allies named above and the Entente. 
 
 The particular profit of this sort of manoeuvre 
 in relation to the definitive consummation of the 
 Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, is readily seen if 
 we imagine the Allies signing a treaty of peace 
 with Turkey, for instance. In such a hypothesis 
 the Allies could treat only with the liegemen of 
 Berlin at Constantinople, for all the other Turk- 
 ish parties having any political importance what- 
 soever have been suppressed. Now, if the Allies 
 should treat with the Ottoman government, reek- 
 ing with the blood of a million Armenians, Greeks, 
 and Arabs, massacred en masse as anti-Germans 
 and friends of the Entente, the following results 
 would follow from this negotiation: the Entente, 
 agreeing not to punish the unheard-of crimes com- 
 mitted in Turkey, would renounce its moral plat- 
 form : it could no longer claim to be fighting in the 
 name of civilization. The Turkish government, 
 
 104 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 which is notoriously composed of assassins, would 
 be officially recognized; and thus the self-same 
 group of men who sold the Ottoman Empire to 
 Germany would be confirmed in power — the 
 group whose leader, Talaat Pasha, declared in the 
 Ottoman Chamber in February, 191 7, 'We are 
 allied to the Central Powers for life and death!' 
 The control by Germany of the Dardanelles, a 
 strategic position of vast and world-wide impor- 
 tance, guarded by her accomplices, would be con- 
 firmed ; the numerous conventions signed at Ber- 
 lin in January, 1917, which effectively establish 
 the most unrestricted German protectorate over 
 the whole of Turkey, would accomplish their full 
 effect during a Pan-German peace. 
 
 The Bulgarian intrigues for a so-called separate 
 peace with the Allies have been at least as numer- 
 ous as those of the Turks of the same nature. In 
 reality, the Bulgarian agents who were sent to 
 Switzerland to inveigle certain semi-official agents 
 of the Entente into negotiations, were there by 
 arrangement with Berlin for the purpose of sound- 
 ing the Allies ? in order to determine to what de- 
 gree they were weary of the war. The Bulgarians 
 have never been really disposed to conclude peace 
 with the Entente based on compromise upon 
 equitable conditions. They desire a peace which 
 will assure them immense acquisitions of territory 
 at the expense of the Greeks, the Roumanians, 
 and, especially, the Serbians, for at Sofia they 
 
 105 
 
F A N -GERM A V V 
 
 crave, above all things, direct geographical con- 
 tact with Hungary. Thus the great Allied Powers 
 could treat with the Bulgarians only by being 
 
 guilt >• of the monstrous infamy of sacrificing their 
 small Balkan allies, and of assenting to a terri- 
 torial arrangement which would permit Bulgaria 
 to continue to be the Pangermanist bridge be- 
 tween Hungary and Turkey over the dead body 
 of Serbia an indispensable element in the func- 
 tioning of the Hamburg Persian Gulf scheme, 
 and hence of Central Pun-t Germany. 
 
 Now, this is precisely the one substantial re- 
 sult of the war to which Bulgaria clings above all 
 else. So it is that a peace by negotiation — in 
 reality a peace of lassitude -between the Allies 
 and Bulgaria, would simply give sanction to this 
 state of affairs. 
 
 In the same way. such a peace with Austria- 
 Hungary could but give definitive shape to the 
 Hamburg Persian Gulf scheme. From the finan- 
 cial and military standpoint, the monarchy of 
 the Hapsburgs, considered as a state, is to-day 
 absolutely subservient to Germany, The reign- 
 ing Hapsburg, whatever his private sentiments, 
 can no longer do anything without the consent of 
 the Hohenzollern. Any treaty of peace signed by 
 Vienna would be, practically, only a treaty of 
 which the conditions were authorized by Berlin. 
 There must be no illusion. Nothing less than the 
 decisive victory of the Allies will avail to make 
 
 1 06 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Germany loosen her grip upon Austria-Hungary, 
 for that grip is to Germany the substantial result of 
 the war. In truth it is that grip which, by its 
 geographic, military, and economic consequences, 
 assures Berlin the domination of the Balkans, and 
 of the East, hence of Central Pan-Germany, hence 
 of Hamburg-Persian Gulf, and the vast conse- 
 quences which derive therefrom. 
 
 Let us make up our minds, therefore, that all 
 the feelers toward a separate peace with Turkey, 
 Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary, which have been 
 put forth and which will hereafter be put forth, 
 have been and will besimplymano^uvresaimed ata 
 so-called peace by negotiation, which would cloak, 
 not simply a German, but a Pan-German peace. 
 
 3. The democratization of Germany 
 
 Certain Allied groups having apparently made 
 up their minds that the 'democratization ' of Ger- 
 many would suffice to put an end automatically 
 to Prussian militarism and to German imperial- 
 ism, it was concluded at Berlin that a consider- 
 able number, at least, of their adversaries, being 
 weary of the war, might be willing to content 
 themselves with a merely formal satisfaction of 
 their demands, in order to have an ostensibly 
 honorable excuse for bringing it to an end. That 
 is why, with the aim of leading the Allies off the 
 scent and inducing them to enter into negotia- 
 tions, Berlin devoted herself during the first six 
 
 107 
 
r A -V - G E K .1/ A .V Y 
 
 months of 1017, with increasing energy, to the 
 
 farce called 'the democratization of Germany. 1 
 Meanwhile the most bigoted Pangermanists put 
 the mute on their demands. They ceased to Utter 
 the words 'annexations' or 'war-indemnities.' 
 They talked of nothing but 'special political ar- 
 rangements' a phrase which in their minds led 
 to the same result but had the advantage of not 
 embarrassing the peace-at-an\ -price men in the 
 Allied countries. The device of democratization 
 of Germany was complementary to the Stock- 
 holm trick, which, as we know, was intended to 
 convince the Russian Soeialists that Russia had 
 no further advantage to expect from continuing 
 the war, since Germany in her turn, was about to 
 enter in all seriousness upon the path of democ- 
 racy — and so forth. 
 
 We must acknowledge that many among the 
 Allied peoples allowed themselves to be ensnared 
 for the moment by this manoeuvre, and honestly 
 believed that Germany was about to reform, of 
 her own motion and radically. But when the 
 German tactics had achieved the immense result 
 of setting anarchy loose in Russia, — a state of 
 affairs which was instantly made the most of in a 
 military sense by the Stall at Berlin, — the farce 
 of the democratization of Germany was aban- 
 doned. Von Bethmann-Hollweg was sacrificed to 
 the necessity of dropping a scheme which he had 
 managed, and Michaelis — Hindenburg's man, 
 
 10S 
 
T H E D I S EASE AND CURE 
 
 and therefore the man of the Prussian military 
 
 party and of the Pangermanists — succeeded him. 
 
 As a matter of fact, the- Germans have, for all 
 
 time, had such an inveterate penchant for rapine 
 
 that they are quite capable of setting up a great 
 military republic and submitting readily enough 
 to Prussian discipline, with a view to starting 
 afresh upon wars for plunder. 
 
 We must bear this truth constantly in mind: 
 if the Hohenzollerns have succeeded, in accord- 
 ance with Mirabeau's epigram, in making war 
 'the national industry,' it is because, ever since 
 the dawn of history, the Germans have always 
 subordinated everything to their passion for lu- 
 crative wars. The same is true of them to-day. 
 Especially in the last twenty years the secret 
 propaganda of the Berlin government has con- 
 vinced the masses that the creation of Pan-Ger- 
 many will assure them immense material benefits. 
 It is because this conviction is so firmly rooted 
 among them that substantially the entire body 
 of Socialist workingmen are serving their Kaiser 
 without flinching, and are willing to endure the 
 horrors of the present conflict so long as it may 
 be necessary and so long as they are not conquered 
 in the field. 
 
 4. Peace through the International 
 
 This is another of the tricks conceived at Ber- 
 lin. In reality the International, having always 
 
 109 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 followed the direction of the German Marxists, 
 has boon the chief means employed for thirty 
 years to deceive the Socialists of the countries now 
 in alliance against Germany by inducing them 
 to believe that war, thanks to the International 
 alone, could never again break out. In a report 
 on 'the international relations of the German 
 workingmen's unions' (1914), the Imperial Bu- 
 reau of Statistics was able to proclaim as an un- 
 deniable truth: ' In all the international organiza- 
 tions German influence predominates. ' 
 
 The conference at Stockholm, initiated by Ger- 
 man agents, and that at Berne, upon which they 
 are now at work, are steps which German union- 
 ism is taking to reestablish over the workingmen 
 of all lands the German influence, which has van- 
 ished since the war began. The idea now is to 
 force the proletariat of the whole world into sub- 
 jection to the guiding hand of Germany. The ob- 
 ject officially avowed is to rehabilitate the Inter- 
 national in the interest of democracy. In reality, 
 it is proposed, above all else, to replace in the front 
 rank the struggle between classes in the Allied 
 countries, in order to destroy the sacred unity 
 that is indispensable to enable the most divergent 
 parties to wage war vigorously against Panger- 
 manist Germany. As the Berlin government is 
 well aware that it has nothing to fear from its own 
 Socialists, the vast majority of whom, even when 
 they disown the title of Pangermanists, are parti- 
 
 110 
 
7 // E D I S E A S E A N D C r ^ /• 
 
 sans of Central Pan-Germany, the profit of the 
 manoeuvre based on the International would in- 
 ure entirely to Germany, who would retain her 
 power of moral resistance unimpaired, while the 
 Allied states, once more in the grip of the bitterest 
 social discord, would find their offensive powers 
 SO diminished by this means that peace would in 
 the end be negotiated on the basis of the present 
 territorial occupations of Germany. 
 
 5. 77^ armi:tice trick 
 
 All the schemes hitherto discussed, whether 
 employed singly or in combination* are intended, 
 first and last, to assist in playing the armistice 
 trick on the Allies. This is based upon an astute 
 calculation, still founded on the weariness of the 
 combatants, which is so easily understood after 
 a war as exhausting as that now in progress. At 
 Berlin they reason thus — and the reasoning is 
 not without force: ' If an armistice is agreed upon, 
 the Allied troops will say, "They're talking, so 
 peace is coming, and, before long, demobiliza- 
 tion." Under these conditions our adversaries 
 will undergo a relaxation of their moral fibre.' 
 
 The Germans would ask nothing more. They 
 would enter upon peace negotiations with the fol- 
 lowing astute idea. If, hypothetically, the Allies 
 should make the enormous blunder of discussing 
 terms of peace on bases so craftily devised, Ger- 
 many, being still intrenched behind her fronts 
 
 in 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 which had been made almost impregnable, would 
 end by saying, ' I am not in accord with you. After 
 all is said, you cannot demand that I evacuate 
 territory from which you are powerless to expel 
 me. If you are not satisfied, go on with the war.' 
 Inasmuch as, during the negotiations, every- 
 thing essential would have been done by German 
 agents to accentuate the moral relaxation of the 
 country which was most exhausted by the conflict, 
 as they succeeded in doing in Russia in the first 
 months of the Revolution, the immense military 
 machine of the Entente could not again be set in 
 motion in all its parts. The result would be the 
 breaking asunder of the anti-German coalition, 
 and, finally, the conclusion of peace substantially 
 on the basis of existing conquests. Thus Berlin's 
 object would be attained. 
 
 6. The 'status quo ante' trick 
 
 The last of the German schemes, and the most 
 dangerous of all, is that concealed under the for- 
 mula, ' No annexations or indemnities ' — a for- 
 midable trap, which, as I have pointed out in 
 earlier chapters, has for its object to confirm 
 Germany in the possession of the gigantic advan- 
 tages which she has derived from the war, and 
 which would assure her the domination of the 
 world, leaving the Allies with their huge war- 
 losses, whose inevitable economic after-effects 
 would suffice to reduce them to a state of absolute 
 servitude with respect to Berlin. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 The Best Way to Crush Pan-Germany 
 
 i 
 the united states and the vassals of berlin 
 
 In the wholly novel plan which I am about to 
 set forth, the United States may play a prepon- 
 derating and decisive part; but by way of pre- 
 amble I must call attention to the. fact that the 
 United States is not, in my judgment, as I write 
 these lines, in a position to give its full effective 
 assistance in the conflict, because it is not officially 
 and wholeheartedly at war with Austria-Hun- 
 gary, Bulgaria, and Turkey — states in thrall to 
 Berlin and constituent parts of Pan-Germany. 
 This situation is, I am fully convinced, unfavor- 
 able to the interests of the Allies, and it paralyzes 
 American action, for these reasons. 
 
 As a matter of fact, Germany can no longer 
 carry on the war against the Entente save by 
 virtue of the troops and resources which are 
 placed at her disposal by Austria-Hungary, Bul- 
 garia, and Turkey. If the Allies wish to conquer 
 Germany, their chief adversary, it is necessary 
 that they understand that they must first of all 
 deprive Prussian militarism of the support — 
 apparently secondary, but really essential — 
 
 113 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 which it receives from its allied vassals. It is, 
 furthermore, eminently desirable that it should be 
 recognized in the United States that Turkish, 
 Bulgar, Magyar, and Austrian imperialism are 
 bases of Prussian imperialism, and that in order 
 to establish a lasting peace, the disappearance of 
 these secondary imperialisms is as necessary as 
 that of Prussian imperialism itself. Moreover, 
 the fact that Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
 Turkey are not officially at war with the United 
 States enables Berlin to maintain connections in 
 America of which we may be sure that she avails 
 herself to the utmost. 
 
 This situation is propitious also for that Ger- 
 man manoeuvre which consists in making people 
 think that a separate peace is possible between 
 Turkey, or Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary on the 
 one side and the powers of the Entente on the 
 other. However, as the game to be played is com- 
 plicated and difficult, good sense suggests that we 
 proceed from the simple to the complex, and 
 hence that we strike the enemy first of all in his 
 most vulnerable part. Now, as we shall see, it is 
 mainly in the territory of the three vassals of 
 Germany that the new plan which I am about to 
 set forth can be carried out in the first instance, 
 without, however, causing any prejudice — far, 
 far from it, — to the invaluable assistance which 
 the Americans are preparing to bring to the Allies 
 on the Western front. For all these reasons, it 
 
 114 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 seems desirable that American public opinion 
 should admit the imperious necessity of a situation 
 absolutely unequivocal with regard to the govern- 
 ments of Constantinople, Sofia, Vienna, and Bud- 
 apest, which are vassals of Berlin and by that 
 same token substantial pillars of Pan-Germany. 
 
 II 
 
 DESTRUCTION OF PAN-GERMANY BY INTERNAL 
 EXPLOSION 
 
 I believe that I have demonstrated, in earlier 
 chapters of this book that, because of the advan- 
 tages, economic and military, which the existence 
 of Central Pan-Germany guarantees to Germany 
 for both present and future, the essential, vital 
 problem that the Allies have to solve — a problem 
 which sums up all the others — is, how to destroy 
 this Central Pan-Germany. 
 
 It is infinitely easier to destroy than is gener- 
 ally supposed among the Allies, because it con- 
 tains potent sources of dissolution. The Allied 
 leaders seem not to have bestowed upon this situ- 
 ation the extremely careful attention which it de- 
 serves. In any event, down to the present time 
 they have not sought to take advantage of a state 
 of affairs which is eminently favorable to them. 
 
 To understand this situation, and how it may 
 be utilized at once, we must set out from the fol- 
 lowing starting-point. Of about 176,000,000 
 
 115 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 inhabitants of Pan-Germany in 191 7, about 
 73,000,000 Germans, with the backing of only 
 21,000,000 vassals, — Magyars, Bulgars, Turks, 
 — have to-day reduced to slavery the immense 
 number of 82,000,000 allied subjects — Slavs, 
 Latins, or Semites, belonging to thirteen different 
 nationalities, all of whom desire the victory of the 
 Entente, since that alone will assure their libera- 
 tion. In addition, a considerable portion of Ger- 
 many's vassals would, under certain conditions, 
 gladly throw off the yoke of Berlin. 
 
 Among the 176,000,000 people of Pan-Ger- 
 many we distinguish the following three groups. 
 
 Group J. Slaves of the Germans or of their vas- 
 sals capable of immediate action favorable to the 
 Entente — say, 63,000,000, made up as follows: — 
 
 (a) In Turkey, — 
 
 Arabs 8,000,000 
 
 Generally speaking the Arabs detest the Turks. 
 A portion of them have risen in revolt in Arabia, 
 under the leadership of the King of Hedjaz. 
 
 (b) In Central Europe, — 
 Polish-Lithuanians 22,000,000 
 Ruthenians 5,500,000 
 Czechs 8,500,000 
 Jugo-Slavs 1 1 ,000,000 
 Roumanians 8,000,000 
 
 55,000,000 
 116 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 There are, then, in Central Europe alone, 55,- 
 000,000 people determinedly hostile to German- 
 ism, forming an enormous, favorably grouped 
 mass, occupying a vast territory, commanding a 
 part of the German lines of communication, and 
 comparatively far from the fronts where the 
 bulk of the German military forces is. 
 
 Moreover, at the present crisis, these 55,000,- 
 000 human beings, subjected to the most heart- 
 less German and Bulgarian terrorism, are coming 
 to understand better and better that the only 
 means of escape from a ghastly slavery, from 
 which there is no appeal, is to contribute at the 
 earliest possible moment to the victory of the 
 Entente. The insurrectionary commotions that 
 have already taken place in Poland, Bohemia, 
 and Transylvania, prove what a limitless devel- 
 opment these outbreaks might take on if the Allies 
 should do what they ought to do to meet this 
 psychological condition. It is clear that, if these 
 55,000,000 slaves of Central Europe should re- 
 volt in increasing numbers, this result would 
 follow first of all : the default of Russia would be 
 supplied. Indeed, the Germans, being harassed 
 in rear of their Eastern fronts, would be consider- 
 ably impeded in their military operations and in 
 their communications. Under such conditions 
 the attacks of the Allies would have much more 
 chance of success than they have to-day. 
 
 117 
 
PA N-G ERM A N Y 
 
 Group 2. Slaves of the Germans or of their vas- 
 sals, who cannot stir to-day, being too near the 
 military fronts, but whose action might follow 
 that of the first group — nearly 16,000,000, made 
 up as follows: — 
 
 (a) In Turkey, — 
 Ottoman Greeks 2,000,000 
 
 Armenians 1 ,000,000 
 
 3,000,000 
 
 (b) On the Western front, — 
 
 French 3,000,000 
 
 Belgians 7,500,000 
 
 Alsatians and Lorrainers 1 ,500,000 
 
 Italians 800,000 
 
 12,800,000 
 
 Group 3. Vassals of Germany, possible rebels 
 against the yoke of Berlin after the uprising of 
 the first group — about 9,000,000. 
 
 Of 10,000,000 Magyars, there are — a fact not 
 generally known among the Allies — 9,000,000 
 poor agricultural laborers cynically exploited by 
 one million nobles, priests, and officials. These 
 9,000,000 Magyar proletarians are exceedingly 
 desirous of peace. As they did not want the war, 
 they detest those who forced it on them. They 
 would be quite capable of revolting at the last 
 moment against their feudal exploiters, if the 
 
 118 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Allies, estimating accurately the shocking social 
 conditions of these poor Magyars, were able to 
 assure them that the victory of the Entente would 
 put an end to the agiarian and feudal system 
 under which they suffer. 
 
 Is not this a state of affairs eminently favorable 
 to the interests of the Allies? Would not the Ger- 
 mans in our place have turned it to their utmost 
 advantage long ago ? Does not common sense tell 
 us that if, in view of the pressure on their bat- 
 tle fronts, the Allies knew enough to do what is 
 necessary to induce the successive revolts of the 
 three groups whose existence we have pointed out, 
 a potent internal element in the downfall of Pan- 
 Germany would become more and more potent, 
 adding its effects to the efforts which the Allies 
 have confined themselves thus far to putting 
 forth on the extreme outer circumference of Pan- 
 Germany? 
 
 Let us inquire how this assistance of the 88,000,- 
 000 persons confined in Pan-Germany in their 
 own despite can be obtained and made really 
 effective. 
 
 Let us start with an indisputable fact. The 
 immense results which the German propaganda 
 has achieved in barely five months in boundless 
 Russia, with her 182,000,000 inhabitants, where 
 it has brought about, in Siberia as well as in Eu- 
 rope, separatist movements which, for the most 
 part, — I speak of them because I have traveled 
 
 119 
 
P A N -G ER M A N Y 
 
 and studied much in Russia, — would never have 
 taken place but for their artificial agitation, — 
 these results constitute, beyond dispute, a strik- 
 ing demonstration of what the Allies might do if 
 they should exert themselves to act upon races 
 radically anti-Boche, held captive against their 
 will in Pan-Germany. Assuredly, in the matter 
 of propaganda, the Allies are very far from being 
 as well equipped as the Germans and from know- 
 ing how to go about it as they do. But the Ger- 
 mans and their vassals are so profoundly detested 
 by the people whom they are oppressing in Pan- 
 Germany; these people understand so fully that 
 the remnant of their liberty is threatened in the 
 most uncompromising way; they are so clearly 
 aware that they can free themselves from the 
 German-Turkish-Magyar yoke only as a result 
 of this war and of the decisive victory of the En- 
 tente, that they realize more clearly every day 
 that their motto must be, ' Now or never. ' 
 
 Considering this state of mind, so favorable to 
 the Allies, a propaganda on the part of the En- 
 tente, even if prepared with only moderate skill, 
 would speedily obtain very great results. Fur- 
 thermore, the desperate efforts which Austria- 
 Hungary, at the instigation of Berlin and with 
 the backing of the Stockholmists and the Pope, 
 was making to conclude peace before its threat- 
 ening internal explosion, show how precarious 
 German hegemony in Central Europe still is. 
 
 120 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 The Austro-Boches are so afraid of the extension 
 of the local disturbances which have already 
 taken place in Poland and Bohemia, that they 
 have not yet dared to repress them root and 
 branch. Those wretches, to fortify themselves 
 against these anti-German popular commotions, 
 resort to famine. At the present moment, not- 
 ably in the Jugo-Slav districts and in Bohemia, 
 the Austro-Germans are removing the greatest 
 possible quantity of provisions in order to hold 
 the people in check by hunger. But this hateful 
 expedient itself combines with all the rest to con- 
 vince these martyrized peoples of the urgent ne- 
 cessity of rising in revolt if they prefer not to be 
 half annihilated like the Serbs. 
 
 To make sure of the constant spread and cer- 
 tain effectiveness of the latent troubles of the 
 oppressed Slavs and Latins of Central Europe, 
 there is need on the part of the Allies, first of moral 
 suasion, then of material assistance. 
 
 To understand the necessity and the usefulness 
 of the first, it must be said that, despite all the 
 precautions taken by the Austro-Boche authori- 
 ties, the declarations of the Entente in behalf of 
 the oppressed peoples of Central Europe become 
 known to these latter comparatively soon, and 
 that these declarations help greatly to sustain 
 their morale. For example, President Wilson's 
 message of January 22, 19 17, in which he urged 
 the independence and unification of Poland, and 
 
 121 
 
PA N -G ERM A N Y 
 
 his ' Flag Day' speech, on June 15, in which he set 
 forth the great and intolerable peril of the Ham- 
 burg-Persian Gulf scheme, manifestly strength- 
 ened the determination of the Poles, the Czechs, 
 and the Jugo-Slavs to free themselves at whatever 
 cost from the fatal yoke of Vienna and Berlin. 
 In addition, the constantly increasing power of 
 the aeroplane enables the Allies to spread impor- 
 tant communications broadcast over enemy terri- 
 tory. 
 
 First of all, it is essential that the three races 
 which, by reason of their geographical situation 
 and their ethnographical characteristics are in- 
 dispensable in any reconstitution of Central Eu- 
 rope based on the principle of nationalities, and 
 who consequently have a leading part to play in 
 the centre of the Pan-Germany of to-day, should 
 be, one and all, absolutely convinced that the vic- 
 tory of the Entente will make certain their com- 
 plete independence. The Poles have received 
 this assurance on divers occasions, notably from 
 President Wilson, and very recently from M. 
 Ribot, commemorating in a dispatch to the 
 Polish Congress at Moscow 'the reconstitution 
 of the independence and unity of all the Polish 
 territories to the shores of the Baltic. ' But the 
 11,000,000 Jugo-Slavs and the 8,500,000 Czechs 
 have not yet received from the leaders of the En- 
 tente sufficiently explicit and repeated assurances. 
 
 There are two reasons why this is so. In the 
 122 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 first place, the absolutely chimerical hope of 
 separating Austria-Hungary from Germany has 
 obsessed, down to a very recent date, certain 
 exalted personages of the Entente, who, having 
 never had an opportunity to study on the spot 
 the latest developments in Austria, still believe 
 in the old classic formula, ' If Austria did not ex- 
 ist, we should have to create it. ' In the second 
 place, certain other personages of the Entente in- 
 cline to the belief that, in order to obtain a swift 
 victory, the problem of Central Europe is a prob- 
 lem to be avoided. Now, as to this point, the few 
 men who unquestionably know Austria well — 
 for example, the Frenchmen Louis Leger, Ernest 
 Denis, M. Haumant, Auguste Gauvain, and 
 others, and the Englishmen, Sir Arthur Evans, 
 Seton- Watson, Wickham Steed, and others — 
 are unanimous in being as completely convinced 
 as I myself am that the breaking-up of the mon- 
 archy of the Hapsburgs is indispensable to the es- 
 tablishment of a lasting peace — and further- 
 more, such a breaking-up as a result of the revolt 
 of the oppressed peoples is one of the most power- 
 ful instruments in the hands of the Entente to 
 bring the war to a victorious close. 
 
 In fact, there are certain quasi-mechanical 
 laws which should guide in the reconstruction of 
 a Europe that can endure. Now, without a free 
 Bohemia and Jugo-Slavia it is impossible — im- 
 possible, I insist — that Poland should be really 
 
 123 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 free, that Serbia and Roumania should be re- 
 stored, that Russia should be released from the 
 grip of Germany, that Alsace-Lorraine should 
 be restored permanently to France, that Italy 
 should be protected from German domination in 
 the Adriatic, in the Balkans, and in Turkey, that 
 the United States should be warranted against 
 the world-wide results of the Hamburg-Persian 
 Gulf enterprise. Bohemia is the central point of 
 the whole. With its circle of mountains, it is the 
 indispensable keystone of the European edifice, 
 rebuilt upon the basis of the principle of nation- 
 alities. Whosoever is master of Bohemia is mas- 
 ter of Europe. It must be, therefore, that liberty 
 shall be master of Bohemia. 
 
 On the other hand, it is undeniable that the 
 successive uprisings of 8,500,000 Czechs and 
 11,000,000 J ugo-Slavs, taking place concurrently 
 with that of 22,000,000 Poles, is absolutely in line 
 with the present military interests of the En- 
 tente. Therefore, for the Allies to assume an at- 
 titude of reserve toward the Czechs and Jugo- 
 slavs is as contrary to the democratic principles 
 they invoke as to their most urgent strategic in- 
 terests. But this mistake has been frequently 
 made, solely because the exceptional importance 
 of Bohemia has not yet been fully grasped. Mr. 
 Asquith, in his speech of September 26 last, 
 furnishes an example of this regrettable reserve 
 with respect to the Czechs — a reserve which is 
 
 124 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 diminishing, no doubt, but which still exists. He 
 said : — 
 
 ' If we turn to Central and Eastern Europe, we 
 see purely artificial territorial arrangements, 
 which are repugnant to the wishes and interests of 
 the populations directly concerned, and which, 
 so long as they remain unchanged, will constitute 
 a field fertile in new wars. There are, first, the 
 claims of Roumania and Italy, so long overdue; 
 there is heroic Serbia, which not only must be re- 
 stored to her home, but which is entitled to more 
 room in which to expand nationally ; and there is 
 Poland. The position of Greece and the South 
 Slavs must not be forgotten.' 
 
 Thus, while Mr. Asquith manifests the best in- 
 tentions toward the oppressed peoples of Central 
 Europe, he does not even mention the Czechs, 
 that is, Bohemia. Now, in reality, all the prom- 
 ises that the Entente can make concerning Po- 
 land, Serbia, Roumania, and Italy, are not cap- 
 able of lasting fulfillment unless Bohemia is set 
 free, for Bohemia dominates all Central Europe. 
 Furthermore, Mr. Asquith's silence as to the fate 
 of Bohemia may be a legitimate cause of uneasi- 
 ness to the Czechs, who are now doing the im- 
 possible to contend with Germanism, despite the 
 shocking terrorism which lies so heavy upon them. 
 So we may say, that Mr. Asquith would have serv- 
 ed the interest of the Entente more effectively if 
 he had emphatically named Bohemia and the 
 
 125 
 
/' A N - G B R M A N Y 
 
 Czechs who are so much in need of being sup- 
 ported and encouraged by the Allies, whom they 
 regard as their liberators. 
 
 The misconceptions that have led to the ignor- 
 ing of the claims of the Central European Slavs, 
 and of their extreme importance in the solution 
 of the war-problem, will soon prove themselves 
 an even heavier load to carry than those commit- 
 ted in Bulgaria and Greece. To put an end to 
 these vagaries, it is necessary that henceforth 
 the leaders of the Entente should earnestly en- 
 courage, at least the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo- 
 slavs — that is to say, about 42.000.000 slaves oi 
 Berlin in Central Europe. The encouragement of 
 these peoples as a single body is indispensable, for, 
 although the Bodies are able to control the local 
 and, so to say, individual insurrectionary move- 
 ments, on the contrary, because of the vast area 
 which a general insurrection oi the 4j.000.000 
 would involve, its repression by the Atistro- 
 Boches would be practically impossible. The ex- 
 ample of a successful general uprising would cer- 
 tainly induce a similar movement by the balance 
 of the 88. 000. 000 human beings who are vitally 
 interested in the destruction of Pan-Germany. 
 To bring about this result, then, the first essential 
 thing to be done is for the leaders of the Entente 
 to put forth a most unequivocal declaration, giv- 
 ing the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs assurance 
 that the victory of the Entente will make certain 
 
 126 
 
7 // I: I) I S E A S E AND C U R E 
 
 their complete liberation. It. is impossible to 
 
 what, there is to hinder such a declaration. Its 
 effects would soon be discerned if it were enthi 
 
 astically supported by the Allied press and by the 
 Allied Socialists, who, let us hope-, will finally 
 realize that, while it is impossible to bring about 
 a revolution against Prussian militarism in Ger- 
 many, it can very easily be effected in Austria- 
 Hungary. 
 
 But, some one will say, a revolution is not pos- 
 sible without material resources. Naturally, I 
 shall discuss this point only so far as the interests 
 of the Entente will allow rne to do it publicly. 
 In the first place I will call attention to the fact 
 that, by reason of the immensity of the territory 
 they occupy, simple passive resistance on the 
 part of the oppressed races of Central Europe, 
 provided that it is offered in concert and accom- 
 panied by certain essays in the way of sabotage 
 and strikes, which are easy enough to practice 
 without any outside assistance, would create al- 
 most inextricable difficulties for the Austro-Ger- 
 mans. 
 
 But there is something much better to be done. 
 At first sight, it seems very difficult for the Allies 
 to bear effective material aid to the oppressed peo- 
 ples of Pan-Germany, because they are surround- 
 ed by impregnable military lines. In fact, by com- 
 bining the results of the tremendous development 
 of the aviation branch made possible by the ad- 
 
 127 
 
P A N - G E R M A N Y 
 
 hesion of the United States, with certain technical 
 resources which are available, the Entente can, 
 comparatively quickly and easily, supply the 
 Poles and the rest with material assistance which 
 would prove extraordinarily efficacious. 
 
 I am not writing carelessly. I have studied for 
 twenty years these down -trodden races and the 
 countries in which they live. I know about the 
 material resources to which I refer. If I do not 
 describe them more explicitly, it is because no 
 one has yet thought of employing them, and in 
 such matters silence is a bounden duty. But I 
 am, of course, at the disposition of the American 
 authorities if they should wish to know about the 
 resources in question, and to study them seriously. 
 I am absolutely convinced that, if employed 
 with due method, determinedly, and scientifically, 
 in accordance with a special technique, these re- 
 sources, after a comparatively simple prepara- 
 tion, — much less in any event than those which 
 have been made in other enterprises, — would 
 lead to very important results which would contri- 
 bute materially to the final decision. 1 
 
 1 To the editor, M. Cheradame has written with less reserve on 
 this vital subject; but it seems best to put in print at this time no 
 more than the suggestion indicated. — The Editor of the Atlantic 
 
 Monthly. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Political Strategy 
 
 Germany is, to all intent, mistress of Central 
 Europe and the Balkans, of Turkey, and of 
 Russia. As I write these lines (in December, 
 1917), the last part of the German scheme which 
 I set forth in the June Atlantic^ is in preparation. 
 All the disposable forces of Pan-Germany are 
 concentrating on the Western front. If such a 
 state of affairs is possible when the Entente has 
 an abundance of admirable troops and boundless 
 resources, it is because, as Mr. Lloyd George 
 declared in his speech of November 12, with his 
 wonted and most salutary frankness, after more 
 than three years of war the Entente has no strate- 
 gic plan. What is the cause of this unfortunate 
 condition? That is what it is most important to 
 ascertain first of all, for the Allies cannot think 
 seriously of winning a decisive victory unless the 
 problem of the strategy which is an indispensable 
 necessity of their position is stated in such terms 
 that it can readily be solved. But it has not 
 yet been so stated. To be sure, Mr. Lloyd George 
 dwelt upon the extreme gravity of the situation, 
 but, despite the fact that he is certainly the most 
 
 1 See Chapter v, .supra. 
 
 129 
 
PA N -G ER MA N Y 
 
 keen-sighted of the leaders of the Entente in 
 Europe, he did not point out definitely the posi- 
 tive remedies capable of putting an end to a state 
 of affairs which is intolerable because it is infi- 
 nitely dangerous. 
 
 The reason for this absence of concrete sugges- 
 tions on Mr. Lloyd George's part is that, notwith- 
 standing his great natural intelligence, he too is 
 subject to that profound failure of insight in re- 
 spect to the conduct of the war which has befallen 
 all the leading men of the Entente without excep- 
 tion. This failure, which is wholly independent 
 of their will, is due mainly to the fact that the 
 present leaders of the Entente, having one and all 
 been firmly convinced that the war would never 
 take place, had not trained themselves intellec- 
 tually to carry it on when it should break out. 
 
 Moreover, for we must set things down as they 
 are, the majority of these leaders of the Entente 
 knew the political geography of Europe only in 
 the most superficial way. As for the ethno- 
 graphic detail which plays in this war a funda- 
 mental part that is still far from being under- 
 stood, they know absolutely nothing about it. It 
 is the same with the practical political economy 
 of Central Europe, of the Balkans, and of Tur- 
 key, and with their national psychology. Now, 
 these sciences — geography, ethnography, politi- 
 cal economy, and national psychology — are abso- 
 lutely indispensable to the wise conduct of the 
 
 130 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 war; and they do not teach themselves. It is 
 altogether impossible to become familiar with 
 them without hard work, long continued. That 
 is why, even assuming that all the guiding spirits 
 of the Entente are endowed with innate genius, it 
 is absolutely impossible for them, held fast as 
 they are at every moment by the daily, always 
 urgent, demands of a war which took them en- 
 tirely by surprise and in which they had to impro- 
 vise everything, to acquire during the conflict that 
 intellectual preparation without which the war 
 cannot be effectively carried on. 
 
 Strictly speaking, it is possible, by spending 
 enough money, to extemporize in two or three 
 years a supply of war material, and armies in the 
 shape of soldiers and regiments, whereas these 
 same operations would require half a score of 
 years in time of peace; but all the gold on earth is 
 powerless to implant swiftly in any man's brain, 
 however well endowed he may be, the enormous 
 mass of positive knowledge which alone will en- 
 able him to evolve the guiding ideas which are 
 indispensable for the conduct of a war so complex 
 as this. Such knowledge and such ideas cannot 
 spring to life spontaneously in a human brain; 
 they cannot make their way into it, and arrange 
 themselves there in the logical order of their rela- 
 tive importance, except as the result of a mental 
 training which demands, not only a native intelli- 
 gence, but an enormous amount of time. 
 
 131 
 
PA N -GERM A N Y 
 
 To acquire these essentials William II and his 
 collaborators, despite the vast resources at their 
 disposal, had to work a full quarter of a century. 
 Now, not one of the leaders of the Entente had 
 received, even in the most rudimentary form, 
 down to twenty-five days before the war, the spe- 
 cial kind of intellectual training without which it is 
 impossible to direct effectively the conduct of this 
 war, which resembles no other war in history be- 
 cause of the vast scope which the Germans have 
 given to it and the endlessly varied methods 
 which they are employing in carrying it on. 
 
 These reasons, then, furnish a simple explana- 
 tion of the fact that, although all the leaders of 
 the Entente have at last agreed to form an Allied 
 Staff, in order to unify the conduct of the war, no 
 one of them is able to say how this staff should be 
 constituted to meet the special necessities of the 
 conflict. Doubtless they understand perfectly — 
 as indeed the great mass of the public understands 
 — that this is not simply a military war, but a 
 political one as well. But this idea of the connec- 
 tion between the war and politics is still extremely 
 vague and confused. Consequently, then, it is 
 essential, first of all, to give it a definite form. 
 
 132 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE WAR 
 
 The first cause of the errors of the Allies in their 
 conduct of the war is their failure thus far to 
 understand clearly its predominant characteristic. 
 Some say, 'This is a war of effectives.' Now the 
 Allies have had for three years an overwhelming 
 superiority in effectives. They have had entire 
 liberty in arming them and making use of them, 
 and yet they are not victorious. 
 
 Others of the Allies declare, 'This is a war of 
 materiel.' Another mistaken idea. In the third 
 year of the war the Allies, as a whole, certainly 
 had more materiel at their disposition than their 
 adversaries. Now if, in the second half of 191 7, 
 the Russians have given way; if the Italians have 
 allowed their Friuli front to be pierced, it is be- 
 cause they elected not to avail themselves of the 
 materiel on hand. In these instances, then, it is 
 very clear that the moral factor far surpassed the 
 material factor. 
 
 Lastly, others of the Allies declare that ' This is a 
 war of credit. When Germany is ruined, she will 
 go to pieces all in a moment.' These men do not 
 understand that, although Germany's external 
 credit is beyond question sorely shaken by the 
 stoppage of her exports, on the other hand, her 
 internal credit is constantly augmented by the 
 enormous profits which the war enables her to 
 
 133 
 
/' .1 X-G E R MA N Y 
 
 realize. 1 Now this internal credit is based upon 
 actualities so evident that it will permit the Berlin 
 government to negotiate all the internal loans it 
 may desire, to support the burden of the war as 
 long as is necessary. If the character of the war 
 is not yet understood, it is because it has been 
 shaped in every detail by the Germans them- 
 selves, who, having embarked upon it with a con- 
 crete end in view, have long been studying the 
 question by what endlessly diversified means they 
 might attain that end. It is their employment of 
 these means which gives to the war its wholly 
 unique character. 
 
 The Berlin government entered into this war 
 in order to obtain by conquest the instruments of 
 universal domination. As this was a far-reaching 
 object, the Germans devoted themselves for a 
 quarter of a century to studying all the military, 
 naval, geographic, ethnographic, economic, and 
 national-psychologic problems of the whole world, 
 and especially of Europe. This preparation - 
 profoundly scientific, we must admit — for the 
 gigantic Bangermanist scheme, led the Germans 
 to make a most thorough investigation, not only 
 of everything relating to the army and navy, but 
 also of four political sciences — geography, eth- 
 nology, political economy, and national psychol- 
 ogy. These four sciences are known, outside of 
 Germany, only in the theoretical or rudimentary 
 'Sec Chapters i and n. supra. 
 
 134 
 
/• // E l) I S E A S E AND C V R E 
 
 stag's whereas the Germans have carried their 
 Study of them so far, that they derive from them 
 immense practical powers which have a constant 
 and far-reaching influence on the whole evolution 
 of the war. 
 
 The Allied leaders do not even suspect the 
 extreme importance of these factors — for two 
 reasons. In the first place, not one of them has 
 made a sufficient study of the four political sci- 
 ences in their application to Central and Eastern 
 Europe to realize f he extraordinary efficacy of the 
 intensive u-,c thai the Germans are making of 
 them. Secondly, while the powers derived from 
 the political sciences are immense, and as real as 
 the X-rays, like those rays they are invisible 
 
 The constant use of the political sciences, in 
 enormous doses, made by the Germans in their 
 corfduct of the war, has this result: that the utili- 
 zation of the military art alone:, even when most 
 highly perfected from a material standpoint, is 
 absolutely insufficient to ensure victory to the 
 Allies. It is because of their failure to under- 
 stand this that, notwithstanding their boundless 
 resources, they have condemned themselves to 
 the most unremitting, the most cruel, the most. 
 heart-rending disappointments. As a matter of 
 fact, this war not only is not solely a military 
 and naval war — it is, in addition, a geographical 
 war, an ethnographical war, an economic war, 
 a war of national psychology. To define its 
 
 135 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 endlessly complex character by a brief phrase 
 which includes all these factors, we may say that 
 it is a war of political sciences. 
 
 A few examples derived from actual events 
 will prove that this is not a matter of words alone, 
 but that the utilization of the political sciences is 
 an absolute necessity for the Allies. 
 
 Down to the present time the swift invasion 
 of Roumania — October-November, 1916 — has 
 been regarded as a triumph of the German heavy 
 artillery. But, while the action of the heavy ar- 
 tillery in forcing the Dobrudja and the passes of 
 the Carpathians was the great physical fact, man- 
 ifest to all, which determined the German victory, 
 the effective use of the heavy guns was possible 
 only because, long before the military movement 
 was begun, the ground had been prepared for the 
 invasion of Roumania, by the Staff at Berlin, with 
 the aid of a practical application of the political 
 sciences. 
 
 Geographical preparation. In March, 1916, it 
 was known that a system of espionage had been 
 organized in the Roumanian Dobrudja by Ger- 
 mans who alleged archaeological explorations as a 
 pretext for their travels. The very precise in- 
 formation thus acquired by the Staff at Berlin 
 was quite indispensable to it. In fact, the Rou- 
 manian Dobrudja is a swampy region of a very 
 peculiar nature, altogether impassable under or- 
 dinary conditions by the immense and heavy 
 
 136 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 materiel of modern armies. To move quickly 
 through such a country, it was necessary to look 
 ahead — to construct months beforehand, and 
 have in readiness for use on the Bulgarian fron- 
 tier, innumerable small bridges to be thrown 
 across the streams, and enormous supplies of mov- 
 able floors to be used in building, on the unstable 
 soil, artificial roads practicable for motor caissons 
 and the tractors of the heavy artillery. 
 
 It was the turning to account of the minute de- 
 tails of the geographical information in the hands 
 of the Germans, operating long before the inva- 
 sion, which enabled her Staff to realize precisely 
 the nature and amount of the special materiel 
 which it was necessary to manufacture and to get 
 together long before the offensive, in order to 
 ensure, when it should be launched, a rapid for- 
 ward movement of the troops at the predeter- 
 mined points. 
 
 Ethnographical preparation. In the Dobrudja 
 there were Bulgarians and Turks as well as Rou- 
 manians. Side by side with the geographical 
 study went the ethnographical research, which 
 made it possible to arrange systematically for a 
 general uprising of these Pro-German elements — 
 a movement which was considerably facilitated 
 by the rapidity of the German invasion. 
 
 Economic preparation. Early in October, 1916, 
 before the movement was begun, a number of 
 merchants, experts in cattle and cereals, and cer- 
 
 137 
 
S G IRM I N V 
 
 tain specialists in political economy, assembled 
 
 behind Falkenha\ n's front, and were thus all 
 
 ready to exploit Roumania after the invasion. 
 
 Therefore the overthrow of Roumania by 
 means of military operations, advance of the 
 Kaiser's troops and effective employment of 
 heavy artillery, which alone were regarded by 
 Allied public opinion as having had a decisive 
 effect, was long anticipated by the geographical, 
 ethnographical, and economic preparation for the 
 military invasion, which was simply a conse- 
 quence of that preparation. In fact, when one is 
 familiar with the swampy character of the IV- 
 brudja, one can but be satisfied that, without 
 careful forethought for the geographical obstacles 
 and without preparing the means to overcome 
 them, the rapid advance of Falkenhayn's heavy 
 artillery an inescapable condition of military 
 success after the offensive was started would 
 have been impossible. On the other hand, it was 
 dtie to the previously arranged scheme for the 
 economic exploitation of the country that the 
 German troops were able to obtain their supplies 
 on Roumanian soil and thus to force the Russo- 
 
 Roumanian troops back without loss of lime. 
 
 Now. this rapidity of movement was an essential 
 
 condition oi the military success. It is perfectly 
 certain, therefore, in the case we are considering, 
 that the military success of the Germans, which 
 was apparent to all eyes, was achieved only by 
 
7 // E D J S E A S E A .7 l) C U R I: 
 
 virtue of the previous employment of three ex- 
 tremely powerful invisible forces, derived from 
 the practical application of geography, ethnog- 
 raphy, and political economy — redoubtable 
 
 forces of which i he Allies have as yet made no use- 
 in any of thr-ir operations. 
 
 Utilization of national psychology. The recent 
 occurrences in Russia and Jtaly will enable me 
 to demonstrate the even more tremendous power 
 of still another political science — national psy- 
 chology. 
 
 The extraordinary disruption of Russia by 
 Germany, which entails such threatening conse- 
 quences for the whole world, was brought about, 
 not 'by force of arms, but by means of a moral 
 propaganda carried on by speech or in print, 
 i he reason that this manoeuvre has produced such 
 tremendous results is that it was based upon 
 exact data supplied by national psychology — a 
 political science of which the Allies seem not even 
 to -uspr-r 1 the existence. It was by favor of this 
 science, no less subtle than powerful, founded on 
 minute observations, that the Germans were able 
 to exploit unerringly the extraordinary ignorance 
 of actualities of the Russian Socialists, their im- 
 measurable pride, and the artlessness, even the 
 very genuine evangelical spirit, of the Russian 
 people, which lead them naturally to forget 
 affronts, and, lastly, the particularist tendencies 
 of certain Russian nationalities, which the fioche 
 
 139 
 
PA N -GERM A N Y 
 
 propaganda has transformed into separatist 
 movements to be immediately carried out. Thus 
 the moral, and even the material, dissolution of 
 the vast Russian ex-Empire of one hundred and 
 eighty millions of people was made possible in a 
 few months by the application of the science of 
 national psychology. 
 
 Now, although this force is invisible, it is un- 
 questionably far greater than the most stupen- 
 dous military force imaginable, since its knowledge 
 of the national psychology of the mixed peoples 
 of Russia enabled the Berlin government to ob- 
 tain a result which could never have been ob- 
 tained by millions of German troops using the 
 most highly perfected weapons and the most ter- 
 rifying explosives of the present day in greatest 
 profusion. 
 
 Again, it was this same gigantic force, national 
 psychology, which enabled the Boches to manu- 
 facture systematically the 'defeatist' frame of 
 mind, by virtue of which they were able to break 
 through the Italian front at Friuli, which they 
 would probably never have succeeded in doing if 
 they had had to carry by sheer assault the exceed- 
 ingly strong mountain positions held by the 
 Italians. 
 
 140 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 II 
 
 POLITICAL STRATEGY AND THE THREE PHASES OF 
 THE WAR 
 
 The utilization of these invisible forces by 
 the Germans has varied in accordance with the 
 changing phases of the war. 
 
 One can distinguish three very clearly marked 
 phases in their conduct of the war. By studying 
 them, we can appreciate how the Grand General 
 Staff at Berlin has unvaryingly pursued the same 
 end — the fulfillment of the Pangermanist plan of 
 1895-1911 — with the assistance of widely dif- 
 ferent methods, which, taken as a whole, consti- 
 tute the 'strategy of political sciences,' which 
 necessarily coordinates with the ' war of political 
 sciences.' 
 
 First phase — from August 1 , to the early days 
 of October, 1914; about two months. 
 
 The Staff at Berlin plunged into war confident 
 of a speedy triumph by means of a whirlwind 
 campaign in two acts: first, utter defeat of France 
 in five or six weeks, following an initial blow of 
 formidable and unparalleled intensity; second, a 
 powerful blow against Russia, which would cer- 
 tainly be incapable of resisting single-handed the 
 German armies which had just triumphed over 
 France. 
 
 If this scheme could have been carried out, 
 Germany, after a contest of about three months, 
 
 141 
 
PA N -G ERM A N Y 
 
 would have been mistress of the whole of Europe. 
 In that case no Balkan campaign would have 
 been necessary. Serbia and Roumania would 
 have had no other choice than to submit on the 
 most severe conditions. As for Austria-Hungary, 
 Bulgaria, and Turkey, by the force of events they 
 would have fallen under the absolute hegemony 
 of Berlin. As a result of this new state of affairs 
 Pan-Germany would have been constituted with- 
 out visible effort, — automatically as it were, — 
 thus assuring Prussianism of the domination of 
 the rest of the world. 
 
 But the calculations of the German Grand 
 General Staff were upset by events not only un- 
 foreseen but coincident : the invasion of East Prus- 
 sia by the Russians, the resistance of Belgium, 
 the intervention of Great Britain, the much 
 greater consumption of munitions than had been 
 anticipated, and, finally, by the victory of the 
 Marne, which was in large measure the conse- 
 quence of all these facts. During this first phase, 
 marked throughout by violence carried to the 
 point of frenzy, the German strategy was purely 
 military — the strategy of political sciences had 
 not yet appeared. 
 
 Second phase — from October, 19 14, to Decem- 
 ber, 191 7; about thirty-eight months. 
 
 At the beginning of October, 19 14, William 
 IPs Grand Staff found itself constrained to aban- 
 don the idea of carrying through the Pangerman- 
 
 142 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 ist scheme by means of the whirlwind campaign 
 which it had prepared. It was obliged therefore 
 to plan to attain its object by means of a long war. 
 It resigned itself the more readily to this necessity 
 because it knew that it was infinitely better sup- 
 plied than the Allies with material to bring about 
 the essential moral and physical conditions — 
 various and complicated as they are — of a long- 
 drawn struggle. 
 
 Furthermore, on the morrow of the battle of 
 theJMarne, the Staff had been in a position to 
 appreciate the extraordinary defensive power of 
 strongly fortified continuous points, consisting of 
 deep trenches protected by barbed-wire entangle- 
 ments; a defensive system the technique of 
 which it had studied exhaustively since the 
 Russo-Japanese War (1904- 1905), whereas it 
 was wholly unknown to the French and British. 
 For these reasons, from the battle of the Marne 
 (October, 19 14) down to the end of the first phase 
 of the offensive against Italy, that is, to Decem- 
 ber, 191 7, a period of thirty-eight months, the 
 whole tactics of Berlin has been directed to the 
 object of carrying out a programme composed of 
 the following elements: — 
 
 1. To organize an immovable defensive on the 
 Western front, while pretending now and then to 
 attempt a genuine attack. 
 
 2. To carry out without pause a series of circu- 
 lar offensives against Russia, Serbia, and Rou- 
 
 143 
 
F A X -G ER M .1 V Y 
 
 mania, in order to seize one after another the ter- 
 ritories of those states, which are essential to the 
 constitution of Central Pan-Germany according 
 to the plan of 1805. 
 
 3. To take advantage of these successive offen- 
 sives on the Eastern fronts in order to strike at the 
 very vitals of Germany's allies, properly so-called : 
 that is to say, under color of helping Austria-Hun- 
 gary, Bulgaria, and Turkey to defend themselves 
 against Russia, Serbia, and Roumania. to organize 
 those three countries militarily and economically 
 to the precise degree and in the precise form nec- 
 essary to bring it about that even, at need, with- 
 out changing their ancient names and the frontiers 
 of 1014. they should contribute to practical pur- 
 pose, and almost without suspecting it, to the 
 constitution of Central Pan-Germany. The plan 
 of [895 assigned to Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, 
 and Turkey an essential and indispensable part 
 to play in its execution. 
 
 Let us, first of all. prove, with the aid of a docu- 
 ment of unquestionable authenticity twenty-two 
 years old, that this was actually the plan of the 
 Berlin Staff. 
 
 The Pangermanist plan of 1805. which Is that 
 of Central Pan-Germany, the formation of which 
 is the first condition of carrying out all the other 
 Pangermanist plans, is set forth in detail in a 
 pamphlet published at Berlin in 1805. with a 
 colored map, under the title. Greater Germany and 
 
 144 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Central Enroth' about 1950. The extraordinary 
 importance of this pamphlet is no longer open to 
 question, for these three reasons. First: from 
 1895 on it was spread broadcast among the Ger- 
 man masses by the Pangermanist League (All- 
 deutsche Verband), whose action after that time 
 in making war inevitable was as deplorable as it 
 was persistent and notorious. Second : every- 
 thing points to the probability that this action of 
 the Pangermanist League toward executing a 
 concrete scheme of annexations was secretly but 
 very definitely agreed upon with the Berlin 
 Grand Staff. Third: the force of this assump- 
 tion is peremptorily proved by the fact that the 
 German Grand Staff, from the beginning of the 
 second phase of the war, has carried it on in a way 
 exactly in accord with the political Pangermanist 
 plan set forth in the pamphlet of 18Q5. 
 
 In very truth, after an interval of a score of 
 years, coincidences so perfect as these between 
 plans and their execution assuredly cannot be 
 fortuitous. The verification of what I say is sup- 
 plied by the map printed on page 146, a repro- 
 duction of the map of the pamphlet of 1895, on 
 which 1 have had the colors represented by lines 
 and have shown the German front as it was at 
 the end of 191 7. Now, it will be noticed that the 
 German armies have stopped a little beyond the 
 lines marking the future frontiers of Central Pan- 
 Germany, or in the positions that are necessary 
 
 145 
 
Map Printed in ' Greater Germany and Central Europe 
 about 1950 ' (1895) 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 to make sure the creation of the satellite states of 
 Pan-Germany to the eastward. Thus, on the 
 Eastern front, they have stopped on lines laid 
 down beforehand, even when they had before 
 them no Russian troops capable of opposing their 
 further advance. Our map also enables us to 
 declare on the most irrefutable testimony that the 
 offensive against Italy — that is to say, first of 
 a!4-, the seizure of Italian Friuli, which was such a 
 surprise to the Allied Staffs — was provided for 
 most definitely in the plan of 1895. In fact, on 
 our map Italian Friuli is plainly included in Pan- 
 Germany, and in the text of the pamphlet, pub- 
 lished in Berlin twenty-two years ago, is a passage 
 on the rectification of frontiers between Italy and 
 Austria which the Pangermanists had already 
 determined to be indispensable. On page 19 we 
 read as follows: — 
 
 'The frontier between Italy and Austria will 
 start at Marmolata, and will run by Monte Cris- 
 tallo, Monte Croce, and Paralba to the water- 
 shed between the Piave and the Tagliamento. It 
 will continue by Monte Cridola, Monte Premag- 
 giore, Monte Valcolda, and Spilimberga, and will 
 follow the line of the lower Tagliamento to the sea.' 
 
 Now, on November 22, Italian aviators re- 
 corded the fact, confirmed by German officer- 
 prisoners, that extensive fortifications had been 
 constructed by the Austro-Germans to form a 
 Hindenburg line 'on the line of the Tagliamento,' 
 
 147 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 that is to say, precisely on the frontier line laid 
 down in 1895. 
 
 Lastly, the Austro-Boche schemes of annexa- 
 tion in this region have been plainly asserted. In 
 the orders of the day to his troops on November 
 4, the Emperor of Austria described the invasion 
 of Italian Friuli as the 'liberation of my territory 
 on the Adriatic littoral,' a phrase which suggests 
 explicitly both the idea of premeditation and the 
 idea of conquest. 
 
 Let us remark in passing that, as in the matter 
 of Poland and indeed in all others, the Emperor 
 of Austria cooperates docilely in the execution of 
 the Pangermanist ideas of Berlin. Certain per- 
 sons of the Entente believe that the government 
 of Vienna is subjugated by Berlin, whose tyran- 
 nous yoke it would be glad to shake off. Nothing 
 of the sort is true. Even though the hegemony 
 of Berlin may be offensive to Austrian self-esteem, 
 the leaders in Vienna and Budapest submit to it 
 readily enough for this simple reason : the dynasty 
 of the Hapsburgs is quite well aware that its 
 fate is bound up with that of the Prussian autoc- 
 racy, and that it can save itself only by saving 
 the Hohenzollerns, that is to say, by strengthen- 
 ing the enormous extension of Prussian milita- 
 rism. If this point of view had been grasped at 
 the outset by the Entente, blunders resulting in 
 endless evil consequences could never have been 
 committed. 
 
 148 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Our pamphlet and map prove, therefore, that in 
 the second phase of the war the German Staff 
 subordinated everything to the determination to 
 create Central Pan-Germany first of all. This 
 determination is easily explained when one is 
 familiar with the Pangermanist ideas and the 
 conditions of their fulfillment. Brought abruptly 
 face to face, after the battle of the Marne, with a 
 redoubtable coalition which it had not foreseen, 
 and which threatened to take in the whole world, 
 the German Staff realized perfectly that the 
 military forces alone of Germany and Austria- 
 Hungary, in view of the ineradicable hostility 
 of the Slavs and Latins who form the majority of 
 the population of the Empire of the Hapsburgs, 
 and because of the insufficient food-supply of the 
 Central Empires, could not resist the combined 
 forces of Russia, France, and Great Britain. On 
 the other hand, the exhaustive investigations pur- 
 sued for more than twenty years in preparation 
 for putting into effect the Pangermanist plan, had 
 shown the German staff that a Central Pan-Ger- 
 many actually constituted, comprising, in addi- 
 tion to the Central Empires, the Balkans and 
 Turkey, would contain all the military and econ- 
 omic elements necessary to confront a formidable 
 coalition. 
 
 Indeed, it was because it had been established 
 before the war that Central Pan-Germany would 
 supply Germany with the means of universal 
 
 149 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 domination, that the war was begun. Under 
 these conditions, then, it was absolutely logical 
 that the German Staff, before seeking to obtain 
 a final decision in the West, should determine 
 to create a Central Pan-Germany, either at the 
 expense of Russia, Serbia, and Roumania, or, by 
 dissembling its purpose, at the expense of Berlin's 
 own allies, who, by the very fact of this creation 
 of Pan-Germany would automatically become 
 more and more completely the vassals of Ger- 
 many. 
 
 It is not true, therefore, as people still persist in 
 saying among the Allies, because of their extraor- 
 dinary and obstinate ignorance of the Panger- 
 manist plan, that the Germans, for three years 
 past, have by their circular offensives simply been 
 seizing territorial pledges ; no — during the second 
 phase of the war the Germans have taken posses- 
 sion of the various fragments of territory essential 
 to the formation of Central Pan-Germany, not 
 regarding them as pledges, but as acquisitions 
 long anticipated, or as destined to remain forever 
 in subjection to the will of Berlin. 
 
 Of course, to refute my interpretation of events, 
 any one can say, ' But Verdun proves that the 
 Germans wished to break through on the Western 
 front early in 191 6.' This objection has only an 
 apparent or very imperfect force. In reality, the 
 German offensive against Verdun was of a two- 
 fold character which is not yet understood by the 
 
 150 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Allies, still because of their ignorance of the Pan- 
 germanist plan. In the conception of the German 
 staff the Verdun operation had, not one, but two 
 objectives — a maximum and a minimum. If 
 the maximum objective could have been secured, 
 that is to say, if the morale of the French poilus 
 could have been destroyed by the length and the 
 savagery of the German offensive ; if the Germans 
 had succeeded in breaking through and taking 
 Paris, France, struck to the heart, would unques- 
 tionably have been put out of the war. Verdun, 
 therefore, may and should be regarded as an at- 
 tempt to break through and to resume the war- 
 fare of movement. 
 
 But what must be clearly understood is that, 
 even if they had been certain at the outset that 
 this maximum result was absolutely impossible of 
 attainment, still the Germans would have under- 
 taken the Verdun operation; for to them it had 
 its full justification in view of the extreme im- 
 portance of the minimum objective which it had 
 in the conception of the Staff — an objective 
 which, as we shall see, was in conformity with the 
 general decision at Berlin to constitute Central 
 Pan-Germany first of all, before really thinking of 
 annihilating France by a genuine offensive. 
 
 This demonstration brings me to the setting 
 forth of a number of points of view which have 
 never, to my knowledge, been suggested. 
 
 Not until the early days of 19 16 did Germany, 
 
 151 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 as a sequel of the recent seizure of Serbia, come 
 into direct geographical contact with Bulgaria 
 and Turkey. Berlin was still a long way from 
 having organized the various resources of those 
 two countries — resources which were indispen- 
 sable to her to enable her to continue the war. 
 
 Now, at that very time, certain persons in 
 France were making persistent efforts to have the 
 French and British supply the expeditionary 
 force at Saloniki with the powerful means of ac- 
 tion which it ought to have. These efforts were 
 on the point of success, for a very large body of 
 public opinion had become convinced of the con- 
 siderable importance of the Balkan theatre. If 
 therefore the Eastern army of the Allies had 
 received quickly the powerful reinforcements 
 which the leaders in Paris and London did not 
 give it, as the Bulgarians had not as yet the neces- 
 sary materiel for fortifying themselves strongly, 
 it is exceedingly probable that the Allies would 
 have been able to recover the Danube front — 
 that is, the strategic position which is the key of 
 the whole war; for its possession alone, by putting 
 into effect automatically the land blockade of 
 Austria-Germany, and depriving her of the men 
 and supplies without which she could not go on 
 fighting, would have assured the Entente a com- 
 plete victory, with efforts tenfold less vigorous 
 than those which have been compulsorily decided 
 upon, with the result that we know. 
 
 152 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 The German Staff, realizing fully that the 
 lengthening of the war would be of advantage 
 only to that one of the two groups of belligerents 
 which should be in possession of the Danube 
 front, spied an immense peril in the campaign car- 
 ried on in France in favor of Saloniki. It deter- 
 mined therefore, at any cost, to prevent the Allies 
 from ascribing to their actions in the Balkans the 
 importance which would have made it possible to 
 bring to naught all the Pangermanist plans. To 
 divert the attention of the Allies from Saloniki- 
 Belgrade, a violent and persistent offensive against 
 Verdun was the best expedient that could be 
 imagined, given the fact that the Pangermanist 
 scheme was at that time wholly unknown to the 
 Allied leaders. 
 
 In fact, the Verdun operation, by threatening 
 the very heart of France, presented from the 
 German standpoint this enormous psychological 
 advantage, that it apparently justified those of 
 the French and British leaders who at that time 
 regarded the Saloniki expedition with the oppo- 
 site of sympathy. Indeed, early in 1916 they were 
 still claiming that the Balkans could not have any 
 decisive influence on the result of the war, since 
 they were sure, as they declared, that they could 
 break through the Western front — which they 
 called the most important one — whenever and 
 wherever they chose. 
 
 Under these conditions it is easy to see why a 
 
 153 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 part of the press also — and hence of public opin- 
 ion — was hostile to the Saloniki expedition, in 
 France, but especially in England. This being 
 so, a vigorous offensive against Verdun could not 
 fail to strengthen these currents running counter 
 to the Balkan expedition by seeming to justify the 
 opposition that had been offered to it. Thus the 
 minimum — but exceedingly important — objec- 
 tive of the Verdun operation consisted in prevent- 
 ing the Allies from shifting the chief theatre of the 
 war to the Balkans in the beginning of 191 6. 
 This minimum objective was completely attained. 
 
 Unquestionably the Verdun operation was ex- 
 pensive to the Kaiser's troops; but in reality these 
 enormous sacrifices had their justification, since 
 they resulted in enabling Berlin to complete the 
 formation of Central Pan-Germany, which alone 
 could furnish the means of contending against the 
 world-wide coalition. It cannot be denied that 
 Verdun, by reason of the Allies' ignorance of the 
 Pangermanist plan, caused them to throw away 
 their last chance of sending sufficient reinforce- 
 ments to the Balkan front before the Austro-Ger- 
 mans and Bulgars had the necessary time and 
 materiel to make it, humanly speaking, about as 
 hard to break through as the Western front. 
 
 Third phase — from December, 1917, to . 
 
 As Central Pan-Germany has become an accom- 
 plished fact in thirty-eight months, and as its mil- 
 itary and political forces have been sufficiently 
 
 154 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 developed, the combined consequences of the 
 length of the war and of the existence of Central 
 Pan-Germany, have manifested themselves in 
 accordance with the anticipations of the German 
 Staff. As Russia, under the government of the 
 Tsar, was not put in a condition to sustain a long 
 struggle either morally or materially, and as she 
 was, later, completely disorganized by the Max- 
 imalist traitors and maniacs, she has gone under. 
 As a result, Roumania has been reduced to im- 
 potence. Thus, at this moment, only the Allied 
 army at Saloniki continues to embarrass the Ger- 
 man Staff. But that army not having been rein- 
 forced sufficiently to form as dangerous a menace 
 as was essential, the Staff has already, in effect, a 
 sufficiently free hand in the East to enter upon the 
 third and last phase of the war, that is to say, to 
 concentrate on the Western front the whole of the 
 disposable forces of Pan-Germany, — Germans, 
 Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks, — in 
 order to make another trial of the war of move- 
 ment likely to bring about the final decision. 
 
 At this moment the concentration is proceeding 
 with all possible speed. But we must thoroughly 
 grasp the fact that in the German scheme the gen- 
 eral offensive in the West is regarded as a very 
 complex operation, necessitating recourse to the 
 strategy of the political sciences, and hence of 
 national psychology, which lies at the root of all 
 the German pacifist manoeuvres. 
 
 155 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 GERMAN PACIFIST MANOEUVRES 
 
 In reality Germany has succeeded in creating 
 Central Pan-Germany only with the aid, since the 
 beginning of the second phase of the war, of her 
 six main pacifist manoeuvres : a separate peace be- 
 tween Berlin and one of the Entente Allies; a 
 separate peace between Turkey, Bulgaria, and 
 Austria-Hungary and the Entente; the democrat- 
 ization of Germany; peace through the Interna- 
 tional ; the armistice trick ; and the drawn game of 
 the deceptive formula, 'peace without annexa- 
 tions or indemnities.' 
 
 These six manoeuvres, which have served in 
 some sort as a screen for the never-ending military 
 achievements of the German armies, had as their 
 chief object the exploitation to the utmost extent 
 of the intellectual lacunar of which the Germans 
 had detected the existence among the Allies — 
 that is to say . — 
 
 i . The incredible yet indubitable ignorance on 
 their part of the Pangermanist plan. Even at 
 the present moment this ignorance is still so great 
 that some of the leaders and some even of the 
 great newspapers of the Entente are wondering 
 what Germany's real war-aims can be, although 
 
 156 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 they have been laid bare for twenty-two years in 
 numberless German publications, and the whole 
 German people knows them, and the geographical 
 boundaries of Pan-Germany correspond exactly 
 to those indicated in the basic plan of 1895, as our 
 map shows. It is this undeniable ignorance on 
 the part of the Allies which has enabled the Ger- 
 mans constantly to spread the belief that they 
 were going to stop; whereas in reality they have 
 planned and executed without a pause the series 
 of offensives destined to constitute Central Pan- 
 Germany. 
 
 2. The credulity of the Allied diplomacy, which 
 ever since the outbreak of war has allowed itself 
 to be deluded into incessant negotiations, official 
 or semi-official, with the Turks, the Bulgars, and 
 the government of Vienna. This credulity con- 
 tributed largely to the loss by the Allies of the 
 Danube front, the key to the war. 
 
 3. The credulity of the Allied Socialists, which 
 is as extraordinary as that of the diplomatists. 
 The Socialists have been hoodwinked by means 
 of the Stockholm manoeuvre, which has had the 
 following disastrous results: the accession to 
 power of Lenine; anarchy in Russia; the capture 
 of Riga; the conquest of the Baltic; the fact that 
 many Allied Socialists have declared their adher- 
 ence to the Boche formula of ' no annexations or 
 indemnities,' without a suspicion that its applica- 
 tion would assure the overwhelming triumph of 
 
 157 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 Prussian militarism and the autocracy; the pierc- 
 ing of the Italian front through the 'defeatist' 
 campaign; and, finally, the armistice with Russia 
 and Roumania, which puts them at Germany's 
 discretion while leaving her at liberty to devote 
 all the effectives at her disposal to the final offen- 
 sive in the West. 
 
 This last manoeuvre was sure to be attended by 
 a lot of others, of which the chief are easily de- 
 tected already. Portugal is to be detached from 
 the Entente. The recent pronunciamento, issued 
 at Lisbon early in December, 191 7, has begun the 
 process. Switzerland, deeply undermined by the 
 German propaganda, as was proved by the dis- 
 turbances at Zurich in November last, is to be 
 violated. If the passage of troops through Swit- 
 zerland should become possible, the Germans 
 would seize Marseilles and Toulon. France 
 would then be cut off from the Mediterranean, 
 and the situation for which the Boche propaganda 
 has long been laying wires in Spain, would then 
 produce all the results foreseen. The scheme is to 
 align Spain against the Entente through the me- 
 dium of the junta of pro-German officers who are 
 to create a military dictatorship, receiving its 
 orders from Berlin and managed by Prince von 
 Ratibor, German Ambassador at Madrid. 
 
 To sum up — the ' idealistic' offensive of Pan- 
 Germany against all of Western Europe which is 
 still outside the rays of the light that shines from 
 
 158 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Berlin, as it is projected by the Staff of William 
 II, is to be executed finally by means of a land 
 attack, on a line which will form a complete 
 envelopment on the day when the intrigues of 
 Berlin have reached their fruition in Switzerland 
 and Spain. Furthermore, it is probable that the 
 attack on the Western front will be marie up of 
 several simultaneous Verduns, in order to involve 
 the Franco-British troops, admirable in their gal- 
 lantry and courage, but manifestly fatigued by 
 three years and a half of atrocious warfare, in a 
 momentary weakness which will make possible 
 the piercing of the wall behind which the freedom 
 of the world is still sheltered. 
 
 It is clear, moreover, that the general offensive 
 of the Pan-German forces against the Western 
 front must, in order to be successful, take place 
 before American troops, having gone through 
 the training that is indispensable to make them 
 into effective fighting men, have arrived in suffi- 
 cient numbers to reinforce that front. 
 
 Let us glance now at the other side. If the Ger- 
 man offensive now in preparation on the West 
 presents a very serious and undeniable danger, we 
 must consider as well that it will have to reckon 
 with many contingencies. The disposable forces 
 of Pan-Germany which can be concentrated on 
 the Western front are tired out, whereas the Allied 
 troops on that front are infinitely more numerous, 
 better equipped and disciplined than they were 
 
 159 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 at the time of the attack on Verdun. It is ex- 
 tremely probable, therefore, that the Verdun 
 achievement will be repeated on a gigantic scale, 
 thus postponing the definitive decision and giving 
 the Allies another chance to conquer Pan-Ger- 
 many if they decide to make use at last of the 
 long unemployed forces existing in Pan-Germany 
 itself which I have described in a previous paper. 
 
 The grave nature of these contingencies is well 
 understood at Berlin. That is why the prepara- 
 tion for the general offensive against the Western 
 front is sure to be attended by the same pacifist 
 manoeuvres which, by bringing about anarchy in 
 the Russian front and rear, have enabled the Ger- 
 man Staff to avoid an expensive military move- 
 ment which the moral downfall of Russia has 
 made unnecessary, while leaving the Germans to 
 become de facto masters of the former Empire of 
 the Tsars by virtue of the monstrous Maximalist 
 delusion. 
 
 It is plain, in truth, that if — let us pose this 
 hypothesis in order to make our argument plausi- 
 ble — a decided moral backsliding should mani- 
 fest itself among the Allies in the West, the general 
 military offensive against them of the forces of 
 Pan-Germany, involving such great losses and so 
 many contingencies, would cease to have any 
 purpose; for fallacious negotiations on the basis 
 of a so-called peace by agreement, of which the 
 negotiations of the Bodies with the Maximalists 
 
 160 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 give a very succinct idea, would suffice to assure 
 Germany of a complete victory, avoiding the 
 necessity of its making itself manifest by a bril- 
 liant military operation as a tangible sign. 
 
 For this reason. The war-expenditures of 
 France and Great Britain are so formidable that, 
 unless the conflict ends with the utter defeat of 
 Germany, making possible a progressive repara- 
 tion for the incredible damage caused by her, a 
 few months of the Boche peace — the ' peace by 
 agreement' — would suffice, if our hypothesis 
 should prove true, to cause the French and Eng- 
 lish bank-notes to lose their value, and there would 
 ensue in France and Great Britain a financial, 
 economic, and moral disaster of such gigantic pro- 
 portions that those two countries could no longer 
 offer the slightest resistance to the constantly aug- 
 mented economic and military resources of trium- 
 phant Pan-Germany. At that moment the Ger- 
 mans, without the slightest risk, could overrun 
 France as far as Bayonne. And on the day when 
 affairs reached this pass, the Germans would meet 
 with no serious obstacle to their projected inva- 
 sion of the British Isles. 
 
 The analysis we have made of the German 
 methods of warfare proves that the strategy of the 
 Grand Staff at Berlin, infinitely more complex 
 than the purely military variety, is a strategy of 
 the political sciences. 
 
 161 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 This is a result of the fact that the creation of 
 the complex Pangermanist scheme has brought 
 the Germans to realize that the solution of every 
 great problem susceptible of statement demands 
 for its performance an accurate acquaintance 
 with, and, generally speaking, the employment of 
 six well-defined factors: a military factor; a naval 
 factor (in fact, a problem that seems to affect only 
 the centre of Europe always reacts to some extent 
 on the general naval situation) ; a geographical fac- 
 tor; an ethnological factor; an economic factor; 
 and a national -psychologic factor. 
 
 It results from this that a military operation to 
 be executed on land, on the sea, or in the air, as 
 soon as it proves to have any relation whatsoever 
 to the general conduct of the war, is not decided 
 upon at Berlin until the following points have 
 been determined by means of a documentation 
 always kept in sight. 
 
 i. The military or naval, geographical, ethno- 
 graphical, economic, and national-psychologic 
 conditions of the execution of the operation pro- 
 posed. 
 
 2. If the operation should be successful, what 
 would be its military, naval, geographical, eth- 
 nological, economic, and national-psychologic 
 reactions on the general situation? 
 
 The result of these considerations is that the 
 solution of every problem presented by the gen- 
 eral conduct of the war requires the solution of an 
 
 162 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 equation with six unknown quantities, not one of 
 which is negligible. 
 
 To place in relief the extreme importance of 
 this last aspect of the matter, I will take as an 
 example the unknown ethnographic quantity. 
 The determination of this quantity is so indispen- 
 sable to the proper conduct of the world-war, that 
 the German Grand Staff, although already pos- 
 sessed of a documentation of exceptional value on 
 the ethnographic questions, carefully got together 
 in peace-time, does not, nevertheless, deem itself 
 justified in neglecting other sources of informa- 
 tion. That is why it has mobilized in its service 
 all Germans who are specially familiar with for- 
 eign countries, particularly those who are experts 
 as to the various nationalities of Austria-Hungary, 
 the Balkans, and Russia. Thus no major opera- 
 tion which may have an effect on foreign peoples 
 is decided upon at Berlin until the opinion of 
 these specialists has been most seriously consid- 
 ered. 
 
 It was by virtue of this information, — of a 
 purely psychological and intellectual order, — 
 that the Germans were able to obtain in the East, 
 and especially in Russia, the successes of which 
 we are all aware, although the normal condition of 
 affairs was exceedingly unfavorable to them, and 
 would have remained so, had the Allies known 
 enough to make the very slight effort which would 
 have sufficed to effect that result. 
 
 163 
 
PA N-G ERM A N Y 
 
 To summarize, then — it is in the strategy of 
 scientific politics — that is to say, in the intellec- 
 tual management of the war in every domain — 
 that the whole secret of the German victories re- 
 sides. In like manner, it is the ignorance on the 
 part of the Allies of this kind of strategy which 
 explains their successive set-backs and their con- 
 stant disappointments despite the superabund- 
 ance of their material resources. Now, this ig- 
 norance is so undeniable that, after three years 
 and a half of war, it is impossible to point to a 
 single operation of theirs, of which the geographi- 
 cal, ethnological, economic, and national-psy- 
 chologic conditions of its execution have been 
 first seriously studied. They have not even 
 thought of such a thing; and at the present mo- 
 ment their leaders have no organization intellec- 
 tually equipped to solve a complete strategic 
 equation. 
 
 But such an organization is absolutely essential 
 to winning a victory. All the elements exist for 
 creating it whenever they choose, in such wise 
 that it will give practical results with comparative 
 promptitude. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE WESTERN FRONT 
 
 I hope that I have shown in my last chapter 
 what the real, deep-seated reason is of the suc- 
 cesses that the Germans have achieved over the 
 Allies. We have seen that, while the Germans 
 are past masters in burglary and murder, and, in 
 committing these thefts and other crimes, employ 
 the most highly perfected material resources, the 
 most thorough study of chemistry, and the most 
 ingenious mechanical inventions, they are equally 
 far advanced in the purely intellectual domain, 
 which enables them to derive from the four fun- 
 damental political sciences — geography, eth- 
 nography, political economy, and national psy- 
 chology — important practical results. Now, 
 the Allies, having even at this moment no com- 
 prehension of the extraordinary potency of these 
 invisible forces, are making no use of them. The 
 result is that they are still in considerably less 
 advantageous condition to contend with the 
 Boches, notwithstanding their vast resources. 
 
 Our deductions have led us also to define the 
 'strategy of the political sciences' and the in- 
 tegral strategic equation which makes its appli- 
 cation possible. This equation contains six un- 
 
 165 
 
PA N -GERM A N Y 
 
 known quantities: military, naval, geographical, 
 ethnographical, politico-economic, and national- 
 psychologic. The facts established by three and 
 a half years of war prove that it is absolutely in- 
 dispensable to find these six unknown quantities 
 before undertaking any operation capable of 
 exerting an appreciable influence on the general 
 development of the war. Indeed, the amazing 
 and perilous present state of affairs is susceptible 
 of this explanation, which summarizes all others : 
 the general operations of the Staff at Berlin have 
 been planned and carried out in accordance with 
 the strategy of the political sciences. On the 
 other hand, the operations of the Entente have 
 been conducted in such utter ignorance of this 
 strategy, that none of them could reasonably be 
 expected to succeed. 
 
 It is of supreme importance for Americans to 
 understand quite clearly the fundamental cause 
 of the strategic errors of the Entente. Indeed, 
 such a clear understanding is the only means 
 by which the United States can avoid sacrifices 
 in men and money infinitely greater than are 
 necessary, as the European Allies of three and a 
 half years must agree. I shall, therefore, treat 
 this part of my subject by appealing to the un- 
 mitigated truth, without the slightest regard for 
 other considerations. 
 
 166 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 THE THEORY THAT THE WESTERN FRONT 
 IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE 
 
 I propose to show that, as a matter of fact, all 
 the strategic errors of the Entente are derived 
 from this: that the Western front has been re- 
 garded as the most important front. The first 
 source of this idea is the incredible but undoubted 
 ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme on the 
 part of the leaders of the Entente. This ignorance 
 is a phenomenon which I set down, but which I 
 cannot explain. The Pangermanist scheme dates 
 from 1895. Since then it has been elaborated in 
 Germany in thousand of lectures. Innumerable 
 pamphlets, spread broadcast, have made this 
 scheme familiar to an immense majority of the 
 sixty millions of Germans. Moreover, it was for 
 the reason that this scheme was carefully devised 
 a long while beforehand that the Germans became 
 earnestly desirous of its execution, and, generally 
 speaking, went cheerfully forth to war, believing, 
 doubtless, that it would be short, but firmly con- 
 vinced that it would bring them enormous booty 
 — a bait which has always set the Germans in 
 motion from the beginnings of history. 
 
 Now, despite the extraordinary publicity of 
 the Pangermanist scheme throughout Germany 
 for twenty-two years, the guiding spirits of the 
 Entente did not believe in its existence during the 
 
 167 
 
PA N -G ER M A N Y 
 
 first two years of the war. 1 agree that this state- 
 ment seems incredible, but I receive constantly 
 so many new proofs of its truth that to doubt it 
 is impossible. 
 
 This ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme on 
 the part of the Allies has had this result ; that they 
 have failed to realize that Germany made war, 
 before all else, to make the Hamburg-Persian 
 Gulf plan a reality, and that that achievement, 
 by reason of its inevitable consequences, would 
 suffice to assure Germany of the dominion of the 
 world. 1 1 is this failure to grasp the real war-aim 
 pursued by Germany, which explains why the 
 supreme importance of the Danube front — which 
 was the key of the war, which the Allies had in 
 their possession, and which it was relatively easy 
 for them to retain — did not receive serious at- 
 tention while it was time. At the opening of 
 hostilities, and even for a very long time there- 
 after, the leaders of the Allies were convinced 
 that Germany was righting to rid herself of France, 
 and especially of England. France and England 
 therefore undertook simply to fight Germany and 
 Austria-Hungary, very little importance being 
 attributed to the action of the latter. Practically 
 then the war was regarded, at Paris and London, 
 as a sort of prize-fight, in which one of the two 
 chief adversaries — either the French and British 
 on the one hand or Germany and Austria on the 
 other — would fall in the ring. 
 
 1 68 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 This quasi-' sportive' idea of the war was par- 
 ticularly prevalent among the British. Having 
 in reality no military traditions, they regarded 
 the conflict as a gigantic boxing-match, in which 
 the best ' slugger ' would necessarily be the victor. 
 So it came about that to the British the war was, 
 and perhaps still is, solely a matter of endurance. 
 On the other hand, once the war was begun by 
 Germany, the question of Alsace-Lorraine inevit- 
 ably came to the front for the French. Now, 
 Alsace-Lorraine was close at hand. Must she 
 not be set free first of all? 
 
 For these diverse reasons, the French and Brit- 
 ish were inclined to argue that the chief theatre 
 of operations was necessarily where the chief 
 adversaries were, and, at the same time, to all ap- 
 pearance, their principal and mutual interests — 
 that is to say, in the West. This conviction once 
 formed, this consequence was deduced from it in 
 London and Paris, namely, that the Balkans and 
 Turkey could have no serious effect on the result 
 of the war; that it was not only useless, therefore, 
 but positively dangerous, to send a considerable 
 force to the East, because the principal front — 
 that in the West, where everything was destined 
 to be decided - — would thus be deprived of the 
 benefit of armies which the Entente, taken by 
 surprise by the war, had been obliged to raise and 
 equip in haste, and therefore had no right to send 
 them a long way from home. 
 
 169 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 This extraordinarily limited conception of the 
 vast conflict inaugurated by Germany also pre- 
 vented the realization of this fact: if it be true 
 that the Western front is the principal one from 
 the standpoint of the Germans, because there 
 alone can they win a decisive victory over France 
 and England, on the other hand, the Germans 
 could not undertake to bring about such a defini- 
 tive decision in the West until the day, the mo- 
 ment indeed, at which we have now arrived, 
 when the Allies have committed the error of con- 
 centrating all their forces in the West. 
 
 Furthermore, we must reflect that the Western 
 front could not be the principal one for the Allies 
 — the one, that is to say, on which to bring about 
 a final decision. For, ever since the day when 
 it was demonstrated that fortified fronts which 
 could be very rapidly increased in depth by means 
 of trenches, deep shelters, and barbed-wire en- 
 tanglements could not be quickly pierced, — a 
 demonstration which was almost conclusive in 
 October, 19 14, — it has been contrary to common 
 sense for the Allies to hope that they could obtain 
 on the Western front a victory so overwhelming 
 as to compel Germany to abandon the Hamburg- 
 Persian Gulf idea. But this controlling point of 
 view was unheeded — a perfectly natural con- 
 sequence of the Allied ignorance of the Panger- 
 manist scheme. 
 
 170 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 II 
 THE MILITARY EXPERT OF THE 'TIMES* 
 
 However that may be, the theory that the 
 Western front is all-important has been repeatedly 
 laid down by Colonel Repington, lately the 
 military critic of the London Times. 1 
 
 Finding myself compelled, in order to make 
 more clear my indispensable demonstration, to 
 show how far Colonel Repington has gone astray, 
 and what infinite harm his errors have done to 
 the cause of the Entente by reason of the mighty 
 influence of the Times which is almost a national 
 organ, I conceive that no sinister motive can be 
 attributed to me if I make, by way of preamble, 
 this statement. I was one of the first Frenchmen 
 who favored the Franco-British rapprochement, 
 at a time when public opinion in my country was 
 opposed to that policy. To the powerful Times, 
 which has many a time assisted me in propagating 
 my ideas, I am most grateful. To me personally, 
 therefore, it is really distressing to take issue with 
 one of its chief collaborators. But according to 
 my honest belief, Colonel Repington, because of 
 the extraordinary influence of the organ in which 
 he writes, has been instrumental in leading the 
 Allies to commit errors in strategy which have 
 cost millions of men and endangered the issue of 
 the war. I feel, therefore, in duty bound to call 
 
 1 Now of the Morning Post. 
 
 171 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 the attention of the Allies to the immense amount 
 of harm done by Colonel Repington. His con- 
 stantly repeated forecasts have this characteristic 
 in common, that for three years and a half they 
 have been falsified by events in the most striking 
 way. 
 
 But the Repington peril still exists. In fact, 
 even to-day a large number of Allied newspapers 
 continue to reproduce his forecasts because they 
 appear in the Times as coming from one having 
 authority, although any sort of credit should have 
 been denied to him a long while since. But his 
 failure to reason from the most indubitable indi- 
 cations and the most notorious facts seems to be 
 complete. This appears from certain passages in an 
 interview on the general condition of affairs given 
 by the colonel to the Temps, October 10, 1917. 
 
 'The situation [declared the military critic of 
 the Times at that late date] is that the Boches are 
 getting the worst of it except in Boche commun- 
 iquSs, and that they know it. Moreover, every 
 time that we go into battle they are beaten. . . . 
 Our losses are slight now because we are proceed- 
 ing according to the plan of an offensive with a 
 limited objective. . . . Our victories are almost 
 automatic. . . . Italy and Russia still have very 
 strong effective forces. . . . Russia? Yes, she is 
 passing through a serious crisis, but we must not 
 lose confidence in her. Russia is a jack-in-the- 
 box, and the winter is working on her side. ' 
 
 172 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 Less than a month after these statements the 
 Italians suffered a serious disaster, Russia went 
 to pieces, and Roumania was reduced to impo- 
 tence. Now, these disastrous events might very 
 easily have been forecast several months before, 
 with the help of the frequent and accordant in- 
 telligence from Italy and Russia. But Colonel 
 Repington has been so hypnotized by the West- 
 ern front that he has consistently refused to give 
 any weight to what was going on in the rest of 
 Europe. We proceed now to trace the chrono- 
 logical development and the influence of his 
 theory. 
 
 At the end of August, 1914, Colonel Repington 
 set forth his own conception of the most important 
 front when he described the part to be played by 
 the Russian armies on the one hand and by the 
 Franco-British armies on the other, in the words 
 quoted below, disclosing at the same time his 
 idea of German strategy. I quote from Le Temps 
 of September 1, 1914: — 
 
 'We must fight, even if we have to fall back to 
 the Atlantic, without allowing Germany to over- 
 whelm us. It is absolutely indispensable for her 
 to have her Metz and her Sedan, and a long war 
 would be disastrous for her with her largely indus- 
 trial population, her business paralyzed, her coast 
 blockaded. Her entire .strategy is based on these 
 considerations, and it should be our aim to bring 
 this plan to naught and to fight with all our 
 
 173 
 
P A y-GER M A N Y 
 
 strength, without endangering the welfare of our 
 people by brilliant coups which would expose us 
 to attack by the enemy. 
 
 1 It is fear that is behind the present German 
 tactics, borrowed from the dervishes — the Ger- 
 man vandalism and this policy of terrorizing the 
 civil population ; it is fear — not physical fear, 
 but fear of the consequences which would result 
 for her if France and England should not be 
 quickly and completely crushed. 
 
 ' Russia, for her part, is performing the func- 
 tion of a "steam-roller. " Her role in the war is 
 most important, and linal triumph depends in 
 large measure on the way in which she carries it 
 out. The Franco-British armies have diverted 
 the main bulk of the German armies from Russia; 
 and while the Allies operating in France keep 
 their claws in that bulk, Russia must take ad- 
 vantage of the opportunity. 
 
 ' The results obtained by her thus far indicate 
 that such is her purpose. 
 
 'Taking into account the season of the year 
 and its natural concomitants, Russia must reach 
 Berlin within two months; if, at the end of that 
 time our claws are still buried in the mass of the 
 German armies of the West, and if Serbia has suc- 
 ceeded in maintaining until then her hold on the 
 Austrians, the strategic and political object of 
 the war will have been attained.' 
 
 These lines expose very clearly the germ of the 
 
 174 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 theory of the main front afterward developed by 
 Colonel Repington. According to his idea, the 
 Franco-British armies must 'operate in France,' 
 Russia playing the part of 'steam-roller,' moving 
 forward slowly but surely in such wise as to reach 
 Berlin in two months. The plain inference from 
 these words is that Colonel Repington was the 
 original inventor of the phrase, ' Russia, the steam- 
 roller.' Events have shown the value of this 
 metaphor. 
 
 The passage quoted proves in addition the error 
 of Colonel Repington as to what military Russia 
 really was, as to the condition of the Russian 
 fortresses in 19 14, and as to the very different 
 condition of the German armies and fortresses at 
 that same time. 1 
 
 As the ' steam-roller ' had not arrived at Berlin 
 in November, 1914, according to his forecast, 
 Colonel Repington gave the final touch to his 
 theory of the main front by publishing the follow- 
 ing in the middle of 1915, when the question arose 
 of sending Franco-British troops to Serbia: — 
 
 'I deem myself justified in these reflections because, on page 
 414 of my book, Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japonaise, published 
 in 1906, eight years before the war, I wrote, after much investiga- 
 tion in Russia and the Far East: 'Will Russia become again a 
 great military power? First of all, is the Russian people bent 
 upon it? Nothing is less certain. Putting the best face on affairs, 
 and recalling what happened in France after 1870, we must never- 
 theless conclude that she will not within ten or fifteen years have 
 become again a great military power, in condition, for example, 
 to take part in really effective fashion in a war against Germany.' 
 
 175 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 'What we must do is kill Germans until the 
 German losses mount up to ten thousand daily. 
 If we accomplish our task, we shall make final 
 victory inevitable. What we must avoid are 
 adventures which might give Germany an oppor- 
 tunity to secure important strategic successes, as 
 at Ulm and Sedan. 
 
 'The war of attrition, in the trenches, on both 
 fronts, is exceedingly burdensome; there is noth- 
 ing inspiring about it, but it must kill Germany 
 in the end if it is kept up.' 1 
 
 The Allies having followed Colonel Repington's 
 advice and sent no troops to the Danube, the at- 
 tack on Serbia was begun in October, 1915. At 
 that time energetic action on the part of the Allies 
 in the way of sending to Serbia, by way of Salon- 
 iki and by the Santi Quarante route, sufficient re- 
 inforcements, might still have saved the greater 
 part of Serbia and thus have maintained the 
 Allies in a position to recover the Danube front. 
 Thereupon Colonel Repington reiterated with 
 singular vigor his theory of the main front as op- 
 posed to the dispatch of Allied troops to the rescue 
 of Serbia. 
 
 'No new units [he said] have made their ap- 
 pearance in the East or the West for several 
 months. It may well be true, therefore, that 
 Germany has not the necessary men to create 
 such units. Under these conditions our manifest 
 
 1 See Le Matin, June 18, 1915. 
 176 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 duty is to persevere on the main front, that is, in 
 France and Flanders. That is where the final 
 decision will be had, and nothing on earth would 
 justify us in withdrawing troops from there. We 
 must send thither all the men and all the muni- 
 tions at our disposal, in order to kill the greatest 
 possible number of Germans. 
 
 'The German- are still capable of holding out 
 against Russia, and of massing more troops 
 against us. What a plight we should find our- 
 selves in if, at such a time, our forces in the 
 Western theatre had been reduced! The respon- 
 sibility would fall, not on the army, which has 
 fought so superbly, but on those who have the 
 supreme management of the war.' 1 
 
 These vigorous arguments had a tremendous 
 influence on British public opinion, and Serbia 
 was abandoned to her fate. Furthermore, still 
 as a result of this theory of the main front, 
 Colonel Repington afterwards, whenever he had 
 a chance, made the bitterest opposition to the 
 dispatch of the Allied expeditionary force to the 
 Balkans. As he found important supporters in 
 France, the army at Saloniki is still without suffi- 
 cient means of action. 
 
 However that may be, Colonel Repington's 
 campaign in support of his disastrous theory 
 that the Western front is the most important one 
 has produced such far-reaching effects that it has 
 
 *Le Petit Parisien, October 15, 191 5. 
 177 
 
P A N-G ER MA N Y 
 
 influenced men occupying very high official posi- 
 tions. For example, early in October, 19 17, 
 General Smuts, a Boer officer, unquestionably of 
 great valor, but, by reason of his foreign birth, 
 having never been in a position to study the vast 
 complexities of the European war, in a speech at 
 a luncheon given by the President of the Cham- 
 bers of Commerce of the United Kingdom, — a 
 speech of special importance because of his mem- 
 bership in the British War Cabinet— declared : — 
 'The Central allies are beaten everywhere, are 
 retreating everywhere, except in Russia. ... To 
 whip Germany we need not go as far as the Rhine. 
 To effect this purpose one strip of land is as good 
 as another, so long as the Germans choose to oc- 
 cupy it; and, take my word for it, long before we 
 have reached the Rhine, Germany will sue for 
 peace. . . . Our military superiority on the West- 
 ern front is no longer open to the slightest ques- 
 tion. ... If we turn to the Italian front, can we 
 entertain any doubt, after the great victories of 
 the Italian army, that our Allies on that front 
 have obtained a complete preponderance over 
 the Germans?' 
 
 A few days later events proved the value of 
 these assertions. As General Smuts had several 
 time3 announced that Germany was virtually 
 whipped, the Weekly Dispatch did not hesitate to 
 make the following truly stupefying comment 
 on these statements: — 
 
 178 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 ' When so circumspect a soldier and statesman 
 as General Smuts declares that we have won the 
 war, we can assume that there are good and suffi- 
 cient reasons why so bold an assertion is a proof 
 that we have won it.' 
 
 Comments of this description unfortunately do 
 not stand alone. For three years and a half a 
 number of Allied newspapers have reproduced 
 declarations of men of more or less prominence, 
 about as valuable as those of General Smuts, as 
 being undeniable truths. As a result, very great 
 harm has been done, for Allied public opinion has 
 been misled by men of unquestionable sincerity, 
 who are, nevertheless, incapable of forming an ac- 
 curate judgment of the situation because they 
 have never been trained for it, and because they 
 do not know a hundredth part of what it is neces- 
 sary to know in order to put forth a prophecy of 
 any value. 
 
 It is because of these divagations that a forest 
 of false ideas has been nurtured among the Allies 
 like a carefully tended garden, until in December 
 last the majority of newspapers proclaimed the 
 victory of the Entente at the precise moment 
 when the Pangermanist schemes were on the 
 point of fulfillment. 
 
 Be that as it may, the aberration caused in 
 numerous controlling councils of the Allies by the 
 theory of the Western as the principal front has 
 gone so far that, even after the Italian catastro- 
 
 179 
 
PA N-GERM A N Y 
 
 phe, when Germany was already master of three 
 fourths of Europe, Major Sir Philip Sassoon, 
 M.P., private secretary to Sir Douglas Haig, in a 
 letter to his constituents, reiterated this theory, 
 declaring that the outstanding facts of the war 
 are not the momentary collapse of Russia and the 
 invasion of Italy, but the steady, inexorable ad- 
 vance of the British armies in Flanders, which 
 neither the enemy nor the weather conditions can 
 check. At that time Major Sassoon believed that 
 the British advance on Cambrai would prove to 
 be irresistible and continuous. A few days later, 
 the German counter-attack, and the serious Bri- 
 tish losses which resulted from it, gave the lie 
 once more to forecasts of this sort. 
 
 On the occasion of Major Sassoon's amazing 
 letter the Socialist journal VHumanite, which 
 often indulges in Utopian conceits, published so 
 accurate a summary of the doctrine of the princi- 
 pal front at the end of 191 7, that I deem it my 
 duty to quote it. 
 
 1 " Don't be alarmed," say the partisans of Oc- 
 cidentalism, or Repingtonians, "by the confusion 
 and backsliding of Russia. Don't ascribe too 
 much importance to the invasion of Northern 
 Italy, Serbia, Roumania — there is no use in 
 stopping to talk about them. All this is of no ac- 
 count. The absolute definitive victory we shall 
 win on the Western front, or, more precisely, on 
 the British front. The irresistible advance of the 
 
 180 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 British army in Flanders will give it to us. The 
 occupation by the enemy of Poland, Lithuania, 
 and Courland, of Wallachia and Venetia; Riga 
 captured, Venice within cannon-shot of the Aus- 
 tro-German lines — all this is of no account in 
 comparison with the taking of Passchendaele (a 
 small village in Flanders). What's the use of 
 unifying the conduct of operations, when there is 
 but one operation of any importance? " — Such is 
 the doctrine. It has never varied.' 1 
 
 1 L'HumanilS, November 17, 1917- 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE WESTERN FRONT THEORY CRITICIZED 
 
 As for the reasons given to justify this theory of 
 the principal front by its partisans, they are all 
 summed up in this statement, which, however, 
 has never been supported by any technical evi- 
 dence. 'This is a war of attrition. As the re- 
 sources of the Allies are inexhaustible, they can 
 certainly hold out much longer than the Germans, 
 who are the besieged party. We have only to 
 establish ourselves more and more strongly on 
 the Western front. As the Germans cannot re- 
 main in a state of war indefinitely, they will be 
 compelled to attack us. Consequently the Kai- 
 ser's troops will have, perforce, to come and be 
 killed on the Western front. It is a mathematical 
 certainty, therefore, that a time will come when 
 we shall have inflicted upon Germany losses in 
 man -power so prodigious, that, finding herself 
 bled white, she will sue for a peace every condition 
 of which we shall be in a position to impose upon 
 her. At that moment we shall be completely vic- 
 torious without having been compelled to cross 
 the Rhine, as we have many times declared.' 
 
 Such is, in reality, incredible as it may appear, 
 the ominously puerile and prodigiously rudimen- 
 
 182 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 tary reasoning which has been the sole basis of 
 the management by the Allies of this complex, 
 world-embracing war; whereas the Germans in 
 carrying it on act consistently according to some 
 plan or other, but always one that has been 
 studied in every part of the Universe without ex- 
 ception. In truth, this theory by which the West- 
 ern front is regarded as the principal one does not 
 deserve even to be considered as a strategic plan 
 at all, for it rests upon an accumulation of such 
 gigantic blunders that it would seem impossible 
 that they could have been committed, were we 
 not constrained to admit their reality by facts 
 that are only too manifest. 
 
 Let us remark first of all that this theory is 
 strictly opposed to the fundamental principle of 
 warfare as established by military history from 
 its most far-off origins. This immutable princi- 
 ple may be stated thus: While supporting one's 
 allies to the utmost, to carry the war into the 
 enemy's country, at the weakest spot, with su- 
 perior forces. Now, the theory that we are con- 
 sidering has had the following results : — 
 
 1. It has prevented the Allies from carrying the 
 war into the enemy's country, and has confined 
 the most frightful struggle that has ever taken 
 place to the richest and most densely populated 
 territory of Belgium and France. 
 
 2. It has compelled the Allies to abandon the 
 hope of striking their enemy at his weakest point, 
 
 183 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 which was beyond question the southern line of 
 Hungary. 
 
 3. It has led the Allies to concentrate their 
 most powerful forces against the strongest por- 
 tions of the German front, where the German staff 
 could most easily manage the most stubborn de- 
 fense by virtue of the vast network of railways 
 that it controls in the West. 
 
 4. It has abandoned successively to the Pan- 
 germanist Moloch such admirable, gallant, and 
 loyal allies as the unhappy Serbs and Roumanians. 
 Such abandonment not only was an unpardon- 
 able moral error on the part of the Allied leaders, 
 but also consummated the substantial strategic 
 blunder of the Entente. For, by an extraordinary 
 chance, the territories of Montenegro, Serbia, and 
 Roumania were, and still are, strategically con- 
 sidered, the key of the world- war, because they 
 form the natural Danube front, the mere posses- 
 sion of which by the Allies deprived Austro-Ger- 
 many of the aid of the Bulgarian and Turkish 
 effectives, and of the resources of the Orient, with- 
 out which it could not have continued the war. 
 Therefore, by supporting with vigor their small 
 Balkan allies, the great Allies would not only have 
 fulfilled their moral duty, but would at the same 
 time have forwarded their essential strategic in- 
 terests and the war would long since have ended 
 victoriously. 
 
 Now, the sole obstacle to this logical develop- 
 
 184 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 ment of the military efforts of the Allies has been 
 the theory that the Western front is the principal 
 front. 
 
 Given the huge blunders, even of a strictly 
 military description, which have resulted from 
 this disastrous theory, one can readily under- 
 stand that it makes no account of the strategy of 
 the political sciences, the existence of which is not 
 suspected, even at the present moment, by the 
 supporters of that theory. Let us note once more 
 that it is based by them upon a long succession of 
 material misconceptions. Events have proved 
 that Colonel Repington's reckoning of the Ger- 
 man reserves was erroneous. Furthermore, in his 
 calculation of the enemy's forces, Colonel Reping- 
 ton has never dealt seriously with the Austro- 
 Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish effectives, 
 which, however, do actually exist and whose sup- 
 port enables Austro-Germany to keep the field. 
 Not taking into the account the total military 
 effectives of Pan-Germany, Colonel Repington 
 has neglected also to consider the resources in sup- 
 plies and raw materials of this vast territory. But 
 these resources, because of the effects of the sub- 
 marine campaign, are to all intent greater for the 
 Boches — or, at all events, more readily acces- 
 sible and transportable — than the resources of 
 the Western Allies, who cannot live now without 
 America and Australia, that is to say, without 
 articles of prime necessity brought from a great 
 
 185 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 distance by slow, infinitely burdensome, and un- 
 certain means of transport. 
 
 Lastly, if it had been true that Austro-Ger- 
 many, blockaded by land, — the Allies being on 
 the Danube front, — would have been in effect 
 a besieged fortress inevitably doomed to capitu- 
 late by reason of the insufficiency of food-supplies, 
 — because, in fact, the resources of Austro-Ger- 
 many alone would have been insufficient for its 
 population, — on the other hand, it was utterly 
 absurd to regard Austro-Germany augmented by 
 the Balkans and Turkey (that is to say, Pan- 
 Germany) as a fortress susceptible of being re- 
 duced by starvation. Pan-Germany to-day is in 
 very truth a fortress, in the sense that it is en- 
 circled by continuous fortified fronts; but it is 
 nonsense to liken Pan-Germany to a fortress 
 having necessarily to surrender because of famine, 
 when, by virtue of its geographic immensity, in- 
 cluding the vast exploitable territories of the 
 Balkans and Turkey, it affords the most diverse 
 products of the soil. And the latent resources of 
 Pan-Germany are immeasurably increased now 
 that the whole of European and Asiatic Russia 
 is open to it. 
 
 To sum up — the theory that the Western 
 front is the principal one is the capital strategic 
 blunder of all the Allied leaders, and it explains all 
 their other blunders. The facts are at hand to 
 prove that it was impossible to conceive of any 
 
 1 86 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 general plan for the conduct of the war by the 
 Allies which would have made it easier for the 
 German General Staff to carry out the Panger- 
 manist scheme. For, from this point of view, the 
 theory has had the following further results: — 
 
 i . It has allowed Germany to lay hold freely of 
 the territories necessary for the creation of Pan- 
 Germany. 
 
 2. It has given her all the time that she re- 
 quired so to organize Pan-Germany that its mili- 
 tary strength should bring about one of its first 
 effects — the collapse of Russia. 
 
 3. It has confirmed Germany in the possession 
 of all the sources of troops, supplies, and raw ma- 
 terials existing in the Balkans and Asiatic Turkey. 
 
 4. On the other hand, it has deprived the Allies 
 of the sources of strategic strength, and of effec- 
 tives, represented by the Balkans and Russia, and 
 has compelled them to seek beyond the Atlantic 
 those things which are indispensable for their 
 subsistence. 
 
 5. It has enabled the German General Staff 
 to concentrate all the disposable effectives of 
 Pan-Germany on the Western front, which con- 
 centration was impossible so long as the Allies 
 were sufficiently formidable in the East. 
 
 Doubtless it is no longer possible to deny to the 
 Western front the title of principal front; but 
 this is because there is, practically, no other now. 
 Clearly it is the principal one for the Germans, 
 
 187 
 
PA N -GERM A N Y 
 
 because they can unquestionably bring about a 
 definitive decision there. But it is assuredly not 
 the principal one for the Allies except so far as it 
 is a question, first of all, of not being hopelessly 
 defeated there. 
 
 Thus the first effort of the Allies must be to do 
 their utmost not to be crushed in the West. But 
 will all the successes that they may be able to 
 win in the West suffice to give them the victory 
 — that is to say, to force Germany to abandon 
 her grip on Central Europe and the Balkans, in 
 other words, on the instruments of universal 
 domination? Of course, no one could undertake 
 to say absolutely that it will not be, but the 
 chances of such a result are exceedingly slender. 
 The facts developed by the war, and the concord- 
 ant precedents of all military history, enable one 
 easily to convince one's self that it cannot be so. 
 In fact, Germany not only is proceeding with the 
 organization of Pan-Germany, but she proposes 
 also to exploit Russia, whence she will obtain im- 
 mense supplemental resources. The means of 
 resistance of the Germans on the Western front 
 must be regarded therefore as augmented in at 
 least as great measure as the means of offensive 
 action which the Allies will be able to accumulate 
 on that front. Consequently it is, to say the least, 
 extremely doubtful whether the results on the 
 Western front can be decisive for the Allies. 
 
 Now, the mere fact that any doubt about it 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 exists is enough to make it the duty of the Allies 
 to take the precautions which wisdom enjoins 
 against this new possible blunder, which this time 
 would be beyond remedy. The Allies must 
 therefore understand that, to win the war, they 
 must, by new methods, enter upon military opera- 
 tions elsewhere than on the Western front. As 
 I hope to show, such supplementary operations 
 are comparatively simple to prepare. 
 
 in 
 
 MR. LLOYD GEORGE AND THE WESTERN FRONT 
 
 In his reverberating speech at Paris on Novem- 
 ber 12, 1917, Mr. Lloyd George performed the 
 service of proclaiming aloud the military blunder 
 of the Allies, — which he justly characterized as 
 'inconceivable,' — in having fixed their attention 
 solely on the Western front. I quote the essential 
 passages of this speech which particularly merit 
 the notice of American readers. But I must call 
 attention to the fact that, although Mr. Lloyd 
 George did fully realize the essential nature of the 
 Danube front from the military standpoint, he did 
 not grasp its capital political importance, as is 
 shown by his speech of January 5, 1918, in which 
 he sanctions the maintenance of the integrity of 
 the Austro-Hungarian Empire; I allude further 
 to this speech at the end of this chapter. 
 
 189 
 
PA N -GERM A N Y 
 
 'There is one feature of this war which makes 
 it unique among all the innumerable wars of the 
 past. It is a siege of nations. The Allies are 
 blockading two huge Empires. It would have 
 been well for us if at all times we had thoroughly 
 grasped that fact. In a siege, not only must 
 every part of the line of circumvallation be strong 
 enough to resist the strongest attack which the 
 besieged can bring to bear upon it ; more than that, 
 the besieging army must be ready to strike at the 
 weakest point of the enemy, wherever that may 
 be. Have we done so? Look at the facts. 
 
 'The enemy was cut off by the Allied navies 
 from all the rich lands beyond the seas, whence 
 he had been drawing enormous stores of food and 
 material. On the east he was blockaded by Rus- 
 sia, on the west by the armies of France, Britain, 
 and Italy. But the south, the important south, 
 with its gateway to the East, was left to be held 
 by the forces of a small country with half the 
 population of Belgium, its armies exhausted by 
 the struggles of three wars, and with two treach- 
 erous kings behind, lying in wait for an opportu- 
 nity to knife it when it was engaged in defending 
 itself against a mightier foe. 
 
 'What was the result of this inconceivable 
 blunder? What would any man whose mind was 
 devoted to the examination of the whole, not 
 merely to one part, of the great battlefield, have 
 expected to happen? Exactly what did happen. 
 
 190 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 While we were hammering with the whole of our 
 might at the impenetrable barrier in the West, the 
 Central Powers, feeling confident that we could 
 not break through, threw their weight on that 
 little country, crushed her resistance, opened the 
 gate to the East, and unlocked great stores of 
 corn, cattle, and minerals, yea, unlocked the door 
 of hope — all essential to enable Germany to 
 sustain her struggle. 
 
 'Without these additional stores Germany 
 might have failed to support her armies at full 
 strength. Hundreds of thousands of splendid 
 fighting material were added to the armies which 
 Germany can control — added to her and lost to 
 us. Turkey, which at that time had nearly ex- 
 hausted its resources for war, cut off from the 
 only possible source of supply, was reequipped 
 and resuscitated, and became once more a for- 
 midable military power, whose activities absorbed 
 hundreds of thousands of our best men in order 
 to enable us at all to retain our prestige in the 
 East. By this fatuity this terrible war was given 
 new life. 
 
 'Why was this incredible blunder perpetrated? 
 The answer is simple. Because it was no one's 
 business in particular to guard the gates of the 
 Balkans. The one front had not become a reality. 
 France and England were absorbed in other 
 spheres. Italy had her mind on the Carso. Rus- 
 sia had a thousand -mile frontier to guard, and, 
 
 191 
 
PA N-GERMA N Y 
 
 even if she had not, she could not get through to 
 help Serbia, because Roumania was neutral. It 
 is true we sent forces to Saloniki to rescue Serbia, 
 but, as usual, they were sent too late. They were 
 sent when the mischief was complete. 
 
 1 Half of those forces sent in time — nay, half 
 the men who fell in the futile attempt to break 
 through on the Western front in September of 
 that year — would have saved Serbia, would have 
 saved the Balkans and completed the blockade of 
 Germany. 
 
 'You may say that is an old story. I wish it 
 were. It is simply the first chapter of a serial 
 which has been running to this hour. . . . 
 
 1 When we advance a kilometre into the enemy's 
 lines, snatch a small shattered village out of his 
 cruel grip, capture a few hundreds of his soldiers, 
 we shout with unfeigned joy. And rightly so, for 
 it is the symbol of our superiority over a boastful 
 foe and a sure guaranty that in the end we can 
 and shall win. But what if we had advanced 
 50 kilometres beyond his lines and made 200,000 
 of his soldiers prisoners and taken 2,500 of his 
 best guns, with enormous quantities of ammuni- 
 tion and stores?' 
 
 Fundamental strategic errors, then, have been 
 committed. The responsible cause of these errors 
 is very simple. The leaders of the Entente, with 
 the assurance born of their misconstruction of 
 actual European conditions, of which they have 
 
 192 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 afforded so many proofs, deeming themselves 
 sure of their position, have obstinately refused 
 to listen to the few men who are aware of the real 
 object with which Germany entered upon the war, 
 and consequently of the means which would per- 
 mit an effective opposition to her success. 
 
 The same reason explains why Mr. Lloyd 
 George's speech of January 5, 191 8, contains the 
 heartrending contradictions and technical blun- 
 ders to which I deem it my imperative duty to 
 call the attention of my American readers. If 
 his declarations relative to war-indemnities should 
 be followed by a practical application, France, 
 on the signature of the treaty of peace, would 
 be condemned to absolute bankruptcy, and the 
 value of the French bank-note would vanish 
 with magical rapidity. 
 
 On the other hand, the declaration concerning 
 the maintenance of the integrity of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Empire is utterly at variance with 
 the principle laid down by the Allies, that the dif- 
 ferent races must be permitted to decide freely 
 concerning their own destiny. Now, the Czechs 
 and Jugo-Slavs want no more of the Hapsburgs or 
 of Austria-Hungary. Why compel them to re- 
 main subject to the yoke of Vienna, which, as all 
 those familiar with the Central European prob- 
 lem are well aware, is unable to escape from the 
 grip of Berlin? They know equally well that it is 
 altogether impossible to place the least reliance 
 
 193 
 
P A N - G E R M A N Y 
 
 on Austria-Hungary, which is not a nation, which 
 is not even a state, but which is, in reality, a sys- 
 tem of ultra-reactionary oppression, operating 
 for the benefit of the German- Magyar hegemony 
 of Europe. As for the Hapsburg dynasty, for 
 centuries past it has broken its word as freely as 
 the Hohenzollerns have broken theirs. Not the 
 slightest credit can be given to its signature by 
 any sane person. 
 
 On the other hand, if Austria-Hungary is al- 
 lowed to exist, the promises of integral restitu- 
 tion made by Mr. Lloyd George to Roumania, 
 Montenegro, and Serbia, are valueless, because 
 incapable of fulfillment by reason of the conti- 
 guity of the Austro-German mass. Nor has the 
 promise of restitution of Alsace-Lorraine any 
 greater value. Such restitution could not be 
 permanent unless Pan-Germany is definitively 
 crushed, that is to say, unless Austria-Hungary 
 disappears. 
 
 It is not pleasant to place one's self in opposi- 
 tion to the almost universal concert of approval, 
 which has greeted Mr. Lloyd George's declara- 
 tion in the Allied countries; but I cannot consent 
 to conceal a truth of which, in my judgment, it is 
 indispensable for the Allies to be informed. For 
 twenty years I stood alone in proclaiming the 
 Pangermanist peril, and the impending war in 
 exactly the shape which it has assumed. I shall 
 stand alone, if I must, in telling you this: Lloyd 
 
 194 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 George's peace terms are either unrealizable or 
 can result only in a terrible deception of the 
 Allies which would cause them to lose the war by 
 making Pan-Germany triumphant. 
 
 If the enormous political blunders which I am 
 forced to point out have been committed by Mr. 
 Lloyd George in his peace programme, it is still 
 for the same old reason : he has neglected to con- 
 sult the real experts, that is, the Englishmen who 
 have given long study to the problem of Central 
 Europe. To consult these men is an absolute 
 necessity, for at this moment there is not, in the 
 whole Entente, any political leader, any diplomat, 
 who is personally thoroughly conversant with this 
 question of Austria-Hungary, the thorough com- 
 prehension of which requires about twenty years 
 of study. What has Mr. Lloyd George done? He 
 has consulted Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, and 
 Mr. Henderson, who certainly have never been to 
 Austria-Hungary to make serious investigations. 
 Per contra, Mr. Lloyd George would assuredly 
 never have been guilty of the serious errors that I 
 am indicating, if he had chosen to listen for one 
 hour to the only three Englishmen who, to my 
 knowledge, have given genuine study to the Aus- 
 tro-Hungarian question on the spot, for many 
 months: Sir Arthur Evans, Mr. Seton -Watson, 
 and Mr. Wickham Steed. The last-named gen- 
 tleman was for ten years before the war the re- 
 markably able correspondent of the Times at 
 
 195 
 
PA -V -G E R \f A X Y 
 
 Vienna. His service of information was so well 
 organized that ir was to him that the French and 
 British embassies applied for information on a 
 multitude of matters, which they were utterly 
 unable to procure for themselves. It is. therefore, 
 altogether contrary to the most elementary com- 
 mon sense, to say nothing of British interests, 
 not to place the greatest reliance on his opinion 
 as to the proper solution of the problem of Central 
 Europe. 
 
 All the foregoing leads us to insistence upon 
 the urgent necessity of this step: to revise the 
 revision of the war-aims of the Allies as set forth 
 in Mr. Lloyd George's programme; for that pro- 
 gramme embodies technical blunders which make 
 it either infinitely hazardous or practically un- 
 workable. 
 
 It will be enough, I believe, for every right- 
 thinking American to know that Mr. Lloyd George 
 made these no less justifiable than alarming state- 
 ments concerning the strategic blunders of the 
 Entente in November, 191 7. or after forty months 
 of warfare; and that in the forty-second month 
 the same Lloyd George was guilty of the tech- 
 nical political blunders that I have pointed out. 
 in connection with the Allies' terms of peace — 
 this will be enough. I say, to convince every such 
 American that the conduct of the war and the 
 preparation for peace, so far as it has developed 
 
 196 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 at present as well in the military as in the political 
 aspect, can no longer be tolerated. 
 
 One of the greatest services that the United 
 States could render to the Allies in Europe would 
 be to say to them: 'We, the United States, are 
 determined to wage war to the limit by all the 
 means at our disposal, but we do not propose 
 that our men and our money shall be wasted to 
 no avail. Henceforth the war must be carried on, 
 and peace prepared for, in accordance with seri- 
 ously considered, and hence truly scientific, 
 plans, as well in the intellectual as in the material 
 domain, and as well from a political as from a 
 military standpoint. ' 
 
 I am well aware that you Americans, by the 
 very force of circumstances, have much to learn 
 from our military leaders, in order to be able to 
 carry on effectively this great war in which you 
 have become involved so suddenly ; but you have 
 special advantages over the Allies in Europe, 
 which should be utilized. Your distance from 
 the other side of the Atlantic gives you the neces- 
 sary interval of space to avoid being hypnotized 
 by the special views of each of the Allies, and 
 hence to see the conflict as a whole, which is most 
 essential. Having never been obliged up to the 
 present time to take sides in European political 
 questions, you have none of the old-time, erro- 
 neous ideas with regard to them which are held 
 by the Allied diplomats in Europe — archaic 
 
 197 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 ideas which are the initial cause of all the dip- 
 lomatic set-backs of the Allies. You have there- 
 fore nothing to forget; and that fact gives you 
 an immense chance of avoiding many disastrous 
 blunders. 
 
 As you certainly have no predetermined plan, 
 and as you are seeking honestly the actual truth, 
 you will inevitably find it if you follow the meth- 
 od of your great captains of industry, all of whom 
 know that, in order to accomplish anything im- 
 portant and efficacious in a province with which 
 they are not familiar, they must begin by apply- 
 ing to the ' expert.' Of course, the expert is not in- 
 fallible. He may, like all of us poor mortals, be 
 mistaken; but when he really deserves to be 
 called an expert, he avoids, with certainty, the 
 commission of such monumental blunders as 
 those heaped up by the European Allied leaders, 
 simply because they did not realize the necessity 
 of consulting experts. Now, there are among 
 the Allies experts on each of the great questions 
 presented by the war and the peace that is 
 to ensue, who are neither politicians, nor dip- 
 lomats, nor soldiers, but who must be con- 
 sulted because they know these questions, root 
 and branch, for the very simple reason that they 
 have studied them long and freely. To be sure, 
 these men are far from numerous, but I declare 
 that they do exist. If you Americans demand 
 that henceforth a call shall be made upon men 
 
 198 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 of real competence, and that there shall be no 
 more discussion about phrases, but solely about 
 carefully studied realities, you will confer upon 
 all the Allies a tremendous service, which will 
 bring us considerably nearer to victory. 
 
 All these advantages are peculiarly yours, 
 Americans. If you choose to make the utmost 
 use of them, you will then be, in many instances, 
 in a position to play the part of a beneficent ar- 
 biter between the European Allies. Although 
 their leading minds, having been taken unawares 
 by the war, have not conducted it as they should 
 have done, they are honest and well-meaning 
 men. Your advice will certainly be well received, 
 provided that they feel that it is invariably 
 dictated in the interest of a mutual, decisive, 
 complete victory — the only sort of victory that 
 will ensure peace for many years to come, and will 
 save civilization. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE LESSON OF THREE YEARS OF WAR 
 AND OF EVENTS IN RUSSIA 
 
 In the preceding chapters, seeking only the truth, 
 I have laid before my American readers the actual 
 situation of affairs with regard to the war, the 
 causes of the blunders heretofore committed by 
 the Allies, and the operation of political strategy 
 — or what I have called 'the strategy of the 
 political sciences.' In my mind these studies are 
 not simply of an historical or theoretical nature. 
 They were intended to precede, and at the same 
 time to justify, the exposition of a concrete war- 
 plan for the Allies — a plan which should be quite 
 new, based upon the political sciences, and really 
 adapted to conditions as they exist to-day. 
 
 I have devoted twenty years of my life to study 
 of the Pan-German scheme, in order to prevent its 
 execution by giving warning of the peril. I have 
 not succeeded in making myself heard in time. 
 And now when, in spite of everything, Pan-Ger- 
 many is actually created, I would like to demon- 
 strate the surest method of destroying it, and 
 hence of putting an end to the war by winning it, 
 and — making due allowance for the blunders 
 already committed — winning it comparatively 
 quickly. 
 
 200 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 I have laid down the broad outlines of the plan 
 which I recommend, in my paper, 'The Best Way 
 to Crush Pan-Germany,' in the Atlantic for De- 
 cember, 191 7. ! The pages which follow are 
 written with the object of setting forth this plan 
 in detail, and of convincing public opinion in 
 America of its possibilities and advantages. When 
 it shall be so convinced, the mighty force of Ameri- 
 can opinion will go far to secure quickly the adop- 
 tion of the measures essential for its execution. 
 
 The plan that I suggest is in reality the out- 
 come of much meditation on the war and the 
 means of winning it. As for the technical infor- 
 mation which the plan assumes, I can fairly say 
 that it is derived from the most reliable sources. 
 Naturally, like every novel idea, it may cause 
 surprise at the first glance; but it must be clearly 
 understood that it is impossible to get out of the 
 strange and unprecedented situation now existing 
 in Europe as a result of the audacity of the Boches, 
 except by adopting ideas which are themselves 
 unprecedented and of premeditated audacity. 
 Moreover this plan is based solely on the employ- 
 ment of elements now in being, in the moral no 
 less than in the material domain. In reality, 
 therefore, there is nothing fanciful about it. 
 
 I beg leave to remind those who may be 
 tempted to ascribe especially great weight to the 
 possible objections which every momentous pro- 
 1 See Chapter vn, supra. 
 
 201 
 
P A N - G E R M A N Y 
 
 posal is likely to arouse, of these facts: that 
 events have shown, unhappily, that the other 
 plans suggested by myself since the beginning of 
 the war, — for instance, that relating to the for- 
 mation of the Danube front, the strategic key to 
 the whole business, — were not only the simplest, 
 but the most susceptible of execution, the most 
 efficacious, and the least costly in men and 
 money. But these plans were regarded as chi- 
 merical by persons who were considered especially 
 competent to judge. 
 
 At the present moment, the question is how 
 to put an end to the existing cataclysm as soon 
 as possible — but only by victory, for slavery is 
 more cruel than death. I may be permitted 
 therefore, I trust, to be listened to in season for at 
 least once in my life. 
 
 That is why I am making a personal appeal to 
 American public opinion, and I urge it to support 
 me vigorously and instantly if I succeed in con- 
 vincing it. 
 
 For my own part, I have a deeply rooted con- 
 viction that, if the execution of the general plan 
 set forth in this study is begun without delay, 
 methodically, persistently, and upon broad bases, 
 it will certainly bring the Allies a complete vic- 
 tory by the end of 191 8; but I must make one 
 explicit reservation. The longer the execution of 
 this plan is postponed, the less efficacious it w-ill be. 
 If this be true, it is for the reason that the Austro- 
 
 202 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 German seizure of Russia involves tremendous 
 consequences which are even yet imperfectly real- 
 ized by the Allies. If they give Germany and 
 Austria-Hungary time to double, yes, even to 
 triple, the railways connecting them with South 
 Russia, the Austro-Germans will have at their 
 disposal limitless supplies of every description, — 
 food, metals, and all the rest, — which will enable 
 them to hold out as long as is necessary against 
 the universal coalition. But, on the other hand, 
 such multiplication of the railways connecting 
 the Central Empires with South Russia cannot 
 be effected within six months. It follows that 
 during that interval the communication of Austria- 
 Germany with the East, where are the particu- 
 larly sensitive and vulnerable strategic positions 
 of Pan-Germany, must be definitively cut. Fur- 
 thermore, the state of mind of the slaves of 
 Central Europe is still such that they can be led 
 to rebel. We must not run the risk of moral 
 collapse on their part which would inevitably 
 come about if the Allies should neglect to give 
 their attention immediately and by practical 
 methods, to the fate of the eighty-six millions of 
 Slavs, Latins, and Semites who are immured 
 against their will in Pan-Germany and are atro- 
 ciously oppressed. Thus there are very serious 
 motives for entering at once upon the execution 
 of the plan proposed. 
 
 For these divers reasons, I regard it as my 
 203 
 
P A X -G E R M A AT Y 
 
 imperative duty to declare emphatically my con- 
 viction that this plan is not only necessary, 
 but indispensable, to the victory of the Allies. 
 
 HOW RUSSIA WAS DESTROYED 
 
 In view of the general condition of affairs in 
 Europe at the beginning of 1918, the dissolution 
 of Russia, provided that the lesson it teaches is 
 thoroughly learned, in no wise lessens the chances 
 of the complete victory of the Entente, as the 
 German propagandists are doing their utmost 
 to convince Allied public opinion that it does, 
 through the medium of pacifists of various breeds. 
 The one thing that the dissolution of the forces of 
 Russia by Germany demonstrates above all else 
 is the potency of the strategy of political sciences, 
 which the Allies can employ in their turn to dis- 
 solve Pan-Germany, and thereby to obtain, in a 
 comparatively short time, a complete victory. 
 
 It was not by the employment of military force, 
 in the sense ordinarily given to that phrase, that 
 the Germans put Russia out of the game, but by 
 turning to account their knowledge of the eth- 
 nography and psychology of the various races 
 living in Russia. Indeed, it was this knowledge 
 which enabled the Germans to exploit unerringly 
 the extraordinary ignorance of actualities of the 
 Russian Socialists, and their stupendous pride; 
 
 204 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 the artlessness, even the very genuine kindliness, 
 of the Russian people, which predispose them to 
 forget speedily the most cruel outrages; and, 
 lastly, the particularist tendencies of certain Rus- 
 sian nationalities — tendencies which the Berlin 
 propaganda has artificially transformed into sep- 
 aratist movements to be put into effect at once. 
 Now, I maintain that the ethnographic and 
 psychological facts of which the Germans cyni- 
 cally take advantage to reduce these peoples to 
 slavery, can very quickly be turned to account, 
 equitably and effectively, by the Allies, to free 
 those who are oppressed by the Boches and Pan- 
 Germans, to assure the truimph of liberty, and to 
 make certain the absolute defeat of Prussian 
 militarism. 
 
 II 
 
 THE OPPOSED FORCES 
 
 To make sure that we do not deceive ourselves, 
 we will not only leave Russia out of the reckoning, 
 but will also omit the resources, considerable and 
 varied though they are, which the Allies derive 
 from their extensive colonies, and the assistance 
 (although, taken as a whole, it is very important) 
 of the Belgians, Portuguese, Serbs, Greeks, Rou- 
 manians, and Japanese. We will enumerate sim- 
 ply the forces of the great Allied powers. 
 
 France has forty millions of inhabitants; Great 
 Britain, forty-six millions; Italy, thirty-six mil- 
 
 205 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 lions; the United States, one hundred millions; 
 making in all two hundred and twenty-two mil- 
 lions of the Allies, who have to contend against 
 seventy-three millions of Germans, ten millions 
 of Magyars, five millions of Bulgars, and six 
 millions of Turks — or only ninety-four millions 
 of actual adversaries. 
 
 But we have, in addition, allies in the fortress 
 that we have to subdue. 
 
 In fact — and this is a matter of extreme im- 
 portance 1 — all the rest of the one hundred and 
 eighty millions of inhabitants of Pan-Germany, 
 the enormous number of eighty-six millions (that 
 is to say, nearly one half), of French, Belgians, 
 Alsace-Lorrainers, Danes, Poles, Lithuanians, 
 Letts, Ruthenians, Czechs, Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, 
 Roumanians, Italians, Armenians, Greeks and 
 Arabs, are slaves, imprisoned in their own despite 
 in Pan-Germany. They are, therefore, anti- 
 Boche by conviction, being well aware that only 
 the decisive triumph of the Entente can put an 
 end to their serfdom. 
 
 Having studied these oppressed peoples on the 
 spot for more than twenty years, knowing their 
 interests and their sentiments, I affirm that this is 
 a psychological situation of enormous concern to 
 the Allies. I maintain further that these eighty- 
 six millions of Slavs, Latins, and Semites represent, 
 by virtue of the strategic importance of the dis- 
 
 1 See map opposite. 
 
 207 
 
P A X - G E R M A .V Y 
 
 tricts in which they live, a force which — on the 
 single condition that they are supplied with the 
 means of action adapted to their unique situation. 
 — may assist materially in the final victors', and 
 a force infinitely stronger than that which the 
 hundred and eighty-two millions of inhabitants 
 of the former Empire of the Tsars ever repre- 
 sented. 
 
 Estimated according to its psychological value, 
 the minimum bulk of the Allies is composed of two 
 groups : — 
 
 {a) The two hundred and twenty-two millions 
 of the declared Allies ; 
 
 (6) The eighty-six millions of latent allies 
 immured in Pan-Germany. 
 
 Thus, regarded from the standpoint of their 
 sentiments, the Allies form a total minimum of 
 three hundred and eight millions, opposed by only 
 ninety-four millions of Boches and Pro-Germans; 
 that is to say, they are about three to one. 
 
 in 
 
 GREAT IMPORTANCE OF OUR LATENT ALLIES 
 
 But some one may say : ' These eighty-six mil- 
 lions of latent allies can do nothing because they 
 are shut up in Pan-Germany. ' But it is this 
 very condition which is extraordinarily favorable. 
 In order to win the war the Allies must absolutely 
 subdue the immense fortress which Pan-Ger- 
 
 208 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 many now is. The experience of three years has 
 proved that its ramparts, constantly strengthened 
 by the Boches, are very hard to raze ; but hitherto 
 the Allies have assailed it only from the outside, 
 heedless of the important fact that half of the 
 garrison is inclined to favor their action. 
 
 Now, out of these eighty-six millions of anti- 
 Boches in Pan-Germany, an ethnological analysis 
 enables us to reckon that about seven millions 
 (Slavs, Latins, and Arabs) have been mobilized, 
 that is to say, incorporated against their will in 
 the armies directed from Berlin. At the present 
 moment, therefore, in the armies of Pan-Germany, 
 one man in every three — an enormous proportion 
 — is an anti-Pangermanist, who detests this war, 
 who is a soldier by compulsion, who is fully aware 
 that his own sacrifice helps to confirm his own 
 servitude and that of his family, and who holds 
 his oppressors in horror; who is armed, and who 
 will beyond question be overjoyed to use his 
 weapons against his Boche or Pan-German neigh- 
 bors the moment that a condition of general 
 unrest enables him to do it effectively. 
 
 It is possible, too, for the Allies to arm the 
 other, immobilized anti-Boches, who are shut up 
 in Pan-Germany, to such effect that there will 
 result a condition of general unrest so far-reaching 
 that the seven millions of anti-Pangermanist 
 soldiers mobilized contrary to their wishes will 
 be able to rise suddenly and use their weapons 
 
 209 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 against their oppressors with irresistible force, if 
 at that moment a carefully planned Allied of- 
 fensive is started on the Western front. 
 
 Judging from what the Boches have done in 
 Russia, and what they are at present trying to 
 do in Greece, Switzerland, and Spain, it is very 
 certain that if they were in our place they would 
 long gone have profited tremendously by the 
 exceedingly favorable conditions which we have 
 described. The essential reason that the Allies 
 have not yet taken this situation into serious 
 consideration is that they have deemed it neces- 
 sary to employ only the material instruments of 
 war, not ascribing the importance that they de- 
 serve to intellectual methods based upon a knowl- 
 edge of ethnography and national psychology. 
 But the dissolution of Russia by the Boches has 
 proved — and herein it may be of use to the 
 Allies — the extraordinary potency of these 
 intellectual methods, which is certainly much 
 greater than that of the most terror-inspiring 
 explosives. 
 
 On the other hand, from a moral standpoint, 
 the Allies unquestionably have, not only the 
 right, but the absolute duty of conveying to those 
 Slavs and Latins and Arabs effective means of 
 successful revolt, since they are now subjected to 
 the most odious form of servitude. Finally, there 
 are in each of the Allied countries numerous 
 students who are thoroughly familiar with the 
 
 210 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 ethnographical and psychological facts which 
 make it possible to prepare upon genuinely 
 scientific lines the contest for the liberty of the 
 oppressed peoples of Pan-Germany. 
 
 IV 
 THE FORMULA OF VICTORY 
 
 To bring about an explosion in Pan-Germany, 
 we must start with the following formula, deduced 
 from the lessons of the war, which seems, in view 
 of the present situation and the blunders hitherto 
 committed, to be the formula by which the Allies 
 are destined to win a complete victory. 
 
 To combine henceforth the military pressure of the 
 Allies outside of Pan-Germany with the scientific, 
 methodical, constant, and persistent development 
 of the internal causes of dissolution which exist in a 
 considerable part of the territory of Pan-Germany. 
 
 To maintain on the Western front an impenetrable 
 and vigilant defensive; but, in order to keep down 
 the losses to the lowest point, to undertake no offen- 
 sive on a grand scale on that front until the German 
 rear has been thrown into confusion, morally and 
 physically, by means of legitimate and essential 
 insurrections systematically organized by the Allies 
 and carried out by the slaves shut up in Pan-Ger- 
 many, demonstrably to their advantage. 
 
 211 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 THE STRATEGICALLY VITAL REGIONS 
 OF PAN-GERMANY 
 
 This programme, if carried into effect, would 
 have enormous and prompt consequences; and 
 yet it can be carried into effect with comparatively 
 little exertion. Indeed the effectiveness of such 
 exertion depends, not on its extent, but on its 
 intelligence. It must be put forth against the 
 specially vulnerable parts of the military organ- 
 ization of Pan-Germany. 
 
 Of the eighty-six millions of Boches shut up in 
 Pan-Germany, at least fifty millions of non- 
 mobilized inhabit the vast territories stretching 
 from the Baltic to the southern Balkans (about 
 1500 kilometres). Now these territories con- 
 stitute the most essential and, at the same time, 
 the most vulnerable strategic bases of all military 
 Pan-Germany. In fact all the channels of com- 
 munication — rail and water — which connect 
 Austria-Germany with Russia, the Balkans, and 
 Turkey, pass through these territories. Now, 
 three years have shown clearly that without the 
 troops and multifarious supplies of the Balkans 
 and Turkey, — to which are now to be added 
 the resources of South Russia, — Austria-Ger- 
 many would long ago have found it impossible 
 to continue the struggle. In reality, therefore, 
 it is enough that the Austro-German communica- 
 
 212 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 tions should be seriously disturbed, for the situa- 
 tion to become, with extraordinary swiftness, 
 very difficult both morally and materially for the 
 armies concentrated on the Western front by the 
 German Staff. 
 
 This result can be secured by an entirely 
 novel method of carrying on the war. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 A Plan for the Allies 
 
 WHY IT MUST BE DISCUSSED PUBLICLY 
 
 A new war-plan may bring about very swiftly 
 the explosion of Pan-Germany, and, as a result, 
 the complete triumph of the Allies; hence it may 
 make possible the conclusion of a peace on gen- 
 uinely democratic principles. 
 
 This plan presents several original features. 
 In the first place, for technical reasons set forth 
 later, the Boches, even if they knew that the 
 Allies were working to carry out this plan, could 
 not oppose its execution to any effective purpose. 
 Moreover, on the twofold condition that the 
 exposition is limited to the general outlines of 
 the plan, and that no allusion is made to any 
 features of the eventual preparation except those 
 which it would be impossible to conceal from 
 Boche espionage, publicity ensures to the Allies 
 the following immediate and worth-while ad- 
 vantages. 
 
 i. It cannot fail to impair the morale of the 
 Germans by letting them know that they are not 
 by any means so near a final triumph as their 
 
 214 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 leaders give them to understand, since the Allies 
 are able to employ new media of victory, exceed- 
 ingly powerful and of great rapidity of execution. 
 
 2. This publicity cannot fail to strengthen 
 materially the morale of all the Allied nations by 
 showing them that the vanished Russian coop- 
 eration can really be replaced by forces of a dif- 
 ferent character, to be sure, and to be employed 
 in an unforeseen way, but which, by reason of the 
 peculiar vulnerability of the points upon which 
 they will be brought to bear, make it possible 
 to secure a complete victory much more quickly 
 than it has ever been possible to expect it with 
 the assistance of the Russian forces. 
 
 3. This publicity, again, cannot fail to demon- 
 strate what an enormous and fatal blunder it 
 would be for the Allies, yielding to a momentary 
 lassitude, to allow themselves to be trapped by 
 the Austro-Boche pacifist manoeuvres, when a 
 definitive and comparatively speedy victory is 
 still entirely possible. 
 
 4. Lastly, this publicity cannot fail to embarrass 
 the Germans very seriously, from now on, from 
 the strategic standpoint. At this time the Ger- 
 man Staff is concentrating as rapidly as pos- 
 sible on the Western front all the troops at its 
 disposal. A definite demonstration that its vital 
 lines of communication with the Orient can ac- 
 tually be threatened by unforeseen means and 
 at widely separated points, will inevitably cause 
 
 215 
 
PAN-GERMAN Y 
 
 havoc in the calculations of Berlin. On any hy- 
 pothesis the decisions resulting from this embar- 
 rassment must be advantageous to the Allies. 
 If, for prudential reasons, in consideration of 
 possibilities which it has not as yet confronted, 
 the German Staff should slow up its concentra- 
 tion in the West so as to leave sufficient forces in 
 the oppressed districts of Pan-Germany, it will 
 thereby decrease its chances of success in its ap- 
 proaching offensive in the West; the result being 
 a reprieve for all the Allied troops. But if, per- 
 sisting in its present plan, the Kaiser's Staff con- 
 tinues to denude of reliable troops extensive 
 regions of Pan-Germany which are capable of 
 being roused to revolt, then they will simply 
 make it easier than it now is to carry the proposed 
 plan into effect. 
 
 II 
 
 MORAL CONDITIONS OF THE SUCCESS OF THE PLAN 
 
 Common sense warns us that we cannot seri- 
 ously expect the oppressed peoples to rebel, if at 
 the same time we refuse to guarantee that they 
 shall not long remain under the yoke of their op- 
 pressors. In order, therefore, that the desired 
 rebellion may become possible, the Allies must 
 give the Poles, Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, Roumanians, 
 and the rest a categorical promise that, after the 
 victory, they shall actually and freely decide 
 their own destiny. Indeed it is sufficient to ap- 
 
 216 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 ply to the conduct of the war the democratic 
 principle invoked by the Entente — by the 
 Allied governments and by the Allied Socialists 
 alike — for the peace-settlement; a principle 
 which is the basis, and, moreover, the justifica- 
 tion of President Wilson's intervention in the 
 affairs of Europe. The proposed plan, then, as- 
 sumes that, in order to bring about a democratic 
 peace, the war itself will be waged on democratic 
 lines. Under this assumption one of the essen- 
 tial objects of the war — the right of 'self- 
 determination' on the part of the different 
 peoples — becomes likewise one of the instru- 
 ments of victory. Thus are set in motion new 
 forces which can but hasten the coming of peace. 
 
 I have now to prove that the Allies have 
 actually in their hands the material means to 
 make the insurrection within Pan-Germany ex- 
 ceedingly effective in a very short time. 
 
 in 
 
 THE ESSENTIAL SPECIAL WEAPON EXISTS 
 
 To enable them to act efficaciously, the op- 
 pressed peoples of Pan-Germany must be put in 
 a condition to contend successfully against the 
 troops employed to suppress the insurrection. 
 The Allies must, therefore, supply in large quan- 
 tities a very effective weapon, which, however, 
 
 217 
 
P AN -GERM A N Y 
 
 will meet the complex necessities growing out of 
 the present military situation and of the peculiar 
 conditions in which the insurgent masses will 
 have to operate. For these various reasons the 
 weapon in question must be manufactured by 
 the Allies rapidly and by the million. It must 
 be easy to transport, hence very light; easy to 
 conceal, hence small; and yet it must be indis- 
 putably powerful. Now, there is in existence a 
 weapon which meets all these diverse conditions. 
 I can describe it with absolute certainty that I 
 am revealing no secret, for, by the irony of fate, 
 the weapon best adapted to bring about the 
 explosion of Pan-Germany and thus to revolu- 
 tionize the war even more completely than the 
 machine-gun, the barbed-wire entanglement, or 
 the submarine has done, is a German weapon, 
 which the Allied factories — notably those in 
 the United States — can turn out rapidly by the 
 million, at a relatively small expense compared 
 with all the other expenses imposed upon the 
 Allies by the war. 
 
 The German automatic ten-shooter Mauser pis- 
 tol has sights graded to a thousand metres. Its 
 bullet is deadly at that distance, which is practi- 
 cally sufficient for all purposes. Again, thanks 
 to its wooden sheath which acts as a stock, it is 
 very accurate at five hundred metres. So that 
 the ammunition of this weapon — and this is a 
 point of great importance — can be expended 
 
 218 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 with pretty good practical results, which is not 
 the case with a pistol without a stock. 
 
 For practical purposes, then, this pistol, — 
 or some other similar one, provided that it is as 
 light and as powerful, has the same range, and is 
 supplied with a stock, — which is essential, — is 
 as effective a weapon as a rifle. Now, this pistol 
 weighs only 1650 grammes. It constitutes, there- 
 fore, a sort of pocket machine-gun, very easy to 
 keep out of sight. Furthermore, the 7.63 mm. 
 cartridge used in it weighs only 12 grammes. 
 Thus the whole thing — pistol, sheath, 200 cart- 
 ridges, and cartridge-box — weigh less than five 
 kilogrammes, with which a man can be effec- 
 tively equipped for several weeks. So that the 
 weapon that is perfectly adapted to the special 
 needs of the slaves of Pan-Germany unquestion- 
 bly exists. The next point is to inquire if it 
 can be supplied to them in large quantities. 
 
 IV 
 THE MEANS OF TRANSPORT EXISTS 
 
 On this point, again, I shall make my demon- 
 stration without revealing anything to the 
 Boches. I shall rely solely upon something that 
 exists already, and I shall give only reliable in- 
 formation which may well be in the possession of 
 those well informed in aviation matters. I shall 
 give figures relating only to one type of airplane, 
 
 219 
 
PA N -G E RM A N Y 
 
 which not only is in being but is sufficiently 
 standardized to be built at the present time in 
 series. This airplane — or other similar ones 
 which are certainly in use in the Allied armies; 
 for of course I do not recommend one type rather 
 than another, for I am thinking only of victory — 
 this airplane, then, can be built by hundreds or 
 by thousands, in a few months, without further 
 study. 
 
 Now, the powerful motor of this standardized 
 airplane will run for nine consecutive hours. 
 With a tank of sufficient size and an average speed 
 of 150 kilometres an hour, it would have a range 
 of 1350 kilometres — that is to say, it could make 
 a raid of 600 kilometres and return to the start- 
 ing-point. Now a range of 600 kilometres is 
 more than sufficient to permit an unlimited 
 number of expeditions to widely separated and 
 strategically vital parts of Pan-Germany, in 
 Europe or Asia. 
 
 In addition to the stock of fuel for 1200 kilo- 
 metres, the pilots, and their equipment, our air- 
 ship can carry on the journey a load of 340 kilo- 
 grammes, that is to say, 68 packages of arms and 
 munitions of five kilogrammes each, or enough 
 to equip 68 anti-Boches. On the other hand, the 
 life of an airplane may be reckoned at 80 hours; 
 so that as nine hours is enough for a raid of 1200 
 kilometres (600 to go and 600 to return), our ves- 
 sel will be able to carry out nine such raids, or to 
 
 220 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 carry nine times 68 packages of arms a distance 
 of 600 kilometres. At that distance, then, one 
 hundred Allied airplanes can in a few days equip 
 61,200 men in the heart of Pan-Germany, for 
 several weeks. A thousand planes would equip 
 612,000 men. If four thousand planes were as- 
 signed to this service, — a figure not at all chi- 
 merical if all the Allies chose to take part, — 
 2,448,000 men, all new combatants, could be 
 equipped within a few months, in the strategically 
 vital portions of Pan-Germany. 
 
 And so, inasmuch as the requisite type of trans- 
 port aircraft exists, the Allies, if they are really 
 determined upon it, can send millions of arms to 
 the slaves of Pan-Germany within a very few 
 months from the day the decision is reached. 
 And as the Boche and pro-Boche elements of the 
 armies of Pan-Germany are held by force of cir- 
 cumstances in the West, as their present reserves 
 are not inexhaustible, the Staff at Berlin cer- 
 tainly could not hold its own against large hos- 
 tile forces, fully armed, operating with rapidity 
 in the very heart of Pan-Germany — a con- 
 tingency which has never been provided for in 
 its plans. 
 
 For all these reasons, therefore, it is quite 
 within bounds to assert that it is possible to 
 establish the ascendency of the revolt of the op- 
 pressed democratic races of Pan-Germany over 
 the Austro-Boche tyranny. 
 
 221 
 
PA N -G E RM A N Y 
 
 ADVANTAGES, AND CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS 
 
 I. Possible large increase in the output of Allied 
 aircraft. — In its eighty hours of serviceable life, a 
 bomb-dropping airplane can carry about 11,000 
 kilogrammes of projectiles 300 kilometres. Again, 
 in eighty hours this same vessel could carry only 
 3060 kilogrammes 600 kilometres ; but those 3060 
 kilogrammes represent the wherewithal to equip 
 612 men in the very heart of Pan-Germany. If 
 we deduct military bombardments in the rear of 
 the Boche armies on the Western front, — which 
 are indispensable operations, — what practical 
 effect do 11,000 kilogrammes of bombs produce? 
 They result in reparable local damage, money 
 loss, and the deaths of a few women and children ; 
 but it is certain that they put very few enemy 
 fighting men where they can do no harm. On 
 the other hand, the 3060 kilogrammes which 
 would make possible the fitting out with arms for 
 several weeks 612 determined anti-Boches who 
 constitute a new fighting force for the Entente, 
 dwelling in the strategically vital portions of 
 Pan-Germany, and placed in a position to ac- 
 count for many Germans and pro-Germans, 
 would manifestly have an infinitely greater in- 
 fluence on the winning of a speedy complete vic- 
 tory than the 1 1 ,000 kilogrammes of bombs would 
 have. This reasoning seems to prove that by 
 
 222 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 assigning to the armament of these oppressed 
 peoples at least a part of their bomb-carrying air- 
 craft, which are beginning to come from the 
 factories in large numbers, the Allies can very 
 soon augment very largely the effectiveness of 
 their thousands of aircraft now under construc- 
 tion. 
 
 2. The helplessness of the Boches to defeat the new 
 plan. — If it were a question of fomenting an 
 insurrection in a small district of two or three 
 million people, and the Boches were in no uncer- 
 tainty as to the locality threatened, they would 
 not hesitate to protect themselves against any 
 revolutionary uprising by massacring the popula- 
 tion. But such is not the case. The oppressed 
 territories in Pan-Germany are of enormous ex- 
 tent. The Allies, therefore, can equip the people 
 in widely separated districts, and postpone making 
 their choice of the special regions to be supplied 
 until the last moment. Thus the Germans will 
 be forced to remain in a state of uncertainty. 
 Moreover, as these oppressed districts contain, 
 all together, eighty-six millions of Slavs, Latins, 
 and Semites, the Austro-Boches, hard-pressed as 
 they are by the Allies on the West, cannot, even 
 if they would, put such vast masses of people to 
 the sword. On the other hand, the Germans and 
 their vassals are already inflicting the most shock- 
 ing terrorism on these populations. Long since 
 they were forbidden to have weapons, and those 
 
 223 
 
PA N -GERM A N Y 
 
 who have them in their possession are shot when 
 they are discovered. But despite the prohibi- 
 tion and despite the terrorism, there are constant 
 disturbances throughout the oppressed districts. 
 It follows that, even if they knew that the pro- 
 posed plan was being put into effect, the Germans 
 could not terrorize these enslaved people more 
 than they are doing. Conversely, since they are 
 constantly revolting even now, when they are 
 without arms and have small chance of success, it 
 is plain that they would make much more trouble 
 if they were effectively and abundantly armed, 
 so that their chance of success would be much 
 greater than it is to-day. 
 
 It is impossible to prevent the Boche air- 
 ships from flying over London and Paris, which 
 are especially well looked after and defended. 
 Manifestly, therefore, the Boches could not inter- 
 fere with numerous passenger-carrying aircraft 
 which would have an endless choice of routes a 
 long way from the military fronts, and by flying 
 low, could drop their packages of munitions in 
 man)' different parts of Pan-Germany (in Europe 
 and Asia), by means of a very simple apparatus, 
 without even alighting. How then could the 
 Boches, threatened on all sides, set up a really 
 effective anti-aircraft organization over hundreds 
 of square miles of territory situated as we have 
 described? 
 
 If the Boches can, almost at will, with their 
 
 224 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 submarines, strew the sea with mines which 
 destroy Allied ships, it is equally true to say that, 
 whenever the Allies choose to do it, they can, 
 much more freely, strew these Boche-harried 
 districts with innumerable packages of muni- 
 tions — veritable mines which will, by virtue of 
 their combined action, blow up the whole of 
 Pan-Germany. 
 
 I am justified, therefore, in saying that the 
 Boches could not effectively interfere with the 
 plan proposed. 
 
 3. The conditions of success of the new plan. — 
 If it is to be surely efficacious, this plan must 
 be methodically prepared with a view to its ex- 
 ecution on a large scale. It is plain that such 
 preparations on a large scale could not be con- 
 cealed from the Boches, — for example, that pas- 
 senger-carrying airships are being built in large 
 numbers, — any more than we have been able to 
 conceal from them the manufacture of heavy 
 artillery. But the fact that the Boches were ap- 
 prized of these preparations would not only be no 
 drawback, but would actually be of advantage. 
 Indeed, it is essential, in view of the lasting moral 
 shock that they are destined to receive, that they 
 and their vassals should have the sense of being 
 constantly threatened in all those parts of Pan- 
 Germany which are not pro-German. This threat, 
 indubitable so far as the possibility of its being 
 translated into action is concerned, but always 
 
 225 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 vague as to the exact localities concerned, would 
 be to our foes a source of wearing fatigue, which, 
 added to all the rest, would hasten the moment 
 of their final collapse, and hence of victory. 
 
 The time for carrying out the plan having 
 arrived, the transport of arms must take place 
 as rapidly as possible to widely separated dis- 
 tricts of Pan-Germany. Thus the Boches and 
 their vassals, having to deal hurriedly with a well- 
 equipped insurrection breaking out over exten- 
 sive territories and at points far removed from 
 one another, would find it practically impossible 
 to put it down. 
 
 Although the general preparation we have de- 
 scribed may be known to the Boches without 
 disadvantage, on the other hand, the actual execu- 
 tion of the plan must be rigorously kept secret: 
 for example, the starting-point of the aircraft, 
 the time fixed, and the objective of the raid. As 
 general preparations would be made at all pos- 
 sible starting-points, which are innumerable, 
 the Boches would feel that they were threatened 
 in every direction — a most desirable consum- 
 mation ; but the Allied high command will always 
 have the power to issue starting orders, at the 
 last moment, to the leaders of the air-squadron, 
 as well as to indicate the precise points to be 
 reached. Under these conditions, the secrecy 
 indispensable to success will be easy to secure. 
 Thus it will be a comparatively simple matter 
 
 226 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 to surprise the Boches despite their knowledge 
 of the plan as a whole. 
 
 I have pointed out why the plan in question, 
 that its success may be assured, should be un- 
 dertaken on a large scale. I propose now to 
 show why a few hundreds of thousands of auto- 
 matic Mausers, if they are judiciously distributed 
 in Pan-Germany, would alone have a probably 
 decisive effect on the war. 
 
 The disturbances which have already taken 
 place in Poland, Austria-Hungary, and the Bal- 
 kans have seriously embarrassed the Austro- 
 Germans and the Bulgarians. Down to the 
 present time the Boches and their vassals have 
 been able to deal with the situation because the 
 insurgents are without arms; but if, in certain 
 parts of Pan-Germany, there were supplies of 
 weapons practically as effective as the rifle, such 
 as the automatic Mauser, the present situation 
 would be made much harder for the Boches, even 
 if the number of these pistols sent by the Allies 
 amounted to no more than 500,000 to 600,000, 
 which a bare thousand aircraft could deliver. 
 
 This estimate of the weapons and aircraft to be 
 employed, although comparatively small, is large 
 enough nevertheless to have a great effect, be- 
 cause to-day, after so long and exhausting a 
 struggle, a simple rupture of equilibrium is suffi- 
 cient to ensure victory. 
 
 227 
 
PA N -GERM A N Y 
 
 At this moment the scales of Destiny may be 
 likened to a steelyard, of which the hook is on 
 the Western front and the end of the beam in 
 Eastern Pan-Germany. For the moment the 
 balance is in equilibrium. To break it, the 
 Boches are preparing to place the supplementary 
 weight of their disposable forces from the East 
 on the hook at the West. On their side, to pre- 
 vent the equilibrium being thus broken, which 
 would mean their defeat, the Allies are preparing 
 to station all their disposable forces under the 
 hook, in order to checkmate the new German 
 movement. But if, in addition, the Allies could 
 place a supplementary weight on the end of the 
 beam in Eastern Pan-Germany, even though 
 the weight be a light one, it will act with great 
 force, because of the length of that arm of the 
 lever; and its force will be exerted in the same 
 direction as the upward push of the Allies in the 
 West. Thereupon the hook of the steelyard, 
 rising abruptly, will give the Allies victory by 
 destroying the equilibrium. 
 
 This comparison, which summarizes the actual 
 facts of the situation, will make it clear why this 
 army of only a few hundred thousands of Allied 
 combatants, recruited from among our latent 
 allies, could not fail to have an extremely far- 
 reaching influence on the issue of the conflict, 
 because they would be a newly organized force, 
 operating in territory through which the vital 
 
 228 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 lines of communication of Pan-Germany pass. 
 Indeed, serious disturbances in Eastern Pan- 
 Germany, by disturbing these essential lines of 
 communication, would react powerfully, both 
 from a moral and a material standpoint, upon 
 every one of the Austro-Boches fighting on the 
 Western front. As soon as this condition of af- 
 fairs is brought about, there would result instantly 
 the special situation which would enable the 
 seven millions of Slav and Latin troops incor- 
 porated against their will in the armies of Pan- 
 Germany — of whom Berlin is so far from sure 
 that she dares not use them in large bodies on 
 the Western front — to join the insurgents in 
 Central Pan-Germany, and, armed with their Ger- 
 man weapons, to act effectively and with little 
 risk against their Austro-Boche oppressors. 
 
 Now, if, at that precise juncture, a carefully 
 prepared Allied offensive is launched in the West, 
 it would manifestly have a vastly greater chance 
 of success than in the past, while at the same 
 time the danger of heavy losses on the Allies' 
 part would be much less than heretofore. 
 
 4. Cost of carrying out the plan. — An airplane 
 of the type under consideration, with all its ac- 
 cessories, is worth at most 100,000 francs. The 
 value of a package of munitions weighing five 
 kilogrammes, reckoning the price of an automatic 
 Mauser at the cost to a private individual before 
 the war, is about 100 francs. The fuel for a trip 
 
 229 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 of 600 kilometres, with equipment for 68 men, 
 would cost 1500 francs. And in its eighty hours 
 of serviceable life one airplane can make nine of 
 such trips. We have, then: — 
 
 Airplane, 100,000 francs 
 
 Fuel, 9x1500, I3>500 
 Packages of munitions, 
 
 68X9X100, 61,200 
 
 Total cost, 174,700 francs 
 
 Thus the net cost of one armed man 600 kilo- 
 metres away in Pan-Germany is only 285 francs, 
 or, in round numbers, 300. So that the equip- 
 ment of 612,000 men, which can be effected by 
 using 1000 airplanes would cost only 184,000,000 
 francs in round numbers — or just about as 
 much as Great Britain is spending in a single day. 
 
 Now, in order to place half a million men on the 
 Western front, the Americans will certainly have 
 to spend tens of billions of francs. Consequently 
 the cost per capita of their combatant troops will 
 be ten times greater than that of equipping one 
 fighting man in the strategically vital portions of 
 Pan-Germany. 
 
 Not only, then, is the plan proposed likely to 
 prove extremely efficacious on the military side, 
 but its execution would require a relatively small 
 outlay in comparison with what the Allies have to 
 spend every day in the effort to obtain results 
 immeasurably less important. 
 
 230 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 VI 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Beyond question, the plan of which I have 
 set forth only the main outlines, like every con- 
 ception of the human mind, involves numerous 
 difficulties, of different kinds, to be overcome; but 
 by studying them one by one, I have con- 
 vinced myself that they can be surmounted more 
 easily than the problems which must be solved 
 in order to carry on a successful offensive in the 
 West. 
 
 In any case, after all that has been attempted 
 fruitlessly, are we justified in not at least giving 
 this plan a trial? The moral situation of the 
 eighty-six millions of slaves in Pan-Germany is 
 indisputably favorable to its execution. The 
 essential physical instruments are in being. If 
 the Allied leaders really wish it, these instruments 
 can be produced in ample quantities with com- 
 parative promptitude. The general strategic 
 idea of the plan is consonant with good sense. 
 The outlay it demands is comparatively insignif- 
 icant. The plan would supply the Entente with 
 a new fighting force without necessitating the 
 sacrifice of more men on its part. It solves the 
 problem of effectives for the Allies and makes it 
 insoluble for the Boches and their vassals. It is 
 in strict conformity with the democratic peace- 
 aims of the Allies. Furthermore, its adoption 
 
 231 
 
PA N -GER MA N Y 
 
 would give the war a direction which would pave 
 the way for the reconstitution of Europe at the 
 peace conference. Lastly, it would make the 
 offensive operations on the Western front in- 
 finitely less costly in men for the Allies, while 
 considerably increasing their chances of success. 
 
 During twenty years of peace I warned public 
 opinion of the formidable peril that was drawing 
 near. Since the outbreak of the war my various, 
 prognostications have, on the whole, been justified 
 by the event. I may be permitted, therefore, 
 m the interest of the Allied cause, to appeal for 
 the support of public opinion in inducing those 
 in authority, first, to examine the proposed plan 
 thoroughly and without prejudice; and, secondly, 
 to set about the intensive construction, with 
 rights of priority, of passenger-carrying aircraft 
 with a very extensive radius of action. 
 
 It is my sincere conviction that this plan may well 
 lead to a swift and definitive decision before the end 
 of 1918. 
 
 The present time (February, 191 8) is especially 
 favorable for preparing to put it into effect 
 morally. After the signature of the treaty with 
 the Poles, despite the momentary concessions 
 made to them, they cannot fail to see that they 
 have been duped by Vienna and Berlin. The 
 Roumanians, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs, always 
 admirable for their physical energy, are demand- 
 ing independence. The Italians realize at last 
 
 232 
 
THE DISEASE AND CURE 
 
 the necessity of coming to an understanding with 
 the Jugo-Slavs and all the other Slavs, Latins, 
 and Semites in Pan-Germany, who also are in 
 the bonds of a degrading servitude. 
 
 In very truth, then, the moral cohesion of the 
 eighty-six millions of slaves in Pan-Germany, 
 fifty millions of whom inhabit the strategically 
 vital portions thereof, can be achieved at once. 
 
 Under these conditions, can we, without be- 
 traying the cause of democracy, without in some 
 sort refusing to accept victory, fail to attempt at 
 least to carry out this plan? Can we refuse to 
 play this card when it seems to be the best one 
 that we can ever hold to win the war? 
 
 As a matter of fact, the present situation is 
 perfectly well defined. If the Allies are content 
 to fight on on the Western front, allowing the 
 numerous pacifist machinations to depress the 
 morale of their people, they risk — on the most 
 favorable hypothesis — being compelled within 
 a few months to negotiate a peace on the decep- 
 tive basis of ' no annexations and no indemnities.' 
 In that case, as the governments of Berlin and 
 Vienna have never kept their word, whatever 
 terms the Allies may make with them will be ab- 
 solutely worthless. Pan-Germany will survive. 
 The Boches will derive a formidable accession of 
 power from their enormous war-profits, whereas 
 the European Allies, sinking under the deadly 
 
 233 
 
PAN-GERMANY 
 
 weight of their incredible war-expenditure, will 
 be reduced to servitude. And — mark it well, 
 Americans — ; the assault of Pan-Germany on 
 the United States will begin forthwith. 
 
 On the contrary, if, desiring to conclude a 
 democratic peace, we are able, in addition, to 
 conduct the war on democratic principles, — 
 that is to say, to supply the eighty-six million 
 slaves of Pan-Germany, at the earliest possible 
 moment, with effective means of fighting for the 
 liberty of the world, — we shall inevitably bring 
 about an internal explosion in Pan-Germany, and, 
 before the close of 191 8, complete victory will 
 be ours. Then will the conclusion of an equitable, 
 restorative, and durable peace become possible. 
 
 The choice must be made between these two 
 alternatives. 
 
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