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THE HUMAN WILL: 
 
 A SERIES OF POSTHUMOUS ESSAYS ON MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 
 
 THE LEGITIMATE OBJECT OF PUNISHMENT, AND 
 
 Tin: POWERS OF THE WILL. 
 
 BY THE LATE 
 
 JAMES POLLARD* ESPY, 
 
 Author of "The Philosophy of Storms," Member of the American Philosophical Society, 
 unci Corresponding Member of the National Institute at Washington. 
 
 1867 
 
 ^ Washing 
 
 CI NCI NN ATI: 
 
 PUBLISHED AT THE OFFICE OF THE DIAL, 
 
 NO. Tii W EST T II I K n ST R K BT. 
 
 1860. 
 

 The Dice of God ;ire always loaded. 
 
 — Greek Proverb. 
 
 Hell is the Love-spark that burnetii up the mountain of Iniquity. 
 
 — Mohammed. 
 
 I think that only is real which men love and rejoice in ; not what they 
 
 tolerate, but what they choose ; what they embrace and avow, and not the 
 
 rhe things which chill, benumb and terrify them. 
 
 — /timer son. 
 
MEMOIR 
 
 James Espy was born on the ninth day of May, 1786, in Washington county, 
 Pennsylvania. He was the youngest of ten children, and the seventh son, hav- 
 ing been born when his mother was nearly fifty years of age. His parents 
 removed to the State of Kentucky, when he was in his fourth year, and settled at 
 Lexington. He was born an inquirer. During this journey with his parents 
 westward, the boat was shoved suddenly from the Brownsville wharf, and little 
 James as suddenly floored. During the rest of the trip down the Ohio, no novel- 
 ties could distract his mind from a pertinacious resolution to find out the prin- 
 ciple by which he had fallen ; and when some one told him that his centre of gravity 
 had been lost, his mind started at once on a voyage of investigation, which 
 ceased only with his life. In his earliest school-days, a severe storm blew a 
 large tree down on the top of the school-house, breaking the timbers and roof ; 
 into the brain of our boy-philosopher, as its proper crucible, the storm fell, and 
 there remained until he had wrested its secret. His thirst for knowledge was 
 from his childhood insatiable ; and his means being limited, he began whilst yet 
 in his teens teaching, during a portion of each year, to pay for the instruction 
 received in the Transylvania University of Lexington, where he was graduated 
 at the age of twenty-one. During the year following he was invited to Cumber- 
 land, Maryland, to take charge of a classical academy of that city, which had 
 been newly endowed by the Legislature. His zeal for instructing the 3 T oung was 
 such that he soon made it a well-known institution, to which students came from 
 every part of the country. Having saved something by this, he went to Bedford, 
 and pursued the study of the Law. 
 
 At the age of twenty-seven he was married to Margaret Pollard, of Cumber- 
 land, whose maiden-name he assumed, and was ever after known as James Pol- 
 lard Espy. He took his bride, who was then only sixteen, to Xenia, Ohio, 
 where he resided for four years in the practice of the law. But it became mani- 
 fest to him that this profession did not accord with the literary and scientific 
 tendencies of his mind; so he was quite ready to accept a call to the classical de- 
 partment of the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia. Thither he went in the year 
 1817, and that city became his home for twenty years. 
 
 His position here was excellently adapted to his intellectual wants, lie was 
 a man of science by nature; and here he found a centre where the facts upon 
 which he wished to experiment could be easily obtained and classified. His 
 mind had for some time been attracted to his specialty : and the world became 
 suddenly aware how far he had gone toward changing meteorology from a specu- 
 lation, but little more respectable than alchemy, into a positive science, by his 
 
iv Memoir. 
 
 invention of the Ni PHfiLOSCOPS, a verj simple and accurate instrument by which 
 
 the expansion of air attributable to Latent calorie can be perfectly measured. At 
 
 ihi> time he published Beveral pamphlets, reviewing and rejeoting the theories of 
 
 rms and currents which prevailed; these attracted notioe because of their 
 
 dear style and great power of analysis, and the savants of New England and 
 
 Philadelphia began to look to Franklin [nstitute lor some theory which should 
 
 the place of those which had been so remorselessly disposed of. By this 
 
 time, also. Prof. Espy had formed his own theory, and brought it practically to 
 
 the (est ot* many storms. Being convinced of its truth, lie announced it in a 
 
 series of lectures in Philadelphia. These Lectures were soon called for in other 
 
 centres of science ; and at length it became necessary for him to abandon Frank- 
 
 i astitute, and devote himself to scientific pursuits alone. 
 
 We have not space here for an analysis of the Professor's Theory of Storms, 
 Which has now become the prevailing one. Its theme is quite simple : He sup- 
 poses that when the air near the surface of the earth becomes more heated or 
 more highly charged with aqueous vapor, which is only five-eighths of the specific 
 gravity of atmospheric air, its equilibrium is unstable, and up-moving columns 
 "i streams will be formed. As these columns rise, their upper parts will come 
 under Less pressure, and the air will, therefore, expand ; as it expands it will 
 grow colder, about one degree and a quarter for every hundred yards of its 
 ascent, as he demonstrated by experiments in the Nepheloscope. The ascending 
 columns will carry up with them the aqueous vapor which they contain, and, if 
 they rise high enough, the cold produced by expansion from diminished pressure 
 will condense some of this vapor into cloud ; for it is known that cloud is formed 
 in the receiver of an air-pump when the air is suddenly withdrawn. The dis- 
 tance to which the air will have to ascend before it will become cold enough to 
 begin to form cloud, is a variable quantity, depending on the number of degrees 
 which the dew-point is below the temperature of the air; and this height may 
 be known at any time, by observing how many degrees a thin metallic tumbler 
 of water must be cooled down below the temperature of the air before the vapor 
 will condense on the outside. 
 
 Professor Espy's account of the generation of winds at the time of a storm, 
 was equally simple: the air rushes from all sides to the centre of the ascending 
 columns, and in conjunction with this, the air is depressed around the columns, 
 and brings down the motion which is known to be greater as air is above the 
 earth's surface. His theories of the annulation of clouds, the interior passage 
 for winds through the cone-centre of tornadoes, arc beautiful, and agree with 
 tin- facts in the case. But we can not dwell upon them. No one interested in 
 t!c subject will Ik; without his great work, The Philosophy of Storms, published 
 by Little k Brown, Boston, during the year 1841. Before its publication in this 
 form, the new theory had caused a sensation in the principal cities of England 
 and Prance, and Professor Espy was invited to visit Europe, and compare his 
 lltfl v. it.Ii those v. liicli had been reached by Redfield, Forbes, Pouillet, Fournet 
 and others. 
 
 He- accordingly visited Europe, and in September, L840, the British Associa- 
 tion appointed a day to entertain the Professor's statement, which was made in 
 the presence of Prof. Forties, Mr. Redfield, Sir John Hersehel, Sir David Brews- 
 ter, and other eminent naturalists. The discussion which followed was one of 
 the most interesting ever reported in the Journals of the Association. In the 
 Academy of Sciences, at Paris, the interest was equally great, and a committee, 
 
Memoir. v 
 
 consisting of Arago and Pouillet, was appointed to report upon Espy's observa- 
 tions and theory. They were satisfied of the importance of the theory at once, 
 and so reported. It was in the debate which look place in the Academy at this 
 time, that Arago said, " France has its Cuvier, England its Newton, America its 
 Espy." On his return from this satisfactory visit, Professor Espy was appointed 
 corresponding member of the Smithsonian Institute. From that time until his 
 death he resided in Washington, beloved and honored by all who knew him. 
 His more recent discoveries will be given to the world, doubtless, by those who 
 have charge of them ; one of them, relating to electricity, is quite interesting and 
 important. We now turn to another side of his life, and one of paramount in- 
 terest. 
 
 Mr. Espy's parents were devout members of the Presbyterian Church, and as 
 that Church had not in those days adopted the compliant system now in vogue, 
 which aspires to carry the Westminster Confession on one shoulder, and the spirit 
 and science of the age on the other, he received a quite strict and religious train- 
 ing. The Bible was his daily study, and he learned the New Testament by 
 rote. But we have seen that he was a realist at birth. One day, having read 
 in the Testament the words " whatsoever ye shall ask in my name that ye 
 shall receive,'' he went out into the garden alone, and, extending his hand up- 
 ward, said, " God, give me a dollar!" His surprise and pain that the dollar 
 did not drop into his hand from the clouds was great. Then Doubt quietly en- 
 tered, took her seat, and henceforth every text must needs pass under her hand, 
 and bear her questionings. Skeptic means, by etymology, ' one who considers 
 a thing : ' consequently skeptics are rarely orthodox. Professor Espy, when he 
 had passed through the waves of doubt, found himself on the strong shores where 
 Faith marries Reason ; and their progeny of high thoughts and holy aspirations 
 arose within him. His mind at first, and entirely by its own operations, arrived 
 at a complete faith in the existence and benevolence of God : then adieu, 
 parental Church, with thy doctrine of the angry God and the endless torments ! 
 But he did not pause with the speculative Epicurists, who care to follow an idea 
 only so far as it makes things easy, and lays the fear-phantoms : he went farther 
 than to reject the idea that endless torment awaited any immortal child of God ; 
 he developed the most perfect system of Optimism which has yet been announced. 
 There is no evil :-. God is good ; God is over all : all is for the best. This 
 was his theme, and he was wont with those who knew him to dwell on it with a 
 convincing power and eloquence which easily arose to majesty. This storm- 
 king, as he was called, had not gone forth to discover the pathways of the light- 
 ning and survey the inviolable channels of wind and storm, and returned to be- 
 lieve that the Chaos, driven from the external world forever, prevailed yet in the 
 storms and winds of the inward and human world. He saw that the passions, 
 the impulses, the motives, had their law, and that there was no chance-work but 
 to empyrics, no Chaos but to the ignorant. These views gradually wrote them- 
 selves through his experience and life, and have bequeathed us the following 
 work. In it his distinction, beyond the production of a clear, simple and logical 
 essay on a much confused subject, is, that he shows that so far from Necessity 
 annihilating responsibility, as is alleged. Necessity alone makes responsibility 
 possible. 
 
 On the 17th day of January last, Professor Espy was stricken with paralysis : 
 he was nearly seventy-four years of age, and it was scarcely expected by his friends, 
 that even a constitution so vigorous as his, a constitution which had never been 
 
vi Memoir. 
 
 . i bad habit of any kind, could vanquish t ho violent Too. When he 
 pain, and could scarcely speak, ho a\;is heard to whisper, " 1 have tried to 
 move that Limb, and can not." No paralytic stroke oould strike to the 
 seat of thought and conviction 1 Never in Buoh a oondition have we known a 
 mind to remain so aotive and so healthy in its tone to the last. As we looked 
 upon the snowy looks oi' the pure old man, we fell how truly the ancient poet 
 described such as u the white blossoms of eternal fruit." He died January 24th. 
 
 The character of Processor Espy was as pure and elevated as any whioh it has 
 been our happiness to moot. His word, with those who mel him, was truth itself; 
 his innocence was like that of a child ; he lived and died without ever being wil- 
 ling to suspect those whom others saw to be jealous of his position and inlluonee. 
 \l\< benevolence was not only large and true, but it was equaled by his affection- 
 : tenderness toward those Mho were appointed in the order of God to 
 minister and be ministered to in the circle of his life. 
 
 When the immortal old man was drawing near to his end, the writer of this 
 memoir stood by him, amongst other friends, anxious for a last word. The old 
 man could not speak a word, but presently moved his fingers as if he would 
 write. Pencil and paper having been brought, he wrote some words in almost 
 e scratches. It took us some hours to decipher them, but at last, letter 
 added to letter, a sublime sentence shone with clear ray upon us; it ran : "I 
 have found in human nature a principle superior to conscience. Conscience can 
 be taught that it is right to burn heretics : Instinct can not be taught not to feel 
 pain at the sight of suffering. " 
 
 There it is, reader ! a voice from the mysterious boundary-line between the 
 darkness of earth and the light of the superior world. We who received it, bear 
 witness that by that principle a living and beautiful soul climbed to bloom and 
 cluster in the light of God. 
 
 The will which he left does so perfectly repeat the practical aim and spirit of 
 his whole life, that we record its opening paragraphs here : 
 
 " In the beginning of this, my last will and testament, I wish to express my 
 most profound reverence for the Supreme E,uler of the Universe, and my un- 
 wavering belief that everything which I have experienced during my whole life 
 (as well the painful as the pleasant) has been so arranged by His infinite goodness 
 and wisdom, as to result in good to me, by educating me to a highar state of 
 knowledge, and to a more intense love of goodness, and so to prepare me for an 
 eternity of* happiness after death. If it is better for me to exist happy after 
 death, I shall so exist, as certainly as there is a God of infinite goodness, wisdom 
 and power; and if it is better for me to suffer some pain hereafter for the sake 
 of further improvement, I doubt not that an infinitely wise and good Father 
 hac arranged that I shall so suffer. 
 
 M Heavenly Father, with unwavering confidence in Thy love, I commit myself 
 and the whole human family, Thy children, to Thy holy kceping. ,, 
 
MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY. 
 
 Science has demonstrated that this earth was once fluid, from 
 heat, to the surface ; it follows that man has not existed on this 
 earth from eternity, and it is manifest that the first man had not a 
 man for his father, nor the first woman a woman for her mother * 
 and as there is no known cause now in existence to produce man, 
 but that of ordinary generation, and it is plainly impossible for 
 him to have originated from any fortuitous concourse of atoms, 
 we are constrained to believe that the first man and first woman 
 were contrived and brought into existence by a being of superior 
 wisdom, power and goodness. And as this same reason applies to 
 all the animals and vegetables on the face of the earth, we may 
 safely infer that the power, wisdom and goodness of this being- 
 are indefinitely great. This inference is greatly confirmed, when 
 we discover innumerable contrivances, both in the moral and 
 physical world, all tending to the well-being of man. 
 
 Now all these contrivances imply a contriver, and unless this 
 contriver was himself contrived, he must have been eternal. For 
 it is certain, that the first cause or contriver always existed, for 
 if there was ever a time when nothing existed, nothing could ever 
 have been brought into existence — ex nihilo nihil Jit. This first 
 self-existent and eternal cause or contriver is called God, whether 
 the immediate contriver of the universe was the self-existent eter- 
 nal first cause or not. But as nothing is gained by supposing 
 that the contriver of the universe, and the former of man, was 
 himself or itself contrived, it is unphilosophical to make the sup- 
 position. 
 
 When we examine the nature of man, we discover that he is so 
 constituted or contrived, that the fundamental law of his nature is 
 to be fond of pleasure and averse to pain. Indeed, as a sensitive 
 being, it would seem he could not be formed otherwise. We find, 
 
8 Accountability and Punishment, 
 
 also, that he is bo contrived as to be able to discover by degrees 
 more and more the causes which produce pleasure, and the causes 
 which produce pain. The sum of human happiness is much in- 
 creased I'} the contrivance God has made, thai one of the princi- 
 pal Bonrces of man's enjoyment is doing good to others, or en- 
 deavoring to increase their happiness. We find, also, that doing 
 evil to others, or even designing to do evil, is always attended 
 with pain, and no doubt more suffering is felt by the evil-doer 
 than by the one to whom the evil is done. 
 
 God has so formed the human race, that one man's true interest 
 or well-being never clashes with another's; or, in other words, 
 one man is never under the necessity of diminishing the weft- 
 being of another, to promote his own happiness. 
 
 If man was so constituted that he could promote his own hap- 
 piness by diminishing that of others, the very constitution of man 
 would then be a species of bribery in God, offering happiness as a 
 reward for doing evil to others. If God is perfectly wise and per- 
 fectly good, he has not so constituted man. Indeed, if we allow 
 that the great First Cause is without intelligence and incapable of 
 design, and that man was formed by a fortuitous concourse of 
 atoms, which is infinitely improbable, still by examining his con- 
 stitution as it is we will be obliged to acknowledge that doing 
 good to others is a source of pleasure, and doing evil to others is 
 a source of pain. If man is never under the necessity of doing 
 evil to others, or of diminishing their happiness to increase his 
 own, a fortiori, God is never under the necessity of diminishing 
 the happiness of one man for the good of another. 
 
 Pain of every hind which does not result in the ultimate good 
 or well-being of the individual suffering it, is an evil to him, and, 
 of course, it can not promote the well-being of others ; and if in- 
 flicted by others, it will diminish their happiness, probably, more 
 than it does that of the individual on whom it is inflicted. All 
 punishment, therefore, ought to be inflicted with the intention of 
 benefiting the individual punished ; for if it results in diminishing 
 the well-being of the individual punished, it certainly will dimin- 
 ish the well-being of those who inflicted it — more especially if 
 the punishment is inflicted without regard to the well-being of the 
 sufferer. 
 
 Punishment, therefore, to be just and useful (and it can not be 
 just without being useful), should be prospective, and not retro- 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 9 
 
 spective ; and it contains a false and dangerous doctrine to say a 
 man ought to be punished for his transgressions! if this form of 
 speech is understood literally. The truth is, he ought to be pun- 
 ished only for the sake of reformation or discipline, — and this is 
 the only mode in which God ever punishes, as will appear more 
 fully hereafter. 
 
 This doctrine, when once admitted, will remove all vengeance 
 from the mind ; and every one will see, that to punish with the 
 feelings of vengeance is to punish oneself. Thus the criminal code 
 of all nations will be freed from its foulest blot, the open avowal 
 and practice of the principle that it is just to punish for the good 
 of the community — in some cases, at least — without any regard 
 to the good of the criminal. This is the most pernicious doctrine 
 that can possibly be inculcated and embraced ; for it teaches men 
 to believe, from their infancy to manhood, that they may (at least, 
 sometimes) benefit themselves by diminishing the well-being of 
 others : and it never occurs to them that it is false ; for it is a doc- 
 trine embraced by the State, and lies at the very foundation of 
 their criminal code. 
 
 The extreme perniciousness of this principle will clearly appear, 
 when we perceive, as we may by a little consideration, that from 
 this one error all our wicked conduct to others arises. Remove the 
 belief that we can benefit ourselves by doing evil to others, and 
 implant in its place the belief that we shall be the principal suf- 
 ferers by such conduct, then all motive to do evil to others is at 
 once cut off, and with the absence of motive the action will, of 
 course, not be performed. If this doctrine is true, the evil done to 
 a community by one legalized murder (the execution of a crimi- 
 nal) is infinitely greater than the most atrocious murder ever com- 
 mitted by an individual, because it teaches, in the most effectual 
 manner, the principle from which all murders and other crimes 
 arise ; and, besides, the moral feeling of the community, by the 
 practice of capital punishments, is rendered callous, to a degree 
 beyond calculation. 
 
 Men are so constructed by the Creator that they perform every 
 day thousands of good actions, without considering for a moment 
 whether happiness or misery will be the result ; but they seldom, 
 if ever, commit a crime without calculating the consequences : 
 Their moral arithmetic, however, deriving its rules of calculation 
 
H 1 Accountability and Punishment. 
 
 m the criminal code of nations. Is false, and (hoy determine to 
 do evil to their fellow-creature from the expectation of increasing 
 their own well-being. In this expectation they must fail, as cer- 
 tainly as a just God stands at the head oi' the universe; for it 
 would be in the highest degree wicked to bribe his creatures with 
 happiness as a reward or consequence of doing evil one to another. 
 AlS it is manifestly not good for an individual to be punished for 
 any crime, when it is impossible for that punishment to work 
 reformation or benefit to the individual in any other way, so it is 
 manifestly unjust to inflict such punishment, and it would be in- 
 finitely unjust to continue such punishment to all eternity. 
 
 ( - i 1 being perfectly wise and perfectly good, he must, from his 
 very nature, intend to do some good in everything which he does ; 
 whenever he punishes any of his creatures, therefore, or, which is 
 the same thing, causes pain to be the necessary consequence of 
 crime, he must intend to do that creature good by the pain, more 
 especially as this is the only way to improve the individual, and 
 thus also to benefit others. 
 
 A- God certainly does punish — that is, cause pain to be the 
 inevitable consequence of certain actions, which we therefore call 
 evil actions — we are sure he will succeed in doing the good which 
 he intends by that punishment ; for he is all -wise to lay his plan, 
 and all-powerful to execute it. Now the only good conceivable 
 to result from punishment is the reformation of the individual, or 
 the happiness of others ; and as these are inseparable, the refor- 
 mation of the individual must be effected. Nor is it difficult to 
 conceive how this is done. God has made man fond of happi- 
 ness, and averse to misery ; it is a law of his nature which never 
 varies. He can not change it, either by volition or crime ; he 
 can not will to hate happiness and love misery any more than he 
 can suspend gravitation by a word of command. 
 
 God has made man also with an intellect capable of finding out 
 by experience more and more of those things which produce mis- 
 er}-, and also more and more of those things which produce hap- 
 piness. Now the wiser he becomes, the wiser will be his volitions ; 
 that, is, the more and more of those things which produce happi- 
 ness \\<: will choose, and the more and more of those things which 
 produce misery he will avoid; and when he becomes perfectly 
 wise, if that time shall ever come, he will then by no possibility 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 11 
 
 choose to do any wicked action, because a perfectly wise being 
 can not choose to make a foolish volition. Nor does this impossi- 
 bility of choosing to make foolish or wicked volitions in the 
 slightest degree impair his free agency ; for, on such a supposition, 
 God is not a perfect free agent, as, from the very perfection of his 
 nature, he can not choose to make a foolish or wicked volition, or 
 perform any wicked action. It has been thought by some that 
 free agency, or moral accountability, implies at least the possibility 
 of choosing to do either good or evil ; but this can not be, for, on 
 this plan, God would not be a free agent ; and man, too, would 
 be less and less a free agent the wiser he became, and when he 
 became perfectly wise, he would cease to be a free agent altogether. 
 It is maintained also by some, that it would be unjust in God 
 to cause pain to follow as a consequence of any action, if that 
 action -could not have been avoided. So far from this being cor- 
 rect, it will" appear by a little reflection that it is entirely con- 
 sistent with the highest benevolence to cause pain to follow the 
 commission of crimes, or the formation of wicked volitions, as 
 this is the only means of enabling the agent to make good voli- 
 tions in future. It may perhaps be objected that God could not 
 have intended to produce the greatest possible amount of happi- 
 ness when he created man, or he would have created him so per- 
 fect in knowledge that he never could choose to do any act from 
 which pain would result. It may be answered that God is only 
 beginning to create man when he is born ; and that it is impos- 
 sible, so far as we know, to create him faster in knowledge than 
 he is actually being created, whilst he remains in this world. And, 
 besides, we may safely infer, that if it would be better for man to 
 have been created in any other way, God, from his infinite per- 
 fections, would have chosen that way. 
 
 -^The justice of punishment does not depend on the fact that it 
 was possible for the individual punished to have avoided the crime 
 committed, but rather on the fact that the being who is punished 
 is created with powers and capacities which may be operated on 
 by the punishment itself, so as to render it possible and even cer- 
 tain, that, with the new motives introduced by the punishment, or 
 by the pain following the commission of the crime, as an effect, 
 he will be finally taught to avoid the crime in future. Unless the 
 individual punished is so created, all punishment would be useless 
 to him, and, of course, useless to others. If retrospective punish- 
 
LS Aecountatril ity and PiuiisJnnvut. 
 
 mem could cause a crime which lias been committed not to be, 
 then it might be useful : bul this is impossible and absurd. Nor 
 surdity of punishing retrospectively lessened by suppos- 
 ing that the individual punished could have avoided doing the 
 criminal act ; for, even on that supposition, the act once done can 
 not he prevented, nor in any wav altered by the punishment. 
 
 (hi some of the points here discussed the human mind seems to 
 he differently constituted, and to take different views, after the 
 most careful and patient examination. Some think that though 
 ©od knew from all eternity all the actions which I perform in my 
 whole lite, yet 1 might have avoided many of them, if not all, and 
 might perform an entirely different set ; otherwise it would he unjust 
 in God to cause pain or punishment to he the result of any of 
 tlu'in. Others acknowledge that foreknowledge implies inevit- 
 ability : hut as foreknowledge is not the cause of the inevitability, 
 they think God may be just in punishing for crimes or vices, pro- 
 vided he only foresaw these vices, but did not decree them. Now 
 my mind is so constituted that it appears to me that if our actions 
 were foreknown to God from all eternity, they must have been 
 decreed by him. For foreknowledge implies the certainty that the 
 event foreknown will come to pass. Now this certainty, or, which 
 i- the -ai ue thing, this inevitability of the event, must have been 
 caused by something in God, or something out of God. If it 
 was something in God, it must have been his decree or determina- 
 tion, either to cause the events to come to pass, or to bring into 
 existence a set of causes which would certainly bring into cx- 
 istence the events foreknown; for, if there was no certainty that 
 the events would take place, then they could not be foreknown. 
 Now, if God decreed to bring these effects into existence, or to 
 bring a set of causes into existence which he knew would certainly 
 produce the effects, then may he be said to have decreed the effects. 
 On tli'- other hand, if God did not decree to bring the effects fore- 
 n into existence himself by his direct agency, nor to create 
 any set "J- train of causes which would certainly produce the effects 
 foreknown, then something out of God was the cause of the cer- 
 tainty, on which God's foreknowledge was founded, or which 
 God'.- foreknowledge implies. Now, whatever this something is, 
 it must he superior to God in power, for it is supposed to have 
 I a most important train of events in the moral world to be 
 certain, and that, too, independent of any agency in God. Nay, 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 13 
 
 more : not only will they come into existence without the agency 
 of God, hut he has no power to binder them ; for that can not he 
 prevented from coming to pass which any being knows will cer- 
 tainly come to* pass. To believe, then, that God foresaw the 
 future actions of men, and at the same time to deny that he was 
 himself the cause of that certainty or inevitability that the events 
 foreknown would take place, on which the foreknowledge was 
 founded, leads to atheism, or at least to a belief that God is a very 
 weak and imperfect heing ; for, inasmuch as it is assumed that 
 the certainty or inevitahility was not caused hy him, and as it is 
 clear that, when an inevitahility is once in existence, the thing in- 
 evitable can not he prevented from coming to pass, the Deity is left 
 powerless in regard to the events taking place or not taking place. 
 If it is said that the inevitability arose from something out of 
 God, hut that the subsequent agency of God had to be employed 
 to bring the -very beings into existence whose acts were inevit- 
 able, and thus he was not powerless in relation to these acts, 
 still, even on this scheme, there would be a power above God, 
 which is atheism. Or, if this power, which causes things to be 
 inevitable, does this with intelligence and goodness, then this 
 power is God, and the being who creates man is an inferior agent, 
 which the superior uses to execute his plans, and bring into exist- 
 ence those things which he had rendered inevitable, or, which is 
 the same thing, which he had decreed. 
 
 Another will object to all these views, and say the only plan to 
 render man a free agent is to suppose that there is no certainty or 
 inevitability, which amounts to the same thing, as it relates to its 
 influence on the character of actions, and consequently there can 
 not be a foreknowledge of the actions of a free agent. This view 
 is founded, as w r as said before, on the assumption that free agency, 
 or moral accountability, implies the possibility of choosing to do 
 either right or wrong, in every case, where a choice is made ; or, 
 as it is vaguely expressed, the agent is free to choose the right or 
 the wrong. If those who take this view of the subject will insti- 
 tute a careful examination of what can be meant here by the word 
 "free," they will, I think, find reason to change their views. If 
 they suppose that the volitions are free from the intelligence and 
 passions of the agent, and also free from the desire of happiness 
 or aversion to misery, which is the universal law of all beings 
 endowed with feeling, then is there no such thing as that kind of 
 
11 .1 uid Punishment. 
 
 i h they contend, If they come to the conclu-' 
 rion, as 1 think they must bj Buch an examination, thai our 
 volitions are not entirely Free from the influence of our state ol 
 as to intelligence, and our clearness of view as to the char- 
 ject, to produce happiness or misery, at the time of 
 willing or choosing, then I desire them to push the inquiry still 
 further, and inquire how much influence the intelligence and state 
 of mind may exercise on the volitions or choices which the agent 
 makes, without destroying his freedom or moral accountability. 
 In pursuing this inquiry to its utmost extent, my mind leans 
 Jv to the conviction that all the time man is increasing in 
 m and goodness, the possibility of his making foolish and 
 :ed volitions is constantly diminishing, and his power to 
 make wise and good volitions is increasing in the same proportion, 
 and thus all that kind of agency or power of acting which is of 
 any value is retained and augmented. And whether any one may 
 choose i" call this power of making volitions under the influence 
 of wisdom and goodness free agency or not, is a matter of little 
 [uence, provided the fact itself is clearly perceived. 
 It we push our inquiry still further, we will perceive that our 
 volitions, like all things which begin to exist, are produced by 
 equate to produce them, each particular volition depend- 
 i its own particular set of causes, adequate to produce that 
 very volition and no other at the time. The particulars going to 
 up the cause are numerous, and if any one of the particu- 
 bould he removed, the particular volition made at that time 
 would he different. For example, suppose we make a volition 
 which [a the result of much deliberation. It is manifest that there 
 are three particulars coexisting as causes of this volition, and 
 that if any one of them had been wanting at the time, the volition 
 could not have been made. These three are the being who chooses 
 or will-, the object of the choice, and the intelligence with which 
 eliberation is made. Other particulars, doubtless, enter into 
 omplex compound going to makeup the cause of the voli- 
 tion, they may he, they are adequate to produce the 
 :ular volition, and no other. Now, if is manifest that the 
 particular volition of which we are speaking is inevitably pro- 
 cause at the moment it comes into exist- 
 l; therefore, if i'v<t agency depends upon the possibility 
 of making a different volition cvf'vy time we make a volition, then 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 15 
 
 free agency in that sense does not, and can not exist. Nor is it 
 desirable that such a free agency should exist, for a being BO con- 
 stituted that his intelligence should not influence hie volitions, 
 wonld he a monstrosity of which we could form no conception — 
 certainly he would not be a moral agent. Such a being could 
 never be taught, and even if he could become intelligent, his intel- 
 ligence would be of no use, for his volitions not being influenced 
 by his understanding, he would be as likely to make foolish or 
 ignorant volitions after he became intelligent as before. But the 
 proposition is so absurd in itself that it seems impossible to attempt 
 to reason from it without uttering absurdities. It is almost as if 
 we were to suppose our uncle to be our aunt, and then to endeavor 
 to find out what would be the consequences of such a supposition. 
 
 There is another consequence flowing from the supposition that 
 there is not a necessary and indissoluble connection between the 
 volitions and the causes of those volitions, which the advocates 
 of this view of the subject little suspect. It is, that man on this 
 principle would not be an accountable being ; or, in other w r ords, 
 it would be utterly useless to punish him after he had committed 
 any crime, with the expectation that the punishment would be of 
 any use. It is true, punishment would produce new views, if it 
 was so arranged that he would perceive it to follow as a conse- 
 quence of the transgression : but what good would that do ? His 
 future volitions, according to the supposition, could not be affected 
 by these new views. Thus it appears that the very principle 
 which those who advocate this view of the subject bring forward 
 as the very essence of moral accountability, would render account- 
 ability absurd if it was true. Indeed, the only scheme on which 
 moral accountability can be founded is that of the necessary con- 
 nection between cause and effect ; or the doctrine that the volitions 
 are dependent on causes, and that among these causes is the state 
 of intelligence and a knowledge of the consequences which will 
 flow from the volitions themselves. 
 
 On this supposition, if a man should violate the law of God — 
 that is, the law of his own nature — it would be useful, just and 
 benevolent in the Deity to cause pain to be the immediate result, 
 so that this new knowledge might become a new cause o( produc- 
 ing a volition corresponding to the law of God on the next occa- 
 sion. This, in fact, is the only mode which could be adopted t<» 
 educate him out of a state of ignorance into a state of knowledge ; 
 
16 Accountability anil Punishment. 
 
 rapidly he committed transgressions, and the mow 
 ie consequent pain came upon him, the Easter i( would 
 
 he would rise into knowledge and happiness. Od the oon- 
 
 i had made man bo thai no pain would follow the 
 
 his laws, l'ui pleasure, then would man never 
 
 (earn to avoid transgression. And the consequences of such an 
 
 arrangement are as impossible to Foresee as it would be to foresee 
 
 the consequences which would follow if our ancle were cur aunt. 
 
 < hi this subject, to know what is, is the only science. Is it a fact 
 
 that pain is a consequence of the transgression of God's laws? 
 
 [s it a fact that this pain has a tendency to educate us into a 
 
 knowledge of those laws ? Is it not better that we should be edu- 
 
 eated on this subject, than remain ignorant? Gould we be so 
 
 educated if pain did not follow transgression as an effect follows 
 
 ? Many would he willing to admit that, provided men 
 
 do transgress, it i- better pain should follow, for the reason as- 
 
 I above : hut they can not admit that it is better to transgress 
 — and this is the rhicf reason why they are unwilling to believe 
 that God decreed the transgression. It, indeed, it proved that 
 
 is a malevolent being, provided he has decreed transgressions 
 of his law, as well as the pain which follows these transgressions, 
 then no argument, however strong, would he sufficient to satisfy 
 the mind of the certainty of such decrees. It would remain for- 
 ever perplexed between the force of the argument, and the absurd- 
 ity of the conclusion. It is not probable, a 'priori, that God has 
 created the human mind so as to remain in a state of perplexity 
 forever on so important a point. The search for truth is indeed 
 me- of the highest enjoyments of the human mind ; and I can well 
 appreciate the saying of one who delighted in the study of God's 
 works, when he declared, " If God should hold out Truth to him 
 in on" hand, and 1 he search for Truth in the other, and allow him 
 
 ike his choice, he would say, Give me the search for 
 
 Tr"tJ<" Much of oil)- pleasure, however, in the search for truth, 
 
 from the continual discoveries of truth itself, and from the 
 
 of making more. But if we should despair of ever arriving 
 at the truth on a particular subject, OUr pleasure; in the search 
 would cease, and with the termination of the pleasure the eeart?h 
 i 
 
 Bow much of out happiness in a future state; of existence will 
 depend '»n the search for truth, we have no means of knowing. 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 17 
 
 [Vrhaps we may there be able to investigate the causes of thin 
 a n<l discover the connection which exists between cause and effe< 
 here we can only generalize facts themselves, and trace them ap to 
 genera] principles, without being able in any case to investigate 
 the origin of those principles, or even discover how it is possible 
 that anything should begin to be. Perhaps we shall be able to 
 with the clearness of certainty what we now can only render prob- 
 able by a laborious train of reasoning, thai everything which is 
 possible is, and everything which is not is impossible at the pi 
 ent time. 
 
 One argument which renders this proposition probable is found- 
 ed on the perfections of God. If we assume that, because God is 
 omnipotent, He could have caused something to exist now which 
 does not exist, it may be predicated of that tiling that it is better it 
 should exist than not exist, or worse that it should exist than not 
 exist, or that its existence would be neither good nor evil. Now, 
 the infinite goodness of God implies not only that all which He 
 does is best, but that He w T ill not omit to do anything which it 
 would be better to do : and to say that God can not do anything 
 contrary to his own infinite goodness, or contrary to his own 
 will — which, from his nature and perfections, must be infinitely 
 good — surely does not limit his omnipotence. It follows that 
 if it is better that the thing should be than not to be, God, from 
 his very perfections, must have willed to bring it into existence, 
 or to lay a train of causes which would bring it into existence, at 
 the very time when it would be best for it to exist. And as God 
 is the author of all things which exist, either directly or indi- 
 rectly, and as nothing can exist contrary to his will, it follows 
 that it is in conformity with the will of God that whatever is now, 
 should be now, and nothing else. Therefore, unless there is some 
 flaw in this reasoning which I can not detect, it is true, at each 
 moment of time, to say, Everything which is possible is ; or, 
 which is the same thing, Nothing is possible which is not. Nor 
 is the truth of this proposition at all incompatible with the omni- 
 potence of God ; for the reason why nothing can be now but what 
 is now exists in the perfections of God, and not in any hindering 
 power out of God. 
 
 Thus it appears that all the transgressions of the law of God 
 which take place are not only inevitable, but that thev are inevit- 
 2 
 
l v .! coiaitahilitij and Punishment. 
 
 able • is ;iu-\ are the best and onlj occurrences which could 
 take pirn 
 
 I tion which almost all would make to this conclusion 
 
 IB anticipated : Why praise men for some acts, and blame them for 
 others, if they are both the verj best possible? I answer that, as 
 praise and blame rise spontaneously in every human mind, if these 
 - are inconsistent with the above reasonings, the presump- 
 inst the reasoning would be very strong, if not conclusive. 
 But there is, indeed, do inconsistency ; for the same reasoning 
 which proves whatever is is best at the present, proves that a 
 change is best for the future, — and praise and blame are introduced 
 to operate on t*>e volitions of men, or as causes to produce new 
 volitions and new actions. It does not follow that, because all 
 the transgressions of the laws o\' Q-od which occur are useful, 
 
 therefore others which do not occur would be useful. On the con- 
 trary, the same reasoning which proves the former to he useful, 
 eg that the latter would be injurious. God, therefore, has im- 
 planted in the human mind the sentiments of approbation and dis- 
 caused praise to be agreeable to us, and approbation, and has 
 blame disagreeable, that these emotions may he links in the great 
 chain of cause and effect — to he the means of bringing into exist- 
 ing such volitions as he foresees will he the best. 
 It" it is replied that when men praise for good actions it is 
 under the impression that the person praised could have done had 
 actions instead of good ; and when they blame, it is under the im- 
 rion that tie* person blamed could have avoided the action 
 blamed : and that men themselves feel self-condemned for certain 
 actions under the impression that they might have avoided them, — 
 swer, that these impressions do not prove the fact. If you 
 line men on this point, you will find that they have no d is- 
 land notions on the subject : most of them will say that they are 
 to do as they please, and this is the whole amount of their 
 ledge on the subject. Now, this is undoubtedly true. They 
 > do as they please. If you ask them if they are i'vae to 
 they do not please, or if they are frfee to please contrary to 
 the way they please, you will find that they have never thought 
 on the subject ; so that the real question, whether anything which 
 a man does through bis whok life could be avoided or not, has 
 ne\er entered their mind. How, then, can their impressions — 
 Or, a- they sometimes call it, consciousness — decide the question ? 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 1 9 
 
 If they examine the subject, s<> as to form any distinci notion of 
 it, they will acknowledge thai the action follows inevitably from 
 
 the will or choice or volition; and thai after a man pleases or 
 wills to do a thing, the thing will be done, of course. 11' we will 
 to move our arm, the arm mows : tho-c is a necessary connection 
 
 between the volition and the motion of the ami. T<> say thai fl 
 man may move his arm or not, just as he pleases, is not deciding 
 the question whether, if he does move his arm, lie might have 
 avoided that action. It is indeed plain that, after he willed to 
 move it, it was no longer possible to avoid it. 
 
 It may be objected that, if men were taught to believe this doc- 
 trine, they would never blame themselves or others, because the 
 sentiment of blame or sorrow for transgression could not spring 
 up under the full belief that the transgression was unavoidable. I 
 answer, that we never can become indifferent to pain under any 
 system of instruction, or under any belief, as to the inevitability 
 of actions. Pain will always be disagreeable to us, and the actions 
 known to be productive of pain — as the transgression of the laws 
 of God must be — will always be disapproved, unless we see clearly 
 that they are intended for good. 
 
 It is true, that all which is bitter and resentful in blame will 
 cease, but all which is instructive and amendatory will remain. 
 When the one who is blamed perceives that there is nothing but 
 kindness and instruction in the blame — no resentment nor ven- 
 geance, no relation to the past, but merely a desire to operate on 
 the future — it will be more efficient in producing reformation than 
 it has heretofore been ; and, besides, the pain of resentful feelings, 
 which has heretofore been very great, will be altogether avoided 
 in the one who blames. The sum of human happiness will be 
 vastly increased when men shall be educated up to a state of intel- 
 ligence and virtue, in which they will clearly perceive that resent- 
 ments are implanted in the human mind only to operate in the 
 lowest states of ignorance, and that God uses them only as a 
 scaffold to build up the temple of knowledge and virtue in the 
 human mind — or rather to lay the foundation of this temple — and 
 when this is done, the scaffold ought to be removed as cumbrous 
 and unsightly. Some have thought that, because God has im- 
 planted resentment in the human mind, it was intended that this 
 feeling should never become extinct — or, in other words, that 
 what God creates He intends to be eternal ; but we have no proof 
 
I cotuitabiliti/ uthl Punishment. 
 
 of tli it es of animals have become extinct, and creal ion 
 
 -. change. Man is born entirely ignorant, and bis 
 
 one degree of knowledge and virtue to another is 
 
 truly a new creation. Man is evidently not made perfect al once; 
 
 evidently made to rise, and not to fall — to ad- 
 
 rards perfection, and never to retrograde; and this great 
 
 .v lie will fulfil. The motive of Tear is useful in the lowest 
 
 s of human intelligence and virtue; but as soon as higher 
 
 motives ran be implanted, fear ceases to operate, and the higher 
 
 motives become much more efficient. 
 
 n duty itself, which is thought by some to be the highest 
 . <■ which can actuate the human mind, will become obsolete 
 in the highest states of intelligence and virtue; for it is the nature 
 of all the higher motives to render useless and inoperative those of 
 inferior quality. Now, the highest of all possible motives to be 
 is ill-' love of goodness itself. Take the exercise of any of 
 8, or example, and the truth of the assertion will be 
 manifest. What is the highest motive to tell the truth, at all 
 times, but the love of truth itself, and the pleasure .we experience 
 in telling the truth ? When the love of truth is once firmly estab- 
 I in our minds, we never avoid lying from the fear of detec- 
 bell the truth from a sense of duty any more than 
 : a ripe peach from a sense of duty, and not from the pleas- 
 ure of the taste. 
 
 The man who loves honesty docs not avoid sheep-stealing from 
 
 lection ; be lias no taste for the tiling, and if he was 
 
 Bure he would never be detected, he would have no desire to do the 
 
 -the certainty of concealment would be no temptation; and 
 
 it' the idea of stealing never enters into his head in such a way as 
 
 luce him to deliberate a moment whether he will steal or not, 
 
 it is manifest thai he does not abstain from stealing through a 
 
 of duty. Even those who maintain that duty is the highest 
 
 e would greatly prefer to have an affectionate wife rather than 
 
 a dutiful one. [ndeed, the moment 1 hear a woman praise herself 
 
 for being a dutiful wife, I am sure she has not much domestic 
 
 pinesfl in the conjugal state. 
 
 L ig a much higher and better motive, for two reasons : It is 
 
 alwaj post, ready to do its work — it never slumbers; but 
 
 duty is not always present to the mind — it has to he called up 
 
 he mind, and sometimes will not come when called ; thus it is 
 
Accountability and Punishment. *1\ 
 
 not so efficient as love. In the second place, duly does not afford 
 so much happines* as love, even when it prompts us to perform 
 the same actions; and thai motive is undoubtedly the besi which 
 produces the highest enjoyment — especially if it is, at the same 
 thus, most efficacious in producing good volitions and virtuous 
 actions. Indeed, tin 4 abstaining from vicious actions through the 
 
 fear of punishment hardly deserves the n.unc of virtue J and ab- 
 staining from any vice through a sense of duty has a less deg 
 of virtue in it, than abstaining from the ame vice through a 
 
 hatred of the vice and a love of the opposite virtue. 
 
 It is an interesting thing to examine how many different mo- 
 tives may actuate the mind in the same line of conduct. For ex- 
 ample, the study of science or literature : A youth may engage in 
 this study from a desire to please his parents, and from this mo- 
 tive alone. Presently he may feel the spirit of emulation or a 
 desire of fame springing up in his bosom ; if this feeling becomes 
 very strong, it will supplant the other entirely, and the first mo- 
 tives will be forgotten. Presently ambition may supplant emu- 
 lation in the same way, and this being a stronger motive than 
 either of the others when it takes deep root, it will stimulate the 
 man to great exertions in the acquisition of knowledge. 
 
 But if the highest of all motives should spring up in the mind — 
 the love of knowledge, and an unspeakable enjoyment in the dis- 
 covery of truth — then all inferior motives, even ambition itself, 
 will be forgotten as if they had never been ; as there is no longer 
 any use for them they may well cease to exist. They are, in fact, 
 like resentment and anger, the mere scaffolding which God uses to 
 build up the mind to a lofty state of excellence, and when this is 
 accomplished the scaffolding is thrown down. I can conceive of 
 no higher motive than the love of truth and the love of goodness. 
 It is probable, therefore, that when this motive once takes root 
 it will flourish to all eternity as the prevailing motive in all our 
 conduct. And as our happiness will consist in the search and dis- 
 covery of truth and in the practice of goodness, it will he impos- 
 sible for the motive ever to change. 
 
 It may perhaps be objected by some, that, if anger and resent- 
 ment should cease to spring up in our minds when we are injured 
 and insulted, great evil would result, for no other motive would 
 stimulate us to inflict that chastisement on the offender which his 
 conduct deserves. Thus, he would never be cured o\' his evil, and 
 
29 oiDitabUiti/ and Punishment. 
 
 subject bo the continual repetition of the insult or 
 injury, [f this is really a true statement of the case, and if the 
 here anticipated would reallj t low from the annihilation of 
 sentment, the objection is unanswerable, and would 
 God never intends these feelings to become extinct, i 
 But are we sure that kindness and gentleness on our part to- 
 - the insolent would be less efficient in curing them of their 
 nt feelings towards us, and their disposition to do us injury, 
 than conduct dictated by anger or resentment? So far from this 
 being the rase, it is as true in the moral world as in the material, 
 that "action and reaction are equal and in opposite directions." 
 Treat a man with harshness, and harshness will be returned — treat 
 him with kindness, and kindness will be returned ; at least, this 
 is the case in the lower stages of his existence. As soon as a man 
 isi - high enough to perceive this law, why not take advantage of 
 it? Why not treat the insolent with kindness, and thus " over- 
 7 with yood? " Until a man is far advanced in knowledge 
 and virtue he will not be able to act on this principle ; bntas soon 
 a- he can he will perceive it will be better both for him and the 
 ler, because he himself will avoid the great pain of anger, 
 and the offender will be more effectually cured. By the law of re- 
 taliation the offender might be restrained from insolent conduct in 
 future, but by the law of kindness the very disposition or desire 
 insolent would forever cease to exist. If even a few men 
 should not only act kindly, hut feel kindly, towards those who mal- 
 them and revile them, the beneficent effects of such conduct 
 would be so apparent and so great that many would hasten to 
 imitate so sublime an example, and an unspeakable amount of 
 j nod would speedily be the result. 
 
 .tremely hard, however, in the present state of society, 
 
 to rise so high in their moral advancement as to act and 
 
 bus, especially as they are educated during all the early part 
 
 of their lives, when they are incapable of thinking for themselves, 
 
 lieve in the law of retaliation, and when they see every one act 
 
 on that principle and no one ever calls it in question. If children 
 
 jiit from their earliest infency, both by precept and by 
 
 nple of their parents and all around them, that they must 
 
 ,rn evil for evil, but to bless them who curse them, who 
 
 bell the mighty influence this system would have on the peace 
 
 and happiness of the world in one generation? 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 23 
 
 But even in the present low state of moral advancement — low- 
 in comparison of what it will be in future times — the man who 
 shall exhibit the sublime mora] spectacle of kindness of feeling 
 
 and gentleness of deport ment towards one who treats him with 
 insult and contumely, will produce a much more lasting and ben- 
 eficial impression on all who witness the scene, than another who 
 returns evil for evil. 
 
 The same mode of reasoning will apply, with peculiar pro- 
 priety, to the conduct of a State towards a criminal. What 
 would be more highly calculated to soften the heart of a criminal 
 than to be treated with gentleness and kindness ? If the State 
 would never do anything to a criminal but what the most affec- 
 tionate parent would wash to be done to his own child under sim- 
 ilar circumstances, for the good of that child — provided that the 
 parent's wishes were guided by sound reason, — an untold amount 
 of evil in the prosecution of criminals would disappear from the 
 earth. The time, I hope, is not far distant wdien every civilized 
 nation will say in her criminal code to each of her offending 
 children : 
 
 My dear child, I am extremely sorry for my past conduct 
 in regard to you, my child ; I ought to have provided the means 
 of giving you a better education ; your understanding ought to 
 have been cultivated by the study of the arts and sciences, and 
 your tastes so improved that you never would have thought of 
 doing anything mean, low and base. I most humbly beg your 
 pardon for having thus neglected you, more particularly as you 
 might have enjoyed a great deal more happiness in the same time 
 than you have done, and also been a much more useful man. 
 Now, as the strongest proof I can give you of my sincere peni- 
 tence for this my neglect, by which you have suffered a severe loss, 
 I shall henceforth make every atonement in my power. In the 
 first place, as you have, through my shameful negligence, advanced 
 so far in life without being properly taught that you are now un- 
 willing to learn, and would not even go to school if left entirely 
 at your own disposal — and as your conduct proves beyond doubt 
 that you can not be trusted to govern yourself until you are fur- 
 ther taught, — I Avill enclose you in this my house of instruction. 
 where you will be furnished with the best masters to instruct yon 
 in the arts and sciences ; you shall take your choice, and if you 
 are too old to^acquire any taste for intellectual pursuits and enjoy- 
 
ii Aocovntability and Punishment. 
 
 ments, 1 shall be the more sorrj for my negligence in doI com 
 your Intellectual and moral education earlier. Notwith- 
 ing, I will furnish you the means of learnings useful trade 
 ur own choice, thai vmi may be able to discover how much 
 happy \ "on will be in future by making your living by your 
 «>wn industry than by the unjust moans which, from mistaken 
 a heretofore employed. Foil shall be treated with the 
 st kindness while you stay under my (•oof, and whenever you 
 are well taught you shall be at liberty to depart. Bo Tar from 
 treating you with harshness and unkindness, my whole conidiMSt to 
 you shall prove thai 1 blame myself and not you. I believe that, 
 it' a child is brought up in the way he should go, when he is old he 
 will not depart from it. You w4re not so brought up ; it is my 
 fault, and why should 1 be angry at you? You were horn in my 
 family, without your knowledge or consent, and indeed without 
 your agency in any way. Some of my children among whom you 
 born were rich and some poor, and many of them became so 
 without any merit or demerit of their own. It was my duty, 
 ever, to see that none should starve either for want of bread 
 or the want of knowledge, unless it was decidedly their own fault. 
 Now, your want of instruction in childhood, when you did not 
 know how to instruct yourself, is clearly my fault, and it ill be- 
 comes me to upbraid you for conduct which I, not you, could have 
 anticipated from the neglect of your education at a time when you 
 did not know how to educate yourself. I knew that ignorance 
 would lead into error, and that error would terminate in crime : 
 you knew nothing of this. I knew that, if you were brought up 
 with a he] id' that you could benefit yourself by injuring another, 
 this belief would lead to crime, yet I took no pains to teach you 
 alsity of this principle; nay, I permitted you to infer that I 
 believed the principle to be true from my own conduct, for I fre- 
 quently punished some of my own children with the avowed pui- 
 -.} doing good to the rest, without the least regard to the good 
 of those punished. For all this conduct I am utterly ashamed, and 
 J promise in future never to do the like again. I begin with you ; 
 all I do to you, you shall feel, and others shall perceive^ is done 
 with the sole intention of making you a wiser and better man; 
 and if i succeed in doing more good to others by this line of eon- 
 duet than by the former — and if I also succeed in educating you 
 Up to 80 high a State of intelligence and virtue that you will no 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 26 
 
 longer haw any desire to do anything base, — all my children will 
 
 have occasion to rejoice at my new mode of discipline when one 
 of them goes astray. I have foolishly acted, heretofore, as if the 
 true interests of my children were not in harmony with each ath 
 and when oik 1 of them acted on the same principle, and endeavored 
 to benefit himself by violating the lights of another, I caught him 
 and punished him without any regard to his happiness or well- 
 being, with the avowed purpose of benefiting the others. This 
 system I shall henceforth abandon, not merely from its injustice 
 and incompetence to produce the desired effect. Imt because it is 
 calculated to perpetuate the belief that we may sometimes benefit 
 ourselves by doing evil to others — an error from which almost all 
 crimes originate. Go, my son, into my house of correction, and 
 be assured that you are deprived of your liberty only from neces- 
 sity — a necessity which lias arisen from my neglect to attend to 
 your education in early life, and from the false doctrine which 1 
 myself contributed to inculcate into your youthful mind. Your 
 transgression has arisen not so much from a desire to do evil to 
 your brothers as from a desire to do good to yourself; as soon as 
 you learn that your good can not be effected in this way, you may 
 then be entrusted again with your liberty : consequently, it shall 
 then most cheerfully be restored to 3^011. In the meantime you shall 
 be visited by the kindest and most benevolent of your brothers 
 and sisters, who will sympathize with you, and be ready to take 
 you by the hand and assist you, when you leave this my house of 
 correction and education of those who err in their search for hap- 
 piness — of those who miss the mark. During your hours of relax- 
 ation from study you may, if you choose, employ yourself in some 
 useful and lucrative occupation ; the proceeds, over and above the 
 expenses of your education, shall be yours, and entirely at your own 
 disposal when you shall be restored to liberty. If you should un- 
 fortunately refuse to accept of intellectual culture, though you have 
 the choice of all departments of science and literature, with the 
 best masters in each, then the only thing remaining is for you to 
 learn some trade by which you may be able to support yourself. 
 and become a useful member of society ; and should you be so per- 
 verse and insensible to the claims of justice that you refuse even 
 to do this, then you will be made to feel want, until you become 
 willing to support yourself by the labor of your own hands. This 
 necessity will be imposed upon you solely with a view to your 
 
26 wmntobitity and Punishment, 
 
 I : for no one can be happy without being useful, [die- 
 ts the bane of happiness, and industrious habits can only be 
 acquired 1>\ the practice of some useful occupation. Practice, my 
 and you will boob discover thai a source of happiness never 
 perceived before is within your reach, which, when mice obtained, 
 you will never abandon. 1 leave yon now to your own choice. 
 
 \ gaod } and you will be happy. 
 
 This is the language every State ought to address to her erring 
 children, she is their mother, and she ought to feel towards (hem 
 cindest compassion when they deviate from the path of recti- 
 tude, because it is then they suffer the most pain. When a child 
 has the colic, the fever and ague, or any corporeal disease, the 
 mother watches over it with the most tender care, and all the med- 
 - which she administers are intended to hasten its cure; none 
 of them are expected to operate on what is past, hut are intended 
 entirely for the future. The medicines are not given for the good 
 of the healthy children, but entirely for the good of the sick. Why 
 should it not be so in moral diseases ? 
 
 It is a curious circumstance, and one which I can not account 
 for, that men in all ages, down to the nineteenth century, have 
 in regard to punishments, and with regard to punishments 
 alone, as if they could change the past. They seem to think 
 that BO Hindi guilt deserves so much punishment, entirely inde- 
 pendent of its tendency to produce reformation, or any beneficial 
 • on til*- sufferer. 
 When a man builds a house, it is not to live in during the 
 eding year, but the succeeding; and when he gives instruc- 
 tion to his child, it is not to make him wiser in time past, but in 
 time to come. Now, if all punishment is only a kind of instruc- 
 tion, and is always unjust unless so intended, why should the idea 
 brospective punishment ever enter our minds, any more than 
 jpective instruction. Jt is true, instruction may be better 
 adapted to the state of the mind by knowing the preceding igno- 
 . and so may punishment by knowing the preceding crime. 
 Medicine may be better adapted to the state of the patient by 
 ing the exact nature of the disease; ; but in all cases the intel- 
 nt In all his actions will aim to produce some effects 
 I'ltuy':. and never to change the past. God himself acts on this 
 plan. In the series of events which take place in his universe, 
 they ><-<\ that the preceding one may produce the sue- 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 27 
 
 ceeding one, but never the reverse. Oh, vain man, how long will 
 it he before thou learnest to act in conformity to the eternal and 
 immutable order established in the universe of God ! 
 Perhaps it may be urged, that though the rule is general that 
 
 men's interests never clash, yet when a man has once committed 
 a crime he has forfeited all right to be treated by his fellows 
 according to the general rule; especially as he voluntarily com- 
 mitted the crime, knowing that if men caught him in the commis- 
 sion of it they would punish him, not with any regard to his 
 good, but merely to set an example to others of what they would 
 have to expect provided they did the same. And as a confirma- 
 tion of this view it is urged, that the criminal himself acknowl- 
 edges the justice of the punishment inflicted upon him — even the 
 punishment of death. The first part of this argument would be 
 unanswerable if it could be shown that it is for the good of society 
 that a criminal should be punished without regard to his good, 
 rather than with regard to his good ; but this I think never can be 
 shown, — and if not, the argument falls to the ground, and the 
 acknowledgement of the criminal only proves how deeply implant- 
 ed that most pernicious doctrine may be, that we may sometimes 
 at least benefit ourselves by diminishing the well-being of others. 
 In the days of persecution the minority acknowledged the right of 
 the majority to burn at the stake. It was what they themselves 
 intended to do as soon as they obtained power. In those days 
 they seemed to think that belief in the doctrines of a creed did not 
 depend upon the evidence of their truth, but upon the evidence that 
 fire would burn ; for that was all the evidence which the persecu- 
 tors deigned to furnish. Had they been acquainted with the laws 
 of the human mind, they would have known that, if they had 
 furnished as conclusive and satisfactory proofs of the truth of their 
 creed as they did that fire would burn, their belief in the one would 
 have been as full and unwavering as their belief in the other. 
 They would have known, also, that the evidence which they furn- 
 ished that fire would burn, though it was perfectly convincing, 
 would not in the least degree tend to convince either the one who 
 was burned, or any of the spectators, that the articles of any par- 
 ticular creed were true which appeared to them to have no connec- 
 tion with the proposition "Fire will burn." It was the error of 
 the age of persecution that unbelief could be destroyed by fire 
 better than by argument : so it is the error of the present day to 
 
- s fertility and Ptniishmoi/. 
 
 re t li.it the public can be better secured from crimes by pun 
 ishing criminals without regard to their good, than by considering 
 their good o/ojm in all the punishment which is inflicted upon 
 them. They profess to ao( Mom the principle thai it is proper 
 and just and useful to the community that criminals should be 
 punished without regard to their happiness, for the sake of exam- 
 [fthis is the true principle, and utility is really expected to 
 the community from example, then do most communities act most 
 tsterously to gain this end. If' example is the thing to ben- 
 efit the community, then ought punishments to be as public as 
 le. Men ought to be chained on the public highways and in 
 the streets of our large cities, after they aTe convicted of coriimes, 
 that tenor for evil deeds might meet us at every corner; and if 
 this wae not sufficient to deter others from the commission of 
 crimes, then the severity of punishments ought to he increased. 
 The criminals ought to he lashed on the hare hack at stated inter- 
 val-, and all the citizens should be invited to attend, that none of 
 them might be deprived of the salutary influence which such exam- 
 ple might have in deterring them from similar crimes. Care 
 ought to he taken not to extend the punishment so far as to 
 endanger the life of the patient, for the longer his life lasts and the 
 examples of torture he affords, the more henefrcial does he 
 become to the community. 
 
 Now how silly do men act, and how inconsistently with their 
 <>\vn principles! Some criminals they catch and strangle within 
 their prison-walls as quietly as possible, and will not let any one 
 be present to derive advantage from this suhlime spectacle, hut 
 the sheriff, the turnkey, and the clergyman ; yet it is well known 
 that men in general are hut little affected with what they only hear, 
 in comparison with what they see. Others they enclose within the 
 wall- of a penitentiary, and let no one see them hut the person who 
 them food and drink, — and not one in a thousand of the com- 
 munity ever think- of them from the time they go in till the time 
 they i ome out. 
 
 Men are beginning to act as if they were ashamed and afraid to 
 niiiimity see their own laws executed, Jest it might have 
 aicious effect on their moral character. The vejy fact that 
 men inning to execute capitally in private is a sure symp- 
 
 tom thai ere long the moral feelings of the community will obtain 
 a glorious victory over that most pernicious error which it is my 
 
Accountability and Punishment. m l\) 
 
 chief object to combat in this paper. As soon as it is acknowl- 
 edged that it is injurious for the multitude to be present at capital 
 punishments, the very corner-stone on which the whole system of 
 criminal jurisprudence is now built is removed, and the whole 
 
 fabric must speedily tumble to the dust, [f the community arc not 
 to be benefited by the spectacle of capital punishments, men will 
 immediately begin to inquire what use there is in punishments. 
 They will then soon come to tin; true conclusion that there is no 
 utility in them only as they are beneficial to the criminal himself. 
 They will then push their inquiries a little further, and they wfll 
 soon conclude that the best way to improve the criminal is to 
 strengthen his understanding, to elevate his tastes, and to teach 
 him the laws of God, and especially that law in which it is enacted 
 that no man can benefit himself by doing evil to another. 
 
 Oh glorious day for mankind when this becomes the universal 
 sentiment ! All malice and strife will cease, and man will learn 
 war no more. Even that universal maxim, that " the best way to 
 preserve peace is to be prepared for war," will be abandoned as a 
 dangerous principle ; for even the act of preparing for war is cal- 
 culated to excite the jealousies and ill will of surrounding nations, 
 and the expense of keeping large standing armies is like a mill- 
 stone hung round the neck of society to retard their advancement 
 in the arts and sciences. When wars cease, men will rapidly ad- 
 vance in all that adorns life and makes it desirable. How much 
 more rapidly would they advance if all thought of wars was for 
 ever removed from the mind ! When rumors of war are spread 
 abroad, and preparations for war are commenced, the all-absorbing- 
 subject of war takes possession of the mind, and no time is left for 
 cultivating the arts of peace, and the evils to society are almost as 
 great as when the chariot of actual war is fiercely driven over the 
 land. A thousand vices will disappear from the earth when the 
 war-spirit becomes extinct, and a thousand virtues will spring up 
 in their stead. As soon as all nations shall clearly perceive that 
 no two of them can carry on a war without great loss to them- 
 selves and to all other nations, all motive to Avar will cease, and 
 men will learn to " do unto others as they would have others do unto 
 them." Industry will then be directed in the right channels. Iron 
 will not be dug out of the bowels of the earth to be melted into 
 cannon balls, and then thrown into the ocean at great expense of 
 saltpetre, sulphur and charcoal. The immense labor heretofore 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 
 
 employed in surrounding cities with walls wad ditohes and forts, 
 occu] much ground which might be usefully employed in 
 
 ill then be spared to increase the wealth and comforts 
 of mankind, and to leave abundance of time bo cultivate the mind 
 eading and study, after all necessary comforts and conyen- 
 b of life are procured by half the quantity of labor which men 
 • w obliged to undergo to obtain a scanty and precarious sub- 
 sistence. 
 
 The external comforts which would arise Prom correct views on 
 these important points would form a very small portion of the 
 whole amount of the increase o( happiness which would be imme- 
 • sperienced. It is in the mind o{ man properly cultivated 
 that his chief happiness dwells. It is the mind, also, which suffers 
 the most poignant anguish, frequently, under false views. What a 
 fountain of joy, springing up to eternal happiness, will be laid open 
 to our view as Boon as we can sec with the clearness of demonstra- 
 tion that everything which occurs, even the most distressing, is 
 ordered by infinite power, under the direction of infinite wisdom 
 and infinite goodness : and that the greatest evils which occur will 
 tend not merely to increase the happiness of the whole universe, but 
 especially of the individual on whom the evils fall. Unbounded 
 and confiding love of God would then fill our souls, terror and 
 i]- would be forever banished from our minds, even when the 
 clouds of adversity shrouded our horizon in their darkest hue. It 
 would be eternally present to our minds that the justice of God 
 required pain to be the consequence of transgression no more than 
 his mosi tender mercy ; and that it would be cruel, as well as un- 
 just, to withhold that pain from the transgressor which alone could 
 t<ach him not to transgress in a similar way again. As soon as we 
 shall see that the infinite holiness of God does not require Him. to 
 punish transgression of his laws with infinite and eternal punish- 
 in. -m, hut rather to cause that pain to follow transgression which 
 will tend to prevent transgression in future, our minds will be freed 
 from all superstitious dread of almighty vengeance, which is as 
 fatal to growth in virtue as to the increase of happiness. 
 
 To punish the transgressor with infinite and eternal punishment 
 
 iona, without intending Up produce the destruction of 
 
 sin, would indicate rather an infinite love of punishment than an 
 
 infinite hatred of sin ; and the best and only way to manifest an 
 
 infinite hatred of sin is to take the best means to root it out of ex- 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 31 
 
 istence. And it would appear, so far as we can Bee, thai this can 
 only be done by the plan Grod lias certainly adopted : to cause 
 
 pain always to follow transgression and happiness always to follow 
 obedience, and then to give man the power to discover thai effects 
 flow from causes. 
 
 Perhaps it may be objected, that Q-od does not intend thai the 
 
 pain which follows transgression should work out the reformation 
 of the transgressor, as it manifestly sometimes does not produce 
 that effect. On the contrary, men sometimes seem to get worse 
 and worse the more they transgress and the more they suffer for 
 the transgression. For example, the drunkard : so far from being 
 cured by the headache consequent on a debauch, so far from abhor- 
 ring the liquor which he knows by experience stultifies all his 
 mental powers, and renders him unfit for a time to enjoy the high 
 pleasures of the understanding and the unspeakable joys of domes- 
 tic affection, he seeks with increased ardor the delirium of intoxi- 
 cation, knowing at the same time that his conduct is hastening 
 him down to a premature and disgraceful death, and agonizing 
 the feelings of all who love him most. Indeed, so far from drunk- 
 enness curing itself by the frightful consequences which God has 
 made to follow in its train, it seems to render its victims regard- 
 less of all consequences, and even to invert the nature of man so 
 far as to cause him to choose misery in preference to happiness, 
 and that, too, at the expense of making those wretched who are 
 united to him by the dearest ties of consanguinity and affinity. 
 Now, it may be said that as God does not cure the drunkard by 
 the pain which He causes to follow drunkenness, He does not cause 
 the pain with the intention of curing ; for He can not be frustrated 
 in his intentions. 
 
 To all this it may be answered, that though the pain of drunk- 
 enness does not always prevent future intoxication, yet this pain 
 may have its utility. We are not sure but that the man who 
 even kills himself by continued drunkenness may die with a more 
 thorough hatred of drunkenness than one who has never been 
 drunk. He knows its evils by sad experience. If it is asked. 
 Why, then, did he not abandon the practice ? the answer may 
 perhaps be, that a state of disease was produced by the habit of 
 intoxication which so affected the body that nothing short of death 
 could cure it, and yet the disembodied spirit may depart to the 
 other world with the utmost loathing of all intemperance — a 
 
[ccountability and Puuis/nuait. 
 
 Ing increased by having experienced the effects of intemper- 
 ance here. 
 
 It would be illogical to infer that, because Q-od docs not always 
 cure a disease bj the pain which arises from that disease whilst 
 the patient is in this world, therefore God never intends to cure 
 the disease. God is constantly using means to overcome igno- 
 rance — his whole universe is one great system o( instruction ; \vt 
 Be advances but a very small distance in producing perfect wis- 
 dom, even in the brightest intelligences, whilst they are in (his 
 world : ami yet it would he manifestly absurd to infer that (Un\ 
 will not succeed in making us extremely wise in millions of years 
 alter our departure from tins world. Now it may be that the dis- 
 ease of the body produced by repeated intoxication is incurable, 
 yet the soul may awake from its stupor in the world of spirits 
 with a hatred of all intemperance and an inexpressible joy at find- 
 ing itself tired from the miserable clog of clay, which it now per- 
 - was the only impediment which hindered it at once from 
 rising into the pure regions of intelligence and bliss. 
 
 But even if the case of the drunkard, and perhaps some others, 
 can not be explained in accordance with the doctrine advanced in 
 this paper, the general principle may still be true, that the pain 
 which God has caused to follow transgression is intended to lead 
 to reformation. Besides, who can tell how many are prevented 
 From becoming confirmed drunkards by considering the horrible 
 state to which they and their families would be reduced if they 
 yielded to the temptation of continued intoxication ? 
 
 ft appear*, then, highly probable that in this case, as in all 
 others, the tendency of the pain consequent upon transgression is 
 to produce reformation in all minds possessing sufficient reason to 
 discover that pain is the result of the transgression ; and therefore 
 'ac may safely infer that God designed this tendency when he 
 arranged it so that pain should follow transgression. Nay, fur- 
 ther, QoA floes not always wait till the commission of the overt 
 aet of transgression before He commences the punishment. He has 
 beautifully and wisely and mercifully arranged it so that the pun- 
 ishment j\ extemporaneous with the first thought of committing 
 the transgression, even before the design is formed or the plan laid. 
 The punishment begins thus early evidently with the design to 
 prevent, the overt &ct, and sometimes even the completion of the 
 design to commit, the overt act. 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 33 
 
 What an untold amount of crime is prevented by this most 
 benevolent arrangement ! How much Buffering is avoided by 
 using an ounce of prevention instead of a pound of cure ! J low 
 much more beautiful is such a plan as this, and how much more 
 efficient in advancing the moral education of rational beings, 
 than any plan which would defer the punishment for a long 
 time after the commission of the transgression ! If God had 
 caused happiness to be the result of transgression of his laws 
 in this world and misery in the next, such an arrangement would 
 seem like a plan to entrap us into crime, for all our experience 
 would then lead us to believe that crimes are true means of hap- 
 piness. Such a scheme was never made by a wise and benevo- 
 lent God. 
 
 Perhaps it may be objected to the system which I have here 
 presented, that it represents God as acting inconsistently with hi.s 
 own plans and determinations. In a former part of this paper, it 
 may be said I endeavored to prove that God designed that man 
 should commit moral evil, and in the latter part I have endeavored 
 to show that God has made the best possible contrivances to pre- 
 vent moral evil, and to cure that which is not prevented. To this 
 objection I answer : that God did certainly intend, as was demon- 
 strated before, all the moral evil which exists, and no more, and 
 the contrivances which He has made to prevent moral evil are 
 intended not to prevent that which takes place, but that which 
 would take place without these contrivances. God, in his infinite 
 wisdom, sees that the ignorance of man would lead him eternally 
 astray from the path of rectitude, if He did not hedge in this path 
 with thorns and thistles, which, by their pungent stings, would 
 warn the traveller, at every deviation, that he must immediately 
 return. 
 
 It may be objected, also, that the system here advocated places 
 the revealed will of God in his Word in contradiction to his secret 
 will in his decrees ; that his revealed will is that man should com- 
 mit no transgressions, but that his secret will is that he should 
 commit all the transgressions which he does commit. To this 
 objection I answer : that there is no contradiction between the 
 revealed and secret will of God. The Word of God is a revelation 
 of his laws, and not at all a revelation of his will that those laws 
 shall not be broken. If God willed that his laws should not be 
 broken, they never would be broken ; for what God wills must come 
 3 
 
$4 Accountability and Punishment* 
 
 to pass, His written W ord is onlj i different form of instructing 
 : - ationai creatures what to do and what not to <lo to Becure 
 their highest happiness, h comes in aid of their experience as to 
 the effects of actions on their happiness or misery, It is kind 
 advice given by a most affectionate Father: Do this, and be 
 happy — avoid that, or be miserable. It nowhere says that God's 
 will or determination is that we shall not disobey. This advice, 
 tike the pain we experience from transgression, or even from the 
 thought of transgression, is intended not to hinder us from the 
 transgressions which we actually commit, but from those we 
 would commit without the aid of this advice. God lias deter- 
 mined that we shall commit no more transgressions than we 
 actually do commit, and lie has taken effectual means to insure 
 that result. 1 think, also, we may safely conclude, from the 
 means which we sec in operation, that it is his determination that 
 we -hall commit fewer and fewer transgressions the longer we 
 until finally, when w r e become perfectly wise, transgres- 
 sion will become impossible. In this process our free agency 
 will all the time remain unimpaired. Our liability to sin will 
 evidently diminish with the increase of our wisdom and goodness, 
 whilst our free agency will constantly remain the same. Nor 
 is it necessary that man should become infinitely wise to render 
 transgression in him impossible ; it is enough that his wisdom 
 be coextensive with his sphere of action, so that nothing should 
 be presented to his mind leading to action beyond his sphere 
 of knowledge. Now, as man's sphere of action is limited, we 
 may well conceive that his knowledge, which is constantly in- 
 ing in this world, and will probabty increase much faster in 
 the next, will become so extensive in millions of years that no 
 proposition could then he proposed to him which he could not 
 mine as to its evil or good consequences; and as God never 
 will, to all eternity, cause,' happiness to be the result of the trans- 
 ion of his laws, this knowledge is all that is necessary to 
 transgression impossible — especially when we consider 
 that man never can have his nature so changed that he can prefer 
 misery to happiness ; and to prefer the known causes of misery to 
 the known causes of happiness would be the same as preferring 
 th • misery itself. 
 
 \ } < rhaps it may he objected that I have based all my reasonings, 
 in this paper, on the supposition that man is a purely intellectual 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 35 
 
 being, and that all hie volitions arise from the dictates of the un- 
 derstanding, whereas it is manifest that he is not purely intellec- 
 tual, and that very many of his volitions aie chiefly influenced 
 by his passions, and still more by his habits — and that, too, so 
 suddenly that his rational powers have no linn- to act before the 
 volition is made ; and hence it is inferred that man may still be 
 liable to transgress the law of God, even after he becomes perfect 
 in knowledge, if thai time should ever arrive. This objection, 
 however plausible, is easily answered. I acknowledge that many 
 of our volitions are influenced by our passions, and many depend 
 on our habits, as completely as the volitions of beasts depend on 
 instinct ; and I have no doubt that we are formed by the Creator 
 with the capacity of acquiring habits, and being influenced by 
 them, for the wisest purposes. Without such a capacity man 
 would be in many respects inferior to the beasts, and, indeed, 
 would be altogether unfitted for an inhabitant of this world. But 
 habits themselves may be examined by reason, and approved or 
 condemned as they shall appear useful or injurious to our happi- 
 ness ; and there is no bad habit, however confirmed by long use, 
 that can not be corrected by long continued and repeated efforts. 
 I will not say that the converse of this proposition is true : that 
 good habits, when once confirmed by long use, can be changed 
 to bad ; for good habits, when examined by reason, will be ap- 
 proved, and, of course, no efforts will be made to change them. 
 Thus they will remain forever as parts of our very self, eternally 
 ready to lead us to make proper volitions on all subjects within 
 the sphere of their influence. Hence, it is manifestly true, if you 
 bring up a child in the way he should go, when he is old he will not 
 depart from it. But Solomon nowhere says, Bring up a child in 
 the way he should not go, and when he is old he will not depart 
 from it. 
 
 All nature is a great s}^stem of education, and we are con- 
 stantly reminded by some pain or inconvenience, every time we 
 deviate from the path of rectitude and virtue, to examine the 
 cause of this pain, and to try to find a remedy and the means of 
 avoiding it in future. If it originates from a bad habit, we see it 
 is our interest to begin immediately to correct that habit ; ami, 
 knowing that bad habits of long standing can only be overcome 
 by long-continued efforts, and a firm determination to succeed, we 
 do not despair of obtaining a victory in the end, though our first 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 
 
 may appeal to be unattended with success, It is acknowl- 
 : 1 1 • • n . that many of our volitions are under the influence of 
 habit, and not decided by reasoB at the moment ; yet, as the habits 
 themselves are Bubjed to reason, to change or modify them accord- 
 I to the dictates of the understanding, it seems that we may 
 lv draw the conclusion on this point which we drew before, 
 that wl ecome perfect in knowledge we will be able to sec 
 
 ariy any bad habit which we may have acquired, and know how 
 come it in the shortest possible time — and when that is 
 ited, transgression will be impossible. 
 .Many of our volitions also arise from our passions, or at least 
 are very much influenced by them ; and as our passions are blind 
 Instincts, and altogether incapable of deciding at all times how 
 far it will ho to our true interest to indulge them, it is inferred on 
 this ground, that transgressions may continue from the impulse of 
 passion long after we become perfectly wise. But neither is this 
 i conclusion ; for it is one of the principal prerogatives of 
 to guide the impulses of passion, and say to each, Thus 
 far 6- /n/lt thou go, and no farther. And we know by experience 
 that many men, even in this early period of existence, when pas- 
 sion i- strong and reason is weak, so restrain their passions that 
 but little evil arises from their indulgence ; we may then, I think, 
 [y infer that the time will come when the passions will become 
 servants and not the masters of reason. This conclusion appears 
 be more unexceptionable when we consider, what is known 
 to he the fact, that superstition, in some of its vagaries — taking 
 it for granted that the indulgence of some of our strongest pas- 
 sion- was sinful — has been able, not indeed to extirpate the pas- 
 sion, but to giant it no indulgence ; if, then, superstition has been 
 aid'-, fighting against nature, to produce such an unexpected result 
 to the great injury of the individual, shall we deny to Omnipotent 
 Reason, acting in harmony with nature, the power of so directing 
 the impulses of passion as to result in good and only good con- 
 tinually ? 
 
 ■■ in to t.li ink that man, in his present imperfect state, 
 could avoid transgressing the law of God altogether; but this is 
 manifestly impossible, for many of the laws of God are unknown 
 to the brightest intellects till the day of their death ; and when we 
 begin to act in infancy all of his laws are unknown to us — even 
 the law of gravitation has to be learned by manya painful thump. 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 37 
 
 Nor docs it impeach the mercy or goodness of God to command 
 us not to transgress, and to punish tie or give us pain when we do 
 transgress; for these commands and the pains resulting from trans- 
 gression are intended as a system of instruction, to enable us 
 
 finally to know and obey all his laws. They are evidently not 
 intended to make us perfectly wise in an instant, for they do not 
 produce that effect, and, so far as we can sec, it is Impossible they 
 should; and if they can not make us perfectly wise in an instant, 
 
 they can not in an instant place us in a situation to keep all the 
 laws of God. 
 
 Everything great and good which God creates is done in a 
 gradual manner, and we know of nothing greater than the mind 
 of man hut the Creator himself. The oak is increasing for cen- 
 turies in majesty and strength. The earth has required thou- 
 sands of centuries to attain its present state of comfort and con- 
 venience for man, and man will be increasing in knowledge and 
 excellence when millions of ages have rolled away. Whether 
 he will continue to transgress and suffer after death we have 
 no means of knowing ; the probability is, from the mere prin- 
 ciples of reason, that man will continue to transgress as long as 
 he is ignorant, and that he will continue to suffer as long as he 
 transgresses. It is, however, quite plain that the whole amount 
 of suffering from transgression will be a mere infinitesimal when 
 compared with the amount of enjoyment which will arise from 
 obedience. For we can see clearly, that even in this world it 
 will be so as soon as the principles contained in this paper 
 are universally believed and acted upon, both by governments 
 and individuals — and this will certainly be the case at no very 
 distant day. Whenever, in the providence of God, the world 
 arrives at a state in which any one can conceive and clearly 
 demonstrate the means of improving the condition of man, the 
 public opinion will soon rise to a point where it will be possible 
 to put those means into operation. Men are beginning to see that 
 wars are always injurious, not merely to the belligerents, but to 
 the whole world ; they are beginning to doubt the propriety oi' 
 punishing capitally before the assembled multitude. The next 
 step, and one, too, which must be taken when men have advanced 
 thus far, will be to abandon forever the law o\' force for fche law of 
 kindness ; and when the law of kindness is once adopted, it will 
 never be abandoned. Men are made to advance, and not to retro- 
 
:,s Accoufitohility and PwUshment. 
 
 e made to rise, and not to fall, The nature of the 
 human mind leads to this conclusion, and the history of the world 
 establishes the Fact, 
 
 Ait er all, ii may be said by some that, in the present state of 
 the world, it would lead to licentiousness to teach the multitude 
 the doctrines contained and advocated in this paper, and if so, it 
 is a strong presumption against the truth of the doctrine 
 . for truth must always be beneficial to mankind. I acknowl- 
 ihat all who have been brought up in the doctrines which 
 have heretofore prevailed on the nature of moral accountability 
 and punishment would immediately infer that men ought neither 
 to be blamed nor punished for any violation of God's law, if it is 
 better for them and all mankind that they should commit the very 
 transgression which they did commit, and especially if it is God's 
 will that they should commit it ; on the contrary, they infer that 
 men ought to be as well pleased with others and with themselves, 
 when they commit murders and thefts, as when they perform the 
 volant and disinterested acts of charity. And they in- 
 sist that, whether this is a just conclusion from the premises or 
 not, as it is one which would he drawn, it is proof conclusive that 
 the doctrine ought not to he taught. Now, I answer, that there 
 is no doubt that ''truth, the. whole truth, and nothing hut the 
 truth," is better for man than falsehood or error, and the nearer 
 pproximate to the truth on any subject the better. And if 
 raid be shown that the doctrines of this essay lead to licen- 
 tiousness, when properly understood, it would be conclusive proof 
 insi their truth. 
 Jt will not do to show that false deductions from the doctrines 
 will lead to licentiousness: this would rather prove the doctrines 
 to be true. To what dreadful evils have false deductions from 
 Christianity led ! False deductions from false principles may 
 lead to good; but false deductions from true principles can lead 
 only to evil. J > 1 1 1 the conclusion that men ought not to be pun- 
 ished for their transgressions is not false, and will not lead to evil, 
 bur to the greatest good ; it will free men from the absurdity of 
 endeavoring by punishment to change the past, instead of direct! 
 
 to the future; and, as was said before, it will 
 
 nt men from punishing from a principle of vengeance. Bu| 
 an absolute non sequitur to say that we ought to be as well 
 ■A with ourselves when we transgress the law of God as 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 39 
 
 when we obey ; because it would be the same as Baying we ought 
 to be as fond of pain as we are of pleasure, which would be the 
 same as saying we ought to change our natures, and not to be 
 what we are. There is no philosophy which can ever have the 
 
 slightest tendency to make us fond of pain and averse to happi- 
 ness, and, of course, it will always be Impossible for us to look 
 with pleasure on the transgression of God's law, knowing, at the 
 same time, that transgression will always be followed with pain ; 
 yet even here much anguish may be avoided by correct views. 
 The only use of repentance and sorrow for transgression is to 
 produce reformation : if that can be effected without the pain of 
 sorrow, so much the better. Now, true philosophy ought to teach 
 us to rejoice whenever we have discovered the cause of any evil 
 produced by a transgression of the law of God, so that we may 
 avoid the evil in future. It is in vain to sit down and weep over 
 what can not be changed ; we ought to save our strength for fu- 
 ture action. Why may not the time arrive when we will be truly 
 grateful to any one who will clearly demonstrate to us that we are 
 wrong, either in our reasoning or in our conduct ? Such a one 
 would undoubtedly be our benefactor, and therefore would deserve 
 our gratitude. 
 
 Again, the doctrines here taught never will be received as true 
 by those who think they lead to licentiousness, and therefore they 
 will not operate injuriously on their minds, except it be to raise a 
 spirit of persecution against the advocates of them. The abolish- 
 ment of the present Criminal Code, and the establishment of a new 
 one founded on true principles, will never take place until the 
 great body of the people are enlightened enough to see that the 
 present system leads to the production of the crimes which it is 
 intended to prevent. As long as the community shall believe 
 that the fear of punishment is the most effectual preventative of 
 crime the present system will be continued, and perhaps it is better 
 it should. Fear is, no doubt, implanted in the human mind for 
 wise purposes, and in the low stages of our existence it may he 
 used as a motive ; but the sooner it can be supplanted by higher 
 motives the better ; and as soon as it is supplanted it will become 
 useless and obsolete. Whether the time will ever come when the 
 motive of fear will be entirely abandoned, both by parents in the 
 education of their children and by States in the correction of crim- 
 inals, it is not for us to say. Certain it is, that the principle of 
 
Ace untabdity and Punishment. 
 
 ufl j parents and States in proportion as thej are 
 ightened. 
 r haps it may be thought unsatisfactory to deduoe from the 
 the Deity only, and not from experience and an ex- 
 amination of facts, the great principle which lies at the foun- 
 i of the system advocated above, namely, the true interest* 
 mkind never clash. As it relates to the present life, where 
 wo ha rienoe of the causes of happiness and misery, the 
 
 objection is worthy of consideration : as to the life to conic, we 
 have no means of knowing by experience, either that there will be 
 a continuance of our conscious existence after death, or thai we 
 will be happy. Once, however, establish that there is a Grod of 
 infinite power, wisdom and goodness, then, if we grant that it 
 will be better for us to exist happy to all eternity than to be anni- 
 hilated at death, it will follow, without a doubt, that we will so 
 exisl : for whatever is better to be done, a God of infinite pcrfec- 
 - will inevitably do, as was before demonstrated. 
 indeed, it could be shown that conscious existence is impos- 
 sible to US while united to our material bodies, then, however 
 able it might appear to exist happy after death, it would im- 
 ply no absurdity to say that a God of infinite perfections could 
 >nfer on us a happy immortality ; but no such impossibility 
 can be shown or even rendered probable. 
 
 If this life comprises the whole of human existence, then, so far 
 as man is concerned, this whole world is a complete failure, at 
 which every rational creature would incline to hiss with scorn, 
 than exult, I am now sixty years old, and during' the 
 whole of my life I have been placed in circumstances 
 
 calculated to produce as large a sum of happiness as falls to 
 the lol of the most favored individuals. In my childhood and 
 youth poor, humble ami obscure, stimulated with a strong desire 
 of knowledge and endowed with a mind capable of acquiring it, I 
 ally advanced from one degree of knowledge to another, 
 until finally I was enabled to unfold mysteries in meteorology 
 : had been bidden from every previous examiner. The cur- 
 theatre of the atmosphere was drawn up, and I 
 admitted behind the scenes, into the very council chamber of 
 the ( when not only the modu* operandi in producing 
 
 storms, but the final causes of many most beautiful contrivances, 
 laid Open to my delighted view. I have lived to see these 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 41 
 
 discoveries acknowledged by the scientific world, and in some de- 
 gree appreciated ; and during the progress of these discoveries and 
 this appreciation, I have derived from them no ordinary degree of 
 happiness: yet I do not hesitate to declare thai if, in the midst of 
 
 my most exalted emotions of pleasure, 1 had been convinced that 
 there is no God to whom all these beautiful contrivances could be 
 referred, and that this life terminates tin; conscious existence of 
 man, 1 should have felt at the same moment that the cup of happi- 
 ness was torn from my lips and dashed to the ground. What ! 
 wakened into existence, and educated for a few short years, to 
 know the unspeakable value of an immortality of happiness, merely 
 to be told that this immortality shall not be mine ! It is a mock- 
 ery which can only exist on supposition that there is no God, and 
 that things begin to exist without cause and without object. 
 What ! bring a being into existence without knowledge, but with 
 the capacity of acquiring knowledge and improving indefinitely — 
 educate him up ( for all nature is a system of education ) to a 
 state in which he begins to know how to live and how to enjoy, 
 and then strike him out of existence ! It is an improbability 
 which could not result from blind chance once in a million of 
 times, even if chance were an agent ; and never from a Benevolent 
 Intelligence. Much less could a Benevolent Intelligence bring into 
 existence a being capable of increasing in knowledge and virtue for 
 a few years, and then place him in a situation where no increase 
 of knowledge would be of any use to him, and where his sensibility 
 would be preserved only to render him capable of suffering un- 
 mingled pain without end, and where he could not even have the 
 mournful consolation of putting an end to his torments by termi- 
 nating his existence. To some minds, the horrible injustice and 
 cruelty of such a proceeding would be heightened if the tormenter 
 had arranged his plans from all eternity to create the being thus to 
 be tormented with just such dispositions and such a degree of de- 
 fective knowledge as would, when placed in certain circumstances 
 determined on, inevitably lead to the violations of the laws for 
 which he was afterwards to be punished to all eternity, without 
 any intention of benefiting him by the punishment. Indeed, so 
 revolting is the latter notion to some minds, who nevertheless 
 think it is necessary to believe in a hell of never-ending torment, 
 they have adopted the following system, which seems to them to 
 relieve the Deity from the odium oi being the tormenter himself: 
 
Accountability and PioiisJnncnt. 
 
 I ..; "God could not create man without endowing 
 
 him with Free will, and that in consequence of this five will, man 
 might bo change his nature, which was originally created capable 
 o\ deriving happiness from goodness alone, as to derive the only 
 pleasure he Bhould then be capable of enjoying from wickedness, 
 or doing evil to others — thai this nature will remain depraved 
 to all eternity, and thus he will be prompted to Ao evil to others, 
 in order to procure for himself the only pleasure his nature is capa- 
 ble of receiving, and thai (*od is constantly restraining him from 
 doing evil, as much as is consistent with his free will." 
 
 Bow llf restrains beings from evil, when at the same linn 4 the 
 nature of these beings is such, that the only pleasure which they 
 enjoy is from the mischief or evil which they do to others, is not 
 explained: nor i- any attempt made to show that G-od is not the 
 author of all this e\ il ; as lie certainly is, as it arises out of the 
 circumstances in which man was placed, whether he was originally 
 created with a nature capable of deriving pleasure only from vice, 
 or whether that nature was acquired after his creation. God, then, 
 by this system, is not freed from the odium of punishing a, portion 
 of his intelligent creatures with eternal punishment, without any 
 intention of benefiting them ; and besides, He is inadvertently 
 accused of having formed men so that a portion of them would be 
 stimulated to all eternity by the strongest motives which we can 
 live of, t<> heap new torments on each other. Such a system, 
 we may safely say, could not be devised by an infinitely good 
 and therefore it does not exist. As it relates to this present 
 life, however, it is proper to inquire, not merely what nature man 
 might to have, consistent with the infinite perfections of the Con- 
 triver, but. what nature, in point of fact, he has, so far as we can 
 rtain by the mosi careful observation. 
 
 Now if any one will turn his attention inwards, he will discover 
 thai our chief happiness consists in our benevolent affections, in 
 oiii- emotions of kindness and good-will towards others, arid in 
 the consciousness that the manifestation of these kind emotions 
 pleasure to those we associate with. Indeed, our love of 
 • nice of much greater happiness to us than our love 
 of ourselves; for even in our solitary moments if is a source of 
 unspeakable joy to reflect, that our kind offices are received and 
 returned with kindneSfi by those we, love, and that, their happiness 
 
 is thu$ increased through our instrumentality. Now these kind 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 43 
 
 affections, more or less strong, are implanted in every human 
 breast. They are always at their posts, frequently not less active 
 
 in the illiterate than in those whose intellects are highly cultivated, 
 and they never let as rest satisfied without doing good ; their very 
 object is the happiness of others. Yet our own happiness exists in 
 the very exercise of kind feelings ; and it' self-love and social are 
 not identically the same, our own happiness and thai of others is 
 promoted by the self-same means. Nothing could be more admi- 
 rably contrived for the production of happiness to the whole sys- 
 tem than this arrangement. 
 
 Again, when we turn our attention to the intellectual part of out 
 nature, and consider the joys attending the pursuit and discovery 
 of truth, though it appears that we are stimulated to exertion in 
 this field chiefly by the pleasure we ourselves experience in the 
 exercise of the intellectual powers, which seems of a more selfish 
 character than the exercise of our benevolent affections, yet it is so 
 arranged that the result of our investigations is for the good of 
 mankind ; for every truth that we discover is connected with some 
 good, which could be procured for the benefit of all only by the 
 discovery of the truth. 
 
 When we reflect on this arrangement, we can not help admiring 
 the goodness and wisdom of the Creator in thus causing our selfish 
 pursuit of truth to result in the universal good of mankind, while 
 at the same time our individual happiness is secured — first, by 
 giving us a high relish for intellectual pursuits, and second, by 
 gratifying our benevolent affections, when we reflect that our labors 
 are beneficial to mankind. 
 
 Again, by pushing our inquiries still further, we will discover 
 that there are no ingredients infused into our constitutions whose 
 object is to produce unhappiness. We have no principle of male- 
 volence or ill-will towards the human race. It is true, we some- 
 times feel angry at a particular individual ; but this passion is 
 always excited by some real or supposed ill-will or injustice on 
 the part of the individual towards us, and the paroxysm is gener- 
 ally of short duration, and while it lasts is generally quite as 
 painful to the one who feels the passion as to the one against 
 whom it is directed. Besides, there is a general tendency in 
 nature to abolish the causes of anger and resentment by edu- 
 cating us up to see that the object of anger and resentment, the 
 correction of the offender, may be much better effected by kindness 
 
U Accom tal 7/7y rtwc£ Punishment* 
 
 \ harshness and violence. As to revenge, 
 - - lorn such a feeling arising in the human breast, and 
 when a person imagines be has been treated with the 
 greatest injustice or insult. This feeling will never be excited, 
 t, become extinct, w 1 hm i men shall treat each other 
 with undeviating kindness and justice, Indeed, before that period 
 shall arrive, much that tends to excite anger and resentment would 
 ae away, if children should be taught from their earliest in- 
 k on their fellows as possessing noble and exalted 
 natures, loving justice and kindness, and invariably disposed to 
 be kind to those that are kind to them ; that G-od is never angry 
 with them, but Looks with tender compassion when they mistake 
 the means of procuring happiness : and if, added to this, they 
 should never see their parents angry at each other or with them, 
 but, overcoming all their waywardness and disohed ienee hy kind* 
 tleness, who can say how much the happiness of the 
 world would be increased in a single generation! The pain of 
 • iii one side, and the resentment and sense of injustice and 
 tyranny on the other, would he avoided, and the worst of all 
 res to action, fear, would never he introduced into the mind 
 of the child. Hie most perfect confidence would thus he estab- 
 lished on both sides, and there being no temptation to deceive from 
 the Bear of punishment, which is the ^reat fountain of untruthful- 
 if the child should never he deceived himself, it is probable, 
 under these benign influences, he would seldom or never deviate 
 from the -i rictest truth. 
 
 In early youth, "thought is speech and speech is truth ; " and 
 would continue if the true system of education were univer- 
 sally adopted. Under the system which is now prevalent, chil- 
 frequently placed in circumstances where they think it is 
 to tell a falsehood to ;ivoid a greater evil, as they sup- 
 ' is, their fear of punishment is greater than their fear 
 of lying. Indeed, in some cases the cxnselty of parents seems 
 almost to justify the deception which is practiced upon them by 
 their children. Were a madman fce meet us on the edge of a pre- 
 cipice from which we had no means of escaping, and with drawn 
 I order us to jump down or he would run us through, we 
 would feel oui justified in saying to him: "Oh! any one 
 
 . -jump down, but we will do something much more won- 
 down and we will jump up ! " A child is some- 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 45 
 
 times as much terrified at the threats of a parent as we would be 
 
 in the situation above. 
 The greal evil of this system is, that the child discovert he can 
 
 frequently benefit himself by lying, which he is taughl to believe 
 wrong — audit is quite Datura] that, alter he experiences benefit 
 
 from one wrong, lie should draw the inference that another mighf 
 benefit him also. Thus he is gradually led to believe thai the 
 interests of all mankind arc not the same, but thai he may some- 
 times benefit himself by diminishing the well-being of others — 
 that fatal error from which all crimes spring. There is one fact 
 highly consolatory on this subject. This highly pernicious error, 
 even when it becomes the most deeply rooted, never destroys our 
 benevolence ; hence, when we do evil to others for the sake of 
 promoting our own happiness, our benevolent feelings are always 
 wounded. This is the regenerating principle ; for as the benevo- 
 lent feelings are part of ourselves, and as the error in question is 
 only acquired by a false education, the false must finally yield to 
 the true, after a long course of painful experiments. 
 
 It was said above, that no ingredients or principles are infused 
 into our constitutions whose object is to produce unhappiness, and 
 yet it can not be denied that we are placed in circumstances which 
 operate on our nature in such a manner as to produce inevitably 
 errors of judgment and errors of conduct, which cause a lament- 
 able amount of human misery. 
 
 Some have thought that a strong argument to prove a future 
 state of existence may be drawn from the fact that the best men 
 suffer a great deal of misery in this life which they do not deserve, 
 and they infer that a just God is bound to remunerate them for all 
 this suffering in a life to come. I confess the argument appears, 
 to my mind, much stronger when drawn from the sufferings of the 
 worst men. The best men experience much more happiness, and 
 suffer much less misery, than the worst, and would have much less 
 reason to complain of injustice in the Creator if they were struck 
 out of existence at death, than the worst men, whose sufferings 
 are tenfold greater ; and as all their wickedness and suffering 
 formed a part of the great plan of the universe, it seems certain, 
 if those who suffered least have a right to expect a continuation 
 of existence after death and remuneration for their suffering here — 
 a fortiori, those who have suffered most have a right to expect the 
 same remuneration. 
 
Accountability and Punishment, 
 
 This conclusion so manifestly follows, on the supposition that 
 I - - cnniscient, thai it needs only to be stated to be seen ; and 
 even on the supposition that th- 1 c\ lis which arise in the workings 
 of the system which God has introduced were unexpected, stir! the 
 Bame conclusion is true, for if any unexpected evil arises toa being 
 whom God brought into existence, whether it comes upon him 
 with or without the consent y^\ bis will, justice requires that he 
 should l>o remunerated, if his Creator has i( in his power to grant 
 the remuneration. 
 
 8 tie have thought that the justice of (lod could not be im- 
 
 . provided every being which He brings into existence has 
 
 such a balance of happiness over misery as would induce him to 
 
 existence to non-existence. But the justice of the Deity is 
 
 not to be decided by the preference of the individual for existence : 
 
 the question is, Could the Deity cause him to enjoy more happi- 
 
 i b given time, or could He, by continuing the system for- 
 
 cause it so to work as to produce to every one an amount 
 
 of happiness greater than all the misery which it is necessary he 
 
 should experience in the early stages of his existence? If this is 
 
 possible, the goodness and justice of the Deity render it certain 
 
 that it will be. 
 
 Perhaps it may be thought that the mode of reasoning adopted 
 here proves too much, and therefore is not correct. In point of 
 fact it may be said, that millions of the human family are mani- 
 festly not placed in the best possible situations for the enjoyment 
 of happiness. They are born into a world where the soil is pre- 
 occupied, from which alone they are to procure their bread. Spin- 
 jennies and steam-engines are invented and in the hands of 
 the wealthy, which renders it impossible to procure the means of 
 support with their hands, the only machines furnished them by 
 nature. The cravings of hunger compel them to employ their 
 time in that most painful and degrading labor, begging, without 
 the pleasure of adding anything to the common stock of wealth. 
 I are deprived of almost all tin; pleasures of intellectual cul- 
 ture, and the joy of contributing in a high degree to the happiness 
 there ; and at the sexual pleasure is the only one within their 
 reach, it, would appear that the care of Providence is much more 
 directed towards the production of human beings than towards 
 their happiness a iter they are produced. 
 
 \or are the rich placed in the most favorable circumstances for 
 
Accountability and Punishment. 47 
 
 the enjoyment of happiness. The temptations which accompany 
 wealth are harder to resist than those which attend poverty. Pros- 
 perity is harder to hear with equanimity than adversity; and it 
 may he safely said that a good education and poverty are the b< 
 
 patrimony that ever was left by a patent to his child. When a 
 
 child is brought up with the knowledge that lie i> born to the 
 inheritance of wealth, it frequently happens that he has not stim- 
 ulus enough to exertion, which is necessary for the health both 
 
 of body and mind. He is more likely to grow up proud, and 
 overhearing, and irritable, in consequence of his want of constant 
 oceupation — feelings that stand in the way of happiness. Thus 
 it may be said, that if the object of the Deity is to produce as much 
 happiness as possible, He is as much bound to prevent men from 
 being too rich as from being too poor. But neither is this objec- 
 tion well founded, for it is directed not against any principles 
 essential to human nature, which w r ere before examined and found 
 to be all good, but against the state of society as at present exist- 
 ing. Now, all the evils of the present state of society have arisen 
 out of ignorance, and ignorance was shown before to be unavoid- 
 able. As soon as society becomes wise enough to see that it will 
 be as much 4o the interest of the rich as of the poor that provision 
 shall be made for every child that is born, that he be w r ell educated 
 and provided with employment after he grows up, sufficient to 
 free him from all fear of want, provided he uses a moderate de- 
 gree of industry, the evils here complained of will cease : and it 
 would be as unreasonable to suppose that God could educate 
 society up to this state of knowledge in a minute, as that He could 
 create an earth in the same time. It is sufficient to "justify the 
 ways of God to man " to show that He is using the most effectual 
 means to bring about this most desirable end. 
 
 If there is any value in creation at all ( and that there is who 
 can doubt ? ), it would seem, as far as we can judge, that it would 
 have been better for God to have created the earth millions of years 
 sooner than He did, so that sensitive beings might have been 
 enjoying happiness all this time, and thus it would seem that there 
 would be a great deal more happiness in the universe than there is. 
 Now, the only inference which can be drawn from the perfections 
 of God on this subject is, that it was impossible for the world to 
 have been created sooner, otherwise God has not done all the good 
 which he could, and consequently is not, on this supposition, infi- 
 
I s . i • •■> tmtabSKty and l^tu'mhmvnt. 
 
 ■a conclusion thai can not be adrititted, unless it is 
 
 shown that the universe could have been created sooner ; but 
 
 this never can be shown. Certainly t ho earth was being created 
 
 millions of yean before it became a lit habitation for man; and 
 
 even yel it is becoming more and more comfortable every day for 
 
 who are brought into existence upon it. Thus if we who 
 
 are brought into existence notes have not enjoyed happiness as 
 
 long as those who lived first on tin 4 earth, preparations have been 
 
 made for us to enjoy more happiness In a given fcime than (hey did. 
 
 \ aly is the physical world better prepared for our reception, 
 
 hut the moral and intellectual ; for every truth which has been 
 
 rered tends to increase tin 4 enjoyments of men; and Moral 
 
 Philosophy itself, however high-sounding its name, is but the 
 
 science ol living well. It is in no respects superior to Physical 
 
 Science, unless it contributes more to human happiness. 
 
THE HUMAN WILL. 
 
 [Extracts from the work of Albert Taylor Bledsoe, on the Will'] 
 
 '/This, then, is the true idea of a free agent : it is one who, in 
 view of circumstances, both external and internal, can act with- 
 out being efficiently caused to do so. This is the idea of a free 
 agent which God has realized by the creation of the soul of man. 
 It may be a mystery ; but it is not a contradiction. It may be a 
 mystery ; but it solves a thousand difficulties which we have un- 
 necessarily created to ourselves. It may be a mystery ; but then 
 it is the only safe retreat from self-contradiction, absurdity, and 
 atheism.' ' — p. 219. 
 
 "It is freely conceded that whatever God foreknows will most 
 certainly and infallibly come to pass. He foreknows all human 
 volitions ; and, therefore, they will most certainly and infallibly 
 come to pass, in some manner or other : the bare fact of their 
 future existence is clearly established, by God's foreknowledge of 
 them. And if all human volitions will be brought to pass by 
 the operation of moral causes, then this manner of their existence 
 is foreknown to God, and they will all come to pass in this way ; 
 but to take this for granted, is to beg the question. We have 
 just as much right to suppose that God foreknows that the voli- 
 tions of moral agents are not necessitated, as the necessitarian 
 has to suppose the contrary ; and then it would follow that our 
 volitions are necessarily free, or without any producing causes. " — 
 p. 141. 
 
 "There is no need of lugging the foreknowledge of God into 
 the present controversy, except it be to deceive the mind. For 
 all future events will certainly and infallibly come to pass, whether 
 they are foreknown or not ; and foreknowledge can not make the 
 matter any more certain than it is without it. If God should 
 4 
 
The Human Will, 
 
 06*86 to foreknow all future volitions, or if He had never known 
 them, the] would, nevertheless, jusl as certainly and infallibly 
 oome to pass, as if he had foreknown them From all eternity. 
 The bare, uaked fad thai they are future infers all thai is implied 
 in God's foreknowledge of them." — p. 148, 
 
 "Let the necessitarian show that God can qo1 foresee future 
 events, unless He have determined to bring them to pass, or unless 
 they are brought to pass by a chain of producing causes, ulti- 
 mately connected with Iris own will, and he will prove something 
 to the purpose." — p. 147. 
 
 •• Has volition an efficient cause? I answer, No. lias it a 
 sufficient 'ground and reason' of its existence? I answer, Yes. 
 ,ie ever imagined that there are no indispensahle antecedents 
 to choice, without which it could not take place. Unless there is 
 a mind, there could he no act of the mind ; and unless the mind 
 possessed a power of acting, it could not put forth volitions. The 
 mind, then, and the power of the mind called will, constitute the 
 ground of action or volition. 
 
 " But a power to act, it will he said, is not a sufficient reason to 
 account for the existence of action. This is true. The reason is 
 to come. The sufficient reason, however, is not an efficient cause ; 
 for there is some difference between a blind impulse or force, and 
 rationality. The mind is endowed with various appetites, passions, 
 and desires — with noble affections, and above all, with a feeling 
 of moral approbation and disapprobation. These are not the ' ac- 
 tive principles,' or the 'motive powers/ as they are called, — they 
 are the ends of our acting ; w r e simply act in order to gratify them. 
 ; t no influence over the will, much less is the will con- 
 trolled by them, and hence we are perfectly free to gratify the one 
 or the other of them ; to act in obedience to the dictates of con- 
 science, or to gratify the lowest appetites of our natures. We see 
 thai certain means must be used in order to gratify the passion, 
 . affection or feeling which we intend to gratify, and we act 
 accordingly. In this we form our designs or intentions free from 
 all influence whatever : nothing acts upon the will; we fix upon 
 the end, and we choose the means to accomplish it. We adopt 
 the means to the end, because there is a fitness in them to accom- 
 plish that end or desire ; and because, as rational creatures, we 
 Lve that fitness. We act with a view to our desires, but not 
 from the influence of our desires ; and our volition is virtuous or 
 
 / 
 
The Human Will. 51 
 
 vicious, according to the intention with which it is put forth — 
 according to the design with which it is directed. 
 
 " Passion is not * the gale/ — it is 'the card.' Reason is not 
 the force, — it is the law. All power resides in the free, untram- 
 meled will. He who overlooks this, and blindly seeks for some- 
 thing to ' move the mind to volition/ loses sight of the grand 
 and distinctive peculiarity of man's nature, and brings it down 
 to the dust, subjecting it to the laws of matter and bondage." — 
 p. 216. 
 
 "It is contended by Edwards, that it is just as absurd to say 
 that a volition can come into existence without a cause, as it is 
 that a world should do so. It is true that a world can not arise 
 out of nothing, and come into existence itself ; and this is also 
 equally true of a volition. But is the mind nothing ? Is the 
 will nothing ? Is a free, intelligent, designing cause nothing ? 
 
 "The philosophers of all ages have sought for the efficient 
 cause of volition, but who has found it ? Is it in the will ? The 
 necessitarian has shown the absurdities of this hypothesis. Is it in 
 the power of motive ? This hypothesis is fraught with the same 
 absurdities. Is it in the uncaused volition of the Deity ? The 
 younger Edwards could do nothing with this hypothesis. In 
 truth, the efficient cause of volition is nowhere." — p. 217. 
 :j> ; "But as we appeal to consciousness, let us pay some little at- 
 tention to its teaching. We find ourselves, then, possessed of a 
 volition : we find our minds in a state of acting. This is all we 
 discover by the light of consciousness. We see not the effectual 
 power of any cause operating to produce it. What shall we con- 
 clude, then ? Shall we conclude that there must be some cause to 
 produce it ? This were not to study nature as the humble ser- 
 vants and interpreters thereof, but to approach it in the attitude 
 of dictators."— p. 227. 
 
 "I would not say we are conscious of liberty, for that would 
 not be correct ; but I will say that we are conscious of that which 
 leads, to the conviction that we are free — that we have a power of 
 contrary choice. As we are not compelled to act, so we know 
 that we may act or not act, so we know that our actions are not 
 necessitated, but may be put forth or withheld. This is liberty — 
 this is a power of contrary choice. We are merely conscious of 
 thought, of feeling, of volition ; and we are so made that we are 
 compelled to believe that there is something which thinks, and 
 
Kfl The Human Will. 
 
 Is, and wills. It is tlir.s, i y what has been called a fundamen- 
 ..w of belief, that we arrive at the knowledge of the existence 
 a r minds, [n like manner, from the consciousness that wo 
 do act or put forth volitions, we are Forced by a Fundamental law 
 lief to yield to the conviction that we are free. This infer- 
 ence as necessarily results from the observed phenomena of the 
 mind, as [the belief of] the existence of the mind itself results 
 from the same phenomena. And if the doctrine of the necessita- 
 rian were true, that volition is a produced effect, we should never 
 infer from it that we have a power of acting at all: we should 
 simply infer that Ave are susceptible of passive impressions." — p. 
 229. 
 
 J: i ttely difficult to form any distinct idea of the author's 
 
 :i of a free agent ; raid if free agency is what the author repre- 
 
 it to be, it may be safely said that not one in a thousand 
 
 knows whether he is a free agent or not, merely on the ground 
 
 that lie could not know what free agency is. 
 
 In the definition of a free agent given above, the author does 
 not say he can act or not act, in view of circumstances both ex- 
 ternal or internal — he says merely he can act, without being effi- 
 ciently caused to do so. But he says again that, "As we are not 
 •lied to act, so w r e know that w r e may act or not act, so w r e 
 .' that our actions are not necessitated, but may be put forth 
 or withheld." And yet the author says (p. 139), " No one ever 
 that human volitions are without all necessity, according to 
 use of that term ; and no one can hold it. No one can 
 that there is an indissoluble connexion between the existence 
 of a thing, and the certain and infallible knowledge of its ex- 
 . There is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatever 
 more capable of strict demonstration, than that God's certain 
 of volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such 
 y of these events, as is without all necessity." 
 author lays, "God foresees all human volitions, and that 
 elf-contradictory and absurd to assert that a thing is fore- 
 known, and yet that it may not come to pass, just as it is to assert 
 that a thin;/ i.-, known to exist, and yet at t^m same time does not 
 ."' — (p. L33.) Now, when we put forth a volition which 
 God foreknows we would put forth, and which He foreknew would 
 not be withheld, and which it would be absurd and contradictory 
 
The Human Will. 53 
 
 to say it miglit not be put forth, or might be withheld, it follows 
 that if we know, when we put forth a volition, that we miglit not 
 put it forth, we know what "is contradictory and absurd," and 
 what is contrary to the truth; for "the volition," says the au- 
 thor, " will certainly and infallibly come to pass." — (p. 138.) 
 " Foreknowledge infers this kind of necessity, and is not contro- 
 verted by any sane man that now lives, or that ever has lived/' 
 
 This the author calls a logical necessity, and it is not the ne- 
 cessity against which he contends. This necessity, he thinks, is 
 compatible with free agency ; but the necessity which arises from 
 the connexion between cause and effect, is what he thinks is utterly 
 incompatible with free agency. He says, " Let the necessitarian 
 show that God can not foresee future events, unless He has deter- 
 mined to bring them to pass, or unless they are brought to pass 
 by a chain of causes, ultimately connected with his own will, and 
 he will prove "something to the purpose. But let him not talk 
 so boastfully about demonstrations, while there is this exceed- 
 ingly weak link in the chain of his argument." 
 
 This link, I think, is of sufficient strength to bear the wdiole 
 weight of the argument. The author says, "God foreknows all 
 human volitions, and therefore they will most certainly and in- 
 fallibly come to pass." Now these human volitions which will 
 most certainly and infallibly come to pass, depend for their cer- 
 tainty on the will of God, or depend not on the w r ill of God. If 
 they depend on the will of God, then God determined to bring 
 them into existence, either directly by his own agency, or by a 
 chain of causes, or by a free agent, or by some other means, which 
 should be effectual. But if human volitions take place infallibly, 
 independent of the will of God, then many highly important 
 events in God's universe take place in such a manner that God 
 neither causes them to be, nor can He prevent them from being ; 
 for whatever God knows will infallibly come to pass, can not be 
 prevented either by God or man. Thus the Deity, according to 
 this scheme, is impotent as to many of the most important events 
 in the universe. He is a mere spectator of what depends not on 
 his will for their existence, and of what his will can not prevent. 
 Indeed, the author says, "If God should cease to know all future 
 volitions, or if He had never known them, they would just as cer- 
 tainly and infallibly come to pass, as if He had foreknown them 
 from eternity." This is the necessity of Fate, not that which 
 
M The Human Will. 
 
 m the infinite perfections of God. Edwards believed 
 that the volitions of men were future before men were created, 
 
 God determined that they should come to pass, and 
 thai without thai determination they would not be future; or, in 
 other words, would not come to pass, because there would have 
 boon no cause to bring them to pass without the determination of 
 God. For, to say that human volitions would as certainly and 
 infallibly come to pass if God had never foreknown them as if 
 Be had foreknown them from all eternity, is the same as saying 
 human volitions would infallibly be the same that they are, whether 
 there is a God or not. 
 
 And to Bhow that he is not merely playing upon the words fu- 
 ture volitions (the word future meaning that which will come to 
 pass), the author adds: " By bringing in the prescience of the 
 Deity, Ave do not really strengthen or add to the conclusion in 
 favor of necessity/ 1 The difference is, that this reasoning lands 
 us in the necessity of blind Fate, and not the necessity arising from 
 the infinite perfections of God, which Edwards contends for. If 
 the author should think with me, that this is a fair deduction from 
 his scheme, he will abandon the scheme rather than adopt the con- 
 clusion. 
 
 But it may be demonstrated in a different manner — that what- 
 ever God foreknew from all eternity He decreed, thus : Let us 
 suppose, then, that God had his eye on a particular volition. 
 ads would say, "As it is a fundamental truth, that no 
 event can come to pass without a cause, the Deity would know 
 that the volition in question would not come to pass without a 
 cause, and that as there was then no cause but Himself, He could 
 not but know that its future certainty implied in his foreknowl- 
 edge depended on his determination to introduce an adequate cause 
 to produce the volition thus known. " 
 
 The author will admit that this reasoning is good when applied 
 to every event but volitions; but his doctrine is, that "volition 
 ie of such nature that it can not be caused/' He grants, however, 
 that, the volition in question has a "ground and reason, without 
 which it will not come to pass, and with which it will most cer- 
 tainly and infallibly come to pass/' Now, as God determined to 
 bring these grounds and reasons into existence, knowing that if 
 He did the volition in question would infallibly take place, and 
 that if He did not the volition would not take place, his determin- 
 
The Human Will. 55 
 
 ing the ground and reason of the volition, was determining the 
 volition itself. This is true even on the absurd supposition that 
 these grounds and reasons are not the cause of the volition — 
 or on the still more absurd supposition, that the volition has 
 no cause. For when the Deity created man, and determined 
 to hring into existence a "ground and reason" of a particu- 
 lar volition, knowing that, if He did so, that particular volition 
 would come into existence, and if He did not do so, that par- 
 ticular volition would not come into existence — nothing could 
 better describe the manner of God's determining that the volition 
 itself should be brought into existence. 
 
 It will not do to say, as the author does (229), "As we are 
 not compelled to act, so we know that we may act or not act. 
 This is liberty, — this is a power of contrary choice, " — unless 
 the author were to go further, and say, God has created also a suf- 
 ficient " ground and reason " for not putting forth the volition, at 
 the same time that He created a sufficient ground and reason for 
 putting it forth. Nor would this groundless supposition be suffi- 
 cient ; for as the Deity's foreknowledge implies an infallible cer- 
 tainty that the volition in question will be put forth, it is absurd 
 to suppose at the same time it may not be put forth. Besides, it 
 might be asked why one "ground and reason' ' should be more 
 effectual than another. Nor would the author be at liberty to 
 infer this power of " contrary choice," even by denying the fore- 
 knowledge of God ; for by his doctrine of " logical necessity," the 
 volition in question " will certainly and infallibly come to pass, 
 whether it is foreknown or not ; and the foreknowledge can not 
 make it more certain than it is without it." "It is just as much 
 a contradiction in terms to say that what is future will [may] not 
 come to pass, as to say what God foreknows will [may] never 
 take place." 
 
 Now, Edwards believes that the volitions of men would not 
 come to pass without the decree of God ; and I think all consist- 
 ent theists agree with him : but as the author believes they will 
 come to pass, though the Deity did not decree them, nor foreknow, 
 his system is bound up in an absolute and blind Fate, from which 
 there is no escape but by abandoning the doctrine that future 
 volitions are certain, independent of the decree of God. 
 
 But what does the author mean by this power of " contrary 
 choice ? " He can not mean that we have power not to put forth 
 
The Human Will. 
 a volition, which will infallibly come to pass, and which it would 
 
 I 31 I I 8V«n tO BHpp086 may not COme to pass. Nor can 
 
 he moan thai of two contrary things proposed for our ohoioe, 
 
 .-! make that one to appear most eligible which appears least 
 
 eligible, or that we can make that one most worthy of choice 
 
 which appears every way unworthy of choice. Even it' we had 
 
 such power, which is impossible, it by no means appears how 
 
 ; .! accountability could be founded upon it. 
 
 1: is, indeed, remarkable that the author doex not say we have 
 
 the power of contrary choice, that we may act or not act, but 
 
 that we know we may act or not act. And yet his whole 
 
 ting goes to prove that when there is "sufficient ground 
 and reason " for a volition, the volition Avill most infallibly come 
 to pass : and it would be the height of absurdity to suppose that 
 it may not come to pass. "To be free, however, it must come to 
 pass without any producing cause." This is the great point with 
 the author : the infallible certainty of the volition's coming to 
 pass may be as absolute as you please, provided only that infalli- 
 ble certainty does not arise from the connection which exists be- 
 tween cause and effect. 
 
 He says: "Let it be assumed that a volition is, properly 
 speaking, an effect, and everything is conceded. On this vantage 
 ground the scheme of Necessity may be erected, beyond the 
 
 • ility of an overthrow. For if volition is an effect prop- 
 erly -peaking, it is necessarily produced by its cause." — (p. 55.) 
 And yet the author seems to shrink from the defence of this posi- 
 tion, when he is pressed by Edward's objection, that it is just as 
 absurd to say that a volition can come into existence without a 
 cause, as it is that a world should do so. For the author, instead 
 
 empting to answer the objection, says, "It is true that a 
 world can not arise out of nothing, and come into existence itself; 
 and this is equally true of a volition. But is the mind nothing? Is 
 
 ill nothing ? Is a free, intelligent, designing cause nothing ? " 
 I thor means by a " i'vee, intelligent, designing cause, " the 
 
 of volition, he gives up the point to the necessitarian. If he 
 
 Qot mean that, he makes no answer to the objection. Indeed, 
 it is manifest that no satisfactory answer can be made to the objec- 
 tion, for no reasoning can either increase or diminish the firmness of 
 our belief that everything which begins to exist must have an 
 adequate cause ; or, which amounts to the same thing, from noth- 
 
The Human Will. 57 
 
 ing, nothing can arise. Nor is our belief in this principle in the 
 least shaken by our ignorance of the cause of any event ; and if 
 the author could show (as I think he has not been able to do) 
 that our volitions are caused neither by our minds nor by motives, 
 nor by their united power, he would not be any nearer convincing 
 us that volitions have no cause, than when he began. 
 
 In fact, the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, as taught by 
 Edwards, amounts just to this : Any imaginary future events, 
 which have causes to produce them, will come to pass ; and any 
 imaginary future events which have not causes to produce them, 
 will not come to pass ; and God is the first designing cause of all 
 other causes, and has thus complete control over the whole uni- 
 verse, both of mind and matter. 
 
 But let us see whether the cause of volition is really as in- 
 scrutable as the author imagines. Let us see whether it is not 
 quite as well understood as the cause of motions of the body called 
 voluntary. The author has no doubt that volition is the cause of 
 the voluntary motions of the body. Now, the manner in which 
 the will operates, to produce the motion of the body, is entirely 
 unknown ; and the only means we have of knowing that volition 
 is the cause of the motion of the body is, that motions uniformly 
 accompany volition : that is, with the volition there is voluntary 
 motion, — without the volition there is not voluntary motion. 
 And as we can repeat the experiment a thousand times, and always 
 with the same result, our minds are so formed that we can not 
 avoid believing that volition is at least Alink in the chain of 
 causes, on which voluntary motion of the body depends, in such 
 a manner that it would not take place without the volition, and 
 will take place with the volition. 
 
 At least, this conviction applies to all the voluntary motions to 
 which we attend ; but as there are a thousand voluntary motions, 
 as we call them, produced every day, of which we take no notice, 
 we can only infer from analogy that these motions are also pro- 
 duced by volitions, of which we are equally unconscious ; for the 
 moment we turn our attention to any continued motion of the 
 body, we become instantly conscious that the motion does not 
 occur without the volition. If we ask the physiologist how these 
 motions are produced, he will tell us the body is a machine so 
 contrived, that by having the origin of the muscles in one bone 
 and the insertion in another, when we will to bend a member of 
 
The Jluman Will. 
 
 the body, the mind Bends ■ nervous fluid through the flexor 
 les, which causes them to swell in thickness and contract in 
 ; : and this contract ion or shortening o\' the muscle causes 
 the member to bend; ami the same operation is produced on the 
 extensors when we will to Btradghten a member. Ask the natural 
 philosopher what this nervous fluid is, or whether there is any 
 which the mind Bends through the muscles, in volition, lie will 
 tell you ho does not know ; but lie will show you by experiment 
 that the magneto-electric fluid produces so powerful a contraction 
 in the length of the flexor muscles of the fingers, that volition is 
 not able to open the hand while under the operation. He will 
 show you by experiment that the galvanic fluid produces, in the 
 recently dead bodies of men, violent contortions of face, and great 
 muscular motion in the arms and legs. He will show you a gal- 
 vanic battery made by bringing in contact similar muscles of 
 recently-killed animals, similar parts of the muscles touching dis- 
 similar. He will show you that if one end of a wire be thrust 
 into the brain of a living animal, and the other end into the hinder 
 or lower part of the animal, an electric current will immediately 
 paflS along the wire. He will show you the electric eel and the 
 torpedo, which not only generate electricity, but discharge it in 
 large quantities, at will, into surrounding bodies. At the same 
 time he will tell you, if you infer from all these experiments that 
 the human mind has the power, at will, to discharge through any 
 particular muscle a quantity of electricity, that you infer what, in 
 the present state of science, can not be proved, and that, if it could 
 be proved, we might probably be as much in the dark as ever as 
 to how the mind operates on the fluid, or how the fluid operates on 
 the muscle. I have said this much merely to show how little we 
 . of the operation of causes in producing a most familiar 
 , the motion of the body ; and yet this want of knowledge 
 not in the least weaken our most perfect belief that there 
 IS a cause for this motion, whether we have discovered what it is 
 or not. However, as we know that, in the normal state of the 
 body, voluntary motion always takes place when we will it, and 
 does not take place when we do not will it, and that we can not 
 even try to move the body either without the will or contrary 
 to the will, we have the highest reason to believe that volition 
 is the cause of voluntary motion, in the sense that with the voli- 
 tion the motion will take place, and that without it the motion 
 
The Human Will. 59 
 
 will not take place. Moreover, we have the same reason to believe 
 that we have the power to move the body with the volition, and 
 no power to move the body without the volition. Thus it appears 
 that the distinction between physical and moral power, which 
 some authors make, is without foundation — there is no physical 
 power without moral ; we can not do anything either without our 
 will or contrary to our will. I do not speak of our thoughts, 
 desires, and sensations, which we are said rather to have than to 
 do — though subsequent thoughts, desires and sensations are often 
 remotely dependent for their existences on previous volitions ; and 
 yet it is not inconsistent with this, as will be shown presently, 
 that volitions depend directly, for their existence, on thoughts, 
 beliefs, and desires combined. God has so arranged that each 
 effect shall be itself the cause of a subsequent event. Nothing is 
 useless in his universe — everything tends towards perfection. 
 God has not yet done creating — so far as man is concerned, his 
 creation is just begun, not merely as to those which are yet to be 
 born, but as to those which have been born. When a child is 
 born into the world, his creation is just commenced, and mani- 
 festly proceeds but a short distance during threescore and ten 
 years. Nor is this anomalous : God takes immense periods to 
 create every thing of great value, and what is of greater value than 
 a human soul ? 
 
 At the very commencement of man's creation, his intellectual 
 being appears almost an entire negation — no dawn of reason, no 
 volition ; the first mental phenomenon exhibited is pain, from 
 want. As yet, not even a desire for food is formed ; for a desire 
 for anything can not be formed until there is intellect to think that 
 the pain of want may be removed by the thing desired. In the 
 course of a few months, however, we find reason begin to dawn ; 
 and with the aid of memory, and repeated experience, the child 
 evidently draws the deduction, that the pain of want is relieved by 
 the mother's breast. This is probably one of the first deductions 
 of reason that an infant draws. It is not at all probable, that the 
 frequent returns of pain from want, and the frequent reliefs from 
 that pain, would be recollected and associated together in such a 
 manner as to enable the infant to draw the deduction on the recur- 
 rence of the pain, that the pain might be removed, before he 
 would associate his relief from pain and his mother's breast 
 together. If he makes the former association first, he will then 
 
80 The Human Will. 
 
 i a desire on the recurrence of fche pain, merely to be 
 rom the pain : bnl this desire can not result m volition: lor 
 
 the infant does not know thai any means exist io relieve 
 
 him from the pain, and there can be no volition until the mind is 
 created as to have Borne object in view, accompanied with a 
 
 belief that that object ean be obtained liy volition. Indeed, a 
 
 volition is formed by the mind from a desire for something, and a 
 
 that the thing desired may be obtained by putting forth the vo- 
 
 Bxperiments may be contrived and performed a thousand 
 
 ways to tesl the truth o( this assertion. 
 
 Suppose, for instance, we have not been able to obtain food for 
 isiderable time, and our desire for food becomes very strong ; 
 foo 1 is now presented for our acceptance, and there is nothing to 
 hinder us from gratifying our desire but the will : if the experi- 
 ment Bhonld lie tried ten thousand times, it would result every 
 time the -am" way, in a formation of volition to take the food 
 and eat. If the food, however, should be presented to us when 
 It a strong aversion to eating, which, for the sake of uni- 
 formity of expression, may be called a desire not to eat, then 
 would the result be just as uniform as before, a will not to eat : 
 it being understood in both cases, that no evil is apprehended by 
 following the desires. 
 
 To prove that the volition does not result from the simple de- 
 sire; wi tli out the belief that the desire may be gratified by the 
 volition, the experiment may be tried in various instances ; and 
 it will always be found, however strong the desire is, no volition 
 will be formed while the mind believes that the desire can not be 
 gratified. 
 
 I example: A criminal condemned to death may desire to 
 
 run oh* from prison, but while he is satisfied that the walls of his 
 
 can not he hroken, and that there is no possibility of 
 
 . the volition to run off will not be formed ; but let his 
 
 chain- be thrown off, and the prison door opened, in such a man- 
 
 te a belief that he may escape, the volition will be 
 
 tttly formed. Open the prison door, however, to a prisoner 
 
 who desi bo stay in prison, and his belief that he may escape 
 
 will nor be sufficient to induce the mind to form the volition to go 
 
 out. Offer an inducement to the prisoner sufficient to create a de- 
 
 fche prison, and then the mind will instantly form 
 
 the volition. By varying these experiments indefinitely any one 
 
 
The Human Will. 61 
 
 may easily satisfy himself that when the desire, and the belief that 
 there is nothing to hinder the gratification of the desire, are Loth 
 present in the mind, then the volition is formed, hut that the voli- 
 tion is not formed when either the desire or belief is wanting. 
 
 Thus it clearly appears, that we have the same reason for be- 
 lieving that a desire, and belief that the desire may be gratified, 
 are the cause of the mind's forming a volition, in the sense that 
 with the desire and belief the volition will be formed, and without 
 the desire and belief the volition will not be formed, that we have 
 to believe that volition is the cause of voluntary motion of the 
 body. It must be recollected, however, that it is the mind which 
 forms the volition — the same mind which has the desire and be- 
 lief. 
 
 As we drew the conclusion before, that we have no power to 
 produce motion in the body, if we have not the will, or do not 
 make the volition, so now we may draw the conclusion that 
 we have no power to form a volition, if we have not the desire, 
 and the belief that the thing desired may be done. 
 
 This conclusion will be confirmed by taking notice of what 
 passes in our mind when two desires exist in it, in such a manner 
 that they both can not be gratified. Suppose, for instance, that 
 we learn at the same moment, that it is highly important to our 
 interests to attend to some business in the north, and, also, that a 
 beloved child is taken dangerously ill in the south. Our pecu- 
 niary interests lead us one way, our affection for our child the 
 other. If one of these desires is felt to be much stronger than 
 the other, there will be no hesitation in forming a volition accord- 
 ing with the strongest desire ; but, if the mind can perceive no 
 difference in the strength of the desires, which is a case rarely if 
 ever occurring, then the mind will not choose one in preference to 
 the other, but it will choose one in preference to neither. 
 
 If every part of infinite space is identically like every other 
 part, we can not conceive that God, with his infinite intelligence, 
 could make any choice of one part in preference of another to 
 place the universe in, when He created it ; He only chose one part 
 in preference to none : for, when the mind perceives no difference 
 between two things, it can not decide that one is better or prefer- 
 able to another. Examples of this kind may be multiplied at 
 pleasure, and we will always find that the volition will correspond 
 with the strongest desire, of which consciousness alone is judge. 
 
■ Human Will. 
 
 In our present imperfect state (and by imperfect state I (Dean 
 
 our incomplete creation), it frequently happens, (hat our desires 
 
 ir passions 01 appetites are opposed to our desires to 
 
 or conscience or moral sense. Our moral sense is created 
 
 much later than our appetites, and in the incipient stage of our 
 
 «Oe they rule the will almost entirely. (\oi\ has contrived it 
 
 bo that die moral sense increases in strength faster than our pas- 
 sions and appetites, and must finally get the complete ascendency ; 
 if not in this world, certainly in the next, as certainly as God is 
 infinitely wise ami good. We see, even in this world, that the 
 sexual sense is not created until the moral sense is considerably 
 advanced in its creation — a wise and beneficent arrangement; for 
 the sexual sense without the moral sense would lead to many- 
 evils. As it i>. the moral sense is not always able to restrain its 
 gratification within the bounds of right reason. 
 
 ( >nfl of the chief offices of the moral sense is, by the pleasure 
 winch its approbation affords, and by the pain which its disappro- 
 bation produces, to induce us to gratify our passions and appetites, 
 at the same time to increase, if possible, the happiness, but 
 never to diminish the comfort and well-being of others. One of 
 the nuans (iod has taken to effect his purpose of increasing its 
 . i< to cause us always, on a review of our conduct, to feel 
 gratified when our moral sense has prevailed over a passion or 
 ite, which otherwise would have been indulged at the expense 
 of others' comfort, and to feel mortified and ashamed when the 
 moral sense was overcome. This experience certainly tends to 
 gthen the moral sense, and give it more power for victory in 
 future. 
 
 birth, there being no use for the moral sense, it is not yet 
 indeed, it can not begin to exist before the dawn of rea- 
 son, for it is the* reason applied to the moral conduct, accompa- 
 nied with a feeling of approbation or disapprobation. "By the 
 contrivance of Gfod, even our senses and appetites are so con- 
 ed for our happiness, that what they immediately make 
 inerally on other accounts also useful, either to our- 
 bo mankind/'* Tins is peculiarly the case with the 
 mora. And it, is; so far superior to all our other senses in 
 
 pect, thai wh&i it approves we call right, and what it dis- 
 
 Etatche8<m'fl Philosophy. 
 
The Human Will. 63 
 
 approves we call wrong. The original meaning of the word right 
 is straight, and of wrong, crooked or twisted. Now, when we 
 examine the nature of those actions which the moral sense ap- 
 proves, they are found generally to lead straight to happiness* 
 without producing misery either to ourselves or others ; whilst 
 those actions which the moral .sense disapproves, generally lead to 
 nnhappiness both of ourselves and others, and in this crooked way 
 lead to reformation and happiness. 
 
 If our moral sense sometimes approves of actions leading to 
 nnhappiness, both of ourselves and others, this arises, no doubt, 
 from its imperfection — God not yet having completed its creation. 
 But when its creation shall be completed, in the next life, it is 
 highly probable that its dictates will universally lead straight to 
 happiness. It is, also, highly probable, that the desire to gratify 
 the moral sense, when it shall have become perfect — that is, made 
 complete, or its creation finished — will be so strong as to over- 
 come all opposing desires, if any then should exist ; and if so, it 
 will then be impossible to will anything wrong. There will be 
 no desire to will contrary to the moral sense, and where all the 
 desire is on one side, and no evil apprehended from its gratifica- 
 tion, the will infallibly agrees with the desire. If it did not, as 
 much inconvenience would be experienced as if the motions of the 
 body did not correspond with the will. 
 
 I wish it always to be understood when I speak of all the de- 
 sires, I mean to include not merely the desire of gratifying the 
 appetites and passions, and external senses, but also especially 
 the desire of gratifying that internal sense, called the moral sense 
 or conscience. 
 
 The voluntary motions of the body, therefore, follow the voli- 
 tions, and the volitions follow the desires, when they are accom- 
 panied with a belief that the desire may be gratified without evil 
 apprehended from the gratification. The desires, from which vo- 
 litions originate, are produced by the presentation to the external 
 or internal senses of certain objects which we believe will increase 
 our pleasure or diminish our pain. Indeed, we can not conceive 
 it possible that desires should not arise in the mind of such a be- 
 ing as man, endowed with sensitivity and reason, and surrounded 
 with objects some capable of producing happiness, and some 
 misery. The beauty of the system is, that God has so arranged 
 it, that even in our present imperfect, unfinished state of creation 
 
M Human Will. 
 
 which are desirable for their own sakes, and to which 
 
 fced, do! from any view to their being useful in future 
 
 otherSj nevertheless, generally contribute to the 
 
 all : and when the creation of the moral sense shall be 
 
 completed, it is probable that this will be universally the case. 
 
 1 inly, the more perfect our moral Bense becomes in this 
 
 world, the less do we choose things hurtful to ourselves and 
 
 . as means to promote our own happiness. 
 
 Aj - nsitive beings, we are necessarily fond 6f pleasure and 
 
 pain ; consequently, those things which appear capable 
 
 of producing pleasure cause desire, and those tilings winch appear 
 
 capable of producing pain cause aversion ; for our beliefs always 
 
 spond to the appearances of things, or, in other words, to 
 
 what appears to be the evidence of their truth. Whenever there is 
 
 sufficient evidence, belief follows, and whenever there is not suffi- 
 
 p ■. belief does not follow. We can not determine or 
 
 will to believe without evidence, or not to believe with evidence ; 
 
 and the evidence itself is just what the nature of the objects and 
 
 the state or constitution of our mind when the object is presented, 
 
 necessarily produce. 
 
 Now, all theists believe that the nature of objects to produce 
 jure or pain, and the constitution of the mind to be so ef- 
 . depend for their existence on the will of God ; and if so, 
 Th*n all the subsequent links of the chain of causes and effects re- 
 sulting in human conduct depend, likewise, on God's will. 
 f the chain of cause and effect, beginning with Inl- 
 and going upwards, are : Human conduct proceeds 
 from volition; volition, from desire, with its accompanying belief 
 that the desire may be gratified without evil ; desire, from a belief 
 thai the object will increase pleasure or diminish pain ; belief , from 
 the evidence before the mind that the object is desirable ; the desira- 
 Us$tbss of the object, from the will of God ; the will of God, from 
 to do good; Ids desire to do good, from his infinite wis- 
 dom and goodness/ and his infinite wisdom and goodness are the 
 cause of oil f irate things, being themselves uncaused and un- 
 creaUMe, 
 
 I links of the chain of cause and effect down- 
 
 .viih the conduct of men, we shall find a beau- 
 tiful and system, which tends in all its parts to the 
 perfection of the reason, the moral sense, and the happiness of 
 
The Human Will. 65 
 
 men. Volition produce* conduct, or action of mind or body; con- 
 duct produces pleasure or pain ; pleasure or pain, especially pain, 
 produces consideration as to its cause ; consideration products belief 
 according to the evidence ; belief produces new desire different ft 
 the former y according to the change of belief produced by the preced- 
 ing experience. In fact, each moral ad becomes, without any inten- 
 tion on our part, an experiment by which we find out, more and 
 more, the causes of happiness and the causes of misery ; and, of 
 course, more and more of the Jaws of morals. For, indeed, (dl 
 science, both of physics and morals, both of matter and mind, consists 
 in a knoivledge of phenomena, and of the relation that the pjhenornena 
 have to one another as to uniformity of sequences. 
 
 The knowledge of the uniformity of sequences, which is some 
 times called the relation of cause and effect, is of the highest im- 
 portance ; it is the art of manufacturing happiness, Loth to oursel 
 and others, and avoiding misery. 
 
 Now, that which is calculated to fill us with the highest vene- 
 ration and love for the great First Cause is, that He has so 
 contrived, that every one, as soon as he has learned the ait, 
 will voluntarily practice it from that time forth forever; for our 
 desire of happiness and aversion to misery are as durable as our 
 existence. But what is calculated to raise our veneration, if pos- 
 sible, still higher, is, that God has introduced us into the great 
 school of his universe, where He employs every action which we 
 perform, and every event which comes within our knowledge, 
 to teach us the relation of cause and effect, which is the great cle- 
 ment of the art of manufacturing happiness, pre has caused us 
 to believe with a confidence that can neither be increased nor di- 
 minished by any arguments, for the belief is instinctive and fun- 
 damental, that every event must have a cause, and that with the 
 cause it will infallibly take place, and without the cause it infal- 
 libly will not take place. He lias arranged these causes -and 
 effects, so that the one follows the other with perfect uniformity, 
 both in the physical and moral world, for the purpose of enabling 
 us to learn what are the causes, and what the effects. Without 
 this uniformity, we could learn nothing. Indeed, if tilings took 
 place contingently, there would be nothing to learn. 
 
 Nor need we fear that this constitution <j( things will change, 
 any more than that the perfections o\^ God himself will change. 
 He has given us memory to store up facts or phenomena which 
 5 
 
The Human Will. 
 
 >•. lit* li.is given us reason, and is increasing 
 lay to im . and 1 [e has made tin* 
 
 \ i ta€ of this reason, and this discovery of truth, delightful for 
 .\n Bake, even when we think not of the utility thai will reb- 
 uilt from increase of wisdom in future. 
 
 11 ■• has surrounded us with our follows, and placed them ai such 
 i poii iew, thai they doted many of our vices or defects 
 
 which escape our own observation. He has inspired them with 
 an instinctive desire to express the disapprobation of their moral 
 iu the form o( blame, without being al all conscious, in 
 many Instanced, t hat God uses this expression of disapprobation 
 as means of advancing our creation so far as to remove the defect. 
 Nor are they aware that God uses every feeling of moral approba- 
 tion and disapprobation which they experience, whether it relates 
 to their own conduct or to the conduct of others, as a means of 
 ring more perfect their own moral sense; for all our senses, 
 nal and internal, are improved by moderate use, nor can we 
 be happy in their entire inactivity. 
 
 God has caused us to ^d a high value on the good opinion of 
 our fellows, especially on the approbation of their moral sense. 
 When we discover by their expression of blame, that certain con- 
 duct of ours has not their approbation, a powerful desire springs 
 ap, corresponding to the high estimation we have of the value of 
 »od, to try and regain their favor by abstaining from like con- 
 duct in future. It is thus God uses his own divine laws of uni- 
 formity in bis universe, the moral sense of our fellows, nay, even 
 the j of our own minds, to aid Jlim in the completion of 
 
 id design, to carry on the work of creating our soul to 
 compl stion, when our wisdom and goodness will be without defect, 
 main thenceforward and forever the source of moral conduct 
 unblameable, and happiness without alloy. 
 
 Ji this is a correct exposition of the relation which mental 
 
 phenomena bear to each other, it follows that all the volitions, 
 
 desiresi and beliefs which exist, have their causes ; and from the 
 
 le connection which God has established between cause 
 
 phenomena must necessarily exist, and those im- 
 
 iy volition-, de-ires and beliefs, which have no cause, must 
 
 [f events can only arise from causes, and 
 
 the connection be( ween the causes and the events can not be broken, 
 
 or, in Other words, if with \\\c causes the events invariably occur, 
 
The Human Will. 67 
 
 and without the causes they do invariably not occur, then the doc- 
 trine of Philosophical Necessity is true. 
 
 However clear and satisfactory the system of Philosophical 
 Necessity appears to me, I was glad to have an opportunity of 
 examining the views and arguments of an acute mind, in opposi- 
 tion to Edwards, and in favor of contingency as the only ground 
 on which liberty and moral agency can be established. 
 
 Henry P. Tappan, in a late work on the " Doctrine of the Will 
 determined by an Appeal to Consciousness/ ' maintains, in oppo- 
 sition to the doctrine of necessity, and the fixed connection between 
 cause and effect, that " necessity, real and absolute, does not 
 belong to cause (p. 276) ; all cause will be found to resolve itself 
 into will, and will is free." That is, when the mind or will of 
 God or man puts forth a volition, the cause of that volition has 
 no more connection with the volition put forth, than it has with 
 hundreds of other imaginable volitions, or with the withholding 
 that volition, and not putting it forth at all. He maintains that 
 it is of the very nature or essence of Will to have the power of 
 putting forth volitions in any direction, not merely according to 
 our pleasure, but contrary to both the dictates of reason and the 
 desires of the heart. "These convictions and these impulses lie 
 in other parts of my being, in my reason and my sensitivity, and 
 do not go to make up a volition, nor do they go in themselves to 
 prevent a volition. I feel within me that I can will against all 
 motives, presented whether by the reason or sensitivity. Let the 
 motives be increased to ever such a degree, I feel that I have 
 power still to will in opposition to these. To will, to put forth 
 the causative nisus, is a simple act, which J can always do ; it is 
 created solely by myself, and capable of being in any given 
 direction, notwithstanding any motives whatever, for or against." 
 — p. 90. 
 
 " In forming our predeterminations, or purposes, and in the 
 causative nisus, or volition, there is no resistance overcome, there 
 is no opposing force whatever. I have freedom here as an attri- 
 bute most unique, both because I purpose and will in entire con- 
 tingency, and because there is no antagonistic power, that, to my 
 consciousness, impedes or overcomes me in purposing and willing. 
 The motives of action found in reason and passion have no 
 
Human Will. 
 
 to physical forces, as plainly appears from (his 
 
 one tart, thai where a resistance exists to a physical force, to a 
 
 o likely to overcome the physical force, and to produce phe- 
 
 i the direction of the antagonistic power, we can conceive 
 
 h an augmentation of the physical force as shall finally 
 
 overcome the antagonistic power. But will, on the contrary, ads 
 
 with the Bame effect when it determines in opposition to infinite 
 
 res properly and intrinsically considered, as when it deter- 
 
 - in opposition to slight motives.''' — p. S ( ,). 
 
 •• When the mind chooses simply in relation to the reason, 
 should we ask why it chooses thus, the only legitimate answer 
 is, thai it thus chooses. When the mind chooses simply in rela- 
 tion I jensitivity, should we ask why it chooses thus, the 
 <-nly legitimate answer is, thai it thus chooses." [And when 
 tli- mind chooses contrary to all motives, let the motives be in- 
 I ;<> ever Buch a degree, should it be asked why it thus 
 
 - j, the only legitimate answer is, that it tints chooses.] 
 ■ 1 other words, the choice is a primary fact, and has no ('act 
 
 ore by which it is to be explained." — p. 228. 
 "It i-. then, this self-conscious power of determining or not 
 mining, of causing or not causing — this contingent power — 
 this power all-sufficient to move itself and put forth the causative 
 nisuSy or withhold the causative nisus — which makes up the idea 
 edom. M — j'. '><>. 
 •• I utingoncy and necessity are opposite ideas and negate each 
 is an idea opposed to necessity, multitudes are 
 neously to aver. Let us see whether the conscious- 
 Ognizefi this idea, and is able to define it intelligibly to 
 well as to find subjects to which it may be legitimately 
 applied. ^ 
 
 "C atingency is that which is, or may be, but which might 
 l, or might, be different from what it is. We plainly 
 idea. I appeal to every man's consciousness. This 
 e us i , hut it is conceivable that it might not 
 j. or that it might he different from what it is. In rela- 
 tion to the will of God, He might have prevented it. In rcla- 
 
 to the will of the author, he might not have written it, or 
 might have written a different hook, or might have destroyed it 
 
 after it was written. lint, we can form no such conception of 
 
 2-{-2=4. We can form no such conception of the being of God, 
 
The Human Will. 69 
 
 nor of the existence of time and space, What is true of this 
 hook, is true of every production of human ari and power. Now- 
 all human ail ami power run back ultimately to human volition- : 
 the contingency of all the sequents of human volitions must, there- 
 fore, he referred to the contingency of the volitions them 
 If the sequents of the volitions, which appear to us contingent* 
 are really so, then i he volitions must be contingent likewise ; for 
 the necessity of the volitions wonhl necessitate all the sequel 
 connected with them by a fixed law. Now what is the testimony 
 of every man's consciousness respecting the volitions ? Does it 
 sustain the logical inference above given ? Are volitions necessary 
 or contingent? It does not appear to me difficult to answer npon 
 this point. If consciousness is clear and decisive npon any ques- 
 tion of psychology, it certainly is clear and decisive here. Let 
 us take any volition whatever ; let us multiply and vary the ex- 
 amples indefinitely, and the result is clearly the same. 
 
 " I make an effort or volition to attend to this book, or to this 
 conversation, or to this subject of thought, and in every act of 
 attention, I have this conviction : I might not attend, or I might 
 attend to something else. Again, I make a volition to raise my 
 arm, to move my foot, to get up and walk, to sit down, or to 
 make any muscular movement whatever ; and in all these volitions 
 I have this conviction : I might forbear to make the volition, or I 
 might make a different volition. I have no consciousness of my 
 power antecedent to my own causality, compelling or necessitating 
 that causality in any particular direction. I appear to myself the 
 sole cause of my .volitions, and I appear to myself a cause acting 
 contingently. In any given case of causality, I can not but think 
 that I can forbear to do what I am doing, or can exercise my 
 causality in a way entirely different. 
 
 " What my consciousness thus testifies respecting myself, I 
 can net but apply to the Deity likewise. If I have this power to 
 do or not to do, He, as the first infinite mind, must surely have 
 this power. Hence, as I actually do conceive of creation as con- 
 tingent — that is, I conceive that it might not be, or it might be 
 different from what it is, or it might cease to he — so here likewise, 
 as in the case of human causality, 1 refer the contingency of all 
 creation, and of all its changes, to the contingency of the divine 
 volitions. 
 
 "When (Jod said, 'Let there be light,' it was positively neces- 
 
10 Human Will. 
 
 that light shouKl appear necessary relatively to his infinite 
 ;it wo dearly conoeive that God was under no necessity 
 o( putting forth t In* volition or creative nisu* represented by the 
 phrase, 'Let there be light. 1 We may not deny Him an attri- 
 bute which wo possess ourselves. A. necessitated Creator could 
 
 reate tree agents. A dependent and finite mind can tot 
 
 1 the measure of the first and infinite. 
 "So decisive are our conceptions on this subject, that the 
 moment we suppose mind as cause to be necessitated in the exer- 
 
 f its causality, we seem to destroy mind itself, and to bring 
 it down to the mere condition of physical causes. Physical 
 causes can not but act under their appropriate circumstances, and 
 can not but act uniformly. Fire must burn when thrown amidst 
 Combustibles. The various elementary substances of chemistry 
 must unit.' according to their definite proportions — a stone thrown 
 into the air must fall to the ground. Here is no choice on the part 
 of the physical cause. But with ourselves, and with all beings like 
 parselves, we know it is quite different. We choose the direction 
 of our causality, and we can vary it every moment. We do not 
 
 i ourselves, I must lift this arm; I must move this foot ; ] 
 must take hold of this chair ; I must read this book, — but we say, 
 I can do this or not, just as I please. ' And wdien we use this lan- 
 guage, we do not mean that if we make the effort or volition it 
 will be done — e. g. y if I please or will to move my aim, my arm 
 will move ; but we mean that the effort or volition itself is entire- 
 ly within our power [even in opposition to all our desires or mo- 
 
 . let the motive^ be increased to ever such a degree, even to 
 infinity (p. 89) ; lor as the strong convictions of our reason, and 
 
 strong impulses or repugnances of our sensitivity, lie — not in 
 the will, but — in other parts of our being, in forming our causative 
 or volition, there is no resistance overcome, no opposing 
 ■i |. We can mate \\\'<> volition or forbear to make 
 it. and in either case there is plainly no consciousness of compul- 
 sion OX necessity. Now how absurd it would be to say of lire 
 
 when placed amid combustibles, it can burn or not burn [as it 
 
 -j. or of a .-.tone thrown dp into the air, it can fall or not 
 fall [as it pleases]. The difference between ourselves as causey 
 
 and phyg] - U only made out in this way, and in this way 
 
 ifl plainly made out, viz. : physical causes are necessitated causes — 
 we are contingent causes." — pp. 00, 07, 89, 90. 
 
The Human Will. 71 
 
 Many other passages of similar import might be selected from 
 the work, but these are sufficient (<> ^h<»w what the author belies 
 to be the only foundation of human and divine freedom — the 
 
 contingency of volitions. The author agrees with th< Pa- 
 
 rian, that all phenomena in the physical world arise necessarily 
 from their causes, in consequence of an inseparable connexion es- 
 tablished by God himself between the causes and the phenomena 
 which they produce. 
 
 So, if 1 understand the author aright, be admits that all mental 
 phenomena, with the exeeption of volition, are necessary : such 
 as pleasurable and painful feelings, desires and aversions, hopes 
 and fears, joys and sorrows, approbation and disapprobation, 
 certainty and doubt. I perhaps ought to have mentioned error, 
 as well as volition, as not belonging to necessity, for he says 
 (p. 277), " Error is not necessary. It is not a necessary develop- 
 ment of reason. It is^ not amotion of the sensitivity arising 
 necessarily from its constitution.* All error belongs primarily to 
 the element of freedom, and is sojnehow connected with the deter- 
 minations of the will." 
 
 But this is a mere insulated assertion ; and as from the manner 
 of its enunciation it appears that the author felt himself altogether 
 incompetent to show how it is possible for an ignorant being to 
 avoid all error, I do not consider this as one of the deliberate 
 opinions of the author. It probably occurred to his mind that 
 erroneous opinions are sometimes censurable ; and if so, according 
 to his view of responsibility, praise and blame, these erroneous 
 opinions could not be altogether unavoidable. 
 
 Let us examine what ground the author has for believing that 
 creation and all its changes are contingent, in the sense of his 
 definition of contingent — that whatever event is, might not have 
 been, or might be different from what it is. 
 
 As to the possibility of a thing's being different from what it 
 is, it is a contradiction in terms, and plainly absurd : a thing can 
 not be different from itself — if it is different, it is another thing. 
 How would it sound to say, Alexander the Great might have been 
 very different from what he was, if he had been born of a differ- 
 ent mother. If this is contingency, it neither can exist nor he 
 conceived of. 
 
 The other part of the definition is not self-contradictory. Let 
 us examine what it means : "An event is, but might not have 
 
The Human 117//. 
 
 latter olauae is always use. I. in common parlance, 
 ; and, of course, another verb is either expressed or 
 ii'n its adjunct //', or something equivalent. In 
 :i( instance, the Bense would be completed thus: An 
 b it might not have been, if proper means had been used 
 I it. This is the manner in which the author uses it, in 
 quoted above. He says a booh is, but if might not 
 r in relation to the will of God, He might have pre- 
 A.gain, it might not have been ; for in relation bo the 
 of the author, he might not have written it. Now, (his is 
 [uivalent to saying, it might not hfive been, if G-od had 
 i prevent it ; it might not have been, if the author 
 had d< >t to write it. On the supposition, however, that 
 
 rmined to prevent it, it would be proper to say not 
 ly thai tfa might not be, but that the book would infal- 
 
 libly not be. So. on the supposition that the author had not 
 i write the boolc,« it would he proper to say not 
 that the book might not have been, but that the book 
 would infallibly not be. Now, this is precisely what the Necessi- 
 tarian iin ids by the term necessity, the sure and certain 
 d that <Jod has established between the antecedent called 
 . and the consequent called effect. It appears, then, that by 
 >wn account, in an example brought forward by him- 
 o illustrate and explain contingency, the doctrine of Neces- 
 sity is I — at least as far as the example itself extends. 
 The author goes on to observe, "What is true of this book is 
 production of human art and power ; but these pro- 
 as being the sequents of volitions, if the sequents are con- 
 y appear to be, then the volitions must be contingent 
 : and he rails upon consciousness, which is the only evi- 
 ing forward, to prove that whenever he makes a voli- 
 tion I hi arm, to move his foot, to get up or sit down, or 
 cular movement whatever, he has this conviction 
 [from -■-], that he might forbear to make the volition,' 
 or might make a different volition." 
 
 hown by writers on the subject, thai it is not the 
 
 to decide the truth or falsehood of such 
 
 prop j " I can withhold any volition I make," any more 
 
 than it is the office of the ear to decide what is the color of a rose. 
 
 to ■ ide nil such questions, and it is the 
 
The Human Will. 73 
 
 office of consciousness to decide what mental phenomena actually 
 occur — such us thoughts, sensations, desires, and volitions — 
 
 and of the existence of these we have no evidence but that of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 Besides, it is impossible for onr consciousness to be exer< 
 every time we make a volition to produce any muscular motion 
 whatever, in deciding thai ire could withhold the volition, or 
 make a different volition, for this reason alone : that in at le 
 ninety -nine out of one hundred of these volitions, no thought 
 enters the mind, either of withholding the volition or making an- 
 other. 
 
 Now, it is manifest that we are not conscious of anything that 
 does not enter the mind, even in thought ; and also, that we can 
 not make a volition which it does not enter our mind to make ; 
 nor can we have a " conviction " arising from any source, that at 
 the time of making a volition we might withhold it, if the thought 
 of withholding it does not enter our mind. Besides, when the 
 thought of withholding the volition does enter the mind, which 
 only occurs when there are motives on both sides, it is found, 
 whenever consciousness is consulted, that it decides that motive 
 to be the strongest according to which the volition is actually 
 made. Consciousness, then, furnishes no ground to believe in the 
 contingency of volitions ; let us examine further what reason says 
 on the subject ; and for the sake of distinctness, we will take a 
 particular volition — that, for example, of Peter's volition to deny 
 his master. Previous to the event, these two propositions or as- 
 sertions may be made concerning it : Peter will make the volition 
 to deny his master ; Peter will not make the volition to deny his 
 master. One of these assertions, made even a million of years 
 before the event, is true — the other is false. If we supple the 
 first to be true, "Peter will put forth the volition," then von 
 may suppose Peter's power to withhold volitions, or to make vo- 
 litions of any kind, as great as you please — he can not prevent 
 that volition from coming to pass which will come to pass. Nay, 
 ytfu may call in the infinite power of God ; God himself can not 
 even will to prevent that from coming to pass which He knows 
 will come to pass. Nor does this assertion infringe in the slight- 
 est degree on his infinite power; for, according to the doctrine of 
 Necessity, the truth of the assertion, " Peter will make a volition 
 to deny his master," depended on the will of God ; and it is not 
 
:\ r Human Will. 
 
 inconsistent with infinite power to say that God can not will nm- 
 
 I ngwhoc - the Future as plain an t lu» present, it is the 
 
 •am* contradiction to Bay of a volition, it may be put forth, and 
 it may not be put forth, as to say (^ the present, concerning a 
 
 volition, it is put forth, and it is not put forth. So there is the 
 
 earns contradiction in Baying, before the event, Peter'* power may 
 
 carted in such a manner as to put forth the volition to deny 
 
 hi > master ; and Peter's power may be exerted in such a manner 
 
 put forth tin 4 volition to deny his master [using the 
 
 may unconditionally] ; as it would be to say, after the event, 
 
 's power has been exerted in such a manner that lie has put 
 
 forth the volition to deny his master; and Peter's power has been 
 
 1 in Bueh a manner that he has not put forth the volition to 
 
 deny his master. 
 
 history of the future is just as certain as if it w r ere written 
 by the finger of God, including all human volitions; and it is 
 manifestly impossible for any man ever to exert his power so as 
 to prevent any volition from being put forth which God knows 
 belongs to this history. This argument of Edwards, the author 
 has not attempted to answer, except by merely saying (page 249), 
 if this argument be true, "A system of absolute fatalism pre- 
 vail-/' [f the author had said, "Universal necessity, arising out 
 of the infinite necessary perfections of God," he would have said 
 exactly what Edwards brought forward the argument to prove; 
 but the word fatalism (which seems to have been introduced here 
 for the purpose of throwing odium on an argument which he 
 could not refute, and which I think can not be refuted) conveys 
 the idea of Universal Necessity, independent of the will and per- 
 il- of &od. The system of Edwards is as different from this 
 sism ifi from atheism. 
 \\ ifl hut jnstioa, however, to the author to state, and show by 
 quotations, that so great is the power of truth, and so clearly did 
 its if on this point, that when he forgot for a moment 
 Loctrine of contingency, he stated, with a clearness and 
 elled by Edwards himself, some of the strongest 
 feature! and foundation-principles of Universal Necessity, origi- 
 
 ta ill- infinite perfections of God; and embracing not 
 Jy all the good actions of men, but all the evil, in such infal- 
 lible certainty and inevitability that God himself can not prevent 
 
The Human Will. 75 
 
 them, being incidental to a .system which must be the best, since it 
 was projected by infinite wisdom, and which, as being the beftt, 
 must have been selected by Him as the all- wise and all-powerful. 
 
 But when he had the doctrine of contingency full in view, he 
 referred "the contingency of all creation, and of all its changes, 
 to the contingency of the divine volitions." Instead of saying, 
 then, that the Deity must have selected the system that appears to 
 Him best, he says we may not deny the Deity an attribute which 
 we possess ourselves : the power of willing or not willing to creal<* 
 the present universe, or to create an entirely different one ; and 
 that, too, contrary to all motives furnished by the reason and 
 sensitivity. 
 
 When God put forth the volition to create this glorious and 
 beautiful universe, filled with benign contrivances to create and 
 continually increase our happiness, giving us bodies furnished 
 with senses fitted to derive pleasure from all surrounding objects, 
 and souls filled to overflowing with delight, in contemplating the 
 perfections of the glorious Creator, He might have put forth a 
 volition to place us in a universe where every sensation would be 
 a pain, and every thought of its Creator a horror. Or, instead of 
 creating within us a moral sense, approving of all kindness, jus- 
 tice, and veracity, as He has done, and also contriving it so that 
 our mistakes should work out their own correction, He might 
 have willed that our moral sense should approve of all cruelty, in- 
 justice and falsehood, and contrived it so that error should perpe- 
 tuate itself forever. 
 
 The possibility of such volitions as these being made by the 
 Deity, instead of those which He has actually made, is necessarily 
 implied in his free agency. A free agent does not say of himself, 
 I must do this, I must do that, but I can do this or not, as 1 
 please ; nay, even contrary to my desire, however strong that de- 
 sire may be, and contrary to the dictates of my moral sense and 
 desire both. For example : I come into a room where I find my 
 dearest friends assembled — my mother and sisters, and a young 
 lady to whom I am ardently attached : my moral sense revolts at 
 the thought of treating any of them with rudeness, indelicacy, 
 and insult ; I have the strongest desire to retain their love and re- 
 spect ; I put forth a volition to spit on one, to slap another in the 
 face, pull another's nose, and treat my intended bride with the most 
 
i Buma* mil. 
 
 shameful rudeness and indelicacy, causing ai the same time the most 
 - in niv "w n breast, 
 •• 1 appeal to consciousness h bether we do not conceive of the pos- 
 sibility, and tlu* actual power, to do acts which disgust our moral 
 - : and do we not conceive of this at the very moment we feel 
 and in the very face of it ? " — p. 195, 
 •* It is this Belf-conscious power of determining or not deter- 
 mine ausing or not causing, this contingent power — this 
 r all-sufficient to move itself and put forth the causative 
 j, or to withhold the causative oisus, — which makes up the 
 •ui." — p. 91 . 
 Whilst the author's mind is filled with his motive of universal 
 contingency, this is the manner in which he speaks of the free 
 f oi God and man ; and apparently aware that reason will 
 ; him no assistance, he calls upon consciousness to testify to 
 the truth of his assertions. Consciousness declares she knows 
 the matter ; she only knows there are desires and vo- 
 lition-, and thoughts and feelings ; whether they even belong to a 
 2 which desires, and wills, and thinks, and feels, or not, she 
 not know. Memory, however, volunteers her testimony, 
 that desire always precedes volition, and reason as Amicus Curiae 
 the universal law to he that where one event follows an- 
 other uniformly, the uniformity is not contingent, but designed. 
 when the author forgets for a time his doctrine of universal 
 Iflgency, and speaks about the perfections of God and the 
 origin of evil, oven Edwards himself would be pleased to listen. 
 s : " When God created free agents, He, as om- 
 iit, must have known all the possible forms and conditions 
 ander which they might be created and constituted; and as He is 
 all-wise and all-mighty, He must have selected, in his actual cre- 
 ation-, the best possible forms and conditions of such beings. In 
 i I constituting free agents under the best possible forms 
 and conditions, He, as omniscient, must have foreseen all the 
 actions, which in the e» rcise of their I'vcc agency they would cer- 
 tainly | • ' orm, and among these He must have foreseen, likewise, 
 their sinful actions. 
 
 }inful actions being those which violate and transgress the 
 laws of rectitude, which God approves and loves with all the 
 energy of his nature, can not in themselves, or in any point of 
 
The Human Will. 77 
 
 view, be pleasing to Him. They are incidental to a system of 
 
 creation which He approves, but then they are incidental evils. 
 
 "If God conceived of a system <>f free agency, in which Be 
 foresaw that these incidental evils would not take place, still this 
 system must have been known to Him, on souk* other accounts, 
 not to be the best system ; for, if in all respects a system of free 
 agency without these incidental evils had been conceived of as 
 the best system, an infinitely good and wise Being must have 
 projected it. 
 
 "These evils, incidental to a system of free agency, God could 
 not, by the very hypothesis, prevent. They are incidental to it. 
 To say that God could have prevented them, and yet have consti- 
 tuted the system as it is, is a plain absurdity. " — pp. 254, 255. 
 
 We would be disposed to believe, if we did not know the con- 
 trary, that the above quotations were copied from the arguments 
 of the Necessitarians, to be afterwards refuted. Certainly no Ne- 
 cessitarian ever expressed the doctrine of Universal Necessity aris- 
 ing from the will of God, in stronger terms. 
 
 God must have foreseen the best system [not might have fore- 
 seen or not foreseen], He must have selected the best system [not 
 might have selected or not selected], He must have foreseen all the 
 actions of men,, — even their sinful actions — which were incidental 
 to this system, and which He knew would certainly come to pass, 
 with such infallibility that He could not prevent them, if He se- 
 lected the system which He has selected, and which He must have 
 selected, there being no other better system to select. 
 
 The description here given by the author of the relation between 
 the volition of God and the future actions of men, including even 
 their sinful actions, corresponds exactly with the Necessitarian notion 
 of cause and effect. The Necessitarians belie ve that the connection 
 between cause and effect is so firm that they never can be separated — 
 that is, with the cause the effect will certainly come to pass, without 
 the cause the effect will certainly not come to pass. And they be- 
 lieve that this connection depends on the perfections oi God. Now 
 the paragraphs above contain the idea as plainly as if expressed in 
 direct terms, that with the volition of God to create the present uni- 
 verse the wicked actions and volitions of men would certainly come 
 to pass, and without the volition (A' < rod to create the present universe 
 the wicked actions of men would certainly not come to pass. They 
 also contain the idea that with the perfections o( the Deity the voli- 
 
M V Human Will. 
 
 ate the presold universe would certainly be pra1 forth, and 
 without tin 4 perfections of the Deity tin' volition to create die present 
 
 universe would certainly no! be put forth. Tims all events are traced 
 the infinite perfections of ( tod ; and as these perfections are not 
 
 events — that is, did not begin to exist. — they have no antecedent, 
 but existed necessarily from all eternity, uncaused. 
 
 fficient causes we knew nothing. It may he that there i* hut 
 •it — that is, the great First Cause. Those antecedents which 
 invariably precede their sequents, which we call causes, art certainly 
 - nut the efficient causes ; as the want of food, followed in- 
 variably with the pain of hunger. A mere negative or nonentity can 
 ill- cause <>t" anything. The efficient cause is undoubtedly some 
 positive entity, producing constant change in the body, which always 
 results in pain When food is not used for a certain length of time. 
 And yet, though we do not know the efficient cause of pain in this 
 instance, we have to more doubt that there is a cause than in those 
 - thai are preceded by positive entities. 
 ( ha belief that an event has a cause, and must have a cause, does 
 not arise from the uniformity with which we see it follows another 
 event ; for if we saw- it preceded every time of its occurrence by a dif- 
 ferent nt, we wotald believe still that it had the same cause 
 
 uniformly preceding it, which we had not yet discovered.' 
 
 We know not whether God has or has not given power to antece- 
 
 to be the efficient causes of the events which uniformly follow 
 
 them ; hut this we know, that if lie has, the chain of causes and 
 
 ts, when traced upwards, must terminate in God, whose perfec- 
 
 events, and therefore uncaused. For, as it is a funda- 
 
 al truth that everything which begins to exist must have a cause, 
 
 is a fundamental truth that what did not begin to exist can not 
 
 b cause. Besides, if invariable antecedents are not efficients, 
 
 nay, for aught we know, be indispensable means, by which God 
 
 - the efficient cause. Indeed, in many cases, it would 
 
 in a contradiction to say, God could have produced 
 
 Sect, without using the very means employed. How 
 
 could Solomon have keen Solomon, unless he had keen horn of 
 
 I and Bath-sheba? Are! yet no one believes that David and 
 
 Bath the efficient cause of Solomon. God was as truly 
 
 the Creator of Solomon as Ife was of Adam and Eve. 
 
 Though God has een prdper to conceal from our view the opera- 
 tion of efl and has not permitted us at present to know 
 
The Human Will. 79 
 
 whether there arc any but the first great Cause himself, yei He has 
 given enough to furnish the means of knowledge suited to out state, 
 in the uniformity of sequences, both in the world of mind and in the 
 world of matter. It fully answers our purpose in reasoning to call 
 by the name <>f cause that antecedent with which the event takes 
 
 place, and without which it does not take place. For example, we 
 
 call a desire, with its accompanying belief that the desire may be 
 gratified without evil, the cause of the following volition merely be* 
 cause our experience teaches us that volition invariably follows. Now 
 the desire and accompanying belief are not the efficient cause of the 
 
 volition ; for as they themselves could not exist without a mind, so 
 neither could they produce a volition without a mind. It is much 
 more probable that the mind is the efficient cause of the volition, 
 than that the desire which precedes it is the cause. Yet, as the 
 mind may exist without the desire, but the desire can not exist 
 without the mind, we speak of the desire being the cause of the 
 volition — or, at least, the sine qua non — of the mind's becom- 
 ing efficient. If the Deity has constituted the mind as the real 
 efficient cause (which we have no means of knowing), then, on 
 this supposition, He has also arranged it so that the mind always 
 becomes efficient when the desire, and belief that the desire may be 
 gratified without evil, are in the mind, and never becomes efficient 
 when they are not in the mind. 
 
 So, though the efficient cause of gravitation probably does not 
 reside in the sun, yet as with the sun the efficient cause of gravita- 
 tion acts according to a fixed law, and without the sun it would 
 not act, by assuming the sun to be the cause, all our deductions 
 as to the motions of the planets are as correct as if we knew the 
 real efficient cause ; for it is only when the sun is present that 
 the real cause becomes efficient, and, as far as we know, can be- 
 come efficient. So, if volition is not the efficient cause of volun- 
 tary motions in our bodies, God has so arranged that the real 
 cause never acts or becomes efficient without volition, and with 
 volition it always does act. Indeed, it seems much more proba- 
 ble that the mind itself is the efficient cause of voluntary motion, 
 than that volition, a mere phenomenon of mind, should be ; and, 
 if so, it would seem that the effort which the mind is conscious of 
 in operating on body, is called volition, just as the operation of 
 body on mind is called sensation. 
 
 It is curious and interesting to read the author's views on this 
 
Human }\llt. 
 
 [lis theory of contingency rendered it necessary for him 
 
 -it a new psychology. According bo this new theory, of all 
 
 the phenomena of the mind, sensations and volitions only are 
 
 effia ts. u The sensations are effects of physical causes \ the voli- 
 
 th< power of the mind, called will, The de- 
 
 and emotions are not effects: they are evidently 
 
 not - of the will, nor of physical causes, and if they be effects 
 
 at all. the causation which produces them must lie either in the 
 
 substance of the sensitivity itself, or in the cognitions of the intel- 
 
 ligence which always precedes them, or in both. But if we grant 
 
 this causality to lie in the sensitivity or in cognitions, then we 
 
 causality from the will, where we had concentrated it, and 
 
 dig] ally through the whole mental faculties, and even 
 
 through the mental phenomena ; we destroy the very distinctions 
 
 to which our previous investigations had conducted us" [and 
 
 then our theory could not stand J. 
 
 Aft ing various reasons, the author comes to this con- 
 
 clusion, that " the relation of the intelligence to its cognitions, 
 and the relation of the sensitivity to the desires, emotions and 
 passions, is the relation of substance and its attributes, inasmuch 
 as these attributes are its necessary developments. We can not 
 conceive of the substance without these attributes or manifesta- 
 tion-, nor can we conceive of the manifestations without the sub- 
 stance. In will, we conceive of simply a power to do or not to 
 without affixing to it any necessary attributes or manifesta- 
 tion^."* 
 
 The chief reason assigned by the author for this conclusion is, 
 
 that " all the different forms of* cognition are really a development 
 
 that which existed before. The primitive judgments existed in 
 
 the capacity of tie- reason; and tin.' emotions, and passions, and 
 
 . have a necessary existence in the capacity or potentiality 
 
 sensitivity, then; being, in these faculties, no potentiality to 
 
 know and feel differently from what they do know and feel." 
 
 •• Km, with the will, every volition is a new creation. It had no 
 
 itil it actually appealed, inasmuch as it appeared under 
 
 an equal possibility of the very opposite volition ; it had no exist- 
 
 '•ic i 11 ting potentiality of the will." 
 
 Now, it nrould appear from this psychology, that the author 
 
 there are several different substances in the mind, having 
 
 each different attributes or properties ; and as " we can not con- 
 
The Human Will. Bl 
 
 oeive of the substance withoul the manifestations," it will follow, 
 also, that these substances were created ai different times ; for as 
 there were no manifestations of the passions and desires till after 
 the cognitions appeared, if follows thai the substance of the sen- 
 sitivity, of which \\ir passions and desires are the manifestatio 
 could not exist until after the existence of the substance of the 
 intelligence, of which the cognitions arc the manifestations. 
 Again, as the cognitions of the intelligence do not appear till 
 
 after the sensations derived from the senses, it follows that the 
 substance of the intelligence is created after the substance to which 
 the sensations belong ; and as the substance to which the sensa- 
 tions belong was created before the appearance of the cognitions, 
 and the substance to which the passions and desires belong was 
 created after the appearance of the cognitions (292), it follows 
 that there must be one substance for the sensations and another 
 for the passions and desires ; for if it is the same substance, it 
 would have to be created both before and after the appearance of 
 the cognitions, which is absurd. It appears to me, that by the 
 same mode of reasoning we would infer that there is another sub- 
 stance of the will, of which volition is the phenomenon or mani- 
 festation, created after all the rest; for the phenomenon of volition 
 does not appear till after cognitions and desires both appear. But 
 the author will not allow that will has any necessary attributes 
 or manifestations, and, of. course, is not a substance. According 
 to his idea of will, it might put forth no volition at all ; for every 
 time it does put forth a volition, it has an equal potentiality to 
 put forth none : as " the relation between cause and effect is one 
 of contingency and freedom ; and any given cause may be thought 
 of as having potentiality to effects, but without being connected 
 with any particular effects as its necessary manifestations " (293). 
 If these deductions are just, from the doctrine that cognitions, and 
 passions and desires arc not effects, but properties of substances, 
 the doctrine itself must be unsound ; and the author himself ac- 
 knowledges, that " if he grants that effects are produced by any 
 power of the mind except the will, the very distinctions to which 
 his previous investigations had conducted him are destroyed." 
 Besides, we are conscious of making efforts in the exercise oi' the 
 reason, and in the creations of the imagination, as well as in the 
 putting forth of volitions; and that theory can hardly be tine 
 which maintains that Milton, when his imagination created the 
 6 
 
ii Human Will 
 
 . made no effort, and produced qo effect except by 
 hat the inventor of the steam engine made no effort 
 imagining it- various parts and the principles of its 
 open I produced no effects but volitions. Indeed, I think 
 
 ain that no one would ev^r have imagined that sen- 
 us and volitions were effects, and passions, and emotions, and 
 g, and beliefs, and imaginings and cognitions not effects, 
 driven to ii to support a favorite theory. Now the 
 . as the foundation of freedom, is considered 
 thor .-is ro important, that he says (p. 1 7i2, corrected in 
 the ei he were obliged to do either, be would rather give 
 
 up the prescience of God Mian his freedom; meaning, by his free- 
 dom, thai tb ire is an equal potentiality in his will to do good and 
 to do evil, though in doing evil he would be acting in opposition 
 to all motives furnished by his intelligence and goodness. Such 
 ii called by the proper name, would be denominated weak- 
 ness, and could not belong to God, unless his knowledge was so 
 that there would be an even chance that one half of his 
 ts should be right and the other half wrong, and one half 
 of In- desires right and the other half wrong ; which can not be, if 
 God i in wisdom and goodness, for the author agrees with 
 
 rians in this, that the desires of God are of neces- 
 sity iufinil I. Now, to say that God can will contrary to 
 ifinitely good desires, is the same as to say thai God can will 
 to make Himself both wicked and miserable — which is as absurd 
 I can annihilate Himself; and yet the author will 
 up the infinite wisdom of God rather than give up the power 
 (weal . making himself both wicked and miserable. But 
 ►Hence would the will of God possess, with the 
 potentiality of committing evil, than without the potentiality? 
 Can there be conceived a greater and more excellent power than a 
 >od? Must this power be united with a power 
 | to i evil, to entitle it. to any moral excellence? The 
 author ai hi question in the affirmative. According to 
 him, litions of God arise necessarily from his infinite wis- 
 dom i ire to do g >od, which are themselves necessary, 
 i i Deity is not a free agent, and has no 
 moral Set the author acknowledges that the 
 
 not the less excellent on account of 
 having no potentiality to commit mistakes ; nor the infinite good- 
 
The Human Will. 
 
 
 Qess of God less excellent on account of nol j g the poten- 
 
 tiality of forming <le.sircs for the production of evil. Why should 
 the divine Will be less excellent, <>n account of possessing no poten- 
 tiality to form < i \il volitions V 
 
 Bui suppose, with the author, that Q-od really j i this 
 
 power, what would be its use? What good would it do to will that 
 every sensation of the whole human race should be pain, and ev< 
 thought a horror, and that, too, contrary to his infinite desire to 
 make them happy ? for even this horrible supposition, according 
 to the teaching of the author, might become a reality ; and that, 
 too, though God had promised to mankind that He would be mer- 
 ciful and kind to them forever. If the Will had not power to 
 break all promises, express and implied, and alter all determina- 
 tions previously made by itself, and that, too, contrary to the 
 infinite desire of preserving truth inviolate, it would not be free, 
 and moral agency would be impossible. 
 
 Any doctrine from which it may be fairly deduced that the 
 above suppositions may become realities, can not be true. Let 
 the reader judge whether the deduction is fairly made or not. 
 
 But it will be said, and, in fact, is said, by the author, that 
 though the Will of God has equal power to do good and to do 
 evil, it is certain that it will never be directed towards the evil ; 
 as certain as that physical causes are followed uniformly by their 
 effects. If you ask him how he knows this, when the potentiality 
 of the will is equal both ways — he draws his answer from the doc- 
 trine of Necessity ; thus adopting the very doctrine that he is en- 
 deavoring to refute, and tacitly acknowledging that the doctrine 
 of Contingency furnishes no answer. 
 
 When the author forgot his syett n. he said 
 what is bdow. 
 
 When God created moral agents. lie 
 must have selected the; best system that 
 infinite wisdom could contrive, ;;- lie is 
 all-wise and almighty. 
 
 If God had conceived of a better sys- 
 tem of moral agents than (lie present, 
 
 being infinitely good and wise, He mutt 
 have projected it. 
 
 When the author thought of his system, ht 
 said wliAxt is h( low. 
 
 When God created moral agents, lie 
 might have selected the worst system, 
 
 instead of tin 1 best, from the equal po- 
 tentiality oi' bis will to do good or to 
 do evil. 
 
 Ef God bad conceived of a 
 tern of moral agent- than the present, 
 
 He might not have chosen it. but some 
 other worse one, from the equal poten- 
 tiality of his will to do good or to do 
 evil. 
 
B 
 
 FJutnan Will. 
 
 omnis< Lent muai 
 
 ■ i all the r\ il volitions 
 tally 1 
 
 I not It pre 
 I 
 
 tnisoienl fon knew that nil 
 future u ill oerta inly come to 
 
 certainty is resolved into 
 inty when we consider | hj 
 in relation to the divine 
 
 1 - iih infinite 
 
 'v ail moral an.! physical i \ ents. 
 
 ince of tin' will I i the ; a 
 
 ral in the indn idual 
 
 i al in the raci of m( a, 
 
 that we are impress< 1 with it< uniform- 
 
 rhe law of this obedience is eor- 
 
 stem of Edwards : 
 
 "The will ia as the most agreeable." 
 
 ft i- true, also, that hi' who calculates 
 
 iint in any given circum- 
 
 >ording to this rule, will 
 
 lly reach an accurate result. — p. 
 
 1 1 God adopted the present system 
 
 ot* moral agents, He as omnis< ient must 
 
 •reseon that all the e\ il volitions 
 
 which aotuallv take piaoe, would oer 
 
 lainly lake plaoe : yet thai Ihrv could 
 
 be prevented, by the equal potentiality 
 
 <>f the will i^\ man to do good or to do 
 
 I Nil. 
 
 God as omnisoient foreknow that all 
 future volitions mighl certainly not 
 
 come to pass. 
 
 1 1 IS not true as a fad, that the same 
 
 kind and degree of certainty prevail in 
 
 mental causes, 01 in the production Of 
 
 volitions, as in physical causes, or the 
 
 production of material phenomena. — p. 
 264. 
 
 If we characterize the governance of 
 the will merely from our observations 
 of the succession of desires and voli- 
 , and this succession is one of in- 
 variable uniformity, it would be natu- 
 ral and legitimate to characterize it as 
 a nceessary governance, aecording to 
 the analogy of physical phenomena in 
 succession (20.")) ; and so it would bo 
 characterized, but for consciousness. 
 
 [f ii be asked how the will, being a 
 • li; its oa1 are, can act 
 ;;• ace to ike interests of the be- 
 • :. i reply, that when we distinguish 
 i facu i< pi • do not sepa- 
 vrU, The \\ ill i- so condi- 
 itfl relation! to the other facul- 
 ,\ in the unity oftfo mind, that it 
 action, anh bs .- applied 
 . and induce- 
 on and the 
 
 : and when the same act i 
 I by the reason and 
 2 . . we hare moral oer 
 of the vott- 
 
 Let the will he distinguished as pure 
 >e conceived 
 
 I experience strong convictions in my 
 reason, and strong impulses or repug- 
 uances in my sensitivity; but, most 
 clearly, these affections in other i><<ris of 
 my being do not go to make up a, voli- 
 tion. 1 feel that I can will against all 
 motives presented, whether by reason 
 or sensitivity, let the, motives be in- 
 
 d lo ever such a- degree, and in 
 
 making the volition, there is no resist- 
 
 01 ercome, no opposing force what- 
 ever (89, 00;. 
 
 The will now, under an obscured 
 reason and a corrupted sensitivity, is 
 
The Human Will. 
 
 than indifferent. Will called upon to I If for the dia- 
 
 is not the faculty of thought or feeling, persion of 1 1 * « - darkness and the finding 
 and therefore il ia indifferent In Ltsvery of the one Law (301). ! cultj 
 
 nature (300). without thought or feeling can be called 
 
 upon t«» and anything, i- uof explain- 
 
 ed.] 
 
 [f the faculty of the Will is, as the author bas characterized it 
 (300), destitute of thoughl and feeling, (and I am not disposed 
 to controvert it,) so far from its being itself kh< very personality, 
 and the only power of the mind which produces effects, it is only 
 a nice piece of mental machinery, contrived by Grod to enable the 
 sensitivity and tin* reason, by its instrumentality, to execute the 
 wishes of the one and the designs of the other. But be this as it 
 may, there is another view of the subject, which, 1 think, alone 
 decides the question in favor of necessity, and against contingency. 
 The author says correctly (p. 297), " The phenomena of the 
 reason and the sensitivity supply the will with objects, laws, rules, 
 and aims of action. Without these, action would be impossible, 
 not for want of a cause of action, but for the want of something to 
 do : just as perception would be impossible without objects, not 
 for want of a perceiving faculty \ but for the want of something to 
 perceive." And again ( p. 314 ), "Reason and sensitivity sup- 
 ply the objects and aims of action ; Will is the power to act in 
 any of the revealed directions." 
 
 This is a great truth, stated with clearness in various other 
 places by the author, and, I think, it never can be successfully 
 controverted. Now, to illustrate the application of this truth, 
 suppose that the Reason and the sensitivity, in harmony, should 
 supply the will with an object and aim of some particular action — 
 eating food, for instance, by a hungry man ; we may suppose the 
 man very hungry, and the food presented very pleasant to the 
 taste and known to be very wholesome. The object and aim sup- 
 plied to the Will, in this case, are to gratify the appetite and pre- 
 serve the life and health of the hungry man. The Reason and 
 sensitivity supply the Will with no object nor aim to withhold the 
 volition to eat ; much less do they supply it with an object and 
 aim of eating arsenic instead of bread: i( follows, then, (if "the 
 Will is the power to act in any of the revealed directions," and if 
 without aims and objects its action is impossible,) that, in this 
 case, the Will can not withhold the volition to cat the savory, 
 wholesome food; nor can it put forth the volition to eat the 
 
\ Human Will. 
 
 pplicd with qo aim 8 nor objects of eil her of I hese 
 i. • is no direction revealed, bui the direction to eat 
 • I. The Will can not even think of any other direc- 
 . and, if reminded of it by another person, Btill Reason and 
 j continue to present the same object ami aim, and no 
 o there. Edwards Bays, in illustration of bis views, that "a wo; 
 honor and chastity may have tin 1 moral inability to 
 itute herself to her slaw." Our author, not being able to 
 admit this, in consistency with his theory, says : " Now 1 appeal 
 one, do we not believe that this woman, with all her pure 
 and honorable reelings, has still the ability in her personality, or 
 will, to determine to do it. We feel certain that she will not do 
 it. but the certainty i^ not the result of a, barrier of necessity, but 
 : determination" — pp. 209, 210. How a certainty should 
 from her determination before the determination existed, is 
 ^plained. N<>w, in this case, reason and sensitivity supplied 
 only the object and aim to preserve her purity of mind and body, 
 whatever to part with it ; and, as the author says truly, 
 11 that the will can not act without an object or aim furnished by 
 tic reason and sensitivity," it follows that, in these circumstances, 
 she could not will to prostitute herself. Besides, to say, as the 
 author does, that tin's woman, with all her pure and honorable 
 '-nld will to prostitute herself to her slave, is a contradic- 
 tion i : for pure and honorable feelings are incompatible 
 with willingness to prostitute herself. 
 
 Another example given by Edwards is, " A child of great love 
 and duty to his parents may be unable to hill his rather." This 
 the author denies on the same ground as before. 
 
 Let . try here, for a moment, without going over the former 
 
 ning, how the theory will work in practice, provided it. is true. 
 
 , -on of great love and duty to his parents should, from 
 
 equal potentiality of his will to good and evil actions," will to 
 
 thrust the heart of his father, at the vevy moment when 
 
 ire to be kind and dutiful, and when Ins " moral 
 
 hocked and disgusted with (195) the volition and its 
 
 equent" — how could we estimate the moral character of 
 
 mi, the internal feelings as well as the externa] act 
 
 ■ and sensitivity supplied the will with 
 
 of kindness, and furnished no aims of murder. All the motives 
 
 The very statement shows that the imaginary 
 
The Human Will. ^ 
 
 son is a monster, such as can n ( >! exist in the creation of God; and 
 it is as absurd to ask the moral character of such a being as to ask 
 
 what kind of a in;in Solomon would have been if he had been born 
 of a different mother. Would he have been wise or foolish; would 
 he have been a male or female ? " 
 
 But, says the author, " if the son had ao power to will to kill his 
 father; it* kind actions necessarily proceeded from kind feelii 
 which were themselves necessary — then he was not a tree agent, and 
 his kind volitions had in them nothing morally good, nothing praise- 
 worthy, nothing deserving happiness as their reward. II" any praise 
 is duo, it belongs of right to the contriver, and not to the contrived. 
 So if a son has iindntil'iil and unkind rebellious feelings towards his 
 father, and no sense of duty to restrain them, and if from this state of 
 mind volitions to act unkindly necessarily spring up, so that the will 
 lias no power (while these unkind and rebellious feelings remain and 
 the moral sense continues dormant) to put forth volitions to act 
 kindly and dutifully, from its equal potentiality to do good and to do 
 evil, then the son is not a free agent, and his unkind volitions have 
 in them nothing morally evil, nothing to be found fault with, noth- 
 ing deserving unhappiness as their consequence. If any fault is in 
 the ease at all, it belongs to the contriver, and not to the contrived." 
 
 These positions are not announced by the author in the words ] 
 have used above, but they seem to me to be taken for granted in his 
 whole system as elementary truths, which need no demonstration. 
 Now, so far from these being elementary truths, believed by every- 
 body, it requires no great ingenuity to show that they are not truths 
 at all, and that they are believed by nobody. 
 
 First, as to free agency. It consists in the liberty of willing as we 
 please. No one with full and perfect liberty ever did or ever can will 
 contrary to his pleasure (including always under the term pleasure all 
 the feelings of the sensitivity and the dictates of reason.) To will 
 or do contrary to our pleasure is considered from our early childhood 
 incompatible with perfect liberty. 
 
 It is the liberty or free agency of God to have a power to will as 
 He pleases, without any restraint whatever. And 1 have never yet 
 heard of any one but the author who maintains that God can will 
 contrary to his own infinite desire to do good, and that without that 
 power He would not be a free agent, and so have no moral excellence 
 whatever. 
 
 The author appeals to consciousness as a proof that we have the 
 
The Human Will. 
 
 will contrary to our desires and the dictates of our moral 
 
 combined. Did he ever make the experiment? II* 1 Bays* 
 
 dutiful and affectionate bod can will t<> kill his father. If he makes 
 
 tin 1 experiment, he will find he can n<> m<>iv will to do bo, contrary 
 
 t<» his strong <1< sires i<- do no harm to his father, than he can move 
 
 hifi will, lie ran not even try to move his hand 
 
 • his w ill, nor ran he try to w ill contrary to his desire. If 
 
 he has a wife in the bloom of youth and beauty, on whom he doats 
 
 with the most nndcr affection, in whose conjugal fidelity and love for 
 
 him he lias the fullest confidence, lei him try to will to use force t<> 
 
 itute her to her slave, and he will find from his utter inability 
 
 that his theory of the equal potentiality of the will to do good 
 
 • evil, even when all tin 1 feelings of the sensitivity and 
 
 be reason are in favor of the good, is utterly false. 
 
 N ie i; true that the necessary dependence of will on the de- 
 
 ol the understanding destroys free agency and 
 
 all Hi tellence, either in fact or in our estimation. Con- 
 
 vince tic lather that the affection of- his son for him, and his sense 
 
 of duty, are bo strong that it is utterly impossible for him to put 
 
 forth a volition t<. ad unkindly, or intend to give the father the 
 
 pain : would the father's estimation of his son's moral ex- 
 
 cellence immediately on tin's conviction dwindle to naught? 
 
 W aid tla' lathe]- immediately look on his son as a mental ma- 
 
 chine, unworthy of any moral approbation, undeserving of any 
 
 happi tpany or to Follow the practice of kind 
 
 rhich aro jarily out of kind feelings and a high sense 
 
 of duty, which if was impossible for him not to have, from the 
 
 Grod had given him, and the manner in which he had hecn 
 
 circumstances in which he had been placed, 
 
 without his knowledge or consent? Would not rather the 
 
 alt with joy, to become assured that all his pa- 
 
 terna had not been in vain, and that he might now 
 
 •• of the affections of his child? and would not his 
 
 i i ■';. burn with a holier (lame when 
 
 cnplated his wisdom and goodness in not leaving the pro- 
 duct! ellence to the operation of contingent causes, 
 hut | certain as those of the physical world? If yon 
 
 him, on the- other hand, that all the hind and 
 
 iil conduct of bis son did not proceed from affection, but 
 from a contingent power of the will, possessing equal potentiality 
 
The Human Will. 89 
 
 to kindness and to rebellion, how would his h.-art -ink within 
 him to discover that what be bad taken for the manifestation of 
 solid virtue and permanent moral excellence, was the result of 
 mere contingency, which might change the next moment from 
 kindness to cruelty, from dntiful obedience to insolent rebellion! 
 [s the author a father, what response does bis heart give to tb 
 questions ? 
 
 Or suppose one to be t lie husband of a young, and beautiful, 
 and pure, and affectionate wife, whom he loves with tender and 
 undivided ailed ion : would his estimation of her virtue and mora] 
 excellence be diminished in the least by becoming perfectly con- 
 vinced that her love of virtue, and of purity of mind and body, 
 and the high estimation she had for the sacred, nature of the con- 
 jugal union, and the unspeakable horror and disgust she felt at 
 the thought of prostituting herself to her slave, all combined to 
 lender it impossible for her to will so abhorrent an act ? Would 
 he immediately view her as a mere mental machine, utterly devoid 
 of any moral exeellence, entitled to no happiness either to accom- 
 pany or to follow these feelings which she could not prevent. 
 worthy of no approbation either of her own moral sense or that 
 of her husband, unless she possessed the only true ground of free 
 agency, an equal potentiality of will to preserve her purity and 
 self-respect, or to give herself up to prostitution and self-degrada- 
 tion ? Let the affectionate husband of a virtuous wife answer 
 these questions, and the doctrine of necessity of will over that of 
 contingency will prevail. 
 
 There is one principle, also, which the author himself lavs down 
 as a truth which can not be denied, from which the doctrine of Ne- 
 cessity in these cases may fairly be deduced. It is, as stated before, 
 that the w 7 ill can not act Avithout objects and aims furnished by the 
 sensitivity and the reason. Now here, in the case of the wile. 
 no objects nor aims were furnished by either to prostitute herself: 
 every object and aim was to preserve her purity. It follows, 
 therefore, that the will could not put forth a volition to prostitute 
 herself. 
 
 So in case of the affectionate and dutiful son : no objects m>r 
 aims were supplied to his will to unkind, disobedient acts, much 
 less to murder his father; therefore, such a volition could not be 
 put forth by the will. 
 
 So far, then, from there being in these cases an equal poten- 
 
Human Will. 
 
 tiality in the will to do good and to do evil, there was no poten: 
 
 | al all to do ei il. To will to do good proceeds 
 
 : to will to do e> il proceeds from weakness. 
 
 \ - do our moral approbations and disapprobations spring up 
 
 only towards those things which we believe might have been 
 
 avoided, by the equal potentiality of the will to do good and to 
 
 these approbations and disapprobations are directed 
 
 rards things over which I In 1 will has no direct control. Ji" 
 
 so obedient to his father, and should perform 
 
 all tli which arc expected by a reasonable father from a son, 
 
 ami it should be discovered thai the son, instead of having kind 
 
 Is his father, and a desire to promote his happiness, 
 
 had 1. iidl of ill-will, and a constant desire to see his father 
 
 might inherit his estate, or from any other bad mo- 
 
 instead of our moral approbation rising up in favor of his 
 
 ong moral disapprobation would spring np in every 
 
 gainst his unkind feelings and evil desires, which we all 
 
 . i ven tin 1 author himself, to be under the law of Necessity, 
 
 andd< all depend immediately on the Will, whether the Will 
 
 has an eq ntiality to do good and to do evil, or not. Thus 
 
 it will be found, by an examination of other moral conduct, that 
 
 approbation and disapprobation, our estimate of moral excel- 
 
 and moral def ct, do not stop at the external action, nor at 
 
 i 11 which produces it, but go back to the desires and 
 
 or, which arc known to he under the law of Ne- 
 
 id which, notwithstanding all the author says to the 
 
 contrary, are universally believed to give rise to the volitions 
 
 tin mseh 
 
 B • is - Qtinually asked of the Necessitarian, with an air of 
 triumph, Why find fault with anyone for that which he could not 
 avoid '.' I' seems to be taken lor granted, as a self-evident truth, 
 lird, unjust, ,'i n<l altogether useless, to find fault with 
 : that which it never was in Ins power to avoid. Now, 
 if this i- a truth, then it will follow that we are all guilty of ab- 
 sd injustice alike; lor we all, the author as well as others, 
 fault with evil desires and evil passions, much more 
 than with evil volitions. And yet the author maintains through- 
 out hi- work that the passions and desires arise necessarily out of 
 nd could not be different from what they are. Now, 
 no right to expeei an answer to this question from 
 
The Human Will. M 
 
 the Necessitarian, any more than the Necessitarian has b righ< to 
 expert an answer from him. Notwithstanding, 1 think a com; 
 plete and satisfactory answer can be given to it on Necessitarian 
 principles. Let us attempt it : 
 
 First, it will not be denied thai some of our neighbor's pas- 
 sions and desires are faulty ; and second, thai God has bo formed 
 ns that we can see those faults, or know they exist, by external 
 
 signs; and also, that lie has 80 formed us that, on seeing them, 
 
 we feel a sentiment of disapprobation. If the question " Why 
 
 find fault" means, what object have we in view when we find a 
 fault in our neighbor, and feel disapprobation, the answer is, we 
 have no objeet in view ; for this discovery of our neighbor's fault, 
 and feeling of disapprobation accompanying the discovery, do 
 not arise from our determination, but from the constitution of our 
 nature, as involuntarily as any of our other judgment- or sensa- 
 tions. 
 
 The question, then, " Why do we find fault/' etc., can only 
 mean, what object had God in view, when He constituted us so 
 that we find or see our neighbor's faults, even those that do not 
 depend on his Will, and so that we feel a moral disapprobation of 
 them as soon as they are found. 
 
 No finite intelligence can comprehend and explain all the ob- 
 jects an infinitely w T ise Being had in view when He constituted 
 our moral and intellectual nature ; but this far we can understand, 
 that every contrivance belonging to it plainly leads to an increase 
 of knowledge and virtue — and none more so than seeing moral 
 defects or faults ; and feeling disapprobation of them. Every such 
 operation of mind increases our moral strength or virtue, and leaves 
 our moral being less defective than it was before. It advances 
 our creation towards perfection. When we are born our moral 
 and intellectual creation is just begun. We are then one entire 
 deficiency, having no knowledge, no virtue, or moral power, no 
 feeling of moral, approbation or disapprobation. AW' are an utter 
 blank. How God operates to inaugurate feeling and thought, we 
 know not; but after they are begun, we see plainly that lie lias 
 laid his plans so that our creation can not fail to advance to 
 entire completion. 
 
 I have frequently heard it asked how anything can come out oi^ 
 the hands of an infinitely wise and holy Creator, defective in any 
 manner? The mistake is, to suppose that the first man's area- 
 
V Human 117//. 
 
 ti«»n i 1 at once, and thai our creation is completed at 
 
 birth; whereas it is then we begin to be in the hands o( God for 
 
 creation. Hie infinite perfections of Sod justify as in believing 
 
 thai I will put any pari of his creation out of his creating 
 
 incomplete or defective. Nor is this conclusion derived 
 
 in what appears to as due to the perfections of God; 
 
 I likewise to Bee that a plan lias been adopted by 
 
 G himself, from which out complete creation in knowledge, vir- 
 
 and happiness, will be secured. What this plan is lias 
 
 . shown (pp. 82, 65), and if there was no otheT proof 
 
 ofth >f God than this plan, full oi' so many beautiful and 
 
 • contrivances, this alone would produce perfect convic* 
 tion in any mind comprehending it. iToreven if we could suppose 
 that something could spring into existence out of nothing — that 
 i^. without a cause (which is itself infinitely absurd and impos- 
 sible) — Btill, even then, there would be an infinite number of 
 . bat blind Chance would not produce a system 
 ig the most beautiful arrangement and harmony of parts, 
 a- if it proceeded from the highest intelligence. 
 
 it will be -aid ihat u finding fault" is not merely cliscover- 
 
 _ >ur neighbor's faults, and feeling a moral disapprobation of 
 
 them, fi;t expressing that disapprobation in the form of blame, 
 
 plainly implying that we think the person blamed had it in his 
 
 to avoid Hi" thing- for which he is blamed. It is urged 
 
 this must be 80 J for it has become a maxim with all men, 
 
 even the X" sessitarians t hem sel ves, that "A man ought not to be 
 
 blamed for what he can not avoid.'' This maxim is undoubtedly 
 
 tood and practiced upon by all. When written 
 
 Mm ambiguity, it is as follows : " A person ought 
 
 i be blamed for what he can not avoid if he pleases;" that is, 
 
 if he or desired to avoid a thing, and could not, then it was 
 
 not his fault, hut if his want of power to avoid it depended on 
 
 the want of desire to avoid it, then it was his fault. The disap- 
 
 : d of out moral sense springs up in a moment, when we 
 
 ii;i? the person's desires were in favor of the evil act, 
 
 and we do not -top io inquire whether those desires were necessary 
 
 Moreover, the stronger the desire to do the blame* 
 
 worthy act, tie- higher dor- our disapprobation rise, whether we 
 
 . oi- advocates of contingency. 
 
 !• ' Wonderful that an acute logician should bring forward the 
 
The Human Will Ml 
 
 common mode of speaking, concerning crimes committed — "The 
 criminal might have avoided committing the crime if be had 
 pleased" — as a proof of the universal belief thai the agent has the 
 unconditional power of avoiding all criminal acts, and all good 
 
 acts, too, when the very expression contains a condition implying 
 
 the doctrine of Necessity as strongly as ii' it asserted that the 
 crime could not be avoided under the circumstances. 
 
 If the common people say that any son of competent bodily 
 strength can murder his lather it* he pleases, certainly they do not 
 mean that he can do it if he does not please. On the contrary, it 
 logically means that he can not do it if he does not please. And to 
 a man not drilled in metaphysics, it would appear as absurd to 
 say he could do it if he did not please, as to say he could do it 
 if he did not will to do it ; for it never enters into any man's 
 mind to will contrary to his own pleasure. (I wish it always to 
 be understood that I mean by pleasure, as here used, all the pleas- 
 ure we derive from the gratification of our senses, of our pas- 
 sions, of our appetites, and of our moral sense.) 
 
 The gratification of the moral sense, in the very early part of 
 our existence, forms no part of our pleasure ; for as yet the moral 
 sense is not created : and even after God has begun to create it, 
 we often think that the gratification of the appetites will be more 
 pleasant than the gratification of the moral sense. The correction 
 of this mistake is gradually made, as the work of creation goes 
 on, by our own experience, and by the testimony of others. This 
 is the means which God employs to create our moral sense up to 
 such perfection and strength that it becomes forever after the un- 
 disputed ruler of all our moral conduct. If this seldom or never 
 occurs in this life, w r e are still sure that in our continued existence 
 we will be under the same divine and benignant administration 
 that we are under here ; and the unchangableness of the divine 
 perfections affords us the most consolatory evidence that a plan 
 so wisely and beneficently contrived, and so undeviatinglv prose- 
 cuted during our whole lives, will not be abandoned in the next 
 life until it is brought to complete perfection. 
 
 But it will still be said, Suppose it is true that the externa] act 
 arises necessarily from the volition, the volition from the desire, the 
 desire from the too high estimate we make of the value ^( the object 
 desired or the wrong estimate of the means U> attain tin 1 object, the 
 wrong estimate from the want of sufficient reason to judge correctly, 
 
< Buman Will* 
 
 - ifficient reason from out unfinished creation ; and sup 
 God, with the purpose of strengthening our moral 
 its creation towards completion, causes a feeling 
 ofdisappi of any one of these particulars to spring up invol- 
 
 untarily in our minds : what is the ase of giving expresion to that 
 feeling in the form of blame, Rince all the particulars are but links 
 in the chain of necessity, originating in God himself, and not one 
 of which can 1 •* ^ broken or changed in the slightest degree, by any- 
 
 g thai we can do or B 
 
 I lis estion means, What utility have we in view when we 
 
 isi 'i to our feelings of moral disapprobation, the an- 
 
 various, according to our intelligence, and our feel- 
 
 ness or unkindness towards the person blamed. If 
 
 v."" have i 2 ■■ 1 r<>r him, our object will be merely the pleasure 
 
 of letting others know our sentiments, or inducing them to be : 
 
 that we would not be guilty of such conduct ourselves. If 
 
 •1 ill-will towards him, a part of our object, at least, will be 
 
 ive liiin pain, 
 
 L ' it he our beloved child, or our dear friend, whose fault we 
 
 discovered, and our object in expressing our disapprobation 
 
 will I b to change the past, but to introduce new motives, 
 
 which he would not otherwise have, to operate on the future, and 
 
 ; a n petition of the same conduct. This object corre- 
 
 gactly with the doctrine of Necessity, which teaches that 
 
 similar motives and similar circumstances, similar conduct 
 
 . and with different motives and different circumstances, 
 
 different conduct will ensue. This object corresponds also with 
 
 of G in causing us to feed and express disapprobation. 
 
 11" has so formed us that we consider the approbation of our 
 
 fellow ' hly desirable object to obtain and preserve, and con- 
 
 the expression of their disapprobation, as soon as known, 
 
 tain to o] a new motive and a new desire, in opposi- 
 
 -ijc which produced the preceding faulty conduct; 
 
 orally improved, thus our creation is advanced. 
 
 the fault found by an enemy without its use. G-od has 
 
 . ' • !i in the early stagss of our creation, with a 
 
 of moral excellence; and when a fault is made 
 
 by ;in enemy, it is half removed. And it was 
 
 h propriety, by a sage of antiquity, that to aid us 
 
The Human Will. 95 
 
 in detecting our faults, we each need a true friend ora bitter enemy, 
 as none l>ut these two have sufficient courage to tell us our faults. 
 
 The question, however, may be fairly asked, though without any 
 hope of a satisfactory answer, " What is the use of blame, or finding 
 fault," if "the will retains an equal potentiality to do good and to do 
 evil, without feeling the slightest resistance in overcoming the i 
 motives introduced into the mind by the blame ,,-.,, ioned by the 
 former conduct, however strong those motives may be " ? The I 
 doctrine on this point appears to he, that there would be no use in 
 expressing our moral disapprobation, if the person blamed could not 
 avoid similar conduct in future by the introduction into his mind of 
 new motives. It is the possibility of our faults being removed that 
 renders the blame of them just and useful, and not at all the \> 
 bility of our not having been faulty. Our being faulty depends on 
 the unfinished state of our creation, and the removal of our faults 
 depends on their discovery either by ourselves or others. Cod has 
 placed our friends, and our enemies, too, in positions from which 
 they can detect many of our faults or defects which escape our notice, 
 and the very pain which we feel on the discovery of our faults be- 
 comes, in the providence of God, a means of removing them. 
 
 It maybe asked how a knowledge of our faults can tend to remove 
 them, when the faults are in the desires, which do not depend on the 
 will. True, our desires do not depend on our will, but they depend 
 on our knowledge; our desire for any particular object is d< pendent 
 on the estimate we make of its value, and when w r c discover that our 
 estimate was erroneous, our desire changes, of course. And when 
 our desires change, our volitions and conduct change with them. 
 The judgment is invariably corrected on the discovery of a fault. 
 And when our judgment shall be so far advanced in its creation as 
 to form a correct estimate of the value of every object of pursuit, our 
 desires for each object will be neither too strong nor too weak, and 
 our volitions and conduct will correspond with our desires, and the 
 advancement of our whole moral character will keep pace with the 
 advancement of our judgment in truly estimating things. 
 
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