A c> •: * .4* \ *-> > /^K^V ^ "oV • .A>^ «' $' * ^' V "*, • * «0 .^^ 0>«^ *o .C** QUESTIONS ADAPTED TO THE ABRIDGED EDITION OF J U P H AM'S MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. BY A TEACHER. PORTLAND:. WILLIAM HYDE, EXCHANGE STREET. 1843. ^ Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1843. BY WILLIAM HYDE, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of Maine b %f THURSTON, ILSLEY & CO. PRINTERS, FORTLAND. QUESTIONS TO UPHAM'S MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. CHAPTER I. | If the mind were cut off from | external things, what would be v A / i the effect upon us ? What kind of existence is the| Upon what do the mental human mind, regarded as a states expressed by taste, touch, whole? smell, sight and sound, de- In how many points of view pend ? must we contemplate it, iri order What are some other states of to get a thorough knowledge of the intellect, not so connected j t ? with outward objects? (3) What are the three grand di- 1 visions under which the mind is j best contemplated? Which kind of knowledge is What words properly express j first acquired, that of external, the states of mind resulting from or that of internal origin ? the action of these leading de- Is the mind, originally, pos- partments ? \ sessed of any knowledge ? Which two grand divisions By what is it first brought in- will be examined in this book ? to action ? ,^x What is said of the adapta- { ' tion of material things to the Which division is first treated ? mind ? What is the office of the in- What striking and important tellect ? facts, already noticed, does this „ Of what is it the source ? lead us to repeat ? Under what two divisions may j To what may the soul ho the intellect of man be consid- j compared ? ered? { What is the soul, regarded in Upon what do intellectual j itself? states of external origin depend ? j To what part of the instru- QUESTIONS ON men! are the the nerves, eye,&c. compared I If undisturbed by outward things, how do this invisible soul | bodily lYaine-work, exist? What is necessary to bring forth its harmony? (4) lu view of what has been said, what is the first general principle laid down ? What is the second? [I] What is first brought forward, in proof of what has i .-aid I What does each one's experi-j ence Bay of the greater part of )n- thoughts, in early life ? By what are our thoughts then forced BOOB US ? To what have they relation? What happens with the mindj advance in age ? B what is the mind, at length, \ brought fully into action? i After the exhaustion of exter- j rial objects around us, what is ■d upon our notice? Does this account accord with • la's experience ? (•5) j After our own experience,! ifl next brought as a proof! en said ? Does what we observe in chil- Igree with what we re- of oursebes ? \ Bfhat must any one believe,! ullu the operations of d in infants ! What, to an infant, constitutes! the j Ufakal are Us first ideas of the I To what may the origin of all its ideas be traced ? What other sources of knowl- edge break in, as he becomes a few years older ? How is his progress in knowl- edge described ? When does he first begin to retire within himself? What fact, with regard to the instruction of children, accords with this view of the subject ? Do they easily understand an abstract statement ? Why do they not ? How are they affected when the subject is explained by a vis- ible representation ? (6) What is brought, in the third place, to prove that the mind is first brought into action by the senses ? What is true of the languages of savage tribes? With what does the growth of language keep pace ? To w T hat does it correspond j in extent ? What does the history of all languages teach us, as to the different application of the same words? W^hat was the word imagine first used to express ? The word impress? The word reflect? Can these words be literally applied to the mind? What), then, is the inference ? If all words are first used to express external things, what seems to be a fair conclusion, as to the origin of our knowledge ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. (?) What, in the fourth place, is brought to prove that we ac- quire our first knowledge through the medium of the senses ? How has it been with deaf persons suddenly restored to hearing ? How, with one born blind, and suddenly restored ? How, with one not blind, but who has not, till a late period, seen certain colors ? What is observed of the inter- nal state of mind, of such per- sons ? Has any inward light, on the subject of sight or sound, sprung up, to compensate for what usu- ally breaks in from without ? At what age did the deaf and dumb man, of the city of Char- tres, suddenly gain his hearing ? Being so long deprived of this important sense, and not being obliged, by circumstances, to improve the other senses the more, what was the state of his mind? On examination, of what im- portant subjects was he found entirely ignorant ? What seemed mysterious to him? What does this great blank in the mind, consequent on the want of hearing, tend strongly to prove ? What did he gain from the senses which he possessed ? What is a proof of his indus- trious application of them? What was evident, as to his amount of knowledge ? Had he any perceptions which are appropriate to sight and hearing ? What effect had this privation on his notions of internal ori- gin ? Why are the instances, above cited, of very great importance in philosophy ? What is the only way to ren- der our progress in this study sure, rapid and delightful ? (8) Of what two senses was James Mitchell deprived? What does his history illus- trate ? CHAPTER II. (9) In connexion with thoughts of external origin, what words have we frequent occasion to use ? Which of these is limited to express a particular variety of mental state ? We can say, the feeling of hardness, and the feeling of an- ger ; can we use the word sen- sation, with the same latitude ? What is one characteristic of sensation? Why can it not be defined ? Does this characteristic distin- guish sensation from all other mental states ? What peculiarity does so dis- tinguish it ? How do other feelings differ, in origin, from sensation ? Why do we not say, the 5en- sation of joy ? X* QUESTIONS ON (10) Where ie sensation sometimes ded as having its position? The Bensation of touch! That of hearing! Of rigW! How far ire the bodily organs concerned with sensation ? Where is the sensation of feel- 7 ill- 1> it philosophical to say, "the »? What expression is more prop- er ? Bow is the eye to be regard- ed I What help does the eye re- 1 quire, that we may seethe satel- < lites of Jupiter ? Doc- this imply that the teles- j cope Bees the stars ? What is the telescope ? What is the eye? Can the one see better than the other? j (ii) Are otir sensations images of j °utward objects ! Are they representations in a-> nyj material sense 1 Why are we often led to think j are I Has thought any form and im-j | inst what notion must we! i, when we think of any thing as round; as extended,! | e beautiful colors, are we to suppose that our in- feelings are painted with iamc iiip I 1 bat would follow the admis-|' pfthis principle? (12) [I] What is necessary to pro- duce an affection of the mind ? Can we determine the extent of this external operation ? What is all that we know con- cerning it? What, then, is the only state- ment we can make at present ? [II] What immediately fol- lows the change in the external organ ? What is all that we know, at this stage of the operation ? What boundary do we here touch ? Have men ever been able to explain the connection of mind and matter ? (13) What state of the mind is im- mediately connected with sensa- tion ? With what latitude is this word used, in common lan- guage? At present, are we concerned with the word in its internal, or in its external acceptation ? How does perception, in this sense, differ from sensation ? How may perception be de- fined ? (14) What does sensation imply, when applied to the mind ? What more is included in per- ception 1 Which of these states is whol- ly within, and which carries us without ourselves ? Which, then, brings all the forms of beauty, in external na- ture, to our knowledge ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. What would be the case, in i second class of secondary qual- respect to these, if we had only| ities. sensation? In this case, what would con- stitute the whole world to us ? What faculty prevents this mistake ? To what does perception di- rectly lead us? (15) While sensation implies exter- nal things, as acause,what more! " T" i si,„p„edb J pe,cep„„ nl \'%2*Z£ CHAPTER III. (17) What, with regard to the sen- ses, is it important to keep clear in the mind ? Of what, in regard to them, is i it desirable to possess a correct ere have been any essence of matter ? ° ther wa ?> . m whlch f e ™ l 8 ht What is all we know about have come into possession of our palter ? j knowledge, but by the senses? Under what two heads have? In what ^.^ we to look writers ranked the qualities of ' I upon them as indispensable ? matter ? How are piimary qualities dis- tinguished ? What are the names of the primary qualities ? Why are they called primary ? What is solidity ? What other term might express the same ? Is water a solid, in this sense ? By what experiment has this been shown ? How does it appear that divis- ibility is essential to matter ? Solidity, extension, &c? (16) Into what two kinds are the secondary qualities of bodies d vided ? an evidence of the of this view of the What is correctness subject ? In what way is the Supreme Being possessed of knowledge ? Is the same true with any other beings ? On what is man wholly depen- dent for his knowledge ? Suppose he be deprived of the ear? Of the eye ? Of the sense of touch ? (18) [I] What relation does the brain sustain, in regard to sen- sation ? | Can sensation be separated | from the nervous system ? What qualities are included > What resemblance is there, in the first class ? between the substance of the When we say a body has > nerves, and that of the brain? sound, what is implied ? Are they connected ? When we say it has color? What effect has an injury of Give some examples of the the brain, on the sensation pro- B QUESTIONS ON ,1 by the presence of an ex- I body ? What is the effect if the nerve be injured I What do these facts go to proi [II] What constitutes the rial organ ? In what subordinate organs, is this organ presented ? On what must an impression be made, before there can be ttion and perception ? What state of mind immedi- ately succeeds an impression on thai subordinate organ called the audilonj nerve ? What if a ray of light make an impression on the retina? What if the hand be impressed on an uneven surface? (19) In analyzing the senses, with which of them is it proper that should begin ? How should we proceed with others? in what particular order is it proposed to take them up? W hat are all bodies, especially id and vegetable, constantly emitting 5 x V} i;i t is said of the diffusion "l' these particles? ^ hat if a sentient being thin the range of them*? (80) Whit i- the name of the or- through which we have the sense of smell ? ^ here is this nerve situated? ^ hit if tins nerve be affected •ne odoriferous particles? Does this sensation prove any connection between the object from which the particles proceed, | and the smell ? What is all that might be sug- \ gested to us ? Would this suggestion imply a corporeal cause ? [II] How, then, does it hap- pen, that we refer our sensations to an external cause ? Illustrate the manner in which we have gained this experience. What is the effect, upon us, of this uniform experience ? (21) What is said of the prompt- ness with which this mental ref- erence is made? Can we trace the progress of the operation ? Why is not this inability sur- prising ? How often have we gone through this process ? What has been the result of this long-continued repetition ? How is this sudden operation of the mind expressed ? What state of the mind does this view of the subject, help to illustrate ? From what will this state re- ceive additional illustrations ? When we are said to have perception of the smell of a body, what three things are sup- posed instantly to exist? (22) What is the principal organ of taste ? With what is the tongue cov- ered? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. What follows the application of a sapid body to the tongue 1 What follows this change in the organ ? What sensation and percep- tion do we gain, in this way ! To what do we immediately refer, as the cause of our sensa- tions ? Do we generally distinguish the qualities of the cause, by separate designations ? How do we express them ? How long are we in referring the internal state to the external cause ? Still, what must be kept in mind, with regard to this refer- ence 1 Of what is this reference the result ? Why do we say of a body, "It is sweet — it is sour " ? When we say a body is sweet, or, it is bitter, what do we in- tend ? How far is there any necessa- ry connection between these bodies and the mental state ? CHAPTER IV. (23) What sense was to be taken next, after the sense of taste? Could we hear, if we had not a sense designed particularly for that purpose ? Does not the air, when put in rapid motion, impress the sense of touch? Could we not gain, by this means, the sensation of sound 1 What is said of the workman- ship of the organ of hearing ? What is said of the position in which the ear is placed ? How is design further shown in the external ear ? How are the undulations of air disposed of, after they enter the ear ? What is first observed, worthy of notice, on the tympanum or drum of the ear ? What immediately follows the pressure of this tympanum by the external air ? (24) ^ hat is said of the number of sensations which we get by hear- I in £ I V\hat other sense will help us \ to illustrate this remark, with ■ regard to hearing ? What illustration is given ? In what respects do sounds : differ? How many variations of tone ; may be perceived by the ear ? How many in strength of tone? How many simple sounds are : made by the combinations of the ■ varieties ? What is required, to produce ; a perfect tone ? Of what is each undulation made up ? In what are these motions uni- form ? What three things may cause i a difference in the same tone ? What instruments illustrate \ this ? How is it illustrated by a ' number of voices ? How by the same voice ? (25) How are we able to distinguish ] the direction from which a sound comes ? 10 QUESTIONS ON What fact Bhows it to be no \ Of what, in particular, does wonder that we should, without jit give us the origin ? experience, be unable to distin-^ ^27) guish the direction? What anecdote of Dr. Reid, What would be at man's earli- BUDDOrtfl tins view of the subject ? est elements of knowledge, if he What anecdote of the traveller had no other sense but smelP and lion illustrate this view? What additional ideas would How does the experience of a > he soon acquire? in when in a strange place, To what feelings, and concep- illnstrate this statement? tions r would these ideas give How would a man, born deaf, rise ? and suddenly bfought to his How would all these feelings hearing, probably regard the first J seem to him, as to their expert- sounds' he heard? ence and origin ? What does experience teach Would he be able to refer UB, with regard to sound, besides them to any external cause ? its direction 1 What would be the result, if he were possessed of hearing j only ? By possessing both smelling CHPTER V. and hearing, would he be able | to form any idea of outwardness? (26) Why is the idea of outward* Which sense comes next in ness a very important idea ? order to hearing ? What is the principal organ of touch ? [a the sense of touch limited to the hand ? By what means does this idea first arise in the mind ? Is this idea directly addressed to the sense of touch? How far might the mind Why, then, are we led to refer j doubtless, be developed, without to the hand principally, as con- the aid of touch ? i with touch ? How would all things appear How does the sense of touch; to us, under these circumstan- compare with the senses already ces ? examined, with respect to uni-j And yet, how might the ac- formity and simplicity ? jtions of the mind move on ? What is the only knowledge J When should we find our we gain immediately from the \ wonted course of thought dis- \ turbed ? By the palate? \ What new perception instant- !>y the sense of smelling? \ly arises, at this precise position Mention some of the qualities of the mind? of bodies, with which touch, What is the peculiar office of make- us acquainted! the sense of touch ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. u What does it thus become the] means of disturbing ? With what does this new idea of outness soon become connect- ed? In what part of our study, shall we again refer to this idea ? Is externality a direct object of touch ? What connection, then, has; touch with externality? (28) By what means do we acquire the idea of extension ? Under what circumstances do we necessarily form this notion ? Is there any resemblance be- tween outward extension, and the notion of it in the mind ? How great is the diversity be- tween them ? With which of these are we Concerned, at present ? Why is it not necessary to multiply words, even about the inward feeling of extension ? Why can we not make this idea clearer by denning it 1 To what must we refer, in this and similar cases, in order to get the best understanding of the matter ? With what idea is the notion of form intimately connected, as its foundation ? Is any one ignorant of what form is ? Are these ideas simple or com- pound ? To what sense are they both ascribed ? In what way, then, are we to understand the idea of form, to be founded upon that of exten- sion ? (29) Do all philosophers agree in ascribing those sensations pro- duced by change of temperature to the sense of touch ? What careful and distinguish- ed writer has so classed them? How many significations has each of the words " heat" and "cold" ? What are these two significa- tions ? What makes it so difficult for us, in this case, to separate the sensation and the quality ? Have they any resemblance to each other ? What are the sensations of heat and cold ? What are those qualities, which we call 'heat' and 'cold' ? How are they conceived by us? By what is their existence plainly indicated ? Does common sense say any thing of the natare of them ? By what illustration is their existence shown to be a matter of common sense ? Whose business is it, to inves- tigate what heat and cold are ? What different theories have been proposed, with regard to heat and cold ? Why are these theories exclu- sively consigned to philosophers! What one thing are we cer- tain of, in regard to heat ? To what is the contrary notion compared ? Is any one so simple as to think that anything like the sen- sation of heat is in the fire W T hat is all that any one would suppose ? I- 1 QUESTIONS ON Why,then,does the simple man jiivtlv laugh at the philosopher, m bo says there is no heat in fire? (30) What do we proceed next to Slder, after heat and cold 1 What do we understand by e words ? W hen do we call a body hard ? When do we call a body soft? Do men nirree in this notion ? Are hardness and softness sen- 8 at ion I ■ they like sensations? I j our perception of these qual- . necessary to their existence? How is the folly of a contrary notion expressed ? By what means do we perceive hardm How may we easily have this B it ion ? Which is easier ; to have the ttion, or to hold it, as a dis- tinct object of thought ? Has the sensation, produced by hardness, a name in any lan- guage! ^ hat reason is given for its having no name ? [s this a distinct sensation ? In what case do we readily at- tend to this sensation ? What, in such case, do we readily acknowledge of it? How is this illustrated? ^ hat is the common language in this case, as illustrated? How i< the language changed, when the head is leaned gently Q8l the pillar ? I- the sensation the same in both xcept in degree? Why is it, in the second case, ifficult to separate the sensa- tion from the idea of hardness? To what must the philosopher attain, before he can reason well \ on this matter? How shall he accomplish so | difficult a task? j To what is the last appeal, in \ matters of this nature? (31) What feelings are next men- tioned, w r hich are too indefinite to be certainly classed? Why are they classed among the states of mind now under consideration 7 Can these feelings be traced to any particular part of the body, as their appropriate organ ? With what limitation do these views apply to the sensations ex- pressed by the words " hunger" and " thirst" ? What feeling and desire com- j bine to render these sensations < complex ? Whv is the feeling of uneasi- \ness classed with notions of an | external origin ? \ Is it certain that they should be classed with feelings arising < from the sense of touch? What considerations forbid us so to class them ? \ What is said of the cause op- \ erating on the stomach, antece- | dent to the feeling of hunger ? What advantage would a ] knowledge of this cause afford | the mental philosopher ? (32) > To the consideration of what I subject do we now return ? \ Is there any resemblance be- MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 13 tween the mental state, and the corresponding outward object? To what two general qualities of matter does this remark apply? Mention some of the primary qualities of matter, Some of the secondary. How much do we know about the manner in which the object can give us a knowledge of some- thing entirely different? What is said of this fact in philosophy ? How is the difference, between the object and the thought, illus- trated by reading and arithmetic? What is said of all the acts of the mind, compared with what they stand for ? How is the mind governed in its feelings and operations ? By what are its efforts charac- terized ? How is the impossibility, of getting at the mind's intrinsic nature, expressed ? What, then, is the relation between the sensation and the object? On what absolute ground does the sign give knowledge of the object? How is this paradoxical sub- ject summed up? CHAPTER VI. (33) What rank is assigned to the j sense of seeing? What is said of our ability to acquire knowledge by touch a- lone? By this sense, how long would jit take us to form a good idea of | a mountain ? How is the sense of sight i contrasted with touch, as to ra- jpidity? j What is the origin of this \ sense ? On a slight inspection, what is the eye proved to be ? What is the medium on which this organ acts ? What is said of the diffusion and direction of the rays of light? Do the rays of light stop at (the surface of the eye? On what principles does the eye combine and refract the rays ? Does it belong to menial phil- osophy to describe the eye mi- nutely ? To whom does it belong ? For what would a careful ex- amination of the eye, afford | strong arguments ? What would happen to the | eye, if the rays were not very | fine ? | What if they were not fitted | to give the sensation of color ? (34) Where do the rays of light first strike the eye ? What would be the effect, if they should pass on in the same direction ? By what part of the eye, are the rays refracted ? To what point are they all di- rected, by this refraction ? What is the retina ? What immediately follows the formation of the image on the retina ? What is the last step we can 2 II QUESTIONS ON in tracing the material partj of the process of seeing ? \\ bat immediately follows ? Can we detect any physical connection between the image, and this mental state ! What is all we can ; say of I them (35) In Bpeaking of the sensations j and perceptions attributed to I sight, J What distinction must be \ madi What is original with the f sight ? (When do we use the term perception, here, instead of sen- sation ?) | Are these original sensations many, or few ? What other senses does the} of sight resemble, in this \ respect ! i Are these numerous colors; all accurately distinguished by name ! Why are they not so distin- j guished ! I From what do some of the* perceptions result, which are im- properly attributed to sight ? How closely are these acts of the judgment sometimes com- bined with the visual sensation? Why are we apt to regard the knowledge thus obtained, as or-j 1 with sight ? (30) ^ hat common mistake is made, in expressing our judg- ment of the length or breadth of (CtS :' W a knowledge of extension ■'turned by sight ? What might such an opinion be apt to incur, at first thought ? In what sense has the notion of extension its origin ? Why can we not define this thought ? Can we give a clear descrip- tion of extension, in its outward sense ? (Does this inability prevent a general agreement as to what extension is ?) With what is the notion of extension closely connected 1 Could consciousness, or in- ward reflection, give us a knowl- edge of extension ? How do we get the first notion of outness ? How do w r e get the idea that the resisting body is extended ? If a man w T ere without motion and without the sense of touch, though possessed of all the other senses, what two ideas could he never acquire ? Having learned extension by touch, what appearance does he soon become acquainted with? What does he soon associate with that colored appearance ? What transfer of knowledge does he thus practically make \ And, finally, what does he im- agine extension to be an object of? And yet, how much has seeing to do with this idea ? What is the true origin of this notion ? How does it become, in some sense, an idea of sight ? (37) What quality of bodies is next considered, after extension ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. By what sense do we first ac- quire a knowledge of figure? To what other sense is this knowledge often attributed ? Is it strange that men should make this mistake ? What is all that a solid body presents to the eye ? What is all that we see, when we suppose we see the cavities of a body ? What does experience teach, about this light and shade ? What is a proof of the truth of this statement ? Can the painter produce this appearance on a. plain surface ? (33) If a blind man has learned, by the sense of touch, to distinguish between a cube and a sphere, can he, on suddenly gaining his sight, tell which is which, by that sense only ? Why can he not ? What is all that solid bodies present to the eye ? What, then, must be the first idea conveyed to the mind by- seeing a globe ? What do we learn by experi- ence in combining the sugges- tions of touch and of sight ? What does this experience hence become the sign of? How, then, do we get the idea of a globe, when it is presented to the sight only ? What has already been men- tioned as a proof of the correct- ness of this view ? What, then, are extension and figure originally perceived by ? When "do we begin to judge of them by sight ? W hen do we acquire this knowledge ? What is the consequence of its being acquired so early ? (39) What do these thoughts lead us next to consider ? What more is comprised in the idea of magnitude, than in the ! idea of extension ? Is the knowledge of magni- ; tude acquired by the eye ? By what sense is it acquired ? Under what two heads has it been common to consider mag- nitude ? Which kind is variable ? Which is always the same ? How are these two kinds illus- I trated by the stature of a man ? According to what, is the ap- parent magnitude greater or less? What fact is given, to prove that we do not judge of magni- tude, at first, by sight ? What is the reason that the men, standing in the door of St. Paul's, appeared to be little chil- dren ? What would have been the op- eration if the door had been al- lowed to be of its real size? What, if the men had been \ known to be of their real size ! (40) Why does a person, in the mist, appear more distant than he really is ? What conclusion does the mind immediately draw ? (What is the effect of the rap- idity of this conclusion ?) What, in this instance, is 1G QUESTIONS ON fly concerned in giving a fic- titious expansion to bodies? What other cause may have some influence in producing this (41) Docs the sun seem larger to us at the zenith, or at the hori- Bon I How many causes may com- bine to produce this effect? [1] Why may the horizon ap- pear more distant to us than it If an object form the same re in the eye, whether seen in the horizon or zenith, but is supposed to be farther off, in the horizon than in the zenith, in which position will it appear larger ? [2] From the sun to the ho- rizon, how do the rays fall on the body of the atmosphere ? How will they be refracted ? What effect will this refrac- tion have on the angle of vision? How will this refraction be af- fected by vapor in the atmos- phere ? [3] What is the third reason why the sun may appear larger in the horizon, than in the ze- nith? Why do ships and forest trees appear large to us, though so distant as to subtend small an- - of \ ision ? Wh.it has this to do with oth- er objects, which seem to be in their company ? (42) What is meant by the distance of objects, when 'the term is | used in reference to ourselves ? What objection might be made I to this definition ? Is there any difficulty in un- | derstanding what is meant by it ? How can blind men get the : measure of distance ? j W 7 hat error, with regard to the perception of distance by sight, \ has lately been corrected? j How do all objects, as to their | distance, first appear to the eye ? Why cannot we prove this, by | our own early recollection ? I How has this statement been I proved to be correct ? What instance is given by \ Cheselden ? \ What objects appeared most : agreeable to him ? > Could he tell their shape ? Has the truth of these views | been corroborated by others,res- | tored to sight ? Does a person, suddenly res- < tored to sight, know how to di- jrect his eyes to particular ob- jects? I Will he readily acquire this faculty ? (43) How do persons, restored to < sight, become able to measure < distance by the eye ? j Is it supposed that all people | acquire this abililty in the same < way .' \ When a body is removed to a distance, how is its visible ap- pearance affected ? How are its colors, to our eye ? Its outlines? What of the objects, inter- \ yening between us and the body j in question ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 17 In this way, what does a cer- tain visible appearance become the sign of? In what art are these princi- ples turned to great account ? By what three means are painters enabled to throw back an object in a picture ? How do they bring an object near ? (44) Is it always easy to form a cor- rect judgment of the distance of < an object, when no objects inter- vene ? What instances are given to j illustrate this statement? What is the reason that we generally estimate the height of a steeple to be less than it is? Why do the fixed stars help to make the sky look like a seg- ment of a hollow sphere ? Why does the horizon appear farther oif than the zenith ? Do the visible heavens appear to us to be greater or less than a < hemisphere? j What will be the effect of I widening the prospect ? (45) What is the principal reason ] why a landsman judges a vessel, seen at a distance on the ocean, to be nearer to him, than it is ? What is the reason that stran- \ gers in Italy and Sicily, judge distant objects to be nearer than they are ? CHAPTER VII. (46) What law of the mental con- 1 stitution, is the subject of the > seventh chapter ? I How is this law described? Plow is it ascertained that habit results from practice ? Is habit an ultimate principle in our nature ? What is included in the word habit, in common language ? To how much of the mind of man has the law of habit refer- ence? How is the diversity of its ap- plication, in action, illustrated? Give some illustrations of its application to the exercise of mere emotion. (47) Does this law apply to the body, as well as to the mind ? In what cases is this found true? While the acts of the mind are quickened, what happens to the muscles ? What is said of the readiness with which the muscles some- times obey the will ? What gives a settled peculiari- ty to a man's hand- writing ? What has habit to do with the gait ? With the voice ? Is the habit, in these cases, mental, bodily, or both ? What is said of its strength? What three leading divisions of our nature are mentioned, to which the law of habit applies? To what shall we, for the present, limit our discussion of this law ? - (48) Is the sense of smell suscepti- ble of cultivation ? Have all people an equal facil- ity in discriminating odors ? 2* L8 QUESTIONS ON Why ia the Bense of smell not j more generally quickened'' [Jnder what circumstances are men Bometimea compelled to* make an Is it utterly impossible for the drunkard to escape the habit of drinking? What seems to be the only sense incommon use of this] way in which he can do it ? Have drunkards, generally, What instance of the effect of j sufficient resolution to abandon habit, on this sense, is related by \ the cup ? Mr. Stewart ! What one is related by Dr. Abercrombie ? What is said of the effect of How is the case with the mul- titude ? (50) Do all people hear equally this law, in the instance connec- we ll by nature ? Is quick natural hearing capa- ; ble of improvement ? How is this proved by the mu- ted with the Hartford Asylum ? (49) What instance of the effect of j habit, on the sense ot taste, is related by Cervantes? What two-fold effect has habit j on the senses ? | (What may be the foundation of the increased power of dis- crimination ?) j What melancholy illustration \ have we, of the increasing > strength of sensations? j May this process of strength- . \ . v .. c A A 6 i I mff, by two blind boys in Phil ening the sensation ot taste, be , ]\- 7 going on, while the hard drinker j ■^ nm is unconscious of it ? Does he pretend to deny that the sensation has become strengthened ? What mistaken notion has of- ten prevented the bibber from breaking up the incipient habit? To what condition is this hab- it rare to bring a man, at last ? W hat three -fold operation has the habit of tasting, in the case the bibber ? How ia he induced to seek re- liefl What is the effect of these re- utions? sician j Under what circumstances is the increase of hearing very per- ceptible ? How do the blind become so acute in hearing ? What use is made of music, by the blind ? What instance is given, of a blind Frenchman ? What instances of quick hear- a- l How early did Dr. Saunder- son become blind ? How did he characterize any new place ? How did he know when he came to a place where he had been before ? How did the blind man of Manchester proceed, whenever he first entered a company ? How did he ascertain the size of the room ? How did he judge of the num- ber of people present ? What is said of his memory ? How long would he remember i a person by his voice ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. L9 How did he know the stature of those he talked with ? How did he judge of their temper ? (51) May the sense of touch be improved by experience ? What do we gain, in regard to our sensations, by repetition, besides increased acuteness in the sensations themselves? By what should we confirm all the principles we lay down ? How did the blind man of Manchester judge of his distance from the fire ? How did he know when he was approaching a solid body ? > Does this man afford the only \ instances of this degree of acute- 1 ness in the sense of touch ? How do the blind generally \ estimate their approach to large \ bodies? Which could find his way best in the dark, a blind man, or one having the sense of seeing ? What instance of the acute- ness of touch was exhibited by Dr. Saunderson ? What profession did blind j Jack at first follow ? W T hat next did he occasionally \ undertake ? What did he finally become ? How did he explore valleys j and precipices? By what means do the blind read, in the modern schools pro- j vided for them ? From what kind of letters do \ they learn the alphabet ? How do their types compare j in size, with ours ? What sort of paper is used for their books ? How is the printer enabled to raise the letters ? How much of reading are the pupils taught, by means of sep- arate types, before they are fur- nished with a book ? Are they ever able to read with facility ? (52) _ In what proportion will the power of touch increase ? In what case will there be peculiar necessity of frequent reference to this sense ? Of what two senses was James Mitchell deprived ? How did he distinguish his own property ? Could he thus distinguish be- tween articles of true same form and materials? By what sense did he form ac- quaintances ? W 7 hat remarkable exploration did he make ? What facts prove the acute- ness of this sense, in the deaf and blind girl of Hartford ? What conjecture has Diderot made, with regard to such per- sons ? (53) Is the sight affected by the law of habit ? In what class of men is the length and acuteness of vision remarkable ? How long did the Sentinel of Hydra keep daily watch upon the summit of the island ? How many sail belonged to the island ? How far off could lie distin- 20 QUESTIONS ON gaish each vessel, r.o as to tell her name with certainty? In what other calling does habit give great power to the ,t I What is the engineer able, in- stantly to determine of a country hv casting his eye over it ? !- any one horn without the M of touch ? How is it with hearing? In one bom deaf, what habits may we look for ! Why should we expect deaf persons to form habits of sight ? What is implied by habit ? V\ hat is always remarked of the sight of the deaf? In what do they read the minds of men ? What is our chief encourage- ment to undertake the instruc- tion of the deaf and dumb ? By what can they sometimes tell what a person says to them? At what age did the young lady of Geneva cease to under- stand by the ear, what was said to her? By what means could she hold conversation ? In what language did she speak ? How could she understand lister in the dark ? W hat is confidently asserted of these views of habit as con- nected with the senses? What is the first suggestion thai these views are especially fitted to call up ? What is the second? (64) n hat besides a direct increase ol power, may our sensations and perceptions acquire ? In what proportion will our memory be weak ? Why are thousands of our sen- sations and perceptions forgot- ten? Are we any wiser for them ? Under what circumstances are we likely to take more interest in our passing sensations and perceptions ? By what process do we make sure of them, under such cir- cumstances ? What sort of power and value do the senses thus acquire ? What, besides repetition, then, must be considered, in order to explain some cases of habit ? (55) In the preceding sections, in what relation have we examined habits ? In what general light should they also be viewed ? In different trades and callings may habits exist, in one sense, without a deficiency in any other 'l How is this remark illustrated by the farmer ? By the printer ? By the painter ? By the shepherd ? By the butcher ? By the sailor ? By the writer ? According to w r hat, then, are acquired perceptions, or liabits, diversified ? (56) When an image is formed on the retina, do we perceive the whole object at once ? In what way do we get a per- ception of the whole object ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 21 Of what are the outlines of every body made up ? Can any two points be in ex- actly the same place ? Must each point be distinctly attended to, as if it were separa- ted from the rest ? As every body is made up of parts, and as the knowledge of a body implies the knowledge of all its parts, what is the conclu- sion ? What are those who adopt these views bound to show ? By what answer is this diffi- culty explained ? What is said of the glance of the mind, in the highest exercise of habit? (57) When we look upon an object diversified with gaudy colors, what effect has it on the mind ? I Would such be the effect, if 5 there were but one single per- \ ception ? Does the first glance at pretty j good paintings produce the same \ confused effect ? \ Have we a distinct idea of a< triangle, at the first glance ? Of a square ? Of a figure of a hundred sides? If perception were immediate-; ly consequent on the picture on \ the retina, would it matter how| many sides were presented ? (58) On the day that John Salter; was restored to sight, was he a-j ble, by sight alone, to tell the j figure of a body ? What did he repeatedly call ^ square and angular bodies ? What did he first desire to do, ] when a square body was present- ed to his sight ? Having examined it for some time, by the sense of sight alone, what did he at last exclaim ? What did he then readily do ? When afterwards he saw a triangle, how did he proceed ? On the thirteenth day after receiving his sight, how did he proceed to distinguish a square from a circle ? What was noticed of the movements of his eyes ? Of what was his perception, at this time, obviously made up? Did he finally appear, like others, to conceive of a whole figure, by a single act of the mind ? When Casper Hauser, (who had been kept in a dungeon from his birth,) was first brought to the light, how did he make himself acquainted with those who were introduced to him ? Did he seem to have any knowledge of the face, as a whole, before he had examined each feature sepai % ately ? CHAPTER VIII. (59) What intellectual state is next to be considered ? Is this a state of external, or of internal origin ? To what are we entitled to ap- ply the term Conception 1 When our past sensations and perceptions are recalled to the mind, as conceptions, have we any thing to do with the 22 QUESTIONS ON time or place, in which they; inated ? | Arc we first to consider con-j cept ions of internal or of exter- nal origin .' {{) In what respect do con- ceptions differ from sensations and perceptions ? When an odoriferous body is mted to us, what do we call i Ik effect produced on the mind? When this sensation afterwards comes up to the mind, in the ab- sence of the object, what is this state of mind called? Where must any object be, in order that we may have a per- cepiion of it ? I- this true with regard to conception ! (11) How does this state of mind differ from ideas of memo- r - v ,\ To what is this state of mind, thus distinguished from all oth- ers, entitled ? On what principles are con- ceptions, as to their appearance and disappearance, regulated ? What is to be understood by the phrases, " power ofconcep-: lion," "faculty of conception" ? (GO) Can we conceive of the ob- of the different senses e- qually well ! Which are most easily con- ceii What objects are mention- ed, as illustrations? How do visual perceptions to exist in the mind ? At what time of life did Cars- buhr become blind ? While blind, how did he en- his visitors ! How did he describe the walls &c? What did he say were ever present to his soul, as he lay blind on his bed ? W T hat was reflected to him during the hours of stillness ? Were these conceptions pleas- ing or troublesome to him ? Which of the other four sen- ses is attended with sensations and perceptions most easily con- ceived ? Are even the conceptions of sound very vivid ? Can w r e easily recall a partic- ular touch, taste, or smell ? As to visible objects, of what are their outlines made up ? By what principles will our conceptions of such objects be assisted ? As w r e first perceive visible ob- jects by parts, what will be the effect, if we afterwards get a conception of one of those parts ? What else does association help to do, bes des to present these parts to the mind in their proper order ? Does association help us to form conceptions of the objects of the other senses ? When w r e think of sound, taste, touch, or smell, of what does the object of our concep- tion consist 1 When we have a sensation, or a perception, by these senses, are the parts of such sensations, &c. necessarily connected ? What, then, must be true of the conceptions, following them ? When we have a series of sen- sations or perceptions by these senses, why is our conception MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. of them less vivid than our con- ceptions of a series of sensations and perceptions of sight I (01) What other law of the mind is next mentioned, as having an influence on our conceptions ? What has been already said, as to the distinctness of our con- ceptions of sound ? What illustrations show that these conceptions of sound may be quickened by habit ? In reading music, or poetry without the voice, where is the melody, which the reader en- joys 1 Of what profession was Bee- thoven ? W hat is said of him, in illus- tration of the influence of habit on our conceptions ? (62) How is the effect of habit on conceptions of sight illustrated by the case of one accustomed to draw ? How by the portrait painter ? Have all people, who can see well, an equally vivid conception of colors 1 Can all, who can distinguish between two colors, presented together, tell which is which, when seen separately ? What is supposed to be the reason of this inability ? Why have they not formed as much of a habit, in this matter, as other people ? (63) To what talent are ready and vivid conceptions very favorable? Is vividness of conception conducive to the talent of con- versation ? How does a person, of lively conceptions, present the objects of discourse ? Why may one, wanting in this respect, though possessing abun- dance of language, become con- fused ? What will be the effect, of his feeble conceptions, on his hear- ers ? From which might a person give the best description of an edifice; the actual perception, or a vivid conception ? In what does the excellence of a description consist ? What is the best rule for mak- ing the selection of particulars I What difficulty do we expe- rience in making the selection from perception 1 What is all that we possess of the object by conception ? Of what is this outline com- posed ? According to what, will the circumstances impressed on dif- ferent minds, bv perception, va- ry ? Under what circumstances can one hardly fail of succeeding in a description 1 What art very much depends on the principles here brought to view ? (64) Are our conceptions ever so vivid that we mistake them for perceptions ? Is it supposed that such a mistake may be permanent ? [I] In what instance might the painter be deceived by his conceptions ? 24 QUESTIONS ON \Y!i:it i- most any painter rea- ch to Bay, alter reflecting upon his thoughts, at such times ? What instance of strong con- ception is given, of Reynolds? Why cannot such illusions be kepi up long, in a healthy mind? Are >uch intense conceptions natural / What other reason, besides the difficulty of keeping the in- t< n-itv ^\ conception, accounts for the shortness of the illusion? [2] How is this view illus- trated, by the manner in which a person avoids a blow ? When is this effect particu- larly observable ? How is it shown that winking at such times, is a proof of belief/ How are these views illustrat- ed by a person looking down from a high tower ? W ill all his reasonings suffice to dispel the illusion ? [3] How is the effect of this momentary belief shown, when we hurt our foot against a stone ? In whom is the illusion, in such instances, most observable? W hat advantage is taken by the poet, of this principle of be- lief in our conceptions? Under what circumstances did King Lear illustrate this princi- [4] Why are some people, who do not believe in ghosts, afraid to enter a room alone in the dark ? I I.»w are such persons affect- ed . when they happen out at "i } What does Dr. Priestly men- tion aa a misfortune ? Did he believe, in after life, in the existence of malignant spirits ? Did he easily bring himself to ; feel composed in the dark ? : Where do people first form conceptions of hobgoblins? When they reason soberly, do they believe in such things ? What, in ninty-nine cases of a hundred, is the only effect of their philosophy ? On what supposition alone, can we explain the conduct of these persons ? (65) Under what circumstances is belief in our conceptions most striking ? By what example is this illus- trated ? Does his conception of the man's image vanish gradually, as his perception brightens ? Why should he, one moment, firmly believe the image of a man to be before him, and at the next, with scarce any change in his perception, be convinced that he sees nothing but a stump ? When the illusion is once broken, can he recall the con- ception ? At what time of the day, is the character, banished to the sandy Key, represented as see- ing spectres ? Did they always appear of the same shape ? What happened, whenever he approached them ? Is this conceptive faculty of creation very common among people in general ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 25 Under what circumstances are they most likely to appear? When is this tendency sure to be greatly strengthened ? What is the well known result, when our conceptions are thus countenanced by perception ? (66) When a person witnesses the acting of a tragedy, what gen- eral belief possesses his mind ? At what times does this belief fail him ? Why do we sometimes feel strong indignation, &c. while wit- nessing certain parts of a play ? In view of the illustrations given, does this momentary be- lief seem incredible ? Why are we strongly affected, sometimes, by merely leading fictitious tragedies ? CHAPTER IX. (67) What do we soon observe, as to the value of our thoughts? In what manner do they differ, to make one state of mind more valuable than another? To what division of the men- tal affections does this considera- tion lead ? By what is this division made ? For what is the mind indebted j to this characteristic? I Could we easily posses knowl- ; edge of the soul, in other re- spects, without understanding this characteristic? (68) What class of mental states is first to be considered ? 3 On what must each one mostly depend for his insight into the nature of these states? What is first to be noticed of a simple idea? By what is this fact implied? What is emphatically true of all simple states of the mind? When will you, without hesi- tation, deny, to any idea, a place in this class? What, then, is the striking characteristic of this class? In what other sense are they completely simple? Can anv thing be a substitute ■J o for them ? Can any thing represent them? W T hat are they? By what are they exclusively constituted ? How is their character mark- ed ? How only can they be known ? (69) W 7 hat, in the second place, is to be noticed of simple ideas? From what are we led to infer this fact ? Can we make a definition by using synonyms? What process is necessary to a legitimate definition? Why will not this process ap- ply to our simple thoughts? If we define ideas by ideas, what must we meet, at last? If we met no ultimate ideas, when should we get through with defining? Could there be any such thing as a definition, if there were no simple states of the mind? In such case, what would be 26 QUESTIONS ON the process of an attempted defi- nition? What would be the result? How may we help a person to catch a simple idea, though we cannot catch it for him ? After this assistance rendered, to what must we leave him ? (70) What is a third mark of sim- ple states ? How is this fact otherwise ex- pressed ? Is the same true of complex ideas? What does Locke say, on this point ? What is meant by their being chimerical ? How is this statement illus- trated ? What names are mentioned, as expressive of chimerical ideas? If simple ideas could be de- ceptive, what would be the re- sult with regard to knowledge ? When we arrive at a simple idea, of what are we sure? How is this view illustrated by contrasting the operations of na- ture, and of man ? (71) W r hich of these classes of ideas was first in origin? Is it always easy to trace the formation of the complex from the simple? What are some of the com- plex notions of external objects? Why may we suppose that equivalent simple ideas existed before these complex ones ? How may, therefore, simple ideas be regarded ? What language is used to ex- press their relation to complex ideas ? What is said of the number of our simple ideas ? What, of complex ? How is the multiplication of complex ideas, from simple ones, illustrated? (72) What different opinion may some have, as to the origin of complexness? How is their notion illustrated, in the instance of the landscape? In the instance of paintings ? Has this notion any appear- | ance of truth 1 Can this appearance be ac- j counted for, without granting ) their notion to be true? What is said of the rapidity with which the mind glances over > the parts of an object ? What is the consequence, when jit glances so rapidly, that we do ;not remember the process? | How does this view explain Uhe examples of the landscape, J paintings, &,c. $ What, on the whole, is the i conclusion ? (73) J Does a complex thought con- • sist of a mixture of simple ideas, | in the sense in which we apply | the word mixture to material ob- jects? \ In the forming of a complex ] idea, are the simple ideas liter- \ ally put together ? I Can a complex state of the I mind be literally separated into simple ideas ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 27 In what sense, then, are we to understand our thoughts to be complex ? If the thoughts which we call complex, are literally simple, what notion do we mean to con- vey by applying to them the word complex ? By what process do we come by this complex state of mind I To what is it felt to be equal ? How is this point illustrated by the rivers ? How by the gold eagle? How must the language that expresses the complexity of thouo-ht be regarded? What will prevent us from be- ing led astray, in these discus- sions, by the use of language which was invented to apply to material things ? (74) What will help us to under- stand the subject of the preced- ing section ? Do weliterally analyze or take apart a complex idea 1 How is literal analysis illus- trated ? Does this term, when applied to the mind, bear the same sig- nification ? Is the process of analyzing thoughts any thing like this ? Would it be possible so to analyze a complex thought? In what sense only, is any no- tion complex ? Are complex ideas the com- pounds, or the results, of former feelings ? What relation have they to simple ideas, as parts ? In this sense, what may they be said to do ? What is all that mental analy- sis concerns ? When do we perform such an analysis ? What term is mentioned, as expressive of a complex idea ? Is this thought really only one? Can we make it a subject of contemplation ? When are we said to analyze it? T What states of mind does every one plainly see must have pre- ceded the notion of government? (75) To what two grand divisions ; of the mind, are simplicity and complexness applicable ? How is this statement express- ed in other words ? To what one grand division does complexness not apply ? What may be further added, in reference to the intellect ? Which class of complex no- tions of the intellect, will be now considered ? What do our simple ideas rep- resent ? What is the only knowledge we gain from the original inti- mations of our senses ? Are our ideas of external ob- jects, for the most part, simple or complex ? How is this statement illus- trated ? (76) Are external objects presented to us in parts, or as wholes ? At what period of life do we ^ QUESTIONS ON begin to contemplate them as | of mind, constituted by this ab- ww- t ■ ■ „ < stractln g process, indicated ? What instance ,s g.ven ? j Into what two classes are ab- Jiow do men contemplate the } stract ideas divided ? loadstone? ! tj„„, • t] - -,- ■ . , . (Of W W ; a «k- , llowis this division explained? (,U1 wliat is this manner of (7g\ contemplating it the result?) | Which division is first to be To what is this, and all other! taken up ? C °^nf notions, virtually equal? What notions are first men- What is the only way in which t ioned as instances of this kind we can g.ve an account of the of abstraction ? loadstone? wi-,n+ n -, wb.t .„ somc of i,. eIementt , u jTcr?' ° r " ,e proper - »S * „r i T,„ a , r/s ;tr ed " ,ire ■-?-> -**• Whit nro .,11 -i , i of a P res ent body ? . Of what are all Set complex bg """ tbe P ° Wer ° f abstraCt " ideas composed ? i V *■ ' Mention some other qualities ( r tnat may be abstracted. | Can the most closely associated CHPTER X \ P r °P erties of a body be separated m the mind ? (77) I What statement is made, with toThe^ S r l '»— rSf t0 these states of the c mpTex f 1d , e."? deiStand ^ " f ? f ^ is the distinctive mark Why does this become neces K ~ , . i By what means is this effected? \ he obTecA Cann0t t8ke place in . Ot what are our complex no- WW 7 « t.ons susceptible, by the aid of r Instan r ces are g^n ? this process? J 31d ° f . Can one °f these properties What is meant by the elemen CtV" *" ° bje ^ UnIess a11 the tary parts' being J&ST^i"* be P~' ■» By what terms are the state* t ,i • , ^ e states ' Is there, in the mind, a power MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 39 adapted exclusively to the pur-j pose of abstraction ? What is apt to cherish the be-^ lief that there is such a power ? What term, in this place, would be better than the term 11 power" ? In what state do our earliest notions exist? How are complex states soon found to be formed ? What, first of all, is necessary in the process of separating a particular abstract idea ? In what manner does this will or choice concern the previous complex idea? What may be truly said with regard to this first movement in separating a complex idea ? When the mind has thus be- come directed to any particular J part of a complex idea, what principle is immediately weak-j ened? What becomes of the other parts of the idea? By this process, what does the part under contemplation be- come ? How is this matter illustrated in considering the color of a house, &c. How, in considering its exten- sion ? What, then, seems to be the only process of the mind, inj forming particular abstract ideas? (80) In what do general abstract ideas differ from particular ab- stract ideas? General abstract ideas being complex, can they be distin- guished from the great body of our complex ideas ? Is the idea conveyed by the name John, Peter, or James, simple, or complex? Is this idea necessarily a gen- eral one ? What are general abstract ideas ? How are they, in most cases, expressed ? What examples are given ? (81) How is it shown that men find little difficulty in classifyng by genera and species ? By what do they seem to be governed, in this process of class- ifying ? How many objects, at least, must be considered together, that we may be able to classify ? How do we proceed, in classi- fying, when a number of objects are presented, before us ? What is to be expected of the mind, immediately on our be- holding a scene furnished with rivers, trees, boats, flocks, houses and men ? What relations will soon be perceived? Why does the mind, in this instance, proceed to form differ- ent classes of the objects pre- sented ? Are the trees, or the individ- ual objects in any other class, exactly alike ? Why, then, are these individ- uals formed into one class? (82) By what are men governed, in making these classifications ? Under what circumstances will mistakes be made in classi- fying ? 3* 30 QUESTIONS ON How comes it, that our earli- j est classifications are sometimes i incorrect ? When are such mistakes cor-j rected ? How are they corrected ? (83) What simple fact is to be il- lustrated by the two following examples ? What name did Caspar Haus-; er give to every animal he met ? \ Why did he call them all by that name? < Why did the savage islanders Conclude the first cow they saw was either a goat or a hog 1 (84) What are those notions com- monly called, which are formed by classification ? What is said of their number ? | What examples are given, of, notions formed in connection j with this classification ? Does this general idea, con- - cerned in classification, embrace every particular which makes a ■ part of each object ? Do we ever see a company of alike, in all men exactly spects ? In classifying, upon what traits and qualities does the mind fix ? What is the only thing neces- > sary to be added to this complex state, to make it a general ab-l stract idea ? Why are these notions called abstract ? In what light, only, could we j consider these notions, if we did j not thus abstract, or leave out, \ certain qualities ? Why are they called general ? (85) Is the ability to form general abstract ideas, of much impor- tance ? In what action of the mind is its importance particularly man- ifest ? What is said of the extensive application of general abstract propositions ? Could we number, without the ability to form abstract ideas ? What must we be able to do, before we can consider objects as forming a multitude ? What must we be able to do, before we can apply to objects a common name ? What is implied in the forma- tion of a genus ? What would be the conse- quence if we were unable to number ? What, if we were unable to classify ? (86) What is said of abstract prin- ciples ? What is the first step in form- ing abstract principles ? What is the second step ? What is the method of pro- ceeding, after we have arrived at some general principle ? What is effected by a constant repetition of this process ? What use does the mind make of these principles, after it has become stored with them ? (87) What reflections are here in- troduced, respecting philosophers and others ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY". 31 How is the difference in their speculations accounted for ? Are the conclusions, at which philosophic minds arrive, in par- ticular instances, proof of great invention ? How is the operation of such minds, in drawing conclusions, explained to be free from diffi- culty ? To what, in degree, is their intellectual effort compared ? How do the speculations ofj most men differ from those ofj philosophers? What inability do they dis- cover ? What powers of mind may men possess, without being phi- losophers ? What happens to such men, when they attempt general pro- positions ? CHAPTER XI. (88) What is thought to be a suf- ficient definition of attention ? What is implied when we say a certain object receives atten- tion ? How is this fact expressed in other words ? j What else is implied besides j this distinct perception ? Is this state of the mind com- plex, or simple ? What does it involve ? On what is this act of the will founded ? What serves to keep the mind fixed on its object ? (89) Under what circumstances is attention said to be slight ? When, intense ? By what do we commonly judge of the degree of attention ? Upon what, in truth, does the time generally depend? What two things must be re- garded in estimating the degree of attention ? What relation does the time bear to the degree of feeling ? Is inability to fix the attention closely, a very common failing ? What is said of the power of some mathematicians to fix their attention ? What facts show Julius Caesar to have possessed great power of attention ? Of what other conquerer is the same thing asserted? (90) What is a well established law ; concerning attention and memo ;ry? ; How do the degree of atten- ; tion and the length of memory : correspond ? By what is this statement con- ; firmed? ; (1) Do we remember, at night, i that we have put ourselves thou- ! sands of times in darkness, dur- ing the day, by winking ? Are we not conscious of the operation and the darkness, every time we wink ? Why, then, do we not remem- ber it ? (2) Under what circumstan- ces may a person hear a clock strike in the room, without seem- ing to know it? 32 QUESTIONS ON If he does hear it, why does he so soon forget it ? (3) What is the reason that a thousand things, presented to the senses during the bustle of the day, are never recalled to mind ? How are we affected by simi- lar things during the stillness of evening ? What poet has remarked this difference ? What fact, concerning people who live near a waterfall, illus- trates this law ? What is the reason that such people do not seem to perceive the sound of the water ? (4) When reading a book, what do we observe besides the words ? How long does the mind re- tain the impression made by these minute parts ? How may we prove that each letter is observed by the reader 1 (5) How does the case of the accountant illustrate this point ? What attention is necessary, that he may know the exact sum? Why does he not remember that he has attended to each sep- arate figure ? By such facts as these, what is memory proved to depend up- on ? With what will the distinct- ness of memory vary 'l (91) With what important practi- j cal rule are we furnished by the: fact that memory depends on at- i tention ? | What evil results from at- tempting to learn more subjects than we can master ? (1) In what predicament does one who pursues such a course find himself? What is repeated as one evil result of going over authors and sciences in this careless w a y (2) What greater evil than the loss of our labor, results from reading and studying in j this careless way ? In educating the mind, what | is full as important as storing it ; with ideas ? \ What double advantage is » gained by a thorough and care- ; ful examination of subjects ? Why is knowledge, thus ac- ; quired, of the most valuable ;kind? I How does this method of stu- ; dy affect the intellect ? ; What ability is lost by the ! mind, by being long left to wan- ! der at liberty ? I What is the consequence, if kbis power be once lost? (92) | What complaint is sometimes j made by those required to exam- ine subjects of study thoroughly? > Are such wanting in ability to \ comprehend ? • What is the particular diffi- i culty which they encounter 1 ! For what does the existence : of this defect present a new rea- son ? By what, is it likely, this de- fect has been caused ? What state of the mind is ex- pressed by attention? When is the attention said to be intense ? What feeling is necessary to this exclusive direction of the mind ? MENTAL rillLOSOHIY. What must always accompany the intellectual powers in their greatest exertions ! What will be found to be the only feeling that will confine the minds of men to scientific pur- suits ? What did Mr. Locke say of one who should discover a rem-; edy for wandering thoughts ? What is here repeated, as the only effective remedy i What other principles may operate, in some degree, as a spur to the pursuit of knowl- edge ? If we find nothing attractive ; in knowledge itself, how will the process of acquiring it prove ? What doctrine, concerning knowledge, should be frequently I impressed ? What anecdote of D'Lambertj is here tfiven ? CHAPTER XII. (93) What is the subject of the \ twelfth chapter? Vrhy is this thought to be a good place to introduce this sub- ject ? What are drean What will throw light on this genera] statement ? What is one reason why the subject of dreaming has always excited so much attention, among all classes ? What statement is made, to show how common this state of the mind is ? What is the testimony of 3Ir. Locke, concerning one individ- ual ? What exception^ to dreaming has Plutarch recorded ! Why are the statements of Locke and Plutarch insufficient to prove that some people n dream ? (94) In explaining dreams, by what fact is our attention first arrested ? In what form does the great body of our waking experience appear ? What becomes of these trains of associated ideas, when we are asleep 1 W T hat statement, by Condor- cet, is here given ? What remark of Franklin, to the same effect ? What remarkable instance of dreaming is related of Mr. Col- eridge ? By what are such statements as these confirmed ? What is proved by such state- ments ? For what was President Ed- wards distinguished ? What did he think to be a good use of dreams ? (95) By what are our trains of thought, in dreaming, liable to be influenced ? What is the effect of these slight sensations ? What incident, related by Dugald Stewart, confirms this statement? What anecdote of an English soldier confirms the same state- ment ? 34 QUESTIONS ON What other cause of dreaming is closely allied to the above ? To what will a man's dreams be likely to relate, if he has been a long time without food ? What does Baron Trenck say he dreamed of, when very hun-j gry in prison ? Of what did the thirsty voy- agers, with Mendez, dream? What is said of the health, in connection with dreams ? What have physicians remark- 1 ed, of the connection of the state \ of health, with dreaming ? (96) What facts, concerning our dreams, might at first induce us to think they cannot be a repe- \ tition of our waking thoughts ? J What is given as the first cause of the incoherence of dreams ? How are our waking thoughts kept uniform and coherent ? How is it with us, when our senses are closed in sleep ? . {97) What is given, in the second^ place, as a cause of the incohe- rence of dreams ? Are the operations of the will entirely suspended, during our dreams ? What is thought to be suffi- cient evidence that acts of voli- tion are continued in dreaming? Are we conscious of acts of \ volition, in our dreams ? What case is supposed, to il- lustrate this point ? Though the will is active in sleep, what is true of the voli- tions put forth by it ? How is our attention affected by the will, when we are awake? What change is wrought, in this respect, by sleep ? What arises, in part, from the want of this influence ? How far is a waking person able, by volitions, to control his thoughts ? To what is the mind of a sleeping person, being destitute of these controlling influences, compared ? (98) How do we look upon objects presented to us in dreams ? How upon events and series of events ? What is said of the expedients, and the feeling of interest, ex- perienced in dreams ? How do we conceive of per- sons, when they are introduced into our dreams ? What is first mentioned as a reason of the vividness of our dreaming conceptions, and of our firm belief in them ? Can we form more vivid con- ceptions of absent objects, with our eyes open, or with them shut ? In what proportion will the liveliness of the conception in- crease ? Why, then, is it very natural to suppose that our conceptions must be very vivid during sound sleep ? What facts, concerning our conceptions, as stated in section 64, go to prove this point ? Why, instead of that momen- tary belief, do our dreaming con- ceptions induce a permanent be- lief? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 35 Hence, what appearance does every thing in our dreams as- sume 1 Into what are the thoughts virtually changed ? How are they regarded ? (99) What is given, in the second j place, as a reason why our dreams appear real ? With what objects do we nat- urally associate reality ? How is this statement illus- trated ? What objects are we, by na- ture, disposed to believe have real existence ? But are our dreaming thoughts such perceptions ? How does it appear that they are merely conceptions ? Why do we believe in the re- ality of objects of perception ? Under what circumstances, then, is it natural that we should believe the same of our concep- tions ? Why is this view not unreas- onable ? How r is this reasoning shown to apply to dreaming ? (100) How does our estimate of time when we are dreaming, differ from our estimate of it when awake ? How is it shown that, in dreaming, we may compress a multitude of transactions into a very short space ? What illustration of this fact is given by Dr. Abercrombie ? What anecdote of Count La- vallette illustrates the same ? What are some of the mighty transactions, which, on waking, we often find to have been the doings of a fleeting watch of the night ? (101) What explanation is generally given of our false estimate of time, in dreaming ? What is said of the rapidity of our thoughts, at all times ? Why, then, is this explanation not satisfactory ? Where is the true explanation to be found ? How are our conceptions, j while we are dreaming, consid- \ ered by us ? At such times, what is every I thought ? W 7 hat is every idea? What are the successive states \ of the mind 7 How, then, is the man im- pressed, who, in dreaming, con- ceives all the particulars of a long voyage or campaign ? What will the real time, spent , j in dreaming, appear to be ? What perceptions may be at- \ tended by illusions analogous to \ those which attend our concep- \ tions in dreams ? \ How does Mr. Stewart illus- trate the illusions of conception by the illusions of perception ? QUESTIONS ON IMAM'S MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. PART II CHAPTER I. (102) Why has the history of the ] mind, thus far, increased in in- < terest ? I What limits have we been j careful not to trespass upon 1 In what position have we seen the mind to be placed ? What has resulted to it, from this position ? For what does inanimate mat- ter seem to have been design- ed by Providence ? With what has it been endued for that purpose ? For what have material eyes been given to the soul ] (What discrimination must here be carefully made?) For what were material hands given to it ? Material means of hearing? With what do we become ac- quainted, by means of these and other senses ? Independent of these senses, what is found to flow up in the remote and hidden places of the soul? How is this doctrine repeated in other words ? What is the natural progress of all true learning ? What, then, must be first con- sidered ? What must next be entered upon and explored ? » What is the general doctrine > of Mr. Locke, on this point ? (103) j After the senses, what is an- other fountain of ideas ? What does the soul do with \ the ideas it has already got ? J What does it gain by these ! operations? What are some of the ideas , thus gained ? | Where does every man find ] this source of ideas ? | Why cannot this source be j called sense ? What might it properly be 1 called ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 37 What name has Mr. Locke preferred to give it? Why has he chosen this name ? (104) In considering the soul, what distinction may be made ? What inquiry, therefore, nat- urally arises 1 Why is it not necessary fully to discuss this question here 1 What is here considered suf- ficient ? What is this general experi- ence and testimony ? To what may impressions on the senses be traced ? If it were not for these im- pressions, what would become of our mental capabilities? Hence, what may be consider- ed the first step towards all our knowledge? What is this process called by Mr. Locke ? (105) What conclusion must here be guarded against ? What is all that can justly be said ? At what have we here arriv- ed ? (Explained in sec. 103) With what are we furnished, by the powers of the mind thus excited ? From what must these notions be distinguished ? What are they, therefore, call- ed ? From what consideration does it appear that the external and the internal, are really distinct sources of thought ? (106) What four notions are speci- fied, as belonging, among others, to the second great source ? What is here mentioned as a matter of internal observation ? (With what is ''internal ob- ; servation" synonymous ?) What idea hence takes its j origin ? The idea of thinking being J thus originated and named, is any one ignorant as to what is | meant by the term ? Have the senses anything to | do with forming this idea ? S To what, alone, must it be ascribed ? How is the mind brought into \ that position which we call doubt- | ing ? W 7 hat is said of this idea, in reference to the senses ? I What is all that we can say of jits origin ? If evidence be sufficiently in- creased, what new state of mind is immediately induced? If the evidence be of a still higher and more decided char- acter, what state of mind arises ? (107) \ W 7 hat seventeen other ideas are mentioned as having, with many others, a like origin with thinking, doubting, &c. Can any of these ideas be as- cribed directly to the senses What is granted, in discussing this point ? How would such a reference prove ? State the question which is supposed to be referred to each one's internal examination. How many answers, is it thought, can be given to this question ? 3S QUESTIONS ON By what have some authors been led to err, on this point ? What, then, must be distinctly kept in mind ? What are these two sources? What ideas, then, are called external ? What are all others called ? CHAPTER II. (108) To what are ascribed that portion of our internal notions, which we shall first consider ? What fact is the term Sugges- j tion here used to express ? In what way does it give the fact ? How does Dr. Reid speak of such ideas as existence, mind, person, &c. Pursuing this train of thought, what notions does he ascribe to Suggestion ? What is his reason for adopt- ing this term ? llow does Mr. Stewart speak of these mental phenomina ] How far, only, does he ascribe the notions of time, number, &,c. to the external world, or to the internal operations of the mind? How would he illustrate this point, in speaking of duration! (109) (I) Is the idea of existence, of external, or of internal origin? Under what head is it natural- ly considered? What is said of existence, in itself? What kind of idea is existence, the word being used to express a mental state? Why can we not exist, with- out having the notion of exis- tence? From what is the origin of this idea inseparable? What kind of being might ex- ist, without having this idea? What is a sufficient reason why man cannot help perceiving that he is what he is? What follows from the fact that we think ? What follows from the fact that we feel ? (II) What is the origin of the notion of mind ? What is said of the notions of \ existence and mind, with refer- I ence to the senses? j What is said of the notion of J mind, in reference to reasoning, i memory, and imagination ? How, then, do we come by ; this notion ? What may be said of all the distinct, powers of the mind? Is the same true of the acts or exercises of these powers ? Are these powers, in them- ; selves, made known to us by di- rect perception ? Why may we not say they are ! made known by direct percep- • tion ? What is that which comes be- ; tween the power and the kowl- < edge of it ? How, then, as separated, do | we get a knowledge of the dis- tinct susceptibilities of the mind ? (III) How far will similar re- marks apply to self-existence and 'personal identity 1 ] In what manner do these no- MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 39 tions seem to flow out from the mind ? How early are they thus sug- gested ? To what degree are these re- marks true? What remarks show the ne- cessity of these notions being thus suggested ? (110) Why shall we not attempt to define unity ? How can we explain a hun- dred, or a score ? How is it when we arrive at unity ? What has been proposed, by some, as a definition of unity ? Why are we no wiser for this definition ? At what time of life does this idea originate ? W 7 ith what other ideas is it closely connected, in the time and manner of its origin ? What is. a man's first notion of himself, as to number ? How soon, then, does he get the idea of unity ? What is said of the distinct- ness of this idea? Why must this idea immedi- ately succeed the notion of ex- istence? What is unity, with regard to enumeration ? In what two ways may we use the numbers arising from the repetition of unity ? (in) Is the term succession, a term of particular, or of general ap- plication ? What does this term express ? What is expressed by it, in its application to mind 1 How does the mind exist, in different periods? What is the permanent law of our thoughts ? What does the fact of such succession form the occasion of? Why is succession not suscep- tible of definition ? Yet, how general is the pos- session of it, and how correct the apprehension of it among men ? What is said of referring the origin of this notion, to any thing external ? What is certain, with regard to smell, taste and touch, in refer- ence to this idea ? What of the deaf and dumb I The blind? Why does it appear impossible that they should be without it ? What, then, is the conclusion, with regard to the origin of this notion ? Of what is it the unfailing re- sult? (112) In our conception of succes- sion and duration, which of them is supposed to be antecedent in time ? Which of them is supposed to be antecedent in the order of na- ture ? In what form is duration made to apply to man ? Under what circumstances is the idea of duration suggested to the mind ? From this view, what follows, with regard to a person asleep ? Why does it follow that we 40 QUESTIONS ON know nothing of duration in' sleep ? From these views, what infer- $ ences are stated, supposing a! person should sleep with a per- fect suspension of all his mental* operations ? (113) By what is it, in some meas- j ure, proved that our notion of succession is antecedent to our notion of duration ? How long did Samuel Chil-j ton sleep ? What did he think when he awoke ? What finally convinced him that he had been sleeping longer than usual ? How long did the nobleman of Lausanne sleep ? On his suddenly awaking, what showed that he was uncon- scious of having slept longer than usual? (114) What do we call duration, when it is measured ? How are such measurements made ? Give examples of natural mo- tions which measure duration ? Give an example of artificial motions produced for measuring duration ? What is the only difference between time and duration ? What is that which we call eternity 1 Is the notion of eternity simple or complex ? How do we get this idea ? (115) What notion is next consider- ed, under the head of original suggestion ? What is said of this idea, with regard to taste, smell and hear- ing ? What is always necessary, in order that we may have any sensation by touch ? (What two exceptions may, perhaps, be properly made to this statement?) Is resistance a quality of space ? Of what alone does sight give us any direct knowledge? In what sense do all visual perceptions, except those of col- or, originate ? How do these perceptions, become the property of sight ? Do we ever speak of space as red, or green, or as possessing any color ? What is possessed by every thing, except heat and cold, that comes within the cognizance of sight and touch ? Has space any thing to do with these qualities ? When do we but just begin to enter the empire of space ? Under what circumstances will the idea of space rush upon the mind with unwonted force ? To what conclusion do these considerations clearly lead ? (116) What, then, shall we say of the origin of the notion of space ? Why can we not state any particular occasion, on which it arises ? What is first mentioned, as supposed by some to give rise to this idea 1 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 41 What supposition is still more j entitled to notice ? What idea must always ac- j company our contemplation of j any body ? How is this statement other- wise expressed ? How early, then, at least, may we date the origin of this idea ? (117) Under what head does the I idea of power properly belong ? < How extensively is this idea? entertained ? What is power, more than a subject of thought ? < What does every one know of; himself, with regard to power ? j In what do we see the effects of an unexplored and invisible power ? To what extent is real power granted to man ? With what does power go hand in hand ? If we suppose any existence, either intelligent or unintelli- gent, what is necessarily im- pliedwith regard to power 1 In supposing accountable exist- ence, what is implied as to pow- er ? (118) Under how many heads are the occasions, of the origin of the idea of power, considered? (1) What cases are embraced under the first head ? What proposition concerning antecedence and sequence, does the very constitution of our minds oblige as to form, and implicitly believe ? At what time of life do we form and believe this proposit- ion ? What has this proposition to do wiih the matter now under consideration ? (2) What occasion is placed under the second head ? What is said concering this occasion ? (3) What occasion is con- sidered under the third head? What, seems to be true, with regard to the connection of the will with the mental and bodily powers ? What is suggested to the mind, whenever we are conscious of such control ? To what is the springing up of this idea compared ? (119) From what do the conceptions of right and wrong spring ? On what occasions do ideas of \right and wrong necessarily a- | rise ? \ Why do they necessarily arise on such occasions? | What celebrated authors are mentioned, as agreeing in this view ? In what connection is this ar- rangement considered impor- \ tant ? ; Are these ideas simple, or ; compound ? I If, then, they are of purely in- > tellectual origin, what is a neces- 5 sary conclusion ? | How is their dissimilarity ex- < pressed ? | If the idea of right and wrong I are thus distinct, what must be I true of right and wrong them- 1 selves ? 4* 42 QUESTIONS ON How is this point otherwise | distinguished writers have been stated ? followed ? For what important doctrine j What authors have preferred is the foundation thus laid ? the term reason? What three circumstances are j What, in the established us- declared by Cousin, to leave the | age of our language, does the distinction, between right and term reason express ? wrong, unchanged to all men? If, then, we annul or perplex What is language here declar- the present use of that word, ed to be ? what shall we be obliged to do? Why is the distinction, be- j To what statement will there tween right and wrong, found in j be no opposition ? all languages ? What are, here, of more con- Can this distinction, once re- \ sequence than the mere name? ceived, ever be reasoned away ? j Are the ideas which have ("1201 | been mentioned, in this chapter, What ideas, closely connect- ed with those of right and j wrong, are next considered ? Which of these two pairs of ideas, comes first, in the or- der of nature ? (What is this order of nature sometimes called ?) What, then, is necessary, in all that are furnished by sugges- tion ? What is said of the number of ideas which owe their origin to this source ? Mention those which are here enumerated ? (122) Of what, besides ideas, is orig- order that we may frame thejinal suggestion the source? ideas of merit and demerit ? What must the reasoning prin- What does merit always im- ciple have to rest upon ? ply ? What is this basis of the com- What is always implied by de- parative and deductive intellect ? merit ? Mention some of the most im- Why cannot these two ideas ^portant propositions which are be defined ? prerequisites to the exercise of Yet, what is said of their ex- , the deductive faculty ? istence, and of our mental per- ception of them ? For what do they furnish us a satisfactory basis ? CHAPTER III. (121) (123) In accounting for the origin { What is the second source of of such ideas as have been con- j internal knowlege? sidered in this chapter, why has By the common usage of our the term suggestion been prefer- {language, what is the term con- red to the term reason? \sciousness, appropriated to ex- In adopting this term, what j press? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 43 What are the terms imagining; and reasoning expressive of? What is evidently implied by their existence ? How many distinct notions, at least, must every instance of consciousness embrace within itself? (1) What notion, embraced by every act of consciousness, is first mentioned ? Does consciousness furnish us with this idea ? By what do we become pos- sessed of it ? By what is this idea express- ed, in English ? (2) What notion, embraced by every act of consciousness, is mentioned in the second place ? (3) What, in the third place '.' j Give an example, showing | that three ideas are embraced by J a single act of consciousness ? Trace out these three ideas, in the expression, / am conscious of anger? How is the application of the term consciousness, limited ? (124) J (1) Can we be said to be conscious now, of an emotion which has past? Of what may we be conscious, in regard to it ? (2) How is consciousness lim- ited, even with regard to things having a present existence ? What is the only office of con- sciousness, in relation to materi- al things ? (3) Is consciousness thus lim- ited, in relation to immaterial things ? How far is consciousness con- cerned, even with our own minds ? (125) How is consciousness con- cerned with belief? Of what order is that belief which arises from conscious- ness? What things, concerning the mind, are we unable to disbe- lieve or even doubt ? What is the only reason that can be given for this belief? What results, as to the nature of these convictions, from their having such a source ? What are the only instances, in the history of the mind, that give any appearance of an ex- ception to this view ? What is adjudged, by com- mon consent, of a man who se- riously rejects consciousness, as a law of belief? What will such a mind be un- able to find ? What things will stand nearly an equal chance of acceptance, with such a mind ? On the whole, what sort of scene will such a mind exhibit ? (126) Are the states of mind, arising from consciousness, few, or ma- ny ? Is it necessa?y, here, to point out all those states of mind that are known thus to arise ? What is proposed to be done? [I] What are first mentioned, as matters of consciousness ? Why does the mind yield its assent, when evidence is pre- sented ? 14 QUESTIONS ON What is said of the number of degrees of assent, of which we are susceptible ? Are all these degrees express- ed by appropriate names? Is it of consequence that they should be ? Mention some names which have been applied to different degrees of assent ? [II] What, in the second j chapter ? place, are mentioned, as matters of consciousness ? (Are the intellectual powers themselves, as well as their acts, subjects of consciousness?) Mention the names of some of the acts and operations What use may be made of the few illustrations which have been given ? CHPTER IV. (127) What is the subject of this What expressions are here said to be allowed by the usage of our language ? What expressions of similar import, are used by Mr. Locke ? Are such expressions free from the danger of being wrong- fill] What are mentioned, in ly apprehended ? the third place, as coming under j Why will they, probably, con the head of consciousness ? (Which of the three grand divisions of the mind, has all its operations included under this head ?) tinue to be used ? What must be kept in view, when we apply them to the mind ? What is meant by saying that Give examples of some of j our thoughts are brought togeth- these operations. |er?&c. [IV] What is mentioned, in What do we mean, when we the fourth place, as originating say, we compare them? from consciousness ? What terms have been used Give the first illustration ? to indicate the power, which the Give the second illustration ? J mind has, to bring about this re- Give, in other words, the sub- j stance of these illustrations. Give the names of some other complex emotions. [V] W 7 hat subjects of internal suit? Which of these terms is some- times used with a different shade of meaning ? What distinguished author has knowledge are mentioned, in the ry law of association ? What is that event called, toj which some other thing holds \ the relation of constant antece-: dence ? What is that called, to which some other holds the relation of sequence ? How is it shown that cause and effect are essentially differ- ent from the laws already dis- cussed ? What fact shows that cause and effect are really entitled to I be counted a primary law of as-> nation 1 What is here to be understood by principles or laws ? Give an illustration of the ef-j feet suggested by the cause. Of the cause suggested by the j effect. What illustration of the effect j suggested by the cause, is given \ by Mr. Locke ? What instance of the opera- tion of this law is cited from Shakespeare? CHPTER VI. (147) What marked and prominent circumstances are next consid- ered, after the primary laws of association ? Of what character is the influ- ence of these circumstances? Hence, what are the sources of this influence called ? What are the four secondary laves of association! What influence have the sub- ordinate laws on the primary? What mistake must we guard against imbibing from the epi- thet applied to these laws ? Without these laws, how would human nature have differed from what it is ? How are the relations, of the primary and the secondary laws, to each other, and to the mind, illustrated ? (148) Which of the four secondary laws is first considered ? What is the more particular statement of this law ? What is said of the strength of the chain of human thoughts, to withstand the lapse of time ? What evidence do we desire, on this subject, from observa- tion ? How is the gradual diminish- ing of the strength of our associ- ations illustrated ? MENTAL PHILOSOrHY. 51 What apparent exception to this law is mentioned ? On this state of things, in the aged, what is the first remark to be made ? Which is best remembered by the aged, that which happened a few hours before, or that which happened weeks or days before ? So far, how does the effect of the lapse of time, in respect to the aged and the young, com- pare ? In the second remark, what two principles are said to com- bine in diminishing the opera- tion of this law, on the events of youth : What part of life is, generally, most interesting ? What part, then, is most fre- quently recurred to ? What is the effect of this in- terest and recurrence ? (149) What secondary law of asso- ciation is mentioned in the sec- ond place ? What is the explanatory state- ment of this law ? What if we experience a feel- ing only once ? What is the effect of repeated experience ? What illustration is given? What is said of the associa- tions of men trained up to par- ticular arts I Why do they seldom mistake or hesitate about things connec- ted w ith their calling 1 How has every thing they see or hear become affected by this law 7 Against what must they con- stantly guard 7 (150) What is the third second ar) law of association ? What is the explanatory st ment of this law ? Why are bright object- m readily recalled than obscure ones 1 Why do very joyful, or very- sorrowful events remain distinct in the memory, while other- ire swept away ? \\ hat instance, in sacred his- tory, illustrates this point ' Why did the Jews weep and hang their harps upon the wil- lows? What feeling attended the conception of the beautic ! Jerusalem ? What is their vivid conception of Jerusalem called ? (151) What is the last of the four secondary laws of association I This law being expressed in the most general terms, follows, as to its applicant In how many distinct points of view must it be contemplat- ed 1 In what application shall we consider it, in the first plat What is here to be under - by the intellect? What is said of difference - the intellects of men ! In what channel do the ciations of the mass of mas run ? (To what, in some cases, may this be entirely owing How do they contem jects? What important reiat. 52 QUESTIONS ON jects do they omit to consider ? j When we find persons of a; higher order of perception, whatj striking difference do we some- > times detect ? How is this difference illus- ? trated ? What is said of the action of \ the associating power, in these > instances? What will show us that such diversities of intellect have beenj frequent ? Repeat the primary laws of association. The secondary. VII. CHAPTER (153) What subject naturally follows the discussion of association ? Why is this considered the j proper arrangement ? fact proves a great dif- In what sense is memory to be ference between the intellect of considered a source of knowl- Newton and that ofcommon men? ; if ' In what various senses was . W ^ at abstract ideas are men- the mind of Newton great ? I ^ oned > *f hlch we should be una- By what principles, besides . ble to form, without the assist. those operating on the mass of an ° e T1 of memory ! men, was his mind regulated? \ What mental faculties neces- ) sarily involve memory in their (152) | exercise? T . ., , What is memory? In what respect, in the second > T ., . , J 7 - ] Is it a simple, or a complex action of the intellect ? (1) What, first, is implied by memory ? place, does this law hold good ? Describe the two classes of] men here alluded to in illustra- \ i0 wi- . • -j p^ ■ J (2) What else is implied by What is said of tne trains oi!., ? v ' r J thought with regard to these two j ' What ig the ianat state . classes .' . r ,,. r , « T , .,. j.~, jmentof this complexness ! In what poems is tins differ- 1 Illustrate the difference be- ence illustrated I L ,♦ i 'tween conceptions and remem- i brances f What is the power of origin at- I he melancholy man ? ., K 5 „ -.it-, , • -j r A i ' m£ these complex states usually What is said of these two < ?. , 7 r J , p , ■; called .' classes of men, as to exceptions totheir g eneral disposition 1 (lo4) What causes may lead to tern- > How far is memory to be con- porary change of characters be-;sidered a ground of belief? tween them ? Why do we thus rely upon Can the cause of such change j memory ? be always perceived ? j Repeat the limitation under How is the cheerful man there represented ? What effect will these tempo- rary changes have on the train of thoughts? which memory is a ground of belief MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 53 How does a man know wheth- er he has reason for doubting his j memory, in any particular case, or not ? Whence does he get his; knowledge of the fact of memo- ry, and the degree of it ? What will happen from his finding reason to suspect its re- ports ? What would be our situation, if we could not rely on our memory ? (155) What is said of the diffusion of the faculty of memory ? How great power of memory is granted to every one ? What is stated, by way of ex- ception, to the equal diffusion of the powers of memory ? What instance of memory is related of Hortensins ? What instance is related of an Englishman ? What is said of the number of instances of this kind ? How must they be consider- ed ? What is said of their explana- tion ? What is probably true of them ? What follows, if they be orig- inal traits ? (156) What particular species of memory is here considered ? What have remembrances al- ready been explained to be ? What will remain, of memory, if we remove the modification of past time ? How does it appear that our conceptions cannot be called up at pleasure ? How, then, do they arise in the mind 1 How, then, will the aspect of memory vary ? What if it be founded on the law of contiguity ? What if it be based on the other principles of association ? Among what kind of people will that specific memory, found- ed on contiguity, be found ? Of what have we abundant in- stances, with regard to the mem- ory of such ? What specifications will they generally make, in their narra- tives? What is observable in their description of persons, places? &c. (157) Who are mentioned, as having indicated their knowledge of this kind of memory ? What instance is given of Mrs. Quickly in the play ? What other instance is given? (158) What 1 different species of memory is considered in the next place ? By what is this kind of mem- ory chiefly sustained ? Why is the circumstantial memory well suited to the pur- pose of such persons as usually possess it ? How does the philosopher es- teem circumstantial memory ? How does he proceed, in his investigations ? What great philosopher was 5* 54 QUESTIONS ON very destitute of circumstantial? In what way only, can we ex- memory ? ercise power over them ? What does he say of himself? \ What follows with regard to Does it appear that he could j our remembrances ? complain of an absolute want of What is implied by choosing memory ? I to remember any thing ? What do his writings indi- \ What ejection, then, is made cate ? j to the idea of calling up thoughts What does he expressly give j by volition ? us to understand ? In what consists our chief pow- What naturally resulted, as to>er of quickening and strengthen- his memory ? \ ing the memory ? /| r q\ What do these considerations What is said of the rapidity, with which the philosophic mind may acquire knowledge ? Under what two forms are the different departments of knowl- edge presented to the student's notice ? How does the man of circum- < bring us to explain ? (161) | When we make a formal at- j tempt to remember any thing, what is evident concerning the event in general, of which, what we recall is a part ? What is the explanatory state- stantial memory proceed in hisjment of this fact? acquirements ? I In how many ways may we Under what circumstances j make an effort to recall what is has philosophic memory the ad- \ not remembered ? vantage? How do we proceed by the What does Mr. Stewart say ^jirst method ? of the man destitute of a philo-j In this operation, how are the sophic turn of mind ? J outlines detained in the mind ? What does he say of the phi- What is this method of restor- losophic mind's entrance on new ; ing thoughts properly considered? pursuits? How do we proceed by the From what does its superiori- \ second method ? ty, which afterwards appears, j Illustrate the process, partly arise? (163) How long does its first dissat- tj +1 ' isfaction continue to stimulate UK? T the "T^k * -,? certain clergyman affected by a j fit of apoplexy ? v lou >> What of the papers printed What is the definition of mem- , during the four years of blank ? ory, already given in Sec. 153 ? j Did he ever fully recover the Into what does this definition j memory of these four years ? resovle memory ? What was the assistance, af- What must be here recollect- ; forded to his prostrated powers ed, as to our trains of thought ? of association ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 55 How did these means operate ; to restore his memory ? In what way, doubtless, were other series of thought recover- ed? Repeat the two methods of exercising intentional reeollec- j tion. What is said of the aged, in illustration of this point? (163) What is the grand use of mem- ory ? What are the two prominent marks of good memory ? To what are impressions on the minds of men of tenacious \ memories, compared ? To w r hat, the impressions on j minds of the opposite cast of memory ? j What is said of the inferiority of memories of the latter kind ? \ In what do some tenacious \ memories seem to fail ? From what may this trouble arise \ \ What is said of this want of \ readiness ? Why should not great readi- ness of memory be expected in philosophic minds ? Kcw must this deject, when sufficient to cause perplexity, be considered ? And how, a prompt command of knowledge ? How does this affect the mem- (164) What must be admitted ofi memory, in whatever light we view it? j [I] What is the first rule for improving the memory ? Why are students inclined to pass on, in a careless manner ? ory f What does Mr. Stewart si reading ? By what rule should we al- ways abide? What is the consequence to those who follow this rule ? What is the consequence of in- creased clearness and interest ! What is the result of increased attention ? [II] What is the second rule ? What is meant by referring our knowledge to general prin- ciples ? What is said of this mode of classification ? What supposition concerning the lawyer and the merchant il- lustrates this matter ? What of the man of letters? How, then, may the ready re- collection of numerous facts be easily secured ? [III] What is the third rule ? How, for instance, is the study of geography to be pursu- ed ? What would be required to recollect the numerous particu- lars of geography from the book 1 (1) What is the first advan- tage of studying geography with maps? &,c. What is said of conceptions of sight ? (2) What is the second ad- vantage ? What results from cur having formed an occular acquaintance with any grand division of the world ? With the outlines and situa- tion of any country ? In what do we find another illustration of this rule? QUESTIONS ON What is said of the number i [V] What is the fifth rule? of facts stated in history ? What will happen to the mind, What directions are given for by being left inactive ? the study of history ? What of the mind, if kept in What advantage will arise \ exercise ? from this method of studying How is this fact accounted for ? history? To what is this law equally Why will the memory seize | applicable ? strongly on the prominent peri- \ What powers of the mind are ods?° here mentioned, to which this On what principle will the law of habit will apply ? subordinate parts of the history How may we secure the ben- be easily remembered ? eficial results of this law, with What is said of charts, trees, j regard to memory ? &c. in this branch of study ? To what else will this rule also apply ? What is true of the ideas about which any science is pe- culiarly conversant ? Give instances of what is here meant ? (166) What help of memory is here given, that has seldom been no- ticed ? What will be found true con- cerning those who are scrupu- lous in this respect ? Why might such an one not ^ ' remember so much as one of an [IV] What is the fourth rule? opposite character ? What is said of the arrange- Other things being equal, how ment of all things, in nature ? J is he, as to what he professes to How, then, should knowledge \ remember ? exist subjectively ? What great man is mentiened, With what will the laws of the whose excellence of memory is mind be found to act in harmo- attributed to this principle ? ny ? On what is this suggestion What are the mind and exter- based ? nal nature, to each other ? By what remarks is this shown By what might the benefits of \ to be so ? - rule be illustrated ? What example is preferred to \ show its i importance ? j CHAPTER VIII. What did the comedian say. to a man boasting of his memo- (167) In what interesting point of A wager being laid, which : view is memory considered in w °n ? | this chapter ? What is very evident concern- 1 What is said to have been ng such unnatural combina- j Bacon's opinion, on this point ? \ What powers did he suppose tions ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. the soul to possess with regard to recollection ? Have other writers fallen in with these views? For what special reason are they worthy of examination ? What inquiry is here suppo- sed, in objection ? In answering this inquiry, what two facts should first be considered ? What effect is the lapse of time admitted to have on the operation of those laws ? But while their action is mod- ified, what is true of the laws themselves ? What commendation is here bestowed on these views? What is known to every one, concerning thoughts which have long slumbered ? After years have rolled by, and new scenes have driven the old from our memory, what may serve suddenly to give a new and vigorous turn to our meditations I By what, at such moments, are w r e sometimes astonished ? Of what do these statements give a faint exhibition? To what do they yield subor- dinate support. (168) What is said of the physical system, in this connection ? What is well known concern- ing the mind and the body, with reference to each other ? What is undoubtedly true of j the influence of the body on mental action ? Is any reason given, why the state of the physical system may not operate on the memory, as well as on the other faculties 7 What is the testimony of those who have been on the point of drowning ? In their quickened state, what has instantly passed before them, as in a mirror ? At such a moment, how have scenes, long gone by, appeared ? What three important points are confirmed by this general experience ? What, in this and in many other cases, is the proximate cause of the acceleration of the mental acts ? By what means does the brain become affected in cases of drowning ? W 7 hat always attends unusual quantities of blood in the brain ? (169) In view of what, must this doc- trine of restoration of thoughts, stand or fall ? What is the grand question, in this case ? Have we yet noticed the strongest facts, which may sup- port this doctrine ? What diversity of effect may be produced by disease, in dif- ferent cases ? W T hat is Plibbert's opinion concerning the liability of for- gotten thoughts to be renewed ? What does he say of the man- ner of their renewal ? What instance is given by him, in support of his views ? (170) What examples of restored thought were exhibited by the 5« QUESTIONS ON traveller in Illinois, when too 5 What does he say he supposes ! to be consistent with the nature \ of a living spirit ? sick to recognize his friends? (171) > In what work has Coleridge j expressed an opinion favorable? to the doctrine of the durability of memory ? What does he introduce in < confirmation of this doctrine? j In what languages did the un- lettered German girl declaim, when sick with a nervous fever?! How was what she uttered proved to be correct language 1 Of what particular dialect was the most of the Hebrew that she! repeated ? j Why was she not suspected of > using deception ? What fruitless exertions were, \ for a long time, made, to dis- cover an explanation ? \ By what means was the nec- essary information as last obtain-; ed ? In whose family had the girl \ lived, in early life ? In what was the old minister \ very learned ? \ With what were the ratings] of the young woman found ex- \ actly to agree ? What habit of the minister, explains how she became pos- sessed of these passages ? What caused her now to re- member what she had probably, i for a long time forgoiten ? (1) What is the first infer- ence, drawn by Mr. Coleridge, | from this and similar insances? \ (•2) The second inference ? \ (3) The third ? (4) In his fourth inference, what does he conclude the book j of final judgment to be ? (172) To what must the doctrine of the duration of memory and res- toration of thought, thus illus- trated be referred for decision on its merits ? What if the doctrine be estab- lished ? What is first mentioned, on which this principle has a bear- ing? For what does it furnish a reason, in this respect ? What is included in the term education, as applied to the hu- man mind ? If the above doctrine of mem- ory be true, what may be the result of a single profligate re- mark in the hearing of a child ? What may be its influence, long after the voice which utter- ed it is silent in the grave ? Against what vain expecta- tion are we here cautioned ? What principles will a belief in this doctrine influence us to instil carefully into the minds of children ? What will these instructions be, in the memory ? What may serve to keep them obscure for a long time ? What is said of the period of their resurrection ? When may they start forth like voices from the dead ? What may their visits impart in adversity ? What influence may their an- gel tones have upon the soul ? MENTAL PHILOSOrilV. (173) With what is the doctrines of restoration of thought, believed to be in accordance ! What may be safely affirmed of every mental principle laid down in the Bible ? What may the doctrine of the Bible, concerning the judgment, be supposed to involve ! What does the bible explicitly teach, in various passages ? What objection has sometimes been raised to this doctrine of the Bible 1 What opinion did Mr. Cole- ridge propose,probably with this objection in view ? From what does this objection derive its plausibility? W 7 hat seems to be the truth, concerning the incidents which have past in our lives ? What have we good reason to suppose the mind will do, at the judgment day? Please to repeat the stanza that concludes this chapter ? CHAPTER IX. (174) What do we examine, next in order, after memory 7 In what respects is this a very interesting subject ? To what are we indebted for our knowledge of the operations of this faculty ? Though consciousness gives us our direct knowledge of all our mental acts, what must here be remarked ? Consciousness having given us a knowledge of the act of reasoning, what does the reason- ing power do ? Of what is this power a source ! What would be our condition, without Original Suggestion ? W ithout Consciousness ? Without Relative Suggestion f Without reasoning 1 How, then, must the reasoning power be regarded ? How does this fountain of knowledge compare with trie others, just mentioned ? Why is a series of judgment, or an act of reasoning, necessa- ry, in addition to "the other sources of knowledge I To what are we cautioned not to limit the results of reasoning ? What higher office does it sustain ? What does it reveal to the mind ? With what does it invest all things ? (175) W hat is the definition of rea- soning ? How may a train of reasoning be regarded ? As a whole, of what u it n up 1 What are these parts called ? What is a proposition defined to be ! What, then, do we mean, v we speak of a proposition ? What, however, may possibly be admitted here? What philosopher expressly speaks of mental propositions ' What does he mean by expression? (1) What is the first part o a proposition ? QUESTIONS ON (•2) The second? iments, by which is each propo- (3) The third ? | sition first suggested ? Point out the three parts in Repeat the course taken by the proposition, " Csesar was ; the disputant. brave." By what other train of associ- In the proposition, " men are \ ations is the consecution of these fallible."' I propositions illustrated? (I) What is the first class, What is all the direct voiun- into which propositions have tary power the disputant posess- been divided ? Give an example (2) The second class ? Give an example. (3) The third class? Give examples. To what are propositions some kind, indispensible? To what are they compared? (176) \ ed, in forming this chain ? (178) \ What question, concerning propositions, is next proposed as a subject of inquiry ? of Give the explanatory state- \ ment of this subject. In discussing this subject, \ what is first to be considered ? What feeling do we entertain, Please to repeat the defimuon ; wfth reffard tQ > the ^ QUt _ of reasoning. line of an argument ? A\ hat, then, will be found, in , In what ^ Q ; g thig de . every process of reasoning ? ] gire of eat agsis / ance to us , How do these propositions of- Hen » what wi „ be tnje of ten follow each other ? ; mogt of {he itions br ht For this reason how are we ; before tbe ^-J, apt to look upon their arrange- * „ -^ na m **.^*„a u .u n , 1 tt i As soon as presented, what • t , . < does the mind do with them ? , J * . to By what means does the mind an arbitrary selection, m • . J .i . .i .. , i J a ' instantly perceive the suitable- rrangement I * : . _f_ , i_i r ment ? How like the arrangement But are the propositions, from ,. , T . r .^ j i i A propositions presented ? which the choice is made, brought' 1 ^ rl ft , r . . . r , ' ,. A . ° « What description is given ol into existence by mere volition I ^ ■ .• V " *9 t, v x a Aj ^ s this perception of agreements By what are they suggested ? ^ J ^ ^ ^ be profil- ( 17 I ably said of it? On what question is an argu- \ What propositions are permit- ment here supposed, in illustra- ^ted, by the mind, to enter in, as tion of what has been said ? • links in the argument ? What step will the disputant < In this way, what finally arises ? first take ? \ How generally will the expla- What will be his chain of j nation, now given, apply ? propositions, before he enters ; In what does the diflerence, in upon the case in hand ? J the various kinds of reasoning, In this, and in all other argu- | mostly consist ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 01 (179) What characteristic has rea- soning, both in its inception and in its prosecution ? From what circumstance is it plain that some propositions must be given ? Where, then, do we always find assumed propositions ? In what kind of reasoning, in particular, are they frequently introduced, during the progress of the argument 1 Are the assumed propositions always expressed? What kind of assumed propo- sitions are usually not expressed? How does Dr. Abercrombie show the necessity of assumed propositions ? (180) Is an assumed proposition nec- essarily an unknown or doubtful one? With reference to what facul- ty, exclusively, are propositions assumed ? What things are, without hes- itation, admitted into the chain of reasoning, and employed to search out hidden truths ? How is it shown to be unnec- essary to make a formal an- nouncement of- the introduction of all these things ? How are these truths charac- terized. (181) What is said of the diversity of the faculty of reasoning, in different individuals? How weak is this faculty some- times found to be ? In others, how strong ? What grades exist between these extremes ? (1) On what, in the first place, does this diversity in the power of reasoning, depend ? What is necessary to a perma- nent reputation for ability in ar- gument ? What particular assertion is here added ? What does all reasoning im- ply? What follows as to reasoning on any subject, where there is no knowledge, or but a little ? What remark is suggested by the fact that many do speak on subjects, without previously stu- dying them \ In every case of reasoning, on I what principles does the mind \ pass from link to link ? | What question naturally aris- es here, as to speaking without previous preparation ? (2) In the second place, on what does the pow T er of reason- ing depend 1 ^ How do some persons fail, ■ with regard to attention ? How do such enter upon the investigation of laborious sub- jects ? \ What is the natural conse- quence of this state of mind ? > What is implied by this de- fective remembrance ? \ (3) What is a third ground of | difference in the power of reas- \ oning ? What remark, made in Sec. 13^, is here repeated ? What is well known as to the ability of different persons to | perceive relations ? What is necessarily implied by a defect in the power of rel- ' ative suggestion? 6 G2 QUESTIONS ON Why is this implied ? And, for the same reason, what necessarily attends a quick and clear perception of relations? (182) What is said of habit, in con- nection with reasoning ? How does the effect of habit appear, in those who follow me- chanic arts ? How do the muscles of such appear to move 1 How does the effect of habit on our mental operations, com- pare with its effect on the mus- cles ? What instance illustrates the fact, that this remark applies to the reasoning faculty ? What necessarily exists in the prosecution of an argument of a moral nature ? On what will the readiness of connecting propositions, and putting forth perceptions, greatly depend ? (183) What is the great instrument of reasoning ? May there ever be a purely mental deduction? What is worthy of note, in the use of language? Under what circumstances will this appear? Of what class of men is this particularly true ? What is said of the conclusions at which such persons arrive ? What of the process by which they arrive at their conclusions? To what famous man is this statement said to apply ? What proves him to have been possessed of a clear insight and good understanding ? When did he seem confused and obscure? How is the discrepancy be- twen his apparent confusion and his correct conclusions figura- tively expressed ? How does Hume describe this part of Cromwell's character ? (184) What remark of Lord Mans- field to an English officer, con- firms this view of the subject ? What are the two sources of perplexity in argument, to busi- ness men ? How have they acquired ex- ceeding readiness in all their mental acts ? What is the consequence of this habit ? What inability arises from this consequence ? In what way has every thing been before their own minds ? Why, then, does their argu- ment stated in words, appear to others defective and confused ? CHAPTER X. (185) Thus far, how has the subject of reasoning been considered ? Into what two great divisions is it now proposed to divide the subject? What particular is first men- tioned, in which demonstrative reasoning differs from all other kinds ? What are the subjects of this kind of reasoning ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 63 What are abstract ideas ! What are first reckoned as coming within this clasi ideas ! How far are duration, veloci- ty, weight, (Sec, to be reckoned as abstract ideas ! What are the subjects of mor- al reasoning? Give an example of a subject for demonstrative reasoning. Of moral reasoning. (186) What must be at the begining of every process of reasoning ? With what must the compari- ■ son of the propositions begin ? Where do we find these pre- liminary truths in demonstrative reasoning ! What is necessary, in order to give a demonstration of the prop- erties of any mathematical figure? What, then, are definitions ? What example is given, of similar preliminaries, used in a ditferent kind of reasoning ! What is an axiom ? What examples are given ? To what do we generally find axioms prefixed ? What mistake, concerning ax- ioms, has long prevailed ? What assertion is here made in opposition to this opinion ? What is here repeated, as a strict definition of an axiom ? What is the principal necessi- ty for their being expressed in words ? But what is said of the per- ceptions implied in them? How do we, in train of rea- soning, make use of these intui- tive perceptions, called axioms! (187) In what kind of reasoning ia it only necessary to attend to one side of the question ? W hat of the first principles, in this kind of reasoning ? By what are these first prin- ciples followed ? If the conclusion be demon- strative, how must we have pro- ceeded through every step in the train ? What is always implied by the opposite of such an agu- ment I What example is given ? How does Moral reasoning differ from Demonstrative in this respect? What illustrations are given ? On examination of a demon- stration, how are we affected ! (188) What is said of our assent, in moral reasoning ? How may we proceed from mere presumption, to certainty ? How, by its very nature, does demonstrative reasoning differ from moral, in this respect ? What is here repeated to be the foundation, in this kind of reasoning ! What are these first principles in mathematics ? Having commenced our train upon these principles, how are we affected at every step ? Of what, then, are we certain, however far we proceed in the train ? To what may demonstrative reasoning be judged to amount ! 64 QUESTIONS ON (189) What is the proper use of di- (191) In what is it repeated that agrams, in demonstrations ? \ moral reasoning differs from Why are they not absolutely j demonstrative ? essential ? \ In the latter, of what does the What remark proves them not j abstract nature of the proposi- essential ? \ tions compared, allow us to be From what might we argue i certain ? the impossibility of our making > With what do we begin, in any perfect figure ? i both kinds of reasoning ? What does Cudworth say on \ How do we proceed in both ? this point ? I In moral reasoning, the prop- To what, then, do our reason- ositions not being abstract, how ings apply, though we look at a^do we express the relation be- diagram ? j tween them ? What is said of the ability of \ What is said of the degrees of the mind, with regard to dia-Uhis presumption? grams? What is the grand difference, What name do we give to a ; then, in the states of mind re- verbal statement of the proper- \ suiting from the two kinds of ties of an imagined perfect fig- ure ? it em- ; reasoning f | At how high a degree of prob- \ ability may we arrive, in moral | reasoning ? | How does this high degree of probability sometimes lead us to \ speak ? How do the belief produced by demonstration, and that pro- i duced by the highest degree of ! probability, compare ? What illustration is given ? What is the highest degree of What conc.se definition might >, babiiit caIled ^ be given of the subjects of mor- ^ J al reasoning ? (19*2) In what respect is moral rea- j What is the first subdivision Boning very useful ? < of moral reasoning? What wrong opinion mayj W 7 hat is generally understood some have, concerning good j by analogy ? demonstrative reasoners ? | What Is the definition of ana- How does exclusive practice ] logical reasoning? of demonstrative,affect the mind, j What example illustrates this with regard to moral reasoning ? > kind of reasoning ? From what is the word moral) What caution° is given, with derived ? j regard to this kind of reasoning ? CHAPTER XL (190) What is the second great di- vision of reasoning. What does this division con- cern ? In general, what does brace? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. ().-> What is the proper use of this | analogical reasoning, in scien- tific inquiries ! (193) What is the second subdivis- ion of moral reasoning? What is the definition of in- ductive reasoning 1 Give the explanatory state- ment of this definition. Having discovered a certain What brought What ments ? are three arguments n the affirmative I is said of these argu CHAPTER XII. (195) Under what name have many writers laid down rules for secur- ~~c\u~ m £ tne b est use of the reason- property in many subjects of the .& facu , ? same kind, what conclusion do * t J g , . ? we make bv induction I w 7 , , ? ; P ., , Tin I • lu -ii * *• • 9 What portion of these rules Wna'ls la d TK?ef are eX ' )lained in this cha ? ter? \\ hat is said ol the beliet Wh doeg ^ geem fce arising from induction ? pr0 per step ? For what important knowl- ^hat circumstance enhances edcre are we entirely dependent L, i f ,i , ™ = .,., r • « ; the value of these rules ? on this kind of reasoning 1 W1 , . c , x ,, A t i ®, Why are the occasions of mor- YV hat example shows that we , J , , r r . al reasoning, more numerous apply the same process for inves- than thoge ^ & demongtrative tigatmg the laws of the mmd? j , . , ? (194) | What is sometimes true of a geometrical demonstration? Please to give the explanatory statement ? Why does an additional pro- cess not strengthen the conclu- sion ? What has been already stated, as the great difference between moral and demonstrative reason- ing 1 From the nature of the sub- jects, what is true of our belief, in the conclusions of moral rea- soning? Hence, what follows with re- gard to the number of solutions, in this kind of reasoning ? What is the question, stated in illustration ? (196) (I) What is the first rule with regard to reasoning ? What is the opposite of a de- sire of the truth, in argument ? What great enemies of truth are generally the foundation for such a preference ? Why are these feelings most sure to lead us to false results ? Why is it especially necessary to keep this rule in view, in pub- lic debate ? (197) (II) What is the second rule for conducting an argument ? How may a question be stated, so as to lead, necessarily, to a decision in favor of one side ? To what species of fallacy 6* 66 QUESTIONS ON does such a statement amount? jrection for conducting an argu- What sometimes happens > ment? from a careless statement of the \ What is a sophism ? question ? * (1) What is the name of the What is the practice of special j first kind of sophism ? pleaders ? \ When does this species of What is the benefit of this \ sophism exist ? practice? j For instance, what was a doc- By what means should we en- j trine of some of the early phi- deavor to prevent all misunder- \ losophers of Greece ? standing of the point at issue ? j What did Aristotle under- What illustration is given of i standby the word principle, in the manner of proceeding T J this doctrine? / j9§\ > What did he attempt to prove? [Ill] What is the third rule j J^hat imputation did he thus for conducting an argument? i m ™ ' did ^ advocates of the What fact affords ground tor , . . , . . 7 , . , „ 5 < doctrine mean by principle f this rule ? When the subject and the propositions are all of an ab- stract nature, what reasoning have we ? In such case, of what kind will the conclusion be ? In examining material bodies, on what evidence do we depend? kind (2) What is the second of sophism? When is this kind found ? Give examples. What closing remark is made concerning this fallacy ? What other species of false argument is nearly related to How will belief, depending on \ t ^is ? this kind of evidence, vary ? What is meant by argui7ig in In judging of what we have a c [ rc i e ? not ourselves witnessed, what ev- j (3) What is the third kind of idence do we use ? j sophism ? How will belief, depending on j W hy is this kind of sophism \ very common this evidence, vary ? What other sorts of evidence 1 j„ < What illustrations are given / are mentioned r TXT1 -. . °„ . In some cases, not included j W hat P lam 1Ilstan ^ of this under these regular divisions, of^ al l ac y ha ? been ascribed to the what is the evidence wholly made Indians of Para guay up 1 (4) What is the fourth species For what kind of evidence \ of sophistry ? should we seek? j W^hen are we chargeable with What if the question admits ; this fallacy ? of more than one kind ? What ig the first example giv . (199) en? [IV] What is the fourth di- 1 What is the second example ? MENTAL PHILOSOrHY. 67 (200) [V] What is the fifth rule for; conducting an argument? What fact, concerning lan- guage, must every enlarged mind be apprised of? Upon what, in all languages,) does a change in the meaning of j many words depend? For what do these imperfec-: tions of language afford oppor-i tunity ? J How will an advocate of truth and justice deal with equivocal terms ? (201) [VI] What caution is added as a sixth rule for conducting an j argument ? How do men usually view) deeds of successful termination ? How do they stigmatize those > of unsuccessful result? In what does the fallacy here j truely consist ? What is said of the character \ and prevalence of this fallacy? What has almost passed into a proverb, in consequence of our > proneness to this fallacy? How is this subject illustrated by men's estimation of Alexan-j der and Charles XII ? Between what other two war- j riors has this fallacy induced men to make a wide difference? \ (202) What is our duty, with regard to our opinions, when carefully formed 1 To what just aspersion would a contrary cause subject us ? What caution is given in this connection ? For what is a certain dej of stability necessary ? From what does a suitable de- gree of stability widely differ I What is said of relinquishing opinions, properly formed, on ac- count of new objections which we cannot answer ? How may a man, whose settled opinions are attacked by new ob- jections, properly answer ? What remark is made con- cerning the reasoning in this an- swer ? (203) What subject is here intro- duced for supporting the remarks under the first rule for conduct- ing an argument ? By what means will one, who argues for victory, proceed to take every advantage ? What is said of this course of argument ? What injury is done to the mind, by inventing cunning ob- jections against good arguments ? What just remark has been made, concerning the end of persons addicted to this practice? Why should they become sceptics? By what is it necessary for even lovers of the truth to guard themselves against this danger, while in the habit of ardent dis- putation ? How did the learned Chilling- worth spend his early days ? What is said of his ability in argument? What bad habit did he con- tract by his proneness to dispu- tation? What effect had the arguments of his adversaries upon him ? 63 QUESTIONS ON \ By what two circumstances are they separated ? With what does reasoning ex- | clusively deal ? | What liberty is allowed to the j in agination ? What do reasoning and the ^imagination respectively ascer- | tain? What are their respective of- Under what general head is j fi ces ? imagination classed? j Within what limits are they What are we apt to associate j respectively exercised ? with the exercises of the imagi- j nation 1 By whom alone was he over- matched and confounded ? CHAPTER XIII. (204) What subject is next taken up, after reasoning ? What caution is necessary in making this legitimate associa- tion ? What is an exercise of the im- agination, in itself '? What is said of its connec- tion with other faculties influences ? What may be truly said of one who has a good imagina- tion ? (205) (206) What is a definition of the imagination? What have the conceptions been properly considered ? What influence is exercised upon them by the mental acts and | implied in a process of imagina- j tion ? To what have our concep- tions been compared ? In view of this figure, how is the difference between the cul- tivated and the uncultivated im- With what particular intel- lectual power is the imagination agination expressed ? closely related ? What is the testimony of the mathematician D'Alembert on this point? How far is his assertion, prob- ably, true ? Why is the imagination spok- en of, as a compound mental state ? (207) What example is taken, more fully to illustrate the nature of What does he intimate, in il- > imagination ? lustration of his views ? What is every writer supposed What is certain, concerning j already to possess, when he be- the deductive and the imagina-| gins to write ? tive powers? With what expectation and What do they both imply ? \ desire does he commence writ- By what are they both occu- > ing ? pied ? What power does his interest What powers do they both in the subject enable him to ex- put in requisition in the same ercise over it, by a mere act of way? the will? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 69 On what principle do various I conceptions, meanwhile, contin- ue to arise in the mind ? As they partake of the perma- nency of the outline, what has the writer an opportunity to do 'I What conceptions are retained by him, and committed to writ- ing ? What becomes of the rest ? How may any one satisfy himself that this account, of the intellectual process of the imag- ination, is correct 1 (208) Please to express, connected- ly and concisely, the whole pro- cess of imagining. Why do we give the names of, imagination to this process ? Why is it important to have a single term to express this com- plex process ? Against what mistaken im- pression must we guard, while using this term ? (209) Repeat Dr. Reid's illustration of the manner of selecting con- ceptions, in an exercise of the imagination. (210) What question still arises, concerning the selecting of con- ceptions 1 What fact concerning the pro- cess of imagining, is admitted ! What is the answer to the question, " Why do we select one image rather than another ¥' What is done with those im- ages, which are found, by this original power, to be suited to the subjects? ^ ith those that are suited to each other ? Vv hat becomes of the rest? Is any voluntary power exer- cised over either cla>< ! What is the substance of all that can be said of the different operations, or for the general conception of the subject of se- lecting conceptions ? What do we here find ? What would be the conse- quence if we were deprived of this faculty ? (211) What celebrated instance of the exercise of the imagination is here chosen to illustrate the subject ? What was Milton's first step in drawing ? What enabled him to keep the outline before him 1 From what might his feeling of desire receive assistance, in rendering the outline perma- nent? Next, what was effected by the principles of association ? Give examples of such con- ceptions. What power was brought into exercise, at the next step? What did the exercise of this power, at once enable him to determine? What did he do with those conceptions which were found suitable? After being combined, how- were they detained and render- ed permanent? What became of the rest? What is said of the landscape 70 QUESTIONS ON which thus arose from the mind of Milton ? (212) ( What erroneous opinion seems to have prevailed, with regard? to the imagination? What supposition is made, to illustrate the common error? Why is the very expression, "wills to imagine," nugatory? What must be true of any thing that we profess to will to imagine! What, then, is concluded, concerning the connection of the will with the imagination? What is concluded concern- ing the quickening of the pow- ers of invention? By what are the greatest minds kept in check? What is true of every stand- ard work of the imagination? Mention some circumstances which must have had their influ- < ence in producing such works. To what is the influence of j circumstances on the imagina- tion compared? What two standard works of imagination are here contrast- ed? | Why could not Bunyan have written the i4 Heart of Mid Lo- thian," nor Scott, the " Pilgrim's Progress;" though both had suf- ficient imagination? (213) How might this fact be easily and pleasantly illustrated? What is thought to have been Lord Byron's practice, when en-! gaged in composition? > What art is closely related to poetry ? I On what are they both based? To what else do the remarks that have been made, upon lite- rary composition, apply ? What does Reynolds's say is one of the great marks of ge- nius? But how does he say men learn to invent? How do they learn to think? How does he express the ne- cessity of models and materials, for works of the imagination ? What is supposed of Homer ? What is certain of Angelo and Raffaelle? (214) What is next to be considered in respect to the imagination? Why is the defence the more necessary ? How is the difference of feel- ing of some, towards this and the other faculties of the mind, expressed ? From what considerations does it appear improper to neglect this noble faculty ? What is a very natural reflec- tion, in speaking on this point ? What, then, seems to have been the intention of the Crea- tor, with regard to this faculty ? If we grant that the imagina- tion was designed to be exercis- ed, what conclusion is forced upon us ? What has been the general re- sult of the culture of this fac- ulty ? Where is the imagination seen to the greatest advantage? What if it be said, they were inspired ? What monuments has imagin- MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 71 ation created for every civilized nation ? To what two purposes have many of these monuments con- tributed ? How has it beguiled many an hour ? How has it subdued many a pang ? TV hat has it often inspired and cherished in the soul ? What is said of the soul, con- scious of immortality, and strug- gling in its narrow bounds? What are the remarks of Ad- dison, concerning refined imag- ination ? (215) In what view is the imagina- tion to be next considered ? What remark is obvious, in this connection ? On what supposition is this remark made ? What if the contrary be true ? If a man be, in other respects, a good reasoner, but have not cultivated the imagination, what defect will immediately appear ? What is he unable to appre- ciate J How is his cause, in an argu- ment, described ? What do these remarks help us to explain ? What character is next to be considered, in illustration of this subject ? What does he do, at a glance? By what means is he able to do this ? What is said of the suitable- ness apparent in all parts of his reasoning ? To what is the imagination, in such a mind, akin ? What if a debator combined the highest results of reasoning, with the highest results of the imagination ? CHAPTER XIV. (I) (216) How is it proposed to con- clude the subject of the Intel- lect? What is abundantly confirmed, by experience, concerning the operations of the mind ? Are the causes of such devia- tions always apparent ? With what are they well known to be frequently connected ? In what threefold division does the mind exist? On what does the action of the will depend ? What is the action of the sen- sitive nature based upon? Under what divisions has the action of the Intellect been con- sidered ? Which of these two divisions is developed first in order of nature and of time? W^hat, so far as the mind is concerned, commences with this division ? In connection with what does all the action, here originated, take place ? Though all the wheels of the mind wait to be set in motion by this one, yet on what does this depend for the first start ? What, then, results to this wheel, and, through this, to all the rest, from a disordered state of the body ? 72 QUESTIONS ON (217) What will the fact just stated, ; help us to explain ? What are conceptions? Under what form have they j already been considered ? In what particular are they j found to vary ? What may they be called, when they are at the highest intensity] \ What are they, especially those originating with the sense of sight, otherwise called ? What, then, are apparitions? What are the most, common apparitions ? What other forms do appari- ; tions often take ? Which of the other senses are! the most liable to be represented > by excited cenceptions '/ Why do the excited concep- j tions of sight, claim more espe- \ cial attention than those of the I other senses ? (218) What kind of excited concep- tions are very common ? [I] Of what are these some- \ times the result ? At what time of life are peo- ple most subject to them ? What employment of the con- j ceptive power is more apparent in children, than in adult per- sons ? How is the proneness of chil- dren, to give reality to their in- ward conceptions, here portray- ed ? Who has made his own early experience of this inclination, the subject of a fine passage of poetry ? Where has Beattie laid the scene of similar conceptions, for the young Minstrel ? [II] In the second place, of what are these transient excited conceptions sometimes the re- sult ? What example is given ? Give the explanatory statement of this example. What great grief was endur- ed by Mrs. Howe, in her captiv- ity ? By what does she say her mind was troubled, while her heart was sorely pained ? What did she often imagine that she plainly saw? (219) What was said in Section 60, of the comparative ease of call- ing up conceptions of sound, and those of sight ? As there is a distinction, then, between the conceptions arising from these two senses, what are we at liberty to say ? Give the explanatory state- ment. What singular incident, in the life of Johnson, is explained on this principle ? What circumstances in the life of Napolean are explained on the same principle ? Who heard similar sounds, when alone, on a desert island ? (220) What fact has been already set forth, in sec. 64, concerning our conceptions ? Why, in the cases referred to, was the vividness of conception very transitory ? What do vivid conceptions^ MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. ::* of a more permanent nature, al- ways imply ? What particular disorder is mentioned first, as a cause of such conceptions ? Why is this cause somewhat conjectural ? What do we know of the ner- vous system, generally, with re- gard to disease ? What of the disease of a par- ticular portion ? What follows from these facts and from what we certainly know of the disorders of the retina ? How is the retina supposed to be affected, in all cases of con- ception of objects of vision ? How is this affection, when all parts of the system are perfectly sound ? What may happen, in this re- spect, under the influence of morbid sensibility ? What is the case related of a lady who attended the music of an orchestra ? To what part of the eye does the nerve of the tympanum of the ear correspond ? What is naturally supposed of the tympanum, in the case of the lady ? Having become morbidly sen- sitive, what was the source of its action ? Upon what alone, does the sensation of sound depend ? What do these considerations render plain ? How is the same reasoning applied to the optic nerve ? If this view be correct, what has one, who is subject to such morbid sensibility of the retina, power to do ? As these results arc not sub- ject to volition, what may justly be said of the subject of them ? What fact is added in confir- mation of these views ? (221) What is the next thing consid- ered as a cause of apparitions 1 | By what is this neglect con- firmed to be a cause of appari- tions ? | What is said of the imagina- | tion of Nicolai ? What is further said of his character ? In what state of mind was he at the time to which he alludes, in his narrative ? What suddenly appeared to him? What did he do on this ap- pearance ? How was his wife affected by his question ? How long did the phantom continue ? How long did he sleep, after the disappearance of the phan- tom ? What did the physician say ? What happened at four in the afternoon ? Did the apparition follow him, as he went from one apartment to another ? Was the apparition constantly before him ? In what posture did it present itself? What appeared to him at six o'clock? How long did the first form continue to appear ? By what was its place sup- plied ? 7 74 QUESTIONS ON In what conditions did his ac- quaintances appear ? What persons, only, were rep- resented to him as apparitions I What does he say of the dis- tinctness of these phantoms ? In what situations did they less frequently appear ? How were these phantoms af- fected by his closing his eyes ? If they disappeared on shutting his eyes, what happened when he next opened them ? Was he able to converse with people about the apparitions while they surrounded him ? Were they generally in motion or at rest ? Did they appear singly or in groups most commonly ? Were these apparitions con- fined to one sex? How did they appear with re- gard to each other ? Did he see anything besides people on foot ? What does he say of the size of these apparitions ? Of their distinctness? Of the color of their skin ? Of the color and fashion of dress ? Was there anything unnatural in their general appearance " As time passed on, did phantoms return more or frequently ? After how long a time they increase in number ? What other change took place at this time ? To whom did they address ] their discourse ? W T hat was the character of! their speeches ? In what character did they the less did appear to him, at different times? When did they usually at- tempt to console him ? In what other situations did they sometimes accost him in this way ? Of what did these consolatory addresses consist ? (222) What is said of Nicolai's ac- quired knowledge ? What of his natural turn of ; mind ? Hence, what was he enabled : to do with regard to his malady? : For what reason was his mind ; especially liable to be affected I by a disorder of the body ? i What had happened to him, : some years before the phantoms | appeared? To what had he submitted, | twice a year, since his attack of the vertigo ? To what did he attribute the appearance of the phantasms ? To what did he resort as a cure ? How did his chamber appear at the time when the leeches were applied ? Describe the effect produced on him by the loss of blood? (223) What is the third cause of ex- cited conceptions 1 In what sense have most of those conceptions, excited by fever, their origin? What are they called by way of distinction ? How is the advancement of the conceptions, till they become phantoms, expressed ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 75 Of what origin and character was the fever which is described in illustration of this subject? With what was the subject of this fever delighted, while calmly conversing with his friends ? In what way did these faces make their appearance ? After a face had gradually become distinct, how long did it remain so? How long was it gradually disappearing ? What was left in its place ? In what respects were the fa- ces exceedingly interesting? To whom did they all direct their attention ? What did he seem able to do while looking upon them ? What kept his mind constant- ly riveted upon these visions ? What was the only interrup- tion to this state of mind ? What other phantasms did he see, besides those of faces ? What did he, at one time, ex- perience from excited concep- tions of sound ? Give the explanatory statement of this fact. (2-24) What is mentioned, in the fourth place, as a cause of excit- ed conceptions ? What great poet seems to have had knowledge of this effect of a disordered brain ? Repeat the passage cited in illustration. With what is the brain very intimately connected? With what two exercises of the mind in particular ? What will alwavs result to the mind from any injury to the brain ? What objection is anticipated, with regard to the cases now un- der consideration ? What common notion, among anatomists, may favor this ob- jection? W T hat other consideration fa- vors this objection? What may be said on the oth- er hand ? What, then, may be a just conclusion ? (225) What do we stand in need of? here, to illustrate the subject ? What disease resulted to a citizen of Kingston-on-Hull, from his various excesses ? What attended this disease of the brain ? What was the man's calling ? What shapes did his phan- tasms assume ? What particular trouble, in his calling, did he experience from them ? What were the remedies, in this case ? How soon was a correct state of mind restored ? (226) What is mentioned, in the fifth place, as a cause of appari- tions ? To what are we referred for a description of this disease ? What is said of its power and effects ? How is the patient affected by the convulsions ? What are among the most striking attendants of this dis- ease ? 7G QUESTIONS ON What do the subjects of this j To what does a healthy sen- disease distinctly see ? J sation always have reference? To whom can we confidently \ (To what extent is it intended appeal, to corroborate these state- here to apply the word outward 1) ments ? What effect has a disease of What might probably be the bodily organ upon the sen- shown, concerning these states sation ? of mind, by further examina-> In what respect, only, is the tion ? j mental state thus produced, de- In what points of view is this > ceptive? subject worthy of every possible \ What sensations have already development ? been treated, with regard to the effects produced by disease ? What sensations are next tak- \ en up ? { Repeat the account given by \ Dr. Brewster, illustrating the ef- fects of disease upon the sensa- What is the etymological sig- : tions of touch, nification of insanity ? Repeat the example illustra- What does it mean, when ap- ting similar effects upon the sen- plied to the mind? sations of hearing ? How does this state of mind (Are all the senses thus liable, differ from that treated under the • by disease, to produce false sen- head of apparitions ? [sations ?) What is said of the structure \ or>o\ and manner of existence of the \) mind? What do we naturally pass to What follows, with regard to consider, next after sensation? insanity? Which of these powers come CHAPTER XV. (II) (227) What is the method proposed to be pursued, in considering this subject? first, in the order of nature? While the act of perception implies sensation, what reference How far, only, will this plan is also implied by it? be carried out, at present? What further acts are implied (228) |ky perception, particularly by : acquired perception ? Beginning with the external \ From what has been said, intellect, what is the first power what would be natural to con- which presents itself to our no- \ elude, concerning perceptions tice ? < which depend upon disordered What is here said to be well sensations? known, of all the outward sen-; Iri addition to disordered per- se? • ceptions, arising from unsound What follows, with regard to sensations, from what other cau- the inward state ? ; ses may they proceed ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 77 Give the first illustration of j victions of consciousness ? disordered perception, arising! What if the belief of person- from the former of these two J al identity be lost ? causes. What is the proper business of Give the second illustration of j consciousness? the same point. I But if we fully believe self to In what way are disordered \ be blotted out, what is then perceptions, arising from the \ clearly beyond the power of con- second of these two causes, apt < sciousness ? to appear ? What then becomes of the Give illustrations. mental acts belonging to self? Why do persons, subject to What instance, already stated, disordered perceptions from this | may serve to illustrate these re- second cause, find it very diffi- \ marks ? cul to read ? (In what sense may that in- /23Q\ i stance be regarded as of a mixed | nature?) Is the human intellect, in its > Relate the instance of the internal divisions also, subject to > watchmaker, which illustrates disorders ? this point. Which of the divisions of the \ What, probably, have some internal intellect comes first in j persons firmly believed, concern- order ? ing the powers of their minds, In what does this power deal, j although self remained? exclusively ? j What, in such case, might one What must be admitted, with \ believe to have become of his regard to the diseases of this \ memory, imagination, &c. ? P°™ \ , , . t . ! (232) What elementary conviction, v J based on original suggestion, is \ Having treated of original sug- sometimes wholly, or partly an-jgestion, and of consciousness, as nulled ? \ subject to unsoundness, what di- Whose case illustrates this | vision of the internal intellect point, so far as identity of the j comes next in natural order ? mind is concerned ? j In what respect does this pow- What did this clergyman, for er resemble original suggestion? a long time, fully believe, con-j To what is its action limited? cernino' his mind? In what does it differ from What is said of his ability? : original suggestion? What of his ability, during,! (What is relative suggestion ?) this alienation ? \ What is always implied by re- What proves that he actually jlations? believed he had no mind ? If, from some unsoundness of , . mind, we incur mistakes, con- ' ' cerning those other things, what What is the basis of the con- Imust result, with regard to that 78 QUESTIONS ON faculty by which relations are j perceived ? j Is this power, in its own nature, j ever liable to be disordered ? Why is not this particular; point discussed here ? j (233) What, with regard to the mind, besides its mere states, may be disordered ? What is said of the irregular action of the law of association ? What is the slightest form of derangement, from this cause, called ? What is it called by Dr. Bush ? How do we designate persons, subject to this mental disease ? When the indications are rath- er decided, what do we say of them ? In what does their disorder seem chiefly to consist ? How do their thoughts pass from one subject to another ? What, then, is one mark of this state of mind? ; With what are these symptoms I generally attended? What follows from this inabil- j ity to check their present or re- call their past ideas ? What has been given as anoth- er mark of this disease? (234) | Give a description of Lavater, j in illustration of this mental dis- 1 order. (235) What faculty is next treated, after association, as subject to disordered action ? What may happen to the mem- ory, while all the other faculties remain perfectly sound ? Of how many kinds are the instances of disordered memory ? (1) What are of the first kind? (2) The second ? (3) The third ? Which kind is sufficiently un- derstood, without illustration ? What two instances are given, in illustration of the second kind of imperfect memory ? What three instances are just given, to illustrate the third kind? In another instance, given to illustrate the third kind of disor- dered memory, what particular difficulty did the man experi- ence ? How long did this alienation last? What of his external senses, during this time ? What was the case, w r ith all his ideas, during this time ? What did he know 7 , concern- ing his words ? On recovering, what mistake did he find he had made, in Wri- ting a check ? (236) Thus far, in treating of in- sanity, how have the powers of the mind been taken up ? Are any of the powers of the mind exempt from derangement ? Of which grand division of the mind is this especially true ? W T hat powers have already been considered, as subject to derangement ? What comes next in order 1 Why, in some cases, is there MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. ~9 a total inability to pass from the premises to the conclusion ? What follows from the close connection of reasoning with re- lative suggestion ? To what extent is reasoning impaired by disordered relative suggestion ? What is more frequently the case, as to the subjects and ex- tent of alienated reasoning ? Under what circumstances do we immediately detect such a- lienation ? To what common and well founded remark has this view of the subject led ? Give an illustration. (•237) In what character have we an instance of this form of insanity ? By what is this character rep-; resented as having had his head turned ? To what was his derangement limited ? On all other subjects, how did ; his understanding appear ? On what subject did the con- \ versation turn, between him and the barber and curate 1 How did he appear to them to reason, on all topics connected with this subject ? What remarks showed his in- s sanity, as soon as the Turkish war was mentioned '? Why should the mention of war lead him to such absurd re- marks? (238) What sometimes happens to men of genius, by their giving way to the suggestions of a mel- ancholy imagination ? How does this sort ofdera ment affect the subjects of it I Though, in the common ac- ceptation of the term, they can hardly be called insane, yet, what decides them to be of unsound mind ? Are these instances frequent, or rare ? Are they easily described? Whose character may illus- trate this subject ? Did Rousseau betray sudden emotions ? Upon what did his feelings grow up ? How did he become impas- sioned ? Why was it very hard to un- deceive him ? Why was it difficult to contin- ue intimate with him ? How did he conceive of con- clusions, drawn from very trifling circumstances ? Which seems to have been the strongest of his faculties ? How may the events of his life be said to have passed ? From what should this mode of existence have prevented him ? What was the only effect it had upon his observations ? Why did he sometimes appear void of sensibility ? (•239) In what does the action of the various intellectual powers, brought to view in this chapter, terminate ? In a sound mind, to what has belief a natural relation? When this relation is dis- turbed, how does the belief exist? Into how many classes are di- vided those persons whose facul- so QUESTIONS ON ty of belief seems to be disor- dered ? (1) What particular inability is characteristic of the first class ? What is necessary to them, in order that they may believe? Of what complaint of the sav- age do such persons remind us ? When this inability is very marked, of what is it a sign ? (2) What is characteristic of the second class ? Of what do they take no note ? What are they ready to believe and report': With what is this state of be- lief frequently connected ? (3) In what way does the alienation of belief show itself in the third class ? What illustrations are given ? How do they appear, on all other subjects ? When arc you sure to per- ceive their insanity of belief? For what does this division furnish the basis ? Having examined this grand division, to what shall we now advance ? (241) What is implied by every movement of the sensibilities? What is implied by our being pleased or displeased ? What, by our exercising the feeling of desire ? By what are these objects made known to us? What would be true of the emotive part of our nature, and of our passions, if our intellect were dormant? To what will the activity of the sensibilities be nearly pro- portionate? (What allowance must be re- membered, in making this state- ment ?) Give this statement more at \ large. DIVISION SECOND. INTRODUCTION. (240) At the commencement ot this work, under what three grand \ divisions was it proposed to study J the mind ? What is said of the clearness j by which their generic distinc- tion is marked? By what is the difference in their nature ascertained ? By what else does observation \ show them to be separated ? Which division comes first in order? \ (242) Into what two general divi- sions does the department of the sensibilities separate? What is said of the channels, into which these leading divi- sions naturally fall ? By what will each of these di- visions be found characterized ? From what language is the word pathematic derived? By whom was it first used, in connection with this subject ? Why did he introduce it ? How broad an application of this word is justified by its ety- mology ? mental ruiLosoniy. 61 (243) How is the difference, between our natural and our moral sensi- bilities, expressed ? How great a blank would be created in the mind, by striking out the conscience ? (What is the conscience here called f) What question always comes up, with regard to everything we desire to do 1 How would a man proceed, in his movements, if conscience should cease to propose this question ? What would always be his ob- ject, in these movements ? At what would he always be disappointed '? Even when raised to higher moods of action, on what would all his movements be based ? Within what limits would the most extensive ranire of suo-aes- tions, that prompt his actions, resolve themselves. What, alone, places him be- yond the limits of this circle ? What will this enable him to do, on suitable occasions ? (244) _ Why do we assign a higher rank to some powers of the mind, than to others I What relative rank do we readily assign to instincts, appe- tites and affections ? Of the natural and the moral sensibility, to which do we not hesitate to assign the higher rank ? What position does the moral sensibility occupy, in respect to the natural ? does it keenly scruti- j What nize ? W hat does it dispense, as an arbitress? (245) What may throw additional light upon the distinction be- tween the moral and the natural \ sensibilities ? What considerations show that brutes possess the pathematic sensibilities, at least in an equal degree with man ? What is the great ground of distinction between man and beast ? Of what good do brutes pos- sess knowledge, in common with man ? By what higher knowledge does man excel ? In what view 7 do brutes, as well as man, understand what is desirable ? What higher prerogative does . man enjoy ? (246) Which of the leading divisions of the sensibilities will be first i discussed ? Into what two parts will this pathematic branch separate ? What three subdivisions are I furnished by the desires ? In what order, both in time i and in nature, are these divisions ' arranged ? In other words, immediately on passing from the intellect to the sensibilities, where do we find ourselves ? In the ordinary process of mental action, what succeeds to emotions ? 82 QUESTIONS ON Why must emotion be imme- diately preceded by an act of the intellect for instance, by percep- tion ? How is it shown to be equally ne- cessary, as the mind is constitut- ed, that all desire should be pre- ceded by emotion ! (247) To what are the divisions, in- to which the moral sensibilities naturally fall, entirely analogous? Accordingly, under this head, what class of mental states first presents itself? In what respect, then, par- ticularly do they answer to the natural emotions ? By what class of feelings are the moral emotions followed ? How is it shown that feelings of obligation hold the same re- lation to moral emotions, that the desires do to the natural emotions ? (What is here meant by mor- al emotions ?) What is all that is here pre- tended to be done with these classifications ? PART FIRST, CLASS FIRST. CHAPTER I. (348) With what branch of the sen- sibilities has it been arranged that we should begin ? What is implied by giving to these a distinct place ? What is very difficult to ex- plain in words ? j What, concerning this subject are all supposed well to under- stand ? In what respect, then, is it (difficult to give a verbal explana- < tion of them ? Why can they not be defined? Upon what, then, are we de- I pendent for a knowledge of the < essential nature of emotions ? In other words, how does the What, in view of the circum- much used in architecture ? j stances, must we conclude to be W hat is its effect ? j the immediate cause of the pleas* What is said of the pyramidal j U re, experienced on beholding form in Gothic architecture ? j colors ? What docs Hogarth say of this > / rally, in view of the beauties of that passed near his window ? motion, on a small scale ? (267) (269) What is the doctrine, which \ What does Kaimes say of mo- we are here opposing ? \ tion, in general ? If this doctrine were true, then When does motion admit what would be the business of j som e exceptions to this remark ? professed composers ? j What degree of continued What is commonly supposed mo tion is most agreeable ? to be the principal field of the j What soon destroys our pleas- composer's labor ? \ ure in the quickest motion \ What results are certainly ne- \ n g ] ow motion ? cessary, in order that he it. How do regular motion and please • ; irregular, compare, in respect To what unreasonable conclu- \ to giving pleasure ? sion, would the doctrine of asso- j Uniformly accelerated, and ciations lead ? < uniformly retarded ? With what must he, who com- 1 what renders motion upward poses works for immorality, \ agreeable ? chiefly deal? \ What question with reo-ard to What is certainly implied by j the re l a tive beauty of motion, is permanency in the works of art? not eBS \\ y decided ? What is said of the change- \ What instances of motion are ableness of associations? {mentioned as more beautiful What of the stability of some j than mo tions in a straight line ? musical compositions ? By what is this assertion sup- ported? With what is it inconsistent? j CHAPTER I (268) (270) What object of contemplation What two positions, with re- is next mentioned, after sound, \ gard to beauty, is it thought ne- as justly reckoned a source of the j cessary to enforce ? beautiful? j In opposition to what theory, Give some illustrations. j are the remarks of Mr. Stewart What particular feature, in < here brought in ? outward scenery, is mentioned With what kind of false ar- YTAL PHILOSOPHY. 89 gument are the advocates of this whence is there a beauty, super- theory, chargeable? added to this intrinsic beauty J W hat is the business of asso- ciation ? Why, therefore, cannot a dis- tinct class of pleasures be ac- counted for by this principle ? What is an plained to be ? W hat might readily be associ- ated with a neat village and sur- rounding farms? What travellers will readily understand the effect of associ- association ex- j ated beauty ? How do Europe and America with regard to the of such consecrated then, create compare, I number Can association anything ? Upon what must it always spots? act • ) At what spot, upon our rag- If association merely transfers ' ged coast, would the finest feel- beauty, what is the necessary > ings of the heart oblige a travel- conclusion ? > ler to pause ? (271) * s tne scenery of this place \ calculated, in itself, to excite By the discussion thus far, on \ extraordinary emotions of beau- this subject, what has been \ ty ? shown with regard to the foun- What is found hovering about dation of beauty ? (that spot, so powerful to excite W hat, from experience, must \ t h eS e emotions ? we admit, in regard to some oth- \ Qn what principle alone can er objects ? \ tn i s fact be explained 1 By what means may these in- j What is connected, by associ- different objects become beauti- a tion, with the sight of the hills ful to us ? f Rome, to excite a fulness of Give the explanatory state- emotion, similar to what has just «nent § been described? Whence is there a beauty su- \ What poet has beautifully peradded to the original beauty \ touched of the spring morning, or the ve rse 1 morning, summer evening ? What these principles in (273) class of instances are more can association ; What accomplish, with regard to beau- next mentioned, in which this its de- ; effect of association is strikingly ty, than jnerely heighten o-ree ? Please to give some illustra- tions. (272) Whence arises, to one who has never before seen, the pleas- seen l W 7 hat is the general remark upon national tunes? What particular instance has often been mentioned ? What did the French find it ure he feels on beholding a vari- necessary to do, with regard to agated landscape ? the Swiss national air ? In the case of other people, i To what, mostly, must the 8* 90 QUESTIONS ON powerful effects of this song be i (2) What has every beautiful attributed? 1 object, in itself? To what is owing the popular-; For this reason, where may ity of the English° tune called we, with propriety, regard the Belleisle ? beauty as existing ? What will be found true of all j What enhances the beauty national airs ? which any object possess in it- In respect to what else, have self? we abundant illustration of the i (3) What various objects are same principle ? mentioned, as capable of excit- Whence has the purple color j ing emotions of beauty ? acquired its character of digni-j How may the degree of beau- ty ? ty, in every instance, be increas- Why has yellow become asso- ; ed 1 ciated with the idea of dignity, (4) Of what emotions, espe- amonor the Chinese ? ciallv, has the mind an original Give illustrations of the same susceptibility? principle, in the use of other What is said of the constitu- colors. tion of the objects of nature, How great a change seems with regard to these feelings ? sometimes wrought in the char-'. How do we speak of those ob- acter of an object, by means of Meets which are followed by erao- this principle ? What is the illustration ? (274) What are the avenues of hu man pleasure ? tions of beauty ? What do we mean by saying < that the object is, in itself, beau- j tifui ? j (5) Are we certain, as to What is said of the number i what objects are to be consider- of its sources ? \ ed originally beautiful ? What effect, upon a beautiful > To what have we good reason object, is produced by bringing! for attributing original beauty ? our happiness into intimacy with > (6) How do many objects, it ? < otherwise indifferent, become What effect is, in this way, ' beautiful ? sometimes produced upon an j How do many objects, in object otherwise indifferent ? j themselves beautiful, come to be How extensive are the sources ; regarded more beautiful ? of associated beauty ? To what is to be attributed -much of the difference of opin- (275) What seems proper here to be given, on account of the difficul- ty of the subject of emotions of beauty ? (1) Instead of a definition of these emotions, what two char- acteristics are stated ? ion, as to what objects are beau- tiful ? CHAPTER IV. (•276) W hat other class of emotions MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 01 have much in common with e-j motions of beauty .' In what does the difference, > between beauty and sublimity, seem to consist ? j On examining emotions of> beauty and of sublimity, what shall we readily observe, withj regard to their intensity ? How may the emotion be af-j fected, and still remain essential- ly the same ? \ What, then, may be true of j even the fainter feelings of beau- ty, and the highest emotions of I the sublime, with respect to each I other ? How has the progression inj feelings, from one that is gentle ) to one that is overwhelming,! been illustrated ? What part of the river excites \ emotions of beauty ? Trace its course till the emo- tions become sublime ? In what, then, does the prin-^ cipal difference, between beauty and sublimity, consist ? (277) Why cannot the emotions of sublimity be defined? Yet, why must we necessarily understand their nature ? What may assist us in more clearly understanding them? What remark seems proper to be made, before proceeding to mention these occasions ? What is the measure of the sublimity of an object ? If emotions of sublimity exist on various occasions, what seems to be the proper object before i us ? (278) What is first mentioned as a source of emotions of sublimity / What remark of Mr. Stewart is cited in confirmation ? What remarks of Irving illus- trate the same point ? What is said of the sublimity of the ocean ? (279) What is the second occasion of emotions of sublimity ? In what situation may every one have experienced this ? To what two elements must we attribute our feelings of sub- limity, on beholding the sky at night? What particular natural curi- osity is here mentioned, as ex- citing emotions of sublimity ? Describe this bridge. What is said of its power to excite emotions of sublimity ? To what is it compared ? (280) What element of sublimity is next considered, after height ? What is here mentioned as a special confirmation of the doc- trine that the grounds of sublim- ity are various ? What doubt is here expressed concerning depth, as an element of sublimity '? How does Burke differ in o- pinion ? How is the similarity of emo- tion, excited by height and by depth, illustrated ? (281) What objects are, in part, in- debted to color, for the sublime emotions which they excite ? What is here particularly men- 92 QUESTIONS ON tioned as an element of the sub- pending, in part, for this feature, lime? upon its indications of power? What illustrations are given ? ; What of the earthquake ? What proves that poets have j When does the ocean gather uniformly conceived of darkness sublimity upon this principle ? as an element of sublimity ? (282) What sound is first mentioned as partaking of sublimity ? What of the human voice ? What of the organ ? Mention some other instances. What is mentioned as sublime, \ from the exhibition of human : energy ? What fact must be kept in mind, concerning all these ex- ; am pies? i To what, for instance, what, tor instance, must part of the sublimity be attribu- What sound, more than any ted ]n such e les ? other, is characterized as sub- \ lime? (285) For what purpose does thun- Wkh what other emoti der seem to be frequently men-i have emo tions of sublimity been tioned in the Bible ? i i • i it A , M - . r ~ . • above explained as closely con- NY hat are the remarks of Cole- < t( j 7 L J ridixe, here introduced ? > T ■,' , 7 . ° * In what particular is another (283) important step here traced in In what two respects do we ; their resemblance ? already see a close analogy be- j VVhat > then > ma y we conclude tween beauty and sublimity ? j of great height, great depth, &c.? Explain how this is the case. \ (^SQ) What is an instance of sub- j , ' limity connected with motion? What circumstance corrobor- What other instances of sub- \ ates tne view of the subject, limity depend, in part, upon rap- wmcn we nave ner ^ drawn from idity of motion ? | the connection of the sublime (oqa\ with the beautiful? . ^° ' \ W T hat inquiry must first be W hat is the first mental ob- ! made, in appealing to experi- ject that is mentioned as an ele- ence ? mem of sublimity ? j Why is this properly the first cautionary remark is step ? What What illustrations are given, here suoro-ested ? In what may the causes of the \ of the operations of original sub- snggestion of power exist ? | limity on the mindl of the In such cases, how do we con- youno- 7 template such objects ? B y what will these operations One the explanatory state- be indicated ? ment of this fact ? j H ow has this been ascertained \> hat is first mentioned as an \ to be a fact f object of great sublimity, de-j How are children generally MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 93 affected by sublime ideas con- veyed by words ? What incident, in the life of Sir W. Jones, illustrates this statement ? When he had arrived at ma- turity of judgment, what did he say of this passage ? Please to repeat it. (287) Though sublime emotions are, in part, original, still to what must a considerable part be at- tributed ? What examples of sound may illustrate this statement ? What instance of high sub- limity in a sound which is feeble and inconsiderable in itself? Under what circumstances may even the rumbling of a cart be very sublime ? How is the sublimity, in this instance, accounted for 1 What other sounds are men- tioned as sublime, on the princi- ple of association 1 CHAPTER V. (283) What emotions are next dis- cussed, after emotions of sub- limity ? What is said of defining this feeling ? In what do these emotions re- semble those of beauty ? From what does this pleasure receive a peculiar modification? For an understanding of this matter, on what must we chiefly rely ? (289) What may assist us in better understanding them 1 What is first mentioned ;is characteristic of the ludicrous ' Give the explanatory state- ment of this remark ? Is this characteristic sufficient, of itself, to constitute a ludicrous emotion ? What two illustrations show I that it is not sufficient 1 What else must, at the same (time, be perceived, in order to < constitute a ludicrous emotion ? (290) What subject, closely con- nected with the ludicrous, is < here taken up 1 \ Is the ludicrous essential to | wit i \ What is the defnnition of wit? (291) What is the first method, em- ployed by wit, for exciting lu- dicrous emotions ? W 7 hat is this species of wit I called? In general, what effect has a direct and formal attempt to de- \ base what is truely great 1 By what means may the same j be effected without the unpleas- ant effect ? In burlesque, what two things | are necessary to the assemblage \ of ideas ? | What is the first method by \ which this assemblage is effect- I ed ? What things are compared in the illustration ? What is the second method of managing burlesque? What analogy can there be 94 QUESTIONS ON between a lobster and the morn- j (294) in or ? | What may some think of the How must this comparison j value of the feelings which have strike every one? jbeen examined in this chapter? What is said of the second il- If this were so, with what lustration ? f > would it be at variance ? (093 \ What is the general economy \ of the mind ? What is the second method of J What is the fact, concerning wit in exciting the ludicrous? jthe use of the ludicrous? What may we call this kind j What does it certainly consti- ofwit? jtute? How are the expressions of \ How does this appear ? burlesque, and mock-heroic, con- > In what application is it an trusted ? \ effective agent ? What comparison is contained \ in the illustration of mock-heroic? > What other instances are to \ be included in this division of CHAPTER VI. wit ? /OQ~\ What is said of the ideas, in j t . }~™' these instances ? What is said of our knowledge What is said of the number I of the emotion of cheerfulness ? of methods of displaying wit ? At what times is it found to > exist ? (293) By what is it indicated ? What is next mentioned, as How does it affect manhood closely connected with the sub- and youth I ject of the ludicrous and wit ? j ^ £ at ™>rds express the same What do we find, among men, i f s cheerfulness, except in a as to their passions ? | higher degree ? What, with regard to their ac- \ . Ro ™ d ™? g^ess dlf &r from tions? |J°y and delight? To what sort of foibles are " 296 nearly all men subject? I What emotion is next consid- To what is the effect, pro- \ ered ? (luced by observing these incon-j By what words do we express gruities in connection with the slightest degree of melan- high traits of character, compar- j choly ? ed ? What is it called when very What do we say of one who seizes upon, and sets forth these foibles, in a lively and exact manner ? What do we call such des- criptions ? much increased ? What relation does sorrow hold to melancholy ? What emotion holds the same relation to sorrow, that gladness | does to joy ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 95 With what exception are the words grief and sorrow synony- mous ? What are sometimes the visi- ble signs of grief? How does sorrow differ from grief, in this respect? (297) Under what circumstances do we feel the emotion of surprise! How does astonishment differ from surprise ? When the feeling is very strong, how does it seem to affect the mind ? What do we say of a person thus affected 1 Under what circumstances does the emotion of surprise be- come wonder! For what is this emotion high- ly important? At what times is it very .evi- dent ? What is the effect of this viv- idness ? (298) What is that emotion which but slightly differs from melancholy? To what are we referred for a full understanding of this emo- tion ? What term expresses dissatis- faction in a higher degree 1 What is the difference between dissatisfaction and discrust ? (290) How is the emotion of diffi- dence often outwardly indicated? What is an interesting modi- fication of this emotion I How does it differ from diffi- dence ? What is the effect of this feel- ing combined with a natural de- sire of regard ? W hat is a Btill higher de of this mental state 1 Under what circumstances does the emotion of shame existl How is it outwardly character- ized ? Y\ hat is said of its connection with guilt ? Of what does it seem to be an appropriate punishment ? (300) What is that emotion which we exercise towards the great mass of our fellow creatures? What fact is sufficient to se- cure for them this regard ? Under what circumstances will regard, or respect, be raised to reverence ? What is said of just objects of reverence ? When does this emotion be- come adoration ? Towards whom, alone, should this exalted emotion be exercis- ed ? What is said of the wisdom and the goodness of men ? What reflections are here in- troduced, concerning the proper object of adoration ? In the foregoing chapters, has the subject of our emotions be< n fully explored ? What hope is expressed with regard to what has been said ? PART FIRST, CLASS SECOND, CHAPTER I. (301) What is the grand character- 96 QUESTIONS ON istic of that region of the natu- ral sensibilities on which we now enter 1 How is the intimate connec- tion of this state of mind with the whole department, now un- der consideration, expressed ? For what reason do we give the name of Desires to the whole of this portion of our sensibili- ties ? What epithet, then, may be properly applied to these sensi- bilities ? (302) To what must we turn, for an explanation of the nature of de- sires ? Why cannot a satisfactory definition be given, in words ? What is the only thing that can truly indicate the essential nature of desire ? Yet, how may we render our conceptions of it more distinct? (303) What is first mentioned, as important to have well settled, concerning the desires ? What especial reason is giv- en i (1) What is the first remark concerning the place of the de- sires ? What intervenes between the intellections and the desires ? What is sufficient proof of this ? What must exist as a causative occasion of desires ? What, then, in other words, is the prerequisite to desire ? (2) What fact is stated, in illustration of what has been said ! : What is involved by these ex- \ pressions of pleasure or of dis- j pleasure ? From what is emotion entirely j distinct? What, in general terms, is the | fixed law of the mind, in regard to this point ? (304) How do the desires compare with emotions, in regard to fix- 3 CJ edness ? How r is the difference between them portrayed ? ; How much consequence is | attached to the fact that the de- i sires are very tenacious of their : position ? By what example is this per- ! tinacity illustrated ? (305) What is the second charac- ; teristic of desires ? How do emotions differ from : desires, in this respect ? V\ hat is one reason of the \ greater fixedness of desires ? By what figures is the defer- ence between emotions and de- sires, again set forth ? (306) What general remark may ap- ply to the emotions ? What are we unable to deter- mine, concerning desires, though they are distinct objects of con- sciousness ? What is a third characteristic of desires ? Is this true, whether the ob- ject be good or evil ? With what will the degree of this enjovment vary ? (307) According to what w T ill desire vary in degree ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. or Where is the original cause of this variation ? By what argument is this point supported ? With what must we be careful not to confound the intensity or degree here spoken of? (308) With what characteristic shall we close this notice of the na- ture of desire ? Give the explanatory state- ment. Does desire always result in action ? What power must first be con- sulted ? What if the will decidedly op- pose action ? Yet, what is true of the ten- dency ? What is said of this tendency, in connection with the other states of the mind ? What would man be, with in- tellect alone ? What if he were possessed of the emotive sensibilities only ? What comparison is here us- ed, in illustration ? Where, only, does the tenden- cy to excite action exist ? What is the office of the will, with regard to this tendency ? (309) Under what circumstances might we be at liberty here to dismiss the subject of desires ? What circumstance sets us on a new, wide and interesting field of inquiry ? How are the desires some- times modified ? Explain. With what departments of the desires is this particularly the case ? What is said, in this connec- tion, of the affections ? In view of these remarks, for what do we seem to have an am- ple and distinct basis ? To what shall we now pro- ceed ? In what order will they be treated ? Mention the four classes in their order. (310) W T hat two-fold action have all \ the principles, now under exam- ination, excepting instinct ? Why may not this division ap- ^ ply to the instincts ? What remark, concerning the other three principles is import- ant in a moral point of view ? CHAPTER JI. (311) \ What are instincts ? | What is generally conceded | concerning this subject f From what circumstance are i these tendences called instincts? What is the original meaning j of instinct ? How do human and brute in- stincts compare ? Of what powers, granted to | man, are brutes nearly destitute? How has their benevolent Creator met this deficiency ? What examples illustrate this point ? (312) What account by Galen, illus- trates the instinct of brutes ? 9 QUESTIONS ON What has been often referred to, as a remarkable illustration of instinct ? What is mentioned by Dr. \ Reid, as a curious mathematical > problem ? To what, does this problem belong ? What did Mr. Maclaurin as- certain with regard to this prob- lem ? Do Bees know any thing of mathematics ? To what is their skillful work- ing compared ? Where is that geometry which guides the bee ? (313) What is said of the instincts of man, as compared with those of brutes? As compared with the other parts of his own nature ? [I] What is first mentioned, as a striking instance of human instinct ? What arguments are brought to show respiration to be in- stinctive? [II] What is the second il- lustration ? What do anatomists say of sucking and swallowing ? By what must each of these thirty pairs of muscles be attend- ed ? W hat is said of the order of their exertion ? ] By whom is this regular train j of operating so scientifically car-j ried on ? What is admitted, with regard to this matter ? j What shows that the infant^ has no knowledge of what is the proper means of removing hun- ger ? [III] What is the third in- stance of human instinct ? What are the illustrations ? (314) [IV] What is the difference between instinctive and deliber- ative resentment ? What illustrations are given of the former ? [V] To what danger are we liable, in treating of this subject? W 7 hat further instance may be safely added ? What illustration is given, of this power of interpreting signs? (315) _ For what does instinct seem to have been particularly designed? In what proportion is this aid diminished ? In what cases, are we wholly dependent on instinct ? What, then, is an evident conclusion, with regard to its value? What reflections close the slibject of instinct ? CHAPTER III. (316) What is the second division, under the general head of de- sires ? What is said of its extent and importance ? What are the prominent ap- petites ? What is the appetite of hun- ger ? The appetite of thirst ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 99 In what two particulars are they distinct from the instincts ; ; What is the first characteristic of this class of desires ? The second ? The third? What is remarked of the feel- ing of uneasiness, connected with the appetites ? (317) In what point of view are the appetites most interesting ? For what were the appetites intended ? What is said of reason without appetite ? What reflections illustrate the insufficiency of reason without appetite ? In what respect have brutes the advantage of man, in the ap- petites of hunger and thirst ? By what means do savages, in some degree, secure a like ad- vantage ? What two arguments show the appetites not to be selfish ? What will combine with the appetite, after the first experi- ence ? To what may this sometimes lead? What several powers and states of mind may combine with appetite in forming a com- plex passion ? In what proportion will this passion strengthen ? (What determinations of our nature are sure to strengthen by habit?) What is said of the victims of appetite? (318) What are some instances of artificial appetite ? By what meant do these arti- cles cause pleasure ! By what is this pleasun lowed ? By what mei | ob- tained I Explain, further, the |>n of becoming brutalized by the appetites. What is the only way to avoid forming such habits, after the first indulgence ? (319) To what two-fold operation are all the appetites subject ? How far is their operation an- alogous to that of the instincts ? But, having been once grati- fied, what may chiefly instigate them to subsequent action ? What sometimes happens, in view of the enjoyment before them ? To what degree are they sus- ceptible of voluntary action ? What is said of their morality, so far as they are merely instinc- tive ? In what case may they be morally good or evil ? In what, then, with respect to the appetites, ar.e vice and virtue; located ? CHAPTER IV. (320) Why is there no danger of confounding the propensities with the instincts ? In what two respects do they differ from the appetites I How do they differ from the affections? 100 QUESTIONS ON Please to mention some of the ( propensities. On what are they all based ? I low shall we best learn what is intrinsic in their nature? (321) What is the first propensity mentioned ? What two sources of proof have we of the existence of this desire ? What is a very ancient axiom, touching this point ? By what may this principle be annulled in its results ? In what sense must it con- stantly exist ? In what sense, only, does the desire of being extinct, exist in the mind of the suicide ? Of what, rather than life, does he desire to be rid ? (322) In what particular are the propensities analogous to the ap- petites ? When does this principle act instinctively ? What are the examples of this ? What of the rapidity and effi- cacy of this form of the desire ? In what case is the instinctive action very important ? When is the exercise of this desire said to be voluntary? Illustrate this voluntary action. What of the adaptation of this principle in both its forms ? When is its exercise morally good ! (323) What propensity is mentioned in the second place ? How is curiosity undoubtedly to be considered ? What is said of its degrees? How should we regard one destitute of this principle ? What would follow, if curios- ity w r ere not natural to man ? What is said of this state of things ? Where do we see the opera- tion of this principle ? Illustrate. What class of writers gain attention principally by means of the working of this principle ? What is, to them, the only requisite to success ? (324) To whom is reference made, in further proof that curiosity is an original propensity ? What is said of its operation in the deaf and dumb ? If this principle were not very strong, by what would it, in their case, be certainly overcome ? What particular case illus- trates this remark ? To what threefold deprivation was he subject ? For what did he show 7 a strong desire ? Into what various situations do we find him led by his curi- osity ? Where do we find, constantly, the most ample proofs that this is a deep seated principle in the mind ? What is its apparent effect upon them ? What are represented, in the poetic illustration, as objects of curiosity ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 101 (325) What twofold action has the principle of curiosity ? To what is purely instinctive action always directed ? For what does it pursue its object I What is the character of the instinctive operation of curiosity, as to morality ? On what is its voluntary oper- ation founded ? What does it imply ? Under what circumstances may its action be properly called voluntary ? How far may curiosity be vir- tuous or vicious ? Explain what is here meant. Give the example by which Mr. Stewart illustrates inordin- ate curiosity ? (326) Where do we find evidence of the existence of the propensity to imitate ? What is difficult of explana- tion, if we do not consider this propensity natural ? In discussing this whole sub- ject, to what periods of life will particular reference be had ? Why ? W hat is true of children, with respect to the principle now be- fore us? In what important matter are they greatly aided by this pro- pensity ? What is said of their acquir- ing the use of oral language ? How is it with them, after they have become old enough to join in juvenile sports ? Please ■ ome illm tions. How is this prin bou a in in In what ally feel most (327) What mistake are we in dan- ger of making, in estimating practical results of imitation I What general re- made, concerning the principles of the mind ? How do children and men compare, with regard to the ex- ercise of imitation 1 What does a careful consider- ation lead us to conclude, con- cerning the value of this princi- ple ? What is first mentioned as an evil which would result from the loss of this principle ? What is it desirable that we should do, even in mature age ? What great benefits immedi- ately result from our thus tread- ing in the steps of our fatln What is incumbent on « one, in view of the importance of imitation ? W T hat is said of him who a bad example, either domestic or public ? Of him who sets a goo.: pie? (328) What, after imitation, next original propensity } (I) To what do we appfe proof of the original of this principle ? (II) What is t!, I « - mark, concerning the lof< esteem ? 102 QUESTIONS ON What evidence do we find in; history, of the existence of this ^ principle in mature age ? Of what periods, in the his- tory of nations, is this especially j true ? (Ill) What peculiar circum-j stances are here mentioned, \ which sometimes put this princi- j pie to proof/ How do we feel, when subject j to such circumstances ? What doctrine does this view of the subject strongly oppose ? (IV) What is the fourth proof of the natural origin of this propensity ? What are the facts, with re- gard to our desire that men's good opinion of us may contin- ue \ What effect is produced by reasoning against these feelings ? (329) On what has the proper oper- ation of this principle a favora- ble effect ? What does it essentially pro- mote, in very early life ? What anticipation may we j form of a young man who cares \ not what people think of him ? j What has he annihilated ? To what has he thus exposed \ himself? What anecdote shows that Sylla understood the value ofj this principle ? \ What did he distinctly inti- i mate, in what he said of Ceesar ? Though this principle is in- nocent, against what must we guard ? Under what circumstances) may a good man not be able to conform to public opinion ? In what case must conscience be consulted ? To what will it prescribe lim- its ? By what comparison is illus- trated the impropriety of obeying the love of esteem, rather than conscience ? (330) What is the origin of our knowledge of the relations of objects ? Of what particular relation, here mentioned, do we early form a notion ? In what instances do very young children give evidence of their knowledge of this relation? What is implied by the actu- ality of possession ? Yet how is the idea of posses- sion to be regarded ? In what view of the subject may all men be said to have a natural desire of possession ? Where is the fact of its exist- ence revealed ? How is the heart affected by this discovery 1 (331) On what does the moral char- acter of the desire of possession depend ? How might some, on slight examination, be induced to speak of this principle ? How far is its action capable of being right, or wrong ? When does it assume the form of an instinct ? What is its character, under this form ? When is this love of posses- sion vicious ? S TAL PHILOSOPHY. L03 When is it virtuous ? How low a grade of being seems necessarily implied by a destitution of this principle ? By what argument is this view supported 1 What passages of scripture imply the innocence of the de- sire to expand the range of our existence ? (332) Of what character is the or- dinary action of this principle conceded, probably to be ? What is here repeated as a great law of the mind ? Why, then, is the possessory principle apt to become too strong ? What does this principle thus become ? What is universally under- stood by covetousnessl What reflections are made on this form of the desire of pos- session ? What does this principle be- come when still further strength- ened by repetition ? What remark is made upon this grade of the principle ? (333) Against what wrong impres- sion are we warned, with regard to poiver? Of what is power an attribute. In what manner is it made known to us by the intellect ? On what occasion is the idea of power revealed to us ? Is power the less real, because not an object of the senses? What comparison illustrates' its distinctness ? Why, then, may we properly speak of the desire Of power ' What sort of principle ia the desire of power I What is the first remark, in support of this vie Of what is pow< r undoubted!] an essential attribute ! i What follows if an intelli \ and sentient existence is d< Me? What also follows from the ) fact that happiness is desirable ! By what examples has Mr. ; Stewart illustrated these vie (334) How far may we suppose the > desire of power to be innocent \ and useful ? \ Upon what will its moral char- \ acter depend, so far as it is vol- ) untary ? \ When will the exercise of this desire be virtuous ? When does it become vicious ? What do we call this desire, when it becomes excessive ? How is it shown that ambition is not innocent ? (335) What is the foundation of self- love ? What supposition, with regard to happiness and misery, would be contrary to common experi- ence and facts 1 With what other dev- our consciousness teach that this desire is equally intense ' In what acts of men do w. constantly see the effects of this principle 1 What is here noticed as a kind arrangement of providence I In what instance has this prin- 101 QUESTIONS ON ciple a reference to inward con- j sol ations ? What will an enlightened con-j science teach us, concerning the | pursuit of happiness ? (336) From what has been said \ above, what is concluded con- cerning the desire of happiness ? With what is this opinion ac- cord ant ? | What notice does the Bible >> take of this principle ? Are we required to love our \ neighbor better than ourselves? \ What do we call this desire of ) happiness? What is said of this term ? Why is this term liable to be misapplied ? What is selfishness ? How are self-love and selfish- ness contrasted, as to morality ? By what are we bound to make this distinction ? How is the contrast between \ them, again expressed ? (337) | What celebrated writer is giv- \ en as authority for the opinion \ that the possessory principle is connatural with the mind ? j What one, that self-love should be regarded in the same light ? Why is this subject particular- j ly important ? What does Dr. Wardlaw say, with regard to the originality of self-love? How does he regard its pres- > ent workings, in man? What does he call the perver- sion of self-love ? How does he characterize sel- fishness. In what part of the law 7 of God is self-love assumed as a stan- dard ? What would be the effect on this command, if self-love were taken away? Does the Bible anywhere dis- approve of this principle ? In what instances is it there directly appealed to ? (338) What is meant by sociality ? On what is this propensity founded ? How has this propensity been sometimes regarded ? What is the fact, concerning this principle, in its first opera- tion ? What has been stated as one of the characteristics of desire? Is this true of sociality ? What, then, may be true of its action, after the experience of pleasure from one successful ex- ertion ? What may, perhaps, such an exercise of the principle be call- ed ? What is chiefly indicated, con- cerning this principle, by such an exercise of it ? What is the character of the principle of sociality, in itself considered ? How may it still be innocent, when, after its first exercise, it is indulged with a view to self- gratification ? (339) (1.) Where, in the first place, may we find evidence that there is such a thing as the propensity of sociality ? To whom do very young chil- MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. dren discover a strong attach-! ment ? To what, mostly, is to bo at- tributed their unhappiness at be- ing left alone ? What further facts illustrate the existence of this principle in children / (II.) In the second place, where do we find evidence of the ex- istence of sociality ? Why can older people sustain solitude better than children ? By what is it proved that man's proper element is society ? (What is meant by his proper element ?) (340) \"\ hat iact evinces tne great strength of the principle of so- ciality ! What circumstance in the his- tory of Baron Trenck, illustrates this statement 1 By what anecdote has Mr Stew- art illustrated the same point 1 Give the illustration from Sil- vio Pellico. How does he speak of the principle of sociality ! (341)" From the foregoing considera- tions, what is maintained con- cern inn; sociality 1 How must we regard those cases of strife and contention, which sometimes arise in society? Under what circumstances would sociality be successful in preventing such occurrences ? What strange notions have Mr. Hobbes and others advanc- ed concerning sociality I What is conceded to civil gov- ernment, well administered .' What better foundation has civil society ! By what may the tend< i of this principle be, for a time, annulled \ Is the principle ever extin- guished ! By what comparison has ( per illustrated this principle ! CHAPTER V. (342) Under what four heads was it proposed, Sec. 309, to discuss the desires ? Which three have already been sufficiently handled ? Which one shall we now pro- ceed to consider 1 What, in the first place, dis- tinguishes the affections from the other forms of our propensive nature ? What is here noticed as a fact, concerning the manner in which we contemplate the different parts of our nature 1 How are the insiinefs, appetites and propensities ranked on the scale of our esteem ? What is the rank of the affec- tions? Where do they stand, on the list? (343) Are the affections of mind, or compl< What is, indeed, true ol state of mind denoted by the term affection? With what will 1 1 emo- tion, implied in this term, always mbined ! Whatd( sort of passioo I Into what two bi may the affectu na be divided I L06 QUESTIONS ON What is, generally, character- istic of the malevolent affections? Of the benevolent affections? What chiefly distinguishes the two classes ? What word may be employed nonymous with affections? IIow will it be used in this work ? IIow is it sometimes employed? (344) Which of the malevolent affec- tions will first be considered ? (What relation may this be considered to hold to all the oth- ers ?) Of what is this affection com- pounded ? To what does the desire, in its original state, seem to be, in some degree, a counterpart ? What is the explanatory state- ment ? In saying they are counter- parts, what should we feel it un-| safe to assert ? What are some of the modifi- 1 cations of resentment ? (345) What twofold action have the j affections I What is their operation in each of these divisions? W hich form will be first treat- ed ? What are the occasions on which this form of resentment- may arise ? To what is its rapidity com- 1 pare Wh.it proves its exceeding! I \\ h it consideration does this) rapidity preclude? What is the precise thino- that i ° arouses us f What illustrations are given of this sort of resentment ? (346) What seems to be the object (or final cause) of instinctive re- sentment ? What shows the practical im- portance of this form of the prin- ciple ? What is the glory of the moral nature ? Give the explanatory state- ment. Why cannot instinctive action be said to possess any moral character ? (347) In what point of view is the second division of resentment the more important ? How are we able to modify in- stinctive resentment, and impart to it a moral character ? What is the appropriate occa- sion of voluntary resentment ? What is the explanatory state- ment ? What is the final cause and whole object of instinctive re- sentment ? What is embraced in the final cause of voluntary resentment? Give the explanatory statement. With reference to what, princi- pally, does it dispense its retri- bution ? When is voluntary resentment right ? When is it wrong ? On what supposition is this statement made ? What circumstance may place MENTAL PHIi. the subject in a different light I What is said of the practical operation of the principle of re- sentment ? How might its deliberate ex- ercise be justified in many cases? What is, however, admitted, concerning it ? What mistake do men often make, with regard to its exercise 7 What is one cause of the fre- quency of unjustifiable anger ? If, when angry, we could turn away from ourselves and con- sider the matter candidly, how should we often be affected ? j What, besides the Bible, has instituted some checks upon the exercise of this passion ? First. What is the first check imposed by nature ? What has often been asserted by those who have endured this check 1 What seems to have been the peculiar design of imposing this check ? Second. What, secondly, is mentioned as a punishment for excessive resentment ? How are men often affected by the experience or anticipation of this punishment ? Third. What is mentioned, | in the third place, as an unfa- vorable tendency of the indul- gence of anger ? What of the mere outward signs of anger ? What of the smile of benevo- lence ? In addition to the punishment of anger, what reward is secured by it? (349) W hence are drawn some I siderationa against the of anger, additional to th< provided by natur< (I.) What is the Mod- eration ? YV hat effect has appearance of action- I What is here recorded a saying of Socrates ? What opinion does that ing indicate ? (2.) What is the second con- sideration ? How might we proceed to ar- gue, in restraint of our anger, under this head ? (3.) What is the third con- sideration? What if we ourselves were without sin ? What must every one feel, who knows his own heart ? What reflection is here added? (4.) What is the fourth con- sideration ? What doctrine elevates the Christian Code far above all hu- man systems ? Repeat the language of this doctrine ? (350) By what various term- do we denominate resentment, in ordi- nary cases What is peevishness or Jr< nessl How docs y ss differ from ordinary Describe the cou ivish- By what compal illustrated \ 108 QUESTIONS ON To what is peevishness com-' pared ? Which is the more unreason- able ? What sometimes prevents peev- ishness from being so disagreea- ble as it otherwise would be ? (351) What is envy ? As a mere state of the mind, how is envy to be regarded? How, in respect to the occa- sions of its origin ? What is its character in the eye of justice ? What is the reason of our ex- periencing this perversion, on seeing the advancement of an- other ? (352) What, after envy, is next men- tioned as a variety of resent- ment? What is included in the feel- ing of jealousy? What is the distinctive char- acteristic of this passion ? What is sometimes called jeal- ousy, on account of its analogy to this passion ? To what is the strength of this passion generally proportionate ? What persons are most subject to it ? Why? What is said of a jealous per- son's judgment and observation ? Why has it been character- ized as the monster that "makes the meat it feeds on " ? How are the tormenting con- tradictions of jealousy set forth ? (353) What is the next modification of resentment ? What is understood by a spirit of revenge? What is revenge, compared with mere resentment ? What more is implied by it, than mere excess ? What is always the moral character of revenge ? Accordingly, with what is it inconsistent, and by what con- demned ? (354) What emotion and desire are embraced by fear ? What question is here suggest- ed ? By what remark (sec. 343) was this case referred to ? What circumstances, howev- er, seem to bring it more prop- erly under this, than under the other division ? To what will the strength of fear be proportionate? With what will the amount of apprehended evil vary, in differ- ent persons ? Yet, what proportion will al- ways remain true ? What is the effect of extreme fear? What is said of the power of this state of mind ? What cautionary hint is here suggested ? VVhen does fear become de- spair ? Under what head .will this state of mind be considered ? CHAPTER VI. (355) \ What is the basis of the be- \ nevolent affections ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 100 What emotion and desire are? embraced by love ? What, then, will always be^ found in the object, fitted to ex- cite a pleasant emotion ? What constitutes the affection of love, properly so called? What are some of the modi- > fications of love, by degree? What illustrates the fact that love is subject to modifications in kind? What is said of the love of parents for their children? Under what eight heads is it I proposed to consider the benev-i olent affections ? (356) In what characteristic is love j analogous to resentment ? Where, in particular, is it sometimes seen to operate in- stinct ivehj? When is it said to be volunta- vyl (357) What is first mentioned, as an j interesting modification of love ? j What view is proposed to be taken of this modification ? [I] By what, in the first place, is this view supported ? In what peculiar light does; the parent view the child ? What is he here said to see in ; mm / j What must be true, then, as | to the depth of parental affec-l tion? [II] What is the second con- j sideration, given in support of this view ? What would be found insup- \ portable, to the parent, without \ the aid of this principle? What comparison illustrates the effect of this principle upon the heart ? [III] What circumstance is given, in the third place, as prov- ing this view ? Why cannot a voluntary affec- tion be implanted \ Why is an instinctive affection necessarily implanted ? Upon what is the voluntary action of this affection based ? How must we regard its in- stinctive action ? As a whole, how may this af- fection be regarded ? [IV] What is the fourth cir- cumstance, in favor of this view? What might we confidently expect of any affection not im- planted by nature ? What is asserted, on the con- trary, of the universality of this affection? (358) [V] What is the fifth cir- cumstance, in favor of this view? What is said of the strength of secondary affections? How is the strength of paren- tal affection found to be in all minds ? What is said of him who has not noticed illustrations of this affection ? Give an account of the exam- ple which occurred on board of the Ajax. (359) What is the counterpart to pa- rental affection ? In what does filial affection, agree with parental I What is the first particular in which it differ.: I 10 no QUESTIONS ON What is the practical object of! fail, yet, how has filial affection parental affection ? \ always sustained itself? Which is attended with the j What is asserted in confirma- greater responsibility; parental i t i on G f this fact? affection, or filial ? What illustration is taken from What, alone, could answer the } ^ history of Russia? requisitions of the child upon the What inGident> in the history P ar t ^. nt • . . „ . r , I of the French Revolution, shows Why is it sufficient, for the; the comparatiTe strength of pa- love of the child for the parent, vp ^ al n £ p , f i™ ? to bum with a gentler ray ? (360) What is the first remark, in favor of considering filial an ^ c . S of strong filial affection exh,bited tion as original? m a Roman prison ? What shows that reason and I What was the effect of this ex- reflection cannot be its basis ? i am P e > upon the people of the What train of thought still fur- ! neighborhood ? ther illustrates this view ? u hat °* er similar instance is (To what other affection does : mentioned ? this illustration equally apply \ (36*2) What is the second remark.; T -r T1 , . - . 7 ^ « c ^ c ,, • n \ >* hat is /rafernaY affection ? m confirmation ol tins view I TT , J ' , . . . , T1 , ii * How does this principle com- Illustrate what is here meant . ... ., r . . r wu * n t. P are with the two, last mention- What penalty has nature at- r , ,. . ' r . . . >i>^ ^ *w«„i^;™ ^ ^i- ijed, as to distinctness of onginal- What is said of such instances in proof of filial affection ? Give the account of an instance Uty? ; To what are we referred fo tached to the violation of filial affection ? What is said of the uniform- 1 J ° , wnat ■" we J™ 8 ™* ,! or ity of the course of nature ? ™ ™ 1°!? ta " dln f of f '^ P? cuhar wk«4 4k^ j u j- *- x * ' trait of this kind of love? What, then, does sue distinct- ly intimate, by the penalty above \ . Hmv " do some attempt to ex-' stated ? Why is this an argument that this affection is not left to reason and reflection ? What other consideration might be brought to support this view ? plain the origin of this affection? What weight is due to these considerations? What one circumstance is a sufficient answer to this expla- nation ? \S hat circumstances, under ,~ " x the hand of nature, constitute a .peculiarly sacred tie? W here may be found illustra- What other remarks mio-ht ap- tions of filial affection ? ply i n proo f of the connatural- Which is strongest, however, ness of this affection? filial or parental affection? j To what decision is the sub- W hirh. then, is more liable to ject left ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 1 1 1 (363) By what general name may we call the affections which have now been passed under review 1 Of what are they an evidence 7 What directly beneficial influ- , ence do they exert. What indirect benefit is de- rived from them ? What was a strange notion of Plato, and other ancients? Why cannot these affections be destroyed by the process which they recommended? What would be the effect on the public, if they were destroy- ed ? What reflections are brought j to show that the family relation j is one of the greatest supports of society ? (364) What is an interesting and J, disputed question, in relation to the domestic affections? What is the more common opinion ? What rank, among the natural sensibilities, is assigned to the domestic affections ? What other reasons are there, for the common opinion concern- ing their morality ? What is here thought to be the correct view of the subject? What example is here given, of the instinctive operation of parental affection ? In what sense are such acts j good ? j What argument shows that: they have no moral character ? (365) Under what circumstances may the exercise of the benevo- lent affect] ither vifl or \ icious I W hat i- the basis of maternal ion ? What operation I ;, for moral character of this ry operation ? W hen does it become \ icious? Give an illustration of virtu- ous mental affection 1 (366) In connection with what, the highest benevolence exist? With what is perfect justice indissolubly joined ? What is said of all forms of benevolence, is the least at vari- ance with justice ? To what, then, must even be- nevolence be subject? When are we sacredly bound to repress its present iodulgi What was the character i I bishop Las Cassas ? "What moved his pity in the island of Hispaniola? To what did he devote all his subsequent life ? Influenced by his benevolent feelings, what did he recommend to the Spanish government ? What would have been clear- ly his duty, if he could foreseen the result upon the N( - groes, of his present ben< to the Indians? (What is the character oi nevolence, always, in to«0 Yet, what would ha the character of his act, if, on the above supposition, 1"- had indulged bis benevolent What must v , '*' 1 " 112 QUESTIONS ON cerning that system which says j reader of his narrative get, con- that benevolence is virtuous in cerning innate humanity ? its own nature ? J What is his exclamation, in (%Qf\ \ view of what he had experienced? What three suppositions, only, W ^ at is the testimony of the can be made concerning the af-j * fection of humanity ? What is said of the first prop- osition ? | (369) What is said of the second? W1 . u Al . , T . . Al , What is all that is here pro- In entering upon the support , . , . , , r c *\ *i • a i * • a * K i ' posed to be maintained, concern- oi the third, what is first to be p ■ . , . i % . A i ing innate humanity I understood 1 5 . , , ? What is the third \ cans 1 What is the anecdote of Park? What is too evident concern- ing this affection ? By what principle is humani- ty doubtless impeded ? argument | in proof of its existence ? What is here mentioned as a \ fact honorable to Christianity ? Yet, what is undoubtedly true What is the tendency of self-! fet what is undoubtedly ] ove ? °f lands not christianized? Yet, though greatly depressed, | What remark of Mr. Swartz what is still true of humanity'? j concerning Tanjore, illustrates How is this fact shown, in the i V? 1S sub J ec t, with regard to In- first place ? i dl \l u What is said of our feelings L VVhat other > kindred fact is of interest in the climate &,£. I here _ st ated in illustration ? of other countries ? How is the intensity of this j interest, compared with what we \ feel for the inhabitants ? What do we find whenever we \ touch a string here ? What two instance tioned ? With what are these plainly inconsistent? are men- facts (370) What is the effect of the mere! What is the fourth argument aspect of man, and the sound ofl to P£ ove that hum anity is innate? the human voice ? j What reflection shows that a What is scarce any one so sel- contrary state of things would fish as to avow ? be inconsistent with the desire of } esteem ? J What, that it would be incon- sistent with sociality ? (368) What is the second argument, in proof of innate humanity ? T To w'haT nrlT^J * j i_ To what people is particularly? ' ^ pr0n,pted hy reference here had? wu f i wr . . , „ . What opportunity had Hotze- objS * ^^ *** ftS 2^r reCtjUdgment Ljr" "*■ ** ^Id What impression must thej What reflection shows that this MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 113 principle requires the existence of innate humanity 1 WiihoHt innate humanity, what inconsistency would be presented by conscience ? What is concluded from the remarks in this section ? (371) What is patriotism ? What intention of nature seems I Under what modification does humanity gain one degree of in- tensity ? Under what form does it ac- ; acquire still another ? What emotion and desire are combined in the affection of \ friendship ? $ With respect to whom, may this affection be supposed to ex- inseparable barrier to friendship'? (373) For what purpose has Provi- to be intimated by diversity of| What ig a common rema rk, in language and by the boundaries \ reference t0 this int? by which she has divided the Y et, what diversities of char- w0 T r i ' . . , . , . . „ \ acter may be consistent with How is the foundation laid tor ; f r i enc j s jjir> ? that state of mind which we call \ Wfaat diversitv must be an patriotism : W T hat broader relation is too little recognized ? How does it appear that pat- riotism is a secondary affection 1 j dence implanted within us the In what proportion is patriot- : principle of : pity ? ism more intense than humanity? How does this differ from the What is, practically, the fact, other benevolent affections? with regard to the strength of What is the appropriate occa- patriotism 1 sion for the exercise of this af- How does it appear that pat- < fection ? riotism need not conflict with; On contemplating a case of humanity ? suffering, what emotion precedes What must here be confessed \ the desire to relieve ? of patriotism, in point of fact ? j What sentiment has Bishop Why has this feeling become Butler expressed of the practical disproportionate, as compared \ importance of this principle ? with philanthropy? j Where are, for the most part, What poet has strongly ex- \ our sources of happiness ? | W 7 hat is said of the power of others to inflict misery upon us ? In what different aspects is pity very important in regulating pressed the effect of this dispro- portion ? (372) Is the affection of friendship, t ^s power ? in distinction from humanity, | In what point of view? espe . connatural . S cially, does it appear eminently Why does it deserve a separ- suited to the con dition of man ? ate notice ? j Why is not humanity a feeling (3 '4) .of muoh strength ? What opinion is sometimes ex* ' 10* 114 QUESTIONS ON To what must this affection have been analogous ? To what twofold action was it, therefore, subject? How must it have differed from the oth^r affections ? What is said of its intensity ? From what does it appear that man must have originally posses- sed such a love, overruling the subordinate principles ? What have we, thus far, seen in all the departments of the mind ? Where may we find proof of this, even without considering the intellect? What is here said of the in- stincts? What of the appetites? The propensities ? The affections? For what purpose is paternal affection implanted ? What affection pertains to the relation of the child ? To man, as such ? What relation is still more im- portant than those just mention- ed ? Then what will analogy justi- fy us in saying ? What if there were no such original principle in the mind ? What reflections contain the argument from analogy ? (377) What argument is urged, in the second place, to prove origi- V 376 ) I nal love to the Creator ? Why does it seem a necessa- 1 What was the character of ry conclusion that there must every thing, when first created? have been, originally in man's What must we say of pro- constitution, a principle of love to [ nouncing all things good, if man &od ? « the noblest work, were created pressed of the affection of pity ? Why is it natural that this opinion should be entertained ? How does this affection oper- ate, in the first instance ? Why is an instinctive action, of pity, necessary ? So far as it acts in this way, what must be its character, as to virtue and vice ? Under what circumstances may it have a moral character ? When is it right ? What two examples illustrate the moral character of pity ? What is conceded, with regard j to a character, in which pity abounds ? Why is this concession made ? (375) What distinct modification of love, is last mentioned? In what does this agree with the other benevolent affections ? What circumstance distin- guishes it from them all ? What if we can trace the good i we have received, to some sel-; fish motive in the giver ? What, then, is necessary toj excite gratitude? j To what must be ascribed the ; difference in the degree of grati- tude, felt by different persons ? CHAPTER VII. MENTAL PHILOSOrilV. lie destitute oflove for his Creator? In what image does the Bible : say man was created ? What are we to understand by this expression ? How must we suppose God to be regulated, in his administra- tion of justice and benevolence? What is it the nature of God; to love ? If man were possessed, as God j is, with affections and moral sen- timents corresponding to the na-| ture and relation of things, that | is, if he were created in the in> age of God, whom must he ne- cessarily love ? What kind of beings are we,; not to suppose God able to ere- \ ate? What is said of adjudging to I such a being the image of God ? \ What, then, is inferred from the statement that man was ere- \ ated in the image of God ? What does the same reason lead us to believe, concerning \ the exaltedness of this love ? To what conclusion, as to its; action, are we pointed by analo- gy' (378) What is the second argument from Scripture ? What does the Savior declare to be the first and great com- mandment ? What is implied by this lan- guage ? What do we constantly find recognized, in the New Testa- ment, which involves the restor- ation of this great principle ? What is man required to be ? What is requisite to his being such? What, (hen, ;nr *« , lim , cd in asserting ! ^ hat .shall uc learn, in next section! concerning the presence of this principlel What, concerning it- afa • i (879) w here, among the principles concerned in the paOumaiii partment, is ranked Um to i How shall we answer the ob- jection, that, this principle of hu- man action is obliterated | How, the objection that men are not naturally governed hv it' What is clearly indicated <>t the mind, by both mental philos- ophy and the Divine Scripturesl What do they indicate to be the proper description of man. as to intellect and morals I How long, according to these views, must he continue in this condition ? On what supposition aloni can we assert the wisdom which we claim for the structure of hu- man nature ? Supposing this great princi- ple, of love to God, to exist in the human mind, what becomes a natural inquiry ? What rank should be assigned to it, without hesitation ? How does it compare with the love of country, friends, parents and children ? Repeat the scripture, } cited, touching this principle ' What are the benefits arising from the exercise of this princi- ple ? From the scriptural exercise of this principle, what mu-t re- sult to the subordinate prim - pies? 116 QUESTIONS ON Give the explanatory state- j By what two statements is the rnent. subject brought to the test of (3gQ) < com in on observation ? \ What supposition is first What is the point of inquiry j mac ] e ? in the opposite view ; that is, j p suc h instances ever occur? suoDosinof love to God to be ab- tt 71 . . . , iuppuoiu & iw v. . What is a common remark, sent? concerning a man thus devoid of How does love to God operate tfaaee&a a ° ffections ? on the exercise of the subordm- , Tq ^ does a .^^ ate principles ? for if hi]a a If tins love be withdrawn from farnigh ; gn . o fmxiH ^ ? God, where will it naturally een- , reflections would a man L T . « • i -n u of domestic affections be likely W hat principles will become . , , 4 * j ■ * • • , . r ^ r ) to make, when tempted to give predominant I . j appetites ? What disorders are thus ac-? { KT , ., . ■£ . , , c n VV hat would he the probable counted for 1 re<5uh ? * What are calculated to recti- ™,' 4 ,, . .., . * '. ' j- j 1 What would be likely to re- fy these disorders ? u .- , r . ^ c , J iru * • *i « «*: ~ ~r *i„J suit, » he were destitute of do- What is now the action ot the< '. «, A - o « mestic aliectjons ' ^Of'theDropensities? I Under what supposition, sec- What becomes of the warn- 1 ond1 ^ would the Probability of ino-s of conscience, and the con- hls falling be greatly increased,? sequent resistance, made by the | What 1S lost by removing n ,{//? ahese leading principles of hu- What contrast is thus present- j man act i°n ? ed, by what men are, to what \ Frorn what does the will re- they ought to be ? j ceive important aid ? In this condition of things, of? What must follow, if these what do we find the true source? \ sources be removed ? What is necessarily involved { W 7 hat metaphor illustrates the by the dethronement of God in \ downward tendency of human the heart 1 \ nature, in this state of things ? (381) | What is asserted of this view What is said of the impor- 1 of the subject ? tance of the topic of the last! To what particular principle section? will these illustrations fully ap- Of what does that section rp'y • chiefly consist ? | What must be the effect of For whose sake shall we de- \ love to God upon the inferior lay upon this subject a little Ion- \ principles ? ger ? i If we were under the influ- What will sometimes operate I ence of this principle, what upon the mind, as a proof? j would be our reflections, when MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. tempted to yield too much to the inferior principles ? What would be the effect up- on our evil passions ? What immediately result?, if this grand principle be obliter- ated ? CHAPTER VIII. (382) What is expressed by the term habit, in its application to the various mental powers ? (3S3) To which of the pathematic sensibilities does habit not ap- ply ? In considering the results of habit, what arrangement will be \ followed with the other sensibil- ities involving desire? Accordingly, what habit is first taken up ? How do the appetites act, or- iginally I What is incidental to their nature 1 Under what circumstances, do we, in view of this pleasure, of- ten stimulate them, a second time ? What is the result of this vol- untary repetition of the indul- gence ? What class of people are an unfortunate example of the truth of this statement 1 What if they had indulged their appetite only a few times ? (384) What if we continually in- dulge the | In point of fact, sometimes find ii. ciality to < What ia Mid, in tion, o! ii J> any ni;m i miser l>\ n tl W ho is to blame foi being u mi Of what is this in- rdii strength of the desire ol sion the natural and i. result ? What is the reason that desire of power so often inordinate ? What alone will Batisfj one possessed of an inordinate sire of power ? How may we suppose him to contemplate even the Sup- Being? (885) What example Ulusti effect of habit, in count with the malevolent aj) What illustration is 1. of the effect of habit on tb nevolent affection- ! What fact is here cxplai on this principle ? May these views be apple all the benevolent affection What is asserted ofpatrioti How may the habil of pathv be acquired I What is found to be the • of habit on the principle of tow to God ? How may the habit of 1" God be acquin d ' What principles bs origin explained by the habit, abtt US QUESTIONS ON Give some examples of sec- < ondarxj principle ? Why might we almost mistake these, in some persons, for orig- inal principles ? What, probably, is the chief reason of their being sought af- ter ? How, in this instance, do the means and the end become al- most inseparably associated ? In what apparent affection does this habit result ? What is mentioned as one of the forms assumed by avarice ? Are men born with this pas- sion ? How is money loved, in the first instance ? How do men form this habit of loving dollars and cents ? What have become insepara- bly connected, in his thoughts, by this habit ? Under what circumstances has a secondary principle of sociali- ty been produced by habit 1 How great a degree of inten- sity may it acquire ? What is said of the number of secondary appetites, propen- sities, &c, which may be found by habit ? What may be explained by- applying this view of human na- ture ? PART SECOND. CHAPTER I. (3S7) Under what three grand divis" ions was it proposed, (sec. 1) to content! ate .the mind? In passing from the intellect to the sensibilities, where do we first find ourselves ? On leaving the emotions, by what two ways may we pass on, to the remote department of the a- ill ? In accordance with this plan, what was first done, on leaving the subject of the intellect? What was attempted, in the second place? To what point is it now .pro- posed to return ? Under what general head are a part of the emotions included? What shall we approach, in this opposite direction ? What question will not be mooted here ? What is considered decisive of this question ? (3S8) W r hich is most complicated, the moral or the palhematic na- ture? Yet, what correspondence is there between them ? What is the first subdivision of the pathematic sensibilities ? Into what two branches are the moral sensibilities divided ? Which of these leading bran- ches, the moral, or the pathe- matic, is capable of still farther division 1 What two divisions, then, will comprehend the whole subject of the moral sensibilities ? Why may not this subject be despatched in a few words? (3S9) What statement of the last section is here repeated? . 119 Yet, what several things, in the mind, are conceded to be closely connected with morals | How does the moral nature, exclusively considered, develope itself in the first place? How in the second place ? Mention some of the subdi- visions of the pathematic emo- tions. What is the only class of mor- al emotions I What is the first remark, con- cerning these moral emotions 1 What two things are implied by their being original 1 Why cannot these feelings be defined ? Hence, in their distinctive na- ture, by what alone can they be known ? Yet, what two reasons are given for believing that their nature is well understood ? Under what circumstances, then, must every one have had emotions of approval or disap- proval ? (390) What is the mental position of moral emotions I With what do they agree, in this respect ? What reflections illustrate this point ? By what are the natural emo- tions immediately followed ? By what, the moral emotional Between what states of mind, then, must moral emotions in- tervene ? Therefore, what must precede moral emotions 1 What must precede feelings of moral obligation ? Whenever we are said to be under obligation to * t, ot I stain, where may ire fim reason for tin tionl According to whit will oar emotions of approval and d proval vary in their cfa What illustration i What is said <>t' thifl tr.nt in our moral emotion* .' On what supposition could n< T , , ie literature of all nations ? In wb f wa [ ™ ust we proceed What classes of writers give ) to 8* a knowledge of this sub- _ ject? i How do we ascertain that the feeling of obligation exists in a conspic- the moral sentiments nous place ? What might be said of their : leelin £ introduction, if there were no various degrees ? real distinction between duty To what other simple state of md personal interest? mind is this state analogous, in ] this respect 1 ^ J How do we express the differ- What, in the fourth place, isj ent degrees of belief? proof of the existence of feelings \ By what phrases do we express noral obligation ? j the different degrees of moral How does it appear that there ; obligation ? MENTAL PHI) (41 Lt do feelipo tioi) always imply I What more than more a< must appear possible, before ob- ligation will be felt, in any Give the explanatory statement. What is said of constrain an ingredient of these feelii What sense are we cautioned tst attaching to the word raint. in this connection : To what, must we remember it is not analogous ! What expression of St. Paul is here introduced ? What is the meaning of this expression ? In reference to this state of the feelings, what expressions do we frequently use ? What is the original import of expressions 1 In what manner is this trait of the feeling of obligation indicat- ed by these expressions ? By what, alone, can we get a full understanding of it ? (406) What question may be started, I with regard to classing I feelings. tat is here admitted as pro- per, with regard to classes . ; What is the first reason why these 9 have not been ed with emotu Hew is the difference in the duration of emotions and feel- ings of obligation illustrat What is reasonable to expect o[^ a man, if he feels the senti- ment of duty How is the difficulty of eradi- (41 W hat is the - What l- mor; : In what In this Inst the objects, in In what view oent upon I What is the time referred gatio What is the in which it can exi What , stance which s feel- ings of obi motions ! What is the illusti I What comnn n men illustrate il ! Wh What is th- in what I - (1.) Wh of the distincti In 124 QUESTIONS ON teristics do they closely approach , each other ? (2) What, in the second place, shows a distinction be- tween them ? What remarks are made in il- \ lustration ? (410) What must follow, if there is no real distinction between de- sires and feelings of obligation ? What is clearly implied by morality ? j By what must moral emotions) be succeeded, before men are led to action ? By what must all other emo-; tions be succeeded, in order to secure action ? Of what two mental states, on- ] ly,does the will take cognizance, < in making up its determinations? What feelings do brute ani-j mals possess, in common with men ? Why do we never speak of; them as possessing a moral char- acter 1 How does our treatment of' them show that we believe them free from moral obligation ? What would be equally true? of man, if he were destitute of ■ these feelings ? CHAPTER IV. (411) What two divisions embrace all the states of mind probably belonging to the moral sensibili- ties? What is first mentioned as an important inquiry, incidental to this subject ? What two kinds of uniformity are to be considered ? Which is the most important? What is implied by uniformity in principle ? What is the rule or law upon which the uniformity of the mor- al nature is based ? By this law, how may we just- ly regard the decisions of con- science, everywhere ? What mistaken opinion have some entertained, with regard to the code of morals established by nature ? What is the correct view of the case ? (412) What is the greatest objection that has been brought against the doctrine of a connatural conscience ? What kind of uniformity is admitted to be wanting ? Is there a want of uniformity of principle ? Which kind of uniformity are we desirous to witness as an at- tribute of conscience ? What is said of a uniformity of decision, based on any other view ? What is all we need show, to meet the objection above sta- ted ? What is the first remark on this point ? By what is this change, not only permitted, but required ? If its uniformity exists in re- lation to the facts perceived, and involves the sameness of those facts, what must follow ? MENTAL PHI1 W hat, then - true, in point of fact, with regard to the manifestations of conscience ? By what is this point illustra- ted f What now is considered as well understood and acknowl- edged ? What shall we endeavor to show, in discussing the variations of conscience ? (413) What is first mentioned, as causing diversities in the decis- - of conscience ? What is the explanatory state- ment of this remark ? What will a proper applica- tion of this statement help us to explain ? What question is supposed, for the purpose of illustration ? What is admitted, concerning the moral action, in this case, when two men decide differently upon it ? Yet, what is certainly the fact, as to this difference ? Bv what superior ability is one enabled to pronounce it right ? What is all the other is able .■_>mprehend ? What, then, will be his decis- ion ? According to what, in each instance, does the moral nature decide ? Of what is the want of uni- formity, in this case, good evi- dence ? In what sense are these de- >ns 3 in fact, uniform ! What is the only proper ground of decision ? 114) With \\ Snd dm; By what might I be ill i' What is the moi of theft ? How do oh; nature, suppose it musl be viewed by a science l In this connection, v. do they a] What evidence is here not . in particular I What is the statement of I tain Cook ? What is first remarked, i planation of this at I What reason have we for posing that the right of pr<> was held less strict by the S wich Islanders other nations ! What was probably the with regard to nearly all of various forms of proper What follows, as to i tion of the right of pi mong thei What kind of pi us may illustr right ! What state- Cook rectness of tail When di form to the E propcrtv ! What one f did i. 115 w; 126 QUESTIONS ON tioned, upon which we may ex-> tance attached to mere courage? pect diversities of moral judg-j What qualities are proportion- ment ? i ally depressed 1 What instance is given t What is the consequent ef- How was conscience affected \ feet on the moral judgment ? by this error? (V^) What reflections show the dif-j *> * ficulty, here, to be less with the | What is the fifth occasion of conscience, than w T ith the erro- \ diversity of moral judgment? neous opinion ? What is meant by saying that What distinguished man of j the action of the mind is condi- piety is mentioned, as having \tionall been himself a slave-trader ? j What condition of moral ac- What prevented him from tion is violated, in the case now seeing it to be wrong ? under consideration ? What does he say, as to his j Why does the usual moral emo- former opinions on the subject ? j tion fail to arise, when the pass What if he had possessed cor- > ions are greatly excited? rect notions of the rights of the j What parts of the mind are Africans ? (416) What wrong speculative opin- ion still prevails, in some coun- tries ? ; What has resulted from this j error ? W r ith what conscience have men carried out this error to its horrible results ? What are some of these re- sults, brought about conscientious- (417) By what, in the fourth place, are our moral judgments some- times perplexed ? \ then unfitted for proper action ? | When does the power of mor- I al judgment return ? | How is the subject of such I passions then affected ? With what will the conscience harmonize, in all the cases which have been mentioned ? To what are its defective judgments owing ? CHAPTER V. (419) what point must a On what point must a few practical remarks be offered, be- How does the principle of as- (fore leaving the subject of the sociation operate upon the mor- moral sensibilities ? al capacity ? Explain what is here meant. How are we apt to view vices \ committed by near relations ? ; s this the case? horn, on this princi- j practice ? ated impor-j What has been the cense- By what may all be convinced I of the importance of this point ? What rank, as compared with ! intellectual culture, has general- ly been assigned to moral, in ' to moral educati How have children been man- red, in this respect ? What parts of our nature have been left to take care of them- selv How must every reflecting mind be affected, in view these facts ! What doctrine, advanced in this work, involves the existence an immutable standard of rectitude ? What principle, of the emo- tive form, indicates whether we conform to this standard 1 What form of this principle demands this conformity ? For what have we here a suf- ficient bn By what special consideration is this view further strengthened? (420) What has sometimes been suggested with regard to the time of commencing a moral education ? What is urged against this 2 est ion 1 How must the contamina- tions of vice be prevented ? What advice is here added ? (421) When ought a course of mor- al training to commence ! When do we begin to learn ? To what is the expanding of the infant mind compared ! What circumstances indicate the early expansion of the mind? What incorrect opinion has been held, with regard to the development of the pathematic and moral part of our nature ? N\ hat is he • : to the of the develi j ment of th and the sensibilii W 1 . in the order of natu How doe Which s< in full ? W 1 jects ofintelli W hat of the prim als? What reflections illust comparatively early rip the moral principle What is mentioned i discouragemen the young How does the ad van < the young, in moral* pare with their prog lect? What does t! lead a teacher to beliei Is any moral instruct lost upon the youn What remarks are m this point ? What declar is richly fulfilled, in tbil What illustr ciplc is here introd Wh cernn the outline culture? What is all that will attempted 7 What is the fil QUESTIONS ON In view of what, does the con--, science act ? What, then, will be the con- \ sequence of adopting wrong opin- ions ? What if these opinions be fun-; d ainental ? What important speculative; opinions is here noticed ? What is the consequence of carrying this opinion into prac- tice ? What is the second example ? j What is resulting from this ? What is the third example of a speculative opinion ? What has already been the re-; suit of it? | What is the inference from [ these remarks? What is said of the doctrine, ; " It is no matter what we be- j lieve, if we are sincere?" What bad characters may set up a claim to sincerity ? What is the only sincerity ap- • proved in the sight of human i reason and of a just Divinity ? \ (424) What is said of religion, as; connected with morality 1 What is here meant by being: religious ? What is granted of the moral- of a man who is not religious? \ How is he defective in mor- ality ? What, then, will it be impos- sible to say of him ? j What must be included, as a! leading element, in moral edu-i cation ? What principle in our nature! demands this? What is the office of con- ace? i I How is God viewed by an en- lightened intellect ? How does conscience view a want of love to his character, and of adhesion to his law 1 Why has a proper regard for the character of God, so great a multiplicity of bearings and re- lations ? How widely, then, is extended the crime involved in the want of it ? From these considerations, what is asserted to be the found- ation of a truly consistent moral life? PART THIRD, CHAPTER I. (425) What department of the mind have we now brought to a close 1 Of what two leading forms does it consist ? With what restriction is this department to be understood as closed ? What is further to be added ? Under what circumstances may the action of the sensibili- ties be described as disordered, or as alienated ? To what is a knowledge of this subject requisite? (426) What may be understood by the general expression, " imper- fect or disordered action of the sensibilities V When does this disordered state become insanity ? MEN Give the explanatory state- Of what ment ? drink, :it first, th< What seems to follow from How do< this remark ? n\ \ Yet, how is each of these states Whal c to be regarded? urged in rain, I May we be able to say, in any to strong drink ! given case, precisely when the What d n of a dn disorder has reached the point ard, here of insanity ? statement ! What, however, is certain, of (428) the mind in this disordered state ? 4 . In what manner will this sub- . As w « f dv . a °' ject be treated? j tites, what will be found To what classifications shall the propensities, with regard ... , n i disorder r we here conform ' , T71 . . W hat are the particu (4:27) of a disordered star T , ., ,. , Density of self-preservation I in accordance with this plan,; 1 wu * - *i -n , . Ll . A . „ r > v\ hat is the illusl ivm what is the just remark ? , pine] , How are the appetites affected ^ by repeated indulgence? (429) What means of resistance have W hen is the individual him- we generally to the approaching j self accoant able for a di tyranny of the appetites ? gtate of thc p( What is the case, after the Where are we likely to fii line, between the possibility and stances f this kind I ' the impossibility of restoration, To what extent is passed . order sometime Within what limits may such V Vhat ii cases be considered as embraced? Valerious Maximu Where are to be found the \v h most frequent cases of mental ticijj in anv f this alienation, arising from exces- disorder sive energy of the appetites? / m it is the bibber's situation ►on as he arrives within the In whal otl limits of mental alienation 7 petition* What powers of the mind still , sons h struggle, though without success? order ! What is morally certain of In such inst him, if he be left to himself? the disorder .Of what do such per.- Wh to be conscious ? Rush I What aid against their appi tites, have they often entreat- :*!]1 R 130 QUESTIONS ON What of Sansin, at Geneva ? j What instance of a man who: times changed his pro- j >n, to escape this malady ? What of a certain agent of the j of Vienna ? What of the wife ofGaubius ? (431) What instance is given of dis- : ordered action of the propensity to imitate ? Under what form does this dis- > order become very important? (432) With how great intensity may the principle of sociality exist? \ Is every degree of imperfec- tion or of disorder of mental ac- tion, properly called alienation ? To what forms of mental ac tion does the term alienation prop- apply ? In what two aspects may the dered state of the social principle discover itself? What do we call those who have a morbid aversion to socie- ty ? In what way may this form of .-order be produced ? (433) How, on the other hand, are people sometimes affected by be- ing cut off from the society of their friends ? What is said of Foscari ? ^ hat has sometimes resulted hwi solitary confinement in - n f From what does nostalgia or hom< !SS proceed ? Is this disease ever fatal ? What people, in particular, are m ! as subject to it? How is their suffering descri- bed ? What account is given of the effect of this disease in the Rus- sian army ? How was its progress termin- ated ? (434) What is said of the strength of the principle of desire oj es- teem ? (What is this desire sometimes called?) Of what use is it ? To what is this desire very lia- ble ? What celebrated Athenian's leading defects may be account- ed for by this view of the subject? What seems to have been his ruling passion ? How has his great desire been otherwise expressed ? In drawing whose character, has Pope illustrated this subject? What does Mr. Stewart say of the inordinate exercise of this propensity ? What is the situation of a man laboring under this disease ? How must the mind be affect- ed by such a state of vicissitude ? What is the effect of disap- pointment in the persuit of ap- plause ? What state of the mind may sometimes be traced to this source ? (435) What effect is sometimes pro- duced by the intense desire of power ? How does this desire become the predominant feeling ? MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. Have we many instance this disorder ? What if this desire be suddenly disappointed 1 Whose history furnishes a strong presumption that such re- sults are frequent ? How is illustrated the fact that the ruling passion still remains in the deranged mind ? What fact, confirming these views, is stated by Pinel ! How did the superintendent terminate the dispute ? CHAPTER II. (430; Why is that subordinate form of imitation, called sympathetic, deserving of particular notice ! What is implied, in all cases of sympathetic imitation ? When does it exist in the high- est degree ? Describe its operation. On what principle does this operation take place? What is the view here taken of the nature of this principle ? Why was it not treated of in another place, as a distinct pro- pensity ? Why was the present connec- sen for the treatment of subject ? den change in the count* n of anoth< ^ hat three exam] 1 lew i- this principle illi ted by a group of childr< How, by b rope-d How are we BOON til ed when v. fall upon the leg or arm i er? (438 Give an account of w h I curred at the boua Ilaerlem, illustrative of tin- ject ? After exhausting tlieir skill, to whom did the physi the place apply ? On observing the case, what immediately occured to hie m What course did he pur- 1 . a remedy ! With what succe — (43! Relate the instance that cured in Chelmsford ! How extensively lias this kind of contagion been known to spread ! (437 What is sympathetic imitation de-enbed to be I Bv what is it proved to e What effect is likely to be pro- duced on us. when we see a sud- CHAPTER III 10 Are the affectioi also liable to be disord What will ! i ceeding in thU What subj- up ? GlT( sentiment or Of 132 QUESTIONS ON Of Henry the Fourth, of] France ? j How may some instances of> presentiment be explained on? natural principles ? Is it necessary, in any of these cases, to suppose any thing su-| pernatural ? What, then, seems the only ex- planation ? \ What is said of the distin- guishing trait of this disorder ? (441) What illustration is given, of \ a disordered condition of mind, j nearly allied to that just men- tioned ? j What is said of the frequency \ of such alienated impulses? What, of their degrees of j strength ? What account of a German woman illustrates this subject? j What humane reflection is suggested by this example ? State the example of the Ger- j man soldier. Of the man at Kaina. Of the melancholy man who '■ witnessed an execution. (442) What is proved by the instan- ? ces just given What degree of disorder do \ they indicate ? J How, then, may they be de- \ scribed ? How does this form of insani- ty compare with other forms ? j What is said of the powers of> perception and reasoning, in the j subjects of this kind of insanity? Where is the seat of this dif- ficulty ? 1 How is the victim of this dis- ease affected ? State the instance of the me- chanic in the asylum Bicetre. (443) Where is the seat of the men- tal disease, called Hypocond- riasis ? What is this disease ? How does it appear that this disease is always connected with gloom ? Yet, what may be true of the occasion of this melancholy? To what may one of the slight- est forms of this disease be tra- ced ? Give the illustration. With what is the origin of the next form of this disease con- nected ? Give some examples of this form. What is the instance of one of the princes of Bourbon ? What still more foolish imag- inations have some fallen into ? What remark do these exam- ples confirm ? Where, as already stated, is the appropriate position of this disorder ? W 7 hat example of an English- man shows that it may also have its origin there ? What is it easy to see may happen under such circumstan- ces ? (444) What is always implied by the existence of hypocondriacs ? W 7 hat is said of the degrees of the gloomy feeling ? How does the distress of this disease compare with bodily pain? MENTAL PHTLOSPi By what is the disease charac- terized in some persons ? What slight occurrences may sometimes dissipate the gloom ? How is the patient often affect- ed at such times ? (1.) What is the first step to be taken in curing this disease ? What is said of the nerves? What are the senses ? What, therefore, may happen to persons whose nervous system is disordered ? What is the illustration ? On what is one of the forms of the disease in question found- ed ? What, in such a case, will fol- low from restoring the bodily system to a right action ? (2.) Why should we break up the old associations of the patient ? How may w r e do it ? What two beneficial results may, by these means, be com- bined to restore the patient ? (3) How may we proceed, when the disease is founded on considerations of a moral na- ture ? What are the two illustrations ? What, in particular, should be avoided ? What did Dr. Johnson say of melancholy ? What advice did he give ? (445) What consideration shows that the passion of fear was implant- ed for a wise purpose ? In what two ways may the dis- ordered state of this affection discover itself? Illustrate the former. What is asserted frith n to the latter I From what in aecotdance with this principle, have sad r< followed ! When does thii Aim strengthen so as to becom< spdir I What distmgok from other forms of feat ! According to what, then, maj despair exist in a greater or lesfl degree ? When is the wretchednef despair very great I (44G) What frequent occurn shows that persons, in a stale ol mental alienation* are Bubjed to a singular perversion of the !>• - nevolent affections ? What is said of the explana- tion ? What illustration is given \>\ Dr. Rush ? (2) What illustration, b\ same physician, shows tin- ease in a more int « (3) How does m-imtv x.ine- times become the indirect r of this disorder I What is the illustration g by Dr. Gall? What prove- that -he had tre d to withstand her grief 1 What fact, .Mated by PjmI, illustrates this snbj< What is in th proximate cane of in What U the retnot- cause ? What is here nditd i ing jov ? What fact ir- son of Lei bin j 134 QUESTIONS ON MENTAL PHILOSOPH Y. What of Pope Leo XI What statement of Mr. Hume: corroborates these facts ? What occasioned the fatal joy j of th e door-keeper of Congress? ] CHAPTER IV. (447) What are the two leading forms of moral derangement? What is the first remark con- cerning voluntary moral derange- ment ? To whom, alone, is the asser- tion of Juvenal not applicable ? Why may not a man become a villain at once ? By what process may the con- science become virtually annihil- ated? How have multitudes become morally insane ? In what composition has Beau- mont well illustrated the prog- 1 ress of the mind, in these cases? \ What is meant here by saying I the conscience is annihilated ? Does the conscience ever die? j With what is its apparent death impregnated ? What does it gather, while it <, appears inactive ? j On its reappearance for what! does it inflict a fearful retribu- tion ? j (448) What question here arises ? What is the answer ? How is this subject illustrated? j What is the application ? How is that man doubly guil-j K C* 1 3 6 ; ty, who commits a crime in con- | sequence of having hardened his : conscience ? What is the only reason why he is not condemned ? By what is his guilt greatly enhanced in the eye of justice? (449) Are any men, by nature, des- titute of a conscience ? What argument from analogy shows that such a thing is possi- ble ? What can be said with cer- tainty, on this point ? By what is the moral accoun- tability of some very much di- minished ? What three instances of mor- al insanity are mentioned by Dr. Rush? Give some account of the boy, mentioned by Dr. Haslam. (450) Is there any moral accounta- bility, where there is, by nature, an entire destitution of con- science ? Why is not a person,thus des- titute, a proper subject of re- wards and punishments ? On what principles must he be treated ? Where there is some slight conscience, how is the person to be judged? What doctrine, touching this point, confounds right and wrong, and is opposed to benev- olence ? What has been the unhappy re- sult of a misunderstanding of this important subject ? ^>^<^^x^:< f ^ Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide Treatment Date: August 2004 PreservationTechnologies A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive Cranberry Township, PA 16066 (724)779-2111 >j§air&£vfc" (V l •Warn'* ** # JH^' ** -timm • '-WKf>'