• \<^'' 
 
 
 
 
 
 ,** ' /Jiife'v Xc^-^"*' .'^M^ "*..^^\'ai:v\/^ 
 
 .^°* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .Qy 
 
 J^ 
 
NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 COMMANDER C. G. GILL, U. S. NAVY 
 
[-60' 
 
NAVAL POWER 
 IN THE WAR 
 
 (1914-1918) 
 
 BY 
 
 ci'C. GILL 
 
 COMMANDER, U. S. NAVY 
 
 MAPS AND DIAGRAMS 
 
 NEW XSJr YORK 
 GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 
 
THE WORLD AT WAR, DECEMBER, 1917 
 
 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 NATIONS AT WAR WITH (iKKMANV (.ir lini iMn, Aiinlilii, 
 Turkey and IliilKfirlii): — 
 
 SorMa (v«. Aiiiilrln July jfl, iol.|). Kumilu (Auuiint i, lan), rramc 
 (AuKUnt ], IUI.I), llnllduin (AiiKUOl 4, lgl,|), (Irrut llrllnlii (Auiiual ,|, 
 1014), Mdiilonrttni (vii. Atiultlit AitKtitit H, iui.|), .liil>iiii (Ailiillitt J.t, 
 lyi,j), Itdly (Vfi. Aiinliiii Mny J4, luis), Siui Miiiltio IvK Au.ililii Miiy 
 J4, loij), I'wlumil (Mnnli u. luif'), Uuiiiiiiiln (vii. Aiinlilu Aii|iu«l >7. 
 I0i«), Hulled SInl™ (April (i. igljl, Culm (A|ull V, niiy), l'(UUVUm 
 (April 7. 101/), (Imw (I'H.v, (liivl, Niiv. ill, mid, lic.vl, ..I Alm.July 
 1, lui;). Slum (July ri. 1U17), I.lhrrlii (Annum .|, lui;). Cliinn (Auguat 
 
 14, lull), llrni'.ll ((Vl.^lior j(i, lul'/l, llllii \M (April ij, luiH), Cunlil 
 
 Klcn (Miiy l^, luil", Nlnuiiipm (klnv ji. imH). Ilnlll llulv is, uiiH), 
 Ilimdurnll (Julv lu, i«iH). 
 
 NAIIDNS THAT ilAVH 
 SHVUKI'.I) KICI.ATION.S 
 WITH (IUKMANV:- 
 
 IMIvIn (Ajirll 14. loi;) 
 UruHiuy ((H'l.;, iod) 
 I'lTU jdcliiliiT (1, mil) 
 ICilliulor (l)rc. 17, mi;) 
 
 NATIONS NiaiTKAI, lUIT 
 rAVdUUADLK TO TTIH 
 AU.IliS:— 
 
 ArKcntiuii, PnrnKUtiy, 
 1 Chill, Sulviidor 
 
 CHIEF NEUTRAL 
 NATIONS:— 
 
 Norway. Sweden, Dcnmorlc, 
 Hulliind, Spain, SwiUerland, 
 Mexico,^ Vcncxucla, Colombia. 
 Note :— Aliilinnistan. 
 
 llaluchistnn, 
 
 Persia. 
 
 Abyssinia 
 
 nUo Dculrul, 
 
 NOTE:-*Central and South America ore more or less 
 involved, but in a diplomatic rather than a military 
 sense. As Africa has been practically annexed by 
 Kuropcan powers the whole continent is involved 
 except the ai]cient empire o( Abyssinia and unap* 
 propriuted portions of the Libyan Desert. Prac- 
 tically all Asia is involved. Although Persia h.AS 
 not declared war there has been considerable fipht- 
 in^' there. fThe South Arabian revolt has aligned 
 :tluit country la^ainst Turkey. 
 
 ^lity has become ditljcult and dangci 
 
 The experience o[ this 
 
 :me seventeen nntionalitic 
 
 ^tiiiiilJted the theory of na 
 
 Allied sea power has permitted the 
 scattered thr( 
 of this force against me enemy. 
 
 On the other hand, lack of naval control has isolated the Central Po 
 Jul unscrupulous use of the submarine. Germany's submarine campaigr 
 recard to neutral rights, and hasc.ist discredit on her national honolu I 
 ^ XUg ^ar has emphasised the importance of free pathways upon the sea. * the need of free out 
 to the sea for land-locked nations, and the strategic value of narrow waters in which ocean highways c 
 verge such as Panama. Suez. Gibraltar, and the Dardanelles. 
 
 • President Wilson. 
 

 COPYRIGHT, 1918, 1919, 
 BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 
 
 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 JAN 27 1919 
 
 ©CI.A5 12169 \^' 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The purpose of this study is to show the de- 
 cisive role of naval power in the war. The scope 
 of the narrative is limited to the more important 
 naval events. These are discussed not so much 
 with a view to completeness in detail as with the 
 view of making clear points of policy, strategy, 
 and tactics necessary to an understanding of the 
 general principles governing the size, composi- 
 tion, training, and uses of modern fleets. 
 
 In the year that has passed since the original 
 manuscript went to press the only major naval 
 operation which has taken place is the overseas 
 transportation of United States troops. This is 
 covered in an additional chapter under the head- 
 ing, "The United States in the War." Extensive 
 notes have also been appended to this chapter de- 
 scribing other war activities of the United States 
 Navy. 
 
 Since the battle of Jutland, war on the sea has 
 not been marked by any major contact of fight- 
 ing forces. Occasional raiding expeditions with 
 attending light cruiser and destroyer engage- 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 ments, together with submarine encounters, com- 
 prise about all that has been heard from the silent, 
 though busy, navies. A noteworthy instance of 
 recent sea fighting is the brilliant attack by the 
 British against Zeebrugge. Another example is 
 the exploit of the Italian Navy in torpedoing 
 Austrian battleships at anchor in the harbour of 
 Trieste. These are interesting enough in them- 
 selves and by no means inconsequential, but do 
 not find a place in this work, which is limited to 
 the major operations of the war. 
 
 Since the publication of this book, moreover, 
 there have not been any disclosures or develop- 
 ments of such a nature as to demand revision of 
 the original text. Advantage has been taken, 
 however, of the opportunity kindly afforded by 
 the publishers to bring statistical data up to date, 
 to perfect diagrams, and to make a few minor 
 changes in arrangement and wording. With the 
 exception of the additional chapter, the main 
 body of the book remains substantially the same 
 as when first published. 
 
 The twelve chapters, with one exception, were 
 contributed to The New York Times Current His- 
 tory Magazine. The exception is the sixth chap- 
 ter — The Dardanelles Operations — which was 
 written to complete the series covering the major 
 naval operations of the war. 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 The author takes occasion to extend his ac- 
 knowledgments and thanks to the editors of The 
 New York Times Current History Magazine for 
 permission to republish, which they have kindly 
 given. 
 
 Acknowledgment is also made to Allan West- 
 cott, Ph.D., Instructor in the United States Naval 
 Academy, for maps and diagrams contributed and 
 for help given in editing the text. Sincere thanks 
 are expressed to Mr. T. G. Frothingham, to the 
 Staff of the English Department of the United 
 States Naval Academy, and to the Officers of the 
 Oklahoma and the Seattle for many helpful sug- 
 gestions cordially given throughout the progress 
 of these studies. C. C. Gill. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The present volume had its origin in lectures 
 delivered by Lieutenant Commander Gill at the 
 United States Naval Academy in the winter of 
 1915-16 to midshipmen who have since been grad- 
 uated and are now in active service. For this 
 audience, the facts and lessons of recent naval his- 
 tory had a special significance, as a very practical 
 preparation for the responsibilities they were soon 
 to undertake. To quote the words of Napoleon, 
 "The happiest inspiration in battle is often a rec- 
 ollection of the past." 
 
 The discussion was afterward continued in The 
 Nezv York Times Current History Magazine^ and, 
 with the sanction of the Navy Department, is now 
 published in book form. In selecting and prepar- 
 ing the material, the author had in mind not only 
 the special needs of young naval officers, whether 
 midshipmen or volunteers now entering the naval 
 service, but also the general popular interest in 
 naval affairs. The book is to be used this year 
 by the Department of English at the Naval Acad- 
 emy in the teaching of naval history. 
 
INTRODUCTION ix 
 
 Undertaking these studies before the entry of 
 the United States into the war, the author has 
 maintained throughout the standpoint of the tech- 
 nical student of naval warfare, rather than that 
 of the philosophical historian. Needless to say, 
 he is not without strong sympathies and convic- 
 tions ; but these, from the nature of the investiga- 
 tion, are subordinated to the search for truth. In 
 other words, the book is not partisan and is not 
 propaganda; it has no special thesis to maintain 
 — except an underlying belief in the importance 
 of naval power to a nation whose boundaries are 
 the two oceans, and whose interests extend 
 throughout the Seven Seas. 
 
 The wisdom of attempting to write naval his- 
 tory at such close range may be questioned. The 
 question may be answered by pointing out that 
 the book aims to draw the significant naval les- 
 sons, rather than to chronicle events in minute de- 
 tail. Whatever the paucity of the data, it is im- 
 portant that these lessons should be drawn im- 
 mediately. Frank discussion clears the air. 
 
 There is an advantage also in the contemporary 
 point of' view, with its appreciation of concurrent 
 events and the feeling of the hour. If distant 
 perspective gives proper proportion, it also throws 
 a haze over the scene. And in naval history par- 
 ticularly, the facts are not always clearer with the 
 
X INTRODUCTION 
 
 lapse of time. Historians a century ago could 
 have determined, more easily than it can be deter- 
 mined to-day, the exact manner in which Nelson 
 brought his fleet into action at Trafalgar; and a 
 century ago there was a recognition — more in- 
 stinctive and less reasoned, perhaps, but not less 
 genuine than to-day — of the greatness of that vic- 
 tory and its meaning in the Napoleonic War. 
 
 Students of naval history, therefore, may feel 
 indebted to the writer for this book — written un- 
 der pressure of duties afloat which since our par- 
 ticipation in the war have left slight leisure for 
 outside work. 
 
 Allan Westcott, 
 Department of English, 
 U. S. Naval Academy. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 1 
 
 II DEFINITIONS AND ESTIMATE OF 
 
 THE SITUATION 9 
 
 Sea Power 9 
 
 •Sea Control 11 
 
 Plans of Warring Navies .... 14 
 
 III OPENING ACTIVITIES 19 
 
 Strength and Disposition of Fleets 19 
 "Goeben" and "Breslau" Episode . 24 
 Attacks on Cable and Wireless Sta- 
 tions 28 
 
 IV NAVAL ACTION IN HELIGOLAND 
 
 BIGHT 33 
 
 V CORONEL AND FALKLAND EN- 
 GAGEMENTS 44 
 
 Battle off Coronel 44 
 
 Falkland Islands Engagement . . 51 
 
 VI DARDANELLES OPERATIONS . . 59 
 
 VII NORTH SEA BATTLES 83 
 
 Dogger Bank Encounter .... 83 
 
 Battle of Jutland (Part 1) ... 88 
 
 VIII NORTH SEA BATTLES (Cont.) ... 101 
 
 Battle of Jutland (Part 2) . . . 101 
 
 xi 
 
xii CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 IX SUBMARINE WARFARE .... 120 
 X ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS ... 132 
 
 XI UNITED STATES IN THE WAR . . 156 
 
 Overseas Transportation of United 
 States Troops 156 
 
 Other War Activities of the United 
 States Navy 163 
 
 XII NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR . . 223 
 APPENDIX 
 
 (1) Comparative Strength of Navies . . . . 161 
 
 Excerpts from a compilation by T. G. 
 Frothingham, reprinted by courtesy of 
 Current History 161 
 
 Table prepared and arranged by C. H. Fos- 
 ter, U. S. N. A 192 
 
 Table published by oflSce of U. S. Naval 
 Intelligence 192 
 
 {£) "Emden" Exploits 195 
 
 Excerpts from articles by Comdr. L. A. 
 Cotton, U. S. N., and Lt. H. von Miicke 
 (executive officer of Emden), the latter 
 translated byLt. Comdr. J. H. Klein, Jr., 
 U. S. N., reprinted by courtesy of 
 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings . . 195 
 
 (3) America's Part in the Development of Naval 
 
 Weapons and Tactics 206 
 
 By T. G. Frothingham, reprinted by 
 courtesy of the U. S. Naval Institute 
 Proceedings , . . 206 
 
MAPS AND DIAGRAMS 
 
 Map of the World Indicating Barred Zones 
 AND Location of Chief Naval Events . 
 
 Frontispiece 
 
 PAGE 
 
 North Sea and Baltic 21 
 
 Map of Eastern Mediterranean .... 25 
 
 Map of German North Sea Coast .... 35 
 
 Diagram of Battle off Coronel .... 47 
 
 Diagram of Falkland Islands Engagement . 55 
 
 Map of Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and 
 Bosporus (The Approaches to Constanti- 
 nople) 65 
 
 Diagram of Dogger Bank Encounter ... 85 
 
 Diagram of Battle of Jutland 93 
 
 British Fleet Formation 103 
 
 Diagram Indicating Fleet Movements after 
 Battle of Jutland 113 
 
 Mine Fields Laid by British and American 
 
 Navies in the North Sea 148 
 
 xiii 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 U. S. S. Constitution 207 
 
 American Letter of Marque Brig Grand 
 
 Turk of Salem 211 
 
 American Armed Brig Tenedos 213 
 
 U. S. S. Niagara- 214 
 
 American Armed Barque Stamboul . . . » . 215 
 
 U. S. S. Pennsylvania, 1837 216 
 
 U. S. S. Pennsylvania, 1916 217 
 
 A Convoy Showing Escort and an Example of 
 
 "Dazzle" Painting 152 
 
 U. S. Naval Gun in Action near Soissons . . 184 
 
NAVAL POWER IN 
 THE WAR 
 
 CHAPTER I . 
 
 Naval Power in the War 
 
 NAVAL activities comprise : — constructing, 
 arming, and fitting out men-of-war; the 
 supply and training of the commissioned and 
 enlisted personnel; the operation and upkeep of 
 the fleets; and the maintenance of the necessary- 
 navy yards and stations at home and abroad. 
 Merchant marine activities, placed largely under 
 control of naval strategists by war measures, 
 include : — The ship-building plants ; the facilities 
 for fitting out, docking and repairing merchant 
 ships; depots for handling merchandise and 
 passengers in home ports and foreign ports 
 of call; the merchant fleets; their personnel; 
 and the agents and machinery used in the 
 management of ocean traffic. The material used 
 in tjiese activities involves the industries of mine, 
 
2 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 field, forest and work shop. Exports and im- 
 ports, emigrants, and immigrants, when carried 
 in ships, are also factors of Sea Power. 
 
 In the war just ended the transportation and 
 supply of the Allied armies depended on naval 
 power. Naval strategy was the grand strategy 
 of the war. 
 
 Allied naval strategy aimed at the gradual 
 exhaustion of the enemy. The ultimate success 
 of this strategy was foretold by two striking ex- 
 amples from History — the Napoleonic Wars 
 and our own Civil War. In the Napoleonic Wars 
 the pressure of British Sea Power prostrated the 
 industry of France, broke her spirit of aggression, 
 and prepared decisive tactical victories in the field. 
 In like manner during our Civil War the pressure 
 of the Union blockade cut off the Southern armies 
 from their source of supply, destroyed the hopes 
 of the Confederacy, and paved the way to Grant's 
 victory and the ensuing peace. 
 
 The two most conspicuous naval actions in this 
 war, the Battle of Jutland and the attempt to 
 force the Dardanelles, were disappointing in re- 
 sults. At Jutland the German High Sea Fleet, 
 although damaged, escaped the clutches of the 
 British Grand Fleet, and at the Dardanelles the 
 Allied offensive to gain control of the approaches 
 to Constantinople and Russia's Black Sea ports 
 
NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 3 
 
 was a failure. As a consequence, in some quarters 
 dissatisfaction led to criticism of Allied naval 
 strategy as a whole. To be sure, complete suc- 
 cesses at Jutland and the Dardanelles would have 
 greatly promoted the aim of Allied strategy; but 
 care should be taken to assign the proper causes 
 to tactical failures. 
 
 Due weight should be given Allied naval 
 achievements: — Restriction of German and Aus- 
 trian battle fleets; destruction of enemy cruisers 
 abroad; annihilation of enemy merchant ma- 
 rine activities; stoppage of enemy supplies from 
 oversea sources; defeat of the enemy submarine 
 policy; transportation and supply of the west- 
 ern armies: — In short, the vitalisation of Allied 
 forces and the devitalisation of .enemy forces. 
 These were the decisive factors in obtaining vic- 
 tory. 
 
 Even with the event so near it may be safely 
 stated that the surrender of the German Fleet 
 without firing a shot was the spectacular culmina- 
 tion of the greatest naval achievement in history. 
 
 Naval power in the war was exerted for the 
 most part behind the scenes. It is hard to realise 
 that the achievements of the Allied fleets, ac- 
 complished with so little fighting, proved, in their 
 influence upon the war, more important than the 
 much heralded land battles involving enormous 
 
4) NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 loss of life and property. The German Govern- 
 ment admitted this potency of sea power, when, 
 in April, 1917, Hindenburg announced that it 
 was only necessary for the German armies to hold 
 their own on land while on the sea the U-boats 
 hemmed in Great Britain 'and so crippled the 
 ocean trade supplying men, food and munitions 
 to Allied armies as to compel the acceptance of 
 peace terms pleasing to the Prussian leaders. 
 
 It is strange that Germany's first soldier should 
 have made the point, that the submarine, the only 
 naval weapon able to evade the Allied blockade, 
 promised a respite and a hope that the German 
 armies could not give, even though the latter had 
 been successful on all fronts and had conquered 
 entire countries. Thus Germany recognised the 
 principle well taught by the distinguished Ameri- 
 can naval officer, Admiral Mahan, that in all great 
 wars between commercial nations land power is 
 ancillary to sea power. 
 
 In this war, as in past wars, the force of sea 
 power slowly but surely shaped the issues. As 
 the arteries of sea-borne commerce to the Teutonic 
 Powers were more and more effectually blocked, 
 and as the U-boat terror subsided while new 
 strength from America, Africa and Asia was trans- 
 ported more and more easily to France, England 
 and Italy — the realisation was slowly but surely 
 
NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 5 
 
 forced home, that Pan-Germanism could not be 
 realised. 
 
 In following the developments of the great 
 war it is of interest to note that in the main noth- 
 ing startling happened to upset expert predic- 
 tions, either as to the part sea power would take, 
 or as to which of the belligerent navies would 
 dominate. In the course of the fighting there 
 were no great surprises. Generally speaking, re- 
 sults corresponded with the degree and kind of 
 peace time naval preparation made by the war- 
 ring nations. 
 
 The statement that there were no great sur- 
 prises should be modified by one exception, sub- 
 marine warfare against merchant ships. Before 
 the British blockade forced Germany to plan her 
 unscrupulous submarine campaign against com- 
 merce it is doubtful if any country, not except- 
 ing Germany, ever thought seriously of such a 
 campaign as a contingency of modern civilised 
 war. It came therefore as a surprise, and its 
 temporary success was due to the fact that in the 
 years of pre-war time development of the sub- 
 marine there had been no contemporaneous de- 
 velopment of naval weapons to combat it as a 
 commerce destroyer. The submarine had always 
 been looked upon as a lawful weapon for use 
 against enemy fighting ships, and its meagre sue- 
 
6 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 cess in this capacity shows that the preparations 
 made against it were adequate ; but the submarine 
 as an unscrupulous commerce raider had thirty 
 years' start of the weapons designed for use against 
 it in this new and unexpected role. If it had been 
 foreseen that submarines would be used in this 
 way, step by step with the development of under- 
 water craft, there would have been a correspond- 
 ing improvement in scientific contrivances for safe- 
 guarding commerce; and had this been the case it 
 is reasonable to suppose that the U-boat would 
 never have reaped its grim harvest of peaceful 
 shipping. 
 
 So this exception goes to prove the rule that 
 naval weapons both for offence and defence are 
 highly scientific products resulting from long years 
 of development. There is always the chance, of 
 course, that one side or the other will hit upon 
 some revolutionising invention. Nor does it nec- 
 essarily follow because none appeared in this war 
 that none will appear in the future; but there is, 
 nevertheless, evidence that in shaping a policy of 
 defence it is safer to heed the lessons of experience 
 than to rely on a mere theory of inventive abilities 
 adequate to meet any situation. 
 
 Neither an army nor a navy can be improvised, 
 but it is an important difference between them 
 that an army can be prepared more quickly and 
 
NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR ,7 
 
 easily than can a navy. At the outbreak of this 
 war Great Britain's army was small, but her pow- 
 erful fleet was ready. Under the protection of 
 this first line of defence a great army was recruit- 
 ed from British possessions all over the world, 
 and equipped, and trained. Navies cannot so 
 readily be built up; it takes years to construct a 
 battleship fleet and train the personnel to fight it. 
 When the war began Germany's army was ten 
 times as strong as Great Britain's army, but four 
 years later this difference had disappeared. On 
 the other hand, in 1914 Germany's sea power 
 was about two-thirds the strength of England's 
 sea power, and when the armistice was signed 
 England had increased this lead. It takes so long 
 to build fighting ships, and the demands on a na- 
 tion's resources are such that Germany was unable 
 to construct during the war a fleet to rival that of 
 her enemy. But it is different in the case of land 
 forces. Great Britain rapidly overcame an initial 
 discrepancy in armies much greater than was the 
 naval discrepancy facing Germany in July, 1914. 
 Careful analysis of the battles fought in pre- 
 vious wars has contributed much to naval science, 
 and the general theories previously deduced have 
 been verified by the events of this war. There is, 
 however, by reason of improvements in ships and 
 weapons, continuous change in the conditions af- 
 
8 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 fecting the application of strategic and tactical 
 principles. This makes it advisable to alter rules 
 of practice in the light of lessons learned from 
 day to day. In attempting this concurrent study 
 of naval operations of the great war, the handi- 
 cap of insufficient and unreliable data is admitted, 
 but even if some of the premises are slightly in 
 error, still, the inferences drawn will have value 
 so long as they are logical and square with accepted 
 naval opinion. 
 
 Secrecy forms an important part of naval strat- 
 egy and is favoured by nature. The sea isolates 
 and frequently swallows up all testimony of the 
 fighting done. Hence the Admiralty announce- 
 ments of both sides have been laconic. There is, 
 however, plenty of evidence that the silent navies 
 were not idle. This is indicated by a summary of 
 the losses sustained. 
 
 It is reported that in first line ships Great Brit- 
 ain and her allies lost ten dreadnoughts and six- 
 teen pre-dreadnoughts, while Germany and her 
 allies lost three dreadnoughts and seven pre- 
 dreadnoughts. The Allies lost twenty-two ar- 
 moured cruisers and twenty-four light cruisers, 
 against seven armoured cruisers and twenty-tour 
 light cruisers lost by the Central Powers. In other 
 types the figures are less reliable, but the Allies 
 lost about seventy-three destroyers, twenty torpedo 
 
NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 9 
 
 boats, forty submarines, and ninety converted 
 cruisers and auxiliaries, while the Central Powers 
 lost about thirty-nine destroyers, twenty-six tor- 
 pedo boats, between one hundred twenty-five and 
 one hundred fifty submarines, and forty-five con- 
 verted cruisers and auxiliaries. In addition to 
 these, both sides lost numerous small craft, includ- 
 ing air scouts, patrol boats, yachts and mine 
 sweepers. 
 
 This list of losses, however, indicates only a 
 part of the naval work accomplished. Difficult 
 and important operations are frequently unat- 
 tended by losses. A complete narrative of the 
 war would include not only the engagements 
 fought, but in addition all the activities incident 
 to mobilising, blockading, commerce destroying, 
 transporting, convoying, patrolling, scouting, raid- 
 ing, and mine laying. It will be many years 
 before the data for such a work will be available. 
 
 The scope of this brief study is limited to the 
 more important naval events. These are dis- 
 cussed not so much with a view to completeness 
 in detail as with the aim of bringing out the points 
 of policy, strategy, and tactics necessary to an 
 understanding of the general principles govern- 
 ing the size, composition, training, and uses of 
 battle fleets. These principles are important as 
 the starting point from which more difficult scien- 
 
10 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 tific deductions proceed. To determine the latter 
 is the function of naval experts who have devoted 
 years to the exhaustive study of technical naval 
 problems. The former comprise a portion of gen- 
 eral knowledge which even a casual student of 
 world politics can ill afford to neglect. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 Definitions and Estimate of the Situation 
 
 Sea Power — Sea Control — Plans of Warring Navies 
 
 SEA POWER 
 
 THE sea power of a nation may be said to 
 comprise all its means for contesting the 
 control of the sea. It includes the battle fleets 
 and their auxiliaries, cruisers, destroyers, subma- 
 rines, aircraft, also naval bases and stations, for- 
 tified or naturally protected harbours, coast de- 
 fences, the merchant marine (embracing armed 
 and unarmed vessels engaged in commerce and' 
 passenger traffic), in short, everything the country 
 possesses that may be useful, directly or indirectly, 
 for the purposes of naval warfare. 
 
 Big-gun ships comprise the main reliance in 
 battle and are known as "dreadnoughts." These 
 are divided into dreadnought battleships and 
 dreadnought battle cruisers, the difference between 
 the two being that a certain amount of the gun 
 power and armour of the battleship is sacrificed 
 
 II 
 
12 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 in the battle cruiser in order to get speed. Pre- 
 dreadnought battleships differ from dreadnought 
 battleships in that, instead of carrying all big 
 guns and torpedo defence guns, they carry some 
 big guns and some smaller or intermediate bat- 
 tery guns, thus tapering down to the torpedo de- 
 fence guns. The armoured cruiser carries a mixed 
 calibre battery like her running mate, the pre- 
 dreadnought battleship, but is faster by reason of 
 having less armour and less powerful guns. 
 
 Both pre-dreadnought battleships and armoured 
 cruisers are discredited as shown by the fact that 
 no more are being built, but they are by no means 
 useless and still form an important part of the 
 strength of the more powerful navies. The light 
 cruiser, used for commerce destroying and scout- 
 ing, is a fast vessel without armour and carries 
 torpedoes as well as a light battery of intermedi- 
 ate calibre guns. The light cruiser type, which 
 has shown considerable usefulness in the recent 
 war, may be regarded as a development of the 
 torpedo boat destroyer, as it is larger, more sea- 
 worthy, more habitable and better armed. The 
 torpedo boat is a smaller edition of the destroyer, 
 and the submarine requires no definition. An aux- 
 iliary cruiser or a converted cruiser is a merchant 
 ship or private vessel requisitioned by the Govern- 
 ment for naval purposes. Such a vessel is usually 
 
NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 13 
 
 armed for both offence and defence. She loses her 
 character of a merchant ship engaged in peaceful 
 pursuits and becomes a part of the fighting navy 
 with the status of a regular man-of-war. 
 
 On the other hand, an armed merchantman is 
 armed simply for defence. She is not a part of 
 the fighting navy, and her character is determined 
 by her employment. If she is still engaged in the 
 peaceful pursuits of trade the fact that a ship car- 
 ries one or two guns for defence only does not 
 change her character into that of a man-of-war. 
 
 Strategy and tactics comprise the science and 
 art of using sea power. The word strategy con- 
 veys the idea of preparation for the fighting and 
 tactics that of execution of the fighting. But 
 before discussing the points of naval strategy and 
 tactics exemplified in the present war, it is well to 
 explain the uses of naval power and to outline the 
 maritime situation in July, 1914. 
 
 SEA CONTROL 
 
 When nations of maritime importance are at 
 war, relative control of the sea, or certain parts 
 of the sea, belongs to the belligerent whose sea 
 power dominates the areas in question. For ex- 
 ample, it is generally considered that from the 
 beginning of the war the Allies had control 
 
14 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 of the Atlantic. This does not mean that the 
 maritime operations of the Central Powers in these 
 waters were literally extinguished. It would 
 appear impossible, in the face of an enterprising 
 and resourceful enemy, to prevent completely the 
 operations of submarines and occasional commerce 
 destroyers. But since these did not materially 
 affect the maritime operations of the Allies it 
 is proper to say that the latter controlled the 
 Atlantic. There are varying degrees of sea con- 
 trol, and the more extensive the submarine and 
 commerce destroying activities of the weaker bel- 
 ligerent, the less completely does the stronger 
 enemy control the sea areas in question. 
 
 Theoretically, in times of peace at least, the 
 seas are free to all, but even then certain areas are 
 said to be potentially controlled by certain nations 
 by virtue of their relatively superior sea power in 
 these respective waters. The superior sea power 
 of Japan in Asiatic waters gives her in peace 
 times what might be called potential control of 
 those seas, and it may be assumed that this poten- 
 tial control increases the weight of her voice in 
 international affairs of the Far East. 
 
 In times of war also the potential sea power of 
 neutrals may easily prove an important factor. 
 At the beginning of the present war had the 
 United States possessed a navy superior to the 
 
NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 15 
 
 navies of the Allies, although, relatively speak- 
 ing between the belligerent powers, the Allies 
 would still have controlled the Atlantic Ocean, 
 the superior sea power of the United States would 
 have given this country a potential control of this 
 ocean, which might have affected the conduct of 
 the maritime operations of all the belligerents, 
 particularly in matters concerning the lawful in- 
 terests of the United States. 
 
 International law is not very clearly codified, 
 and it is natural that different nations should look 
 at things from different angles. This means that 
 when great wars are going on potential sea power 
 may prove especially valuable in securing respect 
 for neutral rights. 
 
 At the beginning of the war the Allies had su- 
 perior sea power and consequent potential control 
 in the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterra- 
 nean Sea, Black Sea, North Sea — in short, in all 
 sea areas excepting those adjacent to the ports 
 and naval bases of the Central Powers, namely, 
 the Adriatic near Austria's ports, the North Sea 
 and the Baltic adjacent to Germany's ports, and 
 the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, and the 
 Bosporus, under the control of Turkey. 
 
 Another estimate of the situation at the time 
 of the armistice shows no material alteration other 
 
16 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 than the extension of enemy naval control in the 
 Baltic and Black Seas incident to the collapse of 
 Russia. The fighting, which changed the potential 
 control into active control, followed a course quite 
 to be expected, and with the exception of the 
 lawless destruction of commerce by submarines, 
 maritime operations were singularly free of 
 surprises. The Allies made a notable attempt to 
 wrest control of the Dardanelles, Sea of Mar- 
 mora, and Bosporus from Turkey and her allies, 
 but it failed, and, with the exception of the 
 battle off the Jutland Peninsula, there has 
 been no other active struggle to alter the areas 
 of sea control as determined by the pre-wartime 
 disposition of sea power. Manifestly, from the 
 beginning the naval situation was disadvan- 
 tageous to the Teutonic Powers. Notwithstand- 
 ing this, the sea power of Germany, the part 
 taken in the war by enemy fleets, and the waters 
 they controlled were far from negligible. Be- 
 sides keeping the Allied fleets at a distance 
 and hampering commerce by the use of sub- 
 marines, enemy naval command of the Baltic 
 and the entrances to the Black Sea by blockading 
 the principal ports of B-ussia contributed in large 
 measure to the downfall of that country.^ 
 
 ^ The German advance in the Baltic Sea against the Russian de- 
 fences guarding the Gulf of Riga would properly be classed as a major 
 operation, except that, by reason of Russian disaffection, this advance 
 took the form of a strategical manoeuvre without noteworthy fighting. 
 
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 17 
 
 PLANS OF WARRING NAVIES 
 
 Broadly speaking, Great Britain's plan of naval 
 campaign at the outbreak of hostilities aimed: — 
 first, to destroy the enemy fleets with superior 
 forces, or, failing in this, to conjfine the enemy 
 fleets and restrict his trade by a system of distant 
 blockades; second, to convert potential control 
 of the high seas into active control by destroy- 
 ing, capturing, or bottling up enemy men-of-war 
 operating on foreign stations. 
 
 On the other hand, the weaker German and 
 Austrian navies instituted a different kind of cam- 
 paign. The Teutonic powers planned: — first, to 
 operate the home fleets so as to protect their coast 
 lines and control as wide as possible sea areas be- 
 yond, thereby preventing a close blockade and 
 permitting commercial intercourse with neighbour- 
 ing neutral countries; second, to use their naval 
 vessels abroad to inflict the greatest possible 
 damage on their enemies before being cornered 
 and destroyed by superior Allied sea power or es- 
 caping to the shelter of home or friendly ports, 
 
 While the German expedition was carefully planned and well executed, 
 Russia does not appear to have offered any organized resistance. The 
 Germans made the voyage to the scene of operations without molesta- 
 tion. Although fighting occurred during the occupation of the Rus- 
 sian coast and outlying islands, the defence was haphazard and in- 
 effectual. Under the circumstances no tactical conclusions can be 
 drawn. Strategically the position of Germany in the Baltic was 
 greatly improved. With the fall of Reval, the Allies lost their Baltic 
 submarine base, and Germany gained practically undisputed control 
 of all these waters. 
 
18 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 as was the case when the Goeben and Breslau 
 eluded numerous enemy ships in the Mediterra- 
 nean and steamed safely through the Dardanelles 
 to Constantinople; third, to interfere with and 
 damage enemy commerce by means of submarines 
 and commerce destroyers, such as the Moewe; and 
 fourth, the Teutonic powers planned to lessen the 
 disparity of force between their navies and the 
 superior navies of their enemies by so-called attri- 
 tion warfare, harassing and menacing the enemy 
 in all possible ways, instituting raids with fast air 
 and sea squadrons, attacking with mines and tor- 
 pedoes, and watchfully seeking opportunity to 
 fall upon a detached portion of the enemy fleet 
 with a superior force. 
 
 How did these plans work out^ What did 
 Teutonic sea power accomplish'? What did Al- 
 lied sea power accomplish? 
 
 Early in the war German commerce destroyers, 
 of which the 'Emden is a historic example, did 
 considerable damage to Allied shipping. Turkey, 
 aided by Germany, defeated the Allies at the Dar- 
 danelles, where a costly attempt was made to 
 wrest from Turkey waterways over which she had 
 exercised authority practically since the beginning 
 of modern history. The potential defensive pow- 
 er proved adequate when put to the test of 
 active resistance. The exploits of submarines as- 
 
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 19 
 
 tonished the world. The British shores were 
 raided both by air and by sea attacks. Control of 
 the Baltic and the entrances to the Black Sea ef- 
 fectually blockaded the principal ports of Russia, 
 and made possible the temporary German domina- 
 tion of that country. 
 
 But to what purposed The superior naval 
 power of the Allies slowly but surely swept the 
 German flag from the seas. In the first month 
 of the war, the German cruisers in American and 
 Far Eastern waters were skillfully drawn away 
 from enemy-infested areas and concentrated un- 
 der the command of Vice Admiral von Spee off 
 the west coast of South America. Here they 
 gained a brief respite by defeating an inferior 
 British squadron. But they were doomed ships, 
 and it was only a question of time before the more 
 powerful enemy navies would find and destroy 
 them. This happened in the Falkland Islands en- 
 gagement, which took place a month after the 
 German victory off Coronel. With no navy to 
 protect them, the German colonies were captured 
 one by one. On the other hand, the colonies of 
 the Allies were secure, and a source of aid and 
 comfort to their mother countries. German sub- 
 marines inflicted enormous losses but did not 
 succeed in closing the sea highways to the Al- 
 lies. Supplies and munitions of war constantly 
 
20 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 streamed into their ports. Transports brought 
 their troops from all parts of the world. 
 
 It was the pressure of naval power which com- 
 pelled Germany as a last hope to undertake her 
 lawless submarine campaign against commerce. 
 This precipitated the United States into the war. 
 Again it was the ability of the naval power of the 
 United States to check the submarine menace in 
 the Atlantic which made the money, food, and 
 man power of America transported over-seas to 
 the support of hard-pressed England, France, and 
 Italy the decisive factor of the war. 
 
 Naval events in this war, therefore, supplied 
 corroborative evidence to inductions grounded in 
 the experience of past wars, thus clarifying rather 
 than confusing the principles already more or less 
 firmly established. Naval power dominated the 
 military situation. The armies of the belligerent 
 denied the sea were overcome by the armies fed 
 and equipped and supported by means of ocean 
 traffic. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 Opening Activities 
 
 Strength and Disposition of Fleets — Goeben and Breslau 
 Episode — Attacks on Cable and Wireless Stations. 
 
 STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF FLEETS 
 (JULY, 1914) 
 
 WHEN hostilities opened, the naval fleets of 
 the countries involved were concentrated 
 in well-defined theatres of operations. Disregard- 
 ing the small detachments on independent or for- 
 eign service, the bulk of Great Britain's fleet faced 
 the German high sea fleet in North Europe, while 
 the French navy was opposed to the Austrian navy 
 in the Mediterranean and Adriatic. Russia's navy 
 had not been rehabilitated since the Russo-Japa- 
 nese war, but the few ships she had guarded Rus- 
 sian Baltic and Black Sea coasts. The relative 
 strengths of these belligerent navies at the begin- 
 ning of the great war may be approximately in- 
 dicated by the following figures. 
 
 Great Britain's navy consisted of sixty-three 
 battleships, ten battle cruisers, thirty-four ar- 
 
 21 
 
22 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 moured cruisers, seventy-four cruisers, two hun- 
 dred destroyers, eighty-five torpedo boats and 
 seventy-eight submarines. Of these, two of the 
 older battleships, thfee battle cruisers, sixteen 
 cruisers, and a few destroyers were on foreign sta- 
 tions. 
 
 Germany's navy consisted of thirty-five battle- 
 ships, five battle cruisers, nine armoured cruisers, 
 forty-five light cruisers, one hundred and forty- 
 three destroyers, and about thirty-five submarines. 
 This fighting strength was concentrated in home 
 waters except for one battle cruiser, two armoured 
 cruisers, eight light cruisers, and one destroyer on 
 duty abroad. 
 
 The French navy comprised twenty-two battle- 
 ships, nineteen armoured cruisers, twelve light 
 cruisers, eighty-four destroyers, one hundred and 
 thirty-five torpedo boats, and seventy-eight sub- 
 marines. As early as 1912, the Entente Cordiale 
 between Great Britain and France resulted in the 
 general scheme that France would look out for 
 British naval interests in southern Europe, while 
 Great Britain would protect French naval inter- 
 ests in northern Europe. France had only four 
 cruisers engaged in distant service. 
 
 Austria's navy numbered twelve battleships, ten 
 cruisers, eighteen destroyers, sixty-three torpedo 
 boats, and ten submarines, AH of these, with the 
 
OPENING ACTIVITIES 
 
 23 
 
 exception of one armoured cruiser on the China 
 station, were in home waters. 
 
 Table (approximate) of Belligerent Fleets 
 July, 1914^ 
 
 
 Battle- 
 
 
 
 Ar- 
 moured 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ships, 
 dread- 
 
 Battle- 
 ships 
 
 Battle 
 cruis- 
 
 Cruis- 
 
 De- 
 stroy- 
 
 Tor- 
 pedo 
 
 Sub-- 
 ma- 
 
 Coast 
 defense 
 
 
 nought 
 type 
 
 ers 
 
 era 
 
 
 ers 
 
 boats 
 
 rines 
 
 vessels ' 
 
 England 
 
 231 
 
 40 
 
 10 
 
 34 
 
 74 
 
 200 
 
 85 
 
 78 
 
 
 
 Germany. .. 
 
 152 
 
 20 
 
 5 
 
 9 
 
 45 
 
 143 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 2 
 
 France 
 
 4 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 12 
 
 84 
 
 135 
 
 78 
 
 1 
 
 Russia 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 9 
 
 91 
 
 14 
 
 30 
 
 2 
 
 Austria- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hungary. . 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 18 
 
 63 
 
 10 
 
 6 
 
 * Assuming 2 Queen Elizabeth class practically completed. 
 2 Assuming 2 Koenig class practically completed. 
 
 Just before the outbreak of war the British fleet 
 had been mobilised at Spithead, and early on Au- 
 gust 4th, the day of Great Britain's war declara- 
 tion against Germany, this fleet put to sea under 
 sealed orders. Less is known about the exact dis- 
 position of the German forces, but probably they 
 were equally ready and concentrated in the vi- 
 cinity of the fortified bases at either end of the 
 Kiel canal connecting the North and Baltic seas. 
 
 On August 5th the British ship Drake cut two 
 cables off the Azores, thus severing this means of 
 communication between the German ships abroad 
 and their Admiralty at home. On the same day, 
 
 ^ For further details of all the navies finally engaged in the 
 war, see Appendix. 
 
M NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 the crew of a fishing boat reported that they had 
 seen a large merchant ship in the North Sea throw- 
 ing things overboard. A British destroyer flotilla 
 of four ships was sent to investigate and soon gave 
 chase to the steamer Koenigen Luise. A shot 
 across the bow was unheeded, thus confirming the 
 suspicions that the fleeing steamer had been con- 
 verted by Germany into a mine layer. An en- 
 gagement lasting about six minutes followed, dur- 
 ing which the mine layer was repeatedly hit and 
 finally sunk by gun fire. Fifty of her crew of one 
 hundred and thirty were saved and made prison- 
 ers. The next day the British light cruiser Am- 
 phion struck a mine, probably one of those laid 
 by the Koenigin Luise, and was destroyed. On 
 August 9th a flotilla of German submarines made 
 an unsuccessful attack against the light cruiser 
 Birmingham^ which escaped unharmed after sink- 
 ing by gim fire the German U-15. 
 
 These early happenings give an idea of how 
 the struggle on the seas began. As fast as the 
 war news spread throughout the world the fight- 
 ing ships and merchant ships of the nations in- 
 volved proceeded, in accordance v/ith instructions, 
 to modify their conduct and movements to meet 
 the change from peace to war conditions. The 
 German warships at large did what they could 
 to safeguard their own commerce, destroy enemy 
 
5 s 
 
OPENING ACTIVITIES 25 
 
 commerce, and evade destruction themselves. The 
 Allied navies set to work blockading enemy coasts, 
 protecting Allied commerce, clearing the seas of 
 enemy flags, rendering assistance to the expedi- 
 tions Sent to reduce German colonies, and trans- 
 porting troops with their impedimenta from all 
 parts of the world to the fighting front. 
 
 Although the primary purpose of fighting ships 
 is to fight, it is readily seen that naval war- 
 time work covers a wide and varied field. Some- 
 times there are important naval happenings with- 
 out attendant losses or even without fighting. 
 The escape of the Goeben and Breslau may be 
 cited as of conspicuous political significance. 
 
 "goeben" and "breslau" episode 
 
 It was reported that during the first few days 
 of the war the German battle cruiser Goeben and 
 light cruiser Breslau bombarded the Algerian 
 coast, sank a few ships in Bona harbour, and then 
 proceeded t3 Messina, arriving there on August 
 5th, 1914. It was also rumoured that while off 
 the northern coast of Africa the two German 
 cruisers, when hard beset by enemy forces, escaped 
 during misty weather by the aid of the ruse of 
 placing some musicians on a raft to attract the 
 attention of enemy patrols by pla)ang German 
 
26 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 airs, while the warships laid their course for Mes- 
 sina. 
 
 From the pre-wartime disposition of forces it 
 may be assumed that the Allies had in the Medi- 
 terranean at this time numerous men-of-war, in- 
 cluding very likely two or three British battle 
 cruisers, several fast light cruisers, and many de- 
 stroyers. International law required that the Ger- 
 man warships leave the neutral port of Messina 
 within twenty-four hours. The chances for es- 
 cape appeared dubious to say the least, and the 
 following version of the manoeuvre, purporting to 
 be based on the log of the Goeben, is of interest: 
 
 On Aug. 6, 1914, just before sailing from Messina the 
 German commander issued these orders : "News about 
 the enemy is uncertain. I presume his strength lies in 
 the Adriatic and that he is watching both exits to the 
 Messina Strait. Our object is to break through to the 
 east and reach the Dardanelles. I want to create the 
 impression that we intend to go to the Adriatic. In case 
 I so succeed I will veer round in the night and make 
 for Cape Matapan, if possible throwing the enemy off 
 our track." 
 
 As the ships — flags flying and music playing — were 
 reaching the open sea the following wireless message 
 from the Kaiser reached the Admiral: "His Majesty 
 expects the Goeben and the Breslau to succeed in break- 
 ing through." 
 
 Shortly after leaving the harbour the English cruiser 
 
OPENING ACTIVITIES 27 
 
 Gloucester appeared on the horizon. The English 
 cruiser was emitting signals in three groups. The word 
 "Mumfu" frequently occurred and it was clear that it 
 referred to the Goeben. The wireless receivers inter- 
 preted the signal of the British cruiser as follows : "Goe- 
 ben making for the Adriatic." 
 
 The German wireless officer argued thus: "I can jam 
 him. If I break my waves against his perhaps I can 
 confuse, hold up, destroy his messages. Shall I jam his 
 wireless?" he asked the Admiral. 
 
 "Shall we fire"?" asked the Commander. 
 
 "No," was the answer to both questions. No one 
 apart from the staff understood the Admiral. This is 
 how he argued, however: "This boat is evidently a 
 patrol, intending to wireless our movements to the main 
 British fleet. He shallsave us, not ruin us. He shall 
 do his work. We will neither fire at nor jam him. Let 
 him wireless that the Germans are making for the Adri- 
 atic, whereas the Dardanelles is our object." 
 
 It was dark. The Breslau closed in. It was 10 o'clock 
 in the evening; then came the order from the bridge: 
 "Starboard ; make for Cape Matapan." 
 
 The watching British cruiser saw the manoeuvre, but 
 before she could wireless the news that the Germans were 
 making for the east the following order flashed out from 
 the Admiral: "Jam the wireless; jam it like the devil." 
 
 For hours the Germans were travelling eastward with- 
 out obstacle, while the patrol boat tried' to make itself 
 understood in vain. Where did the error of our enemy 
 lie ? In England the excuse was advanced that the Ger- 
 mans had acquired knowledge of the British secret wire- 
 less code and so deceived the latter into waiting. Is it 
 worth while contradicting such stuff? The English 
 
28 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 should have waited before the Strait of Messina, and 
 nowhere else. But so confident were they that the Goe- 
 ben and Breslau must try and break through to the Adri- 
 atic in order to reach an Austrian port, that they thought 
 it safe to wait in the Strait of Otranto, which is forty 
 sea miles wide. So positive were they on this point that 
 the thought of our making for the Dardanelles never 
 seems to have occurred to them. 
 
 When the wireless messages of the Gloucester finally 
 reached the British fleet it was too late. The German 
 ships were en route for Constantinople. 
 
 That this episode caused the Allies considerable 
 chagrin may well be imagined. The British com- 
 mander was afterwards relieved. A little later, 
 apparently as an alternative to disarming and 
 being interned, the Go eh en and Breslau were sold 
 by Germany to Turkey, a transaction without pre- 
 cedent and involving a question of international 
 law. Sharp representations were made by the Al- 
 lies to Turkey, claiming that the latter had vio- 
 lated her neutrality and demanding immediate 
 repatriation of the officers and crews. Turkey 
 failed to comply with this demand and it is rea- 
 sonable to suppose that the presence of the two 
 warships in Constantinople had considerable in- 
 fluence in persuading the Turkish Government to 
 join Germany and Austria in the war. 
 
 At this initial period in near Eastern affairs 
 determined action on the part of the Allies to- 
 
OPENING ACTIVITIES 29 
 
 ward Turkey might possibly have had important 
 effects. 
 
 Suppose, for example, that a powerful com- 
 bined British and French naval force had steamed 
 through the Dardanelles up to Constantinople and 
 demanded the surrender of the Goeben and Bres- 
 lau because of Turkey's alleged violation of neu- 
 trality laws. Suppose, also, if Turkey had for- 
 bidden this passage and refused these demands, 
 that the Allied force had fought its way through 
 the Dardanelles and either captured or destroyed 
 the Goeben and Breslau in spite of any armed 
 resistance which might have been offered. ■ It is, 
 of course, problematical how much strength Tur- 
 key could have shown at this time, but it is not 
 an unreasonable supposition that a resolute naval 
 demonstration in the Dardanelles might have been 
 successful and might have had a decisive influence 
 on the wavering Turks, with consequently far- 
 reaching effects upon the general course of the 
 war. 
 
 ATTACKS ON CABLE AND WIRELESS STATIONS 
 
 As another example of the kind of naval activ- 
 ity frequently overlooked because unmarked by 
 fighting, the work of destroying the enemy's cable 
 and wireless service and safeguarding one's own, 
 may be mentioned. 
 
30 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Means of transmitting information are most 
 important factors in modern strategy. These are 
 now so efBcient that it is extremely difficult for 
 commerce destroyers of the nation of weaker sea 
 power to escape the net drawn about them by 
 the stronger navies dominating the seas. That 
 the German ships on foreign stations well realised 
 the part wireless and cable would play in their 
 final downfall is evidenced by some interesting 
 attempts made by them to destroy wireless sta- 
 tions and cable stations. 
 
 An instance of this was the visit of the Nilrn- 
 berg and a German collier to the British cable 
 station at Fanning Island, situated about four 
 hundred miles south of the Hawaiian group in 
 the mid-Pacific. It was in the morning of Sep- 
 tember 7, 1914, that the German cruiser rudely 
 intruded upon the usually quiet and uneventful 
 life of Fanning. 
 
 The cable employes were hard at work, when 
 they were paralysed to see a German officer at 
 the door of the operating room with a revolver. 
 "Take your hands off those keys, all of you I" he 
 commanded. The men were made to line up 
 against the wall, while the sailors with axes 
 smashed the delicate and costly instruments. 
 Heavy charges of dynamite were planted and the 
 cable was blown to atoms. In the meanwhile the 
 
OPENING ACTIVITIES 31 
 
 collier grappled for the cable further out to sea, 
 with the intention of doing additional damage. 
 A search was then made by the officers, and a num- 
 ber of papers were found which revealed that sev- 
 eral valuable instruments were buried in reserve 
 for just such contingencies, and that a quantity of 
 hidden arms and ammunition existed, all of which 
 were quickly uncovered and confiscated/ 
 
 Later on the Niirnherg formed a part of Ad- 
 miral von Spec's squadron, which after the vic- 
 tory off Coronel attempted to raid the Falkland 
 Islands, just as Fanning had been raided. But 
 this time the British Navy did the surprising, and 
 instead of a defenceless wireless station the Ger- 
 mans found Vice Admiral Sturdee on guard with 
 a battle cruiser division. 
 
 Another instance of cable attack, also unhappy 
 in its results for the raiders, occurred in the Far 
 East at the Cocos Islands. The valiant Captain 
 Miiller of the Emden attempted one of his bogus- 
 funnel ruses as a means of taking by storm the 
 cable and wireless station on Keeling-Cocos Isl- 
 and. But the ruse was detected — and well ahead 
 — by those in charge on shore, who promptly ad- 
 vised by wireless several British men-of-war with- 
 in call. This led to the Emden's ultimate doom. 
 Moreover, a rush cable message was sent out to 
 
 * Chas. Bright, 19th Century Magazine, April, 1915. 
 
82 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 the Navy Office at Melbourne, and the alertness 
 and intelligence of the cable and wireless Super- 
 intendents showed that they had well learned the 
 lesson taught by the raid on Fanning Island. The 
 Emden landing parties did, indeed, succeed in cut- 
 ting two cables, but were too late. The intelli- 
 gence which proved fatal had already passed over 
 the wires. 
 
 The story of the operator's part in the sinking 
 of the Emden is one of those records of ready wit 
 and efficiency which make the best of romance. 
 The guns of the Sydney sent the Emden on the 
 rocks, but those guns would not have come into 
 play had not the operator at Cocos Island quickly 
 recognised the enemy in all her disguise and dis- 
 patched the warning message throughout the 
 world which brought the Sydney up in time. It 
 is almost disturbing to think that before the boat's 
 crew had landed from the Eniden the warships 
 were moving to the rescue and London was mak- 
 ing arrangements for repairing the cable and wire- 
 less station. 
 
 The superior sea power of the Allies, however, 
 made German attempts on Allied wireless and 
 cable stations difficult, and, when successful, of 
 only temporary embarrassment, while the over- 
 seas German stations, without ships to defend 
 them, passed permanently into the hands of the 
 Allies. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 Naval Action in Heligoland Bight 
 
 THE first noteworthy naval engagement of 
 the war occurred off Heligoland in August, 
 1914. In connection with this action which at 
 once and so dramatically brought this strategi- 
 cally commanding naval fortress to the world's 
 attention, it is interesting to keep in mind the 
 events that gave to Germany this island outpost 
 and the double base of the Kiel canal. 
 
 It was a strange fatality that Great Brit- 
 ain's foreign policy throughout the 19th Century 
 strengthened the sea power of her enemies 
 both off her own shores and at the Dardanelles, 
 while at the same time her contemporary naval 
 policy carefully maintained a navy strong 
 enough to dominate all rivals. This illustrates 
 the necessity in any country for mutual under- 
 standing and co-operation between the Foreign 
 Office and the Navy department in shaping for- 
 eign policies. 
 
 The island of Heligoland had been a British 
 possession from 1807, but in the late eighties was 
 
 33 
 
34 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 ceded to Germany in exchange for concessions in 
 Africa. In times of peace the African explorer 
 Stanley is said to have called this transfer of 
 Heligoland for concessions in Africa, "The ex- 
 change of a trouser button for a whole suit" A 
 German interviewer in 1914 reported that the Kai- 
 ser, "with joy and pride," spoke of a recent visit to 
 Heligoland, and adapted the above figure to pre- 
 sent conditions by saying, "Today this trouser but- 
 ton holds our whole suit together." 
 
 Heligoland is situated 35 miles northwest of 
 Cuxhaven and 43 miles north of Wilhelmshaven, 
 and it guards the naval bases and the North Sea 
 entrance of the Kiel canal. As a part of the Ger- 
 man program of naval expansion prior to the war 
 it had been converted into an impregnable forti- 
 fication, and the Bight of Heligoland has become 
 an outwork of the German bases which has greatly 
 increased their tactical value. The Bight forms a 
 channel eighteen miles wide leading to the ports 
 of the Elbe and it is a nest of mines and lurking 
 submarines. 
 
 The chief point of interest in the action of Au- 
 gust 28, 1914, is the spirited dash against the out- 
 skirts of these dangers by Admiral Beatty's squad- 
 ron, and his escape without serious damage after 
 inflicting losses upon the Germans. 
 
 The action of August 28th took place about 
 
36 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 seven miles north of Heligoland. Reconnoitring 
 British submarines had reported German light 
 cruisers and smaller craft in the vicinity of Heli- 
 goland. The British plan was to draw these enemy 
 ships away from the protecting guns of the fortress 
 island and then to destroy them. Detailed official 
 reports have not been published, but various ver- 
 sions appearing in the press indicate a British 
 scheme carried out in some such way as is de- 
 scribed in the following paragraphs. 
 
 Three submarines were to steam ahead on the 
 surface of the water to act as decoys, and to re- 
 treat before the German ships which were ex- 
 pected to give chase. The light cruisers Arethusa 
 and Fearless were assigned the mission to cut the 
 enemy off from their home bases. A squadron of 
 light cruisers was detailed to support these two 
 ships, while other light cruisers and battle cruis- 
 ers were held in reserve farther away in the north- 
 west. British destroyers accompanied each of 
 these three cruiser detachments. Vice Admiral 
 Beatty was in chief command of the British forces. 
 
 All ships being in their allotted positions at 
 daybreak of the 28th, the three decoy submarines 
 showing their hulls advanced at half speed to- 
 ward Heligoland. They were accompanied by 
 five sister ships steaming submerged and followed 
 by two destroyers. This detachment was soon 
 
ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 37 
 
 sighted, and German destroyers gave chase, fol- 
 lowed by the light cruisers Ariadne and S trass- 
 burg. 
 
 At about 7 a. m. this chase was being con- 
 ducted toward the British reserve force in the 
 northwest, while the supporting detachment, con- 
 sisting of the Are thus a and the Fearless with ac- 
 companying destroyers, was steaming toward the 
 eastward to cut off the German retreat. At 8.10 
 a. m. these two cruisers were engaged by enemy 
 cruisers, and a stubborn action ensued in which 
 the Arethusa was damaged. At 8.25 a six-inch 
 projectile from the Fearless wrecked the forward 
 bridge of the Ariadne^ killing her captain, and the 
 German ships then withdrew. At about 9 o'clock 
 the Fearless towed the Arethusa to the westward, 
 where she was able to make temporary repairs 
 which permitted her to return to the engagement 
 about an hour later. 
 
 Meanwhile lively destroyer actions were in 
 progress. The German V-187 boldly attacked a 
 superior number of enemy destroyers, but was 
 overpowered by gun fire and sank with her crew 
 cheering and firing their guns as long as the muz- 
 zles were above water. 
 
 During a lull in the fighting the British de- 
 stroyers Goshawk and Defender lowered boats to 
 rescue survivors of the V-187, t)ut the German 
 
38 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 light cruiser Mainz interrupted this operation and 
 forced the destroyers to abandon two of their 
 small boats. The commander of the submerged 
 British submarine E-4 happened to be nearby 
 watching this episode through his periscope. Tak- 
 ing in the situation he manoeuvred his submarine 
 for a rescue, and surprised the two small boats by 
 suddenly coming to the surface midway between 
 them. The Britishers and their rescued prisoners 
 were quickly taken aboard, and the E-4 again sub- 
 merged. 
 
 At about 10 o'clock the British destroyers 
 Lurcher and Firedrake^ which were in company 
 with the decoy submarines, reported that they 
 were being chased by two fast enemy cruisers. 
 The Arethusa^ Fearless^ and two more light cruis- 
 ers armed with 4-inch guns went to the rescue and 
 engaged the Strassburg, which vessel was soon 
 supported by the Koln and Mainz. The larger 
 guns carried by the German cruisers proved too 
 strong for the lighter armed British cruisers, and 
 calls for assistance were sent to the reserve force 
 of battle cruisers and light cruisers previously sta- 
 tioned in the northwest. 
 
 In the meantime (at 11 a.m.) this reserve 
 force had been attacked by three German subma- 
 rines. This attack was frustrated by rapid ma- 
 
ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 39 
 
 noeuvring, and four British destroyers made a 
 counter-attack. Shortly after eleven Vice Admiral 
 Beatty, flying his flag in the battle cruiser Lion^ 
 received word that the British light cruisers were 
 being hard pressed, and he ordered the Falmouth^ 
 carrying eight 8-inch guns, and the Nottingham, 
 carrying nine 6-inch guns, to go to their support. 
 A little later further calls for assistance were re- 
 ceived, and the battle cruisers, having worked up 
 to full speed, proceeded to the scene of the action. 
 When the Lion and Queen Mary appeared out of 
 the mist their heavy guns quickly decided the 
 battle. 
 
 The noonday sun cleared away the mist which 
 had masked the large guns of Heligoland during 
 the engagement, and by evening both British and 
 German forces had retired to their respective home 
 ports. The Germans lost three light cruisers, 
 Koln, Mainz and Ariadne, and one destroyer, 
 V-i8y, sunk. The light cruiser Strassburg suf- 
 fered severe damage as did also other of the Ger- 
 man destroyers and small craft. The British lost 
 no ships sunk, but the light cruiser Arethusa 
 and some of the destroyers were hard hit and 
 compelled to limp back to home navy yards for 
 extensive repairs before returning again to active 
 service. 
 
40 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 The following is Admiral Beatty's report of the 
 engagement : 
 
 H. M. S. Lion, September i, 1914. 
 
 Sir. — I have the honor to report that on Thursday, 
 August 27, at 5 a. m., I proceeded with the First Battle 
 Cruiser Squadron and First Light Cruiser Squadron in 
 company, to rendezvous with the Rear Admiral, Invinci- 
 ble. 
 
 At 4 a. m., August 28, the movements of the flotillas 
 commenced, as previously arranged, the Battle Cruiser 
 Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron supporting. The 
 Rear Admiral, Invincible, with New Zealand and four 
 destroyers, having joined my flag, the squadron passed 
 through the prearranged rendezvous. 
 
 At 8.10 a. m. I received a signal from the Commodore 
 (T), informing me that the flotilla was in action with the 
 enemy. This was presumably in the vicinity of their pre- 
 arranged rendezvous. From this time until 11 a. m. I 
 remained about the vicinity ready to support as neces- 
 sary, intercepting various signals, which contained no in- 
 formation on which I could act. 
 
 At 11 a. m. the squadron was attacked by three sub- 
 marines. The attack was frustrated by rapid maneuver- 
 ing, and the four destroyers were ordered to attack them. 
 Shortly after 1 1 a. m. various signals having been re- 
 ceived indicating that the Commodore (T), and Com- 
 modore (S) were both in need of assistance, I ordered the 
 Light Cruiser Squadron to support the torpedo flotillas. 
 
 Later I received a signal from the Commodore (T), 
 stating that he was being attacked by a large cruiser, and 
 a further signal informing me that he was being hard 
 pressed, and asking for assistance. The Captain (D), 
 
ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 41 
 
 First Flotilla, also signalled that he was in need of help. 
 
 From the foregoing the situation appeared to me crit- 
 ical. The flotillas had advanced only two miles since 8 
 a. m., and were only about 25 miles from two enemy 
 bases on their flank and rear respectively. Commodore 
 Goodenough had detached two of his light cruisers to 
 assist some destroyers earlier in the day, and these had 
 not yet rejoined. (They rejoined at 2.30 p. m.) As the 
 reports indicated the presence of many enemy ships — one 
 a large cruiser — I considered that his force might not be 
 strong enough to deal with the situation sufficiently rap- 
 idly, so at 11.30 a. m. the battle cruisers turned to ESE. 
 and worked up to full speed. It was evident that to be 
 of any value the support must be overwhelming, and car- 
 ried out at the highest speed possible. 
 
 I had not lost sight of the risk of submarines, and pos- 
 sible sortie in force from the enemy's base, especially in 
 view of the mist to the southeast. 
 
 Our high speed, however, made submarine attack diffi- 
 cult, and the smoothness of the sea made their detection 
 comparatively easy. I considered that we were powerful 
 enough to deal with any sorties except by a battle squad- 
 ron, which was unlikely to come out in time, provided our 
 stroke was sufficiently rapid. 
 
 At 12.15 p. ^- Fearless and First Flotilla were sighted 
 retiring west. At the same time the Light Cruiser Squad- 
 ron was observed to be engaging an enemy ship ahead. 
 They appeared to have her beat. 
 
 I then steered NE. to sounds of firing ahead, and at 
 12.30 p. m. sighted Arethusa and Third Flotilla retiring 
 to the westward engaging a cruiser of the Kolberg class 
 on our port bow. I steered to cut her off from Heligo- 
 
42 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 land, and at 12.37 p. m. opened fire. At 12.42 the enemy 
 turned to NE., and we chased at 27 knots. 
 
 At 12.56 p. m. sighted and engaged a two-funnelled 
 cruiser ahead. Lion fired two salvos at her, which took 
 effect, and she disappeared into the mist, binning furi- 
 ously and in a sinking condition. In view of the mist 
 and that she was steering at high speed at right angles 
 to Lion, who was herself steamiirg at 28 knots, the Lions 
 firing was very creditable. 
 
 Our destroyers had reported the presence of floating 
 mines to the eastward, and I considered it inadvisable to 
 pursue her. It was also essential that the squadrons 
 should remain concentrated, and I accordingly ordered a 
 withdrawal. The battle cruisers turned north and circled 
 to port to complete the destruction of the vessel first en- 
 gaged. She was sighted again at 1.25 p. m. steaming 
 SE., with colors still flying. Lion opened fire with two 
 turrets, and at 1.35 p. m., after receiving two salvos, she 
 sank. 
 
 The four attached destroyers were sent to pick up sur- 
 vivors, but I deeply regret that they subsequently re- 
 ported that they searched the area but found none. 
 
 At 1.40 p. m. the battle cruisers turned to the north- 
 ward, and Queen Mary was again attacked by a sub- 
 marine. The attack was avoided by the use of the helm. 
 Lowestoft was also unsuccessfully attacked. The battle 
 cruisers covered the retirement until nightfall. By 6 
 p. m., the retirement having been well executed and all 
 destroyers accounted for, I altered course, spread the 
 light cruisers, and swept northwards in accordance with 
 the Commander-in-Chief's orders. At 7.45 p. m. I de- 
 tached Liverpool to Rosyth with German prisoners, seven 
 
ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 43 
 
 officers and 79 men, survivors from Mainz. No further 
 incident occurred. I have the honor to be, sir, your 
 obedient servant, 
 
 (Signed) David Beatty, Vice Admiral. 
 The Secretary of the Admiralty. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 CORONEL AND FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 
 BATTLE OFF CORONEL 
 
 AT the beginning of the war the British ar- 
 moured cruisers Good Hope and Mon- 
 mouth^ together with the light cruiser Glasgow 
 and the transport Otranto, were in Atlantic wa- 
 ters off the coast of the Americas. These ships 
 rendezvoused off Brazil under the command of 
 Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock and proceeded 
 south around Cape Horn, evidently with the mis- 
 sion to find and destroy German vessels. The 
 old battleship Canopus was also under his com- 
 mand, but apparently did not cruise in company 
 with the other ships because of her inferior speed. 
 At this time German ships in the Pacific in- 
 cluded the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and 
 Gneisenau, the light cruiser Niirnberg^ and the 
 light cruiser Leipzig. These ships in the Pacific, 
 together with the light cruiser Dresden., then in 
 South Atlantic waters, proceeded at the outbreak 
 of the war, apparently in accordance with a pre- 
 arranged plan, to rendezvous off the coast of South 
 America. 
 
 44 
 
CORONEL— FALia^AND ENGAGEMENTS 45 
 
 A comparison of the strategic dispositions of the 
 belligerents in this rather remote theatre of war, in 
 the latter part of October, 1914, shows that the 
 British Admiral had under his command two ar- 
 moured cruisers, one light cruiser, and one battle- 
 ship, while the German Admiral, Count von Spee, 
 had two armoured cruisers and three light cruisers, 
 thus giving the British a superiority of about 
 8,000 tons in displacement and about 2,200 
 pounds in weight of broadside. These figures, 
 however, are misleading, because they do not truly 
 measure the fighting values of the two groups. 
 The German ships were newer and their squadron 
 more homogeneous in both guns and speed. The 
 British ships were a heterogeneous collection of 
 less modern vessels, with the principal fighting 
 strength in an old battleship of only sixteen knots 
 speed, which did not get into the engagement at 
 all. With the Canopus out of the battle line, the 
 Germans had considerable advantage in tonnage 
 and in weight of broadside.^ 
 
 *The following figures indicate the strength of the British 
 ships actually engaged. For the strength of the German squad- 
 ron, see table for Falkland Islands engagement, p. 53 
 
 Name 
 
 Type 
 
 Date 
 
 Dis- 
 place- 
 ment 
 (Tons) 
 
 Belt 
 ar- 
 mour 
 
 Guns 
 
 Speed 
 
 Good Hope .... 
 
 Monmouth 
 
 Glasgow 
 
 Armoured Cruiser . . . 
 Armoured Cruiser . . . 
 Light (scout) Cruiser 
 
 1903 
 1903 
 1911 
 
 14,100 
 9,800 
 4,800 
 
 6-inch 
 4-inch 
 none 
 
 2-9.2', 16-6', 14-3' 
 14-6', 8-3' 
 2-6', 10-4' 
 
 24 
 24 
 26.5 
 
46 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 The information now available seems to afford 
 evidence of superior strategy on the part of Ger- 
 many. All the more credit is due on account of 
 Germany's marked inferiority in total of sea pow- 
 er, with consequently greater difficulties confront- 
 ing Admiral von Spec, beset as he was by Japa- 
 nese squadrons as well as by British squadrons, 
 and without any naval bases in which to seek ref- 
 uge and comfort. 
 
 The movements of these squadrons up to the 
 day of the battle have been considered as strateg- 
 ical because they were in preparation for fighting. 
 We now turn to the tactical phases which have to 
 do with the execution of the fighting. 
 
 On the afternoon of November i, 1914, the 
 British squadron was spread out in scouting for- 
 mation, steaming along the coast of Chile, look- 
 ing for enemy ships. The light cruiser Glasgow 
 had been dispatched to Coronel to send cables. 
 She left there at 9 a. m., November 1, and while 
 steaming to the northward sighted the German 
 squadron about 4 p. m. At about 5 p. m. the 
 British ships formed in line ahead, the Good Hope 
 leading, followed by the Monmouth, Glasgow, 
 and Otranto. The battleship Canopus was about 
 250 miles to the southward. Admiral von Spee 
 formed his ships in line ahead, the Scharnhorst 
 leading, followed by the Gneisenau, with the 
 
i*-- OTRANTOJ 
 
 "^•D . GLASGOW i 
 "■ "-g MONMOUTH i 
 a< 5 
 Z of; GOOD HOPE 
 
 10 C 0) 
 •H E «> 
 
 CD^ US 
 
 6iP7_ 
 
 14,600 yds," 
 
 t NURNBERG ("far In rear") 
 
 I DRESDEN ("l mile behind") 
 i GNEISENAU 
 i SCHARNHORST 
 
 ' 6:20 _ 
 
 1 13;^400yds. 
 
 1 _6l34 
 
 V""1 1,260 yds. 
 
 GOOD HOPE t)\t.\ 6i39_ 
 
 German ships close 1 point. 
 
 / Open fire 
 
 Tumbes Pt. 
 Resume southerly course. 
 
 OTRANTOg 
 
 escapes S.Wj,^ 
 
 6:53 
 
 MONMOUTH 
 
 ceases fire, 7:20jY \ 
 sunk by NURNBERG, 8:56, '^ 
 
 GLASGOW /| 
 
 escapes S,W.r 
 
 GOOD HOPE 
 
 ceases fire, 7:23; 
 sunk, 8:20i-v_^ 
 
 bjpo^ One point off. 
 B,500 yds.N 
 \ 5,300 ^7:26, Cease fire 
 
 '" yds. V^ 
 
 •- x"^ Increase 
 
 \ ■*='^^^\ distance." 
 
 ^\ Light cruisers 
 M In pursuit. 
 
 >«-J 
 
 Wind S. 2 points E. 
 Heavy head/ 
 sea." 
 
 STA.MARIA I 
 
 P.Lavapie, 
 
 Coticepcion 
 
 DIAGRAM OF BATTLE OFF CORONEL 
 
 47 
 
48 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Dresden about one mile in the rear and the Niirn- 
 berg far behind. At 6.07 p. m. the two squad- 
 rons were on nearly parallel southerly courses, 
 about 15,000 yards apart, with the German line 
 inshore. 
 
 There was a heavy sea and strong wind from 
 one to two points to the eastward of south, and 
 the German ships were able to make their course 
 a little to the westward of south, bringing this 
 heavy sea on their unengaged bow. On the other 
 hand, the British carried wind and sea a little on 
 the engaged bow, a marked disadvantage, making 
 their six-inch guns, especially the lower tier, prac- 
 tically useless. It is to be noted that the German 
 8.2-inch guns were mounted higher and were bet- 
 ter for fighting in a seaway. Practically all that 
 the British had to oppose the twelve 8.2-inch guns 
 of the Germans were two old 9.2-inch turret guns 
 on board the Good Hope. An additional disad- 
 vantage was that the British ships were outlined 
 against the western sky, supplying an excellent 
 point of aim for the Germans. 
 
 At this time Admiral Cradock was no doubt 
 doing some hard thinking. Should he engage 
 with such big odds against him? There was the 
 Canopus., his main fighting strength, 250 miles 
 to the southward. By bearing off sharply to the 
 westward, even at this late hour, the speeds of the 
 
CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 49 
 
 two squadrons were so nearly equal that he could 
 have avoided engaging that night, and by morn- 
 ing he might have joined the Canopus and fought 
 the battle on a more equal footing. It would be 
 interesting to know what thoughts flashed through 
 the Admiral's mind and what counsels prevailed 
 upon him to make the courageous but fateful de- 
 cision embodied in his signal to the Canopus at 
 6.18 p.m., "I am going to attack the enemy 
 now." 
 
 The two squadrons gradually neared one an- 
 other on converging courses, and Vice Admiral 
 von Spee describes the resulting battle as follows : 
 
 Wind and swell were head on and the vessels had 
 heavy going, especially the small cruisers on both sides. 
 Observation and distance estimation were under a severe 
 handicap because of the seas which washed over the 
 bridges. The swell was so great that it obscured the 
 aim of the gunners at the six-inch guns on the middle 
 deck, who could not see the sterns of the enemy ships at 
 all and the bows but seldom. At 6.20 p. m., at a dis- 
 tance of 13,400 yards, I turned one point toward the 
 enemy, and at 6.34 opened fire at a distance of 11,260 
 yards. The guns of both our armoured cruisers were 
 effective, and by 6.39 already we could note the first 
 hit on the Good Hope. I at once resumed a parallel 
 course instead of bearing slightly toward the enemy. 
 
 The English opened their fire at this time. I assume 
 that the heavy sea made more trouble for them than it 
 
50 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 did for us. Their two armoured cruisers remained cov- 
 ered by our fire, while they, so far as could be deter- 
 mined, hit the Scharnhorst but twice and the Gneisenau 
 only four times. 
 
 At 6.53, when 6,500 yards apart, I ordered a course 
 one point away from the enemy. They were firing more 
 slowly at this time, while we were able to count numer- 
 ous hits. We could see, among other things, that the 
 top of the Monmouth's forward turret had been shot 
 away and that a violent fire was burning in the turret. 
 The Scharnhorst, it is thought, hit the Good Hope about 
 thirty-five times. 
 
 In spite of our altered course the English changedr 
 theirs sufficiently so that the distance between us shrunk 
 to 5,300 yards. There was reason to suspect that the 
 enemy despaired of using his artillery effectively and 
 was manoeuvring for a torpedo attack. The position of 
 the moon, which had risen at 6 o'clock, was favourable 
 to this move. Accordingly I gradually opened up 
 further distances between the squadrons by another de- 
 flection of the leading ship at 7.45. In the meantime it 
 had grown dark. The range finders on the Scharnhorst 
 used the fire on the Monmouth as a guide for a time, 
 though eventually all range finding, aiming, and obser- 
 vations became so inexact that firing was stopped at 
 7.26. 
 
 At 7.23 a column of fire from an explosion was no- 
 ticed between the stacks of the Good Hope. The Mon- 
 mouth apparently stopped firing at 7.20. The small 
 cruisers, including the Niirnberg, received by wireless at 
 7.30 the order to follow the enemy and to attack his 
 ships with torpedoes. Vision was somewhat obscured at 
 
CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 51 
 
 this time by a rain squall. The light cruisers were not 
 able to find the Good Hope, but the Number g encoun- 
 tered the Monmouth, and at 8.58 was able by shots at 
 closest range to capsize her without a single shot being 
 fired in return. Rescue work in the heavy sea was not 
 to be thought of, especially as the Nurnherg immedi- 
 ately afterward believed she had sighted the smoke of 
 another ship and had to prepare for a new attack. 
 
 The small cruisers had neither losses nor damage in 
 the battle. On the Gneisenau there were two men slightly 
 wounded. The crews of the ships went into the fight 
 with enthusiasm, every one did his duty and played his 
 part in the victory. 
 
 In concluding the account of this battle it is 
 difficult to find any fault in the tactics used by 
 Vice Admiral von Spee. He appears to have 
 manoeuvred so as to secure the advantage of light, 
 wind, and sea. He also suited himself as regards 
 the range. The Good Hope and Monmouth were 
 destroyed, the Glasgoiv had a narrow and lucky 
 escape, while the German losses were two slightly 
 wounded. 
 
 FALKLAND ISLANDS ENGAGEMENT 
 
 After the battle off Coronel, while the German 
 squadron coaled at Valparaiso and made its way 
 in no great hurry around Cape Horn, the British 
 were not idle. Within ten days of the receipt of 
 
52 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 the news of the British disaster in the South Pa- 
 cific the dreadnought battle cruisers Invincible 
 and Inflexible, under command of Vice Admiral 
 Sturdee, were on their way to the Falkland Isl- 
 ands, a wireless and coaling station off the south- 
 east coast of South America. It would appear 
 that Admiral von Spee contemplated an attack on 
 the Falklands, and it would also appear that he 
 did not anticipate the vigorous and alert strategy 
 of his enemy. Had he done so he surely would 
 have either tried to time his visit earlier or else 
 have abandoned it entirely. 
 
 As a matter of ordinary precaution it seems 
 strange that he did not send a scout ship ahead 
 to reconnoitre. At least he might have planned 
 to arrive in the late afternoon, which would have 
 given his ships a good chance to escape from a 
 superior force under cover of darkness. On the 
 other hand, little criticism can be made of Eng- 
 land's strategy. On the morning of December 8, 
 when the German squadron hove in sight of the 
 lookout ship off the Falkland harbour entrance, an 
 opposing fighting force had been provided, and 
 lay at anchor within, consisting of two battle 
 cruisers, the Invincible and Inflexible; three ar- 
 moured cruisers, the Carnarvon, Cornzvall, and 
 Kent; the light cruisers Bristol and Glasgow; and 
 the predreadnought battleship Canopus. 
 
CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 53 
 
 The German squadron was the same as off Cor- 
 onel — two armoured cruisers, the Scharnhorst and 
 Gneisenau, and three light cruisers, the Leipzig, 
 Niirnberg, and Dresden. 
 
 The total tonnage of the British ships was 
 87,000 — nearly three times that of the German 
 tonnage, 35,500. The total weight of the Brit- 
 ish broadside was 9,566 kilograms, nearly five 
 times that of the German broadside, which was 
 2,032 kilograms. 
 
 The following table gives the details of the 
 opposing squadrons : 
 
 BRITISH SQUADRON 
 
 Name 
 
 Type 
 
 Date 
 
 Dis- 
 place- 
 ment 
 (Tons) 
 
 Belt 
 ar- 
 mour 
 
 Guns 
 
 Speed 
 
 Invincible 
 
 Inflexible 
 
 Carnarvon 
 
 Cornwall 
 
 Kent.. 
 
 Battle Cruiser 
 
 Battle Cruiser 
 
 Armoured Cruiser . . . 
 Armoured Cruiser . . . 
 Armoured Cruiser . . . 
 
 Scout Cruiser 
 
 Scout Cruiser 
 
 Coast Defense Ship . . 
 
 1908 
 1908 
 1904 
 1901 
 1903 
 1911 
 1911 
 1897 
 
 17,250 
 17,250 
 10,850 
 9,800 
 9,800 
 4,800 
 4,800 
 12,950 
 
 7-inoh 
 
 7-inch 
 
 6-inch 
 
 4-inch 
 
 4-inch 
 
 none 
 
 none 
 
 6-inch 
 
 8-12", 16-4" 
 
 8-12", 16-4" 
 
 4-7.5", 6-6" 
 
 14-6" 
 
 14-6" 
 
 2-6", 10-4" 
 
 2-6", 10-4" 
 
 4-35 cal. 12', 12-6" 
 
 26.5 
 26.5 
 23.0 
 23.5 
 23 
 
 Bristol 
 
 Glasgow 
 
 Canopus 
 
 26.5 
 26.5 
 16.5 
 
 GERMAN SQUADRON 
 
 Scharnhorst . . 
 Gneisenau. . . 
 
 Leipzig 
 
 Nurnberg... . 
 Dresden 
 
 Armoured Cruiser . 
 Armoured Cruiser . 
 Protected Cruiser. 
 
 Scout Cruiser 
 
 Scout Cruiser 
 
 1907 
 
 11,600 
 
 6-inch 
 
 1907 
 
 11,600 
 
 6-inch 
 
 1906 
 
 3,250 
 
 none 
 
 1908 
 
 3,450 
 
 none 
 
 1908 
 
 3,600 
 
 none 
 
 8-8.2", 6-6" 
 8-8.2", 6-6" 
 10-4" 
 10-4" 
 10-4" 
 
 23.5 
 23.5 
 23.0 
 24.0 
 24.0 
 
 In addition to the fighting ships just mentioned, 
 the converted cruiser Macedonia was acting as a 
 
54 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 lookout ship for the British, and the steamships 
 Baden and Santa Isabel were in the train of the 
 German squadron. The British ships had arrived 
 at 10.30 a. m. the day before and had begun 
 coaling at once. At the time of the engagement 
 the battle cruisers, though not filled up, had suf- 
 ficient fuel on board, and the fact that they were 
 a little light in draft favoured their speed. 
 
 At 8 a. m. the German ships were sighted, and 
 orders were given to raise steam for full speed. 
 The high land hid the main British force, and at 
 9.20 the Gneisenau and the Nilrnberg, with guns 
 trained on the wireless station, had closed to with- 
 in 1 1,000 yards of the Canopus^ which latter ves- 
 sel opened fire at them across the low land with 
 her twelve-inch guns. The Germans hoisted their 
 colours and turned away from their hidden foe, 
 but a few minutes later turned to port, as though 
 to close on the Kent, at the entrance of the har- 
 bour. Then the British battle cruisers were sight- 
 ed, and the two German ships altered course and 
 increased their speed to join their consorts. 
 
 At 9.45 a. m. the British squadron got under 
 way and headed for the German ships, which were 
 clearly in sight, hull down. The sea was calm, 
 with a light breeze from the northwest. The visi- 
 bility was at a maximum, under a bright sun in 
 a clear sky. At 10.20 signal for a general chase 
 
56 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 was made, but the battle cruisers eased speed to 
 twenty knots, to allow the other cruisers to get in 
 station. 
 
 Three enemy ships, probably transports or col- 
 liers, were sighted off Port Pleasant, and the Bris- 
 tol was ordered to take the Macedonia in com- 
 pany and destroy the transports. 
 
 The British squadron, as a whole, was not able 
 to close on the German squadron, and at 11.20 
 Vice Admiral Sturdee decided to attack with his 
 faster ships, the Invincible^ Inflexible^ and Glas- 
 gow. These three all had a speed of twenty-six 
 and one-half knots, and were able to close quickly 
 on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau^ which had a 
 speed of only twenty-three and one-half knots. 
 At 12.55 ^^ battle cruisers opened fire on the 
 German light cruiser Leipzig at a range of 16,500 
 to 15,000 yards. Soon after opening fire, the 
 German light cruisers turned to the southwest and 
 spread, in an effort to escape. The armoured 
 cruisers Cornwall and Kent and the light cruiser 
 Glasgow gave chase, while the battle cruisers and 
 the Carnarvon kept on after the Scharnhorst and 
 Gneisenau: Admiral Sturdee maintained, for the 
 most part, a range of between 16,000 and 12,000 
 yards, destroying the enemy with his twelve-inch 
 guns in rather leisurely fashion, without getting 
 within the effective range of the German 8.2-inch 
 
CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 57 
 
 guns. At 4.17 p.m. the Scharnhorst sank, with 
 her flag flying. The Gneisenau kept up the une- 
 qual fight, but at 6 p. m. she also sank with her 
 flag flying. 
 
 In the chase after the light cruisers the Glasgow 
 was the only ship with superior speed, but she was 
 able to engage the Niirnberg and Leipzig, delay- 
 ing them enough to give the Cornwall and Kent a 
 chance to get into action. The Leipzig sank at 
 9 p. m. and the Niirnberg was sunk by the Kent 
 at 7.27 p.m. 
 
 The Dresden escaped, and made a precarious 
 commerce destroying cruise, which lasted until 
 March 14, 1915, when she was discovered near 
 Juan Fernandez island and destroyed by the Kent, 
 Glasgow, and auxiliary cruiser Orama. 
 
 Hindsight is always better than foresight, and 
 we should be slow to criticise without knowing 
 full particulars, but one cannot help wondering 
 at the tactical disposition of the Bristol and ques- 
 tioning if the Dresden would have escaped had 
 the Bristol been on hand to help the Glasgow. It 
 is to be noted that the Bristol, a sister ship to the 
 Glasgow, was faster and better armed than any 
 of the German light cruisers, and was also three 
 and one-half knots faster than the British ar- 
 moured cruisers Carnarvon, Cornwall and Kent. 
 The reasons for sending a twenty-six-and-one- 
 
58 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 half -knot ship instead of a twenty- three-knot ship 
 after the transports are not very clear, especially 
 as the Bristol and the Glasgow were the only two 
 ships besides the battle cruisers fast enough to 
 catch the Nurnberg and the Dresden. The Bris- 
 tol, to be sure, accomplished her assigned mission 
 in destroying the German steamships. But could 
 not the three-knot slower armoured cruiser Car- 
 narvon have done this equally well"? As it was, 
 the Carnarvon served no useful purpose, and no 
 avail was made of the valuable speed asset of 
 the Bristol. 
 
 The British lost nine killed and about the same 
 number wounded. All the German ships except 
 the Dresden were sunk, and only about 200 men 
 were saved from the total complements. This 
 decisive naval action gave the Allies practically 
 undisputed control of the high seas. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 Dardanelles Operations 
 
 TURKEY entered the war on October 31, 
 1914, and four days later the outer forts 
 of the Dardanelles were bombarded for about ten 
 minutes by Allied men-of-war. What useful pur- 
 pose this bombardment served the Allied cause is 
 not clear. There seems to have been no intention 
 of pushing the attack home, and simply as a di- 
 version it would appear calculated to put the en- 
 emy on guard without gaining any commensurate 
 military advantage. 
 
 As early as November 25, 1914, the idea of 
 making a serious attack on the Dardanelles was 
 discussed at a meeting of the British War Coun- 
 cil. In addition to political benefits expected to 
 result from a military success in this war theatre 
 and the obvious value of opening a way to Rus- 
 sia's Black Sea ports, the argument was advanced 
 that the best way to protect India and Egypt was 
 to threaten Turkish communications, or better yet 
 to cut them by capturing Constantinople. The 
 
 59 
 
60 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Council admitted the points in favour of the pro- 
 ject, but because of the critical situation on the 
 Western front and the shortage of tonnage fgr 
 transport service the question for the time being 
 was dismissed. 
 
 On January 2, 1915, a telegram from Petro- 
 grad stating that Russia was hard pressed in the 
 Caucasus and expressing the hope that a demon- 
 stration would be made against the Turks from 
 some other quarter, spurred the British War Coun- 
 cil to a reconsideration of the Dardanelles pro- 
 ject. In the ensuing deliberations the need of 
 Russia seems to have introduced a question of 
 expediency which hampered the development of 
 plans strictly in accord with sound military prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 At this time naval and military opinion seems 
 to have agreed that if a serious attack was to be 
 made against the Dardanelles fortifications it was 
 highly desirable to make it a joint naval and mili- 
 tary operation. 
 
 The original estimate of the British War Office 
 was that an army of 150,000 men would be re- 
 quired for a combined naval and military attack. 
 The difficulty of supplying this force and the 
 urgency of doing something for Russia led to a 
 discussion of the advisability of making a purely 
 naval demonstration with a view either to with- 
 
DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 61 
 
 drawing if the opening bombardment were not 
 successful, or continuing the attack with such mil- 
 itary support as could be provided on the spot, 
 if the results of the preliminary demonstration 
 warranted further operations aiming at the ulti- 
 mate capture of Constantinople. 
 
 In these discussions a strong opinion developed 
 that the Dardanelles might be forced by the fleet 
 alone, and in consequence, while the War Office 
 made certain military preparations in the Eastern 
 war theatre, important transactions took place be- 
 tween the Admiralty office and Vice Admiral Car- 
 den, then commanding the British forces in the 
 Mediterranean. 
 
 On January 3, 1915, the following telegram 
 was dispatched from the Admiralty to Vice Ad- 
 miral Carden: — 
 
 "Do you think that it is a practical operation to force 
 the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone ? It is assumed 
 that older battleships would be employed, that they 
 would be furnished with mane sweepers, and that they 
 would be preceded by colliers or other merchant vessels 
 as sweepers and bumpers. The importance of the result 
 would justify severe loss. Let us know what your views 
 are." 
 
 On January 5th, Vice Admiral Carden replied 
 to the Admiralty telegram of the third, in the fol- 
 lowing terms: — • 
 
62 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 "I do not think that the Dardanelles can be rushed, 
 but they might be forced by extended operations with a 
 large number of ships." 
 
 On January 6th, the telegram following was 
 sent from the First Lord to Vice Admiral Car- 
 den: — 
 
 "High authorities here concur in your opinion. For- 
 ward detailed particulars showing what force would be 
 required for extended operations. How do you think it 
 should be employed, and what results could be gained?" 
 
 On January nth, Vice Admiral Garden replied 
 to the telegram sent to him from the Admiralty 
 on the 6th. Four operations he said were possi- 
 ble. These were : — 
 
 (a) The destruction of the defences at the en- 
 trance to the Dardanelles. 
 
 (b) Action inside the straits, so as to clear the 
 defences up to and including Cephez Point Bat- 
 tery N8. 
 
 (c) Destruction of defences of the narrows. 
 
 (d) Sweeping of a clear channel through the 
 mine field and advance through the narrows, fol- 
 lowed by a reduction of the forts further up, and 
 advance into the Sea of Marmora. 
 
 He estimated that it would take a month to 
 carry out all these operations. 
 
DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 63 
 
 At a meeting of the war council on January 
 13, 1915, a decision was made and this decision 
 as noted by Premier Asquith reads : — 
 
 "The Admiralty should prepare for a naval ex- 
 pedition in February to bombard and take the 
 Gallipoli peninsula, with Constantinople as its 
 objective." 
 
 On January 15th, the Chief of the Naval War 
 Staff reported his opinion on Admiral Carden's 
 proposal. His memorandum began with the fol- 
 lowing remark: "Concur generally in his plans." 
 After dealing at some length with the detailed 
 proposals this memorandum concluded by saying: 
 'T would suggest (a) might be approved at once, 
 as the experience gained would be useful." Un- 
 less the experience gained from (a) and (b) jus- 
 tified it, the undertaking of (c) and (d) was not 
 recommended. 
 
 On February 16th, a very important informal 
 meeting of ministers was held. Owing to events 
 in Egypt and to changes in plans in the West, it 
 was decided to mass a considerable military force 
 in the Mediterranean to be used as occasion might 
 require. The decisions, which were eventually in- 
 corporated with those of the war council, were as 
 follows : — 
 
 "1. The 29th division, hitherto intended to 
 form part of Sir John French's army, to be des- 
 
64 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 patched to Lemnos at the earliest possible date. 
 It is hoped it may be able to sail within nine or 
 ten days. 
 
 "2. Arrangements to be made for a force to 
 be dispatched from Egypt, if required. 
 
 "3. The whole of the above forces, in conjunc- 
 tion with the battalions of Royal Marines already 
 despatched, to be available in case of necessity to 
 support the naval attack on the Dardanelles. 
 
 "4. Horse boats to be taken out with the 
 29th division, and the Admiralty to make arrange- 
 ments to collect small craft, tugs, and lighters in 
 the Levant. 
 
 ''5. The Admiralty to build special transports 
 and lighters suitable for the conveyance and land- 
 ing of a force of 50,000 men at any point where 
 they may be required." 
 
 It had been intended that the 29th division 
 should be ready to sail for the Mediterranean by 
 the 22nd of February, but on the 20th the War 
 Office decided that the general situation was such 
 that this division could not be despatched as 
 planned. On March 10th the situation on other 
 fronts had changed and the War Office announced 
 that the decision to send the 29th division was 
 again operative. This change of mind entailed 
 a delay of three weeks in despatching these troops. 
 
 In the meantime during January and February 
 
65 
 
66 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 British and French forces in the Mediterranean 
 were preparing for extensive operations against 
 the Dardanelles. The island of Tenedos was 
 seized. Under an agreement with Venizelos, the 
 Greek Premier, the island of Lemnos was occu- 
 pied, and Mudros with its large harbour converted 
 into an advanced naval and military base. Lem- 
 nos was less than fifty miles from Gallipoli, while 
 Tenedos was only twenty-two miles distant from 
 the Turkish coast. It has been said that there 
 was also an arrangement with Venizelos to supply 
 a Greek military expeditionary force, but, as the 
 event proved, this aid could not be relied on. 
 
 By the middle of February a large British fleet 
 had been assembled, including the new superdread- 
 nought Queen 'Elizabeth^ carrying 15-inch guns, 
 the battle cruiser Inflexible, the predreadnought 
 battleships Agamemnon, Irresistible, Vengeance, 
 Triumph, Albion, Lord Nelson, Ocean, Majestic, 
 and a number of light cruisers, destroyers, subma- 
 rines, mine sweepers, and other small craft. In 
 addition to these the French contributed a fleet 
 including the predreadnought battleships Charle- 
 magne, Gaulois, Suffren, and Bouvet, with attend- 
 ing destroyers and submarines. 
 
 Naval operations began on the morning of Feb- 
 ruary 19, 1915, at 8.00 a. m., when the combined 
 fleet, with Vice Admiral Garden in supreme com- 
 
DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 67 
 
 mand and Rear Admiral Guepratte in command 
 of the French division, arrived off Gallipoli, and 
 began a long range bombardment of the outer 
 forts. In the middle of the afternoon three Brit- 
 ish and three French battleships closed the forts 
 and by darkness apparently all the outer shore 
 batteries had been silenced. 
 
 The demolition, however, did not prove perma- 
 nent and bad weather prevented further opera- 
 tions until February 25th, when another bombard- 
 ment took place and by 5 o'clock in the afternoon 
 the forts had again been silenced. 
 
 Mine sweepers then cleared the way for the 
 larger ships and on the next day a division of 
 battleships steamed four miles up the straits and 
 bombarded Fort Dardanos, a battery mounting 
 * 5.g-inch guns. This fort together with a number 
 of concealed batteries was silenced and marines 
 were then landed to complete the demolition. 
 This work was successfully accomplished, except 
 at Kum Kale, where a strong force of Turks drove 
 the landing party back to their boats. 
 
 Bad weather again intervened, permitting the 
 Turks to rehabilitate Fort Dardanos and the hid- 
 den shore batteries. On March 1st the operations 
 were resumed and mine sweepers cleared the chan- 
 nel to within one and one-half miles of the Nar- 
 rows. During the next four days the bombard- 
 
68 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 ment and demolition by landing parties went on. 
 A French squadron bombarded the Turkish line 
 of communications at Bulair, with the hope of 
 embarrassing the enemy's food and munition sup- 
 ply, but without success. Also, as a diversion, a 
 combined Allied fleet bombarded Smyrna, but this 
 does not appear to have had much military sig- 
 nificance. 
 
 On March 6th and 7th violent naval attacks 
 were made both by battleships well within the 
 straits at close range and by the Queen 'Elizabeth^ 
 Agamemnon and Ocean at long range from the 
 Gulf of Saros. The indirect lire of these battle- 
 ships was controlled by airmen, who watched the 
 fall of shell striking beyond the heights of the 
 Peninsula and signalled spot corrections to the 
 ships. As the angle of fall was such that the Eu- 
 ropean forts could not be reached, the indirect fire 
 was concentrated on the forts near Chanak on the 
 Asiatic side. It was thought that this bombard- 
 ment caused the Turks much discomfiture, and 
 that the 15-inch shrapnel from the Queen Eliza- 
 beth inflicted heavy losses. But the forts were 
 not permanently silenced and although the heavy 
 shrapnel fire was temporarily effective against en- 
 emy personnel there was not a sufficient number 
 of high explosive shells dropped in the fortifica- 
 
DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 69 
 
 tions to damage them beyond repair. The result 
 of these bombardments appears to have been ex- 
 aggerated both in the minds of the naval com- 
 manders on the spot and in the hopes of the Al- 
 lied people at large. 
 
 From March 7th to March 18th, there was a 
 lull in the operations at the straits. It was realised 
 that there would be need to land troops, and by 
 March 15th the British forces gathered at Mudros 
 together with the French force assembled at Biz- 
 erta totalled somewhat over 100,000 fighting men, 
 while the naval forces had been increased to the 
 strength indicated in the following table.-^ 
 
 Allied Fleet at Dardanelles 
 british battleships 
 
 Weight in Pounds of a 
 
 Broadside Salvo 
 Heavy Secondary- 
 Name Guns Guns Guns 
 
 Queen Elizabeth . Eight 15-inch, twelve 6-inch 15,600 600 
 
 Inflexible Eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-in. 6,800 372 
 
 Lord Nelson Four 12-inch, ten 9.2-inch. . 5,300 
 
 Agamemnon " " " " .. 5,300 ... 
 
 Swiftsure " lo-inch, fourteen 7.5- 
 inch 3,312 
 
 Triumph Four lo-inch, fourteen 7.5- 
 inch 3.312 
 
 ComwaUis Four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch 3,400 600 
 
 Queen " " " " 3,400 600 
 
 Implacable " " " " 3,400 600 
 
 London " " " " 3,400 600 
 
 Irresistible " " " " 3,400 600 
 
 ^ Naval Inst. Proc, pp. 1735 and 1736, 1915. 
 
70 
 
 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Name 
 
 Guns 
 
 Four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch. 
 
 Goliath 
 
 Ocean 
 
 Vengeance " 
 
 Albion « « « « 
 
 Canopus « " " " 
 
 Prince George. ..." " " " 
 
 Majestic " " " " 
 
 BRITISH CRUISERS, ETC. 
 
 Euryalus Two 9.2-inch, twelve 6-inch 
 
 Dublin Eight 6-inch 
 
 Minerva Eleven 6-inch 
 
 Doris " " 
 
 Talbot " _ " _ _. 
 
 Phaeton Two 6-inch, eight 4-inch . . . 
 
 Amethyst Twelve 4-inch 
 
 Sapphire " " 
 
 Hussar Two 4.7-inch, four 6-pound- 
 
 Weight in 
 
 Pounds of k 
 
 Broadside Salvo 
 
 Heavy 
 
 Secondary- 
 
 Guns 
 
 Guns 
 
 3.400 
 
 600 
 
 3.400 
 
 600 
 
 3.400 
 
 600 
 
 3,400 
 
 600 
 
 3.400 
 
 600 
 
 3.400 
 
 600 
 
 3,400 
 
 600 
 
 
 
 1,360 
 
 
 
 500 
 
 
 
 600 
 
 
 
 600 
 
 
 
 600 
 
 . 
 
 
 355 
 
 
 
 217 
 
 
 
 217 
 
 BRITISH MONITOR 
 
 Humber Two 6-inch, two 4.7-inch. . . 
 
 BRITISH DESTROYERS 
 
 Scorpion One 4-inch, three 12-pound.- 
 
 Wolverine One 4-inch, three 12-pound- 
 
 ers 
 
 Pincher One 4-inch, three 12 -pound- 
 ers 
 
 Renard One 4-inch, three 12-pound- 
 
 ers 
 
 Chelmer Four 12-pounders 
 
 290 
 
 FRENCH BATTLESHIPS 
 
 Suffren Four 12-inch, ten 6.4-inch . . 3,880 495 
 
 Gaulois " " " 5.5-inch.. 3,880 330 
 
 Charlemagne " " " " .. 3.880 330 
 
 St. Louis " " " " .. 3,880 330 
 
 Bouvet Two 12-inch, two 10.8 inch, 
 
 eight 5.5-inch 2,060 308 
 
 Henri IV Two 10.8-inch, seven 5.5- 
 inch 1,124 264 
 
 Jaurdguiberry . . . .Two 12-inch, two 10.8-inch, 
 
 eight 5.5-inch 2,416 264 
 
DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 71 
 
 Weight in Pounds of a 
 
 Broadside Salvo 
 Heavy Secondary 
 Name Guns Guns Guns 
 
 FRENCH CRUISERS 
 
 Kleber Eight 6.5-inch, four 3.9-inch . . 754 
 
 Jeanne d'Arc Two 7.6-inch, fourteen 5.5- 
 inch 763 
 
 D'Entrecasteaux.Two 9.4-inch, twelve 5.5- 
 inch 1,146 
 
 RUSSIAN CRUISER 
 
 Askold Twelve 6-inch 623 
 
 Soon after this concentration unforeseen diffi- 
 culties intervened, and the plan for early joint 
 operations did not materialise. Early in March 
 it had been decided to send out Sir Ian Hamilton 
 to command the troops being assembled near the 
 Dardanelles. His instructions contained the fol- 
 lowing passage: — 
 
 "The fleet has undertaken to force the passage of the 
 Dardanelles. The employment of military forces on any 
 large scale at this juncture is only contemplated in the 
 event of the fleet failing to get through after every effort 
 has been exhausted. Having entered on the project of 
 forcing the Straits, there can be no idea of abandoning 
 the scheme." 
 
 At this time, in March, important telegrams 
 passed between the Admiralty and Admiral Car- 
 den. The First Lord, Mr. Winston Churchill, on 
 March 1 1 th, asked whether the time had not ar- 
 rived when "You will have to press hard for a 
 
72 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 decision," adding: — "Every well-conceived action 
 for forcing a decision, even should regrettable 
 losses be entailed, will receive our support." 
 In his reply Admiral Garden said: — 
 
 "I consider stage when vigorous action is necessary 
 for success has now been reached. I am of opinion that 
 in order to insure my communication line immediately 
 Fleet enters the Sea of Marmora, military operations on 
 a large scale should be opened at once." 
 
 On March 15th the First Lord of the Admiralty 
 sent another telegram to Admiral Garden, in 
 which he said: — 
 
 "When General Hamilton arrives on Tuesday night 
 concert with him in any military operation on a large 
 scale which you consider necessary. . . . The 29th divi- 
 sion (18,000 additional men) cannot arrive until April 
 2nd." 
 
 On March 16th, Admiral Garden was forced 
 to resign his command for reasons wholly based 
 on the state of his health. He was succeeded by 
 Vice Admiral de Robeck. On March 17th Sir 
 Ian Hamilton arrived at Lemnos to take chief 
 command of the Allied armies. A conference at 
 once took place, attended by Vice Admiral de Ro- 
 beck, Rear Admiral Guepratte commanding the 
 French naval forces, General d'Amade command- 
 
DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 73 
 
 ing the French land forces, and Sir Ian Hamilton. 
 
 At about this time it was discovered that the 
 transports had been improperly loaded; guns and 
 munitions needed at once on landing were inac- 
 cessible, being buried under tents and other sup- 
 plies. Sir Ian Hamilton strongly demurred 
 against launching a land attack immediately and 
 made the point that in order to assure an effective 
 landing practically the entire transport fleet must 
 return to Egypt and be reloaded. 
 
 The decision of the conference hung on two al- 
 ternativesT — whether to make a combined attack 
 at once under the handicap of improperly loaded 
 transports, or to delay the land attack until the 
 difficulty could be corrected with the penalty of 
 losing valuable time. The latter course was de- 
 cided upon and many hold that it was the fatal 
 error of the campaign. It gave the Turks time 
 to organise their defence. 
 
 Enver Pasha the Turkish leader is reported to 
 have declared at a later date: — "Their delay en- 
 abled us thoroughly to fortify the peninsula, and 
 in six weeks' time we had taken down there over 
 two hundred Austrian Skoda guns." 
 
 The decision to delay the landing of troops did 
 not deter Vice Admiral de Robeck from carrying 
 out the naval attack. On March 17th the Allied 
 
74 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 fleet sailed from Mudros, arriving off the straits 
 at daylight on the i8th. 
 
 The serious losses to the Allies during the bom- 
 bardment of this date are told in an official state- 
 ment from the British and French Admiralties 
 from which the following extracts are taken : 
 
 Mine-sweeping having been in progress inside the 
 straits, a general attack was delivered by the British and 
 French fleets March 18 on the fortresses at the narrows. 
 At 10.45 a.m. the Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Agamem- 
 non and Lord Nelson bombarded forts, while the Tri- 
 umph and the Prince George fired at batteries. A heavy- 
 fire was opened on the ships. At 12.22 p. m. the French 
 squadron, consisting of the Suffren, Gaulois, Charle- 
 magne and Bouvet, advanced up the Dardanelles and 
 engaged the forts at closer range, and the forts replied 
 strongly. Their fire was silenced by the 10 battleships 
 inside the straits, all the ships being hit several times 
 during this part of the action. By 1.25 p.m. all the 
 forts had ceased firing. The Vengeance, Irresistible, 
 Albion, Ocean, Swiftsure and Majestic, then advanced 
 to relieve the six old battleships inside the straits. As 
 the French squadron, which had engaged the forts in a 
 most brilliant fashion, was passing out, the Bouvet was 
 blown up by a drifting mine. She sank in 36 fathoms 
 in less than three minutes. At 2.36 p. m. the relief bat- 
 tleships renewed the attack on the forts, which again 
 opened fire. The attack on the forts was maintained, 
 while the operations of the mine sweepers continued. 
 
 At 4.09 p. m. the Irresistible quit the line, listing 
 heavilv. and at 5.50 p.m. sank, having probably struck 
 
DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 75 
 
 a drifting mine. At 6.05 p. m. the Ocean, having also 
 struck a mine, sank. Both vessels sank in deep water, 
 practically the whole of their crews having been removed 
 safely under a hot fire. The Gaulois was damaged by 
 gun fire. The Inflexible had her forward control posi- 
 tion hit by a heavy shell and required repair. The bom- 
 bardment and the mine sweeping operations terminated 
 when darkness fell. The losses of the ships were caused 
 by mines drifting with the current, which were encoun- 
 tered in areas hitherto swept clear, and this danger will 
 require special treatment. 
 
 The British casualties among personnel were not 
 heavy, considering the scale of the operations, but prac- 
 tically the whole of the crew of the Bouvet was lost with 
 the ship, an internal explosion apparently having super- 
 vened on the explosion of the mine. 
 
 Vice Admiral de Robeck said, in part: "The 
 power of the fleet to dominate the fortresses by 
 superiority of fire seems to be established. Vari- 
 ous other dangers and difficulties will have to be 
 encountered, but nothing has happened which jus- 
 tifies the belief that the cost of the undertaking 
 will exceed what always has been expected and 
 provided for. The British casualties in the per- 
 sonnel are 61 men killed, wounded and missing. 
 I desire to bring to the notice of Your Lordships 
 the splendid behaviour of the French squadron. 
 Their heavy loss leaves them quite undaunted. 
 They were led into close action by Rear Admiral 
 Gueprette with greatest gallantry." 
 
76 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 On March 19th Admiral de Robeck telegraphed 
 the Admiralty that having had a satisfactory in- 
 terview with Sir Ian Hamilton, General d'Amade 
 and Admiral Wemyss, he proposed to proceed 
 with the attack on the following day. It is sig- 
 nificant that a meeting of the War Council in 
 London was held on the same day of this de- 
 spatch, March 19th, at which it was decided "to 
 inform Vice Admiral de Robeck that he could 
 continue the naval operations against the Darda- 
 nelles if he thought fit." The attitude of Sir Ian 
 Hamilton and the menace of mines and torpedoes, 
 however, influenced Admiral de Robeck to change 
 his mind and discontinue naval operations. 
 
 Sir Ian Hamilton had witnessed the naval at- 
 tack of March 18th and telegraphed the War Of- 
 fice on the 19th: "I have not yet received ^y re- 
 port on the naval action, but from what I actually 
 saw of the extraordinarily gallant attempt made 
 yesterday I am being most reluctantly driven to- 
 wards the conclusion that the Dardanelles are less 
 likely to be forced by battleships than at one time 
 seemed probable, and that if the Army is to par- 
 ticipate its operations will not assume the subsid- 
 iary form anticipated. The Army's share will not 
 be a case of landing parties for the destruction 
 of forts, etc., but rather a case of a deliberate 
 and progressive military operation carried out in 
 
DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 77 
 
 force in order to rnake good the passage of the 
 Navy." 
 
 On March 23rd another telegram from Sir Ian 
 Hamilton said: — "I have now conferred with Ad- 
 miral de Robeck and we are equally convinced 
 that to enable the fleet effectively to force the 
 passage of the Dardanelles the co-operation of the 
 whole military force will be necessary." On the 
 same day Admiral de Robeck telegraphed the Ad- 
 miralty that the mine menace was proving greater 
 than he had expected; that time was required to 
 make arrangements to meet this menace; that a 
 decisive operation about the middle of the next 
 month appeared better than to take great risks for 
 accomplishing what might well prove to be only 
 half measures; and that it did not appear practi- 
 cable to land a sufficient force inside the Darda- 
 nelles to carry out the service. On the 26th he 
 added: — "The check on the 18th is not, in my 
 opinion, decisive, but on the 22nd of March I met 
 General Hamilton and heard his views, and I now 
 think that, to obtain important results and to 
 achieve the object of the campaign, a combined 
 operation will be essential." 
 
 From this time onward two points became per- 
 fectly clear. One was that the Government had 
 no intention of abandoning the attack on the Dar- 
 danelles; the second was that the attack would 
 
78 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 be made both by the Navy and by Military forces 
 employed on a large scale. Sir Ian Hamilton 
 withdrew to Egypt to reload the transports and 
 perfect preparations for landing in force, while 
 the combined fleets made the necessary arrange- 
 ments to do their share when the time came for 
 making the grand effort. 
 
 About six weeks later (April 25th to 26th) took 
 place the famous combined land and sea attack, 
 in which the Allied troops attained at a great cost 
 a slight footing on the peninsula. The guns of 
 the fleet afforded a covering fire for the troops, 
 but there was no serious bombardment of the 
 point of landing. The Turks evidently had made 
 the most of the six weeks' delay and were well 
 prepared. 
 
 From the time of this landing it may truthfully 
 be said that the naval force was used only as an 
 auxiliary of the land forces, although the Navy 
 performed arduous duties in the campaign which 
 followed. On land, in spite of desperate fight- 
 ing, the Allies made no great headway. There 
 was another landing in August, which was almost 
 as costly as the first — again without tactical re- 
 sults — and the undertaking was abandoned in 
 January, 1916. 
 
 In this campaign the Allies lost five British pre- 
 dreadnoughts, one French predreadnought and 
 
DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 79 
 
 about 115,000 men killed, wounded or missing, 
 with about 10,000 more sick. The cost of the 
 expedition, ship losses not included, was about 
 $1,000,000,000. As a diversion to hold an enemy 
 force away from other fields it succeeded; but in 
 the attainment of its main objective it was a 
 failure. 
 
 The decision to attempt forcing the Dardanelles 
 has been much criticised, and it appears indeed to 
 have been a formidable undertaking. But wheth- 
 er or not it was unwise to attempt it is a debatable 
 question. A successful attack upon the Darda- 
 nelles might well have become of the very first 
 importance and produced results which would 
 have quickly been felt in the main eastern and 
 western theatres of the war. Consider for a mo- 
 ment the position of Russia at that time: a vast 
 empire, with millions of men mobilised, crammed 
 with surplus stores of wheat, yet for all practical 
 purposes more cut off from the rest of the world 
 than Germany. The White Sea was ice-bound, 
 and Archangel, which is indifferently served by 
 its railway, would not be open until some time in 
 May. The Baltic was practically sealed. The 
 way to the Black Sea was closed by the Darda- 
 nelles and the Bosporus. Vladivostok was too far 
 away to be of much use. Russia was in bonds, 
 and it was the duty of her allies to burst them if 
 
80 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 they could. Immeasurable advantages would fol- 
 low from the opening of a clear way to Odessa. 
 Ships laden with wheat would stream outward 
 and ships laden with the stores and equipment, 
 which Russia so greatly needs, would stream in- 
 ward. Moreover, the resources of fighting men, 
 food supplies, and raw materials from Turkey in 
 Asia would be cut off from the Central Powers 
 and any possible menace to India, the Suez, and 
 Egypt removed. 
 
 The political results would have been equally 
 great. The effect upon the hesitancy of the Bal- 
 kan kingdoms and other neutrals would have been 
 instant, and would have counteracted the impres- 
 sion created by the successful German operations 
 against the Russians. The fall of Constantinople 
 would probably further have meant the collapse 
 of the Turkish offensive. The Turks would never 
 survive a blow at their heart. The bombardment 
 of the Dardanelles, therefore, if the Allies had 
 been able to carry it to its logical conclusion, 
 would have had far-reaching effects on the con- 
 duct of the war. 
 
 It is interesting here to note the analogy be- 
 tween the circumstances influencing the Allies to 
 attempt to force the Dardanelles and the circum- 
 stances during our civil war which influenced the 
 North to open up the Mississippi. In the civil 
 
DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 81 
 
 war it was desired to cut the Confederacy in two, 
 so as to shut off the resources of Arkansas, Texas, 
 and Louisiana from the Confederate armies and 
 at the same time to open up communications be- 
 tween the Gulf and the Northern States via the 
 Mississippi and its tributaries. Moreover, just as 
 forcing the Dardanelles would have been a de- 
 terrent to Bulgaria's entering the war on the side 
 of the Central Powers and would perhaps have 
 influenced Greece and Rumania to declare for the 
 Allies, so Farragut's capture of New Orleans de- 
 terred France from action hostile to the Union 
 and caused Louis Napoleon to abandon his scheme 
 to despatch a formidable fleet to the mouth of the 
 Mississippi and join an equal force from England 
 with the object of repudiating the blockade as 
 ineffectual and demanding free egress and ingress 
 for merchantmen. 
 
 There is also some analogy between the condi- 
 tions confronting Admiral Farragut, requiring 
 him to force his way by the Confederate forts in 
 the lower Mississippi on his way to attack New 
 Orleans, and the conditions facing Admiral de 
 Robeck, supposing that his mission was to force 
 the Dardanelles in order to attack Constantinople. 
 Admiral Farragut was brilliantly successful in 
 running the forts and capturing New Orleans, 
 while the Dardanelles operations ended in bitter 
 
82 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 disappointment to the Allies. It would not be 
 wise to push the analogy too closely, as erroneous 
 inferences might be drawn; but one cannot help 
 reflecting upon and comparing the circumstances, 
 methods, and results attending these two great 
 enterprises. 
 
 Instead of condemning offhand the attempt to 
 capture Constantinople as foolhardy in concep- 
 tion, it might be better to ponder the possible 
 causes of failure. Failure ccKainly was never 
 due to lack of fighting qualities in the Allied sail- 
 ors and soldiers, for there is probably no more 
 heroic page in history than that recording the 
 brave deeds done in this struggle for the Darda- 
 nelles. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 North Sea Battles 
 
 dogger bank encounter 
 
 WITHIN a few months after the outbreak 
 of hostilities the pressure of superior Al- 
 lied sea power had effectively confined the Ger- 
 man fleet. It is probable that the German Ad- 
 miralty felt the need for a show of naval ac- 
 tivity. Submarines and mines had accomplished 
 some successes, but their more spectacular use had 
 not yet developed, and cruiser raids against the 
 British were instituted, most notable of which was 
 the attack on the defenceless coast towns Scar- 
 boro, Hartlepool and Whitby, in which 99 people 
 were killed. This occurred on December 16, 1914. 
 These raids accomplished no military result, but 
 the attempted raid of January 24, 1915, led to 
 a running fight in the North Sea between two bat- 
 tle cruiser squadrons, during which the German 
 armoured cruiser Bliicher was sunk, having been 
 abandoned by her retreating consorts. No Eng- 
 lish ship was lost. 
 
 83 
 
84 
 
 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 The battle cruiser engagement off the Dogger 
 Bank was the first between modern big-gun ships. 
 Particular interest is also attached to it because 
 each squadron was accompanied by scouting and 
 screening light cruisers and destroyers. It was 
 fear of submarines and mines, moreover, that in- 
 fluenced the British to break off the engagement, 
 and it is also reported that a Zeppelin airship 
 and a seaplane took part, and perhaps assisted in 
 the fire control of the Germans.^ 
 
 At daybreak on January 24, 1915, Vice Ad- 
 miral Sir David Beatty's battle cruiser squadron, 
 consisting of the Lion^ Princess Royal, Tiger, New 
 Zealand, and Indomitable, were patrolling in com- 
 pany with four light cruisers, while three light 
 
 ^The principal details of the vessels in the respective squad- 
 rons follow: 
 
 Name 
 
 Com- 
 pleted 
 
 Displace- 
 ment 
 
 Speed 
 
 Main 
 Armament 
 
 Armour 
 Belt 
 
 
 1912 
 1914 
 1912 
 1912 
 1908 
 
 1914 
 1913 
 1911 
 1910 
 
 26,350 
 28,000 
 26,350 
 18,800 
 17,250 
 
 28,000 
 24,640 
 22,640 
 15,550 
 
 28.5 
 
 28 
 
 28.5 
 
 25 
 
 26 
 
 27 
 
 29.2 
 28.4 
 25.3 
 
 8 13.5-in. 
 8 13.5-in. 
 8 13.5-in. 
 8 12-in. 
 8 12-in. 
 
 8 12-in. 
 10 ll-in. 
 10 ll-in. 
 12 8.2-in. 
 
 9-in. 
 
 Tiger 
 
 9-m. 
 
 
 9-in. 
 
 
 8-m. 
 
 
 7-in. 
 
 
 11-14-in. 
 
 Seydlitz 
 
 Moltke 
 
 11-14-in. 
 11-14-in. 
 
 
 6-in. 
 
 
 
 There were 40 heavy guns in each squadron, but whereas 
 the British included twenty-four i3.s-inch and sixteen 12-inch, 
 the German comprised eight 12-inch, twenty ii-inch, and 
 twelve 8.2-inch. 
 
r».!»' S P 
 
 85 
 
86 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 cruiser flotilla leaders, with their destroyers, were 
 in station ahead. At 7.25 a. m. the Aurora^ one 
 of these flotilla-leading light cruisers, engaged an 
 enemy ship. This scouting and screening force 
 got in touch with and guided the British battle 
 cruisers toward the enemy battle cruiser squad- 
 ron, under Rear Admiral Hipper, consisting of the 
 battle cruisers Seydlitz^ Derjflinger, and Moltke, 
 with the armoured cruiser Bliicher. The Ger- 
 man capital ships were also accompanied by 
 light cruisers and destroyers. It was a stern-, 
 chase fight, in which ranging shots were tried 
 at about 20,000 yards and hits reported at 
 about 18,000 yards. Practically all the fight- 
 ing between the battle cruisers was done at long 
 ranges. The slower armoured cruiser Bliicher 
 dropped astern, and early in the fight developed 
 engine trouble. Her 8.2-inch guns were of little 
 use, and at 10.48 she drew out of line in a de- 
 feated condition. At 12.37 she sank, having re- 
 ceived, very likely, her deathblow from a torpedo. 
 Disregarding the Bliicher, the stern fire of the 
 German battle cruisers consisted of four twelve- 
 inch and sixteen eleven-inch, as opposed to the 
 British bow fire of twelve 13.5-inch guns from 
 the leading three ships and the bow twelve-inch 
 from the New Zealand and Indomitable. These 
 latter two ships, however, being two or three knots 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 87 
 
 slower than the other three, fired for the most part 
 only at the Bliicher. At 1 1 .03 the flagship Lion 
 was put out of action, and she was later towed 
 into port with a considerable list. Considering 
 the long range, the gunnery on both sides appears 
 to have been excellent, and it is hard to say which 
 side did the better shooting or whose battle cruis- 
 ers suffered the more damage. 
 
 The light cruisers and destroyers took little part 
 in the actual fighting. The British flotillas were 
 kept most of the time on the unengaged quarter 
 of Admiral Beatty's squadron. At about 9.30 the 
 German destroyers threatened an attack, and one 
 division of the British destroyers manoeuvred so 
 as to pass ahead of the battle cruisers and screen 
 them; but the threatened attack was not made. 
 Later on the German destroyers again appeared 
 to be preparing for an attack, and the Lion and 
 Tiger opened fire on them, causing them to retire 
 and resume their original course. Shortly before 
 noon, about seventy miles from Heligoland, the' 
 engagement was broken off by the British because 
 of the presence of enemy submarines. 
 
 The conditions surrounding this battle were 
 ideal for illustrating the functions of battle cruis- 
 ers. The German warship raid on the British 
 coast of the previous month was still fresh in 
 mind; and when this situation off the Dogger 
 
88 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Bank arose, the timely interposing of Admiral 
 Beatty's superior force, the fast chase, the long- 
 range fighting, the loss of the Bliicher, and the 
 hasty retreat of the enemy, were all particularly 
 pleasing to the British people. As a result the 
 battle cruiser type of ship attained great popu- 
 larity. 
 
 The question of speed, armour, and armament, 
 however, is a perplexing problem. Before going 
 deeper into this question it is advisable to con- 
 sider further data on the war-time usefulness of 
 battle cruisers. This type of ship will therefore 
 be adverted to later on. 
 
 BATTLE OF JUTLAND Part I 
 
 In a narrative of the principal events of the 
 battle of Jutland, together with a discussion of 
 some of the points in strategy and tactics illus- 
 trated, it should be appreciated that many of the 
 details are lacking. Some of these details will be 
 uncovered in the course of time, but many — hav- 
 ing been lost in the sea along with the ships that 
 went down — can only be matter for speculation. 
 
 The battle of Jutland was fought between the 
 British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas 
 Fleet during the late afternoon and evening of 
 May 31, 1916, with torpedo attacks continuing 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 89 
 
 throughout the night. A decisive engagement was 
 probably prevented by thick weather and ap- 
 proaching darkness, but hard blows were given 
 and sustained on both sides. 
 
 It is a well-recognised experience of history that 
 the public gauges the magnitude of a battle by 
 the consequent changes in the political and mili- 
 tary situation. At times a comparatively minor 
 engagement between relatively small forces where- 
 in little actual fighting occurs will, if followed 
 by a decided change in an international situation, 
 assume in the public eye the proportions of a big 
 battle. On the other hand, it sometimes occurs 
 that a great battle, measured by the size and 
 power of the forces involved and the actual fight- 
 ing done, will, if indecisive and unproductive of 
 changes in the status quo^ appear small in the pub- 
 lic eye and often arouse popular dissatisfaction on 
 both sides. It may be that history will place the 
 battle of Jutland in this latter class. But, even 
 so, when one considers the actual fighting done, 
 and judges by the size, number, and various types 
 of the ships engaged, their ability to manoeuvre, 
 their power to give and their power to sustain hard 
 blows, this battle is far and away the greatest the 
 world has ever seen. Never before has there been 
 brought together such an array of fighting ma- 
 chines — dreadnoughts, battle cruisers, scout cruis^ 
 
90 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 ers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. More- 
 over, it took intelligence, nerve, and endurance 
 of the personnel to operate this powerful machin- 
 ery under varying conditions of wind, sea, and 
 weather. Assuredly it would seem that in this 
 action and all that it exemplifies both in the ships 
 engaged and in the requirements demanded of the 
 personnel there must have been illustrated the 
 best there is of naval art and naval science. 
 The British Grand Fleet comprised: 
 
 (a) An advance force under Vice Admiral Beatty, 
 consisting of six battle cruisers, (four Lions of 28.5 
 knots speed, each carrying eight 13.5-inch guns, and two 
 Indefatigables of 25 knots speed, each carrying eight 12- 
 inch guns,) supported by the Fifth Battle Squadron, 
 under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, (four 25-knot bat- 
 tleships of the Queen Elizabeth class, each carrying eight 
 15-inch guns). 
 
 (b) The main body, under Admiral Jellicoe — flying 
 his flag in the Iron Duke — consisting of a fast wing 
 under Rear Admiral Hood, (three 26-knot battle cruisers 
 of Invincible class, each carrying eight 12-inch guns), a 
 division of four armoured cruisers under Rear Admiral 
 Arbuthnot, and twenty-five dreadnoughts in three squad- 
 rons commanded by Vice Admirals Burney, Jerram, and 
 Sturdee. 
 
 (c) About twenty light cruisers and 160 destroyers, 
 divided between the advance force and the main body. 
 
 The German High Sea Fleet comprised : 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 91 
 
 (a) An advance force under Vice Admiral Hipper, 
 consisting of five battle cruisers (three Derjjlingers of 
 probably 27 knots speed, each carrying eight 12-inch 
 guns, and two Moltkes of probably 28 knots speed, each 
 carrying ten 11 -inch guns). 
 
 (b) The main body under Admiral Scheer, consisting 
 of sixteen dreadnoughts and six predreadnought battle- 
 ships. 
 
 (c) About twenty light cruisers and eighty or ninety 
 destroyers, divided between the advance force and the 
 main body. 
 
 At 2.30 p. m., May 31, 1916, the naval situa- 
 tion in the North Sea was approximately as fol- 
 lows: The German advance force of five battle 
 cruisers under Vice Admiral Hipper was some 
 eighty or a hundred miles to the northwestward 
 of Horn Reef, while fifteen miles to the south and 
 west of him was Vice Admiral Beatty with the 
 British advance force of six battle cruisers, sup- 
 ported by four fast dreadnought battleships under 
 Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. Admiral Jellicoe, 
 in command of the British Grand Fleet, was about 
 fifty miles distant with the main body to the 
 northeastward, while Admiral Scheer, in command 
 of the German High Seas Fleet, was about the 
 same distance away with his main body to the 
 southeastward. German submarines were sighted 
 soon after the beginning of the engagement. Brit- 
 ish and German aircraft were present, but do not 
 
92 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 appear to have figured very prominently in the 
 conflict. 
 
 It is convenient to divide the battle into the 
 following four phases: 
 
 First Phase: British advance force encounters Ger- 
 man advance force. Six British battle cruisers, sup- 
 ported by four dreadnought battleships, engaged with 
 five German battle cruisers, (349 p. m. to 4.45 p. m.). 
 
 Second Phase: Action between British advance force 
 and van of High Seas Fleet. Four British battle cruis- 
 ers and four dreadnought battleships engaged with five 
 German battle cruisers and van of German battle fleet, 
 (4.45 p.m. to 6.15 p.m.). 
 
 Third Phase: British Grand Fleet engaged with Ger- 
 man High Seas Fleet, (6.15 p.m. to dark). 
 
 Fourth Phase: Torpedo attacks and screening opera- 
 tions during the night, {May '^\ to June 1). 
 
 Each one of these phases will be taken up sep- 
 arately in the order named. 
 
 First Phase: Encounter Between the Battle 
 Cruiser Squadrons Commanded by Vice Admiral 
 Beatty {British) and Vice Admiral Hipper {Ger- 
 man). 
 
 The British Grand Fleet had left its bases on 
 the 30th, and was sweeping through the North 
 Sea to the southward with Vice Admiral Beatty's 
 force cruising well in advance of the main body. 
 Besides the six battle cruisers led by Vice Admiral 
 Beatty in the Lion and the four 25-knot battle- 
 
To Skagerrack / 
 
 British Advance Force 
 Main Body 
 
 REFERENCE 
 
 ____ I German Advance Force ____ 
 Main Body 
 
 This dias;rann indicates only the general course of the 
 battle, details of "the formations and maneuvers being 
 omitted. 
 
 DIAGRAM OF BATTLE OF JUTLAND 
 
 93 
 
94 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 ships of the Elizabeth class, led by Rear Admiral 
 Evan-Thomas in the Barham^ this advance force 
 was accompanied by three light cruiser squadrons 
 and four flotillas of destroyers. At 2.20 p. m. the 
 light cruiser Galatea reported the presence of Ger- 
 man ships in considerable force and at 2.25 a Brit- 
 ish seaplane was sent from its mother ship Enga- 
 dine to scout to the northeastward. Visibility at 
 this time was good. The wind was southeast. 
 
 At 3.31 the German battle cruiser squadron 
 (five ships) under Vice Admiral Hipper was 
 sighted to the northeastward at a range of 23,000 
 yards. The two squadrons formed for battle, and 
 approached each other on slightly converging 
 southeasterly courses. Light cruisers and destroy- 
 ers of both sides assumed screening formations, 
 and the opposing light cruisers in the more ad- 
 vanced stations were engaged during the battle ap- 
 proach. At 3.48 fire was opened simultaneously 
 by both sides at about 18,500 yards' range. The 
 squadrons fought on parallel courses curving to 
 the southeast. At 4.08 the battleships under Rear 
 Admiral Evan-Thomas opened fire at 20,000 
 yards' range, but it is doubtful if these ships got 
 close enough to do any effective work during this 
 phase of the battle. About this time submarines 
 were reported both on the engaged and unen- 
 gaged beams of the British battle cruisers. De- 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 95 
 
 stroyers were active in attempts to screen the big 
 ships from underwater attack. 
 
 Ten minutes after the engagement became gen- 
 eral an explosion occurred in the Indefatigable^ 
 and she sank almost immediately. At 4. 1 5 twelve 
 British destroyers moved forward to attack the 
 German battle cruisers; German light cruisers 
 and destroyers made a similar advance at the same 
 time. A fierce engagement ensued between these 
 light craft at close quarters. The Germans did 
 not press their torpedo attack, but six of the Brit- 
 ish destroyers continued the advance under a 
 heavy shell fire, and fired torpedoes at the Ger- 
 man lines. At 4.30 a mighty explosion occurred 
 in the Queen Mary, and she went down so quickly 
 that the following ships in the formation are re- 
 ported as having steamed right over her. At 4.42 
 the German battle fleet was sighted to the south- 
 east, and the British ships turned right about (16 
 points =180 degrees) in succession. The Ger- 
 man battle cruisers also altered course 16 points, 
 and the action continued on a northwesterly 
 course, beginning what we will call the second 
 phase. 
 
 According to German Admiralty reports, during 
 the first phase, lasting about an hour, from 3.49 
 to the time the British changed course 16 points 
 at 4.45, the British battle cruiser Indefatigable 
 
96 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 (tonnage 18,750, main battery eight 12-inch, car- 
 rying 899 men) was sunk at 4.05, and the Queen 
 Mary (tonnage 27,000, main battery eight 13.5- 
 inch guns, carrying 1,000 men) was destroyed at 
 about 4:30. It is also reported that the British 
 lost four destroyers and the Germans two. Be- 
 fore taking up the second phase of the battle, a 
 few points bearing on the first phase will be brief- 
 ly discussed. 
 
 Different theories have been advanced as to the 
 probable causes of the loss of the two British bat- 
 tle cruisers. It is reported that both ships suf- 
 fered heavy explosions which appeared to come 
 up through turret tops. This has led to the opinion 
 that enemy shells exploded in the respective tur- 
 rets, and, igniting chains of powder to the mag- 
 azines, caused the blowing up of the magazines. 
 This is not at all unlikely, and directs attention 
 to the need of safety precautions in the supply of 
 ammunition to turret guns. 
 
 Following the engagement there was comment 
 to the effect that Admiral Jellicoe violated the 
 principle of concentration of forces by sending 
 in advance a squadron of four battleships to sup- 
 port Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. The con- 
 sensus of professional opinion, however, does not 
 appear to support any such criticism. This ad- 
 vance force was composed entirely of fast ships 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 97 
 
 (the battleships had the unusually high speed of 
 25 knots), operating on interior lines between the 
 supporting British fleet and the enemy main fleet, 
 with little or no chance of being cut off by a su- 
 perior enemy force. 
 
 There is also more or less criticism to the ef- 
 fect that Admiral Beatty rashly exposed his com- 
 mand ; that the Germans counted on his impetuos- 
 ity; and it has been said that he did just what 
 Admiral Hipper expected him to do and wanted 
 him to do. On the other hand, it may be ar- 
 gued that at the start of the action the situation 
 was not unfavourable to the British because Ad- 
 miral Hipper was almost cut off by a superior 
 force and in danger of being compelled to turn 
 toward the British Grand Fleet. The plan of co- 
 ordination between the main body under Admiral 
 Jellicoe and the British advance force is not clear, 
 but it is evident that Admiral Beatty tried to get 
 to the southward of Admiral Hipper, and upon 
 the approach of the High Seas Fleet was com- 
 pelled to make a right about turn, a manoeuvre 
 likely to prove disastrous if attempted under gun 
 fire. Reports are somewhat obscure as to just 
 what happened at this time, but it seems that the 
 British ships accomplished the turn without suffer- 
 ing much damage, and that the German battle 
 cruisers turned around at about the same time. 
 
98 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Probably the battleships under Admiral Evan- 
 Thomas were used to provide a covering fire while 
 Admiral Beatty countermarched. Some incline 
 to the opinion that Admiral Hipper failed to take 
 advantage of his speed to draw ahead to a semi 
 T-ing or capping position where he might have 
 hammered Admiral Beatty's ships on the knuckle 
 of their pivoting point without subjecting his own 
 ships to anything worse than a long range fire 
 from the 15-inch guns of the enemy battleships. 
 It may be that the German battle cruisers did 
 not have enough speed to do this, or it may be 
 that Admiral Hipper was intent only on drawing 
 the enemy into the fire of the approaching Ger- 
 man battle fleet. At any rate, whatever the ac- 
 tual circumstances, neither side lost any ships at 
 this time and the battle continued on northerly 
 courses, beginning the second phase. 
 
 Second Phase: Action Between British Advance 
 Force of Battle Cruisers^ Supported by Four Bat- 
 tleships, and German Battle Cruisers, Supported 
 by German High Seas Battle Fleet. 
 
 The Fifth Battle Squadron is reported to have 
 closed the German battle cruisers on an opposite 
 course, engaging them with all guns, when Ad- 
 miral Beatty signalled Admiral Evan-Thomas the 
 position of the German battle fleet and ordered 
 him to alter course 16 points. At 4.57 the Fifth 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 99 
 
 Battle Squadron fell into line astern the battle 
 cruisers and came under the fire of the leading 
 ships of the German battle fleet, which, in the 
 meanwhile, had joined the line of battle in rear 
 of Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers. The action 
 continued at about 14,000 yards' range on north- 
 westerly courses curving north and then northeast- 
 erly. At 5.56 Admiral Beatty sighted the lead- 
 ing ships of the British Baltic battle fleet bearing 
 north, distant five miles, and altered course to east, 
 increasing speed to the utmost, thereby reducing 
 the range to 12,000 yards, and opening a gap be- 
 tween his battle cruisers and Rear Admiral Evan- 
 Thomas's supporting battleships. The German 
 van also turned eastward. 
 
 This completed the second phase of the battle, 
 during which four British battle cruisers and four 
 battleships were engaged for about one hour and 
 a half with the van of the German fleet led by five 
 battle cruisers followed by battleships of the Koe- 
 nig class. Light cruisers and destroyers were also 
 intermittently engaged during this phase and a 
 few isolated but determined torpedo attacks were 
 pushed home. These apparently met with little 
 success, the attackers suffering severe punishment. 
 
 In this second phase, while at first glance it ap- 
 pears that four British battle cruisers supported 
 by four battleships were engaging the entire Ger- 
 
100 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 man High Seas Fleet, such was not strictly speak- 
 ing the case. The superior speed of the British 
 squadrons enabled them to keep in the van, out of 
 range of the enemy centre and rear. At this time 
 the advantage of light was with the Germans, be- 
 cause the British ships had a sky brightened by the 
 setting sun for background, while the German 
 ships were more obscured in the mist by reason of 
 their dark background. But the British Vice Ad- 
 miral reports administering severe punishment to 
 enemy ships during this phase. It is not clear 
 whether the Germans turned to the eastward to 
 avoid being capped or T-ed by the faster enemy 
 ships, or whether they originated the easterly 
 change ot course because of the approaching Brit- 
 ish battle fleet, but this manoeuvre put the Brit- 
 ish fleet in a tactically favourable position for gun 
 fire as well as ultimately placing them between 
 the German fleet and its bases. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 North Sea Battles {Continued) 
 
 BATTLE OF JUTLAND Part II 
 
 Third Phase: British Grand Fleet Engages 
 with German High Seas Fleet. 
 
 DURING the first and second phases of the 
 battle the British Grand Fleet was closing 
 at titmost fleet speed on a southeast by south 
 course. Three battle cruisers, led by Rear Ad- 
 miral Hood in the Invincible., together with screen- 
 ing light cruisers and destroyers, were in advance 
 operating as a fast wing. At 5.45 an outpost light 
 cruiser was engaged with a division of German 
 light cruisers. At 6.10 Admiral Beatty's engaged 
 squadron was sighted by the Invincible. At 6.21 
 Admiral Hood led his squadron into action, taking 
 station in the van just ahead of the Lion and clos= 
 ing at 6.25 to a range of 8,000 yards. A few min- 
 utes later the Invincible was sunk by gun fire. 
 
 In the meanwhile the British battle fleet was 
 coming into action, filling the previously men- 
 tioned gap opened up between Admiral Beatty 
 and Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. At ^.^^ ad- 
 
 lOI 
 
102 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 vanced British armoured cruisers, light cruisers, 
 and destroyers were engaged with German cruisers 
 and destroyers. At 6.16 the armoured cruis- 
 ers Warrior, Black Prince, and Defence under 
 Sir Robert Arbuthnot were drawn between the 
 lines and disabled by close-range fire from the 
 German battleships. At 6.14 Admiral Jellicoe 
 formed the Grand Fleet in battle line, and dur- 
 ing deployment at 6.17 the first battle squadron 
 opened fire on a German battleship of the Kaiser 
 class. At 6.30 the other battle squadrons engaged 
 ships of the Konig class. The four battleships of 
 the Elizabeth class, previously engaged during the 
 second phase, formed astern of the main battle 
 fleet. At this time the Wars pile of this fifth bat- 
 tle squadron had her helm jam with right rud- 
 der, causing her to turn toward the German line, 
 where she was subjected to severe fire, but the 
 trouble being soon corrected she was extricated 
 from this predicament. Admiral Jellicoe reports : 
 
 Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, 
 it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the 
 enemy's battle line. Toward the van only some four or 
 five ships were ever visible at once. More could be seen 
 from the rear squadron, but never more than eight to 
 twelve. . . . The action between the battle fleets lasted 
 intermittently from 6.17 p.m. to 8.20 p.m., at ranges 
 between 9,000 yards and 12,000 yards. During this time 
 the British fleet made alterations of course from south- 
 

 Cf 2 m o n — .» a ^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 / <> :rS m > =a;SO "^ Q 
 
 
 
 
 i ga 5t3 z z s--< < :< 
 
 
 
 
 7 J. r 7' m m > »y > m > 
 
 
 
 
 ^ ttD--'^50O Si-rnrz r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ic s;2 s 2 =^^ 5 ^ 
 
 
 
 
 1915, 
 
 16, El 
 REIG 
 
 m.) 
 
 5;Te 
 
 4,Te 
 
 IND 
 
 .5-ln. 
 
 GH ( 
 
 
 
 
 s -"> = i z •§ C 
 
 
 
 
 X ." t 1 '% 
 
 
 
 
 "-i '? ? "^ * ■ 
 
 
 
 
 § p ^ 3 ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -» ^3 
 
 
 
 
 OJ J^ 
 
 
 
 
 Ol 
 
 
 
 
 3* 
 
 
 
 
 / SOXZWO<ID 
 ■ >:o -=0 m m .-1 ,_, > m 
 
 ■ i° '£ " 3 ^ 'E i r 
 i? IS ? i ^ li ^ s 
 
 o—oll 
 
 
 H 
 
 (A 
 
 
 m 
 
 C 
 
 
 
 •0 
 
 r 
 S 
 
 1 
 
 > 
 tn 
 
 at 
 
 IS 
 
 o 
 
 
 ON ( 
 (1910 
 OD ( 
 
 ■ (191 
 111, T 
 1911, 
 
 (1911 
 
 lee 
 
 1914, 
 
 ID 
 
 o 
 
 ID 
 
 CO 
 
 
 1909, T 
 , Ten 1 
 
 1910, T 
 
 0, Ten- 
 en 12-li 
 Ten 12 
 
 1 , Ten 1 
 Ten 1.3 
 
 (D 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 
 •'to 1 3 -» a ro CD 
 
 to 
 
 
 
 0>'^J--h35 J.3 
 
 X 
 
 
 
 5- 5" o 5- ^ .= -i 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 O ^ C_ •? ^ 1? 
 
 ^-'' 
 
 
 
 ? ? 
 
 
 
 
 O w 
 
 
 
 
 -<s> -.^>"0 — c:3--o--S>— o-o- 
 
 /? H O 2 ?; > o 
 
 -<=^- 
 
 --. .. 
 
 
 m 
 
 
 
 f' ^3j I =9 i: 2 
 
 ^1 i « > l! M 
 ; f^ D c a 3^ c- 5 
 
 2 
 z 
 
 
 1/ 
 \ 
 
 RION (1 
 913, Te. 
 
 EORGE 
 
 Iral Lovesso 
 
 CH (191 
 
 EROR ( 
 
 ERER ( 
 
 (1912, T( 
 ilral Jerram 
 
 <D 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 3 to U5 .P < _i li 
 
 
 
 
 « -: -^ §• 5 ? -: 
 
 CO 
 
 bi 
 
 
 
 qi H H 3 ^ i ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 
 X a (B _» ^^ 3 3 
 
 p 
 
 
 
 3 = 3 CO w _^ 
 
 *-' -' -1 bi ^ CO 
 
 *-' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CO CO 1 " 
 
 
 
 
 . — 3 CJ1 
 
 
 
 
 CJl CJ1 3 _^ 1 
 
 
 
 
 t t "^ ? ^ 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 103 
 
104 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 east by east to west (168^ degrees) in the endeavour to 
 close, but the enemy constantly turned away and opened 
 the range under cover of destroyer attacks and smoke 
 screens. The alterations of course had the effect of 
 bringing the British fleet (which commenced the action 
 in a position of advantage on the bow of the enemy) to 
 a quarterly bearing from the enemy's battle line, but at 
 the same time placed us between the enemy and his bases. 
 During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the 
 High Seas Fleet were visible through the mist the heavy 
 and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battle 
 cruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, 
 and the enemy vessels were seen to be constantly hit, 
 some being observed to haul out of the line and at least 
 one to sink. The enemy's return fire at this time was 
 not effective and the damage caused to our ships was 
 insignificant. 
 
 From the reports it appears that the area of 
 the battle was covered by mist and smoke of vary-, 
 ing density, interspersed* with sections wherein op- 
 posing ships could see each other at the battle 
 range. This gave rise to a series of local actions 
 during which all ships of the battle fleet became 
 engaged, but at no time simultaneously. These 
 detached actions were for the most part between 
 few ships for brief periods. The aggregate fight- 
 ing, however, seems to have been considerable, as 
 may be gathered from the following synopsis of 
 the principal incidents reported by Admiral Jel- 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 105 
 
 licoe and Vice Admiral Beatty. The following ex- 
 tract is from the report of the former: 
 
 At 6.17 the third battle squadron engaged German 
 battleships, battle cruisers, and light cruisers at a range 
 of 11,000 yards. The fourth battle squadron, in which 
 was placed the Commander in Chief's flagship Iron 
 Duke, engaged the battle squadron, consisting of the 
 Konig and Kaiser classes, as well as some of the Ger- 
 man battle cruisers and light cruisers. The mist ren- 
 dered range taking difficult, but the fire of the squad- 
 ron was effective. The Iron Duke opened at 6.30 on 
 a battleship of the Konig class at 12,000 yards range, 
 hitting on the second salvo, and continuing to hit until 
 the target ship turned away. The fire of other ships 
 of the fourth squadron was principally directed at enemy 
 battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of 
 the mist. The ships of the second battle squadron were 
 in action with vessels of the Kaiser and Konig classes 
 between 6.30 and 7.20, and fired also at a battle cruiser 
 which had dropped back, apparently severely damaged. 
 The first battle squadron received more of the return 
 fire than the remainder of the main fleet. The Colos- 
 sus was hit, but not seriously damaged, and other ships 
 were straddled with fair frequency by the German 
 salvos. 
 
 Admiral Jellicoe made special mention of the 
 Marlborough of the third battle squadron, stating 
 that at 6.17 she fired seven salvos at a German 
 battleship of the Kaiser class, then engaged a 
 cruiser and again a battleship. At 6.^4 she was 
 
106 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list 
 to starboard, but at 7.03 reopened on a cruiser, 
 and at 7.12 fired fourteen rapid salvos at a battle- 
 ship of the Konig class, hitting her frequently un- 
 til she turned out of line. These details in the 
 case of the Marlborough permit some rather inter- 
 esting speculations. It seems that this ship alone 
 fired approximately between 200 and 250 13.5- 
 inch shells, each one weighing about 1,240 pounds, 
 aggregating in the neighbourhood of 140 tons of 
 high explosive steel shell, at the effective battle 
 range of 12,000 yards in the beginning, and closing 
 to 9,000 yards during the course of the action. If 
 this is at all indicative of the fighting done by 
 the other battleships of the' main body it is ap- 
 parent that a considerable weight of metal was let 
 loose. In the first and second phases it is esti- 
 mated that each of the ships under Vice Admiral 
 Beatty and Rear Admiral Thomas fired four or 
 five times this amount (about 600 tons each) and 
 the Germans quite as much, if not more. 
 
 After the injury to the Marlborough Vice Ad- 
 miral Burney transferred his flag to the Revenge. 
 
 It appears that the British battle cruisers after 
 the loss of the Invincible were out of action for 
 about half an hour. At about 6.50 the two re- 
 maining ships of Admiral Hood's squadron were 
 ordered to prolong Admiral Beatty's line astern, 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 107 
 
 and, having lost sight of the enemy, the battle 
 cruiser squadrons reduced speed to l8 knots. 
 Course was gradually changed to south and then 
 to southwest in an effort to regain touch with the 
 enemy. At 7.14 two German battle cruisers and 
 two battleships were sighted at about 15,000 
 yards' range, bearing northwesterly. At 7.17 Ad- 
 miral Beatty's ships re-engaged and increased 
 speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 the British battle 
 cruisers had again reduced speed to 18 knots. 
 German destroyers advanced, emitting clouds of 
 dark grey smoke, under which screen the German 
 capital ships turned away and were lost sight of 
 at 7.45. British light cruisers were ordered to 
 sweep westward to regain touch, and at 8.20 Ad- 
 miral Beatty ordered a westerly course in support. 
 Soon afterward German battle cruisers and bat- 
 tleships were heavily engaged at 10,000 yards' 
 range. Admiral Beatty reports that the leading 
 ship was hit repeatedly by the Lion and turned 
 out of line eight points, emitting high flames ; that 
 the Princess Royal set fire to a three-funnel bat- 
 tleship, and that the New Zealand and Indomita- 
 ble both engaged the third ship, forcing her to 
 haul out of line on fire and heeling over. The 
 mist at this time shut them from view, but the 
 Falmouth reported the German ships as last seen 
 at 8.38, steaming to the westward. The British 
 
108 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 battle cruisers did not regain touch, and at 9.24 
 changed to the southerly course set by Admiral 
 Jellicoe for the battle fleet. 
 
 During the third phase the conditions of mist 
 and failing light favoured torpedo attack, but few 
 details have been reported. Light cruisers of the 
 fourth squadron occupied a position in the van 
 until 7.20 p. m., when they carried out orders to 
 attack German destroyers. Again at 8.18 p. m. 
 these light cruisers moved out to support the 
 eleventh destroyer flotilla in a torpedo attack. 
 They came under a heavy fire from the enemy bat- 
 tle fleet at ranges between 6,500 and 8,000 yards, 
 but succeeded in firing torpedoes at German bat- 
 tleships. 
 
 At 6.25 the third light cruiser squadron at- 
 tacked the German battle cruisers with torpedoes, 
 and the Indomitable reported that a few minutes 
 later a German battle cruiser of the Derfflingei- 
 class fell out of line. This may have been tht 
 Liitzow, as at about this time Vice Admiral Hip- 
 per, while under a heavy fire, transshipped his flag 
 in a destroyer from the disabled Liltzow to the 
 Derfflinger. 
 
 It is thus seen that during the third phase, last- 
 ing from 6.15 to about 8.30 p. m., practically the 
 entire British Grand Fleet was engaged with prac- 
 tically the entire German High Seas Fleet. Earl) 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 109 
 
 in the phase the British armoured cruiser Defence 
 (tonnage 14,600, carrying four 9.2-inch guns and 
 755 men) was sunk. At the same time the ar- 
 moured cruiser Warrior (tonnage 13,500, carry- 
 ing six 9.2-inch guns and 704 men) and her sister 
 ship, the Black Prince, were disabled. The War- 
 rior was taken in tow by the Engadine, but broke 
 away during rough weather in the night, and sank 
 after the crew had been taken off. The Black 
 Prince came in close contact with a German bat- 
 tleship during the night and was sunk by gunfire. 
 Rear Admiral Hood's flagship, the Invincible 
 (tonnage 17,250, carrying eight 12-inch guns and 
 750 men), was sunk soon after engaging. 
 
 Between 6 and 6.30 the Germans lost the light 
 cruiser Wiesbaden. The German battle cruiser 
 Liitzow (tonnage 28,000, carrying ten 12-inch 
 guns and 750 men) was disabled, and sank while 
 returning to port. The German battleship Pom- 
 mem (tonnage 13,040, carrying four 11 -inch guns 
 and 750 men) was probably disabled during the 
 day battle and sunk in the night by a torpedo. The 
 German light cruisers Frauenlob and Rostock 
 were destroyed in the evening fighting, while the 
 light cruiser Elbing was abandoned because of 
 damage due to collision with another German 
 ship. According to official admission, each side 
 seems to have lost about four destroyers, either 
 
110 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 during this phase or during the night fighting. 
 
 The details of how Admiral Jellicoe manoeu- 
 vred his ships into action were not disclosed in his 
 report, but the British battle fleet probably ap- 
 proached with squadrons or divisions in line or 
 line of bearing. That is, the ships were in several 
 parallel columns on a southerly course, with the 
 leading ships in a line approximately east and 
 west, at such a distance apart as to permit all 
 ships to swing into one column, heading either 
 east or west. The deployment into a battle line 
 heading easterly seems to have been skillfully ef- 
 fected under trying conditions. Just what th'^ 
 relative positions of the two fleets were during 
 this phase is not known, but the British would ap- 
 pear to have had a tactical advantage in turning 
 the German van. The conditions of poor visibil- 
 ity, however, did not permit them to get full bene- 
 fit of it, although they had the German ships 
 backed by the twilight sky, an important advan- 
 tage, which must have increased as darkness ap- 
 proached. 
 
 Fourth Phase: Torpedo Attacks and Fighting 
 During the Night of May j/ to June i. 
 
 Admiral Jellicoe reports that after the arrival 
 of the Grand Fleet the tactics of the Germans 
 were generally to avoid further action, in which 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 111 
 
 they were favoured by conditions of visibility. 
 At this stage of the battle, shortly after 8.40, 
 Admiral Jellicoe quotes Vice Admiral Beatty as 
 follows : 
 
 In view of the gathering darkness, and the fact that 
 our strategical position was such as to make it appear 
 certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight un- 
 der most favourable circumstances, I did not consider 
 it desirable or proper to close the enemy battle fleet dur- 
 ing the dark hours. 
 
 Admiral Jellicoe then reports : 
 
 At 9 p. m. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and 
 the threat of torpedo boat destroyer attacks during the 
 rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me 
 to dispose of the fleet for the night, with a view to its 
 safety from such attacks, while providing for a renewal 
 of action at daylight. I accordingly manoeuvred to re- 
 main between the enemy and his bases, placing our 
 flotillas in a position in which they would afford protec- 
 tion to the fleet from destroyer attack and at the same 
 time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy's 
 heavy ships. 
 
 The British fleet, after making dispositions to 
 guard against night torpedo attacks, steamed at 
 moderate speed on southerly courses. Conse- 
 quently during the night the British heavy ships 
 were not engaged, but Admiral Jellicoe reports 
 that the British Fourth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and 
 
112 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Thirteenth Flotillas delivered a series of successful 
 torpedo attacks. 
 
 Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the 
 second light-cruiser squadron, stationed in the 
 rear of the battle fleet, was in close action for 
 about fifteen minutes at 10.20 p. m. with a Ger- 
 man squadron, comprising one large cruiser and 
 four light cruisers. In this action the South- 
 hampton and the Dublin suffered rather heavy 
 casualties, although their steaming and fighting 
 qualities were not seriously impaired. 
 
 This night fighting comprises an interesting 
 and perhaps an important phase of the battle, but 
 too little is known about it at this time to permit 
 profitable discussion. During both the day and 
 night conditions were favourable for the use of 
 torpedoes. Destroyer attacks seem to have been 
 numerous, persistent, and daring. It may be as- 
 sumed that a great many torpedoes were fired, but 
 the resulting damage does not appear to have 
 been very extensive. 
 
 Early on the morning of June 1 (3 a. m.) Ad- 
 miral Jellicoe's battle fleet was to the westward 
 of Horn Reef, some ninety miles from the bat- 
 tlefield, as shown on the chart. The British fleet 
 then turned to the northward and retraced its 
 course. 
 
 Visibility was three to four miles. Admiral 
 
'.Skagerrack 
 
 JELLICOE 
 3 A.M. 
 June l 
 
 80 Miles 
 To Heligoland 
 
 Kiel Canal 
 
 DIAGRAM INDICATING FLEET MOVEMENTS AFTER BATTLE OF JUTLAND 
 
 113 
 
114 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Jellicoe reports that the British fleet remained in 
 the proximity of the battlefield and near the line 
 of approach to German ports until ii a. m., June 
 1 ; that the position of the British fleet must have 
 been known to the enemy, because at 4 a. m, the 
 fleet engaged for about five minutes a Zeppelin 
 which had ample opportunity to note and sub- 
 sequently to report the position and course of the 
 British fleet; that the waters from the latitude of 
 Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thor- 
 oughly searched, but no enemy ships sighted; and 
 that at 1.15 p. m., it being evident that the Ger- 
 man fleet had succeeded in returning to port, 
 course was shaped for British bases, which were 
 reached without further incident. By 9.30 p. m. 
 of the next day, June 2, the fleet having fueled 
 and replenished with ammunition, was reported 
 ready for further action. 
 
 The conduct of the British fleet on the evening 
 of May 31, during the night, and on the morning 
 of June 1 raises a good many perplexing questions. 
 In the morning the British ships retraced their 
 tracks to the northward, taking about the same 
 lane they had followed in the night. 
 
 Considerable criticism has been made of Ad- 
 miral Jellicoe for not pressing the retiring enemy 
 ships on the evening of May 31. Did approach- 
 ing darkness, threat of destroyer attack, and the 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 115 
 
 weather conditions constitute adequate reasons for 
 not closing an enemy inferior in numbers, in gun 
 power and in speed? This will probably be a 
 much discussed question for many years to come. 
 Also many people are puzzled that, with the 
 Grand Fleet in position to put itself between the 
 German High Seas Fleet and its bases, there was 
 no decisive engagement on the following day, June 
 1. A study of the chart on page 1 13 indicates that 
 the fleets could not have been very far apart. 
 Considering that the June nights between evening 
 and morning twilight are only five hours long in 
 these latitudes, and also considering the numer- 
 ous scouts, both German and British, it looks as 
 though they should have been pretty well in- 
 formed of each other's whereabouts. But before 
 criticising Admiral Jellicoe for not pressing a re- 
 newal of the engagement, it might be well to re- 
 flect upon the conditions confronting him on that 
 morning : Visibility only three to four miles ; close 
 to enemy bases and comparatively far from home 
 bases; a fleet somewhat knocked about after the 
 previous day's fighting, and no doubt a number 
 of the ships short of both fuel and ammunition; 
 destroyers and light cruisers scattered, many more 
 or less damaged, and perhaps the majority with 
 torpedoes expended; an enemy skilled in the use 
 of submarines and mines. 
 
116 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 It is hard for persons unused to the sea to vis- 
 ualise the conditions and circumstances attend- 
 ing this engagement. Even seagoing men of ex- 
 cellent balance are liable, when transplanted tem- 
 porarily to the tranquillity of a war college, to 
 be somewhat influenced by environment, and, 
 while in enthusiastic search of illustration for pet 
 theories, they may overlook or fail to give due 
 weight to modifying factors which cannot be sim- 
 ulated on the game board. Students of tactics on 
 shore make their decisions after study and discus- 
 sion in the comfortable quiet of a well-lighted 
 room, and then use T square and ruler to move 
 their miniature ships on a motionless wooden 
 ocean. The fighters of the Jutland battled faced 
 quite a different proposition. Decisions had to be 
 made quickly, accurately transmitted by signal, 
 and promptly carried out on a sea darkened by 
 mist, smoke, and approaching night. All this had 
 to be done, moreover, in the midst of battle, un- 
 der the strain of apprehension, in the uncertain- 
 ties of meagre and conflicting information. 
 
 The actual results of the Battle of Jutland did 
 not change the military situation. The British 
 control of the sea remained an absolute factor, as 
 before the battle, and the German High Seas Fleet 
 continued to be a fleet in being and a menace to its 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 117 
 
 enemies. Consequently the battle must be classed 
 as indecisive. 
 
 Moral effect is an important factor in war, and, 
 although the military situation was not changed 
 by the Battle of Jutland, there is no question of 
 the fact that the Qerman public was elated by 
 the statement from Berlin that the British fleet 
 had been withdrawn from the field of battle. This 
 manoeuvre, however, was because of night-fall and 
 was toward the German base of Heligoland, not 
 toward British home bases. This should be con- 
 vincing rebuttal to Germany's claim that her fleet 
 gained a victory. 
 
 Those who support Admiral Jellicoe in his de- 
 cision not to close the enemy battle fleet, maintain 
 that, inasmuch as naval superiority was essential 
 to the Allied cause, it should not have been risked 
 upon such a hazard as would have been involved 
 by continuing the battle under the conditions 
 which have been described. On the other hand, 
 many hold the opinion that the destruction of 
 the German fleet was of such urgent importance 
 as to justify this risk. It is too soon to seek a 
 final solution of so intricate a problem. 
 
 The following is the British statement of losses : 
 
118 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 BATTLE CRUISERS 
 
 Queen Mary. . 
 Indefatigable . 
 Invincible .... 
 
 Ton- Armour 
 nage Belt 
 
 27,000 
 18,750 
 17.250 
 
 9 m. 
 Sin. 
 7 in. 
 
 Main 
 Battery 
 
 l3.S-m. 
 
 i2-in. 
 
 i2-in. 
 
 Speed 
 
 28 
 26 
 26 
 
 Men 
 
 1,000 
 899 
 750 
 
 C'p'd 
 
 '08 
 
 ARMOURED CRUISERS 
 
 Defense 
 
 Black Prince. 
 Warrior 
 
 14,600 
 
 6 in. 
 
 4 9.2-in. 
 
 23 
 
 755 
 
 I3.SS0 
 
 6 in. 
 
 6 9.2-in. 
 
 20.5 
 
 704 
 
 13.550 
 
 6 in. 
 
 6 9.2-in. 
 
 22.9 
 
 704 
 
 'oS 
 '06 
 '08 
 
 DESTROYERS 
 
 
 1,900 
 
 920 
 950 
 950 
 
 950 
 
 
 
 3 4-in. 
 3 4-iii. 
 
 3 4-in. 
 
 31 
 
 29.50 
 31.32 
 31.32 
 
 31-32 
 
 160 
 
 100 
 100 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 '14 
 
 Turbulent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Nestor 
 
 ^ 
 
 Shark 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The following is the German statement of 
 losses : 
 
 BATTLESHIP 
 
 Ton- 
 nage 
 
 Pommem 13.040 
 
 Arma- 
 ment Speed 
 4 ii-in. 19 
 14 6.7-in. 
 
 Latzow. 
 
 BATTLE CRUISER 
 
 28,000 8 i2-in. 27 
 
 12 6-in. 
 
 Date 
 Completion 
 
 1907 
 
 191S 
 
 LIGHT CRUISERS 
 
 Rostock 4,820 
 
 Fraueniob 2,656 
 
 12 4.1-m. 
 10 4.1-in. 
 
 Elbing 
 
 Wiesbaden. 
 
 Five. 
 
 NEW LIGHT CRUISERS 
 
 DESTROYERS 
 
 27.3 
 21.5 
 
 1914 
 1903 
 
NORTH SEA BATTLES 119 
 
 The following are the totals of tonnage and 
 personnel reported lost : 
 
 TOTAL TONNAGE LOST 
 
 British 117. 150 
 
 German 60,720 
 
 TOTAL PERSONNEL LOST 
 
 British 6,10s 
 
 Gennan 2,414 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 Submarine Warfare 
 
 THROUGHOUT the war the submarine was 
 a conspicuous naval weapon, and German 
 science developed it with characteristic energy, 
 system, and thoroughness. In the first months 
 the more powerful Allied navies practically swept 
 the seas of all enemy merchant ships and con- 
 tained the battle fleets of the Central Powers 
 within comparatively narrow limits. Beyond 
 these limits, except for a few raids on commerce 
 by surface cruisers, the naval operations of both 
 Germany and Austria were restricted to the use 
 of submarines. 
 
 Considering the disadvantages inherent in un- 
 derwater navigation, the results attained were 
 truly astonishing. The following incidents may 
 be mentioned as examples of various and nu- 
 merous submarine activities. In the first days of 
 the war one small German submarine sank three 
 British armoured cruisers in less than one hour. 
 On Oct. 7, 1916, the U-53 appeared in Newport 
 Harbor, exchanged official calls, read the daily 
 
SUBMARINE WARFARE 121 
 
 papers, sent dispatches, and departed a few hours 
 after her arrival. The next day the U-boat de- 
 stroyed off Nantucket four British traders and one 
 Dutch trader. In the Spring of 1917 a German 
 submarine bombarded peaceful Funchal. Also be- 
 fore the entry of the United States into the war 
 Captain Konig introduced a new type, a commer- 
 cial submarine, the successful trans- Atlantic block- 
 ade runner, Deutschland. In addition, the under- 
 water mine layer was developed, and it is dis- 
 turbing to think of how this huge mechanical fish 
 secretly threaded the ocean highways, laying its 
 engines of destruction. Finally, U-boat cruisers 
 of about 2,800 tons' displacement, nearly 300 feet 
 long, fitted with a double bottom multiple com- 
 partment protection utilized for carrying oil to 
 permit a cruising radius of about 18,000 miles, 
 and mounting 5.9 inch guns, besides carrying tor- 
 pedoes, are reported to have appeared and taken 
 part in the war. The U-boat as an outlaw com- 
 merce destroyer did enormous damage. 
 
 It is not surprising that the submarine seized 
 upon the imagination. And Germany took ad- 
 vantage of the mystery surrounding underwater 
 attack to circulate propaganda designed to 
 strengthen hopes at home, and at the same time 
 break down morale in enemy countries. This re- 
 sulted in a somewhat confused perspective. In 
 
122 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 studying this phase of the war, therefore, it is 
 important that we should search out the facts, 
 reason to logical conclusions, and take the true 
 measure of the U-boat. 
 
 The outstanding characteristic of the subma- 
 rine, as its name indicates, is its ability to navi- 
 gate below the surface of the water. This enables 
 it to evade the enemy, to make a surprise attack, 
 and to escape by hiding. These faculties are 
 manifestly suitable for the weaker belligerent to 
 use against the stronger enemy. Navies that dom- 
 inate, that have power to seek and destroy in the 
 open, are not dependent upon abilities to evade 
 and to hide. It is for this reason that Allied 
 submarines found their chief opportunity to strike 
 in sea areas controlled by the fleets of the Central 
 Powers, the Baltic, the Dardanelles, and other 
 waters close to Teutonic bases, while German 
 submarines were active in all other ocean areas 
 within the cruising radius of their U-boats. Since 
 the Allies controlled practically all the high seas, 
 the field of the U-boat was large, while the ac- 
 tivities of Allied submarines were confined to the 
 relatively narrow coastal waters controlled by 
 Germany, Austria, and Turkey. 
 
 Without depreciating the utility of the subma- 
 rine, it may be truly said that if the Allies had 
 not possessed a single one they would still have 
 
SUBMARINE WARFARE 123 
 
 enjoyed the incalculable advantages of control of 
 the high seas. The German U-boats, moreover, 
 did not prove effective against enemy battle fleets. 
 In order to facilitate submarine commerce-destroy-* 
 ing operations Germany found it necessary, be- 
 cause of inherent weaknesses in underwater craft, 
 to adopt methods in violation of the laws of 
 civilised warfare. Before going deeper into the 
 uses and limitations of the submarine it might 
 be well to touch briefly upon some of the rules 
 governing its legitimate employment. 
 
 The purpose of rules regulating ocean-borne in- 
 tercourse in times of peace and governing both bel- 
 ligerent and neutral conduct in time of war is to 
 carry out practically the principles of the freedom 
 of the seas, and it need hardly be added that 
 these principles are identical with those govern- 
 ing all rules of right conduct at sea and on shore ; 
 namely, principles of liberty, justice, and hu- 
 manity. 
 
 As weapons and other conditions change, new 
 situations arise which may require modifications 
 in these rules; but both in time of peace and in 
 time of war reason calls for a general concur- 
 rence of Governments before a modified or new 
 rule can become operative ; and any belligerent in- 
 stituting methods in violation of previously estab- 
 lished regulations assumes the burden of proof to 
 
124 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 show that new conditions compel new rules in or- 
 der to carry out the never-changing principles of 
 the freedom of the seas. 
 
 There is little room for confusion of thought 
 on this point. Unfortunately, however, it is the 
 experience of war-time practice that military ne- 
 cessity and the doctrine of "might makes right" 
 twist these rules into a bewildering tangle. One 
 belligerent breaks a rule and attempts to justify 
 his conduct. The enemy, as a matter of policy, 
 turns a deaf ear to the arguments in justification, 
 and, seeing only the broken rule, proceeds to re- 
 talitate by breaking another rule on the ground 
 that military necessity forces him to resort to this 
 act of reprisal. And so one act of reprisal leads to 
 another until unconscionable degrees of lawless- 
 ness are reached. 
 
 It has been suggested as a possible solution ob- 
 viating the difficulties of drawing up a set of good 
 working rules to govern naval operations against 
 commerce that one sweeping sanction of immunity 
 might suffice by which all trade ships would be 
 allowed to carry on their peaceful pursuits unmo- 
 lested in time of war as in time of peace. The 
 objection, however, to such a rule is, that when 
 the world is divided between nations at peace and 
 nations at war, this rule would satisfy peoples at 
 peace and one side of the belligerents, but the 
 
SUBMARINE WARFARE 125 
 
 other belligerents would find it discriminatory and 
 would oppose it as an infringement upon their 
 rights to use the seas in accordance with principles 
 of equity and freedom. 
 
 To deny belligerents, moreover, their right to 
 use the seas for suppressing enemy commerce and 
 imposing economic pressure in order to hasten the 
 settlement of their differences, would deprive the 
 world of what is generally looked upon, when con- 
 ducted according to the rules of civilised warfare, 
 as a humane method of re-establishing conditions 
 of peace. It may be added that those who aim 
 at a world peace secured by a concert of power 
 may reasonably assert that, while the freedom of 
 the seas is a foundation principle on which to make 
 a world peace secure, naval power, by instituting 
 blockades, may at times prove a humane and ef- 
 fective means of compelling recalcitrant Govern- 
 ments to observe the provisions of this peace. 
 
 During a war, the maritime interests of bellig- 
 erents and neutrals are bound to conflict; and it 
 is impossible to give either of them unlicensed use 
 of the seas without restricting the freedom of the 
 other. Hence a compromise is necessary, and so 
 long as nations recognise a state of war as involv- 
 ing conditions subject to law in which both bel- 
 ligerents and neutrals have rights, it is manifest 
 that rules are required to define and guarantee 
 
126 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 these rights. It will not be attempted here to ex- 
 amine closely the many rules drawn to govern 
 naval warfare, some of which were still subjects 
 of controversy when the great war began; but, 
 as an aid to the memory, a few of the recognised 
 and established regulations affecting the use of 
 the submarine will be briefly outlined : 
 
 1. A blockade to be binding must be effective; that is, 
 it must be maintained by a force sufficient to render in- 
 gress to or egress from the enemy coast line dangerous. 
 
 2. A blockade must not bar access to neutral ports or 
 coasts. 
 
 3. During the continuance of a state of blockade no 
 vessels are allowed to enter or leave the blockaded place 
 without consent of the blockading authority. 
 
 4. The prohibition of contraband trade with the at- 
 tendant adjudging of penalties is a belligerent right. 
 This right can only be exercised upon the high seas and 
 the territorial waters of the belligerents and in accord- 
 ance with the rules and usages of international law. 
 (Contraband of war may be defined as articles destined 
 for the enemy and capable of use as an assistance to the 
 enemy in carrying on war either ashore or afloat.) 
 
 5. Lawfully commissioned public vessels of a bel- 
 ligerent nation may exercise the right of visiting and 
 searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever 
 be the ship, the cargo, or the destination. If the exami- 
 nation of ship's papers and search show fraud, contra- 
 band, an offence in respect of blockade, or enemy service, 
 the vessel may be seized. Force may be used to over- 
 
SUBMARINE WARFARE 127 
 
 come either resistance or flight, but condemnation, fol- 
 lows forcible resistance alone. In exercising these rights 
 belligerents must conform to the rules and usages of 
 international law. 
 
 6. When a vessel in action surrenders (usually indi- 
 cated by hauling down the national flag or showing the 
 white flag of truce), firing must cease on the part of the 
 victor. To continue an attack after knowledge of sur- 
 render, or to sink a vessel after submission, is a violation 
 of the rules of civilised warfare only permissible in 
 cases of treachery or renewal of the action. 
 
 7. Absolute contraband, including guns, ammunition, 
 and the like, is liable to capture on the high seas or in 
 the territorial waters of the belligerents if it is shown 
 to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by 
 the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is 
 immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct 
 or entails transshipment, even at a neutral port, or a 
 subsequent transport by land, although it may be through 
 neutral territory. Also there must be a trial and judg- 
 ment of a prize court of the captor having proper juris- 
 diction in regard to the goods involved, whether de- 
 stroyed or not. 
 
 The status of armed merchantmen is generally 
 misunderstood. Merchantmen have the right to 
 arm for defence. A merchantman may repel an 
 attack by any enemy ship, but only a man-of-war 
 can attack men-of-war. 
 
 According to international law the character of 
 a ship is determined by her employment ; and it is 
 
128 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 an established right of merchant vessels that they 
 may carry arms — for defence only — without nec- 
 essarily altering their status before the law .as 
 traders engaged in legitimate peaceful pursuits. 
 This right is well established by precedent, and 
 although prolific of complications, it has on the 
 whole operated to sustain the principles of free- 
 dom of the seas. Its usefulness was conspicuous 
 in the days of piracy; and the "long toms" on 
 board our clipper ships proved strong arguments 
 in suppressing lawlessness. 
 
 In the heat of war, moreover, belligerents are 
 inclined to infringe the privileges of noncombat- 
 ants, and experience has shown that the right of 
 merchant vessels to arm for defence has tended 
 to prevent belligerents from unlawful interference 
 with peaceful traffic. The belligerent right to 
 stop, visit, search, and capture merchantmen is a 
 high sovereign power, and it seems reasonable 
 to require that the vessels authorised to exercise 
 it should possess potential strength. It would be 
 a somewhat absurd condition, inviting abuse and 
 irregularity, if rules were so framed as to permit 
 a fast enemy motor boat, manned by three or four 
 men armed with rifles, to stop, search, and cap- 
 ture an ocean liner, without allowing the liner to 
 attempt lawfully either flight or resistance. On 
 the other hand, a motor boat, submarine, or any 
 
SUBMARINE WARFARE 129 
 
 other duly commissioned and authorised man-of- 
 war has the right to employ force to overcome re- 
 sistance or to prevent flight ; and the merchantman 
 has no redress for damage sustained during at- 
 tempted flight or resistance. In the majority of 
 cases, it is obvious that prudence will influence 
 merchantmen to surrender promptly in the face of 
 a respectably powerful man-of-war rather than 
 forfeit immunity by attempting flight or resist- 
 ance. 
 
 If an armed merchantman of a neutral country 
 on friendly terms with the warring nations should 
 resist by force a belligerent man-of-war, the neu- 
 tral Government would properly discountenance 
 the act as incompatible with the relations of am- 
 ity existing between the two countries. If, how- 
 ever, neutral rights are violated to an intolerable 
 degree a state of armed neutrality may supplant 
 the relations of amity, and under these unusual 
 conditions a Government has the right and may 
 be in duty bound to preserve its neutrality by 
 using such force as the circumstances may require ; 
 but in this delicate situation care must be exer- 
 cised that force is used only in defence of neutral 
 rights. 
 
 From the beginning of the war submarines 
 helped to prevent a close blockade of the coasts 
 of the Central Powers, and the inability on the 
 
130 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 part of the Allied navies to institute a coast line 
 blockade strictly in accordance with the estab- 
 lished rules of international law led to what is 
 generally known as a distant blockade. The 
 British Orders in Council regulating this distant 
 blockade lengthened the contraband lists and ex- 
 tended the doctrine of ultimate destination until 
 Germany's commerce with non-contiguous coun- 
 tries was practically cut off. 
 
 As the effectiveness of the blockade increased, 
 Germany retaliated by taking undue advantage 
 of the war area doctrine, and claimed increasing 
 latitude in the use of the U-boats. As in the case 
 of the invasion of Belgium, Germany made mili- 
 tary necessity the excuse for the illegal acts of 
 the German Navy. Underwater attack against the 
 blockading battle fleets met with little success; but 
 the unscrupulous use of the submarine as a com- 
 merce destroyer brought better results. The vigor- 
 ous protest of neutrals against the violation of 
 their rights caused Germany, for a time, to make 
 an effort to comply with the rules and usages of in- 
 ternational law; but this effort proved ineffectual. 
 The vulnerability of the submarine, with the in- 
 creasing efficacy of the ways and means developed 
 to safeguard merchantmen from its attack, pre- 
 sented to the German Government the alternative 
 either of suffering a curtailment of submarine 
 
SUBMARINE WARFARE 131 
 
 effectiveness or of abandoning lawful methods. 
 Germany's decision to take the latter course was 
 announced to the world by official notification that 
 within a war zone embracing large areas of the 
 high seas her submarines would sink all ships, neu- 
 tral or belligerent. 
 
 This unwarranted course forced the United 
 States into the war against Germany, and aroused 
 the hostility of a great part of the world. Even 
 from the German point of view, the only thing 
 that would have made the result profitable would 
 have been to win a decision in the war by means 
 of the U-boats. This Germany did not succeed 
 in accomplishing. Although there were enormous 
 losses of shipping, the submarines did not succeed 
 in shutting off transportation by sea. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 Anti-Submarine Tactics 
 
 THE cruising radius of the larger submarines 
 ranges from about 6,000 miles to 9,000 
 miles (18,000 miles is the reported radius of the 
 most recent cruiser type) when steaming on the 
 surface at a slow speed of five to ten knots. The 
 newer boats are reported to have a maximum speed 
 of eighteen knots, but economy of fuel is so im- 
 portant, and the consumption is so much greater 
 for high speeds, that submarines use the econom- 
 ical slower speeds except perhaps for short spurts. 
 It is obvious that submarines operating from dis- 
 tant bases cannot well afford to chase merchant- 
 men unless the latter happen to be slow ones. Their 
 usual procedure is to lie in wait along the trade 
 routes and attack the ships which run up to them. 
 Submarines, after cruising a certain distance 
 while submerged, are compelled to come to the 
 surface to recharge their batteries. Here again the 
 maximum submerged speed of about fourteen 
 knots for the newer boats and about ten knots for 
 the older types is extremely uneconomical. For 
 
 132 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 133 
 
 example, approximately speaking, the average 
 submarine when submerged can go four to five 
 hours at ten knots, a total distance of about forty 
 miles; or ten hours at about seven knots, a total 
 distance of seventy miles; or thirty-six hours at 
 about four knots, a total distance of 14 miles; 
 or seventy-two hours at steerage way (about two 
 and one-half knots), a total distance of 180 miles. 
 The more recent U-boats can go much farther, 
 under favorable conditions as far as 250 miles, 
 at a stretch without coming to the surface. But 
 when the limit is reached, whatever it may be, the 
 submarine must stop and wait for an opportunity 
 to come to the surface to recharge batteries. 
 
 It follows, then, that anti-submarine tactics 
 which force the enemy to go comparatively long 
 distances at high speeds tend to limit their activi- 
 ties. Experience has taught submarine command- 
 ers that when the prospects are such as to promise 
 considerable uneconomical cruising, either on the 
 surface or submerged, it is usually a wise policy 
 to abandon the attack. 
 
 The armament of submarines consists of both 
 guns and torpedoes. The hull of the' newer types 
 is protected to some extent by armour, but even 
 so a gun engagement with a well-armed enemy 
 involves great risk. The practice of arming mer- 
 chant ships has forced commerce-destroying sub- 
 
134 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 marines to rely on the torpedo as the principal 
 weapon of attack. 
 
 The general characteristics of the torpedo are 
 now pretty well known. It is a highly scientific 
 mechanism consisting of many intricate parts in- 
 geniously assembled in a metal shell about twelve, 
 to twenty feet long, twenty-one inches in diame- 
 ter, weighing about one ton, and valued in this 
 country at about $6,000. In appearance a tor- 
 pedo somewhat resembles a small, elongated auto- 
 submarine. It has horizontal and vertical rud- 
 ders which can be so adjusted, in conjunction with 
 an automatic steering device, as to make the tor- 
 pedo keep at a certain depth and either travel 
 straight or in a curve. The torpedo is propelled 
 by a screw driven by an automatic compressed 
 air engine, capable of giving a speed as high as 
 thirty-six knots. By the act of launching from 
 the tube a starting lever is tripped, which causes 
 the propelling mechanism to go ahead at full 
 speed. The head of the torpedo carries a power- 
 ful bursting charge. The object of submarine tac- 
 tics is to detonate this high explosive against the 
 underwater body of the target ship. 
 
 To accomplish this object the submarine com- 
 mander has to make preliminary observations 
 through his periscope, estimate the course, speed, 
 and distance of the enemy, manoeuvre his boat to 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 135 
 
 a favourable position, make the necessary firing 
 adjustments, aim the torpedo, and then launch it. 
 
 It is obvious that the closer the target the better 
 the chances of scoring a hit. As a general rule it 
 is not profitable for submarines to fire torpedoes 
 at greater ranges than one thousand yards because 
 the percentage of hits at longer ranges is com- 
 paratively small. Glancing hits, moreover, are 
 not often effective. When the target ship is end 
 on, the torpedo, even when correctly aimed to 
 hit, frequently glances off without exploding (bow 
 wave and wake currents assist this deflection), or 
 if it does explode fails to do much damage. [Ger- 
 many evidently practiced caution both with her 
 torpedoes and with her submarines. Torpedoes 
 were so expensive, the supply was so limited, and 
 the U-boats themselves were so precious that every 
 effort was made to avoid risk of failure and de- 
 struction.] 
 
 It is thus seen that submarine tactics are not al- 
 together simple. If the target ship is fast, steers 
 zigzag courses, keeps a bright lookout, carries 
 guns, and is also attended by escort ships specially 
 equipped for destroying submarines, the difficul- 
 ties in the way of successful attack are consider- 
 ably increased. 
 
 The problem facing the submarine Captain may 
 be summarised as follows : 
 
136 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Keeping in mind the importance of safeguard- 
 ing his own ship and also the necessity of econo- 
 mising in both fuel and torpedoes, he first studies 
 the situation and if he is in a favourable position 
 ahead of his quarry, he decides to attack. Assum- 
 ing that the approaching vessel is armed he sub- 
 merges before there is likelihood of discovery. 
 He then observes at more or less frequent inter- 
 vals through his periscope, takes bearings of the 
 approaching target ship, and estimates her course, 
 distance, and speed. His purpose is to avoid dis- 
 covery and at the same time to manoeuvre into a 
 favourable position for launching at about one 
 thousand yards' range a torpedo so aimed and ad- 
 justed as to strike the enemy ship at an angle of 
 incidence to her fore and aft line greater than 
 thirty degrees. 
 
 There are, of course, any number of variations 
 in the methods of making a submarine attack, but 
 as an illustration, suppose a U-boat submerged 
 and approaching from a bow bearing at a speed of 
 six knots toward a target ship advancing at twelve 
 knots. (With good glasses a periscope can be dis- 
 tinguished in comparatively smooth water by an 
 alert lookout at 3,000 to 4,000 yards.) 
 
 As the ship can probably escape by manoeuvring 
 if the periscope is seen before the torpedo is 
 fired, it follows that the critical time for both the 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 137 
 
 attacker and the attacked is during the interval of 
 approach from the range of 4,000 yaras to the 
 firing range of about 1,000 yards. This interval 
 will last on an average from seven to ten minutes, 
 depending upon the speeds, upon the angle of ap- 
 proach and upon how accurately the submarine 
 judges the course of the target ship. Beginning at 
 4,000 yards the submarine can be expected to show 
 about one foot of periscope and observe for a 
 period of about thirty seconds. After this four or 
 five successive observations will probably be taken 
 at intervals of about one minute, the period of 
 time that the periscope is exposed diminishing 
 gradually to ten or twelve seconds. 
 
 In the meanwhile the submarine will have 
 closed to about 2,000 yards, and from now on 
 only a few inches of periscope will be exposed, 
 but at more frequent intervals, about every thirty 
 seconds, and the length of time the periscope is 
 shown will decrease to from ten to five seconds. 
 
 At about one thousand yards the firing exposure 
 will be made, and this will probably be for about 
 twenty-five seconds in order to assure a well-aimed 
 torpedo. 
 
 The above procedure is not absolute — some sub- 
 marine commanders show more periscope in at- 
 tacking and others less — but i. may be taken as 
 typical. This means that in an average attack 
 
138 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 from the time the submarine can be seen to the 
 time the torpedo is fired about ten minutes elapse, 
 during which there are about fifteen exposures of 
 the periscope for gradually diminishing periods of 
 time, ranging from thirty seconds down to five 
 seconds, except the last exposure for firing, which 
 lasts about twenty-five seconds. 
 
 There has been some talk of a German inven- 
 tion designed to enable a submarine to make a 
 successful approach and attack without showing 
 any periscope. It is improbable that any such 
 device is in general use at present. 
 
 Anti-submarine tactics may be divided into 
 three general classes — first, tactics to detect and 
 to locate; second, tactics to destroy; and, third, 
 tactics to evade. Tactics to detect and to locate 
 include all manner of lookout systems installed in 
 ships and aircraft, underwater listening devices 
 known as microphones or hydrophones, and intel- 
 ligence reports from home and foreign informa- 
 tion agencies by which probable positions of 
 enemy submarines are plotted from day to day 
 together with conjectures as to their future move- 
 ments. Tactics to destroy include the use of 
 depth bombs, mines, guns, nets, and the ram. Tac- 
 tics to evade include the use of smoke screens made 
 by smoke boxes, smoke funnels and the like, zig- 
 zag tactics, quick manoeuvring in the presence of 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 139 
 
 a submarine to frustrate attack or dodge the tor- 
 pedo, and logistic calculations by which informa- 
 tion of all sorts is collated and utilised to keep 
 convoys clear of areas known to be dangerous. 
 
 Although these three classes of anti-submarine 
 tactics are closely related and interdependent, for 
 the sake of clearness they will be briefly discussed 
 separately and in turn. 
 
 TACTICS TO DETECT AND TO LOCATE 
 
 The lookout system is the most important part 
 of the submarine defence of a large ship. Every- 
 thing depends on first seeing the periscope or the 
 torpedo in time, and then transmitting the infor- 
 mation quickly and accurately to the ship control 
 and fire-control stations so that the attack may 
 be thwarted by prompt manoeuvre and gun fire 
 supplemented by the use of depth bombs, smoke 
 screen, or other expedient, according to the cir- 
 cumstances. The organised submarine lookout 
 system for capital ships comprises a large number 
 of lookouts stationed both aloft and below. The 
 horizon circle is divided into sectors, each consist- 
 ing of a comparatively small arc numbered and 
 assigned as an individual lookout station. 
 
 Each sector is covered by at least two lookouts 
 and the more dangerous sectors on the beam are 
 usually covered by three or more lookouts. The 
 
140 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 means of making reports from the lookout sta- 
 tions to the bridge and to the gun-fire control 
 stations are designed to assure prompt and accurate 
 transmission. The personnel is intensively trained 
 both to develop skill in distinguishing objects in 
 the water with the proper glasses provided and also 
 to use judgment in making reports. Lookouts are 
 frequently relieved, and great care exercised that 
 the waters all around the ship are continuously 
 swept day and night by alert lookouts. A ship can 
 usually avoid attack if the submarine or even the 
 torpedo is sighted when still far enough away to 
 permit a radical change of course before the tor- 
 pedo can travel the intervening distance. Safety 
 depends upon "seeing," and an .alert lookout by 
 gaining 200 or 300 yards in sighting a periscope 
 may avert destruction. 
 
 The advantage of altitude in maintaining a 
 lookout for objects both above and below water 
 is obvious. For this reason aircraft lookouts are 
 widely used both in convoy and patrol work. 
 These include the various types of aeroplanes, air- 
 ships, observation kites, and observation balloons. 
 
 The ability of submarines to hide, together with 
 conditions of choppy sea, fog, mist and failing 
 light under which it is easier to see a big ship than 
 it is to see a small periscope tend to handicap the 
 lookouts. It has been endeavoured, therefore, to 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 141 
 
 devise means of detecting the presence of the sub- 
 marine by the sense of hearing. Water is a bet- 
 ter conductor of sound than is the air, and before 
 the war tests had shown that a submarine bell 
 could be heard with the receivers installed on 
 board ship ten miles away when the vessel was 
 in motion, and up to twenty-one miles with en- 
 gines stopped. William Dubilier, an American 
 electrical engineer, devised a harbour defence sys- 
 tem against U-boats which he has explained as 
 consisting of a number of special microphones ar- 
 ranged at a certain depth around the entrance of 
 the harbour, each microphone accurately faced in 
 a known direction. The operator by slowly shift- 
 ing the contact of his receiver from one micro- 
 phone to another can note the one in which the 
 sound of the submarine is loudest and so report 
 the direction of the enemy at that time. The 
 French naval authorities had a school for the sole 
 purpose of training men to listen for the sounds 
 of submarines by means of hydrophones. The 
 operator was stationed in the utter quiet of a 
 padded cell with his ear receiver connected to a 
 series of diaphragms, so sensitive as to record the 
 passage of a submarine at a considerable distance, 
 and also roughly indicate the direction in which 
 it might be travelling. It is obvious that the 
 perfection of such means for detecting and locat- 
 
142 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 ing submerged submarines constitutes an impor- 
 tant step toward rendering commerce destruction 
 by underwater craft a dead issue. 
 
 TACTICS TO DESTROY 
 
 To defeat a submarine campaign against com- 
 merce, successful tactics to destroy, to harass, to 
 make the submarine hunted as well as hunter, are 
 essential both to lessen the numerical strength of 
 the enemy and also to damage his morale. 
 
 The gun is chiefly useful to compel a submarine 
 to keep submerged and use torpedoes at a dis- 
 advantage. While it is difficult to hit a periscope, 
 and even if a lucky hit is scored no serious damage 
 is done as spare periscopes are carried, still, the 
 presence of the gun is important both to em- 
 barrass attack and also to menace the submarine 
 should she for any reason be forced to come to 
 the surface. 
 
 The usual service shell fired by naval guns at 
 comparatively short ranges are deflected upwards 
 on striking the water and ricochet. In order to 
 get a shell to dive and follow an underwater 
 trajectory to reach the submerged U-boat, a non- 
 ricocheting type was developed. These plunging 
 shell are somewhat similar in their operation to 
 depth bombs and render gun-fire more danger- 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 143 
 
 ous to submarines. It may be supposed that 
 such shell kept falling just short of a periscope 
 and so fused as to burst both on contact and at 
 a certain depth make it uncomfortable for an 
 attacking U-boat. 
 
 Under ordinary circumstances most submarine 
 skippers would not consider it wise to risk a gun 
 engagement on the surface. The policy of arming 
 merchantmen together with the convoy system has 
 created conditions under which surface attack has 
 to be made in the face of effective gun-fire. This 
 greatly reduces the usefulness of the larger type 
 of commerce-destroying submarine cruisers which, 
 because of their size, are unhandy for making 
 submerged attack. Torpedoes, moreover, are ex- 
 pensive and cannot be carried in large numbers. 
 On the whole it may be concluded that the gun 
 is an important factor in anti-submarine tactics. 
 
 An under-water weapon is needed to attack an 
 under-water enemy. Mines and depth bombs 
 are, therefore, very useful against submarines. 
 The depth bombs, variously known as depth 
 charges or water bombs, are designed to be dropped 
 over the stern of a ship or thrown in pairs simul- 
 taneously to a distance on either side of the ves- 
 sel by means of a specially designed depth bomb 
 thrower known as a "Y" gun. These bombs are 
 fitted with an hydrostatic valve operated by the 
 
144 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 weight of water so that the charge explodes at 
 the depth to which the valve is set. In order to 
 do damage these charges do not have to be ex- 
 ploded against the hull of the submarine, but are 
 made so large and powerful (300 to 600 lbs.) 
 that when exploded at some distance away the 
 concussion is sufficient to blow in the sides of 
 the submarine or to disarrange the delicate and 
 complicated internal machinery and fittings. The 
 presence of a submarine being evidenced by sight- 
 ing a periscope or a torpedo its location at the 
 particular time is approximated as accurately as 
 possible and marked. The destroyers and other 
 anti-submarine craft in the vicinity then proceed 
 to lay a scientific depth bomb barrage covering 
 the locus of all points the submarine could reach 
 in the elapsed time. A bombed submarine may 
 be destroyed and sunk, or it may be so damaged 
 as to be forced to come to the surface and sur- 
 render; or it may succeed in limping home, or in 
 reaching a neutral port for internment. Even 
 when no material damage is suffered the effects 
 of being bombed are damaging to the morale of 
 the crew. 
 
 Early in the war nets were used to good pur- 
 pose, but after a time the submarines were fitted 
 with net cutting devices and learned to negotiate 
 with fair success this type of defence. Besides 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 145 
 
 channel nets and harbour nets a type of drag 
 net was used. This net has been described as 
 being of wire with a fifteen-foot mesh cut into 
 lengths of one hundred and seventy feet with a 
 depth of twenty-seven feet. To the top edge of 
 this netting large wooden buoys were lashed. De- 
 stroyers or patrol boats with good speed operated 
 in pairs to handle these nets, sections of which 
 were suspended between them. A periscope being 
 sighted and the course of the submarine estimated, 
 the two vessels with the drag net between them 
 would steam ahead of the submarine and then cut 
 away the lashings holding the net so that the 
 enemy U-boat would steer into it and become en- 
 tangled. The buoys marking the net would thus 
 be towed along by the submarine and indicate her 
 position so that she could be destroyed by depth 
 bombs or other means. Submarine sweeps have 
 also, been described as consisting of powerful ex- 
 plosives towed at a certain depth and set to ex- 
 plode on contact. Various kinds of nets are use- 
 ful for harbour defence and against the smaller 
 types of submarines in shoal waters, but are not 
 of much value against the ocean-going submarine 
 cruisers. 
 
 The use of so-called "O" ships or mystery ships 
 comprise an interesting phase of anti-submarine 
 warfare. The service of these require both cour- 
 
146 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 age and skill. A mystery ship may be defined as 
 a naval submarine destroyer disguised as a mer- 
 chantman. The usual type is a merchant ship, 
 mounting carefully concealed guns and manned 
 by a trained naval crew dressed in civilian clothes. 
 The object is to decoy the enemy submarine into 
 easy range and then suddenly unmask the guns 
 and destroy her by rapid and accurate gun-fire 
 before she has a chance to submerge. As an ex- 
 ample, suppose that a "O" ship, loaded with lum- 
 ber so that she will not sink, puts to sea and is 
 torpedoed. At once "panic" parties including 
 men dressed as women scramble into the ship's 
 lifeboats, launch them with much confusion and 
 hastily row away, giving the idea that all hands 
 are abandoning the ship in great terror. Then 
 when the submarine approaches the apparently 
 deserted ship with a view to looting her the hidden 
 crews unmask their guns and open fire. As the 
 methods of the mystery ships become known to 
 the enemy, however, submarines learn to be cau- 
 tious, and successes by these tactics decrease in 
 number. 
 
 Concurrent with improvements In methods for 
 detecting and locating submarines, together with 
 the development of means for destroying them, 
 there has been extension in the use of restrictive 
 mine fields. The diagram shows the mine fields 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 147 
 
 in the North Sea as reported at the close of the 
 war. The first to be laid protected the mouth of 
 the Thames and also helped block the English 
 Channel. Another one extending from the neigh- 
 bourhood of the Dutch Coast to that of Denmark 
 enclosed the waters of Heligoland Bight and was 
 laid early in 1917. The third field, obstructing 
 ocean passage from the North Sea around Scot- 
 land, extended between the Orkneys and the Nor- 
 wegian Coast. This was reported as covering an 
 area of about 12,758 square miles. During the 
 summer of 1918 the efficiency of anti-submarine 
 mine barrages in the North Sea was greatly in- 
 creased. The United States Navy equipped a 
 large mine fleet which took an important part in 
 this work which contributed so effectively to over- 
 coming the U-boat. 
 
 Up to April, 1917, no mine had been devel- 
 oped suitable for blocking the North Sea across 
 the Scotland-Norway line where the depths of 
 water are as great as nine hundred feet. To re- 
 strict the enemy submarines it was necessary to 
 mine this line from the surface to the depth of 
 two hundred and fifty to three hundred feet. The 
 Bureau of Ordnance of the United States Navy 
 Department submitted a plan for laying this 
 barrage with a new type of mine. As a result, 
 100,000 mines were manufactured by the United 
 
MINE FIELDS LAID BY BRITISH AND AMERICAN NAVIES IN THE NORTH SEA 
 (Diagram of the Battle of Jutland is also included) 
 
 148 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 149 
 
 States, of which 85,000 were shipped abroad. 
 Eighty per cent, of the Scotland-Norway mine 
 barrage was laid by the United States Navy. The 
 total personnel engaged numbered 6,700. Re- 
 sults obtained justified the effort and cost ex- 
 pended. 
 
 TACTICS OF EVASION 
 
 The primary objective of anti-submarine tactics 
 is to destroy the enemy submarines. But, since 
 it is easier and wiser for the larger vessels, trans- 
 ports, and merchantment to evade the attack, 
 every effort should be made by them to practise 
 tactics of evasion to supplement tactics to de- 
 stroy. In convoy the latter can much better be 
 conducted by the escorting destroyers. 
 
 Zig-zag tactics make attack difficult. Also, a 
 quick manoeuvre the instant a periscope or tor- 
 pedo is sighted will often save the ship. Alert 
 seamanship is, therefore, a main reliance of capi- 
 tal ships in avoiding submarine attack. 
 
 It may be mentioned here that at the start of 
 Germany's unrestricted submarine campaign 
 against commerce it was extremely hard to con- 
 trol merchantmen and get them to practise simple 
 anti-submarine tactics — such as steering zigzag 
 courses — calculated to embarrass the submarine in 
 the accomplishment of its purpose. It was diffi- 
 cult for seamen who for years had navigated the 
 
150 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 usual lanes to understand and carry out instruc- 
 tions intended to safeguard them from a foe they 
 could not see. When the tangible proof of the 
 enemy's presence arrived it was too late. Utmost 
 vigilance was necessary at all times, and in the 
 early stages of the war the percentage of tor- 
 pedoed ships was not sufficiently high to spur the 
 crews to great exertions. 
 
 There were many influences inclining the indi- 
 viduals on board ships passing through the war 
 zone to the opinion that getting safely by was 
 largely a question of luck. There seemed to be 
 more or less prevalent a sort of fatalistic atti- 
 tude toward the submarine, or the gambler's atti- 
 tude of taking a chance against being torpedoed, 
 with a resulting laxity in the observance of safe- 
 guarding measures. Whatever the cause of this 
 indifference to the practice of simple anti-subma- 
 rine tactics of evasion, there is plenty of evidence 
 that many a ship played into the hands of the 
 U-boat either by failure to carry out instructions, 
 or by a poor lookout system, or by neglect to steer 
 zigzag courses before sighting the submarine. 
 This was unfortunate, but not surprising. The 
 nature of the submarine enemy was such that to 
 combat it successfully required a personnel well 
 trained and well disciplined. The extension of 
 the convoy system strongly advocated by the 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 151 
 
 United States Navy resulted in a closer observ- 
 ance of safeguarding measures and in many ways 
 contributed to the defeat of the U-boats. 
 
 A smoke screen has also been found useful to 
 enable merchantmen to escape in cases where the}'- 
 are not sufficiently well armed to repel the gun 
 attack of submarines manoeuvring on the surface 
 of the water. These screens may be made by es- 
 corting destroyers, or by smoke boxes thrown over- 
 board, or by smoke funnels mounted at the stern 
 filled with a phosphorous compound which when 
 lighted emits a dense black smoke so heavy that 
 it hangs over the surface of the water. It is 
 claimed that the clouds produced by these smoke 
 boxes and funnels will be effective for six hours 
 under usual weather conditions. 
 
 In order to evade and to confuse enemy sub- 
 marines wide use has been made of camouflage 
 painting of hulls and exterior fittings of all types 
 of ships. On January 12, 1918, however, the 
 British Admiralty issued a statement to the effect 
 that "the theory of rendering ships invisible at 
 sea by painting them various colours is no longer 
 tenable, and that the numerous schemes tried by 
 the Admiralty under actual conditions at sea have 
 invariably been disappointing." 
 
 It is generally understood that a scheme of 
 camouflage painting which renders a ship more 
 
152 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 difficult to see under certain light conditions may 
 render the ship more easy to see under other light 
 conditions. Experience seems to indicate that the 
 standard Navy gray for all conditions is as serv- 
 iceable for concealing the presence of the ship as 
 
 A CONVOY SHOWING ESCORT AND AN EXAMPLE OF 
 "DAZZLE" PAINTING 
 
 any colour or scheme of colours so far devised. 
 The so-called dazzle painting, however, has dem- 
 onstrated usefulness as a means of making an 
 accurate estimate of course and speed difficult. 
 
 The convoy system combines all three classes 
 of anti-submarine tactics, and by bringing ocean 
 traffic under control renders the work of the com- 
 merce-destroying submarine much more difficult. 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 153 
 
 The attacking submarine must reckon with the 
 naval escort and risk destruction in approaching 
 the convoy. The make-up of the convoy and es- 
 cort depends on varying conditions. In so far as 
 availability of ships and readiness for sailing per- 
 mit the convoy is forrried with a view to homege- 
 neity in speed so that fast vessels may not be 
 held back by slow ones. Cruisers act as ocean 
 escorts to guard convoys from enemy raider at- 
 tack, and submarine cruisers operating on the sur- 
 face, to supervise generally, and to stand by in 
 readiness to act in any emergency. In submarine 
 danger waters the convoy is surrounded by escort- 
 ing destroyers, yachts, or submarine chasers of 
 other type and frequently attended by aircraft. 
 The strength of the escort varies according to the 
 value of the convoy and the number of submarines 
 supposed to be operating in the vicinity. No 
 fixed rule can be laid down as the naval vessels 
 available must be distributed in such manner as 
 will best meet the requirements of the moment. 
 
 The disadvantages of the convoy system are in- 
 creased likelihood of collision, reduction of speed 
 to that of the slowest ship, and improved chances 
 that a submarine may score a lucky hit at long 
 range. These, however, are outweighed by the 
 advantages as is attested by results obtained. 
 
 Seagoing craft of all descriptions approach- 
 
154 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 ing the characteristics of the destroyers and capa- 
 ble of carrying guns and bombs are useful. 
 Yachts, fast tugs, and other comparatively small 
 vessels capable of keeping the sea and making rea- 
 sonable speed can all do good work in the war 
 zone. Torpedo boats and the smaller submarine 
 chasers and patrol boats, though not so useful as 
 more seaworthy vessels, are still of value for oper- 
 ating nearer the shore. Mine sweepers also are 
 needed. 
 
 Seaplanes, dirigibles (Blimps), and kite bal- 
 loons make good scouts because of the large areas 
 they can cover. Weather conditions are seldom 
 such that submarines entirely submerged can be 
 seen by aircraft, but this does not make the latter 
 less valuable for detecting periscopes and subma- 
 rines awash or on the surface. Also aircraft mark 
 the spot where a periscope is sighted and so assist 
 destroyers and patrols in the effective use of their 
 bombs. 
 
 Cruisers and converted cruisers are needed for 
 distant convoy work, to carry seaplanes, to carry 
 kite balloons, and also for various administrative 
 and mothership duties. 
 
 An anti-submarine force, therefore, includes 
 cruisers, converted cruisers, destroyers, subma- 
 rines, torpedo boats, patrol craft, mine sweepers. 
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 155 
 
 seaplanes, dirigibles, and kite balloons, all sup- 
 plied in as large numbers as can be obtained. 
 
 In the last year of the great war as the German 
 submarine crews learned by hard experience of 
 the increasing number and variety of schemes used 
 to destroy them they began to realise that the 
 chances were against them. This in itself was a 
 restraint, which made the U-boats more wary and 
 consequently less effective. At best there was not 
 much comfort or security in a long submarine 
 cruise. The prospect of dying like a rat in a trap 
 was not pleasant, whether because of accident, or 
 shipwreck, or hostile attack. The strain of con- 
 stant guard against the devices of an alert enemy 
 told on even the strongest nerves. Each new 
 method or contrivance which increased the anxie- 
 ties and difficulties of the U-boats proved helpful 
 in checking their activities, and often contributed 
 in unexpected ways to their destruction. 
 
 The submarine menace was very real. Facts 
 and figures show that it was one of the most im- 
 portant problems of the war. But anti-submarine 
 tactics were developed right along, and, while the 
 U-boat as a lawless commerce destroyer was un- 
 foreseen and countermeasures consequently not 
 prepared during previous years of peace, still, at 
 no time was there any real doubt but that it would 
 be successfully met by the Allied navies. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 United States in the War 
 Overseas Transportation of United States Troops, 
 
 PREVIOUS to 1917 the idea of a United 
 States overseas expeditionary force num- 
 bered by millions would have been generally re- 
 garded as a remote if not impossible contingency. 
 Consequently no extensive peace-time prepara- 
 tions had been made for such an undertaking. The 
 task of providing a transport fleet was, therefore, 
 a pioneer work. Ships had to be obtained, offi- 
 cers and crews enrolled and trained. It was neces- 
 sary to provide docks, storehouses, lighters and 
 tugs, coaling equipment, repair facilities, and all 
 the varied machinery for operating and maintain- 
 ing a large transportation service. An efficient ad- 
 ministrative organisation had to be developed. 
 
 The work of the navy in connection with the 
 transportation of troops to France constitutes a 
 distinct phase of the present war. The attending 
 political and military circumstances incident to 
 the collapse of Russia, the .critical situation on 
 the western front, and the threat of the German 
 
 156 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 157 
 
 submarine combined to make this phase of special 
 significance. Throughout the year following the 
 entry of the United States into the war the mili- 
 tary and naval developments were such that the 
 safe transportation across the Atlantic of troops 
 and supplies became a problem of more and more 
 pressing importance. 
 
 Such, in brief, was the problem confronting 
 Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, then Commander of 
 the Destroyer Force of the Atlantic Fleet, when, on 
 May 29, 1917, he received orders designating him 
 Commander of United States Convoy Operations 
 in the Atlantic in addition to his other duties.* 
 
 The United States Army in France was a de- 
 cisive factor in obtaining speedy victory. The 
 transportation of this army overseas under naval 
 protection was, therefore, a major operation of 
 first importance. A large share of this urgent 
 mission devolved on the United States Navy, and 
 its successful accomplishment in the face of great 
 difficulties is another page to the record of the 
 service in keeping with its past history and tradi- 
 tions. 
 
 The vast work of transporting a United States 
 Army numbering 2,079,880 souls to Europe was 
 not done by the United States Navy unassisted. 
 
 * At the close of the war, in recognition of his services, 
 Rear Admiral Gleaves vi?as promoted to the rank of Vice 
 Admiral. 
 
158 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Help was received from many quarters and the 
 different organisations concerned performed their 
 respective functions in utmost harmony and co- 
 operation. 
 
 At the time the United States entered the war 
 the enormous toll of shipping gathered by the 
 U-boat in the East Atlantic and the boast of von 
 Hindenburg that the submarine blockade of Eng- 
 land would starve her out and win the war, indi- 
 cate the seriousness of the naval situation in those 
 waters at that time. Inasmuch as the principal 
 field of British naval activities was the North Sea 
 and English Channel, the task of breaking the 
 U-boat blockade in the Atlantic naturally became 
 the immediate mission of the United States Navy. 
 The prompt despatching of destroyers, yachts, and 
 all other available craft of a type useful against 
 the submarine to the East Atlantic, and the splen- 
 did work these vessels did in cleaning up these 
 waters of U-boat devastation is a matter of record, 
 the importance of which in winning the war is con- 
 ceded from all quarters. This was the first step 
 in preparation for sending the United States Army 
 overseas. 
 
 The next step was the development of the trans- 
 port service and the convoy and escort system. In 
 this work the Cruiser and Transport Force co-oper- 
 ated with the destroyers and other anti-submarine 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 159 
 
 craft abroad. In addition, Great Britain, France, 
 and Italy supplied troop ships. As would be ex- 
 pected from Great Britain's enormous merchant 
 marine, she was able to supply the greatest carry- 
 ing capacity. She had the ships ready for this use, 
 and 48^ per cent, of the American Army was 
 transported in British steamers; 2^ per cent, was 
 carried in French ships, and 3 per cent, in Italian. 
 The remaining 46^ per cent, were carried in 
 United States ships, and all but 2^ per cent, of 
 these sailed in United States naval transports. 
 
 All the troops carried in United States ships 
 were escorted by United States men-of-war; that 
 is, cruisers, destroyers, converted yachts, and other 
 anti-submarine craft. Also for the most part the 
 troops carried in British, French, and Italian ships 
 were given safe conduct through the danger zones 
 by United States destroyers. Roughly, 82^ per 
 cent, of the maximum strength of the naval escorts 
 provided incident to the transportation of United 
 States troops across the Atlantic was supplied by 
 the United States Navy, 143^ per cent, by the 
 British Navy, and 3^ per cent, by the French 
 Navy. The Army organised and developed an 
 efficient system for loading and unloading the 
 ships at the terminal ports. The navy transported 
 the troops and safeguarded them en route. 
 
 The declaration of war with Germany found 
 
160 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 the United States without a transport fleet and 
 without a merchant marine capable of supplying 
 ships for transporting a large military expedi- 
 tion. Starting with almost nothing at the begin- 
 ning of the war, a United States naval transport 
 service was built up which numbered at the time 
 of the armistice, twenty-four cruisers and forty- 
 two transports, manned, exclusive of troops car- 
 ried, by about 3,000 officers and 42,000 men. This 
 force carried almost a million soldiers to Europe 
 without the loss of a single soldier by the hand of 
 the enemy. 
 
 On homeward-bound voyages, the Cruiser and 
 Transport Force was not as fortunate as on the 
 East bound trips. In a measure this was due to 
 need of concentrating maximum naval escort pro- 
 tection on troop-laden convoys. Frequently this 
 necessitated lighter escort for the ships returning, 
 and it was on these homeward-bound vessels that 
 the submarines scored their successes. The United 
 States Naval Transports Antilles, President Lin- 
 coln, and Covington were torpedoed and sank. The 
 Finland and Mount Vernon were torpedoed, but 
 were able to reach port for repairs. The United 
 States armoured cruiser S>an Diego struck a mine 
 laid by a German submarine and sank. 
 
 The service was not without hazard, as is 
 shown by the casualties suffered. "Nor were enemy 
 
EH 
 
 < 
 
 W 
 H 
 m 
 
 CM 
 
 l-H 
 
 W 
 
 CO 
 
 H 
 H 
 
 P 
 ^ 
 
 Q 
 
 O 
 PM 
 
 m 
 
 CO p^ 
 
 CO HH 
 
 ^^ 
 
 OQ 
 
 Q 
 H 
 H 
 
 P 
 O 
 < 
 
 o 
 
 H 
 O 
 
 l-H 
 
 o 
 
 w 
 
 xn 
 Eh 
 
 Percentage Under French 
 
 Naval Escort '"' 
 
 Percentage Under British oo r-* o ^ os t 
 Naval Escort "^ ^'^^^ 
 
 Percentage Under U. S. '^^?^^^"^ 
 Naval Escort 
 
 Under French Naval 
 Escort 
 
 OOi-lcOOiOOO OOOO »-( <M 05 CO i-H O 
 
 io.-iirs-^»-H.-(»i:5oocooooo 
 
 (M *-i <M i-( l-H t-H (MCO 
 
 fH CT> l>- CO »0 05 IJ 
 
 iO 05 lO lO QO t^ CO CO CO O 1— I tC^ 
 !>■ Oa OO t-- 00 00 OO 00 OO i>- CD | OO 
 
 OOb-wtiOO OOO OO 0003'^ OOCO ^ iCO 
 
 '.^ l-H lO 
 
 -a 0^(N 
 
 coco 
 
 Oi CJS C7i 00 OS C 
 
 ■♦f kC OS CD O OO -^ CD cq 
 
 § Under British* Naval g^g^g^^g 
 :Ih Escort " "' -^ -------- -- 
 
 Under United States 
 Naval Escort 
 
 Percentage Carried by 
 Other Ships 
 
 Percentage Carried by 
 
 Other U. S. Ships 
 Percentage Carried by 
 
 British-Leased Italian 
 
 Ships 
 Percentage Carried by 
 
 British Ships 
 Percentage Carried by 
 
 United States Naval 
 
 Transports 
 Total Ships Sailed 
 
 Total United States 
 Troops Transported 
 
 Number of Other Ships 
 Sailed (French, Itahan, 
 &c.) 
 
 Carried by Other Ships 
 (French, Italian, &c.) 
 
 Number of Other United 
 States Ships Sailed 
 
 Carried by Other United 
 
 States Ships 
 
 No. of British-Leased 
 Italian Ships Sailed 
 
 Carried by British- 
 Leased Italian Ships 
 
 Nimaber of British Ships 
 
 Sailed 
 
 fl Carried by British Ships 
 
 ;Z Number of United States 
 oj Naval Transports 
 g^ Sailed _ 
 
 Ph Carried by United States 
 Naval Transports 
 
 rH (M-^CM COO CO 
 
 ooc^eoonMcocDco 
 
 lOCOCCHOCOOi-^C" 
 
 00"^>Jt)'*cq(MOicsi^-^co 
 
 oj'*rH<DiO'.-ic^r,ooicit^ 
 
 Cq'^CDI>.C003CO^O<^Tj<CO 
 
 trf cqodcoo cocQ"c5"i-rTtH~ 
 
 1 (N CO '^ CM cq lO 
 
 H T-1 i-H i-H CO i-H "<*< CO '^ l>- CO <M -* to 
 
 t^iOiOOOCO^(MOOO-r*<^H 
 
 iMOS030':OcOCOCS|Oit~^iO 
 
 QOt— oco-^^^cocoos c<)_c^ ■^ 
 »o GO CO l-H o '*'" odi>r TfT o i>r 
 
 — ■■ - ^ <M ^-^l lO CO Cd CO 
 C<I Cq (M (M Cq 1-1 
 
 OO<MipHOi000O 
 0-*OCOOO'«*^0 
 
 
 HjN 
 
 ■^ O (M i-htH ,-1 T*l lO Cq T-H O i Cq 
 O O O l-H l-H cq T-l CO (M CO <N 1 C^ 
 
 OOOOOOOO OOOCqiOurscOCOCOCOO I CO 
 
 COCOI^-i-HOCqCDCO 
 
 OO CO CT> CO O O 00 « 
 
 CO lO CO lO CO ■«4< Cq -^ T-H CO CO »0 WD no rt< »D lO OO 
 
 cOiO-^tM'^cO'^t'- 
 
 iC00»Ot>-I>-"rHOi»O 
 T-t T-H l-H CSl Cq l-H (M 
 
 H^^co-*=222 
 
 OO'-HtMO'-Hi-HO 
 
 cy^Oi l-H c 
 
 cocq lo CO 
 
 ootr^ O Oil 
 
 cq ti* CO -^ cq Tj< T:tH 
 
 lOOlOfM-^^OiiOOcO'^ 
 
 locoi— ii-^i-Hcoioi>-r^cocsi 
 
 OC^^t^Ot^'^ CO^COCO CJi-H 
 
 od OS »f3 o i>r o" l-H CD oi" ■^'" c<r 
 
 .. .. __ ^ oOnOoOi-H 
 
 )Cqcq,-H 
 
 - l-H CO to i>- r^ CO CM 
 
 3 t^ -i^ CO CO C 
 
 J"i>ro'"^"cD c 
 
 ^■<^oocq'<*o0l-HO0l 
 
 T-i oi cq CO (M c 
 
 i-li-H"^COuO-^»OOiCOcOO 
 
 OiCOiOTHi-HOOcDOOCOoO 
 
 COOOOtMOOcqO O O '-I l-H (M l-H CO lO CO l>- c 
 
 iCcOOOiOOkOO OOi- 
 
 ) O »0 l-H OilO 
 
 , _j oq 03 l-H o CO 
 1 o o n^^io t-- c^ 
 
 ^-^'od^o-i^ti" 
 
 coooOoq03i-Hoco 
 
 OOOOOOOO 
 
 OOOOOOOO 
 
 OOOcqcot^b- 
 
 OOOCDr-iOfMCO 
 
 OOO 
 
 ^i-H ■^^^co o o 
 
 o<f cs" ■^* 1-*^ os" t>r ^ 
 
 q (M CO ci t^ »o oi 
 
 cqi— icot>-c^oii>-05 osTt<"^o»o005'^05t 
 
 OOOOSOi-HCOOlO 
 OOOOiOsr^^cOI^- 
 lO O "M^OO CD O CD_CO 
 
 ^tC ,-h" oT CO o i-T 
 
 "^t^OicOl^q^ccqco^ocD■^oo 
 
 i-H»ocqcOoat^CM"^I^'-HOi 
 
 lOc^jcocot^i-Htot^iocqcD 
 
 o oT t^ i>^ CO o »o t-T -^ isi" o 
 
 CM CM rJH CO -^ ^- <^ ^O OS l-H 
 
 O Oi CO CO uo "^ O CO CO t^ CO ^^ CO ^ CO «0 W5 CO Oi 
 
 ,_, l-H ,—1 l-H T-H cq oq CO CO CO CO CO Tj< 
 
 O'0»-tOt>-C000i0 
 lO CO l-H ,-H OS 00 -^ 
 OO CM_CO CS O 0_-^^ 
 
 od ^ -^ CO '^ ws" i>r 
 
 c^co^ocDc:!'— 'O'-HOt'- 
 
 l6l 
 
162 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 guns and torpedoes the only menace — danger from 
 fire and internal damage was enhanced by the ma- 
 chinations of enemy secret agents, and the likeli- 
 hood of collision was increased by^ the necessity of 
 manoeuvring without lights in convoy formation 
 vessels manned for the most part by inexperienced 
 crews." ^ 
 
 In connection with the successful operation of 
 these ships special mention should be made of the 
 volunteer and reserve personnel, particularly the 
 officers and men from the United States merchant 
 marine service who enrolled in the navy for the 
 period of the war.^ These rendered splendid 
 service, and the interests of the United States for 
 the future require that the cordial relations of co- 
 operation established between the merchant ma- 
 rine and the navy be maintained. 
 
 ^ Quoted from the General Report of the Secretary of 
 the Navy. 
 
 ^ In the larger transports it was the policy of the depart- 
 ment to have the captains, executive ofificers, chief engineers, 
 gunnery officers, senior medical Officers, and senior supply 
 officers detailed from the regular navy and the remainder 
 of the officer complement filled from the various classes of 
 reserve and volunteer officers. This worked very well, and 
 too much credit cannot be given the latter for the loyal service 
 rendered and the aptitude shown in adapting themselves to 
 naval war conditions. 
 
 In special cases it was possible, after a certain amount of 
 experience had been gained, to relieve heads of departments, 
 originally assignments of regular naval officers, by reserve 
 officers. For example, in the case of the Harrishurg, Louis- 
 ville, Plattsburg, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Finland, after 
 a few trips the reserve captains took over command of the 
 ships. 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 163 
 
 OTHER WAR ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 NAVY 
 
 Excerpts quoted from the Annual Report of the Secretary 
 of the Navy, December, igi8. 
 
 OPERATIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD. 
 
 The operations of our Navy during the world war 
 have covered the widest scope in its history. Our naval 
 forces have operated in European waters from the 
 Mediterranean to the White Sea. At Corfu, Gibraltar, 
 along the French Bay of Biscay ports, at the English 
 Channel ports, on. the Irish coast, in the North Sea, at 
 Murmansk and Archangel, our naval forces have been 
 stationed and have done creditable work. 
 
 Naval men have served on nearly two thousand craft 
 that plied the waters. On the land, marines and sailors 
 have helped to hold strategic points, regiments of ma- 
 rines have shared with the magnificent Army their part 
 of the hard-won victory, a wonderfully trained gun 
 crew of sailors have manned the monster 14-inch guns 
 which marked a new departure in land warfare. In 
 diplomacy, in investigation at home and in all parts of 
 the world by naval officers and civilian agents, in pro- 
 tecting plants and labor from spies and enemies, in 
 promoting new industrial organizations and enlarging 
 older ones to meet war needs, in stimulating production 
 of needed naval craft — these are some of the out-stand- 
 ing operations. 
 
 THE INCREASE OF THE NAVY. 
 
 In 1912 there were 3,094 officers and 47,515 enlisted 
 men in the Navy. By July 1, 1916, the year previous 
 to our entrance into the war, the number had grown to 
 4,293 officers and 54,234 enlisted men. On July 1, 
 1917, three months after the declaration of war, the 
 number of officers had increased to 8,038 — 45694 regu- 
 
164 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 lars, 3,344 reserves ; and the number of enlisted men to 
 171,133 — 128,666 regulars, 32,379 reserves, 10,088 
 National Naval Volunteers. The increase since that 
 time is shown below: 
 
 April 1, 1918: Officers. Men. 
 Regular Navy — 
 
 Permanent 5,441 198,242 
 
 Temporary 2,519 
 
 Reserves 10,625 85,475 
 
 Total , 18,585 283,717 
 
 Nov. 9, 1918: 
 Regular Navy — 
 
 Permanent , 5»656 206,684 
 
 Temporary 4'833 
 
 Reserves 21,985 290,346 
 
 Total 32474 497.030 
 
 TEAMWORK AT HOME AND ABROAD. 
 
 Throughout its enormous expansion since the begin- 
 ning of the war, the enlarged naval force has kept this 
 vital factor — teamwork — always in mind. The Navy 
 at home has shown its capacity for teamwork in cooper- 
 ating with the Army, the War Industries Board, and 
 the many other governmental activities already estab- 
 lished and the new ones wisely created for the success- 
 ful prosecution of the war.' Abroad, the American Navy 
 has given a demonstration, which can be characterized 
 only as wonderful of its readiness to join with our 
 associates in teamwork for the common end and the 
 common good. In the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the 
 Pacific, and the Arctic ; with England, with France, with 
 Japan, with Italy, and all allied nations, the United 
 States navy has cooperated without friction, looking al- 
 ways to the end to be attained. 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 165 
 
 SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND MEN OVERSEAS. 
 
 War was declared on April 6, 1917. On the 4th of 
 May a detachment of destroyers was in European waters. 
 By January 1, 1918, there were 113 United States naval 
 ships across, and in October, 1918,, the total had reached 
 338 ships of all classes. At the present time there are 
 5,000 officers and 70,000 enlisted men of the United 
 States Navy serving in Europe, this total being greater 
 than the full strength of the Navy when the United 
 States entered the war. 
 
 NAVAL BASES ABROAD. 
 
 In order to efficiently cooperate with our allies. United 
 States naval port officers have been stationed at 20 of 
 the principal seaports of Great Britain, France, and 
 Italy. Fifteen naval bases have been established. 
 
 In connection with aviation, two repair and assembly 
 bases, 4 kite balloon stations, 18 seaplane stations, 5 
 bombing plane stations, and 3 dirigible stations have been 
 established and manned with Navy personnel, which in- 
 cludes 624 officers, 97 observers, and over 15,000 enlisted 
 men. 
 
 The destroyers upon their first arrival were based on 
 Queenstown which has been the base of the operations 
 of these best fighters of the submarines during the war. 
 Every facility possible was provided for the comfort 
 and recreation of the officers and men engaged in this 
 most rigorous service. 
 
 When the submarine chaser flotillas were sent overseas 
 it was decided to route them via the Bermudas and the 
 Azores in order to get them across materially fit and with 
 the personnel in fighting trim. Having formulated the 
 plan of getting our chasers across, it was necessary to 
 secure for them certain base facilities on the way over. 
 To that end negotiations were entered into with the 
 Portuguese whereby we received from them the use of 
 a temporary base at Ponta Delgada in the Azores. This 
 base was built up to such an extent that we were able 
 to care for the needs of our small and other craft that 
 
166 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 might require the use of a base while passing to and fro 
 across the Atlantic. 
 
 During the year the forces abroad have been increased 
 by vessels of all types. The most valuable type of 
 vessel abroad for operations against submarines is, of 
 course, the destroyer. There has been a constant in- 
 crease in the number of destroyers sent abroad since the 
 declaration of war, and the number now operating 
 abroad is twice as great as the number which were nor- 
 mally kept in commission during peace time. Of these, 
 25 per cent are new, having been built, commissioned, 
 and dispatched abroad since the declaration of war. 
 These little craft have performed their duties in a most 
 efficient manner and at the same time have maintained 
 themselves in a state of material readiness which is re- 
 markable when it is considered that each destroyer dur- 
 ing a period of three months averages about 20,000 miles 
 cruising. 
 
 The fitting out and operation of the 110-foot subma- 
 rine chasers has had a marked effect upon the submarine 
 campaign both here and abroad. At the beginning of 
 this year there were 38 of these submarine chasers in 
 commission. There are now 406 submarine chasers in 
 commission, of which 235 have been dispatched abroad 
 and the remainder assigned to duty in home waters. 
 
 The problem of sending such a large number of these 
 small vessels with a limited cruising radius across the 
 ocean was one that required careful thought. A plan 
 of sending these chasers in groups, convoyed by a fuel 
 ship and fueling at sea, was finally adopted and was 
 most successful. In connection with the operations of 
 a group of these chasers in the Adriatic, the following 
 cable has been received: 
 
 Italian naval general staff expresses highest appre- 
 ciation useful and efficient work performed by United 
 States chasers in protecting major vessels during action 
 against Durazzo; also vivid admiration of their brilliant 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 167 
 
 and clever operation, which resulted in sinking two 
 enemy submaries. 
 
 The principal antisubmarine efforts were at first car- 
 ried on by surface craft, but it was later realized that 
 the submarine itself is the enemy of the submarine, es- 
 pecially when our enemy submarines are forced to work 
 upon the surface, as they sometimes are. Therefore, it 
 was decided to send certain numbers of our submarines 
 to the Azores, to keep that base clear, and also to the 
 coast of Ireland to operate from that general strategic 
 area. So, first in 1917, and later in 1918, two groups of 
 our submarines were dispatched across the water, and 
 after a hard winter passage made their ports and have 
 been operating from those localities ever since. Before 
 our submarines had been dispatched abroad, the process 
 of concentrating our reserves in these craft on our Atlan- 
 tic coast, there to prepare for future contingencies, had 
 been undertaken. 
 
 During the year numerous convoys of small craft have 
 been towed or escorted abroad for the Army and for the 
 Governments of our allies without any loss. These 
 craft include barges, derricks, tugs, and submarine 
 chasers. The safe despatch abroad of this miscellane- 
 ous craft through submarine-infested waters has been 
 accomplished in a very satisfactory manner. 
 
 The employment of the fighting craft of the Navy 
 may be summed up as follows ; 
 
 THE ESCORTING OF TROOP AND CARGO CONVOYS AND 
 OTHER SPECIAL VESSELS. 
 
 In the summer of 1917, the submarine problem hav- 
 ing become so acute and the losses to merchant ships 
 so great, it became necessary to adopt more effective 
 methods of handling merchant shipping, in order that 
 a greater degree of safety should be afforded. The sys- 
 tem of convoying ships was adopted. While this slowed 
 up shipping fully 20 per cent and increased the dangers 
 
168 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 of collision and other difficulties, experience has amply 
 justified the wisdom of the policy. The convoy system, 
 the adoption of which was suggested by President Wil- 
 son shortly after our entrance into the war, was applied 
 to both cargo and troop ships and its success was almost 
 immediately apparent. It consisted in gathering to- 
 gether certain numbers of vessels, sailing at regular 
 intervals along established lanes, under the guard of 
 heavier ships to protect against raiders, and destroyers to 
 protect against submarines. 
 
 This system went into effect with the first of our 
 troop convoys, which crossed in June, 1917, and has 
 continued ever since, to the day the armistice was signed. 
 It had much to do with breaking the back of the sub- 
 marine offensive, for it deprived the U-boat of the bene- 
 fit he derived from attacking individual, unprotected ships 
 and forced him to devote his efforts, for the most part, to 
 ships which were protected by destroyers. To engage 
 with a convoy, the submarine was forced to enter the 
 danger zone and frequently it was he and not our ships 
 which became the victim. 
 
 In these convoys efforts, all of our destroyers, our 
 armored cruisers, our smaller cruisers, and later the old 
 battleships of our fleet, have been engaged, continuously, 
 winter and summer. It has been hard, grinding work, 
 but that it was well done is attested by the fact that two 
 million troops were sent abroad, with not the loss by 
 enemy action of a single east-bound ship carrying troops 
 under the protection of our forces. 
 
 The history of the convoy operations in which our 
 naval forces have taken part, due to which we have been 
 able so successfully to transport such a large number of 
 our military forces abroad, and so many supplies for 
 the Army, is a chapter in itself. It is probably our 
 major operation in this war and will, in the future, 
 stand as a monument to both the Army and the Navy, 
 as the greatest and most difficult troop transporting ef- 
 fort which has ever been conducted across seas. The 
 work is not finished. The bringing of our forces back 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 169 
 
 is still a naval problem, and it will be undertaken with 
 the same spirit which characterized the transportation 
 and convoy of our troops to Europe. 
 
 TROOPS TRANSPORTED THE ROAD KEPT OPEN TO FRANCE. 
 
 Two million American fighting men have been safely- 
 landed in France. This is the record of the cruiser and 
 transport force of the Atlantic Fleet of the United States 
 and of the American troops carried by British ships, and 
 some assistance from other allied ships. 
 
 From a small beginning at the outbreak of war — a 
 few cruisers and hastily gathered together transports, 
 the latter for the most part slow^ — the cruiser and trans- 
 port force has been gradually expanded into a great 
 fleet, now comprising 24 cruisers and 42 transports, 
 manned by 3,000 officers and 41,000 men. These are 
 augmented by 4 French men-of-war and 13 foreign 
 merchant vessels, a grand total of 83 vessels. This en- 
 tire force, under command of Rear Admiral Albert 
 Gleaves, whose ability and resource have been tested and 
 established in this great service in cooperation with the 
 destroyers, converted yachts and other anti-submarine 
 craft operating abroad, has developed an antisubmarine 
 convoy and escort system the results of which have sur- 
 passed even the most sanguine expectations. The suc- 
 cessful development of antisubmarine tactics in the At- 
 lantic is an achievement of the United States Navy, 
 the value of which it would be hard to overestimate. 
 
 Strategy has required the cruiser and transport force 
 to operate with utmost secrecy. Convoy duty has not 
 been spectacular, but it has demanded endurance, con- 
 stant vigilance, and devotion to duty of the highest order 
 under circumstances of the most trying and arduous 
 nature. Too much credit can not be given to the officers 
 and enlisted personnel who have accomplished this haz- 
 ardous and responsible mission. Winter and summer 
 they averaged approximately 70 per cent of the time 
 at sea. 
 
170 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Up to November i, 1918, of the total number of 
 United States troops in Europe, 924,578 made passage 
 in United States naval convoys under escort of United 
 States cruisers and destroyers. Since the 1st of Novem- 
 ber, 1917, there have been 289 sailings of naval trans- 
 ports from American ports. In these operations of the 
 cruiser and transport force of the Atlantic Fleet not one 
 eastbound American transport has been torpedoed or 
 damaged by the enemy, and only three sunk on the re- 
 turn voyage. 
 
 Taking into consideration the dangers and difficulties 
 attending the service of the cruiser and transport force, 
 the comparatively light casualty list is eloquent testi- 
 mony of an efficient personnel organized and trained 
 under a wise administrative command. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, however, more than half of our 
 naval casualties inflicted by the enemy have been suf- 
 fered in the cruiser and transport force. These losses 
 were to be expected in a service involving great hazard, 
 not only from enemy guns and torpedoes, but also from 
 the machinations of enemy secret agents and from 
 navigational dangers enhanced by operating without 
 lights under unfavorable conditions. 
 
 SOME ILLUSTRATIVE FIGURES. 
 
 As an indication of the work being done by United 
 States naval vessels in the war zone, the following aver- 
 ages of miles steamed per month are given : 
 
 MILES. 
 
 Destroyers 275,000 
 
 Miscellaneous patrol craft 120,000 
 
 Mine sweepers 10,000 
 
 Mine layers . 10,000 
 
 Battleships and submarines 90,000 
 
 Submarine chasers 121,000 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 171 
 
 or a total of 626,000 miles per month. The above figures 
 include vessels actively engaged in naval duties only, 
 under command of the ^orce commander. United States 
 naval forces in Europe, and not troop ships, transports, 
 cargo carriers, or miscellaneous merchant vessels flying 
 the American flag, constantly plying through the war 
 zone. Nor does it include cruisers or battleships en- 
 gaged in oversea escort duties. 
 
 DISTANCES STEAMED BY DESTROYERS. 
 
 Distances steamed by various destroyers can be shown 
 when the record of several of the first to arrive in 
 European waters is examined. Three of these are shown 
 to have steamed during the first year of service in the 
 zone : 
 
 MILES. 
 
 U. S. S. Porter 64,473 
 
 U. S. S. Conyngham 63,952 
 
 U. S. S. Davis 63,015 
 
 An individual instance of activity is given for one of 
 the new destroyers. The U. S. S. Kimberley, during 
 the month of June, steamed 7,019 miles, and was at 
 sea 470 hours during the month ; i. e., about 65 per cent 
 of the time. 
 
 TYPICAL ESCORT RECORDS. 
 
 During July and August, 1918, 3,444,012 tons of 
 shipping were escorted to and from France by American 
 escort vessels; of the above amount, 1,577,735 tons were 
 escorted in and 1,864,677 tons were escorted out of 
 French ports. Of the tonnage escorted into French ports 
 during this time, only 16,988 tons, or O.009 per cent, were, 
 lost through enemy action, and of the tonnage escorted 
 out from French ports, only 27,858 tons, or 0.0 13 per 
 cent, were lost through the same cause. During the same 
 period, July and August of this year, 259,604 American 
 troops were escorted to France by United States escort 
 vessels without the loss of a single man through enemy 
 
172 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 action. The particulars in the above paragraph refer 
 to United States naval forces operating in the war zone 
 from French ports. 
 
 During the same time — July and August — destroyers 
 based on British ports supplied 75 per cent of the escorts 
 for 318 ships, totaling 2,752,908 tons, and including th^ 
 escort of vessels carrying 137,283 United States troops. 
 The destroyers on this duty were at sea an average of 
 67 per cent of the time, and were under way for a period 
 of about 1 6,000 hours, steaming approximately an ag- 
 gregate of 260,000 miles. There were no losses due to 
 enemy action. 
 
 The American force based on Gibraltar, including de- 
 stroyers, gun-boats, cruisers, yachts, and Coast Guard 
 cutters during July and August, have been at sea 56 
 per cent of the time, and actually under way 15,500 
 hours, steaming during this period 160,000 miles. They 
 have supplied approximately 25 per cent of the escorts 
 for Mediterranean convoys between Gibraltar on the 
 one hand and France and Italy on the .other, and have 
 performed 70 per cent of the ocean escort duties between 
 Gibraltar and England. The above figures are given as 
 indicative of what is accomplished month by month by 
 our vessels in the war zone. 
 
 In addition to duty performed by destroyers and other 
 escorting vessels, the extensive naval activities of our 
 battleships with the British Grand Fleet, mining units, 
 patrol units, submarine hunting, mine sweeping, salvage, 
 etc., have been many and varied. 
 
 FUEL SUPPLY — PIPE LINE ACROSS SCOTLAND. 
 
 The coal used by the American Expeditionary Forces 
 in France is carried to that country in vessels largely 
 officered and manned by the Navy. Of the 70 or more 
 ships operating in Army coal service two-thirds have 
 now been commissioned in the Navy, and the others will 
 shortly follow. 
 
 The destruction of tankers carrying oil to our own 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 173 
 
 ships and the British fleet in the North Sea gave much 
 anxiety, and in order to avert the submarine menace in 
 sending the tankers around the north of Scotland it was 
 determined by the American and British Navies to build 
 a pipe line across Scotland. Our naval experts under- 
 took the big task, and thereby reduced the distance and 
 danger of supplying the fleet with oil. 
 
 NORTH SEA MINE BARRAGE. 
 
 The outstanding antisubmarine offensive project of 
 the year was the closing of the North Sea by a mine 
 barrage extending from the Orkney Islands to the terri- 
 torial waters of Norway, together with a barrage across 
 the Straits of Dover. The plan to close the North Sea, 
 and thereby deny enemy submarines free access to the 
 Atlantic from German bases, had its inception in the 
 Bureau of Ordnance in April, 1917, immediately follow- 
 ing the entrance of the United States into the war. At 
 this time there had not been developed anywhere a type 
 of mine suitable for the Scotland-Norway line, whereon 
 the depths of water are as great as 900 feet and where 
 a prohibitive number of mines of the then existing type 
 would have been required to mine this line from the 
 surface to a depth of 250 to 300 feet. 
 
 A memorandum covering the possibilities of the new 
 mine was prepared, advocating the laying of a barrage 
 consisting of mines of this type across the North Sea, 
 and this was given to Admiral Mayo, then leaving for 
 England, where the project could be discussed with the 
 British Admiralty. As a result of his conference with 
 the British authorities and of detailed information fur- 
 nished them by British mining officers sent to this coun- 
 try, the Admiralty gave its approval to the scheme, and 
 both Navies worked together in this big undertaking, 
 more extensive and important than any mine barrage 
 ever before considered, much less carried out. 
 
 The following facts show briefly the magnitude of the 
 operation so far as the United States is concerned. One 
 
174 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 hundred thousand mines were manufactured, of which 
 about 85,000 have been shipped abroad. Two new mine 
 bases were established abroad, with a capacity for as- 
 sembling and issuing 1,000 mines a day. 
 
 ,More than 50,000 American mines have been laid in 
 strategical areas in European waters. The Navy has 
 taken part in and actually laid 80 per cent of the great 
 mine barrage, 230 miles long, from Scotland to Nor- 
 way. A total of 56,439 mines have been laid, all of 
 which were designed and manufactured b)'' the United 
 States and transported and laid by the United States 
 Navy. The total personnel engaged in mining activity 
 alone is upward of 6,700 men. 
 
 HUGE MINE-LOADING PLANT IN OPERATION. 
 
 A special mine-loading plant, with a capacity of more 
 than 1,000 mines a day was established ne.ar Yorktown, 
 Va., by the Navy Department, in accordance with con- 
 gressional authorization, about 11,000 acres of land 
 having been secured for the purpose. 
 
 An immense number of mines will be stowed at this 
 depot, and it will include a mine-loading plant, a mine- 
 assembling plant, and storage for a large amount of 
 high explosives. In addition to this mine-loading depot, 
 the mine-loading plants at the various ammunition depots 
 have been operating successfully during the past year. 
 
 More than a score of cargo vessels were placed in 
 service as mine carriers to transport mines to Europe. 
 Many mine layers and several auxiliary vessels were 
 fitted out and assigned to the execution of the North Sea 
 project. 
 
 The manufacture of the large number of mines re- 
 quired was a work of unprecedented magnitude and 
 necessitated unusual methods. It was clearly impossible, 
 in the time available, to manufacture the mine as a 
 whole in any plant ; therefore the mine was divided into 
 its many component parts and the parts were separately 
 produced in a large number of industrial factories 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 175 
 
 throughout the country. To show the extent of sub- 
 division of work, 140 principal contractors and over 
 400 subcontractors were engaged. The parts were as- 
 sembled into subassemblies in this country, and the 
 subassemblies were shipped to Europe, where the com- 
 plete assembly was made just prior to issue to the mine 
 planters. By carrying out the work in this manner a 
 gain of a full year was made in the planting of the 
 barrage. 
 
 The military results already obtained from the bar- 
 rage more than justify the effort and cost expended. 
 The number of submarines sunk or disabled in the bar- 
 rage probably will never be definitely known, since' it 
 is impossible to keep close observation continuously on 
 a line 250 miles long, but ordnance officers report that 
 there is reason to believe that at least 10 submarines had 
 ended their career at the barrage before the middle of 
 October. 
 
 THE ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY AND OPERATION OF NAVAL 
 VESSELS TO INCREASE THE FORCE IN HOME WATERS. 
 
 During the year numerous smaller craft, including de- 
 stroyers, torpedo boats, mine sweepers, submarines, and 
 submarine chasers have been commissioned and assigned 
 to the home districts for operating against enemy subma- 
 rines and protecting coastwise shipping and for sweeping 
 the channels and approaches to the coast. Action of ene- 
 my submarines in placing mines at focal points along the 
 coast has required extensive mine-sweeping operations. 
 This has necessitated the commissioning of new mine 
 sweepers and t\ie conversion of other craft which have 
 been taken over for that purpose. 
 
 NAVAL DISTRICTS. 
 
 One of the agencies adopted during the war for more 
 efficient naval administration is the organization and 
 development of naval districts. In the efficient admin- 
 
176 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 istration of the large and diversified work carried on by 
 the Navy, some method of grouping activity and decen- 
 tralizing authority is essential. For the purpose of 
 naval administration, the United States and its posses- 
 sions have been divided into convenient subdivisions 
 known as naval districts. The supervision of all naval 
 activities in each of the districts has been placed under 
 a commandant of the district, who is a naval officer of 
 rank and experience. In this way the department has 
 been able through the various commandants of districts 
 to carry out problems involving patrol and defenses of 
 the coast, mine sweeping, communications, information, 
 industrial developments, housing facilities, commandeer- 
 ing vessels, etc. 
 
 THE NAVY THAT FLIES 
 
 Of untold importance during the year was the estab- 
 lishment and placement under operation of naval-air 
 stations at all the strategic and important points on the 
 coast of the United States. Likewise, a station was 
 established in the Canal Zone. As a result of those 
 activities, the larger part of the American coast has been 
 constantly patrolled by naval aircraft. Furthermore, 
 the Navy Department has already planned and is fully 
 prepared to establish enough additional stations to so 
 complete the system that every foot of the coast of the 
 United States can be thoroughly and constantly pa- 
 trolled. Many of the stations now in operation are 
 equipped not only with seaplanes but also with dirigibles 
 and kite balloons. The extent of activities that are being 
 carried on can be readily illustrated. Thus, during 
 June, 1918, a total of 25,642 flights, covering about 
 2,155,860 miles, were made by seaplanes at stations 
 along the United States coast. These figures include 
 both patrol and training. During that same period of 
 time lighter-than-air craft made a total of 613 flights, 
 covering about 56,420 miles. 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 177 
 
 THE CARRYING OUT OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE 
 MEASURES AGAINST ENEMY SUBMARINES IN THE 
 WESTERN ATLANTIC. 
 
 The wisdom of making a clean-cut line of demarca- 
 tion between the military and industrial activities on 
 our coast and of foreseeing the character of hostile opera- 
 tions against which we should make preparation was 
 clearly shown when the enemy first directed his opera- 
 tions against our coast. About the middle of May, 1918, 
 the enemy evidently decided that he must make an 
 effort to stop us from sending more military forces 
 abroad or at least to so distract our efforts that we should 
 be more concerned with protecting our own coast than 
 we were in forwarding troops. 
 
 When the submarines appeared off our coast, the poli- 
 cies already formulated were promptly put into effect. 
 It had been determined before by the department that 
 the logical military objective would be our troop and 
 cargo convoys, but these were so well guarded that the 
 submarine evidently preferred not to engage with them, 
 but devoted his efforts against our coastwise trade, and 
 principally against our unarmed sailing vessels. Along 
 with this campaign of destruction, which had no military 
 value whatsoever, the enemy adopted the practice of 
 strewing our coast with mines. This feature of his cam- 
 paign had been anticipated and our sweepers had been 
 actively engaged in clearing the channels through which 
 our convoys regularly sail. It was natural, however, 
 with the long expanse of sea-coast which we had to 
 protect, that the enemy should succeed in laying de- 
 tached mine fields which more than once proved destruc- 
 tive to our coastwise shipping. 
 
 Up to the time that the U-boats appeared, it had been 
 the practice to allow coastwise ships to sail direct, and as 
 far as was practicable lights were burned and the ordi- 
 nary aids to navigation were kept going. 
 
 Immediately upon their arrival in American waters, 
 without in the slightest degree allowing the enemy's ef- 
 
178 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 forts to diminish the rate of flow of troops and supplies- 
 abroad, all coastwise shipping was hauled in close under 
 the protection of our district forces and a series of rout- 
 ings, escort and air patrols were started which rendered 
 reasonably secure the vessels that plied up and down our 
 coast. In order to further render our shores secure, and 
 to force the hostile submersibles to operate farther afield, 
 our own submarines were immediately sent out against 
 them. Hunting groups of destroyers and chasers, which 
 had been formed and were in readiness, were put into 
 action. 
 
 The net result was that very soon, from a military 
 point of view, the hostile submarine's efforts became 
 practically nil and he was forced to operate farther 
 afield — that is, well out into the Atlantic, where his 
 principal prey became the single unarmed ships return- 
 ing home on their westbound voyages. This move on 
 the part of the Germans had been anticipated, as for 
 the greater part westbound ships rarely returned home 
 singly, but usually in company with another craft which 
 carried a gun sufficiently large to cope with that of 
 the submarine. On the whole, the operations of German 
 submarines against our coast can be spoken of as one 
 of the minor incidents of the war, and had the enemy 
 chosen to carry his operations into the Gulf, or even to 
 the coast of Brazil, he would have found that prepara- 
 tions had been made to anticipate them. 
 
 THE PROTECTION OF VESSELS ENGAGED IN COASTWISE 
 TRADE. 
 
 The appearance of enemy submarines in these waters 
 necessitated the putting into effect of the convoy system 
 for coastwise shipping and for the protection of individ- 
 ual ships engaged in the coastwise trade. This has 
 been accomplished in accordance with the previously made 
 plans and has worked smoothly, the protection to ship- 
 ping being afforded by the craft assigned to naval dis- 
 tricts. 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 179 
 
 PROTECTION OF OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF. 
 
 To forestall enemy submarine operations in the Gulf 
 and Caribbean, a force was established called the Ameri- 
 can Patrol Force, and its headquarters was in the vicinity 
 of Key West. While the coastwise shipping could be 
 adequately protected by routing close along our coast, 
 the problem became a different one the instant it entered 
 the Gulf and Caribbean areas, and it was this problem 
 and the problem of antisubmarine operations which the 
 American patrol detachment had to undertake. As was 
 foreseen, the protection of the oil supplies from the Gulf 
 to our own coast and then abroad were quite vital to 
 the success of the general campaign, and these supplies 
 the patrol detachment was prepared to safeguard by 
 adopting at once the convoy system the instant they 
 were threatened. 
 
 COAST GUARD — ITS WORK WITH THE NAVY. 
 
 Upon the declaration of the existence of a state of 
 war, the Coast Guard, pursuant to the provisions of act 
 of Congress approved January 28, 19 15, entered at once 
 upon its war-time duties as a part of the Naval Estab- 
 lishment. Plans for the mobilization of the service and 
 its operation as a part of the naval forces in the con- 
 tingency of war had already been formulated, so 
 that the transition from its peace-time uses was 
 effected with the minimum of disturbance. The 
 vessels and stations were assigned to the various naval 
 districts and fleets where their services could be used 
 to the best advantage. A number of the cruising cutters 
 were equipped with more effective batteries and assigned 
 to patrol duty in the submarine zone. Others were 
 placed on the coast patrol and given various naval 
 duties in home waters. The crews of Coast Guard sta- 
 tions have been increased in number and a vigilant and 
 extended patrol of the beaches maintained day and night. 
 
180 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 ENTIRE COAST CONNECTED BY WIRE. 
 
 The communication service maintained between sta- 
 tions has been extended so as to embrace all stations 
 along the Atlantic coast and a number of outlying light- 
 houses and light vessels. This system comprises 2,327 
 miles of land line and 402 miles of submarine cable. 
 Through this instrumentality our entire Atlantic sea- 
 board is kept in instant and constant touch with Wash- 
 ington, the various headquarters, and other important 
 centers. The system has proved of incalculable value 
 to the Navy in time when attacks have been made by 
 the enemy off our coast and the presence of enemy craft 
 has been suspected. It is also serving a useful purpose 
 in aiding and directing instant and personal communi- 
 cation between commanding officers and the various 
 units, thereby facilitating action in urgent and im- 
 portant matters. 
 
 Much ammunition and high explosives shipped abroad 
 in connection with the war have been forwarded through 
 the port of New York. The safe handling and loading 
 of such vast quantities of explosives in this congested 
 harbor have demanded and received the most careful 
 and untiring efforts. This work has been largely en- 
 trusted to officers and men of the Coast Guard, and it 
 is gratifying to note that there has not been a single 
 accident or mishap connected with this vast undertaking, 
 either in the harbor of New York or on other navigable 
 waters, during the period of the war. 
 
 SAVING LIVES AND PROPERTY 
 
 While the various units of the Coast Guard are used 
 in the war-time duties of the hour, on many occasions 
 they are and have been able to render effective aid to 
 the distressed on the seas and along our coasts. During 
 the past fiscal year the Coast Guard was instrumental 
 in saving the lives of 1,250 persons, removing 11,084 
 persons from danger, caring for 477 persons in distress. 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 181 
 
 and saving property valued at $15,198,332. Added to 
 these tangible appraisable services there were 1,473 ^^" 
 stances where miscellaneous assistance was rendered. 
 These embrace a multiplicity of humanitarian deeds in- 
 uring to the public interest and good, the exact nature 
 and value of which it is impracticable to appraise or to 
 set out in figures. Among these services may be enumer- 
 ated those of aid to the sick and injured; furnishing 
 food, fuel, and water to persons temporarily cut off 
 from such supplies ; recovering dead bodies ; extinguish- 
 ing fires in the vicinity of Coast Guard stations ; warn- 
 ing vessels from running into danger; and an extensive 
 line of other useful endeavor. 
 
 PERSONNEL ON A WAR FOOTING. 
 
 The personnel of the Coast Guard is on a war footing 
 and on June 30, 1918, consisted of 228 commissioned 
 officers, 36 cadets, 442 warrent officers, and 5,920 en- 
 listed men. There has been no increase in the number 
 of commissioned officers but it has been found necessary 
 in order best to utilize the services of these officers to 
 give them advanced temporary rank on the general plan 
 of running-mates with officers of corresponding length 
 of service in the Navy. 
 
 THE COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY. 
 
 Pursuant to law the President is authorized to trans- 
 fer the vessels, equipment, stations and personnel of 
 this service to the Navy. 
 
 In addition to the making of special wire-drag and 
 other confidential surveys for the Navy, the Coast and 
 Geodetic Survey supplied the Navy with 126,000 charts 
 in 1917 and with more than 102,000 in 1918. 
 
 THE BUREAU OF LIGHTHOUSES. 
 
 Under the provisions of statute law, 46 steamers used 
 as lighthouse tenders, 4 light vessels, and 21 light sta- 
 
182 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 tions, together with 1,132 persons employed thereon, were 
 transferred to the service and jurisdiction of the Navy 
 Department and have continued in that service through- 
 out the war. 
 
 The duties performed by the transferred units con- 
 sisted principally of work on submarine nets and buoy- 
 age in connection therewith, patrol and watch service, 
 drill in mine laying, etc. Prior to the war, for a number 
 of years, a large proportion of the lighthouse tenders 
 had been equipped with mine-laying equipment and had 
 periodic drills in this work. 
 
 OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AMERICAN AND ASIATIC WATERS. 
 
 As enemy activity has been confined principally to the 
 North Atlantic and European waters, it has necessitated 
 the concentration of our purely naval forces in these 
 waters. Our Navy has, however, some representatives 
 in South American and Asiatic waters. The activities 
 in these waters are of general character, but have served 
 to bring us into closer cooperation with the allies in 
 those waters with whom we are associated. 
 
 AID GIVEN TO ALLIED SHIPPING. 
 
 Means were taken to guard the extensive station at 
 Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, against injury, to establish sea 
 patrols, and to increase the personnel to meet the sud- 
 denly increased demands of war conditions. These activi- 
 ties were not confined to the yard proper but extended 
 to the whole fourteenth district. It is a pleasure to 
 record that in all this work full and hearty cooperation 
 was established and maintained with the Army and all 
 other departments of our Government. Thus far, in 
 spite of the enemy sympathizers, both resident and tran- 
 sient, in that cosmopolitan community, no report has 
 been made of the loss of a dollar's worth of property 
 or of injury to a single individual. Aid has been given 
 to domestic and allied shipping and protection extended 
 to Government and private property. 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 183 
 
 NAVY BATTERY OF I4-INCH GUNS AT FRONT. 
 
 One of the great achievements of the Navy during 
 the past year was the design and construction of the 
 14-inch naval guns on railway mountings now on 'the 
 western front, which hurled shells far behind the Ger- 
 man lines. The mount was designed, built, and de- 
 livered in less than four months. On December 26, 
 
 1917, not a drawing had been started. On April 25, 
 
 1918, a completed gun was rolling on its own wheels to 
 Sandy Hook Proving Ground for long-range tests. 
 
 These guns were originally intended for the new battle 
 cruisers, but a change of ship design left them available 
 for other use. As the Navy had no immediate need for 
 them afloat, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance recom- 
 mended that they be utilized for land service with our 
 Army in France. 
 
 It was realized that to be most effective the railway 
 battery must be completely mobile and independent of 
 any permanent artillery base. The guns themselves 
 were mounted on cars which could move freely over the 
 French railways. It was necessary to make the repair 
 shops and barracks for the personnel mobile. Twelve 
 cars were constructed to accompany each gun. There 
 were machine-shop cars, armored ammunition cars, 
 kitchen cars, berthing, crane, and wireless cars. These 
 cars, as well as the gun mounts, were all built and 
 equipped under the direction of the Bureau of Ordnance. 
 This battery is sufficiently mobile so that were an 
 order to move position received while the gun was in 
 action, gun, personnel, kitchen, fuel, berthing cars, and 
 all could be under way in about an hour. 
 
 MANNED BY NAVY GUNNERS. 
 
 The land battery was manned exclusively by blue- 
 jackets under the command of Rear Admiral C. P. 
 Plunkett. The men were trained at the Naval Proving 
 Ground, and went to France ahead of the guns to pre- 
 
184 
 
 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 U. S. NAVAL GUN IN ACTION NEAR SOISSONS 
 
 pare everything for their assembly. The first group 
 arrived in France on June 9, 1918, The first gun was 
 shipped from the United States on June 20. It was 
 ready to fire the last week in August; but did not go 
 into action against the enemy until September 16 in 
 the vicinity of Laon, from which time this gun with its 
 sister guns was engaged in firing against German bases 
 far behind the enemy lines and hitherto completely be- 
 yond the reach of allied artillery. 
 
 The naval land batteries fire heavier projectiles and 
 have greater range than an)^ gun ever before placed on 
 mobile shore mounting. The German long range 
 "freak" guns which fired on Paris were non-mobile. 
 They were built on permanent steel and concrete foun- 
 dations which were eventually sought out by allied aero- 
 planes and the guns subsequently silenced. The shells 
 were small and specially built for long flight. This fact 
 reduced their military efficiency. The German long- 
 range guns, while they had a certain moral effect, were 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 185 
 
 without great practical military value. The American 
 naval guns fire projectiles approximately seven times 
 heavier than the shells the Germans used against Paris. 
 
 CAN HURL BIG PROJECTILES 30 MILES. 
 
 In 1916 the Germans had one 15-inch naval gun in 
 Flanders, which became famous through its long-range 
 bombardment of Dunkirk and other allied bases. This 
 gun was on a permanent foundation and could not be 
 shifted from point to point on the front. Our 14-inch 
 gun can move from one end of France to the other, and 
 it hurls its projectile a distance of approximately 30 
 miles (52,000 yards). 
 
 Briefly, the American Navy has designed, built, and 
 is now. manning with bluejackets specially trained for 
 land service, the largest and most high-powered mobile 
 land artillery in the world. So successful have these 
 guns been that additional orders for many more were 
 requested before the armistice. 
 
 NAVAL LOSSES CAUSED BY SUBMARINE WARFARE. 
 
 Since this country entered the war practically all the 
 enemy's naval forces, except the submarines, have been 
 blockaded in his ports by the naval forces of the allies, 
 and there has been no opportunity for naval engagements 
 of a major character. The enemy's submarines have, 
 however, formed a continual menace to the safety of all 
 bur transports and shipping, necessitating the use of 
 every effective means and the utmost vigilance for the 
 protection of our vessels. Concentrated attack was made 
 by enemy U-boats on the ships which carried the first 
 contingent of our troops to Europe, and all that have 
 gone since have faced this liability to attack. 
 
 Our destroyers and patrol vessels, in addition to con* 
 voy duty have waged an unceasing offensive warfare 
 against the submarines. In spite of all this, our naval 
 losses have been gratifyingly small. Not one American 
 
186 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 troop ship, as previously stated, has been torpedoed on 
 the way to France, and but three, the Antilles, the 
 President Lincoln, and the Covington, were sunk on the 
 return voyage. 
 
 Only three fighting ships have been lost as a result of 
 enemy action — the patrol ship Alcedo, a converted yacht, 
 sunk off the coast of France November 5, 1917; the 
 torpedo-boat destroyer Jacob Jones, sunk off the British 
 coast December 6, 1917; and the cruiser San Diego, sunk 
 near Fire Island, off the New York coast, on July 19, 
 1918, by striking a mine supposedly set adrift by a Ger- 
 man submarine. The transport Finland and the de- 
 stroyer Cassin, which were torpedoed, reached port and 
 were soon repaired and placed back in service. The 
 transport Mount Vernon, struck by a torpedo on Sep- 
 tember 5 last, proceeded to port under its own steam, and 
 was repaired. 
 
 The most serious loss of life due to enemy activity 
 was the loss of the Coast Guard cutter Tampa, with all 
 on board, in Bristol Channel, England, on the night of 
 September 26, 1918. The Tampa, which was doing 
 escort duty, had gone ahead of the convoy. Vessels fol- 
 lowing heard an explosion, but when they reached the 
 vicinity there were only bits of floating wreckage to 
 show where the ship had gone down. Not one of the 
 111 officers and men of her crew were rescued ; and 
 though it is believed she was sunk by a torpedo from an 
 enemy submarine, the exact manner in which the vessel 
 met its fate may never be known. 
 
 LOSS OF THE COLLIER "CYCLOPS." 
 
 There has been no more baffling mystery in the annals 
 of the Navy than the disappearance last March of the 
 U. S. S. Cyclops, Navy collier of 19,000 tons displace- 
 ment, with all on board. Loaded with a cargo of man- 
 ganese, with 57 passengers, 20 officers, and a crew of 
 213 aboard, the collier was due in port on March 13. 
 On March- 4 the Cyclops reported at Barbados, British 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 187 
 
 West Indies, where she put in for bunker coal. Since 
 her departure from that port there has not been a trace 
 of the vessel, and long-continued and vigilant search of 
 the entire region proved utterly futile, not a vestige of 
 wreckage having been discovered. No reasonable ex- 
 planation of the strange disappearance can be given. It 
 is known that one of her two engines was damaged and 
 that she was proceeding at reduced speed, but even if 
 the other engine had become disabled it would have not 
 had any effect on her ability to communicate by radio. 
 Many theories have been advanced, but none that seems 
 to account satisfactorily for the ship's complete vanish- 
 ment. After months of search and waiting the Cyclops 
 was finally given up as lost and her name stricken from 
 the registry. 
 
 SALVAGING AND ASSISTING VESSELS IN DISTRESS. 
 
 During the year a salvaging division has been organ- 
 ized, and the operation of this division has resulted in 
 the saving of lives and property. There have been 
 numerous calls on this division for assistance from all 
 kinds of vessels during the year, including towing, rescu- 
 ing, and convoying disabled vessels, as well as salvaging 
 vessels which were sunk or grounded in home waters. 
 All such calls, from all sources, have been promptly an- 
 swered and assistance rendered. 
 
 The question of salvage of vessels damaged by mines 
 or torpedoes has been a very acute one abroad, and also 
 important along United States coasts. The Navy De- 
 partment during the year has taken over many of the 
 vessels and much of the equipment engaged in coast 
 salvage work and has sent one unit abroad, where it is 
 now operating. The salvage work has been fully organ- 
 ized, utilizing the services of a number of very compe- 
 tent salvage engineers who had been engaged in this 
 work with private companies. 
 
188 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 ANTISUBMARINE DEVICES. 
 
 The department has been keenly appreciative of the 
 necessity of employing every effort to develop devices 
 with which to combat the enemy's submarine operations. 
 Advices and suggestions were freely requested and care- 
 fully considered by the department, the Naval Consult- 
 ing Board, the National Research Council, the various 
 bureaus and departments, the General Board of the 
 Navy, and other boards in Washington. 
 
 In order to coordinate the efforts in this matter the de- 
 partment appointed a special board of officers to have 
 complete charge of carrying out experiments on anti- 
 submarine devices. The General Electric Co., the West- 
 ern Electric Co., and the Submarine Signal Co. patri- 
 otically offered every assistance in this work, and with a 
 fine spirit of co-operation have rendered valuable service. 
 
 An experimental station was established at New 
 London, Conn., under the supervision of the special 
 board, and many scientists of unusual attainments were 
 assembled there in connection with the experiments and 
 development of devices for detecting submarines. 
 
 The naval activities at New London, Conn., 
 embrace also a station for assembling and in- 
 stalling various devices developed and training the 
 personnel for the efficient employment of such devices 
 afloat. The results achieved by these methods have been 
 most gratifying ; and the operations of vessels fitted with 
 these devices, both abroad and in home waters, has had 
 a marked effect in restricting submarine operations. 
 
 AEROPLANE BOMBS FOR USE AGAINST SUBMARINES. 
 
 A heavy aeroplane bomb has been developed for anti- 
 submarine warfare, which has not only all of the quali- 
 ties of an aero bomb, but those also of a depth charge. 
 When an aeroplane sights a submarine and attacks with 
 bombs, the bombs will explode if a direct hit be ob- 
 tained upon the submarine. A submarine attacked from 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 189 
 
 a height Is a rather difficult target to hit and these 
 bombs compensate somewhat for that. Should the bomb 
 miss the submarine it will detonate on reaching a pre- 
 determined depth and will thus have the effect of a 
 depth charge. 
 
 Formerly, bombs were of a more or less delicate nature 
 and impact with the surface of the water was sufficient 
 to detonate them. A submarine running below the sur- 
 face was therefore practically immune from damage 
 from aircraft attack ; but these bombs can be set to 
 explode at considerable depth below the surface and in 
 all they make the aeroplane a much more formidable 
 antisubmarine asset than ever before. 
 
 The Navy's new bomb sights for aeroplanes are con- 
 sidered to be the equal of anything in use at present. 
 These were developed after exhaustive investigations had 
 been made of all sights in use by our allies and our 
 enemies; the latter from captured machines. 
 
 DEPTH CHARGE MOST EFFECTIVE ANTISUBMARINE "WEAPON. 
 
 The successful operation of the depth charge and the 
 development of tactics for attacking submarines with 
 them have been the most potent factors in the solution 
 of the German submarine menace. These charges are 
 now being produced in quantities considerably in excess 
 of the needs of our Navy and merchant fleet, and so tre- 
 mendous is their destructive quality and so thoroughly 
 has strategy for their use been developed, that it is a 
 lucky submarine which shows itself or its periscope 
 within view of a destroyer and survives the subsequent 
 bombardment. 
 
 With the earlier development of the submarine its 
 possibilities as a weapon of offense were vaguely con- 
 ceived. Defense against submarines, however, was 
 largely confined to the general doctrine of gun and 
 torpedo. The Germans made such great strides in sub- 
 marine development that the opportunity of catching a 
 submarine on the surface and destroying him by gunfire 
 
190 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 became exceedingly scant. Because of his low freeboard 
 he could detect the approach of a hostile vessel and sub- 
 merge before that vessel sighted him. Through con- 
 struction improvements and intensive training of per- 
 sonnel, the submarine could submerge even when caught 
 napping before guns could be effectively trained upon 
 him. Through a skillful use of the periscope a sub- 
 marine could attack with little danger except from an 
 occasional lucky shot or from ramming. 
 
 Some method of attacking the submarine under water 
 was necessary. Charges of explosives such as shells or 
 bombs detonating by contact would injure a submarine 
 if the U-boat were struck, but a moving submarine lOO 
 feet below the surface is a difRcult target to hit. There 
 was desired, therefore, not so much a contact charge 
 which would function on striking the submarine, as an 
 explosive charge which would fire near the submarine at 
 a good depth below surface and have such a tremen- 
 dously powerful effect as to damage the enemy although 
 it were 200 feet away from the point of detonation. 
 
 Prior to the entrance of the United States into the war 
 the use of depth charges had begun, but had not been 
 carried out to any marked extent abroad ; yet the United 
 States realized the necessity of being adequately armed 
 with this new weapon against the submarine. 
 
 EXPLOSIVE INCREASED NEW TYPE DEVELOPED. 
 
 Our Navy undertook depth-charge development 
 shortly after the opening of unrestricted warfare. The 
 first design contained 50 pounds of explosive and was 
 operated on a float-and-line principle. A float detached 
 itself from the charge proper upon striking the water 
 and remained on the surface while the charge sank and 
 in sinking payed out rope attached to the float; when 
 a predetermined length of rope had run out the charge 
 exploded. 
 
 On the declaration of the war these charges were al- 
 most immediately available for issue to the vessels of 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 191 
 
 the United States Navy. It was soon apparent, however, 
 that with the construction of larger and stronger sub- 
 marines the 50 pounds of explosive was not sufficient 
 and immediately the development of larger charges was 
 undertaken. The naval torpedo station at Newport de- 
 veloped a type of hydrostatically operated depth charge 
 which subsequently was proven at least the equal of any 
 other depth charge known to be in existence. 
 
 The depth charge has taken a place in the front rank 
 of effective weapons of warfare alongside of the gun 
 and torpedo, and it is destined to remain in that company 
 as long as the submarine is employed as a weapon of war 
 upon the seas. Our destroyers abroad made extensive 
 use of the depth charge, and of all the weapons it was 
 the one most feared by the German submarine. It has 
 perhaps been noticed that German submarines were re- 
 luctant to attack convoys accompanied by destroyers 
 and that they confined their attentions largely to ships 
 which, through breakdown or any other reason, fell out 
 of line and dropped far behind the escorting destroyers. 
 
 TACTICS IMPROVED "y" GUN DESIGNED. 
 
 Along with the development of the weapon itself tac- 
 tics for its use have progressed from an occasional chance 
 shot to a veritable bombardment. At first vessels car- 
 ried one or two depth charges and dropped only one 
 against the submarine. Gradually the number of depth 
 charges carried has increased until now a destroyer will 
 frequently carry more than a hundred. 
 
 The possible movements of a submarine after its dis- 
 covery has been carefully studied and scientific curves 
 have been determined enabling a swift attacking vessel 
 to drop depth charges in the form of a barrage about 
 the submarine, regardless of which direction the sub- 
 marine turns after attack or how great her speed. 
 
 A new gun known as the "Y" gun has been designed 
 and built especially for firing depth charges. All our 
 destroyers and sub-chasers were equipped with this wea- 
 
192 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 pon. It is proving in service the equal of any material 
 in use as depth-charge projectors and has increased the 
 efficiency of depth-charge attack, as it enables depth 
 charges to be thrown astern or on either side of the at- 
 tacking vessel, thus widening the danger zone for an 
 enemy submarine. Already the Navy has armed with 
 depth charges a large number of allied ships. 
 
 NEW TYPE PRODUCED IN 30 DAYS. 
 
 One year ago the depth charge was a comparatively 
 new weapon to our service. Ten thousand 50-pound 
 charges had been manufactured up to that time. Since 
 then twenty-eight thousand 300-pound charges and five 
 hundred 600-pound charges have been delivered. There 
 are now three manufacturers working on contracts for 
 over 30,000 more. 
 
 As a side light on what can be accomplished in the 
 way of rapid production, it is interesting to note that on 
 July 26 orders were issued, on the request of Vice 
 Admiral Sims, to manufacture a new type of charge 
 holding double the usual amount of explosive. The 
 design was completed and first shipment made from the 
 manufacturers' plant within 30 days from that date. 
 
 NONRICOCHETING PROJECTILE ACTS AS A DEPTH CHARGE. 
 
 The ordinary pointed projectile, hitting the water al- 
 most horizontally, is deflected and ricochets. Conse- 
 quently the hull of a submarine below the surface of 
 the water is protected from ordinary shell at short 
 ranges. A special type of nonricocheting shell has been 
 developed for use against the submarines and has now 
 been issued to ships sailing the war zone. 
 
 This shell has an additional feature. It is equipped 
 with a delay-action fuse, so that if it misses the sub- 
 marine it dives below the surface until a predetermined 
 depth has been reached, where is explodes. If it happens 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 193 
 
 to be near a submarine, a direct hit is not necessary, be- 
 cause its detonation has the same effect as a depth charge, 
 but naturally to a considerably smaller extent. 
 
 CAMOUFLAGE SYSTEM OF "dAZZLE PAINTING." 
 
 Since the beginning of the war the question of paint- 
 ing vessels in such a manner as to prevent their being 
 seen, or to enable them to escape submarine attack, has 
 been much discussed. It is not quite the same as "camou- 
 flage" as it is generally understood on land, where 
 objects at rest are painted or marked in such a manner 
 as to prevent their being identified against a fixed back- 
 ground. Experience has shown that no system of mark- 
 ing will materially reduce the visibility of a vessel ; that 
 a uniform coat of paint is about as good as anything 
 for the purpose of reduction of visibility, but unfor- 
 tunately the most desirable color varies with conditions. 
 Experiments which have been carried on for years in 
 our service had indicated a light gray, commonly called 
 "battleship gray," as about the most desirable color for 
 all-around purposes. This appears to have been con- 
 firmed by war experience. There has been developed, 
 however, particularly during the last year, a system of 
 so-called "dazzle" painting — the vessel being painted in 
 an apparently grotesque and bizarre manner for the pur- 
 pose, not of rendering it invisible, but rendering it diffi- 
 cult for the submarine commander, peering through his 
 periscope for a few seconds at a time, to determine the 
 course of the vessel. While not always effective, there 
 is no doubt that dazzle painting is a palliative against 
 submarine attack, and during the last year its applica- 
 tion, not only to naval vessels, but to all vessels of the 
 Emergency Fleet Corporation, has been systematically 
 undertaken. A division was formed in the Bureau of 
 Construction and Repair which undertook the prepara- 
 tion of the designs for all vessels, and the Emergency 
 Fleet Corporation arranged to paint the vessels in ac- 
 cordance with the designs supplied. Up to the 1st of 
 
194 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 October not less than 1,127 vessels had been specially 
 painted upon designs prepared in the Navy Department. 
 
 ARMING MERCHANT SHIPS. 
 
 Almost the first problem which faced the Navy was 
 to secure, as far as possible, the safety of our merchant 
 fleet engaged in carrying food, munitions, and supplies 
 to the military forces at the front. Germany, in at- 
 tempting her submarine war, in the beginning chose 
 to use her submarines in the way that would net her the 
 best and quickest returns, regardless of obligations to 
 protect civilian passengers. She, therefore, instead of 
 using torpedoes attempted to sink by gunfire or by bombs 
 all the merchant ships that fell in the path of her 
 U-boats. 
 
 The department quickly realized that an answer to 
 this which would immediately reduce submarine efficiency 
 and confine its activities to under-water activities was 
 to arm our merchant ships. In so doing, we were forced 
 to make use of the means at hand rather than what we 
 desired to do, but immediately plans went forward to 
 anticipate Germany's next move, which afterward she 
 did make in the form of her cruiser submarines. The 
 cruiser submarine was Germany's counter to the arming 
 of our merchant ships, but by the time those submarines 
 were in operation, the best of our merchant fleet had 
 been armed with a caliber of gun which was able to cope 
 with the heaviest gun of the cruiser submarine. 
 
 In the first part of this war some of the most interest- 
 ing encounters were those between our armed merchant 
 ships and single enemy submarines, and there are cases 
 on record where our armed guards fought until the ship 
 under them went down or they were forced to abandon 
 the vessel in flames. 
 
 MERCHANT SHIPS PROTECTED BY INCREASED ARMAMENT. 
 
 At the declaration of war it was realized that to pro- 
 tect the country's shipping from attacks of enemy sub- 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 195 
 
 marines it would be necessary to arm those merchant 
 vessels traversing the war zone. At first it appeared 
 that guns of about 3-inch caliber would be amply large 
 for defensive work ; but with the advent of the enemy 
 submarines mounting from 4 to 6 inch guns, it soon be- 
 came evident that larger calibers would be required. 
 In addition, the large and rapidly increasing demands 
 of the naval service for guns had to be met. 
 
 The arming of merchant ships has largely been ac- 
 complished. Since the war started 2,570 ships, exclud- 
 ing regular war ships of the Navy, have been armed in 
 one way or another. The first merchant ship to be 
 armed was the oil tanker Campana. Since that time 
 every merchant ship in the Atlantic trade needing arms 
 has been armed as the guns have become available, and 
 those guns provided with naval crews. Since the arm- 
 ing of the Campana more than 1,600 merchant vessels 
 have been furnished with batteries, ammunition, spare 
 parts, and auxiliaries — a procedure which had never 
 been contemplated by the department prior to the out- 
 break of war. In addition to this more than 650 patrol 
 boats and all of our subchasers have been armed and 
 guns of various calibers have been furnished to por- 
 tions of the British and French naval and merchant 
 fleets. Our 14-inch guns mounted on British monitors 
 participated in the attack on Zeebrugge. Our medium- 
 caliber guns mounted on floats manned by Italian crews 
 were important factors in the defense of Venice. We 
 have manned a large portion of the French fishing fleet 
 and have equipped not only with guns, but with depth 
 charges, a number of French mine sweepers. 
 
 Some of the merchant ships have even been armed 
 with depth charges, and practically all of these ships 
 carrying naval guns and naval gun crews have been 
 equipped with special smoke-producing apparatus pro- 
 vided to enable the ship to conceal herself in a cloud of 
 smoke when attacked by a submarine. Several types 
 have been developed, and the proper type issued to ships 
 according to the character of the vessel. Vessels having 
 
196 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 necessary gun power — that is, guns sufficiently large to 
 out-range an enemy submarine— invariably prefer to 
 engage in gun duels with the enemy rather than to escape 
 in a smoke screen. 
 
 NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE. 
 
 The scope of the duties of the Naval Communication 
 Service has been greatly enlarged to provide an efficient, 
 workable system for handling all communications with 
 men-of-war, to provide the necessary codes and ciphers 
 to insure secrecy, and to promulgate regulations to in- 
 sure the proper receipt of orders by all vessels of the 
 Navy. In addition to the usual duties in connection 
 with the combatant ships of the Navy, this service has 
 placed all radio communication with merchant vessels 
 in the Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of 
 Mexico upon a military basis. To accomplish this, such 
 vessels have been provided with standard rules for com- 
 munication, and codes and ciphers to handle same, in 
 order to render their voyages through the war zone as 
 free from danger as possible, as well as to insure their 
 receiving orders at sea. This service has close coopera- 
 tion with the detailing of radio men to all merchant ships 
 crossing the Atlantic, as well as to all Shipping Board 
 ships built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation. A 
 comprehensive system for inspection of radio personnel, 
 radio apparatus, and their communication records has 
 been provided on the foregoing ships, so that they are 
 inspected upon arrival in port, when they are given the 
 necessary instructions to properly carry out their work. 
 
 The expansion of the Code and Signal Section has 
 necessarily been great. This section not only supplies 
 men-of-war but all merchant ships in the Atlantic with 
 codes and ciphers and coordinates the communication 
 procedure and codes of countries cooperating with us in 
 the war with those of our own men-of-war and merchant 
 vessels. This enables all United States vessels to com- 
 municate with secrecy in any part of the world. 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 197 
 
 GROWTH OF RADIO SYSTEM. 
 
 The Navy has operated all coastal and high-power 
 radio stations since the start of the war. While the 
 commercial service on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts has 
 been practically abandoned for the war, in order to han- 
 dle naval and military traffic only, the commercial 
 service elsewhere has been carried on with but few re- 
 strictions as far as ship to shore work is concerned. The 
 Navy occupies a strong position in the commercial radio 
 field on account of efficient service rendered, and I think 
 presages the way for making this service entirely gov- 
 ernmental. 
 
 The commercial radio service between Japan, Hawaii, 
 and San Francisco has been temporarily suspended, in 
 order to prevent information reaching the enemy through 
 this source. This work will be resumed when conditions 
 warrant, in order to relieve the severe congestion of the 
 trans-Pacific cables. Official business is still handled 
 over this trans-Pacific radio circuit, but all such traffic 
 passes through the hands of the Navy for proper en- 
 ciphering to insure secrecy. 
 
 The high-power radio service of the Navy has made 
 great progress during the past year. On the Atlantic 
 coast the Navy has completed and is operating its new 
 high-power station at Annapolis, Md., in addition to 
 those already in service. It is now possible to transmit 
 messages simultaneously from four high-power radio 
 stations to European stations and at the same time re- 
 ceive dispatches from several European stations. 
 
 The Naval Communication Service is cooperating with 
 the State Department and the Committee on Public In- 
 formation in the broadcasting of information of advan- 
 tage to the United States to all parts of the world by 
 high-power radio. 
 
 Official dispatches by trans-Atlantic radio are handled 
 not only for the departments of this Government, but 
 also between foreign embassies here with their home 
 offices abroad. It has been the aim of the Naval Com- 
 
198 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 munication Service to create, for the benefit of this coun- 
 try and its allies, practical, fast and exact radio com- 
 munication with Europe, supplementing the cables and 
 to a certain extent relieving them of the heavy traffic 
 brought on by the war. The results accomplished are 
 satisfactory. 
 
 CABLE CENSORSHIP. 
 
 The office of the chief cable censor, which administers 
 and regulates cable censorship as a whole, is in the Navy 
 Department ; and local stations, where the actual cen- 
 soring of cablegrams is for the most part done, are main- 
 tained at the points of cable landings within the United 
 States and its territorial possessions. 
 
 Close contact has been established and maintained 
 with the various departments of the Government, and 
 also with the special governmental boards and bureaus, 
 the War Trade Board, the Food Administration, the 
 Shipping Board, the Alien Property Custodian, etc. 
 
 As a result of the cooperation of cable censorship, 
 these governmental agencies have been enabled to con- 
 duct their work more effectively ; they have received from 
 cable censorship a very positive assistance in the execu- 
 tion of their policies and have, in many instances, fur- 
 ther received special information, gleaned from the 
 cables, which has resulted in the saving of large sums 
 of money. Further coordination of action has been at- 
 tained by close contact with the censorships of Great 
 Britain, France, Portugal, Brazil, and Cuba. Repre- 
 sentatives of cable censorship are also placed at every 
 station of postal censorship, and a satisfactory system 
 has been developed by which inconsistent policies be- 
 tween the two censorships have been avoided. 
 
 POWERFUL RADIO PLANT COMPLETED. 
 
 Hawaii, situated as it is at the "crossroads of the 
 Pacific," whether in the piping times of peace or in the 
 midst of war's alarms, will always demand our attention 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 199 
 
 and consideration. While the needs for men and ma- 
 terial in other parts of the theater of war have lessened 
 our activities in the Pacific, yet this important outpost in 
 that sea has not been neglected and work on the original 
 plans for its development, with necessary modifications, 
 has been continued as far as circumstances permitted. 
 At the outbreak of the war, acting promptly and accord- 
 ing to prearranged plans, our naval people took over six 
 commercial radio stations and in 48 hours placed them 
 under naval control. In this same field the great Pearl 
 Harbor radio plant, one of the most powerful in the 
 world, was pushed to completion and now forms a link 
 in the chain of communications to our far distant sta- 
 tions. 
 
 IMPORTANT WORK OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
 
 The exigencies of war have imposed new and impor- 
 tant duties upon Naval Intelligence. In peace the func- 
 tion of this agency of the Navy Department is to keep 
 in touch with naval problems, naval expansion, and 
 naval interest in all the countries of the world so that the 
 President, the naval administration, and the responsible 
 naval leaders in Congress may have access to the latest 
 information with reference to naval affairs abroad. Its 
 reports from naval attaches in the leading countries and 
 from other sources furnish the General Board, the Chief 
 of Operations, and the bureaus data which gives them 
 the benefit of what has been learned or put into practice 
 in other countries. During the war its duties abroad 
 have increased many fold ; at home it has — in touch with 
 the 15 naval districts and branch offices — done a most im- 
 portant work in protecting naval and other plants mak- 
 ing war material ; preventing sabotage, and in keeping 
 an eye on alien enemies or others with a destructive pro- 
 pensity. Close cooperation has been had with the De- 
 partments of State, War, Justice, Treasury, and Labor, 
 and, in addition, with the War Trade Board, the United 
 States Shipping Board, and the Alien Property Custo- 
 
200 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 dian. The interchange of information and the results 
 of investigations with these departments of the Govern- 
 ment have been most effective and valuable to the prose- 
 cution of the war. 
 
 A detailed account of the work of the office may not 
 be stated as it is of a highly confidential character, but, 
 generally speaking, the scope of its activities include 
 observation, investigation, and report of all subjects 
 affecting the Navy and the prosecution of the war from 
 a naval point of view. It includes naval operations at 
 sea and on land, the status, changes, and progress of 
 the material and personnel of foreign navies, and a close 
 counterespionage watch at home. This latter includes 
 the investigation of unauthorized radio stations, of alien 
 enemies and suspects, of matters connected with the cable 
 and mail censorship which affect the Navy, the protec- 
 tion of water fronts and vessels, and of plants having 
 contracts with the Navy Department with a view of safe- 
 guarding those plants against sabotage. 
 
 The guarding of our ships while in port and the 
 guarding against the danger from enemy agents among 
 the passengers and crews on both our trans-Atlantic and 
 coastwise ships have been largely performed by the 
 Office of Naval Intelligence, and the results achieved 
 bear eloquent witness to the efficiency of the service ren- 
 dered. 
 
 WORK OF THE GENERAL BOARD. 
 
 The General Board, of which the late George Dewey, 
 the Admiral of the Navy, was long the head, has given 
 wise counsel during this year when the study of naval 
 strategy and naval needs has had practical application 
 in actual warfare. Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger, 
 chairman of executive committee, and other able offi- 
 cers of the board, in addition to their illuminating re- 
 ports, have been in intimate touch with the Secretary 
 of the Navy and the Chief of Operations and with the 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 201 
 
 officers of allied navies in our country, and their advice 
 has been of the greatest value. 
 
 The work of the General Board for the fiscal year 
 ending June 30, 1918, included action upon all questions 
 referred to it by the Secretary of the Navy for investi- 
 gation and recommendation. In addition, the General 
 Board has from time to time made such suggestions and 
 recommendations to the department as in its judgment 
 were called for by the progress of the war. 
 
 Many of the questions proposed have required care- 
 ful research and a knowledge of the latest and most 
 approved practice at home and abroad. In order that 
 the board might have the latest and best information 
 upon all subjects connected with service operations and 
 technical matters, officers returning to the United States 
 from duty in the war zones have been invited to appear 
 before the General Board and an official stenographic 
 record has been kept of their observation of actual war 
 conditions and their opinions and recommendations with 
 regard to service methods, practices, and mechanisms. 
 
 SUBJECTS BOARD HAS ACTED UPON. 
 
 The scope of the work of the General Board is indi- 
 cated in the following partial list of subjects that have 
 been acted upon. 
 
 PAPERS REFERRED FOR THE ACTION OF THE BOARD. 
 
 Antiaircraft defense of naval stations. 
 
 Defense plans for naval districts. 
 
 Purchase of certain Pacific islands. 
 
 Comments and recommendations on quarterly reports 
 of bureaus on preparations for war. 
 
 Discussion of types of seaplanes and seaplane carriers. 
 
 Tactics and strategy of submarines. 
 
 Proposed operations against submarines. 
 
 The use of homing pigeons by the Navy. 
 
 Sovereignty and control over islands and harbors in 
 Caribbean and Panama. 
 
202 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Defense of the Panama Canal ; organization of naval 
 forces ; mine and net defenses. 
 
 Searchlight illumination in naval operations. 
 
 Seaplane catapults for battle and scout cruisers. 
 
 Acquisition of naval-station site, Fonseca Bay, Hon- 
 duras. 
 
 Recommendations upon suggestions for the conduct 
 of the war. 
 
 Distribution and employment of drifting mines. 
 
 The proposed purchase and operation by the Govern- 
 ment of the Cape Cod Canal. 
 
 Proposed construction of a mine barrier in the North 
 Sea. 
 
 Proposed measures to prevent German submarines 
 from operating against allied commerce in the Atlantic. 
 
 Plans for defense of Guam and plans for construction 
 of operating base. 
 
 Types of vessels for offensive use against submarines. 
 
 Design of new submarines. 
 
 General aeronautical policy of the United States. 
 
 Treaty concerning prizes captured during present war. 
 
 Reply to German Government re reciprocal repatria- 
 tion of sanitary personnel. 
 
 Guns for long-range bombardment. 
 
 Shore mounting of heavy guns. 
 
 Ownership of islands and reefs pending in the Pacific 
 Ocean and elsewhere. 
 
 Mine-laying arrangements for destroyers. 
 
 Plan for blockading enemy coast by submarines. 
 
 Subroarine devices for detection of submarines. 
 
 Plans for proposed patrol boats. 
 
 Proposed removal of guns from battleships. 
 
 THE navy's part IN THE UPBUILDING OF OUR MERCHANT 
 MARINE. 
 
 The Navy has always had very much at heart the 
 upbuilding of a merchant marine, for from this source 
 it must largely draw its supply of seafaring men needed 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 203 
 
 to man our naval craft. Therefore, it very early became 
 a matter of extreme importance to the Navy to ascer- 
 tain the best way in which this large merchant service 
 which was being built by the Emergency Fleet Corpora- 
 tion, and which had been requisitioned by the Shipping 
 Board, could be put to efficient war work. Plans were 
 worked out in cooperation with the Shipping Board and 
 with the Army whereby all of the ships turned over for 
 Navy purposes, the cargo ships turned over to the War 
 Department for supplying their Army abroad, and ves- 
 sels of a certain size running through the war zone 
 should be manned by naval crews. 
 
 Had the war been of a different character, it is possi- 
 ble that merchant shipping might not have been dislo- 
 cated to the extent that it was, but the character of the 
 war was such that practically every commercial interest 
 disappeared and all interests became military in their 
 character. The needs of the Army alone, both in troops 
 and supplies, were so great as to practically demand the 
 turning over to their use, not only all of our own avail- 
 able tonnage, but such allied tonnage as could be char- 
 tered. It, therefore, appeared quite necessary that this 
 tonnage operating for a military purpose should be under 
 'strict military control, which in so far as transporting 
 across sea was concerned was a naval matter. Above 
 all, the character of the warfare waged by enemy sub- 
 marines was such that at no time could the seas be called 
 free, and there was the constant menace to crew and 
 cargo which required the highest technical skill to com- 
 bat it. For these reasons it became necessary to man 
 with naval crews those vessels that crossed the war zone, 
 and in this matter the Shipping Board and War De- 
 partment heartily concurred. The troop transports were, 
 from the very beginning, manned with naval crews, as 
 it was recognized that the lives of our soldiers could 
 only, on the seas, be entrusted to those whose experience 
 fitted them to give the maximum amount of safety. The 
 wisdom of this policy is shown by the results, in the 
 
204 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 number of troops and cargo safely transported across 
 the Atlantic. 
 
 With the end of this war, another problem will face 
 the Navy. If it is considered to be the policy that the 
 upbuilding of war-devastated Europe and furnishing 
 food for its peoples will be a governmental problem to 
 be administered by us as a Nation, this important service 
 should be performed by that Government organization 
 best fitted to cope with the problem. If this be the case, 
 the military problems of the past year and a half merely 
 merge themselves into economic problems similar to 
 those which we as a nation have just successfully coped 
 with. Then it may be that the Army organizations 
 which have so successfully ministered to our forces in 
 France will be called upon to supply food for the starv- 
 ing millions. If that be so, then the Navy would proper- 
 ly be called upon to man the ships for this purpose and 
 while the process of demobilization goes on, in so far 
 as our lesser purely military units are concerned, it may 
 be necessary for a number of years to come for the 
 Navy to take an important part in the merchant marine 
 service. 
 
 NAVAL OVERSEAS TRANSPORTATION SERVICE. 
 
 On January 9, 1918, the Naval Overseas Transporta- 
 tion Service was established, owing to the foreseen neces- 
 sity to expeditiously supply the naval forces in foreign 
 waters and to assist the Army if necessary with their 
 tremendous task of transporting and supplying the 
 American Expeditionary Force in France. This organi- 
 zation sprang into being almost overnight, and has 
 proved its right to be reckoned as one of the most im- 
 portant and successful operations of the Navy. 
 
 At the outbreak of the war the lack of an American 
 merchant marine was immediately felt. The United 
 States Shipping Board was authorized, and the vast task 
 of creating a merchant marine was undertaken. The 
 United States was without a sufficiently large trained 
 merchant marine personnel, as the seagoing population 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 205 
 
 of this country was small compared to that which fol- 
 lowed the pursuits on shore. The difficulty of obtaining 
 this trained personnel to man the vast American mer- 
 chant marine was immediately felt, and the Navy De- 
 partment was ready to assist in every way. It was asked 
 to man immediately two vessels, in order to hasten their 
 departure overseas, and from this inception the Naval 
 Overseas Transportation Service has grown in lo rnonths 
 to a fleet of 321 cargo-carrying ships aggregating a 
 dead-weight tonnage of 2,800,000, and numerically 
 nearly equalling the combined Cunard, Hamburg-Ameri- 
 can, and North German Lloyd Lines at the outbreak of 
 the war. Of this number 227 ships represented vessels 
 previously in operation. From the Emergency Fleet 
 Corporation the Navy has taken over for operation 94 
 new vessels, aggregating 700,000 dead-weight tons. On 
 March 21, 1918, by order of the President 101 Dutch 
 merchant vessels were taken over by the Navy Depart- 
 ment pending their allocation to the various vital trades 
 of this country, and 26 of these vessels are now a part 
 of the naval overseas fleet. This vast fleet of cargo 
 vessels has been officered and manned through enroll- 
 ment of the seagoing personnel of the American mer- 
 chant marine, officers and men of the United States 
 Navy, and the assignment after training of graduates 
 of technical schools and training stations, developed by 
 the Navy since the United States entered the war. 
 
 There are required for the operation of this fleet at 
 the present time 5,000 officers and 29,000 enlisted men, 
 and adequate arrangements for future needs of per- 
 sonnel have been provided. The Navy has risen to the 
 exacting demands imposed upon it by the war, and it 
 will certainly be a source of pride to the American peo- 
 ple to know that within 10 months of the time that this 
 new force was created, in spite of the many obstacles 
 in the way of its accomplishment, an American naval 
 vessel, manned by an American naval crew leaves an 
 Arnerican port on the average of every five hours, carry- 
 ing subsistence and equipment so vital to the American 
 
206 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 Expeditionary Force. I would be derelict in my duty 
 unless I expressed my keenest appreciation and heartiest 
 admiration for those men of the Naval Overseas Trans- 
 portation Service who have traveled the lonely lanes of 
 the ocean, which have been for so long infested with the 
 menacing submarine. These terrors have not been re- 
 garded as terrors by this personnel. They have braved 
 the dangers most willingly and have thereby exemplified 
 the best traditions of the Navy of the United States. In 
 the many engagements with the enemy submarines our 
 fleet has necessarily suffered, but it is believed that the 
 losses of the enemy have been relatively much greatei' 
 than ours. 
 
 AN ENGINEERING WAR. 
 
 It is a truism to say that, both on land and sea, this 
 is very largely an engineering war. On ship and shore 
 and in the air its mighty enginery is, in its destructive 
 power, its transports and control, a product of the 
 chemistry of explosives and of engineering in all its 
 branches. It is the engineer, too, who, girdling the 
 earth with wireless telegraphy, has given means of in- 
 stant communication between a Government and its fleets 
 and armies half a world away. 
 
 ELECTRIC PROPULSION A GREAT ADVANCE. 
 
 The most striking engineering accomplishment during 
 the year was the completion of the electrically propelled 
 battleship New Mexico, the results of whose trials con- 
 firm the judgment of the department in adopting this 
 type of machinery for the battle cruisers, and mark an 
 engineering advance which will affect battleship con- 
 struction the world over. Electric propulsion had its 
 inception in the Navy, having first been applied in the 
 collier Jupiter, where its superior advantages were so 
 clearly demonstrated that the Bureau of Steam Engineer- 
 ing recommended it for adoption in the New Mexico and 
 subsequent battleships, and still later in the high-pow- 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 207 
 
 ered battle cruisers. It will be recalled that this decision 
 of the department led to the bitterest criticism not only 
 from engineers pecuniarily interested in other types of 
 machinery but also from others eminent in their pro- 
 fession who had no pecuniary interest, but who feared 
 that we were embarking upon an experiment that would 
 be fraught with national calamity. Despite the criti- 
 cism of these eminent engineers, the decision of the Navy 
 Department, supported by the judgment of the best 
 electrical engineers in the country, was followed in the 
 full conviction that no mistake was being made. 
 
 "new Mexico" met with every test. 
 
 The wisdom of this decision has been amply vindi- 
 cated by the performance of the New Mexico, which has 
 been tested in every way, her trials including many more 
 than those specified in the contract. She has failed in 
 none of them ; the operation of her machinery has been 
 highly satisfactory in every respect; and to-day, in this 
 unique vessel, the United States Navy has a battleship 
 which has no peer in the world's navies, not only for 
 economic propulsion and less liability to serious derange- 
 ment, but for her military superiority in greater maneuv- 
 ering power and increased underwater protection. As 
 so often before, American ingenuity and inventive skill 
 now lead the world in the propelling machinery of bat- 
 tleships. 
 
 repair of GERMAN SHIPS. 
 
 When war was declared with Germany all the German 
 ships lying in our ports, many of them of the highest 
 class of trans-Atlantic passenger steamers, were im- 
 mediately taken over by our Government. Upon exam- 
 ination by our officers, it was found that the machinery 
 of all of them had been deliberately damaged by their 
 crews, in many cases seriously, and the character of the 
 injury was such as to denote that the work had been 
 carried out under a central direction and that it had 
 been well planned. 
 
208 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 When taken over, these ships, to the number of 103, 
 were put under control of the Shipping Board, which 
 later transferred 34 of them to the Navy for use as 
 troop and freight transports, and subsequently added 
 20 more to be repaired and returned to the board. 
 
 The principal damage was the breaking of cast-iron 
 parts of the main engines, chiefly the cylinders, though in 
 one case piston rods, connecting rods, and boiler stays 
 were sawed half in two, and in others the boilers were 
 ruined by dry-firing and had to be renewed. There was, 
 in addition, much vandalism of a minor character, but 
 the remedying of this was insignificant in comparison 
 with the gigantic task of repairing the cylinders, some 
 of which were more than 9 feet in diameter. 
 
 ELECTRIC WELDING SOLVED CYLINDER PROBLEM. 
 
 It was speedily recognized that the large passenger 
 ships thus taken over would have to be our chief re- 
 liance in transporting troops to France, and their quick 
 repair became a matter of great national interest. After 
 a survey by representatives of the Shipping Board, which 
 at the time had custody of them, it was decided to make 
 new cylinders. This decision was in accord with usual 
 practice and also with the rules of marine underwriters, 
 and but for the number of ships and the large number 
 of cylinders involved would probably have been fol- 
 lowed. But the time required was prohibitive and while 
 the subject was under discussion a few of the ships were 
 transferred to the Navy and sent to the New York Navy 
 Yard for repairs. 
 
 As the Navy was not bound either by previous prac- 
 tice or the rules of marine insurance societies, the engi- 
 neer officer of the yard, after conference with an electric 
 welding company, recommended that the broken cylin- 
 ders be repaired by welding, and in this he was heartily 
 supported by the industrial manager of the yard. The 
 matter was referred to the Bureau of Steam Engineering, 
 and the assistant to the bureau was directed to make a 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 209 
 
 thorough examination of all conditions on the ex-German 
 ships. As a result of his investigations, orders were 
 issued to make all repairs where possible by electric weld- 
 ing and to resort to mechanical patching only where 
 welding was impracticable. 
 
 PROVED A COMPLETE SUCCESS. 
 
 This decision, so far-reaching in its application and 
 so fraught with danger to the professional reputation of 
 the officers concerned, was made in the face *of opposition 
 by engine builders and by marine insurance companies 
 but with such confidence in the ultimate result as left 
 no room for doubt of its success. Electric welding was 
 well known, but its application on such an extensive 
 scale was unprecedented ; by its use these damaged cyl- 
 inders could be saved, the work could be done without 
 removing the cylinders, and all the vessels could be made 
 ready for service probably a year before they could have 
 been if the cylinders were renewed. 
 
 Upon completion of repairs, which were carried out 
 uninterruptedly for 24 hours a day, each vessel was sent 
 to sea for a test under full-power conditions for 48 
 hours, the purpose being to ascertain whether the work 
 of repair had been well done and to determine whether 
 the ships were in condition to be intrusted with the trans- 
 portation of troops. So well and so successfully were 
 the repairs accomplished that there was not a single in- 
 stance of a defective weld, nor has one developed during 
 the months of arduous service on which these ships have 
 been engaged. 
 
 SAVED YEAR IN TIME AND $20,000,000. 
 
 I have entered upon so full a statement of this case 
 because I think it stands out as one of the greatest engi- 
 neering achievements of the period. The perpetrators of 
 the sabotage were confident that they had damaged the 
 machinery of these ships beyond repair, which fact is 
 
210 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 evidenced by a memorandum found on board one of 
 them, in which each case was carefully noted, followed 
 by the significant remark, "Can not be repaired" ; and 
 the speedy rehabilitation of these vessels in the face of 
 such German confidence is a splendid triumph of Amer- 
 ican ingenuity and an evidence of American engineering 
 accomplishment that is deserving of the highest com- 
 mendation. The restoration of these magnificent ships 
 to service reflects the greatest credit upon the naval offi- 
 cers concerned and upon the officers and employees of 
 the welding and engineering companies who carried out 
 the work. 
 
 As a side light on this work it has been made the sub- 
 ject of careful estimate and determination that the repair 
 of these ships resulted in a saving of 12 months in time, 
 enabled us to transport at least 500,000 troops to France, 
 and effected an economy which is conservatively esti- 
 mated at upwards of $20,000,000. 
 
 BUILDING 60 HEAVY GUNS FOR SERVICE IN FRANCE. 
 
 Owing to the changed conditions of warfare, it was 
 decided to remove the 7-inch guns from a number of 
 our battleships, substituting therefore a quicker firing 
 and lighter gun. It was at first believed that the most 
 effective use of the 7-inch guns could be made by plac- 
 ing them on railroad mountings, but Gen. Pershing said 
 he did not wish them in that form. 
 
 It was decided to place them on mobile mountings. 
 In the use of high-powered heavy artillery on land guns, 
 such as these and the Navy's 14 inch, railway mounts 
 had invariably been transported in carriages from which 
 on arrival at firing points it was necessary to shift them 
 to a firing mount. This destroyed to a great degree 
 their mobility. The Navy Ordnance Bureau in its 
 mount design sought and found a method of mounting 
 that would make heavy guns as mobile as field artillery. 
 The weight of this high-powered gun, however, throw- 
 ing a projectile weighing some 165 pounds, at a muzzle 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 211 
 
 velocity of 2,800 feet per second, rendered the use of 
 any wheeled gun carriage impossible. Accordingly, a 
 new type of mount was evolved in which the principle 
 of the caterpillar belt was utilized. Instead of wheels, 
 two long endless belts were provided, which so increased 
 the ground-bearing surface that the entire gun and 
 mount, which weigh in the neighborhood of 38 tons, 
 may be readily transported over rough and newly made 
 ground. Twenty of these mounts are now nearing com- 
 pletion. When finished they will be manned by a regi-. 
 ment of picked Marines, the equipment for which has 
 been furnished by the bureau. 
 
 The first two mounts have been tested and proved 
 eminently satisfactory. Following the test of the first 
 7-inch mount, the Army requested the Navy to furnish 
 it with 36 guns similarly mounted ; construction of these 
 mounts is progressing rapidly. 
 
 STAR SHELLS REPLACE SEARCHLIGHTS IN ILLUMINATING 
 ENEMY VESSELS AT NIGHT. 
 
 The American Navy has developed a shell which, 
 when fired in the vicinity of any enemy fleet, will light 
 it up, make it visible, and thus render it an easy target. 
 This most recent naval development is in response to the 
 demand for some means of searching out the enemy at 
 night. For many years the need of lighting the enemy 
 for night battle has been supplied by high-powered 
 searchlights, but the ever-increasing range of naval artil- 
 lery outstripped the development of the searchlight and 
 some more effective method was necessary. 
 
 There was an additional objection to the use of 
 searchlights which the star shell overcomes. The beam 
 i)f the searchlight at night, no matter how well screened 
 and how well focused, presents a single pencil only 
 and exerts a confusing and dazzling effect upon near-by 
 observers. A yet more objectionable feature exists; the 
 searchlight indicates the position of the vessel, so that 
 the enemy has a clearly defined point of aim, steady 
 
212 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 and continuous, rather than only the intermittent flash 
 of gunfire which, in the absence of the searchlight would 
 alone be a means of illuminating his target. 
 
 These shells will be supplied to the vessels of our 
 Navy so that they may illuminate the enemy at night 
 as a target for their guns, without disclosing the posi- 
 tion of our own ships. Not only, however, will we be 
 able to use them for actual battle, but they will prove 
 serviceable in the examination of suspicious objects, such 
 as suspected submarines and vessels of any description 
 met with at night. It is believed that this development 
 alone represents an increase in the night-fighting effi- 
 ciency of our naval vessels by at least 25 per cent. 
 
 The illuminating portion of the shell consists of a 
 single light, or star, attached to a parachute. A unique 
 expedient has been adopted to prevent the aggregate rush 
 of wind resulting from the high speed of the shell while 
 in flight from extinguishing the light after the explosion 
 of the shell. The velocity of the light and parachute 
 has been reduced by expelling the contents of the shell 
 through the base, and in this manner the light and para- 
 chute acquire a rearward velocity practically compensat- 
 ing for the forward velocity of the shell. 
 
 U. S. NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. 
 
 {Extracts from the Report of Admiral Mayo, Com- 
 mander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.) 
 
 Cooperation with the allied navies in general is effected 
 by means of the Allied Naval War Council, which meets 
 monthly or as may be deemed advisable. The member- 
 ship is composed of the several naval ministers and naval 
 chiefs of staff and of officers specifically appointed to 
 represent them in their absence. Vice Admiral Sims 
 is the United States naval representative. The secre- 
 tariat of the council is composed of British officers and 
 personnel, with officers of the allied navies designated 
 for liaison duties therewith. 
 
 The Allied Naval Council has advisory functions only 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 213 
 
 and has liaison with the Supreme War Council, with a 
 view to coordinating and unifying allied naval effort, 
 both as regards naval work only and as regards unity 
 of action with military or land effort. Proposals made 
 by the several allied navies are considered and definite 
 steps recommended to be taken in the premises. As well 
 the naval aspects of military (land) proposals are ex- 
 amined into and passed upon. Conversely military 
 (land) aspects of naval activities are referred to the 
 Supreme War Council for consideration. 
 
 The Allied Naval Counsel has had, in common with 
 the Supreme War Council, until last spring, the handi- 
 cap of being only advisory in function. The conclusions 
 are recommended to the several Governments for adop- 
 tion, but there is no common instrumentality for carry- 
 ing into effect measures which require cooperation or 
 coordination. This state of affairs in the Supreme War 
 Council has been remedied by the appointment of an 
 allied commander in chief in the person of Marshal 
 Foch. 
 
 There can be no doubt but that the Supreme War 
 Council has met and that the Allied Naval Council con- 
 tinues to fill a great need as a sort of clearing house for 
 the necessarily varied proposals of the several Govern- 
 ments, most of which require cooperation on the part of 
 some other Government, and certainly it should be con- 
 tinued in being until a more forceful control of allied 
 naval effort can be agreed upon and brought into effect. 
 
 The United States naval staff representative in Paris 
 is the United States naval liaison officer with the Su- 
 preme War Council, and a member of the staff of Vice 
 Admiral Sims is the liaison officer with the secretariat 
 of the Allied Naval Council. The United States naval 
 staff representative in Paris is also liaison officer at the 
 French Ministry of Marine and is at present naval at- 
 tache as well. 
 
 The naval attache to Italy maintains naval liaison 
 with the Italian Ministry of Marine and keeps in touch 
 with the United States naval activities in Italian waters. 
 
214 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 ACTIVITIES IN COOPERATION WITH THE BRITISH. 
 
 Inasmuch as the British are predominant in naval 
 activity, it is natural to find that a major part of our 
 naval activities are in cooperation with them and con- 
 trolled by them. In fact, the British have been in 
 position to carry so much of the "naval load" of this 
 war that our first and our principal efforts have been 
 toward taking up a share of that load. 
 
 Cooperation has in many cases been carried to such 
 an extent that the coordination necessary for efficiency 
 has developed into practical consolidation. It is pleasing 
 to note that while consolidation is all but a fact, our 
 own naval forces have in every case preferred to pre- 
 serve their individuality of organization and administra- 
 tion and, as far as feasible, of operations ; and that a 
 healthy and friendly rivalry between them and their 
 British associates has resulted in much good to the per- 
 sonnel of both services. 
 
 UNITED STATES NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN IRELAND. 
 
 The largest single group of naval activities wherein 
 cooperation is effected with the British is that in Ire- 
 land, all of them being under the jurisdiction of the 
 commander in chief, coast of Ireland, who has been and 
 is Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, whose cordial appreciation 
 of the work of our forces has gone far to stimulate the 
 personnel coming under his direction. The chief of 
 staff, destroyer flotillas, and the officer in charge of 
 aviation in Ireland are designated by the British Ad- 
 miralty as members of the staff of Admiral Bayly. 
 
 Battleship division six is based on Berehaven, Ire- 
 land, in readiness for the protection of convoys in gen- 
 eral and of troop convoys in particular. 
 
 Submarine detachment is based on Berehaven, Ire- 
 land, and maintain a submarine patrol off the west and 
 south coasts of Ireland. Their service is hard; they 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 215 
 
 have had a great deal of work at sea and have cheer- 
 fully met every demand made on them. 
 
 The destroyers based at Queenstown are the 
 original United States naval force in European waters 
 — a distinction which is an ever-present spur to cheer- 
 ful efficiency under any and all circumstances and pro- 
 duces results which must be a satisfaction to their 
 superiors. 
 
 Subchaser detachment three at Queenstown had only 
 recently arrived, but arrangements for their employment 
 were well in hand, and they were expected to begin 
 operations as soon as the means of basing them had been 
 perfected. 
 
 United States Naval Air Stations in Ireland consists 
 of seaplane stations at Whiddy Island, Queenstown (also 
 the main supply and repair base), Wexford, and Lough 
 Foyle, and a kite-balloon station at Berehaven. None 
 of these stations was in operation in mid-September, 
 except that Lough Foyle was partially so, but all were 
 about ready to begin operations and would do so upon 
 the receipt of the necessary planes or pilots or both, all 
 of which were en route. A great deal of the construc- 
 tion has been done by our own personnel, some of the 
 stations having been entirely done by them. 
 
 Battleship Division Nine of the Atlantic Fleet, under 
 the command of Rear Admiral Rodman, has constituted 
 the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet 
 under Admiral Sir David Beatty for nearly a year. 
 
 When this division was sent abroad it had, in common 
 with other units of the Atlantic Fleet, suffered in effi- 
 ciency from the expansion of the Navy, which required 
 reduction in the number of officers and transfers of num- 
 bers of men to furnish trained and experienced nuclei 
 for other vessels. Upon reporting in the Grand Fleet, it 
 immediately took its place in the battle line on exactly 
 the same status as other units of the Grand Fleet. The 
 opportunities for gunnery exercises is limited but drill 
 and adherence to standardized methods and procedure 
 as developed in our own naval service have brought this 
 
216 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 division to a satisfactory state of efficiency which con- 
 tinues to improve. 
 
 It is pleasing to record that the efficiency of this unit 
 in gunnery, engineering, and seamanship is deemed by 
 the British commander in chief to be in no way inferior 
 to that of the best of the British battle squadrons. In 
 fact, it is perfectly proper to state the belief that our 
 ships are in some respects superior to the British, and 
 perhaps chiefly in the arrangements for the health and 
 contentment of personnel, which have been very thor- 
 oughly examined into by the flag officers, captains, and 
 other officers of the Grand Fleet. These ships have also 
 been the subject of much favorable comment in regard 
 to their capacity for self-maintenance, a matter which 
 has been given much attention in our own Navy of 
 late years. 
 
 Service in the Grand Fleet is noteworthy by reason 
 of the fact that the fleet is at never less than four 
 hours' notice for going to sea, so that liberty is 
 restricted and whatever is necessary in the way of over- 
 haul and upkeep of machinery must always be planned 
 with a view to assembly in case of orders to sea. 
 
 The mine force of the Atlantic Fleet under the com- 
 mand of Rear Admiral Strauss is an independent 
 unit, except that the mine-laying operations are un- 
 der the jurisdiction of the commander in chief of 
 the Grand Fleet, who has to choose the time when ar- 
 rangements can be carried into effect to furnish the 
 necessary destroyer escort and heavy covering forces. 
 The arrangements made at home prior to the departure 
 of the mine force appear to have been well considered 
 and thoroughly developed. The mine-laying operations 
 themselves give an impression of efficiency which can 
 only come from thorough preparation and complete 
 understanding of the work. 
 
 The cross-channel transport service was brought 
 into being to render indispensable assistance to the 
 British in ferrying United States troops across the chan- 
 nel from England, in whose ports over half of our 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 217 
 
 troops were landed from British ships. At the time of 
 inspection late in September four United States vessels 
 were in service, and four more were expected in the 
 course of a few weeks. The vessels in service were 
 superior in capacity to British vessels engaged in the 
 same work and combined with the efficiency of their 
 naval personnel made them the subject of favorable 
 remark by the British transport authorities. 
 
 Subchaser detachment one, based on Plymouth, 
 had been operating for some time. This base is to be 
 expanded into a United States naval base. The upkeep 
 of chasers is effected entirely with the resources of the 
 base ; operations are initiated by the British commander 
 in chief at Plymouth. A great deal of development 
 work in listening devices is being carried on at and 
 from this base. The work of the subchasers from this 
 base has proved their usefulness up to the limit of their 
 sea-going capacity. 
 
 United States naval aviation in England is carried 
 on by cooperation in two British commands. 
 
 The United States seaplane station. Killing holme, is 
 under the vice admiral commanding on the east coast 
 of England. It has been in operation for some time and 
 does escort of coastal convoys, escort of mine layers in 
 the southern part of the North Sea, and some reconnais- 
 sance work in the direction of the Dutch coast. 
 
 The northern bombing group is under the vice 
 admiral commanding at Dover, whose jurisdiction ex- 
 tends to naval aviation units in northern France in the 
 vicinity of Calais and Dunkerque. The day bombing 
 squadrons are manned by marines ; the night bombing 
 squadrons by the Navy. There has been some delay 
 in the acquisition of suitable night bombing planes, but 
 their delivery will find all in readiness to go immediately 
 to work. The British prescribe the objectives and 
 designate the available free flying time ; the operations 
 themselves are carried out by our own personnel. The 
 seaplane station at Dunkerque has operated successfully 
 
218 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 under the handicap of limited and difficult water area in 
 which to take off and to land. 
 
 The assembly, repair, and supply station at Eastleigh 
 was brought into being primarily for the Northern 
 Bombing Group because of the difficulties of transporta- 
 tion to and from the general aviation base at Pauillac. 
 It also does necessary work for Killingholme and for 
 the air stations in Ireland. This base, when visited, was 
 in process of completion and gave every evidence of pur- 
 pose and capacity to meet all requirements likely to be 
 made of it. 
 
 ACTIVITY IN COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH. 
 
 Aside from the cooperation effected by the force com- 
 mander with the French Ministry of Marine through 
 the naval staff representative in Paris on matters of 
 general policy, actual cooperation is carried on by Vice 
 Admiral H. B. Wilson, commander United States naval 
 forces in France, whose headquarters are maintained in 
 Brest. 
 
 It is deemed worthy of special remark that whereas 
 practically all cooperation with the British is effected 
 by operating as units under British control, coopera- 
 tion with the French is arranged on a basis that 
 leaves to the United States naval forces a very large 
 measure of initiative. This is particularly true in re- 
 gard to troopships destined to French ports, which are 
 provided with escort and routed in and out wholly from 
 the Brest headquarters which is kept fully informed as 
 to routes and positions of British-controlled convoys and 
 as to locations of submarine activities and has to so 
 adjust routes on and off the coast as to keep clear of 
 both. Three out of eight escort units are provided by 
 United States vessels for the coastal convoy system, 
 which is operated by the French. Unity of purpose and 
 sympathy of understanding have combined to make the 
 handling of cargo convoys on and off the coast a matter 
 of ready adjustment to the general conditions obtaining 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 219 
 
 in regard to destination of cargo ships and availability 
 of escort vessels. 
 
 At the end of the fiscal year United States naval 
 forces in France are stated to have been, escorting troops 
 into France at the rate of 134,000 per month. Since 
 May 1, 1918, the number of troopships and cargo-vessel 
 convoys east and west bound have averaged more than 
 1 a day, and the number of ships over 200 a month. No 
 convoy of troopships has failed to be met by destroyer 
 escort before entering the area of submarine activity, and 
 no passenger intrusted to the care of the United States 
 naval forces in France has been lost. 
 
 The destroyers based on Brest are controlled direct- 
 ly from headquarters at Brest and are at present main- 
 tained in readiness for service with the aid of the 
 fleet repair ship Prometheus and lately also by the 
 destroyer tender Bridgeport. Additional repair shops on 
 shore are in process of completion. 
 
 The United States naval repair facilities here as well 
 as elsewhere on the coast of France have to be made 
 use of not only for the upkeep of the United States 
 naval vessels based on the coast, but also for neces- 
 sary repairs to troopships and cargo vessels, whether 
 naval. Army, or Shipping Board, the guiding idea being 
 to keep the ships moving. 
 
 Costal districts in France. — The north and west 
 coasts of France are divided into districts which cor- 
 respond with the French prefectures maritimes, and 
 the district headquarters are in every case located in the 
 same place as those of the several prefects maritimes. 
 These headquarters are communication and operating 
 centers and provide naturally by arrangement as above 
 described for full and ready cooperation with the French 
 district activities. 
 
 The principal ports have assigned to them a port 
 officer whose function in regard to all United States 
 ships is to expedite their "turn around," and in addition, 
 where vessels carrying United States naval armed guards 
 are concerned, to inspect the armed guards and adjust 
 
220 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 such matters as are beyond the capacity or authority of 
 the armed guard commander. 
 
 United States naval aviation in France includes all 
 that the title implies, except the northern bombing group 
 mentioned above. 
 
 There are eight sea-plane stations, three dirigible 
 stations, and three kite-balloon stations all of which are 
 operated by district commanders in cooperation with the 
 French naval air services in the several corresponding 
 prefectures maritimes. There is also an assembly, re- 
 pair, and supply base at Pauillac for the general service 
 of all air stations in France and a sea-plane gunnery 
 and bombing training school at Moutchie, both of these 
 activities being directly under the headquarters in Brest. 
 
 Of the eight sea-plane stations, five have been in 
 operation for periods varying from 12 to 3 months, and 
 the remaining 3 are now about ready to begin. 
 
 Of the three dirigible stations, only that at Paim- 
 boeuf has been in operation for any length of time, and 
 is to be used also for training and experimental work. 
 
 Of the three kite-balloon stations, only that at Brest 
 is ready for operation. Test and experimental work 
 have been carried on here since August, 1918, in con- 
 nection with destroyers and yachts. 
 
 The assembly repair and supply station at Pauil- 
 lac has progressed rapidly to completion and is deemed 
 ready to undertake any and all demands that may be 
 made on it. 
 
 V. United States Naval Aviation in Europe. 
 
 The establishment of United States naval aviation in 
 Europe has been one of the most difficult and involved 
 tasks which have had to be undertaken and brought into 
 effect. 
 
 There were arrangements to be made with the French 
 and the British as to locations for stations that 
 would be best adapted for cooperation. There were fur- 
 
UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 221 
 
 ther arrangements to be made as to the procurement of 
 sites or the taking over of the stations already in opera- 
 tion or in process of construction. The Navy Depart- 
 ment had also to be communicated with, largely by cable, 
 as to design, quantities and shipments of material, which 
 upon receipt had to be allocated with a view to com- 
 pleting certain stations as soon as possible while not 
 delaying the progress of the general scheme any more 
 than could be helped. 
 
 Delays and mistakes in the shipment of aviation 
 material probably caused more trouble than any other 
 one thing, for when material once arrives in a European 
 port it has been, and still is, a very difficult matter to 
 arrange for coastwise transportation. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 Naval Lessons of the War 
 
 THE advance of naval science has increased 
 the complexities of ships and guns. Conse- 
 quently the problems to be solved are much more 
 intricate and perplexing, both in preparing mate- 
 rial and in the development of skill to operate the 
 material. This has emphasised the need of wise 
 naval management. One important lesson of the 
 war is the necessity of good plans, well understood 
 and well carried out. 
 
 Every first class navy has its planning depart- 
 ment. The duties of this department are deliber- 
 ative; to draw knowledge from past and current 
 events, to study strategy and tactics as practised 
 now and in the past, at home and abroad; to ad- 
 vise respecting navy yards, bases, and stations ; to 
 make recommendations as to the size, composition, 
 and disposition of fleets; to determine the char- 
 acteristics of speed, armour, and armament for 
 new ships ; in short, to make plans both for naval 
 preparations in time of peace and for employment 
 of the fleets in time of war. 
 
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 223 
 
 The present war has taught that an effective 
 navy is the logical defence for a country situated 
 like the United States. And by an effective navy 
 is meant, not an impotent navy like that of Spain 
 in 1898, nor a weaker navy like the one sur- 
 rendered under such humiliating conditions by 
 Germany in 1918, but one adequate to seek and 
 defeat enemy ships long before they can approach 
 our coasts, thus protecting outlying possessions and 
 the sea-borne trade so necessary to our national 
 life ; in other words, by an effective navy is meant 
 one which stands for world-wide respect for le- 
 gitimate American interests; one which is ready, 
 if need be, to defend these interests in all parts 
 of the world. 
 
 To determine what should be the composition 
 of such a fleet is a difficult problem and to under- 
 stand the details requires expert technical knowl- 
 edge. These technical details are the province 
 of naval experts. The principles, however, from 
 which these details are deduced are not hard to 
 understand, and they are of first importance as 
 the foundation on which the entire structure of 
 naval defence rests. 
 
 A fairly definite idea of the work which has 
 to be done in order to make the sea power of the 
 United States an effective guarantor of national 
 security may be arrived at through a discussion 
 
224 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 of the various types of warships, noting briefly 
 their characteristics, their uses, and the propor- 
 tionate numerical strength of each class required 
 in building up a well-balanced United States 
 Navy. The estimates which follow have to be 
 made in the light of the best obtainable infor- 
 mation. They are approximate and subject to 
 modification from time to time to meet new condi- 
 tions resulting from unforeseen developments. It 
 is always to be remembered that the struggle for 
 control of the seas is an ever-present spur to in- 
 vention and progress in the development of the 
 weapons used. Old ships are constantly being re- 
 placed by new models. Hence the relative value 
 of the respective units may vary somewhat from 
 year to year. 
 
 It is a race for the largest stakes that the world 
 has to offer. Control of the seas is the objective, 
 and the nation which gains this control is the one 
 that maintains a fleet able to take and keep the 
 seas in all weathers, and powerful enough to over- 
 come the strongest enemy fleet that it may en- 
 counter. Although the particular kinds of ships 
 and guns used in answering the demands of nav al 
 strength come and go in continual evolution, still, 
 these broad general demands of sea power remain 
 the same. It is better, therefore, to study the ab- 
 stract requirements of sea power and to note the 
 
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 225 
 
 trend of naval development in meeting these re- 
 quirements than to rivet attention on the par- 
 ticular types of ships now in use as though they 
 were immutable and incapable of being deposed. 
 
 The cornerstone of naval power is the gun ; and 
 the measure of a nation's sea power is the strength 
 of her battleship fleet. In spite of the develop- 
 ment of the mine and torpedo into important fac- 
 tors, the high-power naval gun is still supreme; 
 so it has been in the past; so it is now; and so it 
 probably will continue to be in the future. 
 
 As has previously been pointed out, the only ef- 
 fective naval defence is a fleet strong enough to 
 keep the enemy at a distance. A navy adequate 
 to defend must be sufficiently powerful either to 
 defeat the enemy fleet on the high seas or to con- 
 tain it in enemy home ports. The main reliance 
 of such an effective navy is the long-range gun. 
 
 There is general agreement among experts as 
 to this principle, that the gun is the prime consid- 
 eration in naval warfare; but the different types 
 installed in the newest ships of the various coun- 
 tries indicate somewhat divergent views as to what 
 is the best design of naval gun. It is obvious that 
 the heavier the projectile and the harder it hits 
 the more will be the damage done. In a general 
 way the principal considerations are: First, ac- 
 curacy; second, high velocity; third, weight of 
 
226 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 projectile; fourth, capacity of the gun to sustain 
 continuous fire; and fifth, rapidity, or volume of 
 fire. It is thus seen that the size of the projectile 
 is limited by the efficiency of the propelling power 
 and by the structural capacities of the gun and 
 mount. In other words, the heavier the shell, con- 
 sistent with high velocity, long range, and ac- 
 curacy, the better; but if the structural durability 
 of the gun is threatened, or if velocity and ac- 
 curacy are sacrificed in order to throw a heavier 
 projectile, a point is soon reached where damaging 
 power is lost instead of gained. 
 
 The varying conditions of sea and visibility un- 
 der which naval actions may be fought also tend 
 to modify the effectiveness of the different sizes 
 and designs of guns according to the circumstances 
 which may exist at the time of any particular en- 
 gagement. The gun which would win a fight at 
 close range in misty weather might be defeated by 
 the same enemy gun on a clear day at long range. 
 At the shorter ranges the gun of moderate size 
 might dominate a larger and more powerful enemy 
 gun by greater rapidity and volume of fire. Al- 
 though this is a contingency to be reckoned with, 
 still, the present tendency is to increase the size 
 of the projectile as fast as improvements in the 
 powder and gun structure permit; and this tend- 
 ency appears to be one likely to continue in the 
 
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 227 
 
 future. We may expect, therefore, that the size 
 of naval guns will increase step by step with sci- 
 entific improvements in gun construction and 
 powder. 
 
 It is always a good thing to reduce a problem 
 to its simplest terms. It is fair to assume that 
 overwhelming naval opinion is in favour of the 
 fleet of battleships as the one great factor in sea 
 power. There is also the same indorsement of 
 gun power as the primary requisite of the fleet 
 of battleships. Keeping these two things in mind 
 we can concentrate on the main terms of naval 
 strength without confusing the discussion by intro- 
 ducing the complex details of the modern battle- 
 ship. The problem of adequate naval defence is 
 to provide seaworthy mobile gun platforms capa- 
 ble of mounting and maintaining a superior num- 
 ber of powerful guns in position against the 
 enemy. 
 
 The maintenance of the guns and the mainte- 
 nance of their service, which includes all the ma- 
 terial and personnel of the ship, must necessarily 
 be contained in the gun platform — and conditions 
 on the sea arbitrarily divide the guns into groups 
 mounted on each battleship platform. Thus the 
 problem of the battleship is reduced to finding the 
 best possible group of guns, self-maintained upon 
 a properly mobile platform, that will act in unison 
 
228 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 with other similar gun platforms. Protection of 
 the gun and its platform increases the efficiency 
 of the gun on the sea. Consequently a battleship 
 should be the best possible group of guns, ar- 
 moured, and mounted upon an armoured gun plat- 
 form that is self-maintaining and sufficiently mo- 
 bile. Thinking in these terms, the three compo- 
 nent factors of armament, armour, and speed re- 
 main in their right proportion. 
 
 Since the gun is the prime consideration, the 
 other characteristics of a battleship depend upon 
 what design of ship is considered most serviceable 
 for the purpose of the gun. Some idea of the re- 
 quirements of a battleship may be had by keeping 
 in mind that it is desirable to mount as many 
 guns in one ship as is consistent with having a 
 homogeneous fleet possessing tactical mobility, 
 adequate speed, long cruising radius, seaworthi- 
 ness, habitability, and protection from the blows 
 of the enemy whether delivered from above or 
 below the water. It requires careful weighing of 
 proportionate advantages and disadvantages to 
 harmonise these characteristics into the combina- 
 tion which will produce the best possible type of 
 battleship. 
 
 The advantages of ships of large tonnage over 
 smaller vessels are many ; more heavy guns can be 
 carried, the platform is steadier, the cruising ra- 
 
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 229 
 
 dius is larger, the habitability and seaworthiness 
 are better, and more effective means of protection 
 can be installed. On the other hand, there is a 
 limit of size beyond which the advantages are out- 
 weighed by the disadvantages ; the question of ex- 
 pense enters, and any very large increase in the 
 size of warships might be argued against on the 
 grounds that it would be like putting "too many 
 eggs in one basket." Manoeuvring abilities are 
 adversely affected by very large displacements, 
 and the depths of the various waterways as well as 
 the accommodations of canals and dry docks im- 
 pose definite limits to the size of ships. 
 
 On the whole it may be expected that the tend- 
 ency to increase the tonnage of battleships will 
 continue for some time. It would also appear an 
 improvident policy for any country to increase the 
 size of its battleships by radical changes of large 
 increments, because this would entail expense 
 and a bad effect upon the homogeneity of the fleet. 
 These objections might easily outweigh the ad- 
 vantages gained. It may be assumed, therefore, 
 that future increase in the size of warships will be 
 a gradual growth, with a probably decreasing ac- 
 celeration. 
 
 The fleet of battleships alone does not consti- 
 tute a navy. Scouts, destroyers, submarines and 
 other auxiliaries are needed. In order that the 
 
230 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 United States may make good defence of her 
 great surrounding oceans it is particularly im- 
 portant that her battle fleet should have a far 
 flung service of scouts to give information of tne 
 movements of the enemy. An adequate air serv- 
 ice, including airships, aeroplanes, and captive 
 balloons, is, for obvious reasons, indispensable to 
 the modern fleet. Destroyers are needed to at- 
 tack and confuse the enemy ships, and at the 
 same time guard their own large ships from simi- 
 lar attacks. Submarines are necessa'ry to help de- 
 fend the coasts and also to operate as a tactical 
 sub-division of the fleet. Mine layers are needed 
 to harass and menace enemy ships, while mine 
 sweepers and patrols are required to search for 
 enemy mines and submarines. In addition to 
 these combatant units, auxiliaries, including trans- 
 ports, repair ships, hospital ships, and supply 
 ships, are essential to the life and vigour of a fight- 
 ing navy. 
 
 The floating instruments of sea power, more- 
 over, must be backed by suitably situated and 
 properly defended permanent bases and navy 
 yards in which ships may seek rest and rehabili- 
 tation. Strategically situated island possessions 
 are also needed for naval bases, by which lines of 
 communication may be kept open to such tempo- 
 
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 231 
 
 rary advance bases as the requirements of a par- 
 ticular campaign may demand. 
 
 It is thus seen that, while relative naval power 
 is primarily measured by the strength of the re- 
 spective battleship fleets of the various naval pow- 
 ers a navy should also possess these necessary 
 auxiliaries in order to attain its maximum ef- 
 fectiveness. The first-mentioned auxiliaries, the 
 scouts, are a most important adjunct. 
 
 The battle cruiser is the most powerful type of 
 scout, and in addition to high speed has great 
 offensive powers, together with endurance and a 
 moderate protection of armour. While the chief 
 function of this type is to get information, it has, 
 because of these offensive and defensive charac- 
 teristics, additional uses. The battle cruiser may 
 fight for information and break through a hostile 
 screen; she may support the lighter craft of her 
 own fleet, beat back enemy scouts and guard the 
 main body from surprise ; she may be used to pro- 
 tect national sea routes and attack those of the 
 enemy; and in battle she may operate as a fast 
 wing and take a position favourable for using both 
 guns and torpedoes. 
 
 But the chief utility of the battle cruiser is 
 now held to be that of a scout and raider, pos- 
 sessed of the power to dominate any such craft of 
 other type. Yet the gain of this advantage means 
 
232 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 that one unit has been built instead of several — 
 and, as it would appear that a number of scouts is 
 more useful than one individual, except in un- 
 usual conditions, the wisdom of building one bat- 
 tle cruiser instead of several scouts is questionable. 
 The information service of a fleet requires a 
 large number of scouts, and in order to produce 
 them without undue cost the light cruiser has been 
 developed, small in size and lightly armoured, 
 but with adequate speed and cruising radius for 
 scout duty. As before stated, the unarmoured 
 light cruiser, carrying torpedoes and intermediate 
 guns, may be regarded as a development of the 
 destroyer; it is larger, more habitable, carries 
 larger guns, and is more useful as a scout. The 
 ultimate development of the light cruiser would 
 appear to be a larger unarmoured ship with great 
 speed, carrying torpedoes and a few of the most 
 powerful naval guns. Such a ship could outrun 
 anything it could not fight, and it would take al- 
 most an equal number of battle cruisers to deny 
 information sought by a group of these big-gun 
 fast scouts making determined efforts to break 
 through or to go around the opposing battle cruis- 
 ers. The thin armour of the battle cruiser would 
 afford protection against the small guns of light 
 cruisers, but would be of no avail against the 
 heavy guns of this new type of scout. In fact. 
 
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 233 
 
 the lessons of the war give good ground for belief 
 that such thin armour, particularly in turrets, 
 might increase the chances of disaster, if hits were 
 made by heavy guns. 
 
 There has been talk of such a ship to be devel- 
 oped in this country, its characteristics being ex- 
 treme speed and maximum gun power without ar- 
 mour protection. Those that favour this type 
 hold that, just as the armoured cruiser fell into 
 discredit, so will the battle cruiser «fall into dis- 
 credit upon the advent of this type of scout. The 
 idea is that the battleship is for the main strength 
 of the fighting line, having extreme gun power 
 and extreme endurance and armour protection; 
 that the logical auxiliary of such a battle fleet is 
 a class of ships having extreme speed and extreme 
 gun power without armour protection; that any 
 compromise between these two, such as a battle 
 cruiser, is unsound from the essential standpoint 
 of getting best results from money expended. 
 
 The destroyer, a familiar and popular fighting 
 ship, the usefulness of which the experience of 
 the present war has clearly demonstrated, dis- 
 places about 1,000 tons, has no armour protection 
 carries torpedoes and small-calibre guns, and pos- 
 sesses high speed, quick manoeuvring qualities, and 
 sufficient radius to permit cruising with the fleet. 
 Destroyers have a wide range of employment, in- 
 
234 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 eluding scouting, patrolling, convoying, and fight- 
 ing. They are almost indispensable to the battle- 
 ship fleet. While cruising both during the day 
 and at night the destroyers help screen the capital 
 ships and are ready for any kind of emergency 
 duty. 
 
 When the time of battle comes it would be 
 hard to overestimate the value of destroyers in 
 making attack on the enemy capital ships, in 
 breaking up the projected attacks of enemy de- 
 stroyers, in delivering the deathblow to crippled 
 enemy ships, and making smoke screens for tac- 
 tical purposes, either to confuse the enemy or to 
 envelop and protect any of their own ships which 
 may happen to be hard pressed. 
 
 An excerpt from the report of the Naval Gen- 
 eral Board dated Nov. 17, 1914, reads as follows: 
 "After mature consideration of all the elements 
 involved the General Board concluded that a well- 
 balanced fighting fleet for all purposes of offence 
 or defence calls for a relative proportion of four 
 destroyers to one battleship." 
 
 In addition to this proved value as an auxiliary 
 of the fleet, the destroyer is now recognised as the 
 best weapon against the U-boat. So evident is 
 this that the demand for these craft is most ur- 
 gent, and it may be said that seldom has any type 
 
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 235 
 
 of naval construction won so deserved a recog- 
 nition in the actual test of warfare. 
 
 Auxiliaries less distinctively combative, but 
 still necessary to the maintenance of a fighting 
 navy, include colliers, oil-fuel ships, repair ships, 
 mother ships for submarines and aircraft, trans- 
 ports, and hospital ships. The characteristics and 
 uses of these vessels are obvious, and the respec- 
 tive number needed may be determined by logis- 
 tical calculations. Lesser naval units, including 
 mine layers, mine sweepers, patrol ships, and sub- 
 marine chasers, also have work to do in modern 
 warfare and must be provided for in adequate 
 numbers. 
 
 In making a brief survey of the naval activities 
 of the war, it is seen that the submarine was of 
 no great value to the superior navies controlling 
 the seas, but proved practically the most effec- 
 tive naval weapon of the inferior fleets. When 
 used against the enemy battle squadrons it in- 
 fluenced strategy and tactics and scored successes 
 in sinking some of the older men-of-war, but gen- 
 erally speaking produced no very important re- 
 sults. When used against merchant ships the 
 submarine was unable to attain effectiveness while 
 complying with the rules and usages of interna- 
 tional law, but by resorting to unscrupulous meth- 
 ods it became a dangerous commerce destroyer 
 
236 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
 
 and as such has taken a prominent part in the 
 war. 
 
 Experience has shown that the chief tactical 
 value of the submarine in actual naval warfare 
 is for defence, to hold the enemy at a distance. 
 The fleet submarine has also demonstrated an of- 
 fensive value which may be useful in attaining 
 a tactical advantage. It may be inferred, there- 
 fore, that the United States needs submarines both 
 to help defend her coasts and to operate as a 
 tactical subdivision of the fleet. 
 
 The evolution of the submarine appears to be 
 towards the submersible battleship; but the con- 
 sensus of naval opinion at present seems to be that 
 a super-submersible capable of navigating under 
 the water and also strong enough to fight battle- 
 ships on the surface involves an almost prohibi- 
 tive cost, which would be out of proportion to the 
 advantages gained. By increasing the tonnage of 
 the submarine its mechanical difficulties are aggra- 
 vated. On the other hand, the large tonnage of 
 the surface battleship is like a reserve of wealth, 
 which may be expended in any desirable way; if 
 under-water attack is a serious menace to the bat- 
 tleship some of this tonnage can be drawn upon 
 to supply suitable protection, such as a series of 
 outer and inner bottoms so constructed and subdi- 
 vided as to make the ship practically nonsinkable ; 
 
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 237 
 
 or, if attack from the air is dangerous, reserve ton- 
 nage may be drawn upon for aero defence — and 
 so on. In estimating the value of the submarine 
 in wars to come it would appear safe, therefore, 
 to assume that in future struggles for control of 
 the seas the role of the submarine will always be 
 secondary to that of surface ships. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 Comparative Strength of Navies 
 
 Excerpts from a compilation by T. G. Frothingham, 
 reprinted by courtesy of "Current History." — Table pre- 
 pared and arranged by C. H. Foster, U. S. N. A. — Table 
 published by the Office of U. S. Naval Intelligence. 
 
 THE four deck plans, Fig. i, Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, 
 show practically all the variations in the construc- 
 tion of dreadnoughts, and also of battle cruisers. Keep- 
 ing them in mind will help in the following estimate of 
 the navies of Great Britain, Germany, United States, 
 France, Japan, Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. 
 These will be given in their order of tonnage. 
 
 The United States Navy has taken a leading part in 
 the development of the modern naval gun. This has re- 
 sulted in a gun with an increased length in proportion to 
 its calibre, and a high muzzle velocity without undue 
 erosion. Our 12-inch naval gun, increased from 45 
 calibre to 50 calibre, with a projectile of 870 pounds 
 and an initial velocity of 2,950 foot-seconds, is the most 
 powerful naval gun of its class. Our next step, the 45- 
 calibre 14-inch naval gun, has a projectile of 1,400 
 pounds and initial velocity of 2,600 foot-seconds. This 
 gun has been increased to 50 calibre for the three new 
 dreadnoughts of the Mississippi class. For the later 
 classes of dreadnoughts authorised by Congress a 16-inc? 
 
 ^^39 
 
vj^a 
 
 di- 
 
 
 < 1:i 
 
 « 
 
 m 
 
 C 
 
 
 pa 
 
 
 "1 
 
 > 
 
 
 
 '" 
 
 
 H 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 «i 
 
 W 
 
 00 
 
 Q. 
 
 n 
 
 
 
 J= 
 
 O 
 
 j: 
 
 -n 
 
 (U 
 
 O 
 
 
 
 Z! 
 
 ■^ 
 
 4> 
 
 ■T3 
 
 n1 
 
 n 
 
 fc 
 
 
 J2 
 
 ^ PQ 
 
 OR- 
 
 c _g a 
 <3 oj bo 
 
 o « 
 
 
 e u 
 
 _C I- O 
 '" 3 0) 
 
 (U bo«tl 
 
 240 
 
o S 
 
 
 
 
 O B 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 3<" 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 3_Q- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 M 
 
 
 if 
 
 
 3* 
 
 
 CL 
 
 > 
 
 
 
 H3' 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 s^ 
 
 ►-{ 
 
 
 3 
 
 K'w 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 P 
 
 n 3 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 3'o 
 
 to' 
 
 3 
 o 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 o 
 
 
 ^fD 
 
 
 M 
 
 
 ,^ 
 
 
 Q. 
 
 o 
 
 ^2 
 
 C 
 
 D.' 
 re 
 
 > 
 
 S3 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 fii 
 
 
 
 »« 
 
 0) 
 
 00 
 
 a 
 
 2 
 
 ^■5' 
 
 M 
 
 SL 
 
 1 
 
 3 Q 
 
 wo. 
 
 w' 
 
 3 
 
 n> 
 
 a. 
 o 
 
 (0 
 
 5' 
 
 w 
 
 *<; o 
 
 < 
 
 
 Crt 
 
 a 
 
 n 
 
 
 > 
 
 CLS- 
 
 
 
 
 3* 
 
 
 H 
 
 if 
 
 re 
 
 
 
 -^ 
 
 n 
 n 
 
 
 
 ^ 3" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 > 
 
 
 (D 
 
 
 rt- 
 
 
 a 
 
 
 re 
 
 
 B sr 
 
 
 -t 
 3 
 
 
 '^_yf 
 
 241 
 
242 APPENDIX 
 
 gun has been designed. These guns will be the standard 
 of comparison for armaments when considering the for- 
 eign navies. 
 
 THE BRITISH NAVY 
 
 The British Navy is much the strongest in the world, 
 because, to retain control of the seas, Great Britain has 
 made it her policy to maintain a navy powerful enough 
 to fight any two naval powers that might combine against 
 her. This is the origin of the term "a two-power navy," 
 now so frequently used in our country. 
 
 The British strength, in the recognised first essentials 
 of sea power, known to be built and building is as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 BRITISH NAVY— SHIPS BUILT AND BUILDING 
 
 Dreadnoughts 38' 
 
 Predreadnought battleships 31 
 
 Battle cruisers 7 
 
 ' 35 ships, regular programme, 2 Turkish and i Chilean (building in England) 
 aken over early in the war. 
 
 Of the 38 dreadnoughts built and building the follow- 
 ing is the list of recent construction in the programme, 
 with the dates of completion originally planned for each 
 ship : 
 
 BRITISH NAVY— NEW CONSTRUCTION— DREADNOUGHT TYPE 
 
 Compl'd Displace- 
 in — Name ment Main armament Speed 
 
 1914. .Queen Elizabeth 27,500] ( 250 
 
 1914 .Warspite 27,500 25.0 
 
 i9i5..Barham 27.500 [ 815-inch { 250 
 
 ipis. .Valiant 27,500 25 o 
 
 1915.. Malaya 27.500 J [250 
 
 19 1 5. .Royal Sovereign 25,750] | 220 
 
 1915. .Royal Oak 25,750 22 O 
 
 1916. .Ramillies 25,750 [ 8 15-inch < 22 o 
 
 1916. .Resolution 25,750 220 
 
 19 16. .Revenge 25,750 J I 22 o 
 
 1917- -One Ship 27,500 815-inch 250 
 
 1917. .Renown 25,750 ] 
 
 1917. .Repulse 25,750 ^ 8 is-inch 220 
 
 1917. .Resistance 25,750 J 
 
o 
 
 
 01 
 
 *Ij 
 
 •o^ 
 
 HH 
 
 s* 
 
 P 
 
 n 
 
 
 n 
 
 
 B 
 
 T 
 
 O 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 M 
 
 .r*" 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 < 
 
 
 
 lo 
 
 •Z 
 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 
 «. 
 
 w 
 
 B 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 5' 
 
 yi-m^ 
 
 
 w 
 
 !U 
 
 w 
 
 243 
 

 2 
 
 O o 
 
APPENDIX 245 
 
 The dreadnought strength of the British fleet in the 
 battle of Jutland (May 31-June 1, 19 16) is authorita- 
 tively given as 29. In view of this, it seems improbable 
 that at the date of the battle Great Britain had made any 
 great additions to the dreadnoughts in her known pro- 
 gramme. Great Britain is known to have increased her 
 dreadnoughts by the one Chilean and two Turkish war- 
 ships taken over early in the war. 
 
 The following is the list of British battle cruisers at 
 the time of the battle, with dates of completion: 
 
 BRITISH NAVY— BATTLE CRUISERS BEFORE THE BATTLE OF 
 JUTLAND 
 
 Compl'd Displace- 
 in — Name merit Main armament Speed 
 
 1908 .. Indomitable 17,230 I [ 26 
 
 1908 .. Inflexible .-.. 17,250 i- 812-inch. | 26 
 
 1908 . . Invincible 17,250 J [ 26 
 
 1911 . .Indefatigable 18,750 8 12-inch 25 
 
 i9ii..Lion 26,3501 o T^ ! inrV, / 28. 5 
 
 1912.. Princess Royal 26,350 J ** i3-5 men < ^S.s 
 
 1912. .New Zealand 18,800 1 o ^o 1" rTi I ^^'^ 
 
 1913. .Australia 19,200/ °i2-incn •^ ^6.0 
 
 1913. .Queen Mary 27,000 8 13.5-inch 28.0 
 
 19 14 .Tiger 28,500 8 I3.s-inch 28.0 
 
 There were nine battle cruisers with the British fleet 
 in the battle of Jutland, and it is known that every one 
 of these is in the list above given. Of these, three bat- 
 tle cruisers were lost in this battle, Indefatigable, Queen 
 Mary, and Invincible, leaving the present total seven, 
 as given in the table. 
 
 In the months that have followed the battle it is 
 probable that there has been an increase of the fleet of 
 dreadnoughts, but, realising the other demands on the 
 British yards, it is doubtful if the increase has been 
 abnormal. 
 
 Great Britain has been obliged to increase greatly her 
 fleet of light cruisers, destroyers, patrols, &c,, to meet 
 
246 APPENDIX 
 
 the submarine danger. It is known that a great deal of 
 her building capacity has been used in construction of 
 the monitor type. It has recently been given out that 
 the British Government is building a large number of 
 cargo ships, and the demands on the yards for repairs of 
 the fleet, for supply and transport service, &c., must also 
 be considered. Add to this the great drain on British 
 labour to provide munitions, and the indicated lack of 
 great increase to the fleet would be explained. Conse- 
 quently, it would be reasonable to conclude that in 1917 
 the British fleet of dreadnoughts does not greatly ex- 
 ceed the total given in the regular building programme. 
 Undoubtedly there has been a continuance of the future 
 building programme, and many ships have been laid 
 down. 
 
 From the deck plan of the Queen Elizabeth (Fig. 5) 
 it will be seen that the placing of the turrets follows 
 the design of U. S. S. Michigan (Fig. 4). All of the 
 fourteen ships given in the list of new construction have 
 this arrangement of turrets. Sixteen of the remaining 
 dreadnoughts also have their turrets aligned over the 
 keel. The other seven have the less efficient designs of 
 the Dreadnought (Fig. 1) and Neptune (Fig. 3). 
 
 Great Britain originated the battle cruiser. The plans 
 show the design of the Lion class (Fig. 7) and the ear- 
 lier Invincible class (Fig. 6). It will be seen in the list 
 of recent construction that Great Britain did not add to 
 her programme any battle cruisers for completion after 
 1914. The five 25-knot dreadnoughts {Queen Eliza- 
 heth class) were for 1914 and 1915. After that for 
 1916 and 1917 there is only one 25-knot ship — all the 
 rest are 22-knot. 
 
APPENDIX 247 
 
 For armament eleven dreadnoughts carry 12-inch guns, 
 twelve 13.5-inch, and fourteen 15-inch. The Chilean 
 warship, now called the Canada, carries 14-inch guns. 
 The English 15-inch projectile is very heavy, weighing 
 some 500 poutids more than the American 14-inch pro- 
 jectile, but the initial velocity of this heavier shell is 
 much less than that of our 14-inch. 
 
 It is rumoured, and it is very probable, that still 
 larger English naval guns have been designed — even as 
 large as 18-inch. But, in view of the British programme 
 of construction, it seems most likely that such guns are 
 for the monitors. 
 
 Great Britain has built floating batteries of the moni- 
 tor type. These are for use against shore guns and in 
 places where ships are exposed to torpedoes and mines. 
 There is much mystery maintained about them, but it is 
 known that some have very heavy guns, and that they 
 have a specially devised cushioned protection against 
 mines and torpedoes. 
 
 In all the auxiliaries of a great fleet the British Navy 
 is well equipped — and when one realises that this means 
 cruisers, scouts, supply ships of all kinds, destroyers, sub- 
 marines, aircraft, &c., with the additional burden of 
 patrols, mine sweepers, and transport service, all of 
 which are necessary to maintain British control of the 
 seas, the total is astonishing. 
 
 THE GERMAN NAVY 
 
 Germany became the second naval power of the world 
 in the years that succeeded the laying down of the 
 Dreadnought (1906). This was a time of great activity 
 
248 APPENDIX 
 
 in the foreign navies. In 1907 Germany had laid down 
 four dreadnoughts, in 1908 four, in 1909-10 five, in 1911 
 four. In the same years the United States Navy had 
 been restricted to the two-battleships-a-year policy — and 
 had yielded second place to Germany. 
 
 The known strength of the German Navy is : 
 
 GERMAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 
 
 Dreadnoughts .- 
 
 Predreadnought battleships to 
 
 Battle cruisers , '..'.'.'..''. -^ 
 
 I Six, regular programme; one battle cruiser building taken over from Greece. 
 
 As in the case of the British Navy, absolutely no 
 German naval information has been given out since the 
 start of the war. Concerning the German Navy also sen- 
 sational stories of increased strength have been circulated. 
 It was related that the ships were being rearmed with 
 new guns of great power, that there had been secret con- 
 struction, and that an unexpected strength had been de- 
 veloped, but at the battle of Jutland it was the same 
 story. Germany brought out her whole fleet — and there 
 was no new element of strength. 
 
 The twenty German dreadnoughts in the known pro- 
 gramme consist of thirteen ships, and the following new 
 construction is given with proposed dates of completion : 
 
 GERMAN NAVY— NEW CONSTRUCTION— DREADNOUGHT TYPE 
 
 Compl'd Displace- 
 
 m— Name ment Main armament Speed 
 
 1914- Grosser Kurfurst 25,388] f 220 
 
 r9i4--Markgraf 25,388 I ^„ ^ . . 22^0 
 
 i9i4..K6mg 25,388 f 1° l2-mch ^2.0 
 
 1915. .Kronprmz 25,388 I I 22.0 
 
 l9i6.."T" 28,5001 f 23.0 
 
 1916. .Ersatz Worth 28,500 i 8 is-inch \ 23.0 
 
 1917. -Ersatz Fr'd'h III 28,500 J [ 230 
 
to 
 
 Of 
 
 
 °1 -a 
 
 w 
 
 S 
 
 t« 
 
 & 
 
 w 
 
 
 I-] 
 
 ■M 
 
 H 
 
 
 H 
 
 _a 
 
 < 
 
 
 pa 
 
 IT) 
 
 5 ' 
 
 < 00 
 
 
 
 o 
 
 g 
 
 
 rt 
 
 ffi 
 
 
 H 
 
 CS 
 
 0! 
 
 g 
 
 :0 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 N 
 
 .. 
 
 H 
 
 o 
 
 < 
 
 o 
 
 Cfi 
 
 
 ce; 
 
 00 
 
 w 
 
 
 [ 
 
 ^ 
 
 o> 
 
 C 
 
 
 (U 
 
 
 e 
 
 o 
 
 u 
 
 
 u 
 
 K 
 
 M 
 
 250 
 
APPENDIX 251 
 
 The German battle cruisers in the known building pro- 
 gramme were as follows at the date of the battle of 
 Jutland : 
 
 GERMAN NAVY— BATTLE CRUISERS 
 
 Compl'd Displace- 
 in — Name ment Main armament Speed 
 
 1910. .Von der Tann 19,100 8 ii-inch 27.6 
 
 i9ii..Moltke 22.632 \ •, f 28.4 
 
 l9i3..SeydUtz 24,38s / '° "'"''''' \ 29 2 
 
 1914. .Derfflmger 28,000) [ 27.0 
 
 I9iS-.Lutzow 28,000 I a ..^ :„„i, I 27.0 
 
 (916. .Ersatz Hertha 28,000 » I2-mcn ^7,0 
 
 1917. .E'tz Vic'a Louise 28,000 J 1 27.0 
 
 To the above must be added the battle cruiser Salamis, 
 building for Greece, which the Germans took over early 
 in the war. 
 
 In the battle of Jutland the German High Seas Fleet 
 is given as sixteen dreadnoughts, five battle cruisers, and 
 six predreadnoughts. The battle cruiser Liitzow was lost 
 in the battle. The details of the remaining ships are 
 shown in the above list. 
 
 In the months that have followed Jutland it is im- 
 probable that any great addition has been made to the 
 building programme of the German fleet, but Germany 
 has built some new light cruisers, some destroyers and 
 numerous air craft. There must have been a strong tax 
 on their yards for repairs ; the original ships of the pro- 
 gramme were to be completed, and there must have been 
 a great effort to turn out submarines for their latest 
 offensive. As in the case of the British fleet, it is prob- 
 ably safe to conclude that there has been no abnormal 
 increase of their fighting fleet. 
 
 The German dreadnoughts are known to be well built 
 and able ships, but in many of them the arrangement 
 of the turrets hampers the guns. Eight dreadnoughts 
 have the design of the Helgoland (Fig. 2), five {Kaiser 
 
252 APPENDIX 
 
 class, Fig. 8) have the echelon arrangement shown in the 
 diagrams, and seven have the turrets aligned over the 
 keel. 
 
 The German predreadnought battleships, although 
 they are valuable assets to the German Navy, are not as 
 good as the corresponding British ships and American 
 ships of the same date. 
 
 Of the German dreadnoughts four carry ii-inch guns, 
 thirteen carry 12-inch guns, and three 15-inch guns. 
 These last are the ships of the Ersatz Worth class (Fig. 
 9) in the list given, and, from the evidence of Jutland, 
 it is doubtful if all are completed. These twenty Ger- 
 man dreadnoughts built and building carry forty-eight 
 11 -inch, one hundred and thirty 12-inch, and, when the 
 three Ersatz Worths are completed, twenty-four 15-inch 
 guns. 
 
 THE UNITED STATES NAVY 
 
 The United States Navy has been the leader in the de- 
 velopment of the "all-big-gun" battleship of to-day, 
 called the "dreadnought." From the first single-turret 
 ship, the Monitor, to the two-turret monitors, then to the 
 U. S. S. Roanoke (Fig. 10)— these were the three great 
 strides in such ships designed by the United States Navy 
 in the epoch-making times of the civil war, which led to 
 the plan of big guns in turrets aligned over the keel. 
 
 In the recognised first essentials of sea power the 
 strength of the United States Navy is given as follows : 
 
 UNITED STATES NAVY-BUILT AND BUILDING 
 
 Dreadnoughts _ 
 
 Predreadnought battleships '. '. '. '. ] '. [ '. '. . ' ." ." ' .' .' ' .' .' .' ' ai 
 
 , The United States Navy has no battle cruisers. 
 
fn ....?:{ 
 
 n 
 
 _n_ 
 
 O <o) 
 
 (o> 
 
 FIG. 10— U. S. S. ROANOKE, 1863 
 (;Sea-going Turret Vessel) 
 
 Armament, two is-inch, two ii-inch, two iso-pdr. rifled guns Armor, 
 1 54 in. wrought-iron deck in two layers of ^ in. each, and side armor, 
 454 in. at top. 354 in. at bottom; wrought-iron plates 4 ft. below and 6 ft, 
 above water-line. 
 
 FIG. II— U. S. S. MICHIGAN, 1909 
 
 Armament, eight 12-in. 45 cal. B. L. R., twenty-two 3-in. 50 cal. R. F., 
 four 3-pdr. saluting. Armor belt. 10 in., 11 in., 12 in., at top; 8 in., 9 in., 
 10 in., at bottom. Casemate, 8 in. at top; 10 in. at bottom. Side plating 
 forward and aft, i54-in. nickel steel. Protective deck forward, i^-in., 
 aft. 3-in. nickel steel.i 
 
 ' By courtesy of U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 
 
 253 
 
254 
 
APPENDIX 255 
 
 As the object of this article is to give the strength 
 of the navies at corresponding stages of their building 
 programmes, two of the dreadnoughts should be omitted 
 from this list, the Tennessee and California, as their per- 
 centage completed is small. The three ships of the class 
 of the Mississippi, recently launched, should be included 
 on this basis, as these three ships might be hurried to com- 
 pletion. Consequently, the dreadnoughts in the corre- 
 sponding programme of the United States Navy should 
 be fifteen. 
 
 In Fig. 13 is given the plan of U. S. S. Pennsylvania. 
 As will be seen, this ship is the developed design of the 
 Michigan, with three guns in each turret instead of two. 
 The recent building programme of our first-line dread- 
 nought battleships is given below : 
 
 Comp'd Displace- Speed 
 
 in — Name ment Armament Knots 
 
 1912. .Arkansas 26,000 1 • ( 21.05 
 
 19 1 2. .Wyoming 26,000/ iz-i" j 21.22 
 
 1913.. Texas 27,000 10 14-in 21.0 
 
 1914. .New York 27,000 10 14-in 21.0 
 
 igiS-Nevada 27,500 1 ■ / 20.5 
 
 1915-. Oklahoma 27,500 / ^° ^4-in ^ 30.05 
 
 1916. .Pennsylvania 31,400 1 ,„ , . _, 
 
 1916.. Arizona 31.400 ( " i4-m 21.05 
 
 Idaho 32,000 I 
 
 Mississippi 32,000 \ 12 14-in 21.0 
 
 New Mexico 32,000 J 
 
 The twelve dreadnoughts completed of the battle fleet 
 carry sixty-four 1 2-inch guns and sixty- four 14-inch 
 guns. The three ships of the Mississippi class will add 
 thirty-six 14-inch guns to this total. 
 
 In addition to these, the two ships of the Michigan 
 class carry sixteen 12-inch guns. Of the other pre- 
 dreadnought battleships six carry twenty-four 45-calibre 
 12-inch guns, and eight carry thirty-two 40-calibre 12- 
 inch guns. 
 
«.H 
 
 00^ 
 
 
 < ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 < 
 
 
 > 
 
 
 J 
 
 
 > 
 
 C 
 
 r/l 
 
 
 ^, 
 
 . •* 
 
 ^ 
 
 <S 7 
 
 W 
 
 ^ 1 
 
 Cu 
 
 O^M 
 
 W3 
 
 fs;; 
 
 
 caT3 
 
 W-o 
 
 'Sj rt 
 G 4J 
 
 256 
 
APPENDIX 257 
 
 UNITED STATES VESSELS BUILDING AND AUTHORISED 
 
 Name Displace- Main Where 
 
 Battleships ment Speed battery building 
 
 Tennessee 32,300 21 12 14-in. New York 
 
 California 32,300 21 12 14-m. Mare Island 
 
 Colorado l f Camden 
 
 KSon::::::::: 32.600 2x s xa-in. Newpo- News 
 
 W. Virginia J I Newport News 
 
 No. 49 
 
 so 
 
 SI 
 
 52 
 
 S3 
 
 54 
 
 Battle Cruisers 
 No. 
 
 Characteristics not determined 
 
 .33.000 35 10 14-m. 
 
 3 
 
 4, 
 
 5 > . . . • Characteristics not determined. 
 o 
 
 Scout Cruisers 
 
 No. 4 Seattle 
 
 13 
 
 7.100 3S 
 
 , . Characteristics not determined 
 
 From the foregoing table it will be seen that a great in- 
 crease of the United States Navy has been authorised. 
 As this is for future years it has nothing to do with 
 the present comparison. It should be added that many 
 destroyers are also being rushed to completion. 
 
 THE FRENCH NAVY 
 
 The French Navy was for many years second only 
 to the British Navy, but in the abnormal increase from 
 1906 to 1911 there was no effort made to keep pace with 
 Great Britain and Germany — and this was probably wise 
 from the peculiar situation of France. The strength of 
 the French Navy in the main accepted essentials is as 
 follows : 
 
:s: 
 
 « i 
 
 O 
 
 H 
 O 
 O ^ 
 
 < 
 W 
 
 S -a 
 
 ^•^' 
 M ra 
 
 j<; 
 
 258 
 
APPENDIX 259 
 
 FRENCH NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 
 
 Dreadnoughts 12 
 
 Predreadnought battleships 17 
 
 The French Navy has no battle cruisers. 
 
 The known recent building programme is as follows : 
 
 Comp'd Displace- Speed 
 
 in — Name ment Armament Knots 
 
 191S . . Bretagne 23,172 1 
 
 1915. .Loraine 23,172 ^10 13. 4-inch 20. 
 
 1915. .Provence 23,172 I 
 
 1916. . Normandie 24,828 | 
 
 1916. .Languedoc 24,828 
 
 1916. .Flandre 24,828 [12 13.4-inch 21. S 
 
 1916. .Gascogne 24,828 
 
 1917 • . Beam 24,828 J 
 
 As will be seen from the plans of the Normandie 
 given in Fig. 14, the French have three turrets aligned 
 over the keel — but with four guns in each turret. No 
 other navy has adopted this arrangement of guns. The 
 French have always designed and built good battleships 
 — and French ships have been of great use in the Medi- 
 terranean and elsewhere. It is now known that equality 
 in heavy artillery on the western battle front was only 
 established by use of the French naval guns (Fig. 15). 
 
 In auxiliaries of the battle fleet France is well 
 equipped. Her submarines in particular are known to be 
 very good, although, as has been the case with the British 
 Navy, there has not been much chance to use them. 
 
 THE JAPANESE NAVY 
 
 The strength of the Japanese Navy in the first essen- 
 tials in the known building programme is as follows : 
 
 JAPANESE NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 
 
 Dreadnoughts 6 
 
 Predreadnought battleships 13 
 
 Battle cruiser^ ,..,.,,,........... 4 
 
FIG. 15— FRENCH NAVAL GUN AT WESTERN FRONT. 
 260 
 
APPENDIX 261 
 
 The recent building programme, so far as known, is 
 as follows; 
 
 DREADNOUGHTS 
 
 Comp'd Displace- Speed 
 
 in — Name ment Armament Knots 
 
 1912. .Kawachi 20,800 \ ^^ ,^ • „, „„ _ 
 
 i9i2..Settsu 2o;8oo h^ ^2-mch 20.5 
 
 1915 . . Fu-So 30,600 I 
 
 1916. .Yamashiro 30,6oo ■ , ^ 
 
 I9i6..1se 30,600 " <'ncJi ^2.0 
 
 1917. .Hinga 30,600 J 
 
 BATTLE CRUISERS 
 
 1913-Kongo '. 27,500 \ T^ i-nnTn / 28.0 
 
 i9i4-.Hiyei 27,500 f ^ ^4-mch | ^7.0 
 
 1914-Kmshima 27,500 j „ •, < 28.0 
 
 i9iS..Haruna 27,500 / *^ ^4 men | ^8.0 
 
 The first two dreadnoughts have the arrangement of 
 the turrets of the German Helgoland class (Fig. 2). 
 The four dreadnoughts of the Fu-So class (Fig. 16) are 
 formidable battleships which have followed the design 
 of the U. S. S. Arkansas (Fig. 12). As a matter of 
 course Japan, like the other nations at war, has given 
 out no naval information since she entered the war. Un- 
 doubtedly there has been a great increase of the Japanese 
 building programme, but it is not probable that any new 
 capital ships are ready for service. 
 
 As in the case of the British Navy, it will be noted 
 that the Japanese naval programme did not include bat- 
 tle cruisers for completion later than 1915. Whether 
 or not other ships of this class have been recently laid 
 down is not known. The four battle cruisers in the 
 Japanese building programme probably make up the most 
 powerful squadron of their class afloat to-day. 
 
 In all the auxiliaries of the battle fleet it may be as- 
 sumed that the progressive Japanese are well equipped. 
 

 

 ^^ ^ 
 I * H 
 
 
 3 
 
 B13- 
 
 ^;i; 
 
 263 
 
264 APPENDIX 
 
 In guns It is probable that they are going to larger cali- 
 bres, as is the United States Navy. 
 
 THE RUSSIAN NAVY 
 
 In the matter of sea power Russia has been at a dis- 
 advantage through being obliged to maintain two sepa- 
 rate navies — the Baltic fleet and the Black Sea fleet. 
 This unusual condition has come from closing the Darda- 
 nelles to Russian warships. Their strength in first es- 
 sentials is as follows : 
 
 RUSSIAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 
 
 Dreadnoughts 7 
 
 Predreadnought battleships 7 
 
 Battle cruisers 4 
 
 The known building programme of dreadnoughts is as 
 follows : 
 
 Comp'd Displace- Speed 
 
 in — Name ment Armament Knots 
 
 1914 
 1914 
 1914 
 1914 
 1914 
 191S 
 1915 
 
 .Sevastopol 23,026 
 
 . Petropavlovsk 23,026 I ■ , 
 
 .Poltava 23,026 1^^^^^'^'='^ ^^-O 
 
 . Gangoot 23,026 J 
 
 . Imp'sa Maria , 22,435 1 
 
 .Imp. Alex III 22,435 \ 12 12-inch 21. 
 
 . Ekaterina II 22,435 
 
 Of these the last three are for the Black Sea fleet. It 
 will be observed that the Russian dreadnoughts (Fig. 
 18) carry four turrets in the centre line with three guns 
 in each turret. 
 
 RUSSIAN BATTLE CRUISERS 
 
 Comp'd Displace- Speed 
 
 in — Name ment Armament Eiiots 
 
 1916. . Navarin 32,000 ] 
 
 1916. .Borodino 32,000 I ^- .,. •„!, „,. ^ 
 
 1916.. Ismail 321000 h^ M-"i<=li 2S.O 
 
 1916. .Kinbum 32,000 J 
 
n 3 
 urn 
 
 
 f:^ 
 
 S'iji 
 
 265 
 
^66 APPENDIX 
 
 In these Russian battle cruisers we find again the de- 
 sign of three guns in each turret instead of two. 
 
 Knowing the pressure that the war has brought upon 
 Russia, it seems impossible that this building programme 
 of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers has been completed 
 in any degree that would make the Russian Navy a fac- 
 tor in the balance of sea power at this time. 
 
 Russia, however, is well provided with destroyers, 
 having an unusual number of these craft for a navy of 
 its size. 
 
 THE ITALIAN NAVY 
 
 The corresponding strength of the Italian Navy is as 
 follows : 
 
 ITALIAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 
 
 Dreadnoughts 9 
 
 Predreadnought battleships 7 
 
 The Italian Navy has no battle cruisers. The latest 
 construction in the known building programme is as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 Comp'd Displace- Annament Speed 
 
 in — Name ment Knots 
 
 1913. .Giulio Cesare 22,022 13 12-inch 22.5 
 
 1914. 
 1915- 
 191S 
 1917. 
 I9I7. 
 1917. 
 1917. .F'co-Morosini 30,000 
 
 C'ti di Cavour 22,022 13 12-inch 22.5 
 
 Andrea Doria 22,564 
 
 Duilio 22,564 
 
 . Carra;iolG 30,000 
 
 . Mar'o-Collona 30,000 I o ^r- ; u „- «. 
 
 .C'ro-Colombo soiooo ^ ^ 'S-mch 25.0 
 
 The Italian naval constructors have been very skilful 
 — and the above is an advanced programme calculated 
 to make Italy, if not a great naval power, a valuable ally 
 to any naval power. The turret plan shown in Fig. 19 
 should be noted, as it provides an ingenious way of 
 
erg 
 
 ..■;i^ 
 
 (0^ 
 
 5*^ 
 
 267 
 
268 APPENDIX 
 
 mounting thirteen heavy guns — and it is unique among 
 the navies of the world. 
 
 But, again in the case of Italy, it must be realised that 
 the country has probably been too much occupied in other 
 fields to carry out this ambitious naval programme. 
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY 
 
 Austria-Hungary's known strength in first essentials of 
 sea power is given as follows : 
 
 Dreadnoughts 8 
 
 Predreadnought battleships 6 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Navy has no battle cruisers. 
 The recent known building programme is as follows: 
 
 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 
 
 Comp'd Displace- Speed 
 
 in — • Name ment Armament Knots 
 
 1912. .Viribus Unitis 20,010 1 
 
 1913. .Tegetthoff 20,010 > 12 12-Lnch 21. 
 
 1914. .Prinz Eugen 20,010 J 
 
 1914. .Szent Istvan 20,010 12 12-inch 21.0 
 
 (1). . . .One ship 24,500 ] 
 
 (1)... .One ship 24,500 1 ^„ ,, . ■ t, _, „ 
 
 i)....Oneship 24:500 PO i3.S-mch 21. 
 
 C) One ship 24,500 J 
 
 1 Time due to be completed unknown. 
 
 It is improbable that this programme has been carried 
 through to any degree. It is much more likely that with 
 German assistance Austria-Hungary has been devoting 
 her energies to submarines — and has thus become a fac- 
 tor in the war of destruction now being waged in the 
 Mediterranean. 
 
 For details of naval construction of these Principal 
 Powers see the following tables: 
 
269 
 
270 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 NAVAL STRENGTH, JULY. 1914 
 
 n 
 
 Great Britain 
 
 Germany 
 
 
 Built 
 
 Building 
 
 Built 
 
 Building 
 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 ■• Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 Dreadnoughts .... 
 
 Battleships 
 
 Battle Cruisers. . . 
 Armored Cruisers. 
 
 20 
 
 40 
 9 
 34 
 74 
 167 
 75 
 
 423,350 
 589,38s 
 187,800 
 406,800 
 382,815 
 125,850 
 30,362 
 
 16 
 
 I 
 
 17 
 21 
 22 
 
 421,750 
 
 28,500 
 
 67,000 
 21,770 
 17,236 
 
 13 
 
 20 
 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 41 
 
 130 
 
 27 
 
 285,770 
 242,800 
 88,749 
 94,245 
 150,747 
 67,094 
 14,140 
 
 7 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 24 
 18 
 
 187,164 
 112,000 
 26,900 
 
 Destroyers 
 
 Submarines 
 
 14,400 
 14,400 
 
 Total Tonnage all 
 Types 
 
 2,714,106 
 
 1,306,577 
 
 
 
 Guns 11" to 15".. . 
 
 564 
 
 320 
 
 Active Personnel . . 
 
 150,609 
 
 79,197 
 
 Appropriation for 
 1913-14 
 
 $237,530,459 
 
 $112,091,125 
 
 The above table was prepared and arranged by C. H. Foster, U. S. N. A. 
 (References: Navy Year Book 1914: Brassey: Reports published by office of 
 U. S. Naval Intelligence, etc., etc.) 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 NAVAL STRENGTH, JULY, 1914 (.Continued) 
 
 271 
 
 France 
 
 Austria-Hungary 
 
 Russia 
 
 Built 
 
 Building 
 
 Built 
 
 Building 
 
 Built 
 
 Building 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 4 
 18 
 
 20 
 
 9 
 
 84 
 
 64 
 
 92,368 
 262,67s 
 
 201,724 
 46,09s 
 3S.8I2 
 27,940 
 
 8 
 
 3 
 22 
 
 193.656 
 
 2,653 
 14,766 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 18 
 
 6 
 
 60,030 
 
 74.613 
 
 13.380 
 
 13.81S 
 
 9.450 
 
 1,686 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 6 
 
 93,510 
 
 21,216 
 5.370 
 
 7 
 
 6 
 
 9 
 
 91 
 
 30 
 
 98,750 
 
 63,500 
 
 52.845 
 
 36.748 
 
 6,506 
 
 7 
 
 4 
 
 8 
 44 
 i9 
 
 159.409 
 
 128,000 
 
 53.600 
 53.664 
 13.284 
 
 899.915 
 
 347.S08 
 
 678,818 
 
 204 
 
 90 
 
 160 
 
 63,846 
 
 19.531 
 
 52,463 
 
 $90,164,625 
 
 $29,928,575 ' 
 
 $117,508,657 
 
 1 Estimates given in the Fleet Annual, 1914, page 112. 
 
WARSHIP TONNAGE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL POWERS 
 
 NUMBER AND DISPLACEMENT OF WARSHIPS. BUILT AND BUILDING. OF 1,500 OR MORE TONS. AND OF TORPEDO CRAFT OF MORE THAN 30 TONS 
 
 [Office of Naval Intelligence. Navy Department Table 25. July I. 1916.*] 
 
 1 
 
 Oreat Britain' 
 
 
 Ocrmany 
 
 
 Un 
 
 ited States 
 Oct. I 
 
 ' corrected to 
 . 1916 
 
 France 
 
 Japan 
 
 Riissia 
 
 Ualy 
 
 Aujtritt.Hungary 
 
 Type of vessel 
 
 Built 
 
 Building 
 
 Built 
 
 B 
 
 jilding 
 
 
 B.nilt 
 
 Building 
 
 Built 
 
 Building 
 
 Built 
 
 Building 
 
 Built 
 
 Building 
 
 Built 
 
 Building 
 
 Built 
 
 UuUdinR 
 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 (esti- 
 mated) 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 (esti- 
 mated) 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 (esti- 
 mated) 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 (esti- 
 mated) 
 
 No, 
 
 Tons 
 
 No, 
 
 Tons 
 (esti- 
 mated) 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 (esti- 
 mated) 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons 
 (esti- 
 nmtoil) 
 
 No. 
 
 Tom 
 
 No, 
 
 (Mli- 
 
 iimttxU 
 
 ,.)' 
 
 40 
 
 4Z3.350 
 589.385 
 
 
 421.000 
 
 13 
 2 
 4 
 
 
 4> 
 130 
 
 285,770 
 242.800 
 8,168 
 88.749 
 94.24s 
 150,747 
 67,094 
 
 7 
 
 187.052 
 
 4 
 
 307.450 
 297.936 
 12.900 
 
 S 
 
 160.600 
 
 3 
 18 
 
 69,276 
 
 262,675 
 
 8,800 
 
 9 
 
 216.748 
 
 13 
 
 13 
 13 
 50 
 27 
 13 
 
 41.600 
 
 191.3S0 
 
 9.086 
 
 55.000 
 138,483 
 
 57,915 
 
 20,487 
 
 i?5J 
 
 4 
 
 132,400 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 159,409 
 
 i 
 
 62,644 
 96.100 
 
 7 
 
 187.150 
 
 3 
 J 
 
 fto.ojo 
 74.613 
 41.700 
 
 13.380 
 
 13,5 IS 
 0.450 
 ft.8S2 
 1,685 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 Datuosmps J^J^I] 1 J^ „ ,1 , ,1 
 
 7 
 
 98.750 
 10.380 
 
 
 Dattleslnps IP . , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Loast-ucionao esse . . 
 
 
 
 M 
 74 
 167 
 ■W 
 7S 
 
 188,200 
 40S.200 
 382,81s 
 125,850 
 1 1, .188 
 30,3f'2 
 
 
 28,500 
 
 4 
 
 110. 17s 
 
 
 
 
 
 = 
 
 55.000 
 
 4 
 
 128,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IjQttic cruisers 
 
 ■4 
 54 
 
 140.080 
 66,410 
 45.877 
 
 
 
 9 
 84 
 135 
 64 
 
 201,724 
 46,09s 
 35,812 
 13.426 
 27.940 
 
 
 
 6 
 9 
 91 
 14 
 30 
 
 63.SOO 
 
 52.S45 
 36.748 
 2.132 
 6.S06 
 
 9 
 
 6 
 36 
 68 
 to 
 
 74.020 
 18.830 
 16.807 
 u,Sfl4 
 5. -175 
 
 15 
 
 2 
 8 
 
 ' 4,8S8 
 
 14.JO3 
 
 272 
 
 5,842 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 67,000 
 21,770 
 
 S 
 24 
 
 26.900 
 14.400 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 44 
 
 53.600 
 53.664 
 
 
 Torpralo-imat (icstroyere 
 
 9 
 
 9.9 1 1 
 
 3 
 
 2.653 
 
 = 
 
 1.676 
 
 "•■'"' 
 
 SulMiuiriiicB ■ 
 
 
 17.236 
 
 27 
 
 14.140 
 
 18 
 
 14,400 
 
 44 
 
 
 31 
 
 
 22 
 
 14.766 
 
 2 
 
 1.200 
 
 19 
 
 I3.2S4 
 
 
 
 S.3;n 
 
 Total toiw built antl total tons buildind 
 
 2,[.S«,2S0 
 
 
 SSS,So6 
 
 
 9SI.7I3 
 
 
 352,927 
 
 
 870.653 
 
 
 170.511 
 
 
 665.748 
 
 
 234.167 
 
 
 519,640 
 
 
 180.276 
 
 
 270. S61 
 
 
 4o;.057 
 
 
 28.'i,46o 
 
 
 212,355 
 
 
 9ai,s>6 
 
 
 IS0,4Dj 
 
 Total tons built and builtlins 
 
 2,7I3.75(i 
 
 1 .304,640 
 
 
 1.04 
 
 .164 
 
 899 .9 1 5 
 
 699.916 
 
 6:S..'ii,s 
 
 407.81.'! 
 
 37«.noR 
 
 •■ Due to the Europe; 
 
 [.500 tons a 
 
 current program for which contracts have not been awarded. 
 n battery of all big guns (ii inches or more in caliber), except South 
 li ari.' not cmsiflcTed as dreadnoughts because of low speed. 
 
 I'-n r :;-,. ,r. t- : : ilisplacement, whose main batteries are of more than 
 
 ■* ■': ' ,; ■!;■ ■■ 1 Michigan. 
 
 , : .iHber in main battery and capable of taking their 
 
 ij I 1' 1 1' ii ; rhoy have an increase of speed at the expense of car- 
 ttery and a 'lecrcasc in armor protection. 
 
 L* classed 
 
 I have been sacrificed I _ _ . 
 
 all cruisers except the smallest and oldest 
 
 Scouts are considorud as 
 
 oxtremo spuod. The word 
 
 hftvcprntec- 
 
 narmored warships of more th; 
 in which battery and protectii 
 "protected" has been omitted because 
 live decks. 
 
 The following vessels are not included in the tables: 
 
 Ships over 20 years old from date of launch, unlcfss they have been roconstructod and rcomiod 
 within S years. 
 
 Torpedo craft over 15 years old. 
 
 Those not actually begun or ordered, although authorized. 
 
 Transports, colliers, repair ships, torpedo ships, or other auxiliaries. 
 
 Vessels of less tha*n 1,500 tons, except torpedo craft. 
 
 Torpedo craft of less than so tons. 
 
 Vessels undergoing trials are considered as completed. 
 
"EMDEN" EXPLOITS 
 
 Excerpts from articles by Commander L. A. Cotton, 
 U.S.N., and Lieutenant H. von Miicke {Executive officer 
 of "Emden"), the latter translated by Lieutenant-Com' 
 mander J. H. Klein, Jr., U. S. N. — reprinted by courtesy 
 of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 
 
 IN a war of the size and extent of the Great World 
 War, the magnitude and importance of the major 
 operations are apt to make one overlook operations of 
 lesser military importance in other fields that may be 
 very instructive to those interested in the art of war, and 
 that may illustrate principles of universal application. 
 Of such a nature seem to be the exploits of the Emden 
 in the Far East during the first few months of the war. 
 
 The Emden was a small German cruiser of 3600 tons 
 displacement, having two masts and three funnels and 
 armed with ten 4.1 -inch and eight 5-pounder guns and 
 two submerged torpedo tubes. Her speed was about 25 
 knots and her maximum coal capacity 900 tons. 
 
 In the early days of August, 1914, the little Emden was 
 in the harbour of Tsingtao in the German leased territory 
 of Kiaochow in the province of Shantung, China. She did 
 not remain there for many days, however, for on August 
 6 she inaugurated her war career by capturing a Russian 
 volunteer-fleet vessel near Quelpart Island. The Emden 
 
 273 
 
274. APPENDIX 
 
 accompanied her prize into Tsingtao, filled her bunkers 
 and got out at sunrise the next morning. 
 
 Of the Emden's subsequent movements her Executive 
 officer writes: "During the evening of August 12, we 
 came in the neighbourhood of the island where we ex- 
 pected to meet the cruiser squadron and found the out- 
 post vessels. In the middle lay the powerful cruisers 
 Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with colliers alongside busy 
 coaling. Farther to the left the slender Nurnberg, also 
 engaged in coaling. Scattered about in the harbour were 
 a number of large and small tenders and auxiliaries of 
 the squadron. The Emden was ordered to anchor in the 
 right half of the harbour, close to the flagship. Rousing 
 cheers were exchanged between ships as we passed the 
 other vessels and soon thereafter our anchor splashed — 
 the last time for a long while. 
 
 "The captain reported aboard the flagship for orders 
 from the squadron commander, and made the proposal to 
 him to detach the Emden from the squadron and to send 
 her to the Indian Ocean to carry on a cruise of 'com- 
 merce destruction.' 
 
 "The next day saw the squadron in column, followed 
 by the colliers, on an easterly course. The squadron 
 commander had not yet made known his decision in re- 
 gard to our captain's proposal and we were all eager to 
 know what his conclusions were. Along toward midday 
 several signals were hoisted high on the flagship : 'Em- 
 den detached, wish you much success,' read the signal. 
 In an elegant turn our ship sheered out of column, a 
 'thank-you' signal for the squadron commander's wishes 
 at the mast head, then a semaphore to the Markomannia, 
 'Remain with Emden^ and soon, on an opposite course, 
 
' APPENDIX 275 
 
 we lost sight of the other ships of the squadron. All 
 knew that we had seen each other for the last time. 
 
 "We had now reached the point where, in order to 
 reach the open ocean, we had to pass through the narrow 
 straits. These straits swarmed with fishing craft and 
 such other small ships. The nights being bright moon- 
 light, the Emden was visible for a considerable distance. 
 The captain did not relish the idea of meeting so many 
 sailing vessels. He spoke to me about it, saying that he 
 wished to avoid meeting any sort of ship for fear our 
 presence and course in those waters would become known 
 to everybody. All the English men-of-war had either 
 two or four smokepipes ; none had three like the Emden. 
 Then I conceived the idea of building us a fourth smoke- 
 pipe. Immediately I had all the deck-strips brought out. 
 These are rolls of heavy sail cloth, about two meters 
 wide, laid on the decks as a protection to the linoleum. 
 In the upper end we sewed a wooden batten and then 
 hoisted this improvised smokepipe forward of our regu- 
 lar forward smokepipe. As viewed from the side the 
 effect was good. But from forward its appearance was 
 exceedingly faulty ; it did not have the necessary thick- 
 ness of its step-brothers. It was only a few millimeters 
 thick. . But in the hurry of that first night, nothing bet- 
 ter could be accomplished. I proposed to the captain to 
 build a better fourth smokepipe, to which he agreed. 
 And the next day we began the work. Soon we had built, 
 by means of wooden laths and sail cloth, an elegant 
 smokepipe, and when this was in place we resembled the 
 English cruiser Yarmouth. I purposely had the smoke- 
 pipe made oval as the Yarmouth had one that shape. 
 Our trailer Markomannia was ordered out to a position 
 
276 APPENDIX 
 
 on our beam, and according to her suggestions (by sig- 
 nal) we improved the position of the fourth smokepipe. 
 We then painted the marks to simulate overhearing of 
 the outer casting of the smokepipe, so that from now on 
 we could, at any time, day or night, hoist our fake. 
 
 "And so we arrived in the Bay of Bengal at the end 
 of the first week in September. For about five days an 
 English warship, probably the Minotaur, steamed 
 parallel to and close by us, as we knew by the strength of 
 her radio signals. By and by her signals became weaker 
 until they ceased entirely. We did not sight her." 
 
 The next time the Emden was heard from she was in 
 the Bay of Bengal, a matter of 4000 miles from Tsingtao 
 even by direct route and in what may be termed the heart 
 of the enemy's sea area. On September 14 the Italian 
 S. S. Loredoro arrived off Calcutta and reported that she 
 had on the previous day been held up by the Emden, and 
 on September 16 the British S. S. Kabinga arrived with 
 the crews of five other British steamers that had been 
 sunk by the Emden in the Bay of Bengal between Septem- 
 ber 10 and 14. 
 
 Since there was no German prize court available, the 
 Emden proceeded with her captures as follows : The 
 first ship captured was manned with a prize crew and 
 forced to accompany the Emden. Then when the sec- 
 ond capture was made the more valuable of the two cap- 
 tured ships was sunk by a mine or by gun fire, after the 
 crew had been removed to the other vessel or to the 
 Emden. This procedure was followed with each subse- 
 quent capture until the captured personnel became too 
 
APPENDIX 277 
 
 numerous to be accommodated when they were all placed 
 upon the one remaining ship and she was released. 
 
 On September 16 it was learned that the Emden had 
 coaled on the previous day in False Bay (British) about 
 120 miles from Calcutta. Three British cruisers and 
 three French destroyers were sent in pursuit, a pursuit 
 that proved to be long if not merry. 
 
 On September 18 the quarry was located — but not by 
 a man-of-war — about 20 miles off the mouth of Rangoon 
 River, she having sunk the day before the British S. S. 
 Clan Matheson. One Japanese cruiser now joined in 
 the chase, which proceeded apace. 
 
 Doubling back across the Bay of Bengal the Emden 
 appeared next about a mile off the harbour of Madras at 
 nine o'clock at night on September 22. The Madras light 
 was lighted and working, and the lights of the city were 
 all ablaze. The first intimation to those on shore that 
 an enemy was near was the turning on of the search- 
 lights of the Emden. Quickly picking up the large oil 
 tanks of the Burma Oil Company she opened fire upon 
 them. A few salvos and they were burning briskly. Fir- 
 ing ceased, search-lights were extinguished and the Em- 
 den disappeared into the darkness whence she had come. 
 She had in these few minutes inflicted a damage of more 
 than $100,000. 
 
 From Madras she steamed slowly down the coast, ap- 
 pearing off Pondicherry on September 24, having cap- 
 tured and sunk five more British steamers in the mean- 
 time. At this stage a British cruiser seems to have been 
 within 50 miles of the Emden, but the latter appeared 
 to be able to determine with fatalistic accuracy alike 
 
278 APPENDIX 
 
 where enemy merchantmen were and men-of-war were 
 not. 
 
 About this time, a Russian cruiser joined in the 
 "Emden hunt," but unrestrained the Emden passed out 
 of the Bay of Bengal, around Ceylon, and lay athwart 
 the Aden-Colombo trade route. To the westward of 
 Ceylon up to September 27 she sank five more British 
 steamers and captured a collier with 7000 tons of Welsh 
 coal. 
 
 During the first two weeks of October the Emden was 
 rumoured to be in the Makassar Strait, each of Borneo, at 
 Padang on the Straits of Malakka and southeast of 
 Sumatra, but in reality she seems to have been far away 
 at Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago. There she 
 cleaned her boilers, was heeled over and had her bottom 
 scraped and painted as far as practicable. Then she 
 steamed north again to near the Laccadive Islands. 
 Here from October 15 to 19 she sank five more steamers 
 and a large Tasmanian dredger and captured another 
 large collier. Meanwhile two more Japanese cruisers and 
 one more Russian cruiser joined the searching force. 
 
 All trace of the Emden was lost for ten days, and she 
 made her next appearance 1700 miles from where she had 
 been last reported. 
 
 At early dawn on October 29 the quiet of a sultry sum- 
 mer night still hung over the harbour of Penang (Brit- 
 ish). The puffing little tugs and launches and the many 
 sampans that give to eastern harbours their appearance 
 of unusual animation, lay moored to the wharves or an- 
 chored near by, and sleep still held alike the people 
 ashore and afloat. It was the hour so well known to all 
 sailors at which a lamp is worse than useless, yet without 
 
APPENDIX 279 
 
 which objects can be seen but dimly. The mist of the 
 tropical morning began to lift from the harbour, slowly 
 rolling up as though it were a curtain being lifted from 
 a mammoth stage whereon some terrible tragedy was 
 soon to be enacted. 
 
 Slowly from around the point to the eastward a steamer 
 appeared, indistinct as to details and vague as to char- 
 acteristics, but to the trained eye clearly a man-of-war. 
 Any naval officer can picture to himself what followed on 
 board the Russian cruiser Jemtchug peacefully lying at 
 anchor in the harbour. Suddenly the quartermaster on 
 watch sings out "Man-of-war standing in from the east- 
 ward, sir!" "Make her out," replies the officer of the 
 watch, started from the boredom of the first part of the 
 morning watch. For a moment the quartermaster gazes 
 through his spy glass, and answers "Two-masted cruiser, 
 with four funnels, sir !" "Very well," comes from the 
 officer of the watch, with an admonition to keep a bright 
 lookout on the incoming cruiser, and report her actions. 
 Doubtless the officer of the watch was momentarily 
 alarmed when the ship was first sighted, but he was 
 quickly reassured, for the only cruisers with four funnels 
 in the waters of the Far East were British and Japanese, 
 both friends. Of course, the ship slowly standing in 
 around the point must be the British cruiser Yarmouth, 
 thought he, or one of the Chikuma class of Japanese 
 cruisers, all known to be in near-by waters. Slowly and 
 with outward calm the stranger stood in for the usual 
 anchorage of the Yarmouth, next the berth of the 
 Jemtchug. Now she has reached a point on the 
 J emtchug' s beam and only about 300 yards away. On 
 the stranger all are tense and alert, while on the Jemtchug 
 
280 APPENDIX 
 
 sleep still holds the crew and officers — the last sleep for 
 many, the next few moments proved. Suddenly the Ger- 
 man ensign fluttered from the stranger's truck, a flash of 
 light rippled along her broadside and a salvo hurled death 
 and destruction into the inert Jemtchug. The tragedy 
 had begun. As those on the Jemtchug sprang from their 
 bunks to the sound of steel crashing through steel, of 
 bursting shell and shrieks of pain, a torpedo sent a quiver 
 throughout the ship as it let loose its energy beneath her. 
 Torn by shell and sundered by torpedo and listing badly, 
 the Jemtchug began to sink at once, but a few more salvos 
 in rapid succession and a second torpedo made assur- 
 ance doubly sure as the curtain of smoke rolled down 
 where the curtain of mist had so recently lifted. When 
 in turn the curtain of smoke began to lift, only the masts 
 of the Jemtchug were visible above the blood-stained 
 water, as the struggling survivors cried for help, which 
 the now wide-awake harbour promptly gave. Disappear- 
 ing out the western entrance of the harbour was the in- 
 strument of destruction, the Emden, for the stranger 
 was none other than she. With the aid of a dummy 
 funnel and the artistic use of paint and canvas she had 
 succeeded in her disguise as the Yarmouth in the early 
 morning light, and now was rapidly disappearing from 
 view unscathed and undaunted. 
 
 The engagement, if engagement it may be called, lasted 
 scarcely a quarter of an hour, but the destruction of the 
 Jemtchug was complete. Her casualties reached the total 
 of one officer and 84 men killed and two officers and 
 112 men wounded, being approximately 60 per cent of 
 her complement. 
 
 As the Emden steamed out of the harbour she fired on 
 
APPENDIX 281 
 
 a patrol boat, but only damaged her slightly. Outside 
 she came upon the outer-patrol, the French destroyer 
 Mousquet, and quickly sank her by gun fire. She stopped 
 long enough to pick up the survivors of the Mousquet, 36 
 men and officers, and further out stopped a British 
 steamer to which she transferred them. Then she again 
 disappeared into her habitat, the high sea. Two French 
 destroyers at anchor in Penang harbour quickly raised 
 steam and gave chase, but in vain, for the Emden was 
 not seen again for more than 10 days. 
 
 After the Penang raid, two more cruisers, two gun- 
 boats, three destroyers and an armed merchant cruiser 
 were added to those exclusively engaged in searching 
 for the Emden. This brought the number so engaged 
 up to 19 all told, and in addition a large force was being 
 used in convoy duty in the Far East, almost entirely 
 on account of the Emden s activities. 
 
 The next exploit of the Emden brought to an end her 
 eventful career. At daylight on November 9 she ran in 
 for the harbour on South Keeling Island in the Cocos or 
 Keeling group. She still had her dummy funnel rigged, 
 but its effectiveness as a disguise had vanished with the 
 Penang exploit. The harbour on South Keeling is an 
 important British submarine cable and radio station. As 
 soon as the Emden was sighted, the word was cabled to 
 London, Adelaide, Perth and Singapore, but what was 
 more important, it was flashed into the air by radio that 
 all who could might hear. 
 
 Passing near the Cocos Islands was an army exf)edi- 
 tion from Australia, bound for the Suez Canal and with 
 it, thanks largely to the Emden menace, was a strong 
 naval convoy. The Emden used her radio outfit to the 
 
282 APPENDIX 
 
 best of her ability to interfere with the message being 
 sent, but the keen ear of the radio operator on the Brit- 
 ish cruiser Minotaur caught it just the same. One of the 
 units of the convoy was the Australian cruiser Sydney. 
 Faster, larger and more powerful than the Emden, she 
 was just the ship for the job at hand, and away she 
 steamed full speed for South Keeling and the Emden. 
 
 Meanwhile the Emden had entered the harbour and 
 immediately landed a party of five officers, seven petty 
 officers and 35 men, who proceeded to destroy the radio 
 and cable-stations. The Emden stood back to the har- 
 bour entrance to keep watch. Apparently her captain 
 was somewhat worried about the radio message that had 
 been sent, for at 8.45 he steamed in again and recalled 
 his landing force by flag signals and by siren. The party 
 did not respond promptly enough, and at 9.30 the Em- 
 den, leaving her landing party behind, headed out at 
 full speed as the Sydney came charging up.^ 
 
 The action began at the harbour entrance at a range 
 of only about 4000 yards. Before she turned to head 
 away, the Emden fired a broadside salvo that injured 
 both fire control stations on the Sydney and destroyed 
 one of her range finders. The Sydney had 2 knots su- 
 periority in speed, and she also had 6-inch guns 
 against the Emden s 4.1 -inch guns. Slowly the Sydney 
 
 The Emden landing force consisting of five officers, seven 
 petty officers and thirty-seven men, seized the schooner Ayesha, 
 and sailed for Arabia. On the i6th of December the Ayesha, 
 was wrecked in Seaflower Channel and the crew transferred 
 to the Lloyd liner Choising. Finally they were landed on the 
 Arabian coast of the Red Sea, made their way overland to 
 Turkey, and thence back to Germany, 
 
APPENDIX 283 
 
 hauled out and up, and brought her broadside to bear, 
 almost out of range of the Emdens battery. Soon the 
 Emden lost a funnel, and almost immediately thereafter 
 a mast. Then another funnel went by the board, and 
 fire broke out aft. Handicapped by her landing party left 
 ashore, outranged and outstripped by her larger adver- 
 sary, the Emden ran on the reef at North Keeling. With 
 flag still flying, and burning fiercely, she still continued 
 firing her one available gun, and not until the Sydney 
 had reluctantly fired three more salvos into her, was the 
 flag hauled down on the mass of blackened and twisted 
 steel that had been the Emden. She made a game fight 
 against heavy odds, as is freely admitted by her van- 
 quishers. 
 
 The casualties on the Emden, as is usual with the van- 
 quished in a naval action, were enormous, only four 
 officers and about 75 men being saved, and a number of 
 these were wounded. The Sydney was but little dam- 
 aged, and her casualties amounted only to three killed 
 and 15 wounded. 
 
 ITINERARY OF EMDEN 
 Location 1914 Remarks 
 
 Yellow Sea August 2 Outbreak of war 
 
 Tsingtao (arrived) August s » 
 
 Tsingtao (left) August 7 
 
 Met fleet, probably at Lamo- August 12 
 
 trek Island (Caroline group) 
 Entered Bay of Bengal September 4 1 Route uncertain, Aug. 12- 
 
 Sept. 4 
 
 Off Calcutta, India September 10-14 
 
 Off Rangoon September 18 i 
 
 Madras September 22 Bombardment 
 
 Off Colombo September 30 
 
 Diego Garcia October 5-10 i 
 
 Off Minokoi Island October 15-20 
 
 Penang October 28 Sank Zemtchug and Mous- 
 
 quet 
 
 Straits of Sunda November 1-6 > 
 
 Keeling, Cocos Island November 9 Destroyed by Australian 
 
 cruiser Sydney 
 
 1 Indicates approximate dates. 
 
 The Emden caused in all a direct monetary loss of more than $25, 000, 000. 
 
AMERICA'S PART IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
 NAVAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS 
 
 By T. G. Frothingham, reprinted by courtesy of the 
 United States Naval Institute Proceedings. 
 
 ALTHOUGH most of us know that American tac- 
 tics are being used in this great war, few realise 
 the important part taken by weapons and tactics which 
 had their origin in America. On land the European for- 
 mal battles and formal fortresses have been superseded 
 by armies manoeuvring and intrenching, as developed in 
 our American wars. On the sea American ideas have 
 been even more universally adopted. In their effect on 
 methods and weapons of warfare, our three great wars, 
 the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the 
 Civil War, are beyond comparison. 
 
 Our war for independence, the American Revolution, 
 was destined to differ in tactics from any previous war, 
 and for these new tactics on land and sea the Colonists 
 were well prepared. This is very little understood, even 
 by those who have some historical knowledge ; but a care- 
 ful study of the history of the Revolution shows that, al- 
 though the Colonists were poor in resources, the Ameri- 
 can soldiers and sailors had acquired the qualities that 
 gave them victory. 
 
 On land, the idea that "embattled farmers' sprang 
 forth fully armed is wrong from every historical point of 
 view. The "French wars" had given our people the 
 
 284 
 
7 . J\ 
 
 N""^-^^^^^^ 
 
 -=Vi 
 
 U. S. S. "CONSTITUTION" ("OLD IRONSIDES") 
 
 From the Print by Bowen in the Collection of the Marine 
 Museum, Boston, Mass. By Courtesy of the Society. 
 
 The Symbol of the Spirit of the United States Navy. 
 The Ancestor of the Modern Dreadnought. 
 
 U. S. S. "Constitution" 
 
 U. S. S. "Niagara" 
 
 U. S. S. "Monitor" 
 
 U. S. S. "Roanoke" 
 
 U. S. S, "Michigan" 
 
 U. S. S. "Pennsylvania 
 
 1797 
 1856 
 1862 
 1863 
 1909 
 1916 
 
 285 
 
286 APPENDIX 
 
 right preparation for the Revolution. Scattered through 
 all the Colonies were officers and men who had served in 
 the French and Indian War. Consequently, from Wash- 
 ington down, through the personnel of our Continental 
 Army, were men who had learned the lesson of tactics 
 adapted to this continent. They had also learned, many 
 of them from bitter experience, that such tactics were 
 very effective against the British Army. On the sea the 
 Colonists had another element of preparedness which is 
 not generally appreciated. Nowhere in the world were 
 there hardier and more intelligent seamen. Their ships 
 had been on every sea, and American designers were al- 
 ready noted for the speed of their ships. American sail- 
 ors all over the world had gained the experience that 
 was destined to make them so resourceful against their 
 enemies. Many of them had been fighting in every kind 
 of naval warfare. They were thus especially well 
 equipped for war against a superior naval power, in 
 which ingenuity and daring were necessary qualities. 
 
 On land, the first action of the Revolutionary War was 
 prophetic of great changes of tactics. The Lexington and 
 Concord fight showed the helplessness of the old formal 
 school against a line of battle in extended order, taking 
 advantage of every natural shelter, never giving a set 
 battle but attacking, here, there, and everywhere. 
 
 On the sea, it was the same story. Harassing tactics 
 were adopted by the Americans in naval warfare. With 
 the poor resources at their command, the Colonists could 
 not hope for a strong navy, and the number of ships 
 commissioned in the United States Navy was small. 
 But American naval vessels boldly sailed into the well 
 guarded British seas, and actually harried the British 
 
APPENDIX 287 
 
 coasts. These raids, culminating in the exploits of Paul 
 Jones and the fight off Flamborough Head, had a serious 
 effect on the British public. 
 
 Our Navy also did damage to British commerce, and 
 here another class of American ships was of great tacti- 
 cal value. There being so few naval ships to give service 
 to our seamen, private enterprise began to fit out ships. 
 Soon a swarm of privateers was scattered over the seas, 
 preying on the British merchant marine. English insur- 
 ance rates were raised, and merchants were even deterred 
 from shipping goods at any rate of insurance. The 
 American privateers captured or destroyed about six hun- 
 dred British ships of the value of $i 8,000,000 — very 
 great losses for those days. 
 
 "In all the memorials presented to Parliament the 
 argument used to bring about peace was the unprece- 
 dented destruction of English commerce," ^ and many au- 
 thorities believe this argument of commerce destroying by 
 the United States Navy and American privateers did 
 more to gain independence than any other factor in the 
 war. 
 
 Probably, however, the most extraordinary event in 
 the Revolution, in relation to the present war, was the 
 first use of the torpedo and the submarine. Various 
 forms of mines had been tried before with indifferent suc- 
 cess, but nothing approaching the torpedo as used in the 
 present war. 
 
 In 1775 David Bushnell of Connecticut, who gradu- 
 ated from Yale that year, built the "diving boat" known 
 as the "American Turtle." Its design was astonishingly 
 modern in many ways. It was made of iron plates, 
 
 ^ Maclay. 
 
288 APPENDIX 
 
 propelled by a screw, and guided by a compass made 
 visible by phosphorus. The torpedo was carried outside, 
 to be attached to the enemy ship, and then cast loose. 
 The action of casting off started a clockwork, which gave 
 the submarine time to get away to a safe distance. 
 
 This submarine and torpedo were first tried against 
 the Eagle, a 64-gun ship, lying off New York. The oper- 
 ator in the submarine found difficulty in attaching the 
 torpedo, which contained 100 lbs. of powder, and the 
 explosion was not near enough to the Eagle to cause any 
 damage. It was again tried against the Cerberus at New 
 London. The submarine missed the large ship, but blew 
 up a schooner that lay near her, with several of her 
 people killed. It was Bushnell who in 1778 set afloat 
 torpedoes against the British shipping in the Delaware 
 River near Philadelphia. They were in kegs and did lit- 
 tle damage, but inspired the amusing poem "The Battle 
 of the Kegs," written at the time. 
 
 These attempts with the submarine and the torpedo, al- 
 though they did very little actual harm, caused so much 
 alarm and kept the enemy ships away from narrow waters 
 to such an extent, that it is perfectly fair to say that the 
 submarine and torpedo had a tactical value in the Revo- 
 lutionary War. 
 
 Thus it will be seen that in American warfare on the 
 seas, in the Revolution, are found the germs of many of 
 the most important naval tactics of the present war — 
 tactical use of the torpedo, tactical use of the submarine, 
 commerce destroying as a factor in war, raids upon the 
 enemy's coasts by a weaker navy. 
 
 Our second war with England, the War of 1812, 
 
AMERICAN LETTER OF MARQUE BRIG "GRAND TURK" (14 
 
 GUNS) OF SALEM SALUTING MARSEILLES, 18 15 
 
 From the Painting by Roux in the Collection of the East India 
 Marine Society oi Salem. By Courtesy of the Society. 
 
 found the Americans totally unprepared on land. The 
 generation of the Revolution had passed away. There 
 was no element in the population with any experience in 
 war, except a few Indian fighters in the western part of 
 the United Stiates. On the sea, things were very different. 
 Our seamen had become even more expert in the interval 
 between the two wars, our ships had maintained their 
 superiority in speed, and our privateers repeated the dam- 
 age of the Revolution, but on a larger scale. The Ameri- 
 can privateers captured or destroyed in this war no less 
 than thirteen hundred British vessels of the value of 
 
 289 
 
290 APPENDIX 
 
 $39,000,000. Such losses were unprecedented, and this 
 destruction of commerce won us an advantageous peace. 
 
 The following from the London Times is enough to 
 show the effect of these losses on the public mind: 
 
 "Lloyd's list contains notices of upward of five hun- 
 dred British vessels captured in seven months by the 
 Americans. Five hundred merchantmen and three frig- 
 ates ! Can these statements be true *? And can the 
 English people hear them unmoved?" The reference to 
 the loss of "three frigates" is comment on another offen- 
 sive developed by the Americans on the sea, which was 
 the beginning of great changes in naval tactics. 
 
 The United States Navy had only twenty-three ves- 
 sels in commission in the War of 1812, including the 
 squadrons of Perry and McDonough on the lakes, but 
 in this small navy were concentrated skilled officers and 
 men. Our Navy had gained experience of warfare in 
 the Tripolitan War, etc., and it was far ahead of its time 
 in construction and armament. 
 
 Our naval constructors, with an intuition almost pro- 
 phetic, had built a class of frigates, of which the Consti- 
 tution is best known, and placed 24 pounders on them. 
 Such an armament was ridiculed abroad, and it was pre- 
 dicted that such ships would be useless — but, in the War 
 of 1812, these frigates became the wonder of the world. 
 Another extract from the London Times shows again the 
 state of the public mind — "The fact seems to be estab- 
 lished that the Americans have some superior mode of 
 firing." The "fact" that the Times could not under- 
 stand was the great advance in naval construction shown 
 by these frigates of the United States Navy. This ad- 
 
AMERICAN ARMED BRIG "TENEDOS," OF BOSTON, AT 
 SMYRNA, JULY 4, 1834. 
 
 vanced design by American naval constructors was the 
 birth of the "All big-gun ship" idea, which was destined 
 to dominate naval construction ; and the Constitution 
 may fairly be called the ancestor of the modern dread- 
 nought. 
 
 In the War of 1812 the American inventions of the 
 torpedo and the submarine were of tactical value, al- 
 though not in actual use. Robert Fulton had attempted 
 to develop the Bushnell inventions, at first for the French 
 and then for the English; but he had returned to Amer- 
 ica discouraged. There was some aid voted for his ma- 
 chines, but nothing was ever done with them in actual 
 warfare. However, as in the Revolution, the idea that 
 the Americans possessed such dangerous weapons proved 
 a good defence for portions of our coast. 
 
 In the Mexican War, as there was no navy to oppose 
 291 
 
U. S. S. "NIAGARA" 
 
 From the lithograph by Currier and Ives in the collection of the 
 Marine Museum, Boston, Mass. By Courtesy of the Society. 
 
 Carries 12 Dahlgren Guns, weighing 14 tons, each 11 inches in 
 diameter in the bore, throwing a solid shot of 270 lbs. or a shell of 
 180 lbs. a distance of four miles. This was a very powerful arma- 
 ment for the times. 
 
 our operations, the use of our navy, although important, 
 did not develop tactical changes. Yet it is a curious fact 
 that steamers were then first used in naval warfare.^ In 
 the same spirit of progress that had placed the heavy 
 guns on the Constitution, the United States Navy built 
 steam frigates, the Niagara, Wabash, etc., which 
 had the most powerful armament of their class, holding 
 ' Soley. 
 
 292 
 

 A 
 
 
 
 .y 
 
 I'i-^ 
 
 
 
 
 r«r" 
 
 AMERICAN ARMED BARQUE "STAMBOUL," OF BOSTON, AT 
 MARSEILLES, 1844. 
 
 fast to our Navy's consistent policy of making the gun 
 all-important. 
 
 The Civil War brought about still greater advances 
 in American heavily armed warships, which revolution- 
 ised naval ships and naval tactics throughout the world. 
 The attack in Hampton Roads on the Union fleet by the 
 Merrimac, converted into the casemate ironclad Virginia 
 by the Confederates, showed decisively the helplessness 
 of wooden ships against armoured ships. The fight that 
 followed between the Virginia and the first turret ship, 
 the Monitor, was the first challenge to guns in casemates 
 by guns in turrets. The construction of the epoch-mak- 
 ing Monitor had been hurried, and she was defective in 
 many ways. Consequently, although the Monitor saved 
 the Union fleet, the question of superiority between the 
 two types remained undecided in many minds. 
 
 293 
 
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA" (ist) 1837, Ship-of-the-Hne 
 (three decker) 
 
 From the Lithograph by N. Currier in the Collection of the Marine 
 Museum, Boston, Mass. By Courtesy of the Society. 
 
 Rate, 120 guns. 16, 8 in. 104, 32 pr. Total, 120. Complements 
 1,100. Tonnage, 3,241. Laid down, 1822. Completed, 1837, Phila- 
 delphia. Cost, $694,500. Annual cost in commission, $382,432. 
 Note : Originally this Pennsylvania carried 140 guns. The above 
 data are quoted from the Navy Register of July 1, 1850. 
 
 The less known fight in Wassaw Sound in 1863 estab- 
 lished the superiority of a few big guns in turrets over 
 a greater number in casemates. The Atlanta, a Con- 
 federate casemate ironclad of the type of the Virginia, 
 came out to destroy two monitors, with two excursion 
 steamers to watch the destruction. The monitor Wee- 
 haw ken fired just five shots — and the contest was ended 
 
 294 
 
Copyright, E. Muller 
 
 U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," 1916 
 
 Guns — 12, 14 in. 22, 5 in. Total, 34. Complement, 1,100. Ton- 
 nage, 32,567. Laid down, 1913. Completed, 1916. Built at New- 
 port News. Cost, $14,000,000. 
 
 295 
 
296 APPENDIX 
 
 for all time in favour of big guns in turrets. The all-big- 
 gun ship commands the sea in this war — and the big guns 
 in turrets have never been supplanted. 
 
 In the Monitor type, from one to two turrets was but a 
 step, and many such monitors were built. Then came 
 the Roanoke (1863), another stage in the development 
 of the Monitor. The Roanoke was a "sea-going turret 
 vessel" with three turrets, all aligned over the keel. 
 Here were the essentials of the dreadnought of to-day,^ 
 and this American design of big guns in turrets, aligned 
 over the keel, has prevailed over all other types of ar- 
 moured warships. 
 
 Foreign navies have been reluctant to accept this de- 
 sign. They have built all kinds of armoured ships, and on 
 their turret vessels used various arrangements of the 
 turrets. English and German dreadnoughts, designed 
 less than ten years ago, have other dispositions of the 
 turrets ; but, in the latest classes of dreadnoughts, all 
 foreign naval constructors have conformed to the Ameri- 
 can design of turrets aligned over the keel, from which 
 we have never swerved in mounting our heavy guns. 
 
 From the Constitution to the first Pennsylvania, to the 
 Niagara, to the Monitor, to the Roanoke, to the Michigan, 
 to the present fleet flagship Pennsylvania, are but steps in 
 the American idea of the all-big-gun-ship. 
 
 In the Civil War there was also a great development 
 of the torpedo, and of the submarine. The use of tor- 
 
 *"For one nowadays to see a drawing of the battery plan of 
 the U. S. S. Roanoke is to be reminded that there is nothing 
 new under the sun." Lieut. Corn. W. P. Cronan, U. S. N., ia 
 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 
 
APPENDIX 297 
 
 pedoes by the Confederates was of real tactical value to 
 them. Their torpedoes were placed, as are mines in the 
 present war, to protect narrow waters and harbours. 
 Covered by artillery fire, these mine fields undoubtedly 
 proved a good defence in many cases against the superior 
 naval power of the North. Many Federal warships were 
 destroyed by them, among these the monitors Tecumseh 
 and Petapsco. In fact they were a long step toward the 
 great mine fields, which now defend the German bases 
 against the stronger British fleet. 
 
 There was also tactical use of the torpedo as a weapon 
 of offence, the Confederate ram Albemarle being the 
 most important warship so destroyed. The Albemarle 
 was torpedoed in Cushing's daring night attack. As is 
 well known, with a volunteer crew, he attacked in a 
 launch with the torpedo rigged on a spar. This torpedo 
 was exploded by pulling a lanyard. 
 
 The Confederates also made great strides in the de- 
 velopment of the submarine. Under-sea boats approach- 
 ing the modern type were built, especially at Charleston. 
 The torpedo was thrust out forward on a spar instead 
 of being ejected from a tube. One type had an engine, 
 but the best known submarine, used at Charleston, was 
 propelled by the crew who sat along the shaft and re- 
 volved it by hand. These submarines were fearfully 
 dangerous to their crews, and many crews were drowned 
 in this type of boat. But the Confederates, by the use of 
 the submarine, destroyed one good Federal cruiser, the 
 U. S. sloop of war Housatonic, off Charleston in 1864. 
 
 This Confederate development of the original Ameri- 
 can idea of the submarine undoubtedly paved the way 
 for Holland, Lake and others, and led to the recent high 
 
298 APPENDIX 
 
 efficiency of the U-boat, which has become so important 
 a factor in the grand tactics of the present war. As a 
 dangerous commerce destroyer, nothing approaching the 
 U-boats has ever been seen. 
 
 The other commerce destroyers, the light German crui- 
 sers, which made such destructive raids on British ship- 
 ping, closely followed the tactics of the Confederate Navy 
 in the Civil War, which was the first navy to make com- 
 merce destroying a factor in war after the passing of the 
 privateer.-*^ 
 
 At the outbreak of the Civil War the Confederate 
 Government hoped to create a fleet of privateers. This 
 proved impossible. The South did not have the ships, 
 and privateering was not of much importance in the war. 
 The South then tried new tactics, and the Confederate 
 Navy commissioned warships whose mission was com- 
 merce-destroying. 
 
 These cruisers, Sumter, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
 etc., almost drove the United States flag from the seas. 
 With the command of the sea hopelessly against them, 
 their raids were carried on with the greatest ingenuity and 
 daring, and it was very difficult to catch them. 
 
 In the present war the German cruisers imitated the 
 tactics of these Confederate commerce-destroyers, and did 
 a great amount of damage, with the same control of the 
 sea against them. The Alabama and the Emden will 
 always be associated in their kin?hip of successful au- 
 dacity. 
 
 For the Federals on the sea the hardest task was the 
 blockade of the Confederate coast. Blockades had been 
 
 ^"Privateering is and remains abolished." Declaration of 
 Paris, 1856. 
 
APPENDIX 299 
 
 used before in warfare, and the status of a blockade was 
 well defined/ What the United States Navy accom- 
 plished was no "cabinet blockade," but an effective block- 
 ade such as had never been seen. 
 
 Here was one of the longest coast-lines in the world, 
 where harbours and inlets gave every advantage to the 
 blockade-runner. The United States Navy had not ships 
 enough to carry out the task, but, with characteristic 
 energy all kinds of craft were utilised. The steamer 
 Circassian, one of the most valuable prizes of the war, 
 was actually captured by a Fulton ferry-boat. At first 
 the blockade was de facto, as different portions of the 
 coast were policed and notified of the blockade, but in 
 an astonishingly short time the long coast-line was ef- 
 fectively hemmed in. "As to the legal efficiency of the 
 blockade after the first six months there can be no ques- 
 tion." ^ 
 
 This was only the beginning of the undertaking. 
 Great profits offered inducements to blockade-runners. 
 After the blockade became stringent and ships were be- 
 ing constantly seized on the high seas, attempts were 
 made to evade capture by clearing for one of the avail- 
 able neutral ports, touching there, and then trying to run 
 into a Confederate port. Bermuda, Nassau, Havana, and 
 Matamoras were these ports, of which Nassau was much 
 the most active. The idea was that the claim of neutral 
 destination would protect the ship for most of its voyage, 
 and it would only be in danger in the short run between 
 the neutral port and the Southern port. 
 
 ^"A blockade to be legal must be effective." Declaration of 
 Paris. 
 2 Prof. J. R. Soley, U. S. N. 
 
300 APPENDIX 
 
 This practice proved easy to stop, as the character of 
 cargo and evidence of final destination brought condem- 
 nation in the courts. This evidence was most difficult 
 in the case of Matamoras, the only town of importance 
 on the Confederate southern border, but so general be- 
 came the forfeiture of ships and cargoes that some other 
 evasion was necessary. 
 
 The next scheme tried was clearance for the neutral 
 ports, and then trans-shipment at the neutral port. The 
 return cargoes were to be handled in the same way. 
 "But here again the courts stepped in, and held that 
 though a trans-shipment was made, even after landing 
 the cargo and going through a form of sale, the two 
 voyages were parts of one and the same transaction, and 
 the cargo from the outset was liable to condemnation, if 
 the original intention had been to forward the goods to 
 a blockaded port. Nor did the decision stop here. As 
 all property, both ship and cargo, is confiscated upon 
 proof of breach of blockade, it was held that ships carry- 
 ing on this traffic to neutral ports were confiscable, pro- 
 vided the ultimate destination of the cargo to a block- 
 aded port was known to the owner. In the words of the 
 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 'The ships are 
 planks of the same bridge.' " ^ 
 
 The last resort of the blockade-runners was most in- 
 genious, to break the voyage by shipping to a Federal 
 port, then to a neutral port, then to the Confederate port. 
 Goods were shipped to New York by regular steamship 
 lines, thence to Nassau, to be sent to the South. This 
 was ended, when it was observed that trade with Nassau 
 and Bermuda was abnormal, by orders issued to the col- 
 
 ' Soley. 
 
APPENDIX 301 
 
 lectors of customs to refuse clearance to vessels whose 
 cargoes were in danger of falling into the hands of the 
 enemy, and to require owners to give ample security 
 where there was ground for apprehension that cargoes 
 were destined for the enemy's use. 
 
 These orders were general and named no particular 
 ports. Yet the "Merchants of Nassau" complained of 
 this "unjust discrimination" and persuaded Earl Russell 
 to take up the subject diplomatically. The correspond- 
 ence that followed showed so plainly that "the trade of 
 the Baham.as" was blockade-running, that the British 
 Government "derived little satisfaction," and the traffic 
 was ended. 
 
 Thus were overcome difficulties, physical and legal, 
 that seemed insuperable. The amount of harm done to 
 the South by these perfected blockading tactics cannot be 
 estimated. 
 
 This well established case of successful legal blockad- 
 ing tactics was at the command of the British Govern- 
 ment at the outbreak of this war. Enforcement of a legal 
 blockade against the Teutonic alliance would have been 
 very difficult. Instead of trying this. Great Britain at- 
 tempted in the beginning of the war to keep goods from 
 the Teutonic allies by using her command of the sea, 
 and an increasing list of contraband. Great Britain is 
 now avowedly trying to imitate the blockade of our Civil 
 War. 
 
 The American invention and development of the aero- 
 plane is so recent that there is no need to describe it. 
 
 It is impressive to sum up these American contribu- 
 tions to the naval weapons and tactics of to-day. 
 
 The development of the all-big-gun ship. 
 
302 APPENDIX 
 
 The tactical superiority of the armoured ship. 
 The tactical superiority of guns in turrets— and of 
 turrets aligned over the keel. 
 The tactical use of the torpedo. 
 The tactical use of the submarine. 
 Commerce destroying as a factor in warfare. 
 Raids of an enemy's coasts by an inferior navy. 
 Establishment of a legal blockade of a long coast line. 
 The invention and development of the airplane. 
 
 W 98 
 

 '^ ^V «^iV\V2&//A«. '^ t*?^ «**^^S'^ '^ Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process 
 
 • « ■• • ^^ 'S". * «. » o « -A^ 
 
 *■' » 
 
 ^**a'^ '^<^."'*'o^^** g^"^ PreservationTechnologiej 
 
 -P' ^^L'/TTtZ^ '^ •% 111 Thomson Park Drive 
 

 
 
 
 WERT 
 
 BOOKBINDING 
 
 GrantviUe. Pa 
 
 JULY »UG 1989 
 
 We 'e 0^*'"^ ioond 
 
 
 .»^