OUR 
 
 MILITARY EXPERIENCE 
 
 AND 
 
 WHAT IT SUGGESTS. 
 
 ' ' To what purpose are the qualifications for arms without discipline 
 to render them efficient ?" — Lord Bacon. 
 
 BALTIMORE: 
 CUSHINGS & BAILEY. 
 
 1863. 
 
r 305 
 
 
 
OUR MILITARY EXPERIENCE 
 
 AND 
 
 WHAT IT SUGGESTS. 
 
 That the course of the war thus far has not been very 
 flattering to our arms, must he admitted. A country of 
 eight millions of white inhabitants, has, as yet successfully 
 resisted the twenty millions of the Northern and Border 
 States. Nothing is to be gained by deceiving ourselves 
 in these matters. The skilful surgeon liiakes a careful 
 examination of the wounded patient he -would benefit, 
 though the process be a painful one. 
 
 On several occasions our arms have met with decided and 
 universally admitted reverses. Even when we have claimed 
 victories, they have usually been of rather an equivocal kind. 
 After Antietam, the enemy left Maryland as it were at his 
 leisure, and not so much because we whipped him as because 
 he failed to whip us, and it was necessary for him to have 
 done this, if he wished to remain north of the Potomac. At 
 Shiloh our troops were driven to their gunboats on the first 
 day, and on the second, the enemy were driven back but a 
 short distance by the fresh reinforcements under Buel. 
 Perryville, despite newspaper exaggerations always read to 
 us more like a defeat than a victory, and we cannot see that 
 we had much cause to boast about Murfreesborough. From 
 our own accounts of that battle, G-eneral McCook was badly 
 whipped and driven back the first day : on the next, there 
 was little or no fighting ; on the third day the enemy at- 
 1 
 
tempted to drive us further, and having failed, they retired 
 in the night. Bragg claims to have taken back with him 
 several thousand prisoners, two hundred wagons, thirty-two 
 cannon and a great number of small arms. 
 
 SOUTHEKN MILITAEY POLICY. 
 
 Do we know any reasons why the South, as a military 
 power, should have been comparatively more successful than 
 ourselves ^ They have doubtless a great advantage m the 
 fact that they are fighting on the defensive, on their own 
 soil and surrounded by a friendly population, but besides 
 these, there are other very important causes m operation. 
 
 Their military organization seems to approach more nearly 
 the character of a regular army than our own. Much has 
 been said about the folly of raising soldiers by draft and con- 
 scription, but we believe this has for the most part been but 
 buncombe and bombast. An army of conscripts implies a 
 strong military power in the Government which can not 
 only make the citizen a soldier, but will subject him to such 
 discipline as will make him a good one. For carrying out 
 a thorough military system the South has shown peculiar 
 sagacity in the selection of its leader. He was educated to 
 the profession of arms, served in the field, and for four years 
 filled the office of Secretary of War. As a politician it was 
 not his style to give vent to those clap-trap speeches to the 
 preiudice of the military profession, and a permanent regular 
 organization, which for many years past have been so common 
 in the mouths of demagogues and fourth of July orators 
 
 When Secretary of War he advocated the increase ol the 
 pay of the army, the addition of several new regiments, and 
 the concentration of troops in large garrisons for purposes 
 of instruction. He showed his confidence in Military men 
 over mere partizans and spoils seekers by advocating the 
 Military Superintendency of the armories, the Military con- 
 trol of the Indians, and consequent abolition of many enor- 
 mous partizan abuses in the Indian Department, and in the 
 appointment of an army officer to the supervision of the cap- 
 ital extension, and other Public Works, despite the clamors 
 of disappointed party jobbers and would-be contractors. 
 
When four new regiments were raised, all the field officers 
 save one, and the ranking half of the Captains and Lieu- 
 tenants were promoted from the old army in accordance with 
 his wishes as Secretary of War. When he accepted the 
 leadership of the rebellion, he announced that all officers of 
 the regular army who would enter the Confederate service, no 
 matter from what section of the country they might come, 
 should receive equal or higher rank than they were then 
 holding, and the same or greater pay — commissions too were 
 sent to the graduates of the Military schools of the South 
 all over the world wherever they could be found. The estab- 
 lishment of these Military schools shows that the South as 
 a people appreciated Military knowledge ; and the profession 
 of arms has always been more popular among them than at 
 the North. When the war broke out, it found most of our 
 prominent generals who were Military graduates, in civil 
 life, as McClellan, Rosecrans, Halleck, Burnside, Hooker, 
 Sherman, Curtis, and others. It found however, Lee, the two 
 Johnstons, Beauregard, Longstreet, Van Dorn, Huger and 
 other prominent Southern officers still in the army. The 
 governing classes of the South were fully capable of appre- 
 ciating what was necessary to render an army effective, and 
 when they committed their section to rebellion, and found 
 that war was to be the result^ they bent every energy to 
 perfect their Military system by which alone they could hope 
 for success. They knew that popular enthusiasm alone could 
 not be relied on to keep up armies when the miseries of war 
 had been long and extensively experienced, and they placed 
 their chief reliance upon the force of authority and discipline. 
 From all that we have learned of their armies, we have 
 reason to believe they are subjected to a discipline very much 
 more rigid than our own. It has been a common report that 
 their officers do not hesitate to shoot down their men on the 
 field for the slightest wavering or disobedience of orders, and 
 they have a precedent for this in the orders of Washington 
 in our revolutionary war. We have read frequently of some 
 of their men having been shot or hung, and a statement has 
 been going the rounds of our papers that several of their 
 officers had been reduced to the ranks, because of unauthor- 
 
ized absence from their duties. I have been told the following 
 by a person who professes to have positive knowledge of the 
 facts. A soldier of the rebel army applied to his General 
 for his discharge having received a certificate from his Sur- 
 geon and Captain that he was ruptured and unfit for Military 
 duty ; the General nevertheless ordered him to go to duty 
 which he refused to do, and before twelve o'clock next day he 
 IV as shot. 
 
 NORTHERN MILITARY POLICY. 
 
 In the North we have had an army of more than a million 
 of men since the war begun, and in spite of very consider- 
 able insubordination and occasional mutiny, it is probable 
 that not more than half a dozen military executions have 
 thus far taken place. All of us recollect how in the early 
 stages of the war certain regiments had to be coerced into 
 obedience by a regular battery and squadron of cavalry, and 
 how the major part of another regiment (now out of service) 
 continued its retreat from Bull Run all the way to New 
 York, and there held an indignation meeting, declaring 
 that their disgust for the service had proceeded from the 
 fact that their Colonel had told them that the Zoo Zoo drill 
 was played out ; in other words, that standing on their heads 
 and turning cart ivheels might all be very fine for circus 
 actors, but was not exactly the drill for soldiers. Only the 
 other day we read of half a regiment of cavalry refusing to 
 go into action for no other reason, so far as we have yet 
 heard, than because they did not ivant to. 
 
 All of our public measures have been very considerably in- 
 fluenced, either directly or remotely, by a class of people 
 who in times past have been in the habit of sneering at the 
 military profession, who affected to despise its ranks and 
 grades and inequalities, and who looked upon a sixth ward 
 politician as of more consideration than the most accom- 
 plished officer. Even now, and on the floor of the Senate 
 are heard expressions of contempt towards the Military 
 school of the nation. 
 
WEST POINT. 
 
 One gentleman opposed tlie academy because of its exclu- 
 siveness, yet the members of Congress are the parties who 
 make the appointments. Of course it is exclusive, for if it can 
 but educate three hundreds youths at a time, some two or three 
 millions or more must necessarily be kept out ; on the same 
 principle these gentlemen would most likely think Congress 
 an exclusive body, particularly if they happened to be among 
 the outs instead of the ins. We commend them to study 
 the philosophy of a remark attributed to the President in 
 reference to an appointment to office he was about to make — 
 '' that when two men wanted to ride the same horse one must 
 get behind." One Senator thought that West Point was 
 the cause of the rebellion, the politicians according to him 
 could have had but little to do with it. Could the Senator 
 have thought that the country could be deceived by such a 
 statement as this ? What candid man believes that seces- 
 sion would ever have been inaugurated by the officers of the 
 Army ? Men from all sections of the country, for the most 
 part bound together by the memories of a common Alma 
 Mater, partaking of a common exile upon our wild Indian 
 frontiers where it was their custom to wile away many an 
 hour in talking over the scenes of their West Point home, 
 bound together by the ties of the regiment and the mess, 
 and actuated by the same Esprit du Corps, the officers of 
 the Army were eminently a conservative and national body 
 of men. These men were believers in law, authority and 
 discipline, and in supporting the dignity and power of the 
 General Government, and no class of men in our country 
 were more thoroughly disgusted with the contempt con- 
 stantly oiFered the Federal Government by demagogues, and 
 spoils hunters, Mormons, squatters, whiskey sellers, " et id 
 omne genus." 
 
 As a class I believe I am right in saying of them that 
 they did not sympathize with the doctrines of universal suf- 
 frage, rotation in office, frequent elections for all kinds of 
 officers, and the many other ultra democratic, radical and 
 destructis^e political principles whicli have gained a baleful 
 
ascendancy among the people and in the policy of the 
 country, since the good old conservative party of Washing- 
 ton, Hamilton, Adams, Jay and Marshall was destroyed. 
 
 It is to the demagogues who have brought about this state 
 of things, and not to our conservative little army that this 
 rebellion is more properly attributable, and indeed I have 
 sometimes thought that if the ''Peace Convention" had 
 been composed of Army officers alone they would all still 
 be serving under the same old flag of a happy and undivided 
 country, instead of meeting each other in deadly conflict. 
 
 The officers of our army too, living as they did in isolated 
 garrisons upon the frontiers, have been very extensively 
 bound together by marriage connexions, and no class of our 
 community has been so great a sufferer by this terrible war 
 which has severed their dearest ties and rushed them sword 
 in hand against each other foremost in the fight on every 
 battle field. 
 
 Of the general officers who have thus far fallen in this 
 war for the Union^ probably two-thirds, (we write from 
 memory,) were of the old regular army. We recall the 
 names of Lyon, Sill, Terrell, Williams, Stevens, Eeno, 
 Mansfield, Bayard, Kearney and Kichardson, all of whom 
 belonged to the old army, and except tlie last two were 
 graduates of West Point. 
 
 I have no apology to off"er for those officers who have 
 deserted their colors, and to attempt to do so would be a 
 base reflection upon the many brave and loyal Southerners 
 who are still true, and who are among the very best officers 
 in our army. But I do say that the Southern officers_, as a 
 body, left our army with deep sorrow that the politicians of 
 the country had made it in their opinion necessary for them 
 to do so^ and very generally "when parting from their com- 
 rades they declared that they resigned because they could 
 not fight against their brothers, but would never take up 
 arms against the Old Flag. It is a melancholy fact however 
 that when they went home they did not long resist the pres- 
 sure and remain idle amid such a contest, and though we 
 must acquit West Point of inaugurating, advising or de- 
 siring tliis rebellion, we believe it would have been com- 
 
7 
 
 paratively but a weak affair without the military genius and 
 influence of her Southern sons. 
 
 We now recur to the West Point debate in the Senate. 
 
 One military Senator thought that not a ray of genius had 
 emanated from a graduate during the war, and another said 
 that West Point had been a positive obstruction to our armies, 
 probably referring to Davis, Lee, Johnston, Jackson, Beaui^e- 
 gard, Bragg, Longstreet, Van Born, the Hills, &c. 
 
 Other members based their opposition on the grounds that 
 their constituents did not like the institution, which is 
 usually a potent argument with an M. C. Unfortunately 
 we fear this levelling disposition is but too common among 
 constituents. ''What right has them stuck up Jones's to 
 hev their boy Tom edikated by Uncle Sam, when I hev to 
 pay old Ichabod Crane five dollars a quarter for the schoolin 
 of my four boys. That West Pint is a aristocratick insti- 
 tushun and i'll write to the members from this deestrick and 
 hev it busted up right away." 
 
 In the French revolution it was regarded by the radicals 
 a crime against the state to have had a grandfather, and 
 that class of thinkers in these days, seem to look upon mili- 
 tary education in the same light. So great is their love for 
 equality (which in reality only exists in the purely abstract 
 science of mathematics) and so great is their hatred to rank 
 and grades that we would scarcely be surprised to hear from 
 them a proposition to do away with officers altogether. 
 
 But fortunately for the country, we have some men in 
 position, who, like Senator Nesmyth, can see that education 
 in any business is certainly worth something, and that cities 
 now-a-days are not to be taken by the '■^blowing of horns," 
 a practice which we think by this time ought to have been 
 ^'played out." The fact is, that at the South, West Point, 
 with Davis for a leader, controls the politicians, but in the 
 North, the reverse is very near the truth. 
 
 So far as the charge of exciting jealousies in the army is 
 concerned. West Point would confidently submit her cause 
 to the verdict of the officers of the old army who were ap- 
 pointed from civil life. 
 
8 
 
 In a former article, (in the Baltimore American,) we have 
 considered the evil system which has been followed in officer- 
 ing regiments, and by which so many incompetent persons 
 obtained commissions. We will quote the article. 
 
 OFFICEES. 
 
 '' I saw it stated in Saturday's paper, that General 
 
 had ordered that any officer who offered his resignation, 
 should be dishonorably dismissed the service. I know not 
 if this be so, but I believe the general fact is true, that 
 during the war there has been much difficulty experienced 
 in getting resignations accepted. A Surgeon told me that 
 he knew an officer who behaved in a disgraceful manner 
 during an action^ and that after it was over, he himself told 
 the officer to his face, that he was a coward, although he did 
 not prefer charges against him. The officer immediately 
 handed in his resignation but it was weeks before it was 
 accepted and his place supplied with a better man. When 
 a new regiment goes into action, it is not unlikely that 
 some of its officers may become convinced of the fact that 
 war is not their forte, and before another comes off, may 
 hand in their resignations, and certainly it seems the true 
 policy to accept them at once. Cases undoubtedly do occur, 
 when resignations should not be accepted, and officers should 
 be dishonorably dismissed the service, but if it be understood 
 that all who oifer their resignations are to be treated in this 
 way, it will have the effect of keeping men in service who 
 are sensible of their own unfitness for the positions they 
 occupy. 
 
 Now what can we expect of an army if many of its offi- 
 cers are serving as such under compulsion. They are to be 
 the leaders, yea, the despotic leaders of their men if suc- 
 cess is to be attained, for despite their inferiority in numbers, 
 the influence of the officers upon military results in propor- 
 tion to that of the men, is at least as one hundred to one. 
 If men have the right kind of officers they can be made to 
 go wherever their officers will go, and stay wherever and as 
 long as they will stay. With such officers, men soon learn 
 that obedience is less dan<>:erous than is the coutrarv. 
 
9 
 
 The grand mistake made by the North in this war has 
 been in ignoring the great relative importance of the officers 
 in military organizations, and in adopting a vicious method 
 of officering regiments. 
 
 The usual system has been that a State Governor has 
 given some political adherent the privilege of raising a reg- 
 iment, and has probably appointed also the other field officers. 
 These have made it known that whoever would bring them 
 a certain number of men, should have a Captain's commis- 
 sion, and that for some smaller number a Lieutenant's com- 
 mission would be given. Now, it is evident, that under 
 such a system, the men who have " popularity " enough to 
 raise a company will frequently be about the worst men for 
 officers. Indeed it is questionable whether it would not be 
 nearer the truth to say, that the fact of a man's " popu- 
 larity " in such cases is rather a proof of unfitness than 
 otherwise. And when good men do obtain company com- 
 missions through the favor, as it were, of their men, this 
 fact itself must materially interfere with military discipline. 
 
 Brigade Surgeons have told me that even the appointing of 
 medical officers to regiments from their own neighborhoods 
 was attended with many serious evils. In the afiairs of civil 
 life, the mechanic who hopes to succeed, will not permit 
 familiarities towards his foreman or boss, or on the part of 
 his journeymen and apprentices. 
 
 The fact of it is, the spirit of the North has been too 
 democratic in its tendencies to establish a thorough military 
 system. It has been disposed to flatter the many, and ex- 
 hibit a jealousy towards the few in authority, it listens too 
 readily to complaints of inferiors against their superiors, 
 and its presumptions are always in favor of the governed 
 against the governors. This spirit is necessarily antago- 
 nistic to a system whose corner stone is implicit obedience to 
 superior authority, even at the risk of life itself. Indeed 
 many of the men and journals that are fierce for this war, 
 have been noted in time past for denouncing military estab- 
 lishments, as an useless expense, military science as a hum- 
 bus;, and militarv men as mercenaries and coxcombs. In 
 2 
 
10 
 
 their view, patriotism was the only defence the country 
 would ever require ; yet in this war, the patriotism of the 
 volunteer has heen stimulated by double the pay that was 
 given to the old mercenaries. It may be said that it is 
 necessary to oflScer our armies in the manner alluded to, in 
 order to induce the men to volunteer. Better then raise the 
 men by ''draft;" and it is not so ''certain, whether from the 
 first this would not have been the best way of raising an 
 army, and whether such men with good officers, would not 
 prove more efficient than those who carry with them into 
 the ranks the idea that military service is, on their part, 
 only a voluntary affair." 
 
 As bearing upon some of the views expressed in the above 
 article, we will merely allude here in passing to the leniency 
 which our people have regarded and unfortunately still 
 regard the high military crime of desertion. 
 
 STATE QUOTAS. 
 
 Having considered some of the evils by which regiments 
 have been officered, we may here say a few words as to the 
 way in which the States have recently been furnishing men. 
 
 To avoid the draft, large bounties were offered, and such 
 ruinous facilities given to enlistment, that as a consequence, 
 our hospitals are crowded with broken down men, who have 
 scarcely seen any service, who only entered and drew their 
 bounties a few months ago, and who ought never to have 
 been enlisted at all. In some cases, the parties who induced 
 unsuitable men to enlist, are now busy in endeavoring to 
 procure their discharge, and we have no doubt cases could 
 be found where parties have enlisted two or three times, and 
 drawn several bounties, who have never heard the gun of an 
 enemy. 
 
 OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. 
 
 Another evil of our military system is, that of outside 
 interference. Members of Congress, and politicians in their 
 public and private capacity are busy looking after the inter- 
 ests of their constituents, who are privates, officers, sutlers 
 or contractors in the army. Self-constituted commissions 
 
11 
 
 and committees of all kinds, and both sexes, are busy at 
 work in military affairs, sometimes no doubt for good, but 
 we candidly believe in the main for evil. Much of the good 
 too has only been apparent, and has been done by outsiders, 
 not so much because the government machinery was inade- 
 quate, but because the people clamored for their right to 
 interfere, and the government organization had to yield. 
 
 Another class that has had considerable influence, both 
 immediate and remote, upon our affairs, comprise the vision- 
 aries and philanthropists, who are unfit to be trusted with any 
 practical common sense business, who believe in vegetable 
 diet, Thomsonianism, &c. and who meet together seriously 
 for the purpose of doing a great deal of good, by changing 
 women into men, and abolishing the laws of nature in va- 
 rious other respects. From such influences we could derive 
 no benefit in carrying on the eminently practical business of 
 war. 
 
 We believe many soldiers have been made homesick, and 
 disgusted with the service by the officiousness of State 
 agents and rose-water philanthropists. 
 
 VOLUNTEERS, NOT ALWAYS VOLUNTEERS. 
 
 It is time now for the Union party to take a practical 
 view of affairs, and to discard the follies which political 
 stump orators have been teaching them for so many years. 
 While they give all honor to those who have entered our 
 army from patriotic motives, they ought to see the neces- 
 sity of keeping it up and making it efficient. Every 
 paper startles us with statements as to the great numbers of 
 officers and men absent from their regiments without leave. 
 It is probably no exaggeration to say that if to-morrow 
 every man of our army (a voluntary one though it be) 
 were permitted to do as he pleased, not fifty thousand would 
 be present at roll call twenty-four hours afterwards. Not 
 that so many, perhaps, as this implies, would seek to absent 
 themselves permanently, but they would not be on hand or 
 available. Practically then, even a voluntary army must be 
 kept together by discipline and compulsion. 
 
12 
 
 UNION SENTIMENT OF THE SOUTH. 
 
 But few now, I suppose, look for much material support 
 frora the Union sentiment of the South, No douht at the 
 commencement of our troubles there was a large Union 
 party there, hut many of them are now in the Army, and 
 have lost fathers, sons and brothers in the war. They 
 may have been compelled to enter the service, but soldiers 
 cannot long fight for a cause without wishing it to be suc- 
 cessful, and will readily forgive any amount of discijDline on 
 the part of their officers, provided they but lead them to 
 victory. Military success then is what we want^ and the 
 negro question, habeas corpus question, and indeed all others 
 should be looked upon as but secondary. Now, a military 
 force to be thoroughly efficient, particularly for conquest or 
 invasion, must be subjected to the stern discipline of regular 
 troops. The better to illustrate many of the points discussed 
 in this article, we will take a short glance at our country's 
 wars, beginning with the Revolution. 
 
 In doing this it has not been our desire to draw invidious 
 comparisons ; but so much has been written and said on 
 these subjects for mere "buncombe," that we believe a little 
 wholesome truth is justified and demanded by the occasion. 
 
 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. 
 
 During the Revolution, Washington wrote volumes to 
 Congress on the necessity of an adequate regular military 
 establishment, and the inefficiency of other kinds of troops. 
 We quote a few extracts from Sparks' "Life of Washing- 
 ton." Speaking of the militia, the General says, "Great 
 numbers of them have gone off, in some instances, almost 
 by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a 
 time. With the deepest concern I am obliged to confess my 
 want of confidence in the generality of the troops. Men 
 who have been free and subject to no control, cannot be 
 reduced to order in an instant." Again, he says, "it is not 
 easy to be conceived, except by those who are witnesses to 
 it, what an additional waste and consumption of every 
 
13 
 
 thing, and consequently what an increase of expense results 
 from#laxness of discipline in the army; and where the 
 officers think they are doing the public a favor hy holding 
 their commissions, and the men are constantly fluctuating, 
 it is impossible to maintain discipline." 
 
 Moved by his (Washington's) representations and appeals 
 as well as by their own sense of the necessity of the case, 
 Congress determined to reorganize the army on a plan con- 
 formable in its essential features to the suggestions of the 
 Commander-in-Chief, they who for a long time cherished a 
 lingering hope of reconciliation, were at length convinced that 
 the struggle would not soon terminate, and that it must be met 
 by all the means which the wisdom, patriotism and resources 
 of the country could supply. To the 7-esolute and discerning, 
 this had been obvious from the moment the sword was drawn. 
 The events of a year had impressed it on the minds of all. 
 
 The new army was to consist of Thus matured, the 
 
 plan was sent to the Commander-in-Chief — but General 
 Washington perceived defects in the scheme which he feared 
 would retard, if not defeat its operations. The pay of the 
 officers had not been increased, and he was persuaded that 
 officers of character could not be induced to retain their com- 
 mission on the old pay, (what mercenaries were these revolu- 
 tionary officers, our sentimental radicals would say.) The 
 mode of appointing them was defective, it being left to the 
 State governments, which would act slowly without adequate 
 knowledge, and often under influences not salutary to the 
 interest of the army. ****** ^^ length, also 
 the States being negligent and tardy in the providing for the 
 appointment of officers. Congress authorized General Wash- 
 ington to fill up the vacancies. 
 
 "By a formal resolve, he was authorized to displace and 
 appoint all officers under the rank of Brigadiers, and to fill 
 up vacancies in every part of the arm3^ 
 
 "Some of the States had neglected to complete their ap- 
 pointments, and generally, these were made with so little 
 judgment, and with such a disregard of military rules that 
 officers icitliout ivorth or experience had been put over the heads 
 
14 
 
 of tJiose who had been accustomed to service, and had given 
 proofs of their valor and ability. By his power to displace 
 and fill up vacancies, Washington rectified these errors as 
 far as prudence would permit — he took care to promote 
 meritorious officers who had been overlooked by the State." 
 
 Our three most memorable and important successes in the 
 revolution, the capture of Burgoyne, the campaign of the 
 Jerseys and the capture of Cornwallis, were almost exclu- 
 sively attributable in the first two instances, to what were 
 called the "" Continental troops " or, " troops of the line " 
 and in the last case to these troops and the French com- 
 bined. 
 
 Crayden, an officer in the Continental Army says, "yet 
 in the day of trial from whatever cause it proceeded, the 
 fate of the country and its liberties was always committed to 
 a handful of mercenaries the very things which were the 
 eternal theme of our scor?i and contempt." We have seen 
 with what extraordinary authority Washington was invested 
 by Congress in the matter of officering his army ; and the 
 policy which he sought to pursue in its exercise may be 
 judged from the following extract from a letter which he 
 wrote to Colonel Baylor, who was to command a regiment of 
 light-horse; he says "as nothing contributes so much to the 
 constitution of a good regiment as a good corps of officers 
 and no method is so likely to obtain tliese as leaving the 
 choice in a great measure to the gentleman who is to reap 
 the honors, or share the disgrace of their behavior, I 
 shall vest you with the power of nominating the officers of 
 your regiment, except the field officers, claiming to myself 
 a negative upon a part or a whole, if I have reason to sus- 
 pect an improper choice. I earnestly recommend to you to 
 be circumspect in your choice of officers. Take none but 
 gentlemen; let no local attachments influence you; do not 
 suffer your good nature when an application is made to say 
 "yes," when you ought to say "no." Eemember that it 
 is a public not a private cause that is to be injured or bene- 
 fitted by your choice. Recollect also^ that no instance has 
 yet happened of good or bad behavior in a corps in our service 
 that has not originated with the officers." 
 
15 
 
 Take none but gentlemen, says Washington, what an una- 
 vailajble old fogy would he have been for public office in the 
 times of the ''Latter-day Saints." 
 
 "As bearing upon the subject of 'officers' as well as dis- 
 cipline, we quote from 'Irving.' 'There is a great overturn- 
 ing in the camp as to order and regularity,' (writes the 
 military chaplain,) 'new lords, new laws. The Grenerals 
 Washington and Lee are upon the lines every day * * * The 
 strictest government is taking place, and great distinction is 
 made between officers and soldiers. Every one is made to 
 hnow Ms place and keep it, or be tied up and receive thirty or 
 forty lashes, according to his crime." 
 
 The following extract from a letter of Washington in 
 Sparks' life shows his policy towards mutineers. 
 
 "The fatal tendency of that spirit which has shown itself 
 in the Pennsylvania and Jersey lines, and which derived so 
 much encouragement from impunity in the case of the former, 
 determined me at all events to pursue a different conduct with 
 respect to the latter. For this purpose, I detached a body of 
 troops under Major General Howe with orders to compel the 
 mutineers to unconditional submission, and execute on the 
 spot a few of the principal incendiaries. This has been effected 
 this morning, and we have reason to believe the mutinous 
 disposition of the troops is now completely subdued and 
 succeeded by genuine penitence." 
 
 The "continental" troops were for the most part originally 
 raised only for the war, but Washington was not insensible 
 of the superiority and necessity of an adequate permanent 
 military establishment, and urged the matter upon Congress. 
 He says "supported by a prospect of permanent independence 
 the officers would be tied to the service, and would submit 
 to many momentary privations, and to the inconveniences 
 which the situation of public affairs make unavoidable. 
 This is exemplified in the Pennsylvania officers, who being 
 upon this establishment, are so much interested in the ser- 
 vice, that in the course of months there has been only one 
 resignation in that line." 
 
 And again he writes, "the next, and I believe the last 
 
16 
 
 thing I shall have time to touch upon, is our military estab- 
 lishment; and here if I thought the conviction of the 
 necessity of having a permanent force, had not e'er this 
 flashed upon every man's mind, I could write a volume in 
 support of the utility of it, for no day or hour arrives unac- 
 companied with proof of some loss, some expense, or some 
 misfortune, consequent on the want of it. No operation of 
 war_, offensive or defensive, can be carried on for any length 
 of time without it. No funds are adequate to the supplies 
 of a fluctuating army, though it may go under the denomination 
 of a regidar one." 
 
 And again we are told, '''an incident is related as having 
 occurred while he was in the Convention for forming the 
 Constitution, which was probably suggested by his experience 
 during the war. A member proposed to introduce a clause 
 into the Constitution, limiting a standing army to five 
 thousand men. Washington observed he should have no ob- 
 jection to such a clause, if it were so amended as to provide 
 that no enemy should presume to invade the United States 
 with mare than three thousand." 
 
 THE WAE OF 1812. 
 
 In this war though the navy achieved some signal victories, 
 the land forces on the whole acquired but little glory. A 
 few pages are brightened by the records of Fort Stephenson, 
 Lundy's Lane, Bridgewater and Chijjpewa, where regular 
 troops and their oflicers. Brown, Scott, Kipley, Towson, 
 Jessup and Croghan_, redeemed, to some extent, the disgrace 
 which the militia had brought upon our arms. 
 
 Nor should the brave Barney who stood with his marines 
 by the bridge at the Bladensburg races be overlooked, nor 
 the gallant defenders of Fort McHenry. Even the battle of 
 New Orleans which we talk so much about (and which was 
 won by a regular officer,) is a most wonderful illustration of 
 the daring and steadiness under fire, which masses of men 
 may attain by regular training and thorough discipline. 
 There the British regulars marched up to breastworks with 
 the flints knocked from their muskets ; on arriving at the 
 
17 
 
 ditch, it was found that through some mistake, the regiments 
 that had charge of the fascines and ladders had not come up, 
 and the troops stood there under a deadly fire, which they 
 could not return until ordered to retire, after some fourteen 
 hundred men and three commanding Grenerals had been 
 killed or wounded. To the bungling of the British Generals 
 and their contempt of their enemy, is mainly attributable 
 their defeat at New Orleans. 
 
 THE MEXICAN WAR. 
 
 In the Mexican war we all remember what troops fought 
 Palo Alto and Besaca — what composed Worth's and Twiggs' 
 divisions which did most of the fighting on the lower line, 
 and what was the character of Ringgold's, Bragg's, Dun- 
 can's and Sherman's batteries. 
 
 The following tabular statement of the killed and wound- 
 ed in the Mexican war, taken from official sources will best 
 illustrate this part of the subject. 
 
 
 Mean 
 Strength. 
 
 Killed and Mor- 
 tally wounded. 
 
 Wounded not 
 Mortally. 
 
 
 Officers 
 
 Men. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Men. 
 
 Old Regular Force, 
 
 15,73t) 
 11,186 
 73,532 
 
 63 
 10 
 47 
 
 729 
 133 
 
 517 
 
 118 
 36 
 
 129 
 
 1685 
 
 Additional Regulars (for the War,) 
 Volunteers, 
 
 236 
 1189 
 
 It will thus be seen that the absolute loss in battle by the 
 old army numbering less than sixteen thousand men, ex- 
 ceeded that of the "war regulars" and volunteers together, 
 and which amounted to about eighty-five thousand men. 
 
 Almost one-half of the whole loss of the volunteers was 
 in the battle of "Buena Vista," where there were no regu- 
 lar troops, save a few batteries, and companies of dragoons; 
 a battle that was more nearly lost than any that was fought 
 in Mexico, yet saved principally by the stubborn determina- 
 tion of the veteran general in command, and the cool steadi- 
 ness of the regular artillery. 
 
 THE PRESENT WAR. 
 
 We suspect there are persons who will almost be sur- 
 prised to hear that at present we have any regular army at 
 
18 
 
 all, so much have they read in long newspaper letters of the 
 exploits of the bloody 901st, or gallant 900th, or the Fre- 
 mont Body Guard. But letter-writing for newspapers is 
 not the forte of regular soldiers, and has always heen dis- 
 couraged in well disciplined armies. At Big Bethel and the 
 first Bull Kun fights there were a few regular troops en- 
 gaged, and from all accounts they did fully as well as could 
 he expected from so small a number. In the first of these 
 fights Greble, and in the latter, Tillinghast was killed. 
 
 Immediately after the Bull Run panic, the few ''regulars" 
 about the Capital were used to exercise a wholesome coer- 
 cive power over certain highly patriotic, but rather muti- 
 nous volunteer regiments. On the Peninsula all the regu- 
 lars, except a few batteries, were in the reserve, of which 
 they constituted the greater portion. In the battle of 
 Gaines' Mills, they nobly maintained their part of the line, 
 but it was at Malvern where these troops, particularly the 
 artillery, best showed their true metal. 
 
 There was a brigade of regulars in the battle of Murfrees- 
 borough, under the command of General Eousseau, himself 
 a volunteer. As to their conduct in that fight, we extract 
 the following from one of the papers of the day. 
 
 "In the report of the battle — lasting five days — General 
 Rousseau uses the following language in regard to the 
 brigade. 
 
 "The brigade of the United States Infantry, Lieut. Col. 
 M. Shepherd commanding, was on the extreme right ; on 
 that body of brave men, the shock of battle fell heaviest, 
 and its loss was most severe. 
 
 "Nearly one-half of the command fell, killed or wounded; 
 but it stood up to the work and bravely breasted the storm ; 
 and, though Major King, commanding the Fifteenth, and 
 Major Slemmer, (old Pickens) of the Sixteenth, fell severely 
 wounded, and Maj. Carpenter, commanding the Nineteenth, 
 fell dead in the last charge, together with many other brave 
 officers and men ; the brigade did not falter for a moment. 
 These three battalions were a part of my old Fourth, at the 
 battle of Shiloli. 
 
19 
 
 ''The Eighteenth Infantry, Majors Townsend and Caldwell 
 commanding, were new troops to me; but I am proud to 
 say we know each other now. If I could I would promote 
 every officer, and several non-commissioned officers and pri- 
 vates of this brigade of regulars for gallantry and good ser- 
 vice in this terrific battle. I make no distinction between 
 these troops and my brave volunteer regiments ; for in my 
 judgment there were never better troops than those regi- 
 ments in the world ; but the troops of the line were soldiers 
 by profession, and, with a view to the future, I feel it my 
 duty to say what I have of them. The brigade was admi- 
 rably and skilfully handled by Lieut. Colonel Sheplierd. — 
 This is high praise to come from such a man as General 
 Rousseau. He is no untried holiday soldier. He is emphat- 
 ically the fighting general, and qualities which elicit such 
 praise as this from him must be of very high order. 
 
 "The country will not fail to remember his conduct at the 
 fight at Chaplin Hills and Shiloh, and in the semi-official ac- 
 count of this fight [Murfreesborough] it is said of him — 'It 
 was again the fortune of General Rousseau with his division 
 to change the fortunes of the day. The right wing of our 
 army, under command of Major Gen. McCook, had been 
 completely overwhelmed and driven from its position, by 
 the overwhelming masses of the enemy, and Gen. Rousseau, 
 with his division, with the brigade of regulars on the right, 
 was ordered to move into position to check the victorious 
 and pursuing enemy; and well he performed the task.' — 
 His message to General Rosecrans, in the hottest of the 
 fight is characteristic of the man : ' Tell the general that I 
 shall stay here — right here.' And he did stay. 
 
 "The regular brigade suffered severely. Of the officers, 
 twenty-six were killed or wounded, and of the enlisted men 
 six hundred and eleven." 
 
 In another part of this article it is stated that ShejDherd's 
 brigade consisted of seventy officers and fourteen hundred 
 men. 
 
 An officer who has been serving with a regular regiment 
 in the war, informs me that it has thus far lost in killed 
 
20 
 
 and wounded, seven-eighths of all the officers who have 
 been on duty with it. 
 
 In a preceding part of this article we have already shown 
 that the greater part of our general officers who have thus 
 far been killed in battle were from the old army, so that the 
 complaints so often made of the number of generals who 
 have never heard the sound of an enemy's gun, is scarcely 
 applicable to that class of officers at least. 
 
 A W AN T. 
 
 Besides a more rigid discipline in our volunteer force, what 
 is needed now and always lias been needed, is a larger per- 
 manent regular army — an army that will talk but little 
 politics, that believes quite as much in discipline as pa- 
 triotism, and whose officers are not aspiring to go to 
 Congress. 
 
 If we had had one of even fifty thousand men, we doubt 
 if this rebellion had ever broken out, and millions of money 
 and thousands of lives would have been saved to the coun- 
 try. But the great evil of Democracies is the want of fore- 
 thought; they are apt to look only at the present, and pro- 
 posed measures for the prevention of probable troubles, and 
 accompanied with certain and immediate expense, are gener- 
 ally unpopular ; yet our national experience has fully dem- 
 onstated the fact that a regular establishment is not only 
 the most efficient, but by far the most economical kind of 
 force. But much difficult}^ has been experienced in keeping 
 up our present comparatively small regular army to the 
 legalized strength and from obvious causes. In order to 
 obtain their quotas the States, counties, and towns have 
 offered large bounties for volunteers in addition to the pay 
 of the Federal Government, and men therefore naturally 
 preferred enlisting as ^^ volunteers/' and thus receiving higher 
 pay for their services to the country than regular troops. 
 To obviate this result, an order was issued some months ago 
 permitting volunteers who desired it to be transferred to the 
 regular service ; and as they had already received their boun- 
 ties as volunteers, very many of them availed themselves of 
 this permission, and thus supplied the regular army with 
 
21 
 
 much excellent material. This order, however, is no longer 
 in operation, having from some cause or other been rescinded 
 within a month or so after it was issued. 
 
 At present our regular establishment consists of nineteen 
 regiments of infantry, six of cavalry, and five of artillery. 
 This force might, we think, be advantageously increased by 
 at least seventy additional regiments, making one hundred 
 in all — each arm of the service receiving its proportion^e 
 increase. With such an addition, it might be desirable to 
 dispense with field batteries not in the hands of the regular 
 companies. Poor artillery is much more likely to be inju- 
 rious than beneficial to an army. By inefiective firing, and 
 often at too long a range, they rob their arm of its moral 
 efi'ect and excite a contempt for it in the enemy, and when 
 charged upon, it too often happens that their guns are aban- 
 doned just at the time when they begin to be really efi'ective. 
 There is reason to fear that the enemy has already been but 
 too liberally supplied with ordnance in this way. 
 
 Whatever may be the termination of this conflict, it is 
 more than probable that the country will need an army as 
 large as the one proposed. It is the ballast necessary to 
 keep the ship of State steady, not only in the storm of the 
 revolution, but amid the heavy seas which will follow it. 
 If a reduction ever should be deemed advisable, the number 
 of men in the regiments might be diminished, and surplus 
 officers might be employed with the militia in camps of in- 
 struction, and on various other duties under the Federal and 
 State Grovernments. They might also be employed to ad- 
 vantage by these Governments in various positions of trust, 
 not perhaps directly connected with the military service, for 
 as disbursing ofiicers, the ofiicers of the regular army have 
 always stood proudly pre-eminent on the records for their 
 probity and fidelity to the Government. And this is not 
 to be wondered at when we consider that they have held 
 their ofiices by the tenure of good behaviour, have not been 
 influenced by the corrupt principle of '^rotation," nor be- 
 longed to a school which regards public ofiice as the 
 ' ' spoils of faction . " ' 
 
22 
 
 The great question arises how is this force to be raised 
 with the necessary promptness and care ? We think this 
 could best be done by converting the requisite number of 
 volunteer regiments now in the field into regulars. In our 
 several armies, boards of competent officers of the old or the 
 additional regular army might be convened to pass upon the 
 merits of parties desirous of commissions, and to recom- 
 ifiend suitable persons for the various grades. The officers 
 of those regiments selected for the regular service Avho could 
 not pass the board, must necessarily be displaced; in some 
 cases, it might be practicable to assign them to the vacancies 
 created by the officers who had passed the board, and where 
 this could not be done, they might be ordered to report to 
 the Governors of their respective States, who could appoint 
 them if it were desirable to fill vacancies in other regiments. 
 Provision would also have to be made for those cases where 
 an officer promoted to a new regiment would, by joining it, 
 leave his old company without any commissioned officer. 
 To make the matter more easy of accomplishment, as the 
 officers appointed to the converted regiments would all be 
 present and ready to go on duty at once, it would not be 
 necessary or desirable at first to appoint to these regiments 
 their full quota of officers. One field officer to command 
 each regiment and two-thirds of the captains and lieutenants, 
 so as to give two officers to each company, would at first be 
 sufficient. The appointment of only one-half the field offi- 
 cers of each grade, would give every regiment a field officer 
 to command it, and would besides provide for the promotion 
 of those officers of the regular army who now hold field offi- 
 cer's commissions in the volunteer forces, and could not leave 
 their present commands^ without detriment to the service. 
 Whatever additional number of regular general officers 
 might be considered necessary, could at any future time be 
 appointed, and it is probable that with so large a permanent 
 regular army, it would not be considered desirable to in- 
 crease in the usual proportion the number of such gen- 
 eral officers. Generals to command the new brigades at 
 first, might be selected from regular officers holding volun- 
 teer generals' rank. 
 
23 
 
 When this programme was completed, it would leave all 
 the generals' commissions, half the colonels, lieutenant col- 
 onels and majors, and one-third the captains and lieutenants' 
 still to he filled. Promotion, as in the old army, should be 
 based on seniority as far as this proposed organization would 
 go, i. e. in a regiment, for instance, originally inaugu- 
 rated with seven captains and six first and second lieuten- 
 ants, promotions to vacancies in these places should be made 
 in the ordinary way. The nine hundred original vacancies 
 created by this plan, however, should be prizes to be filled 
 by extraordinary promotion from the whole army, regular 
 and volunteer. A place once filled by extraordinary promo- 
 tion should afterwards be open to ordinary promotion only ; 
 thus the eighth captaincy in a regiment having once been 
 filled by extraordinary promotion, should be afterwards 
 filled by promotion in the ordinary way. Officers and sol- 
 diers recommended for extraordinary promotion should not 
 receive their commissions without having some time or other 
 previously passed a board of regular officers. Mere bravery 
 in a soldier should not, of itself, be a cause for promotion ; 
 for disciplined soldiers are expected to do their duty, and 
 are not presumed to be cowards. Officers should be more 
 than brave; they should be of such education and habits 
 as will give tone to the body to which they belong, and ena- 
 ble them to take a respectable position in society. In this 
 matter the boards should keep in view the important advice 
 of Washington on the same subject, and which has been 
 previously quoted. 
 
 The public can scarcely conceive the immense amount of 
 injury, both to the country and the private soldier, that is 
 due to the ignorance of officers. 
 
 Above all, no political influences should be brought to bear to 
 control or neutralize the action of these boards. Such influ- 
 ences have already done our military affairs a vast deal of 
 mischief and crowded our armies with incompetent officers. 
 If politics should control the business, then the whole of 
 this proposed plan would do us harm on a gigantic scale, 
 and no one would be more violently opposed to its adoption 
 than the writer of this article. 
 
24 
 
 All the details of the plan herein proposed for increasing 
 the regular army may not he found entirely practicable , or 
 free from valid objections, but the main object of the writer 
 has been to shew the necessity for such an increase, and for 
 the exercise of a cautious discrimination in the selection of 
 officers. If the writer will have succeeded in awakening 
 interest in the subject, in turning the thoughts of some re- 
 flecting minds in what he conceives to be the right direc- 
 tion, in exposing some popular humbugs which lie in the 
 path of reform, and in showing that the sneers against a 
 worthy institution are founded in "buncombe," and not in 
 justice, he will be fully satisfied. That we may profit by 
 the experience of the past — that all conservative men may 
 unite in crushing out the demagogism, factions and here- 
 sies which have been so long sapping the dignity and power 
 of the Federal Government, and that its flag may be borne 
 triumphantly over every portion of the Kepublic, is his 
 earnest hope. 
 
 In conclusion, he has only to say that this paper has been 
 written hurriedly by one engrossed in the cares of professional 
 pursuits, and who has cared more about what he had to say 
 than how he said it. 
 
 FEDEKALIST. 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 013 703 706 3