THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES BY FRANCIS VINTON GREENE GRADUATE OF THE D. 8. MILITARY ACADEMY MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS IN THE WAR WITH SPAIN AUTHOR OF The Russian Army and Its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-78 (1879). Army Life in Russia (1880). Improvements in the Art of War (1882). The Mississippi Campaigns of the Civil War (1883). General Greene : Great Commanders Series (1885). The United States Army (1901) NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1911 Copyright, 1911, by CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS Published May, 1911 *S-> 13 "* : n r , inflate ^.JhfiL Mt.Biyelutu >i N JB »i »&>ft Jii CALE OF MILES. ;( Carrytmtk h Falls i ■% 'ff. * s. jo* Norridgmock Falls J / * T JUifc Samfnujles Ripples / I \ Falls Five-Milt Hippies I \ ,'(,- Tievtieck Falls Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Arnold's March Sept. 5-Nov. 13, 1775 BOSTON 23 Greene, Daniel Morgan, Aaron Burr and Henry Dearborn. 1775 The expedition marched from Cambridge to Newbury- sept. 11 port, there embarked in ten small transports, sailed to the Kennebec and up that river almost to Bath, disem- barked and, provided with 200 boats for the portages, plunged into the wilderness. At that date Schuyler was confined to his bed in Ticon- s eP t. 25 deroga with a bilious fever, but the expedition under schuyier's Montgomery, about 1,200 men and four 12-pounders, had from e Ticon- crossed LakeChamplain, descended the Sorel (or Richelieu) River and laid siege to St. John, a fortified town garrisoned sept. 1 by a portion of the 26th Regiment under Major Preston. 1 While the siege was in progress Montgomery was rein- forced by several hundred men from New Hampshire and New York and by a battalion of Canadian patriots under command of his wife's kinsman, Colonel James Living- ston. Ethan Allen with a small force was sent to gain recruits in Canada, and while so engaged undertook to capture Montreal. In the skirmish which resulted, Allen and about half his party were taken prisoners, and Allen sept. 25 himself put in irons and sent to England. A little later another expedition was sent out which captured Fort Oct. is Chambly, lower down on the Sorel, with its garrison of 168 men; among the spoils were six tons of powder, the most valuable commodity on the continent. A few weeks later St. John surrendered, with 400 regulars and 100 Nov. 3 Canadians. Montgomery immediately pressed on to capture of Montreal Montreal, which was without defence, and was surren- dered by a committee of its citizens; Carleton escaping Nov. 12 in a small boat on the St. Lawrence to Quebec. On the day that St. John surrendered Arnold was about 1 See Operations in Canada. Appendix to Sparks's Letters, I, 460-549. This contains the official reports and correspondence of Schuyler, Arnold, Montgomery, Wooster, Sullivan and Gates. 24 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1775 30 miles from Quebec, after a march of incredible Arnolds hardships and hunger through 200 miles of what is still the wilderness a mountain wilderness, the best hunting ground for big game east of the Rocky Mountains. He had sent a Oct. 13 letter to Schuyler by an Indian, but the letter was given to Governor Carleton, who thus first learned of Arnold's approach, and immediately began to remove all the boats in the river so as to prevent Arnold's crossing. But Nov. io Arnold pushed on and when he arrived at the river he collected canoes and dugouts, and although delayed three days by a severe gale and by the presence of a frigate and a sloop of war, he succeeded in crossing on the fourth Nov. 13 night; and landing at the same place where Wolfe had landed sixteen years before, he climbed the cliffs to the Plains of Abraham and marched toward the western Amoid gates of the city. He had about 650 half-naked men, Quebec the rest having perished in the wilderness; and they had barely 400 unbroken muskets between them, and five rounds of ammunition. Arnold promptly demanded the surrender of the city; but he was in no condition to enforce his demand, for the place was strongly fortified, had an abundance of heavy guns and was garrisoned by about 1,900 men, regulars, irregulars and seamen, who had within ten days been gathered for its defence. Had Arnold arrived two weeks earlier, or had his letter to Schuyler not been delivered to Carleton, it is quite pos- sible he would have surprised and captured the place. Situated as he was, there was nothing to do but fall back Nov. 19 about twenty miles, up the river, to Point aux Trembles, and await the arrival of Montgomery, to whom he had already written. When Montgomery received his letter he made instant preparation to march to his assistance. After leaving BOSTON 25 detachments at St. John and Montreal, and sending home 1775 men whose enlistments had expired, he could only take 300 men with him, but with these he set out in transports Nov. 24 which he had captured at Montreal, and made his way Dec. 3 down the river, joining Arnold at Point aux Trembles, Montgomery and handing over for his ragged and half-clothed men a year's supply of clothing which he had found in the military depots at Montreal. Their combined forces numbered less than 1,000 men, but they forthwith laid siege to Quebec. The Canadian winter was already upon them, and in a few weeks the enlistment of most of their men would expire. They were more than 300 miles from their own base of supplies. Their only chance was in a vigorous assault. Montgomery's plan was to send Livingston's Canadian battalion to make a feint on the upper town while the main assaults were to be made on the lower town by Arnold and himself; he following the road under the cliff from Wolfe's Cove to Cape Diamond, and Arnold coming by the St. Roque road from the opposite direction. If they gained possession of the lower town with all its magazines, they hoped to induce Carleton to surrender the upper town without further resistance. The troops moved out at 2 o'clock on a winter morn- Dec. 31 ing, the weather intensely cold and a driving snow-storm in their faces. On reaching Cape Diamond, Montgomery at the head of sixty men attempted to carry a stockade with a rush. He was instantly killed, together with his Assault on aide and ten others; the rest of his party fled. Arnold reached the Palace Gate, on the other side of the town, just before daybreak. He, too, led the storming party, and fell at the first fire, severely wounded in the leg. Had the wound only been mortal, his name would have 26 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1775 gone down in history side by side with that of Wolfe and Montgomery, instead of being forever the synonym of treason. Morgan, with the main body, was close behind Arnold, but in the narrow, crooked streets his retreat was cut off and he was compelled to surrender with 426 men. The remnants of the two columns made their way back to camp. Arnold was carried to a hospital, from which he directed the command of the few hundred men still left to him, but he wrote to Schuyler for reinforcements and he ordered no retreat; nor did Carleton attack him while his little 1776 band remained shivering in their camp to the west of the April i city. The reinforcements arrived three months later, and with them General Wooster, who assumed command. A sort of siege was undertaken, but it was not effective. May i He was soon superseded by General Thomas. And then reinforcements began to arrive for the garrison — the first detachment of the British and Hessians who had just arrived from Europe under command of Burgoyne. Retreat from Thomas raised the siege and retreated to the Sorel, (Riche- lieu), marching up its banks to Chambly, where he died of May 30 small-pox. General Sullivan, who had already been ordered to supersede Thomas, arrived a few days later. Reinforcements brought his strength up to 2,500 men, June 7 and he made an attack on Three Rivers, but was de- feated. Sullivan's army numbered 5,000 on paper, but less than half that number fit for duty; they were com- pletely discouraged and demoralized, "the small-pox, famine and disorder had rendered them almost lifeless." Burgoyne, who had commanded in person at Three Rivers, was daily receiving reinforcements. There was no alternative for Sullivan but a hasty retreat, and he juiy i brought the remnants of his force to St. John and Isle- BOSTON 27 aux-Noix, and thence across Lake Champlain to Crown 1776 Point, where Montgomery had set forth just ten months before. In the lack of proper returns and the disorder of the Results of the , , • , • mi , , i Expedition retreat, it is impossible to say just how many men were to Quebec. sent on this expedition, and how many were lost. But it appears that from first to last not less than 8,000 men served in Canada, and barely 3,000 returned fit for duty. It was a bold expedition, possibly beyond the resources of the Colonies at that period; but Washington considered it with the utmost care, gave it his full approval and felt confident of its success. And Montgomery and Ar- nold showed, in its earlier stages, how apparently insur- mountable difficulties can be overcome by a judicious combination of skill, energy and daring. Had Mont- gomery lived, or had Arnold been left in command when the reinforcements came to Quebec in April, perhaps it might have succeeded. But the generals who were sent in succession to take command, Wooster, Thomas and Sullivan, were none of them equal to an enterprise of this character. 1 Had it succeeded, it would probably have united Canada to the Thirteen Colonies, and changed the whole course and outcome of the war. 1 See the interesting analysis of Sullivan's character in Washington's letter of 17 June, 1776, to the President of Congress. Sparks, III, 426; IV, 364. CHAPTER II NEW YORK 1776 British Plans for Carrying on the War The war had begun in an attempt, from the British stand-point, to put down a local insurrection in Massa- chusetts; but when the news of Bunker Hill and the siege of Boston reached London, it was evident that there were thirteen colonies to subdue, occupying more than a thousand miles of sea-coast, and a hundred miles or more into the interior. To carry out this subjugation more men were needed and a more comprehensive plan for their operation. Parliament had provided in December, 1774, for an army of only 18,000 men, 1 and when it met in the follow- ing year more than two-thirds of this force was cooped up in Boston. It now provided for 12,000 additional seamen and an army of 55,000 men. 2 But as this largely increased force could not be raised immediately, and as allies were not to be had, George III and his ministers arranged to buy soldiers for cash. Treaties were made with the Duke of Brunswick, the Landgrave of Hesse- Cassel and other petty German rulers by which they undertook to furnish a large body of troops, to serve The Hessians under their own officers in America. For each soldier killed England was to pay $35, and for each wounded, $12; England was also to pay all expenses of every char- acter, and in addition to pay to the Landgrave personally $550,000 per annum, and to the other princes in propor- 1 Amer. Archives, 4, I, 1479. 2 Ibid., 4, VI, 143. 28 1776 Oct. 26 1776 Jan. 9 NEW YORK CAMPAIGN OF I776 2 3 4 ENGUSU PT*TUTS.MILI8 American Troops American Works of Defense. * British Troops Hessian Auxiliaries Encampments of British Forces Strategic movements are shown in broken blue (American) and red (British) lines, the direction being indicated by arrow heads. The dates are all of the year 1776 Courtesv of The Burrows Brothers Company, ' Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio New York April-Nov., 1 --6 From Avery's History of the United States and Its People NEW YORK 29 tion. While the employment of mercenaries was an 1776 ancient practice, yet there were special features in these treaties 1 which made this bargain quite unique in its infamy and degradation. The number of such troops sent to America was 29,867 r of whom about 1,200 were killed or mortally wounded, 6,354 died of other causes, 5,000 deserted, and 17,313 returned to their homes nearly eight years later. 2 About 60 per cent came from Hesse, and these mercenaries were thus known under the gen- eral name of Hessians. The last of the 6 treaties relating to these transactions was ratified by Parliament and the first contingent, numbering about 17,000 men, together with 7 British regiments, were ready to sail early in the year, and more were to be ready in the spring. A British regiment at Feb. 5 that time consisted of 2 battalions, 12 companies, about 50 officers and 672 men. One company in each battalion remained at home, and a regiment took something under 600 men to America. The preparations were thus made to send out about 20 regiments or 12,000 men from England, and 17,000 British Force for the New Hessians, which, added to the 19 regiments that Howe campaign had at Boston and the 3 in Canada, would make a force of about 42,000 men — which was thought to be ample for the purpose. The first detachment under Burgoyne (who had gone to England on leave in December) ar- rived in the St. Lawrence in April, and pushing its way through the ice reached Quebec in time to drive back the Americans there under Sullivan, as we have seen. 3 In preparing a plan for the operation of their troops, the British generals were mindful of the topographical 1 Printed in full, Amer. Archives, 4, VI, 271-278. 2 Lowell, 20, 300. 3 Ante, p. 26. Campaign 30 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 features of the Atlantic seaboard, which had already determined the line of military operations during the wars with the French while the latter still possessed Canada. The valley of the Hudson and the northern lakes pierces the range of mountains which extends from New Hampshire to Georgia, and affords a natural low- grade line of communication from Montreal to New York. The Hudson played the same part in the Revolution as the Mississippi in the Civil War. If the British could take and hold this line it would cut off New England from the other colonies. In the former the war had its origin pian of and its most ardent supporters; in the latter were three- fourths of the population and the seat of government. While New York itself did not then possess the relative importance it now has — the colony being seventh in population and the city being exceeded in the number of its inhabitants by Philadelphia, and almost equalled by Boston 1 — yet the harbor was unrivalled, the river was navigable for the ships of the day almost to Albany, and Great Britain had complete control of the sea, the incipient American navy consisting only of a few small privateers. Howe and Burgoyne had long resented the humiliation of being shut up in Boston, which was not easy of defence and whence no offensive movements could be undertaken to advantage. They desired to transfer the seat of war to New York, capture that city, and seize and hold the line of the Hudson. The new campaign was planned on that basis. The British did not follow out this general plan, of the soundness of which there can be no question, but allowed themselves, as we did later in the Civil War, to be drawn into diversions, in the hope of restoring their authority 1 A Century's Growth of Population. Census Bureau, 1909, pp. 9-11. NEW YORK 31 in certain localities, forgetting that the way to gain solid 1776 results in war is to destroy the opposing army and not merely to occupy territory. They thus planned a side side issues issue against Charleston, in South Carolina, where Clinton had been sent with 2,000 men from Boston and where he 1775 was to be joined by a reinforcement of 7 regiments under Dec. ie Cornwallis, convoyed by a fleet under Admiral Parker. 1 Similarly, the imminent danger in Canada led to sending Burgoyne to reinforce Carleton at Quebec. Clinton failed at Charleston and then joined Howe at New York. Bur- goyne, however, instead of reinforcing Howe and thus concentrating a force of such strength as would crush all opposition, moved on along an eccentric line to Montreal, and in the following year crossed Lake Champlain to Ticonderoga, intending thence to move down the Hudson. He could not act in concert with Howe, being separated from him by hundreds of miles of wilderness. The result of acting on such widely divergent lines, instead of con- centrating every available man at New York, was that Burgoyne lost his entire army. On his way to Charleston, Clinton had stopped at New Movement or i c i • i the American York, and as soon as Washington heard 01 this he sent Army to . New York Lee to collect such militia as he could in Connecticut, New York and New Jersey and organize the defence of 1776 New York. 2 A resolution of Congress 4 then sent Lee to Jan. 8 command the newly formed Southern Department; but 1 Post, p. 184. 2 Two exhaustive monographs have been published by Prof. Henry P. Johnston of the New York City College, one on the campaign of 1776 around New York, having special reference to the battle of Long Island, and the other on the Battle of Harlem Heights. Like Frothingham's Boston and Arnold's March, they are filled with references to original documents and copies of a great many of them. These documents have been followed in this chapter and it seems unnecessary to make specific references. 4 Jour. Cont. Cong., IV, 180. 32 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 Mar. 1 March 16 to April 13 Lee's Plan April 29 May 12 Fortifications of New York June 10 Washington soon arrived with his army, which had left Boston as soon as Howe's fleet had sailed from Nan- tasket Roads. Lee had reported that the situation of New York, sur- rounded by deep water, afforded no possibility of defence against an enemy having complete command of the sea. His plan of defence was to build a few small batteries at salient points on North and East Rivers, but to concen- trate the main defence in an intrenched camp on Brooklyn Heights, which commanded the navigation of the East River. Washington approved this plan, and ordered Greene's brigade to occupy these heights and the brigades of Heath, Spencer and Stirling to be stationed just out- side of what then constituted the city of New York, viz., from the Battery to St. Paul's Church. These positions were taken up early in May and all hands worked hard to complete the fortifications. After deducting the 5 regiments left in Boston and 16 sent to Canada, Wash- ington had only 19 left for New York. Their returns showed a strength of 589 officers and 9,963 men, of whom 7,952 were present for duty. 1 The plans of the fortifications were somewhat modified and enlarged after Washington's arrival, and their con- struction was carried out and the guns placed in them under direction of Colonel Henry Knox, who had been Gridley's assistant at Boston and now commanded the Regiment of Artillery. As finally completed the works consisted of no less than 21 redoubts with 121 guns, one- quarter of which were 32-pounders (the largest siege-gun then in use) and one-half larger than 9-pounders. These guns had come from Ticonderoga, from Boston, from the Bahamas (where they had been captured by Commodore 1 Sparks, III, 493. NEW YORK 33 Ezek Hopkins) and from the gun foundries in various 1776 colonies. While Congress had erroneous views about the length of enlistment and the organization of armies, it displayed extraordinary energy in the manufacture of cannon, small-arms and powder. The two works on Governor's Island and Red Hook, with 12 guns, guarded the approach from the Bay to the East River. A battery on Paulus Hook, with 8 guns, was intended to protect the Jersey shore of the North River. On Manhattan Island there were 11 redoubts, with 79 guns, situated on slight eminences adjacent to the water, from the vicinity of Chambers Street around the Battery and up the East River to 86th Street opposite Hell Gate. On Long Island, in front of Brooklyn (then a hamlet of a dozen houses, just east of the present Borough Hall), there were 7 redoubts, mounting 29 guns, stretching across the ridge which extends from Greenwood Cemetery to the Brooklyn Reservoir, and which at the point fortified was about a mile in width between the swamps of Wall- about Bay on the north and Gowanus Creek on the south. The first squadron of the British fleet arrived from Arrival of the Halifax, bringing Howe and his Boston troops; next came Clinton and Cornwallis, who had been defeated at Charleston ; and finally Lord Howe, the naval commander- in-chief, with the Hessians, and the Household troops from London. It was an imposing array, more than 400 transports and 32,000 soldiers the largest expedition that England had ever sent abroad; convoyed by 10 line- of-battle ships and 20 frigates, manned by more than 10,000 seamen, and armed with about 1,200 guns, many of them 64-pounders and 74-pounders, which completely outclassed the guns which had been collected with so much difficulty by Knox. July 3 Aug. 1 Aug. 12 34 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 July 12 June 3 July 2 Disposition of the Troops at New York As the successive detachments arrived they went into camp on Staten Island just inside the Narrows. Wash- ington viewed their arrival with no little anxiety; which was increased when two of the men-of-war sailed up the North River, under a furious cannonade which failed either to stop them or do them any serious damage. These ships anchored in the broad Tappan Zee, forty miles above New York, thus cutting off all communica- tion by water with the Northern army. 1 His position was indeed precarious. Heroic efforts had been made to increase his force. Sullivan had brought back his Continental regiments, or what was left of them, from Ticonderoga, and Congress had passed a resolution call- ing out 13,800 militia for the defence of New York. 2 By the returns at the end of August, 3 Washington had 25 regiments of Continentals and parts of 75 regiments of militia, with a paper strength of 33,363, of whom there were " present fit for duty" 20,328. Opposed to these hastily collected and untrained troops was the greater part of the military and naval force of England, supple- mented by all the mercenaries that it could hire. Washington, however, did not lose confidence. He issued an impassioned address to his troops, 4 telling them that "the fate of unborn millions will now depend, under God, on the courage and conduct of this army," and called upon them to "resolve to conquer or die"; and he dis- posed his troops to the best advantage. They were di- vided into five divisions under Putnam, Heath, Spencer, Sullivan and Greene (all of whom were now major-gener- als); and, as the enemy had complete command of the 1 Sparks, III, 469, 475. 2 Jour. Cont. Cong., IV, 412. 3 Sparks, III, 493; Amer. Archives, 5, II, 450, 451. 4 Sparks, III, 449. NEW YORK 35 water and could choose his point of landing, three divisions 1776 were stationed near the southern part of Manhattan Isl- and, one in the northern part from Fort Washington to Kingsbridge, and one on Long Island. Greene com- manded the latter, and for four months had not only di- rected the construction of the redoubts, but had recon- noitred every foot of the ground by which they could be approached, and had compelled strict discipline and vig- ilance on the part of his troops. Unfortunately, early in August he succumbed to the malarial fever, with which so many of his men were prostrated, contracted in the swamps of Wallabout and Gowanus, adjacent to his works. He endeavored to direct his command from his bed in camp, but finally, a few days before the battle, he was at the point of death, and had to be carried to a house on Man- hattan Island. Sullivan was sent to take Greene's place, Aug. 20 and four days later, when it seemed probable that the Aug. 24 attack would be made on the Long Island side, Putnam, the senior major-general, was sent to take command. Neither of these officers had an opportunity to become familiar with the situation before the attack was made. It was made in overwhelming force. Under cover of Battle of the navy, Howe embarked 20,000 men and 40 pieces of artillery in small boats at Staten Island and landed them Aug. 22 on the beach of Gravesend Bay. It was eight miles from the Brooklyn lines, and Washington was in no position to prevent or hinder the movement. Howe then sent Cornwallis with the Guards and Hessians to the hamlet of Flatbush, just south of what is now Prospect Park, and at the foot of a long ridge, which beginning at the bay (near Greenwood Cemetery) extends, in a direction north of east, through Prospect Park to the Brooklyn Reservoir and many miles beyond. The rest of Howe's 36 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 troops were in rear and to the left of Cornwallis, and in this position they remained for three days; during which Howe received from the tory farmers of Long Island complete information as to Washington's position. On the other hand, Howe's inaction left Washington in doubt whether the landing on Staten Island might not be a feint with a part of his troops, whereas the main landing might be on Manhattan. Washington, however, each day sent reinforcements to Long Island, in all 10 regi- ments, bringing the strength up to about 7,000 men, or more than one-third of his effective force, and, as pre- Aug. 24 viously stated, sent Putnam to assume chief command. Aug. 25 He examined the lines in person with Putnam, and on returning to his head-quarters wrote a sharp letter to the latter in regard to the lack of vigilance and discipline among the troops, but he did not give him specific instruc- tions as to the placing of them. Washington's exact lan- guage was as follows: 1 "I would have you form proper lines of defence around your encampment and works on the most advantageous ground. . . . The wood next to Red Hook should be well attended to. . . . The militia . . . will do for the interior works, whilst your best men should at all hazards prevent the enemy's passing the wood and approaching your works. The woods should be secured by abatis where necessary, to make the en- emy's approach as difficult as possible." It is hardly possible that Washington intended to spread out his small force along the entire ridge, seven miles long, from the river road to Jamaica pass. Putnam, however, seems to have so understood it, although he gave no definite orders to carry such a plan into effect. Aug. 23 He appears to have acquiesced in the dispositions made 1 Sparks, IV, 63. :d'e Tavern Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company Publishers, Cleveland Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Long Island Aug. 27, 1776 NEW YORK 37 in Sullivan's orders; 2 regiments "to possess the Flat- 1776 bush road," 2 others "to take possession of the Bed- ford road/' and 2 others of "the road near the river." The Jamaica pass, five miles to the east of Flatbush, was not guarded. Howe's plan was to make a feint along the coast road Howes piaa and in front of the Flatbush pass, while a turning column of fully half his strength was to make a night march to the eastward and come in by the Jamaica pass, march west by the Jamaica road and come squarely in rear of all the American positions outside of their fortifications. The movement was carried out in accordance with this plan. Major-General Grant with 2 brigades, about 5,000 men, moved forward along the coast road; Lieutenant- General de Heister with 3 brigades, about 6,000 men, Battle of moved toward the Flatbush pass (Prospect Park); while Clinton, Percy and Cornwallis with 5 brigades, about 10,000 men, made the turning movement. At 3 o'clock Aug. 27 in the morning Grant and de Heister were skirmishing with the American outposts and Stirling was hurried forward with 5 regiments to meet Grant. A sharp action ensued in the hills near what is now Greenwood Cemetery, in which Stirling held his own against superior numbers and inflicted on the enemy the greatest losses of the day. As early as 9 o'clock in the morning the turning column Howe's Fiank was squarely in his rear, and in the rear of Sullivan, who, with 6 regiments was defending the Flatbush pass against the feigned attack of the Hessians; and the head of the column was nearer the fortified lines and main camp of the Americans than either Sullivan or Stirling. This turning column — light dragoons, Guards, Highlanders, in- fantry regiments and ten pieces of artillery, in all 10,000 men, under Clinton, Cornwallis and Percy, with Howe 38 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 himself in personal command — had left Flatbush at 9 Aug. 26 o'clock the night before, and piloted by tory guides, had marched to the east and then to the north, and before dawn had reached the Half Way House (Howard's Tav- ern) on the Jamaica road on the eastern side of the Jamaica pass (Atlantic and Vesta Avenues), about five miles from the American fortifications. The American army was absolutely without cavalry, and for such scouting and outpost duty as is usually performed by cavalry it had to rely upon small parties of officers who owned horses. Such a party, five in number, was ob- serving this Jamaica pass. It was surrounded and capt- Aug. 27 ured by Clinton's dragoons about 3 o'clock in the morn- ing. The Jamaica road (East Fulton Street) was thus open, and after resting his troops at the pass until day- light, Howe marched along that road, coming in the rear, first of Sullivan and then of Stirling, without warn- ing. One regiment was posted nearly three miles out on Sullivan's left flank in the direction of the Jamaica pass, but it was in the woods and not on the road, and the British soon surrounded it and compelled the sur- render of the colonel and most of his men, while the others scattered and escaped. The three regiments at the Bedford pass, about a mile to the left of Sullivan, 8.3o a. m. were next uncovered, and after a short skirmish began a hasty retreat toward the forts. The British moved more Aug. 27 quickly on the road than these fugitives in the woods, and Sullivan found himself attacked by Clinton in his rear and the Hessians in his front at the Flatbush pass (Prospect Park). He quickly ordered a retreat, which soon turned to a flight, and Sullivan himself was captured. Stirling's With all this firing on his left and rear, Stirling saw that his position was untenable. About 11 o'clock he started NEW YORK 39 to retreat by the coast road to the Gowanus road and ms thence to the forts, but he had not gone far when he saw that he was surrounded. On his left were the Gow- anus marshes, supposed to be impassable, on his right the main body of the British turning column, and squarely in front of him was Cornwallis with the Highlanders and the Second Battalion of the Guards. These were posted at the Cortelyou house on the Gowanus road where it climbs the hill skirting the Gowanus marsh (Third Street and Fifth Avenue). Stirling promptly decided upon a heroic measure. He Aug. 27. took Major Gist and part of the Maryland regiment and advanced to attack Cornwallis, ordering the rest of his five regiments to make their escape across the swamps and thus gain the forts. While Stirling and his handful of men kept up a stubborn fight for half an hour, or more, the greater part of his men did actually escape through the swamps, with only six or eight drowned. The Mary- landers were finally driven back and dispersed, and Stirling himself was captured. About this time Washington in person arrived at Cobble Arrival of Hill, one of the forts. As soon as he heard of the action 12 u. he had ordered 6 regiments across from New York, but the mischief was done long before they could arrive. They began filing into the forts about noon, and by 2 o'clock in the afternoon the remnants of the 12 regiments that had been in the battle had succeeded in reaching these works. Inside the works were as many more regi- ments which had not been engaged. Howe's troops were fatigued with an all-night march and more or less fighting during a considerable part of the day. He had 20,000 men, less his losses; inside the works, about a mile long, with both flanks protected by swamps, were about 8,000 40 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 Aug. 27, 3 P. M., Howe Decides not to Assault men, half of whom had been in action and defeated. Should Howe assault the works? His men, it is said, were eager for it, and in his own report Howe says it required repeated orders to prevent it. If he succeeded in an assault, it is difficult to see how Washington's army, with a deep river at its back, could have escaped capture or dispersal. Howe says that he thought he would have succeeded, but would have sustained heavy loss; and he was satisfied that he would be able to gain the works, almost without loss, by siege operations. 1 He therefore did not assault. The battle was over. On the British side it was a Responsibility brilliant victory, skilfully planned and well executed. On the American side it was a humiliating defeat. Who was responsible for it? Volumes have been written on this question, and it is not easy to answer it in a sentence. In the first place, no one exercised general command. The part played by Putnam, the commanding general, was insignificant. Sullivan defended the pass, where he had gone as soon as he heard the firing, as long as it could be defended, but Putnam had arrived and superseded him in the chief command three days before, and it is unjust to hold Sullivan responsible for the conduct of the battle. 2 Stirling had five regiments and fought splen- didly with them, and there his responsibility ended. Putnam, in spite of his well-earned reputation for gal- lantry at Ticonderoga, eighteen years before, and later at Concord and Bunker Hill, did practically nothing as a commanding general; and Washington never again placed him in a position of high responsibility. 1 Howe's Report; Dawson, 156; Howe's Narrative, 4, 5. 2 Sparks, IV, 517, 518. NEW YORK 41 Secondly, the American army was surprised, because me it had no cavalry; and was attacked and outflanked by an army of regular troops of nearly three times its numbers. Thirdly, Greene's illness was a terrible misfortune. He knew his troops and knew the ground, and (as he showed later on) he possessed extraordinary skill and re- sourcefulness in similar situations. Finally, Washington was commander-in-chief; it was for him to give orders ; he had more than once examined the ground; and Long Island was one of the points from which he had been expecting an attack for four months. His letter of August 25 1 to Putnam is quite long, but it does not give specific instructions in regard to the dis- position of the troops. It does, however, instruct Put- nam "at all hazards" to prevent the enemy's approach- ing his works. Was Washington wise in allowing the troops to remain outside of their works, in the passes two or three miles distant where he had seen them on his visit of the 24th? Considering the quality of his untrained troops, who had never been in a battle in the open, but who had shown wonderful resistance behind trenches, it seems that he made a grave error in not keep- ing his men in their redoubts, and repeating the per- formance of Bunker Hill, as they probably would have done. Howe's report 2 gives an itemized list of his losses — 63 killed, 283 wounded and 31 missing — and of the prisoners taken, 1,097 in all, including 91 officers; and there is no sufficient ground to doubt the accuracy of his figures. The dead and wounded Americans were practically all 1 Sparks, IV, 65. 2 Dawson, I, 148, 156; Johnston, 1776, pp. 202-206. 42 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 left within the British lines; their exact number is not known. Washington reported them at " about 1,000." ' Precarious Situation on Long Island Aug. 28 Aug. 28 Preparations for With- drawal Aug. 29 Washington may have made a mistake in accepting battle in the open, but his next movement was an oper- ation unsurpassed in military skill. It was no longer a question of defending his forts on Long Island. With their garrison demoralized by defeat there might be doubt as to the outcome of an assault; but there was no need for Howe to make an assault. On the afternoon follow- ing the battle he began a siege, breaking ground for his first parallel about 600 yards in front of Fort Putnam (Washington Park). With complete command of the sea and an overwhelming superiority in artillery, he could land troops to take the works in reverse, cut off all com- munication between New York and Long Island and compel a surrender. Washington saw that his troops must be withdrawn from Long Island without a mo- ment's delay an'd joined to those on Manhattan; and he acted with that extraordinary rapidity which was char- acteristic of him in such an emergency. The morning after the battle he brought over from New York three regiments, one of them the "Fourteenth Regiment of Foot" in the Continental Line, commanded by Colonel John Glover, and made up almost entirely of Marblehead fishermen. There were no handier men in a boat than these in all the world; and they rendered great service here in the next two days, as well as later on at Trenton. Washington then sent orders to collect all the small boats in the Harlem River and the East River as far as Flushing. In order not to discourage his men with notice of a retreat, he issued a general order 1 Sparks, IV, 71. NEW YORK 43 saying that General Mercer had arrived and that he had 1776 fresh troops from New Jersey which were expected that afternoon; that the sick were an encumbrance to the army and were to be removed to New York; that these troops of Mercer's were to take the place of some of those on Long Island ; and therefore all regiments were ordered to parade "with their arms, accoutrements and knapsacks at 7 o'clock at the head of their encampments and there wait for orders." Having made all his preparations, late in the afternoon Washington called a council of war of the eight general officers present and laid the facts before them. 1 They unanimously advised a retreat; and at dark it began. First the sick were carried down to the ferry; then followed the militia; and after them the Continental regiments. Six of the latter, specially selected under command of Mifflin, were left to man the works until dawn. As the others reached the ferry they found The Troops a great number of boats, of all sizes and shapes and de- scriptions, manned by the men of Glover's regiment, and some from Colonel Hutchinson's Twenty-seventh Foot, which came from Gloucester. General McDougall, who had raised the first New York regiment and had lately been made a brigadier, had charge of the embarkation; and Washington spent the night riding along the mile or more of road which is now Fulton Street, from the ferry to the fortified lines, everywhere encouraging the men and directing their movements. It was a very dark night, with torrents of rain and a Aug. 29 north-east gale, which at first made it almost impossible even for the Marblehead sailors to handle their boats. Toward midnight the rain ceased and the wind sub- sided; the crossing then went on rapidly. About 2 1 Amer. Archives, 5, I, 1246. 44 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 o'clock in the morning a blunder was made which might possibly have wrecked the whole movement. An aide- de-camp, mistaking his orders, started Mifflin's entire command for the ferry. Fortunately Washington met them on the road, and led them back to the works. Just before dawn, by good fortune, a dense fog settled down over the river and the works. Under cover of this, Mifflin's regiments were withdrawn without being noticed by the British in their trenches close by. They reached the ferry and were all carried over, Washington himself accompanying the last of them, in the early morning. Aug. 30 A more skilful operation of this kind was never con- ducted. Washington's The troops landed near what is now Fulton Street of His Troops in New York, and joined their comrades in the city and its suburbs. In a few days the army was reorganized into three divisions under Putnam, Spencer and Heath, and posted at various points along the East and Har- lem Rivers, from the Battery to Kingsbridge, watching keenly to see where Howe would cross. The troops were greatly discouraged, and the militia, as Washington said sept. 2 in his letter to the President of Congress, were going off "in some instances, almost by whole regiments, by half ones and by companies at a time." 1 This spread dis- affection among the Continentals, and Washington did not hesitate to say that his condition was " still more alarming." In the midst of his cares he found time to write to Congress those excellent recommendations, which will hereafter be quoted, about the formation of a permanent, regular army. 2 He was not dismayed, nor did he neglect any precautions. He anticipated that Howe would move to Westchester and attack across the 1 Sparks, IV, 72. 2 Ibid., IV, 72, 80, 89. NEW YORK 45 Harlem River, and he therefore posted nearly half of his 1776 force in the vicinity of Kingsbridge; he ordered the fortifications at Fort Washington to be completed, and others to be built at Fort Lee on the opposite Jersey shore ; and he called a council of war and asked the ad- shaii New vice of his generals as to whether New York should be or°Evacuated? evacuated. Greene, then convalescent from his fever, sept. 7 in a strong and ably written opinion advised that the city be immediately evacuated and burned, 1 so that it should not become a head-quarters and depot of supplies for the British. Washington had asked the instructions of Con- gress on this point, and they had instructed him to "have especial care taken, in case he should find it necessary sept. 3. to quit New York, that no damage be done to the said city by his troops on their leaving it; the Congress having no doubt of being able to recover the same, though the enemy should, for a time, obtain possession of it." 2 The other generals were divided in opinion, some being in favor of evacuating; some of defending the city; and some of the middle course, which was adopted, of leaving part of the army in the city, part near Kingsbridge and part at intermediate points. 3 Within a week Greene sept. 12 headed a petition asking for a reconsideration of the question, and at a new council it was decided by ten to three to evacuate immediately. 4 A considerable part of 1 Sparks, IV, 86. 2 Jour. Cont. Cong., V, 733. The expectations of Congress were not realized. New York was the base of operations for the British throughout the war, and they held it until November 25, 1783. If it had been de- stroyed in 1776, the course of the war might have been quite different. On the other hand, the propriety of destroying a city, even to gain so great a military advantage, might well have been questioned, but apparently it was not. Such an act is now forbidden by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. 3 Sparks, IV, 91. 4 Amer. Archives, 5, II, 326, 329. 46 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 the stores had already been moved to Fort Washington and the removal of the rest was hastened. sept. 6 Meanwhile the British ships had assembled near Gov- British ships ernor's Island (which had been abandoned), and one of River the ships had passed up the East River without being seriously injured, and this was soon followed by others. Howe had spread his men along the shore of the East River as far as Hell Gate, leisurely making his prepara- tions to cross. The crossing was finally made on a sept. 15 Sunday morning from Newtown Creek to Kip's Bay British Land (34th Street), the navy covering the landing with a heavy cannonade. The Americans posted on the shore could not stand the grape-shot. They retired, and 84 boat- loads of Guardsmen and Hessians, with Clinton and Cornwallis and Donop in the lead, landed without diffi- culty. Two brigades which were posted as a support on Murray Hill joined in the retreat toward the Blooming- dale road. Washington heard the cannonade and gal- loped from his head-quarters, nearly four miles away, at the Morris House. 1 He rushed in among the fugitives, used strong language, drew his sword and fired his pistols — all to no purpose. He could not rally them. In the melee he narrowly escaped capture, and some thought that he courted death, 2 as it was with difficulty that his staff dragged him away. The retreat was general — and speedy; it soon degen- erated into a panic and rout, affecting even regiments that had most distinguished themselves at Bunker Hill, and were hereafter to show intrepid courage at Trenton and the Brandywine. Putnam's division came up by the road nearest the North River, and but for the patri- otic hospitality of Mrs. Murray, who detained Howe and 1 Sparks, IV, 93. 2 Ibid., IV, 95. NEW YORK 47 his principal generals at lunch, 1 a large part of it would 1776 have been captured. By nightfall the remnants of the Americans flying army were gathered on the heights north and west Hariem of Harlem, near what is now 130th Street and Manhattan Avenue. The losses of the day were 17 officers and 350 men. At dark, Howe's troops were posted across the Howe pursues island from Bloomingdale (97th Street and Broadway) Bioomingdaie through McGowan's Pass (Central Park), to Horn's Hook se P t. 15 (86th Street and East River). Naturally Howe was elated and Washington depressed by the events of the day; and the spirits of the American troops were not improved by the heavy rain as they arrived after sunset on the heights north of the " Hollow Way," and there bivouacked on the wet ground without tents. But Washington arranged them in some order, Putnam's and Spencer's division in the rear (147th Street) and Greene's division (which had been commanded by Heath during Greene's illness) in front (127th to 135th Streets west of Manhattan Avenue). Before he went to bed Washington had given orders for Colonel Knowlton and his "Rangers" to reconnoitre in the morning, and sept. 16 find out the dispositions of the enemy. These " Rangers " Knowiton's • 1 ., T /. n -ii Reconnois- were a special corps, recently organized, of five picked sance companies from New England regiments, all good shots; and they were to do constant scouting, in the absence of cavalry. Their officers were splendid young fellows, among them Nathan Hale, who at this moment was ab- sent at his own request, working his way through Con- necticut across to Long Island and thence to Manhattan, seeking to gain information for Washington as to the position and movements of Howe's troops. He was des- tined to be hanged as a spy about a week later, and to be 1 Thacher, 00. 48 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 immortalized by the beautiful statue which now stands in City Hall Park. Knowlton started on his reconnoissance before dawn, crossed the " Hollow Way," climbed the Claremont Hill (where Grant's monument stands) and moved along the edge of the bluff for more than a mile before he met any- thing. He then ran into the British pickets and the ad- vance of Leslie's brigade near the Jones house (105th Street near Riverside Drive). There was a sharp skir- mish lasting half an hour, and then Knowlton, having accomplished his object and developed a force greater than his own, retreated to the " Hollow Way" (130th Street under Riverside Drive). Washington was up at daylight, writing to Congress 1 an account of the "disgraceful and dastardly" retreat of the previous day, and had just finished his report when he heard the firing. He promptly rode to the front and there met Putnam, Greene and Reed (who had succeeded Gates as adjutant-general a few months before). Reed had been with Knowlton. They made their report to Washington to the effect that the party which had fol- lowed Knowlton as he retired did not exceed 300 men. Washington seized the opportunity, in the hope of re- deeming the disgrace of the previous day, and reinspiring his discouraged men. He planned to capture this de- tachment which was in plain view across the little valley, sounding their bugles with the fox-hunting calls, as at the end of a hard run. He reinforced the Rangers with the Third Virginia regiment, just arrived from the vicinity of Mt. Vernon, and ordered Knowlton to try to get in rear of the British party, while a feint was made nearer the river by part of one of Greene's Rhode Island 1 Sparks, IV, 95. COURTESY Of THE COLUM81A UNIVERSITY MESS ENRY f». J0MN8TQI* NEW YORK 49 regiments 1 under Lieutenant-Colonel Clary. This feint 1776 had the desired effect. The British detachment came down the Claremont Hill to meet them. Before the Rangers could get in their rear the British began to re- treat, followed by Clary on their front and Knowlton fir- ing on their flank. In climbing the rocks (about 123d Street and Morningside Park) Knowlton was instantly killed, and Leitch, the major of the Virginia regiment, re- ceived a wound from which he died within two weeks. The British continued to retreat until they reached a buck- Battle of Har- wheat field (120th Street, between Broadway and River- se P t. i6 side Drive), where they were reinforced and made a stand. Washington had also sent in reinforcements, the greater part of Greene's division, so that there were about 1,800 Americans engaged. Putnam, Greene, George Clin- ton and Reed, were all in the action and all displayed great courage, which animated the men. More rein- forcements came up to the British, including the 42d Highlanders and some of Donop's Hessians. There was a sharp engagement in the buckwheat field lasting an hour and a half. There were no intrenchments on either side. It was a fight in an open, almost level, field, the two lines being not more than a hundred yards apart. Again the British and Hessians retreated, through an orchard about a third of a mile in the rear, where they made a short stand; and then finally to the vicinity of the Jones house (105th Street), more than a mile from the " Hollow Way," where the action had begun at 11 a. m. It was now about 3 p. m., and Howe had brought up nearly the whole of Cornwallis's division and the Hessians, probably 5,000 men. Washington had no intention of bringing on a general engagement and sent 1 Sparks, IV, 98, 99. 50 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 an aide to order a retreat. The troops marched back to Harlem Heights in good order and without being mo- lested. Washington's loss was about 30 killed and 100 wounded, and Howe's 14 killed and 157 wounded. Results of It was not a great battle; yet the numbers engaged were about equal to, and the losses incurred were greater than, those at Bennington, Stony Point, King's Moun- tain or Cowpens. Its importance is due to the fact that the same troops which had fled in a disgraceful panic on the previous day at Kip's Bay recovered their courage; drove the British and Hessian regulars before them for more than a mile; fought them in the open at 40 yards' range; and finally, when the object of the movement was accomplished, retreated in good order and without mo- lestation to their own lines. All this had a wonderful effect in restoring the morale of the Continental army. It completely checked Howe's advance. He made no offensive movement for nearly four weeks, contenting himself with fortifying the hills from Bloomingdale through McGowan's Pass to Hell Gate, while Washing- ton was fortifying the opposing heights north and west of Harlem. There were three distinct lines of trenches and redoubts, extending from the Hudson River to the Harlem Plain, one on the present site of 147th Street, the next at 153d Street and the third at 162d Street. On the hill at 182d Street a large pentagonal bastioned redoubt (Fort Washington) was constructed, the re- mains of which are still visible. It was capable of hold- ing 2,000 men; it was 200 feet above the water; it com- manded a fine stretch down the river as well as across it; and in connection with Fort Lee on the opposite Jersey shore and a line of sunken vessels, booms and chains in the river, it was intended to prevent the British NEW YORK 51 men-of-war and transports from passing up the Hudson. 1776 Great was Washington's disappointment when it was shown that these works could not effect that purpose. Two frigates sailed up the river with a favorable breeze; and although bombarded by the guns of the forts on both Oct. 9 sides, they passed the obstructions without serious injury. Howe's next plan was to move past Washington's flank — a movement quite similar to that which Grant Howe's Fiank- made on a much larger scale in 1864. The lines which thfough Vei1 Wpst chaster Washington had built on Harlem Heights were very strong, and they were defended by 14,750 * men, who had shown in the engagement of September 16 that they were still full of fight. Howe wisely decided not to assault these works. His own lines were now strong enough to be held by a small force, which would make New York safe from recapture. Leaving Lord Percy's division in these works he embarked the rest of his army in small boats at 86th Street and moved them through the Sound to Throg's Neck. This movement threatened Oct. 12 Washington's communications, but it was not effectual. Throg's Neck is connected with the main-land by a cause- way and bridge crossing Westchester Creek. Washing- ton sent a few regiments to destroy this bridge and take position on the west side of the creek. Howe could not have forced the crossing without great loss; he therefore put his men in boats again and moved them across the water to Pell's Point, 2 south of New Rochelle. Washing- ton met this movement by extending Spencer's division Oct. is along the hills behind the Bronx, with their outposts out on the shore of the Sound in touch with Howe's landing parties. Three days later Washington arrived at White 1 Sparks, III, 493; Amer. Archives, 5, II, 910. 2 Howe's Report, Dawson, 185. 52 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 Plains, 1 about eight miles north of New Rochelle, with Oct. 21 Heath's division; and a few days afterward he was joined by Sullivan's, Stirling's and Lee's divisions. He then had at White Plains about 13,000 men— his entire army except about 2,000 men left at Fort Washington, and 4,500 at and near Fort Lee, which were under the command of Greene. 2 Howe had a slightly larger number. Battle of Washington selected a position near White Plains, white Plains fortified it by tw0 ij nes f intrenchments and there awaited Howe's attack. The trenches were on slightly rising ground, the left protected by swampy ground and the right resting on the Bronx River. Beyond the right was a piece of high ground, called Chatterton's Hill, which commanded the plain over which Howe would have to advance. It was occupied by Haslet's Delaware regiment, with two guns of Captain Alexander Hamilton's battery, and supported by McDougall's Brigade; in all about 1,600 men. 3 Although Howe outnumbered Washington he deemed it unwise to attack the main position until he had gained possession of this Chatterton's Hill. He therefore sent Oct. 28 Leslie with his own brigade and three regiments of Hes- sians, about 4,000 men in all, to dislodge Haslet. They forded the Bronx and advanced up the hill, their attack preceded by a sharp artillery fire from thirteen guns posted on the east side of the Bronx. Such effective resistance was made by two excellent regiments in McDougall's ioa.m. brigade and by Hamilton's two guns that the first at- tack failed. Later it was renewed in front, while Rail, with one of the Hessian regiments, made his way around Sparks, IV, 524. 2 Ibid.; Amer. Archives, 5, III, 663. 3 Dawson, 179, 184. Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People White Plains, Oct. 28, 1776 Movements of Nathan Hale, Sept. 10-22, 1776 NEW YORK 53 Haslet's right flank; and this attack succeeded. Mc- ms Dougall retreated, bringing off the guns and joined Washington's main position. The British loss was 28 killed, and 126 wounded; 5 officers being among the killed, and 5 among the wounded; the Hessians lost 77. 1 The American loss was not reported in detail but was esti- mated at less than 200. Howe thus gained Chatterton's Hill, but he did not Oct. 30 attack the main lines that day nor the next. On the third day he was reinforced by two brigades of Percy's division, which he had ordered up from New York; and by the second division of Hessians under Knyphausen which had just arrived from Europe. This brought his strength up to about 20,000 men, and he determined to attack on the Oct. 31 following day. A storm delayed the movement and, Nov. 1 under cover of the storm during the next night, Wash- ington withdrew five miles to a strong position on the heights of North Castle. Howe did not follow him. 2 The chief object of Howe's manoeuvre — to get in rear of Washington, and by occupying a line from Long Island Sound to the Hudson to surround him and cut off his com- munications with New England — had thus failed. He had, nevertheless, succeeded in dividing Washington's small force into three bodies, one in New Jersey, at or near Fort Lee, one on Manhattan Island, at or near Fort Wash- ington and the third at North Castle. The main body, at North Castle, and the most important post, at Fort Washington, were twenty-five miles apart; and Howe was between them. Moreover, his ships had shown that they could ascend the river; he could obtain his sup- 1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 184-185; Lowell, 301. * Dawson, 186. 54 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 plies by water and could concentrate his troops at any point along the river. This faulty disposition of Washington's troops invited disaster, which was not long in arriving. It was due to the unanimous desire of Congress that the last remaining point on Manhattan Island — Fort Washington — should not be abandoned. Congress sent Washington resolu- oct. 11 tions 1 to this effect, and these unfortunately influenced the better judgment of Washington, and also of his gen- erals. Early in November there were in service 106 regiments, of which about one-third were Continentals and two-thirds militia. They numbered on paper about 2,400 officers and 40,000 men; 2 but the "rank and file, present, fit for duty," were only about 19,000. Gates at Ticonderoga had about 6,000; Heath, in the Highlands, with head- quarters at Peekskill, had about 3,000; Lee, at Norch Castle, on the Croton River, had 5,000; and there were 2,700 at Fort Washington, and an equal number at Fort Lee, both under command of Greene. Howe, with nearly 20,000 men, was at Dobb's Ferry on the Hudson, about midway between Lee and Greene; he had fully 10,000 more at New York and Staten Island. 3 Carleton, with nearly 10,000 men, was at Crown Point, and had just defeated Arnold in a spirited naval engagement on oct. ii Lake Champlain. 4 After that he retired to Canada and Nov. 2 went into winter quarters. As previously stated, when Washington withdrew from Nov. i White Plains to North Castle, Howe did not follow him. 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 866. 2 Returns of November 3, November 9, November 13. Amer. Archives, 5, III, 499, 663, 702. 3 Sparks, V, 542. * Sparks, IV, 155; Dawson, 167-174. NEW YORK 55 On the same day he sent a detachment from his troops me at New Rochelle to occupy the heights north of Spuyten Duy vil ; and a few days later he moved his main body Nov. 5 from White Plains to Dobb's Ferry. Washington imme- diately saw what Howe's plan was. "That they will in- vest Fort Washington is a matter of which there can be no doubt. 1 ... I think it highly probable, and al- most certain, that he will make a descent with a part of his troops into Jersey." 2 He prepared to meet this situ- ation as fully as the force at his disposal would permit. Greene had written asking for instructions in regard to Oct. 31 Fort Washington, and Washington had replied leaving the matter to Greene's discretion, only reminding him of the previous intention to hold the fort to the last. While Howe was transferring his base from the Sound to the Hudson River he ordered vessels to come up to meet him at Dobb's Ferry. A frigate and two transports broke Nov. 5 through the obstructions and passed up the river. Greene reported this to Washington, 3 and on the same day Nov. 7 Washington advised Greene of Howe's movements, and his interpretation of them, and said that he should prob- ably come in person with "the troops designed for the Jerseys." 4 When Washington, on the following day, received Greene's report of the passage of the British ships up the river, he began to doubt the advisability of attempting to hold Fort Washington any longer. He immediately wrote to Greene, 5 expressing such doubts, Nov. 8 and saying: "I am therefore inclined to think that it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but as you are on the spot, leave it to you 1 Sparks, IV, 163. » Ibid., IV, 159. 8 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 556. * Ibid., 5, III, 557. •Amer, Archives, 5, III, 602; Sparks, IV, 164. 56 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington as you judge best, and so far revoking the order given to Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last." Washington had by this time come to have great con- fidence in Greene's judgment. Greene was himself the soul of loyalty. Had Washington given him an order it would have been promptly obeyed, whatever his own opinion might have been. Washington not only did not give an order, but he did not intend to give one. He in- tended to — and did — advise Greene that the views he had previously entertained and had expressed the last time he saw Greene had been modified by subsequent events, and without giving any positive orders he left it to Greene's discretion to act as he thought best. Judged by the result, Greene decided wrongly, oct. 11 Congress had passed urgent resolutions that the fort Oct. i6 should be held. 1 At a council of war, where sixteen gen- eral officers were present — including every prominent officer in the army except Greene himself, who was ab- sent in New Jersey — it was unanimously " agreed, that Fort Washington be retained as long as possible." 2 Colonel Robert Magaw, of Pennsylvania, who commanded in Fort Washington, and was considered one of the best regimental commanders in the Continental service, advised Greene that he could hold the fort until the end of the year. 3 Greene concurred in this view, believing that the garrison would make as vigorous a defence as at Bunker Hill. He therefore exercised, unwisely, the discretion vested in him by deciding not to withdraw the garrison. Nov. io When Washington arrived the responsibility of de- 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 866. 3 Amer. Archives, 5, II, 1117; Sparks, IV, 155. 1 Anier. Archives, 5, III, 619. i ■—<——— an i i i i n.. // (An >jb W £ — • - • — Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Comgant , Publishers, Cleveland, uhio affile VBSQtfj ■ S , ■- . «fe >«8«*'«» 2 H T E R . r . r — -v si-a t nrr-tTwMSnwiMiirii-HHii-M«a»..»«.^^-^( j | From Avery's History of the United States and Its People NEW YORK 57 tiding the question rested on him. He had left White 1776 Plains, taking Putnam and Mercer and a small body of troops with him, had crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry Nov. 12 (Stony Point — Verplanck's Point), and riding down on the Jersey side in advance of his troops, reached Greene's Nov. 13 camp at Fort Lee. The matter was fully discussed, but, as Greene said, "finally nothing concluded on"; 1 and as Washington said, 2 when three years later Charles Lee criticised his leadership, the discussion " caused that war- fare in my mind, and hesitation, which ended in the loss of the garrison." Being still in doubt, two days later Washington de- cided to cross the river and examine the position in per- son. In company with Putnam and Greene and Mercer, Nov. 16 he was rowed across early in the morning, but just as they landed the cannonade began, and the attack soon fol- lowed. Greene's description is quite graphic. 3 " There we all stood in a very awkward situation. As the dis- position was made and the enemy advancing, we durst not attempt to make any new disposition ; indeed, we saw nothing amiss. We all urged his excellency to come off. I offered to stay. General Putnam did the same, and so did General Mercer; but his excellency thought it best for us all to come off together, which we did, about half an hour before the enemy surrounded the fort." This was certainly a humiliating position for the commander- in-chief and his principal officers to be in. The battle took place in this wise. Howe moved his loss of Fort main body southward from Dobb's Ferry, and the Hes- sians westward from New Rochelle; he formed his prin- cipal line on the heights, north and east of Harlem River, 1 Greene to Knox, Knox, 33. 2 Sparks, VI, 329. 'Ibid., 34. 58 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 between the Hudson and the Bronx. In advance of them, the Hessians occupied a position south of Harlem River at Kingsbridge, and Cornwallis another position (University Heights) east of the river, both of which they fortified; while Percy brought part of his division from McGowan's Pass up to the " Hollow Way" (125th Street and Manhattan Avenue). The Americans were thus surrounded by something more than 13,000 men 1 — 12 British and 15 Hessian regiments. Thirty flatboats were Nov. 14 brought up the Hudson from New York, and during the night succeeded in passing Fort Washington and through Spuyten Duyvil into the Harlem River south of Kings- bridge. Howe was fully posted as to the American posi- tion by the adjutant of Magaw's regiment, 2 who had deserted two weeks before and given Howe plans of all the works and the strength of the garrison. Magaw, on the American side, commanded three regi- ments : his own and Shee's (now under Cadwalader) from Pennsylvania, and Rawlings' of Maryland; and detach- ments from the so-called " Pennsylvania Flying Camp," under Colonel Baxter, equal to about three more regi- ments. Cadwalader was in the lines from 165th Street south to the " Hollow Way"; Rawlings was in those on the heights near the Hudson, south of Inwood, Baxter at Laurel Hill (Fort George) on the Harlem, and Magaw in Fort Washington. 3 Nov. i6, The attack began almost simultaneously on three sides, Knyphausen and Rail leading the Hessians in two columns against Rawlings, Cornwallis landing from the thirty boats and scaling the heights of Fort George against Baxter, and Percy crossing the " Hollow Way" 1 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1058. ■ Lossing, II, 619. 'Dawson, 189. NEW YORK 59 and attacking Cadwalader. The attack was preceded and ms covered by a heavy artillery fire from the east side of the Harlem River. 1 Cadwalader made only a feeble resistance and fell back toward Fort Washington; but Rawlings de- fended his position with great vigor, and it was only after two hours of hard fighting and heavy losses that the Hessians, with their enormous superiority of force, were able to drive him back. 2 Baxter was mortally wounded, and his men retired before Cornwallis. Learning that Cadwalader was retreating, Howe ordered a fourth attack, which had originally been intended as a feint, to be made vigorously by the 42d Highlanders, crossing the Harlem in boats and climbing a steep hill near the Morris House (165th Street), and trying to intercept Cadwalader. Magaw sent a detachment to oppose this, and the Highlanders lost heavily; but they finally car- ried the hill and captured the detachment. They were, however, so delayed that they were unable to intercept Cadwalader, and he succeeded in reaching Fort Wash- ington. 3 Early in the afternoon all the Americans, more or less demoralized, had been driven from their outlying works into Fort Washington. After some parleying Magaw sur- rendered the entire body to Knyphausen. 4 Howe at first followed up his victory with energetic Nov. is pursuit of the troops in New Jersey. Leaving the Hes- sians with their prisoners, he sent Cornwallis with twelve Nov. 19 regiments across the Hudson at Yonkers, and marching down behind the Palisades he arrived in rear of Fort Lee. Greene had detected the movement; and sending 1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 194. *Ibid., 195; Lowell, 80-84; Eelking, 51. 3 Sparks, IV, 180. i * Dawson, 191, 195. 60 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 report of it to Washington (who was at Hackensac, as- sembling the men he had brought from North Castle) Greene brought off the garrison of Fort Lee during the Nov. 20 night, and reached the Hackensac bridge only a few hours before Cornwallis. Here he was joined by Washington, and a brief stand was made to cover the retreat of the Nov. 23 troops at Hackensac village, behind the Passaic. Then the retreat was continued to Newark. 1 Howe's losses at Fort Washington were 78 killed, 374 wounded and 6 missing. About three-fourths of the losses were in the Hessian regiments under Knyphausen, which attacked Rawlings from the north. The American loss was 59 killed and 2,818 prisoners, of whom 96 were wounded. Adding 105 captured at Fort Lee, the total loss of the Americans was approximately 3,000 men. The British chief of artillery made an itemized report of the artillery, 2 ammunition and stores taken in the two forts; it included 146 pieces of artillery, over 12,000 shot, shell and case, 2,800 small-arms and 400,000 musket cartridges. The Continental treasury and the limited resources of the Colonies in gun factories were in no con- dition to stand such a loss. From every point of view it was a terrible disaster. Results of the Had Howe pursued Washington with the same relent- waswngton less energy and well-directed skill that Grant pursued Lee eighty-eight years later, it is hard to see how the Continental army could have escaped destruction. Howe had nearly 30,000 regular troops, as good as any in the world. He had captured the city of New York and the line of the Hudson for forty miles above it — and that comprised about all there was of the State of New York 1 Sparks, IV, 187, 189. s Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1058, 1059. Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Retreat through New Jersey Nov. -Dec, 1776 NEW YORK 61 at that time,. the settlements around Albany being little 1776 more than Indian trading-posts. He had complete com- mand of the river, with over 300 transports protected by nearly 80 vessels of war. Properly handled, these could have prevented any of Lee's division from crossing the Hudson to join Washington, and with their aid a com- paratively small land force could either have captured Heath at Peekskill and Clinton at Fort Montgomery, or driven them away from their posts, and given Howe the much-desired command of the Hudson to Albany. By controlling the Hudson and remorselessly following Wash- ington's few remaining regiments wherever they went, and keeping the field as long as they kept it, notwith- standing the season, he could have ended the war before spring. Perhaps he did not know the despondency prevailing American on the American side. John Adams, the most important man in Congress — President of the Board of War and member of the committee to seek aid from foreign na- tions — had gone home to spend three months with his Oct. 13, 1776. family in Massachusetts. 1 Congress was ready to pass the resolutions, which it did pass a few weeks later, 2 to Nov. 23 make Washington dictator, and adjourn to Baltimore — where there would probably have been no quorum, if Washington had failed at Trenton. Washington him- self wrote to Congress 3 from Newark that "the situation of our affairs is truly critical," and to his brother, 4 a little later: "In a word, if every nerve is not strained to recruit Dec. is the new army with all possible expedition, I think the game is pretty nearly up." 1 Morse, Life of John Adams, 146; Familiar Letters of John Adams, 233. 2 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 1027. a Sparks, IV, 190. * Ibid., IV, 231. G2 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1773 Howe Goes into Winter Quarters Dec. 20 Dec. 8 Washington Retreats to the Delaware Nov. 29 Dec. 3 Howe missed his chance. Instead of driving Wash- ington to Philadelphia and dispersing his army as its enlistments expired, he halted Cornwallis, first at Bruns- wick, and then at Trenton; and went into winter quar- ters, saying (to Lord George Germain) 1 that his in- tention did not extend beyond getting and keeping possession of East Jersey. Instead of seizing and hold- ing the Highlands of the Hudson he sent Sir Henry Clin- ton, with 6,000 troops and a large part of the navy, to Newport, intending in the spring to capture Providence and thus penetrate into New England. 2 There was no enemy at Newport, and the place was captured without resistance; the advance to Providence was never made, and the British troops which spent the next three years at Newport made the inhabitants miserable but accom- plished no military purpose. Howe, having thus completed his plans for a quiet winter, Washington, by a supreme effort of genius and daring at Trenton, changed the whole situation. No second opportunity like that of December, 1776, ever came to Howe or his successor. Washington had been only a few days at Newark when Cornwallis appeared on the opposite side of the river; simultaneously the Hessians crossed the Passaic above his left flank, and it was rumored that Howe was em- barking men for Staten Island, to turn his right by way of Amboy. 3 Washington therefore retreated to Bruns- wick and a few days later to Trenton, and took position behind the Delaware, having taken the precaution to secure all the boats on the river for 70 miles above Phil- adelphia. 4 His force was reduced to about 3,000 men, 5 1 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1316. 2 Sparks, IV, 220. 3 Ibid., IV, 194. 1 ' i /-* 1 «j i New Army of raising a new army, for which Congress by its resolu- tion 1 at Baltimore had given him practically unlimited powers. In spite of extraordinary energy on Washing- 1775 ton's part, recruits came in slowly. The 88 battalions Dec. 27 authorized by one resolution 2 and the 16 battalions of sept, is infantry, 3 regiments of artillery and 3,000 light horse authorized by another, 3 amounted in all to nearly 76,000 Dec. 27 men. Months after these resolutions had passed Wash- 1777 ington reported to Congress 4 that his force in Jersey was March 14 less than 3,000 fit for duty, all but 981 of whom were 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 1043-1046; Sparks, IV, 550. * Jour. Cont. Cong., V, 762. 8 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 1043-1046; Sparks, IV, 550. * Sparks, IV, 364. 75 76 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 May 24 Howe's Plans 1776 Nov. 30 militia. About 1,000 at a time were being passed through the hospitals for inoculation against small-pox, for Washington had wisely determined that his army should not be destroyed, as the army in Canada had practically been, by that dreaded disease. Later on, however, the new regiments began to come forward, and he had 43 regiments, from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia. They were organized into 10 brigades and 5 divisions, under Sullivan, Greene, Stirling, Stephen and Lincoln. They numbered 8,378 officers and men. 1 Other regiments, from New York and New England, were assembled under Putnam at Peekskill, whence they could move toward Albany or Morristown, as circumstances might require. The difficulty about arms, which at one time was very serious, because the men as their enlistments expired carried their guns home with them and refused to give them up, had been fortunately solved by the arrival of vessels from France bringing 23,000 muskets 2 and 1,000 barrels of powder, in addition to blankets and other military stores. As the months wore along Washington gave incessant thought to what Howe's plans would probably be; and he was convinced that Howe would bring the troops from the St. Lawrence to join him at New York, attack Wash- ington with all his strength, and if he succeeded push on to Philadelphia. While this was obviously the proper military plan for Howe to follow, yet Howe had different ideas in mind. He conveyed these to Lord George Germain in a long letter, which expressed the "hope of finishing the war in one year." He assumed that the army in Canada would 1 Sparks, IV, 432; Marshall, I, 145. 2 Sparks, IV, 338, 375. awwWLss PHILADELPHIA 77 advance against Albany, and for his own troops he pro- 1776 posed the following: * "1st, an offensive army of 10,000 men," to move from Providence and attack Boston; "2d, an offensive army of 10,000 men," to move up the Hudson to Albany, leaving 5,000 to defend New York; "3d, a defensive army of 8,000 men," to be stationed in Jersey. After the movements against Boston and Albany had succeeded the entire force was to be united in Jersey for an attack on Philadelphia — the campaign to end the following winter in Virginia and the Carolinas. To carry out this programme he asked for 10 additional ships of the line, and reinforcements of 15,000 more troops, sug- gesting that they might "be had from Russia or from Hanover, and other German states." A few weeks later Howe modified his views, and wrote Dec 20 to Germain 2 saying that sentiment was changed in Penn- sylvania, that the people were anxious for peace; he therefore proposed to abandon the operations against Boston and Albany; to leave 2,000 men in Newport, 4,000 men at New York, 3,000 on the Hudson, and with his main body of 10,000 effectives to act offensively in Jersey and take Philadelphia. Charles Lee had been a prisoner in Howe's hands for five days prior to the date of this despatch. Under the threat of being treated as a deserter, he had told Howe all he knew — and more. The news of the alleged change of sentiment in Pennsylvania quite probably came from him. When these despatches reached London, Burgoyne was again there on leave of absence, and he offered his advice. His plan 3 was for a movement across Lake Champlain; Howe's Narrative, 9; Amer. Archives, 5, III, 926. 2 Howe's Narrative, 10, 11; Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1317. 3 Burgoyne, Appendix, iii-xii. 78 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR Feb. 28 Burgoyne's Plan 1777 a movement from Oswego across Oneida Lake and down the Mohawk River; and a movement up the Hudson — all three to be directed against Albany. This plan was submitted to King George, who wrote on it an endorse- ment in his own hand, 1 giving it his general approval; he rejected the suggestion that the troops in Canada might be brought to join Howe at New York, saying, "I greatly dislike that idea"; he also said explicitly : "The force from Canada must join him (Howe) at Albany." 2 This plan was therefore the one adopted so far as the London authorities were concerned; Burgoyne was selected to command the two expeditions from Canada; March 27 and he left London, carrying a despatch to Sir Guy Carleton, 3 the Governor of Canada, to that effect. No definite instructions were sent to Howe, but he was in- MarchQ formed by a despatch, 4 which reached him before the orders were given to Burgoyne, that it was not thought necessary to send him so large a reinforcement as 15,000 men; that a smaller number would be sent; and no objection was made to his plan to proceed against Philadelphia. Howe's despatch of December 20 (above quoted) had stated his intention to attack Philadelphia by the direct route through Jersey; but later he changed his mind and April 2 devised a third plan. He outlined this in a confidential despatch 5 to Germain, written four days after Charles Lee had put in his hand a written memorandum of the con- March 29 ditions as Lee thought they existed in the Central and Southern States, and a plan of campaign based on these 1 The King's endorsement in full is given in Fonblanque's Burgoyne, 487. 1 Ibid. 3 Germain to Carleton, Burgoyne, Appendix, xii-xvii. * Germain to Howe, Howe's Narrative, 12. 5 Howe to Germain, Ibid., 13. PHILADELPHIA 79 assumptions. Lee argued ' that there was a strong tory 1777 sentiment in Pennsylvania and Maryland, and that the Lee's pian proper line of attack upon Philadelphia was by way of the Chesapeake. While this written proposition of Lee's, as previously stated, never came to light until eighty years afterward, and was not referred to in any way by Howe, it seems to have been the basis of the plan which he adopted. The extraordinary spectacle was thus presented of a subordinate general going to London and getting the King's approval to one plan of campaign; of the King's minister sending full instructions to one general and none to the other who was to co-operate with him; and of this other general making his own independent plan on the advice of a prisoner, who had turned traitor to the coun- try whose uniform he then wore. This confusion of plans led to the complete surrender of one British army, and the ultimate failure of the other; it was a factor of the highest importance in the ultimate success of the American cause. The military situation was, in a striking degree, similar Military suua- to that in front of Washington eignty-nve years later. Beginning of When McClellan left Johnston at Manassas and went by a circuitous route to the Peninsula he found Johnston facing him on his arrival ; and when Howe left Washing- ton in Jersey and travelled 400 miles to the Head of Elk he found Washington drawn up to meet him. At the Head of Elk, Howe was 70 miles from Philadelphia, whereas he had been only 60 miles from it at Bruns- wick; and the same enemy and same commander op- posed him, after he had consumed two months of the best season of the year in making the change. Had 1 Moore, 88-89. the Year 80 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 April 24 Raid into Connecticut Washington Moves to Middlebrook May 29 Howe adopted a plan similar to that of Grant's in 1864, and insisted on the troops in Canada being sent to join him at New York; and with the combined force of nearly 35,000 regulars had he attacked Washington's 8,000 newly raised Continentals with the same fierceness that was shown in the Wilderness, it hardly seems possible that Washington, fertile as he was in resources, could have saved the Revolution from being crushed in the spring of 1777. But, as stated on a previous page, Howe never recovered from the mental paralysis which he received at Bunker Hill. While Washington was at Morristown, keenly watching for every move of his adversary, Howe made a raid into Connecticut. Governor Tryon (tory governor of New York) with 2,000 men landed at Fairfield, marched up to Danbury, destroyed a large amount of stores which the Americans could ill afford to lose, encountered the mili- tia under Arnold and Wooster in a sharp engagement at Ridgefield (in which Wooster was mortally wounded) and then returned to New York. This raid had no effect on the campaign, and it cost the British a loss of about 200 in killed and wounded. 1 Washington meanwhile kept his eye unceasingly on Howe, and being more than ever convinced that the latter would move toward Philadelphia, he broke up his camp at Morristown and moved about twenty miles south to the Raritan River, so as to be nearer Howe's line of march. Here he occupied a strong position, which Greene had selected, on the heights of Middle- brook, just back of Bound Brook, about ten miles from Brunswick. His right under Sullivan was sent out as far as Princeton. Then followed two months of extremely Dawson, 213-219; Sparks, IV, 404-406. Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States ami Its People |l|S L A. N D M"" / Huntington / THE M.-N. WORKS 73 :iO S/ ' , Danbury Raid April 25-26, 1777 Fort Washington Nov. 16, 1*76 in PHILADELPHIA 81 interesting manoeuvres, carried out on both sides with 1777 excellent skill. First, Howe tried to manoeuvre Wash- Howes ington out of the strong Middlebrook position, and get 1.1 .11 fiii June 13 him down in the lower open country where he could at- June 22 tack him to better advantage. He therefore crossed the Raritan with about 10,000 men and placed himself be- tween Washington and Princeton — on the road to Phila- delphia. Washington did not leave his position. He doubted, as he wrote Schuyler, 1 whether this was "a June 16 real move toward Philadelphia"; if it should so prove, he intended to let Howe get as far as the Delaware, where he would meet with opposition fro: the militia in his front, and then follow rapidly, cut his communica- tions and attack his rear. Washington having correctly interpreted Howe's first move, it failed. 2 Howe's second move was somewhat more successful. June 23 He retreated suddenly to Amboy, hoping thus to tempt Howe's second Washington out of his strong position, and then turn sharply and attack him. The bait was too tempting; Washington sent Greene with three brigades in pur- suit, and himself followed Greene with his entire force. Greene did not advance more than five miles beyond Brunswick, not wishing to get too far from the main body, but Stirling on his left advanced almost to Staten Island Sound. 3 Then Howe made his third manoeuvre. He had taken Howe's Third part of his troops across to Staten Island; he now sud- denly recrossed the Kills, drove Stirling back in some confusion, and marched rapidly to Westfield, several miles west of Rah way. He was thus on Washington's left flank, threatening his communications with the Hud- son. He hoped that Washington would attack; but 1 Sparks, IV, 462. 2 Ibid, IV, 469. s Ibid., IV, 470, 473. 82 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 June 30 Howe Sails lor the Chesapeake July 7 July 21 July 24 Washington Marches Southward Washington returned quickly with his whole force to the Middlebrook lines. 1 The third manoeuvre having thus failed, Howe re- turned to Staten Island, put his troops on board trans- ports and men-of-war, 228 in number, and proceeded to carry out his main purpose of transporting his army to the south of Philadelphia. Washington knew that the troops were on board and that the ships had dropped down to the lower bay; 2 but he could not learn positively that they had sailed. At the same time came reports from Schuyler at Albany and Putnam at Peekskill which led him to believe that Howe intended to move up the Hudson. Burgoyne had crossed Lake Champlain, captured Crown Point and Ticonderoga and was advancing rapidly on Albany. It might be that Howe would suddenly bring his ships back from the lower bay or from outside and sail up the Hudson to join Burgoyne at Albany. Washington therefore or- dered Putnam to send two brigades to reinforce Schuyler, made arrangements to collect shipping to move his own troops up the Hudson, if necessary, and marched in that direction himself; first to Morristown, then to Ramapo and then to the Clove (near Haverstraw Bay), and he sent two divisions (Sullivan's and Stirling's) to cross the Hudson at Peekskill. After being three days in the Clove he received positive information that Howe's fleet had gone to sea. He rightly surmised that their destination was the Delaware, and he promptly put his army in motion to the southward, recalling Sullivan and Stirling to Morristown. The new battalions had been gradually 1 Sparks, IV, 475. 2 Washington's despatches to the President of Congress and others de- scribing his perplexities during these anxious seven weeks are given in Sparks, IV, 479-505; V, 1-44. PHILADELPHIA 83 filling up and his force numbered now about 14,000 1777 men. 1 When Washington reached the Delaware River he juiy3o halted until he should hear of Howe's arrival in the Del- aware Bay. News of this came the next day, and he resumed his march to the south, pushing on himself as Jui y 31 far as Chester, to reconnoitre. There he learned that Aug. 1 Howe's fleet had remained only a day in the Delaware and had put to sea again. He halted the army in the vicinity of Philadelphia, and ordered Sullivan's and Stir- ling's division (which had remained at Morristown) to march back to Peekskill. Nothing was heard of Howe's fleet for three weeks. During this time Washington had moved northward again to the vicinity of the Delaware; and a council of war was unanimously of opinion that Aug. 21 Howe had gone south to Charleston, that it would be useless to follow him there, and the army should move to the North River, with a view possibly to its marching to Albany. But the next day came authentic information Aug. 22 that Howe's fleet was at anchor in the Chesapeake. 2 Washington put his troops, " harassed by marching and Washington countermarching," as he wrote to his brother, 3 again in through motion to the southward; marched through Philadelphia with colors flying and drums beating on a Sunday morn- Aug. 24 ing, exciting no little admiration and animating the militia to turn out, and reached Wilmington the follow- Aug. 25 ing day. Taking Greene and Lafayette (who had just Howe's Army i <• -n . , , Lands at Head arrived from r ranee, been commissioned a major-general, of Eik 1 Lossing, I, 331. 2 Howe embarked his troops (18,000 in all) July 5, sailed July 23, reached the capes of the Delaware July 30, sailed from there the same day, passed the capes of the Chesapeake August 16, and landed at Head of Elk August 25. Howe's Narrative, 23, 24. 3 See foot-note 2, previous page. 84 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 although a few days less than twenty years old, and joined the army) and a small escort, Washington rode forward nearly twenty miles on a personal reconnoissance, and from a high hill near the Head of Elk saw the British camp. He decided to post his army behind a small creek about eight miles south of Wilmington and accept bat- tle. Howe, after making a feint against this position, se P t. 8 moved past Washington's right flank with the intention of crossing the Brandywine, 1 seizing the high ground be- hind the Brandywine and cutting off Washington's com- munications with Philadelphia or forcing him to fight at a disadvantage. But Washington promptly detected the movement, 2 retreated to Wilmington, crossed the Brandy- wine, and marching twelve miles up its eastern bank sept. io took position at Chad's Ford. Greene with his own division and two other brigades was in the centre, op- posite the ford; Sullivan with his division and those of Stirling and Stephen was posted about two miles up the creek with instructions to guard the fords as far as the forks of the Brandywine; and Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, guarded the fords on Greene's left. The total force was about 11,000 men. 3 sept, io On the same evening Howe halted at Kenneth Square, about eight miles south of Chad's Ford. Howe's pian Howe's plan for the ensuing battle was substantially the same as at Brooklyn, and if Washington had not been present in person, with Greene at hand to carry out his orders, it would probably have succeeded. He directed the Hessians to advance to Chad's Ford and make a feint of attacking there, while the larger part of his army under Cornwallis was to march up the Brandywine, 1 The Brandywine empties into the Delaware at Wilmington. 2 Sparks, V, 56. s Dawson, 278. Brandvwine Sept. ii, 1777 Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Fort Mercer, Oct. 22, Nov. 20, and Fort Mifflin, Nov. 15, 1777 PHILADELPHIA 85 cross the stream at the forks and come down in rear of 1777 the American position. 1 Howe's army moved at daybreak. Knyphausen with sept. 11 his Hessians and two British brigades, about 5,000 men in all, marched on the direct road to Chad's Ford, arriving Battle of the there about 10 A. m. He drove back the American out- posts and carried on quite an active artillery duel with Greene's batteries posted on the heights behind the ford; Cornwallis with the greater part of the British troops and some Hessians, about 10,000 men all told, marched twelve miles up the Brandywine, crossed the forks, and then turning southward came squarely in rear of Sullivan's division, posted behind Jones's Ford, almost without firing a shot. 2 In the four hours which had elapsed since Knyphausen began skirmishing at Chad's Ford, Sullivan had received from his "light parties" and had transmitted to Washington contradictory information concerning the enemy's movements. The first report 3 was that a large body of the enemy was marching to the westward a few miles from the Brandywine; Washington immediately ordered Sullivan to cross the creek and attack that body in flank, while he in person joined Greene and made preparations to cross above Chad's Ford and cut off Knyphausen from the rest of Howe's army. Before these plans could be carried into effect, Sullivan received word from a scouting party at the forks of the Bran- dywine that there was no appearance of the enemy in that neighborhood. He thereupon discontinued his movement, and so reported to Washington, who coun- 1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 281. 2 Ibid., 282. 3 Sullivan was much criticised for his conduct at the Brandywine. His defence, accompanied by copies of the reports from the " light parties," is given in full in Sparks, V, 456-463. 11 A. M. 86 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 termanded the orders to Greene. Later came a definite M . report that the British could be plainly seen forming on Osborne's Hill, about a mile or more in rear of Sullivan and to his right. Sullivan promptly withdrew his divi- sion from the creek, changed front to the right and formed line across the main road at the Birmingham meeting-house. His troops were hardly in position when Cornwallis attacked him with great violence. The fight- ing around the stone meeting-house (which is still stand- ing) was very fierce. Sullivan was greatly outnumbered, and his three divisions in succession gave way, Stirling making the most stubborn resistance. Finally both were overwhelmed, and the retreat became a rout. Two of Sullivan's aides were wounded, and Lafayette got a bullet hole in his leg which laid him up for several weeks. 1 Washington had meanwhile received the report from Sullivan 2 of the appearance of the British in his rear; he ordered Greene to leave Wayne to defend Chad's Ford, and with his other brigades (Muhlenberg's and Weedon's) to go to Sullivan's assistance. Greene lost no time, and marching his men four miles in forty-five min- utes, 3 he formed a line in rear of Sullivan's retreating M . troops, opened his ranks to allow them to pass through and then opposed the British with such vigor as to halt their advance. His position was a strong one, on both sides of a narrow pass in the road, and flanked by thick woods. Repeated attacks were made by the British, but they could not dislodge him, and Greene still held the position when night put an end to the firing. Mean- 1 Many of the houses on the Brandywine battle-field are still standing (1911) just as they were at the time of the battle; and the Pennsylvania Historical Society has erected sign-posts indicating the movements of the troops as well as the spot where Lafayette was wounded. 2 See foot note 3, previous page. 3 G. W. Greene, I, 449. PHILADELPHIA 87 while, Wayne, with his small force, was unable to resist 1777 the advance of Knyphausen; the latter had crossed Chad's Ford as soon as Greene's main body had gone to Sullivan's aid. Wayne effected his retreat behind the rear of Greene's line and gained the road to Chester. During the night Greene retreated in good order and sept. 12 without molestation. In the morning the army was as- sembled at Chester and marched to Germantown. The British losses were officially reported as 90 killed, 480 wounded and 6 missing. 1 The Americans left their dead and wounded on the field, and no accurate report of them was ever made. Their loss was estimated at 300 killed and 600 wounded. 2 In this battle Washington had about 11,000 present and Howe between 15,000 and 18,000. 3 The disparity in discipline, arms and equipment was even greater. It has been often questioned whether Washington was justi- fied in fighting a battle under these adverse conditions. On the other hand there can be no doubt that public opinion, in and out of Congress, imperatively demanded it; and had Washington retreated without a battle the effect would have been more disastrous than the defeat. It was indeed a defeat, but Washington saved it from being a rout. Neither the army nor its commander was discouraged. After giving his men only one day's rest at Germantown, Washington boldly crossed the Schuylkill with the in- tent of attacking Howe, who had slowly followed him. The two armies met at Warwick Tavern, about twenty se P t. 16 miles west of Philadelphia and fifteen miles from Chad's Ford. The battle did not take place. Something hap- 1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 278. 1 Marshall's Washington, I, 158. » Lossing, II, 170, 178. 88 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 pened of a nature which military commanders no longer have to take into account in making their plans. The ammunition in Washington's army, and a large part of that in Howe's, was totally ruined ' by a violent rain storm, which continued unabated during the greater part of two days. Washington had no recourse but to retreat across the Schuylkill near Perkiomen, where fresh supplies could be obtained. During this retreat the so- paoii Massacre called "Paoli massacre " occurred. Wayne's division, which constituted the rear guard, was encamped for the sept. 21. night at Paoli Tavern. He was attacked by three regi- ments under General Grey, 2 who reached Wayne's camp without firing a shot, and used the bayonet so effectively that they claimed to have killed and wounded 300 men and to have taken between 70 and 80 prisoners, with a loss on their own side of only 4 killed and 4 wounded. 3 Wayne managed to extricate the rest of his division and retreat to Chester. He was court-martialled but acquitted. 4 Howe captures After this affair Howe manoeuvred against Wash- ington's right flank, causing him to move farther up the Schuylkill; and then, suddenly countermarching, he crossed the Schuylkill at Sweed's Ford (Norristown) and placed himself between Washington and Philadelphia. Washington was not in condition to give battle, and sept. 25 Howe marched down the Schuylkill and took possession of Philadelphia, encamping the bulk of his troops at Germantown. As soon as Washington had obtained fresh ammunition he followed Howe and went into camp 1 Sparks, V, 66. 2 Great-grandfather of Earl Grey, at present (1911) Governor-General of Canada. s Howe's Report, Dawson, 317. 4 Sparks, V, 166; Dawson, 315. PHILADELPHIA 89 on Skippack Creek, about twenty miles from German- 1777 town. 1 In a campaign of thirty-two days since landing at the Results of the Head of Elk, Howe had met and defeated his enemy and gained possession of their capital, the Congress adjourn- ing to York. He had a superiority in numbers and im- mense advantage in munitions and supplies. His move- ments were well conducted, but they lacked the final element of success; he had not destroyed his adver- sary's army. This army, in fact, speedily came forward to attack him, on a bold and hazardous plan, which came surprisingly near to success. Upon taking possession of Philadelphia, Howe posted 2 Howe's • i l v fjioiii Position at the greater part of his army along the line 01 the school Germantown House Lane, which ran through the market square of the village of Germantown, about seven miles from Phila- delphia. At the market it intersected the road (Ger- mantown Avenue) which led from Philadelphia through Chestnut Hill to the open country on the north-west, and along which for nearly two miles stretched the ancient village of Germantown. Howe's line was about three miles long, his left on the Schuylkill, his centre at the market, and his right on a small stream about a mile to the north of the market. In front of a large part of his line was the precipitous gorge of the Wissahickon, nearly 200 feet deep. His outposts were about two miles in ad- vance, at the end of the village toward Chestnut Hill. His force numbered about9,000men, 3 and he had3,000or more in Philadelphia. The rest of his army had been detached across the Delaware River in Jersey, and on learning this Washington deemed the moment auspicious for attack. 4 1 Sparks, V, 73, 77; Dawson, 318. 2 Howe's Report, Dawson, 330. s Lossing, 11. 4 Sparks, V, 78. Plan Plan of Attack 90 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 His plan was somewhat similar to that which had suc- washington-s ceeded so well at Trenton. Leaving his camp on Skip- pack Creek, nearly twenty miles from the Germantown market, one column under Sullivan, consisting of his own and Wayne's divisions flanked by Conway's brigade, Washington's was to f ollow the main road and attack the British left ; another column under Greene, with his own and Stephen's divisions flanked by McDougalPs brigade, was to make a devour by the Lime-kiln road and strike the British right beyond the market; the Pennsylvania militia under Armstrong was to follow the Manatawny road, on the ridge between the Schuylkill and Wissahickon, and cross- ing the Wissahickon at its mouth to get in rear of the British left; the Maryland and Jersey militia under Small- wood and Forman were to follow the York road, a mile or more on Greene's left, and fall upon the rear of their right. Stirling's division formed the reserve, following Sullivan on the main road through Chestnut Hill. Wash- ington in person was with Sullivan's column. His entire force, including some troops recently arrived from Peeks- kill, numbered only 8,000 Continentals and 3,000 militia. The four columns were to march all night on separate roads covering a width of about seven miles, separated by broken country and deep ravines. These columns were to converge at daylight and simultaneously attack. It was indeed a bold plan. oct. 3, Leaving their camps at dusk the night march was car- ried out as directed, and about sunrise the next morning Conway's brigade passed over Chestnut Hill, and drove in the British pickets at Mount Airy. 1 These fell back on Battle of their supports, consisting of a battalion of light infantry and the 40th Regiment. Colonel Musgrave then placed 1 Sparks, V, 78. 7 P. M Oct. 4 Germantown PHILADELPHIA 91 five companies of the latter regiment in a strong stone 1777 house belonging to Chief- Justice Chew. 1 They barricaded the doors, and firing through the windows they resisted every effort to dislodge them by infantry and artillery. They held this position throughout the entire battle. Finding it impossible to capture this house, Sullivan pushed on, dividing his command, his own division on the right of the road and Wayne's on the left. The British contested every wall and garden, but were slowly forced back toward the market. The Pennsylvania militia, in- stead of gaining the rear of the British left, did not cross the Wissahickon, but contented themselves with firing a few shots across the ravine and then retreated. Nash's brigade from Stirling's division was then sent to protect Sullivan's right. The Maryland and Jersey militia did not come into action at all. 2 The battle had been in progress for about three-quarters of an hour before Greene arrived on the left. He had a longer road to march than Sullivan, his guide lost his way, and when day broke there was a heavy fog which soon became so dense that it was impossible to see more than a few yards. 3 When he did come into action, Stephen's division on the right of the Lime-kiln road fired into Wayne's division, mistaking them for the enemy in the fog. This caused confusion and led to the retreat of both divisions, uncovering Sullivan's left and Greene's right flank. The battle, however, continued for nearly two hours longer; Greene fighting his way along the Lime-kiln road and driving the British back until he reached the market house; Sullivan doing the same on ir This house is still standing (1911) in excellent preservation; and, I believe, it is owned by the lineal descendants of Chief-Justice Chew. 2 Lossing, II, 111. 3 Sparks, V, 79, 83, 102; Dawson, 328, 329. town Panic 92 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 the right of the road from Chestnut Hill ; and Maxwell's brigade from the reserve was still firing on the Chew house, nearly two miles behind Sullivan. Cornwallis was hastening from Philadelphia with reinforcements; 1 Howe's main body had been driven through the entire length of the village, and it is said that he was making prepara- oct. 4, tions to retreat to Chester. 2 Then occurred one of those The German- panics 3 to which all armies are subject, and which are never explained. Possibly it was the fog; possibly the firing back at the Chew house which led the Americans to think that they were surrounded; possibly it was be- cause their ammunition was exhausted. Whatever the cause, the retreat began suddenly at all points on their line. Seeing this, General Grant, who commanded on the British right, rallied his disorganized troops and made a vigorous attack. In spite of the personal efforts of Washington, who was again in the midst of the fight, 4 the Americans gave way at all points and hastily retreated. By nightfall they reached their camps on Skippack Creek. They had saved all their artillery. Cornwallis had pur- sued them for five miles, skirmishing with the rear guard under Pulaski, and then abandoned the pursuit. 5 Howe reported his losses as 535 killed, wounded and missing, of whom less than 100 were killed. The losses on the American side were stated by the Board of War to be 152 killed, 521 wounded and 400 missing. 6 General Agnew on the British and General Nash on the Ameri- can side were mortally wounded, and died a few days later. General Stephen was tried by court-martial for 1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 330. 2 Sparks, V, 83. 'Sparks, V, 79, 102; Dawson, 325. * Sullivan's letter, Sparks, V, 467. 8 Sparks, V, 80; Wayne's letter, Dawson, 329. e Dawson, 324. Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Germantown Oct. 4, 1777 PHILADELPHIA 93 "unofficer-like conduct" and intoxication, and was dis- 1777 missed. 1 Washington remained in the camp on Skippack Creek Oct. 29 for three weeks and then moved eastward again to the hills near the village of Whitemarsh, about four miles from Chestnut Hill. Howe came out to attack him, but after an inconclusive skirmish he decided that Washing- Dec. 5 ton's position was too strong. 2 He returned to Phila- Decs delphia and went into winter quarters. Soon after Washington selected the camp at Valley Forge, twenty- five miles up the Schuylkill from Philadelphia, and Dec 19 moved his troops there. 3 In the meantime Howe had gained possession of the Destruction of American forts on both sides of the Delaware near Phila- the Delaware delphia. These works consisted of one redoubt, Fort Mifflin, on the Pennsylvania side, just below the mouth of the Schuylkill; another, Fort Mercer, opposite to it, at Red Bank, on the Jersey shore ; and a third, at Billings- port, about three miles below, on the Jersey side. In addition to the redoubts, the channels of the river were obstructed by chevaux-de-frise. The redoubts were gar- risoned with infantry and artillery at the time of the battle of the Brandywine. 4 Immediately after that battle Earl Howe, 5 commanding the British fleet in America, sent some of his lighter vessels from the Chesapeake around into the Delaware. In co-operation with a British regiment sent across the river at Chester, they removed Oct. 6 the obstructions and captured the garrison atBillingsport. 6 The next attempt was made against Fort Mercer, and Fort Mercer here a gallant and successful defence was made. The 1 Lossing, II, 114. 2 Dawson, 368-373. s Sparks, 522-525. 4 Dawson, 350; Lossing, II, 85-86. s Brother of General Howe. 6 Earl Howe's Report, Dawson, 357. 94 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 garrison consisted of two Rhode Island regiments under command of Colonel Christopher Greene. They num- 22 bered not more than 400 men. They were attacked by Count Donop and 1,200 Hessians, who had crossed the river at Gloucester (just below Camden). These made a furious assault but were completely repulsed. Donop was mortally wounded, 10 other officers and 140 men were killed and wounded and about 200 were taken prisoners. The loss in the garrison was only 14 killed and 23 wounded. 1 This brilliant defence brought the warm- est commendations and the present of a sword from Con- gress to Colonel Greene. Howe next turned his attention to Fort Mifflin. It was garrisoned by a Maryland regiment of 300 men under Colonel Smith, afterward reinforced by 150 Pennsylvania troops sent from Washington's camp. Instead of assault- ing this, Howe reduced it by artillery. He erected shore batteries with guns taken from his brother's fleet — four 32-pounders, six 24-pounders and one 13-inch mortar. With these he kept up a vigorous cannonade for an entire day, inflicting heavy losses on the garrison. Next a combined land and naval attack was made, the shore batteries being reinforced by 6 men-of-war, carrying 191 guns, besides smaller vessels. The redoubt was battered to pieces, about 250 of the garrison were killed and wounded (Colonel Smith being among the latter) and the rest made their escape during the night to Fort Mercer. Finally, Howe sent a strong force against Fort Mercer. It was commanded by Cornwallis and numbered about 5,500 men. It crossed the Delaware at Chester and marched up the east bank of the river. The little gar- 1 Report of Colonel Greene, Dawson, 355; Howe's report, Dawson, 356. PHILADELPHIA 95 rison was unable to cope with an opposing force of this 1777 magnitude and evacuated the fort. 1 Cornwallis took possession and dismantled it. Washington heard of this movement and immediately detached Greene 2 with his division to cross the river at Burlington and march down to the relief of Fort Mercer; but it was too late. The fort had been evacuated the day Greene left Whitemarsh. After some unimportant manoeuvring by Greene and Cornwallis, both returned to their respective camps. 3 Howe was thus in possession of Philadelphia and in undisputed communication with his brother's fleet. His army remained there for seven months, absolutely inac- Nov., 1777, to tive, gradually deteriorating in discipline, its officers engaged in the Mischianza and other foolish gayeties. Meanwhile Washington and his half-clad soldiers were shivering and almost starving at Valley Forge. 1 Washington's, Howe's and Earl Howe's Reports, Dawson, 364-367. 2 Sparks, V, 167. » G. W. Greene, I, 518-533. CHAPTER IV THE HUDSON 1776 While Howe had been carrying on his Philadelphia origin of the campaign, Burgoyne had advanced from Canada along the line of the Hudson, and had surrendered his entire army at Saratoga. The circumstances under which this campaign origi- nated, and the lack of co-operation between Howe and Burgoyne, have already been explained. 1 Briefly, Bur- goyne's plan contemplated a movement of tories and Indians from Oswego down the Mohawk Valley, and an advance of British regulars and Hessians from Montreal through Lake Champlain and the upper Hudson — both to unite at Albany, where Howe was to join him from New York. 2 No instructions having been sent to Howe, 3 that part of the plan disappeared; the other two move- ments were undertaken. 1777 The force detailed to Burgoyne consisted of 3 British July i brigades, 3 Hessian brigades, 38 pieces of light artillery and 10 pieces of siege artillery. They numbered 7,213 rank and file. In addition there were 250 Canadians and 400 Indians; so that, counting the officers, Burgoyne had something over 8,000 men. The expedition from Oswego was commanded by Colonel St. Leger, and con- sisted of 900 Indians and 700 white men; the latter made 1 Pp. 77-79, ante. 3 Burgoyne, Appendix IV, 13. * P. 78, ante. 96 Port!-- Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Arnold's Naval Engagement ion on the American THE HUDSON 97 up of tories under Sir John Johnson, and detachments 1776 from two regular regiments. 1 On the American side, the "Northern Department" situat was still under the command of Schuyler. When Sullivan side' retreated from Montreal in the summer of 1776, Congress passed a resolution 2 directing Washington to send Gates to take command of the American forces in Canada. By the time Gates arrived the American forces were no June 17 longer in Canada, but had been driven back to Crown Point and Ticonderoga. Gates interpreted his instruc- tions to give him independent command of the troops in the field, leaving Schuyler the nominal command of the department, but without any real authority. Schuyler submitted the question to Washington, asking the de- cision of Congress; and Congress decided that Gates was Relations be- not to be independent of Schuyler. 3 But their respective andGaLT 7 functions were never clearly defined, and much friction resulted. There were no military movements in the Northern Department after Gates's arrival, except Arnold's brilliant naval battle on Lake Champlain, which, although fought Oct. 11 by the army, was a naval engagement. When Washing- Oct. 13 ton was hard pressed in New Jersey, Gates was ordered, 4 with seven regiments, to join him; but on his arrival he Dec 20 pleaded ill health and received leave to go to Philadelphia. He thus was not present at Trenton or Princeton, but spent the next few months in consultation with Congress. 1 Burgoyne, 12-17; Appendix XI, 51. In 1780 Burgoyne defended himself before a committee of Parliament, and published a book entitled A State of the Expedition from Canada. It consisted of his narrative, the evidence and an appendix containing the official orders, reports, correspondence and returns. 3 Jour. Cont. Cong., V, 448. 3 Ibid., V, 526. 1 Sparks, IV, 192, 216, 222. 98 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 That body passed a resolution 1 desiring him to resume Feb. 20 the duties of adjutant-general, and when Washington heard of this he urged him to accept. 2 While Gates was March 25 considering the matter Congress passed another resolu- tion 3 directing him " immediately to repair to Ticonderoga and take command of the army there." March 15 Congress meanwhile had passed a resolution 4 severely reprimanding Schuyler on account of a respectful letter which he had written to it concerning matters affecting the discipline of his troops. He determined to proceed to Philadelphia, settle his accounts and retire from the service. The New England delegation had been at all times opposed to him; the New England troops had ex- pressed an unwillingness to serve under him on account of the controversy between New York and New Hamp- shire over the territory which became the State of Ver- mont; he had been criticised and held responsible for the failure of the expedition to Quebec; he was denounced as an aristocrat and his loyalty to the United States was questioned. 5 Twice before he had advised Washington of his intention to resign, 6 but had yielded to Washington's urgent entreaty to remain in service. 7 He was now con- vinced that Congress desired to displace him and that his opportunity for usefulness was gone. Apra But on arriving in Philadelphia and presenting his memorial to Congress he was favorably received, was put in command of the troops there in place of Putnam, who had just been ordered to Peekskill, his accounts May is were speedily settled, and the Board of War made a re- 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 136. 2 Sparks, IV, 355. 8 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 202. * Ibid., VII, 180. 6 Sparks, III, 243, 535-540; Irving, 217. 6 Sparks, Letters, I, 109, 287. 7 Sparks, III, 191,209,243. THE HUDSON 99 port recommending that he be directed to take command 1777 of the Northern Department, and that Gates be offered his choice of resuming the duties of adjutant-general or of serving under Schuyler. 1 Congress adopted the first part of the report, passed a resolution defining the limits May 22 of the Northern Department (including Ticonderoga), assigning Schuyler to the command of it, and repealing the resolution adopted two years before by which his head-quarters were established at Albany. 2 Gates did not accept either of the appointments sug- gested by the Board of War. He was unwilling to serve under Schuyler, and obtained leave to withdraw from j U ne9 the Northern Department, and proceeded to Philadelphia, jui y 8 where he continued his intrigues with Congress until that body passed a resolution directing him "to repair to head-quarters and follow the directions of General Wash- April 1 ington." St. Clair, meanwhile, had been selected for Apm 29 service at Ticonderoga and directed to proceed there forthwith. After the loss of Ticonderoga (as related hereafter), Schuyler again fell under the ban of Congress, and a reso- lution was passed directing him to report at head-quarters, Aug. 1 and Washington to select another officer to command his department. Simultaneously the New England delega- tion, headed by John and Samuel Adams, sent a letter to Washington extolling the merits of Gates and asking that he be appointed in Schuyler's place. But Washing- ton wrote to Congress asking to be excused from making the appointment and suggesting that Congress make its own selection. Congress then, "by the vote of eleven Aug. 4 States," elected Gates "to command the Northern army." Aug. 19 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 300, 336, 349, 364. 2 Ibid., VIII, 375. 100 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 He arrived at the mouth of the Mohawk three days after the victorious battle of Bennington and relieved Schuyler of his command. 1 These events have been related in detail because they were so scandalous, and had such an important relation to the military operations in the North, to the effort to displace Washington during the following winter, and to the subsequent appointment of Gates to command the Southern army — where his career came to an inglorious end. schuyier's The force which Schuyler had at his disposal to oppose the advance of Burgoyne against Ticonderoga and St. Leger against Stanwix was very small. St. Clair, who commanded at Ticonderoga, had 2,546 2 Continentals and 900 militia. Outside of this, there were only small de- tachments of militia at Skenesborough (now Whitehall), Fort Ann, Fort Edward and Albany. May a Burgoyne had arrived at Quebec as soon as the ice was Burgoyne out of the St. Lawrence. Sir Guy Carleton, the Governor of Canada, although practically superseded by Burgoyne, rendered him every assistance. Burgoyne went on to Montreal and there found his troops, an enormous train of siege artillery (in addition to that previously men- tioned) and an ample fleet to convey his force across June 20 Lake Champlain. 1 Everything was speedily assembled June 27 at Cumberland Point (Plattsburg), and a week later he landed at Crown Point. 3 Topography at Ticonderoga played such an important part in the French and Indian wars, the Revolution and the War of 1812, and will have such an essential part should we ever, unfortunately, be again involved in hostilities with 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VIII, 540; VII, 217; VIII, 596, 604; Sparks, V. 14. 3 Carrington, 311; Dawson, 231. * Burgoyne, 9-11. THE HUDSON 101 Great Britain or Canada, that it may be well to describe 1777 somewhat in detail the topographical features which create such importance. From Montreal to New York the distance (by rail) is 384 miles; and paralleling the rail and other roads is a navigable water route for the greater part of the distance — 149 miles from New York to Troy and 147 miles from Whitehall to St. Johns. Between Troy and Whitehall, the valley of the Hudson is followed for 49 miles to Fort Edward ; thence to White- hall, 22 miles, there are two low valleys (through which the Champlain canal has been constructed), the one lead- ing out of the Hudson and the other into Lake Cham- plain at Whitehall; and the highest point of the land between them is only 147 feet above sea level. This long, narrow depression, between the St. Law- rence and Sandy Hook, is flanked (in its northern half) by mountains rising to a height of 2,500 feet or more — the Green Mountains of Vermont on the east and the Adiron- dacks on the west. It has been a natural highway for the early explorers, for the Indians, for military opera- tions and for commerce; it has rare scenic beauty. For more than 20 miles at its southern end, Lake Champlain has a width of half a mile or less, and lofty, rugged hills rise on either side from the water's edge. Then, as it widens and comes into a more open country, it passes between two mountains, Mount Independence on the east and Mount Defiance on the west, which over- look the country for a long distance to the north ; and at this same point it meets the outlet of Lake George, which discharges its water through a narrow gorge about 3 miles long, in which there is a drop of about 220 feet. The surrounding hills are now and always have been densely wooded. 102 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 Previous Operations at Ticonderoga St. Clair's Garrison Through this gateway the Colonial militia attempted, without success, to force their way in their first encounter with the French in 1690. The French then built a stone fort on the point at the edge of the lake, just north of Mount Defiance and Mount Independence, which they named Fort Carillon. In 1758 Montcalm and Levis sup- plemented this by intrenchments of wood and earth, with entanglements of felled timber in front. Against these Abercrombey hurled 15,000 men in a murderous assault, losing nearly 2,000 — the bloodiest battle ever fought on this continent prior to the Civil War. In the following year Amherst attacked it in a more rational manner, by siege operations; and the French, being largely outnum- bered, blew up the stone fort and abandoned it. The English partially rebuilt the ruin and named it Fort Ticonderoga. They maintained a garrison there until it was taken by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold in 1775, as we have seen. It was the starting-point of Mont- gomery's expedition to Quebec in that year, and the rally- ing-point of Sullivan's retreat in the following year. During the winter and spring its works had been some- what strengthened and new works had been built on Mount Independence. To man them properly a garrison of 10,000 men was required. St. Clair was authorized to call on the neighboring States for militia, and could have raised them if he had had provisions. 1 But his sup- plies were insufficient for the men he had; and Burgoyne's advance thus found him with a garrison of barely 3,500 of whom one-third were militia. They were posted partly at Fort Ticonderoga and partly in the trenches and works on the sides and summit of Mount Independence. A bridge had been built across 1 St. Clair's narrative, 240-250. S German Auxiliaries under Otlt. con Hkdetel TlCONDEROGA July 6, 1777 Attack, of Americans upon British Advance Corps B - Detachment under Earl of Balcarres C - American Position after Gen. Riedesel arrived D • British Position after the action E - House in which wounded were cared for q as American Forces c=3 ■■ British Forces fS3 Oi German Auxiliaries HUBBARDTOWN July 7, 1777 Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Bennington Aug. 16, 1777 THE HUDSON 103 the lake at this point. The commanding hills of Mount 1777 Hope, on the north-west, and Mount Defiance, on the south-west, were not occupied, because the force was insufficient and because Mount Defiance was believed to be inaccessible. Burgoyne's journal l shows that after remaining three Burgoyne-s days at Crown Point, to bring up the rear of his army, he advanced in two columns; Fraser's brigade, of about June 3,000 men and 10 guns, on the west side of the lake, and a Hessian detachment on the east; with the main army behind them on both shores and on frigates and gun-boats in the lake. Two days later, Phillips's brigade seized Mount Hope, which commanded the outlet of Lake George, and thus cut off St. Clair from all communica- tion in that direction. 2 The artillery was then landed j u iy2 and a reconnoissance was made to the top of Mount Defiance, which was found not to be inaccessible. The British dragged their artillery to its summit, which com- manded within easy range the fortifications not only at Ticonderoga but also at Mount Independence. As soon as these guns were discovered St. Clair called a council of war 3 of his principal officers, and they unanimously juiy 5 decided that the position was untenable, that Ticonderoga should be evacuated that night, taking the cannon and stores to Mount Independence if possible, and that an immediate retreat should be made from Mount Inde- Evacuation of pendence to Skenesborough (Whitehall). The heavy ar- tillery — 128 pieces — was abandoned; a few lighter pieces with some provisions and stores were placed on boats with Long's regiment and sent up the lake to Skenes- borough, while the rest of the force, under St. Clair, un- 1 Burgoyne, 11, Appendix XXV. 2 Ibid., XXVII. 3 Dawson, 231. 104 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 July 6 July 7 Battle of Hubbard ton Engagement at Skenes- borough July 6 dertook to march to the same point, following a cir- cuitous route of about 45 miles through Hubbardton and Castleton, there being no road through the rough country adjacent to the lake. St. Clair reached Castle- ton the next evening, but the rear guard, consisting of Warner's and Francis's regiments, with the stragglers and infirm — about 1,200 men in all — was then about six miles behind, at Hubbardton. 1 Here they were over- taken in the morning by Fraser's brigade, which had marched nearly all night. He made a most vigorous attack, and was soon reinforced by the advance guard of the Hessians under Riedesel. 2 Warner was defeated, Francis was killed, their retreat to Castleton was cut off, and their men dispersed through the mountains to the eastward. 3 Their losses were never accurately known. Burgoyne claimed that 200 dead were left on the field and 600 wounded; 4 Gordon says the total loss was 324, but does not give his authority. He gives the British loss as 20 officers and 183 killed and wounded. 5 Meanwhile, Burgoyne in person had pursued Long up the lake. As soon as the retreat was discovered the naval vessels had pushed forward and cut a passage through the bridge, and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon, Burgoyne, with two frigates and several gun-boats, carrying three regiments of infantry, arrived in the vicinity of Skenesbor- ough. 6 The Americans were in a stockaded fort; the British regiments landed and climbed the adjacent hills with the intention of getting in rear of the fort and cutting 1 St. Clair's Report, Dawson, 229. 2 Burgoyne, Appendix XXX; Riedesel, I, 363. 3 St. Clair's Report, Dawson, 229. * Burgoyne's Report, Dawson, 234 ; Riedesel, I, 363. e Gordon, II, 484; Riedesel, I, 363; Burgoyne, Appendix XXXIII. e Burgoyne, Appendix XXX; Riedesel, I, 362. THE HUDSON 105 off the retreat. But before this could be accomplished 1777 the fort and the boats near by in the river were set on fire, and Long and his men hastily retreated up the valley of Wood Creek to Fort Ann. Here he was overtaken the Engagement next morning by the 9th British Regiment, with the July 7 two other regiments of Phillips's brigade only a short distance back. Long attacked the 9th Regiment and a sharp engagement took place, but when the two other regiments came up he was forced to retire. After setting fire to Fort Ann he retreated to Fort Edward. Hearing that Skenesborough was occupied, St. Clair was forced to retreat from Castleton eastward to Rutland, and after a painful and circuitous march of seven days he joined Schuyler at Fort Edward. The remnants of jm y i2 Warner's men remained in the vicinity of Rutland. 1 Burgoyne's campaign thus began with a brilliant vic- tory. The loss of Ticonderoga created consternation in Congress and throughout the Colonies. Washington was then in the vicinity of Ramapo, baffled by conflicting reports of Howe's movements, and heard the news by successive reports received from Schuyler at Fort Ed- ward. He immediately bent every energy to reinforce Schuyler. He sent Morgan's Virginia riflemen from his own army, and directed Putnam to send him two brigades (Nixon's and Glover's); he also ordered Arnold to join Reinforce- him; he sent Lincoln to organize and command the New schuyier England militia; and he wrote the most urgent letters to the governors of New York and the New England States, telling them how critical the situation was, and calling upon them to use every effort to fill up their Con- tinental regiments and to call out the militia. 2 As a 1 St. Clair's Report, Dawson, 230. 3 Sparks, IV, 476, 480, 484, 500; V, 17. 106 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 result of these measures, reinforcements kept arriving on the upper Hudson during July, August and September, until at the time of Burgoyne's capitulation Gates's morning return showed 13 brigades of infantry besides artillery and cavalry, with a total strength of 1,698 officers and 18,624 men, of whom 14,914 were present for duty. 1 The other part of Burgoyne's plan — the expedition under St. Leger from Oswego — met with complete dis- st. Leger aster. The route via Oswego and Oneida Rivers, Oneida Lake, Wood Creek and the Mohawk Valley had also been followed in the earlier French and Indian wars; and a stockaded fort had been built at the portage be- tween Wood Creek and Mohawk River, near the present city of Rome, and called Fort Stanwix. 2 It was more or less in ruins in the spring of 1777, and Schuyler sent April Colonel Gansevoort of the 3d New York Regiment to take command. He put the works in as good a condition May 28 as possible, and renamed the place Fort Schuyler. He was soon joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Willett and the juiy 15 rest of his regiment. 3 St. Leger arrived at Oswego and began organizing his expedition. News of this reached General Herkimer, who commanded the militia in Tryon County, and he issued a call for every able-bodied man in the county. They assembled, to the number of about 800, at Fort Dayton, now the village of Herkimer. 4 Thence they Aug. 4 marched to the relief of Fort Schuyler, 30 miles to the westward, before which St. Leger had appeared on the Aug. 3 previous day. News of their approach reached St. Leger, 1 Printed in Burgoyne's narrative, Appendix CIV. 2 Arnold, 141. 3 Ibid., 149. 4 Arnold, 149; Burgoyne, Appendix LXXVIII. 6 A. m. to 2 P.M. THE HUDSON 107 and he sent all his Indians, under Brant, and a part of his 1777 loyalist militia to ambuscade Herkimer near Oriskany, about 5 miles east of Fort Schuyler. Here the road, on which Herkimer was advancing, crossed a deep ravine, at the bottom of which was a marsh and causeway. Just as Herkimer's force had passed over the causeway Aug. 6 and was climbing the western slope of the ravine, 1 with their wagons still on the causeway, the Indians sur- rounded them and attacked with great fury. Herkimer Battle ot was wounded almost at the first fire, but he caused him- self to be propped up against a tree, lighted his pipe and directed the battle for eight hours. 2 It was a bushwhack- ing fight at close quarters, and the Tryon County militia were as expert in that kind of fighting as the Indians themselves; moreover, they personally knew the tory militia opposed to them, and fiercely hated them. 3 No quarter was asked or given, and the losses were out of all proportion to the numbers engaged. During the morning three messengers from Herkimer, ha.m sent to advise the garrison of his approach, succeeded in reaching Fort Schuyler. Lieutenant-Colonel Willett, with 250 men, was immediately ordered to make a sortie, which was completely successful, the tory and Indian camps being both captured, with a large amount of sup- plies and all of St. Leger's and Johnson's papers. The Indians fled to the woods. When news of this reached the ambuscading party an hour or so later, the Indians there also fled, leaving Herkimer and his militia in pos- session of the field. 4 1 The spot is marked by a large monument just south of the New York Central tracks, 225 miles from New York City. 'Arnold, 151; Lossing, I, 246. 3 Dawson, 242. 1 Arnold, 152. 108 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 Siege of Fort Schuyler Aug. 12 Aug. 21 Auk. 22 Defeat of St. Leger Notwithstanding this success, the siege was not yet abandoned. Herkimer was carried back to his home and died of his wounds. About one-third of his militia had been killed and wounded, and the rest soon retired to Fort Dayton (Herkimer). St. Leger gathered together his tories and Indians and his 200 regulars, and closely invested Gansevoort in Fort Schuyler. Willett was then sent to ask aid from Schuyler. With one companion he succeeded in making his way through St. Leger's line and reached Schuyler, then at Stillwater. Schuyler called the usual council of war and explained the importance of relieving Fort Schuyler. To his astonishment there were mutterings accusing him of cowardice and treason, and intimating that he was planning this move in order to give Burgoyne an opportunity to enter Albany unop- posed. Schuyler then called for a brigadier to lead the relieving party, and Arnold, although a major-general and second in command, instantly volunteered. With 800 men, all of whom had volunteered for the ser- vice, he began his march the following day, and soon reached Fort Dayton. From this point he contrived to send men into St. Leger's camp carrying exaggerated statements of his strength, and was preparing to follow them and attack St. Leger, when the Indians, alarmed at these reports and discouraged by the losses at Oriskany and the sortie, became mutinous and deserted in a body. The next day St. Leger raised the siege, and with his regulars and the few tories who still remained with him, retreated hastily to Oswego, and later to Montreal. 2 Thus ended St. Leger's expedition. While these events were in progress others of equal importance to the success of the Americans were trans- 2 Arnold, 153-162; Dawson, 247; Lossing, I, 243-252. THE HUDSON 109 piring near the upper Hudson. After the battle of 1777 Hubbardton and the engagements at Skenesborough and July 7 Fort Ann, Burgoyne assembled his entire force at Skenes- Juiy 6 borough and prepared to advance to the Hudson at Fort July 8 Edward. 1 He decided to use all his boats to bring his supplies via Lake George, but to march his men by the direct route through the wilderness of Wood Creek. Although the distance was only 22 miles, a road had to be cut for nearly the entire distance, and the obstructions which Schuyler's axemen had created had to be removed. Thus 20 days were consumed in the operation. At the end of that time Burgoyne arrived at Fort Edward, and on the same day Phillips took possession of Fort George, j u i y 29 at the head of Lake George. Fort George then became Burgoyne's secondary base of supplies, but although the Burgoyne distance to Fort Edward was only 15 miles, the country Edward 01 was so broken and heavily wooded, and the transportation so poor, that it was with great difficulty that his army could be supplied. 2 Schuyler's reinforcements had hardly yet begun to schuyier t 1 • /• situation. But instead 1777 of doing so he wrote to Burgoyne a trifling letter, 2 sent oct. s Vaughan up the river on a marauding expedition as far Oct. 13 as Kingston, which was burned, and then returned with cnnton to his entire force to New York. He attempted to justify Dec 8 °i6 ne ' his action on the ground that he could not take any 1 Reports of Governor Clinton, Sir Henry Clinton and Putnam, Dawson, 341-346; Sparks, V, 88, 91, 471^76. 3 P. 118, ante. Courtesy of The Burrows Biothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Bemis Heights Oct. 7, 1777 THE HUDSON 123 chances at New York. The excuse was not sufficient, 1777 for he had 8,500 men, and there was no enemy nearer than Putnam, whom he had driven away from Peekskill, and Washington, who was in front of Philadelphia con- fronted by a superior force under Howe. Clinton ac- knowledges that he understood from Captains Campbell and Scott how desperate Burgoyne's situation was. That under these circumstances he was so concerned about the safety of New York can only be explained on the theory that Washington's wonderful exploit at Tren- ton and Princeton in the preceding winter had made Clin- ton attribute to Washington almost supernatural powers. Burgoyne's situation was indeed desperate. He had Burgoyne-* written to Clinton that he could hold out until the 12th. situation. Oct On the 3d he put his men on half rations, and on the 7th, still hearing nothing from Clinton, he determined to at- tack; but his advance was made in a half-hearted fashion, for the purpose, as he said in his report to Germain, of discovering "whether there were any possible means of forcing a passage, should it be necessary to advance, or dislodging him, for the convenience of a retreat." 1 Hav- ing started the battle, he lost control of it, and Arnold fell upon him with fury, inflicting a terrible defeat. Leaving the greater part of his force in the intrench- Battle of ments which he had constructed on the north and east Heights sides of Mill Creek, Burgoyne in person took 1,500 regulars Oct. 7 and six pieces of artillery, and attempted to go around the 11 a. m. head of Mill Creek ravine and attack the American left. His movement was detected, and before he reached the American lines Gates had sent Morgan's riflemen to attack his right, and a strong force consisting of Poor's brigade, two New York regiments and the Connecticut militia to 1 Burgoyne, LXXXIX. 124 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 assail his left. Severe fighting was the immediate result ; 2 p.m. Fraser was mortally wounded, and Burgoyne, abandon- ing his artillery, was driven back across the ravine and into his lines. Arnold, although deprived of all com- mand, had gone into the fight with his troops, leading them and inspiring them. Finally he took entire charge, brought up all the troops he had lately commanded and, himself in the van, hurled them against the lines held by Earl Balcarras in the centre, and later against a strong redoubt held by Breyman on the extreme right of the British lines. The fighting continued throughout the autumn afternoon. Balcarras made a successful defence ; but Breyman was killed, a large part of his men were taken and his works captured just before sunset. Arnold was wounded as he entered the redoubt. Burgoyne's Night put an end to the fighting, which had resulted in a loss on the American side of only 150 men, whereas the British had lost about 600. There was no question of Burgoyne's defeat, and during the night he abandoned his lines and part of his tents and provisions, retreated about a mile across a creek to the north of Mill Creek and took refuge in three redoubts overlooking the Hudson which he had previously constructed. 1 Gates did not appear on the field, but remained in his tent, spending a good part of the day in discussing the merits of the Revolution with Burgoyne's aide who had been wounded and captured. Oct. 8 The next day there was skirmishing in front of these redoubts, while three columns in succession were sent past his right flank to capture the fords of the Hudson in his rear. Detecting these movements during the after- 9 p.m. noon, he abandoned his hospital and wounded and re- 1 Burgoyne, XC-XCII; Arnold, 196-211; Dawson, 301, 307. THE HUDSON 125 treated five miles to Saratoga (Schuylerville), where on 1777 the second morning he assembled his men and began the Oct. 10 construction of new lines on the heights above Fish Creek. Gates followed him and soon completely sur- Oct. 11 rounded him, the main body of the Americans on the south of Fish Creek, Poor's and Learned's brigades and Morgan's riflemen on the west of the British camp, Fellow's brigade on the heights across the Hudson and Stark in Burgoyne's rear at Fort Edward. Burgoyne then called a council of war, himself, Oct. 12 Phillips, Riedesel and Hamilton, and submitted five pos- sible movements to his associates; but the only one that was seriously considered was a prompt retreat to Fort Edward. To accomplish this a start of four miles, un- observed, was deemed essential. Scouts were sent out, and on their return reported that the army was so sur- rounded that it would be impossible for it to march without being immediately discovered. Burgoyne then called a second council of war, "con- Oct. 13 sisting of all the general officers and field officers and cap- tains commanding corps," and asked them whether an army was justified "in capitulating in any possible situ- Negotiations ation," and whether "the present situation is of that nature." Both questions were unanimously answered in the affirmative. An officer was then sent to Gates with a letter from Burgoyne asking a "cessation of arms" Oct. 14 long enough to enable Burgoyne to state the terms "by which in any extremity he and his army mean to abide." Gates replied, naming his own terms, and granting a cessation of arms until sunset. The sixth article re- quired Burgoyne's army to be paraded in their camps, ground their arms and be marched to the riverside on their way to Bennington. The council was reassembled 126 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 and unanimously rejected this article. An officer was sent back and at sunset delivered this ultimatum to Gates: "If General Gates does not mean to recede from the 6th article, the treaty ends at once. . . . The cessa- tion of arms ends this evening." He also delivered the terms which Burgoyne was willing to accept. To the Oct. 15 surprise of every one, the next morning Gates sent an officer to Burgoyne, practically accepting the latter's terms, but stipulating that the conquered army should leave its position at 2 o'clock on that day. Gates had, in fact, just learned of the capture of Fort Montgomery and Fort Clinton and the advance of Vaughan up the Hudson. He was disposed to take the best terms he could get. But the stipulation about moving before 2 o'clock made Burgoyne suspicious. He determined to gain time, and appointed commissioners to arrange terms. Their negotiations continued until 11 p. m., at which hour the articles were agreed upon, the British commissioners giving their word that they would be Oct. is signed by Burgoyne. But when they returned to their camp at midnight Burgoyne had just learned from a deserter that Fort Montgomery had been captured and that part of Clinton's army had reached Kingston. Bur- goyne thereupon called his council together again and asked whether it was honorable to withdraw from a treaty definitely agreed upon by authorized commission- ers; fourteen officers thought it was dishonorable and eight that it was not. Burgoyne refused to be bound by their decision, and agreed with the minority. 1 He then asked 1 The minutes of the council are given in Burgoyne's narrative, Appen- dix, pp. cii to cv. General Riedesel also wrote out, on September 18, his memorandum of the negotiations. Riedesel's Memoirs, pp. 175-184. Stedman (I, 385-392) gives verbatim the letters that were exchanged between Gates and Burgoyne. Camp ohfti-HUh Forces under "SW^cfcPv ^V/J-3 British three gun batteries JS 2 " four mortar battery lj> 4 Redoubts to cover batteries 5 Lines of approach Fort Schuyler Aug. 3-22, 1777 Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Forts Montgomery and Clinton Oct. 6, 1777 Surrender of Burgoyne Oct. 17, 1777 THE HUDSON 127 whether the army would defend their position to the last 1777 extremity. On this the opinions were conflicting, the majority inclining to the opinion that they would not. In order to gain more time, Burgoyne sent word to Gates early in the morning that he had heard that some of the American army had been sent to Albany, and in order to assure himself that he was surrounded by a force three or four times as numerous as his own, he wished to send one of his own officers to examine his force. This was more than Gates would stand, and he replied declining his re- quest, saying that he would show his army after the con- vention was signed, warning Burgoyne of the consequences of refusing to sign the articles agreed upon by authorized commissioners, and telling him if they were not signed "Articles of ... , . . Convention" within an hour he would resort to extreme measures, signed Another council was then summoned, and, although opin- ions were still divided, Burgoyne decided to yield. He signed the articles 1 and sent them to Gates, who signed them in turn. The British and Hessians marched out of their camp oct. 17 the following afternoon, laid down their arms and then marched through the American camp, where the troops were paraded under arms and then on toward Albany. The return, drawn up that day, showed 341 officers, 586 strength of -v. . the Surren- non-commissioned officers and 4,836 privates, a total of dered Army 5,763. 2 Burgoyne gives a detailed statement of his total losses during the campaign, amounting (among the regu- lars, exclusive of Canadians and Indians) to 415 killed, 911 wounded and 1,169 prisoners, a total of 2,495. 3 The garrison of Ticonderoga and Crown Point escaped 1 The original document is in the possession of the New York Historical Society. 2 Dawson, 300. 3 Burgoyne, LI. 128 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 to Montreal. The Hudson was free down to Spuyten Duyvil. Ten times has the United States army received the capitulation of the armed force opposed to it, viz.: at Saratoga, Yorktown, Vera Cruz, City of Mexico, Donel- son, Vicksburg, Appomattox, Durham's Station, Santiago and Manila. Saratoga was the first, and it gave rise to an unfortunate controversy which was not the case in any of the others. In his first proposals Gates stipulated that Burgoyne's army "can only be allowed to surrender [as] prisoners of war." But later he agreed to a " Con- vention" instead of a " Capitulation," and its thirteen articles said nothing of prisoners of war. The essence of the convention was that all the troops, of whatever coun- try, under Burgoyne's command were "to march out of their camp, with the honors of war," and lay down their arms "by word of command of their own officers"; were then to march to Boston, and as soon as Howe should send transports to receive them, were to sail to England, "on condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest," unless they or any part of them should be exchanged by cartel. 1 As a matter of fact they were never sent to England, but were kept at Boston for a year, then sent to Charlottesville, Va., and after that to Lancaster, Pa., and other places. Mean- while each side charged the other with bad faith and a breach of the convention. The real trouble was that under the convention it was possible to send Burgoyne's army back to England for garrison duty, releasing fresh troops for service in Amer- oct. 20 ica. Burgoyne wrote a private letter to Germain, three 'The convention in full is printed in Dawson, 303, 304; Riedesel, I, 184-186. Controversy about the "Convention Troops" THE HUDSON 129 days after the surrender, calling attention to this possi- 1777 bility, and claiming great credit for " saving the army." l Nov. 5 Gates seems not to have seen this point, but Washington's Nov. 13 clear mind saw it the moment he read the document, and he wrote to Heath, 2 who commanded at Boston, pointing it out to him, and requiring him to insist on a rigid com- pliance by Burgoyne with his part of the terms. Howe did not like to send his ships so far away from New York, and presently he asked to have the point of em- barkation changed to Newport; but Washington refused to make any change. 3 If Howe could send his ships to Boston, and spare them for the long voyage to England, well and good; but there should be no change whatever Dec. 17 in the terms. The matter presently came up in Congress, and that body resolved that the embarkation should not take place until the convention was explicitly ratified by the court of Great Britain. It charged that Burgoyne 1773 had not surrendered all his "arms," because he had re- Jan. s tained or concealed his cartridge-boxes and colors, and Riedesel admits that he took the colors off their staffs, burned the latter and put the colors in his trunks. 4 Howe complained that the prisoners were suffering for food and shelter, and Congress insisted that the British should pay for the provisions, and in gold at that, not in Continental currency. 5 It was an unseemly controversy and many of the posi- tions taken by Congress were not tenable ; but it all arose from the trick by which Burgoyne tried to outwit Gates by a surrender which would result in bringing an equal number of fresh troops from England as fast as ships 1 Burgoyne, XCVII. 3 Sparks, V, 144. 3 Ibid., V, 234, 535-538. 4 Madame Riedesel's Memoirs, 161 * Jour. Cont. Cong., IX, 1032; X, 35. 130 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 could cross the ocean and back. The controversy dragged on for nearly four years, Burgoyne meanwhile going to England on parole, and taking his seat in Parliament where he defended before a committee his conduct while in America. More than four years after the surrender, in Dec. 17. nsi a debate in the House of Commons on the American war, he complained that he was still a prisoner of war. 1 Dur- ing all these four years the subject of " convention troops" was in controversy both in and out of Congress. Finally Congress turned the whole matter over to Washington. 2 In the meantime most of the officers and a large part of the men had been gradually exchanged; and others, par- ticularly the Germans, were allowed to escape and settle in America, where they permanently remained, but some of them were still prisoners when peace came in 1783. 3 The surrender of Burgoyne was of signal advantage to the American cause. It hastened the French alliance; it left the Hudson permanently in American control ; it put out of action more than one-fourth of the King's forces in America. It has been sufficiently pointed out that Burgoyne's plan, which he persuaded the King and the ministry to adopt, although the latter failed to advise Howe of his part in it, was inherently wrong and inevi- tably doomed to failure. With the means of transporta- tion then existing an army could not operate in a hostile country when separated from its base of supplies by 180 miles of wilderness. Even if Howe had carried out the part originally assigned to him, the British disaster might have been greater than it was; for, remembering what Washington accomplished at Trenton and at Yorktown, 1 Hansard, Pari. Hist, of England, XXII, 862. 2 Jour. Cong., Ill, 46, 218. 8 Sparks, VI, 257; Riedesel, II, 175. THE HUDSON 131 it is quite possible that in the event of Howe going up ms the Hudson to join Burgoyne, Washington might have taken New York, cut Howe off from his ocean base and captured his army as well as Burgoyne's. The plan which offered the greatest chance of success in the spring of 1777 was the one that King George " greatly disliked" * and that Washington, with clear military insight, antici- pated and dreaded, viz. : to bring every man in America to New York, and with this overwhelming force to crush Washington. Could his army have been destroyed or scattered, the conquest of the Hudson and the separa- tion of New England from the Middle States would have been an easy task. 1 P. 78, ante. CHAPTER V THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 1 1778 The site of the encampment at Valley Forge is now an Military historical park owned by the State of Pennsylvania. of the position The house occupied by Washington and the other stone houses in the vicinity are in substantially the same con- dition as they were during the terrible winter of 1777- 78; the lines of intrenchments and the redoubts in or adjacent to the works can still be distinctly traced. 2 They follow the contour of wooded hills, which rise at their highest point to an altitude of 354 feet above the waters of the Schuylkill on the north and Valley Creek on the west. To the eastward the hills slope gently into an open country, to the north the slope is more abrupt and to the west it is precipitous. The length of the " inner line" of intrenchments was about a mile and a half, and they enclosed an irregular triangle of about 500 acres between Valley Creek and the Schuylkill. But a large part of the troops were encamped, or hutted, out- side of these lines for a distance of two miles to the east- ward. From these positions, in case of attack, the troops 1 The statue of Rochambeau in Lafayette Square, Washington, was unveiled in 1902; and in connection therewith Congress has published an elaborate memoir, edited by George de B. Keim, under the title of Rocham- beau, which contains much original data, not hitherto available, concern- ing the French troops and ships. 2 See Annual Report Valley Forge Park Commission, 1906. 132 Valley Forge Dec. 19, 1777-June 17, 177J Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Philadelphia Evacuated June 18, 1778 THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 133 could quickly retire within the main lines behind which 1778 a very strong defence could be made. The distance, following the windings of the Schuylkill, from the mouth of Valley Creek to the Middle Ferry (now Market Street bridge in Philadelphia) was twenty-one miles; and by road, from Washington's outposts at Port Kennedy (at the mouth of Trout Creek) to those of Howe at Germantown, it was about sixteen miles. In this position, easily defensible, with a rich and long- settled agricultural region at his back from which to ob- tain supplies, and in which were already the crude begin- nings of what is now the great mineral and manufacturing district of Reading, Washington was on Howe's flank as he had been the previous winter at Morristown, and was prepared quickly to follow Howe should he make any move. The American army remained at Valley Forge just six Dec. 19, 1777, months — months of intense anxiety for the commander- mlO* in-chief and of terrible suffering for his men. It was destitute of shoes, clothing and provisions; it was not properly organized; it was deficient in knowledge of drill and manoeuvres; it had no proper system of account- Principal ability; its regiments and battalions were mere skele- tons and recruits were not forthcoming to fill them up. 1 While Washington was working with all his energy to remedy these defects the wretched Conway Cabal was equally active in contemptible intrigues with Congress, the purpose of which was to displace Washington and substitute Gates as commander-in-chief. These were also months of great events in Europe; the 1 The terrible winter at Valley Forge has been described in every history of the Revolution. Perhaps the most vivid picture of it is that given in Trevelyan, III, 294-302. 134 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 Feb. 6 March April Feb. 8 March 8 March 21 Dec. 22 Dec. 23 Conway Cabal conclusion of the French alliance; the adoption by the British ministry and King of measures offering to the Colonies everything they had asked for except indepen- dence ; the despatch of commissioners to treat with Con- gress for peace on these terms; the resignation of Howe and the appointment of Sir Henry Clinton in his place; and the sending of instructions 1 to Clinton that "the war must be conducted on a different plan," the offensive to be abandoned, part of his force to be sent to the West Indies to attack the French at St. Lucia, part to Florida to retain the British possessions there, part to harry the New England coast towns, Philadelphia to be evacuated, everything to be concentrated at New York, and if in danger there — scuttle for Halifax. 2 The campaign of 1777 marked the end of all active operations by the British in the Northern States. The war was to last five years longer, but the British strength was to be frittered away in disjointed movements at great distance from each other; and although the force at New York was to be maintained at a strength always at least fifty per cent greater than the Continentals under Washington, it was to remain all those years strictly on the defensive. At the beginning of the winter Washington wrote to Congress 3 two letters which conveyed a most graphic picture of his starving and naked army. Congress ap- pointed a committee 4 to go to Valley Forge; it remained there for several months, and in concert with it Washing- ton formulated plans for overcoming the defects above enumerated. As to the Conway Cabal, it was a contest of pygmies against a giant. Washington shattered and 1 Sparks, V, 395, 548-551. 3 Ibid., V, 192-203. 2 Germain to Clinton, Sparks V, 550. 4 Jour. Cont. Cong., IX, 1052. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 135 destroyed it by the sheer force of his lofty character and ms great services. Gates, indeed, had strength enough to secure his appointment two years later to the command of the Southern army, where, having no Arnold to lead his troops as at Saratoga, he speedily proved, to the com- plete satisfaction of all concerned, his shallowness and incapacity. But Mifflin, Conway and the rest were more quickly disposed of; Mifflin being without military em- ployment for nearly a year, then resigning and going to Congress where he had no influence; Conway, wounded in a duel, resigning his commission in the army, writing an abject apology to Washington and finally returning to Europe and disappearing forever from public view. 1 No one ever ventured again to dispute the fact that Washington was the one indispensable man for the suc- cess of the Revolution, or to suggest any other name for the position of commander-in-chief. As to the more distinctly military problems at Valley Forge, Washington solved them one by one, so that when the army moved in June it was in a condition of military efficiency which it had never before approached. The most pressing questions were food and clothing. The country was not deficient in either, and the responsibil- ity for the destitute condition of the army was partly due to the unwise action of Congress and partly to the hopeless inefficiency of the quartermaster's department. The delegates in Congress, seldom more than twenty-five 1777 present, were very jealous of a standing army, but they did not hesitate to pass the most despotic resolutions. 2 sept. 17 Among others they ordered Washington "to take, wher- Nov - 14 ever he may be, all such provisions and other articles Dec - 10 1 Sparks, V, 517. J Ibid., V, 187, 406. 136 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1777 Greene Ap- pointed Quartermaster- General March 23 1778 Washington to Greene, August 15, 1780 as may be necessary for the comfortable subsistence of the army under his command, paying or giving certifi- cates for the same"; 1 but it made no adequate provision for paying the certificates. To enforce this impressment with the utmost rigor was to deprive the army of the sup- port of the people. Washington exercised the despotic powers conferred upon him by this and previous resolu- tions with great prudence and much less vigorously than Congress demanded. 2 Such supplies as he did seize were never at the place wanted, for Mifflin, the quartermaster- general, had for six months practically abandoned the duties of his office, 3 and his department was in com- plete disorder. 4 In concert with the committee, Wash- ington prevailed upon Congress 5 to make better provi- sion for payment of the certificates; and jointly they persuaded Greene, much against his will, to perform the duties of quartermaster-general without vacating his position in the line. 6 Having accepted the task, he bent every energy to its successful accomplishment. Before the army moved in June he had established a line of depots or magazines of supplies in rear of the army from the Head of Elk to the North River, 7 and as Washington expressed it, "by extraordinary exertions you [he] so arranged it as to enable the army to take the field the moment it was necessary, and to move with rapidity after the enemy." 8 The deficiencies in drill, organization, discipline and 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VIII, 752; IX, 905, 1014. 2 Sparks, V, 187, 188. 3 G. W. Greene, II, 20, 43, 49. * Report of committee of Congress, February 12, 1778. Original is in handwriting of Joseph Reed; a complete copy is published in Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed, I, 360. 5 Jour. Cont. Cong., X, 210, 223, 224, 325. 6 Ibid., X, 210. 7 G. W. Greene, II, 57. 8 Sparks, VII, 153. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 137 accountability were overcome by the fortunate arrival of 1778 a thoroughly competent man, Steuben, who had served Feb. 23 at Prague and Rossbach and the other battles of the Seven Years' war, on the personal staff of the great Frederick, steuben He joined Washington as a volunteer, and later, when he inspector- . . c i • • i General had proved his entire competency for the position, he was appointed inspector-general of the army. 1 He in- May 27 troduced a definite plan (which Congress subsequently approved) of organization in the infantry, artillery, cav- alry and engineers; he devised a system of accounta- bility for public property which resulted in enormous saving; he taught the troops how to take care of their arms ; he gave them their first drill-book 2 and regulations for troops in active service; he personally drilled them until they could execute manoeuvres with creditable ex- actness. 3 It was to do these things that he had been selected and sent over by the French ministers. 4 In view of their plans to aid the American cause with men, munitions and money, they wished to improve the mili- tary efficiency of the American army. There was proba- bly not a man in the whole world more competent for this task than Steuben. In order to increase the strength of his army, Wash- ington succeeded, in spite of much insubordinate opposi- tion on the part of Gates and Putnam 5 in bringing to Washington ■n /-^ 1 to Putnam- Valley I orge the greater part 01 the Continentals that Nov. 19, 1777 had been at Saratoga. The militia, which had formed more than half of Gates's army, went home soon after 1 Kapp, Steuben, 52, 192-273; Sparks, V, 526, 529; Jour. Cont. Cong., XI, 465, 514, 538, 543, 550. 2 Kapp, Steuben, 200-214. s Ibid., 52, 192-273. 'Ibid., 68, 69; Sparks, V, 527. 6 Sparks, V, 125, 161, 162; Sparks, Letters, II, 536-544. 138 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 Recruits for the Army, Feb. 26, 1778 British Peace Commission the surrender. Moreover, these Continentals, like those already at Valley Forge, were depleted to a mere fraction of their normal strength. In order to fill up the ranks, Congress, which had hitherto "recommended" to the States to furnish their quota, now undertook to "require forthwith" the States to do this by means of a draft. 1 Effectually to carry out a draft required powers and ad- ministrative organization far beyond those possessed by the Congress under the Articles of Confederation; and it is probable that the personal appeals which Washing- ton made all through this winter and spring to the governors of States, Jonathan Trumbull in Connecti- cut, George Clinton in New York, Thomas Wharton in Pennsylvania, Patrick Henry 2 in Virginia, and others, had more effect than the resolutions of Congress, how- ever commanding their language might be. Between them all, however, a certain number of recruits were obtained. The committee of Congress led Washington to believe that the 104 battalions (16 Continental and 88 State "line") which existing laws then authorized would produce an army of 40,000 men for the year's campaign. 3 In fact they produced barely half that number. As for the British Peace Commission, headed by the Earl of Carlisle, which arrived at Philadelphia, it was two years too late. The French alliance bound each country not to make peace without the consent of the other, nor without acknowledgment by Great Britain of the inde- pendence of the United States. 4 Congress refused to 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., X, 200. 2 Sparks, IV, 477; V, 9, 146, 239, 252. » Ibid., V, 314. ♦Treaty of Alliance, February 7, 1778. the United States, 308. Treaties and Conventions of THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 139 treat on any other terms, 1 and the mission was a ridicu- 1778 lous failure. The motives which induced France to make the Feb. 6 alliance cannot be discussed here. The signing of the treaty was due to the campaign of 1777, resulting in the capture of Burgoyne's army on the Hudson and to the fierce, if inconclusive, battles around Philadelphia. It French necessarily involved the prompt despatch to America of a considerable land and naval force by France. At the beginning of June, therefore, Clinton, who had May 11 relieved Howe in the command, began to make prepa- rations for evacuating Philadelphia. Washington was watching him like a hawk. As at Trenton, his service of information seems to have been remarkably efficient. Everything of importance that transpired in Philadelphia, either in the way of events or of plans under discussion, came to the knowledge of Washington within forty-eight hours or less. 2 At this time the British force in the United States strength of numbered 33,756; made up of 18,174 British regulars, Armies ° 11,007 Hessians and 4,575 Provincials; and they were stationed, 19,530 at Philadelphia, 10,456 at New York March 26 and 3,770 at Newport. 3 The American regular force, or "Continental line" and the State "lines," according to the returns which Washington laid before a council of war, were about 15,000, of whom 11,800 were at Valley Forge, 1,400 at Wilmington and 1,800 on the Hudson. Washington thought that he could get enough additional recruits to bring the entire force up to 20,000. At this 1 Jour. Conk Cong., XI, 701, 702. 2 Sparks, V, 377, 393, 409. 3 The returns of the British army, copied from the State Paper Office in London, at various periods from 1777 to 1782, are given in Sparks, Writings of Washington, V, 542-545. 140 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 council, after a long discussion, it was decided not to May 8 attack Philadelphia, but to wait events. 1 The army at Valley Forge was organized into four divisions under Greene, Stirling, Lafayette and Wayne. Lee, who had recently been exchanged, was again on duty as second in command. Steuben was inspector-general. May is With a view to watching the first move in the expected evacuation of Philadelphia, Washington threw out an advance guard between the Schuylkill and the Delaware. 2 It was composed of Lafayette's division, numbering about 2,100 men and 5 guns. They advanced to a hamlet known as Barren Hill, about 11 miles from Valley Forge and only 2 miles from Clinton's outposts at Chestnut Hill. In selecting Lafayette, who was not yet twenty- one years old, for this important duty, Washington doubt- less intended a compliment to France. But within forty- eight hours he was in mortal dread lest the outcome might be anything but pleasing to France. For, from the top of the high hill at Valley Forge, he saw, across the rolling ground between him and Barren Hill, the smoke of skirmishes and the dust of marching columns, which showed that the young marquis was in full retreat toward a ford on the Schuylkill and in imminent danger of being cut off. Clinton had, in fact, planned to capture Lafayette and came very near doing it. He had sent Grant with about 5,000 men via Whitemarsh to come in rear of Lafayette's skirmishat left, Grey with about 2,000 men to cross the Schuylkill and come behind Lafayette's right, while with a consider- able force under his own command he marched through Germantown and Chestnut Hill to attack Lafayette in 1 Sparks, V, 360. 2 Washington's instructions to Lafayette, Sparks, V, 368. Barren Hill THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 141 front. These movements were made during the night; 177s and early the next morning Lafayette was nearly sur- May 20 rounded by a force about five times greater than his own. He extricated himself from this dangerous situation with no little adroitness; 1 and although Grant was nearer to Matson's ford (now Conshohocken) than Lafayette was, the latter, by skilful feints of his rear guard against both Grant and Clinton, marched by the longer road (through Manatawna), got past the head of Grey's column and crossed Matson's ford (Conshohocken) in safety. He took a strong position on the heights on the south bank of the Schuylkill, while Washington assembled every man at Valley Forge to march to his assistance. Thanks to Steuben's drills, they were all under arms in fifteen minutes. But notwithstanding his enormous superiority in force, Clinton did not cross the ford nor attack. He retired almost immediately to Germantown; and Lafay- ette returned to Valley Forge. Clinton lost 2 men killed and 7 or 8 wounded, and Lafayette's losses were about the same. The foolish Mischianza in honor of Howe took place the May is same day that Lafayette moved to Barren Hill; and a May 25 week later Howe sailed for England. Clinton began loading his transports with his heavy baggage, and early in June several vessels had dropped down the river. Washington was fully informed of this; he was more than ever on the alert; frequent councils of war were held; and preparations were made to move promptly as soon as Clinton made any movement. 2 Finally, the transports being loaded with all they could Evacuation of , ,. , , , . , . Philadelphia carry, including some cavalry and the Anspach regiment, 1 Sparks, V, 377, 546; Irving's Washington, III, 407. 2 Sparks, V, 393, 395, 398, 403. 142 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 which it was feared would desert on the march, 1 Clinton June is, assembled his troops just south of Philadelphia, crossed the Delaware to Gloucester Point and marched out to iq a. m. Haddonfield, 5 miles. 2 Washington had information of this within a few hours; and early in the afternoon 6 brigades, 3 under Lee and 3 following under Wayne, had June i9, marched from Valley Forge. Washington with all the Marches from rest of his army marched at 5 o'clock the next morning. This was the first fruit of Greene's work as quartermaster and Steuben's as drill-master. Washington believed that Clinton would move to New Brunswick, cross the Raritan, then march to Amboy and cross the Kills to Staten Island. 2 Such was exactly Clinton's plan. It was therefore a race for New Bruns- wick, and a very pretty race it was. The distance was 58 miles from Philadelphia, 66 miles from Valley Forge. The roads were rather better on Washington's line of march; the weather was the same for both — intense heat (the thermometer exceeding 100° F. in the sun) alternating with violent showers. June 24 On the sixth day Clinton had advanced only 34 miles, and was in the vicinity of Allentown, 2 about 10 miles east of Trenton. Washington was squarely in front of him, 3 having marched 47 miles, crossing the Delaware at Coryell's ferry (Lambertville), 15 miles above Trenton; his main body was north and east of Princeton, and Max- well's brigade and the New Jersey militia were in contact with Clinton, 4 breaking down the bridges, blockading the roads and otherwise obstructing his march. Clinton therefore had to change his plan and make Sandy Hook instead of New Brunswick his objective. 1 Lowell, Hessians, 212. 2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 415. 3 Sparks, V, 409, 411, 416, 422^23. 4 Ibid., V, 423. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 143 He put all his baggage, wheeled vehicles and pack-horses ms under Knyphausen; and turning to the right at Allen- The Two town he sent them forward on the road which leads c™tSt m through Freehold village, or Monmouth Court House, to Sandy Hook. Hitherto he had been able to move his columns on parallel roads, but now he had only a single road, and his impedimenta stretched out for a length of 12 miles. The armed force with Knyphausen consisted of a regiment of cavalry, a battalion of light infantry, 2 brigades of British, 2 brigades of Hessians, and some Provincials. In spite of the heat and the deep sandy roads, Knyphausen reached Freehold — 19 miles — on the second morning. 1 Clinton followed him 2 with a regiment of cavalry, a battalion of light infantry, 3 battalions of June 26 grenadiers and 3 British brigades. He arrived at Free- hold the same afternoon. The whole force then rested a day in a fairly strong de- fensible position on both sides of Monmouth Court House, 2 June 27 their flanks protected by pine woods and their front by streams and morasses. Washington on the previous day was at Cranberry, 8 miles east and south of Princeton, with his main body; and his advance guard of nearly 4,000 men, under Lafay- ette, was on the Monmouth road about 5 miles in rear of Clinton, with orders to attack their rear guard. But as Lafayette was too far separated from the main body, Washington drew him off to the north toward English- town, 6 miles west of Monmouth. At Lee's request Washington sent him with two more brigades to join Lafayette; and on his arrival Lee, as senior officer, was in command. 3 1 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 415. 2 Sparks, V, 424. » Ibid., V, 423. 144 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 June 27 June 27 Battle of Monmouth June 2S 5 A. M. 8 A. M. 10 a. M. 11.30 A. M. At the close of this day, therefore, the positions were as follows: Clinton and Knyphausen, about 15,000 men, on the Monmouth plain and the hills just south of it, facing west; Lee with the advance, 5,000 men and 12 guns, at Englishtown; and Washington with his main body, 6,000 men, between Cranberry and English- town. About 10 or 12 miles north of Monmouth (Freehold) the country is broken, the Middletown hills rising to an altitude of about 400 feet and affording a number of good defensible positions. Washington was very anxious to attack Clinton while he was still in the low ground and before he could reach these hills. He therefore sent ex- plicit orders 1 that evening to Lee to have his men in readiness for attack, intending to march with the main body at daylight to his support. The next morning Knyphausen resumed his march, and as soon as his column was stretched out Clinton followed. 2 Washington heard of it and put his own troops in motion at sunrise, at the same time sending an order to Lee to attack Clinton. Lee moved forward rather leisurely, and began a skirmish with Clinton's rear guard about a mile north of the Court House; but instead of making a vigorous attack he gave a number of contra- dictory orders and then ordered a retreat. 3 The officers and men were astonished, and fearing that something was wrong the retreat soon became disorderly. Wash- ington, galloping ahead of his main body, met the fugi- tives about three miles east of Englishtown 4 and the same distance west of the Court House where Lee had had his 1 Sparks, V, 420, 424, 425. 2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 416. 3 Sparks, V, 420, 424, 425. 4 Ibid., V, 419. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 145 skirmish. He soon encountered Lee, and there is little ms doubt that Washington's passionate nature, which he Battle of usually controlled by his strong will, for once got the ju™™™ 1 better of him. All accounts agree that strong language was used, but the exact words are in dispute. Dawson quotes Lafayette as saying — on his visit to Vice-President Daniel D. Tompkins at his house in New York on August 15, 1824, forty-six years after the event — that Washington Meeting of called Lee "a damned poltroon." 1 If ever profanity is andTcharies justifiable, it was then. Here were the fruits of Washing- ton's labors with the committee of Congress to establish the army on an efficient basis, of Greene's work as quar- termaster to put it in condition to march, of Steuben's instruction in drill and discipline — all in danger of being lost by the combined incapacity, cowardice and treason of this damnable Charles Lee. While Arnold, two years later on the Hudson, planned an infamous stroke which, had it succeeded, might have proved serious, yet what Arnold actually accomplished in injury of the American cause was but a slight fraction of the mischief caused by Lee on this hot Sunday morning at Monmouth. In spite of Clinton's numerical superiority, had Lee attacked him vigorously and held him at the Court House until Wash- ington came up, Washington would have passed around Clinton's right flank between Monmouth and Middle- town, penetrated between Clinton and Knyphausen and in all probability have captured a large part of Clinton's command. But the mischief was done, and, without wasting more words on Lee, Washington rode forward toward the rear of the retreating troops and personally halted and re- formed them, establishing a line, north and west of the 1 Dawson, 408. 146 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 parsonage, between the two morasses. 1 Clinton mean- Battie of while had turned back all his own force and had sent to June 28 Knyphausen for a regiment of cavalry and a brigade of infantry. 2 With this combined force he deployed on both sides of the road from Monmouth to Englishtown and attacked the line which Washington had established between the two morasses. 3 But the main body had now arrived; and it went into action, Greene on the right, Stirling on the left and Washington himself in the centre, on the road. Severe fighting continued throughout the i to 5.3o p.m. blazing afternoon — so intense was the heat that many men on both sides dropped dead without being wounded. 4 Clinton first tried to turn the American left, then their right; each time without success. Finally, Lieutenant - Colonel Monckton led his grenadiers in a fierce assault against Wayne, who was posted in an orchard on an eminence on the north side of the road, about 400 yards north of the parsonage. Monckton was killed and the attack failed. 5 Toward sunset the British retired a short distance to reform and take up a strong defensive position with both flanks protected by small streams. Simultaneously Washington withdrew to the west side of the west morass or ravine, intending to reform his men and attack Clinton 1 Most of the maps in Sparks's Writings of Washington are fairly accurate. But the one in Vol. V, p. 430, is very defective in topography and otherwise. It was copied into Lossing, Irving and other histories and was probably the cause of much of the difficulty expressed by various writers as to under- standing the battle of Monmouth. The accompanying map gives the topography as delineated on the maps of the U. S. Geological Survey; and the positions of the troops are based upon Dawson's and Carrington's analyses of the testimony at the court-martial of Lee. 2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 416; Carrington, Battles of American Revolution, 423-449. s Clinton's Report, Dawson, 416. * Sparks, V, 426, 427. 8 Lossing, II, 157. 'LafayeliePa ) Position after the Retredt 3 'A 1 / g ' 3/4 1 Scale of one Mile THE M.-N. WORKS Gen.Lafayette'8"- \b X \ // Encampment *.\Capt. McLean SO Indians/^ «' V Picket i -Jib' Picket^S \ — Barren Hill May 20, 1778 C0UrteS VuUs h h e efs:c?eTera r n O d the o r hiS° mPaDy ' MoNMOUTH F '° m ^^'^^V/o^ "^ ^ June 27, 1778 THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 147 on both flanks. But night came on before these disposi- ms tions could be perfected, and the attack was postponed until morning. When day broke the British had disappeared; 1 they j u .ie29 had moved at midnight and were well on their way to the Middletown heights. Although in close contact with the cnnton enemy, the American troops had slept so soundly, ex- hausted with the intense heat and the battle of the previous day, that they had not heard the British as they moved away. In the broken country of the Mid- dletown heights there was no chance of successful as- sault, and Washington therefore did not pursue. Clinton reached Sandy Hook in safety, 2 and simultaneously Lord Howe arrived with his ships from the Delaware. On these the troops were transported up the bay to New York. 3 Clinton reported his losses at 124 dead, 170 wounded and 64 missing; and he claimed that nearly half his dead . had perished from the heat. But Washington stated that the number of British buried — " according to the re- turns of the parties assigned to that duty" — was 249. 4 He wrote to Arnold — who, on account of his wound re- ceived at Bemis' Heights, was unable to move with the army and had been sent into Philadelphia to take com- mand and perserve order there — that Clinton's losses during his retreat must have been at least 2,000, includ- ing 600 Hessians who had deserted during the march and gone back to Philadelphia, thenceforth to become good American citizens. Washington reported his own losses at 58 killed, 161 wounded and 131 missing. 4 Washington's army remained a few days at English- town, and thence moved by easy marches through Bruns- 1 Sparks, V, 427, 428, 429. 2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 417. 3 Mahan, 360. * Sparks, V, 428; Dawson, 415. 148 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR July 21 Court-Mart ial of Charles Lee Dec. 5 1778 wick and Paramus to the Hudson, crossed the river at Haverstraw and established itself at White Plains. Charles Lee was promptly put in close arrest and brought to trial for disobedience of orders, misbehavior before the enemy and disrespect to the commander-in- chief. 1 The court-martial moved with the army, hold- ing its sittings from day to day for a period of six weeks. The court found him guilty of all three charges, and im- posed the ridiculously inadequate sentence of suspension from rank for twelve months. The proceedings went to Congress for ratification, and that body held it under consideration for nearly four months. Then, by a vote of 16 to 7 (Massachusetts, under the lead of Samuel Adams, and Georgia voting No; New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia being divided and casting no vote, and six States, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsyl- vania, North Carolina, South Carolina voting Ay), Con- gress grudgingly directed the sentence to "be carried into execution." 2 Just as his sentence was expiring, Lee committed the heinous offence of writing a disrespect- ful letter to Congress, whereupon that body, without a Jan. io. 1780 roll-call, unanimously passed a resolution that they "have no further occasion for his services in the army of the United States." 3 Lee retired to his farm in Virginia and occupied the remaining six years of his life in making scurrilous attacks upon Washington and writing a blasphemous will. 4 While Clinton was retreating from Philadelphia to New York — and for many weeks before — a French squadron 1 Court- Martial of Charles Lee, printed by order of Congress, August 21, 1778. Reprinted in 1823 and 1824. Jour. Cont. Cong., XII, 1287. 2 Jour. Cont. Cong., XII, 1195. 3 Jour. Cong., Ill, 421. 4 Sparks, V, 552-558; VI. 309; Life and Memoirs of Charles Lee, 160 THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 149 of 12 ships of the line and 5 frigates, mounting 834 guns ms and carrying 4,000 soldiers, was on its way across the Atlantic. It had sailed from Toulon and after a voyage April 15 of 84 days had arrived at the capes of the Delaware. 1 juiys Lord Howe, who commanded the British fleet and trans- ports, had been gone 10 days. 1 He knew that the French fleet was on the way, and he had thrown into the work of Arrival of the loading Clinton's transports and moving them to New York that necessary energy of which his brother Sir William had shown so great a lack. The commander of the French fleet was Comte d'Estaing, who had served in the army until his thirtieth year and then been trans- ferred to the navy "with the premature rank of rear- admiral." He lacked the sailor's training, and his cap- tains were jealous of him. 2 After sending the French minister up the Delaware in July 11 one of his ships, d'Estaing sailed northward and anchored in the ocean just south of Sandy Hook. Washington sent his aides, 3 first Laurens and then Hamilton, to wel- come d'Estaing and explain his views as to co-operation. Lord Howe, having carried Clinton's army to New York, hastened back to his ships and anchored inside the Hook. The two fleets were in plain view of each other, across the low narrow strip of sand just south of the Hook. Lord Howe had only 9 ships of the line to d'Estaing's 12, and 534 guns to his 834; but he was a sailor — as d'Estaing was not 4 — and he was determined to dispute the entrance of the French fleet to the last. D'Estaing remained there eleven days. In letters to Washington and to Congress, filled with profuse com- 1 Mahan, 359, 360; Sparks, V, 440. 3 Chevalier, Hist, de la Marine Francaise, quoted by Mahan, 371. 3 Sparks, VI, 1-5. 4 Mahan, 360, 363, 364. 150 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 pliments, he explained the difficulty of crossing the bar, and said that he offered the pilots 50,000 crowns 1 if they would promise success. But Mahan says that "d'Es- taing's heart failed him under the discouragement of the juiy 22 pilots; he gave up the attack and stood away to the southward." Mahan intimates that with Nelson or Farragut in d'Estaing's place, the result might have been very different. Probable it is that if d'Estaing had smashed the British fleet in New York and united his 4,000 soldiers to those of Washington on the north side of Harlem River, Clinton's army — on Manhattan Island and without ships — would have been caught like rats in a trap, and not a man would have escaped. Attack on It had been arranged between d'Estaing and Wash- ington's aides 2 that if it was not feasible to cross the bar at Sandy Hook a combined land and naval movement should be made against Newport, where General Pigott was in command of about 3,000 men, part of those who had captured Newport under Clinton in 1776. 3 D'Estaing jm y 29 sailed thither and at the end of a week anchored off Point Judith. 4 Sullivan had been in command at Providence since the adjournment of the court which had inquired into his conduct at the Brandywine and on Staten Island juiy 17 and had acquitted him. He had about 1,000 Continentals under his command, and Washington wrote to him "to apply in the most urgent manner in my [his] name" to the New England States to raise 5,000 militia — or more. The militia turned out so promptly that within thirty days Sullivan had 7,000 of them, with John Hancock at jmy 22 their head. Washington then put Lafayette in com- 1 Sparks, VI, 12. 2 Sparks, VI, 12; Sparks, Letters, II, 155, 159. 3 Page 62, ante. * Mahan, 361. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 151 mand of two brigades and directed him to march to ms Providence; and a few days later he sent Greene to Juiy27 Rhode Island (his own State) and instructed Sullivan that his entire force, Continentals and militia, was to be divided into two divisions, of which Greene would com- mand one and Lafayette the other. 1 The result of these dispositions was to assemble a force of about 10,000 men under Sullivan's command. Un- fortunately they did not arrive until about ten days after d'Estaing; and when d'Estaing sailed into Narragansett Bay, between Newport and Jamestown, and was pre- Aug. 8 paring to land his soldiers a few miles north of Newport, and join Sullivan who had brought his troops to the same point, Lord Howe appeared off Point Judith. 2 With his customary energy he had sailed from New York for Newport as soon as he heard that d'Estaing had gone there. When the latter saw the masts of Howe's ships in the distance, he promptly decided to fight the British fleet before aiding Sullivan. Sullivan protested, but the French captains were a unit in insisting upon it; and when the wind changed to the north-east d'Estaing Aug. io sailed out to meet Howe. 3 He carried his 4,000 soldiers with him; but why he should have wished to be encum- bered with them in a naval action has never been ex- plained. The two fleets manoeuvred off Block Island Aug. 12 for the weather-gage for nearly two days, and then a furious gale arose and scattered both French and English ships. Several ships were dismasted, and the damage was so serious that Howe had to return to New York. D'Estaing came back to Newport, but only to announce Aug. 20 1 Sparks, VI, 6. 2 Mahan, 361-364; Sparks, 29, 40, 41; Sparks, Letters, II, 176-179. 3 Sparks, VI, 29. 152 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 Aug. 22 Dissension Between the Allies. Aug. 24 Aug. 15 Aug. 28 his intention of proceeding to Boston for repairs. 1 Greene and Lafayette urged him to land his troops and attack the British; after that he could refit his squadron either in Newport or in Boston. But d'Estaing would not yield, and sailed away. 2 Bad blood was thus stirred up between the allies at the very start. Washington, with his usual calmness and good judgment, tried to restore good feeling; and Greene and Lafayette ably seconded his efforts. But Sullivan was so angry that he was most indiscreet. He not only filed a written protest with d'Estaing, but he published an order to his troops expressing the hope that America would be "able to procure with her own arms that which her allies refused to assist her in obtaining." 2 When the militia read this they made up their minds that the expedition would fail and that they might as well go home; and more than 5,000 of them went off within a few days. When d'Estaing had gone out to meet Howe, Sullivan had decided not to delay his operations; 3 and he ad- vanced his men to within two miles of the British lines just north of Newport. During the ensuing week he prosecuted siege operations against the British redoubts and lines in the vicinity of Easton's Pond, and for several days a vigorous artillery fire was exchanged between the two lines. But when d'Estaing's fleet sailed away and the militia went home there was nothing for Sullivan to do but to extricate himself from his difficult position as best he could — and without delay. Accordingly he re- treated during the night to the northern end of the island, and there took position in the lines which had Mahan, 362-364. Sparks, V, 41, 45, 47. Sullivan's Report, Dawson, 439. American Forces in Blue British Forces in Red First Position in battle „ Setond Position in battle C3 Major Lee 1 auxhall Bridge Gen.Knyphausen 4l Battle of Springfield June 23, 1780 »i» V V Gen.Mathew Connecticut Farms ., burned at first attempt ctgpinst Morristowy ^~June 7, 17S0 A. British Fort on Castine Pen. B. Fort erected by British naval commander to protect communications after driven to 3rd position C. Battery captured by Americans July 28 r D. Batterv engaged July 27 E. British Camp F. Americans land and establish intrenchments, July 28 G. Naval action July 2-5 British tieet to 1. H. Battery causes British fleet to withdraw to J. July 28 Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company. Publishers, Cleveland, Oh From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Penobscot Tulv 2C. I77Q British ONG ISL** ' New London Sept. 7, 1 78 1 .Advance of British Army from Staten Island Springfield June 23, 1780 Newport Aug. 29, I77 8 Bridge of; Boats/ entrenchment^ th rown up by Knyphausen after his retregfof June 7, Newark Bay STATEN V ISLAND it . Part orSritisk ' " ^=i^J^± Enr.amnmerit~~ ~.^ VU^» around New York ^ JyJ a^J, THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 153 originally been fortified by the British, just south of ms Butt's Hill. 1 At daylight Pigott moved after him in Battle of two columns, the British on the east road and the Hes- sians on the west road. As soon as he came up with Aug. 29 Sullivan's outposts and "light parties," skirmishing 7 a.m. began. These were driven back and then Pigott made a vigorous attack by the west road against Sullivan's right flank, which was commanded by Greene. The 9 a.m. firing continued here for several hours and the British brought their entire force into action and supported it by a flanking fire from some ships in the bay. 2 But Greene had two veteran brigades — Glover's famous Marblehead fishermen and Varnum's Rhode Island regiments which had marched to Cambridge more than three years before and been in constant service ever since; in addition to these was Cornell's militia and a regiment of Rhode Island negroes commanded by Christopher Greene. They all made a good defence, and the whole force of British and Hessians could not dislodge them. During the afternoon the firing ceased. Both armies remained within a short distance of each other during the night and following day. 3 Pigott sent back to Newport for Aug. 30 his artillery and intended to attack again as soon as it arrived. 4 But during the morning Sullivan received a letter from Washington telling him that Lord Howe had sailed from New York with reinforcements; and later in the clay report was received that the British fleet had been sighted off Block Island. He decided to withdraw to the main-land, and during the night succeeded in doing so without loss, a portion of his force crossing to Bristol, 1 Sullivan's Report, Dawson, 439. 2 Pigott's Report, Dawson, 442. 3 Sullivan's Report, Dawson, 440, 441; Sparks, Corr., II, 179-204. * Pigott's Report, Dawson, 442, 443. 154 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 but the greater part to Tiverton. His losses were 30 killed, 137 wounded and 44 missing; and those of Pigott, 38 killed, 210 wounded and 12 missing. 1 Aug. 31 Within a few hours of Sullivan's retreat to Tiverton, Lord Howe's fleet, carrying Sir Henry Clinton and 5,000 of his men, dropped anchor in Newport harbor. This increased the strength of the British garrison to about 11,000 men. The rest of Sullivan's militia now went home, and with his 1,200 Continentals he withdrew to Providence. Clinton made no attempt to follow him, but taking part of his men on the ships, he harried the towns along the shores of Long Island Sound. 2 Nov. 4 D'Estaing finally completed the repairs of his ships at Departure Boston and then sailed for Martinique, still keeping his Fleet? renc 4,000 soldiers with him. 3 And on the same day Clinton despatched from New York to St. Lucia the 5,000 men which he had been ordered to send there. During the winter Lafayette, after vainly endeavoring to secure jaa. li, 1779 Washington's approval to a project for the reconquest of Canada, sailed back to France. 4 The close of the year thus saw the French and English renewing their ancient strife, and the seat of war trans- ferred to the West Indies. The French alliance, which many thought would promptly end the war, brought at first little but distrust and recrimination. Whether the French admiral had instructions similar to those given the minister of France — to be guided by French and not entirely by American interests — is not known; but Gerard had been his guest on his flag-ship for twelve weeks, and it is probable that 1 Sullivan's Report, Pigott's Report, Dawson, 438, 444. 2 Sparks, VI, 63. 3 Mahan, 365. * Sparks, VI, 190, 545-556. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 155 d'Estaing knew his instructions. 1 To have brought peace ms so quickly and without an attempt to regain Canada for the French would perhaps not have accorded entirely with the French plans. Nor have we the slightest ground to complain of this. Every nation must act for its own interests first, and even exclusively. It was our good fortune that it was the interest of France to aid America in order to injure Great Britain; and its aid was of im- mense value in enabling America to gain what it desired. 2 The military operations of the next four years at the North were of minor importance and can only be briefly summarized. The British army occupied New York and Newport 1773-79 during the first winter; and Washington disposed his c a m P at troops in cantonments at Middlebrook (now Bound Brook) Elizabeth, Ramapo, West Point, Fishkill and Danbury. 3 They were dispersed in this fashion for the purposes of subsistence, but they were in supporting distance, and could be concentrated quickly if Clinton made any move into New Jersey, up the Hudson or into New England. The cantonments formed a semicircle of forty miles' radius around Clinton at New York; and they guarded 1 Mahan, 359. 2 Lafayette's plan for the reconquest of Canada was submitted by him to Congress, and received the formal approval of that body October 22, 1778. Precise instructions were sent four days later to Franklin to govern his conduct as minister in France; and among these instructions were the complete plans for the invasion of Canada. At the same time Congress asked Washington for his views on the subject. In a far-sighted letter, dated November 14, 1778, he replied, opposing the project with such un- answerable arguments that it was abandoned. In this letter Washington uses these words — as true and as significant to-day as the day they were written — " It is a maxim, founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its interest." Sparks, VI, 107, 110; Jour. Cont. Con^., 1039-1048. 3 Sparks, I, 306; VI, 124, 135, 153, 158, 167. 156 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR Oct. Capture of Stony Point 1779 May 31 1778 the vital points in the Highlands of the Hudson through which communication was kept up between New Eng- land and the Middle States. The fortifications in the Highlands were meanwhile strengthened, West Point being the centre of the system instead of the forts eight miles below which had been captured by Sir Henry Clinton. An outpost, however, was planned at Stony Point, and this was in process of fortification when Clinton attacked and captured it. At the same time he took possession of the fort at Verplanck's Point on the opposite side of the river. 1 For this purpose Clinton had brought about 6,000 men up the river; 2 and the possession of Stony and Verplanck's Points cut off King's Ferry, which connected the two points and which had been the usual and most convenient place for crossing the Hudson. An attack on West Point was likely to be the next move of Clinton. 3 Washington therefore left Middlebrook, which had been June 6 his head-quarters for the last six months, and moved first June 25 to the Clove (near Haverstraw), then to New Windsor juiy 21 (Newburg) and finally to West Point, where he remained until the close of the year. Nearly 5,000 of his Conti- nental troops had recently been sent under Sullivan to punish the Indians who had committed the massacres in the Wyoming valley of Pennsylvania during the preceding summer. 4 This left him not more than about 8,000 men. This was insufficient for an attack on New York, for which there was a tempting opportunity had he had sufficient force, or had d'Estaing with his fleet and his soldiers 1 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 526; Sparks, VI, 269. 2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 345. 3 Sparks, VI, 164, 264, 272, 304. 4 Sullivan's Indian Expedition, 1779, published by the State of New York, 1887. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 157 been in that vicinity instead of in the West Indies. The 1779 most that Washington could attempt, therefore, was the recapture of Stony and Verplanck's Points. The former was intrusted to Wayne 1 and the latter to McDougall. 2 Through some misunderstanding or miscarriage of orders McDougall made no serious attempt ; but Wayne carried out his part of the project in the most brilliant manner. For this attack Washington placed under Wayne's Recapture of command the light infantry of the army, about 1,200 in number, and after reconnoitring the approaches in person he gave Wayne instructions to make the attack with un- loaded muskets and to rely solely on the bayonet. As the usual hour for such enterprises was just before dawn, and on that account the watch was more strict at that hour, Washington enjoined Wayne to make the attempt about midnight. Muhlenberg's brigade of about 300 men was to follow Wayne and be in position to reinforce the attack, if necessary; or to form a rallying-point in the retreat, if the enterprise should prove unsuccessful. Wayne began his march from Fort Montgomery at July 15 noon ; and crossing the mountains in rear of Stony Point he arrived within a mile and a half of the enemy's lines at 8 o'clock; 3 here he formed his troops in two columns, 1 Sparks, VI, 289. 2 Ibid., VI, 288, 298, 299. 3 Washington was generous enough to report to Congress (Sparks, VI, 298) that Wayne " improved upon the plan recommended by me [him] and executed it in a manner that does signal honor to his judgment and to his bravery." Wayne's Order of Battle, drawn up by him on July 15 and submitted to Washington before it was read to his troops late that evening, is a model for a document of that kind — clear, definite, explicit, brief but lacking in no detail. It contained two paragraphs which showed the serious nature of the business on hand; and the understanding by his men of this serious- ness was possibly one of the chief causes of the brilliant success which followed. "If any soldier presumes to take his musket from his shoulder to fire or beyin the battle until ordered by his proper officer, he shall be instantly port, July 17 158 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1779 each preceded by an advance guard of about 150 volun- teers, and in front of these a party of 20 picked men and an officer. 1 After carefully reconnoitring the ground over which the advance was to be made, Wayne placed himself at the head of the right column, and shortly juiy i6 after midnight both columns moved forward. 1 Not a Wayne's Re- shot was fired on the American side. Wayne "gave the troops the most pointed orders not to fire on any account, but place their whole dependence on the bayonet, which order was literally and faithfully obeyed. Neither the deep morass, the formidable and double rows of abatis nor the strong works in front and flank could damp the ardor of the troops, who, in the face of the most tremen- dous and incessant fire of musketry, and from cannon loaded with grape-shot, forced their way at the point of the bayonet through every obstacle, both columns meet- ing in the centre of the enemy's works nearly at the same instant." Wayne was wounded at the abatis, but his men pressed on into the fort, and all of the garrison who had not been killed or wounded were taken prisoners. 1 Wayne's loss was 15 killed and 83 wounded. The British lost 19 killed, 74 wounded, 58 missing and 472 prisoners — 623 in all. 2 The captured cannon were ap- put to death by the officer next to him; for the misconduct of one man is not to put the whole troops in danger or disorder, and be suffered to pass with life. . . ." After promising rewards to the first five men to enter the works, he adds: "But should there be any soldier so lost to every feeling of honor as to attempt to retreat one single foot, or to skulk in the face of danger, the officer next to him is to immediately put him to death, that he may no longer disgrace the name of a soldier or the corps or State he belongs to. "As General Wayne is determined to share the danger of the night, so he wishes to participate in the glory of the day in common with his fellow- soldiers." 1 Wayne's Report, Dawson, 525. 2 Wayne's Report, Clinton's Report, Dawson, 527; Johnston, Stony Point, 206. •■ J-'-. •• .- N A. Right Column under Wayne B. Left Column under Murphy *\\k ^7*1 Verplancks A Fort LofSy^^r -/£\_ • y2t' and Butler C. British guard at Causeway D. Reserve under Muhlenberg s s / / A,'' / HUDSON II V \ RIVER StonxPoint &JZ**s - *}^s^*^»-*^' M.-N. WORKS Stony Point July 1 6, 1779 Huntington / -I Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Tryon's Raid THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 159 praised at $158,640 and that sum was distributed by 1779 order of Congress 1 among the officers and men of the storming party, in proportion to the pay of each; and the further sum of $1,500 was divided among the first five men to enter the works. Congress also ordered three medals to be struck in honor of Wayne, and of Fleury and Stewart who commanded the two columns. Sir Henry Clinton immediately brought reinforcements July 17 from New York up the river to Dobb's Ferry; and Wash- ington made a personal examination of Stony Point. He was convinced that it could not be held by less than 1,500 men; 2 it was nearly 20 miles, following the winding roads through the mountains, from his main position at West Point. He therefore determined to evacuate the Evacuation of post, and the cannon and stores were removed and the works destroyed during the following night, the troops July is retreating to West Point. Clinton brought up his whole force from Dobb's Ferry and regained possession of Stony Point the next morning. 3 He retained possession July 19 of it only a short time, however. Finding that he could not draw Washington into a general engagement south of the Highlands, and not feeling any confidence in his ability to capture West Point, he soon afterward deter- mined to transfer the war to the south and to accompany the expedition himself." In anticipation of this he with- drew his troops from both Verplanck's and Stony Points. In the following month Major Henry Lee, who com- Oct. 21 manded the " Light Horse," requested permission to capture of attack the British post at Paulus or Powle's Hook on the Jersey shore (just behind the present site of the Jersey 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., XIV. 890-891. 2 Sparks, VI, 300, 301, 302. s Clinton's Report, Dawson, 526. 4 Stedman, II, 152; Sparks, I, 328; Clinton to Germain, Sparks, VI, 327. 1G0 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1779 City station of the Pennsylvania Railroad). Lee had been in the supporting party at Stony Point and he was keen to undertake a similar enterprise on his own account. After some hesitation 1 Washington gave his consent, but stipulated that not more than 300 men should be engaged, and that no attempt should be made to hold the post. The purpose was to surprise the garrison and bring off as many prisoners as could be secured. Aug. is, Lee set out from Paramus (now Ridgewood), 21 miles north-west of Paulus Hook, with part of his command 4 p.m. and was joined by the rest at Hackensack. Through the treachery or ignorance of a guide several hours were lost during the evening and part of his men were sepa- rated from him. With the remainder, something less than 300 in number, he reached the marsh, which sepa- rated the fortified position on the Hook from the main- Aug. i9. land, not long before dawn. The tide was rising, the day would soon break and the ammunition was ruined in wading through the marsh. Not a moment was to be lost, and the men rushed forward — as at Stony Point — without firing a shot. They cleared the abatis, crossed the ditch and entered the works. There was a short hand-to-hand fight, in which it is said that Lee lost only 2 killed and 3 wounded, whereas the British loss was about 50, and then the greater part of the garrison sur- rendered. Daylight was coming on and Lee immediately began his retreat, bringing with him 158 prisoners. On his way back he was attacked in flank by a portion of the British garrison which was on a foraging expedition near Aug. i9. Weehawken; but Lee beat them off and arrived in safety at the Hackensack Bridge, after twenty-seven hours of continuous marching and not a little fighting. Here a 'Sparks, VI, 317, 318. 3.30 A. M. 11.00 A. M. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 161 supporting brigade under Lord Stirling received him, 1779 and the next day the entire force returned to Para- Aug. 20 mus. 1 Lee's exploit was justly applauded and he received the thanks of Congress 2 and a gold medal. Its military im- portance was that which results from an " insult" to the enemy and from the encouragement it gave to our own army. Stony Point and Paulus Hook were the only two mili- tary events of the year at the North. Clinton had, in- May 9 deed, sent a marauding expedition of 2,500 men, under Marauding Matthews, into the Chesapeake, which captured Norfolk, Virginia and destroyed a number of ships at Suffolk and carried away a considerable quantity of stores, including 3,000 hogs- heads of tobacco. 3 Later a similar expedition, under Tryon, was sent along the Sound ; it destroyed the ship- July 5 ping and set fire to the towns from New Haven to Nor- July 11 walk. 4 These raids angered the population, but had no effect whatever on the issue of the contest. On the other hand, about 1,000 Massachusetts militia Penobscot undertook an independent expedition against Castine, xpe at the mouth of the Penobscot 5 River in Maine, where about 800 British troops had been sent from Halifax to cover parties engaged in getting masts and spars for the British ships. The expedition was a failure, the naval j u i y 25 and military commanders quarrelled, the attack was re- Aug. 11 pulsed, a portion of the British fleet arrived from New York, the ships (24 transports and 20 armed vessels carrying 344 guns) were burned and the members of the expedition made their way home through the wilder- 1 Lee's Report, Dawson, 549-552. 2 Jour. Cont. Cong., XV, 1100. 3 Sparks, VI, 261, 262. 4 Tryon 's Report, Dawson, 514; Sparks, VI, 285, 293. 8 Sparks, VI, 307, 350; Stedman, II, 147, 151. 162 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1779 Dec. 7 Winter Can- tonments for 1779-80 March 9 ness, in small groups amidst terrible hardships, during the autumn. 1 This expedition was undertaken without consulting Washington, 2 and is an example of that lack of central control which prevented the successful application of our military resources during the Revolution. As winter came on Washington moved his head-quar- ters to Morristown. Sullivan's force had returned from the Indian campaign, but it was necessary to send a con- siderable reinforcement to the South. His little army was disposed in cantonments — much as in the preceding winter — at Morristown, in northern New Jersey, in the Highlands and in Connecticut. 3 It was a winter of ex- treme severity, North River and a part of New York Bay being closed with ice strong enough to bear artillery. 4 The sufferings of the men for lack of food and clothing were but little inferior to those at Valley Forge two years before; and it soon became necessary to resort to impressment in order to obtain food. The ever-present difficulty of obtaining recruits gave Washington the great- est anxiety, and in several of his letters he expressed the opinion that the prospect of final success was never so discouraging as at that time. Congress had consoli- dated 5 the 104 battalions (16 Continental and 88 State "lines") into 80 battalions. The return of October showed a paper strength of 27,099, of whom 14,998 were enlisted for the war and the others for various periods which would expire during the coming spring and summer. Washington urged an annual draft to fill up the battalions, the payment of a Continental bounty to such of the 1 Thacher's Military Journal, 170; Stedman, II, 152. 3 Sparks, VI, 350. 3 Ibid., 408, 411, 420, 438. 4 Kapp, Kalb, 183. 6 Jour. Cont. Cong., XIII, 298. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 163 drafted men as would enlist for the period of the war, 1779 and the abolition of State, county and town bounties. 1 The States and towns, however, continued to exercise their own judgment about bounties, and there was much dissatisfaction among the men who three years before had enlisted for the war. The recruiting was never thor- oughly organized and systematized; but a certain num- ber of recruits was obtained by Washington's incessant appeals. On the British side, Newport was abandoned, and the Evacuation of only post retained was New York. Cornwallis arrived Oct. 25 ' with reinforcements, and these, added to the troops brought from Newport, carried the garrison of New York Dec. 1 to 28,756. Of these 13,848 were British regulars, 10,836 were Hessians and 4,072 were Provincials. Washington had only 10,400 effective in all his cantonments; 2 but Clinton did not feel strong enough to attack him. He preferred the plan of sending a large part of his force to the South. Some months after Clinton had gone to the South, 1780 Knyphausen, who was left in command at New York, offensive , . . , ~ 1 • -nt t 9 Movement in determined on an offensive movement in New Jersey/ New jersey He had heard that two regiments at Morristown had mutinied because they had received neither food, cloth- ing nor pay, and that the population of New Jersey were disaffected to the American cause. He thought that if the British troops appeared in New Jersey the people, the militia and possibly the mutinous regiments would rally to their support. He therefore took two brigades, Matthews' and Stirling's, with about 5,000 men, crossed the Kills from Staten Island to Elizabeth and marched 1 Sparks, VI, 402, 403. 2 Ibid., V.. 543; VII, 6. 3 Stedrnan, II, 240, 241; Sparks, VII, 76. 164 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 June 7 Skirmish at Springfield Battle of Springfield, June 23 toward Morristown. But he was quickly undeceived as to the temper of the inhabitants. They fired upon his troops from their houses and from the woods; Stirling was fatally wounded; the militia gathered quickly in front of him, and when after a march of eight miles he reached the village of Springfield, he found one of the regiments which had mutinied drawn up in line to op- pose him. Only a few shots were fired, and then the British column began a retreat, which seems to have been unnecessarily precipitate, to Elizabeth. They would have crossed to Staten Island, but the low tide prevented their getting their cavalry to the bridge of boats which they had built across the Kills where it joins Newark Bay. They therefore stopped on the Jersey shore, and threw up intrenchments, in the nature of a bridge head, for their protection. 1 A few days later Clinton returned to New York from South Carolina, and he determined to do something to redeem this fiasco. He therefore put some of his troops on transports and made a feint of moving up the Hud- son. Washington promptly started toward Ramapo and the Clove with a part of his force, leaving Greene in com- mand at Morristown. Greene with about 1,000 Con- tinentals and the Jersey militia under Dickinson took position behind the stream at Springfield, about 10 miles in advance of Morristown. 2 Knyphausen left Elizabeth early in the morning with about 5,000 infantry, a considerable body of cavalry and 18 pieces of artillery. Marching rapidly, he soon reached the Elizabeth River, about 3 miles east of Springfield, and there divided his force into two columns; sending ^tedman, II, 240, 241; Sparks, VII, 76. 2 Ibid., II, 243, 244; ibid., VII, 85, 87, 506-508. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 165 Matthews forward on the road to Springfield, while he mo himself took the Vauxhall road on the right, intending to turn Greene's left flank. Greene sent Henry Lee with his cavalry and a regiment of infantry to defend the Vauxhall bridge, and posted the rest of his Continentals at the two bridges in front of Springfield. The militia were placed on the flanks. While these troops were far inferior in strength to the British force, they made so spirited a defence at the bridges that they delayed the advance of Knyphausen until late in the afternoon, and gave Greene time to withdraw his force to a strong posi- tion in front of Short Hills, where the Vauxhall and Springfield roads came together. Here he awaited an attack; and a brigade, sent back by Washington as soon as he heard of the fight, was momentarily expected. But instead of attacking, the British set fire to the houses in Springfield and late in the afternoon began a hasty retreat — so rapid that Stark's brigade, which was sent in pursuit, was unable to overtake them. Greene's loss was 13 killed, 62 wounded and 9 missing. The loss of the British was supposed to be somewhat larger, but was never accurately known. Knyphausen remained at his bridge head near Eliza- beth until midnight and then crossed over to Staten Island, taking up his bridge of boats at daylight. 1 The June 24 British troops never again attempted any serious opera- tions in New Jersey. 2 Washington did not return to Morristown. He thought that Clinton would attack the forts in the Highlands, and he moved his army to the northern part of New Jersey; and moved his own head-quarters, in succession, 1 Sparks, VII, 506-508; Dawson, 596-600. 1 Stedinan, II, 244. 166 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 July 26 Washington to President of Congress, April 14, 1779 March 16, 1779 Nov. 24, 1779 Arnold in Command at West Point Aug. 4 Arnold's Treason Feb. 3, 1779 May 1, 1779 Jan. 20. 1780 to Ramapo, to Peekskill and to West Point. Greene, worn out with the vexatious relations with Congress in his uncongenial and thankless task as quartermaster- general, finally resigned that post 1 and resumed his duties in the line, being now second in command to Washington. Washington, conscious of his own strength and rectitude, waived all consideration of the innuendoes and unjust criticism of him which Gates was constantly sending to his friends in Congress. He had offered Gates the command of Sullivan's expedition against the Indians, which Gates curtly declined. As the com- mand in the Highlands seemed now the most important station in the army, Washington offered this to Gates; 2 he again declined, and obtained leave to retire to his estate in Virginia. Arnold then applied for the com- mand at West Point and his application was supported by some members of Congress. After considering the application for several months, Washington granted it, and Arnold took command. 3 This application was made with treasonable intent, for, as was afterward learned, Arnold had been in corre- spondence with Clinton under an assumed name for nearly eighteen months. While in command at Philadelphia, he lived beyond his means and got into debt; 4 he also gave offence to the Council of Pennsylvania and they pre- ferred charges against him. Washington promptly or- dered a court-martial, but the council were slow in pro- ducing their witnesses, and the trial dragged through the year. It was finally concluded, and the court found him censurable on two of the charges and sentenced him to a Sparks, VII, 91, 131, 150, 304, 512, 515. 2 Ibid., VI, 188, 189, 214-223, 409. 3 Ibid., VII, 95, 139, 140, 265, 521. Arnold, 239. ourtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Arnold's Treason Andre's Capture Sept. 20-25, 1780 Sept. 21 THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 167 reprimand. 1 While he was a brave and skilful soldier, i?8o his mind was ill-balanced; and brooding over his griev- ances and the slights which he fancied had been put upon him ever since the capture of Ticonderoga in 1775, he thought he would duplicate the parts which had been played in the past by Monck and by Marlborough 2 — to their great profit — and would deliver the American army into the hands of the British and restore the allegiance of the Colonies to the British crown. When Clinton learned the identity of his anonymous Meeting of correspondent he turned him over to Andre, his adjutant- Andre, general. The correspondence continued, and at Arnold's request and under his passport Aiidre went up the river, and met Arnold late at night, on the west shore a few miles below Stony Point. Arnold delivered to him vari- ous documents, some of them in his own handwriting — a detailed statement of the troops, 3,086 in number, stationed at various posts in the Highlands; a complete description of the forts in the Highlands and the arma- ment and ordnance stores at each; the standing orders to the garrison as to what they should do in case of attack; and a copy of the proceedings of the council of war held at West Point a short time before. 3 What 1 The language which Washington used in this reprimand is classic. "Our profession is the chastest of all; even the shadow of a fault tarnishes the lustre of our finest achievements. ... I reprimand you for having forgotten that in proportion as you have rendered yourself formidable to our enemies, you should have been guarded and temperate in your de- portment toward your fellow-citizens. Exhibit anew those noble qualities which have placed you on the list of our most valued commanders. I will myself furnish you, so far as it may be in my power, with opportunities of regaining the esteem of your country." (Arnold, 261.) 2 Monck delivered the Roundhead army to Charles II ; Marlborough deserted during the night from James II to William of Orange, and aided in establishing William on the throne. See Wolseley's Marlborough, where the question of Marlborough's honor is discussed at length. 3 All the essential letters are given in Sparks, VII, 520-552. 168 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 plans were verbally discussed at this midnight meeting is not a matter of record; but it was universally believed, and doubtless correctly, that they included the details of an attack by Clinton and a surrender by Arnold; and that this would take place either during the next two days or later, during an expected movement of Washington against New York, concerning which Washington was at that moment in conference with Rochambeau at Hartford. ,. 22 The next morning Arnold returned to his head-quarters at the Robinson house, opposite West Point, and Andre started to return to New York. He was captured near Tarrytown with the above-mentioned documents in his boots. The officer to whom Andre was brought sent word of the capture to Arnold, and despatched the documents by messenger to meet Washington on the road back from Hartford. Arnold received the intelligence while at break- fast. He immediately left the house and escaped in his barge, which rowed him down the river below Verplanck's Point, where he arrived safely within the British lines. Washington arrived at the Robinson house, on his return from Hartford, an hour after Arnold had left. He crossed to West Point and inspected the works, and re- turned to the Robinson house about noon. There the messenger, who had missed Washington on the road, arrived with the documents and a letter from Andre. Hamilton was at once sent off in the hope of capturing Arnold, but the latter had so many hours the start that pursuit was fruitless. Simultaneously orders were sent to Greene, who had been left in command of the army at Tappan during Washington's absence, to march the left wing to King's Ferry so as to be in position to dispute any attempt of Clinton to come up the river. 1 1 Sparks, VII, 520-552; also VII, 205, 212, 214-221, 235, 241, 256. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 169 The unfortunate Andre 1 was first brought to West 1780 Point and then to Tappan. A board of fourteen general Trial of Andre. officers, with Greene as president, and including Stirling, Lafayette, Steuben, James Clinton, Knox, Glover and Stark, was convened to try Andre. The board found sept. 29 that "under a feigned name and in a disguised habit he passed our works," . . . that he was captured "in a dis- guised habit," while on his way to New York, and "when taken he had in his possession several papers which contained intelligence for the enemy." The board was therefore of opinion that he "ought to be considered a spy from the enemy, and that agreeably to the laws and usage of nations, it is their opinion he ought to suffer death." Washington approved the sentence, and Andre Death of was hanged. Appeals were made by Arnold and Clin- 12 M . ' ton, 1 and the latter sent up the tory chief -justice to argue that Andre was not a spy; it is said that Arnold offered to Clinton to take Andre's place, but Clinton de- clined to allow it; and Andre himself, in a touching letter, appealed for the privilege of being shot instead of dying "on a gibbet." 1 But there was too much at stake; the proof of his being a spy was incontrovertible, and Wash- ington — deeply affected as he was — was inflexible that he should die the death of a spy. Forty years later his body was disinterred, carried to England and buried in Westminster Abbey near a monu- ment which had already been erected to his memory, in the company of England's greatest men. The author of subsequent his misfortunes, the man who tempted him, received for Arnold his treason a commission as brigadier-general in the British army, and fought against his former comrades during the campaign in Virginia. He was then brought 1 Arnold, 307, 311, 335, 343, 348; Sparks, VII, 534, 540, 542, 543. 170 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 New London Massacre, Sept. 7. 1781 Feb. 6, 1778 north and led an expedition of tories and Hessians against New London, not many miles from his birthplace. It was the last engagement of the war at the North. He captured Forts Trumbull and Griswold, burned the town and massacred the garrison. Soon after he was sent to England, and received £6,315 in money for himself, a pension of £500 a year for his wife and £100 a year for each of her children. Subsequently the King gave him a grant of 13,400 acres of land in upper Canada. He re- mained in the British army until his death twenty years later; but the British officers despised him; he fought a duel in resentment of their insults, got into debt, lost his fortune and died in poverty. 1 It is said that he died in the uniform of an American major-general, which he had on at the time he escaped from the Robinson house and which he had always preserved. The actual damage which he succeeded in doing to the American cause was slight; but it was not for lack of intention. His name has been a synonym for infamy during 130 years, and it seems probable that it will so continue so long as history is written. Meanwhile, what of the French alliance? What were the French ships and soldiers doing during the two years and more which had elapsed since the signing of the treaty? The answer, in brief, is that they were fighting the com- mon enemy, England, in the West Indies. They thus created a diversion by causing British ships and soldiers to be sent from New York to St. Lucia and elsewhere; and to this extent they aided the American cause. But while the French were primarily concerned with French interests, Washington was keenly alive to American in- terests. He thought that as much harm could be done 1 Arnold, 348, 363, 378, 389, 393, 395. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 171 to England, and more benefit conferred on America, if mo the French would concentrate their strength at New York. If they could command the sea and land only a few of their troops, he pledged himself to "bring 25,000 effective men into the field"; and with these he felt confident that he could capture the city and its garrison and put an end to the war. All through the year 1779 he tried May i, 1779 to bring this about. He had conferences with Gerard, sept. ie the French minister, and his successor, Luzerne. He Oct. 4 wrote to d'Estaing; he called on the governors of the Oct. 2 nearest States for 12,000 militia and they began to as- sept. 13 semble; he stationed Henry Lee, and later Duportail Oct. 10 and Hamilton, on the Jersey coast with letters to be handed to d'Estaing as soon as he reached the Delaware capes. 1 But d'Estaing never came. Although he had written Movements of that he would be on the coast of Carolina in May, he re- mained in the West Indies to capture St. Vincent and j une 16 Grenada. Then he went to San Domingo and thence j u iy4 to Georgia. But instead of making short work of the British there as he had anticipated, and then proceed- ing to the Delaware and New York, he became involved Oct. 9 in a siege at Savannah, and finally in an assault, in which he was repulsed and wounded. Then he sailed away to Oct. 20 France. 2 Washington heard of this at the close of the year; he dismissed the militia and put his Continentals Nov. 20 into cantonments as previously stated. It was a bitter disappointment. A few months later Lafayette rejoined Washington at May 10. i7so Morristown, after an absence of sixteen months in France. While the responsible French ministers had an eye single 1 Sparks, VI, 61, 62, 237, 368, 371, 373, 378, 409, 540. 'Mahan, 367, 376; Sparks, VI, 320, 361, 368, 409. 172 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 to the interests of France as they understood them, and used their ships and their men to protect their interests in the West Indies rather than in an attack upon New York — this enthusiastic young nobleman cared nothing about the West Indies, but was wholly and disinterestedly devoted to America, and to Washington personally. It was due chiefly to his persistent and persuasive appeals during his absence in France that the King was induced to send a new and larger expedition to America, and to give explicit instructions to its commander that he was to act under Washington's orders. 1 Arrival of The expedition consisted of 7 ships of the line under Second French , „, . , ■ « • 11 ■ Expedition de Ternay convoying transports carrying 6 full regiments May 2 (6,000 officers and men) under Rochambeau. It sailed juiy io from Brest and landed at Newport. It was to be followed by a second expedition of 4 regiments; but this was block- aded in Brest by a British squadron and never arrived. 2 Lafayette had brought to Washington full information in regard to the French expedition and copies of the in- structions; which were that the French troops should act as a unit, under Washington's orders, should "co- operate in the most effectual manner" and that the plan of campaign should be left to Washington. Before Rochambeau arrived Washington had prepared his plan — which was an attack on New York — had completed his own arrangements for supplies and for calling out a large juiy is body of militia. He sent Lafayette to confer with Ro- chambeau, carrying with him detailed instructions, both written and verbal, in regard to the movement against New York. 3 This was to begin immediately, and the 1 Sparks, VI, 368, 497, 545-556; VII, 511. 2 Ibid., VII, 171, 176, 520; Mahan, 382, 394. 3 Ibid., VII, 142, 171, 496-498, 510. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 173 allied troops were to meet just north of the Harlem River i?8o about August 5. But this plan was upset by the British naval com- manders. It was a fundamental part of the plan that the French should have a naval superiority. 1 They had this when de Ternay arrived. But within ten days they lost it. De Ternay had been followed across the Atlantic jm y 13 by six British ships under Admiral Graves, who arrived at New York a few days after de Ternay reached Newport. 2 This restored the British superiority on the sea; and the combined fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot promptly sailed for Newport and anchored off Point Juiy2i Judith. Clinton followed this with 6,000 troops which left New York and proceeded down the Sound with the intention of attacking Newport. But Washington instantly met this move by crossing his army from New Jersey at Dobb's Ferry, and marching down toward Kingsbridge to attack New York. Clinton thereupon returned to j u i y 3i New York, the British fleet, however, still remaining off Point Judith, blockading the French and intercepting or turning back their despatch-boats. News of Clinton's movement reached Rochambeau and he immediately called upon Heath, who commanded in New England, for militia to aid in his defence. Several thousand turned out quickly and went to his assistance on Rhode Island. 3 Within a month after its arrival, therefore, the French French Army t • <• 1 »aa p f • t ttt 1 • . ar *d Navy expedition of 1780, far from aiding Washington in any Blockaded in offensive movements, found itself cooped up in New- 1 "A naval superiority being essential to every enterprise in these States," Washington to Guicken. (Sparks, VII, 196.) "A decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle," Washington to Lafayette. (Sparks, VII, 509.) 2 Sparks, VII, 113, 127, 169. 3 Ibid., VII, 113, 127, 131, 138. 174 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 Sept. 21 The Revolu- tion Nearly Exhausted March IS port and relying on the New England militia for its protection. After Clinton had returned to New York the militia were gradually sent home ; but the British fleet remained on the blockade. Washington went to Hartford and discussed the situation with de Ternay and Rochambeau. All were agreed that the French army could not leave its fleet until sufficient ships should arrive to establish their naval superiority; and while there was a large French fleet in the West Indies at all times during the years 1780 and 1781, yet for various reasons no part of it came to America until late in the summer of the latter year. 1 Nothing, therefore, could be done. The French army remained inactive at Newport for eleven months after its arrival. 2 During this time the Revolution came near to expir- ing from sheer exhaustion. Its credit was exhausted; paper money had been issued by Congress to the extent of $241,000,000 and by the States to $209,000,000; and no provision had been made for its redemption. 3 Con- gress attempted to fix its value at 40 to 1 in specie, but the market rate was soon 1,000 to 1/ and finally it had no value whatever. 5 Having neither money nor credit, Congress then attempted to collect supplies from the States in kind. The response was such as each State saw fit to make. 6 What was furnished, together with 1 Sparks, VII, 195, 203, 207, 509. Lossing, I, 316-321. 2 Rochambeau, 391. 4 Jour. Cong., 442. 8 Fiske, Amer. Rev., II, 197, 198. 6 Washington wrote to Congress (April 3, 1780) that this system "has proved in its operation pernicious beyond description"; and to Joseph Jones in Congress (May 31, 1780): "One State will comply with a requisi- tion of Congress; another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ either in the manner, the matter or so much in point of time that we are always working uphill." (Sparks, VII, 13, 67.) THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 175 what was obtained by impressment was barely enough to 1780 keep the troops from starving. In clothing there was a similar destitution; and in powder the supplies were so low that Washington endeavored through Lafayette to negotiate a loan 1 from the French of 30,000 pounds of this indispensable article. As to recruiting, matters were in the same unsatisfactory condition that they had been in for the last five years. The 104 battalions authorized in 1776 had been consolidated into 80 battalions in 1779, March 9, ms and were now further consolidated into 50 regiments of Oct. 3, i78o infantry, with 4 regiments of cavalry, 4 of artillery and 1 of artificers. 2 Their organization was to be substantially that which had been prepared by Steuben and approved by Congress in 1778; enlistments were to be for the war; but if the States could not fill up their quota with recruits for the war, then they were recommended to fill them up with recruits enlisted for one year. 3 Resolutions were passed at intervals of a few months, May 20 sometimes " requiring" and at others " requesting" or sept. 21 "recommending" the States to fill up their quota. 4 If Oct. 3 this had been done the strength of the army (including Dec. 22 officers) would have been 35,850 infantry, 2,720 artillery ineffective and 2,020 cavalry. 5 But it was not done. The regi- Recruiting ments seldom had more than one-third of their author- ized strength. The response, by States or individuals, to the resolutions of Congress was feeble. The war had been in progress nearly six years, and ardor for enlist- ment was greatly diminished. The French alliance was in itself a detriment to recruiting. The average man could 1 Sparks, VII, 118. 2 Jour. Cong., Ill, 223, 432, 532, 538. 3 On Washington's recommendation this was modified, October 21, so as to provide "that the whole of the troops be enlisted for the war"; but the States continued to enlist recruits for one year. (Jour. Cong., Ill, 538.) * Jour. Cong., Ill, 458, 521, 532, 557. 5 Ibid., Ill, 538. 176 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i not comprehend the importance of the command of the sea, and he could not understand why more soldiers were required when 6,000 well-trained and well-equipped French infantry were doing nothing at Newport. Finally the sufferings and destitution of the half-starved and half- naked men who had enlisted were not such as to tempt others to share their fate. This winter the troops were cantoned, as before, from Morristown, through the Highlands, to Connecticut. 1 It was the fourth winter, counting from Valley Forge, in which each time the suffering had been almost beyond endurance. At last the troops resolved that they would stand it no longer, and a mutiny broke out. The six Pennsylvania Jan. i, regiments, forming Wayne's division, stationed at Morris- town, began the new year by parading under arms, and under command of their sergeants marched off toward Mutiny of the Philadelphia. In attempting to control them one officer LinT sy v< was killed and several were wounded. Wayne, who not only at Stony Point but at Monmouth and elsewhere had shown the most intrepid courage, rushed in among his men and drew his pistol; but they merely placed their bayonets against his breast and would have killed him if he had persisted. They marched off; and the next day he followed and overtook them at Princeton. They stated their grievances — no pay for the last twelve months, insufficient food and clothing, expiration of ser- vice (on the ground that they had enlisted for three years or the war, and were held for the war after the three years had expired). Wayne was powerless to give any relief in these matters, and the men continued their march to Trenton. Three emissaries, despatched by Clinton as soon as he heard of the trouble, attempted 1 Sparks, VII, 313, 318. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 177 to induce them to go over to the enemy. But they in- mi dignantly turned these over to Wayne, and after a sum- Jan. 10 mary trial assisted in hanging them. At Trenton they were met by a committee of Congress, by the President of Pennsylvania and by a force of 1,000 men under St. Clair, sent by Washington to oppose their crossing the Delaware. They stated their case, and the committee promised them prompt payment of portion of their pay, immediate supply of certain specified articles of clothing and discharge forthwith of all those who had not enlisted for the entire war — the term of enlistment to be estab- lished by each man's oath. They were practically all discharged, and their arms and ammunition were sent to Philadelphia. They were then asked to re-enlist for the war, receiving the bounties then paid to recruits; and almost all of them did so within ninety days. 1 They were soon sent to Virginia and rendered good service in the Southern campaign. The success of this mutiny led to another — the three regiments of New Jersey, stationed at Pompton. They Jan. 20 similarly marched off one evening, under their sergeants, Mutiny of the Ngw Jersey for Trenton. But Washington, who had by this time Line satisfied himself that he could rely upon the main body of his troops, determined to handle this affair in a differ- ent manner. He placed a detachment of New England troops under command of Major-General Robert Howe, of North Carolina, and directed him "to compel the muti- neers to unconditional submission/' and "to grant no terms while they are with arms in their hands in a state of resistance." Howe carried out these instructions to the letter. He surrounded the camp of the mutineers at Ringwood, disarmed them, selected one ringleader from 1 Sparks, VII, 350, 359, 364, 387, 436. 178 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i each regiment, tried them by summary court and hanged Jan. 28 them on the spot. The others promptly submitted and returned to duty. 1 Washington had repressed these outbreaks with a stern hand, but at the same time he wrote to the governors of States calling upon them to take steps to redress the well-founded grievances of the men in the matter of pay, clothing and food, 2 with the result that their conditions were to some extent improved and a few dollars in real money were paid to them. He realized, however, that the country was nearly at the end of its resources, or, as he expressed it (in the letter to Laurens), "the people are discontented; but it is with the feeble and oppressive mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself." 3 In order to bring the war to a close it was essential to raise some hard money. For this purpose Lieutenant- Colonel John Laurens, of South Carolina, one of his aides, was selected; and Congress appointed him a special minister to France. 4 Washington gave Laurens a letter Jan. 15 of instructions, written in that clear, impressive and Mission to forcible style of which he was so complete a master. In this he set forth the actual situation in America, the cause of her financial difficulties, the great natural re- sources which would enable her to repay a loan and the imperative need of two things — a loan of money and "a constant naval superiority on these coasts." With this Feb. 13 letter 5 Laurens sailed from Boston; he landed there on Aug. 25 his return six months later. Vergennes was of opinion 1 Sparks, VII, 380, 386, 560-566. 2 Ibid., 381. 8 Sparks, VII, 373. 4 Ibid., 368. 6 The original, in Washington's handwriting, is in the Archives of the Foreign Office in Paris. A complete copy is printed in Sparks, VII, 368-373. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 179 that the manner in which he pressed his case savored more 1781 of the camp than of diplomacy. 1 However that might be, he induced the French ministers to make a loan of 6,000,000 francs; 2 he converted some of this promptly into arms, ammunition and clothing, all of which he brought back with him, together with 2,500,000 francs in hard cash. 3 His representations and Washington's letter also led to the sending of the French fleet from the West Indies to Yorktown, thereby establishing the French naval superiority, and enabling Washington to carry out his long-deferred plans for making the French alliance really effective. 'Sparks, VII, 526; Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, IX, 211. 2 Vergennes stated that the amount which the French King had ad- vanced to America, to the close of 1781, was 20,000,000 francs, exclusive of the cost of maintaining the French army and navy in America. (Sparks, VIII, 526.) 3 The financial assistance of France was far more effective than its military co-operation. In the list of Combattants Francais de la Guerre Americaine, furnished by the French Government, and published by the United States Senate in 1905, there are more than 47,000 names — the offi- cers and men of 62 naval vessels and 13 regiments, who at one time or an- other landed on our shores or cruised in our waters. But like the American militia they came and went at their own will; the greatest number ashore at any one time was 8,400; they took part in two battles only, Savannah and Yorktown; their battle losses were 637 at Savannah and 186 at York- town. In a military sense they were more than offset by the German troops who fought with Great Britain. These numbered 29,867, of whom only 17,313 returned. Their effective strength from 1777 to 1782 was never less than 12,000. They were always subject to the orders of the British general, and, hirelings though they were, they fought well; they were in 9 principal battles and 11 minor engagements, and their killed and wounded numbered 2,200. (Lowell, 301; Sparks, V, 542-545.) CHAPTER VI CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 1775 At the time of the Revolution, Boston was about as far removed from Savannah as it now is from Manila. By sea the distance was 1,100 miles; and the time, depend- ing on wind and weather, was from 8 to 30 days. The British controlled the sea and that avenue of communica- tion was not open to the Americans. By land, the roads were so bad that troops could not make the march in less than 60 days, and a courier riding "express" consumed fully 20 days. In fact the letters exchanged between Washington and Greene, after the latter had assumed command in the South, were usually 30 days old when they reached their destination. The Thirteen Colonies were divided, by topographical conditions as well as by political affiliations, into three groups, whose interests were by no means identical. The dividing lines were the Hudson River and the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay. The four New England Colonies had a population of less than 750,000, and were engaged in agriculture and ocean commerce, with the beginnings of some struggling manufactures; the five Middle Colonies had a population of not quite 1,000,000; they were almost wholly agricultural and furnished the food supplies; the four Southern Colonies, with a population of more than 1,000,000/ were also 1 Census Report on Growth of Population, 1909, p. 9. 180 CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 181 agricultural, but their chief product was tobacco (the 1775 cotton planting being then only just introduced and the cotton-gin being not yet invented), and the greater part of this was raised for export. These elementary facts must be considered in order properly to understand the military events of the Revolu- tion. The Northern and Southern Colonies were so far separated that they were not within supporting distance; and by its command of the sea 1 England was able to move its troops in attack upon one or the other in one-fourth of the time that the Americans could move from one to the defence of the other. The Northern and Southern campaigns were therefore entirely distinct and separate ; and each section, for the most part, relied upon itself for its defence. Moreover, the lack of identity in interest between the three groups of Colonies produced jealousies in the small body of Congress, where the vote was always by States; and these jealousies prevented the utilization of the full military resources of the country. 2 While Congress did not possess any specific power to enforce its resolutions, yet in those matters where the States were in unanimous accord, the State government was quite ready to exert its sovereign power to carry these resolves into effect. But where there was only a narrow majority, each State carried them out or not as it saw fit; 3 and each State was keenly alert, both in Congress and in its own legislature, to see that the effect of any measure did not give to one State an advantage over another. Against this sectionalism, which applied to 1 Sparks, VII, 169, 170, 196, 337, 371; Mahan, 397-400. 2 Sparks, VII, 67, 167, 225, 298, 333, 391. 3 " One State yields obedience, and another refuses it, while a third mutilates and adopts the measure in part only, and all vary in time and manner." (Washington to Custis, Sparks, VII, 442.) 182 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1775 the assembling and movements of troops as well as to other matters, Washington's letters contain a series of protests, made year after year in temperate and judicious but none the less strong and forcible language. But they were all in vain. British pians As the State of Virginia contained nearly one-fifth of the colonies the entire population, and the four Southern States about forty per cent of it, the British constantly sought to de- tach these States from their allegiance to the cause of the United Colonies; hoping to accomplish this, first by conquest and after conquest by conciliation. The true military principle for suppressing the Revolution was to defeat, crush and disperse Washington's army, wherever it was, and to capture or kill Washington. Had the British adhered to this principle, and successfully carried it into effect, there is slight reason to doubt that the Revolution would, at that time, have failed. But they did not adopt this principle. Their plans were always based on acquiring territory and re-establishing piecemeal the authority of the crown. Thus they took New York and held it as their base of operations; captured Phila- delphia and then lost it; occupied Newport with a view to retaking Boston, but never carried out that part of the plan; tried to take Charleston and failed ; sent Burgoyne on an abortive expedition down the Hudson in the hope of detaching New England from the Central States ; and then abandoned all aggressive movements at the North and attempted to wear out the Revolution by petty raids into Connecticut, New Jersey and Virginia. Fi- nally, when the war had been in progress for four years without producing any substantial results except the establishment of a base at New York, it was determined to make the South the principal theatre of operations, in CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 183 the hope that if the North could not be subdued, at least 1775 its importance could be greatly diminished and its ex- pansion prevented by restoring the populous Southern Colonies to British allegiance, and thus creating a barrier on the south similar to that of Canada on the north. 1 The war began at the South in much the same fashion as at the North. The attack at Lexington and Patrick Henry's eloquence caused the four Southern Colonies to break out into such open resistance that three of the royal governors found it necessary to seek refuge on British ships of war, and to write home asking that regular troops be sent to their assistance. Pending the arrival iamb of these there were conflicts with the militia. The first of these was in Virginia, at the Great Bridge over the va. Elizabeth River, about nine miles from Norfolk. 2 In this encounter the British were defeated and their com- Dec. 9 manding officer fell, pierced by fourteen bullets. The militia pursued them and took possession of Norfolk. 2 Soon afterward the royal governor, from his ships, called 1776 on the town to surrender; and this being refused he bom- Jan. 1 barded it for three days, set fire to it and reduced it to Jan. 4 ashes. 3 The next clash was in North Carolina, at Moore's Moore's Bridge. N. C. Bridge, over a branch of the Cape Fear River, near the site of the present town of Fayetteville. The contestants Feb. 27 were about 1,500 tory militia, raised by the royal governor, 1 There were ten principal battles at the North, with aggregate losses of about 24,000 men; and eleven at the South, with losses of about 18,000. In numbers, importance and losses the battles in the South were about equal to those at the North; the duration of the campaigns in each section was about the same — four years. The crowning victory at Yorktown was due in about equal measure to the previous campaigns on each side of the Potomac, and to the skill with which Washington profited by the results of both. 2 Dawson, 122-126. s Dawson, 122-126. 184 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 Arrival of Regular Troops Feb. 13 May 3 Jan. June 4 June 9 Preparations for the Defence of Charleston 1775 June 26 Nov. 4 Dec. 28 May and 1,000 Colonial militia, called out by the Provincial Council and commanded by General Moore. It was dis- astrous to the tories; 30 of them were killed or wounded, their leader and 850 men were captured and the rest fled; the Colonials lost only two men slightly wounded, and they captured a large quantity of supplies, including 1,500 rifles and a military chest containing £15,000 in specie. 1 Meanwhile the regular troops which had been called for were on their way. Comwallis, with 7 regiments, convoyed by a squadron of 2 ships of the line and 6 frigates mounting in all 230 guns, sailed from Cork and arrived at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. Clinton was already there, having been despatched from Boston with parts of 2 regiments. He was senior to Corn- wallis and took command of all the troops. He decided to proceed to the attack of Charleston, where he arrived outside the bar, and soon after landed part of his troops on Long Island. 2 On the American side preparations were not lacking to defend the South. By successive resolutions Congress requested North Carolina to raise 2 battalions, South Carolina 3, Georgia 1, and Virginia 6 — all to be on the Continental establishment. 3 It was some time before these troops were raised, but meanwhile South Carolina was taking energetic measures for its own defence. Several months before Congress passed its resolutions the State had raised 4 regiments of its own; and having learned, by intercepted despatches 4 to the royal governor, first that it was intended to send regular troops to coerce the South, and later that Cornwallis with his 7 regiments 1 Dawson, 128-134. 3 Jour. Cont. Cong., II, 107, 325, 463. 2 Ibid., 135, 140, 142. * Lossing, II, 543. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 185 was about to sail from Cork, the State began the con- i?76 struction of elaborate fortifications to defend Charleston harbor. 1 These were not quite finished when Parker's fleet with Clinton's and Cornwallis's soldiers appeared off the bar. Simultaneously 2 battalions arrived from June Virginia and 1 from North Carolina, carrying the total strength of the garrison (including militia) to more than 6,000 men. 2 Charles Lee, who had been sent from Boston by Washington, arrived at the same time and took com- mand. The fortifications were constructed on Sullivan's Island, on the north side of the entrance to the harbor; on James Island, on its south side; at Haddrell's Point, nearer to the city; and on the wharves of the city itself. 3 In all they mounted nearly 100 cannon; and there was a good supply of powder on hand, part of which had been purchased in the West Indies a year before and part of it captured from a British supply ship at St. Augustine, by a cruiser which the gentlemen of Charleston had fitted out for that purpose. The principal fort was on the southern side of Sullivan's Island; and under the name of Fort Moultrie that point has ever since been strongly fortified. In 1776 its fort had 4 bastions and was made of soft palmetto logs and earth, with a deep ditch, and parapets 16 feet thick mounting 30 guns. It was large enough for a garrison of 1,000 men, but its defenders numbered only 344, the 2d South Carolina Regiment, under command of Colonel William Moultrie. 4 The 1st Regiment, Colonel Gadsden, was at Fort Johnson on James Island, and the 3d Regiment, Colonel Thomson, was on the eastern end of Sullivan's Island; he was to 1 Moultrie's Memoirs of the American Revolution, I, 140. 2 Marshall's Washington, I, 72. s Moultrie, I, 142, 146. 4 Gordon, II, 283; Lossing, II, 544-546. 186 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 177C Defence of Charleston June 4 June 28 June 28 Attack on Sullivan's Island oppose any attempt of Clinton's men to cross the inlet known as the " Breach," which separated Long Island from Sullivan's. The rest of the defending force was distributed at HaddrelFs Point, where Lee had his head- quarters, and in the city. 1 The soul of the defence was Moultrie. 2 Lee arrived three weeks before the attack began and gave a great many orders, most of them foolish; but his reputation was so great on account of his alleged services in various European armies that he was looked up to as a great soldier and cheerfully obeyed. He gave it as his opinion that Fort Moultrie would be a "mere slaughter pen" and would have to be abandoned; and in the orders which he kept sending to Moultrie, 3 he impressed daily upon him the importance of securing his retreat and his impa- tience that a bridge of boats, which he had ordered to be built, was not finished. Moultrie built the bridge as or- dered, but he remained in the fort; and he afterward wrote that he "never was uneasy on not having a retreat" because he did not imagine that the enemy could force him "to that necessity." 4 Three weeks were spent by Parker and Clinton in getting the ships over the bar, landing the troops on Long Island and making other preparations. 5 Finally the attack was made. Two ships of the line and two frigates were to sail in under topsails and anchor off Fort Sullivan; three frigates were to pass them on the west and anchor between Fort Sullivan and the city where 1 Gordon, II, 283. 2 Fiske, Amer. Rev., I, 198, 199; Amer. Archives, 4, VI, 1191. 3 More than twenty of these have been preserved. (Amer. Archives, 4, VI, 1186.) * Lossing, II, 547. 5 Stedman, I, 186; Lee's Report, Sparks, Letters, I, 243-247; Lossing, II, 548-550. •2 :! 4 1. Actieou S. Bristol 3. Experiment 4. Solebay i. Sphynz (i. Syren 7. Thunder BomTj 5. Friendship Sullivan's Island (Charleston) June 29, 1776 3° Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History- of the United States and Its People CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 187 they could enfilade the fort and bombard its western side 1776 which was not quite finished. A bomb-ship, or mortar- boat, escorted by the remaining frigate was to anchor south-east of the fort and bombard it from that side. Clinton's troops were to cross the "Breach" inlet from Long Island, in boats or by fording, drive back Thom- son's regiment and take the fort in the rear. The ships went in as ordered; but Clinton's men never got across the inlet. It proved to be full of sand-bars, on which the water was only a few inches deep, and the boats ran aground; and between these were deep holes where the men sank in up to their necks. Thomson's regiment also opened fire on them. They returned to Long Island and took no part in the battle. The action thus devolved entirely on the navy. For June 28, ten hours they bombarded the fort, and the fort replied 9 p A m. ' with equal spirit. In the middle of the action the flag- ship (Bristol) swung around so as to be exposed to en- filade, and Moultrie's men swept her decks so effectively that every man on them was killed or wounded. 1 The ships were at such close range that musketry fire was used with deadly effect. The mortar-boat was disabled early in the action ; and the three frigates, which were to pass the rest of the squadron and take position between the fort and the city, grounded on the " Middle Shoal" (where Fort Sumter was afterward built). Two of them got off after a few hours, but the third stuck fast, and was abandoned and blown up the following morning. After darkness had set in and the tide was running ebb, having made no impression on the fort Parker withdrew out of range to his former anchorage in the "Five Fathom Hole." He had lost 64 killed and 161 wounded; one of 1 Parker's Report, Dawson, 141. 188 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1776 July 19 Aug. 1 Results of the British Defeat at Charleston 1777 Feb. 19 Feb. 5 1778 his ships had been struck 70 times, one was abandoned and the others were so seriously injured that it was several months before the repairs were completed. The loss in the fort had been only 17 killed and 20 wounded. 1 Parker and Clinton remained for three weeks, repairing damages. Then Clinton sailed north convoyed by the one frigate that was in condition to go to sea. He ar- rived on Staten Island in time to take part in the attack on New York. 2 The defence of Charleston was a brilliant victory. Seven newly organized regiments, which had never before been under fire, had beaten off 7 regiments of regulars and 8 ships of war whose guns outnumbered 6 to 1 those of Fort Sullivan. It inspirited the South, cheered the whole country and disheartened the British. They made no further movements in the South for two and a half years. The Continental battalions of the four Southern States, which in 1777 were increased to 31 in number, 3 were duly organized; and in the absence of military operations near their homes they were available for ser- vice under Washington. The entire quota of Virginia and North Carolina (24 battalions) were ordered to join Washington; they were engaged in the battles around Philadelphia, and they remained with him until the British began anew their attack on the South. This renewal began in the winter of 1778-79. Wash- ington was then at Middlebrook, 4 with his troops in can- tonments through the Highlands to Connecticut. Clinton had 27,803 men 5 (exclusive of officers) at New York and 5,789 at Newport. Before leaving Philadelphia he had 1 Lee's Report, Dawson, 139. 3 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 90, 133. 8 Sparks, V, 542. 2 Sparks, IV, 27. * Ante, p, 155. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 189 received instructions, due to the French alliance, to ins send 5,000 men to St. Lucia and 3,000 to Georgia or Florida; to abandon offensive operations at the North; and in the following winter to make an attack on the Southern Colonies. "Georgia should be first taken, and the passage into South Carolina will then be compara- March 8 tively easy." * March 21 The retreat to New York and the operations at New- port delayed for several months the execution of these orders; but toward the close of the year these expeditions left New York for their destinations, the first for St. Nov. 4 Lucia and the second for Georgia. The latter consisted Nov. 27 of 2 British battalions, 2 Hessian battalions, 4 battalions British Troops 7 Sent to of New York tories under Cruger and De Lancey and a Georgia detachment of royal artillery — numbering in all about 3,500 men, and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Archi- bald Campbell of the 71st Highlanders. Convoyed by a British squadron under Commodore Hyde Parker, it arrived safely at Tybee Island, at the mouth of the Dec. 23 Savannah River. 2 These movements were not made without the knowl- Partisan edge of Washington and of Congress; and it was also in Georgia known that the predatory warfare which had been car- ried on during the last two years between the Georgia loyalists who had taken refuge in Florida, on the one side, and the Colonial militia of Georgia and South Caro- lina under Major-General Robert Howe, on the other side, had resulted adversely to the latter; and that the former were now preparing to invade both Georgia and South Carolina. Congress thereupon passed resolutions requesting the Governor of Virginia to forward 1,000 men Oct. 17 1 Germain to Clinton, Sparks, V, 549. 2 Campbell's Report, Dawson, 477. 190 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 and the Governor of North Carolina to send 3,000 men, sept. 25 for the defence of the other two Southern States; and at the same time directed Howe to repair to Washington's head-quarters and Lincoln to take his place as commander of the Southern Department. 1 These resolutions were passed without consulting Washington, but he fully con- curred in the selection of Lincoln in whom he had the Dec. 19 highest confidence. When Lincoln arrived at Charleston situation at the situation was as follows: Campbell with 3,500 men when Lincoln on transports was approaching the mouth of the Savannah mand River; Prevost with 2,000 men was moving north from Florida, part of his force marching by land and part of them being transported by water; these two forces were to effect a junction and under Prevost's orders were to conquer Georgia first and then South Carolina; 2 Robert Howe, with about 1,000 (1st and 2d Georgia, 3d and 4th South Carolina and some Georgia militia) was at Fort Sunbury (the site of Fort McAllister in the Civil War), about 20 miles south of Savannah; Lincoln was at Charleston, with perhaps 1,500 men (1st and 2d South Carolina and some militia); the North Carolina and Virginia troops were assembling, and part of them were on the march but none of them had yet arrived. 3 About Dec. 25 Howe heard of the arrival of Campbell off the Savannah River and of the approach of Prevost from Florida at the same time. Leaving part of his force at Sunbury, he quickly marched back to the defence of Savannah. On arriving there he posted his little force as follows: the Georgia regiments on the east of the town with their left flank on the river; the South Carolina regiments across the road leading into town from the south-east, 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., XII, 950, 951, 1021; Sparks, VI, 74, 83. 2 Germain to Clinton, Sparks, V, 549. s Lossing, II, 525. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 191 their right flank protected by a swamp, and one com- ms pany in advance on a hill about two miles down the river; the Georgia militia in observation on the main road lead- ing into town from the south. 1 While Howe was making these dispositions, Campbell capture of , . , . . Savannah had reconnoitred the river and captured some citizens who gave him quite accurate information in regard to the situation at Savannah and the small force opposed to him. He decided to attack without waiting for a junction with Prevost. Accordingly the ships came over the bar, sailed up the river with a flood tide and anchored about two miles below the city. At daybreak Dec 2s the debarkation began, and the first troops who landed Dec 29 climbed the bluff (where Fort Jackson was afterward built) and were received by a smart fire from the com- pany of the Carolina regiment, in which 3 Highlanders were killed and 5 wounded. But this company was completely outnumbered and driven back and the de- barkation then proceeded. When this was completed, 2 p.m. Campbell moved forward to within 1,000 yards of Howe's position; he then made a feint against Howe's left, near the river, and at the same time sent his light infantry supported by one of the New York toiy battalions accom- panied by a negro guide, who led them along a blind path 3 p. m. through the swamp on Howe's right. These came out of the swamp on the main Ogeechee Road, and brush- ing aside the Georgia militia they were directly in rear of Howe. Simultaneously Campbell attacked Howe in front. Completely overpowered by such superior num- bers, Howe and the two Carolina regiments made their escape through the town and across the swamps to the west of it. But the Georgia troops, who were on 1 Dawson, 474; Campbell's Report, Dawson, 478. 192 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1778 Howe's left, were less fortunate and were nearly all captured. Campbell's losses were only 7 killed and 19 wounded; he captured 38 officers and 415 men, besides 45 cannon, 23 mortars and a large amount of ammunition and stores. He states that 83 Americans were found dead in Savannah and 11 wounded; a considerable number were drowned in attempting to escape through the swamps. 1 The British victory was complete. Howe was tried by court-martial, 2 but was acquitted and served under Washington until the close of the war. 3 Meanwhile Prevost was marching north through Geor- gia. 4 He met with slight resistance at Fort Sunbury, 1779 and captured the place and its garrison of 200 men with- jan. 6 out difficulty. Then he pressed on to Savannah, effected Jan. 19 his junction with Campbell, took command of the united conquest of forces and promptly sent Campbell up the river 120 miles to Augusta. This place was also taken without serious Jan. 29 opposition, the Provincial militia retreating as Campbell approached. Leaving a garrison at Augusta, Campbell proceeded to establish posts at various places in western Georgia. 5 Within six weeks from the time Campbell landed at Savannah the conquest of Georgia was complete, and the royal governor was requested to return from England and resume his government. 6 1 Dawson, Campbell's Report, 477-479. 3 Sparks, V, 451. 3 Ibid., VI, 299; VII, 74-88, 94, 363, 382, 563; VIII, 457. 4 If contemporary accounts are to be relied upon, the damage to private property on this march, and the one which soon followed it from Savannah to Charleston, was even greater than that on the more famous march through Georgia eighty-six years later. (See Gordon, III, 259, 261.) 5 Stedman, II, 106-108. 8 Lossing, II, 528. Movements of American forces are shown in blue and of French auxiliaries in black lines; British are shown in red. Operations in 177S and 1779 are designated by broken lines. Operations in 1780 in continuous lines. Gen. Gates > Sir Henry Clinton and Earl-Cornwallis 32 Movements of partisans and ^r-ir ^*V|^?^tiH fjaZff^ Tr- of small bodies of troops ^MXSSSSJffi^^ are shown in fine lines Arrows indicate direction and Frent Sept. 10 to Oct. 19, lff^ Evacuated Jul^.fij: « Battles and skirmishes S^uiujui-y Captured, BUFFALO. N. Y. Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company^ Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People South Carolina 1779-1780 CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 193 Lincoln, however, was not disposed to give up South 1779 Carolina without a struggle, and he even contemplated an attempt to reconquer Georgia. 1 Additional militia had come in and the North Carolina regiments were be- ginning to arrive. With these and the troops which he had found at Charleston on his arrival, he made up a force of about 3,500 men, of whom 1,000 were counted as "regulars" because they were on the Continental establishment, 1,400 were armed militia and 1,000 were unarmed, undisciplined and untractable men. With Defence of this force he marched toward Savannah, but it fell before Carolina he arrived, and picking up the remnants of the garrison which had escaped with Howe, he took post on the east Jan. 3 bank of the river, at the hamlet of Purysburg, about 15 miles above Savannah. Nearly opposite to him, at the hamlet of Ebenezer, was Prevost, whose force of more than 5,000 men, the greater part of them British regulars, was stationed at various points along the river from Savannah to Augusta, with some outlying posts in the western part of the State. 2 Notwithstanding the odds against him, the stout- hearted Lincoln proceeded with his plans, not only to defend South Carolina but to recapture Georgia. Some preliminary skirmishes, resulting favorably to the Ameri- cans, confirmed his intentions in this respect. At Beau- Action at fort, on Port Royal Island, a force of four companies of regulars, sent by sea to capture that island, was met and Feb. 3 defeated by the militia which Moultrie brought out from Charleston to oppose them. Ten days later, in the upper 1 Lincoln to Washington, Sparks, Letters, II, 245. 2 Lossing, II, 552; Gordon, III, 229; Marshall, II, 296; Dawson, 480; Life of Lincoln. 194 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1779 Engagement at Kettle Creek Feb. 14 Lincoln Takes the Offensive Feb. 27 part of Georgia, 160 miles from the sea-coast, the tory militia under Colonel Boyd had a collision with the Pro- vincial militia under Colonel Andrew Pickens. The locality was on Kettle Creek, Wilkes County, beyond Augusta. Boyd was severely wounded, more than 40 of his men were killed, a large number wounded, 75 were captured and the rest dispersed. The captives were all tried for treason and 5 of them were hanged. Pickens lost only 9 killed and 23 wounded. 1 The tory militia of the Carolinas never afterward assembled in sufficient numbers to give any trouble. Encouraged by these successes, Lincoln, whose force had increased to between 6,000 and 7,000 men by the arrival of North Carolina and Virginia troops and the gathering of militia, now felt strong enough to take the offensive. For this purpose he sent Ashe with 1,500 men up the east bank of the river to attack Augusta. 2 Prevost then realized that his force was too much scat- tered; he drew in the outlying garrisons in the upper part of the State, and uniting them with that of Augusta under Campbell marched them all down the west bank of the river, intending to concentrate his entire force at Ebenezer. 3 When Lincoln heard of this he ordered Ashe to follow Campbell down the west bank; and Ashe did so, going into camp in the angle between Briar Creek and the river, about 53 miles above Savannah. Then Prevost planned and carried out an admirable counter-stroke. He sent his younger brother, Lieutenant- Colonel Prevost, with portions of the 60th and 71st Regiments, some light infantry, a troop of cavalry and some Provincials — in all about 900 men — to make a 1 Dawson, 481. a Ibid., 487. 3 Ibid., Lincoln's Report, 492; Prevost's Report, 493. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 195 detour of about 50 miles, crossing Briar Creek far above 1779 Ashe's camp and coming down on his rear. In order to divert Ashe's attention from the real movement a demon- stration was made against his front by one battalion of the 71st Regiment. The movement was carried out as smoothly as at an Battle of annual manoeuvre. Ashe was completely surprised and March 3 ignominiously defeated. Only 450 of his men rejoined Lincoln's army. The rest — more than two-thirds of the whole force — were lost. About 150 were killed or wounded; as many more were drowned in attempting to cross the river; 27 officers and nearly 200 men were taken prisoners; nearly 600 succeeded in escaping and went home. Young Prevost lost 5 killed and 11 wounded. 1 Ashe was tried by court-martial and severely cen- sured; he was soon after taken prisoner, contracted small-pox and died. He was a patriot of the highest character, but without military experience or instinct. 2 This brilliant action of the British destroyed the pos- Lincoln Ad- sibility of recovering Georgia at that time. But Lincoln, Augusta whose courage and determination were perhaps greater than his military skill, did not think so. He determined to cross the Savannah River, cut off the enemy's com- munications with the back country and protect the leg- islature which had been summoned to meet at Augusta. 3 Leaving about 1,000 men under Moultrie on the lower river, at Purysburg and the Black Swamp, with the other 4,000 men of his command he marched up the river, A P rii23 crossed it and moved on toward Augusta. 3 In so doing he uncovered the road to Charleston, unless Moultrie could hold Purysburg. 1 Dawson, 489-491; Lincoln's Report, 493; Prevost's Report, 494. 2 Dawson, 494. 3 Ibid., 495, 496. 196 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1779 As soon as Prevost detected the movement he advanced April 29 against Purysburg, intending at first only to make a demonstration which would bring Lincoln back. But as Moultrie's force was too small to oppose him, and as Prevost met less resistance than he had anticipated, he prevost Ad- pushed on to Charleston, driving Moultrie before him. chartestoa Expresses had been sent to Lincoln begging him to re- turn; but he believed that Prevost's movement was only a feint and he was not to be deterred from his intention of going to Augusta. May io Finally, Prevost crossed the Ashley River and appeared before Charleston. The situation there was desperate, but the people were energetic; the fortifications had all been on the side toward the sea, but during Prevost's advance lines were laid out on the land side, between the Ashley and Cooper Rivers, and their construction vigor- ously pushed; the slaves were armed; the entire able- bodied population turned out as militia. Fortunately, Feb. 2 Pulaski's Legion, 1 which had been ordered by Congress from New Jersey to the South, had just completed its sixty May ii days' march, and arrived at the same time as Prevost. 2 May 12 The next day Prevost summoned the town to surren- der, and some rather discreditable proposals were put for- 1 Pulaski was a Polish revolutionist who had been obliged to flee from his own country in 1771, and after serving in the Turkish army had come to America in 1777. Congress made him a brigadier-general, and he served at the Brandywine and Germantown. By resolution of March 28, 1778, Congress authorized him to raise and command "an independent corps of 68 horse and 200 foot, the horse to be armed with lances and the foot to be equipped as light infantry." It was called "Pulaski's Legion," and was independent of and additional to the regular military establish- ment planned by Steuben and adopted by Congress, May 27, 1778. Con- gress considered this legion as under its special orders, and by frequent resolutions ordered it from one point to another. (Jour. Cont. Cong., X, 291; XII, 983; XIII, 132.) 2 Dawson, 496-498. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 197 ward by the defenders that South Carolina should remain 1779 neutral during the rest of the war and its status be de- Charleston termined by the treaty of peace when made; Prevost surrender rejected this and demanded an unconditional surrender. This was refused, and the town prepared to receive an assault. 1 Prevost, however, did not assault. Lincoln was al- ready marching to the relief of Charleston; he had per- sisted in his intention of going to Augusta, but the news he received there from Charleston convinced him that Prevost intended something more serious than a feint, and he was now hurrying back with all possible speed. Prevost intercepted a letter from Lincoln to Moultrie telling of his approach, and he also knew of Pulaski's arrival ; his force was less than 3,000 men, far inferior to that of Lincoln; the defenders' trenches were strong, and could not be carried without heavy loss. Prevost therefore determined to withdraw from Prevost with- Charleston. 2 As Lincoln was advancing by the road Charleston from Savannah, Prevost was forced to retire by the islands which, with numerous marshes and inlets, form the sea-coast from Charleston to Savannah. He had abundant shipping to facilitate such a movement. He therefore crossed the Ashley River during the night, May 13 marched over to Stono Inlet, crossed that and estab- lished himself on John's Island. To protect his position and permit him to withdraw gradually and without molestation to Savannah, a bridge-head was constructed on the main-land at Stono Ferry. It consisted of three strong redoubts, with heavy abatis in front; and in its rear was a bridge of boats to John's Island. l iD^ 1 Gordon, III, 257; Lossing, II, 554; Marshall, 1,299; Stedman, II, 112. 2 Dawson, 498, 499; Stedman, II, 112-115. 198 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1779 The troops were gradually sent back through the Sea Islands to Savannah, until finally only the rear guard re- mained at Stono Ferry. It consisted of one battalion of the 71st Highlanders, the Hessian regiment Von Trum- bach, a detachment of artillery and ( some Carolina loyalists — in all about 900 men. All the boats but one had been taken away in connection with the withdrawal of the other troops through the Sea Islands, and this rear guard was thus in a somewhat perilous position. Lincoln determined to attack and if possible capture it. He now had between 6,000 and 7,000 men in Charleston, but he only brought 1,200 men into action. His plan was to send Moultrie, "with all the troops that can be spared from Charleston," to make a demonstration on James Island so as to prevent reinforcements from com- ing to the assistance of the rear guard, and if circum- stances were favorable to land his men on John's Island and cut off their retreat. The real movement was under Lincoln's own direction, and was an attack on the main- land against the bridge-head. 1 June 20 Lincoln crossed the Ashley River soon after midnight and began his march across to Stono Ferry, a distance of about 8 miles. His left wing consisted of the South Battle of Carolina Continentals under Huger; his right, of the Carolina militia; in the reserve were the Virginia militia; and he had 6 pieces of artillery and a small body of cavalry. He had to advance through a dense growth of pine saplings on one flank and "an open forest of stately pines" on the other flank; and it was difficult to maintain connection between them. But a little after sunrise he approached the redoubts. The Hessians re- treated; but 2 companies of the Highlanders made 1 Dawson, 499, 500; Lowell, 241; Lee's Memoirs, 130, 131. Stono Ferry 7 A. M. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 199 such a stout defence that, according to Stedman, only 1773 11 men succeeded in making their retreat, all the rest being either killed or wounded. 1 The entire British force was then brought into action, and there was stiff fighting at close quarters, and some- times hand to hand with the bayonet, for about an hour. Then reinforcements from the western end of John's Island came in sight. It was to prevent this that Moul- trie had been sent by way of James Island; but through some misunderstanding there was delay in Moultrie's movements and he did not arrive in time. 2 Lincoln therefore ordered a retreat, and he moved back to Charleston in good order. The British followed him a short distance and then abandoned the pursuit. The Americans lost 146 killed and wounded and 165 missing. The British loss was 26 killed, 103 wounded and 1 missing. 3 Lincoln did not again molest Prevost, and the latter retired slowly from island to island, and finally reached Savannah. An outpost was left at Beaufort, on Port Royal Island. The sickly season and intense heat put a stop to all military operations for the next two months. During this interval, Governor Rutledge, Lincoln, the French consul and the citizens of Charleston — all wrote letters 1 to d'Estaing, begging him to come to their assistance. D'Estaing had promised to be on the American coast in May, but he stayed in the West Indies to capture St. Vincent and Grenada. 4 Then he sailed for Haiti, and there the letters from Charleston safely reached him. 5 1 Stedman, II, 117. ' Dawson, 500; Prevost's Report, 503. * Dawson, 500; Prevost's Report, 503. 4 Ante, p. 171. s Sparks, VI, 359. 200 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1779 Sept. 4 D'Estaing Returns to America Sept. 9 D'Estaing Lands Sept. 12 Sept. 13 He decided to sail for Savannah. His arrival was so unexpected that off the mouth of the river he captured a British ship of the line, a frigate and two supply ships. 1 Prevost promptly called in his outlying detach- ments, at Sunbury and Beaufort, and prepared for de- fence; and Lincoln with equal alacrity marched toward Savannah. D'Estaing brought with him 6,000 soldiers and a squadron of 37 ships with over 2,000 guns. 2 Compared with this the British ships on the Southern coast were in- significant. Prevost had less than 3,000 men. 2 Lincoln had about 1,000 Continentals, 2 and a few months before he had gathered together nearly 5,000 militia. Adding these to the 6,000 of d'Estaing, Prevost was outnumbered 4 to 1. With good leadership and prompt action there was now an opportunity to capture Prevost 's entire force; then proceed to the North, fight the British fleet, which was inferior to d'Estaing's, unite with Washington in an attack on New York and end the war. But these proved to be idle dreams; for the leadership was poor and the action was slow. D'Estaing had sent some of his ships in advance to Charleston to concert plans with Lincoln; when his main body anchored off Tybee Island; small vessels were arriving from Charleston to aid in landing his troops, and Lincoln was on the march from Charleston. It was decided to make the landing through Ossabaw Sound, about 12 miles south of Tybee Island; the troops came ashore at a plantation called Beaulieu, about 8 miles due south of Savannah. D'Estaing landed only 3,500 men, but with these he marched to Savannah the next day and demanded a "surrender to the arms of 1 Dawson, 563; Stedman, II, 122-123. J Keim, 255. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 201 the King of France." * Prevost asked for twenty-four ms hours to consider it, his object being to gain time till the arrival of the Beaufort garrison; he then declined to surrender. Some skirmishing took place during the sept, ig next three days, and then Lincoln arrived, having crossed Lincoln joins the river several miles above Savannah. He brought savannah at with him, however, only 600 Continentals and 750 mili- tia. 2 His militia came and went at their own will, and rendered obedience — and not much of that — only to the State officials. On four days' notice it was probably not possible for Lincoln to despatch a larger force. Twelve days had now elapsed since d'Estaing's fleet Defence of had first been sighted, and during that time Prevost and his engineers and other officers had been working with tremendous energy. 2 The 4 men-of-war had retired up the river; their guns and sailors were being landed to take positions in the trenches; 2 of the ships and 4 transports had been sunk in the river, blocking the channel below the town ; smaller vessels had been scuttled and a boom stretched across the river above the town to prevent fire rafts from coming down; gangs of 4,000 negroes had been working in reliefs, night and day, under the direction of the soldiers, in throwing up redoubts and trenches, cutting timber and building abatis. 3 The line extended from the swamp on the west of the town around to the river on the east. It was about 1,100 yards long, and there were five strong redoubts made of soft wood and earth and connected by trenches, with traverses at suitable intervals. In these were posted the regulars and Provincials which Campbell had brought 1 Dawson, 563; Stedman, II, 123-124. 2 Ibid., 564; ibid., II, 125-133; Lossing, II, 530. 3 Ibid., 565; ibid., II, 125-133; Moultrie, II, 33; Gordon, III, 328-332; Lee's Memoirs, 55-60; Lossing, II, 528-531. 202 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1779 from New York and Prevost from Florida. Prevost states their numbers at only 2,360 effective, but it is hard to reconcile this with the official reports of six months before when they numbered over 5,000, and in the meantime they had had no severe losses. Including the sailors, the volunteers from the transports and the negroes whom he armed, he probably had in the trenches fully 4,000 men. siege of Moultrie recorded his opinion that if the works had been assaulted the day after the Americans joined the French they would have been carried. D'Estaing and Lincoln thought differently, and decided on a siege. 1 Artillery had to be landed from the ships and brought up from Beaulieu with insufficient transportation. A week se P t. 23 went by before ground was broken for the approaches and ten days more before the artillery opened fire. In the meantime Prevost had made two small sorties which were repulsed. This was of small consequence. The important thing was that he had gained in all eighteen more days for his negroes to work on the trenches and his sailors to mount their guns. When the allies made their junction he had only 12 guns in place; when their artil- lery was ready he had mounted 76 guns — pieces of 6, 9 and 18 pounds. Oct. 4 Finally the cannonade opened and continued almost oct. 9 without interruption for five days. Some houses were damaged and a few persons injured in the town; but no harm was done to the trenches or their defenders. D'Estaing then became anxious. He was impatient to send some of his ships back to the West Indies and the rest to France. He had already been five weeks on the American coast. His engineers told him that it 1 Prevost's Report, Dawson, 566. ^Mar S^ □ □ □ □ □ (** /!!]□□□□ na as ki» %^*Nff DDDDDDD 3 '^-;\Cv /jS Savanna)! City SEW£ AUGUST, vi-.ty ^5 V *.'H\ ^ v . II American \ Camp vi « -4. As.'Vjf American! British French ^ 5^ • \ ^ 'French Camp 100 200 300 Scale of Yards Americans — 1 British ^ m A. Wilkin's Battery, 16 Guns .B. Gibb's Battery, 9 Guns C. Ferguson's Battery, 6 Gnns D. Old Magazine, 6 Guns E. Citadel, 66 Guns F. Where garrison laid dowi arms G. Gadsden's Wharf, 7 Guns H.01d Indian Wharf, 5 Guns I. Governor's Bridge, 3 Gun 1. 4 Gnus K. Darrell's, 7 Guns • Redoubts Vessels behind Boom L'A venture, 24 Guns Boston, 32 Guns LePolaque, 16 Guns Ranger, 20 Guns Providence, 32 Guns Five Galleys Charleston Harbor jAbff'oTt Johnson ings Pt urtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio Cl. ery's History of the United States and Its People CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 203 would take ten days more to complete the sap which was 1779 about 300 yards from British trenches just south of the town. He would not wait. It was either raise the siege or make an assault. 1 He decided on the latter. The allied camp was about 1,200 yards south of the The Allies British lines ; the French on the right, the Americans on British Lines the left. The plan of assault was to send Huger with the South Carolina militia to make a demonstration against the works on the east or left of the British line; while the main attack was to be made on the opposite flank, in two columns. One of these, under Count Dillon, was to make its way along the base of the bluff and on the edge of the swamp, where it would be protected from British fire, and when near the river it was to climb the bluff and attack the Sailor's Battery, which formed the extreme right of the British lines. 1 The other column was to be led by d'Estaing and Lincoln and was to at- tack the Spring Hill redoubt, at the south-west angle of the lines, where the road from Augusta rose to the bluff from the causeway across the swamp. There were 3,500 French and 850 Americans in the two columns. The troops were to move at 4 o'clock in the morning so as to make the assault at dawn. There was delay, however, in getting started, and it Oct. 9 was broad daylight when Dillon, who had lost his way in the swamp, was discovered. He was not near enough to the bluff to be sheltered from fire, and after losing heavily he retreated to camp without having reached the enemy's lines at all. The other column made a fierce attack and was warmly received. That portion of the lines was commanded by 1 Dawson, 565; Stedman, II, 125-133; Moultrie, II, 33; Gordon, III, 328-332; Lee's Memoirs, 55-60; Lossing, II, 528-531. 204 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1779 Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, the competent officer who had so successfully defended the bridge-head at Stono Ferry four months before. A Charleston sergeant who had deserted the day before had told him of the prepara- tions for the assault, and while Maitland's force (one battalion of 71st Regiment, one battalion of 60th and a company of marines) was far inferior in numbers to the assailants, he was ready to make a vigorous defence. The attack was made with the greatest gallantry. Al- though the column was exposed to the direct fire of the Spring Hill redoubt and to the cross-fire of the works on either side of it, yet the men pressed on until the colors of France and Carolina were planted on the parapet. A desperate hand-to-hand encounter continued for fifty- five minutes. D'Estaing was twice wounded, although not severely. Pulaski was horribly mangled, receiving wounds from which he died in a few days. The troops that did not reach the parapet were crowded in the ditch and on the glacis; and the Highlanders came out of their trenches on the left of the redoubt and mowed down the assailants with a terrible enfilade fire. Three standard-bearers of the Carolina colors, two lieutenants and a sergeant were killed in succession on top of the parapet. Repulse of gut the British did not yield an inch. They had driven back Huger when he made his demonstration on the opposite flank, and they now began to bring reinforce- ments from that flank to support Maitland. The losses of the French and Americans were so heavy that they were finally forced to yield, and they retreated to their camps. The British loss was 40 killed, 63 wounded and 52 missing. The allies lost 16 officers and 228 men killed CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 205 and 63 officers and 521 men wounded, a total of 837 — 1779 nearly six times as many as the defenders. 1 It was the severest fighting since Bunker Hill — a fierce assault and a splendid defence. The loss of officers, particularly the Americans, shows how gallantly they led their men, and seems to justify Moultrie's opinion that if the assault had been made when the allies made their junction three weeks before, and when the British works were only partially completed, it would have succeeded. The assault having been tried, and having failed, Lin- coln was for continuing the siege; but d'Estaing would not hear of it. He raised the siege at once and returned The Allies to his ships. Sending some of these to the West Indies, siege with the others he sailed for France 2 — on the same day Oct. 20 that Washington wrote to Lafayette: "We have been in D'Estaing hourly expectation, for the last fifteen days, of seeing France Count d'Estaing off Sandy Hook." 3 Henry Lee and Du Portail and Hamilton were on the Jersey coast watching for d'Estaing's arrival in order that they might deliver the letters which Washington had addressed to him in regard to joint operations after his arrival. 4 But he did not come their way. When d'Estaing left Savannah Lincoln was, of course, forced to march back to Charleston. D'Estaing mismanaged affairs at Savannah as badly as he had at Newport in the previous year. The feeling against him was very bitter. The South was terribly disheartened; and the militia, which had been gathering- in large numbers at Charleston, went home. The British were correspondingly elated. 1 Dawson, 565; Stedman, IT, 125-133; Moultrie, II, 33; Gordon, III, 328-332; Lee's Memoirs, 55-60; Lossing, II, 528-531. 3 Dawson, 569. s Sparks, VI, 383. * Ante, p. 171. 206 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1779 When Clinton heard of d'Estaing's arrival on the oct. 25 Southern coast he recalled to New York the 6,000 men Clinton's ex- who had so long been doing nothing at Newport; and as uS sSIth soon as news arrived of d'Estaing's defeat and departure for France, he determined to leave Knyphausen in com- mand at New York, while he himself went to the South, taking Cornwallis with him as second in command, to try a second time to capture Charleston, believing that if successful he could complete the conquest of the South and restore the entire section to the British crown. He also planned to operate on an entirely different line from that which he adopted in 1776. Having now a base at Savannah, that was his destination; and from there he intended to move along the islands, following in an op- posite direction the route of Campbell in the summer of 1779, and attack Charleston from the rear with his army, while the fleet assailed it in front. 1 His expedition was of no small proportions — 90 trans- ports and supply ships, carrying 8 British and 5 Hessian regiments, besides Provincials and artillery and cavalry, in all about 8,500 men. They were convoyed by a fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot, consisting of 5 ships of the line and 9 frigates, with 650 guns and crews numbering probably 5,000 men. 2 Dec. 26 The . ships sailed at a bad season, and off Hatteras 1780 encountered the winter gales; so that it was more than Jan. 30 thirty days before the ships began arriving at Tybee Island. They had been scattered and dispersed on the voyage; an ordnance ship had foundered; a ship con- taining Hessians was driven across the ocean to be beached on the Cornwall coast of England; most of the 1 Sparks, VI, 486; Lee's Memoirs, 62-75; Dawson, 570; Tarleton, 4, 35. 2 Dawson, 570, 571. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 207 artillery and cavalry horses perished; the stores, of which i78o there was a plentiful supply, were damaged. 1 After making a few of the most urgent repairs the fleet canton Lands sailed up to North Edisto Inlet and the troops were to n ar landed on John's Island about 30 miles south of Charles- Feb. n ton. Within a few days advance guards had crossed John's Island, and seized Stono Ferry, James Island, Wappoo Cut and the west bank of the Ashley River op- posite Charleston. Lincoln at that time had only 1,400 Continentals and 1,000 militia. Clinton had more than 8,000 regulars. Had he acted with the same celerity which Campbell displayed at Savannah the year before, he could have captured Charleston and its small garrison, conquered the whole of South Carolina and then marched northward to the Chesapeake. But whereas Campbell captured Savannah in six days from the time his ships arrived off the mouth of the Savannah River, Clinton did not cross the Ashley River and begin serious opera- March 29 tions against Charleston until seven weeks after he was ashore. In the meantime he had brought 1,200 men from Savannah and had sent about half of his transports back to New York for reinforcements; and the lighter ships of Arbuthnot's squadron had crossed the bar and anchored in Five Fathom Hole, to the south of Fort Moultrie. 1 Lincoln had been doing whatever was possible with preparation his slender resources. The lines across the peninsula, Charleston from the Cooper to the Ashley Rivers, were completed and strengthened. Washington had already sent all the 1 Dawson, 570-578; Lee, 62-75; Tarleton, 1-84; Stedman, II, 176-195; Lowell, 244-247, 301; Eelking, 176-184. The reports of Clinton and Arbuthnot, the articles of capitulation and other official documents are given in full in Tarleton. 208 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1779 North Carolina and Virginia Continentals which he had Nov. 23 in his army; 1 and these arrived while Clinton was mak- Dec io ing his preparations to cross the Ashley River, or during 1780 the siege. The American squadron under Commodore Feb. 20 Whipple — 9 vessels and 248 guns — were at first disposed to contest the entrance of Arbuthnot's ships into the harbor; 2 but it was not deemed strong enough for that April 7 purpose, and it was therefore withdrawn to the city; some of the guns were carried ashore and placed in the trenches, and 4 of the frigates and several merchant- ships were sunk in the two channels on either side of Shute's Folly (where Castle Pinckney was afterward built) at the mouth of the Cooper River. Their masts were connected by boom and chains, and chevaux-de-frise were placed on their decks. The passage into the Cooper River was thus effectually blocked; and behind the bar- rier was the rest of the squadron — 5 vessels and 124 guns. 2 Lincoln was thus enabled to preserve his communications with the main-land and keep open a route for the rein- forcements which were expected, or for a retreat, if that should be decided upon. Finally, Clinton had completed his preparations, crossed the Ashley River in force and opened Ins first parallel March 29 at 1,800 yards from Lincoln's works. A few days later April 8 Arbuthnot, with 7 frigates and 216 guns, ran by Fort Moultrie, with a loss of 27 men, and anchored between James Island and the city. 1 April io Clinton and Arbuthnot united in a demand for sur- render, and Lincoln sent back a brief but spirited refusal. The siege then began in earnest. 3 Clinton had lost 60 1 Sparks, VI, 415. 2 See foot-note, p. 207. 3 The most complete account of the siege of Charleston is that given in Moultrie's Memoirs of the American Revolution, II, 65-106, and Tarleton, 1-84. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 209 days in getting ready, and Lincoln had not been idle. 1780 Charleston was now surrounded by a series of redoubts siege of and trenches, forming an irregular triangle whose three sides had a total length of nearly five miles. On the water sides were 9 batteries with 60 guns. 1 On the land side there was a large hornwork astride the main road, "the Citadel," with 66 guns; in front of this a strong line of trenches, extending from river to river, and with a redoubt at each flank like a bastion, giving a flanking fire in front of the trenches; in front of this again, a wet ditch or canal, with a dam to retain the water at low tide ; and in front of the canal a line of abatis and trous-de-loup. The siege was carried on according to the scientific rules of the day, under the able direction of the chief engineer, Colonel Moncrieff, who had gained great repu- tation at the defence of Savannah. There were first, second and third parallels; saps, double saps and flying saps; and a sortie, in which 15 of the enemy were killed and 12 taken prisoners. Finally, on the twenty-eighth Mays day, the counterscarp had been gained, the canal had been drained and the besiegers were ready to crown the scarp. Then Clinton sent a second summons to sur- render. Lincoln replied, proposing impossible terms in order to gain time. He was now nearly surrounded, and his communica- Charleston tions with the North were practically severed. These communications had been maintained through a post at Monck's Corners, 30 miles north of Charleston, which was occupied by a detachment of Continental cavalry and some militia under Huger. Against this Clinton sent about 1,400 men; and a portion of this force under Tarleton surprised Huger and dispersed his command, 1 See foot-note, p. 207. 210 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 of which they captured about 100 officers and men and Apra 14 400 horses — the latter being very useful in replacing the horses of "Tarleton's Legion" which had been injured and thrown overboard on the rough voyage from New May 6 York. Tarleton then pressed north, and at the crossing of the Santee River he defeated the mounted militia which was gathering at that point, inflicting on them a loss of 41 killed and wounded and 67 taken prisoners. 1 Lord Rawdon, 2 meanwhile, had arrived from New York with a reinforcement of 2,500 men, and had been as- signed to the command of all the force operating on the east of the Cooper River; he soon captured the works at Haddrell's Point, and Arbuthnot then landed sailors and marines to assault Fort Moultrie from the land side while he bombarded it with his ships from the water side. When these preparations were completed the fort was sur- rounded, and it surrendered with its garrison of 291 men. Lincoln was thus completely surrounded by a force which (including the reinforcements from New York and Savannah and the sailors who had been landed to man the siege-guns) numbered about 14,000 men. Further resistance was hopeless, and he signed the articles of May 12 capitulation which Clinton offered. The return of pris- oners, signed by John Andr6, deputy adjutant-general, numbers 7 generals, 290 other officers, 5,169 rank and file, including Continentals, militia and armed citizens — 5,466 in all. The return of captured ordnance shows 391 guns of different calibres, 5,316 muskets, 15 regimental colors, 33,346 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 8,394 round shot, 376 barrels of powder — besides grape and case shot, cartridges, etc., by the thousand. 1 See foot-note, p. 207. s Afterward Earl of Moira and Governor-General of India. April 18 April 24 Surrender of Fort Moultrie May 7 Surrender of Charleston CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 211 Lincoln's losses during the siege were 92 killed and 146 mo wounded; those of Clinton were 76 killed and 179 wounded. 1 It was the greatest disaster sustained by the American army during the war — or, in fact, at any time ; for on no other occasion (except at Harper's Ferry) have 5,000 men of the United States laid down their arms to an enemy. 2 Lincoln was sent North on parole and immediately asked for a court of inquiry. 1 But it was never held. Washington was at first disposed to think that Lincoln should have retreated North as soon as the Arbuthnot ships crossed the bar; but when he learned all the cir- cumstances he held Lincoln blameless. 1 The latter was Nov. 7 soon exchanged, resumed his military duties under Washington's direction, rendered excellent service for a year and was then appointed to the newly created office mi of secretary of war, 3 filling that office until after the Oct. 30 treaty of peace had been signed. In fact, serious as was the disaster, there is but little ground for criticism of Lincoln and much for commendation. The idea of re- mo treating was fully discussed in two councils; at the second April 21 of these, a large number of citizens broke in and declared A P ru 26 that "if he attempted to withdraw the troops and leave the citizens, they would cut up his boats and open the gates to the enemy." The greater part of his force was militia and armed citizens ; his Continentals were from the Southern States, and disposed to render allegiance to State rather than Continental authority. 4 The command- 1 See foot-note, p. 207. 2 The surrender of 1 1,000 men under General White, near Harper's Ferry, on Sept. 15, 1862 was, in view of the magnitude of the struggle then in progress, comparatively unimportant. 3 Jour. Cong., Ill, 471, 683; Sparks, VII, 102. * Moultrie's Memoirs, II, 97. 212 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 ing general was the only Northern man in the army. If he had ordered a retreat his orders would not have been obeyed, and there would have been dissension on the part of the civil authorities which would have prob- ably carried the State back to its British allegiance. The prudent course of Lincoln preserved its adhesion to the United States. On strictly military grounds a retreat was out of the question. Clinton had 12,500 soldiers well equipped in every particular. Had Lincoln crossed the Cooper River with his 2,000 ill-equipped Continentals and at- tempted the long march — without adequate transporta- tion — to join Washington in New Jersey, he would prob- ably have been overwhelmed and destroyed before he reached the Santee. In place of that he made a sturdy defence — remarkably so, in view of the slender resources at his disposal — and in so doing he delayed the conquest of South Carolina for at least two months. Having taken Charleston, Clinton sent out detachments to occupy various points in the interior of the State. One of them under Tarleton, a most energetic cavalry leader, overtook, near the North Carolina boundary, the 3d Virginia Regiment, about 300 men under Colonel Buford. Action at the which was marching from Virginia to Charleston. The MiTy 29 WS ' engagement was short but destructive, the Americans losing 113 killed, 150 wounded and 53 prisoners; while Tarleton's losses were only 9 killed and 12 wounded. 1 June 5 Believing that the State was now fully conquered, Clinton returned to New York, taking with him about one-third of his troops, 2 and leaving with Cornwallis, 1 Dawson, 582-585; Tarleton, 30; Stedman, II, 193. 2 Ante, p. 164; Sparks, V, 544. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 213 who hereafter commanded in the South, 6 British, 1 1780 Hessian, and 6 Provincial regiments — in all 8,345 men. Return of, The main body was at Charleston, but there were strong detachments at Savannah and Augusta in Georgia; and there was a chain of posts in South Carolina, from Ninety- Disposition of Six on the West, through Rocky Mount, Camden and After the °° ps Cheraw, to Georgetown on the coast. 1 The intense heat Charleston. precluded active operations, and it was Cornwallis's in- tention to rest his troops during the summer, and as soon as the crops were gathered, and he could have the aid of the tory militia, to march northward and conquer North Carolina and Virginia. 2 Active operations had now been in progress in the South continuously (except as interrupted by the summer heat) for about eighteen months. Savannah and Charles- ton, the two principal cities, had been captured; Georgia and South Carolina had been conquered and were every- where under British control ; the authority of the United States was not recognized nor were there any Continental soldiers — except prisoners of war — in any part of either State. Large numbers of the citizens had returned to the British allegiance; a greater number, however, adhered to the United States. Each side furnished its militia Ramsour's and they fought each other furiously; in one rough-and- j une 26 " tumble encounter with clubbed muskets, about 400 men Hanging Rock. on a side, more than one-third of the combatants were killed and wounded; in another of a similar character, with about 800 men on each side, the tory losses were fully fifty per cent, those of the Americans not being re- corded. 3 In a smart skirmish between 75 men under Williamson's Colonel Bratton, one of Sumter's partisan chiefs, and a s. a c., a juiyi2 1 Dawson, 592; Tarleton, 87; Stedman, 195; Lee, 78. 2 Tarleton, 86. 3 Dawson, 592-596, 601-603, 608-611. 214 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 scouting party from "Tarleton's Legion" with some of the tory militia — 115 men in all — the latter was surprised and destroyed, only 12 men escaping. Soon after, Sum- Rocky Mount, ter himself, with 600 men, assaulted a British fortified S. C, July 30 , . , . ' . ,, . _ . . post but was repulsed with a loss ol 13 men, the de- fenders (New York volunteers) losing 12. Two days later, at a point about 60 miles distant, in the north-west corner of South Carolina, Colonel Clarke, of Georgia, with Green spring, 196 men, met and defeated Captain Dunlap, who was scouting with a detachment of 210 men — dragoons and mounted riflemen. The losses on each side were about Hanging Rock, 15 per cent. A week after that, Sumter, with 800 men, again attacked a British stockaded post just north of Camden. He was again unsuccessful and was forced to retreat, but only after a severe fight lasting nearly four hours, in which he had inflicted on the enemy a loss of about 130 men. 1 These partisan encounters were soon succeeded by events of a more serious character. Four months pre- Aprii 3 viously Washington had ordered the Continental line of Maryland and Delaware with a regiment of artillery and 12 guns to proceed to Charleston. Baron de Kalb, who had come from France with Lafayette, was assigned to the command. 2 The force numbered 2,000 men, and the transfer of such a body for a distance of nearly 800 miles Be Kaib was a serious matter. The troops started from Morris- tne south town and marched to Head of Elk, where the infantry April i6 embarked on boats and proceeded through Chesapeake May 3 Bay and James River to Petersburg, where it was joined June 6 by the artillery which had gone overland. Here De Kalb June 20 learned of the surrender of Charleston. He continued his march, however, and crossing the border of North Carolina 1 Dawson, 604-605. J Sparks, VII, 7, 15. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 215 finally came into the theatre of operations and encamped i78o on Deep River, about 50 miles north of the British post July 6 of Cheraw. He had called on the governors of Virginia and North Carolina for reinforcements of militia and for supplies of all kinds and transportation. But he received almost nothing; and, in fact, the States had little or nothing to give. More than once on their march the troops were in danger of starvation. 1 The news of the fall of Charleston had reached Wash- June i ington, through his secret service in New York, 2 earlier Gates a p - than it did De Kalb, and he had at once informed Con- command the gress. That body, without consulting Washington, ap- Army, pointed Gates to command the Southern army. 3 Six weeks later Gates arrived at De Kalb's camp and took jui y 25 command. De Kalb was an experienced soldier, and he had care- fully studied the situation and formed a definite, careful plan of operations. It was submitted to Gates, with the approval of all the senior officers. 4 But Gates declined to consider it and forthwith issued an order for the Juiy28 army to march immediately against Camden, the prin- cipal British post. This march of about 120 miles was accomplished in about two weeks, and in the course of it Gates was joined by 1,200 North Carolina militia under Caswell and by a few small detachments from the North. 5 His movements were not unknown to Rawdon, who commanded at Camden. He called in his outlying de- tachments, reported the facts to Cornwallis and urged 1 Kapp's Kalb, 195-199. J Sparks, VII, G9. 5 Jour. Cong., Ill, 465. 4 Kapp's Kalb, 206-209; narrative of Williams, Johnson, I, 486. 5 Dawson, 612-619; Tarleton, 102-153; Stedman, 204-218; Lee, 94- 103; Kapp's Kalb, 220-238. The official reports are given at length in Tarleton. 216 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 him to come in person with reinforcements from Charles- Aug. 13 ton. Comwallis did so, and arrived at Camden three days before the battle. 1 The situation was then as follows : Gates was at Ruge- ly's Mills, 13 miles north of Camden, with a force which he imagined numbered 7,000 men, but in reality, as his adjutant-general informed him on the following morning, numbered 3,052 present fit for duty. They consisted of the Continentals of Maryland and Delaware, the militia of North Carolina and Virginia, 8 pieces of artillery, Ar- mand's Legion and Porterfield's Light Infantry. The militia had been recently assembled and had never been in action or received any military training. There were no less than 13 general officers present, the greater part of them belonging to the militia. With this force Gates intended to attack the British post at Camden, of which he had no adequate knowledge, either by reconnoissance or otherwise. He seems to have thought that he could repeat the brilliant capture of Stony Point, and his order for a night march was in some degree copied from Wayne's famous order. In the afternoon before the march he issued to his men a full ration of corn-meal and fresh meat, and, having no rum, he distributed (from the hos- pital stores just arrived from Virginia) a gill of molasses per man. 2 The food was hastily and badly cooked, and, washed down with molasses, it was more powerful than a compound cathartic. The men were in great distress during the night march and when the battle began were in an enfeebled, weak condition. 3 Opposed to Gates, the force under Cornwallis should have numbered about 4,000; but the intense heat of 1 See foot-note 5, p. 215. 2 See foot-note 5, p. 215. 3 Narrative of Colonel Otho Williams, Johnson, I, 494. CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 217 summer had produced a good deal of sickness; more than 1780 800 were in the hospital, and, including the reinforcements which Cornwallis brought from Charleston, the morning report showed only 122 officers and 2,117 men fit for duty. About half the force was well-seasoned regulars, 23d, 33d and 71st Regiments; there were two tory regi- ments raised in New York, the Volunteers of Ireland and the British Legion, who were almost as good as regulars, and two regiments of Carolina militia. Corn- wallis (like Gates) believed that the American army numbered 7,000 men. Nevertheless, he determined to attack them, relying upon the superior discipline and greater experience of his troops. 1 Both armies, therefore, moved out at 10 o'clock at night, Aug. 15 each intending to surprise the other. About 2 o'clock in Aug. ie the morning the advance guards came in contact at a point 9 miles north of Camden, where the road after crossing Saunder's Creek passes through an open forest of pines about a mile wide, flanked on each side by an im- passable marsh. Armand's Legion, at the first fire, was thrown back on the main body in some confusion. But Cornwallis did not pursue, as he did not wish to risk the uncertainties and accidents of a night engagement. He leisurely deployed his force, the light infantry, 23d and 63d Regiments on the right, Irish Volunteers, Legion and North Carolina Regiment on the left, 71st in re- serve and Tarleton's cavalry in the rear; and when the deployment was completed he waited for daylight. Gates also deployed in similar manner, 2d Maryland and Delaware on the right, North Carolina and Virginia militia on the left and 1st Maryland in reserve. The distance between the lines was about 200 yards. 1 1 See foot-note 5, p. 215. 218 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 At daylight Cornwallis began the action by a vigorous Aug. i6 attack from his right. 1 The British regulars struck the Battle of Carolina and Virginia militia; the latter, in their weak- ened condition, due to the improper diet which Gates had prescribed, without any experience of battle and commanded by untrained officers, threw away their arms and fled. 1 Armand's foreign legion went with them, and they broke through the left flank of the 1st Mary- land, throwing that brigade into confusion, and, sweeping Gates with them, carried him off the field so that he was not again heard from for several days. But the Mary- landers restored order in their ranks, made a partial change of front to the left, arrested the British advance and, on the right, under the gallant leadership of De Kalb, took the offensive. Rawdon's Irishmen made a stout defence, and there was fierce fighting in the woods for nearly an hour. Then De Kalb fell, mortally wounded; the 23d and 33d Regiments turned the left flank of the Maryland brigades; and Cornwallis, perceiving that there was no cavalry opposed to him (Armand hav- ing fled), sent Tarleton with the cavalry of his legion still farther around their flank and in their rear. The whole line then gave way, and the retreat was soon a rout. 1 The American force was destroyed. It lost all its artillery, all its baggage, all its supplies and nearly all its muskets and ammunition. 1 The militia scattered in every direction and in small groups worked their way home; the Delaware regiment was almost annihilated; the remnants of the 6 Maryland regiments, about 700 men in all, came together at Hillsborough about ten days after the battle. 1 Gates covered the 60 miles to Char- 1 See foot-note 5, p. 215. y of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio Avery's History of the United States and Its People CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 219 lotte on the day of the battle, and in the next 48 hours 1737 another 100 miles to Hillsborough. night of Gates Cornwallis lost 68 killed, 245 wounded and 11 missing. 1 Gates's army was thus destroyed; but Sumter and his Aug. is partisans were still intact a few miles away. On the day Aug. is before the battle Gates had sent him a reinforcement of 400 men, and on the day of the battle Sumter had inter- cepted and captured a considerable amount of supplies Aug. ie and their escort which were coming up from Charleston and had nearly reached Camden. 1 Hearing of Gates's defeat, Sumter began his retreat northward to his home country in the Catawba settlements. Tarleton went Actional after him in hot pursuit, surprised him in his camp and Aug. is destroyed him. Sumter himself escaped without hat, coat or boots; of his men, 150 were killed or wounded, 300 taken prisoners and the rest dispersed. The prison- ers and supplies which Sumter had taken two days before were recaptured. Tarleton's loss was only 6 killed and 9 wounded. 1 1 Dawson, 623. CHAPTER VII BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 1780 The conquest of the South seemed now to be complete. Greene Ap- The only armed force of the Americans south of New pointed to — «/\ • command the Jersey was the remnants of Gates s army, about 700 in Southern ~ \ J . Army number, which were assembling at Hillsborough, m the northern part of North Carolina. Nevertheless, Con- gress did not despair. As usual when disasters came thickly it turned to Washington. Having itself chosen the three commanders, Howe, Lincoln and Gates, under whom Savannah and Charleston, Georgia and the two Carolinas had been lost, it now called upon Washington to select a commander for the Southern army. 1 Wash- ington selected Greene, 2 who, in the language of John Fiske, "in every campaign since the beginning of the war had been Washington's right arm; and for indefatigable industry, for strength and breadth of intelligence, and for unselfish devotion to the public service, he was scarcely inferior to the commander-in-chief." 3 Oct. 22 Greene received his orders 4 and letters from Washing- ton while in command at West Point after Arnold's treason, and in accordance with his instructions pro- ceeded immediately to Philadelphia for conference with Congress. Steuben was sent with him, 5 to be second in 1 Jour. Cong., Ill, 534. 2 Sparks, VII, 257. 3 Fiske, American Revolution, II, 250. 4 Sparks, VII, 271, 272. 6 Fiske, 11,251. 220 BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 221 command, and to be president of the court which Greene 1780 was ordered to convene to inquire into Gates's conduct. Congress approved and ratified Washington's selection Oct. 30 and adopted resolutions conferring upon Greene extraor- dinary powers. His army was to consist of all the Con- Oct. 3 tinental regiments raised or to be raised from Delaware Oct. 21 to Georgia, inclusive (the number of such regiments having been fixed by previous resolutions at 24, with an authorized strength of 36 officers and 681 men each); he was to organize and employ his army as he should judge most proper, subject to the control of the commander- in-chief, whose control at a distance of 800 miles, with no railroads or telegraph, was merely nominal ; he was to have all the powers heretofore conferred upon Gates in regard to appointments and promotions, and in addition was to have the power 1 of making exchanges of prisoners, which hitherto had been conferred only upon Washington ; the legislatures and governors of the six States above named were " earnestly recommended" to "afford every assistance and support, in men, clothing, money, arms, intrenching tools, provisions and other aids and supplies"; and the heads of the several staff departments were " directed to furnish" on his order "such articles as, upon inquiry, he shall find cannot be obtained in the Southern Department." 2 In short, every power that Congress could put on paper was given to him. He was to carry on the Revolution in the distant South and regain the conquered States. Had Congress been in position to make good its reso- lutions, Greene's task would have been an easy one. But the 24 regiments of the Southern States, from Dela- ware to Georgia, with an authorized strength of 17,000 1 Jour. Cong., Ill, 538, 540, 541. 2 Ibid., Ill, 541. 222 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 men, had no existence, except in the remnants of Gates's army at Hillsborough. That of Georgia had never been raised; those of the two Carolinas and most of those of Virginia had been captured at Charleston. Greene undertook the task in a hopeful if not confident spirit. 1 He left an agent at Philadelphia to see that sup- plies were sent to him in case Congress had any; and on his way south he left Steuben in Virginia to organize all the troops that Governor Jefferson would call out, both Continental and militia, and forward them to the South. Several of the best officers in the army made applica- tions to go with him — Steuben, 2 Lafayette, 3 Henry Lee 3 (father of Robert E. Lee) and John Laurens. 3 Wash- ington had different plans for Lafayette, but the others were sent. 4 On his arrival at the South, Greene soon gained the loyal and hearty support of the famous partisan leaders — Morgan, Marion, Sumter, Pickens and William Washington. Dec. 4 When Greene took command at Charlotte, the paper strength of his "army" was 2,307, of whom 1,482 were Greene present, and not quite 800 were equipped and fit for duty. 5 command He succeeded, with Steuben's efficient help, in increasing this, within three months, to 4,441 present for duty, of whom 1,651 were Continentals, although most of them were new levies who had never been in battle. 6 It never again reached that number. This was the force, aided by the partisans of Sumter and others, which varied in 1 G. W. Greene, III, 35; letter to Congress. 3 Kapp, Steuben; Sparks, VII, 316, 361, 404. 3 Sparks, VII, 316; Sparks, Letters, III, 140. 4 Laurens on arriving at Philadelphia was selected for the special mission to France (ante, p. 178), but he joined Greene as soon as he returned. 5 Greene to Lafayette, G. W. Greene, III, 70; Gordon, IV, 27. 6 G. W. Greene, III, 190; Gordon, IV, 54. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 223 numbers at various times, from nothing to perhaps a mo maximum of 2,000, with which Greene reconquered the South. The returns in the British Record Office show that in 1781 and 1782 the British force in the Caro- linas and Georgia varied from a minimum of 8,141 to a maximum of 10,859* — effective, fit for duty, exclusive of officers and non-commissioned officers. About three- fourths of them were regulars, British and Hessians, and the rest were tory regiments from New York and New Jersey, which had seen four years' service, and were fully as well organized as and infinitely better equipped and supplied than the few Continentals in the Southern army. f In the interval between the battle of Camden and the Aug. i6 date when Greene assumed command, Cornwallis had Dec - 4 not been idle. He had marched, unopposed, into North Sept - 8 Carolina as far as Charlotte; and Clinton had sent 3,000 Sept - 22 men under Leslie from New York to the Chesapeake, 2 0ct- 16 there to act under Cornwallis's orders and either effect a junction with him as he marched north, or to create a diversion in his favor and prevent the sending of reinforce- ments to the South. These plans miscarried; for, soon cimton sends after Cornwallis reached Charlotte and before Leslie had to the south sailed from New York, a force of backwoodsmen, between 900 and 1,500 strong, who lived in the mountains from Virginia to Georgia, suddenly appeared almost as if they had sprung out of the ground, and surrounded a party of regulars and tory militia, about 1,100 in number, on King's Mountain. This force was commanded by Major Ferguson, of the 71st Regiment, a gallant and skilful officer. He had been posted in the foot-hills of the Alle- Battle of ghanies, on Cornwallis's left flank, about thirty miles from Mountain 1 Sparks, V, 542. 2 Tarleton, 170, 199; Sparks, VII, 269. 224 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 Oct. 7 Oct. 14 Results of the Battle of King's Mountain Charlotte. He was to keep down the patriot militia in that neighborhood. Hearing of the approach of Colonel Williams and the others, he took a defensive position on the top of King's Mountain, a wooded hill just north of the boundary between North and South Carolina. Here he was surrounded by the mountaineers about 4 o'clock on an autumn afternoon. The battle was not very scientific, but it was effective. Dismounting from their horses, these frontiersmen climbed the hill on all sides, using their hunting rifles with great effect. Ferguson made a gallant defence. Three times he beat them back, using the bayonet. After an hour of hard fighting Fer- guson was killed and his men surrendered. He had lost 224 killed and 163 wounded; 716 were taken prisoners. On the American side 28 were killed (including Williams) and 60 wounded. 1 The Americans dispersed almost as quickly as they had gathered. The news of this extraordinary action spread fast in all directions; it brought out the militia of North Carolina and the new levies in Virginia ; it carried discouragement to the tories in both Carolinas. It took place on the edge of Mechlenberg County, where the hostility to Great Britain was fierce, and whence a declaration of indepen- dence had been launched a full year before that of Phila- delphia. Surrounded by such a hostile population, dis- appointed in the hopes he had formed that North Carolina would rally to his support as he advanced and stunned by the blow at King's Mountain, where 121 of his regu- lars and nearly 1,000 of his militia had been destroyed, Cornwallis not only halted his invasion but retreated, in some haste, to South Carolina. He marched back 90 miles, and took station at Winnsboro, between Camden Dawson, 628-632; Tarleton, 164, 192-196. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 225 and Ninety-Six. Here he fell ill of a fever which incapac- i78o itated him for several weeks. During this time Rawdon Oct. 24 was in command, and he received a letter from Clinton advising him that Leslie had sailed for the Chesapeake and was to act under Cornwallis's orders. Rawdon at Leslie sent to . Reinforce once wrote to Leslie 1 requesting him to come by water to cornwaiiis the Cape Fear River in North Carolina. Leslie was de- layed by gales and did not reach the Cape Fear River in less than six weeks. On arriving there he found instruc- Dec. 14 tions from Cornwallis to come to Charleston, where he i78i arrived safely, and thence marched to Camden. 2 He Jan. 4 brought with him 2,500 men — a brigade of the Guards, the regiment of Bose, the Hessian Yagers and some Provincials. This carried Cornwallis's strength, accord- ing to Clinton, to 11,306 effective, 3 exclusive of officers. The number of posts which he felt obliged to occupy made it impossible to take more than 4,000 men when he / resumed his march into North Carolina. Until Leslie arrived at Camden, nearly three months Actional ' . . Fish Dam after King's Mountain, Cornwallis remained idle at Ford, ° ' . Nov. 9 Winnsboro. The partisan troops, however, were inces- santly on the move — Sumter in the Catawba district and Marion, "the Swamp Fox," on the lower Pedee. The latter penetrated to within a few miles of Georgetown but was driven back into the swamps. Sumter was at- tacked, 4 at a point on the Broad River about 25 miles north-west of Winnsboro, but held his own. Then the ever restless Tarleton was recalled from his pursuit of Marion in the low country and sent to destroy Sumter. Action at J Blackstocks, Tarleton was worsted, losing more than 100 men; the Nov. 20 Sparks, VII, 347. 2 Tarleton, 184, 243. 3 Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 282. * Dawson, 633; Lee, 112; Tarleton, 173, 200. Greene Takes the Offensive 226 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1780 success, however, was counterbalanced by the fact that Sumter was wounded ' and was not able to take the field again for several weeks. While Cornwallis was at Winnsboro waiting for Leslie, Greene had taken the offensive. He was so inferior in numbers to Cornwallis that battle was out of the question until he could raise and equip a larger force; his only plan now was to carry on a partisan warfare, threatening Cornwallis's flanks, breaking up his communications and Dec. i6 intercepting his supplies. 2 In pursuance of this plan he divided his force, small as it was, and sent Morgan with about 600 men — Maryland line, Virginia militia and the remnants of the 1st and 3d Dragoons under William Washington — to cross the Catawba, join Sumter and other partisans and move South, threatening Ninety-Six and Augusta. 3 The rest of his force, about 1,100 in number under Huger, was sent to the Pedee and took position at Cheraw, where Rawdon had maintained a post prior to the battle of Camden. In this position they supported Marion, threatened Camden and were nearer to Charles- ton than Cornwallis was at Winnsboro. Greene accom- panied Huger 's column. It was a risky movement, for the two detachments were 140 miles apart, with Cornwallis between them, and a good chance for him to beat them in detail. If Cornwallis attempted this Greene expected by a rapid retreat to unite the two detachments in North Caro- lina, 4 and he sent his chief engineer, Kosciusko, and his quartermaster, Carrington, back to reconnoitre the fords 1 Dawson, 635-637; Lee, 114; Tarleton, 173-180. a G. W. Greene, III, 130; Greene to Washington, Sparks, Letters, III, 189, 214, 217, 225. 3 Johnson, I, 346. 4 Greene to Varnum, Johnson, I, 350. reerosse, *./>■«- N ! J -VA Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio THE MATTHEWS-NORTHHUP WORKS, BUFFALO, N. V. From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Campaign of 1781 BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 227 on the various rivers, 1 collect boats and obtain wagons mo for transporting them from one river to the next. While at Cheraw, Lee's Legion arrived from the North and was sent to join Marion and make another demonstration against Georgetown. Meanwhile, Clinton, at New York, was supporting itsi Cornwallis by every means in his power, in the hope of Jan. 12 making a complete job at the South. As soon as he heard that Leslie had been ordered from the Chesapeake to Charleston, he sent another expedition to the Chesa- peake 2 — 1,600 men under Benedict Arnold, now a briga- dier in the British service. Arnold arrived at Hampton i78o Roads, went up the river to Jamestown, marched 800 Arnold sent ' L to Virginia men to Richmond and burned the town. His instruc- tions were to cut Greene's communications and destroy his supplies at Petersburg; but Steuben rallied the Vir- ginia militia and Arnold retreated down the James River to Portsmouth and waited for reinforcements from New York. This movement into Virginia led Washington to send Lafayette thither with 1,200 men. 3 The entire en- Feb. 20 ergies of both sides were thus concentrated on the South. The successive reinforcements of the British were all placed under Comwallis's orders, and those of the Amer- icans under Greene; but the distance was so great and the means of communication so slow that the Virginia campaign was carried on by the local commanders inde- pendent of their nominal chiefs. To return to Cornwallis : the audacity of Greene's move- ments — dividing his inferior force — had the desired effect. It led Cornwallis to scatter his forces. Had Cornwallis 1 The military importance of these rivers, which played so important a part in Sherman's campaign in 1865 as well as in Greene's campaign of 1781, is evident from a glance at the map. 2 Sparks, VII, 348. 3 Ibid., VII, 417-423. Dec. 30 1781 Jan. 3 Jan. 7 Jan. 19 228 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1730 quickly concentrated and attacked first one and then the other of Greene's detachments, he might have de- stroyed both. Instead of this he sent Tarleton to attack Morgan; directed Leslie to march to Camden to protect that post against a possible attack by Huger; and kept his main body at Winnsboro, which was 70 miles from Tarleton on the one side and separated by a deep river (Wateree) from Leslie on the other side. Instead of his beating Greene in detail, Greene's right wing under Mor- gan destroyed Cornwallis's detachment under Tarleton. i78i Tarleton crossed the Broad River, and moving rapidly Jan. 2 up its western branches he came in contact with Morgan Jan. i6 at the Cowpens — an enclosure for cattle just south of the line between North and South Carolina and about 20 miles west of King's Mountain. Morgan had about 1,000 men, the force with which he left Charlotte having been increased by about 400 militia. Tarleton's command numbered about 1,000 men — British Legion and parts of the 7th, 16th and 71st Infantry and 17th Dragoons. 1 He reconnoitred Morgan's position and found that he was posted in an open wood, his flanks unprotected and the Broad River at his back. Tarleton was of opinion that the position was very advantageous for him and disad- vantageous for Morgan. He anticipated an easy victory. Morgan, however, thoroughly understood the troops under his orders, and as a commander of light troops he was unexcelled — perhaps unrivalled. He posted his force in three lines: in front, 150 expert riflemen; then about 315 militia, many of whom had served in the Con- tinental line; in rear of these, on a slight eminence, the Maryland regulars who had survived Camden, and more militia, about 430 in all ; behind this eminence the cav- 1 Tarleton, 250; Johnson, 367. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 229 airy, 125 strong, under William Washington. The men i78i had slept well, had eaten a good breakfast and were in fine spirits. Morgan had harangued them in satisfactory fashion, and had instructed them to reserve their fire until the enemy was within 50 yards, then to take careful aim at those who wore epaulets, and while continuing their fire to retire to the second line of militia, which was under command of Pickens. After firing two rounds, carefully aimed, Pickens's line was to retire to the left of the regulars. All these orders were carried out with remarkable exactness. Tarleton began his march during the night and made Jan. n, such slow progress that five hours elapsed before he came in sight of the first line of the militia. He then deployed; 8 A * M light infantry and legion infantry to the right, 7th In- fantry to the left with the 71st in reserve behind its left flank, legion cavalry in the second line and a troop of dragoons on each flank. In this order they advanced, Battle of the without firing. At 50 yards the militia delivered their fire with murderous accuracy and fell back as ordered; the British returned the fire and continued their advance, the 71st being brought into line on the left of the 7th. An attempt was made by the dragoons on the right to turn Morgan's left flank, but William Washington with his cavalry came out from behind the eminence where he had been under cover and drove them back. The British continued to advance, and soon came on the main line — the Marylanders. These received them with very delib- erate fire, delivered kneeling, and aimed low. The 71st outflanked the American right, and to meet this an order was given to the companies on the right to change front. This was not well executed, and the whole line began to retreat. Tarleton thought the day was won and sent 230 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i orders to the legion cavalry to come up on the left and charge. Before this could be done Morgan gave an order, "Face about and fire once more." This was performed with great coolness, and simultaneously the militia which had retreated as ordered at the beginning was just fin- ishing a complete circle of the whole battle-ground and coming up on the American right. The British were staggered at first and then ran. They were experienced troops, most of whom had served throughout the war and been in many battles. A panic set in quite similar to that which seized the Americans at Germantown, and their officers could not stop them. More than half the com- mand surrendered and the rest fled. William Washington charged in pursuit, but Tarleton managed to collect 14 officers and 40 horsemen and checked the pursuit suffi- ciently to enable him to escape and rejoin Cornwallis. The battle lasted less than an hour. Tarleton lost 100 killed, 229 wounded and 600 prisoners not wounded, about 85 per cent of his entire command. The firing at the epaulets was very effective, for 39 of his officers were killed or wounded. Morgan's loss was only 12 killed and 60 wounded. 1 This was one of the most interesting battles of the whole war. It shows what can be done with militia provided they are good marksmen and are commanded by competent officers who understand them. Morgan, Pickens, William Washington and Clarke, of Georgia, were all experts in their respective lines. Jan. 4 It had been suggested by Tarleton two weeks before the battle that while he advanced against Morgan's front the main body under Cornwallis should simultaneously advance to King's Mountain to cut off his retreat. 1 Dawson, 646-653; Tarleton, 214, 250; Johnson, 370-384. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 231 Cornwallis replied: "You have . . . understood my i78i intentions perfectly." l But Cornwallis did not do his Jan. 5 part. He seems to have been nervous about his right flank, which was threatened by Huger and the main body of Greene's little army on the Pedee. Cornwallis moved a few miles from Camden and then waited a week until Leslie had crossed the Wateree. He then slowly Jan. 14 moved northward, but on the day of the battle instead of being at King's Mountain in Morgan's rear he was 25 miles to the south. Had he been in rear of Morgan, he might have destroyed him or driven him westward into the mountains, notwithstanding Morgan's victory over Tarleton, for Cornwallis outnumbered Morgan nearly four to one. 1 Morgan had no illusions as to his position after the Morgan Re- battle. He buried the dead, left the wounded of both Catawba sides under a flag of truce and, picking up his captured cannon, ammunition, 800 muskets and prisoners, before noon he began his retreat and crossed the Broad River. He was so encumbered with prisoners and captured stores that his progress was slow, but it was fast enough to keep ahead of Cornwallis; and at the end of a week he had marched nearly 90 miles and had passed the Catawba. The next day Cornwallis arrived at Ramsour's Mill (now Jan. 24 Lincolnton) on the Little Catawba, 20 miles to the rear. Jan. 25 It was a week before the news of Morgan's victory j an . 24 reached Greene, on the Pedee. He also learned that Morgan was retreating and Cornwallis advancing, and he saw that the thing to do was to unite Huger and Morgan as quickly as possible. He therefore called in Lee, who Jan. 25 was scouting on the sea-coast near Georgetown, and or- dered Huger to march to Salisbury; and personally he tarleton, 246. 232 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i rode across the country, 125 miles, with only an aide and three orderlies, and joined Morgan on the Catawba. 1 Greene joins Comwallis was on the opposite side of the river, delayed Jan. 30 ' in crossing by a sudden rise of the river. When he had arrived at Ramsour's Mill and realized that Morgan was 20 miles ahead of him, he made up his mind to divest himself of everything that could impede rapid move- jan. 26 ments. He spent two days in burning up all his tents, Jan. 27 baggage and extra clothing and supplies, keeping only his ammunition, hospital stores and such rations as could be carried on the person. The destruction of the rum, then the choicest article on the ration list, seemed to the officers to be an extraordinary act of self-abnegation. He also destroyed all his wagons except a few which were to be used for the sick and wounded, and he mounted some of his infantry on the horses thus made available. £fm eat t0 the Then began a retreat 2 (on the American side), one of the most memorable in the annals of war 3 ; the numbers were small but the stake was great, and there was abun- dant military skill on both sides. Jan - 29 Leaving Ramsour's Mill (Lincolnton), Cornwallis ar- rived at the Catawba on the afternoon of the second day. It was too late for a crossing, and during the night came the rise in the river due to a winter's rain. Cornwallis had no boats and it was necessary to wait for two days Jan. 29 for the river to subside sufficiently to be fordable. Dur- ing this interval Greene arrived and immediately made 1 Johnson, 394-403. 2 Gordon, IV, 36^5; G. W. Greene, III, 151-175; Johnson, 403- 432; Greene to Washington, Sparks, Letters, III, 225, 233; Tarleton, 218-229, 249-264; Stedman, 325, 333. 3 " Every measure of the Americans, during their march from the Catawba to Virginia, was judiciously designed and vigorously executed." (Tarleton, 229.) Greene before Cornwallis ) Greene's return to South Carolina , Earl Cornwallis - . s Lord Rawdon Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Retreat to the Dan Jan. -Feb., 1 781 the Catawba BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 233 the following dispositions: Pickens with the militia was i78i to take the Cowpens prisoners through the mountains to Charlottesville, where the Saratoga prisoners were now kept; Morgan was to retreat at once to the Yadkin; the fords on the Catawba were to be watched by 300 North Carolina militia under Davidson, who had just joined the army; Huger was to hasten his march to Salisbury. The next day the river had fallen sufficiently to be ford- Feb. 1 able, and Cornwallis forced a passage at two fords, dis- Passage of persing the militia, but only after they had inflicted on him a loss of 4 killed and 36 wounded and their own leader, Davidson, had been killed. He pushed forward during the afternoon, and one of Tarleton's scouting parties came near capturing Greene, who had remained with the militia until they dispersed and had then ridden rapidly toward Salisbury. He stopped to pass the night Feb. i at Carr's house, and from there wrote to Huger counter- manding his orders of the previous day in so far as to require him to keep on the east side of the Yadkin and not to attempt to reach Salisbury. It was evident that a junction with Morgan there was impossible. Morgan, having a day's start, easily reached the Yad- Feb. 2 ' kin before Cornwallis could come up with him. The Feb. 3 river was swollen with rains, but Carrington was there with the boats, on which the foot troops and supplies were ferried across, while the mounted men swam their horses. Greene joined him during the crossing, and just as it was completed toward sundown the advance of Cornwallis 's army came up. They had no boats and could not cross. All they could do was to bring up their artillery and bombard the American bivouac; the troops were easily put under shelter, and the only harm done was to shatter the hut in which Greene was writing his 234 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1781 Passage of the Yadkin, Feb. 8 Feb. 8 Feb. 9 Feb. 11 Feb. 14 despatches — one of which directed Huger to leave the Yadkin and march for Guilford. Cornwallis was thus forced to move twenty-five miles up the Yadkin where the fords were more shallow, and this he did during the next few days. His intention was to put himself between Greene and the fords on the upper Dan, believing that Greene could not cross the lower Dan and that he could thus force him to fight at a disadvantage. As this movement developed Greene, with Morgan, re- tired slowly to Guilford (near Greensborough) and there was joined by the rest of his army under Huger and Lee. His army being reunited, Greene was disposed to accept battle. He carefully selected a good position at Guilford. Unless he could rally the militia he was still too weak in numbers to expect success. His efforts to bring out the militia were fruitless; moreover, every day's retreat brought him nearer to Steuben and rein- forcements in Virginia, and carried Cornwallis farther from his base. A council of war decided unanimously against a battle. 1 Greene therefore determined to continue the retreat and put himself behind the Dan. Carrington had already collected the boats on that river in the vicinity of Boyd's Ferry; Kosciusko was sent there to throw up trenches to defend the crossing; a body of 700 picked men under Williams was sent to get in front of Cornwallis and retard his advance as much as possible. With the main body and the supplies Greene left Guilford, and three days later crossed the Dan at Boyd's Ferry, about 10 miles above the junction of the Dan with the Roanoke, and about 30 miles below the present city of Danville. The following day Williams, who had carried on a continuous 1 Johnson, II, 425. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 235 series of skirmishes with Tarleton for the last four days, i78i also safely crossed the river, his men in the boats and the horses swimming as at the Yadkin. Cornwallis's own Feb. 15 letter accurately describes the movement: "I tried by Greene a most rapid march to strike a blow either at Greene Dan uto e (Huger) or at Morgan before they got over the Dan, but could not effect it." What was now to be done? Cornwallis was 230 miles comwains • iiii t^ Retires to from his base; he had no boats to cross the Dan or the Huisborough, Feb. 20 Roanoke on Greene's left flank. If he attempted to cross higher up Greene would meet him at whatever point he selected, and the crossing would be difficult if not impossible. Should it succeed Greene would retreat into Virginia and soon effect a junction with Steuben, and then Cornwallis would be outnumbered. Cornwallis therefore decided to march back into North Carolina, occupy Hillsborough, where the Provincial legislature had lately been in session, " raise the royal standard" and try to gather the tory militia. His army soon reached Hills- borough. It was exhausted with its long march, during which it had lost about 250 men; and the lack of sup- plies which had been burned up at Ramsour's Mill four weeks ago was now keenly felt. Greene's army was also exhausted with the long march in the dead of winter, over roads alternately frozen and deep in mud, with a succession of snow-storms and rains, which inflicted a greater hardship on his men than on the British, because they were insufficiently clad, had neither tents nor blankets and many of them were barefooted. His army was intact and by no means despondent. Re- inforcements from Steuben speedily began to arrive. In the face of extraordinary difficulties, Steuben had raised and equipped 400 Continentals, and the militia of 236 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i the southern counties of Virginia at last realized their Greene danger and began to assemble. Pickens had returned Receives Rein- ,. . , . . , . . TT . . . , , . forcements irom taking the prisoners to Virginia and was now back on the Catawba rallying the militia which had dispersed at the crossing of that river. The Governor of North Carolina was using every effort to bring out the militia in other parts of the State. From all of these sources Greene's army, which numbered only 1,430 when it crossed the Dan, was increased within the next three weeks to 1,715 Continentals and a force of militia which has been variously estimated at from 2,800 to 3,900 men. His total force at the battle of Guilford was be- tween 4,500 and 5,700 men. 1 His own returns, two days before the battle, give the number as 4,444. 2 Feb. is He moved in pursuit of Cornwallis before the reinforce- Feb. 23 ments began to arrive. The day after Cornwallis left the Dan to march to Hillsborough Greene sent Williams across the river, and he followed with the main body a few days later. In scouting around Hillsborough Lee (whose legion was part of Williams's command) fell in with the first body of tory militia which responded to Corn- Destruction ot wallis's proclamation. It numbered 300 men, was corn- Tories, manded by Colonel Pyle, was marching from Guilford to Hillsborough and was about midway between the two hamlets. By a stratagem Lee got in immediate contact with it before his identity was discovered; when the firing began Lee's men cut the tories to pieces, 90 of them being killed, nearly all the rest wounded and only a few escap- ing. 3 Lee did not lose a man. The news of this encoun- ter travelled fast and it put a decided damper on rallying Feb. 26 to "the royal standard." The next day Cornwallis left 1 Schenck, 310-312. 2 Gordon, IV, 54. 3 Dawson, 658-660; Lee, 154-157; Tarleton, 231-233. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 237 Hillsborough and marched westward to meet Greene. i78i The two armies came in touch on the Haw River. Both March 2 were anxious for battle, but Greene wanted to postpone it until his reinforcements arrived. Constant manoeuvring followed for ten days, and there was a smart skirmish 1 in Action at which about 50 men were lost on each side. Finally the March 6 S reinforcements arrived, and as soon as he could organize them Greene marched to Guilford, intending to accept March 10 battle on the ground which he had carefully selected during his retreat. His force numbered, as already stated, between 4,500 and 5,700 men; but of these less than 500 had ever been in battle. Cornwallis's return gave 2,253 March 14 fit for duty, exclusive of officers. Every man (except the North Carolina regiment which was left with the baggage on the day of the battle) was a veteran regular who had been in most of the battles at the North as well as at Savannah, Charleston and Camden. Relying on the superior quality of his troops, as at Camden, Cornwallis did not hesitate to attack. The dispositions of the troops on both sides were quite similar to those at the Cowpens. Greene had, in fact, recently received a letter from Morgan 2 giving his advice in regard to the handling of the militia. 3 Greene had the highest regard for Morgan and adopted his suggestions. He posted 4 the North Carolina militia in a line across the Salisbury road about a mile from Guilford, with ex- pert riflemen on each flank, the Delaware battalion and Lynch 's Virginians on the right and the legion infantry and Campbell's Virginians on the left. About 300 yards 1 Dawson, 661-663. 2 Morgan was obliged by ill health to leave Greene's army in Febru- ary. He joined Washington just before the surrender at Yorktown. 3 Schenck, 321. * Greene's Report, Tarleton, 312-317. 238 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i behind them was a line of Virginia militia, with William Washington's cavalry on their right and Lee's on their left. The third line was about 550 yards in rear of the second and was composed of the Continentals, 2 Virginia regiments on the right and 2 Maryland regiments on the left, posted on a slight eminence some distance in front of the Court-House. The only fault in these dispositions seems to have been in having the lines too far apart, about twice the distance they were at the Cowpens. Doubtless this was made necessary by the nature of the ground, which was heavily wooded, with occasional clear- ings of a few acres for cultivation. There was one such clearing in front of the main line and another in front of the advanced line, and it was thought that the North Carolina militia, posted in the woods behind this latter clearing and their flanks held by expert riflemen, would make a good resistance although they had never before been under fire. Battle of Cornwallis had been encamped for two days on the March is Salisbury road, about twelve miles south-west of Guilford. Hearing of Greene's movement to that point, he left the North Carolina regiment with the baggage and with his 2,000 regulars broke camp at daylight and marched toward Guilford. After marching eight miles his ad- vance under Tarleton came in contact with Lee and a skirmish ensued, Lee falling back to the main body and taking post on the left flank as above stated. About noon Cornwallis came in sight of the American lines and at once deployed: Leslie's brigade (71st and Bose) to the right, Webster's brigade (23d and 33d) and Yager's to the left, O'Hara's brigade (Guards) in reserve, two pieces of artillery on the road in centre and Tarleton's cavalry in the rear. 1 1 Cornwallis's Report, Tarleton, 303-310. Guiliord BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 239 The battle 1 opened with a cannonade from the two mi 3-pounders which lasted twenty minutes. Then the 1.30 p.m. whole line advanced with admirable steadiness across the first clearing. The air was sharp and frosty and the British bayonets glistened in the sun of a cloudless day. Battle of The North Carolina militia had no bayonets. They were armed with hunting-rifles and powder-horns. It took three minutes to load. They delivered their first fire at 150 yards. When they had reloaded the Highlanders were within 40 yards; the militia fired their second round, leaning their rifles on the rail-fence at the edge of the clearing. Both rounds were carefully aimed and were effective. But still the British line came on. It is claimed — and also disputed — that Greene had given the North Carolina militia the same order that Morgan gave at Cowpens, to fire two rounds and then retire to the next line. Whether they had this order or not they retired, not to the second line, but far beyond the battle-ground. They ran through the intervals of the Virginia militia and past its left flank, and most of them were not again heard of. The flanking parties did not take part in the flight, and Leslie's brigade wheeled to the right against Lee and Campbell and Webster's to the left against Kirkwood and Lynch; O'Hara's brigade moved forward into the gap thus created. Kirkwood and Lynch fell back slowly, contesting their ground, and took post on the right of the Continentals; William Washington's cavalry with- drew to the rear of the Continentals ; Lee and Campbell did not yield at first, and it was only after the 1st Bat- talion of the Guards had been brought up on the right 'Tarleton, 269-279; Stedman, II, 337-347; Johnson, II, 1-22; Lee, 170-180; Dawson, 663-G70; Sehenck, 292-3S7. 240 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i of the Bose regiment that they were forced back up the slope of a hill just behind their first position. The action continued here, quite separate and apart from the main battle, for nearly two hours, and in the course of it Corn- wallis personally led the Guards battalion and had his horse shot under him. March isth, The North Carolinians having broken and run, O'Hara's Guilford brigade advanced through the woods, with Webster on its left and the 71st on its right, and fell upon the Vir- ginia militia — the second line. But they made a good defence, until their right flank was enveloped by the British left, when it gave way; and soon after Stevens, who commanded the left brigade, was badly wounded. Then the whole line gave way and retreated past the left of the Continentals. Within half an hour after the battle opened the militia, whether their numbers were 2,800 or 3,800, were all gone except the gallant riflemen from Virginia under Lynch and Campbell, many of whom were old soldiers, but whose numbers did not exceed 200 men. The North Carolinians had lost 11 and the Virginians 46, killed and wounded, and had inflicted probably an equal loss on their oppo- nents. The hard fighting of the day was yet to come, and the numbers were about equal — 2,000 on each side. 3 p. m. The British troops continued their advance through the woods and came to the second clearing. Three sepa- rate and somewhat disjointed attacks were made across this and against the four Continental regiments posted on the rising ground in the woods on the opposite side. Two of them were repulsed — the first by Webster's bri- gade, against the centre of the line between the Virginia and Maryland brigades. He was driven back with heavy loss, Webster himself being mortally wounded and his Guilford BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 241 brigade forced back across the clearing and separated i78i from O'Hara. The second was by two battalions of the Guards under O'Hara. They struck the left flank — the 2d Maryland, a new regiment — and it fled almost with- Battle of out firing a shot. Then the 1st Maryland wheeled to the left and took them in flank, and they were driven back in great confusion, one battalion losing nearly half its strength and O'Hara being wounded. They were pur- sued by the 1st Maryland and by William Washington's cavalry. Colonel Stewart of the Guards was killed, and their retreat was only checked by Cornwallis in person, who brought the two 3-pounders along the road to the edge of the clearing and ordered them to fire grape over the heads of his own men, many of whom were wounded by it. If at this moment Greene had followed up his sue- March 15, cess by a vigorous attack with the three regiments which now remained to him, he might have defeated Cornwallis. The attack might have failed, and if so he would have lost his whole army and the war in the South would have ended — for there were no more reinforcements to come from the North. He had previously made up his mind never to risk the total destruction of his army, and he abided by this determination. He therefore reformed his men in their first position on the wooded hill; and Cornwallis brought up the 71st and the battalion of the Guards which had been fighting against Lee and Camp- bell on the extreme right, reformed his lines and prepared for a final assault with the seven battalions which he now had. As he began to move forward Greene decided to save his army while it was still in his power to do so. He placed the 1st Virginia, which had not been engaged, in position to cover his retreat, and retired in good order. Corn- 3.30 p. M. 242 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1781 March 16 March 17 Cornwallis Retreats to Wilmington March 18 March 28 wallis followed him only a short distance, and before morning Greene had taken a good defensive position be- hind the Haw River, about ten miles from the battle- field. He had lost 78 killed and 183 wounded; when the returns were made up, 1,046 of the militia were missing; the others had straggled into camp. He had inflicted upon Cornwallis a loss of 93 killed, 413 wounded and 26 missing, nearly 30 per cent of his strength. 1 The retreat to the Dan and the battle of Guilford were to the South what the retreat through New Jersey and the battles of Trenton and Princeton were to the North. They turned the tide; and each attracted equal atten- tion in Europe. Greene lost the battle but won the cam- paign, and the first step toward Yorktown was taken. Cornwallis's losses were so great and his situation so pre- carious at such a distance from his base that a retreat was imperative. The only question was in what direc- tion he should go. The distance to Camden was about 160 miles. To return there was to acknowledge the total failure of his campaign. The distance to Wilmington was about 200 miles. There he would have the support of the British ships; and possibly he might draw Greene after him, and after he had refitted his army engage him in battle again and meanwhile the posts in South Caro- lina would be safe. 2 He determined to retreat as far as Cross Creek (Fay- etteville) where he had ordered supplies to be sent from Wilmington. Giving his men two days' rest and aban- doning his wounded, he began his march. Greene in- stantly started in pursuit. He came up with Cornwallis's rear at Ramsay's Mill, on Deep River, but did not feel 1 Dawson, 669, 670. 2 Tarleton, 27S, 322-327; Stedman, II, 350-353. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 243 strong enough to attack him. Cornwallis then went on i78i unmolested to Cross Creek, and finding no supplies there A P ni 7 continued his retreat to Wilmington. 1 Greene did not follow him beyond Deep River. Corn- wallis being out of the way, he decided to march to South Carolina and endeavor to regain that State. 2 He remained at Ramsay's Mills a week, reorganizing March 29 his army and perfecting his plans. The Virginia and Aprils North Carolina militia had been called out for six weeks and their time was up; they had been with him just twenty- three days, and they had been of real service for they had enabled him to fight the battle of Guilford even though they had failed at the critical moment. He released them all with thanks and sent them home. His army was then reduced to the four Continental regiments — 1st and 2d Virginia, 1st and 2d Maryland, Lee's Legion and William Washington's dragoons — in all about 1,450 men. Under a curious order of the " Council Extraordinary" which then administered so much of the Provincial gov- ernment as existed in North Carolina, all of the six weeks' militia who had fled from Guilford were " sentenced to twelve months' duty as Continentals." 3 An effort was made to round them up, and later a few hundred of them joined Greene and did good service, as did other skeleton regiments which were raised as speedily as possible in North Carolina. The force with which Greene began his march into South Carolina was less than 1,500 men. He designed to aid these to the utmost by utilizing fully the partisan corps under Sumter, Marion and Pickens. While Greene was not as successful as Morgan in getting the most out of the militia on the battle-field, he was 'Tarleton, 278, 322-327; Stedman, II, 350-353. 2 Greene, Letters, Johnson, II, 37-40. 3 Schenck, 394. 244 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1781 Greene Marches to South Carolina far more successful than any other commander at the South in securing the co-operation of these irregular leaders, who abhorred discipline, considered obedience as synonymous with servility and made it a practice to submit their plans to their followers for approval before putting them into execution. Notwithstanding these eccentricities they rendered valuable service. Sumter was now on the Broad River, recovered from his wound and recruiting his men; Marion was hiding in the Pedee swamps, but ready to emerge when conditions were favorable; Pickens was on his familiar ground in western South Carolina. Greene communicated with all of them, requesting their assistance, and they cheerfully gave it — sometimes according to Greene's plans and sometimes according to their own. On the British side, Rawdon had been left in command when Cornwallis marched North. He was at Camden, whose garrison was 1,400 men, of whom 500 were at the moment detached in the hope of catching Marion. In ad- dition to the two main posts of Charleston and Savannah, there were others at Augusta, Ninety-Six, Fort Granby, Orangeburg, Fort Motte, Fort Watson and Georgetown, whose garrisons varied from 120 to 630 men. Exclud- ing Charleston and Savannah, Rawdon had about 3,500 effective men in the various other posts, and in the two States 8,U1. 1 With his 1,500 Continentals and such assistance as he could get from the partisan leaders and any militia that might join him, Greene set out to capture these posts and reconquer South Carolina. With the main body he marched to Camden; he kept Lee on his left flank, to give warning if Cornwallis should come toward South 'Sparks, V, 545. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 245 Carolina, and if not then to effect a junction with Marion i78i and attack Fort Watson, below Camden; Sumter was requested to join the main body at Camden, and Pick- ens to advance against Ninety-Six on his right. Greene marched to Camden, 140 miles in 14 days, of April 6-20 which 3 were spent in collecting boats to cross the Pedee. During this time Lee had joined Marion at a ferry lower A P ru 14 down on the Pedee, and the two had proceeded to besiege Fort Watson, a stockaded post on the Santee about half- way between Camden and Charleston. After a siege of 8 capture of days the place was captured 1 by the expedient of cutting trees and erecting (during the night) a tower, from the top of which a plunging fire was delivered inside the stockade which rendered it untenable. Its garrison of April 15-23 120 men was captured, with the loss to Marion and Lee of 2 killed and 4 wounded. They then moved to the High Hills of Santee in the hope of intercepting Colonel Watson, who with 500 men of the Camden garrison had been sent to catch Marion in the Pedee swamps and after a fruit- less chase was now returning to his post. He managed to evade Marion and Lee and joined Rawdon at Camden, but not until after the battle had been fought. Greene had approached Camden from the north and May 7 had hoped to surprise it, but the tories gave warning of A P ru 20 his approach. Not having men enough either to assault or to surround and besiege it, he retired to a rising ground about two miles north of the village and took up a de- fensive position. The ground was wooded — like nearly all of the battle-grounds in the Southern campaign. Its right was protected by the Wateree, its left by a rivulet and swamp ; the high-road from Camden to the Waxhaws passed through the centre. The troops were disposed as Dawson, G72; Lossing, II, 501. 246 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i follows: the 2 Virginia regiments on the right, the 2 Maryland on the left and 2 guns on the road between them; a body of North Carolina militia which had just joined were placed in the second line, thus reversing the dispositions made at the Cowpens and at Guilford. William Washington's cavalry was in rear of the left and the Delaware battalion was stationed as an outpost at the foot of the hill about 500 yards in advance of the main line. The men bivouacked in this order night and day, expecting an attack. Greene's strength, Lee's Legion being detached, was 1,174 Continentals and 248 North Carolina militia. 1 Battle of Hob- Rawdon decided to attack without waiting for Watson, kirk's Hill . . April 25 ' as he feared that Marion and Lee might join Greene if he delayed. Marching out of his fortified village early in the morning, he circled to the right through the woods in order to approach the hill from the south-east where the slope was least steep. He had 1 regular regiment — 63d — and 3 regiments of New York tories (Volunteers of Ireland, King's American and New York Volunteers), with a detachment of South Carolina tories and a few ioa.m. dragoons. As he came in contact with the Delaware battalion he deployed with 3 regiments in the first line and moved forward to attack the hill. Greene seems to have been overconfident, and instead of waiting to receive the attack in his chosen position on the crest of the wooded slope he took the offensive. Rawdon's front being narrow, he endeavored to envelop him on both flanks while he made a vigorous attack on his centre. Campbell with the 1st Virginia was to turn his right flank, Ford with the 2d Maryland his left; 1 Johnson, II, 72-95; Stedman, 356-362; Dawson, 680-684; G. W. Greene, III, 239-255. , v ':'' Hob kirks , ',1 V? Brig. <■ tfn'l llutfer i. Col. Campbell u. Col. H Virginia Uii^TT^ ^rg „ Col. Washington jfe i-Tit Toil . L'uu\ .descents | British H Americans □ Original Column of attack H Formation for assault ■H Final Position ■i American 1st Position d American 211. 1 Position •--, \ yO t * \ N/ <"i \ Col. <\* \ L * \ >v S * ^Washington* \ \ ' + * S^ \ ' g ^ N T. \ hio From Avery's History of the United State-, and Its People BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 247 Gunby with the 1st Maryland and Hawes with the 2d i78i Virginia were to charge with the bayonet against his centre; the artillery were to use grape; and William Washington with his cavalry was to sweep around his left flank and attack him in rear. It was too ambitious a programme. Rawdon quickly extended his front by bringing up the Irish regiment, and in the sharp fighting which ensued Captain Beatty of the 1st Maryland was killed, his company began to re- tire and Gunby ordered the regiment to fall back to reform. In doing so this regiment — which had fought so gallantly at Camden, the Cowpens and Guilford, and in nearly every battle since Long Island — became de- moralized and could not be rallied. Rawdon 's men charged up the hill, and the 2d Maryland, seeing the retreat of the 1st, and their colonel, Ford, being mortally wounded, also began to retreat; and this brought Raw- don on the left flank of the Virginia regiments. Greene saw that the day was lost and immediately withdrew the Virginia regiments and the artillery. His little force re- treated five miles and took up another position, but Raw- don did not pursue. He returned within his lines at Camden that same afternoon. Greene's losses were 19 killed, 115 wounded and 136 missing, and Rawdon's about the same, 258 killed, wounded and missing. 1 Thus Greene lost his second battle, and he was somewhat disheartened, writing to Luzerne, the French minister (in a vain appeal for help from the French soldiers cooped up in Newport): "We fight, get beat, May io rise and fight again." 2 As at Guilford, the ultimate advantages were all on his side; for Rawdon, unwill- 1 Dawson, 684. » See also Sparks, Letters, III, 299. 248 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i ing to risk a second engagement, soon retreated to Charleston. 1 May 7 At the time of the battle, Pickens on the extreme right was approaching Ninety-Six; Marion and Lee on the left were at the Santee Hills, trying to intercept Watson on his return from Georgetown to Camden; and Sumter, in- stead of joining Greene as requested had started on an independent expedition against Fort Granby (Columbia). Watson managed to elude Marion and join Rawdon in Camden. Greene then sent Lee against Fort Granby, Marion against Fort Motte, 30 miles south of Camden, and with his main body retired 6 miles to Rugely's Mill. Rawdon was thus surrounded and every one of his posts threatened. Notwithstanding the reinforcement brought by Watson, he did not feel strong enough to at- tack Greene, and he decided that his only safety was in a retreat to Charleston. He therefore burned the stock- ades at Camden and such stores as he could not carry, and retreated to Monck's Corner, about 30 miles from Charleston. While he was on his retreat Marion surrounded Fort Motte. 2 This was a post, garrisoned by 150 men, at the point where the Congaree and Wateree Rivers unite to form the Santee. With Fort Watson, lower down on the Santee, it maintained the communications between Cam- den and Charleston. The post consisted of an old colo- nial mansion, in a commanding situation, which had been fortified. It was captured by the novel expedient of shooting arrows carrying firebrands against the dry shin- gles on the roof, by which the house was set on fire. The May 12 garrisoned soon surrendered. 3 1 Stedman, II, 361. 2 Dawson, 689-692; G. W. Greene, III, 278. 3 Lossing, II, 480. May 10 Rawdon Evacuates Camden May 24 Capture of Fort Motte BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 249 Lee then went on to Fort Granby, where Sumter had i78i abandoned his attack in favor of a more promising expedi- capture of tion against Orangeburg, about thirty miles to the south. May n Rawdon had already given orders for the evacuation of Orangeburg, but Sumter arrived before the order was executed, and with slight difficulty captured the garrison of 350 men. He then retraced his steps to Fort Granby capture of and on his arrival was annoyed to find that Lee had ar- May 15 rived the day before and had compelled its surrender, with its garrison of 240 men. Sumter felt that Lee had stolen his glory and complained to Greene of Lee's conduct, stating that he considered it "for the good of the public to do it without regulars." ! Greene replied that Lee had acted in accordance with his orders; whereupon Sumter sent in his resignation. Greene diplomatically persuaded him to withdraw it, and he afterward rendered excel- lent service, in co-operation with Lee, in the vicinity of Charleston. 2 All the interior posts in South Carolina were now capt- May 9 ured except Ninety-Six. As soon as Rawdon evacuated Camden, Greene marched rapidly toward Ninety-Six, sending Lee some North Carolina militia, who had just arrived, to join Pickens who had collected a considerable body of militia in the vicinity of Augusta. On his way May 21 Lee captured a large amount of supplies collected for dis- tribution to the Indians at a point on the Savannah River, about twelve miles below Augusta. He then crossed the river and late on the same day joined Pickens on the west side of Augusta. This village was defended by two stockaded forts, one siege of in the village and the other about half a mile up the river. May 22 to Its garrison numbered 630 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel : Johnson, II, 122. 2 G. W. Greene, III, 290, 295, 298. 250 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i Browne. The garrison of the upper fort was composed of Georgia loyalists. They attempted to escape to the main fort and nearly half of them were killed by the Georgia militia of Colonel Clarke. The siege of the principal fort lasted fourteen days. Browne made a stiff defence. To the first summons to surrender he returned a spirited refusal. He made two vigorous sorties. The besiegers finally won by the same device as at Fort Watson — a wooden tower from which to deliver a plunging fire within June 5 the stockade. Browne was finally forced to yield, and signed articles of capitulation in which his garrison was definitely surrendered as " field prisoners of war." * siege of Pickens and Lee hastened to join Greene, who had May 22 to ' begun the siege of Ninety-Six. This place had been elab- orately and somewhat curiously fortified with stockades and deep ditches. Its garrison numbered 550 men, a tory regiment from New York, another from New Jersey and some South Carolina loyalists — all commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger, of New York. He also made a spirited defence. Greene had only 984 men — prior to the arrival of Pickens and Lee — and it was impossible to surround the place. His engineer, Kosciusko, opened May 23 his first parallel at 70 yards. Cruger punished this " in- sult " the next morning by a vigorous sortie supported by the fire of three 3-pounders. The intrenching party was routed and lost most of their tools. Kosciusko then began a new first parallel at "a more respectful distance," 400 yards, and from this the besiegers gradually worked their way up to the ditch of the Star Fort. There were con- stant sorties; there were the same devices of a wooden tower for plunging fire and arrows carrying firebrands to set fire to the beleaguered buildings; the source of 1 Dawson, 673, 679; G. W. Greene, 300-302; Stedman, II, 363. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 251 water supply was captured, and the besieged suffered 1781 terribly from thirst. 1 While the siege was in progress reinforcements from j une 3 Ireland arrived at Charleston, three full regiments, 3d, 19th and 30th, and a number of recruits for the Guards. Rawdon determined to march to the relief of Ninety-Six. Marion was operating near the coast, and hearing this news sent a courier to notify Greene, who in turn sent explicit instructions to Sumter and Marion to place them- selves in front of Rawdon and retard his advance, as Williams and Lee had so skilfully done on the Dan. Rawdon managed to evade them, and was approaching with 1,800 infantry, 200 cavalry and a body of South Caro- lina loyalists. To conclude the siege before his arrival Assault at was impossible, and Greene determined on an assault. June fs u Campbell with picked detachments from the Virginia and Maryland regiments was to attack the Star Fort, and Lee with the legion infantry the redoubt; the rest of the command was to man the wooden tower and the trenches from which they were to concentrate their fire on the Star Fort. Axes were provided to cut down the abatis, fascines to fill up the ditch and long poles with hooks to pull down the sand-bags of the besiegers' trenches. At noon the assault began, preceded by an hour's can- nonade from Greene's four guns. The storming parties rushed forward and gained the ditch. Then the besiegers poured into the ditch from the sally-port of the main stockade. A desperate hand-to-hand struggle resulted and the assailants were driven out. Lee was more suc- cessful and carried the redoubt, and was preparing to attack the village stockade from the rear. Greene, how- July 20 Dawson, 692-697; Stedman, 364-373; G. W. Greene, 303-317; Johnson, II, 138-154. 252 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i ever, adhering to his resolution never to submit his little force to the risk of total destruction, decided not to renew the assault, but to raise the siege, and preceded by his wounded he moved across the Broad River in the direc- tion of Charlotte. He had again lost the battle, but won the campaign, for Ninety-Six was speedily evacuated and never again occu- pied by the British. His losses during the siege were 57 killed, 70 wounded and 20 missing. Cruger lost 27 killed and 58 wounded. 1 June 21 Rawdon arrived the following day after an exhausting march of 180 miles. As quickly as possible he started in pursuit of Greene, but finding that the latter had crossed the Broad he returned to Ninety-Six and made Evacuation of preparations for its evacuation. Leaving Cruger there juiy 3 to arrange for the departure of the numerous loyalists residing in the vicinity, Rawdon marched first to Fort juiy 14 Granby and then to Orangeburg, where he was joined by the 3d Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, from Charleston, and soon after by Cruger, from Ninety-Six. This carried his strength to nearly twice that of Greene; and the latter decided on account of the intense heat to march his men to the high hills of Santee, about 30 miles below Camden, for a short but much-needed rest. juiy 20 Leaving Stewart in command in Orangeburg, Rawdon took 500 men and returned to Charleston, pursued by Sumter and Marion and Lee to within 5 miles of the city. Rawdon then left for England on leave of absence, but his ship was captured by de Grasse and he was carried a prisoner to Yorktown. Stewart followed Greene and went into camp facing him, with the Congaree between them. Greene's main body was on the Santee Hills; ^tedman, II, 373. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 253 Sumter took station on his right near the site of Fort i78i Granby (Columbia), Marion (who had captured George- capture of town while Greene was at Ninety-Six) on his left at Nel- June 20 son's Ferry on the lower Santee, and Pickens returned to his old recruiting-ground near Ninety-Six. 1 It was not quite eight months since Greene had taken command at the South. At that time everything south of North Carolina was in the enemy's possession. Now they had lost all of Georgia except Savannah and all but a small portion of South Carolina. In the interval Greene's little army had marched 950 miles, fought 3 battles and a score of minor engagements, conducted 5 sieges, captured 9 posts and taken nearly 3,000 prisoners. His army had no organized commissariat or transport system, no tents or camp equipage, and only insuffi- cient clothing. He had no base of supplies, but lived off the countiy which, although in the main friendly to him, was filled with a very substantial minority of intensely bitter loyalists. The enemy outnumbered him three to one, and was composed of the best British regulars and Hessians, the well-organized and veteran tory regiments of New York and New Jersey and a nu- merous body of local partisans, all well equipped and sup- plied, and supported by an ample military chest of ready money. Battles were lost because the troops lacked training and that steadiness which only experience under fire will bring; but the campaigns were won by tireless marches skilfully planned and directed. These were carried on, with extraordinary fortitude on the part of the men, through the snows and cold rains of the winter and the fierce heat of a Southern summer. 'Stedman, II, 372-383; Johnson, II, 162-178. 254 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i Greene gave his little army six weeks' rest in the com- Aug. 23 paratively salubrious region of the Santee Hills. Dur- ing that time he received some fresh levies from North Greene Carolina (the Guilford runaways, " condemned" to twelve offensive months, service as Continentals), carrying his strength to something over 2,000 men. He then resumed the offensive, and marched to attack Stewart. Aug. 28 It would have been difficult, if not impossible, to have forced a passage of the Santee; and Greene therefore made a circuit of about ninety miles, crossing the Wateree near Camden and the Congaree below Fort Granby (Columbia), and picking up the militia of Pickens and Henderson (formerly Sumter) on his march. Having thus crossed the rivers, he approached Stewart from the north-west, and the latter retired about forty miles to his depot of supplies at Eutaw Springs. se P t. 7 Greene slowly followed him, and a week later was joined by Marion on his return from a very successful raid on the Edisto near Charleston. The next day Greene moved forward in two columns, ready for deploy- ment as soon as the enemy was encountered. He had 2,300 men of whom 1,254 were Continentals and the rest militia. Stewart had an equal number, but all veterans; 6 regi- ments — 3d, 63d, 64th, Grenadiers, New York Volunteers and New Jersey Volunteers. They were encamped in a clearing, on both sides of the main road, a few hundred yards from the Santee; and in rear of the camp was a sept, s substantial brick house and palisaded garden which 8 a. m. played a very important part in the battle. About four miles from the camp Lee's cavalry came in contact with a "rooting" party (sent out to dig sweet- potatoes) and its escort. There was a skirmish in which From Avery's History of the United States and Its People Eutaw Springs Sept. 8, 1 78 1 BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 255 about 40 prisoners were taken and the rest rushed back i78i to camp to give the alarm. Stewart promptly formed his men in a single line, 3 regiments on each side of the road and 2 pieces of artillery on the road. Greene moved forward and, as he approached the Brit- Battle of ish position, deployed in two lines; the militia in front, springs, Marion on the right and Pickens on the left and the North faep ' Carolina militia in the centre; the Continentals in the second line, the two new North Carolina regiments on the right, the 1st and 2d Virginia in the centre, 1st and 2d Maryland on the left ; two pieces of artillery in the centre of each line; Lee's Legion on the right flank and Hender- son's (Sumter's) partisans on the left; William Washing- ton's cavalry and the Delaware battalion in the rear. The firing began at 150 yards and was soon very heavy. io A . m. The militia, under the guidance of Marion and Pickens, fought well and held their ground for some time; and when they were forced back Sumter's two North Caro- lina regiments came into line with them and the ground was regained. Soon afterward they were again forced back, and Greene then ordered Campbell and Williams with the Virginia and Maryland regiments to move for- ward without firing, relying on the bayonet; and at the same time sent Lee and William Washington to charge with their cavalry on both flanks. There was soon des- perate fighting along the whole line. William Washing- ton came to grief. In the wooded ground his dragoons were defeated with a loss of nearly half their strength, their leader himself being wounded and taken prisoner. The infantry and Lee's cavalry on the right were en- tirely successful. They drove the British regiments (after a desperate struggle, in which Campbell was killed and Henderson and Howard were wounded) to and through 256 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i their camp. Stewart succeeded in rallying his men at sept. 8 the cross-roads in rear of his camp, and a portion of them Battle of took refuge in the brick house and the adjoining garden; sprigs and from the windows of the house and from the shelter of the stout garden fence they poured a very destructive fire upon the infantry of Lee's Legion and Kirkwood's Delaware battalion, who had followed to the door. The Virginia and Maryland regiments stopped in the camp. It was filled with abundant supplies, including rum. It was so long since the Continentals had seen such delicacies that the temptation to partake of them was irresistible — especially as they thought the victory was already theirs. 12 M The battle however, was not won. The little party in the brick house was keeping up a vigorous fight against the Delaware battalion and Hampton's regiment of Sumter's men; the four pieces of artillery were brought into action at close range, but they were unable to make any impression on the walls. Finally Major Marjoribanks came out of the garden and made a bold and successful attack (in which he was mortally wounded), turning Hampton's left flank and capturing three of the four pieces of artillery. Meanwhile the Continentals were enjoying the good things in camp, but Stewart was re- forming his men at the cross-roads. He soon renewed his attack and the Continentals were in no condition to receive it. They began to fall back and Greene ordered a retreat, bringing off his own wounded as well as his prisoners. It was a bloody battle; 1 the Americans lost 120 killed, 375 wounded and 8 missing; the British, 85 killed, 351 1 Stedman, II, 377-381 ; Gordon, IV, 168-171 ; G. W. Greene, III, 391- 405; Johnson, II, 220-237; Dawson, 711-720. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 257 wounded and 430 missing — a total of nearly 40 per cent i78i of their strength. Both sides retreated, Greene on the night of the battle, Results of ~ , ., ., the Battle about 7 miles, and Stewart the next day 14 miles, leaving behind him a portion of his wounded and 1,000 muskets and destroying such stores as he could not carry away. As soon as Greene learned that Stewart sept. io had retreated he started in pursuit, but the latter was soon joined by a reinforcement from Charleston, and Greene returned to the Santee Hills. Thus for the fourth time Greene failed to gain a vic- tory in battle; the British rum unfortunately deprived him of it at the very moment of success. Again, as on the previous occasions, the advantages of victory were on his side, for the British retired to the vicinity of Charleston. Greene gave his men another short rest at the Santee Hills and then moved down to the Ashley in Action at Dorchester, pursuit. After a sharp skirmish at the beginning of Dec. i winter he drove them within their lines at Charleston; and, although the garrison was many times superior to him in numbers, he maintained a strict blockade until the city was evacuated. There was no serious fighting at the South after Eutaw Re-estabiish- . meat of the Springs. The Carolinas and Georgia were recovered and American i v i i mi Government the American governments were re-established. The two in the south British garrisons remained quietly within the limits of 1782 Savannah and Charleston until they were evacuated and July n the troops carried by sea to New York. Dec - 14 This eleven months' campaign — January to December, 1781, from the Catawba to the Dan and from the Dan back to Charleston and Augusta — received at the time the enthusiastic commendation of Washington and his comrades on the one side and of Tarleton and Stedman 258 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1781 Comments on Greene's Southern Campaign on the other. It has always been considered one of the most brilliant in American annals, and it has been quite as much praised by English as by American writers. Though the numbers on each side were small, yet from the military stand-point it is full of interest and instruc- tion and well repays examination in all its details. The marches, the manoeuvres, the sieges, the raids and the scouting by both Lee and Tarleton, the improvised pontoon trains, the proper use of the topography of the country for defence and offence — were all admirable. There was but little artillery on either side, but it was well handled. The four battles were fiercely contested and the percentage of loss on both sides was large. The British had the advantage of well-trained and well-armed troops, but this was more than counterbalanced by the superiority of the American generalship. In only one respect can Greene be criticised, and whether the criticism is just or unjust it is hard to say. He lost every battle. Morgan, under similar circumstances, gained a great vic- tory. If Greene had possessed the same temperament as Morgan or Wayne he would probably, both at Guilford and at Eutaw, have made one more effort and risked everything on the result of it. If unsuccessful, he would have been destroyed; if successful, he would have hast- ened by a few months what he finally accomplished. The general opinion is, and it is probably well founded, that the circumstances did not justify the risk, and that his prudence — in saving his little army while there was yet time and after he had, in each case, inflicted such a loss on his adversary as to compel the adversary's re- treat — was not the least of the many exhibitions of good judgment which characterized the whole campaign. CHAPTER VIII YORKTOWN When Cornwallis, retreating from Guilford, reached "81 Wilmington, he was in great perplexity. His letters were somewhat pathetic. To Phillips: "My situation here is April 24 very distressing; Greene has taken the advantage of my being obliged to come to this place, and has marched to South Carolina." 1 To Clinton: "My present under- A P ni23 taking sits heavy on my mind." 2 To Germain: "If we are so unlucky as to suffer a severe blow in South Carolina . . . this might enable General Greene to hem perplexity of me in among the great rivers and by cutting off our subsistence render our arms useless. And to re- main here for transports to carry us off . . . would be as ruinous and disgraceful to Britain as most events could be." 3 His view was that if the war was to be offensive it AprU22 should be in Virginia; if defensive, at New York. In either event he had no hope of saving the Carolinas. He was by no means sure that Clinton would approve his views. He very much desired Clinton's instruc- tions, but it would take six weeks or more to obtain them, and he could not wait that long. He had al- ready wasted two weeks in thinking about it, and when he received definite information that Phillips had been 1 Clinton-Cormvallis, I, 428. a Ibid., I, 424. 3 Ibid., I, 421,422. 259 2G0 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1781 Decides to March to Virginia April 24 May 20 Situation in Virginia 1780 Oct. 15 Nov . 25 Dec. 20 1781 Feb. 24 Feb. 15 March 10 March 16 ordered to Virginia he decided to march thither and join him. 1 ' Having made his decision, Cornwallis marched from Wilmington; and following what is now the line of the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, through Goldsborough and Weldon, he reached Petersburg — 223 miles — at the end of four weeks. 2 Here he found that Clinton had bent every effort to send a sufficient force into Virginia, via the Chesapeake, to cut Greene's communications, and that Washington had stripped his little army of every man that could be spared, in order to keep these com- munications open. Clinton first had sent Leslie with 2,500 men to Hamp- ton Roads; and when Cornwallis had taken these to Charleston, Clinton had sent Arnold with 1,600 men to take their place. Then Washington sent Lafayette with 1,200 men to join Steuben, and at the same time ordered Wayne with 1,000 men to follow Lafayette, although Wayne was unable to march until three months later. Clinton met this by sending Phillips with 2,600 men to reinforce Arnold, and Washington persuaded Rocham- beau to send 1,200 of the French troops at Newport to reinforce Lafayette. They never reached him because 1 This decision was approved by Germain, but Clinton maintained that it was the cause of the loss of his army and the disastrous termination of the war. His view was that Cornwallis should have gone back to South Carolina, collected his forces, which largely outnumbered Greene's, and beaten him in battle; to which the troops in Virginia would have con- tributed by cutting off Greene's communications with the North. Corn- wallis maintained that Greene had made it impossible for him to march back to South Carolina, and that Virginia was the place for the final struggle. The controversy was maintained, so long as Clinton lived, in almost endless Narratives and Replies, which by the industry of Mr. B. F. Stevens were collected, arranged and printed so that every one can now read both sides. Clinton-Cornwallis, I and II. 2 Tarleton, 291. a oo o - c5 c ' ^2 a- 2 YORKTOWN 261 the squadron convoying them was met and defeated by i78i a British squadron, and thereupon they returned to New- port. Finally Clinton sent three more regiments (1,500 May 23 men) to reinforce Phillips/ and these arrived at Peters- burg a few days after Cornwallis reached that point. 2 Clinton had thus sent 5,700 men to Virginia 3 ; Washing- ton could only send 1,200. Cornwallis brought 1,500 with him, carrying his total strength to 7,200. Lafayette had gathered a few hundred militia; Steuben was in the vicinity of Charlottesville, trying to raise eighteen months' men to fill up Greene's new Continental regiments; and Wayne, although supposed to be marching through Maryland, had not in fact left York, Pa., at the time that May 24 Cornwallis marched to cross the James. Cornwallis argued, then and afterward, in favor of " solid operations in Virginia." Here was his chance. Lafayette was at Richmond, only twenty miles off, with a force one- sixth as large as his own. Destroy him, and break up Cornwall's Feeble Steuben's recruiting depot at the mouth of the Rivanna, Movements and his march to Virginia would have been justified not only to Clinton but to all the world. Cornwallis lost the chance; and his movements for the next three months can only be characterized as feeble — far different from the energy which he had displayed in the Jerseys four years before. Lee and Jackson have shown what a general of the first rank would have done in Cornwallis's situation. Un- doubtedly either of them would have crossed the James above Richmond, between Lafayette and Steuben, and marched rapidly across the headwaters of the Virginia 1 Phillips died a few days before Cornwallis arrived and Arnold was sent back to New York soon after. 2 Sparks, VIII, 10, 13, 19, 22, 510-516; Tarleton, 285-292. 3 Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 470-499. 262 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1781 May 26 Lafayette's Energetic Action May 27 June 4 June 1 June 7 June 9 June 10 streams to get between Lafayette and Wayne. With sufficient celerity of action, all three detachments could have been either destroyed or dispersed. Comwallis's base was the sea, and he could not forget it. His communications with New York were via the lower James, and he was not willing to cut loose and take the risk of Lafayette's small force getting in his rear. He therefore crossed the James 30 miles below Richmond, at Westover; and his plans extended no further than "to dislodge Lafayette from Richmond and with my [his] light troops to destroy any magazines or stores in the neighborhood" and then "to move to the neck (penin- sula) at Williamsburg." ' It was Lafayette who acted with the proper celerity. He promptly retreated to Ely's Ford on the Rapidan, covering the 70 miles in 7 days. Cornwallis pursued no farther than the North Anna (30 miles). He then sent his cavalry (which outnumbered that of Lafayette 10 to 1) on two raids, one under Tarleton to Charlottesville to disperse the legislature, and the other under Simcoe to break up Steuben's depot at Point of Fork, where the Rivanna empties into the James, 50 miles above Rich- mond. With the main body he followed leisurely to the latter point (40 miles in 6 days), and was joined there by Tarleton and Simcoe, who had accomplished the ob- ject of their raids, destroying a great deal of tobacco and some arms and supplies. Steuben was forced to march rapidly southward with his 450 Continental recruits; but he was not pursued. He halted at Cole's Ferry, on the Staunton River, and waited for further advices or in- structions from either Greene or Lafayette. 2 1 Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 488. 2 Tarleton, 295-299; Kapp, Steuben, 448^150. YORKTOWN 263 Meanwhile, Wayne was marching south with good i78i speed. He made the 160 miles from York, Pa., to the Arrival of Rapidan in 14 days, and he joined Lafayette without May 26 any serious effort on Cornwallis's part to prevent it, June io although the latter knew that Wayne was on his way to reinforce Lafayette. As soon as the junction was made, Cornwallis retreated through Richmond to Williamsburg, June 14-26 Lafayette following him, and Steuben joining Lafayette on the march. On the outskirts of this little village the first shot was fired after a month of marching. It was June 9 an inconclusive skirmish between advance guard and rear guard, with a loss of about 30 men on each side. 1 At Williamsburg Cornwallis received a letter from Clinton asking him to send about 3,000 men to New York. Cornwallis thereupon changed his plan of remaining at Williamsburg and prepared to cross the James and march to Portsmouth, where the men would embark. As he approached the river at Jamestown Lafayette pressed Battle of Jamestown, close to him and a smart engagement" resulted in which July 6 the Americans lost 26 killed, 99 wounded and 12 missing, chiefly in Wayne's Pennsylvania regiments; and Corn- wallis lost 5 killed and 70 wounded. Lafayette was defeated, but Cornwallis made no at- tempt to follow him and he retired slowly to Malvern Hill, below Richmond. The next day Cornwallis crossed July 7 the James, and sending on to Portsmouth the troops designated for embarkation, with the rest he marched as far as Suffolk. Tarleton was sent on a long raid 3 across juiy 9-24 the State to the mountains and back — 400 miles in 15 days — to destroy the stores which Steuben had been accumulating: for the Southern armv. These had beer i & 1 Dawson, 69S-700. 2 Tarleton, 354; Dawson, 701-704. 3 Tarleton, 358. 264 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i safely removed and all that Tarleton accomplished was to burn up a good many hogsheads of tobacco. A situation then existed on the British side which had a most important bearing on the issue of the campaign. It was somewhat similar to that of four years before which resulted so disastrously at Saratoga. 1 Lack of In London, Lord George Germain — probably the most ordination on incompetent official that ever held an important post at British ' a critical moment — was Colonial Secretary, charged with the conduct of the war under the personal direction of the King, with whom he was a great favorite. His letters were sometimes six weeks and sometimes three months in crossing the ocean, and when they reached their desti- nation the state of facts on which they were based had usually changed. Yet he undertook to direct the opera- tions at this distance and corresponded directly with Clinton and with Cornwallis — frequently giving contra- dictory instructions. At New York, Clinton, who was commander-in-chief of the land forces and peace commissioner as well, was responsible for the operations; but he had no control over the navy, whose co-operation was absolutely essen- tial as all plans were based on the control of the sea. Sometimes the naval commander was in accord with Clinton and sometimes he was not; and in the latter cases he acted on his own judgment, regardless of Clin- ton's plans. At the south, from Virginia to Georgia, Cornwallis was in chief command. His letters reached New York in from eight days to two months. Clinton's letters to him were very numerous, and they were such as not to leave Cornwallis a free hand; neither did they give him 1 P. 79, ante. YORKTOWN 265 positive orders. Clinton and Cornwallis had different i78i views as to the proper plan of campaign, and Germain favored those of Cornwallis. Clinton sent instructions to Cornwallis, always with a saving clause that if the latter had other plans in view the instructions were not to be followed. Cornwallis tried to follow these directions, but every move he made was disapproved. Clinton cen- sured him for marching north from Wilmington, for not remaining at Williamsburg, for going to Portsmouth and finally for selecting Yorktown as the naval sta- tion. Clinton did not give him any positive instructions nor do his letters contain any clear, definite, matured plan. 1 With such lack of co-operation and co-ordination among those in the highest authority, success would under any circumstances have been difficult. On the American side military conditions were far Favorable more favorable. When Greene was sent to the South the American Congress gave him full authority and placed at his dis- posal all its resources — they were meagre enough, but it was absolutely everything they had. Washington gave Greene the benefit of his advice before he left and after that never sent him an order, although he continued to accord him the most hearty and unstinted support. In short, the government and the commander-in-chief gave the local commander every assistance they could com- mand and they both left to him the conduct of the campaign. On the American side there was precisely that co- operation and co-ordination which was so completely lacking on the British side, and it was one of the prime factors of success. There were lessons in these opera- 1 Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 493; II, 15, 53, 73, 98, 109, 143. 266 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i tions of 1781 which if they had been learned and applied in the Civil War would have saved many lives. Clinton's in- The instructions which Cornwallis received from Clin- cornwaiiis ton — always with a reservation as above stated — re- june ii-i5-i9 peated in three successive letters, were to send about 3,000 men to New York. The reason given was that Washington and the French allies were approaching New York, and Clinton feared he had not enough men for its defence — a reason which would override the reservations. Cornwallis received the first two of these letters at Will- iamsburg, and crossed the James to march to Ports- mouth and obey them. While on the march he received June 28 another letter, of later date, ordering the detachment to Philadelphia instead of New York. Four days later juiyi came another letter, of subsequent date, ignoring the orders for Philadelphia, but urging immediate despatch of troops to New York. Before the troops could be put juiy ii on the transports came a sixth and a seventh letter, juiy is dated later than the others, directing him to keep all his troops in Virginia and to occupy Old Point Comfort as a support for the fleet which was to be sent to Hamp- juiy26 ton Roads. Cornwallis at once went in person to ex- amine Old Point Comfort, taking with him his army engineers and the naval commanders then present. They were all of opinion, and so reported in writing, that Old Point Comfort was not suitable for defence. Inasmuch as Clinton and Graves (the naval commander-in-chief) had both urged the supreme importance of establishing a naval station in the Chesapeake, supported by defen- sive works on shore, Cornwallis selected the harbor be- tween Yorktown and Gloucester as the one best adapted for that purpose. He informed Clinton and Graves of his decision, as being in accordance with the spirit of his YORKTOWN 267 orders, and also in accordance with the opinion which i78i Phillips had given Clinton 1 — that Yorktown was the proper station — which opinion Clinton had previously sent to Comwallis for his guidance. The transports be- comwaiiis ing now at Portsmouth, the troops were sent to Gloucester Yorktown and Yorktown as quickly as possible, the lines of field fortifications were laid out and the work of constructing them was begun. Some excuse for the vacillating and contradictory Aug. 2 orders that Clinton gave may be found in the masterly plans that Washington had recently been formulating and was now putting into effect. For three years, with infinite patience and tact, Washington had been trying to obtain some positive, tangible, military benefit from the French alliance. There was no doubt of its moral, Washington's political and financial advantage ; but as yet the French troops had taken little or no part in the military opera- tions. In 1778 the French fleet had been blown away from Newport carrying the soldiers with it. In 1779 it had to come to Savannah for a short period, only to en- gage in a disastrous repulse. In 1780 it had got into Newport, but had been bottled up there ever since. Now, at last, the diplomatic but incessant arguments of Washington with Rochambeau at Newport, and the less diplomatic but effective efforts of Laurens supported by Franklin in Paris, began to have their effect. A new fleet was to be sent under de Grasse to the West Indies and thence to the American coast — to co-operate with Rochambeau under Washington's direction. As soon as Washington heard of this at his head- May 22 quarters at New Windsor (Newburg) he set out for Wethersfield (near Hartford) and there met Rocham- 1 Clinton-Cornwallis, II, 19, 24, 26, 29, 41, 49, 61, 73. 208 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i beau. 1 They perfected the details of an attack on New York — the obvious plan, for the accomplishment of which Washington had so often asked the co-operation of the French. Washington again sent to the New England governors 2 the most urgent request that they fill up their quota in the Continental regiments, for one season if the men could not be obtained for longer. A small portion of de Grasse's fleet soon arrived in Boston, bringing 700 recruits for the regiments at Newport and announcing what de Grasse's movements would be. He intended to arrive on the American coast in July or August. Letters were sent k him by Luzerne and Rochambeau, at Washington's suggestion, urgently re- questing him to bring troops as well as ships from the West Indies, and to come to New York, stopping on his way at the Chesapeake, where perhaps he might find an opportunity for an important stroke. 3 The Allies The operations against New York then proceeded. kew e York ' The French army finally left Newport for Providence June 10 and then marched westward. Washington marched south- ward from the Highlands, and the two armies came July 6 together, taking a position extending from Dobb's Ferry to White Plains. An attempt was made by the advance juiy 2-3 guard under Lincoln to surprise and capture the posts on the north end of Manhattan Island, and by Lauzun's Legion to capture an outpost of Provincials in Mor- risania; but both failed. 4 juiy 20-23 Washington then carefully reconnoitred from Fort Lee in New Jersey and from Chatterton's Hill across the Harlem, the fortifications of the British on Manhattan Island where he had himself first laid out the fortified Sparks, VIII, 54. 2 Ibid., VIII, 51-53. 3 Ibid., VIII, 64-78. * Ibid., VIII, 8G-98. YORKTOWN 269 lines five years before. They were too strong to be at- i78i tacked. The French had 4 regiments, Bourbonnais, Soissonnais, Saintonge and Royal-Deux-Ponts. They were 10 company regiments and their full complement was about 65 officers and 1,250 men each. There had been some sickness, and detachments had been left at Providence and elsewhere to guard their stores. Their effective strength was now about 930 each. In addition there was Lauzun's Legion, the artillery and the engineers. The entire French force was 4,756.* Washington had little if any more, for his appeal to the New England governors had brought only a feeble response. Clinton had in New York about 14,000 effectives, 2 in fortified lines, to reach which it was necessary to pass one or the other of the rivers, which were controlled by the smaller British vessels, while a large squadron was in the lower bay. Until de Grasse should arrive an attack was out of the question. Washington's fertile mind was intently thinking of Washington's alternative plans; to be decided as soon as definite in- Plans telligence of de Grasse's movements should be received. He had written to Lafayette directing him to establish jui y 13 a line of "expresses" to keep him quickly informed of any movements of the enemy and similarly to inform Greene; he now wrote to both Greene and Lafayette, July 30 directing both of them to send him the most complete information they could obtain as to the strength and position of the British troops in Virginia and at Charles- ton, and intimating as clearly as he dared, in view of the possibility of his letters being intercepted as several had been recently, that a campaign to Virginia or a siege of 1 Return of June 1 ; Keim, 389. 8 Sparks, V, 544, 545. 270 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1781 News from de Grasse Aug. 14 July 8 The Allies March to Virginia Aug. 15 Aug. 19 Aug. 17 Aug. 21 Charleston might be the outcome of de Grasse's arrival. His later letters showed that he was considering three projects: if Clinton reinforced Cornwallis, to attack New York; if Cornwallis reinforced Clinton (as he thought the most probable), to march to Virginia; and if on arriving in the Chesapeake the conditions were favorable, to move by sea to Charleston and besiege it in conjunction with Greene. 1 While he was thinking of these different plans, definite news came from de Grasse. The letter was addressed to Rochambeau and was dated at Cape St. Francis, San Domingo. It was clear and concise, very different from the letters that d'Estaing wrote. It stated that he would sail north on August 13; would bring with him 29 vessels of war and a portion of the garrison of San Domingo, to wit: 3 regiments, Gatinais, Agenois and Touraine, each 1,000 strong, together with 100 dragoons, 100 artillery- men, 10 field pieces and several siege cannon and mortars; he would proceed directly to the Chesapeake and would sail back to the West Indies on October 15, taking the troops with him. 2 Washington made an instant decision; he would march to the Chesapeake to meet him. Orders were immedi- ately despatched to Lafayette to prevent Cornwallis escaping to South Carolina; to Heath to take command of the little force, twelve small battalions, which was left in the north. A letter was sent by Duportail, the chief engineer, to de Grasse, explaining his plans, and asking him to send light vessels to Head of Elk in order to transport the troops down the Chesapeake. 3 And then the allied armies were put in motion, crossing the Hudson at King's Ferry to Stony Point, then marching 1 Sparks, VIII, 116-122. * Ibid., VIII, 522. * Ibid., 127-139 YORKTOWN 271 behind the Palisades to Newark and New Brunswick, nsi making a feint against Staten Island, and then on through sept. 1 Philadelphia to Head of Elk. So skilfully had Washing- ton conducted this movement and concealed it from the enemy that the troops had been 14 days on the march, . and most of them had passed Philadelphia when Clinton wrote to Cornwallis: 1 "By intelligence which I have this day received, it would seem that Mr. Washington is sept. 2 moving an army to the southward, with an appearance of haste, and gives out that he expects the co-operation of a considerable French armament." In making this move Washington put everything to Boldness of the hazard. A vigorous antagonist would have marched piaiV 1 " up the Hudson, scattered Heath's little force, seized the Aug. 11 Highlands and held them. Clinton had just been rein- forced by 2,500 Hessians, and his own return showed an effective strength at New York of 16,701 men. 2 Heath had, at the most, 2,500. Can there be any doubt of what a man like Grant or Lee would have done in Clinton's place? Further, if Washington failed in Virginia, New England was hopelessly separated from the South, and notwithstanding the Carolinas and Georgia had been re- gained, the Revolution would have collapsed. Daring as was the plan, it was eminently wise; for without a great victory the Revolution would die of ex- haustion. It was a time — as it had been at Trenton — when nothing but audacity would avail ; and it indicates the extraordinary balance and poise of Washington's mind that he could wait three long years for the psycho- logical moment to arrive, and when it did arrive that he instantly took advantage of it. 1 Clinton-Cornwallis, II, 149, 150. * Sparks, V, 545. 272 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i In boldness of conception and celerity of execution this march to Virginia was comparable with Napoleon's famous campaign of 1805, when he suddenly abandoned the camp which he had formed at Boulogne for the in- vasion of England and marched to the Danube. The dis- tance was about the same, 400 miles. Washington cov- ered it in 28 days, Napoleon in 35 days. Napoleon left the Channel on August 27, and the capitulation of Ulm took place on October 15 — 49 days later. Washington crossed the Hudson August 21, and the surrender of Yorktown was on October 19 — 59 days. Washington's resources in men, money, equipment, supplies and trans- portation were but a small fraction of those at Napoleon's disposal; but the effect on the world's history of Ulm and Austerlitz was a still smaller fraction of the results which flowed from Yorktown. Movements of It was an integral part of Washington's plan that the and English French should for the time being at least control the sea, Fleets and fortunately the naval commander was of a different type from d'Estaing. De Grasse came up through the Bahama Channel instead of the direct route, and Hood, who left the Windward Islands in pursuit, thus passed him without knowing it. After looking in at the Chesa- peake, Hood went on to New York, and the united fleet, Aug. 31 under Graves, immediately sailed for the Chesapeake, hoping to intercept de Barras's smaller fleet (which was on its way from Newport) before it could join de Grasse. In Aug. 30 the interval de Grasse had passed inside of Cape Henry. 1 He at once sent the land troops — the brigade of St. Simon sept. 5 — up to the James River and landed them near Williams- burg, where they were joined two days later by Lafayette who had marched down from Malvern Hill to meet them. 1 Mahan, 389. YORKTOWN 273 On the day the French troops landed the British fleet mi came in sight of Cape Henry. De Grasse went out to Navai Battle fight them, but, unlike d'Estaing at Newport, he did not Chesapeake carry his soldiers with him. These were left with Lafay- ette. The naval engagement was inconclusive, both sides losing heavily in men and guns, and then manoeuvring for four days without renewing the action. The net result was very advantageous to de Grasse, for the Brit- ish admiral found it necessary to take his fleet back to New York for repairs. De Grasse was left in control of the Chesapeake, and during the manoeuvring de Barras slipped in between the capes, bringing with him some recruits for the French regiments and a large train of siege artillery. 1 Clinton at New York learned from Cornwallis prior to ciinton Goes Graves's return that de Grasse was in the Chesapeake, comwalus and saw at once that the only chance to save Cornwallis was to join him with troops from New York. He there- sept. 6 fore embarked 4,000 men on transports and wrote to Cornwallis that he would sail with them as soon as the admiral could furnish a convoy. It was six weeks before the British ships were sufficiently repaired to furnish a convoy. Clinton then sailed with 7,000 men, but when he Oct. 19 reached the capes he learned that Cornwallis had already Oct. 24 surrendered, and he retraced his steps to New York. 2 Meanwhile, Washington had joined Lafayette at Will- iamsburg and his troops continued to arrive during the sept. 14 next ten days; some marching by land, but the greater Allied Army number coming down the Chesapeake from Annapolis, Washington Baltimore and Head of Elk in small vessels furnished by the French. The entire force 3 — the French from New- 1 Mahan, 389. 2 Clinton-Cornwallis, II, 152, 172, 186, 188. 'Johnston, Yorktown, 112-119. 274 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i port, the Americans from the Hudson, Lafayette's troops from Virginia and the French from Haiti — numbered about 16,600 men. The Americans were organized into 3 divisions under Lincoln, Lafayette and Steuben ; there were the remnants of 17 infantry regiments from each of the States from Massachusetts to Virginia, 4 artillery regiments and 1 of cavalry — in all 5,645 Continentals; and there were 3 brigades of new militia — 3,200 men — from Virginia under command of the governor, Nelson. The French were organized in 2 brigades, and there were 7 regiments of infantry, 1 of artillery and 1 of cavalry — about 7,800 rank and file, effective, in all. Cornwallis's return gave 5,316 effective. He had 1 Provincial, 4 Hessian and 11 British regiments, besides artillery and the cavalry of Simcoe's Rangers and Tarleton's Legion. eof As soon as his army was assembled and organized Washington moved forward from Williamsburg and sur- rounded Yorktown, the Americans on the right and the . 28 French on the left. The siege was begun and prosecuted in thoroughly military fashion. Cornwallis did not feel strong enough to occupy his outlying works south-east of . 30 the village, and he therefore abandoned them. They were immediately occupied by the allies, and from them the 6 first parallel was opened at 600 yards; the siege-guns had been landed from de Barras's fleet and brought to the trenches, and were vigorously used. The approaches were carried forward and the second parallel was opened, ii at 300 yards. Then a most gallant night assault was H made, Alexander Hamilton in the lead, and two redoubts were carried near the river on the British left. The second 15 parallel was promptly extended to include these. On the following night just before daybreak Cornwallis made a Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company Publishers. Cleveland, Ohio 40 YoRKTOWN Sept. 30-Oct. 19, 1 78 1 From Avery's History of The United States and Its People YORKTOWN 275 vigorous sortie with the Guards and light infantry, carried 1781 two batteries, hastily and imperfectly spiked the guns and inflicted a loss of about 100 men on the French. They could not hold the position and were driven back to their own lines. 1 Cornwallis then attempted to ferry his men across to Oct. 16 Gloucester in a desperate plan of trying to save his army by marching toward Philadelphia; but this plan was completely frustrated at the start by a violent storm which arose during the night and scattered and swamped his boats. With great difficulty his men were reassem- bled on the Yorktown side. Then Cornwallis opened Oct. 17 negotiations for surrender and two days later the capit- Oct. 19 ulation was signed. Washington took care that there capitulation i 1 1 i 1 • i i i i 1 i n at Yorktown should be no such mistakes as had been made at bara- toga. The garrison, including the naval force, was to be surrendered as prisoners of war; all public property was to belong to the United States ; no engagement was made as to future exchange of prisoners, "the soldiers to be kept in Virginia, Maryland or Pennsylvania . . . and supplied with . . . rations" ; the officers to be allowed to go to Eng- land or New York or elsewhere on parole; no stipulation as to the civil rights of the inhabitants ; a ship to be furnished to carry Cornwallis's sealed despatches to New York. 2 It was a long time before the prisoners were ex- changed, and there never was a word of controversy con- cerning the capitulation. The number surrendered 3 was 7,157 soldiers, 840 sea- 1 Johnston, Yorktown, 120-149; Dawson, 733-744; Tarleton, 368-393, 414-433. 2 The Articles of Capitulation are given in full in Tarleton, 438-442; Johnston, Yorktown, 186-189; Clinton-Cornwallis, 199-203; Sparks, VIII, 533-536. 3 Johnston, Yorktown, 164, 169, 194; Tarleton, 390, 448-451. 276 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i men and 80 camp followers — 8,077 in all. In addition there were 144 cannon, 6,658 muskets, large quantities of ammunition, supplies and clothing belonging to the army and 4 frigates, 30 transports, 15 galleys and several smaller vessels belonging to the navy. The losses during the siege had been: British, 156 killed and 326 wounded; allies, 75 killed and 199 wounded. Two-thirds of the losses of the allies were sustained by the French. comment on Could Cornwallis have saved his army? The attempt Cornwallis's . iiiici i ••<• surrender he made the day before he opened negotiations for sur- render would almost certainly have resulted in over- whelming disaster. The celerity with which Washington marched to Virginia indicates the vigor with which he would have pursued any such attempt. Cornwallis, fol- lowed and harassed by an enemy outnumbering him three to one, the greater part of its troops well equipped and all of them supported by the French fleet moving up the Chesapeake, would have had small chance of ever reaching Philadelphia. There was an opportunity four weeks earlier when success was possible. When de Grasse returned within the capes after his engagement with the British fleet, the allied army was only beginning sept. i6 to arrive. The force then opposed to Cornwallis was about 2,000 Continentals under Lafayette and the 3 French regiments from the West Indies. The roll of these latter shows 187 officers and 3,337 men; 1 but many of them were sick with scurvy, and it is not probable that more than 2,200 were effective. Lafayette's total force was thus not more than 4,200 effective. Cornwallis had 5,100 effective. If he could have defeated Lafayette, or driven him back to Richmond, he might have crossed the James and marched to Charleston. Tarleton argues 2 that 'Keim, 507. 2 Tarleton, 369. YORKTOWN 277 this should have been attempted and would have sue- i78i ceeded. The distance was 420 miles, through a hostile country all the way, with many rivers to cross, with Washington and the allies following from the North, and Greene facing him from the South as soon as he reached South Carolina. It does not seem probable that it could have succeeded. Cornwallis did not attempt it, because he had already received Clinton's letter of Sep- temper 6 telling him that he was coming to his relief; and he could not doubt that the British would beat the French on the sea. Did Cornwallis surrender too soon? When he opened Oct. io negotiations he had 2,089 on the sick report and about 4,700 effective. He had upward of 350,000* pounds of provisions; with proper care this would have lasted from 20 to 25 days. Clinton, with 7,000 men, arrived off the capes within 7 days. The fleet which convoyed him contained 27 ships of the line; de Grasse had 36. If Cornwallis had held out 10 days longer, in the naval en- gagement that would have taken place there was a chance that the British would have won, and the addition of 7,000 regulars to Cornwallis's force would have changed the whole situation. Cornwallis had received a week before a letter from Clinton saying that he would sail on the 12th. There is ground for argument that neither the number of his sick nor the state of his food supplies justi- fied him in surrendering at the time he did, and that he should have awaited Clinton's arrival and the result of the naval battle which that would bring on. Cornwallis gave his reasons as follows: 2 that his works "were going to ruin," that it would be "desperate to attempt to main- tain them," that he "could not fire a single gun," that 'Tarleton, 457. 2 Clinton-Cornwallis, II, 212, 213. 278 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR i78i his " numbers had been diminished by the enemy's fire, but particularly by sickness" and that "it would have been wanton and inhuman to the last degree to sacrifice the lives" of his soldiers "by exposing them to an assault, which from the numbers and precautions of the enemy could not fail to succeed." On his return to England Comwallis was never brought to trial nor even censured — except in Clinton's pamphlets. He lived twenty-five years longer, the greater part of which was spent as governor-general and commander- in-chief in India; where in the siege of Seringapatam and in his campaigns against Tippoo Sahib he conquered for his country a large part of what is now the Indian Empire. His contemporaries did not blame him for the loss of Yorktown, and the general opinion has since been that the surrender was due to the masterly combination of Washington from which no escape was possible. of the The war practically ended with Yorktown. Wash- ington tried to persuade de Grasse to join him in an ex- pedition against Charleston or in one against New York. The latter, however, insisted on returning to the West Indies. The troops were then scattered: Wayne and the Pennsylvania Continentals were sent to reinforce Greene at the South; Rochambeau remained at Williams- burg; St. Simon's brigade was sent back to Haiti; Wash- ington and the New York and New England Continentals returned to the Hudson ; Lafayette went back to France. In the following spring Clinton was superseded by Carleton. tyof There were no more military movements. A } T ear was spent in negotiating the treaty of peace, and during this year Savannah and Charleston were evacuated, as previously stated. When the treaty had been signed YORKTOWN 279 New York was evacuated. The war was over and the 1783 independence of the United States was established and Nov. 25 acknowledged. The war had called forth the entire military strength of Great Britain — most of her navy, nearly all of her army and all the mercenaries that her money could hire. She sent to America 57 British and 30 Hessian regiments, and raised in or near New York 12 Provincial regiments which were thoroughly organized and equipped and served from three to six years. The number of sea- men exceeded 40,000, in more than 100 ships, and with these Great Britain kept control of the sea for the entire eight years, with the exception of forty-one days in 1779 and sixty-four days in 1781. Considered in the light of its influence upon the prog- Washington's ress of mankind, the Revolution was one of the most soiE as important wars in the whole history of the world. The result was due — more than to all other causes combined — to the ability of Washington as a soldier. His political services were of such surpassing importance and value that it has long been the fashion to speak disparagingly or at least apologetically of his military achievements. If his campaigns are carefully studied, no other conclu- sion can be reached than that they were most skilfully conducted; and if Washington had died at any time between 1783 and 1789 he would have been known in history as one of the great soldiers of all time. In his principal battles, Long Island, Brandywine and Germantown, he was either defeated or the result was inconclusive. This was not because they were badly planned, but because the soldiers by whom they were fought, while brave and patriotic, were deficient in train- 2S0 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1783 ing, experience and discipline — were not as efficient in- struments for accomplishing a specific purpose, plans for which had been properly made, as were their opponents. At Monmouth the combined treason and incapacity of Charles Lee robbed Washington of a well-deserved vic- tory. At Fort Washington, his own indecision caused a grave disaster. This is about the only criticism that can be made of his military acts during eight long years of warfare. Against this are the achievements on which his military reputation securely rests: the marvellous retreat from Long Island, the audacious attack at Trenton and Prince- ton, the well-planned movement from Valley Forge, when Howe evacuated Philadelphia, and the brilliant march to Yorktown. These four events occurred at intervals during five years, and between them were periods of enforced inaction compelled by the poverty of military resources. Those were the Fabian periods during which any other policy would have resulted in ruin. The four offensive events were Napoleonic. Each of them was characterized by an extraordinary exhibition of daring, celerity and skill, the three qualities to which both Caesar and Napoleon owed their classic triumphs. It was in the domain of strategy rather than of tactics that Wash- ington's genius was exhibited, and his successes were due to well-matured plans and rapid marches; the accidents of battle were nearly always unfavorable to him. He possessed the gaudium certaminis in a marked degree, and in the melees at Kip's Bay, Princeton and German- town his reckless exposure was phenomenal. The placid benignity which Stuart placed in the portraits which he painted a few years before Washington's death, and the austere character which Sparks has embodied in his YORKTOWN 281 twelve volumes, must not make us forget that during 1783 the Revolution, at the age of forty-four to fifty-one, Washington had very warm blood in his veins. He was a man of passionate vigor, intense energy and affection- ate sympathy. He was a pre-eminent soldier. PART II THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES "Regular troops are alone equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as offence, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous." — George Washington. CHAPTER I THE POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA The usual statement of our military policy is that we maintain a small regular army in time of peace, raise large volunteer forces in time of war and maintain at all times a " well-regulated militia" in the various States. This policy rests upon certain fundamental principles, viz., distrust of a standing army, reliance upon untrained troops and dependence upon voluntary service. It is a singular fact that while we have been successful, not only in the general result, but in the specific military events, in all our wars except the second war with Great Britain, yet the principles upon which our armies have been raised and organized have been denounced by pro- fessional soldiers in every generation, beginning with Washington, as wasteful, extravagant, inefficient and wrong. The policy which we have adopted was not, as Glad- origin of 1 J r ' . Our Military stone said of the Constitution, "struck off at one time by Policy the brain and purpose of man," but, on the contrary, is due in part to our geographical situation, but chiefly to racial prejudices which have their roots far back in Eng- lish history; as far back, indeed, as the very beginning of English — as distinguished from British — history, in the fifth and sixth centuries. The Teutonic tribes which then conquered Britain and founded England brought 285 286 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES Ancient Hatred of a Standing Army with them two ideas of profound significance, 1 viz., the ideas of representative government and of voluntary mil- itary service; and these ideas or principles have never been abandoned, but have been maintained, developed and enlarged during nearly fifteen hundred years. They are the foundation of English civilization, English gov- ernment and English habit of thought. Our ancestors brought them to America in the seventeenth century, .at the very time when the Stuart kings were endeavoring to rule without Parliament, to levy taxes without legis- lative sanction, to create a standing army for the destruction of the liberties and the religion of the Eng- lish people. These twin principles — representative gov- ernment and voluntary military service — were the foun- dation of the state, no less in Virginia than in New England 2 ; for, while the Puritan looked upon the army as the instrument of oppression, to the Cavalier the words "standing army" meant Cromwell's disciplined troops, who had arrested members of Parliament, stabled their horses in cathedrals, insulted and robbed the nobility and gentry and murdered the king. To both Cavaliers and Puritans, therefore, as they founded their settlements in America, the name of standing army was hateful, with a bitterness and intensity of hatred which we can at this distance hardly appreciate. A hundred years or more later this hatred was, if possible, still further in- tensified by the acts of an English king and Parliament, 1 "The base of the new English society was the freeman. . . . War was no sooner over than the warrior settled down into the farmer. . . . Each little village commonwealth lived the same life in Britain as its farmers had lived at home. Each . . . made laws in the assembly of its wise men, and chose its own leaders among the 'earls' for peace or war." (J. R. Green, Short History of the English People, 12. See also John Fiske, The Beginnings of New England, 25-30.) 2 John Fiske, Civil Government in the United States, 64-65. POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 287 who again used a standing army to enforce their law for levying taxes against the will of those taxed. Thus, the outbreak of the Revolution found our ancestors, North and South, not only inheriting the hatred of a standing army, through generations of their own forebears, but at the instant confronted with a standing army as the in- strument of the oppression which they were determined no longer to tolerate. Detestation of the word army was not alone an inherited prejudice, but a vital funda- mental principle in the political faith of the day. Such a prejudice, founded originally on justice, is slow to die. It survived long after the conditions which gave rise to it had ceased to exist. It has been slowly expir- ing in this country during the last hundred years, but it can hardly yet be called extinct. The debates in Congress at the last reorganization of the army in 1901 contain much of the same oratorical declamation about standing armies and the destruction of the liberties of Greece and Rome that Macaulay 1 so graphically nar- rates in his account of the debate in Parliament in 1697. On the other hand, the militia in England antedated popularity of the regular army by at least one thousand years; it was England 1 * m part of the local government, and although derided in Dry den's witty verse 2 it was always popular with the great body of the English people. It was essentially the same in the sixth century as in the seventeenth, and again in the nineteenth; its members were by turns fishermen, husbandmen, judges and warriors; they followed the 1 History of England, V, 54. Debate on the mutiny act. s " Mouths without hands, maintained at vast expense, In peace a charge, in war a weak defence. Stout once a month they march, a blustering band, And ever but in time of need at hand." — Drydex, " Cymon and Iphigenia." 288 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES Popularity of the Militia in the American Colonies 1775 trade of soldier, not as their chief occupation, but as in- cidental and subordinate to some other occupation by which they gained food, shelter and clothing. Their service was voluntary, although — for the able-bodied — the liability to service was universal; they elected their own officers; they were part of the people, and not a class apart. These ideas were also brought to America in the seventeenth century. Belief in the militia and reliance upon its sufficiency were as important a part of the creed of the early settlers as was their hatred of an army. The militia was organized in every Colony as soon as the government was established, and was as essential a part of the governing machinery as the town meeting in New England or the county court in Virginia. 1 It performed its part, on the whole, perhaps, satisfac- torily, in the numerous Indian wars and in the French wars. It was the only military system indigenous to the Colonies; an army was the system employed by the " tyrant," George III. Naturally, when the Revolution broke out the first re- liance was upon the militia; but when the battles of Lex- ington and Concord brought a realization of how serious the struggle was going to be, the word "army" came to be used. Massachusetts and other New England Colonies began to raise their several armies and concentrate them at Boston; and in June, 1775, the Continental Congress took them over as a Continental army, appointed Wash- ington its commander-in-chief and adopted rules and June 30 regulations for its government. 2 A form of enlistment was agreed upon which prescribed that the term of ser- vice was to be "for one year, unless sooner discharged." 3 1 John Fiske, Civil Government in the United States, 16-67. 2 Jour. Cont. Cong., II, 90-111. 3 Ibid., II, 91. Origin of the Continental Array June 15 POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 289 This legislation was framed upon the Mutiny Act of 1697, 1775 which limited the existence of the British army to one j une i4 year, and which had annually been re-enacted. Congress evidently thought that the liberty of the people might be subverted quite as well by a standing army as by George III, and determined to retain the right to disband it at any moment. But it soon became evident that the danger was not that of having a permanent army, but of having no army at all. Congress fixed the strength of the new Nov. 4 army at 20,372 officers and men; 1 but by December 31, only 9,650 had enlisted 2 and of these large numbers were absent. On the same date the term of service of the old army expired. It became necessary to call on the militia for temporary service in the attack on Dorchester Heights in March, 1776. Congress attempted to remedy the lack 1776 of enlistments by calling on the various Colonies to ineffective furnish a certain number of battalions for the Continental of congress army, for service until the end of the year, and various resolutions to this effect were passed between January and September of 1776. 3 The response was not alto- sept. ie gether encouraging, and then Congress adopted a resolu- tion 4 "that eighty-eight battalions be enlisted as soon as possible, to serve during the war, unless sooner dis- charged" — that each State furnish a certain quota; that a bounty of twenty dollars be given to each non-com- missioned officer and private; that a grant of land be made to each officer and soldier who shall engage for the war; and that the appointment of all officers below the grade of general be left to the States. Still the enlist- ments were not satisfactory, and in November two reso- 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., Ill, 321. 2 Sparks, III, 220. 3 Jour. Cont. Cong., IV, 29, 47, 99, 237, 357, 412; V, 486, 521, 598. 4 Ibid., V, 762. 290 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1776 lutions 1 were adopted, the first requiring the enlisting officers to offer to recruits their choice of two forms of enlistment, one for the war and the other for three years; the second, a few days later, providing for only one form of enlistment which read "for three years or during the . 27 war." The army meanwhile was dwindling down to less than 5,000 men; 2 thereupon Congress appointed Washington 3 virtually dictator, authorized him to raise 16 battalions, in addition to those already resolved upon, and 3,000 light horse, 3 regiments of artillery and a corps of engineers; to appoint and discharge officers and fill all vacancies, to call on the States for militia, to impress supplies and to arrest and confine persons who refused to accept Continental currency or were disaffected to the American cause. The system of short-term voluntary enlistments thus came to grief before the Revolution had been much more than a year in progress. By Washington's personal efforts more than from any other cause, acting under any one of the many resolutions of Congress, the Continental army was maintained with varying strength from 6,000 to 10,000 men, and the militia of the various States came from time to time to help out for a few weeks in an emer- gency. Congress continued to pass resolutions through- out the year 1777, 4 calling on the States to furnish their quota, but without much effect; and after a conference of a committee with Washington at Valley Forge it re- sorted to the draft. The states were 5 "required forth- with to fill up by drafts, from their militia or in any other way that shall be effectual their respective battalions 1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 945, 971. 2 Sparks, III, 225. 3 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 1045; Upton, 30. * Upton, 25-32. * Jour. Cont. Cong., X, 200. POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 291 of Continental troops." Having no power to enforce its ms decree, this resolution of Congress had no more effect than its predecessors, but Washington's personal appeals, combined with the news of the French alliance, succeeded in bringing out enough men to carry on the war. It continued in this way to the end, Congress passing 1783 futile resolutions and Washington raising men and carry- sept. 3 ing on the war by the mere strength of his personal char- acter. The treaty of peace was signed in 1783 and in the 1784 following year the army was disbanded, 1 except eighty j U ne2 soldiers retained to guard the public stores at Fort Pitt and West Point. The total number of enlistments had been 395,858, 2 and the maximum force in the field at any one time about 35,000, or one in eleven of the enlistments. We had succeeded in our main purpose of achieving waste and independence, and we had accomplished this without a of the . . « . , Revolution standing army, and by means of snort and numerous en- listments, large bounties and grants of lands. The waste and extravagance were repaired a few years later by the financial genius of Hamilton. The enormous pension roll 3 was easily provided for from the resources of a land of rapidly developing wealth. Public sentiment was con- confirmed firmed in its opposition to a standing army and confidence a standing in the efficacy of untrained volunteers and militia was still further strengthened. The one man to whom suc- cess was due, and who achieved it, not because but in spite of our defective military policy, thought differently. Washington's opinions on the subject are worthy of careful study even at this late day, for his judgments 1 Jour. Cong., IV, 433; Upton, 69. = Upton, 58. 3 Total Revolutionary pensions during 126 years (1783 to 1908), $70,000,000. Report Com. Pensions, 1908, 12, 21. Army 292 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1784 were the result of long deliberation and were of almost miraculous accuracy. He had seen service in the Indian and French wars before he came to take command at Cambridge in 1775. His knowledge of what took place between that date and 1783 was unrivalled. He was pre-eminently qualified as a witness. His writings on the subject during those eight years, to Congress, to the State authorities and to personal friends, form no inconsiderable part of the twelve vol- umes edited by Sparks. A few of the most pertinent of those addressed to the President of Congress are here quoted. February 9, 1776: 1 "To expect the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits as from veteran soldiers is to expect what never did and perhaps never will happen." September 24, 1776: 2 "To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. . . . The jealousy of a standing army, and the evils to be appre- hended from one, are remote and, in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin." December 20, 1776 : 3 "Short enlistments, and a mis- taken dependence upon militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt." August 20, 1780 : 4 "Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, ... we never should have had to re- treat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, Sparks, III, 279; Upton, 11. 2 Sparks, IV, 113-115; Upton, 16. 3 Ibid., IV, 234. *Ibid., VII, 162; ibid., 53. POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 293 trembling for the fate of America; ... we should not 1784 have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the Washington's enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, en- ° pimoai during frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity, from the same cause." September 15, 1780 i 1 " Regular troops are alone equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as offence, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous." It will be observed that in these letters Washington addressed himself solely to the question of the moment : the proper method of organizing an army for carrying on the war. He said nothing about the propriety of main- taining an army in time of peace. In a letter 2 to John Banister, of Virginia, delegate in Congress, written from Valley Forge on April 21, 1778, Washington admits the justice of the jealousy of a standing army in time of peace. His words are: "The other point is, the jealousy, 3 which Congress unhappily entertain of the army, and which, if reports are right, some members labor to estab- lish. You may be assured, there is nothing more in- jurious or more unfounded. This jealousy stands upon the commonly received opinion, which under proper limitations is certainly true, that standing armies are dangerous to a state. The prejudices in other countries have only gone to them in time of peace, and these from their not having any of the ties, the concerns or inter- 1 Sparks, VII, 206; Upton, 54. 2 Ibid., V, 328; ibid., 38. 3 Italics as in Sparks. Opinions 294 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1784 ests of citizens, or any other dependence, than what Washington's flowed from their military employ; in short, from their being mercenaries, hirelings. It is our policy to be prej- udiced against them in war, though they are citizens, having all the ties and interests of citizens, and in most cases property totally unconnected with the military line." The final word of Washington, as general-in-chief, on military policy was given in the address 1 which he sent to the governors of the States from Newburg about six months prior to resigning his commission. He evidently thought it either useless or unwise to advocate a stand- ing army in time of peace, and therefore argued in favor of making the militia as effective as possible. He stated that there were four things "essential to the well-being, I may even venture to say to the existence, of the United States as an independent power," and one of them was "the adoption of a proper peace establishment." His opinion on this was as follows: 2 "The militia of this coun- try must be considered as the palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility. It is essential, therefore, that the same system should pervade the whole; that the formation and discipline of the militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform, and that the same species of arms, accoutrements and military apparatus should be introduced in every part of the United States. No one, who has not learned it from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense and confusion which result from a contrary system, or the vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed." While these recommendations were never carried into effect until 120 years after they were written, to wit, after the passage of the Militia Act of 1903, and while 1 Sparks, VIII, 443; Upton, 68. 2 Sparks, VIII, 450. POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 295 each succeeding war has found us at the outset with 1787 different systems of formation and discipline, and dif- Military ferent kinds of arms, accoutrements and military ap- congress paratus in the militia of the various States, yet these views of Washington were adopted in the Constitution in 1787, and have ever since been and now are the funda- mental law of the land. As to the navy, the Constitu- tion gives Congress power "to provide and maintain a navy," which evidently implies a permanent and con- tinuing force; but as to the army the power of Con- gress is "to raise and support armies, but no appropria- tion of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years," which equally implies a temporary force raised for war or other emergency. Congress is further given power, 1 "to make rules for the government of the land and naval forces, to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; and to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the offi- cers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." In order to emphasize still further the basis of the military policy, Congress at its first session passed an amendment 2 to the Constitution, which was promptly ratified by the States, reciting that "a well-regulated militia" is "necessary to the security of a free State." The English tradition, originating in the tyranny of the Stuarts more than 200 years before, was thus em- 1 Constitution of the United States, I, VIII, 12, 13, 14. 2 Ibid., Second Amendment. 296 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1787 bodied in our fundamental law. The army was to exist on sufferance for no longer a period than two years. Our main reliance was to be on the militia and on such armies as could be improvised when war breaks out. ia Act It will be observed, however, that it was to be a " well- regulated militia"; and during the eight years of his presi- dency Washington made recommendations in each of his annual messages in favor of measures to make the militia a really effective force. The only result was the passage of the Militia Act of 1792, 1 which remained in force for 111 years, although it was obsolete a few years after it was enacted. In his message of 1793 2 Washing- ton called attention to its many defects, and again pressed upon Congress "the necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defence. . . . The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other nation abounds. ... If we de- sire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war." In his message of 1794 he called attention to the "striking defects" in the militia law and resulting "extraordinary expense and waste." He referred to the subject again in 1795, and in his last message in 1796 3 he particularly advocated the establish- ment of a military academy to preserve and transmit a knowledge of the military art, which he considered "of great moment to the security of a nation." These appeals, however, were all unsuccessful. The memory of the Stuarts and of George III was still com- paratively fresh in the minds of the people, and the 1 Mil. Laws, 95; Upton, 84. 3 Mess. Presidents, I, 166, 184, 202. 2 Mess. Presidents, I, 140. POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 297 prejudice against a standing army was not to be over- 1787 come even by the arguments of the man who had gained, almost single-handed, their independence. With the close of the Revolution, as already stated, 1789 the army was disbanded. Thirty years passed before we again had a serious war. In the meantime there were insurrections, such as Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786, and the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania in 1794; Indian wars, such as Harmar's Miami expedi- tion in 1790, St. Clair's campaign of 1791 and Wayne's campaign of 1794; the probability of war with France in 1798. 1 These emergencies were met, partly by the militia and partly by volunteer armies raised for three years, and by a small but slowly increasing permanent force of regulars. This latter originated in a force of origin of the 700 men raised for service against the Indians in 1784, ' b ' Army continued for three years in 1785, again extended for June 2, 1784 three years in 1787 2 and finally recognized by the First April 1. 1735 Congress 3 as "the establishment for the troops in the Oct. 3, 1787 service of the United States." The army has existed sept. 29, 1789 continuously from that day to the present, with increas- ing numbers, and with reorganizations in 1790, 1792, 1795, 1798, 1802, 1808, 1812, 1815, 1821, 1838, 1842, 1846, 1855, 1861, 1866, 1870, 1874, 1898, 1901— or, on an average, once in six years. In January, 1812, when war with Great Britain seemed war of 1812 inevitable, the army consisted, under the laws of 1802 and 1808, of 11 regiments. By successive acts, 4 Congress in- creased this as follows: January 11, 1812, to 24 regiments. 1 Upton, 71-77, 79, 83, 86, 87. 2 Jour. Cong., IV, 434, 493, 785; Upton, 69, 71, 3 Mil. Laws, 87; Upton, 75. < Mil. Laws, 212, 230, 238, 250; Upton, 95, 123. 298 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1812 1814 Refusal to Furnish Militia June 26, 1812, to 32 regiments. January 29, 1813, to 51 regiments. January 27, 1814, to 54 regiments. The authorized strength of the latter was about 63,000 men. But recruiting was always slow. The actual force varied from one-quarter to one-half of that which the law authorized. Volunteers were not called for, but the President was "authorized to accept" 1 not exceeding 30,000 volunteers. They did not come forward, the total number during the entire war being only about 10,000. 2 The militia was called out, 3 but not exceeding 100,000 men and for a period not longer than six months. Con- gress now possessed the power, which the Continental Congress lacked, to enforce its laws, but it did not exer- cise that power. All the evils of the Revolution were repeated in perhaps aggravated form: short enlistments, successive levies of raw troops, enormous bounties, ex- travagant grants of lands and liberal promises of pen- sions. The rolls of the Pension Office show that 527,654 4 men were in service, most of them for periods of less than six months and more than half of them for less than three months. Not more than 25,000, or one in twenty, were in the field at any time. The Pension Office is still paying pensions to the widows of soldiers of the War of 1812 (338 in number), and the total pensions of that war have amounted to nearly $46,000,000. 5 The military operations, as might be expected, were far from creditable; some of the militia refused, at critical periods, to cross the frontier. The governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to call forth the 1 Mil. Laws, 215; Upton, 95. 3 Ibid,, 222. 4 Ibid., 137. 2 Upton, 137. 5 Com. Pensions, 1910, 11, 27. POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 299 militia of those States, reserving to themselves the right isi4 to determine when the exigency provided for in the Con- stitution and in the Act of Congress of 1795 had arisen. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts sustained them in this contention, and the question remained in doubt until 1827, when the Supreme Court of the United States de- cided that it belonged exclusively to the President to judge when such exigency arises. 1 As soon as the war was over the army was reduced to Mar. 3 is is 10,000 men, 2 and six years later to 6,000 men. 3 John C. Mar. 2 1821 Calhoun was then Secretary of War. He held the posi- tion during the eight years of Monroe's administration, from 1817 to 1825, and next to Elihu Root was the ablest administrator among the fifty or more individuals who have filled that important office. Congress called upon him for two reports on the army, which he made in Decem- ber, 1818, 4 and December, 1820. In these he discussed in caihoun-s the most comprehensive manner the purposes for which we maintain an army, its relation to our political princi- ples, its strength, organization, equipment, emoluments, rations and clothing. He pointed out the terrible price which we had paid in 1812 in consequence of the lack of a proper military establishment and of suitable prep- aration in the preceding years; showed that "however remote our situation from the great powers of the world, and however pacific our policy, we are, notwithstanding, liable to be involved in war; and to resist, with success, its calamities and dangers, a standing army in peace is an indispensable preparation." He further stated that "to suppose our militia capable of meeting in the open field the regular troops of Europe would be to resist the 1 Martin vs. Mott, 12; Wharton, 19; Upton, 96-97. 2 Mil. Laws, 266. s Ibid., 306. 4 Burnside, 139, 144; Upton, 145. 300 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES i8i8 most obvious truth and the whole of our experience as i82o a nation"; and argued that "if our liberty should ever oun's be endangered by the military power gaining the ascen- dancy, it will be from the necessity to retrieve our affairs, after a series of disasters, caused by the want of adequate military knowledge." ' He laid down the fundamental proposition that "at the commencement of hostilities there should be nothing either to new-model or to create: the only difference between the peace and the war for- mation of the army ought to be in the increased magni- tude of the latter, and the only change in passing from the former to the latter should consist in giving to it the augmentation which will then be necessary. It is thus, and thus only, the dangerous transition from peace to war may be made without confusion and disorder." The staff should be completely formed in time of peace and the organization of the line such that when hostilities begin "the force may be sufficiently augmented without adding new regiments or battalions." 2 In these documents, so remarkable in breadth and foresight, Calhoun followed to some extent the principles formulated by Scharnhorst in Prussia after the battle of Jena. He anticipated by more than a generation the system of expansion in war which has since been adopted for all European armies, and for which this country had to wait more than eighty years, during the greater part of which these principles were unsuccessfully advocated by army officers, until the genius and persistence of Mr. Root persuaded Congress to adopt them in the legislation of 1901-3. Upon these principles, including especially "the desire to avoid creating new regiments with raw, inexperienced 1 Burnside, 145. 2 Bumside, 146; Upton, 149. POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 301 officers at their head in time of war," 1 Calhoun worked isi8 out a complete scheme of organization for an army of 1820 544 officers and 6,391 men in peace, to be augmented to 832 officers and 18,200 men in war, without the formation of any new regiments. 2 His wise words fell on deaf ears. Congress was then 1821 in the midst of the intensely exciting debate which re- caihoun's Re- sulted in the "Missouri Compromise." Calhoun's report Adopted apparently received no attention in Congress; there does Feb. 27 not seem to have been any debate on it; McMasters makes no reference to the subject; von Hoist does not mention it in his biography of Calhoun. The law, as March 2 passed, simply reduced the army to 4 regiments of artil- lery, 7 regiments of infantry and a certain number of staff officers; the companies were small, each containing only 42 privates, and the entire authorized force was 542 officers and 5,642 men. 3 No provision was made for augmenting the enlisted strength in time of war or other emergency. The old reliance upon militia and untrained levies was still the popular idea. No change of any importance was made in the army during the next seventeen years, except the formation of a regiment of dragoons, 4 now the 1st Cavalry. The actual strength was, however, at all times less than what the law authorized. In November, 1835, the author- ized strength, 5 including the dragoons, was 7,198 and the actual strength 3,888. In 1835 we became involved in the Florida war against 1833 the Seminole Indians, which proved a very serious affair, The Florida lasting more than seven years. The army was altogether 1 Burnside, 146. i Burnside, 157. 3 Ibid., 217. 4 Mil. Laws, 329; Upton, 161. 6 Upton, 162. 302 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1333 March 3 1836 May 23 1838 July 5 1837 The Florida War insufficient in numbers to cope with it; instead of aug- menting its enlisted strength, as Calhoun had advised, the Florida militia was called out and Colonel Clinch, commanding the few hundred regulars on duty in Flor- ida, was authorized to call on the governors of South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama for the militia of those States. The President was " authorized * to accept" vol- unteers not exceeding 10,000 men "to serve six or twelve months." The regular army was subsequently 2 increased by one more regiment of infantry and an addition of 16 privates to every company of artillery and of 38 privates to every company of infantry. This increased the authorized strength to 12,539 3 and the actual strength to perhaps 9,000. The greatest number of men in the field at any one time was in November, 1837, when they numbered 5,025 regulars and 4,454 volunteers and militia. 4 The rolls of the Pension Office show that during the seven years of this war the total number of men in service was 61,269 5 of whom the greater number served for three months or less. It was a repetition on a smaller scale of the methods of the Revolution and the War of 1812; and it should be remembered that the Indian warriors against whom these 60,000 or more men went out for a few days numbered only about 1,200. 6 The waste and extrava- gance of such methods are in sharp contrast with the effective work done by the small but well-trained army in the Indian campaigns after the Civil War. The jealousy of a standing army was still a living principle, and Andrew Jackson undoubtedly expressed 1 Mil. Laws, 336; Upton, 168. 8 Burnside, 219. 3 Upton, 190. 2 Mil. Laws, 341; Upton, 181-183. 4 Upton, 175. 6 Ibid., 194. POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 303 the opinions of a majority of his countrymen when in 1835 his seventh annual message as President, in December, Jackson's 1835, 1 he spoke of "the necessity of an efficient organiza- pm tion of the militia," and defined our military policy in these words: "To suppress domestic violence and to repel foreign invasion, should these calamities overtake us, we must rely in the first instance upon the great body of the community whose will has instituted and whose power must support the government. A large standing mili- tary force is not consonant to the spirit of our institu- tions nor to the feelings of our countrymen, and the lessons of former days and those also of our own times show the danger as well as the enormous expense of these permanent and extensive military organizations." In the message of 1836, 2 however, his views were slightly modified. "While the necessities existing during the pres- ent year for the service of militia and volunteers have furnished new proof of the patriotism of our fellow- citizens, they have also illustrated the importance of an increase in the rank and file of the regular army. . . . In this connection it is also proper to remind you that the defects in our present militia system are every day rendered more apparent." His successor, President Van Buren, in his message of 1837 1837, 3 spoke of "the necessity of increasing our regular van Buren: forces; and the superior efficiency, as well as greatly diminished expense of that description of troops, recom- mend this measure as one of economy as well as of efficiency." But he hastened to add: "It is not, how- ever, compatible with the interests of the people to main- tain in time of peace a regular force adequate to the 1 Mess. Presidents, III, 170. 2 Ibid., Ill, 254. 3 IbUL, III, 300. 304 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1837 defence of our extensive frontiers. In periods of danger and alarm we must rely principally upon a well-organized militia, and some general arrangement that will render this description of force more efficient has long been a subject of anxious solicitude." In subsequent messages 1 Van Buren referred, with diminishing interest, to the necessity of an efficient or- ganization of the militia; but nothing was done. The subject excited no popular interest until the outbreak of the war with Mexico. When the Seminole war ended in 1842 the army was reduced from 12,539 to 8,613 2 men, the reduction being made in the number of enlisted men in a company, and 1842 Aug. 23 1846 War with Mexico it so remained until 1846. Mess. Presidents, III, 497, 537. a Mil. Laws, 358; Upton, 193. CHAPTER II THE GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY Seventy years had thus passed in which we had had 1846 two wars with Great Britain and numerous campaigns against the Indians. Throughout this period the popular faith in an untrained militia remained unshaken. When, however, it became necessary to make prepa- rations for the war with Mexico, slightly different ideas began to prevail. The President was authorized, by suc- cessive acts of Congress, for the first time, to "call for," as well as to " accept," volunteers, the number not to exceed 50,000, and the term of service to be twelve months "or to the end of the war"; "to employ" the militia for not May 13 exceeding six months ; to increase the number of privates in any company to 100 men; to organize a company of engineers; to raise a regiment of mounted riflemen; to May 16 raise a regiment of dragoons and nine more regiments of May 19 infantry, to serve during the term of the war and no 1847 longer. 1 These various laws provided for an authorized Feb. 11 strength of 30,890 regulars and 50,000 volunteers. The volunteers first enlisted claimed their discharge at the end of twelve months, and a new force had to be en- listed; so that the total number of volunteers was 73,532. The rolls of the Pension Office show a total of regulars and volunteers of 104,284. The greatest num- 1 Mil. Laws, 367-379; Upton, 203-206. 305 306 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1847 ber at any time under Scott's command was 13,500 and war with under Taylor, 7,000. These figures 1 compare favorably Mexico with the corresponding figures in the Revolution and in the War of 1812. They show that the army in the field was nearly one-sixth of the total number of enlistments, whereas in the previous wars it had been only one-eleventh or one-twentieth. Considering the results accomplished, the number of men called out during the Mexican War was much smaller than in the previous wars. The benefit of military training was beginning to be felt, and the small armies of Scott and Taylor were very efficient. The Military Academy at West Point had sent out, from 1802 to 1847, no less than 1,368 graduates, 2 and of these 523 served in the regulars and 36 in the volunteers 3 with the armies in Mexico. Scott, who had had personal experience of the wretched results due to untrained troops in the War of 1812 and the Florida war, gener- ously attributed his success in Mexico to these West Point graduates, stating his "fixed opinion" that but for them the war would have lasted four or five years, with more defeats than victories, whereas with their help complete victory had been obtained "in less than two campaigns." 4 1848 The close of the war brought the usual reduction — to jui y 19 10,320 men: 5 but the army was soon increased 6 by add- 1850 ing to the number of privates in each company, equiva- june 17 lent for the whole army, about 4,400 men; and later by two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry, about 1855 4,000 men, carrying the authorized total to 18,349. At March 3 no time, however, did the actual strength exceed 15,000. 7 1 Upton, 209, 215, 216. 2 Cullum, II, 206. 3 Centennial of the U. S. M. A., 629-630. 4 Cullum, I, XI; Upton, 222. 'Mil. Laws, 223, 393. 6 Upton, 223 7 Upton, 224. GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 307 With these exceptions there was no additional legislation i86i until the outbreak of the Civil War. The magnitude of this struggle was not underestimated. President's °° < Proclamation, As in previous wars the militia was first called out ; A P ril 15 75,000 men for three months. As soon as Congress convened this was supplemented by two laws, each cal- The civii war ling for 500,000 volunteers, and a third law adding to jm y 22 the regular army 9 regiments of infantry, 1 of cavalry July 25 and 1 of artillery. These laws 1 were all under debate jm y 29 at the time of the battle of Bull Run, and were passed July 21 under its influence. The enlistment of volunteers in a i86i few months exceeded 700,000, 2 about one in six of the caiisfor 11 # Volunteers able-bodied male population. It was a magnificent ris- ing in mass of the Northern population. Had this vast host possessed military training, the rebellion might possibly have been quickly suppressed. But the "well- regulated" militia of the Constitution, uniformly armed and accoutred, trained and disciplined, as Washington had advised, and possessed of a thorough knowledge of the military art, did not exist. The training and knowl- edge had to be gained as the war progressed. Enlistment in the regular army was not popular. Its total strength never reached 26,000, 3 or two-thirds of what was authorized, and of these a large number were stationed in the fortifications and on the Western frontier. The force available for the field was probably less than 10,000, and most of these served in the "regular divis- ion," forming part of the 5th Army Corps. They formed an inconsiderable part of the great army by which the war was carried on. The strength of the volunteer army on January 1, 1 War Records, 3, V, 606; Mil. Laws, 466, 471, 473. 2 Ibid., 3, IV, 1264. 3 Upton, 257. 308 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1862 July 1 1883 Resort to Conscription March 3 1864 Feb. 24 1885 Number of Men in Service 1862/ was about 528,000 men. The War Department in December, 1861, had directed that no more regi- ments be raised unless specially authorized, and on April 3, 1862, had discontinued all recruiting. 2 This was resumed by order of June 6, 1862, and it was soon evi- dent that large numbers of men must still be raised in order to make up for the losses in the field. The gov- ernors of eighteen States thereupon joined in a letter to the President suggesting that he call for additional men, and on July 1 Lincoln made a call for 300,000 men, More than 420,000 3 were furnished. As the war went on further calls became necessary, the draft or conscription was authorized 4 and finally the President was empow- ered 5 to call for such numbers of men as the military service required. There were in all, between April, 1861, and December, 1864, eleven successive calls; six for vol- unteers for three years or the war; four for militia for three to nine months, and one for regulars for five years. The total number called for was 2,763,670, and the num- ber furnished was 2 J 778,304. 6 There were a great many re- enlistments, so that it is difficult to say how many individuals enlisted. The number was probably in ex- cess of 2,100,000. The enrollment of April, 1865, 7 showed 2,245,063 able-bodied men at their homes. From this it would appear that the number of men available for military service in the Northern States was something more than 4,300,000 and of these about 2,100,000, or nearly one-half, were enlisted. The national government was victorious, at a fearful sacrifice; the Confederacy was annihilated. That the 1 War Records, 3, I, 775. 2 Ibid., 3, V, 608. 3 Ibid., 3, IV, 1265. * Ibid., 3, V, 611. 6 Ibid., 3, V, 636. a Ibid., 3, IV, 1269. 7 Ibid., 3, V, 620. GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 309 struggle would have been shortened and the loss in lives 1S35 and treasure reduced if we had had a larger trained army at the beginning has often been asserted by military writers. This is at least open to doubt; for in such case the South would have had almost the same relative ad- vantage as the North. The nature of the struggle was such that it could only be ended by the absolute destruc- tion of the military strength of the Confederacy, and this could only be accomplished by the use of almost the en- tire strength of the loyal States. On the other hand, it Defects of the is not open to dispute that the strength of the govern- tem m the ment was not employed to the best advantage, but was misapplied, with accompanying waste and extravagance almost equal to those of the Revolution and the War of 1812. The same defects appeared: short service, enor- mous bounties and grants of land and a gigantic pension roll * destined probably to endure till the last quarter of the twentieth century. It is believed that at no other time in the history of the world have so many as 2,000,000 men been brought into the military service by a single nation in the space of four years. The failure to realize the full value of so numerous a force, composed for the most part of such superb material, was chiefly due to the constant raising of new regiments of raw recruits and inexperienced officers instead of keeping the old regiments filled up to their full strength. The maximum force under arms at any time was about 970,000 2 men, or the equivalent of 970 regiments. But the total number of organiza- tions raised during the war was 1,952 3 regiments, 36 1 The pension bills of recent years — more than forty years after Appo- mattox— have been about $155,000,000, of which abo"ut$146,000,000 are paid to the Civil War pensioners. J War Records, 3, V, 137, 1029. s Ibid., 3, V, 1029. 310 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1865 battalions and 900 independent companies; this gives a total equivalent of 2,050 regiments, or more than twice as many as were needed. Had the quota assigned to each State been a certain number of regiments, squadrons and batteries, instead of a certain number of men, with a requirement that these organizations be kept up to their maximum, and that the appointment of officers be limited to men who had seen at least six months of active service in the ranks, there is little doubt that the final result would have been accomplished in less time and with a smaller number of men than 2,000,000. This method was frequently advocated during the progress of the war, but always rejected on the ground that troops could not be raised except for new organizations and with new officers. We had to come to conscription in the middle of the war, and enforce it relentlessly for the remaining two years, and we shall doubtless have to do the same if we are ever again engaged in a war last- ing more than two years. A conscription law will be no more odious, if it contains these salutary provisions which have received the approval of our greatest soldiers. 1 comparison It must be noted that there was a great improvement wars € in the Civil War over any previous war in the relation of the number of troops in the field at any one time to the total number of enlistments. We have seen that in the 1 In a series of marginal notes made by General Sherman on an article by the author, published in Journal of the Military Service Institution in 1883, he says: "There is no doubt that reinforcing by new regiments was bad in every sense, and that recruits should be sent to old regiments." The same opinion was more than once expressed by General Grant and by General Sheridan in conversations with the author. See also Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. II, 388: "I believe that 500 new men added to an old and experienced regiment were more valuable than 1,000 men in the form of a new regiment, for the former, by association with good, experienced captains, lieutenants and non-commissioned officers, soon became veterans, whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year." GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 311 Revolution and the War of 1812 this ratio was one in 1865 twenty, and in the war with Mexico, one in six; in the War of the Rebellion it was one in four. The enlistments were 2,778,304; l in May, 1864, there were 970,710 in service, of which 662,345 2 were present for duty, in the field. The return of the volunteer army to the occupations Disbarment of peace has no parallel in history. The muster out tUr Army" 1 ' began within three weeks of Lee's surrender, and by August, 1865, 640,806 had been discharged; by Novem- ber, 800,963; by January, 1866, 918,722; by November, 1866, 1,023,021." The regular army had an authorized strength in April, 18S6 1865, 4 of 47,806. It was reorganized 5 so as to consist of July 2s 10 regiments of cavalry; 5 regiments of artillery; 41 regiments of infantry; 4 regiments of veteran reserves ; 1 battalion of engineers; and the various staff corps. The total authorized strength was 80,258, but the actual strength was 54,581 . 6 In 1869 7 the infantry regiments were reduced from 45 1869 to 25, bringing down the authorized strength to 55,618 March 3 and the actual strength to 37,383. 8 In 1870 the number of enlisted men was reduced to Reorganiza- 30,000, and in 1874 to 25,000. 9 There were no changes A?my Uhe of any importance in the organization or strength of i87o the army until the war with Spain, twenty-four years July is later. 1 War Records, 3, IV, 1269. J Ibid., 3, V, 497. 3 Ibid., 3, V, 517, 1012. * Army Register, 18G5, 106a. 5 Array Register, 1867, 144a. 6 Army Register, 1866, 150c. 7 Mil. Laws, 1907, 540. 8 Army Register, 1869, 235a. 9 Mil. Laws, 1907, 187; Burnside, 102. Report 312 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1874 During the years 1874 to 1878 the question of the June 17 permanent organization of the army was studied by successive committees of Congress; and a large amount of testimony was taken which, however, resulted in no legislation except the reduction to 25,000 men. In 1878 a committee was formed of three senators and five representatives, to whom was referred "the whole sub- ject-matter of reform and reorganization of the army." 1878 The report of this committee 1 is a veritable mine of in- Dee, is formation on every essential fact connected with the history of the army during the preceding 100 years. General Burnside, then senator from Rhode Island, Bumside was its chairman. All of its members had served in the Civil War, one of them (Senator M. C. Butler, of South Carolina) as a major-general in the Confederate army. General Garfield, then leader in the House of Representatives, and soon afterward President, contrib- uted two very thoughtful and instructive papers for its consideration. Prominent survivors of the Civil War, Hancock, McDowell, McClellan, Terry, Pope, Ord, Hazen, Hunt and others, were called upon to submit their views accompanied by a draft of a bill to carry them into effect. The chiefs of staff departments, Humphreys, Meigs, Townsend, Benet, Marcy, Alvord and McFeely, contributed exhaustive histories of their several depart- ments and recommendations as to their proper organiza- tion and their relations to the Secretary of War and the commanding general. Most important of all, General Sherman, then general-in-chief, submitted a history of the army from 1776 to 1876, accompanied by elaborate statistical data, extracts from the writings of Wash- ington and the reports of Knox, Dearborn, Calhoun, 1 45th Cong., 3d Sess., Senate report, 555. GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 313 Cass and other secretaries of war, and of committees of 1878 Congress; and finally his own matured views as to our military policy and the proper organization of the army to carry it into effect. At that time General Emory Upton, one of the brilliant group of officers who attained the rank and command of a major-general within a few years of graduation from West Point in 1861, had just returned from a trip around the world, undertaken for the purpose of studying foreign military systems, and had written his book on "The Armies of Asia and Europe," to which the committee gave full consideration. He was then engaged upon his "Military Policy of the Upton's" mm. United States," which was not published until Mr. Root was Secretary of War in 1904, but the voluminous data which it contains were available to the committee as well as his views upon the proper method of organizing our military strength, and the best system of tactics, or drill regulations. These two documents, the report of the Burnside Bumside committee in 1878 and Upton's book on military policy, epor contain an encyclopaedia of military information, ex- tracted from hundreds of volumes of state papers and other archives not readily accessible. Nowhere else is there to be found so much original information relating to the army condensed into such comparatively small space. Full use has been made of these volumes in pre- paring this chapter, and I desire to express my grateful acknowledgment of them and to refer all students to them for fuller details. The bill 1 which the committee reported followed the recommendations of the distinguished soldiers who had given the committee their advice, in certain essential 1 Burnside, 1. 314 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1878 Report not Adopted Lack of Popular Interest features, as to which these latter were substantially in accord, viz., a regiment of three battalions in each of the arms, infantry, artillery and cavalry; the staff depart- ments, instead of being officered by permanent appoint- ments, were to be filled by detail of officers from the line, who would return to the line after the expiration of their detail, thus giving to line officers a knowledge of staff duties and to staff officers familiarity with the needs of the army. The number of enlisted men in a company was to vary according to the exigencies of the services as determined by the President, subject to appropriations by Congress, thus providing a flexible system with small companies in time of peace capable of immediate and large expansion in time of war; and there was to be a "general staff," of somewhat limited functions, such as those hitherto performed by the adjutant-general's and inspector-general's departments. These wise provisions, and others, were enacted into law more than twenty years later. The Burnside bill of 1878 failed to pass, and the elaborate labors of the committee, based upon the experience and advice of the successful leaders in the greatest war of modern times, and upon a careful study of the military systems of Europe, apparently went for naught. The reason was not far to seek. There was no popular interest in the subject. Without that no measures can be enacted in this country. The discharged soldiers, North and South, more than 2,000,000 in number, and constituting about one in four of the entire voting population, were weary of the name of war; they were engaged in building up the industries of the country, in laying the foundations of that material development which in the succeeding thirty years has astonished the world ; they fondly hoped GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 315 that we would never again be engaged in war. Many of 1878 the statesmen of the period, discarding the lessons of history, did not hesitate to predict with entire confidence that there never would be another war in this country, that we should never have occasion to attack another nation, and no other nation would ever dare attack us. They could see no need for an army outside of a small force to protect the settlers against the Indians on the ever-advancing Western frontier. As to its organization they were indifferent, considering it a matter of very minor importance as compared with the development of railways, the silver question, the Chinese problem, the disfranchisement of the negroes and other public ques- tions then pressing for solution. The final effort of the Burnside committee, the cul- mination of more than twelve years' discussion about the army, having resulted in no action, the subject was dropped. The only point upon which the legislators, representing public opinion as they always do, were agreed was that the army should not exceed 25,000 l men in numbers, and this was inserted as a proviso in the appropriation bill, re-enacted in succeeding years and then incorporated in the "Revised Statutes," as the per- manent law. Twenty years later war came suddenly and almost 1898 out of a clear sky, although its cause — the discontent of The war Cuba under Spanish rule — had been in existence for two generations and had more than once brought our rela- tions with Spain close to the breaking-point. The gen- eration of the Civil War had practically passed away, its passions had been largely forgotten, there were new leaders in Congress, new men coming to the front in the 1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 187; Rev. Stat, of 1S78. with Spain 316 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1898 army. Its faithful service under great hardship, its suc- cess in settling the Indian question, the aid it had ren- dered in building up the Great West, its thorough effi- ciency and the studious attainments of its officers had made for it a host of friends which it had never possessed at the outbreak of any previous war. When the law for raising troops to carry on the war came up in Congress, April 22 the latter did not hesitate to declare 1 that "The regular army is the permanent military establishment, which is maintained both in peace and war according to law." The law further provided that "The volunteer army shall be maintained only during the existence of war, or while war is imminent . . . that all enlistments for the volunteer army shall be for a term of two years, unless sooner terminated, and that all officers and men com- war with posing said army shall be discharged from the service of the United States when the purposes for which they were called into service shall have, been accomplished, or on the conclusion of hostilities." March 8 This and other laws 2 expanded the enlisted strength April 26 from 25,000 to 63,116, by adding 2 regiments of artil- lery, making all regiments to consist of 3 battalions and 12 companies, and the companies to have 106 en- listed men in the infantry, 200 in the heavy artillery, 173 in the light artillery and 100 in the cavalry. April 20 In the joint resolution 3 which demanded that Spain relinquish its government of Cuba, the President was "directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect." This was substan- 1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 184. 2 Sec. War, 1898, 1, 252-262. 3 Ibid. GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 317 tially according to precedent in previous wars. In the 1898 law passed two days later there was a more specific war with direction 1 and one entirely novel: "When it becomes necessary to raise a volunteer army, the President shall issue his proclamation stating the number of men de- sired, within such limits as may be fixed by law." The law then specified in detail how such volunteers were to be organized. It also authorized another novelty, the raising of volunteer troops, " possessing special qualifica- tions," not from the States but "from the nation at large," not exceeding 3,000 men in all, the officers to be ap- pointed under "regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War." A little later this was expanded so May n as to provide for "a volunteer brigade of engineers from the nation at large," and "an additional volunteer force of not exceeding 10,000 enlisted men possessing immu- nity from disease incidental to tropical climates," the officers of these troops to be appointed by the President and not by the governors of States. The President's first call for volunteers was for 125,000 men, and in April 23 order to be sure of getting enough men while the en- thusiasm was still warm, this was followed by a second May 25 call 3 for 75,000 men. The President of the United States, William McKinley, had in his youth trudged through the long marches and fought in many battles of the Civil War; the Secretary of War, R. A. Alger, had also served in the same war; the adjutant-general, Henry C. Corbin, had not only had the same experience, but was a man of rare executive and administrative ability and of tireless energy. They used Mistakes of i-i . ,. ~ Civil War not their utmost efforts, and with success, in persuading ton- Repeated gress so to legislate that the mistakes of the Civil War 1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 192. 2 Sec. War., 1898, I, 259. 318 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1898 and our previous wars might not be repeated. It will be noticed that there was no limit except the President's discretion to the number of men to be called for; that national volunteers, officered by the President under regulations prescribing examinations as to their military qualifications, were provided for. Therefore, when the second call for volunteers was made, the rule was estab- lished and rigidly enforced that the recruits should be sent to fill up existing regiments from every State, and no new regiments were formed until this had been done. The laws passed and the regulations established for carrying them into effect in 1898 are models for similar occasions hereafter. It should be noted, however, that the able-bodied population was then about 13,000,000, and the number of men called for, about 250,000, was only one in fifty, instead of one in two as in the Civil War. It may be a question whether the principles established in 1898 can be carried out in a war making such a de- mand on our military strength as did the Civil War. There seems to be no ground to doubt that they can be, if the number of volunteers in the first call is sufficiently large, and if, in case volunteers do not respond, the con- scription is immediately applied. prompt There was no such difficulty in 1898. The number called for was ample, and the response was instantaneous, not only for the volunteer but also for the regular army. Within a month the regulars were increased to 44,125, and the volunteers to 124,804; within ninety days, regulars to 56,258 and volunteers to 212,094/ These war with troops were all organized, armed, equipped and in the field within the dates named. When the peace protocol 1 Sec. War, 1898, I, 257, 260. Organization Spain GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 319 was signed, on August 12, recruiting was stopped; there i8S8 were then 274,717 men in the field, of which approxi- mately 59,000 were regulars, 16,000 United States vol- unteers, and 200,000 State volunteers. The army had numbered only 28,183 l on April 1. The number of Span- ish regular troops surrendered at Santiago was 13,006 and at Manila about 13,500; 15,000 were dispersed at Santiago, and over 70,000 2 were sent home from Ha- vana as a result of the Santiago campaign. To have increased our military force by 1,000 per cent, and to have defeated, captured or dispersed the armies op- posed to us — all within a period of about four months — shows what can be accomplished with our latent military strength when it is judiciously applied. While the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain was pending the insurrection broke out in the Philippines. Under the law the ratification of the treaty required the A P ru 22 reduction of the regular army to its previous strength of about 28,000 men and the discharge of the entire vol- unteer force. This was done. Congress then enacted 1899 that the regular army might be maintained at not ex- March 2 ceeding 65,000 3 men, and that 35,000 volunteers should be raised " from the country at large." These new troops 1898 were raised in the course of a few months, and all the National Volunteers volunteers and a large part of the regulars sent to the Philippines. The field officers were selected from the regular army on their efficiency records, and the com- pany officers were chosen, under rigid examination as to their service and qualifications, solely from those who had served in the war against Spain. These volunteers took their part side by side with the regulars in suppress- »Sec. War, 1898, I, 253-260. 2 Sargent, Campaign of Santiago, III, 1. 3 Mil. Laws, 1907, 190, 200. 320 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1839 Philippine Insurrection Elihu Root as Secretary of War ing the Philippine insurrection. That they were the most efficient, the best disciplined and most thoroughly trained volunteers that were ever mustered into our service is generally conceded. The individuals had the same excellent qualities as the volunteers of the Civil War, but these " volunteers from the nation at large" were organized on a system immensely superior. It is not likely that this experience will be forgotten the next time there is occasion to call for volunteers. It is true that at the outbreak of the Civil War we discarded the experience of our previous wars and repeated the same mistakes. No other system had then ever been tried and proved. Now that a better system has been actually used, and the precedent established, it is probable that we shall adhere to it in similar emergencies hereafter. The organized force of insurgents was defeated and dispersed by midsummer of 1900; a guerilla warfare con- tinued for nearly a year longer, but practically ceased with the capture of Aguinaldo in March, 1901. Under the law 1 the army was to be reduced in strength to what it had been prior to April, 1898, and all the volunteers were to be discharged prior to July 1, 1901. In the meantime, in August, 1899, Elihu Root had become Secretary of War. During the five years of his administration the army obtained those measures of re- form and advancement for which its chief officers had been begging in vain for three generations; and the coun- try at last saw its military establishment placed on a footing for which a few of its most far-sighted states- men, Washington, Calhoun, Cass and others, had argued, equally without success. Congress finally adopted these measures chiefly in consequence of four successive annual 1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 190. GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 321 reports, 1899 to 1902 inclusive, 1 of the Secretary of War, 1899 which for clearness of thought, brevity and lucidity of statement, have probably never been excelled in our state papers. Mr. Root had never had any military training or experience, even in a militia company; but he sur- rounded himself with the best military advisers, officers fresh from the experience of Cuba, the Philippines and China, and thoroughly familiar with our military his- tory and the defects of our military system in the past. Having absorbed their ideas, weighed them and clarified them, rejecting some and accepting others, he then pre- sented the subject to Congress in documents which read like the arguments in a great cause before the Supreme Court of the United States. It fell to Mr. Root's lot to. formulate and put into 1901 operation a permanent scheme of government for the Philippines and for Porto Rico, and a temporary govern- ment for Cuba, which was followed by evacuation on conditions which provided for our intervention in case of mishap (which happened within a few years), all in accordance with a general plan of which the outlines only had been suggested by President McKinley. The organization of this civil government was constructive statesmanship of the highest order, and the instruments for carrying his plans into effect were the officers and men of the army. Simultaneously with the development and solution of these insular problems, he took up the needs of the army and secured, between 1901 and 1903, the reorganization of the army, the formation of the general staff and the establishment of a "well-regulated" militia. He obtained the necessary appropriations for completing and arming our sea-coast fortifications, the construction projects 1 Sec. War, 1899-1903, 328-352. 1903 322 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1903 of which had begun in 1888; he amplified and system- atized the plan of education at the schools for infantry, cavalry and light artillery which had been established by Generals Sherman and Sheridan several years before, and enlarged the scope of instruction at the pre-existing schools for the heavy artillery and engineers; he founded the War College at Washington for advanced instruction of a limited number of officers; and finally, he organized the Army Medical School. He persuaded Congress to appropriate nearly $7,000,000 to rebuild and enlarge the historic Military Academy at West Point, but for whose existence during three-quarters of the nineteenth century the military art in this country would have been lost; and he procured an increase in the number of cadets from 384 to 481. The arguments in the annual reports, by which these re- sults were accomplished, are themselves so condensed that any summary of them is impossible. The key-note is the proposition, in the report for 1899, "that the real object of having an army is to provide for war" — a truism which singularly enough had been disregarded for many years. Reorganization With this object in view it was provided ' that the army should consist of 30 regiments of infantry, 15 of Feb. 2 cavalry, 1 of engineers, a corps of artillery (of size equal to 13 regiments) and the staff departments. The artil- lery was divided into two branches, the coast artillery and the field artillery, with a chief of artillery in charge of both. 2 The number of officers was fixed at 3,996 3 1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1048. 2 By the act of January 25, 1907, the field artillery was transferred to the line of the army and organized into six regiments; the coast artillery became a corps, under its chief, charged with the care and use of coast fortifications, including torpedoes and submarine mines. 3 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1048-1060. GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 323 and the enlisted strength was left to the discretion of 1903 the President, between 60 ; 000 and 100,000. The ad- vantage and economy of this flexible system have been fully utilized by successive executive orders, fixing the enlisted strength according to the necessities of the year and the appropriations of Congress; it has varied from 59,866 to 78,782.* As to the staff departments, it was provided 2 that when a vacancy occurred in the position of chief of the corps or department, it should be filled by detail of any officer in the army, not below the rank of lieutenant- colonel, for a period of four years; and as to the other officers, those then holding permanent appointments were to retain them and be promoted according to seniority, but as vacancies occurred, they were to be filled by de- tails from the line, for a period of four years, under such system of examination as the President should prescribe. From these provisions the engineer, judge-advocate and medical departments, for obvious reasons, were excepted ; but as to all others the rule of details and consequent interchangeability of service in the staff and line was to prevail. The system has now been in operation for nearly ten years, more than fifty per cent of the officers in the seven other staff departments are detailed from the line and several hundred officers have already served their detail in the staff and returned to the line. The eternal bickering and mutual complaints between the staff and line which filled the air for thirty years prior to the passage of this law are no longer heard. The army is a homogeneous body, each part understanding and in touch with the others. The law also provided for the organization of battalions, 1 Army Registers, 1903-1910, 2 Mil. Laws, 1907, 10G1. 324 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1903 of which there are now seven, of Philippine scouts, with majors and captains detailed from the army and lieu- tenants appointed from officers and enlisted men who had served in the war with Spain; also for a Porto Rico regiment, with field officers detailed from the army and captains and lieutenants appointed from veterans of the war with Spain or citizens of Porto Rico — the latter for four years, but with provision for reappointment and pro- motion if found qualified. There are now ten native officers in this regiment. Feb. 14 The establishment of the general staff is a landmark in our military history. Its purpose was to prevent the recurrence of such confusion in the transport and supply departments as had accomplished the assembling of troops at Tampa in 1898, which was then fresh in the public mind but was by no means unprecedented. The law 1 provided for the selection by the President of one of the general officers, to be called chief of staff, and 4 colonels, 6 lieutenant-colonels, 12 majors and 20 cap- tains, all for the period of four years, unless sooner re- lieved. The chief of artillery was to be an additional member of the staff. General staff The duties of the general staff are briefly but clearly defined in the law: 2 "To prepare plans for the national defence and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the army and its state of prep- aration for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing and co-ordinating the action of all the different officers who are subject under the terms 1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1290. 2 Ibid., 1907, 1291. GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 325 of this act to the supervision of the chief of staff; and 1903 to perform such other military duties not otherwise as- signed by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President." The officers " subject to the supervision of the chief of staff" are those of all troops of the line and of the ten different staff departments — the entire army, in fact. The chief of staff is also required to per- form such duties as hitherto had been assigned by law to the commanding general of the army. They were only two in number, membership in the Board of Forti- fications and the commissioners of the Soldiers' Home. The anomaly of a commanding general in time of peace attempting to exercise actual command, whereas the Constitution makes the President commander-in-chief and the statute designates the Secretary of War as his agent, thus disappeared, and with it the cause of endless misunderstanding and resulting inefficiency. It was suc- ceeded by an efficient system under which one of the generals is selected as chief military adviser to the Presi- dent and holds the position at the pleasure of the latter. The merit of this law was soon tested. In September, 1906, it became necessary 1 to send a force of 6,000 men to intervene in Cuba. Plans for such a contingency had been prepared long in advance. They were carried out with the smoothness and regularity of a drill on parade. The contrast to the confusion, extravagance and lack of efficiency in previous movements of our troops in an emergency was most striking. 2 Report War Dept., House Documents, Vol. 2, 1906, 458-459. 2 While these pages are going through the press a still larger movement has been carried out ; 20,000 men have been concentrated in Texas, with- out previous notice, in a period of nine days. Detailed reports are as yet lacking, but apparently the operation has shown great efficiency on the part of the general staff. 326 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1903 It is the business of the general staff to be prepared for similar contingencies, which to the general public seem unexpected and improbable. All the world knows what the general staff did for Prussia in 1870. Our own general staff differs from that of the European armies in many particulars, but it is believed that it is adapted to our own requirements and will perform equally valuable service for us if a similar contingency should arise. Of its many but important minor duties it is impossible to speak here in detail. They are fully set forth in regu- lations 1 prepared by Mr. Root under date of August 3, 1903. jimtia Actof The law 2 "to promote the efficiency of the militia" directed that the organization, armament and discipline Jan. 21 of the militia should be the same as in the regular army, and provided the funds to make this effective. For the first time in all our history the militia now has the same arms, equipment, uniforms and drill as the regular army, and is equipped with tents, cooking apparatus and other material necessary to take the field at a moment's notice. The law further authorized the President in time of war or other specified emergency to call forth any part of the militia for a period not exceeding nine months; and he is not required to call upon the governor of a State, but he may " issue his orders for that purpose to such officers of the militia as he may think proper." Every officer and enlisted man thus called forth shall be mustered into the service of the United States, and for failure to present himself for such muster there are heavy penalties. In other words, when the emergency arises, the President may order any colonel to report on a fixed date with his regiment, and all its arms and equipment (which remain 1 Sec. War, 1899-1903, 483. 2 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1249. GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 327 at all times the property of the United States), to a mus- 1903 tering officer, and forthwith that regiment becomes a part of the volunteer army, as defined and provided for in the law of 1898. The militia law 1 also requires a certain number of drills every year, provides for annual encampments and manoeuvres in conjunction with regular troops, author- izes the detail of officers of the army for duty with it, affords safeguards for the issue and proper care of the arms and other property of the United States which are furnished to it and permits the attendance of any of its officers at any of the army schools, except West Point, with a view to their becoming officers of the army. Encampments and joint manoeuvres have been held MmtiaActof under this law every year since 1904, with manifest ad- vantage not alone to the militia but also to the army. The law goes to the utmost limit in carrying out the constitutional requirement of a well-regulated militia. Its only danger is that it may have gone so far as to discourage recruiting in the organized militia, commonly called the National Guard, the strength of which is about 120,000 men. Officers of the army as well as the general public are apt to forget the full significance of the fact that the National Guard receives no pay, that its only material compensation is exemption from jury duty, that its drills are habitually carried on at night after the day's work is over, that all its members are engaged in other avocations in which they gain their living, and that their military duties are necessarily subordinate to the chief occupation of their lives. All that the ser- vice has to offer them is the occasional use of armories for athletic or social purposes, the physical advantages 1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1249-1250. 1903 328 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1903 of military drill, the pleasure of handling fire-arms and becoming proficient in their use and the applause of the Miiitia Act of public at parades. As against this they are liable to be called away from their families, and their business, per- haps losing their employment, as many did in 1898, on the President's order for service for any period not exceeding their term of enlistment and at any point within or with- out the United States. To remedy this it has been sug- gested that service in the militia be paid. But this is of doubtful expediency, for many of the best and oldest regiments in the National Guard have existed for several generations solely from pride and esprit-de-corps. To convert them into paid organizations would be to destroy their traditions and change the whole character of their personnel. It probably will work out in practice that in the sea- coast cities, where about one-half of the older National Guard regiments are to be found, they will prove to be a most satisfactory support to the coast artillery. Even with the present organization of the army we have less than half the number of instructed men necessary to man the guns already in position. To serve in the forts at the guns, or to be stationed near the forts to defend them from a land attack, will not take the men far from their homes. Already several of the National Guard or- ganizations have been changed from infantry regiments to coast artillery companies. They have their designated stations at certain of the ten-inch or twelve-inch guns in a fort within a few hours' ride by trolley-car or boat from their armories, and they have been drilling at these identical guns eveiy summer for several years. That fort and their particular gun are as familiar to them as their own armories. That they could render ad- GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 329 mirable service there in time of war does not admit of 1903 doubt. The other half of the National Guard, located at points distant from the seaboard, would probably respond to an order for active service with less loss than the regi- ments in the larger cities. It is equipped as infantry, and except in case of extraordinary emergency would probably not be kept away from its home, involuntarily, for any great length of time. The scheme formulated in Mr. Root's report for 1902 * Mr. Root's . , Plan embraced 1. A regular army of from 60,000 to 100,000 men; 2. A militia, trained and fully armed and equipped and subject to the President's order, of from 120,000 to 150,000 men; 3. A first volunteer reserve, composed of such portions of the organized militia as might volunteer for a longer period than nine months; 4. A second volunteer reserve, composed of officers and men who have had previous military service ; 5. Volunteers organized by the States, as in, the Civil War. He estimated the number available for immediate ac- tion, in the first four classes at 250,000 to 300,000 men, and stated that the number of the fifth class "has no limit, except the possibility of transportation and sup- ply." No legislation has yet been enacted in regard to the three classes of volunteers above referred to, although an act has been drafted 2 under the direction of the general staff, and has been pending in Congress since 1909. This 1 Sec. War, 1899-1903, 286. 2 61st Congress, 2d Session, Senate bill 4003. 330 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1903 act is intended to provide in advance for the organiza- tion of the volunteer army, so that when war is imminent it would only be necessary for the President to state in his proclamation the number of men desired in each arm or corps. The act provides how they shall be organized and how many general and staff officers shall be ap- pointed in proportion to the number of men called for. Briefly, the law contains the following essential provisions, viz., the period of service is to be for the war, unless sooner discharged; all officers of every grade are to be appointed by the President; the men received into ser- vice are to be taken as far as practicable from the several States and Territories in proportion to population; the organization, arms and equipment are to be identical with those in the regular army; all volunteer organiza- tions are to be maintained as nearly as possible at their maximum strength by means of recruiting depots es- tablished for that purpose; regular officers are to be assigned to all organizations not exceeding five to one regiment; and officers and men in the volunteer army are to be on the same footing as those in the regular service. That these provisions are justified and demanded by our experience in previous wars does not admit of doubt, from the professional military stand-point. It is equally true that they run counter to various political considera- tions and to many deep-seated prejudices in favor of rights previously exercised by the governors of States. Whether these latter can be overcome to the extent necessary to enact these laws remains to be seen, system of One other question, brought forward by Mr. Root in his first report of 1899, 1 is still pending in Congress; that 1 Sec. War, 1899-1903, 61. Promotion GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 331 is, the system of promotion. In every other military ser- 1903 vice in the world, and in every great corporate organi- zation employing large bodies of men, the promotion of officers is based on relative merit and fitness determined by some specified board or other agency. In our army, below the grade of general officers, promotion is deter- mined solely by seniority. Mr. Root proposed that one vacancy in three should be filled by selection under care- fully guarded regulations so as to prevent favoritism. The great majority of officers opposed this so vigorously that for eleven years they have defeated it. As an alter- native proposition the general staff has drafted a law, which has been pending in Congress for two years, based upon the principle of " elimination." If vacancies are less than a certain number in any grade during a certain number of years, then a definite number of officers in that grade are to be eliminated by retirement, the selections for elimination to be made by a board of officers under proper regulations. Such a measure would stimulate promotion, but would not accomplish the purpose of selecting the best men for command. When war comes and men's lives depend every day and every hour on the skill of the officers in command, then the rule of strict seniority is thrown to the wind; the purpose then is to select the best man, and no claim of vested right to pro- motion is considered or tolerated. The same principles should apply when, in time of peace, the army is prepar- ing for war. This chapter has already exceeded its intended length, summary and it only remains to summarize it. It has been my endeavor to show that our forefathers were imbued with an intense prejudice against a standing army in time of 332 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1903 peace and a supreme reliance upon untrained militia; that these prejudices resulted in enormous waste, ex- travagance and inefficiency in the Revolution and the War of 1812, and to a minor extent in the Mexican War, the Civil War and the war with Spain; that neverthe- less a standing army was found to be necessary and has existed since the First Congress, gradually increasing in numbers and efficiency, and slowly, step by step, gain- ing the confidence of the people; that the strength of the army has varied from 50 to 120 per 100,000 of the population, or from 1 per cent to 2J per cent of the "able-bodied male population," and its annual cost, ex- clusive of pensions, has been less than 1 per cent of our national wealth; and that finally, in this 135th year of our independence, we have an efficient army, and a militia with uniform arms, equipment, organization and drill, both respectable in numbers, though small as modern armies are counted, and both subject to the instant call of the President. We have built proper fortifications on our sea-coasts and have placed in them a reasonable number of modern high-powered guns. More progress has been made in the improvement of our army during the last ten years than in all its pre- vious history. The war with Spain, so brief in point of time, so slight as regards loss of life, has changed com- pletely our relations to the rest of the world. It has brought us into close touch and sharp competition with the nations of Europe on one side and of Asia on the other; and with this competition the prospect of foreign war, which thirty years ago seemed so remote as to be negligible, is now a contingency that must be kept always in mind. Abuse of a disciplined regular army and praise of a patriotic untrained militia are no longer the popular GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 333 cries with which demagogues in politics strive to catch 1903 votes. Measures to improve the efficiency of the army and to put the country in a proper state of defence and keep it so are no longer approved in the abstract and neglected in the concrete, but they receive the serious consideration of Congress, and this consideration leads to actual legislation. Our military policy still remains, and is likely to remain, somewhat different from that of the nations of Europe. Enormous armies, conscription and universal military service seem not to be necessary with us. We still rely upon voluntary service; but universal liability to ser- vice is the law of the land, and conscription is in the background if volunteers are not sufficient. Above all, public opinion is beginning to appreciate the fact that untrained patriotism is not sufficient and that our chief reliance must be upon a military force trained in advance in time of peace for the immensely complex problems of war. It would be a mistake on the part of our legislators to possibility of War attempt to blink or dodge the fact that among the con- ditions of our national life at the present time is the possibility of war with one or another great nation possessing a trained army of from 300,000 to 1,000,000 men, with ample transport facilities for crossing the oceans which bound our coasts, and a powerful navy to protect such transports. If such a war comes, the attack on our coasts will probably precede the declaration of war. It is a fallacy to argue that these oceans isolate and protect us from other nations. That might have been true when Washington gave his wise advice against en- tangling alliances; 1 although England crossed the At- 1 Sparks, XII, 231, 232. 334 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1903 lantic with 30,000 men in 1776, the allies sent 60,000 men through the Mediterranean in 1854 and we moved 12,600 men across the Gulf of Mexico in 1847. In two of these expeditions the troops were carried in sailing ships, moving with uncertain speed, from 50 to 100 miles in a day, and each carrying from 200 to 250 soldiers. Now they would be carried in great steamers, with 3,000 to 5,000 troops on each, travelling at a certain speed of 400 miles or more every day. More than one great na- tion can assemble and embark an army much larger than our own in 10 days and cross the Atlantic in 10 days more, or the Pacific in 20 days. While our prin- cipal cities are protected by modern fortifications, yet there are long stretches of beach and several harbors on both coasts where a landing is feasible unless we have a mobile army strong enough to prevent it. These are not theories, but the actual conditions which confront us in this twentieth century. That we should ultimately prevail in any such contest, owing to our enormous resources, our mechanical ingenuity, our fertility in expedients and, above all, the dominant character of our race, seems probable — unless our race is decadent, and if that be true then we shall perish. The race which came out victorious from the Civil War will not probably be subdued; but if it wins it will be at the end of a sacrifice which cannot be measured. Such a contingency is among the possibilities under any circumstances; it goes with the conditions of our national life. If we are not prepared for it, it becomes not alone a probability but almost a certainty; for we are competing with all the world for the trade of the Orient and of South America, and we must so compete. GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 335 If we abandon the competition our prosperity will come 1903 to an end. It is not to be expected that we shall abandon it, but rather that the trade rivalry for foreign markets which has recently begun will rapidly increase in the next few years. In such rivalry the potential causes of war are numerous and frequent. The Venezuelan incident has shown that the ties which bind us to Great Britain are so strong that war with that country is improbable even under extreme provocation. But it is idle to deny that there are other nations which are jealous of our phenomenal growth. Their attitude toward us, however friendly it may have been in the past, is now by no means cordial, and at times seems like thinly veiled hostility. It is well to remember what Washington wrote in 1778 r 1 "It is a maxim, founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its interest; and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it." Some people say that the expression of such views inadequate provokes war. The teachings of history prove that this for war is not true, and that war comes to the nation that is not prepared for it. Especially is this true of a very rich nation, with abundant resources — unorganized. We have always been unprepared for war, and we have been at war one year in every seven since we declared our inde- pendence. We have a more efficient army and a more highly organized militia now than at any previous time in our history; but compared with the possibilities that confront us and the conditions which have resulted from the use of steam and electricity, we are about as unpre- pared now as at any previous time. 'Sparks, VI, 110. 336 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES Necessity It would seem to be incumbent upon those who are Definite responsible for our national legislation to study these policy 7 facts, to forget the traditions which our Puritan and Cavalier ancestors brought over from England nearly three hundred years ago, to realize that what was wise in the days of the Stuart tyranny has no application in this twentieth century and to frame a military policy suited to the conditions under which we are now living. APPENDIX The Medical Department can justly claim an equal share with the Ordnance Department and the Corps of Engineers in the valuable contributions to the advancement of science made by the army in the last ninety years, and particularly since the Civil War. Among them is the suppression of yellow-fever in the tropics, which is solely due to the efforts of the army surgeons, one of whom lost his life in the process. Aside from the loss of life, the paralysis of business throughout the Mississippi Valley and the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, which was an incident to such epidemics as that of 1878 at Memphis, produced financial loss many times greater than the entire cost of the war with Spain and the resulting acqui- sition of the Philippines. From such financial losses and the appalling loss of life from yellow-fever, we are henceforth, apparently, immune. Moreover, it is reasonably certain that but for this great achievement of the Army Medical Corps and the sanitation introduced by Colonel Gorgas on the Isthmus, we should not have been able to construct the Panama Canal. Had we had such proportionate loss of life among the 45,000 or more laborers now working on the canal as attended the construc- tion, by a much smaller force, of the Panama Railroad from 1849 to 1855 (where, as the phrase goes, a laborer was buried under every tie), or such loss of life as befell the French during their unsuccessful attempt to build the canal between 1883 and 1892, there is little doubt that this would have created an adverse public sentiment sufficiently strong, when added to the sentiment against building the canal on other grounds, to have led to the abandonment of the entire project. 337 338 APPENDIX General Wood, chief of staff, has kindly caused to be pre- pared by Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Kean, Medical Corps U. S. A., a condensed statement of the facts in regard to the suppression of yellow-fever and the connection of the mos- quito therewith. As the matter is one of world-wide im- portance, and has a distinct bearing on the enforcement of any military policy that the United States may decide upon, the statement is published in full, as follows: THE CONQUEST OF YELLOW-FEVER The military occupation of Cuba brought the army in con- frontation with yellow-fever, a foe which had before been de- structive to many invading expeditions in the Antilles and which at Santiago gave General Shafter's army a severe demonstration of its fatal and demoralizing power. Upon the recommendation of the surgeon-general, a commission was sent to Havana to study the question of its cause and prevention, a task upon which many distinguished scientists had labored in vain. Major Walter Reed, Surgeon, U. S. A., who was placed at its head, had recently overthrown the claim of the dis- tinguished bacteriologist, Sanarelli, to have discovered the bacillus of yellow-fever, by demonstrating that this organism was a common one in the United States and having no causa- tive relation to that disease. The other members of the com- mission were Acting Assistant Surgeons James Carroll, Jesse W. Lazear and A. Agramonte, the latter a Cuban by birth and the only member of the commission who had clinical experience with yellow-fever and was immune to it. The time was most opportune for such investigation, as the disease was at that time prevalent both in Havana and in the town of Marianao near the camp of the American troops, and it had become plainly evident that the energetic measures of the American military government to clean up the towns, disinfect and enforce other sanitary measures were without effect in preventing the spread of this mysterious disease. APPENDIX 339 The transmission of malaria by a certain species of mos- quito had recently been demonstrated by the English military surgeon, Major Ronald Ross. Dr. Carlos Finlay, of Havana, had, since 1881, stoutly maintained that yellow-fever was a mosquito-borne disease and had fixed accurately upon the species which was responsible, but his numerous experiments had failed to demonstrate the truth of his hypothesis, and it therefore received no more attention or acceptance from the scientific world than the vast number of other theories which had at one time or another been advanced with regard to this peculiar and dreaded disease. Dr. H. R. Carter had observed that when a non-immune person went into an infected house he became sick in 5 days or less, but that 15 or 20 days elapsed before a house became infected after a patient sick with yellow- fever was carried into it and secondary cases appeared. Carter drew no inferences from this observation, but to Reed's mind it suggested that the difference between the period of incubation and that required to infect a building was due to the fact that the infective agent had to pass through a stage of devel- opment in some biting insect as an intermediate host, and he determined to investigate the mosquito theory of Finlay. The first attempts were tried secretly on Carroll and Lazear and other persons at the hospital of Columbia Barracks, but were failures owing to the same cause that had rendered neg- ative Finlay's numerous and intelligent experiments on human beings, namely, that two conditions have to be satisfied for the transmission of yellow-fever: the mosquito, in order to become infected, must bite a patient during the first three days of the disease, and, second, the insect must be kept at least twelve days before it can transmit the infection. Mean- while, during a temporary absence of Reed in the United States, mosquitoes in which both conditions were fulfilled were ap- plied to Dr. Carroll and to a cavalry soldier, both of whom came down with yellow-fever, Carroll's case being very severe. These cases convinced Reed, but they were not sufficient to convert the scientific world, and it was evident that a series 340 APPENDIX of fully observed and controlled cases was necessary to con- firm and define the conditions of this momentous discovery. He went, therefore, to General Leonard Wood, the Military Governor of Cuba, to ask permission to conduct such danger- ous experiments on human beings and for a sum of money to reward volunteers who should offer themselves for this perilous experience. General Wood promptly granted both with a ready appreciation of the importance of the matter which entitles him to no small share of the glory of the discovery. Havana was at that time full of Spanish laborers who had come to Cuba seeking employment, and who all anticipated sooner or later an attack of yellow-fever, an expectation in which they were not usually deceived. It was found easy to induce these men to submit to the bite of infected mosquitoes, although the consequences were carefully explained to them. They concurred in the opinion of the board that their chances of recovery were far better with the skilful care and good nursing of an army hospital than if the disease were contracted in the usual way amid the squalor and neglect of their accustomed surroundings. American soldiers of the hospital corps also came forward in abundance, so that it was no longer necessary for other members of the commission to offer themselves for experiment. Lazear, however, the member who had charge of the infecting of the mosquitoes, was bitten while so doing in the yellow-fever hospital in Havana and died of malignant yellow-fever. In the fall of 1900, after Lazear's death, a camp named after him was established about a mile from Columbia Barracks for the conduct of a series of experiments which, by precision of detail and rigidness of control, would admit of no uncertainty of interpretation and would be a perfect demonstration carrying conviction to every scientific and un- prejudiced mind. Camp Lazear was established November 20 and the subjects for experiment were kept there under rigid regulations to exclude infection in any way except experi- mentally. As soon as taken sick the cases were taken to the isolation hospital of the barracks. One building was con- APPENDIX 341 structed for mosquito experiments. It was carefully screened and contained a large room entirely divided across its centre by a partition of wire gauze which permitted circulation of air but not the passage of mosquitoes. In one side of this screen infected mosquitoes were let loose, and the individuals who went into that side were bitten and infected. On the other side of the screen, breathing the same air, slept and lived non-immunes who remained uninfected. This demonstrated that the mosquito, not the air, carried the infection. At some distance away another building was constructed into which were carried bedclothes and shirts worn by yellow-fever patients, some even soiled with black vomit and other dis- charges. In this room, of which the air was kept warm and moist, slept and lived 6 non-immune American soldiers for periods of ten days each during a period of two months. Acting Assistant Surgeon R. P. Cook underwent this re- pulsive experience with the first 2 soldiers, and although they daily handled and even slept in this presumably infected cloth- ing, none of them contracted yellow-fever. Three of them afterward demonstrated their susceptibility by contracting the disease by the bites of infected mosquitoes. In these ex- periments 14 cases of yellow-fever were caused by infected mosquitoes of the genus Stegnomyia, 5 by injections of blood of patients in the first three days of their illness and 3 by in- jections of filtered blood serum, 22 cases in all, of which 15 were Americans and 7 were Spaniards. No deaths occurred except that of Dr. Lazear above mentioned. In a series of 10 experimental cases at Havana, however, conducted in 1901 by Gorgas and. Guiteras, 3 proved fatal, 2 being Spaniards and 1 an American trained nurse, Miss Clara Louise Maas. These experiments demonstrated that 1. Bacillus Idervides of Sanarelli does not cause yellow-fever. 2. Yellow-fever is carried by the mosquito, genus Stegnomyia. 3. That this mosquito cannot convey the disease until the twelfth day after biting the patient, and then retains the in- fective power for the rest of its life. 342 APPENDIX 4. Patients can transmit yellow-fever to the mosquito only during the first three days of the disease. 5. Yellow-fever is not communicable by clothing, etc. Application was at once made of this knowledge by Major W. C. Gorgas, Health Officer of Havana, in February, 1901, and this dread disease was stamped out of Havana and Cuba for the first time in nearly two centuries. Between the years 1853 and 1900 it has caused 35,952 deaths in the city of Havana alone. The application at the Isthmus of Panama of the same knowledge, together with the administrative methods worked out in Havana, has enabled Gorgas to make healthy one of the most pestilential countries in the world, and so make possible the construction of the Panama Canal. This same discovery has been applied with equal success in other centres of infection, such as Rio de Janeiro and Vera Cruz, so that there is now a good prospect of the extermination of this dis- ease in the western hemisphere. J. R. Kean, Lieutenant-Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A. BOOKS OF REFERENCE 1. Dr. William Osier: "iEquanimitas" and other addresses. Pp. 118. P. Blakiston's Son & Co. 2. Dr. Howard A. Kelly: "Walter Reed and Yellow Fever." McClure, Phillips & Co., New York. 3. "Major Walter Reed and the Yellow Fever Commission." A com- pilation prepared by authority of the surgeon-general and published as a Senate Document. 4. Major J. R. Kean: "The Scientific Work and Discoveries of the Late Major Walter Reed." Senate Doc. No. 118, 57th Congress, 2d Session. 5. Also Senate Docs. No. 10, 59th Congress, 2d Session, and No. 520, Gist Congress, 2d Session. INDEX Abercrombey at Ticonderoga, 1758, 102. Adams, John, 14, 61, 99; endorses Gates, 99. Adams, Samuel, 3; writes to Congress endorsing Gates, 99, 149. Agnew, General, mortally wounded, 92. Allen, Colonel Ethan, 6; captured and sent to England, 23, 102. Andre, Major, meets Arnold, 167; capt- ure of, 168; death of, 169. Anspach regiment sent by transports feared desertion, 141. Arbuthnot, Admiral, sails for Newport, 173; with Clinton at Charleston, 208. Arnold, Benedict, 21, 22; plans to invade Canada, 22; arrives at Quebec, 24, 25; wounded, 26; might have suc- ceeded, 27; defeated by Carleton, 54; at Ridgefield, 80; defeats St. Leger, 108; joins Gates, 115; at- tacks Fraser, 116; in battle with- out command, 124; compared to Lee, 145; gets command at West Point, 166; meets Andre\ 167; es- capes to British ship, 168; subse- quent career of, 169; sent South to reinforce Cornwallis, 227. Ashe defeated at Briar Creek and court- martialled, 195. Augusta, siege of, 249. Balcarras, Earl, at Bemis' Heights, 124. Barren Hill, skirmish, 140. Baume, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Benning- ton, 110; warns Burgoyne, 111; death of, 113. Baxter, Colonel, 58; mortally wounded, 59. Beaufort, action at, 193. Bennington, battle of, 113. Boston, besieged, 3; garrison of, 4; works completed, 5; evacuation of, 19. Boyd, Colonel, at Kettle Creek, 194. Brandywine, battle of, 85. Brant with St. Leger, 107. Breyman, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Ben- nington, 112-113; death of, 124. Briar Creek, battle of, 195. British army, 139, 163. British fleet, arrival at New York, 33. British plans for dividing the Colonies, 182. Brown, Colonel, raids Burgoyne's com- munications, 119. Browne, Lieutenant-Colonel, defends Au- gusta, 250. Brunswick Dragoons at Bennington, 110. Brunswick, Duke of, 28. Bunker Hill, Gage's plan of attack, 7; Howe's formation for assault, 9; American retreat, 10. Burgoyne, in command of reinforce- ments, 26; resented being shut up in Boston, 30; reasons for the loss of his army, 31; selected to com- mand two expeditions from Can- ada, 77; his plan to reach Albany, 78; his force, 96; arrives at Quebec, 100; advances from Crown Point, 103; captures Ticonderoga and pur- sues Long up the lake, 104, 106; takes Fort Edward, 109; starts for Bennington, 110; position precari- out, 114; at Freeman's Farm, 116; at Bemis' Heights, 123; negotiates for surrender, 125; signs terms, 127; goes to England on parole, 130, 139. Burnside's report, 312-313; not adopted, 314. Burr, Aaron, 23. Cadwalader, Colonel John, with Magaw at New York, 58; letter to, from Washington, 66, 67; occupies Bor- dentown, 69; ordered to join Wash- ington, 70. Calhoun's reports, 299; not adopted, 301. Camden, battle of, 218. Campbell, Captain, messenger to Bur- goyne, 117; Colonel, sent to attack Fort Montgomery, 121. Campbell, Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald, sent to Georgia, 189; at Savannah, 191; killed at Eutaw Springs, 255. Carleton, Sir Guy, Governor of Canada, at Montreal, 22; escapes in a small boat, 23; learns of Arnold's ap- proach, 24; at Quebec, 25; fails to attack Arnold, 26; reinforced by Burgoyne, 31; at Crown Point, 54; renders Burgoyne every assistance, 100. Carlisle, Earl of, heads peace commis- sion, 138. Carrington, quartermaster-general of Greene's army, 226; meets Morgan with boats, 233, 234. Chad's Ford, battle of, 84. Charleston, preparations for the defence of, 184; result of the victory, 188; 343 344 INDEX unsuccessful attack of Prevost, 197; its siege by Clinton, 209; its sur- render, 210. Charlestown set on fire, 9. Chew, Chief Justice, 91. Civil War, the, 307; call for volunteers, 307; resort to conscription, 308; number of men in service, 308; de- fects of military system, 309; com- pared with previous wars, 310; dis- bandment of the volunteers, 311. Clarke, Colonel, defeats Dunlap, 214; at siege of Augusta, 250. Clary, Lieutenant-Colonel, 49. Clinton, Fort, captured, 121. Clinton, General George, 49; hastens to the relief of his brother, 121-138. Clinton, General James, 61; commander Forts Clinton and Montgomery, 121. Clinton, Sir Henry, at Bunker Hill, 10; failure at Charleston, 31; arrives at New York, 33; attacks Sullivan on Long Island, 38; lands at Kip's Bay, 46; sent to Newport, 62; notifies Burgoyne of intention to attack Fort Montgomery, 117; his message to Burgoyne, 118; moves up Hudson, 120; fails Burgoyne. 122; in supreme command, 134; attempts to capture Lafayette, 140; evacuates Philadelphia, 141; at Monmouth, 144; escapes, 147; arrives at Newport, 154 ; captures Stony Point, 156; reoccuples Stony Point, 159; sends marauding ex- pedition up the Chesapeake, 161; corresponds with Arnold, 167; ap- peals for Andre\ 169; sails for New- port, 173; returns to New York, 174, 176; at Charleston, 185; his expedition South, 206; lands near Charleston, 207; sends reinforce- ments South, 223; sends 7,500 men to Cornwallis, 261; instructions to Cornwallis, 266; goes to relieve Cornwallis, 273; superseded by Carleton, 278. Continental army, 17; movement to New York, 31-54, 162; ineffective plans for recruiting, 175; origin of, 288. Continental Congress, appoints Washing- ton commander-in-chief, 13, 75; adjourns to York, Pa., 89; sends committee to Valley Forge, 134 ; in- effective resolutions of, 289; mili- tary powers of, 295. Conway, Cabal, 134; wounded in a duel, makes abject apology to Washing- ton, 135. Conway's brigade, 90. Cornwallis, reinforces Clinton at Charles- ton, 31; arrives at New York, 33; sent to Flatbush, 35; at the Cor- telyou house, 39; lands at Kip's Bay, 46; at Harlem Heights, 49; at Fort George, 58; at Fort Lee, 59, 60; captures Lee, 65; his at- tempt to turn Washington's flank, 66, rejoins his command, 70; marches toward Princeton, 71, 72; in battle of the Brandywine, 84 et seq.; hurrying with reinforcements, 92; attacks Fort Mercer, 94, 163; with seven regiments at Cape Fear River, 184; goes South with Clinton, 206; defeats Gates at Camden, 219; retreats to South Carolina after King's Mountain, 224; burns his baggage to pursue Morgan, 232; gives up the chase, 235; he defeats Green at Guilford, 240; retreats to Wilmington, 242; his perplexity at Wilmington, 259; arrives at York- town, 267; surrender, 275; returns to England, 278. Cowpens, battle of the, 229. Crown Point, capture of, 6. Cruger, Lieutenant-Colonel, sent to Geor- gia, 189; commands defence of Ninety-Six, 250. Cuba, occupation of, 338. Dearborn, Henry, 23. De Grasse, announces his co-operation, 270; arrives at Cape Henry, 272; his naval battle with the English fleet, 273. De Kalb, Baron, sent South by Wash- ington, 214; mortally wounded at Camden, 218. De Lancey, Colonel, sent to Georgia, 189. Delaware, Washington crosses the, 66; forts destroyed, 93. Dillon, Count, at Savannah, 203. Donop, General, lands at Kip's Bay, 46; at Harlem Heights, 49; on the Dela- ware, 66; retreats to Amboy, 69; death of, 94. Dorchester Heights seized, 18. Duer, William, 64. Duportail stationed on coast to commu- nicate with d'Estaing, 171. Edward, Fort, 109. Estaing, Comte d', arrives with French fleet, 149; fails to attack, 150; sails for Newport, 150; fails to land his troops, 151; abandons allies at New- port, 152: sails for Martinique, 154; movements of, 171; returns with three expeditions, 200; after fiasco at Savannah, sails for France, 205. Eutaw Springs, battle of, 255. Ewing, Colonel, 68. Fellow's brigade at Saratoga, 125. Ferguson killed at King's Mountain, 224. Fleury receives medal from Congress, 159. INDEX 345 Florida war, 301. Francis killed, 104. Fraser's brigade, at Ticonderoga, 103; at battle of Hubbardton, 104; mortally wounded, 124. Freeman's Farm, battle of, 116. French alliance, 132. Gadsden, Colonel, at Charleston, 185. Gage, Major-General Thomas, command- er-in-chief at Boston, 4; issues in- sulting proclamation, 7; assaults American works in front, 8; recalled in disgrace, 11. Gansevoort, Colonel, sent to Fort Stan- wix, 106, 108. Gates, Horatio, appointed adjutant-gen- eral, 16; called in council, 17; at Ticonderoga, 54; joins Washington, 65; relations with Schuyler, 97; elected to command the Northern army, 99; his strength at surrender of Burgoyne, 106; relieves Schuyler, 114; refuses to reinforce Arnold, 116; jealous of Arnold, 118; not on field at Bemis' Heights, 124; surrounds Burgoyne, 125; grants armistice until sunset, 128, 137; re- tires from army, 166; sent South by Congress to command army, 215; defeated at Camden, 218. George III, arranges to buy soldiers for cash, 28; endorses Burgoyne's plan, 78; plan that the king disliked, 131. Georgetown, capture of, 253. Georgia, conquest of, 192. Gerard, guest of d'Estaing, 154, 171. Germain, Lord George, 76; had failed to give Howe instructions, 119; incom- petence of, 264. Germantown, battle of, 90; panic of, 92. Gist, Major, captured, 39. Glover, Colonel John, regiment of Marble- head fishermen, 42, 43; his regi- ment to man the boats at the cross- ing of the Delaware, 67; brigade sent to Schuyler, 105; at Newport, 153. Granby, Fort, capture of, 249. Grant, Major-General, takes over Corn- wall's command, 66; rallies his troops, 92: at Barren Hill, 140. Graves, Admiral, 4; arrives with fleet, 173. Great Bridge, battle of, 183. Greene, Christopher, 23; gallant defence of Fort Mifflin, 94; in command of Rhode Island negroes at Newport, 153. Greene, General Nathanael, appointed brigadier-general, 15; a great sol- dier, 16; in council of war, 17: at Boston, 19; ordered to Brooklyn Heights, 32; at New York, 34, 35; illness at the battle of Long Island, 41; advocates evacuation of New York, 45; his division posted after retreat to Harlem Heights, 47; at battle of Harlem Heights, 48; in command of troops at Forts Lee and Washington, 52, 54; reports the passage of British ships up the river, 55; crosses river to Fort Washington with Washington, Put- nam and Mercer, 57; brings off the garrison of Fort Lee, 60; on march to Trenton, 67; in the attack on Trenton, 68; advises pushing on to Princeton, 69; gets one of the five new divisions, 76; selects position at Middlebrook, 80; in pursuit of Howe with three brigades, 81; on reconnoissance with Washington and Lafayette, 83; his batteries at Brandywine, 85; halts British ad- vance, 86; nearing the battle of Germantown, 90; fighting his way along Lime-kiln road, 91; ap- pointed quartermaster-general, 136; organization at Valley Forge, 140; at Monmouth, 146; at Newport, 153; his loss at battle of Spring- field, 165; resigns as quartermaster- general, 166; president of Andrfi court-martial, 169; appointed to command Southern army, 220; his successful retreat, 234; receives reinforcements, 236; marches to South Carolina, 244; abandons siege of Fort Ninety-Six, 251; re- treats from Eutaw Springs, 256. Grey, General, attacks Wayne, 88, 140. Gridley, Colonel Richard, chief engineer at Boston, 5; sends guns to Cam- bridge from Ticonderoga, 6; builds square redoubt at Breed's Hill, 7; amazes Howe by night work on Dorchester Heights, 18. Guilford, battle of, 238. Hale, Nathan, absent at his own request, 47. Hamilton, Alexander, 52; nearing his twentieth birthday, 68; sent to wel- come Comte d'Estaing, 149; sent to capture Arnold, 168, stationed on Jersey coast to meet d'Estaing, 171; leads the assault at Yorktown, 274. Hamilton, General, in council of war with Burgoyne, 125. Hancock, John, 3; at head of 7,000 New England militia, 150. Hand, Colonel, at Trenton, 68; his regi- ment at Princeton, 71. Harlem Heights, battle of, 49. Haslet, Colonel, 52; killed at Princeton, 71. Heath, William, appointed brigadier- general, 14; in council of war, 17; stationed with Spencer and Stirling, 346 INDEX 32; commands one of the five divi- sions, 34; after reorganization com- mands one of the three divisions, 44; commands Greene's division during his illness, 47; arrives at White Plains, 52; head-quarters at Peeks- kill, 54; might have been captured, 61; ordered to Morristown, 69; goes into winter quarters, 72. Henry, Patrick, Washington's appea lto, as Governor of Virginia, 138; his eloquence fires the Southern Colo- nies, 183. Herkimer, General, 106; at battle of Oriskany, 107; death of, 108. Herrick, Colonel, at Bennington, 113. Hesse-Cassel, Landgrave of, 28. Hessians, engagement with, by England, 28; at battle of Long Island with Cornwallis, 35; loss at White Plains, 53; they attack Fort Washington, 58; at Trenton, 67; they advance to Chad's Ford, 84; at battle of Brandywine, 85. Hinman, Colonel, 22. Hobkirk's Hill, battle of, 246. Hopkins, Commodore Ezek, 33. Howe, Lord, 93; at Sandy Hook to meet French fleet, 149; at New- port, 154. Howe, Major-General Robert, quells mu- tiny of New Jersey line, 177, 189; at Savannah, 190; tried by court- martial, 192. Howe, Sir William, sent out from Eng- land, 5; in command at Bunker Hill, 8; leaves Boston, 20; arrives at New York, 33; at battle of Long Island, 37; lands in New York, 46; flanking movement through West- chester, 51; at battle of White Plains, 52; sends Cornwallis in pur- suit of Washington, 59; captures Fort Washington, 60; goes into winter quarters, 62; withdraws from New Jersey, 72; sails for Chesa- peake, 82; at Chad's Ford, 82; at battle of Brandywine, 85; captures Philadelphia, 88; attacks Washing- ton, 93; returns to Philadelphia, 95; resignation of, 134; sails for Eng- land, 141. Hubbardton, battle of, 104. Hutchinson, Colonel, 27; Fort, 43. Jackson's opinions, 303. Jamestown, battle of, 263. Jay, John, 64. Johnson, Sir John, 97, 107. Jones, Brigadier-General, 4. Kettle Creek engagement, 194. King's Mountain, battle of, 223. Kip's Bay, British land at, 46. Knowlton, Colonel Thomas, ordered to reconnoitre with his " Rangers," 47; ordered to get in rear of the British, 48; death of, 49. Knox, Henry, drags cannon through the snow from Ticonderoga, 18; guns placed under direction of, 32; his guns outclassed by British fleet, 33; his letter of December 28, 67; direct- ing the artillery at Trenton, 68. Knyphausen, Lieutenant-General, 53; his attack at Fort Washington, 58; Magaw surrenders to, 59; sustained three-fourths of the losses at Fort Washington, 60; at Brandywine, 85; Wayne unable to resist his advance, 87; in charge of Clinton '3 baggage, 143; at Monmouth, 144; expeditions into Jersey, 163; left in command in New York, 206. Kosciusko, fortifies Bemis' Heights, 115; engineer of Greene's Southern army, 226; sent to throw up trenches, 234; opens first parallel at Ninety-Six, 250. Lafayette, Marquis de, arrival of, 83; wounded, 86; commands a division, 140; sent to Providence with two brigades, 150; sails for France, 154; member of Andre 1 court-martial, 169; returns from France, 171; sent to confer with Rochambeau, 172; had gathered a few hundred militia, 261; retreats from Richmond before Cornwallis, 262; returns to France, 278. Laurens, Colonel John, aide-de-camp, sent to receive Comte d'Estaing, 149; sent to France to raise money, 178. Learned 's brigades at Saratoga, 125. Lee, Charles, appointed major-general, 14; in council of war, 17; sent to New York, 31; reports situation in New York, 32; reaches White Plains, 52; at North Castle with 5,000 men, 54; might have been prevented from crossing Hudson, 61; Washington gives him orders in writing, 63; his dilatory march, 64; capture, 65; a prisoner in Howe's hands, 77; gives traitorous information to Howe, 78; his dis- grace at Monmouth, 145; his court- martial, 148; sent to Charleston, 185. Lee, Major Henry, captures Paulus Hook, 159; sent to defend Vauxhall bridge, 165; stationed on Jersey coast to meet d'Estaing, 171; captures Fort Granby, 249; hastens to join Greene at Ninety-Six, 250 Leitch, Major, wounded. 49. Leslie, General, 52; sent South to rein- force Cornwallis, 225. Lincoln, General, goes into winter quar- INDEX 347 ters at Morristown, 72; commands one of the five divisions of new troops, 76; sent by Washington to organize the New England militia, 111; brings troops to Gates's camp, 119; at Beaufort, 193; takes the offensive, 194; defeated at Stono Ferry, 198; joins d'Estaing at Sa- vannah, 201; raises siege, 205; de- feated at Charleston, 210. Livingston, Colonel James, 23. Long retreats before Burgoyne, 105. Long Island, battle of, 35; Howe's plan of battle, 37; arrival of Washing- ton, 39; responsibility for the de- feat, 40; withdrawal from, 42. McDougall, General, raises the first New York regiment, 43; retreats bringing off the guns at White Plains, 53; with Greene at Germantown, 90; fails to attack Verplanck's Point, 157. Magaw, Colonel Robert, commander at Fort Washington, 56; commands three regiments, 58; opposes Howe's fourth attack, 59. Mahan, Captain, criticises Comte d'Es- taing, 150. Marion, on lower Pedee, 225; was hiding in the Pedee swamps, 244; capt- ures Fort Motte, 248; captures Georgetown, 253. Marjoribanks, Major, sortie at Eutaw Springs, 256. Mawhood attacks Mercer's brigade, 70. Maxwell's brigade, 92. Mercer, Fort, 94 Mercer, General, reported to have ar- rived at Long Island as the retreat began, 43; offered to stay at Fort Washington, 57; death of, 71. Mexican War, 306. Mifflin, Fort, 94. Mifflin, Thomas, quartermaster-general, 16; left toman the works on retreat from Long Island, 43; withdrawn under cover of fog, 44; sent to Phila- delphia to take charge of the stores, 63; militia raised by his exertions at Philadelphia, 69: ordered to join Washington after Trenton, 70; in Conway Cabal, resigns from army, 135. Military policy, origin of, 284; necessity of a definite one, 336. Militia, popularity of, in England, 287; popularity of, in American Colonies, 288; act, 296; refusal to furnish, 1814, 298; act of 1903, 326. Mischianza, the, 141. Monckton, Colonel, killed, 146. Moncrieff, Colonel, engineer at siege of Charleston, 209. Monmouth, battle of, 144. Monroe, Lieutenant James, 68. Montcalm at Ticonderoga in 1758, 102. Montgomery, Fort, captured, 121. Montgomery, Richard, appointed briga- dier-general, 14; captures Montreal, 23; joins Arnold, 24; death of, 25. Montreal, capture of, 23. Moore, General, in command at battle of Moore's Bridge, 183. Moore's Bridge, battie at, 183. Morgan, ranger, defeats Carleton. 230; retreats to the Catawba, 231. Morgan's riflemen, sent to Schuyler, 105; attack Fraser, 116; at battle of Bemis' Heights, 123; in pursuit of Burgoyne, 125. Morris House, Washington gallops from, 46; the 42d Highlanders attack, 59. Moultrie, Fort, surrenders, 210. Moultrie, 64; in defence of Charleston, 185; won the battle at Sullivan's Island, 186; records his opinion, 202. Muhlenberg, 86; at Stony Point, 157. Murray, Mrs., detains Howe. Musgrave, Colonel, places five companies in the Chew house, 90. Nash, General, mortally wounded at Ger- mantown, 92. New Jersey line mutineers, 177. New London massacre, 170. Newport, attack on, 150; evacuated by the British, 174. New York, defence of, 31; fortifications of, 33; disposition of troops, 34. Nicholls, Colonel, at Bennington, 113. Ninety-Six, siege of, 250; evacuated, 252. Nixon's brigade sent to Schuyler, 105. O'Hara at Guilford, 241. Orangeburg, capture of, 249. Paoli massacre, 88. Parker, Admiral, 31; arrives at Charles- ton, 185; defeated, withdraws, 187. Parker, Commodore Hyde, sent to Geor- gia, 189. Paulus Hook, capture, 160. Peace Commission, 138. Pell's Point, 51. Pennsylvania line, mutiny of, 176. Penobscot expedition, 161. Percy, Earl, his brigade in garrison of Boston, 4; to attack Dorchester Heights, 19; left in New York. 51; Howe reinforced by two brigades of his division, 53; attacks Washing- ton Heights, 58. Philippine insurrection, 320. Phillips's brigade seizes Mount Hope, 103; Phillips takes possession of 348 INDEX Fort George, 109; in council of war with Burgoyne, 125. Pickens, Colonel Andrew, at Kettle Creek, 194; on familiar ground, 244; hastens to join Greene at Ninety- Six, 250; returns to his old recruit- ing-ground, 253. Pigott, Brigadier-General, 4; attacks at Lexington, 10; at Newport, 153. Pomeroy, Seth, 8; appointed brigadier- general, 14. Poor, Colonel, 71; after Bennington, 115; at Bemis' Heights, 123; his brigade helps to surround Burgoyne, 125. Potter, Colonel, killed, 71. Prescott, Colonel, fortifies Bunker Hill, 7; completes his breastworks at Bunker Hill, 8; retains the com- mand, 9. Preston, Major, commanding at St. John, 23. Prevost, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Briar Creek, 195. Prevost, General, at Savannah, 190; sum- mons Charleston to surrender, 196; withdraws, 197; retires to Savannah, 199. Princeton, battle of, 70. Pulaski, 92; at Charleston, 197; mortal- ly wounded at Savannah, 204. Putnam, Israel, appointed major-gen- eral, 14; called in council of war, 17; given one of the five divisions at New York, 34; takes command on Long Island, 35; failure as com- manding general, 40; Washington's letter to, 41 ; commands one of three divisions, 44; in the retreat from New York, 46; his division posted on the heights, 47; meets Washing- ton on the retreat, 48; in action at Harlem Heights, 49; leaves White Plains with Washington, 57; sent to fortify Philadelphia, 63; at Peeks- kill, 76; reports from, 82; out-gen- eralled by Clinton, 120; retreats up the river, 122; opposition to Wash- ington, 137. Pyle, colonel of tories, defeated, 236. Quebec, siege of, 25; retreat from, 26. Rail, Colonel, attacks with Knyphausen, 58; in command at Trenton, 66; rudely awakened, 67; tries to form his troops, 68; his death, 69. Rawdon, Lord, at Charleston, 210; de- feats Greene at Hobkirk's Hill, 246; evacuates Camden, 248; comes to the relief of Fort Ninety-Six, 250; captured at sea by Count de Grasse, 252. Rawlings' regiment, 58, 60. Reed, Adjutant-General Joseph, had been with Knowlton, 48; in action at Washington Heights, 49; won- ders if Washington was such a great man as he had been thought, 64. Revolution, nearly exhausted, 174; waste and extravagance of, 291. Riedesel, at battle of Hubbardton, 104; anxious to mount Duke of Bruns- wick's dragoons, 1 10; council of war with Burgoyne, 125. Rochambeau, 168; arrives with six French regiments, 172; at Hart- ford, 174. Root, Elihu, as Secretary of War, 320; his projects, 321 ; his plan for army, 329. St. Clair, selected for service at Ticon- deroga, 99; his force, 100; garrison of, 102; evacuates Ticonderoga, 103; watches Castleton, 104; sent by Washington to stop Pennsylvania mutineers, 177. St. Leger, commences expedition from Oswego, 96; advancing on Stanwix, 100; his papers captured, 107; de- feated by Arnold, 108. Saratoga, surrender of Burgoyne, 125; controversy about terms at, 128. Savannah, capture of, 191; defence of, 201; siege of, 202. Schuyler, Fort, siege of, 108. Schuyler, Philip, appointed major-gener- al, 14; to command Northern army, 22; sick with fever, 23; Arnold's letter to, delivered to Carleton, 24; Washington calls on him for troops, 64; reports from, led Washington to think Howe intended to move up the Hudson, 82; his difference with Gates, 97; reprimanded by Con- gress, 98, 100; reinforcements for, 105; calls council of war, 108; re- treats to Stillwater, 109. Scott, Captain, third message to Bur- goyne, 118. Second war with Great Britain, 298. Skenesborough, battle of, 104. Smallwood, General, 90. Smith, Colonel, death of, at Fort Mifflin, 94. South Carolina, defence of, 193. Spain, war with, 316; mistakes of Civil War not repeated, 317; prompt or- ganization, 318. Spencer, Joseph, appointed brigadier-gen- eral, 15; called in council, 17; stationed just outside New York, 32; commands one of the five original divisions, 34; after reorgan- ization commands one of the three divisions, 44; his division at about 147th St., 47; along the hills behind the Bronx, 51. Springfield, battle of, 164. Standing army, hatred of, 286; opposi- tion to, 291; ibid., 296. INDEX 349 Stark, General John, at Bennington, re- fuses to obey orders, 111; receives thanks of Congress, 112. Stephen, General, in command of divi- sion, 76; his division fires into Wagner's division, 91; court-mar- tialled and dismissed, 92. Steuben, Baron, appointed inspector- general, 137; organization prepared by, 175; second in command to Greene in the Southern army, 220; on the James, 261. Stewart, with Wayne at Stony Point, receives medal from Congress, 159. Stewart, Colonel, of the Guards, killed at Guilford, 241. Stewart, Lieutenant-Colonel, reinforces Rawdon, 252; commanded British force at Eutaw Springs, 254. Stirling, General Lord, stationed just outside New York, 32; his heroic attack, 38; capture of, 39; fought splendidly at Long Island, 40; his division reaches White Plains, 52; gets one of the five original divisions; 76; driven back by Howe, 81; sent to cross the Hudson at Peekskill,S2, made the most stubborn resistance at Brandy wine, 86; his division formed the reserve at battle of Ger- mantown, 90; gets one of the four divisions at Valley Forge, 140; at Monmouth, 161. Stono Ferry, battle of, 198. Stony Point, capture of, 156; recapture, 157; evacuation, 159. Sullivan, John, appointed brigadier-gen- eral, 14; in council of war, 17; to attack Boston Neck, 19; ordered to supersede Thomas, 26; not equal to an enterprise like expedition to Quebec, 27; driven back at Quebec, 29; had brought back his regiments from Ticonderoga, 34; sent to take Greene's place, 35; captured, 38; unjust to hold him responsible for the battle of Long Island, 40; ar- rives at White Plains, 52; guarding fords of the Delaware, 66; 68, 70, 71, 76, 80, 82, 85, 86, 90, 91; at Provi- dence, 150. Sullivan's Island, battle at, 186. Sumter, 244; captures Orangeburg, 249, 253. Tarleton, with Clinton at Charles- ton, 209; his cavalry at Camden, 218. Taylor, Sergeant, hung as spy, 117. Ternay, de, arrival with second French fleet, 172; at Hartford, 174. Thomas, John, appointed brigadier-gen- eral, 14; called in council, 17; oc- cupied Dorchester Heights, 18; re- inforcement of 2,000 men ordered for, 19; given command at Quebec and dies of small-pox, 26; not equal to the conquest of Quebec, 27. Thompson, Colonel, at Sullivan's Island, 185. Throg's Neck, 51. Ticonderoga, captured by Ethan Allen, 6; topography of, 100; previous op- erations at, 102; evacuation of, 103. Tompkins, Daniel D., 145. Trenton, battle of, 67. Trumbull, Jonathan, 21, 138. Tryon, Governor, raid into Connecticut, 80. United States army, origin, 297; growth of, 305; reorganization of, 311, 322; general staff, 324. Upton's " Military Policy," 313. Valley Forge, 132. Van Buren's opinions, 303. Varnum's Rhode Island regiments at Newport, 153. Vaughan attacks Fort Clinton, 121. Vergennes's opinion of Laurens's diplo- macy, 178. War, possibility of, 333; inadequate prep- aration for, 335. Ward, Artemas, appointed commander- in-chief, 4; his regiments construct field works, 5; sends Prescott rein- forcements, 8; created major-gen- eral, 14; in council of war, 17; left in command in Boston when Wash- ington went to New York, 20. Warner's regiment at battle of Hubbard- ton, 104; Warner, 113. Warren, Joseph, President of Provincial Congress, 8; death of, 10. Washington, appointed commander-in- chief, 13; arrives at Cambridge, 16, reaches New York, 33; arrival at battle of Long Island, 39; retreat from Long Island, 43; disposition of troops in New York, 44; tries to rally retreating brigades at Kip's Bay, 46; arrives on Harlem Heights, 47, 48; disappointed in Fort Wash- ington, 51; White Plains, 52; re- treats to North Castle, 53, 60; re- treats to the Delaware, 62, 64; he crosses the Delaware, 66; at Tren- ton, 67; recrosses the Delaware, 70; arrives at Morristown, 72; raising new army, 75; moves to Middle- brook, 80; marches south through Philadelphia, 83; returns to Chad's Ford, 84; fights battle at Brandy- wine, SO. Washington, General, at Germantown, 350 INDEX 90; at Valley Forge, 133; writes two letters to Congress, 134; brings Continentals to Valley Forge, 137; leaves Valley Forge, 142; mutiny with Lee at Monmouth, 145; goes to White Plains, 148; in camp at Middlebrook, 155; retires to winter quarters at Morristown, 162; Wash- ington approves Andrews sentence, 169; threatens New York to draw Clinton from Newport, 173; goes to Hartford, 174; sends Greene to com- mand Southern army, 220; he meets Rochambeau at Hartford, 267; starts for Yorktown, 270; boldness of, 271; strategy compared to Napoleon's, 272; joins Lafayette, 273; returns to New York, 278. Washington, George, his ability as a sol- dier, 279; dictator, 290; his opin ions, 292. Washington, Captain William, 68; with Greene's army South, 226; came up with his cavalry, 229; at Guil- ford Court House, 238; wounded and captured at Eutaw Springs, 255. Washington, Fort, to be completed, 45, 50; loss of, 57; results of loss, 60. Watson, Fort, capture of, 245. Wayne, Anthony, 86; at Brandywine, 87; at Germantown, 90; his division fired into, 91; gets one of the four divisions formed at Valley Forte, 140; at Monmouth, 146; at Stony Point, 157; mutiny of his division, 176; hangs three emissaries from Clinton, 177; at York, Pa., 261; joins Lafayette, 263. Weedon, Colonel, with Sullivan, 86. Wharton, Thomas, governor of Pennsyl- vania, 138. White Plains, battle of, 52. Willett, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Fort Stanwix, 106; ordered to make a sortie at Oriskany, 107; sent to ask aid from Schuyler, 108. Wooster, David, appointed brigadier- general, 15; arrival at Quebec, 26, 27; mortally wounded, 80. Yellow-fever, conquest of, 338. Yorktown, siege of, 274; surrender of, 275. &77-1