511 G738 opy 1 ifiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiifiiiiiiiHiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiii 22 A GERMAN REPLIES TO "J'ACCUSE" A SLANDERER NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE PERIOD PRECEDING THE WORLD WAR By PROF. DR. THEODOR SCHIEMANN ISSUES AND EVENTS NEW YORK Price 25 cents S3 liiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii E3 iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiitiE!iiiiiisniniisinii3i!iiiiEi8iiniiiiMiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii A SLANDERER NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE PERIOD PRECEDING THE WORLD WAR By PROF. DR. THEODOR SCHIEMANN ISSUES AND EVENTS NEW YORK E3 MiiiiiMiiiiiMiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii D^^ 02 i A SLANDERER NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE PERIOD PRECEDING THE WORLD WAR BY PROFESSOR DR. THEODOR SCHIEMANN UNDER the French title "J'accuse" there has been pub- lished in the German language, but on the soil of French Switzerland, a pamphlet "by a German" which will doubtless be greeted as highly gratifying in France, England, Russia, and wherever else Germany's enemies are weaving their intrigues. The anonymous author has bor- rowed from the Russian coat of arms the title vignette: St. George thrusting his lance down the dragon's throat. But he sets over it this verse as motto: Wer die Wahrheit kennt und sagt sie nicht, Der ist fiirv^rahr ein erbarmlicher Wicht P) The "Accuser" has chosen as sponsor a Swiss living in Lausanne, Dr. Anton Suter, who has the impudence to take upon himself the responsibility for the publication of this libel, and to commend it as an "act which can turn out to be nothing but a blessing to the German people and to mankind." This Mr. Suter was clearly incapable of seeing through the misstatements and the downright falsehoods which the "accuser" tries to foist on undiscriminating or hopelessly prejudiced readers. No, the author of "J'accuse" is in no respect "a German patriot," but a deliberate slanderer who well knows from personal experience that, of all the masks behind which slander conceals its true features, that of the heart-broken patriot is the most effective. He very well knows that what he presents to his readers as "the truth ' is merely that prearranged list of accusations — garnished with poison- ous sophistries of his own manufacture — with which our enemies are trying to win over the public opinion of the world. ^Who knows the truth and brin.^s it not to light He is, in sooth, a pitiable wight. With that truth which may not be kept dark, the con- tents of "J'accuse" have nothing in common, A chain of assertions is presented to us which have as little to do with actual facts as those predictions of this "German" in which our economic, military, and moral downfall are foretold. Today no one believes in such an outcome, not even in the camp of our enemies, no, not even those Augurs who, in the hope of some such denouement, set in motion the chain of events that led to the world war — Poincare, Asquith, Goremykin, who allowed their names to be used to cover the secret work of Delcasse, Grey, Iswolski and Ssassonow. Today all of them are looking forward with horror to the moment when the structure which they wished to erect will collapse and bury them under its ruins. And with them, under the burden of his shame, will collapse this "accuser," when the German people in its hour of victory turns away with loathing from those who had hoped to profit by fling- ing mud at their own fatherland. "J'accuse" starts out with the chapter, "Germany, Awake!" Its aim is to give the German reader a light by which to perceive the following of the Accuser's "truths": 1. That this war was long since planned and prepared for by Germany, not only on the field of war, but of politics ; 2. That it had long since been agreed that this war of aggression should be presented to the German people as a war of liberation, since it was known that only in this way could the necessary enthusiasm be counted on; 3. That the object of this war was to be the achieve- ment of the hegemony of the continent and, in the course of time, the conquest of England's position as a world power, in accordance with the principle : ote-toi de la que je m'y mette ! Has a more shameless inversion of the truth ever been heard from the mouth of a German to the prejudice of his own fatherland? We oppose him with the following propositions : 1. That this war was desired by France in the first in- stance, was brought closer to realization by the Russian- French alliance, and, through England's joining hands with these conspirators, became, under English leadership, neces- sary and inevitable ; 2. That these three powers had long since resolved to break Germany's powerful strategic position in Central Europe, and had been systematically working to educate the world up to the notion that this proceeding is a moral necessity; 3. That in this war which has been thus forced on us our goal should be the permanent safeguarding of our bor- ders and the freeing of the seas from English tyranny. The actual contents of the "accusation," and our own contrasting point of view, have now^ been clearly charac- terized, as far as fundamentals go. But the anonymous accuser tries through four further sections of his book to bolster up those theses of his which are not, as he would have it appear, formulated for the German people, but for the enemies of our people. He calls them: 11. History of the Period Preceding the Crime (N. B. our crime). III. The Crime. IV. Consequences of the Deed. V. The Future and Epilogue. Unedifying as the task is, we mean to follow him up, step by step. The "History of the Period Preceding the Crime" includes pages 25 to 113, and begins with a section on: "Our Imper- ialists : Bernhardi & Co." The author's first great falsification is this — that he treats "imperialism" as if it expressed a German desire for world conquest, whereas word and conception are, as everyone knows, of English origin, and were coined on the occasion of the British Colonial Conferences at Queen Victoria jubi- lee. It was only by a malicious distortion that they were later applied to the tendencies of German politics and the currents in the soul of the German people. The writings of General von Bernhardi, moreover, which the author attacks, appeared — a fact that has natural!}^ also been left unmen- tioned — in 1912, at a time when the aggressive policies of the powers of the Triple Entente left no doubt that soon or late we should have to reckon on a coalition of England, Russia and France, whose goal was no less than our polit- ical humiliation, to be followed, as a logical consequence, by the annihilation of the German position and power. It was the old prescription: avilir, puis demolir. The brave books of Bernhardi, with a clear prevision of what was in preparation, pointed out the necessity of grasping the sword before the conspiracy which threatened Germany should become active. That was the more his perfect right since the threat of v/ar, particularly on the part of England and Russia, had, as we shall see, for years never let up. But it is a downright falsification to identify the advice of Bernhardi with the secret aims of our government. His writings — insofar as they were not of a purely military char- acter — were inopportune and unwelcome to the government, since it foresaw the misuse to which they could be put by the evilly inclined. Today it is unlikely that anj-one will deny that Bernhardi saw and judged the situation correctly. The distinguished American, Thomas C. Hall, Professor of Christian ethics in New York, and now lecturing at Gottln- gen as exchange professor, vigorously repudiated the hypo- critical expressions of indignation over the writings of Bernhardi and Treitschke as early as January, 1915. "How many who are horrified at Bernhardi or Treitschke have really read either of these men and really know what they stand for? They are indeed free from some of the ingrained 'homage our vices pay to virtue,' but there is not an opin- ion expressed on force and war that could not be matched with a hundred quotations from English and American sources, including such apostles of peace as Mr. Roosevelt, Dr. Lyman Abbott and Lord Roberts. Both men, however, knew what they were talking about and do not pretend that a pagan world about us is really governed by Christian principles !" It is also a historically untenable proposition to say that a preventive war cannot, after its own fashion, be a defensive war. What was the war which Frederick the Great waged for seven long years for the maintenance of the Prussian state, if not a defensive war in which he would have been lost had he not played the praevenire. That saying so often used in the 17th Century, "Melius est praevenire quam praeveniri," describes exactly the decision which Frederick had to make, and corresponds to the conditions with which we had to reckon in 1914. But the "Accuser" even goes so far as to include the German-Austrian Alliance among those facts which he em- braces under the catchword, "Preliminary History of the Crime," without permitting himself to be turned aside by the particular fact that this combination, and the later acces- sion of Italy, kept the peace of Europe for 44 years. In this "Preliminary History" he treats our "senseless" colonial policy, our efforts to secure a "place in the sun," which, as he interprets it, is made to mean that we are striving for the exclusive place in the sun and for world mastery; for he thus states it — the place in the sun for us, the place in the shadow for the others. Equally superficial and "inspired" are the sections that follow, pages 55 to 68. They are not worth referring to, especially as in the later sections the same questions are constantly being taken up. But a very decided protest must be lodged against the author's way of introducing his opinion with the word "we" and trying in this way to seem to be one with us. We have as little in common with the sentiments of this "German," as with what he represents as truth, but which in reality is a web of ignorance and of conscious falsification of fact. This shows itself in the most pronounced way in the sections on "The Policy of Isolation" and "The First Hague Con- ference." The "Accuser" seeks to explain away the "Policy of Isolation" as a merely geographical conception, and flatly declares that there is no proof of England's aggressive designs against us. As we shall, in the course of this expo- sition, bring out facts which leave no doubt as to England's aggressive designs, we shall now take up the section on "The First Hague Conference," which demands a more searching criticism. The First Hague Conference It is in connection with the first Hague Conference that the "Accuser" tries to show that English love of peace and German pettifoggery stood at that time in fixed opposition, and that our policies caused the collapse of a magnanimous attempt on the part of England at peace and reconciliation. The so-called Peace Manifesto of Nicolas H of August 12th 24th 1898^ which, as everyone knows, suggested a decreasing of armaments and the calling of a conference for the con- sideration of measures to secure universal peace, serves as his point of departure. The "Accuser" seems to know nothing of the political an- tecedents of this Russian proposal. He contents himself with referring to Bloch's well-known book^ and to Salis- bury's wail over the cost of armament in the year 1869. The naive notion that the Czar had read these things does not deserve refutation. On the other hand it is not unimportant to learn the true connection of events which led to the call- ing of the first so-called peace conference. On March 27, 1898, was signed the agreement which, to the bitter anger of Japan, established the cession to Russia of the Lino- Tung Peninsula and of Port Arthur. Shortly afterwards, on the 20th of May, Japan had to leave Wei-Hai-wei as well, which was then at once occupied by the English. The Eng- lish competition in East Asiatic waters had been watched with growing displeasure in Russia, and as early as the 8th of April, 1898, the "Nowoje Wremja," which then, as so often before and since represented the designs of the Rus- sian foreign office, threatened a Russian-Japanese alliance in the event of England's carrying out her dangerous de- signs in the Gulf of Petschili. If England were to establish itself permanently in Wei-hai-wei, Russia would demand an extension of its territory in Central Asia. Indeed, on the 7th of April the "N. W." went so far as to declare that the Anglo-Russian agreement of March 11, 1895, was no longer to be considered binding. But that meant that the Anglo-Russian conflict over Cen- tral Asia, which had been adjusted with such difficulty, might again break out, and was calculated to frighten Eng- land, whereas, as a matter of fact the anxiety was on the Russian side. It was in connection with these events that the disarmament proposal in question was made. It was made under the very correct impression that England which was always parading its humanitarian sentiments. iWrongly set by the accuser as the 28th of August, ilwan Stanislawowitsch: "The Future War," 6 vols., Peters- burg 1898 (Russian). would not be able to reject it. It was believed that this could be counted on the more, as England had at that very time (the 10th of July) insulted France in deadly fash- ion at Fashoda, and was simultaneously making prepara- tions for the war against the Transvaal. Directly after this Russian disarmament proposal, Russia and France made feverish efforts to increase their navy. The Czar, who as early as March, 1898, had appropriated the sum of 90 million roubles for the extension of his fleet, ordered the comple- tion of the work to be hastened as much as possible; and in France a subscription was taken up for the building of sub- marines, although point 4 of the program for the peace conference proposed by the Russian Minister of foreign affairs, Murawjew, expressly prohibited this method of war- fare. In the royal speech at the opening of the English parliament in February, 1899, the Russian proposal was re- ferred to with scepticism. "We must," said Lord Salisbury in the Upper House, "keep clearly in mind the dangers and imperfections of the relations in which we live, and be re- solved not to owe our peace to the consideration, or to the love of peace, of others. That would be criminal!" So when on May 18, 1899, the Hague Conference was opened, it was met with the utmost distrust in all the organs of the government party, the English Unionists. The "Stand- ard" of June 21, 1899, declared that the safeguarding of pri- vate property at sea, proposed at the conference, would result in the downfall of the English Sea Power. "When it comes to serious business conventions count for little ;" our "most vital interests, our trade, demands that we re- serve to ourselves the right of attack which we owe to our sovereignty of the sea." And that the plan for the safe- guarding of private property at sea collapsed because of England, is well known. England it was, too, that reserved for itself the use of dum-dum bullets. In January, 1900, the "Standard" was still exercised over the idea of neutral goods in neutral harbors being non-contraband. It called this an "extravagant proposal" and declared : "Our naval officers will continue to search suspicious ships in African waters, whatever nationality they may belong to. When necessary, damages will be paid." And as to the use of stink- ing gases, both England and the United States declared that they could not give them up 1 In the face of these facts stands the shameless assertion of the "Accuser" that — "In the whole course of the con- ference, ever the same picture : England at the head of all efforts to lessen the intolerable burden of armament and to place the points of difference between civilized peoples more and more completely on a basis of justice. On the side of England — France, Russia, America, and, naturally, the smaller states. And on the opposite side, always, Germany, followed by Austria-Hungary." 8 We wish to contrast with this glorification of England a French view which appeared on July 19, 1899, the day on which the first Hague Conference was closed, and which waxes ironical over the attitude of England at the confer- ence, in the following cutting manner: "There are persons who do not love England; certainly they are in the wrong. England is a great liberal country, whose diplomacy has the highest respect for international agreements and binding promises. England is before all else concerned with secur- ing, from one pole to the other, the recognition of the eter- nal principles of humanity. England has made humanitar- ian sentiments an article of export, like alcohol, or cotton, and if it occasionally appears that England does not herself act upon the precepts which she urges upon others, this is merely due to her Christian humility." "England hates the bloody laurels that are plucked on the battlefield; the English work harder than any other people to realize the dream of eternal peace; nor will England ever be found to let a war loose upon the world, unless, of course, it is to England's advantage." "England desires that, in any case, the future wars shall take place under the most humane conditions imaginable, and would gladly deny its neighbors the use of dangerous weapons which can bring mourning to so many families in which England is interested. When the day comes when the European States wish to give up their armies, and more especially, to turn their navies into scrap-iron, England will not oppose them. Indeed it would be incompatible with the English love of freedom to interfere in such cases: If you grant them the liberty of arming themselves to the teeth, they have nothing against our being prohibited all weapons, even to the sword-stick. They found it, too, in very bad taste at the Hague Conference when an attempt was made to deny them the use of the dum-dum bullets, in their inter- course with weaker peoples. Do you know what the dum- dum bullets are? (There follows a description, which I omit). The English who have already tried out the benefi- cence of this invention on their subjects, the Hindus, are unwilling, in their zeal for the spread of civilization, to withhold it from the Boers also. According to a London despatch, 30 miltrailleuses, arranged for dum-dum cartridges, are being shipped to Capetown. In this, too, the humane spirit of our friends across the channel makes itself rec- ognized. One may actually hope that, thanks to the use of these instruments, the war against the Boers will not be of long duration and that the most absolute quiet will soon reign in the Transvaal. Therefore, since war is a scourge of the human race, England will, by avoiding long, bloody struggles, have once more taken over^-thanks to its good' ness of heart and the gentleness of its customs — the leader- ship of the peoples." The deep bitterness toward England which at that time ran through the whole of France brought matters in No- vember of that year to the point that France and Russia sounded us as to an alliance against England; and, because of the great sympathy of our people for the struggling Boers, a definite turning against England would, at the time, have been taken up in Germany with jubilation. What held us back from this was consideration for Eng- land and the very slight confidence with which, even at that time, this combination of allies was looked upon in many circles — as well as the fact that there was no direct interest of Germany's in question. And Emperor William remained firm as a rock in his resolve not to unsheathe the sword for any but German interests. What, moreover, could one expect of a Russian ally who shouted to us through his press that the entrance of Ger- many into the Russo-French combination would create the impression "of putting assafoetida into a fragrant bou- quet"^ and from a French ally whose foreign minister, Del- casse, made on the 24th of November, only a few months after the close of the Hague Conference, a speech which endeavored, with very little attempt at concealment, to strengthen in the French the hope of "Revenge" through Russia's help. But in February, 1900, Eduard Herve delivered, at the reception of Deschanel into the Academy, an address in which he ardently championed the idea of a Russian-French- English alliance, of which the result was to be "le partage de I'Allemagne."^ These were the shadows which the An- glo-French entente (being prepared by Delcasse, and des- tined to be the source of all the evil which has since over- taken Europe), cast before them. Of these things the "Accuser" with his smatterings of history, naturally knows nothing. We, however, consider it particularly worth while to linger over these first important stages of the world conflict which was preparing. The struggle of the English parties brings it to pass that occasionally the truth as to the motives and aims of English politics is clearly and strongly expressed. It is the Irish for the most part, who have taken it upon themselves to sharpen the conscience of the English; it is always with- out political results, but its value as witness to suppressed truth remains. At the very time when Deschanel, and i"Now. Wr." No. 8399. 2Peb. 1, 1900. The speech of Deschanel which followed was even more poisonously anti-German; it also set up the ideal of an Anglo-Franco-Busslan Alliance pointed against Germany. 10 Herve were working up their enthusiasm over the idea of an alliance with England (in spite of Fashoda and in spite of Maskat), the Irish Nationalist, Timothy Michael Healy, delivered a speech in the House of Commons in which he was moved by the impression made by England's disgrace- ful defeats in the Transvaal, to remark that the English seemed to believe that the Almighty had given them a cer- tificate of title to the universe, and they therefore regarded every reverse they met with as a breach of contract. "But I do not believe" — he went on — ^"that the Good God will al" ways be English." In view of the treaties which England has broken, no nation can bank on England's sense of honor, so long as stock exchange diplomacy continues. They want to turn the whole world into a stock company, take the twelve apostles into their company, with limited liability, and to lift up their hands like the Pharisees and demand of the other nations that they rejoice over it."^ These were the moods which accompanied that Boer War which was fought under false colors — ostensibly for the free- ing of the Uitlanders, supposed to have been injured by the Boers, but really for the winning of the goldfields of the Rand and the diamond fields of the Orange Republic, whose riches so intoxicated the imaginations of the English kings of finance that they regarded every opposition to the attain- ment of this goal 33 a crime against humanity. For Eng- land is humanity.^ This psychological atmosphere it is which provides the explanation for the fact that when, in November, 1900, the Boers were showing a power of resist- ance which the English had considered impossible, the "Standard" could write : "The burning of the farms and the wasting of the lands of the refractory Boers seems not to have had the necessary effect. But there are other meas- ures by which agitators and midnight murderers can be brought to submission, and these measures must be resorted to without delay. The lives of British soldiers are some- what more valuable than those of Dutch rebels!!"^ The World Alliance Against Germany. The period between the first and the second Hague Con- ference, that is, between May, 1899, and July, 1907, is dis- iThis, in answer to the "Accuser" who has the audacity to maintain that we have taken over the ancient Jewish idea of being the chosen people of God. This notion, in all its grotes- que onesidedness, has, on the contrary, remained since the days of Cromwell, specificially English. Compare on this point the highly characteristic remarks of Sir Roger Casement, "England's Achilles Heel." (Berlin, 1915. pp. 32 33.) ^In passing be it remarked that from 1895 until after the Boxer uprising the English firm of "Kaynochs Munitions Co," supplied China with guns and ammunition; and the head of this firm was Arthur Chamberlain, brother of Joseph Chamber- lain. ^Thls saying should be incorporated in the coat of arms which England will undoubtedly grant to the new English Field Marshal, Botha. a posed of by the "Accuser" in less than four pages. He thereby suppresses three facts which, together with the Morocco question, have determined the destinies of the world; and as to the conflict over Morocco — it was a crisis which had a permanent effect on world politics and particu- larly on Anglo-German relations. The reference is, of course, to the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance of January 30, 1902, whereby England again took up the plan of attacking Russia, which had been frustrated by the Czar's disarmament proposal of 1898; the co-opera- tion of the English and German fleets against Venezuela from December, 1902, to May, 1903; and, third, the con- clusion of the Anglo-French Entente on the 8th of April, 1904, which Delcasse and Lord Lansdowne signed. In view of the present world situation a detailed exposi- tion is not required of how the Anglo-Japanese alliance not only justified itself as a means of annihilating (or shall we say "disarming after the English fashion") the Russian sea power, but also proved serviceable as a ready instrument for the disposing of England's troublesome German com- petitor. It has remained less in the memory of the present gen- eration that it is from the co-operation of England and Germany against the violent tyranny of Castro in Venezuela (which defied all justice and all the obligations he had en- tered into), that that practice of casting suspicion on Ger- many, which has never since let up, is to be dated. Then it was that the watchword of a world alliance against Germany was first given out by the politicians of the "National Re- view"; and it is characteristic that, in spite of the points of political antagonism between England and Russia, which were becoming ever sharper, English and Russian journal- ists^ were agreed that the co-operation of these two rivals was the necessary perquisite to the attainment of this ideal. As the third member of their alliance, both these coun- tries considered the nation which for centuries had been Germany's antagonist — France. In the French cabinet, ever since the late autumn of 1898, there was felt the decisive influence of a man whose thoughts were directed toward creating a political situation which should offer France the opportunity for that "Revenge" for which it yearned so eagerly. M. Delcasse, whom we herewith introduce as the first organizer of the world war, M. Delcasse, who man- aged to hold his own in five successive ministries of diverg- ent political tendencies as director of the foreign policy of France — M. Delcasse could not, directly after the impres- ^They were, to name only the most poisonous members of this group of conspirators, Messrs. Maxse, Blennerhasset, Wes- selitzki and Tatischtschew. That the French, however, have a prior claim on the idea has already been mentioned. sion made by the Fashoda Affair, think of stretching a friendly hand toward England. So he took up the idea, very popular in France at that time, of a union of the Latin races under French leadership. Camille Barrere, ambassa- dor at Rome since 1899, identified his ambition with that of Delcasse, and their combined efforts succeeded, despite Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance, in inducing the Zanardelli Ministry, in which Prinetti was foreign minister, to sign an agreement, of which Italy's betrayal of its allies was one of the consequences. It will be useful to follow through to its final consequences this French-Italian intrigue in which Russia, too, and Eng- land were later drawn in as assistant seducers. A speech of Barrere's on January 1, 1902, first called the attention of the world to the fact that a change in the grouping of the powers was preparing. What became known was this, that agreements were exchanged between France and Italy which, to permit of Italy's later establishing itself in Tripoli, forbade France to advance east of Tunis; and that England had granted the Italians considerable conces- sions in the matter of Tripoli's eastern border. Thus Crispi's plan of receiving a compensation for Italy's renunciation to Tunis seemed to be brought close to realization. In reality, the Italian-French agreement of 1902 had a much wider scope. It appears that the price Italy paid for the concessions made to her, was the obligation to hold herself neutral in a war between Germany and France. The subordination to France in which Italy thereby placed her- self showed itself first at the Algeciras Conference, and then through the fact that, when the Russian-French affiliation broadened out into a Triple Entente, England and Russia also entered into such intimate relations with Italy that the Triple Alliance became, in fact, an illusion. In October, 1909, were concluded those arrangements between Italy and Russia at Racconigi, whereby the former was made secretly to serve the Russian policies in the Near Orient ; and that the position of Italy as a member of the Triple Alliance, to which the epithet "equivocal" could hardly be applied any longer, was completely undermined. Then in the year 1911, when Italy's war against Turkey broke out, the contents of Italy's agreement with France — which had still been kept strictly secret — revealed them- selves through the fact that the troops sent to Tripoli were not taken from the neutral Swiss, nor from the Austrian, but from the French frontier, which was completely de- nuded of Italian troops. From this it was correctly con- cluded by those within the Triple Entente that henceforth the point of issue would be the winning over of Italy to an active co-operation with the enemies of Germany and Austria. The point of attack became Albania, where Italy 13 was pledged, in case of war, to act hand in hand with Austria, and, if it came to the point of defending the prin- ciple of Albania's integrity, to give Austria armed help. In the negotiations over this matter, in which it appears that Iswolski took part, directly or indirectly, it was represented to the Italians that in 1902, and again at Racconigi, they had assumed obligations which were inconsistent with an advocacy and support of Austria's interests. And it was very forcibly brought home to the Italians that France and Russia would stand firmly together in case of a far-reaching Austro-Serbian conflict. Iswolski became convinced that Italy believed it could get better support for its designs from the powers of the Entente than from its allies. In Petersburg and Paris, therefore, it was no longer considered immediately neces- sary to work for a secession of Italy from the Triple Al- liance; the existing relationship, in which Italy practically paralyzed the policies of the others, seemed in every way more advantageous. And such was, in truth, the state of things which existed up to the time of Italy's break with her two allies. The Italian diplomats could hardly do enough to show their confidence in their friends of the Entente, and at the same time suffered the Italian General Staff to discuss with our own, military measures in the event of a war. Even at that time it was a non plus ultra of per- fidy. Ssassonow's stay in Paris in August, 1912, only a few months after the "unchanged" renewal of the Triple Alliance had been arranged between Secretary of State von Kider- len-Wachter and San Giuliano, and a quarter of a year be- fore the renewal became a fact, resulted, because of the good relations in which France and Russia stood to Italy, in a cessation of efforts to make Italy join the Entente. It was no secret that the existing "relation of confidence" was considered more useful. That the French were never- theless distrustful of Italy can be readily understood, since they knew that they were dealing with a friend who was very free of bias, and who might easily make a new change of front. In the summer of 1913 the French had, as the passionate polemics in the "Temps," "Debats" and "Matin" showed, a suspicion that Italy might, in the end, and in spite of everything, cause a shift of the balance of power in the Mediterranean for the benefit of the Triple Alliance. Noth- ing but repeated, clear-cut declaration that the Triple Al- liance treaty had in no way been altered, had a pacifying effect. This was held in Paris to indicate that Italy con- sidered itself now as before, bound by its arrangement with France. In July, 1914, the hostility with which the Russian press attacked Prince William of Albania seems to have resulted in increased friendliness between Russia and Italy; at any 14 r 4. 4.Uof <-v.<» Italians were at that time not dis- for Italy as well. Further ir,dications of the faithless and treacherous pohcy 11", T'J'tl .1.; 'p,"Ul."y Hi,.o„ .f ,<•■, Crl„e- o Austria-Hungary. Wliere is The "Accuser," to be sure, raises the question. Where is thi proof that France wished us harm? He denies that in T?,?.sia there exists a "hatred of Germany nourished on Pan- "lust''; to h m the Triple Entente is a harmless defen- JvIllHance- and the annexation of Bosnia and the Her- rgo;inrdoi;e'w1th the approval and the Previous permis- • ^( T?,iccia a challenge to Russia and bervia, aespnc Bosnia and the Herzegovina as everyone knows^Jormed ^ PT °t ^Rt^sia^^ind Turket- n c:n.eTo"r;aH"e t\at HQ 1R78 , .» Indeed because of the superficiality of the "Accusers hi toAfa'l k^rwledge, and this un-'entifi=^ jnetho of mves- fixation which consists of bringing together scatterea irag rr-^f^arious UansacHon^ and arra^^^^^^^^ ^rthTcrime'- is to be condemned as completely worthless. 15 and whose substance he imparts to the world in the form of judicial pronouncements. These verdicts of the "Accuser" — who at the same time sets up as judge, are as follows: "Austria is guilty, alone, or in common with others, of having brought on the European war." "Germany is guilty, in common with Austria, of having brought on the European war." "Against England I can find no grounds for an accusa- tion. Sir Edward Grey has earned, as no one else has, the title 'Peacemaker of Europe.' His efforts were in vain, but his merit in having worked for the maintenance of peace with untiring zeal, with cleverness and energy, will remain ineffaceable in history." "Russia is completely innocent of the European war, and the guilt falls on Germany and Austria alone." "France." This section is a hymn in praise of the French diplomacy, and starts out with the sentence, "L'Empire d'Al- lemagne supportera devant I'histoire I'ecrasante responsa- bilite."^ Thus in contrast with the verdicts of "guilty" against Germany and Austria-Hungary stand the verdicts acquitting England, Russia and France. Whoever, by overwhelming proof, converts the latter into their opposite, thereby also annuls the former verdicts of this "German" against his fatherland and against Austria-Hungary. It will therefore suffice to look into these "acquittals," which contrast with the unanimous "conviction" of all Germany — with the sole exception of this quasi-German. We begin with France, reminding the reader of all those accusing circumstances, which we have already presented, in referring to the attitude of Italy. Two Heretics of France. Let two unofficial French voices now familiarize us with the sentiments which were prevalent in those circles of educated France not under English domination at the time of the serious political crises of the years 1905 and 1911. They coincide almost entirely with those views — prevalent (as I have learned through the correspondence with French patriots that I have kept up for many years), during the years 1913 and in 1914 before the outbreak of the war — which recognized in the deliberate efforts on the part of the leading French politicians to make the German-French relations critical and, in France's growing dependence on those elements in Petersburg and London which made for war, a misfortune and a danger of everincreasing imminence. Toward the end of the year 1906 appeared the book by ^Indeed, it is characteristic that at every opportunity the "Accuser" parades his smatterings of French. 16 Emile Flourens. "La France conquise. Edward VII et Clemenceau." Flourens was foreign minister in the Goblet Ministry from December, 1886, to April 4, 1888, and was also a member of the later ministries of Rouvier and Tirard. As deputy he always sat in the ranks of the moderate republicans. His book is a burning protest against the depen- dence on the English diplomacy in which Edward VII had placed the French by converting first Delcasse and then Cle- menceau into tools for the attainment of his ends. Flourens reproaches the King with having, insofar as in his power lay, disturbed the good relations existing between Germany and Russia, in which he recognized a hostage to peace, and with using the remaining continental powers as pawns in order to checkmate Germany. The efforts of Emperor William to achieve closer relations with England he consciously frus- trated, and finally succeeded in making Morocco the brand that lit the fires of dissension between France and Germany. And after the fall of Delcasse, says this writer, he made every effort, through Clemenceau, to turn France into a "sol- dier of England." No one could emphasize the aggressive tendency of the Franco-English combination directed against Germany, more strongly than Flourens does. And the Rus- sian press, too, began, as far back as that, to put itself at the service of this policy. On the 17th of March, 1906, there appeared in the Petersburg "Russ" a Paris letter in which it was literally stated: "I learn from a reliable source that during his stay in Paris King Edward expressed the desire that a military convention be concluded between England and France. It is said that his wish was sympathetically received. The election of Clemenceau (Minister of the In- terior in the Sarien Cabinet, President of the Ministry, No- vember, 1906, to July, 1909) is agreeable to the Liberal Eng- lish cabinet; it will result in bringing England and France still closer together. For his English sympathies are well known. The 'entente cordiale' beams ever brighter. And that, too, is what Sir Edward Grey has declared to his col- leagues." Nor were these Petersburg circles blind to the fact that closer relations between Russia and England through their French ally, were also set in motion by these events. Nearly five years passed since Flourens had sounded his alarm in "La France conquise." It died away without the slightest effect. The advances England was making to France had in the meanwhile, taken on a more and more definite character. The sole protesting voice, raised by the "Eclair" every week in the Waverly Articles under the title "I'Angle- terre inconnue," may have sharpened the political conscience of many a Frenchman, but since these articles were not only strictly Catholic in tendency, but also monarchistic in tone, an influence on the ruling group was out of the question. 17 Those who belonged to this group in France were, without exception, anti-clerical, and belonged to the Freemasons. "Grand Orient" at that time (1909) numbered 25,000 members, the "Grande Loge de France" 5,000, and the fact that King Edward was the head of the English Freemasons, who stood in the closest relations with their French and Italian broth- ers, helped very materially to increase the English influence in France. The Platonic connection of the German Free- masonry with these organizations, whose "humanity" was directed against backward Germany, resulted in a duping of the Germans similar to that which resulted from the fra- ternizing of the German Social Democrats with their "com- rades" in England and France. Now, it is very characteristic that England, which at the very time of the peace negotiations at Portsmouth renewed its alliance with Japan, was at the same time endeavoring to approach Russia again; and, above all things, to prevent the formation of more intimate relations between us and Rus- sia, which had been feared since the meeting between Em- peror William and the Czar at Bjorko. After the great ser- vices which Germany had rendered its Russian neighbor dur- ing the Japanese war and during the Revolution, this com- bination most dreaded by England, appeared not improbable to those who had no conception of the fact that anti-Ger- man tendencies penetrated even to the immediate entour- age of the Czar; and that the Russian intellectuals, always moving from one extreme to the other, were in procss of converting their ideals of freedom into an unbridled nation- alism. Nor must it be overlooked that the Algeciras conference which passed off without destroying the world peace, led to that revolution in naval policy which, through the build- ing of the first dreadnaught announced a new era in naval warfare. The first success of English diplomacy in the direction of Russia was the agreement of the two powers on the division of Persia into spheres of influence at the end of August, 1907; this was designed above all else — so much is now certain, and the result has demonstrated it — to make of Persia the booty by means of which Russia should be led to an understanding with England over the great questions of European politics. The chain of intrigues which thence- forth were woven in Teheran, were always directed from the English side with a view to this end. The consequence was a forbearance (in questions that Great Britain had till then regarded as a noli me tangere), which did not lack a certain comic aspect, and which was masterfully taken ad- vantage of by Hartwig the Russian envoy to Persia at that time. There followed the great crisis of the year 1908. It was 18 this very year which seemed to all the friends of peace to promise the best prospects for the future. In Berlm a com- mittee was formed for the creation of more friendly relations between the French and Germans; the boundary difficulties between German and French Camerun were adjusted by a treaty the North Sea and Baltic Treaty guaranteed to the powers that had possessions on the coasts their status; and it could be taken as a sign of growing confidence m the tinal disappearance of the campaign against Germany which had principally been carried on by the English press that in May and June South German burgomasters first, then IJU German pastors paid a visit to England, and found there a hospitable, and, in part, an enthusiastically friendly re- ception. . Parallel with these things, to be sure, were symptoms which could not help but be disquieting. Agents led by an English Balkan Committee, at whose head stood the member of Parliament, Noel Buxton, arranged for a Bulgarian-Turk- ish war, and in May it became known that King Edward VII was about to pay the Czar a visit. The previous conference of the King with Clemenceau and Pichon at Biarritz had been disquieting enough. Against his journey to ?"^sia a protest was made in the House of Commons by 57 Radicals, because they viewed with distrust, and not without reason, the meddling of the King in world politics. The protest was defeated by a great majority; but what sort of hopes the enemies of Germany were pinning to this journey was shown by an article in the "Golos Moskwy" (of May 31, 1908) which, as the organ of Gutschkow at that time reflected the opinions of very powerful circles. The visit of Edward VII was des- tined, it was said, to lead up to a Russian-Enghsh alliance. 'Tf it is assumed that this alliance will become a reality,^ and will direct its point against Germany, the latter's position would certainly be most difficult. Pressed back, from the west and the east, by the armies of Russia and France, cut off from the sea by the English fleet, it would fall into diffi- culties from which a way out could hardly be found. The pictures of Europe's political life change from day to day, and perhaps we shall witness the realization of that grandiose plan of Edward VII whose final aim is the peaceful isolation of Germany." . The use of the word "peaceful" was conscious hypocrisy, for even then the Russians wanted war, but out of consid- eration for the Czar, who could not be initiated into the ultimate aims of the great conspiracy which was preparing* an attempt was made to keep alive in the public mind the notion that, in the face of the powerful combination of England, Russia and France we would, without a struggle, submit to the dictates of the Three, and that each of them would, without much expense, arrive at the goal of their 19 desires: — the possession of Constantinople and the Darda- nelles by Russia, the reincorporation of Alsace Lorraine by- France and the capture of the German fleet by England. The leading politicians of the three powers were not so optimistic in their reckonings; they knew that it would not pass off without a struggle. When, on June 9th, King Edward met the Czar off Reval, he took with him Sir Charles Har- dinge, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, and Nicol- son; Iswolski, Stolypin and two secretaries of state accom- panied the Czar. What it was that Czar and King discussed has not become known, and was probably of no great conse- quence, but Hardinge and Iswolski assuredly came to an understanding as to their plans for the future. By word of mouth, only — in strict pursuance of the consistent general instruction of Grey; but the result of the negotiations was communicated to the diplomatic representatives of Eng- land and Russia, and later came, circuitously, to our knowl- edge. Iswolski declared himself ready to proceed with England against Germany, as soon as Russia should have sufficiently strengthened itself in a military way. Six to eight years was the longest period contemplated for this purpose, that is to say, till between the years 1914 and 1916. As long as Clemenceau remained in office, it could be reckoned on that France would, under all circumstances join in. A rather long period of military preparations for the three powers was, of course, contemplated. Furthermore an agitation was begun in England im- mediately after the days at Reval for the concentration of the channel fleet in the North Sea. There appeared that book of Percival A. Hislam which caused such a stir, "The Admiralty of the Atlantic"; in Russia the Imperial Council approved the four armored cruisers voted down by the Duma; England and Russia entered with fresh energy on a movement for reforms in Macedonia; and the English fleet manoeuvres between the Channel Fleet and the Home Fleet in the North Sea, close to our borders, already bore the character of a demonstration, not to say of a threat. This impression was increased by the visit which the Presi- dent of the French Republic paid to the Czar in Reval at the end of July. Fallieres took with him Clemenceau and his foreign minister, Pichon. There followed shortly after- wards in Ischl a meeting of King Edward with Emperor Francis Joseph, whom, as later became known, the King endeavored to introduce into his political constellation, an endeavor that was notoriously unsuccessful. To this chain of machinations there belongs the final fact, that King Ed- ward conferred on August 25th at Marienbad with Clem- enceau and Iswolski. Meanwhile the fruits of the English agitation in Bulgaria had ripened to such an extent that a Bulgarian-Turkish war 20 seemed unavoidable, and there seemed every likelihood that a partition of Turkey would be the result, and that the great powers immediately interested, Austria, Russia and England would profit thereby. Russia had since May, 1908, been engaging in negotiations with Austria, which, pro- ceeding from the question of the building of a railroad in the Balkans and on the Adriatic Sea, led up finally to Russia's being ready to adopt a favorable attitude toward the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; in return for which Austria promised to take her troops out of the Sandschak Nowibazar directly after the annexation had been proclaimed. Austria furthermore declared itself ready to enter into a confidential exchange of opinions with Rus- sia concerning Constantinople and the Dardanelles. That was the agreement arrived at on the 27th of August be- tween Aehrenthal and Iswolski at Buchlau and Som- merang. It is not definitely known how Turkey got word of this agreement. It is certain that she regarded the meetings at Reval with the greatest distrust, and highly probable that the Young Turks in Paris also got wind of further plans. The Revolution of July 24, 1908, and the proclamation of the Turkish constitution was the countermove, and had, as a direct consequence, that England went over, with flying colors, into the camp of "parliamentary" Turkey. Thus began a new stage of the oriental question, which was in- troduced by the proclamation of the independence of Bul- garia, by the acceptance of the title of Czar by Ferdinand, and by the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and which led to a serious European crisis which reached its highest point in March, 1909. Since, in the meanwhile, it had become clear that England had no inclination to allow the question of Constantinople and the Dardanelles to be taken up, Iswolski was seized by the notion that he had been duped in Buchlau by Aehrenthal. His hate was directed against his Austrian fellow-diplomat; Russia identified itself with the Servian claims, and that led to a diplomatic campaign which came near ending in a European war, and was accompanied by a press campaign of almost unexampled bitterness. It was, moreover, directed not only against Austria-Hungary, but also against Germany. Russia, England, France, and even Italy (in spite of the fact that Tittoni had been kept in- formed by Iswolski of the negotiations at Buchlau) raised protests against the annexation of Bosnia and the Herze- govina. A royal council in Vienna decided on the 17th of March to call in the reserves, a Russian-Austrian war seemed inevitable; when finally, on the 25th of March, 1909, Russia condescended to recognize, without reserve, the annexed territory as part of the Habsburg monarchy. 21 England's Panic of 1909. On the German side this campaign was led by Kider- len-Wachter. He prevented the annexation question from being dragged on to the forum of an international confer- ence; our emperor left no room for doubt that Germany considered itself bound by its treaty obligations in case of a Russian attack on Austria-Hungary, and finally brought it about that all the powers recognized the annexation and renounced the idea of a conference. Sir Edward Grey, to be sure, muttered resentfully. It has become known that he reproached the Petersburg cabinet very emphatically because of its attitude which had, in effect, been peaceful. It was not he, however, but Kiderlen, who carried the day. That was to be rated the more highly, as he simultane- ously brought to a happy conclusion (by the agreement of February 9th) the Moroccan question which had again been brought to a head through the Casablanca conflict. Despite all this, and although the attitude of Germany had been in all points loyal and correct, the hate of England and Russia was especially directed against us. In Eng- land it took the form of a panic lasting from February to June, 1909, was caused by the invention of the airship by Count Zeppelin, brought with it a veritable orgy of pas> sionate attacks through the press, and aimed at the annihi- lation of the German fleet. "Two weeks, perhaps two days" — wrote the "Standard" at that time — "would suffice to destroy the Kaiser's sea power, and once that is removed from the world, the peace of Europe is assured." The "Morning Post" said: "We are still in a position to destroy the German war fleet and to ruin completely the enormous and increasing German com- merce. But if we let things go on until 1912, the advantage will be on the German side!" At that time "Nineteenth Century," "Fortnightly Review," "National Review" wrote, and English statesmen such as Admiral Fitzgerald and Lord Charles Beresford spoke in the same spirit, some- times in tones even more poisonous. It was really as though the whole nation had for the time lost its senses and all feeling for its own dignity. But eventually the excited temperament of these "In- sulars" wore itself out, and there occurred, as in England so often happens, a sudden change of sentiment. As early as the end of 1908 a member of Parliament, Mr. H. Side- botham, had pointed out, in the Reform Club at Manches- ter, that the constant interference of the King in foreign politics was no longer to be endured. In June, 1909, a visit of English clergymen to Berlin showed that it was already possible to escape from the general suggestion. A few days later a meeting of the Czar with Emperor William 22 took place, and the table talk which was exchanged on hat o'c casion permitted the conclusion t^at Russia woud not allow herself to be used as an ally of the French "Revenge" or of the English politic of pamc ^ Finally came the fall of the Clemenceau Ministry and the new Briand Ministry appeared to look with little favor on the plans which the English had by no means aban. doned; so that a fresh meeting of Edward VII with Clem- enceau at Marienbad made an almost funeral impression The campaign at Racconigi in October was Iswolskis las important act as foreign minister. At the end of the year he was appointed member of the Imperial Council, The Russian press had attacked him violently, and the Czar looked about for his successor. Negotiations w^th bsas- sonow, the Russian ambassador at Rome, for the taking over of the ministry, had already begun several months before; yet they did not, until October, 1910 reach their conclusion, which resulted in Iswolski's transfer to Paris^ where he was thenceforth the centre of all the efforts to influence public opinion against Germany and Austria- Hungary, and, in particular, exercised a most Pemicious influence by bribing the Paris press, ^^'[^^^y anti-German enough. There can be no doubt that his bitter hatred of Aehrenthal was one of the springs of his activity. The year 1910 then passed through contradictory poli- tical currents. The English electoral campaign, whose re- sult seemed to assure the Liberal cabinet its position for a long time to come, was conducted by means of a barefaced misuse of the watchword: an "Imminent German Peril. In London and Petersburg an agitation was started tor the' withdrawal of English and Russian deposits in Germany, the Delcassean tendencies again won ground, and the storm which had been brewing since February on the Bal- kan Peninsula increased the political nervousness, ihere were however, side by side with the voices which urged a strengthening of the English armed forces, through the introducution of universal compulsory service, others which made themselves heard, these, in view of the ever more threatening recurring danger of a universal war, preached reconciliation. In the "Empire Review" Edward Dicey wrote: "If England and Germany are friends, the peace of Europe is assured, but if the two nations fall out, it will be a most unhappy day for mankind." In the "Semschts- china" a respectable journalist. Glinka, championed the view 'that it would be madness for Russia to decide for England if it were a question of chosing between England and Germany. And as to France, my political friends there wrote me that the public opinion of the country wished to preserve peace, and was resolved not to go with England. 23 Such was the situation when on May 6, 1910, King Ed- ward died and with George V a personality took hold of the rudder who had till then stood aloof from politics and as to whose pacific sentiments there was the less doubt in Germany as the King stood in the best of personal rela- tions to his Imperial cousin. The journey of Emperior William to London for the funeral of Edward VII seemed to have strengthened these friendly relations still more. But it was worth bearing in mind that the "Temps," in the obituary dedicated to Edward VII, expressly admitted that the King carried through the Anglo-French Entente over the heads of both governments, and that at that time the same paper was protesting violently against the dislodging of the Russian troops along the German and Austrian frontiers. Unfortunately it was these hostile voices, and not the peaceful elements, which possessed the decisive influence. King George was as little of an independent political reality as Nicholas II. Just as the latter was not able to bring more than temporary opposition to bear against chauvinistic influences, and was under the thumb of the war party led by the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikol- ajewitch\ so George V was unable to escape the influence of the three men who carried on the traditions of Edward VII: Asquith, Grey, 'Churchill. The visit of Nicolas II, with his new foreign minister Ssassonow, at Potsdam, and the Potsdam treaty of November 4, 1911, resulted, as a matter of fact, only in the semblance of an improvement in the German-Russian relations. Ssassonow, after his re- turn to Petersburg, deliberately put the contents of the treaty before the Russian public in a false light, when he declared to the "Nowoje Wremja" that Germany had re- nounced all interest in Balkan politics. That was the more conscientiousless, as at that very time a new crisis was in preparation both in Morocco and in the Balkans. Francis Delaisi's "La Guerre Qui Vient." About this time there appeared in Paris a companion piece to "La France conquise" by Flourens, the brochure by Francis Delaisi, "La guerre qui vient." It reached the bookshops in May, 1911, but was at once bought up and destroyed by the French government. There was too much dangerous truth presented by Delaisi to the limited under- standing of the common herd of the French, and so this insignificant bit of writing passed practically unnoticed. But a copy of it was retained in Switzerland, and in 1914, iPrincess Militza of Montenegro, wife of the Grand Duke Peter Nikolajewitch, worked in the same direction. To the war party there also belonged the notorious leader-writer of the "Nowoje Wremja,'" Pilenko, the Czarina Mother, and Iswolski, who, by his settling in Paris, had gained even greater influence. 24 after the outbreak of the war, there appeared a new edi- tion, to which we owe our knowledge of one of the most remarkable bits of political soothsaying. Delaisi is a socialist, and became known through two earlier books, "La force allemande," "La Democratie et les Financiers," of which only the titles are known to me. "La guerre qui vient," however, indicates that he is a man who really has something to say. The picture he draws of the world war which he expected and would, if in any way possible, have liked to prevent, bears an astonishing like- ness to the reality that we are today experiencing. Delaisi perceived quite correctly in May, 1911, that England was about to repeat the "coup" of 1905— that is to say, the shoving of France into the Moroccan adventure. He de- clared that Delcasse became member of this Monis Min- istry, as minister of Marine, in order to conclude a military convention which was calculated to bind France to Eng- land permanently. For the Island Kingdom, conquered on the industrial field, had resolved to take up arms. The policy of isolation, said Delaisi, which began in 1903 with the journeys of Edward VII, was now completed: France was won through Morocco, Russia through the sacrifice of Persia, Italy was being led to defection from its allies by the offer of Tripoli and Albania, and through the encour- agement of the Young Turks, the friend of Germany, Ab- dul Hammid, had successfully been put out of the way. England had been building up her fleet of dreadnaughts since 1905. He pointed out that the former naval base at Plymouth, directed against France, had now given place to Dover and Rosyth, from whose fortified harbors the German war fleet was to be destroyed and German com- merce once for all put an end to. The British colonies had already been drawn into participation in this patriotic work. There could be no doubt of it — England meant to return to her old corsair tactics and to the system of blockading the continent. The naval manoeuvres of 1909 and 1910 were, he said, a sort of dress-rehearsal, and the consterna- tion was immense when the fleet that represented the en- emy succeeded in escaping through the Channel undam- aged. But even assuming that England could succeed in carrying out her plan of blocking the mouth of the Weser and of the Elbe, and to capture off the north coast of Scotland or the Channel every merchant ship returnmg to Germany, the final goal, he declared, would not have been reached. Germany could conduct her ships lying in for- eign harbors to Rotterdam and Antwerp under neutral flag, and so keep its commerce alive. For that reason England meant to blockade the Schelde as well, and, since the cannon of Flushing command the entrance, she must 25 prevent the fortifications of city and harbor that were planned, by bringing powerful pressure to bear on Holland. From all this it follows that Antwerp would have to be- come the objective in the struggle. England could only triumph if it closed up Antwerp; Germany could only maintain itself if it held this harbor open. Delaisi then assumes that, Germany, foreseeing the immi- nent peril, will concentrate its fleet off Flushing, and simul- taneously direct an army corps against Antwerp, where- upon there would be nothing left for the English, but to land troops in Belgium and throw the Prussians back across the Meuse and the Rhine. He pointed out that Kitchener had already said: "The frontier of the British Empire in Europe is not the Pas de Calais, but the line of the Meuse." But to land troops one must be master of an army that can measure itself against the German, and that explains how the cry for universal compulsory military service could be raised in England. But as it met with no response, the eyes of the English turned toward France. "We have," they said, "not enough soldiers, but France has soldiers. Over there, across the Pas de Calais, there is a large, well-schooled and disci- plined army; it is well armed and able to defy the Ger- mans. The French are brave and warlike; they love war, and understand how to wage it. When the grand phrases 'honneur national,' 'interets superieurs de la Patrie et de la civilisation,' are whispered to them, then they will march forward. We must therefore try to get the French army for ourselves." "That cannot be very difficult. The French democracy is merely an outward appearance. This people is in reality ruled by an oligarchy of financiers and owners of iron foun- dries, upon whom press and politicians are dependent. We will deal with these persons, promise them a large war loan, through which their banks will receive large com- missions, we will pledge ourselves to give them the chance to construct a few railways in Turkey, or to provide them with big enterprises in Syria, Ethiopia or in Morocco. "For a few millions they will sell us the whole French army." Thus did these good people think the matter out; and their wire-pullers got to work. As early as 1903, when the war for the Transvaal had scarcely been liquidated, Edward VII arrived in Paris, and all the dear boobies who had yelled so loud, "Long live Kruger," now learned, through the press that they 'must shout "Vive I'Angleterre." To reward us, the London cabinet magnanimously gave us, in return for Egypt, whose financial supervision be- 26 longed to us, Morocco, which did not belong to England. And at all the banquets one toasted the Entente cordiale. But that did not suffice. As Delcasse, who in 1905 wanted to force us into a war with Germany, was overthrown, England understood that it was necessary to be wary. She waited until the friend and messmate of Edward VII again came to power. He became— accidentally as it were— Minister of Marine, and —also as if by accident— it was announced, directly before his appointment, that negotiations were being taken up between London and Paris concerning a military agreement. ''Naturally this agreement is to be 'defensive.' But how easy will it be for the British government to force Ger- many to a declaration of war by the blockading of Ant- "^^'And then we, the French, will march into the lowlands of Belgium and get broken heads, not for the King ot Prussia, but this time for the King of England. The question of how the French people, which wished for nothing more ardently than the maintenance of peace, are to be dragged into the war arranged by England is, Tys DelLt eSy to answer. For the plan is already fin- ished, and may any day be put into practice. The military convention at present being negotiated provides that m case of war the British fleet shall protect the French coasts while the French army shall proceed against Antwerp^ In Trder to move the French peasants to go freely into the field it will be impressed upon them that the Prussians wak; up^very morning with the thought of marching into France The venal press will exaggerate every disturb- ance vide Nancy!) until the idea of -German peril sM^ have taken fast root. Then when some fine day the English fleets set themselves in motion, and German troops ad- vance simultaneously toward ^^^werp, it will be said th^^^ the neutrality of Belgium has been violated, and the Prus- sian army is advancing against Lille. Here we discontinue our report on the leading ideas of Delaisi. He considered it possible for France to remain neutral in a German-English war, if it would ^^^^^^^o ^end the English its troops and to lend us the rnoney which we would need for our preparations for war. The foni^er would have been quite sufficient to preserve peace, for without French help England would not have dared to make war, Ld as to Germany's need of French money that was il- lusion. It was a widely-spread superstition, which has only just disappeared. But Delaisi certainly saw truly, when he recognized the danger that threatened Europe m the de- termination of England to keep world politics under all 27 circumstances on paths which must inevitably lead to a break with Germany. That Delaisi did not include the Russian factor in his reckonings was due to the situation at that time. In the year 1911 it was believed in London that Morocco would have to be chosen as the point of attack, and that as soon as France had bound itself the participa- tion of Russia would follow of itself, by virtue of the Al- liance Franco-Russe. General Monier's March on Fez in 1911. There can be no doubt that Sir Edward Grey had already been instructed by France concerning the intended March on Fez, when General Monier informed him on the 25th of April, 1911, that he would undertake it; and it is equally certain that the incompatibility of the French enterprise with the stipulations of the documents of Algeciras was well known to him. The "North German Public Gazette" had, moreover, on the 30th of April pointed out that a breach of these stipulations would lead to incalculable com sequences. But these very consequences were desired by England and France. The press of both countries again went to work to excite public sentiment against Germany. In France the acceptance of a constitution for Alsace-Lor^ raine was turned into grist for this mill. In England, dur^ ing the visit of Emperor William, who attended the unveil- ing of the monument to Queen Victoria, this campaign was temporarily suspended and the Kaiser even honored as a guest of whom England was proud. But directly after his departure the campaign was taken up again; and even dur- ing Emperor William's stay in London Grey explained to our ambassador, Metternich, that the agreements made be- tween England and France placed on England the obliga- tion to support France even in case of the occupation of Fez lasting a long time; which admitted of no other inter- pretation than that England conceded to France the right to annex Morocco by degrees, and was determined to support her in this by force of arms. France's proceeding in Mor- occo in breach of her agreements met only with approval, although the Englishmen who had emigrated to Morocco stood diametrically opposed to the French policy of ex- ploitation and annexation — certainly a proof that the Eng- lish government was not following its own interests in this matter. It had only stipulated with France in advance that fortifications of the coast might not, in consequence of the accession of Morocco, remain in French or Spanish hands. It was therefore the more readily offended when, the ap7 pearance of the "Panther" at Agadir gave proof that Ger- many did not mean to permit its treaty rights to be ignored. The English fleet destined for Norway was called back to 28 Portsmouth, and the whole expeditionary force was also set in readiness. Our general staff received reports from its agents which described the seriousness of the situation. They referred to England's intention to occupy Belgiuni or Copenhagen in case of war. Thus our military attache in Berne reported on the basis of absolutely reliable reports that the landing of English troops in Belgium in the course of the summer, had been immediately impending. It was also suspicious in the highest degree that at that time the journeys of the French General Staff and the manoeuvres of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th cavalry divisions took place exclu- sively on the Belgian border. Asquith and Lloyd George made in their speeches no secret of the fact that they held a participation of England in the conflict unavoidable. A new situation, said the prime minister, had arisen in Mor- occo. England would fulfill its treaty obligations towards France, which were, he said, well known to the Chamber; and Lloyd George declared in a speech which he held m the Mansion House: "If a situation is forced upon us m which peace can only be maintained through the surrender of the great and beneficent position which England has se- cured, then peace at any price would be intolerable humilia- fion " But what most irritated Sir Edward Grey was that the plan conceived by the French Foreign Minister, de Selves: to answer the sending of the "Panther" with a French- English naval demonstration of Agadir, was, in consequence of Caillaux' opposition shipwrecked in the English cabinet, which, originally, had not shown itself averse to entermg into this dangerous proposition. Through the revelations of Faber, the extremely critical situation in July, 1911, was later made thoroughly known and no one in England was in a position to rebuke him for the facts he presented, on the ground that they were lies. Not until the German-French treaty of November 4th, was the crisis relieved. It had among other things led to Eng- land's renewal for another ten years of its offensive and de- fensive treaty with Japan on the 13th of July, 1911, that is to say practically four years before its expiration, obviously it was done with a view to making sure of its ally m the East against Germany even in case the war toward which the English statesmen were working should break out until after August 1, 1915, or should not be settled by that time. It was no thanks to Asquith and Grey that the peace was lOn Dec 21st, 1911. there was published in the LeiPfig Illu''s?ra?ed- olzette a map which showed ^t^ie posUion of the i"rfi^\eri^8 'Tho^fwer"e fhe'day" on'^hich ^plSncing' u^on iSS «^^sroS^ir^^^frr^^s?d ^ ^ marching goals on the continent. 29 ultimately maintained in spite of everything. As the stormy waves of the Moroccan conflict began to settle, a tendency again made itself felt in England which was in sharp oppo- sition to the policy of the cabinet. They had experienced the uncanny feeling of standing at the edge of an abyss and of being dragged against their will into a war in which no English interests whatever were at stake. Dn sober second thought it became evident that the artfully culti- vated bitterness against Germany could not be referred to any harm that England had suffered through us, but had been kindled by pointing out future possibilities which were said to threaten the world position of England. Against the consciencelessness of this effort, ever louder protests were now raised from the members of the rank and fil of the cabinet party. The Orientalist, Edward Granville Browne, complained that the English foreign policy had never been so secret, so lacking in straightforwardness, and so inaccessible to any kind of criticism; that it was more autocratic than in Russia. "We risk" — he wrote — "a war with Germany, that France may seize unfortunate Morocco; we lay ourselves open to the ridicule of our enemies and the pity of our friends by our obsequiousness to Russia; we estrange the confidence of Islam by our policy in Persia, in Turkey and in Morocco, and as to Tripoli we are at least open to suspicion." Great liberal papers and weeklies such as "Manchester Guardian," "Daily Graphic," "Economist" emphatically point- ed out that it was a mistake of the English policy to place itself in systematic opposition to the vital interests of Ger- many, that an entente with Germany would much better correspond, from every point of view, with the highest in- terests of England. The policy which followed the opposite goal was, they declared, "stupid and unbusinesslike." The "open letter about the foreign policy 1904-1911" — which such balanced and respected publicists as Morel and Hirst signed with their initials, was a deadly accusation against the leader of the English policies. But it was dismissed by Sir Edward Grey with the declaration that England was determined to continue its relations in their existing form with France and Russia; which, however, meant nothing else than that it would proceed with his system of political preparations for a war against Germany, and would protect its comrades of the Entente even if, in contempt of existing treaties, they violated the rights of other powers. A Paris telegram to the "Journal de Geneve" published the following striking commentary on it: "Sir Edward Grey has declared that there exist between France and England no pledges other than those which have already been made public. From this the conclusion has been drawn that no military conventions exist between the two states. That is quite correct; but 30 from this it is not to be deduced that England and France have never considered the possibility of uniting their mili- tary forces." The exact facts of the matter are these: Each time that a war seemed more or less imminent, the two governments entered into a consultation and promised for a limited period of time to support each other with their military power. That was the case in the summer of 1905, as it was at the time of the Casablanca affair. In the course of this year, however, the entente cordiale had become so plaint an m- strument, that each time that the circimistances seemed to demand it, a military arrangement was concluded by word of mouth, which was to be binding for the duration of the crisis, and which led to the exchange of very definite views as to how the armed forces of the two nations were to be employed. On December 21, the "Daily Chronicle" wrote that if the policies of England were guided by public opinion, a Ger- man-English iin^ thousand millions of francs in France were completed, whereas a loan which was negotiated in Paris by Austria-Hungary was wrecked under Russian pressure, and every giving of financial sup- port to Turkey was similarly prevented. It was an exceed- ingly noteworthy political game. They hoped in Paris on the one hand to separate Austria from Germany in spite of everything, and on the other hand, to prevent Turkey from joining the Triple Entente. Anglo-French Naval Co-operation. Even more involved was England's double game. The negotiations, which had for a long time hung fire with Ger- many, concerning the adjustment of their mutual interests in the Bagdad Railway district, and in Africa at Portugal's expense, were again taken up, and, with apparent sincerity, led very close to a conclusion, so that in September, 1913, an agreement seemed to be immediately at hand. That in this, 39 as in the negotiations for a naval convention, which were similarly renewed, there was only the deceptive appearance of reality, we know from those admissions of Haldane on July 5, 1915, which we have cited above. They were moves in the game of preparing for that "struggle for existence" which Haldane had, on his return from Berlin in February 1912, represented to his colleagues in the cabinet as in- evitable. Yet the visit of King George V, to Paris, where he arrived on April 21, 1915, accompanied by Sir Edward Grey, — who, on this occasion set foot for the first time in his life on the soil of the Continent — became of decisive significance. As to the course of this visit and its meaning, we are thoroughly informed, through the "Documents concerning the Outbreak of the War"\ Section 7 of the new German White Book, between England and France for cooperation at sea in case of war, that the English fleet would take over the protection of the North Sea, of the Channel, and of the Atlantic Ocean, in order to allow the French the possibility of concentrating their fleet in the western Mediterranean, where Malta would be put at their service as a point of support. The English Mediterranean fleet was then to come under the command of a French Admiral, the FrencL torpedo boats and sub- marines were to be put to use in the Channel. The same source informs us that in May, as a result of the visit of George V, it was proposed by France — along with a series of political questions which were taken up — that the existing military and political agreements between France and England be supplemented by corresponding agreements between England and Russia. Sir Edward Grey took up the proposal very sympathetically, but declared him- self unable, without the consent of the cabinet, to give any binding answer. It follows from later Paris reports dated July, — although the exact day is not mentioned — that the proposal of a Rus- sian-English naval convention is to be traced back to Iswol- ski, who wanted to make the royal visit to Paris serve as a means of turning the Triple Entente into an alliance after the pattern of the Triple Alliance. Out of consideration for the English disinclination toward forming alliances, how- ever, they gave up, for the immediate future, the carrying out of this larger plan and preferred to proceed step by step. And the report had now come in, that the English cabinet had, upon Grey's recommendation, agreed to the conclusion of a naval convention, and decided that the negotiations should take place in London between the English Admiralty and the Russian naval attache Mr. Wolkow. The above 1 First published in the "North German Public Gazette" of October 16, 1914. 40 authority cited in the White Book goes on to add that the satisfaction of the Russian and the French diplomacy over this new taking of the English politicians by surprise was great, and the conclusion of a formal alliance was held to be only a matter of time. Wolkow then went to Petersburg with the text of the Franco-English naval conventions, and soon was back in London with instructions for his negotia- tions. What these instructions were is shown by a report pro- ceeding very evidently from Petersburg which is based on the minutes, or possibly on an extract from the minutes, of a conference which was held on the 26th of May at the headquarters of the Chief of the Russian Admiralty StafI for the purpose of fixing on the basis of the negotiations with England. It is important enough to be given here in full: "In consideration of the fact that an agreement between Russia and England concerning the cooperation of their naval forces in the case of war-like operations of Russia and England, participated in by France, is desired, the confer- ence arrived at the following conclusions: "The projected naval convention is to regulate the rela- tions between the Russian and English armed forces at Sea in all particulars, which entails an understanding concern- ing signals and special codes, radio telegrams and the man- ner of communication between the Russian and English Naval Staffs. The two naval staffs shall, moreover, make reports to each other at regular intervals concerning the fleets of third powers, and concerning their own fleets, par- ticularly as to technical data, as well as newly introduced machines and inventions. There shall also take place ex- change of views at regular intervals between the Russian and the English Naval Staff, after the pattern provided by the Franco-Russian agreement, for the examination of ques- tions which interest the two naval ministries. The Russian naval convention with England shall, like the Franco- Russian, make provision for previously agreed upon, but separate, actions of the Russian and English navies. As to strategic aims, a distinction is to be made between the naval operations in the Black Sea and the North Sea districts, on the one hand, and the prospective sea fights in the Medi- terranean on the other. In both districts Russia must en- deavor to receive compensation for relieving a part of the English fleet so that it can deal with the German fleet. "In the Bosphorus and Dardanelles region, temporary ^ I want to point out in this connection that to this end a system of espionage has been organized in Pomerania for years, and that a part of its membership has acquired property in Pomerania. 41 undertakings in the Straits, as strategic operations of Russia in case of war, shall be taken into consideration. "The Russian interests in the Baltic demand that England retain as large a part of the German fleet as possible in the North Sea. The overwhelming numerical superiority of the German fleet over the Russian would thereby be done away with, and a Russian landing in Pomerania perhaps become possible.^ In this connection the English government could perform a substantial service, if, before the beginning of warlike operations, it were to send a great number of merch- ant ships to the Baltic ports, that the shortage of Russian transport ships be made up. "As far as the situation in the Mediterranean is concerned, it is of the highest importance for Russia that a certain pre- ponderance of the Entente fleet over the Austro-Italian be secured. For, in case the Austro-Italian forces govern this sea, attacks of the Austrian fleet in the Black Sea would be possible, which would be a dangerous blow to Russia. It must be assumed that the Austro-Italian forces preponderate over the French. England would there- fore have to secure the majority of forces to the Entente powers, by despatching the necessary number of ships to the Mediterranean, at least so long as the development of the Russian navy has not proceeded far enough to assume the solution of this problem itself. Russian ships would have to be able to use with England's consent, English ports as a base in the eastern Mediterranean, just as the French naval convention permits the Russian fleet to use the French ports as a base in the western Mediterranean." Through an indiscretion which appeared in the press, it became known that the negotiations of Wolkow with Prince Louis of Battenberg took place on the basis of these instruc- tions. At that time he was First Lord of the Admiralty, today, as is well known, he is placed on the shelf as a "German." Sir Edward Grey and the Naval Convention. That England delayed the concluding of the naval con- vention longer than the Russians liked, so that eventually it could not be signed before the outbreak of the war, was due to the fact that at that very time the English press had become distrustful, and pointed particularly to the existing policies of Russia which stood in opposition to English in- terests in Persia and in India. Grey who was forced to deny, in Parliament, his relations to Russia, and simultane- ously had to negotiate with Russia, fell into a very em- barrassed situation. But he saved himself by bare-faced lying. On the 11th of June, he gave, when interpellated by Mr. King concerning the English-Russian naval convention, 42 the following information, according to the stenographic ''"Tr\tn7rabirmember for North Somerset put a simi- lar question last year in regard to land forces and the hon- orable member fo'; North Salford also put °n *f ,-"^ ^^/, ; timilar Question to the one he has agam put today, ine pr me minister answered at that time that, if a war be ween ?he European powers breaks out, there exist no ""P"bl'=hed a/reements which could limit or disturb the freedom of the government or of Parliament to_ decide on the q-^f- » whether England shall take part m a war. Th s answer cov whthf Questions which lie before me m wntmg. It which would make th.s assertion les t™". ^° i"^ judge, of that sort are in progress and it is, as far as 1 can ju s , mmmmm eluded, for the naval negot.ations ^ ^^^-^^^^^offieially wavering ^X^f^^'.^ey werf pending, since the whole aware of the tact tnat i"=J Lord of the Admir- matter had been g.ven over to the t.rst ^om ^^^ alty, at the suggestion, to be sure, of S«r Edwara y ^^^^_ finally the agreements with F-.^"": ^2 bore pour sauver la ulated in the letters of Noyember 1912. bore, P ^^ face, a qualified .character! That England as _^ ^^^^ ^^_ fact, was bound hand and fo^ was depe ^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ cisions as Russia or Fran« mi=nt ^^.^jjed, by Par- not been discovered nor f °7'' i.* ^J'L _„ith and the narrow liament; it was known on y to G'ey- f'*' p„liament also did circle of their confidants in the cabinet^ Jen decided on, on not know that war with Germany had been tun- principle, since 1909, and that --^^^'hen onlyj ^^^ PP^^^^^^^ ity was being looked for to conduct it ^^_ possible certainty of success. . I" l'„°^',X goal, and it did lieved themselves in England to be n«a;^^%Lferences and not lie with England that congresses ana ^^^^^ not the sword, decided the co^f^f °* *^f,'ection of postpon- however, English policy took the "ew direct o p ^ 43 until then every conflict must be avoided, and Germany be kept to the idea by means of negotiations concerning the pending problems: of the proportion of naval construction year; of naval celebration; African colonies; Bagdad Rail- way (that it had little to fear from England). As is well known, we held fast to this idea until the last moment. The game of Sir Edward Grey was luckily played. Now his cards lie before us, and we see that they are the cards of a professional card sharper. Nor do they today in England avoid admitting this, or indeed, boasting about it. In the "Cologne Gazette" of July Uth of this year is published the letter of an Englishman to a Chilean which was given out in the "Gazeta Militar" a paper, appearing in Santiago de Chile. This letter, because of the "brutal frankness" with which it champions that "Morality for a pack of wolves" to which we above referred, deserves to be hung lower, as an important document of con- temporary history. "Germany" — so says the Englishman's letter — "had become a deadly poison for British trade. 'Made in Germany' was already an intolerable nightmare. Wherever an Englishman wanted to conclude a deal a German competitor came out victorious, and every manufactured article produced in Eng- land would run up against an equally good, or better article manufactured more cheaply in Germany. And not alone England suffered from the consequences of German cheap- ness; it had become a universal plague. France, Belgium and Russia had also to watch how their factories rapidly retrograded; they were flooded by German wares under such alarming circumstances that it cried to heaven. And it is a fact that it was in these countries, in Belgium particularly, rather than in England, that there arose the idea of an alli- ance to settle Germany's hash. Before the attack on Liege the Germans did not know how well Belgium was prepared, and today they still believe in its innocence." "From the above you can gauge what more the future has in store for the poor German. I can assure you that no part of the program of this war was for England something unforeseen, and that, however, the fortunes of war may turn out, the result of the war will bring us profit and the busi- ness will bloom here as never before. All the Belgian fac- tories have already disappeared; the industrial districts of France and Russia are laid waste by armies, Germany and Austria-Hungary will remain ruined, consequently, only the English factories will remain to supply the world, and if we can succeed in persuading Spain and Italy to take part in the struggle, these prospects would be even more complete. There are no grounds for getting excited over the ruin and the desolation that the war calls forth on the continent, for 44 the greater they are, the greater and the more positive will be the advantages for England." To which the "Gazeta Militar" adds the remark: "The recipient of the above letter hands it over to the public as a sign of protest against the inhuman views it contains, and will send to its author, as his sole answer, the number of the 'Gazeta' in which it appears." Here at last is a voice which openly acknowledges the motives of the men who made the war; after all the official hypocrisy, one sincere word. We recommend it to the "Accuser," to purge him of the esteem in which he holds the disinterested love of peace of his English heroes. He has now received a picture of the actual preliminary history of the war, a piece of truth, inso- far as it can today be confirmed, and insofar as it can be brought to light without damage to our interests. We shall not enter upon a polemic against his exposition of the offi- cial publications of the material that refers to the time be- tween the murder of the archduke and the outbreak of the war. He was, to say the least, exceedingly uncritical and unscientific in his treatment of those diplomatic despatches which were published by the powers of the Entente after a previous understanding, and with the omission of all that showed how the conspiracy hung together; indeed, in all probability he glorified them against his better judgment, deliberately and craftily turning the German publications to his own account, in order to make his theses believable. Under the title "The Diplomatic Struggles Before the War," and with the use of citations that drive his points home, these questions have been examined by Ludwig Bergstrasser with scientific thoroughness, exhaustively and impartially. Of the arguments and assertions of the "Accuser" it leaves not a single point unrefuted. In the most recent number of the Historical Magazine of Meinecke and Vigener Pp. 48-592 Bergstrasser's excellent study is published. Be it highly recommended to our readers. We add to this a ref- erence to the excellent book of Dr. Ernst Miiller-Meiningen: "The World War and the Collapse of International Law," (3rd edition. Berlin 1915. Published by George Reimer.) And finally, there have recently been added the despatches of the Belgian ambassadors from London, Paris, Berlin published by the "North German Gazette," where proceeds, from impartial lips, a loud protest against the intrigues which were woven by England, France and Russia, against the peace of the world. No other conclusion can be drawn from these documents. But the blood which has been shed in this war, and all the misery which has accompanied it, cries out to Heaven for vengeance. It will fall upon those who instigated the war! 45 But to the "Accuser," one word in conclusion. He calls his book a book of truth. In reality it is a book of miser- able slanders, written out of the restless vanity of a life estranged from the soil of his native country; an act of revenge for a past for which he himself is to blame, an act which is forced to hide itself under the veil of anonymity. A man from whom every German turns away with loathing, and of whom, it will be said, when finally his name is given over to universal contempt: "God keep our children and our children's children from becoming like this man, who in the hour of the supreme struggle of our people for its existence, let himself be used as the herald of the enemies of Germany." 46 Subscribe to ISSUES AND EVENTS The Standard Weekly Publication of National Circulation which fights for Principles, Ideals, Honor and Justice FRANCIS J. L. DORL, Editor. 21 PARK ROW NEW YORK, N. Y 5c. per copy. 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