1 |B »o; n H IIT4I IH 3«1'J ■ fi in H ■ B , ij! wft ■ i 1 ' LIBRARY OF CONGRESS DDDDSSTSb7a • v^) •1"°' ^^ 0* * .^ ' « • • ■\" - t • O . '^% 4 > « • • H-^* V V' .♦• - '' V l'^ ^rf • k* •J'. <> *'7V M «? ^'A o^H 'o . , .,-i '"* K^' "^ * <> ^^<^ ^ '»^y^r^« ^40*. » -^"-^^^ . < • '•" 4.* ^ '-.'^K^,* «^' "** -.-t . - '. •^*.>*/ • .-l^^ » ■ o •/ \*^^V V^^*/ \'^^\/ O • I \ f \ ^ ^c^^^ •2L./S^" ♦ ».j LIFE OF JOHN t). CAIHOUN, « PRESENTING A CONDENSED HISTORY OF POLITICAL EVENTS FROM 1811 TO 184 3. TOGETHER WITH A SELECTION FROM HIS SPEECHES, REPORTS. AND OTHER WRITINGS SUBSEQUENT TO BIS ELECTION AS VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING HIS LEAD- ING SPEECH ON THE LATE WAR DELIVERED IN 1811. ^ NEW-YORK: HARPER & BROTHERS, 82 CLIFF-STREET. 184 3. £"3 4 •" Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1843, By Harper & Brothers, ' In the Clerk's Office of the Southern Dis.trict of New-York. 6 Si 3 ADVERTISEMENT. • / Since Mr. Calhoun first took a leading part in the politics of the coun- try and the administration of its government, a new generation of men Jias risen into life, who cannot appeal to their memories for the his- tory of his public services. It was thought necessary, therefore, by his political friends, who desire to see his great abilities and high virtues placed in the widest sphere of usefulness, that a biographical sketch should be published to furnish information to the young, and to revive the recollections of those of more mature age ; and to attain their object most effectually, it was deemed expedient that the sketch should be ac- -companied with a selection from liis speeches, reports, and other writings, which would furnish the most authentic evidence of his opinions as well on subjects of high constitutional law as on the great measures of policy which divide and distinguish the two great parties of the country. Such a selection, to be practically useful to the public, must necessarily be very limited when taken in comparison with the whole body of Mr. Calhoun's very numerous speeches, reports, and other writings, as a complete col- lection of them would be too bulky and expensive for general circulation. This selection, therefore, contains one speech only delivered prior to his becoming Vice-president, and, while many delivered subsequently have, m order to prevent the volume from being too large, been unavoidably excluded, it is particularly full on the subject of Banks, Independent Treas- ury, Currency, Tariff, Distribution of the Proceeds of the Public Lands, State Rights, and the principles and policy which should control in the administration of the government, those being the subjects which for some years past have agitated, and still continue to agitate, the public mind, and on which the people of the United States are interested in having exact and authentic information respecting Mr. Calhoun's settled and matured opinions after the long experience of thirty-two years uninter- oruptedly devoted to their service. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. CHAPTER I. Including the Period from his Infancy until he entered Congress. The object of the present memoir of John Caldwell Calhoun is not to present a biography of the man, but to describe him as a statesman ; to draw and to develop his character in that capacity, and to trace his emi- nent public services during a long career in one of the most eventful pe- riods of human history. To dwell on a character like his, distinguished by every trait that should win esteem and command admiration, would be to the biographer a most attractive labour ; but the pleasure of depicting a private life elevated by spotless purity and integrity, and a severe sim- plicity of tastes and habits, must be relinquished — except so far as occa- sional reference to his early history may become necessary — for the high- er duty of portraying his intellectual features, and of explaining his mo- tives and conduct as a public man. It is not our aim to commend him to public affection, or to enlist popular sympathy in his behalf, but rather to show to the world, not for his sake, but for its own instruction, the deep influence of this master-mind upon the great political events of his age. A fair and impartial review of the career of this eminent statesman in connexion with public affairs, is necessary to a thorough understanding of the course of our own government for nearly two thirds of its existence. Such a review, it is believed, would be no unacceptable offering at the present time. ((Throughout the v/hole period from 1811 up to the pres- ent time he has served the Union in the various capacities of Represent- ative, Secretary of War, Vice-president, and Senator. ' He has taken a prominent and influential part in all the great questions which have arisen during that long interval ; and, although he has asked a release from farther public service, it is not impossible that he may be destined to close his career as a statesman in another and a higher station. With faculties unclouded, with physical powers unimpaired, wkli a judgment matured by observation and experience, with an intrepidity untamed by the many trying vicissitudes of his extraordinary life, and with an activity whose energies are unabated by time, it is probable thac the American people will not dispense with such services as he might' render in the highest sphere open to American statesmen. Mr. Calhoun is a native of South Carolina, and was born in Abbeville District on the 18th of March, 1782. His family is Irish on both sides. His father, Patrick Calhoun, was born in Donegal, in Ireland, but the fam- ily emigrated when Patrick was a child, first to Pennsylvania, where they remained some, years, and then to the western part of Virginia, from whence they Avere driven by the Indians after Braddock's defeat. They 4 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. removed finally to South Carolina in 1756, when Patrick settled on the place where the subject of this sketch was born, and which still continues in the family of his younger brother. His mother, whose maiden name was Caldwell, was born in Charlotte County, Virginia. They had five children, one daughter and four sons, of whom John was the youno-est but one. He was called after his maternal uncle, Major John Caldwell, whom the Tories had murdered in cold blood, and in his own yard, after destroy- ing his house by fire. If time permitted, it might be interesting here to trace the effect which the traditions of the stirring scenes of a pioneer's life might have had upon the mind and character of young Calhoun. His paternal and maternal family both being Whig, they were exposed not only to hostile Indian incursions, but also to Tory outrages. They main- tained their foothold on the soil despite the conflicts of an almost con- stant border warfare, and adhered to their country amid the horrors of civil strife and in the face of foreign invaders. But they had need both, of courage and constancy to bear them through the severe trials to which, they were exposed. Of three maternal uncles able to bear arms, one per- ished as we have before described, another fell at the battle of Cowpens with thirty sabre wounds, and a third, taken prisoner by the English, was immured for nine months in the dungeons of St. Augustine. Nor was Patrick Calhoun, the father, indebted to anything less than a strong arm and a stout heart for his escape from the perils which surrounded him. Upon one occasion, with thirteen other whites, he maintained a desperate conflict for hours with the Cherokee Indians, until, overwhelmed by su- perior numbers, he was forced to retreat, leaving seven of his companions dead upon the field. Three days after, they returned to bury their dead, and found the bodies of twenty-three Indian warriors, v/ho had perished in the same conflict. At another time, he was singled out by an Indian distinguished for his prowess as a chief and for his skill with the rifle. The Indian taking to a tree, Calhoun secured himself behind a log, from whence he drew the Indian's fire four times by holding his hat on a stick a little above his hiding-place. The Indian at length exhibited a portion of his person in an effort to ascertain the effect of his shot, when he re- ceived a ball from his enemy in the shoulder, which forced him to fly. But the hat exhibited the traces of four balls by which it had been perfo- rated. The effect of this mode of life upon a mind naturally strong and inquisitive was to create a certain degree of contempt for the forms of civilized life, and for all that was merely conventional in society. He claimed all the rights which nature and reason seemed to establish, and he acknowledged no obligation which was not supported by the like sanc- tions. It was under this conviction that, upon one occasion, he and his neighbours went down within twenty-three miles of Charleston, armed with rifles, to exercise a right of suflrage which had been disputed : a contest which ended in electing him to the Legislature of the state, in which body h^ served for thirty years. Eelying upon virtue, reason, and courage as all that constituted the true moral strength of man, he at- tached too little irqportance to mere information, and never feared to en- counter an adversary who, in that respect, had the advantage over him : a confidence which mai\y of the events of his life seemed to justify. In- deed, he once appeared as his own advocate in a case in Virginia, in which he recovered a tract of land in despite of t\\e regularly-trained dispu- tants who sought to embarrass and defeat him. ( He opposed the Federal Constitution, because, as he said, it permitted other people than those of South Carolina to tax the people of South Carolina, and thus allowed tax- ation without representation, which was a violation of the fundamental principle of the Revolutionary struggle. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 5 We have heard his son say that among his earliest recollections was one of a conversation when he was nine years of age, in which his father maintained that government to be best which allowed the largest amount of individual liberty compatible with social order and tranquillity, and in- sisted that the improvements in political science would be found to consist in throwing off many of the restraints then imposed by law, and deemed necessary to an organized society. It may well be supposed that his son John was an attentive and eager auditor, and such lessons as these must doubtless have served to encourage that free spirit of inquiry, and that intrepid zeal for truth for which he has been since so much distinguished. The mode of thinking which was thus encouraged may, perhaps, have compensated in some degree the want of those early advantages which are generally deemed indispensable to great intellectual progress. Of these he had comparatively few. But this was compensated by those natural gifts Avhich give great minds the mastery over difiiculties which the timid regard as insuperable. ; Indeed, we have here another of those rare instances in which the hardiness of natural genius is seen to defy all obstacles, and develops its flower and matures its fruit under circum- stances apparently the most unpropitious. ' The section of the country in which his family resided was then newly settled, and in a rude frontier state. There was not an academy in all the upper part of the state, and none within fifty miles, except one at about that distance in Columbia county, Georgia, which was kept by his broth- er-in-law, Mr. Waddell, a Presbyterian clergyman. There were but a few scattered schools in the whole of that :|egion, and these were such as are ■usually found on the frontier, in which reading, writing, and arithmetic were imperfectly taught. At the age of thirteen he was placed under the charge of his brother-in-law to receive his educatiOm Shortly after, his father died ; this was followed by the death of his sister, Mrs. Waddell, within a few Aveeks, and the academy was then discontinued, which sus- pended his education before it had fairly commenced. His brother-in- law, with whom he was still left, was absent the greater port of the time, attending to his clerical duties, and his pupil thus found himself on a se- cluded plantation, without any white companion during the greater por tion of the time. > A situation apparently so unfavourable to improvement turned out, in his case, to be the reverse. Fortunately for him, there Avas a small circulating library in the house, of which his brother-in-law was libra- rian, and, in the absence of all company and amusements, that attracted his attention. His taste, although undirected, led him to history, to the neglect of novels and other lighter reading ; and so deeply was he inter- ested, that in a short time he read the whole of the small stock of his- torical works contained in the library, consisting of Rollin's Ancient His- tory, Robertson's Charles ^., his South America, and Voltaire's Charles XII. After despatching these, he turned with like eagerness to Cook's Voyages (the large edition), a small volume of Essays by Brown, and Locke on the Understanding, which he read as far as the chapter on In- finity. All this was the work of but fourteen weeks. So intense was his application that his eyes became seriously affected, his countenance pal- lid, and his frame emaciated. His mother, alarmed at the intelligence of his health, sent for him home, where exercise and amusement soon re- stored his strength, and he acquired a fondness for hunting, fishing, and other country sports. Four years passed away in these pursuits, and in attention to the business of the farm while his elder brothers Avere absent, to the entire neglect of his education. But the time was not lost. Exer- cise and rural sports invigorated his frame, while his labours on the farm gave him a taste for agriculture, which he has always retained, and in the 6 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN pursuit of which he finds delightful occupation for his intervals of leisure from public duties. About this time an incident occurred upon which turned his after life. His second brother, James, who had been placed at a counting-house m Charles- ton, retm'ned to spend the summer of 1800 at home. John had determined to become a planter ; but James, objecting to this, strongly urged him to ac- quire a good education, and pursue one of the learned professions. He re- plied that he was not averse to the course advised, but there were two difficul- ties in the way : one was to obtain the assent of his mother, without which he could not think of leaving her, and the other was the want of means. He said his property was small and his resolution fixed : he would far rather be a planter than a half-informed physician or lawyer. With this determination, he could not bring his mind to select either without ample preparation ; but if the consent of their mother should be freely given, and he (James) thought he could so manage his property as to keep him in funds for seven years of study preparatory to entering his profession, he would leave home and commence his education the next week. His mother and brother agreeing to his conditions, he accordingly left home the next week for Dr. Waddell's, who had married again, and resumed his academy in Columbia county, Georgia. This was in June, ' 1800, in the beginning of his 19th year, at which time it may be said he com- menced his education, his tuition having been previously very imperfect, and confined to reading, writing, and arithmetic in an ordinary country school. His progress here was so rapid that in two years he entered the junior class of Yale College, and graduated with distinction in 1804, just four years from the time he commenced his Latin grammar. #He was highly esteemed by Dr. Dwight, then the president of the college, although they differed widely in politics, and at a time when political feelings were intensely bitter. TJie doctor was an ardent Federalist, and Mr. Calhoun was one of a very few, in a class of more than seventy, who had the firmness openly to avow and maintain the opinions of the Republican party, and, among others, that the people were the only le- gitimate source of political power. Dr. Dwight entertained a different opinion. In a recitation during the senior year, on the chapter on Politics in Paley's Moral Philosophy, the doctor, with the intention of eliciting his opinion, pro- pounded to Mr. Calhoun the question, as to the legitimate source of power. He did not decline an open and direct avowal of his opinion. A. statesman," and prepared his oi-ation, but was prevented from delivering it by a '^Vere indisposition. After graduating, he commenced the study of the law, and. devoted three years to that and miscellaneous reading, eighteen months of which were spent at Litchfield, Connecticut, where a celebrated law-school was kept at that time by Judge Reeves and Mr. Gould. He acquired great distinction at the school. It was there that he successfully cultivated, in a debating society, his talents for Extemporary speaking. The residue of the time was spent in the offices of Mr. De Saussure, of Charleston (afterward chancellor), and of Mr. George Bowie, of Abbeville. Having spent seven years in preparation, accord- ing to his determination when he commenced his education, and having passed his examination for admission to the bar, he began the practice of law in his na- tive district. He rose at once into full practice, taking a stand with the oldest and ablest lawyers on the circuit, LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 7 He continued but a short time at the bar. While he was yet a student, after his return from Litchfield to Abbeville, an incident occurred which agitated the whole Union, and contributed to give to Mr. Calhoun's life, at that early period, the political direction which it has ever since kept — the attack of the English frigate Leopard on the American frigate Chesapeake. It led to public meetings all over the Union, in which resolutions were passed expressive of the indignation of the people, and their firm resolve to stand by the government in whatever measure it might think proper to adopt to redress the outrage. At that called in his native district, he was appointed one of the committee to prepare a report and resolutions to be presented to a meeting to be convened to receive them on an appointed day. Mr. Calhoun was requested by the committee to prepare them, which he. did so much to their satisfaction, that he was appointed to ad- dress the meeting on the occasion before the vote was taken on the resolutions. The meeting was large, and it was the first time he had ever appeared before the public. He acquitted himself with such success that his name was pre- sented as a candidate for the state Legislature at the next election. He was elected at the head of the ticket, and at a time when the prejudice against law- yers was so strong in the district that no one of the profession who had offered ^or many years previously had ever succeeded. This was the commencement of his political life, and the first evidence he ever received of the confidence of the people of the state — a confidence which has continued ever since constantly increasing, without interruption or reaction, for the third of a century ; and w^hich, for its duration, universality, and strength, may be said to be without a parallel in any other state, or in the case of any other public man. He served two sessions in the state Legislature. It was not long after he took his seat before he distinguished himself. Early in the session an informal meeting of the Republican portion of the members was called to nominate can- didates for the places of President and Vice-president of the United States. Mr. Madison was nominated for the presidency without opposition: When the nomination for the vice-presidency was presented, Mr. Calhoun embraced the occasion to present his opinion in reference to coming events, as bearing on the nomination. He reviewed the state of the relations between the United States and Great Britain and France, the two great belligerents which were then struggling for mastery, and in iheir stmggle trampling on the rights of neu- trals, and especially ours ; he touched on the restrictive system which had been resorted to by the government to protect our rights, and expressed his doubt of its efficacy, and the conviction that a war with Great Britain would be una- voidable. " It was," be said, " in this state of things, of the utmost importance that the ranks of the Republican party should be preserved undisturbed and un- broken by faction or discord." He then adverted to the fact, that a discontent- ed portion of the party had given unequivocal evidence of rallying round the name of the venerable vice-president, George Clinton (whose re-nomination was proposed), and of whom he spoke highly ; but he gave it as his opinion, that should he be nominated and re-elected, he would become the nucleus of all the dis- contented portion of the party, and thus make a formidable division in its ranks should the country be forced into war. These persons, he predicted, would ulti- mately rally under De Witt Clinton, the nephew^ whom he described as a man of distinguished talents and aspiring disposition. To avoid the danger, he sug- gested for nomination the name of John Langdon, of New-Hampshire, of whom he spoke highly both as to talents and patriotism. It was Mr. Calhoun's first effort in a public capacity. The manner and mat- ter excited great applause ; and when it is recollected that these remarks pre- ceded the declaration of war more than three years, and how events happened according to his anticipations, it affords a striking proof of that sagacity, at so early a period, for which he has since been so much distinguished. It at once gave him a stand among the most distinguished members of the Legislature. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. During the short period he remained a member, he originated and carried through several measures, which proved in practice to be salutary, and have become a permanent portion of the legislation of the state. CHAPTER II. Including the period from his entering Congress until his appointment as Secretary of War. In the mean time, the growing difficulties in our foreign relations, especially with Great Britain, impressed the community at large with the belief that war with that formidable power was approaching. The impression naturally turned the attention of the people, in selecting candidates for Congress, to those whom they believed to be the most competent to serve them at so trying a period. The eyes of the congressional district in which Mr. Calhoun resided were- turned towards him, and he was elected by an overwhelming majority over his opponent. This was in the fall of 1810, and he took his seat in the councils of the nation a year afterward, in the first session of the twelfth Congress,.* known as the war session, with his two distinguished colleagues, Mr. Cheves and Mr. Lowndes, who, like himself, had been elected in reference to the critical condition of the country. His reputation had preceded him, and he was placed second on the Committee of Foreign Relations, which, in the existing state of our relations with the two great belligerents, was regarded as the most important of the committees, and Avas, accordingly, filled by members selected in reference to the magnitude of its duties. The other distinguished individuals who com- posed it were Peter B. Porter, the chairman, and Felix Grundy, of Tennessee, on the Republican side, and John Randolph and Philip Barton Key on the other. It was, indeed, an eventful period of our history, and the duties which it imposed on the committee were of the most difficult and responsible character. It is not easy, at this day, to estimate the magnitude of the crisis. Our pres- ent government had its origin just preceding the commencement of the great Revolution in France, which, in its progress, involved her in a war without ex- ample or parallel in the history of the world, taking into estimate its cause, ex- tent, duration, the immensity of force brought into conflict, the skill which di- rected it, the variety and magnitude of its incidents, and the importance of the stake at issue. England Avas the great antagonist power to France in this mighty struggle, whose shocks reached even our distant shores. From the be- ginning, our mutual rights were invaded by both sides, and our peace endan- gered ; but so recently had our government been established, so hazardous was it to put it to the test of war, and especially in such a struggle, and so advan- tageous to our commerce and prosperity Avas our position as a neutral power, while all Europe was at Avar, that it became the fixed policy of the government to preserve peace and bear wrongs, so long as the one could be preserved and the other endured without sacrificing the honour and independence of the coun- try. This pacific and wise policy Avas, with some slight exceptions, steadily pursued for more than fifteen years. At length came the Berlin and Milan Decrees on the part of France, and the hostile orders in council on the part of England, which forced on our government the embargo and other restrictive measures, adopted from an anxious desire of preserving peace, and in the hope of obtaining respect for our rights from one or other of the two belligerents. Experience soon proved hovir impotent these measures Avere, and how fallacious was our hope. The encroachments on our rights and independence continued to advance, till England at length pushed her aggressions so far that our com- merce was reduced to a state of dependance as complete as when we were her colonies, and our ships were converted, at the same time, into a recruiting-ground tl LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 9 to man her na\y. Not a A'essel of ours was permitted to reach Em-ope but through her ports, and more than 3000 of our hardy seamen were impressed into her service, to fight battles in which they had no interest. Our independ- ence, as far as the ocean was concerned, had become an empty name ; but so hazardous was it to take up arms in the imprepared state of the country, and to be drawn into a struggle apparently so fearful and interminable between the two Srst powers on earth, that the stoutest and boldest might well have paused at taking the step. It was in such a crisis of our affairs that Mr. Calhoun took his seat in Con- gress. To him it was not unexpected. He had little confidence from the be- ginning in the peaceful measures resorted to for the redress of our wrongs, and saw beforehand that the final alternatives would be war or submission, and had deliberately made up his mind, that to lose independence, and to sink down into a state of acknowledged inferiority, depending for security on forbearance, and KOt on our capacity and disposition to defend ourselves, would be the worst calamity which could befall the country. According to his opinion, the ability of the government to defend the country against external danger, and to cause its rights to be respected from without, was as essential as protection against violence within, and that, if it should prove incompetent to meet successfully the hazard of a just and necessary war, it would fail in one of the two great objects for which it was instituted, and that the sooner it was known the better. With these fixed opinions, his voice, on taking his seat, was for the most decisive course. The President's Message, at the opening of the session, was, in its general features, warlike, and yet there were expressions of an ambiguous character, • which led many to doubt what course of policy was really intended by the ad- ministration. The portion which related to our affairs with other powers was referred to the Committee of Foreign Relations. The excitement in the coun- try was intense, and party spirit never ran higher. All eyes were turned on the proceedings of the committee. They reported, at an early period of the session, resolutions strongly recommending immediate and extensive prepara- tions to defend our rights and redress our wrongs by an appeal to arms. The debate was opened by the chairman, Mr. Porter, and he was followed on the same side by Mr. Grundy. It was allotted to Mr. Calhoun to follow Mr. Ran- dolph, Avho, on the opposite side, succeeded Mr. Grundy in^an able and elo- quent speech. The discussion from the beginning excited profound interest, both in the body and the crowded audience daily assembled in the lobby and galleries, and this interest had increased as the discussion advanced. It was Mr. Calhoun's first speech in Congress, except a few brief remarks on the Ap- portionment Bill. The trial was a severe one ; expectation was high. The question was of the greatest magnitude, and he to whom he had to reply, a vet- eran statesman of unsurpassed eloquence. How he acquitted himself, the pa- pers of the day will best attest. The remarks of the Richmond Enquirer, then, as now, a leading journal on the Republican side, may be taken as an example. Mr. Ritchie, in his remarks on the speeches, after characterizing Mr. Randolph's, said : " Mr. Calhoun is clear and precise in his reasoning, marching up directly to the object of his attack, and felling down the errors of his opponent with the club of Hercules ; not eloquent in his tropes and figures, but, like Fox, in the moral elevation of his sentiments ; free from personality, yet full of those fine touches of indignation, which are the severest cut to the man of feeling. His speech, like a fine drawing, abounds in those lights and shades which set off each other : the cause of his country is robed in light, while her opponents are wrapped in darkness. It were a contracted wish that Mr. Calhoun were a Vir- ginian ; though, after the quota she has furnished with opposition talents, such a wish might be forgiven us. We beg leave to participate, as Americans and friends of our country, in the honours of South Carolina. We hail this young B 10 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. Carolinian as one of the master-spirits who stamp their names upon the age in which they live." When Mr. Calhoun sat down, he was greeted by the great body of the party for his successful effort, and thenceforward took rank with the ablest and most influential members of the body. But, as clear as it appeared to him that the period had arrived when a resort to arms could no longer be avoided "without sacrificing the honour and interest of the country, such was far from being the feeling of many, even of the Republican members of the body. Many, who saw the necessity, hesitated ; some from the great hazard of war, others from the want of preparation, or the difficulty of selecting between the belliger- ents, when both had so grossly violated our rights ; and not a few from a linger- ing confidence in the Non-importation Act, and other restrictive measures, as the means of redressing our wrongs. Mr. Calhoun, although he approved of the motive which had led to a resort to those measures in the first instance, and regarded them as wise temporary expedients, never had any confidence in. them as instruments of avenging or redressing the wrongs of the country. Be- lieving that they had accomplished all they ever could, and that a latent attach- ment to them was one of the principal impediments to a resort to arms, he did not hesitate to attack the whole system. To realize the boldness and hazard of such a step, it must be borne in mind that the support or opposition to the system had been for many years the main test of party fidelity, and that party spirit was never higher than, at the time. But as strongly as he was attached to the administration, to the Republican party, and their general policy, and opposed as he was to the Federalists, he did not hesitate, young as he was, when he believed duty and the interest of the country required it, to place himself above all party considerations, and to expose manfully the defects of a system which had been so long cherished and defended by the party to which he belonged. The following extracts from a ■speech delivered against it will give in his own language some of the most prominent objections which he urged against the system, and afford, at the same time, a fair specimen of his powers of reasoning and eloquence at that early period, and of the lofty and patriotic sentiments which actuated him in the line of policy that he advocated. " The restrictive system," he said, " as a mode of resistance, or as a means of obtaining redress, has never been a favourite one with me. I wish not to •censure the motives which dictated it, or attribute weakness to those who first resorted to it for a restoration of our rights. But, sir, I object to the restrictive system because it does not suit the genius of the people, or that of our govern- ment, or the geographical character of our country. We are a people essen- tially active ; I may say we are pre-eminently so. No passive system can suit such a people ; in action superior to all others, in patient endurance inferior to none. Nor does it suit the genius of our government. Our government is ■founded on freedom, and hates coercion. To make the restrictive system ef- fective, requires the most arbitrary laws. England, with the severest penal statutes, has not been able to exclude prohibited articles ; and Napoleon, with all his power and vigilance, was obliged to resort to the most barbarous laws to enforce his Continental system." After showing how the whole mercantile community must become corrupt by the temptations and facilities for smuggling, and how the public opinion of the commercial community (upon which the system must depend for its enforce- ment) becomes opposed to it, and gives sanction to its violation, he proceeds " But there are other objections to the system. It renders government odi- ous. The farmer inquires why he gets no more for his produce, and he is told it is owing to the embargo, or commercial restrictions. In this he sees only the hand of his own government, and not the acts of violence and injustice ■which this system is intended to counteract. His censures fall on the govern- LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 11 jiient. This is an unhappy state of the puWic mind ; and even, I might say, in a government resting essentially on public opinion, a dangerous one. In war it is different. Its privation, it is true, may be equal or greater ; but the public mind, under the strong impulses of that state of things, becomes steeled against sufferings. The difference is almost infinite between the passive and active state of the mind. Tie down a hero, and he feels the puncture of a pin : throw him into battle, and he is almost insensible to vital gashes. So in war. Im- pelled alternately by hope and fear, stimulated by revenge, depressed by shame, or elevated by victory, the people become invincible. No privation can shake their fortitude ; no calamity break their spirit. Even when equally successful, the contrast between the two systems is striking. War and restriction may leave the country equally exhausted ; but the latter not only leaves you poor, but, even when successful, dispirited, divided, discontented, with diminished patriotism, and the morals of a considerable portion of your people corrupted. Not so in war. In that state, the common danger unites all, strengthens the bonds of socTiety, and feeds the flame of patriotism. The national character mounts to energy. In exchange for the expenses and privations of war, you obtain military and naval skill, and a more perfect organization of such parts of your administration as are connected with the science of national defence. Sir, are these advantages to be counted as trifles in the present state of the world 1 Can they be measured by moneyed valuation 1 I would prefer a ^ngle victory over the enemy, by sea or land, to all the good we shall ever derive from the continuation of the Non-importation Act. I know not that a victory would pro- duce an equal pressure on the enemy ; but I am certain of what is of greater consequence, it would be accompanied by more salutary effects on ourselves. The memory of Saratoga, Princeton, and Eutaw is immortal. It is there you will find the country's boast and pride — the inexhaustible source of great and heroic sentiments. But what will history say of restriction ? What examples worthy of imitation will it furnish to posterity ? What pride, what pleasure, will our children find in the events of such times ? Let me not be considered romantic. This nation ought to be taught to rely on its courage, its fortitude, its skill and virtue, for protection. These are the only safeguards in the hour of danger. Man was endued with these great qualities for his defence. There is nothing about him that indicates that he is to conquer by endurance. He is not incrusted in a shell ; he is not taught to rely upon his insensibility, his passive suffering, for defence. No, sir ; it is on the invincible mind, on a magnanimous nature, he ought to rely. Here is the superiority of our kind ; it is these that render man the lord of the world. It is the destiny of his condi- tion that nations rise above nations, as they are endued in a greater degree with these brilliant qualities." But this is not the only instance in which Mr. Calhoun, at this early stage of his public life, manifested a spirit above party influence or control, that spirit which he has so often since exhibited, when duty and patriotism demand- ed it. No one appreciates more highly the value of party ties within proper limits, or adheres more firmly to his party within them, than he does. He never permits them to influence him beyond those necessary limits. Acting accord- ingly, he did not hesitate to give his cordial and warm support to a bill for the increase of the navy, reported by his able and distinguished colleague, who was then chairman of the Naval Committee, although, at and previous to that time, the great body of the Republican party was and had been opposed to it. It was owing to the decided support which it received Irom Mr. Cheeves, Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Lowndes, and Mr. Clay, and its brilliant achievements afterward (even then confidently anticipated by them), that it has since become with the whole Union the favourite arm of defence. As prominent as was the situation of Mr. Calhoun at the commencement of ithis eventful session, as the second on the most important committee, it became 12 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. still more so in its progress. The chairman, Mr. Porter, withdrew from Con- gress, and Mr. C. found himself at the head of the committee, which, in addition to its peculiar duties, was charged, by a vote of the House, with a large portion of those properly belonging to the Committee on Military Affairs. Few indi- viduals with so little parliamentary experience have ever been placed in so re- sponsible a situation. He had never before served in a deliberative body except for two short sessions in the Legislature of his own state, making together but nine weeks. With such limited experience, it is difficult to conceive a situ- ation of the kind more arduous than that in which he was placed at the head of such a committee at such a period, when party spirit was at its height and the opposition under the guidance of leaders distinguished for their talents and ex- perience ; and yet, so ample were his resources, and so great his aptitude for business, that he not only sustained himself, but acquired honour and distinc- tion for the ability with which he discharged the duties of his station. It will not be attempted to trace Mr. Calhoun's course through this laborious and long-to-be-remembered session. It is sufficient to say that "he exhibited throughout the same zeal and ability with which he commenced it. Near its close he reported and carried through the bill declaring war against Great Britain — a war under all circumstances fairly entitled to its appellation as the second war of independence. The proceedings were in secret session, con- trary to his 6pinion and wishes. Such was the brilliant career of Mr. Calhoun during his first session, and that under the most responsible and trying circumstances. Much of his suc- cess is to be attributed to his early and wise determination not to come forward till he had laid the foundation in a solid education, and fully prepared himself to act his part in life. Without them, the mere force of natural talents could not have carried him successfully through the difficulties he had to encounter at the outset of his congressional career. The declaration of war fixed the policy of the government for the time, and the discussions in Congress during its continuance turned, for the most part, on questions relating to the finances, the army, the navy, the mode of conducting the war, and its success and disasters. These gave rise to many warm and animated debates of deep interest and excitement at the time, and in most of which Mr. Calhoun took a prominent part, and fully sustained the reputation he had acquired for ability and eloquence ; but as the subjects were generally of a temporary character, and have long since lost much of their interest, the object of this sketch does not require that they should be particularly noticed. They will, accordingly, be passed in silence, and the notice of the events of the pe- riod confined to those that may be regarded as exceptions to the ordinary party discussions of the day. This course is the more readily adopted, because it is believed that the whole country is disposed to do ample justice to the patriot- ism, the intelligence, and ability with which he performed his part during this eventful period of our history. The first incident that will be noticed took place at the commencement of the session immediately succeeding the declaration of war. South Carolina had in that Congress an unusual number of men of talents : General D. R. Wil- hams, Langdon Cheves, William Lowndes, and the subject of this sketch, all of whom were entitled to prominent positions in the arrangement of commit- tees. Mr. Calhoun was the youngest. The speaker was embarrassed. There was a difficulty in placing so many from one state, and that a small one, at tho head of prominent committees, and Mr. Calhoun, with his characteristic disin- terestedness, cheerfully assented to be placed second on that at the head of which he had served with so much distinction at the preceding session. Mr. Smilie, an old and highly-respectable member from Pennsylvania, was placed at the head of the committee. At its first meeting the chairman, without pre- viously intimating his intention, moved that Mr. Calhoun shovdd be elected LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 13 chairman. He objected, and insisted that Mr. Smilie should act as chairman, and declared his perfect willingness to serve under him ; hut he was, notwith- standing, unanimously elected, and the strongest proof that could be given of the highly satisfactory manner in which he had previously discharged his duty was thus afforded. In this conviction, and as illustrative of the same disinterested character, when the speaker's chair became vacant by the appointment of Mr. Clay as one of the commissioners to negotiate for peace, Mr. Calhoun was so- licited by many of the most influential members of the party to become a can- didate for it; but he peremptorily refused to oppose his distinguished colleague, Mr. Cheves, who was elected. At an early period of the same session, a question out of the ordinary course, and which excited 'much interest at the time, became the subject of discussion, that of the merchants' bonds. The Non-importation Act (one of the restrictive measures) was in force when war was declared. Under its operation a large amount of capital had been accumulated abroad, and especially in England, the proceeds of exports that could not be returned in consequence of the prohibition of imports. The owners, when they saw war was inevitable, became alarmed, and gave orders for the return of their property. It came back, for the most part, in merchandise, which was subject to forfeiture under the act. The own- ers petitioned for the remission of the forfeiture, and permission to enter the goods on paying the war duties. The secretary of the treasury, on the other hand, proposed to remit the forfeiture on condition that the amount of the value of the goods should be loaned to the government by the owners. Mr. Cheves, who was at the head of the Committee of Ways and Means, reported in favour of the petition, and supported his report by an able speech. The question had assumed much of a party character, but it did not deter Mr. Calhoun from an independent exercise of his judgment. He believed that the act never con- templated a case of the kind, and that to enforce, under such circumstances, a forfeiture amounting to millions, which would embrace a large class of citizens, would be against the spirit of the criminal code of a free and enlightened peo- ple. But waving these more general views, he thought the only alternative was to remit the forfeiture, as prayed for by the owners, or to enforce it accord- ing to the provisions of the act : that, if the importation was such a violation as justly and properly incurred the forfeiture, then the act ought to be enforced ; but if not, the forfeiture ought to be remitted ; and that the government had no right, and if it had, it was unbecoming its dignity to convert a penal act into the means of making a forced loan. Thus thinking, he seconded the effort of his distinguished colleague, and enforced his views in a very able speech. The result was, that the forfeiture was remitted, and the goods admitted on paying duties in conformity to the course recommended by the committee. There was another case in wliich, at this period, he evinced his firmness and independence. The administration still adhered to the restrictive policy, and even after the war was declared the President recommended the renewal of the Embargo. Mr. Calhoun, as has been shown, opposed, on principle, the whole system as a substitute for war, and he was still more opposed to it as an auxiliary to it. He held it, in that light, not only as inefficient and delusive, but as calculated to impair the means of the country, and to divert a greater share of its capital and industry to manufactures than could be, on the return of peace, sustained by the government on any sound principles of justice or policy. He thought war itself, without restrictions, would give so great a stim- ulus, that no small embarrassment and loss would result on its termination, iti despite of all that could be done for them, while, at the same time, he expressed his v.'illingness, when peace canv;, to protect the establishments that might grow up during its continuance, as far as it could be fairly done. The Embargo failed on the first recommendation ; but, at the next session, oeing recommended again, it succeeded. Mr. Calhoun, at the earnest entreaties 14 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. of friends, and to prevent division in the party vvrhen their union was so neces- sary to the success of the war, gave it a reluctant vote. But the time was approaching when an opportunity would be afforded him to carry out successfully his views in reference to the restrictive system, and that with the concurrence of the party. The disasters of Bonaparte in the Rus- sian campaign, his consequent fall and dethronement in the early part of 1814, and the triumph of Great Britain, after one of the longest, and, altogether, the most remarkable contests on record, offered that opportunity, which he promptly seized. This great event, which terminated the Avar in Europe, left Great Brit- ain, flushed with victory, in full possession of all the vast resources, in men, money, and materials, by which she had brought that mighty conflict to a suc- cessful termination, to be turned against us. It was a fearful state of things ; but, as fearful as it was of itself, it was made doubly so by the internal condi- tion of the country, and the course of the opposition. Blinded by party zeal, they beheld with joy or indifference what was calculated to appal the patriotic. Forgetting the country, and intent only on a party triumph, they seized the op- portunity to embarrass the government. Their great effort was made against the Loan Bill — a measure necessary to carry on the war. Instead of support- ing it, they denounced the war itself as unjust and inexpedient ; and they pro- claimed its farther prosecution, in so unequal a contest, as hopeless, now that the whole power of the British Empire would be brought to bear against us. Mr. Calhoun replied in a manner highly ..characteristic of the man, undaunted, able, and eloquent. None can read this speech, even at this distance of time, ■ without kindling imder that elevated tone of feeling, which wisdom, emanating from a spirit lofty and self-possessed under the most trying circumstances, only can inspire. In order to show the justice and expediency of the war, he took an historical view of the maritime usurpations of Great Britain, from the cele- brated order in council of 1756, to the time of the discussion, and demon- strated that her aggressions were not accidental, or dependant on peculiar cir- cumstances, but were the result of a fixed system of policy, intended to estab- lish her supremacy on the ocean. After giving a luminous view of the origin and character of the wrongs we had suffered from her, he clearly showed the flimsiness of the pretext by which she sought to justify her conduct, as well as that of the opposition to excuse her, and dwelt upon the folly of hoping to ob- tain redress by sheathing the sword or throwing ourselves on her justice. The following extract, taken from the conclusion, will afford an example of his lofty and animating eloquence : " This country is left alone to support the rights of neutrals. Perilous is the condition, and arduous the task. We are not intimidated. We stand opposed to British usurpation, and, by our spirit and efforts, have done all in our power to save the last vestiges of neutral rights. Yes, our embargoes, non-inter- course, non-importation, and, finally, war, are all manly exertions to preserve the rights of this and other nations from the deadly grasp of British mari- *time policy. But (say our opponents) these efforts are lost, and our condi- tion hopeless. If so, it only remains for us to assume the garb of our condition. We must submit, humbly submit, crave pardon, and hug our chains. It is not wise to provoke where we cannot resist. But first let us be well assured of the hopelessness of our state before we sink into submission. On what do our op- ponents rest their despondent and slavish belief? On the recent events in Eu- rope ? I admit they are great, and well calculated to impose on the imagina- tion. Our enemy never presented a more imposing exterior. His fortune is at the flood. But I am admonished by universal experience, that such prosperity is the most precarious of human conditions. .From the flood the tide dates its ebb. From the meridian the sun commences his decline. Depend upon it, there is more of sound philosophy than of fiction in the fickleness which poets attribute to fortune. Prosperity has its weakness, adversity its strength. In LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. IS many respects our enemy has lost by those very changes which seem so very much in his favour. He can no more claim to be struggling for existence ; no more to be fighting the battles of the world in defence of the liberties of mankind. The magic cry of ' French influence' is lost. In this very hall we are not strangers to that sound. Here, even here, the cry of ' French influence,' that baseless fiction, that phantom of faction now banished, often resounded. I re- joice that the spell is broken by which it was attemptejd to bind the spirit of this youthful nation. The minority can no longer act under cover, but must come out and defend their opposition on its own intrinsic merits. Our example- can scarcely fail to produce iis effects on other nations interested in the main- tenance of maritime rights. But if, unfortunately, we should be left alone to maintain the contest, and if, which may God forbid, necessity should compel us to yield for the present, yet our generous efforts will not have been lost. A mode of thinking and a tone of sentiment havo gone abroad which must stimu- late to future and more successful struggles. What could not be effected with eight millions of people will be done with twenty. The great cause will never be yielded — no, never, never ! Sir, I hear the future audibly announced in the past — in the splendid victories over the Guerriere, Java, and Macedonian. We, and all nations, by these victories, are taught a lesson never to be forgotten. Opinion is power. The charm of British naval invincibility is gone." Such was the animated strain by which Mr. Calhoun roused the spirit of the government and country under a complication of adverse circumstances cal- culated to overwhelm the feeble and appal the stoutest. Never faltering, never doubting, never despairing of the Republic, he was at once the hope of the party and the beacon light to the country. But he did not limit his efforts to repelling the attacks of the opposition, and animating the hopes of the government and country. He saw that the very events which exposed us to so much danger, made a mighty change in the po- litical and commercial relations of Continental Europe, which had been so long closed against foreign commerce, in consequence of the long war that grew out of the French Revolution, and of those hostile orders and decrees of the two great belligerents, which had for many years almost annihilated all lawful com- merce between the Continent of Europe and the rest of the world. The events that dethroned Bonaparte put an end to that state of things, and left all the pow- ers of Europe free to resume their former commercial pursuits. He saw in all this that the time had come to free the government entirely from the shackles of the restrictive system, to which he had been so long opposed ; and he, according- ly, followed up his speech by a bill to repeal the Embargo and the Non-importa- tion Act. He rested their repeal on the groimd that they were a portion of the restrictive policy, and showed that the ground on which it had been heretofore sustained was, that it was a pacific policy, growing out of the extraordinary state of the world at the time it was adopted, and, of course, dependant on the continuance of that state. " It was a time," he said, " when every power ou the Continent was arrayed against Great Britain, under the overwhelming influ • ence of Bonaparte, and no country but ours interested in maintaining neutral rights. The fact of all, the Continental ports being closed against her, gave to our restrictive measures an efiicacy which they no longer had, now that they were open to her." He admitted that the system had been continued too long, and been too far extended, and that he was opposed to it as a substitute for war, but contended that there would be no inconsistency on the part of the government in abandoning a policy founded on a state of things which no longer existed. " But now," said he, " the Continental powers are neutrals, as between us and Great Britain. We are contendinsr for the freedom of trade, and ought to use every exertion to attach to our cause Russia, Sweden, Hol- land, Denmark, and all other nations which have an interest in the freedom of the seas. The maritime rights assumed by Great Britain infringe on the 16 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. rights of all neutral powers, and if we should now open our ports and trade to the nations of the Continent, it would involve Great Britain in a very awkward and perplexing dilemma. She must either permit us to enjoy a very lucrative commerce with them, or, by attempting to exclude them from our ports by her system of paper blockades, she would force them to espouse our cause. The option which would thus be tendered her would so embarrass her as to produce a stronger desire for peace than ten years' continuance of the present sy.stem, inoperative as it is now rendered by a change of circumstances." These views had the desired effect, and the bill passed. The subsequent session (that of 1814-1.5) was the last of the war sessions. It was short, terminating on the 4th of March. It was one of much excite- ment, but was principally distinguished /or the project of a bank, submitted by the administration, and intended for the relief of the financial difficulties of the government. Upon this measure Mr. Calhoun differed from the administration and a large portion of the party. It so happened that he was detained at home by sickness, and did not take his seat for several weeks alter the commencement of the session, and his place as chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations was filled by the late secre- tary of state, Mr. Forsyth. He found, on his arrival, the plan of a bank agreed on, and he was especially requested by the secretary of the treasury, with whom he had the kindest relations, and several members of the Committee of Ways and Means, to give it his particular attention, which he promised to do. His predisposition was strongly in favour of a bank of some kind. It was then generally thought to be indispensable to the prosecution of the war. With this disposition, and a strong desire to meet what were the views of the secretary and the administration, and of his friends on the Ways and Means, he took up the plan for examination. The whole subject of banking, theoretically and practically, was, in a great measure, new to him. He had never given it a serious and careful examination, and his mind, though favourably disposed to the plan, was open to the reception of truth. The leading features of the plan were a bank of $50,000,000 of capital, to consist, with the exception of a few millions of specie, entirely of the stock is- sued by the government for loans made to carry on the war. It was not to pay specie during the war, nor till three years after its termination, and was to lend the government, whenever required, $30,000,000, at six per cent., to carry on the war. With all his prepossessions in its favour, he was soon struck by the fact, that the great leading object was to create a machine for lending money, not on the means or credit of the bank, or the individuals to be incorporated, but of the government itself ; for the bank would not be bound to pay its notes, and would have little or nothing on which to lend but the stock of the govern- ment. The whole contrivance was, virtually, under the specious show of a loan, for the government to borrow back its own credit at six per cent., for ■which it had already stipulated to pay a high interest — not less, on an average, than eight per cent. Those who had lent the government, alleging that they had loaned all they had, modestly proposed to lend it, on its own credit, as much as it might need to carry on the war, if it would incorporate them under the magic name of " a bank," exempt them from the payment of their debts as a corporation, give them the use of the public money, and not only endorse their notes by receiving them for its dues, but also pay them away as money in their disbursements. It was impossible for a mind constituted as Mr. Calhoun's not to see the •whole effects of the scheme, or to give its assent to it, by whomsoever contri- ved, or by whatever name called. To him, no alternative was left but to sac- rifice his judgment, or to diffee from the administration and many of his friends ■who were anxious to have his support ; but, as responsible and painful as was the alternative, he did not hesitate. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 17 When the bill came up he opposed it in a speech, in which he briefly stated his objections ; and such was its effect that, though the measure had the support of the administration, and the whole of the Committee of Ways and Means but one, it was struck out, and the amendment he proposed was substituted by aa overvvhelmino' majority. His substitute was, that the government should use its own credit directly in the shape of treasury notes, to be issued to meet ts wants, and to be funded in the bank in the form of stock at six per cent. ; that the bank should be bound to pay its notes at all times, and should make the (government no loans but short ones, in anticipation of its current revenue. By the issue of treasury notes, to be funded in the bank, he proposed to obtain the immediate supplies to carry on the government ; and, by establishing a specie-paying bank, under proper restrictions, he hoped to sustain a strong po- sition, from which the currency, then consisting, south of New-England, exclu- sively of the notes of suspended banks, might be restored to the specie standard on the return of peace. His substitute was, in its turn, defeated. Two other bills, differently modified, were successively introduced, and were both defeat- ed — one by the casting vote of the speaker, Mr. Cheeves, and the other by the President, who vetoed it on the ground that, as modified, it would not afford the relief required by the treasury. The crreater part of the session had been spent in these various attempts to pass a bill, and many who entirely agreed with Mr. Calhoun in his view of the subject, and had stood fast by him at first, now yielded to the pressure. Finally, a rally was made, a short time before the close of the session, to pass a bill, and it was again introduced in the Senate much im- proved in some of its objectionable features, but still defective enough to prevent him and the friends who stood by him from giving it their sup- port. It speedily passed that body, and was sent to the House, where it was pressed through to its passage with all possible despatch. On the question of ordering it to the third reading, Mr. Calhoun made a few re- marks, in which he warned the House against adopting a measure which a great majority decidedly disapproved, but for which they were prepared to vote under a supposed necessity, which did not exist. He concluded hj saying that the bill was so objectionable that, were it not for the sup- posed necessity, if, for instance, the news of peace should arrive before its passage, it would not receive fifteen votes, and concluded by saying that he would reserve a full statement of his objections to the bill for the ques- tion on the passage to be taken the next day, when he intended to make a final stand against it, and appeal to the public for the vindication of his course. At the time there was not the slightest rumour or indication of peace, and no one expected it. On the contrary, every indication was, that the Avar would be pushed with vigour in the approaching campaign. The attack had been made on New-Orleans, and by every mail it was ex- pected to hear of its fate ; and yet, strange as it may seem, that very day. subsequent to the adjournment of the House, a despatch, sent on by a mer- cantile house in New-York, to be forwarded by the mail to the South to its agents, arrived in the city, with the intelligence that a vessel had come in after the departure of the mail, bringing the treaty of peace. The member to whom it was sent was so struck with the coincidence, that he informed Mr. Calhoun of the fact in confidence. By some means, a rumour got out that there was a late arrival at New-York bringing important in- telligence. Next day the friends of the bill made an effort to push it through before the arrival of the mail in the afternoon. Mr. Calhoun moved to lay the bill on the table, saying that there was a hope that the mail from New-York, which would arrive in a few hours, might bring in- telligence that would have an important bearing on the bill. The vote on his motion verified his prediction. The mail arrived with the treaty of C 18 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. peace. It was then proposed to him to modify the bill in conformity with his views, if he would withdraw his opposition. He refused, and demanded other and severer restrictions than those which he had hereto- fore proposed. An attempt was then made to take up the bill and pass it, which failed by a large majority. It was thus his sagacity and firmness, under the most trying circum- stances, against the whole weight of the administration, defeated a meas- ure, which, if it had been adopted as first proposed, would have been fol- lowed by consequences more disastrous than could well be anticipated. He had the satisfaction to receive the thanks of many of the members for its defeat, who but a short time before were ready to denounce him for his resistance to it. It is now to be regretted that none of Mr. Calhoun's speeches against the measure were published. He declined publishing at the time on the ground that his object was to defeat the bill, but to do so without distracting the party or impairing confidence in the administra- tion, on which the success of the war so much depended. For that rea- son, he not only avoided publishing, but bore patiently the denunciations daily levelled against him for his opposition to the bill. On all other measures of the session he gave the administration an active and hearty support. It was, indeed, a rule with him, when compelled to differ from his party on an important measure, to limit his opposition strictly to the measure itself, and to avoid, both in manner and matter, all that could by possibility give offence. By a rigid observance, too, of this rule, he suc- ceeded in maintaining his individual opinion in reference to all important questions on which he difiered from his party without weakening his standing with them. The transition from a state of v/ar to that of peace gave rise to many important questions, the most prominent of which grew out of the finances and the currency. At the succeeding session, Mr. Lowndes and BIr. Cal- houn were placed at the head of the committees which had charge of these important subjects; Mr. Lowndes was made chairman of the Ways and Means, and Mr. Calhoun, from the prominence he had acquired at the pre- ceding session on the Bank Question, was appointed chairman of that on. currency. The most prominent question connected with the finances was that of the readjustment of the duties on the imposts. The duties had been doubled at the commencement of the Avar, and the question now presented was, how much they should be reduced. It was one that took in the whole range of the future policy of the government, and involved the considera- tion of many important subjects ; the military and naval establishments, the debt, and the new direction given to a large amount of the capital and industry of the country in consequence of the war, the Embargo, the Non- importation, and Non-intercourse Acts, which preceded it. These, in turn, involved the question of our foreign relations in all their bearings. After a survey of the whole ground, the Committee of Ways and Means reported the bill, with the full concurrence of the administration, which passed with but few changes, and has since been called the Tariff of 1816. Few measures have been less understood or more misrepresented. It has been the general impression that the duties were adjusted by the bill mainly in reference to the protection of manufactures. Such is far from being the fact. With the exception of a few items, such as the minimum duty on coarse cottons, the duties on rolled iron, and, perhaps, one or two more, the duties would have been arranged substantially as they were if there had not been a manufacturing establishment in the whole country. It was in other respects a revenue bill, proposed and reported by the committee to whom the subject of revenue properly belonged, and regu- lated in its details, with the few exceptions referred to, by revenue con- siderations. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 19 • The first great question in the adjusting of the duties was, what amount of revenue Avould the future policy of the country require 1 And, in de- cidino- that, the leading question was, whether the public debt should be rapidly or slowly paid 1 In this decision were involved, not only the ques- tion of the policy of freeing the government as soon as possible from debt, but also the collateral effects of such a process on the country under the particular circumstances of the case. In that view, the effects which raising the duties, with a view to the speedy discharge of the debt, would have m sustaining the manufacturing establishments which had grown up under the war, and the restrictive system preceding it, served to create a strong motive for adopting that policy, and for fixing the duties as high as they stand in the act. In conformity with this policy, an efficient sink- ing fund of $10,000,000 annually was provided for the payment of the prmcipal and interest of the debt, with the proviso that all moneys re- maining in the treasury at the end of each year exceeding' $2,000,000 should be carried to its aid. It was in reference to these views, and the necessity of providing for the military and naval establishments on a scale sufficiently extended for the public service, that the details of the bill and the rates of the duties were mainly adjusted, and not solely or principally for the protection of manufactures, as has been erroneously supposed. If proof is required, conclusive evidence will be found in the bill itself, which imposes a much lower average rate of duties on what are now called the protected articles, that is, articles similar to those made at home, or which may come into competition with them, than upon the other descriptions. Nor has the course of Mr. Calhoun in reference to it been less misun- derstood or misrepresented than the measure itself. He has frequently "been called the author of the protective system. Nothing is more untrue. He was not on the committee, and took no part in the discussion, except to make a short off-hand speech at the request of a friend, at a particular stage of the debate. He was engrossed Avith the duties 'of his own com- mittee, and had bestowed but little attention to the details of the bill. He concurred in the general views and policy in which it originated, and the more readily because it would sustain the manufacturing establishments that had grown up under the war-measures of the government. Shortly after he came into Congress, he had anticipated, as has been stated, the dif- ficulty that would be occasioned by the new direction which so consider- able a portion of the capital and labour of the country had taken ; and, while he professed a disposition at the time to do what could be legiti- mately done to support them on the return of peace, yet he used his best efforts to diminish the necessity, as far as practicable, by removing every Temnant of the restrictive system during the war. He did not then, nor do we believe that he has since doubted that, in deciding whether the debt should be more speedily or more tardily discharged, the favourable effects which the former mode-would have in sustaining the manufacturing estab- lishments Avas, under the circumstances of the case, a legitimate and prop- er consideration. But truth and candour require us to say, that, as far as the details of the bill Avent beyond, and raised the duties above the rev- enue point, Avith the vieAV to protection, as on our coarse cottons and rolled iron, he has long believed it to be unconstitutional, unjust, and un- wise. The subject Avas new, and his attention was draAvn to other sub- jects, and he did not take the proper distinction between duties for revenue and for protection, nor Avas it, as it is believed, taken at the time by any one. He Avho Avill examine Mr. Calhoun's remarks on the occasion Avill not fail to perceive that the support he gave the bill looked, not to what has since been called the protective policy, but almost A\^holly to consid- erations of a public character connected ~*'th the foreign relations of the 20 LIFE OF JOHN" C CALHOUN. country, and the danger resulting from war to a country, as ours was then, in a great measure, dependant on agriculture and commerce with foreign nations, without the requisite naval power to keep open in war the chan- nels of trade with the rest of the world. In fact, it is difficult at this time, in the changed condition of the country and the world, to realize the circumstances under which the public men of that day acted, and the mo tives which guided them. To do so, we must go back to the history of that period. A just and necessary war had been honourably terminated with the greatest power in the world, after a short but perilous struggle. The violent and unpat- riotic course of the opposition during the war had so discredited it, that the name and doctrines of the Federal party, once so respectable, had be. come odious. After the war, they ceased to use their old name, or to avow their doctrines as a party ; and the long struggle between them and their principles and policy, and the Republican party and their principles and policy, was supposed to have finally terminated in the ascendency of the latter. The impression was almost universal, that the danger to our popular system of government from the Federal consolidation doctrines was ended. The only cause of danger to the country and its institutions was then supposed to be from abroad. The overthrow of Bonaparte was followed throughout Europe by a powerful reaction against the popular principles on which our government rests, and to which, through the in- fluence of our example, the French Revolution was traced. To counter- act their influence, and to put down effectually their revival in Europe, a league of all the great Continental monarchs was formed, called the Holy Alliance. Great Britain did not expressly accede to it, but countenanced and supported it. Our country of all the world stood alone in opposi- tion, and became an object of the deepest jealousy. The Spanish prov- inces of South America, it is true, were in a revolutionary state, and struggling to form governments similar to ours. It Avas known that this formidable combination of crowned heads meditated hostile move- ments against them on political grounds, which could not be made with- out involving us. In such a state of the world, well might the patriots of that day be roused to the dangers from without, almost to the neg- lect of those from within. Had events taken the course Avhich then seem- ed so probable, much that was then said and done, which now seems to require explanation, would have been regarded as profoundly wise. This is pre-eminently true of Mr. Calhoun's course. Always AMgilant and soli- citous for the safety and prosperity of the country, he kept his eyes steadily directed, at that critical period, to the point from Avhich he and all then thought the country Avas menaced, and VA'as active and zealous in giving such a direction to the policy of the government, for the time, as was best calculated to meet it. During this period, he spoke at large on the subject of defence against external danger, in a speech delivered on the subject of the repeal of the direct taxes, and which, for its eloquence, ability, and lofty and patriotic sentiments, gained him great applause. To the same cause may be traced his course, and that of the great body of the party at the time, on most of the subjects in reference to Avhich different vieAvs are now entertained by them, and, among others, on that of internal improvements. On that subject, as AA'-ell as upon the tariff, his vieAvs have been much misunderstood as Avell as misrepresented. Of these vicAVs a brief explanation may here be important. During the war, Avhile the coasting trade Avas interrupted, the AA'hole in ternal commercial intercourse, and the military transportations and move- ments over our widely-extended country, had to pass through internal routes, then in a state far less perfect than at present, and the difficulties ^/ y LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 21 were immense. Great delay, uncertainty, and expense attended the con- centration of any considerable force or supply on a point where the de- fence of the country or an attack on the enemy made it necessary. This greatly enfeebled our military operations, and contributed much to ex- haust the means of the government. So great were the expense and dif- ficulties, that it is estimated, for example, that much of the flour delivered at Detroit during the war cost $60 per barrel, and most of the cannon and ball transported to the lakes not less than 50 cents per pound. At the commencement of the first session after the war, while the rec- ollection of these things was fresh, Mr. Madison, in his opening message, among other things, invited the attention of Congress to the subject of internal improvements, and recommended Congress to call into exercise whatever constitutional power it might possess over the subject, and if that should not prove adequate, to apply for an amendment to the Con- stitution granting such additional powers as would be sufficient. Mr. Calhoun, acting, as he supposed, in strict conformity to this recommenda- tion, reported a bill at the next session, to set apart and pledge the bonus of the United States Bank and their share of its dividends as a fund for internal improvement. It made no appropriation, nor did it intend to af- firm that Congress had any power, much less to fix the limits of its power, over the subject ; but to leave both, as well as the appropriations thereaf- ter to be made, to abide the decision of Congress, in conformity with the President's views. Nor did Mr. C. undertake to establish either in his speech. He declined both, and confined his remarks to the general ben- efit of a good system of internal improvements. When urged to assert the power of Congress, he refused, saying that, although he believed it possessed the power to a certain extent, he was not prepared to say to what limits it extended. He had not the least suspicion, in reporting and supporting the bill, that he went beyond the President's recommendation, or that he would have any difficulty in approving it, till the bill had pass- ed both Houses, and was sent to him for his signature. It was Mr. Madison's last session, and only a few days before its termi- nation, when the bill was sent to him ; and while it was still before him, Mr. Calhoun called to take his leave of him. After congratulating him on the success of his administration, and expressing the happiness he felt in having had the opportunity of co-operating with him in its most difficult period, that of the w^ar, he took his leave. When he reached the door, Mr. Madison requested him to return. He did so, and took his seat ; and for the first time Mr. M. disclosed to him his constitutional objections to the bill. Mr. Calhoun expressed his deep regret, first, that he should en- tertain them, and, next, that he had not intimated them to him in time, saying that, if he had, he (Mr. Calhoun) would certainly not have subject- ed him to the unpleasant duty, at the very close of his administration, of vetoing a bill passed by the votes of his friends, nor himself to having the Aveight of his name and authority brought against him on such a subject. He t|ien stated that he had introduced the bill, as he believed, in strict con- formity to his recommendation, and if he had gone beyond, .it was not in- tentional, and entreated him to reconsider the subject j but it was'too late. In this connexion, it is due to candour to state, that although Mr. Cal- houn has never committed himself, in any speech or report, as to the ex- tent of the constitutional powers of Congress over internal improvements, yet his impression, like that of most of the yovmg men of the party at the time, Avas, that it was comprehended under the money-power of the gov- ernment. Experience and reflection soon taught him this was an error — one, in all probability, originating with him, and others of his own age, in the precedent of the Cumberland Road, which may be regarded as the first 22 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. departure by the Kepublican party from the true construction of the Con- stitution in reference to that dangerous power. Thus much it has been thought proper to state by way of explanation, and as due to that por- tion of our political history, and the part which Mr. Calhoun acted in re- laion to it. The subject of the currency, as has been stated, was particularly in- trusted to Mr. Calhoun. It was regarded as the most difficult and impor- tant question of the session. All the banks of the states south of New- England had, at an early period of the war, stopped payment, and gold and silver had entirely disappeared, leaving within their limits no other cur rency than the notes of banks that either would not or could not redeem them. Government was forced to submit, and not only to collect its taxes and dues, and make its disbursements, and negotiate its loans in their dis- credited and depreciated paper, but also to use them, at the same time, as the agents of the treasury and depositories of its funds. At first the de- preciation was inconsiderable, but it continued to increase, though une- qually, in the different portions of the Union to the end of the war. It was then hoped it would stop ; but the fact proved far otherwise ; for the progress of depreciation became more rapid and unequal than ever. It was greatest at the centre (the District of Columbia and the adjacent re- gion), where it had reached 20 per cent., as compared with Boston ; nor was there the least prospect that it would terminate of itself. It became absolutely necessary, in this state of things, for the government to adopt the rule of collecting its taxes and dues in the local currency of the place, to prevent that which was most depreciated from flooding the whole Union ; for the public debtors, if they had the option, would be sure to pay in the most depreciated. But the necessary effect of this was to turn the whole import trade of the country towards the Chesapeake Bay, the region where the depreciatioii was the greatest. By making entry there, the duties could be paid in the local depreciated currency, and the goods t^ 3n o.. ed where they were wanted. The result of the rule, though n.iavoidable, was to act as a premium for depreciation. It was impossible to tolerate such a state of things. It was in direct hostility to the Con- stitution, which provides that " all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States," and that " no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over another." Thus the only question was, What shall be done ■? The administration was in favour of a bank, and the President (Mr. Madison) recommended one in his Message at the commencement of the session. The great body of the Republican party in Congress concurred in the views of the administration, but there were many of them who had, on constitutional grounds, insuperable objections to the measure. These, added to the Federal party, who had been against the war, and were, in consequence, against a bank, constituted a formidable opposition. Mr. Calhoun, whose first lesson on the subject of banks, taken at the preceding session, was not calculated to incline him to such an institution, was averse, ii) the abstract, to the whole system ; but perceiving then no other way of relieving government from its difficulties, he yielded to the opinion that a bank was indispensable. The separation of the govern- ment and tli(j banks was at that time out of the question. A proposition of the kind would have been rejected on all sides. Nor was it possible then to collect the taxes and dues of the government in specie. It had been almost entirely expelled the country j there appeared to be no alter- native but to yield to a state of things to which no radical remedy could at that time be applied, and to resort to a bank to mitigate the evils of a system which in its then state was intolerable. This, at least, was the LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 23 view which Mr. Calhoun took, and which he expressed in his speech on takin«y up the bill for discussion. It is said to have been one of the most elaborate and powerful he ever delivered. Unfortunately, it is lost. That published at the time is a meager sketch of what took three hours in the delivery, and such as it is, never passed under his review and correction, and omits almost entirely all that does not immediately refer to the bank. The passage of the Bank Bill was followed by the joint resolution of 1816, which prohibited, after a certain day, the reception of the notes of any bank which did not pay specie. It received the decided support of Mr. Calhoun, and was the first step towards the separation of the govern- ment from the banking system. Through the joint agency of the two measures, the currency was brought to the specie standard, and the evil remedied. During the same session a bill was passed changing the per diem pay of members of Congress into an annual compensation of $ 1500. It proved to be exceedingly unpopular ; so much so, that the greater part of the members who voted for it declined offering for re-election, and those who were ao-ain candidates, with few exceptions, were defeated at the polls. Mr. Calhoun voted for the bill, though he took but little part or interest in its passage. When he returned to his constituents, he found, for the first time the tide of popular favour against him. So strong was the current, that his two predecessors, who had retired in his favour. General Butler and Colonel Calhoun, the latter a near relative, were both violently opposed to him, and the former came out as a candidate against him. They were both men of great influence, the one residing at Edgefield, the other in Ab- beville, and these two formed the Congressional district. Only a few faith- ful friends ventured openly to vindicate his vote. He was advised to ap- peal to the kind feelings of his constituents, and apologize for his course. This he peremptorily declined, declaring that he had voted for the meas- ure because he believed it was right, and could not, as his opinion remain- ed unchanged, apologize for that which his judgment approvec:. i^^He a!\^ ded, at the same time, that all he asked was, that his constituents shouM give him a hearing in explanation of his vote. A day was appointed in each of the districts for him to address them at the courthouses. He met and addressed them accordingly. In his two speeches he confined himself to the merits of the question, without apology or appeal to sym- pathy, but with such force, candour, and manliness, that the tide was com- pletely turned, and he was triumphantly re-elected. At the next session of Congress a bill was introduced to repeal the act. It gave rise to an animated and interesting debate, in which Mr. Calhoun took part, and entered fully into the merits of the measure, and the reasons which governed him in voting for it. An estimate may be formed of the ability of the speech from the following compliment bestow- ed upon it by Mr. Grosvenor, of New- York, one of the ablest and most dis- tinguished members of the House, on the opposite side in politics. To understand the allusion which he made, and to appreciate the full force of the compliment, it is proper to premise that there had been a personal difference between him and Mr. Calhoun in one of the secret sessions during the war, since which they had not been on speaking terms. Mr. Grosvenor said, " He had heard, with peculiar satisfaction, the able, manly, and constitutional speech of the gentleman from South Carolina." [Here Mr. Grosvenor, recurring in his own mind to their personal difference with Mr. Calhoun, Avliich arose out of the warm party discussions during the war, paused for a moment, and then proceeded] : " Mr. Speaker, I will not be restrained. No barrier shall exist which 1 will not leap over for the purpose of offering to that gentleman my thanks for the judicious, in- 24 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. dependent, and national course which he has pursued in this House for the last two years, and particularly upon the subject now before us. Let the honourable gentleman continue with the same manly independence, aloof from party views and local prejudices, to pursue the great interests of his country, and fulfil the high destiny for which it is manifest he was born. The buzz of popular applause may not cheer him on his way, but he will inevitably arrive at a high and happy elevation in the view of his country and the world." He made another effort about the same time on the treaty-making pow er, of which William Pinckney, the distinguished advocate, at that time a member of the House from Maryland, and who followed in the debate, said, " The strong power of genius, from a higher region than that of ar- gument, had thrown on the subject all the light with Avhich it is the pre- rogative of genius to invest and illustrate everything 5" and still more directly, " The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) has exhaust- ed the correct constitutional grounds of the question, and left me nothing but to recapitulate his arguments." After taking an active and influential part in all the great questions which grew out of the transition from a state of war to that of peace, both at this and the preceding session, he began to turn his attention to- wards correcting the abuses which existed in the administrative branches of the government, and more especially towards the disbursements, in which great looseness and profusion had prevailed during the war. He had ever been the advocate of rigid economy and accountability in the use of the public money, and had resolved thenceforward to devote him- self to their enforcement Avhile he remained in Cons^ress. The first thinjr that he struck at was the dangerous power which had been given to the President, of transferring appropriations, at his discretion, from one branch of service to another, in the war and navy departments ; thereby con- verting, in effect, specific into general appropriations, and subjecting them, in a great measure, to his control. The evil had become so inveterate that it could not all at once be extirpated. The chairman of the Commit- tee of Ways and Means, and the Secretary of the Treasury, both opposed the repeal of the act which authorized such transfers, but he neverthe- less succeeded, against their opposition, in imposing important limitations on the power. This was among his last Congressional acts. CHAPTER III. Including the Period during his Administration of the War Department. Shortly before the meeting of Congress at the next session, he re- ceived an invitation from Mr. Monroe to take a place in his cabinet as Secretary of War. It was unsolicited and une:xpected His friends, with, some exceptions, advised against his acceptance, on the ground that Coa- gress was the proper theatre for his talents ; Mr. Lowndes concurred m this advice, and, among other reasons, urged that his improvement in speaking had been such that he was desirous to see the degree of einia nence he Avould reach by practice. Indeed, the prevailing opinion at the time Avas, that his talent lay more in the power of thought than action. His great powers of analysis and generalization were calculated to a^ake the impression, which was not uncommon at the time, that his mind wa* more metaphysical than practical, and that he would lose reputation ia taking charge of a department, especially one in a state of such dlsotd^t LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. • 25 and confusion as the war department was then. The reasons assigned by his friends served but to confirm Mr. Calhoun in the opinion that he ought to accept. He believed the impression of his friends was erroneous as to the character of his mind 5 but if not, if his powers lay rather in thinking and speaking than in execution, it Avas but the more necessary he should exercise them in the latter, and thereby strengthen them where they were naturally the weakest. He also believed that he could render more service to the country in reforming the great disbur- sing department of government, admitted to be in a state of much disor- der, than he could possibly do by continuing in Congress, where most of the great questions growing out of a return to a state of peace had been discussed and settled. Under the influence of these motives, he accept- ed the proffered appointment, and entered on the duties of the depart- ment early in December, 1817. Thus, after six years of distinguished services in Congress, during which Mr. Calhoun boje a prominent and efficient part in originating and sup- porting all the measures necessary to carry the country through one of the most trying and difficult periods of its existence, and had displayed throughout great ability as a legislator and a speaker, we find him in a new scene, where his talents for business and administration for the first time are to be tried. He took possession of his department at the most unfavourable period. Congress was in session, when much of the time of the secretary is necessarily occupied in meeting the various calls for information from the two Houses, and attending to the personal applica- tion of the members on the business of their constituents. Mr, Graham, the chief clerk, an able and experienced officer, retired shortly afterward, and a new and totally inexperienced successor had to be appointed in his place. The department was almost literally without organization, and everything in a state of confusion. Mr. Calhoun had paid but little at- tention to military subjects in any of their various branches. He had never read a treatise on the subject, except a small volume on the Staff. In this absence of information, he determined at once to do as little as possible at first, and to be a good listener and a close observer till he could form a just conception of the actual state of the department and what was necessary to be done. Acting on this prudent rule, he heard all and observed everything, and reflected on and digested all that he heard and saw. In less than three months he became sa well acquainted with the state of the department, and what was required to be done, that he drew up himself, Avithout consultation, the bill for organizing it on the bureau principle, and succeeded in getting it through Congress against a formidable opposition, who denounced it as wild and impracticable. But, on the contrary, this organization has been proved to be so perfect, that it has remained unchanged through all the vicissitudes and numerous changes of parties till this time, a period of twenty-five years. But that was only the first step. The most perfect system is of little value without able and faithful officers to carry it into execution. The President, under his advice, selected to fill the several bureaus such offi- cers as had the confidence of the army for ability and integrity, and pos- sessing an aptitude of talent for the service of the bureau for which they were respectively selected. With each of these Mr. Calhoun associated a junior officer, having like qualifications, for his assistant. But, to give effect to the system, one thing was still wanting — a code of rules for the department and each of its bureaus, in order to give imiformity, consist- ency, efficacy, and stability to the whole. These he prepared, with the assistance of the heads of the respective bureaus, under the provision of the bill for the organization of the department, which gave the secretary D 26 , LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. the power to establish rules not inconsistent with existing laws. They form a volume of considerable size, which, like the act itself, remains sub- stantially the same, though, it is to be feared, too often neglected in prac- tice by some of his successors. All this was completed in the course of a few months after the passage of the act, and the system put into active operation. It worked without a jar. In a short time its fruits began to show themselves in the increased ef- ficiency of the department and the correction of abuses, many of which were of long standing. To trace his acts through the period of more than seven years, during which Mr. Calhoun remained in the war-office, would be tedious, and occupy more space than the object of this sketch would justify. The results, which, after all, are the best tests of the system and the efficiency of an administration, must be taken as a substitute. Suffice it, then, to say, that when he came into office, he found it in a state of chaos, and left it, even in the opinion of opponents, in complete organiza- tion and order. An officer of high standing and a competent judge pro- nounced it the most perfectly organized and efficient military establish- ment for its size in the world. He found it with upward of $40,000,000 of imsettled accounts, many of them of long standing, going back almost to the origin of the government, and he reduced them to less than three millions, which consisted, for the most part, of losses, and accounts that never can be settled. He prevented all current accumulation, by a prompt and rigid enforcement of accountability ; so much so, that he was enabled to report to Congress in 1823, that " of the entire amount of money drawn from the treasury in 1822 for military service, including pensions amount- ing to $4,571,961 94, although it passed through the hands of 291 dis- bursing officers, there has not been a single defalcation, nor the loss of a single cent to the government." He found the army proper, including the Military Academy, costing annually more than $451 per man, including of- ficers, professors, and cadets, and he left the cost less than $287 ; or, to do more exact justice to his economy, he diminished such parts of the cost per man as were susceptible of reduction by an efficient administration, excluding pay and such parts as were fixed in moneyed compensation by law, from $299 to $150. All this was effected by wise reforms, and not by parsimony (for he was liberal, as many supposed, to a fault) in the qual- ity and quantity of the supplies, and not by a fall of prices ; for in making the calculation, allowance is made for the fall or rise of prices on every article of supply. The gross saving on the army was $1,300,000 annu- ally, in an expenditure which reached $4,000,000 when he came into the department. This does not include the other branches of service, the ord- nance, the engineer and Indian bureaus, in all of which a like rigid econ- omy and accountability were introduced, with similar results in saving to the government. These great improvements were made under adverse circumstances. Party excitement ran high during the period, and Mr. Calhoun came in for his full share of opposition and misrepresentation, which may be explained "by the fact that his name had been presented as a candidate for the pres- idency. He was often thwarted in his vicAvs and defeated in his meas- ures, and was made for years the subject of almost incessant attacks in Congress, against which he had to defend himself, but with such com- plete success, finally, as to silence his assailants. They had been kept constantly informed of every movement in his department susceptible of misconstruction or of being turned against him. One of the representa- tives, who boarded in the same house with his principal assailant, offered to disclose to Mr. Calhoun the channel through which his opponents in Congress derived the information on which they based their attacks. Mr. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ps to General Jackson and Mr. Calhoun, who were elected by a large majority «vf the whole electoral college. His inauguraV address was received with enthusiasm by the people of the state, and strong Vopes were entertained that their expectations upon his elec- * tion would be fu^r realized, and the necessity of resorting to the ultimate remedy of the Constitution avoided ; but his first message, at the commence- ment of the next session, went far to extinguish their hopes. Here we reach a peri'^d of history of Avhich it will be difficult to treat with- out reviving some recollettion of the unfortunate difference which, for a time, divided the Republican parvy, now so happily united in the defence of their common principles and of coiHtitutional liberty. But, referring to the past, as we shall for its facts, and not for its feelings, we shall endeavour to give so much of this history as is indispensable to an explanation of Mr. Calhoun's con- nexion with political affairs, as it will hereafter be written by some impartial hand — an effort which, we trust, may not be imacceptable to the great actors LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 37 of that day, if they should find it but a cahn and dispassionate review of those trying and eventful scenes in which they bore so prominent a part. To sup- pose that any man would recoil from the truth of history is to attribute to him the meanest and most unmanly of fears — an injustice which no motives of false delicacy would make us even seem to oiler to those whom we respect as friends. In discharging our duty as chroniclers, we shall not presume to decide upon the merits of past disputes, as our immediate object may be accomplished with- out entering upon that delicate ground. In stating the opinions and course of Mr. Calhoun, it is not always with a view of justifying them, and we may dis- approve some features in the policy of President Jackson without doubting his ; motives, or disparaging his great abilities and eminent public services. Each of these great men is too deservedly proud of the past to wish to disguise or conceal any portion of that history upon which he rests his pretensions for fame ; and the hishest evidence of a nolole nature is that candour which receives truth without offence Avhenever it is truthfully told. Now that the fires of old feuds have burned out, and the excitement of the time has passed away, we doubt not but that each will look upon the past without passion and with impartiality. But to resume the thread of our narrative. The first message of the Presi- dent, in December, 1829, did not remove the apprehensions Avhich heretofore had weighed so heavily upon Mr. Calhoun's mind — apprehensions which then seemed the more exaggerated as he, perhaps, was the or«ly man of the time who measured, in their full extent, the consequences of a system against which he was destined soon to peril his all in deadly strife. One of the paragraphs in this message declares that, " After the extinction of the public deljt, it is not probable that any adjustment of the tariff, upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the government ■without a considerable surplus in the treasury beyond what may be required for its current service." After discussing various modes of applying this sur- plus, the message thus again proceeds : " To avoid these evils, it appears to me that the most safe, just, and federal disposition which could be made of this sur- plus revenue would be its apportionment among the several states, according to their ratio of representation ; and, should this measure not be found warrant- ed by the Constitution, that it would be expedient to propose to the states an amendment authorizing it." These recommendations were not calculated to relieve the apprehensions of Mr. Calhoun as to the danger of a long continuance of the protective system and its union with distribution ; a conjunction which, of all others, he regarded as the most formidable to the liberties of our people and the permanence of their free institutions ; and, at the same time, they con- tributed to make a deep and lasting impression upon the people of South Caro- lina, and greatly increased their efforts to disseminate correct information as to the nature of the evil, and the absolute necessity of averting it by the separate action of the state, if not done by the General Government, all hope of which Avas now wellnigh gone. The next annual message recurred to the same topics. " In my first message," said President Jackson, " I stated it to be my opinion that ' it is not probable that any adjustment of the tarifl", upon principles satis- factory to the people of the Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the government without a considerable surplus in the treasury beyond what may be required for its current service.' I have had no cause to change that opinion, but much to confirm it." In another part of the same message he said, " Thus viewing the subject, I have heretofore felt it my duty to recommend the adop- tion of some plan for the distribution of the surplus funds, which may at any time remain in the treasury after the national debt shall have been paid, among the states, in proporlioji to the number of their representatives, to be applied by them to objects of internal impi-ovement. Although this plan has met with fa- vour in some portions of the Union, it has also elicited objections, which merit deliberate consideration." These he proceeded to state and answer at great 38 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. length. It soon became apparent that systematic movements were making in the leading tariff states to enforce this policy by the weight of their influence. The governors of New- York and Pennsylvania followed with similar recom- mendations, and their respective legislatures adopted strong resolutions in fa- vour of the scheme. The door of hope from without seemed to be wellnigh closed. Unless the state should interpose to avert this system by her separate action, it appeared inevitable that the tariff.of 1828, that " bill of abominations," would be perpetuated in connexion with a distribution of the surplus revenue after the payment of the debt, with all of its dangerous and corrupting conse- quences. South Carolina did not hesitate in her choice between these alterna- tive.*. Everywhere the subject of state remedies was agitated, and the elec- tions throughout the state turned upon that deeply-exciting and important ques- tion. In the mean time, the personal relations between Mr. Calhoun and the Presi- dent had been impaired by various causes, and in the spring of 1830 the differ- ence became serious and the rupture complete. Separated as they now were upon great public questions, and alienated also by private differences, it is not surprising that the President should have directed the whole weight of his immense popularity against Mr. Calhoun ; nor had the latter any resource in the opposition, who, separated from him in principle and policy, bore down upon him with their whole strength and influence. These things, of them- selves, seemed to constitute difficulties of sufficient magnitude to overpower him. On the whole expanse of the wide American Continent, there were, perhaps, but two spirits that could have encountered them ; and these, strangely enough, were the two individuals who wSre destined to conduct the two parties in the tremendous contest that was approaching. But, undaunted at the pros- pect, and strong not only in the consciousness of his intellectual resources, but also in that high resolve which springs from a deep sense of wrong, Mr. Cal- houn fearlessly assumed the responsibility of the movement in the great issue which South Carolina was preparing to make with the General Government ; and, in obedience to the calls on him from various quarters, he unhesitatingly avowed his opinions on the complex and difficult questions arising out of it. It would be difficult to imagine a situation of more peril, or a greater example of self-abandonment and moral intrepidity. He and the state now stood alone in open, bold, and undaunted resistance against the scheme of a permanent distri- bution of the surplus revenue, sustained by a perpetual protective tariff'. They were assailed with equal fierceness by the administration and opposition parties, and they were deserted by all the Southern states, though most of them had adopted the strongest resolutions, declaring the tariff of '28 to be oppressive, un- just, unequal, and unconstitutional, and pledging themselves in the most posi- tive manner to oppose it. Nothing but the deepest conviction of the truth and justice of their cause, and of the magnitude of the questions, could have sus- tained him under such difficulties, and in the face of so imposing a force. He commenced the address containing the avowal of his opinion with a state- ment of his views on the question of the relation which the states bear to the General Government. After referring to the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, the Virginia report and the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Cobbett, as containing a summary of his opinion, he said, " As many niight not have an opportunity to refer to them, and as different opinions might be entertained as to their meaning, he would, to avoid all ambiguity, and that his sentiments might be fully known, state his opinions of the doctrine which he believed they embraced." With these preliminary remarks, he proceeded to give, in the first place, a concise summary of the doctrines they embraced, and in the next, his impression of the character and tendency of these doctrines, followed up by a calm, lucid, and able array of reasons in support of his opin- ion ; and, finally, brought the whole to bear on the protective system, and the LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 3^ dangers to wliich it exposed our political institutions. He then showed that the period of the final payment of the debt was fast approaching, and that, if the threatened danger was not promptly met, the most disastrous consequences would follow ; and, finally, if the government itself should fail to meet it, state •interposition w^as the only adequate and constitutional remedy which could ar- rest it. The following extract from this manly and able document contains the doctrines of state interposition or nullification, with his impression of its char- acter and tendency : " The ffreat and leading principle is, that the General Government emanated from the people of the several states, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people formino- one aggregate political community ; that the Constitution of the United States is, in fact, a compact,' to which each state is a party, in the character al- ready described ; and that the several states or parties have a right to judge of its infractions, and, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the lan- ofuage of the Virginia resolutions, ' to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.^ This right of interposition, thus solemnly as- serted by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may, state-right, veto, nulli- fication, or by any other name, I conceive to be the fundamental principle of our system, resting on facts historically as certain as our Revolution itself, and deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth "whatever ; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depends the stability and safety of our political institutions. " I am not ignorant that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and formerly, regarded it in a very different light, as anarchical and revolutionary. Could I believe such in fact to be its tendency, to me it would be no recom- mendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our political institutions, and the union of these states. I never breathed an oppo- site sentiment ; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great in- strument of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and our posterity ; and, next to these, I have ever held them most dear. Nearly half my life has passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputa- tion I have acquired is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has, indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, to be my greatest political fault. With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined, with the ut- most care, the bearing of the doctrine in question ; and so far from anarchical or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of our sys- tem and of the Union itself, and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the states the right of protecting their several powers, and which would vest in the General Government (it matters not through what department) the right of de- termining, exclusively and finally, the powers delegated to it, is incompatible ■with the sovereignty of the states and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said, to give to the General Gov- ernment the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make ' its dis- cretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers ;' and that ' in all cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress.'' Language cannot be more explicit, nor can higher authority be ad- duced. , "That different opinions are entertained on this subject, I consider but as an additional evidence of the great diversity of the human intellect. Had not able, experienced, and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the highest respect, takeu different views, I should have thought the right too clear to admit of doubt ; but 40 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. I am taught by this, as well as by many similar instances, to treat with deference opinions differing from my own. The error may possibly be with me ; but, if so, I can only say, that after the most mature and conscientious examination, I have not been able to detect it. But with all proper deference, I must think that theirs is the error who deny what seems to be an essential attribute of the conceded sovereignty of the stales, and who attribute to the General Govern- ment a right utterly incompatible with what all acknowledge to be its limited and restricted character ; an error originating principally, as I think, in not duly reflecting on the nature of our institutions, and on what constitutes the only ra- tional object of all political constitutions." The following are the three concluding paragraphs, which will exhibit the tone and feeling with which the address was written. " In forming the opinions I have expressed, I have not been actuated by an unkind feeling to our manufacturing interest. I now am, and ever have been, decidedly friendly to them, though I cannot concur in all the measures which have been adopted to advance them. I believe considerations higher than any question of mere pecuniary interest forbid their use. But, subordinate to the hio^her views of policy, I regard the advancement of mechanical and chemical improvements in the arts with feelings little short of enthusiasm, not only as the prolific source of national and individual wealth, but as the grea>. mear_i of en- larcrino- the domain of man over the material world, and thereby of laying the solid foundation of a highly-improved condition of society, morally and politi- cally. I fear not that we shall extend our power too far over the great agents of nature ; but, on the contrary, I consider such enlargement of our power as tending more certainly and powerfully to better the condition of our race, than any one of the many powerful causes now operating to that result. With these impressions, I not only rejoice at the general progress of the arts in the world, but on their advancement in our own country ; and, as far as protection may be incidentally afforded in the fair and honest exercise of our constitutional powers, I think now, as I have always done, that sound policy, connected with the security, independence, and peace of the country, requires it should be ; but we cannot go a single step beyond without jeopardizing our peace, our harmony, and our liberty — considerations of infinitely more importance to us than any measure of mere policy can possibly be. " In thus placing my opinion before the public, I have not been actuated by the expectation of changing the public sentiment. Such a motive on a ques- tion so long agitated, and so beset with feelings of prejudice and interest, would argue, on my part, an insufferable vanity, and a profound ignorance of the human heart. To avoid, as far as possible, the imputation of either, I have confined my statement on the many and important points on which I have been compelled to touch, to a simple declaration of my opinion, without advancing any other reasons to sustain them than what appeared to me to be indispen- sable to the full understanding of my views ; and if they should, on any point, be thought to be not clearly and explicitly developed, it will, I trust, be attributed to my solicitude to avoid the imputations to which I have alluded, and not from any desire to disguise my sentiments, nor the want of arguments and illustra- tions to maintain positions which so abound in both, that it would require a volume to do them anything like justice. I can only hope that truths which I feel assured are essentially connected with all we ought to hold most dear, may not be weakened in the public estimation by the imperfect manner in which I have been, by the object in view, compelled to present them. " With every caution on my part, I dare not hope, in taking the step I have, to escape the imputation of improper motives, though I have, without reserve, freely expressed my opinions, not regarding whether they might or might not 'be popular. I have no reason to believe that they are such as will conciliate pubhc favour, but the opposite, which I greatly regret, as I have ever plarcd a LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 41 high estimate on the good opinion of my fellow-citizens. But, be that as it may^ I shall, at least, be sustained by feelings of conscious rectitude. I have formed my opinions after the most careful and deliberate examinations, with all the aids which my reason and experience could furnfsh ; I have expressed these honestly and fearlessly, regardless of their effects personally, which, however interesting to me individually, are of too little importance to be taken into the estimate, where the liberty and happiness of our country are so vitally involved." He followed up, the next year, this statement of his opinion by a letter* ad- dressed to General Hamilton, then governor of the state, at his request, in which he went into the same subjects more fully, and with additional force of argument and illustration. They both did much to enlighten the state on the subject discussed, and to sustain her in the arduous struggle into which she was preparing to enter. In the mean time, the peHod selected for final and decisive action was rapidly approaching, and the excitement in the state became deeper and deeper. A strong party, under able leaders, had risen in the state against the course. pro- posed to be taken. They admitted the tariff to be unconstitutional and oppress- ive, but disagreed as to the remedy, which they regarded as revolutionary, and not warranted by the Constitution. They assumed the popular name of the Union party. The Avhole weight of the General Government was thrown in their favour. The two parties were drawn up in fierce array against each other, and every nerve was strained on each side to gain the ascendency. The whole energy and talents of the state were aroused, and the people were inces- santly addressed on both sides, through speeches, pamphlets, and newspapers, by the ablest men, in manly and eloquent arguments, making direct appeal to their understandings and patriotism, on all the questions involved in the issue. At this stage, a gleam of light inspired the hope that the necessity of resort- ing to the extreme remedy of the Constitution would be unnecessary. President Jackson, in his message to Congress at the opening of the session in Decem- ber, 1831, omitting for the first time all allusion to the scheme of distribution, announced the near approach of the period when the public debt would be finally paid, and recommended that provision should be made for the reduction of the duties and the relief of the people from unnecessary taxation, after the extinguishment of the debt. The message diffused general joy tluroughout the state. It was believed that the scheme of distribution was abandoned, and was hoped, ?ate as it was, that most of the mischief anticipated from the surplus revenue, by a prompt and judicious reduction of the duties, might be still avoid- ed. The delegation in Congress prepared to co-operate zealously with the friends of the administration in making such a reduction as would relieve the people from unnecessary taxation, and save the country and government from the worst of all evils, an accumulating and corrupting surplus, collected in bank notes, or, what Avas the same thing, bank credit. But this gleam of sunshine proved transient and illusory. It soon became apparent that neither side, administration or opposition, contemplated anything like an adequate reduction. In spite of every effort made by the delegation, and after spending the greater portion of the session on the subject, an inconsidera- ble reduction of some three or four millions of dollars only was effected. This still left a revenu'e more than twice as large as the usual and necessary expendi- ture of the government would require after the payment of the debt, and the du- ties at high protective rates, on what were called the protected articles ; and as if, too, to extinguish all hope, this trifling reduction was announced by Mr. Clay on the part of the opposition, and the Secretary of the Treasury on that of the administration, as the final adjustment of the tariff, and the permanent system of revenue, after the payment of the debt. In a striking particular, the act making the reduction was even more unequal and worse than the tariff of '28* * See " Speeches," &c., No. 4. F ^ LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. It exempted the manufacturing portion of the community almost literally from all taxes. It gave them a bounty on all they made by imposing duties on all similar articles imported, and all such as could come in competition with what they made, while it exempted them,%s consumers, from paying taxes on almost all others, by admitting them duty free ; so that, instead of abandoning the prin- ciple of protection, or guarding against the danger of a surplus, the act but per- petuated the protective policy, and left the coitntry and the goverimient exposed to all the evils of a large annual surplus. Such an arrangement could not induce South Carolina to surrender the stand she had taken. On the contrary, it only aroused her to more active resistance, and energetic preparation to meet an issue, which now seemed almost inevi- table. At this stage an incident occurred that tended greatly to confirm and animate her in her course. From the commencement, the State Rights party had claimed the authority of the Virginia Resolutions, Mr. Madison's Report, and the Kentucky Resolutions, which they attributed to Mr. Jefferson, as sanctioning the doctrine of nullification and the' course they proposed to take, while those who opposed denied that they authorized the interpretation put on them, or that Mr. Jefferson was the author of the Kentucky Resolutions. It became a point of great importance to estab- lish which of the two were right. Both sides admitted the high authority of Mr. Jefferson, and that the report and resolutions contained the true political creed of the party. Mr. Ritchie, the experienced editor of the Enquirer and the associate of Mr. Jefferson, and most of the distinguished men who were his contemporaries in Virginia, was among the most influential of those who denied that these documents, or the opinions of Mr. Jefferson, authorized the doctrine of nullification. But, fortunately, the original manuscript of Mr. Jefferson, from "which the Kentucky Resolutions were taken, was brought to light at this criti- cal juncture, and left no doubt that Mr. Jefferson was their real author, and that he entertained the doctrines of nullification to the full extent, as interpreted by the State Rights party, which Mr. Ritchie had the candour to acknowledge, as the following extract from the Enquirer of March, 1832, shows. From the Richmond Enquirer, March 13th. MR. JEFFERSON THE AUTHOR OF THE KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS. " Nullification — An Error corrected. — We come before the public to correct an error into which we have betrayed them. Some of the politicians of South Carolina had maintained the opinion, that Mr. Jefferson was not only the friend, but the father of nullification ; and their principal argument was, that he was the author of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, as well as those of 1798 ; and that in those of 1799 is to be found the memorable passage, ' The several states which formed that instrument, being sovereign and independent, have the tmquestionable right to judge of its infraction ; and that a nullification hy these sovereignties of all unauthorized acts, done under colour of that instrument, is the rightful remedy.^ " We had a great curiosity to ascertain the truth of this opinion. We hunted up all the facts that were within our reach, weighed them as impartially as we could, and we arrived at a different conclusion from that of .the State Rights politicians of South Carolina. We expressed oiu: opinions in the ' Enquirer' of the 13th of September last. " We have now to state our conviction that toe were wrong, and the South Carolinians were right as to Mr. Jefferson's opinions. A small MS. book has been found among his papers, which, with other articles, contains two copies, in his own handwriting, that appear to have been the original of the Kentucky Reso- lutions. The first of these is blurred and much corrected, with passages struck out and others interlined. The other is a fair and later copy, judging from the LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 45 oolour of the paper and of the ink, of Mr. J.'s draught. We are indebted to his grandson for the permission to examine these MSS., and compare them with the printed copies of the Kentucky Resolutions, and for the opportunity of correct- ing our own mistake, and of laying the following result before our readers." Here follows Mr. Jefferson's original draught of the Kentucky Resolutions. Never was a document more clear and explicit on any point than this in fa- vour of the principles on which Carolina had placed her right to interpose. Words could not make it more so. It says expressly, " That in all cases of an abuse of delegated powers, the members of the General Government being chosen by the people, a change by the people would be the constitutional rem- edy ; but where powers are assumed which have not been delegated, a nullificationt of the act is the rightful remedy that every state has a natm'al right to, in cases not in the compact (casus non foederis), to nullify, of their own authority, all as- sumptions of powers within tlreir limits ; that without this right, they would be under the absolute and unlimited dominion of whoever might exercise this right of judgment for them; that, nevertheless, this Commonwealth (Kentucky), from motives of regard and respect for its co-states, has wished to communicate with them on the subject ; that with them alone it proposes to communicate, they alone being parties to the compact, and solely authorized to judge, in the last resort, of the powers exercised under it — Congress being not a party, but merely the creature of the compact, and subject, as to its assumption of its powers, to the final judgment of those by whom, and for whose use, itself and its powers were created." So fully does the above extract, and the whole draught, in fact, accord with the views taken by Mr. Calhoun in the statement of his opinion, and letter to General Hamilton, that, had it been possible for him to have had access to the manuscript, he might well have been suspected of plagiarism. Supported by this high and explicit authority, the State Rights party moved forward with renovated energy and confidence in preparing for the great issue ; but the difficulties were great. The Union party, thoroughly organized under able leaders, and animated by the greatest zeal, were supported not only by the whole influence of the General Government, but sustained and cheered by the concurring voice of both parties, and, it may almost be literally said, of the whole Union. Against this immense resistance, the State Rights party had to obtain a majority of two thirds of both houses of the Legislature to carry out its views, as, according to their opinion, the right of a state to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, and therefore null and void, is derived from the fact that the Constitution is a compact to which the people of the states, in their sover- eign capacity, are direct parties ; and, of course, the right appertains to them in this capacity only, and c&n only be exercised by them, through a convention, in the same mode that the instrument was adopted, and not by the State Government. They regard the General and State Governments as co-ordinate governments, and the people of the states, severally, as the paramount sovereign authority. Accord- ing to these views, in order to take the final step it would be necessary to call a convention of the people of the state ; and for this purpose, by a provision of the Constitution of the state, two thirds of the Legislature were necessary ; with- out thjit nothing could be done, and the cause would have to be abandoned. The election was pending, and the great struggle between the parties was, on one side, to carry two thirds of both houses, and on the other to defeat it. The magnitude of the issue was felt by both, and never was a political struggle more ardent ; and, let it be added for the honour of both parties and the state, never before, in such a struggle, was the appeal more direct and solemn to the intel- ligence and patriotism of the people, and so free from all false issues, cant, or appeal to paseion or prejudice. It resulted in the triumph of the State Rights party. They returned more than the constitutional number to both houses. The Legislature met and called 44 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. a Convention, which assembled and passed the Ordinance of Nullification, the 24th of November, 1832, accompanied by two addresses ; one to the people of South Carolina, and the other to the people of their co-states of the Union, set- ting forth fully an explanation of the motives and principles which governed them as one of the parties to the constitutional compact, in the high and solemn act of sovereignty, which duty to themselves and to the Union compelled them to perform. They adjourned to meet in March, subsequent to the period at which, by the Constitution, the approaching session of Congress would ter- minate. Congress met at the usual period, in December, and the President, in his Mes- sage, announced the final payment of the public debt, and recommended a re- duction of the duties to the standard required for the revenue of the government economically and efficiently administered, to take place as soon as the faith of the government, and the preservation of the large capital invested in manufac- turing establishments, would permit. The time of Governor Hamilton having expired, General Hayne, then a sen- ator in Congress, was elected his successor, and placed at the head of the gov- ernment of the state at this momentous period. The proceedings of the Con- vention were reported to the Legislature, which met shortly after its adjournment, and an act introduced and passed to carry into effect the ordinance, to go into operation in February. That was followed by the proclamation of the President, which asserted that the ordinance was subversive of the Constitution, and that the object of South Carolina was the destruction of the Union ; and after giving his views of the Constitution, and the provisions of the existing laws applicable to the case, and declaring the course he would pursue, he warned all the peo- ple of the state against obedience to the ordinance, under the high penalty for treason against the United States. Governor Hayne issued his counter procla- mation, repelling the charges of the President, and maintaining the grounds taken by the Convention, and replying to the reasons assigned for the grounds taken in the President's proclamation. CHAPTER V. Including the Period from his Resignation of the Vice-presidency till the Admission of Michigan into tlie Union. At this critical juncture, the Legislature elected Mr. Calhoun to fill the vacancy in the Senate occasioned by the election of General Hayne as governor. As trying as was the situation under such circumstances, he resigned without hesita- tion his place as Vice-president, and proceeded to Washington to take his seat in the Senate. Never was theje, since the commencement of the government, a moment of more intense interest and anxiety throughout the whole Union, and never before was any public man placed in a situation more difficult and re- sponsible. The expectation was general that he would be arrested as soon as he arrived in Washington ; and on his way thither, wherever he stopped, crowds collected to see him. Nor was the excitement less when he arrived at the seat of government, where he had been so loEg and familiarly known. When he appeared in the Senate to take his seat as a member in a body over which he had so long and recently presided, the gallery and chamber were thronged with spectators. He repeated the constitutional oath in a firm and audible voice, and took his seat on the side and in the midst of his old political friends, of whom a large majority were now placed in hostile array to him. But as trying and responsible as was the occasion, he stood erect and unap- palled, conscious of the purity of his motives, and strong in the depth of his conviction of the truth, justice, constitutionality, and magnitude of tte questioa LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 45 which South Carolina, in her confidence, had selected him as her chosen repre- Kentative to defend. Mr. Calhoun, a few days after he took his seat, in order to bring the whole subject under the early consideration of the Senate, offered a resolution, calling apon the President to lay before the body the ordinance and other documents connected with it, which had been transmitted to him by the executive of the state ; but he forbore to press its adoption, on the statement of Mr. Grundy, that there was reason to believe the President was preparing a message on the subject, which would be accompanied by the documents requested, and that the message would probably be sent the day after the next. Not expecting any- thing of importance the next day, Mr. Calhoun delayed some time after the usual meeting of the body to take his seat. When he entered the chamber, he was surprised to find it crowded, and the Secretary of the Senate in the midst of reading the message, which he did not expect until the next day. It took strong ground against South Carolina, and recommended the adoption of the most decisive measures to coerce her obedience. It was a trying moment. He had not the slightest anticipation that he would be called on to say anything when he entered the chamber, and was wholly unprepared ; and, to add to his embarrassment, he had, for the long period of fifteen years (while he filled the war department and the place of Vice-presi- dent), been entirely out of the habit of public speaking. Nor could he avoid speaking, as it would look like shrinking not to give an immediate reply to the message. Under all these trying circumstances, he rose as soon as the reading was over, and replied, in a manly and effective speech, to the ground taken in the message. After he concluded, the message and documents were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, of which Mr. Grundy was chairman and Mr. Webster a prominent member. They reported a bill, extending the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States greatly and beyond all former acts, and cloth- ing the President with almost unlimited powers, both as to men and money. In order to have a preliminary discussion, and to take the sense of the Sen- ate on the principles involved in the issue, before the bill was called up, Mr. Calhoun prepared and moved the three following resolutions, which affirmed the grounds on which South Carolina placed her right, on the one side, and negatived, on the other, those assumed in the proclamation and message. " Resolved, That the people of the several states composing these United States are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of each state acceded as a separate and sovereign community, each binding itself, by its own particular ratification ; and that the Union, of which the said com- pact is the bond, is a Union betioeen the states ratifying the same. " Resolved, That the people of the several states, thus united by a constitu- tional compact, in forming that instrument, in creating a General Government to carry into effect the objects for which it was formed, delegated to that gov- ernment, for that purpose, certain definite powers, to be exercised jointly, re- serving, at the same time, each state to itself, the residuary mass of powers, to be exercised by its own separate government ; and that, whenever the General Government assumes the exercise of powers not delegated by the compact, its acts are unauthorized, void, and of no effect ; and that the said government is not made fhe final judge of the powers delegated to it, since that would make its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers ; but that, as in all other cases of compact among sovereign parties, without any common judge, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress. " Resolved, That the assertions, that the people of these United States, taken collectively as individuals, are now, or ever have been, united on the principle of the social compact, and, as such, are now formed into one nation or people , or that they have ever been so united in any one stage of their political exist- 46 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ence ; or that the peopie of the several states comprising the Union have not, as members thereof, retained their sovereignty ; or that the allegiance of their citizens has been transferred to the General Government ; or that they have parted with the right of punishing treason through their respective state gov- ernments ; or that they have not the right of judging, in the last resort, as to the extent of the powers reserved, and, of consequence, of those delegated, are not only without foundation in truth, but are contrary to the most certain and plain historical facts, and the clearest deductions of reason ; and that all exercise of power on the part of the General Government, or any of its departments, de- riving authority from such erroneous assumptions, must of necessity be uncon- stitutional ; must tend directly and inevitably to subvert the sovereignty of the states, to destroy the federal character of the Union, and to rear on its ruins a consolidated government, without constitutional check or limitation, and which must necessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself." It is obvious, on the perusal, that if the principles offered by the resolutions be true. South Carolina would stand justified ; and if those negatived be false, the bill could not be rightfully sustained ; and such being the case, it was but fair that the principles should be settled prior to the discussion and action on the bill. But as reasonable as was the request of Mr. Calhoun, the Senate, under the influence of the committee, laid his resolutions on the table, and took up the bill for discussion. The debate was very able on both sides. Many of the old and sound Republicans, refusing to yield their long-cherished principles to party feelings or considerations, opposed the bill with great ability and vigour. Mr. Grundy, as chairman, claimed the right of closing the debate, and Mr. Cal- houn reserved himself to reply to Mr. Webster, who was the great champion of the bill ; but he was informed, through one of Mr. Webster's friends, that he would not speak before him. This left him no option, as he could not avoid •speaking, and had therefore to submit. He spoke late,* and conjecturing that Mr. "Webster intended to speak to the principles involved, and not to the provisions of the bill, he spoke at large on a variety of points, which he thought required explanation in connexion with the course of South Carolina, and but slightly touched on the principles which he had affirmed or negatived in his resolutions, in order to deprive Mr. Webster of the advantages he aimed at in reserving himself for the reply. He was right in his conjecture. The moment he sat down, Mr. Webster rose to reply, but spoke, as he anticipated, not on the bill, but to the resolutions, without assailing or controverting any of the positions taken by Mr. C. in his speech. This gave him a claim to be heard on his resolutions ; and the Senate accordingly permitted him to call them up, and as- signed a day in order to give him an opportunity of replying to Mr. Webster in their support. When the day came the senate-chamber and gallery were crowded, and Mr. Calhoun replied in a speechf which, for precision and force of argument, has rarely, if ever, been equalled. The great point at issue was, whether the Con- stitution is or is not a compact between the States. Mr. Webster, with that strength of understanding which belongs to him, saw clearly where the real issue lay, and had the fairness and candour to concede that if, in fact, the Con- stitution is a compact between the States, then the doctrines cont^ded for by South Carolina necessarily followed, nullification, secession, and all. Mr. Cal- hoim, accordingly, mainly directed his efforts to establishing- the fact, and with such success, that even the North American Quarterly Review, published in Boston, and at all times the champion of the principles supported by Mr. Web- ster, in an article reviewing the debate, admitted that Mr. Calhoun had success fully maintained his ground on that point. Mr. Randolph, then in a feeble state of health, on his way to Philadelphia, was present in the senate-chamber, it is believed for the last time, when Mr. Calhoim spoke. He sat near the desk * See " Speeches," &c., No. 5, t See " Speeches," &c,, No. 6. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 47 where Mr. C. stood while addressing the Senate, and at the close openly and highly complimented him for the ability and success of his reply, which he re- garded as unanswerable. The bill passed, but while it was in progress, efforts were made in both Houses so to modify the duties as to terminate the controversy peaceably. Upon faith in these efforts. South Carolina postponed the time for carrying into effect her ordinance, from the first of February till after the adjournment of Congress on the fourth of March. Mr. Verplanck, in the early part of the session, had reported a bill in conformity with the message of the President at the opening of the session, proposing a very great reduction of the duties, but without sur- rendering the principle of protection, or, in many instances, reducing the duties to the revenue standard. Its progress was slow. It was detained a long time in committee of the whole, where many amendments, increasing the duties, were made. After it was reported to the House, it continued to drag along with difficulty. Many of the objectionable amendments made in the committee of the whole were concurred in, and the fate of the bill still continued doubtful, notwithstanding the steady and united support which it received from the State Rights party, objectionable as it was in many particulars. Their support was more than counterbalanced by the division in the ranks of the administration party. In the mean time, Mr. Clay introduced a bill in the Senate, which received the sanction of that body, and was sent to the House, where Mr. Verplanck's bill still lingered near the end of the session. It was moved as a substitute to his bill, and carried by a large majority ; Mr. Verplanck himself, and the lead- ing friends of the administration who supported his bill, voting for it in despair, as it is believed, of the passage of his own. It received the sanction of the President, and has since been called the Compromise Act ; and thus terminated this controversy, the most agitating and memorable that ever occurred under the government. It is not deemed necessary to go into the origin or history of the act, or mi- initely into its provisions. The former have been given several times by Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun in their places in the Senate, and are generally known. It is sufficient to say that Mr. Calhoun, from the commencement, refused to go into any arrangemetit which did not explicitly surrender the principle of pro- tection, but was willing to allow ample time for the gradual reduction of the duties on the protected articles, in order to save the manufacturers from ruin ; but he insisted on a total repeal at once on all improtected articles, in order to prevent, if possible, the great object of his dread from the first, a surplus rev- enue. Mr. Clay was, of course, on his part, solicitous, in making the changes necessary to a compromise, to give as slight a shock as possible to his long- cherished system. The result was the surrender of the protective principle and the establishment of the ad valorem., and a gradual reduction of duties on all protected articles, to terminate on the thirtieth of June, 1842, when no duty above 20 per cent, ad valorem should be laid ; the immediate repeal of all du- ties on articles not similar to those manufactured in the country, and a moderate list of articles to be made permanently free of duty after the thirtieth of June, 1842, with provisions for cash duties and home valuation. Such are the gen- eral outlines of the provisions of the act which peaceably closed the controver- sy ; and if faith and pledges had been observed with as much fidelity on the side of the tariff interest as it has been on the part of the opposite side, the pos- sibility of its renewal would have forever been prevented. Whatever opinion may have been entertained at one time of the views and motives of Mr. Calhoun, and the small but gallant party with which he acted, none now, not even the most prejudiced, doubts the purity, and patriotism of his and their motives, however much they may differ from them as to principles and policy. .So far from hostility to the Union, one of the leading objects was its 18 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. preservation. The Union may be destroyed as well by consolidation as by dis- solution — by the centripetal as well as the centrifugal tendency of the bodies of which it is composed. It is the duty of the patriot to resist both, and hold the which has induced it to seize on the deposites 1 What, but the large surplus revenue ? the eight or ten millions in the public treasury beyond the wants of the government ? And what has put so large an amount of money in the treas ury when not needed ? I answer, the protective system : that system whicb graduated the duties, not in reference to the wants of the government, but ii> reference to the importunities and demands of the manufacturers, and which poured millions of dollars into the treasury beyond the most profuse demands, and even the extravagance of the government — taken— unlawfully taken — from the pockets of those who honestly made it. I hold that those who make are entitled to Avhat they make against all the world except the government, and against it except to the extent of its legitimate and constitutional wants ; and that for the government to take one cent more is robbery. In violation of this sacred principle, Congress frst removed the money by high duties, imjustly and unconstitutionally imposed, from the pockets of those who made it, where it was rightfully placed by all laws, human and divine, into the treasury. The executive, in his turn, following the* example, has taken them from that depos- ite, and distributed them among favourite and partisan banks. The means used have been the same in both cases. The Constitution gives to Congress the power to lay duties, with a view to revenue. This power, without re- garding the object for which it was intended, forgetting that it was a great trust power, necessarily limited, by the very nature of such powers, to the subject and the object of the trust, was perverted to a use never intended, that of protecting the industry of one portion of the country at the expense of another ; and, under this false interpretation, the money was transferred from its natural and just deposite, the pockets of those who made it, into the public treasury, as I have stated. In this, too, the executive followed the example of Congress. By the magic construction of a few simple words — ' unless other- wise ordered' — intended to confer on the Secretary of the Treasury a limited power — to give additional security to the public deposites, he has, in like manner, perverted this power, and made it the instrument, by similar sopListrj', of drawing the money from the treasury, and bestowing it, as I have stated, on favourite and partisan banks. Would to God, said Mr. C, would to God I could reverse the whole of this nefarious operation, and terminate the contro- versy by returning the money to the pockets of the honest and industrious citi- zens, by the sweat of whose brows it was made, with whom only it can be rightfully deposited. But as this cannot be done, I must content myself by giving a vote to return it to the public treasury, where it was ordered to be dejiosited by an act of the Legislature." These extracts contain an explanation, not only of Mr. Calhoun's views of the banking system at the time, but also of those which have governed his after 52 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. course in reference to the banks, and most of the prominent questions since agitated. He believed that there was, at the time, a strong tendency in all the departments of the government to usurp power, and that it originated with Con- gress. It is, indeed, a settled opinion with him, which he has long entertained, and the reasons for which he recently explained in his speech on the veto, that usurpations in the Federal Government almost necessarily originate with Con- gress ; but that the powers which it gains by usurping those of the states or people, adds, not to its strength, but to that of the other departments, and es- pecially of the executive, in whose hands it becomes the means of usurping ia turij the powers of Congress, and controlling its proceedings. He accordingly attributed the great power and influence of the executive at this time, and its tendency to encroachment, to the previous encroachments of Congress, espe- cially in passing the tariff of '28. That having been prostrated by the inter- position of the State of South Carolina and the Compromise Act at the last ses- sion, he next turned his efforts to arresting, what he believed to be its natural consequence, the encroachments of the executive ; and was thus, and to that extent, brought for the time to act with the opposition party, then called National Republicans. But he occupied throughout his own independent State Rights ground and principles, from which he in no instance departed. Wherever they led, he followed, without regarding whether they brought him to co-operate with the opposition or administration, or left him alone in the Senate to maintain and defend his own separate and peculiar position. His course in the very case under consideration strikingly illustrates these remarks. He essentially differed on this important occasion from both of the great parties, administration and opposition. The former was in favour of the league of state banks as the fiscal agents and depositaries of the Government, and opposed both to a national bank and the divorce of government from the banks. The latter, on the contrary, were in favour of a national bank, and op- posed to the league of banks and the divorce ; while Mr. Calhoun and the State lights party were in favour of the divorce, or what has since been called the Independent Treasury, and opposed to a national bank, and any connexion with the banking system in any way. It was in conformity to these views, and after consulting Mr. Calhoun and the prominent members of the party, that General Gordon, then a distinguished representative from Virginia, introduced at the time a bill to establish the Independent Treasury. It failed. The public mind was not then prepared ; but to him will belong the lasting honour of introducing one of the most important measures of modern times. The removal of the deposites was not the only question of importance which was agitated during the session. Among others, the motion of Mr. Webster, who was then chairman of the Committee on Finance, for leave to bring in a bill to recharter the Bank of the United States for six years, gave rise to an in- teresting discussion. Mr. Calhoun seized the opportunity, not to discuss the question of renewal, but that of the currency generally, which he showed, even then, to be deeply diseased, and to warn the Government and country of the ap- proach of the catastrophe which has since befallen them. He pointed out the cause and character of the disease, and the remedy that should be adopted to prevent, if possible, the approaching shock, or at least to lessen its violence. ilis speech* on the occasion is one of the ablest and most remarkable for its forecast he ever made. It is prophetic throughout, and was pronounced by one of the senators, himself a speaker of distinguished abilities and long experience, the ablest he ever heard. To appreciate its merits, it must be read. Upon this occasion he exhibited, in a remarkable degree, that statesmanlike faculty which has enabled him to do so much to direct events, by always taking the nearest practicable step towards his object, instead of refusing to do anything unless he could effect what was the best in the abstract. The great ends in his sys- tem of life, whether public or private, he has ever held to be fixed by reason and * See « Speeches," &c., No. 8. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. " 53 general rules ; but the time and mode of attaining them he regarded as questions of expediency, to be determined by the circumstances under which he is called to act. If things are now wrong, he who refuses to make any change for the better because he cannot obtain at once what he believes to be best in the abstract, is responsible for them as they exist, and should be classed rather with those who sustain the present wrongs than w^ith those who pursue the right ; for in prac- tice, the effects of their action are the same ; and yet he who makes the nearest attainable approach to the right is too often confounded with those who main- tain the wrong, and postponed for others who, content to think correctly, are yet too timid to act if there be danger of misconstruction, and really contribute to the continuance of that which they condemn. This is a species of fear which Mr. Calhoun has never known. Seeing clearly his own ends, which have been long fixed by observation and reflection, he judges, with a rare saga- city, of the nearest practicable approach which can be made to them under the circumstances, and advances forward to the boundaries assigned by prudence without fear of the enemy, and halts when he has taken as much ground as he can occupy, without regard to the remonstrances of his followers, who take their counsels merely from zeal, and do not properly ascertain the limits upon human power, and the controlling force of events. It is thus that he is ever in prog- ress ; and although generally in advance of his party and the world, in a long life he has never been forced to abandon any forward movement, or recede from his end. He uses time to control circumstances, and directs them both to his great object, which he is ever on the march sooner or later to attain. This it is which makes him the master-statesman of his age, and thus he has been, able to accomplish so much with such inconsiderable means. Upon the occasion to which we now refer, he exhibited this statesmanlike mode of thinkinor and actino- in a remarkable degree. He sought no trial of skill in oratory where victories were to be barren of results to the country. He avoided all those topics of personal or party excitement, w^rose fleeting interest belonged to the time and not to the case ; but, looking to the exigencies of the country, and not to the mere feelings of the day, he surveyed the whole ground with miUtary precision, and made a masterly reconnoisance of the field. As abstract ques- tions, he did not enter into the nature of the banking system, or its constitutional propriety. In discussing the disease, it Avas necessaiy to touch slightly upon the tendencies of the banking system; and these touches, like the line of Apelles, showed the master's hand, and his thorough acquaintance with the subject. He traced clearly the deep seat of the malady, and developed its probable progress and consequences unless corrected. He then addressed himself to the discovery of some remedy, which should be both safe and efficient. With the propriety and constitutionality of the banking system as abstract questions he had nothing to do, and upon them he only touched so far as they bore upon the remedy which he had in view. Banks were in existence, and through them the currency was indisputably deeply diseased. There was not the least proba- bility of any successful effort to force the Government to abandon the use of pa- per. He contented himself, therefore, with showing that, if the Government could use paper, it could also regidate its value ; and the question was to ascer- tain the best means of reaching that object. He proposed a continuance of the bank for twelve years, under severe restrictions, and upon conditions which would gradually diminish the volume of paper currency, so as to enable the Government, at the end of that period, to dispense with its use altogether, if it should choose to do so, without any shock to the community. In this point of view, it was of no importance whether the original charter was constitutional or not. Suppose it to be unconstitutional, it was a question whether we would rid ourselves of the evil gradually, and without injury to the community, or whether we should repeal it at once, at the sacrifice of all of its immense con- nected interests, and send the whole toppling down the abyss together. He thought there was a great difference between doing and undoing ; and while he 54 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. would never originate what he beheved to be unauthorized by the Constitution, he would take his own time for repairing the breaches already made in it, and ^o conduct the process as to produce the least possible amount of suffering in the country. It was thus that he agreed to compromise an unconstitutional tariff by allowing time, so as to save vast and meritorious interests which were connected with it ; and thus, too, he now sought (to use his own words) to " unbank the banks." Here, too, he exhibited an instance of that cautious pro- cess by Avhich all real statesmen conduct their reforms, and proved his aversion to hazarding the vast interests of a community by any sudden change which was not justified by experience, but suggested only by theoretic opinions. It was clearly seen, both in this and his preceding speeches, that he disapproved the banking system, and saw, as far as mere reason without experience could point, that its tendencies were evil ; and yet he forbore to strike at it until there was time to verify his reflection by experience, and the period should arrive ,when an effectual blow might be given. If the system were good, it was clear to him that it required severe restrictions and judiciotis regulation ; if evil, he was equally decided that it ought to be removed gradually, so as to produce the least shock to the community. In either point of view, his course of conduct would be the same up to a certain period, to which he limited his prescription. The question of his future action he reserved for the time itself, to be deter- mined by the lights of a more matured experience. It was not his object to amuse theorists or gratify a mere taste for speculation, but he sought a practical remedy for a disease under which the community was likely to suffer most in- tensely. As his suggestions were not taken, we can come to no certain con- clusion as to what they would have led, but posterity will form its opinion as to their probable result. Of this, however, we feel assured, that the speech will always be considered as most remarkable for its political forecast. So deeply was he impressed with the approaching danger, that when he un.- derstood Mr. Webster contemplated making the motion he afterward made, to renew the charter, he sent word through a friend of his, who had called on him, that he feared he was about to make a false move, and said that, although he and Mr. Webster were scarcely on speaking terms, in consequence of the occurrences of the last session, he would be glad to have a full conversation with him before he made his motion, if he Vt'ould give him an opportunity by calling on him. The next morning he called. Mr. Calhoun stated his objection to the course he proposed, and what he thought ought to be done. Mr. Webster took time before he gave an answer, but informed Mr. Calhoun, when he called next daj' to learn his decision, that he concluded not to change his course. Mr. Calhoun expressed his regret, and on being asked by Mr. Webster whether he would oppose his motion, he replied no ; but added that he believed the govern- ment and country were approaching a period of great peril, and that he felt that it would be due both to the public and himself to embrace the occasion to state at large the opinions and views he had expressed to him. He, in fact, regarded it as the critical moment ; and when he saw that it was permitted to pass with- out doing anything to prevent the disorder into which the currency was falling, he made up his mind that what has since followed was inevitable. In this connexion, and governed by the same views, he gave a decided sup- port to what is called the Gold Bill, which raised the relative value of gold compared to silver, and the establishment of the branch mints, both of which he regarded as intimately connected with a return to a permanent and sound cur- rency. The administration favoured both measures, and Mr. Clay opposed them The discussion on both was conducted principally by him and Mr. Calhoun. The proceedings of the Senate on the removal of the deposites was followed by the President's protest, which gave rise to a full and animated discussion in the Senate. Mr. Calhoun took decided ground against its reception. In the course of his argument, he maintained the position that the Constitution vests all LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 55 discretionary powers in Congress, to the exclusion of the executive and judici- ary departments ; and that neither of them, nor any office under the gOA^ernment, can exercise any power not authorized by law, but such as is expressly granted by the Constitution. To sustain this important position, he cited the provision in the Constitution which gives to Congress the power " to pass all laws ne- cessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing" (that is, the pow- ers granted to Congress), " and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof.''^ The provision is express, and the position incontrovertible ; and yet, strange as it may seem, it had been theretofore entirely overlooked, although it is one of the most important provisions in the whole instrument. It is the provision, in fact, which binds up all the parts in one, making of them one government, instead of consisting, as they would without it, of three hostile departments, each with the authority to assume whatever right it might think proper to cany into execution its share of the granted powers. One of the important consequences of this provision of the Constitution is to subject the removing power to the regulation of law. The mere fact that the power of removing from office is not granted by the Constitution to the President, is conclusive proof that it can only be ex- ercised by the authority of law, and, of course, subject to such limitation as it may impose. It was, indeed, an investigation into the origin of that power which led Mr. Calhoun to the examination of the Constitution, which ended in making this important disclosure, as it may fairly be termed. At the next session a special committee of nine members was, on motion of Mr. Calhoun, raised, in order to inquire into the extent of the executive patron- age, the cause of its great increase of late, and the expediency and practicabil- ity of reducing the same, and the means of doing it. After a minute and labo- rious investigation, he made a full and able report* on all the points, of which 10,000 copies were ordered to be printed by the Senate. One of the leading objects which he had in view was to strike at the surplus revenue. He anticipated it would be large, although the Compromise Act had repealed the duties on more than one half of the imports. But even that, aided by the gradual reduction on all the residue, could not prevent the accumulation. He dreaded it, not only because it would add greatly to the patronage of the executive by extending its control over the banks, and, through them, over the whole community, but still more because it would be the source of boundless speculation and corruption. To ascertain its probable extent, he entered into a minute examination of the finances, and after exploring the whole ground, he estimated the surplus at an averagq of not less than nine millions of dollars an- nually for the whole period the Compromise Act had to run. As moderate as his estimate proved to be, it was violently assailed, at the time, for its supposed extravagance. But time rolled on, and at the opening of the next session, his estimate, in- stead of proving extravagant, fell short of the actual amount by millions, and that with a surplus daily increasing with an accelerated velocity, under a new impulse, which was swelling it btyond all assignable limits. Here a brief ex- planation is necessary, in order to have a just conception of the danger to which the government and country were exposed at this period. The tariff of 1828 gave the first impulse to that great expansion of the cur- xency, which, under the influence of difierent causes, both foreign and domestic, ■was still on the increase, and continued so till just before the final explosion in 1837. So powerful was the first impulse, from the high duties imposed in 1828, that the currency was doubled, in the manufacturing portions of the Union, in eighteen montlfe from the passage of the act. On the accumulation of the surplus revenue from the same cause, after the payment of the public debt, a new im- pulse was given to the expansion. The surplus was deposited with the banks, and became, in fact, so much additional bank capital, in the least responsible and * »pc "SrpppbRB." &c.. No. 10. 56 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. most dangerous form. This, with other causes, and especially the withdrawal of the deposites from the United States Bank, and the approaching termination of its charter, gave a great additional impulse to the whole system. State banks were multiplied in all directions, with but little capital^ and charters less guarded than ever. All these concurring causes tended greatly to increase the expansion, and, by necessary consequence, to produce a corresponding augmen- tation of prices, to which, however, there was an important exception. The price of all public lands which had been offered at public sales and not sold, was fixed by law at $1 25 per acre, and could not, of course, partake of the general rise. The quantity of such lands was gi'eat, not less, probably, than two hundred millions of acres, and thus a universal spirit of speculation, engen- dered by an inflated currency and high duties, was turned in that direction. The facility of purchasing was not less than the quantity to be purchased. The deposites of the government in the state banks selected as its fiscal agents was upward of forty millions of dollars, consisting almost exclusively of bank- notes. From this vast source speculators and political partisans drew their funds, in the form of discount or loan, in exchange for which they gave their own promissory notes, and received the notes deposited by the government, or, what was the same, a credit in bank founded on them. These, in turn, were exchanged for the public lands, when they passed into the hands of the receiv- ers, and were by them returned to the banks as new deposites, to take the same rapid round again and again, and sweeping away from the people, by means of their own funds, a corresponditig amoimt of their land, and swelling, in the same proportion, the amount brought to the credit of the government by the banks, under the fallacious name of public money in the treasury, but which, in reality, was nothing more than the notes in bank given by speculators and par- tisans in exchange for the public lands. In this operation every revolution but increased the force of the next, which, if left to operate unchecked, must end, as was manifest, in the entire absorp- tion of the public domain and the universal explosion of the banking system, with the ultimate loss of what was due to the Government. It was about the time when these powerful causes began to operate with such effect as to be seen and felt by all, that the administration obtained a majority in the Senate, where it had for some time been in a minority ; on which Mr. Calhoun, who> had moved, as has been stated, at the preceding session, in anticipation of the danger, rose in his place and said, that, as the friends of the administration were now in a majority, he left it to them to take the lead in providing a remedy for this alarming state of things. All now felt that something must be done, and that promptly, to regulate and control the deposite banks, and to save the public funds and the national do- main. Three remedies were proposed. The first was, to absorb the current revenue and the vast surplus already accumulated by the increase of the pub- lic expenditures ; and, with that view, a resolution was actually introduced in the Senate and passed, calling on the executive to know how much could pos- sibly be spent on military defences. The next was to vest what was not need- ed to meet the current expenses of the government in state stocks ; and tho other, to pass an act regulating and controlling the deposite banks, and to place the surplus in deposite in the treasury of the several states. The first two came from the friends of the administration, and the last was proposed by Mr. Calhoun as an amendment to the second. It was the choice of evils. Something must be done. Anything was better than the continuance of the actual state of things. This all acknowledged. The objection to the first was great. So sudden and great an Increase of ex- penditures when prices were so extravagant, and when, without a vast enlarge- ment of the disbursing departments, there could be no efiicient accountabilityj could not but end in much waste, loss, extravagance, and corruption, to say no LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 57 thing of tlie great increase of patronage. But the great and decisive objection was, that expenditures sufficiently large to absorb the surplus would necessarily destroy, in their eftects, the Compromise Act, and restore the protective system. It is easy to raise the expenditures, but very difficult to reduce them, of which the experience of the last five or six years affords abundant proof. The revenue at the time, though far beyond the wants of the government, was in the regidar course of reduction under the compromise, which would, in the course of six years, bring it down to a sum only sufficient for the support of the Government with rigid economy. To have raised the expenditures sufficiently high to ab- sorb the surplus, under such circumstances, would have required an unusual disbursement of between thirty and forty millions of dollars for the whole pe- riod, as experience has shown ; and, of course, a sudden reduction of nearly twenty millions, to bring down the expenditures to what, with proper manage- ment, would be necessary. So great and sudden a reduction would prove im- practicable, and the certain result w^ould be loans, debts, the violation of the com- promise, and a renewal of the protective system. All this Avas urged against the scheme by Mr. Calhoun at the time. It was defeated, at least in a great degree ; and it may well be asked, after the experience of the last two years, what would have been the consequences if it had not been, when even its par- tial effects have brought on the Government and country, to the extent they have, the very evils then anticipated by him. The objection to vesting the surplus in state stocks was not less serious Among so many other mischievous consequences, it would have been grossly partial ; but the insurmountable objection was the danger of entangling the Government with the state stocks. This scheme was in substance as much a deposite of the surplus revenue with, the states as that proposed by Mr. Calhoun as an amendment to it. The latter placed the money with the states upon their promise to return it, if the General Government should require it, while the former exchanged the surplus for the obligations, by which the states, in another form, Avere bound to repay it ; so that each scheme proposed to exchange the surplus for state credit in some form. With state stocks depreciating as they have since done, it would have been as impopular and impossible to have used any means to recover the money by selling them, as it would have been to have recalled it directly from the states themselves. The difference Avas, that Mr. Calhoun's scheme bestowed upon the states all the patronage resulting from the use of the money, Avhile the other gave it to the Secretary of the Treasury, in Avhom it vested an almost unlimited discretion, and to Avhom it gaA^e the dangerous power of dealing in those stocks to large amounts. That this plan Avould have resulted in the entire loss of the money, Avith Uttle or no benefit to the states, Ave may see from our past experi- ence. The immense increase of executive patronage to which it Avould have led may also be estimated. But the endless train of mischiefs which Avould have followed in some of its remote consequences it would be difficult to measure, as we may readily perceive, when Ave come to consider the use Avhich might have been made of such a power in the federal executive by those Avho have con- ceiA'ed the monstrous scheme of assuming the state debts. Indeed, the exist- ence of such a power would naturally seem to suggest such a use of it, with the ideas now prevalent in the minds of many of our public men on the subject of state-indebtedness. Nor was the last of the alternatives free from serious objections ; but, under all circumstances, it Avas thought to be the least so by Congress, and it accord- ingly passed through both houses by a large majority. Mr. Calhoun made a very comprehensive and able speech against the first tAvo, and explained his views of the substitute he offered. This was not the only important measure that claimed his attention during the session. In the preceding recess the Abolitionists had for the first time H 58 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. regularly organized as a party, with a powerful press, and attempted, by sys- tematic operations, to force its publications on the South, with a view of actino on its slave population. It carried deep excitement throughout that entire sec- tion. Everywhere meetings were held and the attempt denounced, and the other sections called upon to adopt measures to stay the evil. The President in his message at the opening of the session, called the attention of Cono-ress to the subject, and recommended the adoption of efficient measures to prevent the circulation of their incendiary publications through the mail. Mr. Cal- houn, although he appreciated and highly approved the patriotic motives of the President, could not agree with him to the full extent of his recommendation. He saw the danger of permitting Congress to assume the right of judging of what constituted an incendiary publication ; for if it be conceded that it has the right of determining what is incendiary, and to prevent its circulation, it would, by necessary consequence, carry with it the right of determining what was not, and to enforce its circulation against the laws of such states as might prohibit them. With this impression, and in order to prevent the adoption of erroneous views, at the outset, on a subject so vitally important to the slave-holding states, he moved the reference of the portion of the message containing the recom- mendation to a special committee, of which he was appointed chairman. The report* he made took a very original and able survey of the whole ground, and conclusively proved, both by arguments drawn from the Constitution and the practice of the Government, that it belonged to the states separately to de- termine what is or is not calculated to aftect or disturb its internal police, in- cluding its peace and safety, and to adopt the measures necessary for their security ; and that it was the duty of the General Government not only to con- form its acts, in reference to the mail or for the regulation of commerce, to the legislation of the states in such cases, but to aid in the execution of the laws of the states, as far as its power would permit, when it became necessary. The report was accompanied by a bill, drawn up in conformity with these views, and was ordered to the third reading by the casting loie ol ihe Vice- president, but finally failed. This bill gave rise in the Senate to a very animated and interesting debate, principally between Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Davis of Massachusetts, in which the arguments for and against are strongly presented on both sides. For ori- ginal views of the Constitution and strength of argument, Mr. Calhoun's speechf on the occasion ranks with his ablest, and is worthy of the study of all Avho de- sire to understand some of the most important provisions of that instrument. During the same session he made another speech^ on the same subject, dis- tinguished for its foresight and knowledge of the Constitution. For the first time there began to pour in that flood of petitions on the subject of abolition ■which has since deluged Congress. The members from the non-slave-holding states on both sides, though adverse to the petitions, were opposed to taking strong and decided grounds against them ; and their respective political friends in the South were naturally indisposed to force them to take higher grounds than they were inclined to do. The result was a sort of compromise, to re- ceive the petitions, but not to refer or act upon them. Mr. Calhoun, whose rule has ever been to meet danger " on the frontier," to use his own expres- sion, saw the peril of receiving the petitions, and determined to take a decided stand against it. He expected to stand alone ; but with such force did he maintain his objections^ to receiving, that he was supported by a large portion of the Southern senators, and the motion to receive was laid on the table. Since then, no petition of the kind has been received by the Senate. The prominent question at the next session was the Specie Circular. The President had issued an order in the recess prohibiting the receipt of bank- .notes, or anything but specie in payment of the public lands. The opposition * See " Speeches," &c., No. ] 1. t Ibid, No. 12. t Ibid, No. 13. ^ Ibid, No. 14. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 59 was unanimously opposed to it, both on the ground of expediency, and the want of authority on his part to issue such an order, while his friends and supporters were greatly divided, some sustaining, but the greater part opposing the meas- ure. Mr. Calhoun agreed with those who denied the right of the President to issue the order, on the broad principle that neither the Constitution nor the laws conferred it, and that the executive had no power but what was conferred by the one or the other. Nevertheless, he declined voting for the bill to super- sede the order, which was passed by a great majority, a large portion of the administration party voting for it. His reasons were, that the diseased state of the ciuTency Avas beyond remedy, and whether the circular was repealed or not, the result would be the same. He regarded the catastrophe as inevitable, and that the only question was, at whose door the responsibility should be laid. He saw that if the circular should be rescinded, it would be charged on those by whose vote it was done ; and as he felt conscious that he had done all that he could to arrest the approaching calamity, he was determined to avoid all responsibility, and therefore declined voting for the bill. He was entitled to the floor, and intended to offer his reasons at large ; but when it came up on its passage, was accidentally prevented from speaking. On his return home in March, several of his friends in Charleston, interested in trade and the banks, asked his opinion of the prospect ahead. His reply was, that the storm was ap- proaching, and was just at hand, and his advice was to reef — reef — reef — quickly and closely, to avoid being wrecked. In two months the banks suspended pay- ments, and the commerce and business of the country were prostrated. During the same session an important question arose in reference to the ad- mission of Michigan. She had been admitted at the preceding session on the condition of agreeing to the boundary between her and Ohio, as presented by the act for her admission. The Legislature of the state, in compliance with the act of Congress, called a convention of the people of the state, in order to determine whether the conditions should be accepted or not. The convention rejected the condition. Subsequently, an informal meeting or caucus was called by the part}^ in favour of accepting it, without legal authority, or any other cere- mony than is used for convening such meetings for ordinary political objects. It met, and agreed to the condition, which had been in due form considered and rejected by the convention legally and regiUarly called. The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom the subject was referred, reported in favour of admitting the state on the authority of the informal meeting or caucus, for it was, in fact, nothing more. Mr. Calhoun opposed the report in two speeches* on the ground of the unconstitutionality and the danger of the precedent, in which he displayed, with great force of argument, that thorough knowledge of the Constitution for •which he is remarkable. But, as powerful as was his resistance, it proved vain. The bill passed, and has made a precedent, the danger of which time only can disclose. CHAPTER VI. in which the Narrative is continued until the Termination of the Second Session of the 27th Congress. The suspension of the banks in the spring of '37 marks an important period in the life of Mr. Calhoun and the political history of the country. Fortunately, tinder the operation of the joint resolution of 1816, and the Deposite Act of the preceding year, in the passage of both of which he took a decided part, the act of suspension of itself entirely separated the Government and the banks. The former prohibited the Government from receiving the notes of suspended banks * See " Speeches," &.C., Nos. 16 and 17. 60 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, in the public dues ; and the latter prohibited it from using such banks as the depositaries of the public money, or as the fiscal agents of the Government. Without these, the union of the Government with the banks would still have continued, and the former would have found itself reduced to the same condi- tion that it Avas at the end of the war in 1815, of receiving and paying away the notes of discredited banks, and using them as its depositaries and agents in the management of its revenue. The suspension, as has been stated, was not unexpected to Mr. Calhoun ; and he was not long in making up his mind as to the course he would pursue. He resolved to resist the reunion of the Government and the banks in any form, and to oppose the establishment of a national bank. Indeed, he regarded it as the first occasion that ever occurred which offered an opportunity for car rying into execution what he had long believed to be the true policy of the country, the divorce of the Government from all connexion with banks ; an opinion which he had first publicly and plainly indicated in 1834, in his speech on the removal of the deposites, already cited. He made known his determi- nation to a few confidential friends long before the call of the extraordinary ses- sion, and resisted decidedly all attempts to influence him to support a national bank. With his course thus fixed, he went to Washington at the commencement of the extra session, resolved to await the development of the views of the two great parties before he should publicly make known his own, and to act with or against them, according as their course might agree or disagree with his own. He listened attentively to the reading of the President's Message at the opening of the session, which explicitly opposed the establishment of a United States Bank, and the renewal of the union of the Government and the banks, and made up his mind, as soon as the reading was finished, that he would give it his support. The impression got out that Mr. Calhoun would support the message. It caused much excitement ; but as it was only a rumour, the development of his course in his place in the Senate was looked to with deep solicitude. It was not long before an occasion offered. The Committee on Finances reported, shortly after the message Avas received, a bill for the establishment of what was called a Sub-treasury, but Avithout any provision for collecting the Govern- ment dues in specie. Mr. Calhoun rose in his place, and declared himself in favour of the entire separation of the Government from the banks, but denounced in strong terms the report of the committee for omitting what he regarded as essential to a separation ; a provision for collecting the public dues in the constitutional currency, without which the measure they had reported would prove a perfect abortion. He declared that if that was what Avas meant by a sub-treasury, he washed his hands of all concern with it. His remarks made a deep sensation, and he was solicited by many of the friends of the administration to bring for- Avard, in the shape of an amendment, a proposition to collect the public dues in specie. He replied that he had not intended to offer any proposition of his OAvn ; but, as they requested it, he would comply Avith their Avishes. When the bill for the issue of treasury notes came up a few days after, he stated his opinion at large on the subject of the separation of the Government and the banks, in a speech, Avhich made a permanent impression on the public mind, in reference to the whole banking system. He gave notice in his speech* of his intention of moA'ing an amendment, at the proper time, to the bill, for the gradual but permanent separation of the Government from the banks, but finally agreed to postpone his motion till the bill for the establishment of the Sub- treasury should come under consideration. When that came up, he moved his amendment, and made a second speech,! ^^ which he traced the rise and progress of the banking system, and marked the several stages through which it had * See " Speeches," &.C., No. 18. t See " Speeches," &c.. No. 19. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUX. 61 passed ; lie showed that it contained within itself the principle of its own de- struction ; and finally exposed the mischievous character and tendency of the system, economically, politically, and morally. His amendment prevailed, and the bill passed the Senate as amended, but failed in the House. Such was Mr. Calhoun's course on this memorable occasion. All things considered, it has seldom been equalled for patriotism, magnanimity, sagacity, and boldness. We have seen him, in obedience to his principles, and what seemed to be his duty, separate himself from General Jackson and the party when in the plenitude of their power, and when he held the second office in the Government, with every prospect of reaching the highest. We have seen him, after his separation, instead of courting the opposition in order to maintaui himself against the power and influence of the executive, again pursue a course in obedience to principle and duty, which brought him into direct conflict with both, and left him with his state alone to maintain the unequal struggle against a course of policy which, he believed, if not arrested, would prove ruinous to the Government and country. We have seen him, when the state, in pursuance of his course, had eflected its object, availing himself of the aid of the opposition to bring down the power and influence of the executive department (origina- ting in the encroachments of the Congress) within proper constitutional, legal limits. That done, we next see him, when the reaction of the very system to oppose which he separated from the party had prostrated them, and when the opposition with which he had for a time acted were preparing to rush on and overwhelm them in their weakness, and to re-establish their old doctrines and principles, rising up promptly, overcoming all personal feelings, forgetting all past difierences, boldly repelling the assaults of his recent allies, and de- fending and protecting those from whom he had been so long separated, and by whom he had been much wronged, in stern obedience to his principles and to what he believed to be his duty : thus clearly showing, by his whole course throughout this eventful period, that lohen they were at stake, neither ambition, fear, enmity, friendship, nor popularity could bend him from his course. The stand which he took drew down on him, as might be expected, the bitter denunciation and vengeance of the opposition, who had now assumed the name of Whigs. Among other things, they charged him with desertion, as if he had ever been of their party, and when, in fact, he had kept himself distinct from both the great parties from the time of his separation from General Jackson. That there might be no mistake on that point, he took the earliest opportunity in the Senate to avow what his position was. In his speech on Mr. Webster's motion, in 1834, to renew the charter of the United States Bank for six years, he said, " I am the partisan of no class, nor, let me add, of either political party. I am neither of the opposition nor administration. If I act with the former in any instance, it is because I approve of their course on the particular occasion, and I shall always be happy to act with them when I do approve. If I oppose the administration, if I desire to see power change hands, it is because I disap- prove of the general course of those in authority." To which he added : " But mine has not been, nor will it be, a systematic opposition. Whatever measure of theirs I deem right I shall cheerfully sup- port, and I only desire that they will aflTord me more frequent occasions for support and fewer for opposition than they have heretofore done." He often avowed the same sentiments, and acted throughout in strict conformity to the principles here laid down ; and when Mr. Clay, for the first time in the Senate, assumed the name of Whig for himself and the party, intending to comprehend under it all that did not support the administration, the State Rights as well as the national parties, Mr. Calhoun rose in his place and disavowed the name, as applied to himself, and expressed himself contented with the name he bore. If to this it is added, he never, on any occasion, joined in their political meet- ings or party consultations, and always kept himself free on every question to ^ 62 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. follow the dictates of his own judgment, it must be obvious that the charge of desertion is wholly groundless. In truth, he never from the first permitted his party obligations to overrule his attachment to principles or duty, and through- out this trying period he availed himself of the aid of whatever party fell ia with his course for the time, to effect the important objects he had in view, but without permitting them, in any instance, to divert him from his end. At the next session, the Sub-treasury, or the reorganization of the treasury, with the view of collecting, safe keeping, and disbursing the public moneys through its own officers, Avithout the agency of banks, again became the prom- inent question. The subject was again referred in the Senate to the Commit- tee of Finance, which reported a bill much fuller in its details, and containing what is called the specie feature, that is, a provision for the gradual, but entire separation of the government from the banks, similar to that moved at the extra session by Mr. Calhoun. Mr. Rives moved, as a substitute, to strike out the whole bill after the enacting clause, and to insert in lieu the use of the state banks as the depositaries and fiscal agents of the government, as formerly used, but with some additional modifications. The discussion took place on the amendment, and the argument principally turned on the respective merits of the two systems. Both sides put out their strength. The debate was ani- mated and able. Mr. Calhoun took a prominent part, and greatly distinguished himself in the speech he delivered on the occasion.* This drew down on him pointed personal attacks from the two great leaders of the opposition, Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster, with whom he had to contend single handed. The conflict excited deep and universal interest.! It was called in the journals of the day the war of the giants ; and it is no more than justice to him to say, that he repelled their charges with signal success, and turned back the war with effect.J ' After the defeat of the amendment offered by Mr. Rives, and just before the question was put on the engrossment, a motion was made to strike out the spe- cie feature, which succeeded by the united vote of the opposition and a consid- erable portion of the friends of the administration. The effect of the amend- ment would be for the government to collect the dues in the notes of the banks, and deposite them for safe keeping in its own safes and vaults, to which Mr. Calhoun had from the first avowed his hostility. He reserved his opposition until the bill had been perfected, according to the view? of those who had made the amendment, and the question put on the engrossment, when he stated his objections in a short, but strong and decisive speech, showing that it was liable to all the dangers and objections for which the pet-bank system was obnoxious, attended by additional dangers and objections peculiar to itself. The bill, nev- ertheless, passed the Senate, but the argument was not without its effects. The views of Mr. Calhoun were almost unanimously sustained by the party in the House and the country. The bill failed, and the session terminated in leaving things as they were. It was during this session that Mr. Calhoun introduced his resolutions on the subject of abolition. He had always regarded this as the most mischievous species of political fanaticism, and the only question which could really en- danger the Union. He saw the non-slave-holding states closely divided be- tween two great parties, and a third growing up and organizing upon a principle which they believed of a higher importance than any involved in the political issues of the day. Should this sect continue to increase without opposition from either of the gi'eat parties, its influence might become strong enough to de- cide the political contests, and so formidable that it would be courted. As their ends could only be attained through consolidation, it was likely that they would join the party whose principles had that tendency. The best interests of the Union, and the integrity of the Republican party, seemed to require the line X^^ * See " Speeches," &c., Nos. 20, 21, and 22. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 68 be drawn at once between that party and the Abolitionists. He accordingly moved the following resolutions, which present so strongly his views of the re- lations of the General Government and of the states to this subject, that we shall extract them. " Mr. Calhoun then submitted the following resolutions : " Resolved, That, in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the states adopting the same acted severally as free, independent, and sovereign states ; and that each, for itself, by its own voluntary assent, entered the Union with the view to its increased security against all dangers, domestic as well as foreign, and the more perfect and secure enjoyment of its advantages, natural, political, and social. " Resolved, That, in delegating a portion of their powers to be exercised by the Federal Government, the states retained severally the exclusive and sole right over their own domestic institutions and police, and are alone responsible for them ; and that any intermeddling of any one or more states, or a combina- tion of their citizens, with the domestic institutions and police of the others, on any ground or under any pretext whatever, political, moral, or religious, with a view to their alteration or subversion, is an assumption of superiority not war- ranted by the Constitution, insulting to the states interfered with, tending to en- danger their domestic peace and tranquillity, subversive of the objects for which the Constitution was formed, and, by necessary consequence, tending to weaken and destroy the Union itself. " Resolved, That tliis Government was instituted and adopted by the several states of this Union as a common agent, in order to carry into effect the powers which they had delegated by the Constitution for their mutual security and pros- perity ; and that, in fulfilment of this high and sacred trust, this Government is bound so to exercise its powers as to give, as far as may be practicable, in- creased stability and security to the domestic institutions of the states that com- pose the Union ; and that it is the solemn duty of the Government to resist all attempts by one portion of the Union to use it as an instrument to attack the domestic institutions of another, or to weaken or destroy such institutions, in- stead of strengthening and upholding them, as it is in duty bound to do. " Resolved, That domestic slavery, as it exists in the Southern and Western States of this Union, composes an important part of tjieir domestic institutions, inherited from their ancestors, and existing at the adoption of the Constitution, by which it is recognised as constituting an essential element in the distribu- tion of its powers among the states ; and that no change of opinion or feeling on the part of the other states of the Union in relation to it can justify them or their citizens in open and systematic attacks thereon, with the view to its over- throw ; and that all such attacks are in manifest violation of the mutual and solemn pledge to protect and defend each other, given by the states respectively on entering into the Constitutional compact which formed the Union, and, as such, is a manifest breach of faith, and a violation of the most solemn obliga- tions, moral and religious. " Resolved, That the intermeddling of any state or states, or their citizens, to abolish slavery in this district, or any of the territories, on the ground or under the pretext that it is immoral or sinful, or the passage of any act or measure of Congress with that view, would be a direct and dangerous attack on the in- stitutions of all the slave-holdinsr states. " Resolved, That the union of these states rests on an equality of rights and advantages among its members ; and that whatever destroys that equality tends to destroy the Union itself; and that it is the solemn duty of all, and more es- pecially of this body, which represents the states in their corporate capacity, to resist all attempts to discriminate between the states in extending (he benefits of the Government to the several portions of the Union ; and that to refuse to extend to the Southern and Western States any advantage which would tend to .«4 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. Strengthen or render them more secure, or increase their limits or population by the annexation of new territory or states, on the assumption or under the pre- text that the institution of slavery, as it exists among them, is immoral or sinfid, or otherwise obnoxious, would be contrary to that equality of rights and advan- tages which the Constitution was intended to secure alike to all the members of the Union, and would, in effect, disfranchise the slave-holding states, with- holding from them the advantages, Avhile it subjected them to the burdens of the Government." These, with the exception of the last, passed the Senate with some slight modifications. In the course of a long and running debate on these resolutions, he examined the relations of our government to this subject. He showed those who viewed slavery only in the abstract, that they could never thus form a true conception of their duty in the existing state of things. It was not a question to be considered in the abstract, but in the concrete, and with a full view of all the circumstances connected with it. In a large portion of our country, two laces had been thrown together in nearly equal numbers, and separated into castes by a natural line too strongly drawn ever to be effaced. The question was not as to what different state of things could be conceived as more desira- ble, but what was the best relation to establish between two such races thrown to- gether under such circumstances. Under the institution of slavery, both races had prospered, and the black especially had made a more rapid advance in civilization than it had ever done before in the same space of time and under other circumstances. These were facts to induce those to pause who were tempted, by considerations of abstract philanthropy, to overstep the bounds which were imposed on their action not only by the Constitution, but also by an enlighten- ed spirit of benevolence itself. If other considerations were wanting, he pointed to the incidental political benefits arising from an institution which harmonized the relations between capital and labour, and thus introduced a spirit conserva- tive of both interests, so far as Southern influence could be felt in the action of the General Government. The passage of these resolutions placed the Aboli- tionists in direct hostility to the Republican party, and led to a state of things which was far safer to the party and the Union than to have permitted so dan- gerous a sect to grow up unopposed. The Republicans, from all sections of the Union, found in these propositions a common ground where they could stand, without danger of schism upon the question which threatened most to divide them. At the next session the prominent subject of debate was Mr. Crittenden's bill to prevent the interference of certain Federal officers in elections. Mr. Calhoun spoke with much power and effect on the occasion.* After discussing the subject fully against the bill on its merits, both as to its constitutionality and expediency, and showing that its effects would be the opposite of what was intended — that it would increase instead of diminishing the influence of the ex- ecutive — he declared himself the fixed and strenuous friend of reducing the influence and patronage of that branch of the government within the narrowest limits consistent with the Constitution and the object for which it was created. He then proceeded to show that the legitimate means of effecting that was to restrict the revenue and expenditure to the legitimate and constitutional wants of the Government, and to hold the executive power strictly to its appropriate sphere. This led him into a very interesting account of the two hostile sys- tems of policy, which had divided the country from the formation of the Gov- ernment, of one of which Mr. Jefferson was the head and General Hamilton of the other. After tracing their rise and progress, he showed that the present struo-crle was but a continuation of the original conflict between them, and that an opportunity was now afibrded for the first time since the Government went into operation, to put down eilectually that of which Hamilton was the head — ■ the old Federal and consolidation party; and to give the opposite — that of * See " Speeches," &c., No. 23. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 65 which Jefferson was the head, the old State Rights Republican party — a per- manent ascendency. In conclusion he said, " It would be presumptuous in me, Mr. President, to advise those who are charged with the administration of the Government what course to adopt ; but if they would hear the voice of one who desires nothing for himself, and whose only wish is to see the country prosper- ous, free, and happy, I would say to them. You are placed in the most remark- able juncture that has ever occurred since the establishment of the Federal Government, and, by seizing the opportunity, you may bring the vessel of state to a position where she may take a new tack, and thereby escape all the shoals and breakers into the midst of which a false steerage has run her, and bring her triumphantly into her destined port, with honour to yourselves and safety to those on board. Take your stand boldly ; avow your object ; disclose your measures, and let the people see clearly that you intend to do what Jefferson designed, but, from adverse circumstances, could not accomplish : to reverse the measures originating in principles and policy not congenial with our political system ; to divest the Government of all undue patronage and influence ; to re- strict it to the few great objects intended by the Constitution ; in a word, to give a complete ascendency to the good old Virginia school over its antagonist, which time and experience have proved to be foreign and dangerous to our sys- tem of Government, and you may count with confidence on their support, with- out looking to other means of success. Should the Government take such a course at this favourable moment, our free and happy institutions may be perpet- uated for generations, but, if a different, short will be their duration." Had the course advised been early and openly avowed and vigorously pursued in time, very different might have beer, the termination of the last presidential election ; and it may be added, that the advice is not less applicable to the com- ing than to the past election, and, if the Federal consolidation party is ever to be permanently put down, and the State Rights Republican party to gain the permanent ascendency, it can only be effected by its adhering steadily and in good faith to the course advised. The next session, that of 1839-40, which immediately preceded the late presidential election, was distinguished for the number and importance of the subjects that were agitated and discussed, and, it may be added, the ability and animation of the discussions. Among the more prominent of these may be in- cluded the public lands ; the assumption of state debts ; Mr. Calhoun's resolu- tions in reference to the case of the Enterprise ; the Bankrupt Bill, and the re- peal of the salt-tax ; in all of which Mr. Calhoun took a prominent part.* His speeches on his resolutions and on the assumption of state debts are among the ablest he ever delivered, and are worthy of the attention of all who desire to understand the subjects which they discuss. The presidential election having terminated in favour of the Whigs, the next session was principally occupied in the discussions connected with the public lands, preparatory to one of the leading objects of policy contemplated under the new administration. Mr. Calhoun made tliree speeches on the subject :t one on the prospective Pre-emption Bill ; another on an amendment to it pro- posed by Mr. Crittenden, as a substitute, to distribute the revenue from the pub- lic lands among the states ; and, finally, one in reply to Mr. Webster and Mr. Clay. In these the whole policy of the public lands, and the various plans which were proposed in reference to them, were discussed. It is a subject which early attracted Mr. Calhoun's attention, and has engrossed much of his reflection. As far back as February, 1837, he offered a substitute, in the form of an amendment to the bill, to suspend the sales of the public lands, in which he proposed to cede to the new states the portion of the public lands lying within their respective limits, on certain conditions, which he accompanied by a speech * See " Speeches," &c., Nos. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29. I 66 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. explanatory of his views and reasons. He followed up the subject in a speech delivered in January, 1839, on the Graduation Bill ; and in May, 1840, air elaborate and full report was made from the Committee on Public Lands, and a bill introduced by him, containing substantially the same provisions with his original proposition. These, with his three speeches already referred to, con- tain a full view of his objects and reasons for the proposed cession. There have been few measures ever presented for consideration so grossly misrepresented, or so much misconceived, as the one in question. It has beea represented as a gift — a surrender — an abandonment of the public domain to the new states ; and having assumed that to be its true character, the most un- worthy motives have been attributed to the author for introducing it. Nothing- is more untrue. The cession is neither more nor less than a conditional sale, not extended to the whole of the public domain, as represented, but to that por- tion in the new states respectively within whose limits they lie ; the greater part of which are mere remnants, which have long since been offered for sale, without being sold. The conditions on which they are proposed to be ceded or sold are drawn up with the greatest care, and with the strictest provisions to ensure their fulfil- ment ; one of which is, that the state should pay 65 per cent, of the gross pro- ceeds of the sale to the General Government, and retain only 35 per cent, for the trouble, expense, and responsibility attending their administration. An- other is, that the existing laws, as they stand, except so far as they may be mod- ified or authorized to be modified by the act of cession, shall remain unchanged, unless altered by the joint consent of the General Government and the several states. They are respectively authorized, if they should think proper, to adopt a system of graduation and pre-emption within well-defined and safe limits pre- scribed in the conditions ; and the General Government is authorized to appoint officers in the several states, to whom its share of the proceeds of the sale shall be directly paid, without going into the state treasury ; and these conditions are put under the guardianship of the courts, by providing, if they shall be violated, that all after rules by the state shall be null and void. So far from this being a gift, or an abandonment of the public lands to the new states, he has clearly proved, if there be truth in figures, that the Government would receive a great- er amount of revenue from the lands in the new states, under the system he proposes, than under the present. These demonstrations are based on calcula- tions which neither have nor can be impugned. But his views extended far beyond dollars and cents in bringing forward the- measure. He proposed to effect by it the high political objects of placing the new states on the same footing of equality and independence with the old, in reference to their domain ; to cut off" the vast amount of patronage which the public lands place in the hand of the executive ; to withdraw them, as one of the stakes, from the presidential game ; to diminish by one fourth the busi- ness of Congress, and with it the length and expense of its session ; to enlist the Government of the new states on the side of the General Government ; to aid in a more careful administration of the rest of the public domain, and thereby prevent the whole of it from becoming the property of the occupants from possession ; and, finally, to prevent the too rapid extinction of Indian titles in proportion to the demand for lands from the increase of population, which he shows to be pregnant with great embarrassment and danger. These are great objects, of high political import; and if they could be effected by the measure proposed, it is justly entitled to be ranked among the wisest and most politic ever brought forward. That they can be effected, it is almost impossi- ble for any well-informed and dispassionate mind deliberately to read the speeches and documents referred to, and to doubt. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. fir * CHAPTER VII. • Conclusion. One of the first acts of the new administration was to call an extra session in the spring of 1841. Flushed with success, and confident in their power to consummate their entire system of policy, the Whigs assembled at the commence- jnent of this session with overwhelming majorities in each House of Congress. The Republicans came, under circumstances well calculated to dispirit them, and too weak in point of numbers to have made an efficient opposition except under the most skilful management. It soon became manifest, as the plan of the campaign was developed, that the majority were determined to sweep every- thing by " coups-de-main," artd would not depend upon address at the expense of time to take any post which could possibly be carried by storm. They com- menced in the House of Representatives by wresting from the minority some of the most inestimable of the privileges of debate : privileges which the minority had enjoyed from the institution of the House of Representatives up to that time, and even during the war, when the opposition, by its factious course, seemed to have justly forfeited all respect, if it had not been deemed the sacred right of the tax-payer to be fully heard before new burdens were imposed upon him. But the minority were no longer allowed to debate questions in the Committee of the Whole until they were satisfied with the hearing. The majority seized the power of arresting the debate whenever they chose, and thus, under the pretence of preventing factious delays, they acquired the means of terminating the discussion whenever it searched their purposes too deeply, or developed too strongly the consequences of their measures. Under this state of things, there was little left to the opposition but the mere vote ; and the majority so completely acquired the whole sway in the lower House that it was by their grace only that their opponents could even remonstrate against their measures. In that body one overruling influence seemed to prevail, which did not emanate from within, but cast its shadow from without. Nor could even the fascinations of the splendid genius that controlled, relieve the dull, dreary, ■ and depressing sense of dependance under which that House seemed to think and move. In the Senate, however, this tendency to the absolute power of a majority met with a severe and effective resistance. Determined never to yield up the arms which were necessary for the contest, they repelled every attempt to introduce " the gag." Foremost among the opposition stood Mr. Calhoun, and the parliamentary annals of the world hardly afford an instance of a more formi- dable array of intellectual force than that opposition then presented. Nothing- could be more brilliant than its career through the whole of this short but event- ful session. The majority boldly assumed the old Federal positions upon the bank, the tariff, and the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands. Confident in their strength to carry it, they openly avowed their system. Profusion in pub- lic expenditure and special legislation seemed to be the order of the day. To the shattered victims of the war so long waged by the stock interests, a deliver- ance from all obligation for the past was declared in the Bankrupt Law ; and the affiliated system of the bank, the tariff, and the distribution tempted them Avith an almost boundless prospect for future indulgence. The prodigal, the idle, the desperate, the visionary speculator, and even the cunning usurer, were each invited, by some appropriate hope, to join in the gemeral foray, when the whole field of productive industry was to be given up to plunder. There seemed to be at last a prospect that Hamilton's system would prevail. With 63 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. revenue decreasing daily, the Secretary of the Treasury proposed an annual ex- penditure of about $27,000,000, and recommended a distribution among the states of tlie proceeds of the public lands. This lavish expenditure was to be main- tained from customs alone ; and through the influence of another bank expansion, our people were to be tempted to buy freely under the ruinous rates of duties which were proposed. Entreaty and remonstrance were alike unavailing with the majority, which for a while pursued its course without regard to the rights of the states or the freedom of individual pursuits, which were overwhelmed in their way. The whole hope of an efficient resistance to these measures in Congress now rested on the Senate, where the necessary privileges of debate were still retained. Our history does not present us an instance of an opposi- tion more distinguished for its ability, or more untiring in its energy. Its searching gaze seemed to read the hidden purpose with almost as much cer- tainty as it followed the open movements of its adversary. The purposes and principles of the system proposed by the majority were so clearly exposed by skilful amendments or in vigorous debate, that the public attention was fully aroused and directed to the consequences : consequences which Avere so pow- erfully and accurately depicted, that even the authors of the measures would have been appalled had they been less reckless of the future. The natural af- finity between the tariff and distribution, which Mr. Calhoun had proclaimed so long before, was now clearly proved by the course of the majority during this session. So essential did they deem the distribution in order to secure the permanence of the tariff, that they ventured upon the former measure at every hazard, and at a time, too, when the revenue was deficient, and there was scarcely a hope that the customs would afford money enough for the current expenses of the Government. This ominous combination, which Mr. Calhoun had sacrificed so much to avert, was now at hand, and he met it in a speech,* which is one of the finest specimens of his power and style. There are portions of that speech in which he traces the consequences of distribution with a spirit of inquiry so eager, so searching, so keen, that he forgets himself and the personal feelings of the contest in the contemplation of the vision of ruin before him, and seems to seek relief from his forebodings by unbosoming himself to the country. The ma- jority now faltered, for the first time, under the appeals of the opposition, and incorporated a provision for suspending the distribution when the duties upon imports exceeded a certain rate — a provision to which we have since owed the suspension of that dangerous act. The condition of the finances, which seemed not to have been fully appreciated by the majority, together with the proviso of which we have spoken, rendered the distribution law practically inefficient. Their bank bills had been vetoed by the President, from whom they were soon alienated ; the Bankrupt Law was generally odious, and it seemed to require nothing more than the absurd and extravagant Tariff Act of the succeeding ses- sion to consummate their ruin. Thus did the opposition come out of the contest with flying colovus at the close of that eventful session. The part which Mr. Calhoun bore in this crisis is so justly and so thoroughly appreciated by the country, that no particular comment upon it is necessary. Suffice it to say, that the discussions of the extra session and of that which succeeded it were important and exciting. The most prominent of the extra session were upon the M'Leod case, the Report of the Secretary of the Treas- ury, and the Bankrupt Law.f The debate on the bank bills turned almost ex- clusively upon the details. At the succeeding session the , principal subjects were the Treasury Note Bill, the Veto power, Mr. Clay's resolutions in refer- ence to the revenue and expenditures, the Loan Bill, and the Tarifi" Bill. To Mr. Calhoun's speeches upon these subjects we simply refer, because they are so recent as to be. familiar to all, and not because they are less worthy of study than some others of a more distant date, from which we have extracted freely. Indeed, we have so often found occasion to recommend the perusal of the par- * See " Speeclies," &c., No. 31. t Ibid., No. 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 68 ticular speech to which we were referring, that Ave Avere almost afraid of exci- ting the suspicion that our object Avas more to eulogize the statesman than to instruct the reader ; and yet we are sure that all who study these speeches Avill acquit us of such a motive. We have recommended their perusal because we believed that they gave the best vicAv of the state of public afiairs, and of the mode in which a statesman would deal with such events, Avhich has yet been furnished ; nor did we know of any other models, eitlier of statesmanship or oratory, in our OAvn parliamentary annals, to Avhich Ave could better invite the attention of the student. Indeed, Ave could scarcely direct him amiss among these speeches for specimens of luminous conceptions, or of that simple and natural order of propositions Avhich constitutes a peculiar charm in style, and enables the orator to fascinate his audience, and carry them along Avith him. The English language affords no finer examples than are to be found in these speeches of the power of analysis in eliminating the truth of a case from cir- cumstances which obscure and embarrass it. Nor are there any more attract- ive for novel and profound speculation, in Avhich he sometimes deals when such lights and shadoAvs are necessary to complete the picture which he is drawing. In how many of the unexplored regions of human thought will the attentive reader be startled to find the trace of his footstep, and yet so rapid is he in his flight over his subject, that he scarcely takes time to set up his flag on the lands Avhich he has found, or to perpetuate the evidences of his title to the honours of discovery. Here, perhaps, we ought to leave the reader to draAv his own conclusions as to the nature of the man and of his public services from the narrative which we have given ; and yet we feel that it Avill be impossible for him to understand either fully, even with the aids which we have offered him, without a careful study of his speeches, reports, and other public addresses, in connexion Avith the his- tory of the times ; a study to which Ave again commend him, as Avell worthy of the time and labour Avhich it may cost. For ourselves, we can truly say, that our estimate of his public services has increased with our opportunities for stud- ying them, and that our admiration of his character has grown as his private and political history became more familiar to us. Indeed, it Avould almost seem to us, at times, that it belonged to the destiny of the American people to have reared up such a man, and that one of its necessities required him to pursue that long and stormy career, through which he has watched and helped to steer the ship of state with an eye that never winked and an energy that never tired. It required his indomitable Avill, and a nature thus rarely constituted, to have maintained this eager and incessant labour for the happiness of the American people, and to have led, for so long a period, the triumphal march of our glori- ous institutions. With a turn of mind naturally philosophical, his great power of analysis and his faculty of attentive observation early enabled him to i'orm a system for the conduct of life, both in his private and public relations, and to determine within his own mind upon the true ends of human action ; ends which he has pursued with a matchless constancy, while a knowledge of his ultimate destination and of the high objects of his journey has cheered him along through the thorny paths of public life. Of all the men whom Ave have ever seen, he seems to us to have surveyed most completely the whole ground of human action. To these advantages he adds another, which constitutes, perhaps, his highest quality as a statesman. It is the faculty of considering circumstances in their combinations, and of determining their relative power in propelling events. To analyze this combination, or "juncture" (as he some- limes cnlls it), and to determine the resultant of all these forces, is, in his opin- ion, the highest and rarest faculty of a statesman. If he values this power more than most others, it is because he has derived more benefit from its use, and well may he estimate highly that qualhy which, by affording him an insight into futurity far beyond the usual range of human vision, has given him such TO LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. control over events. These were the gifts in whose strength he presented him- self on the stage of the world in the very commencement of his public life, as one fully grown and armed for the trials which belonged to the time and the place. True to those noble instincts which spring more from a Divine source than from human reason, he ever leaned to liberty as against power, and early learned to resist those temptations which so often lead man to increase the power of the mass, which he is content to share as a member, at the expense of those separate and individual rights of which nature constituted him the pe- culiar guardian, and which were only given as the means of self-culture, and is indispensable to the moral elevation of his being. His public life may be divided into two grand epochs : the first, in which he put forth his whole energies to enable his countrymen to maintain their inde- pendence against foreign aggression ; and the second, in which he undertook the more difficult task of freeing their domestic legislation from those devices by which one was enabled to prey upon another. In each of these periods he has been emphatically " the man of his time," and he has ever regarded the tenets of the Republican party as indicating the best means of attaining these ends under our form of government. Of all men now living, he, perhaps, has con- tributed most to illustrate and establish that political creed. We are aware that we expose ourselves here to the sneers of some of those literal expositors of the law, who believe that man was made for the Sabbath and not the Sabbath for man. But we repeat the assertion, that in all the public exigencies in which he was called to act, he made the nearest practical approach to the great ends of the Republican party which human wisdom or foresight could then devise. In all the great measures of our government since he first entered Congress, his influence has been felt either in their origination or modification, and to this influence more than any other the Republican party is indebted for its present proud position before the world. Morally considered, the great objects of the Republican party are simple and few. Its first is to preserve, as far as possible, the independence of individual action and pursuit ; and it rejects all limitations upon this independence which are not essential to the great ends of social organization. It regards all of those powers which man wields in his aggregate or corporate capacity as so many limitations upon his individual rights, and it yields those which are indispensa- ble to the institution of society as so many concessions which necessity has ex- torted from liberty. These are the terms upon which they would grant Govern- ment its powers ; and they would administer the power thus limited with an equal regard for all who are entitled to share the benefits of the trust. Tried by these tests, Mr. Calhoun has nothing to fear, when the circumstances are con- sidered under which he was called to act. In the first epoch of his public life, we were forced to defend ourselves in a war with the most formidable nation of the globe, and with the only power whose arm was long enough to reach us in our distant position, and within the defences of so many natural barriers. In its commencement it was a war of independence, and it might become a contest for existence. In this state of things, it was in our aggregate power alone that we were to find the strength to resist foreign assaults, and every American patriot sought the means of increas- ing it as far as the limitations of the Constitution would permit. The war was a measure of the Republican party, and the unpatriotic course of the opposition devolved upon them alone the duty of devising the means to prosecute it. Un- der these circumstances, the Republican party deflected from the natural line of their direction, and sought to concentrate as much power in the Government as they then believed indispensable for the successful conduct of the war. How far they were right or wrong, it is not our province here to determine ; but cer- tain it is, that there was much in the overruling power of circumstances to jus- tify their course and excuse their errors, if errors they may be called. .\Yith LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 71 how much more justice may the same apology be made for Mr. Calhoun him- self. The leading advocate of hostilities and the chairman of the committee which reported the declaration of war, with a deep responsibility to the country for the success of that contest, which he was accused of precipitating ; young, ardent, and indignant at the course of foreign and domestic enemies, it is sur- prising that he was not less scrupulous of the Constitution in calling I'orth the means of defending it, and our people against ibreign expositions of law and justice, which ultimately might have overturned all, unless arrested by our successful resistance. And yet, upon how many great occasions did he re- strain the Republican party from aberrations from their principles. It was he who opposed the restrictive system against the majority of the party. It was he, too, who took a prominent part in resisting the system of forced loans in the case of the merchants' bonds, and who defeated Mr. Dallas's vast scheme of a national bank to issue irredeemable paper, which was recommend- ed by a Republican President and supported by the party. Session after ses- sion did he combat it, until he succeeded in restoring to the country a specie- paying paper, and something like uniformity in the medium in which its taxes were collected. And although the opinions of that day, growing out of the exi- gencies of the war, exaggerated the necessity for roads and canals as military defences, and called for the general use of a power which was given by the Constitution within the narrowest limits, it is remarkable that he has nowhere expressly affirmed the existence of such a power in the Federal Government. His views of the proper use to be made of this power, if it existed, or could be obtained, when given in obedience to a call of the House of Repre- resentatives, were perhaps the ablest ever taken of the relation of this subject to our military defences, yet he cautiously abstained from deciding the constitu- tional question. This was before the Republican party had paused in that ca- reer in which they were concentrating power within to defend themselves against attacks from without. In a review of this period of his life, it may with truth be said, that all those acts for which he has been reproached as departures from the State Rights creed, were substitutes for much worse measures, which, but for him, his party would have adopted ; and, although some of them were nei- ther the wisest nor best, according to the present standard of information, they were each the nearest approach to the true Republican line of action which was permitted by the state of public knowledge and feeling ac the time. But, whatever may have been the errors of the early part of his public life, he nobly redeemed them in the second period, which commenced from his election to the vice-presidency. It was during the interval then allowed for reflection that he first examined thoroughly the working of the machinery of the Govern- ment in its internal as well as its external relations. He was amon" the first of the Republican party to pause in that career by which power had been con- solidated in the Federal Government, without due reflection upon its conse- quences to the states and the people. He saw that the distribution of the polit- ical powers of our system, as contemplated by the Constitution, had been de- ranged, and that vast affiliated stock interests had been permitted to grow up almost unconsciously, which threatened to absorb the whole power and influ- ence of the Confederacy, and to substitute a government of the few for that of the many ; and, worse than all, he saw many of the Republican party so deeply entangled in the consequences of past action, and so little aware of the mis- chiefs which threatened them, that it was impossible to receive their co-oper- ation in the efforts which were necessary to save the Government from deep organic derangement, and the party itself from utter annihilation. His position gave him a deep interest in the unity of the party, if he had looked to himself alone ; the road to office was open and easy ; but the higher and more alluring path to fame lay along a steeper route and over rugged and difficult precipices. Between these alternatives he did not hesitate, but determined at once to strike 72 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. the blows he believed to be necessary to save the country and restore the party to its pristine purity of faith and practice. We have given the history of the memorable contest in which, with unexampled odds against him, he maintained his foothold and accomplished his grand design. We have seen the series of skilful movements and masterly combina- tions by which, Avith comparatively few forces, he occupied and manfully contested every inch of disputed territory, until he finally struck down the protective system with blows from which it never can entirely recover in the face of the formidable array against him, wielding the battle-axe of Richard or the cimeter of Saladin, as strength or skill might best serve his turn. Ever ready, cheerful, and confident, he sometimes obtain- ed concessions from mere respect to his gallantry and prowess, which no force at his disposal could then have extorted. Experience now proved that he had not been a moment too soon in striking at the protective sys- tem. The Republican party had been gradually wasting under the as- saults of their open enemies, and the moral influences of the stock in- terests. The banks, deprived for the time of their natural ally the tariff, Avere forced to take the field alone, and the difficulty which the Republi- cans experienced in coping with this single interest, proved how impossi- ble it would have been for them to have resisted the whole affiliated sys- tem if its strength had been unimpaired, and its united forces directed against them. They now saw that Mr. Calhoun had been warring all alono", not against them, but a common enemy, Avhich, but for him, might have overwhelmed all together. Mr. Calhoun, who had left his ancient friends in their strength to reform, but not to destroy, now returned to them in their weakness to cheer, to animate, to rally, and defend them, and was prouder of their alliance upon principle in their period of adversity than he would have been of all the honours which they could have heaped upon him in their prosperity. It was not in his nature to regard the exe- crations Avhich these stock interests poured out upon him. They had too often tried the temper of his steel not to know the force of the arm which wielded it, and it was perhaps with as much of despair as rage that privilege saw its ancient and well-trained adversary take the field with additional strength against it. Mr. Calhoun did not now direct his atten- tion so much to mere affairs of outposts as to placing the party upon that solid platform of principle, in which he well knew that the whole batter- ing- train of the Federal hosts could never effect a breach. With a true military eye, he readily seized all the advantages of position, and under his advice mainly, they have, at every sacrifice, directed column after col- umn upon this elevated post, where they now command the field, and from which, if not abandoned or lost by want of vigilance, they must ultimately recover the country. He is now about to retire from the theatre of public life, neither weari- ed nor worn, but because his work is done, so far at least, as senatorial life can afford him any useful part to play. If there be any new field of action worthy of his powers, and as yet untrodden by him, it is in that highest executive sphere, for which the character of Iiis mind and the ex- perience of his life have so eminently fitted him. It is, perhaps, only upon this theatre that his countrymen would not now exclaim, " Superfluous Jags the veteran on the stage," and it is there that they will probably re- quire him to consummate, as perhaps he alone can do, those great Repub- lican reforms so cherished by the party, as destined to commend it to the grateful regards of posterity. We cannot better close this sketch than by extracting a portrait of Mr. Calhoun as a man and an orator, which was drawn by a friendly hand, it is true, but which we recognise as being so just and well executed that we gladly adopt it as our own. LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 73 In his person Mr. Calhoun is slender and tall. His countenance, at rest, is strikingly marked with decision and firmness. In conversation it is highly animated, expressive, and indicative of genius. His eyes are large, dark, brilliant, and penetrating, and leave no doubt, at first view, of a high order of intellect. His manners are easy, natural, and unassu- ming, and as frank as they are cordial and kind. In all his domestic rela- tions his life is without a blemish. He has none of the cautious reserve and mystery of common politicians ; for he has nothing to conceal or disguise. He is accessible to all, agreeable, animated, instructive, and eloquent in conversation, and communicates his opinions with the utmost freedom. Some politicians seek popularity by carefully avoiding re- sponsibility. Whatever popularity Mr, Calhoun possesses has, on the contrary, been acquired by bold and fearless assumption of responsibility on all critical and trying occasions. His judgment is so clear and dis- criminating, that he seems to possess a sort of prophetic vision of future events, and on occasions when most men doubt and hesitate, he decides with confidence, follows up his decision with undoubting firmness, and has never failed in the end to be justified by time, the arbiter of all things. Few men have been called upon to pass through scenes of higher polit- ical excitement, and to encounter more vigorous and unrelenting opposi- tion than Mr. Calhoun j yet, amid all the prejudices which party feeling engenders, and all the jealousy of political rivals, and all the animosity of political opponents, no one has yet ventured to hazard his own repu- tation for judgment or sincerity so far as to doubt one moment his great and commanding talents. As an orator, Mr. Calhoun stands in the foremost rank of parliamentary speakers. On first rising in debate, he always felt the anxiety of diffi- dence, arising from a sensibility which is almost always the companion of true genius. His manner of speaking is energetic, ardent, rapid, and marked by a solemn earnestness, which leaves no doubt of his sincerity and deep conviction. His style is pure, forcible, logical, and condensed ; often figurative for illustration, never for ornament. His mind is Avell stored with the fruits of learning, but still better with those of observa- tion and reflection. Hence depth, originality, and force characterize all his speeches. He lays his premises on a foundation too broad, solid, and deep to be shaken ; his deductions are clear and irresistible ; " the strong power of genius," to adopt the language of the eloquent Pinkney, in re- ferring to Mr. Calhoun's splendid speech on the treaty-maliing power, "from a higher region than that of argument, throws on his subjects all the light with which it is the prerogative of genius to invest and illus- trate everything." And his speeches, full of the most elevated and pa- triotic sentiments, after conquering the understanding, take the heart entirely captive, and carry along his hearers, often unconsciously, and sometimes against their will, to the point he desires. Mr. Calhoun had attained so high a reputation as a member of Con- gress, that it was thought by many that he was leaving his appropriate field when he accepted the appointment of Secretary of War. On the contrary, his new situation only presented another theatre for the exer- cise of his great and diversified talents. The distinguishing feature of his mind, the power of analysis, was now to be exercised in the practical business of Government, and at once, as by enchantment, order, efficiency, and perfect accountability sprang from the chaos in which he found the department, and demonstrated that his energy in execution was equal to his wisdom in organizing, and left it doubtful whether his legislative talents were not surpassed by his practical ability in administration. As a statesman, in the most enlarged and elevated sense of the term, K 74 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN Mr. Calhoun has no superior. A philosophical observer of men and of their affairs, he analyzes and reduces all things to their original elements, and draws thence those general principles, which, with inconceivable rapidity and unerring certainty, he applies on all occasions, and banishes the perplexity and doubt by w^hich ordinary minds are overwhelmed and confounded. By this wonderful faculty, he is enabled to decide at once, not only what measures are at present necessary for a government novel in its principles, and placed in circumstances of which there is no pre- cedent in the history of mankind, but, by discerning results through their causes, to look into futurity, and to devise means for carrying on our be- loved country in a direct path to the high and glorious destiny which, under the g-uidance of wisdom and virtue, awaits her. To the highest powers of mind Mr. Calhoun unites those elevated moral qualities, which are equally essential with ability to complete the character of a perfect statesman : inflexible integrity, honour without a stain, disinterestedness, temperance, and industry ; a firmness of purpose which disdains to calculate the consequences of doing his duty ; pru- dence and energy in action, devotion to his country, and inextinguishable love of liberty and justice. To these great qualities, perhaps, we ought to add a lofty ambition ; but it is an ambition that prefers glory to office and power, which looks upon the latter only as a means for acquiring the former, and which, by the performance of great and virtuous actions for the accomplishment of noble ends, aims at the establishment of a widely- extended and ever-during fame. This ingredient, which enters into the composition of all great and powerful minds, seems intended by Provi- dence to stimulate them to the highest pitch of exertion in the rervi'ce of mankind ; and if it be a defect, it is one which Mr. Calhoun shares, as well as all their high qualities, with the most perfect models of Greek and Roman excellence. To those who have not been attentive observers of the life, character, and conduct of Mr. Calhoun, or who may have been alienated by political conflicts, the above portraiture may seem to derive some of its colour- ing from the partial pencil of friendship. If an intimate connexion of that kind for more than a quarter of a century may be supposed to tincture the writer's mind with partiality, it will be allowed, at the same time, that it affords the best possible opportunity of forming an accurate estimate of the moral and political character of the subject of this me- moir. His statements of fact and opinion he knows to be entirely authentic ; and after a deliberate review of every sentence and word he has written, he finds nothing which a reverence for justice and truth will allow him to alter. ^ Selection FROM THE SPEECHES, REPORTS, AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OP JOHJf C. CALHOUN, SUBSEQUENT TO HIS ELECTION AS VICE-PRESIDENT, (including also his first speech in congress in 1811), AND REFERRED TO IN HIS "LIFE.'* CONTENTS. Page I. Delivered in the House of Representatives, December 19, 1811, in the De- bate on the Second Resolution reported by the Committee of Foreign Relations 9 II. Onslow in Reply to Patrick Henry— No. 1 14 » » " No. 2 . . . . . .22 III. Mr. Calhoun's Address, stating his Opinion of the Relation which the States and General Government bear to each other . . . .27 IV. Mr. Calhoun's Letter to General Hamilton on the Subject of State Inter- position 43 V. Speech against the Force Bill 67"^ -> VI. Speech on his Resolutions, and Reply to Mr. Webster, February 26, 1833 98 VII. Speech on the Subject of the Removal of the Deposites from the Bank of the United States, January 13, 1834 122 VIII. Speech on Mr. Webster's Proposition to Recharter the United States Bank, March 26, 1831 138 IX. Speech delivered in the Senate of the United States, April 9, 1834, on the Bill to Repeal the Force Act 154*=* X. A Report on the Extent of Executive Patronage, February 9, 1835 . . 168 XI. A Report on that Portion of the President's Message which related to the Adoption of efficient Measures to prevent the Circulation of incendiary Abolition Petitions through the Mail, February 4, 1836 . . .189 XII. Speech on the Abolition Petitions, March 9, 1836 197 XIII. Speech on the Bill to prohibit Deputy Postmasters from receiving and transmitting through the Mail certain Papers therein mentioned, April 12, 1836 210 XIV. Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions, February, 1837 . . 222 XV. Speech on the Public Deposites, May 28, 1836 226 XVI. Speech on the Bill for the Admission of Michigan, January 2, 1837 . . 243 XVII. On the same Subject, January 5, 1837 249 XVIII. Speech on the Bill authorizing an Issue of Treasury Notes, September 19, 1837 259 XIX. Speech on his Amendment to Separate the Government from the Banks, October 37 1837 275 XX. Speech on the Sub-treasury Bill, February 15, 1838 . . . .290 XXI. Speech in Reply to Mr. Clay, on the Sub-treasury Bill, March 10, 1838 . 309 XXII. Speech in Reply to Mr. Webster on the Sub-treasury Bill, March 22, 1838 329 XXIII. Speech on the Bill to Prevent the Interference of certain Federal Officers in Elections, February 22, 1839 352 XXIV. Speech on the Report of Mr. Grundy, of Tennessee, in relation to the As- sumption of the Debts of the States by the Federal Government, Febru- ary 5, 1840 363 XXV. Speech on his Resolutions in reference to the Case of the Enterprise, March 13, 1840 378 XXVI. Speech on the Bankrupt Bill, June 2, 1840 390 XXVII. Speech on the Prospective Pre-emption Bill, January 12, 1841 . . 403 XXVIII. Speech on the Bill to Distribute the Proceeds of the Public Lands, Janu- ary 23, 1841 417 XXIX. Speech in Reply to the Speeches of Mr. Webster and Mr. Clay, on Mr. Crittenden's Amendment to the Pre-emption Bill, January 30, 1841 . 429 XXX. Speech on the Case of M'Leod, Juno 11, 1841 442 XXXI. Speech on the Distribution Bill, Angus} 24, 1841 447 XXXII. Speech on the Treasury Note Bill, January 25, 1842 . . . .462 XXXIII. Speech in Support of the Veto l^ower, February 28, 1842 . . . .477 XXXIV. Speech on Mr. Clay's Resolutions in Relation to the Revenues and Expen- ditures of the Government, IVfarch 16, 1842 489 XXXV. Speech on the Loan Bill, April 12, 1842 509 - XXXVI. Speech on the Passage of the Tariff Bill, August 5, 1842 . . . .518 XXXVII. Speech on the Treaty of Washington, August, 1842 532 XXXVIII. Speech on the Oregon Bill, January «4, 1843 544 t * SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. I. DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 19, 1811, IN THE DEBATE ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF FOR- EIGN RELATIONS. Mr. Speaker — I understood the opinion of the Committee of Foreign Rela- tions differently from what the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has stated to be his impression. I certainly understood that the committee recom- mended the measures now before the house as a preparation for war ; and such, in fact, was its express resolve, agreed to, I believe, by every member except that gentleman. I do not attribute any wilful misstatement to him, but consider it the effect of inadvertency or mistake. Indeed, the report could mean nothing but war or empty menace. I hope no member is in favour of the lat- ter. A bullying, menacing system has everything to condemn and nothing to recommend it — in expense it almost rivals war. It excites contempt abroad and destroys confidence at home. Menaces are serious things, which ought to be resorted to with as much caution and seriousness as war itself; and should, if not successful, be invariably followed by war. It was not the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) that made this a war question. The resolve contemplates an additional regular force ; a measure confessedly improper but as a preparation for war, but undoubtedly necessary in that event. Sir, 1 am not insensible to the weighty importance of this question, for the first time sub- mitted to this house, to compel a redress of our long list of complaints against one of the belligerants. According to my mode of thinking, che more serious the question, my conviction to support it must be the stroitger and more unal- terable. War, in our country, ought never to be resorted to but when it is clearly justifiable and necessary ; so much so as not to require the aid of logic to convince our understanding, nor the ardour of eloquence to inflame our pas- sions. There are many reasons why this country should never resort to it but for causes the most urgent and necessary'. It is^uflicient that, under a govern- ment like ours, none but such will justify it in -ne eyes of the people ; and were I not satisfied that such is the present cas"-'? I certainly would be no advocate of the proposition now before the house. Sir, I might prove the war, should i* follow, to be justifiable, by the express admission of the gentleman from Virginia ; and necessary, by facts undoubted and universally admitted, such as -le did not attempt to controvert. The ex- tent, duration, and character of the injuries received ; the failure of those peace- ful means heretofore resorted to for the redress of our wrongs, arc my proofs ^ that it is necessary. Why should I mention the impressment of our seamen- depredation on every branch of our commerce, including the direct export trade, continued for years, and :nade under laws which professedly undertake to reg- ulate our trade with otter nations ? negotiation, resorted to again and again, till it became hopeless, and the restrictive system persisted in to avoid war, and in the vain expectation of returning justice ? The evil still continued to grow, so that each succeeding year exceeded in enormity the preceding. The ques- tion, even in the opinion and admission of our opponents, is reduced to this sin- B 10 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUX. gle point : Which shall we do, abandon or defend our own commercial and mar^ itime rights, and the personal liberties of our citizens employed in exercising them ? These rights are vitally attacked, and war is the only means of re- dress. The gentleman from Virginia has suggested none, imless we consider the whole of his speech as recommending patient and resigned submission a& the best remedy. It is for the house to decide which of the alternatives ought to be embraced. I hope the decision is made already, by a higher authority than the voice of any man. It is not in the power of speech to infuse the sense of independence and honour. To resist wrong is the instinct of nature ; a gen- erous nature, that disdains tame submission. This part of the subject is so imposing as to enforce silence even on the gen- tleman from Virginia. He dared not to deny his country's wrongs, or vindi- cate the conduct of her enemy. But one part only of his argument had any, the most remote relation to this point. He would not say that we had not a good cause for war, but insisted that it was our duty to define that cause. If he means that this house ought, at this stage of its proceedings, or any other, to specify any particular violation of our rights to the exclusion of all others, he prescribes a course which neither good sense nor the usage of nations war- rants. When we contend, let us contend for all our rights — the doubtful and the certain, the unimportant and essential. It is as easy to contend, or even more so, for the whole as for a part. At the termination of the contest, secure all that our wisdom, and valour, and the fortune of war will permit. This is the dictate of common sense, and such, also, is the usage of nations. The sin- gle instance alluded to, the endeavour of Mr. Fox to compel Mr. Pitt to define the object of the war against France, will not support the gentleman from Vir- ginia in his position. That was an extraordinary war for an extraordinary pur- pose, and was not governed by the usual rules. It was not for conquest or for redress of injury, but to impose a government on France which she refused to receive — an object so detestable that an avowal dare not be made. I might here rest the question. The affirmative of the proposition is estab- lished. I cannot but advert, however, to the complaint of the gentleman from Virginia when he was first up on this question. He said he found himself re- duced to the necessity of supporting the negative side of the question before the affirmative was established. Let me tell that gentleman that there is no hard- ship in his case. It is not every affirmative that ought to be proved. Were I to affirm that the houso ig now in session, would it be reasonable to ask for proof? He who would deny its truth, on him would be the proof of so extra- ordinary a negative. How, then, could the gentleman, after his admissions, and with the facts before him an^ the nation, complain ? The causes are such as to warrant, or, rather, to make -4; indispensable in any nation not absolutely de- pendant to defend its rights by arris. Let him, then, show the reasons why we ought not so to defend ourselves. On him, then, is the burden of proof. This he has attempted. He has endeavoui-?d to support his negative. Before I pro- ceed to answer him particularly, let me call the attention of the house to one circumstance, that almost the whole of hi^ arguments consisted of an enumer- ation of evils always incident to war, however JMst and necessary ; and that, if they have any force, it is calculated to produce unqualified submission to every species of insult and injury. I do not feel myself bound to answer arguments of that description, and if I should allude to them, it will be only incidentally, and not for the purpose of serious refutation. The first argument which I shall notice is the unptepared state of the coun- try. Whatever weight this argument might have in a question of immediate war, it surely has little in that of preparation for it. if our country is unpre- pared, let us prepare as soon as possible. Let the gentleing re- stricted in the slightest degree by the fact that the Vice-president, under the Constitution, is president of the body, saving only the right of adopting such rules as apply to the appointment or election of a presiding o-^cer, which the Senate would have possessed, if the Constitution had not provided a president of the body : and, as I have proved, from your own cases, that the particular power in question incontrovertibly belongs to the house, i^ follows necessarily, according to established rules of construction, that the Senate also possesses it. You have overlooked these obvious truths by a/fixing too high an idea to the powers of the presiding officer in preserving oJ^Ier. According to your concep- tion, the house is nothing, and the officer «^verything, on points of order. No- thing can be more erroneous. The pov-er you attribute to him has never been possessed by the president, or speak<;r, in any deliberative assembly ; no, not even by delegation from the boJy itself. The right of preserving tfder must depend on the power of enforcing it, or of punishing for a breach jf order — a right inherent in the house alone, and nev- er, in any instance, delegated to the chair. Our Constitution confines this right to each house of Congress, by providing " that they may punish for disorderly conduct :" a power which they neither have delegated, nor can delegate, to the presiding officer. What, then, is the right of preserving order, belonging to the Vice-president, which you have so pompously announced, and for not enfor- cing which, according to your conception, you and your associates have de- nounced Mr. Calhoun almost as a traitor to his country ? It is simply the right of calling to order, in the strict, literal meaning ; and, so far from being derived from the right of preserving order, as you absurdly sup- 20 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. pose, it is not even connected with it. The right oi preserving order depends on the right of enforcing it, or the right of punishment for breaches of order, al- ways possessed by the body, but never, either by delegation or otherwise, by the chair. It is notorious that the chair cannot enforce its calls to order. The body alone can, and that only on its decisions, and not on that of the presiding officer. It is thus manifest, the high right of preserving order, to which you make the right of calling to order incidental, belongs especially to the Senate, and not to the Vice-president ; and, if your argument be correct, the incident must follow the right ; and, consequently, it is the right and duty of a senator to call to order for disorderly conduct. So clear is the proposition, that, if the member called to order by the chair for disorderly conduct chooses to persist, the presiding officer has no other remedy but to repeat his call, or throw himself for the enforcement of it, on the Senate. This feebleness of the chair, in ques- tions of order, explains why there has always been such indisposition to call to order, even when it is made the express duty by rule, as in the House of Representatives, and the House of Commons in England. Thousands of in- stances might be cited to establish the truth of this remark, both there and here : instances in which all that has been said and uttered by Mr. Randolph is no- thing, but in which the speaker waited for the interference of some of the mem- bers, in order to preserve order. Such was the case in the recent occurrence in the House of Commons, when Mr. Hume made an attack on the Bishop of London and the lord-chancellor, both of whom, as members of the House of Lords, were under the protection of positive rules ; yet no one, even there, had the assurance to throw the responsibility on the presiding officer. The parti- sans of power in our country have the honour of leading in these new and dan- gerous attacks on the freedom of debate. Some men, of honest intention, have fallen into the error about the right of the Vice-president to preserve order independently of the Senate, because the judges, or, as they express it, the presiding officer in the courts of justice pos- sess the right. A moment's reflection will show the fallacy. There is not the least analogy between the rights and duties of a judge and those of a presiding offices in a deliberative assembly. The analogy is altogether the other way. It is between the court and the house. In fact, the latter is often called a court, and +here is a very strict resemblance, in the point under consideration, between vvhai may be called a parliamentary court and a court of justice. They both have the right of causing their decision to be respected, and order and de- corum to be observed in their presence, by punishing those who offend. But who ever heard of'ihe speaker or Vice-president punishing for disorderly con- duct 1 The utmost j^wer they can exercise over disorderly conduct, even in the lobby or gallery, is to <^ause it to be suppressed, for the time, by the ser- geant-at-arms. Enough has been said, though the subject is far from being exhausted, to de- monstrate that your views of the rdative powers and duties of the Vice-pres- ident and the Senate, in relation to the point in question, are wholly erroneous. It remains to be shown that your opinions (ftr arguments they cannot be call- ed) are dangerous to our liberty, and that they aio in conflict with the first prin- ciples of our government. I do not attribute to y«^,i, or those with whom you are associated, any deep-laid design against public Liberty. Such an attempt, as flagitious as it may be, requires a sagacity and boldness quite beyond what we have now to apprehend from those in power. But tTaat there exists, at the present time, a selfish and greedy appetite to get and to hold office, and that, to effect their grovelling objects, doctrines slavish and dangerous are daily prop- agated, cannot be doubted by even careless observers. The freedom of de- bate is instinctively dreaded by the whole corps, high and low, of those who make a speculation of politics ; and well they may : for it is the great and only effectual means of detecting and holding up to public scorn every raachi- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 21 nation against the liberty of the country. It ranks lirst, even before the liberty of the press, the trial, by jury, the rights of conscience, and the writ of habeas corpus, in the estimation of those who are capable of forming a correct estimate of the value of freedom, and the best means of preserving it. Against this pal- ladium of liberty your blows are aimed ; and, to do you justice, it must be ac- knowledged, if the energy be not great, the direction is not destitute of skill. If you could succeed in establishing the points which you labour, that the Vice- president holds a power over the freedom of debate, under the right of preserv- ing order, beyond the will or control of the Senate ; and that, consequently, he alone is responsible for what might be considered an undue exercise of the free- dom of speech in debate, a solid foundation would be laid, from which, in time, this great barrier against despotic power would be battered down. It is easy to see that the scheme takes the power of protecting this, the first of its rights, wholly out of the hands of the Senate, and places its custody in the hands of a single individual, and he in no degree responsible to the body over which this high power is to be exercised : thus efl'ectually destroying the keystone of free- dom, responsibility, and introducing into a vital part of our system uncontrolled, or, what is the same thing, despotic power ; which, being derived, by your theory, from the Constitution, and being applicable to all points of order, neces- sarily would vest in the Vice-president alone an independent and absolute power, that would draw into the vortex of his authority an unlimited control over the freedom of debate. Mark the consequences ! If the Vice-president should belong to the same party or interest which brought the President into power, or if he be dependant on him for his political standing or advancement, you icill virtually place the control over the freedom of debate in the hands of the executive. You thus introduce the President, as it were, into the chamber of the Senate, and place him virtually over the deliberation of the body, loith powers to restrain discussion, and shield his conduct fro?n investigation. Let us, for instance, sup- pose that the present chief magistrate should be re-elected, and that the party which supports him should succeed, as, in all probability, they would in that event, in electing also their Vice-president, can it be doubted that the rules for the restraint of the freedom of debate in the Senate, which have been insisted on openly by the party during the last Avinter, would be reduced to practice, through a subservient Vice-president ? And what are those rules ? One of the leading ones, to advert to no other, is, that the conduct of the executive, as a co-ordinate branch of that government, cannot be called in question by a sen- ator in debate, at least so far as it relates to impeachable oilences ; and, of course, an attempt to discuss the conduct of the President, in such cases, would be disorderly, and render the senator liable to be punisJied, even to expulsion. What would be the consequence ? The Senate would speedily sink into a body to register the decrees of the President and sing hosannas in his praise, and be as degraded as the Roman Senate under Nero. But let us suppose the opposite state of things, in which the Vice-president chooses to pursue a course independent of the will of the executive, and, in- stead of assuming so dangerous an exercise of power, he should indulge (for indulgence it must be called, if allowed by his courtesy) that freedom of debate which exists in other deliberative assemblies. What will then follow ? Pre- cisely that which occurred last winter. Most exaggerated and false accounts would everywhere be propagated, by hirelings of power, of the slightest occur- rence in the Senate. The public indignation would be roused at the supposed disorder and indecorum, and the whole would be artfully directed against the Vice-president, in order to prostrate his reputation ; and thus an officer, without patronage or power, or even the right of defending himself, Would be the target against which the whole force and patronage of the Government would be di- rected. Few men would have the iirmness to encounter danger so tremendous ; 22 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. and tlie practical result, in the lon^ run, must be a subservient yielding to the executive will. No. 2. Having now established, I may venture to say beyond the possibility of rea- sonable controversy, that the idea of an inherent right in the Vice-president, in- dependent of, and beyond the will of the Senate, to control the freedom of de- bate, is neither sanctioned by the Constitution, nor justified by the relation be- tween the body and its presiding officer, and that it is subversive of the right of free discussion, and, consequently, dangerous to liberty, I might here fairly rest the question. To you, at least, who treat with scorn the rules and usages of the Senate, as the source of the power of the Vice-president, all farther in- quiry is fairly closed. But as many, who may agree with you in the conclu- sion, may treat with contempt your high-strained conception of the origin of the power under investigation, it will not be improper to ascertain whether it has been conferred on the Vice-president by any act of the Senate, express or im- plied, the only source whence the power can be fairly derived. In this view of the subject, the simple inquiry is. Has the Senate conferred the power ? It has been fully established that they alone possess it, and, consequently, from the Senate only can it be derived. We, then, affirm that the Senate has not conferred the power. The assertion of the negative, in such cases, is sufficient to throw the burden of proof on those who hold the affirmative. I call on you, then, or any of your associates, to point out the rule or the usage of the Senate by which the power has been conferred. None such has, or can be designated. If a similar question be asked as to the power of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, how easy would be the reply ? The 19th rule, which express- ly gives the power to him, would be immediately quoted ; and, if that were sup- posed to be doubtful, the journals of the house would be held up as containing innumerable instances of the actual exercise of the power. No such answer can be given when we turn to the power of the Vice-president. The rules are mute, and the journals of the Senate silent. What means this striking differ- ence, but that, on this point, there is a difference, in fact, between the power of the speaker and of the Vice-president? a difference which has been always understood and acted on ; and when to this we add, that the rules of the two houses in regard to the power are strikingly different ; that, while those of the Representatives expressly delegate the power to the speaker, those of the Sen- ate, by strong implication, withhold it from the Vice-president, little room can be left for doubt. Compare, in this view, the 19th rule of the house and the 7th of the Senate. The former says, " If any member, by speaking or other- wise, transgress the rules of the house, the speaker shall, or any member may, call to order : in which case the member so called to order shall immediately sit down, unless permitted to explain ; and the house shall, if appealed to, de- cide on the case without debate ; if there be no appeal, the decision of the chair shall be submitted to. If the decision be in favour of the member called to order, he shall be at liberty to proceed ; if otherwise, he will not be permit- ted to proceed without leave of the house ; and if the case require it, he shall be liable to the censure of the house." The rule of the Senate, on the contra- ry, provides, " If the member shall be called to order for words spoken, the ex- ceptionable words shall immediately be taken down in writing, that the presi- dent may be better enabled to judge of the matter." These are the corresponding- rules of the two houses : and can any impartial mind contend that similar pow- ers are intended to "be conferred by them on the speaker and Vice-president ? Or will it be insisted on that the difference in the phraseology is accidental, when it is known that they have often been revised on the reports of commit- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 23 tees, who would not fail to compare the rules of the two houses on correspond- incr subjects ? Under such circumstances, it is impossible that it could be in- tended to confer the same power by such difierence of phraseology, or that the Avithholding of the power in question from the Vice-president was unintentional. This rational construction is greatly strengthened, when we advert to the dif- ferent relations which the two officers bear to their respective houses. The speaker is chosen by the House of Representatives, and is, consequently, di- rectly responsible to the body ; and his decision, by the rules, may be appealed from to the house. The Vice-president, on the contrary, is placed in the chair by the Constitution, is not responsible to the Senate, and his decision is with- out appeal. Need we look farther for the reason of so essential a variation hi the rules conferring power on their respective presiding officers ? It is a re- markable fact, that the same diffi^rencc exists in the relation between the pre- sidinu- officers of the two houses of the British Parliament, and the bodies over which they respectively preside. In the Commons, the speaker is chosen as in our House of Representatives, and is, consequently, in like manner respon- sible ; on the contrary, in the House of Lords the chancellor presides cx-qfficio, in like manner as the Vice-president in the Senate, and is, in like manner, ir- responsible to the body. Now it is no less remarkable that the speaker pos- sesses the power in question, while it is perfectly certain that the lord-chancel- lor does not. Like cause, like effect ; dissimilar cause, dissimilar effect. You, sir, have, it is true, made a puny effort to draw a distinction between the mode in which the Vice-president and the lord-chancellor are appointed, and have also feebly denied that the latter has not the power of calling to order. Both of these efforts show the desperation of your cause. What does it signify by ■whom an cx-qfficio officer is appointed, if not by the body 1 There can be but one material point, and that without reference to the mode of appointment — is he, or is he not, responsible to the house ? If the former, there is good cause for the delegation of the power ; for power exercised by responsible agents is substantially exercised by the principal ; while by irresponsible agents it is the power of him by whom it is exercised. Nor is your effort to show that the chancellor has the power less unhappy. You have cited but one instance, and that really renders you ridiculous. The lord-chancellor, as is well known, has the right of speaking ; and you most absurdly cite the commencement of a speech of one of the chancellors, in which he states that he would call back the attention of the Lords to the question at issue, as an instance of exercisino- the power of calling to order as presiding officer, for departure from the ques- tion ! Though you have signally failed to prove your position, you have not less completely established the fact, that your integrity is not above a resort to trick, where argument fails. Nor is this the only instance of subterfuge. You made a similar effort to do away the authority of the venerable Jefferson. He has left on record, that he considered his power as presiding officer of the Senate as the poicer of umpirage, or, what is the same thing, an appellate power. In order to break the force of this authority, you have denied the plain and inva- riable meaning of the word, and attempted to affix one to it which it never bears. You say that its usual meaning is synonymous with " office," " authority," or " the act of determining," and that it is only in its technical sense that it con- veys the idea of an appellate power ! Can it be unknown to you that no word in the language more invariably has attached to it the idea of decision by appeal, and that there is not an instance of its being used by any respectable authority in the sense which you state to be its usual meaning ? It only remains to consider the cases that you have cited from the Manual, to prove that the Speaker of the House of Commons possesses the power in question ; by which you would infer that it belongs also to the Vice-president. A very strange deduction by one who believes that the power originates in the Constitution, and that it neither can be given or taken away by the authority of the 24 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. Senate itself. After asserting that it has " deeper and holier foundations than the rules and usages of the Senate," there is something more than ridiculous, that you at last seek for the power in the rules and usages of the House of Com- mons ! But let such inconsistency pass. You have, indeed, established the fact that the speaker has the power, but you have overlooked the material cir- cumstance, as I have shown from your own cases, that he possesses it hy posi- tive rules of the house. You might as well have shown that the Speaker of the House of Representatives possesses it, and then inferred that the Vice- president does also : for he, too, holds the power by positive rules of the body, which makes the analogy as strong in the one case as the other. But you would have it understood that the rules of Parliament have been adopted by the Senate. No such thing. I challenge you to cite a single rule or act of the Senate that gives countenance to it. Finally, you tell us that Mr. Jefferson has cited these rules as being part of the rules and usages of the Sen- ate. Admitting, for a moment, that Mr. Jeflerson had cited them as such, stiU. a very important question would arise, How came they to be the rules of the Senate ? The Constitution provides that the Senate shall determine the rules of its proceedings ; now, if that body has not, by any rule, adopted the rules of the British Parliament, by what process of reason could they be construed to be the rules of the Senate ? That the Senate has not adopted the rules of Parlia- ment, is certain ; and I confess I am not a little curious to see the process of reasoning by which they are made the rides of the Senate, without adoption. Is there not a striking analogy between this and the question, whether the com- mon law is a part of the laws of the Union 1 We know that they have been, decided by the highest judicial authority not to be ; and, it seems to me, the ar- guments which would be applicable to the one would be equally so to the other question. That the rules and usages of Parliament may be referred to to illus-. trate the rules of either house of Congress, is quite a distinct proposition, and may be readily admitted. Argmnents may be drawn from any source calcula- ted to illustrate, but that is wholly different from giving to the rules of another body a binding force on the Senate, without ever having been recognised as its rules. This is a subject of deep and grave importance ; but as it is not neces- sary to my purpose, I decline entering on it. It is sufficient, at present, to de- ny that Mr. Jefferson has cited the rules of the Parliament, referred to by you, as those of the Senate. On the contrary, they are expressly cited as the rules of the British House of Commons, without stating them to be obligatory on the Senate. He has notoriously cited many of the rules of that body which are wholly dissimilar from the usages of the Senate. But you cite Mr. Jefferson's opinion, in which he says, " The Senate have, accordingly, formed some rules for its government" (they have been much enlarged since) ; " but these going only to a few cases, they have referred to the decision of the president, without debate or appeal, all questions of order arising under their own rules, or where there is none. This places under the discretion of the president a very exten- sive field of decision." If your object in quoting the above passage was to show that, where the Senate has adopted no rules of its own, the rules of Parliament are those of the Senate, it completely fails. Not the slightest countenance is given to such an idea. Mr. Jefferson, on the contrary, says that, in cases of omission, the sound discretion of the president is the rule ;* and such has been the practice, and from which it has ibllowed that usages of the Senate are very different from the Parliament, which could not be, if the latter were adopted, where there were no positive rules by the Senate. If this view of the subject be correct, which is certainly Mr. Jefferson's, the * This opinion of Mr. Jefferson's is probably founded on the latter part of the 6th rule, which strongly supports it. The rule is as follows : " When a member shall be called to order, he shall sit down until the president shall have determined whether he is in order or not ; and every question of order shall be decided by the president, without debate ; but if there be a doubt in his mind, he may call for the sense of the Senate." SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 25 Vice-president had the right to make the rule by exercising a sound discretion ; and the only question that could arise in this view is, whether he has acted on correct principles in referring the power to the house, instead of exercising it by the chair. So long as doubtful and irresponsible power ought not to be as- sumed — so long as the freedom of debate is essential to liberty — and so long as it is an axiom in politics that no povvcr can be safe but what is in the final con- trol and custody of the body over which it is exercised — so long the rule (to view it in that light) adopted by the Vice-president will be considered in con- formity to sound political principles. But, suppose it to be conceived that the rules of Parliament are those of the Senate, when not overruled by its own posi- tive acts, still, two questions would remain : first, whether the 7th rule of the Senate, by a sound construction, does not restrain the Vice-president from exer- cising the power, by limiting it to the members of the Senate ? and, secondly, whether the practice of the House of Lords, or that of the Commons, ought, in this particular, to prevail ? Both of these points have already been incidental- ly considered, and a single remark will now sufHce. Whether we regard the nature of the power, or the principles of our system of government, there can be no doubt that the decision ought to be against the practice of the House of Commons, and in favour of that of the House of Lords. It may not be improper to notice an opinion which, if I mistake not, has, in no small degree, contributed to the error which exists as to the decision of the Vice-president. There are many who are far from agreeing with your absurd and dangerous positions as to the inherent powers of the Vice-president over the freedom of debate, but who have, I think, a vague conception that he has the right in dispute, as presiding officer, but a right subordinate to, and depend- ant on, the Senate. They concede to the Senate the right of determining their rules, and that this right comprehends that of determining what is, or what is not, disorderly conduct, and how the same shall be noticed or inhibited ; but they have an idea that the ex-officio duty of the Vice-president to regulate the proceedings of the Senate according to their own rules, extends to cases of the freedom of debate. The amount of the argument, as far as I can understand it, is, that, where there is a rule of the Senate, the Vice-president has, ex-oficio, the power of regulating the proceedings of the Senate by it, without any express authority in the rule to that eflect. All this may be fairly conceded, but it decides nothing. It brings back the question to the inquiry. Is there, or is there not, such a rule ? which has been fully considered, and, I trust, satisfactorily determined in the negative. I will not again repeat the arguments on this point : I do not deem it necessary'. It is sufficient to remark, if there be a rule, let it be shown, and the question is at an end. There is none. As connected with this part of the subject, I do not think it necessary to meet the ridiculous charge of inconsistency which you make against the Vice- president in the exercise of his power, and which you endeavour to support by- reference to the stale and false accounts of his conduct in the case of Mr. Dick- erson. It is sufficient that Mr. D. has repelled the charge of injustice, and you exhibit but a sorry and factious appearance in defending a senator from oppres- sion, who is not conscious of any injustice having been inflicted. Having demonstrated that the powers which you claim for the Vice-presi- dent do not belong to him as presiding officer of the Senate, and that they are not conferred on him by the rules or usage of the Senate, or those of Parlia- ment, I may safely affirm that it does not exist, and that, so far from censure, Mr. Calhoun deserves praise for declining to exercise it. He has acted in the spirit that ought to actuate every virtuous public functionary — not to assume doubtful powers — a spirit, under our systems of delegated authority, essential to the preservation of liberty, and for being guided by which, he will receive the thanks of the country when the excitement of the day has passed away. I have now completed what may be considered the investigation of the sub- D 26 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN- ject ; but there are still several of your remarks that require notice. You have not only attacked the decision of Mr. Calhoun, but you have impugned his mo- tives with licentious severity. The corrupt are the most disposed to attribute corruption, and your unprovoked and unjustifiable attack on Mr. C.'s motives speak as little in favour of your heart as your arguments do of your head. For- tunately for the Vice-president, his general character for virtue and patriotism shields him from the imputation of such gross abuse of power, from such impure motives as you attribute to him. He could not decide differently from what he did without being at war with the principles which have ever governed him. It is well known to all acquainted with him, publically or privately, that the maxim which he holds in the highest veneration, and which he regards as the founda- tion of our whole system of government, is, that power should be controlled by the body over which it is exercised, and that, without such responsibility, all delegated power would speedily become corrupt. Whether he is wrong in giv- ing too high an estimate to this favourite maxim is immaterial. It is, and long- has been, his, and could not fail in having great influence in the decision which you have so seriously assaulted. Had his principles been like yours, as illus- trated in your essay, it is possible he might have taken a different view of the subject ; but, as he has decided in conformity to principles long fixed in his mind, there is something malignant in the extreme to attribute his decision to motives of personal enmity. You not only attack Mr. C.'s motives for this de- cision, but also his motive for the constitution of the Committee of Foreign Re- lations. You think it a crime in him that the venerable and patriotic Macon should be placed at the head of the committee. I will neither defend him nor the other members of the committee. They need no defence ; but I cannot but remark, that the election of Mr. Macon president pro tem. of the Senate is a singular comment on your malignant attack on the Yice-president. It would have been impossible that you should steer clear of the cant of your party, and we accordingly have a profusion of vague charges about Mr. Cal- houn's ambition. The lowest and most mercenary hireling can easily coin such charges ; and while they deal in the general, without a single specification, it is utterly impossible to meet or refute them ; but, fortunately, they go for no- thing with the wise and virtuous, saving only that, on the part of those who make them, they evince an envious, morbid mind, which, having no real ground of attack, indulges in vague, unmeaning abuse. It is highly honourable to Mr. C. that, in the midst of so much political enmity, his personal and public char- acter stands free from all but one specific charge — which is, that he has incli- ned, in his present station, too much against his ovjn power, and too much in favour of the inestimable right of the freedom of debate. That he has been indefatiga- ble in the discharge of his duty ; that he has been courteous to the members, and prompt and intelligent, all acknowledge. Not a moment was he absent from his post during a long and laborious session, and often remained in the chair, without leaving it, from eight to twelve hours. He has, however, com- mitted one unpardonable sin which blots out all. He did not stop Mr. Ran- dolph. This is the head and front of his offending. And who is Mr. Randolph ? Is he or his manners a stranger in our national councils ? For more than a quarter of a century he has been a member of Congress, and during. the whole time his character has remained unchanged. Highly talented, eloquent, se- vere, and eccentric ; not unfrequently wandering from the question, but often uttering wisdom worthy of a Bacon, and wit that would not discredit a Sheri- dan, every speaker had freely indulged him in his peculiar manner, and that without responsibility or censure ; and none more freely than the present Sec- retary of State, while he presided in the House of Representatives. He is elected, with a knowledge of all this, by the ancient and renowned common- wealth of Virginia, and takes his seat in the Senate. An immediate outcry is made against the Vice-president for permitting him, who has been so long per- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 27 mitted by so many speakers, to exercise his usual freedom of discussion, though in no respects were his attacks on this administration freer than what they had been on those of Mr. Jefierson, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Monroe. Who can doubt, if Mr. Calhoun had yielded to this clamour, that the whole current would have turned, and that he would then have been more severely denounced for what would have been called his tyraruiy and usurpation, than he has been for refusing to interfere with the freedom of debate ? His author- ity would have been denied, and properly denied : ths fact that Mr. R. had been permitted by all other presiding officers, for so long a time, to speak without re- straint, would have been dwelt on ; and the injustice done to the senator, and the insult otl'ered to the state that sent him, would have been painted in the most lively colours. These considerations, we are satisfied, had xS) weight Avith the Vice-president. Those who know him know that no man is more re- gardless of consequences in the discharge of his duty ; but that the attack on him is personal, in order to shake his political standing, and prostrate his char- acter, is clearly evinced by every circumstance ; and with this object, that he would have been assaulted, act as he might, is most certain. It is for the American people to determine whether this conspiracy against a public servant, whose only fauh is that he has chosen the side of liberty rather than that of pow- er, and whose highest crime consists in a reverential regard for the freedom of debate, shall succeed. Onslow. III. MR. Calhoun's address, stating his opinion of the relation which the STATES AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT BEAR TO EACH OTHER. The question of the relation which the States and General Government bear to each other is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the Convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties as to what this relation should be, whose different sentiments constituted no small imped- iment in forming that instrument. After the General Government went into operation, experience soon proved that the question had not terminated with the labours of the Convention. The great struggle that preceded the political rev- olution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on it, and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were imbodied and ably sus- tained : on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and the Report to the Virginia Legislature ; and on the other, in the replies of the Legislature of Massachusetts and some of the other states. -These resolutions and this report, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same time (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief-justice M'Kean, and concurred in by the whole bench), contain what I believe to be the true doctrine on this important subject. I refer to them in order to avoid the necessity of presenting my views, with the reasons in support of them, in detail. As my object is simply to state my opinions, Imight pause with this refer- ence to documents that so fully and ably state all the points immediately con- nected with this deeply-important subject ; but as there are many who may not liave the opportunity or leisure to refer to them, and as it is possible, however clear they may be, that different persons may place different interpretations on their meaning, I will, in order that my sentiments may be fully known, and to avoid all ambiguity, proceed to state summarily the doctrines which I conceive they embrace. 28 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. The great and leading principle is, that the General Government emanated from the people of the several states, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community ; that the Constitution of the United States is, in fact, a compact, to which each state is a party, in the character al- ready described ; and that the several states, or parties, have a right to judge of its infractions ; and in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of povv^er not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the language of the Virginia Resolutions, " ifo interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and lib- erties appertaining to them." This right of interposition, thus solemnly assert- ed by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may — State-right, veto, nullifi- cation, or by any other name — ■! conceive to be the fundamental principle of our system, resting on facts historically as certain as our revolution itself, and deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth ^ whatever ; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depend the stability and safety of our political institutions. I am not ignorant that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and formerly, regarded it in a very difterent light, as anarchical and revolutionary. Could I believe such, in fact, to be its tendency, to me it would be no recom- mendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our political institutions and the union of these states. I never breathed an oppo- site sentiment ; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great in- struments of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and our posterity ; and next to these I have ever held them most dear. Nearly half my life has been passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputation I have acquired is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has, indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, to be my greatest political fault. With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined, with the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question ; and, so far from anar- chical or re volution ary^l solemnly believe it to be the oidy solid foundation of our system, and of the tJriion itself; and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the states the right of protecting their reserved powers, and which would vest in the General Government (it matters not through what department) the right of determining, exclusively and finally, the powers delegated to it, is in- compatible with the sovereignty of the states, and of the Constitution itself, con- sidered as the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said to give to the General Government the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make " its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers ;" and that, " in all cases of compact between pai'tics having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself as ivell of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress." Language cannot be more explicit, nor can higher author- ity be adduced. That different opinions are entertained on this subject, I consider but as an additional evidence of the great diversity of the human intellect. Had not able, experienced, and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the highest respect, taken different views, I would have thought the right too clear to admit of doubt ; but I am taught by this, as well as by many similar instances, to treat with deference opinions differing from my own. The error may, possibly, be with me ; but if so, I can only say that, after the most mature and conscientious ex- amination, I have not been able to detect it. But, with all proper deference, I must think that theirs is the error who deny what seems to be an essential at- tribute of the conceded sovereignty of the states, and who attribute to the Gen- eral Government a right utterly incompatible with what all acknowledge to be its limited and restricted chaiacter : an error originating principally, as I must SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 29 think, in not duly reflecting on the nature of our institutions, and on what con- stitutes the only rational object of all political constitutions. It has been well' said by one of the most sagacious men of antiquity, that the object of a constitution is to restrain the government, as that of laws is to restrain individuals. The remark is correct ; nor is it less true where the government is vested in a majority than where it is in a single or a few individuals — in a republic, than a monarchy or aristocracy. No one can have a higher respect for the nraxim that the majority ought to govern than I have, taken in its proper sense, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution, and confined to subjects in which every portion of the community have similar interests ; but it is a great error to suppose, as many do, that the right of a majority to govern is a natural and not a conventional right, and therefore absolute and unlimited. By nature every individual has the right to govern himself; and governments, whether founded on majorities or minorities, must derive their right from the assent, expressed or implied, of the governed, and be subject to such limitations as they may impose. Where the interests are the same, that is, where the laws that may benefit one will benefit all, or the reverse, it is just and proper to place them under the control of the majority ; but where they are dissimilar, so that the law that may benefit one portion may be ruinous to another, it would be, on the contrary, unjust and absurd to subject them to its will ; and such I conceive to be the theory on which our Constitution rests. That such dissimilarity of interests may exist, it is impossible to doubt. They are to be fouud in every community, in a greater or less degree, however small or homogeneous, and they constitute everywhere the great difficulty of forming and preserving free institutions. To guard against the unequal action of the laws, when applied to dissimilar and opposing interests, is, in fact, what mainly renders a constitution indispensable ; to overlook which, in reasoning on our Constitution, would be to omit the principal element by which to determine its character. Were there no contrariety of interests, nothing would be more simple and easy than to form and preserve free institutions. The right of suf- frage alone would be a sufficient guarantee. It is the conflict of opposing inter- ests which renders it the most difficult work of man. Where the diversity of interests exists in separate and distinct classes of the community, as is the case in England, and was formerly the case in Sparta, Rome, and most of the free states of antiquity, the rational constitutional pro- vision is that each should be represented in the government, as a separate es- tate, with a distinct voice, and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in order to check their encroachments. In England the Constitution has assumed ex- pressly this form, while in the governments of Sparta and Rome the same thing was effected under different, but not mucli less efficacious forms. The perfection of their organization, in this particular, was that which gave to the constitutions of these renowned slates all their celebrity, which secured their liberty for so many centuries, and raised them to so great a height of power and prosperity. Indeed, a constitutional provision giving to the great and sep- arate interests of the community the right of self-protection, must appear, to those who will duly reflect on the subject, not less essential to the preservation of liberty than the right of suffrage itself. They, in fact, have a common object, to eflect which the one is as necessary as the other to secure responsibility : that is, that those who make and execute the laws should be accountable to those on whom the laws in reality operate — the only solid and durable foundation of liberty . If, without the right of suffrage, our rulers would oppress us, so, without the right of self-protection, the major would equally oppress the minor interests of the community. The absence of the former would make the governed the slaves of the rulers, and of the latter, the feebler interests, the victim of the stronger. Happily for us, we have no artificial and separate classes of society. We 30 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. have wisely exploded all such distinctions ; but we are not, on that account, ex- empt from all contrariety of interests, as the present distracted and dangerous condition of our country, unfortunately, but too clearly proves. With us they are almost exclusively geographical, resulting mainly from difference of climate, soil, situation, industry, and production, but are not, therefore, less necessary to be protected by an adequate constitutional provision than where the distinct in- terests exist in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth, greater, as such separate and dissimilar geographical interests are more liable to come into con- flict, and more dangerous, when in that state, than those of any other descrip- tion : so much so, that ours is the first instance on record where they have not formed, in an cxteiisive territory, separate and independent communities, or sub- jected the whole to despotic sway. That such may not be our unhappy fate also, must be the sincere prayer of every lover of his country. So numerous and diversified are the interests of our country, that they could not be fairly represented in a single government, organized so as to give to each great and leading interest a separate and distinct voice, as in governments to which I have referred. A plan was adopted better suited to our situation, but perfectly novel in its character. The powers of the government were divided, not, as heretofore, in reference to classes, but geographically. One Gener- al Government was formed for the whole, to which was delegated all the powers supposed to be necessary to regulate the interests common to all the states, leaving others subject to the separate control of the states, being, from their local and peculiar character, such that they could not be subject to the will of a majority of the whole Union, without the certain hazard of injus- tice and oppression. It was thus that the interests of the whole were subject- ed, as they ought to be, to the will of the whole, while the peculiar and local interests were left under the control of the states separately, to whose custody only they could be safely confided. This distribution of power, settled solemnly by a constitutional compact, to which all the states are parties, constitutes the peculiar character and excellence of our political system. It is truly and emphat- ically American, without example or parallel. To realize its perfection, we must view the General Government and those of the states as a whole, each in its proper sphere independent ; each perfectly adapted to its respective objects ; the states acting separately, representing and protecting the local and peculiar interests ; acting jointly through one General Government, with the weight respectively assigned to each by the Constitu- tion, representing and protecting the interest of the whole, and thus perfecting, by an admirable but simple arrangement, the great principle of representation and responsibility, without which no government can be free or just. To pre- serve this sacred distribution as originally settled, by coercing each to move in its prescribed orb, is the great and difficult problem, on the solution of which the duration of our Constitution, of our Union, and, in all probability, our liberty depends. How is this to be effected? The question is new when applied to our peculiar political organization, where the separate and conflicting interests of society are represented by dis- tinct but connected governments ; but it is, in reality, an old question under a new form, long since perfectly solved. Whenever separate and dissimilar in- terests have been separately represented in any government; whenever the sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the experience and wisdom of ages have devised but one mode by which such political organization can be preserved — the mode adopted in England, and by all governments, ancient and modern, blessed with constitutions deserving to be called free — to give to each co-estate the right to judge of its powers, Avith a negative or veto on the acts of the others, in order to protect against encroachments the interests it par- ticularly represents : a principle which all of our Constitutions recognise in the distribution of power among their respective departments, as essential to main- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 31 tain the independence of each, but which, to all who will duly reflect on the subject, must appear far more essential, for the same object, in that great and fundamental distribution of powers between the General and State Governments. So essential is the principle, that to withhold the right from either, where the sovereign power is divided, is, in fact, to annul the division itself, and to con- solidate in the one left in the exclusive possession of the right all powers of government ; for it is not possible to distinguish, practically, between a govern- ment having all power, and one having the right to take what powers it pleases. Nor does it in the least vary the principle, whether the distribution of power be between co-estates, as in England, or between distinctly organized but con- nected governments, as with us. The reason is the same in both cases, while the necessity is greater in our case, as the danger of conflict is greater where the interests of a society are divided geographically than in any other, as has already been shown. These truths do seem to me to be incontrovertible ; and I am at a loss to un- derstand how any one, who has maturely reflected on the nature of our institu- tions, or who has read history or studied the principles of free government to any purpose, can call them in question. The explanation must, it appears to me, be sought in the fact that in every free state there are those who look more to the necessity of maintaining power than guarding against its abuses. I do not intend reproach, but simply to state a fact apparently necessary to explain the contrariety of opinions among the intelligent, where the abstract considera- tion of the subject would seem scarcely to admit of doubt. If such be the true cause, I must think the fear of weakening the government too much in this case to be in a great measure unfounded, or, at least, that the danger is much less from that than the opposite side. I do not deny that a power of so high a na- ture may be abused by a state, but when I reflect that the states unanimously called the General Government into existence with all its powers, which they freely delegated on their part, under the conviction that their common peace, safety, and prosperity required it ; that they are bound together by a common origin, and the recollection of common suffering and common triumph in the gTeat and splendid achievement of their independence ; and that the strongest feelings of our nature, and among them the love of national power and distinc- tion, are on the side of the Union, it does seem to me that the fear which would strip the states of their sovereignty, and degrade them, in fact, to mere dependant corporations, lest they should abuse a right indispensable to the peace- able protection of those interests which they reserved under their own peculiar guardianship when they created the General Government, is unnatural and un- reasonable. If those who voluntarily created the system cannot be trusted to preserve it, who can ? So far from extreme danger, I hold that there never was a free state in which this great conservative principle, indispensable to all, was ever so safely lodged. In others, when the co-estates representing the dissimilar and conflicting inter- ests of the community came into contact, the only alternative was compromise, submission, or force. Not so in ours. Should the General Government and ii^ siute come into conflict, we have a higher remedy : the power which called the General Government into existence, which gave it all its authority, and can enlarge, contract, or abolish its powers at its pleasure, may be invoked. The states themselves may be appealed to, three fourths of which, iu fact, form a power, whos° decrees are the Constitution itself, and whose voice can silence all discontent. The utmost extent, then, of the power is, that a state acting in its sovereign capacuy, as one of the parties to the constitutional compact, may com- pel the governmem, created by that compact, to submit a question touching its infraction to the parties who created it ; to avoid the supposed dangers of which, it is proposed to resort to the novel, the hazardous, and, I must add, fatal proj- ect of giving to the General Government the sole and final ricdu of interpret- .32 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ing the Constitution, thereby reversing the whole system, making that instru- ment the creature of its will instead of a rule of action impressed on it at its creation, and annihilating, in fact, the authority which imposed it, and from which the government itself derives its existence. That such would be the result, were the right in question vested in the le- gislative or executive branch of the government, is conceded by all. No one has been so hardy as to assert that Congress or the President ought to have the right, or deny that, if vested finally and exclusively in either, the consequences •which I have stated would necessarily follow ; but its advocates have been rec- onciled to the doctrine, on the supposition that there is one department of the General Government which, from its peculiar organization, affords an independ- ent tribunal through which the government may exercise the high authority which is the subject of consideration, with perfect safety to all. I yield, I trust, to few in my attachment to the judiciary department. I am fully sensible of its importance, and would maintain it to the fullest extent in Its constitutional powers and independence ; but it is impossible for me to be- lieve that it was ever intended by the Constitution that it should exercise the power in question, or that it is competent to do so ; and, if it were, that it would be a safe depositary of the power. Its powers are judicial, and not political, and are expressly confined by the Constitution "to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under its authority ;" and which I have high authority in asserting excludes political questions, and comprehends those only where there are parties amenable to the process of the court.* Nor is its incompetency less clear than its want of con- stitutional authority. There may be many, and the most dangerous infractions on the part of Congress, of which, it is conceded by all, the court, as a judicial tribunal, cannot, from its nature, take cognizance. The tarift' itself is a strong case in point ; and the reason applies equally to all others where Congress per- verts a power from an object intended to one not intended, the most insidious and dangerous of all the infractions ; and which may be extended to all its powers, more especially to the taxing and appropriating. But, supposing it competent to take cognizance of all infractions of every description, the insuperable objec- tion still remains, that it would not be a safe tribunal to exercise the power in question. It is a universal and fundamental political principle, that the power to pro- tect can safely be confided only to those interested in protecting, or tliei_r__re- sponsible agents— a maxim not less true in private than in public affairs. (.Xhe danger in our system is, that the General Government, which represents the in- terests of the whole, may encroach on the states, which represent the peculiar and local interests, or that the latter may encroach on the former. In examining this point, we ought not to forget that the government, through all its departments, judicial as well as others, is administered by delegated and jesponsible agents ; and that the jwioer which really controls, itltimatcly, all the movements, is not in the agents, but those who elect or appoint them. To under- stand, then, its real character, and what would be the action of the system in any supposable case, we must raise our view from the mere agents to thJrf high controlling power, which finally impels every movement of the machine. By doing so, we shall find all under the control of the will of a majority, ^-ompound- ed of the majority of the states, taken as corporate bodies, and the majority of the people of the states, estimated in federal numbers. These, urited, constitute the real and final power which impels and directs the movenr»c'y to the genius of Europe over that of Asia ; and which, in its consequences, has continued to affect the destiny of so large a portion of the world even to this day. There is often close analogies between events ap- parently very remote, which are strikingly illustrated in this case. In the great contest between Greece and Persia, between European and Asiatic polity and civilization, the very question between the federal and consolidated form of gov- ernment was involved. The Asiatic governments, from the remotest time, with some exceptions on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, have been based on the principle of consolidation, which considers the whole community as but a unit, and consolidates its powers in a central point. The opposite principle has prevailed in Europe — Greece, throughout all her states, was based on a federal system. All were united in one common, but loose bond, and the gov- ernments of the several states partook, for the most part, of a complex organi- zation, which distributed political power among different members of the com- munity. The same principles prevailed in ancient Italy ; and, if we turn to the Teutonic race, our great ancestors — the race which occupies the first place in power, civilization, and science, and which possesses the largest and the fairest part of Europe — we shall find that their governments were based on the federal organization, as has been clearly illustrated by a recent and abiC writer on the British Constitution (Mr. Palgrave), from whose writings I introduce the follow- ing extract : " In this manner the first establishment of the Teutonic States was effected. SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 87 They were assemblages of septs, clans, and tribes ; tlioy were confederated hosts and armies, led on by princes, magistrates, and chieftains ; each of whom was originally independent, and each of whom lost a portion of his pristine in- dependence in proportion as he and his compeers became united under the su- premacy of a sovereign, who was superinduced upon the state, first as a milita- ry commander, and afterward as a king. Yet, notwithstanding this political con- nexion, each member of the state continued to retain a considerable portion of tlie riohts of sovereignty. Every ancient Teutonic monarchy must be consid- ered as a federation : it is not a unit, of whidi the smaller bodies politic there- in contained are the fractions, but they are the integers, and the state is the multiple which results from them. Dukedoms and counties, burghs and baron- ies, towns and townships, and shires, form the kingdom ; all, in a certain de- cree, strangers to each other, and separate in jurisdiction, though all obedient to the supreme executive authority. This general description, though not al- Avavs strictly applicable in terms, is always so substantially and in elfect ; and hence it becomes necessary to discard the language which has been very gen- erally employed in treating on the English Constitution. It has been supposed tlrat the kingdom was reduced into a regular and gradual subordination of gov- ernment, and that the various legal districts of which it is composed arose from the divisions and subdivisions of the country. But this hypothesis, which tends greatly to perplex our history, cannot be supported by fact ; and instead of view- ino- the Constitution as a whole, and then proceeding to its parts, we must ex- amine it synthetically, and assume that the supreme authorities of the state were created by the concentration of the powers originally belonging to the m.embers and corporations of which it is composed/J [Here Mr. C. gave way for a motion to adjourn.] i ■ ^^ On the next day Mr. Calhoun said, I have omitted at the proper place, in the course of my observations yesterday, two or three points, to which I will now advert, before I resume the discussion where I left off. I have stated that the ordinance and acts of South Carolina were directed, not against the revenue, but against the system of protection. But it may be asked. If such was her object, how happens it that she has declared the whole system void — revenue as well as protection, without discrimination ? It is this question which I pro- pose to answer. Her justitication will be found in the necessity ol' the case ; and if there be any blame, it cannot attach to her. The two are so blended, tlirouo-hout the Avhole, as to make the entire revenue system subordinate to the protective, so as to constitute a complete system of protection, in which it is impossible to discriminate the two elements of which it is composed. South Carolina, at least, could not make the discrimination, and she was reduced to the alternative of acquiescing in a system which she believed to be unconstitution- al, and which she felt to be oppressive and ruinous, or to consider the whole as one, ccjually contaminated through all its parts, by the unconstitutionality of the protective portion, and, as such, to be resisted by the act of the state. I maintain that the state has a right to regard it in the latter character, and that, if a loss of revenue follow, the I'ault is not hers, but of this government, which has improperly blended together, in a manner not to be separated by the state, two svsteuis wholly dissimilar. If the sincerity of the state be doubted ; if it be supposed that her action is against revenue as well as protection, let the two be separated : let so much of the duties as are intended for revenue be put in one bill, and the residue intended for protection be put in another, and I pledge myself that the ordinance and the acts of the state will cease as to the former, and be directed exclusively against the latter. I also stated, in the course of my remarks yesterday, and I trust I have con- clusively shown, that the act of 1816, with the exception of a single item, to which 1 have alluded, was, in reality, a revenue measure, and that Carolina and the other states, in supporting it, have not incurred the slighted responsibility 88 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. in relation to trie system of protection which has since grovvn up, and which now so deeply distracts the country. Sir, I am willing, as one of the repre- sentatives ot Carolina, and I believe I speak the sentiment of the state, to take that act as the basis of a permanent adjustment of the tariff, simply reducino- the duties, in an average proportion, on all the items to the revenue point. I make that ofl'er now to the advocates of the protective system ; but I must, in candour, inform them that such an adjustment would distribute the revenue between the protected and unprotected articles more favourably to the state, and to the South, and less so to the manufacturing interest, than an average uniform ad valorem,- and, accordingly, more so than that now proposed by Carolina through her con- vention. After such an offer, no man who values his candour will dare accuse the state, or those who have represented her here, with inconsistency in refer- ence to the point under consideration. I omitted, also, on yesterday, to notice a remark of the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives), that the only difficulty in adjusting the tariff" grew out of the ordi- nance and the acts of South Carolina. 1 must attribute an assertion so incon- sistent with the facts to an ignorance of the occurrences of the last few years in reference to this subject, occasioned by the absence of the gentleman from the United States, to which he himself has alluded in his remarks. If the sen- ator will take pains to inform himself, he will find that this protective system advanced with a continued and rapid step, in spite of petitions, remonstrances, and protests, of not only Carolina, but also of Virginia and of all the Southern States, until 1828, when Carolina, for the first time, changed the character of her resistance, by holding up her reserved rights as the shield of her defence against farther encroachment. This attitude alone, unaided by a single state, arrested the farther progre^""of the syste«a., so that the question from that pe- riod to this, on the part of the manufacturers, has been, not how to acquire more, but to retain that which they have acquired. I will inform the gentle- man that, if this attitude had not been taken on the part of the state, the ques- tion would not now be how duties ought to be repealed, but a question, as to the protected articles, between prohibition on one side and the duties establish- ed by the act of 1838 on the other. But a single remark will be sufficient in reply to what I must consider the invidious remark of the senator from Virgin- ia (Mr. Rives). The act of 1832, which has not yet gone into operation, and which was passed but a few months since, was declared by the supporters of the system to be a permanent adjustment, and the bill proposed by the Treasury Department, not essentially different from the act itself, was in like manner de- clared to be intended by the administration as a permanent arrangement. What has occurred since, except this ordinance, and these abused acts of the calumniated state, to produce this mighty revolution in reference to this odious system ? Unless the senator from Virginia can assign some other cause, he is bound, upon every principle of fairness, to retract this unjust aspersion upon the acts of South Carolina. The senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton), as well as others, has relied with great emphasis on the fact that we are citizens of the United States. I do not object to the expression, nor shall I detract from the proud and elevated feel- ings with which it is associated ; but I trust that I may be permitted to raise the inquiry. In what manner are we citizens of the United States ? without weak- ening the patriotic feeling with which, I trust, it will ever be uttered. If by cit- izen of the United States he means a citizen at large, one whose citizenship extends to the entire geographical limits of the country, without having a local citizenship in some state or territory, a sort of citizen of the world, all I have to say is, that such a citizen would be a perfect nondescript ; that not a single individual of this description can be found in the entire mass of our population. Notwithstanding all the pomp and display of eloquence on the occasion, every citizen is a citizen of some state or territory, and, as such, under an express pro- SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALHOUN. 89 vision of the Constitution, is entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states ; and it is in this, and in no other sense, that we are citizens of the United States. The senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Dallas), indeed, re- lies upon that provision in the Constitution which gives Congress the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and the operation of the rule actu- ally established under this authority, to prove that naturalized citizens are citi- zens at large, without being citizens of any of the states. I do not deem it ne- cessary to examine the law of Congress upon this subject, or to reply to the ar- gument of the senator, though I cannot doubt that he (Mr. D.) has taken an en- tirely erroneous view of the subject. It is sufficient that the power of Congress extends simply to the establishment of a uniform rule by which foreigners may be naturalized in the several states or territories, without infringing in any other respect, in reference to naturalization, the rights of the states as they existed before the adoption of the Constitution. Having supplied the omissions of yesterday, I now resume the subject at the point whore my remarks then terminated. The Senate will remember that 1 stated, at their close, that the great question at issue is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated system of government ; a system in which the parts, to use the emphatic language of Mr. Palgrave, are the integers, and the whole the multiple, or in which the whole is a unit and the parts the fractions ; that I stated, that on the decision of this question, I believe, depend not only the lib- erty and prosperity of this country, but the place which we are destined to hold in the intellectual and moral scale of nations. I stated, also, in ray remarks on this point, that there is a striking analogy between this and the great struggle between Persia and Greece, which was decided by the battles of Marathon, Platea, and Salamis, and which immortalized the names of Miltiades and The- mistocles. I illustrated this analogy by showing that centralism or consolida- tion, with the exception of a few nations along the eastern border of the Medi- terranean, has been the pervading principle in the Asiatic governments, while the federal system, or, what is the same in principle, that system which organ- izes a community in reference to its parts, has prevailed in Europe. Among the few exceptions in the 'Asiatic nations, the government of the twelve tribes of Israel, in its early period, is the most striking. Their govern- ment, at first, was a mere confederation without any central power, till a mil- itary chieftain, with the title of king, was placed at its head, without, however, merging the original organization of the twelve distinct tribes. This was the commencement of that central action among that peculiar people which, in three generations, terminated in a permanent division of their tribes. It is im- possible even for a careless reader to peruse the history of that event without being forcibly struck with the analogy in the causes which led to their separa- tion, and those which now threaten us with a similar calamity. With the es- tablishment of the central power in the king commenced a system of taxation, which, under King Solomon, was greatly increased to defray the expense of rearing the temple, of enlarging and eVnbellishing Jerusalem, the seat of the central government, and the other profuse expenditures of his magnificent reio-n. Increased taxation was followed by its natural consequences — discontent and complaint ; which before his death began to excite resistance. On the succes- sion of his son, Rehoboam, the ten tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demanded a re- duction of the taxes ; the temple being finished, and the embellishment of Jeru- salem completed, and the money which had been raised for that purpose being no longer required, or, in other words, the debt being paid, they demanded a reduction of the duties— a repeal of the tariff. The demand was taken under consideration, and after consulting the old men, the counsellors of '98, who ad- vised a reduction, he then took the opinion of the younger politicians, who had since grown up, and knew not the doctrines of their fathers ; he hearkened unto their counsel, and refused to make the reduction, and the secession of the tea M 90 SPEECHES OF JOIiN C. CALHOUN. tribes under Jeroboam followed. The tribes of Judah and Benjamin, which had received the disbursements, alone remained to the house of David. But to return to the point immediately under consideration. I know that it is not only the opinion of a large majority of our country, but it may be said to be the opinion of the age, that the very beau ideal of a perfect government is the government of a majority, acting through a representative body, without check or limitation in its power ; yet, if we may test this theoi^' by experience and reason, we shall find that, so far from being perfect, the necessary tenden- cy of all governments, based upon the will of an absolute majority, without con- stitutional check or limitation of power, is to faction, corruption, anarchy, and despotism ; and this, whether the will of the majority be expressed directly through an assembly of the people themselves, or by their representatives. 1 know that, in venturing this assertion, I utter that which is unpopular both within and without these walls; but where truth and liberty are concerned, Buch considerations should not be regarded. I will place the decision of this point on the fact that no government of the kind, among the many attempts which have been made, has ever endured for a single generation, l3Ut, on the contrary, has invariably experienced the fate which I have assigned to it. Let a single instance be pointed out, and I will surrender my opinion. But, if we had not the aid of experience to direct our judgment, reason itself would be a certain guide. The view which considers the com.munity as a unit, and all its parts as having a similar interest, is radically erroneous. However small the community may be, and however homogeneous its interests, the moment that government is put into operation, as soon as it begins to collect taxes and to make appropriations, the different portions of the community must, of necessity. bear different and opposing relations in reference to the action of the govern- ment. There must inevitably spring up two interests — a direction and a stock- holder interest — an interest profiting by the actioa of the government, and in- terested in increasing its powers and action ; and another, at whose expense the political machine is kept in motion. I know how difficult it is to commu- nicate distinct ideas on such a subject, through^the medium of general proposi- tions, without particular illustration ; and in order that I may be distinctly un- SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUX, 99 justify this course on the part of that gentleman. I had, it is true, denounced the bill in strong language, but not stronger than the rules which govern parlia- mentary proceedings permit ; nor stronger than the character of the bill, and its bearing on the state which it is my honour to represent, justified. I am at a loss to understand what motive governed the senator in giving a personal char- acter to his remarks. If he intended anything unkind — (here Mr. Webster said, audibly, Certainly not ; and Mr. C. replied, I will not, then, say what I in- tended, if such had been his motives) — but still I must be permitted to ask. If he intended nothing unkind, Avhat was the object of the senator ? Was his motive to strengthen a cause which he feels to be weak, by giving the discussion a per- sonal direction ? If such was his motive, his experience as a debater ought to have tausht him that it was one of those weak devices which seldom fail ta react on those who resort to them. If his motive was to acquire popularity by attacking one Avho had voluntarily, and from a sense of duty — from a deep conviction that liberty and the Constitution were at stake — had identified him- self with an unpopular question, I would say to him that a true sense of dignity would have impelled him in an opposite direction. Among the possible motives which might have influenced him, there is another to the imputation of which he is exposed, but which, certainly, I will not attribute to him — that his motive was to propitiate in a certain high quarter — a quarter in which he must know- that no offering could be more acceptable than the immolation of the character of him who how addresses you. But whatever may have been the motive of the senator, I can assure him that I will not follow his example. I never had any inclination to gladiatorial exhibitions in the halls of legislation, and if I now had, I certainly would not indulge them on so solemn a question : a question which, in the opinion of the senator from Massachusetts, as expressed in debate- involves the union of these states, and in mine, the liberty and the Constitution of the country. Before, however, I conclude the prefatory observations, I must allude to the remark which the senator made at the termination of the argument of my friend from Mississippi (Mr. Poindexter). I understood the senator to say that, if I chose to put at issue his character for consistency, he stood pre- pared to vindicate his course. I assure the senator that I have no idea of call- ing in question his consistency, or that of any other member of this body. It is a subject in which I feel no concern ; but if I am to understand the remark of the senator as intended indirectly as a challenge to put in issue the consist- ency of my course as compared to his own, I have to say that, though I do not accept of his challenge, yet, if he should think proper to make a trial of charac- ter on that or any other point connected with our public conduct, and will select a suitable occasion, I stand prepared to vindicate my course, as compared with his, or that of any other member of this body, for consistency of conduct, purity of motive, and devoted attachment to the country and its institutions. Having made these remarks, which have been forced upon me, I shall now proceed directly to the subject before the Senate ; and in order that it may, with all its bearings, be fully understood, I must go back to the period at which I in- troduced the resolutions. They were introduced in connexion with the bill which has passed this house, and is now pending before the other. That bill was couched in general terms, without naming South Carolina or any other state, though it was understood, and avowed by the committee, as intended to act directly on her. Believing that the government had no right to use force in the controversy, and that the attempt to introduce it rested upon principles utterly subversive of the. Constitution and the sovereignty of the states, 1 drew up the resolutions, and intro- duced them expressly with the view to test those principles, with a desire that they should be discussed and voted on before the bill came up for consideration. The majority ordered otherwise. The resolutions were laid on the table, and the bill taken up for discussion. Under this arrangement, which it was under- 100 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. stood originated with the committee that reported the bill, I, of course, conclu- ded that its members would proceed in the discussion, and explain the princi- ples, and the necessity for the bill, before the other senators would enter into the discussion, and particularly those from South Carolina ; understanding, how- ever, that, by the arrangement of the committee, it was allotted to the senator from Tennessee to close the discussion on the bill. I waited to the last moment, in expectation of hearing from the senator from Massachusetts. He is a mem- ber of the committee. But not hearing from him, I rose to speak to the bill, and as soon as I had concluded, the senator from Massachusetts arose — I will not say to reply to me, and certainly not to discuss the bill, but the resolutions which had been laid on the table, as I have stated. I do not state these facts in the way of complaint, but in order to explain my own course. The senator having directed his argument against my resolutions, I felt myself compelled to seize the lirst opportunity to call them up from the table, and to assign a day for their discussion, in the hope not only that the Senate would hear me in their vindication, but would also afford me an opportunity of taking the sense of this body on the great principles on which they are based. The senator from Massachusetts, ii> his argument against the resolutions, directed his attack almost exclusively against the first, on the ground, I suppose, that it was the basis of the other two, and that, unless the first could be demol- ished, the others would follow of course. In this he was right. As plain and as simple as the facts contained in the first are, they cannot be admitted to be true without admitting the doctrines for which I, and the state I represent, con- tend. He (Mr. W.) commenced his attack with a verbal criticism on the res- olution, in the course of which he objected strongly to two words, " constitu- tional," and " accede." To the former on the ground that the word, as used (constitutional compact), was obscure — that it conveyed no definite meaning — and that the Constitution was a noun-substantive, and not an adjective. I re- gret that I have exposed myself to the criticism of the senator. I certainly did not intend to use any expression of a doubtful sense, and if I have done so, the senator must attribute it to the poverty of my language, and not to design. I trust, however, that the senator will excuse me, when he comes to hear my apology. In matters of criticism, authority is of the highest importance, and I have an authority of so high a character, in this case, for using the expression which he considers so obscure and so unconstitutional, as will justify me even in his eyes. It is no less than the authority of the senator himself — given on a solemn occasion (the discussion on Mr. Foote's resolution), and doubtless with great deliberation, after having duly weighed the force of the expression. (Here Mr. C. read from Mr. Webster's speech in reply to Mr. Hayne, in the Senate of the United States, delivered January 26, 1830, as follows:) " The domestic slavery of the South I leave where I find it — in the hands of their own governments. It is their affair, not mine. Nor do I complain of the peculiar effect which the magnitude of that population has had in the dis- tribution of power under the Federal Government. We know, sir, that the representation of the states in the other house is not equal. We know that grteat advantage, in that respect, is enjoyed by the slaveholding states ; and we know, too, that the intended equivalent for that advantage, that is to say, the imposition of direct taxes in the same ratio, has become merely nominal : the habit of the government being almost invariably to collect its revenues from other sources, and in other modes. Nevertheless, I do not complain, nor would I countenance any movement to alter this arrangement of representation. It is the original bargain — the compact — let it stand ; let the advantage of it be fully enjoyed. The Union itself is too full of benefits to be hazarded in propo- sitions for changing its original basis. I go for the Constitution as it is, and for the Union as it is. But I am resolved not to submit in silence to accusa- tions, either against myself individually, or against the North, wholly unfound- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 101 ed and unjust : accusations which impute to us a disposition to evade the con- stitutional COMPACT, and to extend the power of the government over the internal laws and domestic condition 6f the states." It will be seen, by this extract, that the senator not only uses the phrase " constitutional compact," which he now so much condemns, but, what is still more important, he calls the Constitution itself a compact — a bargain ; which contains important admissions, having a direct and powerful bearing on the main issue involved in the discussion, as will appear in the course of his re- marks. But, as strong as his objection is to the word " constitutional," it is still stronger to the word " accede," which, he thinks, has been introduced into the resolution with some deep design, as 1 suppose, to entrap the Senate into an admission of the doctrine of state rights. Here, again, I must shelter myself under authority. But I suspect that the senator, by a sort of instinct (for our instuicts often strangely run before our knowledge), had a prescience, which would account for his aversion for the word, that this authority was no less than Thomas Jefferson himself, the great apostle of the doctrines of state rights. The word was borrowed from him. It was taken from the Kentucky Resolu- tion, as well as the substance of the resolution itself. But I trust that 1 may neutralize whatever aversion the authorship of this word may have excited in the mind of the senator, by the introduction of another authority — that of Wash- ington himself, who, in his speech to Congress, speaking of the admission of North Carolina into the Union, uses this very term, which was repeated by the Senate in their reply. Yet, in order to narrow the ground between the sena- tor and myself as much as possible, I will accommodate myself to his strange antipathy against the two unfortunate words, by striking them out of the reso- lution, and substituting in their place those very words which the senator him- self has designated as constitutional phrases. In the place of that abhorred ad- jective " constitutional," I will insert the very noun-substantive " constitution ;" and in the place of the word " accede," I will insert the word " ratify," which he designates as the proper term to be used. Let us now see how the resolution stands, and how it Avill read after these amendments. Here Mr. C. said the resolution, as introduced, reads : Resolved, That the people of the several states composing these United States are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of each state acceded as a separate and sovereign community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification ; and that the Union, of which the said compact is a bond, is a union between the states ratifying the same. As proposed to be amended : Resolved, That the people of the several states composing these United States are united as parties to a compact, under the title of the Constitution of the Uni- ted States, which the people of each state ratified as a separate and sovereign community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification ; and that the Union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a Union between the states ratifying the same. Where, sir, I ask, is that plain case of revolution ? Where that hiatus, as wide as the globe, between the premises and conclusion, which the senator pro- claimed would be apparent if the resolution was reduced into constitutional lan- guage ? For my part, with my poor powers of conception, I cannot perceive the slightest difference between the resolution as first introduced, and as it is proposed to be amended in conformity to the views of the senator. And, in- stead of that hiatus between premises and conclusion, which seems to startle the imagination of the senator, 1 can perceive nothing but a continuous and sol- id surface; sufficient to sustain the magnificent superstructure of state rights. Indeed, it seems to me that the senators vision is distorted by the medium through which he views everything connected with the suliject ; and that the same distortion which has presented to his imagination this hiatus, as wide as 102 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. the globe, where not even a fissure exists, also presented that beautiful and clas- sical image of a strong man struggling in a bog without the power of extricating himself, and incapable of being aided b^ any friendly hand, while, instead of struggling in a bog, he stands on the everlasting rock of truth. Having now noticed the criticism of the senator, I shall proceed to meet and repel the main assault on the resolution. He directed his attack against the strong point, the very horn of the citadel of state rights. The senator clearly perceived that, if the Constitution be a compact, it was impossible to deny the assertions contained in the resolutions, or to resist the consequences which I had drawn from them, and, accordingly, directed his whole fire against that point ; but, after so vast an expenditure of ammunition, not the slightest impression, so far as I can perceive, has been made. But, to drop the simile, after a careful examination of the notes which I took of what the senator said, I am now at a loss to know whether, in the opinion of the senator, our Constitution is a com- pact or not, though almost the whole argument of the senator was directed to that point. At one time he would seem to deny directly and positively that it was a compact, while at another he would appear, in language not less strong, to admit that it was. 1 have collated all that the senator has said upon this point ; and, that what I have stated may not appear exaggerated, I will read his remarks in juxtapo- sition. He said that " The Constitution means a government, not a compact. Not a constitution- al compact, but a government. If compact, it rests on plighted faith, and the mode of redress would be to declare the whole void. States may secede if a league or compact." 1 thank the senator for these admissions, which I intend to use hereafter. (Here Mr. C. proceeded to read from his notes.) " The states agreed that each should participate in the sovereignty of the other." Certainly, a very correct conception of the Constitution ; but when did they make that agreement but by the Constitution, and how could they agree but by compact ? " The system, not a compact between states in their sovereign capacity, but a government proper, founded on the adoption of the people, and creating indi- vidual relations between itself and the citizens." This the senator lays down as a leading fundamental principle to sustain his doctrine, and, I must say, by a strange confusion and uncertainty of language ; not, certainly, to be explained by any want of command of the most appropriate words on his part. " It does not call itself a compact, but a constitution. The Constitution rests on compact, but it is no longer a compact." I would ask. To what compact does the senator refer, as that on which the Constitution rests ? Before the adoption of the present Constitution, the states had formed but one compact, and that was the old confederation ; and, certain- ly, the gentleman does not intend to assert that the present Constitution rests upon that. What, then, is his meaning 1 What can it be, but that the Con- stitution itself is a compact ? and how will his language read, when fairly in- terpreted, but that the Constitution was a compact, but is no longer a compact ? It had, by some means or another, changed its nature, or become defunct. He next states that " A man is almost untrue to his country who calls the Constitution a com- pact." I fear the senator, in calling it a compact, a bargain, has called down this ieavy denunciation on his own head. He finally states that " It is founded ou compact, but not a compact results from it." To what are we to attribute the strange confusion of words ? The senator SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 103 has a mind of high order, and perfectly trained to the most exact use of lan- guage. No man knows better the precise import of the words he uses. The difficulty is not in him, but in his subject. He who undertakes to j)rove that this Constitution is not a compact, undertakes a task which, be his strength ever so great, must oppress him by its weight. Taking the whole of the argument of the senator together, I would say that it is his impression that the Constitu- tion is not a compact, and will now proceed to consider the reason which he has assigned for this opinion. He thinks there is an incompatibility between constitution and compact. To prove this, he adduces the words " ordain and establish," contained in the pre- amble of the Constitution. I confess I am not capable of perceiving in what maimer these words are incompatible with the idea that the Constitution is a compact. The senator will admit that a single state may ordain a constitution ; and where is the difficulty, where the incompatibility of two states concurring in ordaining and establishing a constitution ? As between the states themselves, the instrument would be a compact ; but in reference to the government, and those on whom it operates, it would be ordained and established — ordained and established by the joint authoriti/ of two, instead of the single authority of one. The next argument which the senator advances to show that the language of the Constitution is irreconcilable with the idea of its being a compact, is ta- ken from that portion of the instrument which imposes prohibitions on the au- thority of the states. He said that the language used in imposing the prohibi- tions is the language of a superior to an inferior ; and that, therefore, it was not the language of a compact, which implies the equality of the parties. As a proof, the senator cited the several provisions of the Constitution which provide that no state shall enter into treaties of alliance and confederation, lay imposts, &c., without the assent of Congress. If he had turned to the articles of the old coniederation, which he acknowledges to have been a compact, he would have found that those very prohibitory articles of the Constitution were borrow- ed from that instrument ; that the language which he now considers as imply- ing superiority was taken verbatim from it. If he had extended his researches still farther, he w^ould have found that it is the habitual language used in treat- ies, whenever a stipulation is made against the performance of any act. Among many instances wlxich I could cite if it were necessary, I refer the senator to the celebrated treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay with Great Britain in 1793, and in which the very language used in the Constitution is employed. To prove that the Constitution is not a compact, the senator next observes that it stipulates nothing, and asks, with an air of triumph, Where are the evi- dences of the stipulations between the states ? I must express my surprise at this interrogatory, coming from so intelligent a source. Has the senator never seen the ratification of the Constitution by the several states ? Did he not cite them on this very occasion ? Do they contain no evidence of this stipulation on the part of the states ? Nor is the assertion less strange that the Constitu- tion contains no stipulation. So far from regarding it in the light in which the senator regards it, I consider the whole instrument but a mass of stipulation : ■what is that but a stipulation to which the senator refers when he states, in the course of his argument, that each state had agreed to participate in the sover- eignty of the others ? But the principal argument on which the senator relied to show that the Constitution is not a compact, rests on the provision in that instrument which declares that " this Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under their authority, are the supreme laws of the land." He asked, with marked emphasis. Can a compact be the supreme law of the land ? 1 ask, in return, whether treaties are not compacts, and whether treaties, as well as the Constitution, are not declared to be the supreme law of the land ? His ■argument, in fact, as conclusively proves that treaties are not compacts as it 104 ' SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. does that this Constitution is not a compact. I might rest this point on this decisive answer ; but, as I desire to leave not a sliadow of doubt on this impor- tant point, I shall follow the gentleman in the course of his reasoning. He defines a constitution to be a fundamental law, which organizes the gov- ernment, and points out the mode of its action. I will not object to the defini- tion, though, in my opinion, a more appropriate one, or, at least, one better adapted to American ideas, could be given. My objection is not to the defini- tion, but to the attempt to prove that the fundamental laws of a state cannot be a compact, as the senator seems to suppose. I hold the very reverse to be the case ; and that, according to the most approved writers on the subject of gov- ernment, these very fundamental laws which are now stated not only not to be compacts, but inconsistent with the very idea of compacts, are held invariably to be compacts ; and, in that character, as distinguished from the ordinary laws of the country. I will cite a single authority, which is full and explicit on this point, from a writer of the highest repute. Burlamaqui says, vol. ii., part 1, chap, i., sec. 35, 36, 37, 38 : " It entirely de- pends upon a free people to invest the sovereigns whom they place over their heads with an authority either absolute, or limited by certain laws. These regulations, by which the supreme authority is kept within bounds, are called the fundamental laws of the stated " The fundamental laws of a state, taken in their full extent, are not only the decrees by which the entire body of the nation determine the form of govern- ment, and the manner of succeeding to the crown, but are likewise covenants between the people and the person on whom they confer the sovereignty, which regulate the manner of governing, and by which the supreme authority is lim- ited." " These regulations are called fundamental laws, because they are the basis, as it were, and foundation of the state on which the structure of the government is raised, and because the people look upon these regulations as their principal strength and support." " The name of laws, however, has been given to these regulations in an im- proper and figurative sense, for, properly speaking, they are real covenants. But as those covenants are obligatory between the contracting parties, they have the force of laws themselves." The same, vol. ii., part 2, ch. i., sec. 19 and 22, in part. " The whole body of the nation, in whom the supreme power originally resides, may regulate the government by a fundamental law in such manner as to commit the exercise of the difierent parts of the supreme power to different persons or bodies, who may act independently of each other in regard to the rights committed to them, but still subordinate to the laws from which those rights are derived." " And these fundamental laws are real covenants, or what the civilians call pacta conventa, between the difierent orders of the Republic, by which they stipulate that each shall have a particular part of the sovereignty, and that this shall establish the form of government. It is evident that, by these means, each of the contracting parties acquires a right not only of exercising the power granted to it, but also of preserving that original right." A reference to the Constitution of Great Britam, with which we are better acquainted than with that of any other European government, will show that it is a compact. Magna Charta may certainly be reckoned among the funda- mental laws of that kingdom. Now, although it did not assume, originally, the form of a compact, yet, before the breaking up of the meeting of the barons which imposed it on King John, it was reduced into the form of a covenant, and duly signed by Robert Fitzwalter and others, on the one part, and the king on the other. But we have a more decisive proof that the Constitution of England is a com- pact in the resolution of the Lords and Commons in 1688, which declared that SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 105 " King James the Second, having endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of the kingdom, by breaking the original contract between the king and people, and having, by the advice of Jesuits and other wicked persons, violated the fun- damental law, and withdrawn himself out of the kingdom, hath abdicated the government, and that the throne is thereby become vacant." But why should I refer to writers upon the subject of government, or inquire into the constitution of foreign states, when there are such decisive proofs that our Constitution is a compact 1 On this point the senator is estopped. I bor- row from the gentleman, and thank him for the word. His adopted state, Avhich he so ably represents on this floor, and his native state, the states of Massachusetts and New-Hampshire, both declared, in their ratification of the Constitution, that it was a compact. The ratification of Massachusetts is in the following words (here Mr. C. read) : " In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Feb. 6, 1788. " The Convention having impartially discussed and fully considered the Con- stitution of the United States of America, reported to Congress by the Conven- tion of Delegates from the United States of America, and submitted to us by a resolution of the General Court of said Commonwealth, passed the 25th day of October last past, and acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the universe, in affording the people of the United States, in the course of his providence, an opportunity deliberately and peaceably, without fraud or surprise, of entering into an explicit and solemn compact with each other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of lib- erty to themselves and of Massachusetts, assent to and ratify the said Constitu- tion for the United States of America." The ratification of New-Hampshire is taken from that of Massachusetts, and almost in the same words. But proof, if possible, still more decisive, may be found in the celebrated resolutions of Virginia on the alien and sedition law, in 1798, and the responses of Massachusetts and the other states. Those resolutions expressly assert that the Constitution is a compact between the states, in the following language (here Mr. C. read from the resolutions of Virginia as follows) : " That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it views THE. POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AS RESULTING FROM THE COMPACT, TO WHICH THE STATES ARE PARTIES, AS LIMITED BY THE PLAIN SENSE AND IN- TENTION OF THE INSTRUMENT CONSTITUTING THAT COMPACT AS NO FARTHER VALID THAN THEY ARE AUTHORIZED BY THE GRANTS ENUMERATED IN THAT COM- PACT ; AND THAT, IN CASE OF A DELIBERATE, PALPABLE, AND DANGEROUS EX- ERCISE OF OTHER POWERS NOT GRANTED BY THE SAID COMPACT, THE STATES WHO ARE PARTIES THERETO HAVE THE RIGHT, AND ARE IN DUTY BOUND, TO INTERPOSE FOR ARRESTING THE PROGRESS OF THE EVIL, AND FOR MAINTAINING WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE LIMITS THE AUTHORITIES, RIGHTS, AND LIBERTIES APPERTAINING TO THEM. " That the General Assembly doth also express its deep regret that a spirit has, in sundry instances, been manifested by the Federal Government to en- large its powers by forced constructions of the constitutional charter, which de- fines them ; and that indications have appeared of a design to expound certain general phrases (which, having been copied from the very limited grant of powers in the former articles of confederation, wore the less liable to be misconstrued), so as to destroy the meaning and eflect of the particular enumeration which necessity explains, and limits the general phrases, and so as to consolidate THE STATES, BY DEGREES, INTO ONE SOVEREIGNTY, THE OBVIOUS TENDENCY o 106 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. AND INEVITABLE RESULT OF WHICH WOULD BE TO TRANSFORM THE PRESENT KEPUBLICAN SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES INTO AN ABSOLUTE, OR, AT BEST, A MIXED MONARCHY." They were sent to the several states. We have the reply of Delaware, New- York, Connecticut, New-Hampshire, Vermont, and Massachusetts, not one of which contradicts this important assertion on the part of Virginia ; and, by their silence, they all acquiesce in its truth. The case is still stronger against Massachusetts, which expressly recognises the fact that the Constitu- tion is a compact. In her answer she says (here Mr. C. read from the answer of Massachusetts as follows) : " But they deem it their duty solemnly to declare that, while they liold sacred the principle, that consent of the people is the only pure source of just and legitimate power, they cannot admit the right of the state Legislatures to denounce the administration of that government, to which the people them- selves, by a solemn compact, have exclusively committed their national concerns. That, although a liberal and enlightened vigilance among the people is always to be cherished, yet an unreasonable jealousy of the men of their choice, and a recurrence to measures of extremity upon groundless or trivial pretexts, have a strong tendency to destroy all rational liberty at home, and to deprive the Uni- ted States of the most essential advantages in their relations abroad. That this Legislature are persuaded that the decision of all cases in law or equity, arising under the Constitution of the United States, and the construction of all laws made in pursuance thereof, are exclusively vested by the people in the judicial courts of the United States." " That the people, in that solemn compact, which is declared to be the supreme law of the land, have not constituted the state Legislatures the judges of the acts or measures of the Federal Government, but have confided to them the power of proposing such amendments of the Constitution as shall appear to them neces- sary to the interests, or conformable to the wishes, of the people whom they represent." Now, I ask the senator himself — I put it to his candour to say, if South Car- olina be estopped on the subject of the protective system because Mr. Burke and Mr. Smith proposed a moderate duty on hemp, or some other article, I know not what, nor do I care, with a view of encouraging its production, of which motion, I venture to say, not one individual in a hundred in the state ever heard, whether he and Massachusetts, after this clear, full, and solemn recognition that the Constitution is a compact, both on his part and that of his state, be not forever estopped on this important point 1 There remains one more of the senator's arguments to prove that the Con- stitution is not a compact, to be considered. He says it is not a compact, be- cause it is a government ; which he defines to be an organized body, possessed of the will and power to execute its purposes by its own proper authority ; and which, he says, bears not the slightest resemblance to a compact. But I would ask the senator, Who ever considered a government, when spoken of as the agent to execute the powers of the Constitution, as distinct from the Constitu- tion itself, as a compact ? In that light it would be a perfect absurdity. It is true that, in general and loose language, it is often said that the government is a compact, meaning the Constitution which created it, and vested it with authority to execute the powers contained in the instrument ; but when the distinction is drawn between the Constitution and the government, as the senator has done, it would be as ridic- ulous to call the government a compact as to call an individual, .appointed to execute provisions of the contract, a contract ; and not less so to suppose that there could be the slightest resemblance between them. In connexion with this point the senator, to prove that the Constitution is not a compact, asserts that it is wholly independent of the state, and pointedly declares that the states SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 107 have not a right to touch a hair of its head ; and this, with that provision in the Constitution that three fourths of the states have a right to aUer, change, or amend, or even to abohsh it, staring him in the face. 1 have examined all of the arguments of the senator intended to prove that the Constitution is not a compact ; and I trust I have shown, by the clearest demonstration, that his arguments are perfectly inconclusive, and that his as- sertion is against the clearest and most solemn evidence — evidence of record, and of such a character that it ought to close his lips forever. I turn now to consider the other, and, apparently, contradictory aspect in which the senator presented this part of the subject : I mean that one in which he states that the government is founded in compact, but is no longer a com- pact. I have already remarked, that no other interpretation could be given to this assertion, except that the Constitution was once a compact, but is no long- er so. There is a vagueness and indistinctness in this part of the senator's argument, which left me altogether uncertain as to its real meaning. If he meant, as I presume he did, that the compact is an executed, and not an execu- tory one — that its object was to create a government, and to invest it with proper authority — and that, having executed this office, it had performed its functions, and, with it, had ceased to exist, then we have the extraordinary avowal that the Constitution is a dead letter — that it has ceased to have any binding efi'ect, or any practical influence or operation. It had, indeed, often been charged that the Constitution had become a dead letter ; that it was continually violated, and had lost all its control over the government ; but no one had ever before been bold enough to advance a theory on the avowed basis that it was an executed, and, therefore, an extinct instru- ment. I will not seriously attempt to refute an argument which to me appears so extravagant. I had thought that the Constitution was to endure forever ; and that, so far from its being an executed contract, it contained great trust powers for the benefit of those who created it, and all future generations, which never could be finally executed during the existence of the world, if our gov- ernment should so long endure. I will now return to the first resolution, to see how the issue stands between the senator from Massachusetts and myself. It contains three propositions. First, that the Constitution is a compact ; second, that it was formed by the -States, constituting distinct communities ; and, lastly, that it is a subsisting and binding compact between the states. How do these three propositions now stand 1 The first, I trust, has been satisfactorily established ; the second, the senator has admitted, faintly, indeed, but still he has admitted it to be true. This admission is something. It is so much gained by discussion. Three years ago even this was a contested point. But I cannot say that I thank him for the admission : we owe it to the force of truth. The fact that these states ■were declared to be free and independent states at the time of their independ- ence ; that they were acknowledged to be so by Great Britain in the treaty which terminated the war of the Revolution, and secured their independence ; that they were recognised in the same character in the old articles of the con- federation ; and, finally, that the present Constitution was formed by a conven- tion of the several states, afterward submitted to them for their ratification, and was ratified by them separately, each for itself, and each, by its own act, bind- ing its citizens, formed a body of facts too clear to be denied and too strong to be resisted. It now remains to consider the third and last proposition contauied in the lesolution — that it is a binding and a subsisting compact between the states. The senator was not explicit on this point. I understood him, however, as as- serting that, though formed by the states, the Constitution was not binding be- tween the states as distinct communities, but between the American people in the aggregate, who, in consequence of the adoption of the Constitution, accord- 108 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. mg to the opiniou of the senator, became one people, at least, tD the extent of the delegated powers. This would, indeed, be a great change. All acknowl- edge that, previous to the adoption of the Constitution, the states constituted distinct and independent communities, in full possession of their sovereignty ; and, surely, if the adoption of the Constitution was intended to effect the great and important change in their condition which the theory of the senator sup- poses, some evidence of it ought to be found in the instrument itself. It pro- fesses to be a careful and full enumeration of all the powers which the states delegated, and of every modification of their political condition. The senator said that he looked to the Constitution in order to ascertain its real character ; and, surely, he ought to look to the same instrument in order to ascertain what changes were, in fact, made in the political condition of the states and the coun- try. But with the exception of " we, the people of the United States," in the preamble, he has not pointed out a single indication in the Constitution of the great change which he conceives has been effected in this respect. Now, sir, I intend to prove that the only argument on which the gentleman relies on this point must utterly fail him. I do not intend to go into a critical examination of the expression of the preamble to which I have referred. I do not deem it necessary ; but were it, it might be easily shown that it is at least as applicable to my view of the Constitution as to that of the senator ; and that the whole of his argument on this point rests on the ambiguity of the term thir- teen United States ; which may mean certain territorial limits, comprehending within them the whole of the states and territories of the Union. In this sense the people of the United States may mean all the people living within these limits, without reference to the states or territories in which they may reside, or of which they may be citizens, and it is in this sense only that the expres- sion gives the least countenance to the argument of the senator. But it may also mean the states united, which inversion alone, without farther explanation, removes the ambiguity to which I have referred. The expression, in this sense, obviously means no more than to speak of the people of the sev- eral states in their united and confederated capacity ; and, if it were requisite, it might be shown that it is only in this sense that the expression is used in the Constitution. But it is not necessary. A single argument will forever settle this point. Whatever may be the true meaning of this expression, it is not ap- plicable to the condition of the states as they exist under the Constitution, but as it was under the old confederation, before its adoption. The Constitution had not yet been adopted, and the states, in ordaining it, could only speak of themselves in the condition in which they then existed, and not in that in which they would exist under the Constitution. So that, if the argument of the sena- tor proves anytliing, it proves, not, as he supposes, that the Constitution forms the American people into an aggregate mass of individuals, but that such was their political condition before its adoption, under the old confederation, direct- ly contrary to his argument in the previous part of this discussion. But I intend not to leave this important point, the last refuge of those who advocate consolidation, even on this conclusive argument. I have shown that the Constitution affords not the least evidence of the mighty change of the po- litical condition of the states and the country, Avhich the senator supposed it efi'ected ; and I intend now, by the most decisive proof, drawn from the consti- tutional instrument itself, to show that no such change was intended, and that the people of the states are united under it as states and not as individuals. On this point there is a very important part of the Constitution entirely and strange- ly overlooked by the senator in this debate, as it is expressed in the first reso- lution, which furnishes the conclusive evidence, not only that the Constitution is a compact, but a subsisting compact, binding between the states. I allude to the seventh article, which provides that " the ratification of the convention of nine states shall be suflftcient for the establishment of this Constitution between. SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 109 the slates so ratifying the same." Yes, between the states : these little words mean a volume — compacts, not laws, bind between the states ; and it here binds, not between individuals, but between ike states : the states ratifying, implying, as strong as language can make it, that the Constitution is what, I have assert- ed it to be — a compact, ratified by the slates, and a subsisting compact, binding the states ratifying it. But, sir, I will not leave this point, all-important in establishing the true the- ory of our government, on this argument alone, as demonstrative and conclusive as I hold it to be. Another, not much less powerful, but of a different charac- ter, may be drawn from the tenth amended article, which provides that " the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people." The article of ratification which I have just cited informs us that the Constitu- tion, which delegates powers, was ratified by the states, and is binding between them. This informs us to whom the powers are delegated, a most important fact in determining the point immediately at issue between the senator and my- self. According to his views, the Constitution created a union between indi- viduals, if the solecism may be allowed, and that it formed, at least to the ex- tent of the powers delegated, one people, and not a Federal Union of the states, as I contend ; or, to express the same idea differently, that the delegation of powers was to the American people in the aggregate (for it is only by such delegation that they could be made into one people), and not to the United States, directly contrary to the article just cited, which declares that the pow- ers are delegated to the United States. And here it is worthy of notice that the senator cannot shelter himself under the ambiguous phrase " to the people of the United States," under which he would certainly have taken refuge, had the Constitution so expressed it ; but, fortunately for the cause of truth and for the great principles of constitutional liberty for which I am contending, " peo- ple" is omitted : thus making the delegation of power clear and unequivocal to the United States, as distinct political communities, and conclusively proving that all the powers delegated are reciprocally delegated by the states to each other, as distinct political communities. So much for the delegated powers. Now, as all admit, and as it is express- ly provided for in the Constitution, the reserved powers are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people : none will pretend that, as far as they are concerned, we are one people, though the argument to prove it, however ab- surd, would be far more plausible than that which goes to show that we are one people to the extent of the delegated powers. This reservation " to the people" might, in the hands of subtle and trained logicians, be a peg to hang a doubt upon ; and had the expression " to the people" been connected, as fortu- nately it is not, with the delegated instead of the reserved powers, we should not have heard of this in the present discussion. I have now established, I hope, beyond the power of controversy, every alle- gation contained in the first resolution — that the Constitution is a compact formed by the people of the several states, as distinct political communities, subsisting and binding between the states in the same character : which brings me to the consideration of the consequences which may be fairly deduced in reference to the character of our political rsystem from the^se established facts. The first, and most important, is, that they conclusively establish that ours is a federal system : a system of states arranged in a Federal Union, and each re- taining its distinct existence and sovereignty. Ours has every attribute Avhich belongs to a federative system. It is founded on compact ; it is formed by sovereign communities ; and is binding between them in their sovereign capaci- ty. 1 might appeal, in confirmation of this assertion, to all elementary writers on the subject of government, but will content myself with citing one only : Burlamaqui, quoted with approbation by Judge Tucker, in his Commentary on no SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. Blackstone, himself a high authority, who says (here Mr. C. read from Tuck er's Blackstone as follows) : Extracts from Blackstone's Commentaries. " Political bodies, whether great or small, if they are constituted by a people formerly independent, and under no civil subjection, or by those who justly claim independence from any civil power they were formerly subject to, have the civil supremacy in themselves, and are in a state of equal right and liberty with respect to all other states, whether great or small. No regard is to be had in this matter to names, whether the body politic be called a kingdom, an em- pire, a principality, a dukedom, a country, a republic, or free town. If it can exercise justly all the essential parts of civil power within itself, independently of any other person or body politic, and no other hath any right to rescind or annul its acts, it has the civil supremacy, how small soever its territory may be, or the number of its people, and has all the rights of an independent state. " This independency of states, and there being distinct political bodies from each other, is not obstructed by any alliance or confederacies whatsoever, about exercising jointly any parts of the supreme powers, such as those of peace and war, in league oflensive and defensive. Two states, notwithstanding such, treaties, are separate bodies, and independent. " These are, then, only deemed politically united when some one person or council is constituted with a right to exercise some essential powers for both, and to hinder either from exercising them separately. If any person or coun- cil is empowered to exercise all these essential powers for both, they are then one state : such is the State of England and Scotland, since the act of union made at the beginning of the eighteenth century, whereby the two kingdoms were incorporated into one, all parts of the supreme power of both kingdoms being thenceforward united, and vested in the three estates of the realm of Great Britain ; by which entire coalition, though both kingdoms retain their ancient laws and usages in many respects, they are as effectually united and incorpo- rated as the several petty kingdoms which composed the heptarchy were before that period. " But when only a portion of the supreme civil power is vested in one person or council for both, such as that of peace and war, or of deciding controversies between different states, or their subjects, while each within itself exercises other parts of the supreme power, independently of all the others — in this case they are called si/stems of states, which Burlamaqui defines to be an assemblage of perfect governments, strictly united by some common bond, so that they seem to make but a single body with respect to those affairs which interest them in common, though each preserves its sovereignty, full and entire, independently of all others. And in this case, he adds, the confederate states engage to each other only to exercise with common consent certain parts of the sovereignty, especially that which relates to their mutual defence against foreign enemies. But each of the confederates retains an entire liberty of exercising as it thinks proper those parts of the sovereignty which are not mentioned in the treaty of union, as parts that ought to be exercised in common. And of this nature is the American confederacy, in which each state has resigned the exercise of certain parts of the supreme civil power which they possessed before (except in com- mon with the other states included in the confederacy), reserving to themselves all their former powers, which are not delegated to the United States by the common bond of union. " A visible distinction, and not less important than obvious, occurs to our ob- servation in comparing these different kinds of union. The kingdoms of Eng- land and Scotland are united into one kingdom ; and the two contracting states, by such an incorporate union, are, in the opinion of Judge Blackstone, totally annihilated, without any power of revival ; and a third arises from their con- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. IH junction, in which all the rights of sovereignty, and particularly that of legisla- tion, are vested. F'rom whence he expresses a doubt whether any infringe- ments of the fundamental and essential conditions of the union would of itself dissolve the union of those kingdoms ; though he readily admits that, in the case of a federate alliance, such an infringement would certainly rescind the compact between the confederated states. In the United States of America, on the contrary, each state retains its own antecedent form of government ; its own laws, subject to the alteration and control of its own Legislature only ; its own executive officers and council of state ; its own courts of judicature, its own judges, its own magistrates, civil officers, and officers of the militia ; and, in short, its own civil state, or body politic, in every respect whatsoever. And by the express declaration of the 12th article of the amendments to the Consti- tution, the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. In Great Britain, a new civil state is created by the annihilation of two antecedent civil states ; in the American States, a gene'Cdl federal council and administration is provided for the joint exercise of such of their several powers as can be more conveniently exercised in that mode than any other, leaving their civil state unaltered ; and all the other powers, which the states antecedently possessed, to be exercised by them respectively, as if no union or connexion ■were established between them. " The ancient Achaia seems to have been a confederacy founded upon a similar plan : each of those little states had its distinct possessions, territories, and boundaries ; each had its Senate or Assembly, its magistrates and judges ; and every state sent deputies to the general convention, and had equal weight in all determinations. And most of the neighbouring states which, moved by" fear of danger, acceded to this confederacy, had reason to felicitate themselves. " These confederacies, by which several states are united together by a per- petual league of alliance, are chiefly founded upon this circumstance, that each particular people choose to remain their own masters, and yet are not strong enough to make head against a common enemy. The purport of such an agreement usually is, that they shall not exercise some part of the sovereignty there specified without the general consent of each other. For the leagTies to which these systems of states owe their rise seem distinguished from others (so frequent among different states) chiefly by this consideration, that, in the latter, each confederate people determine themselves, by their own judgment, to certain mutual performances, yet so that in all other respects they design not in the least to make the exercise of that part of the sovereignty, whence these performances proceed, dependant on the consent of their allies, or to retrench anything from their full and unlimited power of governing their own states. Thus we see that ordinary treaties propose, for the most part, as their aim, only- some particular advantage of the states thus transacting — their interests happen- ing at present to fall in with each other — but do not produce any lasting union as to the chief management of aflairs. Such was the treaty of alliance between America and France in the year 1778, by which, among other articles, it was agreed that neither of the two parties should conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained, and whereby they mutually engaged not to lay down their arms until the independ- ence of the United States should be formally or tacitly assured by the treaty or treaties which should terminate the war. Whereas, in these confederacies, of which we are now speaking, the contrary is observable, they being estab- lished with this design, that the several states shall forever link their safety one with another, and, in order to their mutual defence, shall engage themselves not to exercise certain parts of their sovereign power, otherwise than by a common agreement and approbation. Such were the stipulations, among others, con- tained in the articles of confederation and perpetual union between the Ameri- 212 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUK- can States, by which it was agreed that no state should, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with, any king, prince, or state; nor keep up any vessels of war, or body of forces, in time of peace ; nor engage in any war, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, unless actually invaded ; nor grant com- missions to any ships of war, or letters of marque and reprisal, except after a declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, with several others ; yet each state respectively retains its sovereignty, freedom, and inde- pendence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not expressly dele- gated to the United States in Congress assembled. The promises made in these two cases here compared run very differently ; in the former, thus : ' 1 will join you in this particular war as a confederate, and the manner of our attacking the enemy shall be concerted by our common advice ; nor will we desist from war till the particular end thereof, the establishment of the inde- pendence of the United States, be obtained.' In the latter, thus : ' None of us who have entered into this alliance will make use of our right as to the affairs of war and peace, except by the general consent of the whole confederacy.' We observed before that these unions submit only some certain parts of the sovereignty to mutual direction ; for it seems hardly possible that the affairs of diflferent states should have so close a connexion, as that all and each of them should look on it as their interest to have no part of the chief government ex- ercised without the general concurrence. The most convenient method, there- fore, seems to be, that the particular states reserve to themselves* all those branches of the supreme authority, the management of which can have little or no influence in the affairs of the rest." Mr. Calhoun proceeded : If we compare our present system with the old confederation, which all acknowledge to have been federal in its character, we shall find that it possesses all the attributes which belong to that form of government as fully and com- pletely as that did. In fact, in this particular, there is but a single difference, and that not essential, as regards the point immediately under consideration, though very important in other respects. The confederation was the act of the state governments, and formed a union of governments. The j)resent Consti- tution is the act of the states themselves, or, which is the same thing, of the people of the several states, and forms a union of them as sovereign communi- ties. The states, previous to the adoption of the Constitution, were as separate and distinct political bodies as the governments which represent them, and there is nothing in the nature of things to prevent them from uniting under a compact, in a federal unfon, without being blended in one mass, any more than uniting the governments themselves, in like manner, without merging them in a single government. To illustrate what I have stated by reference to ordinary trans- actions, the confederation was a contract between agents — the present Consti- tution between the principals themselves ; or, to take a more analogous case, one is a league made by ambassadors ; the other, a league made by sovereigns — the latter no more tending to unite the parties into a single sovereignty than the former. The only difference is in the solemnity of the act and the force of the obligation. There, indeed, results a most important difference, under our theory of govern- ment, as to the nature and character of the act itself, whether executed by the states themselves, or by their governments ; but a result, as I have already stated, not at all afiVscting the question under consideration, but which will throw much light on a subject in relation to which I must think the senator from Massachusetts has formed very confused conceptions. The senator dwelt much on the point that the present system is a constitu- tion and a government, in contradistinction to the old confederation, with a view SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 113 of proving that the Constitution was not a compact. Now, I concede to the senator that our present system is a constitution and a govenunent ; and that the former, the old confederation, was not a constitution or government : not, however, for the reason which he assigned, that the former was a compact, and the latter not, but from the difierence of the origin from which the two com- pacts are derived. According to our American conception, the people alone can form constitutions or governments, and not their agents. It is this differ- ence, and this alone, which makes the distinction. Had the old confederation been the act of the people of the several states, and not of their governments, that instrument, imperfect as it is, would have been a constitution, and the agency which it created to execute its powers, a government. This is the true cause of the difference between the two acts, and not that in which the senator seems to be bewildered. There is another point on which this difference throws important light, and which has been frequentlj' referred to in debate on this snd former occasions. I refer to the expression in the preamble of the Constitution, which speaks of " forming a more perfect union," and in the letter of General Washington, lay- ing the draught of the Convention before the old Congress, in which he speaks of " consolidating the Union ;" both of which I conceive to refer simply to the fact that the present Union, as already stated, is a union between the states themselves, and not a union like that whicii had existed between the govern- ments of the states. We will now proceed-to consider some of the conclusions which necessarily follow from the facts and positions aheady established. They enable us to de- cide a question of vital importance unJer our system : Where does sovereignty reside ? If I have succeeded in establishing the fact that ours is a federal sys- tem, as I conceive I conclusiveZy have, that fact of itself determines the ques- tion which I have proposed, h is of the very essence of such a system, that the sovereignty is in the parts, and not in the whole ; or, to use the language of Mr. Palgrave, the parts are the units in such a system, and the whole the mul- tiple ; and not the whole the units and the parts the fractions. Ours, then, is a government of twenty-four sovereignties, united by a constitutional compact, for the purpose of exercising certain powers through a common government as their joint agent, and not a union of the twenty-four sovereignties into one, which, according to the language of the Virginia Resolutions, already cited, would form a consolidation. And here I must express my surprise that the senator from Virginia should avow himself the advocate of these very resolutions, when he distinctly maintains the idea of a union of the states in one sovereignty, which is expressly condemned by those resolutions as the essence of a consol- idated government. Another consequence is equally clear, that, whatever modification was made in the condition of the states under the present Constitution, were modifications extending only to the exercise of their powers by compact, and not to the sover- eignty itself, and are such as sovereigns aro competent to make : it beino^ a con- ceded point, that it is competent to them to stipulate to exercise their powers in a particular manner, or to abstain altogether from their exercise, or to dele- gate them to agents, without in any degree impairing sovereignty itself. The plain state of the facts, as regards our government, is, that these states have agreed by compact to exercise their sovereign powers jointly, as already stated ; and that, for this purpose, they have ratified the compact in their sovereign ca- pacity, thereby making it the constitution of each state, in nowise distinguish- ed from their own separate constitution, but in the superadded obligation of com- pact — of faith mutually pledged to each other. In this compact, they have stip- ulated, among other things, that it may be amended by three fourths of the states : that is, they have conceded to each other by compact the right to add new pow- ers or to subtract old, by the consent of that proportion of the states, without re- P 114 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. quiring, as otherwise would be the case, the consent ol' all : a modification no more inconsistent, as has been supposed, with their sovereignty, than any other contained in the compact. In fact, the provision to which I allude furnishes strong evidence that the sovereignty is, as I contend, in the states severally : as the amendments are effected, not by any one three fourths, but by any three fourths of the states, indicating that the sovereignty is in each of the states. If these views be correct, it follows, as a matter of course, that the allegiance of the people is to their several states, and that treason consists in resistance' to the joint authority of the slates united, not, as has been absiu-dly contended, in resistance to the government of the United States, which, by the provision of the Constitution, has only the right of punishing. These conclusions have all a most important bearing on that monstrous and despotic bill which, to the disgrace of the Senate and the age, has passed this body. I have still a right thus to speak without violating the rules of order, as it is not yet a law. These conclusions show that the states can violate no law ; that they neither are, nor in the nature of things can be, under the domin- ion of the law ; that the vrorst that can be imputed to them is a violation of compact, for which they, and not their citizens, are responsible ; and that, to undertake to punish a state by law, or to hold the citizens responsible for the acts of the state, which they are on their allegiance bound to obey, and liable to be punished as traitors for disobeying, is a cruelty unheard of among civilized nations, and destructive of every principle upon which oiu: government is found- ed. It is, in short, a ruthless and complete revolution of our entire system. I was desirous 'to present these views fully before the passage of this long- to-be-lamented bill, but as I was prevented -by the majority, as I have stated at the commencement of my remarks, I trust tlnat it is not yet too late. Having now said what I intended in relation to my first resolution, both in reply to the senator from Massachusetts, and in vindication of its correctness, I will now proceed to consider the conclusions drawn from it in the second res- olution—that the General Government is not the exclusive and final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, but that the states, as parties to the compact, have a right to judge, in the last resort, of the infractions of the com- pact, and of the mode and measure of redress. It can scarcely be necessary, before so enlightened a body, to premise that our system comprehends two distinct governments — the General and State Gov- ernments, which, properly considered, form but one. The former representing the joint authority of the states in their confederate capacity, and the latter that of each state separately. I have premised this fact simply with a view of pre- senting distinctly the answer to the argument offered by the senator from Mas- sachusetts to prove that the General Government has a final and exclusive right to judge, not only of its delegated powers, but also of those reserved to the states. That gentleman relies for his main argument on the assertion that a government, which he defines to be an organized body, endowed with both will, and power, and authority in propria vigore to execute its purpose, has a right inherently to judge of its powers. It is not my intention to comment upon the definition of the senator, though it would not be difficult to show that his ideas of government are not very American. My object is to deal with the conclu- sion, and not the definition. Admit, then, that the government has the right of judging of its powers, for which he contends. How, then, will he withhold, upon his own principle, the right of judging from the state governments, which he has attributed to the General Government ? If it belongs to one, on his prin- ciple it belongs to both ; and if to both, when they differ, the veto, so abhorred by the senator, is the necessary result : as neither, if the right be possessed by both, can control the other. The senator felt the force of this argument, and, in order to sustain his main position, he fell back on that clause of the Constitution which provides that SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 115 " this Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, shall be the su- preme law of the land." This is admitted : no one has ever denied that the Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance of it, are of paramount authority. But it is equally undenia- ble that laws not made in pursuance are not only not of paramount authority, but are of no authority whatever, being of themselves null and void ; which pre- sents the question, Who are to judge whether the laws be or be not pursuant to the Constitution ? and thus the diliiculty, instead of being taken away, is re- moved but one step farther back. This tlie senator also felt, and has attempted to overcome the diflicidity by setting up, on the part of Congress and the judi- ciary, the (inal and exclusive right of judging, both for the Federal Government and the fetates, as to the extent of their powers. That I may do full justice to the gentleman, I will give his doctrine in his own words. He states : "That there is asupreme law, composed of the Constitution, the laws pass- ed in pursuance of it, and the treaties ; but in cases coming before Congress, not assuming the shape of cases in law and equity, so as to be subjects of ju- dicial discussion. Congress must interpret the Constitution so often as it has oc- casion to pass laws ; and in cases capable of assuming a judicial shape, the Su- preme Court must be the final interpreter." Now, passing over this vague and loose phraseology, I would ask the sena- tor upon Avhat principle can he concede this extensive power to the legislative and judicial departments, and withhold it entirely from the executive ? If one has the right, it cannot be withheld from the otlier. I woidd also ask him on Avhat principle, if the departments of the General Government are to possess the right of judging, finally and conclusively, of their respective powers, on what principle can the same right be withheld from the State Governments, which, as well as the General Government, properly considered, are but departments of the same general system, and form together, properly speaking, but one gov- ernment. This was a favourite idea of Mr. Macon, for whose wisdom I have a respect, increasing with my experience, and whom I have frequently heard say that most of the misconceptions and errors in relation to our system origi- nated in forgetting that they were but parts of the same system. I would far- ther tell the senator, that, if this right be withheld from the State Governments ; if this restraining influence, by which the General Government is coerced to its proper sphere, be withdrawn, then that department of the government from which he has withheld the right of judging of its own powers (the executive) will, so far from being excluded, became the sole interpreter of the powers of the gov- ernment. It is the armed interpreter, with powers to execute its own construc- tion, and without the aii of which the construction of the other departments will be impotent. -=- But I contend thac the states have a far clearer /ight to the sole construction of their powers tkan any of the departments of the Federal Government can have ; this power is expressly reserved, as I have stated on another occasion, not only agaiiisc the several departments of the General Government, but against the Unhed States themselves. I will not repeat the arguments which I then offered on this point, and which remain unanswered, but I must be permitted to offer strong additional proof of the views then taken, and which, if I am not mistaken, are conclusive on this point. It is drawn from the ratification of the Constitution by Virginia, and is in the following words (Mr. C. then read as follows) : '• We, the delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected in pursuance of a recommendation from the General Assembly, and now met in Convention, hav- ing fully and freely investigated and discussed the proceedings of the Federal Convention, and being prepared, as well as the most mature deliberation hath enabled us, to decide thereon, do, in the name and in behalf of the people of Virginia, declare and make known that the powers granted under the Constitu- 116 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. tion, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with them, and at their will ; that, therefore, no right of any denomination can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified by the Congress, by the Sena-te or House of Representatives, act- ing in any capacity, by the President or any departmenit or officer of the United States, except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those purposes ; and that, among other essential rights, the liberty of con- science and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified by any authority of the United States. With these impressions, with a solemn appeal to the Searcher of all hearts for the purity of our intentions, and under the conviction that whatsoever imperfections may exist in the Constitution ought rather to be examined in the mode prescribed therein, than to bring the Union in danger by a delay, with the hope of obtaining amendments previous to the ratification — we, the said delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the people of Virginia, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify the Constitution recom- mended on the 17th day of September, 1787, by the Federal Convention, for the government of the United States, hereby announcing to all those whom it may concern, that the said Constitution is binding upon the said people, accord- ing to an authentic copy hereto annexed, in the words following," &c. It thus appears that that sagacious state (I fear, however, that her sagacity is not as sharpsighted now as formerly) ratified the Constitution, with an ex- planation as to her reserved powers ; that they were powers subject to her own will, and reserved against every department of the General Government — le- gislative, executive, and judicial — as if she had a prophetic knowledge of the at- tempts now made to impair and destroy thera : which explanation can be con- sidered in no other light than as containing a condition on which she ratified, and, in fact, making part of the Constitution of the United States — extending as well to the other states as herself. I am no lawyer, and it may appear to be presumption in me to lay down the rule of law which governs in such cases, in a controversy with so distinguished an advocate as the senator from Massachusetts. But I shall venture to lay it down as a rule in such cases, which I have no fear that the gentleman will contradict, that, in case of a contract between several partners, if the entrance of one on condition be admitted, the condition enures to the benefit of all the partners. But I do not rest the argument simply upon this view : Virginia proposed the tenth amended article, the one in question, and her ratification must be at least received as the higher, evidence of its true mean- ing and interpretation. If these views be correct — and I do not see how tiwy can be resisted — the rights of the states to judge of the extent of their reserved powers stands on the most solid foundation, and is good against every department of the General Gov- ernment ; and the judiciary is as much excluded from an inttrference with the reserved powers as the legislative or executive departments. To establish the opposite, the senator relies upon the authority of Mr. Madison, "m the Federal- ist, to prove that it was intended to invest the court with the powei in question. In reply, I will meet Mr. Madison with his own opinion, given on a rnost solemn occasion, and backed by the sagacious Commonwealth of Virginia. Tne opinion to which I allude will be found in the celebrated report of 1799, of which Mr. Madison was the author. It says : " But it is objected, that the judicial authority is to be regarded as the sole expositor of the ConsVUulion in the last resort ; and it may be asked for what reason, the declaration by the General Assembly, supposing it to be theoretical- ly true, co\ild be required at the present day, and in so solemn a manner. " On this objection it might be observed, first, that there may be instances of usurped power, which the fortns of the Constitution would never draw with- in the control of the judicial department : secondly, that, if the decision of the ju- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 117 cliciary be raised above the authority of the sovereign parties to the Constitu- tion, the decisions of the other departments, not carried by the forms of the Constitution before the judiciary, must be equally authoritative and final with decisions of the department. But the proper answ^er to this objection is, that the resolution of the General Assembly relates to those great and extraordinary cases in which all the forms of the Constitution may prove inellectual against infractions dangerous to the essential rights of the parties to it. The resolution supposes that dangerous powers, not delegated, may not only be usurped and executed by the other departments, but that the judicial department, also, may exercise or sanction dangerous powers beyond the gi-ant of the Constitution ; and, consequently, that the ultimate right of the parties to the Constitution to judge whether the compact Avas dangerously violated, must extend to violations by one delegated authority as well as by another ; by the judiciary as well as by the executive or the legislative." The senator also relies upon the authority of Luther Martin to the same point, to which I have already replied so fully on another occasion (in answer to the senator from Delaware, Mr. Clayton), that I do not deem it necessary to add any farther remarks on the present occasion. But why should I waste words in reply to these or any other authorities, when it has been so clearly established that the rights of the states are reserved against all and every department of the government, that no authority in oppo- sition can possibly shake a position so well established ? Nor do I think it ne- cessary to repeat the argument which I offered when the bill was imder dis- cussion, to siiow that the clause in the Constitution which provides that the ju- dicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Con- stitution, and to the laws and treaties made under its authority, has no bearing on the point in controversy ; and that even the boasted power of the Supreme Court to decide a law to be unconstitutional, so far from being derived from this or any other portion of the Constitution, results from the necessity of the case — where two rules of unequal authority come in conflict — and is a power belong- ing to all courts, superior and inferior, state and general, domestic and foreign. I have now, I trust, shown satisfactorily that there is no provision in the Constitution to authorize the General Government, through any of its depart- ments, to control the action of the state within the sphere of its reserved pow- ers ; and that, of course, according to the principle laid down by the senator from Massachusetts himself, the government of the states, as well as the General Government, has the right to determine the extent of their respective powers, without the right on the part of either to control the other. The necessary re- sult is the veto, to which he so much objects ; and to get clear of which, he in- forms us, was the object for which the present Constitution was formed. I know not whence he has derived his information, but my impression is very different as to the immediate motives which led to the formation of that instrument. I have always understood that the principal was, to give to Congress the power to regulate commerce, to lay impost duties, and to raise a revenue for the pay- ment of the public debt and the expenses of the government ; and to subject the action of the citizens individually to the operation of the laws, as a substitute for force. If the object had been to get clear of the veto of the states, as the senator states, the Convention certainly performed their work in a most bungling manner. There was unquestionably a large party in that body, headed by men of distinguished talents aud influence, who commenced early and worked ear- nestly to the last, to deprive the states — not directly, for that would have been too bold an attempt, but indirectly — of the veto. The good sense of the Con- vention, however, put down every efiort, however disguised and j)erseveringly made. I do not deem it necessary to give from the journals the history of these various and unsuccessful attempts, though it would afford a very instructive les- son. It is sufficient to say that it was attempted by proposing to give Congress 118 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. power to annul the acts of the states which they might deem inconsistent with the Constitution ; to give to the President the power of appointing the governors of the states, with a view of vetoing state laws through his authority ; and, finally, to give to the judiciary the power to decide controversies between the ' states and the General Government : all of which failed — fortunately for the liberty of the country — utterly and entirely failed ; and in their failure we have the strongest evidence that it was not the intention of the Convention to deprive the states of the veto power. Had the attempt to deprive them of this power been directly made, and failed, every one Avould have seen and felt that it w^ould furnish conclusive evidence in favour of its existence. Now, I would ask, What possible difference can it make in what form this attempt was made ? ■whether by attempting to confer on the General Government a power incom- patible with the exercise of the veto on the part of the states, or by attempting" directly to deprive ihem of the right of exercising it. We have thus direct and strong proof that, in the opinion of the Convention, the states, unless deprived of it, possess the veto power, or, what is another name for the same thing, the right of nullification. I know that there is a diversity of opinion among the friends of state rights in regard to this power, which I regret, as I cannot but consider it as a power essential to the protection of the minor and local inter- ests of the community, and the liberty and the union of the country. It is the very shield of state rights, and the only power by which that system of injus- tice against which we have contended for more than thirteen years can be arrested : a system of hostile legislation, of plundering by law, which must ne- cessarily lead to a conflict of arms if not prevented. But I rest the right of a state to judge of the extent of its reserved powers, in the last resort, on higher grounds — that the Constitution is a compact, to which the states are parties in their sovereign capacity ; and that, as in all other cases of compact between parties having no common umpire, each has a right to judge for itself. To the truth of this proposition the senator from Mas- sachusetts has himself assented, if the Constitution itself be a compact — and that it is, I have shown, I trust, beyond the possibility of a doubt. Having es- tablished that point, I now claim, as I stated I would do in the course of the dis- cussion, the admissions of the senator, and, among them, the right of secession and nullification, which he conceded would necessarily follow if the Constitu- tion be indeed a compact. I have now replied to the arguments of the senator from Massachusetts so far as they directly apply to the resolutions, and Avill, in conclusion, notice some of his general and detached remarks. To prove that ours is a consolidated gov- ernment, and that there is an immediate connexion between the government and the citizen, he relies on the fact that the laws act directly on individuals. That such is the case I will not deny ; but I am very far from conceding the point that it aflbrds the decisive proof, or even any proof at all, of the position which the senator wishes to maintain. I hold it to be perfectly within the competen- cy of two or more states to subject their citizens, in certain cases, to the direct action of each other, without surrendering or impairing their sovereignty. I rec- ollect, while I was a member of Mr. Monroe's cabinet, a proposition was sub- mitted by the British Government to permit a mutual right of search and seizure on the part of each government of the citizens of the other, on board of vessels engaged in the slave-trade, and to establish a joint tribunal for their trial and pun- ishment. The proposition was declined, not because it would impair the sover- eignty of either, but on the ground of general expediency, and because it would be incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution which establish the ju- dicial power, and which provisions require the judges to be appointed by the President and Senate. If I am not mistaken, propositions of the same kind were made and acceded to by some of the Continental powers. With the same view, the senator cited the suability of the states as evidence SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 119 of their want of sovereignty ; at wliicii I must express my surprise, coming from the quarter it does. No one knows better than the senator that it is perfectly •within the competency of a sovereign state to permit itself to be sued. We have on the statute-book a standing law, under which the Unhed States may be sued in certain land cases. If the provision in the Constitution on this point proves anything, it proves, by the extreme jealousy with which the right of suing a state is permitted, the very reverse of that for which the senator contends. Among other objections to the views of the Constitution for which I contend, it is said that they are novel. I hold this to be a great mistake. The novelty is not on my side, but on that of the senator from Massachusetts. The doctrine of consolidation which he maintains is of recent growth. It is not the doctrine of Hamilton, Ames, or any of the distinguished federalists of that period, all of ■whom strenuously maintained the federative character of the Constitution, though they were accused of supporting a system of policy which would neces- sarily lead to consolidation. The first disclosure of that doctrine was in the case of M'CuUoch, in which the Supreme Court held the doctrine, though wrapped up in language somewhat indistinct and ambiguous. The next, and more open avowal, was by the senator of Massachusetts himself, about three years ago, in the debate on Foot's resolution. The first official annunciation of the doctrine •was in the recent proclamation of the President, of which the bill that has re- cently passed this body is the bitter fruit. It is farther objected by the senator from Massachusetts, and others, against this doctrine of state rights, as maintained in this debate, that, if they should prevail, the peace of the country would be destroyed. But what if they should not prevail ? Would there be peace ? Yes, the peace of despotism : that peace which is enforced by the bayonet and the sword ; the peace of death, where all the vital functions of liberty have ceased. It is this peace which jhe doc- trine of state sovereignty may disturb by that conflict, which in every free state, if properly organized, necessarily exists between liberty and power ; but which, if restrained within proper limits, is a salutary exercise to our moral and intel- lectual faculties. In the case of Carolina, which has caused all this discus- sion, who does not see, if the efTusion of blood be prevented, that the excite- •ment, the agitation, and the inquiry which it has caused, will be followed by the most beneficial consequences ? The country had sunk into avarice, in- trigue, and electioneering, from which nothing but some such event could rouse it, or restore those honest and patriotic feelings which had almost disappeared under their baneful influence. What government has ever attained power and distinction without such conflicts ? Look at the degraded state of all those na- tions where they have been put down by the iron arm of the government. I, for my part, have no fear of any dangerous conflict, under the fullest ac- knowledgment of state sovereignty : the very fact that the states may interpose will produce moderation and justice. The General Government will abstain from the exercise of any power in which they may suppose three fourths of the states will not sustain them ; while, on the other hand, the states will not in- terpose but on the conviction that they will be supported by one fourth of their co-states. Moderation and justice will produce confidence, attachment, and patri- otism ; and those, in turn, will ofl'er most powerful barriers against the excess of conflicts between the states and the General Government. But we are told that, should the doctrine prevail, the present system would be as bad, if not worse, than the old confederation. I regard the assertion only as evidence of that extravagance of declaration in which, from excitement of feeling, we so often indulge. Admit the power, and still the present system would be as far removed from the weakness of the .old confederation as it would be from the lawless and despotic violence of consolidation. So far from being the same, the difference between the confederation and the present Constitution would still be most strongly marked. If there were no other distinction, the 120 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. fact that the former required the concurrence of t]ie states to execute its acts, and the latter, the act of a state to arrest its acts, would make a distinction as broad as the ocean : in the former, the vis inertm of our nature is in opposition to the action of the system. Not to act was to defeat. In the latter, the same principle is on the opposite side — action is required to defeat. He who under-i stands human nature will see in this diflerence the difi'erence between a feeble and illy-contrived confederation, and the restrained energy of a federal system. Of the same character is the objection that the doctrine will be the source of weakness. If we look to mere organization and physical power as the only source of strength, without taking into the estimate the operation of moral causes, such would appear to be the fact ; but if we take into the estimate the latter, we shall find that those governments have the greatest strength in which power has been most efficiently checked. The government of Rome furnishes a memorable example. There, two independent and distinct powers existed — the people acting by tribes, in which the plebeians prevailed, and by centuries, in which the patricians ruled. The tribunes were the appointed representa- tives of the one power, and the Senate of the other : each possessed of the au- thority of checking and overruling one another, not as departments of the gov- ernment, as supposed by the senator from Massachusetts, but as independent powers — as much so as the State and General Governments. A shallow ob- server would perceive, in such an organization, nothing but the perpetual source of anarchy, discord, and weakness ; and yet, experience has proved that it was the most povverful government that ever existed ; and reason teaches that this power was derived from the very circumstance which hasty reflection would consider the cause* of weakness. I will venture an assertion, which may be considered extravagant, but in which history will fully bear me out, that we have no knowledge of any people in which a power of arresting the improper acts of the government, or what may be called the negative power of government, was too strong, except Poland, where every freeman possessed a veto ; but even there, although it existed in so extravagant a form, it was the source of the highest and most lofty attachment to liberty, and the most heroic courage : qualities that more than once saved Europe from the domination of the crescent and cime- ter. It is worthy of remark, that the fate of Poland is not to be attributed so much to the excess of this negative power of itself, as to the facility which it afforded 1o foreign influence in controlling its political movements. I am not surprised that, with the idea of a perfect government which the senator from Massachusetts has formed — a government of an absolute majority, iHichecked and unrestrained, operating through a representative body — that he should be so much shocked with what he is pleased to call the absurdity of the state veto. But let me tell him that his scheme of a perfect government, as beautiful as he conceives it to be, though often tried, has. invariably failed, and has. always run, whenever tried, through the same uniform process of faction, corruption, anarchy, and despotism. He considers the representative principle as the great modern improvement in legislation, and of itself sufficient to secure liberty. I cannot regard it in the light in which he does. Instead of modern, it is of remote origin, and has existed, in greater or less perfection, in every free state, from the remotest antiquity. Nor do I consider it as of itself sufficient to secure liberty, though I regard it as one of the indispensable means — the means of securing the people against the tyranny and oppression of their rulers. To secure liberty, another means is still necessary — the means of securing the different portions of society against the injustice and oppression of each other, which can only be effected by veto, interposition, or nullification, or by what- ever name the restraining or negative power of government may be called. The senator appears to be enamoiired with his conception of a consolidated government, and avows himself to be prepared, seeking no lead, to rush, in its defence, to the front rank, where the blows fall heaviest and thickest. I ad- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 121 mire his gallantry and courage, but I will tell him that he Avill find in the op- posite ranks, under the flag of liberty, spirits as gallant as his own ; and that experience will teach hira that it is infinitely easier to carry on the war of legislative exaction by bills and enactments, than to extort by sword and bayo- net from the brave and the free. The bill which has passed this body is intended to decide this great contro- versy between that view of our government entertained by the senator and those who act with him, and that supported on our side. It has merged the tariff', and all other questions connected with it, in the higher and direct issue which it presents between the federal and national system of governments. I con- sider the bill as far worse, and more dangerous to liberty, than the tarilT. It has been most wantonly passed, when its avovved object no longer justified it. I consider it as chains forged and fitted to the limbs of the states, and hung up to be used when occasion may require. We are told, in order to justify the pas- sage of this fatal measure, that it was necessary to present the olive-branch with one hand and the sword with the other. We scorn the alternative. You have no right to present the sword. The Constitution never put the instru- ment in your hands to be employed against a stale ; and as to the olive-branch, whether we receive it or not will not depend on your menace, but on our own estimate of what is due to ourselves and the rest of the community in reference to the diflicult subject on which we have taken issue. The senator from Massachusetts has struggled hard to sustain his cause, but the load was too heavy for him to bear. I am not surprised at the ardour and zeal with which he has entered into the controversy. It is a great struggle between power and liberty — power on the side of the North, and liberty on the side of the South. But, while I am not surprised at the part which the sena- tor from ^Massachusetts has taken, I must express my amazement at the prin- ciples advanced by the senator from Georgia, nearest me (Mr. Forsyth). I had supposed it was impossible that one of his experience and sagacity should not perceive the new and dangerous direction which this controversy is about to take. For the first time, we have heard an ominous reference to a provision in the Con- stitution which I have never known to be before alluded to in discussion, or in connexion with any of our measures. I refer to that provision in the Constitu- tion in which the General Government guaranties a republican form of gov- ernment to the states — a power which hereafter, if not rigidly restricted to the objects intended by the Constitution, is destined to be a pretext to interfere with our political affairs and domestic institutions in a manner infinitely more dangerous than any other power which has ever been exercised on the part of the General Government. I had supposed that every Southern senator, at least, would have been awake to the danger which menaces us from this n6w quar- ter ; and that no sentiment would be uttered, on their part, calculated to coun- tenance the exercise of this dangerous power. With these impressions, I heard the senator, with amazement, alluding to Carolina as furnishing a case which called for the enforcement of this guarantee. Does he not see the hazard of the indefinite extension of this dangerous power ? There exists in every Southern State- a domestic institution, which would require a far less bold con- struction to consider the government of every state, in that quarter, not to be Republican, and, of course, to demand, on the part of this government, a sup- pression of the institution to which I allude, in fulfilment of the guarantee. I believe there is now no hostile feelings combined with political considerations, in any section, connected with this delicate- subject. But it requires no stretch of the imagination to see the danger which must one day come, if not vigilant- ly watched. With the rapid strides with which this, government is advancing to power, a time will come, and that not far distant, when petitions will be re- ceived from the quarter to which I allude for protection : when the faith of the guarantee will be, at least, as applicable to that case as the senator from Geor- Q 122 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. gia now thinks it is to Carolina. Unless his doctrine be opposed by united and 3Eirm resistance, its ultimate effect will be to drive the white population from the Southern Atlantic States. VII. SPEECH ON THE SUBJECT OF THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITES FROM THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 13, 1834. The Special Order now came up, the question being on Mr. Clay's resolu- tions in regard to the removal of the Public Deposites. Mr. Calhoun then rose, and said, that the statement of this case might be given in a very few words. The 16th section of the act incorporating the Bank provides that, wherever there is a bank or branch of the United States Bank, the public moneys should be deposited therein, unless otherwise ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury, and that, in that case, he should report to Congress, if in session, immediately ; and, if not, at the commencement of the next ses- sion. The secretary, acting under the provision of this section, has ordered the deposites to be withheld from the Bank, and has reported his reasons, in conformity with the provisions of the section. The Senate is now called upon to consider his reasons, in order to determine whether the secretary is justified or not. I have examined them with care and deliberation, without the slightest bias, as far as I am conscious, personal or political. I have but a slight ac- to prevent the government from withholding the deposites, so long as tlie Bank faithfully performed its part of the contract ? This is the full extent of his pow- er. According to his own showing, not a particle more can be added. But there is another aspect in which the position in which the secretary has pla- ced himself may- be viewed. It ofifers for consideration not only a question of 126 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. the extent of his power, but a question as to the nature and extent of duty which has been imposed upon him. If the position be such as he has descri- bed, there has been confided to him a trust of the most sacred character, ac- companied by duties of the most solemn obhgation. He stands, by the mutual confidence of the parties, vested with the high judicial power to determine on the infraction or observance of a contract in which government and a large and respectable portion of the citizens are deeply interested ; and, in the execution of this high power, he is bound, by honour and conscience, so to act as to pro- tect each of the parties in the full enjoyment of their respective portion of ben- efit in the contract, so long as they faithfully observe it. How has the secre- tary performed these solemn duties, which, according to his representation, have been imposed upon him ? Has he protected the Bank against the aggres- sion of the government, or the government against the unfaithful conduct of the Bank in relation to the deposites 1 Or has he, forgetting his sacred obligations, disregarded the interests of both : on one side, divesting the Bank of the de- posites, and on the other, defeating the government in the intended security of the public funds, by seizing on them as the property of the executive, to be dis- posed at pleasure to favourite and partisan banks ? But I shall relieve the secretary from this awkward and disreputable posi- tion in which his own arguments have placed,him. He is not the mutual trus- tee, as he has represented, of the government and the Bank, but simply the agent of the former, vested, under the contract, with power to withhold the de- posites, with a view, as has been stated, to their additional security — to their safe keeping ; and if he had but for a moment reflected on the fact that he was directed to report his reasons to Congress only, and not also to the Bank, for withholding the deposites, he could scarcely have failed to perceive that he was simply the agent of one of the parties, and not, as he supposes, a joint agent of both. The secretary having established, as he supposes, his right to dispose of the deposites as, in his opinion, the general interest and convenience of the people might require, proceeds to claim and exercise power with a boldness commensurate with the extravagance of the right which he has assumed. He commences with a claim to determine, in his official character, that the Bank of the United States is unconstitutional : a monopoly, baneful to the welfare of the community. Having determined this point, he comes to the conclusion that the charter of the Bank ought not to be renewed, and then assumes that it will not be renewed. Having reached this point, he then determines that it is his duty to remove the deposites. No one can object that Mr. Taney, as a citizen, in his individual character, should entertain an opinion as to the uncon- stitutionality of the Bank ; but that he, acting in his official character, and per- forming official acts under the charter of the Bank, should undertake to deter- mine that the institution was unconstitutional, and that those who granted the charter, and bestowed upon him his power to act imder it, had violated the Constitution, is an assumption of power of a nature which I will not undertake to characterize, as I wish not to be personal. But he is not content with the power simply to determine on the unconstitu- tionality of the Bank. He goes far beyond : he claims to be the organ of the voice of the people. In this high character, he pronounces that the question of the renewal of the Bank charter was put at issue at the last presidential elec- tion, and that the people had determined that it should not be renewed. I do not, said Mr. Calhoun, intend to enter into the argument whether, in point of fact, the renewal of the charter was put at issue at the last election. That point was ably and fully discussed by the honourable senators from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) and New-.Jersey (Mr. Southard), who conclusively proved that no such question was involved in the issue ; and if it were, the issue comprehend- ed so many others, that it was impossible to conjecture on which the election. SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 127 turned. I look to higher objections. 1 wouhl inquire by what authority the Secretary of the Treasury constitutes himself the organ of the people of the Uni- ted States. He has the reputation of being an able lawyer, and can he be ig- norant that, so long as the Constitution of the United States exists, the only or- urans of the people of these states, as far as the action of the General Govern- ment is concerned, are the several departments, legislative, executive, and judi- cial, which, acting wUhin the respective limits assigned by the Constitution, have a right to pronounce authoritatively the voice of the people ? A claim on the part of the executive to interpret, as the secretary has done, the voice of the people through any other channel, is to shake the t'oundation of our system. Has the secretary forgotten that the last step to absolute power is this very as-' siunption which he has claimed for that department ? I am thus brought, said Mr. C, to allude to the extraordinary manifesto read by the President to the cabinet, and which is so intimately connected with the point immediately under consideration. That document, though apparently addressed to the cabinet, was clearly and manifestly intended as an appeal to the people of the United States, and opens a new and direct organ of communication between the Presi- dent and them unloiown to the Constitution and the laws. There are but two chamiels known to either through which the President can communicate with the people — by messages to the two houses of Congress, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, or by proclamation, setting forth the interpretations which he places upon a law it lias become his official duty to execute. Going beyond, is one among the alarming signs of the times which portend the over- throw of the Constitution and the approach of despotic power. The secretary, having determined that the Bank was unconstitutional, and that the people had pronoimced against the recharter, concludes that Congress had notliing to do with the subject. With a provident foresight, he perceives the difficulty and embarrassment into which the currency of the country would be thrown on the termination of the Bank charter ; to prevent which, he pro- ceeds deliberately, with a parental care, to supply a new currency, " equal to or better" than that whicii Congress had supplied. With this view, he determines on an immediate removal of the deposites ; he puts them in certain state insti- tutions, intending to organize them, after the fashion of the empire state, into a great safety -fund system, but which, unfortunately, undoubtedly for the project- ors, if not for the country, the limited power of the state banks did not permit him to effect. But a substitute was found by associating them in certain arti- cles of agreement, and appointing an inspector-general of all this league of banks ! and all this without law or appropriation ! Is it not amazing that it never occurred to the secretary that the subject of currency belonged exclusively to Congress, and that to assume to regulate it was a plain usurpation of the pow- ers of that department of the government ? Having thus assumed the power officially to determine on the constitutional- ity of the Bank ; having erected himself into an organ of the people's voice, and settled the question of the regulation of the currency, he next proceeds to as- sume the judicial powers over the Bank. He declares that the Bank has trans- cended its powers, and has, therefore, forfeited its charter, for which he inflicts on the institution the severe and exemplary punishment of withholding the de- posites ; and all this in the face of an express provision investing the court with power touching the infraction of the charter, directing in what manner the trial should be commenced and conducted, and securing expressly to the Bank the sacred right of trial by jury in fmding the facts. All this passed for nothing in the eyes of the secretary, who was too deeply engrossed in providing for the common welfare to regard either Congress, the Court, or the Constitution. The secretary next proceeds to supervise the general operations of the Bank, pro- nouncing, with authority, that at one time it has discounted too freely, and at an- other too sparingly, without reflecting that all the control which the government 128 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. * can riglitfully exercise over the operations of the institution is through the five directors who represent the government in this respect. Directors ! Mr. Cal- houn exclaimed, did I say? (alluding to the present). No, spies is their prop- er designation. I cannot, said Mr. C, proceed with the remarks which I intended on the re- mainder of the secretary's reasons : I have not patience to dwell on assump- tions of power so bold, so lawless, and so unconstitutional ; they deserve not the name of argument, and I cannot waste time in treating them as such. There are, hov/ever, two which I cannot pass over, not because they are more extraordinary or audacious than the others, but for another" quality, which I choose not to designate. The secretary alleges that the Bank has interfered with the politics of the country. If this be true, it certainly is a most heinous offence. The Bank is a great public trust, possessing, for the purpose of discharging the trust, great power and influence, which it could not pervert from the object intended to that of influencing the politics of the country without being guilty of a great politi- cal crime. In making these remarks, I do not intend to give any countenance to the truth of the charge alleged by the secretary, nor to deny to the officers of the Bank the right which belongs to them, in common with every citizen, free- ly to form political principles, and act on them in their private capacity, with- out permitting them to influence their official conduct. But it is strange it did not occur to the secretary, while he was accusing and punishing the Bank on the charge of interfering in the politics of the country, that the government also was a great trust, vested with powers still more extensive, and influence im- measurably greater than that of the Bank, given to enable it to discharge the ob- ject for which it was created ; and that it has no more right to pervert its pow- er and influence into the means of controlling the politics of the country than the Bank itself. Can it be unknown to him that the fourth auditor of the treasu- ry (an officer in his own department), the man who has made so prominent a figure in this transaction, was daily and hourly meddling in politics, and that he is one of the principal political managers of the administration ? Can he be ignorant that the whole power of the government has been perverted into a great political machine, with a view of corrupting and controlling the country ? Can he be ignorant that the avowed and open policy of the government is to reward political friends and punish political enemies ? and that, acting on this princi- ple, it has driven from office hundreds of honest and competent officers for opin- ion's sake only, and filled their places with devoted partisans ? Can he be ig- norant that the real offence of the Bank is not that it has intermeddled in poli- tics, but because it would not intermeddle on the side of power ? There is no- thing more dignified than reproof from the lips of innocence, or punishment from, the hands of justice ; but change the picture — let the guilty reprove and the criminal punish, and what more odious, more hateful, can be presented to the imagination ? The secretary next tells us, in the same spirit, that the Bank had been waste- ful of the public funds. That it has spent some thirty, forty, or fifty thousand dollars — I do not remember the exact amount (trifles have no weight in the determination of so great a question) — in circulating essays and speeches in de- fence of the institution, of which sum, one fifth part — some seven thousand dol- lars — belonged to the government. Well, sir, if the Bank has really wasted this amount of the public money, it is a grave charge. It has not a right to waste a single cent ; but I must say, in defence of the Bank, that, assailed as it was by the executive, it would have been unfaithful to its trust, both to *he stockholders and to the public, had it not resorted to every proper means in its power to de- fend its conduct, and, among others, the free circulation of able and judicious publications. But admit that the Bank has been guilty of wasting the public funds to the , ' SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 129 full extent charged by the secretary, I would ask if lie, the head of the finan- 4iia\ department of the government, is not under as liigh and solemn obligation to take care of the moneyed interest of the public as the Bank itself. I would ask him to answer me a few simple questions : How has he performed this dutj in relation to the interest which the public holds in the Bank ? Has he been less wasteful than he has charged the Bank to have been 1 Has he not wast- ed thousands where the Bank, even according to his own statement, has hun- dreds ? Has he not, by withdrawing the dcposites and placing them in the state banks, where the public receives not a cent of interest, greatly aflected the dividends of the Bank of the United States, in which the government, as << stockholder, is a loser to the amount of one fifth of the diminution ? a sum which I will venture to predict will many fold exceed the entire amount which the Bank has expended in its defence. But this is a small, a very small proportion of the public loss, in consequence of the course which the executive has pur- sued in relation to the Bardv, and which has reduced the value of the shares from 130 to 108 (a senator near me says much more. It may be; I am not particular in such things), and on which the public sustains a corresponding loss on its share of the stock, amounting to seven millions of dollai's — a sum more than two hundred fold greater than the waste which he has charged upon the Bank. Other administrations may exceed this in talents, patriotism, and lionesty, but, certainly, in audacity, in effrontery, it stands without a parallel ' The secretary has brought forward many and grievous charges against the Bank. I will not condescend to notice them — it is the conduct of the secreta- ry, and not that of the Bank, which is immediately under examination, and he has no right to drag the conduct of t1,e Bank into the issue, beyond its opera- tions in regard to the deposites. To that extent I am prepared to examine his allegations against it, but beyond that he has no right — no, not the least — to ar- raign the conduct of the Bank ; and I, for one, will not, by noticing his charges beyond that point, sanction his authority to call its conduct in question. But let the point in issue be determined, and I, as far as my voice extends, will give to those who desire it the means of the freest and m^st urdimited inquiry into its conduct. I am no partisan of the Bank — I am oonnected with it in no way, by moneyed or political ties. I might say, wit2i truth, that the Bank owes as much to me as to any other individual in the country ; and I might even add that, had it not been for my eflbrts, it would not have been chartered. Standing in this relation to the institution, a high sense of delicacy, a regard to independ- ence and character, has restrained me from any connexion with the institution whatever, except some trifling accommodations in the way of ordinary business, which were not of the slightest importance either to the Bank or myself. But while I shall not condescend to notice the charges of the secretary against the Bank beyond the extent which I have stated, a sense of duty to the institution, and regard to the part which I took in its creation, compels me to notice two allegations agamst it which have fallen from another quarter. It is said that the Bank had no agency, or at least efficient agency, in the restoration of specie payment in 1817, and that it had failed to furnish the country with a uniform and sound currency, as had been j)romised at its creation. Both of these allegations I pronounce to ])e without just foundation. To enter into a minute examination of them would carry me too far from the sul)ject, and I must content myself witli saying that, having been on the political stage, without in- terruption, from that day to this — having been an attentive observer of the ques- tion of the currency throughout the whole period — that the Bank has been an indispensable agent in the restoration of specie payments ; tliat without it the restoration could not have been effected short of the utter prostration of all the moneyed institutions of the country, and an entire depreciation of bank paper ; and that it has not only restored specie payment, but has given a currency far more uniform between the extremes of the country than was anticipated, or even R 130 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOTJN. ' dreamed of, at the time of its creation. I will say for myself, that I did not be- lieve, at that time, that the exchange between the Atlantic and the West would be brought lower than two and a half per cent. — the estimated expense then, including insurance and loss of time, of transporting specie between the two points. How much it was below the anticipated point I need not state : the whole commercial world knows that it was not a fourth part at the time of the removal of the deposites. But to return from this digression. Though I will not notice the charges of the secretary for the reasons already stated, I will take the liberty of propound- ing to those who support them on this floor a few plain questions. If there be in banking institutions an inherent tendency so strong to abuse and corrup- tion as they contend — if, in consequence of this tendency, the Bank of the Uni- ted States be guilty of the enormous charges and corruptions alleged, notwith- standing its responsibility to the government and our control over it, what is to be expected from an irresponsible league of banks, as called by the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay), over which we have no legal control ? If our power of renewincr the charter of the Bank of the United States — if our right to vacate the charter by scire facias, in case of misconduct — if the influence which the appointment of five government directors gives us — and, finally, if the power which we have of appointing committees to examine into its condition, are not sufficient to hold the institution in check ; if, in spite of all these, it has, from the innate corruption of such institutions, been guilty of the enormous abuses and crimes charged against it, what may we not expect from the associated banks, the favourites of the treasury, over the renewal of whose charter the government has no power, against which it can issue no scire facias, in whose direction it has not a single individual, and into whose conduct Congress can appoint no committee to look ? With these checks all withdrawn, what will be the con- dition of the public funds ? I, said Mr. Calhoun, stated in the outset of my remarks, that, as broad as was the power whicr- the secretary had assumed in relation to the deposites, there was a portion of t\ie transaction of a highly important character, to which he has not alluded, and in relation to which he has not even attempted a justifi- cation. I will now proceed h^ make good this assertion to the letter. There is a material differen^;e between withholding money from going into the Bank, and withdrawing it alter it h;is been placed there. The former is authorized in the manner which I have stated, \mder the sixteenth section, which directs, as has been frequently stated, that the public money shall be deposited in the Bank, unless otherwise ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury. But neither that sec- tion, nor any portion of the act incorporating the Bank, nor, in truth, any other act, gives the secretary any authority of himself to toithdraw public money de- posited in the Bank. There is, I repeat, a material difi"erence between loith- holding public money from deposite and withdrawing it. When paid into the place designated by law as the deposite of the publi'^ money, it passes to the credit of the treasurer, and then is in the treasury of the United States, where it is placed under the protection of the Constitution itself, and from which, by an express provision of the Constitution, it can only be withdrawn by an appro- priation made by law. So careful were the framers of the act of 1816 to leave nothing to implication, that express authority is given to the Secretary of the Treasury, in the fifteenth section, to transfer the deposites from one place to an- other, for the convenience of disbursements ; but which, by a strange perversion, is now attempted to be so construed as to confer on the secretary the power to> withdraw the money from the deposite, and loan it to favourite state banks — I express myself too favourably, I should say give (they pay no interest) — with a view to sustain iheir credits or enlarge their profits — a power not only far be- yond the secretary, but which Congress itself could not exercise without a fla- grant breach of the Constitution. But it is said, in answer to these views, SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 131 that money paid in deposite into the Bank, as directed by law, is not in the treasury. I will not stop, said Mr. C, to reply to such an objection. If it be not in the treasury, where is the treasury ? If it be not money in the treasury, Avhere is the money annually reported to be in the^treasury ? where the eiohtor nine millions Avhich, by the annual report of the secretary, are said to be now ia the treasury ? Are we to understand that none of this money is, in truth, in the treasury ? that it is floating about at large, subject to be disposed of, to be given away, at the will of the executive, to favourites and partisans ? So it would seem ; for it appears, by a correspondence between the treasurer and the cash- ier of the Bank, derived through the Bank (the secretary not deeming it worth while to give the slightest information of the transaction, as if a matter of course), that he has drawn out two millions and a quarter of the public money without appropriation, and distributed it at pleasure among his favourites ! But it is attempted to . indicate the conduct of the secretary on the ground of precedent. I will not j^op to notice whether the cases cited are in point, nor will I avail myself of the great and striking advantage that I might have on the question of precedent : this case stands alone and distinct from all others. There is none similar to it in magnitude and importance. I waive all that : I place myself on higher grounds — I stand on the immov-iblo principle that, on a ques- tion of law and constitution, in a deliberative assembly, there is no room — no place for precedents. To admit them woul<'' be to make the violaiio7i ofio-day the law and Constitution of to-morroic ; ai^t to fubstitute in the place of the tvrit- ten and sacred will of the people and th Legislature, the infraction of those char- ged with the execution of the law. Such, vi my opinion, is the relative force of law and constitution on one side, as compared with precedents on the other. Viewed in a different light, not in reference to the law or Consthution, but to the conduct of the officer, I am disposed to give rather more weight to prece- dents, when the question rel.~es to an excuse or apology for the officer, in case of infraction. If the infra/^'on be a trivial one, in a case not calculated to ex- cite attention, an officer ^'ig^^ ^^irly excuse himself on the ground of precedent ; but in one like ihis, o^'he utmost magnitude, involving the highest interests and most important prir^ip'^^, where the attention of the officer must be aroused to a most carefid e:''ii"i"^tio"' be cannot avail himself of the plea of precedent to excuse his coronet. It is a case where false precedents are to be corrected, and not followed An officer ought to be ashamed, in such a case, to attempt to vin- dicate his conduct on a charge of violating law or Constitution by pleading pre- cedent. Ths principle in such case is obvious. If the secretary's right to withdraw niblic money from the treasury be clear, he has no need of precedent to vindic'te him. If not, he ought not, in a case of so much magnitude, to have a^'^d. I lave not (said Mr. Calhoun) touched a question, which has had so promi- nent a part in the debate, whether the withholding of the deposites was the act o'the secretary or the President. Under my view of the subject, the question is not of the slightest importance. It is equally unauthorized and illegal, whether done by President or secretary ; but, as the question has been agitated, and as my views do not entirely correspond on this point with those advocating the side which I do, I deem it due to frankness to express my sentiments. I have no doubt that the President removed the former secretary, and placed the present in his place, expressly with a view to the removal of the deposites. I am equally clear, under all the circumstances of the case, that the President's conduct is wholly indefensible ; and, among other objections, I fear he had in , view, in the removal, an object eminently dangerous and unconstitutional — to give an advantage to his veto never intended by the Constitution — a power in- tended as a shield to protect the executive against the encroachment of the legislative department — to maintain tlie present state of things against dangerous or hasty innovation, but which, I fear, is, in this case, intends' ^ a sword to 132 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. defend the usurpation of the executive. I say I fear ; for, although the circum- stance of this case leads to a just apprehension that such is the intention, I will not permit myself to assert that such is the fact — that so lawless and unconsti- tutional an object is contemplated by the President, till his act shall compel me to believe to the contrary. *But while I thus severely condemn the conduct of the President in removing the former secretary and appointing the present, I must say that, in my opinion, it is a case of the ahnse, and not of the usurpation of power. The President has the right of removal from office. The power of removal, wherever it exists, does, from necessity, involve the power of general supervision ; nor can I doubt that it might be constitutionally exercised in ref- erence to the deposites. Reverse the present case : suppose the late secreta- ry, instead of being against, had been in favour of the removal, and that the President, instead of for, had been against it, deeming the removal not only in- expedient, but, xinder the circumstances, illegal ; would any man doubt that, under such circunit,tances, he had a right to remove his secretary, if it were the only means of preveming the removal of the deposites ? Nay, would it not be his indispensable duty to have removed him ? and had he not, would not he have been universally, and justly, held responsible ? 1 have now (said Mr. C.) ofiered all the remarks I intended in reference to the deposite question ; and, or reviewing the whole ground, I must say, that the secretary, in removing tKe deposites, has clearly transcended his power ; that he has violated the contract betwee-a the Bank and the United States ; that, in so doing, he has deeply injured \hat i=rge and respectable portion of our citi- zens who have been invited, on tr^ fanh of the government, to invest their property in the institution ; while, at ihe same time, he has deeply injured the public in its character of stockholder ; ai4, finally, that he has inflicted a deep wound on the public faith. To this last I aluibute the present embarrassment in the currency, which has so injuriously aflectei all the great interests of the country. The credit of the covmtry is an importan. portion of the currency of the country — credit in every shape, public and privaVv credit, not only in the shape of paper, but that of faith and confidence between Ugn and man through the agency of which, in all its forms, the great and mighw exchanges of this commercial country, at home and abroad, are, in a great meaS)]-e effected. To inflict a wound anywhere, particularly on the public faith, is v^ embarrass all the channels of currency and exchange ; and it is to this, and no to the with- drawing the few millions of dollars from circulation, that I attribute the present moneyed embarrassment. Did I believe the contrary — if I thought that any great and permanent distress would of itself result from winding up, in a regular and legal manner, the present or any other Bank of the United States, I wiuij deem it an evidence of the dangerous power of the institution, and, to that e^^ent, an argument against its existence ; but, as it is, I regard the present embtrrass- ment, not as an argument against the Bank, but an argument against the'g,w. less and wanton exercise of power on the part of the executive — an embarrais- ment which is likely to continue if the deposites be not restored. The bankt which have received them, at the expense of the public faith, and in violation of law, will never be permitted to enjoy their spoils in quiet. No one who re- gards the subject in the light in which I do, can ever give his sanction to any law intended to protect or carry through the present illegal arrangement ; on the contrary, all such must feel bound to wage perpetual war against a usurpa- tion of power so flagrant as that which controls the present deposites of the public money. If I stand alone (said Mr. Calhoun), I, at least, will continue to maintain the contest so long as I remain in public life. , As important (said Mr. Calhoun) as I consider the question of the deposites, in all its bearings, public and private, it is one on the surface, a mere pretext to another, and one greatly more important, which lies beneath, and which must be taken into consideration, to understand correctly all the circumstances SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 133 attending this extraordinary transaction. It is felt and acknowledged on all sides that there is another and a deeper question, which lias excited the pro- found sensation and alarm which pervade the country. If we are to believe what we hear from the advocates of the administration, we would suppose at one time that the real question was Bank or no Bank ; at another, that the question was between the United States Bank and the state banks ; and, finally, that it was a struggle on the part of the administration to guard and dei'end the rights of the states against the encroachments of the Gen- eral Govermnent. The administration the guardians and defenders of the rights of the states ! What shall I call it ? audacity or hypocrisy ? The au- thors of the proclamation the guardians and defenders of the rights of the states ! The authors of the war message against a member of this coni'ederacy — the au- thors of the " bloody bill" the guardians and defenders of the rights of the states ! This a strujjcrle for state rights ? No, sir : state rights are no more. The struggle is over for the present. The bill of the last session, which vested in the government the right of judging of the extent of its powers, finally aCiid. conclusively, and gave it the right of enforcing its judgments by the sword, de- stroyed all distinction between delegated and reserved rights, concentrated in the government the entire power of the system, and prostrated the states, as poor and helpless corporations, at the foot of this sovereignty. Nor is it more true that the real question is Bank or no Bank. Taking the deposite question in the broadest sense : suj)pose, as it is contended by the friends of the administration, that it involves the question of the renewal of the charter, and, consequently, the existence of the Bank itself, still the banking sys- tem would stand almost untouched and unimpaired. Four hundred banks would still remain scattered over this wide Republic, and on the ruins of the United States Bank many would rise to be added to the present list. Under this aspect of the subject, the only possible question that could be presented for consideration would be, whether the banking system was more safe, more beneficial, or more constitutional, with or without the United States Bank. If, said Mr. Calhoun, this was a question of Bank or no Bank — if it involved the existence of the banking system, it would indeed be a great question — one of the first magnitude, and, with my present impression, long entertained and daily increasing, I would hesitate — long hesitate — before I would be found un- der the banner of the system. I have great doubts, if doubts they may be call- ed, as to the soundness and tendency of the whole system, in all its modifica- tions : I have great fears that it will be found hostile to liberty and the advance of civilization — fatally hostile to liberty in our country, where the system ex- ists in its worst and most dangerous form. Of all institutions affecting the great question of the distribution of wealth — a question least explored and the most important of any in the whole range of political economy — the bankmg in- stitution has, if not the greatest, one of the greatest, and, I fear, most pernicious influence on the mode of distribution. Were the question really before us, I would not shun the responsibility, as great as it might be, of freely and fully of- fering my sentiments on these deeply-important points ; but, as it is, I must content myself with the few remarks which 1 have thrown out. What, then, is the real question which now agitates the country ? I answer, it is a struggle between the executive and legislative departments of the gov- ernment : a struggle, not in relation to the existence of the Bank, but which, Congress or the President, shall have the power to create a Bank, and the consequent control over the currency of the country. This is the real question. Let us not deceive ourselves : this league, this association of banks, created by the executive, bound together by its influence, united in common articles of as- sociation, vivified and sustained by receiving the deposites of the public money, and having their notes converted, by being received everywhere l)y the treasu- ry, into the common currency of the country, is, to all intents and purposes, a 134 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. Bank of the United States — the executive Bank of the United States, as distin- guished from that of Congress. However it might fail to perform satisfactorily the useful functions of the Bank of the United States as incorporated by law, it •would outstrip it — far outstrip it — in all its dangerous qualities, in extending the power, the influence, and the corruption of the government. It is impossible to conceive any institution more admirably calculated to advance these objects. Not only the selected banks, but the whole banking institutions of the country, and with them the entire money power, for the purpose of speculation, peculation, and corruption, would be placed under the control of the executive. A system of menaces and promises Avill be established : of menace to the banks in pos- session of the deposites, but which might not be entirely subservient to execu- tive views ; and of promise of future favours to those who may not as yet enjoy its favours. Between the two, the banks would be left without influence, hon- our, or honesty, and a system of speculation and stock-jobbing would com- mence, unequalled in the annals of our country. I fear they have already com- menced ; I fear the means which have been put in the hands of the minions of power by the removal of the deposites, and placing them in the vaults of de- pendant banks, have extended their cupidity to the public lands, particularly in the Southwest, and that to this we must attribute the recent phenomena in that quarter — immense and valuable tracts of land sold at short notice ; sales fraudu- lently postponed to aid the speculators, with which, if I am not misinformed, a name not unknown to this body has performed a prominent part. But I leave this to my vigilant and able friend from Mississippi (Mr. Poindexter), at the head of the Committee on Public Lands, who, I doubt not, will see justice done to the public. As to stock-jobbing, this new arrangement will open a field which Rothschild himself may envy. It has been found hard work — very hard, no doubt — by the jobbers in stock, vidio have been engaged in attempts to raise or depress the price of United States Bank stock ; but no work will be more easy than to raise or depress the price of the stock of the selected banks, at the pleasure of the executive. Nothing more will be required than to give or withhold deposites ; to draw, or abstain from drawing warrants ; to pamper them at one time, and starve them at another. Those who would be in the se- cret, and who would know when to buy and when to sell, would have the means of realizing, by dealing in the stocks, whatever fortune they might please. So long as the question is one between a Bank of the United States incorpo- rated by Congress, and that system of banks which has been created by the will of the executive, it is an .insult to the understanding to discourse on the pernicious tendency and unconstitutionality of the Bank of the United States. To bring up that question fairly and legitimately, you must go one step farther : you must divorce the government and the banking system. You must refuse all connexion with banks. You must neither receive nor pay away bank-notes ; you must go back to the old system of the strong box, and of gold and silver. If you have a right to receive bank-notes at all — to treat them as money by re- ceiving them in your dues, or paying them away to creditors — you have a right to create a bank. Whatever the government receives and treats as money, is money in effect ; and if it be money, then they have the right, under the Consti- tution, to regulate it. Nay, they are bound by a high obligation to adopt the most efficient means, according to the nature of that which ihey have recogni- sed as money, to give it the utmost stability and uniformity of value. And if it be in the shape of bank-notes, the most efficient means of giving those quali- ties is a Bank of the United States, incorporated by Congress. Unless you give the highest practical uniformity to the value of bank-notes, so long as you receive them in your dues, and treat them as money, you violate that provision of the Constitution which provides that taxation shall be uniform throughout the United States. There is no other alternative : I repeat, you must divorce the government entirely from the banking system, or, if not, you are bound to incor- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 135 porate ,a bank as the only safe and efficient means of giving stability and uni- formity to the currency. And should the deposites not be restored, and the present illegal and unconstitutional connexion between the executive and the league of banks continue, I shall feel it my duty, if no one else moves, to in- troduce a measure to prohibit government from receiving or touching bank-notes in any shape whatever, as the only means left of giving safety and stability to the currency, and saving the country from corruption and ruin. Viewing the question, in its true light, as a struggle on the part of the execu- tive to seize on the power of Congress, and to unite in the President the power of the sword and the purse, the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) said, truly, and, let me add, philosophically, that we are in the midst ol' a revolution. Yes, the very existence of free governments rests on the proper distribution and or- (ranization of power ; and to destroy this distribution, and thereby concentrate power in any one of the departments, is to ellect a revolution ; but, while 1 aoree with the senator that we are in -the midst of a revolution, I cannot agree with him as to the time at v/hich it commenced, or the point to which it has progressed. Looking to the distribution of the powers of the General Govern- ment — into the legislative, executive, and judicial departments — and confining his views to the encroachment of the executive upon the legislative, he dates the commencement of the revolution but sixty days previous to the meeting of the present Congress. I, said Mr. Calhoun, take a wider range, and date it from an earlier period. Besides the distribution among the departments of the General Government, there belongs to our system another, and a far more im- portant division or distribution of power — that between the states and the Gen- eral Government, the reserved and delegated rights, the maintenance of which is still more essential to the preservation of our institutions. Taking this wide review of our political system, the revolution in the midst of which we are, be- gan, not, as supposed by the senator from Kentucky, shortly before the com- mencement of the present session, but many years ago, with the commence- ment of the restrictive system, and terminated its first stage with the passage of the force bill of the last session, which absorbed all the rights and sovereign- ty of the states, and consolidated them in this government. While this pro- cess was going on, of absorbing the reserved powers of the states on the part of the General Government, another commenced, of concentrating in the execu- tive the powers of the other two, the legislative and judicial departments of the government, which constitutes the second stage of the revolution, in which we have advanced almost to the termination. The senator from Kentucky, in connexion with this part of his argument, read a striking passage from one of the most pleasing and instructive writers in any lan- guage (Plutarch), giving the description of Caesar forcing himself, sword in hand, into the treasury of the Roman Commonwealth. We are at the same stage of our political revolution, and the analogy between the two cases is complete, va- ried only by the character of the actors and the circumstances of the times. That was a case of an intrepid and bold warrior, as an open plunderer, seiz- ing forcibly the treasury of the country, which, in that Republic, as well as ours, was confided to the custody of the legislative department of the govern- ment. The actors in our case are of a difierent character : artful and cunning politicians, and not fearless warriors. They have entered the treasury, not sword in hand, as public plunderers, but with the false keys of sophistry, under the silence of midnight. The motive and object are the same, varied only by character and circumstances. " With money I will get men, and with men money," was the maxim of the Roman plunderer. With money we will get partisans, with partisans votes, and with votes money, is the maxim of our pub- lic pilferers. With men and money, Cxsar struck down Roman liberty at the fatal battle of Pharsalia, never to rise again ; from which disastrous hour, all the powers of the Roman Republic were consolidated in the person of Caesar, and 136 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUxV. perpetuated in his line. With money and corrupt partisans, a great effort is now making to choke and stifle the voice of American liberty, through all its con- stitutional and legal organs ; by pensioning the press ; by overawing the other departments ; and, finally, by setting up a new organ, composed of office-holders and partisans, under the name of a national convention, which, counterfeiting the voice of the people, will, if not resisted, in their name dictate the successioji ; when the deed shall have been done — the revolution completed — and all the powers of our Republic, in like manner, consolidated in the executive in time, and perpetuated by his dictation. The senator from Kentucky (Mr. C.) anticipates with confidence that the small party who were denounced at the last session as traitors and disuriionists will be found, on this trying occasion, standing in the front rank, and manfully- resisting the advance of despotic power. I, said Mr. Calhoun, heard the an- ticipation with pleasure, not on account of the compliment which it implied, but the evidence which it affords that the cloud which has been so industriously thrown over the character and motive of that small, but patriotic party, begins to be dissipat-ed. The senator hazarded nothing in the prediction. That party- is the determined, the fixed, and sworn enemy to usurpation, come from what quarter and under what form it may — whether from the executive upon the other departments of this government, or from this government on the sovereignty and rights of the states. The resolution and fortitude with which it maintained its position at the last session, under so many difficulties and dangers, in defence of the states against the encroachments of the General Government, furnished evidence not to be mistaken, that that party, in the present momentous struggle, would be found arrayed in defence of the rights of Congress against the en- croachments of the President. And let me tell the senator from Kentucky, said Mr. C, that, if the present struggle against executive usurpation be successful, it will be owing to the success with which we, the nuUifiers — I am not afraid of the word — maintained the rights of the states against the encroachment of the General Government at the last session. A very few words will place this point beyond controversy. To the inter- position of the State of South Carolina we are indebted for the adjustment of the tariff question ; vv-ithout it, all the influence of the senator from Kentucky over the manufacturing interest, great as it deservedly is, would have been wholly incompetent, if he had even thought proper to exert it, to adjust the question. The attempt would have prostrated him, and those who acted with him, and not the system. It was the separate action of the state that gave him the place to stand upon, created the necessity for the adjustment, and disposed the minds of all to compromise. Now, I put the solemn question to all who hear me, If the tariflfhad not then been adjusted — if it was now an open ques- tion — what hope of successful resistance against the usurpations of the executive, on the part of this or any other branch of the government, could be entertained ? Let it not be said that this is the res\xlt of accident — of an unforeseen contin- gency. It was clearly perceived, and openly stated, that no successful resist- ance could be made to the corruption and encroachments of the executive while the tariff question remained open — while it separated the North from the South, and wasted the energy of the honest and patriotic portions of the community against each other, the johit effort of which is indispensably necessary to expel those from authority who are converting the entire powers of government into a corrupt electioneering machine ; and that, without separate state interposition, the adjustment was impossible. The truth of this position rests not upon the accidental state of things, but on a profound principle growing out of the nature of'government and party struggles in a free state. History and reflection teach us that, when great interests come into conflict, and the passions and the preju- dices of men are roused, such struggles can never be composed by the influ- ence of any individuals, however great ; and if there be not somewhere in the SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 137 system some high constitutional power to arrest their progress, and compel the parties to adjust the difference, they go on till the state falls by corruption or violence. I will, said Mr. C, venture to add to these remarks another, in connexion with the point under consideration, not less true. We are not only indebted to the cause which I have stated for our present strength in this body against the pres- ent usurpation of the executive, but if the adjustment of the tariff had stood alone, as it ought to have done, without the odious bill which accompanied it — if those who led in the compromise had joined the State Rights party in their resistance to that unconstitutional measure, and thrown the responsibility on its real authors, the administration, their party would have been so prostrated throughout the en- tire South, and their power, in consequence, so reduced, that they would not have dared to attempt the present measure ; or, if they had, they would have been broke and defeated. Were I, said JMr. C, to select the case best calculated to illustrate the ne- cessity of resisting usurpation at the very commencement, and to prove how difficult it is to resist it in any subsequent stage if not met at first, I would se- lect this very case. What, he asked, is the cause of the present usurpation of power on the part of the executive ? What the motive, the temptation, which has induced them to seize on the deposites ? What but the large surplus revenue ? the eight or ten millions in the public treasury beyond the wants of the government ? And what has put so large an amount of money in the treas- ury, when not needed ? 1 answer, the protective system — that system which graduated duties, not in reference to the wants of the government, but in refer- ence to the importunities and demands of the manufacturers, and which poured millions of dollars into the treasury beyond the most profuse demands, and even the extravagance of the government — taken — unlawfully taken, from the pockets of those who honestly made it. I hold that those who make are entitled to what they make against all the world, except the government ; and against it, except to the extent of its legitimate and constitutional wants ; and that for the government to take one cent more is robbery. In violation of this sacred prin- ciple, Congress first removed the deposites into the public treasury from the pockets of those who made it, where they were rightfully placed by all laws, human and divine. The executive, in his turn, following the example, has taken them from that deposite, and distributed them among favourite and partisan banks. The means used have been the same in both cases. The Constitution gives to Congress the power to lay duties with a view to revenue. This power, without regarding the object for which it was intended, forgetting that it was a great tmst power, necessarily limited, by the very nature of such powers, to the subject and the object of the trust, was perverted to a use never intended, that of protecting the industry of one portion of the country at the expense of another ; and, under this false interpretation, the money was transferred from its natural and just deposite, the pockets of those who made it, into the public treasury, as I have stated. In this, too, the executive followed the example of Congress. By the magic construction of a icw simple words — " unless otherwise order- ed" — intended to confer on the Secretary of the Treasury a limited power — to give additional security to the public deposites, he has, in like manner, pervert- ed this power, and made it the instrument, by similar sophistry-, of drawing the money from the treasury, and bestowing it, as I have stated, on favourite and partisan banks. Would to God, said Mr. C, would to God I could reverse the whole of this nefarious operation, and terminate the controversy by returning the money to the pockets of the honest and industrious citizens, by the sweat of whose brows it was made, and to whom only it rightfully belongs. But, as this cannot be done, I must content myself by giving a vote to return it to the public treasury, where it was ordered to be deposited by an act of the Legis- lature. • S 138 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. There is another aspect, said Mr. C, in which this subject may be viewed. We all remember how early the question of the surplus revenue began to agi- tate the country. At a very early period, a senator from New-Jersey (Mr. Dickerson) presented his scheme for disposing of it by distributing it among the states. The first message of the President recommended a similar project, which was followed up by a movement on the part of the Legislature of Mew- York, and, I believe, some of the other states. The public attention was aroused — the scheme scrutinized — its gross unconstitutionality and injustice, and its dangerous tendency — its tendency to absorb the power and existence of the ' states, were clearly perceived and denounced. The denunciation was too deep to be resisted, and the scheme was abandoned. What have we now in lieu of it ? What is the present scheme but a distribution of the surplus revenue ? A distribution at the sole will and pleasure of the executive — a distribution to favourite banks, and through them, in the shape of discounts and loans, to corrupt partisans, as the means of increasing political influence ? We have, said Mr. C, arrived at a fearful crisis. Things cannot long re- main as they are. It behooves all who love their country — who have aflection for their offspring, or who have any stake in our institutions, to pause and re- flect. Confidence is daily withdrawing from the General Government. Alien- ation is hourly going on. These will necessarily create a state of things inimical to the existence of our institutions, and, if not arrested, convulsions must follow ; and then comes dissolution or despotism, when a thick cloud will be thrown over the cause of liberty and the future prospects of our country. VIII. SPEECH ON MR. WEBSTER's PROPOSITION TO RECHARTER THE UNITED STATES BANK, MARCH 26, 1834. The question being upon granting leave to Mr. Webster to introduce into tne Senate a bill to recharter, for the term of six years, the Bank of the United States, with modifications : I rise, said Mr. Calhoun, in order to avail myself of an early opportunity to express my opinion on the measure proposed by the senator from Massachu- setts, and the questions immediately connected with it, under the impression that, on a subject so intimately connected with the interests of every class in the community, there should be an early declaration of their sentiments by the members of this body, so that all might know what to expect, and on what to calculate. I shall vote for the motion of the senator, not because I approve of the meas- ure he proposes, but because I consider it due in courtesy to grant leave, un- less there be strong reasons to the contrary, which is not the case in this in- stance ; but while I am prepared to vote for his motion, and, let me add, to do ample justice to his motives for introducing the bill, I cannot approve of the measure he proposes. In every view which I have been able to take, it is ob- jectionable. Among the objections, I place the uncertainty as to its object. It is left perfectly open to conjecture whether a renewal of the charter is intend- ed, or a mere continuance, with the view of affording the Bank time to wind up its affairs ; and what increases the uncertainty is, if we compare the provisions of the proposed bill with the one or the other of these objects, it is equally un- suited to either. If a renewal of the charter be intended, six years is too short ; if a continuance, too long. I, however, state this as a minor objection. There is another of far more decisive character : it settles nothing ; it leaves every- thing unfixed ; it perpetuates the present struggle, which so injuriously agitates SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 139 the countiy — a struggle of bank against bank — of one set of opinions against another ; and prolongs the whole, without even an intervening armistice, to the year 1842 : a period that covers two presidential terms, and, by inevitable con- sequence, running, for two successive presidential elections, the politics of the country into the Bank question, and the Bank question into politics, with the mutual corruption which must be engendered ; keeping, during the whole peri- od, the currency of the country, which the public interest requires should have the utmost stability, in a* state of uncertainly and lluctuation. But why should I pursue the objections to the plan proposed by the senator? He himself acknowledged the measure to be defective, and that he would pre- fer one of a more permanent character. He has not proposed this as the best measure, but has brought it forward under a supposed necessity — under the im- pression that something must be done — something prompt and immediate, to re- lieve the existing distress which overspreads the land. I concur with him in relation to the distress, that it is deep and extensive ; that it fell upon us sudden- ly, and in the midst of prosperity almost unexampled ; that it is daily consign- ing hundreds to poverty and misery ; blasting the hopes of the enterprising ; taking employment and bread from the labourer ; and working a fearful change in the relative condition of the money dealers on one side, and the man of busi- ness on the other — raising the former rapidly to the top of the wheel, while it is whirling the latter, with equal rapidity, to the bottom. While I thus agree with the senator as to the distress, I am also sensible that there are great pub- lic emergencies in which no permanent relief can be afforded, and when the v.dsest are obliged to resort to expedients : to palliate and to temporize, in order to gain time with a view to apply a more effectual remedy. But there are also emergencies of precisely the opposite character : when the best and most per- manent is the only practicable measure, and when mere expedients tend but to distract, to divide, and confound, and thereby to delay or defeat all relief ; and such, viewed in all its relations and bearing, I consider the present ; and that the senator from Massachusetts has not also so considered it, I attribute to the fact that, of the two questions blended in the subject under consideration, he has given an undue prominence to that which has by far the least relative im- portance — I mean those of the Bank and of the currency. As a mere bank question, as viewed by the senator, it would be a matter of but little importance whether the renewal should be for six years or for a longer period ; and a pref- erence might very properly be given to one or the other, as it might be suppo- sed most likely to succeed ; but I must say, that, in my opinion, in selecting the period of six years, he has taken that which will be much less likely to succeed than one of a reasonable and proper duration. But had he turned his view to the other and more prominent question involved ; had he regarded the question as a question of currency, and that the great point was to give it uniformity, per- manency, and safety ; that, in effecting these essential objects, the Bank is a mere subordinate agent, to be used or not to be used, and to be modified, as to its duration and other provisions, wholly in reference to the higher question of the currency, I cannot think that he would ever have proposed the measure which he has brought forward, which leaves, as I have already said, everything connected with the subject in a state of uncertainty and fluctuation. All feel that the currency is a delicate subject, requiring to be touched with the utmost caution ; but in order that it may be seen as well as felt why it is so delicate, why slight touches, either in depressing or elevating it, agitate and convulse the whole community, I will pause to explain the cause. If wc take the aggregate property of a community, that which forms the currency consti- tutes, in value, a very small proportion of the whole. What this proportion is in our country and other commercial and trading communities, is somewhat un- certain. I speak conjecturally in fixing it as one to twenty-five or tliirty, though I presume that is not far from the truth ; and yet this small proportion of the / 140 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. property of the community regulates the vahie of all the rest, and forms the me- dium of circulation by which all its exchanges are effected ; bearing, in this re- spect, a striking similarity, considering the diversity of the subjects, to the blood in the human or animal system. If we turn our attention to the laws which govern the circulation, we shall find one of the most important to be, that, as the circulation is decreased or in- creased, the rest of the property will, all other circuijistances remaining the same, be decreased or increased in value exactly in the same proportion. To illustrate :/If a community should have an aggregate amount of property of thir- ty-one millions of dollars, of which one million constitutes its currency ; and that one million should be reduced one teijth part, that is to say, one hundred thousand dollars, the value of the rest will be reduced in like manner one tenth part, that is, three millions of dollars. And here a very important fact dis- closes itself, which explains why the currency should be touched with such delicacy, and why stability and uniformity are such essential qualities ; I mean that a small absolute reduction of the currency makes a great absolute reductioa of the value of the entire property of the community, as we see in the case pro- posed ; where a reduction of one hundred thousand dollars in the currency re- duces the aggregate value of property three millions of dollars — a sum thirty times greater than the reduction of the currency. From this results an impor- tant consideration. If we suppose the entire currency to be in the hands of one portion of the community, and the property in the hands of the other portion, the former, by having the currency under their exclusive control, might control the value of all the property in the community, and possess themselves of it at their pleasure. Take the case already selected, and suppose that those who hold the currency diminish it one half by abstracting that amount from circula- tion : the effect of which would be to reduce the circulation to five hundred thousand dollars ; the value of property would also be reduced one half, that is, fifteen millions of dollars. Let the process be reversed, and the money abstract- ed gradually restored to circulation, and the value of the property would again be increased to thirty millions. It must be obvious that, bj^ alternating these processes, and purchasing at the point of the greatest depression, when the cir- culation is the least, and selling at the point of the greatest elevation, when it is the fullest, the supposed moneyed class, who could at pleasure increase or di- minish the circulation, by abstracting or restoring it, might also at pleasure con- trol the entire property of the country. Let it be ever borne in mind, that the exchangeable value of the circulating medium, compared with the property and the business of the community, remains fixed, and can never be diminished or increased by increasing or diminishing its quantity ; while, on the contrary, the exchangeable value of the property, compared to the currency, must increase or decrease with every addition or diminution of the latter. It results, from this, that there is a dangerous antagonist relation between those who hold or com- mand the currency and the rest of the community ; but, fortunately for the coun- try, the holders of property and of the currency are so blended as not to consti- tute separate classes. Yet it is worthy of remark — it deserves strongly to at- tract the attention of those who have charge of the public affairs — that under the operation of the banking system, and that peculiar description of property ex- isting in the shape of credit or stock, public and private, Avhich so strikingly dis- tinguishes modern society from all that preceded it, there is a strong tendency to create a separate moneyed interest, accompanied with all the dangers which must necessarily result from such interest, and which deserves to be most care- fully watched and restricted. I do not stand here the partisan of any particular class in society — the rich or the poor, the property holder or the money holder ; and, in making these re- marks, I am not actuated by the slightest feeling of opposition to the latter. My object is simply to point out important relations that exist between them, re- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 141 suiting from the laws which govern the currency, in order that the necessity for a uniform, stable, and safe currency, to guard against dangerous control of one class over another, may be clearly seen. I stand iti my place simply as a senator from South Carolina, to represent her on this lloor, and to. advance the common interest of these states as far as we have the constitutional power, and as far as it can be done consistently with equity and justice to the parts. I am the partisan, as I have said, of no class, nor, let me add, of any political party. I am neither of the opposition nor of the admiiiistralion. If I act with tlie former in any instance, it is because I approve of the course on the particular occasion ; and i shall always be happy to act with them when I do approve. If I oppose the aduunislration — if 1 desire to see power change hands — it is because 1 dis- approve of the general course of those in authority — because they have depart- ed from the principles on which they came into office — because, instead of using the immense power and patronage put in their hands to secure the liberty of the country and advance the public good, they have perverted them into party in- struments for personal objects. But mine has not been, nor will it be, a syste- matic opposition. Whatever measure of theirs I may deem right, I shall cheer- J'ully support ; and I only desire that they shall atlbrd me more frequent occa- sions for support, and fewer for opposition, than they have heretofore done. With these impressions, and entertaining a deep conviction that an unfixed, unstable, and iluctuating currency is to be ranked among the most fruitful sour- ces of evil, whether viewed politically, or in reference to the business transac- tions of the country, 1 cannot give my consent to any measure that does not place the currency on a solid foundation. If I thought this determination would delay the relief so necessary to mitigate the present calamity, it would be lo me a subject of the deepest regret. I feel that sympathy which I trust I ought, for the suflering of so many of my fellow-citizens, who see their hopes daily with- ered. I, however, console myself with the reflection that delay will not be the result, but, on the contrary, relief will be hastened by the view which I take of the subject. I hold it impossible that anything can be effected, regard- ing the subject as a mere bank question. Viewed in that light, the opinion of this house, and of the other branch of Congress, is probably definitively made lip. In the Senate, it is known that we have three parties, whose views, con- «idering it as a bank question, appear to be irreconcilable. All hope, then, of relief, must centre in taking a more elevated view, and in considering it, in its true light, as a subject of currency. Thus regarded, I shall be surprised if, on full investigation, there will not appear a remarkable coincidence of opinion, even between those whose views, on a slight inspection, would seem to be con- tradictory. Let us, then, proceed to the investigation of the subject under the aspect which I have proposed. What, then, is the currency of the United States ? What its present state and condition ? These are the questions which I propose now to consider, with a view of ascertaining what is the disease, what the remedy, and what the means of applying it, that may be necessary to restore our currency to a sound condition. The legal currency of this country — that in which alone debts can be dis- charged according to law — are certain gold, silver, and copper coins authorized by Congress under an express provision of the Constitution. Such is the law. VVhat, now, are the facts ? That the currency consists almost exclusively of bank-notes, gold having entirely disappeared, and silver, in a great measure, expelled by banks instituted by twenty-five distinct and independent powers, and notes issued under the authority of the direction of those institutions. They are, in point cf fact, the mint of the United States. They coin the actual money (for such we must call bank-notes), and regulate its issue, and, conse- quently, its value. If we inquire as to their number, the amount of their issue, and other circumstances calculated to show their actual condition, we shall find 142 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. that, so rapid has been their increase, and so various their changes, that no ac- curate information can be had. According to the latest and best that I have been able to obtain, they number at least four hundred and fifty, with a capital of not less than one hundred and forty-five millions of dollars, with an issue ex- ceeding seventy millions ; and the whole of this immense fabric standing on a metallic currency of less than fifteen millions of dollars, of which the greater part is held by the Bank of the United States. If we compare the notes in circulation with the metallic currency in their vaults, we shall find the propor- tion about six to one ; and if we compare the latter with the demands that may be made upon the banks, we shall find that the proportion is about one to elev- en. If we examine the tendency of the system at this moment, we shall find, that it is on the increase — rapidly on the increase. There is now pending a project of a ten million bank before the Legislature of New- York ; but recently one of five millions was established in Kentucky ; within a short period one of a large capital was established in Tennessee, besides others in agitation in several of the other states (here Mr. Porter, of Louisiana, said that one of eleven millions had just been established in that state). This increase is not accidental. It may be laid down as a law, that, where two currencies are permitted to circidate in an)'" country, one of a cheap and the other of a dear material, the former necessarily tends to grow upon the lat- ter, and will ultimately expel it from circulation, imless its tendency to increase be restrained by a powerful and efficient check. Experience tests the truth of this remark, as the history of the banking system clearly illustrates. The sen- ator from Massachusetts truly said that the Bank of England was derived from that of Amsterdam, as ours, in turn, are from that of England. Throughout its progress, the truth of what I have stated to be a law of the system is strongly evinced. The Bank of Amsterdam was merely a bank of deposite — a storehouse for the safe-keeping of the bullion and precious metals brought into that com- mercial metropolis, through all the channels of its widely-extended trade. It was placed under the custody of the city authorities ; and on the deposite, a cer- tificate was issued as evidence of the fact, which was transferable, so as to en- title the holder to demand the return. An important fact was soon disclosed — that a large portion of the deposites might be withdrawn, and that the residue would be sufficient to meet the returning certificates ; or, what is the same in elFect, that certificates might be issued without making a deposite. This sug- gested the idea of a bank of discount as well as deposite. The fact thus dis- closed fell too much in with the genius of the system to be lost, and, accord- ingly, when transplanted to England, it suggested the idea of a bank of discount and of deposite ; the very essence of which form of baiddng, that on which their profit depends, consists in issuing a greater amount of notes than it has specie in its vaults. But the system is regularly progressing, under the impulse of the laws that govern it, from its present form to a mere paper machine — a machine for fabricating and issuing notes, not convertible into specie. Already has it once reached this condition, both in England and the United States, and from which it has been forced back, in both, to a redemption of its notes with great difficulty. The natural tendency of the system is accelerated in our country by pecu- liar causes, which have greatly increased its progress. There are two power- ful causes in operation. The one resulting from that rivalry which must ever take place in states situated, as ours are, under one General Government, and having a free and open commercial intercourse. The introduction of the bank- ing system in one state necessarily, on this principle, introduces it into all the others, of which we have seen a striking illustration on the part of Virginia and some of the other Southern States, which entertained, on principle, strong aversion to the system ; yet they were compelled, after a long and stubborn re- sistance, to yield their objections, or permit their circulation to be furnished by SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 143 the surrounding states, at the expense of their own capital and commerce. The same cause which thus compels one state to imitate the example of an- other, in introducing the system from self-defence, will compel the other states, in like manner, and from the same cause, to enlarge and give increased activity to the banking operation, whenever any one of the states sets the example of so doing on its part ; and thus, by mutual action and reaction, the whole sys- tem is rapidly accelerated to the final destiny wliich I have assigned. This is strikingly exemplified in the rapid progress of the system since its first introduction into our country. At the adoption of our Constitution, forty- five years ago, there were but three banks in the United States, the amount of whose capital I do not now recollect, but it was very small. In this short space, they have increased to four hundred and fifty, with a capital of one hun- dred and forty-five millions, as has already been stated : an increase exceeding nearly a hundred fold the increase of our wealth and population, as great as they have been. But it is not in numbers only that they have increased : there has, in the same time, been a rapid advance in the proportion which their notes in circu- lation bear to the specie in their vaults. Some twenty or thirty years ago, it was not considered safe for the issues to exceed the specie by more than two and a half or three for one ; but now, taking the whole, and including the Bank of the United States with the state banks, the proportion is about six to one ; and excluding that Bank, it would very greatly exceed that proportion. This increase of paper in proportion to metal results from a cause which deserves much more notice than it has heretofore attracted. It originates mainly in the number of the banks. I will proceed to illustrate it. The senator from New- York (Mr. Wright), in assigning his reasons for be- lieving the Bank of the United States to be more dangerous than those of the states, said that one bank was more dangerous than many. That in some re- spects may be true ; but in one, and that a most important one, it is strikingly the opposite — I mean in the tendency of the system to increase. Where there is but one bank, the tendency to increase is not near so strong as where there are many, as illustrated in England, where the system has advanced much less rapidly, in proportion to the wealth and population of the kingdom, than in the United States. But where there is no limitation as to their number, the in- crease will be inevitable, so long as banking continues to be among the most certain, eligible, and profitable employments of capital, as now is the case. With these inducements, there must be constant application for new banks, whenever there is the least prospect of profitable employment — banks to be founded mainly on nominal and fictitious capital, and adding but little additional capital to that already in existence — and with our just and natural aversion to monopoly, it is difficult, on principles of equality and justice, to resist such ap- plication. The admission of a new bank tends to diminish the profits of the old, and, between the aversion of the old to reduce their income and the desire of the new to acquire profits, the result is an enlargement of discounts, eflected by a mutual spirit of forbearance ; an indisposition on the part of each to oppress the other ; and, finally, the creation of a common feeling to stigmatize and oppose those, whether banks or individuals, who demand specie in payment of their notes. This community of feeling, which ultimately identifies the whole as a, peculiar and distinct interest in the community, increases, and becomes more and more intense, just in proportion as banks multiply ; as they become, if I may use the expression, too populous, when, from the pressure of increasing num- bers, there results a corresjionding increase of issues, in proportion to their means, which explains the present extraordinary disproportion between specie and notes in those states where banks have been most multiplied ; equal, in some, to sixteen to one. There results from this state of things some political considerations, which demand the profound attention of all who value the liberty and peace of the country. 144 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. While the banking system rests on a solid foundation, there will be, on their part, but little dependance on the government, and but little means by which the government can influence them, and as little disposition on the part of the banks to be connected with the government ; but in the progress of the system, when their number is greatly multiplied, and their issues, in proportion to their means, are correspondingly increased, the condition of the banks becomes more and more critical. Every adverse event in the commercial world, or political jBOvement that disturbs the existing state of things, agitates and endangers them. They become timid and anxious for their safety, and necessarily court those in power, in order to secure their protection. Property is, in its nature, timid, and seeks protection, and nothing is more gratifying to government than to become a protector. A union is the result ; and when that union takes place — when the government, in fact, becomes the bank direction, regulating its favours and ac- commodation — the downfall of liberty is at hand. Are there no indications that we are not far removed from this state of things ? Do we not behold in those events which have so deeply agitated us within the last few months, and which liave interrupted all the business transactions of this community, a strong ten- dency to this union on the part of a department of this government, and a por- tion of the banking system ? Has not this union been, in fact, consummated in the largest and most commercial of the states ? AVhat is the safety-fund system of New-York but a union between the banks and the state, and a consummation by law of that community of feeling in the banking system which I have at- tempted to illustrate, the object of which is to extend their discounts, and to ob tain which, the interior banks of that state have actually put themselves under the immediate protection of the government? The effects have been striking. Already have they become substantially mere paper machines, several having not more than from one to two cents in specie to the dollar, when compared with their circulation ; and, taking the aggregate, their average condition will be found to be but little better. I care not, said Mr. C, whether the present commissioners are partisans of the present state administration or not, or Avhether the assertion of the senator from New-York (Mr. Wright), that the government of the state has not interfered in the control of these institutions, be correct. Whether it has taken place or not, interference is inevitable. In such state of weakness, a feeling of dependance is unavoidable, and the control of the government over the action of the banks, whenever that control shall be- come necessary to subserve the ambition or the avarice of those in power, is certain. Such is the strong tendency of our banks to terminate their career in the pa- per system — in an open suspension of specie payment. Whenever that event occurs, the progress of convulsion and revolution will be rapid. The currency will become local, and each state will have a powerful interest to depreciate its currency more rapidly than its neighbour, as means, at the same time, of ex- empting itself from the taxes of the government, and drawing the commerce of the country to its ports. This was strongly exemplified after the suspension of specie payment during the late war, when the depreciation made the most xapid progress, till checked by the establishment of the present Bank of the Uni- ted States, and when the foreign trade of the country was as rapidly conver- ging to the point of the greatest depreciation, with a view of exemption from du- ties, by paying in the debased currency of the place. W^hat, then, is the disease which afflicts the system ? what the remedy ? and what the means of applying it? These are the questions which I shall next proceed to consider. VVhat I have already statei points out the disease. It consists in a great and growing disproportion between the metallic and paper circulation of the country, cflected through the instrumentality of the banks : a disproportion daily and hourly increasing, under the impulse of most powerful causes, which are rapidly accelerating the country to that state of convulsion SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 145 • and revolution which I have indicated. The remedy is to arrest its future prog- ress, and to diminish the existing disproportion — to increase the metals and to diminish the paper — advancing till the currency shall be restored to a sound, safe, and settled condition. On these two points all must be agreed. There is no man of any party, capable of reflecting, and who will take the pains to in- form himself, but must agree that our cm-rency is in a dangerous condition, and that the danger is increasing ; nor is there any one who can doubt that the only safe and eflbclual remedy is to diminisli this disproportion to whicli 1 have re ferred. Here the extremes unite : the senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton), and the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), who stands here as the able and strenuous advocate of the banking system, are on this point united, and must move from it in the same direction : though it may be the design of the one to .go through, and of the other to halt after a moderate advance. There is another point on which all must be agreed — that the remedy must be gradual — the change from the present to another and sounder condition, slow and cautious. The necessity for this results from that highly delicate nature of currency which I have already illustrated. Any sudden and great change from our present to even a sounder condition would agitate and convulse socie- ty to the centre. On another point there can be but little disagreement. What- ever may be the different theoretical opinions of the members of the Senate as to the extent to which the reformation of the currency should be carried, even those who think it may be carried practically and safely to the restoration of a metallic currency, to the entire exclusion of paper, must agree that the restora- tion ought not to be carried farther than a cautious and slow experience shall prove that it can be done, consistently >vith the prosperity of the country, in the existing fiscal and commercial condinou of the world. To go beyond the point to which experience shall show it is proper to go, would be to sacrifice the pub- Jic interest merely to a favourite conception. There may be ultimately a disa- greement of opinion where that point is, but, since all must be agreed to move forward in the same direction and at the same pace, let us set out in the spirit of harmony and peace, though we intend to stop at difl'erent points. It may be that, enlitrhtened by experience, those who intended to stop at the nearest point may be disposed to advance farther, and that those who intended the farthest, may halt on this side, so that finally all may agree to terminate the journey to- gether. This brings us to the question of how shall so salutary a change be effected ? "What the means, and the mode of application ? A great and difficult question, on which some diversity of opinion may be expected. No one can be more sensible than I am of the responsibility that must be in- curred in proposing measures on questions of so much magnitude, and which in so distracted a state, must afl!ect seriously great and inffuential interests. But this is no time to shun responsibility. The danger is great and menacing, and delay hazardous, if not ruinous. While, however, I would not shun, 1 have not sought the responsibility. 1 have waited for others ; and, had any one pro- posed an adequate remedy, I would have remained silent. And here, said Mr. Calhoun, let me express the deep regret which I feel that the administration, ■with all that weight of authority which belongs to its power and immense pat- ronage, had not, instead of the deposite question, which has caused such agita- tion and distress, taken up the great subject of the currency ; examined it grave- ly and deliberately in all its bearings ; pointed out its diseased condition ; des- ignated the remedy, and proposed some safe, gradual, and efl^ectual means of applying it. Had that course been pursued, my zealous and hearty co-opera- tion would not have been wanting. Permit me, also, to express a similar re- gret that the administration, having failed in this great point of duty, the oppo- sition, with all its weight and talents, headed on this question by the distinguisli- ed and able senator from Massachusetts, who is so capable of comprehending T 146 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. this subject in all its bearings, had not brought forward, under its auspices, some permanent system of measures, based upon a deliberate and mature investio-a- tion into the cause of the existing disease, and calculated to remedy the disor- dered state of the currency. What might have been brought forward by them with such fair prospects of success, has been thrown on more incompetent hands, unaided by patronage or influence, save only that power which truth clearly developed, and honestly and zealously advanced, may be supposed to possess, and on which I must wholly rely. But to return to the subject. Whatever diversity of sentiment there may be as to the means, on one point all must be agreed : nothing effectual can be done, no check interposed to restore or arrest the progress of the system, by the ac- t'o.i of the states. The reasons already assigned to prove that banking by one state compels all others to bank, and that the excess of banking in one in like manner compels all others to like excess, equally demonstrate that it is impossi- ble for the states, acting separately, to interpose any means to prevent the catas- trophe which certainly awaits the system, and perhaps the government itself, un- less the great and growing danger to which I refer be timely and effectually arrested. There is no power anywhere but in this government — the joint agent of all the states, and through which a concert of action can be effected adequate to this great task. The responsibility is upon us, and upon us alone. The means, if means there be, must be applied by our hands, or not applied at all— a consideration, in so great an emergency, and in the presence of such imminent danger, calculated, I should suppose, to arouse even the least patriotic. What means do we possess, and how can they be apphed 1 If the entire banking system was und^r the immediate control of the Gener- al Government, there would be no difficulty in devising a safe and effectual remedy to restore the equilibrium, so desirable, between the specie and the pa- per which compose our currency. But the fact is otherwise. With the ex- ception of the Bank of the United States, all the oi\ier banks owe their origia to the authority of the several states, and are under their immediate control which presents the great difficulty experienced in devising the proper means of effecting the remedy which all feel to be so desirable. Among the means which have been suggested, a senator from Viro-inia not now a member of this body (Mr. Rives), proposed to apply the taxing power to suppress the circulation of small notes, with a view of diminishing the paper and increasing the specie circulation. The remedy would be simple and eifect- ive, but is liable to great objection. The taxing power is odious under any circumstances ; it would be doubly so when called into exercise with an over- flowing treasury ; and still more so, with the necessity of organizing an expen- sive body of officers to collect a single tax, and that of an inconsiderable amount. But there is another, and of itself a decisive objection. It would be unconstitutional — palpably and dangerously so. All political powers, as I sta- ted on another occasion, are trust powers, and limited in their exercise by the subject and object of the grant. The tax power was granted to raise revenue for the sole purpose of supplying the necessary means of carrying on the oper- ations of the government. To pervert this power from the object thus intend- ed by the Constitution, to that of suppressiiig the circulation of bank-notes, would be to convert it from a revenue into a penal power — a power in its nature and object essentially different from that intended to be granted in the Consti- tution ; and a power which in its full extension, if once admitted, would be suf- ficient of itself to give an entire control to this government over the property and the pursuits of the community, and thus concentrate and consolidate in it the entire power of the system. Rejecting, then, the taxing power, there remains two obvious and direct means in possession of the government, which may be brought into action to efiect the object intended, but neither of which, either separately or jointly, is SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 147 of sufficient efficacy, however indispensable they may be as a part of an effi- cient system of measures, to correct the present, or repress the growing disor- ders of the currency ; I mean that provision in the Constitution which empow- ers Congress to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and the power of prohibiting anything but the legal currency to be received, either in whole or in part, in the dues of the government. The mere power of coining and regulating the value of coins, of itself, and uTisustained by any other meas- ure, can exercise but a limited control ovi&r ilie actual currency of the country, and is inadequate to check excess or correct disorder, as is demonstrated by the present diseased state of the currency. Congress has had, from the beginning, laws upon the statute-books to regulate the value of coins ; and at an early pe- riod of the goveniment the mint was erected, and has been in active operation ever since ; and yet, of the immense amount which has been coined, a small res- idue only remains in the country, the great body having been expelled under the banking system. To give efficiency to this power, then, some other must be combined with it. The most immediate and obvious is that which has been suggested — of excluding all but specie in the receipts of the government. This measure would be effectual to a certain extent ; but with a declining income, "which must take place under the operation of the act of the last session, to ad- just the tarifi', and which must greatly reduce the revenue (a point of the ut- most importance to the reformation and regeneration of our institutions), the effi- cacy of the measure must be correspondingly diminished. From the nature of things, it cannot greatly exceed the average of the government deposites, "which I hope will, before many years, be reduced to the smallest possible amount, so as to prevent the possibility of the recurrence of the shameful and dangerous state of things which now exists, and which has been caused by the vast amount of the surplus revenue. But there is, in my opinion, a strong ob- jection against resorting to this measure, resulting from the fact that an exclu- sive receipt of specie in the treasury would, to give it efficacy, and to prevent extensive speculation and fraud, require an entire disconnexion on the part of the government with the banking system in all its forms, and a resort to the strong box as the means of preserving and guarding its funds — a means, if prac- ticable, in the present state of things liable to the objection of being far less safe, economical, and efficient than the present. What, then, Mr. Calhoun inquired, what other means do we possess, of suffi- cient efficacy, in combination with those to ^A•hich I have referred, to arrest its progress, and correct the disordered state o^ the currency ? This is the deeply- important question, and here some division of opinion must be expected, how- ever united we may be, as I trust we are thus far, on all other points. I intend to meet this question explicitly and directly, without reservation or concealment. After a full survey of the whole subject, I see none : I can conjecture no means of extricating the country from the present danger, and to arrest its far- ther increase, but a Bank — the agency of which, in some form, or under some authority, is indispensable. The country has been brought into the present dis- tressed state of currency by banks, and must be extricated by their agency. We must, in a word, use a bank to unbaidc the banks, to the extent that may be necessary to restore a safe and stable currency — ^just as we apply snow to a frozen limb in order to restore vitality and circulation, or hold up a burn to the flame to extract the inflammation. All must see that it is impossible to sup- press the banking system at once. It must continue for a time. Its greatest enemies, and the advocates of an exclusive specie circulation, must make it a part of their system to tolerate the banks for a longer or a shorter period. To suppress them at once would, if it were possible, work a greater revolution — a greater change in the relative condition of the various classes of the communi- ty, than would the conquest of the country by a savage enemy. What, then, must be done ? I answer, a new and safe system must gradually grow up un- (T {• 'VV, 148 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. der, and replace the old ; imitating, in this respect, the beautiful process which we sometimes see of a wounded or diseased part in a living organic body- gradually superseded by the healing process of nature. How is this to be effected ? How is a bank to be used as the means of cor- recting the excess of the banking system ? and what bank is to be selected as the agent to effect this salutary change 1 I know, said Mr. C, that a diversity of opinion will be found to exist, as to the agent to be selected, among those who ao^ree on every other point, and who, in particular, agree on the necessity of using some bank as the means of effecting the object intended : one prefer- ring a simple recharter of the existing Bank, another the charter of a new Bank of the United States ; a third, a new Bank ingrafted upon the old ; and a fourth, the use of the state banks as the agent. I wish, said Mr. C, to leave all these as open questions, to be carefully surveyed and compared with each other, calmly and dispassionately, without prejudice or party feeling ; and that to be selected which, on the whole, shall appear to be best, the most safe, the most efficient, the most prompt in appUcation, and the least liable to constitutional objections. It would, however, be wanting in candour on my part not to de- clare that my impression is, that a new Bank of the United States, ingrafted upon the old, will be found, under all the circumstances of the case, to combine the greatest advantages, and to be liable to the fewest objections ; but this im- pression is not so firmly fixed as to be inconsistent with a calm review of the whole ground, or to prevent my yielding to the conviction of reason, should the result of such review prove that any other is preferable. Among its peculiar recommendations may be ranked the consideration that, while it would afford the means of a prompt and effectual apphcation for mitigating and finally removing the existing distress, it would, at the same time, open to the whole community a fair opportunity of participation in the advantages of the institution, be they what they may. Let us, then, suppose (in order to illustrate, and not to indicate a preference) that the present Ba-nk be selected as the agent to effect the intended object. What provisions will be necessary ? I will suggest those that have occurred to me, mainly, however, with a view of exciting the reflections of those much more familiar with banking operations than myself, and who, of course, are more competent to form a correct judgment of their practical effect. Let, then, the Bank charter be renewed for twelve years after the expiration of the present term, with such modifications and limitations as may be judged proper ; and that after that period it shall issue no notes under ten dollars — that government shall not receive in its dues any sum less than ten dollars, except in the legal coins of the United States ; that it shall not receive in its dues the notes of any bank that issues notes of a denomination less than five dollars ; and that the United States Bank shall not receive in payment, or on deposite, the notes of any bank whose notes are not receivable in the dues of the govern- ment, nor the notes of any bank which may receive the notes of any bank whose notes are not receivable by the government. At the expiration of six years from the commencement of the renewed charter, let the Bank be prohibited from is- suing any note under twenty dollars, and let no sum under that amount be re- ceived in dues of the government, except in specie ; and let the value of gold be raised at least equal to that of silver, to take effect immediately ; so that the country may be replenished with the coin, the lightest and the most portable in proportion to its value, to take the place of the receding bank-notes. It is unnecessary for me to state, that at present the standard value of gold is less than that of silver ; the necessary effect of which has been to expel gold entire- ly from circulation, and to deprive us of a coin so well calculated for the circulation of a country so great in extent, and having so vast an intercourse, commercial, social, and political, between all its parts, as ours. As an addition- al recommendation to raise its relative value, gold has, of late, become an impor- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 149 tant product of three considerable states of the Union — Virginia, North Caro- lina, and Georgia — to the industry of which the measure proposed would give a strong impulse, and which, in turn, would greatly increase the quantity pro- duced. Such are the means which have occurred to me. There are members of this body far more competent to judge of their practical operation than myself ; and as my object is simply to suggest them for their reflection, and for that of others who are more familiar with this part of the subject, I will not at present enter into an inquiry as to their efficiency, with a view of determining whether they are fully adequate to effect the object in view or not. There are, doubtless, others of a similar description, and perhaps more efficacious, that may occur to the ex- perienced, which 1 would freely embrace, as my object is to adopt the best and most efficient. And it may be hoped, that if, on experience, it should be found that neither these provisions, nor any other in the power of Congress, are fully adequate to effect the important reform which I have proposed, the co-operatioa of the states may be afforded, at least to the extent of suppressing the circula- tion of notes under five dollars, where such are permitted to be issued under their authority. I omitted, in the proper place, to state my reason for suggesting twelve years as the term for the renewal of the charter of the Bank. It appears to me that it is long enough to permit the agitation and distraction which now disturbs the countrj' to subside, while it is sufficiently short to enable us to avail ourselves of the full benefit of the light of experience, which may be expected to be de- rived from the operation of the system under its new provisions. But there is another reason which appears to me to be entitled to great weight. The char- ter of the Bank of England has recently been renewed for the term of ten years, with very important changes, calculated to furnish much experience upon the nature of banking operations and currency. It is highly desirable, if the Bank charter should be renewed, or a new bank created, that we should have the full benefit of that experience before the expiration of the term, which would be effected by fixnig the period I have designated. But as my object in selecting the recharter of the Bank of the United States was simply to enable me to present the suggestions I have made in the clearest form, and not advocate the recharter, I shall omit to indicate man}'^ limitations and provisions, which seem to me to be important to be considered, when the question of its perma- nent renewal is presented, should it ever be. Among others, I entirely concur in the suggestion of the senator from Georgia, of fixing the rate of interest at five per cent. — a suggestion of importance, and to which but one objection can, in my opinion, be presented — I mean the opposing interest of existing state in- stitutions, all of which discount at higher rates, and which may defeat any measure of which it constitutes a part. In addition, I will simply say that I, for one, shall feel disposed to adopt such provisions as are best calculated to secure the government from any supposed influence on the part of the Bank, or the Bank i'rom any improper interference on the part of the government, or which may be necessary to protect the rights or interests of the states. Having now stated the measure necessary to apply the remedy, I am thus brought to the question. Can the measure succeed ? which brings up the inqui- ry of how far it may be expected to receive the support of the several parties which now compose the Senate, and on which 1 shall next proceed to make a few remarks. First, then, can the State Rights party give it their support 1 that party of which I am proud of being a member, and for which I entertain so strong an attachment — the stronger because we are few among many. In proposing this question, I am not ignorant of their long-standing constitutional objection to the Bank, on the ground that this was intended to be, as it is usually expressed, a hard-money government, whose circulating medium was intended to consist of 150 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, the precious metals, and for which object the power of coining money, and regulating the value thereof, was expressly conferred by the Constitution. I know how long and how sincerely this opinion has been entertained, and under how many difficulties it has been maintained. It is not my intention to attempt to change an opinion so firmly fixed ; but I may be permitted to make a t'ew observations, in order to present what appears to me to be the true question in reference to this constitutional point, in order that we may fully comprehend the circumstances under which we are placed in reference to it. With this view, I do not deem it necessary to inquire whether, in conferring the power to coin money, and to regulate the value thereof, the Constitution in- tended to limit the power strictly to coining money and regulating its value, or whether it intended to confer a more general power over the currency ; nor do I in- tend to inquire whether the word coin is limited simply to the metals, or may be extended to other substances, if, through a gradual change, they may become the medium of the general circulation of the world. I pass these points. Whatever opinion there may be entertained in reference to them, we must all agree, as a fixed principle in our system of thinking on constitutional questions, that the power under consideration, like other powers, is a trust power ; and that, like all such powers, it must be so exercised as to effect the object of the trust as far as it may be practicable. Nor can we disagree that the object of the power was to secure to these states a safe, uniform, and stable currency. The nature of the power, the terms used to convey it, the history of the times, the necessi- ty, with the creation of a common government, of having a common and uniform circulating medium, and the power conferred to punish those who, by coun- terfeiting, may attempt to debase and degrade the coins of the country, all pro- claim this to be the object. It is not my purpose to inquire whether, admitting this to be the object. Con- gress is not bound to use all the means in its power to give this safety, this sta- bility, this uniformity to the cvirrency, for v/hich the power was conferred ; nor to inquire whether the states are not bound to abstain from acts, on their part, in- consistent with them ; nor to inquire whether the right of banking, on the part of a state, does not directly, and by immediate consequence, injuriously affect the currency — whether the effect of banking is not to expel the specie currency, which, according to the assumption that this is a hard-money government, it was the object of the Constitution to furnish, in conferring the power to coin money ; or whether the effect of banking does not necessarily tend to diminish the value of a specie currency as certainly as clipping or reducing its weight would ; and whether it has not, in fact, since its introduction, reduced the val- ue of the coins one half. Nor do I intend to inquire whether Congress is not bound to abstain from all acts, on its part, calculated to affect injuriously the specie circulation, and whether the receiving anything but specie, in its dues, must not necessarily so affect it by diminishing the quantity in circulation, and depreciating the value of what remains. All these questions I leave open. I decide none of them. There is one, however, that I will decide. If Congress has a right to receive anything else than specie in its dues, they have the right to regulate its value ; and have a right, of course, to adopt all necessary and proper means, in the language of the Constitution, to effect the object. It mat- ters not what they receive, tobacco, or anything else, this right must attach to it. I do not assert the right of receiving, but I do hold it to be incontroverti- ble, that, if Congress were to order the dues of the government to be paid, for in- stance, in tobacco, they would have the right, nay, more, they would be bound to use all necessary and proper means to give it a uniform and stable value — inspections, appraisement, designation of qualities, and whatever else would be necessary to that object. So, on the same principle, if they receive bank-notes, they are equally bound to use all means necessary and proper, according to the peculiar nature of the subject, to give them uniformity, stability, and safety. SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 151 The very receipt of bank-notes, on the part of the government, in its dues, would, it is conceded, make them money, as far as the government mav be concerned, and, by a necessary consequence, vv'ould make them, to a great ex- tent, the currency of the country. I say nothing of the positive provisions in the Constitution which declare that " all duties, imposts, and excises shall be imiform throughout the United States," which cannot be, unless that in which they are paid should also have, as nearly as practicable, a uniform value throughout the country. To effect this, if bank-notes are received, the bank- ing power is necessary and proper within the meaning of the Constitution ; and, consequently, if the goverimient has the right to receive bank-notes in its dues, the power becomes constitutional. Here lies, said Mr. Calhoun, the real con- stitutional question : Has the government a right to receive bank-notes, or not ? The question is not upon the mere power of incorporating a bank, as it has been commonly argued ; though even in that view there would be as great a constitutional objection to any act on the part of the executive, or any other branch of the government, which should unite any association of state banks into one system, as the means of giving the uniformity and stability to the cur- rency which the Constitution intends to confer. The very act of so associa- ting or uniting them into one, by whatever name called, or by whatever depart- ment performed, would be, in fact, an act of incorporation. But, said Mr. Calhoun, my object, as I have stated, is not to discuss the con- stitutional questions, nor to determine whether the Bank be constitutional or not. It is, 1 repeat, to show where the difliculty lies : a difficulty which I have felt from the time I first came into the public service. I found then, as now, the currency of the country consisting almost entirely of bank-notes. I found the government intimately connected with the system ; receiving bank-notes in its dues, and paying them away, under its appropriations, as cash. The fact was beyond my control : it existed long before my time, and without my agency ; and I was compelled to act on the fact as it existed, without deciding on the many questions which I have suggested as connected with this subject, and on many of which I have never yet formed a definite opinion. No one can pay less regard to the precedent than I do, acting here, in my representative and de- liberative character, on legal or constitutional questions ; but I have felt from the beginning the full force of the distinction so sensibly taken by the senator from Virginia (Mr. Leigh) between doing and undoing an act, and which he so strongly illustrated in the case of the purchase of Louisiana. The constitu- tionality of that act was doubted by many at the time, and, among others, by its author himself; yet he would be considered a madman who, coming into polit- ical life at this late period, would now seriously take up the question of the constitutionality of the purchase, and, coming to the conclusion that it was un- constitutional, should propose to rescind the act, and eject from the Union two flourishing states and a growing territory : nor would it be an act of much less madness thus to treat the question of the currency, and undertake to suppress at once the system of bank circulation which has been growing up from the beginning of the government, which has penetrated into and connected itself ■with every department of our political system, on the ground that the Constitu- tion intended a specie circulation ; or who would treat the constitutional ques- tion as one to be taken up de novo, and decided upon elementary principles, without reference to the imperious state of facts. But in raising the questio'n whether my friends of the State Rights party can consistently vote for the measure which I have "suggested, I rest not its decision on the ground that their constitutional opinion in reference to the Bank is errone- ous. I assume their opinion to be correct — I place the argument, not on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality, but on wholly different ground. I lay it ' down, as an incontrovertible principle, that, admitting an act to be unconstitu- tional, but of such a nature that it cannot be reversed at once, or at least without 152 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. involving gross injustice to the community, we may, under such circumstances vote for its temporary continuance, for undoing gradually, as the oidy practica- ble mode of terminating it, consistently with the strictest constitutional objects. The act of the last session, adjusting the tariff, furnishes an apt illustration. All of us believed that measure to be unconstitutional and oppressive, yet we voted for it without supposing that we violated the Constitution in so doino-, although it allowed upward of eight years for the termination of the system, on the ground that to reverse it at once would spread desolation and ruin over a large portion of the country. I ask the principle in that case to be applied to this. It is equally as impossible to terminate suddenly the present system of paper currency, without spreading a desolation still wider and deeper over the face of the country. If it can be reversed at all — if we can ever return to a metallic currency, it must be by gradually undoing what we have done, and to tolerate the system while the process is going on. Thus, tlie measure which I have suggested proposes, for the period of twelve years, to be follow- ed up by a similar process, as far as a slow and cautious experience shall prove we may go consistently with the public interest, even to its entire reversal, if experience shall prove we may go so far, which, however, I, for one, do not anticipate ; but the effort, if it should be honestly commenced and pursued, would present a case every way parallel to the instance of the tariff to which I have already referred. I go farther, and ask the question, Can you, consistently with your obligation to the Constitution, refuse to vote for a measure, if intended, in good faith, to eflect the object already stated ? Would not a refusal to vote for the only means of terminating it consistently with justice, and without involving the horror of revolution, amount in fact, and in all its practical consequences, to a vote to perpetuate a state of things which all must acknowledge to be emi- nently imconstitutional, and highly dangerous to the liberty of the country 1 But I know that it will be objected that the Constitution ought to be amended, and the poAver conferred in express terms. I feel the full force of the objection. I hold the position to be sound,- that, when a constitutional question has been agitated involving the powers of the government, which experience shall prove cannot be settled by reason, as is the case of the Bank question, those who claim the power ought to abandon it, or obtain an express grant by an amend- ment of the Constitution ; and yet, even with this impression, I would, at the present time, feel much, if not insuperable objection, to vote for an amendment, till an eflbrt shall be fairly made, in order to ascertain to what extent the power might be dispensed with, as I have proposed. I hold it a sound principle, that no more power should be conferred upon the General Government than is indispensable ; and if experience should prove that the power of banking is indispensable, in the actual condition of the currency of this country and of the world generally, I should even then think that, what- ever power ought to be given, should be given with such restrictions and limita- tions as would limit it to the smallest amount necessary, and guard it with the utmost care against abuse. As it is, without farther experience, we are at a loss to determine how little or how much would be required to correct a dis- ease which must, if not corrected, end in convulsions and revolution. I con- sider the whole subject of banking and credit as undergoing at this time^ throughout the civilized world, a progressive change, of which I think I per- ceive many indications. Among the changes in progression, it appears to me there is a strong tendency in the banking system to resolve itself into two parts — one becoming a bank of circulation and exchange, for the purpose of regulating and equalizing the circulating medium, and the other assuming more the character of private banking ; of which separation there are indica- tions in the tendency of the English system, particularly perceptible in the late modification of the charter of the Bank of England. In the mean time, it would be wise in us to avail ourselves of the experience of the next few years before SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ' 153 any change be made in the Constiuiticn, particularly as the course which, it seems to me, it would be advisable to piursue, would be the same, whether the power be expressly conferred or not. I next address myself to the members of the opposition, who principally rep- resent the commercial and manufacturing portions of the country, where the banking system has been the farthest extended, and where a larger portion of the property exists in the shape of credit than in any other section, and to whom a sound and stable currency is most necessary, and the opposite most dangerous. You have no constitutional objection ; to you it is a mere questiou of expediency. Viewed in this light, can you vote for the measure suggested ? A measure designed to arrest the approach of events which, I have demonstra- ted, must, if not arrested, create convulsions and revolutions ; and to correct a disease which must, if not corrected, subject the currency to continued agita- tions and fluctuations ; and, in order to give that permanence, stability, and uni- formity, which is so essential to your safety and prosperity. To effect this may require some dirtinution of the profits of banking, some temporary sacri- fice of interest ; but if such should be the fact, it will be compensated more than a hundred fold by increased security and durable prosperity. If the sys- tem must advance in the present course without a check, and if explosion must follow, remember that where you stand will be the crater — should the system quake, under your feet the chasm will open that will ingulf your institutions and your prosperity. Can the friends of the administration vote for this measure ? If I understand their views, as expressed by the senator from Missouri, behind me (Mr. Ben- ton), and the senator from New-York (Mr. Wright), and other distinguished members of the party, and the views of the President as expressed in reported conversations, I see not how they can reject it. They profess to be the advo- cates of a metallic currency. I propose to restore it by the most effectual measures that can be devised ; gradually and slowly, and to the extent that experience may show that it can be done consistently with a due regard to the public interest. Farther no one can desire to go. If the means I propose are not the best and most eflectual, let better and more eflectual be devised. If the process which I propose be too slow or too fast, let it be accelerated or retarded. Permit me to add to theso views what, it appears to me, those whom I address ought to feel with deep and solemn obligation of duty. They are the advocates and the supporters of the administration. It is now conceded, almost universally, that a rash and precipitate act of the executive, to speak in the mildest terms, has plunged this country into deep and almost universal distress. You are the supporters of that measure — you personally incur the responsibility by that support. How are its consequences to terminate ? Do you see the end ? Can things remaia as they are, with the currency and the treasury of the country under the ex- clusive control of the executive 1 And by what scheme, what device, do you propose to extricate the country and the Constitution from their present dan- gers ? I have now said what I intended. I have pointed out, w ithout reserve, what I believe in my conscience to be for the public interest. May what I have said be received with favour equal to the sincerity with which it has been uttered. la conclusion, I have but to add, that, if what I have said shall in any degree con- tribute to the adjustment of this question, which I believe cannot be left opea without imminent danger, I shall rejoice ; but if not, I shall at least have the consolation of having discharged my duty. U 154 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. IX. SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES APRIL 9, 1834, ON THE BILL TO REPEAL THE FORCE ACT. I HAVE, said Mr. Calhoun, introduced this bill from a deep conviction that the act which it proposes to repeal is, in its tendency, subversive of our political institutions, and fatal to the liberty and happiness of the country ; which I trust to be able to establish to the satisfaction of the Senate, should I be so fortunate as to obtain a dispassionate and favourable hear- ing- In resting the repeal on this ground, it is not my intention to avail my- self of the objections to the details of the act, as repugnant as many of them are to the principles of our government. In illustration of the truth of this assertion, I might select that provision which vests in the Pres- ident, in certain cases, of which he is made the judge, the entire force of the country, civil, military, and naval, with the implied power of pledging the public faith for whatever expenditure he may choose to incur in its application. And, to prove how dangerous it is to vest such extraordi- nary powers in the executive, I might avail myself of the experience which we have had in the last {ew months of the aspiring character of that de- partment of the government, and which has furnished conclusive evidence of the danger of vesting in it even a very limited discretion. It is not for me to judge of the propriety of the course which the members of this body may think proper to pursue in reference to the question under con- sideration ; but 1 must say that I am at a loss to understand how any one, who regards as I do the acts to which I have referred, as palpable usur- pations of power, and as indicating on the part of the executive a danger- ous spirit of aggrandizement, can vote against the bill under considera- tion, and thereby virtually vote to continue in the President the extraor- dinary and dangerous power in question. But it may be said that the provision of the act which confers this pow- er will expire, by its own limitation, at the termination of the present session. It is true it will then cease to be law ; but it is no less true that the precedent, unless the act be expunged from the statute-book, will live forever, ready, on any pretext of future danger, to be quoted as an au- thority to confer on the chief magistrate similar, or even more dangerous powers, if more dangerous can be devised. We live in an eventful period, and, among other things, we have had, recently, some impressive lessons on the danger of precedents. To them immediately we owe the act which has caused the present calamitous and dangerous condition of the coun- try ; which has been defended almost solely on the ground of precedents — precedents almost unnoticed at the time ; but had they not existed, or had they been reversed at the time by Congress, the condition of the •country would this day be far different from what it is. With this knowl- edge of the facts, we must see that a bad precedent is as dangerous as the bad measure itself; and in some respects more so, as it may give rise to acts far worse than itself, as in the case to which I have alluded. In this view of the subject, to refuse to vote against the repeal of the act, and thereby constitute a precedent to confer similar, or more dangerous powers hereafter, would be as dangerous as to vote for an act to vest per- manently in the President the power in question. But I pass over this and other objections to the details not much less formidable. I take a higher stand against the act: I object to the princi- ple in which it originated, putting the details aside, on the ground, as I SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 155 have stated, that they are subversive of our political institutions, and fatal, in their tendency, to the liberty and happiness of the country. Fortunate- ly, we are not left to conjecture or inference as* to what these principles are. It was openly proclaimed, both here and elsewhere, in the debates of this body and the proclamation and message of the President, in which the act originated, that the very basis on which it rests — the assumption on Avhich only it could be supported — was, that this government had the final and conclusive right, in the last resort, to judge of the extent of its powers ; and that, to execute its decision, it had the right to use all the means of the country, civil, military, and fiscal, not only against individ- uals, but against the states themselves, and all acting under their author- ity, whether in a legislative, executive, or judicial capacity. If farther evidence be required as to the nature and character of the act, it will be found in the history of the events in which it took its ori- gin. It originated, as we all know, in a controversy between this govern- ment and the State of South Carolina, in reference to a power which in- volved the question of the constitutionality of a protective tariff. I do not intend to give the history of this controversy ; it is sufficient for my pur- pose to say that the state, in maintenance of what she believed to be her unquestionable power, assumed the highest ground : she placed herself on her sovereign authority as a constituent member of this confederacy, and made her opposition to the encroachment on her rights through a conven- tion of the people, the only organ by which, according to our conception, the sovereign will of a state can be immediately and directly pronounced. This government, on its part, in resistance to the action of the state, as- sumed the right to trample upon the authority of the convention, and to look bej'ond the state to the individuals who compose it : not as form- ing a political community, but as a mere mass of insolated individuals, without political character or authority ; and thus asserted in the strongest manner, not only the right of judging of its own powers, but that of over- looking, in a contest for power, the very existence of the state itself, and of recognising, in the assertion of what it might claim to be its power, no other authority whatever in the system but its own. Such being the principle in which this bill originated, we are brought to the consideration of a question of the deepest import. Is an act, which assumes such powers for this government, consistent with the nature and character of our political institutions'! It is not my intention, in the discussion of this question, to renew the debate of the last session. But, in declining to renew that discussion,! wish to be directly understood that I do so exclusively on the ground that I do not feel myself justified in repeating arguments so recently ad- vanced ; and not on the ground that there is the least abatement of con- jidence in the positions then assumed, or in the decisive bearing which they ought to have against the act. So far otherwise, time and reflection have but served to confirm me in the impression which I then entertain- ed ; and, without repeating the arguments, I now avail myself, in this dis- cussion, of the positions then established, and stand prepared to vindicate them against whatever assaults maybe made upon them, come from what quarter they may. Without, then, reopening the discussion of the last session on the elementary principles of our government, which were then brought into controversy, I shall now proceed to take the plainest and most common-sense view of our political institutions, regarding them merely in a matter-of-fact way, in order to ascertain the parts of which they are composed, and the relations which they bear to each other. Thus regarding our institutions, we are struck, on the first view, with the number and complexity of the parts — with the division, classification, 156 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. and organization which pervade every part of the system. It is, in fact, a system of governments ; and these, in turn, are a system of departments — - a system in which government bears the same relation to government, in reference to the whole, as departments do to departments, in reference to each particular government. As each government is made up of the le- gislative, executive, and judicial departments organized into one, so the system is made up of this government, and the state governments, in like manner, organized into one system. So, too, as the powers which consti- tute the respective governments are divided and organized into depart- ments, in like manner in the formation of the governments, their powers are classed into two distinct divisions : the one containing powers local and peculiar in their character, which the interests of the states require to be exercised by each state through a separate government 5 the other containing those which are more general and comprehensive, and which can be best exercised in some uniform mode through a common govern- ment. The former of these divisions constitutes what, in our system, are known as the reserved powers, and are exercised by each state through its own separate government. The latter are known as the delegated powers, and are exercised through this, the common government of the several states. This division of power into two parts, with distinct and independent governments, regularly organized into departments, legisla- tive, executive, and judicial, to carry their respective parts into effect, constitutes the great striking and peculiar character of our system, and is without example in ancient or modern times ; and may be regarded as the fundamental distribution of power under the system, and as constituting its great conservative principle. If we extend our eyes beyond, we shall find another striking division between the power of the people and that of the government — between that inherent, primitive, creative power which resides exclusively in the people, and from which all authority is derived, and the delegated power or trust conferred upon the government to effect the object of their cre- ation. If we look still beyond, we shall find another and most important division. The people, instead of being united in one general community, are divided into twenty-four states, each forming a distinct sovereign com- munity, and in which, separately, the whole power of the system ulti- mately resides. If we examine how this ultimate power is called into action, we shall find that its only organ is a primary assemblage of the people, known un- der the name of a convention, through which their sovereign will is an- nounced, and by which governments are formed and organized. If we trace historically the exertion of this power in the formation of the gov- ernments constituting our system, we shall find that, originally, on the separation of the thirteen colonies from the crown of Great Britain, each state for itself, through its own convention, formed separate constitu- tions and governments, and that these governments, in turn, formed a league or confederacy for the purpose of exercising those powers, in the regulation of which the states had a common interest. But this confed- eracy, proving incompetent for its object, was superseded by the present Constitution, which essentially changed the character of the system. If we compare the mode of the adoption of this Constitution with that of the adoption of original constitutions of the several states, we shall find them precisely the same. In both, each state adopted the Constitutioa through its own convention, by its separate act, each for itself, and is only bound in consequence of its own adoption, without reference to the adoption of any other state. The only point in which they can be dis- tinguished is the mutual compact, in which each state stipulated with the SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 157 Other to adopt it as a common Constitution. Thus regarded, this Con- gtitution is, in fact, the Constitution of each state. In Virginia, for in stance, it is the Constitution of Virginia ; and so, too, this government, and the laws which it enacts, are, within the limits of the state, the gov- ernment and the laws of the state. It is, in fact, the Constitution and gov- ernment of the whole, because it is the Constitution and government of each part ; and not the Constitution and government of the parts because it is of the whole. The system commences with the parts, and ends with the whole. The parts are the units, and the whole the multiple, instead of the whole being a unit and the parts the fractions. Thus viewed, each state has two distinct Constitutions and governments — a separate Consti- tution and government, instituted, as I have stated, to regulate the object in which each has a peculiar interest ; and a general one to regulate the inter- ests common to all, and binding by a common compact the whole into one community, in which the separate and independent existence of each state as a sovereign community is preserved, instead of being fused into a common mass. Such is our system : such are its parts, and such their relation to each other. I have stated no fact that can be questioned, nor have I omitted any that is essential which I am capable of pei-ceiving. In reviewing the whole, we must be no less struck with the simplicity of the means by Avhich all are blended into one, than we are by the number and coraplex- itjr of the parts. I know of no system, in either respect, ancient or mod- ern, to be compared with it ; and can compare it to nothing but that sub- lime and beautiful system of which our globe constitutes a part, and to which it bears in many particulars so striking a resemblance. In this sys- tem, this government, as we have seen, constitutes a part — a prominent, but a subordinate part, with defined, limited, and restricted powers. I now repeat the question, Is the act which assumes for this government the right to interpret, in the last resort, the extent of its powers, and to enforce its interpretation against all other authority, consistent with our institutions X To state the question is to answer it. We might with equal propriety ask whether a government of unlimited power is consist- ent with one of enumerated and restricted pow^ers. I say unlimited, for I M'ould hold his understanding in low estimation who can make, practical- ly, any distinction between a government of unlimited powers, and one which has an unlimited right to construe and enforce its powers as it pleases ; who does not see that, to divide power, and to give one of the parties the exclusive right to determine what share belongs to him, is to annihilate the division, and to vest the whole in him who possesses the right 1 It would be no less absurd, than for one in private life to divide his property with another, and vest in that other the absolute and uncon- ditional right to determine the extent of his share ; which would be, in fact, to give him the whole. Nor could I think much more highly of the understanding of him who does not perceive that this exclusive right, on the part of this government, of determining the extent of its powers, ne- cessar^y destroys all distinction between reserved and delegated powers; and that it thus strikes a fatal blow at that fundamental distribution of power which lies at the bottom of our system. It also, by inevitable con- sequence, destroys all distinction between constitutional and unconstitu- tional laws, making the latter to the full as obligatory as the former; of which we had a remarkable example when the act proposed to be repeal- ed was before the Senate. It is well known that the power in controver- sy between this government and the State of South Carolina had been pronounced to be unconstitutional by the legislatures of most of the Southern States, and also by many of the members of this body; and yet 158 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. there were instances, however extraordinary it may appear, of members of the body voting to enforce an act which they believed to be unconsti- tutional, and that, too, at the hazard of civil war. As strange as such a course most appear, it was the natural and legitimate consequence of the power which the act assumed for this government, and illustrates, in the strongest manner imaginable, the truth of what I have advanced. But to proceed. This unlimited right of judging as to its powers, not only de- stroys, as I have stated, all distinction between constitutional and uncon- stitutional acts, but merges in this government the very existence of the separate governments of the states, by reducing them from that independ- ent and distinct existence, as co-governments, assigned to them in the system, to mere subordinate and dependant bodies, holding their power and existence at the mercy of this government. It stops not here — it an- nihilates the states themselves. The right which it assumes of trampling upon the authority of a Convention of the people of the states, the only organ through which the sovereignty of the states can exert itself, and to look beyond the states to the individuals who compose them, and to treat them as entirely destitute of all political character or power, is, in fact, to annihilate the states, and to transfer their sovereignty, and all their powers, to this government. If we now raise our eyes, and direct them towards that once beautiful system, with all its various, separate, and independent parts blended into one harmonious whole, we must be struck with the mighty change ! All have disappeared — gone — absorbed — concentrated and consolidated in this government, Avhich is left alone in the midst of the desolation of the sys- tem, the sole and unrestricted representative of an absolute and despotic majority. Will it be tolerated, that I should ask whether an act which has caused so complete a revolution — which has entirely subverted our political sys- tem, as it emanated from the hands of its creators, and reared in its place one in every respect so different — must not, in its consequences, prove fa- tal to the liberty and the happiness of these states % Can it be necessary for me to prove that no other system that human ingenuity can devise, or imagination conceive, but that which this fatal act has subverted, can preserve the liberty or secure the happiness of the country % Need I show that the most difficult problem which ever was presented to the mind of a legislator to solve, was to devise a system of government for a country of such vast extent, that should at once possess sufficient power to hold the whole together, without, at the same time, proving fatal to liberty 1 There never existed an example before of a free community spreading over such an extent of territory ; and the ablest and profoundest thinkers, at the time, believed it to be utterly impracticable that there should be. Yet this difficult problem was solved — successfully solved, by the wise and sagacious men who framed our Constitution. No : it was above un- aided human wisdom — above the sagacity of the most enlightened. It was the result of a fortunate combination of circumstances, co-operating and leading the way to its formation ; directed by that kind Providence which has so often and so signally disposed events in our favour. To solve this difficult problem, and to overcome the apparently insu- perable obstacle which it presents, required that peculiar division, distribu- tion, and organization of power which, as I have stated, so remarkably distinguish our system, and which serve as so many breakwaters to ar- rest the angry waves of power, impelled by avarice and ambition, and which, driven furiously over a broad and unbroken expanse, would be re- sistless. Of this partition and breaking up of power into separate parts, the most remarkable division is that between the reserved and delegated SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOCN. 159 powers, which forms the basis on which this and the separate governments of the states are organized, as the great and primary departments of the system. It is this important division which mainly gives that expansive character to our institutions, by means of which they have the capacity of being spread over the vast extent of our country without exposing us on the one side to the danger of disunion, or on the other to the loss of lib- erty. Without this happy device, the people of these states, after having achieved their independence, would have been compelled to resolve them- selves into small and hostile communities, in despite of a common origin, a common language, and the common renown and glory acquired by their united wisdom and valour in the war of the Kevolution, or have submitted quietly to the yoke of despotic power as t,he only alternative. In the place of this admirably-contrived system, the act proposed to be repealed has erected one great consolidated government. Can it be ne- cessary for me to show Vv'hat must be the inevitable consequences 1 Need I prove that all consolidated governments — governments in which a sin- gle power predominates (for such is their essence) — are necessarily despot- ic, whether that power be wielded by the will of one man, or that of an absolute and unchecked majority ] Need I demonstrate that it is, on the contrary, the very essence of liberty that the power should be so divided, distributed, and organized, that one interest may check the other, so as to prevent the excessive action of the separate interests of the communi- ty against each other ; on the principle that organized power can only be checked by organized power ? The truth of these doctrines was fully understood at the tinse of the formation of this Constitution. It was then clearly foreseen and ibretold what must be the inevitable consequences of concentrating all the powers of the system in this government. Yes, we are in a state predicted, fore- told, prophesied from the beginning. All the calamities we have expe- rienced, and those which are yet to come, are the result of the consolida- ting tendency of the government ; and unless that tendency be arrested — unless we reverse our steps, all that has been foretold will certainly befall us — even to the pouring out of the last vial of wrath — military des- potism. To this fruitful source of woes may be traced that remarkable decay of public virtue ; that rapid growth of corruption and subserviency j that decline of patriotism ; that increase of faction ; that tendency to an- archy ; and, finally, that visible approach of the absolute power of one maa which so lamentably characterizes the times. Should there be any one seeing and acknowledging all these morbid and dangerous symptoms, but should doubt whether the disease is to be traced to the cause which I have assigned, I would ask him, To what other can it be attributed ^ There is no event — no, not in the political or moral world, more than in the physi- cal — without an adequate cause. I would ask him. Does he attribute it to the people 1 to their want of sufficient intelligence and virtue for self-gov- ernment 1 If the true cause may be traced to them, very melancholy would be our situation ; gloomy would be the prospect before us. If such, be the fact, that our people are, indeed, incapable of self-government, I know of no people upon earth with whom we might not desire to change condition. When the day comes when this people shall be compelled to surrender self-government, a people so spirited and so long accustomed to liberty, it will be indeed a day of revolution, of convulsion and blood, such as has rarely, if ever, been witnessed in any age or country ; and, until compelled by irresistible evidence, so fearful a cause cannot be ad- mitted. Can it be attributed to the nature of our system of government 1 Shall we pronounce it radically defective, and incapable of effecting the objects •160 ' SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. for which it was created 1 If that be, in truth, the case, our situation would be, in fact, not much less calamitous than if attributable to the people. To what other system could we resort 1 To a confederation 1 That has already been tried, and has proved utterly inadequate. To consolidation'? Rea- son and experience (as far as we have had experience) proclaim it to be the worst possible form. But if the cause be not in the people or the system, to what can it be attributed but to some misapprehension of the nature and character of our institutions, and consequent misdirection of their powers or functions 1 And if so, to what other misapprehension or misdirection, but that which directed our system towards consolidation, and consummated its movement in that direction in the act proposed to be repealed 1 That such is the fact — that this is the true explanation of all the symptoms of decay and corruption which I have enumerated — is, in reality, our only consolation ; furnishes the only hope that can be ra- tionally entertained of extricating ourselves from our present calamity, and of averting the still greater that are impending. I know that there are those who take a different, but, in my opinion, a very superficial view of the cause of our difficulties. They attribute it exclusively to those who are in power, and see in the misconduct of Gen- eral Jackson the cause of all that has befallen us. That he has done much to aggravate the evil, I acknowledge with pain. I had my full share of responsibility in elevating him to powei', and there once existed between lis friendly relations, personal and political, and I would rejoice had he so continued to conduct himself as to advance the interests of the country, and his own reputation and fame. He certainly might have effected much good. He came into office under circumstances, and had a weiorht of popularity which placed much in his power, for good or for evil ; but either from a want of a just comprehension of the duties attached to the situation in which he is placed, or an indisposition to discharge them, or the improper influence and control of those who, unfortunately for the country and for himself, have acquired, through flattery and subserviency, an ascendency over him, he has disappointed the hopes of his friends, and realized the predictions of his enemies. But the question recurs. How happened it that he who has proved himself so illy qualified to fill the high station that he occupies, was elected by the people 1 If it be attrib- uted to a misapprehension of his qualifications, or to an undue gratitude for distinguished military services, which at times leads astray the most intelligent and virtuous people in the selection of rulers — how shall we explain his re-election, after he had actually proved himself so incompe- tent ; after he had violated every pledge which he had made previous to election ; after he had disregarded the principles on which he had permit- ted his friends and partisans to place his elevation, and had outraged the feelings of the community by attempting to regulate the domestic inter- course and relations of society'? Shal. we say that the feelings of grat- itude for military services outweighed all this'? or that the people, with all this experience, were incapable of forming a correct opinion of his con- duct or character, or of understanding the tendency of the measures of his administration '? To assert this would be neither more nor less than to assert that they have neither the intelligence nor the virtue for self- government ; as the very criterion by which their capacity in that respect is tested, is their ability duly to appreciate the character and conduct of public rulers, and the true tendency of their public measures ; and to ad- mit their incapacity in that respect would, in fact, bring us back to the people as the cause. To understand truly how the distinguished individual now at the head of the nation was elevated to this exalted station, in despite of his ac- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 161 knowledged defects in several respects, and how he has retained his power among an intelligent and patriotic people, notwithstanding all the objections to his administi-ation that have been stated, we must elevate our views from the individual, and his qualifications and conduct, to the working of the system itself, by which only we can come to a knowledge of the true cause of our present condition ; how we have arrived at it, and by what means we can extricate ourselves from its dangers and diffi- culties. I do not deem it necessary, in taking this view, to go back and trace the operation of our government from the commencement, or to point out the departure from its true principles from the beginning, with the evils thence resulting, however interesting and instructive the inves- tigation might be. I might show that from the first, beginning with the formation of the Constitution, there were two parties in the Convention : one in favour of a national, or, what is the same thing, a consolidated government, and the other in favour of the confederative principle ; how the latter, from being in the minority at first, gradually, and after a long struggle, gained the ascendency ; and how the fortunate result of that as- cendency terminated in the establishment of that beautiful, complex, fed- erative system of government which I have attempted to explain. I might show that the struggle between the two parties did not termi- nate with the adoption of the Constitution ; that after it went into opera- tion the national party gained the ascendency in the counsels of the na- tion ; and that the result of that ascendency was to give an impulse to the government in the direction which their principles led, and from which it never afterward recovered. I am far from attributing this to any sin- ister design. The party were not less distinguished for patriotism than for ability, and no doubt honestly intended to give the system a fair trial ; but they would have been more than men, if their attachment to a favour- ite plan had not biased their feelings and judgment. I (said Mr. C.) avail myself of the occasion to avow my high respect for both of the great parties which divided the country in its early history. They were both eminently honest and patriotic, and the preference which each gave to its respective views resulted from a zealous attachment to the public interest. At that early period, before there was any experience as to the operation of the system, it is not surprising that one should believe that the danger was a tendency to anarchy, while the other believed it to be towards despotism, and that these different theoretical views should hon- estly have a decided influence on their public conduct. I pass over the intermediate events : the reaction against the national, or, as it was then called, federal party — the elevation of Mr. Jefferson in consequence of that reaction in 1801 — and the gradual departure (from the influence of power) of the Republican party from the principles which brought them into office. I come down at once to the year eighteen hun- dred and twenty-four, when a protective tariff" was for the first time adopt- ed ; when the power to impose duties, granted for the purpose of raising revenue, was converted into an instrument of regulating, controlling, and organizing the entire capital and industry of the country, and placing them under the influence of this government ; and when the principles of con- solidation gained an entire ascendency in both houses of Congress. Its first fruit was to give a sectional action to the government, and, of course, a sectional character to political parties — arraying the non-exporting states against the exporting, and the Northern against the Southern section. It is my wish to speak of the events to which I feel myself compelled to refer, in illustration of the practical operation of that consolidating tendency of the government, which was consummated by the act pro- posed to be repealed, and which I believe to be the cause of all our evils X 162 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. with the greatest possible moderation. I know how delicate a task it is to speak of recent political events, and of the actors concerned in thenn ; and I would, on this occasion, gladly avoid so painful a duty, if I did not believe that truth and public interest require it. Without a full under- standing of the events of this period, from '24 down to the present time, it is impossible that we can have a just knowledge of the cause of our present condition, or a clear perception of the means of remedying it. To avoid all personal feeling, I shall endeavour to recede, in imagination, a century from the present time, and from that distant position regard the events to which I allude, in that spirit of philosophical inquiry by which an earnest seeker after truth, at so remote a day, may be supposed to be ac- tuated. I feel I may be justified in speaking with the less reserve of these events, as the great question which, during the greater part of the period, so deeply agitated the country (the protective tariff), may now be consid- ered as terminated in the adjustment of the last winter, never to be re- agitated, as I trust ; and, of course, may be spoken of with the freedom of a past event. But to proceed with the narrative : the presidential contest, which was terminated the next year, placed the executive department under the con- trol of the same interest that controlled the legislative, so that all depart- ments of this government were united in favour of that great interest. The successful termination of the election in favour of the individual then elevated to the chief magistracy, and for whom 1 then and now entertain kind feelings, may be attributed in part, no doubt, to the predominance o{ the tariff interest, and may be considered as the first instance of the predominance of that interest in a presidential contest. Let us pause at this point (it is an important one), in order to survey the state of public affairs at that juncture. In casting our eyes over the scene, we find the country divided into two great hostile and sectional parties — placed in conflict on a question, believed to be on both sides of vital importance, in reference to their respective interests ; and, on the side of the weaker party, believed, in addition, to involve a constitutional question of the greatest magnitude, and having a direct and important bearing on the duration of the liberty and Constitution of the country. In this conflict, we find both houses of Congress, Avith the chief magistrate, and, of course, the government itself, on the side of the dominant interest, and identified with it in principles and feelings. In this state of things, a great and solemn question, What ought to be done 1 was forced on the decision of the minority. Shall we acquiesce, or shall we oppose 1 and if oppose, how 1 To acquiesce quietly would be to subject the property and industry of an entire section of the country to an unlimited and indef- inite exaction ; as it was openly avowed that'the protective system could only be perfected by being carried to the point of prohibition on all ar- ticles of which a sufficient supply could be made or manufactured in the country. To submit under such circumstances would have been, accord- ing to our view of the subiect, a cross dereliction both of interest and duty. It was impossible. But how could the majority be successfully opposed, possessed, as they were, of every department-of the government I How, in this state of things, could the minority effect a change in their favour through the ordinary operations of the government ^. They could effect no favourable change in this or the other house — the majority in both but too faithfully represented what their constituents believed to be the interest of their section, to whom only, and not to us, they were re- sponsible. The only branch of the government, then, on which the mi- nority could act, and through which they could hope to effect a favourable change, was the executive. The President is elected by a majority of SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 163 the whole electoral votes, and, of course, the minority have a weight in his election, in proportion to their niimber and the unity of their voice. Here was all our hope, and to this point all our eflorts to effect a change were necessarily directed ; but even here our power of acting with efi'ect was limited to a narrow circle. It would have been hopeless to present a can- didate openly and fully identified with our own interest. Defeat would have been the certain result, had his acknowledged qualifications for intelli- gence, experience, and patriotism been ever so great. We were thus forced by inevitable consequence — neither to be avoided nor resisted — to abandon the contest, or to select a candidate who, at best, wAs but a choice of evils ; one whose opinions were intermediate or doubtful on the subject which divided the two sections. However great the hazard, or the objections to such a selection for such an office, it must be char- ged, not to us, but to that action of the system which compelled us to make the choice— compelling us by that consolidating tendency which had drawn under the control of this government the local and reserved powers belonging to the states separately ; the exercise of which had ne- cessarily given that direction to its action, that created and placed in con- flict the two great sectional, political parties. But it was not sufficient that the opinion of our candidate should not be fully in coincidence with our own. That alone could not be sufficient to ensure his success. It was necessary that he should have great per- sonal popularity, distinct from political ; to be, in a word, a successful military chieftain, which gives a popularity the most extensive, and the least affected by political considerations ; and this was another fruit — a necessary fruit of consolidation. To these recommendations others must be added, in order to conciliate the feelings of the minority — that he should be identified, for instance, with them in interest, possess the same prop- erty, and pursue the same industry. These qualifications, all of which were made indispensable by the juncture, pointed clearly to one man, and but one, General Jackson. There was, however, another circumstance which gave him great prominence and strength, and which greatly con- tributed to recommend him as the opposing candidate. He had been de- feated in the presidential contest before the House of Representatives (though returned with the highest vote) under circumstances which were supposed to involve a disregard of the public voice. I do not deem it necessary to enter into an inquiry as to the principles which controlled the election, or as to the view of the actors in that scene. Many con- siderations doubtless governed, and, among others, the feelings of prom- inent individuals in reference to the candidates, and their opinion of their respective qualifications, besides the one to which I have alluded — that of giving to the dominant interest that control over the executive which they had over the legislative department. These combined motives, as I have stated, pointed distinctly to Gen- eral Jackson. H« was selected as the candidate of the minority, and the canvass entered into ivith all that zeal which belonged to the magnitude of the stake, united with the consciousness of honest and patriotic pur- pose. The leading objects were to effect a great political reform, and to arrest, if possible, what we believed to be a dangerous, and felt to be an oppressive action of the government. It is true that the qualifications of the individual, thus necessarily selected, were believed to be, in many im- portant particulars, defective ; that he lacked experience, extensive polit- ical information, and a command of temper; but it was believed that his firmness of purpose, and his natural sagacity, by calling to his aid the ex- perience, the talents, and patriotism of those who supported his claims, would compensate for these defects. 164 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. I do not deem it necessary to enter into a history of this interesting and animated canvass ; but there is one circumstance attending it so striicing, so full of instruction, and so illustrative of the point under con- sideration, that I cannot pass it in silence. The canvass soon ran into "ihe great and absorbing question of the day, as all ordinary diseases run 'nto the prevailing one. Those in power sought to avail themselves of the popularity of the system with which they were identified. I speak it not in censure. It was natural, perhaps unavoidable, as connected with the morbid action of the government. That portion of our allies iden- tified \fith the same interest were in like manner, and from the same motive and cause, forced into a rivalry of zeal for the same interest. The result of these causes, combined with a monopolizing spirit of the protect- ive system, was the tariff of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight : that disastrous measure, which has brought so many calamities upon us, and put in peril the Union and liberty of the country. It poured millions into the treasury, beyond even the most extravagant wants of the government ; and which, on the payment of the public debt, caused that hazardous junc- ture, resulting from a large undisposable surplus revenue, which has spread such deep corruption in every direction. This disastrous event opened our eyes (I mean myself, and those imme- diately connected with me) as to the full extent of the danger and op- pression of the protective system, and the hazard of failing to efi'ect the reform intended throuoh the election of General Jackson. With these disclosures, it became necessary to seek some other ultimate, but more certain measure of protection. We turned to the Constitution to find this remedy. We directed a more diligent and careful scrutiny into its pro- visions, in order to ascertain fully the nature and character of our polit- ical system. We found a certain and effectual remedy in that great fun- damental division of the powers of the system between this government and its independent co-departments : the separate government of the states, to be called into action to arrest the unconstitutional acts of this government, by the interposition of the state — the paramount source from which both governments derive their power. But in relying on this as our ultimate remedy, we did not abate our zeal in the presidential canvass; we still hoped that General Jackson, if elected, would effect the necessary reform, and there\>y supersede the necessity for calling into action the sovereign authority of th« state, which we were anxious to avoid. With these views, the two we^e pushed with equal zeal at the same time ; which double operation commenced in the fall of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight, but a few months after the passage of the Tar- iff Act of that year ; and at the meeting of the Legislature of the State, at the same period, a paper, known as the South Carolina Exposition, was reported to that body, containing a full development, as well on the con- stitutional point, as the operation of the proiective system, preparatory to a state of things which might eventually render the action of the state necessary in order to protect her rights and interests, and to stay a course of policy which we believed would, if not arrested, prove destructive of liberty and the Constitution. This movement on the part of the state places beyond all controversy the true character of the motives which governed us in the presidential canvass. We were not the mere partisans of the candidate we supported. We aimed at a far more exalted object than his election — the defence of the rights of the state, and the security of liberty and of the Constitution. To this we held his election entirely subordinate. This we pursued, unwarped by selfish or ambitious views. The contest terminated in the elevation of him who now presides 5 but it soon became apparent that our apprehensions that we might be dis- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 165 appointed in the expected reform, was not without foundation. That oc- curred, which we ought, perhaps, to have expected, and which, under similar circumstances, has rarely failed to follow. He who was elevated to power proved to be more solicitous to retain what he had acquired than to fulfil the expectation of those who had honestly contributed to his elevation, with a view to political reform. The tale may be readily told: not a promise fulfilled — not a measure adopted to correct the abuses of the system — not a step taken to arrest the progress of consolidation, and. to restore the confederative principles of our government — not a look cast to the near approach of the payment of the public debt — nor an effort made to reduce gradually the duties, in order to prevent a surplus revenue, and to save the manufactures which had grown up under the protective system, from the hazard of a shock caused by a sudden reduction of the duties. All were forgotten; and, instead of attempting to control events, the executive was only solicitous to occupy a position the most propitious to retain and increase his power. It required but little penetration to see that the position sought was a middle one between the contending parties: to be identified v.'ith no principle or policy, and rely on the personal pop- ularity of the incumbent, and the power and patronage of the government, as the means of support. Hence a third party was formed, a personal and government party, made up of those who were attached to the person and the fortunes of a successful political chief. In a word, we had ex- hibited to our view, for the first time under our system, that most danger- ous spectacle, in a country like ours, a prerogative party, who take their creed wholly from the mandate of their chief. The times were eminently propitious for the formation of such a party. Millions were poured into the treasury by the high protective duties of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight, furnishing an overflowing fund to secure the services of ex- pectants and partisans. Against these superabundant means of power there was not, nor could there be, as things were situated, any effective resistance, all being necessarily withdrawn in consequence of the fierce contest between the two sections which continued to rage with increasing violence, and which wasted the strength of the parties on each other, in- stead of opposing the rapidly-increasing power of the executive. This, and not the personal or the military popularity of General Jackson, is the true explanation of the fact, which has struck so many with wonder, that no misconduct, that no neglect of duty nor perversions of the power of government, however gross, has been able to shake his power and pop- ularity ; and that the people have looked idly on, apparently bereaved of every patriotic sentiment, or joined to swell the tide of power with shouts of approbation at every act, however outrageous. I do not doubt that his personal popularity, arising from his military achievements, contributed much to his elevation (in fact, it was one of the elements, as stated, which governed his selection as a candidate), and to sustain him while in power ; but I feel a perfect conviction that, whatever advantage he has gained from this source, has been more than counterbalanced by the mismanage- ment and blunders of his administration, and that it would be equally dif- ficult to expel from power any individual of sagacity and firmness, in possession of that department, under the circumstances which he has held it. Let us learn, from the instructive history of this interesting period, that despotic power, under our system, commences with usurpation of this government on the reserved powers of the states, and terminates in the concentration of all the powers of this government in the person of a chief magistrate ; and that, unless the first be resisted, the latter follows by a necessary, resistless, and inevitable law, as much so as that which governs the movements of the solar system. 166 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. As soon as it was perceived that he whom we had elevated to office was, as I have stated, more intent to retain and augment his power than to meet the just expectations on which he was supported, we totally de- spaired of relief and reform through the ordinary action of this govern- ment, and separated, from that moment, from the administration ; with- drew from the political contest here, and concentrated all our energies on that ultimate remedy which we had taken the precaution to prepare, in order to be called into action in the event of things taking the direction ■w^hich they have. An active discussion followed in the state, in which the principles and character of our political institutions were fully investigated, and a clear perception of the danger to which the country was exposed was impress- ed upon the public mind. Still the determination was fixed not to act while there was a ray of hope of redress from the government 5 and we accordingly waited the approach of the final payment of the public debt, when all pretexts for keeping up the extravagant duties of eighteen hun dred and twenty-eight would cease. The near approach of that event caused the passage of the act of eighteen hundred and thirty-two, which was proclaimed on both sides, by the opposition and the administration, to be a final and permanent adjustment of the protective system. We felt every disposition to acquiesce in any reasonable adjustment, but it was impossible, consistently with our views of the nature of our rights, and the consequences involved in the contest, to submit to the act. The protective principle was fully maintained ; the reduction was small, and the distribution of the burden between the two sections more unequal than under the act of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight. Every effort was made to magnify the amount of reduction. With that view false and de- ceptions calculations were made, and that, too, in official documents, in order to make the impression that the revenue would be reduced to the legitimate wants of the government, or, at least, nearly so. We were not to be imposed upon by such calculations. We clearly perceived that the income would be at least from twenty-two to twenty-five millions of dol- lars, nearly double what the government ought to expend ; and we as clearly saw how much so large a permanent surplus must contribute to corrupt the country and undermine our political institutions. Seeing this, with a prospect of an indefinite continuance of the heavy and useless tax levied in the shape of duties, the state interposed, and by that inter- position prepared to arrest within its limits the operation of the protective system — interposed, not to dissolve the Union, as was calumniously charged, but to compel an adjustment here or through a convention of the states, or, if an adjustment could not be had through either, to compel the government to abandon the protective system. The moment was portentous. Our political system rocked to the centre. Whatever diseases existed within, engendered by long corrup- tion and abuse, were struck to the surface. The proclamation and the message of the President appeared, containing doctrines never before officially avowed — going far beyond the extreme tenets of the Federal party, and in direct conflict with all that had ever been entertained by the Republican party ; and yet, such was the corruption, such the subserviency to power, that both parties, forgetting the past, abandoning every political principle, however sacred or long entertained, rushed to the embrace of the new creed — suddenly, instantly, without the slightest hesitation. Never did a free people exhibit so degraded a spectacle ; give such evi- dence of the loose attachment to principle, or greater subserviency to power. At this moment the current of events tended towards despotic authority in the person of the chief magistrate on one side, and to dis- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 167 xinion on the other : on one side to clothe the President with power more than dictatorial, in order to maintain the ascendency of the protective system; and, on the other, to resist the loss of liberty at every hazard. Fortunately for the country, there was at the time in the councils of the nation an individual who had the highest weight of authority with the supporters of that system — one who had done more to advance it than any other — who was the most intimately identified with it, and to whom, of course, the task of adjustment most appropriately belonged. For- tunately, also, he had the disposition and the fortitude to undertake it. An adjustment followed ; the crisis of our disease was passed ; the body politic from that moment became convalescent ; the tendency to despotic power in the executive was weakened — doubly weakened — by enabling those who had been so long wasting their strength in mutual conflict, to unite in resisting the usurpation of that department, as we this day behold on the question of the deposites ; and by diminishing the revenue — the food on which it had grown to such enormous dimensions. In a short time the decreasing scale of duties will cause the effect of this diminution to be felt : a period that will be hastened by that profuse and profligate disbursement which has nearly doubled the public expenditure, and which is so rapidly absorbing the surplus revenue. I have said that the crisis is passed ; yet there remains some trouble- some and even dangerous symptoms, growing out of the former cause of the disease, which, however, may be overcome by skill and decision ; un- less, indeed, they should run into the lurking cause of another, and most dangerous disease, Avith which it is intimately connected, and excite it into action; I mean the rotten state of the currency. There are indica- tions of a very dangerous and alarming character of this tendency, at the point where the currency is the most disordered. I refer to the measure now pending before the Legislature of New-York, to pledge the capital and the industry of the state, to the amount of six millions of dollars, in support of the banks — a measure of a kind that a British minister (Lord Althorp), with all the power of Parliament to support him, refused to adopt, because of its dangerous and corrupting tendency. Let us now turn, and inquire, AVhat would have been the course of events if the state had not interposed, and things had been permitted to take their natural course \ The act of eighteen hundred and thirty-two was proclaimed, as I have stated, on both sides, to be a final settlement of the tariff question, and, of course, was intended to be a permanent law of the land. The revenue, as I have already stated, under that act, and the sales of public lands, would, in all probability, be not less than twenty-five millions of dollars per annum : a sum exceeding the legiti- mate wants of the government, estimated on a liberal scale, by ten or eleven millions of dollars. Now, I ask, What would have been our situa- tion, Avith so large an annual surplus, and a fierce sectional conflict raging between the Northern and Southern portions of the Union '? If we find it so difficult to resist the usurpation of the executive department with a temporary surplus revenue, to continue at most l^ut for one or two years, how much more difficult would it have been to resist with a permanent surplus such as I have stated? If we find it so difficult to resist that de- partment when those who have been separated by the tariff are united, how utterly hopeless would have been tlie prospect of resistance were that question now open, and those who are now united against executive encroachments were exhausting their strength against each other 1 Is it not obvious that the executive power, under such circumstances, would have been irresistible, and that we should have been impelled rapidly to despotism or disunion] One or the other would certainly have been our 168 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUX. fate, if events had been permitted to move in the channel in which they were then flowing, and despotism much more probably than disunion. It is almost without example that free states should be disunited in con- sequence of the violence of internal conflicts ; but very numerous are the cases in which such conflicts have terminated in the establishment of de- spotic power. The danger of disunion is small ; that of despotism great. We have, however, I trust, escaped, for the present, the danger of both, for which we are indebted to that great conservative principle of our sys- tem, which considers this government and that of the states as co-depart- ments ; and which proved successful, although rejected by every state but one, and although called into action on the most trying occasion that caa be imao-ined, and under the most adverse circumstances. 1 said that the danger has passed for the present. The seeds of the disease still remain in the system. The act which I propose to repeal accompanied the adjustment of the tarifl*. It was passed solely on the ground of recognising the principles in which it originated, and to estab- lish them, as far as an act of Congress could do so, as the permanent law of the land. While these seeds remain, it will be in vain to expect a healthy state of the body politic: alienation, the loss of confidence, susr picion, jealousy, on the part of the Aveaker section at least, who have ex- perienced the bitter fruits that spring from those principles, must accom- pany the movements of this government. But these seeds will not remain in the system without germinating. Unless removed, the genius of con- solidation will again exhibit itself 5 but in what form, whether in revival of the question from whose dangers we have not yet wholly escaped j whether between North and South, East and West ; whether between the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding states ; the rich and poor, or the capitalists and the operatives, it is not for me to say ; but that it will again revive (unless, by your votes, you expunge the act from your statute- book), to divide, distract, and corrupt the community, is certain. Nor is it much less so that, when it again revives, it will pass through all those stages which we have witnessed, and, in all human probability, consum- mate itself, and terminate, finally, in a military despotism. Reverse the scene — let the act be obliterated forever from among our laws 5 let the principle of consolidation be forever suppressed, and that admirable and beautiful federative system, Avhich I have so imperfectly portrayed, be firmly established, and renovated health and vigour will be restored to the body politic, and our country may yet realize that permanent state of liberty, prosperity, and greatness, which we all once so fondly hoped was our allotted destiny. X. A REPORT ON THE EXTEJJT OF EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE, FEBRUARY 9, 1835 The Select Committee appointed to inquire into the extent of the executive patron- age ; the circumstances which have contriluted to its great increase of late ; the expediency and practicability of reducing the same, and the means of such re- duction, have bestowed 071 the subjects into which they were directed to inquire thai deliberate attention which their importance demands, and submit, as the re- sult of their investigation, the following report, in part : To ascertain the extent of executive patronage, the first subject to which the xesolution directs the attention of the committee, it becomes necessary to as- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 169 certain previously the auiount of the revenue and the expenditure, and the number of officers, agents, and persons in the employment of the government, or who receive money from the public treasury, all of which, taken collectively, consti- tute the elements of which patronage is mainly composed. As the returns of the revenue and expenditure for the year 1834 are not yet completed, your committee have selected the year 1833 as being the last of which complete and certain returns can be obtained. The result of iheir investigation on all these points will be found in a table an- nexed to the report, which contains a statement of the gross amount of the rev- enue under the various heads of customs, lands, postoffice, and miscellaneous, for the year 1833 ; the expenditures for the same period, arranged under the va- rious heads of appropriations, the number of officers, agents, contractors, and persons in the employment of the government, or who receive money from the public treasury. From this table it appears that the aggregate amount of* the revenue for the year was $35,298,426, and of the disbursements $22,713,755; that the number of officers, agents, and persons in the employment of the gov- ernment is 60,294 : of which there btlong to the civil list, including persons in civil employ, attached to the army and navy, 12,144 ; to the military and In- dian department, 9643 ; to the navy, including marine corps, 6499 ; to the post- office, 31,917 ; all of whom hold their places directly or indirectly from the ex- ecutive, and, with the exception of the judicial officers, are liable to be dismiss- ed at his pleasure. If to the above there be added 39,549 pensioners, we shall have a grand total of 100,079 persons who are in the employ of the govern- ment, or dependant directly on the public treasury. But, as great as is this number, it gives a very imperfect conception of the sum-total of those who, as furnishing supplies or otherwise, are connected with, and more or less dependant on, the government, and, of course, liable to be in- fluenced by its patronage, the number of whom, with their dependants, cannot even be conjectured. If to these be added the almost countless host of expect- ants who are seeking to displace those in office, or to occupy their places as they become vacant, all of whom must look to the executive for the gralihcatioa of their wishes, some conception may be formed of the immense number sub- ject to the influence of executive patronage. But to ascertain the full extent of this influence, and the prodigious control which it exerts over public opinion and the movements of the government, we must, in addition to the amount of the revenue and expenditure, and the num- ber of persons dependant upon the government, or in its employ, take into the estimate sk variety of circumstances which contribute to add to the force and extent of patronage. These, in the regular course of the investigation, would next claim the attention of your committee ; but as all, or, at leasts a far greater part of them, are of recent origin, they will properly fall under the next head to which the resolution directs the attention of your committee, and which they will now proceed to investigate. Among the circumstances which have contributed to the great increase of executive patronage of late, the most prominent, doubtless, are the great increase of the expenditure of the government, which, within the last eight years (from 1825 to 1833), has risen from $11,490,460 to $22,713,755, not including pay- ments on account of the public debt ; a corresponding increase oX officers, agents, contractors, and others, dependant on the government ; the vast quantity oi land to which the Indian title has, in the same period, been extinguished, and v/hich, has been suddenly thrown into the market, accompanied with the patronage in- cident to holding Indian treaties, and removing the Indians to the west of the Mississippi, and also a great increase of the number and influence of survey- ors, receivers, registers, and others employed in the branch of the administra- tion connected with the public lands ; all of which have greatly increased the influence of executive patronage over an extensive region, and that the most Y 170 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. growing and flourishing portion of the Union. In this connexion, the recent practice of the government must be taken into estimate, of reserving to individ- isal Indians a large portion of the best land of the country, to vv^hich the title of the nation is extinguished, to be disposed of under the sanction of the execu- tive, on the recommendation of agents appointed solely by him, and \vhich has prevailed to so great an extent of late, especially in the South w^estern section of the Union. ' It is difficult to imagine a device better calculated to augment the patronage of the executive, and, with it, to give rise to speculations calculated to deprave and corrupt the community, without benefit to the Indians. But as greatly as these causes have added to the force of patronage of late, there are others of a different nature, which have contributed to give it a far greater and more dan- gerous influence. At the head of these should be placed the practice so great- ly extended, if not for the first time introduced, of removing from office persons well qualified, and who had faithfully performed their duty, in order to fill their places with those who are recommended on the ground that they belong to the party in power. • Your committee feel that they are touching ground which may be considered of a party character, and which, were it possible consistently with the discharge of their duty, they would wholly avoid, as their object is to inquire into facts only, as contributing to increase the patronage of the executive, without looking to intention, or desiring to cast censure on those in power ; but while they v.'ould cautiously avoid any remark of a party character, as inconsistent with the gravity of the subject, and incompatible with the intention of the Senate in di- recting the inquiry, they trust that they are incapable of shrinking from the per- formance of the important and solemn duty confided to them, of thoroughly in- vestigating to the bottom a subject involving, as they believe, the fate of our po- litical institutions and the liberty of the country, by declining to investigate, fully and freely, as regards its character and consequence, every measure or practice of the government connected with the inquiry, whether ft has or has not been a subject of party controversy. In speaking of the practice of removing from office on party ground as of re- cent date, and, of course, comprehended under the causes which have, of late, contributed to the increase of executive patronage, your committee are aware that cases of such removals may be found in the early stages of the govern- ment ; but they are so few, and exercised so little influence, that they may be said to constitute instances rather than as forming a practice. It is only within the last few years that removals from office have been introduced as a system ; and for the first time, an opportunity has been afforded of testing*the tendency of the practice, and witnessing the mighty increase which it has given to the force of executive patronage ; and the entire and fearful change, in conjunction with other causes, it is effecting in the character of our political system. Nor ■will it require much reflection to perceive in what manner it contributes to in- crease so vastly the extent of executive patronage. So long as offices were considered as public trusts, to be conferred on the honest, the faithful, and capable, for the common good, and not for the benefit or gain of the incumbent or his party, and so long as it was the practice of the government to continue in office those who faithfully performed their duties, its patronage, in point of fact, was limited to the mere power of nominating to ac- cidental vacancies or to newly-created offices, and could, of course, exercise but a moderate influence, either over the body of the community, or of the office-hold- ers themselves ; but when this practice was reversed — when offices, instead of being considered as public trusts, to be conferred on the deserving, were regard- ed as the spoils of victory, to be • bestowed as rewards for partisan services, without respect to merit ; when it came to be understood that all who hold of- Ace hold by the tenure of partisan zeal and party service, it is easy to see that SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 171 the certain, direct, and inevitable tendency of such a state of things is to convert, the entire body of those in office into corrupt and supple instruments of power, and to raise up a host of hungry, greedy, and subservient partisans, ready for every service, however 'base and corrupt. Were a premium offered for the best means of extending to the utmost the power of patronage ; to destroy the love of country, and to substitute a spirit of subserviency and man- worship ; to en- courage vice and discourage virtue ; and, in a word, to prepare for the subver- sion of liberty and the establishment of despotism, no scheme more perfect could be devised ; and such must be the tendency of the practice, with whatever in- tention adopted, or to whatever extent pursued. As connected with this portion of the inquiry, your committee cannot avoid adverting to the practice, similar in its character and tendency, growing out of the act of the 15th of May, 1820, which provides, among other things, that, from and after its passage, all district attorneys, collectors, and other disbur- sing officers therein mentioned, to be appointed under the laws of the United States, shall be appointed for the term of four years. The object of Congress in passing this act was, doubtless, to enforce a more faithful performance of duty on the part of the disbursing officers, by withholding reappointments from those who had not faithfully discharged their duty, without intending to reject those who haif. At first the practice confonned to the intention of the law, and thereby the good intended was accomplished, without material- ly increasing the patronage of the executive ; but a very great change has fol- lowed, which has, in the opinion of your committee, defeated the object of the act, and, at the same time, added greatly to the influence of patronage. Faithful performance of duty no longer ensures a renewal of appointment. The consequence is inevitable : a feeling of dependance on the executive, on the -.part of the incumbent, increasing as his term approaches its end, with a great iift;rease of the number of those who desire his place, followed by an active com- petition between the occupant and those who seek his place, accompanied by all those acts of compliance and subserviency by which power is conciliated ; and, of course, with a corresponding increase of the number of those influenced by the -executive will. In enumerating the causes which have, of late, increased executive patronage, your committee cannot, without a dereliction of duty, pass over one of very re- cent origin, although they are aware that it is almost impossible to allude to it, in the most delicate manner, without exciting feelings of a party character, which they are sinjcerely anxious to avoid : they refer to the increased power which late events have given to the executive over the public funds, and, with it, the currency of the country. In considering this part of the subject of their inquiry, it is the intention of the committee to confine themselves exclusively to the tendency of the events to which they refer as increasing executive patronage, avoiding all allusion to motives, or to the legality of the acts in question. Whatever diversity of opinion may exist as to the expediency or the legality of removing the deposites, there can, it is supposed, be none as to the fact that the removal has, as things now stand, increased the power and patronage of the executive in reference to the public funds. They are now, in point of fact, under his sole and unlimited control ; and may, at his pleasure, be withdrawn from the banks where he has ordered them to be deposited, be placed in other banks, or in the custody of whomsoever he may choose to select, without limit- ation or restriction ; and must continue subject to his sole will, till placed, by an act of Congress, under the custody of the laws. Whether any provision can be devised which would place them as much beyond the control of the execu- tive in their present as they were in their former place of deposite, and which, at the same time, would not endanger their safety, are points on which your com- mittee do not deem it necessary to venture an opinion. What addition this un- 172 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. limited control over the public funds, from the time of their collection till thafc of their expenditure, makes to the patronage of the executive, is difficult to es- timate. According to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, the amount of the public funds in deposite on the 1st of January, 1834, was $11,702,905 ; and their estimated amount, on the 31st of December last, was $8,695,981 ; making an average amount for the year of $10,199,443, the use of which, con- sidering the permanency of the deposites, may be estimated as not of less value to the banks in which they were deposited than four per cent. ; making, at that rate, on the average amount in deposite, the sum of $407,977 per annum. This immense gain to these powerful and influential monopolies depends upon the will and pleasure of the executive, and must give him a corresponding control over them ; but this, of itself, affords a very imperfect view of the extent of his patronage, dependant on his control over the public deposites. To ascertain its full extent, the advantages which these banks have, in consequence of the de- posites, in circulating their notes and in dealing in exchanges, and the compe- tition which it must excite among the banks generally to supplant each other in these advantages, and, of course, in executive favour, on which they depend, and which must tend to create, on their part, a universal spirit of dependance and subserviency ; the means which the deposites necessarily afford to raise or depress at pleasure the value of the stock of this or that bank ; and the wide field which is consequently opened to the initiated partisans of power for the accumulation of fortunes by speculations in bank stock ; the facility which all these causes combined must give to political favourites in obtaining bank accom- modations ; and, finally, the control which the accompanying power of desig- nating the notes of what banks may, and what may not, be received in the pub- lic dues, gives to the executive over these institutions, must be taken into the estimate, to form a correct opinion of the full force of this tremendous engine of power and influence, wielded, as things now stand, by the will of a single in- dividual. Your committee have now enumerated the principal causes which have of late contributed to increase so greatly the patronage of the executive. There are others still remaining to be noticed, which have greatly contributed to this increase, and which claim the m.ost serious consideration ; but, as they are of an incidental character, it is proposed to consider them in their proper connex- ion, in a subsequent part of this report. Having completed, under its proper head, the inquiry as to the extent of executive patronage, and the cause of its recent increase, your committee will next proceed to investigate the deeply-in- teresting questions of the expediency and practicability of its reduction. In considering the question of the expediency of its reduction, your commit- tee do not deem it necessary to enter into an elaborate argument to prove that patronage, at best, is but a necessary evil ; that its tendency, where it is not effectually checked and regulated, is to debase and corrupt the community ; and that it is, of course, a fundamental maxim in all states having free and pop- ular institutions, that no more should be tolerated than is necessary to maintain the proper efiicacy of government. How little this principle, so essential to the preservation of liberty in popular governments, has been respected under ours, the view which has already been presented of the vast extent to which, patronage has already attained under this government, and its rapid growth, but too clearly demonstrate. But as great and as rapid as has been its growth, it may be thought by some who have not duly reflected upon the subject, that it is not more than sufficient to maintain the government in its proper efficiency, and that it cannot be diminished without exposing our institutions to the danger of weakness and anarchy. To demonstrate the utter fallacy of such a suppo- sition, it is only necessary to compare the present to the past, in reference to the point under consideration. No one capable of judging will venture to assert that the patronage of the SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 173 executive branch of this government, in any stage of its existence, from the time it went fairly into operation, has ever proved deficient in proper influence and control ; yet, if the present be compared with any past period of our histo- ry, excluding, of course, that of the late war, the patronage now under the con- trol of the •executive will be found greatly to exceed that of any former period. To illustrate the truth of this remark, your committee will select, for compari- son, the years 1825 and 1833 : the former, becajise it was thought, even then, by many of the most experienced and reflecting of our citizens, that executive patronage had attained a dangerous extent ; and the latter, because it is the latest period of which we have the requisite materials with which to make the comparison. What, then, is the comparative extent of executive patronage, respectively, with the short interval of but eight years between them ? What, at these respective periods, was the amount of the revenue and expenditure ? "What the* number of persons in the employ of the government, or dependant on its bounty l and what the extent to which, according to the practice of the re- spective periods, the patronage of the government was brought to exert over those subject to its control ? A short comparative statement will show. The income of the government, in all its branches, including the postoffice, was, in 1825, $28,147,383 ; and 1833, $36,667,274. The gross expenditures, including the public debt, in 1825, was $24,814,847; in 1833, $27,229,389. Excluding the public debt, it was, in 1825, $12,719,503 ; in 1833, $25,685,846. The number of persons employed, and living on the bounty of the government, in 1825,55,777; in 1833, 100,079. Measuring the extent of the patronage, at these respective periods, by these elements combined, without taking into consideration the circumstances which, as already shov/n, have in this short period given such increased force to ex- ecutive patronage, the result of the whole, in 1825, compared to 1833, is as 65 to 89, makhig an increase of upward of 36 per cent. If the comparative ra- pidity of this great increase be examined, it will be found that it has had a pro- o-ressive acceleration throughout the period. If we divide the period into equal parts of four years each, the increase in the first four years will be found much less than in the last four. The increase, for instance, of the revenue during the first four years, was 4,616,594 dollars ; and during the last four, 4,906,026 dollars ; of the expenditures during the first four, 1,873,675 dollars ; and during the last four, 9,313,340 dollars. It may be said that this increase of patronage, great as it is, does not mate- rially exceed the growth and population of the country, with which it is as- sumed that it ought to keep pace. This view overlooks entirely the increase of patronage from those circumstances which have so much increased it during the period in question, as has already been shown. If these be taken into con- sideration ; if to the increase of revenue and expenditure, and the number de- pendant on government, we add the vast increase of executive patronage from the immense public domain recently thrown into market, the great extent of Indian reservations, the control which the practice of removal has established over those in office, and the great addition to executive power over the public funds, and, through this, over the banking institutions of the country, it cannot be doubted that, instead of increasing only 36 per cent., it has more than doubled in the period in question, while the growth and population of the country have prob- ably not exceeded 24 per cent. But your committee cannot agree that there is any substantial reason why executive patronage should increase in the same proportion with the growth and population of the country. With the exception of the postoffice establishment, there is no necessary connexion between the increasing growth and population of the country and the increasing patronage of the government. On the con- trary, many of the public establishments are, or ought to be, stationary ; others on the decrease ; others, though necessarily increasing, increase at a rate far 174 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. less than our population ; and yet we find that, for the last eight years, there has been a progressive increase of patronage far greater than the growth and population of the country. But the assumption that executive patronage and influence should increase in the same ratio with the growth and population of the country^ is not less dan- gerous than it is erroneous. If this assumption be carried out in practice, it must finally prove fatal to our institutions and liberty. The same amount of patronage and influence, in proportion to the extent and population of a country, which, in a small state, moderately populous, would be perfectly safe, might prove fatal in an extensive and populous community, just as a much smaller military force, in proportion, would hold under subjection the latter than the former. The principle is the same in both cases : the great advantage which an organized body, such as a government or an army, has over an unorganized mass — an advantage increasing with the increased difficulty of concert and co- operation ; and this, again, increasing with the number and dispersion of those on whose concert and co-operation resistance depends ; and hence, from their combined action, both as applied to the civil and military, the great advan- tage which power has over liberty in large and populous countries — an advan- tage so great that it is utterly impossible in such countries to defend the latter against the former, unless aided by a highly artificial political organization such as ours, based on local and geographical interests. If to this difficulty, result- ing from numbers and extent only, there be added others of a most formidable character, the greater capacity, in proportion, on the part of the government, in large communities, to seize on and corrupt all the organs of public opinion, and thus to delude and impose on the people ; the greater tendency in such com- munities to the formation of parties on local and separate interests, resting on opposing and conflicting principles, with separate and rival leaders at the head of each, and the great difficulty of combining such parties in any system of re- sistance against the common danger from the government, some conception may be formed of the vast superiority which that organized and central party, con- sisting of office-holders and office-seekers, with their dependants, forming one compact, disciplined corps, wielded by a single individual, without conflict of opinion within either as to policy or principle, and aiming at the single object of retaining and perpetuating power in their own ranks, must have, in such a country as ours, over the people a superiority so decisive, that it may be safe- ly asserted that, whenever the patronage and influence of the government are sufficiently strong to form such a party, liberty, without a speedy reform, must inevitably be lost. When we add that this great advantage of the government over the people, of power over liberty, must increase proportionately with the growth and population of our country, it must be apparent how fatal would be the assumption, if acted on, that patronage and influence should increase in the same proportion ; and how infinitely dangerous has been the tendency of our affairs of late, when, as has been shown, instead of increasing simply in the same proportion, they have advanced with a rapidity more than double. So far is the assumption from being true, if we regard the duration of our institutions and the preservation of our liberty, we must hold it as a fundamental maxim, that the action of the government should, with our growth, gradually be- come more moderate instead of more intense : a maxim resting on principles deep and irreversible, arid which cannot be violated without inevitable destruc- tion. Moderation in the action of this government, the great central power of our system, is, in fact, the condition on which our political existence depends ; and, in acting in conformity, it but conforms to the principle which Divine wis- dom has impressed upon the beautiful and sublime system of which our globe is a part, and in which the great mass that gives life, and harmony, and action to the whole, reposes almost motionless in the centre. Your committee are aware that, since 1833, there has been a very consid- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 175 erable decrease of revenue, under the act of March 2(1, 1833, known as the Compromise Law, with other preceding acts, in consequence of the payment of the public debt, which would very considerably aflect the comparison, if the year 1834, instead of 1833, had been selected ; and they have to express their regret that the want of full and accurate materials for the former year prevents them from furnishing a statement which, while it would show the de- crease, would also show how little the final discharge of the public debt has contributed to diminish either the public expenditure or the patronage of the executive : facts of no small moment, as connected with the subject of inquiry. The deep interest which the enlightened and patriotic took in that great event was not to indulge in the. idle boast that the country was free from debt, but that it would, as they believed, be necessarily followed by the substantial bless- ing of reducing the public burdens, and, with it, the patronage of the govern- ment ; and thus, while it relieved industry, it would, at the same time, strength- en liberty against power. Thus far, these anticipations have been but very im- perfectly, if at all, realized. As great as has been the reduction of the revenue, it is still as great as it was when the debt exceeded more than $100,000,000; and, what is more to the point, what conclusively shows how much easier it is to discharge a public debt than to obtain the corresponding benefits, a proportion- ate diminution of the public expenditure, is the fact, that now, when we are free from all debt, the public expenditure is as great as it was when the debt was most burdensome to the country. The only difterence is, that then the money went to the public creditors, but now goes into the pockets of those who live on the government, with great addition to the patronage and influence of the ex- ecutive, but without diminution of burden to the people. Your committee will next proceed to inquire what has been the effects of this great, growing, and excessive patronage on our political condition and prospects : a question of the utmost importance in deciding on the expediency of its reduction. Has it tended to strengthen our political institutions, and to give a stronger assurance of perpetuating them, and, with them, the blessings of liberty to our posterity 1 Has it purified the public and political morals of our country, and strengthened the feeling of patriotism ? Or, on the other hand, has it tended to sap the foundation of our institutions ; to throw a cloud of un- certainty over the future ; to degrade and corrupt the public morals ; and to substitute devotion and subserviency to power, in the place of that disinterested and noble attachment to principles and country, which are essential to the pres- ervation of free institutions ? These are the questions to be decided ; and it is with profound regret that your committee are constrained, however painful, to say that the decision admits of little doubt. They are compelled to admit the fact, that there never has been a period, from the foundation of the government, when there were such general apprehensions and doubts as to the permanency and success of our political institutions ; when the prospect of perpetuating them, and, with them, our liberty, appeared so uncertain ; when public and po- litical morals were more depressed ; when attachment to country and principles were more feeble, and devotion to party and power stronger : for the truth of all which they appeal to the observation and reflections of the experienced and enlightened of all parties. If we turn our eyes to the government, we shall find that, with this increase of patronage, the entire character and structure of the government itself is undergoing a great and fearful change, which, if not arrest- ed, must, at no distant period, concentrate all its power in a single department. Your committee are aware that, in a country of such vast extent and diversity of interests as ours, a strong executive is necessary ; and, among other reasons, in order to sustain the government, by its influence, against the local I'celings and interests which it must, in the execution of its duties, necessarily encoun- ter ; and it was doubtless with this view mainly that the framers of the Consti- tution vested the executive powers in a single individual, and clothed him with 176 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. .the almost entire patronage of the government. As long as the patronage of the executive is so moderate as to compel him to identify his administration with the public interest, and to hold his patronage subordinate to the principles and measures necessary to promote the common good, the executive power nily be said to act within the sphere assigned to it by the Constitution, and may be considered as essential to the steady and equal operation of the government ; but when it becomes so strong as to be capable of sustaining itself by its influ- ence alone, unconnected with any system of measures or policy, it is the cer- tain indication of the near approach of irresponsible and despotic power. When it attains that point, it will be difficult to find anywhere in our system a power sufficient to restrain its progress to despotism. The very causes which render a strong executive necessary, the great extent of country and diversity of inter- ests, will form great and almost insuperable impediments to any eflectual re- sistance. Each section, as has been shown, will have its own party and its own favourites, entertaining views of principles and policy so diflerent as to render a united eflbrt against executive power almost impossible, while their separate and disjointed efforts must prove impotent against a power far stronger than either, taken separately ; nor can the aid of the states be successfully in- voked to arrest the progress to despotism. So far from weakening, they will add strength to executive patronage. A majority of the states, instead of oppo- sing, will be usually found acting in concert with the Federal Government, and, of course, will increase the influence of the executive : so that, to ascertain his patrdnage, the sum-total of the patronage of all the states, acting in conjunction •with the federal executive, must be added to his. The two, as things now stand, constitute a joint force, difhcult to be resisted. Against a danger so formidable, which threatens, if not arrested, and that speedily, to subvert the Constitution, there can be but one effectual remedy : a prompt and decided reduction of executive patronage ; the practicability and means of effecting which, your committee will next proceed to consider. The first, most simple, and usually the most certain mode of reducing patron- age, is to reduce the pubhc income, the prolific source from which it almost ex- clusively flows. Experience has shown that it is next to impossible to reduce the public expenditure with an overflowing treasury ; and not much less difficult to reduce patronage without a reduction of expenditure ; or, in other words, that the most simple and effectual mode of retrenching the superfluous expenditure of the government, of introducing a spirit of frugality and economy in the admin- istration of public affairs, of correcting the corruption and abuses of the government, and, finally, of arresting the progress of power, is to leave the money in the pock- ets of those who made it, where all laws, human and divine, place it, and from which it cannot be removed by government itself, except for its necessary and indispensable wants, without violation of its highest trust and the most sacred principles of justice. Yet, as manifest as is this truth, such is our peculiar (it may be said extraordinary) situation, that this simple and obvious remedy to excessive patronage, the reduction of the revenue, can be applied only to a very limited extent. But before they proceed to the question of reducing the revenue, your com- mittee propose to show what will be its probable amount in future, as the laws now stand, to what limits the public expenditure may be reduced consistently with the just wants of government, and, finally, what, with such reduction, will be the probable annual surplus to the year 1842, when the highest duties will be reduced to 20 per cent, under the act of March 2, 1833 ; and when, as the act provides, the revenue is to be reduced to a sum necessary to an economical administration of the government. According to the statement from the Treasury Department, the receipts of the year 1834, from all sources, amounted to $22,584,365 ; of which, customs yield- ed $16,105,373; land, $5,020,940; the residue being made uo of bank divi- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 177 dends and incidental items ; and the question now for consideration is, What will be the probable annual receipts from all sources during the next seven years, if the income, as has just been stated, is to be reduced to ihe economical wants of the government ? a question which, from its nature, can only be an- swered by probable estimates and conjectures, and which, in this case, is the more difficult to be answered from a defect of data in reference to the customs, the principal source of revenue. The changes in the rates of duties have been so great latterly, and the period so recent since the laws, as they now stand, commenced operation, that it is impracticable to resort to those average results, deduced from long periods, by which only the temporary changes and fluctu- ations of commerce can be detected, and its habitual current ascertained and subjected to calculation. The act of the 2d of March, 1833, which made the last change, and on the provisions of which the estimates of the income from the customs for the period in question must be based, commenced its operation on the first of January, 1834, and we, of course, have the result of but a single year. From a statement furnished by the treasury department, it seems that the domestic exports of that year amounted, in round numbers, to eighty mill- ions of dollars, and the imports, given in round numbers (as all the subsequent statements are), to $125,500,000; of which $23,000,000 were reshipped, leaving $102,500,000 for the consimiption and use of the country, of which $55,000,000 were of articles free of duty, and $47,000,000 of those liable to du- ties; that the gross receipts amounted to .$15,572,448,and the nett to $14,222,448, leaving $1,350,000 as the expense of collection ; that the reduction of one tenth of the duties above 20 per cent, ad valorem every two years, according to the provisions of the act of 2d of March, 1833, amounted to $850,000. As scanty as are these data, it is believed that it may be safely anticipated that the average annual income of the period in questton will be equal, at least, to the income of the last year. Instead of entering into all the details through which your committee have come to this conclusion, which would swell this re- port to an unwieldy size, they will content themselves with simply giving the results of the causes which, as far as can be foreseen, may either increase or diminish the receipts of the customs for the next seven years as compared with the past year, accompanied by a statement of their probable effects in the aggregate. It will, however, be previously necessary to inquire whether the receipts from the customs during the last year in fact equalled the amount which the commercial transactions of the year, under ordinary circumstances, ought to have produced. It is not possible, in such an inquiry, to overlook the very un- usual importation of the precious metals during the year, which, according to the statements from the treasury department, amounted to $16,572,582, consti- tuting, to that amount, a part of the articles imported in the year free of duty. The reshipment for the same period amoimted to $1,676,208, leaving in the country, of the amount imported, $14,896,374 : a sum greatly exceeding our an- nual consumption, which, in addition to the supplies from our own mines, prob- ably falls short of $2,000,000. The excess was doubtless caused by the pecu- liar condition of the country, in reference to its currency, during the year ; and would, under ordinary circumstances, have been imported in goods of various descriptions for the usual supply of the country instead of gold and silver. Sub- tracting, then, the two millions from this sum, and the balance from the amount of tbe articles free of duty, which, as stated, is $55,000,000, it would reduce the annual consumption of goods free of duty, including the precious metals, to $42,103,626; and assuming that the proportion between goods free of dut}% and those liable to duty, to be as that sum is to $47,000,000 ; and, also, that the excess of the supply of gold and silver imported during the year would, un- •der ordinary circumstances, have returned in that proportion between the dulied and the free articles, it would add to the former $7,133,313, and, of course, in- Z 178 ' SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. crease the receipts from the customs in the same proportion ; that is, it would make an addition to them of $2,150,000, and would have raised the receipts from customs during the year from $14,220,000 to $16,370,000 ; which last, it is believed, may be assumed, at the present rate of the duties, as the proba- ble receipts, under ordinary circumstances, of an export and import trade equal to that of the last year. Let us nt)w inquire into the causes which may tend to diminish or increase this estimated receipt during the next seven years, and their probable effects^ in the aggregate, on the income from the customs. The only cause, as is believed, that will tend to diminish the amount, as far as can noAv be foreseen, is the gradual reduction of one tenth every two years, under the act of the 2d of March, 1833, till the year ,1841, as has been stated. It will be seen, by reference to the statement from the treasury already given, that this reduction last year, on an importation of $47,000,000 of dutiable articles, amounted to $850,000. If, however, instead of that amount, the importation of such articles had been $54,133,000, as it is assumed they would have been had not the derangement of the currency prevented, the reduction on account of the one tenth would have increased in the same proportion, and would have, of course, amounted to $975,000. Against this increased reduction there must be set ofT a probable gradual in- crease of the domestic exports of the country ; and with them, as a necessary consequence, a corresponding increase of the imports, and with them the re- ceipts from the customs. If we take the last six years, from 1828 to 1834, the last included, the average annual increase of domestic exports in the period is nearly $5,000,000, of which the increase in 1833 was $7,200,000, and in 1834, $9,600,000, making in the last two years an average increase of $8,800,000 : tlius showing a much mire rapid increase at the end than at the beginning of the series. If to this fact Ave add the effect which the decrease of duties under the act of the 2d of March, 1833, must have on the exports, the growing de- mand for the great staples of the country, and the vast amount of fertile and fresh lands brought into market within the last five years in the region most congenial to the growth of cotton, it is believed that it may be safely assumed that the average annual increase of our domestic exports for the next seven years will, at least, equal $6,000,000. This increase must be followed by a corresponding increase of imports, and Avith them, as stated, of the receipts from the customs. Assuming that the proportion between the free and dutied articles, in consequence of this increase of imports, will be as has been estimated, it will add to the receipts from the customs an annual increase of $1,000,000, from which, however, must be deducted $59,000 on account of the biennial reduction of one tenth, which would reduce the increase to $941,000. If this be deducted from the average reduction of one tenth, as above ascertained, we shall have, taking the tAvo causes together, the increase of the customs from increased imports, and the decrease from the biennial reduction of one tenth, a decrease of revenue equal to $34,000 annually -. making, in seven years, $238,000. But it must be taken into the estimate, that the increase of revenue from the increase of exports is annually added, AA'hile the reduction on account of the one tenth is biennially. Taking this into the estimate, the increase of revenue on account of the increase of the exports over the decrease, on account of the biennial reduction of one tenth, will in the scA^en years equal $3,298,500 ; from which take $238,000, and it will leave an aggregate increase over the decrease of $3,060,500. This conclusion, however, rests on the assumption that the proportion be- tween the free and dutied articles will remain during the period the same as is estimated for last year ; but it is probable that the reduction of the price of the free articles, in conseouence of the repeal of the duties, will greatly increase SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 179 their consumplion, and, of course, have a corresponding efiect in reducing the amount of the dutiable articles, and, with them, the receipts into the treasury. It is, however, believed to be a safe estimate, that the reduction of the receipts from this cause will be more than counterbalanced by the excess of the increase of income from the increase of exports over the reduction of one tenth biennial- ly, as has been shown ; and that it may, therefore, be assumed with reasonable confidence, if no untoward event should intervene, that the average annual re- ceipts from the customs will be equal to the sum of $16,370,000, the sum which the commerce of last year ought to have yielded, as has been shown, under ordinary circumstances. Your committee will next inquire what will be the probable amount of re- ceipts from the public lands during the period in question. The receipts from that source during the last year, according to a statement from the treasury, equalled $5,020,940. This, however, probably greatly exceeds the permanent receipts from that source, as it was caused, probably, by the great quantity of rich and valuable land thrown into the market during the year. The receipts of 1833 equalled $3,967,682, and that of the last four years averaged $3,705,405. If we take into consideration, with these facts, the rapid increase of our popu- lation, the steady rise in landed property generally, the vast quantity of lands held by the government, it is believed to be a safe estimate, that the average an- nual income from this source, during the period in question, will be at least equal to $3,500,000. Of the remaining sources of revenue, the bank dividends is the only one that requires notice. They amounted in 1833 to $450,000 ;* and it is probable that they will give an equal annual income till the expiration of its charter, 1836, after which time there will be a reduction from the income of the government equal to the annual dividends ; but it is believed, by those who are most familiar with the subject, that a retrenchment in the collection of the customs, by a reform- ation of that branch of the administration, may be effected, at least equal to this re- duction. It cost the government the last year $1,350,000 to collect $14,222,448, which is more than equal to nine per cent. : a rate, considering the facility of collecting this branch of the revenue, and the decreased inducement to elude the duties in consequence of the great reduction in the rate of duties, altogether extravagant. If these calculations should prove correct, the average income of the gov- ernment for the next seven years, not including incidental items, will equal $20,320,000, making in the whole period the aggregate sum of $142,240,000 ; to which, if we, add the residue of the government stock in the United States Bank, amounting to $6,343,400, and which must be paid into the treasury at the ex- piration of its charter, and the surplus in the treasury on the 31st of December last, which, after deducting $2,000,000, will amount to $6,695,981, it will give an aggregate sum of $148,679,381 ; which, divided by seven, will make the average annual sum, subject to the disposition of the government for the next seven years, amount to $21,239,911. Such being the probable average annual income and means of the govern- ment for the seven ensuing years, the next question which presents itself for consideration is. What ought to be the average expenditure for the same period ? The expenditure for the year 1834. as taken from the annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury, equals $19,430,373, and for the preceding year $22,713,753 ; deducting in both cases the payments on account of the public debt. Your committee are, however, of the opinion, that these amounts far exceed what ought to be the expenditure on a just and economical scale, and that it may be very greatly reduced without injury to the public service. They are also of opinion, that to this great and extravagant expenditure may be at- * * The amount of dividends for 1834 could not be obtained from the treasury. 180 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. • tributed, in no small degree, the disease which now threatens so seriously the body politic. That a just conception may be formed of this extraordinary in- crease, they have annexed a table of expenditures from the year 1823 to 1833, deducting the payment on account of the public debt, by which it appears that, in this short period of ten years, the expenditure has risen from $9,784,000 to $22,713,000, being an increase in the latter over the former of almost $3,000,000 beyond the whole expenditure of the government in 1823, exclu- ding, as stated, the pubUc debt ; and this, too, during a period of profound peace, when not an event had occurred calculated to warrant any unusual expenditure. Of this enormous increase the greater part occurred in the last three years, in Avhich time the expenditure has risen nearly $9,000,000., which may well ac- count for the present dangerous symptoms. Your committee have not time to give that minute attentioh to the expendi- tures necessary to determine what particular items can or ought to be retrenched ; nor do they deem it important, at present, to enter into so laborious an inquiry, even if time did not prevent. It is sufficient for their purpose to assume that the expenditures of 1823 were, at the time, considered ample to meet all the just wants of the government ; and that, so far from being a period distinguished by parsimony, the then administration were thought by many to be unreasonably profuse, and were, accordingly, the object of systematic attacks on account of their supposed extravagance. Assuming, then, the expenditure of $9,784,000 to have been ample at that period, the question which presents itself is, What ought it to be at present, taking into consideration the necessity of increased expenditures in consequence of increased population ? They have already shown that the government cannot bear a permanent in- crease of expenditure in proportion to the growth of the population, which may be estimated at about three per cent., without an increase of patronage which must, in its progress, inevitably prove fatal to the institutions and liberty of the country. On this principle, the expenditure, instead of increasing nearly thir- teen millions' in ten years, as it has, ought to have increased much less than three, and ought not, in the opinion of your committee, to have exceeded two millions at the farthest. Assuming that sum as a liberal allowance, and adding it to the expenditure of 1823, we shall have the sum of $11,784,000, beyond which the present expenditure ought not to have passed, including the pensions : and, excluding them, $10,012,412, instead of $22,713,000, the sum actually expended. But it is believed that this sum will very considerably exceed, on the basis assumed, what ought to be the average annual expenditure for the next seven years. Of the items which compose the present expenditure, that for pensions constituted, last year, the sum of $3,341,877. Considering the advanced age of the pensioners, there ought to be, according to the annuity tables, a decrease by deaths of fourteen per cent, annually, which, in seven years, would diminish the expenditure on pensions from the sum above mentioned to $1,040,802 annu- ally, giving an annual average deduction of $328,725, and would reduce the expenditure on pensions for the ensuing seven years to an average sum of $2,048,000. Add this sum to $10,012,412, the sum beyond which the present expenditure ought not to extend, excluding the pensions, and we shall have $12,060,412, as what the annual average expenditure for the next seven years ought to be. Take this from the sum of $21,239,911, which, as has been shown, will be the probable average annual means of the government for the same period, and it would leave $9,179,499 ; or, in round numbers, for the facility of calculation, nine millions, as the average surplus means during the period at the disposition of the government, on the supposition that the expenditures will be reduced to the economical wants of the government. Having shown what will be the probable surplus revenue should the expen- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 181 diture be reduced to its proper limits, the committee propose next to consider whether, under existing circumstances, the revenue can be reduced. The two great sources of revenue are lands and customs. The others (not including the postoffice, which is a particular fund) are of small amount. Af- ter a careful investigation, your committee are of opinion that the act of 2d of March, 1833, has reduced the duties on imports, with some exceptions, as far as is practicable, under existing circumstances, consistently with the intent and spirit of the act. The act provides, among other things, that after the 31st day of December, 1833, in all cases where the duties shall exceed twenty per cent, ad valorem, one tenth part of such e.Kcess shall be reduced, and, in like manner, one tenth part every two years, till the 31st of December, 1839 ; and that, on the 31st of December, 1841, one half of the residue qf such excess shall be deducted ; and on the 30th of June, 1842, the residue. It also provides that, till the 30th of June, 1842, the duties imposed by the then existing law shall remain un- changed, except as provided in the sixth section. Your committee do not deem it necessary to inquire whether the circumstan- ces under which it passed involves anything in the nature of a pledge or con- tract, which would forbid any alterations of its provisions. It is sufficient for their purpose to state the fact, that the act is the result of a compromise between great sectional interests, brought into conflict under circumstances which threat- ened the peace and safety of the country ; and that it continues to be the only- ground on which the adjustment of the controversy can stand. Under these circumstances, to disregard the provisions of the act would be to open a contro- versy which your committee hope is closed forever : a controversy which, if renewed, would do more to increase the power and influence of the executive than any other event that could occur. With the impression, then, that the provisions of the act cannot be disturbed without endangering the peace of the country, and adding greatly, by its consequences, to executive patronage, your committee have limited their inquiries to the reduction of the duties on such ar- ticles as, by the provisions of the act, are subject to be reduced ; and, after a careful investigation, they are of the opinion that all the reductions which caa be effected, consistently with the spirit of the compromise, are inconsiderable ; and that, to make those that might be made, would require too much time and investigation to permit it to be done at this session, as will appear by a reference to the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, herewith annexed ; but, in order that the subject may be taken up with full information at the next session, they have instructed their chairman to submit a resolution for the consideration of the Senate, directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report, at the commence- ment of the next session, what duties under twenty per cent, ad valorem may, with a due regard to the manufacturing interests of the country, be repealed or reduced, with aa estimate of the probable amount of the reduction. In turning from the customs to the public lands, your committee find that the difficulty of reducing the revenue from that source is not less considerable than that from the customs. They fully agree in that liberal policy in relation to the public lands that regards them as the means of settlement, as well as a source of revenue ; and that they should be disposed of, accordingly, in the manner best calculated to diffuse a flourishing and happy population over the vast regions placed under our dominion ; a policy, the wisdom of which is best illustrated by the wonderful success with which it has been accomplished. It is an es- sential maxim of this noble and generous policy, that the price of the public lands should be fixed so low as to be accessible to the great mass of the citi- zens, and, at the same time, so high as not to subject them to the monopoly of the great capitalists of the country. Your committee are of opinion that this happy medium is attained by the present price ; and, judging from many indica- tions of late, that no considerable reduction can be made in the price without 182 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. making them the prey of hungry and voracious speculators and monopoUsts, to the great injury of the honest and industrious portion of the community, as well as to the portion of the country where the lands may be situated. Be this, however, as it may, it is at least certain that the immediate, effect of reduction would be to increase rather than diminish the revenue from lands, and, of course, to augment instead of reducing the public income. To this may be added another, and, under ordinary circumstances, conclusive objection against the reduction. The reduction of the price of public lands, while it would act, in effect, as a bounty to the purchasers from the government, by enabling them to acquire more land for the same sum of money, would act, at the same time, as a tax upon the entire body of landholders, who constitute the gi'eat mass of our population — a tax on them immeasurably greater than the bounty to the purchasers. The government of the United States is, in fact, the great land-dealer of the country, and, as such, has the power, by raising or reducing the price of its lands, to reduce or raise, in a greater or less degree, the value of lands everywhere, and, of course, to affect in the same degree the property of the landholders throughout the Union. To what extent any given reduction of the price of pub- lic lands would affect the price of lands generally, would be difficult, if not im- possible, to ascertain. It would be greater or less, according to the circumstan- ces. The price of land in the adjacent portion of the country, or that fron^ which emigration principally flowed, would be reduced nearly in the same pro- portion with that of the public lands ; that is, if the price of public lands be re- duced one half, lands adjacent, or lying in the emigrating portion of the country, would generally fall one half, while the more remote would be less affected, in. proportion to distance and the absence of emigration. But it may be safely as- sumed, taking the whole country, that the actual fall in the value of lands gen- erally, in the hands of the holders, would greatly exceed the actual reduction of the price of public lands. To illustrate : if the price of the latter be reduced one half, which at pi'esent would be sixty-two and one half cents per acre, lands generally throughout the country would be reduced in value per acre much more than that sum ; and if the far greater quantity held by the whole body of land proprietors, compared to the quantity sold by the government, be taken into the estimate, some idea may be formed how great the aggregate loss of the pro- prietors generally would be, on any reduction of price, compared with the ag- gregate gain of the purchasers. As great, however, as it must be, none who know the public spirit and enlightened patriotism of that great and respectable portion of our citizens can doubt their cheerful acquiescence in the sacrifice, should the public interest, or the fundamental maxim which ought to govern in the disposition of the public lands, require it ; but, otherwise, it would be a plain and palpable sacrifice of one, and that the largest portion of the community, to the other, without a corresponding benefit. In presenting this view, it is not the intention of your committee to offer any opinion on the propriety of a grad- uated reduction, as a measure of general policy, in the price of such public lands as have remained long in the market unsold, and of which there is no imme- diate prospect of making sale at the present price, because of their inferior qual- ity. Their case is verj' distinguishable from that of the great body of the pub- lic lands ; but the immediate effects of such reduction would obviously be to raise instead of reduce the revenue, and would, of course, increase instead of diminish the difficulty under consideration. Having now shown that no other reduction of the revenue can be effected, under existing circumstances, than the progressive reduction already provided for by the act of March 2d, 1833, in either of the great sources of our public income, with the exception already stated, your committee will next proceed to inquire whether executive patronage can be reduced by reducing the expendi- tures of the government. SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 183 The result of their investigation on this point is, that, for reasons which will hereafter be offered, a reduction of expenditure, under existing circumstances, would tend to increase instead of reducing execiuive patronage. But if it were otherwise, it would be found utterly impracticable, for reasons already assigned, to reduce the expenditure much below the income. Experience has abundant- ly proved that, so long as there is a large surplus in the treasury, the interests in favour of its expenditure will ever be stronger than that opposed to it ; and that no prudential consideration, arising from the necessity of accumulating , funds to meet future wants, or the hazard of enlarging executive patronage, or the danger of corrupting the political and public morals of the country by use- less and profuse expenditure, or any other whatever, is suflicient to resist the temptation to expend. If one unworthy object of appropriation is defeated, an- other, with no greater claims on the public bounty or justice, will ever stand ready to urge its claims, till the frugal and patriotic are wearied out with inces- sant and useless eflbrts to guard the treasury. But were it practicable, with an overflowing treasury, to bring the expenditures wdthin proper limits, such is the present condition of things, that to reduce expenditure would, as has been stated, increase the patronage of the executive, and that to an extent so great that DO object of expenditure can be suggested, having a plausible claim on the justice or bomity of the public, which would tend half so much to increase his patronage as leaving the public money unexpended, to accumulate as surplus revenue in the deposite banks. To realize the truth of this remark, it must be borne in mind that the depos- ites are under the exclusive control of the executive ; that they are deposited in banks selected by him ; that they have the free use of them without com- pensation to the public, and they may be continued or dismissed as depositories of the public funds, at the pleasure of the executive. With these facts before us, the result must be obvious. To accumulate a per- manent surplus revenue in the banks is, in fact, but to add so much additional bank capital — capital, in this case, exclusively under executive control, without check or limitation ; and, with its increasing amount, daily giving to him a greater control over the deposite banks, and, through them, ov^er the banking institutions of the country generally : thus adding the deep and wide-spread influence of the banks to the already almost overwhelming patronage of the executive. As the expenditure cannot be reduced, the next inquiry is, whether some ob- ject of general utility, in which every portion of the country has an interest, may not be selected as a fixed and permanent object on which to expend the sur- plus revenue. Your committee admit that, if such an object of expenditure could be selected, under a well-regulated system of disbursements established by law, much of the patronage incident to the present loose and unregulated disbursements might be curtailed ; but they are at a loss to find such an object. Internal improvement approaches the nearest; but there is opposed to it, with the object in view, in- superable objections. To pass by the formidable difficulty, the long-establish- ed diversity of opinion as to its constitutionality, which divides the two great sections of the country, experience has shown that there is no expenditure so little susceptible of being regulated by law ; none calculated to excite deeper competition, or to enlist a greater number in its favour, in proportion to the amount expended ; and, of course, calculated to add more to executive patron- age. To these an additional objection of a recent origin may be added. Your committee allude to the executive veto, as applied to internal iir.provements, the effect of which has been to increase very considerably his power and patronage in reference to this branch of expenditure. The executive, in his veto mes- sage, assumes the ground that internal improvements may or may not be con- stitutional, according to the nature of each particular object ; the distinction t» 184 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN be determined by him in the exercise of his constitutional function of giving or withholding his approval to acts of Congress ; the practical effect of which is to draw within his control the power and influence which appertain, not only to the administration, but also to the enactment of the law ; and, of course, to in- crease in the same degree his influence and patronage in reference to internal improvements. In making these remarks, the object of your committee is not to call in ques- tion the motive of the executive, or his right to draw what distinction he may think just and right in the exercise of his veto power, or the correctness of the distinctions in reference to the particular subject under consideration ; but sim- ply to exhibit the full extent of the objections to selecting it as the subject oa which to expend the surplus revenue — objections, in their nature, incapable of being wholly removed even by an amendment of the Constitution, were au amendment practicable. But if no subject of expenditure can be selected on which the surplus can be safely expended, and if neither the revenue nor expenditure can, imder existing circumstances, be reduced, the next inquiry is, What is to be done with the sur- plus ? which, as has been shown, will probably equal, on an average, for the next eight years, the sum of $9,000,000 beyond the just wants of the government : a surplus of which, unless some safe disposition can be made, all other means of reducing the patronage of the executive must prove ineffectual. Your committee are deeply sensible of the great difliculty of finding any sat- isfactory solution of this question ; but, believing that the very existence of our institutions, and, with them, the liberty of the country, may depend on the suc- cess of their investigation, they have carefully explored the whole ground, and the result of their inquiry is, that but one means has occurred to them holding out any reasonable prospect of success. A few preliminary remarks will be necessary to explain their views. Amid all the difiiculties of our situation, there is one consolation — that the danger from executive patronage, as far as it depends on excess of revenue, must be temporary. Assuming that the act of 2d of March, 1833, will be left undisturbed by its provisions, the income, after the year 1842, is to be reduced to the economical wants of the government. The government, then, is in a state of passage from one where the revenue is excessive, to another in which, at a fixed and no distant period, it will be reduced to its proper limits. The difficulty, in the intermediate time, is, that the revenue cannot be brought dowa to the expenditure, nor the expenditure, withoiit great danger, raised to the rev- enue, for reasons already explained. How is this difficidty to be overcome ? It might seem that the simple and natural means would be to vest the surplus in some safe and profitable stock, to accumulate for future use ; but the difficul- ty in such a course will, on examination, be foimd insuperable. At the very commencement, in selecting the stock, there would be great, if not insurmountable difficulties. No one would think of investing the surplus ia bank stock, against which there are so many, and such decisive reasons, that it is not deemed necessary to state them ; nor would the objections be less deci- sive against vesting in the stock of the states, which would create the danger- ous relation of debtor and creditor between the government and the members of the Union. But suppose this difficulty surmounted, and that some stock, per- fectly safe, was selected, there would still remain another that could not be sur- mounted. There cannot be found a stock with an interest in its favour suffi- ciently strong to compete with the interests which, with a large surplus reve- nue, will ever be found in favour of expenditures. It must be perfectly obvious to all who have the least experience, or who will duly reflect on the subject, that, were a fund selected in which to vest the surplus revenue for future use, there would be found in practice a constant conflict between the interest in fa- vour of some local or favourite scheme of expenditure, and that in favour of the SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 185 stock. Nor can it be less obvious that, in point of fact, the former would prove far stronger than the latter. The result is obvious. The surplus, be it ever so great, would be absorbed by appropriations instead of being vested in the stock, and the scheme, of course, would, in practice, prove an abortion ; which brings us back to the original inquiry. How is the surplus to be disposed of un- til the excess shall be reduced to the just and economical wants of the govern- ment ? After bestowing on this question, on the successful solution of which so much, depends, the most deliberate attention, your committee, as they have already stated, can advise but one means by which it can be effected ; and that is an amendment of the Constitution, authorizing the temporary distribution of the surplus revenue among the states till the year 1843, when, as has been shown, the income and expenditure will be equalized. Your committee are fully aware of the many and fatal objections to the dis- tribution of the surplus revenue among the states, considered as a part of the ordinary and regular system of this government. They admit them to be as great as can be well imagined. The proposition itself, that the government should collect money for the purpose of such dislribution, or should distribute a surplus for the purpose oi perpetuating taxes, is too absurd to require refutation ; and yet what would be, when applied, as supposed, so absurd and pernicious, is, in the opinion of your committee, in the present extraordinary and deeply-dis- ordered state of our affairs, not only useful and salutary, but indispensable to the restoration of the body politic to a sound condition : just as some potent medicine, which it would be dangerous and absurd to prescribe to the healthy, may, to the diseased, be the only means of arresting the hand of death. Dis- tribution, as proposed, is not for the preposterous and dangerous purpose of raising a revenue for distribution, or of distributing the surplus as a means of perpetuating a system of duties or taxes, but a temporary measure to dispose of an unavoidable surplus while the revenue is in the course of reduction, and which cannot be otherwise disposed of without greatly aggravating a disease that threatens the most dangerous consequences ; and which holds out hope, not only of arresting its farther progress, but also of restoring the body politic to a state of health and vigour. The truth of this assertion a few observations Avill suffice to illustrate. It must be obvious, on a little reflection, that the effects of distribution of the surplus would be to place the interests of the states, on all questions of expen- diture, in opposition to expenditure, as every reduction of expense would ne- cessarily increase the sum to 'be distributed among the states. The effect of this would be to convert them, through their interests, into faithful and vigilant sentinels on the side of economy and accountability in the expenditures of this government ; and would thus powerfully tend to restore the government, in its fiscal action, to the honest simplicity of former days. It may, perhaps, be thought by some that the power which the distribution among the states would bring to bear against the expenditure, and its conse- quent tendency to retrench the disbursements of the government, would be so strong as not only to curtail useless or improper expenditure, but also the use- ful and necessary. Such, undoubtedly, would be the consequence if the pro- cess were too long continued ; but in the present irregular and excessive ac- tion of the system, when its centripetal force threatens to concentrate all its powers in a single department, the fear that the action of this government will be too much reduced by the measure under consideration, in the short period to which it is proposed to limit its operation, is without just foundation. On the contrary, if the proposed measure should be applied in the present diseased state of the government, its effect would be like that of some powerful altera- tive medicine, operating just long enough to change the present morbid action, but not sufficiently long to superinduce another of an opposite character. A A 186 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. But it may be objected, that, though the distribution might reduce all useless expenditure, it would, at the same time, give additional power to the interest in iiavour of taxation. It is not denied that such would be its tendency ; and, if the danger from increased duties or taxes was at this time as great as that from a surplus revenue, the objection would be fatal ; but it is confidently believed that such is not the case. On the contrary, in proposing the measure, it is as- sumed that the act of March 2, 1833, will remain undisturbed. It is on the strength of this assumption that the measure is proposed, and, as it is believed, safely proposed. It may, however, be said that the distribution may create, on the part of the states, an appetite in its favour which may ultimately lead to its adoption as a permanent measure. It may, indeed, tend to excite such an appetite, short as is the period proposed for its operation ; but it is obvious that this danger is far more than countervailed by the fact, that the proposed amendment to the Con- stitution to authorize the distribution would place the power beyond the reach of legislative construction, and thus effectually prevent the possibility of its adoption as a permanent measure, as it cannot be conceived that three fourths of the states will ever assent to an amendment of the Constitution to authorize a distribution, except as an extraordinary measure, applicable to some extraor- dinary condition of the country like the present. Giving, however, to these, and other objections which may be urged, all the force that can be claimed for them, it must be remembered, the question is not whether the measure proposed is or is not liable to this or that objection, but whether any other less objectionable can be devised ; or, rather, whether there i-s any other which promises the least prospect of relief that can be applied. Let not the delusion prevail that the disease, after running through its natural course, will terminate of itself, without fatal consequences. Experience is op- posed to such anticipations. Many and striking are the examples of free states perishing under that excess of patronage which now afflicts ours. It may, in fact, be said with truth, that all, or nearly all, diseases which afflict free govern- ments, may be traced directly or indirectly to excess of revenue and expendi- ture ; the effect of Avhich is to rally around the government a powerful, corrupt, and subservient corps — a corps ever obedient to its will, and ready to sustain it in every measure, whether right or wrong, and which, if the cause of the dis- ease be not eradicated, must ultimately render the government stronger than the people. What progress this dangerous disease has already made in our country it is not for your committee to say ; but when they reflect on the present symptoms, on the almost unbounded extent of executive patronage, wielded by a single will ; the surplus revenue, Avhich cannot be reduced within proper limits in less than seven years — a period which covers two presidential elections, on both of which all this mighty power and influence will be brought to bear — and when they consider that, with the vast patronage and influence of this government, that of all the states acting in concert with it will be combined, there are just grounds to fear that the fate which has befallen so many other free governments must also befall ours, unless, indeed, some effectual remedy be forthwith ap- plied. It is under this impression that your committee have suggested the one proposed, not as free from all objections, but as the only one of sufficient power to arrest the disease, and to restore the body politic to a sound condition ; and they have, accordingly, reported a resolution so to amend the Constitution that the money remaining in the treasury at the end of each year, till the 1st of January, 1843, deducting therefrom the sum of $2,000,000 to meet current and contingent expenses, shall annually be distributed among the states and territories, including the District of Columbia ; and, for that purpose, the sum to be distributed to be divided into as many shares as there are senators and representatives in Congress, adding two for each territory, and two for the Dis- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 187 i trict of Columbia ; and that there shall be allotted to each state a number of shares equal to its representation iu both houses, and to the territories, inclu- ding the District of Columbia, two shares each. Supposing the surplus to be distributed should average $9,000,000 annually, as estimated, it would give to each share $30,405 ; which, multiplied by the number of senators and repre- sentatives of any state, would show the sum to which it would be entitled. The reason for selecting the ratio of distribution proposed in the amendment is too obvious to require much illustration. It is that which indicates the rela- tive political weight assigned by the Constitution to the members of the confed- eracy respectively, and, it is believed, approaches as nearly to equality as any other that can be selected. It may be objected that some states, under the distribution, may receive more, and others less than their actual contribution to the treasury, under the existing system of revenue. The truth of the objec- tion may be acknowledged, but it must also be acknowledged that the inequali- ty is at least as great under the present system of disbursement, and would be as great under any other disposition of the surplus that can be adopted. But as effectual as the distribution mast be, if adopted, to retrench improper expenditure, and reduce correspondingly the patronage of the government, yet other means must be added to bring it within safe limits, and to prevent the re- currence hereafter of the danger which now threatens the institutions and the liberty of the country ; and, with this view, your committee have reported a bill to repeal the first and second sections of the act to limit the term of certain officers therein named, passed 13lh May, 1820 ; to make it the duty of the President to lay before Congress, on the first of January next, and on the first of January every four years thereafter, the names of all defaulting officers and agents charged with the collection and disbursement of the public money, whose commissions shall be vacated from and after the date of such message ; and also to make it his duty, in all cases of nomination to fill vacancies occa- sioned by removal from office, to assign the reason for w^hich said oflicer may have been removed. The provisions of this bill are the same as those contained in bill No. 2, re- ported to the Senate on the 4th of May, 1826, by a select committee appointed to " inquire into the expediency of reducing the patronage of the government of the United States," and which was accompanied by an explanatory report, to which your committee would refer the Senate ; and, in order to facilitate the reference, they have instructed their chairman to move to reprint the report for their use. But the great and alarming strides which patronage has made in the short period that has intervened since the date of the report, has demonstrated the necessity of imposing other limitations on the discretionary powers of the ex- ecutive, particularly in reference to the General Postoffice and the public funds, on which important subject the executive has an almost unlimited discretion as things now are. In a government like ours, liable to dangers so imminent from the excess and abuse of patronage, it would seem extraordinary that a department of such vast powers, with an annual income and expenditure so great, and with a host of persons in its service, extending and ramifying itself to the remotest point, -and into every neighbourhood of the Union, and having a control over the cor- respondence and intercourse of the whole community, should be permitted to remain so long, without efficient checks or responsibility, under the almost un- limited control of the executive. Such a power, wielded by a single will, is sulficient of itself, when made an instrument of ambition, to contaminate the •community, and to control to a great extent public opinion. To guard against this danger, and to impose effectual restrictions on executive patronage, acting through this important department, your committee are of the opinion that an entire reorganization of the department is required ; but their labour, in refer- 188 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ence to this subject, has been superseded by the Committee on the Postoffice, which has bestowed so much attention on it, and which is so much more mi- nutely acquainted with the diseased state of the department than your committee can be, that it would be presumption on their part to attempt to add to their recommendation. But, as exiensive and dangerous as is the patronage of the executive through the postoffice department, it is not much less so in reference to the public funds, over which, as has been stated, it now has unlimited control, and, through them, over the entire banking system of the country. With a banking system spread from Maine to Louisiana, from the Atlantic to the utmost West, consist- ing of not less than five or six hundred banks, struggling among themselves for existence and gain, with an immense public fund under the control of the ex- ecutive, to be deposited in whatever banks he may favour, or to be withdrawn at his pleasure, it is impossible for ingenuity to devise any scheme better calcu- lated to convert the surplus revenue into a most potent engine of power and in- fluence ; and, it may be added, of peculation, speculation, corruption, and fraud. The first and most decisive step against this danger is that already proposed, of distributing the surplus revenue among the states, which will prevent its growing accumulation in the banks, and, with it, the corresponding increase of executive power and influence over the banking system. Tn addition, your committee have reported a bill to charge the deposite banks at the rate of per cent, per annum for the use of the public funds, to be calculated on the average monthly deposites ; to prohibit transfers, ex'cept for the purpose of dis- bursements ; and to prevent a removal of the public funds from the banks in which they are now, or may hereafter be deposited, without the consent of Congress, except as is provided in the bill. The object of the bill is to secure to the government an equivalent for the use of the public funds, to prevent the abuses and influence incident to transfer- warrants, and to place the deposite banks, as far as it may be practicable, beyond the control of the executive. In addition to these measures, there are, doubtless, many others connected with the customs — Indian affairs, pubhc lands, army, navy, and other branches of the administration — into which, it is feared, there have crept many abuses, which have unnecessarily increased the expenditures and the number of per- sons employed, and, with them, the executive patronage ; but to reform which would require a more minute investigation into the general state of the adminis- tration than your committee can at present bestow. Should the measures which they have recommended receive the sanction of Congress, they feel a strong conviction that they will greatly facilitate the work of carrying accountability, retrenchment, and economy through every branch of the administration, and thereby reduce the patronage of the executive to those safe and economical limits which are necessary to a complete restoration of the equilibrium of the system, now so dangerously disturbed. Your committee are deeply impressed with the necessity of commencing early, and of carrying through to its full and final completion, this great work of reform. The disease is daily becoming more aggravated and dangerous, and, if it be permitted to advance for a few years longer with the rapidity with which it has of late, it will soon pass beyond the reach of remedy. This is no party question. Every lover of his country and of its institutions, be his party what it may, must see and deplore the rapid growth of patronage, with all its attend- ant evils, and the certain catastrophe which awaits its farther progress, if not timely arrested. The question now is not how, or where, or with whom the danger originated, but how it is to be arrested ; not the cause, but the remedy ; not how our institutions and liberty have been endangered, but how they are to be rescued. SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 189 XL • A REPORT ON THAT PORTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WHICH RE- LATED TO THE ADOPTION OF EFFICIENT MEASURES TO PREVENT THE CIRCULATION OF INCENDIARY ABOLITION PETITIONS THROUGH THE MAIL, FEBRUARY 4, 1836. The Select Committee to whom was referred that portion of the PresidenCs Mes- sage which relates to the attempts to circulate, through the vxail, infiammatory appeals, to excite the slaves to insurrection, submit the following report: The committee fully concur with the President as to the character and ten- dency of the papers which have been attempted to be circulated in the South through the mail, and participate with him in the indignant regret which he ex- presses at conduct so destructive of the peace and harmony of the country, and SO repugnant to the Constitution and the dictates of humanity and religion. They also concur in the hope that, if the strong tone of disapprobation which, these unconstitutional and wicked attempts have called forth does not arrest them, the non-slaveholding states will be prompt to exercise their power to suppress them, as far as their authority extends. But, while they agree with the Presi- dent as to the evil and its highly dangerous tendency, and the necessity of ar- resting it, they have not been able to assent to the measure of redress which he recommends — that Congress should pass a law prohibiting, under severe pen- alty, the transmission of incendiary publications through the mail, intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection. After the most careful and deliberate investigation, they have been constrain- ed to adopt the conclusion that Congress has not the power to pass such a law ; that it would be a violation of one of the most sacred provisions of the Consti- tution, and subversive of reserved powers essential to the preservation of the domestic institutions of the slaveholding states, and, with them, their peace and security. Concurring, as they do, with the President in the magnitude of the evil and the necessity of its suppression, it would hare been the cause of deep regret to the committee, if they thought the difference of opinion, as to the right of Congress, would deprive the slaveholding states of any portion of the protec- tion which the measure recommended by the President was intended to afford them. On the contrary, they believe all the protection intended may be afford- ed; according to the views they take of the power of Congress, without infrin- ging on any provision of the Constitution on one side, or the reserved rights of the states on the other. The committee, with these preliminary remarks, will now proceed to estab- lish the positions which they have assumed, beginning with the first — that the passage of a law would be a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. In the discussion of this point, the committee do not deem it necessary to in-' quire whether the right to pass such a law can be derived from the power to establish postoffices and postroads, or from the trust of " preserving the relation created by the Constitution between the states," as supposed by the President. However ingenious or plausible the arguments may be by which it may be at- tempted to derive the right from these or any other sources, they nmst fall short of their object. The jealous spirit of liberty which characterized our ancestors at the period when the Constitution was adopted, forever closed the door by which the right might be implied from any of the granted powers, or any other source, if there be any other. The committee refer to the amended article of the Constitution, which, among other things, provides that Congress shall pass no law which shall abridge the liberty of the press — a provision which inter- poses, as will be hereafter shown, an insuperable objection to the measure rec- 190 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ommended by the President. That the true meaning of this provision may be fully comprehended, as bearing ojti the point under consideration, it will be ne- cessary to recur briefly to the history of the adoption of the Constitution. It is well known that great opposition was made to the adoption of the Con- stitution. It was acknowledged on all sides, at the time, that the old confeder- ation, from its weakness, had failed, and that something must be done to save the country from anarchy and convulsion ; yet, so high was the spirit of liberty — so jealous were our ancestors of that day of power, that the utmost efforts were necessary, under all the then existing pressure, to obtain the assent of the states to the ratification of the Constitution. Among the many objections to its adoption, none were more successfully urged than the absence in the instrument of those general provisions which experience had shown to be necessary to guard the outworks of liberty : such as the freedom of the press and of speech, the rights of conscience, of trial by jury, and others of like character. It was the belief of those jealous and watchful guardians of liberty, Avho viewed the adoption of the Constitution with so much apprehension, that all these sacred barriers, without some positive provision to protect them, would, by the power of construction, be undermined and prostrated. So strong was this apprehen- sion, that it was impossible to obtain a ratification of the instrument in many of the states without accompanying it with the recommendation to incorporate in the Constitution various articles, as amendments, intended to remove this defect, and guard against the danger apprehended, by placing these important rights beyond the possible encroachment of Congress. One of the most important of these is that which stands at the head of the list of amended articles, and which, among other things, as has been stated, prohibits the passage of any law abridg- ing the freedom of the press, and which left that important barrier against pow- er under the exclusive authority and control of the states. That it was the object of this provision to place the freedom of the press be- yond the possible interference of Congress, is a doctrine not now advanced for the first time. It is the ground taken, and so ably sustained by Mr. Madison, in his celebrated report to the Virginia Legislature, in 1799, against the alien and sedition law, and which conclusively settled the principle that Congress has no right, in any form or in any manner, to interfere with the freedom of the press.* The establishment of this principle not only overthrew the se- dition act, but was the leading cause of the great political revolution which, in 1801, brought the Republican party, with Mr. Jefferson at its head, into power. With these remarks, the committee will turn to the sedition act, in order to show the identity in principle between it and the act which the message recom- mends to be passed, as far as it relates to the freedom of the press. Among its other provisions, it inflicted punishment on all persons who should publish any false, scandalous, or malicious writing against the government, with intent to defame the same, or bring it into contempt or disrepute. Assuming this pro- vision to be unconstitutional, as abridging the freedom of the press, which no one now doubts, it will not be difficult to show that if, instead of inflicting pun- ishment for publishing, the act had inflicted punishment for circulating through the mail for the same offence, it would have been equally unconstitutional. The one would have abridged the freedom of the press as effectually as the other. The object of publishing is circulation ; and to prohibit circulation is, in effect, to prohibit publication. They both have a common object— the communication of sentiments and opinions to the public; and the prohibition of one may as effectually suppress such communication as the prohibition of the other ; and, of * The article is in the following words : " Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibitmg the Iree exer- cise thereof: or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition the government for a redress of grievances." SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 191 course, would as effectually interfere with the freedom of the press, and be equally unconstitutional. But, to understand more fully the extent of the control which the right of prohibiting circulation through the mail would give to the government over the press, it must be borne in mind that the power of Congress over the post- office and the mail is an exclusive power. It must also be remembered that Congress, in the exercise of this power, may declare any road or navigable water to be a post-road ; and that, by the act of 1825, it is provided " that no stage, or other vehicle which regularly performs trips on a post-road, or on a road parallel to it, shall carry letters." The same provision extends to packets, boats, or other vessels, on navigable waters. Like provision may be extended to newspapers and pamphlets ; which, if it be admitted that Congress has the right to discriminate in reference to their character, what papers shall or what shall • not be transmitted by the mail, would subject the freedom of the press on aU subjects, political, moral, and religious, completely to its will and pleasure. It would, in fact, in some respects, more effectually control the freedom of the press than any sedition law, however severe its penalties. The mandate of the government alone would be sufficient to close the door against circulation through the mail ; and thus, at its sole will and pleasure, might intercept all communica- tion between the press and the people, while it would require the intervention of courts and juries to enforce the provisions of a sedition law, which experi- ence has shown are not always passive and willing instruments in the hands of government, where the freedom of the press is concerned. From these remarks, it must be apparent that, to prohibit publication on one side, and circulation through the mail on the other, of any paper, on account of its religious, moral, or political character, rests on the same principle ; and that each is equally an abridgment of the freedom of the press, and a violation of the Constitution. It would, indeed, have been but a poor triumph for the cause of liberty, in the great contest of 1799, had the sedition law been put down on principles that would have left Congress free to suppress the circulation through the mail of the very publications which that odious act was intended to pro- hibit. The authors of that memorable achievement would have had but slen- der claims on the gratitude of posterity, if their victory over the encroachment of power had been left so imperfect. It will, after what has been said, require but few remarks to show that the same principle which applied to the sedition law would apply equally to a law punishing, by Congress, such incendiary publications as are referred to in the message, and, of course, to the passage of a law prohibiting their transmission through the mail. The principle on which the sedition act was condemned as unconstitutional was a general one, and not limited in its application to that act. It withdraws from Congress all right of interference with the press, in any form or shape whatever ; and the sedition law was put down as unconstitutional, not because it prohibited publications against the government, but because it inter- fered at all with the press. The prohibition of any publication on the ground of its being immoral, irreligious, or intended to excite rebellion or insurrection, would have been equally unconstitutional ; and, from parity of reason, the sup- pression of their circulation through the mail would be no less so. But, as conclusive as these reasons are against the right, there are others not less so, derived from the powers reserved to the states, which the conunittee will next proceed to consider. The message, as has been stated, recommends that Congress should pass a. law to punish the transmission through the mail of incendiary publications in- tended to instigate the slaves to insurrection. It of course assunfies for Congress a right to determine what papers arc incendiary and intended to excite insur- rection. The question, then, is. Has Congress such a right ? A question of vital importance to the slaveholding states, as will appear in the course of the discussion. 5 92 SPEECHES of JOHiX C. CALHOUN. After examining this question with due deliberation, in all its bearings, the committee are of opinion, not only that Congress has not the right, but to admit it would be fatal to the states. Nothing is more clear than that the admission of the right, on the part of Congress, to determine what papers are incendiary, and, as such, to prohibit their circulation through the mail, necessarily involves the right to determine what are not incendiary, and to enforce their circulation. Nor is it less certain that, to admit such a right, would be virtually to clothe Congress with the power to abolish slavery, by giving it the means of breaking down all the barriers which the slaveholding states have erected for the pro- tection of their lives and property. It would give Congress, without regard to the prohibition laws of the states, the authority to open the gates to the flood of incendiary publications which are ready to break into those states, and to punish all who dare resist as criminals. Fortunately, Congress has no such right. The internal peace and security of the states are under the protection' of the states themselves, to the entire exclusion of all authority and control on the part of Congress. It belongs to them, and not to Congress, to determine ■what is, or is not, calculated to disturb their peace and security ; and, of course, in the case under consideration, it belongs to the slaveholding states to deter- mine what is incendiary and intended to incite to insurrection, and to adopt such defensive measures as may be necessary for their security, with urdimited means of carrying them into effect, except such as may be expressly inhibited to the states by the Constitution. To establish the truth of this position, so es- sential to the safety of those states, it woidd seem sufficient to appeal to their constant exercise of this right at all times, without restriction or question, both before and since the adoption of the Constitution. But, on a point of so much importance, which may involve the safety, if not the existence itself, of an en- tire section of the Union, it will be proper to trace it to its origin, in order to place it on a more immovable foundation. That the states which form our Federal Union are sovereign and independent communities, bound together by a constitutional compact, and are possessed of all the powers belonging to distinct and separate states, excepting such as are delegated to be exercised by the General Government, is assumed as unques- tionable. The compact itself expressly provides that all powers not delegated are reserved to the states and the people. To ascertain, then, whether the power in question is delegated or reserved, it is only necessary to ascertain ■whether it is to be found among the enumerated powers or not. If it be not among them, it belongs, of course, to the reserved powers. On turning to the Constitution, it will be seen that, while the power of defending the country against external danger is found among the enumerated, the instrument is whol- ly silent as to the power of defending the internal peace and security of the- states, and, of course, reserves to the states this important power, as it stood before the adoption of the Constitution, with no other limitation, as has been stated, except such as are expressly prescribed by the instrument itself. From what has been stated, it may be infen-ed that the right of a state to defend it- self against internal dangers is a part of the great, primary, and inherent right of self-defence, which, by the laws of nature, belongs to all communities ; and ^o jealous were the states of this essential right, without which their independ- ence could not be preserved, that it is expressly provided by the Constitution,* that the General Government shall not assist a state, even in case of domestic violence, except on the application of the authorities of the state itself: thus ex- cluding, by a necessary consequence, its interference in all other cases. Having now shown that it belongs to the slaveholding states, whose institu- tions are in danger, and not to Congress, as is supposed by the message, to de- termine what papers are incendiary and intended to excite insurrection among * See 4th article, 4th section, of the Constitution. SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN. 193 .the slaves, it remains to inquire, in the next place, what are the corresponding duties of the General Goveriimcut, and the other states, from witliin whose lim- its and jurisdiction their institutions are attacked : a subject intimately connect- ed with that with which the committee are immediately charged, and which, at the present juncture, ought to be fully understood by all the parties. The committee will begin with the first. It may not be entirely useless to premise that rights and duties are recipro- cal—the existence of a right always implying a corresponding duty. If, con- sequently, the right to protect her internal peace and security belongs to a state, the General Government is bound to respect the measures adopted b}^ her for that purpose, and to co-operate in their execution, as far as its delegated pow- ers may admit, or the measure may require. Thus, in the present case, the slaveholding states having the unquestionable right to pass all such laws as may be necessary to maintain the existing relation between master and slave in those states, their right, of course, tr prohibit the circulation of any publication or any intercourse calculated to di-siurb or destroy that relation, is incontrovertible. In the execution of the measures which may be adopted by the states for this pur- pose, the powers of Congress over the mail, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations and btcween the states, may require co-operation on the part of the General Government ; and it is bound, in conformity to the principle estab- lished, to respect the laws of the state in their exercise, and so to modify its acts as not only not to violate those of the states, but, as far as practicable, to co-operate in their execution. The practice of the government has been in conformity to these views. By the act of the 28th of February, 1803, entitled " An act to prevent the importation of certain persons into certain states," where, by the laws of those states, their importation is prohibited, masters or captains of ships or vessels are forbidden, under severe penalty, " to import or bring, or cause to be imported or brought, any negro or mulatto, or person of colour, not being a native or citizen, 4}i registered seaman of the United States, or seamen, natives of countries be- yond the Cape of Good Hope, into any port or place which shall be situated in any state which, by law, has prohibited, or shall prohibit, the admission or im- portation of such negro, mulatto, or other person of colour." This provision speaks for itself, and requires no illustration. It is a case in point, and fully embraces the principle laid down. To the same effect is the act of the 25th of February, 1799, respecting quarantine and health laws, which, as belonging to the internal police of the states, stand on the same ground. The act, among other things, " directs the collectors and all other revenue officers, the masters and crews of the revenue cutters, and the military officers in command on the station, to co-operate faithfully in the execution of the quarantine and other re- strictions which the health laws of the state may establish." The principles embraced by these acts, in relation to the commercial inter- course of the country, are equally applicable to the intercourse by mail. There may, indeed, be more difhculty in co-operating with the states in the latter than in the former, but that cannot possibly affect the principle. Regarding it, then, as established both by reason and precedents, the committee, in conformity ■with it, have prepared a bill, and directed their chairman to report the same to the Senate, prohibiting, under the penalty of fine and dismission from office, any deputy postmaster in any state, territory, or district, from knowingly receiving and putting into the mail any letter, packet, pamphlet, paper, or pictorial repre- sentation, directed to any postoffice or person in a state, territory, or district, by the laws of which the circulation of the same is forbidden ; and also prohibit- ing, under a like penalty, any deputy postmaster in said state, territory, or dis- trict, from knowingly delivering the same, except to such persons as may be authorized to receive them by the civil authority of said state, territory, or dis- trict. B B 194 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. It remains next to inquire into the duty of the states, from within whose lim- its and jurisdiction the internal peace and security of the slaveholding states are endangered. In order to comprehend more fully the nature and extent of their duty, it will be necessary to make a few remarks on the relations which exist between the states of our Federal Union, with the rights and obligations reciprocally result- ing from such relations. It has already been stated that the states which compose our Federal Union are sovereign and independent communities, united by a constitutional compact. Among its members the laws of nations are in full force and obligation, except as altered or modified by the compact ; and, of course, the states possess, with that exception, all the rights, and are subject to all the duties which separate and distinct communities possess, or to which they are subject. Among these are comprehended the obligation which all states are under to prevent their citi- zens from disturbing the peace or endangering tr.e security of other states ; and, in case of being disturbed or endangered, the righi of the latter to demand of the former to adopt such measures as will prevent their recurrence ; and, if re- fused or neglected, to resort to such measures as its protection may require. This right remains, of course, in force among the states of this Union, with such limitations as are imposed expressly by the Constitution. Within their limits,, the rights of the slaveholding states are as full to demand of the states within whose limits and jurisdiction their peace is assailed, to adopt the meas- ures necessary to prevent the same, and, if refused or neglected, to resort to means to protect themselves, as if they were separate and independent commu- nities. Those states, on the other hand, are not only under all the obligations which independent communities would be to adopt such measures, but also under the obligation which the Constitution superadds, rendered more sacred, if possible, by the fact that, while the Union imposes restrictions on the right of the slave- holding states to defend themselves, it aflbrds the medium through which their peace and security are assailed. It is not the intention of the committee to in- quire what those restrictions are, and what are the means which, under the Constitution, are left to the slaveholding states to protect themselves. The pe- riod has not yet come, and they trust never will, when it may be necessary to decide those questions ; but come it must, unless the states whose duty it is to suppress the danger shall see in time its magnitude, and the obligations which they are under to adopt speedy and effectual measures to arrest its farther prog- ress. That the full force of this obligation may be understood by all parties, the committee propose, in conclusion, to touch briefly on the movements of the Abolitionists, with the view of showing the dangerous consequenpes to which they must lead if not arrested. Their professed object is the emancipation of slaves in the Southern States, which they propose to accomplish through the agency of organized societies, spread tlu-oughout the non-slaveholding states, and a powerful press, directed mainly to excite in the other states hatred and abhorrence against the institu- tions and citizens of the slaveholding states, by addresses, lectures, and picto- rial representations, abounding in false and exaggerated statements. If the magnitude of the mischief affords, in any degree, the measure by which to judge of the criminality of a project, few have ever been devised to be com- pared Avith the present, whether the end be regarded, or the means by which it is proposed to be accomplished. The blindness of fanaticism is proverbial. With more zeal than understanding, it constantly misconceives the nature of the object at which it aims, and towards which it rushes with headlong violence, regardless of the means by which it is to be effected. Never was its charac# ter more fully exemplified than in the present instance. Setting out with the abstract principle that slavery is an evil, the fanatical zealots come at once to SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 195 the conclusion that it is their duty to abolish it, regardless oi' all the disasters Avhich must follow. Never was conclusion more false or dangerous. Admit- ting their assumption, there are innumerable things which, regarded in the ab- stract, are evils, but which it Avould be madness to attempt to abolish. Thus reo-arded, government itself is an evil, with most of its institutions intended to protect life and property, comprehending the civil as well as the criminal and miUtary code, which are tolerated only because to abolish them would be to increase instead of diminishing the evil. The reason is equally applicable to the case under consideration : to illustrate which, a few remarks on slavery, as it actually exists in the Southern States, will be necessary. He who regards slavery in those states simply under the relation of master and slave, as important as that relation is, viewed merely as a question of prop- erty to the slaveholding section of the Union, has a very imperfect conception of the institution, and the impossibility of abolishing it without disasters unex- ampled in the history of the world. To understand its nature and importance fully, it must be borne in mind that slavery, as it exists in the Southern States (mcluding under the Southern all the slaveholding States), involves not only the relation of master and slave, but also the social and political relations of two races, of nearly equal numbers, from different quarters of the globe, and the most opposite of all others in every particular that distinguishes one race of men from another. Emancipation would destroy these relations— would divest the masters of their property, and subvert the relation, social and political, that has existed between the races from almost the first settlement of the Southern States. It is not the intention of the committee to dwell on the pecuniary aspect of this vital subject : the vast amount of property involved, equal, at least, to $950,000,000, the ruin of families and individuals, the impoverishment and prostration of an entire section of the Union, and the fatal blow that would be given to the productions of the great agricultural staples, on which the com- merce, the navigation, the manufactures, and the revenue of the country almost entirely depend. As great as these disasters would be, they are nothing com- pared to what must follow the subversion oC the existing relation between the two races, to which the committee will confine their remarks. Under this relation the two races have long lived in peace and prosperity, and if not disturbed, would long continue so to live. While the European race has rapidly increased in wealth and numbers, and, at the same time, has main- tained an equality, at least morally and intellectually, with their brethren of the non-slaveholdinc' states, the African race has multiplied with not less rapidity accompanied by great improvement, physically and intellectually, and a degree of comfort which the labouring class in few other countries enjoy, and con- fessedly o-reatly superior to what the free people of the same race possess in. the non-staveholding states. It may, indeed, be safely asserted, that there is no example in history in which a savage people, such as their ancestors were when brought into the country, have ever advanced in the same period so rap- idly in numbers and improvement. To destroy the existing relations, would be to destroy this prosperity, and to place the two races in a state of conflict, which must end in the expulsion or extirpation of one or the other. No other can be substituted compatible with their peace or security. The difficulty is in the diversity of the races. So strongly drawn is the line between the two in consequence, and so strengthen- ed by the force of habit and education, that it is impossible for them to exist to- gether in the same community, where their numbers are so nearly equal as in the slaveholding states, under any other relation than that which now exists. Social and political equality between them is impossible. No power on earth can overcome the difficulty. The causes lie too deep in the principles of our nature to be surmounted. But, without such equality, to change the present f 196 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. condition of the African race, were it possible, would be but to change the form of slavery. It would make them the slaves of the community instead of the slaves of individuals, with less responsibihty and interest in their welfare on the part of the community than is felt by their present masters ; while it would destroy the security and independence of the European race, if the African should be per- mitted to contiiuie in their changed condition within the limits of those states. They would look to the other states for support and protection, and would be- come, virtually, their allies and dependants ; and would thus place in the hands of those states the most effectual instrument to destroy the influence and con- trol the destiny of the rest of the Union. It is against this relation between the two races that the blind and criminal zeal of the Abolitionists is directed — a relation that now preserves in quiet and security more than 6,500,000 of human beings, and which cannot be destroyed without destroying the peace and prosperity of nearly half the states of the Union, and involving their entire population in a deadly conflict, that must ter- minate either in the expulsion or extirpation of those who are the object of the misguided and false humanity of those who claim to be their friends. He must be blind indeed who does not perceive that the subversion of a re- lation which must be followed with such disastrous consequences, can only be effected by convulsions that would devastate the country, burst asunder the bonds of the Union, and ingulf in a sea of blood the institutions of the country. It is madness to suppose that the slaveholding states would quietly submit to be sacrificed. Every consideration — interest, duty, and humanity ; the love of country, the sense of wrong, hatred of oppressors, and treacherous and faithless confederates, and, finally, despair — would impel them to the most daring and desperate resistance in defence of property, family, country, liberty, and exist- ence. But wicked and cruel as is the end aimed at, it is fully equalled by the criminality of the means by which it is proposed to be accomplished. These, as has been stated, consist in organized societies and a powerful press, directed mainly with a view to excite the bitterest animosity and hatred of the people of the non-slaveholding states against the citizens and institutions of the slave- holding states. It is easy to see to what disastrous results such means must tend. Passing over the more obvious effects, their tendency to excite to insur- rection and servile war, with all its horrors, and the necessity which such ten- dency must impose on the slaveholding states to resort to the most rigid disci- pline and severe police, to the great injury of the present condition of the slaves, there remains another threatening, incalculable mischief to the country. The inevitable tendency of the means to which the Abolitionists have resort- ed to effect their object must, if persisted in, end in completely alienating the two great sections of the Union. The incessant action of hundreds of societies, and a vast printing establishment, throwing out daily thousands of artful and in- flammatory publications, must make, in time, a deep impression on ihe section of the Union where they freely circulate, and are mainly designed to have ef- fect. The well-informed and thoughtful may hold them in contempt, but the young, the inexperienced, the ignorant, and thoughtless will receive the poison. In process of time, when the number of proselytes is sufficiently multiplied, the artful and profligate, who are ever on the watch to seize on any means, how- ever wicked and dangerous, will unite with the fanatics, and make their move- ments the basis of a powerful political party, that will seek advancement by diff'using, as widely as possible, hatred against the slaveholding states. But, as hatred begets hatred, and animosity animosity, these feelings would become reciprocal, till every vestige of attachment would cease to exist between the two sections ; when the Union and the Constitution, the offspring of mutual af- fection and confidence, would forever perish. Such is the danger to which the movements of the Abolitionists expose the SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALllOTN. ] 97 country. If the force of the obligation is in proportion to the niagnituile of the danger, stroncer cannot be imposed than is at present on the states, within whose limits the danger originates, to arrest its farther progress — a duty they owe, not only to the states whose institutions are assailed, but to the Union and Constitution, as has been shown, and, it may be added, to iheinselves. The sober and considerate portions of citizens of the non-slaveholding states, who have a deep slake in the existing institutions of the country, would liave little forecast not to see that the assaults which arc now directed against the institu- tions of the Southern States may be A-ery easily directed against those which, uphold their own property and security. A very slight modification of the ar- guments used against the institutions which sustain the property and security of the South would make them equally eflectual against the institutions of the North, including banking, in which so vast an amount of its property and capi- tal is invested. It would be well for those interested to reflect whether there now exists, or ever has existed, a wealthy and civilized community in which, one portion did not live on the labour of another ; and whether the form in which slavery exists ill the South is not but one modification of this universal condition ; and, linally, whether any other, under all the circumstances of the case, is more defensible, or stands on stronger ground of necessity. It is time to look these questions in the face. Let those who are interested remember that labour is the only source of wealth, and how small a portion of it, in all old and civilized countries, even the best governed, is left to those by whose labour wealth is created. Let them also reflect how little volition or agency the operatives in any country have in the question of its distribution — as little, ■with a (e\y exceptions, as the African of the slaveholding states has in the distri- bution of the proceeds of his labour. Nor is it the less oppressive, that in the one case it is effected by the stern and powerful will of the government, and in the other by the more feeble and flexible will of a master. If one be an evil, so is the other. The only diflference is the amount and mode of the exaction and distribution, and the agency by which they are efi'ected. XII. SPEECH ON THE ABOLITION PETITIONS, M.VKCH 9, 1836. The question of receiving the petitions from Pennsylvania for the abo- lition of slavery in the District of Columbia being under consideration, Mr. Calhoun rose and said : If we may judge from what has been said, the mind of the Senate is fully made up on the subject of these petitions. With the exception of the two senators from V^ermont, all who have spoken have avowed their conviction, not only that they contain nothing requiring the action of the Senate, but that the petitions are hifrhly mis- chievous, as tending to agitate and distract the country, and to endanger the Union itself. With these concessions, I may fairly ask, "Why should these petitions be received 1 Why receive when we have made up our mind not to act 1 Why idly waste our time and lower our dignity in the useless ceremony of receiving to reject, as is proposed, should the peti- tions be received 1 Why, finally, receive what all acknowledge to be highly dangerous and mischievous '. But one reason has, or can be as- signed — that not to receive would be a violation of the right of petition, and, of course, that we are bound to receive, however objectionable and dangerous the petitions may be. If such be the fact, there is an end to the question. As great a< would be the advantage to the Abolitionists if we are bound to receive, if it would be a violation of the right of petition 198 J.PEECjHL;s OF JOHX C. CALHOUN. not to receive, wc nii;>r. acijuii-xe. On tho other hand, if it shall he fihown, not onlj' tn;it v " are net bound to receive, but tluu to ri-ceive. on the ground on \vi icW it hns been placed, would sacrifice the constitutional rights of this boily, would yield to the Ab(ditionists all they could hope at this tiuic, and would surrender all the outworks by which the slave- holding states can defend their rights and property here, then a unani- mous rejection o^ these petitions ought of right to I'ollow. Tlie (iecipposite course has been pursued. Abolition petitions have not only been received in both houses, but received on the most obnoxious and dangerous of all grounds — that we are bound io receive them ; that is, to take jurisdiction of the question of slavery whenever the Abolitionists may think proper to petition for its abolition, either here or in the states. Thus far, then, we of the slaveholding states have been grievously disappoint- ed. One question still remains to be decided — that presented by this bill. To refuse to pass this bill would be virtually to co-operate with the Abolitionists — would be to make the officers and agents of the postoffice department in effect their agents and abettors in the circulation of their incendiary publications in violation of the laws of the states. It is your unquestionable duty, as I have demonstrably proved, to abstain from their violation ; and, by refusing or neglect- ing to discharge that duty, you would clearly enlist in the existing controversy, on the side of the Abolitionists, against the Southern States. Shouhl such be your decision by refusing to pass this bill, I shall say to the peoph; of the South, look to yourselves — you have nothing to hope from others. But I must tell the Senate, be your decision what it may, the South will never abandon the principles of this bill. If you refuse co-operation with our laws, and conflict should ensue between your and our law, the Southern States will never yield 222 , SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN to the superiority of yours. We have a remedy in our hands, which, in suck event, we shall not fail to apply. We have high authority for asserting, that in such cases " state interposition is the rightful remedy" — a doctrine first an-' nounced by Jefferson — adopted by the patriotic and Republican State of Ken- tucky, by a solemn resolution in '98, and finally carried out into successful prac- tice on a recent occasion, ever to be remembered by the gallant state which I, in part, have the honour to represent. In this well-tested and efficient remedy, sustained by the principles developed in the report, and asserted in this bill, the slaveholding states have an ample protection. Let it be fixed — let it be riveted in every Southern mind, that the laws of the slaveholding states for the protec- tion of their domestic institutions are paramount to the laws of the General Government in the regulation of commerce and the mail, and that the latter must yield to the former in the event of conflict ; and that, if the government should refuse to yield, the states have a right to interpose, and we are safe. With these principles, nothing but concert would be wanting to bid defiance to the movements of the Abolitionists, whether at home or abroad ; and to place our "domestic institutions, and, with them, our security and peace, under our own pro- tection, and beyond the reach of danger. XIV. SPEECH ON THE RECEPTION OF ABOLITION PETITIONS, FEBRUARY, 1837. If the time of the Senate permitted, I should feel it to be my duty to call for the reading of the mass of petitions on the table, in order that we might know Avhat language they hold towards the slaveholding states and their institutions j but as it will not, I have selected indiscriminately from the pile, two : one from those in manuscript, and the other from the printed ; and, without knowing their contents, will call for the reading of them, so that we may judge, by them, of the character of the whole. (Here the secretary, on the call of Mr. Calhoun, read the two petitions.) Such, resumed Mr. C, is the language held towards us and ours; the peculiar institutions of the South, that on the maintenance of which the very existence of the slaveholding states depends, is pronounced to be sinful and odious, in the sight of God and man ; and this with a systematic design of rendering us hateful in the eyes of the world, Avith a view to a general crusade against us and our institutions. This, too, in the legis- lative halls of the Union ; created by these confederated states for the better protection of their peace, their safety, and their respective insti- tutions ; and yet we, the representatives of twelve of these sovereign states against whom this deadly Avar is waged, are expected to sit here in silence, hearing ourselves and our constituents day after day denounced, without uttering a word ; if we but open our lips, the charge of agitation is re- sounded on all sides, and we are held up as seeking to aggravate the evil which we resist. Every reflecting mind must see in all this a state of things deeply and dangerously diseased. I do not belong, said Mr. C, to the school which holds that aggression is to he met by concession. Mine is the opposite creed, which teaches that encroachments must be met at the beginning, and that those who act on the opposite principle are prepared to become slaves. In this case, in particular, I hold concession or compromise to be fatal. If we concede an inch, concession would follow concession — compromise would follow compromise, until our ranks would be so broken that eflectual resistance would be impossible. We must meet the enemy on the frontier, with a SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 223' fixed determination of maintaining our position at every hazard. Con- sent to receive these insulting petitions, and the next demand will be that they be referred to a committee, in order that they may be deliberated and acted upon. At the last session, we were modestly asked to receive' them simply to lay them on the table, without any view of ulterior action. 1 then told the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), who strongly urged that course in the Senate, that it was a position that could not be maintained ; as the argument in favour of acting on the petitions, if we were bound to receive, could not be resisted. I then said that the next step would be to refer the petition to a committee, and I already see in- dications that such is now the intention. If we yield, that will be followed by another, and we would thus proceed, step by step, to the final consum- mation of the object of these petitions. We are now told that the most effectual mode of arresting the progress of abolition is to reason it down ; and with this view, it is urged that the petitions ought to be referred to a committee. That is the very ground which was taken at the last session in the other house ; but, instead of arresting its progress, it has since ad- vanced more rapidly than ever. The most unquestionable right may be rendered doubtful, if once admitted to be a subject of controversy, and that would be the case in the present instance. The subject is beyond the jurisdiction of Congress — they have no right to touch it in any shape or form, or to make it the subject of deliberation or discussion. In opposition to this view, it is urged that Congress is bound by the Constitution to receive petitions in every case and on every subject, Avhether within its constitutional competency or not. I hold the doctrine to be absurd, and do solemnlj^ believe that it would be as easy to prove that it has the right to abolish slavery, as that it is bound to receive peti- tions for that purpose. The very existence of the rule that requires a question to be put on the reception of petitions, is conclusive to show that there is no such obligation. It has been a standing rule from the commencement of the government, and clearly shows the sense of those who formed the Constitution on this point. The question on the recep- tion would be absurd, if, as is contended, we are bound to receive ; but I do not intend to argue the question ; I discussed it fully at the last ses- sion, and the arguments then advanced neither have nor can be answered. As widely as this incendiary spirit has spread, it has not yet infected this body, or the great mass of the intelligent and business portion of the North ; but unless it be speedily stopped, it will spread and work upward till it brings the two great sections of the Union into deadly con- flict. This is not a new impression with me. Several years since, in a discussion with one of the senators from Massachuse'tts (Mr. Webster), before this fell spirit had showed itself, I then predicted that the doctrine of the proclamation and the force bill — that this government had a right, in the last resort, to determine the extent of its own powers, and enforce it at the point of the bayonet, which was so warmly maintained by that senator — would at no distant day arouse the dormant spirit of Aboli- tionism ; I told him that the doctrine was tantamount to the assump- tion of unlimited power on the part of the government, and that such Avould be the impression on the public mind in a large portion of the Union. The consequence would be inevitable — a large portion of the IN'orthern States believed slavery to be a sin, and would believe it to be an obligation of conscience to abolish it, if they should feel themselves in any degree responsible for its continuance, and that his doctrine would necessarily lead to the belief of such responsibility. I then predicted tliat it would commence, as it has, with this fanatical portion of society ; and that they would begin their operation on the ignorant, the weak, the 224 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. • young, and the thoughtless, and would gradually extend upward till they became strong enough to obtain political control, when he, and others holding the highest stations in society, would, however reluctant, be compelled to yield to their doctrine, or be driven into obscurity. But four years have since elapsed, and all this is already in a course of regu- lar fulfilment. Standing at the point of time at which we have now arrived, it will not be more difficult to trace the course of future events now than it was then. Those who imagine that the spirit now abroad in the North will die away of itself without a shock or convulsion, have formed a very inadequate conception of its real character 5 it will continue to rise and spread, un- less prompt and efficient measures to stay its progress be adopted. Al- ready it has taken possession of the pulpit, of the schools, and, to a con- siderable extent, of the press ; those great instruments by which the mind of the risinor jreneration will be formed. However sound the great body of the non-slaveholding states are at present, in the course of a few years they will be succeeded by those who will have been taught to hate the people and institutions of nearly one half of this Union, with a hatred more deadly than one hostile nation ever entertained towards another. It is easy to see the end. By the necessary course of events, if left to themselves, we must become, finally, two people. It is impossible, under the deadly hatred which must spring up between the two great sections, if the present causes are permitted to operate unchecked, that we should continue under the same political sys- tem. The conflicting elements would burst the Union asunder, as power- ful as are the links which hold it together. Abolition and the Union can- not coexist. As the friend of the Union, I openly proclaim it, and the sooner it is known the better. The former may now be controlled, but in a short time it will be beyond the power of man to arrest the course of events. We of the South will not, cannot surrender our institutions. To maintain the existing relations between the two races inhabitino- that section of the Union is indispensable to the peace and happiness of both. It cannot be subverted without drenching the country in blood, and extir- pating one or the other of the races. Be it good or bad, it has grown up Avith our society and institutions, and is so interwoven with them that to destroy it would be to destroy us as a people. But let me not be under- stood as admitting, even by implication, that the existing relations be- tween the two races, in the slaveholding states, is an evil : far otherwise ; I hold it to be a good, as it has thus far proved itself to be, to both, and will continue to prove so, if not disturbed by the fell spirit of abolition. I appeal to facts. Never before has the black race of Central Africa, from the dawn of history to the present day, attained a condition so civilized and so improved, not only physically, but morally and intellectually. It came among us in a low, degraded, and savage condition, and, in the course of a few generations, it has grown up under the fostering care of our institutions, as reviled as they have been, to its present comparative civilized condition. This, Avith the rapid increase of numbers, is conclu- sive proof of the general happiness of the race, in spite of all the exag- gerated tales to the contrary. In the mean time, the white or European race has not degenerated. It has kept pace with its brethren in other sections of the Union where sla- very does not exist. It is odious to make comparison ; but I appeal to all sides whether the South is not equal in virtue, intelligence, patriotism, courage, disinterestedness, and all the high qualities which adorn our na- ture. I ask whether we have not contributed our full share of talents and political wisdom in forming and sustaining this political fabric j and SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 225 ^vhether we have not constantly inclined most strongly to the side of lib- erty, and been the first to see, and first to resist, the encroachments of power. Ill one thing- only are we inferior — the arts of gain ; we acknowl- edo-e that we are less wealthy than the Northerti section of this Union, but I trace this mainly to the fiscal action of this government, which has extracted much from, and spent little among us. Had it been the reverse — if the exaction had been from the other section, and the expenditure with us — this point of superiority would not be against us now, as it was not at the formation of this government. But I take higher ground. I hold that, in the present state of civiliza- tion, where two races of different origin, and distinguished by colour, and other physical differences, as well as intellectual, are brought to- gether, the relation now existing in the slaveholding states between the two is, instead of an evil, a good — a positive good. 1 feel myself called upon to speak freely upon the subject, where the honour and interests of those I represent are involved. I hold, then, that there never has yet existed a Avealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did not, in point of fact, live on the labour of the other. Broad and general as is this assertion, it is fully borne out by history. This is not the proper occasion, but, if it were, it would not be difficult to trace the va- rious devices by which the wealth of all civilized communities has been so unequally divided, and to show by what means so small a share has been allotted to those by whose labour it was produced, and so large a share given to the non-producing class. The devices are almost innu- merable, from the brute force and gross superstition of ancient times, to the subtle and artful fiscal contrivances of modern. I might well chal- lenge a comparison between them and the more direct, simple, and patri- archal mode by which the labour o^ the African race is among us com- manded by the European. I may say, with truth, that in few countries so much is left to the share of the labourer, and so little exacted from him, or Avhere there is more kind attention to him in sickness or infirmi- ties of age. Compare his condition with the tenants of the poor-houses in the most civilized portions of Europe — look at the sick, and the old and infirm slave, on one hand, in the midst of his family and friends, un- der the kind superintending care of his master and mistress, and compare it with the forlorn and wretched condition of the pauper in the poor- house. But I will not dwell on this aspect of the question: I turn to the political ; and here I fearlessly assert, that the existing relation between the two races in the South, against which these blind fanatics are waging war, forms the most solid and durable foundation on which to rear free and stable political institutions. It is useless to disguise the fact. There is, and always has been, in an advanced stage of wealth and civilization, a conflict between labour and capital. The condition of society in the South exempts us from the disorders and dangers resulting from this con- flict ; and which explains why it is that the political condition of the slaveholding states has been so much more stable and quiet than those of the North. The advantages of the former, in this respect, will become more and more manifest, if left undisturbed by interference from without, as the country advances in wealth and numbers. We have, in fact, but just entered that condition of society where the strength and durability of our political institutions are to be tested ; and I venture nothing in pre- dicting that the experience .of the next generation will fully test how vastly more favourable our condition of society is to that of other sec- tions for free and stable institutions, provided we are not disturbed by the interference of others, or shall have sufficient intelligence and spirit to resist promptly and successfully such interference. It rests with our- Ff 226 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. selves to meet and repel them. I look not for aid to this government, or to the other states ; not but there are kind feelings towards us on the part of the great body of the non-slaveholding states ; but, as kind as their feelings may be, we rfiay rest assured that no political party in those states will risk their ascendency for our safety. If we do not defend our- selves, none will defend us ; if we yield, we will be more and more pressed as we recede ; and, if we submit, we will be trampled under foot. Be assured that emancipation itself would not satisfy these fanatics : that gained, the next step would be to raise the negroes to a social and polit- ical equality with the whites ; and, that being effected, we would soon find the present condition of the two races reversed. They, and their Northern allies, would be the masters, and we the slaves; the condition of the white race in the British West India Islands, as bad as it is, would be hap- piness to ours ; there the mother-country is interested in sustaining the supremacj'^ of the European race. It is true that the authority of the former master is destroyed, but the African will there still be a slave, not to individuals, but to the community — forced to labour, not by the au- thority of the overseer, but by the bayonet of the soldiery and the rod of the civil magistrate. Surrounded, as the slaveholding states are, with such imminent perils, I rejoice to think that our means of defence are ample, if we shall prove to have the intelligence and spirit to see and apply them before it is too late. All we want is concert, to lay aside all party differences, and unite with zeal and energy in repelling approaching dangers. Let there be concert of action, and we shall find ample means of security without re- sorting to secession or disunion. I speak with full knowledge and a thor- ough examination of the subject, and, for one, see my way clearly. One thing alarms me — the eager pursuit of gain which overspreads the land, and which absorbs every faculty of the mind and every feeling of the heart. Of all passions, avarice is the most blind and compromising — the last to see, and the first to yield to danger. I dare not hope that anything I can say will arouse the South to a due sense of danger ; I fear it is be- yond the power of mortal voice to aw^aken it in time from the fatal secu- rity into which it has fallen. ■ XV. SPEECH ON THE PUBLIC DEPOSITES, MAY 28, 1836. The Senate then proceeded to the consideration of the bill to regulate the deposites of the public money. After some words from Mr. Wright in explanation, Mr. Calhoun said : This bill, which the senator from New-York proposes to strike out in order to sub- stitute his amendment, is no stranger to this body. It was reported at the last session by the Select Committee on Executive Patronage, and passed the Sen- ate after a full and deliberate investigation, by a mixed vote of all parties, of twenty to twelve. As strong as is this presumptive evidence in its favour, I would, notwithstanding, readily surrender the bill and adopt the amendment of the senator from New- York, if I did not sincerely believe that it is liable to strong and decisive objections. I seek no lead on this important subject ; my sole aim is to aid in applying a remedy to what I honestly believe to be a deep and dangerous disease of the body politic : and I stand prepared to co-operate with any one, be he of what party he may, who may propose a remedy, provi- ded it shall promise to be safe and efficient. I, in particular, am desirous of co- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 227 operating with the senator from New-York, not only because I desire the aid of his distinguished talents, but, still more, of hi« decisive influence with the powerful party of which he is so distinguished a member, and which now, for good or evil, holds the destiny of the country in its hands. It was in this spirit that I examined the amendment proposed by the senator ; and I regret to say, after a full investigation, I cannot acquiesce in it, as I feel a deep conviction that it will be neither safe nor efficient. So far from being substantially the same as the bill, as stated by the senator, I cannot but regard it as essentially different, both as to objects and means. The objects of the bill are, first, to se- cure the public interest as far as it is connected with the deposites ; and, next, to protect the banks in which they are made against the influence and control of the executive branch of this government, with the view both to their and the public interest. Compared with the bill, in respect to both, the proposed amendment will be found to favour the banks against the people, and the exec- utive against the banks. I do not desire the Senate to form their opinion on jny authority. I wish them to examine for themselves ; and, in order to aid them in the examination, I shall now proceed to state, and briefly illustrate, the several points of difterence between the bill and the proposed amendment, ta- king them in the order in which they stand in the bill. The first section of the bill provides that the banks shall pay at the rate of two per cent, per annum on the deposites for the use of the public money. This provision is entirely omitted in the amendment, which proposes to give to the banks the use of the money without interest. That the banks ought to pay something for the use of the public money, all must agree, whatever diver- sity of opinion there may be as to the amount. According to the last return of the treasury department, there was, on the first of this month, $45,000,000 of public money in the thirty-six depository banks, which they are at liberty to use as their own for discount or business, till drawn out for disbursements, an event that may not happen for years. In a word, this vast amount is so much additional banking capital, giving the same, or nearly the same, profit to those institutions as their permanent chartered capital, without rendering any other service to the public than paying away, from time to time, the portion that might be required for the service of the government. Assuming that the banks real- ize a profit of six per cent, on these deposites (it cannot be estimated at less), it would give, on the present amount, nearly three millions of dollars per annum, and on the probable average public deposites of the year, upward of two mill- ions of dollars ; which enormous profit is derived from the public by compara- tively few individuals, without any return or charge, except the inconsiderable service of paying out the draughts of the treasury when presented. But it is due to the senator to acknowledge that his amendment is predicated on the suppo- sition that some disposition must be made of the surplus revenue, which would leave in the banks a sum not greater than would be requisite to meet the cur- rent expenditure : a supposition which necessarily must affect, very materially affect, the decision of the question of the amount of compensation the banks ought to make to the public for the use of its funds ; but, let the disposition be what it may, the omission in the amendment of any compensation whatever is, in my opinion, wholly indefensible. The next point of difference relates to transfer warrants. The bill prohibits the use of transfer warrants, except with a view to disbursement, while the amendment leaves them, without regidatioii, under the sole control of the treas- ury department. To understand the importance of this difference, it must be borne in mind that the transfer warrants are the lever by which the whole bank- ing operations of the country may be controlled through the deposites. By them the public money may be transferred from one bank to another, or from one state or section of the country to another state or section ; and thus one bank may be elevated and another depressed, and a redundant currency created in one state 228 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. or section, and a deficient in another ; and, through such redundancy or defi- ciency, all the moneyed engagements and business transactions of the whole community may be made dependant on the will of one man. With the present enormous surplus, it is difficult to assign limits to the extent of this power. The secretary, or the irresponsible agent unknown to the laws, who, rumour says, has the direction of this immense power (we are permitted to have no certain information), may raise and depress stocks and property of all descriptions at his pleasure, by withdrawing from one place and transferring to another, to the unlimited o^ain of those who are in the secret, and certain ruin of those who are not. Such a field of speculation has never before been opened in any country ; a field so gi-eat, that the Rothschilds themselves might be tempted to enter it with their immense funds. Nor is the control which it would give over the pol- itics of the country much less unlimited. To the same extent that it may be used to affect the interests and the fortunes of individuals, to the like extent it may be employed as an instrument of political influence and control. I do not intend to assert that it has or will be so employed ; it is not essential at pres- ent to inquire how it has or will be used. It is sufficient for my purpose to show, as I trust I have satisfactorily, that it may be so employed. To guard against the abuse of so dangerous a power, the provision was inserted in the bill to prohibit the use of transfer warrants, except, as stated, for the purpose of disbursement ; the omission of which provision in the amendment is a fatal ob- jection to it of itself, were there no other. But it is far from standing alone : the next point of difference will be found to be not less striking and fatal. The professed object of both the bill and the amendment is to place the safe- keeping of the public moneys under the regulation and control of law, instead of being left, as it now is, at the discretion of the executive. However strange it may seem, the fact is, nevertheless, so, that the amendment entirely fails to effect the object which it is its professed object to accomplish. In order that it may be distinctly seen that what I state is the case, it will be necessary to view the provisions of the bill and the amendment in reference to the deposite separately, as they relate to the banks in which the public funds are now de- posited, and those which may hereafter be selected to receive them. The bill commences with the former, which it adopts as banks of deposite, and prescribes the regulations and conditions on the observance of which they shall continue such ; while, at the same time, it places them beyond the con- trol and influence of the executive department, by placing them. under the pro- tection of law so long as they continue faithfully to perform their duty as fiscal agents of the government. It next authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to select, under certain circumstances, additional banks of deposite, as the exigen- cy of the public service may require, on which it imposes like regulations and conditions, and places, in like manner, under the protection of law. In all this the amendment pursues a very different course. It begins with authorizing the secretary to select the banks of deposite, and limits the regulations and condi- tions it imposes on such banks ; leaving, by an express provision, the present banks wholly under the control of the treasury or the executive department, as they now are, without prescribing any time for the selection of other banks of deposite, or making it the duty of the secretary so to do. The consequence is obvious. The secretary may continue the present banks as long as he pleases ; and so long as he may choose to continue them, the provisions of the amend- ment, so far as relates to the deposites, will be a dead letter ; and the banks, of course, instead of being under the control of the law, will be contrary, as I have said, to the professed object both of the bill and amendment — subject exclusive- ly to his will. The senator has attempted to explain this difference, but, I must say, very un- satisfactorily. He said that the bill prohibited the selection of other banks ; and, as he deemed others to be necessary, at certain important points, in con- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 229 sequence of the present enormous surplus, he inserted the provision authorizing the selection of other bunks. The senator has not stated the provisions of the bill accurately : so far from not authorizing, it expressly authorizes the selec- tion of other banks where there are now none ; but I presume he intended to limit his remarks to places where there are no existing banks of deposite. Thus limited, the fact is as he states ; but it by no means explains the extraor- dinary omission (for such I must consider it) of not extending the regulations to the existing banks, as well as to those hereafter to be selected. If the public service requires additional banks at New-York and other important points, in consequence of the vast sums deposited there (as I readily agree it does), if no disposition is to be made of the surplus, it is certainly a very good reason for enlarging the provisions of the bill, by authorizing the secretary to select other banks at those points ; but it is impossible for me to comprehend how it proves that the regulations which the amendment proposes to impose should be ex- clusively limited to such" newly-selected banks. Nor do I see why the senator has not observed the same rule, in this case, as that which he adopted in refer- ence to the compensation the banks ought to pay for the use of the public money. He omitted to provide for any compensation, on the ground that his amendment proposed to dispose of all the surplus money, leaving in the possession of the banks a sum barely sufficient to meet the current expenditure, for the use of which he did not consider it right to charge a compensation. On the same principle, it was unnecessary to provide for the selection of additional banks where there are now banks of deposite, as they Avould be ample if the surplus was disposed of. In this I understood the senator himself to concur. But it is not only in the important point of extending the regulations to the existing banks of deposite that the bill and the amendment differ. There is a stri- king ditierence between them in reference to the authority of Congress over the banks of deposite embraced both in the bill and the amendment. The latter, fol- lowing the provision in the charter of the late Bank of the United States, authorizes the secretary to withdraw the public deposites, and to discontinue the use of any one of the banks whenever, in his opinion, such bank shall have violated the conditions on which it has been employed, or the public funds are not safe in. its vaults, with the simple restriction, that he shall report the fact to Congress. "VVe know, from experience, how slight is the check which this restriction im- poses. It not only requires the concurrence of both houses of Congress to overrule the act of the secretary, where his power may be improperly exerci- sed, but the act of Congress itself, intended to control such exercise of power, may be overruled by the veto of the President, at whose will the secretary liolds his place ; so as to leave the control of the banks virtually under the con- trol of the executive department of the government. To obviate this, the bill vests the secretary with the power simply of withdrawing the deposites and suspending the use of the bank as a place of deposite ; and provides that, if Congress shall not confirm the removal, the deposites shall be returned to the l)aidc after the termination of the next session of Congress. The next ])oint of difference is of far less importance, and is only mentioned as tending to illustrate the different character of the bill and the amendment. The former provides that the banks of deposite shall perform the duties of commis- sioners of loans without compensation, in like manner as was the duty of the late Bank of the United States and its branches, under its charter. Among these duties is that of paying the pensioners — a very heavy branch of disburse- ment, and attended with considerable expense, and which will be saved to the government under the bill, but will be lost if the amendment should prevail. Another difference remains to be pointed out, relating to the security of the deposites. With so large an amount of public money in their vaults, it is im- portant that the banks should always be provided with ample means to meet their engagements. With this view, the bill provides that the specie in the 230 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. vaults of the several banks, and the aggregate of the balance in their favour with other specie-paying banks, shall be equal to one fifth of the entire amount of their notes and bills in circulation, and their public and private deposites — a sum, as is believed, sufficient to keep them in a sound, solvent condition. The amendment, on the contrary, provides that the banks shall keep in their own vaults, or the vaults of other banks, specie equal to one fourth of its notes and bills in circulation, and the balance of its accounts with other banks payable on demand. I regret that the senator has thought proper to change the phraseology, and to use terms less clear and explicit than those in the bill. I am not certain that I comprehend the exact meaning of the provision in the amendment. What is meant by specie in the vaults of other banks ? In a general sense, all depos- ites are considered as specie ; but I cannot suppose that to be the meaning in this instance, as it would render the provision in a great measure inoperative. I presume the amendment means special deposites in gold and silver in other banks, placed there for safe keeping, or to be drawn on, and not to be used by the bank in which it is deposited. Taking that to be the meaning, what is there to prevent the same sum from being twice counted in estimating the means of the several banks of deposite ? Take two of them, one having $100,000 in specie in its vaults, and the other the same amount in the vaults of the other bank, ■which, in addition, has, besides, another $100,000 of its own ; what is there to prevent the latter from returning, under the amendment, $200,000 of specie in its vaults, while the former would return $100,000 in its own vaults, and an- other in the vaults of the other bank, making, in the aggregate, between them, $400,000, when, in reality, the amount in both would be but $300,000? But this is not the only difference between the bill and amendment, in this particular, deserving of notice. The object of the provision is to compel the banks of deposite to have, at all times, ample means to meet their liabilities, so that the government should have sufficient assurance that the public moneys in their vaults would be forthcoming when demanded. With this view, the bill provides that the available means of the bank shall never be less than one fifth of its aggregate liabilities, including bills, notes, and deposites, public and pri- vate ; while the amendment entirely omits the private deposites, and includes only the balance of its deposites with other banks. This omission is the more remarkable, inasmuch as the greater portion of the liabilities of the deposite banks must, with the present large surplus, result from their deposites, as every one who is familiar with banking operations will readily perceive. I have now presented to the Senate the several points of difference which I deem material between the bill and the amendment, with such remarks as to enable them to form their own opinion in reference to the difference, so that they may decide how far the assertion is true with which I set out, that, wherever they differ, the amendment favours the banks against the interests of the public, and the executive against the banks. The senator, acting on the supposition that there would be a permanent surplus beyond the expenditures of the government, which neither justice nor regard to the public interest would permit to remain in the banks, has extended the provis- ions of his amendment, with great propriety, so as to comprehend a plan to with- draw the surplus from the banks. His plan is to vest the commissioners of the sinking fund with authority to estimate, at the beginning of every quarter, the probable receipts and expenditures of the quarter ; and if, in their opinion, the receipts, with the money in the treasury, should exceed the estimated expenditure by a certain sum, say $.5,000,000, the excess should be vested in state stocks ; and if it should fall short of that sum, a sufficient amount of the stocks should be sold to make up the deficit. We have thus presented for consideration the important subject of the surplus revenue, and with it the question so anxiously and universally asked, What shall be done with the surplus ? Shall it be ex- Ali SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 231 pended by the government, or remain where it is, or be disposed of as proposed by the senator ? or, if not, what other disposition shall be made of it ? questions, the investigation of which necessarily embraces the entire circle of our policy, and on the decision of which the future destiny of the country may depend. But before we enter on the discussion of this important question, it will be proper to ascertain what will be the probable available jneans uf the year, ia order that some conception may be formed of the probable surplus which may remain, by comparing it with the appropriations that may be authorized. According to the late report of the Secretary of the Treasury, there was de- posited in the several banks a little upward of $33,000,000 at the termination of the lirst quarter of the year, not hicluding the sum of abouc $3,000,000 de- posited by the disbursing agents of the government. The same report stated the receipts of the quarter at about $11,000,000, of which lands and customs yielded nearly an equal amount. Assuming for the three remaining quarters an equal amount, it would give, for the entire receipts of the year, $44,000,000. I agree with the senator, that this sum is too large. The customs will prob- ably average an amount throughout the year corresponding with the receipts of the first quarter, but there probably will be a considerable falling off in the receipts from the public lands. Assuming $7,000,000 as the probable amount, which I presume will be ample, the receipts of the year, subtract- ing that sum from' $44,000,000, will be $37,000,000; and subtracting from that $11,000,000, the receipts of the first quarter, would leave $26,000,000 as the probable receipts of the last three quarters. Add to this sum $33,000,000, the amount in the treasury on the last day of the first quarter, and it gives $59,000,000. To this add the amount of stock in the United States Bank, which, at the market price, is worth at least $7,000,000, and we have $66,000,000, which I consider as the least amount at which the probable available means of the year can be fairly estimated. It will, probably, very considerably exceed this amount. The range may be put down at between $66,000,000 and $73,000,000, which may be considered as the two extremes between which the means of the year may vibrate. But, in order to be safe, I have assumed the least of the two. The first question which I propose to consider .is. Shall this sum be expend- ed by the government in the course of the year 1 A sum nearly equal to the entire debt of the war of the Revolution, by which the liberty and independence of these states were established ; more than five times greater than the expen- diture of the government at the commencement of the present administration, — deducting the payments on account of the public debt — and more than four times greater than the average annual expenditure of the present administration, making the same deduction, extravagant as its expenditure has been. The very magnitude of the sum decides the question against expenditure. It may be wasted, thrown away, but it cannot be expended. There are not objects on which to expend it ; for proof of which I appeal to the appropriations already Hiade and contemplated. We have passed the navy appropriations, which, as liberal as they are admitted to be on all sides, are raised only about $2,000,000 compared with the appropriations of last year. The appropriations for fortifi- cations, supposing the bills now pending should pass, will amount to about $3,500,000, and would exceed the ordinary appropriations, assuming them at $1,000,000, which I hold to be ample, by $2,500,000. Add a million for ord- nance, seven or eight for Indian treaties, and four for Indian wars, and suppo- sing the companies of the regular army to be filled as recommended by the war department, the aggregate amount, including the ordinary expenditures, would be between thirty and thirty-five millions, and would leave a balance of at least $30,000,000 in the treasury at the end of the year. But suppose objects could be devised on which to expend the whole of the available means of the year, it would still be impossible to make the expendi- \ SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ^<^ithout immense waste and confusion. To expend so large an amount, reg- 'iiiarly and methodically, would require a vast increase of able and experienced disbursing officers, and a great enlargement of the organization of the govern- ment, in all the branches connected with disbursements. To effect such an en- largement, and to give a suitable organization, placed under the control of skil- ful and efficient officers, must necessarily be a work of time ; but, without it, so sudden and great an increase of expenditure would necessarily be followed by inextricable confusion and heavy losses. But suppose this difficulty overcome, and suitable objects could be devised, would it be advisable to make the expenditure ? Would it be wise to draw off so vast an amount of productive labour, to be employed in unproductive objects, in building fortifications, dead walls, and in lining the interior frontier with a large military force, neither of which would add a cent to the productive power of the country ? The ordinary expenditure of the government, under the present administra- tion, may be estimated, say at $18,000,000, a sum exceeding by five or six millions what, in my opinion, is sufficient for a just and efficient administration of the government. Taking eighteen from sixty-six would leave forty-eight millions as the surplus, if the affairs of the government had been so administer- ed as to avoid the heavy expenditures of the year, which I firmly believe, by early and prudent management, might have been effected. The expenditure of this sum, estimating labour at $20 a month, would require 200,000 operatives, equal to one third of the whole number of labourers employed in producing the great staple of our country, which is spreading wealth and prosperity over the land, and controlling, in a great measure, the commerce and manufactures of the world. But take what will be the actual surplus, and estimate that at half the sum which, with prudence and economy, it might have been, and it would require the subtraction of 100,000 operatives from their present useful employ- ment, to be employed in the unproductive service of the government. Would it, I again repeat, be wise to draw oft' this immense mass of productive labour, in order to employ it in building fortifications and swelling the military estab- lishment of the country ? Would it add to the strength of the Union, or give in- creased security to its liberty, .or accelerate its prosperity ? the great objects for which the government was constituted. To ascertain how the strength of any country may be best developed, its pe- culiar state and condition must be taken into consideration. Looking to ours with this view, who can doubt that, next to our free institutions, the main source of our growing greatness and power is to be found in our great and astonishing increase of numbers, wealth, and facility of intercourse ? If we desire to see our country powerful, we ought to avoid any measure opposed to their develop- ment, and, in particular, ought to make the smallest possible draught, consistent with our peace and security, on the productive powers of the country. Let these have the freest possible play. Leave the resources of individuals under their own direction, to be employed in advancing their own and their country's wealth and prosperity, with the extraction of the least amount required for the expen- diture of the government ; and draw off not a single labourer from his present productive pursuits to the unproductive employment of the government, except- ing such as the public service may render indispensable. Who can doubt that such a policy would add infinitely more to the power and strength of the coun- try than the extravagant schemes of spending millions on fortifications and the increase of the military establishment ? Let us next examine how the liberty of the country may be affected by the scheme of disposing of the surplus by disbursements. And here I would ask. Is the liberty of the country at present in a secure and stable condition ? and, if not, by what is it endangered ? and will an increase of disbursements aug- ment or diminish the danger ? SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 233 Whatever may be the diversity of opinion on other points, there is not an in- telligent individual of any party, who regards his rgputation, that will venture to deny that the liberty of the country is at this time more insecure and unstable than it ever has been. We all know that there is in every portion of the Union, and with every party, a deep feeling that our political institutions are undergoing a great and hazardous change. Nor is the feeling much less strong, that the vast increase of patronage and influence of the government is the cause of the great and fearful change which is so extensively affecting the character of our people and institutions. The effect of increasing the expenditures at this time, so as to absorb the surplus, would be to double the number of those who live, or expect to live, by the government, and in the same degree augment its patron- age and influence, and accelerate that downward course which, if not arrested, must speedily terminate in the overthrow of our free irtstitutions. These views I hold to be decisive against the Avild attempt to absorb the im- mense means of the government by the expenditures of the year. In fact, with the exception of a few individuals, all seem to regard the scheme either as im- practicable or unsafe ; but there are others, who, while they condemn the at- tempt of disposing of the surplus by immediate expenditures, believe it can be safely and expediently expended in a period of four or five years, on what they choose to call the defences of the country. In order to determine how far this opinion may be correct, it will be neces- sary first to ascertain what will be the available means of the next four or five years ; by comparing which with what ought to be the expenditure, we may determine whether the plan would, or would not, be expedient. In making the calculation, I will take the term of five years, including the present, and which ■will, of course, include 1840, after the termination of which, the duties above twenty per cent, are to go ofl', by the provisions of the Compromise Act, in eighteen months, when the revenue is to be reduced to the economical and just wants of the government. The available means of the present year, as I have already shown, will equal at least $66,000,000. That of the next succeeding four years (including 1840) may be assumed to be twenty-one millions annually. The reason for this as- sumption may be seen in the report of the select committee at the last session, which I have reviewed, and in the correctness of which I feel increased con- fidence. The amount may fall short of, but will certainly not exceed, the esti- mate in the report, unless some unforeseen event should occur. Assuming, then, $21,000,000 as the average receipts of the next four years, it will give an aggregate of $84,000,000, which, added to the available means of this year, will give $150,000,000 as the sum that will be at the disposal of the govern- ment for the period assumed. Divide this sum by five, the number of years, and it will give $30,000,000 as the average annual available means of the period. The next question for consideration is. Will it be expedient to raise the dis- bursement during the period to an average expenditure of $30,000,000 annual- ly ? The first, and strong objection to the scheme is, that it would leave in the deposite banks a heavy surplus during the greater part of the time, beginning with a surplus of upward of thirty millions at the commencement of next year, and decreasing at the rate of eight or nine millions a year till the termination of the period. But, passing this objection by, I meet the question directly. It would be highly inexpedient and dangerous to attempt to keep up the disburse- ments at so high a rate. I ask, On what shall this money be expended ? Shall it be expended by an increase of the military establishment ? by an enlarge- ment of the appropriations for fortifications, ordnance, and the navy, far beyond what is proposed for the present year ? Have those who advocate the scheme reflected to what extent this enlargement must be carried to absorb so great a sum ? Even this year, with the extraordinary expenditure upon Indian treaties 234 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. and Indian wars, and with profuse expenditure in every other branch of service, the aggregate amount of appropriations will not greatly exceed $30,000,000, and that of disbursements will not, probably, equal that sum. To what extent, then, must the appropriations for the army, the navy, the fortifications, and the like, be carried, in order to absorb that sum, especially with a declining expenditure in several branches of the service, particularly in the pensions, which, during the period, will fall off more than a million of dol- lars ? But, in order to take a full view of the folly and danger of the scheme it will be necessary to extend our view beyond 1842, in order to form some opinion of what will be the income of the government when the tariff shall be so reduced, under the Compromise Act, that no duty shall exceed twenty per cent, ad valorem. I know that any estimate made at this time cannot be con- sidered much more than conjectural ; but still, it would be imprudent to adopt a system of expenditure now, without taking into consideration the probable state of the revenue a few years hence. After bestowing due reflection on the subject, I am of the impression that the income from the imposts, after the period in question, will not exceed $10,000,000. It will probably fall below, rather than rise above, that sum. I assume, as the basis of this estimate, that our consumption of foreign articles will not then exceed $150,000,000. We all know that the capacity of the coun- try to consume depends upon the value of its domestic exports, and the profits of its commerce and navigation. Of its domestic exports it would not be safe to assume any considerable increase in any article except cotton. To what ex- tent the production and consumption of this great staple, which puts in motion so vast an amount o'f the industry and commerce of the world, may be increas- ed between now and 1842, is difficult to conjecture ; but I deem it unsafe to suppose that it can be so increased as to extend the capacity of the country to consume beyond the limits I have assigned. Assuming, then, the amount which I have, and dividing the imports into free and dutiable articles, the latter, ac- cording to the existing proportion between the two descriptions, would amount in value to something less than $70,000,000. According to the Compromise Act, no duty, after the period in question, can exceed twenty per cent., and the rates would range from that down to five or six_ per cent. Taking fifteen per cent, as the average, which would be, probably, full high, and allowing for the ex- penses of collection, the nett income would be something less than $10,000,000. The income from public lands is still more conjectural than that from cus- toms. There are so many, and such various causes in operation affecting this source of the public income, that it is exceedingly difficult to form even a con- jectural estimate as to its amount, beyond the current year. But, in the midst of this uncertainty, one fact may be safely assumed, that the purchases during the last year, and thus far this, greatly exceed the steady, progressive demand for public lands, from increased population, and the consequent emigration to the new states and territories. Much of the purchases have been, unquestion- ably, made upon speculation, with a view to resales, and must, of course, come into market hereafter in competition with the lands of the government, and to that extent must reduce the income from their sales. Estimating even the de- mand for public lands from what it was previous to the recent large sales, and taking into estimate the increased population and wealth of the country, I do not consider it safe to assume more than $5,000,000 annually from this branch of the revenue, which, added to the customs, would give for the annual receipts between fourteen and fifteen millions of dollars after 1842. I now ask whether it would be prudent to raise the public expenditures to the sum of $30,000,000 annually during the intermediate period, with the prospect that they must be suddenly reduced to half that amount ? Who does not see the fierce conflict which must follow between those who maybe interest- .ed in keeping iip the expenditures, and those who have an equal interest against SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 235 an increase of the duties as the means of keeping them up ? I appeal to the senators from the South, whose constituents have so deep an interest in low du- ties, to resist a course so impolitic, unwise, and extravagant, and which, if adopted, might again renew the tariff", so recently thrown off by such hazard- ous and strenuous efforts, with all its oppression and disaster. Let us remem- ber what occurred in the fatal session of 1828. With a folly unparalleled. Congress then raised the duties to a rate so enormous as to average one half the value of the imports, when on the eve of discharging the debt, and when, of course, there would be no objects on which the immense income from such extravagant duties could be justly and constitutionally expended. It is ama- zing that there was such blindness then as not to see what has since follow- ed — the sudden discharge of the debt, and an overflowing treasury, without the means of absorbing the surplus ; the violent conflict resulting from such a state of things ; and the vast increase of the power and patronage of the government, with all its corrupting consequences. We are now about, I fear, to commit an error of a different character : to raise the expenditure far beyond all example, in time of peace, and with a decreasing revenue, which must, with equal cer- tainty, bring on another conflict, not much less dangerous, in which the strug- gle will not be to find objects to absorb an overflowing treasury, but to devise means to continue an expenditure far beyond the just and legitimate wants of the country. It is easy to foresee that, if we are thus blindly to go on in the management of our affairs, without regard to the future, the frequent and violent concussion which must follow from such folly cannot but end in a catastrophe that will ingulf our political institutions. With such decided objections to the dangerous and extravagant scheme of absorbing the surplus by disbursements, I proceed to the next question. Shall the public money remain where it now is ? Shall the present extraordinary state of things, without example or parallel, continue, of a government, calling itself free, extracting from the people millions beyond what it can expend, and placing that vast sum in the custody of a few monopolizing corporations, selected at the sole will of the executive, and continued during his pleasure, to be used as their own from the time it is collected till it is disbursed ? To this question there must burst from the lips of every man who loves his country and its insti- tutions, and who is the enemy of monopoly, injustice, and oppression, an indig- nant no. And here let me express the pleasure I feel that the senator from New-York, in moving his amendment, however objectionable his scheme, has placed himself in opposition to the continuance of the present unheard-of and dangerous stale of things ; and I add, as a simple act of justice, that the tone and temper of his remarks in support of his amendment were characterized by a courtesy and liberality which I, on my part, shall endeavour to imitate. But I fear, notwithstanding this favourable indication in so influential a quarter, the very magnitude of the evil (too great to be concealed) will but serve to perpetu- ate it. So great and various are the interests enlisted in its favour, that I greatly fear that all the efforts of the wise and patriotic to arrest it will prove unavailing. At the head of these stand the depository banks themselves, whh their numerous stockliolders and officers ; with their $40,000,000 of capital, and an equal amount of public deposites, associated into one great combination ex- tending over the whole Union, under the influence and control of the treasury department. The whole weight of this mighty combination, so deeply interest- ed in the continuance of the present state of things, is opposed to any change. To this powerful combination must be added the numerous and influential body who are dependant on banks to meet their engagements, and who, whatever may be their political opinions, must be alarmed at any change which may limit their discounts and accommodation. Then come the stock-jobbers, a growing and formidable class, who live by raising and depressing stocks, and who behold in the present state of things the most favourable opportunity of 236 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. carrying on their dangerous and corrupting pursuits. With the control which the Secretary of the Treasury has over the banks of deposite, through transfer Avarrants, with the power of withdrawing the deposites at pleasure, he may, whenever he chooses, raise or depress the stock of any bank, and, if disposed to use this tremendous power for corrupt purposes, may make the fortunes of t]*e initiated, and overwhelm in sudden ruin those not in the secret. To the stock-jobbers must be added speculators of every hue and form ; and, in particu- lar, the speculators in public lands, who, by the use of the public funds, are rapidly divesting the people of the noble patrimony left by our ancestors in the public domain, by giving in exchange what may, in the end, prove to be broken credit and worthless rags. To these we must add the artful and crafty poli- ticians, who wield this mighty combination of interests for political purposes. I am anxious to avoid mingling party politics in this discussion ; and, that I may not even seem to do so, I shall not attempt to exhibit, in all its details, the fear- ful, and, I was about to add, the overwhelming power which the present state of things places in the hands of those who have control of the government, and which, if it be not wielded to overthrow our institutions and destroy all responsibility, must be attributed to their want of inclination, and not to their want of means. Such is the power and influence interested to continue the public money where it is now deposited. To these there are opposed the honest, virtuous, and patri- otic of every party, who behold in the continuance of the present state of things almost certain convidsion and overthrow of our liberty. There would be found on the same side the great mass of the industrious and labouring portion of the ■community, whose hard earnings are extracted from them without their knowl- edge, were it not that what is improperly taken from them is successfully used as the means of deceiving and controllino' them. If such were not the case — if those who work could see how those who profit are enriched at their ex- pense — ^the present state of things would not be endured for a moment ; but as it is, I fear that, from misconception, and consequent want of union and co- operation, things may continue as they are, till it will be too late to apply a remedy. I trust, however, that such will not be the fact ; that the people will be roused from their false security ; and that Congress will refuse to adjourn till an eflicient remedy is applied. In this hope, I recur to the inquiry. What shall that remedy be ? Shall we adopt the measure recommended by the senator from New- York, which, as has been stated, proposes to authorize the commis- sioners of the sinking fund to ascertain the probable income of each quarter, and, if there should be a probable excess above $5,000,000, to vest the surplus in the purchase of state stocks ; but, if there shall be a deficiency, to sell so> much of the stock previously purchased as would make up the difference ? I regret that the senator has not furnished a statement of facts sufficiently full to enable us to form an opinion of what will be the practical operation of his scheme. He has omitted, for instance, to state what is the aggregate amount of stocks issued by the several states : a fact indispensable in order to ascertain how the price of the stocks would be aftected by the application of the surplus to their purchase. All who are in the least familiar with subjects of this kind, must know that the price of stocks Yises proportionably with the amount of the sum applied to their purchase. I have already shown that the probable surplus at the end of this year, notwithstanding the extravagance of the appropriations, will be between thirty and thirty-five millions ; and before we can decide un- derstandingly whether this great sum can with propriety be applied as the sen- ator proposes, we should know whether the amount of state stocks be sufficient to absorb it, without raising their price extravagantly high. The senator should also have informed us, not only as to the amount of the stock, but how it is distributed among the states, in order to 'enable us to deter- mine whether his scheme would operate equally between them. In the ab- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 237 sence of correct information on both of these points, we are compelled to use such as we may possess, however defective and uncertain, in order to make up our mind on his amendment. We all know, then, that while several of the states have no stocks, and many a very inconsiderable amount, three of the large states (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Nevv-York) have a very large amount, not less in the aggregate, if I am cor- rectly informed, than thirty-dve or forty millions. What amount is held by the rest of the states is uncertain, but I suppose that it may be safely assumed that, taking the whole, it is less than that held by those states. With these facts, it cannot be doubted that the application of the surplus, as proposed to be ap- plied by the senator, would be exceedingly unequal among* the states, and that the advantage of the application would mainly accrue to these states. To most of these objections, the senator, while he does not deny that the application of the surplus will greatly raise the price of stocks, insists that the states issuing them will not derive any benefit from the advance, and, consequently, have no interest in the question of the application of the surplus to their purchase. If by states he means the government of the states, the view of the senator may be correct. They may, as he says, have but little interest in the market value of their stocks, as it must be redeemed by the same amount, whether that be high or low. But if we take a more enlarged view, and comprehend the people of the state as well as the government, the argument entirely fails. The senator will not deny that the holders have a deep interest in the application of so large a sum as the present surplus in the purchase of their stocks. He will not deny that such application must greatly advance the price ; and, of course, in determining whether the states having stocks will be benefited by applying the surplus as he proposes, we must first ascertain who are the hold- ers. Where do they reside ? Are they foreigners residing abroad 1 If so, would it be wise to apply the public money so as to advance the interests of foreigners, to whom the states are under no obligation but honestly to pay to them the debts which they have contracted ? But if not held by foreigners, are they held by citizens of such states ? If such be the fact, will the senator deny that those states will be deeply interested in the application of the surplus, as proposed in his amendment, when the effects of such application must be, as is conceded on all sides, greatly to enhance the price of the stocks, and, conse- quently, to increase the wealth of their citizens ? Let us suppose that, instead of purchasing the stocks of the states in which his constituents are interested, the senator's amendment .had proposed to apply the present enormous surplus to the purchase of cotton or slaves, in which the constituents of the Southern senators are interested, would any one doubt that the cotton-growing or slave- holding states would have a deep interest in the question ? It will not be de- nied that, if so applied, their price would be greatly advanced, and the wealth of their citizens proportionably increased. Precisely the same effect would re- sult from the application to the purchase of stocks, with like benefits to the citi- zens of the states which ha/e issued large amounts of stock. The principle is the same in both cases. But there is another view of the subject which demands most serious consid- eration. Assuming, what will not be questioned, that the application of the sur- plus, as proposed by the amendment, will be very unequal among the states, some having little or none, and others a large amount of stocks, the result would necessarily be to create, in effect, the relation of debtor and creditor between the states. The states whose stocks might be purchased by the couunission- ers would become the debtors of the government ; and as the government would, in fact, l)e but the agent between them and the other states, the latter would, in reality, be their creditors. This relation between them could not fail to be pro- ductive of important political consequences, which would influence all the op- erations of the government. It would, in particular, have a powerful bearing 238 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. upon the presidential election ; the debtor and creditor states each striving to give such a result to the elections as might be favourable to their respective in- terests ; the one to exact, and the other to exempt themselves from the pay- ment of the debt. Supposing the three great states to which I have referred, whose united influence would have so decided a control, to be the principal debtor states, as would, in all probability, be the fact, it is easy to see that the result would be, finally, the release of the debt, and, consequently, a correspond- ent loss to the creditor, and gain to the debtor states. But there is another view of the subject still more deserving, if possible, of attention than either of those which have been presented. It is impossible not to see, after what Has been said, that the power proposed to be conferred by the amendment of the senator, of applying the surplus in buying and selling the stocks of the states, is one of great extent, and calculated to have powerful in- fluence, not only on a large body of the most wealthy and influential citizens of the states which have issued stocks, but on the states themselves. The next question is. In whom is the exercise of this power to be vested 1 Where shall we find individuals sufficiently detached from the politics of the day, and whose virtue, patriotism, disinterestedness, and firmness can raise them so far above political and sinister motives as to exercise powers so high and influen- tial exclusively for the public good, without any view to personal or political aggrandizement ? Whom has the amendment selected as standing aloof from pol- itics, and possessing these high qualifications 1 Who are the present commis- sioners of the sinking fund, to whom this high and responsible trust is to be confided ? At the head stands the Vice-president of the United States, with whom the Chief-justice of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secre- tary of the Treasury, and the Attorney-general, are associated ; all party ni'bn, deeply interested in the maintenance of power in the present hands, and having the strongest motives to apply the vast power which the amendment would con- fer upon them, should it become a law, to party purposes. I do not say it would be so applied ; but I must ask, Would it be prudent, would it be wise, would it be seemly, to vest such great and dangerous powers in those who have so strong a motive to abuse it, and who, if they should have elevation and virtue enough to resist the temptation, would still be suspected of having used the power for sinister and corrupt purposes ? I am persuaded, in drawing the amendment, that the senator from New- York has, without due reflection on the impropriety of vesting the power where he proposes, inadvertently inserted the provision which he has, and that, on review, he will concur with me, that, should his amendment be adopted, the power ought to be vested in others, less expo- sed to temptation, and, consequently, less exposed to suspicion. I have now stated the leading objections to the several modes of disposing of the surplus revenue which I proposed to consider ; and the question again recurs, What shall be done with the surplus ? The Senate is not uninformed of my opinion on this important subject. Foreseeing that there would be a large sur- plus, and the mischievous consequences that must follow, I moved, during the last session, for a select committee, which, among other measures, reported a resolution so to amend the Constitution as to authorize the temporary distribu- tion of the surplus among the states ; but so many doubled whether there would be a surplus at the time; that it rendered all prospect of carrying the resolution hopeless. My opinion still remains unchanged, that the measure then proposed was the best ; but so rapid has been the accumulation of the surplus, even be- yond my calculation, and so pressing the danger, that what would have been then an efficient remedy, would now be too tardy to meet the danger, and, of course, another remedy must be devised, more speedy in its action. After bestowing on the subject the most deliberate attention, I have come to the conclusion that there is no other so safe, so efficient, and so free from ob- jections as the one I have proposed, of depositing the surplus that may remain SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 239 at the termination of the year, in the treasury of the several states, in the man- ner provided for in the amendment. But the senator from New- York objects to the measure, that it would, in effect, amount to a distribution, on the ground, as he conceives, that the states would never refund. He does not doubt but that they would, if called on to refund by the government ; but he says that Con- gress will, in fact, never make the call. He rests this conclusion on the sup- position that there would be a majority of the states opposed to it. He admits, in case the revenue should become deficient, that the Southern or staple states would prefer to refund their quota rather than to raise the imposts to meet the deficit ; but he insists that the contrary would be the case with the manufacturing states, which would prefer to increase the imposts to refunding their quota, on the ground that the increase of the duties would promote the interests of manu- factures. I cannot agree with the senator that those states would assume a po- sition so entirely untenable as to refuse to refund a deposite which their faith would be plighted to return, and rest the refusal on the ground of preferring to lay a tax, because it would be a bounty to them, and would, consequently, throw the whole burden of the tax on the other states. But, be this as it may, I can tell the senator that, if they should take a course so unjust and monstrous, he may rest assured that the other states would most unquestionably resist the in- crease of the imposts ; so that the government would have to take its choice, either to go without the money, or call on the states to refund the deposites. But I so far agree with the senator as to believe that Congress would be very reluctant to make the call ; that it would not make it till, from the wants of the treasury, it should become absolutely necessary ; and that, in order to avoid such necessity, it would resort to a just and proper economy in the public ex- penditvures as the preferable alternativ^e. I see in this, however, much good in- stead of evil. The government has long since departed from habits of econo- my, and fallen into a profusion, a waste, and an extravagance in its disburse- ments, rarely equalled by any free state, and which threatens the most disas- trous consequences. But I am happy to think that the ground on which the objection of the sena- tor stands may be removed, without materially impairing the proA-isions of the bill. It will require but the addition of a few words to remove it, by giving to the deposites all the advantages, without the objections, which he proposes by his plan. It will be easy to provide that the states shall authorize the proper officers to give negotiable certificates of deposite, which shall not bear interest till demanded, when they shall bear the usual rates till paid. Such certificates would be, in fact, state stocks, every way similar to that in which the senator proposes to vest the surplus, but with this striking superiority : that, instead of being partial, and limited to a few states, they would be fairly and justly appor- tioned among the several states. They would have another striking advantage over his. They would create among all the members of the confederacy, recip- rocally, the relation of debtor and creditor, in proportion to their relative weight in the Union ; which, in feffect, would leave them in their present relation, and would, of course, avoid the danger that would result from his plan, which, as has been shown, would necessarily make a part of the states debtors to the rest, with all the dangers resulting from such relation. The next objection of the senator is to the ratio of distribution proposed in the bill among the states, which he pronounces to be unequal, if not unconstitution- al. He insists that the true principle would be to distribute the surplus among the states in proportion to the representation of the House of Representatives, without including the senators, as is proposed in the bill, for which he relies on the fact, that, by the Constitution, representation and taxation are to be appor- tioned in the same manner among the states. The Senate will see that the effect of adopting the ratio supported by the senator would be to favour the large states, while that in the bill will be more favoiu'able to the small. 240 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, The state I in part represent occupies a neutral position between the two. She cannot be considered either a large or a small state, forming, as she does, one twenty-fourth part of the Union ; and, of course, it is the same to her which- ever ratio may be adopted. But I prefer the one contained in my amendment, on the ground that it represents the relative weight of the states in the govern- ment. It is the weight assigned to them in the choice of the President and Yice-president in the electoral college, and, of course, in the administration of the laws. It is also that assigned to them in the making of the laws by the ac- tion of the two houses, and corresponds very nearly to their weight in the ju- dicial department of the government, the judges being nominated by the Presi- dent and confirmed by the Senate. In addition, I was influenced, in selecting the ratio, by the belief that it was a wise and magnanimous course, in case of doubt, to favour the weaker members of the confederacy. The larger can al- ways take care of themselves ; and, to avoid jealousy and improper feelings, ought to act liberally towards the weaker members of the confederacy. To "which may be added, that I am of the impression that, even on the principle as- sumed by the senator, that the distribution of the surplus ought to be apportion- ed on the ratio with direct taxation (which maybe well doubted), the ratio which I support would conform in practice more nearly to the principle than that vi'hich he supports. It is a fact not generally known, that representation in the other house, and direct taxes, should they be laid, would be very far from being equal, although the Constitution provides that they should be. The inequality would result from the mode of apportioning the representatives. Instead of apportion- ing them among the states, as near as may be, as directed by the Constitution, an artificial mode of distribution has been adopted, which, in its effects, gives to the large states a greater number, and to the small a less than that to which they are entitled. I would refer those who may desire to understand how this ine- quality is effected, to the discussion in this body on the apportionment bill un- der the last census. So great is this inequality, that, were a direct tax to be laid. New- York, for instance, Avould have at least three members more than her apportionment of the tax would require. The ratio which I have proposed "would, I admit, produce as great an inequality in favour of some of the small states, particularly the old, whose population is nearly stationary ; but among the new and growing members of the confederacy, which constitute the greater portion of the small states, it would not give them a larger share of the deposites than what they would be entitled to on the principle of direct taxes. But the objec- tion of the senator to the ratio of distribution, like his objection to the condition on which the bill proposes to make it, is a matter of small comparative conse- quence. I am prepared, in the spirit of concession, to adopt either, as one or the other may be more acceptable to the Senate. It now remains to compare the disposition of the surplus proposed in the bill with the others I have discussed ; and, unless I am greatly deceived, it pos- sesses great advantages over them. Compared with the scheme of expending the surplus, its advantage is, that it would avoid the extravagance and waste which must result from suddenly more than quadrupling the expenditures, with- out a corresponding organization in the disbursing department of the govern- ment to enforce economy and responsibility. It would also avoid the diversion of so large a portion of the industry of the country from its present useful direc- tion to unproductive objects, with heavy loss to the wealth and prosperity of the country, as has been shown, while it would, at the same time, avoid the increase of the patronage and influence of the government, with all their corruption and danger to the liberty and institutions of the country. But its advantages would not be limited simply to avoiding the evil of extravagant and useless disburse- ments. It would confer positive benefits, by enabling the states to discharge their debts, and complete a system of internal improvements, by railroads and canals, which would not only greatly strengthen the bonds of the confederacy, but increase its power, by augmenting infinitely our resources and prosperity SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN. 24] I do not deem it necessary to compare the disposition of the surplus which is proposed in the bill with the dangerous, and, I must say, wicked scheme of leaving the public funds where they are, in the banks of deposite, to be loaned out by those institutions to speculators and partisans, without authority or con- trol of law. Compared with the plan proposed by the senator from New- York, it is suffi- cient, to prove its superiority, to say that, while it avoids all of the objectiojis to which his is liable, it at the same time possesses all the advantages, with others peculiar to itself. Among these, one of the most prominent is, that it provides the only efficient remedy for the deep-seated disease which now af- flicts the body politic, and which threatens to terminate so fatally, unless it be speedily and eflectually arrested. All who have reflected on the nature of our complex system of government, and the dangers to which it is exposed, have seen that it is susceptible, from its structure, to two dangers of opposite character, one threatening consolidation, and the other anarchy and dissolution. From the beginning of the government, we find a difference of opinion among the wise and pati-iotic to which the gov- ernment was most exposed : one part believing that the danger was that the government would absorb the reserved powers of the states, and terminate in consolidation, while the other were equally confident that the states would ab- sorb the powers of the government, and the system end in anarchy and disso- lution. It was this diversity .of opinion which gave birth to the two great, hon- est, and patriotic parties which so long divided the community, and to the many political conflicts which so long agitated the country. Time has decided the controversy. We are no longer left to doubt that the danger is on the side of this government, and that, if not arrested, the system must terminate in an entire absorption of the powers of the states. Looking back, with the light w^hich experience has furnished, we now clearly see that both of the parties took a false view of the operation of the system. It was admitted by both that there would be a conflict for power between the gov- ernment and the states, arising from a disposition on the part of those who, for the time being, exercised the powers of the government and the states, to en- large their respective powers at the expense of each other, and which would induce each to watch the other with incessant vigilance. Had such proved to be the fact, I readily concede that the result would have been the opposite to Avhat has occurred, and the Republican, and not the Federal party, would have been mistaken as to the tendency of the system. But so far from this jealousy, experience has shown that, in the operation of the system, a majority of the states have acted in concert with the government at all times, except upon the eve of a political revolution, when one party was about to go out, to make room for the other to come in ; and we now clearly see that this has not been the result of accident, but that the habitual operation must necessarily be so. The mis- conception resulted from overlooking the fact, that the government is but an agent of the states, and that the dominant majority of the Union, which elect and control a majority of the State Legislatures, would elect also those who ■would control this government, whether that majority rested on sectional inter- ests, on patronage and influence, or whatever basis it might, and that they would use the power both of the General and State Governments jointly, for aggran- dizement and the perpetuation of their power. Regarded in this light, it is not at all surprising that the tendency of the system is such as it has proved itself to be, and which any intelligent observer now sees must necessarily terminate in a central, absolute, irresponsible, and despotic power. It is this fatal ten- dency that the measure proposed in the bill is calculated to counteract, and which, I believe, would prove efliective if now applied. It would place the states in the relation in which it was universally believed they would stand to this government at the time of its formation, and make them those jealous and H H 242 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. vigilant guardians of its action on all measures touching the disbursements and expenditures of the government, which it was confidently believed they would be ; which would arrest the fatal tendency to the concentration of the entire power of the system in this government, if any power on earth can. But it is objected that the remedy would be too powerful, and would produce an opposite and equally dangerous tendency. I coincide that such would be the danger, if permanently applied ; and, under that impression, and believing that the present excess of revenue would not continue longer, I have limited the measure to the duration of Ihe Compromise Act. Thus limited, it will act sufficiently long, I trust, to eradicate the present disease, without superinducing one of an opposite character. But the plan proposed is supported by its justice, as well as these high con- siderations of political expediency. The surplus money in the treasury is not ours. It properly belongs to those who made it, and from whom it has been unjustly taken. I hold it an unquestionable principle, that the government has no right to take a cent from the people beyond what is necessary to meet its legitimate and constitutional wants. To take more intentionally would be rob- bery ; and, if the government has not incurred the guilt in the present case, its exemption can only be found in its folly — the folly of not seeing and guarding against a vast excess of revenue, which the most ordinary understanding ought to have foreseen and prevented. If it were in our power — if we could ascertain from whom the vast amount now in the treasury was improperly taken, justice would demand that it should be returned to its lawful owners. But, as that is impossible, the measure next best, as approaching nearest to restitution, is that which is proposed, to deposite it in the treasuries of the several states, which, will place it under the disposition of the immediate representatives of the peo- ple, to be used by them as they may think fit till the wants of the government may require its return. But it is objected that such a disposition would be a bribe to the people. A bribe to the people ! to return it to those to whom it justly belongs, and from whose pockets it should never have been taken. A bribe ! to place it in the charge of those who are the immediate representatives of those- from whom we derive our authority, and who may employ it so much more usefully than we can. But what is to be done ? If not returned to the people, it must go some- how ; and is there no danger of bribing those to whom it may go ? If we dis- burse it, is there no danger of bribing the thousands of agents, contractors, and jobbers, through whose hands it must pass, and in whose pockets, and those of their associates, so large a part would be deposited? If, to avoid this, we leave it where it is, in the banks, is there no danger of bribing the banks in whose custody it is, with their various dependants, and the numerous swarms of specu- lators which hover about them in hopes of participating in the spoil ? Is there no danger of bribing the political managers, who, through the deposites, have the control of these banks, and, by them, of their dependants, and the hungry and vo- racious hosts of speculators who have overspread and are devouring the land ? Yes, literally devouring the land. Finally, if it should be vested as proposed by the senator from New-York, is there no danger of bribing the holders of state stocks, and, through them, the states which have issued them ? Are the agents, the jobbers, and contractors ; are the directors and stockholders of the banks ; are the speculators and stock-jobbers ; are the political managers and holders of state securities, the only honest portion of the community ? Are they alone incapable of being bribed ? And are the people the least honest, and most liable to be bribed t Is this the creed of those now in power 1 of those who profess to be the friends of the people, and to place implicit confi- dence in their virtue and patriotism ? I have now (said Mr. Calhoun) stated what, in my opinion, ought to be done with the surplus. Another question still remains : not what shall, but what r SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 243 will be done with the surplus ? With a few remarks on this question, I shall conclude what I intended to say. There was a time, in the better days of the Republic, when to show what ought to be done was to ensure the adoption of the measure. Those days have passed away, I fear, forever. A power has risen ^lp in the government greater than the people themselves, consisting of many, and various, and poweriul in- terests, combined into one mass, and held together by the cohesive power of the vast surplus in the banks. This mighty combination will be opposed to any change ; and it is to be feared tliat, such is its influence, no measure to which it is opposed can become a law, however expedient and necessary, and that the public money will remain in their possession, to be disposed of, not as the public interest, but as theirs may dictate. The time, indeed, seems fast ap- proaching, when no law can pass, nor any honour be conferred, from the chiei magistrate to the tide-waiter, without the assent of this powerful and interested combination, which is steadily becoming the government itself, to the utter sub- version of the authority of the people. Nay, I fear we are in the midst of it ; and I look with anxiety to the fate of this measure as the test whether we are or not. If nothing should be done — if the money which justly belongs to the people be left where it is, with the many and overwhelming objections to it — the fact will prove that a great and radical change has been effected ; that the govern- ment is subverted ; that the authority of the people is suppressed by a union of the banks and executive — a union a hundred times more dangerous than that of Church and State, against which the Constitution has so jealously guarded. It Avould be the announcement of a state of things from which, it is to be feared, there can be no recovery — a state of boundless corruption, and the lowest and basest subserviency. It seems to be the order of Providence that, with the exception of these, a people may recover from any other evil. Piracy, robbery, and violence of every description may, as history proves, be followed by vir- tue, patriotism, and national greatness ; but where is the example to be found of a degenerate, corrupt, and subservient people, who have ever recovered their virtue and patriotism ? Their doom has ever been the lowest state of wretch- edness and misery : scorned, trodden down, and obliterated forever from the list of nations. May Heaven grant that such may never be our doom ! XVI. SPEECH ON THE BILL FOR THE ADMISSION OF MICHIGAN, JANUARY 2, 1837. Mr. Grundy moved that the previous orders of the day be postponed, for the purpose of considering the bill to admit tlie State of Michigan into the Union. Mr. Calhoun was opposed to the motion, and said, the documents ac- companying the bill had but this morning been laid upon the tables, and no time had been allowed for even reading them over. Mr. Grundy insisted on his motion. Of one point he was fully satis- fied, that Michigan had a right to be received into the Union ; on this, he presumed, there would be but little difference of opinion, the chief diffi- culty having respect to the mode in which it was to be done. There seemed more difference of opinion, and he presumed there would be more debate, touching the preamble than concerning the bill itself; but he could not consent to postpone the subject. Congress were daily pass- ing laws, the effect of Avhich pressed immediately upon the people of Michigan, and concerning which they were entitled to have a voice and 244 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. a vote upon this floor ; and, therefore, the bill for their admission ought to receive the immediate action of the Senate. As to the documents, they were not numerous. The gentleman from South Carolina might readily run his eye over them, and he would perceive that the facts of the case were easily under'stood. Indeed, there was but one of any con- sequence respecting which there was any controversy. When the Senate adjourned on Thursday, many senators had been prepared, and were de- sirous to speak, although the documents Avere not then printed. It was the great principles involved in the case which would form the subjects of discussion, and they could as well be discussed now. He thought the Senate had better proceed. One fact in the case was very certain : there had been more votes for the members to the last convention than for the first. How many more was a matter of little comparative consequence. The great question for the Senate to consider was this : What is the will of Michigan on the subject of entering the Union 1 If this could be decided, it was of less consequence whether the bill should or should not expressly state that the last convention, and the as- sent by it given, formed the ground of the admission of the state. Mr. Calhoun here inquired whether the chairman of the committee was to be understood as being now ready to abandon the preamble 1 If the Judiciary Committee were agreed to do this, he thought all difficulty would be at an end. Mr. Grundy replied, that, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, he had no authority to reply to the inquiry, but, as an individual, he consid- ered the preamble as of little consequence, and he should vote for the bill whether it were in or out. Michigan ought, undoubtedly, to be ad- mitted, and all the consequences would result, whether the preamble were retained or not. He had received no authority from the committee to consent that it should be stricken out. For himself, he was settled in the belief that Congress possessed full power to prescribe the boundaries of a territory, and that, when that territory passed into a state, the right re- mained still the same. Congress had already established the boundary of Ohio, and that settled the question. He never had perceived the necessity of inserting in the admission bill the section which made the assent of Mich- igan to the boundaries fixed for her by Congress a prerequisite to her admission, because the disputed boundary line was fixed by another bill ; and, whether the preamble to this bill should be retained or not, Michigan could not pass the line, so that the preamble was really of very little consequence. Mr. Calhoun said that, in inquiring of the honourable chairman whether he intended to abandon the preamble of the bill, his question had had re- spect, not to any pledge respecting boundaries, but to the recognition of the second convention and of its doings. He wanted to know whether the chairman was ready to abandon that principle. He had examined the subject a good deal, and his own mind was fully made up that Michigan could not be admitted on the ground oi^ that second convention; but the Senate might set aside the whole of what had been done, and receive Michigan as she stood at the commencement of the last session. Mr. Grundy observed, that if the gentleman's mind was fully made up, then there could be no necessity of postponing the subject. The gentle- man has fully satisfied himself, and now (said Mr. G.) let us see if he can satisfy us. His argument, it seems, has been fully matured, and we are now ready to listen to it. Though I consider that there is no virtue in the preanible, and that the effect of the bill will be the same v.hether it is stricken out or retained, yet I am not ready to say that 1 shall vote to strike it out. I am ready to hear what can be said both for and against it. SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 245 The question was now put on the motion of Mr. Grundy to postpone the previous orders, and carried, 22 to 16. So the orders were postponed, and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which having been again read at the clerk's table, as follows : A Bill to admit the State of Michigan into the Union upon an equal footing with the original States. Whereas, in pursuance of the act of Congress of June the fifteenth, eighteen hundred and thirty-six, entitled, "An act to establish the northern boundary of the State of Ohio, and to provide for the admission of the State of Michigan into the Union, upon the conditions therein expressed," a convention of delegates, elected by the people of the said State of Michigan, for the sole purpose of giving their assent to the boundaries of the said State of Michigan as described, declared, and established in and by the said act, did, on the fifteenth of December, eighteen hundred and thirty-six, assent to the provisions of said act: therefore. Be it enacted, at the last session. The first was to settle the controversy, as to bound- ary, between Michigan and Ohio, and it was that object alone which im- posed the condition that Michigan should assent to the boundary pre- scribed by the act as the condition of her admission. But there was an- other object to be accomplished. Two respectable gentlemen, who had been elected by the state as senators, were then waiting to take their seats on this floor ; and the other object of the bill was to provide for their taking their seats as senators on the admission of the state, and for this purpose it was necessary to make the positive and unconditional dec- laration that Michigan was a state, as a state only could choose senators, by an express provision of the Constitution ; and hence, the admission was made conditional, and the declaration that she was a state was made ab- solute, in order to effect both objects. To show that I am correct, I will ask the secretary to read the third section of the bill. [Th§ section was read, accordingly, as follows : " Sect. 3. And he it farther enacted. That, as a compliance with the fundamental condition of admission contained in the last preceding sec- tion of this act, the boundaries of the said State of Michigan, as in that section described, declared, and established, shall receive the assent of a convention of delegates elected by the people of said state, for the sole purpose of giving the assent herein required ; and as soon as the assent herein required shall be given, the President of the United States shall announce the same by proclamation ; and thereupon, and without any fat- ther proceeding on the part of Congress, the admission of the said state into the Union, as one of the United States of America, on an equal foot- ing with the original states in every respect whatever, shall be considered as complete, and the senators and representatives who have been elected "by the said state as its representative in the Congress of the United States, shall be entitled to take their seats in the Senate and House of Repre- sentatives respectively, without farther delay."] Mr. Calhoun then asked. Does not every senator see the two objects — the one to settle the boundary, and the other to admit her senators to a seat in this body ; and that the section is so worded as to effect both, in the manner I have stated \ If this needed confirmation, it would find it in the debate on the passage of the bill, when the ground was openly taken by the present majority, that Michigan had a right to form her con- stitution, under the ordinance of 1787, without our consent, and that she was of right, and in fact, a state, beyond our control. I will (said Mr. C.) explain my own views on this point, in order that the consistency of my course at the last and present session may be clearly seen. My opinion was, and still is, that the movement of the people of Michi- gan in forming for themselves a state constitution, without waiting for the assent of Congress, was revolutionary, as it threw off the authority of the SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 251 United States over the territory ; and that we were left at liberty to treat the proceedings as revolutionary, and to remand her to her territorial condition, or to waive the irregularity, and to recognise what was done as rightfully done, as our authority alone was concerned. My impression was, that the former was the proper course ; but I also thought that the act remanding her back should contain our assent in the usual manner for her to form a constitution, and thus to leave her free to become a state. This, however, was overruled. The opposite opinion prevailed, that she had a perfect right to do what she had done, and that she was, as I have stated, a state both in fact and right, and that we had no control over her; and our act, accordingly, recognised her as a state from the time she had adopted her Constitution, and admitted her into the Union on the condition of her assenting to the prescribed boundaries. " Having thus solemnly recognised her as a state, we cannot now undo what was then done. There were, in fact, many irregularities in the pro- ceedings, all of which were urged in vain against its passage j but the presidential election was then pending, and the vote of Michigan was con- sidered of sufficient weight to overrule all objections and correct all ir- regularities. They were all, accordinglj'^, overruled, and we cannot now ^o back. Such was the course, and such the acts of the majority at the last session. A few short months have since passed. Other objects are now to be effected, and all is forgotten as completely as if they had never ex- isted. The very senators who then forced the act through, on the ground that Michigan was a state, have wheeled completely round, to serve the present purpose, and taken directly the opposite ground ! We live iu strange and inconsistent times. Opinions are taken up and laid down, as suits the occasion, without hesitation, or the slightest regard to principles or consistency. It indicates an unsound state of the public mind, pref- nant with future disasters. I turn to the position now assumed by the majority to suit the present occasion ; and, if I mistake not, it will be found as false in fact, and as er- roneous in principle, as it is inconsistent with that maintained at the last session. They now take the ground that Michigan is not a state, and cannot, in fact, be a state till she is admitted into the Union ; and this on the broad principle that a territory cannot become a state till admitted. Such is the position distinctly taken by several of the friends of this bill, and implied in the arguments of nearly all who have spoken in its favour. In fact, its advocates had no choice. As untenabfe as it is, they were forced on this desperate position. They had no other which they could occupy. I have shown that it is directly in the face of the law of the last ses- sion, and that it denies the recorded acts of those who now maintain the position. I now go farther, and assert that it is in direct opposition to plain and unquestionable matter of fact. There is no fact more certain than that Michigan is a state. She is in the full exercise of sovereign authority, with a Legislature and a chief magistrate. She passes laws, she executes them, she regulates titles, and even takes away life — all on her own authority. Ours has entirely ceased over her, and yet there are those who can deny, with all these facts before them, that she is a state. Thev might as well deny the existence of this hall ! We have long since as- sumed unlimited control over the Constitution, to twist and turn, and deny it, as it suited our purpose ; and it would seem that we are presumptu- ously attempting to assume like supremacy over facts themselves, ag if their existence or non-existence depended on our volition, I speak freely. The occasion demands that the truth should be boldly uttered. 252 SPEFXHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. But those who may not regard their own recorded acts, nor the plain facts of the case, may possibly feel the awkward condition in which coming events may shortly place them. The admission of Michigan is not the only point involved in the passage of this bill. A question will follow, Avhich may be presented to the Senate in a very few days, as to the right of Mr. Norvell and Mr. Lyon, the two respectable gentlemen who have been elected senators by Michigan, to take their seats in this hall. The decision of this question will require a more sudden facino- about than has been yet witnessed. It required seven or eight months for the majority to wheel about from the position maintained at the last session to that taken at this, but there may not be allowed them now as many days to wheel back to the old position. These gentlemen cannot he refused their seats after the admission of the state by those gentlemen who passed the act of the last session. It provides for the case. I now put it to the friends of this bill, and I ask them to weigh the question de- liberately — to bring it home to their bosom and conscience before they answer — Can a territory elect senators to Congress 1 The Constitution is express : states only can choose senators. Were not these gentlemen chosen long before the admission of Michigan ; before the Ann Arbour meeting, and while Michigan was, according to the doctrines of the friends of this bill, a territory'? Will they, in the face of the Constitu- tion, Avhich they are sworn to support, admit as senators on this floor those who, by their own statement, were elected by a territory 1 These questions may soon be presented for decision. The majority, who are forcing this bill through, are already committed by the act of last session, and I leave them to reconcile as they can the ground they now take with the vote they must give when the question of their right to take their seats is presented for decision. A total disregard of all principle and consistency has so entangled this subject, that there is but one mode left of extricating ourselves without trampling the Constitution in the dust ; and that is, to return back to where we stood when the question was first presented ; to acquiesce in the right of Michigan to form a constitution, and erect herself into a state, under the ordinance of 1787 ; and to repeal so much of the act of the last session as prescribed the condition on which she was to be admitted. This was the object of the amendment that I offered last evening, in order to relieve the Senate from its present dilemma. The amendment involved the merits of the whole case. It was too. late in the day for discussion, and I asked for indulgence till to-day, that i might have an opportunity of presenting my views. Under the iron rule of the present majority, the indulgence was refused, and the bill ordered to its third reading; and I have been thus compelled to address the Senate when it is too late to* amend the bill, and after a majority have committed themselves both as to its principles and details. Of such proceedings I complain not. I, as one of the minority, ask no favours. All I ask is, that the Constitution be not violated. Hold it sacred, and I shall be the last to complain. I now return to the assumption that a territory cannot become a state till admitted into the Union, which is now relied on with so much con- fidence to prove that Michigan is not a state. I reverse the position. I assert the opposite, that a territory cannot be admitted till she becomes a state ; and in this I stand on the authority of the Constitution itself, which expressly limits the power of Congress to admitting new states into the Union. But, if the Constitution had been silent, he would indeed be ignorant of the character of our political system, who did not see that states, sovereign and independent communities, and not territories, can. only be admitted. Ours is a union of states, a Federal Republic. States, SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 253 • and not territories, form its component parts, bound together by a solemn league, in the form of a constitutional compact. In coming into the Union, the state pledges its faith to this sacred compact : an act which none but a sovereign and independent community is competent to per- form ; and, of course, a territory must first be raised to that condition be- fore she can take her stand among the confederated states of our Union. How can a territory pledge its faith to the Constitution ? It has no will of its own. You give it all its powers, and you can at pleasure overrule all. her actions. If she enters as a territory, the act is yours, not hers. Her consent is nothing without your authority and sanction. Can you, can Congress, become a party to the constitutional compact 1 How absurd. But I am told, if this be so — if a territory must become a state before it can be admitted — it would follow that she might refuse to enter the Union after she had acquired the right of acting for herself. Certainly she may. A state cannot be forced into the Union. She must come in by her own free assent, given in her highest sovereign capacity through a convention of the people of the state. Such is the constitutional provision ; and those who make the objection must overlook both the Constitution and the ele- mentary principles of our government, of which the right of self-govern- ment is the first ; the right of every people to form their own government, and to determine their political condition. This is the doctrine on which our fathers acted in our glorious Revolution, which has done more for the cause of liberty throughout the world than any event within the rec- ord of history, and on which the government has acted from the first, as regards all that portion of our extensive territory that lies beyond the limits of the original states. Read the ordinance of 1787, and the various acts for the admission of new states, and you will find the principle in- variably recognised and acted on, to the present unhappy instance, with- out any departure from it, except in the case of Missouri. The admis- sion of Michigan is destined, I fear, to mark a great change in the his- tory of the admission of new states ; a total departure from the old usage, and the noble principle of self-government on which that usage was found- ed. Everything, thus far, connected with her admission, has been irreg- ular and monstrous. I trust it is not ominous. Surrounded by lakes within her natural limits (which ought not to have been departed from), and possessed of fertile soil and genial climate, with every prospect of wealth, power, and influence, who but must regret that she should be ushered into the Union in a manner so irregular and unworthy of her fu- ture destiny \ But I will waive these objections, constitutional and all. I will sup- pose, with the advocates of the bill, that a territory cannot become a state till admitted into the Union. Assuming all this, I ask them to explain to me how the mere act of admission can transmute a territory into a state. By whose authority would she be made a state 1 By ours^. How can we make a state % We can form a territory ; we can admit states into the Union ; but I repeat the question. How can we make a state 1 I had sup- posed this government was the creature of the states, formed by their authority, and dependant on their will for its existence. Can the crea- ture form the creator 1 If not by our authority, then by whose ? Not by. her own ; that would be absurd. The very act of admission makes her a member of the confederacy, with no other or greater power than is pos- sessed by all the others ; all of whom, united, cannot create a state. By what process, then, by what authority can a territory become a state, if not one before admitted? Who can explain? How full of difliculties, compared to the long-established, simple, and noble process which has prevailed to the present instant ! According to the old usage, the Gen- 254 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. eral Government first withdraws its authority over a certain portion. of its territory, as soon as it has a sufficient population to constitute a state. They are thus left to themselves freely to form a constitution, and to ex- ercise the noble right of self-government. They then present their Con- stitution to Congress, and ask the •privilege, (for one it is of the highest character) to become a member of this glorious confederacy of states. The Constitution is examined, and, if Republican, as required by the Fed- eral Constitution, she is admitted, with no other condition except such as maybe necessary to secure the authority of Congress over the public do- main within her limits. This is the old, the established form, instituted by our ancestors of the Revolution, who so well understood the great principles of liberty and self-government. How simple, how sublime ! What a contrast to the doctrines of the present day, and the precedent which, I fear, we are about to establish ! And shall we fear, so long as these sound principles are observed, that a state will reject this high priv- ilege — will refuse to enter this Union % No, she will rush into the em- brace of the Union so long as your institutions are worth preservinf^. When the advantages of the Union shall have become a matter of calcu- lation and doubt \ when new states shall pause to determine whether the Union is a curse or a blessing, the question which now agitates us will cease to have any importance. Having now, I trust, established, beyond all controversy, that Michigan IS a state, I come to the great point at issue — to the decision of which all that has been said is but preparatory — Had the self-created assembly which met at Ann Arbour the authority to speak in the name of the people of Michigan 5 to assent to the conditions contained in the act of the last ses- sion j to supersede a portion of the Constitution of the state, and to over- rule the dissent of the convention of the people, regularly called by the constituted authorities of the state, to the condition of admission \ I shall not repeat what I said when I first addressed the Senate on this bill. We all, by this time, know the character of that assemblage ; that it met without the sanction of the authorities of the state ; and that it did not pretend to represent one third oi the people. We all know that the state had regularly convened a convention of the people, expressly to take into consideration the condition on which it was proposed to admit her into the Union, and that the convention, after full deliberation, had declined to give its assent by a considerable majority. With a knowledge of all these facts, I put the question. Had the assembly a right to act for the state \ Was it a convention of the people of Michigan, in the true, legal, and constitutional sense of that term 1 Is there one within the limits of my voice that can lay his hand on his breast and honestly say it was \ Is there one that does not feel that it was neither more nor less than a mere caucus — nothing but a partij caucus — of which we have the strongest evidence in the perfect unanimity of those who assembled X Not a vote Avas given against admission. Can there be stronger proof that it was a meeting got up by party machinery, for a party purpose I But I go farther. It was not only a party caucus, for party purpose, hut a criminal meeting — a meeting to subvert the authority of the state, and to assume its sovereignty. I know not whether Michigan has yet passed laws to guard her sovereignty. It may be that she has not had time to enact laws for this purpose, which no community is long without ; but I do aver, if there be such an act, or if the common law be in force in the state, the actors in that meeting might be indicted, tried, and punished for the very act on which it is now proposed to admit the state into the Union. If such a meeting as this were to undertake to speak in the name of South Carolina, we would speedily teach its authors what they owed to the SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 255 authority and dignity of the state. The act was not only in contempt of the authority of the State of Michigan, but a direct insult on this govern- ment. Here is a self-created meeting, convened for a criminal object, Avhich has dared to present to this government an act of theirs, and to expect that we are to receive this irregular and criminal act as a ful- iilment of the condition which we had prescribed for the admission of the state ! Yet I fear, forgetting our own dignity, and the rights of Michi- gan, that we are about to recognise the validity of the act, and quietly to submit to the insult. The year 1836 (said Mr. C.) is destined to mark the most remarkable change in our political institutions since the adoption of the Constitution. The events of the year have made a deeper innovation on the principles of the Constitution, and evinced a stronger tendency to revolution, than any which have occurred from its adoption to the present day. Sir (said Mr. C, addressing the Vice-president), duty compels me to speak of facts intimately connected with yourself. In deference to your feelings as presiding officer of the body, I shall speak of them with all possible re- serve, much more reserve than I should otherwise have done if you did not occupy that seat. Among the first of these events which I shall no- tice, is the caucus of Baltimore ; that, too, like the Ann Arbour caucus, has been dignified with the name of the convention of the people. This caucus was got up under the countenance and express authority of the President himself; and its edict, appointing you his successor, has been sustained, not only by the whole patronage and power of the government, but by his active personal influence and exertion. Through its instru- mentality he has succeeded in controlling the voice of the people, and, for the first time, the President has appointed his successor ; and thus the first great step of converting our government into a monarchy has been achieved. These are solemn and ominous facts. No one who has examined the result of the last election can doubt their truth. It is now certain that you are not the free and unbiased choice of the people of these United- States. If left to your own popularity, without the active and direct influence of the President, and the power and patronage of the government, acting through a mock convention of the people, instead of the highest, you would, in all probability, have been the lowest of the candidates. During the same year, the state in which this ill-omened caucus con vened, has been agitated by revolutionary movements of the most alarm- intr character. Assuming the dangerous doctrines that they were not bound to obey the injunctions of the Constitution, because it did not place the powers of the state in the hands of an unchecked numerical major- ity, the electors belonging to the party of the Baltimore caucus, who had been chosen to appoint the state senators, refused to perform the func- tions for which they had been elected, with the deliberate intention to subvert the government of the state, and reduce her to the territory con- dition, till a new government could be formed. And now we have before us a measure not less revolutionary, but of an opposite character. In the case of Maryland, those who undertook, without the authority of law or Constitution, to speak and act in the name of the people of the slate, proposed to place her out of the Union by reducing her from a state to a territory ; but in this, those who, in like manner, undertook to act for Michigan, have assumed the authority to bring her into the Union without her consent, on the very condition which she had rejected by a convention of the people, convened under the authority of the state. If we shall sanction the authority of the Michigan caucus to force a state into the Union without its assent, why might we not here sanction a 256 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. • similar caucus in Marj^land, if one had been called, to place the state out of the Union ^ These occurrences, Avhich have distinguished the past year, mark the commencement of no ordinary change in our political system. They an- nounce the ascendency of the caucus system over the regularly constituted au- thorities of the country. I have long anticipated this event. In early life my attention was attracted to the working of the caucus system. It was my fortune to spend five or six years of my youth in the northern por- tion of the Union, where, unfortunately, the system has so long prevailed. Though young, I was old enough to take interest in public affairs, and to notice the working of this odious party machine ; and after-reflection, with the experience then acquired, has long satisfied me that, in the course of time, the edicts of the caucus would eventually supersede the authority of law and Constitution. We have at last arrived at the com- mencement of this great change, which is destined to go on till it has consummated itself in the entire overthrow of all legal and constitutional authority, unless speedily and effectually resisted. The reason is obvi- ous : for obedience and disobedience to the edicts of the caucus, where the system is firmly established, are more certainly and efl'ectually re- warded and punished than to the laws and Constitution. Disobedience to the former is sure to be followed by complete political disfranchise- ment. It deprives the unfortunate individual who falls under its ven- geance of all public honours and emoluments, and consigns him, if depend- ant on the government, to poverty and obscurity ; while he who bows down before its mandates, it matters not how monstrous, secures to him- self the honours of the state, becomes rich, and distinguished, and power- ful. Offices, jobs, and contracts flow on him and his connexions. But to obey the law and respect the Constitution, for the most part, brings little except the approbation of conscience — a reward, indeed, high and noble, and prized by the virtuous above all others, but, unfortunately, little valued by the mass of mankind. It is easy to see what must be the end, unless, indeed, an effective remedy be applied. Are we so blind as not to see this — why it is that the advocates of this bill, the friends of the system, are so tenacious on the point that Michigan should be admitted on the authority of the Ann Arbour caucus, and on no other X Do we not see why the amendment proposed by myself, to admit her by rescind- ing the condition imposed at the last session, should be so strenuously opposed % Why even the preamble would not be surrendered, though many of our friends were willing to vote for the bill on that slight con- cession, in their anxiety to admit the state 1 And here let me say that I listened with attention to the speech of the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Crittenden). I know the clearness of his imderstanding and the soundness of his heart, and I am persuaded, in declaring that his objection to the bill was confined to the preamble, that he has not investigated the subject with the attention it deserves. I feel the objections to the preamble are not without some weight ; but the true and insuperable objections lie far deeper in the facts of the case, which would still exist were the preamble expunged. It is these which render it impossible to pass this bill without trampling under foot the rights of the states, and subverting the first principles of our government. It would require but a few steps more to effect a complete revolution, and the senator from North Carolina has taken the first, I will explain. If you wish to mark the first indications of a revolution, the commence- ment of those profound changes in the character of a people which are working beneath, before a ripple appears on the surface, look to the change of language : you will first notice it in the altered meaning of im- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 257 portant words, and which, as it indicates a change in the feelings and principles of the people, become, in turn, a powerful instrument in accel- erating the change, till an entire revolution is effected. The remarks of the senator will illustrate what 1 have said. He told us that the terms *' convention of the people" were of very uncertain meaning and difRcult to be defined ; but that their true meaning was, any meeting of the people, in their individual and primary character, for political purposes. 1 know it is difficult to define complex terms, that is, to enumerate all the ideas that belong to them, and exclude all that do not ; but there is always, in the most complex, some prominent idea which marks the meanino- of the term, and in relation to which there is usually no disagreement. Thus, ac- cording to the old meaning (and which I had still supposed was its legal and constitutional meaning), a convention of the people invariably implied a meeting of the people, either by themselves, or by delegates expressly chosen for the purpose, in their high sovereign authority, in expressed con- tradistinction to such assemblies of individuals in their private character, or having only derivative authority. It is, in a word, a meeting of the people in the majesty of their power — in that in which they may right- fully make or abolish constitutions, and put up or put down governments at their pleasure. Such was the august conception which formerly entered the mind of every American when the terms " convention of the people" were used. But now, according to the ideas of the dominant party, as "vve are told on the authority of the senator from North Carolina, it means any meeting of individuals for political purposes, and, of course, applies to the meeting at Ann Arbour, or any other party caucus for party pur- poses, which the leaders choose to designate as a convention of the peo- ple. It is thus the highest authority known to our laws and Constitution is gradually sinking to the level of those meetings which regulate the operation of political parties, and through which the edicts of their lead- ers are announced and their authority enforced ; or, rather, to speak more correctly, the latter are gradually rising to the authority of the former. When they come to be completely confounded; when the dis- tinction between a caucus and the convention of the people shall be com- pletely obliterated, which the definition of the senator, and the acts of this body on this bill, would lead us to believe is not far distant, this fair political fabric of ours, erected by the wisdom and patriotism of our an- cestors, and once the gaze and admiration of the world, will topple to the ground in ruins. It has, perhaps, been too much my habit to look more to the future and less to the present than is wise ; but such is the constitution of my mind, that, when I see before me the indications of causes calculated to effect important changes in our political condition, I am led irresistibly to trace them to their sources, and follow them out in their consequences. Lan- guage has been held in this discussion which is clearly revolutionary in its character and tendency, and which warns us of the approach of the period when the struggle will be between the conservatives and the destruc- tives. I understood the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan) as holding language countenancing the principle that the will of a mere nu- merical majority is paramount to the authority of law and Constitution. He did not, indeed, announce distinctly this principle, but it might fairly be inferred from what he said ; for he told us, the latter, where the Con- stitution gives the same weight to a smaller as to a greater number, might take the remedy into their own hand ; meaning, as 1 understood him, that a mere majority might, at their pleasure, subvert the Constitution and government of a state, which he seemed to think was the essence of De- mocracy. Our little state has a Constitution that could not stand a day . Kk ^ 258 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. against such doctrines, and yet we glory in it as the best in the Union. It is a Constitution which respects all the great interests of the state, giving to each a separate and distinct voice in the management of its po- litical affairs, by means of which the feebler interests are protected agamst the preponderance of the greater. We call our state a republic, a com- monwealth, not a democracy ; and let me tell the senator it is a far more popular government than if it had been based on the simple principle of the numerical majority. It takes more voices to put the machine of gov- ernment in motion than those that the senator would consider more pop- ular. It represents all the interests of the state, and is, in fact, the gov- ernment of the people, in the true sense of the term, and not of the mere majority, or the dominant interests. I am not familiar with the Constitution of Maryland, to which the sen- ator alluded, and cannot, therefore, speak of its structure with confidence j but I believe it to be somewhat similar in its character to our own. That it is a government not without its excellence, we need no better proof than the fact that, though within the shadow of executive influence, it has nobly and successfully resisted all the seductions by which a corrupt and artful administration, with almost boundless patronage, has tempted to seduce her into its ranks. Looking, then, to the approaching struggle, I take my stand immova- bly. / am a conservative in its broadest and fullest sense, and such / shall ever remain, unless, i?ideed, the government shall become so corrupt and disor- dered that nothing short of revolution can reform it. I solemnly believe that our political system is, in its purity, not only the best that ever was formed, but the best possible that can be devised for us. It is the only one by which free states, so populous and wealthy, and occupying so vast an extent of territory, can preserve their liberty. Thus thinking, I can- not hope for a better. Having no hope of a better, I am a conservative j and, because I am a conservative, I am a state rights man. I believe that in the rights of the states are to be found the only effectual means of check- ing the overaction of this government ; to resist its tendency to concen- trate all power here, and to prevent a departure from the Constitution ; or, in case of one, to restore the government to its original simplicity and purity. State interposition, or, to express it more fully, the right of a state to interpose her sovereign voice, as one of the parties to our consti- tutional compact, against the encroachments of this government, is the only means of sufficient potency to effect all this ; and I am, therefore, its advocate. I rejoiced to hear the senators from North Carolina (Mr. Brown) and Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan) do us the justice to distin- guish between nullification and the anarchical and revolutionary move ments in Maryland and Pennsylvania. I know they did not intend it as a compliment, but I regard it as the highest. They are right. Day and night are not more different — more unlike in everything. They are iinlike in their principles, their objects, and their consequences. I shall not stop to make good this assertion, as I might easily do. The occasion does not call for it. As a conservative and a state rights man, or, if you will have it, a nullifier, I have and shall resist all encroachments on the Constitution, whether it be the encroachment of this government on the states, or the opposite — the executive on Congress, or Congress on the executive. My creed is to hold both governments, and all the departments of each, to their proper sphere, and to maintain the author- ity of the laws and the Constitution against all revolutionary movements. I believe the means which our system furnishes to preserve itself are am- ple, if fairly understood and applied ; and I shall resort to them, however corrupt and disordered the times, so long as there is hope of reforming SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 259 the government. The result is in the hands of the Disposer of events. It is my part to do my duty. Yet, while I thus openly avow myself a conservative, God forbid I should ever deny the glorious right of rebel- lion and revolution. Should corruption and oppression become intoler- able, and cannot otherwise be thrown ofl" — if liberty must perish, or the o-overnment be overthrown, I would not hesitate, at the hazard of life, to resort to revolution, and to tear down a corrupt government, that could neither be reformed nor borne by freemen ; but I trust in God things will never come to that pass, I trust never to see such fearful times ; for fearful, indeed, they would be, if they should ever befall us. It is the last remedy, and not to be thought of till common sense and the voice of mankind would justify the resort. Before I resume my seat, I feel called on to make a few brief remarks on a doctrine of fearful import, which has been broached in the course of this debate — the right to repeal laws granting bank charters, and, of course, of railroads, turnpikes, and joint-stock companies. It is a doc- trine of fearful import, and calculated to do infinite mischief. There are countless millions vested in such stocks, and it is a description of property of the most delicate character. To touch it is almost to destroy it. But, Avhile I enter my protest against all such doctrines, I have been greatly alarmed with the thoughtless precipitancy (not to use a stronger phrase) with which the most extensive and dangerous privileges have been grant- ed of late. It can end in no good, and, I fear, may be the cause of con- vulsions hereafter. We already feel the effects on the currency, which no one competent of judging but must see is in an unsound condition. 1 must say (for truth compels me) I have ever distrusted the banking sys- tem, at least in its present form, both in this country and Great Britain. It will not stand the test of time ; but I trust that all shocks or sudden revolutions may be avoided, and that it may gradually give way before some sounder and better-regulated system of credit, which the growing intelligence of the age may devise. That a better may be substituted I cannot doubt ; but of what it shall consist, and how it shall finally super- sede the present uncertain and fluctuating currency, time alone can de- termine. All I can see is, that the present must, one day or another, come to an end, or be greatly modified, if that, indeed, can save k from an entire overthrow. It has within itself the seeds of its own deptruction. XVIII SPEECH ON THE BILL AUTHORIZING AN ISSUE OF TREASURY NOTES, SEPTEMBER 19, 1837. Mr. President : An extraordinary course of events, with which all are too familiar to need recital, has separated, in fact, the government and the banks. What relation shall they bear hereafter? Shall the banks again be used as fiscal agents of the government 1 Be the depositories of the public money ? And, above all, shall their notes be considered and treated as money in the re- foipts and expenditures of the government ? This is the great and leading ([uestion ; one of the first magnitude, and full of consequences.' I have given It my most anxious and deliberate attention, and have come to the conclusion that we have reached the period when the interests both of the government and the banks forbid a reunion. I now propose to offer my reasons for this conclusion. I shall do it with that perfect frankness due to the subject, to the country, and the position I occupy. All I ask is, that I may be heard with a 260 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. candour and fairness corresponding to the sincerity with which I shall deliver my sentiments. Those who support a reunion of the banks and the government have to overcome a preliminary difficulty. They are now separated by operation of law, and cannot be united while the present state of things continues, without repealing the law which has disjoined them. I ask, Who is willing to propose its repeal ? Is there any one who, during the suspension of specie payments, would advocate their employment as the fiscal agents of the government, who would make them the depositories of the public revenue, or who would receive and pay away their notes in the pubhc dues ? If there be none, then it resuhs that the separation must continue for the present, and that the reunion must be the work of time, and depending on the contingency of the resumption of specie paj^ments. But suppose this difficulty to be removed, and that the banks were regularly redeeming their notes, from what party in this body can the proposition come, or by which can it be supported, for a reunion between them and the govern- ment ? Who, after what has happened, can advocate the reunion of the govern- ment with the league of state banks ? Can the opposition, who for years have been denouncing it as the most dangerous instrument of power, and efficient means of corrupting and controlling the government and country ? Can they, after the exact fulfilment of all their predictions of disastrous consequences from the connexion, now turn round and support that which they have so long and loudly condemned ? We have heard much from the opposite side of untried experiments on the currency. I concur in the justice of the censure. Nothing can be more delicate than the currency. Nothing can require to be more deUcately handled. It ought never to be tampered with, nor touched, un- til it becomes absolutely necessary. But, if untried experiments justly deserve censure, what condemnation would a repetition of an experiment that has failed deserve ? An experiment that has so signally failed, both in the opinion of sup- porters and opponents, as to call down the bitter denunciation of those who tried it. If to make the experiment was folly, the repetition would be madness. But if the opposition cannot support the measure, how can it be expected to jteceive support from the friends of the administration, in whose hands the ex- periment has so signally failed as to call down from them execrations deep and loud 1. ^ If, My. President, there be any one point fully established by experience and reasoiv, I hold it to be the utter incompetency of the state banks to furnish, of themselves, a sound and stable currency. They may succeed in prosperous times, but the first adverse current necessarily throws them into utter confusion. Nor has any device been found to give them the requisite strength and stability but a great central and controlling bank, instituted under the authority of this government. I go farther : if we must continue our connexion with the banks — if we must receive and pay away their notes as money, we not only have the right to regulate, and give uniformhy and stability to them, but we are bound to do so, and to use the most efficient means for that purpose. The Constitu- tion makes it our duty to lay and collect the taxes and duties uniformly through- out the Union ; to lulfil which, we are bound to give the highest possible equality of value throughout every part of the country, to whatever medium it may be collected m ; and if that be bank-notes, to adopt the most effective means of ac- complishing it, which experience has shown to be a Bank of the United States. This has been long my opinion. I entertained it in 1816, and repeated it, in my place here on the deposite question, in 1834. The only alternative, then, IS, disguise It as you may, between a disconnexion and a Bank of the United States. This is the real issue to which all must come, and ought now to be openly and fairly met. But there ai-e difficulties in the way of a National Bank, no less formidable SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALHOUN. 261 than a reconnexion with the state banks. It is utterly impracticable, at pres- ent, to establish one. There is reason to believe that a majority of the peo- ple of the United States are deliberately and unalterably opposed to it. At all events, there is a numerous, respectable, and powerful party — 1 refer to the old State Rights party — who are, and ever have been, from the beginning of the government, opposed to the Bank, and whose opinions, thus long and firmly entertained, ought, at least, to be so much respected as to forbid the creation of one without an amendment of the Constitution. To this nmst be added the insuperable difficulty, that the executive branch of the government is openly opposed to it, and pledged to interpose his veto, on constitutional grounds, should a bill pass to incorporate one. For four years, at least, then, it will be imprac- ticable to charter a bank. What must be done in the mean time ? Shall the treasury be organized to perform the functions which have been recently dis- charged by the banks, or shall the state institutions be again employed until a bank can be created 1 In the one case, we shall have the so much vilified and denounced sub-treasury, as it is called ; and in the other, difficulties insur- mountable would grow up against the establishment of a bank. Let the state institutions be once reinstated and reunited to the government as their fiscal agents, and they will be found (he first and most strenuous opponents of a Na- tional Bank, by which they would be overshadowed and curtailed in their profits. I hold it certain, that in prosperous times, when the state banks are in full operation, it is impossible to establish a National Bank. Its creation, then, should the reunion with the state banks take place, will be postponed until some disaster similar to the present shall again befall the country. But it re- quires little of the spirit of prophecy to see that such anofher disaster would be the death of the whole system. Already it has had two'paralytic strokes — the third would prove fatal. But suppose these difficulties were overcome, I should still be opposed to the incorporation of a bank. So far from affording the relief which many an- ticipate, it would be the most disastrous measure that could be adopted. As great as is the calamity under which the country is suffering, it is nothing to what would follow the creation of such an institution under existing: circum- stances. In order to compel the state institutions to pay specie, the Bank must have a capital as great, or nearly as great, in proportion to the existing institu- tions, as the late Bank had, when established, to those of that day. This would give it an immense capital, not much less than one hundred millions of dollars, of which a large proportion, say twenty millions, must be specie. From what source is it to be derived ? From the state banks ? It would empty their vaults, and leave them in the most helpless condition. From abroad, and Eng- land in particular ? it would reproduce that revulsive current which has lately covered the country with desolation. The tide is still running to Europe, and if forced back by any artificial cause before the foreign debt is paid, cannot but be followed by the most disastrous consequences. But suppose this difficulty overcome, and the Bank re-established, I ask. What would be the effects under such circumstances ? Where would it find room for business, commensurate with its extended capital, without crushing the state institutions, enfeebled by the withdrawal of their means, in order to create the instrument of their oppression ? A few of the more vigorous might survive, but the far greater portion, with their debtors, creditors, and stock- holders, would be involved in common ruin. The Bank would, indeed, give a specie currency, not by enabling the existing institutions to resume, but by de- stroying them and taking their place. Those who take a different view, and so fondly anticipate relief from a Na- tional Bank, are deceived by a supposed analogy between the present situation of the country and that of 1816, when the late Bank was chartered, after the war with Great Britain. I was an actor in that scene, and may be permitted 262 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. to speak in relation to it with some little authority. Between the two periods there is little or no analogy. They stand almost in contrast. In 1816, the government was a debtor to the banks ; now it is a creditor : a difference of the greatest importance, as far as the present question is concerned. The banks had over-issued, it is true, but their over-issues were to the government, a sol- vent and able debtor, wliose credit, held by the banks in the shape of stock, was at par. It was their excessive issues to the government on its stock which mainly caused the suspension ; in proof of which, it is a remarkable fact, that the depreciation of bank paper, compared with gold and silver, was about equal to the proportion which the government stock held by the banks bore to their is- sues. It was this excess that hung on the market and depressed the value of their notes. The solution is easy. The banks took the government stock pay- able in twelve years, and issued their notes for the same, payable on demand, in violation of the plainest principles of banking. It followed, of course, that when their notes were presented for payment, they had nothing but government stock to meet them. But its stock was at par, and all the banks had to do was to go into market with the stock they held and take up their notes ; and thus the excess which hung upon the market and depressed their value would have been withdrawn from circulation, and the residue would have risen to par, or nearly par, with gold and silver, when specie payments might be easily resumed. This they were unwilling to do. They were profiting every way : by drawing interest on the stock, by discounting on it as capital, and by its continued rise in the market. It became necessary to compel them to surrender these advan- tages. Two methods presented themselves : one a bankrupt law, and the oth- er a National Bank. I was opposed to the former then, as I am now. I re- garded it as a harsh, unconstitutional measure, opposed to the rights of the states. If they have not surrendered the rights to incorporate banks, its exer- cise cannot be controlled by the action of this government, which has no power but what is expressly granted, and no authority to control the states in the ex- ercise of their reserved powers. It remained to resort t© a National Bank as the means of compulsion. It proved effectual. Specie payments were re- stored ; but even with this striking advantage, it was followed by great pressure in 1818, 1819, and 1820, as all Avho are old enough to remember that period must recollect. Such, in fact, must ever be the consequence of resumption, when forced, under the most favourable circumstances ; and such, accordingly, it pro- ved even in England, with all her resources, and with all the caution she used in restoring a specie circulation, after the long suspension of 1797. What, then, would be its effects in the present condition of the country, when the govern- ment is a creditor instead of a debtor ; where there are so many newly-created, banks without established credit ; vvhen the over-issues are so great ; and when so large a portion of the debtors are not in a condition to be coerced ? As great as is the tide of disaster which is passing over the land, it would be as nothing to what would follow, were a National Bank to be established as the means of coercing specie payments. I am bound to speak without reserve on this important point. My opinion, then, is, that if it should be determined to compel the restoration of specie pay- ments by the agency of banks, there is but one way — but to that I have insu- perable objections — I mean the adoption of the Pennsylvania Bank of the Uni- ted States as the fiscal agent of the government. It is already in operation, and sustained by great resources and powerful connexions, both at home and abroad. Through its agency specie payments might undoubtedly be restored, and that with far less disaster than through a newly-created bank, but not with- out severe pressure. I cannot, however, vote for such a measure ; I cannot agree to give a preference and such advantages to a bank of one of the members of this confederacy, over that of others — a bank dependant upon the will of a state, and subject to its influence and control. I cannot consent to confer such favours SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 263 on the stockholders, many of whom, if rumour is to be trusted, are foreign cap- italists, and without claim on the bounty of the government. But if all these, and many other objection-s, were overcome, there is still one which I cannot sur- mount. There has been, as we all know, a conflict between one of the departments of the government and that institution, in which, in my opinion, the department was the assailant ; but I cannot consent, after what has occurred, to give to the Bank a triumph over the government, for such its adoption as the (iscal agent of the government would necessarily be considered. It would degrade the government in the eyes of our citizens and of the world, and go far to make that Bank the government itself. But if all these difficulties were overcome, there are others, to me, wholly insurmountable. I belong to the State Rights party, which at all times, from the beginning of the government to this day, has been opposed to such an insti- tution, as unconstitutional, inexpedient, and dangerous. They have ever dread- ed the union of the political and moneyed power, and the central action of the government to which it so strongly tends, and at all times have strenuously resisted their junction. Time and experience have confirmed the truth of their principles ; and this, above all other periods, is the one at which it would be most dangerous to depart from them. Acting on them, I have never given my countenance or support to a National Bank but under a compulsion which I felt to be imperious, and never without an open declaration of my opinion as unfa- vourable to a bank. In supporting the Bank of 1816, 1 openly declared that, as a question de novo, I should be decidedly against the Bank, and would be the last to give it my sup- port. I also stated that, in supporting the Bank then, I yielded to the necessi- ty of the case, growing out of the then existing and long-established connexion between the government and the banking system. I took the ground, even at that early period, that so long as the connexion existed — so long as the govern- ment received and paid away bank-notes as money — they were bound to regu- late their value, and had no alternative but the establishment of a National Bank. I found the connexion in existence and established before my time, and over which I could have no control. I yielded to the necessity in order to correct the disordered state of the currency, which had fallen exclusively under the control of the states. I yielded to what I could not reverse, just as any mem- ber of the Senate now would, who might believe that Louisiana was unconsti- tutionally admitted into the Union, but who would, nevertheless, feel compelled to vote to extend the laws to that state, as one of its members, on the ground that its admission was an act, whether constitutional or unconstitutional, which lie could not reverse. In 1834 I acted in conformity to the same principle, in proposing the renew- al of the Bank charter for a short period. My object, as expressly avowed, was to use the Bank to break the connexion between the government and the bank- ing system gradually, in order to avert the catastrophe which has now befallen us, and which I then clearly perceived. But the connexion, which I believed to be irreversible in 1816, has now been broken by operation of law. It is now an open question. I feel myself free for the first time to choose my course on this important subject ; and, in opposing a bank, I act in conformity to principles which I have entertained ever since I have fully investigated the subject. But my opposition to a reunion with the banks is not confined to objections limited to a national or state banks. It goes beyond, and comprehends others of a more general nature relating to the currency, which to me are decisive. I am of the impression that the connexion has a most pernicious influence over bank currency ; that it tends to disturb that stability and uniformity of value which is essential to a sound currency, and is among the leading causes of that tendency to expansion and contraction which experience has shown is incident 264 SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALHOUN. to bank-notes as a currency. They are, in my opinion, at best, without the re- quisite qualities to constitute a currency even when unconnected with the gov- ernment, and are doubly disqualified by reason of that connexion, which sub- jects them to sudden expansions and contractions, and exposes them to fatal catastrophes, such as the present. I will explain my views. A bank-note circulates not merely on account of the credit of the institutions by which it is issued, but because government re- ceives it, like gold and silver, in payment of all its dues, and thus adds its own credit to that of the bank. It, in fact, virtually endorses on the note of every specie-paying bank " receivable by government in its dues." To understand how greatly this adds to the circulation of bank-notes, we must remember that government is the great money-dealer of the country, and the holder of immense public domains ; and that it has the power of creating a demand against every citizen as high as it pleases, in the shape of a tax or duty, which can be dis- charged, as the law now is, only by bank-notes or gold and silver. This, of course, cannot but add greatly to the credit of bank-notes, and contribute much, to their circulation, though it may be difficult to detennine with any precision to what extent. It certainly is very grcclt. For why is it that an individual of the first credit, whose responsibility is so indisputable that his friend, of equal credit, endorses his note for nothing, should put his with his friend's, being their joint credit, into a bank, and take out the notes of the bank, which is, in fact, but the credit of the bank itself, and pays six per cent, discount between the credit of himself and his friend and that of the bank ? The known and estab- lished credit of the bank may be one reason, but there is another and powerful one. The government treats the credit of the bank as gold and silver in all its transactions, and does not treat the credit of individuals in the same manner. To test the truth, let us reverse the case, and suppose the government to treat the joint credit of the individuals as money, and not the credit of the bank, is it not obvious that, instead of borrowing from the bank and paying six per cent, dis- count, the bank would be glad to borrow from him on the same terms ? From this we may perceive the powerful influence which bank circulation derives from the connexion with the credit of the government. It follows, as a necessary consequence, that to the extent of this influence the issues of the banks expand and contract with the expansion and contraction of the fiscal action of the government ; with the increase of its duties, taxes, in- come, and expenditure ; with the deposites in its vaults acting as additional cap- ital, and the amount of bank-notes withdrawn, in consequence, from circulation : all of which must directly afl'ect the amount of their business and issues ; and bank currency must, of course, partake of all those vibrations to which the fis- cal action of the government is necessarily exposed, and, when great and sud- den, must expose the system to catastrophes such as we now witness. In fact, a more suitable instance cannot be selected, to illustrate the truth of what I assert, than the present, as I shall proceed to show. To understand the causes which have led to the present state of things, we must go back to the year 1824, when the tariff system triumphed in Congress : a system which imposed duties, not for the purpose of revenue, but to encour- age the industry of one portion of the Union at the expense of the other. This was followed up by the act of 1828, which consummated the system. It rais- ed the duties so extravagantly, that out of an annual importation of sixty-four millions, thirty-two passed into the treasury : that is, government took one half for the liberty of introducing the other. Countless millions were thus poured into the treasury beyond the wants of the government, which became, in time, the source of the most extravagant expenditures. This vast increase of receipts and expenditures was followed by a corresponding expansion of the business oi the banks. They had to discount and issue freely to enable the merchants to pay their duty-bonds, as well as to meet the vastly increased expenditures of SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 265 the government. Another effect followecl the act of 1828, which gave a still farther expansion to the action of the banks, and which is worthy of notice. It turned the exchange with England in favour of this country. That portion of the proceeds of our exports which, in consequence of the high duties, could no longer return with profit in the usual articles which we had been in the habit of receiving principally from that country in exchange for our exports, returned, in gold and silver, in order to purchase similar articles at the North. This was the tirst cause which gave that western direction to the precious metals, the re- vulsive return of which has been followed by so many disasters. With the ex- chanofe in our favour, and, consequently, no demand for gold and silver abroad, and the vast demand for money attendant on an increase of the revenue, almost every restraint was removed on the discounts and issues of the banks, especially in the Northern section of the Union, where these causes principally operated. With their increase, wages and prices of every description rose in proportion, followed, of course, by an increasing demand on the banks for farther issues. This is the true cause of that expansion of the currency which began about the commencement of the late administration, but which was erroneously charged by it to the Bank of the United States. It rose out of the action of the govern- ment. The Bank, in increasing its business, acted in obedience to the condi- tion of things at the time, and in conformity with the banks generally in the same section. It was at this juncture that the late administration came into power — a juncture remarkable in many respects, but more especially in relation to the question of the currency. Most of the causes which have since termi- nated in the complete prostration of the banks and the commercial prosperity of the country were in full activity. Another cause, about that time (I do not remember the precise date), began to produce powerful effects : I refer to the last renewal of the charter of the Bank of England. It was renewed for ten years, and, among other provisions, contained one making the notes of that bank a legal tender in all cases except between the Bank and its creditors. The effect was to dispense still farther with the use of the precious metals in that great commercial country, which, of course, caused them to flow out in every direction through the various channels of its commerce. A large portion took their direction hitherward, and served still farther to increase the current which, from causes already enumerated, was already flowing so strongly in this direction, and which still farther increased the force of the returning current, on the turn of the tide. The administration did not comprehend the difficulties and dangers which surrounded it. Instead of perceiving the true reason of the expansion of the currency, and adopting the measures necessary to arrest it, they attributed it to the Bank of the United States, and made it the cause or pretext for waging war on that institution. Among the first acts of hostility, the deposites were remo- ved, and transferred to selected state banks ; the effect of which, instead of resist- ing the tendency to expansion, was to throw off the only restraint that held the banking institutions of the country in check, and, of course, gave to the swell- ing tide, which was destined to desolate the country, a powerful impulse. Banks sprung up in every direction ; discounts and issues increased almost without limitation ; and an immense surplus revenue accumulated in the depos- ite banks, which, after the payment of the public debt, the most extravagant ap- propriations could not exhaust, and which acted as additional banking capital ; the value of money daily depreciated ; prices rose ; and then commenced those unbounded speculations, particularly in public lands, which was transferred, by millions of acres, from the public to the speculators for worthless bank-notes, till at length the swelling flood was checked, and the revulsive current burst its barriers, and overspread and desolated the land. The flrst check came from the Bank of England, which, alarmed at the loss of its precious metals, refused to discount American bills, in order to prevent a L L 268 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. farther decrease of its cash means, and cause a return of those which it had lost. Then followed the objectionable manner of carrying into execution the deposite act, which, instead of a remedial measure, as it might have been if it had been properly executed, was made the instrument of weakening the banks, especially in the great commercial metropolis of the Union, where so large a portion of the surphis revenue was accumulated. And, finally, the treasury or- der, which still farther weakened those banks, by withdrawing their cash means to be invested in public lands in the West. It is often easy to prevent what cannot be remedied, which the present instance strongly illustrates. If the administration had formed a true conception of the danger in lime, what has since happened might have then been averted. The Bear approach of the expiration of the charter of the United States Bank would Lave aflbrded ample means of staying the desolation, if it had been timely and properly used. I saw it then, and purposed to renew the charter for a limited period, with such modifications as would have effectually resisted the increas- ing expansion of the currency, and, at the same time, gradually and finally wear out the connexion between the Bank and the government. To use the expres- sion I then used, " to unbank the banks," to let down the system easily, and so to eifect the separation between the Bank and the government, as to avoid the possibility of that shock which I then saw was inevitable without some such remedy. The moment was eminently propitious. The precious metals were flowing in on us from every quarter ; and the vigorous measures I purposed to adopt in the renewal of the charter would have efiectually arrested the increase of banks, and checked the excess of their discounts and issues ; so that the ac- cumulating mass of gold and silver, instead of being converted into bank capital, and swelling the tide of paper circulation, would have been substituted in the place of bank-notes, as a permanent and wholesome addition to the currency of the country. But neither the administration nor the opposition sustained me, and the pre- cious opportunity passed vmseized. I then clearly saw the coming calamity was inevitable, and it has neither arrived sooner, nor is it greater, than what I expected. Such are the leading causes which have produced the present disordered state of the currency. There are others of a minor character, connected with the general condition of the commercial world, and the operation of the execu- tive branch of the government, but which of themselves would have produced but little effect. To repeat the causes in a few words, the vast increase which the tariffs of 1824 and 1828 gave to the fiscal action of the government, com- bined with the causes I have enumerated, gave the first impulse to the expan- sion of the currency. That, in turn, gave that extraordinary impulse to over-tra- ding and speculation (they were effects, and not causes) which has finally ter- minated in the present calamity It may thus be ultimately traced to the con- nexion between the banks and the government ; and it is not a little remarkable, that the suspension of specie payments in 1816 in this country, and in 1797 in Great Britain, was produced by the same causes. There is another reason against the union of the government and the banks, intimately connected Avith that under consideration, which I shall next proceed to state. It gives an advantage to one portion of citizens over another, that is neither fair, equal, nor consistent Avith the spirit of our institutions. That the connexion between the Bank and the government, the receiAdng and paying away their notes as cash, and the use of the public money from the time of the col- lection to the disbursement, is the source of immense profit to the banks, cannot be questioned. It is impossible, as I have said, to ascertain with any precision to what extent their issues and circulation depend upon it, but it certainly con- stitutes a large proportion. A single illustration may throw light upon this point. Suppose the government were to take 'up the veriest beggar in the I SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 267 , Street, and enter into a contract with him, that nothing should be received in its 7 dues or for the sales of its public lands in future, except ojold and silver and his \ promissory notes, and that he should have the use of the public funds from the time of their collection until their disbursement. Can any one estimate the wealth which such a contract would confer? His notes would circulate far and wide over the whole extent of the Union, would be the medium through which the exchanges of the country would bo performed, and his ample and ex- tended credit would give him a control over all the banking institutions and moneyed transactions of the community. The possession of a hundred mill- ions would not give a control more efi'ectual. 1 ask, Would it be fair, would it be equal, would it be consistent with the spirit of our institutions, to confer / such advantages on any individual ? And if not on one, would it be if confer- red on any number ? And if not, why should it be conferred on any corporate body of individuals ? How can they possibly be entitled to benefits so vast, which all nuist acknowledge could not be justly conferred on any rmmber of unincorporated individuals ? I state not these views with any intention of bringing down odium on bank- ing institutions. I have no unkind feeling towards them whatever. I do not hold them responsible for the present state of things. It has grown up gradu- ally, without either the banks or the community perceiving the consequences Avhich have followed the connexion between them. My object is to state facts as they exist, that the truth may be seen in time by all. This is an age of in- vestigation. The public mind is broadly awake upon this all-important subject. It affects the interests and condition of the whole community, and will be in- vestigated to the bottom. Nothing will be left unexplored ; and it is for the in- terest of both the banks and of the community that the evils incident to the connexion should be fully imderstood in time, and the connexion be gradually terminated, before such convulsions shall follow as to sweep away the whole system, with its advantages as well as its disadvantages. But it is not only between citizen and citizen that the connexion is unfair and unequal. It is as much so between one portion of the country and another. The connexion of the government with the banks, whether it be with a combi- nation of state banks or with a national institution, will necessarily centralize the action of the system at the principal point of collection and disbursement, and at which the mother-bank, or the head of the league of state banks, must be located. From that point, the whole system, through the connexion with the government, will be enabled to control the exchanges both at home and abroad, and with it the commerce, foreign and domestic, including exports and imports. After what has been said, these points will require but little illustra- tion. A single one will be sufficient ; and I will take, as in the former in- stance, that of an individual. Suppose, then, the government, at the commencement of its operation, had selected an individual merchant, at any one point in the Union, say New-York, and had connected itself with him, as it has with the banks, by giving him the use of the public funds from the time of their collection until their disburse- ment, and of receiving and paying away, in all its transactions, nothing but his promissory notes, except gold and silver ; is it not manifest that a decisive con- trol would be given to the port where he resided, over all the others ; that his promissory notes would circulate everywhere, through all the ramifications of commerce ; that they would regulate exchanges ; that they would be the me- dium of paying duty-bonds ; and that they would attract the imports and ex- ports of the country to the ports where such extraordinary facilities were afford- ed ? If such would clearly be the effects in the case supposed, it is equally clear that the concentration of the currency at the same point, through the connexion of the government with the banks, would have equal, if not greater effects ; and that whether one general bank should be used as an agent, or a 268 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. league of banks, whicli should have their centre there. To other ports of the country, the trifling advantages which a branch or deposite bank would give in the safe keeping of the public revenue would be as nothing, compared to the losses caused to their commerce by centralizing the moneyed action of the coun- try at a remote point. Other gentlemen can speak for their own section ; I can speak with confidence of that which I have the honour in part to repre- sent. The entire staple states, J feel a deep conviction, banks and all, would, in the end, be great gainers by the disseverance, whatever might be the tempo- rary inconvenience. If there be any other section in which the effects would be different, it would be but to confirm the views which I have presented. As connected with this, there is a point well deserving consideration. The union between bank and government is not only a main source of that danger- ous expansion and contraction in the banking system which I have already il- lustrated, but is also one of the principal causes of that powerful and almost ir- resistible tendency to the increase of banks which even its friends see and de- plore. I dwelt on this point on a former occasion (on Mr. Webster's motion to renew the Bank charter in 1833), and will not repeat what I then said. But in addition to the causes then enumerated, there are many others very power- ful, and, among others, the one under consideration. They all maybe summed up in one general cause. We have made banking too profitable — far, very far too profitable — and, I may add, influential. One of the most ample sources of this profit and influence may be traced, as I have shown, to the connexion ■with the government ; and is, of course, among the prominent causes of the strong and incessant tendency of the system to increase, which even its friends see rrtust finally overwhelm either the banks or the institutions of the country. With a view to check its growth, they have proposed to limit the number of banks and the amount of banking capital by an amendment of the Constitution ; but it is obvious that the effects of such an amendment, if it were practicable, would but increase the profits and influence of bank capital ; and that, finally, it would justly produce such indignation on the part of the rest of the community against such unequal advantages, that in the end, after a long and violent stnig- gle, the overthrow of the entire system would follow. To obviate this difficul- ty, it has been proposed to add a limitation upon the amount of their business ; the effects of which would be the accommodation of favourites, to the exclusion of the rest of the community, which avouM be no less fatal to the system. There can be, in fact, but one safe and consistent remedy — the rendering bank- ing, as a business, less profitable and influential ; and the first and decisive step towards this is a disseverance between the banks and the government. To this may be added some effectual limitation on the denomination of the notes to be issued, which would operate in a similar manner. I pass over other important objections- to the connexion — the corrupting in- fluence and the spirit of speculation which it spreads far and wide over the land. Who has not seen and deplored the vast and corrupting influence brought to bear upon the legislatures to obtain charters, and the means necessary to participate in the profits of the institutions ? This gives a control to the gov- ernment which grants such favours of a most extensive and pernicious charac- ter, all of which must continue to spread and increase, if the connexion should continue, until the whole community must become one contaminated and cor- rupted mass. There is another and a final reason, which I shall assign against the reunion Avith the banks. We have reached a new era with regard to these institutions. He who would judge of the future by the past, in reference to them, will be ■wholly mistaken. The year 1833 marks the commencement of this era. That extraordinary man who had the power of imprinting his own feelings on the community, then commenced his hostile attacks, which have left such effects behind, that the war then commenced against the banks, I clearly see, will not SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN. 269 terminate, unless there be a separation between them and the government ; until one or the other triumphs ; till the government becomes the bank, or the bank the government. In resisting' their union, I act as the friend of both. I have, as 1 have said, no unkind feeling towards the banks. I am neither a bank man nor an anti-bank man. I have but little connexion with them. Many of my best friends, for whom I have the highest esteem, have a deep interest in their prosperity, and, as far as friendship or personal attachment extends, my inclination would be strongly in their favour. But I stand up here as the rep- resentative of no particular interest. I look to the whole, and to the future, as Tvell as the present ; and I shall steadily pursue that course which, under the most enlarged view, I believe to be my duty. In 1834 I saw the present crisis. I, in vain, raised a warning voice, and endeavoured to avert it. I now see, ■with equal certainty, one far more portentous. If this struggle is to go on ; if the banks will insist upon a reunion with the goverpment against the sense of a large and influential portion of the conmiunity ; and, above all, if they should succeed in efiecling it, a reflux flood will inevitably sweep away the whole system. ( A deep popular excitement is never without some reason, and ought ever to betreated with respect ; and it is the part of wisdom to look timely into the cause, and correct it before the excitement shall become so great as to de- molish the object, with all its good and evil, against which it is directed. The only safe course for both government and banks is to remain, as they are, separated ; each in the use of their own credit, and in the management of their own affairs. The less the control and influence of the one over the other the better. Confined to their legitimate sphere, that of affording temporary credit to commercial and business men, bank-notes would furnish a safe and conveni- ent circulation in the range of commerce and business, within which the banks may be respectively situated, exempt almost entirely from those fluctuations and convulsions to which they are now so exposed ; or, if they should occasionally be subject to them, the evil would be local and temporary, leaving undisturbed the action of the government and the general currency of the country, on the stability of which the prosperity and safety of the community so much depend. I have now stated my objections to the reunion of the government and the banks. If they are well founded ; if the state banks are of themselves incom- petent agents ; if a Bank of the United States be impracticable, or, if practicable, would at this time be the destruction of a large portion of the existing banks, and of renewed and severe pecuniary distress ; if it would be against the set- tled conviction of an old and powerful party, whose opposition time cannot abate ; if the union of government and banks adds to the unfitness of their notes for circulation, and be unjust and unequal between citizen and citizen, and one portion of the Union and another ; and, finally, if it would excite an implacable and obstinate war, which could only terminate in the overthrow of the banking system or the institutions of the country — it then remains that the only alterna- tive would be permanently to separate the two, and to f eorgaruze the treasury so as to enable it to perform those duties which have heretofore been performed by the banks as its fiscal agents, ij^his proposed reorganization has been called a sub-treasury ; an unfortunate word, calculated to mislead and conjure up difli- culties and danger that do not in reality existi So far from an experiment, or some new device, it is only returning to the old mode of collecting and disburs- ing public money, which, for thousands of years, has been the practice of all enlightened people till within the last century. In what manner it is intended to reorganize the treasury by the bill reported, I do not know. I have been too much engaged to read it ; and I can oidy say that, for one, I shall assent to no arrangement which provides for a treasury bank, or that can be perverted into one. If there can be any scheme more fatal than a reunion with the banks at this time, it would be such a project. Nor will I give my assent to any arrangement which shall add the least uimecessary 270 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. patronage. I am the sworn foe to patronage, and have done as much and suf- fered^as much in resisting it as any one. Too many years have passed over me to change, at this late day, my course or principles. But I will say, that it is impossible so to organize the treasury for the performance of its own functions as to give to the executive a tenth part of the patronage it will lose by the pro- posed separation, which, when the bill for the reorganization comes up, I may have an opportunity to show. I have ventured this assertion after much reflec- tion, and with entire confidence in its correctness. But something more must be done besides the reorganization of the treasury. Under the resolution of 1816, bank-notes would again be received in the dues of the government, if the Bank should resume specie payments. The legal, as well as the actual connexion, must be severed. But I am opposed to all harsh or precipitate measures. No great process can be effected without a shock but through the agency of ti^ie. I, accordingly, propose to allow time for the final separation ; and with this view I have drawn up an amendment to this bill, which I shall offer at the proper time, to modify the resolution of 1816, by pro- viding that after the 1st of January next, three fourths of all sums due to the government may be received in the notes of specie-paying banks ; and that after the 1st of January next following, one half; and after the 1st of January next subsequent, one fourth ; and after the 1st of January thereafter, nothing but the legal currency of the United States, or bills, notes, or paper issued under their authority, and which may by law be authorized to be received in their dues. If the time is not thought to be ample, I am perfectly disposed to extend it. The period is of little importance in my eyes, so that the object be effected. In addition to this, it seems to me that some measure of a remedial charactetj connected with the currency, ought to be adopted to ease off the pressure while the process is going through. It is desirable that the government should make as {ew and small demands on the specie market as possible during the time, so as to throw no impediment in the way of the resumption of specie payments. With this view, I am of the impression that the sum necessary for the present wants of the treasury should be raised bv a paper, which should, at the same time, have the requisite qualities to enable it to perform the functions of a paper circulation. Under this impression, I object to the interest to be allowed on the treasury notes, which this bill authorizes to be issued, on the very opposite ground that the senator from Massachusetts bestows his approbation. He approves of interest, because it would throw them out of circulation, into the hands of capitalists, as a convenient and safe investment ; and I disapprove, because it Avill have that efiect. I am disposed to ease off the process ; he. I would suppose, is very little solicitous on that point. • But I go farther. I am of the impression, to make this great measure suc- cessful, and secure it against reaction, some stable and safe medium of circula- tion, to take the place of bank-notes in the fiscal operations of the government, ought to be issued. I intend to propose nothing. It would be impossible, with so great a weight of opposition, to pass any measure without the entire support of the administration ; and if it were, it ought not to be attempted where so much must depend on the mode of execution. The best measure that could be devi- sed might fail, and impose a heavy responsibility on its author, unless it met with the hearty approbation of those who are to execute it. I intend, then, merely to throw out suggestions, in order to excite the reflection of others on a subject so delicate and of so much importance, acting on the principle that it is the duty of all, in so great a juncture, to present their views without reserve. /'' It is, then, my impression that, in the present condition of the world, a paper / currency, in some form, if not necessary, is almost indispensable in financial / and commercial operations of civilized and extensive communities. In many f respects it has a vast superiority over a metallic currency, especially in great and extended transactions, by its greater cheapness, lightness, and the facility SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 271 of determining the amount. The great desideratum is, to ascertain wliat de- scription of paper has the requisite qualities of being free from fluctuation in. value, and liability to abuse, in the greatest perfection. 1 have shown, I trust, that the bank-notes do not possess these requisites in a degree sufhciently high for this purpose. I go farther. It appears to me, after bestowing the best re- flection I can give the subject, that no convertible paper, that is, no paper whose credit rests upon a promise to pay, is suitable for currency. It is the form of credit proper in private transactions between man and man, but not for a stand- ard of value to perform exchanges generally, which constitutes the appropriate functions of money or currency. The measure of safety in the two cases are wholly different. A promissory note, or convertible paper, is considered safe so long as the drawer has ample means to meet his engagements, and, in pass- ing from hand to hand, regard is had only to his ability and willingness to pay. Very diflerent is the case in currency. The aggregate value of the currency of a country necessarily bears a small proportion to the aggregate value of its property. This proportion is not well ascertained, and is probably subject to considerable variation in different countries, and at different periods in the same country. It may be assumed conjecturally, in order to illustrate what I say, at one to thirty. Assuming this proportion to be correct, which probably^s not very far from the truth, it follows, that in a sound condition of the country, where the currency is metallic, the aggregate value of the coin is not more than one in thirty of the aggregate value of the property. It also follows that an increase in the amount of the currency, by the addition of a paper circulation of no in- trinsic value, but increases the nominal value of the aggregate property of the country in the same proportion that the increase bears to the whole amount ot^ currency; so that, if the currency be doubled, the nominal value of the property will also be doubled. Hence it is, that when the paper currency of a country is in the shape of promissory notes, there is a constant tendency to excess. We look for their safety to the ability of the drawer ; and so long as his means are ample to meet his engagements, there is no distrust, without reflecting that, con- sidered as currency, it cannot safely exceed one in thirty in value compared to property ; and the delusion is farther increased by the constant increase in value of property with the increase of the notes in circulation, so as to main- tain the same relative proportion. It follows that a government may safely contract a debt many times the amount of its aggregate circulation ; jjut if ie were to attempt to put its promissory notes in circulation in amount equal to its debts, an explosion in the currency would be inevitable. And hence, with other causes, the constant tendency to an excessive issue of bank-notes in pros- perous times, when so large a portion of the community are anxious to obtain accommodation, and who are disappointed when good negotiable paper is re- fused by the banks, not reflecting that it would not be safe to discount beyond the limits I have assigned for a safe circulation, however good the paper offered. On what, then, ought a paper currency to rest ? I would say on demand and supply simply, which regulates the value of everything else — the constant de- mand which the government has on the community for its necessary supplies. A medium resting on this demand, which simply obligates the government to receive it in all its dues, to the exclusion of everything else except gold and silver, and which shall be optional with those who have demands on government to receive or not, would, it seems to me, be as stable in its value as those metals themselves, and be as little liable to abuse as the power of coining. It would contain within itself a self-regulating power. It could only be issued to those who had claims on the government, and to those only with their consent, and, of course, only at or above par with gold and silver, which would be its ha- bitual state ; for, as far as the government was concerned, it would be equal, in every respect, to gold and silver, and superior in many, particularly in regu- lating the distant exchanges of the country. Should, however, a demand for 272 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. gold and silver from abroad, or other accidental causes, depress it temporarily, as compared with the precious metals, it would then return to the treasury ; and as it could not be paid out during such depression, its gradual diminution in the market would soon restore it to an equality, when it would again flow out into the general circulation. Thus there would be a constant alternate flux and re- flux into and from the treasury, between it and the precious metals ; but if at any time a permanent depression in its value be possible, from any cause, the only eflTect would be to operate as a reduction of taxes on the community, and the only suflferer would be the government itself. Against this, its own interest "would be a sufficient guarantee. Nothing but experience can determine what amount and of what denomina- tions might be safely issued, but it may be safely assumed that the country would absorb an amount greatly exceeding its annual income. Much of its ex- changes, which amount to a vast sum, as well as its banking business, would revolve about it, and many millions would thus be kept in circulation beyond the demands of the government. It may throw some light on this subject to state, that North Carolina, just after the Revolution, issued a large amount of pa- per, which was made receivable in dues to her. It vvas also made a legal ten- der, but which, of course, was not obligatory after the adoption of the Federal Constitution. A large amount, say between four and five hundred thousand dollars, remained in circulation after that period, and continued to circulate for more than twenty years at par with gold and silver during the whole time, with no other advantage than being received in the revenue of the state, which was much less than $100,000 per annum. I speak on the information of citizens of that state, on whom I can rely. But whatever may be the amount that can be circulated, I hold it clear, that to that amount it would be as stable in value as gold and silver itself, provided the government be bound to receive it exclusively with those metals in all its dues, and that it be left perfectly optional with those who have claims on the government to receive it or not. It will also be a necessary condition, that notes of too small a denomination should not be issued, so that the treasury shall have ample means to meet all demands, either in gold or silver, or the bills of the government, at the option of those who have claims on it. With these con- ditions, no farther variation could take place between it and gold and silver than that which would be caused by the action of commerce. An unusual de- mand from abroad for the metals would, of course, raise them a little in their relative value, and depress, relatively, the government bills in the same propor- tion, which would cause them to flow into the treasury, and gold and silver to flow out ; while, on the contrary, an increased demand for the bills in the do- mestic exchange would have the reverse eflject, causing, as I have stated, an alternate flux and reflux into the treasury between the two, which would at all times keep their relative values either at or near par. No one can doubt that the fact of the government receiving and paying away bank-notes, in all its fiscal transactions, is one of the principal sources of their great circulation ; and it was mainly on that account that the notes of the late Bank of the United States so freely circulated over the Union . I would ask, then, Why should the government mingle its credit with that of private corporations ? No one can doubt but that the government credit is better than that of any bank — more stable and more safe. Why, then, should it mix it up with the less perfect credit of those institutions ? Why not use its own credit to the amount of its own transactions ? Wiiy should it not be safe in its own hands, while it shall be consid- ered safe in the hands of 800 private institutions, scattered all over the country, and which have no other object but their own private profit, to increase which, they almost constantly extend their business to the most dangerous extremes? And why should the community be compelled to give six per cent, discount for the gov- ernment credit blended with that of the banks, when the superior credit of the SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 273 government could be furnished separately, without discount, to the mutual ad- vantage of the governnment and the community ? Why, let me ask, should the government be exposed to such difficulties as the present, by mingling its credit with the banks, when it could be exempt from all such by using, by itself, its own safer credit ? It is time the community, wiiich has so deep an interest in a sound and cheap currency, and the equality of the laws between one portion of the citizens of the country and another, should reflect seriously on these things, not for the purpose of oppressing any interest, but to correct gradually disorders of a dangerous character, which have insensibly, in the long course of years, without being perceived by any one, crept into the state. The ques- tion is not between credit and no credit, as some would have us believe, but in what form credit can best perform ihe functions of a sound and safe currency. On this important point I have freely thrown out my ideas, leaving it to this body and the public to determine what they are worth. Believing that there might be a sound and safe paper currency founded on the credit of the govern- ment exclusively, I was desirous that those who are responsible, and have the power, should have availed themselves of the opportunity of the temporary de- iicit of the treasury, and the postponement of the fourth instalment, intended to be deposited with the states, to use them as the means of affording a circulation for the present relief of the country aud the banks, during^he process of separ- ating them from the government ; and, if experience should justify it, of furnish- ing a permanent and safe circulation, which would greatly facilitate the opera- tions of the treasury, and afford, incidentally, much facility to the commercial operations of the country. But a different direction was given, and when the alternative was presented of a loan, or the withholding of the fourth instalment from the states, I did not hesitate to give a decided vote for withholding it. My aversion to a public debt is deep and durable. It is, in my opinion, pernicious, and is little short of a fraud on the public. I saw too much of it during the late war not to understand something of the nature and character of public loans. Never was a country more egregiously imposed on. Having now presented my views of the course and the measures which the permanent policy of the country, looking to its liberty and lasting prosperity, re- quires, I come finally to the question of relief I have placed this last, not that I am devoid of sympathy for the country in the pecuniary distress which now pervades it. No one struggled earlier or longer to prevent it than myself; nor can any one more sensibly feel the wide-spread blight which has suddenly blasted the hopes of so many, and precipitated thousands from alfluence to pov- erty. The desolation has fallen mainly on the mercantile class — a class which I have ever held in the highest estimation. No country ever had a superior body of merchants, of higher honour, of more daring enterprise, or of greater skill and energy. The ruin of such a class is a heavy calamity, and I am so- licitous, among other things, to give such stability to our currency as to prevent the recurrence of a similar calamity hereafter. But it was first necessary, in the order of things, that we should determine what sound policy, looking to the future, demands to be done at the present juncture, before we consider the question of relief; which, as urgent as it may be, is subordinate, and must yield to the former. The patient lies under a dangerous disease, with a burnino- thirst and other symptoms, which distress him more than the vital organs which are attacked. The skilful physician first makes himself master of the nature of the disease, and then determines on the treatment necessary for the restoration of health. This done, he next alleviates the distressing symptoms as far as is consistent with the restoration of health, and no farther. Such shall be my course. As far as I possibly can, consistently with the views I entertain, and what I believe to be necessary to restore the body politic to health, I will do everything in my power to mitigate the present distress. Farther I cannot go. After the best reflection, I am of opinion that the government can do but lit- M M 274 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. tie in the way of relief ; and that it is a case which must be mainly left to the constitution of the patient, who, thank God, is young, vigorous, and robust, with a constitution sufficient to sustain and overcome the severest attack. I dread the doctor and his drugs much more than the disease itself. The distress of the country consists in its indebtedness, and can only be relieved by payment of its debts. To effect this, industry, frugality, economy, and time are neces- sary. I rely more on the growing crop — on the cotton, rice, and tobacco of the South, than on all the projects or devices of politicians. I am utterly opposed to all coercion by this government. But government may do something to re- lieve the distress. It is out of debt, and is one of the principal creditors both of the banks and of the merchants, and should set an example of liberal indul- gence. This I am willing to give freely. I am also prepared to vote freely the use of government credit in some safe form, to supply any deficit in the cir- culation, during the process of recovery, as far as its financial wants will per- mit. I see not what more can be safely done. But my vision may be obtuse upon this subject. Those who differ from me, and who profess so much sym- pathy for the public, seem to think that much relief may be afforded. I hope they will present their views. I am anxious to hear their prescriptions, and I assure them, that whatever they may propose, if it shall promise relief, and be not inconsistent with»the course which I- deem absolutely necessary for the restoration of the country to perfect health, shall cheerfully receive my support. They may be more keensighted than I am as to the best means of relief, but cannot have a stronger disposition to afibrd it. We have, Mr. President, arrived at a remarkable era in our political history. The days of legislative and executive encroachments, of tariffs and surpluses, of bank and public debt, and extravagant expenditure, are past for the present. The government stands in a position disentangled from the past, and freer to choose its future course than it ever has been since its commencement. We are about to take a fresh start. I move oflf under the State Rights banner, and go in the direction in which I have been so long moving. I seize the opportunity thoroughly to reform the government ; to bring it back to its original principles ; to retrench and economize, and rigidly to enforce accountabihty. I shall op- pose strenuously all attempts to originate a new debt ; to create a National Bank ; to reunite the political and money powers (more dangerous than Church and State) in any form or shape ; to prevent the operation of the compromise, which is gradually removing the last vestige of the tariff system ; and, mainly, I shall use my licst efforts to give an ascendency to the great conservative prin- ciple of state sovereignty, over the dangerous and despotic doctrine of consoli- dation. I rejoice to think that the executive department of the government is . now so reduced in power and means, that it can no longer rely on its influence and patronage to secure a majority. Henceforward it can have no hope of sup- porting itself but on wisdom, moderation, patriotism, and devoted attachment to the Constitution, which, I trust, will make it, In its own defence, an ally in ef- fecting the reform which I deem indispensable to the salvation of the country and its institutions. I look, sir, with pride to the wise and noble bearing of the little State Rights party, of which it is my pride to be a member, throughout the eventful period through which the country has passed since 1824. Experience already bears testimony to their patriotism, firmness, and sagacity, and history will do it jus- tice. In that year, as I have stated, the tariff system triumphed in the councils of the nation. We saw its disastrous political bearings — foresaw its surpluses, and the extravagances to which it would lead — we rallied on the election of the late President to arrest it through the influence of the executive department of the government. In this we failed. We then fell back upon the rights and sovereignty of the states ; and by the action of a small, but gallant state, and through the potency of its interposition, we brought the system to the ground, SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN'. 275 sustained as it Avas by the opposition ant! the administration, and by the whole power and patronage of the government. The pernicions overllow of the treas- ury, of which it was the parent, coukl not be arrested at once. The surplus was seized on by the executive, and, by its control over the banks, became the fruitful source of executive influence and encroachment. Without hesitation, we joined our old opponents on the tariti' question, but under our own Hag, and without merging in their ranks, and made a gallant and successful war against the encroachments of the executive. That terminated, we part with our late allies in peace, and move forward, lag or onwaid who may, to secure the fruits of our long, but successful struggle, under the old Republican flag of '98, which, though tattered and torn, has never yet been lowered, and, with the blessing of God, never shall be with my consent. XIX. SPEECH ON HIS .AMENDMENT TO SEPARATE THE GOVERNiVIENT FROM THE BANKS, OCTOBER 3, 1837. .Mr. President : In reviewing this discussion, I have been struck with the fact, that the argument on the opposite side has been limited, almost exclu- sively, to the questions of relief and the currency. These are, undoubtedly, im- portant questions, and well deserving the deliberate consideration of the Sen- ate ; but there are other questions involved in this issue of a far more elevated character, which more imperiously demand our attention. The banks have ceased to be mere moneyed incorporations. They have become great political institutions, with vast influence over the welfare of the community ; so much so, that a highly distinguished senator (Mr. Clay) has declared, in his place, that the question of the disunion of the government and the banks involved in its consequences the disunion of the states themselves. With this declaration sounding in our ears, it is time to look into the origin of a system which has already acquired such mighty influence ; to inquire into the causes which have produced it, and whether they are still ou the increase ; in what they will ter- minate, if left to themselves ; and, finoJIy, whether the system is favourable to the permanency of our free institutions ; to the industry and business of the country ; and, above all, to the moral and intellectual development of the com- munity. I feel the vast importance and magnitude of these topics, as well as their great delicacy. 1 shall touch them with extreme reluctance, and only be- cause I believe them to belong to the occasion, and that it would be a derelic- tion of public duty to withhold any opinion, which I have deliberately formed, on the subject under discussion. The rise and progress of the banking system is one of the most remarkable and curious phenomena of modern times. Its origin is modern and huirible, and gave no indication of the extraordinary growth and influence which it was destined to attain. It dates back to 1609, the year that the Bank of Amsterdam was established. Other banking institutions preceded it ; but they were insula- ted, and not immediately connected with the systems which have since sprung up, and which may be distinctly traced to that bank, which was a bank of deposite — a mere storehouse — established under the authority of that great commer- cial metropolis, for the purpose of safe-keeping the precious metals, and facili- tating the vast system of exchanges which then centred there. The whole sys- tem was the most simple and beautiful that can be imagined. The depositor, on delivering his bullion or coin in store, received a credit, estimated at the standard value on the books of the bank, and a certificate of deposite for the amount, which was transferable from hand to hand, and entitled the holder to 276 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. withdraw the deposite on payment of a moderate fee for the expense and hazard of safe-keeping. These certificates became, in fact, the circulating medium of the community, performing, as it were, the hazard and drudgery, while the pre- cious metals, which they, in truth, represented, guilder for guilder, lay quietly in store, without being exposed to the wear and tear, or losses incidental to actual use. It was thus a paper currency was created, having all the solidity, safety, and unilbrmity of a metallic, with the facility belonging to that of paper. The whole arrangement was admirable, and worthy of the strong sense and down- right honesty of the people with whom it originated. Out of this, which may be called the first era of the system, grew the bank of deposite, discount, and circulation — a great and mighty change, destined to ef- fect a revolution in the condition of modern society. It is not difficult to explain how the one system should spring from the other, notwithstanding the striking dissimilarity in features and claaracter between the oflfspring and the parent. A vast sum, not less than three millions sterling, accumulated and remained habit- ually in deposite in the Bank of Amsterdam, the place of the returned certifi- cates being constantly supplied by new depositors. With so vast a standing deposite, it required but little reflection to perceive that a very large portion of it might be withdrawn, and that a sufficient amount would be still left to meet the returning certificates ; or, what would be the same in efiect, that an equal amount of fictitious certificates might be issued beyond the sum actually depos- ited. Either process, if interest be charged on the deposites withdrawn, or the fictitious certificates issued, would be a near approach to a bank of discount. This once seen, it required but little reflection to perceive that the same pro- cess would be equally applicable to a capital placed in bank as stock ; and from that the transition was easy to issuing bank-notes payable on demand, on bills of exchange, or promissory notes, having but a short time to run. These, com- bined, constitute the elements of a bank of disccxmt, deposite, and circulation. Modern ingenuity and dishonesty would not have been long in perceiving and turning such advantages to account ; but the faculties of the plain Belgian was either too blunt to perceive, or his honesty too stern to avail himself of them. To his honour, there is reason to believe, notwithstanding the temptation, the deposites were sacredly kept, and that for every certificate in circulation, there was a corresponding amount in bullion or coin in store. It was reserved for another people, either more ingenious oi less scrupulous, to make the change. The Bank of England was incorporated in 1694, eighty-five years after that of Amsterdam, and was the first bank of deposite, discount, and circulation. Its capital was £1,200,000, consisting wholly of government stock, bearing an interest of eight per cent, per annum. Its notes were received in the dues of the government, and the public revenue was deposited in the bank. It was au- thorized to circulate exchequer bills, and make loans to government. Let us pause for a moment, and contemplate this complex and potent machine, under its various character and functions. As a bank of deposite, it was authorized to receive deposites, not simply for safe-keeping, to be returned when demanded by the depositor, but to be used and loaned out for the benefit of the institution, care being taken always to be provided with the means of returning an equal amount, when demanded. As a bank of discount and circulation, it issued its notes on the faith of its capital stock and deposites, or discounted bills of exchange and promissory notes back- ed by responsible endorsers, charging an interest something greater than was authorized by law to be charged on loans ; and thus allowing it, for the use of its credit, a higher rate of compensation than what individuals were authorized to receive for the use and hazard of money or capital loaned out. It will, per- haps, place this point in a clear light, if we should consider the transaction in its true character, not as a loan, but as a mere exchange of credit. In discount- ing, the bank takes, in the shape of a promissory note, the credit of an indi- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 277 vidual so good that another, equally responsible, endorses his note for nothing, and gives out its credit in the form of a bank-note. The transaction is obvious- ly a mere exchange of credit. If the drawer and endorser break, thd loss is the Bank's ; but if the Bank breaks, the loss falls on the commiuiity ; and yet this transaction, so dissimilar, is confounded with a loan, and the bank per- mitted to charge, on a mere exchange of credit, in which the hazard of the breaking of the drawer and endorser is incurred by the Bank, and that of the Bank by the community, a higher sum than the legal rate of interest on a loan ; in which, besides the use of his capital, the hazard is all on the side of the lender. Turning from these to the advantages which it derived from its connexion with the government, we shall find them not less striking. Among the first of these in importance is the fact of its notes being received in the dues of the government, by which the credit of the government was added to that of the Bank, which added so greatly to the increase of its circulation. These, again, when collected by the government, Avere placed in deposiie in the Bank ; thus oiving to it not only the profit resulting from their abstraction from circulation, from the time of collection till disbursement, but also that from the use of the public deposites in the interval. To complete the picture, the Bank, in its ca- pacity of lender to the government, in fact paid its own notes, which rested cm the faith of the government slock, on which it was drawing eight per cent. ; so that, in truth, it but loaned to the government its own credit. Such were the extraordinary advantages conferred on this institution, and of which it had an exclusive monopoly ; and these are the causes which gave such an extraordinary impulse to its growth and influence, that it increased in a lit- tle more than a hundred years — from 1694, when the second era of the sys- tem commenced, with the establishment of the Bank of England, to 1797, when it terminated — from .£1,200,000 to nearly £11,000,000, and this mainly by the addition to its capital through loans to the government above the profits of its annual dividends. Before entering on the third era of the system, I pause to make a few reflections on the second. I am struck, in casting my eyes over it, to find that, notwithstanding the great dissimilarity of features which the system had assumed in passing from a mere bank of deposite to that of deposite, discount, and circulation, the operation of the latter was confounded, throughout this long period, as it regards the effects on the currency, with the bank of deposite. Its notes were universally regard- ed as representing gold and silver, and as depending on that representation ex- clusively for their circulation ; as much so as did the certificates of deposite in the original Bank of Amsterdam. No one supposed that they could retain their credit for a moment after they ceased to be convertible into the metals on de- mand ; nor were they supposed to have the effect of increasing the aggregate amount of the currency ; nor, of course, of increasing prices. In a word, they were in the public mind as completely identified with the metallic currency as if every note in circulation had laid up in the vaults of the Bank an equal amount, pound for pound, into which all its paper could be converted the moment it was presented. All this was a great delusion. The issues of the Bank never did represent, from the fvrst, the precious metals. Instead of the representatives, its notes were, in reality, the subslilute for coin. Instead of being the mere drudges, performing all the out-door service, while the coins reposed at their ease in the vaults of the banks, free from wear and tear, and the hazard of loss or destruc- tion, as did the certificates of deposite in the original Bank of Amsterdam, they substituted, degraded, and banished the coins. Every note circulated became the substitute of so much coin, and dispensed with it in circulation, and thereby depreciated the value of the precious metals, and increased their consumption in the same proportion ; while it diminished in the same degree the supply, by 278 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. rendering mining less profitable. The system assumed gold and silv^er as the basis of its circulation ; and yet, by the laws of its nature, just as it increased its circulation, in the same degree the foundation on which the system stood was weakened. The consumption of the metals increased, and the supply di- minished. As the weight of the superstructure increased, just in the same pro- portion its foundation was undermined and weakened. Thus the germe of de- struction was implanted in the system at its birth ; has expanded with its growth, and must terminate, finally, in its dissolution, unless, indeed, it should, by some transition, entirely change its nature, and pass into some other and entirely dif- ferent organic form. The conflict between bank circulation and metallic (though not perceived in the first stage of the system, when they were supposed to be indissoliibly connected) is mortal ; one or the other must perish in the struggle. Such is the decree of fate : it is irreversible. Near the close of the second era, the system passed the Atlantic, and took loot in our country, where it found the soil still more fertile, a«d the climate more congenial than even in the parent country. The Bank of North America was established in 1781, with a capital of $400,000, and bearing all the fea- tures of its prototype, the Bank of England. In the short space of a little more than half a centuiy, the system has expanded from one bank to about eight hun- dred, including branches (no one knows the exact number, so rapid the increase). and from a capital of less than half a million to about $300,000,000, without, apparently, exhausting or diminishing its capacity to increase. So accelerated has been its growth with us, from causes which I explained on a former occa- sion,* that already it has approached a point much nearer the lirAits beyond which the system, in its present form, cannot advance, than in England. During the year 1797, the Bank of England suspended specie payments : an event destined, by its consequences, to effect a revolution in public opinion in re- lation to the system, and to accelerate the period which must determine its fate. England was then engaged in that gigantic struggle which originated in the French Revolution, and her financial operations were on the most extended scale, followed by a corresponding increase in the action of the Bank, as her fiscal agent. It sunk under its over-action. Specie payments were suspended. Panic and dismay spread through the land — so deep and durable was the im- pression thatthe credit of the Bank depended exclusively on the punctuality of its payments. In the midst of the alarm, an act of Parliament was passed making the notes of the Bank a legal tender ; and, to the surprise of all, the institution proceeded on, apparently without any diminution of its credit. Its notes circulated freely as ever, and without any depreciation, for a time, compared with gold and silver ; and continued so to do for upward of twenty years, with an average diminution of about one per cent, per annum. This shock did much to dispel the delusion that bank-notes represented gold and silver, and that they circulated in conse- quence of such representation, but without entirely obliterating the old impres- sion which had taken such strong hold on the public mind. The credit of its notes during the suspension was generally attributed to the tender act, and the great and united resources of the Bank and the government. But an event followed of the same kind, under circumstances entirely differ- ent, which did more than any preceding to shed light on the true nature of the system, and to unfold its vast capacity to sustain itself without exterior aid. We finally became involved in the mighty struggle that had so long desolated Europe and enriched our country. War was declared against Great Britain in 1812, and in the short space of one year our feeble banking system sunk un- der the increased fiscal action of government. I was then a member of the other house, and had taken my full share of responsibility in the measures which * See Speech on Mr. Webster's motion to renew the charter of the United States Bank in 1834 I SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 279 had led to that result. 1 shall never forget the sensation which the suspension, and the certain anticipation of the prostration of the currency of the country, as a consequence, excited in my mind. We could resort to no tendor act ; we had no great central regulating power, like the Bank of England ; and the credit and resources of the government were comparatively small. Under such circum- stances, I looked forward to a sudden and great depreciation of hank-notes, and that they would fall speedily as low as the old continental money. Guess ray surprise when I saw them sustain their credit, with scarcely any depreciation, for a time, from the shock. I distinctly recollect Avhen I first asked myself the question, What was the cause ? and which directed my inquiry into the extraordi- nary phenomenon. I soon saw that the system contained witiiin itself a self-sus- taining power ; that there was between the banks and the community, mutually, the relation of debtor and creditor, there being at all times something more due to the banks from the community than from the latter to the former. I saw, in this reciprocal relation of debts and credits, that the demand of the banks on the com- munity was greater than the amount of their notes in circulation could meet ; and that, consequently, so long as their debtors were solvent, and bound to pay at short periods, their notes could not fail to be at or near a par with gold and sil- ver. I also saw that, as their debtors were principally the merchants, the}'' ■would take bank-notes to meet their bank debts, and that that which the mer- chant and the government, who are the great money-dealers, take, the rest of the comm-unity would also take. Seeing all this, I clearly perceived that self- sustaining principle which poised the system, self-balanced, like some celestial body, moving with scarcely a perceptible deviation from its path, from the con- cussion it had received. Shortly after the termination of the war, specie payments were coerced with us by the establishment of a National Bank, and a few years afterward, in Great Britain, by an act of Parliament. In both countries the restoration was follow- ed by wide-spread distress, as it always must be when effected by coercion ; for the simple reason that banks cannot pay unless their debtors first pay, and that to coerce the banks compels them to coerce their debtors before they have the means to pay. Their failure must be the consequence ; and thit involves the failure of the banks themselves, carrying with it universal distress. Hence I am opposed to all kinds of coercion, and am in favour of leaving the disease to time, with the action of public sentiment and the states, to which the banks are al'one responsible. But to proceed with my narrative. Although specie payments were restored, and the system apparently placed where it was before the suspension, the great capacity it proved to possess of sustaining itself without specie payments, was not forgot by those who had its direction. The impression that it was indispen- sable to the circulation of bank-notes that they should represent the precious metals, was almost obliterated ; and the latter were regarded rather as restrictions on the free and profitable operation of the system than as the means of its security. Hence a feeling of opposition to gold and silver gradually grew up on the part of the banks, which created an esprit du corps, followed by a moral resistance to specie payments, if I may so express myself, which in fact suspended, in a great degree, the conversion of their notes into the precious metals, long before the present suspension. With the growth of this feeUng, banking business as- sumed a bolder character, and its profits were proportionably enlarged, and with it the tendency of the system to increase kept pace. The effect of this soon displayed itself in a striking manner, which was followed by very important con- sequences, which I shall next explain. It so happened that the charters of the Bank of England and the late Bank of the United States expired about the same time. As the period approached, a feeling of hostility, growing out of the causes just explained, which had ex- cited a strong desire in the community, who could not participate in the profits 280 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. of these two great monopolies, to throw off their restraint, began to disclose it- self against both institutions. In Great Britain it terminated in breaking down the exclusive monopoly of the Bank of England, and narrowing greatly the spe- cie basis of the system, by making the notes of the Bank of England a legal tender in all cases, except between it and its creditors. A sudden and vast in- crease of the system, with a great diminution of the metallic basis in proportioa to banking transactions, followed, which has shocked and weakened the stabil- ity of the system there. With us the result was different. The Bank fell un- der the hostility of the government. All restraint on the system was removed, and banks shot up in every direction almost instantly, under the growing im- pulse which I have explained, and which, with the causes I stated when I first addressed the Senate on this question, is the cause of the present catastrophe. With it commences the fourth era of the system, which we have just entered — an era of struggle, and conflict, and changes. The .system can advance no farther in our country, without great and radical changes. It has come to a stand. The conflict between metallic and bank currency, which I have showa to be inherent in the system, has, in the course of time, and with the progress of events, become so deadly that they must separate, and one or the other fall. The degradation of the value of the metals, and their almost entire expulsiou from th'eir appropriate sphere as the medium of exchange and the standard of value, have gone so far, under the necessary operation of the system, that they are no longer sufficient to form the basis of the widely-extended system of bank- ing. From the first, the gravitation of the system has been*m one direction — to dispense with the use of the metals ; and hence the descent from a bank of de- posite to one of discount ; and hence, from being the representative, their notes have become the substitute for gold and silver ; and hence, finally, its present tendency to a mere paper engine, totally separated from the metals. One law has steadily governed the system throughout — the enlargement of its profits and influence ; and, as a consequence, as metallic currency became insufficient for circulation, it has become, in its progress, insufficient for the basis of banking operations ; so much so, that, if specie payments were restored, it would be but nominafc, and the system would in a few years, on the first adverse current, sink down again into its present helpless condition. Nothing can prevent it but great and radical changes, which would diminish its profits and inffuence, so as effectually to arrest that strong and deep current which has carried so much of the. wealth and capital of the community in that direction. Without that, the system, as now constituted, must fall ; unless, indeed, it can form an alliance with the government, and through it establish its authority by law, and make its credit, unconnected with gold and silver, the medium of circulation. If the al- liance should take place, one of the first movements would be the establishment of a great central institution ; or, if that should prove impracticable, a combina- tion of a few selected and powerful state banks, which, sustained by the govern- ment, would crush or subject the weaker, to be followed by an amendment of the Constitution, or some other device, to limit their number and the amount of their capital hereafter. This done, the next step would be to confine and con- solidate the supremacy of the system over the currency of the country, Avhich ■would be in its hands exclusively, and, through it, over the industry, business, and politics of the country ; all of which would be wielded to advance its prof- its and power. The system having now arrived at this point, the great and solemn duty de- volves on us to determine this day what relation this government shall hereafter bear to it. Shall we enter into an alliance with it, and become the sharers of its fortune and the instrument of its aggrandizement and supremacy ? This is the momentous question on which we must now decide. Before we decidcyit behooves us to inquire whether the system is favourable to the permanency of our free Republican institutions, to the industry and business of the country, and, SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 2S1 above all, to our moral and intellectual development, the great object for which we were placed here by the Author of our being. Can it be doubted what must be the efiects of a system whoso operations have been shown to be so unequal on free institutions, whose foundation rests on an equality ^)f rights ? Can that favour equality which gives to one portion of the citizens and the country such decided advantages over the other, as I have showa it does in my opening remarks ? Can that be favourable to liberty which t^)n- centrates the money power, and places it under the control of a few powerful and wealthy individuals ? It is the remark of a profound statesman, that the revenue is the state ; and, of course, those who control the revenue control the state ; and those who can control the money power can control the revenue, and through it the state, with the property and industry of the country, in all its ramifications. Let us pause for a moment, and reflect on the nature and extent of this tremendous power. The currency of a country is to the community what the blood is to the hu- man system. It constitutes a small part, but it circulates through every portion, and is indispensable to all the functions of life. The currency bears even a smaller proportion to the aggregate capital of the community than what the blood, does to the solids in the human system. What that proportion is, has not been, and perhaps cannot be, accurately ascertained, as it is probably subject to con- siderable variations. It is, however, probably between twenty-five and thirty-five to one. I will assume it to be thirty to one. With this assumption, let us sup>- pose a community whose aggregate capital is $31,000,000 ; its currency would be, by supposition, one million, and the residue of its capital thirty millions. This being assumed, if the currency be increased or decreased, the other portion of the capital remaining the same, according to the well-known laws of currency, property would rise or fall with the increase or decrease ; that is, if the cur- rency be increased to two millions, the aggregate value of property would rise to sixty millions ; and, if the currency be reduced to $500,000, it would be re- duced to fifteen millions. With this law so well established, place the money power in the hands of a single individual, or a combination of individuals, and they, by expanding or contracting the currency, may raise or sink prices at pleasure ; and by purchasing when at the greatest depression, and selling at the greatest elevation, may command the whole property and industry of the community, and control its fiscal operations. The banking system concentrates and places this power in the hands of those who control it, and its force in- creases just in proportion as it dispenses with a metallic basis. Never was aa engine invented better calculated to place the destiny of the many in the hands of the few, or less favourable to that equality and independence which lies at the bottom of our free institutions. ' These views have a bearing not less decisive on the next inquiry — the effects of the system on the industry and wealth of the country. Whatever may have been its effects in this respect in its early stages, it is difilcult to imagine any- thing more mischievous on all of the pursuits of life than the frequent and sud- den expansions and contractions, to which it has now become so habitually sub- ject that it may be considered its ordinary condition. None but those in the secret know what to do. All are pausing and looking out to ascertain whether an expansion or contraction is next to follow, and what will be its extent and duration ; and if, perchance, an error be committed — if it expands when a con- traction is expected, or the reverse — the most prudent may lose by the miscalcu- lation the fruits of a life of toil and care. The consequence is, to discourage industry, and to convert the whole community into stock-jobbers and speculators. The evil is constantly on the increase, and must continue to increase just as the banking system becomes more diseased, till it shall become utterly intolerable. But its most fatal effects originate in its bearing on the moral and intellectual development of the community. The great principle of demand and supply gov- N N 282 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ems the moral and intellectual world no less than the business and commercial. If a community be so constituted as to cause a demand for high mental at- tainments, or if its honours and rewards are allotted to pursuits that require their development, by creating a demand for intelligence, knowledge, wisdom, justice, firmness, courage, patriotism, and the like, they are sure to be -produced. But if, on the contraiy, they be allotted to pursuits that require inferior qualities, the higher are sure to decay and perish. I object to' the banking system, be- cause it allots the honours and rewards of the community, in a very undue pro- ^ portion, to a pursuit the least of all favourable to the development of the higher mental qualities, intellectual or moral, to the decay of the learned professions, and the more noble pursuits of sciene, literature, philosophy, and statesmanship,' and the great and more useful pursuits of business and industry. With the vast increase of its profits and influence, it is gradually concentrating in itself most of the prizes of life — wealth, honour, and influence, to the great disparagement and degradation of all the liberal, and useful, and generous pursuits of society. The rising generation cannot but feel its deadening influence. The youths ■who crowd our colleges, and behold the road to honour and distinction termina- ting in a banking-house, will feel the spirit of emulation decay within them, and will no longer be pressed forward by generous ardour to mount up the rugoed steep of science as the road to honour and distinction; when, perhaps, the high- est point they could attain, in what was once the most honourable and influential of all the learned professions, would be the place of attorney to a bank. Nearly four years since, on the question of the removal of the deposites, although I was opposed to the removal, and in favour of their restoration, be- cause I believed it to be illegal, yet, foreseeing what was coming, and not ■wishing there should be any mistake as to my opinion on the banking system, I stated here in my place what that opinion was. I declared that I had long entertained doubts, if doubts they might be called, which were daily increasing, that the system made the worst possible distribution of the wealth of the com- munity, and that it would ultimately be found hostile to the farther advancement of civilization and liberty. This declaration was not lightly made : and I have now unfolded the grounds on which it rested, and Avhich subsequent events and reflection have matured into a settled conviction. With all these consequences before us, shall we restore the broken connex- ion 1 Shall we again unite the government with the system ? And what are the arguments opposed to these high and weighty objections ? Instead of meet- ing them and denying their truth, or opposing others of equal weight, a rabble of objections (I can call them by no better name) are urged against the separa- tion : one currency for the government, and another for the people ; separation of the pfiople from the government ; taking care of the government, and not the people ; and a whole fraternity of others of like character. When I first saw them advanced in the columns of a newspaper, I could not but smile, in thinking how admirably they were suited to an electioneering canvass. They have a certain plausibility about them, which makes them troublesome to an opponent simply because they are merely plausible, without containing one particle of reason. I little expected to meet them in discussion in this place ; but since they have been gravely introduced here, respect for the place and company ex- acts a passing notice, to which, of themselves, they are not at all entitled. I begin with that which is first pushed forward, and seems to be most relied on— one currency for the government and another for the people. Is it meant that the government must take in payment of its debts whatever the people take in payment of theirs ? If so, it is a very broad proposition, and would lead to important consequences. The people now receive the notes of non-specie- paying banks. Is it meant that the government should also receive them! They receive in change all sorts of paper, issued by we know not whom. Mu^t the government also receive them "? They receive the notes of banks SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 283 issuing notes under five, ten, and twenty dollars. Is it intended that the gov- ernment shall also permanently receive them ? They receive bills of exchange. Shall government, too, receive them ? If not, I ask the reason. Is it because they are not suitable for a sound, stable, and uniform currency ? The reason is good ; but what becomes of the principle, that the government ought to take ■whatever the people take ? But I go farther. It is the duty of government to receive nothing in its dues that it has not the right to render uniform and stable in its value. We are, by the Constitution, made the guardian of the money of the country. For this the right of coining and regulating the value of coins was given, and we have no right whatever to receive or treat anything as money, or the equivalent of money, the value of which we have no right to regulate. If this principle be true, and it cannot be controverted, I ask, What risht has Congress to receive and treat the notes of the state banks as monev 1 If the states have the right to incorporate banks, what right has Congress to regulate them or their issues ? Show me the power in the Constitution. If the right be admitted, what are its limitations, and how can the right of subject- ing them to a bankrupt law in that case be denied ? If one be admitted, the other follows as a consequence ; and yet those who are most indignant against the proposition of subjecting the state banks to a bankrupt law, are the most clamorous to receive their notes, not seeing that the one power involves the other. I am equally opposed to both, as unconstitutional and inexpedient. We are next told, to separate from the banks is to separate from the people. The banks, then, are the people, and the people the banks — united, identified, and in- separable ; and as the government belongs to the people, it follows, of course, according to this argument, it belongs also to the banks, and, of course, is bound to do their biddings. I feel on so grave a subject, and in so grave a body, an almost invincible repugnance in replying to such arguments ; and I shall hasten over the only remaining one of the fraternity which I shall condescend to notice with all possible despatch. They have no right of admission here, and, if I •were disposed to jest on so solemn an occasion, I should say they ought to be driven from this chamber, under the 47th rule.*TI The next of these formidable objections to the separation from the banks is, that the government, in so doing, takes care of itself, and not of the people. Why, I had supposed that the gov- ernment belonged to the people ; that it was created by them for their own use, to promote their interest, and secure their peace and liberty ; that, iu taking care of itself, it takes the most effectual care of the people ; and in refusing all em- barrassing, entangling, and dangerous alliances with corporations of any de- scription, it was but obeying the great law of self-preservation. But enough ; I cannot any longer waste yvords on such objections. I intend no disrespect to those who have urged them ; yet these, and arguments like these, are mainly relied on to countervail the many and formidable objections, drawn from the highest considerations that can influence the action of governments or individu- als, none of which have been refuted, and many not even denied. The senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) urged an argument of a verj different character, but which, in my opinion, he entirely failed to establish. He asserted that the ground assumed on this side was an entire abandonment of a great constitutional function conferred by the Constitution on Congress. To establish this, he laid down the proposition, that Congress was bound to take care of the money of the country. Agreed ; and with this view the Constitu- tion confers on us the right of coining and regulating the value of coins, in or- der to supply the country with money of proper standard and value ; and is it an abandonment of this right to take care, as this bill does, that it shall not be expelled from circulation, as far as the fiscal action of this government extends ? But having taken this unquestionable position, the senator passed (by what * It is the rule regulating the admission of persons in the lobby of the Senate. -y^, t^\N-H 284 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. means he did not condescend to explain) from taking care of the money of the country to the right of estabHshing a currency, and then to the right of estab- lishing a bank currency, as I understood him. On both of these points I leave him in the hands of the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), who, in an able and constitutional argument, completely demolished, in my judgment, the position assumed by the senator from Massachusetts. I rejoice to hear such an argument from such a quarter. The return of the great State of Pennsyl- vania to the doctrines of rigid construction and state rights sheds a ray of liorht on the thick darkness which has long surrounded us. But we are told that there is not gold and silver enough to fill the channels of circulation, and that prices would fall. Be it so. What is that, compared to the dangers which menace on the opposite side ? But are we so certain that there is not a sufficiency of the precious metals for the purpose of circulation ? Look at France, with her abundant supply, with her channels of circulation full to overflowing with coins, and her flourishing industry. It is true that our sup- ply is insufficient at present. How covfld it be otherwise 1 The banking sys- tem has degraded and expelled the metals — driven them to foreign lands — • closed the mines, and converted their products into costly vases, and splendid utensils and ornaments, administering to the pride and luxury of the opulent, in- stead of being employed as the standard of value, and the instrument of making- exchanges, as they were manifestly intended mainly to be by an all-wise Provi- dence. Restore them to their proper functions, and they will return from their banishment ; the mines will again be opened, and the gorgeous splendour of wealth Avill again reassume the more humble, but useful, form of coins. But, Mr. President, I am not driven to such alternatives. I am not the ene- my, but the friend of credit — not as the substitute, but the associate and the as- sistant of the metals. In that capacity, I hold credit to possess, in many re- spects, a vast superiority over the metals themselves. I object to it in the form which it has assumed in the banking system, for reasons that are neither light nor few, and that neither have nor can be answered. The question is not whether credit can be dispensed with, but what is its best possible form — the most stable, the least liable to abuse, and the most convenient and cheap. I threw out some ideas on this important subject in my opening remarks. I have heard nothing to change my opinion. I believe that government credit, in the form I suggested, combines all the requisite qualities of a credit circulation in the highest degree, and also that government ought not to use any other credit but its own in its financial operations. When the senator from Massachusetts made his attack on my suggestions, I was disappointed. I expected argument, and he gave us denunciation. It is often easy to denounce, when it is hard to refute ; and when that senator gives denunciations instead of arguments, I con- clude that it is because the one is at his command, and the other not. We are told the form I suggested is but a repetition of the old Continental money — a ghost that is ever conjured up by all who wish to give the banks an exclusive monopoly of government credit. The assertion is not true : there is not the least analogy between them. The one was a promise to pay when there was no revenue, and the other a promise to receive in the dues of gov- ernment when there is an abundant revenue. , We are also told that there is no instance of a government paper that did not depreciate. In reply, I affirm that there is none, assuming the form I pro- pose, that ever did depreciate. Whenever a paper receivable in the dues of government had anything like a fair trial, it has succeeded. Instance the case of North Carolina, referred to in my opening remarks. The draughts of the treas- ury at this moment, with all their encumbrance, are nearly at par with gold and silver ; and I might add the instance alluded to by the distinguished sena- tor from Kentucky, in which he admits that, as soon as the excess of the issues of the Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky were reduced to the proper point, its SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 285 notes rose to par. The case of Russia might also be mentioned. In 1827, she had a fixed paper circulation, in the form of bank-notes, but which were incon- vertible, of upward of $130,000,000, estimated in the metallic ruble, and which had for years remained without fluctuation, having nothing to sustain it but that it was received in the dues of the government, and that, too, with a revenue of only about $90,000,000 annually. I speak on the authority of a respectable traveller. Other instances, no doubt, might be added, but it needs no such support. How can a paper depreciate which the government is bound to re- ceive in all its payments, and while those to whom payments are to be made are under no obligation to receive it 1 From its nature, it can only circulate when at par with gold and silver ; and if it should depreciate, none could be in- jured but the government. But my colleague objects that it would partake of the increase and decrease of the revenue, and wOuld be subject to greater expansions and contractions than bank-notes themselves. He assumes that government would increase the amount with the increase of the revenue, which is not probable, for the aid of its credit would be then less needed ; but if it did, what would be the effect? On the decrease of the revenue, its bills would be returned to the treasury, from which, for the want of demand, they could not be reissued ; and the excess, * instead of hanging on the circulation, as in the case of bank-notes, and expo- sing it to catastrophes like the present, would be gradually and silently with- drawn, without shock or injury to any one. It has another and striking advan- tage over bank circulation — in its superior cheapness, as well as greater stabili- ty and safety. Bank paper is cheap to those who make it, but dear, very dear, to those who use it — fully as much so as gold and silver. It is the little cost of its manufacture, and the dear rates at which it is furnished to the communi- ty, which give the great profit to those who have a monopoly of the article. Some idea may be formed of the extent of the profit by the splendid palaces "which we see under the name of banking-houses, and the vast fortunes which have been accumulated in this branch of business ; all of which must ultimate- ly be derived from the productive powers of the community, and, of course, adds so much to the cost of production. On the other hand, the credit of govern- ment, while it would greatly facilitate its financial operations, would cost no- thing, or next to nothing, both to it and the people, and, of course, would add nothing to the cost of production, which would give every branch of our indus- try, agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, as far as its circulation might ex- tend, great advantages, both at home and abroad. But there remains another and great advantage. In the event of war, it would open almost unbounded resources to carry it on, without the necessity of resorting to what I am almost disposed to call a fraud — public loans. I have already shown that the loans of the Bank of England to the government were very little more than loaning back to the government its own credit ; and this is more or less true of all loans, where the banking system prevails. It was pre-eminently so in our late war. The circulation of the government credit, in the shape of bills receivable exclusively with gold and silver in its dues, and the sales of public lands, would dispense with the necessity of loans, by in- creasing its bills with the increase of taxes. The increase of taxes, and, o^ course, of revenue and expenditures, would be followed by an increased de- mand for government bills, while the latter would furnish the means of paying the taxes, without increasing, in the same degree, the pressure on the commu- nity. This, with a judicious system of funding, at a low rate of interest, would go far to exempt the government from the necessity of contracting public loans in the event of war. I am not, Mr. President, ignorant, in making these suggestions (I wish them to be considered only in that light), to what violent opposition every measure of the kind must be exposed. Banks have been so long in the possession of gov- 286 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. eminent credit, that they very naturally conclude they have an exclusive ri^ht to it, and consider the withdrawal of it, even for the use of the government it- self, as a positive injury. It was my fortune to take a stand on the side of the government against the banks during the most trying period of the late war — the winter of 1814 and 1815 — and never in my life was I exposed to more cal- umny and abuse — no, not e^en on this occasion. It was my first lesson on the subject. I shall never forget it. I propose to give a very brief narrative of the scenes through which I then passed ; not with any feeling of egotism, for I trust I am incapable of that, but to illustrate the truth of much I have said, and to snatch from oblivion not an unimportant portion of our financial history. I see the senators from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) and of Alabama (Mr. King), who were then members of the House of Representatives, in their places, and they can vouch for the correctness of my narrative, as far as the memory of transactions so long passed will serve. The finances of the country had, at that time, fallen into great confusion. Mr. Campbell had retired from the head of the treasury, and the late Mr. Dal- las had succeeded — a m.an of talents, bold and decisive, but inexperienced in the afi'airs of the department. His first measure to restore order, and to furnish !he supplies to carry on the war, was to recommend a bank of $50,000,000, to be constituted almost exclusively of the new stocks which had been issued du- ring the war, to the exclusion of the old, which had been issued before. The proposed bank was authorized to make loans to the government, and was not bound to pay specie during the war, and for three years after its termination. It so happened that I did not arrive here till some time after the commence- ment of the session, having been detained by an attack of bilious fever. I had taken a prominent part in the declaration of the war, and had every motive and disposition to sustain the administration, and to vote every aid to carry on the war. Immediately after my arrival, I had a full conversation with Mr. Dallas, at his request. I entertained very kind feelings towards him, and assured him, after he had explained his plan, that I would give it my early and favourable attention. At that time I had reflected but little on the subject of banking. Many of my political friends expressed a desire that I should take a prominent part in favour of the proposed bank. Their extreme anxiety aroused my attention, and, being on no committee (they had been ap- pointed before my arrival), I took up the subject for a full investigation, with every disposition to give it my support. I had not proceeded far before I was struck with the extraordinary character of the project : a bank of $50,000,000, whose capital was to consist almost exclusively of government credit in the shape of stock, and not bound to pay its debts during the war, and for three years afterward, to furnish the government with loans to carry on the war ! I saw at once that the effect of the arrangement would be, that government would borrow back its own credit, and pay six per cent, per annum for what they had already paid eight or nine. It was impossible for me to give it my support under any pressure, however great. I felt the difficulty of my situation, not only in opposing the leading measure of the administration at such a crisis, but, what was far more responsible, to suggest one of my own, that would afford reiief to the embarrassed treasury. I cast my eyes around, and soon saw that the government should use its own credit directly, without the intervention of a bank ; which I proposed to do in the form of treasury notes, to be issued in the operations of the government, and to be funded in the subscription to the stock of the bank. Treasury notes were, at that time, below par, even with bank paper. The opposition to them was so great on the part of the banks, that they refused to receive them on deposite, or payment, at par with their notes ; while the government, on its part, received and paid away notes of the banks at par with its own. Such was the influence of the banks, and to such degradation did the government, in its weakness, submit. All this influence I had to en- SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALHOUN. 287 counter, with the entire weight of the administration thrown into the same scale. I hesitated not. I saw the path of duly clearly, and determined to tread it, as sharp and rugged as it was. When the bill came up, I moved my amendment, the main features of which were, that, instead of government stock already is- sued, the capital of the bank should consist of funded treasury notes ; and that, instead of a mere paper machine, it should be a specie-paying bank, so as to be an ally instead of an opponent, in restoring the currency to a sound condition on the return of peace. These were, with me, indispensable conditions. I accompanied my amendment with a short speech of fifteen or twenty minutes, and so overpowering was the force of truth, that, notwithstanding the influence of the administration, backed by the money power, and the Committee of Ways and Means, which was vmanimous, with one exception, as I understood, my amendment prevailed by a large majority ; but it, in turn, failed — the opposition, the adherents of the administration, and those who had constitutional scruples, combining against it. Then followed various, but unsuccessful, attempts to charter a bank. One was vetoed by the President, and another was lost by the casting vote of the speaker (Mr. Cheves). After a large portion of the session was thus unsuccessfully consumed, a caucus was called, in order to agree on some plan, to which I, and the few friends who still adhered to me after such hard service, were especially invited. We, of course, attended. The plan of compromise was unfolded, which approached much nearer to our views, but which was still objectionable in some features. I' objected, and required far- ther concessions, which were refused, and was told the bill could be pass- ed without us ; at which I took up my hat and bade good-night. The bill was introduced in the Senate, and speedily passed that body. On the second read- ing, I rose and made a few remarks, in which I entreated the house to remem- ber that they were about to vote for the measure against their conviction, as had been frequently expressed ; and that, in so doing, they acted under a suppo- sed necessity, which had been created by those who expected to profit by the measure. I then reminded them of the danger of acting under such pressure ; and I said that they were so sensible of the truth of what I uttered, that, if peace should arrive before the passage of the bill, it would not receive the support of fifteen members. 1 concluded by saying that I would reserv-e what I intended to say on the question of the passage of the bill, when I would express my opinion at length, and appeal to the country. My objections, as yet, had not gone to the people, as nothing that I had said had been reported — such was my solicitude to defeat the bill without extending our divisions beyond the walls of the house, in the then critical condition of the country. My object was to ar- rest the measure, and not to weaken confidence in the administration. In making the supposition, I had not the slightest anticipation of peace. England had been making extensive preparations for the ensuing campaign, and had made a vigorous attack on New-Orieans, but had just been repelled ; but, by a most remarkable coincidence, an opportunity (as strange as it may seem) was afforded to test the truth of what I said. Late in the evening of the day I met Mr. Sturges, then a member of Congress from Connecticut. He said that he had some information which he could not withhold from me ; that a. treaty of peace had been made ; and that it had actually arrived in New- York, and would be here the next day, so that I would have an opportunity of test- ing the truth of my prediction. He added, that his brother, who had a mercan- tile house in New- York, had forwarded the information to him by express, and that he had forwarded the information to connected houses in Southern cities, with direction to purchase the great staples in that quarter, and that he wished me to consider the information as confidential. I thanked him for the intelli- gence, and promised to keep it to myself. The rumour, however, got out, and the next day an attempt was made to pass through the bill ; but the house was unwilling to act till it could ascertain whether a treaty had been made. It ar- 288 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, rived in the course of the day, when, on my motion, it was laid on the table ; ajid I had the gratification of receiving the thanks of many for defeating the bill, who, a short time before, were ahiiost ready to cut my tliroat for my perseve- ring opposition to the measure. An offer was then made to me to come to my terms, which I refused, declaring that I would rise in my demand, and would agree to no bill which should not be formed expressly with the view to the speedy restoration of specie payments. It was afterward postponed, on the conviction that it could not be so modified as to make it acceptable to a major- ity. This was my first lessons on banks. It has made a durable impression on my mind. My colleague, in the course of his remarks, said he regarded this measure as a secret war waged against the banks. I am sure he could not intend to at- tribute such motives to me. I wage no war, secret or open, against the exist- ing institutions. They have been created by the legislation of the states, and are alone responsible to the states. I hold them not answerable for the present state of things, which has been brought about under the silent operation of time, without attracting notice or disclosing its danger. Whatever legal or constitu- tional rights they possess under their charters ought to be respected ; and, if attacked, I would defend them as resolutely as I now oppose the system. Against that I wage, not secret, but open and uncompromising hostilities, origi- nating not in opinions recently or hastily formed. I have long seen the true character of the system, its tendency and destiny, and have looked forward for many years, as many of my friends know, to the crisis in the midst of which we now are. My ardent wish has been to effect a gradual change in the bank- ing system, by which the crisis might be passed without a shock, if possible ; but I have been resolved for many years, that should it arrive in, my time, I would discharge my duty, however great the difficulty and danger. I have thus far faithfully performed it, according to the best of my abilities, and, with the blessing of God, shall persist, regardless of every obstacle, with equal fidelity, to the end. He who does not see that the credit system is on the eve of a great revolu- tion, has formed a very imperfect conception of the past and anticipation of the future. What changes it is destined to undergo, and what new form it will ulti- mately assume, are concealed in the womb of time, and not given us to foresee. But we may perceive in the present many of the elements of the existing sys- tem which must be expelled, and others which must enter it in its renewed form. In looking at the elements at work, I hold it certain, that in the process there will be a total and final separation of the credit of government and that of indi- viduals, which have been so long blended. The good of society, and the in- terests of both, imperiously demand it, and the growing intelligence of the age will enforce it. It is unfair, unjust, unequal, contrary to the spirit of free insti- tutions, and corrupting in its consequences. How far the credit of govern- ment may be used in a separate form, with safety and convenience, remains to be seen. To the extent of its fiscal action, limited strictly to the function of the collection and disbursement of its revenue, and in the form I have suggested, I am of the impression it may be both safely and conveniently used, and with great incidental advantages to the whole community. Beyond that limit I see no safety, and much danger. What form individual credit will assume after the separation, is still more un- certain, but I see clearly that the existing fetXers that restrain it will be thrown ■ off. The credit of an individual is his property, and belongs to him as much as his land and houses, to use it as he pleases, with the single restriction, which is imposed on all our rights, that it is not to be used so as to injure others. What limitations this restriction may prescribe, time and experience will show ; but, whatever they may be, they ought to assume the character of general laws, obligatory on all alike, and open to all ; and under the provisions SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 289 •of which all may be at liberty to use their credit, jointly or separately, as freely ■as they now use their land and houses, without any preference by special acts, in any form or shape, to one over another. Everything like monopoly must ul- timately disappear before the process which has begun will finally terminate. I see, not less clearly, that, in the process, a separation will take place be- tween the use of capital, and the iise of credit. They are wholly difi'crent, and, under the growing intelligence of the times, cannot much longer remain con- founded in their present state of combination. They are as distinct as a loan and an endorsement ; in fact, the one is but giving to another the use of our capital, and the other the use of our credit ; and yet, so dissimilar are they, that we daily see the most prudent individuals lending their credit for nothing, in the form of endorsement or security, who would not loan the most inconsider- able sum without interest. But as dissimilar as they are, they are completely confounded in banking operations, which is one of the main sources of the profit, and the consequent dangerous flow of capital in that direction. A bank discount, instead of a loan, is very little more, as I have shown, than a mere exchange of credit — an exchange of the joint credit of the drawer and endorser of the note discounted for the credit oi the bank in the shape of its own note. In the exchange, the bank ensures the parties to the note discounted, and the community, which is the loser if the bank fails, virtually ensures the bank ; and yet, by confounding this exchange of credit with the use of capital, the bank is permitted to charge an interest for this exchange, rather greater than an indi- vidual is permitted to charge for a loan, to the great gain of the bank and loss to the community. I say loss, for the community can never enjoy the great and full benefit of the credit system, till loans and credit are considered as entirely distinct in their nature, and the compensation for the use of each be adjusted to their respective nature and character. Nothing would give a greater impulse to all the business of society. The superior cheapness of credit would add in- calculably to the productive powers of the community, when the immense gains which are iiow made by confounding them shall come in aid of production. Whatever other changes the credit system is destined to undergo, these are t;ertain'!y some which it must ; but when, and how the revolution will end — •whetiier it is destined to be sudden and convulsive, or gradual and free from shock, time alone can disclose. Much will depend on the decision of the present question, and the course ivhich the advocates of the system will pursue. If the separation takes place, and is acquiesced in by those interested in the system, the prospect will be, that it will gradually and quietly run down, without shock or convulsions, which is my sincere prayer ; but if not — if the reverse shall be insisted on, and, above all, if it should be efl'ected through a great political struggle (it can only so be effected), the revolution would be violent and convul- sive. A great and thorough change must take place. It is wholly unavoida- ble. The public attention begins to be roused throughout the civilized world to this all-absorbing subject. There is nothing left to be controlled but the mode and manner, and it is better for all that it should be gradual and quiet than the reverse. All the rest is destiny. I have now, Mr. President, said what I intended, without reserve or disguise. In taking the stand I have, I change no relation, personal or political, nor alter any opinion I have heretofore expressed or entertained. I desire nothing from the government or the people. My only ambition is to do my duty, and shall follow wherever that may lead, regardless alike of attachments or antipathies, personal or political. I know full well the responsibility I have assumed. I see clearly the magnitude and the hazard of the crisis, and the danger of confiding the execution of measures in which I take so deep a responsibility, to those in whom I have no reason to have any special confidence. But all this deters me not, when I believe that the permanent interest of the country is involved. My course is fixed. I go forward. If the administration recommend what I ap- Oo 290 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. prove on this great question, 1 will cheerfully give my support ; if not, I shall oppose ; but, in opposing, I shall feel bound to suggest what I believe to be the proper measure, and which I shall be ready to back, be the responsibility what it may, looking only to the country, and not stopping to estimate whether the benefit shall inure either to the administration or the opposition. XX. SPEECH ON THE SUB-TREASURY BILL, FEBRUARY 15, 1838. I REGARD this measure, which has been so much denounced, as very little more than an attempt to carry out the provisions of the joint resolution of 1816, and the deposite act of 1836. The former provides that no notes but those of specie-paying banks shall be received in the dues of the government, and the latter that such banks only shall be the depositories of the public revenues and fiscal agents of the government ; but it omitted to make provisions for the con- tingency of a general suspension of specie payments, such as is the present. It followed, accordingly, on the suspension in May last, which totally separated the government and the banks, that the revenue was thrown in the hands of the executive, where it has since remained under ii^ exclusive control without any legal provision for its safe-keeping. The object of this bill is to supply this omission ; to take the public money out of the hands of the executive and place it under the custody of the laws, and to prevent the renewal of a connex- ion which has proved so unfortunate to both the government and the banks. But it is this measure, originating in an exigency caused by ou^ own acts and that seeks to make the most of a change effected by operation of law, instead of attempting to innovate, or to make another experiment, as has been errone- ously represented, which has been denounced under the name of the .sub-treas- ury with such unexampled bitterness. In lieu of this bill, an amendment has been offered, as a substitute, 'oy the senator from Virginia farthest from the chair (Mr. Rives), which, he informs us, is the first choice of himself and those who agree with him, and the second choice of those with whom he is allied on this question. If I may judge from appearances, which can hardly deceive, he might have said their first choice under existing circumstances ; and have added, that, despairing of a National Bank, the object of their preference, they have adopted his substitute, as the only practical alternative at present. We have, then, the question thus nar- rowed down to this bill and the proposed substitute : it is agreed on all sides, that one or the other must be selected, and that to adopt or reject the one is to reject or adopt the other. The single question, then, is, Which shall we choose ? A deeply momentous question, which we are now called on to decide in behalf of the states of this Union ; and on our decision their future destiny must in a great degree depend, so long as their Union endures. , In comparing the relative merits of the two measures, preparatory to a decis- ion, I shall touch very briefly on the principles and details of the bill. The former is well understood by the Senate and the country at large, and the latter has been so ably and lucidly explained by the chairman of the committee in his opening speech, as to supersede the necessity of farther remarks on them at this stage of the discussion. I propose, then, to limit myself to a mere general summary, accompanied by a few brief observations. The object of the bill, as I have already stated, is to take the public funds out of the hands of the executive, where they have been thrown by operation of our acts, and to place them under the custody of law ; and to provide for a gradual and slow, but a perpetual separation between the government and the banks. SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 291 It proposes to extend the process of separating to the year 1845, receiving du- ring the first year of the series the notes of such banks as may pay specie, and reducing thereafter the amount receivable in notes one sixth annually, till the separation shall be finally consummated at the period mentioned. The provisions of the bill are the most simple and effectual that an able com- jnittee could devise. Four principal receivers, a few clerks, and a sufficient number of agents to examine the state of the public funds, in order to see that all is right, at an annual charge not exceeding forty or fifty thousand dollars at most, constitute the additional officers and expenditures required to perform all the functions heretofore discharged by the banks, as depositories of the public jnoney and fiscal agents of the treasury. This simple apparatus will place ihe public treasury on an independent footing, and give to the government, at all times, a certain command of its funds to meet its engagements, and preserve its honour and faith inviolate. If it be desirable to separate from the banks, the government must have some independent agency of its own to keep and dis- burse the public revenue ; and if it must have such an agency, none, in my opinion, can be devised more simple, more economical, more eft'ectual and safe than that provided by this bill. It is the necessary result of the separation, and to reject it, without proposing a better (if, indeed, a better can be), is to reject the separation itself. I turn, now, to the substitute. Its object is directly the reverse of that of the bill. It proposes to revive the league of state banks, and to renew our connex- ion with them, and which all acknowledge has contributed so much to corrupt the community, and to create a spirit for speculation heretofore unexampled in our history. The senator, in offering it, whether wisely or not, has at least acted consistent- ly. He was its advocate at first in 1834, when the alternative was between it and the recharter of the late Bank of the United States. He then defended it zealous- ly and manfully against the fierce assaults of his present allies, as he now defends it, when those who then sustained him have abandoned the measure. Whether wisely or not, there is something heroic in his adherence, and I commend him for it ; but I fear I cannot say as much for his wisdom and discretion. He acknowl- edged, with all others, the disasters that have followed the first experiment, but attributes the failure to inauspicious circumstances, and insists that the measure has not had a fair trial. I grant that a second experiment may suc- ceed after the first has failed ; but the senator must concede, in return, that every failure must necessarily weaken confidence, both in the experiment and rhe experimenter. He cannot be more confident in making this second trial than he was in the first ; and, if I doubted the success then, and preferred the .sub-treasury to his league of banks, he must excuse me for still adhering to my opinion, and doubting the success of his second trial. Nor ought he to be sur- prised that those who joined him in the first should be rather shy of tryino- the experiment again, after having been blown into the air, and burned and scald- ed by the explosion. But, if the senator has been unfortunate in failing to se- cure the co-operation of those who aided him in the first trial, he has been com- pensated by securing the support of those who were then opposed to him. They are now his zealous supporters. In contrasting their course then and now, I intend nothing personal. I make no charge of inconsistency, nor do I intend to imply it. My object is truth, and not to wound the feelings of any- one or any party. I know that to make out a charge of inconsistency, not only the question, but all the material circumstances must be the same. A change in either may make a change of vote necessary ; and, with a material variation in circumstances, we are often compelled to vary our course, in order to pre- serve our principles. In this case, 1 conceive that circumstances, as far as the present allies of the senator are concerned, have materially changed. Then the option was between a recharter of the late Bank and a league of state banks 292 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOU>r. but jfiow the former is out of the question, and the option is between such a leacrue and a total separation from the banks. This being the ahernative, they may well take that which they rejected in 1834, without subjecting themselves to the charge of inconsistency, or justly exposing themselves to the imputation of change of principle or opinion. I acquit them, then, of all such charges. They, doubtless, think now as they formerly did of the measure which they denounced and rejected, but which a change of circumstances now compels them to support. But in thus acquitting them of the charge of inconsistency, they must excuse me if I should avail myself of the fact, that their opinion remains un- changed, as an argument in favour of the bill, against the substitute. The choice is between them. They are in the opposite scales. To take from the one is, in effect, to add to the other ; and any objection against the one is an argument equally strong in favour of the other. I, then, do avail myself of their many pow- erful objections in 1834 against the measure, which this substitute proposes now to revive. I call to my aid and press into my service every denunciation they then uttered, and every argument they then so successfully urged against it. They — no, we (for I was then, as now, irreconcilably opposed to the measure) charged against it, and proved what we charged, that it placed the purse and the sword in the same hands ; that it would be the source of boundless patron- age and corruption, and fatal, in its consequences, to the currency of the coun- try ; and I now avail myself of these, and all other objections then urged by us, in as full force against this substitute, as if you were again to rise in your pla- ces and repeat them now ; and, of course, as so many arguments, in effect, in favour of the bill ; and on their strength I claim your vote in its favour, imless, indeed, still stronger objections can be urged against it. I say stronger, be- cause time has proved the truth of all that was then said against the measure now proposed to be revived by this substitute. What was then prediction is now fact. But whatever objections have been, or may be urged against the bill, however strong they may appear in argument, remain yet to be tested by the unerring test of time and experience. Whether they shall ever be realized, must be admitted, even by those who may have the greatest confidence in them, to be at least uncertain ; and it is the part of wisdom and prudence, where ob- jections are equally strong against two measures, to prefer that which is yet un- tried to that which has been tried and failed. Against this conclusion there is but one escape. It may be said that we are sometimes compelled, in the midst of the many extraordinary circumstances in which we may be placed, to prefer that which is of itself the more objectionable to that which is less so ; because the former may more probably lead, in the end, to some desired result than the latter. To ap- ply the principle to this case. It may be said that the substitute, though of itself objectionable, is to be preferred, because it would more probably lead to the establishment of a National Bank than the bill, which you believe to be the only certain remedy for all the disorders that affect the currency. I admit the position to be sound in principle, but it is one exceedingly bold and full of dan- ger in practice, and ought never to be acted on but in extreme cases, and where there is a rational prospect of accomplishing the object ultimately aimed at. The application in this case, I must think, would be rashness itself. It may be safely assumed, that the success of either, whichever may be adopted, the bill or the substitute, would be fatal to the establishment of a National Bank. It can never put down a successful measure to take its place ; and, of course, that which is most likely to fail, and replunge the country into all the disasters of a disordered currency, is that which would most probably lead to the restora- tion of a National Bank ; and to prefer the substitute on that account is, in fact, to prefer it because it is the worst of the two. But are you certain that another explosion would be followed by a bank ? We have already had two ; and it is far more probable that the third would impress, universally and indelibly, on the SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 293 public mind, that ther» was sonietliing radically and incurably wrong in the sys- tem which would blow up the whole concern, National Bank and all. If I may be permitted to express an opinion, I would say you have pursued a course on this subject unfortunate both for yourselves and country. You are opposed both to the league of .banks and the sub-treasury. You prefer a Na- tional Bank, and regard it as the only safe and certain regulator of the currency, but consider it, for the present, out of the question, and are therefore compelled to choose between the other two. By supporting the substitute, you will be held responsible for all the mischief and disasters that may follow the revival of the pet-bank system, as it has been called, with the almost certain defeat of your first and cherished choice ; and those you oppose will reap all the benefits of the power, patronage, and influence which it may place in their hands, with- out incurring any portion of the responsibility. But that is not all. The suc- cess of the substitute would be the defeat of the bill, which would, in like man- ner, place on you the responsibility of its defeat, and give those you oppose all the advantage of having supported it, without any of the responsibility that would have belonged to it had it been adopted. Had a different course been taken — had you joined in aiding to extend the custody of the laws over the public revenue in the hands of the executive, where your own acts have placed it, and for which you, of course, are responsible, throwing, at the same time, on those to whom you attribute the present disordered state of the currency, the burden of the responsibility — you would have stood ready to profit by events. If the sub-treasury, contrary to your anticipation, succeeded, as patriots, you would have cause to I'ejoice in the unexpected good. If it failed, you would have the credit of having anticipated the result, and might then, after a double triumph of sagacity and foresight, have brought forward your favourite measure, with a fair prospect of success, when every other had failed. By not taking this course, you have lost the only prospect of establishing a National Bank. Nor has your course, in my opinion, been fortunate for the country. Had it been different, the currency question would have been decided at the called session; and had it been decided then, the country would this day have been in a much better condition : at least the manufacturing" and commercial section to the North, where the derangement of the currency is felt the most severely. The South is comparatively in an easy condition. Such are the difficulties that stand in the way of the substitute at the very threshold. Those beyond are vastly greater, as I shall now proceed to show. Its object, as I have stated, is to revive the league of state banks ; and the first question presented for consideration is. How is this to be done — how is the league to be formed ? how stimulated into life when formed ? and what, after it has been revived, would be the true character of the league or combination ? To answer these questions we must turn to its provisions. It provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall select twenty-five specie- paying banks as the fiscal agents of the government, all to be respectable and substantial, and that the selection shall be confirmed by the joint vote of the two houses. It also provides that the shall be made the depositories of the public money, and that their notes shall be receivable in the dues of the government ; and that, in turn, for these advantages, they shall stipulate to perform certain duties, and comply with various conditions, the object of which is to give the Secretary of the Treasury full knowledge of their condition c^nd business, with the view to supervise and control their acts, as far as the interest of the govern- ment is concerned. In addition to these, it contains other and important pro- A'isions, which I shall not enumerate, because they do not fall within the scope of the objections that I propose to urge against the measure. Now, I ask, What does all this amount to ? What but a proposal, on the part of the government, to enter into a contractor bargain with certain selected state banks, on the tQrms and conditions contained ? Have we the right to make such 294 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. a bargain ? is the first question ; and to that I give a defided negative, which I hope to place on constitutional grounds that cannot be shaken. I intend to dis- cuss it, with other questions growing out of the connexion of the government with the banks, as a new question, for the first time presented for consideration and decision. Strange as it may seem, the questions growing out of it, as long as it has existed, have never yet been presented nor investigated in reference to their constitutionality. How this has happened, I shall now proceed to ex- plain, preparatory to the examination of the question which I have proposed. The union of the government and the banks was never legally solemnized. It originated shortly after the government went into operation, not in any legal enactment, but in a short order of the treasury department of not much more than half a dozen of lines, as if it were a mere matter of course. We thus glided imperceptibly into a connexion, which was never recognised by law till 1816 (if my memory serves), but which has produced more important after- consequences, and has had a greater control over the destiny of this country, than any one of the mighty questions which have so often and deeply agitated the country. To it may be traced, as their seminal principle, the vast and ex- traordinary expansion of our banking system, our excessive import duties, un- constitutional and profuse disbursements, the protective tariff, and its associated system for spending what it threw into the treasury, followed in time by a vast surplus, which the utmost extravagance of the government could not dissipate, and, finally, by a sort of retributive justice, the explosion of the entire banking system, and the present prostrated condition of the currency, now the subject of our deliberation. How a measure fraught with such important consequences should at first, and for so long a time, escape the attention and the investigation of the public, deserves a paasing notice. It is to be explained by the false conception of the entire subject of banking which, at that early period, universally prevailed in the community. So erroneous was it, that a bank-note was then identified in the mind of the public with gold and silver, and a deposite in bank was regarded as under the most safe and sacred custody that could be devised. The origi- ual impression, derived from the Bank of Amsterdam, where every note or cer- tificate in circulation was honestly represented by an equal and specific quantity of gold or silver in bank, and where every deposite was kept as a sacred trust, to be safely returned to the depositor when demanded, was extended to banks of discount, down to the time of the formation of our government, with but slight modifications. With this impression, it is not at all extraordinary that the de- posite of the revenue in banks for safe keeping, and the receipt of their notes in the public dues, should be considered a matter of course, requiring no higher authority than a treasury order ; and hence a connexion, with all the important questions belonging to it, and now considered of vast magnitude, received so little notice till public attention was directed to it by its recent rupture. This total separation from the system in which we now find ourselves placed for the first time, authorizes and demands that we shall investigate freely and fully, not only the consequences of the connexion, but all the questions growing out of it, more especially those of a constitutional character ; and I shall, in obedience to this demand, return to the question from which this digression has carried me. Have we, then, the right to make the bargain proposed ? Have we the right to bestow the high privileges, I might say prerogatives, on them of being made the depositories of the public revenue, and of having their notes received and treated as gold and silver in the dues of the government, and in all its fiscal transactions 1 Have we the right to do all this in order to bestow confidence in the banks, with the view to enable them to resume specie payments 1 What is the state of the case 1 The banks are deeply in- debted to the country, and are unable to pay ; and we are asked to give them these advantages in order to enable them to pay their debts. Can we grant the y SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 295 boon ? In answering this important question, I begin with the fact that our government is one of limited powers. It can exercise no right but what is specifically granted, nor pass any law but what is necessary and proper to carry such power into effect. This small pamphlet (holding it up) contains the Con- stitution. Its grants of power arc iiiw and plain, and I ask gentlemen to turn to it and point out the power that authorizes us to do what is proposed to be done, or to show that the passage of this substitute is necessary to carry any of the granted powers into effect. If neither can be shown, Avhat is proposed cannot be constitutionally done ; and till it is specifically pohited out, I am war- ranted in believing that it cannot be shown. Our reason is often confounded by a mere name. An act, in the minds of many, may become of doubtful constitutional authority when applied to a bank, •which none would for a moment hesitate to pronounce grossly unconstitutional ■when applied to an individual. To free ourselves from this illusion, I ask. Could this government constitutionally bestow on individuals, or a private asso- ciation, the advantages proposed to be bestowed on the selected baidis, in order to enable them to pay their debts '\ Is there one who hears me, who would venture to say yes, even in the case of the most extensive merchant or mercan- tile concern, such as some of those in New- York or New-Orleans, at the late suspension, whose embarrassments involved entire sections in distress ? But, if not, on what principle can a discrimination be made in favour of the banks % They are local institutions, created by the states for local purposes, composed, like private associations, of individual citizens, on whom the acts of the state cannot confer a particle of constitutional right under this Constitution that does not belong to the humblest citizen. So far from it, if there be a distinction, it is against the banks. They are removed farther from the control of this gov- ernment than the individual citizens, who, by the Constitution, are expressly subject to the direct action of this government in many instances, while the state banks, as constituting a portion of the domestic institutions of the states, and resting on their reserved rights, are entirely beyond our control ; so much so as not to be the subject of a bankrupt law, although the authority to pass one is expressly granted by the Constitution. On what possible ground, then, can the right in question be placed, unless, indeed, on the broad principle that these local institutions, intended for state purposes, have been so extended, and have so connected themselves with the general circulation and business of the country, as to affect the interest of the ■whole community, so as to make it the right and duty of Congress to regulate them ; or, in short, on the broad principle of the general welfare ? There is none other that I can perceive ; but this would be to adopt the old and exploded principle, at all times dangerous, but pre-eminently so at this time, when such loose and dangerous conceptions of the Constitution are abroad in the land. If the argument is good in one case, it is good in all similar cases. If this gov- ernment may interfere with any one of the domestic institutions of the states, on the ground of promoting the general welfare, it may with others. If it may be- stow privileges to control them, it may also appropriate money for the same purpose ; and thus a door might be opened to an interference with state in- stitutions, of which we of a certain section ought at this time to be not a little jealous. The argument might be pushed much farther. We not only offer to confer great and important privileges on the banks to be selected, but, in turn, ask them to stipulate to comply with certain conditions, the object of which is to bring them under the supervision and control of this government. It might be asked, "Where is the right to purchase or assume such supervision or control ? It might be repeated, that they are state institutions, incorporated solely for state purposes, and to be entirely under state control, and that all supervision on our part is in violation of the rights of the states. It might be argued that such su- 296 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. pervision or control is calculated to weaken the control of the states over their own institutions, and to render them less subservient to their peculiar and local interests, for the promotion of which they were established, and too subservient to other, and, perhaps, conflicting interests, which might feel but little sympathy with those of the states. But I forbear. Other, and not less urgent objections claim my attention. To dilate too much on one would necessarily sacrifice the claim of others. I next object that, whatever may be the right to enter into the proposed bar- gain, the mode in which it is proposed to make it is clearly imconstitutional, if I rightly comprehend it. I am not certain that I do ; but, if I understand it rights ly, the plan is, for the Secretary of the Treasury to select twenty-five state banks, as described in the substitute, which are to be submitted to the two houses, to be confirmed or rejected by their joint resolutions, without the approval of the President ; in the same mode as they would appoint a chaplain, or establish a joint rule for the government of their proceedings. In acting on the joint resolution, if what I suppose be intended, each house would have the right, of course, to strike from it the name of any bank and in- sert another, which would, in fact, vest in the two houses the uncontrollable right of making the selection. Now if this be the mode proposed, as I infer from the silence of the mover, it is a plain and palpable violation of the Consti- tution. The obvious intention is to evade the veto power of the executive, which cannot be without an infraction of an express provision of the Constitu- tion, drawn up with the utmost care, and intended to prevent the possibility of evasion. It is contained in the 1st article, 7th section, and the last clause, which I ask the secretary to read : [" Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjourn- ment), shall be presented to the President of the United States ; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill."] Nothing can be more explicit or full. It is no more possible to evade the executive veto, on any joint vote, than on the passage of a bill. The veto was vested in him not only to protect his own powers, but as an additional guard to the Constitution. I am not the advocate of executive power, which I have been often compelled to resist of late, when extended beyond its proper limits, as I shall ever be prepared to do when it is. Nor am I the advocate of legis- lative or judicial. I stand ready to protect all, within the sphere assigned by the Constitution, and to resist them beyond. To this explicit and comprehen- sive provision of the Constitution, in protection of the veto, there is but a single exception, resulting, by necessary implication, from another portion of the in- strument, not less explicit, which authorizes each house to establish the rules of its proceedings. Under this provision the two houses have full and uncon- trollable authority within the limits of their respective walls, and over those sub- ject to their authority, in their official character. To that extent they may pass joint votes and resolutions, without the approval of the executive ; but beyond that, without it they are powerless. There are in this case special reasons why his approval should not be eva- ded. The President is at the head of the administrative department of the gov- ernment, and is especially responsible for its good management. In order to hold him responsible, he ought to have due power in the selection of its agents, and proper control over their conduct. These banks would be by far the most powerful and influential of all the agents of the government, and ought not to be selected without the concurrence of the executive. If this substitute should be adopted, and the provision in question be regarded such as I consider it, there 3an be no doubt what must be the fate of the measxtre. The executive will be SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 297 bound to protect, by the intervention of its constitutional right, the portion of power clearly allotted to that department by that instrument, which would make it impossible for it to become a law with the existing division in the two houses. I have not yet exhausted my constitutional objections. I rise to higher and to broader, applying directly to the very essence of this substitute. I deny your right to make a general deposite of the public revenue in a bank. More than half of the errors of life may be traced to fallacies originating in an improper use of words ; and among not the least mischievous is the application of this word to bank transactions, in a sense wholly different from its original meaning. Ori- ginally it meant a thing placed in trust, or pledged to be safely and sacredly kept, till returned to the depositor, without being used by the depositary while in his possession. All this is changed when applied to a deposite in bank. Instead of returning the identical thing, the bank is understood to be bound to return only an equal value ; and instead of not having the use, it is understood to have the right to loan it out on interest, or to dispose of it as it pleases, with the single condition, that an equal amount be returned when demanded, which, experience has taught is not always done. To place, then, the public money in deposite in bank, without restriction, is to give the free use of it, and to al- low them to make as much as they can out of it between the time of deposite and disbursement. Have we such a right ? The money belongs to the people — collected from them for specific purposes, in which they have a general in- terest — and for that only ; and what possible right can we have to give such use of it to certain selected corporations ? I ask for the provision of the Con- stitution that authorizes it. I ask if we could grant the use, for similar purpo- ses, to private associations or individuals ? Or, if not to them, to individual of- ficers of the government ; for instance, to the four principal receivers under this bill, should it pass. And if this cannot be done, that the distinction be point- ed out. If these questions be satisfactorily answered, I shall propound others still more difficult. I shall then ask, If the substitute should become a law,/ and the twenty-five banks be selected, whether they would not, in fact, be the treas- ury ? And if not, I would ask. Where would be the treasury 1 But if they Avould be the treasury, I would ask. If public money in bank would not be in the treasury ? And if so, how can it be drawn from it to be lent for the purpose of trade, speculation, or any other use whatever, against an express provision of the Constitution 1 Yes, as express as words can make it. I ask the secretary to read the 1st article, 9th section, and the clause next to the last. [" No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appro- priations made by law ; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."] How clear ! How explicit ! No fnoney to be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law ; that is, the object on which the expenditure is to be made, to be designated by law, and the sum allotted to ef- fect it, specified ; and yet we have lived in the daily and habitual violation of this great fundamental provision, from almost the beginning of our political ex- istence to this day. Behold the consequences ! It has prostrated and ingulfed-- the very institutions which have enjoyed this illicit favour, and tainted, above all other causes, the morals and politics of the whole country. Yes, to this must be traced, as one of the main causes, the whole system of excessive reve- nue, excessive expenditure, and excessive surpluses ; and to them, especially the last, the disastrous overthrow of .ne banks and the currency, and the un- exampled degeneracy of public and private morals, which have followed. We have suffered the affliction : may the blessing which follows chastisement, when its justice is confessed, come in due season. But I take still higher ground. I strike at the root of the mischief. I deny Pp 298 SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN. the right of this government to treat bank-notes as money in its fiscal transac- tions. On this great question I never have before committed myself, though not generally disposed to abstain from forming or expressing opinions. In all instances in which a National Bank has come in question, I have invariably taken my ground, that if the government has the right to receive and treat bank- notes as money, it had the right, and was bound, under the Constitution, to regulate them so as to make them uniform and stable as a currency. The rea- sons for this opinion are obvious, and have been so often and fully expressed on former occasions, that it would be useless to repeat them now ; but I never examined fully the right of receiving, or made up my mind on it, till since the catastrophe in May last, which, as I have said, entirely separated the govern- ment from the banks. Previous to that period, it was an abstract question, with no practical bearing ; as much so as is now the constitutional right of admitting Louisiana into the Union. Things are now altered. The connexion is dis- solved, and it has become a practical question of the first magnitude. The mover of the substitute assumed as a postulate, that this government had a right to receive in its dues whatever it might think proper. I deny the posi- tion in toto. It is one that ought not to be assumed, and cannot be proved, ani Avhich is opposed by powerful objections. The genius of our Constitution is opposed to the assumption of power. Whatever power it gives is expressly granted ; and if proof were wanted, the numerous grants of powers far more obvious, and apparently much more safe to be assumed than the one in question, would afford it. I shall cite a few striking instances. If any powers might be assumed, one would suppose that of applying money to pay the debts of the government, and borrowing it to carry on its operations, would be among them ; yet both are expressly provided for by the Constitution. Again, to Congress is granted the power to declare war and raise armies and navies ; yet the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules for the regulation of the army and navy, are not left to assumption, as ob- vious as they are, but are given by express grant. With these, and other in- stances not less striking, which might be added, it is a bold step to assume, ■without proof, the far less obvious power of the government receiving whatever it pleases in its dues as money. Such an assumption would be in direct con- flict with the great principle which the State Rights party, with which the sen- ator (Mr. Rives) classes himself, have ever adopted in the construction of the Constitution. But, if the former cannot be assumed, it would be in vain to at- tempt to prove that it has been granted, or that it is necessary and proper to carry any of the granted powers into effect. No such attempt has been made, nor can be with success. On the contrary, there are strong objections to the power, which, in my opinion, cannot be surmounted. If once admitted, it would lead, by consequence, to a necessary interference with individual and state concerns never 'contemplated by the Constitution. Let ns, for instance, suppose that, acting on the assumption of the senator, the gov- ernment should choose to select tobacco as an article to be received in pay- ment of its dues, which would be as well entitled to it as any other product, and in which the senators constituents are so much interested. Does he not see the consequences ? In order to make its taxes imiform, which it is bound to do by the Constitution, and which cannot be done unless the medium in which it is paid is so, the government would have to assume a general control over the great staple in question ; to regulate the weight of the hogshead or package ; to establish inspections under its own officers in order to deterniine the quality, and whatever else might be necessary to make the payments into the treasury uniform. So, likewise, if the still greater staple, cotton, be- select- ed. The weight of the bale, the quality of the cotton, and its inspection, would all necessarily fall under the control of the government ; and does not the sena- tor see that the exercise of a power that must lead to such consequences — con- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 299 I sequences so far beyond the sphere assigned to this government by the Consti- tution — must be unconstitutional ? Nor does the objection extend only to these and other staple articles. It applies with equal, if not greater force, to receiv- ing the notes of state banks, as proposed by the substitute, in the dues of the government and the management of its fiscal concerns. It must involve the government in the necessity of controlling and regulating state banks, as this substitute abundantly proves, as well as the whole history of our connexion with them ; and it has been shown that banks are at least as far removed from the control of this government as the cultivators of the soil, or any other class of citizens. To this I might add another objection, not less strong, that for the government to receive and treat bank-notes as money in its dues, would be in direct conflict, in its effect, with the important power conferred expressly on Congress of coining money and regulating the value thereof ; but as this will come in with more propriety in answer to an argument advanced by the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), I shall now state his argument, and reply to it. He asserted again and again, both now and at the extra session, that it is the duty of the government not only to regulate, but to furnish a sound curren- cy. Indeed, it is the principal argument relied on by the senator in opposition to the bill, which, he says, abandons this great duty. Now, if by currency be meant gold and silver coins, there will be but little difference between him and myself. To that extent the government has a clear and unquestionable right by express grant ; but if he goes farther, and inte.ids to assert that the govern- ment has the right to make bank-notes a currency, which it is bound to regulate, then his proposition is identical in effect, though differently expressed, with that of the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives), and all the arguments I have urged against it are equally applicable to his. I hold, on my part, that the power of the government on this subject is limited to coining money and regulating its value, and punishing the counterfeiting of the current coins — that is, of the coins made current by law, the only money known to the Constitution. It is time to make a distinction between money, or currency, if you please — between that which will legally pay debts, and mere circulation, which has its value from its promise to be paid in the former, and under which classification, bank- notes, as well as bills or promissory notes of individuals, fall. These are all in their nature private and local, and cannot be elevated to the level of currency, or money, in the fiscal transactions of government, without coming into conflict, more or less, with the object of the Constitution in vesting the power of coining money and regulating its value in Congress, as I shall now proceed to show. It will hardly be questioned that the object was to fix a standard, in order to furnish to the Lfnion a currency of uniform and steady value, and was therefore imited in the same sentence with the kindred power to fix the standard of weights and measures, the objects being similar. Now, if our experience has proved anything, it has amply shown that so long as the government is connect- ed with the banks, and their notes received in its transactions as money, so long it is impossible to give anything like stability to the standard of value ; and that the power of coining and regulating the coins becomes, in a great measure, a mere nullity. Every dollar issued in bank-notes, when it is made the substi- tute for money, drives out of circulation more or less of the precious metals ; and when the issue becomes exorbitant, gold and silver almost entirely disap- pear, as our experience at this time proves. The effects are analogous to alloyiiig or clipping the coin, as far as stability of standard is concerned ; and it would be noi less rational to suppose that such a power on the part of indi- viduals would be consistent with a uniform and stable currency, than to sup- pose the receiving and treating bank-notes as a substitute for money by the government would be. The only check or remedy is to restrict them to their proper sphere, to circulate in common with bills of exchange or other private 300 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. and local paper, for the convenience of business and trade. So far from such a course operating injuriously on the people, or from being liable to the charge of forming one currency for the people and another for the government, as has been so often and wiih such effect repeated, it is the very reverse. Government, by refusing to receive bank-notes, as it is bound to do, would, in fact, furnish a choice to the people, to take either money or notes at their pleasure. The demand of the government will always keep a plentiful supply of the former in the country, so as to afford the people a choice ; while the opposite would expel the money, and leave no option to them but to take bank-notes, or worse, as at present. I have now shown how it is proposed to form the league of banks, and have presented the constitutional impediments that stand in the way. These are numerous and strong ; so much so, that they ought to be irresistible with all, except the latitudinous in construction ; but I cannot expect they will produce their full effect. I know too well the force of long-entertained impressions, however erroneous, to be sanguine — how strongly the mind rebels against the expulsion of the old and the admission of new opinions. Yet in this case, where we clearly see how gradually and silently error crept in under the dis- guise of words, applied to new and totally different ideas, without exciting notice or alarm ; and when we have experienced such deep disasters in consequence of parting from the plain intent and meaning of the Constitution, I cannot but hope that all who believe that the success of the government depends on a rigid adherence to the Constitution, will lay aside all previous impressions, taken up without reflection, and give to the objections their due weight. I come now to the next point, to show how this league is to be revived or stimulated into life. Till this can be done, the substitute, should it become a law, would be a dead letter. The selection is to be made from specie-paying banks. None but such can receive the public deposites, or have their notes received in the dues of the government. There are none such now. The whole banking system lies inanimate, and must be vivified before it can be reunited with the government. No one is bold enough to propose a union with this lifeless mass. How, then, is the extinguished spark to be revivified ? How is the breath of life, the Promethean fire, to be breathed into the system anew? is the question. This is the task. The mover tells us that it must be the work of the government. He says that it is bound to aid the banks to resume payments, and for that purpose ought to hold out to them some adequate inducement. He tells us that they have been long preparing, and had made great efforts, but can go no farther ; have rolled the round, huge rock almost to the summit, but unless the govern- ment put forth its giant arm, and give the last push, it will recoil and rush down, the steep to the bottom, and all past labour be lost. Now, what is this adequate inducement ? What this powerful stimulus, which it is proposed the govern- ment should apply, in order to enable the banks to accomplish this Herculean task ? The substitute shall answer. It proposes to fix the 1st of July next for the period of resumption ; and, as the inducement to resume, it proposes to select twenty-five of the most respecta- ble and solid out of the resuming banks to be depositories of the public moneys and the fiscal agent of the government, as has been already stated. It also pro- poses — and this is the stimulus, the essence of the whole — to make the notes of such banks as may, resume on or before that day exclusively receivable in the public dues. Here is a quid pro quo ; something proposed to be done, for which something is to be given. We tell the banks plainly, If you resume, we, on our part, stipulate to make twenty-five of you our fiscal agents and deposit lories of the revenue ; and wo farther stipulate, that those who resume by the time fixed, shall have the exclusive privilege, /orewer, of having their notes re- ceivable in the dues of the government, in common with gold and silver. If the banks perform their part, we shall be bound in honour and good faith to SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 301 perform ours. It would be a complete contract, as obligatory as if signed, sealed, and delivered. Such is the inducement. The next question is, Will it be adequate ? Yes, abundantly adequate. The battery is strong enough to awaken the dead to life ; the consideration sufficient to remunerate the banks for whatever sacrifice they may be compelled to make in order to resume payment. It is difficult to estimate the value of these high privileges, or prerogatives, as I might justly call them. They are worth mill- ions. If you were to enter into a similar contract with an individual, I doubt not that he could sell out in open market for at least thirty, forty, or fifty mill- ions of dollars. I do, then, the mover the justice to say, that his means are am- ple to eflect what he proposes. As difficult as is the work of resumption — and difficult it will turn out to be when tried — the inducement will prove all-sufficient. But the resumption, however desirable, may be purchased too dearly ; and such would prove to be the case, should the project succeed. Not only is the ofi'er too great, but the mode of effecting it is highly objectionable. Its operation would prove not less disastrous than the bargain has been shown to be uncon- stitutional, which I shall now proceed to establish. The offer will have a double effect. It will act as a powerful stimulus to re- sumption, but will act, at the same time, with equal force to excite a struggle among the banks, not only to resume themselves, but to prevent others from re- sumino-. The reason is clear. The advantage to each will increase as the number of the resuming banks decreases ; and, of course, the great point of contest among the strong will be to restrict the proffered prize to the smallest number. The closer the monopoly the greater the profits. In this struggle, a combination of a few powerful and wealthy banks, the most respectable and solid, as designated in the substitute, will overthrow and trample down the res- idue. Their fall will spread desolation over the land. Whatever may be the fate of others in this desperate contest, there is one in relation to which no doubt can be entertained — I refer to the United States Bank of Pennsylvania, a long name, and a misnomer ; and which, for the sake of brevity, but with no personal disrespect to the distinguished individual at its head, I shall call Mr. Biddle's bank. That, at least, will be one of the winners, one of the twenty- five to whom the prize will be assigned. Its vast resources, its weahh and in- fluential connexions, both at home and abroad, the skill and ability of the offi- cer at its head, and, what is less honourable, the great resource it holds in the notes of the late United States Bank, of which more than six millions have been put into circulation, in violation, to say the least, of a trust, constituting more than five sixths of all its circulation, and which it is not bound to pay, with the still greater amount on hand, making, in the whole, more than twenty-six mill- ions, and which may be used in the same way, if not prevented, would place it be- yond all doubt among the victors. He starts without proper weights, and will lead the way from the first. Who the others may be is uncertain ; this will de- pend mainly upon his good-will and pleasure. It may be put down as certain, whoever they may be, that they will be powerful and influential, and not unfa- vourable to his interest or aggrandizement. But the mischievous effect will not be limited to this deathlike struggle, in which so many must fall and be crush- ed, that might otherwise weather the storm. The forced resumption, for such it will be in effect, would be followed by wide-spread desolation. It is easy to sink to suspension, but hard to return to resumption. Under the most fa- vourable circumstances, and when conducted most leisurely and cautiously, the pressure must be severe ; but, if coerced or precipitated by baidvrupt laws or temptations such as this, it will be ruinous. To make it safe and easy must be the work of time. Government can do but little. The disease originates in excessive indebtedness, and the only remedy is payment or reduction of debts. It is estimated that, when the banks suspended payments, the conununity was indebted to them the enormous sum of $475,000,000. To reduce this within 302 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. the proper limits is not the work of a few days, and can be but httle aided hy us. The industry and the vast resources of the country, with time, are the only remedies to be relied on for the reduction ; and to these, with the state legisla- tures, and the public opinion, the resumption must be left. To understand the subject fidly, we must look a little more into the real cause of the difficulty. This enormous debt was incurred in prosperous times. The abundant means of the banks, from the surplus revenue and a combination of other causes, indu- ced them to discount freely. This increased the circulation, and with its in- crease its value depreciated, and prices rose proportionably. With this rise, enterprise and speculation seized the whole community, and every one expect- ed to make a fortune at once ; and this, in turn, gave a new impulse to discounts and circulation, till the swelling tide bursted its barriers and deluged the land. Then began the opposite process of absorbing" the excess. If it had been pos- sible to return it back to the banks, the sources from which it flowed, through its debtors, the speculating, enterprising, and business portion of the communi- ty, the mischief would have been in a great measure avoided. But circulation had flowed off into other reservoirs — those of the moneyed men and bankers, ■who hoard when prices are high, and buy when they are low. The portion thus drawn off and held in deposite, either in banks or the chests of individuals, was as effectually lost, as far as the debtors of the banks were concerned, as if it had been burned. The means of payment was thus diminished ; prices fell in proportion, and the pressure increased as they fell. Though the amount in cir- culation be greatly reduced, yet the banks are afraid to discount, lest, on re- sumption, the hoarded mass of deposites held by individuals or other banks should be let loose, and, in addition to what might be put into circulation should discounts be made, would cause another inundation, to be followed by another suspension. How is this difficulty to be safely surmounted, but by unlocking the hoarded means ? And how is that to be done without deciding the curren- cy question ? This is the first and necessary step. That done, all will be able to calculate and determine what to do. The period of inaction and uncertainty would cease, and that of business revive. Funds that are now locked up would be brought again into operation, and the channels of circulation be replenished in the only mode that can be done with safety. Thus thinking, I am now, and have been from the first, in favour of an early decision, and averse to all coer- cion, or holding out temptation to resume ; leaving the disease to the gradual and safe operation of time, with as little tampering as possible. In the mean time, I hold it to be unwise to cease discounting, and to adopt an indiscriminate system of curtailment. Its effects are ruinous to the business of the countrj'', and calculated to retard rather than to accelerate a resumption. The true sys- tem, I would say, would be to discount business paper as freely as usual, and curtail gradually permanent debts. The former would revive business, and would increase the debts to the banks less than it would increase the ability of the community to pay them. Having now shown how this league or combination of banks is to be formed and revived, with the difficulties in the way, it remains to determine what will be the true character and nature of the combination when formed. It will con- sist of state banks retaining their original powers, that of discounting and all, without being in the slightest degree impaired. To these the substitute pro- poses to make important additions : to receive their notes as gold and silver in the public dues, to give them the use of the public deposites, and to organize and blend the whole into one, as the fiscal agent of the government, to be pla- ced under the immediate supervision and control of the Secretary of the Treas- ury. Now, what does all this amount to ? Shall I name the word — be not startled : A BANK — a government bank — the most extensive, powerful, and dangerous that ever existed. This substitute would be the act of incorpora- tion ; and the privileges it confers, so much additional banking capital, increas- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 303 ing immensely its powers, and giving it an unlimited control over the business and exchanges of the country. The senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) vi^as right in supposing that this new trial of the experiment would be made under very different circumstances Irom the first, and would have a different termination. That, too, like this, was a bank — a government bank— as distinguished from the late Bank, to which it was set up as a rival, and was at the time constantly so designated in debate. But circumstances now are indeed different, very different, and so would be the result of the experiment. This bank would not be the same rickety concern as the former. That ended in anarchy, and this would end in despotism. I will explain. The former failed not so much in consequence of the adverse circumstances of the times, or any essential defect in the system, as from the want of a head — a common sensoriura, to think, to will, and decide for the whole — which was indispensably necessary to ensure concert, and give unity of design and exe- cution. A head will not be wanting now. Mr. Biddle's bank will supply the defect. His would be not only one of the resuming banks, as I have shown, but would also be one of the twenty-five to be selected. If there should be the temerity to omit it, the present project would share the fate of its predeces- sor. Mr. Biddle's bank, at the head of those excluded, would be an overmatch for the selected, in skill, capital, and power, and the whole league would in- evitably be overthrown. But, if selected, the position of his bank in the league would be certain. Its vast capital, its extensive connexions, its superior au- thority, and his skill, abilities, and influence, would place it at the head, to think and act for the whole. The others would be as dependant on his as the branches of the late bank were on the mother institution. The whole would form one entire machine, impelled by a single impulse, and making a perfect contrast with its predecessor in the unity and energy of its operations. Nor would its fate be less dissimilar. Anarchy was inscribed on the first from the beginning. Its deficiency in the great and essential element to en- sure concert was radical, and could not be remedied. Its union with the gov- ernment could not supply it, nor avert its destiny. But very different would be the case of the present. Add its intimate union with the government, for which the substitute provides, to its other sources of power, and it would be- come irresistible. The two, government and bank, would unite and constitute a single power ; but which would gain the ascendency — whether the govern- ment would become the bank, or the bank the government — is neither certain nor material ; for, whichever it might be, it would form a despotic money-cracy (if I may be permitted to unite an English and a Greek word) altogether irre- sistible. It is ijot a little surprising that the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives), whose watchful jealousy could detect, as he supposed, the embryo of a government bank in the bill, should overlook this regular incorporation of one by his own substitute. Out of the slender materials of treasury warrants, and draughts to pay public creditors, or transfer funds from place to place, as the public service might require, and four principal receivers to keep the public money, he has conjured up, with the aid of a vivid imagination, a future government bank, which, he told us, with the utmost confidence, would rise like a cloud, at first as big as a hand, but which would soon darken all the horizon. Now, it is not a little unfortunate for his confident predictions, that these seminal princi- ples from which the bank is to spring have all existed, from the commence- ment of our government, in full force, except the four receivers, without show- ing the least tendency to produce the result he anticipates. Not only ours, but every civilized government, has the power to draw treasury warrants and trans- fer draughts ; nor has the power in a single instance terminated in a bank. Nor can the fact that the money is to be kept by receivers contribute in the least 804 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. to produce one. The public funds in their hands will be as much beyond the control of the executive as it was in the vaults of the banks. But, to shorten discussion, I would ask, How can there be a bank without the power to dis- count or to use the deposites 1 and out of which of the provisions of the bill could the treasury by any possibility obtain either, under its severe penahies, which prohibits the touching of the public money, except on warrants or drauohts, drawn by those having authority in due form, and for the public service. But the danger which an excited imagination anticipates hereafter from the bill would exist in sober reality under the substitute. There it would require neither fancy nor conjecture to create one. It would exist with all its facul- ties and endowments complete — discount, deposites, and all — with immense means, guided by a central and directing head, and blended and united with the government, so as to form one great mass of power. What a contrast with the bill ! How simple and harmless the one, with its four principal re- ceivers, twice as many clerks, and five inspectors, compared with this complex and mighty engine of power ! And yet there are many, both intelligent and patriotic, who oppose the bill and support the substitute, on the ground that the former would give more patronage and power than the latter ! How strange and wonderful the diversity of the human mind ! So far from being true, the very fact of the separation of the government from the banks, provided for in the bill, would, of itself, be the most decisive blow that could be given against government patronage, and the union of the two the most decisive in its favour. When their notes are received in the public dues as cash, and the public money deposited in their vaults, the banks be- come the allies of the government on all questions connected with its fiscal action The higher its taxes and duties, the greater its revenue and expenditure ; and the larger its surplus, the more their circulation and business, and, of course, the greater their profit ; and hence, on all questions of taxation and disbursements, and the accumulation of funds in the treasury, their interest would throw them on the side of the government, and against the people. All this is reversed when separated. The higher the taxation and disburse- ments, and the larger the surplus, the less would be their profit ; and their in- terest, in that case, would throw them with the people, and against the govern- ment. The reason is obvious. Specie is the basis of banking operations, and the greater the amount they can command the greater will be their business and profits ; but when the government is separated from them, and collects and pays away its dues in specie instead of their notes, it is clear that the higher the tax- es and disbursements, and the greater the surplus in the treasury, the more spe- cie will be drawn from the use of the banks, and the less will be left as the ba- sis of their operations ; and, consequently, the less their profit. Every dollar withdrawn from them would diminish their business fourfold at least ; and hence a regard to their own interest would inevitably place them on the side to which I have assigned them. The effects on the politics of the country woidd be great and salutary. The weight of the banks would be taken from the side of the tax-consumers, where it has been from the commencement of the government, and placed on the side of the tax-payers. This great division of the community necessarily grows out of the fiscal action of the sovernment. Take taxation and disbursement togeth- er, and it will always be found that one portion of the community pays into the treasury, in the shape of taxes, more than it receives back in that of disburse- ments, and that another receives back more than it pays. The former are the tax-payers, and the latter the consumers — making the great, essential, and con- trolling division in all civilized communities. If, with us, the government has been thrown on the side of the consumers, as it lias, it must, in a considerable degree, be attributed to its alliance with the banks, whose influence has been, in consequence, at all times steadily and powerfully on that side. It is to this . SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 305 uiiscliievous and unholy alliance that may be traced the disasters which have befallen us, and the great political degeneracy of the country. Hence the pro- tective system ; hence its associated and monstrous system of disbursements ; hence the collection of more money from the people than the government could require ; hence the vast and corrupting surpluses ; hence legislative and execu- tive usurpations ; and, finally, hence the prostration of the currency, and the disasters which give rise to our present deliberations. Revive this fatal con- nexion — adopt this substitute, and all this train of evils will again follow, with re- doubled disasters and corruption. Refuse the connexion — adopt this bill, and all will be reversed, and we shall have some prospect of restoring the Consti- tution and country to their primitive simplicity and purity. The effect of the refusal on the patronage of the government would be great and decisive. Burke has wisely said, that the " revenue is the state in modern times." Violence and coercion are no longer the instruments of government in civilized commu- nities. Their reign is past. Everything is now done by money. It is not only the sinew of war, but of politics, over which, in the form of patronage, it exercises almost unlimited control. Just as the revenue increases or dimin- ishes, almost in the same proportion is patronage increased or diminished. But admit, for a moment, that neither the separation nor the connexion would have any sensible effect to increase or diminish the revenue, and that it would be of the same amount, whether the bill or substitute should be adopted, yet, even on that supposition, the patronage of the latter would be a hundred fold greater than the Ibrmer. In estimating the amount of patronage of any meas- ure, three particulars must be taken into the calculation : the number of persons who may be affected by it, their influence in the community, and the extent of the control exercised over them. It will be found, on comparison, that the sub- stitute combines all these elements in a far greater degree than the bill, as I shall now proceed to show. I begin with the number. The bill provides, as has been stated, for four principal receivers, eight or ten clerks, and a suitable number of agents to act as inspectors, making, in the whole, say 25 individuals. These would constitute the only additional officers to keep and disburse the public money. The substitute, in addition to the offi- cers now in service, provides for the selection of 25 banks, to be taken from the most powerful and influential, and which would have, on an average, at the least 100 officers and stockholders each, making, in the aggregate, 2500 persons who would be directly interested in the banks, and, of course, imder the influ- ence of the government. As to the relative influence of the officers and the selected banks over the community, every impartial man must acknowledge that the preponderance would be greater on the side of the latter. Admitting the respectability of the receivers and other officers provided for in the bill, and the officers and stock- holders of the banks to be individually the same, still the means of control at the disposition of the former would be as nothing compared to that of the latter. They would not touch a cent of public money. Their means would be limited to their salary, which would be too small to be felt in the community. Very different would be the case with the officers and stockholders of the banks. They, of all persons, are by far the most influential in the community. A greater number depend on them for accommodation and favour, and the success of their business and prospects in life, than any other class in society ; and this would be especially true of the banks connected with the government. It only remains, now, to compare the extent of the control that may be exer- cised by the government over the two, in order to complete the comparison ; and here, again, the preponderance will be found to be strikingly on the same side. The whole amount of expenditure, under the bill, would not exceed $30,000 or $40,000 annually, at the very farthest, and this constitutes the whole amount of control which the government can exercise. There would be 306 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. no perquisites, no contracts, jobs, or incidental gains. The offices and salaries would be all. To that extent those who may hold them would be dependant on the government, and thus far they may be controlled. How stands the ac- count on the other side? What value shall be put on the public deposites in the banks ? What on the receivability of their notes as cash by the govern- ment ? What on their connexion with the government as their fiscal ao-ent, which would give so great a control over the exchanges and business of the country ? How many millions shall these be estimated at, and how insig- nificant must the paltry sum of $30,000 or #40,000 appear to those countless millions held, under the provisions of the substitute, at the pleasure of the gov- ernment ! Having now finished the comparison as to the relative patronage of the two measures, I shall next compare them as fiscal agents of the government ; and here let me say, at the outset, that the discussion has corrected an error which I once entertained. I had supposed that the hazard of keeping the public mon- ey under the custody of officers of the government would be greater than ia bank. The senators from New-Hampshire and Connecticut (Messrs. Hubbard, and Niles) have proved from the record, that the hazard is on the other side, and that we have lost more by the banks than by the collecting and disbursing officers combined. What can be done to increase the security by judicious se- , lection of officers and proper organization is strongly illustrated by the fact, stated by the chairman (Mr. Wright) in his opening speech, that in the war department there has been no loss for 15 years — from 1821 to 1836 — on an expenditure certainly not less than $100,000,000. I take some pride in this result of an organization which I originated and established, when Secretary of War, against a formidable opposition. As to the relative expense of the two agencies, that of the bill, as small as it is, if we are to judge by appearances, is the gre-test ; but if hy facts, the substi- tute would be much the most so, provided we charge it with all the advantages which the banks would derive from their connexion with the government, as ought in fairness to be done, as the whole ultimately comes out of the pockets of the people. In a single particular the banks have the advantage as fiscal agents. They would be the more convenient. To this they are entitled, and I wish to with- hold from them no credit which they may justly claim. The senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) appeared to have great apprehension that the collection of the public dues in specie might lead to hoarding. He ttiay dismiss his fears on that head. It is not the genius of modern and civil- ized governments to hoard ; and if it were, the banks will take care that there shall be no extraordinary accumulation of cash in the treasury. Pass the bill, and I underwrite that we shall never have again to complain of a surplus. It would rarely, if ever, in peace and settled times, exceed three or four millions at the outside. Nor is his apprehension that hoarding of specie would lead to war less groundless. The danger is in another quarter. War is the harvest of banks, when they are connected with government. The vast increase of revenue and expenditures, and the enormous public loans, which necessarily inure mainly to their advantage, swell their profits in war to the utmost limits. But separate them from government, and war would then be to them a state of famine, for reasons which must be apparent after what has been said, which would throw their weight on the side of peace, and against war; just as cer- tainly as I have shown that the separation would throw it on the side of tax- payers, and against the tax-consumers. I come, now, to the comparison of the efTects of the two measures on the currency of the country. In this respect, the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives)' seemed to think that his substitute would have a great superiority over the bill, but his reasons were to me wholly unsatisfactory. If we are to judge from ex- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 307 perience, it ought to be pronounced to be the worst possible measiue. It has been in operation but twice (each for but a hw years) since the commence- ment of the government, and it has so happened that the only two explosions ot" the currency occuiTed during those periods. But, without relying on these iisastrous occurrences, we have seen enough to satisfy the most incredulous .hat there are great and radical defects in our bank circulation, which no remedy heretofore applied has been able to remove. It originates in the excess of pa- per compared to specie, and the only effective cure is to increase the latter and reduce the former ; and this the substitute itself impliedly acloiowledges, by pro- posing a remedy that would prove wholly inoperative. It proposes that, after a certain period mentioned, none of the banks to be selected should issue notes under ten dollars. The effects would clearly be, not a diminution of the circu- lation of small notes, but a new division of the banking business, in which the issue of larse notes would fall to the lot of the selected banks, and the small O ... to the others, without restricting in the least the aggregate amount of paper circulation. But what the substitute would fail to do, the bill would effectually remedy. None doubt but the separation from the banks would greatly increase the pro- portion of specie to paper ; but the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) appre- hends that its operation would be too powerful, so much so, in fact, as to destroy the banks. His argument is, that specie would be always at a premium, and that it would be impossible for the banks to do business so long as that was the case. His fears are groundless. What he dreads would be but a temporary evil. The very fact that specie would bear a premium would have the double effect to diminish paper circiUation and increase the importation of specie, till an equilibrium between the two would be restored, when they would be at par. At what point this would be effected is a little uncertain ; but the fear is, that with our decreasing revenue, instead of the specie being increased to excess, it would not be increased sufficiently to give the desired stability to the cur- rency. In this connexion, the senator urged an objection against the bill, which I regard as wholly groundless. He said that the payment of the dues of the gov- ernment in specie would create a double demand : a domestic, as well as a foreign, the effects of Avhich would be to increase greatly its fluctuations ; and so deeply was he impressed with the idea, that he drew a vivid picture of its alternate flow from the coast to the interior, and from North to South, and back again. All this is the work of imagination. The effect would be directly the reverse. The more numerous the demand? the less the fluctuation ; so much so, that the greatest stability would be where it exclusively performed the func- tion of circulation, and where each individual must keep a portion to meet his daily demands. This is so obvious, chat I shall not undertake to illustrate it. But the superiority of the bill over the substitute would not be limited only to a more favourable proportion between specie and paper. It would have another important advantage, that cannot be well over-estimated : it would make a prac- tical distinction between cuiTcncy and circulation — between the currency of the country and private and local circulation, under which head bank paper would be comprehended. The effects would be, to render a general explosion of the circulation almost impossible. Whatever derangements might occur would be local, and conlined to some one particular commercial sphere ; and even within its limits there would be a sound currency to fall back on, not partaking of the shock, and which would greatly diminish the intensity and duration of the dis- tress. In the mean time, the general business and finances of the country would proceed, almost without feeling the derangement. With a few remarks on the comparative effects of the two measures on the industry and business of the country, I shall conclude the comparison. What has been said on their relative effects on the currency goes far to decide the question of their relative effects on business and industry. 308 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. I hold a sound and stable currency to be among the greatest encouragements to industry and business generally ; and an unsound and lluctuating one, now- expanding and now contracting, so that no honest man can tell what to do as among the greatest discouragements. The dollar and the eagle are the meas- ure of value, as the yard and the bushel are of quantity ; and what would we think of the incorporation of companies to regulate the latter — to expand or contract, to shorten or lengthen them at pleasure, with the privilege to sell by the contracted or shortened, and buy by the expanded or lengthened ? Is it not seen that it would place the whole industry and business of the country under the control of such companies ? But it would not more certainly effect it than a similar control possessed by the money institutions of the country over the measure of value. But I go farther, and assert confidently, that the excess of paper currency, as well as its unsteadiness, is unfavourable to the in- dustry and business of the country. It raises the price of everything, and, con- sequently, increases the price of production and consumption ; and is, in the end, hostile to every branch of industry. I hold that specie and paper have each their proper sphere : the latter for large and distant transactions, and the former for all others ; and that the near- er our circulation approaches gold and silver, consistently with convenience, the better for the industry and the business of the country. The more specie the better, till that point is reached. When attained, it would combine, in the greatest possible degree, soundness and facility, and would be favourable to the productive classes universally ; I mean men of business, planters, merchants, and manufacturers, as well as operatives. It would be particularly favourable to the South. Our great staples are cash articles everywhere ; and it was well remarked by the senator from Mississippi (Mr. Walker), at the extra session, that we sold at cash prices and bought at paper prices ; that is, sold low and bought high. The manufacturing, commercial, and navigating interests would also feel its beneftcial eflects. It would cheapen productions, and be to manufactu- rers in lieu of a protective tariff. Its effects would be to enable them to meet foreign competition, not by raising prices by high duties, but by enabling them to sell as cheap or ch^japer than the foreigner, which would harmonize every mterest, and place oui manufactures on the most solid basis. It is the only mode by which the foreign market can ever be commanded ; and commanded It would be, with a sound aad moderately expanded currency. Our ingenuity, invention, and industry are p.qual to those of any people ; and all our manu- facturers want is a sound curt*.ncy and an even chance, to meet competition with success everywhere, at home or abroad. But with a bloated and fluctua- ting paper circulation this will be in.possible. Among its many drawbacks, it levies an enormous tax on the community. I have already stated that the communiiy is estimated to have been indebted 40 the banks $475,000,000 at the suspension of specie payments. The inter- est on this sum, estimated at six per cent, (it ought to be higher), would give an annual income to those institutions of upward of thirty millions '; and this is the sum yearly paid by the community for bank accommodations, to the excess of which we owe our bloated and unstable circulation. Never was a circu- lation so worthless furnished at so dear a rate. How much of this vast in- come may be considered as interest on real capital it is diflicult to estimate ; but it would, I suppose, be ample to set down ten millions to that head, which would leave upward of twenty millions annually as the profits derived from banking privileges, over and above a fair compensation for the capital invested, which somebody must pay, and which must ultimately fall on the industry and business of the country. But this enormous expansion of the system is not as- tonishing, so great is the stimulus applied to its growth. Ingenious men of other ages devoted themselves in vain to discover the art of converting the ba- ser metals into gold and silver • but we have conferred on a portion of the com- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 309 jnunity an art still higher — of converting paper, to all intents and purposes, into the precious metals ; and ought we to be surprised that an article so cheap to the manufacturers, and so dear to the rest of the community, should be so great- ly over-supplied, and without any reference to the interest or to the wants of the community ? If we are to believe the senator from Virginia, and others on the same side, we owe almost all our improvements and prosperity to the banking system ; and if it should fail, the age of barbarism would again return. I had supposed that the bases of our prosperity were our free institutions, the wide-spread and fer- tile region we occupy, and the hereditary intelligence and energy of the stock from which we are descended ; but it seems that all these go for nothing, and that the banks are everything. I make no war on them. All I insist on is, that the government shall separate from them, which I believe to be indispensable, for the reasons I have assigned both now and formerly. But I cannot concur in attributing to them our improvements and prosperity. That they contributed to give a strong impulse to industry and enterprise in the early stages of their op- eration, I doubt not. Nothing is more stimulating than an expanding and de- preciating currency. It creates a delusive appearance of prosperity, which puts everything in motion. Every one feels as if he was growing richer as prices lise, and that he has it in his power, by foresight and exertion, to make his for- tune. But it is the nature of stimulus, moral as well as physical, to excite at first, and to depress afterward. The draught which at first causes unnatural excitement and energy, is sure to terminate in corresponding depression and weakness ; nor is it less certain that the stimulus of a currency, expanding be- yond its proper limits, follows the same law. We have had the exhilaration, and the depression has succeeded. We have had the pleasure of getting drunk, and now experience the pain of becoming sober. The good is gone, and the evil has succeeded ; and, on a fair calculation, the latter will be found to be greater than the former. Whatever impulse the banking system was calculated to give to our improvement and prosperity, has already been given ; and the reverse effects will hereafter follow, unless the system should undergo great and radical changes ; the first step towards which would be the adoption of the measure proposed by this bill. I have, Mr. President, finished what I intended to say. I have long antici- pated the present crisis, but did not, imtil 1837, expect its arrival in my time. When I saw its approach, I resolved to do my duty, be the consequences to me what they might ; and I offer my thanks to the Author of my being, that he has given me the resolution and opportunity of discharging what I honestly believe to be my duty in reference to this great subject. How the question will be decided is acknowledged to be doubtful, so nearly are the two houses supposed to be divided ; but whatever may be its fate now, I have the most perfect confidence in its final triumph. The public attention is roused. The subject will be thoroughly investigated, and I have no fears but the side I support will prove to be the side of truth, justice, liberty, civilization, and the advancement of moral and intellectual improvement. XXI. SPEECH IN REPLY TO MR. CLAY, ON THE SUB-TREASURY BH^L, MARCH 10, 1838. I RISE to fulfil a promise I made some time since, to notice at my leisure the reply of the senator from Kentucky farthest from me (Mr. Clay), to my remarks when I first addressed the Senate on the subject now under discussion. 310 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. On comparing with care the reply with the remarks, I am at a loss to determine whether it is the most remarkable for its omissions or mis- statements. Instead of leaving not a hair on the head of my arfTuments, as the senator threatened (to use his not very dignified expression), he has not even attempted to answer a large, and not the least weighty por- tion ; and of that which he has, there is not one fairly stated or fairly an- swered. I speak literally, and without exaggeration ; nor would it be dif- ficult to make good to the letter what I assert, if I could reconcile it to myself to consume the time of the Senate in establishing a long series of negative propositions, in which they could take but little interest, how- ever important they may be regarded by the senator and myself. To avoid so idle a consumption of the time, I propose to present a few in- stances of his misstatements, from which the rest may be inferred ; and, that I may not be suspected of having selecced them, I shall take them in. the order in which they stand in his reply. The Senate will recollect, that when the senator from Virginia farthest from me (Mr. Rives) introduced his substitute, he accompanied it with the remark that it was his first choice, and the second choice of those who are allied with him on this occasion. In noticing this remark, I stated, that if I might judge from appearances, which could scarcely de- ceive one, the senator might have said not only the second, but, under existing circumstances, it was their first choice 5 and that, despairing of a bank for the present, they would support his substitute. Assuming this inference to be correct, I stated that the question was narrowed down, in fact, to the bill and substitute, of which one or the other must be selected. The senator from Kentucky, in his reply, omitted all these qualifications, and represented me as making the absolute assertion that, in the nature of the case, there was no other alternative but the bill or the substitute, and then gravely pointed out two others — to do nothing, or adopt a Na- tional Bank, as if I could possibly be ignorant of what was so obvious. After he had thus replied, not to what I really said, but his own misstate- ment of it, as if to make compensation, he proceeded in the same breath to confirm the truth of what I did say, by giving his support to the sub- stitute, which he called a half-way house, where he could spend some pleasant hours. Nothing is more easy than to win such victories. Having inferred, as has turned out to be the fact, that there was no other alternative at present but the bill and substitute, I next showed the embarrassment to which the gentleman opposite to me would be involved from having, four years ago, on the question of the removal of the de- posites, denounced a league of state banks similar to that proposed to be revived by the substitute. After enlarging on this point, I remarked, that if I might be permitted to state my opinion, the gentlemen had taken a course on this subject unfortunate for themselves and the country — un- fortunate for them, for, let what would come, they would be responsible. If the bill was lost, theirs would be the responsibility ; if the substitute was carried, on them the responsibility would fall ; and if nothing was done, it would be at their door ; and unfortunate for the country, because it had prevented the decision of the question at the extra session, which would j not have failed to put an early termination to the present commercial and i pecuniary embarrassment. This the senator, in his reply, met by sta- ting that I had called on him and his friends to follow my lead ; and thus regarding it, he made it the pretext of some ill-natured personal remarks, which I shall notice hereafter. I never dreamed of making such a call ; and what I said cannot be tortured, by the force of construction, to bear a meaning having the least semblance to it. After making these preliminary remarks, I took up the substitute, and SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 311 showed that it proposed to make a bargain with the" banks, I then stated the particulars and the conditions of the proposed bargain ; that its object was to enable the banks to pay their debts, and for that purpose it proposed to confer important privileges ; to give them the use of the pub- lic funds from the time of deposite to disbursement, and to have their notes received as cash in the dues of the government. I then asked if we liad a ri^ht to make such a bargain. The senator, leavino- out all these particulars, represented me as saying that the government had no right to make a bargain with the banks; and then undertakes to involve me in an inconsistency in supporting the bill, because it proposes to bar- gain with the banks for the use of their vaults as a place of safe-keeping for the public money ; as if there was a possible analogy between the two cases. Nothing is more ■easy than to refute the most demonstrative ar- gument in this way. Drop an essential part of the premises, and the most irresistible conclusion, of course, fails. In the same summary and easy mode of replying to my arguments, the senator perverted my denial that the government had a right to receive bank-notes as cash, into the assertion that it had no right to receive any- thing but cash ; and then accuses me with inconsistency, because I voted, at the extra session, for the bill authorizing the receipt of treasury notes in the dues of the government ; as if any one ever doubted that it could receive its own paper, or securities, in payment of its own debts. Such are the misstatements of the senator, taken in their regular order as they stand in his reply, and they present a fair specimen of what he chooses to consider an answer to my argument. There is not one less unfairly stated, or unfairly met, than the instances I have cited. The senator presented two difficulties in reply to what I said against receiving bank-notes by the government, which demand a passing notice before I dismiss this part of the subject. He objected, first, that it was contrary to the provision of the bill itself, which authorizes the receipts of the notes of specie-paying banks for a limited time. To answer this objection, it will be necessary to advert to the object of the provision. By the provisions of the joint resolutions of 1816, the notes of specie- paying banks are made receivable in the dues of the government ; and, of course, on the resumption of specie payments, bank-notes would again be received by the government as heretofore, without limitation as to time, unless some provision be adopted to prevent it. In a word, the government, though wholly separated, in fact, at present from the banks, is not so by law ; and the object of the provision is to effect a permanent separation in law and in fact. This it proposes to do by a gradual repeal of the joint resolution of 1816, in order to prevent, as far as possible, any injurious effects to the community or the banks. The senator, in making his objection, overlooks the broad distinction between the doing and un- doing of an unconstitutional act. There are some unconstitutional acts that are difficult, if not impossible, to be undone ; such, for instance, as the admission of Louisiana into the Union, admitting it to be unconstitu- tional, which I do not. There are others which cannot be undone sud- denly without wide-spread distress and ruin; such as the protective tariff^, which, accordingly, the Compromise Act allowed upward of eight years for the gradual repeal. Such, also, is the case under consideration, •which, under the provisions of the bill, would be effected in seven jf^ears. In all such cases, I hold it to be not only clearly constitutional for Con- gress to make a gradual repeal, but its duty to do so ; otherwise it would be often impossible to get clear of an unconstitutional act short of a rev- olution. His next objection was, that the reasons which would make the receipt 312 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. of bank-notes unconstitutional, would also make the China trade so, which he represented as absorbing a large portion of the specie of the country. There is no analogy whatever between the two cases. The very object of specie is to carry on trade, and it would be idle to attempt to reoulate the distribution and fluctuation which result from its operation. Expe- rience proves that all attempts of the kind must either prove abortive or mischievous. In fact, it may be laid down as a law, that the more uni- versal the demand for specie, and the less that demand is interrupted, the more steady and uniform its value, and the more perfectly, of course, it fulfils the great purpose of circulation, for which it was intended. There are, however, not a few who, taking a different view, have thought it to be the duty of the government to prohibit the exportation of specie to China, on the very ground which the senator assumes, and I am not cer- tain but that he himself has been in favour of the measure. But the senator did not restrict himself to a reply to my arguments. He introduced personal remarks, which neither self-respect, nor a regard to the cause I support, will permit me to pass without notice, as adverse as I am to all personal controversies. Not only my education and dis- position, but, above all, my conception of the duties beloning to the sta- tion I occupy, indisposes me to such controversies. We are sent here, not to wrangle or indulge in personal abuse, but to deliberate and decide on the common interests of the states of this Union, as far as they have been subjected by the Constitution to our jurisdiction. Thus thinking and feeling, and having perfect confidence in the cause I support, I ad- dressed myself, when 1 was last up, directly and exclusively to the rea- son of the body, carefully avoiding every remark which had the least per- sonal or party bearing. In proof of this, I appeal to you, senators, my witnesses on this occasion. But it seems that no caution on my part could prevent what I was so anxious to avoid. The senator, having no pretext to give a personal direction to the discussion, made a premedi- tated and gratuitous attack on me. I say having no pretext, for there is not a shadow of foundation for the assertion that I called on him and his party to follow my lead, at which he seemed to take offence, as I have already shown. I made no such call, or anything that could be construed into it. It would have been impertinent, in the relation between myself and his party, at any stage of this question ; and absurd at that late period, when every senator had made up his mind. As there was, then, neither provocation nor pretext, what could be the motive of the senator in making the attack 1 It could not be to indulge in the pleasure of personal abuse, the lowest and basest of all our passions, and which is so far beneath the dig- nity of the senator's character and station. Nor could it be with the view to intimidation. The senator knows me too long and too well to make such an attempt. I am sent here by constituents as respectable as those he represents, in order to watch over their peculiar interests, and take care of the general concern ; and if I were capable of being deterred by any one, or any consequence, in discharging my duty, from denouncing what I regard as dangerous or corrupt, or giving a decided and zealous sup- port to what I think right and expedient, I would, in shame and confu- sion, return my commission to the patriotic and gallant state I represent, to be placed in more resolute and trustworthy hands. If, then, neither the one nor the other of these be the motive, what, I again repeat, can it bel In casting my eyes over the whole surface, I can see but one — which is, that the senator, despairing of the sufficiency of his reply to overthrow my arguments, had resorted to personalities, in the hope, with their aid, to effect what he could not accomplish by main strength. He well knows that the force of an argument on moral or po- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 313 litical subjects depends greatly on the character of him who advanced it j and that, to cast suspicion on his motive, or to shake confidence in his un- derstanding, is often the most effectual mode to destroy its force. Thus viewed, his personalities may be fairly regarded as constituting a part of his reply to my argument ; and we, accordingly, find the senator throw- ing them in front, like a skilful general, in order to weaken my arguments before he brought on his main attack. In repelling, then, his personal attacks, I also defend the cause which I advocate. It is against that his blows are aimed, and he strikes at it through me, because he believes his blows will be the more effectual. Having given this direction to his reply, he has imposed on me a double duty to repel his attacks — duty to myself and the cause I support. I shall not decline its performance ; and when it is discharged, I trust I shall have placed my character as far beyond the darts which he has hurled at it as my arguments have proved to be above his abilities to reply to them. In doing this, I shall be compelled to speak of myself. No one can be more sensible than I am how odious it is to speak of one's self. I shall endeavour to confine myself within the limits of the strictest propriety j but if anything should escape me that may wound the most delicate ear, the odium ought, in justice, to fall, not on me, but the senator who, by his unprovoked and wanton attack, has imposed on me the painful neces- sity of speaking of myself. The leading charge of the senator — that on which all others depend, and which, being overthrown, they fall to the ground — is, that I have gone over ; have left his side, and joined the other. By this vague and indef- inite expression, I presume he meant to imply that I had either changed my opinion, or abandoned my principles, or deserted my party. If he did not mean one or all ; if I have changed neither opinions, principles, nor party, then the charge meant nothing deserving notice. But if he in- tended to imply, what I have presumed he did, I take issue on the fact — ■ I meet and repel the charge. It happened fortunately for me, fortunately for the cause of truth and justice, that it was not the first time that I had offered my sentiments on the question now under consideration. There is scarcely a single point in the present issue on which I did not expli- citly express my opinion four years ago, in my place here, when the re- moval of the deposites, and the questions connected with it, were under discussion — so explicitly as to repel effectually the charge of any change on my part, and to make it impossible for me to pursue any other course but what I have without involving myself in gross inconsistency. I in- tend not to leave so important a point to rest on my bare assertion. What I assert stands on record, which I now hold in my possession, and intend, at the proper time, to introduce and read. But, before I do that, it will be proper I should state the questions now at issue, and my course in relation to them ; so that, having a clear and distinct perception of them, you may, senators, readily and satisfactorily compare and deter- mine whether my course on the present occasion coincides with the opin- ions I then expressed. There are three questions, as is agreed by all, involved in the present issue: Shall we separate the government from the banks, or shall we re- vive the league of state banks, or create a National Bank 1 My opinior^ and course in reference to each are well known. 1 prefer the separatioa to either of the others ; and, as between the other two, 1 regard a Na- tional Bank as a more efficient and a less corrupting fiscal agent than a league of state banks. It is also well known that I have expressed my- self on the present occasion hostile to the banking system as it exists, and against the constitutional power of making a bank, unless on the as- R R 314 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. sumption that we have the right to receive and treat bank-notes as cash in our fiscal operations, which I, for the first time, have denied on the present occasion. Now, I entertained and expressed all these opinions, on a different occasion, four years ago, except the right of receiving bank- notes, in regard to which I then reserved my opinion ; and if all this should be fully and clearly established by the record, from speeches delivered and published at the time, the charge of the senator must, in the opinion of all, however prejudiced, sink to the ground. I am now prepared to introduce and have the record read. I delivered two speeches in the session of ISSS-S^, one on the removal of the deposites, and the other on the question of the renewal of the charter of the late Bank. I ask the secretary to turn to the volume lying before him, and read the three paragraphs marked in my speech on the deposites. I will thank him to raise his voice and read slowly, so that he may be distinctly heard ; and I must ask you, senators, to give your attentive hearing, for on the coin- cidence between my opinions then and my course now, my vindication against this unprovoked and groundless charge rests. [" If (said Mr. C.) this was a question of bank or no bank ; if it involved the existence of the banking system, it would indeed be a great question — one of the first magnitude ; and, with my present impression, long en- tertained and daily increasing, I would hesitate, long hesitate, before I would be found under the banner of the system. I have great doubts (if doubts they may be called) as to the soundness and tendency of the whole system, in all its modifications. I have great fears that it will be found hostile to liberty and the advance of civilization ; fatally hostile to liberty in our country, where the system exists in its worst and most dangerous form. Of all institutions afTecting the great question of the distribution of wealth — a question least explored, and the most important of any in the whole range of political economy — the banking institution has, if not the greatest, among the greatest, and, I fear, most pernicious influence on the mode of distribution. Were the question really before us, I would not shun the responsibility, great as it might be, of freely and fully offer- ing my sentiments on these deeply-important points ; but as it is, I must content myself with the few remarks which I have thrown out. " What, then, is the real question which now agitates the country \ I answer, it is a struggle between the executive and legislative departments of the government ; a struggle, not in relation to the existence of the bank, but which, Congress or the President, should have the power to create a bank, and the consequent control over the currency of the coun- try. This is the real question. Let us not deceive ourselves. This league, this association of banks, created by the executive, bound to- gether by its influence, united in common articles of association, vivified and sustained by receiving the deposites of the public money, and having their xiotes converted, by being received everywhere by the treasury, into the common currency of the country, is, to all intents and purposes, a Bank of the United States, the Executive Bank of the United States, as distinguished from that of Congress. " However it might fail to perform satisfactorily the useful functions of the Bank of the United States, as incorporated by law, it would outstrip it, far outstrip it, in all its dangerous qualities: in extending the power, the influence, and the corruption of the government. It is impossible to conceive any institution more admirably calculated to advance these objects. Not only the selected banks, but the whole banking institutions of the country, and, with them, the entire money power, for the purposes of speculation, peculation, and corruption, would be placed under the control of the executive. A system of menaces and promises would be SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALHOUN. 315 established: of menaces to the banks in possession of the deposites, but which might not be entirely subservient to executive views, and of prom- ises of future favours to those who may not as yet enjoy its favours. Between the two, the banks would be left without influence, honour, or honesty, and a system of speculation and stock-jobbing would commence unequalled in the annals of our country. " So long as the question is one between a Bank of the United States, incorporated by Congress, and that system of banks which has been cre- ated by the will of the executive, it is an insult to the understanding to discourse on the pernicious tendency and unconstitutionality of the Bank of the United States. To bring up that question fairly and legitimately, you must go one step farther — you must divorce the government and the bankino- system. You must refuse all connexion with banks. You must neither receive nor pay away bank-notes ; you must go back to the old system of the strong box, and of gold and silver. If you have a right to receive bank-notes at all — to treat them as money by receiving them in your dues, or paying them away to creditors — you have a right to create a bank. Whatever the government receives and treats as money is money ; and if it be money, then they have the right, under the Consti- tution, to regulate it. Nay, they are bound, by a high obligation, to adopt the most efficient means, according to the nature of that which they have recognised as money, to give to it the utmost stability and uniformity of value. And if it be iVi the shape of bank-notes, the most efficient means of giving those qualities is a Bank of the United States, incorporated by Congress. Unless you give the highest practical uniformity to the value of bank-notes — so long as you receive them in 5'^our dues and treat them as money, you violate that provision of the Constitution which provides that taxation shall be uniform throughout the United States. There is no other alternative. I repeat, you must divorce the government entirely from the banking system, or, if not, you are bound to incorporate a bank, as the only safe and efficient means of giving stability and uniformity to the currency. And should the deposites not be restored, and the present illegal and unconstitutional connexion between the executive and the league of banks continue, I shall feel it my duty, if no one else moves, to introduce a measure to prohibit government from receiving or touching bank-notes in a"ny shape whatever, as the only means left of giving safety and stability to the currency, and saving the country from corruption and ruin." Such were my sentiments, delivered four years ago, on the question of the removal of the deposites, and now standing on record ; and I now call your attention, senators, while they are fresh in your minds, and be- fore other extracts are read, to the opinions I then entertained and ex- pressed, in order that you may compare them with those that I have ex- pressed, and the course I have pursued on the present occasion. In the first place, I then expressed myself explicitly and decidedly against the banking system, and intimated, in language too strong to be mistaken, that, if the question was then bank or no bank, as it now is, as far as government is concerned, I would not be found on the side of the bank. Now, I ask, I appeal to the candour of all, even the most prejudiced, is there anything in all this contradictory to my present opinions or course 1 On the contrary, having entertained and expressed these opinions, could I at this time, when the issue I then supposed is actually presented, have gone against the separation without gross inconsistency % Again : I then declared myself to be utterly opposed to a combination or league of state banks, as being the most efficient and corrupting fiscal agent the govern- ment could select, and more objectionable than a Bank of the United 316 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. States. I again appeal, is there a sentiment or a word in all this contra- dictory to what I have said or done on the present occasion 1 So far otherwise, is there not a perfect harmony and coincidence throughout, which, considering the distance of time and the difference of the occasion, is truly remarkable, and this extending to all the great and governing questions now at issue '? But the removal of the deposites was not the only question discussed at that remarkable and important session. The charter of the United States Bank was then about to expire. The senator from Massachusetts nearest me (Mr. Webster), then at the head of the Committee on Finance, suggested, in his place, that he intended to introduce a bill to renew the charter. I clearly perceived that the movement, if made, would fail ; and that there was no prospect of doing anything to arrest the danger ap- proaching, unless the subject was taken up on the broad question of the currency ; and that, if any connexion of the government with the banks could be justified at all, it must be in that relation. I am not among those who believe that the currency was in a sound condition when the deposites were removed in 1834. I then believed, and experience has proved I was correct, that it was deeply and dangerously diseased ; and that the most efficient measures were necessary to prevent the catas- trophe which has since befallen the circulation of the country. There was then not more than one dollar in specie, on an. average, in the banks, including the United States Bank and all, for six of bank-notes in circu- lation, and not more than one in eleven compared to the liabilities of the banks, and this while the United States Bank was in full and active oper- ation, which proves conclusively that its charter ought not to be re- newed, if renewed at all, without great modifications. I saw, also, that the expansion of the circulation, great as it then was, must still farther increase ; that the disease lay deep in the system ; that the terms on which the charter of the Bank of England was renewed would give a^ western direction to specie, which, instead of correcting the disorder, by substituting specie for bank-notes in our circulation, would become the basis of new banking operations that would greatly increase the swelling tide. Such were my conceptions then, and I honestly and earnestly en- deavoured to carry them into effect, in order to prevent the approaching catastrophe. The political and personal relations between myself and the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) were then not the kindest. We stood in opposition, at the preceding session, on the great question growing out of the conflict between the state I represented and the General Govern- ment, which could not pass away without leaving unfriendly feelings on both sides ; but, where duty is involved, I am not in the habit of permitting my personaUrelations to interfere. In my solicitude to avert coming dangers, I sought an interview, through a common friend, in order to com- pare opinions as to the proper course to be pursued. We met, and con- versed freely and fully, but parted without agreeing. I expressed to him my deep regret at 'our disagreement, and informed him that, although I could not agree with him, I would throw no embarrassment in his way, but should feel it to be my duty, when he made his motion to introduce a bill to renew the charter of the Bank, to express my opinion at large on the state of the currency, and the proper course to be pursued, which 1 accordingly did. On that memorable occasion I stood almost alone. One party supported the league of state banks, and the other the United States Bank, the charter of which the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) proposed to renew for six years. Nothing was left me but to place myself distinctly before the country on the ground I occupiedj SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 317 Avhich I did, fully and explicitly, in the speech I delivered on the occasion. In justice to myself, I ought to have every word of it read on the pres- ent occasion. It would of itself be a full vindication of my course. I stated and enlarged on all the points to which I have already referred j objected to the recharter as proposed by the mover, and foretold that what has since happened would follow, unless something effectual was done to prevent it. As a remedy, I proposed to use the Bank of the United States as a temporary expedient, fortified with strong guards, in order to resist and turn back the swelling tide of circulation. With this view, I proposed to prohibit the issue of any note under ten dollars at first, and, after a certain interval, under twenty ; and to refuse to recei\se the notes of any bank that issued notes under five dollars, or that re- ceived the notes of any bank that issued less, in order to make a total separation between the banks that should refuse to discontinue the issue of small notes and the others, in the hope that the influence of the latter, with the voice of the community, would ultimately compel a discontinu-