B F vfe ■ ■ ■ Class 3F& 85 Book DOBELL COLLECTION / ON INSTINCT. ON INSTINCT. A LECTURE DELIVERED BEFORE THE DUBLIN NATURAL HISTORY SOCIETY, 11th NOVEMBER, 1842. RICHARD WHATELY, D.D., ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN. DUBLIN: JAMES M C GLASHAN, 21, D'OLIER-STREET. W. S. ORR AND CO., 147, STRAND, LONDON. MDCCCXLVII. 4^ / 205449 .'13 ON INSTINCT. There is no particular branch of Natural History upon which I should be as well qualified to give in- struction, or with which I am as well acquainted, as many who are here present. If I were to attempt to instruct either those who had paid much attention to such a study, or again those who were mere beginners, in the one case, I should be undertaking to teach those who were greater proficients than myself; in the other, I should probably be a less skilful instruc- tor than they might find in persons more conversant with each particular branch of the subject. But hav- ing been called upon to deliver a lecture upon some point connected with Natural History, I consider it would be more suitable in respect to my slender at- tainments in each particular branch of Natural His- tory, and to the circumstances of the Society, to select a point in which Natural History comes in contact with the Philosophy of the Human Mind, and those metaphysical pursuits to which I have mostly devoted myself. Besides the intrinsic advantage of directing the atten- tion of my audience to this particular branch of study, another benefit resulting from such a course of inquiry is, to relieve the study of Natural History from some part of the discredit under which, with many, it has laboured, in being considered as a frivolous occupation D ON INSTINCT. of the time and faculties of man, leading him to re- flect upon, examine, search into, and ascertain the facts connected with this science, and all for no pur- pose beyond the mere innocent amusement arising from the study — a study thus represented as con- ducive in no way to the development of the higher faculties of the mind, or to the attainment of any other benefit to mankind. The charge does fairly lie against Natural History thus, and only thus studied. And the same might be said with regard even to the cultivation of litera- ture. If a man went no farther in literary pur- suits than to be a good judge of diiferent editions of books, or the different modes of binding or printing those books, he might make a very useful librarian ; but it could not be said that he had turned literary knowledge to any of the more dignified purposes for which it might be employed. There, no doubt, are such persons ; but it would not therefore be true to re- gard Literature altogether as merely a Bibliomania — a mere curiosity about rare books, because some have no other than such literature. And equally unfair would it be to pronounce a similar contemptuous cen- sure on Naturalists, because there are some among them who correspond to those librarian-students just alluded to — men who are content to arrange and label, as it were, the volumes of the great Book of Nature, and then forget to peruse them, or peruse them without intelligence, and without profit. The point which I have chosen as forming a con- tact between Zoology and the branch of Philosophy which has relation to the human mind, is the sub- ject of INSTINCT. If I or my audience were to estimate the propriety of my taking up the examina- tion of such a subject, from the degree of information from existing books which I could bring to bear upon it, my claim to their attention would be very low in- deed. I have found so little of a systematic p,p- ON INSTINCT. / count of the matter in all the authors I have ever read, that it struck me it might be desirable to call the attention of the audience to the subject. I shall be occupied rather in proposing questions for consi- deration, than in answering questions myself. In many subjects it might be objectionable to take this course ; but in this case something may be gained by pointing out to you what to ask, and to what you should direct your inquiries ; though I could not un- dertake to answer the questions which I may propose, satisfactorily to myself. At any rate, if I can- not give you satisfaction, I hope I can give you un- satisfaction — that is, I hope I may be able to render you dissatisfied with the extent of your knowledge, by pointing out how much there is to be known, to be studied, and to be inquired into. A Treatise upon the subject of Animal Instincts is a desideratum. I have seen in many books interest- ing descriptions of different instincts, curiously illus- trated by well authenticated facts. I have seen mi- nute details of important and interesting characteris- tics of Instinct. But I never saw anything like a phi- losophic or systematic view of the subject ; nor have I ever heard a distinct and satisfactory answer to the question, "What do you mean by Instinct?" It seems, therefore, that however far advanced we may be in a Dictionary on the subject of Instinct, a Gram- mar is a thing very much wanted. It is in general rather implied and supposed, than distinctly laid down, that a Being is acting instinctively when impelled blindly towards some end which the agent does not aim at or perceive ; and on the other hand, that it is acting rationally, when acting with a view to, and for the sake of, some end which it does perceive. But in the ordinary language even of Naturalists, and even when they are describing and recounting instances of remarkable Instincts, we often meet with much that is inconsistent with this view. And when anv one 6 ON INSTINCT. says, as many are accustomed to do, that Brutes are actuated by Instinct, and Man by Reason, this lan- guage has the appearance, at least, of being much at variance with such a view. When I speak of Animal-instinct, it should be remembered that I include Man. I presume that you have all learned that Man is an Animal, although it is a fact frequently forgotten by many. Man pos- sesses Instinct, though in a lower degree than most other animals ; his inferiority in these being com- pensated by his superiority in other respects. And again: as Man possesses Instinct in a lower degree than the brutes, so, in a lower degree than Man, brutes — at least the higher brutes — possess Reason. As some things felt and done by Man are allowed to be instinctive — as hunger and thirst for instance, are evidently instincts — so many things done by brutes, at least by the higher description of brutes, would be, if done by man, regarded as resulting from the exercise of Reason — I mean where the actions of the brute spring, to all appearance, from the same im- pulse as the rational acts of man. In many instances we know this is not the case. A man builds a house from Reason — a bird builds a nest from Instinct ; and no one would say that the bird, in this, actedfrom Reason. But mother instances, Man not only does the same things as the brutes, but does them from the same kind of impulse, which should be called instinctive, whether in man or brute. And again, several things are done by brutes, which are evi- dently not instinctive, but, to all appearance, no less rational than human acts : being not only the same actions, but done from the same impulse. I shall not at present inquire what is called Reason, any more than what is denominated Instinct. I would only say that several things which are allowed by every one to be acts of Reason, when done by a man, are done by brutes manifestly under a similar impulse — I mean ON INSTINCT. 9 such things as brutes learn to do, either by their own unaided experience, or, as taught by Man. Do- cility is evidently characteristic of Reason. To talk of an elephant, a horse, or a dog doing by Instinct such things as it has been taught, would be as absurd as to talk of a child's learning to read and write by Instinct. But, moreover, Brutes are, in many instances, capable of learning even what they have not been taught by Man. They have been found able to com- bine, more or less, the means of accomplishing a cer- tain end, from having learned by experience that such and such means so applied, would conduce to it. The higher animals of course show more of Reason, than the lower. There are many instances of its existence in domestic animals. The Dog is regarded as the animal most com- pletely man's companion; and I will mention one, out of many specimens of the kind of Reason to which I refer, as exhibited in a dog. The inci- dent is upon record, and there seems no ground for doubting it, although it did not come under my own personal observation. This dog being left on the bank of a river by his master, who had gone up the river in a boat, attempted to join him. He plunged into the water, but not making allowance for the strength of the stream, which car- ried him considerably below the boat, he could not beat up against it. He landed and made allowance for the current of the river, by leaping in at a place higher up. The combined action of the stream, and his swimming, carried him in an oblique direction, and he thus reached the boat. Having made the trial, and failed, he apparently judged from the failure of the first attempt, that his course was to go up the stream, make allowance for its strength, and thus gain the boat. I do not vouch for the accuracy of this anecdote ; but I see no grounds for disbeliev- 10 ON INSTINCT. ing it, as it is of a piece with many other recorded instances. There is another instance of this nature, which did come under my own observation, and is more worthy of being recorded, because the actor was a Cat — a species of animal which is considered gene- rally very inferior in sagacity to a dog. This cat lived many years in my mother's family, and its feats of sagacity were witnessed by her, my sisters, and myself. It was known, not merely once or twice, but habitually, to ring the parlour bell whenever it wished the door to be opened. Some alarm was ex- cited on the first occasion that it turned bell-ringer. The family had retired to rest, and in the middle of the night the parlour bell was rung violently : the sleepers were startled from their repose, and pro- ceeded down stairs, with pokers and tongs, to inter- rupt, as they thought, the predatory movement of some burglar ; but they were agreeably surprised to discover that the bell had been rung by pussy ; who frequently repeated the act whenever she wanted to get out of the parlour. Here are two clear cases of acts done by a cat and dog, which, if done by a man, would be called reason. Every one would admit that the actions were rational — not, to be sure, proceeding from a very high exertion of intellect; but the dog, at least, rationally jumped into the stream at a dis- tance higher up from the boat, into which he wished to get, because he found that the stream would thus carry him to it, instead of from it ; and the cat pulled the parlour bell, because she had observed that when it was rung by the family, the servant opened the door. It is quite clear that if such acts were done by Man, they would be regarded as an exercise of Reason ; and I do not know why, when performed by brutes, evident- ly by a similar mental process, as far as can be judged, they should not bear the same name. To speak of a ON INSTINCT. 11 cat's having an instinct to pull a bell when desirous of going out at the door, or of an elephant's lifting up a cannon, or beating down a wall, at his driver's com- mand, by instinct, would be to use words at random. On the other hand, hunger and thirst are as in- stinctive in man as in brutes. An invalid, indeed, when taking food without appetite, does not act upon Instinct ; he acts upon Reason, which tells him that unless he eat, his strength would not support the dis- ease under which he labours ; but the man who eats when he is hungry, and drinks when he is thirsty, acts as truly from instinct as the new-born babe when it sucks. It appears, then, that we can neither deny Reason universally and altogether to brutes, nor Instinct to Man ; but that each possesses a share of both, though in very different proportions. Then the question naturally arises — which is one I propose, but do not presume positively to decide — "What is the differ- ence between Man and the higher brutes ?" We have already decided, in reference to one point, what the difference does not consist in. It is not that brutes are wholly destitute of everything that, in Man, we call Reason. Instances to the contrary, si- milar to what have been above mentioned, might be produced to a great extent. But this would be su- perfluous ; because, as has been said, the docility of many brutes is familiar to all : and if any one could seriously speak of teaching anything to a Being wholly devoid of reason, he would evidently be using the word in some sense quite different from that in which it is ordinarily employed. And yet the difference between Man and brute, in respect of intelligence, appears plainly to be not a difference in mere degree, but in hind. An intelli- gent brute is not like a stupid man. The intelligence and sagacity shown by the elephant, monkey, and 12 ON INSTINCT. dog, are something very different from the lowest and most stupid of human Beings. It is a difference in kind, not merely in degree. It strikes me that in all the most striking instances in which brutes display reason, all the intellectual operation seems to consist in the com- bination of means to an end. The dog who swam from a higher part of the river to reach the boat ; the cat who rang the bell to call the servant ; the elephant of whom we have read that was instructed by his keeper off hand to raise himself from a tank into which he had fallen, by means of faggots, thrown into him by the keeper, on which the elephant raised himself from the pit, and from which all the wind- lasses and cranes in the Indian empire could not have extricated him ; the monkey in the Zoological Gar- dens, who used to possess himself of a nut placed beyond the reach of his paw, by doubling a straw, and casting this round it, by which means he was enabled to draw it towards him : these, and many other similar instances of sagacity, appear to consist in the adaptation of means to an end. But the great difference between Man and the higher brutes appears to me to consist in the power of using SIGNS — arbitrary signs — and employing language as an instrument of thought. We are ac- customed to speak of language as useful to man, to communicate his thoughts. I consider this as only one of the uses of language. That use of language which, though commonly overlooked, is the most characteristic of Man, is as an instrument of thought. Man is not the only animal that can make use of language to express what is passing within his mind, and that can understand, more or less, what is so ex- pressed by another. Some brutes can be taught to utter, and many others, to understand, more or less imperfectly, sounds expressive of certain emotions. Every one knows that the dog understands the gene- ON INSTINCT. 13 ral drift of expressions used ; and parrots can be taught not only to pronounce words, but to pronounce them with some consciousness of the general mean- ing of what they utter. We commonly speak, indeed, of (i saying so-and-so by rote as a parrot ;" but it is by no means true that they are quite unconscious of the meaning of the sounds. Parrots do not utter words at random; for they call for food; when dis- pleased, scold ; and use expressions in reference to particular persons which they have heard applied to them. They evidently have some notion of the general drift of many expressions which they use. Almost every animal which is capable of being tamed can, in some degree, use language as an indi- cation of what passes within. But no animal has the use of language as an (i instrument of thought." Man makes use of general signs in the applica- tion of his power of Abstraction by which he is enabled to reason ; and the use of arbitrary general signs, what logicians call " common terms" with a facility of thus using Abstraction at pleasure, is a character- istic of Man. By the expression " making use of abstraction," I do not mean our merely recognizing the general cha- racter of some individual, not seen before, of a class we are acquainted with ; as when, for instance, any one sees for the first time some particular man or horse, and knows that the one is a man, and the other a horse. For this is evidently done by brutes. A bird, for instance, which has been used to fly from men, and not from oxen, will fly from an individual man whom it has never seen before, and will have no fear of an ox. But this is not having what I call the power of using abstraction at pleasure. It is merely that similar qualities affect animals in a similar way. With certain description of forms are associated ideas of fear or gratification. Thus a young calf readily comes up to a woman whom it sees for the 14 ON INSTINCT. first time, because a woman has been used to feed it with milk ; while the young of wild animals fly from any human Being. But I speak of Man being able so to use the power of abstraction as to employ signs to denote any or every individual of a certain class. Perhaps you may think that I am giving a remark- able instance of instinctive love of an author for the offspring of his own mind, by quoting from a work written by myself. But it is necessary to refer to the passages which treat of language as an instrument of thought in the " Elements of Logic :" — " In inward solitary reasoning, many, and perhaps most persons, but especially those not much accustomed to read or speak concerning the subjects that occupy their thoughts, make use, partly, of Signs that are not ar- bitrary and conventional, but which consist of men- tal-cow ceptions of individual objects ; taken, each, as a representative of a Class. E.g.a, person practically conversant with mechanical operations, but not with discussions of them in words, may form a conception of — in colloquial phrase, c figure to himself — a cer- tain field or room, with whose shape he is familiar, and may employ this, in his inward trains of thought, as a Sign, to represent, for instance, * parallelogram' or c trapezium,' &c. ; or he may ' figure to himself a man raising a weight by means of a pole, and may use this conception as a general Sign, in place of the term ' lever;' and the terms themselves he maybe unacquainted with ; in which case he will be at a loss to impart distinctly to others his own reasonings ; and in the attempt, will often express himself (as one may frequently observe in practical men unused to reading and speaking) not only indistinctly, but even erroneously. Hence, partly, may have arisen the belief in those supposed ' abstract ideas' which will be hereafter alluded to, and in the possibility of rea- soning without the use of any Signs at all. ON INSTINCT. 15 "Supposing there really exist in the mind — or in some minds — certain ' abstract ideas,' by means of which a train of reasoning may be carried on indepen- dently of Common-terms [or Signs of any kind] — for this is the real point at issue — and that a system of Logic may be devised, having reference to such rea- soning — supposing this — still, as I profess not to know anything of these ' abstract ideas/ or of any f Universals' except Signs, or to be conscious of any such reasoning process, I at least must confine myself to the attempt to teach the only Logic I do pretend to understand. Many, again, who speak slightingly of Logic altogether, on the ground of its being ' con- versant only about words, entertain fundamentally the same views as the above ; that is, they take for granted that Reasoning may be carried on altogether independently of Language ; which they regard (as was above remarked) merely as a means of communi- cating it to others. And a Science or Art which they suppose to be confined to this office, they accordingly rank very low. " Such a view I believe to be very prevalent. The majority of men would probably say, if asked, that the use of Language is peculiar to Man ; and that its office is to express to one another our thoughts and feelings. But neither of these is strictly true. Brutes do possess in some degree the power of being taught to understand what is said to them, and some of them even to utter sounds expressive of what is passing within them. But they all seem to be incapable of another very important use of Language, which does characterize Man — viz., the employment of ' Com- mon-terms' ('general-terms') formed by Abstraction, as instruments of thought ; by which alone a train of Reasoning may be carried on. "And accordingly, a Deaf-mute, before he has been taught a Language — either the Finger-language or Beading — cannot carry on a train of Beasoning, any 16 ON INSTINCT. more than a Brute. He differs indeed from a Brute in possessing the mental capability of employing Lan- guage ; but he can no more make use of that capabi- lity, till he is in possession of some System of arbitrary general-signs, than a person born blind from Cataract can make use of his capacity of Seeing, till the Cata- ract is removed. " Hence it will be found by any one who will ques- tion a Deaf-mute who has been taught Language after having grown up, that no such thing as a train of Reasoning had ever passed through his mind before he was taught. " If indeed we did reason by means of those ' Ab- stract ideas' which some persons talk of, and if the Language we use served merely to communicate with other men, then a person would be able to reason who had no knowledge of any arbitrary Signs. But there are no grounds for believing that this is possible ; nor consequently, that ' Abstract-ideas' (in that sense of the word) have any existence at all. "There have been some very interesting accounts published, by travellers in x\m erica, and by persons residing there, of a girl named Laura Bridgeman, who has been, from birth, not only Deaf and Dumb, but also Blind. She has, however, been taught the fin- ger-language, and even to read what is printed in raised characters, and also to write. "The remarkable circumstance in reference to the present subject, is, that when she is alone, her fingers are generally observed to be moving, though the signs are so slight and imperfect that others cannot make out what she is thinking of. But if they inquire of her, she will tell them. "It seems that, having once learnt the use of Signs, she finds the necessity of them as an Instru- ment of thought, when thinking of anything beyond mere individual objects of sense. " And doubtless every one else does the same ; ON INSTINCT. 17 though in our case, no one can (as in the case of Laura Bridgeman) see the operation : nor, in general, can it be heard ; though some few persons have a habit of occasionally audibly talking to themselves ; or as it is called, c thinking aloud.' But the Signs we commonly use in silent reflection are merely mental conceptions, usually of uttered words : and these doubt- less are such as could be hardly at all understood by another, even if uttered audibly. For we usually think in a kind of short-hand (if one may use the expres- sion), like the notes one sometimes takes down on pa- per to help the memory, which consist of a word or two — or even a letter — to suggest a whole sentence ; so that such notes would be unintelligible to any one else. "It has been observed also that this girl, when asleep, and doubtless dreaming, has her fingers fre- quently in motion : being in fact talking in her sleep. " Universally, it is to be steadily kept in mind, that no ' common-terms' have, as the names of Indi- viduals [ ( singular terms'] have, any real thing exist- ing in nature corresponding to each of them, but that each of them is merely a Sign denoting a certain in- adequate notion which our minds have formed of an Individual, and which, consequently, not including the notion of ' individuality' \numerical-xm\tf], nor anything wherein that individual differs from certain others, is applicable equally well to all, or any of them. Thus 'man' denotes no real thing (as the sect of the Realists maintained) distinct from each in- dividual, but merely any man, viewed inadequately, i.e., so as to omit, and abstract from, all that is pe- culiar to each individual ; by which means the term becomes applicable alike to any one of several indivi- duals, or [in the plural] to several together. " The unity [singleness or sameness] of what is de- noted by a common-term, does not, as in the case of a 18 ON INSTINCT. singular-texm, consist in the object itself being (in the primary sense) one and the same, but in the one- ness of the Sign itself : which is like a Stamp (for marking bales of goods or cattle), that impresses on each a similar mark ; called thence, in the secondary sense, one and the same mark. And just such a stamp, to the mind, is a Common-term ; which being itself one, conveys to each of an indefinite number of minds an impression precisely similar, and thence called, in the transferred sense, one and the same Idea. " And we arbitrarily fix on the circumstance which we in each instance chuse to abstract and consider separately, disregarding all the rest ; so that the same individual may thus be referred to any of several different Species, and the same Species, to several Genera, as suits our purpose. Thus it suits the Farmer's purpose to class his cattle with his ploughs, carts, and other possessions, under the name of ' stock :' the Naturalist, suitably to his purpose, classes them as ' quadrupeds, 9 which term would in- clude wolves, deer, &c, which, to the farmer, would be a most improper classification : the Commissary, again, would class them with corn, cheese, fish, &c, as 'provision ;' that which is most essential in one view, being subordinate in another. " Nothing so much conduces to the error of Real- ism as the transferred and secondary use of the words 1 same, 5 ' one and the same,' ' identical,' &c, when it is not clearly perceived and carefully borne in mind, that they are employed in a secondary sense, and that more frequently even than in the primary. " Suppose e.g. a thousand persons are thinking of the Sun : it is evident it is one and the same indivi- dual object on which all these minds are employed. So far all is clear. But suppose all these persons are thinking of a Triangle — not any individual triangle, but Triangle in general — and considering, perhaps, ON INSTINCT. 19 the equality of its angles to two right angles : it would seem as if, in this case also, their minds were all em- ployed on 'one and the same' object : and this object of their thoughts, it may be said, cannot be the mere word Triangle, but that which is meant by it : nor again, can it be everything that the word will apply to : for they are not thinking of triangles, but of oft? thing. Those who do not maintain that this ' one* thing' has an existence independent of the human mind, are in general content to tell us, by way of ex- planation, that the object of their thoughts is the ab- stract ' idea' of a triangle ; an explanation which sa- tisfies, or at least silences many ; though it may be doubted whether they very clearly understand what sort of thing an ' idea' is ; which may thus exist in a thousand different minds at once, and yet be ' one and the same.' " The fact is, that ' unity' and f sameness' are in such cases employed, not in the primary sense, but to denote perfect similarity. When we say that ten thousand different persons have all c one and the same' Idea in their minds, or are all of ( one and the same' Opinion, we mean no more than that they are all thinking exactly alike. When we say that they are all in the ( same' posture, we mean that they are all placed alike ; and so also they are said all to have the * same' disease, when they are all diseased alike." It is hardly necessary to add, that I am a decided nominalist. The abstract Ideas of which persons speak, and the mere names of which language is represented as furnishing, are things to which I am a stranger. The using of Signs of some kind, such as have been above described, the combining and re- combining of these in various ways, and the analyz- ing and constructing of passages wherein they occur, this is what I mean by the employment of language as an instrument of thought ; and this is what no brute has arrived at. Brutes have (as has been said 20 ON INSTINCT. above), more or less, the use of language to convey to others what is passing within them. But the power of employing Abstraction at pleasure, so as to form " general Signs" and make use of these Signs as an instrument of thought, in carrying on the process which is strictly called Reasoning, is probably the chief difference of Man and the brute ; but Reason, in a sense in which the term is often employed, is, to a certain extent, common to Man and brute. And In- stinct, again, although possessed by Man in an infe- rior degree to that of the brutes, is, in some points, common to both. Brutes, as has been said, have not command over Abstraction, so as to make use of it to form general Signs ; and it may be added, that different men are, as to this point, elevated in various degrees — some more and some less — above the brutes. A great degree of a certain kind of intelligence, similar to what is found in the higher descriptions of brutes, is found in some men who have a great inaptitude for abstract Reasoning. Persons may often be met with who have much of a certain practical sagacity, and are accounted knowing, clever, and ingenious, who yet are even below the average in respect of any scientific studies ; and others again, who rank high in that particular kind of intelligence, which is altogether peculiar to Man, are often greatly inferior to others in those mental powers which are, to a certain degree, common to Man with the higher brutes. To sum up, then, what has been hitherto said : it appears that there are certain kinds of intellectual power — of what, in Man, at least, is always called Reason — common, to a certain extent, to Man with the higher brutes. And again : that there are cer- tain powers wholly confined to Man — especially all those concerned in what is properly called Reason- ON INSTINCT. 21 ing — all employment of language as an instrument of thought ; and it appears that Instinct, again, is, to a certain extent, common to Man with brutes, though far less in amount, and less perfect in Man ; and more and more developed in other animals, the lower we descend in the scale. An Instinct is, as has been said above, a blind ten- dency to some mode of action, independent of any consideration on the part of the agent, of the end to which the action leads. Hunger and thirst are no less an instinct in the adult, than the desire of the new-born babe to suck, although it has no idea that milk is in the breast, or that it is nutritious. When, on the other hand, a man builds a house, in order to have shelter from the weather, and a comfortable place to pursue his trade, or reside in, the act is not called Instinct ; while that term does apply to a bird's building a nest : because Man has not any blind desire to build the house. The rudest savage always contemplates, in forming his hut, the very object of providing a safeguard against the weather, and per- haps against wild beasts and other enemies. But, supposing Man had the Instinct of the bird — suppos- ing a man who had never seen a house, or thought of protecting himself, had a tendency to construct something analogous to a nest ; or again, supposing a bird was so endowed with reason as to build a nest with a view to lay eggs therein, and sit on them, with a design, and in order, to perpetuate its species : in the former case Man would be a builder from Instinct, and in the latter, the bird would be a builder from Reason. But it is worth observing that there are many cases in which, though the agent is clearly acting from rational design with a view to a certain end, yet the act may, in reference to another and quite different end, which he did not contemplate, be considered as in some sort instinctive. When, for instance, any 22 ON INSTINCT. one deliberately takes means to provide food for the gratification of his hunger, and has no other object in view, his acts are, evidently, with a view to that immediate end, rational and not instinctive. But he is, probably, at the same time, and by the same act, promoting another object, the preservation of his life, health, and strength ; which object, by supposition, he was not thinking about. His acts, therefore, are in reference to the preservation of life — analogous, at least, to those of Instinct ; though, in reference to the object he was contemplating — the gratification of hun- ger — they are the result of deliberate calculation. There are many portions of men's conduct to which this kind of description will apply — particularly all that men do with a view solely to their own indivi- dual advantage, but which does produce most import- ant, though undesigned, advantages to the public. " And this procedure" (as I have observed in the Fourth Lecture on Political Economy) " is, as far as regards the object which the agent did not contem- plate, precisely analogous, at least, to that of instinct. lt The workman, for instance, who is employed in casting printing- types, is usually thinking only of producing a commodity by the sale of which he may support himself; with reference to this object, he is acting, not from any impulse that is at all of the cha- racter of instinct, but from a rational and deliberate choice : but he is also, in the very same act, contri- buting most powerfully to the diffusion of knowledge, about which perhaps he has no anxiety or thought : in reference to this latter object, therefore, his pro- cedure corresponds to those operations of various ani- mals which we attribute to instinct ; since they doubt- less derive some immediate gratification from what they are doing. So Man is, in the same act, doing one thing, by choice, for his own benefit, and another, undesignedly, under the guidance of Providence, for the service of the community." ON TNSTINCT. 23 And again, "various parts of man's conduct as a member of society are often attributed to human fore- thought and design, which might with greater truth be referred to a kind of instinct, or something analo- gous to it ; which leads him, while pursuing some immediate personal gratification, to further an object not contemplated by him. In many cases we are liable to mistake for the wisdom of Man what is in truth the wisdom of God. " In nothing, perhaps, will an attentive and candid inquirer perceive more of this Divine wisdom than in the provisions made for the progress of society. But in nothing is it more liable to be overlooked. In the bodily structure of Man we plainly perceive innumer- able marks of wise contrivance, in which it is plain that Man himself can have had no share. And again, in the results of instinct in brutes, although the ani- mals themselves are, in some sort, agents, we are sure that they not only could not originally have de- signed the effects they produce, but even afterwards have no notion of the contrivance by which these were brought about. But when human conduct tends to some desirable end, and the agents are competent to perceive that the end is desirable, and the means well adapted to it, they are apt to forget that, in the great majority of instances, those means were not devised, nor those ends proposed, by the persons themselves who are thus employed. Those who build and who navigate a ship, have usually, I conceive, no more thought about the national wealth and power, the na- tional refinements and comforts, dependent on the in- terchange of commodities, and the other results of commerce, than they have of the purification of the blood in the lungs by the act of respiration, or than the bee has of the process of constructing a honey- comb. " Most useful indeed to Society, and much to be honoured, are those who possess the rare moral and 24 ON INSTINCT. intellectual endowment of an enlightened public spi- rit ; but if none did service to the Public except in proportion as they possessed this, Society I fear would fare but ill. Public spirit, either in the form of Pa- triotism which looks to the good of a community, or in that of Philanthropy which seeks the good of the whole human race, implies, not merely benevolent feel- ings stronger than, in fact, we commonly meet with, but also powers of abstraction beyond what the mass of mankind can possess. As it is, many of the most important objects are accomplished by the joint agency of persons who never think of them, nor have any idea of acting in concert ; and that with a certainty, com- pleteness, and regularity, which probably the most diligent benevolence under the guidance of the great- est human wisdom, could never have attained. "For instance, let any one propose -to himself the problem of supplying with daily provisions of all kinds such a city as our metropolis, containing above a mil- lion of inhabitants. Let him imagine himself a head commissary, entrusted with the office of furnishing to this enormous host their daily rations. Any con- siderable failure in the supply, even for a single day, might produce the most frightful distress, since the spot on which they are cantoned produces absolutely nothing. Some, indeed, of the articles consumed admit of being reserved in public or private stores, for a considerable time ; but many, including most articles of animal food, and many of vegetable, are of the most perishable nature. As a deficient supply of these, even for a few days, would occasion great incon- venience, so a redundancy of them would produce a corresponding waste. Moreover, in a district of such vast extent, as this 'province' (as it has been aptly called) ' covered with houses/ it is essential that the supplies should be so distributed among the different quarters, as to be brought almost to the doors of the inhabitants ; at least within such a distance that they ON INSTINCT. 25 may, without an inconvenient waste of time and la- bour, procure their daily shares. "Moreover, whereas the supply of provisions for an army or garrison is comparatively uniform in kind : here the greatest possible variety is required, suitable to the wants of various classes of consumers. "Again, this immense population is extremely fluctuating in numbers ; and the increase or diminu- tion depends on causes, of which, though some may, others can not, be distinctly foreseen. The difference of several weeks in the arrival, for instance, of one of the great commercial fleets, or in the assembly or dis- solution of a parliament, which cause a great varia- tion in the population, it is often impossible to fore- see. " Lastly, and above all, the daily supplies of each article must be so nicely adjusted to the stock from which it is drawn — to the scanty, or more or less abundant, harvest — importation — or other source of supply — to the interval which is to elapse before a fresh stock can be furnished, and to the probable abundance of the new supply, that as little distress as possible may be undergone ; that on the one hand the population may not unnecessarily be put upon short allowance of any article, and that on the other hand they may be preserved from the more dreadful risk of famine, which would ensue from their continuing a free consumption when the store was insufficient to hold out. " Now let any one consider this problem in all its bearings, reflecting on the enormous and fluctuating number of persons to be fed — the immense quantity, and the variety, of the provisions to be furnished, the importance of a convenient distribution of them, and the necessity of husbanding them discreetly ; and then let him reflect on the anxious toil which such a task would impose on a Board of the most expe- rienced and intelligent commissaries ; who after all 26 ON INSTINCT. would be able to discharge their office but very in- adequately. " Yet this object is accomplished far better than it could be by any effort of human wisdom, through the agency of men, who think each of nothing be- yond his own immediate interest — who, with that object in view, perform their respective parts with cheerful zeal — and combine unconsciously to employ the wisest means for effecting an object, the vastness of which it would bewilder them even to con- template. " It is really wonderful to consider with what ease and regularity this important end is accomplished, day after day, and year after year, through the saga- city and vigilance of private interest operating on the numerous class of wholesale, and more especially re- tail, dealers. Each of these watches attentively the demands of his neighbourhood, or of the market he frequents, for such commodities as he deals in. The apprehension, on the one hand, of not realizing all the profit he might, and, on the other hand, of hav- ing his goods left on his hands, either by his laying in too large a stock, or by his rivals underselling him — these, acting like antagonist muscles, regulate the extent of his dealings, and the prices at which he buys and sells. An abundant supply causes him to lower his prices, and thus enables the public to enjoy that abundance ; while he is guided only by the ap- prehension of being undersold ; and, on the other hand, an actual or apprehended scarcity causes him to demand a higher price, or to keep back his goods in expectation of a rise. * For doing this, corn-dealers in particular are often exposed to odium, as if they were the cause of the scarcity ; while in reality they are performing the important service of husbanding the supply in pro- portion to its deficiency, and thus warding off the ca- lamity of famine ; in the same manner as the com- ON INSTINCT. 27 mander of a garrison or a ship regulates the allow- ances according to the stock, and the time it is to last. But the dealers deserve neither censure for the scarcity which they are ignorantly supposed to pro- duce, nor credit for the important public service which they in reality perform. They are merely occupied in gaining a fair livelihood. And in the pursuit of this object, without any comprehensive wisdom, or any need of it, they co-operate, unknowingly, in con- ducting a system which, we may safely say, no hu- man wisdom directed to that end could have con- ducted so well — the system by which this enormous population is fed from day to day. " I have said, ' no human wisdom ;' for wisdom there surely is in this adaptation of the means to the result actually produced. In this instance, as well as in a multitude of others, from which I selected it for illustration's sake, there are the same marks of con- trivance and design, with a view to a beneficial end, as we are accustomed to admire (when our attention is drawn to them by the study of Natural Theology) in the anatomical structure of the body, and in the instincts of the brute creation. The pulsations of the heart, the ramifications of vessels in the lungs — the direction of the arteries and of the veins — the valves which prevent the retrograde motion of the blood — -all these exhibit a wonderful combination of mechanical means towards the end manifestly design- ed, the circulating system. But I know not whether it does not even still more excite our admiration of the beneficent wisdom of Providence, to contemplate, not corporeal particles, but rational free agents, co- operating in systems no less manifestly indicating de- sign, yet no design of their' s; and though acted on, not by gravitation and impulse, like inert matter, but by motives addressed to the will, jet advancing as re- gularly and as effectually the accomplishment of an object they never contemplated, as if they were mere- ly the passive wheels of a machine." 28 ON INSTINCT. As for Instincts strictly so-called — those wholly unconnected with anything rational in the agent — these are, as has been said, more and more curiously developed the lower we go in the animal creation. Insects far surpass in this respect the more intelli- gent brutes. The architecture of many of these is far more complicated and curious, than that of the bird or the beaver ; and they not only construct re- ceptacles for their young, but, in many instances — that of the bee among others — store up in these a supply of food of a totally different kind from what they subsist on themselves. The gratification which, doubtless, is in all cases afforded by the performance of any instinctive act, is what we can give no explanation of. Birds take a delight in picking up straws and feathers, and weav- ing them into a nest ; and bees, in constructing a cell, and storing it with pollen, which they do not eat themselves, but which is the food of the larvae. All we can say is, that the bird has a kind of appe- tite at a certain season for picking up straws ; and so for the rest. But the mysteriousness of the process is greater in some cases than in others ; because, in some cases we cannot, while in others we can, per- ceive through what medium the instinct acts. We can understand, for instance, through the means of what organs the instinct of sucking and suckling operate. We can understand that the young calf is incited to suck by the smell of its mother's milk, and that the mother is anxious to be sucked by its young, because it is thus relieved from a painful and distressing distention of the udder ; but I cannot understand the analogous instinct of birds. We do not knowthrough the medium of what organs birds are induced to put food into the mouths of their young. We see a pair of birds searching all day long for food ; and in many instances the food they seek is such as they do not feed on themselves — for example, granivorous birds hunt after caterpillars for ON INSTINCT. 29 their young : in other cases they seek for food which their own appetite incites them to eat ; but they trea- sure it for their young, and are impelled by an in- stinctive appetite to put it into its mouth when opened. I might also add, that this instinct is not peculiar to birds. The mammalia partake of it ; for we find wolves, dogs, and other carnivorous animals, bringing home meat, and leaving it before their young ones. If a bitch or wolf has pups, and cannot bring food to them otherwise than by first swallowing it, she swallows it, and then disgorges it ; for the animal has the power of evacuating its stomach at pleasure. Pigeons invariably swallow the food before they give it to their young. There are many other cases in which it cannot be ascertained towards what the immediate impulses of animals tend. Take the case of migratory birds — a those which have been caged : when a particular jason arrives, they desire to fly in a certain direc- tion. Now, towards what the impulse is we cannot comprehend. They have a disposition to fly ; but it is not a mere desire to use their wings. They have a disposition to fly in a certain direction ; but what leads them in that direction cannot be understood. In some instances, in short, we know through what organs the impulse acts, although we cannot understand why it is that the organs should have that particular sort of impelling power. In other in- stances we do not know the organs, or the impulse on which the animal acts, but only the object de- signed by Providence. As for instance, we can only say of migratory birds, that they are impelled not by a mere desire to use their wings, but to fly in a cer- tain direction pointed out to them by God ; but how pointed out, is only known to Him. It is not my design to give a lecture on natural theology — a subject which has been ably treated of by 30 ON INSTINCT. Paley and others ; but I will take occasion to remark that one of the most interesting and important points dwelt on by these authors is, the combination of physical laws with instincts adapted to them. When we see a combination of causes all apparently di- rected from various quarters to a certain end, which is accomplished not by one impulse alone, but by an adaptation of several impulses to certain physical laws, one of which would not be effectual without the other, we can not hesitate for a moment to recognize this great principle in nature. One instance out of many, of this principle, may be taken as a sample — that of the instinct of suction, as con- nected with the whole process of rearing young animals. The calf sucks, and its mother equally desires to be disburthened of its milk. Thus there are two instincts tending the same way. Moreover, the calf has an appetite for grass also ; it takes hold of the grass, chews and swallows it; but it does not bite but sucks the teat. But it is also necessary that there should be a physical adaptation of the atmosphere to the instinct of the animal. It is the pressure of the atmosphere upon the part, and the withdrawal of that pressure within the young animal's mouth, which forces out the milk. Here is an adaptation of instinct to the physical constitution of the atmos- phere. Yet, again, all this would be insufficient without the addition of that Storge, or instinctive pa- rental affection, which leads the dam carefully to watch and defend its young. The most timid animals are ready to risk their lives, and undergo any hardships, to protect their young, which is a feeling quite distinct from the gratification felt by the dam from her offspring drawing her milk. Here, then, are se- veral instincts, and the adaptation of the atmosphere to one of those instincts, all combining towards the preservation of the species ; which form, in conjunc- tion, as clear an indication of design as can be con- ON INSTTSCT. 31 ceived. It is hardly possible to conceive any plainer mark of design, unless a person were beforehand to say that he intended to do a certain thing. Yet this is not all ; for the secretion of milk is not common to both sexes, and all ages and all times. Here is the secretion of milk at a particular time, just corres- ponding with the need for it. If we found sickles pro- duced at harvest, fires lighted when the weather is cold, and sails spread when favourable winds blow, we should see clearly that these things were designed to effect a certain end or object. Now, in the case of the mother and the young, there is a secretion of milk at a particu- lar period, and in an animal of a distinct sex — the one which has given birth to the young. Yet the perpetuation of the species might take place if the milk had been so provided as to be constant and uniform in all ages and sexes. But what we do see is, means provided for an end, and just commensurate to that end. I will conclude with proposing one more ques- tion, which I consider well worthy of inquiry — that relating to the implanting and modification of Instinct in animals. The most widely diffused of all implant- ed and modified Instincts is that of Wildness or Tameness. Whether the original Instinct of brutes was to be afraid of man, or familiar with him, I will not undertake to say. My own belief is, that it is the fear of man that is the implanted instinct. But at any rate, it is plain that either the one or the other — wildness or tameness — must be an implanted and not an original Instinct. All voyagers agree, that when they have gone into a country which had not appa- rently been visited by man, neither bird nor beast ex- hibited fear. The birds perched familiarly upon their guns, or stood still to be knocked on the head. After the country had been for some time frequented, not only individual animals become afraid of man, but their offspring inherit that fear by Instinct. The 32 ON INSTINCT. domesticated young of the cow, and the young of the wild cattle of the same species furnish illustrations of this fact. I have seen an account of an experiment tried with respect to these latter. In this instance, a very young calf of one of the breed of wild cattle still remaining in some of the forests in England, on seeing a man approach, lay crouching close, and pre- serving the most perfect stillness, apparently endea- voured to escape notice. On being discovered, it immediately put itself in an attitude of defence, com- menced bellowing and butting at the intruder with such violence that it fell forward upon its knees, its limbs, from its tender age, being yet scarcely able to support it. It rose and repeated the attack again and again, till by its bellowing, the whole herd came gal- loping up to its rescue. We all know how different this is from the action of a young calf of the domestic breed. To what extent Instinct is implanted in animals in consequence of the education received by many gene- rations of their predecessors, is a point to which the attention of the curious might be profitably directed. I have pointed out the road, and hope that the ques- tion may lead to important inquiries upon the subject. THE END. Dublin : Printed by Edward Bull, 6, Bachelor's-walk. Z \*m #4 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 003 470 914 2