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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
 
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 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
3itcarnattcme Vatbi X>ct 
 
 together toittj 
 
 (Efyree (Essays 
 
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 Het>. Cllan S? §atr>fcestt>ortt} 
 
 with a 
 
 <£ommenbatory Preface 
 
 bg tfye 
 
 Pery Hep. <£. a. ^offman, S. C. D v ££. D., 
 
 Dean of tlje (Sen. dfyeo. Sent. 
 
 ALBANY, N. Y.: 
 RIGGS PRINTING AND PUBLISHING CO. 
 
 1897 
 
.rt* 
 
 Copyright, 1897 
 By 
 
 Alan S. Hawkesworth 
 
 Tftk Library 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 ft 
 
Essays by the same Author 
 
 De Trinitate. Price 75 Cents. 
 
 Formally commended by the Rt. Rev. G. F. Seymour, the Rt. Rev. 
 H. C. Potter, and the Very Rev. E. A. Hoffman. 
 
 On the Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Christian Priest- 
 hood. Price 25 Cents. 
 
 Formally commended by the Rt. Rev. G. F. Seymour, the Rt. Rev. 
 J. Scarborough, and the Very Rev. E. A. Hoffman. 
 
 On Free Will. Price 10 Cents. 
 
 The above can be obtained either of the publishers, or the author. 
 
P REFACE 
 
 By the Very Revd. E. A. HOFFMAN, D.D., LL.D. 
 Dean of the Gen. Theo. Seminary. 
 
 The doctrine of the Incarnation is not only the heart of the 
 Gospel, but also the corner stone of the foundation on which rests 
 the entire fabric of the Christian Faith. From it flows out all 
 that gives vitality and strength to the Christian life. Apart from 
 the Incarnation, which made possible and gave infinite value to 
 the Atonement, the Christian disciple cannot look for the forgive- 
 ness of his sins, or for grace to walk in the path of God's com- 
 mandments, or for hope of the world to come. "For God was 
 in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their 
 trespasses unto them." And on it is built the entire system of 
 work and worship, of faith and practice, which the Church was 
 sent to proclaim and sustain in this evil world. "For other founda- 
 tion can no man lay, than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ." 
 
 Around it were arrayed the theories and errors which assailed 
 the Faith in the early ages of the Christian Church, and com- 
 pelled its adherents to set forth, for the instruction and protec- 
 tion of the faithful, the fuller and more explicit form of the Creed, 
 known as the Nicene Creed. And strange as it may seem, many 
 of these errors are being revived in our own days, under the veil 
 of rationalistic and philosophical interpretations of the Scriptures. 
 Most important, therefore, is it that the Church should be guarded 
 against these errors by thorough instruction in this fundamental 
 doctrine, for no one is safe who cannot give an intelligent ac- 
 count of the faith which is in him, and the ground on which it 
 rests. 
 
 I deem it no slight honour to be asked to write a word of preface 
 to a Treatise which so ably states this doctrine as the Church has 
 received the same. It gives a very admirable and comprehensive 
 analysis of the doctrine in all its bearings and consequences. 
 The work could well be used as the basis of a series of theological 
 
 (v) 
 
VI 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 lectures, or as the framework of an exhaustive treatise; and the 
 
 author has done an excellent work in preparing, and placing it 
 
 within the reach of the clergy and laity. Without committing 
 
 myself to all the statements contained in it, I heartily commend 
 
 it to those who would be rightly instructed in the Christian 
 
 Faith. 
 
 May God's blessing go with it, leading many who are bewildered 
 
 by the strange doctrines, which in these days are set forth as the 
 
 Gospel, to place their trust in the only Rock on which they caa 
 
 find rest and peace "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday and to-day, 
 
 and forever." 
 
 E. A. HOFFMAN, D.D., LL.D. 
 
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY 
 
 De 3rtcarnattone Perbt Dei. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Incarnation, being the complement of all natural truths and 
 ideals, in Nature, and in man; and that both individually, and 
 racially; must also be, and is the vital heart of Christianity. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Is, then, the Supreme Mystery; only comparable, even in a meas- 
 ure, to the incomprehensible "modification" that certainly took 
 place at Prime Creation — ''A priori" objections either "Deistic" 
 or "Theological." — Their several consideration, and refutation. 
 
 — The Incarnation a "local manifestation" — Illustrative anal- 
 ogies. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Heretical theories considered, and confuted — Gnosticism, and 
 Doketism — Arianism — Apollinarianism — Nestorianism — 
 Eutychianism — Monophysitism — Theory of Gess, and Godet 
 
 — Monothelitism — Adoptionism. 
 
 The Catholic doctrine of Chalcedon — The "Hypostatic Union" — 
 The humanity "impersonal;" and, therefore, "never to be di- 
 vided." 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The Logos, being the "Archetypal Man," He, and He only, both 
 could, and should be Incarnate in man — As He could not have 
 been in an animal, or an angel. 
 
 The Virgin Birth, its necessity, nature, and "secretness." 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 The "Kenosis," not an abrogation of Essence, but a "local limi- 
 tation" — Our Lord's passibility, ''ignorance," and growth — 
 Yet His humanity perfect — And, therefore, inerrant, and im- 
 
 (vii; 
 
viii ANALYTICAL SUMMARY 
 
 peccable — Relation of temptation to humanity, and its resist- 
 ance — Christ, then, could be tempted; but could not sin — The 
 "Two Wills" of our Lord. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Christ our "Example;" for He lived as "Very Man" — His Inspira- 
 tion by the Holy Spirit — His prayers, and the several varieties 
 of prayer — The Agony in Gethsemane; and Cry upon the Cross. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 The Atonement, and its corporate nature — The "descent into 
 Hell" — The estate of the dead — The Resurrection; and the 
 "spiritual body." 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The Ascension, and Session — The Priesthood of our Lord, His 
 gift of the Holy Spirit, His Church, and her Sacraments, all de- 
 pendent on His Manhood. — The Incarnation, therefore, a 
 primary intention, even apart from the "fall." 
 
 The Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation is, then, coherent and 
 logical, and is also in agreement with all known facts — Some 
 instances of this — Conclusion. 
 
 NOTE 14. ON THE " LOCAL MANIFESTATION. 
 
 Illustrative quotations from the Fathers and Schoolmen — Neglect 
 of the doctrine of late years — ''Communicatio idiomatum" a 
 misleading phrase. 
 
 NOTE 31. ON THE HYPOSTATIC UNION IN CHRIST. 
 
 Distinction between the Trinitarian and the Christological 
 "hypostasis." 
 
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY ix 
 
 THREE SUBSIDIARY ESSAYS 
 
 Cfye (Essential Xcature of Stn. 
 
 Erroneous identification of "Sin" with "Sensuousness" — Leading 
 to Dualism — And Buddhistic Nihilism — And again appearing 
 in Puritanism. 
 
 Sin, not material, but spiritual — And is a "falling short," in spite 
 of, and in opposition to Divine guidance — Is, therefore, illogical, 
 hateful, and damning — Bearing of all this upon the doctrine of 
 the Incarnation. 
 
 Spirit ctnb ITtatter. 
 
 Theories concerning the inter-relation — Dualism — Materialism — - 
 
 Idealism — Pantheism. 
 The Catholic theory — "Matter" simply a "catena of phenomena" 
 — But yet possesses an objective origin — Which origin we 
 can only conceive of as "Spirit" — An analysis of our person- 
 ality — The Ultimate Prime Origin, then, is the Absolute Spirit 
 — Who must, at the least, be Personal. — Summary — Bearing 
 of all this upon the doctrine of the Incarnation. 
 
 Oje Primary Criterion of Crutfy, 
 
 We can, and do know truth; not absolutely, but relatively. — For 
 both our intellectual "prime data," and the testimonies of our 
 senses, are, and must be valid — Objections to these statements 
 refuted. 
 
Se 3ncamatiom Perbt Set 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 HE glorious fact of the Incarnation — that the Logos of 
 God took our nature upon Him, and became man, — 
 this fact, I say, is not only the central and vital one of 
 Christianity, differentiating it from all other faiths, and 
 being the radiating source of all its teaching and Sacra- 
 mental grace, but it is also the crown and complement to 
 the truths of Natural Religion and Philosophy, — the 
 point towards which they all tend, and in which, and in which 
 alone, they find their satisfaction and fulfillment. 
 
 And this, indeed, must be so ; for He, Who was there made 
 manifest, is the Creator and Upholder of the Universe — the 
 '• Logos," in Whom " all things consist ; " — and the being, there- 
 fore, and ultimate reason of all things, must, of necessity, so 
 center in, and only be knowable through Him. 
 
 And yet furthermore : this inherence of all things in our 
 Lord, as the " Logos," is not only theoretically, but also actually 
 true ; for the more closely we study the prime laws of being, 
 both as we may observe them in Nature, and especially as we 
 may learn them in the depths of our own individuality, and yet 
 again discover them by observation in the souls of our fellow- 
 men (thus proving them to be, not mere personal idiosyncrasies, 
 but undoubtedly basic elements of humanity), the more closely, 
 I say, we study these prime laws of being, the more will we 
 also be struck by their (so to speak) incomplete and prophetic 
 character ; or in other words, by the testimony that they bear, 
 if we will but hearken, to that Logos Who is ever Immanent in 
 them, and Who has also been explicitly revealed to us as the 
 Incarnate Christ of God. 
 
 Thus, considering first the vast Universe around us, we find 
 everywhere the reign of order and of reason : all our science, 
 all our knowledge, and our very capability for existence itself, 
 is ultimately based upon this fundamental fact, namely that the 
 world is no fortuitous and illogical chaos — a causeless " con- 
 course of atoms ; " — but is, on the contrary, an orderly and logi- 
 cal Cosmos, which we, as intelligent beings, are able, in some 
 measure, to comprehend. To use, then, philosophical lan- 
 guage, we may say that the underlying "noumena" of all 
 things are " ideas," or \6yoi of God; which X6yoi y again, are ever 
 i (i) 
 
2 DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 grouped under wider and higher categories, until at last they 
 finally center in Him Who is, in an especial manner, " the Su- 
 preme'* Aoyoe, of God — the "Express Image" of the Father, 
 and " First born of every creature." 
 
 Then, turning from this Cosmos around us to the depths of 
 our own being, we again find this same centering in, and point- 
 ing upwards of our nature to Him : for we, each and all, philoso- 
 pher, or savage, find both ourselves, and our fellows in general, 
 to be possessed of certain primal intuitions, or axioms of truth 
 —sensational, intellectual, moral, and religious ; — axioms that 
 we have in no sense acquired, but have, on the contrary, uni- 
 versally inherited as the essential marks of our being. 1 Such, 
 for instance, are those sensational axioms that give us the cer- 
 tainty of the existence of an external "Non-ego " — the Universe 
 around us ; — such, again, are those axioms of intellectual truth 
 — mathematical or logical, — that give us the capabilities of rea- 
 soning, and of knowledge ; and such, still again, are those ax- 
 iomatical laws of the conscience, and those spiritual intuitions, 
 that give us the truths of morality, and of Natural Religion. 
 
 Now all these axioms are, I repeat, innate and universal; and 
 must therefore be accepted and used as undoubtedly true and 
 valid, if we are to have any foundation, not only for our relig- 
 ion, or morality, or even for our thought, but also, as I have 
 said, for our very existence itself. 
 
 And yet as we carefully study, as far as may be, these neces- 
 sary and basic laws of our being, we are continually confronted 
 with the fact that they are not complete in themselves — are not 
 self-satisfied, and self explanatory, — but that they, equally with 
 the"Ao^oz" of Nature, point forward to an ideal knowledge 
 and experience (i. e. of their " Logos ") that ought to be, and 
 must be attained. For the axioms of the intellectual, and even 
 of the sensational nature, all demand a Great Prime Cause — a 
 Creator and God of all; — and even more clearly do the instincts 
 of the conscience, and of the spiritual intuitions, cry out for Him. 
 
 But if this be true of the individual soul, no less is it also true 
 of the organic consciousness of our Race. For who, with the 
 record of history before him, can deny that men, in all ages, 
 have ever sought after their God — sought Him by religions and 
 philosophies innumerable — sought Him through bitter agony 
 and toil — sought Him, even despite of their ever present sense of 
 their own sinfulness and of judgment — if only they might find 
 Him for Whom their souls did yearn. The saying of St. Au- 
 gustine " cor nostrum inquietum est donee requiescat in Te 
 [Conf. lib. i, cap. i]," is, then, abundantly true ; and St. Philip 
 
 (i) That there are any such "prima data," and faculties for reasoning, inherited, and 
 not personally acquired, is disputed by many psychologists ; yet surely, in the first 
 place, all reasoning, and therefore the acquiring of experience itself, necessitates 
 some "prime data" for the mind ; and secondly, are not these '"prima data"— these 
 '•innate powers"— the very qualities that give us, as I state in the text, our essential 
 being itself? They are not, therefore, in any sense, extra gifts to the man, concern- 
 ing the possession of which there might reasonably be doubts; but are rather the essen- 
 tial qualities of his Ego qua Ego. " Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo." 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 3 
 
 in his cry to the Christ, " Lord, show us the Father'' (St. John, 
 xiv, 8), was but voicing" humanity's deepest need. 
 
 The knowledge, then, of God — the Great Father of all — is 
 imperatively demanded, both by Nature, as its Creator and 
 Reason, and by our own being, as our Enlightener and Guide ; 
 and yet that Father — that great Prime Cause of all, — because 
 Primal and Infinite, must, in His Essence, be ever unknowable 
 to man ; and even in His relations to us as the Creator and Up- 
 holder of Nature, and of our own being, He can be but dimly 
 and uncertainly apprehended; for our intellects are so finite, 
 and our knowledge of things, necessarily, so partial and imper- 
 fect, that men have ever been tempted to think of their God, 
 rather as an Irresistible Fatality, or even as an Irresponsible 
 Despot, than as a loving Father of all. 
 
 As the Inspirerof our souls — the Logos- Giver of instinctive 
 " light " — He can, it is true, be more freely and fully known ; 
 and that both because He is, in some measure, manifesting 
 Himself to us therein as the True and the Holy; and is there- 
 fore, again, also more personally related to us. More personally 
 related, I say, for His relation to us as the Creator is, evidently, 
 more impersonal and non-individual in its character, than His 
 relation to us as the Logos " Lightener " of our souls; for in 
 the latter case we stand to Him rather as one taught does to his 
 Teacher; but in the former case — or in creation — rather as a 
 phenomenon (so to speak) does to its " Noumenal Reality " and 
 Creator. 
 
 We can, then, know Him both more freely, and more fully, as 
 the " Lightener and Inspirer" of our souls; and yet even this 
 Divinity working in the soul, no less than the Divinity working 
 in the world, can only be certainly known to man — can only, in 
 other words, rise from being a mere philosophical theorem, to 
 the place of an absolute and undoubted fact — by reason of that 
 supreme revelation of our God, made to us in His Incarnation: 
 for from that manifestation we first learn to think of Him, not 
 so much as Power (for that we know before), nor yet as Wisdom 
 (for that, too, Nature could teach us), but as Love, Tender and 
 Infinite; and that is a lesson by no means clear from Natural 
 Religion. 
 
 To use, then, the words of our Lord's reply to Philip " he that 
 hath seen Me " — the Incarnate Logos of God — he, and he only, 
 "hath seen the Father." 
 
 True, even before Christ came, men could, in some measure, 
 feel and recognizing this Divine indwelling (vide Acts xiv, 17; 
 and xvii, 27, 28); and were thereby, as I have said, moved to 
 seek after Him, by their religions, and their philosophies, if 
 haply they might find Him. Yet it was not, I repeat, until that 
 supreme revelation of our God made to us in Christ, that men 
 had any certain clue through the labyrinth of being; their phi- 
 losophies, therefore, before that time, and still more their relig- 
 ions, were, at the best, but tentative, partial, and uncertain; and 
 
4 DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 contained, even under the most favorable conditions, more or 
 less of extraneous and hurtful admixture. 2 
 
 But when Wisdom came unto His own, all that was best and 
 purest in those heathen philosophies and religions — Pythago- 
 rean, Magian, Stoic, and Platonic — was fulfilled and completed 
 in Him; so that the truly religious man, or philosopher, became 
 now the true Christian, and brought the treasures of his wisdom 
 to help unfold the Faith, even as the Magi brought their offer- 
 ings to the cradle of their Lord. The heathen philosophies, in 
 short, and philosophical religions, as the Fathers again and 
 again insisted, 3 bore the same relation to the Gentiles that the 
 Mosaic dispensation bore to the Jews, in that they acted as 
 " pedagogues " to lead men to, and prepare them for the Christ; 
 this was their high office, and this their testimony to the Mes- 
 siah Who should come. 
 
 And not only is all this theoretically true, but history, with 
 its record of the preparation of mankind for, and their wonder- 
 ful anticipations of that Advent, bears its subtle testimony to 
 the same point, and shows us that Christianity was no mere after- 
 thought — no illogical intrusion from without upon the Universe 
 of God, — but that it was, in very truth, the Crown of the Ages — 
 the ideal for which mankind had been preparing long before. 
 
 As, then, we study the heathen faiths, and heathen wisdom, 
 we may well be struck, and perhaps even surprised, by their 
 wonderful, even if fragmentary knowledge of the suffering Mes- 
 siah Who should come. Thus we find in Classic Greece those 
 intense longings for, and anticipations of an Incarnate Deliverer, 
 which were, more or less clearly, voiced in the various " myste- 
 ries" — "Orphic," " Eleusinian," &c; and which ran, like a fun- 
 damental chord, through the deepest tragedies of her poets. 
 Such, again, were those expectations of a coming Deliverer and 
 Restorer of the "Golden Age,'' universal in the Roman world 
 of Augustus, and of which the famous "IV Eclogue" of Virgil 
 is but a well known example. And such, yet again, were those 
 Magian prophesies in Persia concerning the coming of "Soshyos," 
 
 (2) In thus classing the Pre-Christian religions with philosophies, I need scarcely say 
 that I by no means include in this category the Jewish Covenant [which was, I be- 
 lieve, properly a "Pre-Christian Christianity"]; but am merely referring to those 
 great heathen faiths— such as Zoroastrianism, Brahminism, Buddhism, or Hellenism— 
 that are, properly speaking, nothing else than the natural, if sometimes crude, ex- 
 pression of the philosophical and religious consciousness of the race, reaching out 
 after God. 
 
 (3) Thus, to give two instances only, St. Augustine says [Retract: I, 13, 3.] " Res 
 ipsa quae nunc Christiana religio nuncupatur, erat apud antiquos, nee defuit ab initio 
 generis humani quousque ipse Christus veniret in carne, unde vera religio quae jam 
 erat, coepit appellari Christiana." And St. Clement of Alexandria says [" Stromata." 
 Book I, chap. V.] '• Before the advent of the Lord philosophy was necessary to the 
 Greeks for righteousness." * * * For God is the cause of all good things; but of 
 some primarily, as the Old and New Testaments; and of others by consequence, as 
 philosophy. Perchance, though, philosophy was given to the Greeks directly and 
 primarily, till the Lord should call the Greeks. And thus was a scnoolmaster to bring 
 the Hellenic mind, as the Law the Hebrew, to Christ." Vide also chap, xvi; and 
 Book VI, chaps, v, vi, viii, xvii, &c. 
 
 With all this agrees St. Paul's appeal to the natural religious consciousness in Acts 
 xiv, T5-17, and xvii, 22-31, as already quoted, and especially the reference on "Mar's 
 Hill " to "one of your poets " as a prophetic or rel?jpous authority. And, in fact, how 
 could it well be otherwise; unless, indeed, Christianity were an unnatural religion, 
 foisted in upon the revolting mind. 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 5 
 
 or"Honofer" — the Incarnate " Word," — Who should both re- 
 deem mankind, and unite them with Himself. 
 
 In short, whatever part, or period we study of the pre-Chris- 
 tian world, we find these prophecies, and anticipations of the 
 Christ Who should come; from Egypt to Scandinavia, from 
 India or China to the Celts of the West, even in pre-Christian 
 America — Mexico and Peru — we everywhere find, I repeat, this 
 dim foreknowledge of Him. 
 
 When the Angels, then, sang over Bethlehem, on that first 
 Christmas morn, it was over the supreme mystery of humanity — 
 the revelation in flesh of Him towards Whom all the lines of 
 our being, personal and racial, converge; and in Whom, and in 
 Whom alone, they find their satisfaction and fulfillment. 
 
 But the Incarnation of the Logos being, thus, the crown and 
 complement of all natural truth, it evidently must also be, as I 
 have said, the central and vital fact of Christianity — its differ- 
 ential and causal doctrine, and the well spring of all its teach- 
 ing and grace. 
 
 For the essential doctrine of Christianity — that which makes 
 it Christianity — is, manifestly, not in its ethical teaching; nor in 
 the truths it teaches concerning man's being and nature, and 
 the immortality of his soul; nor, yet again, in the truths of our 
 Creator's Being and Essence — even of His Triune Nature, — 
 and His government of the world; and that because these truths 
 are part of the religious "prime data " inspirational in the heart 
 of every man, as man (vide note i page 2); and therefore be- 
 long rather to "Natural Religion": this being so, then Chris- 
 tianity, evidently, only possesses these truths in common with 
 all other faiths; and can, therefore, in short, only especially 
 claim them as establishing and making them certain, or in 
 other words, as lifting them out of the category of more or less 
 tentative beliefs, into that of basic and undoubted facts. 
 
 But it is the truth that both completes and interweaves all 
 these "natural" truths of the Being of God, and the being of 
 man — namely the truth of the Incarnation of God in man — that 
 is, as I have said, both the differential and causal doctrine of 
 the Christian Faith, and the plenary fountain head of all its 
 teachings and Sacramental grace. For it is, evidently, from 
 this prime fact, and it alone, that the subsidiary facts of our 
 Lord's life — such as His Atonement, Resurrection, and Ascension 
 — derive ail their meaning and validity; and it is also this fact, as 
 I will hereafter show, that underlies and gives significance to 
 both our Lord's gift of the Holy Spirit to His Church, and that 
 Church's Sacramental system as a whole — her claim of Commis- 
 sion from her Head, her Priesthood, Baptisms, and Eucharists, 
 and the Gospel of Redemption that she preaches to the world. 
 
 Thus the Incarnation of our Lord is, if we may use the simile, 
 like a gold ring, to which all the truths of our nature converge, 
 in which they are made secure, and/rom which, in turn, radiate 
 all the special doctrines of our most Holy Faith. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 HE Incarnation, then, in man of the Logos of God is, as I 
 have shown, the crown and necessary complement of all 
 natural truths, as it is also the living- and vivifying heart 
 of Christianity; and yet, because it is this supreme and central 
 truth, it is also (as, indeed, might be expected) the most deeply 
 mysterious of all; so that, from the very first preaching of the 
 Faith, men — believers, as well as unbelievers — have not ceased 
 to wonder and surmise how, in reality, God could become man. 
 
 " The Incarnation of the Logos of God ! " Surely, as we say 
 these words, and endeavor to realise, in some slight degree, 
 their import, we can well stagger at the tremendous meaning 
 they convey. For what else in human history — even the fall of 
 empires, or of nations — can compare, for one moment, with such 
 an event ? One that is certainly the greatest, not only that hu- 
 manity, or this earth, but that the Universe itself has ever seen. 
 For this Incarnation of the Logos is, surely, speaking with all 
 solemnity and reverence, a stupendous and all important event 
 in the Being of the Godhead Himself — even, in some sense, a 
 modification of His previous existence, — affecting profoundly, 
 not only the Logos, but also the Father, in Whose Bosom He 
 is, and the Holy Spirit, Who Eternally deriveth Plenitude from 
 the Father through Him. 
 
 There is, then, we may say, but one other event that can be 
 even faintly comparable to this incomprehensible "modification" 
 in the Divine Existence, and that is in the apparent, and yet 
 again incomprehensible "modification** that took place at the 
 beginning of the Creation of God. This, I say, was certainly 
 an apparent "modification," for a previously non-existent Uni- 
 verse was then brought into actual being, and became, in brief, 
 an entity that was, and is, in some real sense, external to, and 
 distinct from, its Creator and God. And that there was this be- 
 ginning — that this external Universe is not eternally existent, — 
 is, I think, evident from the following lines of thought. 
 
 In the first place we have the empirical evidence of our senses 
 that all things in the Cosmos are transient, and temporary; and 
 therefore must once have had a beginning; and still further our 
 sciences of physical phenomena — our geology, physics, astron- 
 omy, etc, — all assure us that there was a time when this world 
 was not; and if not this world, then presumably neither the 
 Universe. 
 
 And these conclusions are still further enforced by the follow- 
 ing philosophical arguments. If the Universe be thought eter- 
 nally existent, then it must also be thought either self existent, 
 or else a necessary production from the Eternal God. 
 
 (6) 
 
DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 7 
 
 But if we hold it to be self existent apart from God, then it 
 ■must itself be a God; 4 and we are thus driven either to a theory 
 of two mutually exclusive Infinities (which is absurd); or else to 
 a theory of an Infinity consisting in an atheistic Universe (the de- 
 ductions from which are equally absurd) ; and as we may further 
 add, under either of these suppositions, whether it be that of a 
 self existent world with a self existent God, or that of a self ex- 
 istent world alone, any change or decay, such as our senses give 
 us cognisance of, would be utterly and entirely incongruous. 
 
 But on the other hand, if the Universe be thought to be a nec- 
 essary production from God (as Pantheism teaches), then we 
 would have something that would be, not a finite creation of 
 God, but (in theological language) rather something that would 
 be best described as an "Infinite Logos," Begotten of His Essence; 
 and therefore also something that would be, in a sense, 
 " Sjuoovdiog" with Him, and be God; and ought, then, to be wor- 
 shipped as Him; while in this case, again, the observed change 
 and decay in Nature would be utterly incompatible. 
 
 So, then, both from empirical, and philosophical considera- 
 tions we are sure that the Universe is not eternal, but once 
 began to be; yet this, I say, entails upon us the recognition of 
 an incomprehensible "modification," at the moment of prime 
 creation, in the existence of the Eternal One. 
 
 And this is true, even if we adopt the apparently tenable 
 idea, advocated by some eminent theologians, that although the 
 actual entity of the Universe had a definite beginning, yet the 
 ideals of that entity had no such beginning, but were eternally 
 pre-existent in the Divine Logos; for even granting this as 
 probably true, yet the "preciptation" (so to speak) of the Uni- 
 verse of God, from its eternally pre-existent ideality, to its 
 finite, created, and historical existence, was certainly, I repeat, 
 an apparent, although incomprehensible " modification " in the 
 Being of the Eternal. Before that time He was all in all; but 
 since that time He has, in a real and true sense, been self lim- 
 ited by His world — has, in short, given it EX-istence, where pre- 
 viously was only SUB-sistence in Him. 
 
 Thus although the Infinite Godhead is, by His very Essence, 
 the Everlasting and Unchangeable, yet still we have this in- 
 comprehensible, yet none the less evident, " modification " of 
 existence and relation in that Unchangeable. 
 
 But even this wonder of Creation, great as it is, manifestly 
 falls far short of that supreme wonder of all — the Incarnation. 
 Nay! it is even, as I have shown, in relation to the "Xbyoz" of 
 the Universe, an entirely subsidiary fact, centering upon, lead- 
 ing up to, and preparing for, that great Central Mystery. 
 
 The Incarnation, then, being this stupendous antinomy — this 
 
 (4) And, as St. Athanasius further argues [De Incar; Verbi Dei § 2. 4.] God would 
 then be, not a creator \_Kzi6zyi^\ but a mere artizan \TExyiTU<Z\, working with pre- 
 existent material. 
 
 (p) This argument from change has alrsadv been mentioned among the empirical 
 evidences ; but yet it, manifestly, has also a place here. 
 
$ DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 41 modification " in the Unchangeable — although an antinomy 
 that is, in some degree, paralleled and illustrated by an only 
 less stupendous one, namely Creation itself, it ought not to 
 greatly surprise us if men, now as ever, feel some difficulty in 
 realising and believing in that supreme Wonder; and in truth, 
 if we do not find this feeling of difficulty, and perhaps even of 
 doubt, it will, in most cases, be only because they have never 
 fairly considered it, and are either stupid and thoughtless, or 
 else careless and indifferent. 
 
 Let us, then, as briefly, and yet as clearly and accurately as 
 may be, endeavor to explain, and show the logical sequences of 
 the Church's doctrine of the Incarnation. But as to her beliefs 
 in matters of fact — namely that the Logos was so Incar- 
 nate, that Jesus of Nazarath was that Incarnate Logos, and 
 the various events in His Blessed Life and Teaching, — all these 
 will not be expounded in this present treatise; unless, indeed, it 
 be in the way of passing and necessary reference; and that for 
 two reasons. 
 
 In the first place, it is "imprimis " necessary to demonstrate 
 that this doctrine of the Incarnation is logically coherent and 
 possible, before any arguments can be validly advanced as to 
 its actual existence in fact; for any "proofs" derived from 
 history, human testimony, or internal evidence can only avail 
 to establish something that is, at least, not "a priori" incredible. 
 
 And in the second place, experience will also, I think, show 
 us that it is precisely in this direction of supposed " a priori " 
 incredibility that the doubts and difficulties of the majority, if 
 not all, of the stumblers at this doctrine lie. 
 
 Let us, then, I repeat, take the Church's doctrine of the In- 
 carnation — that doctrine that is to her, as I have said, the 
 center and foundation of all her faith and ritual, — and show- 
 ing the logical coherence and reasonableness of it, thereby 
 strengthen the hands of our brethren; and also, in so doing, 
 provide the necessary primary foundation for any historical 
 argument as to the facts of the Gospel narrative. 
 
 To begin, then, it may be said that the " a priori " objections 
 to the Incarnation may all be summed up under two chief 
 heads, first what I may call the class of " Deistic " objections, 
 and secondly what, for want of a better term, I may term the 
 " theological " class. 
 
 First, then, as to the "Deistic" objections. Men, for many 
 ages past, have pointed to the mighty Universe around us, 
 with all its evidences of o'erwhelming wisdom and power, and 
 have asked how it could be possible, or credible, that the Crea- 
 tor and God of all should so condescend as to come into this 
 petty world of ours, and be born as a man among men ? 
 
 This objection is as old as Christianity itself ; and, as derived 
 from the old Epicurean Deism, was one of the first difficulties 
 raised by the philosophers of Greece and Rome. It was, again, 
 especially congenial to the Deists of the last century; and 
 
DE INCARNA TIONE VERBI DEI 9 
 
 although Deism, as a philosophy, is now dead, yet the objection 
 is still advanced; our greatly developed acquaintance with both 
 the vastness, and the intricacy of Nature being supposed, by 
 some, to have even increased its force. 
 
 And yet all that is necessary to abundantly expose its sophis- 
 try is to bring forward a very elementary theological and philo- 
 sophical axiom, namely, that God is necessarily Infinite and 
 Absolute, — not merely " magni-finite " (to coin a new word) as 
 Deism supposes, — and is therefore omnipresent at all times to all 
 His Creation. This simple, and yet most effective reply is 
 again as old as Christian theology itself ; and was powerfully 
 urged by the great St. Athanasius himself, in refutation of 
 this very objection to the Incarnation, namely, that "God was 
 too great." « 
 
 It is, in fact, only so long as Deistic habits of thought prevail, 
 and God is anthropomorphically pictured as a kind of magni- 
 fied emperor, utterly dissevered from, and outside of His 
 Creation — a Creation, it is true, that had once been formed by 
 the " Great Artizan" 7 in the past; but yet one that had been then 
 abandoned by Him to take care of itself ; while He rarely, if 
 ever, interfered with its working; and then only capriciously — 
 it is, I say, only while this strange type of thought prevails that 
 men can think of God as " too great " to care for His Universe; 
 and as, certainly, " too great " to become Incarnate in man. 
 
 But this, let it be noticed, is an entirely anthropomorphic 
 conception of the Godhead — an ascribing to Him of our faults, 
 finite limitations, and imperfections, — and not merely an an- 
 thropometric one — or a conceiving of Him, it is true, in a neces- 
 sarily manlike way; but yet in the terms of our highest perfec- 
 tions and knowledge. 
 
 Certainly all our conceptions, not merely in theology, but in 
 every department of thought, are, and must be anthropome- 
 tric 8 — or in a "man's manner," — for we, manifestly, can only 
 think in the terms of a man's mind: but we need not, and ought 
 not to be anthropomorphic — or project our "juopcpw" or "estate" 
 into Nature, and its God; and read therein all our imperfections 
 and limitations — for this is a type of thought that is possible 
 only to savage, or shallow minds. 
 
 Deistic and anthropomorphic conceptions, then, of the "great- 
 ness of God," and His want of concern for the world, although 
 possible to the shallow Eighteenth century, or to decadent 
 Greece and Rome, are quite impossible to us now. Scientific 
 
 (6) St Athanasius [De Incar: Verbi Dei, §41.] "The Philosophies of the Greeks 
 say that the Universe is a great bodv, and rightlv so. For we see it. and its parts are 
 objects of our senses. If, then, the Word of God is in the Universe, which is a body, 
 and has united Himself with the whole, and with all its parts, what is there surprising 
 or absurd, if we say that He has united Himself with man also ?" 
 
 (7) Such was the title that Voltaire, and the other 78th century Deists, gave to God' 
 But compare the words of St. Athanasius quoted in note 4, and also what is said on 
 pp. 6 and 7, concerning the dependence of the Universe on God. 
 
 _ <B) I have coined this word, and differentiated between it and "anthropomorphic " 
 in the interests of clearness and accuracy; for the latter term has too long been used 
 in both the " morphic " and the " metric " senses, with a resultant obscurity and con- 
 fusion of thought. J 
 
io DE INCARNATIONE VERBI DEI 
 
 knowledge is ever giving us a more vivid realisation of the 
 living Unity of Nature — teaching us, in other words, that it is, 
 not so much a machine, as an organism; — and we, therefore, 
 can now only conceive of God as did the wisest philosophers of 
 old, and the ancient Fathers of the Church; namely, not as a 
 magnified emperor, remote from His Creation, but as the Om- 
 nipresent and Infinite " Reality" of the Universe — the Ultimate 
 Soul of all. 9 
 
 The deepest thought, then, has ever found its most perfect 
 analogy for this relation of the Creator to His Cosmos, in the 
 relation that exists between the body and soul of man, that sole 
 " manifestation " and " reality " — " phenomenon," and " noume- 
 non" — of which we have any certain knowledge; 10 and if it be 
 objected that this, not less than the Deism exposed above, is 
 only a delusive projection of our own being into Nature, we 
 may reply by making the distinction already noted, and saying 
 that while it is certainly anthropometric — or a reading of Na- 
 ture and Being through the eyes of a man, and an interpreting* 
 it in the terms of our highest and most perfect categories, — yet 
 it certainly is not, like Deism, anthropomorphic — or a reading 
 of ourselves, with all our frailties and imperfections, into the 
 Universe and into God. 
 
 Nor, again, is this truth of the Immanence of God in His 
 World at all incongruous, as some, perchance, may imagine it 
 to be, with what I have already said (pp. 6 and 7) concerning 
 the real separateness that exists between Him and that world. 
 
 We certainly know that there is this separateness, and that 
 we, for example, are not God; and that both from primary in- 
 nate truth, and (so far as may be) from experience also; no the- 
 ory, therefore, or deductions, philosophical or religious, can 
 ever be allowed to contradict this primary fact of our being; 
 and any theory that does so, is thereby self condemned. 
 
 If, then, this analogy between God and His Cosmos, on the 
 one hand, and the spirit and body of man, on the other, if, I 
 say, it did so imply the identity, or confusion of God and His 
 Cosmos, then it would be manifestly untrue. But it does not 
 make this flagrant blunder; for in the analogy chosen — i. e., 
 the spirit and body of man, — the two terms, while certainly 
 closely interconnected (as, again, God and His creation must 
 be) are not, by any means, to be confused, or identified. Under 
 this Catholic and philosophical conception, then, of God as the 
 " Soul of the Universe," which is the highest and most perfect 
 conception we are capable of forming, we are able to think of 
 that Universe as existing, it is true; but yetnot as self existing, 
 apart from, and dissevered from Him, Who is its Sole Ultimate 
 41 Reality." 
 
 If this were not true — if, in other words, the Universe were 
 
 (o) Vide St. Paul's words in Acts xvii, 25-28; and Coloss: I, 17; &c. 
 
 (10) For this statement, and the succeeding paragraph, see the Essay on Spirit 
 
 do) 
 and Matter 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI Ir 
 
 not God's " Body " — then its self existence would, as has been 
 already shown (pp. 6 and 7), imply also its eternity, andt here- 
 fore its essential equality with, and independence of God. But, 
 Nature being the " Body of God," the smallest atom exists be- 
 cause, and only because, He is ever its Thinker and Upholder; 
 and thus is ever giving (not has given) it distance in Him. 
 
 In short, this wonderful Immanence of God in Nature neces- 
 sarily implies also His Transcendence; or, in other words, just 
 as I am able to be immanent in my body, and to give it exist- 
 ence, because, and only because, I am greater than my body — 
 because I am a living entity, a spiritual, individual, and think- 
 ing unit, — so God is able to " think " His Universe, and give it 
 real existence, because, and only because, He is Infinite and 
 Absolute Transcendent Wisdom and Power. Pantheism, then, 
 in not recognising this fact, makes the same terrible mistake 
 with respect to God, that Materialism makes with respect to 
 man; for as the latter seeks to explain away the essential unity 
 of our personality — the spirit and the reason — as being merely 
 the sum total of diverse, and often opposite " sensations," so too 
 the former endeavors to similarly explain away the Personality, 
 the Unity, the Transcendence, and the Reason of God, and 
 predicates Him simply as the sum total — " to nav " — of all the 
 diverse, and often opposite " laws," and "forces "of the Uni- 
 verse. The same stricture, therefore,* applies with equal force 
 to both of these systems; " laws," "forces," "sensations;" what 
 possible meaning, we may well ask, or existence have they, 
 unless it be in relation to a pre-existent Being — God, or man, as 
 the case may be — of Whom they are the "laws," the "forces," 
 or the sensations ? " u 
 
 But yet the truth that Pantheism does, in a measure, see, and 
 which Catholic theology more fully sees, and insists upon as 
 fundamental, and yet again, the truth upon which all modern 
 science is, more or less, consciously based, namely the Unity of 
 Nature as a whole, and the Immanence of the Creative Logos 
 in it, this truth, I say, is sufficient to show the utter futility of 
 the Deistic objection that "God is too great" to become Incar- 
 nate in man. For if He be the " Omnipresent Soul ", " giving 
 to all life, and breath, and all things " — giving existence to each 
 atom as fully as to each world, — then truly nothing can be 
 either "small" or "great" with Him; and we can well plead 
 the argument of St. Athanasius already mentioned (vide 
 note 6), and ask what is there incredible in He, Who is in 
 all things, making a more perfect manifestation of Himself 
 through one ? 
 
 Deistic objections, then, to the Incarnation, based on the 
 "greatness of God", are mistaken and invalid; and yet the very 
 conception of the Godhead that shows their untenableness, gives 
 rise to the second difficulty, namely what I have called, for 
 want of a better name, the "theological" one: although this, as 
 
 (11 ) On all the foregoing discussion compare also the Essay on " Spirit and Matter." 
 
I2 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 I trust I can show, is only because the doctrine of the Incarna- 
 tion is not correctly apprehended. 
 
 In other words, so long as the Blessed Trinity is falsely con- 
 ceived of in a Tritheistic (or rather, to coin a more exact term, 
 in a Trideistic) way, then it is, of course, quite possible to im- 
 agine One of these Gods as leaving the other Two in heaven, 
 and becoming a man. But let the true and Catholic doctrine 
 of the Trinity be clearly apprehended, namely that God is, not 
 Three, but One in Three Personalities — Father, Son, and Holy 
 Spirit, — then, I say, it becomes at once incredible that One 
 Personality of the Trinity — namely the Logos — should, so to 
 speak, " dethrone " Himself, forsake the Unity, and descend ta 
 earth as a man! 
 
 This would be simply inconceivable, even if it were only in 
 relation to His Cosmic functions; for in that Logos all things, 
 as I have shown, " consist ", or in other words, have their actual 
 existence; and if He. then, should, for one single instant, cease 
 to be the Logos, and to give them being, then they also, at the 
 same instant, would necessarily cease to exist. 
 
 But if this " dethronement" of the Logos is inconceivable in 
 relation to the Universe, still less, if possible, is it conceivable 
 in relation to the Essence of God; that One Personality of the 
 Trinity should, for a moment, be wanting — that the Logos 
 should cease, even for a time, to be the Ever Begotten of the 
 Father, and the Eternal Giver of Plenitude to the Holy Spirit, 
 Who Ever Proceedeth through Him — all this, I say, is simply 
 utterly incredible. 12 
 
 Here then we have the "theological" difficulty in conceiving 
 of the Incarnation, a difficulty, it will be noticed that springs 
 not, like the first objection, from a false and Deistic conception 
 of the Godhead, but rather from a true and vital grasp upon 
 the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. 
 
 And this difficulty is all the more potent in fact in that there 
 are many earnest believers who, even if not consciously, are yet 
 subconsciously oppressed and injured by it. They may not be 
 able to clearly and articulately formulate the difficulty; yet it is 
 nevertheless, as I have said, subconsciously present to them; 
 and especially so in their endeavors to obtain a fairly coherent 
 picture of our Lord's character and work ; but this they find 
 themselves unable to attain; for their conceptions of Him, as a 
 
 (fa) Yet, strange to say, this hypothesis has actually been broached by Zinzendorf, 
 Thomasius [Christi Person und Werk], Gess [Die Lehre von der Person Christi], 
 Ebrard[Christliche Dogmatik], and Godet LCom: on the Gospel of St. John]; the latter, 
 and Gess, even predicating a "depotentiation" of the Logos to an utterly unconscious 
 germ; which germ, on becoming a man, only attained, or rather recovered, complete 
 self consciousness by years of patient experience (vide page 21). And furthermore; 
 while this self consciousness was being thus slowly recovered, the Father, and the 
 Holy Spirit are represented as carrying on by Themselves the work of the Godhead j 
 so that the Trinity, in short, for a season, became only a Duality '. ! 
 
 Surely all this is a most extraordinary hypothesis; and is only conceivable, even for 
 an instant, to a thorough going ,k Trideist;" or in other words, to one who conceives 
 of the Blessed Trinity not merely, in a heretical manner, as Three Gods, but also in 
 an eighteenth century fashion, as Three Deistic Gods— three gigantic men ;— each 
 utterlv separate, both from his fellows, and from the world over which he jointly 
 presides ! ! 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB] DEI 13 
 
 man, and as the Logos, are mutually incongruous, and ever con- 
 tradictory ideals. This unfortunate hiatus leads, then, to one 
 or the other aspect of our Lord's character, and generally that 
 of His Logos Nature, being lost sight of, and practically, at any 
 rate, denied; and hence arises false and heretical thought, cor- 
 rupting and injuring the whole Christian life. 
 
 And yet there need not be this formidable difficulty, if we 
 will but approach the subject in a clear and accurate manner. 
 Thus, in the first place, it is clearly unimaginable that the 
 Logos should, at any time, even for one moment, cease to 
 be the Logos; this is plainly evident, as already has been 
 shown, both from the Being of God, and the Being of the 
 Universe. 
 
 And still further, the Generation of the Logos from the 
 Father, and the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father 
 through Him, are, as the Creed confesses, Eternal in their char- 
 acter; and it is hardly necessary to add that this does not mean 
 at an "infinitely remote date in the past"; but on the contrary, 
 a Generation and Procession that is now, as ever, taking place, 
 arising from the Very Being of God. 
 
 The Incarnation of the Logos, then, does not, and cannot 
 mean, I repeat, that He ceased, even for a time, to be the Logos 
 — or was, in other words, "dethroned"; — but, on the contrary, 
 simply means that He was, during that Incarnation, locally 
 manifested (1 Timothy, iii, 16,), and as I will hereafter show, 
 also locally limited by the manhood He then assumed. 
 
 To elucidate my meaning; nearly all men will acknowledge 
 that at certain times and places God has wrought in a special 
 manner through certain "inspired" men — poets, teachers, or 
 heroes. — Christians, furthermore, will hold that this Divine 
 power has been manifested in a yet more signal manner through 
 His Church — her saints, her doctors, and her councils, — and 
 more especially through "inspired" writers — Moses and the 
 Prophets, under the Old Dispensation; the Apostles and Evan- 
 gelists under the New. 
 
 Here, then, in all these instances of "Inspiration," whether it 
 be that of a lower, or a higher type — the " Inspiration," of a 
 poet, of a saint, or of an Evangelist, — we have yet clear in- 
 stances of a "manifestation" of God, localised and even limited by 
 the personality and limitations of the man Whom He thus " in- 
 spires;" and yet assuredly a " local manifestation and limita- 
 tion " that, in no sense, and in no way, conflicts with His Eternal 
 Omnipresence and Omnipotence. 
 
 But we can go even further than this in our analogies; for 
 there is, if we will but see it, a "local and limited 13 manifesta- 
 tion ■' of God, in a real and true sense, immanent in the heart of 
 every man, namely in that instinctive illumination of "prime 
 data " — sensational, intellectual, moral, and religious, — to which 
 
 (73) See pp. 41-43 on the necessary limitations of instinctive guidance and light. 
 
14 
 
 DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 I have already referred. Thus St. John, in the opening of his 
 Gospel (St. John, i, 9), tells us that the Logos is "the Light that 
 lighteneth every man that cometh into the world;" and with 
 this agree both St. Paul's words at Lystra (Acts xiv, 17), and at 
 Athens (Acts xvii, 28), and the constant teaching of the Catho- 
 lic Church. And who, in truth, in considering both in history, 
 and their own souls, that inspirational knowledge of, and thirst 
 for God, of which I, have already spoken (pp. 2 and 3), and 
 especially noting those wondrous twin "lights" of conscience 
 and intellectual truth — " lights " that are, to a large degree, im- 
 personal and non-individualised in their character, — inherent in 
 man, as man (vide note 1), and ever guiding him onward to 
 righteousness, truth, and God, who, I say, in considering these 
 things can fitly deny them to be real " inspirational " guidings 
 from God ? Here, then, again we have another clear instance, 
 as I have said, of a local and limited " manifestation " of God; a 
 "manifestation" that is immanent in each individual heart; 
 and yet One that is not the less Omnipresent to all His 
 Creation. 
 
 And here " en passant " I may remark that this " local mani- 
 festation " of the Logos in every man, or in other words, this 
 verity that every human being, as such, is a temple of the in- 
 dwelling Light, this, I say, is the fact that gives us the key to 
 both the modicum of truth in, and the vast fallacy of, the " lib- 
 eral " quibble that " Christ was, no doubt, an Incarnation of 
 God, for so is every man." 
 
 True, every man is, as I have shown, in some sense, a " mani- 
 festation" of God; and so too, in a higher sense, is every hero, 
 poet, and sage; and so again, in a yet higher sense, is every 
 saint, every Father of the Church, and the Church herself as 
 a whole; and in an even still higher sense may we say that the 
 " inspired" Apostles and Prophets of God are " manifestations " 
 of Him. 
 
 But yet the Incarnation of the Logos differs from all the fore- 
 going, not only in degree, but in kind; for an " Incarnation," as 
 I will show, means something far surpassing mere possession, 
 even though that be of the fullest possible kind. The accu- 
 rate meaning of " Incarnate " in short, is for God, not merely to 
 be in a man, but to be a man; and that is a wonder of which we 
 have no exemplar, apart from Christ. 
 
 It must not, then, be overlooked or forgotten that all the 
 " possessions" mentioned above — of a man, a hero, a Christian, 
 or an Evangelist — are merely examples of a local manifes- 
 tation and limitation of the Omnipresent and infinite; and are 
 not, in any sense, analogues that can be pressed beyond that 
 point. 
 
 But using them for this, and this purpose only, we may say 
 that we can thus obtain a clear conception of the " local mani- 
 festation" of our Lord: a conception that, while it guards the 
 reality of the Incarnation, yet leaves inviolate the Catholic doc- 
 
DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 15 
 
 trine of the Godhead; and one, moreover, that is hinted at in a 
 saying of our Lord's (St. John, iii, 13); and as such, has been 
 more or less fully unfolded by the ancient Fathers of the 
 Church. 14 
 
 In the Incarnation, then, of our Lord, He, as the Logos, 
 never ceased, for one instant, or in any place, to be Omnipres- 
 ent; but the Presence, invisible elsewhere, was visible within 
 the limits of the human body of the Christ. 
 
 (14) Vide the note at the end of this treatise, on the " Local Manifestation." 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 ET us now pass on to consider, as far as may be, how in 
 truth our Lord became man; and it will, I think, help us 
 if we first lay down how He did not; or, in other words, if 
 we consider, and refute, as briefly as possible, the various heret- 
 ical teachings upon this vital point. 
 
 To begin then, and passing by Ebionitism, which, in stating 
 that our Lord was a man only, denied any Incarnation at all, we 
 may say that the succession of heretical doctrine on this point, 
 both logically and historically, is as follows. 
 
 There were first those various heresies, included under the 
 generic term of " Gnostic," which were, strictly speaking, non- 
 Christian in origin, anti-Christian in many respects, and in fact 
 were the only slightly modified presentations of ancient Syrian 
 philosophies. 15 Nevertheless inasmuch as the "^Eon Christ" 
 was given a place in all their systems, and they all professed to 
 have a Christology, it may be well to briefly notice their wide 
 divergence from the Church's doctrine. 
 
 Starting, then, as they did, from the fundamental principal of 
 the essential evil of " matter," qua " matter," and the equally 
 essential good of "spirit," qua "spirit," it is, of course, manifest 
 that no real Incarnation of Christ could be allowed; the appar- 
 ent humanity of our Lord was, then, explained away in various 
 fashions. Some, like Cerinthus, predicated a mere "possession," 
 or inspiration by the "u^Eon Christ" of the man Jesus; which 
 " possession " was supposed to have commenced at His baptism, 
 and to have ceased at His crucifixion. This theory re-appears, 
 in a somewhat modified form, in the later, and more properly 
 Christian heresies of Nestorianism, and Adoptionism, and will 
 be considered and confuted in those connections. 
 
 Others, again, of the Gnostics conceived of our Lord as indeed 
 the "^Eon Christ," and Him alone; but avoided the fancied 
 corruption of the Divine Spirit by a material body, by predi- 
 cating to that material body a merely illusionary existence. 
 True, said they, He appeared to possess a material body, and to 
 live the life of a man; but it was in appearance only; for that 
 an " Emanation" from the Divine — an "^Eon" — could be bound 
 by a body, could hunger, could suffer, and above all could be 
 crucified and die, this, to them, was utterly inconceivable. All 
 the accounts, therefore, in the Gospels, of such a manhood, and 
 such a death, were to be taken as being merely subjective illu- 
 sions, having no real foundation in fact; for our Lord's body 
 was, in short, to all intents and purposes, a phantasm — an ap- 
 parition — and nothing more. This is the strange theory named 
 
 (15) Vide the Essay on the "Essential Nature of Sin," re the " Gnostics." 
 
 (16) 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 1? 
 
 by the Church the M Doketic " one, and sternly repudiated by 
 her as subversive of all truth and reality. How, it was well 
 asked, if such a theory were correct, was He properly Incarnate 
 at all ? And furthermore, if His life and His death were thus 
 mere figments, must not our redemption be a figment also; and 
 finally was not the Holy and True One thereby made the 
 Author and Father of lies ! ! 
 
 Yet another strange Gnostic idea, closely connected with 
 Doketism, was that our Lord's humanity came direct from 
 heaven, and that He took no substance of His mother, but 
 passed through her " tanquam per canalem." l6 This, probably, 
 at first, was only intended as an expression of His body's phan- 
 tasmal unreality; but the later Gnostics (such as Valentinus),. 
 and the Manichaeans, seem to have taken it in a more literal 
 sense; and it was, strangely enough, said to have even found a 
 place in the semi-doketic system of the Christian Apollinarius. 
 From the Manichaeans it passed over, probably by w T ay of the 
 Paulicians, to various of the heretical sects of the Middle Ages; 
 and was part of the heretical inheritance of the abhorred Ana- 
 baptists. 
 
 Leaving these unreal and fanciful systems we pass on to the 
 consideration of the great Arian heresy, in so far as it affected 
 the doctrine of the Incarnation. The Christology of this sect, 
 with its semi-gnostic principles, 17 does not seem to have been 
 very clearly defined; but from all the indications that we can 
 gather it was probably of an Apollinarian and semi-gnostic 
 type. The hyper-angelic, semi-divine, Emanated " Son " was 
 conceived of as inhabiting a human body to which He was 
 both " Ego " and mmd; 18 and furthermore sin was held to be an 
 essential quality of finite and created wills; so that the "Son," 
 although hyper-angelic, being yet created, could and must, 
 therefore, be chargeable with sin. The dualistic theory of 
 " sin " that this implies will be examined in an Essay upon the 
 " Essential Nature of Sin" following this treatise; at present we 
 need only consider the Christology; and this can more conven- 
 iently be done by taking up its next, and more Christian type. 
 
 Apollinarius, the quondam friend of St. Athanasius, fought 
 bravely against the Arian misbelief; but, unfortunately, in so 
 doing, assumed that both the Arian Christology, and theory of 
 
 (16) tt Xpidrdv yibv i'Siov ,' ' a\\a k<xi ibvxiKOv" . . . "elvai 8e 
 tovtov ,tov Sia -dxpiaz Siodev6avra Ka^aittp vSoop Sia aooXffvog 
 658VSI." [St. Irenaeus Contra Haer: Lib; I, cap. 7, § 2.] 
 
 117) The underlying Gnostic principles of Arianism. on the one hand, and the wide- 
 spread influence, at the time, of such Dualistic theories, on the other, are often not as 
 clearly apprehended as they should be; and the consequence is that the exceedingly 
 rapid, even if short lived, successes of Arianism are wondered at as inexplicable 
 But the truth is that much of the Pre-Christian, and Non-Christian Greek thought 
 was fundamentally Dualistic in its character Arianism, therefore, with i*s Ema- 
 nitional theorv of Christ, was most agreeable to the peculiar intellectual atmosphere 
 of its age; and as such, both reaped all the accruing popularity and advantage- and 
 was also correspondingly evanescent. 
 
 < <2&ua yao "dvrov [i. e. rov Adyov] ' dibvxov scpx ["ApEio<f\ hXxcp- 
 e'vai, EvxpyxKivai ds ret rfjs ibvxy"n rffv ^EorKra" [Theodoret Haer: Fab: 
 Lib: IV, cap. 1.] Vide also Epiphanius [Adv: Haer: Lib: II; Haer: LXIX, cap. i 9 . 
 3 
 
18 DE INCARNATIONE VERBI DEI 
 
 u sin," were practically correct. They had objected to the God- 
 head of Christ on the ground that He " did not know," and was 
 also, as man, necessarily passable and peccable, things that were 
 clearly impossible to the Infinite and Eternal God. 
 
 To all this Apollinarius rightly replied by denying our Lord's 
 peccability; but, at the same time, he unfortunately granted to 
 the Arians their contention that sin was an essential property 
 of a real humanity — that faultiness, in short, was not merely an 
 accident, and a " fall," but was, on the contrary, an inherent 
 quality in every created will; — 19 thus distinctly approximating, 
 in this respect, to the Gnostic " evilness of matter." 
 
 Under the pressure of this theory of the evilness " per se " of 
 liumanity, he could, indeed, allow to our Lord a human body; 
 but he was forced to deny the existence of a human mind and 
 will. The Logos, in short, was pictured as abiding in a human- 
 appearing shell, of which He was, not only the " Ego," but the 
 rational mind as well: and it was in relation to this "shell" 
 theory that he was said to have even adopted the " tanquam per 
 canalem " heresy spoken of above. 90 
 
 Catholics naturally replied that all this was only the Doketic 
 " illusionary " heresy in a mere modified form: He, Who was 
 the God of truth, would not condescend to such a lie; and more- 
 over, such a false simulacrum of humanity would eviscerate of 
 all real meaning both His Incarnation, and the Redemption He 
 had made. 
 
 And even still further: such a negation of any real humanity 
 to our Lord, other than His mere physical existence, would 
 render utterly meaningless, not only the mental anguish He 
 endured in the Garden, and on the Cross, but above all, and 
 especially, His "descent into Hell" after death; for obviously, 
 on the one hand, our Lord's human body did not so " descend," 
 but lay in the sepulchre; while, on the other hand, in His God- 
 head He could not properly be said to have " descended;" inas- 
 much as any such notion of change of locality is entirely de- 
 barred by His Essential Omnipresence. Our Lord, therefore, 
 could be said to " descend into Hell," simply and only, in His 
 Incarnate relation as man; which relation, again, or "manhood," 
 can, obviously, only consist in that element of His humanity — : 
 namely, "mind," and "vital life " — which was not resting in the 
 Syrian tomb: this is, evidently, an all conclusive objection to 
 Apollinarianism; and as such it was advanced, and accepted at 
 the time. 21 
 
 But if Apollinarianism was mere modified Doketism, the next 
 lieresy was but a modified Cerinthian Gnosticism, in its doc- 
 
 (19) Vide St. Athanasius [De Incar. contra Apoll. .Lib: I, § 2] % who quotes him as 
 paying "oitov yap teXeioc, ' * av^pooitivoc, ekei yap ajuapria" Vide also Lib: 
 
 (20) Vide Rufinus [Eccl. Hist. Lib. II, cap. 20]; Nicephorus [Eccl. Hist. Lib. XVIII, 
 cap. 53]; Theodoret [Eccl. Hist. Lib. V, cap. 3 1: St. Gregory Nazianzen List Epist. to 
 Cledonitts, §§ 4 and 6]; St. Vincent of Lerins [Commin. cap. XII, § 34], &c 
 
 (21) E. g. vide St. Athanasius [Contra Apoll. Lib. I, § 13 et seq.; and Lib. II, § 14 et 
 «eq.]; Theodoret |Exp. Pslm. XV, io>; &c. 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERBI DEI I9 , 
 
 trine of the Person of Christ. This heresy — Nestorianism — 
 stated that the Incarnation of our Lord was, in fact, but a mere 
 "possession," or inspiration, by which the Logos dwelt in the 
 man Jesus, Whom He there assumed. True, this "possession " 
 of Jesus did not merely begin at His baptism (as Cerinthus had 
 taught), but was from the moment of His conception; neither, 
 again, did it cease at His crucifixion (as Cerinthus had also 
 taught), but, on the contrary, continued then, as it will continue 
 for evermore. Nevertheless it was, after all, but a mere " pos- 
 session" — He was but " Qeocpopos," — and there were in Him two 
 separable persons — the man Jesus, and the Logos; — so that 
 the blessed Virgin, His mother, was but " XpidroroKo^" not 
 11 Oeoro/cos," 23 as the Church had said. 
 
 The fallacy of this most dangerous heresy is plainly evident. 
 If, in the first place, such a theory were true, then, logically, 
 there could be no real meaning to, or place for, either the 
 Atonement wrought on Calvary, or the Sacramental system 
 of the Church derived from that Atonement. For, obviously, 
 under this supposition, the Inspiring Logos on the one hand, 
 did not, and could not have suffered, died, and risen again; nor, 
 on the other hand, could the passion, death, and resurrection 
 of the man Jesus have had much more efficacy or benefit than 
 that of any other Holy man. And yet further; if the Logos 
 and the man Jesus were separable Persons, even if it be only 
 in thought, then they evidently could have been divided; and, 
 in fact, were so divided at the death, and burial of our Lord; so 
 that at that time (under this supposition) the Incarnation, mani- 
 festly, must, for a season at least, have ceased to be ! It is hard to 
 see, if the Nestorian theory of our Lord's Person be the true 
 one, how these conclusions can well be denied. 
 
 But even further: as I have already pointed out (pp. 14, 15), 
 such mere " possession " would not, and could not, in any true 
 sense of the word, constitute an " Incarnation" at all; for this, 
 as I have stated, implies, not merely being in a man, but being 
 a man; I will recur to this fact, and more fully elucidate it, 
 when I treat of our Lord as the Primal Man. 
 
 And finally; if this Nestorian theory were true, and the man 
 Jesus merely "joined to," and " inspired by" the Indwelling 
 Logos, then we might well ask how such " possession " would 
 greatly differ from the various examples of " Inspiration " al- 
 ready given (pp. 13-14). Surely, in such a case, Christianity, 
 with all its vast superstructure of faith, and of doctrine, would 
 be mistakenly founded upon a very ordinary event indeed — 
 upon an event, in short, that is, in some degree, paralleled in the 
 heart of every man! 
 
 So much then for Nestorianism: but turning now to the next 
 heresy in order, namely the Eutychian, we find that the pendu- 
 
 (22) Which term, I need scarcely say, should, strictly, be translated "the God 
 Bearer" [from u TlKTIO v J, or "Deipara," rather than "the mother of God;*' this latter 
 phrase being open to heretical misconstructions. 
 
20 DE INCARNA TIONE VERBI DEI 
 
 lum has swung the other way, and we are presented with a 
 theory that is but little removed from the true and orthodox 
 Paith. Thus Eutychianism said that while our Lord's human 
 body, and human mind were real entities, and had a genuine 
 •existence, yet the powers of the latter of these — i. e. His human 
 mind — were so "swallowed up," and overwhelmed by His God- 
 head as to be practically without operation. He could, then, 
 "hunger;" but He could not be "ignorant:" for the "self-emp- 
 tying " — the " K£vaodi$" — mentioned by St. Paul (Philip ii, 5-9), 
 applied only to His body, and not to His human mind; inasmuch 
 as this latter was " swallowed up in His Godhead, as is a drop 
 of honey in the ocean." 23 
 
 Now this question of the " Kenosis " is certainly a most diffi- 
 cult one, and its full treatment must be reserved to its proper 
 sequence (vide chap, v): but yet an obvious objection to this 
 Eutychian theory, and one that can be advanced here, is that 
 it plainly lies open, nearly as much as Apollinarianism, to the 
 charge of Doketic unreality. He Who freely assumed our 
 perfect humanity, would surely not proceed to thus swamp and 
 nullify one chief element in that humanity, namely its rational 
 mind. Nay! inasmuch as that human mind, like all other finite 
 reasons, must derive its very existence from His inspirational 
 "light" (vide note 1, and pp. 42 and 43, &c.), He can hardly 
 be thought to be so swamping and nullifying its action, at 
 the same instant that He is giving it both its very being and 
 guidance. 
 
 Although, then, some 24 have felt themselves forced to adopt 
 this theory, or at least a modified form of it, out of a feeling of 
 reverence for our Lord, yet such a course, is, I am sure, both 
 unnecessary and wrong. For while, on the one hand, it intro- 
 duces into our faith concerning our Lord's Incarnation the 
 deadly virus of unreality, on the other hand, all reverent solici- 
 tude for the honor of our Lord is, as I hope to show, abundantly 
 satisfied by the Catholic doctrine of His Person. 
 
 But from Eutychianism was developed the much more serious 
 errors of Monophysitism, a somewhat broad term, covering a 
 number of more or less variant sects. Their doctrine, as a 
 whole, was a development on ultra- Eutychian lines, for they 
 taught that the humanity was, not merely "swallowed up " and 
 rendered inoperative, but actually transfused into the Godhead — 
 Deified — in some inconceivable way. 
 
 To this Catholics replied that such a "transfusion" as this of 
 the finite into the Infinite — the manhood becoming the God- 
 
 (ai) This was the chosen simile of the Eutychians; see the " Eranistes, or Polymor- 
 phous" [Dialogue II, on " the Unconfused "] written by Theodoret against them. Yet 
 St Gregory of Nyssa [Adv. Apoll. § 42] used the same simile in exposition of the 
 orthodox faith ! This, of course, was before the heretical bearings of the analogy 
 were clearly seen; yet it was, surely, always a dangerous and misleading simile to 
 
 a (24) E. g. many of the " Schoolmen " [vide note 63 and p. 39]; who certainly, in their 
 apparent predication of Omniscience to the human mind of our Lord came perilously 
 near Eutychianism. 
 
BE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 21 
 
 "head — was utterly and entirely inconceivable; and in addition, 
 if it were true, the result would be no true " Incarnation " at 
 all; but rather a "third confused something," that would be 
 neither God, nor man. 
 
 This Monophysite theory was revived in an even exaggerated 
 form by the Lutherans of the Reformation period; for although 
 their theology at first was strongly Nestorian in tendency, 25 yet 
 they were ultimately led by their Eucharistic theory, first into 
 Adoptionism; and thence into ultra-Monophysite thought; 
 predicating, by their peculiar interpretation of the " communi- 
 catio idiomatum," all the qualities of the Godhead, even the 
 Omnipresence, to the finite humanity of our Lord. 
 
 But it was reserved for the present age to give expression to 
 an opposite, and if possible, even more absurd form of Mono- 
 physitism, namely the transfusion of the Divine into the 
 human! The theory that the Infinite Logos " depotentiated " 
 Himself, and entirely forsaking both the Unity of the Trinity, 
 and the Universe that He upheld, became an utterly uncon- 
 scious embryo; and passing through an ignorant, fallible, and 
 peccable boyhood, to a manhood in which He was but dimly 
 conscious of Himself, finally only attained, or rather recovered, 
 the complete self consciousness of His Godhead by years of 
 patient experience, this monstrous theory, I say, first 26 defi- 
 nitely broached by Zinzendorf, has been gravely advocated by 
 Gess,* 7 Godet, 28 and others of the Neo-Lutheran school, as the 
 correct exposition of the "Kenosis" preached by St. Paul!! 
 
 Now, as I have already stated, in my treatment of Eutychian- 
 ism, the full consideration of the very difficult question of the 
 "Kenosis" must be reserved until its proper sequence; I will 
 therefore merely say here that such a heresy as the above not 
 only falls, like its more Christian analogue — Monophysitism 
 proper, — into the grave philosophical absurdity of confound- 
 ing the finite and the Infinite — the human and the Divine, — 
 but it also, in an even blasphemous manner, makes the Abso- 
 lute, for a season, even inferior to man! 
 
 Returning to the more sober heresies of the Church, we may 
 note Monothelitism, an attempted compromise between the 
 more moderate section of the Monophysites, and the Eastern 
 Catholic Church. This theory stated that while our Lord, in 
 His Incarnation, had doubtless the orthodox " Two Natures" 
 
 (25) Inasmuch as their reproduction of, and strenuous insistence upon, the Gnostic 
 theory of the total evilness of man, as man— all his virtues, even, being nothing more 
 than additional sins,— would logically have led them, had they followed it out, into 
 either a Nestorian view of our Lord's Incarnation [as was, in fact, at first Luther's 
 own view; although later modified, as stated in the text, into an Adoptionistic theory: 
 vide note 29]; or else into such an absurd and blasphemous theory as was actually put 
 forth later by Gess, &c. ; namely that the Infinite " depotentiated " Himself, and be- 
 came a sinjulman! 
 
 (26) Although we find it, previously, among the incoherent heresies of the various 
 Anabaptist sects; and traces of it, again, occur among the Gnostics; for it was, appar- 
 ently, substantially professed by Beron of the Valentinian school. [.Vide St. Hippo- 
 lytus. " Contra Beronem et Helicem."] 
 
 (27) Vide his "Die Lehre von der Person Christi." 
 
 (28) Vide his "Com: on the Gospel of St John." 
 
22 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 yet nevertheless His Will was only One; and furthermore, that 
 that Will belonged solely to His Divine Nature, His humanity 
 being, in short, totally destitute of this faculty. 
 
 But, as the Catholics naturally replied, this not only injured 
 our Lord's true humanity (for a human nature that lacked a 
 will would be, at the least, very imperfect; even if it were not 
 utterly inconceivable), but also it practically re-introduced an 
 Apollinarian denial to our Lord of any real humanity, other 
 than His mere physical existence. 
 
 But the full consideration of this heresy must be reserved 
 until we treat of the "two wills" of our Lord (vide pp. 45 and 
 46); suffice it now to say that it was heretical, more in its de- 
 ductions, than in its statements; and as I will show in its analy- 
 sis, was but little removed from the true and orthodox Faith. 
 
 The last heresy that concerns us is that strange one of early 
 Spain, known to theologians as the "Adoptionist " heresy. The 
 accounts given of its character are extremely difficult to un- 
 ravel; but it would seem that it started from a. Nestorian basis, 
 and reached Monophysitic conclusions. 29 Thus its advocates 
 predicated in our Lord, primarily, Two Persons — the man Jesus, 
 and the "Word," — as did Nestorius; but the man Jesus was 
 thought to have been gradually " assumed " by, or transfused 
 into the "Word;" until at our Lord's Resurrection His Nature 
 was but a Monophysitic One. 30 Hence they were willing both to- 
 anathematise Nestorius, whose " Two Persons," ever remained 
 distinct, and to grant to the Blessed Virgin the title of "Qeotokos" 
 in view of what her Son became. 
 
 Yet if such a doctrine were true, then the " Word " did not 
 become "Incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary;'* 
 but, on the contrary, was, during His life, gradually becoming sa 
 in some indefinable way. And furthermore; when this "gradual 
 Incarnation " had been completed, not only would we have the 
 incomprehensible "third something" of the Monophysites, that 
 was neither God nor man; but we would also have to predicate 
 the additional absurdity of a gradual annihilation and disap- 
 pearance of the " Ego " of a man ! 
 
 Such, then, are the various heretical theories concerning the 
 Incarnation of our Lord; and in contradistinction to them all 
 we have the doctrine of the Church, as laid down at the Council 
 
 (29) A similar fusion of these two heresies seems to have been previously held by- 
 some of the later and minor Monophysite sects; and hence, very probably, its origin in 
 Gothic Spain; being introduced there, from Egypt, by some of these heretics, follow- 
 ing in the wake of the invading Moors. 
 
 It is, certainly, very Eastern in its subtlety, and unlike what Western thought 
 would produce; and as such, indeed, it sorely puzzled the comprehension of the blunt 
 Goths and Franks, who condemned it at the Councils of Frankfort, Aix la Chapelle, 
 &c. And furthermore; it seems, to me, to be the legitimate conclusion to which Mono- 
 physite thought, at its ultimate analysis, must arrive. So that everything, in fact, both 
 in its history, and its character, points to its primary origin in the East. 
 
 We may notice, too, in this connection, that "Adoptionism " was similarly embraced 
 by Luther, as the logical transition from his earlier Nestorianism, to his later Mono- 
 physitism [vide Dorner '• Person of Christ," part 2, vol. 2, sect, ij; and as such, .again, 
 it has been the teaching of various Lutheran theologians; and, notably, of Dorner 
 himself [vide part 2, vol. 3, pp. 250 et seq.] . „ . . , _ . 
 
 (30) Vide Lib: II, 16, of the treatise o£ Felix, the Spanish originator of the heresy. 
 
DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 23 
 
 of Chalcedon, namely that while there were, and are in our 
 Lord Two distinct Natures — the Divine, and the human, — yet 
 their union is "hypostatic"* 1 and of the closest possible character, 
 so that He is but One Person — " for as the reasonable soul and 
 flesh is one man, so God and man is One Christ." 39 
 
 It was not, then, by taking a man unto Him that He became 
 Incarnate, as Nestorius, and the Adoptionists said; nor was it, 
 again, by assuming, in any degree, the illusionary appearance of 
 a man, as the " Doketic " heresy, and, in a lesser degree, Apolli- 
 narianism taught; nor, yet again, by either blending Himself 
 with, or changing Himself into a man, as the various Monophy- 
 site heresies imagined. But it was, so to speak, by creating a 
 manhood around Him; a manhood that had no conceivable exist- 
 ence apart from Him: and yet also one that was real and true, 
 could hunger and thirst, endure anguish and temptation; and 
 in short, as I hope to show, feel all the limitations of a natural 
 human existence. 
 
 Thus if we may picture to ourselves man as a three fold being — 
 Spiritual ''Ego," mental life, and bodily life creating a body — then 
 we can say that, in our Lord, the Logos was His "Ego;" and that 
 His mental and bodily lives were real and genuine human ones, 
 having for their Creative and Sustaining "Ego" the Divine Logos 
 of God. 
 
 And, furthermore, even as it is true that in man the intellect, and 
 the bodily life exist, and can only exist as "emanations" (so to 
 speak) of the individual and hypostatic "Ego"; so, too, in Christ 
 the human intellect, and the human bodily life could have, and did 
 have, no possible existence apart from Him, either before He 
 "assumed" them, or subsequent to that event. 33 
 
 This is a most important point, for, as it will be noticed, it is 
 precisely here that Nestorianism, on the one hand, and Mono- 
 physitism, with its various affiliations (i. e. Apollinarianism, 
 Eutychianism, and Adoptionism), on the other, went so widely 
 astray; 34 for they all made the primary mistake of conceiving of 
 
 (31) Vide the note, at the end of this treatise, on "the Hypostatic Union in Christ." 
 
 (32) Compare Eph: ii, 15. " For to make in Himself of twain, one new man, &c." 
 
 (33) Vide the Essay en " Spirit and Matter." 
 
 ('34) Vide St. Leo [Epist: xxviii "to Flavian, 11 i. e. the " Tome. 1 ' cap. 4; ar.d again 
 Epist: xxxv, "to Julian, bishop of Cos. 1 ' cap. 3]; in which latter passage he says: "In 
 eo vero quod Eutj-ches in episcopali judico ausus est dicere 'ante Incarnationem duas 
 in Christo fuisse naturas, post Incarnationem autem unam.' " * * * "Arbitror 
 enim talia loquentem hoc habere persuasum, quod anima quam Salvator assumpsit 
 prius in coelis sit commorata quam de Maria Virgine nasceretur, eamque sibi Verbum 
 m utero copularet Sed hoc Catholicae mentes auresque non tolerant: quia nihil secum 
 Dominus de coelo veniens nostrae conditionis 'exhibuit; nee animam enim quae ante- 
 rior exstitisset, nee carnem quae non materni corporis esset accepit. Natura quippe 
 nostra non sic a?sumpta est, ut prius creat.a, post assumeretur; sed nt ipsa assianptione 
 crearetur. Unde quod in Origine merito damnatum est qui animarum antequam cor- 
 poribus insererentur, non solum vi tarn, sed utdiversas, fuisse asseruitactiones necesse 
 est ut etiam in isto nisi maluerit sententiam abdicare plectatur.'' Vide also St. John 
 Damascene [De Fide Orth: Lib: hi, cap, 2; and Lib: iv, cap. 6;] ?t. Gregory Nazianzen 
 [Orat: 36;! &c. 
 
 In fact, this was the source of error in all the Christological heresies, with the ex- 
 ception of Gnosticism, and its daughter Arianism; which sprang rather from an even 
 more radical error, namely Dualism. But perhaps, analysing still deeper, Dualistic 
 principles were the " fors et origo mali " in everv one of these heresies; for their com- 
 mon initial mistake, noted above, of making the Incarnation a co?nbination or junc- 
 
24 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 our Lord's humanity as existing previous to the Incarnation, and 
 therefore apart from Him ; instead of regarding it, like the Catho- 
 lics did, as created by that Incarnation.™ The insoluble problem, 
 therefore, that they set before themselves, was to Incarnate the 
 Logos in a separate humanity; and that by making the Incarna- 
 tion either a mere "possession" of the pre-existing humanity; or 
 else an "absorption" or "transfusion" of that humanity into the 
 overpowering Divinity. 
 
 But the true and Catholic faith is, I repeat, that the Humanity 
 of our Lord had, and can have, no possible existence, either pre- 
 vious to, or apart from Him, Who was, and is, Its Hypostatic 
 "Reality" and "Ego." This is what theologians mean when 
 they speak of the Human Nature of our Lord as being an ''im- 
 personal personality;" and it is also the special point of distinc- 
 tion in saying that He assumed, "not mem, but humanity." 36 
 
 But yet, on the other hand, it was not, by any means, a mere 
 "abstract humanity" that He assumed; for such an abstraction 
 is purely notional to our minds, and is without any actual exist- 
 ence; but it was real and personal humanity, genuine and indi- 
 vidual, given to Him, and Him alone, by her who conceived Him 
 in her womb, and became thus the earthly "mother of her Lord." 37 
 
 It follows, then, that the Incarnation, having once taken place, 
 can never be undone; there can never be an "Excarnation;" but 
 the Godhead, and the manhood are there joined together, never 
 to be divided. And even when our Lord died upon the Cross, 
 and His Human body was thereby parted from His human bodily 
 life and intellect — the one to lie in the sepulcher, and the other 
 (mind, and vital life) to descend to the "Hell" of the dead, — even 
 then, I say, the "Hypostatic Union" was not impaired; for the 
 Omnipresent Logos was with that lifeless body in the grave, as 
 He was with His human Soul in "Hell;" being thus, during those 
 three days, "locally manifest" in those two places. 38 
 
 ture, in various ways, between God and a fire-existent man [or "humanity," as the 
 
 pression of the phenomenal relations, of that " spirit "—that "hypostatic Ego " [Vide 
 the Essay on " Spirit and Matter."] And this erroneous anthropology came, in turn, 
 from a Dualistic opposition between " Spirit " and " Matter." 
 (3s) Vide St. Leo; quoted in the preceding note. 
 
 (36) Vide St. Augustine [De Fide; ad Petr: cap. i 7 fl St. Cyril Alex: [De Incar: Dom: 
 cap. 32;] Peter Lombard [Liber Sent: Book iii, dist. 5, qq. 1 and 4;] St. Thomas Aqui- 
 nas [Sum: Theo: Pars, iii, Q. iv, art. 2.] "Utrum Filius Dei assumpserit personam?" 
 denied; &c. . . 
 
 (37) Vide St. John Damascene. [De Fide Orth: Lib: 111, cap. n;] Peter Lombard 
 [Liber Sent: Book iii, dist. 5, q. 5;] St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars. iii. Q. iv, 
 art. 4;! &c. See also pp. 20 and 30, on the necessity, in relation to a real Incarnation, of 
 a human conception and birth. 
 
 (38) Vide St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q. L, art. 2.] " Utrum in morte 
 Christi fuerit separata Divinitas a carne?" denied: so too Peter Lombard [Liber Sent: 
 Book iii, dist. 21, qq. 1 and •>.] And St. Thomas Aquinas again [Q. idem, art, 3.] 
 "Utrum in morte Christi fuerit facta separatio Divinitatis ab anima?" denied. See 
 also p. 65 and note no on the " descent into Hell," 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 fHE Logos, then, perfectly assumed our nature — mental and 
 bodily, — joining it to Himself in One Inseparable Person; 
 and He was able to do this — to be this "Ego" of a man, with 
 a human intellect begotten of, and a human bodily life proceed- 
 ing from that ''Ego" — because, and only because He was the 
 ''Primal Adam" — the "Adam Quadmon" of the Cabbalists — in 
 whose "Image" man had first been made. 
 
 It has, therefore, ever been taught, since the theology of the 
 Incarnation was first clearly formulated, that our Lord could not 
 have become Incarnate in a beast, or a plant, or even in an angel, 
 as He did in man. 
 
 He could not, in the first place, have been so Incarnate in an 
 animal, or a plant; and that because such beings lack the intellec- 
 tual ability to know God; and are, therefore, manifestly incapable 
 of being the media for an Incarnation of the "Word." While 
 angels, on the other hand, although certainly able to know God, 
 are yet also unable to receive Him, owing to their lack of such a 
 common, corporate, and generic nature as could be assumed; 
 arising from their want of the power of self propagation ; and their 
 consequent purely separate and underived individualities. While 
 our Lord, then, might certainly have come into an angelic indi- 
 vidual, and so possessed and inspired him in a Nestorian way 
 (and this, as I have already shown, would have been no true 
 "Incarnation"); yet He, obviously, could not have come into, and 
 then absorbed, or annihilated that individuality, in an Adoptionist 
 fashion; for this would be, not the "assumption" of an angelic 
 nature, but simply the destruction of one; nor, again, could He 
 have changed Himself into an angel; for this would involve the 
 philosophical absurdity of a Monophysitic change of natures. 
 
 Our, Lord, then, I repeat, could not have become Incarnate in a 
 plant, or a beast, whose generic nature would not be suitable; nor 
 even in an angel, whose being lacks such a corporate and generic 
 nature as might be assumed; but could only so tabernacle in 
 man — a being who possesses a corporate nature kindred to His 
 own, and originally made, in fact, in His likeness. 39 Any other 
 nature, then, than this He could, no doubt, have possessed, could 
 have inspired, could have been (so to speak) a Nestorian Christ; 
 
 (30) Vide Peter Lombard [Liber Sent: Book iii, dist. 2, q. ij] and St. Thomas Aqui- 
 nas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii. Q. iv, art. x;] who also divides the congruity for the Incarna- 
 tion into a '* congruity of dignity," and a "congruity of need;" and savs that while 
 animals, as non-intellectual, lack the former, angels, as unfallen, lack the latter. Yet 
 see my remarks on pp. 71, 72 as to the non -essentiality of the "fall" to the Incarnation. 
 And yet again; under the supposition of Aquinas, would not the fallen angels have an 
 even greater ''congruity," both of "dignity." and of "need," than man? 
 
 4 (25) 
 
26 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 but He could not have&eew it; and this, as has been already noted, 
 is what "Incarnation" really means. 
 
 And this fact of the Logos being the "Primal Adam"— the 
 Archetypal Man — gives us the key to many obscurities. In 
 the first place it shows us, as I have just explained, how God 
 could become really a man; and not, on the one hand, be merely 
 in a man, as Nestorius taught; nor yet, on the other hand, be only 
 such an imitation man, as Doketism falsely imagined. 
 
 It again allows us, I think, to perceive, at least in some degree, 
 the grand purpose of God in the Incarnation of His Son. This, 
 apparently, was primarily to unify man with Him — the "image" 
 with its Maker; — and only incidentally, as it were, to atone by 
 suffering for the sins of man. I will touch upon this point again 
 before I close. 
 
 And, finally, it gives us the plain reason why the Son or Logos 
 of God, rather than the Father, or the Holy Spirit, became 
 Incarnate in man. This seems to me perfectly simple, if we will 
 but realize the following facts. In the first place, the Logos, 
 as the Logos — the Word and Wisdom of God, — is the High 
 Priest and Mediator to all Creation: from the Unknown, and 
 Unknowable '"Apxv" of the Godhead — the "Father" — is Eter- 
 nally Begotten the Plenary Essence of the "Son," Who is 
 the "Express Image" of His Person — the Mediator and Revealer 
 of His Will: — and from that '"Apxw," again, of the Father, 
 through the Plenary Essence of the Son, Eternally Proceedeth 
 that Holy Spirit, Who is the Lord and Giver of Life. If, then, 
 in short, we may but name the Father "the Primal Cause," the 
 Son "the Formal Cause," and the Holy Spirit "the Efficient 
 Cause" of Creation, we may possibly gain a clearer conception 
 both of the inter-relations of the Three Blessed Persons in the 
 Trinity, and also of the reason for the special Incarnation of One 
 of those Persons — namely the "Formal Cause" and "Wisdom" — 
 in man; inasmuch as he had been made in that "Wisdom's" like- 
 ness. 
 
 And man was made in this "likeness" because it was most fit- 
 ting and indeed necessary, that he — an intelligent, moral, and 
 spiritual being, created (as we believe) to love and serve his God; — 
 should be, to his finite capacity, a mirror and representative of 
 the Divine Logos of God. 
 
 True it is that, in some sense, every created being, and Creation 
 itself as a whole, must be, to a greater or less degree, an "image" 
 and reflection of the Logos ; and that because He is, as I have said, 
 the "Creative and Formal Cause;" this thought I have already 
 hinted at in the beginning of this treatise (pp. 1 , 2) when speaking 
 of the " Xoyoi " in Nature, and the testimony they bear to Him. 
 
 And similarly, to draw out an analogy, may we not also say that 
 the creations of man — his books, his mechanism, or his build- 
 ings — all bear the impress of their author; and reflect, in their 
 
DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 27 
 
 degree, his personality and "image/' Reflect, I say, in their de- 
 gree; for, manifestly, the higher and more intellectual our crea- 
 tion is in its character, the more of our individuality do we give 
 to it; and consequently, the more perfectly, also, will it mirror 
 us forth. Thus, for example, a biographical novel, or a philo- 
 sophical theory will, evidently, bear far more of our ''image" than 
 any mechanism we may invent ; and this latter, again, witness far 
 more concerning us than the house or monument we may build. 
 
 Carrying on the analogy, then, may we not surely say that 
 while all things in the Cosmos must, and do reflect the Logos; 
 yet this reflection is more or less perfect according to their respec- 
 tive rank in the scale of being; 40 or in other words, according as 
 they partake more or less of an intellectual, moral, and spiritual 
 character; and finally, that it is in man, and man alone, who, as I 
 have already remarked, was created especially to know and love 
 Him, that we must look for such an especial reflection, as will 
 warrant us in speaking of him as being, more peculiarly, in the 
 "image" of that Logos of God. 
 
 And in fact it is only because there is this likeness and "image" 
 that God can, in any degree, be known to man; for were there 
 no common predicates between man and his God, — no likeness 
 by which (as is said on pp. 9 and 10) God can be known an- 
 thropometrically — then there would, manifestly, be no relation — 
 no connotation — between ourselves and our Maker; and He 
 would therefore be absolutely and entirely unknowable. 
 
 But this necessary likeness being allowed, it follows then, as 
 I have shown, that the Logos, and the Logos alone, could be 
 Incarnate; and that both by reason of His inherent Priesthood, 
 and of His Archetypal relation to man. 41 
 
 True it is that in a sense, it was not the Logos alone Who was 
 manifest in Christ; but both the Father and the Holy Spirit were 
 working through that humanity, by reason of the necessary 
 circumin cession (itEpix&pytGii) and co-working of the Persons 
 of the Blessed Trinity among Themselves. 42 Nevertheless the 
 Father, and the Holy Spirit were not, properly speaking, Incar- 
 nate — were not man; — but were only, so to speak, Nestorian 
 "possessions," or in the man; and It was the Logos, and the Logos 
 alone, Who was the "Son of Man" — Who became, in other words, 
 actually Incarnate, in any true sense of the term. 
 
 This truth, then, of the Logos like "image" of man is the key 
 that explains much in the Incarnation; showing how, in reality, 
 
 (40) And, in fact, determines that rank. 
 
 (41) Vide St. Thomas Aquinas ['Sum: Theo:" Pars iii. Q iii. art. 8:1 St. Tohn Damas- 
 S en c '-tt- Fl « e 0«h:" Lib iv, cat). *;] St. Bernard P'Sermo de Adventu." i;l Richard 
 SL e yh\X xct0T L 'pib: de Verbo lncar:" cap. 8 et seq.;l St. Athanasius ["He Incar: Verbi 
 Jjei. 883^5; and 'Four Discourses against the Arians," 2nd disc: cap. 6a et seq. on 
 
 TtpoororoKOS^ St. Augustine [Tract: in Toan: li. ,;] St. Clemens Alex: ["Strom:" 
 Lib: v, can. 14; "Paed:"' Lib: i, can. 7 i &c. Vide also notes 51 and 5*. 
 
 (42) Vide St. Augustine I "De Trimtate," Lib: ii. cap. v. t>. and "De Fide; ad Petr:" 
 cap. 2;] Peter Lombard [Liber Sent: Book iii. dist: 1, q. 3,] &c. 
 
*8 
 
 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 God became Man; why He became Man; and finally, why it was 
 the Logos Who thus became Man; as it is, again, the key to the 
 Christian doctrine of sin and redemption; 43 yet it is also a truth 
 that is liable, on the other hand, to be fearfully misapprehended. 
 
 For men have taken this likeness, and pressed it far beyond 
 anthropometric, to even anthropomorphic limits ; and have plainly 
 said that humanity and Divinity are, at the bottom, the same — 
 that the ultimate terms of the one, are also the ultimate terms 
 of the other; — and even that humanity raised to its highest powers 
 becomes Divinity! 
 
 True it is, as I have already stated, that we can only know God 
 in a manlike way — can only predicate Him in terms of our high- 
 est perfections (such as '''personality," "thought," "volition," and 
 "holiness"); which, in truth, He must, at least, possess, seeing 
 that He is the Creator, and Sustainer of these perfections in us. — 
 But by what right, or what law of thought, can we possibly limit 
 the Absolute to these qualities, and say that we are the final meas- 
 ure of all things — the Absolute in fact, — so that "humanity 
 raised to its highest powers — its most perfect expression — be- 
 comes Divinity!" Such language is, evidently, rankly anthropo- 
 morphic, and is worse than absurd; for if it has any meaning at 
 all, it can only imply a heathen "apotheosis." 
 
 Humanity, then, and Divinity are not fundamentally the same; 44 
 and still less does humanity ever become Divinity; nevertheless 
 the human nature that the Logos assumed was, I repeat, a 
 nature akin to His own, inasmuch as it had been created in His 
 "image." Thus as Canon Mason in his "Faith of the Gospel" 
 (p. 150) has finely said, "the natures of God and man are not 
 contradictory to each other, as life and death are, or holiness and 
 
 (43) Vide the Essay on "the Essential Nature of Sin." 
 
 (44) Vide St. John Damascene [De Fide Orth: Lib: iii, cap. 2;] and St. Thomas Aqui- 
 nas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q. xvi, art. 7;] who both deny that man was Deified by the 
 Incarnation; and St. Thomas [Q. idem, art. 5,] further denies that the same things can 
 be predicated of humanity and Divinity. 
 
 And this consideration, as I mav here remark, evidently entirelv cuts away any such 
 attempted explanation of our Lord's Divinity, as that put forward, in the early history 
 of the Church, by Artemon, and Paul of Samosata; namely, that our Lord was origi- 
 nally nothing more than a man; but that He attained Divinity as a reward for His 
 unusual virtue. 
 
 Such an idea is so utterly absurd, contradicting, as it does, the most elementary 
 theological and philosophical axioms, that it needs no refutation here; it is. in short, 
 only explicable as the importation of the thoroughly heathen conception of an "apoth- 
 eosis"— the promotion of a dead hero to a " Divinity " that differed widely from the 
 Christian and Theistic meaning of the word. 
 
 And yet, strange to say, this teaching, at least in its mam features, has been repro- 
 duced, of late years, by Ritschl, and his school in Germany; but with this portentous 
 exception: to Paul of Samosata, and his followers, both the Godhead, and our Blessed 
 Lord, were objectively real and true; their heresy being simply, as I have stated, the 
 heathen absurdity of an "apotheosis;" but to Ritschl, and his disciples, both God, and 
 Christ are mere humanly projected ideals; and the " Divinity " that Christ attained, 
 only our subjective appreciation of Him as our religious Hero! Whether Jesus of 
 Nazareth really performed certain things— whether, in fact, He ever really existed,— 
 does not matter, they say, in the slightest degree; inasmuch as His name is merely a 
 convenient svnonymn to us for our humanistic ideal ! ! 
 
 This is, evidently, Idealism run mad; and is far worse than a sincere and open 
 Atheism; for it chooses, as its watchword, conscious unreality and lies. It is, then, 
 rather a heresy against primary truth, and religious honesty, than a strictly Christo- 
 Jo.Rical error; and has, therefore, with the heresies of Paul of Samosata, and of EbioU- 
 ism, been omitted from consideration in my text. 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERBI DEI 2g 
 
 sin. To conceive of a union between two such mutually ex- 
 clusive terms as those is impossible; but not between God and 
 man." tt And again (p. 173), "in the unity of His Person all con- 
 tradiction was reconciled; and the same things which became 
 Him as Son of God, became Him as Son of man" * * * 
 ''This double aspect of each and all of our Lord's works must 
 never be forgotten. He was not, by one series of acts, showing 
 Himself as Son of God, and by another as Son of Man. There 
 was in him no alternation between two parts which were to be 
 played. He was continuously and harmoniously both. Thus we 
 may, for clearness of study, contemplate His whole life and death, 
 first as the manifestation of God to man, and secondly as the 
 representation of man to God." 
 
 Our Lord, then, was the "Primal Adam;" and as such was truly 
 Incarnate in man; being, at one and the same time, both Very 
 and True God, and Very and True Man — the Logos "Ego," and 
 the human mind and life; — and this fact throws a flood of light 
 upon the meaning of, and necessity for, His Virgin Birth. 
 
 Had He been merely a Nestorian Christ — a man "indwelt by 
 God," — and His mother only " Xpidror6Ko$," not " Qsoto'kos" 
 as well, then, humanly speaking, there would have been no par- 
 ticular necessity for, or meaning in, such an unprecedented mira- 
 cle. For if merely a holy and obedient being had been required 
 for the Logos to dwell in, then surely it would have been amply 
 sufficient for a sanctified father to have been provided, as a sancti- 
 fied mother was, in the person of the Holy Maid. But for a 
 Logos-ensouled humanity — not ma??, — such as our Lord as- 
 sumed, any earthly father would, manifestly, be inconceivable. 
 
 And furthermore, as I may point out, it was only by reason of 
 this Virgin Birth that He was able to be, not a mere Palestinian 
 Jew of the first century, with certain inherited family peculiarities 
 and "atavisms," but on the contrary, the Archetypal Representa- 
 tive of all humanity — the Very "Son of Man" In fact we may 
 even say that if such a necessary truth as the Virgin Birth of our 
 Lord had not been recorded in the Gospels, it would have been 
 a serious difficulty; and one not to be easily reconciled with the 
 other known facts of His Person. 
 
 But considering this Virgin Birth from another aspect, it is 
 again evident that this motherhood of Mary was also an essen- 
 tial ; as otherwise He would not have assumed a real humanity. 
 
 Thus some have asked the question why our Lord did not 
 create and assume a manhood already matured; and so have 
 escaped the fancied ignominy of being a human embryo, and of 
 undergoing a human birth. 
 
 (45} Compare also St John Damascene |De Fide Orth: L:b: iii. cap. 2.1 ct "£lv yctp 
 tpvdsi riXstpiQebi, yiyonrs &v6ei TeXf.ioc'av'Spcditoc.b 'avro? 6v rpaitEi$ 
 ttjv (pvfjiv jvde rpavrddas ri)v 61 kov oiiiav .» k. r. X.; and St'. Leo uses similar 
 laneruaee [Sermo lxii. cap. 2; and Enist: cxxiv. S 5, "to the monks of Palestine."] 
 "Utraque essentia communes habeat actiones;" &c. 
 
3° 
 
 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 In answer to this we may say that such a question not only 
 implies a Manichaean, and unchristian depreciation of "matter," 
 and the "flesh/' but also overlooks the all important fact that our 
 Lord, as Very Man, must needs have undergone all the various 
 phases of our natural life — our prenatal existence, our birth, and 
 our childhood, no less than our manhood, and death; — for thus, 
 and only thus, was He fully identified with us, and so enabled to 
 accomplish His redemptive work. 
 
 But going even deeper than this, we may say that it was by 
 such a human conception and birth, and by it alone, that our Lord 
 was able to be, not merely a full man, but a true man at all. In 
 other words, if He had so directly created His humanity, and not 
 naturally assumed it from the Virgin, He could hardly have been 
 of one race with ourselves ; but would, on the contrary, have been, 
 at the most, merely a Being with a human aspect. For, referring 
 back to what I have said of the impossibility of His being Incar- 
 nate in an angel, owing to the lack of such a common angelic 
 nature as could be assumed (p. 25), we may similarly say that it 
 was only by His thus partaking, by a natural human birth from 
 a woman, in this common human nature of ours, that He was able, 
 as I have said, to be a true man at all. 
 
 We believe, then, both by Catholic logic, and by the plain 
 testimony of" the Gospels, that the Creative Spirit formed in the 
 womb of the Holy Virgin the living primal germ of the humanity 
 that was to be the earthly tabernacle of the Incarnate Son; a 
 tabernacle that was never, from its beginnings, separate from Him; 
 and which drew aliment from, and grew to natal maturity in, the 
 protective and sustaining womb of her who was the "mother of 
 her Lord." 
 
 And this miraculous conception, although certainly unprece- 
 dented, is not (biologically speaking) by any means so impos- 
 sible an occurrence as is often pretended. "Parthenogenesis" is 
 actually the rule in the lower and primary forms of life ; 46 and the 
 contrary fact is as purely a specialised function as say the func- 
 tions of the eye or the ear. Human "parthenogenesis," then, 
 is no more "prima facie" impossible, than is human sight without 
 an eye, a thing by no means inconceivable. 47 Given, then, as 
 under the Christian hypothesis of the Virgin Birth, a human life 
 germ, created by the Holy Spirit of God, and the subsequent 
 growth and development of that life germ into a perfect human 
 body would be a perfectly natural, and indeed necessary occur- 
 rence. 
 
 I may further point out that there also exists an unnoticed, 
 
 (4^ Takine the word to mean, not merely the phenomenon of "alternate genera- 
 tion » [to which, in zoology, the tprm is generally restricted"!, but also that reproduc- 
 tion tov "budding." which is the law of the primary cell: and which can, surely.be 
 
 de U 7 ) ^or Sight°no e t r the a "light'' vibrations possibly be transferred sav by electricity 
 directlv to the optic nerve, and thence to the brain, without being first imprinted on 
 the retina ? 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 3I 
 
 and yet (in some respects) close parallel to this natural growth 
 of an unusually planted life germ, in the recent developments of 
 surgical "transplanting." In this operation a foreign bone, 
 or piece of flesh is grafted into a living body, and thereupon pro- 
 ceeds to draw sustenance from, live in, and finally be assimi- 
 lated to that body; this surely is, to all practical intents, a "non- 
 natural birth" of the aforesaid bone, or piece of flesh. 
 
 If this be so, then the only non-natural feature of the Virgin 
 Birth is this primary creation by the Holy Spirit of the life germ; 
 and if Christ be the Incarnate Logos of God (and to this truth 
 all the facts of His life and doctrine testify), then any other origin 
 for His humanity would, manifestly, be utterly incompatible. 
 
 There is yet another point that ought not to be omitted in this 
 connection, and that is the doctrine of the "'aenrdpSEvoc" or 
 "Ever Virginity" of Mary. This doctrine, although not directly 
 mentioned in the New Testament, is yet most congruous to the 
 facts there given; and is, moreover, part of the Universal and 
 Catholic tradition of the Church j 48 having been never so much as 
 called in question by any professedly orthodox, or even heterodox 
 Christian (with the exception of the ignorant Helvidius, 49 the 
 disciple of the Arian Auxentius), until the unhappy divisions of 
 the last four centuries. Some of the Gnostics, it is true, and the 
 Ebionites denied it ; but in every instance (with the possible excep- 
 tion of Helvidius just mentioned) those who did so, denied also 
 the Virgin Birth, and the Godhead itself; making Jesus only the 
 human son of Joseph the carpenter; and thus put themselves out- 
 side the pale of even heretical Christianity. 
 
 And even now (apart from an unreasoning antipathy to it, 
 because of its supposed Roman affiliations) the only arguments 
 that are alleged against it are the mentions of our Lord's "breth- 
 ren" in St. Matt., xii, 46, and St. John, ii, 12. But even aside from 
 the proverbial looseness of the term "brethren" in the East, these 
 were certainly not his full brothers ; but were probably either His 
 half brothers, or His cousins; and this because they were, from 
 all indications, older than he ; as indeed we know was the case with 
 one of them, namely "James, the brother of the Lord." 
 
 Returning to the Miraculous Conception itself, we may say that 
 the question which so exercised the minds of many during the 
 Middle Ages, namely as to the specific channel through which this 
 Creation was effected, and whether it were not through the ear, 
 need not detain us now, inasmuch as it entirely overlooks the 
 vital point in that Conception. It was not an introduction from 
 without of a pre-existent germ,™ through the ear or otherwise; 
 
 C48* F. sr. vide St. Athanasius p'Ora*: ii, contra Arian:" S 70; and "Com: in Pslm. 
 lxxxiv." S it: and "Com: in Luc:" 5 26;! Decrees of the Council of Chalcedon LEvagnus. 
 "Eccl: Hist." Lib: ii. cap 4. p 200;] &c . 
 
 Uo> Some of the Apollinarians and Eunomians are said to have also denied it, at 
 least implicitly; but yet this is not absolutely certain; and in any case, even if they 
 did so it was onlv as reproducing Gnostic teaching. 
 
 (50' Which, in fact, would be only a modification of the "tanquam per canalem 
 theory of the Gnostics. [Vide p 17.] 
 
32 
 
 DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 but, on the contrary, it was a new creation — a prime vivification — 
 11 in situ" by the Omnipresent Lord and Giver of Life, concerning 
 Whom any transmission through space is inconceivable. 
 
 And if it be further asked why the creation of this primal germ 
 of our Lord's body should have been the work of the Third Per- 
 son of the Godhead — the Holy Spirit, — rather than of the Second 
 Person. — the Logos — Who inhabited that body, and gave it 
 constant being, we can only say that in thus speaking of the Holy 
 Spirit as the especial Agent, we by no means exclude the simul- 
 taneous co-working of either the Logos, or the Father. The 
 creation, in short, of that primal germ was the work of the God- 
 head, as such; 51 and if it is also spoken of as being especially the 
 work of the Holy Spirit, the reason is probably to be found in 
 His Personal Relation in the Divine Essence. Thus, if we 
 revert to my conception of the Father as the "Primal Cause," 
 the Son as the "Formal Cause," and the Holy Spirit as the 
 "Efficient Cause" in creation (page 26), we can possibly see why 
 the creation of the primal germ of our Lord's humanity was the 
 especial work of Him Who is, in a supreme manner, the Effi- 
 cient Underlying Reality — the Lord and Giver of Life and Be- 
 ing — to all the Creation, animate, or inanimate, of God. 52 
 
 There is yet another question that might be asked, and that is 
 why our Lord assumed a masculine nature, and not a feminine 
 one? In answer to this we may say that, while He, obviously, 
 must have chosen one of the two, there was much, both in His life 
 and work, that rendered the masculine form the only one fit 
 or suitable. 
 
 But going even deeper than this, is there not a further reason 
 in the fact that while true masculinity can, and does include 
 true femininity, yet the contrary is not the case; or in other 
 words, did not our Lord, in assuming the masculine nature, 
 assume with it, as the major and inclusive one, also the feminine; 
 and would He not, on the other hand, have failed to so include 
 masculinity, had He become a woman? 
 
 But whether this be true or not, at least we can say that there 
 were in His character these two diverse species of humanity. For 
 if His stern reproofs of hypocrisy, and His steadfast facing of 
 death, were instances of His true masculinity, no less was His 
 tactful care for the multitude in the wilderness (St. Matt., xv, 32; 
 
 (51) Vide Peter Lombard [Liber Sent: Book iii. dist. i, q. 4; and dist. 4, qq 1 and 2; 
 and dist. 5, q. r,] which latter passage reads as follows. " Et cum tota Trinitas op- 
 erata sit formationem suscepti hominis quoniam inseparabilia sunt opera Trinitatis, 
 solus tamen Pilius accepit hominem in singularitatem personae, non in Unitatem 
 Divinae Naturae; id est, quod est proprium Filii, non quod commune est Trinitati." 
 See also St. Augustine L"D<5 Trim" Lib: i, cap. 4 and 5;] and St. Thomas Aquinas, 
 quoted in the note following. 
 
 (52) Vide St. Thomas Aquinas |_Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q. xxxii, art. 1.] "Conceptionem 
 corporis Christi tota Trinitas est operata." * * * "Ad primum ergo dicendum, 
 quod opus oonceptionis commune quidam est toti Trinitati; secundum tamen modum 
 aliquem attribuitur singulis Personis. Nam Patri attribuitur auctoritas respectu 
 Personae Filii, qui per hujus modi conceptionem sibi assumpsit humanam naturam. 
 Filio autem attribuitur ipsa carnis assumptio. Sed Spiritni Sancto attribuitur for- 
 matio corporis quod assumitur a Filio." 
 
DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 33 
 
 St. Mark, viii, 3) a plain manifestation of the feminine pole in His 
 nature. Surely in this respect, as in all others, He was not 
 merely a man alone, but the true Representative of humanity — 
 the very ''Son of Man." 
 
 There is yet another interesting point that ought not be over- 
 looked, and that is what we may term the " secretness " of the 
 Virgin Birth; for it seems to have been utterly unknown to the 
 Jews of our Lord's time, 53 and even to His early disciples. 54 It was, 
 in short, as St. Ignatius said, 55 one of "the three mysteries of 
 shouting," (the other two being our Lord's Messiahship, and the 
 Atoning character of His death) "which were wrought in silence 
 by God." 
 
 And the reason for this "secretness" is not hard to see. In 
 the first place, it would naturally be a matter that would be known 
 only to Mary, and to her betrothed husband Joseph, and possi- 
 bly also to a few of her relations; and as something that would be 
 peculiarly liable to the cavillings and blasphemies of the igno- 
 rant and unbelieving, it would hardly be further spread. 
 
 But more than this; it was also something that could have no 
 possible meaning apart from the Divinity of our Lord. Once 
 acknowledge both His Godhead, and His Archetypal relation to 
 mankind, and, as I have just shown, His Virgin Birth becomes 
 a logical necessity. But let that Essential Nature be unknown 
 to, or unbelieved by men, and at once the Birth is without mean- 
 ing or congruity. The first step, therefore, was to reveal Him- 
 self ; and then, and only then, would the various peculiarities of 
 His Nature, and among these, especially His unique Birth, be 
 both comprehensible, and explicable. 
 
 And furthermore, as I may here remark, this self-revelation 
 of our Lord must needs have been, as it was, a gradual educa- 
 tionary process. Had He come in the '' vopcpr?" of the God- 
 head (were such a thing possible), no doubt all could, and 
 would have believed in Him; but coming, as He did, in the 
 " Mopcprf " of man — in the "local limitations" of His Incarnation, — 
 it was manifestly, difficult for men to see that this real and true 
 man was, in verity, the Incarnate Logos of God. For the first 
 thirty years, then, of His life, and until the commencement of 
 His ministry, there would obviously, have been no suitable 
 occasion for, or indeed meaning in, such a revelation; and even 
 after His ministry opened, the process must have been a gradual 
 one; and in fact it was not until the grand confession of St. Peter 
 'Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God" (St. Matt., xvi, 
 16), that any, even of His nearest and dearest disciples, seemed 
 to realise, in any degree, Who He really was; a realisation that 
 was not perfected until after His Resurrection. 
 
 (53) Vide, for instance, their words " is not this Tesus. the son of Joseph?''* [St. John 
 vi, 4?; also St. Luke iv, 22: St. Matt: xiii. ^5; St. Mark vi, i.l 
 
 (54) Vide the words of St. Philio [ St. John i, 45.] % 
 
 (55) "Epistle to the Ephesians," § 19. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 HE Infinite and Omnipresent Logos, then, having become 
 Incarnate, and "made man," by the primal Will of the 
 Father, and through the operation of the Creative Spirit, 
 was thus locally manifested to His world; and furthermore, as 
 I have said, also locally limited by reason of the medium of that 
 manifestation, namely the humanity : this brings us to one of the 
 main facts in that Incarnation; and one, moreover (as has been 
 already remarked), that is often grieviously misapprehended and 
 misapplied; namely what is known to theologians as the 
 "Kenosis," or "self emptying" of the Son. 
 
 This is often expounded as if He therein laid aside, and 
 abrogated the powers and attributes of His Godhead — as if, in 
 •short, He thereby practically annulled His Divinity. 66 Yet such 
 a "conversion of the Godhead into flesh" as this implies is surely 
 something that is utterly and entirely unthinkable. For the at- 
 tributes of the Godhead — His Power, His Love, His Knowledge, 
 His Justice — are certainly not separable, the one from the other; 
 but are, accurately speaking, only distinguishable as conven- 
 ient concepts to our minds, imaging forth to us various aspects 
 of His Infinite and Indivisible Unity. He can, fchen, no more 
 "lay aside," or relinquish His Knowledge, or His Power, than He 
 can His Nature Itself. 
 
 And it is, if possible, even still more inconceivable that the Son 
 alone should thus abrogate His Essential Nature in the Triune 
 God, to the exclusion of the Father and the Holy Spirit. 57 This 
 absurdity, which in fact (as I have already stated in note 12) is 
 only even imaginable under a thoroughly Trideistic conception 
 of the Trinity, I have, I think, fully exposed when introducing 
 the doctrine of the "local manifestation." 
 
 And, in addition, we might ask, if indeed any further argument 
 is required, if this "laying aside" by the Son of His Power, would 
 not be also a "laying aside" of His ability to redeem? Such a 
 "depotentiation" as this, in order that He might become Incar- 
 nate, would surely sacrifice the very reason itself for which that 
 Incarnation was undertaken, namely to draw man to God, and 
 incidentally to also redeem him from sin. 
 
 But while any abrogation, or annulling by the Logos of the 
 Essential Powers of His Godhead — such as His necessary Infi- 
 nite Wisdom, and Power — is utterly unthinkable and absurd, yet 
 
 (56^ Which, as explained on t>. 21 and in note 12 is the theory of the "Kenosis," ad- 
 vocated bv Zinzendorf, Gess, Godet, and others ! - -,. 
 
 ^7) As is taught, not only by Zinzendorf. Gess. and Godet, but even by Kbrard, 
 Thomasius, and in fact the majority of the Neo-Lutheran theologians ! 
 
 (34) 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 35 
 
 the local manifestation that characterized His Incarnation, neces- 
 sarily carried with it a local limitation, by the medium of that 
 manifestation, of the action of those Essential Powers.™ 
 
 For inasmuch as it was zhuman mind, and a human body that 
 He assumed, and through which He worked, it is plainly evident 
 that strictly superhuman works could not be wrought through 
 them. The human organism — body, and mind — is, no doubt, 
 capable of heroic deeds, and of great endurance; but it is certainly 
 not possessed of infinite powers ; and its capabilities, after all, are 
 exceedingly finite and limited. 
 
 Thus, in the first place, the body, with its cosmos of nerves 
 and of muscles, becomes rapidly weary; and in such a case, 
 imperatively needs refreshment and rest; and it can, therefore, 
 and indeed must suffer hunger, weariness, and pain. Our Lord, 
 then, in assuming a body, necessarily assumed with it the natural 
 conditions of that body; and it was, therefore, in no deceptive or 
 Doketic fashion that He hungered and slept, and suffered bitter 
 agony and pain. 
 
 But if the body of man is finite and passible, so also is the 
 human intellect. It is true that the mind of man is, in its stu- 
 pendous powers, the most Godlike thing with which we are ac- 
 quainted. It is capable of such profound reasoning, it has made 
 such sublime discoveries, it has given birth to such magnificent 
 creations, that the temptation has ever been to bow down before 
 it as our God. Yet we must never forget that it is, after all, by 
 the very constitution of its being, finite; and therefore utterly 
 incapable of Omniscience; and although we may fancy, in our 
 pride of intellectuality, that its capabilities for reasoning and for 
 knowledge are practically boundless, yet in every direction the 
 limit is speedily reached, and impotence or madness bar our 
 further way. 
 
 Inasmuch, then, as our Lord took a real and operative human 
 mind (and this, as I have already shown, pp. 18-20, is essential 
 to the reality of His Incarnation), He necessarily took with it 
 its limitatK s, and ignorance. To deny this, and to insist that, 
 in His "local manifestation" as the Christ, He was as Omniscient 
 as He is in the Omnipresent Estate of the Logos, is not only to 
 overlook the close and necessary interconnections there are be- 
 tween Omniscience and Omnipresence, but it is also to fall 
 into the serious error of Eutyches, or even of the Monophysites; 
 and thus to eviscerate the Incarnation of all real meaning. For 
 if the humanity was "swallowed up in the Divinity," and rendered 
 inoperative, and still more if it was even "transfused into the 
 Divinity," and made One Nature, then for that reason, mav we 
 ask, was it assumed at all? For, as is shown on pp. 20 and 21, 
 
 (48) -"Ev 'avrGp xaroiKEi nay to 7tXr/pa)jLia rrjc, SedrKToi o-Ga/zarz/^&s " 
 [Coloss: it, 9.] 
 
36 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 under either one of these suppositions, He was not, in any real 
 sense, a true man; and we are thereby driven to assume either a 
 practically Doketic view of His life and sufferings, and to think 
 of them as merely a simulated deception; or else we must formu- 
 late our thoughts on strictly Monophysitic lines, and even absurdly 
 predicate passibility to the Deity. 
 
 Either side of this dilemma is, manifestly, utterly untenable; 
 and we are, therefore, forced to acknowledge the reality, and 
 operation of our Lord's human mind, as we do that of His human 
 body; frankly recognising the necessary finite limitations of the 
 same. He Who is the Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent 
 and Eternal Logos of God was, by His "local assumption" in 
 time of, and "local manifestation" through, a finite nature that 
 had been made in His own image, necessarily limited by that 
 nature — only working with that body, and thinking with that 
 brain, the works and thoughts that the said body and brain were 
 able to perform and endure. 
 
 But even furthermore: our Lord assumed — created around 
 Him — not only the intellectual faculties of the mind — its cold and 
 colorless powers of reasoning, — but also those warmer, and more 
 highly individualised emotional qualities — passions, affections, 
 and sympathies — that are so inseparably part of the nature of 
 man. 
 
 Thus we are plainly told that our Lord "wept" (St. John, xi, 
 35); "loved" (St. Mark, x, 21; St. John, xi, 5), "was moved with 
 compassion" (St. Matt., ix, 36; St. Mark, vi, 34; viii, 2), and with 
 "indignation" (St. Matt., xvii, 17), that He "groaned" (St. John, 
 xi, 33), and finally, "began to be sorrowful, and very heavy" (St. 
 Matt, xxvi, 37; St. Mark, xiv, 33; St. Luke, xxii, 44); all emotions 
 that evidently belong, and belong only to our Lord's human 
 emotional nature; for the Godhead, as the Absolute and Eternal, 
 is manifestly Impassible and Unchangeable. It is entirely owing, 
 I think, to the practical oversight of this emotional part of our 
 Lord's humanity that so many of His recorded experiences, and 
 especially His Awful Agony in the Garden, and on the Cross, 
 are so often found entirely indecipherable and obscure ; and I will 
 therefore, in treating of that Agony and Crucifixion, recur to this 
 emotional nature of our Lord; and unfold (as far as may be) its 
 bearings upon those awful mysteries. 
 
 And finally: all these faculties, and elements of our Lord's 
 real humanity were absolutely perfect; and that both in themselves, 
 and in their several inter-relations and balance: in other words, 
 there was in Him neither excess, nor defect in any part of His 
 humanity; but He was, as the Archetypal man, the Perfect 
 Representative of our race. 
 
 Our Lord, then, possessed a natural and passible human body, 
 perfect in all its parts; and also a natural and passible human 
 mind, perfect in all its faculties for both thought and emotion. And 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 37 
 
 this leads us on to the subject of His growth, both in stature, and in 
 knowledge. 
 
 This latter fact, namely the increase in knowledge, has been 
 fiercely controverted by many, under the impression that such a 
 "growth" would be derogatory to the dignity of the Incarnate 
 Word : yet it is surely a fact that is as plainly taught us in Holy 
 Scripture as is the corresponding "growth" in His Body (vide 
 St. Luke, ii, 52). That He was an infant, and from that grew to 
 man's estate, being subject, during the process, and in His subse- 
 quent life, to all the natural limitations of His body, and to its 
 hunger, weariness, and pain, all this, I think, is freely accepted 
 by every one who professes, in any degree, to follow the Gospel 
 record. 
 
 And that His strictly analogous "growth" in knowledge, and 
 the natural limitations of His human mind, 59 have not been as 
 freely acknowledged, but have, on the contrary, been explained 
 away, is due, I think, solely and entirely, to preconceived 
 theories of an Eutychian character. 
 
 Yet surely we ought, in the first place, to fit our theories to 
 the facts as given us, and not reverse the process; and secondly, 
 such a suppression, or explaining away of facts, as Eutychianism, 
 or semi-Eutychianism calls for, is, as I hope to show, not at all 
 necessary under the true and Catholic theory of our Lord's Per- 
 son. He, I repeat, the Omniscient, Omnipresent, Impassible 
 and Eternal Logos, took, and locally limited Himself by, a finite 
 and passible humanity — body, bodily life, and mind; — and in so 
 doing necessarily subjected Himself to the laws governing that 
 humanity — to the capacity for growth, the finite limitations, and 
 the liability to suffer pain, incident to a real human body; to the 
 similar capacity for growth, the finite limitations, and the liability 
 to suffer anguish, incident to a real human mind ; — and the finite 
 limitations, the growth, and the pain are every whit as conceiva- 
 ble and necessary in one direction as the other. As He hungered, 
 and was fed, so He came to know; as His body was racked with 
 pain, so His soul was with anguish ; and finally, as He grew from 
 
 (5g) Thus we are told, not only that He "increased in wisdom and stature" [St. Luke 
 ii, 52], but also that He "marvelled" [St. Matt: viii. ioj St. Mark vi, 6], and even came 
 to know [St. Mark viii, 17: and xi, 13], These are. evidentlv, the workings of a real 
 and finite human mind; for in His Godhead, as the "All-Knowing," He manifestly 
 cannot realise anything more intensely at one time, than another; and cannot, there- 
 fore, either '•marvel," or "come to know." 
 
 And so, yet again, have we our Lord's own statement [St. Mark xiii. 32! that He, as 
 the "Son." did not know the day of judgment. This, from the context [inasmuch as 
 He is there classed with finite and created beings— i. e. angels and men]— is, most nat- 
 urally, to be interpreted of His human manifestation, and its limitations; and thus in- 
 deed, it has, almost unanimously, been interpreted by the Fathers, and later Doctors: 
 vide St Athanasius ["Contra Arian:" Lib: iii, cap. 37]; St. Ambrose ["On the Holy 
 Spirit," Lib: ii. cap. n, § n 7 ; and "On the Christian Faith," Lib: v, cap. 4, § 193 et seq.]; 
 St. Gregory Nazianzen ["Fourth Theo: Orat:" § 15]; St. Gregory the Great | "Epist: x, 
 § 39]; St. Bernard [De Grad: Hum: cap. 3, §S to-h"); &c. In short, the only authority [so 
 far as I am aware] who does not so explain this text, but refers it rather to the Essen- 
 tial Subordination of the Son, is St Basil [Epist: viii, § 17; and ccxxxvi]; and even he 
 gives the ordinary interpretation as an alternative. And in furtherance of this expo- 
 sition we may also note St. Matt: xxiv, 36; and especially Acts i, 7, spoken by our Lord 
 after His resurrection. 
 
38 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 2l babe to man's estate, so His mind expanded in an equal degree — 
 He "increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God 
 and man." 
 
 To still further enforce this truth of the natural growth in 
 knowledge we may point out that an infant's mind is manifestly 
 incapable of conceiving, or even of containing, the thoughts of a 
 mature man; a perfect babe, a perfect child, a perfect man, are all 
 as different in their several capabilities and capacities for thought, 
 as they are for action: would He, then, Who assumed a 'perfect 
 humanity, during His infancy, conceive with that infant brain a 
 man's thoughts — still less the thoughts of Infinitude; — or would 
 He, in so doing, be a perfect human babe? Surely not! Cath- 
 olic logic, equally with Holy Writ, assures us that the "growth" 
 must have been as real in this respect as in the other; and that 
 He Who assumed a perfect humanity, progressed naturally from 
 childhood to youth, and from that to man's estate; being, in each 
 succeeding age, a real and perfect human being, with the proper 
 limitations, and powers of that age. 60 
 
 His "growth," then, — in mind, as in body — was no mere 
 Doketic "seeming," but was a genuine reality; and this is the true 
 and vital "Kenosis" spoken of by St. Paul (Philip, ii, 6-8), in 
 which He Who had been in the " /uopcpr? " — the Divine Estate — of 
 God, clung not to it, but locally took the "juopfa? " — the human 
 estate — of a man; 61 and "locally limiting" Himself by the neces- 
 sary conditions of that manhood, humbled Himself, even unto 
 the death of the Cross. 
 
 It was, in short, such a "self emptying" — such a "self limita- 
 tion" — as was inseparable from a true Incarnation ; but it was not 
 as has already been stated (p. 34), such a " depotentiation" as 
 would, in effect, have rendered that Incarnation powerless and 
 useless. 
 
 A vital point, therefore, and one we must never forget, is as 
 follows: although there was this "local limitation," yet never- 
 theless, It was the Logos Who was thus manifesting Himself: it 
 
 (60) Vide St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q. xiii, art. i.] "In mysterio 
 Incarnationis ita facta est unio in persona, quod tamenremansit distinctio naturarum, 
 utraque scilicet natura retinente id quod sibi est proprium " * * * "cumigitur 
 anima Christi sit pars humanae naturae, impossibile est quod omnipotentiam habeat." 
 And again, [Q. xii, art. 2.1 "Utrum Christus in hac scientia profecerit? " affirmed. 
 See also St. Athanasius ['Contra: Arian:" Lib: iv]: St. Basil [Epist: viii]; St. Gregory 
 Nazianzen ["Fourth Theo: Orat." § i$\\ St. Cyril Alex: ["Thes:" Lib: xxii]; St. Am- 
 brose ["De Incar: Dom: 1 ' cao. 7]; St. Hilary ["De Trin-" Lib: x. car«. 8, et seq.]; &c, 
 
 (61) Vide St. Augustine [Prosper. "Sent: ex Aug: delib:" 328! ' Reliquit Christus 
 Patrem" * * * "1- on quia deseruit, et recessit a Patre: sed quia non in ea. forma 
 apparuit hominibus in qua aequalis est Patri." 
 
 On the other hand, Gess and Godet, &a. make the gross blunder of confusing* 
 " juopfir/"— "form," or "estate"— with " ovdi'a "— " being-," or "essence,"— as^ if, 
 indeed, the two were synonymous ! Yet surely it is plainly evident that the ' ' Ov6ia " 
 of anything— whether of God, or of one of His creatures— cannot possibly be " laid 
 aside;" inasmuch as It is the very Thing Itself: while, on the other hand, the"juop(prf" 
 of anything can be readily "laid aside;" inasmuch as it is merely an "estate," depend- 
 ent on its external relations. When our Lord, therefore, became man. He could not 
 possibly relinquish His " 6v6i'oc " — i. e. Himself ; — but, on the other hand, could not 
 possibly fail to "relinquish" His"/*o/30?7" of Divinity, and assume in its place His 
 te U.0O(pr) " of humanity; inasmuch as He was now in flesh appearing. 
 
BE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 39 
 
 is entirely owing to their oversight, or even definite rejection, of 
 this all important fact that men, like Gess, or Godet, have been 
 enabled to predicate even mistakes and errors to our Lord! 
 
 Although, then, He possessed a natural human mind, with all 
 its natural human limitations, yet it was, as I have already stated, 
 perfect in all respects, and without any of the congenital, or ac- 
 quired imperfections and aberrations that arise from sin; a mind, 
 in short, such as nowhere else was found: and furthermore; It 
 was, I repeat, the Infinite and Omniscient Logos Who was ex- 
 pressing Himself through that mind; expressing Himself to a 
 degree of which we can form but a faint conception. 
 
 Take the wisest, the holiest, the best of men, those whose in- 
 tellects have towered highest over their fellows, or those who have 
 been most fully under the illuminating inspiration of God, take 
 even those holy ones who will, at the consummation of all things, 
 attain to the Beatific Vision of their God, free there from all the 
 distractions and illusions of this time of testing and education, 
 take, I say, the most perfect humanity to which the highest and 
 holiest of us can attain, and this we can surely at least predicate 
 of Him Who was called the "Son of Man." 68 If the mind of a 
 Kepler, or a Newton could apprehend the laws of the Universe, 
 how much more capable of that apprehension must have been 
 the human intellect of Him "by Whom all things consist?" If the 
 redeemed ones can know their God in the Beatific Vision, how 
 much more capable of that knowledge must have been the human 
 mind of Him Who is ever in the Bosom of the Father? And 
 although we may demur to the "dicta" of some of the Schoolmen, 
 when they argued that all events — past, present, and future — 
 must have been perfectly known to His human mind, 63 on the 
 ground that such a claim, in all strictness, would imply an Euty- 
 chian, or even Monophysitic predication of Omniscience to that 
 finite intellect, yet if we will but consider the foreknowledge that 
 has been displayed by inspired men, we will not be too exacting 
 on this score. He Who inspired the prophets of old, could well, 
 even in His human limitations, know the thoughts of men (St. 
 Matt., ix, 4; xii, 25; St. Mark, ii, 8; St. Luke, v, 22; vi, 8; ix, 47, 
 etc.) ; say to Nathanael "I saw thee under the figtree" (St. John, 
 
 (62) Vide St. Thomas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii. Q. ix, art. 2 ] " Utrum Christus habuerit 
 scientiam quam habent Beati vel Comprehensores?" affirmed: and so again [Q. idem, 
 art. 3.] " Utrum Christus habuerit scientiam inditam vel infusam, praeter scientiam 
 beatam?" affirmed; thus: " Intellectus autem possibilis humanus est in potentia ad 
 omnia intelligibilia. Reducitur autem in actum per species intelligibiles; quae sunt 
 quaedam formae completivae ipsius." But yet, of course, this knowledge, both 
 "beatific," and "infused," does not mean Omniscience; but only such "inspired illu- 
 mination" as our Lord must have had in plenary fullness; inasmuch as He was the In- 
 spirer. [See pp. 40 and 45, and note 60.] 
 
 (63) So Peter "Lombard [Liber Sent: Book iii, dist. 14.] " Si anima Christi habuerit 
 sapientiam parem cum Deo, et si omnia scit quae Deus?" Decided in the affirmative; 
 on the ground that "our Lord had the Spirit without measure " [St. John iii, 34I. So 
 too Hugo de S. Victor, Duns Scotus, &c. Yet nevertheless, inasmuch as he [Peter 
 Lombard] also confesses that although Christ knew all things as does God, still " nee 
 ita clare et perspicue omnia capit ut Deus,' 1 he probablv meant nothing more by the 
 above than the : 'scientiam inditam vel infusam" of Aquinas. 
 
4 o DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 i, 48) ; and, in short, on many occasions, give evidence of the pos- 
 session of knowledge, unattainable to, yet not incomprehensible 
 by, unaided and uninspired humanity. 64 
 
 Bearing, then, all these facts in mind, we may say that while 
 our Lord, in His Incarnation, was, it is true, necessarily limited 
 by the medium — the humanity — through which he worked; yet 
 we must not, and dare not deny to Him the fullest powers of 
 which that humanity is capable ; nor even such powers and knowl- 
 edge as it might legitimately be inspired with from on High : and 
 furthermore; while it is true that, in the "humiliation" — the 
 "Kenosis" — of His "local manifestation," His human mind was, 
 no doubt, necessarily ''ignorant" of many things that it could not 
 possibly contain, yet it did not, and could not suffer from an 
 error in judgment, or in thought; inasmuch as in it, and through 
 it was working the Inerrant Logos of God. 65 
 
 And yet further: our Lord could be tempted; for liability to 
 temptation (although not necessarily to sin, as Apollinarius 
 maintained) is inseparable from every human existence. For, if 
 we analyse temptation, we will, I think, find it to be something 
 that is necessarily common to every man; common, not because 
 he is "fallen," but because he is, first of all, both a self- centered, 
 and a finite being; and secondly, because he is a man, made in 
 the "image" of God; and therefore a being to be educated, and 
 developed by temptation into a more perfect likeness. 
 
 In the first place, then, temptation is necessarily common to every 
 man, because he both a self centered, and a finite being. All 
 material Nature, in so far as it is unconscious, and irresistibly 
 swayed by its "Ultimate Reality" — God, — is, manifestly, outside 
 the range of, and impervious to "temptation." And He Who 
 is its "Underlying Reality," certainly, cannot be tempted; for He, 
 as the All-knowing, cannot be deceived, or misled by anything. 
 
 But man, and in fact, all created and finite conscious beings 
 of whatever kind — angels, or dwellers in the stars, 66 — in so far 
 as they are self-conscious and self-centered, and therefore also 
 self determined — possessing in other words, the powers of free 
 thought, and free will — are, just so far, necessarily amenable to 
 "temptation;" and therefore liable (but only liable) to fall into 
 sin. For they can, and they must, on many occasions, determine 
 the path that they will tread; and because they are not Omniscient, 
 
 (64) Thus, for example, He foretold His betrayal, Crucifixion, and Resurrection [St. 
 Matt: xii, 40; xvii, 22, 23; xx, 18, 19; xxvi, 21: St. Mark ix. 31; x, 33 34; St. Luke ix, 22; 
 xiii, 32, 33: xviii. 31-33; xxii, 21; St. John ii, 19; vi. 70, 7ij.xii, 321 33J5 the. denial of St. 
 Peter TSt. Matt, xxvi, 34; St. Mark xiv, 30; St. Luke xxii, -34 ; St. John xni, 38I; the de- 
 struction of Jerusalem [St Mark xiii; St. Luke xix, 43; xxi, 6]; and the end of the world 
 [St. Matt: xxiv; St. Mark xiii, 24.] M . . 
 
 (65) Causing it, therefore, in the language of St. Thomas Aquinas [vide note 62], to 
 possess all the fullness of the "scientia infusa:" Similar, also, is the teaching of St. John 
 Damascene [De Fide Orth: Lib: iii, cap. 21 and 22]. See also the parallel fact of our 
 Lord's Impeccability. [Vide p. 45 J ,_,».. -, , in * 
 
 (66) Vide St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: ParsLz, Q. lxm, art. x.\ _ Respondeo 
 dicendum, quod tarn Angelus quam quaecumque creatura rationalis, si in suanatura 
 cousideretur, potest peccare." 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 41 
 
 but finite in their knowledge, they are, therefore, liable to make 
 mistakes in judgment, choose the wrong path, and ultimately, 
 then, to even fall into sin. 67 
 
 And in the second place, temptation is necessarily common to 
 every man, because he is a being made in the ''image" of God; and 
 has therefore to be educated and developed into a more perfect 
 likeness ; a work that only temptation and experience can accom- 
 plish. 
 
 But this second reason is, evidently, closely akin to, and even 
 dependent upon the first, namely the finite knowledge and will of 
 man; 68 and both are well summed up in one by Bishop Butler, in 
 his "Analogy," as follows : "mankind, and perhaps all finite crea- 
 tures, from the very constitution of their nature, before habits 
 of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is 
 right; and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits for a security 
 against this danger" (Part I, Chap. V, sect. 4). 69 
 
 Temptation, then, springs from our finite manhood; and the 
 great security, therefore, against it, as Bishop Butler here points 
 out, lies in the direction of "habitual righteousness;" or in other 
 words, in the educated ability to resist, slowly acquired through 
 painful experience. 
 
 But there is yet another conceivable method of overcoming 
 temptation, namely by an "inspiration" from on High; which 
 "inspiration," again, may take the form, either of an "illumina- 
 tion" — a showing, with more or less clearness, the true inward- 
 ness, and final results of the course towards which we are 
 tempted; — or else it may come as an "irresistible guidance," or 
 impulse from God, overbearing the temptation, and rendering 
 it of none effect. 
 
 Now in comparing these two (or perhaps, more strictly, these 
 three) methods of resisting temptation, it will be noticed then an 
 "inspiration from God" is the more effective one; being abso- 
 lutely certain in its latter form of an "irresistible impulse"; and 
 only less so in its other form of a ''Divine illumination." 
 
 On the other hand, an "educated ability to resist," acquired 
 through experience, while certainly giving, at the most, but com- 
 parative security, is yet the one best adapted for the ordinary 
 rule of life. For the chief end of man's life on earth being (ap- 
 parently) to educate him, any rendering sin impossible, by means 
 of an infallible and irresistible guidance, would defeat its own 
 ends. An automaton, swayed by irresistible impulse to do right, 
 
 (67) For a consideration of the question as to how a "falling short" passes over into 
 Sin. see the Essav on ''the Essential nature of Sin." 
 
 (68) And is. in fact, the "final cause," or reason "ad quem " of temptation, as that 
 first is its " primal cause," or reason "a quo." 
 
 (69) St. Clement of Alex: has the same thought when he says that we can attain im- 
 peccability by training, until " habit becomes virtue " LStrom: Lib: vii, cap. 7 ~\ Com- 
 pare, also, the old proverb " 7ta$rj/xara Jia$r//iara," quoted in Herodotus [Lib: 
 i, 207]; and St. Augrustine's words "de vltiis nostris scalam nobis facimus, si vitia ipsx 
 calcamus." [Sermo iii de Ascen.] 
 
 6 
 
42 
 
 DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 such as man, in that case, would be, at the close of such guidance, 
 would not only be quite as impotent, and quite as rudimentary 
 in his spiritual nature as he was in the beginning, but also any 
 gain, arising from the mechanically acquired "habits of virtue/' 
 would be more than counterbalanced by such an accompanying 
 atrophy of the will power and spirituality as would inevitably 
 ensue. 
 
 Nor even would a protection by "illumination" altogether es- 
 cape this fatal weakening of man's individuality and spiritual 
 nature; that is if it were a course at all extensively employed, and 
 without a previous willingness to be so "illuminated" on the part 
 of the individual soul. For although the will power and indi- 
 viduality, in such a case, might not, and in fact, would not, be so 
 seriously injured and atrophied as they would be under an "irre- 
 sistible guidance," yet, I think, they would be injured; for a 
 spirit of moral dependence, and therefore of weakness, would, 
 undoubtedly, be thereby fostered. 
 
 True it is that man, having "fallen," and inherited a more or 
 less biased nature, is in need of the "grace" — the "inspired illu- 
 mination" — of God to overcome, and often to even detect the 
 evil. But this "inspired grace" is always given, I think, merely 
 in relation to a few doubtful points, where ''light" or "illumina- 
 tion" is both absolutely necessary, and otherwise unobtainable: 
 and furthermore; it is also always given to a willing subject; and 
 therefore does not come into conflict with, or over-ride the indi- 
 viduality and will. But the consideration of "infused grace" need 
 not detain us here, for the special point I am now making is merely 
 that man, as a self-centered and free-willed finite being, is neces- 
 sarily subject, by the very fact of his existence, to be "tempted." 
 
 And furthermore: man must not only do right, but must he 
 right — be holy ; — must, in other words, learn to hate sin, qua sin ; 
 and to love the right, qua right; and such a disposition can only 
 be acquired as the result of an education and experience, painful 
 often, and toilsome, but yet abundantly worthy of all the suffering 
 and all the toil. 
 
 "Irresistible impulse," then, can find no place in man; and even 
 "Divine guidance by illumination" is only allowable and neces- 
 sary in relation to those "prima data" that make an education pos- 
 sible — those first springs of knowledge, in other words, upon 
 which all else depends; and where any mistake, or falling short 
 would mean irretrievable ruin to the race. 70 "Prime intuitions" — 
 "infallible inspirations" — from God are restricted, therefore, to 
 those indispensible axioms in ethics (such as the "laws of con- 
 science"), and in thought (such as "necessary truth," mathemat- 
 ical, or logical), upon which all our "knowledge" and "experience" 
 is based; and which (even if such necessary "prime data" could be 
 
 (70) Vide note x, and the Essay on " Spirit and Matter." 
 
DE INCARNA TIONE VERBI DEI 43 
 
 dispensed with) ''experience" could not possibly acquire in time 
 to prevent ruin to mankind. 
 
 So again, "infused grace" (as has been already hinted) is, I 
 think, simply and solely a further extension into the realm of the 
 "spiritual" of this inspiration of necessary prime axioms; for 
 just as man needs the axioms of "necessary truth" to make intel- 
 lectual experience, and even existence possible; and again needs 
 the axioms of "conscience" to make moral life possible; so too does 
 he need the axioms of ''infused grace" to make spiritual (as dis- 
 tinguished from, and superior to, moral) life possible. 71 Yet in 
 none of these instances do these "inspired axioms" — intellectual, 
 moral, or spiritual — destroy the free will and individuality of the 
 man; but, on the contrary, are indispensable to both; and that 
 by granting such necessary "prima data" as give the will oppor- 
 tunity to act, and allow experience to be gained. 72 
 
 "Inspired illumination," then, so long as it is confined to these 
 basic axioms, dees not destroy, or even injure the will and indi- 
 viduality of man ; but on the contrary is, as I have said, the neces- 
 sary concomitant to both. But these necessary "prima data" 
 having been given, man, as a self-contained and self-limited be- 
 ing, is perforce left to (in some degree) work out his own salva- 
 tion, win a holy character by the only possible way, namely by 
 overcoming temptation, and thus, in short, "learn by the things 
 that he suffers." 
 
 This being so, let us now see the bearing of all this upon the 
 Personality of our Lord — His perfect sinlessness; and yet His real 
 temptation. 
 
 In the first place, then, in taking human nature, He necessarily 
 assumed, with its other limitations, this liability to temptation 
 springing from its finiteness. As the Omniscient and Omni- 
 present Logos He, obviously, could not be "tempted," for He 
 knew all things. But as the Incarnate Logos, "locally limited" 
 by the humanity He had assumed, He could not, with His human 
 intellect, comprehend all things; and consequently, then, could be 
 tempted. 
 
 And even further: not only was He tempted because of His 
 human limitations, but also in order that He — the Son of Man — 
 
 (71) Vide St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars ia, zae, Q. ex. art. 1.] "Gratia est 
 quaedam lux animae;" and again [Q. idem , art. 3.] "Ut naturale lumen rationis 
 aliquid est praeter virtutes acquisitas; ita supernaturale gratiae lumen sive donum, 
 est aliquid praeter virtutes infusasquibus homo perficiturad ambulandum, secundum 
 quod congruit divinae gratiae lumini." 
 
 Similarly, according to the Fathers. " grace " is an added gift to the natural man, 
 lost by the ,k fall," and restored by the Incarnation; and is. in short, in no sense, in 
 negation, or opposition to "nature;" but, on the contrary, is rather its restoration. 
 Vide St. Athanasius [De Incar: Verbi Dei, § 4]; St. Clement of Alex: [Strom: Lib: vi, 
 cap. 12]; St. Trenaeus LContra Haer: Lib: iv, cap. 38]; St. Augustine [De Spiritu et 
 Littera, xxvii, 47]: &c. 
 
 Agreeablealso to this is what I have oointed out. in chao. I of this Treatise, con- 
 cerning- the incomplete and prophetic character cf man's nature; inasmuch as it points 
 upwards to, and is onlv fulfilled in, the Incarnation. 
 
 (72) The consideration of this necessitv of "prime data" for tha operations of is 
 "free will," will clearlv show us the close inter-dependence— not ottosition— there a 
 "between the guidings of the Omnipotent, and the workings of our will. 
 
44 DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 might experience to the full all our nature — might, in other 
 words, even as we do, "learn by the things that He suffered" (Heb. 
 v, 7), — and so be a merciful and faithful High Priest, Who could 
 be, to the fullest extent, sympathetic with us His brethren. He 
 was, then, "tempted on all points like as we are, yet without sin" — 
 tempted both as a true man, and as our Elder Brother; — and that 
 to a degree such as we can hardly imagine. For He possessed, 
 as I have already stated (pp. 36 et seq.) y a perfect humanity, with- 
 out any of the marrings or imperfections arising from sin, con- 
 genital, or acquired; and was, therefore, endowed with the most 
 perfect and exquisite sensibilities; and therefore, again, could, 
 as I have said, feel the poignancy of temptation to a degree we 
 can hardly realize. 
 
 For the ''agony of temptation" can hardly be said to have much 
 meaning to an unholy and impure man ; and it is only so far as we 
 strive to do right, and are possessed, in some measure, with the 
 spirit of holiness, that such an expression has any fitness: so, 
 again, does refinement of nature and disposition count for much; 
 a civilised man is "tempted" far more than a savage, and a gentle- 
 man than a boor. In short the more perfect and highly organised 
 a being is, the more numerous are his relations to the Universe, 
 and the fuller, therefore, is his life; and therefore, also, the more 
 numerous and powerful are his temptations (if he be finite) ; and 
 the more grievous and deadly his sin, if he falls. 
 
 If this be true, then how exquisitely sensitive, in every direc- 
 tion, must have been the human nature of Him Who was both 
 the holiest and the most refined of all the sons of men? True, He 
 could never have known one fearful class of temptations, namely 
 those sins that assault us with the awful prestige of former vic- 
 tories, and of "habit;" and to overcome which we have, in a special 
 sense, to fight against ourselves. But although He knew not 
 this terrible uprooting of "habitual sin," yet He did know, in His 
 exquisitely perfect humanity, all the sensibilities, and even (if we 
 may so speak) the weaknesses to which these sins appeal; and 
 He further knew the conflict with the far more subtle, and seduc- 
 tive temptations that arise from apparent, or at the utmost, only 
 incomplete right — the doing of a "little evil," or of a "rather 
 doubtful" act, that "great good" might ensue — the exercising, 
 in short, of a "little wise diplomacy," such as men sometimes com- 
 mend to us; — for on one occasion, at least, was this momentary 
 bowing to evil asked of Him, in return for the Kingship over the 
 souls of men (St. Matt., iv, 9; St .Luke, iv, 7). 
 
 Such, then, were our Lord's temptations ; far more subtle, more 
 intense, more acute than any we may have to endure ; even after 
 allowing for the non-presence in His experience of temptation 
 from "habitual sin." How, then, it may be asked, was He ena- 
 bled to endure ; and especially how was He able, while being thus 
 vitally tempted, to yet remain "without sin"? 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 45 
 
 To fully answer this question it is necessary to again refer 
 to the human nature of our Lord. In man, as has already been 
 stated, we have an "Ego," a mental life, and a bodily life with a 
 body; altogether forming one self contained individuality — a 
 man. And, as again has been stated, because a man is this self 
 contained individuality, the utmost inspired aid to live right that 
 can be given him can only come in the form of an "illumination" 
 from God; which "illumination" must not exceed the necessary 
 "initial data" of life, under penalty of injuring the said indi- 
 viduality. 
 
 But in our Lord and Saviour Christ we have, as has already been 
 laid down (pp. 23, 24), no human " Ego;" but He Himself — the 
 Logos — is the "Ego" of His humanity; creating around Him (so 
 to speak) the real mental life, bodily life, and body of a man; being 
 thus really Incarnate, thus the true God-man. 
 
 The "inspired guidance," therefore, that with a human "Ego" 
 would be limited to an "illumination" of prime intuitional truth, 
 with Him was not so limited, nor indeed could be, for the Inspirer 
 was Himself."' 3 On the one hand, then, no atrophy of, or injury 
 to His individuality was to be feared ; and on the other, the "me- 
 chanical habit of virtue" (so to speak), resulting to His humanity 
 from this "Infallible Guidance," was itself the necessary education 
 of that humanity; for only thus was it perfectly moulded to His 
 will. 
 
 And this brings us to the question of the "Two Wills" of our 
 Lord, a doctrine of the Catholic faith that was enforced against 
 the Monothelites (pp. 21, 22), who upheld, it will be remem- 
 bered, the " juovepysia" or " One Will" of our Lord. Yet, at 
 the first sight, this contention of the Monothelites seems per- 
 fectly accurate ; for if we analyse, as far as may be, our own being, 
 we will, I think, find that "will" is the center and core of person- 
 ality itself — is, in other words, the prime essential note of indi- 
 viduality, and of a differentiation from the external world. A 
 "will," then, and an "Ego" are entirely correlated terms; and 
 where there is but one "Ego," there can be, properly speaking, 
 but one will. Since our Lord, then, was One Person, although 
 possessing Two Natures, His "will," strictly speaking, was but 
 One also ; and the Monothelites, who argued similarly, were quite 
 correct in so doing : but yet the conclusions that they drew from 
 these premises, namely that our Lord's humanity was therefore 
 devoid of a proper human will, were, obviously, entirely wrong; 
 for a humanity without a "will" would be as Doketic and unreal 
 as one without "thought ;" and the vital reality of the Incarnation 
 would thus be lost sight of, and denied! 
 
 (7^) Vide St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q, xv, art. a.l " Cum in Christo 
 virtus cum gratia fuerit secundum perfectissimum gradum, nullo modo fuit in ipso 
 fomes pecciti." 
 
 Our Lord, therefore, possessed a plenary inspiration of " grace, " as well as the 
 plenitude of the "scientia indita vel infusa." [See note 62.] 
 
4 6 
 
 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 The solution of this ^vcltX^ lies in the full recognition of our 
 Lord's Incarnation as a " local manifestation and limitation" He, 
 in His Eternal Omnipresence, was the Omnipotent Wilier of all; 
 but, in His finite and local humanity, He was (as has been already- 
 laid down) evidently limited by the nature He assumed : as, then, 
 He could not "know" all, so He could not "will" all; for He, cer- 
 tainly, could as little exercise Omnipotence, as Omniscience, while 
 working through a real humanity. He possessed, then, if we 
 may so express it, a dual state of will, One Omnipotent in the 
 Logos, One limited in man: if, therefore, we think of the Oneness 
 of the Wilier — think, in other words, of the "will" as a note of per- 
 sonality — we may say that His Will was One; but if, on the other 
 hand, we think of His Two Natures — think, in other words, of 
 the "will" as an operation — then we may say that He had Two 
 Wills.™ 
 
 And, in fact, this is the key to the whole question ; for what the 
 Monothelites insisted on was, not so much the Oneness of the 
 Wilier (which, indeed, all allowed), but rather the Oneness of the 
 "evepyeia " or " operation ; which " evepyeia " was the Divine 
 Will alone; so that the humanity, being thought of as without 
 any " kvepyeia," was, in effect, reduced to an Eutychian desue- 
 tude. 
 
 But perhaps, analysing still deeper, while there were "Two 
 Wills" in the Logos — One Omnipotent, as has just been stated, 
 in the Godhead, and One limited in man, — yet there were not, it 
 seems to me, properly speaking, "Two Wills" in Christ — i. e. the 
 Logos Incarnate, — but "One Will," or " kvepyeioc "only ; which 
 sole "tvepyeia " was His "human Will" — or, speaking more accu- 
 rately, His Divine Will as working through, and limited by His 
 humanity, — and that alone. 75 
 
 (74) Vide St. John Damascene [De Fide Orth: Lib: iii, cap. 14.] <c [E7Cei8r} roivvv 
 kit fiev 6 Xpidros Kai jui'a ' 'avrov -q V7t6dra6l<;, ei<, Kai o avroc, etinv o 
 SeXaov SeiK&<; re Kai ' ' av^pooitivGO<; and again IDe Duabus Voluntatibus ; § 27.] 
 'EiteiSrj de jui'a rov Xpidrov ff V7t66ra6is, Kai eic, 6 Xpldrdg, Hi 6 Sehoov 
 KaT ,v ajjL(pGo rd? <pvdei<;. 
 
 And so, again, St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q xviii, art. 1.] "Utrum in 
 Christo sint duae voluntates." * * * "Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posue- 
 runt in Christo esse unam solam voluntatem. Sed ad hoc ponendum diversimode 
 tnoti esse videntur; 1 ' and groes on to argrue that "will" is an essential to the human 
 reason; and is therefore indispensable to the humanity of our Lord. 
 
 ( 75 ) St. John Damascene [De Fide Orth: Lib: iii, cao ; 14.] " ™r£ yap ravra 
 tpvdiK&s rfSelev ore rf Sei'a 'avrov SeXudig tfZelLe ,Kai itapexaopM *V 
 aapKi itddx^y km Ttpdrreiv ra idia." 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 ®UR Lord, then, as we have seen, in His earthly manifestation 
 as the Incarnate One, could be both ''ignorant," and 
 "tempted;" and that in a real and vital manner; for the finite 
 humanity He there assumed must needs have been so limited, 
 have so suffered, and so too have been educated for Himself; but 
 yet, although thus limited, He could neither be mistaken, nor fall 
 into sin; and that because He, the "Ego" and Inspirer of that 
 humanity, was the Omniscient and All Holy Logos of God; "locally 
 limited," it is true, in His "manifestation," by its proper finite 
 limitations ; but yet, certainly, loosing nothing thereby of His own 
 Essential Holiness and Infinitude. 
 
 And this now brings us to another consideration, namely the 
 value of our Lord's life to us as "our Example," a fact that is 
 repeatedly insisted upon in the New Testament 76 as an important, 
 although secondary, aspect of His Life. 
 
 Yet some may ask of what possible value to us, as an example, 
 was that unique life? For He was the Incarnate Logos of God, 
 redeeming and atoning for mankind; and therefore, as some may 
 say, to neither His Person, nor His work, can our lives have any 
 analogy. 
 
 In a sense, no doubt, all this is, to some extent, true; and yet, 
 on the other hand, was it not our Lord's primary purpose, in His 
 Incarnation, to be a perfect man; and as such, and the great Head 
 of our race, to draw us unto, and unite us with the Father; and 
 only incidentally (so to speak), and in the accomplishment of 
 this end, to redeem us from corruption and sin? 
 
 But if this be true, and, indeed, who can deny it, then surely He 
 presents, as our Archetypal and Perfect Head, the closest likeness 
 of what our lives, at least, ought to be; and is, therefore, plainly 
 "our Example." And even further: not only is there this close 
 analogy to us, in His Person as the Archetypal man, so that we 
 have clear exemplars for our conduct in His perfect Life, but we 
 even, as I hope to show, have some real share and fellowship in 
 His supremest work, namely the redemption of, and atonement 
 for mankind. 
 
 In fact we may lay it down as a cardinal axiom that whatever 
 our Lord wrought in His Incarnation, that He evidently wrought 
 as the Incarnate One; and therefore as man, and as man alone. 
 There was, then, in Him, as has been already remarked (p. 29), 
 
 (76) Vide Romans xv, 5; Philip: ii, 5; I St. Peter ii, ax. See also St. Matt: xi, 29; St* 
 John xiii, 15; &c. 
 
 (47) 
 
48 BE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 no alternation of parts — no acting sometimes as God, and some- 
 times as a man, — but a constant and unvarying living, in all re- 
 ' spects, the life of the Archetypal Head of our race : this is evi- 
 dently a most important fact, and one that is too often forgotten 
 in many expositions of our Lord's life." 
 
 He was, then, as I have said, in all the circumstances of His 
 life and work, our -'"Example;" and that too, as I have already 
 hinted, and will hereafter more fully show, even in those things, 
 such as His miraculous powers, and especially His atoning death, 
 that may seem, at the first sight, most alien to our natures. 
 
 Our Example, I say, not our Pattern ; 78 for while we certainly 
 cannot be Catholic Christs — Incarnate "Logoi" of God, — yet we 
 can, and ought to be (so to speak) Nestorian Ones — " Seocpopoi — , 
 or be, in other words, men inspired and indwelt by Him, Who will 
 guide our actions, and lead us home. 
 
 And yet, as I have already remarked (pp. 42, 43), this inspiring 
 guidance — this "grace" — will be no "irresistible impulse," 
 atrophying our wills, and rendering us useless automata; but 
 will rather be an extension of the "Light" that lighteneth every 
 man; a power, therefore, to recognise and resist the hidden 
 temptations of evil. While our wills, then, will, in no sense, be 
 atrophied or impaired ; but will rather be given opportunities for 
 action; yet our natures will be trained to "habitual righteousness" 
 by that indwelling and inspiring Spirit of God; working in us, as 
 we are willing, and drawing us nearer to God. 
 
 Our Lord, then, was our "Example," in His earthly life; both 
 as manifesting to us the general character of a Divinely guided 
 life; and even more particularly, as I will proceed to show, as 
 setting before us the results of inspiration from the Holy 
 Spirit; but before passing on to this point, let us first consider, 
 as briefly as may be, another respect in which our Lord, as the 
 "Primal Adam" — the "Archetypal Man," — is our Example of 
 what, at least, we might have been, were it not for the ruin wrought 
 in us by sin ; I refer, in short, to His Transfiguration. 
 
 This event, as we know, is said by St. Paul (Philip: iii, 21) to 
 be an example of the glories of the resurrection body — a mani- 
 festation of what shall be for the pure and holy 79 ; and it has, there- 
 fore, been further expounded, and apparently satisfactorily, as 
 
 (77) Which oversight, as I may remark, is a mistake made by most of the Christo- 
 logical heresies [especially those modern ones of the school of Gess]; and springs, it 
 seems to me, from their common initial mistake of conceiving of our Lord's humanity 
 as having a separate and previous existence, before He '* assumed " it: vide pp. 23, 24, 
 and note 34. 
 
 (78) Parallel to this thought is what St. Thomas Aquinas says, when discussing 
 whether our Lord suffered, in His Passion, all varieties of human agonies; thus: 
 " passus est Christus omnes passiones humanes, non quidem secundum speciem, sed 
 secundum genus." [.Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q. xlvi, art. 5.] 
 
 (79) This is the aspect of the Transfiguration, principally touched upon by the 
 Fathers and Schoolmen: Vide St. Leo the Great [Sermo li. 3I; St. Basil [Horn: in Psl: 
 xliv, a]", St. Augustine [Exp: ad Gal:]; Theodoret [Epist: cxlv]; St. Gregory the Great 
 [Moral: Lib: xxxii, cap. 6]; St. Anselm [Hom:iv]: Peter Lombard [Liber Sent: Book 
 iii, dist. 16, q. 2, art. 1]; St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q. xlv, art. a, ad. 3]; 
 ■fee. 
 
DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 49 
 
 an example of what would have been, had not sin come into the 
 world, the natural ending of the earthly life of unfallen and per- 
 fect man. In such a case, it is said, there would have been no 
 pangs of dissolution — no fierce grapple with death, our last 
 dread foe, — but "the natural body" would have faded into the 
 "spiritual" one — life be swallowed up in a larger life; — without 
 the previous suffering and ignominy of death and the tomb. 
 
 But man having ''fallen," and become a sinner, by that "fall" 
 and sin is subjected to the dark mystery of death; so that his body 
 can no longer be "clothed upon," but must first pass through 
 corruption and the grave. Yet hints of the glories that might 
 have been are occasionally given, as in the shining of the face of 
 Moses, the fiery chariot of Elijah, and above all, the Transfigura- 
 tion of our Lord. 
 
 Yet the consummation of this glory — this natural ending of 
 His perfect human life — He deliberately renounced; and prefer- 
 ring to be made in all things like unto His brethren, in order to 
 redeem them from their sin, set His face towards Jerusalem, went 
 on to His Passion and the grave, and tasted death for every man. 
 
 Our Lord, then, I repeat, was, in all respects, our "Example;" 
 and that both as manifesting to us the capabilities of a perfect 
 human nature; and also as illustrating what a perfect man — one 
 holy, loving, and inspired by God — should be: and this leads 
 us on to the question of His Inspiration by the Holy Ghost. 
 
 No one, who has studied at all carefully the Gospel record of 
 our Lord, will deny that many things in His life are spoken of as 
 done under the inspiration and guidance of the Holv Spirit of 
 God. Thus He is "filled with the Spirit" at His Baptism; 80 He 
 is led up by the same Spirit into the wilderness to be "tempted 
 of the devil;" 81 He declares at the beginning of His ministry "the 
 Spirit of the Lord is upon me;" 82 and finally all His miracles are 
 declared to have been performed, not by His own Power, but 
 by that of the Inspiring Spirit. 83 
 
 Now all these things, and especially His Baptism, and Wonder 
 working by the Spirit, were certainly no more Doketic "seem- 
 ings" — mere actings to the world; — for such an interpretation 
 would both eviscerate those actions of any real meaning; and 
 would also blasphemously fasten the charge of deliberate false- 
 hood upon the Holy and True. 
 
 Yet, on the other hand, since He is the Logos — God of God, 
 and Light of Light, of One Essence with the Father, — we may 
 possibly fail to see the precise necessity for, or indeed meaning in, 
 such an Inspiration by that Holy Spirit, Who Himself "Proceed- 
 eth through the Son." 
 
 And no mere consideration of the Oneness of the Godhead, and 
 
 (8o> St. Matt:iii. 16; St. Marki, 10; St. Luke iii, 22; St. John i, 33. 
 
 (81) St. Matt:iv, 1; St Mark i, 12; St. Luke iv, 1. 
 
 (82) St. Luke iv, 18; vide also verse 14. 
 
 (83J St. Matt:xii, 28; St. Luke v, 17; xi, 20; St. John xiv, 12; Acts x, 38. 
 
50 DE INCARNATIONE VERBI DEI 
 
 the Equality in action of the Triune Persons, will help us here; 
 for the question is, not why the Holy Spirit should act (for, in- 
 deed, both He, and the Father must ever act), but why He should 
 be the Inspirer — why, in short, the Son should be, in some sense, 
 inert ; needing, therefore, to be baptised with, be led by, and work 
 His miracles through, Him? 
 
 The answer to this question will, I am sure, again be found in 
 that necessary "Kenosis" or "self emptying" — that "local limita- 
 tion," consequent upon the medium of His Incarnation, namely, 
 His humanity, — of which I have already treated. 
 
 For the Logos, certainly, in the Omnipresent Estate of His 
 Godhead, needed no inspiration, or guidance by the Holy Spirit, 
 other than that necessary " circumincession " and co- working 
 proper to the Blessed Trinity. 
 
 But in the "local manifestation" of the Logos — the Incarna- 
 tion — He was, as I have repeatedly stated, necessarily limited by 
 the capabilities of the nature He assumed; for His humanity, 
 being real and natural, manifestly possessed only human powers 
 and capabilities; albeit these were perfect of their kind. It was, 
 then, evidently impossible for Him to perform superhuman acts, 
 or miracles by that humanity's means; He could only do these 
 works by means of the non-Incarnate, Unconfined, and Infinite 
 Divine Power; or in other words, by the Inspiration of that same 
 Holy Spirit, Who is the Inspirer of all the children of God; so that 
 our Lord was, even in this respect, as in all others, acting as Very 
 Man, and as our "Example." 
 
 And this shows us the meaning of, and necessity for, the 
 Baptism of our Lord; which, I emphatically repeat, was no mere 
 Doketic acting to the world; but had, on the contrary, a real and 
 vital meaning. Before that rite He, in His Incarnation, possessed 
 but human powers; and while He waited, the mysteries of that 
 Incarnation, and of His redemption were hid in silence from the 
 world. 84 
 
 But when the time was come 86 that He should proclaim liberty to 
 the captive, and redemption to the sons of men, then it became 
 necessary that He, the Opener of a New Dispensation — the 
 Bearer of a new Revelation, — should possess the power of working 
 miracles or "signs," as the tokens of, and authentic vouchers for 
 His Mission from on High. 86 
 
 (84) Vide what is said on p. 33 concerning: the "secretness" of the Virgin 
 Birth. 
 
 (85) Vide St. John ii, n, "this beginning of miracles, &c." This consideration, as 
 was pointed out by St. Chrysostom [Super Joan: Horn: xvi], who is, again, quoted by 
 St. Thomas Aquinas |_Sum: Theo: Pars hi, Q. xliii, art. 3, ad. 1], effectually disposes of 
 all the pseudo miracles of the various apocryphal and heretical "Gospels of the In- 
 fancy," &c. 
 
 (86) Vide St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q. xliii, art. 1.] " Respondeo 
 dicendum quod Divinitus conceditur homini miracula facere propter duo. Primo 
 quidam et principaliter ad confirmandam veritatem quam aliquis docet" * * * "ut 
 dum aliquis facit opera quae solus Deus facere potest, credantur ea quae dicuntur 
 esse a Deo. 4 ' * * * ' Secundo, ad ostendendam praesentiam Dei in homine per 
 gratiam Spiritus Sancti: ut dum scilicet homo facit opera Dei, credatur Deus habitare 
 in eo per gratiam." 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 5I 
 
 He therefore wrought, as I have said, His miracles or "signs," 
 not by the power of His own Incarnate Godhead (which, be- 
 cause Incarnate, was powerless to work them) ; but solely as the 
 prophets of God have ever wrought them, namely by the power 
 of that Holy Spirit, Who was given to Him in all Plenitude from 
 His Baptism (St. John, iii, 34) ; and therefore, again, not as illus- 
 trating His own Power — as setting forth Himself;" — but, as I 
 have stated, simply as the gift of God — as tokens of, and vouchers 
 for, His Mission from the Father. 
 
 We will now pass on to the very difficult subject of the prayers 
 of our Lord; and will consider, as briefly, and yet as accurately 
 as may be, how, and in what sense, our Lord could be said to 
 "pray." 
 
 Many find great difficulty in conceiving such a thing: that igno- 
 rant and sinful men should be said to "pray" to God — should re- 
 quest favors from Him, — this, they say, is quite intelligible; but 
 that the Incarnate Son — Incarnate, too, by His own Will — should 
 ever be said to "pray" — should ever, in other words, be said to 
 need and request aught from Him, with Whom He is Eternally 
 One, — this, to their mind, is utterly incomprehensible! 
 
 But let us, before attempting to solve this question, first de- 
 fine what is the true nature of prayer ; and that having been done, 
 we can then more clearly and intelligently decide how, and in 
 what sense, our Lord could really "pray." 
 
 Prayer, then, may be considered under two very different, and 
 yet quite coherent aspects; for it may be thought of either as (1) 
 a request or petition for a favour from God (which is almost, to 
 many people, the sole meaning of "prayer"), or else it may be (2) 
 simply a loving communing with our Father — a raising of our 
 hearts to Him, with no very definite petition, save for His pres- 
 ence. 
 
 And these two divisions may be again subdivided, according as 
 the prayer is a petition (a) for a gift, (b) for information, or (c) 
 for deliverance from evil ; or again, is either a communing (a) per- 
 sonal, and private, or (b) public, and witnessing before others. 
 
 Taking first the ''communing" aspect of prayer, and that in 
 its "private" variety, we may say that such an act would be most 
 congruous with our Lord's Nature, both as Very God, and as 
 Very Man. For He Who is Eternally in the Bosom of the 
 Father, must ever hold this intercommunion with Him; and even 
 the "local limitations" incident upon the Incarnation were, mani- 
 festly, powerless to alter or affect this loving intercourse of the 
 Persons in the Triune God. 
 
 But if this "private communing" aspect of prayer is most con- 
 gruous to the Godhead of our Lord, and even to that Godhead as 
 limited by the Incarnation, not less is it also congruous to His 
 
 (87) Vide St. John v, 19 and 30 et seq.; viii, 28; xii, 44 et seq.; xiv, 10 et seq.; &c. 
 
52 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 true and essential manhood. For every human being that exists, 
 both because he is a creature of God, and is further in the "image" 
 of the Logos, is entitled to come to his Creator saying "our 
 Father;" and Christianity, in its covenant of Baptism, only re- 
 enforces this relationship; and, makes us, by that Sacramental 
 Oath, which swears us into the army of the Lord — His Church, — 
 only the more definitely "children" of our Lord. 
 
 Our Lord, then, I repeat, could commune with His Father, not 
 only as the "Son," or even as the "Incarnate Son," but also as the 
 "Son of Man;" and could thus, in short, be our Priestly Inter- 
 cessor, pleading as our Mediator with the Father, because He 
 was truly of One Nature with both God and man. 
 
 It is in full accordance with this view that we find so many 
 of the recorded prayers of our Lord to be of this ''private com- 
 muning" character; as for instance His great intercessory prayer, 
 mentioned in the xvii chapter of St. John's Gospel. 88 
 
 But the other variety of "communing prayer" is given us in 
 what I may term the "teaching prayers" of our Lord, wherein He 
 uses this communing as a witness to, and testimony of, His Divine 
 Mission from the Father. Thus at the raising of Lazarus He 
 prayed, thanking His Father, "that they who stood by might be- 
 lieve" (St. John, xi, 42); and of this same character was His 
 prayer in the Temple Courts shortly preceding His Passion (St. 
 John, xii, 30). 
 
 I need hardly say that these "teaching" prayers were, in no 
 sense, Doketic unrealities ; but were rather, as I have said, "testi- 
 monies" — "manifestations" and "signs" — to the world, like the 
 Voices that were heard at His Baptism and Transfiguration, or 
 even like His miracles themselves. 
 
 And furthermore ; as in the more private "communings," so also 
 may we say here, that this variety of prayer is proper, not less to 
 His humanity, than His Divinity; for we find similar prayers 
 spoken by Moses, 89 by Samuel, 90 by Elijah, 91 and by other prophets 
 of God; the only apparent essential being that the speakers must 
 be true and legitimate ambassadors from Him. This "testimony 
 of mission" was, then, proper, not only to our Lord's Divinity, 
 and that by reason of His Essential Unity with the Father; but 
 also to His humanity, and that by reason of its proper assumption 
 by Him. 
 
 Our Lord, then, could pray, in the sense of "communing" with 
 His Father; and that both as Very and True God, and as very 
 and true man ; and that again, not only in a private and personal 
 fashion, but also publicly, and as a witnessing to the world: it 
 
 (88) It should also be noticed, that both this class of prayers, and those of the Agony 
 in the Garden, are so evidently personal and private, that thev can only have become 
 known to the Evangelists by subsequent revelation; a revelation that was, very prob- 
 ably, made to them by our Lord during the great forty days preceding His Ascension. 
 
 (80) Ex: xiv, I-;; Numb: xx, 10; &c. 
 
 (go) I Sam: xii, 17. 
 
 (91) I Kings xviii, 36, 37. 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 53 
 
 remains now to be seen if he could also be said to "pray," in the 
 sense of making a petition to God. 
 
 But "petitionary prayer," as has already been remarked, can 
 be again subdivided, according as it is a petition (a) for a gift, 
 (b) for information, or (c) for deliverance from evil. True it is 
 that these varieties are closely interconnected in many ways ; yet, 
 none the less, they are also widely different in some, at least, of 
 their bearings. 
 
 Thus taking the first subdivision, it is evident that our Lord 
 could not ask for a gift from His Father, for He possessed all 
 things; and although He had, in His Incarnation, made Himself 
 "poor," that He might "make many rich," yet it was a voluntary 
 impoverishment; and any prayer, therefore, for enrichment, even 
 in His Incarnate limitations, and still less in His Essential God- 
 head, was, manifestly, out of the question. 
 
 But, it may yet be asked, would not such a prayer be quite 
 conceivable of, and coherent with, our Lord's finite humanity? 
 Granting that in His Essential Godhead, and even in that God- 
 head as limited by the Incarnation, He could have no possible 
 need; and therefore, also, could not, in any sense, be said to ask 
 for the fulfillment of a need; yet was not His real and finite human- 
 ity capable of such a need; and therefore also capable of making 
 such a prayer? 
 
 In answer to this we may point out, first, that our Lord's 
 humanity was the creation of His "Hypostatic" Godhead- — was, 
 in short, the expression (if we may so speak) of that Incarnate 
 Godhead, — and therefore was not capable of originating any 
 prayer; and secondly, that although it was certainly finite and 
 limited (being real); yet it was none the less, also perfect; being 
 both plenarily inspired by the "Hypostatic" Logos with all the 
 natural powers and faculties of which it was capable (pp. 35, 36, 
 39, 40, and 46) ; and also plenarily endowed by the Holy Spirit 
 with all the superhuman powers it might require (pp. 50 and 51). 
 Even then, in relation to the finiteness of our Lord's humanity, 
 no necessary requirement was left unfulfilled; and any prayer, 
 therefore, for enrichment, even on this score, was totally out of 
 the question. 
 
 It is in accordance, we may notice, with this view that when 
 our Lord was tempted by Satan in the wilderness to turn stone 
 into bread for His need (which act would practically involve a 
 "prayer for enrichment"), He refused, saying "man shall not 
 live by bread alone," or as He elsewhere expressed it, His bread 
 was "to do the will of Him that sent Him." 
 
 But if any "prayer for enrichment" was utterly alien to His 
 Being, so also was any "request for information." For although 
 He, the Omniscient Logos, was Incarnate in man; and therefore 
 necessarily limited, and "ignorant" of many things; yet (as was re- 
 marked in connection with a "prayer for enrichment") He was 
 
54 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 both voluntarily Incarnate, and His humanity was also a perfect 
 one, and inspired by the "Hypostatic" Logos with all the knowl- 
 edge, and all the powers, it was capable of receiving. 
 
 It follows, then, as in the previous case, that any "prayer for 
 information" would also be alien to His Nature, alien both as. 
 He is Very and True God, and is very and true man; and alien,, 
 again, in the latter connection, both by the voluntariness of His. 
 limitation, and by the perfect natural knowledge of the humanity- 
 He assumed. 
 
 It remains, finally, to be seen if He could pray for "deliv- 
 erance from evil;" and if we examine the records of our Lord's 
 earthly life, we will, I think, find one clear instance of such a 
 prayer, namely in that dread and mysterious scene in the Garden,, 
 when He prayed in bitter anguish "Father, if it be possible, let 
 this cup pass from Me; nevertheless not as I will, but as Thou 
 wilt." 
 
 Such a bitter cry of human suffering, and human ignorance 
 was, evidently, not the voicing of the Divinity of our Lord, but 
 rather of His real humanity. Certainly as the Eternal Logos of 
 God He could not pray in such terms to the Father; and espe- 
 cially would it be meaningless for Him to say "not as I will, but 
 as Thou wilt;" for in the Godhead that Will is One. 
 
 But in the humanity He assumed as the Incarnate One — a human- 
 ity that, as I have already shown, was limited, ignorant, emotional,, 
 passible, and possessed of the faculty of a human will, — He 
 could thus pray; for that humanity, on the one hand, could not 
 possibly fathom the depths of the Council of God; and on the 
 other, must perforce shrink from the horrible suffering and agony 
 seen before it. 9 * Our Lord, therefore, as Very Man, both could, 
 and must pray "if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me;" while 
 from His Divine Will, inspiring that manhood, came yet the 
 further cry "Thy will be done."" 
 
 Our Lord, then, both could, and did pray for deliverance from 
 evil ; yet it was not in the relation of His Essential Godhead ; but 
 in His relation as Incarnate in man. 
 
 And I would here like to point out how all the foregoing en- 
 tirely bears out the Canon I have laid down (p. 47) as to our Lord's 
 continually acting, during His whole Incarnation, as Very Man, 
 and our "Example;" and not working alternately, sometimes as 
 God, and sometimes as man: for, as we have seen, while some 
 of His prayers, such as those of the "communing" variety, are 
 quite predicable of His Godhead ; yet all are entirely predicable to 
 
 (g2) i. e. by inspirational knowledge: vide pp. 39 and 40. 
 
 (93) Vide St. Athanasius P 4 Contra Arian:'* Orat; iii, § 29]; St. Chrysostom (.Horn: in 
 Matt: lxxxiii, § i]; St. Leo [Sermo:lvi, 2; and lxvi, 8]; St. Hilary [" De Trin: Lib: x t 
 cap. 37-39.I 4l Impossibile tamen homini est passionis terrore non vinci, nee possit nisi 
 per probationem fides nesci. Atque ideo et pro hominibus ut homo vult calicem tran- 
 sire, ettit Dei ex Deo voluntas effectui paternae voluntatis unitur " [cap. 38I: St J onn , 
 Damascene [De Fide Orth: Lib: iii, cap. 24.] << cb$ jusv &£0$ ravroreA.f?<; gov too 
 Uatpi ooc, 8e "av^pooito^ to rfjs 'av^poaitoryiroc, <pv6iKob<; EvdsiKvvrat 
 $£'A.HjLLarovro yap 4>v6iKobs itapaireirai toy $dvarov." 
 
DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 55 
 
 His manhood; and some, as the petition in the Garden just men- 
 tioned, are predicable of His manhood alone. 
 
 Yet another point we might notice is the close connection that 
 all these aspects of our Lord's life, that were manlike alone, have 
 with His Cross and Passion; and in fact, as we may remark, it was 
 during that last Agony and Passion of our Lord that His real 
 humanity was most apparent; not, of course, that He was more 
 human, during that period, than on any other occasion; but sim- 
 ply that the sufferings of the Garden, and of the Cross, showed 
 the more passible, and evidently human side, both of His human 
 body, and of the human emotions of His mind. 
 
 And this brings us to the most awful and most mysterious of 
 all our Lord's sayings, namely that most bitter lament upon the 
 cross, when He cried, amidst the thick darkness, "My God! My 
 God! why hast Thou forsaken Me!!" 
 
 But taking even the lowest, and most heretical view of our 
 Lord's Person, and considering Him simply as a great prophet 
 of God, how, it may well be asked, could these words be true — 
 how, in short, could the Father be said, in any sense, to have for- 
 saken the Righteous? While if we hold the Catholic faith, and 
 believe Him to be, not merely man, but the Incarnate Logos of 
 God, we may well wonder in what possible sense our Lord could 
 give this cry. 
 
 In the Omnipresent Estate of the Logos He certainly was in- 
 separable from the Father; and He evidently was not less so in His 
 earthly manifestation as the Christ; while His humanity alone 
 could not have willed this cry: for not only was that humanity 
 "impersonal," and without a human "Ego" (pp. 23 and 24); but 
 still further, if such an interpretation of the cry were true, then 
 there must have been, at that moment, a separation between the 
 humanity and the Divinity; and the Incarnation, in short, as 
 the Gnostics taught (vide p. 16), must then have ceased to be! It 
 is, then, utterly incredible that either the Logos "Ego," or the 
 human nature alone, could have volunteered this cry; and yet it 
 evidently had a meaning, and that' a most awful one; for even 
 apart from the falsity of any mere Doketic "acting," His agony 
 and woe were too evidently sincere and heartfelt — the cry was 
 too evidently wrung from the abyss of His anguish — for any 
 other supposition to be, for a moment, tenable. 
 
 But although the ''impersonal" human nature alone could not 
 have willed that cry, yet it evidently only had a meaning in rela- 
 tion to that human nature; and the solution is, probably, to be 
 found in the following considerations. 
 
 As I have already remarked (p. 36), our Lord, in assuming 
 humanity, took with it, not only the clear and cold reasoning 
 powers of the intellect, but also those warmer, and more indi- 
 vidualised faculties of the emotions that help to make a perfect 
 man. As a Possessor, then, of this emotional nature He could 
 
56 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 enter, to the fullest extent, not only into our affections and 
 sympathies, but also into our sufferings and woes; and that, too, 
 in all their sharpness and intensity. 
 
 For, as already has been remarked (p. 44) with reference to 
 temptation, the higher and more refined the type of a man, and 
 the fuller, therefore, is his life, the more acutely, also, will he feel 
 the power of temptation: and so, again, may we say that the 
 more perfect a man — the more refined, imaginative, and full of life 
 he is, — the greater also will be his realisation of the grim horror 
 of death. 
 
 True, he may, by summoning all his will power and resolution, 
 simply refuse to face that horror; and thus, preserving his nerves 
 unshattered, meet death with unflinching fortitude. ' And so, 
 again, may the Christian, in the hour of death, strengthen himself 
 by trust in his Saviour; and although this trust does not, in any 
 way, lessen the horribleness of death, yet it draws our mind away 
 to the greater glories to come, so that the fear of death is, not, 
 indeed, destroyed, but "swallowed up in victory." 
 
 But while, then, our Lord, as the Perfect Man, was most keenly 
 alive, and keenly responsive in every fibre of His Being to every 
 human emotion and sensation; and therefore, again, was sensible, 
 to the fullest possible extent, of all the poignancy of the horror 
 of death that the natural man could feel; yet nevertheless, as our 
 Representative — as the great Son of Man, — He steadfastly re- 
 fused to either turn His eyes away from that horror, or to deaden 
 His sensibilities by partaking of the proffered myrrh; but, on the 
 contrary, drank His cup of bitterness to the very dregs; suffering 
 therein, to the fullest extent, all that man could ever know — "tast- 
 ing death for every man." 
 
 And yet again; as He deliberately faced that horror in all its 
 bitterness, putting aside both the merciful anodyne, and the 
 stoical nerving of oneself by simply refusing to think of it 
 (courses which although quite allowable, and even commendable 
 to us, would not be suitable to Him, as the Representative Man), 
 as, I say, He deliberately faced that horror, so too He could not 
 take the comfort of the believer, and let death be "swallowed up in 
 victory;" for His work at that moment was, not to minimise, but 
 to taste that bitterness of death in all its natural fullness. 
 
 If we consider for a moment we will, I think, find that the most 
 awful horror the mind of man can shudderingly conceive is that 
 of blank desolation in the midst of unfathomable space. Com- 
 pared with this terror all the pangs of Dante's fancied Inferno 
 are almost as nothing; for they, at least, had the solace of com- 
 pany and fellowship. And with this supreme horror the terrors 
 of dissolution are closely akin; for, in that dread hour, we feel 
 ourselves irresistibly slipping into the dark abyss of death, with 
 our friends and loved ones powerless to accompany or aid, as, 
 naked and solitary, we pass to our doom. 
 
DE INCARNA TIONE VERB! DEI 
 
 57 
 
 True, as I have said, with the Christian, this horror is over- 
 come, and this solitariness relieved by the faith in our Risen Re- 
 deemer; but, as I have again said, in His own last Agony, no such 
 relief was possible, for He was dying as the great ''Son of Man" — ■ 
 "treading the wine press alone," — and none there was to help 
 Him. 
 
 As, then, the blackness of dissolution stole upon Him, and 
 His soul was suffering the keenest pangs of which humanity is 
 capable, who can wonder that from that human soul was wrung 
 the awful cry of supremest anguish — that the sense of desola- 
 tion overcame it, — and that He exclaimed "Why hast Thou for- 
 saken Me!" 
 
 Not that it was, of course, in any sense true that there ac- 
 tually was this forsakeness; but simply that the sensations His 
 soul was then experiencing could be given expression in no other 
 way; for although the Presence was the same, yet the sense of that 
 Presence was becoming dim and uncertain to the human soul; 
 and the growing feeling of desolation could be voiced in no other 
 manner: thus, as it has been well expressed, "non solvit unionem, 
 sed subtraxit visionem;" a "subtraction" that was not, of course, 
 in any sense, on the part of God; but, simply and solely, a want 
 of realisation, as I have said, on the part of the human soul; 
 whose eye of perception was then being glassed over by the icy 
 hand of death. 
 
 It was, then, if we may so express it, the cry of dying humanity 
 that our Lord was thus voicing as our Supreme Head; voicing it, 
 I say, not as the expression of His own individuality, but as the 
 "Son of Man." 94 
 
 And yet this ''voicing" partook, in no sense, of the nature of a 
 Doketic "seeming;" for although it was, obviously, not true of 
 His complete Person, yet it was true, in a sensational sense, of 
 His emotional nature: in accordance with this idea, I think, is the 
 fact that it was a quotation by our Lord from the xxii Psalm — that 
 it was not, in other words, original with Him, but was the utter- 
 ance, long before, of a suffering human soul. 
 
 C94) Vide the Epistle to the Hebrews: and especially chap, v, 7, 8; St. Athanasitis [De 
 Incar: Contra Arian: §2.] « ek 7tpodd)7tov rfjusr'spov Xsysi;" and [Orat: contra 
 Arian: iii, cap. 29; and iv, cap. 2]; St. Gregory Nazianzen [Orat: xxx. 5.] << ov yctQ 
 "* avToc, kyKaraXEXhitrai " . . . . <e ev kavrop 8e, orCEp intov, rvitoi 
 TO r}/J.ETEpov; " St. Augustine [Epist: cxl, § 6.] " Haec ex persona sui corporis 
 Christus dicit, quod est Ecclesia:" and [Com: in Pal: xxi. 1; 2nd Exp]; St John Damas- 
 cene [De Fide Orth: Lib: iii, cap. 24.] << qo6te TO Tf^ETEpov OlKEloVfAEVOC, Ttpo6- 
 GOTtov tcLvtcz 7tpo6Hv£,(XTO." Vide also Theodoret[Com: in Psl: xxi, i]; Epiphanius 
 [Adv: Haer: Lib: ii Haer: lxix, cap. 61-63]; St. Leo [Sermo lxvii, 7; and Ixviii, 1,2]; 
 St. Hilary [De Trin: Lib: x, cap. 62-71]; St. Ambrose [Com: in Luc: Lib: x, cap. 127]; 
 Peter Lombard [Liber Sent: Book iii, dist. 21, q. i\\ &c. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 §UR Lord, then, suffered and died as "The Man;" and this 
 brings us to the wider question of the Death upon the Cross 
 as a whole, and to the supreme mystery of the Atonement 
 that underlay that Death; a mystery that can be apprehended in 
 two opposite, and yet correlated ways: namely either from the 
 side of God, or from the side of man. 
 
 Taking the latter point of view first," we may say that it was 
 the completeness of our Lord's Incarnation — the perfectness of 
 His humanity — that caused His death. For He was the Holy 
 and True in a world of evil and wrong; and because of this — 
 because of the hatred that evil ever bears to good, and because 
 He fought bravely against the wrong, and by seeking to lead 
 men back to holiness and to God, disturbed the "vested interests" 
 of sin — because of this, I say, He was hunted to His death by the 
 malice of evil men. 
 
 And so too will we, if we endeavor to follow in His footsteps, 
 and like Him, to fight against evil and wrong, draw down upon 
 ourselves the bitter hatred of wicked doers; for the betterment 
 of mankind in righteousness and holiness can only be pur- 
 chased at the cost to the champion of ignominy and suffering, and 
 possibly even of death. 
 
 It was, then, because, of the "fall," and the sins of men, that 
 the Primal and Perfect Adam, Incarnate among men, became also 
 the "Man of Sorrows" — the Sufferer of Calvary ; — and the 
 prophetic Greek sage read truly the hearts of men, when he said 
 that the perfect man would even be crucified. 96 
 
 Passing on, now, to the first mentioned aspect of the Atone- 
 ment, namely that of its relation toward God, we may say that 
 while there undoubtedly is this aspect of the death of Christ; and 
 while it must, moreover, be, of necessity, the supreme one; yet 
 nevertheless it must also be, by its very nature, something thatwe 
 are unable to fully comprehend. For inasmuch as it is an unique 
 work — the sole thing of its kind, — it is certainly out of all relation 
 and comparison; and must therefore, in the nature of things, be 
 unknown and unknowable. 
 
 And even yet further; in so for as it is an Atonement offered 
 to God, it is, manifestly, not to be comprehended, in its fullness, 
 by any but Him; and can even be apprehended by us, only so far 
 as it may practically affect us; and therefore only in a dim and very 
 imperfect way. 
 
 (95) Vide Plato ["Republic." Book ii, speech of Glaucon to Socrates.] "The just 
 man will be scourged, racked, bound— will have his eyes burnt out; and at last, after 
 suffering every kind of evil, he will be crucified " [or ° impaled."] 
 
 (58) 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERBI DEI 59 
 
 But yet that there is this supreme aspect of the Death upon 
 Calvary — that it was an Atonement, offered to God for us — is, 
 I think, evident from the following lines of thought. 
 
 In the first place, we have the clear and categorical statements 
 of the Apostles and Evangelists, 96 and even of our Lord Himself 97 
 to that effect; no one, in fact, who has at all studied the New 
 Testament, can deny that this redemption wrought by Christ is 
 the very heart of its teachings; and is only second in importance 
 to the prime verity of all, namely the Incarnation itself. 
 
 Then, in addition, we have the closely connected argument, de- 
 rived from those prophetic foreshadowings, spoken, or acted — in 
 word, or in type, — that were so abundant under the Old Covenant. 
 For such, and such only, can be the meaning of the various 
 prophecies of Messiah's death; 98 and such, again, is the evident 
 teachings of the ritual sacrifices — those strangely vivid prophetic 
 types — that were so prominent and all important under the Patri- 
 archal, and Jewish Dispensations. 
 
 And finally, we have the fact that such an Atonement gives us 
 the only adequate ultimate reason for the Crucifixion of our Lord. 
 For although the malice of evil men was quite capable of com- 
 passing that death, and in truth, as I have shown, was its human 
 cause and aspect, yet nevertheless the fact remains that our Lord 
 deliberately exposed Himself to the gratification of that hatred, 
 set His face towards Jerusalem, and suffered Himself to be taken. 
 For surely at any moment, previous to His arrest in the Garden, 
 He could easily have escaped their clutches : and that He refused 
 to do so, but drank to its dregs His cup of suffering, was simply 
 and solely because He would not put that cup aside. It must, 
 then, I think, be allowed that He willingly laid down His Life 
 (St. John, x, 17,18) ; and that, as He Himself said (St. John, x, 11), 
 to atone for the sins of His people. 
 
 Such, then, is the Divine aspect of the death of our Lord upon 
 Calvary: but yet we must, in no case, fall into the terrible error 
 of speaking of that Atonement as if it were the placation of an 
 angry God, by One of a different nature. Ignorant schismatics, 
 whose only apparent commission to preach and explain the Faith 
 lies in their own conceit and selfwill, have too often given occa- 
 sion for blasphemy by expounding the Atonement as if it were 
 the act of an angry God the Father, unjustly smiting an innocent 
 God the Son ; and the "justice, not love" of the Father is sharply 
 contrasted with the "love, not justice" of the Son; as if, for- 
 sooth, true justice and true love were ever disunited! 
 
 Such an awful heresv. I need scarcely point out, is not only 
 utterly incompatible with the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, 
 
 (06) St. John xi, 51, 52; Rom: iii, *s; v, 6; II Cor: v, 18, i y ; Heb: ix, 28; I Peter 1, 19; 11, 14; 
 I St. John ii. 2: Rev: i. 5: &c. 
 
 (97) St Matt: xx. 28: xxvi. 28: &c. 
 
 (98) Gen: iii, 15; Isaiah liii; Daniel ix, 26. 
 
60 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 but is also plainly contradicted by the whole of the teaching of 
 the New Testament, and of the Church. 
 
 For God the Father, equally with the Son, and Holy Spirit, is 
 not a morose and fearful Baal, to be placated by suffering and 
 wrong; but is, on the contrary, the loving Father of all Who 
 willeth the salvation of every man from that hideous disease of sin, 
 which alone is the true giver of damnation to our race. He, then, 
 "so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son" (St. 
 John, iii, 16); and because He "was in Christ, reconciling the 
 world unto Himself" (II Corin: v, 19), He thereby "commendeth 
 His love toward us" (Rom: v, 8; vide also Eph: ii, 4, 5, etc.). 
 
 How far that atoning death of Christ was a necessity in the 
 nature of things it is, of course, impossible for us to comprehend; 
 inasmuch as that lies, as I have already stated, among the incom- 
 prehensible prime verities of God. But yet that necessity can 
 possibly be, in some small measure, apprehended, if we will but 
 realise that, even in human affairs, the loving parent cannot, for 
 very love, pass over, unnoticed and unpunished, a serious and 
 growing viciousness in a child ; and that not less for the sake of 
 the erring one, than for the protection, and guidance, of his inno- 
 cent brothers and sisters. 
 
 For sin and vice are, not so much unlawful acts, as evidences 
 of a diseased state of the soul — a blasting, and cankering destruc- 
 tion of the primary ''image" of God; — inasmuch as a soul, lost 
 and damned by a "habitual" preference for evil, has certainly 
 lost, not only its primary love for holiness and truth, but also, 
 with that love, even the Logos-like faculty of reason; for sin and 
 wrong are, by their very nature, unreasonable, and exclusive of 
 all Right Reason, and Truth. 100 
 
 It follows, therefore, that the punishment — even the drastic 
 punishment — of a sinner, during his growth towards that ter- 
 rible "habitual sinfulness," is, in no sense, cruel or vindictive; 
 but is, on the contrary, strictly remedial in its character; and 
 therefore merciful and loving, and worthy of the Great Father 
 of all. 
 
 God, then, because He is Loving and Merciful, no less than 
 because He is Holy, cannot but abhor, and punish sin ; and that, 
 too, not merely for the protection and guidance of His un- 
 fallen creatures, but even for the sake of sinful man himself. 
 
 He came, therefore, to redeem His people from their sins — not 
 in them; — for the company of the pure and holy would be no 
 heaven to an impure man ; but, on the contrary, a state of intol- 
 erable anguish; and it would not be until such a man was re- 
 deemed from his sin, and made pure and holy, and that, too, only 
 
 (gg") Compare pp. 41 et seq.. and note 6g. and what is there said concerning habit 
 (ioo^ Vide the Essav on "the Essential Nature of Sin:" and also compare the wise 
 
 Arabic proverb that " the most grievous evil that can befall a sinner is to be a sinner; 
 
 and again, the saying < < 77 Se kccky} fiovXrj too fiovlevdavri KaKidrK." 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 61 
 
 with his own acquiescence, 101 but that he would be, not merely 
 fit, but able to enjoy the Beatific Vision of his God. 
 
 Sin, then, must not only be marked by God's abhorence and 
 condemnation, but man must be purified from it; and both these 
 conditions we find fulfilled in the awful tragedy of the Cross; so 
 that men have ever there seen both God's love to the sinner, and 
 His abhorrence of sin; and have thereby been moved, as nothing- 
 else could move them, to loathe and forsake that sin, and to 
 enlist under the banner of the Crucified: as our Lord Himself, 
 then, said "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto Me." 
 
 We come, therefore, to our God, not only as His creatures, or 
 even as children formed in the "image" of the Son, but also as 
 redeemed ones, bearing in our hands the Sacrificial Blood; for by 
 that right, and that right alone, have we "access to the holiest;" 
 and are made, in short, One Mystical Body with our Great High 
 Priest and Head. 
 
 Christ, then, as the "Son of Man," was our Sacrifice and Atone- 
 ment; and this brings me to the consideration of an obscure, and 
 yet most fruitful line of thought, namely the question in what 
 sense, and in what degree, may we, as "members incorporate in 
 Him," be truly said to be partakers in "the fellowship of His 
 sufferings?" 
 
 Now it is sometimes stated (although not by Catholic theo- 
 logians), as a self evident fact, that as Christ's ''merit" is infi- 
 nite, the "merit" of His Passion is infinite also; and as such, cannot 
 be affected by, or have any relation to, any sufferings that we 
 may endure; or in other words, that we of His Body — the 
 Church, — having been redeemed from sin, have no further part 
 or lot in the matter ; our connection with the Atonement wrought 
 for sinners being, purely and solely, passive in its character. 
 
 Yet surely our Lord suffered on the Cross, not as Very and 
 Infinite God, but as very and finite man : and therefore the "merit" 
 of His Passion was finite also, and atoned for the sins of a finite 
 race: Christ, in short, I repeat, suffered, not apart from man, 
 but as Man — as the Great Head of our race; — and we, therefore, 
 as "members incorporate in Him," have our part in the work, 
 and must carry our portion of the Cross — bear our share of the 
 sufferings and woe of the world, and give our quota of painful 
 toil towards the redemption of mankind. 
 
 This certainly appears to be the meaning, not only of that ex- 
 pression in Philippians iv, 10, already quoted, namely "the fel- 
 lowship of His sufferings," but also of those words of St. Paul in 
 Colossians i, 24, bidding us to "fill up that which is behind in the 
 afflictions of Christ." 102 
 
 (rox) Vide what is said on pp. 41 et seq. on the necessity of freedom to holiness: 
 eomoare also note 72. 
 
 (102I Vide also Rom: viii, 17; II Cor: i, 5, 7; iv, 10; II St. Tim: ii, 12; I St. Peter iv, 13; 
 v. 10; &c. 
 
62 DE . INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 But yet, of course, it is not, in any sense, true that the redemp- 
 tion wrought by our Lord upon Calvary lacked aught of com- 
 pleteness; such an idea would, plainly, be repulsive to every 
 Christian sentiment, and would even be formally heretical. 
 
 Nevertheless it is, I think, evidently true that, in our Lord's 
 Atonement, He presented, not only His own individual humanity, 
 but also that of His whole Mystical Body yet to be; and just as all 
 the aspirations and capabilities of humanity were summed up in 
 the Incarnation; so also were all its sufferings and agonies over 
 sin gathered in one on the Cross. 103 
 
 It follows, then, that every saint, every martyr, aye ! and every 
 sincere member of Christ's Church, is, in some real sense, a par- 
 taker in the fellowship of those sufferings; so that even in this 
 redeeming aspect of our Lord's humanity may it be said that He 
 is, in some measure, our "Example." 
 
 And perhaps also, in this connection, should be noted the 
 purifying effect upon the soul of sorrow and suffering; for this, 
 together with the "corporate" nature of our Lord's death, upon 
 which I am insisting, may possibly throw some light upon the 
 Sacrificial aspect of His Atonement. 
 
 Christ, then, as our High Priest, and that, not merely by right 
 of His Logos Mediatorship, but also, and especially, by reason 
 of His primary Archetypal likeness to, and later Incarnation in, 
 man, as our High Priest, I say, and the great Head of our race, 
 offered up to God the Atonement for sin; and thereby redeemed 
 us by His own blood. And having finished this work, He died 
 the natural death of a man, and descended 104 into the "Hell" or 
 "Hades" of the dead, thus fulfilling the whole experience of man. 
 
 And this estate of the dead is, evidently, no inconsiderable por- 
 tion of our existence; for it will last from death until the Resur- 
 rection Day; when, with the bodies our God shall give us, we 
 will wake to active life once more. 
 
 But yet this season in "Hell" must not be imagined simply as 
 a time of mere stupor and total unconsciousness; and that for the 
 principal reason that our Lord — our Archetypal "Example," — 
 during Llis sojourn in that "Hell" as a man, was not, in His 
 humanity, so unconscious and inactive; but on the contrary, 
 preached to those ''spirits in prison" the redemption He had made 
 (I Peter, iii, 19; iv, 6). 
 
 (103) Vide St. Augustine [Epist: cxl, cap. vi, § i8l. "Ecclesia in illo patiebatur, 
 quando pro Ecclesia patiebatur. Nam sicut audivimus Ecclesia vocem" in Christo 
 patientis ' Deus! Deus Mens! quare ]\te dereliquisti?' " * * * [Cap. xi, § 2ql, "sed 
 
 Firocul dubio non in illis vocibus eramus ; et Caput pro suo corpore loquebatur." * * * 
 Cap xiii. § 33.] "Clamat ergo martyris anima transfigurata in Christo." St. Leo 
 [Sermo lxix, and lxx]j St. Thomas Aquinas [Exp: in Davidem, Ps1: xxil; &c. 
 
 See also, what is said on p. 57, and in note 94 concerning the representative nature 
 of our Lord's cry upon the cross. 
 
 And furthermore, as I may here remark, this consideration will also show us the 
 utter falsit}' - of those highly artificial and unreal "forensic" theories of the Atonement, 
 put forth by Calvinistic and Lutheran teachers. 
 
 (104) i. e. in His human "anima" — or "mind," and ''vital life" — ; not in His Godhead; 
 which, because Omnipresent, cannot partake of any change of locality. See, similarly, 
 note itg on the "Ascension." 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 63 
 
 And yet, on the other hand, it cannot be a time of such activity 
 and fullness of life as we now enjoy, with our present body; and 
 will enjoy hereafter, with our ''resurrection body;" and that for 
 the following reasons : in the first place, we, evidently, now have 
 this fullness of life because, and only because, our body, with its 
 Cosmos of sensational nerves receiving impressons from, and 
 motor nerves conveying activities to our environment — the ma- 
 terial world around us, — places us in active relation to that world; 
 and thus enables us to have active life: and in the second place, 
 unless a material body were so necessary for the full exercise of the 
 powers of our "Ego" — or in other words, unless a body were such 
 a necessary medium and instrument of the "Egoistic" Spirit, and 
 not such a mere prison house to, and clog upon, the faculties of 
 that Spirit, as Dualistic, or quasi-dualistic thinkers falsely sup- 
 pose 10 ' 1 — unless, I say, the material body were such a necessary 
 instrument, there would obviously be neither meaning to, nor 
 fitness in, a resurrection body for the redeemed soul. 106 
 
 The body, then, evidently is, and must be, a necessity for the 
 exercise of the full activities of the "Ego;" and when, therefore, 
 from various causes, the lesion of death occurs, we thereby be- 
 come "naked" and "unclothed," and are reduced to a state of 
 proportionate helplessness; and perforce, must lie in "Hell," until 
 we are once more "clothed upon" with our "spiritual" 107 body on 
 the Resurrection Morn. 
 
 Perhaps, then, our existence in that estate of the dead may best 
 be pictured, not as a stupor of unconsciousness, as I have al- 
 ready remarked, but rather as partaking of the nature of a gentle 
 and timeless dream; in which our relations will be principally 
 with the Immanent and Inspiring Logos ; Who there, as here, will 
 ever be giving us being; and only indirectly (so to speak), and 
 through Him, with our fellow creatures in "Hell." 
 
 From this, then, it follows that our happiness, or misery, dur- 
 ing this season in "Hades," will depend, solely and entirely, upon 
 this relation of ours with the Logos, or in other words, upon our 
 capacity for enjoying a measure of the "Vision" of our Lord. 
 
 Thus, to illustrate, we can well believe that those blessed ones 
 who know, and perfectly love Him, even now, will enjoy, in that 
 "Vision," all the bliss possible to a being, who is yet debarred 
 from active and perfect life, by reason of the lack of a body: on 
 the other hand, those of us who die, full of manifold faults and 
 imperfections, and yet sincerely and truly loving our Lord, will 
 surely, by that "Vision," be filled with mingled bliss and loving 
 remorse for our many shortcomings and infirmities; a remorse that 
 
 (to=> On this point, and this whole discussion on the inter-relations of "body" and 
 ''spirit." see the Essays on "The Essential Nature of Sin,"andon "Spirit and Matter " 
 
 (106) Which body, as a matter of fact, is, as we know, denied bv all the dualistic 
 and quasi-dualistic "Spiritualizers:" vide, again the Essay on "The "Essential Nature 
 ot Sin " 
 
 (107) Vide what is said, further on, concerning this "spiritual" body. 
 
64 DE INCARNA TIONE VERBI DEI 
 
 will burn away those infirmities, as nothing else could do, and 
 purify us in its fierce, yet cleansing flame. 
 
 And yet again; those souls who have, until this season, been igno- 
 rant of their God, or seen Him, at the best, but dimly through 
 their heathen faiths, and yet, despite of this, have followed and 
 obeyed, as best they could, His guidings and "enlightenings" of 
 their minds, those souls, I say, will doubtless, in that "Vision," at 
 last receive the Full Light, hear His Gospel, and know Him as 
 their Lord. 108 
 
 While, finally, those wicked ones who, in this life, have chosen 
 evil for their guide, and have thereby lost their Logos-imaged 
 manhood, and become transmuted into fiends, what can such un- 
 happy ones experience in this relation, but solitude, agony, and 
 woe? And in this instance, alas! it will not be, as in.the case of 
 the imperfect, yet sincere Christian, a remedial suffering, spring- 
 ing from remorseful love, and purifying the nature, even as the 
 silver is purified in the fire; but will rather be the hopeless, and 
 self inflicted tortures of a hateful nature, eating out its own heart 
 with malice and hatred to all around. 
 
 Such, then, I think, is the clearest conception that we can form 
 of our existence as unclothed spirits in "Hades," or ''Hell:" 109 
 and yet, as it may be remarked, this picture, and especially what 
 I have said concerning our activities, although probable in many 
 ways, is yet, at the last analysis, but speculative, or at least in- 
 ductive, and therefore not absolutely certain; all that we, as Catho- 
 lic theologians, can surely say is that there is this "Hell" — this 
 estate of the disembodied dead; — and that our Lord, in taking 
 our true nature upon Him, and fulfilling our whole existence, 
 
 (108) Vide T St. Peter iii, ig, 20; ccmf : also Acts x, 34, 35; and our Lord's judgment of 
 the "nations" l_i. e. the heathen'] in St. Matt: xxv, 31-46. In this category, also, evi- 
 dently belong unbaptised infants. 
 
 (ioq) Compare, on all the foregoing discussion, St. Luke xvi, 22-31; xxiii, 43; II Cor: 
 v, 1-8: Philip: i, 2V, Heb: xii, 23; I St. Peter iii, 10. 20; Rev vi, 9-11. Also Hermas [Lib: 
 iii. Simil: 9, § 16]: St. Clemens Alex: [Strom: Lib: vi. cap. 6]; St. Irenaeus ["Adv: 
 Haer:" Lib: ii, cap. 33, 34, and v, cap. 31]: Tertullian ["De Anima" cap. 53-58]; Lactan- 
 tius [Inst: Div: Lib: vii, cap. q, et seq.]: "St. Hilary [Exp: in Psl: cxx, § 16; and cxxxviii, 
 § 22~|; St. Gregory Nazianzen [Orat: xxxix. § 19; and xl, § 76]; St. Ambrose [De Bono 
 Mortis, cap. 10]; St. Augustine r u Enchir:" cap. 69, and 109; "De Civitate Dei, xxi. 13]; 
 St. Gregory the Great [Dial: iv]; St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii, qq. Ixix 
 and lxx], &c. 
 
 It is, probably, unnecessary to here remark that in all the previous discussion of the 
 estate of the disembodied dead, "Hell" is not used in the commonlv understood sense 
 of "Gehenna" — i. e. the final estate, or place of the damned,— but only in the sense 
 implied in the Creed, and as equivalent to the "Hades" of the New Testament and the 
 "Sheol" of the Old. 
 
 And furthermore: on this point the whole Catholic Church is in actual and real [al- 
 though not nominal] agreement; for while Anglicans generally speak of this estate as 
 "Hades," or "Hell" (for all souls in general], and "Paradise" [for the blessed dead, in 
 particular], Roman Catholics distinguish the various estates as "Purgatory" [for im- 
 perfect Christians], "Heaven" [for the perfected saints; also used for the estate of 
 *inal and post-resurrection glory, thus lying open to the danger of a confusion in 
 terminology], and "Hell" [for the "habitually ' evil; again also used for the final es- 
 tate of the damned, with a resultant ambiguitv]; "Limbus Patrum," "Puerorum,'' &c. 
 Greek Catholics, on the other hand, speak of but two estates, "Heaven" [by which is 
 meant as in the Roman Church, both the final and eternal estate of the redeemed, 
 and also their present and temporal estate in "Paradise"], and "HeTl" [under which 
 term is included all "Hades," except "Paradise;" and also the final and eternal estate 
 of the lost.] While, therefore, there is some confusion of terms, yet the common 
 agreement in meaning is, I think, substantial. 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 6$ 
 
 could not but pass through that season in "Hell;" and thus unify 
 Himself with that vast army of the dead. 
 
 And during this descent into ''Hell" the Hypostatic Union 
 was still complete; for (as has been already noted on p. 24) He, 
 the Essentially Omnipresent Logos, ever Immanent in His Uni- 
 verse, and Eternally in the Bosom of the Father, was evidently 
 present in, and manifested by His human soul in Hell, as He was 
 also present in, and (to its measure) manifested by His human 
 body in the tomb. 110 
 
 This latter presence of our Lord, that namely with His human 
 body in the grave, is evident, I think, not only from His Essential 
 Omnipresence, but also from the following considerations. If 
 that body had been forsaken in death by the Divine Immanence, 
 as it was by our Lord's human life, then the Catholic formula of 
 "never to be divided" would, clearly, be contradicted: and even 
 furthermore the Resurrection, in such a case, would have been, 
 not simply even a re- Incarnation, but rather a Nestorian re-posses- 
 sion. This is plainly untenable ; and we must, therefore, recog- 
 nise the Hypostatic Union as unimpaired; so that, even in death, 
 there was no element of His humanity that, for one single instant, 
 existed apart from Him. 
 
 But having fulfilled this portion of our existence, and "tasted 
 death for every man," He rose again the third day from the 
 dead; 111 and taking His body from the grave (in which, as I have 
 stated, He never had ceased to be present) He revivified and trans- 
 formed it, in some subtle way, into the "Resurrection" or "spirit- 
 ual" body; called "spiritual," not because it is subjective and il- 
 lusionary, nor even because it is non-material, but simply and 
 solely because it is completely under the sway of the spiritual 
 faculties. 11 * 
 
 (no) Vide St. Athanasius ["De Incar: contra Apoll:" Lib: ii, § 14.! (e juijte rf/S 
 Qeotktostov crab fiat oc, hv rep rdepep aitoXifiitavon vk$, jurjre rfjs ipvxv$ 
 EV TOO "<xSy x&P^OMZTKSi" and [° e Sa l J Adv: J. C, Lib: i, pp. 645, 646.I li w6zE 
 6vk avSpa)7to<; Qeov EXGopzX,ero, owe 0e'o<; itpb<; "(XV-rpGOTtov EyKaraX- 
 Eiipiv SiKysiro owe r} vsKpoodig a7tox&>pK6'iS ©eov, rf aito o~Gojj.aroc, rjv 
 UEra6ra6i<;, 'aXXa ipyxfji 'alio craDfiaroc, x&>pi6^o<;;» St. Augustine [De 
 Fide et Symbolo. Lib: iii, cap. 7.] "Totus Filius apud Patrem. totus in coelo totus 
 in terra, totus in utero Virprinis. totus in cruce, totus in inferno, totus in paradiso quo 
 latronem introduxit;" and [Tract: in Joan:" 47, § 9]; St. Leo [Sermo lxxi, 2,] "Quoniam 
 Deitas quae ab utraque suscepti hominis substantia non recessit, quod potestate di- 
 visit. potestate conjunxit." St. John Damascene |_De Fide Orth: Lib: i ; i, cap. 27; and 
 Lib: iv. cap. 1]; Peter Lombard | Liber Sent: Book iii, dist: 22, q. 2.] "Et utique totus 
 eodem tempore erat in inferno, in coelo totus. ubique totus." and St. Thomas Aquinas 
 [Sum: Theo- Pars iii, Q. Iii, art. 3.] "Totus Christus fuit in sepulchro, quia tota Per- 
 sona fuit ibi per corpus sibi unitum; et similiter totus fuit in inferno, quia tota Per- 
 sona Christi fuit ibi ratione animae sibi unitae: totus etiam Christus tunc erat ubique, 
 ratione Divinae Naturae." Vide, also, p. 2d and note 33. 
 
 (in) The consideration n f the various evidences for the fact of the Resurrection ot 
 our Lord, is evidently outside of the scope of this present treatise; for mv design here 
 is merely to expound an d unfold, as far as may be, the substance, and bearing of the 
 Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation. I must, therefore, reserve for another occasion 
 the examination of the evidences in favour of the Resurrection; and the rebuttal of 
 the various sceptical theories — namelv, that it was a mere revival from a swoon, or 
 was a mvth, or an illusion. &o. — bv which some have endeavoured to explain it awav- 
 
 (112) Vide St. Thomas Aquinas I Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Hv art t, ad. 2.1 "Haec est 
 autem dispositio corporis grloriosi, ut sit spirituale. id est subjectum spiritui ut Apos- 
 tolus dicit [I Cor: xv.] Ad hoc autem quod sit omnino corpus subjectum Spiritui, re- 
 
66 DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 Our Lord's resurrection body, in short, was, in no sense, an 
 unique and miraculous one ; but was, on the contrary, an entirely 
 natural one; and proper to the resurrection man. 113 For just as 
 the body of His humiliation, wherein He suffered, and was cruci- 
 fied, was no mere Doketic apparition, but a real human body, 
 that could, and did actually, hunger, and become weary, and feel 
 pain, so too was His resurrection body, simply and solely, that 
 natural human body, raised from the grave, and "glorified" — even 
 "sublimated," if we may use the term — by His Spirit, as our bodies 
 shall be by our spirits; and thus made a "spiritual" body, and 
 agreeable to its new conditions and environments. 
 
 That this is true — that Christ's risen body is simply the body 
 proper to the risen man, — is evident, I think, from the following 
 considerations. In the first place, such is the plain statement of 
 St. Paul, both in his Epistle to the Philippians (iii, 21), and especi- 
 ally in his well known argument for the resurrection in I Corinth, 
 xv, where he uses the fact of our Lord's Resurrection as conclu- 
 sively showing that we too shall be raised. 
 
 And, in the second place, if Christ be not our "Example," here 
 as elsewhere in His Incarnate Life, it is hard to see what can be 
 the meaning and teaching of His Resurrection; for He evidently 
 rose again, as He had lived and died, solely as the Incarnate One; 
 or in other words, not in His Divine and non-Incarnate Estate 
 as Very God, but in His human and Incarnate Estate as Very 
 Man. This being so, then our Lord's resurrection body is clearly 
 an "example" of what ours shall be, when we rise from the dead, 
 re-create our bodies around our "hypostatic Ego," and thus 
 "awake in His likeness." 
 
 This "spiritual" body to be is, no doubt, largely incomprehen- 
 sible to us now; for it is, in many respects, outside of the cate- 
 gories of our present experience and knowledge: but yet we may 
 possibly form some slight conception of it by considering that, 
 even now, our bodies are sustained, and, to a large extent, 
 moulded by, our hypostatic and creative "Ego;" and are thereby 
 enabled to more or less efficiently meet and conquer those con- 
 stant changes of environment that constitute "life." 
 
 But sin, by introducing discordances, has both marred the 
 perfection of our nature, and also introduced conflicting "environ- 
 ments" — has, in short, made many things "natural" and easy to 
 one part of our nature, that are, at the same time, ''unnatural/' 
 abhorent, and destructive to another part ;\H and thus, as I have 
 
 quiritur quod omnis actio corporis subdatur spiritus voluntati;" also St. Augustine 
 [De Fide et Symbolo, cap. vi, § n,] &c. 
 
 (113) Vide St. Thomas Aquinas [Sura: Theo: Pars iii, Q. liv, art. i, ad. t.1 "Ad pri- 
 mum ergo dicendum quod Corpus Christi post resurrectionem non ex miraculo, sod 
 ex conditione gloriae, &c." 
 
 (114) Thus, to take an instance, a dweller in one of our "slums" has "environments" 
 of— or "correspondences" with— (i) the laws of God, and of right, (2) the laws of his 
 nature, and its appetites— inherited, or acquired,— (3) the laws of the land, and of "so- 
 ciety" as a whole, and finally, (4) the "common law," or usages of bis particular "so- 
 ciety." Now all these "laws" are, more or less, interconnecting and opposite; and 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 67 
 
 stated, has introduced discordances that ultimately issue in 
 death. 
 
 But in the resurrection life, our body, we believe, will be a 
 "spiritual" one; and as such, entirely under the sway of our "Ego;" 
 which "Ego," again, will be pure and holy, and without any con- 
 flicting appetites; so that whatever we may naturally desire, we 
 may lawfully and rightly do. When, therefore, we pass into the 
 "heavenly mansions," we will be in perfect agreement with our 
 God; and in the enjoyment of the Beatific Vision, will be also in 
 harmony with all our "environment" — with our own nature, with 
 the angelic host, and with our redeemed brethren: -so that our 
 souls will be no more torn by conflicting emotions, or desires; but 
 in that knowledge of our God, will have perfect satisfaction and 
 eternal life; for our correspondences with our environment will 
 ever be perfect. 115 
 
 Such, then, so far as we can imagine it, will be our resurrec- 
 tion state; and of this estate we have, as I have just said, an 
 example in our risen Lord. For His body was, evidently, a 
 "spiritual" one; and as such, given whatever form His creative 
 "Ego" might will; He therefore, could appear (St. Luke, xxiv, 36; 
 St. John, xx, 19 and 26), and disappear from sight (St. Luke, 
 xxiv, 31); and could even, on occasions, present another appear- 
 ance to His disciples (St. Mark, xvi, 12; St. Luke, xxiv, 16 and 31 ; 
 St. John, xxi, 4). With reference to this latter point we may note 
 that, even in this present life, the "Ego" has great influence on 
 the appearance of the outer man; a brutal countenance bespeaks 
 a brutal soul, and 'Vice versa;" and again, our loves, our hates, 
 our fears, and our joys are all reflected in our visage; and finally, 
 if a refined and good man should fall into sin, and commit a 
 brutal act, his whole appearance is thereby changed, and that to a 
 very startling degree. Truly, therefore, even in this life, as I 
 have said, the "Ego" moulds the body; and what bounds, then, 
 can we put to the changes that may be wrought by it in the resur- 
 rection life? 
 
 A rather difficult minor point, in connection with the "spirit- 
 ual" body lies in the eating by our Lord on several occasions pre- 
 ceding His Ascension (St. Luke, xxiv, 43; St. John, xxi, 13). 
 Possibly we may explain this by saying that inasmuch as the resur- 
 rection body, both in our Lord's case, and in ours, consists of 
 material particles 116 (although those particles are so entirely under 
 the sway of the spiritual faculties as to deserve the name of a 
 
 whatever set he obeys, he thereby transgresses, and is punished by the other "corre- 
 spondences;" his life, therefore, must ever be a more o*- less unhappy one. 
 
 (ns) Compare the saying- of Herbert Spencer, "perfect correspondence would be 
 perfect life. Were there no change? in the environment, but Bttch as the organism 
 had adopted changes to meet, and were it never to fail in the efficiencv with which it 
 meet them, there would be eternal existence, and universal knowl 'edge." Does rot all 
 this exactlv agree with our Lord's words "This is life eternal, that thev mieht know 
 Thee, the onlv true God. and Jesus Christ. Whom Thou hast sent" [St. John xvii. <|. 
 
 (it61 And that because it is a bodv; vide what is said on pp. 62 and 63 as to the disem- 
 bodied dead; and also the Essay oh "Spirit and Matter." 
 
68 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 "spiritual" body), yet, I say, inasmuch as that body consists of 
 material particles, it must needs be subject to friction and wear, 
 and therefore stand in need of constant renewal. For "life," in 
 its very nature, consists, not in changelessness (which would 
 rather be death), but in constant movement; and the eternal life, 
 therefore, of the body will not consist in an eternal sameness; but 
 will rather, as I have stated, be an eternally perfect meeting of 
 the constantly changing environment. 
 
 If this be true, then we may possibly conceive how our Lord, 
 in order to reassure His disciples of His material reality (St. Luke, 
 xxiv, 39), might, on a few occasions, take from common food 
 those new particles required for the renewal of His body, that He 
 ordinarily would take directly from the surrounding elements. 
 But this is an obscure speculation; and must, therefore, be taken 
 by the reader for what it is worth. 
 
 Another very curious question, and one, I think, that has 
 never been previously raised, concerns the nature of our Lord's 
 resurrection vesture. 
 
 That He was so vested is, certainly, evident to anyone who 
 reads the account of His appearances to His disciples : and further- 
 more; as He did not always present the same appearance, it is, 
 presumably, but reasonable to conclude that His vesture on each 
 of those occasions — say, for instance, on Easter morning, on the 
 road to Emmaus, or at the Galilean lake — was also different: and, 
 yet again, we may notice the similar vestments of the angels [e. g. 
 St. Matt, xxviii, 3; St. Mark, xvi, 5; St. Luke, xiv, 4; St. John, 
 xx, 12, etc.], and of the redeemed ones in bliss [Rev., vii, 9]. 
 
 And yet these garments, both in our Blessed Lord's case, and in 
 our own, cannot well be thought of as things separate from, ex- 
 ternal, and foreign to the "resurrection body," — cannot, in other 
 words, hold to it such a mere extraneous relation as that now ex- 
 isting between our present body and its garments, — inasmuch as, 
 in such a case, we would have to make the rather improbable 
 hypothesis of a restoration, or recreation, of our human fabrics and 
 fashions ! 
 
 The solution of the enigma seems, to me, to be, perhaps, as 
 follows : the resurrection body, as I have already remarked [vide 
 pp. 66, 67] 117 will not be something that is external to us, and 
 separately created, and into which we are put; but will, on the 
 contrary, be rather the creation, and perfect expression of our 
 "hypostatic" Ego — the "phenomenon," in other words, of that 
 "noumenon." In such a case, then, it is, I believe, quite con- 
 ceivable that the Ego, in "projecting around itself" [so to speak], 
 as its "expression," a body, should also "project," or "express" 
 anv vestings of that body that it might will to create. 
 
 This, of course, is merely given as a hypothesis; but yet it 
 
 (117) Vide also the Essay on "Spirit and Matter." 
 
DE INCARNATIONS VERB I DEI 69 
 
 seems to me to be also one that is perfectly feasible and de- 
 fensible. 
 
 There is yet one final point on which it may be well to touch: 
 when we receive our resurrection bodies, and attain unto the heaven 
 of God, our existence, as of our bodies, so of our spirits, will not, 
 as I have previously stated, be an eternal sameness ; but will doubt- 
 less be rather a growth from glory unto ever higher glories — a 
 constant advance into ever increasing knowledge and perfection. 
 Yet such a growth in perfection cannot, I think, be truly predicated 
 of the Human Nature of our Lord : for although His Humanity 
 is certainly a true one, and is exactly akin to our own in that it is 
 given entire being by, and is a faithful reflection of, the hypos- 
 tatic "Ego," or "Spirit," yet it widely differs in this one respect; 
 with us, in heaven, that creative "Ego" will still be finite; and, 
 therefore, will be capable, as I have stated, of a constant develop- 
 ment in knowledge and perfection; which development will con- 
 stitute its "life." But in His case, there will be no such capacity 
 for development; for His Hypostatic "Ego" is the Infinite, Om- 
 niscient, and All Perfect Logos, in Whom any growth, or increase 
 is unthinkable; while His humanity — mental life, bodily life, and 
 body — although certainly essentially finite, and even furthermore, 
 once the subject of such "growth" (vide pp. 37 and 38), is yet now, 
 it seems to me, fully "grown" in all respects, and completely 
 "habituated" to His Will (vide p. 44 et seq.); it, therefore, can 
 only now "grow" in compliance with an equal development in that 
 Will, or Hypostatic "Ego;" and any such development, as I have 
 just shown, is impossible to Him. 118 
 
 It follows, then, I think, that our Lord's glorified humanity, 
 although certainly kindred in all other respects to our own, will 
 yet not, like ours, grow from glory unto glory; but will rather 
 be the Eternally Perfect Ideal, to Which we will ever be attaining. 
 
 <it8) But therefore, also, on the other hand, possible to us; for while our " spiritual 
 body" will, as I have previously stated, like His, be in perfect agreement with our 
 perfect and redeemed "Ego;" and therefore be "perfect" of its kind; yet inasmuch as 
 that "Ego." being finite, as well as perfect, can, and must develop in perfection, so 
 also must the "spiritual body" it gives being to, develop with it to an equal degree. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 ©UR Lord, then, on that first Easter morning, rose from the 
 dead, and manifested forth this ideal humanity — body, mind, 
 and "Ego" — of the resurrection life; and having done so, 
 spent forty days on earth among His disciples, before His Ascen- 
 sion into Heaven : this, as we are plainly told (Acts i, 3), was for 
 the sake of confirming their faith, and instructing them in the 
 things pertaining to the Kingdom of God. 
 
 But having fulfilled this work, He then Ascended into Heaven, 
 there to be our Great High Priest before the Throne of God. 119 
 
 And this office He is able to fulfill because, and only because, 
 He — the Mediating Logos — has become also the "Son of Man"- — 
 has, in other words, as I have shown in this treatise, taken our 
 nature truly upon Him, has suffered, and been tempted, like our- 
 selves, and finally has died for us upon the Cross, passed through 
 "Hell," and risen again from the tomb. Llad He not have been so 
 Incarnate, and so partaken of our griefs, He might, no doubt, have 
 been bur "King," our "Lord," even our "Prophet;" but He could 
 hardly have been our "Priest;" for the prime and essential note 
 of priesthood is, not superiority, or even holiness [although this, 
 too, is necessary], 120 but likeness and sympathy. This likeness, 
 then, and sympathy He has acquired by His Incarnation and life; 
 and is, therefore, as our Brother, our Merciful and Faithful High 
 Priest before the Throne on High. 
 
 It is, again, by reason of this assumption of our nature by our 
 Lord, that we, as His fellow men and brethren, are able to become 
 "members incorporate in Him;" and therefore, also, be partakers 
 in His Priesthood. For all the faithful, in their several "orders" 
 as "Bishops," "Priests," "Deacons," or "Laymen" of His Church, 
 are His commissioned and corporate representatives — His 
 "priests" — to the world, and to God; and, as such, preach, on the 
 one hand, His Gospel to mankind; and on the other, offer up to 
 God the Eucharistic Sacrifice of His Passion. And this, I repeat, 
 is because, and only because, He has first become One with us; 
 and is, by His Incarnation, our Elder Brother and Head. 
 
 (iiq) Ascended, not in His Omnipresent Estate as the Logos [concerning Whom any 
 transmission, or transference through space is, manifestly, incredible], but m His 
 ■*inite Estate, as Incarnate, and manifest to man. 
 
 Vide St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q. 1vii, art. 2]. "Ascendit Christus 
 in coelum, non secundum Divinam Naturam, quae nunquam coelum deseruit, sed se- 
 cundum quod homo virtute Divinitatis penetravit coelos." 
 
 See also note 104 on the "descent" of our Lord into "Hell;" and compare the note at 
 the end of this treatise on "the Local Manifestation." 
 
 (120) Vide what is said upon the necessity of sinlessness to perfect sympathy [and 
 consequently, to priesthood] at the close of the Essay on "the Essential Mature of 
 Sin." 
 
 (7o) 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 7I 
 
 And so, again, is the Holy Ghost — the Lord and Giver of life — 
 given by our Lord to His Church, to be her Vivifying and Guid- 
 ing Soul, simply and solely, because of this incorporate relation 
 to Himself. For the Holy Spirit, by His Essence, Eternally Pro- 
 ceedeth from the Father, through the Son; and is, therefore, neces- 
 sarily given by the Son to those whom He has made One with 
 JrLimself by means of His Incarnation and Redemption. 
 
 It, therefore, evidently follows that, as I have stated at the 
 beginning of this treatise, the Incarnation is the central and vital 
 fact of Christianity, and the plenary well spring of all its teach- 
 ings, and Sacramental grace; in that from it depends all the 
 Church's Gospel and Theology, all her Sacraments and ritual, 
 all her Priesthood and Mission, even her very existence itself, and 
 the Immanent Life she ever derives from the Holy Spirit of God. 
 
 This being the case, it may be well to theoretically inquire if 
 the Incarnation would not have taken place, even if man had not 
 fallen; or in other words, if the reason for the Incarnation does not 
 lie deep in humanity itself, the effect of the ''Fair' and of sin be- 
 ing, not to cause, but rather to modify that "Intention of Crea- 
 tion ;" and turn it, for a season, into a time of suffering and anguish 
 — making the Incarnation, in short, become also the Atone- 
 ment. 
 
 The reasons for thinking this probably are very weighty, and 
 may be briefly summed up as follows. If it be supposed that the 
 "Fall" was really an essential to the Incarnation, then we should 
 at once be confronted with the fact that, in such a case, man, by 
 becoming a sinner, has attained to blessings and favors — even 
 to the supreme knowledge of, and union with His God — that He 
 might never have hoped for had he remained obedient! Such 
 an idea is surely repugnant to our sense of the fitness of things ; 
 "o felix culpa!" 1 ' 21 is certainly not the true characterisation of dis- 
 obedience and wrong. 
 
 And secondly, we have the very strong argument that, inas- 
 much as our Lord is the Primal and Archetypal Adam, in Whose 
 "image" man had first been made (vide pp. 25 et seq.), man, there- 
 fore, by the very constitution of his being and nature, called for 
 such an assimilation to his God as was wrought in the Incarnation; 
 which assimilation, as I have shown (p. 2 et seq.), he longs for, 
 and is unsatisfied until he attains; and finally, which having at- 
 tained, he is capable of both appreciating and receiving. 
 
 Sin and the "Fall," on the other hand, so far from helping this 
 "assimilation," have, on the contrary, greatly hindered and re- 
 tarded it; and by blurring and injuring the Divine ''Image" in our 
 nature, have rendered the work of the Incarnate One, if possi- 
 bly (humanly speaking) "more necessary;" certainly also more 
 painful and difficult. 
 
 fT2i) As Richard de S. Victor exclaimed f _De Verbo Incar: cap. 3]. 
 
72 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 In short, we may say that the benefits of the Incarnation are 
 neither summed up by, and commensurate with, nor exhausted 
 by the Atonement, and man's redemption from sin. For al- 
 though the assumption of our nature by our God is certainly the 
 way we are, and apparently the only way we could be, re- 
 deemed from our sin, and made holy and righteous, yet this is true 
 because, and only because, we are, first and foremost, drawn 
 thereby into union with our God ; our purification being, in short, 
 not a precedent, but a consequence of thus being made One with 
 Him. 122 The Incarnation, then, in brief, is the major and primary 
 fact; and as such, must evidently include the Atonement, as it does 
 all else in Christianity; and not 'Vice versa;" so that we may 
 well conclude that even if man had not fallen, the Logos would 
 still have become Incarnate. 123 
 
 Yet another argument in support of this reasoning, and that a 
 most subtle one, lies in the dual character and order of the 
 Eucharistic elements. Our Lord, it will be noticed, first gave 
 His Body for the life of the world, to make us One with Himself 
 (compare St. John, vi, 32-58; and I Corinth., x, 17); and then, 
 and only then, did He give His Atoning Blood, poured out for 
 the remission of sins (St. Matt., xxvi, 28). This is, I repeat, a most 
 subtle argument ; and yet certainly one that powerfully reinforces 
 the other considerations mentioned. 
 
 Continuing this line of thought we may say that, even with- 
 out the "Fall," there would doubtless have been a "Virgin Birth;" 
 and that both because the Incarnation would still have been a 
 new beginning — the coming of the Head of our race; — and also 
 because it would otherwise have been no true "Incarnation" at 
 all, but the mere Nestorian "possession" of a man inspired by 
 God (vide p. 29). 
 
 And having become so Incarnate among un-fallen men, while 
 there, obviously, would have been no necessity for, or meaning in 
 His sufferings and Atonement, yet He certainly would still unite 
 us with Himself, possibly even by an Eucharistic rite ; and thus, 
 no doubt, have caused us to be transformed, even as He was at 
 His Transfiguration, without passing through the agonies and 
 ignominies of death, into the "Spiritual body" of the Resurrection 
 life (vide pp. 48 and 49). 
 
 But yet, of course, all this is mere theoretical speculation; for 
 
 (122) Popular "revivalism" often forgets this vital fact, when it tiroes people to first 
 "become holy," either bv "works," or [more generally! by "faith" [by which term a 
 self excited emotional experience is intended!; and then, having: so "become holy, 
 and "experienced religion," to "come to God," and "join the Christian Church. But 
 this erroneous teaching overlooks, as I have said, the fact that, firstly, we cannot, 
 apart from God. make ourselves holy, even by "works," and certainlvnot by emotion; 
 and secondly, that, as our Lord Himself said, He came, not to call the righteous, but 
 sinners to repentance. We cojne. therefore to Christ, and to His body— the Church — 
 not as self conscious .and self sufficient "saints," seeking admission, for the mere pur- 
 pose of edification, into a "holv club; 1 ' but as sinful men— "lost pieces of silver. ' yet 
 with the image and superscription of the Great King,— coming to Him Who is our 
 Archetvpal Brother. Redeemer, and Priest. 
 
 (123) Compare the Nicene phrase "for us men, and for our salvation, &c. 
 
DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 73 
 
 man having fallen, The Incarnate One became, of necessity, 
 also the "Man of Sorrows" — the Crucified Lamb of God. 124 
 
 Such, then, is the Church's doctrine of the Incarnation of the 
 Logos; a doctrine that is, as I trust I have shown, perfectly co- 
 'herent, and self consistent; and in accurate agreement with all the 
 known facts of our Lord's Person and life. 
 
 It remains now to be seen if it can be also substantiated by posi- 
 tive arguments; or if, on the other hand, it is a mere fine spun 
 theory, very beautiful, no doubt, and well rounded; but yet with no 
 more solid basis than the poetic imagination. 
 
 Of course, as I stated towards the commencement of this trea- 
 tise (p. 8), a full and detailed examination of the various evidences 
 for the historical facts of Christianity is outside of my present 
 design; which is merely to elucidate and unfold, as far as may 
 be, the Church's doctrine concerning that Incarnation. 
 
 But yet, this work having now been accomplished, a brief 
 sketch of some of the arguments in favour of the actual agree- 
 ment with reality of that doctrine will, I think, both be suitable 
 here, and will also make a fit close to the discussion. 
 
 To begin, then, we may say that the very self consistence and 
 coherency of the doctrine is, in itself, no despicable argument; for 
 false or inaccurate theories are, invariably, somewhere, or in 
 some respects, self conflicting and illogical; perfect agreement, 
 both with itself, and its surroundings, belongs only to truth. 
 
 But even passing over this consideration, we have the follow- 
 ing positive arguments. In the first place, there are, on the one 
 hand, the definite and repeated claims of our Lord to be the 
 Eternal Logos of God, Incarnate among men; 125 and on the other 
 hand, the various circumstances of His life, His teaching, His 
 death, and resurrection. In view, then, of these claims and this 
 life, He must evidently be held to be "aut Deus, aut homo non 
 bonus," alternatives of which we must certainly choose the first. 126 
 He Who walked those Galilean fields was certainly, if our appre- 
 ciation of truth can at all be trusted, no deluding, or self deluded 
 imposter; but was what He claimed to be, namely the Incarnate 
 Word, tabernacling among men. 
 
 Then a second line of argument consists in that centering in, 
 and preparation for His coming, to which I have already alluded 
 at the beginning of this treatise. For, as I there endeavoured to 
 
 (124) St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q. i, art. 3], it is true, while he grants 
 that "potuisset enim etiam peccato non existente Deus incarnari," yet rather inclines 
 to the opinion that the "fall" was a necessary precedent to the Incarnation; and this 
 because the redemption of man is always, in Holy Scripture, linked with that Incar- 
 nation. 
 
 Yet this reasoning, it seems to me, is not quite to the point; inasmuch as the question 
 is, not what is actually the case now Tfor all grant that, under present conditions, the 
 Incarnation and the Atonement are inseparable], but what, theoretically, might have 
 been, had man not fallen. Under this latter supposition, the view I have advanced in 
 the text seems, to me, to be impregnable. 
 
 (i25)_ Vide St. Matt: xi, 27; xxviii, iq; St. John iii, 13-21; v, 17-47; x, ?o; xiv; xv, 26; xvi, 
 15; xvii, 10; &c. 
 
 (126) For a full discussion of this point, I beg to refer to Canon Liddon's Bampton 
 Lectures "On the Divinity of our Lord." 
 
 IO 
 
74 DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 show, both the ideas — the "logoi" — of Nature, and the basic 
 elements of humanity, all proceed from, center in, aspire to, and 
 are only fulfilled in, the Logos; thus giving rise to the thirst of 
 the soul for Him; which thirst, again, can only be satisfied by His 
 revelation to us in His Incarnation. 
 
 And even furthermore: humanity, as I pointed out, was not 
 only implicitly, but also explicitly awaiting Him ; as the prophesies 
 and foreshadowings in the heathen religions show (vide. pp. 4-5) 
 He was, then, the Ideal of the Ages — the fulfillment and satisfac- 
 tion of man's fervent desire for God ; — and as such, was truly the 
 Logos Incarnate. 
 
 And, thirdly, we may continue this line of thought by pointing 
 to all secular history, both before, and since His coming. We 
 date our chronologies "B. C," and "A. D.;" and this is no mere 
 Christian prejudice, but is amply warranted by facts: for no 
 thoughtful historian, no matter how personally skeptical he may 
 be of the Faith, can fairly deny that the life and death of Christ 
 has divided human history as nothing else has done. 
 
 Before that central point, humanity seemed to be sinking ever 
 deeper and deeper into misery and sin ; any increase in civilisation 
 apparently meaning only increased facilities for viciousness, and 
 the infliction of wrong. Men felt the gross darkness of their sins 
 growing deeper and denser around them, while their religions 
 and philosophies had lost their power to aid; their only hope being 
 in that eagerly expected Advent of the God-man, Who should re- 
 new the "Golden Age." 
 
 Then at the darkest hour the dawn came — the "Sun of Right- 
 eousness arose with healing in His wings;'' — and the path of 
 humanity was no longer downwards, but upwards to God through 
 Him. True, "man's inhumanity to man" is, unhappily, rife 
 enough, even now ; and sin and suffering have by no means ceased 
 upon this earth; nevertheless it is a fact that the tide of right- 
 eousness is rising; and that men, by reason of Christ and His 
 Church, are ever becoming better, and purer, and happier; so that 
 we can fairly anticipate the day when ''the Kingdoms of this 
 world" shall have become "the Kingdoms of our Lord, and of His 
 Christ." 
 
 There is yet another aspect, that ought not to be overlooked, 
 in which we may recognise our Lord as the pivotal center of his- 
 tory; and that is in the political and social, no less than the re- 
 ligious, preparation of heathendom for His Advent, and His 
 Church. 
 
 Thus we may instance the unifying policy of Rome, fusing away 
 the barriers between men; and thus completing the work begun 
 by the preceding empires of Babylon, Persia, and Macedon : for 
 from this unification sprang, as we know, that destructive syncret- 
 ism of the National Religions that, humanly speaking, rendered 
 possible the triumphs of Christianity; and so too, again, was 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 75 
 
 evolved that conception of "world-citizenship," that both enabled 
 the Gospel to be preached; and also made comprehensible its doc- 
 trines of the brotherhood of men, the Fatherhood of God and the 
 unity of humanity in our Lord and Saviour Christ. 
 
 And so, again, even now, may we still recognise in human af- 
 fairs, if we will but look for it, this constant preparation for, and fur- 
 therance of, the work of Christ, and His Church. 
 
 True, this is a line of argument that must, evidently, vary greatly 
 in cogency, according as it is moulded, both by our acquaintance 
 with the philosophy of history, and also by the individual bias of 
 our mind. Nevertheless it is surely not too much to say that 
 there has been, and is, this preparation of heathendom for 
 Christianity — of heathendom as it existed before Christ came, 
 of heathendom as it exists now in non-Christian lands, aye! and of 
 heathendom as it exists still, by reason of human iniquity, in the 
 midst of our highest civilization. 
 
 And here let me remark that no thoughtful theologian can fail 
 to see, in this preparation of the nations for the Christ, the definite 
 operation of that Indwelling and Inspiring Holy Spirit, Who 
 Eternally Proceedeth through the Son; working upon the nations 
 by the gift of the Logos, as He works upon the Church by the gift 
 of the Christ (vide p. 71) ; brooding o'er their discords with His 
 life giving wings, as He brooded over chaos at the building of the 
 world. 
 
 But since there is this preparation of humanity for Christ — 
 since He is this central pivot of the Ages, no less than the Great 
 Logos of the "Ad^oz," and Revealer of God to man, — since, in 
 short, He is this King over the souls of men, we may well ask how 
 He could be merely "David's son." 
 
 Surely the mighty facts of His life, and of His work, are only 
 intelligible under the Catholic doctrine of His Person, namely 
 that He — the "Son of man" — was the Incarnate Primal Adam, 
 and Archetypal Logos of God; Who for us men, and for our sal- 
 vation, came down from heaven, took our true nature upon Him, 
 and was born as Man among men. 
 
 $/^ / W&W§/§/&W$ 
 
NOTE FOURTEEN 
 ON THE "LOCAL MANIFESTATION" OF OUR LORD. 
 
 >S^HE doctrine that I have enunciated in my treatise, concerning 
 the Incarnation and "Kenosis" of our Lord — namely that 
 the said Incarnation and "Kenosis" was, in no sense, a "lay- 
 ing aside" of His Divinity; but merely a necessarily visible, tempo- 
 ral, and local "manifestation" and limitation by that Incarnation 
 of Him Who was both previously, and simultaneously the Invisible 
 Eternal, Omnipresent, and Omnipotent Logos — this doctrine, I 
 say, is not only taught by our Lord (vide St. John, iii, 13), but is 
 also something that must, perforce, be evident to any one who, in 
 any degree, appreciates the Catholic doctrines of the Triune Na- 
 ture, and Immanence in His creation of God, and as such a neces- 
 sary deduction, it was unhesitatingly accepted by all the old 
 Fathers of the Church. 
 
 Thus, to give a few brief extracts from some of the principal au- 
 thorities, we may instance the following. 
 
 St. Athanasius (De Incar: Verbi Dei; § 17). "For He was not, 
 as might be imagined, circumscribed in the body ; nor while pres- 
 ent in the body, was He absent elsewhere; nor while He moved 
 the body, was the Universe left void of His working and provi- 
 dence;" * * * "for just as, while present in the whole of 
 Creation, He is at once distinct in being from the Universe, and 
 present in all things by His power" * * * "thus, even while 
 present in a human body, and Himself quickening it, He was, 
 without inconsistency, quickening the Universe as well, and was 
 in every process of nature, and yet also outside of the whole; and 
 while known from the body by His works, He was not the less 
 manifest from the working of the Universe as a whole." * * * 
 "And this was the wonderful thing, that He was at once walking 
 as man, and, as the Word, was quickening all things, and, as the 
 Son, was dwelling with His Father." 
 
 St. Hilary (De Trinit: iii, 16). "Non amiserat quod erat sed coe- 
 perat esse quod non erat; non de suo destiterat, sed quod nos- 
 trum est acceperat;" (ix, 66.) "Nee Deus destitit manere qui homo 
 est;" (xi, 48) "In forma enim Dei manens, forma servi assumpsit" 
 * * * (xii, 6) "neque enim defecit ex sese qui se evacuavit." 
 St. Epiphanius (Adv. Haer: Lib. ii, Haer. lxix, cap. 61). kcci kv 
 Mapza krvyxave veca v avSpGoito$ eysvero, 'a\Xa ryf Svrd/iei 'avrov 
 hitXrfpov ra. crvintocvra. 
 
 St. Augustine (Epist: 137 ad Volusianum. c. ii, 6). "Et puta- 
 
 (76) 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 77 
 
 mus nobis de omnipotentia Dei incredibile dici aliquid, cum 
 dicitur Verbum Dei, per quod omnia facta sunt, sic assumpsisse 
 corpus ex Virgine, et sensibus apparuisse mortalibus, ut immor- 
 talitatem suam non corruperit, ut aeternitatem non mutaverit, 
 ut potestatem non minuerit, ut administrationem mundi non 
 deseruerit, ut a sinu Patris, id est a secreto, quo cum illo, et in 
 illo est, non recesserit" * * * (Cap iii, 10). "Homo quippe 
 Deo accessit, non Deus a Se recessit;" and in Epist. CXL. cap. 3. 
 "Hie ergo Deus, Verbum Dei per quod facta sunt omnia, Filius 
 Dei est, incommutabiliter manens, ubique praesens, nullo clausus 
 loco, nee partialiter per cuncta diffusus"; and in "De Fide, ad 
 Petr:" cap. 2, similarly. Vide also Tract: in Joan, ii, 4; xvii, 16; 
 cii, 6; cxi, 2, etc.; and in Epist: cxl, cap. 3. 
 
 St. Gregory Nazianzen (Epist. CI. "to Cledonius the priest, 
 against Apollinarius") "Who (i. e. the Eternal Word) in these last 
 days has assumed manhood also for our salvation; passible in 
 His flesh, impassible in His Godhead; circumscript in the body, 
 uncircumscript in the Spirit, etc., etc." 
 
 St. Gregory of Nyssa, who (in his "Cat: Magna. Cap. X.) 
 denies that the Infinity of the Godhead could be circumscribed 
 by the Incarnation; for that would be an impossibility. 
 
 Theodoret ("On the Immutability of the Word." cap. I.) shows 
 that, inasmuch as the Word is "per se" immutable, He therefore 
 must be said to have assumed flesh in the Incarnation ; not become 
 flesh, as the Monophysites taught: and again in the "Dialogue 
 on the Unconfounded,"cap. II., he argues similarly: and yet again, 
 in his Eccl. History (Book V, c. xi) he quotes, as orthodox, "a 
 Confession of the Catholic Faith, which Pope Damascus sent to 
 Bishop Paulinus in Macedonia, when he was at Thessalonica" 
 in which the following passage occurs, "If any one says that the 
 Son of God, living in the flesh when He was on earth, was not in 
 heaven, and with the Father, let him be anathema." 
 
 St. John Damascene (De Fide. Orth: lib. iii, cap. ii.). « 'a\V kvo- 
 iKK6a% ryi yadrpl rfj% ayiac, IlapSevoy, aitEpiypaitrcsDC, hv r# kavzov 
 VKotiratisi" * * * ^ GsLp vii ^ <s kjc' idxdroov dk r&v IlarpiK&v koXtioov 
 ovk 'artodrdvra Aoyov', 'aTtsptypaTtraog, kvoptcxKevoi r# yadrpl rffs 
 ayias Ilap^svov, , a6itopoo<; k. r.X." 
 
 St. Thomas Aquinas (Sum. Theo. Pars, iii, Q. v, art. 2, ad. 1). 
 "Christus dicitur de coelo descendisse dupliciter. Uno modo 
 ratione Divinae Naturae : non ita quod Natura Divina in coelo de- 
 sierit, sed quia in infimis novo modo esse coepit; scilicet secun- 
 dum naturam assumptam, secundum illud Joan iii, 13 ;" etc. Vide 
 also notes 38, 104, no, on the "descent into Hell," and note 119 
 on the "Ascension." 
 
 See also St. Irenaeus (Con:Haer. v, 18,3); Origen ("DePrincip." 
 trans, by Rufmus, Book iv, 30; and "Com. in Joan," Tom. vi,; 
 ed. of Migne, 1862, pp. 264, 265); Eusebius ("Dem. Evang.," 
 lib. iv, 13, and vii, 1); Proclus of Cyzicus ("Orat. I, 9," ed. of 
 
78 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 Migne. LXV, p. 690); John Cassian ("De Incar:" vi, 19; and 
 "The Seven books of John Cassian," iv, 6; vii, 22. etc., etc. "The 
 Conf. of Abbot Moses," c. xiv) ; St. Leo. (Epist. xxviii, "to Fla- 
 vian," i. e. "the Tome"); St. Ambrose (De Spiritu Sancto, Book 
 I, cap. 9), etc., etc. 
 
 In short this truth of the "local manifestation" was never lost 
 sight of, or denied, either by the Fathers, or the Schoolmen; al- 
 though, doubtless, in many cases its prime importance, for an 
 accurate conception of the Incarnation, does not seem to be quite 
 so clearly apprehended as it was, say, by St. Athanasius. 
 
 Nevertheless, whether enlarged upon, or not, it was always dis- 
 tinctly recognised as an integral part of Catholic doctrine; and 
 the opposite dangers of Monophysitism, on the one hand, and 
 either Nestorianism, or Doketism, on the other — or in other 
 words, the blending of the human and the Divine, or the failure 
 of a true Incarnation — that Scylla and Charybdis of Christology, 
 were thereby avoided. 
 
 But at the period of the "Reformation," Lutheranism, by 
 its Monophysitic formula of "nee Verbum extra carnem, nee caro 
 extra Verbum," distinctly contradicted this necessary doctrine; 
 and thus became the logical parent of such absurd and painful 
 theories of the Incarnation, and its "Kenosis," as those advocated 
 by Zinzendorf, Gess, and others (vide pp. 12 and 21 and note 12); 
 for their thoroughly " Trideistic " theory is, as I have said (note 
 12), only explicable as the joint product of Lutheran Monophy- 
 sitism, and eighteenth century Deism. 127 
 
 Calvin, on the other hand, in opposition to Lutheranism, re- 
 produced, on this point, the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas 
 (vide his Inst., Book ii, c. xv) ; and, as a consequence, Presbyterian 
 and Calvinistic theology has always retained a more or less clear 
 expression of it; although Calvin's horrible doctrine that Christ, 
 during His Crucifixion, was "under the wrath of God!" has 
 practically nullified this acknowledgment by again introducing 
 a "Trideistic" separation of wills between the Personalities of the 
 Blessed Trinity. 
 
 Returning to the succession of Catholic theologians — i. e., 
 in the Roman Communion, and in our own Anglican branch, — 128 
 I may say that even here, to the best of my knowledge, this vital 
 .element in the theology of the Incarnation, has not been given 
 in any sense, formally rejected, or denied; but simply that it has 
 tHe place and attention it deserves; but has been, practically, at 
 any rate, overlooked; I do not mean, of course, that it has been, 
 been, as I have just stated, overlooked; almost the only recogni- 
 
 (127) Yet, on the other hand, Martensen, the Danish Lutheran Bishop, in his "Christ- 
 liche Dogmatik" Tpp. 266-7], .gives the clearest and most accurate expression to the 
 doctrine of the "Local Manifestation" that, to my knowledge, has appeared of late 
 years. 
 
 (T28) Concerning modern Greek and Russian theology, I regret to say that I am far 
 too ignorant of the subject to speak of its bearing upon this point. 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB1 DEI 
 
 79 
 
 tion it receives being in connection with the "descent into Hell," 
 when such notice can not well be avoided. 
 
 But although it has been so, practically, neglected, yet it is, 
 manifestly, a doctrine of the utmost importance; for until we 
 clearly recognise it in all its bearings, and give it the prominence 
 that is its due, much in the theology of the Incarnation will seem 
 self contradictory, and untenable: but once let it be thoroughly 
 grasped and realised, and not only will our theological concepts 
 gain in clearness and accuracy, but also, as a necessary conse- 
 quence, will our vital grasp upon, and personal relation to, the 
 great verities of our Faith be strengthened and made sure. 
 
 On the other hand, I utterly fail to see how any "communicatio 
 idiomatum" can properly be predicated in the Incarnation. 
 
 True it is that many elements in our Lord's character — such as 
 His holiness, His love, and even His obedience to the will of the 
 Father — are equally predicable of both His Natures — His Logos 
 Godhead, and His real humanity. — And even furthermore; as I 
 have shown (vide Chap. V.), the said holiness, love, and obedience, 
 as also our Lord's human wisdom, partook of such a perfect and 
 inerrant character, as they never could have hoped to have at- 
 tained, were their "hypostatic Ego" not the Divine Logos of God: 
 so that, in some small sense, it may be truly said that our Lord's 
 humanity participated, to some extent, in one, at least, of the 
 prerogatives of His Divinity, namely Inerrancy. 
 
 Yet notwithstanding, all this holiness, love, obedience, and 
 knowledge were not, in any sense, "idiomata" unnatural and for- 
 eign to the humanity ; but were, on the contrary, qualities entirely 
 natural to the man ; being, in short, essential parts of that "image" 
 of the Logos, in which man had first been made; and therefore 
 wholly proper to humanity. 
 
 In fact, as I have shown in my main treatise (Chap. IV), it was 
 entirely on account of this likeness — this common ground — be- 
 tween man and his God, that the Logos was able to be Incarnate, 
 and live as very man (vide p. 47). This being so, there was, then, 
 in these "common properties," manifestly, no true "communicatio 
 idiomatum," in any sense of the term; but merely the necessary 
 fact that those things which became Him in His Godhead, also 
 became Him as very and true man. 
 
 But, it may be asked, was not the Inerrancy which, as noted 
 above, was conveyed by His Divinity to those natural human 
 qualities of holiness and knowledge, as they existed in Christ, was 
 not this a real "communicatio" from the Divine Estate? 
 
 To this we may reply by pointing out that the said Inerrancy 
 was merely perfect in degree; inasmuch as it was circumscribed 
 by the real and finite humanity — or in other words, that it was 
 not such an Absolute Omniscience and Holiness, as is only 
 proper to the non-Incarnate Divinity ; but merely such a relative 
 perfection as is, not only predicable, but essentially proper both 
 
80 DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 to the Ideal man, and to God in Man. — Even the Inerrancy, then, 
 conveyed to His human powers by our Lord, can not be properly 
 described as.a "communicatio idiomatum;" but rather as a mere 
 "communication of power/' developing the "idiomata" that were 
 native to man. 
 
 In brief, then, as I have stated on page 47 of my main treatise, 
 whatever our Lord did in His Incarnation, that He evidently did 
 as the Incarnate One, and therefore solely as man; it follows from 
 this that all the above perfections, although certainly suitable to 
 His Godhead, were yet not wrought by Him as God, but as man; 
 for in His character and life there was no alternation of parts ; nor 
 even a simultaneous co-working; but a constant acting as the 
 Incarnate. 
 
 But if there was no true blending in the common properties of 
 our Lord's Two Natures, still less was there any communication 
 of the "idiomata" peculiar to each. For His manhood certainly 
 did not, and could not, receive any of the powers peculiar to the 
 Godhead — such as Omniscience, Omnipresence, or Omnipotence; 
 — any statement contradicting this elementary fact would, surely, 
 involve us in all the philosophical absurdities of the Monophy- 
 site heresy. 
 
 But if His manhood did not receive any of the properties of His 
 Godhead, still less is it possible to conceive of that Godhead as 
 partaking in any of the "idiomata" peculiar to the manhood — such 
 as its finiteness, its passibility, and its liability to temptation, — and 
 thus ceasing to be the Absolute. This absurdity, I trust, I have 
 fully refuted in treating of the Neo-Monophysitic heresies of Zin- 
 zendorf, Gess, and Ebrard (vide p. 21). 
 
 And finally, even if we explain the "communicatio" in the usual 
 Catholic sense, as merely meaning that "whatever belongs to our 
 Lord in either of His Two Natures, belongs to Him as the One 
 Christ," even in this case, I say, the phrase must not be logically 
 pressed ; as otherwise it might imply that there was constituted of 
 those "Two Natures" a Monophysitic "third something," to which 
 the said Natures communicated their "idiomata." 
 
 In short, the theory that there is any "communicatio idio- 
 matum" whatever between our Lord's Two Natures is, to my mind, 
 a theory that darkens, rather than illumines; for if there be any 
 meaning at all in the words, it can only imply such a Monophysitic 
 confusion between the Godhead and the manhood as is clearly 
 absurd and heretical. 
 
 In making these strong assertions I am, of course, aware that 
 many of the Fathers and Schoolmen have employed the phrase ; 
 but I believe I am correct in stating that, in spite of its occa- 
 sional use, it is yet a formula that is extraneous to their general 
 tone of thought ; 129 and one that they never sounded, or developed: 
 
 (120) Thus, to take but three representative men. St. Cyril of Alex: (Scholia De 
 Incar: cap. 11), St. John Damascene (De Fide Orth: Lib: iii, cap. 4), and St. Thomas 
 
DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 81 
 
 I do not think that any of them ever attached any importance 
 to the phrase; or would hesitate for a moment, to reject it if the 
 issue were clearly drawn. 
 
 In fact it was ever, if I may be allowed the expression, a mere 
 conventional and perfunctory phrase, that was only employed to 
 evade (shall I say) difficulties in the exposition of our Lord's char- 
 acter — such as His cry upon the Cross ; — whose true solution lies, 
 not in any such fancied "communicatio," but rather, as I have 
 endeavored to show in my treatise, in the full appreciation and 
 application of the "local manifestation and limitation" of our 
 Lord, caused by His real Incarnation. 
 
 Aquinas (Sum: Theo: Pars iii, Q. xvi, art. 5), all vehemently deny that there was any 
 interchange, or confusion whatever between the Divine, and the human "idiomata" of 
 our Lord. 
 
 II 
 
 ©h 
 ^ 
 
NOTE THIRTY-ONE 
 PN THE HYPOSTATIC UNION IN CHRIST. 
 
 fT is highly important to notice that the word " hypostasis " 
 is used in Christian theology in two widely different and 
 almost opposite senses, according as it relates to the doc- 
 trine of the Trinity, or has reference to the union of Two 
 Natures in our Lord. 
 
 In its etymology, and primitive use, as every Greek scholar 
 knows, "vTt66ra6i%" exactly corresponded to the Latin "sub- 
 stantia" or substratum, and was equivalent, in all respects, to the 
 { ' dvdia" or "real being" of a thing as it is "in itself." 
 
 But in the formulation of the Church's doctrine of the Trinity, 
 both it, and u itft66ooTtoY^ were at first used to express the Three Per- 
 sonalities of the One God; the quasi-Monarchian faultiness of the 
 one expression (i. z. u rtf>66oo7tov") being used to balance and correct 
 the quasi-Tritheistic faultiness of the other (i. e. " vnodradu "). 
 But evidently this state of acknowledged faulty expression could 
 not continue; the Church, both for its own sake, and for that of 
 the heretics, must have an exact terminology; and hence, shortly 
 after the Council of Nicaea, the use of " Ttpotiooitov" was entirely 
 abandoned, and " vxodradis " given the specialised and technical 
 meaning of a "Personality" in the Blessed Trinity; its former 
 meaning of "substantia" or substratum being abrogated in this 
 connection. 
 
 But when the various Christological heresies shortly after arose, 
 u vTc66za6i<i " was again used for the relation that existed between 
 the Incarnate Logos, and His humanity ; and, in this case, retained 
 its old pre-Nicene meaning of "substantia;" for, as it was ex- 
 plained, just as the creative and hypostatic Spirit, or ''Ego," to- 
 gether with its begotten "mind," and created and material "body," 
 made one man; so the Creative and Hypostatic Logos of God, 
 together with the begotten "mind," and created material "body," 
 of the real humanity of our Lord, made One Christ; Who thus 
 "hypostatically" joined His humanity to His Divinity. 
 
 This wide difference, then, of meaning between the Trinitarian 
 u vitb6ra6i$" and the Christological " vxodratiis" must, in no 
 case, be overlooked, or forgotten; inasmuch as upon its clear 
 appreciation depends our accurate grasp of Catholic truth. 
 
 (82) 
 
THREE ESSAYS 
 
 SUBSIDIARY 
 
 TO THE 
 
 DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION 
 
 ON THE 
 
 ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SIN 
 SPIRIT AND MATTER 
 
 AND 
 
 THE PRIMARY CRITERION OF TRUTH 
 
(Dn tfye (Essential nature of 5m 
 
 r&O 
 
 'HE realization of sin — of our wrong- doing and unworthiness 
 HD before God — is one of the most persistent experiences in our 
 moral and spiritual natures: we naturally wish to be happy, 
 to be free from care, and self satisfied; and yet, in spite of these 
 powerful interests to the contrary, we are incessantly distressed by 
 this sense of culpability- — by this testimony of our consciences that 
 we have repeatedly broken the laws of our deepest nature, and of 
 our God. — The question, then, as to why we are sinners, and what, 
 in its essential nature is "sin," this question, I say, has ever pos- 
 sessed an absorbing and vital interest to earnest and thoughtful 
 men. 
 
 The earliest attempt to solve this problem consisted in the 
 theory that "sin," in its essence, was simply sensuousness or in 
 other words, the deference of a man to the merely animal guidance 
 of his appetites. 
 
 This theory, while fundamentally false, as I will show, in its 
 ultimate analysis, yet contains enough superficial verity to be 
 readily accepted by primitive thought: for the most obvious sins — 
 those whose evil effects were most evident, — were precisely those 
 that partook of this sensual character; gluttony, drunkenness, 
 debauchery, all such sinkings as these of the man in his animal 
 nature, were so evidently wrong, both in themselves, and in their 
 effects, that it was easy to think of these alone as sins, and to over- 
 look the far more heinous, and entirely nonsensual evils of dis- 
 honesty, envy, and malice. 
 
 Tracing onward this idea of sin as "sensuousness" — the sway- 
 ing of a man by his animal instincts and passions, — we may say 
 that its logical outcome was Gnostic and Manichaean Dualism, 
 and ultimately also the Nihilism of the Buddhist. 
 
 Thus, taking up Gnosticism in the first place, we may say that 
 evil having been identified with animalitv, it was natural that man 
 should be divided into two sharply antithetical and opposite na- 
 tures — one sensual, "material," sinful, and dead; and the other 
 anti-sensual, "spiritual," holy and living:. 
 
 Following on this division, it was eaually natural that the same 
 antithesis should be carried out into Nature; until the only con- 
 ceivable relation that the Pure Supreme Spirit could be thought 
 to have with dead and polluted "matter" was by means of suc- 
 
 (85) 
 
86 DE INCARNA TIONE VERB1 DEI 
 
 cessive "Emanations," 130 with their successive deteriorations ; until 
 at least a "Demiurge" was evolved, gross enough to meddle with 
 "matter," and create the world. And logically, furthermore, this 
 "Demiurge," as the maker of the material Universe, was the 
 Author also of sin; and we thus arrive at the complete Dualistic 
 theory of Two opposed Creators — the "Demiurge/' and the 
 "Primal Spirit," — with their two equally opposed, and mutually 
 exclusive Universes, the one entirely evil, and the obber entirely 
 good. 
 
 The error of all this is obvious; for, as the Early Fathers of the 
 Church, in their fight against Gnosticism, showed, it lay open to 
 the vital objection of opposing, as mutually incompatible, God 
 and His world: it introduced, in short, a spirit of falsity into 
 Nature ; making it the work of a lying demon, in place of the Uni- 
 verse of God. 
 
 It furthermore, by its theory of two contrasted Universes, ren- 
 dered any redemption of the sinner an utter impossibility; for,, 
 evidently, what was evil must remain such; and what was good 
 could not be altered; any passage, then, or transition between the 
 two opposite worlds was plainly unthinkable. 
 
 And lastly, it made the gross philosophical error of treating* 
 ''sin" as if it were a concrete, and separate entity; in place of its 
 being, as it is, a mere question of relation, and of the will. 
 
 So much, then, for the Gnostic theory of evil as inherent in mat- 
 ter, qua matter; a theory that is, as I have shown, derived from the 
 primal mistake of identifying "sin" with "sensuousness." 
 
 But from this conception, again, was also evolved, as I have 
 stated, the Buddhistic doctrine of Nihilism. For evil being 
 thought to have its origin in the material body and its senses, all 
 that gave life and being to that bodily existence was considered, 
 by a simple train of reasoning, to be also evil, in that it was the sus- 
 tainer and originator of sin. Therefore love, hate, thought, de- 
 sire, will — all things, in short, that gave individuality to the man, 
 and differentiated him, in any way, from the universe around 
 him — were all considered to be sinful "per se ;" in that they were, 
 simply and solely, instances of an existence, "material" in char- 
 acter, and separate from "Pure Spirit;" and, therefore, wholly 
 sinful in its being. 
 
 The wisest and holiest thing, then, under this supposition, that 
 a man could do was to so weaken and impoverish that sinful in- 
 dividuality, by the suppression of all natural emotion and desire — 
 erring as little on the side of undue mortification, as of self in- 
 dulgence; but holding the middle course of placid passivity, — 
 that when this prison house of flesh, now binding him to " de- 
 lusion " — to " Maya," — dropped away in death, his spirit might 
 
 (130) Which, I need hardly remark, implied, not merely Procession, and certainly not 
 Plenarv Derivation (like the Catholic doctrine of the "Bepretting-.'" and "Procession of 
 the Son, and Holy Spirit), but rather, as I state in the text, Procession with deteriora- 
 tion. 
 
THE ESSENTIAL NA TURE OF SIN 87 
 
 retain nothing of its stain ; but free from desire, thought, or will, 
 be assimilated into the Pure Being of the Universe, "as a bursting 
 bubble is absorbed in the ocean where it floats;" and thus would 
 be attained the final rest of "Nirvana." 131 
 
 But if, on the other hand, a person did not so quench the delu- 
 sive fires of life — the desires and emotions of his senses, — but, on 
 the contrary, gave them full sway over his being, by loving, by 
 hating, by thinking, by willing, and above all, by indulging the 
 desires of the flesh, then he would so ingrain into his nature that 
 individuality — that sinful separateness from ''Undifferentiated 
 Being" — as to render impossible his absorption after death into 
 the restful bosom of the Universe. Necessity — "Karma" — 
 would then condemn him to a new era of life — a metempsychosis 
 — a re-incarnation ; — possibly, if his animality was strong, even in 
 the being ot a beast. So the weary round would go on, birth 
 upon birth, life after life, until at last he would awaken to the 
 truth, quench his desires, destroy his individuality, and so, at death, 
 reach the final haven of "Nirvana." 
 
 Now all this is evidently self nugatory, illogical, and untenable; 
 inasmuch as in denouncing individuality, it denounces also the 
 very foundations of its own reasoning. For if all thought, and all 
 existence be but an lying dream, must not Buddhistic thought 
 itself be equally a lie? And if, again, we predicate the "Uncon- 
 scious'' as the Ultimate Reality of Being, must we not either rank 
 "tree life" (so to speak) above the intelligent life of a man; or else 
 conceive of thought and will as the creations and products of 
 that "Blind Life!" And finally, is it not the height of absurdity 
 to treat life, and all that makes life possible — namely thought, 
 love, will, and personality, — as if it were the negation of being; 
 and call abstract negation "the only true life!" 
 
 Buddhistic Pessimism and Nihilism is, then, I repeat, self nu- 
 gatory, illogical, and utterly untenable; and yet it is, as I have 
 just shown, simply the logical outcome of the initial mistake of 
 conceiving of "sin" solely as "sensuousness;" with its necessary 
 Dualistic deductions of a "per se" evilness of "matter," and two 
 opposite worlds. 
 
 But even further: this same erroneous conception of "sin" as 
 "material," and "material" as "sin," with its logical Manichaean 
 corolleries of an "evil world of nature" opposed to a "good world 
 
 (131) Which, as I may remark, is not, as itjs so often mistakenly explained, annihi 
 lation; but is rather absorption into i( TO rtav." Buddhism, in fact, with its doctrine 
 of the Ultimate Pure Undifferentiated Being, from Which was evolved all the fantastic 
 worlds of gods and of men, and to Which, at last, they finally return and are re-ab- 
 sorbed, in ..his conception, I say, it closelv approximated to the "Ultimate Uncon- 
 scious'' of Schopenhaur and Hartmann— that Great "Tree Life" (so to speak) of the 
 Universe, which is, as these philosophers imagine, the Ultimate Reality, and Cause 
 of All. 
 
 Furthermore: their common deduction, from these premises, of pessimistic and 
 hopeless conclusions is especially striking; and the same objections of self contradic- 
 tion, and suicidal negation, are valid against both systems. 
 
 In fact the pessimistic "Philosoohv of the Unconscious" is, in all vital respects, only 
 Buddhism in a new guise; as, indeed, its advocates have frankly allowed. 
 
88 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 of spirit," reappears in a very prevalent modern theory of ethics, 
 and "spiritual religion;" a theory that can, perhaps, be most con- 
 veniently named the "Puritanical" one. 
 
 This, in its prime origin, sprang from the extreme fatalism of 
 the various "reformers" — Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Zwingli, 
 Beza, etc., — and their consequent conception of sin as essential 
 to the nature of man, as man; so that all his acts — his prayers, 
 and his virtues, no whit less than his vices — were wholly and en- 
 tirely sin, and created as such by God; an evilness that was so 
 essential to our being that it remained untouched and unaltered, 
 even after a man was forensically "counted righteous" by God! 13a 
 
 This general system reverses it will be noticed, the Gnostic and 
 Buddhistic progression ; for while these latter reasoned from the 
 supposed sensuous character of sin, to pessimism and fatalism, 
 Lutheranism and Puritanism argued from fatalism, to a practi- 
 cally dualistic theory of sin and the world. 
 
 According to this system, then, ''grace" or "spirituality," in- 
 stead of being a coherent prolongation of, and in agreement with 
 nature (vide pp. 42, 43, and note 71), was completely and entirely 
 opposed to it in all respects; whatsoever things were "natural," 
 being therefore "per se" evil; and whatsoever things were "spirit- 
 ual," being therefore "per se" anti-natural. In agreement with 
 this view the Biblical doctrine of the "fall of man" was taken out 
 of its proper subsidiary position, and made the central and all im- 
 portant fact of religion, hiding or distorting everything else; man, 
 under this teaching, being no longer in the "ima^e" of his God — 
 a "lost piece of silver" — a "wandering sheep " — a "prodigal son'; — 
 but rather an "utter mass of corruption" — a reprobate and devil, — 
 totally delivered to evil, and belonging (in the language of the 
 Gnostics) to a world that was "vhiKff "—sensual and vile! What- 
 soever things, then, as I have already stated, that were "natural" 
 to the man — his "virtues," no less than his "vices" — were thought 
 to be in themselves essentially and irredeemably evil ; and especially 
 was this true of his pleasures and enjoyments; for inasmuch as 
 these were so agreeable and helpful to corrupt humanity they 
 must, manifestly, be totally wrong and vile. 
 
 The only course, then, proper to a spiritual man — i. e. one who 
 had been arbitrarily and unwillingly transferred by God (or per- 
 haps, more strictly, treated as if transferred) 1 " 3 from the evil world 
 of "nature," to the opposite world of "spirit" — the only course, 
 I say, for such a one to adopt, with regard to this sinful world and 
 its pleasures, was, either to avoid them, as far as possible, and so 
 
 (132) That I have not overdrawn, or overstated in anyway this horrible common 
 feature of the systems of the various ''Reformers, 1 ' will, I think, be allowed by any 
 one who has even the most cursory acquaintance with their writings. For some ex- 
 amples, see Luther [Com: in Gal: cap. 11, 20, and v, iq], Melancthon [Com: in Romans"), 
 Calvin [Inst: Lib: ii, cap. 2, §§ 1, 9, &c], Beza [Aphorisms] , Zwingli [De Provid: cap. 6], 
 Ac, &c. 
 
 (133) Inasmuch as his evil nature was thought to be entirely unaffected; all his acts, 
 even his very prayers, being still essentially and wholly sin. 
 
THE ESSENTIAL NA TURE OF SIN 89 
 
 be "unnatural;" or else, seeing that this abnegation of nature, 
 manifestly, cannot be perfectly accomplished (especially as the 
 transfer to the ''spiritual" kingdom was only fictitious, not actual), 
 yto freely indulge in them all without let or hindrance, recognising 
 'the fact that it was only the hopelessly carnal and evil nature that 
 could be affected thereby; the "spirituality" remaining entirely 
 unaffected, and possessed of indefeasible grace. 
 
 In accordance with this truly horrible scheme, God was no 
 longer thought of as the Immanent Father of Nature, loving all, 
 and Eternally working in His Cosmos; but rather as an external 
 Power, separate from all; only at times arbitrarily interfering 
 with Nature ; and then only to work in opposition and contradic- 
 tion to its laws. 13 * And furthermore; inasmuch as God was so en- 
 tirely alien from Nature and its "logoi," He ought then to be wor- 
 shipped, by His favourites, in as ugly, as barren, and as unnatural 
 a manner as possible — the "beauty of holiness" having no longer 
 any meaning; — all music, all colors, all flowers, all ritual, being 
 manifestly "natural" and "material;" and therefore essentially 
 ''unspiritual," "ungodly," and wrong! 
 
 This damnable heresy, as a whole, is, thank Heaven, largely 
 dying away; but yet we may still observe traces of its influence in 
 the objection so frequently urged, even now, against the ritual 
 and Sacraments of the Church, namely that they are "material;" 
 and therefore necessarily "unspiritual," and opposed to all true 
 worship. 
 
 And so too have we still to suffer from the "tender consciences," 
 and far from tender tongues, of ill-educated people ; who think our 
 innocent pleasures — our golf, our athletics, or our games — 
 "worldly," and "unworthy of serious professors" (to use their 
 own uncouth phraseology), far exceeding in heinousness any mali- 
 cious scandal in which they may choose to indulge ; and we, for 
 refusing such a standard, are thereby incontrovertibly convicted 
 of "ungodliness;" or else are thought to be, at the very least, 
 "shallow in our personal religion." 
 
 And so, yet again, are many of the erroneous popular concep- 
 tions of Christianity directly traceable to this Puritanical Dualism. 
 Thus we constantly meet the false spirituality that abuses the 
 body as a clog — a hindrance — of the soul, and that speaks of death 
 as a "going to glory;" thus ignoring, and sometimes even openly 
 denying, the Catholic doctrines, both of the estate of the soul in 
 Hades (vide pp. 62-64), and of the resurrection of our bodies from 
 the dead. 
 
 In fact it is not too much to say that the ultimate root of most, 
 if not all, modern heresies, from "revivalism," on the one hand, 
 
 (134) Canon Gore, in his "Bampton Lectures" on the Incarnation fp. 130], speaks of 
 'the tendency, always present in the vulear imarrinption, to see the Divine, rather in 
 what is portentous and unaccountable, than in wh^.t is orderl v and tranquil. To think 
 of power, not as what works through law, but as what triumphs over it." 
 
 12 
 
9 o DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 to the so-called "liberalism," on the other, is this essential Dual- 
 ism inherited from Puritanism. Thus, to illustrate, we have on 
 the one side the "revival" conception of religion as belonging 
 solely to men of a certain artificial nature — namely the ''godly" 
 or "spiritual" — who have "experienced religion;" — the race of 
 man, as a whole, being thought to be merely "natural" and 
 "worldly;" and to have therefore no concern whatever in the 
 matter, or relationship with the Great Father of All ! Surely this, 
 as I may remark in passing, is an accursed heresy: God is the 
 Father of all and His redemption is for every man; for none are 
 " vXikoi " and vile. True it is that men are practically divided into 
 two classes — "Christian," and, "non-Christian," — just as they are 
 into "Republican," and "non-Republican," or "English" and 
 ''non- English;" but the difference lies solely in their circum- 
 stances, and wills; and is, in no sense, a matter of essential nature; 
 for all are in the "image" of God ; and all therefore, and only there- 
 fore, can be redeemed by Him. 
 
 But turning from "revivalism" to the modern "liberalism," we 
 find the same fundamental confusion of "spirituality" with "un- 
 naturalness ;" only in this instance "unnaturalness" means un- 
 reality and self delusion. Thus prayer is made a mere emotional 
 exercise; and religion "undogmatic," and wholly subjective; until 
 we finally issue in a Christianity that is a mere "impressional at- 
 mosphere;" and a God and Christ Who "only exists in the hearts 
 of the faithful;" and is, in short, such a mere auto-projection of 
 humanity as is the "Etre Supreme" of "Positivism." 
 
 And all these protean forms of error are, I repeat, the mere 
 logical expression and outcome of Puritanical habits of thought, 
 with their "quasi Gnostic" theories of the evilness of the world, 
 and the material character of sin. 
 
 But, as I need scarcely point out, it is all radically and funda- 
 mentally wrong. Religion and Spirituality are not synonymous 
 with delusion and unreality ; man and Nature are not the creations 
 and offspring of the Evil One ; and natural emotions and pleasures 
 are not "per se" sinful and wrong; but are, on the contrary "per 
 se" entirely right, just so far as they may be in agreement with 
 the Cosmos of the Universe, and our own true nature. 135 "Spirit" 
 and "matter," in short, are not two contradictory and mutually ex- 
 clusive worlds ; but are, on the contrary, two perfectly congruous, 
 and mutually dependent "Cosmoi;" being created, and ruled by 
 the same Lord and Father of all ; this thought I will more fully 
 develop in the succeeding Essay upon "Spirit and Matter." 
 
 The theory, then, of "sin" being simply "sensuousness," or in 
 other words, inherent in the body and its senses, is an utterly un* 
 
 (135) But see pv. 60, and 66, and note 114, and mv rewarks there on the discords that 
 have been introduced into our nature bv sin. All our desires, then, may not be equally 
 "Cosmical. 11 or, in other words, equallv in agreement with our true nature: but may, 
 on the contrary, be the unnatural products of either "habitual," or "original" sin— or, 
 in other words, of acquired, or inherited evil tastes. 
 
THE ESSENTIAL NA TURE OF SIN pi 
 
 tenable one; for it leads us, as we have seen, into the illogical and 
 destructive quagmires of Dualism, of Nihilism, or of Puritanical 
 misconceptions of the Faith. It is, in short, while superficially 
 attractive, yet based upon an essentially shallow, and entirely 
 false view. 
 
 For although a sensuous act may be, and often is, exceedingly 
 sinful and wrong, sinking the man even lower than the animal ex- 
 istences around him ; yet the sin of the act consists, as I will show, 
 simply and solely, in its spiritual relations; for in so far as it is 
 merely ''sensual" — or a following of the senses — it is, manifestly, 
 in complete accord with our nature; and therefore, as I have stated 
 above, entirely right and true. 
 
 On the other hand, as I have already hinted at the beginning of 
 this Essay, those sins that are most heinous and "mortal" in their 
 nature — that destroy most quickly the "image" of the Logos in 
 the soul (vide p. 60) — are precisely those that partake of an en- 
 tirely "spiritual" character. Envy, hatred, and malice, cruelty, 
 hypocrisy, dishonesty, and lies, all these are, assuredly, "non- 
 sensual" in their nature, and belong wholly to the spirit; and 
 furthermore, as I would like to point out, the more "spiritual" 
 they are — the more they rise superior to the bodily senses, and 
 the individual — in fact (if we may use the term), the more "unself- 
 ish" they are, — the more horrible, fiendish, and devilish they also 
 become. 
 
 "Sin" then is, in its essential character, in no sense a material 
 thing dependent, for its being, on the body and the bodily senses; 
 but is, on the contrary, an entirely spiritual relation, dependent 
 solely on the will. 
 
 Referring back to what I have said in my main treatise (pp. 
 40 et seq.) upon the necessity of temptation to man, it will there 
 be seen that "sin," as a result of temptation, must be a necessary 
 possibility (but only possibility, not certainty) to him. For in- 
 asmuch as man is both a self centered, and a finite individual — is, 
 in other words, both endowed with a "free will" or "self deter- 
 mination," and is also necessarily ignorant and limited at many 
 points — he can, and must, continually exercise his essential power 
 of choice; and therefore, as I have said, must be continually 
 exposed to temptation, and liable to fall into sin; until he has, by 
 experience, attained the protection of a "habit of righteousness." 
 Apollinarius, therefore, in holding that sin belonged by nature to 
 every finite will (vide p. 18), only made the mistake (but that a 
 most vital one) of turning a "necessary may be" into a "necessary 
 must " 
 
 This being so, then "sin," in its initial stage, can, perhaps, be 
 best described as an imperfection — a falling short of truth and 
 righteousness — a choosing of the wrong path, or even of the "lesser 
 good." 
 
 And furthermore; it is the amount of this imperfection— this 
 
92 DE INCARNATIONE VERBI DEI 
 
 falling short- — this defect of good, — and it alone, that determines 
 the sinfulness of the sin. From this it follows that "sins of omis- 
 sion," and of "commission/' are only catechetically separable; 
 inasmuch as every sin, at its ultimate analysis, is, as I have said, 
 an omission, or negation of good. 
 
 This being so, we can, then, well understand how so many 
 able theologians, from St. Augustine, 136 and the "Areopagite," 1 " 
 to the "schoolmen" of the Middle Ages, 138 have called "sin" a 
 mere negation — a " (SripHdn ;", — and likened it to darkness — the 
 absence and negation of light. — And this, too, is, I think, the point 
 of Isaiah's statement (chap, xlv, 7), where he takes the chosen 
 similitude of the Magians between evil and darkness, and shows 
 it to be entirelyjnisapplied ; inasmuch as neither darkness, nor 
 evil were such concrete entities as they imagined; but were rather 
 negative relations, solely dependent for their existence on the being 
 of their opposite realities — light, and good; — for "I," the Lord, 
 "form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create 
 evil." 
 
 In fact, we may say that this must needs be true; for it is a 
 familiar axiom in logic that the opposite of a thing can be no real 
 entity, but only a negation. Thus the opposite of "white" is "not 
 white," or as we generally describe it, "black:" and so too the 
 opposite of "red" is, it is true, "green;" but this is not as the color 
 "green," but as a "not red." Similarly, then, the opposite of 
 "good" can only be "not good;" and if ''evil" is also an opposite, 
 it must therefore be simply an interchangeable term. 
 
 "Sin," therefore, is initially a "not good" — a "falling short;" — 
 but yet it cannot consist merely in this "falling short" — this "fail- 
 ure to attain ;" — for if it did, it would hardly be culpable, or worthy 
 of the reprobation of God. The Father can, certainly, condemn 
 none of His finite creatures for a mere want of knowledge, or abil- 
 ity — of Omniscience, or Omnipotence ; — inasmuch as, by their very 
 essential being, they cannot but be ignorant, and powerless at 
 many points. But while He cannot, then, condemn us for mere 
 passive ignorance, and passive failure to attain, yet He certainly 
 can for an active and deliberate falling short, and a refusal of 
 offered guidance and light; and this is, in fact, the key of the 
 whole question. 
 
 In the heart of every man, as man, 189 is shining the "Logos 
 light" — in all cases, the "light of reason," and of ''conscience;" 
 and in some worthy cases, the further "light of grace;" — and 
 from Him, too, comes that wonderful faculty of love, by which we 
 are drawn into sympathy and union with our fellows, and with 
 our God. 
 
 (n6> Vide the "Enchiridion." cap. 11-14. 
 
 (137) "On th^ Divine Names," Book iv. 8 34. 
 
 (138) E. g. St. Thomas Aquinas [Sum: Theo: Pars \a. Q. xlir, art. 1 and 2; and ia. Mae, 
 Q. cix, art. 2. ad. 2"!, &c. Vide also St. Gresrorv of Nyssa f"De Anima et Resur-" and 
 **De Cat: Magna," cap 61, St. Athanasms [contra Gentes. §§ 2-7L &c. 
 
 (i3Q) Vide note 1, and pp. 3, 3, 42 and 43, &c, of the main treatise, "De Xncarnatione." 
 
THE ESSENTIAL NA TURE OF SIN gs 
 
 When, therefore, the choice comes to a man, by which he must 
 decide the path that he will tread, he has, for his right guidance, 
 this indefectible, unalterable, and (to his finite capacity) abso- 
 lutely true "light of reason," of "conscience," and of "grace; 140 
 and also further has, as I have stated, in his heart, the instinct or 
 inspiration of "love," prompting him to do the right and loving 
 thing to his Maker, and his fellowman. 
 
 If, then, he deliberately refuses to be guided by this "light," 
 and trampling upon his instinctive love, chooses the wrong path, 
 he certainly has committed a "sin" in thus "failing to do good;" 
 and so, rightly, is both culpable before God, and has deteriorated 
 in his own soul. 
 
 It therefore follows that ''sin" is an act essentially of the will; 
 and is merely relative to what might, and ought to have been 
 done, in agreement with God's Cosmos — the "logoi" of His 
 Logos, — and His inspired "light" and "love." The special harm, 
 then, of sin consists in its disorder — a disorder that is disease in 
 its progression; and in its fulfillment death (vide p. 66). 
 
 From this it follows that "sin" is an evil wrought, not only 
 against God and His Cosmos, but also against ourselves; for, in- 
 asmuch as it transgresses the laws of our highest being — our 
 intellect, our conscience, and our love, — it deteriorates, as I have 
 just stated, our whole being, and slowly kills that Divine "image" 
 in which we first were made. This is true from the fact that, as I 
 have mentioned on p. 41 of my main treatise, a deliberate act of 
 the will, or even a semi-conscious volition, establishes, at each 
 repetition, a "habitual" character — a mental and moral groove, — 
 in which, at last, the whole being becomes stereotyped and fixed. 
 Every sinful choice, then, helps to form a "habitual" evil nature; 
 and to deaden, and finally kill, the light and love in our souls; un- 
 til, at last, the man has become an illogical and hateful fiend. 
 
 These considerations may help us to understand something of 
 those abysms of evil — those "impersonal" and "unselfish" cruel- 
 ties and hatreds, — to which I have already referred. Such acts, 
 and states of mind certainly appear utterly irrational and inex- 
 plicable: but they are possibly conceivable if we consider them 
 as the effects of a ''habitual" preference for evil, and trampling 
 upon love; coming, perhaps, bv evil suggestion from devils; or 
 perchance in some cases, even begotten bv the man himself, out of 
 the depths of his own evil- "habit:" irrational, such hatreds, and 
 such preferences for evil, certainlv are: but so fas I have alreadv 
 stated in my main treatise, p. 60) in its final completion, is all sin; 
 for it must necessarilv, by its very nature, be "illogical," or with- 
 out the Logos and Wisdom of God. 
 
 Sin, then, we mav finallv sav, in its essential character and 
 nature, is the act of a finite will, deliberately, or "habitually" 
 
 (140) Vide pp. 42, 43. 
 
94 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 choosing, against definite guidance and light, imperfection, or a 
 wrong path of life: and furthermore; as it is against this guid- 
 ance and light — this inspiration, from the Logos, of love and 
 of truth, — it must needs be also against our love, and our reason, 
 and contrary to our essential being itself; and partakes, therefore, 
 of the character of an irrational hatred, corrupting and damning 
 the soul. 
 
 From this it follows that redemption from this malignant and 
 anti-logical disease can only come to the man by his own willing 
 acceptance of an inspiration of "grace" and "love" from the 
 Logos; or in other words, by his "free will" accepting, and co- 
 operating with, precedent guidance and light: which redemption 
 can only take the form of a union between the sinner and his 
 God; which union, again, as I have endeavored, in my main trea- 
 tise to show, was, and is effected by the Incarnation of our Lord, 
 and by His Church, and her Sacraments depending on the same. 
 Holiness, therefore, can only be a result, proceeding from such a 
 Union with the Holy One; and never a mere antecedent state, 
 preparatory to such a union. 141 
 
 But to follow out these thoughts in all their fullness, and to 
 illustrate their bearings upon the minutiae of ethics and theology, 
 is, manifestly, beyond the design of this present Essay: my inten- 
 tion here being merely to expose and briefly refute, on the one 
 hand, the materialistic conception of sin; and on the other, to give 
 a slight sketch of the Catholic doctrine on the subject. This hav- 
 ing now been accomplished, let us rapidly review the bearings of 
 it all upon the doctrine of the Incarnation. 
 
 To begin, then, if "sin" were actually essential to the very being 
 of Nature, and of man, as the Gnostics and the Puritans both 
 supposed, then, evidently, Christ could not have become really 
 Incarnate in this sinful flesh. 
 
 We would be driven, then, to predicate, either such a mere 
 "simulacrum," or shell of humanity, as the Doketics, and (in a 
 measure) Apollinarianism imagined ; or else to think of our Lord, 
 like Cerinthus and Nestorius did, as the "possession," or "in- 
 spiration" of the man Jesus by God. That is, of course, unless 
 we escape either of these alternatives by making the Incarnation, 
 in the fashion of Gess and Godet, such a "depotentiation" of the 
 Logos as would make Him nothing but a sinner! 
 
 But if, again, we upheld this latter hypothesis, it would 
 logically drive us to deny His Essential Godhead ; and to conceive 
 of Him, like the Arians did, not as the "Son," "onoovdios^ with 
 the Father ; but as an Emanation, "erspovdios," and deteriorated 
 from the Pure Absolute! 
 
 The Dualistic theory, then, that "sin" is an essential quality 
 of Nature, and of man. is utterly and wholly incompatible with a 
 
 (141) Vide p. 72 and note T22 Nor, I might add, can it be the mere forensic "count- 
 ing righteous" of an essentially impure and corrupt man. 
 
THE ESSENTIAL NA TURE OF SIN 95 
 
 true Incarnation of our Lord. Let us now see if the idea that 
 "sin" is merely a "falling short," and nothing more (i. e. omitting 
 any reference to our guidance from God), and essential, then, to 
 a finite and ignorant creature, let us see, I repeat, if this idea is 
 any more congruous than Dualism with the Catholic doctrine of 
 the Incarnation. 
 
 I think not: for in such a case, obviously, Christ would either 
 be very and true man; and therefore finite, as man; and therefore, 
 again, necessarily sinful ; or else we would be forced to think of 
 Him as little more than the "quasi man" of the Doketics and Apol- 
 linarians. 
 
 But inasmuch as ''sin" is, not a mere "falling short," but a 
 "falling short in spite of, and in opposition to, inspired light and 
 guidance," then, manifestly, Christ, while certainly a real man, 
 and therefore properly limited and ignorant (vide Chap. V.), was 
 yet, and in fact could only be, without sin; for He evidently could 
 not transgress, or "fall short" of the inspiration and guidance from 
 God, inasmuch as He Himself was the Inspirer (vide p. 45). 
 
 "Sin," then, because it is an imperfection, and a revolt against 
 God, while possible to every finite will, is not an essential to 
 such a will; and certainly is not predicable, in any sense, of the 
 True and Perfect Man. 
 
 And finally: this consideration will expose the utter absurdity 
 of the modern Unitarian contention that Christ, because He was 
 a true, perfect, and representative man, must needs have been 
 a sinner; and even that such faultiness is essential to His real 
 sympathy with us ! 
 
 For, as I need scarcely point out, this assertion is simply the 
 reproduction of the Puritan dualistic theory, already exposed, of 
 the evilness "per se" of the creature ; and is as rational, to a theo- 
 logian, as the claim that a perfect piece of porcelain, say, to be 
 perfect, must needs be somewhere cracked, or mis-shapened! 
 
 But, manifestly, just the opposite fact holds true; for had our 
 Blessed Lord been a sinner, He would not have been, as He is, 
 "the Man," but could only have been a man alone; or in other 
 words, would have utterly lost His representative manhood. For, 
 obviously, had our Great Head, say, stolen, He could not ade- 
 quately represent to God those of us who never stole; and so on 
 through all the sins. 
 
 But a far more subtle, and dangerous fallacy lies in the claim 
 that sin, or faultiness in our Head is essential to His real sym- 
 pathy with us; for this vitally affects the doctrine of our Lord's 
 High Priesthood, which, as I have stated in my main treatise (p. 
 70), is entirely dependent upon His human sympathy. 
 
 In refutation, then, of this specious contention we may point 
 out that while temptation, and its concomitant, suffering-, are cer- 
 tainly necessary to a sympathetic experience, yet sin assuredly 
 is not; but, in accordance with what I have just stated, is utterly 
 
9 6 DE INCARNA TIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 destructive of such sympathy, because destructive of corporate 
 union and brotherhood. Sin, in brief, so far from making us more 
 loving, merciful, sympathetic, and human, is, on the contrary, a 
 mortal disease, destroying all love, mercy, and sympathy, cor- 
 rupting and damning the soul, and making us, in short, as I have 
 already shown, selfish, hateful, and inhuman fiends. 
 
 In no sense, therefore, is it at all proper, or predicable to Him, 
 Who is our Elder Brother, Redeemer, and Priest — "the Friend of 
 publicans and sinners," — "in all points tempted like as we are, 
 yet without sin." 
 
 WW 
 
Spirit arxb VTiatkt 
 
 'HE question of the essential being of, and exact relation be- 
 tween "Spirit" and Matter," is a puzzle as old as philosophy, 
 or even religion itself ; and yet, in spite of all the thought, 
 and all the discussion that have been spent upon it, it is still as 
 fresh and absorbing as ever in its interest. And the reason for 
 this perennial interest is not far to seek; for upon this essential 
 being and inter-relation, depend many of the primary "data," 
 both of our Philosophy and our Religion: the being of man, and 
 the immortality of his soul — the existence of the Great Prime 
 Cause, God, and His relation to the world — the origin, existence, 
 and meaning of the vast Universe around us, — such are some 
 of the all important issues, dependent for their solution on our 
 answer to the above question. 
 
 The theories that attempt, in any degree, to answer this riddle 
 may be roughly divided into three great classes; firstly, those 
 that completely separate and divide the two worlds of "spirit," 
 and of "matter," as did the Dualism of the Gnostics; secondly, 
 those that identify all being as, simply and solely, different 
 forms, or states of "matter," as did the atheistic Materialits of the 
 last century; and thirdly, those that more or less fully identify 
 all being, including "matter," as simply the forms, or products 
 of "spirit," as do, in varying degrees, the Idealists, the Panthe- 
 ists, Catholic theologians, and modern thinkers in general. 
 
 Of these three great classes, the first, or Dualistic theory, has 
 been fairly well analysed and considered, and I trust, also con- 
 futed, in my Essay on the "Essential Nature of Sin;" but I may 
 add to the arguments there advanced also the following: in the 
 first place, not only is such a theory, by its conception of two 
 utterly opposite and exclusive worlds — one of "spirit," and one 
 of "matter," — entirely incompatible with our instinctive intui- 
 tions, both of the unity of Nature, and the Unity of God, and 
 also again of the Cosmical order of Creation, and its complete 
 dependence upon Him, 142 not only, I say, is such a theory en- 
 tirely incompatible with these primary intuitions, but it is, fur- 
 thermore, totally contradicted, at every point, by our practical 
 everyday observation. 
 
 For we are constantly experiencing the close inter-relations 
 that exist between "spirit," or "mind," and "matter:" thus, phy- 
 
 (142) And, I might further add, is also opposed to the logical axiom mentioned in the 
 Essay on "The Essential Nature of Sin" [p. 92I, namely, that the opposite of an entity 
 [in this case, God] cannot be another entity Las the Cosmos is], but only a negation, 
 
 13 (97) 
 
9 8 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 sical phenomena, such as vibrations in the ether, are constantly 
 being transmuted into mental experiences, such as ''sight;" while, 
 on the other hand, mental conditions, such as "anger," "fear," or 
 "desire," are constantly becoming the originators of physical 
 changes in our environment. And yet the only possible way in 
 which Dualism can account for this close inter-relation is by predi- 
 cating some such highly artificial theory of identical, yet entirely 
 non-related movements in the two opposite worlds, as Descartes 
 once put forward, in his theory of "animals as automata." 
 
 No! of a truth Dualism is utterly untenable in every respect; 
 for, in the first place, it is primarily based (as I have shown in my 
 previous Essay) upon a shallow and erroneous conception of 
 "sin;" in the second place, it is opposed to all Religious and Phil- 
 osophical axioms; and finally, it is contrary to all that we prac- 
 tically know of this world, and its component "matter." 
 
 But is the second theory of "spirit" and "matter" — i. e. the 
 "material" one — any preferable? I think not. For if "spirit" be 
 but another form of ''matter," it evidently, then, must consist, like 
 matter, of various combinations of those same "elemental atoms" 
 that Materialism predicates as the sole realities of the Universe. 
 Yet if this be true, then every "spirit," including our own "Ego," 
 can be no such indivisible and individual unit, as we imagine ; but 
 can only be as temporary a compound, and therefore be also as 
 destructible, as say the entity of water, or of wood. 
 
 But such an idea, I need hardly point out, contradicts the very 
 foundations of all our knowledge, and experience; for the very 
 first thing that I know, and in fact (as I will hereafter show), the 
 only thing that I really do know, is that I exist and am one — an 
 individual, — with powers of thought, and of will; all my "know- 
 ledge" — "practical," as well as "philosophical" — all my "expe- 
 rience," and my very existence itself, is ultimately based solely 
 upon this primary fact ; and no theory, therefore, and no reasoning 
 can possibly overthrow it. 
 
 "But," says the Materialist, "this may all be true; and yet your 
 'primal intuitions' be false, and self delusive; for 'matter' is, and 
 must be, all in all; and any separateness, then, or individuality, 
 can be nothing more than a fanciful delusion." 
 
 To all this we may well reply by asking for the origin of this 
 "fancy" — this "delusion;" — surely it is an axiom that things cannot 
 be greater than their source, or in other words, cannot be without 
 an adequate reason: if this be true, then how, may we not well 
 ask, can physical atoms give rise to all the phenomena of thought; 
 and especially to the "delusion" of individuality and non-materiality? 
 Things, as we know them, do not turn against their causes in that 
 way. And this argument, it will be noticed, applies equally as 
 well to the "fiery nebula," predicated bv Tyndall, in which he 
 supposed was latent all the thought and life of the world, as it 
 does to the crude Materialism of Cabanis. 
 
SPIRIT AND MA TTER 
 
 99 
 
 But more than this : in thus giving the lie to our own primary 
 intuitions, Materialism forfeits the very reason for its own exist- 
 ence; inasmuch as it was, and can only be intended as an attempted 
 explanation of the various phenomena of life, and of the world. 
 If, then, it denies, as contrary to its theory, our primal intuitions 
 of truth, it both denies the very principles upon which everything 
 is based ; and also stands forth as a self confessed failure. 
 
 So much, then, for Materialism; a theory that can never attract 
 the philosopher, or thoughtful man; and which, in fact, impera- 
 tively requires many "spiritual" and anti-materialistic conceptions 
 — such as "laws," "causes," "life," and "reason," — in order that 
 it may be even intelligibly expressed. 
 
 We come now to the third theory, that, namely, which more or 
 less fully identifies all being as simply either forms, or products of 
 "spirit," and says that what we call "matter" is not "dead" at all; 
 but is, on the contrary, the product of "life" — of "spirit;" — and 
 has, in short, no possible existence, except as a phenomenon, or 
 relation of that "life," or "spirit." 
 
 This theory, it will be noticed, is capable of a wide variety of 
 expression. Thus it may be embodied in an extreme Idealistic 
 form; and "matter" spoken of as simply the subjective phantasy of 
 our own imagination. 
 
 But this, evidently, is well nigh as unreal and artificial an 
 hypothesis as Materialism itself; for it is almost as absurd and self 
 nugatory to deny our intuitions and sensations of an objective 
 world, as it is to deny our own individual entity. 
 
 But again: it may also be formulated in a Pantheistic way; and 
 both "spirit" and "matter" spoken of as being "merely phenom- 
 enal variations in the existence of the Absolute One." 
 
 To this the Christian philosopher answers that such a system 
 again implies the falsity of our primal intuitions; for if all "mat- 
 ter" and all "spirit," including my own Ego and individuality, 
 are nothing more than "phenomenal variations in the One;" and 
 if I, with all else, have only a delusive sense of separation from 
 " ro Ttav ;" then is all thought, all knowledge, and all logic and 
 reasoning, including Pantheism itself, without any foundation in 
 reality; and the "delusion of personality" is, besides, as inex- 
 plicable and causeless, as it is under the Materialistic scheme. 
 
 Then, finally, we have the theory of the Christian philosopher, 
 who speaks of "spirit" and "matter," in the terms of our human 
 knowledge and experience, not as things totally separate and 
 opposite; nor yet, on the other hand, as entirely identical; but 
 rather, if we may so express it, as two stages, or two aspects of 
 the one creative act of God, by which He is ever giving existence 
 to His world (vide p. 7). 
 
 "Spirit" and "matter," in short, under this conception, stand 
 to one another in the Cosmos in much the same relation that they 
 do in that "Micro-Cosmos" — the body and soul of man; — or in 
 
ioo DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 other words, "spirit" is conceived of, on the one hand, as being" 
 the creative and hypostatic "reality" of "matter;" and "matter" 
 as being, on the other hand, the instrument, and phenomenal em- 
 bodiment of an otherwise non-related, and therefore unknowable 
 "spirit." 143 
 
 And this, as I have just said, is speaking in the terms of our 
 human knowledge and experience; for ''matter," as we know it, 
 at the ultimate analysis, is surely nothing else than an expression 
 for a certain "catena of phenomena;" which phenomena, again, 
 as I hope to show, are most probably the results, or products of 
 "mind-will," or "spirit." 
 
 True, in vulgar phraseology, matter is sometimes spoken of 
 as a "dead" something, in which certain qualities, or properties — 
 such as "weight," "color," and "size" — essentially inhere; but 
 this, I think, is simply an erroneous and vicious terminology, 
 inherited from the dualistic, or quasi dualistic philosophy *of the 
 Greeks, and without any foundation in accurate thought. 
 
 For, looking at the subject calmly and clearly, no one, I think, 
 will deny that all we know, and all we can know of matter is, sim- 
 ply and solely, this "catena of phenomena" — "color," "weight," 
 "size," "smell," etc., — or in other words, the various relations it 
 may bear to us through our senses. 
 
 And even furthermore : our latest, and most accurate scientific 
 knowledge testifies to the same fact, by assuring us that these 
 same "phenomena," or "appearances," by which alone we appre- 
 hend "matter," are not, in any true sense, objective qualities resid- 
 ing in anything; but are rather transient states, or waves of motion 
 in the unknown and unknowable "substratum;" which "waves," 
 again, or "transient states," are translated by our "senses" — 
 those sentinels of our mind and Ego — into entirely subjectvei 
 impressions. 
 
 Thus, to illustrate, "sound," as we have discovered, is, simply 
 and solely, wave pulsations in our atmosphere ; and "color," and 
 "light" are similar pulsations in the hypothetical "ether;" while 
 "heat" is thought to be a vibration in the theoretical "molecules" 
 themselves, conveyed probably by the same pulsations in the 
 "ether" that also cause "light;" "weight," again, as we know, is 
 simply an expression for the various attractions of "gravitation ;" 
 and finally, what we term "size," and "locality," is probably merely 
 a synonymn for the larger, or smaller space within which these 
 different forces are in action ; so that scientifically speaking, "mat- 
 ter" is, as Huxley has well said, logically only our expression for 
 a certain "vortex of forces," or in the above mentioned phrase, 
 "catena of phenomena." 
 
 And in fact it is hard to see how it could well be otherwise ; inas- 
 much as the nerves, in their various specialised forms of "optic," 
 
 (143) Non-related and unknowable, that is. except to our "Hypostatic" Creator. 
 
SPIRIT AND MA TIER 101 
 
 "aural," "tactual," etc., by which alone, as Physiology teaches, 
 our brain (and, consequently, also our intellect, and our ''Ego") 
 communicates with the external world, could hardly receive, and 
 convey to that brain, anything else than motion; and that, too, 
 only in its transient variational state of wave pulsations. 1 ^ 
 
 But yet, on the other hand, we must not overlook, or forget the 
 fact that although the phenomenal relations of "matter," by which 
 alone we know it, are, and must be, thus subjective; yet they are 
 by no means such mere self delusions as the Idealistic school 
 supposes. For although they are subjective impressions; yet 
 nevertheless we did not, and in fact (as I will show) could not in 
 any sense, originate them; but on the contrary, have merely 
 translated them into that form, from impressions made upon us 
 by something, or some change, that actually is in the external 
 "non-Ego." 
 
 We have, I say, in the first place, by our senses, merely trans- 
 lated to ourselves some external occurrences. Thus, if we were 
 without the power and capacity for "sight," there would, obviously, 
 be to us no such thing as "color," or "light:" and furthermore; 
 if, in the whole Universe, there was no eye, or at least no optic 
 nerve, to "see," there would similarly be also no "light" that could 
 be "seen." Yet nevertheless, the vibrations in the "ether," that 
 we now know as "light," would certainly not thereby cease to be; 
 and might, possibly, even impress themselves upon the various 
 sensitive beings of the Universe (including ourselves) by some 
 other sense that that of "sight." 1 " 
 
 In fact we are far too apt to think of our five 146 senses, by the 
 means of which we are put into cognisable relation with our en- 
 vironment, as the only possible relation to that environment that 
 
 (144) Only, I say, in its transient variational state; for a constant and unvarying 
 force (as. for example, the pressure of the atmosphere) would, manifestly, be undiffer- 
 entiated to the senses; and they, consequently, would be totally passive to its exist- 
 ence; we would, and must, therefore, be entirely and absolutely ignorant of such a 
 force: except, indeed, as our reason might require it as the theoretical "substratum" 
 of sensible variations. 
 
 Thus, in the instance given of the pressure of the atmosphere, this is, as we know, 
 entirelv outside of our senses; and therefore wholly unknown to us; except in its va- 
 riational form of a wind; or except, again, as the theoretical cause of barometrical 
 pressure; which latter, still farther, is known to us only by reason of a "variation" ar- 
 tificially introduced, namely, a vacuum. 
 
 And so. again, is the "ether," if there be such a thing, wholly unknown, and un- 
 knowable to us; except as the theoretical "substratum" of certain "variational wave 
 pulsations"— namely, "heat" and "light." 
 
 All this may help us to understand why a constant phenomenon, such as the ticking 
 of a clock, soon ceases to impress us; for the "variations" have become regular; and 
 therefore partake of the character of a constant force. But let that ticking suddenly 
 cease — let there be. in other words, a "variation" in the "variations," — and our nerves 
 are at once impressed, and we are startled, even from the soundest sleep. 
 
 And this "variational law" of the senses depends, I think, on the primary law that 
 "knowledge" imperatively requires, first, "appreciation," then "synthesis" or correla- 
 tion, and lastly "analysis'* or differentiation and comparison; and this last stage is 
 absolutely necessary before a fact can be "known." "Variations,'" then, are indis- 
 pensable to "knowledge" acquired through the senses; inasmuch as they are required 
 for both the "differentiation," and the "comparison." 
 
 (i45> As, in fact, they probably do impress themselves now in the phenomenon of 
 "heat." 
 
 (146) Or possibly six; inasmuch as some Phvsiologists differentiate between the 
 senses of "touch" and of "weight." But yet the exact number does not affect my 
 argument. 
 
ioz DE INCARNATIONE VERBI DEI 
 
 there can be ; and of the information that they convey to us, as the 
 only possible information there is; and in brief, of what we sen- 
 suously learn and ''know," as absolute and final truth. 
 
 Yet surely it is quite conceivable that there should be a being 
 who should possess, not five, but five hundred senses; not one 
 of wh®m should be at all similar to any of ours. In such a case, 
 obviously, that being could not ''see," or "hear," or "smell" as we 
 do; yet nevertheless those innumerable forces, and changes in the 
 Cosmos, that we, in some small measure, so dimly apprehend, 
 would doubtless be far more freely and widely apprehended by 
 those five hundred varieties of sensitive nerves, conveying a larger 
 information concerning those changes, than we can know, to the 
 sensible being to whom they belonged. 
 
 It follows, then, that our "senses" are, as I have said, merely 
 the translations to us of some change, or some occurrence, that 
 actually is in the external "non-Ego;" and this brings me to my 
 second point, namely the objective origin in reality of these sub- 
 jective phenomena. 
 
 And to begin, I may say that the very fact that they are wave 
 pulsations, which we only partially apprehend, and translate, is, 
 in itself, plain evidence of this external origin; for if they were 
 mere self hallucinations, they would not, obviously, be 'partial 
 translations at all, but complete originals; nor would they, again, 
 in such a case, partake of their unforeseen, and (so to speak) arbi- 
 trary pulsational character; but would, on the contrary, be both 
 anticipated, and constant ; and yet, as I have just shown, it is en- 
 tirely upon this unexpected and "variational wave" character that 
 their whole cognisability depends. It is plainly evident, therefore, 
 from these considerations, that the origin of these phenomena 
 must be external to us; or in other words, that they must have, 
 as their creative "substratum," a real, and not merely ideal ex- 
 istence. 
 
 Nor can their transitional character be objected against this 
 reality; for while the occurrences that they represent to us may be, 
 and in fact, as I have shown, must be thus transitory and fleeting; 
 yet nevertheless, while they exist, they are, none the less, actual 
 and real : a changing cloud, while it lasts, is as "real" as a granite 
 rock ; and the rock, again, while it lasts, has as true a relation to 
 the Universe as, say, an archangel of God. 
 
 "Matter," then, although it may be, and is, only a phenomenal 
 relation, has yet, for its hypostatic origin and "substratum," as true 
 an actual and objective existence as anything can have: this is, 
 evidently, a most important fact; and one that should be stronglv 
 impressed on the mind; for upon it, as I will hereafter show, 147 
 most important issues depend. 
 
 But yet, of this actual and hypostatic cause and origin of the 
 phenomena of "matter"— this "noumenal" being, or actual nature 
 
 (147) Vide the Essay on "the Primary Criterion of Truth." 
 
SPIRIT AND MA TTER 103 
 
 as it is "in itself," — we, not being its Creators and Upholders, 
 must be entirely ignorant: and the only probable, or indeed, as 
 I will endeavor to show, possibly coherent idea we can form of it, 
 is in the terms of our human knowledge and experience; by say- 
 ing that the creative and hypostatic "cause" of all the phenomena 
 known to us as "matter," is simply "life," "mind-will," or "spirit;" 
 even as the ''cause" (and the only "cause," too, in the whole Uni- 
 verse, that we actually "/mow") of the phenomenal "matter" of 
 our bodies is our own "life" and "mind-will" — our creative and 
 hypostatic "spirit," or "Ego." 
 
 And this being of ours can, perhaps, be most accurately sum- 
 marised as follows: we are, first, a living existence, possessed 
 of the essential powers of (1) autonomous will, (2) thought, and (3) 
 self consciousness: and let it be noted that in this progression, 
 each power, or faculty imperatively requires its precedent faculty; 
 "self consciousness," presupposing "thought;" and "thought" a 
 "will.'" 43 
 
 But while this is the theoretical and "a priori" order, our prac- 
 tical appreciation of that order (inasmuch as we are not our own 
 creators) must, obviously, be in the reverse direction — namely "a 
 posteriori," or inductive; — or in other words, I must, necessarily, 
 first realize my own self consciousness ; then my thinking powers, 
 upon which that self consciousness is based; and finally, my 
 power of autonomous will, that underlies all, and is the central 
 core, and essential mark of differentiation, of my Ego itself. 
 
 The first thing, therefore, that I recognise, and the very first 
 that I can recognise, is my own self consciousness: but this 
 realisation, again, necessarily implies two sets of relations, one 
 "internal," and the other "external." 
 
 First, then, an "internal" set of relations is implied, namely a 
 triune self relationship; for/ (the thinking subject) am conscious 
 that / (as an "object") exist; and am, further, conscious of the 
 consciousness; 149 and this triune self relationship is absolutely es- 
 sential to all subsequent rational knowledge. 
 
 But inseparably interlinked ' with, and inter-dependent upon, 
 this consciousness of self, is also the consciousness of an external 
 world ; for, surely, if there were no such realization of an external 
 "non-Ego," there could be no comparison, and differentiation; 
 and, consequently, no possibility of "knowledge." 
 
 I am conscious, then, both of a triune self, and of an external 
 world ; and am thereby assured that I am an individual ; and pos- 
 sess the faculties of "thought" (in its three-fold variations of 
 "reason," "conscience," and~"love"), and of "will," together with 
 
 (148) Or. in other words, the "power of choice.'' For, obviously, without this faculty 
 the analysis of "thought" could not take place. 
 
 (14Q) All. I believe, will readily grant the first two of these relations — namely, 
 the "Ego" as both "subject" and "object:"— and that the third step !or the realisation 
 of this relation] is also indispensable to l 'self-consciousness." is. I think, evident from 
 the fact that without such a realisation, the subiectivity of the mind never rises above 
 self-delusion; as in the case of madmen, or of dreams. 
 
104 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 a sensitive nervous "body," linking those internal faculties with 
 an external world. 
 
 And having such a nature, I can, therefore, in my internal rela- 
 tions, reason, and know truth, know good and evil, and feel love, 
 joy, anger, and hatred; I can originate motion, and decide (within 
 certain broad limits) my own actions; and in my external rela- 
 tions, can both experience, through my sensitive nerves, a variety 
 of sensations (such as heat, cold, weight, light, etc.) ; and can also, 
 as I will show, translate to myself these sensations; thus correlating 
 these two sets of relations — the internal, and the external — the 
 one with the other. 
 
 I am, then, given the knowledge of two inter-connected sets 
 of relations, or "worlds" — one of them internal, mental, "Egois- 
 tic," and "spiritual;" and the other external, bodily, "non- Egois- 
 tic," and "material ;" — and from the first of these worlds (or the 
 "spiritual" one), I get the ideas of various "spiritual" relations, — 
 such as "cause, and effect" (from my will), "logical order, and law" 
 (from my reason), "loveliness and hatefulness" (from my emo- 
 tions), and "holiness, and sin" (from my conscience); — while, on 
 the other hand, from my "external," or "material" world, I get the 
 conception of an external "non-Ego" of "matter," with its phe- 
 nomenal relations of "heat," "weight, "color," "size," etc. 
 
 And furthermore: it is in this latter "world" of the external 
 "non-Ego" that I must class, as a general rule, even my own body; 
 for although it is certainly mine; yet nevertheless, as I sensu- 
 ously apprehend it (i. e. by touch, sight, and smell, etc.), it is, evi- 
 dently, nothing else, practically, than the external, and objective 
 "cause" of a "subjective catena of phenomenal relations" to its 
 own nerves; being thus (if we may so express it), like the mind, 
 "self conscious" — or in other words, apprehending (as a "sub- 
 ject") itself (as an "object"); and thirdly, realising that ^auto- 
 apprehension." — But yet further: I not only "know" my body 
 thus sensuously and "externally," but also actually and "inter- 
 nally" (although, it is true, in a somewhat dim and imperfect man- 
 ner) as the creation of my "Ego," and under my guidance and 
 sway — know it, in other words, not only in its "phenomenal rela- 
 tions," but also (in a measure) "really," and as its "hypostatic 
 cause" (i. e. my own individuality) is "in itself." Here, then, is 
 that synchronising point of my "material" and "spiritual" worlds, 
 by which I am enabled to make that necessary translation and 
 correlation to which I have already alluded. 
 
 But still further: I have this knowledge of these two differ- 
 entiated, yet closely interconnected and interdependent "worlds " 
 — one internal, "Egoistic," and "spiritual," the other external, 
 "non-Egoistic," and "material:" — but in this last mentioned 
 world— i. e. the "external" — I again perceive differences. In 
 the ultimate sense, it is true, all of its phenomena appeal to my 
 "spiritual world," through my senses (by reason of the synchron- 
 
SPIRIT AND MA ITER i $ 
 
 isms obtained through my body), and give me the impressions 
 of "order," "reason," and ''beauty;" such appeal being, in fact, 
 the only means by which I can logically and coherently trans- 
 late to myself those sensuous impressions. But although all 
 the external phenomena make this spiritual appeal; yet some 
 make it in a more striking and vivid way than others ; so that in 
 interpreting them, I cannot but project myself, to a greater or 
 less degree, into them; and think of their creative and hypostatic 
 "cause" as, more or less, such a one as myself. 
 
 Thus, if the observed phenomena be, in all respects, similar 
 to my own, I think of that "cause" as another man; but if the 
 similarity be only partial, then I conceive of the "cause" as a 
 conscious, and "willing" living animal; or as an unconscious, 
 and "non- willing" living plant; or finally, as a non-living, and 
 merely "material" stock, or stone, according to the measure and 
 degree of identity. 
 
 In short, when we try to interpret to ourselves and "know" 
 this external Universe around us, we cannot but think of it and 
 translate it in terms of our own self conscious being, and of that 
 synchronism in our body, spoken of above; and although we may 
 add to our stock of conceptions by experience, and the study of 
 the Cosmos; yet even these extra conceptions are, and must be, 
 themselves ultimately based on the prime factors of our own 
 existence, and its self conscious and intuitional or essential 
 knowledge. 
 
 We cannot, then, be aught but "anthropometric," and read 
 all things through the medium, and in the terms of our own 
 individuality; for although our "knowledge," even of the depths 
 of our own being, and certainly, then, also of the external Cosmos, 
 as read through that being, is exceedingly limited, partial, and 
 relative; yet inasmuch as it is, obviously, all that we possess, we 
 cannot, manifestly, get either beyond, or behind it — cannot, in 
 other words, think external, and superior to ourselves ; — but must, 
 necessarily, accept it as true, at least relatively, and as far as it 
 goes. 
 
 When, therefore, we turn to what is called "merely material" 
 substance — i. e. something whose phenomenal relations to us 
 we can interpret only (or at least, mcst evidently) in terms of our 
 own "material" body, such as " color," "weight," "size," etc., — 
 are we not abundantly justified in predicating as the Ultimate 
 Creative and Hvpostatic "Cause" of that "matter" something 
 similar to the only hvpostatic and creative "cause" of phenomena 
 that we know, namely our own "Eg-o," "spirit," or "mind will?" 
 And we have all the more warrant for this comparison in the 
 "spiritual" effects — such as "design," "beautv." "law," etc., — 
 that we may observe in "matter," if we will but look for them. 
 Above I have denned "mere matter" as something whose phenom- 
 14 
 
106 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 enal relations to us we can at least most evidently interpret in 
 the terms of our own bodily existence; but yet, as I have again 
 stated, even "mere matter" must have its mental and "spiritual" 
 relations — like "design," "beauty," and "law" — if it is to be co- 
 herent, and therefore intelligible: if this were not true — if all 
 the Universe, including "mere matter," were not a logical Cos- 
 mos, — then, obviously, our environment would be as unintelligible 
 as a child's chance heap of alphabet blocks; "knowledge" would 
 be unobtainable; and life, in brief, not possible. But, as we 
 know, the Universe, including its component "matter," is intel- 
 ligible — is a Cosmos; — and we, therefore, can "know" things, 
 and their "laws;" and therefore, again, can exist. This thought 
 I have already touched upon in my main treatise, in the exposi- 
 tion of the Immanence of the Logos (vide p. I et seq.); but the 
 point I am now insisting upon is merely that there is this plain 
 evidence of a mental and "spiritual" sway over "matter;" a 
 sway that is, in fact, as essential and necessary to the very being 
 of that ''matter," as the innate qualities of "volition" and "thought" 
 are to our own existence. 
 
 This being so, then we are, surely, abundantly justified in say- 
 ing that all "matter" is, and can only be, like our bodies, the 
 phenomenal creation of a hypostatic "life," "mind will," or 
 "spirit;" and that not only where such a "cause" is allowed by all, 
 namely in the case of our fellowmen, and (in their degree) animals, 
 and even plants; but also in relation to that "purely material 
 world" — the stocks, and the stones, — whose Great Hypostatic 
 Creator and Sustainer, the savage, with his pantheistic fetichism, 
 dimly apprehends; and we, Christian philosophers, who have 
 been enlightened by the Incarnation, more fully and accurately 
 apprehend, as the Omnipresent and Omnipotent Lord and Giver 
 of Life, Who Eternally Proceedeth from the "'Apxv" of the Father, 
 through the Eternal Logos of God. 
 
 But, it may be objected, is there not one serious flaw in this 
 argument? No doubt it is true that the only conceivable Ulti- 
 mate Prime Cause of the various phenomena we know as 
 "matter" is, and can only be "Mind Will," or "Spirit." But, it 
 may be, and in fact, is asked, what right have we to predicate 
 to that "Mind Will" self consciousness, or in other words, per- 
 sonality ; may it not rather be thought of as the "Absolute Un- 
 conscious" of Schopenhaur and Hartmann? For is not "life" — 
 that creative hypostasis of "matter," — in even the majority of its 
 manifestations, utterly unconscious and blind? This, for instance, 
 is its character in plants ; and it is little less so in the myriad lower 
 forms of animal life — animalculae, and molluscs; — while, as we 
 rise in the scale of being, it is, in the higher animals, still very 
 limited (so far as we can judge) in its self realisation; and even in 
 man — the creature who is, to a special degree, the "self 
 conscious" — there are still vast tracts in his nature — aye! in the 
 
SPIRIT AND MA TTER io7 
 
 very citadel of "self consciousness" itself, namely the mind, and its 
 memories — that are entirely outside of his self realisation. 
 
 This being so, then by what right, it is asked, do we predicate 
 to the Ultimate and Absolute, that (namely "self consciousness") 
 which is the property of life in only a few instances; and even 
 then, and at its best, only to an imperfect degree? 
 
 To this it may be replied that we are abundantly justified in 
 predicating the Absolute — the Creator and Sustainer — as, at the 
 very least, a Self conscious Person: for, in the first place, He is 
 not the mere Pantheistic sum of " to nav" but, on the contrary, 
 is Transcendent over His creation, because Immanent in it: 150 and 
 in the second place, we surely cannot but predicate to the Ulti- 
 mate the possession of at least the highest powers and qualities 
 to which He gives existence in His Creatures. 
 
 Thus He gives "being" to "mere matter," because He is the 
 Supreme Being; and trees, and the lower animals have "life" 
 from Him, because He is the Eternal Life; to the higher ani- 
 mals, again, He gives a "willing life," because He is the Omnipo- 
 tent Wilier; and finally, man possesses both "will," and "thought" 
 (with its triune faculties of ''reason," "conscience," and "love"), 
 with a resultant more or less perfect "self consciousness," because, 
 and only because, he is given such essential being and existence 
 by the inspiration of Him Who is Ever the True, the Holy, and 
 the Loving Wilier: in short, we cannot, as I have said, but predi- 
 cate to the Absolute the full possession of at least the perfec- 
 tions to which He gives existence in us. 
 
 The perfections, I say; and this, of course, at once exposes the 
 sophistry of predicating Him as the "Unconscious," because He 
 gives, say to trees, unconscious life; for what He gives is life; and 
 its "unconsciousness" is, in no sense, a positive, but is rather a 
 negative quality. 151 And this consideration, again, also cuts away 
 any argument as to the Absolute being unholy and evil, or at 
 least, "non-holy," because evil is found in His world; for, as I 
 have shown in the previous Essay on "the Essential Nature of 
 Sin," "evil," in its concrete state of "evil acts," or "sin," is, at the 
 last analysis, nothing more than a negation of the good, and a 
 falling short of God's Inspirational guidance ; and therefore 
 does not proceed from Him. 
 
 And as a further argument for our contention that the Ultimate 
 '•Mind Will," or "Spirit" is, not the "Unconscious," but the Su- 
 preme Person, we may well inquire what possible conception 
 can be formed of a Perfect Mind and Reason that is not, at the 
 same time, Self conscious? 
 
 (150) Vide p. f 1 of the main treatise. , ,. 
 
 (i 5 t) As well might we argue that a watchmaker could have no more perfections 
 than those that belong- to his watch. For while he must possess at least the positive 
 qualities of his creation— namely, its ingenuity, and the thoughts of measurement ana 
 of time expressed in it;— vet he surelv is not limited bv its wants— 1. e. ot lite, ot con- 
 science, or of reason:-nay ! it might better be argued that he must have far more than. 
 he has given, or could give to his creation. 
 
108 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 True it is that "will," as I have already stated, may not always 
 realise its own activity; and even the mind, again, on occasions, 
 as in dreams, and "unconscious cerebration/' may not fully appre- 
 ciate its own reasoning: nevertheless the logical crown and 
 completion of both "will," and "reason" is, I insist, a self realisa- 
 tion and self consciousness. In fact, as I have previously stated 
 (vide p. 103), the necessary order and progression seems to be 
 first "will," then "thought," and finally "self consciousness," with 
 its triune self relation, and its realisation of the external "non- 
 Ego;" and it is not until this progression has been fulfilled that 
 ''knowledge," and especially its resultant — "wisdom" — is prac- 
 ticable to the mind. 
 
 And yet again: may not this phenomenon of "unconscious 
 thought and will" be best explicable as the activities of the In- 
 spiring Logos in our souls? For from that Enlightening Logos, 
 as I have shown, 162 come all the necessary "prime data" of "rea- 
 son," "conscience," and "love" that make our existence pos- 
 sible: and these inspired "data" are, surely, essentially sub- 
 conscious in their nature; inasmuch as they are (so to speak) 
 the "foundation strata" of our very being; which only "out-crop," 
 and rise to the light, in our very partial self realisation. 
 
 If this be true, then may we not insist that "self consciousness" 
 actually is (as it certainly abstractly appears to be) absolutely 
 necessary to, and inseparable from "thought" and "will;" the 
 only apparent exceptions — namely, in the instances above men- 
 tioned — being only apparent, and not real; inasmuch as the 
 "blind thought and will," of which we occasionally catch a glimpse 
 in our own personality, are, properly speaking, not ours at all ; 
 but belong rather to that Hypostatic Logos, Who is ever In- 
 spiring us, and giving us existence; so that this "thought and 
 will" then, are, actually, not "unconscious" at all; but rise to 
 absolute self realisation in Him. 
 
 And finally, may we not point out that the predication of the 
 Absolute as "Unconscious Thought," and especially as "Un- 
 conscious Will," would, practically, be nothing else than predi- 
 cating Him as " Blind Chance!" For surely a "will" without 
 wisdom, or logical plan (both of which certainly imply self con- 
 sciousness) is nothing else than an illogical and fortuitous "force:"' 
 and such a "Prime Cause" is clearly untenable from all the laws 
 of thought and experience — religious, philosophical, or scientific. 
 
 This being the case, then surely we can but predicate to the 
 Creative Wisdom all that we mean by "personality." True, it 
 might be objected that while there doubtless is, in the Absolute, 
 the triune state of self knowledge — i. e. in the Blessed Trinity 
 of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit;— yet the second prerequisite 
 to a full "Personality" is wanting, namely the realisation of an 
 
 (152) Vide pp. 2, 42, 43, and note 1 of my main treatise. 
 
SPIRIT AXD MA TTER 109 
 
 external "non-Ego," inasmuch as He is Immanent in all. Never- 
 theless this would lead us, not to a ''Mind Will" that was inferior 
 in its self consciousness to man, but rather to a Consciousness that 
 is super -eminent above ours; such as, in fact, we cannot anthro- 
 pometrically picture, or conceive. 
 
 And yet further; while the Absolute is certainly Immanent 
 in all, yet is not the Cosmos, by its very being, in some real sense, 
 a "non-Ego" to Him; inasmuch as He has given, and is ever 
 giving to it a real and true existence? (vide p. 7). Here, mani- 
 festly, we are sounding the very abysms of being; and human 
 thoughts and conceptions fail us: but yet we are, surely, abund- 
 antly justified in saying that He Who is our Creator, and the 
 Hypostatic Reality of the Universe around us, has at least Person- 
 ality, if not something higher. 
 
 But it may be finally objected to all the above that this is a mere 
 delusive projection of ourselves and our being into Nature: and 
 w r hat warrant, it may be asked, have we for thus making our- 
 selves the measure of all things? 
 
 Well, if by "making ourselves the measure" is meant the 
 anthropomorphically giving to the Ultimate our finite limitations, 
 then, obviously, such a course is absurd. But if an anthropo- 
 metric interpretation of all things is objected to, and the predica- 
 tion of the Absolute in the terms of our perfections, then how, 
 it may well be asked, can we do otherwise? Surely we are quite 
 warranted, by every canon of thought, in thus predicating to 
 the Absolute at least all our perfections in their supremest degree; 
 so long, of course, as we are careful not to limit Him to these 
 perfections alone. This is not, in any sense, making Him a 
 man; but is merely thinking of Him as men must think. 
 
 And finally, if the correctness and validity of even our most 
 perfect conceptions are themselves called in question, we can only 
 reply that such a cavil is self nugatory and untenable; inasmuch 
 as we cannot but hold, as thoroughly valid and impregnable, our 
 necessary ideas: but the full discussion of this point must be 
 reversed for another Essay. 163 
 
 "Matter," then, to sum up all our previous discussion, is simply 
 our name for a certain catena of variational phenomena /'sub- 
 jectively" translated to us by our senses, yet "objectively" origi- 
 nating outside of ourselves; and that "objective origin" — that 
 hypostatic cause — we can, as I have shown, only coherently pic- 
 ture to ourselves as "life," "mind will," or "spirit;" which "spirit," 
 again, we can, in some cases, recognise as belonging to beings 
 who are either similar, or inferior to ourselves — such as other 
 men, animals, or plants: — but which, in the great maioritv of 
 instances, such as in reference to the "merely material" Universe 
 around us, or even the prime origin of those beings — men, ani- 
 
 (i 53 ) Vide the Essay on "the Primary Criterion of Truth." 
 
no DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 mals, and plants — to which I have just referred, we can only 
 predicate as the Omnipresent and Omnipotent Prime Cause of 
 all things — the Lord and Giver of Life, — Who both creates, and 
 ever upholds the Cosmos; and Who, possessing at least all the 
 Plenitude of Wisdom, Holiness, Love, and Power, is a Perfect 
 Self conscious Person; unless, indeed, He can be better thought 
 of (if only we could conceive such a thing) as "Hyper-Personal." 
 
 "Matter," then, is solely the product, or creation of "spirit" — ■ 
 of secondary and created spirits, or ultimately of the Great Prime 
 Spirit; — and the world is therefore (to employ a daring phrase) 
 the "body" of the Infinite God. 
 
 But yet, on the other hand, since it is this product, or creation 
 of "spirit," it is also its necessary embodiment; at least in its 
 finite relations. In fact, so far as we can judge from our own 
 experience and reason, a "spirit," stripped of its raiment of 
 "matter," would be both absolutely helpless, and entirely unknown 
 and unknowable, except to its Creator and God: this thought 
 I have already touched upon in my main treatise, with reference 
 to the "descent into Hell." And this unknowableness, and non- 
 relation of a disembodied spirit is evident, I think, from the follow- 
 ing considerations: if, on the one hand, a "spirit" could both 
 work its will upon, and make itself known unto other entities; 
 then it would, obviously, be in a phenomenal (and therefore 
 material) relation to such entities; or would, in other words 
 possess a "body:" while, on the other hand, if it were without 
 such phenomenal relations, then it would, obviously, be without 
 any relation at all ; unless, in truth, it be with its own Hypostatic 
 Prime Creator and Upholder — God ; — and possibly, then, through 
 Him, with other entities. 
 
 But not only does this law that a "body" or "matter" implies 
 "relation," and "relation" implies a "body," hold good with re- 
 spect to our own "Ego," but it certainly seems to me to be also 
 valid with respect to the Great Prime "Ego" Himself, namely 
 the Creator. For, evidently, so long as He gave no existence 
 to the Cosmos, He was utterly unknown and unknowable; and 
 even now that He has given it such existence, He, in His own 
 Essence, is, and must be, entirely unknowable, not only to man, 
 but to the whole of Creation ; and can only be even faintly appre- 
 hended, and known to be, first "materially" and "sensuously" (so 
 to speak), as the Hypostatic Cause of the Cosmos; and secondly, 
 again "materially" and "sensuously," as the God-man Who was 
 Incarnate among us; and finally, can also, perhaps, be indefi- 
 nitely apprehended by us, as our Prime "Hypostasis" and Crea- 
 tor; which last relation is a "non-sensuous" and "non-material" 
 one, only because it is creative and direct. 
 
 "Spirit," then, we can say is the necessary hypostatic "Cause" 
 of "matter;" and "matter" is its necessary embodiment, and thing 
 that is caused. This is a hypothesis that, as I think I have shown, 
 
SPIRIT AND MA TTER 1 1 r 
 
 follows the strictest lines of thought; and while it gives rise, I 
 believe, to no serious difficulties, or self contradictions, at the 
 same time solves, or at least gives us the clue to solving, all 
 that we can hope to comprehend. And while, again, it fully 
 expresses all the portions of truth that are contained in the clash- 
 ing systems of Dualism, Materialism, Idealism, and Pantheism, 
 yet it carefully avoids all their mistakes, and falls into none of their 
 errors. 
 
 Thus, with Dualism, it acknowledges the separateness of the 
 spheres of "spirit" and "matter;" while yet their illogical and 
 untenable opposition is denied: and so again, it sees, with 
 Materialism, the practical and true reality of "matter," and its 
 close interconnection with "spirit;" but yet does not suicidically 
 depict it as the only reality and existence: then, with Idealism, 
 the entirely "subjective" character of our sensuous impressions 
 of "matter" is realised; while yet the vital fact is also recognised 
 that these "subjective impressions" are, in no sense, mere halluci- 
 nations; but have an origin in "objective reality:" and finally, 
 while it appreciates, with Pantheism, the grand truth of the 
 Unity of all things, and their inherence in God ; yet it does not, 
 like Pantheism, make the fatal mistake of calling that unity a 
 confusion, and our sense of separateness and individuality a 
 delusion; but on the contrary, recognises the axioms that the 
 Immanence of God implies also His Transcendence, that our 
 sense of individuality is, and must be valid, and in short, that 
 "differentiation in unity" is the primary law, not only of knowl- 
 edge, but of life, and the Cosmos itself. 
 
 There is yet one more point that should be touched upon, and 
 that is the precise character, under this hypothesis, of the inter- 
 action that there is between ''spirit" and "matter;" inasmuch 
 as both are in fact, as our daily experience assures us, so inter- 
 acting and inter-connected. 
 
 Well, as to the action of "spirit" on "matter," that, as I have 
 just laid down, is "hypostatic" and creative. And as to the oppo- 
 site action, that, namely, of "matter" on "spirit," this we can, 
 possibly, best conceive of as "influential," or ''inductive" (so to 
 speak) in its character; inasmuch as it operates by changing 
 the environing relations of that spirit; and thus causing it to 
 act. This seems to me to fairly represent all the action and influ- 
 ence that "matter" has upon "spirit." 
 
 And finally we may briefly view the bearings of all this on the 
 Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation. One such bearing I have 
 already touched upon, when I stated that this manifestation to 
 man was the second (and as I may further add, the clearest) way 
 by which God is "sensuously," or"materially" known to man. To 
 this consideration we may also add the following: if "spirit" and 
 "matter" were so entirely separate and opposed, as the Dualists 
 imagined, then, manifestly, God could not have assumed a body; 
 
U2 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 but could only have been, either such a phantasy, as the Doketics, 
 in fact, pictured; or else such a mere inspiration in a man, as 
 Cerinthus, and later, Nestorius supposed: and so again, if 
 "matter" were all there is, as the Materialists say, then, obviously, 
 there would be no Logos to be Incarnate: but on the other 
 hand, if "spirit" alone exists, and "matter" is only our subjective 
 illusion, as the Idealists maintain, then evidently we again could 
 have only a Doketic Christ: while finally, if God be merely the 
 sum of all force, and all being — or is, in other words, merely our 
 expression for " ro nav" — and Pantheism the true Philosophy; 
 then, manifestly, an Incarnation would be both meaningless and 
 impossible. 
 
 But since "spirit" and ''matter" are both of them actual and 
 dissimilar entities; and yet also entities that are closely inter- 
 connected, inasmuch as they stand to one another as do a "hypos- 
 tasis" and its creation — a "cause" and its "effect;" — and since, 
 again, both ultimately derive their existence from Him, Who is 
 the Ultimate Cause of all; then, evidently, the Logos, Who is 
 that "Immanent Hypostasis"could become truly Incarnate and 
 Very Man; and that, not by joining Himself to a separate human- 
 ity, but by creating around Him a real humanity — mind, bodily 
 life and body : — which humanity, again, because created and 
 upheld by Him, could, obviously, not exist a moment apart 
 from Him; but was " hypos tatically " one with Him, and 
 "never to be divided." 
 
Cfye Primary Criterion of Crutf? 
 
 HERE is one double assumption that has been made in the 
 preceding pages, which few, I imagine, of my readers, will be 
 disposed to cavil at; and that is, first, that our senses are 
 trustworthy and reliable, at least as far as they go; and secondly 
 and especially, that the instinctive, orinnate "prime data" — mathe- 
 matical, logical, moral, etc., — by which we both think, and interpret 
 to ourselves the information that is given us by our senses, that 
 these "prime data/' I say, are also correct and entirely valid, again 
 at least as far as they go ; and in brief, that we are in a true relation 
 to the Cosmos ; and are both able to know, and (according to our 
 finite capacity) actually do know, the facts concerning that 
 Cosmos. 
 
 These primary assumptions, as I have said, probably few will 
 call in question; nevertheless both for the sake of the few who 
 may dispute these premises, and also to ensure a logical com- 
 pleteness to our arguments, it may, perhaps, be well for us to see 
 if these assumptions can be defended. 
 
 For there have been those in all ages who have raised this 
 initial question of Philosophy; and asked, like Pilate, "what 
 is truth?" We have a sensuous appreciation of the world; 
 and we, necessarily, form practical theories and ideas, concern- 
 ing that world, and its "facts :" but, say these questioners, what 
 possible assurance, or even reasonable probability have we that 
 these things are "facts;" or in other words, what certainty have 
 we that there is any correlation, or analogy whatever between the 
 Cosmos as we imagine it to be, and the Cosmos as it really is? 
 
 This is, evidently, a most serious question, and one that strikes 
 to the very foundation of all our philosophy, all our science, all 
 our thought, and even our very existence itself; inasmuch as upon 
 the answer that we return, depends our whole attitude towards 
 our God, His world, and our daily life. For if we decide that we 
 do not know reality — that we are, in other words, self deluded 
 by our thought and senses, — or even that we are unable to know 
 if we be not so deluded, then obviously we must sink into pessi- 
 mism, apathy, and despair. 
 
 But if, on the other hand, we can answer that both our senses, 
 and our reasoning faculties are entirely valid, and both put us 
 into actual relations with the Cosmos, and give us, if not final 
 15 ( IJ 3) 
 
1I4 DE INCARNATIONE VERB I DEI 
 
 and absolute, at least such relative truth as we can finitely appre- 
 hend, if such, I say, be our answer, then, evidently, we can face 
 our life and its problems in a hearty and common sense fashion, 
 trusting in our Creative Father, His guidance, and His love. 
 Such, then, are the two alternatives. 
 
 To solve this riddle it is evident that we must first decide upon 
 the validity of our "prime data;" inasmuch as upon these "prime 
 data" depends the whole of our being. And the first point that 
 we can make is that they must be accepted as thus valid; for we 
 can get neither beyond, nor behind them. And furthermore; 
 the only possible way in which we could even guess at their 
 falsity, would be by their illogically contradicting themselves; but 
 this, as a matter of fact, we know they do not do: and in truth, 
 if they were so self nugatory, they could not possibly endure; 
 but would speedily destroy both themselves and us: and this 
 brings me to an all conclusive argument. 
 
 When we gaze upon the Cosmos in which we live, we neces- 
 sarily think of it, and treat it, as I have already said (vide p. 106) 
 not as a child's chance heap of alphabet blocks — a "fortuitous 
 concourse of atoms," — but as a logical and coherent volume — 
 a logical Cosmos, upheld by the Logos — which we, as logical 
 beings, made in the "image" of that Logos, are able to logically 
 and accurately apprehend: it is this fact, as I have repeatedly 
 pointed out, and this fact alone, that makes, not only our science, 
 or our thought, but even our mere animal existence possible. 
 
 But let this not be true, let us, in other words, be "self halluci- 
 nated" by our "prime data" and our senses, and at "cross pur- 
 poses" with the Universe, then it is surely obvious that the said 
 Universe would speedily crush us out of existence. This, as I 
 have said, is an all conclusive argument, from which there is no 
 escape. 
 
 But, says the Pessimistic Nihilist, although all this may be 
 true, and granting that our "innate ideas of truth" — our ''prime 
 data," — are, and must be thus valid, yet may we not, at the same 
 time, be deceived by the testimonies of our senses? For these 
 "senses," as every student knows, are only our "subjective" and 
 personal impressions; may they not, then, be also delusions? 
 And if they be so delusive, then although we may have valid truth 
 in ourselves, yet how can we know it in the Cosmos; inasmuch 
 as we are not in a true relation to that Cosmos? 
 
 This is, evidently, a most specious and subtle objection; and 
 yet the same argument, namely that of practical efficiency, and 
 even existence, that establishes the validity of our "prime data," 
 is equally available here. For if our senses be mere delusions, 
 then how do either those senses continue, or we, their possessors, 
 practically exist? Under such a hypothesis, a blind man walking 
 on the edge of a precipice, would not be in greater peril than 
 we; and speedy catastrophy and extinction would be inevitable! 
 
THE PRIMA R Y CRITERION OF TR UTH 115 
 
 But the best reply, I think, lies in pointing out that, as I have 
 laid down in my Essay on ''Spirit and Matter," while our "senses" 
 it is true, do give us, and can only give us entirely subjective im- 
 pressions; yet these impressions are, in no sense, self originated 
 and delusive; but are, in every instance, representations and 
 translations to us of objective and external realities. Any "sub- 
 jective" hallucination, then, is, manifestly, out of the question; 
 and our sensuous appreciation of things, while necessarily far 
 from being perfect and absolute, is yet entirely accurate, relatively, 
 at least, and as far as it goes. 
 
 Yet it may be again asked, do not our senses, as a fact, occas- 
 ionally deceive us? Do we not hear, and see things falsely — see 
 the sun move around the earth, or hear a ventriloquist "throw his 
 voice;" — and are there not, again, such things as the apparitions 
 of madness, or delirium: and if our senses can so deceive us in 
 some particulars, then why not in all? 
 
 The answer to this lies in the accurate discrimination between 
 a "deception by our senses," which possibility I deny, and a 
 "deception by our false interpretation of those senses," which 
 possibility we must allow. In other words, what our senses 
 give us are, as I have shown, merely the impressions or "transla- 
 tions" of external phenomena; and we, guided, first by our in- 
 tuitional "prime data.," and secondly by our practical experience, 
 derived from former phenomenal impressions (and ultimately 
 based, then, on our "intuitional data"), guided, I say, by these 
 "prime data," made more effective by experience, we proceed 
 to interpret to ourselves the aforesaid "phenomenal impressions," 
 as originating from certain external entities. And in these two 
 guides to our interpretation — namely "prime data," and experi- 
 ence — while the first, being primary, is infallible (or at least, in- 
 controvertible), yet the second, being secondary, and variously 
 derived, has by no means this character, but is exceeding liable 
 to mislead. 
 
 Thus, to illustrate; we have been accustomed to connect a cer- 
 tain roar with a lion; and when an ostrich gives a similar roar, 
 we again think it is a lion; and then say, perhaps, that "our senses 
 have deceived us." But this is not really the case, for what our 
 senses told us concerning the roar, and also in connection with 
 the instances, mentioned above, of the sun, and the ventriloquist, 
 was entirely accurate, at least so far as it concerned those senses; 
 and the fault of our mistakes lay wholly in our hasty conclusions 
 from insufficient premises. 
 
 As to the phenomena of mental aberrations, the subject is 
 too little known for us to dogmatise: but yet it is, I think, evi- 
 dent that it is not the senses that are here at fault; but rather 
 the inchoate and illogical dreamings of a disordered mind. 
 
 Both our "primal intuitions of truth," and the information 
 concerning the "non-Ego" given us by our senses, are, then, 
 
n 6 DE INCARNATIONE VERB J DEI 
 
 entirely valid and reliable; and we are therefore labouring under 
 no nightmare of self hallucination; but can and do know truth, 
 and the Cosmos as it actually is, at least relatively to our finite 
 intelligences. 
 
 The only source, then, of possible error lies, as I have said, in 
 our interpretation of those senses; and this element of uncer- 
 tainty in our knowledge, and liability to error, has, probably, the 
 same reason for its existence as has temptation (vide p. 40 etseq.): 
 for it must primarily, and necessarily, spring from our finite self 
 existence, and want of Omniscience ; and is necessary, in the sec- 
 ond place, for our proper education. 
 
 One vital fact, then, that we should ever remember, is that 
 this truth and knowledge of ours is entirely relative and partial. 
 Some people are ever insisting upon the necessity for Absolute 
 Truth; as if, indeed, that could be known by any being, other 
 than the Absolute Himself. Yet assuredly ''Absolute Truth" 
 is all comprehensive — is all that is; — and cannot, therefore, be 
 apprehended by any finite mind : all that we can do is to relatively 
 apprehend truth in sections (so to speak) ; and at the same time, 
 recognise it as relative. Our God has given us but a finite ex- 
 istence; and we can, therefore, but "know" and "prophesy in 
 part;" and follow as closely as we can the guidings of Him Who 
 is the Inspiring Logos in our souls; and Who has been further 
 manifested to us as the Christ. 
 
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